[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                          FROM BAIT TO PLATE:
                       HOW FORCED LABOR IN CHINA
                 TAINTS AMERICA'S SEAFOOD SUPPLY CHAIN
=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 24, 2023

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
 
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                               __________

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              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

           House                            Senate

CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey,             JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Co-chair
Chair                                STEVE DAINES, Montana
JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts     MARCO RUBIO, Florida
BRIAN MAST, Florida                  TOM COTTON, Arkansas
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia            ANGUS KING, Maine
MICHELLE STEEL, California           TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ANDREA SALINAS, Oregon
ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa
RYAN ZINKE, Montana

                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

               DANIEL K. KRITENBRINK, Department of State

                  MARISA LAGO, Department of Commerce

                   THEA MEI LEE, Department of Labor

                     UZRA ZEYA, Department of State

                   ERIN BARCLAY, Department of State

                      Piero Tozzi, Staff Director

                   Matt Squeri, Deputy Staff Director

                                  (ii)


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                               Statements

Opening Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a U.S. Representative from 
  New Jersey; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China.     1
Statement of Hon. Thea Mei Lee, Deputy Undersecretary for 
  International Affairs..........................................     3
Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley, a U.S. Senator from Oregon; Co-
  chair, 
  Congressional-Executive Commission on China....................     6
Statement of Ian Urbina, Director and Founder of The Outlaw Ocean 
  Project........................................................     6
Statement of Robert K. Stumberg, Professor of Law at Georgetown 
  University.....................................................     9
Statement of Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee 
  for Human Rights in North Korea................................    11
Statement of Sally Yozell, Director of the Environmental Security 
  Program at the Stimson Center..................................    14

                                APPENDIX
                          Prepared Statements

Urbina, Ian......................................................    32
Stumberg, Robert K...............................................    34
Scarlatoiu, Greg.................................................    46
Yozell, Sally....................................................    56

Smith, Hon. Chris................................................    60
Merkley, Hon. Jeff...............................................    61
McGovern, Hon. James P...........................................    62
Sullivan, Hon. Dan...............................................    63
Zinke, Hon. Ryan.................................................    64

                       Submissions for the Record

``The National Security Imperative to Tackle Illegal, Unreported, 
  and Unregulated Fishing'' from Brookings Commentary, January 
  25, 2021, by Michael Sinclair, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, 
  Forward Defense Program, Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center 
  for Strategy and Security; Adjunct Professor, George Washington 
  University Law School..........................................    66
Statement of Judy Gearhart, Research Professor, American 
  University's Accountability Research Center....................    69
Statement of Badri Jimale, Horn of Africa Institute..............    70
Statement of Stephanie Madsen, Executive Director, At-sea 
  Processing Association.........................................    71
Letter from the Chairs to Secretary of Homeland Security 
  Alejandro Mayorkas.............................................    78
Question for Greg Scarlatiou of HRNK from Senator Sullivan.......    80
Questions for Ian Urbina, The Outlaw Ocean Project, from 
  Representative Zinke...........................................    81
Questions for Ian Urbina, The Outlaw Ocean Project, from Senator 
  Sullivan.......................................................    83
Questions for Robert Stumberg, Georgetown University Law Center, 
  from Senator Sullivan..........................................    84
Questions for Sally Yozell, Environmental Security Program, 
  Stimson Center.................................................    85
CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form..........................    87
Witness Biographies..............................................    89

                                 (iii)

 
                          FROM BAIT TO PLATE:
                       HOW FORCED LABOR IN CHINA
                 TAINTS AMERICA'S SEAFOOD SUPPLY CHAIN

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2023

                            Congressional-Executive
                                       Commission on China,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The hearing was held from 9:02 a.m. to 10:49 a.m., in Room 
2360, Rayburn House Office Building, Representative Chris 
Smith, Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
presiding.
    Also present: Senator Jeff Merkley, Co-chair, and Deputy 
Undersecretary for International Affairs, Thea Lee.

   STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW 
   JERSEY; CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

    Chair Smith. The hearing will come to order. I want to 
welcome each and every one of you to this hearing on ``How 
Forced Labor in China Taints America's Seafood Supply Chain.'' 
The compass, as we all know, is an instrument of great 
assistance to navigators and seafarers. Its origins lie in 
ancient China, specifically in the Han Dynasty, which dates 
back to the third century BC. It's one of the many enduring 
contributions China has made not only to maritime exploration, 
navigation, and safety, but also to world civilization.
    Yet today, we find ourselves confronting a very different 
reality in China, where its moral compass is adrift, both at 
sea and on land. Recent revelations from a comprehensive four-
year investigation conducted by The Outlaw Ocean Project have 
shed light on deeply troubling practices within the Chinese 
distant water fishing fleet and seafood processing industry. 
These practices involve egregious violations of human rights, 
including forced labor and other exploitative activities. A 
four-year investigation, led brilliantly by Ian Urbina, who 
will testify before our Commission today, found, for example, 
that ``almost half'' of the Chinese squid fleet, 357 of the 751 
ships that they studied, were tied to human rights and 
environmental violations. And that over 100 Chinese squid ships 
engaged in illegal fishing, including trespassing into waters 
of other nations.
    On land, the investigation reveals a disconcerting pattern 
of PRC-based companies exploiting the forced labor of Uyghurs 
and North Koreans to process substantial quantities of seafood 
destined for the United States market. From fish sticks to 
calamari, these products infiltrate the supply chains of major 
restaurants, wholesalers, and even find their way into the 
meals served in American schools and military bases. Such 
actions directly contravene the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention 
Act and the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions 
Act, both of which strictly prohibit the importation of goods 
produced by forced labor into the United States market.
    It is evident that the People's Republic of China is not 
the sole party involved in these reprehensible practices. 
Governments, including our own, have been complicit--
unwittingly or wittingly--in the procurement of tainted 
seafood. Our panel of experts--and what a group of experts we 
have indeed before this Commission today--will testify and 
emphasize the extent to which government procurement processes 
and policies have enabled these injustices. That is why Senator 
Merkley and I have drafted a letter to the Department of 
Homeland Security. Without objection, the letter to Secretary 
Mayorkas will be made a part of the record. Calling for a 
comprehensive investigation into not only the PRC's disturbing 
activities at sea and on the land, but also the weaknesses of 
our system and the complicity of the seafood industry.
    Beyond these egregious abuses of human rights, there are 
also national security implications as well. Chinese fishing 
vessels serve as part of China's Maritime Militia. Earlier this 
year, such vessels, under the guise of fishing boats, severed 
cables on Matsu Island, an island off the coast of China still 
under the control of Taiwan. Additionally, hundreds of Chinese 
fishing ships reportedly operate in waters belonging to the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia, serving as a 
civilian militia to escort Chinese oil and gas survey vessels 
and drilling rigs.
    More to the point, just last Sunday a Chinese Coast Guard 
ship collided with a Philippine vessel enroute to deliver 
supplies to an outpost that the Philippines maintains at Second 
Thomas Shoal, located approximately 100 nautical miles off its 
coast. China claims that this territory, far beyond its 
legitimate boundaries--and despite the fact that the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in the Hague made a binding decision in 
2016 under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea that this 
area lies within Philippine territorial waters.
    This underscores an important fact. China, under Xi Jinping 
and the Chinese Communist Party, is willing to upend the rules 
of the global international order and act in a lawless, 
predatory manner, both at sea and on land. It shows no respect 
for human rights. We see that in a myriad of areas in addition 
to this one today. And it does not respect labor rights. I will 
point out parenthetically that when China was under 
consideration and the United States was moving towards the WTO 
with China, I held two hearings on that and voted against 
ascension into the WTO. And we argued that they would change 
the WTO and not the other way around. We were foolish, in my 
opinion, to think that somehow a rules-based organization like 
the WTO would somehow mitigate their abuses. Instead, they 
exploit them, and they have not come under the banner of 
international law even a little bit.
    Thanks in large part, let me say this, to the reporting of 
Ian and his team--and published in The New Yorker and 
elsewhere--the consciousness of American businesses and 
government leaders are awakening. And certainly, we're trying 
to amplify that and we're trying to work with you, Ian, and our 
other distinguished witnesses, to try to make real and systemic 
reforms. Some are beginning to walk away from their abuse-
tainted sourcing. This includes the supermarket chain 
Albertsons, as well as McDonald's Filet-O-Fish. Both have 
severed ties with the supplier implicated in Ian's reporting on 
forced labor practices. So there's already good things 
happening, but so much more needs to happen because of this 
landmark and historic human rights work.
    And we're seeing similar actions taken beyond the seafood 
industry. Over the summer, this Commission--after a hearing on 
these issues of forced labor--the Wisconsin-based company, 
Milwaukee Tool, regarding allegations that the company had 
purchased gloves from a supplier that was utilizing forced 
prison labor to make those gloves--Milwaukee Tool took action 
to investigate its supply chain. And I and my distinguished 
staff met with them. Last week, they discovered multiple 
examples of counterfeit gloves originating in the PRC bearing 
their brand name. Perhaps they were even made in a prison camp.
    Part of that lawless behavior I spoke of includes 
ubiquitous unauthorized counterfeit goods. We know they 
proliferate all over China, and there needs to be far more 
done. It's not just the theft of intellectual property. It is 
the production of these counterfeit goods that flood our 
market, the European Union, and really the world market. The 
upshot is that Milwaukee Tool has cut ties with the glove 
manufacturer in question and they are now moving that operation 
outside of China altogether. I am deeply encouraged that the 
company has taken these positive steps. It is yet another 
example of an American company responding constructively to 
reports of human rights abuses in the PRC.
    I think all of you know, this is not just a bicameral 
House-Senate, bipartisan Democrat and Republican commission; 
this also includes the executive branch. We are really 
privileged to have with us Thea Lee, whom I've known for 
decades. When she worked for the AFL-CIO, she was a one-woman 
force fighting against labor and human rights abuses. And now 
she is the Deputy Undersecretary for ILAB. And I just want to 
thank her for her leadership, and yield to her for any comments 
she wants to make.

                     STATEMENT OF THEA LEE,

        DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,

                    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

    Ms. Lee. Thank you so much, Chairman Smith. And good 
morning, everybody. It is a great pleasure to be here this 
morning with all of you. And I would like to thank you and your 
staff, Chairman Smith, for the courtesy extended to me to come 
and to speak early in order to accommodate my travel schedule 
later this morning.
    This is my first hearing as a commissioner representing the 
executive branch. And I want to thank you for your leadership 
of the Commission in promoting human rights in China and for 
exposing the government's corrupt practices that fall short--
fall way short--of universally recognized human rights and 
international labor standards. I would also like to thank the 
witnesses for being here today. And I look forward to your 
testimony.
    I want to recognize the contributions made by the 
Commission staff in conducting research, producing reports, and 
organizing hearings such as today's. Exposing the abusive labor 
practices in fishing is of critical importance, as those abuses 
impact America's seafood supply chain, global supply chains, 
and community livelihoods around the world. This industry sits 
at the intersection of key Biden administration priorities, 
human and worker rights, environmental protection, food safety, 
and national security.
    It is clear that we are at a moment where further urgent 
action is needed to achieve a whole-of-government approach to 
address egregious abuse of worker rights in the seafood 
industry. In 2022, President Biden signed a historic national 
security memorandum on combating illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing and associated labor abuses. As shown in 
the recent Annual Report, the U.S. Government has taken actions 
to sanction human rights abusers and provide tools that help 
protect fishers from exploitation.
    At the Bureau of International Labor Affairs, known as 
ILAB, an agency within the Department of Labor, our job is to 
advocate for worker rights around the world. We engage with our 
interagency and multilateral partners to fully leverage U.S. 
enforcement mechanisms and trade frameworks to prevent tainted 
seafood from reaching U.S. shores. We are pushing for better 
governance, including of crew labor rights on the high seas, 
and we are seeking to improve labor inspections on vessels and 
in seafood processing.
    I think folks know we publish and maintain a list of goods 
produced with child labor or forced labor, based on our 
evidence-based research. We have documented child labor or 
forced labor in the production of fish, dried fish, shellfish, 
and shrimp in 20 countries, including China. Our Comply Chain 
and Better Trade Tool apps serve as useful resources for worker 
protection and the private sector's due diligence process. We 
have also dedicated more than $20 million in project funding to 
address labor exploitation in the fishing and seafood sectors 
globally.
    Our research and advocacy work has directly contributed to 
the U.S. Government's ability to stop tainted seafood at the 
border. The sanctioning of Pingtan Marine Enterprise, a Chinese 
fishing conglomerate, for labor abuse and illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated fishing, was a significant step in our 
enforcement actions. But we know that government action alone 
will not solve this problem. We need more reliable information, 
effective policy and enforcement actions, and transparency and 
accountability in global supply chains. We would like to see, 
as Chairman Smith said, the industry take greater 
responsibility for global supply chains. We need more effective 
tools to strengthen penalties and to deny market access to 
actors that tolerate labor exploitation.
    Chair Smith, while the challenges remain daunting, progress 
is possible. And I saw this clearly. I met with some Indonesian 
fishers and advocates earlier this year at the Seafood Expo 
North America. And they told me that some simple improvements 
in working conditions, such as having access to Wi-Fi so they 
have means of communication at sea, could help prevent 
exploitation. It could make an enormous difference in people's 
lives. And we have been working with the Taiwanese government 
and with others to see if we can move that forward, because it 
provides a chain of communication, and it can help address 
especially some of the most egregious labor abuses in terms of 
unsafe conditions and forced labor.
    So I'm looking forward to hearing from the witnesses today 
on suggestions on how government, business, and consumers can 
help turn the tide on forced labor in fishing. The Department 
of Labor is deeply committed to building a more sustainable 
seafood sector that respects labor rights and promotes the 
welfare of all the workers on fishing vessels and in the 
processing chain. Again, let me thank the witnesses, the 
esteemed witnesses, for being here today. I'm looking forward 
to hearing your testimony, but I also want to thank you for the 
work that all of you do every day to bring attention to these 
urgent issues. Thank you. I look forward to the rest of today's 
hearing.
    Chair Smith. Secretary Lee, thank you so very much. And, 
again, this Commission is really, really blessed to have you on 
it. You know, we worked with you, again, when you were not 
within government. To have such an advocate who is so 
knowledgeable is truly, truly remarkable. Thank you so much.
    Now I'd like to introduce our distinguished witnesses, 
beginning with Mr. Ian Urbina, who is the director and founder 
of The Outlaw Ocean Project, a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit 
journalism organization that produces investigative stories 
about human rights and environmental and labor concerns at sea. 
Mr. Urbina and his team of international investigative 
reporters conducted a remarkable historic landmark four-year 
investigation both on land and at sea, exposing horrific labor 
abuses in the global seafood industry attributable to the 
Chinese Communist Party and how this has tainted the United 
States seafood supply chain.
    I'd like to note that this reporting is truly 
groundbreaking. It's the first reporting of its kind revealing 
how Uyghurs, North Koreans, and others are forced to work in 
seafood processing plants. His team is doing incredible work to 
shed light on the plight of persecuted communities and 
individuals trapped and held either on Chinese fishing vessels 
or in these plants, thousands of miles away from their homes. 
Before founding The Outlaw Ocean Project, Mr. Urbina spent more 
than a decade as a staff reporter for The New York Times. He 
has received various journalism awards, including a Pulitzer 
Prize and an Emmy. Thank you for your important work and for 
joining us today.
    Our next distinguished witness is Professor Robert 
Stumberg, a professor of law at a place not too far from here, 
Georgetown University. He directs the university's Harrison 
Institute for Public Law, which often works with public 
officials and coalitions on health and food, trade policy, and 
human rights for workers. He's published several pieces, 
incisive pieces, including one titled ``Turning a Blind Eye: 
Respecting Human Rights in Government Purchasing.'' Professor, 
we look forward to learning more about U.S. Government 
procurement and much more from you today, which will help guide 
us as we try to weigh in very strongly on this important issue. 
Thank you.
    We're also joined by longtime friend Greg Scarlatoiu, the 
executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North 
Korea. He's testified before this Commission on multiple 
occasions from as early as 2012, and before the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs as well, when I was the chair of the 
Subcommittee on Africa and the Subcommittee on Global Health, 
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations. Mr. 
Scarlatoiu brings a wealth of knowledge of the plight of North 
Koreans, including extensive insight on North Korean forced 
labor in both China and in Russia. Many of us who have met him 
before are so impressed with his work, and that's why we 
couldn't wait to have him back here today to give us his 
counsel and insight.
    Finally, I'd like to welcome Sally Yozell, the director of 
the Environmental Security Program at the Stimson Center, where 
she leads a team that conducts research and develops global 
security strategies to combat illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing, put an end to forced labor and human 
rights abuses in the seafood industry, and work to increase 
transparency throughout the seafood supply chain.
    While this is her first time as a witness before this 
Commission--and it won't be the last--she is not a stranger to 
Congress. As a matter of fact, she testified not too long ago 
for the House Natural Resources Committee to discuss full 
seafood traceability and how to stop Russian seafood, or 
``Putin's pollock,'' from entering our borders. I fully agree 
with their views that American consumers do not want, and 
should not buy, seafood caught illegally or linked to labor and 
human rights abuses. Again, thank you for your landmark work as 
well.
    We are joined, of course, by our very distinguished Co-
chair, Senator Merkley. And I yield him such time as he may 
consume.

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON; CO-
       CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for 
convening this hearing, which builds on several hearings this 
Commission has held on topics such as the implementation of the 
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, the plight of North Korean 
refugees in China, the aggressive long arm of the Chinese 
government, and the importance of holding American corporations 
to account when they are complicit in human rights abuse. I'm 
going to suggest that I put the balance of my statement in the 
record, given the limited time that you have to be here, and 
the desire to get right to the testimony. I'd rather jump right 
in.
    Chair Smith. Thank you, Senator Merkley.
    Mr. Urbina.

                    STATEMENT OF IAN URBINA,
         DIRECTOR AND FOUNDER, THE OUTLAW OCEAN PROJECT

    Mr. Urbina. Thank you to Chairman Smith and Chairman 
Merkley. And thank you to the rest of the Commission for 
inviting me to speak. I'll briefly talk about a four-year 
investigation that my news organization, The Outlaw Ocean 
Project, conducted in collaboration with The New Yorker, 
focusing on China's role in human rights and environmental 
concerns tied to the world's seafood supply chain.
    Seafood is a distinct global commodity. It is the world's 
last major source of wild protein. It is the largest globally 
traded food commodity by value. Seafood is also harder to track 
than many other products. It is typically harvested offshore, 
often on the high seas, where there is limited national 
jurisdiction and little enforcement of what few murky rules 
exist. Labor spot checks on ships at sea are rare. These 
workplaces stay in constant motion. Deckhands are often 
undocumented. They tend to come from poorer nations. Their 
access to political capital and legal recourse in the form, 
say, of lawyers, advocates, journalists, or unions, is minimal.
    And between bait and plate there are an inordinate number 
of handoffs of this product. It goes from fishing ship to 
refrigeration ship, to port, to processor, to cold storage, to 
exporter, to U.S. importer, to distributor or food service 
company, and then, finally, to restaurant, grocery store, or 
public food pantry, military base, or public school. These many 
handoffs make it tougher to trace the true origin of the catch 
and to ensure that there is no forced labor or other 
environmental crimes in the supply chain. Worse still, the few 
auditing entities that exist, what certification regimes that 
have emerged in the private sector, whether they focus on 
environmental or labor concerns, do a very poor job even at 
identifying and countering such crimes in these supply chains.
    China plays a unique role. It is the undisputed superpower 
of seafood because its distant water fishing fleet, which is to 
say those vessels in foreign or international waters, is vastly 
bigger than that of any other country. So too is China's 
processing capacity. Even seafood caught by U.S.-flagged ships 
in our own waters is often shipped to China to be cleaned, cut, 
and packaged before being sent back to American consumers. 
China matters, and was the focus of our investigation--not just 
because it is the global linchpin of seafood production, but 
also because China is the most opaque of settings, the most 
prone to illegal fishing practices, and, we've come to find 
out, the most dependent on forced labor when it comes to 
seafood.
    This forced labor occurs in two distinct realms: at sea and 
on land--on the fishing ships and in the processing plants. At 
sea, the problem of forced labor is endemic and varied. Debt 
bondage, human trafficking, beating of crew, criminal neglect 
in the form of beriberi, passport confiscation, wage 
withholding, denial of timely access to medical care, death 
from violence. We found a widespread pattern on Chinese ships. 
The investigation revealed that almost half of the Chinese 
fleet, 357 of the 751 ships we studied, were tied to human 
rights or environmental violations.
    On land, the problem of forced labor is deep and 
consistent, especially after the start of the global pandemic 
led to severe labor and logistical and supply chain problems in 
China. The government there began helping its massive seafood 
industry keep production and exports up and running. It did so 
by moving thousands of workers across the country from 
Xinjiang, a landlocked and subjugated region in the far west, 
to Shandong, a coastal eastern province in the far east, where 
much of the seafood infrastructure is based.
    Most of the global seafood industry is impacted. The 
investigation found that since 2018, more than a thousand 
workers from Xinjiang have been forcibly relocated to at least 
ten seafood processing plants in Shandong that supply dozens of 
major U.S. seafood brands, as well as brands in at least twenty 
other countries. I need not tell this Commission about China's 
labor transfer programs and the ways in which this state-run 
effort has been legally defined as state-sponsored forced labor 
because the ethnic minorities pressed into service do not have 
an option to say no to these jobs.
    I also do not need to remind this Commission that under the 
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, there are very clear and 
strict prohibitions of any products in part or whole being 
imported to the U.S. that rely on Xinjiang labor. Lastly, I do 
not need to tell the people gathered here that if credible 
evidence is brought forward, as I think our investigation has, 
indicating the existence of Xinjiang labor in a particular 
supply chain, then this federal law, the UFLPA, puts the onus 
on industry, on the companies themselves, to prove that they do 
not in fact have Uyghurs or other ethnic minority Xinjiang 
labor tied to their products. And until they do, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection is supposed to block shipments of this 
import.
    U.S. companies responding by simply saying that their 
partners in China at the plants have reassured them that no 
forced labor exists in their plants is probably not sufficient 
evidence that they are free from forced labor. Similarly, 
relying on social or marine auditing firms that inspected these 
plants but, by their own admission, were not actually looking 
for the presence of Xinjiang workers, is not sufficient 
evidence that they are free from forced labor. The Chinese 
seafood industry and the government have already responded that 
using Xinjiang workers is not illegal under Chinese law and 
that the use of these workers does not constitute forced labor 
because they receive proper living conditions, a salary, 
vocational training, and fair treatment.
    But U.S. seafood companies need to understand that this 
misses the point. Under U.S. law, any use of Xinjiang workers 
is deemed illegal because it occurs in the context of a larger 
government-run and coercive program, and whether these workers 
are paid or they tell auditors or the state media that they are 
happy to have the job is not relevant. Think here for 
comparison of the use of child laborers in other countries, 
which may be legal or defined distinctly in those nations, but 
regardless of their laws it is not legal for those products to 
come into the U.S.
    As an aside, I will mention that I am intentionally 
refraining, for the time being, from discussing an additional 
set of processing plants in China that our investigation found 
tied to U.S. seafood importers and that rely on another form of 
state-sponsored forced labor, namely North Korean workers. As 
you know, imports to the U.S. associated with this demographic 
of forced labor is also strictly prohibited by federal law. We 
will soon publish more of those findings about this topic.
    But for now, I will humbly encourage the public to take a 
deep look at the broken nature of the labor auditing of the 
seafood industry and why seafood companies have been allowed 
for too long to operate in a place where they have culpable 
deniability, because to operate there they have to agree to not 
look too hard at thorny issues like human rights. In fairness 
to the industry, the world was not previously aware of how much 
Xinjiang labor had tainted the global seafood supply chain. The 
world was also not aware of how pervasive forced labor on 
Chinese fishing ships is as well.
    That moment has now passed. We now see that hundreds of 
seafood companies are tied to these Chinese ships and these 
Chinese factories. The question is, what will industry and 
government do about it? The laws on the matter, at least in the 
U.S., are pretty clear. The issue is whether they will be 
enforced. Thank you for your time today.
    Chair Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Urbina, for that.
    I'd like to now recognize Mr. Stumberg.

               STATEMENT OF ROBERT K. STUMBERG, 
            PROFESSOR OF LAW, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

    Mr. Stumberg. Good morning, and thank you for this 
opportunity to talk about four questions. Number one, which 
U.S. Government agencies purchase seafood? Number two, is the 
Buy American Act an effective antidote to purchasing seafood 
that is tainted by forced labor? Number three, there's a 
prohibition on purchasing goods made with forced labor in the 
U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation (The FAR). Is it effective? 
And number four, what's on the to-do list for fixing any gaps 
in these other laws? I've given you a relatively technical to-
do list, which we certainly will not cover in today's 
conversation, but I'm happy to respond to any questions you 
might have about it.
    Which agencies? It's a relatively small world in the 
context of seafood. The U.S. Department of Agriculture and the 
Defense Department far surpass the other agencies that purchase 
seafood, including the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the 
Department of Justice, the Veterans Administration, and others. 
Ian's team identified about $200 million over a five-year 
period, which is certainly a conservative estimate. But that's 
a very solid baseline number that could easily be double or 
triple, if only better data were available.
    It's interesting--when you look at who these agencies buy 
from, USDA buys from companies that are themselves importers. 
Almost all the purchasing for commodity programs is from three 
importers. Defense, on the other hand, buys from companies that 
are the two largest food service distributors in the United 
States, U.S. Foods and Cisco. They, in turn, buy from the 
importers. Two facts make that interesting.
    Fact one, these two largest distribution companies are 
enormous. Cisco, for example, has $68 billion in annual 
revenue. Compare that to a couple million dollars in federal 
contracting. It's just a blip on the scale of their revenue 
scheme. But there's an opportunity to focus on procurement, 
that tiny percentage, as the tail that might wag the dog. That 
is because the same company is also obligated to comply with 
the Tariff Act and its broad prohibition on any imports tainted 
by forced labor. So you see the connection between the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation and government purchasing on the one 
hand, and the Tariff Act, which is the foundation for the 
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.
    When Ian's team asked USDA to comment on his reporting, he 
got a very interesting answer, which was, first, we're 
obligated to buy American only--both U.S.-caught fish and U.S.-
processed fish, in terms of our purchasing. And second, it's 
audited by NOAA. And they said they do on-site audits. The 
Federal Acquisition Regulation has three exceptions to Buy 
American. One of them is if the supply isn't available. The 
second is if the domestic prices are unreasonable, with a 
litmus test to 20 percent compared to foreign prices. And the 
third is, goods that are intended for resale, i.e., not for 
public feeding programs like the national school lunch program. 
The resale exemption applies to a military commissary or a 
government cafeteria.
    Those are the three exceptions. And you then have to ask 
this question. If the USDA's answer is that they audit domestic 
processing, they've excluded foreign sources from auditing. So 
they presented a kind of Catch-22 on their own answer to the 
question that Ian posed. I presume that most of their 
purchasing probably does comply with the Buy American Act. And 
yet, is there enough of a loophole here, legally authorized 
under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, for them to buy based 
on these exceptions?
    Let's think about auditing for a second. They say they do 
on-site auditing, but what's the site? Audits are often 
typically based in companies' corporate headquarters. They say 
they do on-site audits for processing but, again, the 
headquarters of an audit of a processing company may be 
different from the actual facility of the company. And so it 
raises as many questions as it answers in terms of whether the 
answer that Ian got is actually a clear explanation of the way 
they do business.
    And then, of course, there's a possibility that they do 
perfectly comply with Buy American. These are big companies. 
And so they could make sure that they are segregating their 
sources for U.S. Government contracts, while on the other hand 
for all of their other customers--practically every major 
grocery chain in the United States and most institutional 
purchasers, governments, universities, that huge market--they 
are sourcing in Chinese processing facilities that used forced 
labor. So that's possible too. But then it reveals the need for 
a more comprehensive strategy for transparency, which simply 
does not exist.
    I'm pretty much at the end of my time. That's the big 
picture. What's on the to-do list? I'll give you the broad 
categories. And we can talk about details if you're interested, 
either today or later. Number one, plug the gaps in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation. The exceptions that I told you about--
--
    Chair Smith. With new law or through any kind of 
administrative action, or both?
    Mr. Stumberg. Could be either.
    Chair Smith. Okay.
    Mr. Stumberg. Every piece of the FAR, the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation, can be traced back to an act of 
Congress. If you try to amend the FAR, you have to go through 
an elaborate rulemaking process under a council that's chaired 
by the Office of Management and Budget, which is where 
progressive regulations go to get sick and die. On the other 
hand, Congress isn't exactly a model of democratic efficiency 
these days either. But everything can be traced back to laws 
such as the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, which is the 
law that contains the prohibition on purchasing goods made with 
forced labor, and the UFLPA, which is not synced with 
procurement at all. The opportunity to sync the UFLPA, which is 
run by the border control agency, and procurement is an 
enormous opportunity. And there's no connection whatsoever at 
this point.
    And I should just say, in passing, that it's common for 
government agencies of this scale, particularly when dealing 
with new laws like the UFLPA, not to be connected to each 
other. I mean, 9/11 was the story of agencies not connecting to 
each other, so we all have learned a very painful lesson. The 
U.S. Government does not have a strategy for monitoring or 
policing human rights in its procurement, governmentwide. The 
UFLPA contains the DNA, if I may say, for a governmentwide 
strategy that's narrowly focused on Xinjiang-sourced goods.
    There are interesting concepts and inventions in the UFLPA 
and in CBP's implementation of it. You could take that DNA, 
extract it, and plug it into the procurement system. And you 
would end up with something that looks like a SWAT team of 
lawyers, auditors, and guys that like to wear sweat suits and 
jump on boats and, you know, chase around the ocean and do real 
investigative work on behalf of the American people. That could 
be a model for how that works.
    The United States Government doesn't have it. Some smaller 
progressive governments around the world do. Swedish counties, 
for example, pool their resources for that kind of SWAT team to 
support all of their counties, which do most of the purchasing 
for governments in that country. Another example is that there 
are about 900 universities and government entities in Europe 
that have pooled their resources for electronics purchasing, 
which are also subject to forced labor, much of it from China. 
So for that industry, they pooled their resources through a 
monitoring entity called Electronics Watch. Electronics Watch, 
in turn, is based on the model of the Worker Rights Consortium.
    So there are models out there that the U.S. Government 
could learn from and incorporate into its strategy. What better 
place to start than with seafood as a test case to build that 
strategy and then expand it to other sectors?
    Chair Smith. Thank you so much. I'm going to have to leave 
for a few moments. We have a vote going on the Speaker's--talk 
about dysfunction--Speaker's race. So I will go vote and then 
come right back. But, obviously, you're in great hands with Co-
chair Merkley.
    Co-chair Merkley. Well, thank you very much for your 
testimony. And we'll just proceed.

                 STATEMENT OF GREG SCARLATOIU,

         EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

                         IN NORTH KOREA

    Mr. Scarlatoiu. Chairman Smith and Chairman Merkley, thank 
you for inviting me to testify this morning. Deputy 
Undersecretary Lee, it's an honor to meet you this morning.
    The official dispatch of North Korean workers to China's 
seafood processing plants is a breach of applicable U.N. 
Security Council sanctions, international human rights 
instruments, and, most importantly, our own CAATSA. Mindful of 
CAATSA provisions relating to sanctions for forced labor and 
slavery overseas of North Koreans, my organization, HRNK, has 
conducted a preliminary investigation into whether the working 
conditions these workers face are subject to Section 302(b) of 
the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016. 
We further endeavored to identify Chinese entities that employ 
North Korean laborers, with the aim of determining if such 
entities and individuals in charge meet the criteria under 
Section 111 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.
    Until their repatriation began on August 23rd or the 29th, 
there were thousands of North Korean workers officially 
dispatched to Chinese seafood processing factories. In many 
cases, these workers process seafood imported from North Korea. 
The importation of seafood processed by North Korean workers in 
China, seafood exported from North Korea to China, or a 
combination of both into the United States would constitute a 
blatant violation of CAATSA. Three major seafood processing 
companies have historically employed North Korean labor and 
have exported their products to the United States. Witnesses 
mentioned the presence of at least three seafood processing 
factories that employ North Korean workers in Donggang, Dandong 
City.
    North Korean seafood exported to China from Rajin Port is 
primarily transported overland by vehicles through Chinese 
customs. It is then distributed and sold in China's Yanbian 
Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin Province, or flown into 
inland cities, including Beijing. Seafood processed in Hunchun 
is exported as frozen or dried food to the United States, 
Europe, Japan, and other countries.
    The main North Korean seafood products transported inland 
in this manner include various species of squid, croaker, snow 
crab, hair crab, and blue crab. North Korean workers process 
fish caught seasonally, such as cod and pollock, as well as 
clams during clam season. They also process octopus and 
shellfish packaged as Chinese export products.
    There are reported instances of processed seafood marked 
``made in China'' being shipped out to Vladivostok, where 
labels are switched to ``made in Russia'' and exported to third 
countries.
    The employment of North Korean workers in Chinese seafood 
processing plants and labor standards violations may contravene 
the ILO's Forced Labour Convention (No. 29), and the Abolition 
of Forced Labor Convention (No. 105), other ILO conventions, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, also known 
as the Palermo Protocol.
    The North Korean seafood processing workers face inhumane 
working conditions--long working hours, denial of proper rest 
and breaks, harsh treatment, and minimal safety measures, 
posing a risk to their physical and mental well-being. Lack of 
freedom and communication--they're often isolated, facing 
limited contact with the outside world and their families. They 
are unable to exercise their right to freedom of movement and 
communication. Absence of labor rights--such rights, including 
the right to unionize and engage in collective bargaining, are 
nonexistent.
    North Korean workers covet overseas positions, as the 
average monthly remittance of $70 is dramatically higher than 
the $3 average monthly industrial wage in North Korea. The 
average bribe paid to become a dispatched worker is $2,000 to 
$3,000. The workers must borrow the funds from moneylenders and 
pay it back with interest. The workers are lured with false 
promises and subsequently entrapped under abysmal working 
conditions.
    Wage violations through compulsory contributions extracted 
by the North Korean authorities, unpaid overtime, and 
precarious safety and health conditions, are widespread. The 
workers must moonlight for other companies to pay back their 
loans, with the approval of three site supervisors--party, 
security agency, technical manager--who must also be bribed. 
Including moonlighting, a North Korean seafood processing 
worker in China may make up to about $210 a month. The North 
Korean worker's monthly wages are paid upon their repatriation 
in North Korean currency at the official exchange rate.
    During the COVID-19 quarantine, the workers received no 
wages and the interest on loans increased, reportedly leading 
to about thirty suicides, most of them women. The Chinese 
companies pay the North Korean regime mostly based on 
production volume. The payment is made in Chinese currency. Men 
mainly carry frozen fish blocks, and women sit down and peel 
fish or squid or sort clams and crabs by size. Most of the 
North Koreans work the whole day in cold storage. Additionally, 
the pungent smell inside is unbearable. North Korean workers at 
the Chinese seafood processing plants usually work about 10 
hours a day. If production targets are not met, the workday can 
extend to over 12 hours.
    I respectfully recommend the following: Continue to 
encourage civil society groups with relevant networks to 
continue investigating conditions of work at Chinese seafood 
processing factories, and whether products processed by North 
Koreans end up on the U.S. market. Propose that new findings on 
violations affecting North Koreans at such factories be 
included in the annual report on trafficking in persons 
required under Section 110(b) of the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act of 2000.
    Seek to determine whether the government of China has made 
any serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of 
trafficking in persons as they relate to the official 
dispatching of North Korean workers to Chinese seafood 
processing plants. And, finally, seek to confirm whether 
seafood exported from China to the United States contains North 
Korean seafood products and whether North Korean workers 
officially dispatched to China processed seafood exported from 
China to the United States. If confirmed--for example, if 
confirmed based on newly available information and analysis, 
such products would have to be denied entry at any of the U.S. 
ports, pursuant to a prohibition under Section 307 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930.
    Thank you very much.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you so much for bringing this 
perspective to bear on the North Korean element of forced 
labor.
    And now we'll turn to Sally Yozell.

                   STATEMENT OF SALLY YOZELL,

           DIRECTOR, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY PROGRAM,

                       THE STIMSON CENTER

    Ms. Yozell. Good morning, Chairman Merkley and Under 
Secretary Lee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 
I ask unanimous consent that my full testimony be included in 
the record.
    Co-chair Merkley. Without objection.
    Ms. Yozell. I was asked to speak about illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated fishing in the seafood supply chain. IUU 
fishing can take many forms and has been linked to criminal and 
illicit activities, such as smuggling of guns, drugs, and 
wildlife, human trafficking and forced labor, as we've heard, 
as well as money laundering and tax fraud. In all of its forms, 
IUU fishing directly contributes to overfishing, threatening 
the sustainability of fish stocks and damaging marine 
ecosystems. IUU fishing harms the economic, food, and 
environmental security of coastal communities, particularly in 
developing countries, and can destabilize the security of 
maritime states by fueling corruption and distorting markets.
    I saw these impacts recently firsthand on a trip to the 
Gulf of Guinea, where Chinese-owned operations have expanded 
their industrial fleets, fishmeal operations, and fish bases. 
These developing nations often lack the financial and technical 
capacity to manage their fisheries. And they often lack the 
political will--they can be influenced by Chinese investment. 
This can lead to food insecurity and unemployment, 
environmental degradation, and civil unrest. IUU fishing 
accounts for a third of global fish harvest and it is valued at 
more than $30 billion annually. Ultimately, it occurs because 
it remains profitable, loopholes persist, and the opaqueness of 
the global seafood supply chain has made it largely invisible 
to governments, businesses, and consumers.
    That is, until last week, when Mr. Urbina's reporting has 
blown the lid off one of the most traded food commodities in 
the world, revealing a very dark side that has flourished 
undetected. Seafood accounts for more than $140 billion in 
trade each year. The demand for seafood is greater than ever. 
The United States is the second-largest seafood importer, 
behind China. And last year we imported 340,000 metric tons of 
seafood, valued at over $30 billion. We know one simple truth. 
U.S. consumers and consumers around the world do not want to 
eat seafood that is caught illegally or that is the product of 
forced labor and human rights abuses. But how do they know?
    The United States imports about 85 percent of all its 
seafood. Just under 40 percent of U.S. seafood imports are 
initially caught in U.S. waters, exported for processing in 
Asia and China, and then reimported into the United States. An 
illustrative example of this is pollock and salmon. Because of 
the war on Ukraine, Russian-caught seafood is currently banned 
from the United States. Yet, Russian pollock and salmon enter 
U.S. commerce every single day. Under the U.S. COOL Act, fish 
that is processed in China becomes a product of China, 
essentially hiding its real origin. So Russian catch can be 
processed alongside U.S.-harvested fish, where it is commingled 
and processed into fish blocks, fish sticks, canned salmon, or 
frozen filets, and then sent back to grocery stores, 
restaurants, and even our own school lunch programs, and on to 
unwitting American consumers.
    Stopping the importation of ``Putin's pollock'' through 
China is an easy fix if the United States Government were to 
implement a more comprehensive traceability system that tracks 
seafood throughout the supply chain. As a former co-chair of 
the task force which created NOAA's seafood import monitoring 
program, called SIMP, I can say with certainty that SIMP was 
originally en-
visioned to prevent and deter IUU fish from entering the United 
States. It was to effectively track all imported seafood from 
the point of harvest to its initial entry into the U.S. market, 
or as we like to say, bait to gate. SIMP has been in operation 
for six years. Yet it only covers about 45 percent of U.S. 
seafood imports. It does not cover several high-risk species, 
including pollock, salmon, blue swimming crab, squid, and 
haddock.
    As NOAA Fisheries looks to improve its program, they must 
consider the fact that SIMP is currently a single narrow 
program, rather than a true traceability system. It is siloed 
from other relevant monitoring programs and hamstrung by its 
reliance on a paper-based framework. This opens the door to 
falsification and prevents the use of advanced risk analytics. 
Globally, the United States, Japan, and the European Union all 
have traceability programs. And when you combine all three, 
they make up more than 60 percent of the international seafood 
market. This is a powerful bloc.
    Several additional programs are coming online, such as 
South Korea and Australia. And all of these countries are 
looking to the United States as its global leader. At home, 
numerous agencies are working to combat IUU fishing. NOAA 
Fisheries manages the seafood and the SIMP program, as I noted. 
The U.S. Coast Guard uses satellite, AIS, and radar to track 
its fishing vessels at sea. The Department of Labor monitors 
for forced labor and human rights abuses. The Food and Drug 
Administration collects seafood data relating to human health 
and food safety. And the Treasury Department follows the money, 
which can provide valuable insight into beneficial ownership of 
IUU fishing enterprises. And I could go on.
    But despite all of this data and all of these programs, the 
International Trade Commission estimates that $2.4 billion 
worth of IUU-caught fish products entered the U.S. market in 
2019 alone. In my written testimony, I have shared 10 next 
steps that can be implemented now to achieve a broader, more 
holistic vision to prevent IUU fish from entering our markets. 
To summarize just a few, let me say that we need a full-
functioning traceability system that is, one, standardized: 
Expand the Seafood Import Monitoring Program and work with 
other countries to develop a consistent global list of high-
risk species. Two, streamlined: Move to a full, digitized 
traceability system that will support the use of risk-based 
analytics and reduce the burden on industry. And we have to get 
rid of the paper. In today's world, how many billion-dollar 
industries lack digitization and rely on paper-based records? 
Third, synchronized: The U.S. should widen its aperture to what 
is considered risky behavior.
    First, NOAA Fisheries should follow through on its work to 
amend the definition of IUU fishing to include forced labor in 
the seafood supply chain and work across federal agencies to 
consider other risks linked to vessel histories, ownership 
information, and land- and sea-based processing, transshipment, 
and ports. IUU fishing is a global problem that requires global 
solutions. The United States Government has the opportunity and 
the responsibility to ensure more transparency and to chart a 
path forward that moves the seafood supply chain out of the 
shadows. Thank you for your time, and I'm happy to answer any 
questions.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Ms. Yozell.
    I'm going to note that there are submissions for the 
record. These are from Judy Gearhart, Research Professor at 
American University's Accountability Research Center; from 
Badri Jimale of the Horn of Africa Institute, from Stephanie 
Madsen, Executive Director, At-sea Processing Association, and 
from Michael Sinclair, former Federal Executive Fellow at 
Brookings. If there's no objection, their material will be 
entered into the record. Hearing none, so ordered. And now our 
Chair has returned. Is everything fixed? [Laughter.]
    Chair Smith. No. We'll have another vote in 15 or 20 
minutes.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you.
    Chair Smith. You know, Mr. Urbina, you mentioned auditors 
and, you know, one of the things that I've been very concerned 
about for the longest of times--as a matter of fact, back in 
2012 I actually chaired a hearing on this Commission and 
pointed out that the ability of anybody to say anything of 
worth to an auditor, when potentially there are people around 
who will snitch on them, especially within the company, or even 
Chinese Communist Party security types, well, the audit hearing 
that we had made it clear--we focused on Apple and some of the 
other big companies--the auditors go in, they talk to six 
people, they'd say, ``Oh, we met them separately,''--you know, 
separately, with recording devices going. ``And they said, 
`everything is just fine.' ''
    I'm wondering if that's been your experience. You know, our 
government, unfortunately, is too willing to accept that. They 
say, oh, they got a clean bill of health by auditing company X, 
Y, or Z. Many of them are foreign based. They're not 
Pricewaterhouse. They're coming out of Europe and the UK. I 
think it's a sham, frankly. You know, maybe there's some good 
people involved, but the process is a sham, because you're 
going to get a Potemkin village almost every time. And I wonder 
what your thoughts might be on that.
    And you mentioned, Mr. Stumberg, about NOAA. We're in a big 
fight with NOAA on issues relating to ocean wind. I'm leading 
the effort in my state, because they and others, including the 
Bureau of Ocean Management, have been absolutely AWOL in terms 
of doing their due diligence about the impact of radars and the 
fish kill that we're seeing with whales. But, you know, 
reasonable people can disagree on that, but the radars are 
overwhelming. We will be blinded if these 3,400--it's the size 
of the Chrysler Building--ocean wind turbines go off the New 
Jersey, New York coast. And yet NOAA has been no help. I've 
been shocked and dismayed by it. And I'm wondering if you might 
want to speak to how valid their work is on this.
    Senator Merkley and I, in our letter yesterday to Secretary 
Mayorkas, we--bottom line, we believe the situation needs a 
robust and coordinated response across all federal levels, 
including DOD. What has the response been from USDA, and DOD, 
which procures so much of this fish for our troops and for the 
commissaries? I have a commissary in my district, joint bases 
in my district. I've been to it many times, you know, with 
others. I don't use it, but I go there when I do base tours. 
And there they are, right on the rack, all these different fish 
products. Which normally would be great, but if it's, as it is, 
sourced through human rights abuse, we've got a problem.
    So I'm just wondering what their initial responses have 
been. Has there been a response? Because we're going to--you 
know, we're going to push really hard. I don't care who's in 
the White House, you know, we want no complicity in human 
rights abuse. So whoever comes in next, might be the same. 
Might be Biden again. It just has to change. There's got to be 
an aggressiveness there that has been sorely lacking.
    Mr. Urbina. Thanks for the questions. On the issue of 
auditing, I would just sort of maybe pull up to altitude and 
take a big bird's-eye view of it, and first start by saying 
it's important to think of seafood in the way that it's 
distinct from other products. And remember that there are these 
two distinct universes where seafood is coming from and 
processing through. And so, when we think about the auditing 
system, and you think about the two universes--the at-sea and 
the on-land--it's important to ask, ``Okay, what do the at-sea 
audits look like versus the on-land ones?''
    And the at-sea audits are nonexistent when it comes to 
labor. And that's a huge problem that's easily overlooked 
because it's the toughest problem to solve. Spot checks on 
ships and conditions on ships are really a big challenge. So 
that's one dichotomy I'd put forward. The second one is the 
question of what kinds of audits we're talking about. Are these 
marine audits or social audits? Marine audits are largely 
environmental in focus. They're focused on IUU concerns and 
these matters. And the private sector has more of an 
infrastructure for marine audits. They're flawed, deeply 
flawed, the marine audits are, but at least they exist. How to 
check on the attempted traceability of where the fish is coming 
from, what gear is being used, what ships, etc.
    When it comes to social audits in the seafood space, 
there's far less infrastructure. And there are some firms that 
are doing these social audits, meaning checking on labor 
issues, but only on processing plants. So that's a second 
dichotomy that I think is important to bear in mind. The next 
one is China. You know, audits in the rest of the world versus 
audits in China. That's another dichotomy to really not forget 
about. If you're going to operate in China, you've got to play 
by their rules. And the U.S. business community knows that. And 
so do NGOs who are now working there.
    And those rules are pretty problematic. You know, you can't 
ask certain questions. You can't say certain things. And so 
auditing firms and U.S. companies that are operating there know 
full well when they go in that they can't stay there unless 
they play by those rules. So there is a bit of a sham in having 
labor audits through private firms in China, because there's 
this whispered sense that they're not really going to do what 
even weak auditing is supposed to do. And then the last layer I 
would go to is whether social audits, labor-focused audits on 
land in China, are even looking for the right things and doing 
them in the right way. Are they even looking for Xinjiang 
workers? What we found is the answer is no. They were not 
fluent on the issue of the problem of Xinjiang workers.
    They were not looking in the right way for that issue. And 
then also, are they doing them in a credible way? In other 
words, are they calling ahead and saying we're going to show up 
on Tuesday to check your plant? That's not a real audit, 
because they know to clean things up because the auditor's 
coming on Tuesday. So, these are the layers of questions I'd 
ask of auditing. And for the most part, the answers we got in 
our investigation were not hopeful ones.
    Chair Smith: You know, at that hearing in 2012, I would 
just point out that Thea Lee was one of our distinguished 
witnesses that day, speaking on behalf of the AFL-CIO. But we 
had Li Qiang--and I just say this because I think it speaks 
volumes--who was executive director of China Labor Watch. And 
he said, according to very conservative estimates, about 30,000 
plants--over 100,000 audits are conducted for over 30,000 
plants. The multinationals would then more often than not bribe 
the auditing companies by giving them like $3,000 or so to 
avoid making the investment to make the improvements and to 
really bring the information forward. So people are chilled 
from telling you what is actually going on. This hearing was in 
relation to things like what Apple was doing with its workforce 
in China. So, you know, big, big caution flag when we hear 
about audits.
    In terms of the response of DOD, for example, or any of the 
government agencies, I know your research is new, but what has 
the reaction been? Are they saying, let's meet with you, let's 
begin plotting out, you know? And, Mr. Stumberg, I'm doing a 
rewrite of my original law that--I'm the author of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000--and we have a 
reauthorization that we're working on. It will be marked up, we 
believe, in the next Foreign Affairs Committee meeting. That 
said, we're looking at some new language in a number of areas. 
I'd love to get your input as to how we could amend that or 
should amend that. So please, either now or in follow-up, we 
just need that from you, if we could.
    Mr. Stumberg. That sounds like bait. I'll take it. 
[Laughter.]
    Chair Smith. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    Mr. Stumberg. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act, as 
implemented in the FAR, requires prevention plans to prevent 
the government from buying goods made with forced labor. Good. 
It only authorizes prevention plans for services performed 
overseas, not goods purchased by agencies, and explicitly not 
goods that are commercial off-the-shelf items. These are so-
called COTS items, which include canned fish. So, yes, there 
are prevention measures in the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act. But, no, they don't cover any of the products we've talked 
about here today.
    And for the overseas services, what they have in mind is 
commissary services for military bases and embassies overseas, 
not importation of goods produced overseas or processed 
overseas. So there's a disconnect in the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act as relates to the FAR sections that aim to 
prevent procurement sourced with forced labor. Fortunately, the 
Uyghur Act provides a good model for closing this gap in the 
FAR with respect to procurement of goods. For example, 
purchasing agencies could require prevention plans for goods 
that pose a high risk of forced labor based on guidance from 
the Departments of Labor, Homeland Security, and other agencies 
in the forced-labor task force. More specifically, the FAR 
could incorporate the Uyghur Act's rebuttable presumption of 
forced labor for purposes of procurement. So to summarize, the 
agencies that are doing procurement should follow the precedent 
set for trafficking victims by importing from the Uyghur Act 
some of its standards. Does that make sense?
    Chair Smith. It does.
    Mr. Stumberg. And the threshold is very high.
    Chair Smith. I deeply appreciate it. Because we're doing it 
right now.
    Mr. Stumberg. Right.
    Chair Smith. Thank you. You know, finally, Mr. Scarlatoiu, 
in your testimony you say that all North Korean workers in 
Chinese seafood plants who were detained during COVID-19 were 
recently repatriated. I understand that some of them had to 
stay longer than three years due to lockdown during the 
pandemic. Does that mean they will be reprimanded for staying 
longer in a foreign land than the contracted three years, even 
though it was out of their control?
    Mr. Scarlatoiu. Basically, we're dealing with two 
categories of North Koreans. The ones who are there without 
government approval--China claims that they're illegal economic 
migrants--they were arrested, punished, and forcibly 
repatriated to North Korea, where they face a credible fear of 
persecution. Workers have normally been okay for as long as 
they follow the instructions of their three site supervisors, 
the state security department fellow, the site technical 
supervisor, and the party representative--the Korean Workers' 
Party representative. So they go back home and for about three 
years they're under the surveillance of the Gestapo, Stasi, 
basically the Ministry of State Security. And then they're 
okay.
    However, in this particular case, they overstayed their 
contracts. Most of them still moved around in groups. Their 
humanitarian situation was dire. There were no contracts, there 
was no money at their work sites. A few of them managed to 
moonlight if some companies were still open for business, with 
the approval of the three site supervisors, whom they had to 
bribe. We have had very credible reports from sources within 
the North Korean escapee community, who in turn have their 
sources inside China, that things were so bad that these 
workers had to work on Chinese farms. They barely had one meal 
a day. And it went so far as these workers going to the local 
markets to acquire vegetable clippings--the clippings that are 
thrown away--and making vegetable soup out of them.
    I have mentioned the issue of loan sharks. These workers do 
want, at the initial stage, positions overseas. The average 
monthly salary of a North Korean industrial worker is $3 a 
month. They can make as much as $70 or, if they manage to 
moonlight, even up to $210. They have to pay a bribe in the 
amount of $2,000 to $3,000. They have to repay the loan sharks. 
Interest accumulates. This is what happened under COVID. And 
they were all under tremendous pressure. We have had reports of 
about 30 suicides among these workers, most of them women.
    In terms of the repression they face when they go back 
home, based on what we know about how North Korea operates, 
yes, sir. They will be under much more pressure than their 
predecessors who were simply out there in China until the 
contracts expired and then they came back home. In North Korea, 
it doesn't matter that you haven't done anything wrong. There 
is a perceived offense of having worked at an unauthorized 
worksite, having overstayed your contract, regardless of the 
reason why. The likelihood that they will face some degree of 
punishment, if not harsh punishment, is quite high.
    Chair Smith. Ms. Yozell, a few years ago I chaired a 
hearing on Malaysia being red-carded for their abuses with 
regard to their fishing. Can you explain the difference between 
the U.S. seafood import program and the red carding program of 
the EU?
    Ms. Yozell. Sure. The EU system, as you say, is a carded 
system. And basically it is a government-to-government system 
in which literally there is catch verification that the seafood 
that is being caught is not IUU fish. And if it is, then a 
country will first receive a yellow card, and then if they 
don't improve the work they do, then they get a red card. And 
when they receive a red card, all seafood from that country is 
no longer allowed to be imported. On the other hand, in the 
U.S. system, the SIMP program, it's the industry that is 
required to determine if seafood caught is IUU or not. And it 
is not government-to-government. Information is then passed 
through. And NOAA then determines, based on the information it 
receives from the brokers, whether the seafood is IUU fish or 
not.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you so much. And I'm going to ask 
you--Director Urbina, thank you for your four-year study. In 
your testimony you note that you studied 751 ships. You've also 
referred to how difficult that is. What does it mean to study a 
ship? Like, were 751 boats tracked as to what they were 
offloading and where they were offloading it? Or were these 
conversations with 751 crews? How did you go about this very 
difficult task?
    Mr. Urbina. Sure. So, again, thinking in bifurcated 
fashion, at sea, on land. Three of the four years we've really 
focused on the at-sea universe. And our hope was to look at the 
entire Chinese distant water fleet. That was too big to take 
on. So we then honed it down to look at the portion of the 
fleet that we thought was potentially most interesting and 
illustrative. So we honed in on the squid fleet, for a bunch of 
reasons. The squid fleet, and the distant water squid fleet, is 
in the most interesting places around the world--North Korean 
waters, coast of West Africa, high seas Falkland Islands, high 
seas Galapagos.
    The goal then was to go to those four places and lay eyes 
directly on the vessels and try to talk our way onto the 
vessels to witness crew, witness conditions, check seafood 
traceability and their refrigeration, talk to officers and 
captains, etc. And that was successful. In each of those places 
we were able to get on vessels. When that didn't work, we 
interviewed the crew through a very old-school method of bottle 
communication. So we would write notes and put them in plastic 
bottles weighed down with rice and, you know, cigarettes, and 
candy.
    And when the ship would try to leave when they saw us 
coming, we would follow them and we--I would throw bottles onto 
the back of the vessel. And the crew, usually the deckhands--
the captain was looking forward, the deckhands were facing 
backwards--they would receive the bottle. Sometimes they 
wouldn't open it, read it. Other times, they would. They'd take 
the message out. It was written in Bahasa Indonesian, because a 
lot of the crew were Indonesian, Chinese, and English. There'd 
be a pen in there. Sometimes they would scribble responses to 
the questions back, phone numbers of family back home, pleas 
for help. They'd put it back in the bottle, throw it back over, 
we'd pick it up. So that was a labor-intensive process, but 
very effective in getting interactions with crew.
    So that was sort of the on-the-water method of reporting. 
The remote method of reporting was a deep dive on various forms 
of data, which would allow you to understand where these ships 
have been, you know, by way of tracking them through satellite 
technology, etc. Are they engaged in sovereignty incursions, so 
illegal fishing in that form? Is there a written record in any 
universe--be it foreign media, or state reports, or other 
databases--of dead bodies coming off of these ships, of 
infractions by the ships?
    So, vacuum in all that you can about the vessels and build 
a database so that you can identify levels of concern for 
different vessels. And then connect the supply chain dots from 
those vessels, to refrigeration, to port, to processing plant, 
to U.S. or European buyer. The only way you have impact is if 
you can make it relevant to European and American consumers. 
And for that, you need the supply chain work. You can just talk 
about a bad thing happening on a vessel, but no one's going to 
care unless they realize they're tied. So that was the on-water 
investigation.
    The on-land investigation was a whole different kettle of 
fish, if you will. And this was done by the investigative team 
at my organization--mining of media reports and cell phone 
footage by workers from within processing plants, open-source 
intelligence, to see what you can lay eyes on. That TikTok--
Chinese TikTok, there's a lot of footage of workers chronicling 
their labor transfer from Xinjiang to Shandong. Here I am on 
the plane. Here I'm arriving at my factory. Here I am working. 
Here I am seeing the ocean for the first time. So, we mined all 
of that material to connect the dots to actually figure out how 
many workers were actually in these plants.
    And then also a lot of companies have newsletters which are 
very candid. Parent companies of the seafood processing plants 
talk very openly about how appreciative they are of the Chinese 
government helping them fill their labor shortage by 
transferring workers. And so we mined that material as well, 
and a number of other materials to build a grid of knowledge 
about what the plants are that are using Uyghur workers.
    Co-chair Merkley. It is truly a stunningly expansive 
project you undertook, under incredibly difficult 
circumstances. And just as you were describing throwing bottles 
onto the boats and hoping somebody would open the bottle--and 
you apparently got a lot of bottles thrown back, giving 
firsthand accounts. So thank you for elaborating on that. I am 
really kind of struck by all of your testimony of how complex 
and difficult it is to tackle this particular challenge.
    And one piece that I hadn't anticipated, that U.S. flagged 
vessels fishing in their own waters ship their product to China 
for processing. So immediately it's intermixed--U.S.-produced 
food is intermixed with the Chinese flow. Is that one--is that 
an inevitable piece of the economics of processing because it's 
so labor intensive? Why is American seafood from U.S. vessels 
in American waters being shipped to China for processing?
    Mr. Urbina. I'll take that one on. Inevitable is the word 
that I focused on in your question. I think the answer to the 
inevitable part of your question is no, but it depends. The 
challenge of solving that problem depends on the type of 
seafood. If you look at the history of squid, very labor 
intensive, costly, dirty work. And during the late '80s, early 
'90s it was wholesale shipped to China for the cleaning, 
processing of it. There is not much infrastructure for 
processing of squid in the U.S. The challenge that the industry 
will face for finding alternate places to do that work is going 
to be tough.
    Pollock, different story. You know, there are out of Alaska 
at-sea processors who are doing a lot of the processing in U.S. 
waters, on U.S. vessels, for U.S. consumers, and avoiding the 
problem. Can they scale up? I don't know. But really an honest 
answer would be to look at the type of seafood and then look at 
how we could encourage processing alternatives that allow 
industry players to not rely on North Korean or Uyghur-worked 
factories in China.
    Co-chair Merkley. I'll ask--thank you. And I will say, 
Professor Stumberg, you described Director Urbina's work--James 
Bond would be impressed. And I think that's certainly--the more 
you know about your project, the more that that rings true. One 
of the challenges we've had with the UFLPA is that even if 
goods are detained, when they are released they are sent to 
Canada. If they're banned from our market, they're sent to 
Canada or Europe. How much do we have to accentuate 
international cooperation to have any significant impact on 
this challenge?
    Mr. Stumberg. In addition to that, two years ago Congress 
asked the Department of State and Defense to look around the 
world and report back to Congress on the risk of forced labor 
in seafood. Sally knows more about this than I do. But the 
report that came back to Congress was that 29 countries, 
including China, have a very high risk of forced labor in their 
seafood. And so the need for this kind of monitoring is 
profound. You're right, there are obvious markets all around 
the world. If they can't sell their seafood in the United 
States, they're going to go somewhere else. Someone else will 
buy that seafood. So, why bother, right?
    Well, from a moral point of view, ``why bother'' is easy. 
The American taxpayers don't want to be trading in forced labor 
products just to save a few pennies on the dollar. Why bother 
in terms of the rule of law and a global economy that is 
working for working people in the United States as well as 
abroad? If American workers, including the processors in 
Alaska, have to compete with forced labor in China, they're not 
going to. How do you compete with slave labor?
    Co-chair Merkley. So let me reframe the question, because 
as a principal author of the UFLPA, I certainly believe that we 
should be doing this. How do we get Canada and Europe to work 
in concert with the United States to help us tackle this 
challenge?
    Mr. Stumberg. I don't have a profound answer to that 
profound question, but I will observe this: Europe is ahead on 
this. The European Union has already approved a comprehensive 
sustainability disclosure mandate for all of their member 
governments, a directive that was approved and is now being 
implemented--the corporate sustainability reporting directive. 
So they're years ahead of us, with that Europe-wide, industry-
wide disclosure system, the kind of systematic approach that 
Sally was alluding to earlier, including very specific auditing 
protocols. And they're implementing it now as we speak.
    On the tail of that, both the European Parliament and the 
Commission have approved proposals for mandatory due diligence, 
which is legalese for doing the kind of homework that Ian was 
talking about. And the kind of homework that CBP has outlined 
for itself in its own work plan. It's just that when you read 
the details of the European approach to due diligence, it's 
pretty gauzy. It's chock full of legal jargon. It's hard to 
understand how it's really going to happen. But when you read 
the CBP program, you go, oh, this could actually work.
    So in some sense, the United States is a thought leader, 
but we're way behind Europe in terms of scaling this up and 
applying it not just to seafood, not just to food, but 
industrywide, regionwide. So getting in sync with what the 
Europeans are doing, learning from the way they're scaling up 
this kind of corporate accountability, understanding that 
companies are going to have to comply with these EU directives 
and they're going to be preoccupied with that for a decade or 
more while the Americans are futzing around with vessel by 
vessel withhold orders. You know, we're not on the same page, 
and the Europeans are really making us look like we're still in 
the 20th century. So that's a quick answer to your question.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you.
    Ms. Lee.
    Ms. Lee. Thank you, Chair Merkley.
    I think you could feel that I was getting interested in 
this answer, because this is part of what I spend a lot of my 
time doing--trying to think about how we can cooperate better 
with other countries, how do we cooperate better within the 
United States Government? Because we actually have some very 
powerful tools. And I think all of you have mentioned several 
of them. And I don't think we're using them to the full extent 
that we need to or could. So I guess one quick thing with 
respect to Canada is that in our most recent USMCA trinational 
meeting, Mexico and Canada, under the USMCA, also committed to 
institute a forced-labor import ban.
    And they don't know how to do it. So we brought some of our 
Customs and Border Protection folks. And we are going through 
ongoing technical exchanges to help to see how far we can go in 
terms of sharing information that would make that more 
effective. Even the Canadian and Mexican businesses said to us, 
We don't want to get all the forced-labor import rejects that 
come from the United States. That's not good for our own 
competitive atmosphere.
    But, you know, Professor Stumberg, I don't totally agree 
with you in terms of the European Union versus the United 
States. I think our tools are amazing, the Uyghur Forced Labor 
Prevention Act, the rebuttable presumption which gets around 
some of the issues that Ian raised; that we don't have to prove 
or get access to China, because we know China doesn't give 
access. They don't give access to auditors. But you know, I 
think we're at the very beginning of learning how to implement 
those.
    And one of the things that I've also been doing in the G-7 
and the G-20 is trying to figure out how we can take the very 
best of what the European Union is doing and what the United 
States has--a lot of other countries are very jealous of a 
forced-labor import ban, in whole or in part. Because if we 
were able to enforce the Tariff Act of 1930, the Uyghur Forced 
Labor Prevention Act, the North Korean sanctions, it would be 
massively powerful. We can't really do it all of a sudden. But 
I also think that the point that you raised, Professor 
Stumberg, about the integration of U.S. Government procurement 
with the trade measures, the import ban, and the Uyghur Forced 
Labor Prevention Act, is exactly next.
    So I know that wasn't really a question, but the question 
is for each of you--and thank you so much for your testimony, 
for your work. One thing, if you could, back to enforcement. 
Because I'm in the executive branch, I don't know how long 
it'll take Congress to enforce better and stronger laws. I know 
we need them. But I think that there's so much that can be 
done. What would be your number-one ``ask'' of the U.S. 
Government in terms of strengthening enforcement of existing 
laws? So if each of the witnesses wouldn't mind, I would love 
to hear from you.
    Mr. Urbina. I'm going to cheat and answer with multiple 
small pieces that add up to one. I think that when it comes to 
enforcement, as the point you made, there's a real problem 
within the U.S. Government about agencies not actually working 
well with each other. And I know that sounds boring and very 
Washington-
focused, but as I've looked at this for over a decade it's a 
huge problem. So you even look at things like trafficking 
getting introduced as an element within SIMP. The bigger issue 
is that the agency that oversees SIMP isn't built to be looking 
at trafficking issues and labor issues.
    ILAB is, and even State is, but the whole program of SIMP 
resides under an agency that's a bunch of folks that are 
really, really strong on fishery issues and marine issues, but 
not labor issues. But everyone is defensive about their 
jurisdiction, and therefore there's language in the rule, but 
not real, actual implementation of it. That's got to be fixed, 
and it's by people in this room. Similarly, a threshold issue. 
Say Customs and Border Protection has their own interpretation 
of WROs--what is the threshold for a case that might be brought 
forward? This person was trafficked. Here's the evidence. The 
burden is on NGOs and journalists to do all that work. That's a 
problem. And then it's handed to Customs and Border. And 
Customs and Border, sometimes their lawyers will say, Okay, but 
we want recent stuff--recent defined as within the last two 
years. These contracts--these people are at sea for two years.
    So, your case is going to be automatically kicked out 
because your case of a trafficking human being is three or four 
years old. But the nature of the industry that that person's 
working in, they're going to be offshore for two years. So, 
there are fundamental interpretive flaws and threshold issues 
in how these agencies are implementing the tools on the table. 
And unless someone really pushes and fixes those, the best law 
on the books isn't going to get what it's supposed to do.
    Mr. Stumberg. First a note about SIMP. As Sally explained, 
SIMP was built to cover environmentally illegal fishing. It was 
not built to cover human rights illegal fishing, nor does it 
cover any of the commercially valuable fish that the USDA and 
the Department of Defense purchase. If you just applied SIMP to 
what the U.S. Government buys, that would be a big leap 
forward. And while you're at it, collect what relevant labor 
rights information you can. I'm not trying to pitch SIMP as the 
right place to have a human rights strategy, but it could be a 
very valuable tool if expanded, as a coalition of eight civil 
society organizations recommended back in March. They did a 
really good report led by the World Wildlife Fund and seven 
other groups.
    Two other ideas: First of all, implement the Uyghur Forced 
Labor Prevention Act. What do I mean by that? It's now been a 
year and a half since the workplan hit the pavement, right? 
Have some empathy for CBP. In response to their initial list of 
20 known entities that have direct connections to Xinjiang 
province, they've been flooded with thousands of pieces of 
evidence about other entities. An entity could be anything from 
a vessel to U.S. Foods. Thousands. So how do they process that? 
They have yet to come out with a rule or a guideline on how 
they're going to make decisions about how and when to add more 
entities to the list, but so far they've gone from 20 to 27 and 
that's it.
    So I have empathy for them considering the workload, but 
it's been a year and a half and at least they need a strategy 
for telling the rest of us, this is how we're going to sift 
through all this evidence. You can say the same about the five 
high-priority categories where they're focusing on enforcement. 
I'd make the pitch that Ian has--you know, give them an 
invitation to add seafood next, simply based on his reporting 
alone. He's done their work for them.
    And not only that, if I can say one more thing--when I read 
the CBP work plan published a year and a half ago, I couldn't 
believe that this was from a U.S. Government bureaucracy 
because it was so forward looking. They were talking about, and 
I assume they're working on this now, using artificial 
intelligence and the various computer databases--the very ones 
that Ian used--to intentionally sift through and pull out all 
the data that he's presented in his reporting. CBP implies that 
they want to be able to do the same damn thing with AI.
    Now, I don't know squat about AI, but I have a feeling that 
that's probably possible. So could Ian's work be a picture of 
what the future looks like at CBP? I hope so. Probably 
everything except, you know, putting on your jumpsuit hopping 
on a skiff and chasing down people on the high seas. I don't 
expect CBP to do that. But we have to leave something for Ian 
and his grandchildren to do. [Laughter.]
    Ms. Lee. It's all about the jumpsuit.
    If I could say one last thing--thank you so much for those 
answers. And I actually completely agree with what you both 
said here. And it's one of the things--ILAB is in cooperation 
talks with both CBP and with NOAA because, as you said, we have 
the expertise. I have 165 staff now. We have tremendous 
technical expertise. And so we're doing some staff exchanges. 
We're doing some contracting. And we really do want--and we're 
in very deep conversation with NOAA about SIMP and ways that we 
think it could be strengthened and improved, and the 
definitions, and so on. I think that's really important.
    And with respect to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, 
you know, I sit on the FLETF, the Forced Labor Enforcement Task 
Force. In fact, I co-chair the entity subcommittee. So I will 
tell you that we are trying as hard as we can. It's been very 
slow going. It's been frustrating, I think, to all of us. But, 
you know, we're trying to figure out what can withstand legal 
challenge, what can be as robust as possible. But I share your 
frustration with the slowness of the process. But I will tell 
you that we are really trying to use those tools that Congress 
gave us as effectively as we can. And I apologize, I'm going to 
have to leave--to catch a plane. But thank you, again, to all 
of you for your work.
    Ms. Yozell. If I could just hop in for a minute, please. I 
want to just note that you had asked what could be done, one or 
two things. I think the number one thing that we've been 
waiting for, for quite some time, is for NOAA to add labor and 
human rights abuse to the definition of IUU fishing. They said 
they would a while ago, and they have backed off of that. In 
addition, I think it's really important--we recently 
interviewed several federal agencies and said: What do you need 
to do better at your job? Your agency, as well as others, all 
said: Sharing data and information.
    NOAA collects a significant amount of information through 
its SIMP program, but it does not share it. You and other 
agencies collect a lot of information that NOAA could use as 
well, but they haven't asked for it. So we really need to open 
that aperture and understand all that we can about risky flags, 
risky vessels, risky ports, and I could go on and on. And I 
also want to just note that there are a number of things that 
were in the NDAA and appropriations that have asked NOAA to try 
to harmonize the data and information more, and that has yet to 
occur.
    And then just finally, expanding the list of species 
covered. It's such a small list, yet pollock, salmon, squid, 
blue swimming crab, and haddock--all species we know have been 
the result of IUU fishing but are not on NOAA's list. And they 
must be expanded to those and others.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Director Yozell. And 
thank you, Deputy Undersecretary Lee. This is why it's so 
valuable that this Commission have members of both parties from 
the House and Senate, but also to have members from the 
executive branch. And I think many of the recommendations and 
ideas that are discussed here--having you here to hear them 
directly, from your role inside the administration, is hugely 
helpful. I hope we have given you sufficient time to catch your 
plane. I really appreciate that you're here in person.
    Ms. Lee. Thank you.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you.
    I'm going to raise some questions provided by others, 
starting with one from Congresswoman Wexton, who would like to 
have been here. And her question is for you, Mr. Urbina.
    She asks: Currently, most Americans focus on where their 
fish is caught, for example, was it caught in Alaska or was it 
caught in Norway, not about where they are processed, as in 
China or the Russian Far East, and by whom. How do we make the 
complex supply chain more transparent, so importers in the U.S. 
seafood industry understand that they're not violating the 
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, and the Countering 
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act?
    Mr. Urbina. Yes, I think seafood, again, is distinct from 
tomatoes, or cotton, or computer chips--it traverses these two 
universes. And so one big thing that has to happen 
intellectually in the public space is we need to not be talking 
about seafood as a marine issue but be talking about seafood as 
a product that crosses land as well. And so, I think, that's 
one big step. So environmental groups, Oceana, for example, or 
Greenpeace or Sea Shepherd or whatever, need to be really 
working more closely with Human Rights Watch and lawmakers who 
are focused on land issues, more than they are now.
    Number two, I think the infrastructure that exists for the 
private sector to monitor and trace its supply chain also has 
to evolve a lot--and hopefully this will be a poke in that 
direction--in that they can no longer, I think, simply put 
forward that they're MSC certified or that they've been sort of 
accredited as a good steward by a private entity, and 
therefore, they're part of the ocean conservation team. That's 
not enough anymore. I think there has to be much more 
involvement by seafood companies on land labor issues.
    And then lastly, I think Sally really said it best. The 
definitional change in IUU to incorporate sea slavery or human 
rights issues is one big step. And then building on, as Bob and 
Sally have both said, SIMP, a flawed tool but the one that's 
probably the most developed on the table. Building on SIMP, 
expanding it, redefining it, getting more agencies involved in 
it is--at least from what I hear from experts--probably the 
best step for trying to get the supply chain of this product 
more under control.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you. Thank you very much.
    Chair Smith would like a little bit more information 
regarding how China has reacted to the reporting about forced 
labor in their seafood industry.
    Mr. Urbina. I'll answer that. With a wall of silence. I 
mean, if you think of the three big players that you would 
expect to respond to this reporting, one would be the market 
players--seafood companies in Europe in the U.S. The second 
would be government players, meaning this government. And the 
third would be China. The history of the last two years of 
engaging with market players, and we put all of our 
interactions with all 300 companies up on our website, has been 
largely a wall of silence. Most of the big companies refuse to 
engage. A couple of exceptions engaged; Lunds is one example, 
where these are companies that didn't agree, didn't like what 
we were telling them, but were willing to converse and knew 
they were on record the whole time. They pushed back at times 
but were very open in trying to figure out how to fix these 
things.
    But the vast majority of market players did not. And I 
think that's a big problem, because those who don't engage end 
up getting very little journalistic light on them because 
there's just this wall of silence from them. And those who do 
engage end up getting a lot more spotlight on them, even though 
they took the high road. In terms of the Chinese government, 
there have been a couple of comments coming out of the Overseas 
Fisheries Agency Association essentially calling the story and 
the reporting fabricated. But there's something interesting in 
that response, which is--and this is something I think the 
public in the West needs to be mindful of--they elide 
definitions. They are quick to point out under our own laws 
nothing illegal is happening here. This is not forced labor. 
These people are paid a wage. They're given vocational training 
and happy to have these jobs. And it's all true. And it's all 
coming from the Chinese government. But it's irrelevant. And I 
think, luckily, the U.S. media and companies are understanding 
that that's irrelevant, because of the category that is child 
labor, or prison labor, or North Korean labor, or Uyghur labor. 
That's point one. There has been market reaction since the 
reporting. So big companies have already begun severing ties to 
major factories in China. And so that's having clear financial 
repercussions in China. But that's about what we've seen.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you.
    You know, as we're talking about this I was thinking about 
a whole different piece of this forced labor, which is the west 
coast of Africa. My daughter worked with children who were 
basically sold into the fishing industry. The ships are 
anchored under the old slave castles. So it's like a very 
dramatic, ancient slavery, new slavery. But all of that seafood 
is domestic consumption, so it doesn't enter into the supply 
chains in the way that we're talking about here. And I've read 
reports of other slave labor in other parts of the Pacific, in 
which, again, it's mostly for domestic. But this is an area 
where the supply chains affect the U.S. We have more--perhaps 
more leverage if we can solve the complexity and bring all the 
forces to bear.
    I did want to go back to just one piece of this, which was 
the purchasing by the U.S. Government. And I believe that it 
was noted--and I'm not sure which of you raised this--but the 
three exceptions. That was your testimony, Mr. Stumberg? That 
the U.S. Government--the exceptions include, domestic supply is 
unavailable, domestic prices are too high, or it's intended for 
resale. So you're essentially saying that the U.S. Government 
will purchase non-American seafood if it's in one of those 
three exceptions and that this ties into the possibility of 
purchasing seafood from China that has been produced 
essentially by slave labor. Do I have that correct?
    Mr. Stumberg. You do.
    Co-chair Merkley. Okay.
    Mr. Stumberg. I can illustrate one of those exceptions, if 
seafood is not available. First of all, what does that mean? Is 
it not available as U.S.-caught seafood, or is it simply not 
available in terms of processing in the United States? The rule 
itself is vague. It's open on that point. Let me just leave it 
at that because it gets very technical at that point.
    In terms of price reasonableness, it's a 20 percent range. 
So comparing U.S. processing to any low-wage country, where you 
get into a 20 percent range, I don't empirically understand or 
know what that looks like. But when you add the prospect of 
forced labor in that low-wage country, you can imagine how it 
gets to the point where the price advantage may well be such 
that unwittingly the U.S. standard for what's a reasonable 
price encourages, incentivizes processors to go to foreign 
suppliers in order to compete for U.S. procurement.
    Co-chair Merkley. That third category, that it's intended 
for resale. Why would the U.S. Government be purchasing these 
non-American supplies for resale?
    Mr. Stumberg. To help stock commissaries and to provide the 
raw goods for other contractors who are running cafeterias for 
U.S. Government facilities, that kind of thing. And I mention 
it only because it's very explicit in the regulation. So 
they've thought about it.
    Co-chair Merkley. And, finally, I want to turn to you, Mr. 
Scarlatoiu, for bringing the North Korean aspect to bear. You 
noted the enormous stress in which individuals may be excited 
about being able to leave North Korea for higher wages, but the 
North Korean government takes 90 percent of the wages, and the 
wages perhaps aren't paid until they return to North Korea, 
what might be many years. And that meanwhile, the interest is 
accumulating on the money they borrowed to pay the bribe to get 
on that trip to begin with. And that the stress of these 
combined factors has produced significant evidence of suicides, 
primarily women, you mentioned. Why primarily women?
    Mr. Scarlatoiu. In both categories, that of North Koreans 
who cross the border without government approval and in some 
industries where North Koreans are dispatched officially by the 
government, depending on the industry, women represent a higher 
proportion than men. In the case of refugees, about 80 percent. 
In the case of the workers, if we're talking--and, again, it's 
industry based--restaurant workers, textile workers--they're 
mostly women. At the seafood processing plants, there are 
particular tasks that are assigned to women--peeling the 
seafood, measuring the seafood, and, of course, they have to 
spend time within those terrible working conditions in the 
refrigerated cold rooms, a very harsh environment. They have to 
experience the pungent smell. These are jobs that North Korean 
workers take up. Chinese workers would not take up these jobs 
because the working conditions are so terrible.
    It is very likely that these working conditions take more 
of a physical and psychological toll on these women. Some of 
them happen to be married women who have left families behind. 
And the stress of not only having to live under these working 
conditions but also to be unable to repay those loans and 
interest, takes a very heavy toll on them. There is no proper 
health care provided. And of course, there is no mental health 
care provided--none what-
soever--to these North Korean workers.
    Co-chair Merkley. And these suicides are happening while 
doing foreign labor, or after returning to North Korea?
    Mr. Scarlatoiu. We had reports that the suicides happen in 
China while they were still unable to return home.
    Co-chair Merkley. And the loans have to be repaid after one 
returns to North Korea?
    Mr. Scarlatoiu. They continue paying them once they're 
dispatched to China; in this case, as seafood processing 
workers. Of course, the $70 a month that they receive from the 
North Korean regime--not in dollars but in North Korean 
currency when they return--is not enough to cover the debt and 
the interest. And thus, they have to moonlight and do odd jobs, 
of course with the approval of their site supervisors. Unless 
they do that, this would be perceived as great wrongdoing, and 
they would be punished.
    Co-chair Merkley. We touched on a lot of different pieces 
of a complex puzzle. Thank you each for bringing your 
perspective, knowledge, and experience to bear. Do we have 
closing comments that need to be read into the record?
    Staff Director Tozzi. I think we can leave--if there are 
supplemental materials, people can submit them by close of 
business Friday.
    Co-chair Merkley. If there are any supplemental materials 
or questions from members of the Commission, please submit them 
by the end of the day on Friday. And if we do have additional 
questions to send to all of you, please respond as promptly as 
possible so we can get those into the record.
    Again, thank you very much for your testimony and your work 
on a very significant human rights challenge, one that this 
Commission is determined to highlight and to develop as much as 
possible legislative strategies to increase our ability to 
improve those conditions. Thank you, and this hearing is 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 10:49 a.m., the hearing ended.]

?

        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
=======================================================================


                         A  P  P  E  N  D  I  X

=======================================================================

                          Prepared Statements

                                ------                                


                        Statement of Ian Urbina

    Thank you to Chairman Smith and Chairman Merkley and thank you to 
the rest of the Commission for inviting me to speak. I will briefly 
talk about a four-year investigation that my news organization, The 
Outlaw Ocean Project, conducted in collaboration with The New Yorker, 
focused on China's role in human rights and environmental concerns tied 
to the world's seafood supply chain.
    Seafood is a distinct global commodity. It is the world's last 
major source of wild protein. It is the largest globally traded food 
commodity by value.
    Seafood is also harder to track than many other products. It is 
typically harvested offshore, often on the high seas, where there is 
limited national jurisdiction and little enforcement of what few murky 
rules exist. Labor spot checks on ships at sea are rare. These 
workplaces stay in constant motion. Deckhands are often undocumented. 
They tend to come from poorer nations. Their access to political 
capital and legal recourse in the form, say, of lawyers, advocates, 
journalists, or unions, is minimal.
    And, between bait and plate there are an inordinate number of 
handoffs of this product. It goes from fishing ship, to refrigeration 
ship, to port, to processor, to cold storage, to exporter, to U.S. 
importer, to distributor or food service company, and then, finally, to 
restaurant, grocery store, or to public food pantry, military base, or 
public school. These many handoffs make it tougher to trace the true 
origin of the catch and to ensure that there is no forced labor or 
other environmental crimes in the supply chain. Worse still, the few 
auditing entities that exist, what certification regimes that have 
emerged in the private sector, whether they focus on environmental or 
labor concerns, do a very poor job even at identifying and countering 
such crimes in these supply chains.
    China plays a unique role. It is the undisputed superpower of 
seafood because its distant water fishing fleet, which is to say those 
vessels in foreign or international waters, is vastly bigger than that 
of any other country. So too is China's processing capacity: even 
seafood caught by U.S.-flagged vessels, in our own waters, is often 
shipped to China to be cleaned, cut and packaged before being sent back 
to American consumers.
    China matters, and was the focus of our investigation, not just 
because it is the global linchpin of seafood production, but also 
because China is the most opaque of settings, the most prone to illegal 
fishing practices and, come to find out, the most dependent on forced 
labor when it comes to seafood.
    This forced labor occurs in two distinct realms: at sea and on 
land--on the fishing ships and in the processing plants.
    At sea, the problem of forced labor is endemic and varied. Debt 
bondage. Human trafficking. Beating of crew. Criminal neglect in the 
form of beriberi. Passport confiscation. Wage withholding. Denial of 
timely access to medical care. Death from violence. We found a 
widespread pattern on Chinese ships. The investigation revealed that 
almost half of the Chinese squid fleet, 357 of the 751 ships we 
studied, were tied to environmental or human rights violations.
    On land, the problem of forced labor is deep and consistent. 
Especially after the start of the global pandemic led to severe labor, 
logistical and supply chain problems in China, the government there 
began helping its massive seafood industry keep production and exports 
up and running. It did so by moving thousands of workers across the 
country from Xinjiang, a landlocked and subjugated region in the far 
west, to Shandong, a coastal eastern province in the far east where 
much of the seafood infrastructure is based.
    Most of the global seafood industry is impacted. The investigation 
found that since 2018, more than a thousand workers from Xinjiang have 
been forcibly relocated to at least ten seafood processing plants in 
Shandong that supply dozens of major U.S. seafood brands, as well as 
brands in at least twenty other countries.
    I need not tell this Commission about China's ``labor transfer'' 
programs and the ways in which this state-run effort has been legally 
defined as ``state-sponsored forced labor'' because the ethnic 
minorities pressed into service do not have an option to say no to 
these jobs.
    I also do not need to remind this Commission that under the Uyghur 
Forced Labor Prevention Act, there are very clear and strict 
prohibitions of any products in part or whole being imported to the 
U.S. that rely on Xinjiang labor.
    Lastly, I do not need to tell the people gathered here that, if 
credible evidence is brought forward, as I think our investigation has, 
indicating the existence of Xinjiang labor in a particular supply 
chain, then this federal law, the UFLPA, puts the onus on industry, on 
the companies themselves, to prove that they do not in fact have 
Uyghurs or other ethnic minority Xinjiang labor tied to their products 
and until they do, U.S. Customs and Border Protection is supposed to 
block shipments of this import. U.S. companies responding by simply 
saying that their partners in China at the plants have reassured them 
that no forced labor exists in their plants is probably not sufficient 
evidence that they are free from forced labor. Similarly, relying on 
social or marine auditing firms that inspected these plants but, by 
their own admission, were not actually looking for the presence of 
Xinjiang workers, is also not sufficient evidence that they are free 
from forced labor.
    The Chinese seafood industry and government has already responded 
that using Xinjiang workers is not illegal under Chinese law and that 
the use of these workers does not constitute forced labor because they 
receive a salary, vocational training, proper living conditions, and 
fair treatment. But U.S. seafood companies need to understand that this 
misses the point. Under U.S. law, any use of Xinjiang workers is deemed 
illegal because it occurs in the context of a larger government-run and 
coercive program, and whether these workers are paid or they tell 
auditors or state media that they are happy to have the job is not 
relevant. Think, here, for comparison, of the use of child laborers in 
other countries, which may be legal or defined distinctly in those 
nations, but regardless of their laws, it is not legal for those 
products to come into the U.S.
    As an aside, I will mention that I am intentionally refraining, for 
the time being, from discussing the additional set of processing plants 
in China that our investigation found tied to U.S. seafood importers 
and that rely on another form of state-sponsored forced labor, namely 
North Korean workers. As you know, imports to the U.S. associated with 
this demographic of forced labor is also strictly prohibited by federal 
law. We will soon publish more about those findings.
    But for now, I will humbly encourage the public to take a deep look 
at the broken nature of the labor auditing of the seafood industry and 
why seafood companies have been allowed for too long to operate in a 
place where they have culpable deniability because to operate there 
they have to agree to not look too hard at thorny issues like human 
rights.
    In fairness to industry, the world was not previously aware of how 
much Xinjiang labor had tainted the global seafood supply chain. The 
world was also not aware of how pervasive forced labor is on Chinese 
fishing ships themselves.
    That moment has passed. We now see that hundreds of seafood 
companies are tied to these Chinese ships and these Chinese factories. 
The question is what will industry and government do about it? The laws 
on the matter, at least in the U.S., are pretty clear. The issue is 
whether they will be enforced.

                      Statement of Robert Stumberg

1.  Introduction

    Two-hundred and forty--that's the number of name-brand stores and 
institutional suppliers that we all depend on. Through them, we all buy 
seafood from importers who sell what forced laborers process in Chinese 
factories and vessels. We do it as families, as schools, as businesses. 
What is not in that number are the ways we buy forced-labor seafood as 
governments, mostly through five federal agencies and local school food 
authorities.
    The Outlaw Ocean team, led by Ian Urbina, made transparency happen. 
They aren't the first to reveal Xinjiang supply chains.\1\ But what 
distinguishes their seafood reporting is that they literally chased 
outlaw vessels across the seas, surveilled trucks at the port, and 
monitored internet traffic in multiple languages. James Bond would be 
impressed. And they didn't stop with the report. They created power 
tools for tracing supply chains, purchasing seafood, and fixing 
policies that unwittingly enable an empire of exploitation. Now we can 
trace our own families' supply chains for products we buy every week.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See, e.g., the interactive tools developed by the Helena 
Kennedy Centre for International Justice at Sheffield Hallam University 
and NomoGaia, Driving Force--Automotive Supply Chains and Forced Labor 
in the Uyghur Region, which includes an interactive supply chain map 
and a data base of companies at every stage of the supply chain, 
available at https://www.shuforcedlabour.org/drivingforce/ (viewed 
October 21, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The international Coalition to End Forced Labour in the Uyghur 
Region has added the Outlaw Ocean reporting to its online library to 
show the complex puzzle of affected industries--aluminum, apparel, 
automotive, cotton, food, vinyl, polysilicon, solar, and more.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Coalition to End Forced Labour in the Uyghur Region, Seafood 
Imports in More Than 20 Countries Implicated in Uyghur Forced Labour 
(October 2023), https://enduyghurforcedlabour.org/seafood-imports-in-
more-than-20-countries-implicated-in-uyghur-forced-labour/ (viewed 
October 21, 2023). The coalition's on-line library includes the work of 
this committee: https://enduyghurforcedlabour.org/ (viewed October 21, 
2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I appreciate your invitation to address one piece of this puzzle--
the role of governments as wholesale buyers of seafood. I will briefly 
respond to several procurement questions:

        Which U.S. government agencies purchase seafood?

        Is the Buy American Act an antidote to forced-labor goods?

        Does the prohibition on purchasing forced-labor goods work?

        What is on the to-do list for fixing related gaps in policy?

a. Forced labor in U.S. seafood supply chains

    Outlaw Ocean reporters have linked Chinese forced labor to U.S. 
Government suppliers who sent seafood worth $200 million over the past 
5 years to military bases, federal prisons, and the National School 
Lunch Program.\3\ By one estimate, half of the fish sticks served in 
American public schools have been processed in China.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ See Appendix 1, Outlaw Ocean, Discussion, and Appendix 2, 
Outlaw Ocean, Methodology; Ian Urbina, The Crimes Behind the Seafood 
You Eat, New Yorker (October 9, 2023), available at https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/16/the-crimes-behind-the-seafood-
you-eat (viewed October 21, 2023; Ian Urbina, The Uyghurs Forced to 
Process the World's Fish, New Yorker, News Desk (October 9, 2023), 
available at https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-uyghurs-
forced-to-process-the-worlds-fish (viewed October 21, 2023); Ian 
Urbina, The return of an old scourge reveals adeep sickness in the 
global fishing industry, Boston Globe (October 12, 2023) ($50 billion 
from one NSLP supplier), available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/2023/
10/12/opinion/beriberi-fishermen-outlaw-ocean/ (viewed October 21, 
2023).
    \4\ Urbina, Uyghurs Forced to Process; see Appendix 2, Outlaw 
Ocean, Methodology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even fish that is ``locally caught'' or ``wild caught'' can be 
processed by forced labor because much of the fish coming out of U.S. 
waters and U.S.-flagged ships is frozen, sent to China for processing, 
refrozen, and then shipped back to the United States.\5\ In those 
cases, country-of-origin labeling requires labeling as a fish from two 
countries, e.g., ``Alaskan'' and ``Product of China'' on the same 
label.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Kristen Abrams, There's something fishy about your seafood. 
China uses human trafficking to harvest it. USA Today, Opinion (October 
11, 2023), available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2023/10/
11/us-seafood-china-human-trafficking-uyghur-forced-labor/71127786007/ 
(viewed October 21, 2023).
    \6\ Craig A. Morris, A Tale of a Fish from Two Countries, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Blog Archives (posted December 5, 2016), 
https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2016/12/05/tale-fish-two-countries; see 
also Frank Asche et al., China's Seafood Exports: Not for Domestic 
Consumption?, Science, DOI: 10.1126/science.abl4756 (January 28, 202).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The report that suppliers to U.S. agencies import seafood from 
China is not surprising. The rest of the U.S. market imports 75 percent 
to 80 percent of its seafood.\7\ China is the leading exporter to the 
United States,\8\ which is China's second-leading export market (after 
Japan).\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ NOAA Fisheries, US Aquaculture, Current Status of Seafood, 
updated September 20, 2022, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/
aquaculture/us-aquaculture (viewed October 15, 2023).
    \8\ China exported 377,3221,296 kg to the United States in 2022). 
NOAA Fisheries, Foreign Fishery Trade Data, Foreign Trade, 2022 (search 
for all species and all countries), https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/
national/sustainable-fisheries/foreign-fishery-trade-data (viewed 
October 15, 2023).
    \9\ The value of China's exports to the United States was $1.87bn 
out of $16.12bn total exports in 2021. USDA Foreign Agriculture 
Service, 2021 China's Fishery Report, Report Number: CH2021-0176, 15, 
Table 11. China: Exports of Seafood Products by Country of Destination 
(December 22, 2021), available at https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/
api/Report/
DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=2021%20China%27s%20Fishery%20Report--
Beijing--China%20-%20People%27s%20Republic%20of--12-17-2021 (viewed 
October 20, 2023).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Federal procurement of seafood

    So how much seafood does the federal government purchase? There is 
no clear statistic. The overlapping search filters on USAspending.gov 
indicate which agencies are most likely to purchase seafood, but they 
are not accurate as stand-alone measures. The following are dollar 
amounts of federal procurement since fiscal year 9, just over 5 years.

        The industry codes for wholesale trade in seafood and seafood 
preparation/packaging also show USDA in the lead: Agriculture $1.046 
billion, Justice $2.4 million, Defense $1.2 million, Smithsonian 
$82,000, and Veterans $57,000.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ USAspending.gov, search parameters for FY2019-24, NAICS 3117 
for seafood processing/packaging and NAICS 424460 for wholesale trade 
in seafood (viewed October 21, 2023).

        The product codes for direct purchase of meat, poultry and 
fish shows Defense in the lead: Defense, $2.4 million, Agriculture 
$1.046 billion, Justice $1.2 million, and Veterans $54,000.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ USAspending.gov, search parameters for FY2019-24, PSC 8905 for 
meat, fish and poultry (viewed October 21, 2023).

        The service code for accommodation and food would include 
seafood as a very small percentage of a big absolute number. It shows 
Defense in the lead, $5.9 billion, Homeland Security $403 million, 
State $394 million, Agriculture $391 million, Veterans $139 million, 
and Justice $48,000.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ USAspending.gov, search parameters for FY2019-24, PSC 72 for 
accommodation and food service (viewed October 21, 2023).

    In sum, USDA appears to lead the other agencies in terms of direct 
purchase of seafood, in the range of $1 billion over a 5-year period.
    Since July 2022, USDA has invited bids entitled Pacific Seafood 
Products (8/3/22), Salmon Products (6/15/23), Pollock Products (11/17/
22), Shrimp Products (12/13/22), Salmon Products (12/22/22), Groundfish 
Products (3/2/23), Pollock Products (5/9/23), Section 32 Purchase of 
Salmon and Pollock Products (6/14/23), and Section 32 Purchase of 
Rockfish and Shrimp Products & CCC Pollock and Haddock (6/15/23), and 
Salmon Products (9/15/23).\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service, Open Purchase Requests 
for Seafood, https://www.ams.usda.gov/open-purchase-
request?field_term_grades_and_standards_target
_id=865 (viewed October 3, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To illustrate one example, the June 2023 ``Section 32 Purchase of 
Salmon Products'' requested fixed-price bids for Pacific Seafood Items, 
Alaska Sockeye (Red) Salmon Products (Canned) and Alaska Sockeye (Red) 
Salmon Products (Fillets).\14\ The award of this procurement listed 
F.O.B. distribution to food assistance programs at various locations in 
the United States. Awards totaled 1,269 discrete delivery locations 
with a total procurement value of over $70 million (estimate).\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ USDA, Solicitation--Domestic Commodity Invitation, 
Description: 12-3J14-23-B-0467, Bid invitation number: 2000009419, 
Purchasing Group: AMS-Livestock (Start date: June 15, 2023), available 
at https://www.ams.usda.gov//sites/default/files/2000009419%20-
%20Bid%20Invitation.pdf (viewed July 27, 2023).
    \15\ USDA, 2000009419-3, Reports :: Bid Array, Archive Date: 2024-
01-12, https://usda.jaggaer.com/clearview/
usda_domestic_2000009419_3_1689170424?p=reports_bid_
array;menu=1318;scenario=2 (viewed July 23, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The pre-solicitation announcement provided this notice of the Buy-
American regulation:

        ``Pursuant to Agricultural Acquisition Regulation (AGAR) 
        470.103(b), commodities and the products of agricultural 
        commodities acquired under this contract must be a product of 
        the United States and shall be considered to be such a product 
        if it is grown, processed, and otherwise prepared for sale or 
        distribution exclusively in the United States.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service, Pre-Solicitation 
Announcement for Section 32 Purchase of Salmon Products (May ll, 2023), 
https://www.ams.usda.gov/content/pre-
solicitation_announcement-section-32-purchase-salmon-products.

    The solicitation notice also required full transparency of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
processing facilities at the bidding stage:

        Offerors who intend to use more than one processing plant and 
        shipping point for contracts awarded under this solicitation, 
        other than the processing plant and shipping point entered in 
        their bids, may submit a list of their approved processing 
        plants and shipping points on a separate sheet of paper to be 
        uploaded in WBSCM, and to be submitted with their bids.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ USDA, Solicitation, Bid invitation number: 2000009419, at 1-2 
(see above).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. USDA comments on reports of forced labor

    The Outlaw Ocean reporters asked USDA to comment on their evidence 
that some USDA suppliers were importing from processors that used 
forced labor in China. USDA replied that all the fish that it purchases 
``must be grown and processed in the United States or its territories'' 
as required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).\18\ When the 
reporters followed up with more specific questions, the agency replied 
that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Appendix 1, Outlaw Ocean, Discussion, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.

        1.  USDA requires that seafood products be sourced in U.S. 
        waters by U.S. flagged vessels, which it confirms with onsite 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        audits.

        2.  The audits verify that processing facilities are based in 
        the U.S. or its territories.

        3.  For documentation, contractors are required to provide 
        documents during audits that show compliance with requirements 
        including domestic origin.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ For the detailed email exchange, see id.

    The USDA comments imply that the Buy American Act is an antidote to 
forced labor goods, specifically in seafood supply chains. On a 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
technical level, the USDA comments invite questions for a closer look:

        What is the site of an onsite audit? The contractor's business 
office? A sampling of fishing vessels? A sampling of processing 
facilities? All facilities? In other words, are these audits any more 
effective than the audits that failed, as shown by Outlaw Ocean's 
reporting (e.g., audits by the Marine Stewardship Council, Sedex, and 
several wholesalers).

        Does verification of processing based on a declaration of 
intent before performance establish ``domestic origin'' as performance 
actually happened? Does ``domestic origin'' include both catch of 
seafood in U.S. waters and processing of that seafood in U.S. 
territory?

        How would an auditor find out whether a contractor requested 
use of foreign processing based on non-availability of that processing 
in U.S. territory? Do USDA contract officers keep records of 
determination of availability?

    The more substantive question is, what is the domestic-origin 
requirement? If a purchase is made under procurement rules that allow 
foreign processing of fish, then there would be no domestic processing, 
and thus, no audit of domestic processing.
    Section 2 below looks into the ``requirement'' of purely domestic 
sourcing and the several exceptions to that rule that allow contractors 
to source seafood from foreign processors. Section 3 follows that with 
a summary of federal rules that prohibit procurement of goods produced 
with forced labor.

2. Exceptions to the Buy American Act

a. Federal agency procurement

    The Buy American Act requires agencies to purchase only ``domestic 
end products'' for public use in the United States. The BAA is 
implemented through the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and 
additional agency rules, including the Department of Agriculture 
(AGAR).\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ 41 U.S.C. ch. 83; FAR 25.002 Policy; Subpart 425.1--Buy 
American Act--Supplies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    USDA requires that all commodities acquired for use by the Food and 
Nutrition Service [USDA Marketing Service] must be a product of the 
United States, ``except as may otherwise be required by law, and shall 
be considered to be such a product if it is grown, processed, and 
otherwise prepared for sale or distribution exclusively in the United 
States . . . '' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ AGAR, 470.103(b) Exceptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A preliminary question is whether all U.S.-caught seafood is a 
domestic end product, regardless of where it is processed. The answer 
is no, to be a domestic end product, seafood must be ``processed and 
prepared . . . exclusively in the United States.'' \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ AGAR 470.103(b) Use by the Food and Nutrition Service and (d) 
Product derived from animals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are three exceptions to the Buy-American mandate: (1) if the 
supply is not adequate, (2) if domestic prices are unreasonable, and 
(3) if the product is for resale in stores.

    (1) Inadequate supply

        (a)  ``The Buy American statute does not apply with respect to 
        . . . supplies if . . . , either as end items or components, 
        [they] are not . . . produced in the United States in 
        sufficient and reasonably available commercial quantities and 
        of a satisfactory quality.'' \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ FAR 25.103(b) Nonavailability.

        (b)  ``The head of the contracting activity may make a 
        determination that [a] supply is not . . . produced in the 
        United States in sufficient and reasonably available commercial 
        quantities of a satisfactory quality. A determination is not 
        required before January 1, 2030, if there is an offer for a 
        foreign end product that exceeds 55 percent domestic content.'' 
        \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ FAR 25.103(b)(2); see FAR 25.106(b)(2). While domestic content 
is not explicitly defined, the FAR determines the amount of domestic 
content based on the percent of the cost of all components. FAR 
25.101(a) General. (``he cost of its components mined, produced, or 
manufactured in the United States exceeds 60 percent of the cost of all 
its components . . . '')

    Let's interpret that language. The contract office may determine 
that a seafood product is not available in sufficient quantities. But a 
determination is not required before 2023.
    That latter phrase is ambiguous; it could be read two ways.

        The first is that a formal, written determination is not 
required before 2030. If so, then decisions about availability will not 
be traceable. They will become invisible decisions until 2030.

        The second is that a decision about domestic availability is 
not required at all before 2030, so long as the product from a foreign 
processor exceeds 55 percent domestic content.

    The first is a blow to transparency, and the second is a loophole 
for foreign processors. In practice, the two meanings may be 
equivalent.
    In the case of seafood, a contractor could assert that the U.S.-
caught fish is available, but the domestic processing capacity is not. 
Imagine the conversation: Domestic processing has become too expensive. 
So why not process the fish in China? The processing won't exceed 45 
percent of the total cost. Besides, no one will ever know the 
difference.

    (a) Unreasonable prices

    A reasonably priced domestic product is not available if the lowest 
domestic offer is more than 20 percent higher than the lowest foreign 
offer (or 30 percent higher for a small business bidder). For example, 
if the domestic price from a large business is 21 percent higher than 
the lowest foreign offer, it is not reasonable. The agency must accept 
the lower foreign offer.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ FAR 25.103(c) Unreasonable cost; FAR 25.106(b)(1) Determining 
reasonableness of cost. For Seafood Product Preparation and Packaging 
(NAICS 311710) the threshold for small business is 750 employees or 
less. FAR 2.101 Definitions, ``Small business concern'' incorporates 13 
CFR Part 121 Small business size regulations; 13 CFR 121.201 What size 
standards has SBA identified by North American Industry Classification 
Systems codes?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If there is no reasonably priced domestic offer, then a foreign 
offer that uses U.S.-caught seafood would enjoy a 20 percent price 
preference over a competing foreign product--so long as it has at least 
55 percent domestic content (the value of the raw seafood).\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ FAR 25.106(b)(2)(ii); see FAR 25.101(a) General.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The question here is, what is the cost advantage of processing 
seafood in a low-wage country like China? A more severe question is, 
how much more advantage can Chinese processors gain by participating in 
forced-labor schemes with workers from Xinjiang and North Korea? Is 
that advantage likely to exceed 20 percent compared to U.S. domestic 
processing?
    I was unable to find any recent cost comparisons of fish processing 
in low-wage countries. A study done in 1995 indicates that the wages 
can range from 6 to 18 percent of total product costs, with U.S. costs 
on the high end.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Aurora Zugarramurdi, Maria A. Parin, Hector M. Lupin, Economic 
engineering applied to the fishery industry-4. Production Cost, 103, 
Table 4.6 (Food & Agriculture Organization, 1995), https://
www.google.com/books/edition/Economic_Engineering_Applied_to_the_Fish/
a4lUTm1-f9kC?hl=en&gbpv=1 (viewed October 21, 2023).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Resale in stores

    The Buy-American Act does not apply to agency procurement of 
seafood for resale in a commissary at military bases or other 
government-authorized retail stores. This is because resale to 
consumers is not a public use (e.g., a public feeding program).\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ FAR 25.003; FAR 25.102 (Buy-American policy requires ``only 
domestic end products for public use inside the United States.'') The 
FAR does not define ``commissary,'' but other federal regulations refer 
to ``Authorized resale outlets (military commissary stores, Armed 
Forces exchanges and like activities of other Government departments 
and agencies). See 41 CFR 51-6.4.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Grants to State and local governments

    The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) buys about 20 percent of 
fish that is served in schools. The remaining 80 percent is purchased 
with Federal funds by local buyers who rely on many of the same 
importers.\29\ There is no exception for local buyers to buy foreign 
seafood because there is no requirement to Buy American.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Appendix 2, Outlaw Ocean, Methodology.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (1) School food authorities

    When spending funds under the National School Lunch Program, local 
school food authorities and state distributing agencies are required to 
buy domestic commodities or products ``to the maximum extent 
practicable.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ 7 CFR 210.21(d)(2) Procurement. A domestic agricultural 
commodity is produced in the United States, and a domestic food product 
is processed in the United States substantially using agricultural 
commodities that are produced in the United States. 7 CFR 210.21(d)(1). 
See also 2 CFR 250.17(e) Use of funds obtained incidental to donated 
food distribution.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) Other recipients of Federal funds

    When spending federal funds generally, state and local governments 
``should, to the greatest extent practicable'' provide a preference for 
goods produced in the United States.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ 2 CFR 200.322 Domestic preferences for procurements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This ``practicable'' standard amounts to a recommended practice; 
they ``should'' rather than ``must.'' \32\ It is not a constraint on 
local purchasers that seek a price advantage from purchasing foreign-
sourced fish. Local authorities are likely to purchase directly or 
indirectly from the same importers who sell to neighboring businesses 
that Outlaw Ocean reporting has linked to forced labor--the likes of 
Food Lion, Giant Foods, Gordon Food Service, Harris Tweeter, IGA, 
Kroger, Sysco, and US Foods.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ 2 CFR 200.101(b) Applicability to different types of Federal 
awards.
    \33\ Outlaw Ocean, Bait-to-Plate sourcing tool, https://
www.theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-superpower-of-seafood/
bait-to-plate/#buyers (viewed October 21, 2023).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Forced-labor prohibition in procurement

    The FAR prohibits procurement of goods made with the benefit of 
trafficking, which includes forced labor.\34\ Trafficking is a 
composite of related harms that include commercial sex, forced labor, 
fraud, and the worst forms of child labor.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ FAR 22.1504 (Violations and remedies); Exec. Order No. 13,126, 
Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured 
Child Labor (June 12, 1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 32383 (June 16, 1999).
    \35\ FAR 22.1703 (Combat human trafficking--policy); FAR 22.1704 
(Violations and remedies). ``Severe forms of trafficking in persons'' 
means ``(1) Sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by 
force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform 
such act has not attained 18 years of age; or (2) The recruitment, 
harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for 
labor services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the 
purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, 
or slavery.''

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Definition of forced labor

    The FAR waters down the definition of forced labor in comparison to 
the ILO's definition. In the FAR:

         `` `Forced labor' means knowingly providing or obtaining the 
        labor or services of a person--(1) By threats of serious harm 
        to, or physical restraint against, that person or another 
        person; (2) By means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended 
        to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not 
        perform such labor or services, that person or another person 
        would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.'' \36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ FAR 22.1702 Definitions.

    In contrast to ``threats of serious harm,'' the ILO requires only a 
``menace of penalty.'' Many elements of the Chinese labor schemes for 
Uyghurs and other Turkic and Muslim-majority peoples appear to violate 
both definitions of forced labor. Yet the FAR definition is 
qualitatively less comprehensive when it comes to coercion that does 
not involve threats or physical restraint. For example, it is not clear 
whether serious harm includes being fired or canceling a work visa if a 
worker refuses to work overtime. Similarly, it is not clear whether 
physical restraint includes locking factory doors during working hours 
or other constraints on freedom of movement.
    The FAR's definition of forced labor is also inconsistent with the 
definition in the Tariff Act of 1930, which prohibits import of goods 
produced with convict, forced, or indentured labor.\37\ The Tariff Act 
is the foundation for the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Section 307 of Title III, Chapter 497 (46 Stat. 689); Tariff 
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1307.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Prevention plans

    The FAR requires certain contractors to have a plan to prevent 
forced labor, but this is limited to contracts for products or services 
acquired outside of U.S. territory that exceed $500,000.\38\ No 
prevention plan is required when there is evidence that a product is 
being imported to the United States from a region or a business that 
has a high-risk of forced labor. Nor is there any link between 
procurement and the high-risk sectors identified under the UFPLA or the 
list of entities known to have connections with forced-labor schemes in 
Xinjiang.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ FAR 22.1703(c) Policy.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. The fix-it list

a. Implement procurement tools

    (1) Exceptions to the Buy American Act

        (a)   Non-availability--Close the ``non-availability'' gap \39\ 
        by requiring agency contract officers to:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ This would entail rulemaking by the FAR Council of FAR 
25.103(b) Nonavailability.

                 i.   formally determine when domestic products are not 
                available (prior to 2030 when they must do it anyway), 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                and

                ii.   determine availability based on both domestic 
                content of a product and domestic processing of a 
                product.

        (b)   Reasonable prices--Enable agency contract offices to 
        waive the rule on reasonable prices from foreign suppliers \40\ 
        (the 20-percent range) when there is evidence that a supply 
        chain poses a high risk of human trafficking or forced labor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ This would entail rulemaking by the FAR Council of FAR 
25.103(c) Unreasonable cost; FAR 25.106(b)(1) Determining 
reasonableness of cost.

    (2) Compliance with the FAR's prohibition of trafficking and forced 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
labor

        (a)   Apply the UFLPA presumption of forced labor to bidders 
        and suppliers of contractors in U.S. government 
        procurement.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ This would entail rulemaking by the FAR Council of FAR 22.1703 
Policy and FAR 11.1704 Violations and remedies. See the pending 
legislation introduced by Senators Rubio and Merkley, S. 1770, the 
Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act of 2023, Sec. 10. 
Prohibition on certain United States government agency contracts.

        (b)   Require a trafficking and forced-labor prevention plan 
        for high-risk imports, starting with seafood and priority 
        sectors for UFPLA enforcement. The FAR already provides for 
        prevention plans in limited circumstances (services provided 
        abroad in contracts over $500,000).\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ FAR 22.1703(c) Policy.

        (c)   Define forced labor for procurement consistently with its 
        definition in the Tariff Act and the ILO Convention--based on 
        the menace of a penalty, rather than explicit threats.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ This would entail rulemaking by the FAR Council of FAR 22.1702 
Definitions.

        (d)   Do not recognize ``social audits'' as evidence of 
        compliance if (1) the auditor is paid by the supplier, or (2) 
        the auditor fails to conduct confidential interviews with 
        workers using strict protocols to avoid coercion by 
        employers.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ See Testimony of Scott Nova, Executive Director of the Worker 
Rights Consortium, Hearing of the Senate Committee on Finance: Ending 
Trade that Cheats American Workers By Modernizing Trade Laws and 
Enforcement, Fighting Forced Labor, Eliminating Counterfeits, and 
Leveling the Playing Field, 13-14 (February 16, 2023), https://
www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
2023.02.16%20Nova%20Testimony%20for%20Customs%20Hearing.pdf (viewed 
October 21, 2023).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        (e)   Develop NOAA audit protocols for USDA purchasing.

    (3) Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006--
Fully implement the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act 
of 2006 (FFATA), in which Congress mandated transparency of federal 
suppliers and sub-suppliers down to contracts of $25,000. However, the 
Office of Management and Budget used rulemaking to exclude most 
supplier subcontracts.\45\ Congress could re-assert its transparency 
obligation by:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-282, 2(b)(1)(D), 120 Stat. 1186, 1187 (2006); Reporting 
Executive Compensation and First-Tier Subcontract Awards, 77 Fed. Reg. 
at 44052-53.

        (a)   clarifying that public disclosure of contractors and 
        subcontractors applies not only to prime contractors (first-
        tier), but also to all subcontractors and their suppliers 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        (second and third tier),

        (b)   requiring Federal contractors to disclose their full 
        government supply chains, either on USAspending.gov or Open 
        Supply Hub, a neutral transparency platform,\46\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Open Supply Hub, Explore Global Supply Chain Data, https://
opensupplyhub.org/, and OSH, Civil Society, https://
info.opensupplyhub.org/civil-society (viewed October 23, 2023).

        (c)   requiring broader public disclosure of records of 
        shipments to the U.S. from overseas suppliers as a way of 
        providing the government and public with the means to verify 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        the completeness and accuracy of brand disclosures.

    (4) Need for a human rights strategy in procurement

    As noted above, U.S. procurement law prohibits purchase of goods 
made with human trafficking and forced labor.\47\ The law requires 
contract managers to require greater transparency on high-risk 
contracts by writing a prevention plan and reporting any 
investigations. However, a GAO audit found that agencies were 
completely unaware of their duties under this law.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ 47 FAR 22.1503, 52.222-50.
    \48\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Should Address 
Weaknesses in Oversight of Contractors and Reporting of Investigations 
Related to Contracts (Washington: GAO-21-546, 2021), 1, 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Contract officers do not have the time, human rights expertise, 
corporate-affiliation data, or trade data they need to monitor 
suppliers' compliance with human rights obligations. Other countries 
have been more creative. For example, Swedish counties have created an 
inter-agency SWAT team to oversee its human rights standards.\49\ And 
over 900 European universities and government entities have affiliated 
with Electronics Watch to monitor and enforce their ITC procurement 
codes.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ See Pauline Gothberg, Public Procurement and Human Rights in 
the Healthcare Sector: The Swedish County Councils' Collaborative Model 
(London: Edward Elgar 2019), 165-179.
    \50\ Electronics Watch, Affiliates, https://electronicswatch.org/en 
(viewed October 21, 2023); Id, What We Do; Id, Monitoring Partners; Id, 
Electronics Watch Contract Conditions with Guidance for Contractors 
(EW, June 2020).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Implement the UFLPA

    Reforming the mechanics of the Federal Acquisition Regulation is a 
heavy lift, and the forum for doing so (the OMB) is dedicated to saving 
money, not saving lives. It should be easier to persuade U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection to implement already authorized elements of the 
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. No ``reform'' is necessary. The 
challenge is to just do it--understanding that the agency has been 
swamped by evidence that importers are sourcing from Xinjiang and from 
facilities in other parts of China connected to forced labor. Several 
ideas have been presented to this committee (and DHS) by Dr. Laura 
Murphy of Sheffield Hallam University, and to the Senate Finance 
Committee by Scott Nova at the Worker Rights Consortium. These and 
other published reports are posted in the online library of the 
Coalition to End Forced Labour in the Uyghur Region.\51\ Here is a 
thumbnail sketch for two of their recommendations: \52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ Coalition to End Forced Labour in the Uyghur Region, https://
enduyghurforcedlabour.org/ (viewed October 21, 2023).
    \52\ For a broader overview of UFPLA reforms, see Marti Flacks, 
What's Next for the Uyghur Forced LaborPrevention Act? (CSIS, June 21, 
2023), https://www.csis.org/analysis/whats-next-uyghur-forced-labor-
prevention-act (viewed October 21, 2023).

    (1) Known entities--The UFPLA's presumption of forced labor is 
triggered by doing business with a ``known entity'' implicated in 
forced labor or importing products with any content from Xinjiang.\53\ 
The original list of known entities was based on CBP's past withhold-
release orders (WROs) or Commerce Department actions. The first list, 
issued June 2022, included 20 known entities. Two months earlier, Dr. 
Murphy's team sent the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF) 
evidence of 55,000 Xinjiang entities doing business in the Uyghur 
Region and 150 businesses that participate in state-sponsored labor-
transfer programs that are tantamount to forced labor.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Operational Guidance for 
Importers, 4-5 (June 13, 2022); Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, 
Pub. L. No. 117-78, 135 Stat. 1529, 2(d)(2)(B)(ii) and Sec. -3(a).
    \54\ Testimony of Professor Laura T. Murphy, Sheffield Hallam 
University, Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Hearing of 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China: Implementation of the 
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and the Impact on Global Supply 
Chains, 3 (April 18, 2023), available at https://www.cecc.gov/events/
hearings/implementation-of-the-uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act-and-
the-impact-on-global (viewed October 21, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yet the list has expanded by only seven entities. Obviously, the 
FLETF must triage its workload, and it needs to establish an efficient 
process for vigorously expanding the known-entity list. Quality of 
evidence matters, and entities cited in high-profile reports by Outlaw 
Ocean, Sheffield Hallam University, and others merit additions to the 
known-entity list.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ See Testimony of Scott Nova, Executive Director of the Worker 
Rights Consortium, Hearing of the Senate Committee on Finance: Ending 
Trade that Cheats American Workers By Modernizing Trade Laws and 
Enforcement, Fighting Forced Labor, Eliminating Counterfeits, and 
Leveling the Playing Field, 9-10 (February 16, 2023), https://
www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
2023.02.16%20Nova%20Testimony%20for%20Customs%20Hearing.pdf (viewed 
October 21, 2023).

    (2) High-priority sectors--The FLETF monitors and develops an 
enforcement plan for high-priority sectors, which include apparel, 
cotton and cotton products, silica-based products, and tomatoes and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
downstream products.\56\

    \56\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2023 Updates to the 
Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or 
Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People's Republic of China--
Report to Congress 9-11 (July 26, 2023); Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention 
Act, Pub. L. No. 117-78, 135 Stat. 1529, 2(d)(2)(B)(viii) and (ix). See 
Scott Nova testimony, 11-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    No new priority sectors have been added since the UFPLA was first 
implemented. The Outlaw Ocean reporting makes an urgent case that the 
FLETF should adopt seafood as the next priority sector. Moreover, the 
reporting and interactive tools provide elements that CBP could 
incorporate into its own monitoring and enforcement strategy.

c. Expand the Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP)

    (1) Scope of SIMP--The SIMP requires disclosure of seafood imports 
for 1,100 unique species, categorized in 13 species groups, that are 
vulnerable to illegal fishing, seafood fraud, or both. SIMP covers 
about half of all seafood imports into the United States. SIMP species 
groups include Abalone, Atlantic cod, Blue crab (Atlantic), Dolphinfish 
(Mahi Mahi), Grouper, King crab (red), Pacific cod, Red snapper, Sea 
cucumber, Sharks, Shrimp, Swordfish, and Tuna (Albacore, Bigeye, 
Skipjack, Yellowfin, Bluefin).\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ NOAA Fisheries, Seafood Import Monitoring Program, https://
www.fisheries.noaa.gov/international/seafood-import-monitoring-program 
(viewed October 21, 2023).

    (2) Gaps in coverage--In light of the Outlaw Ocean reporting, it 
becomes clear that SIMP is not designed to cover species connected with 
forced labor, in part because most of these are not at risk of 
extinction from illegal fishing. Not covered by SIMP are squid and the 
species that are purchased by USDA including Haddock, Pacific Rockfish, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pacific Whiting, Pollock, Salmon, and various groundfish.

    (3) NOAA proposed rule--In December 2022, NOAA reported that 
``shrimp and tuna (Albacore, Bigeye, Bluefin, Skipjack and Yellowfin) 
are the most predominant species that are entering U.S. markets and 
that are vulnerable to forced labor in the supply chain.'' With shrimp 
and tuna already on the SIMP list, NOAA proposed adding additional tuna 
species to the list.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ NOAA, Notice of Proposed Rule, Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act; Seafood Import Monitoring Program, 87 
FR 79836-79848, 50 CFR 300, Agency/Docket No. 221215-0273, RIN:0648-
BK85, Document No. 2022-27741, available at https://
www.Federalregister.gov/documents/2022/12/28/2022-27741/magnuson-
stevens-fishery-conservation-and-management-act-seafood-import-
monitoring-program (viewed October 21, 2023).

    (4) Need to significantly expand SIMP--A coalition of leading civil 
society organizations replied to the NOAA proposal by calling for 
several major expansions of SIMP. They provided 19 pages of commentary 
and recommendations, including these among others: \59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ Comment on NOAA-NMFS-2022-0119, RIN: 0648-BK85, submitted by 
World Wildlife Fund, Oceana, Greenpeace, International Corporate 
Accountability Roundtable, Azul, Conservation International, and Global 
Labor Justice/International Labor Rights Fund (March 28, 2023), https:/
/www.regulations.gov/comment/NOAA-NMFS-2022-0119-2163 (viewed October 
21, 2023).

        (a)   Cover of all species of seafood imports, whether by land, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        air, or sea,

        (b)   Report unique vessel identifiers to enable traceability,

        (c)   Deepen supply chain reporting requirements such as the 
        provenance of fish feed used in aquaculture.

        (d)   Address forced labor by disclosing the country or 
        regional fishery management organization (RFMO) where the 
        fishing occurs, the home country of the fishers, and the 
        countries where the fish may be processed or consumed,

        (e)   Require recordkeeping of worker and crew manifests at 
        sea, proof of minimum age requirements (18 or older), duration 
        of work at sea (less than 3 months), and proof of grievance 
        mechanisms, and

        (f)   Increase transparency on SIMP audit procedures.

    (5) Need for international cooperation--Congress directed the 
Departments of State and Commerce to report on human trafficking, 
including forced labor, in seafood supply chains. The agencies reported 
(December 2020) on the need to expand seafood transparency beyond 
traditional health and environmental concerns, both domestically and in 
terms of international cooperation. They identified 29 countries that 
pose a significant risk of forced labor in their seafood supply chains: 
Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ecuador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, 
Guinea, Honduras, Indonesia, Ireland, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania, 
North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the People's Republic of 
China, Philippines, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ Report to Congress Human Trafficking in the Seafood Supply 
Chain Section 3563 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2020 (Pub. L. 116-92), available at https://
www.fisheries.noaa.gov/international/international-affairs/forced-
labor-and-seafood-supply-chain (viewed October 21, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Appendix 4 of the DOS/DOC report includes technical recommendations 
to deter human trafficking and forced labor outside of U.S. waters. 
This Commission could ask the multi-agency group focusing on seafood to 
comment on how the Outlaw Ocean reporting relates to their 
recommendations and strategy for deterrence.
    It would be ironic if the result of stronger U.S. measures against 
forced-labor imports merely resulted in those goods being shipped to 
other countries. Outlaw Ocean's reporting highlights the need to expand 
border bans, similar to the UFLPA and Tariff Act, among other 
countries. The U.S. government should work with trading partners to 
ensure no country is a dumping ground for fish processed with Uyghur 
forced labor.\61\ The UFPLA model will be truly effective when other 
countries follow suit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ Section 4(b)(1) of the UFLPA requires the U.S. Government 
strategy for implementation of the law to include ``a plan to enhance 
bilateral and multilateral coordination, including sustained engagement 
with the governments of United States partners and allies, to end 
forced labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, and members of 
other persecuted groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Appendix 1

                  The Outlaw Ocean Project Discussion

U.S. Department of Agriculture \62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ The Outlaw Ocean Project, Discussion, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, https://www.theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-
superpower-of-seafood/discussion/#us-
department-of-agriculture (viewed October 20, 2023).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
July 10, 2023

    Email sent to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Acting Deputy 
Director of Communications, Ed Curlett. The email outlined procurement 
contracts awarded by the USDA to five seafood companies whose supply 
chains are linked to Uyghur forced labor, and that the U.S. has 
prohibited the import of goods produced by forced labor. The email also 
asked for comment.

July 13, 2023

    Paige at the U.S. Department of Agriculture press office replied: 
``Thank you for reaching out. I'm looping you with Allan Rodriguez, 
USDA's Press Secretary.'' July 13, 2023: Allan Rodriguez emailed: 
``USDA is committed to preventing forced labor and human trafficking. 
All agricultural products, including fish, purchased by USDA for use in 
food assistance programs are procured in accordance with the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) System, and must be grown and processed in 
the United States or its territories. The FAR implements procurement-
related aspects of various statutes and Executive Orders, including 
those addressing forced or indentured child labor and the trafficking 
of persons. Thanks, Allan [Quoted text hidden] [Quoted text hidden] 
USDA includes FAR-prescribed contract terms regarding combatting human 
trafficking which outlines required notifications, contractual 
remedies, and contractor compliance with U.S. Government policy.''

July 19, 2023

    Email sent to USDA Press Secretary Allan Rodriguez for further 
clarification on the USDA's statement. The email asked: 1. As we have 
identified five companies in the U.S. that are major providers of 
seafood to the USDA and these companies rely heavily, if not 
exclusively, on processing in China, how does the USDA ensure that all 
the seafood they're providing through these contracts is processed in 
U.S.-based processing facilities? 2. Does the USDA verify this 
independently or do you rely on the contracted company to provide the 
verification? 3. If the latter, what types of information or 
documentation are required from the contractor to verify the country of 
origin and location of processing of the seafood provided under USDA 
contract?

July 20, 2023

    The Outlaw Ocean Project replied to say yes, that was fine.

July 21, 2023

    Allan Rodriguez replied with the following answers:

    1. USDA requires that our seafood products be sourced in U.S. 
waters by U.S. flagged vessels and produced in U.S. establishments 
approved by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Seafood Inspection 
Program. USDA ensures this requirement is met by conducting pre-and 
post-production, onsite audits.

    2. USDA and the Department of Commerce verify requirements are 
being followed by conducting onsite pre-production and post-production 
audits to ensure that contractual, technical, and operational 
requirements of each Department are met. In addition to verifying 
compliance with requirements, these onsite audits verify that 
processing facilities are based in the U.S. or its territories.

    3. Each contractor must declare the production facilities and 
shipping points they intend to use to produce products for USDA. In 
addition to onsite verification, contractors are required to provide 
documents during audits that show compliance with contractual, 
technical, and operational requirements including domestic origin. 
Contractors that source seafood from both U.S. and international waters 
or flagged vessels must have a segregation plan in place that ensures 
only seafood sourced from U.S. waters and flagged vessels is provided 
to USDA's food purchase program.

U.S. Department of Defense \63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ The Outlaw Ocean Project, Discussion, U.S. Department of 
Defense, https://www.theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-
superpower-of-seafood/discussion/#us-
department-of-defense (viewed October 20, 2023).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
July 12, 2023

    Email sent to the U.S. Department of Defense regarding procurement 
contracts awarded to Sysco.
    The email said that Sysco sells Ruggiero and High Liner seafood; 
Ruggiero and High Liner have imported seafood from Chinese processors 
connected to Uyghur forced labor. The email also asked for comment.

U.S. Department of Justice \64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ The Outlaw Ocean Project, Discussion, U.S. Department of 
Justice, https://www.theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-
superpower-of-seafood/discussion/#us-
department-of-justice (viewed October 20, 2023).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
July 10, 2023

    Query sent to the U.S. Department of Justice via the online form 
required for media queries.
    The email outlined procurement contracts awarded by the Bureau of 
Prisons to a seafood company whose supply chain is linked to Uyghur 
forced labor, Channel Fish Processing, and that the U.S. has prohibited 
the import of goods produced by forced labor. The email also asked for 
comment.

                               Appendix 2

                        The Outlaw Ocean Project
                            Methodology \65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ The Outlaw Ocean Project, Methodology, https://
www.theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-superpower-of-seafood/
methodology/#method-discussion (viewed October 20, 2023).

How did the investigation calculate the total number of seafood plants 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
connected to Xinjiang forced labor?

    We found user-generated content posted in the last 12 months 
showing Xinjiang minorities working at ten seafood enterprises, for 
which we also had state media and/or company statements describing 
Xinjiang labor transfers. The ten plants are operated by five corporate 
entities, and each group owns two facilities:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Company name                       Corporate Group
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qingdao Lian Yang Aquatic Products Co.   Tianyuan
 Ltd..
Qingdao Tianyuan Aquatic Products Co.    Tianyuan
 Ltd..
Rizhao Jiayuan Foodstuff Co. Ltd.......  Shandong Meijia
Rizhao Meijia Keyuan Foods Co. Ltd.....  Shandong Meijia
Rizhao Rirong Aquatic Products Co. Ltd.  Rongsense
Rizhao Rongxing Food Co. Ltd...........  Rongsense
Rongcheng Haibo Ocean Food Co. Ltd.....  Chishan
Shandong Haidu Ocean Food Co. Ltd......  Chishan
Yantai Longwin Foods Co. Ltd...........  Sanko
Yantai Sanko Fisheries Co. Ltd.........  Sanko
------------------------------------------------------------------------

How did the investigation find out about social audits conducted at 
Shandong seafood-processing plants using Xinjiang labor?

    We communicated our findings to hundreds of North American and 
European companies buying seafood from Shandong plants using workers 
from Xinjiang. In many cases, companies pointed to social-audit reports 
to assert there was no evidence of forced labor at the implicated 
factories. We asked importers and their customers to tell us when and 
what types of social audits had been conducted, who had conducted them, 
and what they had found with respect to Xinjiang workers. Although in 
most cases, companies declined to answer our enquiries, usually 
referring to commercial confidentiality, some buyers confirmed audit 
dates, auditor identities, and the standard used (Sedex Members Ethical 
Trade Audit, or SMETA). A few even shared audit reports. In order to 
further ascertain whether Xinjiang workers were being detected by 
social audits, we spoke to the auditors, and standards and 
certification bodies, about our findings.

How did the investigation identify companies importing seafood from 
Chinese processors connected to abuses at sea and on land?

    Trade data allowed us to track exports from processing plants to 
stores and restaurants outside of China. We obtained data from a 
variety of sources, including Chinese customs and private aggregators 
of import data from North American and European countries. We also 
searched company websites for information about customers and export 
approvals. Footage posted to Douyin by workers in seafood plants often 
featured seafood packaging showing useful details like vessel names or 
brand labels. We also used optical character-recognition searches to 
look for examples of packaging and documentation featuring the unique 
export codes of Chinese processing plants (export approval codes and 
health marks issued by government authorities, certification codes 
issued by the Marine Stewardship Council and the Aquaculture 
Stewardship Council).

How did the investigation connect companies importing seafood tainted 
or associated with crimes or other concerns to consumers?

    Trade data told us which companies were importing seafood from 
Chinese suppliers of interest, but in most cases, we needed to look at 
the next link in the chain: the customer of the importer. We searched 
through importers' websites, product catalogs, and social-media 
profiles in order to ascertain who they were supplying. We used 
OpenCorporates, an open database of companies, to identify the 
ownership and corporate structures of companies in the U.S., Canada, 
Europe, and elsewhere. We also used a U.S. Government trademark data 
base and a global brand database to expand our list of brands owned by 
companies importing seafood tainted by forced labor or illegal fishing 
to search across catalogs and online stores for major grocery chains 
and food service groups.
    We identified unique codes for importers--health marks issued by 
market state authorities, certification codes issued by the Marine 
Stewardship Council and the Aquaculture Stewardship Council--and 
conducted optical-character recognition searches for those codes on 
product packaging and commercial documents. We visited dozens of stores 
in 12 states (Alabama, Arkansas, California, the District of Columbia, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, South Carolina, 
Texas, and Virginia) and several countries (Australia, France, Ireland, 
and the United Kingdom) to obtain images of seafood packaging in order 
to establish, using those unique codes, the origin of the seafood. We 
reviewed product listings on major retailer and foodservice distributor 
websites to identify seafood products that were produced or sold by 
target importers and that matched the types of seafood sourced from 
Chinese processors of interest.
    Finally, communications with seafood importers and their 
customers--and, in some cases, the next tier of buyers--helped clarify 
our findings on the connections among fishing vessels, processing 
plants, and global consumers.

How did the investigation connect companies importing seafood tainted 
by or associated with potential crimes or other concerns to public 
procurement chains in North America and Europe?

    We looked at government-contract databases, such as the European 
Union's tender data base, which contains detailed records of tenders 
and contracts for all European Union countries and European agencies, 
and USASpending.gov, which provides federal spending data, to identify 
the main companies supplying frozen seafood to government agencies. We 
used trade data to identify any companies that received procurement 
contracts and also imported from Chinese companies tied to seafood 
associated with potential crimes, including those using Uyghur labor. 
We also investigated major government suppliers' product lists and 
catalogs to ascertain if they were supplied by companies that imported 
seafood associated with potential crimes and risk indicators.
    In the UK, whitefish is supplied by companies associated with our 
investigation to public institutions such as schools and hospitals. The 
supply is typically through intermediaries, working under what are 
known as ``framework agreements'' that identify government-approved 
vendors. Implicated seafood suppliers were identified through reference 
to brand names and the use of unique Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 
codes on primary school menus for 2023 and other documentation.
    U.S. public procurement rules have various exemptions that allow 
local-level buyers for school-lunch or other federally supported 
programs to purchase food and other products if they are looking for 
better options in terms of price, quality, quantity, or availability. 
In the U.S., half of the fish sticks served in public schools have been 
processed in China, according to the Genuine Alaska Pollock Producers, 
an industry group. They said their research was derived from a review 
of purchasing records of their members. States and large school 
districts have historically used USDA grants to buy seafood directly 
from commercial vendors, much of which is sourced through China, the 
organization said. Foods purchased by the USDA have only accounted for 
about 20 percent of what is served in schools, according to the 
organization, which means the remaining 80 percent is purchased mostly 
by local buyers.
                                 ______
                                 

                      Statement of Greg Scarlatoiu

    The witness wishes to thank HRNK team members Ingyu Choe, Mohona 
Ganguly, Raymond Ha, Doohyun (Jake) Kim, Damian Reddy, as well as Jung 
Gwang-il, Ko Young-hwan, Lee Hyun-seung and Ri Jong-ho for their 
invaluable contributions to research, translation, editing, direct 
testimony, and securing testimony from key witnesses in China and North 
Korea.

                           Executive Summary

    Mindful of Section 321 of the Countering America's Adversaries 
Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), ``Sanctions for Forced Labor and 
Slavery Overseas of North Koreans,'' as applied to North Korean workers 
officially dispatched to Chinese seafood processing plants, HRNK 
endeavored to make a preliminary determination as to whether the 
working conditions these workers face are subject to Section 302(b) of 
the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 
9241(b)). We further endeavored to identify Chinese entities that 
employ North Korean laborers, with the aim of determining if such 
entities and individuals in charge meet the criteria under Section 111 
of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7108) 
relating to the prevention of trafficking in persons.
    Until their repatriation began on August 23 or 29, 2023, there were 
thousands of North Korean workers officially dispatched to Chinese 
seafood processing plants. In many cases, these workers processed 
seafood imported from North Korea. The importation of seafood processed 
by North Korean workers in China, seafood exported from North Korea to 
China, or a combination of both, into the United States directly from 
China or relabeled ``Made in Russia'' in the Russian Far East would 
constitute a blatant violation of CAATSA.
    Chinese seafood processing plants are notorious for their reliance 
on forced or indentured labor, including that of North Korean workers. 
For over three decades, North Korea has been officially dispatching 
workers to countries such as Russia, China, and the UAE, where they 
work in factories, restaurants, and in other enterprises to earn 
hundreds of millions of dollars annually for the regime. This is 
despite the various sanctions against overseas North Korean labor, and 
the ban imposed on North Korean overseas workers by the United Nations 
Security Council in 2019. This ban required the immediate expulsion of 
North Korean workers from the countries that were benefiting from their 
labor. \1\ However, despite the severity of these measures, they have 
largely been ignored.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Choe Sang-hun, ``North Koreans Trapped in `State-Sponsored 
Slavery' in Russia,'' The New York Times, April 3, 2023. https://
www.nytimes.com/2023/04/03/world/asia/north-korea-human-rights.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China continues to utilize North Korean overseas labor to the 
fullest extent possible. For instance, as claimed by the Chinese 
government, last year, there were over 80,000 North Korean workers 
residing in one northeastern Chinese city alone. At least 450 of these 
workers were working in seafood processing plants, according to HRNK's 
research. Despite the Chinese government's most ardent efforts to erase 
any mention of these workers on the internet, numerous posts on Chinese 
social media have featured them in some capacity. \2\ According to 
individuals interviewed by HRNK, much of the seafood products that 
these workers process is exported to the United States, which is a 
clear violation of CAATSA and other applicable U.S. legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Ian Urbina, ``The Crimes behind the Seafood You Eat,'' The New 
Yorker, October 9, 2023. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/16/
the-crimes-behind-the-seafood-you-eat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

       North Korean Workers in Chinese Seafood Processing Plants:
                    International Legal Implications

    The dispatch of North Korean workers to Chinese seafood processing 
plants has long been a controversial subject due to its multifaceted 
legal and human rights implications.
    The employment of North Korean workers in Chinese seafood 
processing plants may raise concerns regarding human rights abuses and 
labor exploitation. The International Labour Organization (ILO) sets 
internationally applicable labor standards, including the Forced Labor 
Convention (No. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (No. 
105), which prohibit the use of forced labor. These workers often face 
exploitative conditions, including long working hours, low wages (or 
wages that are appropriated), inadequate safety measures, and limited 
freedom of movement. Such practices contravene the principles of 
various ILO conventions, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR).
    The employment of North Korean workers in Chinese seafood 
processing plants has raised allegations of forced labor and human 
trafficking. There have been reports indicating that workers' passports 
are confiscated by the North Korean authorities, leaving these workers 
vulnerable to exploitation and restricted movement. These actions 
violate Article 4 of the UDHR, which prohibits any slavery or forced 
labor. Such conduct also violates the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons (also known as the Palermo Protocol), 
which condemns any behavior amounting to trafficking in persons.
    The involvement of Chinese seafood processing plants employing 
North Korean labor has also evoked questions relating to international 
economic sanctions imposed on North Korea. These sanctions aim to 
stifle the North Korean government's sources of revenue, including the 
exportation of labor. Thus, the presence of North Korean workers in 
Chinese seafood processing plants could potentially violate these 
sanctions, demanding further international attention and action. The 
international community generally condemns the use of forced labor. 
States and organizations can rely on conventions such as the UDHR, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
to address labor rights violations and protect the rights of North 
Korean workers. Both China and North Korea have ratified the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR. China is a founding member of the ILO, and it has ratified 
Conventions 29 and 105.
    Under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 
(CAATSA), the United States has imposed sanctions on various entities 
involved in North Korean labor exports. The purpose of these sanctions 
is to prevent North Korea from earning foreign currency through labor 
exports, which could be used to fund its nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missile programs. The CAATSA sanctions target not only North Korean 
workers abroad, but also foreign companies and individuals involved in 
their employment. Under Section 321 of CAATSA, the United States 
imposes sanctions on entities involved in ``knowingly employing North 
Korean laborers.'' If Chinese seafood processing plants employ North 
Korean workers, they risk being subjected to U.S. sanctions. This 
provision serves to deter countries from engaging in these practices 
due to the potential economic and reputational consequences.
    The human rights implications for the above conduct include:

    1. Inhumane Working Conditions: North Korean workers dispatched to 
Chinese seafood processing plants often face extremely challenging 
working conditions. Reports suggest that workers are subjected to long 
work hours, harsh treatment, and minimal safety measures, posing a risk 
to their physical and mental well-being. The denial of proper rest and 
breaks violates the workers' right to safe working conditions.

    2. Lack of Freedom and Communication: Workers dispatched from North 
Korea are often isolated. They are allowed limited contact with the 
outside world and their families. As a result, they are unable to 
exercise their right to freedom of movement and communication. This 
isolation also leaves them vulnerable to exploitation and unable to 
seek assistance or redress for any human rights violations they may 
face.

    3. Absence of Labor Rights: The labor rights of these workers, 
including the right to join a trade union and engage in collective 
bargaining, are severely curtailed. This lack of representation 
compromises workers' ability to advocate for fair wages, acceptable 
working conditions, and access to social security benefits.

    Living and Working Conditions for North Korea's Overseas Workers

    North Korean workers must undergo a strenuous process before being 
sent abroad, and suffer from horrific and squalid working and living 
conditions once they cross the border. Overseas positions are highly 
coveted by North Koreans, as the average monthly remittance of $50 to 
$100 makes a considerable difference for their families back home, as 
opposed to the $3 monthly wage they would receive as factory workers in 
North Korea. North Korean workers dispatched to Chinese seafood 
processing plants pocket about $70 a month (500 Chinese yuan). \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Interview with North Korean escapee, October 8, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Selection is a particularly competitive undertaking, as prospective 
workers utilize all available resources to bribe officials into 
allowing them to work overseas on an ``official'' contract. These are 
considered to be ``golden opportunities'' for North Korean workers, who 
are catalyzed into attempting to be dispatched overseas by the 
purported benefits, such as earnings to start businesses in North 
Korea, and even the allure of obtaining ``middle-class status 
symbols,'' such as watches, televisions, and foreign-made rice cookers. 
The average bribe paid to a government official to be dispatched 
overseas is $2,000-$3,000. The workers often come from the dong-yo 
(``wavering'') class in North Korea's songbun system of loyalty-based 
social classification. For these workers, this is a huge amount of 
money. The only option is to borrow it from money lenders and pay it 
back with interest. \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Interview with North Korean escapee, October 9, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One North Korean escapee, Lim Il, recounted his reaction to 
learning he was to be sent overseas to China:

        ``I felt like I had won the lottery,'' he said. ``People 
        fantasized about getting overseas labor jobs . . . . Unless you 
        were an idiot, you wouldn't give up such an opportunity.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Tim Sullivan, Martha Mendoza, and Hyung-Jin Kim, ``NKorean 
Workers Prep Seafood Going to US Stores, Restaurants,'' AP News, August 
21, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/sports-middle-east-canada-europe-
global-trade- 8b493b7df6e147e98d19f3abb5ca090a.

    Once they reach their destination, their passports and any other 
official documents are confiscated by their minders. The minders 
closely monitor them, limiting their freedom of movement and preventing 
them from speaking to other workers. The laborers sometimes work up to 
fourteen to sixteen hours a day. They are given no holidays 
(potentially having one day off a month at most), and they are not paid 
directly by their foreign employers. According to the North Korean 
overseas workers, as well as the former officials who used to supervise 
the process of their expatriation, the North Korean government seized 
up to 90 percent of their salary, leaving a measly 10 percent for the 
workers and their families back home to survive on.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Greg Scarlatoiu, Raymond Ha, and Hyunseung Lee, ``North Korean 
Workers Officially Dispatched to China & Russia,'' The Committee for 
Human Rights in North Korea, September 26, 2022. https://www.hrnk.org/
uploads/pdfs/Overseas_Workers_0926.pdf .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Their living conditions are also inhumane, as laborers are often 
forced to reside in unsanitary and hazardous accommodations provided to 
them by their employers. They can sometimes also be subjected to 
excessive fees to pay for this housing. \7\ Laborers whose wages are 
specifically being used to provide revenue for the North Korean 
government are placed in collective housing arrangements and 
purposefully isolated from other workers of different nationalities. 
After enduring these ruthless conditions, North Korean workers who 
eventually return home are subject to strict surveillance by the 
Ministry of State Security (MSS) for three years. \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``North Korea Sanctions & 
Enforcement Actions Advisory,'' July 23, 2018. https://www.cbp.gov/
sites/default/files/assets/documents/2018-Aug/
NorthZ%20Korea%20Sanctions%20_%20Enforcement%20Actions%20Advisory.pdf.
    \8\ Scarlatoiu, Ha, and Lee, ``North Korean Workers Officially 
Dispatched to China & Russia.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             History of North Korean Involvement in China's
                      Seafood Processing Industry

    North Korean workers have long been involved in China's seafood 
processing industry. Over 3,000 workers were employed pre-COVID in 
seafood processing plants in the northeastern city of Hunchun. The 
major seafood processing companies that have historically employed 
North Korean labor and have exported their products to the United 
States include Joint Venture Hunchun Dongyang Seafood Industry & Trade 
Co. Ltd. and Hunchun Pagoda Industry Co. Ltd., distributed globally by 
Ocean One Enterprise; Yantai Dachen Hunchun Seafood Products; and 
Yanbian Shenghai Industry & Trade Co. Ltd.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Sullivan, Mendoza, and Kim, ``NKorean Workers Prep Seafood 
Going to US Stores, Restaurants.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    North Korean laborers have not only suffered from inhumane working 
and living conditions, but have also been explicitly discriminated 
against by their Chinese employers. In Dandong, North Korean workers 
even had to wear blue headbands, allegedly to distinguish themselves 
from Chinese workers. \10\ Chinese workers received job protections and 
were allowed to take days off, while North Korean workers finished 
their contracts while taking no sick days and filing no complaints. The 
restrictions these workers face have made them very ``valuable'' 
employees in the eyes of Chinese employers. Li Shasha, a sales manager 
at Yanbian Shenghai Industry and Trade Co, claimed that North Korean 
laborers were ``more stable'' than Chinese workers, and that ``they 
won't take leave for some personal reason.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Choi Woo-jung, ``Korean Workers in Dandong All Wearing Blue 
Bands on Their Heads . . . Why?'' [in Korean], TV Chosun, December 20, 
2013. Accessed October 10, 2023. https://www.chosun.com/site/data/
html_dir/2013/12/20/2013122003710.html.
    \11\ ``How U.S. Seafood Fans May Help Fund North Korea ,'' CBS 
News, October 4, 2017. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-us-seafood-
fans-may-unwittingly-help-fund-north-korea/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    North Korean laborers are also paid considerably less than their 
Chinese counterparts. For instance, at one seafood processing plant, 
North Korean workers were reportedly paid about $300, compared to the 
Chinese workers' salary of $540.\12\ However, due to ``voluntary 
contributions'' demanded by the North Korean authorities, those 
involved in the seafood processing industry only get to retain about 
$70 out of the $300 they earn.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Sullivan, Mendoza, and Kim. ``NKorean Workers Prep Seafood 
Going to US Stores, Restaurants.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    North Korean workers in China are far more heavily monitored and 
surveilled than their counterparts in other countries, such as Russia, 
the UAE, and Malaysia. The North Korean government fears that the 
workers dispatched to China may be more predisposed towards wanting to 
escape, as they could potentially follow the example of tens of 
thousands of North Koreans who escaped to or through China.
    Most of the workers at the Hunchun seafood processing plant are 
women in their twenties. They arrive at the plant already divided into 
work units, each headed by a North Korean overseer. They are isolated 
from all others, including their fellow workers, and even their 
employers.\13\ One supervisor at a Hunchun company that has many North 
Korean employees stated that, ``They're not allowed to mingle with the 
Chinese . . . . We can only communicate with their team leaders.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Ibid.
    \14\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The workers are surrounded by North Korean propaganda. There are 
even posters featuring political slogans posted all over their living 
quarters. Because of the constant surveillance, it can be said that 
there is very little difference, if any, between the workers' treatment 
in North Korea and their conditions in China.\15\ One medical worker 
who had treated many North Korean workers corroborated this account, 
saying, ``They only talk about what they need to. They don't talk about 
what they might be thinking.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Ibid.
    \16\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Were Seafood Products Processed with North Korean Labor
                     Exported to the United States?

    Seafood products processed by North Korean workers were almost 
certainly exported to the United States. In ``The Crimes Behind the 
Seafood You Eat,'' Ian Urbina and his team discovered that companies 
that have employed North Korean and Uyghur workers have exported over 
47,000 tons of seafood. Around 17 percent of the squid processed and 
packaged by Uyghurs and North Koreans was sent to dozens of U.S. 
importers, which in turn distributed it to destinations including 
military bases and public schools. North Korean escapees interviewed by 
the witness, including those who were directly involved in North Korean 
seafood exports to China or the dispatch of North Korean workers to 
Chinese seafood processing plants, concurred with Urbina's findings. 
This blind spot is in part due to the seafood industry being 
notoriously difficult to monitor and police.\17\ These difficulties are 
compounded by the fact that China has often obstructed the details of 
its seafood processing industry from the U.S. government. \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ``Fisheries Crime,'' 
accessed October 9, 2023. https://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/
Campaigns/Fisheries/
Fisheries_Leaflet_PRINT.pdf.
    \18\ Urbina, ``The Crimes behind the Seafood You Eat.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States has strict laws banning the importation of all 
goods made with North Korean labor, the most prominent of which is 
CAATSA. The implementation of these laws in numerous industries has 
been documented recently, including the confiscation of products made 
with North Korean and Uyghur labor. However, seafood processed with the 
use of North Korean labor has made its way through American import 
companies, and eventually to the public through supermarkets and 
restaurants. Some examples of distributors are Sea-Trek, which is based 
in Rhode Island and ships products to Europe, Central America, 
Australia, and the Caribbean, and the Fishin' Company, which exports 
and supplies seafood to supermarkets, retailers, and food companies. 
Seafood proven to be processed using North Korean labor has, in recent 
years, been found not only through these suppliers, but through notable 
supermarket chains as Walmart and ALDI. In 2017, several of these 
companies moved to address concerns regarding their supply chains. \19\ 
However, these efforts have not halted the importation of ``tainted'' 
seafood.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Sullivan, Mendoza, and Kim, ``NKorean Workers Prep Seafood 
Going to US Stores, Restaurants.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                Have Chinese Factories Processed Seafood
                       Imported from North Korea?

    According to a report published by South Korea's Korea 
International Trade Association (KITA), seafood caught on North Korea's 
east coast is first gathered at the port of Rajin before it is 
transported overland, passing through North Korean customs at Wonjeong 
and Chinese customs at Quanhe. \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Baek Seong-ho, ``North Korea's Seafood Production and and 
Exports'' [in Korean], KITA Inter-Korean Trade Report vol. 7 (2020). 
https://www.kita.net/cmmrcInfo/internationalTrade Studies/
researchReport/
northKoreaTradeReportDetail.do?pageIndex=1&no=13&classification=19 
&searchReqType=detail&pcRadio=19&searchClassification=19&searchStartDate
=&searchEnd Date=&searchCondition=CONTENT&searchKeyword=&continent--
nm=&continent--cd=&country--nm=&country--cd=&sector--nm=&sector--
cd=&itemCd--nm=&itemCd--cd=&searchOpenYn=.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    North Korean seafood that has passed through Chinese customs is 
distributed and sold in cities and counties within China's Yanbian 
Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin Province. Some of it is processed 
in seafood processing facilities in Hunchun and then exported as frozen 
or dried seafood to the United States, Europe, Japan, and other 
countries.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additionally, after North Korean seafood clears Chinese customs at 
the Quanhe (Hunchun) border crossing, a significant portion of it is 
transported by plane to inland cities, including Beijing. The main 
North Korean seafood products transported inland in this manner include 
squid, flounder, snow crab, horsehair crab, and lobster. \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Ibid.

[Statement continues with table entitled ``Status of Major North Korean 
Seafood Trading Companies'' on next page.]

                                               Status of Major North Korean Seafood Trading Companies \23\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                               Year
                Company                            Affiliation             Established           Main products                        Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chosun Ryoongseong Trading Company....  Korean People's Army (KPA) Rear                 Seafood                         Major seafood export bases in
                                         Service Bureau                                                                  Chongjin, Sinpo, Wonsan,
                                                                                                                         Onchon, Haeju, and Uiju, with
                                                                                                                         ownership of numerous fishing
                                                                                                                         vessels.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chosun Chongunsan Trading Company.....  KPA                                      1997   Seafood                         ................................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chosun Shinheung Trading Company......  KPA (State SecurityP Department)                Seafood                         ................................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chosun Shinjin Trading Company........  KPA (General PoliticalP Bureau)                 Seafood, Processed Seafood      ................................
                                                                                         Products
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chosun Birobong Trading Company.......  KPA (ReconnaissanceP Bureau)             1988   Seafood                         ................................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chosun Maebong Trading Company........  Ministry of the People's Armed           1980   Seafood                         ................................
                                         Forces
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chosun Gwangmyeong General Trading      Cabinet (External Economic               1976   Seafood                         ................................
 Company.                                Affairs Committee)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chosun Namsan Trading Company.........  Nampo Economic & Administration          1984   Seafood (clams, shellfish,      ................................
                                         Committee Trade Bureau                          crab, shrimp)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chosun Songdowon Trading Company......  Wonsan Economic &P Administration        1983   Seafood (pollock,P flounder,    ................................
                                         Committee Trade Bureau                          red snapper, clams, squid,
                                                                                         abalone, shrimps, crabs, seaP
                                                                                         cucumbers, etc.)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chosun Fishing & Vessels Company......  Cabinet (FisheriesP Committee)                  Primarily responsible for       ................................
                                                                                         seafood-related
                                                                                         transportation services
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chosun Daeseong General Trading         Korean Workers' Party (KWP)              1974   Seafood                         ................................
 Company.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chosun Rungrado General Trading         KWP (Pyongyang City Party                1973   Seafood, Shellfish              ................................
 Company.                                Committee)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           Interview Findings

    HRNK interviewed ten individuals, including former officials with 
direct involvement and experience dealing with the importation of North 
Korean seafood into China and the dispatch of North Korean workers to 
Chinese food processing plants, as well as individuals still actively 
involved in North Korea's seafood trade and the export of labor to 
Chinese processing plants.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Kim Jong-hwa, ``The Current Status of North Korea's Fisheries 
Industry and Ways to Promote Inter-Korean Exchange'' [in Korean], 
Chungnam Institute Issue Report (April 30, 2019), 12. http://
oak.cni.re.kr/handle/2016.oak/5676.
    \24\ English and Korean versions of the questionnaire and 
respondent answers are available upon request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    None of the individuals interviewed by HRNK were aware of North 
Korean sailors or fishermen dispatched to Chinese fishing vessels. 
However, all ten interviewees were aware of the presence of North 
Korean workers at Chinese seafood processing factories. North Korean 
workers dispatched to Chinese processing plants also process fish and 
other seafood caught by North Korean vessels and subsequently exported 
to China.
    Thousands of North Korean seafood processing laborers have worked 
in China, stifled under various tight restrictions and egregious human 
rights abuses. They have worked in seafood processing plants, such as 
those in Hunchun, while the Chinese and North Korean regimes continued 
to grow richer by exporting products processed with North Korean labor 
to countries including the United States, which would be a clear 
violation of CAATSA.
    Reflecting on his experience, stating that while he never thought 
of himself as being put through such unbearable treatment, a North 
Korean formerly dispatched to a Chinese seafood processing plant 
remarked that ``These North Korean workers (today) still don't know 
they are slaves.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Sullivan, Mendoza, and Kim, ``NKorean Workers Prep Seafood 
Going to US Stores, Restaurants.''
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                   selection and dispatch procedures
    Based on the decisions of North Korean authorities (central and 
regional) and based on consultation between North Korean and Chinese 
entities, investment proposals are first publicly announced in China. 
Subsequently, contracts are signed with Chinese counterparts who meet 
the requisite conditions.
    This is followed by the selection of workers within North Korea. 
The regime agencies tasked with the official dispatching of overseas 
workers include the Central Party's Overseas Dispatch Department and 
the Provincial Party's 2nd Department (Overseas Dispatch Department). 
The ultimate controlling authorities are typically officials from the 
Korean Workers' Party (KWP), in particular the Organization and 
Guidance Department, as well as the Ministry of Social Security with 
respect to 
security-related matters.
    The KWP's Overseas Dispatch Department sends an official document 
related to overseas dispatch worker recruitment to the Provincial 
Party. Then, the Provincial Party's 2nd Department (Overseas Dispatch 
Department) recruits workers to be dispatched overseas. To be selected 
as an overseas dispatch worker, one must be employed in a factory or 
enterprise at the provincial level or above.
    Guidelines for selecting personnel are issued to various factories 
and enterprises. The selection process follows a principle of 
voluntariness rather than coercion. In principle, worker selection is 
done by the relevant unit's trade company, the unit committee, and the 
city or provincial committee, with approval from the municipal office 
of the Ministry of Social Security.
    The Provincial Party's 2nd Department is supposed to send a 
recruitment notice to the provincial factory/enterprise to select 
personnel, but this procedure is not followed. The selection process is 
rigged. There is already a list of people that will be sent. Those who 
wish to go abroad have already bribed the relevant officials with the 
help of brokers, and their identity and background checks are already 
complete.
    The background check can take several months. The Ministry of 
Social Security thoroughly checks the resident registration documents 
for each individual, verifying, through authorities at the local level, 
the chulsin songbun (social class assigned at birth), ideological 
orientation, and family relationships. If even a minor problem is 
discovered during this process, the individual will be disqualified at 
the document review stage. Having relatives in China is also a reason 
for disqualification. Those with relatives in China are considered to 
be at high risk of defection. During the document review, individuals 
must also undergo a physical examination to determine if they can work 
overseas for an extended period. The Ministry of State Security 
conducts a final review of all the aforementioned items prior to 
issuing the visa.
    Before initiating the clearance process, the individual needs to 
receive a positive review and evaluation from the organization (Youth 
League or Party organization) of the factory/enterprise they belong to. 
If all goes smoothly, the Provincial Party's 2nd Department finally 
informs the factory/enterprise that certain individuals will be 
dispatched as overseas laborers to China. The bribe required to go 
abroad varies by region, and it can range between $2,000 and $3,000. In 
North Pyongan Province, one must pay a $2,000 bribe in cash.
    Generally, the standard duration of overseas work contracts is 
three years. The standard duration of a work permit issued for dispatch 
to China is three years. In some cases, workers may be dispatched for 
shorter periods, such as one-year or three-month intervals for training 
or internships. When the contract expires, it can be extended by 
allowing the workers to exit and re-enter customs on the same day, 
thereby enabling them to continue working in China. \26\ Workers 
typically travel by bus and train both when they are dispatched to 
China and when they return home. This is mainly because they are often 
assigned to companies near the North Korea-China border, making 
transportation by bus, train, or sometimes even traveling on foot a 
viable option.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Contract extensions may occur based on mutual agreements at 
the local level between the parties involved. However, the North Korean 
regime is reluctant to allow workers to spend too much time outside the 
country. More often than not, the teams of dispatched workers are 
replaced entirely after repatriation. Their chances of being allowed to 
leave the country again are extremely low.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Due to a lack of transparency regarding their contracts, the North 
Korean authorities ultimately employ deceptive methods to dispatch 
workers. For instance, when dispatched to China, the contract 
stipulates a monthly wage of 2,000 to 2,500 Chinese yuan, i.e., $280 to 
$350, luring workers with false promises. This leads to a climate where 
workers strive to be dispatched abroad, particularly to China, as 
foreign currency-earning laborers. However, at the dispatch sites, the 
workers' wages are heavily poached under various pretexts. \27\ After 
excluding food expenses, living expenses, medical expenses, national 
contributions, and state support funds, the amount paid to workers from 
the contracted 2,000 Chinese yuan is typically only an average of 200 
to 300 Chinese yuan. Moreover, wages are often not paid in full for 
various reasons, leading to widespread dissatisfaction and an unjust 
cycle of exploitation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ This includes financing projects such as greenhouse 
construction, construction of hydroelectric power plants, revolutionary 
historical site construction and renovation in Pyongyang, and 
construction in Samjiyon. The funds needed for such projects is often 
siphoned from the wage statements of overseas workers. As a result, 
many workers reportedly have nearly empty wage statements even after 
having worked abroad for several years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          working conditions and employment practices in china
    The interviewees confirmed that in Dandong, China, the focus is on 
clothing production and repair rather than fish processing. Seafood 
processing primarily takes place in the Yanbian, Yanji, Hunchun, and 
Tumen areas. However, interviewees mentioned the presence of at least 
three seafood processing factories where officially dispatched North 
Korean workers are employed in Donggang, Dandong City. One interviewee 
pinpointed the name of one such factory-- Donggang Luyuan Food Co., 
Ltd.
    North Korean workers process a wide variety of fish at the Chinese 
plants depending on the season: fish caught seasonally, such as cod and 
pollock; clams during clam season, and crab, including snow crab, 
during crab season. They also process squid, octopus, shellfish, and 
package them as Chinese products for export. The interviewees reported 
instances of processed seafood marked ``Made in China'' being shipped 
out to Vladivostok in the Russian Far East, where labels are switched 
to ``Made in Russia'' and subsequently exported to third countries.
    Working conditions for the North Korean workers dispatched to 
Chinese seafood processing plants are dire. Wage violations (through 
compulsory ``contributions'' extracted by the North Korean 
authorities), unpaid overtime, and precarious safety and health 
conditions are common.
    Wages are not directly handed to the laborers, but are recorded in 
the company's books for payment. The Chinese companies pay the North 
Korean authorities mostly based on production volume, and the payment 
is made in Chinese currency. Since the company's books are under the 
control of the company owner or management, there is always a risk of 
wage arrears, and a significant portion of the wages that laborers are 
supposed to receive upon returning to North Korea may be appropriated 
by the state or left unpaid. This has led to significant 
dissatisfaction among the workers.
    Safety is governed by labor safety rules established in cooperation 
with local Chinese companies, but these rules are often not properly 
enforced due to the overriding focus on earning foreign currency for 
the North Korean regime. Due to excessive exploitation, most of the 
workers are in a severe state of physical and emotional exhaustion. 
There is insufficient medical coverage for those who fall ill. Minor 
illnesses are treated with over-the-counter medicine, but for severe 
cases, workers were taken to a ``Welfare Hospital'' in Dandong City, 
which is now closed.
    One interviewee mentioned that his cousin often visited the Chinese 
seafood processing plants as an interpreter, and he also went several 
times to translate. The first thoughts that came to his mind when he 
saw the workers' appearance and their work environment were 
``prisoners'' and ``jail.'' Men mainly carry frozen fish blocks, and 
women sit down and peel fish or squid or sort clams and crabs. The 
sorting is done based on size, categorizing the larger ones as first-
grade, the smaller ones as second-grade, etc., as there is a price 
difference based on grade. Most of the workers in seafood processing 
factories work in cold storage, so they work all day in extremely cold 
conditions. Additionally, the pungent smell inside is unbearable. Due 
to such poor working conditions, local Chinese people are unwilling to 
work there.
    North Korean workers at Chinese seafood processing plants usually 
work about 10 hours a day. However, if production targets are not met, 
the workday can extend to over 12 hours. If they fail to complete their 
daily assigned tasks, the workers face collective pressure within the 
company. Moreover, if deficiencies such as failure to complete one's 
tasks or any behavior deemed ``deviant'' persist, their monthly wages 
may be partially reduced or not paid at all.
    According to eight out of ten interviewees, North Korean workers' 
monthly wages are paid upon their return to North Korea, in North 
Korean currency, at the official exchange rate. The reason behind that 
procedure is that the North Korean authorities do not want the workers 
to be in possession of larger amounts of cash while in China, as that 
may facilitate their defection. Two interviewees stated that payments 
to the workers were made monthly while in China. When workers in China 
want to purchase daily necessities such as toilet paper, cosmetics, 
toothpaste, toothbrushes, sanitary pads, underwear, and medications, 
they are required to manage these expenses themselves. When workers 
request these necessary products from their managers, the managers 
purchase the items on their behalf and deduct the cost from the 
workers' wages. This way, a portion of the workers' wages is spent on 
these personal consumables in China.
    North Korean workers at Chinese seafood processing plants make 
about 500 Chinese yuan a month, i.e., $70. The average salary of a 
North Korean industrial worker in North Korea is $3 per month. Despite 
severe exploitation, these jobs are highly coveted, as they allow the 
workers to dramatically increase their families' income in North Korea, 
by North Korean standards. However, since contracts run for only up to 
three years, they must moonlight for other companies to have enough to 
pay back the loan sharks who lent them $2,000 to $3,000 to bribe 
officials in order to be sent to China. Moonlighting must be approved 
by the three site supervisors (party, security agency, technical 
manager), who also must be bribed. On rare occasions, their own 
worksites may pay a limited amount of overtime, according to the 
interviewees. Overall, a North Korean seafood processing worker in 
China may make up to 1,500 Chinese yuan a month, or about $210.
    The working conditions involve collective living, where both work 
and daily life take place within the factory and dormitory facilities. 
This arrangement can be likened to detention or confinement facilities. 
Workers are generally not allowed to go outside except for specific 
instances such as visiting a hospital or buying groceries, which 
require supervision by a guardian or a fellow worker.
                    impact of the covid-19 pandemic
    Due to the border lockdown during COVID, North Korean workers in 
China could not return home. As a result, these workers stayed in China 
for up to five or six years. The workers received no wages during the 
pandemic, and the interest on loans they had taken from loan sharks in 
North Korea to bribe officials increased, leading to many female 
workers taking their own lives. North Korean authorities reportedly 
used deception to manipulate families in the aftermath of such 
incidents.
    Beginning on August 23 or August 29 of this year, all or most North 
Korean workers in China, including workers at the Chinese seafood 
processing plants, were repatriated. Those who were sick and those over 
30 years of age, were reportedly the first ones to be sent back. \28\ 
According to interviewees, many buses were observed entering North 
Korea at dawn. From October 1st to October 10th, an eyewitness thought 
it was due to the Korean Chuseok (Thanksgiving) holiday period, but he 
witnessed buses going in again on October 12th. The repatriated workers 
will be replaced by entirely new teams dispatched from North Korea. 
According to one interviewee, there has been speculation that seafood 
processing workers will not return to China in the future. Instead, it 
is expected that China will build such factories in North Korea and 
employ people there.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ There were workers who were diagnosed with cancer during their 
stay in China. They could not return due to COVID and only recently 
managed to return to North Korea. The body of a deceased worker was 
also recently sent back to North Korea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Repatriation may come as a great relief to North Korean workers 
officially dispatched to China, including workers previously stationed 
at China's seafood processing plants. Their life under COVID was 
terrible. For several years, they had to seek accommodation within the 
factory premises. Essentials were provided by the person in charge, who 
would go shopping once or twice a week. Since the official contracts 
had ended, they had no work and had to do odd jobs, especially on 
Chinese farms, to secure even one meal a day. One interviewee spoke 
about North Korean workers being spotted picking up discarded vegetable 
clippings at local markets to use as soup ingredients.
                      possible ties to south korea
    None of the interviewees were able to name any South Korean 
companies involved in trading Chinese seafood processed by North Korean 
workers, although they were aware of the close association with South 
Korean businesses in certain sectors, including clothing and 
electronics assembly. Thus, interviewees thought that collaboration 
with South Korean entities in the seafood processing sector was not 
entirely outside the realm of possibility. However, three of them 
stated that most of the seafood processed in factories in Donggang, 
Dandong City goes to South Korea. The interviewees also mentioned that 
all Russian frozen crabs exported to South Korea are processed by North 
Korean laborers who label them as Chinese or Russian products.

                            Recommendations

    On behalf of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), 
I respectfully recommend to the Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China that it consider some, or all of the following:

      Encourage civil society organizations with connections to 
North Koreans currently or formerly involved in the official 
dispatching and management of North Korean workers at Chinese seafood 
processing plants to continue investigating conditions of labor at 
these facilities, as well as the possibility that seafood products 
processed by North Koreans may end up on the U.S. market.

      Propose that new findings regarding violations of 
internationally accepted labor standards affecting North Koreans at 
Chinese seafood processing plants be included in the Annual Report on 
Trafficking in Persons, required under Section 110(B) of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 707(B)).

      Seek to determine whether the government of China has 
made serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of 
trafficking in persons, as they relate to the official dispatching of 
North Korean workers to Chinese seafood processing plants and the 
working conditions at such facilities.

      Seek to confirm whether seafood exported from China to 
the United States contains North Korean seafood products, and whether 
North Korean workers officially dispatched to China processed seafood 
exported from China to the United States. Should that be the case, such 
seafood products exported from China to the United States would have to 
be denied entry at any of the ports of the United States, pursuant to a 
prohibition under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 
1307).

    The witness also recommends continuing to seek information 
pertaining to the following questions, some of them addressed in the 
current submission:

      Do the working conditions at seafood processing plants in 
China, as they apply to officially dispatched North Korean workers, 
qualify for an exemption to the prohibition above? Is there any 
evidence that such North Korean labor does not qualify as forced or 
indentured labor?

      Are there any extenuating circumstances that may grant an 
exception to some of the persons involved in dispatching North Korean 
workers to Chinese seafood processing plants?

      Does the employment of North Korean laborers result in 
the direct or indirect transfer of stores of value to the North Korean 
authorities?

      Are all wages and benefits provided directly to the 
laborers and held in bank accounts within the Chinese jurisdiction in 
which they temporarily reside, and are such wages and benefits 
denominated in Chinese currency?

      Do the North Korean laborers' working conditions conform 
to internationally accepted standards, in particular to the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) core conventions?

                       Statement of Sally Yozell

    Representative Smith, Senator Merkley, and members of the 
Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
    My name is Sally Yozell, and I am the Director of the Environmental 
Security Program at the Stimson Center, a nonprofit, nonpartisan 
research institution based here in Washington, D.C. Our program employs 
a research-to-action model that supports innovative policy actions to 
create durable global change for good. A central focus of our work is 
combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
                         impacts of iuu fishing
    IUU fishing can take many forms--from local, small-scale boats 
misreporting catch, to large-scale, industrial foreign-flagged vessels 
underreporting their catch. Beyond this there are also coordinated 
efforts supported by flag state governments or transnational crime 
syndicates. IUU fishing is a ``crime of convergence,'' and has been 
linked to other criminal and illicit activities such as the smuggling 
of guns, drugs, and wildlife; human trafficking and forced labor; as 
well as money laundering and tax fraud. i
    In all its forms, IUU fishing directly contributes to 
overfishing, threatening the sustainability of fish stocks and damaging 
marine ecosystems. The consequences of IUU fishing ripple throughout 
increasingly complex supply chains, far beyond the point of harvest. It 
harms the economic, food, and environmental security of coastal 
communities. IUU fishing destabilizes the security of maritime states, 
supports organized criminal networks, fuels corruption, destabilizes 
good governance, distorts markets, and drives human trafficking and 
labor and human rights abuses in the fishing industry.
    I saw this firsthand on a recent research trip to the Gulf of 
Guinea to better understand the impacts of foreign-flagged fishing on 
coastal communities. Chinese-owned operations have expanded their 
presence in West Africa through industrial fleets, fish meal 
operations, and bases. All these enterprises deepen partnerships with 
West African governments and increase access to fish in West African 
waters. This rapid expansion is occurring in developing nations that 
lack the financial, technical, and operational capacity to manage and 
enforce their fisheries. There is often a lack of political will to 
manage these distant water fleets, which can be linked to corruption or 
influenced by other Chinese foreign investments. The degradation of 
these fisheries can lead to food insecurity, unemployment, and 
environmental degradation and has the potential to drive civil unrest 
and destabilize the security of these maritime states. ii It 
is imperative that the Chinese fleets consider investing in sustainable 
fisheries management as part of their expansive fisheries access 
agreements.
    It is estimated that IUU fishing accounts for up to a third of the 
world's total fisheries harvest and is valued at more than $30 billion 
annually, but due to its clandestine nature the number in fact could be 
higher. iii Ultimately, IUU fishing occurs because it 
remains profitable, loopholes persist, and the opaqueness and 
complexities of the global seafood supply chain have made it largely 
invisible to governments, businesses, and consumers.
    That is, until last week.
    Mr. Urbina's reporting has blown the lid off one of the most traded 
food commodities in the world, revealing a dark side that has 
flourished undetected.
            complexities of the global seafood supply chain
    Seafood accounts for more than $140 billion in trade each year. 
iv Commercial fishing is big business, with a complex global 
seafood supply chain and over 56 million people working on vessels to 
support it. v The demand for seafood is greater than ever; 
in 2022, the United States imported 340,000 metric tons of seafood, 
valued at just over $30 billion. vi
    Fueling this demand are distant water fishing (DWF) fleets. 
The details of their operations are largely obscured as they fish far 
from shore, often with little oversight from their home countries or 
accountability in the regions where they fish. The five largest DWF 
fleets--from China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Spain--target four 
main regions of the ocean: the Pacific, West Africa, East Africa, and 
South America. vii With regard to China, which has by far 
the largest global DWF fleet, there is little insight into vessel 
ownership--and the Chinese-owned enterprises that support these 
vessels, the conditions aboard these vessels, nor the fisheries access 
agreements these fleets use. The challenges these fleets pose to 
coastal countries' marine resources will persist unless there is 
measurable shift toward improved fisheries management, accountability 
of flag-state responsibilities, and overall transparency throughout the 
seafood industry and supply chain. As the largest distant water fleet, 
China has the opportunity to improve transparency by providing more 
detailed information about the beneficial ownership of its fishing 
enterprises.
    Against this complicated backdrop, we know one simple truth: U.S. 
consumers--and consumers around the world--do not want to eat seafood 
that is caught illegally or that is the product of forced labor. In 
fact, 72% of U.S. consumers support increased traceability for seafood; 
they want all parts of the industry to be fair and equitable, 
especially for the harvesters, processors, and merchants who follow the 
rules. viii
    But how can they know?
    The seafood supply chain is complex. Seafood is harvested all 
around the world in nearshore coastal waters, in territorial seas and 
Exclusive Economic Zones, and on the high seas. Depending on the fish, 
the seafood supply chain looks different. It is often transshipped and 
processed at sea, or processed in major centers often located in China 
where seafood can be commingled with other global catches and altered, 
making it difficult to distinguish, while also opening up the potential 
for mislabeling, all before it moves by air or sea to various wholesale 
suppliers, stores, and restaurants. At each point in the supply chain, 
new and different risks emerge.
    The United States imports about 85% of if its seafood. ix 
Just under 40% of U.S. seafood imports are caught in U.S. waters, 
processed in China, and then imported back into the United States. 
x After being processed, it is imported back into the United 
States.
    An illustrative example of this is pollock and salmon. As a result 
of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Russian-caught seafood is currently 
banned from the United States. Yet despite this, Russian pollock and 
salmon still enter U.S. commerce today. xi Since 2014, 
Russian seafood exports to the U.S. have grown by 173%. xii 
In 2021 Russia exported $1.2 billion worth of crab, cod, pollock, 
salmon, and other fish to the United States.
    Under the U.S. Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) Act, seafood 
products are labeled as products of the processing country. Russian-
caught fish that is processed in China becomes a product of China--
essentially hiding its real origin. Russian catch is processed 
alongside U.S. harvested fish, where it can be commingled and processed 
into fish blocks, fish sticks, canned salmon, or frozen fillets, and 
sent back to U.S. grocery stores, restaurants, and even school lunch 
programs for unwitting American consumers. xiii
    Stopping the importation of ``Putin's pollock'' through China 
is an easy fix. If the United States government implemented a 
comprehensive traceability system that tracked all seafood through the 
supply chain, IUU fish products could not be masked.
                          towards traceability
    In 2015, the Obama Administration's Task Force on Combating IUU 
Fishing and Seafood Fraud created the Seafood Import Monitoring 
Program, which is managed by NOAA Fisheries. As a former co-chair of 
the Task Force, I can say with certainty that it was originally 
envisioned to be a cornerstone of a comprehensive risk-based seafood 
traceability system. It was meant to effectively and efficiently track 
imported seafood from the point of harvest to its initial entry into 
the U.S. market--from bait to gate.
    Our goal was to initially start with a limited number of 13 species 
groups at risk of IUU fishing and seafood fraud and eventually ramp up 
to cover all species. Now in operation for six years, the Seafood 
Import Monitoring Program covers about 45% of U.S. seafood imports. But 
it does not cover several high-risk species like pollock, salmon, blue 
swimming crab, and squid.
    This is a pivotal time for the Seafood Import Monitoring Program. 
Per its rulemaking last year (0648-BK85), NOAA Fisheries is considering 
adding new species, increasing the use of electronic catch 
verification, applying artificial intelligence to the process, and 
increasing enforcement and auditing. Expanding the Seafood Import 
Monitoring Program to include all species is a good next step to 
provide greater confidence to consumers that the seafood they buy is 
not illegally harvested.
    As NOAA Fisheries looks to improve its program, they must consider 
the fact that, rather than a true traceability system, the Seafood 
Import Monitoring Program is a single narrow program. It is siloed from 
other relevant trade monitoring programs that exist within NOAA 
Fisheries and across other federal agencies. It is hamstrung by its 
reliance on a paper-based framework, which opens the door for 
falsification, and which altogether prevents the use of advanced risk 
analytics. The program is further constrained by inadequate enforcement 
capacity and limited interagency communication.
    Unlike the European Union's IUU fishing law, which uses a red-
yellow-green card system, which relies on a government-to-government 
certification process, the Seafood Import Monitoring Program places the 
burden of proof on the importer of record. Without digitization and 
electronic catch certification, importers of record lack the ability to 
see across the full length of the seafood supply chain to verify that 
each unit of seafood entering U.S. commerce has been safely, legally, 
and sustainably harvested.
    As a leading market state, the United States has tremendous power--
and responsibility--to transform global fishing practices and improve 
monitoring, control, and surveillance. Together with Japan and the 
European Union, we import more than 60% of all internationally traded 
seafood. This is a powerful market block. The United States can do so 
much more to improve fishery resources globally and provide consumers 
with the confidence that the seafood they consume is safe, legal, and 
sustainable.
    We cannot fail.
                     opportunities for improvement
    As more seafood tracking and traceability systems are implemented 
around the world, other countries are looking to the United States as a 
global leader in this space, with a functional and effective seafood 
traceability system that is standardized, streamlined, and 
synchronized.
    Importers, harvesters, and businesses in the seafood supply chain 
are well aware, data and information about seafood is collected and 
stored by numerous U.S. agencies. NOAA Fisheries examines seafood data 
from the point of harvest to when it enters the U.S. market; the U.S. 
Coast Guard uses automatic information systems (AIS) and radar to track 
fishing vessels at sea; the Department of Labor monitors forced labor 
allegations and evidence of human rights abuses; the Food and Drug 
Administration collects seafood data relating to human health and food 
safety; and the Treasury Department follows the money, which could 
provide insights into beneficial ownership of IUU fishing enterprises. 
I could go on.
    Despite all of this data and all of these programs, the 
International Trade Commission estimated that $2.4 billion worth of 
IUU-caught products entered the U.S. market in 2019 alone. xiv
    Regulators, advocates, and industry agree; more can be done.
    One key barrier to a better system is the lack of standardization 
of the data the U.S. government collects. Standardized data is needed--
from different points in the supply chain--that is appropriately 
granular and verifiable so that it can be communicated across agencies 
in a timely manner. Moreover, the paper-based system that exists today 
hinders success. In today's world, how many multi-billion-dollar 
industries lack digitization and rely on paper-based records?
    A cohesive system requires a globally standardized list of fish 
species at risk for IUU fishing and mislabeling. This is critical as 
more international traceability programs come online. IUU fishing is 
inherently a global problem; illegally caught or mislabeled species 
entering one major market state are very likely to enter other global 
markets. For example, Japan's new counter-IUU fishing regulation covers 
pacific saury, squid, mackerel, and sardine. None of these species are 
included in the U.S. program and we know from Mr. Urbina's reporting 
that illegally and unsustainably caught squid is entering the U.S. 
market. On the other hand, Japan's list of species considered at risk 
for IUU fishing does not include sharks and tunas, which are covered by 
the U.S. program. The scale of our solutions needs to match the scale 
of the global problem; gaps in our collective efforts will only allow 
IUU fishing to continue to thrive.
    As regulators work towards standardizing data, they must be 
cognizant of the burden these data and information requirements have on 
harvesters and businesses. Simplifying the data collection process is 
imperative and creating a digitized, interoperable system is essential. 
Alignment of data elements across trade tracking programs opens the 
door to improved interagency data sharing and collaborative 
enforcement, while simultaneously reducing the burden on law-abiding 
industry.
    There is no need to reinvent the wheel. Risk analytics systems 
already exist and are used by other federal agencies. For example, the 
Food and Drug Administration screens more than 50 million imports a 
year for health and safety, including seafood. The FDA uses the PREDICT 
system, which electronically reviews trade data and targets risk 
screening for fraudulent and adulterated products.
    The multidimensional problem of IUU fishing needs an equally 
multidimensional solution. Viewing risk in a more holistic way--and 
creating a synchronized system to communicate that risk between and 
among relevant agencies, businesses, and stakeholders--is exactly the 
path forward to gain more success.
    Beyond focusing only on species considered at risk, the United 
States should widen the aperture of what is considered ``risk'' in the 
seafood supply chain. Forced labor and human rights abuses should be a 
priority for the U.S. government, as outlined in President Biden's 2022 
National Security Memorandum on Combating IUU Fishing and Associated 
Labor Abuses. xv NOAA should follow through on its work to 
amend the definition of IUU fishing to include forced labor and human 
rights abuses in the seafood supply chain (0648-BG11).
    Federal agencies also need to work together and use all their 
available tools to share information and reduce risks within the 
seafood supply chain. Risks can be linked to vessel histories, 
ownership information, and land- and sea-based processing. 
Transshipment, ports, flag-state activities, the role of middlemen and 
intermediaries, also present risk. Armed with a more detailed 
understanding of these risks and how they interact, the U.S. government 
can better focus its resources to target and root out bad actors and 
prevent IUU-caught fish from entering our markets, while rewarding 
those who abide by the laws.
                          necessary next steps
    No seafood trade tracking system is perfect. As technology advances 
there will be new opportunities for improvement. There are some 
incremental changes that can be made now to achieve a broader, more 
holistic vision to prevent IUU-caught fish from entering our markets. 
Beyond providing confidence to consumers that the seafood they are 
buying is legally harvested, creating an effective seafood traceability 
system can positively impact environmental, economic, and human 
security around the world.
    Last year, NOAA Fisheries published a draft rulemaking to update 
its Seafood Import Monitoring Program, but it fell short and, perhaps 
more importantly, lacked input from stakeholders. NOAA Fisheries and 
its interagency partners should begin a public and transparent process 
to improve the Seafood Import Monitoring Program, by:

      Including all seafood species under the Seafood Import 
Monitoring Program.

      Creating a globally standardized list of fish species at 
risk for IUU fishing and mislabeling.

      Widening the aperture of what is considered ``risk'' in 
the seafood supply chain, including and especially with respect to 
human rights abuses and forced labor.

      Improving monitoring, control, and surveillance by 
requiring automatic information systems and vessel monitoring systems 
to be used on vessels throughout the seafood supply chain and by 
sharing the data publicly.

      All relevant agencies should implement the relevant 
provisions of the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act, including 
harmonizing data standards. xvi

      Improving information sharing among the relevant 
government agencies. xvii

      Moving to a fully digitized seafood traceability 
system.

      Using risk-based analytics to better target bad actors.

      Requiring electronic catch documentation that is verified 
by governments to accompany all seafood that enters the U.S. market.

      Requiring detailed beneficial ownership information to 
accompany harvest documents.

    No single agency or organization alone can solve this challenge. 
IUU fishing is a global problem that requires global solutions. The 
United States government has the opportunity--and responsibility--to 
chart a path forward to move the global seafood supply chain out of the 
shadows. A transparent system will benefit all.

(References appear on the next page.]
REFERENCES

    i Royal United Services Institute for Defence and 
Security, ``Below the Surface: How Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
Fishing Threatens our Security,'' Cathy Haenlein, (2017). https://
static.rusi.org/201707_rusi_below_the_surface_haenlein.pdf.
    ii The Stimson Center, ``Charting a Blue Future for 
Cooperation between West Africa and China on Sustainable Fisheries,'' 
Sam Geall et al., (2023). https://www.stimson.org/2023/
charting-a-blue-future-for-cooperation-between-west-africa-and-china-
on-sustainable-fisheries/.
    iii Gina Fiore & Peter Horn, ``6 Facts You May Not Know 
About Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing,'' Pew, June 7, 
2023. https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
articles/2023/06/07/6-facts-you-may-not-know-about-illegal-unreported-
and-unregulated-fishing.
    iv The Role of the Seafood Supply Chain in Sustainable 
Fisheries,'' Pew, May 3, 2022, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-
and-analysis/articles/2021/04/13/the-role-of-the-seafood-supply-chain-
in-sustainable-fisheries.
    v The Stimson Center, ``Shining a Light: The Need for 
Transparency across Distant Water Fishing,'' Sally Yozell & Amanda 
Shaver, (2019). https://www.stimson.org/2019/shining-light-need-
transparency-across-distant-water-fishing/.
    vi United States Department of Agriculture, ``Seafood 
Market Update,'' Shinsuke Kitada
(Tokyo, 2023 https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/
DownloadReportByFileName?file
Name=Seafood%20Market%20Update_Osaka%20ATO_Japan_JA2023-0020.pdf.
    vii Yozell & Shaver, ``Shining a Light.''
    viii Morning Consult, ``World Oceans Day Summary 
Findings,'' Deborah Beck, (2022). https://
www.waltonfamilyfoundation.org/about-us/newsroom/walton-family-
foundation-urges-action-on-seafood-traceability-ahead-of-world-oceans-
day.
    ix Oceana, ``U.S. Seafood Demand Drives Illegal Fishing 
Around the World, Says Oceana Report.'' February 1, 2022, https://
usa.oceana.org/press-releases/u-s-seafood-demand-drives-illegal-
fishing-around-the-world-says-oceana-report/.
    x Jessica A. Gephart, Hally E. Froelich & Trevor A. 
Branch, ``To create sustainable seafood industries, the United States 
needs a better accounting of imports and exports,'' PNAS, (2019): 9142-
9146, https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1905650116.
    xi Frank Asche, et al., ``China's seafood imports--Not 
for domestic consumption?,'' Science January 375 (2022): 386-388. 
https//:www.science.org/doi10.1126/science.ab14756.
    xii Oceana,``U.S. Seafood Demand Drives Illegal Fishing 
Around the World, Says Oceana Report.'' February 1, 2022. https://
usa.oceana.org/press-releases/u-s-seafood-demand-drives-illegal-
fishing-around-the-world-says-oceana-report/.
    xiii Yuka Hayashi, ``Russian Fish Find Way Onto American 
Tables Despite Import Ban,'' Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2022, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-fish-find-way-onto-american-
tables-despite-import- ban-11649329202.
    xiv United States International Trade Commission, 
``Seafood Obtained via Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: 
U.S. Imports and Economic Impact on U.S. Commercial Fisheries,'' Renee 
Berry et al., (Washington, 2021). https://www.usitc.gov/publications/
332/pub5168.pdf.
    xv ``Memorandum on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing and Associated Labor Abuses,'' (Washington, 2022). 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-
actions/2022/06/27/memorandum-on-combating-illegal-unreported-and-
unregulated-fishing-and-
associated-labor-abuses/.
    xvi United States of America, National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, Washington, June 30, 2023, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-118hrpt125/pdf/CRPT-
118hrpt125.pdf.
    xvii United States of America, Maritime Security and 
Fisheries Enforcement Act, Washington, October 23, 2019 https://
uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title16/chapter99&edition=
prelim.
                                 ______
                                 

                   Statement of Representative Smith

    The compass is an instrument of great assistance to navigators and 
seafarers. Its origins lie in ancient China, specifically the Han 
Dynasty, which dates to the third century BC. It is one of the many 
enduring contributions China has made not only to maritime exploration, 
navigation, and safety, but also world civilization.
    Yet today, we find ourselves confronting a very different reality 
in China, where its moral compass appears to be adrift, both at sea and 
on land.
     Recent revelations from a comprehensive four-year investigation 
conducted by The Outlaw Ocean Project shed light on deeply troubling 
practices within the Chinese distant water fishing fleet and seafood 
processing industry.
    These practices involve egregious violations of human rights, 
including forced labor and other exploitative activities. A four-year 
investigation led brilliantly by Ian Urbina, who will testify today, 
found for example that ``almost half of the Chinese squid fleet, 357 of 
the 751 ships we studied, were tied to human rights or environmental 
violations'' and over 100 Chinese squid ships engaged in illegal 
fishing, including trespassing into the waters of other nations.
    On land, the investigation reveals a disconcerting pattern of PRC-
based companies exploiting the forced labor of Uyghurs and North 
Koreans to process substantial quantities of seafood destined for the 
U.S. market.
    From fish sticks to calamari, these products infiltrate the supply 
chains of major restaurants, wholesalers, and even find their way into 
the meals served at American schools and military bases. Such actions 
directly contravene the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) and 
the Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATA), both 
of which strictly prohibit the importation of goods produced by forced 
labor into the U.S. market.
    It is evident that the People's Republic of China is not the sole 
party involved in these reprehensible practices. Governments--including 
our own--have been complicit in the procurement of tainted seafood.
    Our panel of experts testifying today will emphasize the extent to 
which government procurement processes and policies have enabled these 
injustices.
    This is also why Senator Merkley and I have drafted a letter to the 
Department of Homeland Security, calling for a comprehensive 
investigation into not only the PRC's disturbing activities at sea and 
on land but also the weaknesses in our system and the complicity of the 
private sector in the seafood industry.
    Beyond these egregious abuses of human rights, there are also 
national security implications as well.
    Chinese fishing vessels serve as part of China's maritime militia. 
Earlier this year, such vessels, under the guise of fishing boats, 
severed cables to Matsu Island, an island off the coast of China still 
under the control of Taiwan.
    Additionally, hundreds of Chinese fishing ships reportedly operate 
in waters belonging to the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia, serving as a civilian militia to escort Chinese oil and gas 
survey vessels and drilling rigs.
    More to this point, just last Sunday, a Chinese coast guard ship 
collided with a Philippine vessel en route to deliver supplies to an 
outpost that the Philippines maintains at Second Thomas Shoal, located 
approximately 100 nautical miles off its coast.
    China claims this territory, far beyond its legitimate boundaries, 
despite the fact that the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague 
made a binding decision in 2016 under the U.N. Convention on the Law of 
the Sea that this area lies within the Philippines' territorial waters.
    This underscores an important fact: China, under Xi Jinping and the 
Chinese Communist Party, is willing to upend the rules of the global 
international order and act in a lawless, predatory manner, both at sea 
and on land. It shows no respect for human rights writ large, let alone 
labor rights.
    But fortunately--thanks in large part to the reporting of Ian 
Urbina and his team, published in The New Yorker and elsewhere--the 
consciences of American businesses and government leaders are 
awakening, and we are beginning to see them walking away from abuse-
tainted sourcing. This includes the supermarket chain Albertsons, as 
well as McDonald's Filet-O-Fish. Both have severed ties with a supplier 
implicated in Ian's reporting on forced labor practices.
    We are seeing similar action taken beyond the seafood industry. 
Over the summer the Commission sent a letter to a Wisconsin-based 
company, Milwaukee Tool, regarding allegations that the company had 
purchased gloves from a supplier that was utilizing forced prison labor 
to make those gloves.
    Milwaukee Tool took action to investigate its supply chain, and I 
met with them last week. They discovered multiple examples of 
counterfeit gloves originating in the PRC bearing their brand name.
    Part of that lawless behavior I spoke of includes ubiquitous 
unauthorized, counterfeit goods. The upshot is that Milwaukee Tool has 
cut ties with the glove manufacturer in question and they are moving 
that operation outside of China altogether.
    I am deeply encouraged that the company has taken these positive 
steps, as it is yet another example of an American company responding 
constructively to reports of human rights abuses in the PRC.
                                 ______
                                 

                      Statement of Senator Merkley

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing, which builds 
on several hearings that this Commission has held on topics such as the 
implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, the plight of 
North Korean refugees in China, the aggressive long-arm of the Chinese 
government, and the importance of holding American corporations to 
account when they are accomplices in human rights abuses.
    Today we will hear about fresh investigative reporting from The 
Outlaw Ocean Project that gives us even more information about the 
prevalence of forced labor in China. This time we are examining the 
seafood supply chain, including its vulnerability to forced labor both 
on land and at sea.
    At least ten major seafood companies in China were found to have 
received more than a thousand Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim 
ethnic minorities from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. These 
individuals were forcibly transferred to work in seafood processing 
factories in Shandong province, thousands of miles away from Xinjiang.
    My colleagues at the Commission and I are horrified to learn that 
this seafood processed by Uyghur forced laborers is reportedly entering 
the United States--something we worked hard to stop with the Uyghur 
Forced Labor Prevention Act.
    We will continue working with our friends at the Department of 
Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection to fully enforce 
this legislation.
    The investigations also revealed evidence of thousands of North 
Korean laborers working in seafood processing centers in China along 
the border of North Korea. The Outlaw Ocean Project found that over one 
thousand tons of seafood have been exported to American importers by 
Chinese seafood-processing companies linked to North Korean labor. 
Pursuant to the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, 
we must swiftly stop these imports.
    China's seafood industry is not only responsible for human 
trafficking, bad labor practices, and egregious human rights abuses, 
but it is also tied to China's illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing, which has global repercussions for the environment, for food 
security, and for our national security. The PRC's maritime aggression 
is alarming, as their fishing fleets have been found to overfish, 
target protected species, and encroach on waters of other countries, 
violating international law. American businesses need to pay attention 
to this behavior and recognize that it impacts them, too.
    As we'll hear today, seafood processed in the PRC by Uyghur and 
North Korean forced laborers enters the United States illegally--
including through U.S. Federal procurement, impacting hundreds of 
American military bases and public school cafeterias.
    Major American grocery store chains, restaurants, and food-service 
companies are also implicated, unwittingly exposing thousands of 
American consumers to seafood linked to forced labor and egregious 
human rights abuses.
    For the United States to be able to protect American consumers from 
exposure to products tainted by forced labor and to best defend 
persecuted groups abroad, we need to better understand the nature and 
scale of this challenge. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses 
as to how we can use existing tools and legislation to address this 
challenge and what more we can do.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
                                 ______
                                 

                  Statement of Representative McGovern

    Good morning. I join my colleagues in welcoming those present to 
today's hearing on the use of forced labor in the seafood supply chain. 
I regret that I am not able to join you in person.
    This hearing continues the work of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China to shine a light on the use of forced labor by the 
People's Republic of China, and its consequences for supply chains and 
the American consumer.
    Forced labor is a grave human rights violation that has been 
prohibited under U.S. law since 1930. American consumers should not 
have to worry about whether the products they purchase are tainted by 
forced labor from China, or for that matter, from any other country.
    American workers and American producers should not have to compete 
with companies that rely on forced or slave labor. There is wide 
bipartisan agreement on this issue.
    The U.S. Government has made important progress in enforcing the 
ban on forced labor since passage of the bipartisan Uyghur Forced Labor 
Prevention Act that I was privileged to lead and which became law in 
December 2021. Rather than rely on moral suasion, the law creates a 
rebuttable presumption that all goods produced in the Xinjiang region 
of China are made with forced labor. That means the burden of proof 
lies with those who want to import goods to show that their supply 
chains are free of forced labor. In the past we have heard from the 
Department of Homeland Security that the law has brought ``a sea 
change'' to the way the government approaches forced labor issues. That 
is a very good thing. One of the questions in today's hearing is 
whether/how the UFLPA can be applied in the fisheries sector.
    As we take up this question, it is important to take into account 
the work that the U.S. Government is already doing to address forced 
labor in the seafood supply chain. The problem is complex and global: a 
congressionally mandated report \1\ issued in 2020 by the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration identified 29 countries 
particularly at risk for human trafficking, including forced labor, in 
their seafood sector. The report provides recommendations that overlap 
with proposals we will hear today, in particular the need to promote 
and support global traceability efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Public 
Law 116-92, section 3563.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The fact that the problem is global does not in any way diminish 
the relevance of a focus on China. As The New York Times vividly 
reported last fall, China's ``rapacious'' deep-water commercial fishing 
fleet is the largest in the world and operates non-stop in 
international waters. Not only does the PRC tolerate labor abuse, but 
its fleet's fishing practices, driven by rapidly increasing demand for 
seafood, harm local economies and the environment, and risk the 
sustainability of many species, such as tuna. So there is no question 
that we should do all we can to counter the PRC's bad practices--even 
as we acknowledge a broader set of actors and recognize that a 
comprehensive response will require strong international governance and 
cooperation, import standards and proactive supply chain verification, 
along with innovative ways to meet rising global demand for protein.
    Part of that comprehensive response should be to support U.S. 
fishing, which of course does not rely on forced labor. The U.S. 
fishing industry, while not perfect, is much more sustainable than 
fishing elsewhere. The Magnuson-Stevens Act has been largely successful 
at helping revive U.S. fishing stocks after total collapse earlier in 
our history. One of the big takeaways from the U.S. experience is that 
fisheries management cannot be a race to the bottom. Planning, 
community stewardship, a regulatory floor, and verification are 
essential.
    Finally, let me reiterate a point I have made previously: enforcing 
forced labor laws generally, and the UFLPA in particular, requires 
resources. This Commission must be clear that talk about human rights 
in China has to be backed up with funding. Cuts to the budgets of 
agencies that implement human rights policy will gut that policy. It is 
important to keep this in mind as the struggle to approve FY 2024 
appropriations bills continues.
    Thank you.
                                 ______
                                 

                     Statement of Senator Sullivan

Overview

    Chair Smith, Co-chair Merkley, fellow Commissioners, I appreciate 
the opportunity to provide written testimony for this hearing, as I was 
unable to attend in person. I commend the Commission for a timely and 
laser focus on the impacts of Chinese forced labor on the global 
seafood market, which has a significant negative impact on an industry 
that is an economic pillar of my state of Alaska.
    Forced labor in the Chinese seafood supply chain--both on land and 
on sea--has been an open secret for years, but never has it been as 
well documented as in CECC witness Ian Urbina's Outlaw Ocean Project 
reporting. His thorough reporting on human rights abuses throughout the 
seafood supply chain, coupled with other witnesses' testimony and 
credible documentation from many others through the years, is a call 
for action.
    These human rights abuses need to be combated because they are just 
wrong. But these unacceptable practices also have two related impacts: 
the damage done to global seafood sustainability, and the devastating 
economic impact forced labor has on seafood producers that are playing 
by the rules--like those in my state. Fortunately, the U.S. and its 
partners can tackle all three of these challenges through a series of 
national and global actions.
    As we all know, Alaska leads the country in the magnitude and 
sustainability of its seafood sector. According to the Alaska Seafood 
Marketing Institute in its 2022 report, the Alaska seafood industry 
nationally creates over 100,000 full-time-equivalent jobs, $6 billion 
in annual labor income, and $15 billion in economic output. Alaska and 
the U.S. seafood industry in general have produced large, diversified 
harvests as a result of a decades-long commitment to sustainable 
management.
    But the Alaska seafood industry and others around the world that 
maintain high sustainability and labor standards cannot compete--and 
shouldn't have to--with China's system of forced labor and vacuum-the-
ocean efforts that hide behind obscured supply chains. These supply 
chains can crush our U.S. producers because their ``competition'' is 
seafood caught through illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing, including with forced labor, as well as seafood caught in 
Russian waters.

What Next?

    I commend our government's efforts in combating IUU fishing and 
forced labor, particularly the efforts of the agencies that are members 
of the U.S. Inter-Agency Working Group on IUU Fishing. But we need to 
do even better. Our efforts must be both national and global, as China 
has strategically positioned itself as an integral component in the 
global seafood supply chain, including many U.S.-produced products. 
Here are some thoughts on how to further improve our response:

    1.  U.S. Laws. The U.S. has a number of laws to combat IUU fishing, 
forced labor or both, including the Maritime Security and Fisheries 
Enforcement Act, the Moratorium Protection Act, and the Uyghur Forced 
Labor Protection Act. But are they effective? Do they need further 
enforcement? Are there gaps or flaws that need amending? Further 
resources to improve enforcement? Lawmakers need to know these answers, 
and to provide targeted support if needed.

    2.  Stronger Seafood Import Controls. Part of U.S. import controls 
include the Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP), which, despite 
its comprehensive-sounding name, is focused on requirements for 
importers; importers are a very small part of the global seafood supply 
chain. This is a baked-in design flaw in a program that is meant to be 
used for screening and deterrence only, so it does not find imports of 
IUU seafood. So instead of expanding this resource-intensive program, I 
support strengthening other efforts to ensure integrity in the supply 
chain, including enforcing existing U.S. laws and supporting adoption 
of global standards by seafood importing nations.

    3.  Working with Global Partners. The seafood supply chain is truly 
global. If seafood produced by forced labor cannot be imported into one 
country, it will likely be moved to another. Tackling the issue means 
looking at adopting global standards and assisting other countries with 
their seafood management. Some of these efforts are captured in my 
Fighting Foreign Illegal Seafood Harvests Act of 2023, which focuses on 
fighting IUU fishing at its source.

    4.  Banning Imports of Russian Seafood. Despite Russia's ban on the 
import of U.S. seafood, and despite the brutal, illegal invasion of 
Ukraine by the Russian Federation, and despite the President's March 
2022 Executive Order 14068 that resulted in the prohibition of Russian 
seafood imports, seafood products of Russian Federation origin continue 
to enter United States commerce through ``substantial transformation'' 
that is often occurring in China. I urge the Biden Administration to 
close this loophole that is lending itself to unethical practices in 
both China and Russia, and for Congress to pass my United States-
Russian Federation Seafood Reciprocity Act of 2023, which would codify 
this ban.

    5.  Corporate Efforts, Consumer Knowledge. I don't think any of us 
would knowingly choose to eat seafood that came from forced labor. I 
support transparency throughout the supply chain, including 
corporations raising their standards and labeling that informs 
consumers on the origin of their seafood.

Conclusion

    We--Congress, executive branch agencies, industry, nongovernmental 
groups--share the goal to strengthen the seafood supply chain both 
ethically and economically. Some of our efforts have been successful, 
while others have fallen short. This is a moment where we must seize 
the opportunity to expand our efforts in a thoughtful and comprehensive 
way. If done correctly we can both bolster our domestic seafood 
industry AND strengthen the global seafood supply chain that provides 
healthy, nutritious protein to consumers around the world, strengthens 
our economy, and provides jobs to hardworking men and women. Inaction, 
and the consequences associated with this, are simply not an option.
                                 ______
                                 

                   Statement of Representative Zinke

I would have given the following opening statement if not for my duties 
at the House Republican Conference electing a Speaker-designee.

    Thank you, Chairman Smith, for holding this very important hearing 
on China's use of forced labor in the seafood industry both on fishing 
vessels and processing facilities, and the infiltration of related 
seafood into the United States supply chain.
    It must first be noted that between the legally ambiguous use of 
the Antiquities Act to deem large swaths of the U.S.'s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) restricted to commercial harvests, top-down 
regulatory bureaucracy from NOAA Fisheries, inadequate stock 
assessments, and the invasion of fishing grounds by wind turbines, 
America's fishermen are at the brink.
    The number of U.S.-flagged fishing vessels has steadily decreased 
over decades and will continue to dwindle as there is hardly any 
current incentive for young fishermen to invest their time, money, and 
effort in a profession needled by an overbearing regulatory regime and 
under constant threat from highly bankrolled e-NGOs.
    To supplement the limited amount of domestic catch (by both labor 
restrictions and catch restrictions), satiate America's demand for 
seafood, and be in the black, U.S. seafood companies are forced to 
import from China.
    I appreciate the work of Ian Urbina and his team at The Outlaw 
Ocean Project in uncovering the extensive use of forced labor, 
including Uyghur forced labor, on Chinese fishing vessels and in 
seafood processing. However, American seafood companies do not have the 
luxury of a crack investigative team with unlimited time and resources 
to survey the Chinese exporters they source from.
    In fact, many of the U.S. companies mentioned in Urbina's reporting 
who later ceased accepting imports from their Chinese counterparts 
invested in what industry considered ``top-of-the-line'' third-party 
auditors to investigate labor abuses in China.
    I hope that this hearing delves into what the United States 
Government can do better to identify Chinese companies using forced 
labor and ease the burden on U.S. companies just trying to supplement 
the U.S. food supply chain.
    While decoupling from any users of forced labor is the ultimate 
goal, what must be investigated is the extent that Chinese forced labor 
infests the American food supply chain and how we can supplant it 
without creating inconvenience and higher prices for ordinary 
Americans.
    Additionally, while not necessarily within the scope of this 
hearing, I hope that we can discuss what action can be taken to 
revitalize the American seafood industry, particularly through 
deregulation and possible amending of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act.
                       Submissions for the Record

                              ----------                              


                    The National Security Imperative
         to Tackle Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing

   [From Brookings Commentary, Order From Chaos: Foreign Policy in a 
                   Troubled World, January 25, 2021]

                          By Michael Sinclair

[Editor's Note: This piece is part of a series titled ``Non-state Armed 
Actors and Illicit Economies: What the Biden Administration Needs To 
Know,'' from Brookings's Initiative on Non-State Actors.]

    Over the last few years illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing has become more recognized as a national security concern. At 
first glance, fish hardly seem to be on par with other cutting edge 
national security issues--cyber, space, artificial intelligence, 
drones, nuclear proliferation, and perhaps most importantly the return 
of strategic competition now commonly referred to as ``great'' power 
rivalry (although perhaps not for long). But in the years to come, make 
no mistake, fishin' may indeed become an increasingly important mission 
for the United States and its security partners and allies around the 
world, and most certainly those in the Indo-Pacific.
    To succeed in this mission, the Biden administration should lean on 
the U.S. Coast Guard to do what it does best, especially in the 
Pacific, where Chinese fishing fleets do double-duty as maritime 
militias that threaten and intimidate the fishers from neighboring 
nations. The administration should also continue to develop counter-IUU 
bilateral agreements, including those that may allow prosecuting 
masters of vessels that commit ``grave breaches.'' It may also need to 
make a hard choice between partnering with China's neighbors, or with 
China itself, to best address this threat.
                         fishing as an industry
    Fishing, a $401 billion global industry, provides 20% of the 
protein intake for nearly half of the world's population, and global 
fish consumption has been on the rise for almost 60 years. Yet 93% of 
the world's fish stocks are fully exploited, overexploited, or 
significantly depleted, and global climate change is adversely 
affecting stocks.
    It's axiomatic that sustainment requires effective management. The 
problem is that fish move, so for management to be truly effective it 
must be consistently applied both regionally and, really, around the 
world. In other words, country A's strong fisheries management 
practices can be undermined by country B's if the latter is unwilling 
or unable to implement strong practices--or worse, if it actively or 
tacitly condones IUU fishing.
                              enter: china
    Chinese fishing practices present a truly unique and dire IUU 
threat. First, China boasts the world's largest fishing fleet. It uses 
this fleet, to devastating effect, to meet its population's huge demand 
for protein. It also provides generous subsidies, which has 
incentivized the rapid proliferation of large, capable, ``distant 
water'' vessels that can harvest staggering amounts of catch in a 
single voyage, often by dragging the ocean bottom without regard to 
fish type, age, or quantity limits. When working together in fleets, 
these vessels are rapacious.
    Chinese-flagged fishing vessels range the world over in search of 
catch and are notorious for fishing within other nations'--especially 
developing nations'--exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Most recently, a 
huge Chinese fishing fleet, estimated to have 350-400 vessels, plied 
the waters near the environmentally sensitive Galapagos islands--a 
UNESCO World Heritage Site--and so overwhelmed the government of 
Ecuador's ability to respond that Ecuador requested U.S. Coast Guard 
assistance to protect its EEZ. This fleet then moved south into Chile's 
EEZ, where it continued to operate as late as December 2020 in the face 
of an active response from the Chileans and a strong rebuke from then-
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Shortly after, Pompeo also imposed 
visa sanctions on certain Chinese officials associated with China's 
malign maritime activities, including IUU fishing, in the South China 
Sea. The presence of this fleet has most recently resulted in a new 
sustained regional response: Operation Southern Cross.
    While China sometimes attempts to strategically deny oversight for 
activities of its distant water fishing fleet in much the same way that 
Russia denied responsibility for the activities of armed actors during 
violence in the Crimea, China takes the opposite tack in the South and 
East China Seas. There, its fishing fleet doubles as the sanctioned 
People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia. This militia has a history of 
working in a coordinated fashion to harass and bully China's neighbors' 
own fishing vessels in disputed maritime territory and, in some cases, 
those neighbors' EEZs. It's increasingly clear that these maritime 
militias are part of a concerted Chinese ``gray zone'' effort to exert 
strategic influence throughout the region.
     the operational and legal challenges of fisheries enforcement
    IUU fishing is an exceedingly difficult challenge. First, the 
operational dynamics are significant. Patrol vessels and aircraft (and 
their crews) are expensive. Few countries can afford them or dedicate 
such resources to fishing regulation in meaningful numbers. And the 
tyranny of distance plagues EEZ protection, like it does other maritime 
issues. This makes developing and maintaining the domain awareness 
across thousands of miles of ocean necessary for effective fisheries 
management a Herculean (or perhaps more accurately Sisyphean) task. 
Further, bad actors actively frustrate state attempts to build that 
awareness, through tactics like disabling required tracking devices; 
deploying difficult-to-detect, untended gear like high seas drift nets 
that indiscriminately kill marine life; and using onload/offload 
``motherships'' to mask the type and size of fish they catch.
    The international legal landscape also makes it difficult for 
states, beyond a vessel's flag state, to engage in IUU fishing 
enforcement. Thus, often only China can address Chinese IUU fishing. 
China is largely not interested in doing so, although that might be 
improving slowly as China develops aquaculture capabilities and 
recognizes that sustainment and better transparency may be in its best 
long-term interests.
    Moreover, several other international legal norms complicate 
countering IUU fishing. First, Article 73 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) prohibits criminal 
prosecution of fishing offenses in the absence of an express agreement 
between two states authorizing such prosecution. While the United 
States has signed but not yet ratified UNCLOS, it considers the vast 
majority of the treaty to accurately reflect the current state of 
customary international law as it relates to the law of the sea. Next, 
there are several broad-reaching, multi-lateral international 
agreements like the United Nations Fish Stocks Convention and many 
specific regional fisheries conventions that provide for enforcement 
remedies like catch and vessel seizures, but consistent with UNCLOS, do 
not typically allow for criminal prosecution.
    Domestically, the Magnusson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation Act and 
the Lacey Act provide the substantive law for fishing violations in the 
United States EEZ, but aren't particularly helpful elsewhere. On a 
positive note, Congress recently passed the Maritime Security and 
Fisheries Enforcement (SAFE) Act directing the U.S. government to start 
the process of focusing the efforts of relevant federal departments and 
agencies on the challenge posed by IUU fishing.
                                options
    The Biden administration can adopt several measures to better 
address the national security challenge posed by IUU fishing, both in 
general and regarding China.
    First, the United States could look to increase its use of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) as force multipliers, especially in 
the realm of improving the quantity and quality of maritime domain 
awareness information. The European Union's partnerships with NGOs to 
extend its fisheries management capabilities are a good model. But 
Washington should exercise great discretion on who to partner with and 
what activities the government sanctions--there are some cowboys out 
there.
    Second, the administration should ensure the maximum availability 
of Coast Guard forces in the Pacific theater: both cutters and law 
enforcement detachment boarding teams that are embarked aboard Navy 
ships and perhaps even integrated within deployed U.S. Marine Corps 
forces. An increased Coast Guard presence will help model what 
responsible maritime behavior should look like, and provides the 
operational commander in theater with flexible options to prevail 
across the full spectrum of strategic competition. In other words, 
there should be lots of Coast Guard resources in the Pacific, and U.S. 
Navy ships there should be fully capable of delivering both lethality 
and coast guardsmen, depending on the mission need.
    Third, the United States should consider developing the legal 
framework, and associated policies and procedures, to embark Coast 
Guard boarding teams aboard the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA)'s growing fleet of vessels. NOAA, already in the 
IUU fight, oversees the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
charged with domestic fisheries enforcement. Both NOAA and NMFS have a 
long history of teaming up with the Coast Guard. This will require 
jointly developed protocols to safely and effectively deploy Coast 
Guard law enforcement detachment boarding teams on NOAA's more capable, 
longer-range vessels as a sort of ``Coast Guard cutter-lite.'' This 
should be undertaken in a manner similar to how the Navy employs 
embarked Coast Guard personnel during counter-drug operations.
    Fourth, the State Department and the U.S. Coast Guard should expand 
the use of bilateral IUU fishing agreements. These agreements are 
particularly crucial in the Pacific, where competing claims of 
international sovereignty necessitate increasing the capacity and 
capabilities of partner nations to better deal with Chinese maritime 
aggression, including the malign activities of its fishing fleet/
maritime militia.
    More globally, the United States should pursue bilateral agreements 
that make criminal prosecution possible for especially heinous cases. 
This could be akin to the grave breaches ``try or transfer'' provisions 
that established the quasi-universal jurisdiction and helped make the 
Geneva Conventions so revolutionary in the humanitarian law context. 
Indeed piracy--another crime of universal jurisdiction--shares much 
(but not all) in common with IUU fishing, especially as IUU fishing so 
often intersects with other forms of criminality. This is of course 
easier said than done, especially with nations like Mexico, whose 
fishers are notorious IUU fishing recidivists. (Moreover, the United 
States is unlikely to reciprocally subject its own citizens to Mexican 
criminal jurisdiction.) Yet, despite a long history of U.S. flagged 
fishing vessels sometimes violating domestic fisheries laws within the 
U.S. EEZ, the overall risk of foreign criminal prosecution for U.S.-
based fishers is relatively low. This is because U.S. fisheries 
management within its EEZ has been relatively successful, even if not 
perfect. Thus, unlike near Chinese shores, lots of fish remain in the 
U.S. EEZ, so U.S.-flagged fishing vessels don't need to travel all over 
the world chasing catch.
    But, adding prosecutorial teeth and applying those teeth--
especially with regard to the vessel's master--may begin deterring some 
of the more egregious IUU violations. The United States would therefore 
also need to develop its own applicable extraterritorial criminal 
statute, perhaps modeled on the extraterritorial reach of the Maritime 
Drug Law Enforcement Act. Such a statute would enable it to engage in 
appropriate criminal prosecutions of IUU fishing cases with a 
sufficient nexus to the United States. As such, criminal prosecution 
for ``grave breaches'' of IUU fishing measures could then become 
increasingly central to U.S. negotiations of international fisheries 
management agreements.
    Finally, fisheries enforcement is not a good issue area for 
reducing U.S.-China tensions. In fact, on this issue, seeking 
cooperation for the sake of cooperation may pose unacceptable risk. 
Specifically, it risks undermining the important and necessary 
collaboration with other countries in the Pacific and around the world 
to guard their fisheries, including against China's fishing fleet. A 
focus on cooperating with China on fisheries enforcement also risks 
charges of hypocrisy and complicity against the United States from 
specially affected states, including isolated island nations in the 
Pacific and West African nations, both of which are extremely 
vulnerable and whose fisheries, food security, and livelihoods are 
devastated by Chinese fishing. Why should these countries seek 
partnership with the United States to check Chinese EEZ encroachments 
if the United States is itself partnered with China?
    Further, calling for more aggressive Chinese enforcement of the 
activities of its fishing fleets also runs the risk of incentivizing 
China to engage in more far-flung military operations. China's naval 
force grows more impressive by the year. Thus, China could disguise its 
military maritime expansionism under the sought-after self-policing of 
its fishing fleet (while in reality not breaking with its current tacit 
consent to fishing crimes). Better first to build capacities, 
capabilities, and partnerships with affected, like-minded countries.

Michael Sinclair, Federal Executive Fellow, The Brookings Institution; 
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard,  2023 The Brookings Institution.

The views expressed are the author's alone and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the United States Coast Guard, U.S. 
Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, or the 
U.S. Government.
                                 ______
                                 

                      Statement of Judy Gearhart, 
          Accountability Research Center, American University

    Recent reporting by The Outlaw Ocean Project has highlighted the 
need for U.S. leadership in improving ocean stewardship and advancing 
transparency in seafood supply chains. The CECC has an important role 
to play in both ensuring the implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor 
Prevention Act (UFLPA) covers the seafood industry and enlisting U.S. 
seafood industry leaders--both major retailers and importers--in 
efforts to prevent human rights abuses in the seafood industry. The 
Outlaw Ocean Project findings highlight the geopolitical importance of 
the U.S. building stronger alliances around these goals.
    U.S. trade policy is a powerful tool, as demonstrated by the 
application of the UFLPA to apparel and other industries. To advance 
sustainable change, however, these efforts must be paired with an 
increase in seafood industry workers' access to remedy and regulatory 
incentives for greater producer and retailer cooperation. The solutions 
will require:

    A.  Strengthening interagency cooperation and the Seafood Import 
Monitoring Program;

    B.  Increasing reporting requirements on corporations;

    C.  Enabling fishers' access to remedy; and

    D.  Deepening alliances with other countries combating IUU and 
forced labor at sea.

A.  Strengthening Interagency Cooperation and the Seafood Import 
Monitoring Program

    In June 2022, the White House issued a National Security Memorandum 
(NSM) on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and 
Associated Labor Abuses--calling for greater U.S. leadership and 
increased interagency collaboration to address these issues. 
Strengthening interagency efforts and policy coherence will benefit 
U.S. fishing companies and others operating legally.
    The Outlaw Ocean articles highlight reasons to believe a 
significant portion of U.S. seafood imports are processed by Uyghur 
forced labor in China. Notably, a significant portion of that seafood 
may even have been caught legally by U.S. fishing vessels and exported 
to China to be processed and then re-exported back to the U.S. or on to 
other countries. Such is the case for a third of Alaska's seafood, for 
example. Not only is the processing of seafood in China subsidized by 
forced labor, but the narrow scope of U.S. regulations currently 
enables the commingling of IUU fish with other, similar species and 
then exported under the name of the unmonitored species. Fuel subsidies 
to distant water fleets, which the WTO is attempting to address, 
further enable these practices. Absent stronger trade regulations and 
reporting requirements on seafood producers and retailers, U.S. 
consumers are helping to finance the operation of the Chinese fleet.
    The CECC should encourage current efforts to expand the scope and 
strengthen the implementation of the U.S. Seafood Import Monitoring 
Program (SIMP) and NOAA's efforts to work more closely and 
transparently with other U.S. Government agencies. In response to the 
June 2022 NSM and NOAA's proposed new rule for reforms to SIMP, a 
number of civil society organizations have called for additions to 
SIMP. These recommendations include: 1) reporting on all species of 
seafood imports (via land, air, and sea), 2) the use of unique vessel 
identifiers to enable traceability, and 3) increased transparency in 
SIMP auditing procedures.

    1. Covering all seafood imports whether entering by sea, land, or 
air would help address issues relating to fraudulent labeling and 
challenges in identifying processed seafood correctly. NOAA's most 
recent proposal to expand SIMP would still only cover 21 percent of 
seafood imports coming from China.

    2. Require that importers report producer vessels' unique vessel 
identifiers or authorization and related key data elements to enable 
greater traceability and facilitate additional reporting requirements 
on fishing practices, fisher protections, and producer vessels' 
ownership and control.

      Traceability data on vessel suppliers that includes key 
data elements (KDEs) on the date and location of landing, offloading or 
transshipment, and on the commingling or transformation of the product, 
will require businesses to adopt more responsible practices.

      These and other IUU related KDEs should be paired with 
increased reporting on labor issues such as (but not limited to) crew 
manifests, duration of work at sea, the labor rights record and 
policies of supplier vessels and the manning agencies they use.

      Both labor policies and catch documentation must be 
paired with requirements that buyers report on the vessels or vessel 
group supplying them and the ownership and financing behind those 
vessels.

    This increased reporting would greatly expand the ability to 
identify forced labor risks at sea and thus enable Customs and Border 
Protection to better uphold its mandate under the UFPLA and more 
broadly, the U.S. Tariff Act, to hold goods at port suspected of being 
made in whole or in part with forced labor.

    3. Improve upon and increase transparency in SIMP audit procedures 
to facilitate the interagency collaboration and stakeholder engagement 
mandated by the NSM. This will enable NOAA and other U.S. agencies to 
engage with greater credibility when seeking collaboration from key 
market actors and allies such as the EU and Japan in monitoring seafood 
supply chains.

B. Increase reporting requirements on corporations

    To strengthen the implementation of SIMP, additional regulations 
and incentivizers should require increased reporting for both retailers 
and importers to track KDEs relating to both the provenance of their 
seafood and the treatment of fishers as outlined above. Transparent 
data sharing between corporations and SIMP could prove essential for 
preventing both IUU and forced labor. It may also benefit the U.S. 
seafood processing industry.

C. Focus on access to remedy

    Multiple studies have documented the correlation between IUU and 
forced labor in the seafood industry. The revelation of Uyghur forced 
labor in seafood processing in China is an added area of risk. Much of 
the seafood processed in China has already come from vessels that may 
be using forced labor, some of which may or may not be Chinese vessels. 
Encouraging China's ratification and implementation of the Port State 
Measures Agreement (PSMA) could provide a constructive pathway to 
engage China on overfishing and labor rights abuse at sea. Although 
this will not directly address the problem of forced labor in China's 
seafood processing sector, it should be included in the context of 
future dialog.
    Additional policies are needed to prevent forced labor, human 
trafficking, and other pervasive human rights abuses at sea. These 
include the need for fishers to be allowed access to port services and 
connectivity at sea. The expansion of electronic catch documentation 
should also come with greater connectivity at sea that is then also 
extended to fishers. Access to port services and connectivity at sea 
also requires increased engagement of national and global trade unions. 
Representative fisher organizations need to be engaged in the 
development of greater fisher rights protections on all distant water 
fleets to be given access to port and at-sea inspection data so they 
can better monitor fishers' welfare and the implementation of policies 
meant to protect them.

D.  Deepening alliances with other countries combating IUU and forced 
labor at sea

    U.S. leadership is needed to build a coalition of countries that 
prioritize responsible ocean stewardship and the protection of seafood 
industry workers on the water and on land. Currently, the U.S. 
requirements for electronic catch documentation are applied to a much 
smaller number of species than the EU requirements, yet the EU 
requirements also do not require key data elements on labor-related 
issues.
    The U.S. needs to prioritize catch documentation and traceability 
and strengthen its collaboration with other countries committed to such 
improvements, including the EU and Japan. Such alliances will be 
essential to advancing more responsible ocean stewardship, coordinated 
policing, and market incentives for responsibly caught and processed 
seafood.
                                 ______
                                 

          Statement of Badri Jimale, Horn of Africa Institute

    I am Badri Jimale. I represent Horn of Africa Institute. I am 
testifying in favor of having meaningful discussion about the illegal 
fishing practices conducted by People's Republic of China-based 
companies in the Horn of Africa. I will discuss the impact of Chinese 
fishers on Somaliland.
    The illicit activities of People's Republic of China-based 
companies engaging in illegal fishing off the coast of Somaliland are 
posing significant challenges for the local fisher industry, placing 
immense pressure on its sustainability. Unfortunately, Somaliland lacks 
a well-equipped coast guard capable of effectively fending off these 
encroachments by Chinese trawlers prowling its waters. This glaring 
inadequacy creates an alarming scenario where the delicate balance 
between marine resources and human livelihoods is severely jeopardized. 
Moreover, what exacerbates this issue is the overall lack of 
transparency and communication surrounding these activities, leading to 
confusion among local authorities and communities alike.
    Disturbingly, it must be highlighted that this problem extends 
beyond just Somaliland's shores, as China's fishing in Nigerian seas 
has resulted in countless Nigerian fishermen being rendered unemployed 
due to extreme overfishing practices employed by Chinese vessels. We 
are deeply concerned about the potential ramifications of such a 
scenario repeating itself in Somaliland. The devastating consequences 
stemming from such unsustainable methods are numerous--depletion of 
fish stocks, impacting food security and nutrition; loss of income for 
local fishermen leading to heightened poverty levels; and irreparable 
damage to fragile marine ecosystems that support diverse species and 
maintain ecological balance. These actions not only undermine 
sustainable development efforts but also violate international laws 
governing maritime territories.
    Urgent measures need to be taken by both national and international 
stakeholders to address this critical issue before irreversible harm 
occurs.
                                 ______
                                 

     Submission of Stephanie Madsen, At-sea Processors Association

                              1. overview
    Chair Smith, Co-chair Merkley, Commissioners, thank you for the 
opportunity to provide written testimony to supplement the record. My 
name is Stephanie Madsen, and for the last 17 years I have served as 
Executive Director of the At-sea Processors Association (APA).
    APA represents proud American seafood companies, all participants 
in the Bering Sea Alaska pollock fishery. My members are some of the 
many seafood sector participants who have read The New Yorker's gut-
wrenching new reporting on human rights abuses in the Chinese seafood 
sector and concluded that the status quo is completely unacceptable. 
Ian Urbina's Outlaw Ocean Project spent 4 years conducting brave, 
innovative and harrowing reporting on the inhumane treatment of workers 
on board some of China's distant water fleet vessels and in several 
seafood processing plants in Shandong Province. The reporting team 
present very credible evidence that forced labor is widespread aboard 
some Chinese fishing vessels. They also use analysis of social media 
posts to confirm the presence of Uyghur laborers in some Shandong 
Province seafood processing facilities--laborers who are victims of 
China's brutal repression of Xinjiang and its ``re-education'' of the 
province's minority populations.
    These human rights abuses should be intolerable for all of us. 
Equally intolerable is a system that allows seafood products harvested 
and processed under these conditions to enter global commerce. 
Unfortunately, while strict U.S. labor and environmental regulations 
hold my members to stringent performance standards, Federal and 
multilateral policy settings have been largely ineffectual in 
discouraging and preventing the exploitation of workers in the Russian 
and Chinese seafood sectors.
    We can and must do better. On a national level, Federal authorities 
and the seafood industry must act with urgency to put in place stronger 
systems that can prevent seafood produced with forced labor or via IUU 
fishing practices from entering our domestic market. On a global level, 
we need reforms that will bring greater transparency and assurance to 
seafood supply chains and drive down international rates of IUU fishing 
and human rights abuse in seafood production.
                         2. wild alaska pollock
    The contrast between the practices of my members and those of their 
Russian and Chinese competitors could not be more stark. I represent 
the Bering Sea's Alaska pollock catcher-processor fleet. Our vessels 
fish sustainably, exclusively in U.S. waters, operating under U.S. 
labor laws. All vessels are crewed overwhelmingly by U.S. citizens and 
green card holders. Two federally trained independent observers are on 
board at all times. Vessels return to port every 10 to 14 days. We have 
voluntarily subjected our vessel operations to independent third-party 
social audits in an effort to demonstrate and extend best practices. We 
are proud to provide stable family-wage jobs--with full labor and 
safety protections--to thousands of American workers.
    The United States produces vast quantities of Alaska pollock for 
domestic and global consumption. Our products reach consumers in the 
form of fish sandwiches, fish sticks, frozen fillets, seafood surimi, 
and in many other product forms. The Bering Sea Alaska pollock fishery 
is conducted entirely within U.S. federal waters in conformance with 
strict federal regulations. This single fishery accounts for more than 
one-third of total U.S. fishery landings and provides American and 
global consumers with more than three billion seafood meals every year.
    The Bering Sea Alaska pollock fishery is also vital for communities 
across Alaska, in addition to coastal communities in Washington and 
Oregon where many Alaska pollock fishing vessels home port. We provide 
a tax revenue base, sustain infrastructure, and generate economic 
activity in coastal communities with few alternative means of economic 
development. Among the beneficiaries are numerous western Alaska 
villages that are some of the most remote and socio-economically 
disadvantaged in the Nation.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ For general background on the Community Development Quota (CDQ) 
program, which has enabled Western Alaska communities to now control 
catch rights to more than one-third of Bering Sea Alaska pollock quota, 
see: https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/alaska/sustainable-fisheries/
community-development-quota-cdq-program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Our vessels not only harvest Wild Alaska Pollock, they also 
immediately perform primary processing on board. This process utilizes 
the entire fish to produce a variety of products, with frozen fillet 
and frozen surimi blocks the two most important for human consumption. 
After offload to cold storage and other facilities in Unalaska, AK, 
these products are transported to secondary processing facilities 
located in or near the markets where they are consumed. U.S. secondary 
processing facilities are located in Anacortes, Bellingham and Redmond, 
WA; Brunswick and Carrollton, GA; Braintree and Gloucester, MA; 
Portsmouth, NH; Cucamonga, CA; Motley, MN; and Carteret, NJ. At these 
facilities, fillet and surimi blocks are cut to size and made ready for 
consumers through processes such as breading, battering, and re-
manufacturing before being packaged for final sale in retail or food 
service outlets. In total, the U.S. Alaska pollock sector generates 
approximately 30,000 jobs in the American seafood harvesting, 
processing, distribution, wholesale, retail, restaurant and food 
service industries.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Mckinley Research. The Economic Value of Alaska's Seafood 
Industry (January 2022) available at https://www.mcdowellgroup.net/wp-
content/uploads/2022/05/mrg_asmi-economic-
impacts-report_final.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Wild Alaska Pollock harvested by our vessels remains fully 
traceable throughout the supply chain, and anyone handling our product 
at any point can see detailed information about its origin. This 
includes the name of the vessel that harvested the fish, the harvest 
time and date, and even the exact tow. Importantly, in the United 
States only U.S.-harvested pollock can carry the name ``Alaska'' on the 
label. If you purchase a fish sandwich, fish sticks, or other whitefish 
product labeled as ``Alaska'' or ``Alaskan'' pollock, you can be 
assured that its entire production life cycle--from bait to plate--
occurred under the most ethical conditions.
                    3. the russia-china seafood axis
    Few global seafood supply chains are so simple and transparent. 
Part of what makes The New Yorker's reporting so important is that 
China is a global seafood juggernaut. Not only does it farm and harvest 
huge amounts of fish every year, it is also the world's biggest seafood 
processing hub. The full supply chains of seafood products that pass 
through these Chinese processing facilities can be incredibly complex 
and opaque. Product often moves through the hands of myriad supply 
chain actors, sometimes becoming intermixed or anonymized over time.
    Assurance mechanisms that can provide greater supply chain 
transparency frequently fail or are non-existent. Importers and 
retailers too often lack visibility of whether the seafood they are 
buying is sustainably or ethically produced. This urgently needs to 
change.
    While human rights abuses in the Chinese seafood sector are rightly 
under the microscope today, to focus exclusively on China is to miss a 
critical part of the picture. It is impossible to tell the story of the 
Chinese seafood industry without expanding one's gaze to neighboring 
Russia. That is because so much of the raw material entering Chinese 
processing facilities originates in Russian waters. It is harvested by 
Russian fishing vessels where human rights abuses, including the 
exploitation of North Korean and other vulnerable migrant workers, are 
an open secret. These fisheries also directly fund Russia's war in 
Ukraine. For example, in 2023 the Russian budget allocated $US3.97 
billion in revenue from auctions distributing pollock and crab fishing 
quota; \3\ and on October 1st, 2023 Russia imposed a new export duty on 
seafood that is now raising significant additional sums for the 
Kremlin.\4\
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    \3\ See: https://www.seafoodnews.com/Story/1246973/Russia-Ready-to-
Attract-397-Billion-as-
Result-of-Crab-and-Pollock-Actions-This-Year.
    \4\ http://government.ru/en/docs/49567/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recognizing the importance of seafood production to the Russian 
economy, on March 11, 2022 President Biden signed Executive Order 14068 
prohibiting the importation of Russian seafood into the United 
States.\5\ Yet sanctions have had minimal impact. Ilya Shestakov, the 
head of Russia's Federal fisheries agency, recently stated: ``the 
situation in the [Russian seafood] industry is stable. The sanctions, 
in fact, did not touch us at all.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ https://www.Federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/15/2022-
05554/prohibiting-certain-
imports-exports-and-new-investment-with-respect-to-continued-russian-
federation.
    \6\ See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sUP2auVdNiw.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The primary reason for this is the axis that Russia has built with 
the Chinese seafood processing sector. The act of re-processing Russian 
seafood in China constitutes ``substantial transformation'' under 
international trade rules, conferring ``Chinese origin'' on Russian 
seafood products and allowing them to evade sanctions and continue 
entering the U.S. market--without any import duties or serious 
regulatory scrutiny.
    Russia and China combine to form a seafood superpower axis. In 
2023, analysts estimate that the total Russian wild-capture harvest 
will exceed five million tons--a stunning total. Pollock is a key 
pillar of Russia's seafood economy, sometimes accounting for up to 40 
percent of total Russian fishery landings.\7\ Indeed, Russia harvests a 
majority of the world's ``Alaska pollock,'' with its 2023 Total 
Allowable Catch set at more than two million tons.\8\ A huge portion of 
this harvest is sent directly to China, where it moves through Chinese 
seafood processing facilities. Thanks to Ian Urbina's reporting, the 
world now knows the conditions under which some Chinese seafood 
processing occurs--and much of the time it is Russian raw materials 
that are moving through the facilities that lack any serious human 
rights due diligence or supply chain integrity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ In 2023, analysts expect that approximately two million tons of 
Russia's approximately five million tons of fishery landings will be 
``Alaska pollock''. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sUP2auVdNiw.
    \8\ See: https://www.intrafish.com/fisheries/russia-sets-pollock-
quota-for-2023/2-1-1340793.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Russia-China seafood superpower axis is only getting stronger. 
Just this month it was reported that Chinese economic development 
officials are planning to open a significant new seafood processing 
center to deliver semi-finished products made from imported Russian 
seafood.\9\ The new facility will be built in Hunchun, a Chinese city 
in far eastern Jilin province, which, tellingly, shares a border with 
both Russia and North Korea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ See: https://www.intrafish.com/processing/chinese-officials-
launching-seafood-processing-
center-to-produce-value-added-product-from-imported-russian-crab-
pollock/2-1-1530304.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              4. a stronger seafood import control system
    Important work has been done over the last two decades to try and 
improve seafood supply chain transparency, and now is the time to scale 
up what has been proven to work. It will take a range of approaches--
from policymakers, seafood sector participants, and other 
stakeholders--to bring needed reform to the global seafood sector. A 
critical category of reforms that APA is calling for today is the 
adoption of a more uniform and robust system of import controls by 
seafood importing nations.

    (a) EU Documentation Requirements

    In 2010, the European Union implemented a new Illegal, Unregulated 
and Unreported (IUU) Regulation.\10\ Although by no means perfect, the 
Regulation was a quantum leap forward in the fight against IUU fishing, 
and it established effective systems that should inform U.S. action 
now.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
?uri=CELEX:32008R1005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A core tenet of the EU's IUU Regulation is the requirement that a 
catch certificate accompany all seafood imports. The catch certificate 
must be issued by a flag state. Among other things, the certificate 
requires disclosure of the type and quantity of seafood harvested, as 
well as an attestation that it was caught by a licensed fishing vessel 
operating legally. Additionally, the EU system creates what is referred 
to as an ``Annex IV'' document requirement. This obliges any third-
country processor or exporter to confirm: (i) that seafood products 
received from another country were accompanied by a valid catch 
certificate; and (ii) that the final products being re-exported are 
coming from that specific consignment. Critically, the Annex IV 
document must be endorsed by regulatory authorities of the transiting 
state.
    These document requirements are in no way a silver bullet. They 
are, however, vastly superior to the requirements currently facing 
seafood products entering the United States:

    (i) They are more comprehensive, applying to all seafood products, 
not merely a subset considered to be ``high risk.''

    (ii) They are more streamlined, creating a uniform set of 
requirements that impose a manageable administrative burden on both 
industry and regulatory authorities.

    (iii) They are more credible, carrying the imprimatur of regulatory 
authorities in both harvest and transshipment countries.

    Adopting the EU import documentation requirements would be an 
immediate and significant improvement on the status quo for the U.S. 
seafood import system. Furthermore, the benefits would be significantly 
magnified by the alignment it would create between the two most 
important global authorities in the fight against IUU fishing. Uniform 
documentation would allow for far deeper U.S.-EU cooperation on 
enforcement, limiting the ability of bad actors to present fraudulent 
information on catch certificates and Annex IV documentation, and 
providing authorities in both jurisdictions with specific, 
complementary information about how seafood moves through supply chains 
globally. If other major importing nations, notably Japan, could be 
encouraged to follow suit, the effectiveness and potential impact of 
the document requirements would become even more significant.
    APA calls for immediate action from the U.S. Congress and the Biden 
Administration to follow Europe's lead and require catch certificates 
and the equivalent of Annex IV documentation to accompany all seafood 
imports.

    (b) ``Identification and Certification'' Authorities

    A second element of the European Union system should also be 
targeted for adaptation. The EU's IUU Regulation enables issuance of a 
``yellow card'' or ``red card'' against any flag state that is not 
providing an acceptable level of cooperation in the fight against IUU 
fishing. This element of the IUU Regulation arms EU authorities with 
critical leverage. It allows them to insist upon state cooperation on 
catch certificate and Annex IV requirements; and it empowers them in 
broader anti-IUU consultations.
    In the United States, the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium 
Protection Act and its implementing regulations provide some parallel 
authorities, allowing the President to take action against non-
cooperating countries.\11\ Pursuant to the Act's requirements, NOAA 
Fisheries produces a biennial report to Congress on improving 
international fisheries management. The report enables NOAA to (i) 
``identify'' nations and entities for certain problematic activities; 
(ii) consult with identified nations and entities; and (iii) issue 
negative certifications against nations or entities that are not 
cooperating on corrective action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2011/01/12/2011-507/
high-seas-driftnet-fishing-moratorium-protection-act-identification-
and-certification-procedures-to.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The EU ``carding'' system and the U.S. biennial IUU reporting 
process have both resulted in specific, measurable, and important 
improvements in fishing activities and seafood supply chains globally. 
For example, the EU issued a ``yellow card'' against Thailand in April 
2015. This resulted in a highly productive dialog between Thai and EU 
authorities, and the subsequent enactment and enforcement of new Thai 
laws and regulations. These reforms improved transparency in Thai 
seafood supply chains, created a new system for registering and 
monitoring vessels, and channeled more resources into enforcement 
activities.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
IP_19_61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Successes have also been achieved through the NOAA Fisheries 
biennial IUU reporting process. For example, after the 2019 report had 
identified three countries--South Korea, Ecuador and Mexico \13\--the 
2021 report revealed that two of those countries had taken significant 
corrective actions as a result of bilateral consultations with U.S. 
authorities. First, in November 2019 South Korea responded to U.S. 
consultations by enacting legislative changes that enable quick 
enforcement action against a vessel found to have fished illegally. 
Second, consultations with Ecuador resulted in an end to Ecuadoran 
recalcitrance in the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, enabling 
more effective cooperative action in that critical multilateral 
forum.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ NOAA Fisheries. Improving International Fisheries Management: 
2019 Report to Congress (September 2019) available at: https://
media.fisheries.noaa.gov/dam-migration/improving-intl-fisheries-
mgmt_2019_report_final.pdf.
    \14\ See: https://media.fisheries.noaa.gov/2021-08/2021Report-to-
Congress-on-Improving-
International-Fisheries-Management.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nonetheless, shortcomings are evident. Most significantly, 
bilateral consultations resulting from the U.S. biennial report come 
without the clear sequence of economic consequences prescribed by the 
EU's IUU Regulation. We believe an optimal program design would 
distinguish itself from the EU system by enabling a more targeted 
approach to ``carding'' trading partners.
    Different seafood supply chains have vastly different challenges 
even within individual countries. It is possible for some fisheries or 
regions to have effective measures in place while others are plagued by 
serious IUU activity. Furthermore, a clear shortcoming of the EU system 
is that major nations are, in reality, ``too big to card''. For 
example, it is almost impossible to imagine the EU issuing a ``red 
card'' against China and prohibiting the importation of all Chinese 
seafood into the EU. Both shortcomings can be addressed by giving the 
NOAA Administrator power to exclude imports of a specific species from 
a specific country when such action is warranted by serious IUU 
concerns. APA calls for adoption of such a system as quickly as is 
practicable.

    (c) Forced Labor and Human Rights

    As Commissioners will be aware, Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 
1930 provides U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CPB) with the power 
to detain any import shipment when it has reason to believe that the 
goods--or their inputs--were made with forced labor.\15\ These 
authorities have become far more meaningful in recent years thanks to 
Congress's enactment of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement 
Act of 2015 (TFTEA) repealing the ``consumptive demand'' clause.\16\ 
Since the 2016 implementation of TFTEA, Withhold Release Order (WRO) 
authorities have been issued by CBP against seafood shipments on 
several occasions.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ For general background see: https://crsreports.Congress.gov/
product/pdf/IF/IF11360#:u:text=
Section%20307%20of%20the%20Tariff(CBP)%20enforces%20the%20prohibition.
    \16\ https://www.Congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/644/
text.
    \17\ See, for example: https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-
release/cbp-issues-withhold-release-order-seafood-harvested-forced-
labor and https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-
issues-withhold-release-order-chinese-fishing-fleet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With respect to products tainted by Uyghur labor specifically, the 
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act provides strong authorities to 
ensure that such products are denied entry to the U.S. market. It is 
very concerning that the law does not yet appear to have been enforced 
with respect to seafood. If investigative journalists have been able to 
identify the use of Uyghur laborers at specific seafood processing 
plants in China, U.S. Customs and Border Protection authorities should 
be able to do so as well. APA calls for full implementation and 
enforcement of this landmark law with respect to seafood imports 
immediately.
    Beyond Uyghur and other forced labor, APA welcomes dialog about 
other import control system improvements that may be necessary to 
ensure that all seafood imports are produced through processes that 
respect the human rights of workers at every stage of production.

    (d) The Seafood Import Monitoring Program

    APA is sharing the above ideas in good faith and with a spirit of 
cooperation. We stand ready to listen to alternative ideas, and to 
engage in authentic dialog about their merits with policymakers, 
members of civil society, and other seafood industry participants. This 
includes with NGO's advocating for Seafood Import Monitoring Program 
(SIMP) expansion.
    APA has consistently held the view that SIMP has a central design 
flaw: it imposes all the obligations on a single and often marginal 
player in the supply chain, namely the seafood importer. For many 
seafood products, the importer is moving inventory just a single, 
modest step along a lengthy global supply chain. The role is 
transactional, connecting customer quality and product form 
specifications with the lowest cost raw material that can satisfy them. 
Importers have expertise in seafood trading, import documentation 
compliance, and logistics. What they often lack is either knowledge or 
leverage that can be helpful in the fight against IUU.
    Transactional importers are not harvesters, or processors, or 
retailers. They are not price setters, and they do not define market 
tolerance for risk. To make them the central character in our Nation's 
seafood import control system is to fundamentally misread the cast.
    SIMP stands in contrast with the programs and initiatives discussed 
above that focus on fishing and processing operations--and, critically, 
the governments that regulate them. The respective results to date 
stand in clear contrast, too: since SIMP's implementation in 2018, we 
are unaware of even a single instance in which it has operated to 
secure any positive change with respect to fishing practices or 
meaningful seafood supply chain integrity. The reality is that 
transactional importers attempting to comply with SIMP reporting 
requirements are not currently reaching up complex and opaque seafood 
supply chains to extract useful information or press for needed 
changes. Unfortunately, given the position of transactional importers 
in most seafood supply chains, we believe it is unrealistic to expect 
that this will ever change.
    SIMP advocates and responsible seafood sector participants share 
strong alignment on values and objectives. Today we are calling for a 
renewed dialog across stakeholder groups to reach agreement on how our 
shared objectives can be achieved.
                       5. corporate due diligence
    Although not the primary focus of today's hearing, it is important 
to note that more effective corporate due diligence in seafood supply 
chains must be part of the solution. Seafood companies and corporate 
buyers should put in place due diligence programs that are calibrated 
to the nature of the risk and designed to provide true assurance 
relating to supply chain integrity.
    Social auditing is often a central element of such corporate due 
diligence processes. As The New Yorker's reporting makes clear, social 
auditing is not a panacea. It is ineffective in identifying collusion 
among bad-faith operators, for example, or in uncovering falsified 
government information or secret government activities. A social audit 
provides insight into practices at a specific location and at a 
specific moment in time. This may be insufficient in high-risk 
environments, in which case additional corporate due diligence methods 
will be required.
    When used appropriately, however, we strongly believe that social 
auditing is an important tool for the seafood sector. It can define 
minimum acceptable standards, provide a measure of assurance, and drive 
needed improvements globally. In particular, voluntary programs can 
enable good-faith actors to receive external scrutiny and feedback, 
which in turn can help strengthen effective operational procedures.
    In this context it is important to understand that, in many cases, 
human rights abuses in the seafood sector occur not as a result of 
premeditated actions but because of serious process failures. Where a 
vessel operator has not prioritized translation services, crew members 
may commence work under conditions they do not fully understand. Where 
a company has not anticipated and planned for a scenario where they go 
out of business while crew remain at sea, workers may find themselves 
stranded. Where recruiting firms rather than vessel operators hold the 
contractual relationship with crew members, three-way misunderstandings 
may lead to pay or other conditions being contrary to what was 
promised. Voluntary social audits can be a mechanism for the 
establishment of robust systems in these and other areas.
    APA is proud to have undertaken independent, voluntary social 
audits of its vessel operations, and we hope other seafood companies 
and associations will follow our lead. At the same time, it is always 
critical to be honest about the limitations of such programs. They 
should never be relied upon as a singular solution, and they should 
never be used as a shield against valid criticism of failures to 
undertake more comprehensive due diligence in high-risk environments.
                        6. consumer empowerment
    The New Yorker's reporting underscores the shortcomings of another 
aspect of the seafood sector's current operations. Opacity in seafood 
supply chains and seafood labeling too often disempowers even the most 
well-intentioned consumers in the United States and globally, limiting 
the ability of even highly diligent individual seafood buyers to make 
informed decisions.
    For example, in Europe consumers purchase pollock products carrying 
the ``Alaska pollock'' species name and assume that it is ethically 
sourced. Unfortunately, EU authorities allow this confusion to prevail, 
refusing to grant a Geographical Indication to Alaska for pollock 
harvested off its coasts. As a result, people from Spain to Slovenia 
who purchase ``Alaska pollock'' products harvested in Russia and 
processed in China mistakenly assume they are from Alaska. We remain 
grateful to the U.S. Congress for enacting legislation to prohibit the 
use of the ``Alaska pollock'' name on foreign-harvested seafood 
products. This is the kind of ``truth in advertising'' that should be 
expanded across more seafood labeling laws in the United States and 
globally.
    The role of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) in seafood supply 
chain labor assurance was a focal point of The New Yorker's reporting. 
Today, however, I want to highlight another highly concerning dimension 
of the MSC's impacts on the global seafood industry: its evolution to 
become a barrier to transparency in seafood labeling. The MSC's revenue 
model has long relied on logo license fees. In its most recent annual 
report, logo license fees from use of the MSC eco-label were reported 
as totaling more than 29 million pounds. In our opinion, a thirst to 
maintain and grow this organizational revenue compromises the integrity 
of the MSC program in numerous ways. One is the MSC program's 
concerted, decades-long effort to market a generic MSC logo designed to 
provide blanket and anonymous ``assurance.''
    Since last year's invasion of Ukraine, this problem has become far 
more acute. The MSC has refused to stop certifying Russian seafood, and 
its eco-label is now serving to ``blue-wash'' a Russian seafood 
industry that many consumers of good conscience have no desire to 
finance.
    Russian ``Alaska pollock,'' Pacific salmon, Pacific halibut, 
Pacific cod and other species reach global consumers behind the veil of 
a reassuring MSC ``blue check''. In many cases, there is no easy way 
for seafood buyers to see that these products are harvested in Russia 
and processed in China, often under completely unacceptable labor and 
environmental conditions. As a result, on supermarket shelves the world 
over, identical-looking seafood products hide behind identical MSC eco-
labels, leaving even the most diligent seafood consumer disempowered.
    Consumers have a right to know where their seafood comes from, and 
governments, seafood companies, and assurance programs should all do 
their part to bring transparency to consumer purchasing decisions. A 
good place to start is to require the display of harvest origin on all 
seafood products. APA supports federal action to mandate such 
disclosures.
                             7. conclusion
    We want to recognize again the important reporting of The New 
Yorker, which has shone a needed spotlight on individuals in the 
Chinese seafood sector who are victims of a failing system. To date, 
while important progress has been made in the fight against IUU 
fishing, there have also been far too many failures. The truth is that 
some industry initiatives in this area have been too weak to make a 
difference, while some NGO proposals would grind legitimate and ethical 
seafood trade to a halt. This issue is too serious to tolerate a 
continuation of such failures. We must all work together to implement 
more transparent, more ethical global seafood supply chains. APA stands 
ready to do its part.

              Letter from the Chairs to Secretary Mayorkas

                                 ______
                                 
                                             October 24, 2023

Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
2707 Martin Luther King Jr Ave SE
Washington, DC 20528-0525

Dear Secretary Mayorkas:

As chairs of the bipartisan and bicameral Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China (CECC), we write to pose questions about the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s response to troubling reports 
about forced labor and other human rights abuses in China's seafood 
industry and to urge immediate actions to ensure that America's seafood 
supply chains are forced labor-free. Given that these reports implicate 
the United States Government's seafood purchases, we believe the 
situation needs a robust and coordinated response across all Federal 
agencies.

Recent investigations by Washington, DC-based nonprofit journalist 
organization The Outlaw Ocean Project revealed human rights abuses on 
board China's illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing fleets 
and the forced labor of Uyghurs transferred from the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR) to seafood processing factories in the 
Shandong province of China. There is also emerging evidence of North 
Koreans working in seafood processing in Liaoning province. Up to 
80,000 North Korean laborers are working in the cities of Donggang and 
Dandong, important seafood processing centers. Since 2017, at least 
three Chinese seafood processing companies, known for employing North 
Korean workers, sent over 1,000 tons of seafood to the United States 
through a dozen different importers.

The evidence presented by The Outlaw Ocean Project and detailed in the 
New Yorker and other publications globally is compelling and well 
documented. Major wholesalers, restaurants, grocery chains, food 
service companies, and the U.S. Government all import large amounts of 
seafood from the processing plants in Shandong and Liaoning. From the 
fish sticks served at school lunches to the fish sandwiches and 
calamari sold at major restaurants and grocery chains, the plates of 
American consumers are filled with products likely tainted with forced 
labor. At the very least, we should all agree that American veterans, 
school children, and men and women in uniform should not be unwitting 
accomplices to egregious human rights abuses.

As you know, under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (P.L. 117-78, 
or UFLPA); the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 
(P.L. 115-44 or CAATSA) as well as Sec. 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 
(19 U.S.C. Sec. 1307), seafood caught or processed with forced labor 
should be prohibited from entry into the United States. Because Uyghurs 
and North Koreans are working in PRC-based processing plants, the 
ability of DHS to act immediately and robustly is greatly enhanced by 
existing legislation.

Given that the information compiled in the reports referenced above was 
shared with DHS before publication, we ask you to report on the actions 
already taken to address seafood supply chains from China's IUU fishing 
and tainted with the forced labor of Uyghurs and North Koreans, and we 
urge you to take the following steps as soon as possible:

        1)   Issue Withhold Release Orders (WROs) for all seafood 
        processing facilities in Shandong and Liaoning provinces.

        2)   Place the companies that employ Uyghur labor on the 
        ``Entity List'' pursuant to UFLPA and inform seafood importers 
        of the intent to stop imports from those companies immediately.

        3)   Stop imports from companies employing North Korean labor 
        immediately, pursuant to CAASTA.

        4)   Coordinate with all Federal agencies purchasing seafood 
        for schools, veterans, prisons, and military bases to inform 
        them of DHS actions against China's seafood industry and train 
        procurement specialists about U.S. laws prohibiting the import 
        of forced labor-made products and enforcement of both existing 
        WROs related to China and the UFLPA. We have sent copies of 
        this letter to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Labor, 
        Education, and Veterans Affairs and the Director of the Office 
        of Management and Budget to start an interagency dialog on 
        Federal procurement.

        5)   Report to us on the specific outcomes of DHS coordination 
        with the Secretary of Commerce to address the import of seafood 
        caught or processed with forced labor as required by the James 
        Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act of 2023 (P.L. 117-
        263).

We note and appreciate the emphasis placed by DHS on China's seafood 
industry over the past several years and the enforcement of the UFLPA 
by the men and women of Customs and Border Protection (CBP). There is 
always more that can be done, but we continue to offer staunch support 
for CBP's enforcement efforts and DHS's leadership of the Forced Labor 
Enforcement Task Force. Please let us know how we can assist you to 
ensure America's seafood supply chains are cleared of forced labor.

We look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Representative Chris Smith                 Senator Jeffrey A. Merkley
Chair                                    Co-chair

cc: Secretary of Defense
Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of State
Secretary of Education
Secretary of Veterans Affairs
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Labor
Director of the Office of Management and Budget
Undersecretary Robert P. Silvers, Department of Homeland Security

                  Questions and Answers for the Record

                                 ______
                                 

       Question for Greg Scarlatoiu of HRNK from Senator Sullivan

    Question. I have introduced the U.S.-Russian Federation Seafood 
Reciprocity Act of 2023, bipartisan and bicameral legislation to close 
the loophole that is allowing Russian-origin seafood that has been 
reprocessed in other countries to be imported into the U.S. What do you 
think the impact of closing this loophole would be on the forced labor 
situation in China?
    Answer. Closing this loophole may provide the basis for a broader 
counteroffensive against Chinese export goods produced with forced 
labor. A ``domino effect'' could be triggered while addressing the 
seafood processing industry, subsequently exposing other Chinese 
industrial sectors that use forced labor. The case of North Koreans 
officially dispatched to Chinese seafood processing factories could 
provide an example of how ``closing the loophole'' may result in 
diminished demand and thus reduced numbers of laborers sent to China, 
in particular to China's Hunchun region.
    Within the greater picture of China's use of forced labor, North 
Korean workers represent a group that is systematically abused by their 
own regime and the Chinese authorities. Subjected to endless coercion, 
control, surveillance, punishment, exploitation, and appalling working 
conditions, in a work environment that resembles a North Korean work 
setting, North Korean workers provide cheap labor to China, procure 
hard currency for their own North Korean regime, and get to keep very 
little to themselves.
    According to witnesses formerly and currently involved in the 
exportation of seafood from North Korea to China and the processing of 
seafood by North Korean workers in China, the Russian Far East is an 
important destination for such products processed and packaged by North 
Koreans.
    According to the (South) Korean Industrial Trade Association 
(KITA), notably, after the inter-Korean relations were completely 
suspended due to the sinking of the corvette Cheonan and the Yeonpyeong 
Island shelling incident in 2010, North Korea needed an alternative 
market for seafood exports that had been going to South Korea. 
Simultaneously, Chinese regional governments and enterprises began to 
focus on investing in seafood processing facilities in the border 
region of Hunchun as a strategy to alleviate the excess demand for such 
seafood. Consequently, Hunchun became the major processing center and 
market for North Korean seafood, evolving into the ``Hunchun-Border 
Economic Cooperation Zone.''
    According to KITA, Chinese provincial governments and enterprises 
regarded Hunchun as strategically advantageous due to its convenient 
geographical location for trade with North Korea, South Korea, Japan, 
and Russia, and shorter transportation distances, leading to cost 
savings in seafood processing. This collaboration between North Korea 
and Chinese enterprises in the seafood sector gained momentum following 
the South Korean government's sanctions after the ``May 24 measures,'' 
i.e., sanctions imposed by South Korea against the North, a response to 
the March 26, 2010, sinking of the ROKS Cheonan by a North Korean 
submarine.
    KITA confirms that, as of the end of 2019, approximately 30 
companies in China's Hunchun region had seafood processing facilities 
and were specialized in processing North Korean seafood. It is 
estimated that these seafood processing factories employed around 2,000 
to 2,200 North Korean workers.
    Beginning on August 23 or 29, 2023, most or all North Korean 
workers officially dispatched to China, including workers from Chinese 
seafood processing factories, were returned to North Korea.
    According to sources within the North Korean escapee community in 
South Korea and the United States, many of them with points of contact 
in China and North Korea, the North Korean regime is likely already 
preparing the next groups of workers to be dispatched to China's 
seafood processing factories and other industrial sectors. The Russian 
Far East is reportedly an important destination for Chinese seafood 
processed and packaged by North Koreans in China. ``Closing the 
loophole'' presents the potential to curb Russian demand for such 
products and reduce the number of North Korean and other forced 
laborers involved in China's seafood processing industry, in particular 
in the Hunchun region.

    Questions for The Outlaw Ocean Project from Representative Zinke

    Question. You cite the UFLPA, which creates a CBP rebuttable 
presumption of ``forced labor'' for products from the Xinjiang region. 
If you think that the onus should be on industry and that currently 
available third-party auditors don't provide ``sufficient evidence'' of 
a lack of forced labor, how can U.S. seafood companies meet your 
standard for proving the lack of forced labor?
    Answer. Respectfully, I'd start by refining certain phrasing of 
your question because it has errors in its assumptions.
    First, it is important to point out that the issue is not that I 
``think the onus should be on industry.'' The onus is in fact on 
industry under the UFLPA. This is not an aspirational or interpretive 
matter. It is a fact of law. Feel free to check with Prof. Stumberg or 
other legal experts about UFLPA. But the ``rebuttable presumption'' 
within that law indeed shifts the burden of proof to an importer to 
show that its supply chain from those provinces is free of forced 
labor. Under CBP rules, that would require the importer to prove a 
negative, either that: (a) its suppliers do not include processing 
facilities from those provinces, or, (b) if they do, those suppliers do 
not use processing facilities where there is evidence of forced labor. 
So the issue is not meeting my standard of proving forced labor.
    Second, it is important to look at the meaning of ``forced labor'' 
in the UFLPA and elsewhere. Here is a helpful pull of relevant spots in 
the laws.

CBP's Introduction

    The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) establishes a 
rebuttable presumption that the importation of any goods, wares, 
articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in 
part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic 
of China, or produced by certain entities, is prohibited by Section 307 
of the Tariff Act of 1930 and that such goods, wares, articles, and 
merchandise are not entitled to entry to the United States. The 
presumption applies unless the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) determines, through clear and convincing evidence, 
that the goods, wares, articles, or merchandise were not produced using 
forced labor or that UFLPA does not apply to the goods, wares, or 
merchandise seeking to be entered into the United States.

Statutory Definition in the Tariff Act

19 U.S.C.  1307 Convict-made goods; importation prohibited (section 
307 of the
Tariff Act)

    All goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or 
manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor 
or/and forced labor or/and indentured labor under penal sanctions shall 
not be entitled to entry at any of the ports of the United States, and 
the importation thereof is hereby prohibited, and the Secretary of the 
Treasury is authorized and directed to prescribe such regulations as 
may be necessary for the enforcement of this provision. ``Forced 
labor,'' as herein used, shall mean all work or service which is 
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty for its 
nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer himself 
voluntarily. For purposes of this section, the term ``forced labor or/
and indentured labor'' includes forced or indentured child labor.

CBP Rule for Withholding Imports

19 CFR 42 Findings of Commissioner of CBP

    (e) If the Commissioner of CBP finds at any time that information 
available reasonably but not conclusively indicates that merchandise 
within the purview of section 307 is being, or is likely to be, 
imported, he will promptly advise all port directors accordingly and 
the port directors shall thereupon withhold release of any such 
merchandise pending instructions from the commissioner as to whether 
the merchandise may be released otherwise than for exportation.

CPB 2023 Update: Enforcement of the UFLPA Rebuttable Presumption

Page 10:

    The UFLPA establishes a rebuttable presumption, which became 
effective on June 21, 2022, that the importation of any goods mined, 
produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in Xinjiang, or produced by 
an entity on the UFLPA Entity List, is prohibited under 19 U.S.C.  
1307. The Commissioner of CBP may grant an exception to the presumption 
if an importer meets specific criteria outlined in Section 3(b) of the 
UFLPA.
UFPLA Section 3(b)

SEC. 3. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT IMPORT PROHIBITION APPLIES TO GOODS 
MINED, PRODUCED, OR MANUFACTURED IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS 
REGION OR BY CERTAIN ENTITIES.

. . . under subsection (a) unless the Commissioner determines----

    (1) that the importer of record has----

        (A) fully complied with the guidance described in section 
        2(d)(6) and any regulations issued to implement that guidance; 
        and

        (B) completely and substantively responded to all inquiries for 
        information submitted by the Commissioner to ascertain whether 
        the goods were mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in 
        part with forced labor; and

    (2) by clear and convincing evidence, that the good, ware, article, 
or merchandise was not mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in 
part by forced labor.

CBP Guidance

See the guidance generally; Part II Requesting an Exception to the 
Rebuttable Presumption (page 9)

Page 15:

    E. Evidence Goods Originating in China Were Not Mined, Produced, or 
Manufactured Wholly or In Part by Forced Labor

Documentation may include, but is not limited to:

      Supply chain map identifying all entities involved in 
production of the goods;

      Information on workers at each entity involved in the 
production of the goods in China such as wage payment and production 
output per worker;

      Information on worker recruitment and internal controls 
to ensure that all workers in China were recruited and are working 
voluntarily; and

      Credible audits to identify forced labor indicators and 
remediation of these if applicable.

Note: The resources listed in Section III of this CBP operational 
guidance document provide additional information on due diligence, 
supply chain tracing, and supply chain management measures.

    The bottom line is that it is not relevant under UFLPA whether (as 
the Chinese government and U.S. companies seeking to do business in 
China are apt to point out) select Xinjiang workers in their plants may 
be given a wage or attest in interviews with auditors or state media 
that they are ``happy'' to have the job, or are provided dorms, meals, 
vocational training. The relevant point here is that under UFLPA, these 
workers are categorically seen as part of state-sponsored forced labor 
because they are not given the true option to decline the work nor to 
leave the work without serious penalty. (This interpretation is 
consistent with CBP's description of labor transfer programs in the 
UFPLA implementation strategy, pages 19-22. That description relates 
back to the legal definition: work that is involuntary and performed 
under the menace of a penalty.) The comparison to keep in mind here is 
prison labor or child labor or North Korean labor or debt bonded labor. 
Even if auditors or companies are told that those workers are ``happy'' 
and earning, the legal lens through which they are viewed is distinct 
because of issues of agency and choice. Here again, it is confusing for 
lawmakers to ask questions about these matters since in fact this is 
embodied in the laws themselves and it is by no means an interpretive 
matter of a journalist. Nor does it make much sense for industry to ask 
journalists to counsel them on how to comply with these laws. If the 
industries seek to do business in settings where such labor concerns 
exist, it is likely best for the industries to figure out how and 
whether they can do so without running afoul of existing laws. The 
relevant questions for the industry and lawmakers to ask would be for 
the social auditors: Are they actually inspecting plants for the 
presence of Xinjiang labor (not what is the definition of forced 
labor)? Can social auditors actually do legitimate inspections that 
entail unannounced visits, actual anonymized worker interviews, true 
investigation of labor conditions in China and if not, are such audits 
illegitimate tools?
    Question. Moving further, where does the onus on industry for 
compliance end and where does the U.S. Government's responsibility 
begin to identify bad actors in the Chinese seafood industry?
    Answer. This is a question best answered by scholars or lawmakers 
but not likely me.
    Question. Prior to your reporting, would you expect any U.S. 
seafood company to be able to uncover what you uncovered in a general 
audit of a Chinese exporter?
    Answer. What made our reporting difficult was that we were needing 
to penetrate these supply chains from the outside, typically with no 
help from companies; in fact, most often with active resistance from 
companies. The companies themselves are the ones who have internal 
access and control over their own supply chains, so, yes, to put it 
bluntly, the companies can investigate their own supply chains and 
indeed are required to do so under U.S. law. The companies have direct 
access to their own full and unfettered transport and trade data (which 
is vaguely and only partially handed over to government or private 
databases mined by reporters and NGO's). The companies have the 
decisionmaking power and leverage to instruct their suppliers in China 
to allow spot checks and legitimate audits or else those companies will 
withdraw from China (reporters and NGO's have no such leverage). The 
companies indeed are the ones who have financially benefited from doing 
business in contexts like China where labor is cheaper, and this 
financial benefit puts added responsibility on them to control their 
supply chains to ensure they are devoid of labor or environmental 
crimes on their supplier ships or supplier processing plants.
    Mandatory human rights due diligence surely would help the 
industry. While Section 2(d)(6) of the UFLPA requires the FLETF to 
provide guidance to importers on conducting due diligence and effective 
supply chain tracing, there is no requirement for firms sourcing from 
China to actually undertake due diligence. Mandatory human rights due 
diligence in global supply chains is emerging across key market states, 
most notably with the European Union's Directive on Corporate 
Sustainability Due Diligence.
    So, here again, I fear the framing of the question misses the 
bigger picture: whether it is easy or difficult to weed out forced 
labor in a product's supply chain is immaterial. The law in the U.S. 
forbids companies from importing items made with forced labor and 
therefore companies likely have to only enter countries or markets 
where they are pretty confident that they can operate in compliance 
with the law. If there is a reasonable expectation that China might not 
allow auditors or companies to fully check on compliance with such 
laws, the real question becomes whether those companies can find ways 
to fix that problem so that they can operate in those cost-saving 
settings lawfully.
                                 ______
                                 

      Questions for The Outlaw Ocean Project from Senator Sullivan

    Question. What are some key things to keep in mind when we work 
with our global partners on seafood supply chains and forced labor?
    Answer. Forgive me for answering a question with more questions but 
such is the proclivity of a journalist. To me, the questions I'd 
personally be interested to ask of ``global partners on seafood supply 
chains and forced labor'' are, for starters, fairly basic ones: Do 
ports conduct inspections of crews on ships that enter their waters? Do 
they have proper methods for checking whether forced labor exists? Does 
the relevant country have a protocol for how they handle instances when 
they suspect forced labor or when crew seek to be rescued?
    Question. What are the most pressing areas of cooperation between 
us and the other countries who import seafood from China?
    Answer. I'd humbly refer this question to the broad array of 
answers that stakeholders have put forward as potential solutions to 
the myriad problems our investigation highlighted. On the Solutions 
page of our website we have put forward a variety of answers that NGOs, 
academics, industry consultants and associations have posited. See: 
https://www.theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china-the-superpower-of-
seafood/solutions/
    Question. In your opinion, is this ability to import Russian-
origin, Chinese-processed seafood a loophole that should be closed?
    Answer. My team and I have not focused on the Russian-Chinese 
nexus, so I will refrain for now from commenting on this specific 
matter.
    Question. What are your thoughts on expanding efforts to combat IUU 
fishing at its sources, rather than focusing efforts at the end of the 
supply chain?
    Answer. As a journalism organization, not an advocacy organization, 
we do not tend to comment on specific pieces of legislation or specific 
types of solutions promoted by key NGOs or other stakeholders. That 
said, it strikes me that the definition of IUU likely needs to be 
adjusted to incorporate the category of illegality that is human rights 
and labor violations against the workers involved in the fishing 
process.
                                 ______
                                 

    Questions for Robert Stumberg, Georgetown University Law Center,
                         from Senator Sullivan

1. U.S. Seafood Industry Unfair Competition

    Question. What are some key things to keep in mind when we work 
with our global partners on seafood supply chains and forced labor?
    Answer.

      Which of our global partners account for the largest 
market share of seafood imports that are sourced in China.

      To what extent do domestic fishers and fish processors--
in the United States and elsewhere--suffer from unfair and illegal 
competition from the Chinese distant-water fishing fleet.

      To what extent does over-harvesting by the Chinese 
distant-water fishing fleet undermine seafood as a sustainable protein 
resource for domestic consumers in countries around the world.

      To what extent do U.S. seafood distributors and their 
foreign counterparts trade in forced-labor seafood to supply their 
domestic customers.

    Question. What are the most pressing areas of cooperation between 
us and the other countries who import seafood from China?
    Answer. This is not a question that I have studied recently. Others 
who spoke to this question before the CECC include Sally Yozell at the 
Stimson Center and Judy Gearheart at American University's 
Accountability Research Center.\1\ I also recommend the comments filed 
in March 2023 by the World Wildlife Fund and six other leading 
conservation and human rights organizations on NOAA's proposed rule to 
reform the SIMP.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ CECC, Hearings & Roundtables, ``From Bait to Plate: How Forced 
Labor Taints America's Seafood Supply Chain,'' Witnesses and Submitted 
Testimony (October 24, 2023), https://www.cecc.gov/events/hearings/
from-bait-to-plate-how-forced-labor-in-china-taints-the-american-
seafood-industry.
    \2\ Comment on NOAA-NMFS-2022-0119, RIN: 0648-BK85, submitted by 
World Wildlife Fund, Oceana, Greenpeace, International Corporate 
Accountability Roundtable, Azul, Conservation International, and Global 
Labor Justice/International Labor Rights Fund (March 28, 2023), https:/
/www.regulations.gov/comment/NOAA-NMFS-2022-0119-2163 (viewed October 
21, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    From work I did years ago, important topics of cooperation included 
WTO negotiations on subsidies for fishing in international waters and 
harmonizing the asynchronous approaches to regulating IUU fishing by 
the United States and the European Union.
    Finally, as I noted in my October 24 testimony, Congress directed 
the Departments of State and Commerce to report on human trafficking, 
including forced labor, in seafood supply chains. The agencies reported 
(December 2020) on the need to expand seafood transparency beyond 
traditional health and environmental concerns, both domestically and in 
terms of international cooperation. They identified 29 countries that 
pose a significant risk of forced labor in their seafood supply 
chains.\3\ Appendix 4 of the DOS/DOC report includes technical 
recommendations to deter human trafficking and forced labor outside of 
U.S. waters. The CECC could ask the multi-agency group focusing on 
seafood to comment on how the Outlaw Ocean reporting relates to their 
recommendations and strategy for deterrence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Report to Congress ``Human Trafficking in the Seafood Supply 
Chain,'' Section 3563 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92), available at https://
www.fisheries.noaa.gov/international/international-affairs/forced-
labor-and-seafood-supply-chain (viewed October 21, 2023).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Russia-China Seafood Axis

    Question. I have introduced the U.S-Russian Federation Seafood 
Reciprocity Act of 2023, bipartisan and bicameral legislation to close 
the loophole that is allowing Russian-origin seafood that has been 
reprocessed in other countries to be imported into the U.S. What do you 
think the impact of closing this loophole would be on the forced labor 
situation in China?
    Answer. I have not studied the Russian seafood trade, so I'm not 
speaking as an expert on this question. That said, anything that 
reduces Russian demand for products made with forced labor should, in 
theory, reduce the demand for forced labor within China's seafood 
sector.
    Upon reading S. 2011, I notice that the bill would sunset upon a 
finding that Russia no longer excludes U.S. seafood from its market 
(sec. 5). If China's use of forced labor to process seafood outlives 
that sunset, then the bill's beneficial impact on forced labor would be 
lost.

3. Forced Labor in the Seafood Industry Is a Global Challenge

    Question. What are your thoughts on expanding efforts to combat IUU 
fishing at its sources rather than focusing efforts at the end of the 
supply chain?
    Answer. By end of the supply chain, I assume that you are referring 
to the UFLPA's ban on forced labor imports into the United States. I 
have two thoughts about this question.
    First, this is not an either/or choice for Congress. There is a 
strong case for both expanding IUU enforcement and importation of 
processed fish for consumption in the United States.
    Second, the policy objective of an import ban (or a procurement 
ban) is to reduce demand for products processed with forced labor, 
which in turn, should reduce the demand for forced labor in the first 
place. So, this may appear to be a policy that touches the ``end'' of 
the supply chain, but in fact, it aims at the beginning of the demand 
cycle for Chinese-processed seafood. The effect would be to shift 
demand for processing to source countries that do not use forced labor.
                                 ______
                                 

   Question for Sally Yozell of the Environmental Security Program, 
                 Stimson Center, from Senator Sullivan

    Question. I have introduced the U.S.-Russian Seafood Reciprocity 
Act of 2023, bipartisan and bicameral legislation to close the loophole 
that is allowing Russian-
origin seafood that has been reprocessed in other countries to be 
imported into the U.S. In your opinion, is this ability to import 
Russian-origin, Chinese-processed seafood a loophole that should be 
closed?''
    Answer. Thank you for your question on closing the loophole of 
importing Russian-origin, Chinese-processed seafood. To answer your 
question in short, yes, this is a significant loophole that needs to be 
closed. With the ongoing war in Ukraine, ensuring an effective ban on 
the importation of Russian seafood and seafood products would strike an 
economic blow to Russia. In 2021, Russia was the eighth-largest 
exporter of seafood to the U.S., with $1.2 billion worth of crab, cod, 
pollock, and other fish,\1\ including $900 million in king crab, 
entering U.S. markets.\2\ Halting illegal and mislabeled Russian 
seafood from entering the United States would serve the American people 
well, increasing domestic revenue, growing jobs, and benefiting fishing 
communities at home. Furthermore, American consumers do not want to buy 
rebranded Russian catch, and U.S. chefs do not want to serve it.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Laine Welch. ``Ban on U.S. purchases of Russian seafood opposed 
by some national food marketers.'' Anchorage Daily News. March 1, 2022, 
https://www.adn.com/business-economy/2022/02/28/ban-on-us-purchases-of-
russian-seafood-opposed-by-some-national-food-marketers/ (Accessed 
October 31, 2023).
    \2\ Rachel Sapin. ``U.S. seafood industry backs Russia seafood ban, 
but says clarity is needed on its impact.'' IntraFish. March 11, 2022, 
https://www.intrafish.com/opinion/us-seafood-
industry-backs-russia-seafood-ban-but-says-clarity-is-needed-on-its-
impact/2-1-1183613 (Accessed October 31, 2023).
    \3\ Desrochers, ``New poll finds U.S. voters want assurances 
merchants are selling legally caught seafood''; Oceana, ``American 
Voters Want to End Illegal Fishing & Seafood Fraud''; and Clark, 
``Chefs Urge Congress: End Illegal Fishing & Labor Violations.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    That said, the scope of the issue is far larger than just targeting 
Russian-caught, Chinese-processed seafood. The legislative solution 
needs to go beyond a timebound, Russian-only fix. A solution to the 
larger problem at hand, including a legislative one, needs to address 
the issues that allow any illegal seafood, not just illegal Russian 
seafood laundered through China, to enter U.S. markets. In 2019 alone, 
the International Trade Commission estimated that $2.4 billion worth of 
illegally harvested products entered the U.S. market,\4\ accounting for 
11 percent of U.S. seafood imports.\5\ Just under 40 percent of U.S.-
caught seafood is processed overseas and re-imported into the United 
States; the door is wide open for American-caught products to be 
commingled alongside Russian and other illegally harvested and 
mislabeled seafood.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ United States International Trade Commission, ``Seafood 
Obtained via Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: U.S. Imports 
and Economic Impact on U.S. Commercial Fisheries,'' Renee Berry et al., 
(Washington, 2021). https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5168.pdf.
    \5\ ITC Report, p. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the second largest importer of seafood in the world, the U.S. 
has the responsibility to play a leadership role in eradicating 
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and seafood fraud. 
There are several effective and realistic ways to accomplish these 
goals to prevent ``Putin's Pollock'' and other illegal seafood from 
entering American homes, grocery stores, restaurants, school lunch 
programs, military bases, and prisons.
    Legislation could be tailored to prevent illegally harvested and 
mislabeled seafood from entering the United States. In October 2023, 
the European Parliament approved new fisheries control rules requiring 
digital catch certification on all EU-flagged vessels without 
exceptions and full traceability on all seafood throughout the supply 
chain. Small vessels will receive certain exceptions until 2030. With 
full traceability and digitization, systems can quickly provide 
accurate data and information to law enforcement and fisheries 
management authorities so they can act. In the U.S., these actions 
could include working with Customs to enforce Tariff Act prohibitions 
on the importation of products created with forced labor or issuing a 
withhold release order (WRO) to prevent the entry of an imported 
product into the U.S. market. Additionally, it assures consumers that 
the seafood they are purchasing is legal and accurately labelled, while 
also rewarding those in the fishing industry who follow the rules.
    By legislating a more comparable system to that of the EU, industry 
would not have to meet the requirements of different traceability 
systems around the globe. Japan is implementing a seafood traceability 
program and others will join soon including South Korea and Australia. 
It is critical to bring U.S. seafood trade monitoring programs into 
alignment with their international counterparts to reduce the burden on 
law-abiding industry and eliminate loopholes for illegally harvested 
seafood to reach the market.
    A comprehensive traceability system in the United States that 
tracks all seafood through the supply chain, would put an end to masked 
illegally harvested fish products sold in the United States. This 
precisely is what NOAA's Seafood Import Monitoring Program initially 
set out to accomplish: to be a comprehensive risk-based seafood 
traceability system. Yet, 6 years after being implemented, the Seafood 
Import Monitoring Program covers only 45 percent of U.S. seafood 
imports and excludes several species that are at high risk of illegal 
harvesting and mislabeling, such as pollock, salmon, and squid.
    The Seafood Import Monitoring Program is at a pivotal moment, and 
there are several paths, whether through legislative or executive 
action, to expand and improve the program. Such action would provide 
consumers with confidence that the seafood they consume is safe, legal, 
and sustainable, and would go a long way toward ensuring all parts of 
the fishing industry are fair and equitable, especially for the 
harvesters, processors, and merchants who follow the rules. I commend 
you for your legislation and recommend expanding the bill to prevent 
and deter all illegal seafood, beyond just Russian-caught and Chinese-
processed seafood, from entering the United States.
    These big challenges merit thoughtful solutions. Stopping illegal 
seafood, including that of Russian origin, requires a comprehensive and 
flexible seafood tracking system. Both Congress and the Administration 
have the power to make that a 
reality.
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                          Witness Biographies

    Ian Urbina, Director and Founder of The Outlaw Ocean Project

    Ian Urbina is the Director of The Outlaw Ocean Project, a non-
profit journalism organization based in Washington, DC that produces 
investigative stories about human rights and environment and labor 
concerns on the two thirds of the planet covered by water. Before 
founding The Outlaw Ocean Project, Urbina spent roughly 17 years as a 
staff reporter for The New York Times. He has received various 
journalism awards, including a Pulitzer Prize, two George Polk Awards, 
and an Emmy. Several of his investigations have also been converted 
into major motion pictures.

    Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human 
Rights in North Korea

    Greg Scarlatoiu is the Executive Director of the Committee for 
Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). For 10 years, he has been a 
visiting professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies and Yonsei 
University. Scarlatoiu is Vice President of the International Council 
on Korean Studies (ICKS). He has been a Radio Free Asia Korean 
columnist for 20 years. Scarlatoiu holds a Master of Arts in Law and 
Diplomacy from the Fletcher School, Tufts University, and a Master of 
Arts and Bachelor of Arts from Seoul National University's Department 
of International Relations. He completed the MIT Seminar XXI Program 
for U.S. national security leaders in 2016-2017. Scarlatoiu was awarded 
the title ``Citizen of Honor, city of Seoul,'' in January 1999. Born 
and raised in communist Romania, he is a naturalized U.S. citizen. 
Scarlatoiu is fluent in Korean, French and Romanian.

    Robert Stumberg, Professor of Law at Georgetown University

    Robert Stumberg is a professor of law at Georgetown University, 
where he directs the Harrison Institute for Public Law. The Institute 
works with public officials and coalitions on community development, 
health and food, trade policy, and human rights for workers. His 
published work includes ``Turning a Blind Eye? Respecting Human Rights 
in Government Purchasing'' (coauthor, ICAR 2014) and ``Transparency: 
See and Be Seen,'' a forthcoming chapter in Business, Human Rights, and 
Sustainable Development, editors Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan and M. Rafiqul 
Islam (Leiden: Brill 2023). BA, Macalester College; JD, Georgetown 
University; LLM, Georgetown University.

    Sally Yozell, Director of the Environmental Security Program at the 
Stimson Center

    Sally Yozell is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Environmental 
Security Program at the Stimson Center, a security research institute 
based in Washington, DC. Her research examines environmental factors 
that have the potential to undermine the security of individuals, 
communities, and nations across the globe. Ms. Yozell leads a team that 
explores the links between environmental degradation and the loss of 
natural resources, and how these issues can threaten and undermine 
economic, food, and ecological security. They conduct research and 
develop global security strategies to combat IUU fishing, thwart 
illicit networks, put an end to forced labor and human rights abuse in 
the seafood industry, and work to increase transparency throughout the 
seafood supply chain.
    Ms. Yozell also oversees CORVI, the Climate and Ocean Risk 
Vulnerability Initiative, a program that works with coastal cities and 
island states to build resilience in communities threatened by the 
climate crisis. CORVI is a place-based and data-driven decision support 
tool for leaders who need to make smart climate investments to improve 
the safety and security of coastal cities and island states. CORVI is 
now operating in 15 cities around the world.
    Prior to joining Stimson, Ms. Yozell managed the Our Ocean 
Conferences for the U.S. State Department (2014-2016) and continued to 
serve as an advisor to Our Ocean Conference host governments (2017-
2019). She also served as a Senior Advisor to former U.S. Secretary of 
State John Kerry, during which time she co-chaired the Presidential 
Task Force on Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood 
Fraud. Previously, she was the Director of Policy and Deputy Assistant 
Secretary at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Ms. 
Yozell led marine programs at The Nature Conservancy and Battelle 
Memorial Institute and worked for almost a decade in the U.S. Senate. 
She holds an MPA from Harvard University and a BA from the University 
of Vermont.

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