[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                          COUNTERING CHINA'S 
                GLOBAL TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION CAMPAIGN

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________


                           SEPTEMBER 12, 2023

                               __________


 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China






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                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

53-487 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2024









              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House

                                     Senate

CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,       JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Co-chair
    Chair                            STEVE DAINES, Montana
JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts     MARCO RUBIO, Florida
BRIAN MAST, Florida                  TOM COTTON, Arkansas
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia            ANGUS KING, Maine
MICHELLE STEEL, California           TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ANDREA SALINAS, Oregon
ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa
RYAN ZINKE, Montana

                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

               DANIEL K. KRITENBRINK, Department of State

                  MARISA LAGO, Department of Commerce

                   THEA MEI LEE, Department of Labor

                     UZRA ZEYA, Department of State

                   ERIN BARCLAY, Department of State

                      Piero Tozzi, Staff Director

                   Matt Squeri, Deputy Staff Director


                                  (ii)









                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                               Statements

Opening Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a U.S. Representative from 
  New Jersey; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China.     1
Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley, a U.S. Senator from Oregon; Co-
  chair, 
  Congressional-Executive Commission on China....................     3
Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern, a U.S. Representative from 
  Massachusetts..................................................     4
Statement of Hon. Uzra Zeya, Under Secretary of State for 
  Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights.................     5
Statement of Hon. Dan Sullivan, a U.S. Senator from Alaska.......     6
Statement of Hon. Andrea Salinas, a U.S. Representative from 
  Oregon.........................................................     8
Statement of Hon. Ryan Zinke, a U.S. Representative from Montana.     8
Statement of Hon. Michael Chong, Member of Canadian Parliament, 
  Wellington-Halton Hills, Ontario...............................    10
Statement of Yana Gorokhovskaia, Research Director for Strategy 
  and 
  Design, Freedom House..........................................    24
Statement of Laura Harth, Campaign Director, Safeguard Defenders.    26
Statement of Rushan Abbas, Founder and Executive Director, 
  Campaign for Uyghurs...........................................    31

                                APPENDIX
                          Prepared Statements

Chong, Michael, Hon..............................................    41
Gorokhovskaia, Yana..............................................    47
Harth, Laura.....................................................    50
Abbas, Rushan....................................................    54

Smith, Hon. Chris................................................    58
Merkley, Hon. Jeff...............................................    59
McGovern, Hon. James P...........................................    60
Sullivan, Hon. Dan...............................................    60
Zeya, Hon. Uzra..................................................    61

                       Submissions for the Record

``China Sows Disinformation About Hawaii Fires Using New 
  Techniques,'' New York Times, September 11, 2023, submitted by 
  Senator Sullivan...............................................    63
Chapter 11, entitled ``A Law Firm on Every Corner,'' from ``Hard 
  Drive: A Family's Fight Against Three Countries'' by Mary Todd 
  and Christina Villegas, submitted by Representative Zinke......    67
``Involuntary Returns: China's Covert Operation to Force 
  `Fugitives' Overseas Back Home,'' a report by Safeguard 
  Defenders......................................................    77
Statement of Su Yutong, human rights advocate; Radio Free Asia 
  journalist.....................................................   145
Statement of Levi Browde, Executive Director, Falun Data 
  Information
  Center.........................................................   148
Statement of Zhou Fengsuo, Executive Director, Human Rights in 
  China, and student leader at the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
  demonstrations.................................................   158
Statement of Anna Kwok, Executive Director, Hong Kong Democracy 
  Council, and Mason L. Wong, research fellow, Hong Kong 
  Democracy Council..............................................   161
CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form..........................   182
Witness Biographies..............................................   183

                                 (iii)









 
                          COUNTERING CHINA'S 
                GLOBAL TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION CAMPAIGN

                              ----------                              


                      TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2023

                            Congressional-Executive
                                       Commission on China,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The hearing was held from 10:00 a.m. to 12:12 a.m., in Room 
1100, Longworth House Office Building, Representative Chris 
Smith, Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
presiding.
    Also present: Senator Jeff Merkley, Co-chair, Under 
Secretary Uzra Zeya, Senator Dan Sullivan, and Representatives 
McGovern, Zinke, and Salinas.

   STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW 
   JERSEY; CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

    Chair Smith. This is an important hearing. It's a hearing 
that we have been working on and working closely with Co-chair 
Merkley and, of course, Ranking Member McGovern on, because 
this is an issue that is getting worse, not better. And so we 
are trying to bring a focus on it. We've introduced 
legislation, totally bipartisan. Senator Merkley, Jim McGovern 
and I, and others, have sponsored it, which is now pending in 
both the House and the Senate.
    In June 2021 on the 32nd anniversary of the 1989 student 
democracy protests, which as we all know ended in the horrific 
Tiananmen Square Massacre, I visited Liberty Sculpture Park in 
Yermo, California to witness the unveiling of a sculpture made 
by artist Chen Weiming. It was a 20-foot-tall statue that 
morphed Xi Jinping's skull with a coronavirus molecule. And 
Chen named it the ``CCP Virus.'' It was a bold work of art 
rightfully assigning blame to the CCP, and Xi Jinping in 
particular, for the horrific pandemic and all the mistakes that 
were made, especially in the early months, that shook the 
world.
    I was honored to attend and to see Chen's work, and to join 
him and other heroes of the Chinese democracy movement in 
speaking out against the atrocities committed by the Chinese 
Communist Party. Less than two months later, however, the 
sculpture was gone. It was vandalized and then burned to the 
ground, likely by a band of CCP agents targeting Chen and other 
Chinese democracy activists here in the United States to punish 
and scare them into silence. At the ceremony, there were 
Chinese Communist Party agents in attendance.
    Unfortunately, Chen's case is not a rare case. With us that 
day in Yermo was Wei Jingsheng, perhaps the greatest advocate 
for Chinese human rights and democracy of our time. Very few 
people know this, but in May of 2022 right here in Washington, 
a car swerved in front of Wei's car and suddenly braked in 
front of him while another rammed him from behind. Both cars 
quickly fled the scene. Wei believes, and I also believe, that 
this was an attempt on Wei's life. This, incidentally, is the 
same tactic that I have heard used over and over against other 
Chinese individuals who have run afoul of the CCP.
    And the list goes on. Major Xiong Yan, who served in the 
U.S. Army and ran for Congress in New York City, was stalked 
and harassed by Chinese agents here in the United States. 
Pastor Bob Fu, whom I've known for over two decades, a leading 
advocate on behalf of Christians and human rights activists and 
defenders trying to escape China, was threatened with a bomb at 
his home in Texas. The brave eight Hong Kongers, whose heads 
the authorities have placed bounties on, have been harassed 
along with their families just this past summer, solely for 
speaking out against the atrocities happening in their beloved 
Hong Kong.
    Indeed, I note that that group includes a number of 
individuals whose outspokenness has led them to testify here at 
the China Commission. So this is really personal for all of us 
on this panel. It also becomes personal when I hear about a 
fellow legislator from a sister democracy who has been harassed 
for speaking out about human rights in China. Member of 
Parliament Michael Chong of Canada was harassed for what 
Senator Merkley and I have repeatedly done, calling the Chinese 
Communist Party's treatment of Uyghurs what it is--genocide. 
And although Michael has been harassed, he is not in any way, 
shape, or form intimidated. And he is joining us today on the 
witness panel; he'll be the first to speak to us today.
    My friends, the Chinese Communist Party has waged a 
pervasive coercive campaign around the world against anyone who 
does not agree with the Party. They target Uyghurs, Hong 
Kongers, Tibetans, dissidents, activists, students, 
journalists, or anyone who dares to state their unapproved 
opinions about the People's Republic of China. The Chinese 
Communist Party uses modern technology to digitally harass and 
surveil individuals around the globe. They abuse the Interpol 
system to punish and force the return of those who exercise 
their freedom of speech while abroad. They detain and harass 
dissidents' families and friends back in China, like the sister 
of Rushan Abbas, to unjustly attempt to coerce silence. Rushan 
will join us here this morning on panel number II.
    And they even use direct physical assaults beyond their 
borders to control what is said about their country and its 
wrongdoing. Recently we've seen them go so far as to set up 
shop right here in the United States, establishing illegal 
police stations here in New York City to surveil and harass 
Chinese immigrants on our soil. The Chinese Communist Party's 
strategy of trying to rewrite global norms has succeeded in far 
too many cases. This has led to self-censorship and curtailment 
of basic freedoms, even here in the United States of America--
students scared to speak out, journalists scared to write, free 
citizens scared to attend gatherings--all this happening beyond 
China's borders and within ours.
    Indeed, as Michael Chong's testimony illustrates, and as 
underscored in news just this past weekend from Great Britain--
where an alleged spy worked in Parliament--it is also happening 
within our legislatures. We cannot and will not let the Chinese 
Communist Party in any way intimidate us or scare us into 
submission through these tactics. Today, we will hear from 
experts and victims alike who have seen these stories up close. 
We must work to protect freedom of speech, assembly, and 
opinion, here in the United States as well as elsewhere, and 
including in the People's Republic of China.
    I'd like to yield to our distinguished co-chair, Senator 
Merkley.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith.

         STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, A SENATOR FROM
 OREGON; CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

    Co-Chair Merkley. Transnational repression is central to 
the Chinese Communist Party's strategy of silencing critics of 
Chinese policy around the world. It affects so many of the 
Uyghurs, the Hong Kongers, the Tibetans, the human rights 
advocates, the journalists, and others this Commission works 
with on a daily basis. This hearing gives us a chance to give a 
platform to some of the victims and experts from across the 
globe who have been most engaged in trying to identify ways we 
can address this vexing challenge. We know from past testimony 
that it isn't easy, as the Chinese Communist Party's 
sophisticated tactics seem to know no bounds and bring the 
power of a ruthless state against individual dissidents, 
members of the Chinese diaspora, and, insidiously, their family 
members in China.
    That's why it's so critical that we redouble the efforts to 
wrap our minds around the dimensions of this threat, to raise 
awareness globally, to identify ways to build common cause with 
those who have been targeted--religious groups, activists, 
journalists, politicians--as well as governments sick and tired 
of the brazen violation of sovereignty that transnational 
repression represents. Last year I chaired another hearing on 
this topic to hear about what the Biden administration is doing 
about it. And I'm proud that one of the officials at the 
forefront of that work, Under Secretary Uzra Zeya, is now one 
of our commissioners. The State Department is dedicated to and 
is continuing to apply significant time and attention to 
developing a more comprehensive strategy to counter, deter, and 
mitigate these threats. We have also seen the Department of 
Justice make important strides in pursuing criminal charges 
against groups and individuals accused of engaging in 
transnational repression.
    But despite these efforts, this Commission's reporting 
shows how far we have to go. We continue to track a disturbing 
number of cases of transnational repression, both here in the 
United States and abroad, with the knowledge that countless 
others are taking place and likely not being reported on. I 
imagine that for every case we hear about, there's another 10 
we don't know about. We have seen egregious harassment 
campaigns, even against legislators in the world, including the 
Honorable Michael Chong, who is here as a Member of the 
Canadian House of Commons. We have seen relentless targeting of 
young activists who have spoken out bravely against the 
increasingly repressive conditions in Hong Kong. And we have 
seen the unrelenting pressure that continues to be directed at 
Uyghurs around the world.
    We know this is, as Freedom House calls it, the most 
sophisticated global and comprehensive campaign of 
transnational repression in the world. It relies on 
surveillance technology, spyware, threats to individuals 
through phone calls or face-to-face intimidation, and even 
harassment of family members and friends back in China. As 
Safeguard Defenders revealed in an eye-opening report earlier 
this year, the PRC is also responsible for establishing at 
least 102 overseas service stations in at least 53 countries, 
breaching national sovereignty and coercing Chinese diaspora 
members to return to the PRC for criminal investigation.
    All of this requires that the United States, and as many 
other governments as possible--and we do need international 
cooperation to make this effective--make it a priority to 
address this issue. That's why earlier this year I introduced 
the Transnational Repression Policy Act, joined on a bipartisan 
basis by my colleagues Senator Rubio, Senator Cardin, and 
Senator Hagerty, to hold foreign governments and individuals 
accountable when they stalk, intimidate, or assault people 
across borders.
    I appreciate Chairman Smith's work to lead the House 
companion to this legislation. If enacted, the Transnational 
Repression Policy Act would mandate additional U.S. Government 
reporting on the issue, required training for U.S. diplomatic 
and law enforcement personnel, bolster intelligence community 
efforts to track and share information on these incidents, and 
develop a more effective tip line for victims and witnesses. 
I'm working to get this bill passed. I think it's essential 
that we do. And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses 
today who are bringing their experience, their story to bear on 
this very important issue.
    Chair Smith. Thank you, Chairman Merkley.
    I'd like to now yield to the ranking member, Jim McGovern.

                STATEMENT OF JAMES P. McGOVERN, 
              A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Representative McGovern. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And 
I join my colleagues in welcoming the witnesses today, and the 
public, to see CECC's hearing on transnational repression. 
Transnational repression occurs when governments reach across 
borders to silence dissent among diasporas and exiles, 
including through assassinations, illegal deportations, 
abductions, digital threats, Interpol abuse, and family 
intimidation.
    Our focus today is on the practices of the People's 
Republic of China. but transnational repression can be carried 
out not just by unfriendly governments, but also by strategic 
allies. It can target people anywhere they or their families 
reside or visit, even in democracies like the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Germany, Australia, South Africa, and here in the 
United States. That's why I worked with Senator Merkley during 
the 117th Congress as he led the development of the 
Transnational Repression Policy Act, and why I'm proud to co-
lead the same bill, H.R. 3654, in the House this Congress with 
Chairman Smith. It is critically important to make sure that 
the U.S. Government has the tools it needs to confront this 
global challenge, both domestically and internationally.
    I turn now to China. Freedom House's database on 
transnational repression now includes information on 854 direct 
physical incidents committed by 38 governments in 91 countries 
around the world since 2014. China is an origin country for 253 
of those recorded incidents, a stunning 30 percent. As we will 
hear today, the PRC targets abroad the same populations that it 
represses internally, especially Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and 
Tibetans. State agents linked to the security and police forces 
have engaged in forced rendition of asylum seekers, street 
assaults, digital surveillance, online harassment, and the 
coercion and intimidation of family members and friends of 
dissidents.
    We must be sure that we have the knowledge and the capacity 
to protect the people who are targets of these practices, 
especially those who are within U.S. jurisdiction. And we must 
do a better job of engaging with partner countries and 
strengthening multi-
lateral strategies to counter the PRC's actions, which violate 
international human rights, among them the right to freedom of 
expression, association, asylum, and freedom of movement, and 
the prohibition on arbitrary detention. So I look forward to 
this hearing today. I thank the witnesses again. And I look 
forward to hearing their recommendations. And with that, I 
yield back my time.
    Chair Smith. Thank you very much.
    It's my honor to--you know, this Commission, as I think all 
of you know, or most of you know, is not only bicameral and bi-
partisan, it also includes distinguished members of the 
executive branch. We are joined by one of those members, Under 
Secretary Uzra Zeya. And I yield the floor to her.

   STATEMENT OF HON. UZRA ZEYA, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 
         CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

    Under Secretary Zeya. Good morning and thank you, Chairman 
Smith, and Co-chair Merkley, and Ranking Member McGovern, and 
fellow commissioners. I'm honored to be with you all today for 
this important discussion on the increasingly pervasive and 
concerning use of transnational repression by PRC authorities. 
Transnational repression, or TNR, is a global phenomenon. But 
the PRC's efforts are especially pervasive, pronounced, and 
persistent. The PRC uses TNR to harass and threaten Uyghurs, 
Tibetans, members of other ethnic and religious minority 
groups, Hong Kongers, and PRC citizens, and non-PRC citizens 
living abroad who seek only to exercise their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.
    As we've heard from the co-chairs and ranking member, the 
PRC utilizes a wide variety of tactics, including online 
harassment, exit bans, or imprisonment of family members of 
targeted individuals, the misuse of international law 
enforcement systems such as Interpol, and pressure on other 
governments to forcibly return targeted individuals to the PRC. 
The sheer breadth and depth of their efforts cannot be ignored 
and should not be permitted to continue. It is a direct affront 
to national sovereignty and impacts people all over the world, 
including U.S. citizens and individuals residing in the United 
States.
    This is why, since 2021, the Biden-Harris administration 
has made combating transnational repression a global human 
rights priority. One way that we've sought to counter this 
scourge is through our diplomatic engagement and tools. We 
continue to engage the PRC directly, making clear in no 
uncertain terms that their conduct is unacceptable and must 
stop. We have not, and we will not, keep quiet in the face of 
these transgressions. We've used sanctions as an accountability 
tool as well. Specifically, in March 2022 we imposed visa 
restrictions on PRC officials responsible for or complicit in 
transnational repression.
    This administration energized the interagency to combat TNR 
in the United States as well. U.S. Government agencies have 
increased their domestic engagement with domestic communities 
targeted by the PRC. This outreach helps to create improved 
two-way communication, which both enhances our understanding of 
the threat and helps those affected more quickly access 
government assistance when they are targeted or even before 
this occurs. We've also jump-started international cooperation 
to drive a global response, because it's not only Americans and 
U.S. residents who have suffered abuse. Specifically, we 
deployed interagency teams to meet with foreign counterparts to 
raise their awareness of this threat and to share our own 
lessons learned.
    One example of this effort is the recent launch of a G7 
Rapid Response Mechanism Working Group on TNR. This coalition 
will raise international awareness of the threat TNR poses to 
democratic values and deepen our shared commitment to 
countering it. The experiences and details presented by today's 
panelists will surely highlight the very real threat of the 
PRC's transnational repression activities, as well as the need 
for governments, legislators, activists, and others to continue 
to work even more closely together to counter it. Hearing your 
stories, and in some cases learning from what you have gone 
through personally, is vitally important as we advance our 
common cause.
    The administration welcomes Congress's ongoing leadership 
on these issues, and we look forward to further deepening our 
collaboration. Thank you again for this opportunity to speak. 
And thank you all for coming together today to confront this 
challenge.
    Chair Smith. Madam Secretary, thank you very much for your 
leadership and for joining us at this hearing today.
    It's now my honor to yield to Senator Sullivan, a new 
member of the Commission.

                STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
                     A SENATOR FROM ALASKA

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your 
outstanding leadership on this. It's great to see my colleague 
from the U.S. Senate and the Co-chair, Senator Merkley. This is 
such an important topic. The effort, often successful, of the 
Chinese Communist Party to reach far beyond its borders to 
target critics in the diaspora communities throughout the 
world, is outrageous. But let's face it, it's just one of many 
outrageous things Beijing is doing across the board. As this 
committee has done an excellent job of doing, we need to 
continue to recognize and highlight the brutal nature of the 
Chinese Communist Party regime we are dealing with, especially 
under the dictatorial rule of Xi Jinping.
    Look no further than the string of strange disappearances 
that we've seen in China in their government in the last couple 
of months. The Chinese foreign minister and former ambassador 
to the United States disappeared. This was Xi Jinping's right-
hand man until recently. The commander and deputy commander of 
the PLA Rocket Force, gone. Now, apparently, the defense 
minister is gone. Who knows what's going on here? But to be 
clear, this is the sort of regime we're dealing with, a regime 
whose officials suddenly disappear without any explanation. 
They're probably somewhere in China, with bullets in their 
heads, in ditches. This is the way the CCP operates.
    And now Xi Jinping is trying to export this. Just a couple 
of months ago, authorities in Hong Kong issued arrest warrants 
for activists and lawyers accused of violating the CCP-imposed 
National Security Law, specifically for people who no longer 
live in Hong Kong, or anywhere in China for that matter. Hong 
Kong has declared that it will pursue these people for life. 
And it's not unthinkable that they could one day make good on 
grabbing them. Of course, I'm not worried about the United 
States aiding in their return, or the U.K., or Australia, or 
Japan, or other places where they now reside. But life is long. 
They all travel. One day they could find themselves in the 
hands of a government all too eager to burnish its credentials 
with Beijing.
    This is one of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, I'm working with 
Representative John Curtis on a bill to press the Biden 
administration to sanction the prosecutors, and judges, and 
other officials responsible for enforcing these unjust Hong 
Kong laws. The days of the independence of the Hong Kong 
judiciary system and the rule of law in Hong Kong are 
unfortunately long gone. Beijing has seen to that. Now we need 
to do what we can to try to even the scales up on behalf of the 
people of Hong Kong.
    Mr. Chairman, there's one more issue that I want to just 
raise in my opening statement. These kinds of aggressive 
actions are also targeting Americans directly. And even, 
remarkably, during times of tragedy. I'd like to submit for the 
record this New York Times story that just broke last night 
entitled ``China Sows Disinformation About Hawaii Fires Using 
New Techniques.''
    Chair Smith. Without objection, so ordered.
    Senator Sullivan. This story, that just broke at the New 
York Times, talks about how when wildfires swept across Maui 
last month, killing over 100 Americans, the CCP unleashed its 
information warriors. They said on the internet the disaster 
was not natural, in a flurry of false posts and lies that 
spread across the internet. They said the natural disaster was 
the result of a secret weather weapon being tested by the 
United States military and intel agencies. To bolster this lie, 
they posted photographs that were generated by artificial 
intelligence programs.
    Mr. Chairman, as we all know, when countries around the 
world suffer natural disasters, even adversaries come together 
to help each other. Not under Xi Jinping's rule. The Chinese 
Communist Party is now trying to sow discord among Americans as 
we sadly bury our own dead in Hawaii. This is outrageous. And I 
call on the Chinese ambassador to the United States to formally 
apologize to our country. But Mr. Chairman, he won't, because 
if he did, he'd disappear too. We all know that.
    One final thing, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say how 
honored I am to join this Commission. It is such a great--it 
has such a great history, especially under your leadership. At 
a time when many people are raising questions about Congress's 
decisions in the past relating to China--for example, extending 
MFN 20 years ago--it is good to remind Americans that at the 
same time the Congress also established organizations like this 
one to keep a critical eye on human rights. I think there may 
be more Congress can do to live up to this Commission's 
mandate, perhaps even expand it. But as the new guy here, I'm 
eager to learn from my colleagues about how the Commission 
works. And I'm very honored to be part of that.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I, again, am very glad to be here 
and look forward to working with you and all the members of 
this distinguished Commission.
    Chair Smith. Thank you so very much, Commissioner, for your 
very eloquent remarks. And welcome to the Commission. We're so 
glad that you're here.
    I'd like to now recognize Congresswoman and Commissioner 
Andrea Salinas.

               STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREA SALINAS,
                  A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OREGON

    Representative Salinas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can be 
brief. I just want to thank you, the co-chairs, for today's 
hearing, and Ranking Member McGovern; it is critically 
important. I want to thank the witnesses for coming here to 
testify. And like our newest member, I too am eager to continue 
to learn and really, hopefully figure out what some tools are 
to provide some accountability around this. This sounds like a 
global problem and something that is not just affecting human 
rights but also affects the way we do business around the world 
with trade. So I want to thank you all for conducting today's 
hearing.
    Chair Smith. Thank you so very much.
    I'd now like to recognize Commissioner Ryan Zinke.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN ZINKE,
                 A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MONTANA

    Representative Zinke. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want 
to thank you and Senator Merkley for holding this hearing. And 
on this side of the aisle we have the Marine and Navy team. 
We'll try to do our best. But, Mr. Chairman, on June 24th, 
2012, Dr. Shane Truman Todd, a young American engineer, was 
found hanging in his Singapore apartment a week before his 
scheduled return to the United States. Although Dr. Todd had 
repeatedly expressed fear about the work he was doing, from and 
to a Chinese company, authorities immediately ruled his death a 
suicide. His family initially didn't know what to believe. 
However, this started to change when they arrived in Singapore 
and evidence seemed to suggest murder and not suicide.
    The narrative changed when they discovered that what they 
had thought was a speaker was actually an external hard drive 
with thousands of backup files from Dr. Todd's computer. The 
data revealed by those files changed the narrative from a 
tragic suicide and loss of a son to an international story of 
deceit and cover-up. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to enter Chapter 11 
of Mrs. Todd's book entitled ``Hard Drive: A Family's Fight 
Against Three Countries,'' into the record.
    Chair Smith. Without objection, so ordered.
    Representative Zinke. And if any member would like hard 
copies, we will certainly make those available, and I look 
forward to hearing your testimony, Minister Chong. And thank 
you, again, for holding this hearing.
    Chair Smith. Thank you very much.
    Before I introduce our very distinguished Member of 
Parliament, I just want to point out that a number of us met 
with the wife of Lu Siwei several weeks ago. He is in Laos, and 
it's not looking good. And my hope is that the Laotian 
government will rethink forcible repatriation of this amazing 
man back to China, where he faces a very, very terrible future. 
In meeting with his wife, and all the human rights 
organizations rallied behind him, there's total solidarity 
there, I'm happy to say. She couldn't have been more persuasive 
and loving towards her husband. And she made it so clear that 
if the West and all countries in democracies don't speak up, 
his future is so bleak. So our appeal would be to the Laotian 
government that they now cease and desist any kind of forcible 
repatriation.
    This Commission is very honored to welcome the Honorable 
Michael Chong here today, as he will testify to the depths the 
Chinese Communist Party has gone to in its transnational 
repression campaign, going so far as to attempt to coerce 
foreign Members of Parliament in countries with strong 
democratic roots simply for speaking out against human rights 
atrocities. Mr. Chong was first elected to the Parliament of 
Canada in 2004 and represents the riding [electoral district] 
of Wellington-Halton Hills. He is currently the Shadow Minister 
for Foreign Affairs for the Official Opposition and Vice Chair 
of the special committee on the Canada People's Republic of 
China relationship. Mr. Chong has served in the Federal cabinet 
as President of the Queen's Privy Council, Minister of 
Intergovernmental Affairs, and Minister for Sport. Mr. Chong 
also served as chair of several House of Commons standing 
committees.
    It is a true honor and a privilege for us to have Mr. Chong 
join us today, though it's unfortunately due to the 
unacceptable and outrageous overreach of the Chinese Communist 
Party. After calling the CCP's treatment of the Uyghurs what it 
is--genocide--Mr. Chong received threats personally, and 
members of his family living in Hong Kong have been targeted as 
a result. The Chinese Communist Party not only seeks to silence 
its critics at home, it has gone so far as to harass thousands 
of people abroad for speaking the truth about their 
totalitarian regime. My colleagues and I are appalled at the 
attempts to censor you and others who have bravely spoken out. 
We welcome you, and please consume however much time you would 
like.

                STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL CHONG,
                 MEMBER OF CANADIAN PARLIAMENT

    Mr. Chong. Well, thank you. Thank you, Chairman Smith. 
Thank you, Co-chairman Merkley, Ranking Member McGovern, 
Senator Sullivan, Representatives Salinas and Zinke. Thank you 
very much for having me in front of your Commission today. I 
understand that you're interested in my experience of Beijing's 
transnational repression, or what we also call foreign 
interference.
    Like millions of Canadians and Americans, I'm the child of 
immigrants. My mother immigrated from the Netherlands and my 
father immigrated from Hong Kong. I have extended family in 
both the Netherlands and Hong Kong. I've been elected since 
2004 to represent the district of Wellington-Halton Hills and 
have served in the federal Cabinet and chaired several 
parliamentary committees. In 2020, I was appointed the Official 
Opposition's Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs. Since then, 
my criticisms of Beijing have increased in response to 
President Xi's increasing violations of the rules-based 
international order and its repression in the PRC and abroad.
    In November 2020, I introduced a motion adopted by the 
House of Commons calling on the Canadian government to make a 
decision on Huawei's involvement in Canada's 5G network within 
30 days and to develop a robust plan to combat China's growing 
foreign operations in Canada and its increasing intimidation of 
Canadians living in Canada. Several months later in February, I 
introduced another motion, which the House also adopted, 
recognizing Beijing's actions towards Uyghurs and other Turkic 
Muslims as genocide. In May this year, I learned that a PRC 
diplomat working out of the PRC consulate in Toronto had, since 
2020, been gathering information to further target me and my 
family in Hong Kong.
    Last month I learned I was the target of a disinformation 
campaign in May of this year on the Chinese language social 
media platform WeChat. The Canadian Department of Foreign 
Affairs concluded that Beijing's role in this disinformation 
operation was highly probable. But my experience is but one 
case of Beijing's interference in Canada. Many, many other 
cases go unreported and unnoticed, and the victims suffer in 
silence. This has serious implications for the approximately 4 
percent of Canadians--1.7 million--of Chinese descent.
    Beijing targets these diaspora groups using a variety of 
tactics. One tactic is to target the many Chinese international 
students in Canada, coaching them into participating in foreign 
interference threat activities on university campuses, such as 
targeting pro-Hong Kong democracy activists and Tibetan and 
Uyghur human rights campaigners. Other tactics include 
targeting Chinese language media and social media in Canada, 
the establishment of illegal police stations in Canada, the 
wrongful arrest and detention of Canadians, such as Michael 
Kovrig, Michael Spavor, and the currently detained Huseyin 
Celil, whose whereabouts are completely unknown. And another 
tactic includes coercing Canadians on Canadian soil back to the 
People's Republic of China. Recently, the PRC has used a tactic 
of creating wanted lists and offering bounties for the arrest 
of those from Canada.
    These various tactics are a serious and concerted effort to 
interfere with democratic activity in Canada and leave millions 
of Canadians at risk of being intimidated, coerced, silenced, 
and unable to enjoy the basic democratic rights and freedoms 
guaranteed in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in our 
Constitution. These tactics cannot be tolerated in a free and 
sovereign country. Canada must work more closely with 
democratic allies, like the United States, in countering 
Beijing's efforts to interfere in our democratic life. Foreign 
interference is a serious national security threat to Canada. 
It threatens our economy, our long-term prosperity, social 
cohesion, our Parliament, and our elections. It requires a 
suite of measures to combat, including closer cooperation among 
allied democracies. Canada must work toward a stronger defense 
and security partnership with the United States and allies. We 
must look for every opportunity to strengthen this partnership 
to meet the challenge of rising authoritarianism and to 
preserve our fundamental freedoms, our democracy, and the rule 
of law. Thank you very much.
    Chair Smith. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chong, for your 
excellent testimony and for your leadership.
    Just a couple of questions, then I'll yield to my 
colleagues for any questions they have. When you talked about 
closer cooperation, are you persuaded that we are cooperating 
now? Is it as robust as it should be? And what is being left 
undone and unaddressed?
    Mr. Chong. Well, thank you, Chairman Smith, for that 
question. I think there are a number of ways in which we can 
cooperate in a better way. So, for example, the United States 
has long had a Foreign Agents Registration Act, since 1938. 
Australia more recently introduced one I think in 2019. The 
U.K. just adopted one two months ago in July. The government of 
Canada has announced that it's taking a look at introducing one 
in Canada to give law enforcement a tool to prosecute Beijing's 
agents operating on our own soil. And so I think there could--
one way in which we could better cooperate is to exchange 
information on legislative best models to see what works and 
what doesn't. We have similar judicial systems in our 
democracies. So that's one area of cooperation.
    Another area, for example, is how we use sunlight and 
transparency to counter foreign interference threat activities. 
Our security agencies and services, our experts, have told us 
that often foreign interference, transnational repression, 
doesn't rise to the level of a criminal prosecution. And so one 
way to counter it is to make it public and to go public with 
the intelligence to tell members of the public, Members of 
Congress, Members of Parliament, here's what exactly is going 
on. To arm citizens and elected officials with the information 
they need to protect themselves. So best practices on how to do 
that during elections, in between elections. Those are just two 
examples of where I think we could more closely cooperate.
    Chair Smith. You know, I mentioned the list of things that 
they'd done to people who have been outspoken that I know of, 
that we know of as a Commission. I would point out that Anna 
Kwok, who is here today with us in the back, she has testified 
in the past here, this year, on behalf of Hong Kong. She has a 
bounty on her head. I mean, there's no let-up on the repressive 
tactics employed by Xi Jinping. And even Chen Guangcheng, who I 
worked to help release years ago, they--he assumes it was the 
Chinese Communist Party--in order to send the message that they 
were watching went into his home when he and his wife and 
family were out and rearranged everything. They didn't destroy 
anything. They just re-
arranged it, to let him know, We've been here. Rebiya Kadeer, 
the great Uyghur human rights activist, similarly has had one 
instance after another.
    And I'm wondering, you know, looking at you--here you are, 
high profile, you know, Member of Parliament. And yet they're 
doing this against you. You know, I was put on the hit list by 
Global Times a couple of years ago. I was briefed by the FBI; 
it nowhere near comes to what you're going through, believe me. 
But they said, Watch out for social media. Watch out for other 
things that they may do. They refused to give me a visa. I've 
been trying to put together a trip there--we'll go to 
Xinjiang--since their foreign ministry said, We have nothing to 
hide--anybody wants to come, come. We sent a letter to the 
embassy and said: I want to come. Please approve it. And we 
have not heard back from them since. But we're going to keep 
trying.
    I say this because, you know--the level of angst directed 
against you, and you have family members at risk, you know, we 
need to rally behind you and others like you who have family 
especially. They could do a lot here, but to people in Hong 
Kong or anywhere else in the PRC they can do a lot more. So 
that's why redoubling our efforts, passing this legislation, 
sharing best practices, is so important. You know, in reference 
to the PRC's disinformation campaign against you on WeChat, 
could you elaborate on what that looked like?
    Mr. Chong. Thank you, Chairman Smith. What happened with me 
is that in May of this year, while a big debate was going on in 
Canada about foreign interference, a number of narratives--
false narratives about me popped up on Chinese-language social 
media, particularly on the WeChat platform. And these 
narratives persisted for about a week, and the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs concluded that they emanated from 
Chinese Communist Party accounts. This is corrosive because 
WeChat in Canada has over a million users and some five million 
people globally--including many in Canada--saw that 
disinformation. They have weaponized Chinese-language social 
media, Chinese media such as CGTN, the state broadcaster. 
They're targeting radio stations and television stations.
    I know that in the U.K., just a couple of years ago, Ofcom, 
their broadcast regulator, pulled CGTN off the air, off of 
television, because of human rights violations and 
disinformation that was being spread. So that's something I 
think democracies have to grapple with. Best practices on how 
to do that I think is critically important, because one of the 
things we need to do is balance our fundamental belief in free 
speech, free expression, free media, and freedom of 
communication with the need to counter this disinformation.
    Chairman Smith, you also mentioned how the PRC is using 
money to corrupt our system. And I think that's another area 
for cooperation. Often transnational repression comes alongside 
corruption, alongside personal illicit gain, payments of monies 
or consideration, money laundering. And so I think countering 
that money laundering, countering the proceeds of illicit gain, 
I think is something democracies also need to work more closely 
on. And the United States, being the world's reserve currency 
and the U.S. dollar being the main means of transaction in our 
global economy, I think we can do a lot together to counter 
this repression that takes the form of financial corruption.
    Chair Smith. Before my time runs out, just two things. Is 
the Canadian government standing in solidarity with you and 
everyone else? Very briefly on that. And on the college 
campuses, what is the PRC doing vis-a-vis minority religions?
    Mr. Chong. Yes. Since the spring, the Canadian government 
has been standing up and supporting me. I think before that 
point in time, you know, there were issues that have popped up, 
but they are now, like many other democracies, reacting to the 
threat. You know, like I said, the U.K. just adopted a foreign 
agents registry two months ago,and the Canadian government has 
announced it will be introducing one. You know, democracies are 
often slow to react to the threat of authoritarian states, 
which can act much more quickly because it's one-person or a-
few-people rule. So, yes, they have been supportive of me in 
recent months.
    On university campuses, what is going on is that there are, 
I believe, over 100,000 Chinese international students at 
Canadian--Canada's leading research universities. Often these 
students are coached and coerced into participating in foreign 
interference threat activities on Canadian university campuses. 
For example, just a couple of years ago there was a Tibetan 
human rights activist at the University of Toronto Scarborough 
campus. She had campaigned for president of the student 
council. She had won the election. And she was immediately 
targeted by students through a coordinated effort by the PRC 
consulate. A similar thing happened at the McMaster University 
campus in Hamilton, Ontario, where a Uyghur human rights 
activist was similarly targeted by students through a 
coordinated action of the PRC consulate. So these are the kinds 
of coercive activities taking place on university campuses.
    Chair Smith. Thank you.
    Co-chair Merkley.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And following up on that impact on university campuses, in 
your testimony you note that international students were 
compelled to demonstrate against pro-Hong Kong rallies after 
threats were made ``to withhold their government scholarships 
or harm their families back home.'' In your estimation, is this 
a--this is not just a one-off. This is a systemic strategy to 
use the Chinese students who are present to essentially create 
a pro-China force on campuses.
    Mr. Chong. Yes, I think it is a systemic, long-term effort 
to create fear on university campuses. I've just highlighted 
two examples of what has happened, but we've had many other--
we've heard about many other cases on university campuses. And 
often the Chinese international students who are conducting 
these activities are themselves being coerced into doing it. 
Not in all cases, but in many cases. And so, yes, it is a 
pervasive threat on university campuses.
    Co-chair Merkley. And I've also read about the strategies 
that China is using in which they essentially recruit some of 
the Chinese students to spy on other Chinese students who might 
be participating in critiquing China's policies or 
participating in protests against Chinese activities in Hong 
Kong or against Uyghurs, and so forth. Is that something that 
you've observed in Canada as well?
    Mr. Chong. Yes, we have observed that. At our committee in 
the House of Commons, we heard testimony from witnesses who 
highlighted exactly that going on. That these students were 
being coerced into spying on other students, threatening other 
students from the PRC who weren't toeing the PRC line. And 
doing so under threat of having their scholarships withdrawn, 
or their family targeted back home.
    Co-chair Merkley. Is there an effort to establish a channel 
through which students can report these strategies of coercion, 
so we can get a better grip on how widespread it is and ponder 
ways to address it?
    Mr. Chong. Well, there is a number, a center that Canadians 
can call to report foreign interference threat activities, but 
I don't think it's broadly made available to Chinese 
international students or promoted among that community. Again, 
it's an area where we could learn from each other on best 
practices on how to counter this threat, and where I think 
allied democracies can learn from each other on how to counter 
this.
    Co-chair Merkley. I'll shift gears here from the campuses. 
And thank you for those insights. You note in your testimony 
that there's significant influence in Mandarin-language news 
outlets. And, you know, I would have thought that often those 
news outlets in our democracies would be a place that would be 
particularly interested in reporting on China's abuses. But 
they're being co-opted. What is the strategy being employed 
there? Why is it effective?
    Mr. Chong. Well, I think the strategy is multi-pronged. So, 
for example, there are state broadcasters from the PRC that are 
on the airwaves in democracies, such as CGTN, the PRC's state 
broadcaster. It often promotes propaganda right out of the 
Chinese Communist Party. And those broadcasts are seen by 
millions of people around the world. People close to the 
Chinese Communist Party leadership have often taken ownership 
of newspapers and radio stations. And we've noticed that 
there's been a shift in the editorial stance of those 
newspapers.
    For example, Sing Tao Daily is the largest Chinese-language 
newspaper in Canada. Its former editor is Victor Ho and he has 
told us in testimony in front of our committee that the 
newspaper is largely now a vehicle for Chinese Communist Party 
propaganda and views, compared to when he was the editor, where 
it was truly an independent newspaper that operated free of any 
control from Beijing.
    Co-chair Merkley. I think that's a really important point. 
But is it the Chinese government that is buying these outlets? 
Is it Chinese corporations or affluent Chinese individuals? How 
are they securing ownership control?
    Mr. Chong. It's not directly owned by the state. These are 
assets that have been purchased by individuals that are close 
to the PRC. You know, for example, we've seen recently a couple 
of years ago that the South China Morning Post, the largest 
English-language newspaper in Hong Kong, changed ownership. And 
there are suggestions that its editorial stance has changed 
because of that.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you. Thank you very much. And I 
just want to close with the question as to whether any of your 
family back in China have ever been threatened as a result of 
your conversations?
    Mr. Chong. Well, my experience is, I think, illustrative of 
what is happening to many Canadians, and Americans, and other 
citizens of other democracies. Out of an abundance of caution, 
I've cut off contact with my family in Hong Kong in order to 
ensure that they are somewhat insulated from the work that I'm 
doing here. And I know in talking to members of diaspora 
communities across Canada and in the United States, that many, 
many other people have done the same thing. And so this is the 
consequence, one of the consequences, of the PRC's 
transnational repression.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thanks so much.
    Chair Smith. Senator Sullivan.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Minister, welcome. And thank you, again, for your 
courage in being here. What you're doing, even as we speak in 
terms of your testimony, takes an enormous amount of courage. 
And I just want to let you know how much we admire it and 
appreciate it, because it takes people like you to speak out 
even though you do so with threats and risks to your family. So 
we really appreciate that.
    I want to just touch on a couple points that I raised in my 
opening statement. Your point about sticking together as 
democracies, can you expand on this a little bit more, 
particularly in light of the fact that we've seen that the 
Chinese Communist Party's strategy is often to try to isolate 
and single out certain democracies? You know, they were really, 
really pounding Lithuania from an economic standpoint. In 
Australia, they undertook this big coercive economic, 
essentially, blockade. And can you tell just a little bit more 
on how important it is for all of us, as democracies, to push 
back together, stick together, and that brings us power and 
strength? Particularly when they try to pick off smaller 
countries, which I know is part of their strategy.
    Mr. Chong. Well, thank you, Senator, for that question. I 
mentioned how we can work more closely together on translating 
intelligence into public disclosure. Our members of the public 
have talked a bit about working together to figure out how we 
counter disinformation during--targeting elected officials and 
our elections, while still upholding the fundamental freedom of 
speech. Foreign agent registry is another opportunity for 
cooperation. I talked a bit about how we can cooperate on 
transnational financial crimes, which often come alongside 
foreign interference, but another area for cooperation is 
combating repression within the People's Republic of China.
    For example, we know that much of the cotton and many of 
the tomatoes produced in Xinjiang province in western China are 
being produced through the forced labor of Uyghurs. And we know 
that those products are being exported around the world. I 
think the United States has done an excellent job in enforcing 
bans on the importation of products, like tomatoes and cotton, 
that have been produced using that forced labor. As I 
understand it, some 2,500 shipments from the PRC in the last 
two or three years have been seized by U.S. border officials 
and prevented from coming into the United States.
    In Canada, we've yet to seize one shipment. There was a 
single shipment that was seized, but later released. We have 
evidence that those products continue to flow into Canada. And 
I think that's an area where we should learn from U.S. best 
practices on stopping these products from coming into our 
country. We're part of the North American Free Trade Zone. We 
can't be the place where these products have a back door to 
come in. So that is another example of where I think we could 
work much more closely with a democracy like the United States 
to learn how to implement these sorts of bans.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Let me follow up on your 
points on transparency, working together. I also believe it's 
important, particularly for regimes like this that often only 
recognize power and threats to their own viability. As you 
know, the Chinese Communist Party's number-one goal is to stay 
in power, way above anything else. The welfare of their people, 
they couldn't care less, as long as they stay in power.
    So here's another question I have for you. I also think 
it's important that we go on a little bit of offense. Covertly, 
overtly, collectively. A lot of the CCP leadership, we know, is 
corrupt. We know they steal from their own people. We know that 
they're very rich from their corruption. Don't you think it 
makes sense--the Chinese are trying to sow discord as people in 
Hawaii are literally burying our fellow Americans--just 
outrageous--that we should also go on offense? Let the Chinese 
people know how corrupt their leaders are, that they're all 
very rich because they steal from their people. Don't you think 
we should be going on offense covertly, overtly? You want to 
mess with us, Okay, we'll mess with you. And maybe we'll bring 
your leadership down. Don't you think we should be doing that?
    Mr. Chong. Well, I think that's a very good point you make, 
Senator. I think of past decades before the rise of the 
internet and modern communication technologies, where shortwave 
radio was often used as a way to ensure that people in 
authoritarian states were receiving news and information that 
wasn't the propaganda of the state. And I think in this day and 
age, we should be funding VPN technologies that will allow 
people behind great firewalls, like the one in the PRC, to 
access news and information from the outside world, so that 
they actually get the truth rather than propaganda.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, I think it's also very true--and 
I'm sure you would agree--that Xi Jinping's biggest weakness is 
that he fears his own people. That's why he's killing all of 
his close associates, or at least disappearing them. I don't 
know where they are. They're probably dead.
    Let me get back to this issue of the nature of the regime, 
because I think you understand it more than most. But it's 
often right in front of our faces, and we don't want to 
recognize it. Let me give you a broader example. You know, it's 
really interesting to me that you read Xi Jinping's speeches, 
you watch what he says publicly, you look at who he emulates. 
The guy emulates Mao Zedong. There's no doubt about it. He's 
trying to model himself on Mao Zedong. If you just do a little 
bit of reading of the history of Mao Zedong, he's one of the 
most brutal dictators in the history, maybe, of the world. 
``The Black Book of Communism'' estimates that he killed 
probably 50 to 60 million of his own citizens. And the current 
leader of China emulates him. That would be like the chancellor 
of Germany emulating Hitler.
    So what does it say about the nature of the regime that the 
current leader of China emulates one of the most brutal 
dictators in the history of the world? Shouldn't we be 
concerned about that? But shouldn't it also be a lesson for us?
    Mr. Chong. Yes, I think it should be of concern to us. I 
think the rising prosperity of authoritarian states, such as 
the People's Republic of China, over the last 20 years has 
given them the resources to export their model of 
authoritarianism around the world. Whether it's in the South 
China Sea, whether it's in the Indo-
Pacific region, and I think we, as democracies, need to 
acknowledge that this is a very real threat. And I think we 
have slowly come to this realization over the last decade. You 
know, I think--beyond 10 years ago, I think we wrongly assumed 
that along with increasing prosperity in these authoritarian 
states that they would gradually improve their record on human 
rights, democracy, and the rule of law. But the opposite has 
happened. All they have done is taken this newfound wealth and 
reinforced this authoritarianism, using technology, using other 
methods to repress their people.
    But going back to an earlier point you made about sunlight 
and transparency and disclosure, one of the things that we are 
based on is freedom of speech, freedom of expression, a belief 
in transparency and sunlight. That is not something 
authoritarian states are based on. They're based on the very 
opposite principles. So I think by naming and shaming bad 
actors, by using intelligence and making some of that public to 
name and shame bad actors, I think will go a long way in 
countering this threat.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thanks again for your courage.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you again, sir.
    Chair Smith. I'd now like to yield to the ranking member, 
Jim McGovern.
    Representative McGovern. Thank you. Thank you for your 
testimony. Thank you for being here.
    You know, the concern is that it's not just about social 
media outlets that China can control or has a greater influence 
on. I mean, you know, I just plugged into Twitter, ``Maui fire 
causes.'' And things come up, like from The Desert Review--
whatever the hell that is, I have no idea--but basically it 
echoes the stuff that China's been putting out, in a number of 
posts, that somehow there's some mysterious causes to these 
fires. And it doesn't say the Chinese government posted them. I 
mean, they obviously have sympathizers and people who promote 
conspiracy theories.
    But we have a problem, again, as a country that believes in 
free speech and freedom of expression. I mean, we have a 
problem on our own social media platforms with disinformation 
being put out there. And in the case of Twitter, now X, all the 
review procedures that used to be in place are gone. I mean, 
we're reading about the attacks on the Anti-Defamation League, 
who were raising issues about antisemitic posts being placed 
online--the response that really tried to destroy the integrity 
of the ADL is really quite, you know, stunning.
    And so how do you get these social media platform 
executives who oversee this to actually be more responsible? 
And it's not just about naming and shaming the Chinese 
government, which we ought to do because of what they're doing. 
But we have corporate leaders that tolerate this in countries 
like ours. I mean, how do you get--do we name and shame them a 
little bit more?
    Mr. Chong. Well, Representative McGovern, that's an 
excellent question. And this is where I think like-minded 
democracies could really learn from each other on best 
practices and different models. So, for example, the European 
Union has a model to counter disinformation. The European 
Commission has set up a unit within the EC to counter 
disinformation in real time that's springing up on social media 
platforms. On the other hand, a very different model is the 
Taiwanese model. Taiwan is ground zero for the PRC's 
disinformation operations. Both the PRC and Taiwan share a 
common language. And so they are ground zero for this 
disinformation and they've taken a very different approach.
    I was recently part of a delegation to Taiwan where I met 
with Audrey Tang, who's the new inaugural minister of digital 
affairs. And she told me about their policy, which is a very 
different approach. It's grounded in resiliency. It's grounded 
in the education system, the primary and high school education 
system, and in civil society--empowering civil society groups 
to counter this disinformation. So this is where I think we can 
learn from each other on best practices, on what works, what 
doesn't. But at the end of the day we have to balance two 
competing things. That is to counter this disinformation while 
upholding freedom of the media and freedom of speech.
    Representative McGovern. The level of disinformation that 
is being peddled on various social media platforms really 
undercuts our democracy and the very freedoms that we all care 
about. And it's always frustrating to me that we can't seem to 
come to a consensus on what disinformation is. And so we don't 
want to be in the business of censorship, but there ought to be 
some mechanism that clearly calls out lies and disinformation 
and conspiracy theories, and attacks on individuals, even if 
they're very subtle, for what they are. And so this is a real 
challenge. Some of it, you know, is putting pressure on China. 
Some of it is putting pressure on the platforms that allow 
people to traffic these lies and threats.
    As I said in the beginning, I'm worried about attacks 
against people on these various platforms. But I also, quite 
frankly, am very worried about the other forms of transnational 
repression, including assassinations, illegal deportations, 
abductions, family intimidation, and Interpol abuse. I mean, 
the potential for the abuse of Interpol is well known and long-
standing. Do you have any specific recommendations for reform 
of the Interpol system to combat transnational repression?
    Mr. Chong. Well, I think we do need to take a look at 
reforming Interpol. In light of the bounties and the demand for 
the arrest of eight pro-Hong Kong democracy activists who are 
abroad, I think we've got to make sure that Interpol isn't used 
as a tool by the PRC to arrest and detain these individuals. I 
think of a Canadian, Huseyin Celil, who was wrongfully arrested 
outside of the PRC, I believe in Turkmenistan, a number of 
years ago, and then extradited to the PRC.
    His whereabouts are completely unknown and the PRC won't 
tell the Canadian government where he is being detained, or 
even if he is alive. And his wife and children live in 
Burlington, Ontario, just a couple miles up from--north of the 
border, north of New York State. It's so corrosive, that kind 
of tactic, because it sends a message to the rest of the 
community in Canada, that if they dare to speak up, if they 
dare to stand up, they may be arrested abroad and taken to the 
PRC.
    Representative McGovern. Again, I think we need to do a 
better job of coordinating with other like-minded countries 
when another country has somebody who is seeking asylum, and 
yet China has a particular hold over the country where that 
person is seeking refuge and are thinking of deporting him or 
her back to China. I mean, we ought to be more coordinated in 
our efforts to try to provide a circle of protection around 
those individuals. This is an important topic.
    The abuse of these various platforms to target people, to 
discredit people, to spread conspiracy theories, has 
proliferated in a way that I don't think any of us could have 
imagined when social media first came into being. And it's hard 
to figure out how to put the genie back in the bottle, but 
maybe what we need--you know, are more truth tellers trying to 
influence on social media. And maybe we need to try to 
establish a group of people to set the record straight.
    But, again, I just thought it was interesting. When I 
googled ``Maui fires,'' when I plugged it in on Twitter, two 
conspiracy theories appear--both are being peddled by the 
Chinese government. But I appreciate your courage and I 
appreciate your advocacy. And I look forward to working with 
you in the months ahead. I yield back.
    Chair Smith. Commissioner Zinke.
    Representative Zinke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, I'd like to thank you for being here. It's 
not easy to stand up for freedom. And it takes a lot of 
courage. And thanks. I'd like to ask your thoughts on Chinese 
capabilities and priorities, perhaps, on industrial espionage, 
in particular the high-tech sector.
    Mr. Chong. Well, thank you, Representative Zinke, for that 
question. It's a very serious area of foreign interference. Our 
security services have told us that the PRC is a threat in two 
ways in five areas. They are a threat to our national security 
and they are a threat to us in the form of the theft of 
intellectual property. And that is, in particular, in five 
sensitive areas of research and development at our leading 
universities and in our leading Canadian companies.
    Those five areas are: telecommunications--5G 
telecommunications, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, 
biopharma, and clean technologies. And so I think what we 
should be doing is banning any government funding of research 
in partnership with PRC entities in those five sensitive areas 
of research. And so whether it's the four Canadian granting 
councils, or in the United States here the National Institutes 
of Health and other granting councils, I think we need to make 
it clear that we won't fund research in those five areas that's 
in partnership with PRC entities. I think we also need to ban 
research in partnership with any entity affiliated with the 
People's Liberation Army.
    Represenative Zinke. And let me follow up. A concern when 
you talk about green technologies is EV. It sounds so nice. And 
I'm all for cleaner is better, etc. But I'm concerned about the 
supply chain. Because in order to power EV, it takes batteries. 
And just a cursory look at the supply chain, when you look at 
what is required for a battery: Well, lithium, cobalt. So who 
controls the mining of lithium, cobalt, and those other 
materials? And then the chips. Who's making the chips that run 
it and the production? And it goes on and on.
    And then, of course, the other side of it is, What do you 
do when the battery has ended its lifecycle? You know, in the 
U.S. 90 percent of the solar cells that are no longer useful 
because of the technology and different reasons, they're just 
thrown into a landfill someplace across the country. We have no 
plan on what the disposal of the toxic batteries and liability 
should be. So I'm concerned about the EV world because it seems 
like we're pushing an agenda without looking at the engine 
behind it, and the engine seems to be Chinese. Do you share 
that same concern?
    Mr. Chong. Yes, I share that concern. I think there's two 
ways in which Canada can be a stronger partner to the United 
States in that regard. I think, first off, we are a vast 
country with immense natural resources. We have critical 
minerals of our own that can be part of the North American 
automobile supply chain. And I think that's an area in which we 
can work more closely with the United States. I think the 
second area, though, is equally important. We're the fifth-
largest natural gas producer in the world and we currently 
don't have an LNG export facility to get our natural gas to 
global markets. And if we can get those terminals built, if we 
can export natural gas to international markets, and more 
natural gas to the United States, we can accomplish two goals.
    First, we can help reduce global emissions because a fifth 
of global emissions come from coal-fired electricity plants in 
places like the People's Republic of China. We can cut those 
emissions in half overnight by transitioning those plants to 
natural gas. And, secondly, we can help displace oil and gas 
from authoritarian states and replace it with oil and gas 
produced here from democracies. And I think particularly when 
it comes to Germany and Japan, who are currently buying vast 
amounts of gas from authoritarian states--they should be buying 
their gas from Canada instead, and from the United States. And 
so those are two ways in which I think we can help the United 
States. We've got critical minerals of our own and we've got 
vast amounts of natural gas that we need to get to 
international markets.
    Representative Zinke. So it seems like on both sides we 
have hurdles for our natural gas exports. But you're actually 
right. I mean, no one does it cleaner, better than North 
America. And if you want to look at how not to produce energy, 
I'll take you on a tour of Russia or the Middle East.
    The other point that I think is important, you look at 
dependency, and who is dependent on whom, and for what. On 
critical minerals, as you mentioned, there's some critical 
minerals that they have the entirety of the supply chain. And 
it's not a secret. And one of them happens to be germanium. And 
it turns out germanium is needed for lenses, especially high-
definition lenses, that you might want to put on military 
hardware, thermal optics, as a matter of fact almost everything 
we use. But critical metals are locked up and we can't get to 
the resources.
    We have germanium here, but the germanium permit is almost 
impossible to get. And while technology on the battlefield 
changes every two years, we're waiting 25 years for a permit. 
And I would agree absolutely that the TransCanada pipeline--
which is about 18 inches--would both reduce overall emissions 
and help us shore up our energy needs. Natural gas pipelines. 
Do you see any success in your current government on this 
issue?
    Mr. Chong. Well, I think you're exactly right. We need 
regulatory reform in Canada to reduce the regulatory hurdles to 
approving natural resource projects. In fact, the government of 
Canada itself has acknowledged that. Finance Minister Freeland 
was actually here in Washington last year and said that Canada 
needs to expedite the approval of these natural resource 
projects to get our resources to market to help our allies. She 
was very explicit about that. I await the Canadian government's 
plans in that regard.
    It can be done. I'll give you one example of how a 
democracy did it. Germany, after the war in Ukraine began, 
realized that it had complete reliance on Russian natural gas, 
and that those pipelines were being shut down. We know one of 
them was blown up in the Baltic Sea and the other one never 
came online. And so Germany had to scramble. Well, within days 
after last February's invasion, they approved six new LNG 
terminals in the Baltic and North Sea. One of them came online 
in a record roughly six months from approval to live operation 
in Wilhelmshaven, which is a port, I believe, in the North Sea. 
So democracies, like Canada, can expedite these projects. We 
just need the political will to do so. And I think it's 
critical that we do that.
    Representative Zinke. I look forward to working with you on 
that. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    Chair Smith. Ms. Salinas.
    Representative Salinas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chong, we've been talking a little bit about science 
and technology. And I serve on the Science, Space, and 
Technology Committee, where we frequently discuss issues around 
research security, especially in the context of economic 
competition with China. International research collaboration 
does have significant benefits, but reports suggest that our 
efforts to crack down on bad actors have actually caused many 
Chinese American researchers to leave positions at American 
universities. And I understand this. How can we balance 
protecting against real, legitimate, and dangerous threats from 
the Chinese government and their influence on college campuses 
and fostering a welcoming environment for students and 
researchers at North American universities, where we really 
want to make true advancements?
    Mr. Chong. Well, that's a great question. You know, we have 
to balance academic freedom with the need to protect national 
security in sensitive areas of research. And one critical 
element in doing that is being open and transparent about what 
research will be funded and what won't be funded. And I think 
that will clear the suspicion. I think, in the absence of clear 
policies about what the government will fund, and what it won't 
fund because it crosses a line, I think you clear a lot of the 
suspicion away.
    And so my view is in the Canadian context we should be 
clear that we will not fund research partnerships and research 
that is done in collaboration with PRC entities in the five 
sensitive areas of research that I identified and secondly, in 
research partnerships with the People's Liberation Army. I 
don't think there's any research that the Canadian government 
should fund that's done in collaboration with the PRC's 
military.
    So if we put those policies in place, and also then simply 
advise universities that we think that there are security 
risks--if they then on their own decide to fund those research 
partnerships, if they decide to do those partnerships in those 
five sensitive areas, then I think we empower our university 
community, our academics, to do the right thing. And I'm 
confident that they will, and that they'll know where the lines 
are. And I think that clears a lot of the suspicion about any 
research that's been conducted with researchers from the PRC.
    Representative Salinas. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chair Smith. Thank you so very much.
    Mr. Chong, thank you for your testimony. Without objection, 
your full statement and any materials you would like to include 
in the record will be made a part of the record. But thank you 
for your clarity, for your boldness, for your courage. It is 
greatly appreciated, greatly respected south of the border--
that is to say, the Canadian border.
    Mr. Chong. Well, thank you very much for having me. And we 
look forward to building a stronger defense and security 
partnership with the United States.
    Chair Smith. Yes. I appreciate it so much. Thank you. 
[Applause.]
    I'd now like to introduce our second panel. And beginning--
it is a very, very fantastic group of experts and leaders, 
including those who have unfortunately been victimized by 
China's transnational repression and those who have studied and 
witnessed it up close.
    First, I'd like to welcome Dr. Yana Gorokhovskaia, the 
research director for strategy and design at Freedom House. 
Yana has a Ph.D. from the University of British Columbia and 
has been published in peer-reviewed journals and outlets such 
as Foreign Affairs, Politico, the Guardian, the Washington 
Post, and Just Security. At Freedom House, Yana oversees 
research that quantifies trends toward and away from global 
freedom and democracy, as well as monitoring transnational 
repression. She has co-authored two reports on the topic in 
recent years, ``Still Not Safe: Transnational Repression in 
2022,'' and ``Defending Democracy in Exile: Policy Responses to 
Transnational Repression.''
    Next, we will hear from Ms. Laura Harth, campaign director 
at Safeguard Defenders, a human rights NGO that protects human 
rights, promotes the rule of law, and works to enhance local 
civil society capacity in some of Asia's most hostile 
environments. Focused on the PRC, it also works to counter 
growing transnational repression by the Chinese Communist Party 
around the world through its direct action, research, and 
advocacy efforts. Indeed, you may recognize the organization's 
name from a groundbreaking investigation they released exactly 
a year ago, entitled ``110 Overseas: Chinese Transnational 
Policing Gone Wild,'' in which they expose the abhorrent 
lengths to which the CCP has gone to maintain control over 
people outside its borders, including the establishment of at 
least 54 police-run overseas police service centers across five 
continents to carry out Chinese police operations on foreign 
soil, including right here in the United States. Laura also 
covers external relations for the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance 
on China and acts as an advisor to Hong Kong Watch.
    Then we will hear from Rushan Abbas, a Uyghur American 
activist who has dedicated her life to championing the rights 
of the Uyghur people, and a great friend of this Commission. 
Rushan began her advocacy at Xinjiang University, where she 
courageously led pro-democracy protests in 1985 and again in 
1988. After re-
locating to the U.S. in '89, she co-founded the Uyghur Overseas 
Student and Scholars Association, that was in 1993, and played 
a pivotal role in establishing the Uyghur American Association 
in 1998 and was elected as vice president for two terms. In 
response to Beijing's escalating genocidal actions against the 
Uyghurs in 2017, Ms. Abbas cofounded the Campaign for Uyghurs, 
or CFU.
    In 2020, CFU released its report ``Genocide in East 
Turkistan,'' meticulously detailing how the PRC's atrocities 
make it subject to strictures of the Genocide Convention. 
Notably, CFU received a Nobel Peace Prize nomination in 
February of 2022 for its tireless advocacy. Indeed, for the 
record, it was former Commissioner Tom Suozzi and I who made 
the nomination. Tom and I also launched the Uyghur Caucus here 
in Congress, and now co-lead that with Jennifer Wexton. And we 
hope to re-launch that again very soon. Rushan has a personal 
story to relate as well. In 2018 her family members underwent 
the unthinkable. After her first public speech in September of 
2018, the CCP abducted and detained her sister Gulshan in 
China, in retaliation for her activism. She remains in custody.
    So I welcome our very, very distinguished witnesses. And 
now, Yana, I yield the floor to you.

                STATEMENT OF YANA GOROKHOVSKAIA,

           RESEARCH DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGY AND DESIGN,

                         FREEDOM HOUSE

    Ms. Gorokhovskaia. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Co-chairman 
Merkley, and distinguished members of the Commission for the 
opportunity to share information about the scope and scale of 
the global transnational repression campaign carried out by the 
People's Republic of China. Today, I'll use my time to describe 
how the PRC tries to silence people living abroad, as well as 
how this campaign has evolved. I'll conclude with some 
suggestions about the ways that democratic governments can 
better protect people who are targeted by the PRC.
    I'll begin with this simple fact: The People's Republic of 
China today is one of the least-free countries in the world. It 
now ranks near the very bottom among 195 countries assessed in 
``Freedom in the World,'' which is our global survey of 
political rights and civil liberties. The domestic situation is 
important to understand because, like other authoritarian 
governments, the PRC exports oppression abroad as a way of 
maintaining the regime at home. Even though Chinese officials 
routinely reference the government's policy of noninterference, 
Beijing seeks to dictate, sometimes through the use of physical 
force, the terms of free speech, association, movement, 
assembly, and even religious expression of individuals who are 
thousands of miles away.
    China is carrying out the world's most sophisticated and 
comprehensive campaign of transnational repression using a wide 
array of physical, digital, and psychological tactics to 
attempt to silence those views as a threat. According to a 
database that Freedom House maintains, the PRC is responsible 
for about 30 percent of all recorded physical incidents of 
transnational repression globally since 2014. It has conducted 
campaigns in at least 36 countries, including in democracies 
like the United States. As Chairman Smith and Co-chairman 
Merkley already noted, Beijing targets a very diverse array of 
people--pro-democracy activists, journalists, students, human 
rights defenders, artists, former insiders, civil society 
organizations, and whole ethnic and religious groups like the 
Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Falun Gong practitioners, as well as 
anyone else who is brave enough to criticize the Chinese 
Communist Party.
    It uses many different tactics to try to silence people. 
One of the most harmful and hard-to-address tactics is the 
intimidation of family or coercion by proxy. Harassment of 
family members still living in China can be psychologically 
devastating for people seeking to promote human rights and 
advocate for freedom. Commission members already noted how the 
PRC seeks to manipulate mechanisms of international cooperation 
like Interpol and extradition agreements. And I want to pause 
to point out two important cases.
    One is the case of Idris Hasan. Idris was detained in March 
of 2021 when he landed in an airport in Casablanca on a red 
notice that was issued by China. Two and a half years later, 
he's still in prison, despite the fact that the red notice was 
canceled shortly after his arrest. Idris is at risk of being 
deported to China every single day because Morocco and China 
have an extradition agreement. And worryingly, China is 
actively pursuing the ratification of more extradition 
agreements, as our colleagues at Safeguard Defenders and Oxus 
Society have well documented. Lu Siwei also, in Laos, faces 
imminent deportation. And his situation is also very worrying.
    The PRC's toolkit of repression is evolving in dangerous 
ways. For example, evidence has recently emerged that the PRC 
is co-opting former members of domestic law enforcement 
agencies to harass, coerce, stalk, and surveil people living 
both in the U.S. and in Canada. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the Department of Justice, and their Canadian 
counterparts, have begun to examine these cases. However, I 
want to underline that the involvement of former law 
enforcement officials in transnational repression campaigns may 
amplify, rightfully, the fear that members of the diaspora 
feel--because it demonstrates that the PRC is able to deputize 
officials in democratic states to carry out its repressive 
schemes.
    The PRC is the world's worst abuser of internet freedom 
domestically. It employs digital tactics of transnational 
repression as well. These tactics, which include mass trolling, 
smear campaigns, threats and intimidation, spoofing of 
accounts, and even doxing of personal information, are meant 
to, first, intimidate, drown out reports of human rights 
abuses, and apply psychological pressure. I also want to note 
that these tactics are gendered. Women face not only violent 
but sexualized threats online in response to their work or 
their activism that shines a critical light on the PRC. The 
PRC's campaign of transnational repression is a threat to 
sovereignty, democratic institutions, and human rights. 
Building resilience and imposing accountability are key.
    I'd like to conclude today by sharing some of Freedom 
House's recommendations for how to better protect people. I'll 
start with one that I think many on this Commission are already 
working on--codifying a definition of transnational repression. 
This will facilitate the tracking of incidents, distinguish 
attacks from ordinary crime, and coordinate interagency action 
in addition to serving as a basis for any other laws that may 
be needed. The second is training for government officials, 
including law enforcement, who may encounter transnational 
repression, to make sure that officials are equipped with 
matching and sufficient information to protect those who are at 
risk.
    The third is conducting strategic, consistent, and 
culturally sensitive outreach to communities that are at risk 
of experiencing transnational repression, in order to equip 
them with the resources they need to report these incidents. 
The fourth is using voice and vote to limit the ability of 
Interpol member states to misuse red alerts and other kinds of 
notices. And finally, deploying targeted sanctions against 
Chinese officials for the use of transnational repression, as 
well as screening Chinese diplomats for a history of harassing 
diaspora members while at their postings.
    I should note that several pieces of legislation to address 
transnational repression have been introduced or will be 
introduced in the near future. And I want to say, again, thank 
you to Co-chairman Merkley and Chairman Smith for your 
introduction of the Transnational Repression Policy Act, which 
Freedom House supports. We look forward to working with you to 
see that it passes into law. Addressing transnational 
repression committed by the government of the People's Republic 
of China is a matter of urgency. It is imperative that 
Congress, in a bipartisan fashion, come together with the 
executive branch and like-minded partners to protect those who 
are at risk and to defend democratic institutions. We 
appreciate the leadership of the Commission on this issue, and 
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
    Chair Smith. Thank you so very much for your testimony and 
your recommendations.
    Ms. Harth.

                   STATEMENT OF LAURA HARTH, 
             CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR, SAFEGUARD DEFENDERS

    Ms. Harth. Thank you so much, Chairman Smith, Co-chairman 
Merkley, distinguished members of the Commission. Good morning. 
It is truly an honor to testify before you today on behalf of 
Safeguard Defenders.
    As was already said, most people will know us, if they know 
us, for the report released exactly one year ago today, which 
exposed the formal cooperation between public security 
authorities in China and United Front-linked groups around the 
world in the setting up and running of so-called overseas 
police service centers. Now, counter to what PRC authorities 
and their propaganda mouthpieces continue to say, even over the 
weekend and today, these stations are not just in open 
violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Open-
source evidence exclusively from Chinese authorities and state 
party media links such stations directly to so-called 
persuasion to return operations, including video evidence from 
such an operation taking place in Spain.
    Now, as is often the case when yet another Chinese foreign 
interference story breaks--and we've obviously just heard from 
Canada with the Honorable Michael Chong--we're seeing the 
fallout over the weekend over an alleged spy in Westminster. 
The reports on police stations presented somewhat of a rude 
awakening for many democratic governments that have previously 
been very reluctant to engage on the issue of transnational 
repression coming from China. While overseas police stations 
definitely jump-started a growing series of conversations, 
these are clearly but the tip of the iceberg in what members of 
the dissident communities have long known, and what Freedom 
House rightly defines, as the world's most sophisticated, 
comprehensive, and far-reaching campaign of transnational 
repression.
    Within this campaign, Safeguard Defenders focuses our 
direct action and documentation efforts on countering one of 
its most extreme iterations, that of involuntary returns. While 
these are not new, the scale on which PRC authorities are 
coercing individuals to return to China to face prosecution has 
exploded over the course of the past decade, with official, yet 
partial, numbers released annually under Operation Fox Hunt and 
Skynet claiming well over 10,000 returns from over 120 
countries between 2014 and October 2022. And we will soon 
release additional evidence on such operations taking place 
around the world.
    The often-clandestine methods for these returns have been 
set in stone by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection in a written legal interpretation to the 2018 
National Supervision Law that vastly expanded this non-judicial 
body's reach. Extradition, repatriation, off-side prosecution, 
persuasion, luring and entrapment, and even kidnapping are 
among the official policies used by PRC authorities. The so-
called persuasion to return method is the one used most 
frequently--threats and harassment, or worse, against family 
members back home, or direct threats and harassment of 
individuals overseas by covert agents, individuals linked to 
PRC embassies or consulates, private investigators and security 
firms, co-opted private individuals, rabid nationalists, or 
even victims themselves.
    The Chinese Communist Party has set up a true whole-of-
society effort to exert control over diaspora communities 
worldwide and silence dissent. These efforts clearly undermine 
the most fundamental freedoms of targeted communities, severely 
infringe upon the rights and due process of individuals coerced 
into returning, and constitute a grave violation of the 
territorial and judicial sovereignty of other nations. The 
climate of suspicion and widespread fear further isolates 
targeted communities and individuals from their environments. 
They may also expose individuals that have been co-opted or 
coerced into doing the CCP's bidding, to criminal liability. As 
has often been said, to effectively counter such a massive 
undertaking, democracies need to respond with a similar whole-
of-government approach that recognizes transnational repression 
for the domestic threat it is, one that is inextricably linked 
to the CCP's influence operations.
    Now, speaking from a European perspective, we are really at 
the very beginning of such an endeavor and will need continued, 
concerted allied efforts to move beyond the stage of timid 
condemnation to effective and coordinated transnational 
counteraction to match the CCP's efforts. Working towards joint 
definitions, sharing of information and best practices, as well 
as the coherent application of set standards, are an essential 
step in this direction. It is, in our view, equally key to end 
the legitimization of the PRC's illegal practices through 
judicial and police cooperation agreements, at the bilateral 
but also at the multilateral level.
    It is no coincidence that the PRC has been pushing the 
signing and ratifying of such agreements at an accelerated rate 
during the same timeframe in which its involuntary returns 
operations have exploded. Some may remember the example of the 
joint police patrols that seemed, at the very least, conducive 
to the pilot run of overseas police stations in Italy, 
something the Italian authorities have since recognized as 
being imprudent. But it doesn't end with such examples. Nor 
does it end with the examples of extradition agreements or 
Interpol abuse. In particular, I'd like to use this occasion to 
severely question the legitimacy of the U.N. Office on Drugs 
and Crime's MOU with the CCP's Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection--that same body I mentioned before--as 
the Chinese focal point for all work under the Convention 
against Corruption.
    Not only does PRC propaganda adopt these types of 
agreements as a demonstration of the international community's 
trust in its judicial system, it directly contributes to a 
heightened sense of fear within targeted communities, gravely 
subverts the international rules-based order, and often acts as 
a gateway to similar agreements at the bilateral level, 
especially in the Global South. Ending such legitimization is a 
crucial part in rebuilding trust with the targeted communities 
that are key to understanding emerging threats and actors. 
Personally, I believe the biggest compliment we have received 
on our work is that of victims across Europe stating they 
finally found audiences eager for their stories and 
experiences.
    To them. I want to say: We need more of your stories. 
Authorities need to hear more of your stories. The U.S. and 
Australia have already set up exemplary multilingual, dedicated 
hotlines to report transnational repression efforts, also 
anonymously. To encourage this best practice elsewhere, 
Safeguard Defenders has today released a pilot guide with 
reporting channels in a series of countries, which we will 
continue to update and hopefully grow with similarly dedicated 
hotlines. So if you or others have been the target of 
transnational repression, please report to the relevant 
authorities. Please report to the FBI if you're in this 
country. Only by coming together can we begin to effectively 
push back against the CCP's efforts. Thank you.
    Chair Smith. Thank you so very much.
    Senator Merkley has a vote pending over on the Senate side 
and has to run to make it, so I yield whatever time he needs.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I 
apologize to our third witness. Thank you so much for your 
advocacy.
    As you know, I'm deeply engaged in efforts to highlight and 
address and create pressure regarding Chinese treatment of the 
Uyghur community and their enslavement practices, including 
stopping the export of products made, in order to create 
international pressure to change those tactics. Ms. 
Gorokhovskaia, I want to turn to your testimony, Freedom House, 
and I appreciate so much your organization's work. But I wanted 
to highlight one piece of your testimony about the use of 
retired police officers. Have you seen this as a significant, 
sustained strategy that is being employed by China?
    Ms. Gorokhovskaia. Thank you. We've seen a few instances of 
it. I think much of the issue is that people who retire from 
either law enforcement or even sometimes from the DHS have 
specific skills and networks of contacts that make them very 
valuable and employable as private investigators. And they take 
contracts which sometimes originate in China or Iran to collect 
information. And we've seen this. There were also prosecutions 
recently in New York. We've seen a case like this with the RCMP 
in Canada. And this is an extremely dangerous practice and 
probably speaks to the need for more regulation of private 
investigators and transparency about where that work is coming 
from and on behalf of whom they're collecting this information.
    Co-chair Merkley. And let me also turn to your mention of 
red notices. We've had hearings and testimony on this before 
this committee before, trying to draw attention and diminishing 
China's ability to use red notices, reducing the ability of 
countries to cooperate with them. Are we having any impact? Is 
it becoming harder for China to use red notices to detain 
people and use extradition agreements to return people home?
    Ms. Gorokhovskaia. I think there's a great deal of 
attention to China's misuse of red notices, as well as misuse 
of red notices by other countries like Russia. However, as the 
case of Idris Hasan demonstrates, the problem is that even when 
the red notice is pulled back, when it's canceled, you can 
still be detained. The effect is that you are--you're still 
imprisoned. And then other mechanisms kick in, whether that's 
the police cooperation agreements, whether that's extradition 
agreements. And so the simple fact that this information is 
still shared and can be acted on is a serious problem. I hope 
that answers your question.
    Co-chair Merkley. Thank you. And Ms. Harth, you talk about 
``110 Overseas.'' And I gather 110 is a reference to the 
emergency number that you would dial in China. Is that a name 
that all of you have given the Chinese tactic or is that one 
that China uses?
    Ms. Harth. I believe it was used by at least one of the 
authorities in the documentation we reviewed--``110 Overseas,'' 
a slogan to define these overseas services that they were 
offering. But it's not a consistent name used by all the public 
security authorities.
    Co-chair Merkley. So they're, on one level, advertising 
services to the Chinese diaspora--legitimate services--but 
using these service stations to coordinate transnational 
repression.
    Ms. Harth. Yes, I believe there were two issues with these 
overseas stations. They were offering administrative or 
consular services on site, which in many cases may well have 
been in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations because obviously private individuals are not allowed 
to establish consular services or others at free will. On the 
other hand, we found concrete evidence--and I wish to 
highlight, exclusively on the basis of open-source evidence 
from PRC sources--that these stations had indeed been used for, 
we found evidence of, 84 persuasion to return operations. And 
that evidence in one case included video evidence of such an 
operation taking place between a station in Spain and the 
public security authorities in China.
    Co-chair Merkley. And this is what you're referring to when 
you talk about China's patrol and persuade campaign, monitor 
what Chinese diaspora are doing and persuade them to stop or 
persuade them to perhaps report on others who are criticizing 
China?
    Ms. Harth. So in our case, we use ``persuade'' to refer to 
the persuasion to return operations, which is a term used by 
the PRC, their most preferred methodology to bring people 
back--to coerce people to go back to China. But the patrol 
obviously refers more generally to the potential control and 
harassment of people overseas.
    Co-chair Merkley. And that persuasion to return home to 
China, the main instrument used is threats to their family 
members back home should they not return?
    Ms. Harth. Absolutely.
    Co-chair Merkley. Threats to do what to the family members 
back home?
    Ms. Harth. Threats may include the detention of family 
members, interrogations, calling them into police stations, 
disappearing family members, taking away their jobs, taking 
away certain benefits, the threats or actually doing all those 
things, even prosecute family members instead of the target 
overseas.
    Co-chair Merkley. And you refer to Operation Fox Hunt, 2014 
through 2022. I think the stat you have in here is 10,000 
returns in your testimony. Is that the Chinese government 
saying that they've persuaded 10,000 people to return home 
through this strategy?
    Ms. Harth. Official numbers released annually by the CCDI, 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, on Fox Hunt and 
Skynet lists close to 12,000 returns between 2014 and October 
2022. And we're obviously waiting for the new data possibly at 
the end of October.
    Co-chair Merkley. So 12,000, I mean, they're kind of 
bragging about having persuaded people to return home, which 
sends a huge message. If the intimidation is that successful, 
threatening family members back home--I mean, this is not 
encouraging university students to return to use their 
education back home. This is encouraging people to return back 
home who have criticized China abroad?
    Ms. Harth. Who exactly they're going after under these 
campaigns is not always clear, especially when it comes to Fox 
Hunt and Skynet. These are people typically accused of 
corruption, financial crimes. Now, whether those accusations 
are correct, it is obviously very hard to say, knowing the 
Chinese system.
    Co-chair Merkley. Do we have any sense of that number? I 
think you corrected me that it's 12,000. Do they report on the 
distribution between countries of those numbers? No? Okay. Now, 
Operation Fox Hunt, that's the Chinese name for this operation, 
is that correct?
    Ms. Harth. Yes.
    Co-chair Merkley. Well, we have a lot of work to do to 
address this expanding strategy. And I appreciate, from Freedom 
House, the five recommendations that you mentioned. I did want 
to ask you, Ms. Harth, you mentioned that the United States has 
an exemplary dedicated hotline. We've been asking for a 
dedicated hotline from the FBI, but they keep telling us they 
want to keep using their general tip line. Are we unaware of 
something that has been established here in the United States?
    Ms. Harth. I was referring to the multilingual guides that 
they have put out describing transnational repression, making 
sure that when instances are reported that it is centralized, 
that it is looked at, that people that receive those calls or 
messages know what they're talking about. And coming from 
overseas, I can tell you that is exemplary, indeed.
    Co-chair Merkley. Okay. Well, it may be that in the 
international comparison we're doing well, but we are pushing 
for there to be a dedicated way for people to report 
transnational repression, including linguists appropriate to 
the countries that are the major offenders. But I don't think 
we're quite there yet. But I appreciate that at some level 
we're making some impact. But we're not where we want to get 
to. Thank you so much, all three of you, for bringing
your expertise to bear on this really big issue that concerns 
the ability to have the freedom of speech and assembly that we 
cherish so much, yet is so directly threatened by these 
tactics. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chair Smith. I hope you make your vote.
    Ms. Rushan Abbas.

             STATEMENT OF RUSHAN ABBAS, FOUNDER AND
            EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CAMPAIGN FOR UYGHURS

    Ms. Abbas. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Chairman Merkley, 
members of the Commission, and all the staff at the Commission. 
Thank you for giving us the opportunity to speak today. The 
Commission is well aware of the CCP's endless list of genocidal 
crimes being carried out against the Uyghurs and the other 
Turkic groups in East Turkestan, also known as Xinjiang. Today, 
I will speak about the Chinese regime's use of transnational 
repression to stifle defiance and hide their crimes. Beijing's 
tactics of intimidation and hostage taking to silence Uyghurs 
have global effect. Through these measures, the CCP violates 
the First Amendment rights of American citizens residing on 
U.S. soil.
    The totalitarian rule from China extends beyond its 
borders, oppressing U.S. citizens. In 2018, we received the 
news that 24 family members of my husband, Abdulhakim Idris, 
were missing and likely detained in the camps. On September 
5th, 2018, I spoke about the growing mass detention and exposed 
the CCP's genocidal policies at the Hudson Institute here in 
Washington. Six days later, my sister, Gulshan Abbas, was 
unjustly detained by the regime in retaliation for my activism 
and my free speech as a U.S. citizen.
    Yesterday marks the fifth anniversary of her being taken 
from our lives. The Chinese regime has maintained silence about 
her situation, while their mouthpiece, Global Times Network, 
spread misinformation, accusing me of fabricating my claims 
about her disappearance. Later, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs confirmed her false imprisonment, all based on 
fabricated charges. My sister, Gulshan, has no political 
history and is a retired medical doctor, a mother, and a 
grandma who continues to suffer in a Chinese prison. For five 
long years, my niece, Zieba, has put her life on hold, 
relentlessly fighting for her mother's freedom. Witnessing her 
journey is incredibly painful as she navigates working and 
raising her 5-year-old daughter, while grappling with the 
overwhelming loss and the trauma of having her mother held 
hostage because of me.
    Recently, we just learned that my father-in-law, Abdulkarim 
Zikrullah Idris, passed away in January of this year. My 
husband lost contact with his family in April 2017. After over 
six years, all we know is that his father passed away seven 
months ago. The exact date and the circumstances surrounding 
his death are unknown. My mother-in-law, Habibehan Idris, is 
said to be outside the camps, but she's in poor health, alone, 
and has no one to take care of her because her four children 
and all her grandchildren are still missing and likely 
detained. The plight of my sister and my in-laws are one of 
many.
    Uyghurs in the United States are facing the most 
significant crisis of our lives. But many of us are afraid to 
speak out because of what might happen to our lives back in our 
homeland. Our efforts to raise awareness and advocate for 
change are targeted and undermined. Remember when we used to 
have this sort of hearing on the Hill before? A room full of 
Uyghurs used to join you, holding pictures of their missing 
family members. But today, you don't see many. They are afraid 
of coming to public events like this as a direct result of TNR. 
I face daily online attacks with hate and mis-
information spread through the CCP bot accounts. Uyghur 
activists, including myself, are subject to libel and 
harassment, fostering mistrust and hatred. Platforms like 
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube offer no protection.
    Today I urge you to protect Uyghur American citizens. This 
call is reinforced through my written testimony and policy 
recommendations. I returned from Almaty, Kazakhstan last night. 
We were there for a film festival featuring the documentary, 
``In Search of My Sister,'' which highlights my story and my 
sister's detention. When we arrived there, the venue canceled 
the event. The supposed reasons for the cancellation vary. Some 
cite a visit by two Chinese diplomats to the venue the day 
before. Others point to the Kazakh government. Nonetheless, 
it's clear that the CCP is ultimately responsible for 
suppressing this event.
    The CCP is an evident threat to freedom and democracy in 
the world. China's international policing intimidation and 
harassment tactics extend to everyone, as highlighted by the 
Honorable Mr. Chong and the experts here. I am, as a female 
activist, personally experiencing everything that Yana 
described earlier. China's economic and technological power 
gives the government significant sway, causing self-censorship 
and silence in various American industries. The CCP influence 
undermines American values and global freedom. And as long as 
our families are detained in prison, concentration camps, 
forced into slavery with forced labor, forced into marriage, 
facing forced sterilization and forced abortion and kidnapping, 
all Uyghurs worldwide are direct victims of this genocide.
    Urgent action is necessary to protect not just my sister, 
my in-laws, and the millions of Uyghurs, but the entire world. 
Only through collective efforts can we safeguard Americans from 
China's infiltration and the normalization of TNR here at home. 
I ask that we work together to preserve democracy and freedom 
and human rights. If we do not stand to hold the CCP 
accountable today, we will most certainly lose the privilege 
tomorrow. Thank you.
    Chair Smith. Thank you very, very much for your testimony, 
for your incredible courage for speaking out, and for sharing 
about the agony you have suffered personally for your sister. I 
remember when Tom Suozzi did the showing of your documentary--
which you showed again--I believe it's the same one, yesterday. 
You know, it's very moving. And I think we ought to do it again 
here on Capitol Hill with the Speaker and others, so they can 
see just how barbaric and cruel the Chinese Communist Party 
really is in taking hostages of family members and friends of 
people who speak out, as you have done so bravely.
    So I would offer that to you. I thank you for traveling 25 
hours on a plane to get here to testify. That is a personal 
sacrifice on behalf of your sister and all Uyghurs. And again, 
if we don't, as a country, and if the West and the democracies 
do not begin aggressively calling out the abuses of Xi Jinping, 
the abuses will only multiply. And so the idea behind this 
hearing, behind our legislation on transnational crimes that 
are being committed by so-called police and others on behalf of 
the Chinese Communist Party here and elsewhere, it's time to 
put a tourniquet on it all. It just has to happen, because it's 
only going to get worse. So I thank you.
    I do have a few questions, but I want to point out that I 
mentioned Lu Siwei earlier, who we're all concerned about in 
Laos. You know, yesterday, 164 Chinese nationals were 
renditioned from Laos to China. And there's fear that, of 
course, Lu Siwei may be part of a forcible return. You know, 
the whole idea of calling it ``persuasion to return'' or 
anything like that--these governments unwittingly or wittingly 
cooperate with a violation of refugee law, where you know 
people are going to be sent back and have a well-founded fear 
of persecution. And that's where they're going back to.
    So I would hope that all of us would reach out to the 
administration, ask Michelle Outlaw, who's our charge in Laos, 
to raise the issue of Lu Siwei. And perhaps some of you might 
want to make mention of that now. And some of the questions I 
have, you know, you, Laura Harth, mentioned the U.N. Office on 
Drugs and Crime and the MOU with the CCP's Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection, and what a farce it is. Such 
legitimization, as you point out, is a crucial part of--it 
legitimizes the illegitimate. And I'm not sure if you could 
speak about that--has our Department of State spoken out on 
that MOU? Have we done it effectively? Because we can't look 
the other way when agreements are entered into by governments 
like this. So maybe you want to speak about that a little bit--
or elaborate on that very poor MOU.
    Ms. Harth. Yes, maybe specifically on that agreement. That 
memorandum of understanding was signed shortly after the 2018 
reform of the National Supervision Law, which created a state 
front for this internal CCP police--I think that is the best 
way to describe the Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection. Now, that state front is not independent in any 
way. It does not have independent employees. It does not report 
independently. It sits in the same offices and all its 
representatives are the exact same people. So it is not a 
different body.
    As soon as that was set up--their body's powers were vastly 
expanded, both within China through the formalization of a 
system called Liuzhi, which is effectively an extrajudicial 
system for enforced disappearances, torture, and so on. They 
call it a special investigative mechanism. It has been 
denounced by U.N. human rights bodies. At the same time, the 
CCDI bodies have been in charge of overseeing all 
international, let's say, police repatriation efforts. So 
clearly a very worrying body. And as I said before, it does not 
surprise us that they also started pushing this body for all 
international law enforcement and judicial cooperation.
    Now, that included, famously, an agreement--the first one, 
I think--with the Australian Federal Police, which was signed 
only a couple of weeks after this reform. Luckily, the AFP has 
now a couple of months back recognized that that was a mistake 
that will not be made again. So that will not be renewed. In 
Denmark, a similar agreement existed that has also not been 
renewed. But a lot of agreements exist around the world, 
including this MOU. I think the most important thing that 
worries us is the fact that it has been appointed as a focal 
point. And one of the issues there is obviously that also it's 
not just Interpol; under this mechanism there are police 
cooperation mechanisms.
    So far as I know, there has not been any public statements 
by countries on the UNODC mechanism. We'll definitely be 
raising that issue more. I can tell you that the UNODC has been 
unwilling to release the contents of that MOU or to provide 
civil society organizations, such as us, with any further 
information. Thank you.
    Chair Smith. Now, is that something that Secretary Blinken 
and the U.S. Department of State should be raising? Have they 
done so in any fora that you know of?
    Ms. Harth. I don't know what--publicly, I haven't seen that 
happen. I don't know if that has happened privately. I 
definitely hope this would be something that allied countries 
in general--democratic nations in general--would be looking 
into more as they try to tackle the issue of transnational 
repression and the issue of the illegitimacy of what the CCP is 
trying to do here in really overturning the international 
rules-based order. Thank you.
    Chair Smith. It is something that we, as a Commission, will 
undertake further. We already have, but will do more. Perhaps 
this calls for a letter from commissioners, if they would be so 
inclined to sign, to our administration asking that this be 
raised. I mean, even the euphemism ``persuasion to return,'' 
you know, with broken bodies and broken hearts, especially of 
family members in order to effectuate that forcible return. I 
mean, it flies in the face of the Refugee Convention and all 
parts thereof--and China is a signatory to it. I know it 
doesn't really apply here, but it's that concept of coercing 
people to involuntarily repatriate. So if you could provide us 
any additional information you would think would be helpful. 
And we will ask Secretary Blinken to raise it. And I thank you 
for really bringing a spotlight to it today.
    I'd like to ask Rushan, in what ways should the U.S. 
Government be more helpful to the diaspora, like yourself, who 
are suffering so much? Is there outreach? Is there--I mean, 
does the FBI talk to you at all, and to others? You know, do we 
have enough resources deployed? Obviously, there's always the 
concern, Do you have enough people at the FBI and other 
agencies to do the work? Is the need not being staffed 
sufficiently? Or is there a lack of, you know, actual guidance 
coming from the administration?
    Ms. Abbas. Yes. We have been talking to the FBI and the 
State Department and the other law enforcement. And it seems 
like they are on it, paying attention. But it seems like there 
is not much they can do for people like us, seeing all this 
libel, harassment, intimidation, and the blackmail online 
especially; they are protected under the freedom of speech. 
It's interesting how these platforms are not open to the 
general public in China. The regular, ordinary Chinese people 
cannot use YouTube, or Twitter, or Facebook, and other social 
media platforms. Yet the Chinese officials, or Chinese state 
media, or those Chinese troll accounts, are constantly 
attacking us, harassing us. But when we reach out to the FBI 
and the others, they are in touch with us, and they are 
constantly communicating with us. But we don't see any tangible 
help.
    We are already facing so much agony. Our family members are 
suffering. Every day everything we do is at the cost of our 
family members' freedom. And I wake up every day with my 
sister's face and I go to bed with her face. And since her 
detention, my life completely changed. I quit my full-time job 
as a business development director. And every--you know, the 
dream or the ambition I had professionally for my life all 
evaporated overnight. I became a full-time activist. I doubled 
down on my efforts. Therefore, when I see those kinds of 
attacks, which is daily, I take these as the impact of my work. 
We are speaking to the power, and we have the truth, and the 
Chinese Communist regime is afraid of the truth.
    But at the same time, it frustrates me when I see 
absolutely nothing is being provided, other than just the 
interviews, or talks, or saying that they are doing something. 
But it seems like it's extremely slow. We have been talking to 
the FBI for over a year now. I don't see any kind of tangible 
action being provided.
    Chair Smith. Yana or Laura, do you have any sense as to how 
many Chinese operatives, police and others, are here in the 
United States? And how many they've deployed throughout the 
world to harass and intimidate?
    Ms. Harth. You know, I think it would be very hard to have 
a number on that. As I said before, the issue is that the 
number of actors is so wide, between those that are, you know, 
official agents that may have been deployed from China to come 
to other countries, those that may be stationed in embassies 
and consulates, and then, you know, the whole host of private 
actors, semi-private actors, that are being engaged. I think 
it's very hard to calculate. And I do want to make, if I may, a 
small note of caution, because, as I said, some of these people 
may be victims themselves. Now that does not necessarily excuse 
what they are doing, but it is important to keep it in mind 
that a lot of these people may not have a choice themselves. 
And again, I think that just demonstrates how evil this regime 
is because they do not care if those people will then go and 
face criminal charges, or anything else. Thank you.
    Chair Smith. Yana.
    Ms. Gorokhovskaia. I would agree with that. I think it's 
very hard to estimate. I think we see transnational repression 
and foreign influence play out in lots of different ways. There 
was discussion of what happens on university campuses. I think 
that's especially also something to watch. We saw a lot of 
students, Chinese students, taking up their own white paper 
protests last year in response to what was happening 
domestically in China. And frustratingly, a lot of those people 
were then--first of all, didn't get support from their 
universities, but also then faced reprisals, either threats on 
campus or threats to their families.
    And so I think the important thing is that every time we 
see pro-democracy, pro-human rights, pro-freedom activism by 
people outside of China, we see a very harsh and very immediate 
response. And although there is action to support people, like 
the FBI and other actions, there's still--many people who are 
facing this don't feel like they have anywhere to turn, and 
they don't understand necessarily that there is solidarity, 
that they can reach out, and that people in the U.S. Government 
and other democratic governments understand that this is a 
problem.
    Chair Smith. Has there been a better understanding? Several 
years ago, I did a series of hearings on Confucius Institutes 
and the malign influence that they're having on the student 
body, especially Chinese students that they surveil. And of 
course, the one-sided political tirades that come from those 
people that implement it, it's all the party apparatus. I mean, 
don't talk about the Dalai Lama. Don't talk about the Uyghurs. 
And many of our universities, our colleges--bought into it. 
Now, are you finding that this is part of that apparatus to 
this day, that they're becoming even more repressive using 
Confucius Institutes or like-minded entities?
    Ms. Gorokhovskaia. I think, while the influence of 
Confucius Institutes has waned, we've seen other facets of this 
be expressed. And I do think that one thing to caution 
against--this sometimes gets wrapped into a language of anti-
Asian hate--is that this is sort of harassment or racial 
profiling. And that is--that's also to the PRC's advantage, 
because it pits people against each other, and it delegitimizes 
the voices of people who are speaking out for freedom. So I 
think that Confucius Institutes have become less of a problem, 
but I don't think that the influence has disappeared as a 
result of that.
    Chair Smith. Good point. Now on the red notices, those of 
us who have read Bill Browder's book--you know, he's testified 
many times before us. He's done an amazing job, especially with 
the Magnitsky Act and Global Magnitsky. I was the House sponsor 
of Global Magnitsky. It's just a tremendous tool for the 
administration. But concerning the abuse of red notices--what 
does Interpol do to mitigate that abuse, especially when it 
comes out of China, or Russia, or some other totalitarian 
country?
    Ms. Gorokhovskaia. Well, one thing that can be done is to 
be more transparent about the number and the origin of notices. 
We don't know where the notices are coming from. Often people 
don't know that they have a notice against them until they get 
arrested somewhere on a border. And that's something that 
Interpol can do. They do make some notices public. They can be 
more transparent, so that people have an opportunity to look it 
up--look up whether or not they are subject to a notice, and 
actually appeal for that notice to be rescinded or canceled, if 
there's grounds to do that. So that's one very concrete thing 
that Interpol can do.
    Chair Smith. Laura, could you just tell us how many 
countries--do you have any sense of how many countries have 
unwittingly signed agreements which allow for these illicit 
extraditions?
    Ms. Harth. I'd have to come back to you on that. But 
there's definitely a huge number of--it's not just extradition 
agreements--police, judicial cooperation agreements, it doesn't 
stop--but I'll get back to you on that.
    Chair Smith. Okay. Anything else you would like to add 
before we conclude the hearing? And Rushan, know that your 
sister will remain a high priority for this Commission, and 
you, and others who are in that similar situation. I do thank 
you especially, we all do, for your courage in coming forward. 
You know, injustice need not be forever. And, you know, the 
heroes of democracy and human rights are you and your sister, 
and others who are fighting so tenaciously, and paying for it 
with the loss of their freedom. So thank you for that 
sacrifice. I can't tell you how in awe I am, and my colleagues 
are, of what you have suffered and how you persevere to 
continue to bring the message to the world about what is 
happening under Xi Jinping. So thank you.
    Thank you so much. The hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the hearing ended.]





=======================================================================


                            A P P E N D I X

=======================================================================


                          Prepared Statements

                              ----------                              


                    Statement of Hon. Michael Chong

                                 ______
                                 

           My Experience with the People's Republic of China

    I was first elected to Parliament in 2004 and represent the 
electoral district of Wellington-Halton Hills in Ontario, Canada, where 
I was raised. Like millions of Canadians and Americans, my parents were 
immigrants. My mother immigrated from the Netherlands in the 1960s. My 
father immigrated from Hong Kong in 1952, and I have extended family 
living in both the Netherlands and Hong Kong. Today, tens of millions 
of North Americans have family living abroad and who are at risk of 
being targeted by authoritarian states.
    The ties between Canada and Hong Kong are longstanding and deep. 
During the Second World War, some two thousand Canadian soldiers of the 
Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers defended Hong 
Kongers against a vicious, surprise attack that took place 
simultaneously with the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941; half 
the Canadian soldiers were casualties of the ensuing battle. Hong Kong 
is ``Canada's Pearl Harbor''. Today, some 300,000 Canadian citizens 
live in Hong Kong.
    During my time in Parliament, I have served in the federal cabinet 
as President of the Queen's Privy Council, Minister of 
Intergovernmental Affairs, and Minister for Sport, and have chaired 
several House of Commons Standing Committees. In September 2020, I was 
appointed Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Official 
Opposition and have served in this role since. In our Westminster 
system of government, my mandate is to hold the Canadian government 
accountable on foreign policy and to serve as part of a ``government-
in-waiting''.
    Several years after Xi Jinping became President of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC), it became clear the PRC was increasingly 
violating a number of international norms, laws, and treaties. This 
included violations of the Sino-British Joint Declaration (which 
guaranteed Hong Kongers liberties and freedoms for fifty years from 
1997), its detention of Western journalists, and its increased military 
belligerence in the South China Sea. At the time, I voiced my criticism 
of the PRC, which usually resulted in the PRC embassy requesting a 
meeting with me to exchange views.
    After my appointment as Shadow Minister, my criticisms of the 
government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) increased in 
response to President Xi's increasing violations of the rules-based 
international order and repression in the PRC and abroad, including the 
wrongful detention of Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, 
increasing evidence of a Uyghur genocide, threats to national security, 
and theft of intellectual property. These criticisms were amplified 
following my September 2020 appointment because my position meant I was 
speaking and acting on behalf of my parliamentary party.
    On November 18, 2020, the House of Commons adopted a motion I 
introduced (Opposition Motion (Foreign policy towards China)), which 
called on the Canadian government to ``make a decision on Huawei's 
involvement in Canada's 5G network within 30 days'' and ``develop a 
robust plan, as Australia has done, to combat China's growing foreign 
operations here in Canada and its increasing intimidation of Canadians 
living in Canada.'' \1\ On February 22, 2021, the House of Commons 
adopted another motion I introduced (Opposition Motion (Religious 
minorities in China)), which recognized the PRC's actions towards 
Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims as a genocide.\2\ Both motions 
received support from members of every parliamentary party. In response 
to the second motion, and in coordination with the United States and 
United Kingdom, the Canadian government imposed sanctions ``in response 
to human rights violations in Xinjiang'' on March 22, 2023.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ House of Commons, Vote Detail-23--Members of Parliament--House 
of Commons of Canada (ourcommons.ca), 18 November 2020.
    \2\ House of Commons, Vote Detail-56--Members of Parliament--House 
of Commons of Canada (ourcommons.ca), 22 February 2021.
    \3\ Global Affairs Canada, Canada joins international partners in 
imposing new sanctions in response to human rights violations in 
Xinjiang, 22 March 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response, on March 27, 2021, the PRC sanctioned me for the 
Canadian government's imposition of sanctions on March 22, 2023, along 
with the Chair of the United States Commission on International 
Religious Freedom (USCIRF), Gayle Manchin and Vice Chair of the USCIRF, 
Tony Perkins.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Announces Sanctions on Relevant US and 
Canadian Individuals and Entity (fmprc.gov.cn), 27 March 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Subsequently, I concluded the PRC's sanctions on me and others were 
proof of our effectiveness and continued to speak up in defense of 
democracy, freedom, and the rules-based international order.
    On May 1st of this year, I learned through a report in a newspaper, 
The Globe and Mail, that a PRC diplomat working out of the consulate in 
Toronto had, since 2020, been gathering information to further target 
me and my family in Hong Kong.\5\ The source for the Globe report was 
an internal July 2021 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) 
assessment shared with the newspaper by an un-
disclosed source. The Canadian government subsequently confirmed the 
existence of the CSIS assessment.\6\ In response to the public release 
of this information, the Canadian government declared the diplomat, Mr. 
Zhao Wei, ``persona non grata'' on May 8, 2023.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ The Globe and Mail, China views Canada as a `high priority' for 
interference: CSIS report--The Globe and Mail, 1 May 2023.
    \6\ The Globe and Mail, `No one person' responsible for Ottawa 
failing to warn Michael Chong he was being targeted, national-security 
adviser says--The Globe and Mail, 1 June 2023.
    \7\ Global Affairs Canada, Canada declares Zhao Wei persona non 
grata--Canada.ca, 8 May 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On August 9, 2023, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Development (Global Affairs Canada) informed me, and publicly revealed, 
that I was a target of a disinformation campaign on the Chinese social 
media platform WeChat between May 4 and 13, 2023. According to the 
Department's findings, large volumes of false and misleading narratives 
about me were shared, including on my ``background, political stances, 
and family's heritage'' and that the PRC's role in the information 
operation is ``highly probable.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Global Affairs Canada, Rapid Response Mechanism Canada detects 
information operation targeting member of Parliament--Canada.ca, 9 
August 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These are the reported instances of the PRC's targeting of me to 
date.

           Transnational Repression vs. Foreign Interference

    Transnational repression and foreign interference are terms that 
are often interchangeable. Generally, transnational repression is 
defined as authoritarian governments' extraterritorial efforts to 
silence, deter, undermine, and threaten dissidents and activists who 
oppose them. Foreign interference is defined in Canadian law as foreign 
state ``activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to 
the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a 
threat to any person.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ CSIS, Foreign Interference and You, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         PRC's Foreign Interference Threat Activities in Canada

    My experience is but one case of PRC foreign interference in 
Canada. Many other cases go unreported and unnoticed, and the victims 
often suffer in silence.
    CSIS continues to observe PRC foreign interference threat 
activities in Canada. CSIS has assessed that foreign interference 
``poses one of the greatest strategic threats to Canada's national 
security.'' \10\ CSIS has stated that the PRC's foreign interference in 
Canada is a ``significant threat to the integrity of our political 
system and democratic institutions, social cohesion, economy and long-
term prosperity, and fundamental rights and freedoms.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Public Safety Canada, Countering Foreign Interference, March 
10, 2023.
    \11\ CSIS, Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference--
Revised Speaking Notes, p. 2, February 9, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Canada continues to be a target of the PRC, which is ``seeking to 
advance their political, economic and security interests to the 
detriment of Canada's,'' and the threat is a ``growing concern.'' \12\ 
This has direct implications for the approximate 1.7 million Canadians 
of Chinese descent living in Canada (4.7 per cent of the country's 
population).\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Public Safety Canada, Foreign Interference and Hostile 
Activities of State Actors (publicsafety.gc.ca), 20 August 2021.
    \13\ Statistics Canada, The Daily--The Canadian census: A rich 
portrait of the country's religious and ethnocultural diversity 
(statcan.gc.ca), 26 October 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    PRC foreign interference activities target a variety of diaspora 
groups in Canada using various tactics. Some of these activities are 
documented in a report of the House of Commons Special Committee on the 
Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship titled A Threat to 
Canadian Sovereignty: National Security Dimensions of the Canada-
People's Republic of China Relationship.
    One tactic used by the PRC is to target Canadian university 
campuses. The Special Committee heard testimony from Chemi Lhamo, who 
was targeted by the PRC after she spoke up about Tibetan human rights 
and ran for the 2019 student elections at the University of Toronto's 
Scarborough campus. She told the Special Committee she ``received 
thousands of harassing comments on social media, including rape and 
death threats, because of her Tibetan identity'' and that they 
continued after being elected student president.\14\ Ms. Lhamo stated 
her threats were connected to the PRC's mission in Canada and that the 
Communist Party of China (CCP) ``coerces Chinese international students 
into following CCP party lines and protesting initiatives that are seen 
as threatening PRC interests.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ CACN, A Threat to Canadian Sovereignty: National Security 
Dimensions of the Canada-
People's Republic of China Relationship (ourcommons.ca), May 2023, 19-
20.
    \15\ Ibid, 19-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rukiye Turdush's experience is another example of the PRC's foreign 
interference on Canadian university campuses. Ms. Turdush is the 
Research Director of the Uyghur Research Institute. She testified at 
the Special Committee about the harassment she faced following her talk 
about the plight of Uyghurs at McMaster University's Muslim Students' 
Association in 2019. She stated that ``the McMaster Chinese Students' 
Association reported the event to the PRC embassy and published a 
statement condemning the presentation [ . . . and] that the PRC embassy 
in Ottawa later praised students who had protested her talk for their 
patriotism.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Ibid, 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many Chinese international students are coerced by the PRC into 
participating in the PRC's foreign interference activities on 
university campuses. Cheuk Kwan, past chair of the Toronto Association 
for Democracy in China, testified at the Special Committee, ``about 
Chinese international students who were `compelled' to `demonstrate 
against pro-Hong Kong rallies' '' after threats had been made ``to 
withhold their government scholarships or harm their families back home 
if they [did not] comply.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ CACN, The Breach of Hong Kong's High Degree of Autonomy: A 
Situation of International Concern (ourcommons.ca), February 2021, 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other foreign interference tactics used by the PRC include 
targeting Chinese language media and social media in Canada, as well as 
the establishment of illegal PRC ``police service centres'' in Canada.
    CSIS has assessed that Chinese language media in Canada, including 
newspapers, radio and television broadcasters, are targeted by the PRC. 
In a 2021 briefing note to the Canadian Prime Minister, CSIS explained 
that ``Chinese-language media outlets operating in Canada and members 
of the Chinese-Canadian community are primary targets of PRC-directed 
foreign influenced activities.'' \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ CSIS, Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference--
Revised Speaking Notes, p. 9, February 9, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Special Committee's report on Hong Kong highlighted testimony 
from Guy Saint-Jacques, former Canadian Ambassador to the PRC, who was 
``struck by the extent to which Canadian media publishing in Mandarin 
reflected the views expressed in Beijing during the Meng Wanzhou 
affair.'' \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ CACN, A Threat to Canadian Sovereignty: National Security 
Dimensions of the Canada-
People's Republic of China Relationship (ourcommons.ca), May 2023, 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The report also highlighted the testimony of Victor Ho, former 
editor of Sing Tao Daily (Canada's largest Chinese language newspaper):

        [Mr. Ho] provided the example of a half-hour ``radio speech'' 
        by China's Consul General in Vancouver on 23 July 2020. 
        According to Mr. Ho, during the speech, which was ``programmed 
        in newscast airtime,'' the Consul General asked Chinese 
        Canadians to support the National Security Law while also 
        suggesting that there were ``very few people in Canada trying 
        to slander'' the law and ``attempting to cause trouble overseas 
        as well.'' In Mr. Ho's view, the Consul General ``treats 
        Chinese Canadians as Chinese nationals, when of course they are 
        not.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Ibid, 41.

    Chinese language social media is another medium for foreign 
interference. CSIS has observed ``social media being leveraged to 
spread disinformation or run foreign influenced campaigns designed to 
confuse or divide public opinion or interfere in healthy public 
debate.'' \21\ The Special Committee`s national security report 
concluded that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ CSIS, Foreign Interference Threats to Canada's Democratic 
Process, July 2021, 6.

        Disinformation and influence campaigns designed to divide 
        public opinion and interfere with public debate are 
        increasingly being spread through social media. WeChat and 
        other social media applications monitored by the PRC provide a 
        powerful tool for the PRC to censor information, manipulate 
        public sentiment, and to monitor and intimidate diaspora.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ CACN, A Threat to Canadian Sovereignty: National Security 
Dimensions of the Canada-
People's Republic of China Relationship, May 2023.

    After assessing recent activity on WeChat in May of this year, the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development concluded that it 
is ``highly probable'' that the PRC played a role in the information 
operation that was spreading disinformation about me.\23\ It is 
estimated that WeChat has over one million users in Canada and that the 
disinformation regarding me was viewed by between two and five million 
WeChat users globally.\24\ Clearly, the PRC is using social media 
channels like WeChat as a tool for foreign interference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Global Affairs Canada, WeChat account activity targeting 
Canadian parliamentarian suggests likely foreign state involvement 
(international.gc.ca), 9 August 2023.
    \24\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As in the United States, the PRC has been documented to have 
established illegal ``police service centres'' in Canada, most notably, 
in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. The PRC describes them as 
``service stations'' that were established during the pandemic to help 
Chinese nationals with administrative matters, such as driver's 
licenses and other documents, and that they are run by volunteers.\25\ 
These stations have been assessed by human rights groups as a tool to 
``threaten and monitor Chinese nationals abroad.'' \26\ This includes 
coercing persons in Canada back to the PRC. For example, a U.S. 
indictment unsealed in federal court in Brooklyn, New York on October 
22, 2023, revealed that an individual in Canada was coerced back to the 
PRC.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Reuters, Canada police probe alleged Chinese `police stations' 
in Montreal, Reuters, 9 March 2023.
    \26\ BBC, Canadian police investigate Chinese `police stations' in 
Quebec--BBC News, 9 March 2023.
    \27\ DOJ, Six Individuals Charged with Conspiring to Act as Illegal 
Agents of the People's Republic of China, October 20, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PRC foreign interference threat activities also target Canada's 
general elections. In the 2021 election, Kenny Chiu (former Member of 
Parliament for Steveston-Richmond East, British Columbia) was targeted 
and was the subject of disinformation. The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism 
(RRM) in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development 
observed Chinese Communist Party media accounts spreading a hostile 
narrative about Kenny Chiu and the Conservative Party of Canada's 
election platform, saying inaccurately that anyone with ties to China 
would be ``considered a spokesperson for the Chinese government'' \28\ 
and that ``all individuals or groups with ties to China would be 
required to register.'' \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Unclassified, G7 RRM Canada. p. 1, Monday, October 18, 2021.
    \29\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PRC foreign threat activities have also targeted the 
fundamental right to peacefully protest in Canada. In response to a 
peaceful rally organized in August 2019 in Vancouver backing Hong 
Kong's anti-extradition protests, pro-PRC counter-protesters allegedly 
organized through the PRC consulate in Vancouver threatened those at 
the rally. Threats were made through social media and in person by pro-
PRC counter-protestors.\30\ Co-founder Cherie Wong of the Pro-Hong Kong 
group ``Alliance Canada Hong Kong'' and other pro-Hong Kong activists 
received threats, including rape and murder.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Ibid.
    \31\ CBC News, ``We know where your parents live'': Hong Kong 
activists say Canadian police helpless against online threats, 
September 10, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There have also been suggestions that the PRC paid protesters to 
support the daughter of Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei, Meng Wanzhou, at 
her extradition hearing that took place in Vancouver.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ CBC News, The strange tale of the paid protesters supporting 
Meng Wanzhou at her extradition hearing, January 21, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recently, the PRC is utilizing a new foreign interference tactic by 
creating ``wanted lists'' and offering bounties for the arrest of those 
living overseas. Last year, the government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region placed Victor Ho on a ``wanted list,'' allegedly 
for violations of Hong Kong's National Security Law, but in fact for 
his speaking up in Canada in favor of Hong Kong's democracy and human 
rights. This year, the government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region offered HK$1 million [USD$128,000) bounties for 
the arrest of eight democracy activists based overseas, all of whom are 
believed to be living in Canada, the United States, Britain and 
Australia. Out of the eight, at least two have ties to Canada (Dennis 
Kwok and Elmer Yuen).

        Responding to PRC Foreign Interference Threat Activities

    Foreign interference is a complex national security threat to 
Canada \33\ and requires a suite of measures to combat. CSIS has stated 
that foreign interference can be countered through investigating and 
monitoring, utilizing threat reduction measures, reducing PRC access to 
critical economic sectors, conducting stakeholder engagement, publicly 
``calling out'' foreign state actors and prosecuting individuals and 
entities.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ CSIS, Foreign Interference and You (canada.ca), 2021, 2.
    \34\ CSIS, Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference--
Revised Speaking Notes, p. 11, February 9, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Foreign interference also requires cooperation among allied 
democracies. The 2023 report from the Canadian government's National 
Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians emphasized the 
need for ``cooperation with allies on foreign interference.'' \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ NSICOP, 2022 Annual Report, p. 17, July 19, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One area for cooperation should include the sharing of best 
practices among the Five Eyes intelligence alliance about when to 
release information to the public about the PRC's foreign interference 
threat activities. Often intelligence gathered about foreign 
interference does not meet the evidentiary standard required to 
commence a prosecution, yet still constitutes a serious threat that 
needs to be countered. In those cases, Five Eyes intelligence agencies 
have advised governments that sunlight and transparency is a tool that 
can be used. In 2021, CSIS provided a briefing to the Canadian Prime 
Minister on foreign interference stating, ``Canada can make use of a 
policy that is grounded in transparency and sunlight in order to 
highlight the point that FI [foreign interference] should be exposed to 
the public.'' \36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ CSIS, Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference--
Revised Speaking Notes, 9 February 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, in 2022 the U.K.'s MI5 went public about a PRC agent 
in the U.K. Parliament, Christine Lee. MI5 informed the Speaker about 
the security threat this individual presented, and in turn, the Speaker 
emailed all members of the U.K. House of Commons, identifying this 
individual as a security threat.\37\ Members took appropriate action, 
cut off contact with this individual, and the integrity of the U.K. 
Parliament was protected. Sunlight and transparency worked, and the 
integrity of U.K.'s democracy was ensured.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ The Independent, Christine Lee: Security warning to MPs over 
Chinese spying threat, The Independent, 13 January 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Transparency in party nominations (primaries) and general 
elections, including the disclosure of information regarding foreign 
interference, is particularly sensitive because of the impact these 
disclosures can have on party nominations and elections; the timely 
release of information about foreign interference while maintaining the 
confidence of all political parties and candidates are equally 
important if we are to protect democracies against foreign interference 
in the electoral process. Exchanging best practices in this area is 
another area in which democracies can learn from each other.
    Another area for cooperation is exchanging information on effective 
legislative measures that can be implemented to prosecute PRC agents 
carrying out foreign interference activities. A foreign agent registry 
can be a useful tool to combat foreign interference. Recently, the U.S. 
foreign agent registry was used to shut down a PRC ``police station'' 
in lower Manhattan and two individuals were arrested for acting as PRC 
agents.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ DOJ, U.S. Attorney Announces Charges Against Co-Director of 
Think Tank for Acting as an Unregistered Foreign Agent, Trafficing in 
Arms, Violating U.S. Sanctions Against Iran, and Making False 
Statements to Federal Agents, July 10, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. has had a foreign agent registry (Foreign Agent Registry 
Act) since 1938,\39\ while Australia adopted the Foreign Influence 
Transparency Scheme Act 2018 in 2019.\40\ This past summer, the U.K. 
adopted the National Security Act 2023, which establishes a 
registry.\41\ The Canadian government has announced it will introduce 
legislation for a registry but has yet to introduce one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Foreign Agents Registration Act, Foreign Agents Registration 
Act, Foreign Agents Registration Act (justice.gov), retrieved 30 August 
2023.
    \40\ Australian Government, Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme 
Act 2018, April 11, 2019.
    \41\ U.K. Public General Acts, National Security Act 2023, July 11, 
2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If the threshold for a registry is too high, then it will not 
capture the activity needed to be countered. On the other hand, if the 
threshold for a registry is too low, then it will capture much activity 
unrelated to foreign interference. Exchanging information on effective 
legislative models for a registry is an area where democracies can 
learn from each other.
    Translating intelligence into evidence is often difficult but 
essential if individuals engaged in foreign interference are to be 
successfully prosecuted. A clear definition of what constitutes foreign 
interference and establishing clear evidentiary standards that are 
accepted by the intelligence community and law enforcement alike are 
critical if those engaged in foreign interference are to be 
successfully prosecuted.
    Foreign interference often takes place alongside corruption, 
including money laundering and covert enrichment. Enhancing financial 
transparency through a beneficial ownership registry covering 
corporations, trusts and real estate is critical to combatting the 
corruption that often accompanies foreign interference. In addition, 
freezing and seizing the assets of individuals engaged in foreign 
interference would serve as a deterrent and remove the profit motive. 
Best practices and coordination on financial transparency, asset 
freezes, and forfeiture should be shared among allied democracies.
    Foreign interference often takes place through the deliberate 
spreading of disinformation. Democracies should share best practices on 
how to combat this disinformation while upholding our cherished 
freedoms of thought, belief, opinion, and expression, including freedom 
of the press and other media of communication. Recently, I was part of 
a parliamentary delegation to the Republic of China (Taiwan), where we 
met with Audrey Tang Feng, the Minister of Digital Affairs. Taiwan is 
ground zero for the PRC's disinformation campaigns, and Taiwan has a 
well-
developed multi-faceted policy grounded in building resilience among 
Taiwanese society while protecting fundamental freedoms.
    Repression with the PRC can also be better countered through better 
coordination and cooperation among allied democracies. The North 
American and European Union free trade areas collectively comprise 
about 43 per cent of global GDP.\42\ This immense purchasing power 
should be used to counter repression and uphold human rights. 
Furthermore, Canada is a signatory, along with the U.S. and Mexico, of 
the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). Article 23.6 of the 
Agreement requires signatories to ban the import of products produced 
using forced labor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ World Bank, GDP, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is evidence that the PRC is forcing the Uyghur minority in 
Xinjiang province to harvest cotton and tomatoes. Since CUSMA has come 
into effect, the U.S. has interdicted and seized thousands of shipments 
from Xinjiang from entering the United States. Canada, conversely, only 
stopped one shipment of cotton products from the PRC at the border, and 
these products were later released.\43\ The Canadian government can 
learn from best practices in the U.S. to counter repression within the 
PRC while upholding the rules-based international order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ The Globe and Mail, Only shipment Canada has seized on 
suspicion of forced labour was released after challenge from importer, 
The Globe and Mail, 27 May 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Canada must work toward a stronger defense and security partnership 
with the United States, our Euro-Atlantic allies, and democratic 
partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Canada must look for every 
opportunity to strengthen these partnerships to ensure we meet the 
challenge of rising authoritarianism and preserve our fundamental 
freedoms, democratic institutions, and the rules-based international 
order.

                    Statement of Yana Gorokhovskaia

                                 ______
                                 

 Transnational Repression Committed by the People's Republic of China--
                      Evidence from Freedom House

    Thank you, Chairman Smith, Co-chairman Merkley, and distinguished 
members of the commission, for the opportunity to share information 
about the scope and scale of the global transnational repression 
campaign carried out by the People's Republic of China (PRC). I will 
use my time to first describe the ways in which the PRC intimidates, 
harasses, harms, and otherwise tries to silence critics, diaspora 
members, and exiles living beyond its borders and second, to explain 
how this campaign has evolved to threaten people in new ways. I'll 
conclude with suggestions for policies that can be adopted by 
democratic governments, including by the United States, to better 
protect people targeted by the PRC.
    The People's Republic of China is one of the least free countries 
in the world. Freedoms there have deteriorated rapidly over the last 
decade, and especially since 2017, under the leadership of Xi Jinping. 
The country now ranks near the very bottom among the 195 countries 
assessed every year in Freedom in the World, our global survey of 
political rights and civil liberties.\1\ Like other authoritarian 
governments, the PRC also exports oppression abroad as a way of 
maintaining its regime at home.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2023: China,'' https://
freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even though Chinese officials routinely reference the government's 
policy of noninterference, Beijing seeks to dictate, sometimes through 
use of physical force, the terms of free speech, association, movement, 
assembly, and even religious expression of individuals thousands of 
miles away. Today, China is carrying out the world's most sophisticated 
and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression, using a wide 
array of physical, digital, and psychological tactics to attempt to 
silence those it views as threats to the regime.
    Freedom House has compiled a database of direct physical incidents 
of transnational repression--including assassinations, abductions, 
assaults, detentions, and unlawful deportations--that spans 2014 to 
2022 inclusive.\2\ After our last update, the database now includes 854 
cases. This is a conservative estimate based only on public, verified 
cases of direct attacks which excludes incidents that are harder to 
confirm, such as the intimidation of family, digital surveillance, and 
online harassment. Even so, a clear picture of the PRC's role in this 
global phenomenon has emerged. China is responsible for 30 percent of 
the coded cases--nearly twice as many as Turkey, the second most 
prolific perpetrator in the database.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Yana Gorokhovskaia, Nate Schenkkan, and Grady Vaughan, Still 
Not Safe: Transnational Repression in 2022, Freedom House, April 2022, 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/
FH_TransnationalRepression2023_0.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This statistic tells only one part of the story. The PRC has 
targeted people in at least 36 countries, including those living in 
democracies. Among the victims are pro-democracy activists, 
journalists, students, human rights defenders, artists, former 
insiders, civil society organizations, as well as whole ethnic and 
religious groups like the Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Falun Gong 
practitioners, and others who simply criticize the Chinese Communist 
Party.
    Beijing's transnational repression toolkit is diverse. It continues 
to rely on well-practiced tactics of intimidation such as forcing 
family members to call their relatives abroad in order to urge them to 
stop engaging in activities like protest or human rights activism, 
objectionable to the PRC.\3\ Members of the diaspora are sometimes 
recruited or coerced into informing on each other.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Sam Judah, ``China Using Families as `Hostages' to Quash Uyghur 
Dissent Abroad,'' BBC, July 31, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
66337328.
    \4\ Gulchehra Hoja, ``With Threats and Intimidation, China Coerces 
Uyghurs in Turkey to Spy on Each Other,'' RFA, February 5, 2023, 
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghur-turkey-
02052023210957.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It also continues to abuse established mechanisms of international 
cooperation, like Interpol's notifications system and extradition 
agreements, which allow it to co-opt agencies of foreign states in 
order to repress. Idris Hasan, a Uyghur activist,
was detained on a Red Notice requested by China after he landed at the 
airport in Casablanca in March 2021.\5\ He has been in prison for more 
than two years. Despite the fact the that the Red Notice was cancelled 
shortly after his arrest, Idris is in danger every day of being 
deported because Morocco and China have an extradition agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Nicholas Muller, ``The Continued Imprisonment of Idris Hasan,'' 
The Diplomat, July 1, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/the-
continued-imprisonment-of-idris-hasan/; https://menarights.
org/en/articles/2-years-detention-uyghur-activist-idris-hasan-must-be-
released.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PRC menaces people living in democracies. In addition to the 
problem of overseas police stations that my colleague from Safeguard 
Defenders has described, China has sent police officers into foreign 
countries to surveil and intimidate targeted individuals, sometimes in 
cooperation with the government \6\ and sometimes clandestinely.\7\ 
Signaling a dangerous evolution of this tactic, evidence has emerged 
over the last year that the PRC is co-opting former members of domestic 
law enforcement agencies to harass, coerce, stalk, and surveil people 
living in the U.S. and Canada.\8\ The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and the Department of Justice, as well as their Canadian counterparts, 
have begun to pursue these cases. There has been at least one 
successful criminal prosecution in New York state to date. However, it 
is worth underlining that the employment of former law enforcement 
officials by the PRC to act as proxies in the transnational repression 
campaign may amplify the fear that members of the diaspora feel, 
demonstrating that the PRC is able to co-opt officials in democratic 
states to carry out its repressive schemes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Michael E. Miller and Matthew Abbott, ``China Hoped Fiji Would 
Be a Template for the Pacific. Its Plan Backfired,'' The Washington 
Post, August 21, 2023, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/china-fiji-police-mou-
pacific-islands/.
    \7\ Sebastian Rotella and Kirsten Berg, ``Operation Fox Hunt: How 
China Exports Repression Using a Network of Spies Hidden in Plain 
Sight,'' ProPublica, July 22, 2021, https://www.propublica.org/article/
operation-fox-hunt-how-china-exports-repression-using-a-network-of-
spies-hidden-in-plain-sight.
    \8\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Federal Jury Convicts Three 
Defendants of Interstate Stalking of Chinese Nationals in the U.S. and 
Two of Those Defendants for Acting or Conspiring to Act on Behalf of 
the People's Republic of China,'' U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern 
District of New York, June 20, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/
pr/federal-jury-convicts-three-defendants-interstate-stalking-chinese-
nationals-us-and; Robert Fife and Steven Chase, ``Former Mountie 
Targeted B.C. Real Estate Tycoon for China, RCMP Allege,'' The Globe 
and Mail, August 21, 2023, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/
article-rcmp-officer-charged-bc-entrepreneur/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PRC's toolkit of repression is growing, with each new tactic 
exploiting a previously undetected vulnerability and adapting to the 
responses of democratic countries. Wang Jingyu was a teenager when he 
fled China in 2019 after posting comments online critical of the CCP 
and supportive of pro-democracy protests. In 2021, he was detained in 
Dubai while on a layover on his way to the U.S. He was held in 
detention for weeks and the UAE authorities allowed Chinese embassy 
officials to interrogate the teen.\9\ His release was secured as a 
result of media attention and international pressure. But Wang 
continues to be targeted. Beginning last year, bomb threats were made 
in his name, and in the names of other activists and journalists, 
against Chinese embassies in the Netherlands and Norway.\10\ These 
threats predictably activated the security and public safety responses 
of European law enforcement, resulting in police investigations, 
questioning, and even the brief detention of some of the targeted 
individuals. Like the co-opting of former law enforcement agents 
working in democracies, ``swatting,'' or harassment carried out by 
alerting police or emergency services through false reporting, is meant 
to cause psychological stress and demonstrate the reach of the PRC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Voice of America, ``Teen, Fiancee Flee to Netherlands to Avoid 
Extradition Back to China,'' July 21, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/
east-asia-pacific_teen-fiancee-flee-netherlands-avoid-extradition-back-
china/6208514.html.
    \10\ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Alison Snyder, ``Fake Bomb 
Threats Used to Harass China Critics,'' Axios, April 2, 2023, https://
www.axios.com/2023/03/29/chinese-activists-false-bomb-threats; Jemimah 
Steinfeld, ``Critics of Beijing Face Increasing Impersonation 
Attacks,'' New Lines Magazine, August 21, 2023, https://
newlinesmag.com/reportage/critics-of-beijing-face-
increasing-impersonation-attacks/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PRC is the world's worst abuser of internet freedom 
domestically; \11\ it also employs tactics of digital authoritarianism 
in its transnational repression campaign. These tactics, which include 
mass trolling, smear campaigns,\12\ threats and intimidation, spoofing 
accounts, and even doxing of personal information, are meant to 
intimidate critics and journalists, drown out reports of human rights 
abuses, and apply psychological pressure on the targets. These tactics 
are also often gendered; women face not only violent but sexualized 
digital threats in response to work that shines a critical light on the 
PRC.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Freedom House, ``Freedom on the Net 2022: China,'' https://
freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-net/2022.
    \12\ Wang Gang and Liam Scott, ``Trolling of Female Asian 
Journalists on Rise as Beijing Seeks to Discredit Media,'' Voice of 
America, January 2, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/trolling-of-female-
asian-journalists-on-rise-as-beijing-seeks-to-discredit-media/
6898789.html.
    \13\ Albert Zhang and Danielle Cave, ``Smart Asian Women Are the 
New Targets of CCP Global Online Repression,'' Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, June 3, 2022, https://www.
aspistrategist.org.au/smart-asian-women-are-the-new-targets-of-ccp-
global-online-repression/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The CCP's campaign of transnational repression is a threat not only 
to the targeted individuals and groups but also to state sovereignty, 
democratic institutions, and the exercise of fundamental rights. 
Building resilience and imposing accountability are key to curbing the 
CCP's campaign of transnational repression. Steps to better protect 
against the CCP's campaign of transnational repression, both in the 
United States and abroad, include:

    1.  Codifying a definition of transnational repression, which will 
facilitate the tracking of incidents at home and abroad, distinguish 
attacks from ordinary crime, and coordinate inter-agency action, in 
addition to serving as a basis for any other laws that may be needed.

    2.  Training for government officials, including law enforcement, 
who may encounter transnational repression. Several agencies, including 
the FBI, Department of State, and Department of Homeland Security, have 
begun instituting trainings, but they vary in consistency and content. 
Coordinated, mandated requirements across agencies could help ensure 
that officials are equipped with matching and sufficient information to 
help protect those at risk and to not unwittingly become a player in an 
authoritarian regime's campaign of transnational repression. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation has begun this effort.

    3.  Conducting strategic, consistent, and culturally sensitive 
outreach to communities that are at risk of experiencing transnational 
repression in order to equip them with the resources to report these 
activities.

    4.  Using voice and vote within international institutions to limit 
the ability of Interpol member states to target individuals through the 
misuse of Red Notices and other alerts.

    5.  Deploying targeted sanctions against Chinese officials for the 
use of transnational repression and screening Chinese diplomats for a 
history of harassing diaspora members in their postings.

    More details about these recommendations, and additional 
recommendations, are available in our reports.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Freedom House, ``Policy Recommendations: Transnational 
Repression,'' https://freedomhouse.org/policy-recommendations/
transnational-repression#US.

    I should note that several pieces of legislation to address 
transnational repression have been introduced or will be introduced in 
the near future. Thank you, Co-chairman Merkley and Chairman Smith for 
your introduction of the Transnational Repression Policy Act, which 
Freedom House supports. We look forward to working with you and your 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
staff to see this passed into law.

    Addressing transnational repression committed by the government of 
the People's Republic of China is a matter of urgency. It is imperative 
that Congress, in a bipartisan fashion, come together with the 
executive branch and like-minded partners to protect those at risk and 
defend democratic institutions and fundamental rights. We appreciate 
the leadership of the Commission on this issue, and I look forward to 
your questions.

                        Statement of Laura Harth

    Chairman Smith, Chairman Merkley, distinguished members of the 
Commission, it is an honor testifying before you today on behalf of 
Safeguard Defenders.
    Most people will know us for the report released exactly one year 
ago today, which exposed the formal cooperation between public security 
authorities in China and united front-linked groups around the world in 
the setting up and running of over 100 so-called ``overseas police 
service centers'' in more than 50 countries around the world. On the 
exclusive basis of open-source evidence from Chinese authorities and 
State/Party media, we were able to link at least three of these 
stations to ``persuasion to return'' operations that took place in 
Spain, Serbia and France.
    While the revelations of 110 Overseas and its follow-up Patrol and 
Persuade contributed to jumpstarting a conversation on the PRC's 
transnational repression in countries where that was not previously the 
case, in particular in Europe, we have and will continue to highlight 
how these are but the tip of the iceberg in what Freedom House rightly 
defines as ``the world's most sophisticated, comprehensive, and far-
reaching campaign of transnational repression.''
    Within this campaign, Safeguard Defenders has focused its 
documentation as well as its direct-action efforts on countering one of 
its most extreme iterations: involuntary returns. While not new, the 
scale on which PRC authorities are coercing individuals to return to 
China to face prosecution has exploded over the course of the past 
decade, with official--yet partial--numbers released annually claiming 
well over ten thousand returns from over 120 countries in the world 
between the start of Operation Fox Hunt in 2014 and October 2022. We 
will soon release additional evidence on such operations in targeted 
countries.
    The often-clandestine methods for these returns have been set in 
stone by the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in a 
written legal interpretation to the 2018 National Supervision Law that 
vastly expanded the non-judicial body's reach: ``extradition,'' 
``repatriation,'' ``off-site prosecution,'' ``persuasion,'' ``luring 
and entrapment,'' and ``kidnapping.''
    The so-called ``persuasion to return'' method is the one used most 
frequently. Threats and harassment--or worse--against family members 
back home or direct threats and harassment of individuals overseas by 
covert PRC agents, individuals linked to its embassies or consulates, 
private investigators and security firms, coopted private individuals, 
rabid nationalists or even victims themselves: the Chinese Communist 
Party has set up a true whole of society effort to exert control over 
diaspora communities worldwide and silence dissent.
    These efforts clearly undermine the most fundamental freedoms of 
targeted communities, severely infringe the rights and due process of 
individuals coerced into returning and constitute a grave violation of 
the territorial and judicial sovereignty of other nations. The climate 
of suspicion and widespread fear further isolate targeted communities 
and individuals from their environment, and may expose individuals that 
have been co-opted or coerced into doing the CCP's bidding to criminal 
liability.
    To effectively counter such a massive undertaking, democracies need 
to respond with a similar whole of government approach that recognizes 
transnational repression for the domestic threat it is, one that is 
inextricably linked to the CCP's influence operations. Speaking from a 
European experience, we are but at the very beginning of such an 
endeavor and will need continued concerted allied efforts to move 
beyond the stage of timid condemnation to effective and coordinated 
transnational counteraction to match the CCP's efforts. Working towards 
joint definitions, sharing of information and best practices is an 
essential step in this direction. It is in our view equally key to end 
the legitimization of the PRC's illegal practices through judicial and 
police cooperation agreements, at the bilateral but also at the 
multilateral level. It is no coincidence the PRC has been pushing the 
signing and ratifying of such agreements at an accelerated rate during 
the same timeframe in which its involuntary returns operations have 
exploded.
    These agreements were often pushed through within economic and 
cultural cooperation packages, but the signing of similar agreements in 
particular by Western countries has equally acted as a most effective 
``gateway'' for other countries to sign on, as we discovered firsthand 
during court extradition proceedings in a European country. As 
awareness on the overall human rights situation in the PRC grows, 
democratic nations are increasingly becoming aware of the intrinsic 
risks of these agreements. However, we continue seeing remarkable 
efforts by PRC authorities to expand their cooperation footprint in 
these fields in the Global South.
    In this regard I'd like in particular to severely question the 
legitimacy of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's MoU with the CCP's 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection--and its State front the 
National Commission of Supervision--and its acceptance of this body--
that cannot be described but as the internal police force of the 
Chinese Communist Party--as the Chinese focal point for all work under 
the Convention Against Corruption.
    While PRC propaganda dubs these types of agreements as a 
``demonstration of the international community's trust in its judicial 
system,'' they directly contribute to a heightened sense of fear within 
targeted communities and subvert the international rules-based order.
    Ending such legitimization is a crucial part in rebuilding trust 
with targeted communities. And allow me to conclude with an appeal to 
them. The question we receive time and time again from democratic 
governments willing to engage on the issue is: ``we need the victims to 
come forward.''
    The U.S. and Australia have already set up exemplary multilingual 
dedicated hotlines to report transnational repression efforts, also 
anonymously. To encourage this best practice elsewhere, Safeguard 
Defenders has today released a pilot guide with reporting channels in a 
series of countries, which we will continue to update and hopefully 
grow with similarly dedicated hotlines.
    While we understand the personal toll for victims to come forward 
and the mistrust that may exist towards local authorities who, often 
and for too long, have maintained preferential channels of 
interlocution with those seeking to exert control at the behest of the 
CCP, the time to come forward and thus contribute to build a democratic 
whole of society effort to counter transnational repression is now. 
Please do so.

                                      *  *  *

A report by Safeguard Defenders entitled Involuntary Returns--China's 
Covert Operation to Force `Fugitives' Overseas Back Home, appears under 
Submissions for the Record.


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                       Statement of Rushan Abbas

    My name is Rushan Abbas. I am an Uyghur-American, a mother and a 
Uyghur rights activist. I am the founder and Executive Director of 
Campaign For Uyghurs (CFU). I currently live in Falls Church, Virginia 
but I was born in Urumqi, the capital city of the so-called `Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region.' Xinjiang is a name that has been designated 
by the Chinese government and means the ``New Frontier.'' However, it 
is important to note that historically and geographically, this area 
has been known as East Turkistan. This name pays respect to the Uyghur 
and other Turkic groups who have inhabited the region for centuries.
    My activism is focused on the human rights and freedoms of the 
Uyghur people. The situation in East Turkistan has raised global 
concerns, as there have been multiple determinations by U.S. NGOs and 
other government entities of systemic discrimination against Uyghurs by 
the Chinese government amounting to crimes against humanity and 
genocide. By raising awareness and speaking out against these 
injustices, I hope to counter Chinese propaganda and contribute to the 
international dialogue and efforts to safeguard the rights and dignity 
of Uyghurs.

             Introduction to Transnational Repression (TNR)

    Thank you for giving me the platform to testify about China's 
transnational repression and long-arm policing of Uyghurs in the 
diaspora. It is essential to shed light on the various tactics employed 
by the Chinese government to intimidate and silence Uyghurs who live on 
American soil. Surveillance is an ever-present reality that we face 
collectively as Uyghurs in the region, and as diaspora members. The 
feeling of being constantly watched weighs heavily on my mind. There 
have been occasions where I have suspected the presence of Chinese 
agents within our communities, keeping a tight watch on our activities 
and reporting back to their superiors.
    The presence of online surveillance, including hacking attempts and 
strange online activities, as well as systematic hate speech 
dissemination through bot accounts, and libel targeted at myself and 
other Uyghur individuals, jeopardize the safety of Uyghur individuals 
by creating online echo chambers of hate and disinformation.
    However, it is the targeting of our families that has caused 
immense distress and anguish within the Uyghur diaspora. The Chinese 
government's ruthless approach extends to our loved ones who still 
reside in East Turkistan. We hear stories of harassment, arbitrary 
detention, and forced disappearance, all meant to exert pressure on us 
and to deter any attempts to expose the truth about the atrocities 
being committed against the Uyghurs.
    These threats and intimidation tactics have created a suffocating 
atmosphere of fear, making it challenging for Uyghur diaspora members 
to speak out, testify in public, or participate in interviews. We are 
torn between our moral obligation to fight for the survival of our 
people, who are being systematically erased in the region, and our 
familial obligation of minimizing potential risk to vulnerable 
relatives.
    It is essential for the international community to understand the 
gravity of the threats faced by the Uyghur diaspora and to support and 
amplify the courageous voices that speak out. By standing in solidarity 
with us, you send a powerful message to the CCP that we are not alone 
and at the very least, the United States stands for its constituents' 
safety. Together, we can shed light on the Chinese government's 
transnational repression and work towards bringing about justice and 
accountability for the countless victims of these heinous human rights 
abuses.

                             Personal Story

    My family's personal experience serves as a harrowing testament to 
the grave repercussions faced by Uyghur activists and their loved ones 
who dare to use their freedom of speech to advocate for human rights. 
In 2018, we received news that 24 of my husband's family members had 
gone missing and were likely detained. I spoke up about the unjust 
arrests and highlighted the Uyghur genocide and crimes against humanity 
being committed by the Chinese government, on September 5, 2018. On 
September 11th, exactly five years ago, the authorities arbitrarily 
detained my sister, Dr. Gulshan Abbas, who, to this day, remains a 
victim of their unjust actions. It was only in December 2020 that we 
received indirect information through a third party, confirming her 
unfair sentencing on fabricated charges of `terrorism' and `social 
disruption.' The spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
later verified these distressing revelations during a press conference.
    My sister is an apolitical person and the circumstances surrounding 
her abduction are direct retribution imposed upon my own activism, 
highlighting the Chinese Communist Party's utilization of transnational 
kin punishment and repression. This excruciatingly painful situation 
unveils the extent to which Chinese authorities resort to arbitrary 
detention, persecution, and a flagrant disregard for justice to quash 
dissent and promote their own political agenda.
    I also stand before you today to share a deeply distressing story 
that reveals another dark reality of China's transnational repression. 
In January 2023, my father-in-law, Abdulkarim Zikrullah Idris, 
tragically left this world at the age of 81. What is truly 
heartbreaking is that our family learned of his passing on August 15th, 
seven months after it occurred. The exact date and circumstances 
surrounding his death remain shrouded in uncertainty, leaving us in a 
state of anguish and longing for closure.
    In the era of instant communication, internet and advanced 
technologies like AI, Uyghurs encounter radio silence when seeking 
updates on the well-being of their loved ones. The last time my husband 
was able to communicate with his father was on April 25, 2017, and for 
the past 6 and a half years, we have been uninformed about his location 
and health, until recently. I must also add that my husband has not 
been able to see his father for more than twenty years, preventing him 
from bidding a final farewell or participating in a proper burial.
    My mother-in-law, Habibehan Idris, has been reported to be outside 
of the camps, while her children, Turanisahan Idris, Bu'Aisha Idris, 
Bu'Hadiqa Idris, and Abdurahim Idris, are missing and reportedly 
detained, and their spouses and children are also missing. She 
currently battles illness, which is made all the more challenging by 
the absence of the caregiving support that her children would have 
provided because they too have also been imprisoned by the Chinese 
government.
    The absence of closure and being forced to live in the unknown 
about the fate of our family members is a blatant violation of basic 
human rights by the Chinese regime, and underscores the ongoing 
suffering endured by the Uyghurs.
    CFU Program Director Arslan Hidayat's in-laws, his father-in-law 
Abdurashid Tohti, mother-in-law Tajigul Qadir, and two brothers-in-law 
Ametjan Abdurashid and Mohamed Ali Abdurashid have been missing since 
mid-2017. The Chinese government refused to provide any information 
about these detained individuals. The only information they have is 
that they have been given long-term prison sentences for fabricated 
charges of ``disturbing social order'' and ``preparing to commit 
terrorist activities.''
    The Chinese government claims to be operating in accordance with 
the ``rule of law'' and commits to protecting ``the public's right to 
information'' in court rulings in our homeland. However, none of these 
assertions seem to hold true in the cases involving Uyghurs.

                      China's Intimidation Tactics

    As mentioned before, due to China's transnational repression and 
intimidation tactics, Uyghurs are hesitant to speak out, testify, or 
participate in interviews. This reluctance stems from the threats 
issued by the Chinese government, which have created an atmosphere of 
fear and suppression. Consequently, Uyghurs refrain from sharing their 
experiences and knowledge, depriving the world of valuable insights and 
hindering efforts to shed light on the situation.
    Amnesty International's research, captured in the study ``Nowhere 
Feels Safe,'' involved interviews with individuals from Uyghur, Kazakh, 
Uzbek, and other ethnic backgrounds residing in 22 countries. An 
important revelation emerged: approximately two-thirds hesitated to 
link their names to the study, driven by concerns over potential 
consequences for themselves or their families stemming from Chinese 
authorities.
    The report `` `We Know You Better Than You Know Yourself': China's 
Transnational Repression of the Uyghur Diaspora'' revealed that around 
two-thirds of Uyghurs surveyed have been directly threatened and 
experienced threats to their family while living in the U.K. and about 
4 in 5 Uyghurs report being directly threatened or having their 
families threatened by Chinese authorities while living in Turkey.
    The Chinese government employs various methods, such as phone 
calls, emails, or social media messages, to intimidate Uyghur diaspora 
members. These tactics involve harassment, threats, or warnings that 
aim to instill fear and dissuade individuals from persisting in their 
activism or advocacy efforts. This direct form of communication can 
evoke intense intimidation, leaving Uyghur diaspora members feeling 
vulnerable and anxious.
    Instances in the United States exemplify these tactics. Uyghurs in 
the U.S. have reported receiving phone calls from Chinese authorities 
or even family members in the region, warning them that their online 
activities or activism could lead to the detention of or harm to their 
relatives. An illustrative case involves an Uyghur American who carried 
a photograph of his detained sister as a symbol of his advocacy against 
the CCP's abuses. When his parents contacted him, they delivered a 
distressing ultimatum: to ensure his sister's safety, he was pressured 
to suspend his activism. This situation underscores the extent of 
pressure and coercion exerted on Uyghur diaspora members to silence 
their voices.
    Safeguard Defenders' recent report ``Targeted in Turkiye, China's 
Transnational Repression Against Uyghurs'' further exposed China's 
tactics of threatening the Uyghur community into stopping activism 
work; producing pro-China propaganda; and/or spying on other Uyghurs. 
The report identifies how the CCP's patterns of harassment are 
organized by local Chinese police and state agents that are operating 
in collaboration with employees within Chinese embassies. They have 
formulated networks in East Turkistan that are structured around 
specific Uyghur neighborhoods or districts in China. Their networks 
involve cooperation among Chinese police, ``Neighborhood Working 
Groups,'' and Chinese police operatives. The Chinese police exploit 
intelligence gathered through these transnational networks, and 
information known by family members in the region, to exert control 
over Uyghurs in the diaspora. Although the report is on Uyghurs in 
Turkey, most of the tactics in the report being used by Chinese police 
are also being used against Uyghurs in China and share stark 
similarities to those used against Uyghur Americans.
    The specific repression tactics include threatening to harm their 
family in East Turkistan, using coercion to compel the Uyghur community 
into collaboration by refraining from processing their passport renewal 
requests, offering financial incentives, and even luring them with what 
they yearn for the most: reconnecting with their families. Uyghurs in 
the diaspora are coerced to become informants, remain silent about 
human rights violations in the Uyghur region, or take part in pro-CCP 
propaganda. The report `` `We Know You Better Than Yourself': China's 
Transnational Repression of the Uyghur Diaspora'' (2023) also indicates 
a significant shift in the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) approach 
since 2017, with a heightened emphasis on deploying Uyghur informants, 
employing intimidation tactics to silence open discourse among Uyghurs, 
and enlisting them to contribute to the creation of favorable 
depictions of China.
    I have been a target of attacks and harassment by Uyghurs in the 
diaspora whose family members are in detention back home. They have 
used tactics such as hate speech, libel, and blackmail to discredit my 
advocacy and reinforce disinformation and propaganda by the CCP. They 
are being reported to the FBI.
    Uyghurs in exile are monitored closely, both physically and 
digitally. This surveillance can range from monitoring online 
activities and social media presence to physical surveillance, 
including tracking movements, infiltrating community organizations, and 
attending public events where Uyghur diaspora members gather. Chinese 
security agents or informants may be present within these communities, 
keeping a watchful eye on their activities and reporting back to 
authorities. The objective of conducting such surveillance is to keep 
tabs on Uyghur activists, advocates, and community members, instill a 
sense of constant scrutiny, and create a climate of fear.
    Furthermore, Uyghurs abroad frequently experience calls from family 
members or law enforcement personnel, pressuring them to disclose 
details about their current location, educational institution, and 
information concerning other Uyghurs hailing from the same hometown as 
the inquiring official, thus falling under their surveillance 
``jurisdiction.'' It's essential to note that the Chinese Communist 
Party has no rightful claim to personal and identifiable information of 
Uyghurs living outside China; however, these individuals are compelled 
to provide information under
duress.
    The Chinese government makes a point of using tactics that put 
immense pressure on diaspora members, instilling fear of potential 
consequences for their loved ones who remain in East Turkistan. This 
involves using family members as leverage to pressure, coerce, or 
silence Uyghurs abroad. Families experience harassment, arbitrary 
detention, and even forced disappearance, leaving Uyghur diaspora 
members torn between raising awareness about the atrocities and 
protecting their vulnerable relatives.
    By using these tactics, the Chinese government aims to suppress 
dissent, maintain control over the diaspora community, and discourage 
Uyghurs from advocating for the rights of their fellow Uyghurs. These 
actions create a climate of fear and vulnerability, making it difficult 
for Uyghur diaspora members to openly express their concerns, share 
information about human rights abuses, or support international efforts 
to hold China accountable for its actions. As such, it has become 
increasingly crucial to support and amplify the voices of the diaspora 
community, empowering them to share their experiences while ensuring 
their safety and protection.

                 Legislative and Policy Recommendations

    In addressing China's transnational repression and supporting 
Uyghurs in the diaspora, there are several policy suggestions and 
legislative steps that can be considered.
    We recommend the United States introduce and pass legislation that 
explicitly condemns China's transnational repression tactics, focusing 
on the protection of Uyghur activists, advocates, and their families. 
The legislation can provide legal remedies for cases of harassment, 
intimidation, or threats faced by Uyghur community members, enabling 
them to seek justice and hold perpetrators accountable. It can also 
establish mechanisms for individuals to report incidents and receive 
support.
    The introduction of the Transnational Repression Policy Act (TRPA) 
on March 16th, 2023, by Senator Jeff Merkley, Senator Marco Rubio, 
Senator Ben Cardin, and Senator Bill Hagerty--members of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, is a good start. The TRPA, if enacted, 
would greatly assist Uyghurs facing transnational repression by China. 
This commitment from the United States would strengthen efforts to 
advocate for Uyghur rights and work towards a more secure and just 
global environment for all individuals affected by transnational 
repression.
    The U.S. Government should consider implementing targeted sanctions 
on Chinese officials and entities involved in transnational repression 
and human rights abuses against the Uyghur community. These sanctions 
could include freezing assets, restricting access to financial systems, 
and imposing travel bans. By targeting those responsible for human 
rights violations, the U.S. sends a strong message that such actions 
will have consequences and discourages other countries from engaging in 
similar behavior.
    The United States can engage in diplomatic efforts to mobilize 
international support in addressing the issue of transnational 
repression carried out by China. This could involve championing 
resolutions or joint statements at the United Nations and other 
international forums, urging countries to explicitly condemn China's 
actions and take a firm stance against transnational repression. 
Collaborating with like-minded countries, the U.S. could also establish 
multilateral initiatives aimed at investigating and countering China's 
repressive actions.
    The U.S. should work closely with its allies and partners to 
strengthen intelligence sharing related to transnational repression 
activities carried out by China. Enhanced collaboration allows for the 
identification of networks and individuals involved in such activities 
and helps build a comprehensive understanding of China's methods. The 
intelligence gathered could be used to expose tactics, support legal 
action, and strengthen advocacy efforts.
    The United States can take steps to raise awareness about China's 
transnational repression and the threats faced by the Uyghur diaspora. 
This could involve supporting media campaigns, hosting public events, 
and sponsoring educational initiatives that inform the public about the 
situation. Additionally, the U.S. Government can work with human rights 
organizations, media outlets, and Uyghur community representatives to 
create safe platforms for Uyghurs to share their testimonies, ensuring 
their voices are heard and their stories are documented.
    In an era of extensive surveillance, protection of digital rights 
is crucial. The U.S. could introduce policies and initiatives to 
strengthen online privacy, encryption standards, and cybersecurity 
practices, specifically focused on the Uyghur diaspora. These efforts 
could involve providing resources, training, and guidance on secure 
digital practices, while also advocating for international agreements 
and norms that condemn state-sponsored hacking and cyber espionage 
activities.
    By implementing these policy suggestions, the United States 
Government can take a proactive approach in addressing China's 
transnational repression, supporting the Uyghur diaspora, and fostering 
international collaboration to seek justice and accountability for 
Uyghurs.

                               Conclusion

    It is crucial that we shed light on the plight of countless 
families torn apart by China's reprehensible tactics. By denying basic 
human rights and resorting to arbitrary detention, the Chinese 
government seeks to silence those who speak up for justice and 
challenge their oppressive regime. The agony faced by my family is not 
unique; it is a testament to the suffering endured by many others who 
fall victim to the same repressive tactics. As we remember my family 
members, my relatives, my loved ones, let us also advocate for the 
rights of those unjustly imprisoned, offer support to their loved ones 
left behind, and strive for a world where transparency, empathy, and 
justice prevail. Only through consistent and unwavering efforts can we 
hope to make a difference in the lives of those affected by 
transnational repression and bring an end to this cycle of suffering.
                                 ______
                                 

                     Statement of Hon. Chris Smith

    Today's hearing, ``Countering China's Global Transnational 
Repression Campaign,'' will come to order.
    In June 2021, on the 32nd anniversary of the 1989 Student Democracy 
Protests which, as we all know, ended in the horrific Tiananmen Square 
Massacre, I visited Liberty Sculpture Park in Yermo, California, to 
witness the unveiling of a sculpture made by the artist Chen Weiming. 
It was a 20-foot-tall statue that morphed Xi Jinping's skull with a 
coronavirus molecule, and Chen named it ``CCP Virus.'' It was a bold 
work of art, rightfully assigning blame to the CCP and Xi Jinping for 
the horrific pandemic that shook our world.
    I was honored to attend, to see Chen's work, and to join him and 
other heroes of Chinese democracy in speaking out against the 
atrocities committed by the CCP.
    Less than two months later, the sculpture was gone. It was 
vandalized and then burned to the ground, likely by a band of CCP 
agents targeting Chen and other Chinese democracy activists here in the 
U.S. to punish and scare them into silence. Unfortunately, Chen's is 
not a rare case.
    With us that day in Yermo was Wei Jingsheng, perhaps the greatest 
advocate for Chinese human rights and democracy of our time. Very few 
people know this, but in May 2022, while driving right here in 
Washington, DC, a car swerved in front of Wei's car and suddenly braked 
in front of him while another rammed him from behind. Both cars quickly 
fled the scene. Wei believes, and I also believe, that this was an 
attempt on his life.
    This, incidentally, is the same tactic that I have heard used 
against another Chinese individual who ran afoul of the CCP.
    And the list goes on.
    Major Xiong Yan, who served in the U.S. Army and who ran for 
Congress in New York City, was stalked and harassed by Chinese agents 
here in the U.S.
    Pastor Bob Fu, a leading advocate on behalf of Christians and human 
rights defenders trying to escape China, was threatened with a bomb at 
his home in Texas.
    The brave 8 Hong Kongers who had bounties placed on their heads 
just this past summer, solely for speaking out against the atrocities 
happening in their beloved Hong Kong, and whose families were harassed. 
Indeed, I note, this group includes a number of individuals whose 
outspokenness led them to testify here at the China Commission, so this 
is really personal.
    It also becomes personal when I hear about a fellow legislator from 
a sister democracy who has been harassed for speaking out about human 
rights in China. MP Michael Chong of Canada was harassed for what 
Senator Merkley and I have repeatedly done, calling the Chinese 
Communist Party's treatment of Uyghurs what it is: a genocide. And 
though Michael has been harassed, he is not intimidated, and he will be 
joining us here today to tell us his story.
    My friends, the CCP has waged a pervasive coercive campaign around 
the world against anyone who does not agree with the Party. They target 
Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, dissidents, activists, students, 
journalists, or anyone who dares to state their ``unapproved'' opinions 
about the PRC.
    The CCP uses modern technology to digitally harass and surveil 
individuals around the globe. They abuse the Interpol system to punish 
and force the return of those who exercise their freedom of speech 
while abroad. They detain and harass dissidents' families and friends 
back in China to unjustly attempt to coerce silence--like the sister of 
Rushan Abbas; Rushan will join us here this morning. And they even use 
direct physical assaults beyond their borders to control what is said 
about their country and its wrongdoings.
    Recently we've seen them go so far as to set up shop right here in 
the United States, establishing illegal ``police stations'' in New York 
City to surveil and harass Chinese emigrants on our soil.
    The CCP's strategy of trying to rewrite global norms has succeeded 
in too many cases. This has led to self-censorship and curtailment of 
basic freedoms even here in the U.S.
    Students, scared to speak out. Journalists, scared to write. Free 
citizens, scared to attend gatherings.
    All of this is happening beyond China's borders, and within ours. 
Indeed, as Michael Chong's testimony illustrates, and as underscored in 
news just this past weekend from Great Britain, where an alleged spy 
worked at Parliament, it is also happening within our legislatures.
    We cannot and will not let the Chinese Communist Party scare us 
into submission through these tactics.
    Today we will hear from experts and victims alike, who have seen 
these stories up close. We must work to protect the freedoms of speech, 
assembly, and opinion--both here in the U.S. and elsewhere.
                                 ______
                                 

                     Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley

    Thank you very much, Chairman Smith. Transnational repression is 
central to the Chinese Communist Party's strategy of silencing critics 
of Chinese policy around the world. It affects so many of the Uyghurs, 
Hong Kongers, Tibetans, human rights advocates, journalists, and others 
this Commission works with on a daily basis. This hearing gives us a 
chance to give a platform to some of the victims and experts from 
across the globe who have been most engaged in trying to identify ways 
we can address this vexing challenge.
    We know from past testimony that it isn't easy, as the Chinese 
Communist Party's sophisticated tactics seem to know no bounds and 
bring the power of a ruthless state against individual dissidents, 
members of the Chinese diaspora, and, insidiously, their family members 
in China.
    That's why it's so critical that we redouble the effort to wrap our 
minds around the dimensions of this threat, to raise awareness 
globally, to identify ways to build common cause with those who have 
been targeted--religious groups, activists, journalists, politicians--
as well as governments sick and tired of the brazen violation of 
sovereignty that transnational repression represents.
    Last year I chaired another hearing on this topic to hear about 
what the Biden Administration is doing about it, and I am proud that 
one of the officials at the forefront of that work, Under Secretary 
Uzra Zeya, is now one of our commissioners. The State Department is 
dedicated and is continuing to apply significant time and attention to 
developing a more comprehensive strategy to counter, deter, and 
mitigate these threats. We have also seen the Department of Justice 
make important strides in pursuing criminal charges against groups and 
individuals accused of engaging in transnational repression.
    But despite these efforts, this Commission's reporting shows how 
far we have to go. We continue to track a disturbing number of cases of 
transnational repression both here in the United States and abroad, 
with the knowledge that countless others are taking place and likely 
not being reported on. I imagine that for every case we hear about, 
there's another ten we don't know about. We have seen egregious 
harassment campaigns, even against legislators around the world 
including the Honorable Michael Chong who is here, a member of the 
Canadian House of Commons. We have seen relentless targeting of young 
activists who have spoken out bravely against the increasingly 
repressive conditions in Hong Kong. And we have seen the unrelenting 
pressure that continues to be directed at Uyghurs around the world.
    We know that this is, as Freedom House calls it, ``the most 
sophisticated, global, and comprehensive'' campaign of transnational 
repression in the world. It relies on surveillance technology, spyware, 
threats to individuals through phone calls or face-to-face 
intimidation, and even harassment of family members and friends still 
in China. As Safeguard Defenders revealed in an eye-opening report 
earlier this year, the PRC is also responsible for establishing at 
least 102 ``overseas service stations'' in at least 53 countries, 
breaching national sovereignty and coercing Chinese diaspora members to 
return to the PRC for criminal investigation.
    All of this requires that the United States and as many other 
governments as possible--and we do need international cooperation to 
make this effective--make it a priority to address this, difficult as 
it will be. That's why earlier this year I introduced the Transnational 
Repression Policy Act, joined on a bipartisan basis by my colleagues 
Senator Rubio, Senator Cardin, and Senator Hagerty in the Senate, to 
hold foreign governments and individuals accountable when they stalk, 
intimidate, or assault people across borders. I appreciate Chairman 
Smith's work to lead the House companion to this legislation. If 
enacted, the Transnational Repression Policy Act would mandate 
additional U.S. Government reporting on the issue, require training for 
U.S. diplomatic and law enforcement personnel, bolster intelligence 
community efforts to track and share information on these incidents, 
and develop a more effective tip line for victims and witnesses. I'm 
working to get this bill passed, I think it's essential that we do, and 
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today who are bringing 
their experience, their stories, to bear on this very important issue.
                                 ______
                                 

                  Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern

    Good morning. I join my colleagues in welcoming our witnesses and 
the public to today's CECC hearing on transnational repression.
    Transnational repression occurs when governments reach across 
borders to silence dissent among diasporas and exiles, through 
assassinations, illegal deportations, abductions, digital threats, 
Interpol abuse, and family intimidation.
    Our focus today is on the practices of the People's Republic of 
China, but transnational repression can be carried out not just by 
unfriendly governments but also strategic allies. It can target people 
anywhere they or their families reside or visit, even in democracies 
like the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Australia, South Africa, and 
here in the United States.
    That is why I worked with Senator Merkley during the 117th Congress 
as he led the development of the Transnational Repression Policy Act, 
and why I am proud to co-lead that same bill (H.R. 3654) in the House 
this Congress with Chairman Smith. It is critically important to make 
sure that the U.S. Government has the tools it needs to confront this 
global challenge both domestically and internationally.
    I turn now to China. Freedom House's database on transnational 
repression now includes information on 854 direct physical incidents 
committed by 38 governments in 91 countries around the world since 
2014. China is an origin country for 253 of those recorded incidents, a 
stunning 30 percent.
    As we will hear today, the PRC targets abroad the same populations 
it represses internally, especially Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and 
Tibetans. State agents linked to the security and police forces have 
engaged in forced rendition of asylum seekers, street assaults, digital 
surveillance, online harassment, and the coercion and intimidation of 
family members and friends of dissidents.
    We must be sure that we have the knowledge and capacity to protect 
the people who are the targets of these practices, especially those who 
are within U.S. jurisdiction. And we must do a better job of engaging 
with partner countries and strengthening multilateral strategies to 
counter the PRC's actions, which violate international human rights--
among them the right to freedom of expression, association, asylum, and 
freedom of movement, and the prohibition on arbitrary detention. I look 
forward to hearing the witnesses' testimonies and their 
recommendations.
                                 ______
                                 

                     Statement of Hon. Dan Sullivan

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your outstanding leadership on this. 
It is great to see my colleague from the U.S. Senate and Co-chair 
Senator Merkley. This is such an important topic. The effort--often 
successful--of the Chinese Communist Party to reach far beyond its 
borders to target critics in the diaspora communities throughout the 
world is outrageous.
    But let's face it, it's just one of many outrageous things Beijing 
is doing across the board. We need to continue to recognize and 
highlight, as this Commission has been doing, the brutal nature of the 
Chinese Communist Party regime we are dealing with, especially under 
the dictatorial rule of Xi Jinping. Look no further than the string of 
strange disappearances that we've seen in China in their government in 
the last couple of months. The Chinese foreign minister and former 
ambassador to the United States disappeared. This was Xi Jinping's 
right-hand man until recently. The commander and deputy commander of 
the PLA rocket forces--gone. And now, apparently the defense minister 
is gone. Who knows what's going on here. But to be clear, this is the 
sort of regime we're dealing with--a regime whose officials suddenly 
disappear without any explanation. They're probably somewhere in China 
with bullets in their heads in ditches.
    This is the way the CCP operates. And now Xi Jinping is trying to 
export this.
    Just a couple of months ago, authorities in Hong Kong issued arrest 
warrants for activists and lawyers accused of violating the CCP-imposed 
national security law, specifically for people who no longer live in 
Hong Kong, or anywhere in China, for that matter.
    Hong Kong has declared that it will pursue these people for life. 
And it's not unthinkable that they could one day make good on grabbing 
them. Of course, I'm not worried about the United States aiding in 
their return, or the UK, or Australia, or Japan, or other places where 
they now reside. But life is long. They all travel. One day, they could 
find themselves in the hands of a government all too eager to burnish 
their credentials with Beijing.
    This is one of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, I'm working with 
Representative John Curtis on a bill to press the Biden administration 
to sanction the prosecutors and judges and other officials responsible 
for enforcing these unjust Hong Kong laws. The days of the independence 
of the Hong Kong judiciary system and the rule of law in Hong Kong are 
unfortunately long gone.
    Beijing has seen to that. Now we need to do what we can to try to 
even up the scales on behalf of the people of Hong Kong.
    Mr. Chairman, there is one more issue that I want to just raise in 
my opening statement. These kinds of aggressive actions are also 
targeting Americans directly, and even, remarkably, during times of 
tragedy. I'd like to submit for the record this New York Times story 
that just broke last night entitled, ``China Sows Disinformation About 
Hawaii Fires Using New Techniques.'' This story that just broke in the 
New York Times talks about how, when wildfires swept across Maui last 
month killing over 100 Americans, the CCP unleashed its information 
warriors. They said on the internet that the disaster was not natural. 
In a flurry of false posts and lies that spread across the internet, 
they said the natural disaster was the result of a secret weather 
weapon being tested by the United States military and intel agencies. 
To bolster this lie, they posted photographs that were generated by 
artificial intelligence programs.
    Mr. Chairman, as we all know, when countries suffer natural 
disasters, even adversaries come together to help each other. Not under 
Xi Jinping's rule. The Chinese Communist Party is now trying to sow 
discord among Americans as we sadly bury our own dead in Hawaii. This 
is outrageous and I call on the Chinese ambassador to the United States 
to formally apologize to our country. But Mr. Chairman, he won't, 
because if he did, he'd disappear too. We all know that.
    One final thing, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say how honored I am 
to join this Commission. It has such a great history, especially under 
your leadership. At a time when many people are raising questions about 
Congress's decisions in the past relating to China, for example 
extending MFN 20 years ago, it is good to remind Americans that, at the 
same time, Congress also established organizations like this one to 
keep a critical eye on human rights. I think there may be more Congress 
can do to live up to this Commission's mandate, perhaps even expand it. 
But as the new guy here, I'm eager to learn from my colleagues about 
how the Commission works and I'm very honored to be a part of that. 
With that, Mr. Chairman, I again am very glad to be here and look 
forward to working with you and all of the members of this 
distinguished Commission.
                                 ______
                                 

                      Statement of Hon. Uzra Zeya

    Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Co-chair Merkley, 
Ranking Member McGovern, and fellow commissioners. I am honored to be 
with you all today for this important discussion on the increasingly 
pervasive and concerning use of transnational repression by PRC 
authorities.
    Transnational repression--or TNR--is a global phenomenon, but the 
PRC's efforts are especially pervasive, pronounced, and persistent. The 
PRC uses TNR to harass and threaten Uyghurs, Tibetans, members of other 
ethnic and religious minority groups, Hong Kongers, and PRC citizens 
and non-PRC citizens living abroad, who seek only to exercise their 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
    As we've heard from the Co-chairmen and Ranking Member, the PRC 
utilizes a wide variety of tactics, including online harassment, exit 
bans on or imprisonment of family members of targeted individuals, the 
misuse of international law enforcement systems such as INTERPOL, and 
pressure on other governments to forcibly return targeted individuals 
to the PRC.
    The sheer breadth and depth of their efforts cannot be ignored and 
should not be permitted to continue. It is a direct affront to national 
sovereignty and impacts people all over the world, including U.S. 
citizens and individuals residing in the United States. This is why, 
since 2021, the Biden-Harris Administration has made combating 
transnational repression a global human rights priority.
    One way we have sought to counter this scourge is through our 
diplomatic engagement and tools. We continue to engage the PRC 
directly, making clear in no uncertain terms that their conduct is 
unacceptable and must stop. We have not and we will not keep quiet in 
the face of these transgressions. We have used sanctions as an 
accountability tool as well. Specifically, in March 2022, we imposed 
visa restrictions on PRC officials responsible for, or complicit in, 
transnational repression.
    This Administration energized the interagency to combat TNR in the 
United States, as well. U.S. Government agencies have increased their 
domestic engagement with communities targeted by the PRC. This outreach 
helps to create improved two-way communication, which both enhances our 
understanding of the threat and helps those affected more quickly 
access government assistance when they are targeted--or even before 
this occurs.
    We have also jumpstarted international cooperation to drive a 
global response because it is not only Americans and U.S. residents who 
have suffered abuses. Specifically, we deployed interagency teams to 
meet with foreign counterparts to raise their awareness of this threat 
and to share our own lessons learned.
    One example of this effort is the recent launch of a G7 Rapid 
Response Mechanism Working Group on TNR. This coalition will raise 
international awareness of the threat TNR poses to democratic values 
and deepen our shared commitment to countering it.
    The experiences and details presented by today's panelists will 
surely highlight the very real threat of the PRC's transnational 
repression activities, as well as the need for governments, 
legislators, activists, and others to continue to work even more 
closely together to counter it. Hearing your stories, and in some cases 
learning from what you have gone through personally, are vitally 
important as we advance our common cause.
    The Administration welcomes Congress's ongoing leadership on these 
issues and we look forward to deepening our collaboration.
    Thank you for this opportunity to speak and thank you all for 
coming together today to confront this challenge.

                       Submissions for the Record

                              ----------                              


        [Reprinted from the New York Times, September 11, 2023]

   China Sows Disinformation About Hawaii Fires Using New Techniques

                By David E. Sanger and Steven Lee Myers

    When wildfires swept across Maui last month with destructive fury, 
China's increasingly resourceful information warriors pounced.
    The disaster was not natural, they said in a flurry of false posts 
that spread across the internet, but was the result of a secret 
``weather weapon'' being tested by the United States. To bolster the 
plausibility, the posts carried photographs that appeared to have been 
generated by artificial intelligence programs, making them among the 
first to use these new tools to bolster the aura of authenticity of a 
disinformation campaign.
    For China--which largely stood on the sidelines of the 2016 and 
2020 U.S. presidential elections while Russia ran hacking operations 
and disinformation campaigns--the effort to cast the wildfires as a 
deliberate act by American intelligence agencies and the military was a 
rapid change of tactics.
    Until now, China's influence campaigns have been focused on 
amplifying propaganda defending its policies on Taiwan and other 
subjects. The most recent effort, revealed by researchers from 
Microsoft and a range of other organizations, suggests that Beijing is 
making more direct attempts to sow discord in the United States.
    The move also comes as the Biden administration and Congress are 
grappling with how to push back on China without tipping the two 
countries into open conflict, and with how to reduce the risk that A.I. 
is used to magnify disinformation.
    The impact of the Chinese campaign--identified by researchers from 
Microsoft, Recorded Future, the RAND Corporation, NewsGuard and the 
University of Maryland--is difficult to measure, though early 
indications suggest that few social media users engaged with the most 
outlandish of the conspiracy theories.
    Brad Smith, the vice chairman and president of Microsoft, whose 
researchers analyzed the covert campaign, sharply criticized China for 
exploiting a natural disaster for political gain.
    ``I just don't think that's worthy of any country, much less any 
country that aspires to be a great country,'' Mr. Smith said in an 
interview on Monday.
    China was not the only country to make political use of the Maui 
fires. Russia did as well, spreading posts that emphasized how much 
money the United States was spending on the war in Ukraine and that 
suggested the cash would be better spent at home for disaster relief.
    The researchers suggested that China was building a network of 
accounts that could be put to use in future information operations, 
including the next U.S. presidential election. That is the pattern that 
Russia set in the year or so leading up to the 2016 election.
    ``This is going into a new direction, which is sort of amplifying 
conspiracy theories that are not directly related to some of their 
interests, like Taiwan,'' said Brian Liston, a researcher at Recorded 
Future, a cybersecurity company based in Massachusetts.
    If China does engage in influence operations for the election next 
year, U.S. intelligence officials have assessed in recent months, it is 
likely to try to diminish President Biden and raise the profile of 
former President Donald J. Trump. While that may seem counterintuitive 
to Americans who remember Mr. Trump's effort to blame Beijing for what 
he called the ``China virus,'' the intelligence officials have 
concluded that Chinese leaders prefer Mr. Trump. He has called for 
pulling Americans out of Japan, South Korea and other parts of Asia, 
while Mr. Biden has cut off China's access to the most advanced chips 
and the equipment made to produce them.
    China's promotion of a conspiracy theory about the fires comes 
after Mr. Biden vented in Bali last fall to Xi Jinping, China's 
president, about Beijing's role in the spread of such disinformation. 
According to administration officials, Mr. Biden angrily criticized Mr. 
Xi for the spread of false accusations that the United States operated 
biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine.
    There is no indication that Russia and China are working together 
on information operations, according to the researchers and 
administration officials, but they often echo each other's messages, 
particularly when it comes to criticizing U.S. policies. Their combined 
efforts suggest a new phase of the disinformation wars is about to 
begin, one bolstered by the use of A.I. tools.
    ``We don't have direct evidence of coordination between China and 
Russia in these campaigns, but we're certainly finding alignment and a 
sort of synchronization,'' said William Marcellino, a researcher at 
RAND and an author of a new report warning that artificial intelligence 
will enable a ``critical jump forward'' in global influence operations.
    The wildfires in Hawaii--like many natural disasters these days--
spawned numerous rumors, false reports and conspiracy theories almost 
from the start.
    Caroline Amy Orr Bueno, a researcher at the University of 
Maryland's Applied Research Lab for Intelligence and Security, reported 
that a coordinated Russian campaign began on Twitter, the social media 
platform now known as X, on Aug. 9, a day after the fires started.
    It spread the phrase, ``Hawaii, not Ukraine,'' from one obscure 
account with few followers through a series of conservative or right-
wing accounts like Breitbart and ultimately Russian state media, 
reaching thousands of users with a message intended to undercut U.S. 
military assistance to Ukraine.
    China's state media apparatus often echoes Russian themes, 
especially animosity toward the United States. But in this case, it 
also pursued a distinct disinformation campaign.
    Recorded Future first reported that the Chinese government mounted 
a covert campaign to blame a ``weather weapon'' for the fires, 
identifying numerous posts in mid-August falsely claiming that MI6, the 
British foreign intelligence service, had revealed ``the amazing truth 
behind the wildfire.'' Posts with the exact language appeared on social 
media sites across the internet, including Pinterest, Tumblr, Medium 
and Pixiv, a Japanese site used by artists.
    Other inauthentic accounts spread similar content, often 
accompanied with mislabeled videos, including one from a popular TikTok 
account, The Paranormal Chic, that showed a transformer explosion in 
Chile. According to Recorded Future, the Chinese content often echoed--
and amplified--posts by conspiracy theorists and extremists in the 
United States, including white supremacists.
    The Chinese campaign operated across many of the major social media 
platforms--and in many languages, suggesting it was aimed at reaching a 
global audience. Microsoft's Threat Analysis Center identifed 
inauthentic posts in 31 languages, including French, German and 
Italian, but also in less prominent ones like Igbo, Odia and Guarani.
    The artificially generated images of the Hawaii wildfires 
identified by Microsoft's researchers appeared on multiple platforms, 
including a Reddit post in Dutch. ``These specific A.I.-generated 
images appear to be exclusively used'' by Chinese accounts used in this 
campaign, Microsoft said in a report. ``They do not appear to be 
present elsewhere online.''
    Clint Watts, the general manager of Microsoft's Threat Analysis 
Center, said that China appeared to have adopted Russia's playbook for 
influence operations, laying the groundwork to influence politics in 
the United States and other countries.
    ``This would be Russia 2015,'' he said, referring to the bots and 
inauthentic accounts Russia created before its extensive online 
influence operation during the 2016 election. ``If we look at how other 
actors have done this, they are building capacity. Now they're building 
accounts that are covert.''
    Natural disasters have often been the focus of disinformation 
campaigns, allowing bad actors to exploit emotions to accuse 
governments of shortcomings, either in preparation or in response. The 
goal can be to undermine trust in specific policies, like U.S. support 
for Ukraine, or more generally to sow internal discord. By suggesting 
the United States was testing or using secret weapons against its own 
citizens, China's effort also seemed intended to depict the country as 
a reckless, militaristic power.
    ``We've always been able to come together in the wake of 
humanitarian disasters and provide relief in the wake of earthquakes or 
hurricanes or fires,'' said Mr. Smith, who is presenting some of 
Microsoft's findings to Congress on Tuesday. ``And to see this kind of 
pursuit instead is both, I think, deeply disturbing and something that 
the global community should draw a red line around and put off-
limits.''

                                      *   *   *
    David E. Sanger is a White House and national security 
correspondent. In a 38-year reporting career for The Times, he has been 
on three teams that have won Pulitzer Prizes, most recently in 2017 for 
international reporting. His newest book is ``The Perfect Weapon: War, 
Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age.''

    Steven Lee Myers covers misinformation for The Times. He has worked 
in Washington, Moscow, Baghdad and Beijing, where he contributed to the 
articles that won the Pulitzer Prize for public service in 2021. He is 
also the author of ``The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir 
Putin.''

         
          
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    

    
                         Statement of Su Yutong

    Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for convening 
this meeting and inviting me to submit testimony.
    As an individual who has faced incredible abuse at the hands of the 
Chinese government's crackdown on independent voices and journalists, I 
can speak first-hand about my experiences and the treatment I have had 
to endure as a journalist, as an activist, and as a woman. Despite 
living outside of China, beyond its borders, I am still threatened and 
harassed by authorities--often with serious and harmful consequences. 
This relentless campaign that I have suffered is designed to scare and 
silence me.. But it is obvious that the same people who work to make my 
life a living misery are scared too. They fear me and people like me, 
who use our voices to draw attention to wrongdoing in a country that 
wishes to keep its people in the dark.
    I was born in Beijing. Early on, while still in China, I became an 
internet activist. Because my work was critical of China's human rights 
record, I was frequently placed under house arrest and invited for 
``chats'' with the police. On June 3, 2010, I posted the diary of 
former Chinese Premier Li Peng on the internet, which details the 
suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen student demonstrations by the CCP 
authorities. As a result, my home was raided by the Chinese police, my 
belongings were confiscated and I was put under house arrest.\1\ With 
the help of activists and human rights lawyers I managed to escape to 
Hong Kong.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
campaigns/2012/05/china-for-
activists-the-internet-is-like-dancing-in-shackles/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Once in Hong Kong, I started working as a journalist with the 
German news agency Deutsche Welle. With the help of the former human 
rights officer at the German embassy in China, I secured a German visa 
at the German consulate in Hong Kong. On August 11, 2010, I arrived in 
Germany, where I continued working for the Chinese department of 
Deutsche Welle. I wrote and published nearly 1,500 articles.
    Simultaneously with my work as a journalist, I continued with my 
work as an activist. In 2011, after the Chinese artist Ai Weiwei was 
secretly detained by the Chinese police, I launched a solidarity 
campaign on social media. At that time, there was a Chinese-run website 
in Germany, called Anti-CNN. They published a photoshopped nude photo 
claiming it was me, and described me as Ai Weiwei's mistress.
    From that point on, I became a target of continuous harassment by 
the Chinese government.
    In July of 2014, a fellow journalist, Frank Sieren at Deutsche 
Welle, published an article in German and Chinese, in which he 
described the Tiananmen Massacre as ``a slip-up by the CCP.'' The piece 
sparked a public outcry from a number of pro-democracy activists and 
massacre survivors. I was a signatory to an open letter protesting this 
article and spoke out against the article on Twitter. On August 19, 
2014, I was fired \2\ by Deutsche Welle for doing so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/22/world/
europe/german-broadcaster-fires-chinese-blogger.html; RSF: https://
rsf.org/en/beijing-imposes-its-propaganda-beyond-its-
borders; Der Spiegel: https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/
deutsche-welle-streit-um-twitter-nachricht-zu-tiananmen-massaker-a-
987085.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During this time and after, I was regularly smeared by the official 
Chinese media. In August 2014, the Chinese official media Global Times 
published two articles calling me an anti-China reporter. This put an 
extraordinary amount of pressure on my family in China, who worried 
that these attacks forecast their own mistreatment. Chinese Communist 
Party authorities did not limit their campaign to traditional media 
only. They spread rumors about me on Twitter (now known as X) and other 
social media platforms, too. The insults ranged from calling me a 
prostitute, to being a German ``dog''; I received death and rape 
threats, as well as anonymous messages stating they would kill me and 
my whole family. Sometimes, these messages were accompanied by 
extremely violent videos. CCP authorities also attempted to bribe me: 
unknown people have sent me messages promising me money if I stop my 
work, even offering me a passport to return to China. Threats and 
harassment of my family have continued.
    In November 2014, Beijing State Security called me directly, asking 
me not to participate in the protests in Germany. The official insisted 
that if I stopped protesting, he could be helpful in securing a chance 
to see my parents again. Although I am a Chinese citizen, I have no 
right to go back to my country. The State Security used my family to 
blackmail me into compliance.
    In 2016, I joined Radio Free Asia as a reporter, covering a variety 
of issues, including human rights abuses within and outside China. The 
harassment continued. In May 2018, someone sent me a private message on 
Twitter from a Chinese number, threatening to kill me and my whole 
family. Deciding that I needed to do something, I reported this threat 
to German authorities--making this instance the first time I had done 
so. Because it came from China, I reported the threat to the diplomat 
in charge of Chinese affairs of the German Foreign Ministry.
    I lived in relative peace until June 2022. Around that time, 
threats and harassment became more frequent and persistent. On June 4, 
2022, I participated in a protest in front of the Chinese embassy in 
Germany, in support of Hong Kong after Beijing's national security laws 
had been put in place, completely changing its media and political 
landscape. A Chinese man arrived at the scene, and I later learned his 
name was ``Zhu Kenan.'' He took our photos and followed us. On the 
night of June 4th, he sent me a message via Telegram. He warned me 
against criticizing the Chinese government. When I asked him to stop 
texting me, he responded by posting a photoshopped nude photo of me 
that had first appeared in 2011, circulated on social media and the 
internet. I told him I would call the police. But his threats didn't 
stop online. He started following me in real life.
    Later, I found out that a Hong Kong activist was also threatened 
and followed by the same man. We reported the case to German police in 
Berlin on June 6, 2022. The case was later transferred to Germany's 
State Criminal Police Office, or Landeskriminalamt (LKA), for 
investigation. But unfortunately, in July last year, the investigation 
was suspended because Zhu Kenan left Germany and returned to China. In 
August he sent me a message via Twitter, saying that he was going to 
Beijing and wanted to visit my parents' house. When he sent this 
message, I learned that my parents and relatives were threatened by 
Chinese police and national security.
    In June 2022, different men rang the doorbell at my apartment every 
night, saying they were responding to a sex advertisement they had seen 
online. I told them that I was not a sex worker and I asked how they 
got my address and information. Some of them told me my information was 
posted on an underground porn website.
    These incidents continued throughout the summer. The last such 
incident was on August 20th, when I found a strange man waiting outside 
my apartment door. When I threatened to call the police, he left in a 
hurry. In October last year, I started to report on Chinese overseas 
police stations threatening dissidents in Europe; on November 22, I 
accompanied Chinese dissident Wang Jingyu in the Netherlands to report 
his case to the Berlin police station. Following my reporting on this 
issue, unknown people booked two hotel rooms in Berlin under my name, 
and I reported it to German police.
    Beginning on November 25, 2022, a man named Yilisen Aierken began 
to send me threatening and harassing messages. He said he would rape 
and kill me. He said there was a group that works for CCP in Europe, 
and the people in this group knew my address. He also said they had 
published my photos, name and information on porn sites. Yilisen 
Aierken continued sending me threatening messages until January, when 
the messages abruptly stopped. On the evening of February 11, unknown 
persons booked many luxury hotel rooms under my name in Hong Kong, 
Macau, New York, Houston, Los Angeles, Istanbul and other cities, and 
reported false bomb threats. I kept getting calls from the police 
everywhere.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ AXIOS: https://www.axios.com/2023/03/29/chinese-activists-
false-bomb-threats; RFA: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/
harassment-03202023133743.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the advice of the police, I left my apartment in Berlin and 
stayed with friends for three months, unable to go home. During this 
period, I also received messages offering bribes to quit my work, which 
I reported to the police. There was nothing they could do, they 
informed me, because offering money to someone is not a crime.
    On June 16, 2023, I received a terrifying video from an unknown 
person in my Telegram of a person being dismembered. When I saw this 
video, I became physically sick. The unknown person also said that my 
head would be chopped off. On June 20, I participated in a protest in 
front of the German Chancellery, and I discovered that Chinese embassy 
staff and CCP agents monitored and secretly photographed the 
protesters.
    At the end of June, my parents and relatives in China were 
threatened by Chinese police and state security. They told my parents 
that I participated in anti-China activities and smeared China. They 
called me a criminal. Since the beginning of August, many newspapers 
and TV stations in Germany have reported the threats to me by Chinese 
overseas police stations.
    Chinese diplomats stationed in Germany monitored and secretly 
photographed Chinese protesters in Germany. After that, I suffered more 
serious online smears than ever before. Unknown people spread rumors 
and posted photoshopped nude photos on Twitter and other social media 
every day to humiliate me. They also insinuated that I have actually 
taken money from the Chinese government to discredit me in the eyes of 
other activists.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Women in Journalism: https://www.womeninjournalism.org/threats-
all/germany-cfwij-calls-on-german-authorities-to-investigate-
continuous-attacks-on-su-yutong
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I have lived with these threats and rumors for 12 years now. While 
the police protection helps me feel somewhat safer, those who harass me 
are still free. While many of my harassers are anonymous, some of them 
are known to law enforcement yet nothing is being done.
    Despite leaving China, I live under threat every day. Despite my 
personal pride and refusing to admit it, even to myself, I have been 
afraid. Authorities in Germany have been helpful. But it's unclear what 
power they have, given that this form of harassment--crossing borders, 
crossing continents and time zones--can target me, my loved ones, my 
friends, and my fellow journalists and activists at any given time, 
without warning. We don't have recourse and they are allowed to 
continue doing it with impunity.
    We can be living in places where human dignity is respected by the 
law, with strong civil societies, and be subject to the whims of a 
society that cares little for those things in pursuit of its own wish 
to bury the truth, no matter the cost. I have dedicated my life to 
lifting up the voices of others, so they can be heard. I want the world 
to know my story--and the stories of others like me--who dare to speak 
truth to power, and feel the force of reprisal no matter where we 
choose to live. My only consolation, though seemingly small, is that 
the people and government behind this campaign are also afraid. The 
intensity of their threats and harassment mirrors their own fear.
    Thank you.

                        Statement of Levi Browde

                                 ______
                                 

        The Chinese Communist Party's Transnational Repression 
                          Targeting Falun Gong

    Mr. Chairman, Co-chairman Merkley, and distinguished members of the 
commission, thank you for holding a hearing on this urgent issue and 
for allowing me to submit this written testimony. In this document, I 
would like to draw your attention to the following dimensions of 
transnational repression related to how the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) and its proxies target believers of Falun Gong:

      The CCP and its proxies have been carrying out a campaign 
of transnational repression against Falun Gong for over two decades, 
expanding and refining the tactics, mechanisms, and apparatus that 
today target a far wider array of victim communities.

      CCP-backed individuals or misinformed Chinese nationals 
have physically assaulted Falun Gong practitioners in the United States 
and other countries who were trying to raise awareness about violations 
of freedom of belief in China; in several recent cases, the attackers 
have faced prosecution for their actions.

      Ethnic Chinese and non-ethnic Chinese Falun Gong 
practitioners on university campuses across the United States have 
reported incidents of surveillance, slander, and censorship by Chinese 
officials, CCP proxies, or other China-linked individuals.

      Dragon Springs, a campus in New York that houses the 
training facilities for Shen Yun Performing Arts, faces threats to 
strip its non-profit status by Chinese agents, two of whom were charged 
by federal prosecutors this May. The campus continues to face ongoing 
frivolous lawsuits and surveillance by the CCP.

1. A Two-Decade Campaign of Transnational Repression

    Falun Gong, also known as Falun Dafa, is a spiritual practice in 
the Buddhist tradition that combines meditation and gentle exercises 
with a moral philosophy centered on the core tenets of truthfulness, 
compassion, and tolerance.\1\ Descending from an ancient lineage and 
introduced publicly in China in 1992, Falun Gong is now practiced in 
more than 70 countries, although the largest contingent of believers--
numbering in the tens of millions--remains in China.
    Since July 1999, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has engaged in a 
systematic and illegal effort to eradicate Falun Gong, deploying 
arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings.\2\ This 
policy remains one of the most widespread campaigns of persecution in 
China today.\3\ Since the inception of this campaign, the CCP's 
attempts to intimidate, harass, and suppress Falun Gong practitioners 
have not remained within the borders of mainland China. For over 20 
years, Falun Gong practitioners outside China--be they Chinese 
nationals, members of the diaspora, or non-Chinese believers--have been 
a primary target of transnational repression and other forms of 
harassment around the world.
    In a 2021 report, Freedom House found that the Chinese regime 
``engages in the most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign 
of transnational repression in the world'' and that among its targets 
are Falun Gong practitioners. This is just one example of the 
documentation of this long-term effort, with other evidence including 
first-hand accounts by victims, leaked CCP documents, congressional 
testimonies from defectors, and third-party investigations.
    Since July 1999, Falun Gong practitioners outside China have faced 
break-ins, physical attacks in Chinatown, an assault on an anti-
censorship technologist in his home in Atlanta, beatings by Chinese 
security agents accompanying officials visiting Latin America, and a 
shooting of Falun Gong activists in South Africa, among other 
incidents. As early as 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted 
H. Con. Res. 304, one of the first acts of Congress related to 
transnational repression that outlined various attacks on Falun Gong 
practitioners that had occurred in the United States and the 
intimidation of local U.S. officials supporting their right to freedom 
of belief, while requesting measures to protect U.S. residents who 
practice Falun Gong.\4\
    These attacks have continued over the past 24 years. In a 2021 case 
study on transnational repression originating in China, Freedom House 
relayed its findings regarding cases of the CCP targeting Falun Gong 
since 2014: \5\

        Practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual movement banned in 
        China, also face regular reprisals from China and from Chinese 
        agents. These include frequent harassment and occasional 
        physical assaults by members of visiting Chinese delegations or 
        pro-Beijing proxies at protests overseas, as in cases that have 
        occurred since 2014 in the United States, the Czech Republic, 
        Taiwan, Brazil, and Argentina. Media and cultural initiatives 
        associated with Falun Gong have reported suspicious break-ins 
        targeting sensitive information, vehicle tampering, and 
        pressure from Chinese authorities for local businesses to cut 
        off advertising or other contractual obligations with them. 
        Multiple Falun Gong practitioners in Thailand have also faced 
        detention, including a Taiwanese man involved in uncensored 
        radio broadcasts to China and several cases of Chinese refugees 
        formally recognized as such by the UN High Commissioner for 
        Refugees (UNHCR). In October 2017, a Falun Gong practitioner 
        who had survived a Chinese labor camp and become a high-profile 
        informant on CCP abuses--sneaking a letter into a Halloween 
        decoration when detained and later filming a documentary with 
        undercover footage--died of sudden kidney failure in Indonesia. 
        Some colleagues consider his death suspicious, but no autopsy 
        was performed.

    These incidents are not accidental. Behind them lies a deliberate 
policy, massive bureaucratic structures, and guidance from the highest 
levels of the CCP security apparatus. Two insiders who defected to 
Australia in 2005 offered a glimpse of this system. Hao Fengjun, a 
former officer in the extralegal 610 Office security agency in Tianjin, 
relayed: ``Falun Gong practitioners all over the world are under CCP 
surveillance. I personally received intelligence information about 
Falun Gong practitioners in Australia, the United States, and Canada.'' 
\6\ Chen Yonglin, a former officer in the Chinese consulate in Sydney, 
testified before Congress:

        In each Chinese mission overseas there must be at least one 
        official in charge of Falun Gong affairs. The head and the 
        deputy head of the mission will be responsible for the Falun 
        Gong affairs. I am aware of there being more than 1,000 Chinese 
        secret agents and informants residing in Australia, and they 
        have partaken in efforts to persecute the Falun Gong. The 
        number in the United States should be higher. The United Front 
        uses the overseas Chinese diaspora, including students, 
        businesspeople, media, and so-called Chinese community groups 
        to influence, manipulate, and pressure foreign citizens, 
        politicians, and business leaders to toe the Party line on 
        Falun Gong.\7\

    More recently, in a 2015 speech to party cadres from the 610 
Office, Meng Jianzhu, then a member of the CCP Central Committee and 
head of the Political Legal Affairs Committee that oversees the 
security apparatus, called on those listening to ``actively expand and 
deepen the overseas battlefield'' against Falun Gong and other banned 
religious groups. In the speech, which was leaked and published online 
by the Europe-based Association for the Defense of Human Rights and 
Religious Freedom, Meng further explains:

        The struggle against `Falun Gong' and other xie jiao 
        organizations is actually a serious political struggle. It is a 
        political contest with the anti-China forces in the West. . . . 
        We must strengthen the top-level design, coordinate the 
        domestic and foreign fronts, and treat the countries and 
        regions with serious `Falun Gong' activities such as the United 
        States as the main battlefield. . . . We must fully play our 
        party's political and institutional advantages, and coordinate 
        and urge all relevant departments to do a good job on 
        intelligence information, crackdown control, and education 
        transformation.\8\

    One point of information to note is that unlike other ethnic 
minority and exile groups targeted by the CCP, the Falun Gong community 
does not consist solely of members of the Chinese diaspora or those who 
have fled China. In addition to the many practitioners outside China 
who are of Chinese or Taiwanese descent, there are tens of thousands, 
if not more, people from a wide range of ethnicities who practice Falun 
Gong and have no connection to the country other than practicing this 
Chinese spiritual and meditation practice. Many do not speak Chinese 
and have never been to China. From Cape Town to Cannes, Bangladesh to 
Berlin, Tel Aviv to Tehran, Falun Gong is practiced in over 100 
countries and its spiritual teachings have been translated into 50 
languages.\9\ Earlier this year, a small community of Falun Gong 
practitioners in the African nation of Togo celebrated the 10th 
anniversary of Falun Gong's introduction to the country.\10\ These and 
other believers are nationals of countries other than China and locally 
integrated into everyday society. Nevertheless, because of their faith 
and identity as Falun Gong practitioners, the CCP sees them as a threat 
and targets them as well. Non-ethnic Chinese adherents have been barred 
from parades, been beaten by Chinese thugs in Latin America, or been 
detained and deported from European countries when trying to peacefully 
demonstrate against visiting Chinese leaders. In Russia, under CCP 
pressure, Falun Gong's spiritual text was banned, a situation which the 
European Court of Human Rights recently ruled a violation of the 
charter.\11\
    The Falun Dafa Information Center has been tracking these and other 
cases of transnational repression targeting Falun Gong, especially in 
the United States, although we are trying to expand our documentation 
efforts globally. Within the past three years, Falun Gong practitioners 
around the world have continued to experience the long arm of the CCP's 
persecution. This testimony highlights three key dimensions of this 
broader campaign.

2. Physical Assaults and Prosecutorial Actions

    Facing fierce persecution in China alongside systematic censorship, 
one way in which Falun Gong practitioners around the world have tried 
to counter the negative effects of the CCP's persecution has been to 
set up information booths, especially in Chinatowns or at sites 
frequented by tourists from mainland China. Volunteers and recent 
refugees take turns manning the booths, distributing information 
debunking CCP false propaganda about Falun Gong, exposing rights 
violations in China, and urging individuals to reconsider their 
affiliation with the CCP.
    These sites have emerged as a primary target for assault by 
individuals affiliated with CCP proxies, or deceived by Chinese state-
run propaganda that demonizes Falun Gong. The attacks tend to be more 
frequent in cities where a Chinese embassy or consulate is present.
    Since 2008, volunteers at Falun Gong information booths in 
Chinatowns, including in New York and San Francisco, have faced such 
harassment, heckling, and physical attacks. In some cases, the 
attackers had clear links to the CCP and proxy entities like the China 
Anti-Cult Association (CACA) but in other cases, they may have been 
individuals who were simply incited by CCP propaganda.\12\
    The most recent attack happened on February 16, 2023. Zhongping Qi 
physically assaulted Falun Gong practitioner David Fang unprovoked, 
injuring David's hand, neck, and chin. (The attacker has a history of 
verbally abusing Falun Gong booth volunteers.) He often cursed and made 
unprovoked slurs towards the volunteers at Falun Gong booths in Queens, 
New York. Later that week, police officers from New York's 109th 
Precinct arrested and charged Zhongping Qi with third degree 
assault.\13\ Mr. Fang, the victim of the attack, told the Falun Dafa 
Information Center on September 3:

        I was persecuted in China for my faith, and under immense 
        pressure for years. Soon after I arrived in the United States 
        this February, I was attacked and became fearful that the CCP 
        will come to haunt me in New York. I was scared that I would 
        never be free.\14\

    A similar incident happened in 2022. Then 32-year-old Zheng Buqiu 
began vandalizing a Falun Gong booth outside Queens Public Library 
where he tore down a poster before being stopped by volunteers. Every 
day for a week, Zheng destroyed booths across Flushing by punching and 
kicking display boards, knocking over tables with informational 
booklets, and breaking volunteers' portable speaker by stomping on it. 
The attacks continued at three different information booth locations 
until NYPD officers arrested Zheng on February 15, 2022. Police charged 
him with criminal mischief in the fourth degree and a hate crime. One 
volunteer at the booth said that Zheng had been seen with Li Huahong, 
the president of the CACA, an entity linked to the 610 Office, who has 
herself been arrested four times since 2008 by NYPD for vandalizing 
Falun Gong booths, indicating Zheng may not have been acting alone.\15\
    In 2019, an individual believed to be affiliated with the Chinese 
consulate pretended to be a Falun Gong practitioner for six months, 
collecting information and bringing his son to meditation sites in 
Hermann Park in downtown Houston. In the fall of that year, the 
individual attacked and attempted to sexually assault a female Falun 
Gong practitioner in the parking lot. Multiple practitioners witnessed 
the incident and after blocking his assault, discovered he was not 
actually a Falun Gong adherent. After that incident, this individual 
and his son were never seen again.\16\
    Such attacks are not limited to the United States. In October 2022, 
Chinese nationals Kang Zhao and two accomplices (including Zhao's wife) 
in Canberra, Australia, were caught vandalizing signs attached to at 
least two Falun Gong practitioners' cars, one of which belonged to 
Nancy Dong. After being notified by witnesses, Dong arrived at the 
parking lot and tried to film Zhao and his accomplices, as they spray 
painted over the sign ``CCP % China'' atop her car. Zhao took Nancy 
Dong's phone away and elbow slammed her to the ground by her neck, 
proceeding to kick and punch her until she almost lost consciousness. 
The altercation led to bruising on her arms and injuries to her lower 
body. In December 2022, Zhao was arrested by police after trying to 
leave the country. He pleaded guilty in court to charges of common 
assault, property damage, and defacing property.\17\
    In April 2022, a Westminster court in the United Kingdom sentenced 
a pro-CCP individual, Mr. He Renyong, to 16 weeks in prison for 
assaulting and harassing Falun Dafa practitioners in Chinatown. The 
court dealt the accused a deferred sentence of 18 months, 100 hours of 
community service, and over 1,000 pounds ($1,300 USD) in fines and 
fees.\18\

3. Surveillance, Slander, and Censorship on University Campuses

    The Falun Dafa Information Center released a report analyzing how 
the CCP's persecution of Falun Gong impacts students and faculty who 
practice Falun Gong on university campuses in the United States, based 
on publicly available reports and a survey conducted in early 2023.\19\ 
The following are five key takeaways from that report:

    1.  At least 45 university campuses across the United States have 
students or faculty who practice Falun Gong. One-fifth of respondents 
to a 2023 survey reported feeling uncomfortable self-identifying as a 
Falun Gong practitioner due to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda 
or other influences.

    2.  Physical and digital surveillance of both Falun Gong 
practitioners and Chinese international students--and resulting Chinese 
government reprisals--are a major area of concern. One non-ethnic 
Chinese Ph.D. candidate studying in Minnesota reported, ``Whenever I 
and my club held a booth for our Falun Dafa student club, there was 
always a suspicious Chinese student wandering about and pretend[ing] to 
be on their phones and constantly checking on us. They never engaged 
with us but were just there to monitor us.'' The same student remarked 
that the presence of these individuals seemed to deter Chinese students 
from engaging in Falun Gong Club activities on campus.

    3.  Chinese Student and Scholars Associations (CSSA) have engaged 
in multiple attempts since 2017 to censor or penalize Falun Gong-
related activities on U.S. university campuses, with long-term 
repercussions even when demands were not met. The associations are 
known to have ties to local Chinese consulates. In one case, a graduate 
student and Falun Gong practitioner in Illinois had joined the Chinese 
Student and Scholars Association (CSSA) to access the resources it 
offers to international students from China. He reported that Chinese 
diplomats in the United States caused his removal from the group: ``I 
was told by the then-CSSA President that the Chinese embassy in Chicago 
asked him to remove me from CSSA due to my involvement in Falun Gong 
activities. I had a personal website that published content about Falun 
Gong. I was later told that somehow the Chinese consulate of Chicago 
has noticed my connection with Falun Gong and asked the then-CSSA 
administration to remove me from the CSSA.''

    4.  CCP propaganda demonizing Falun Gong causes apprehension among 
practitioners and university representatives. University 
representatives have appeared unprepared for false claims made about 
Falun Gong and have not always provided equal opportunity for Falun 
Gong Club representatives to respond.

    5.  Chinese-language textbooks being used at some U.S. universities 
contain inaccurate and damaging depictions of Falun Gong.

Case Study: Reprisal Campaign for a Film Screening about Confucius 
Institutes

    A graduate student at a major university in Pennsylvania reported a 
month-long, coordinated campaign in March and April 2021 aiming to 
slander and delegitimize the Falun Dafa Club for co-hosting an online 
screening and panel discussion on the documentary film, In the Name of 
Confucius. The club had hosted the event with the Athenai Institute and 
Students for a Free Tibet, which the official student government body, 
the Graduate and Professional Student Assembly (GAPSA) had also helped 
advertise in their newsletter and social media. The film screening was 
relevant to campus discussions regarding Confucius Institutes, gifts to 
the university from China, and the presence of a CSSA club on 
campus.\20\
    In the week following the event, at least 79 students and former 
graduates associated with the CSSA sent multiple emails to GAPSA, with 
complaints that the event promoted by GAPSA was too political. In the 
emails, the CSSA members claimed that the Falun Dafa Club, Students for 
a Free Tibet, and Athenai Institute were ``anti-China'' organizations 
with the mission to slander China and Chinese people. They petitioned 
the association to respond to the claims that the Falun Gong Club had 
violated university policies, and that the GAPSA promotion of this 
event was an act of marginalization against the Chinese community on 
campus.\21\ An investigation revealed, though, that many Facebook posts 
about the event from Chinese international students revolved around 
slandering Falun Gong and opposing the Falun Gong Club's right and 
eligibility to host events.\22\ Faculty members involved with GAPSA 
held a roundtable on March 30, 2021 to address the petition and the 
``controversy,'' inviting groups including GAPSA representatives and 
CSSA members to attend; however, the Falun Gong Club president was not 
provided a similar presentation opportunity. During a second meeting, 
one CSSA member presented a slideshow that included CCP politicized 
propaganda against Falun Gong, falsely misrepresenting the faith as a 
``cult.''
    After a week of deliberation, the faculty members acknowledged that 
the Falun Gong Club and its president had not violated any university 
policies, but the incident nevertheless had a long-term impact. It is 
unclear if the CSSA members were acting of their own accord or under 
pressure from Chinese officials, but the attempt fits a pattern 
reported at other university campuses of Chinese students lodging 
complaints about events critical of the CCP, claiming they promote 
anti-Asian hatred.\23\ After this stressful and upsetting experience, 
the Falun Gong Club president went on to hold one last documentary 
screening of Letter from Masanjia about forced labor in China before 
her graduation that June, but reported experiencing ongoing trauma and 
anxiety from the harassment. The campaign against In the Name of 
Confucius also affected GAPSA, which did not promote this second 
documentary screening or future events held by the university's Falun 
Gong Club on their social media or in public event notices.

4. Campaign to Monitor and Slander Dragon Springs

    Beginning in the early 2000s, Falun Gong practitioners in New York 
built a campus with Buddhist-style temple buildings modeled on Tang 
Dynasty architecture. The campus is called Dragon Springs. Today, it 
also houses two accredited academic institutions--Fei Tian Academy of 
the Arts and Fei Tian College--and the training center for Shen Yun 
Performing Arts, an internationally renowned classical Chinese dance 
company.\24\
    According to leaked CCP documents, targeting this campus for 
surveillance, espionage, and legal harassment is a priority for the 
regime. A 2017 document from the CCP's Henan Provincial Committee 
states: ``Tightly focus on the overseas xie jiao core backbones, the 
headquarters [Dragon Springs] base and foreign political figures, 
carefully organize strategies to strike and divide them. Pay close 
attention to the trend of overseas activities of Falun Gong . . . 
collect early warnings, forward-looking, action-oriented intelligence 
information, and thus serve the overall struggle situation.'' \25\ The 
campus has faced vandalism, frequent spying via drones, and localized 
social media campaigns spreading falsehoods about the campus.
    In an unprecedented case, federal prosecutors charged two men on 
May 26, 2023, with attempting to bribe an IRS official with tens of 
thousands of dollars in a scheme to help the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) ``topple'' Falun Gong in the United States.\26\ Specifically, 
they were charged with manipulating ``the IRS Whistleblower Program, 
through bribery and deceit,'' in an attempt to strip an entity run by 
Falun Gong practitioners of its tax-exempt status. Given that the 
bribery targeted an IRS office in Orange County, New York, the intended 
target was most likely Dragon Springs or Shen Yun Performing Arts, both 
of which are headquartered in Orange County.
    Many who work at the Dragon Springs campus are refugees who escaped 
religious persecution or survived torture in China. Many have relatives 
back in China who have faced intimidation, harassment, and even arrest 
by security forces due to their having family members working at or 
attending Fei Tian Academy, Fei Tian College, or working for Shen Yun. 
One recent case is Aihua Liu, the mother of U.S. citizens Steven and 
Lydia Wang, who was sentenced to four years in prison in China last 
month. Steven Wang, her son, is a principal dancer for Shen Yun.\27\
    A particularly damaging tactic that the CCP and its apparent 
proxies have used, has been to weaponize the U.S. legal system by 
filing baseless lawsuits to harm the reputation of Dragon Springs in 
the local community and force lengthy, costly legal cases. Since 2019, 
the campus or its residents have faced three lawsuits by an American 
national who spent 15 years in Tianjin and then moved to the area, and/
or by his associates. The lawsuits purport to relate to environmental 
protection but are based on mistruths, ultimately failing in court. All 
three of these lawsuits have been dismissed, but the plaintiffs seem 
poised to continue filing further suits.

5. Recommendations

    The CCP's ongoing campaign against Chinese citizens who practice 
Falun Gong remains one of the most severe human rights crises and 
sources of religious freedom violations in today's China. As described 
above, this campaign of persecution extends internationally. In this 
context, the Falun Dafa Information Center urges policymakers and 
members of civil society to take the following steps to condemn, deter, 
and prevent acts of transnational repression against Falun Gong 
believers in the United States and around the world.

(A)  Take action to protect Falun Gong communities from transnational
repression

    1.  Punish diplomats who engage in intimidation, harassment, 
surveillance, or pressuring members of the Chinese diaspora to 
marginalize Falun Gong or take action against practitioners. Declare 
diplomats who commit transnational repression against Falun Gong 
targets persona non grata.

    2.  Investigate and prosecute anyone who assaults Falun Gong 
practitioners who were peacefully exercising their right to free 
speech, as authorities in New York City have done.

    3.  Investigate proxy groups, such as the 610 Office-linked Anti-
Cult Association, that are at the forefront of harassing Falun Gong 
practitioners in locations such as Flushing, NY.

    4.  Investigate digital surveillance of Falun Gong communities and 
pressure China-based companies like Tencent or ByteDance to be 
transparent about moderation policies and data collection. Urge them to 
avoid censorship and surveillance of Falun Gong-related information on 
popular apps such as WeChat and TikTok outside of China.

    5.  Ensure that expanding activities to monitor and prevent 
transnational repression include Falun Gong. Relevant actions could 
include making sure that those working on transnational repression 
receive minimal education on Falun Gong, that engagement with 
vulnerable communities to collect incidents includes Falun Gong, and 
that transparency enforcement for foreign agents includes additional 
entities that demonize or harass Falun Gong believers. Ensure that 
local Falun Gong community representatives are aware of any available 
channels to report incidents of transnational repression.

    6.  Actively welcome and support Falun Gong refugees fleeing China, 
including by ensuring that asylum officers and others in the 
immigration system evaluating applications receive at least a minimal 
education on Falun Gong.

    7.  University faculty, administrators, and relevant U.S. 
Government agencies must take further action to preempt, monitor, 
deter, and counter CCP activities that undermine freedom of expression, 
freedom of belief, and non-discrimination for Falun Gong practitioners 
and for others on campus.

    8.  Representatives from relevant congressional committees and U.S. 
Government agencies--such as the National Security Council, Department 
of Homeland Security, and Department of State--should meet with Falun 
Gong representatives, torture survivors, victims of transnational 
repression, and relatives of jailed practitioners outside China. This 
will enable them to receive up-to-date information about conditions in 
China. Given the severity of the persecution in China and risk of 
reprisals, it is too dangerous for local adherents to meet with foreign 
government officials inside the country. As such, U.S. officials and 
diplomatic staff should make a particular priority of meeting with 
Falun Gong practitioners prior to their travel to China or during 
visits to their home country. High-level officials, including 
presidents, vice presidents, prime ministers, secretaries of state, and 
religious freedom ambassadors should also meet with Falun Gong torture 
survivors, victims of transnational repression, or relatives of jailed 
practitioners to better understand conditions in China and to signal 
support for their freedom.

(B)  Vocally condemn transnational repression against Falun Gong in 
public and private

    1.  U.S. officials should make public statements condemning 
incidents of transnational repression targeting individual Falun Gong 
practitioners and their families.

    2.  In meetings with Chinese counterparts, officials should call 
for the halt of transnational repression of Falun Gong practitioners, 
including at the highest levels of diplomacy.

    3.  When preparing to meet with consular officials, make use of 
publicly available resources or queries to the Falun Dafa Information 
Center to ascertain conditions of transnational repression.

    4.  Local, state, and federal officials should make public 
statements on key anniversaries, such as May 13 (World Falun Dafa Day) 
and July 20 (the date of the CCP's launch of its violent persecution)--
that express support for U.S. residents and citizens who practice Falun 
Gong and condemn ongoing transnational repression.

    5.  Members of Congress, the U.S. Ambassador to China, and human 
rights groups should advocate for the release of imprisoned Falun Gong 
practitioners, especially those with family members residing outside 
China.

[ENDNOTES follow on next three pages.]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                       Statement of Zhou Fengsuo

                                 ______
                                 

       The CCP's Transnational Repression of Emerging Activists 
                     After the White Paper Movement

                              introduction
    My name is Zhou Fengsuo, and I am a former Tiananmen student leader 
and current Executive Director of Human Rights in China, a New York-
based organization that advocates for a more just and democratic 
Chinese future. I am honored to provide testimony on the situation of 
Chinese students in the United States, which grows more and more 
precarious with each passing day. Due to my position as a long-time 
activist, I have been lucky enough to meet with hundreds of young 
overseas Chinese activists and hear their stories. Last year, 
frustration with the Chinese government's repressive policies finally 
overflowed and sparked the White Paper Movement, where individuals--
mostly students and young people--around the world protested against 
CCP censorship and repression. In the aftermath of these protests, the 
CCP has cracked down on anyone who was involved, and has especially 
targeted students on U.S. campuses.
    Chinese students in the United States played a critical role in the 
White Paper Movement. It was their mobilization that eventually forced 
the CCP to change their policies. The White Paper protests demonstrated 
that student activism abroad is a crucial method of putting pressure on 
the Chinese government. We believe that in the future, activism outside 
of China will continue to be highly influential, and it is imperative 
that we support emerging activism with the goal of promoting change in 
China.
    However, activism organizations and individual activists all over 
the world are now facing harassment and retaliation from the CCP 
because of their activities during the White Paper protests. This lack 
of security is the main obstacle they are facing. Pushing back on the 
long arm of the CCP and resisting its transnational repression is key 
to ensuring the future success of the organizations formed after the 
White Paper Movement.
    From those who have been brave enough to share their situations 
with us, we know that the CCP mostly collects information through 
online surveillance, as well as through pro-CCP student informants. We 
also know that the two most common strategies for suppressing activist 
voices are detaining them for questioning if they return to China, and 
holding their parents hostage until they agree to stop their activities 
or even become informants themselves. In the past year, I have traveled 
across the globe to meet with young activists who have been targeted in 
the aftermath of the White Paper Movement, learn their concerns, and 
discuss how to best support and protect them. Below, I will share just 
a few of their stories.
               the ccp harasses activists to instill fear
    I have interviewed dozens of activists in North America and Europe 
who became involved in the pro-democracy movement following the White 
Paper protests. Many of them are young college students or recent 
graduates who became involved in activism on their college campuses. 
Their level of ``activist'' activity ranges from those who merely post 
anti-CCP messages on social media to those who attend protests and try 
to rally their fellow students.
    Many students have told me similar stories of harassment from 
Chinese police. Often, there is some key moment of exposure--a phone 
number revealed online, a viral social media post, or a classmate 
turned informant. There are even cases of email addresses found by 
Chinese police through website accounts that should have only been 
visible to employees of a U.S. company, which suggests that CCP agents 
have managed to access some internal databases.
    Once an overseas activist is on the radar of the authorities, the 
Chinese police often use one of two strategies: hostage-taking or 
direct interrogation. The first strategy involves Chinese police going 
to the home of the activist's parents, calling the activist, and 
forcing their parents to ask specific questions about their activities 
and other contacts before demanding that they stop whatever anti-CCP 
actions they have been engaged in. There is, of course, an implicit (or 
explicit) threat to their parents if they do not comply. This strategy 
is especially common among young overseas activists because so many of 
them have parents back in China, who are an easy target for 
retaliation.
    The second strategy is to detain and question the young activists 
themselves, usually when they return home to see their families in 
China. Students have told me about being taken away by police and 
interrogated for over ten hours at a time. Especially for young people 
with little experience in this arena, such detentions are terrifying. 
The police threaten their families and tell them they will be thrown in 
jail for years in order to elicit a ``confession.'' Many were 
interrogated many times over the same kind of question in order to 
break their spirit and find inconsistencies. Some were put in a hotel 
and questioned for weeks.
    No matter which strategy the police employ, the intent is clearly 
to frighten the activist into stopping their activities, and to collect 
information about their networks. Police often demand that the 
activists themselves become informants and spy on other overseas 
students and organizations.
    I have heard similar stories from activists across the U.S., 
Canada, and Europe. In Europe, several activist organizations are all 
but dissolved after constant harassment from CCP agents made them too 
afraid to contact one another. Some told me they were even followed, 
despite living outside China, which made them so afraid they ceased 
their activities altogether and went into hiding. A student on an 
American campus was threatened with violence by a classmate, who told 
her he would hurt her so she couldn't continue to post anti-CCP 
content.
                              conclusions
    From speaking with activists, I have learned several key facts 
about the CCP's tactics for transnational repression. First, the 
significance of the internet for surveillance purposes cannot be 
overstated. It enables direct surveillance by CCP agents and creates 
new platforms for self-censorship. Second, students who support the CCP 
pose a threat to Chinese students' freedom of speech. They may report 
on their classmates, or threaten them directly. Third, the fact that 
most Chinese students have family members back home makes them uniquely 
vulnerable to ``hostage''-style questioning and pressure from the 
authorities.
    So far, it seems that most of the information the Chinese police 
have on activists comes from online surveillance of social media and 
websites. But there are still real concerns about informants within the 
Chinese diaspora community. Even though the recent activities by U.S. 
law enforcement against informants have been widely positively received 
by the Chinese activist community, they need direct and concrete 
support from universities and the government in protecting their safety 
from the CCP's still-pervasive influence, both online and on the 
ground.
    From Chinese students' point of view, these are real, serious risks 
that create a chilling effect on activism and speech. The situation 
does not show signs of improvement; to the contrary, concerning cases 
have proliferated in recent years. We should seek to protect Chinese 
students and enable them to enjoy the freedom of speech that should be 
guaranteed in America.
                               proposals
1.  Universities should be proactive in protecting the right to free 
speech of Chinese students, especially against material risks:

    a. New students who arrive should be given some sort of rights 
training, with an emphasis on free speech;

    b. Students should be warned that they can be prosecuted for 
threats or for taking threatening action against other students;

    c. Chinese Scholars Associations (CSAs) have been an extension of 
the CCP's influence on college campuses. These organizations harbor 
student informants and create a chilling environment of fear for 
Chinese student communities. They should be required to disclose their 
association with the Chinese Embassy and other affiliates.

2.  Students faced with CCP repression often feel confused and afraid, 
which renders them unable to resist under pressure. We need to 
establish channels to connect Chinese students with relevant government 
offices and institutions so that incidents can be understood quickly, 
and help can be provided in an effective, safe, and timely manner.

3.  Online surveillance and data leaks should be a major concern for 
legislation and enforcement.

4.  Facebook recently removed many accounts that are associated with 
disinformation. All major social platforms should crack down on these 
fake accounts.

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                          Witness Biographies

    The Honourable Michael Chong, P.C., M.P., Member of the House of 
Commons, Canadian Parliament, Official Opposition Shadow Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Vice Chair of the Special Committee on the Canada-
People's Republic of China Relationship

    Michael Chong was first elected to the Parliament of Canada in 2004 
and represents the riding of Wellington-Halton Hills. He is currently 
the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Official Opposition and 
Vice-Chair of the Special Committee on the Canada-People's Republic of 
China Relationship. Mr. Chong has served in the Federal cabinet as 
President of the Queen's Privy Council, Minister of Intergovernmental 
Affairs, and Minister for Sport. Mr. Chong has also served as chair of 
several House of Commons standing committees.

    Yana Gorokhovskaia, Ph.D., Research Director for Strategy and 
Design, Freedom House

    Yana Gorokhovskaia is the Research Director for Strategy and Design 
at Freedom House, a non-profit and non-partisan organization devoted to 
the support and defense of democracy around the world. Yana has a Ph.D. 
from the University of British Columbia and has been published in peer-
reviewed journals and outlets such as Foreign Affairs, Politico, the 
Guardian, the Washington Post, and Just Security. At Freedom House, 
Yana oversees research-related trends in global freedom and democracy 
as well as transnational repression. She has co-authored two reports on 
the topic in recent years: ``Still Not Safe: Transnational Repression 
in 2022'' and ``Defending Democracy in Exile: Policy Responses to 
Transnational Repression.''

    Laura Harth, Campaign Director, Safeguard Defenders

    Laura Harth is the Campaign Director at Safeguard Defenders, a 
human rights NGO that undertakes and supports activities for the 
protection of human rights, promotion of the rule of law, and 
enhancement of local civil society capacity in some of Asia's most 
hostile environments. Focused on the PRC, it also works to counter 
growing transnational repression by the Chinese Communist Party around 
the world through direct actions, research, and advocacy efforts. Laura 
also covers external relations for the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on 
China and acts as an adviser to Hong Kong Watch. Previously a 
contributor to Hong Kong-based Apple Daily's English edition, she is a 
contributor to Italian outlet Formiche and co-authored a Sinopsis 
report to expose and counter Chinese Communist Party foreign 
interference operations in Italy.

    Rushan Abbas, Founder and Executive Director, Campaign for Uyghurs

    Rushan Abbas, a Uyghur American activist, has dedicated her life to 
championing the rights of the Uyghur people. Beginning her advocacy 
during her time at Xinjiang University, she led pro-democracy protests 
in 1985 and 1988. After re-
locating to the United States in 1989, her commitment to the cause only 
grew stronger. Co-founding the Uyghur Overseas Student and Scholars 
Association in 1993, she played a pivotal role in establishing the 
Uyghur American Association in 1998 and was elected as its vice 
president for two terms.
    In response to Beijing's escalating genocidal actions against 
Uyghurs in 2017, Abbas co-founded the Campaign for Uyghurs (CFU). This 
organization advocates for Uyghur human rights and democratic freedoms, 
rallying the international community against the atrocities in East 
Turkistan. She pioneered the ``One Voice One Step'' movement, 
orchestrating a global protest on March 15, 2018, across 14 countries 
and 18 cities against China's mass Uyghur detentions. Her sister's 
abduction followed her first public speech in September 2018, as 
retaliation for Rushan's activism. In 2020, CFU released the report 
``Genocide in East Turkistan,'' meticulously detailing how China's 
actions align with the Genocide Convention. Notably, CFU received a 
Nobel Peace Prize nomination in February 2022 for its relentless 
advocacy. Rushan Abbas engages with global lawmakers, briefing them on 
East Turkistan's human rights crisis.
    Testifying before Congress multiple times, she sheds light on the 
Chinese regime's genocide and crimes against humanity. Rushan currently 
serves as a lived experience expert on the Inter-Parliamentary 
Taskforce on Human Trafficking and as the Advisory Board Chair of the 
Axel Springer Freedom Foundation.
      
     

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