[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COUNTERING CHINA'S
GLOBAL TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION CAMPAIGN
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 12, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
53-487 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House
Senate
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey, JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Co-chair
Chair STEVE DAINES, Montana
JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts MARCO RUBIO, Florida
BRIAN MAST, Florida TOM COTTON, Arkansas
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia ANGUS KING, Maine
MICHELLE STEEL, California TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ANDREA SALINAS, Oregon
ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa
RYAN ZINKE, Montana
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
DANIEL K. KRITENBRINK, Department of State
MARISA LAGO, Department of Commerce
THEA MEI LEE, Department of Labor
UZRA ZEYA, Department of State
ERIN BARCLAY, Department of State
Piero Tozzi, Staff Director
Matt Squeri, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Statements
Opening Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a U.S. Representative from
New Jersey; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 1
Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley, a U.S. Senator from Oregon; Co-
chair,
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.................... 3
Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern, a U.S. Representative from
Massachusetts.................................................. 4
Statement of Hon. Uzra Zeya, Under Secretary of State for
Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights................. 5
Statement of Hon. Dan Sullivan, a U.S. Senator from Alaska....... 6
Statement of Hon. Andrea Salinas, a U.S. Representative from
Oregon......................................................... 8
Statement of Hon. Ryan Zinke, a U.S. Representative from Montana. 8
Statement of Hon. Michael Chong, Member of Canadian Parliament,
Wellington-Halton Hills, Ontario............................... 10
Statement of Yana Gorokhovskaia, Research Director for Strategy
and
Design, Freedom House.......................................... 24
Statement of Laura Harth, Campaign Director, Safeguard Defenders. 26
Statement of Rushan Abbas, Founder and Executive Director,
Campaign for Uyghurs........................................... 31
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Chong, Michael, Hon.............................................. 41
Gorokhovskaia, Yana.............................................. 47
Harth, Laura..................................................... 50
Abbas, Rushan.................................................... 54
Smith, Hon. Chris................................................ 58
Merkley, Hon. Jeff............................................... 59
McGovern, Hon. James P........................................... 60
Sullivan, Hon. Dan............................................... 60
Zeya, Hon. Uzra.................................................. 61
Submissions for the Record
``China Sows Disinformation About Hawaii Fires Using New
Techniques,'' New York Times, September 11, 2023, submitted by
Senator Sullivan............................................... 63
Chapter 11, entitled ``A Law Firm on Every Corner,'' from ``Hard
Drive: A Family's Fight Against Three Countries'' by Mary Todd
and Christina Villegas, submitted by Representative Zinke...... 67
``Involuntary Returns: China's Covert Operation to Force
`Fugitives' Overseas Back Home,'' a report by Safeguard
Defenders...................................................... 77
Statement of Su Yutong, human rights advocate; Radio Free Asia
journalist..................................................... 145
Statement of Levi Browde, Executive Director, Falun Data
Information
Center......................................................... 148
Statement of Zhou Fengsuo, Executive Director, Human Rights in
China, and student leader at the 1989 Tiananmen Square
demonstrations................................................. 158
Statement of Anna Kwok, Executive Director, Hong Kong Democracy
Council, and Mason L. Wong, research fellow, Hong Kong
Democracy Council.............................................. 161
CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form.......................... 182
Witness Biographies.............................................. 183
(iii)
COUNTERING CHINA'S
GLOBAL TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION CAMPAIGN
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2023
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was held from 10:00 a.m. to 12:12 a.m., in Room
1100, Longworth House Office Building, Representative Chris
Smith, Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
presiding.
Also present: Senator Jeff Merkley, Co-chair, Under
Secretary Uzra Zeya, Senator Dan Sullivan, and Representatives
McGovern, Zinke, and Salinas.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
JERSEY; CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Chair Smith. This is an important hearing. It's a hearing
that we have been working on and working closely with Co-chair
Merkley and, of course, Ranking Member McGovern on, because
this is an issue that is getting worse, not better. And so we
are trying to bring a focus on it. We've introduced
legislation, totally bipartisan. Senator Merkley, Jim McGovern
and I, and others, have sponsored it, which is now pending in
both the House and the Senate.
In June 2021 on the 32nd anniversary of the 1989 student
democracy protests, which as we all know ended in the horrific
Tiananmen Square Massacre, I visited Liberty Sculpture Park in
Yermo, California to witness the unveiling of a sculpture made
by artist Chen Weiming. It was a 20-foot-tall statue that
morphed Xi Jinping's skull with a coronavirus molecule. And
Chen named it the ``CCP Virus.'' It was a bold work of art
rightfully assigning blame to the CCP, and Xi Jinping in
particular, for the horrific pandemic and all the mistakes that
were made, especially in the early months, that shook the
world.
I was honored to attend and to see Chen's work, and to join
him and other heroes of the Chinese democracy movement in
speaking out against the atrocities committed by the Chinese
Communist Party. Less than two months later, however, the
sculpture was gone. It was vandalized and then burned to the
ground, likely by a band of CCP agents targeting Chen and other
Chinese democracy activists here in the United States to punish
and scare them into silence. At the ceremony, there were
Chinese Communist Party agents in attendance.
Unfortunately, Chen's case is not a rare case. With us that
day in Yermo was Wei Jingsheng, perhaps the greatest advocate
for Chinese human rights and democracy of our time. Very few
people know this, but in May of 2022 right here in Washington,
a car swerved in front of Wei's car and suddenly braked in
front of him while another rammed him from behind. Both cars
quickly fled the scene. Wei believes, and I also believe, that
this was an attempt on Wei's life. This, incidentally, is the
same tactic that I have heard used over and over against other
Chinese individuals who have run afoul of the CCP.
And the list goes on. Major Xiong Yan, who served in the
U.S. Army and ran for Congress in New York City, was stalked
and harassed by Chinese agents here in the United States.
Pastor Bob Fu, whom I've known for over two decades, a leading
advocate on behalf of Christians and human rights activists and
defenders trying to escape China, was threatened with a bomb at
his home in Texas. The brave eight Hong Kongers, whose heads
the authorities have placed bounties on, have been harassed
along with their families just this past summer, solely for
speaking out against the atrocities happening in their beloved
Hong Kong.
Indeed, I note that that group includes a number of
individuals whose outspokenness has led them to testify here at
the China Commission. So this is really personal for all of us
on this panel. It also becomes personal when I hear about a
fellow legislator from a sister democracy who has been harassed
for speaking out about human rights in China. Member of
Parliament Michael Chong of Canada was harassed for what
Senator Merkley and I have repeatedly done, calling the Chinese
Communist Party's treatment of Uyghurs what it is--genocide.
And although Michael has been harassed, he is not in any way,
shape, or form intimidated. And he is joining us today on the
witness panel; he'll be the first to speak to us today.
My friends, the Chinese Communist Party has waged a
pervasive coercive campaign around the world against anyone who
does not agree with the Party. They target Uyghurs, Hong
Kongers, Tibetans, dissidents, activists, students,
journalists, or anyone who dares to state their unapproved
opinions about the People's Republic of China. The Chinese
Communist Party uses modern technology to digitally harass and
surveil individuals around the globe. They abuse the Interpol
system to punish and force the return of those who exercise
their freedom of speech while abroad. They detain and harass
dissidents' families and friends back in China, like the sister
of Rushan Abbas, to unjustly attempt to coerce silence. Rushan
will join us here this morning on panel number II.
And they even use direct physical assaults beyond their
borders to control what is said about their country and its
wrongdoing. Recently we've seen them go so far as to set up
shop right here in the United States, establishing illegal
police stations here in New York City to surveil and harass
Chinese immigrants on our soil. The Chinese Communist Party's
strategy of trying to rewrite global norms has succeeded in far
too many cases. This has led to self-censorship and curtailment
of basic freedoms, even here in the United States of America--
students scared to speak out, journalists scared to write, free
citizens scared to attend gatherings--all this happening beyond
China's borders and within ours.
Indeed, as Michael Chong's testimony illustrates, and as
underscored in news just this past weekend from Great Britain--
where an alleged spy worked in Parliament--it is also happening
within our legislatures. We cannot and will not let the Chinese
Communist Party in any way intimidate us or scare us into
submission through these tactics. Today, we will hear from
experts and victims alike who have seen these stories up close.
We must work to protect freedom of speech, assembly, and
opinion, here in the United States as well as elsewhere, and
including in the People's Republic of China.
I'd like to yield to our distinguished co-chair, Senator
Merkley.
Co-chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, A SENATOR FROM
OREGON; CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Co-Chair Merkley. Transnational repression is central to
the Chinese Communist Party's strategy of silencing critics of
Chinese policy around the world. It affects so many of the
Uyghurs, the Hong Kongers, the Tibetans, the human rights
advocates, the journalists, and others this Commission works
with on a daily basis. This hearing gives us a chance to give a
platform to some of the victims and experts from across the
globe who have been most engaged in trying to identify ways we
can address this vexing challenge. We know from past testimony
that it isn't easy, as the Chinese Communist Party's
sophisticated tactics seem to know no bounds and bring the
power of a ruthless state against individual dissidents,
members of the Chinese diaspora, and, insidiously, their family
members in China.
That's why it's so critical that we redouble the efforts to
wrap our minds around the dimensions of this threat, to raise
awareness globally, to identify ways to build common cause with
those who have been targeted--religious groups, activists,
journalists, politicians--as well as governments sick and tired
of the brazen violation of sovereignty that transnational
repression represents. Last year I chaired another hearing on
this topic to hear about what the Biden administration is doing
about it. And I'm proud that one of the officials at the
forefront of that work, Under Secretary Uzra Zeya, is now one
of our commissioners. The State Department is dedicated to and
is continuing to apply significant time and attention to
developing a more comprehensive strategy to counter, deter, and
mitigate these threats. We have also seen the Department of
Justice make important strides in pursuing criminal charges
against groups and individuals accused of engaging in
transnational repression.
But despite these efforts, this Commission's reporting
shows how far we have to go. We continue to track a disturbing
number of cases of transnational repression, both here in the
United States and abroad, with the knowledge that countless
others are taking place and likely not being reported on. I
imagine that for every case we hear about, there's another 10
we don't know about. We have seen egregious harassment
campaigns, even against legislators in the world, including the
Honorable Michael Chong, who is here as a Member of the
Canadian House of Commons. We have seen relentless targeting of
young activists who have spoken out bravely against the
increasingly repressive conditions in Hong Kong. And we have
seen the unrelenting pressure that continues to be directed at
Uyghurs around the world.
We know this is, as Freedom House calls it, the most
sophisticated global and comprehensive campaign of
transnational repression in the world. It relies on
surveillance technology, spyware, threats to individuals
through phone calls or face-to-face intimidation, and even
harassment of family members and friends back in China. As
Safeguard Defenders revealed in an eye-opening report earlier
this year, the PRC is also responsible for establishing at
least 102 overseas service stations in at least 53 countries,
breaching national sovereignty and coercing Chinese diaspora
members to return to the PRC for criminal investigation.
All of this requires that the United States, and as many
other governments as possible--and we do need international
cooperation to make this effective--make it a priority to
address this issue. That's why earlier this year I introduced
the Transnational Repression Policy Act, joined on a bipartisan
basis by my colleagues Senator Rubio, Senator Cardin, and
Senator Hagerty, to hold foreign governments and individuals
accountable when they stalk, intimidate, or assault people
across borders.
I appreciate Chairman Smith's work to lead the House
companion to this legislation. If enacted, the Transnational
Repression Policy Act would mandate additional U.S. Government
reporting on the issue, required training for U.S. diplomatic
and law enforcement personnel, bolster intelligence community
efforts to track and share information on these incidents, and
develop a more effective tip line for victims and witnesses.
I'm working to get this bill passed. I think it's essential
that we do. And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
today who are bringing their experience, their story to bear on
this very important issue.
Chair Smith. Thank you, Chairman Merkley.
I'd like to now yield to the ranking member, Jim McGovern.
STATEMENT OF JAMES P. McGOVERN,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Representative McGovern. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And
I join my colleagues in welcoming the witnesses today, and the
public, to see CECC's hearing on transnational repression.
Transnational repression occurs when governments reach across
borders to silence dissent among diasporas and exiles,
including through assassinations, illegal deportations,
abductions, digital threats, Interpol abuse, and family
intimidation.
Our focus today is on the practices of the People's
Republic of China. but transnational repression can be carried
out not just by unfriendly governments, but also by strategic
allies. It can target people anywhere they or their families
reside or visit, even in democracies like the United Kingdom,
Canada, Germany, Australia, South Africa, and here in the
United States. That's why I worked with Senator Merkley during
the 117th Congress as he led the development of the
Transnational Repression Policy Act, and why I'm proud to co-
lead the same bill, H.R. 3654, in the House this Congress with
Chairman Smith. It is critically important to make sure that
the U.S. Government has the tools it needs to confront this
global challenge, both domestically and internationally.
I turn now to China. Freedom House's database on
transnational repression now includes information on 854 direct
physical incidents committed by 38 governments in 91 countries
around the world since 2014. China is an origin country for 253
of those recorded incidents, a stunning 30 percent. As we will
hear today, the PRC targets abroad the same populations that it
represses internally, especially Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and
Tibetans. State agents linked to the security and police forces
have engaged in forced rendition of asylum seekers, street
assaults, digital surveillance, online harassment, and the
coercion and intimidation of family members and friends of
dissidents.
We must be sure that we have the knowledge and the capacity
to protect the people who are targets of these practices,
especially those who are within U.S. jurisdiction. And we must
do a better job of engaging with partner countries and
strengthening multi-
lateral strategies to counter the PRC's actions, which violate
international human rights, among them the right to freedom of
expression, association, asylum, and freedom of movement, and
the prohibition on arbitrary detention. So I look forward to
this hearing today. I thank the witnesses again. And I look
forward to hearing their recommendations. And with that, I
yield back my time.
Chair Smith. Thank you very much.
It's my honor to--you know, this Commission, as I think all
of you know, or most of you know, is not only bicameral and bi-
partisan, it also includes distinguished members of the
executive branch. We are joined by one of those members, Under
Secretary Uzra Zeya. And I yield the floor to her.
STATEMENT OF HON. UZRA ZEYA, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Under Secretary Zeya. Good morning and thank you, Chairman
Smith, and Co-chair Merkley, and Ranking Member McGovern, and
fellow commissioners. I'm honored to be with you all today for
this important discussion on the increasingly pervasive and
concerning use of transnational repression by PRC authorities.
Transnational repression, or TNR, is a global phenomenon. But
the PRC's efforts are especially pervasive, pronounced, and
persistent. The PRC uses TNR to harass and threaten Uyghurs,
Tibetans, members of other ethnic and religious minority
groups, Hong Kongers, and PRC citizens, and non-PRC citizens
living abroad who seek only to exercise their human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
As we've heard from the co-chairs and ranking member, the
PRC utilizes a wide variety of tactics, including online
harassment, exit bans, or imprisonment of family members of
targeted individuals, the misuse of international law
enforcement systems such as Interpol, and pressure on other
governments to forcibly return targeted individuals to the PRC.
The sheer breadth and depth of their efforts cannot be ignored
and should not be permitted to continue. It is a direct affront
to national sovereignty and impacts people all over the world,
including U.S. citizens and individuals residing in the United
States.
This is why, since 2021, the Biden-Harris administration
has made combating transnational repression a global human
rights priority. One way that we've sought to counter this
scourge is through our diplomatic engagement and tools. We
continue to engage the PRC directly, making clear in no
uncertain terms that their conduct is unacceptable and must
stop. We have not, and we will not, keep quiet in the face of
these transgressions. We've used sanctions as an accountability
tool as well. Specifically, in March 2022 we imposed visa
restrictions on PRC officials responsible for or complicit in
transnational repression.
This administration energized the interagency to combat TNR
in the United States as well. U.S. Government agencies have
increased their domestic engagement with domestic communities
targeted by the PRC. This outreach helps to create improved
two-way communication, which both enhances our understanding of
the threat and helps those affected more quickly access
government assistance when they are targeted or even before
this occurs. We've also jump-started international cooperation
to drive a global response, because it's not only Americans and
U.S. residents who have suffered abuse. Specifically, we
deployed interagency teams to meet with foreign counterparts to
raise their awareness of this threat and to share our own
lessons learned.
One example of this effort is the recent launch of a G7
Rapid Response Mechanism Working Group on TNR. This coalition
will raise international awareness of the threat TNR poses to
democratic values and deepen our shared commitment to
countering it. The experiences and details presented by today's
panelists will surely highlight the very real threat of the
PRC's transnational repression activities, as well as the need
for governments, legislators, activists, and others to continue
to work even more closely together to counter it. Hearing your
stories, and in some cases learning from what you have gone
through personally, is vitally important as we advance our
common cause.
The administration welcomes Congress's ongoing leadership
on these issues, and we look forward to further deepening our
collaboration. Thank you again for this opportunity to speak.
And thank you all for coming together today to confront this
challenge.
Chair Smith. Madam Secretary, thank you very much for your
leadership and for joining us at this hearing today.
It's now my honor to yield to Senator Sullivan, a new
member of the Commission.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
A SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
outstanding leadership on this. It's great to see my colleague
from the U.S. Senate and the Co-chair, Senator Merkley. This is
such an important topic. The effort, often successful, of the
Chinese Communist Party to reach far beyond its borders to
target critics in the diaspora communities throughout the
world, is outrageous. But let's face it, it's just one of many
outrageous things Beijing is doing across the board. As this
committee has done an excellent job of doing, we need to
continue to recognize and highlight the brutal nature of the
Chinese Communist Party regime we are dealing with, especially
under the dictatorial rule of Xi Jinping.
Look no further than the string of strange disappearances
that we've seen in China in their government in the last couple
of months. The Chinese foreign minister and former ambassador
to the United States disappeared. This was Xi Jinping's right-
hand man until recently. The commander and deputy commander of
the PLA Rocket Force, gone. Now, apparently, the defense
minister is gone. Who knows what's going on here? But to be
clear, this is the sort of regime we're dealing with, a regime
whose officials suddenly disappear without any explanation.
They're probably somewhere in China, with bullets in their
heads, in ditches. This is the way the CCP operates.
And now Xi Jinping is trying to export this. Just a couple
of months ago, authorities in Hong Kong issued arrest warrants
for activists and lawyers accused of violating the CCP-imposed
National Security Law, specifically for people who no longer
live in Hong Kong, or anywhere in China for that matter. Hong
Kong has declared that it will pursue these people for life.
And it's not unthinkable that they could one day make good on
grabbing them. Of course, I'm not worried about the United
States aiding in their return, or the U.K., or Australia, or
Japan, or other places where they now reside. But life is long.
They all travel. One day they could find themselves in the
hands of a government all too eager to burnish its credentials
with Beijing.
This is one of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, I'm working with
Representative John Curtis on a bill to press the Biden
administration to sanction the prosecutors, and judges, and
other officials responsible for enforcing these unjust Hong
Kong laws. The days of the independence of the Hong Kong
judiciary system and the rule of law in Hong Kong are
unfortunately long gone. Beijing has seen to that. Now we need
to do what we can to try to even the scales up on behalf of the
people of Hong Kong.
Mr. Chairman, there's one more issue that I want to just
raise in my opening statement. These kinds of aggressive
actions are also targeting Americans directly. And even,
remarkably, during times of tragedy. I'd like to submit for the
record this New York Times story that just broke last night
entitled ``China Sows Disinformation About Hawaii Fires Using
New Techniques.''
Chair Smith. Without objection, so ordered.
Senator Sullivan. This story, that just broke at the New
York Times, talks about how when wildfires swept across Maui
last month, killing over 100 Americans, the CCP unleashed its
information warriors. They said on the internet the disaster
was not natural, in a flurry of false posts and lies that
spread across the internet. They said the natural disaster was
the result of a secret weather weapon being tested by the
United States military and intel agencies. To bolster this lie,
they posted photographs that were generated by artificial
intelligence programs.
Mr. Chairman, as we all know, when countries around the
world suffer natural disasters, even adversaries come together
to help each other. Not under Xi Jinping's rule. The Chinese
Communist Party is now trying to sow discord among Americans as
we sadly bury our own dead in Hawaii. This is outrageous. And I
call on the Chinese ambassador to the United States to formally
apologize to our country. But Mr. Chairman, he won't, because
if he did, he'd disappear too. We all know that.
One final thing, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say how
honored I am to join this Commission. It is such a great--it
has such a great history, especially under your leadership. At
a time when many people are raising questions about Congress's
decisions in the past relating to China--for example, extending
MFN 20 years ago--it is good to remind Americans that at the
same time the Congress also established organizations like this
one to keep a critical eye on human rights. I think there may
be more Congress can do to live up to this Commission's
mandate, perhaps even expand it. But as the new guy here, I'm
eager to learn from my colleagues about how the Commission
works. And I'm very honored to be part of that.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I, again, am very glad to be here
and look forward to working with you and all the members of
this distinguished Commission.
Chair Smith. Thank you so very much, Commissioner, for your
very eloquent remarks. And welcome to the Commission. We're so
glad that you're here.
I'd like to now recognize Congresswoman and Commissioner
Andrea Salinas.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREA SALINAS,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OREGON
Representative Salinas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can be
brief. I just want to thank you, the co-chairs, for today's
hearing, and Ranking Member McGovern; it is critically
important. I want to thank the witnesses for coming here to
testify. And like our newest member, I too am eager to continue
to learn and really, hopefully figure out what some tools are
to provide some accountability around this. This sounds like a
global problem and something that is not just affecting human
rights but also affects the way we do business around the world
with trade. So I want to thank you all for conducting today's
hearing.
Chair Smith. Thank you so very much.
I'd now like to recognize Commissioner Ryan Zinke.
STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN ZINKE,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MONTANA
Representative Zinke. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want
to thank you and Senator Merkley for holding this hearing. And
on this side of the aisle we have the Marine and Navy team.
We'll try to do our best. But, Mr. Chairman, on June 24th,
2012, Dr. Shane Truman Todd, a young American engineer, was
found hanging in his Singapore apartment a week before his
scheduled return to the United States. Although Dr. Todd had
repeatedly expressed fear about the work he was doing, from and
to a Chinese company, authorities immediately ruled his death a
suicide. His family initially didn't know what to believe.
However, this started to change when they arrived in Singapore
and evidence seemed to suggest murder and not suicide.
The narrative changed when they discovered that what they
had thought was a speaker was actually an external hard drive
with thousands of backup files from Dr. Todd's computer. The
data revealed by those files changed the narrative from a
tragic suicide and loss of a son to an international story of
deceit and cover-up. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to enter Chapter 11
of Mrs. Todd's book entitled ``Hard Drive: A Family's Fight
Against Three Countries,'' into the record.
Chair Smith. Without objection, so ordered.
Representative Zinke. And if any member would like hard
copies, we will certainly make those available, and I look
forward to hearing your testimony, Minister Chong. And thank
you, again, for holding this hearing.
Chair Smith. Thank you very much.
Before I introduce our very distinguished Member of
Parliament, I just want to point out that a number of us met
with the wife of Lu Siwei several weeks ago. He is in Laos, and
it's not looking good. And my hope is that the Laotian
government will rethink forcible repatriation of this amazing
man back to China, where he faces a very, very terrible future.
In meeting with his wife, and all the human rights
organizations rallied behind him, there's total solidarity
there, I'm happy to say. She couldn't have been more persuasive
and loving towards her husband. And she made it so clear that
if the West and all countries in democracies don't speak up,
his future is so bleak. So our appeal would be to the Laotian
government that they now cease and desist any kind of forcible
repatriation.
This Commission is very honored to welcome the Honorable
Michael Chong here today, as he will testify to the depths the
Chinese Communist Party has gone to in its transnational
repression campaign, going so far as to attempt to coerce
foreign Members of Parliament in countries with strong
democratic roots simply for speaking out against human rights
atrocities. Mr. Chong was first elected to the Parliament of
Canada in 2004 and represents the riding [electoral district]
of Wellington-Halton Hills. He is currently the Shadow Minister
for Foreign Affairs for the Official Opposition and Vice Chair
of the special committee on the Canada People's Republic of
China relationship. Mr. Chong has served in the Federal cabinet
as President of the Queen's Privy Council, Minister of
Intergovernmental Affairs, and Minister for Sport. Mr. Chong
also served as chair of several House of Commons standing
committees.
It is a true honor and a privilege for us to have Mr. Chong
join us today, though it's unfortunately due to the
unacceptable and outrageous overreach of the Chinese Communist
Party. After calling the CCP's treatment of the Uyghurs what it
is--genocide--Mr. Chong received threats personally, and
members of his family living in Hong Kong have been targeted as
a result. The Chinese Communist Party not only seeks to silence
its critics at home, it has gone so far as to harass thousands
of people abroad for speaking the truth about their
totalitarian regime. My colleagues and I are appalled at the
attempts to censor you and others who have bravely spoken out.
We welcome you, and please consume however much time you would
like.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL CHONG,
MEMBER OF CANADIAN PARLIAMENT
Mr. Chong. Well, thank you. Thank you, Chairman Smith.
Thank you, Co-chairman Merkley, Ranking Member McGovern,
Senator Sullivan, Representatives Salinas and Zinke. Thank you
very much for having me in front of your Commission today. I
understand that you're interested in my experience of Beijing's
transnational repression, or what we also call foreign
interference.
Like millions of Canadians and Americans, I'm the child of
immigrants. My mother immigrated from the Netherlands and my
father immigrated from Hong Kong. I have extended family in
both the Netherlands and Hong Kong. I've been elected since
2004 to represent the district of Wellington-Halton Hills and
have served in the federal Cabinet and chaired several
parliamentary committees. In 2020, I was appointed the Official
Opposition's Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs. Since then,
my criticisms of Beijing have increased in response to
President Xi's increasing violations of the rules-based
international order and its repression in the PRC and abroad.
In November 2020, I introduced a motion adopted by the
House of Commons calling on the Canadian government to make a
decision on Huawei's involvement in Canada's 5G network within
30 days and to develop a robust plan to combat China's growing
foreign operations in Canada and its increasing intimidation of
Canadians living in Canada. Several months later in February, I
introduced another motion, which the House also adopted,
recognizing Beijing's actions towards Uyghurs and other Turkic
Muslims as genocide. In May this year, I learned that a PRC
diplomat working out of the PRC consulate in Toronto had, since
2020, been gathering information to further target me and my
family in Hong Kong.
Last month I learned I was the target of a disinformation
campaign in May of this year on the Chinese language social
media platform WeChat. The Canadian Department of Foreign
Affairs concluded that Beijing's role in this disinformation
operation was highly probable. But my experience is but one
case of Beijing's interference in Canada. Many, many other
cases go unreported and unnoticed, and the victims suffer in
silence. This has serious implications for the approximately 4
percent of Canadians--1.7 million--of Chinese descent.
Beijing targets these diaspora groups using a variety of
tactics. One tactic is to target the many Chinese international
students in Canada, coaching them into participating in foreign
interference threat activities on university campuses, such as
targeting pro-Hong Kong democracy activists and Tibetan and
Uyghur human rights campaigners. Other tactics include
targeting Chinese language media and social media in Canada,
the establishment of illegal police stations in Canada, the
wrongful arrest and detention of Canadians, such as Michael
Kovrig, Michael Spavor, and the currently detained Huseyin
Celil, whose whereabouts are completely unknown. And another
tactic includes coercing Canadians on Canadian soil back to the
People's Republic of China. Recently, the PRC has used a tactic
of creating wanted lists and offering bounties for the arrest
of those from Canada.
These various tactics are a serious and concerted effort to
interfere with democratic activity in Canada and leave millions
of Canadians at risk of being intimidated, coerced, silenced,
and unable to enjoy the basic democratic rights and freedoms
guaranteed in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in our
Constitution. These tactics cannot be tolerated in a free and
sovereign country. Canada must work more closely with
democratic allies, like the United States, in countering
Beijing's efforts to interfere in our democratic life. Foreign
interference is a serious national security threat to Canada.
It threatens our economy, our long-term prosperity, social
cohesion, our Parliament, and our elections. It requires a
suite of measures to combat, including closer cooperation among
allied democracies. Canada must work toward a stronger defense
and security partnership with the United States and allies. We
must look for every opportunity to strengthen this partnership
to meet the challenge of rising authoritarianism and to
preserve our fundamental freedoms, our democracy, and the rule
of law. Thank you very much.
Chair Smith. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chong, for your
excellent testimony and for your leadership.
Just a couple of questions, then I'll yield to my
colleagues for any questions they have. When you talked about
closer cooperation, are you persuaded that we are cooperating
now? Is it as robust as it should be? And what is being left
undone and unaddressed?
Mr. Chong. Well, thank you, Chairman Smith, for that
question. I think there are a number of ways in which we can
cooperate in a better way. So, for example, the United States
has long had a Foreign Agents Registration Act, since 1938.
Australia more recently introduced one I think in 2019. The
U.K. just adopted one two months ago in July. The government of
Canada has announced that it's taking a look at introducing one
in Canada to give law enforcement a tool to prosecute Beijing's
agents operating on our own soil. And so I think there could--
one way in which we could better cooperate is to exchange
information on legislative best models to see what works and
what doesn't. We have similar judicial systems in our
democracies. So that's one area of cooperation.
Another area, for example, is how we use sunlight and
transparency to counter foreign interference threat activities.
Our security agencies and services, our experts, have told us
that often foreign interference, transnational repression,
doesn't rise to the level of a criminal prosecution. And so one
way to counter it is to make it public and to go public with
the intelligence to tell members of the public, Members of
Congress, Members of Parliament, here's what exactly is going
on. To arm citizens and elected officials with the information
they need to protect themselves. So best practices on how to do
that during elections, in between elections. Those are just two
examples of where I think we could more closely cooperate.
Chair Smith. You know, I mentioned the list of things that
they'd done to people who have been outspoken that I know of,
that we know of as a Commission. I would point out that Anna
Kwok, who is here today with us in the back, she has testified
in the past here, this year, on behalf of Hong Kong. She has a
bounty on her head. I mean, there's no let-up on the repressive
tactics employed by Xi Jinping. And even Chen Guangcheng, who I
worked to help release years ago, they--he assumes it was the
Chinese Communist Party--in order to send the message that they
were watching went into his home when he and his wife and
family were out and rearranged everything. They didn't destroy
anything. They just re-
arranged it, to let him know, We've been here. Rebiya Kadeer,
the great Uyghur human rights activist, similarly has had one
instance after another.
And I'm wondering, you know, looking at you--here you are,
high profile, you know, Member of Parliament. And yet they're
doing this against you. You know, I was put on the hit list by
Global Times a couple of years ago. I was briefed by the FBI;
it nowhere near comes to what you're going through, believe me.
But they said, Watch out for social media. Watch out for other
things that they may do. They refused to give me a visa. I've
been trying to put together a trip there--we'll go to
Xinjiang--since their foreign ministry said, We have nothing to
hide--anybody wants to come, come. We sent a letter to the
embassy and said: I want to come. Please approve it. And we
have not heard back from them since. But we're going to keep
trying.
I say this because, you know--the level of angst directed
against you, and you have family members at risk, you know, we
need to rally behind you and others like you who have family
especially. They could do a lot here, but to people in Hong
Kong or anywhere else in the PRC they can do a lot more. So
that's why redoubling our efforts, passing this legislation,
sharing best practices, is so important. You know, in reference
to the PRC's disinformation campaign against you on WeChat,
could you elaborate on what that looked like?
Mr. Chong. Thank you, Chairman Smith. What happened with me
is that in May of this year, while a big debate was going on in
Canada about foreign interference, a number of narratives--
false narratives about me popped up on Chinese-language social
media, particularly on the WeChat platform. And these
narratives persisted for about a week, and the Canadian
Department of Foreign Affairs concluded that they emanated from
Chinese Communist Party accounts. This is corrosive because
WeChat in Canada has over a million users and some five million
people globally--including many in Canada--saw that
disinformation. They have weaponized Chinese-language social
media, Chinese media such as CGTN, the state broadcaster.
They're targeting radio stations and television stations.
I know that in the U.K., just a couple of years ago, Ofcom,
their broadcast regulator, pulled CGTN off the air, off of
television, because of human rights violations and
disinformation that was being spread. So that's something I
think democracies have to grapple with. Best practices on how
to do that I think is critically important, because one of the
things we need to do is balance our fundamental belief in free
speech, free expression, free media, and freedom of
communication with the need to counter this disinformation.
Chairman Smith, you also mentioned how the PRC is using
money to corrupt our system. And I think that's another area
for cooperation. Often transnational repression comes alongside
corruption, alongside personal illicit gain, payments of monies
or consideration, money laundering. And so I think countering
that money laundering, countering the proceeds of illicit gain,
I think is something democracies also need to work more closely
on. And the United States, being the world's reserve currency
and the U.S. dollar being the main means of transaction in our
global economy, I think we can do a lot together to counter
this repression that takes the form of financial corruption.
Chair Smith. Before my time runs out, just two things. Is
the Canadian government standing in solidarity with you and
everyone else? Very briefly on that. And on the college
campuses, what is the PRC doing vis-a-vis minority religions?
Mr. Chong. Yes. Since the spring, the Canadian government
has been standing up and supporting me. I think before that
point in time, you know, there were issues that have popped up,
but they are now, like many other democracies, reacting to the
threat. You know, like I said, the U.K. just adopted a foreign
agents registry two months ago,and the Canadian government has
announced it will be introducing one. You know, democracies are
often slow to react to the threat of authoritarian states,
which can act much more quickly because it's one-person or a-
few-people rule. So, yes, they have been supportive of me in
recent months.
On university campuses, what is going on is that there are,
I believe, over 100,000 Chinese international students at
Canadian--Canada's leading research universities. Often these
students are coached and coerced into participating in foreign
interference threat activities on Canadian university campuses.
For example, just a couple of years ago there was a Tibetan
human rights activist at the University of Toronto Scarborough
campus. She had campaigned for president of the student
council. She had won the election. And she was immediately
targeted by students through a coordinated effort by the PRC
consulate. A similar thing happened at the McMaster University
campus in Hamilton, Ontario, where a Uyghur human rights
activist was similarly targeted by students through a
coordinated action of the PRC consulate. So these are the kinds
of coercive activities taking place on university campuses.
Chair Smith. Thank you.
Co-chair Merkley.
Co-chair Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And following up on that impact on university campuses, in
your testimony you note that international students were
compelled to demonstrate against pro-Hong Kong rallies after
threats were made ``to withhold their government scholarships
or harm their families back home.'' In your estimation, is this
a--this is not just a one-off. This is a systemic strategy to
use the Chinese students who are present to essentially create
a pro-China force on campuses.
Mr. Chong. Yes, I think it is a systemic, long-term effort
to create fear on university campuses. I've just highlighted
two examples of what has happened, but we've had many other--
we've heard about many other cases on university campuses. And
often the Chinese international students who are conducting
these activities are themselves being coerced into doing it.
Not in all cases, but in many cases. And so, yes, it is a
pervasive threat on university campuses.
Co-chair Merkley. And I've also read about the strategies
that China is using in which they essentially recruit some of
the Chinese students to spy on other Chinese students who might
be participating in critiquing China's policies or
participating in protests against Chinese activities in Hong
Kong or against Uyghurs, and so forth. Is that something that
you've observed in Canada as well?
Mr. Chong. Yes, we have observed that. At our committee in
the House of Commons, we heard testimony from witnesses who
highlighted exactly that going on. That these students were
being coerced into spying on other students, threatening other
students from the PRC who weren't toeing the PRC line. And
doing so under threat of having their scholarships withdrawn,
or their family targeted back home.
Co-chair Merkley. Is there an effort to establish a channel
through which students can report these strategies of coercion,
so we can get a better grip on how widespread it is and ponder
ways to address it?
Mr. Chong. Well, there is a number, a center that Canadians
can call to report foreign interference threat activities, but
I don't think it's broadly made available to Chinese
international students or promoted among that community. Again,
it's an area where we could learn from each other on best
practices on how to counter this threat, and where I think
allied democracies can learn from each other on how to counter
this.
Co-chair Merkley. I'll shift gears here from the campuses.
And thank you for those insights. You note in your testimony
that there's significant influence in Mandarin-language news
outlets. And, you know, I would have thought that often those
news outlets in our democracies would be a place that would be
particularly interested in reporting on China's abuses. But
they're being co-opted. What is the strategy being employed
there? Why is it effective?
Mr. Chong. Well, I think the strategy is multi-pronged. So,
for example, there are state broadcasters from the PRC that are
on the airwaves in democracies, such as CGTN, the PRC's state
broadcaster. It often promotes propaganda right out of the
Chinese Communist Party. And those broadcasts are seen by
millions of people around the world. People close to the
Chinese Communist Party leadership have often taken ownership
of newspapers and radio stations. And we've noticed that
there's been a shift in the editorial stance of those
newspapers.
For example, Sing Tao Daily is the largest Chinese-language
newspaper in Canada. Its former editor is Victor Ho and he has
told us in testimony in front of our committee that the
newspaper is largely now a vehicle for Chinese Communist Party
propaganda and views, compared to when he was the editor, where
it was truly an independent newspaper that operated free of any
control from Beijing.
Co-chair Merkley. I think that's a really important point.
But is it the Chinese government that is buying these outlets?
Is it Chinese corporations or affluent Chinese individuals? How
are they securing ownership control?
Mr. Chong. It's not directly owned by the state. These are
assets that have been purchased by individuals that are close
to the PRC. You know, for example, we've seen recently a couple
of years ago that the South China Morning Post, the largest
English-language newspaper in Hong Kong, changed ownership. And
there are suggestions that its editorial stance has changed
because of that.
Co-chair Merkley. Thank you. Thank you very much. And I
just want to close with the question as to whether any of your
family back in China have ever been threatened as a result of
your conversations?
Mr. Chong. Well, my experience is, I think, illustrative of
what is happening to many Canadians, and Americans, and other
citizens of other democracies. Out of an abundance of caution,
I've cut off contact with my family in Hong Kong in order to
ensure that they are somewhat insulated from the work that I'm
doing here. And I know in talking to members of diaspora
communities across Canada and in the United States, that many,
many other people have done the same thing. And so this is the
consequence, one of the consequences, of the PRC's
transnational repression.
Co-chair Merkley. Thanks so much.
Chair Smith. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Minister, welcome. And thank you, again, for your
courage in being here. What you're doing, even as we speak in
terms of your testimony, takes an enormous amount of courage.
And I just want to let you know how much we admire it and
appreciate it, because it takes people like you to speak out
even though you do so with threats and risks to your family. So
we really appreciate that.
I want to just touch on a couple points that I raised in my
opening statement. Your point about sticking together as
democracies, can you expand on this a little bit more,
particularly in light of the fact that we've seen that the
Chinese Communist Party's strategy is often to try to isolate
and single out certain democracies? You know, they were really,
really pounding Lithuania from an economic standpoint. In
Australia, they undertook this big coercive economic,
essentially, blockade. And can you tell just a little bit more
on how important it is for all of us, as democracies, to push
back together, stick together, and that brings us power and
strength? Particularly when they try to pick off smaller
countries, which I know is part of their strategy.
Mr. Chong. Well, thank you, Senator, for that question. I
mentioned how we can work more closely together on translating
intelligence into public disclosure. Our members of the public
have talked a bit about working together to figure out how we
counter disinformation during--targeting elected officials and
our elections, while still upholding the fundamental freedom of
speech. Foreign agent registry is another opportunity for
cooperation. I talked a bit about how we can cooperate on
transnational financial crimes, which often come alongside
foreign interference, but another area for cooperation is
combating repression within the People's Republic of China.
For example, we know that much of the cotton and many of
the tomatoes produced in Xinjiang province in western China are
being produced through the forced labor of Uyghurs. And we know
that those products are being exported around the world. I
think the United States has done an excellent job in enforcing
bans on the importation of products, like tomatoes and cotton,
that have been produced using that forced labor. As I
understand it, some 2,500 shipments from the PRC in the last
two or three years have been seized by U.S. border officials
and prevented from coming into the United States.
In Canada, we've yet to seize one shipment. There was a
single shipment that was seized, but later released. We have
evidence that those products continue to flow into Canada. And
I think that's an area where we should learn from U.S. best
practices on stopping these products from coming into our
country. We're part of the North American Free Trade Zone. We
can't be the place where these products have a back door to
come in. So that is another example of where I think we could
work much more closely with a democracy like the United States
to learn how to implement these sorts of bans.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Let me follow up on your
points on transparency, working together. I also believe it's
important, particularly for regimes like this that often only
recognize power and threats to their own viability. As you
know, the Chinese Communist Party's number-one goal is to stay
in power, way above anything else. The welfare of their people,
they couldn't care less, as long as they stay in power.
So here's another question I have for you. I also think
it's important that we go on a little bit of offense. Covertly,
overtly, collectively. A lot of the CCP leadership, we know, is
corrupt. We know they steal from their own people. We know that
they're very rich from their corruption. Don't you think it
makes sense--the Chinese are trying to sow discord as people in
Hawaii are literally burying our fellow Americans--just
outrageous--that we should also go on offense? Let the Chinese
people know how corrupt their leaders are, that they're all
very rich because they steal from their people. Don't you think
we should be going on offense covertly, overtly? You want to
mess with us, Okay, we'll mess with you. And maybe we'll bring
your leadership down. Don't you think we should be doing that?
Mr. Chong. Well, I think that's a very good point you make,
Senator. I think of past decades before the rise of the
internet and modern communication technologies, where shortwave
radio was often used as a way to ensure that people in
authoritarian states were receiving news and information that
wasn't the propaganda of the state. And I think in this day and
age, we should be funding VPN technologies that will allow
people behind great firewalls, like the one in the PRC, to
access news and information from the outside world, so that
they actually get the truth rather than propaganda.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I think it's also very true--and
I'm sure you would agree--that Xi Jinping's biggest weakness is
that he fears his own people. That's why he's killing all of
his close associates, or at least disappearing them. I don't
know where they are. They're probably dead.
Let me get back to this issue of the nature of the regime,
because I think you understand it more than most. But it's
often right in front of our faces, and we don't want to
recognize it. Let me give you a broader example. You know, it's
really interesting to me that you read Xi Jinping's speeches,
you watch what he says publicly, you look at who he emulates.
The guy emulates Mao Zedong. There's no doubt about it. He's
trying to model himself on Mao Zedong. If you just do a little
bit of reading of the history of Mao Zedong, he's one of the
most brutal dictators in the history, maybe, of the world.
``The Black Book of Communism'' estimates that he killed
probably 50 to 60 million of his own citizens. And the current
leader of China emulates him. That would be like the chancellor
of Germany emulating Hitler.
So what does it say about the nature of the regime that the
current leader of China emulates one of the most brutal
dictators in the history of the world? Shouldn't we be
concerned about that? But shouldn't it also be a lesson for us?
Mr. Chong. Yes, I think it should be of concern to us. I
think the rising prosperity of authoritarian states, such as
the People's Republic of China, over the last 20 years has
given them the resources to export their model of
authoritarianism around the world. Whether it's in the South
China Sea, whether it's in the Indo-
Pacific region, and I think we, as democracies, need to
acknowledge that this is a very real threat. And I think we
have slowly come to this realization over the last decade. You
know, I think--beyond 10 years ago, I think we wrongly assumed
that along with increasing prosperity in these authoritarian
states that they would gradually improve their record on human
rights, democracy, and the rule of law. But the opposite has
happened. All they have done is taken this newfound wealth and
reinforced this authoritarianism, using technology, using other
methods to repress their people.
But going back to an earlier point you made about sunlight
and transparency and disclosure, one of the things that we are
based on is freedom of speech, freedom of expression, a belief
in transparency and sunlight. That is not something
authoritarian states are based on. They're based on the very
opposite principles. So I think by naming and shaming bad
actors, by using intelligence and making some of that public to
name and shame bad actors, I think will go a long way in
countering this threat.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thanks again for your courage.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again, sir.
Chair Smith. I'd now like to yield to the ranking member,
Jim McGovern.
Representative McGovern. Thank you. Thank you for your
testimony. Thank you for being here.
You know, the concern is that it's not just about social
media outlets that China can control or has a greater influence
on. I mean, you know, I just plugged into Twitter, ``Maui fire
causes.'' And things come up, like from The Desert Review--
whatever the hell that is, I have no idea--but basically it
echoes the stuff that China's been putting out, in a number of
posts, that somehow there's some mysterious causes to these
fires. And it doesn't say the Chinese government posted them. I
mean, they obviously have sympathizers and people who promote
conspiracy theories.
But we have a problem, again, as a country that believes in
free speech and freedom of expression. I mean, we have a
problem on our own social media platforms with disinformation
being put out there. And in the case of Twitter, now X, all the
review procedures that used to be in place are gone. I mean,
we're reading about the attacks on the Anti-Defamation League,
who were raising issues about antisemitic posts being placed
online--the response that really tried to destroy the integrity
of the ADL is really quite, you know, stunning.
And so how do you get these social media platform
executives who oversee this to actually be more responsible?
And it's not just about naming and shaming the Chinese
government, which we ought to do because of what they're doing.
But we have corporate leaders that tolerate this in countries
like ours. I mean, how do you get--do we name and shame them a
little bit more?
Mr. Chong. Well, Representative McGovern, that's an
excellent question. And this is where I think like-minded
democracies could really learn from each other on best
practices and different models. So, for example, the European
Union has a model to counter disinformation. The European
Commission has set up a unit within the EC to counter
disinformation in real time that's springing up on social media
platforms. On the other hand, a very different model is the
Taiwanese model. Taiwan is ground zero for the PRC's
disinformation operations. Both the PRC and Taiwan share a
common language. And so they are ground zero for this
disinformation and they've taken a very different approach.
I was recently part of a delegation to Taiwan where I met
with Audrey Tang, who's the new inaugural minister of digital
affairs. And she told me about their policy, which is a very
different approach. It's grounded in resiliency. It's grounded
in the education system, the primary and high school education
system, and in civil society--empowering civil society groups
to counter this disinformation. So this is where I think we can
learn from each other on best practices, on what works, what
doesn't. But at the end of the day we have to balance two
competing things. That is to counter this disinformation while
upholding freedom of the media and freedom of speech.
Representative McGovern. The level of disinformation that
is being peddled on various social media platforms really
undercuts our democracy and the very freedoms that we all care
about. And it's always frustrating to me that we can't seem to
come to a consensus on what disinformation is. And so we don't
want to be in the business of censorship, but there ought to be
some mechanism that clearly calls out lies and disinformation
and conspiracy theories, and attacks on individuals, even if
they're very subtle, for what they are. And so this is a real
challenge. Some of it, you know, is putting pressure on China.
Some of it is putting pressure on the platforms that allow
people to traffic these lies and threats.
As I said in the beginning, I'm worried about attacks
against people on these various platforms. But I also, quite
frankly, am very worried about the other forms of transnational
repression, including assassinations, illegal deportations,
abductions, family intimidation, and Interpol abuse. I mean,
the potential for the abuse of Interpol is well known and long-
standing. Do you have any specific recommendations for reform
of the Interpol system to combat transnational repression?
Mr. Chong. Well, I think we do need to take a look at
reforming Interpol. In light of the bounties and the demand for
the arrest of eight pro-Hong Kong democracy activists who are
abroad, I think we've got to make sure that Interpol isn't used
as a tool by the PRC to arrest and detain these individuals. I
think of a Canadian, Huseyin Celil, who was wrongfully arrested
outside of the PRC, I believe in Turkmenistan, a number of
years ago, and then extradited to the PRC.
His whereabouts are completely unknown and the PRC won't
tell the Canadian government where he is being detained, or
even if he is alive. And his wife and children live in
Burlington, Ontario, just a couple miles up from--north of the
border, north of New York State. It's so corrosive, that kind
of tactic, because it sends a message to the rest of the
community in Canada, that if they dare to speak up, if they
dare to stand up, they may be arrested abroad and taken to the
PRC.
Representative McGovern. Again, I think we need to do a
better job of coordinating with other like-minded countries
when another country has somebody who is seeking asylum, and
yet China has a particular hold over the country where that
person is seeking refuge and are thinking of deporting him or
her back to China. I mean, we ought to be more coordinated in
our efforts to try to provide a circle of protection around
those individuals. This is an important topic.
The abuse of these various platforms to target people, to
discredit people, to spread conspiracy theories, has
proliferated in a way that I don't think any of us could have
imagined when social media first came into being. And it's hard
to figure out how to put the genie back in the bottle, but
maybe what we need--you know, are more truth tellers trying to
influence on social media. And maybe we need to try to
establish a group of people to set the record straight.
But, again, I just thought it was interesting. When I
googled ``Maui fires,'' when I plugged it in on Twitter, two
conspiracy theories appear--both are being peddled by the
Chinese government. But I appreciate your courage and I
appreciate your advocacy. And I look forward to working with
you in the months ahead. I yield back.
Chair Smith. Commissioner Zinke.
Representative Zinke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I'd like to thank you for being here. It's
not easy to stand up for freedom. And it takes a lot of
courage. And thanks. I'd like to ask your thoughts on Chinese
capabilities and priorities, perhaps, on industrial espionage,
in particular the high-tech sector.
Mr. Chong. Well, thank you, Representative Zinke, for that
question. It's a very serious area of foreign interference. Our
security services have told us that the PRC is a threat in two
ways in five areas. They are a threat to our national security
and they are a threat to us in the form of the theft of
intellectual property. And that is, in particular, in five
sensitive areas of research and development at our leading
universities and in our leading Canadian companies.
Those five areas are: telecommunications--5G
telecommunications, quantum computing, artificial intelligence,
biopharma, and clean technologies. And so I think what we
should be doing is banning any government funding of research
in partnership with PRC entities in those five sensitive areas
of research. And so whether it's the four Canadian granting
councils, or in the United States here the National Institutes
of Health and other granting councils, I think we need to make
it clear that we won't fund research in those five areas that's
in partnership with PRC entities. I think we also need to ban
research in partnership with any entity affiliated with the
People's Liberation Army.
Represenative Zinke. And let me follow up. A concern when
you talk about green technologies is EV. It sounds so nice. And
I'm all for cleaner is better, etc. But I'm concerned about the
supply chain. Because in order to power EV, it takes batteries.
And just a cursory look at the supply chain, when you look at
what is required for a battery: Well, lithium, cobalt. So who
controls the mining of lithium, cobalt, and those other
materials? And then the chips. Who's making the chips that run
it and the production? And it goes on and on.
And then, of course, the other side of it is, What do you
do when the battery has ended its lifecycle? You know, in the
U.S. 90 percent of the solar cells that are no longer useful
because of the technology and different reasons, they're just
thrown into a landfill someplace across the country. We have no
plan on what the disposal of the toxic batteries and liability
should be. So I'm concerned about the EV world because it seems
like we're pushing an agenda without looking at the engine
behind it, and the engine seems to be Chinese. Do you share
that same concern?
Mr. Chong. Yes, I share that concern. I think there's two
ways in which Canada can be a stronger partner to the United
States in that regard. I think, first off, we are a vast
country with immense natural resources. We have critical
minerals of our own that can be part of the North American
automobile supply chain. And I think that's an area in which we
can work more closely with the United States. I think the
second area, though, is equally important. We're the fifth-
largest natural gas producer in the world and we currently
don't have an LNG export facility to get our natural gas to
global markets. And if we can get those terminals built, if we
can export natural gas to international markets, and more
natural gas to the United States, we can accomplish two goals.
First, we can help reduce global emissions because a fifth
of global emissions come from coal-fired electricity plants in
places like the People's Republic of China. We can cut those
emissions in half overnight by transitioning those plants to
natural gas. And, secondly, we can help displace oil and gas
from authoritarian states and replace it with oil and gas
produced here from democracies. And I think particularly when
it comes to Germany and Japan, who are currently buying vast
amounts of gas from authoritarian states--they should be buying
their gas from Canada instead, and from the United States. And
so those are two ways in which I think we can help the United
States. We've got critical minerals of our own and we've got
vast amounts of natural gas that we need to get to
international markets.
Representative Zinke. So it seems like on both sides we
have hurdles for our natural gas exports. But you're actually
right. I mean, no one does it cleaner, better than North
America. And if you want to look at how not to produce energy,
I'll take you on a tour of Russia or the Middle East.
The other point that I think is important, you look at
dependency, and who is dependent on whom, and for what. On
critical minerals, as you mentioned, there's some critical
minerals that they have the entirety of the supply chain. And
it's not a secret. And one of them happens to be germanium. And
it turns out germanium is needed for lenses, especially high-
definition lenses, that you might want to put on military
hardware, thermal optics, as a matter of fact almost everything
we use. But critical metals are locked up and we can't get to
the resources.
We have germanium here, but the germanium permit is almost
impossible to get. And while technology on the battlefield
changes every two years, we're waiting 25 years for a permit.
And I would agree absolutely that the TransCanada pipeline--
which is about 18 inches--would both reduce overall emissions
and help us shore up our energy needs. Natural gas pipelines.
Do you see any success in your current government on this
issue?
Mr. Chong. Well, I think you're exactly right. We need
regulatory reform in Canada to reduce the regulatory hurdles to
approving natural resource projects. In fact, the government of
Canada itself has acknowledged that. Finance Minister Freeland
was actually here in Washington last year and said that Canada
needs to expedite the approval of these natural resource
projects to get our resources to market to help our allies. She
was very explicit about that. I await the Canadian government's
plans in that regard.
It can be done. I'll give you one example of how a
democracy did it. Germany, after the war in Ukraine began,
realized that it had complete reliance on Russian natural gas,
and that those pipelines were being shut down. We know one of
them was blown up in the Baltic Sea and the other one never
came online. And so Germany had to scramble. Well, within days
after last February's invasion, they approved six new LNG
terminals in the Baltic and North Sea. One of them came online
in a record roughly six months from approval to live operation
in Wilhelmshaven, which is a port, I believe, in the North Sea.
So democracies, like Canada, can expedite these projects. We
just need the political will to do so. And I think it's
critical that we do that.
Representative Zinke. I look forward to working with you on
that. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chair Smith. Ms. Salinas.
Representative Salinas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chong, we've been talking a little bit about science
and technology. And I serve on the Science, Space, and
Technology Committee, where we frequently discuss issues around
research security, especially in the context of economic
competition with China. International research collaboration
does have significant benefits, but reports suggest that our
efforts to crack down on bad actors have actually caused many
Chinese American researchers to leave positions at American
universities. And I understand this. How can we balance
protecting against real, legitimate, and dangerous threats from
the Chinese government and their influence on college campuses
and fostering a welcoming environment for students and
researchers at North American universities, where we really
want to make true advancements?
Mr. Chong. Well, that's a great question. You know, we have
to balance academic freedom with the need to protect national
security in sensitive areas of research. And one critical
element in doing that is being open and transparent about what
research will be funded and what won't be funded. And I think
that will clear the suspicion. I think, in the absence of clear
policies about what the government will fund, and what it won't
fund because it crosses a line, I think you clear a lot of the
suspicion away.
And so my view is in the Canadian context we should be
clear that we will not fund research partnerships and research
that is done in collaboration with PRC entities in the five
sensitive areas of research that I identified and secondly, in
research partnerships with the People's Liberation Army. I
don't think there's any research that the Canadian government
should fund that's done in collaboration with the PRC's
military.
So if we put those policies in place, and also then simply
advise universities that we think that there are security
risks--if they then on their own decide to fund those research
partnerships, if they decide to do those partnerships in those
five sensitive areas, then I think we empower our university
community, our academics, to do the right thing. And I'm
confident that they will, and that they'll know where the lines
are. And I think that clears a lot of the suspicion about any
research that's been conducted with researchers from the PRC.
Representative Salinas. Thank you. I yield back.
Chair Smith. Thank you so very much.
Mr. Chong, thank you for your testimony. Without objection,
your full statement and any materials you would like to include
in the record will be made a part of the record. But thank you
for your clarity, for your boldness, for your courage. It is
greatly appreciated, greatly respected south of the border--
that is to say, the Canadian border.
Mr. Chong. Well, thank you very much for having me. And we
look forward to building a stronger defense and security
partnership with the United States.
Chair Smith. Yes. I appreciate it so much. Thank you.
[Applause.]
I'd now like to introduce our second panel. And beginning--
it is a very, very fantastic group of experts and leaders,
including those who have unfortunately been victimized by
China's transnational repression and those who have studied and
witnessed it up close.
First, I'd like to welcome Dr. Yana Gorokhovskaia, the
research director for strategy and design at Freedom House.
Yana has a Ph.D. from the University of British Columbia and
has been published in peer-reviewed journals and outlets such
as Foreign Affairs, Politico, the Guardian, the Washington
Post, and Just Security. At Freedom House, Yana oversees
research that quantifies trends toward and away from global
freedom and democracy, as well as monitoring transnational
repression. She has co-authored two reports on the topic in
recent years, ``Still Not Safe: Transnational Repression in
2022,'' and ``Defending Democracy in Exile: Policy Responses to
Transnational Repression.''
Next, we will hear from Ms. Laura Harth, campaign director
at Safeguard Defenders, a human rights NGO that protects human
rights, promotes the rule of law, and works to enhance local
civil society capacity in some of Asia's most hostile
environments. Focused on the PRC, it also works to counter
growing transnational repression by the Chinese Communist Party
around the world through its direct action, research, and
advocacy efforts. Indeed, you may recognize the organization's
name from a groundbreaking investigation they released exactly
a year ago, entitled ``110 Overseas: Chinese Transnational
Policing Gone Wild,'' in which they expose the abhorrent
lengths to which the CCP has gone to maintain control over
people outside its borders, including the establishment of at
least 54 police-run overseas police service centers across five
continents to carry out Chinese police operations on foreign
soil, including right here in the United States. Laura also
covers external relations for the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance
on China and acts as an advisor to Hong Kong Watch.
Then we will hear from Rushan Abbas, a Uyghur American
activist who has dedicated her life to championing the rights
of the Uyghur people, and a great friend of this Commission.
Rushan began her advocacy at Xinjiang University, where she
courageously led pro-democracy protests in 1985 and again in
1988. After re-
locating to the U.S. in '89, she co-founded the Uyghur Overseas
Student and Scholars Association, that was in 1993, and played
a pivotal role in establishing the Uyghur American Association
in 1998 and was elected as vice president for two terms. In
response to Beijing's escalating genocidal actions against the
Uyghurs in 2017, Ms. Abbas cofounded the Campaign for Uyghurs,
or CFU.
In 2020, CFU released its report ``Genocide in East
Turkistan,'' meticulously detailing how the PRC's atrocities
make it subject to strictures of the Genocide Convention.
Notably, CFU received a Nobel Peace Prize nomination in
February of 2022 for its tireless advocacy. Indeed, for the
record, it was former Commissioner Tom Suozzi and I who made
the nomination. Tom and I also launched the Uyghur Caucus here
in Congress, and now co-lead that with Jennifer Wexton. And we
hope to re-launch that again very soon. Rushan has a personal
story to relate as well. In 2018 her family members underwent
the unthinkable. After her first public speech in September of
2018, the CCP abducted and detained her sister Gulshan in
China, in retaliation for her activism. She remains in custody.
So I welcome our very, very distinguished witnesses. And
now, Yana, I yield the floor to you.
STATEMENT OF YANA GOROKHOVSKAIA,
RESEARCH DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGY AND DESIGN,
FREEDOM HOUSE
Ms. Gorokhovskaia. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Co-chairman
Merkley, and distinguished members of the Commission for the
opportunity to share information about the scope and scale of
the global transnational repression campaign carried out by the
People's Republic of China. Today, I'll use my time to describe
how the PRC tries to silence people living abroad, as well as
how this campaign has evolved. I'll conclude with some
suggestions about the ways that democratic governments can
better protect people who are targeted by the PRC.
I'll begin with this simple fact: The People's Republic of
China today is one of the least-free countries in the world. It
now ranks near the very bottom among 195 countries assessed in
``Freedom in the World,'' which is our global survey of
political rights and civil liberties. The domestic situation is
important to understand because, like other authoritarian
governments, the PRC exports oppression abroad as a way of
maintaining the regime at home. Even though Chinese officials
routinely reference the government's policy of noninterference,
Beijing seeks to dictate, sometimes through the use of physical
force, the terms of free speech, association, movement,
assembly, and even religious expression of individuals who are
thousands of miles away.
China is carrying out the world's most sophisticated and
comprehensive campaign of transnational repression using a wide
array of physical, digital, and psychological tactics to
attempt to silence those views as a threat. According to a
database that Freedom House maintains, the PRC is responsible
for about 30 percent of all recorded physical incidents of
transnational repression globally since 2014. It has conducted
campaigns in at least 36 countries, including in democracies
like the United States. As Chairman Smith and Co-chairman
Merkley already noted, Beijing targets a very diverse array of
people--pro-democracy activists, journalists, students, human
rights defenders, artists, former insiders, civil society
organizations, and whole ethnic and religious groups like the
Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Falun Gong practitioners, as well as
anyone else who is brave enough to criticize the Chinese
Communist Party.
It uses many different tactics to try to silence people.
One of the most harmful and hard-to-address tactics is the
intimidation of family or coercion by proxy. Harassment of
family members still living in China can be psychologically
devastating for people seeking to promote human rights and
advocate for freedom. Commission members already noted how the
PRC seeks to manipulate mechanisms of international cooperation
like Interpol and extradition agreements. And I want to pause
to point out two important cases.
One is the case of Idris Hasan. Idris was detained in March
of 2021 when he landed in an airport in Casablanca on a red
notice that was issued by China. Two and a half years later,
he's still in prison, despite the fact that the red notice was
canceled shortly after his arrest. Idris is at risk of being
deported to China every single day because Morocco and China
have an extradition agreement. And worryingly, China is
actively pursuing the ratification of more extradition
agreements, as our colleagues at Safeguard Defenders and Oxus
Society have well documented. Lu Siwei also, in Laos, faces
imminent deportation. And his situation is also very worrying.
The PRC's toolkit of repression is evolving in dangerous
ways. For example, evidence has recently emerged that the PRC
is co-opting former members of domestic law enforcement
agencies to harass, coerce, stalk, and surveil people living
both in the U.S. and in Canada. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Justice, and their Canadian
counterparts, have begun to examine these cases. However, I
want to underline that the involvement of former law
enforcement officials in transnational repression campaigns may
amplify, rightfully, the fear that members of the diaspora
feel--because it demonstrates that the PRC is able to deputize
officials in democratic states to carry out its repressive
schemes.
The PRC is the world's worst abuser of internet freedom
domestically. It employs digital tactics of transnational
repression as well. These tactics, which include mass trolling,
smear campaigns, threats and intimidation, spoofing of
accounts, and even doxing of personal information, are meant
to, first, intimidate, drown out reports of human rights
abuses, and apply psychological pressure. I also want to note
that these tactics are gendered. Women face not only violent
but sexualized threats online in response to their work or
their activism that shines a critical light on the PRC. The
PRC's campaign of transnational repression is a threat to
sovereignty, democratic institutions, and human rights.
Building resilience and imposing accountability are key.
I'd like to conclude today by sharing some of Freedom
House's recommendations for how to better protect people. I'll
start with one that I think many on this Commission are already
working on--codifying a definition of transnational repression.
This will facilitate the tracking of incidents, distinguish
attacks from ordinary crime, and coordinate interagency action
in addition to serving as a basis for any other laws that may
be needed. The second is training for government officials,
including law enforcement, who may encounter transnational
repression, to make sure that officials are equipped with
matching and sufficient information to protect those who are at
risk.
The third is conducting strategic, consistent, and
culturally sensitive outreach to communities that are at risk
of experiencing transnational repression, in order to equip
them with the resources they need to report these incidents.
The fourth is using voice and vote to limit the ability of
Interpol member states to misuse red alerts and other kinds of
notices. And finally, deploying targeted sanctions against
Chinese officials for the use of transnational repression, as
well as screening Chinese diplomats for a history of harassing
diaspora members while at their postings.
I should note that several pieces of legislation to address
transnational repression have been introduced or will be
introduced in the near future. And I want to say, again, thank
you to Co-chairman Merkley and Chairman Smith for your
introduction of the Transnational Repression Policy Act, which
Freedom House supports. We look forward to working with you to
see that it passes into law. Addressing transnational
repression committed by the government of the People's Republic
of China is a matter of urgency. It is imperative that
Congress, in a bipartisan fashion, come together with the
executive branch and like-minded partners to protect those who
are at risk and to defend democratic institutions. We
appreciate the leadership of the Commission on this issue, and
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
Chair Smith. Thank you so very much for your testimony and
your recommendations.
Ms. Harth.
STATEMENT OF LAURA HARTH,
CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR, SAFEGUARD DEFENDERS
Ms. Harth. Thank you so much, Chairman Smith, Co-chairman
Merkley, distinguished members of the Commission. Good morning.
It is truly an honor to testify before you today on behalf of
Safeguard Defenders.
As was already said, most people will know us, if they know
us, for the report released exactly one year ago today, which
exposed the formal cooperation between public security
authorities in China and United Front-linked groups around the
world in the setting up and running of so-called overseas
police service centers. Now, counter to what PRC authorities
and their propaganda mouthpieces continue to say, even over the
weekend and today, these stations are not just in open
violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Open-
source evidence exclusively from Chinese authorities and state
party media links such stations directly to so-called
persuasion to return operations, including video evidence from
such an operation taking place in Spain.
Now, as is often the case when yet another Chinese foreign
interference story breaks--and we've obviously just heard from
Canada with the Honorable Michael Chong--we're seeing the
fallout over the weekend over an alleged spy in Westminster.
The reports on police stations presented somewhat of a rude
awakening for many democratic governments that have previously
been very reluctant to engage on the issue of transnational
repression coming from China. While overseas police stations
definitely jump-started a growing series of conversations,
these are clearly but the tip of the iceberg in what members of
the dissident communities have long known, and what Freedom
House rightly defines, as the world's most sophisticated,
comprehensive, and far-reaching campaign of transnational
repression.
Within this campaign, Safeguard Defenders focuses our
direct action and documentation efforts on countering one of
its most extreme iterations, that of involuntary returns. While
these are not new, the scale on which PRC authorities are
coercing individuals to return to China to face prosecution has
exploded over the course of the past decade, with official, yet
partial, numbers released annually under Operation Fox Hunt and
Skynet claiming well over 10,000 returns from over 120
countries between 2014 and October 2022. And we will soon
release additional evidence on such operations taking place
around the world.
The often-clandestine methods for these returns have been
set in stone by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection in a written legal interpretation to the 2018
National Supervision Law that vastly expanded this non-judicial
body's reach. Extradition, repatriation, off-side prosecution,
persuasion, luring and entrapment, and even kidnapping are
among the official policies used by PRC authorities. The so-
called persuasion to return method is the one used most
frequently--threats and harassment, or worse, against family
members back home, or direct threats and harassment of
individuals overseas by covert agents, individuals linked to
PRC embassies or consulates, private investigators and security
firms, co-opted private individuals, rabid nationalists, or
even victims themselves.
The Chinese Communist Party has set up a true whole-of-
society effort to exert control over diaspora communities
worldwide and silence dissent. These efforts clearly undermine
the most fundamental freedoms of targeted communities, severely
infringe upon the rights and due process of individuals coerced
into returning, and constitute a grave violation of the
territorial and judicial sovereignty of other nations. The
climate of suspicion and widespread fear further isolates
targeted communities and individuals from their environments.
They may also expose individuals that have been co-opted or
coerced into doing the CCP's bidding, to criminal liability. As
has often been said, to effectively counter such a massive
undertaking, democracies need to respond with a similar whole-
of-government approach that recognizes transnational repression
for the domestic threat it is, one that is inextricably linked
to the CCP's influence operations.
Now, speaking from a European perspective, we are really at
the very beginning of such an endeavor and will need continued,
concerted allied efforts to move beyond the stage of timid
condemnation to effective and coordinated transnational
counteraction to match the CCP's efforts. Working towards joint
definitions, sharing of information and best practices, as well
as the coherent application of set standards, are an essential
step in this direction. It is, in our view, equally key to end
the legitimization of the PRC's illegal practices through
judicial and police cooperation agreements, at the bilateral
but also at the multilateral level.
It is no coincidence that the PRC has been pushing the
signing and ratifying of such agreements at an accelerated rate
during the same timeframe in which its involuntary returns
operations have exploded. Some may remember the example of the
joint police patrols that seemed, at the very least, conducive
to the pilot run of overseas police stations in Italy,
something the Italian authorities have since recognized as
being imprudent. But it doesn't end with such examples. Nor
does it end with the examples of extradition agreements or
Interpol abuse. In particular, I'd like to use this occasion to
severely question the legitimacy of the U.N. Office on Drugs
and Crime's MOU with the CCP's Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection--that same body I mentioned before--as
the Chinese focal point for all work under the Convention
against Corruption.
Not only does PRC propaganda adopt these types of
agreements as a demonstration of the international community's
trust in its judicial system, it directly contributes to a
heightened sense of fear within targeted communities, gravely
subverts the international rules-based order, and often acts as
a gateway to similar agreements at the bilateral level,
especially in the Global South. Ending such legitimization is a
crucial part in rebuilding trust with the targeted communities
that are key to understanding emerging threats and actors.
Personally, I believe the biggest compliment we have received
on our work is that of victims across Europe stating they
finally found audiences eager for their stories and
experiences.
To them. I want to say: We need more of your stories.
Authorities need to hear more of your stories. The U.S. and
Australia have already set up exemplary multilingual, dedicated
hotlines to report transnational repression efforts, also
anonymously. To encourage this best practice elsewhere,
Safeguard Defenders has today released a pilot guide with
reporting channels in a series of countries, which we will
continue to update and hopefully grow with similarly dedicated
hotlines. So if you or others have been the target of
transnational repression, please report to the relevant
authorities. Please report to the FBI if you're in this
country. Only by coming together can we begin to effectively
push back against the CCP's efforts. Thank you.
Chair Smith. Thank you so very much.
Senator Merkley has a vote pending over on the Senate side
and has to run to make it, so I yield whatever time he needs.
Co-chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
apologize to our third witness. Thank you so much for your
advocacy.
As you know, I'm deeply engaged in efforts to highlight and
address and create pressure regarding Chinese treatment of the
Uyghur community and their enslavement practices, including
stopping the export of products made, in order to create
international pressure to change those tactics. Ms.
Gorokhovskaia, I want to turn to your testimony, Freedom House,
and I appreciate so much your organization's work. But I wanted
to highlight one piece of your testimony about the use of
retired police officers. Have you seen this as a significant,
sustained strategy that is being employed by China?
Ms. Gorokhovskaia. Thank you. We've seen a few instances of
it. I think much of the issue is that people who retire from
either law enforcement or even sometimes from the DHS have
specific skills and networks of contacts that make them very
valuable and employable as private investigators. And they take
contracts which sometimes originate in China or Iran to collect
information. And we've seen this. There were also prosecutions
recently in New York. We've seen a case like this with the RCMP
in Canada. And this is an extremely dangerous practice and
probably speaks to the need for more regulation of private
investigators and transparency about where that work is coming
from and on behalf of whom they're collecting this information.
Co-chair Merkley. And let me also turn to your mention of
red notices. We've had hearings and testimony on this before
this committee before, trying to draw attention and diminishing
China's ability to use red notices, reducing the ability of
countries to cooperate with them. Are we having any impact? Is
it becoming harder for China to use red notices to detain
people and use extradition agreements to return people home?
Ms. Gorokhovskaia. I think there's a great deal of
attention to China's misuse of red notices, as well as misuse
of red notices by other countries like Russia. However, as the
case of Idris Hasan demonstrates, the problem is that even when
the red notice is pulled back, when it's canceled, you can
still be detained. The effect is that you are--you're still
imprisoned. And then other mechanisms kick in, whether that's
the police cooperation agreements, whether that's extradition
agreements. And so the simple fact that this information is
still shared and can be acted on is a serious problem. I hope
that answers your question.
Co-chair Merkley. Thank you. And Ms. Harth, you talk about
``110 Overseas.'' And I gather 110 is a reference to the
emergency number that you would dial in China. Is that a name
that all of you have given the Chinese tactic or is that one
that China uses?
Ms. Harth. I believe it was used by at least one of the
authorities in the documentation we reviewed--``110 Overseas,''
a slogan to define these overseas services that they were
offering. But it's not a consistent name used by all the public
security authorities.
Co-chair Merkley. So they're, on one level, advertising
services to the Chinese diaspora--legitimate services--but
using these service stations to coordinate transnational
repression.
Ms. Harth. Yes, I believe there were two issues with these
overseas stations. They were offering administrative or
consular services on site, which in many cases may well have
been in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations because obviously private individuals are not allowed
to establish consular services or others at free will. On the
other hand, we found concrete evidence--and I wish to
highlight, exclusively on the basis of open-source evidence
from PRC sources--that these stations had indeed been used for,
we found evidence of, 84 persuasion to return operations. And
that evidence in one case included video evidence of such an
operation taking place between a station in Spain and the
public security authorities in China.
Co-chair Merkley. And this is what you're referring to when
you talk about China's patrol and persuade campaign, monitor
what Chinese diaspora are doing and persuade them to stop or
persuade them to perhaps report on others who are criticizing
China?
Ms. Harth. So in our case, we use ``persuade'' to refer to
the persuasion to return operations, which is a term used by
the PRC, their most preferred methodology to bring people
back--to coerce people to go back to China. But the patrol
obviously refers more generally to the potential control and
harassment of people overseas.
Co-chair Merkley. And that persuasion to return home to
China, the main instrument used is threats to their family
members back home should they not return?
Ms. Harth. Absolutely.
Co-chair Merkley. Threats to do what to the family members
back home?
Ms. Harth. Threats may include the detention of family
members, interrogations, calling them into police stations,
disappearing family members, taking away their jobs, taking
away certain benefits, the threats or actually doing all those
things, even prosecute family members instead of the target
overseas.
Co-chair Merkley. And you refer to Operation Fox Hunt, 2014
through 2022. I think the stat you have in here is 10,000
returns in your testimony. Is that the Chinese government
saying that they've persuaded 10,000 people to return home
through this strategy?
Ms. Harth. Official numbers released annually by the CCDI,
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, on Fox Hunt and
Skynet lists close to 12,000 returns between 2014 and October
2022. And we're obviously waiting for the new data possibly at
the end of October.
Co-chair Merkley. So 12,000, I mean, they're kind of
bragging about having persuaded people to return home, which
sends a huge message. If the intimidation is that successful,
threatening family members back home--I mean, this is not
encouraging university students to return to use their
education back home. This is encouraging people to return back
home who have criticized China abroad?
Ms. Harth. Who exactly they're going after under these
campaigns is not always clear, especially when it comes to Fox
Hunt and Skynet. These are people typically accused of
corruption, financial crimes. Now, whether those accusations
are correct, it is obviously very hard to say, knowing the
Chinese system.
Co-chair Merkley. Do we have any sense of that number? I
think you corrected me that it's 12,000. Do they report on the
distribution between countries of those numbers? No? Okay. Now,
Operation Fox Hunt, that's the Chinese name for this operation,
is that correct?
Ms. Harth. Yes.
Co-chair Merkley. Well, we have a lot of work to do to
address this expanding strategy. And I appreciate, from Freedom
House, the five recommendations that you mentioned. I did want
to ask you, Ms. Harth, you mentioned that the United States has
an exemplary dedicated hotline. We've been asking for a
dedicated hotline from the FBI, but they keep telling us they
want to keep using their general tip line. Are we unaware of
something that has been established here in the United States?
Ms. Harth. I was referring to the multilingual guides that
they have put out describing transnational repression, making
sure that when instances are reported that it is centralized,
that it is looked at, that people that receive those calls or
messages know what they're talking about. And coming from
overseas, I can tell you that is exemplary, indeed.
Co-chair Merkley. Okay. Well, it may be that in the
international comparison we're doing well, but we are pushing
for there to be a dedicated way for people to report
transnational repression, including linguists appropriate to
the countries that are the major offenders. But I don't think
we're quite there yet. But I appreciate that at some level
we're making some impact. But we're not where we want to get
to. Thank you so much, all three of you, for bringing
your expertise to bear on this really big issue that concerns
the ability to have the freedom of speech and assembly that we
cherish so much, yet is so directly threatened by these
tactics. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chair Smith. I hope you make your vote.
Ms. Rushan Abbas.
STATEMENT OF RUSHAN ABBAS, FOUNDER AND
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CAMPAIGN FOR UYGHURS
Ms. Abbas. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Chairman Merkley,
members of the Commission, and all the staff at the Commission.
Thank you for giving us the opportunity to speak today. The
Commission is well aware of the CCP's endless list of genocidal
crimes being carried out against the Uyghurs and the other
Turkic groups in East Turkestan, also known as Xinjiang. Today,
I will speak about the Chinese regime's use of transnational
repression to stifle defiance and hide their crimes. Beijing's
tactics of intimidation and hostage taking to silence Uyghurs
have global effect. Through these measures, the CCP violates
the First Amendment rights of American citizens residing on
U.S. soil.
The totalitarian rule from China extends beyond its
borders, oppressing U.S. citizens. In 2018, we received the
news that 24 family members of my husband, Abdulhakim Idris,
were missing and likely detained in the camps. On September
5th, 2018, I spoke about the growing mass detention and exposed
the CCP's genocidal policies at the Hudson Institute here in
Washington. Six days later, my sister, Gulshan Abbas, was
unjustly detained by the regime in retaliation for my activism
and my free speech as a U.S. citizen.
Yesterday marks the fifth anniversary of her being taken
from our lives. The Chinese regime has maintained silence about
her situation, while their mouthpiece, Global Times Network,
spread misinformation, accusing me of fabricating my claims
about her disappearance. Later, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs confirmed her false imprisonment, all based on
fabricated charges. My sister, Gulshan, has no political
history and is a retired medical doctor, a mother, and a
grandma who continues to suffer in a Chinese prison. For five
long years, my niece, Zieba, has put her life on hold,
relentlessly fighting for her mother's freedom. Witnessing her
journey is incredibly painful as she navigates working and
raising her 5-year-old daughter, while grappling with the
overwhelming loss and the trauma of having her mother held
hostage because of me.
Recently, we just learned that my father-in-law, Abdulkarim
Zikrullah Idris, passed away in January of this year. My
husband lost contact with his family in April 2017. After over
six years, all we know is that his father passed away seven
months ago. The exact date and the circumstances surrounding
his death are unknown. My mother-in-law, Habibehan Idris, is
said to be outside the camps, but she's in poor health, alone,
and has no one to take care of her because her four children
and all her grandchildren are still missing and likely
detained. The plight of my sister and my in-laws are one of
many.
Uyghurs in the United States are facing the most
significant crisis of our lives. But many of us are afraid to
speak out because of what might happen to our lives back in our
homeland. Our efforts to raise awareness and advocate for
change are targeted and undermined. Remember when we used to
have this sort of hearing on the Hill before? A room full of
Uyghurs used to join you, holding pictures of their missing
family members. But today, you don't see many. They are afraid
of coming to public events like this as a direct result of TNR.
I face daily online attacks with hate and mis-
information spread through the CCP bot accounts. Uyghur
activists, including myself, are subject to libel and
harassment, fostering mistrust and hatred. Platforms like
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube offer no protection.
Today I urge you to protect Uyghur American citizens. This
call is reinforced through my written testimony and policy
recommendations. I returned from Almaty, Kazakhstan last night.
We were there for a film festival featuring the documentary,
``In Search of My Sister,'' which highlights my story and my
sister's detention. When we arrived there, the venue canceled
the event. The supposed reasons for the cancellation vary. Some
cite a visit by two Chinese diplomats to the venue the day
before. Others point to the Kazakh government. Nonetheless,
it's clear that the CCP is ultimately responsible for
suppressing this event.
The CCP is an evident threat to freedom and democracy in
the world. China's international policing intimidation and
harassment tactics extend to everyone, as highlighted by the
Honorable Mr. Chong and the experts here. I am, as a female
activist, personally experiencing everything that Yana
described earlier. China's economic and technological power
gives the government significant sway, causing self-censorship
and silence in various American industries. The CCP influence
undermines American values and global freedom. And as long as
our families are detained in prison, concentration camps,
forced into slavery with forced labor, forced into marriage,
facing forced sterilization and forced abortion and kidnapping,
all Uyghurs worldwide are direct victims of this genocide.
Urgent action is necessary to protect not just my sister,
my in-laws, and the millions of Uyghurs, but the entire world.
Only through collective efforts can we safeguard Americans from
China's infiltration and the normalization of TNR here at home.
I ask that we work together to preserve democracy and freedom
and human rights. If we do not stand to hold the CCP
accountable today, we will most certainly lose the privilege
tomorrow. Thank you.
Chair Smith. Thank you very, very much for your testimony,
for your incredible courage for speaking out, and for sharing
about the agony you have suffered personally for your sister. I
remember when Tom Suozzi did the showing of your documentary--
which you showed again--I believe it's the same one, yesterday.
You know, it's very moving. And I think we ought to do it again
here on Capitol Hill with the Speaker and others, so they can
see just how barbaric and cruel the Chinese Communist Party
really is in taking hostages of family members and friends of
people who speak out, as you have done so bravely.
So I would offer that to you. I thank you for traveling 25
hours on a plane to get here to testify. That is a personal
sacrifice on behalf of your sister and all Uyghurs. And again,
if we don't, as a country, and if the West and the democracies
do not begin aggressively calling out the abuses of Xi Jinping,
the abuses will only multiply. And so the idea behind this
hearing, behind our legislation on transnational crimes that
are being committed by so-called police and others on behalf of
the Chinese Communist Party here and elsewhere, it's time to
put a tourniquet on it all. It just has to happen, because it's
only going to get worse. So I thank you.
I do have a few questions, but I want to point out that I
mentioned Lu Siwei earlier, who we're all concerned about in
Laos. You know, yesterday, 164 Chinese nationals were
renditioned from Laos to China. And there's fear that, of
course, Lu Siwei may be part of a forcible return. You know,
the whole idea of calling it ``persuasion to return'' or
anything like that--these governments unwittingly or wittingly
cooperate with a violation of refugee law, where you know
people are going to be sent back and have a well-founded fear
of persecution. And that's where they're going back to.
So I would hope that all of us would reach out to the
administration, ask Michelle Outlaw, who's our charge in Laos,
to raise the issue of Lu Siwei. And perhaps some of you might
want to make mention of that now. And some of the questions I
have, you know, you, Laura Harth, mentioned the U.N. Office on
Drugs and Crime and the MOU with the CCP's Central Commission
for Discipline Inspection, and what a farce it is. Such
legitimization, as you point out, is a crucial part of--it
legitimizes the illegitimate. And I'm not sure if you could
speak about that--has our Department of State spoken out on
that MOU? Have we done it effectively? Because we can't look
the other way when agreements are entered into by governments
like this. So maybe you want to speak about that a little bit--
or elaborate on that very poor MOU.
Ms. Harth. Yes, maybe specifically on that agreement. That
memorandum of understanding was signed shortly after the 2018
reform of the National Supervision Law, which created a state
front for this internal CCP police--I think that is the best
way to describe the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection. Now, that state front is not independent in any
way. It does not have independent employees. It does not report
independently. It sits in the same offices and all its
representatives are the exact same people. So it is not a
different body.
As soon as that was set up--their body's powers were vastly
expanded, both within China through the formalization of a
system called Liuzhi, which is effectively an extrajudicial
system for enforced disappearances, torture, and so on. They
call it a special investigative mechanism. It has been
denounced by U.N. human rights bodies. At the same time, the
CCDI bodies have been in charge of overseeing all
international, let's say, police repatriation efforts. So
clearly a very worrying body. And as I said before, it does not
surprise us that they also started pushing this body for all
international law enforcement and judicial cooperation.
Now, that included, famously, an agreement--the first one,
I think--with the Australian Federal Police, which was signed
only a couple of weeks after this reform. Luckily, the AFP has
now a couple of months back recognized that that was a mistake
that will not be made again. So that will not be renewed. In
Denmark, a similar agreement existed that has also not been
renewed. But a lot of agreements exist around the world,
including this MOU. I think the most important thing that
worries us is the fact that it has been appointed as a focal
point. And one of the issues there is obviously that also it's
not just Interpol; under this mechanism there are police
cooperation mechanisms.
So far as I know, there has not been any public statements
by countries on the UNODC mechanism. We'll definitely be
raising that issue more. I can tell you that the UNODC has been
unwilling to release the contents of that MOU or to provide
civil society organizations, such as us, with any further
information. Thank you.
Chair Smith. Now, is that something that Secretary Blinken
and the U.S. Department of State should be raising? Have they
done so in any fora that you know of?
Ms. Harth. I don't know what--publicly, I haven't seen that
happen. I don't know if that has happened privately. I
definitely hope this would be something that allied countries
in general--democratic nations in general--would be looking
into more as they try to tackle the issue of transnational
repression and the issue of the illegitimacy of what the CCP is
trying to do here in really overturning the international
rules-based order. Thank you.
Chair Smith. It is something that we, as a Commission, will
undertake further. We already have, but will do more. Perhaps
this calls for a letter from commissioners, if they would be so
inclined to sign, to our administration asking that this be
raised. I mean, even the euphemism ``persuasion to return,''
you know, with broken bodies and broken hearts, especially of
family members in order to effectuate that forcible return. I
mean, it flies in the face of the Refugee Convention and all
parts thereof--and China is a signatory to it. I know it
doesn't really apply here, but it's that concept of coercing
people to involuntarily repatriate. So if you could provide us
any additional information you would think would be helpful.
And we will ask Secretary Blinken to raise it. And I thank you
for really bringing a spotlight to it today.
I'd like to ask Rushan, in what ways should the U.S.
Government be more helpful to the diaspora, like yourself, who
are suffering so much? Is there outreach? Is there--I mean,
does the FBI talk to you at all, and to others? You know, do we
have enough resources deployed? Obviously, there's always the
concern, Do you have enough people at the FBI and other
agencies to do the work? Is the need not being staffed
sufficiently? Or is there a lack of, you know, actual guidance
coming from the administration?
Ms. Abbas. Yes. We have been talking to the FBI and the
State Department and the other law enforcement. And it seems
like they are on it, paying attention. But it seems like there
is not much they can do for people like us, seeing all this
libel, harassment, intimidation, and the blackmail online
especially; they are protected under the freedom of speech.
It's interesting how these platforms are not open to the
general public in China. The regular, ordinary Chinese people
cannot use YouTube, or Twitter, or Facebook, and other social
media platforms. Yet the Chinese officials, or Chinese state
media, or those Chinese troll accounts, are constantly
attacking us, harassing us. But when we reach out to the FBI
and the others, they are in touch with us, and they are
constantly communicating with us. But we don't see any tangible
help.
We are already facing so much agony. Our family members are
suffering. Every day everything we do is at the cost of our
family members' freedom. And I wake up every day with my
sister's face and I go to bed with her face. And since her
detention, my life completely changed. I quit my full-time job
as a business development director. And every--you know, the
dream or the ambition I had professionally for my life all
evaporated overnight. I became a full-time activist. I doubled
down on my efforts. Therefore, when I see those kinds of
attacks, which is daily, I take these as the impact of my work.
We are speaking to the power, and we have the truth, and the
Chinese Communist regime is afraid of the truth.
But at the same time, it frustrates me when I see
absolutely nothing is being provided, other than just the
interviews, or talks, or saying that they are doing something.
But it seems like it's extremely slow. We have been talking to
the FBI for over a year now. I don't see any kind of tangible
action being provided.
Chair Smith. Yana or Laura, do you have any sense as to how
many Chinese operatives, police and others, are here in the
United States? And how many they've deployed throughout the
world to harass and intimidate?
Ms. Harth. You know, I think it would be very hard to have
a number on that. As I said before, the issue is that the
number of actors is so wide, between those that are, you know,
official agents that may have been deployed from China to come
to other countries, those that may be stationed in embassies
and consulates, and then, you know, the whole host of private
actors, semi-private actors, that are being engaged. I think
it's very hard to calculate. And I do want to make, if I may, a
small note of caution, because, as I said, some of these people
may be victims themselves. Now that does not necessarily excuse
what they are doing, but it is important to keep it in mind
that a lot of these people may not have a choice themselves.
And again, I think that just demonstrates how evil this regime
is because they do not care if those people will then go and
face criminal charges, or anything else. Thank you.
Chair Smith. Yana.
Ms. Gorokhovskaia. I would agree with that. I think it's
very hard to estimate. I think we see transnational repression
and foreign influence play out in lots of different ways. There
was discussion of what happens on university campuses. I think
that's especially also something to watch. We saw a lot of
students, Chinese students, taking up their own white paper
protests last year in response to what was happening
domestically in China. And frustratingly, a lot of those people
were then--first of all, didn't get support from their
universities, but also then faced reprisals, either threats on
campus or threats to their families.
And so I think the important thing is that every time we
see pro-democracy, pro-human rights, pro-freedom activism by
people outside of China, we see a very harsh and very immediate
response. And although there is action to support people, like
the FBI and other actions, there's still--many people who are
facing this don't feel like they have anywhere to turn, and
they don't understand necessarily that there is solidarity,
that they can reach out, and that people in the U.S. Government
and other democratic governments understand that this is a
problem.
Chair Smith. Has there been a better understanding? Several
years ago, I did a series of hearings on Confucius Institutes
and the malign influence that they're having on the student
body, especially Chinese students that they surveil. And of
course, the one-sided political tirades that come from those
people that implement it, it's all the party apparatus. I mean,
don't talk about the Dalai Lama. Don't talk about the Uyghurs.
And many of our universities, our colleges--bought into it.
Now, are you finding that this is part of that apparatus to
this day, that they're becoming even more repressive using
Confucius Institutes or like-minded entities?
Ms. Gorokhovskaia. I think, while the influence of
Confucius Institutes has waned, we've seen other facets of this
be expressed. And I do think that one thing to caution
against--this sometimes gets wrapped into a language of anti-
Asian hate--is that this is sort of harassment or racial
profiling. And that is--that's also to the PRC's advantage,
because it pits people against each other, and it delegitimizes
the voices of people who are speaking out for freedom. So I
think that Confucius Institutes have become less of a problem,
but I don't think that the influence has disappeared as a
result of that.
Chair Smith. Good point. Now on the red notices, those of
us who have read Bill Browder's book--you know, he's testified
many times before us. He's done an amazing job, especially with
the Magnitsky Act and Global Magnitsky. I was the House sponsor
of Global Magnitsky. It's just a tremendous tool for the
administration. But concerning the abuse of red notices--what
does Interpol do to mitigate that abuse, especially when it
comes out of China, or Russia, or some other totalitarian
country?
Ms. Gorokhovskaia. Well, one thing that can be done is to
be more transparent about the number and the origin of notices.
We don't know where the notices are coming from. Often people
don't know that they have a notice against them until they get
arrested somewhere on a border. And that's something that
Interpol can do. They do make some notices public. They can be
more transparent, so that people have an opportunity to look it
up--look up whether or not they are subject to a notice, and
actually appeal for that notice to be rescinded or canceled, if
there's grounds to do that. So that's one very concrete thing
that Interpol can do.
Chair Smith. Laura, could you just tell us how many
countries--do you have any sense of how many countries have
unwittingly signed agreements which allow for these illicit
extraditions?
Ms. Harth. I'd have to come back to you on that. But
there's definitely a huge number of--it's not just extradition
agreements--police, judicial cooperation agreements, it doesn't
stop--but I'll get back to you on that.
Chair Smith. Okay. Anything else you would like to add
before we conclude the hearing? And Rushan, know that your
sister will remain a high priority for this Commission, and
you, and others who are in that similar situation. I do thank
you especially, we all do, for your courage in coming forward.
You know, injustice need not be forever. And, you know, the
heroes of democracy and human rights are you and your sister,
and others who are fighting so tenaciously, and paying for it
with the loss of their freedom. So thank you for that
sacrifice. I can't tell you how in awe I am, and my colleagues
are, of what you have suffered and how you persevere to
continue to bring the message to the world about what is
happening under Xi Jinping. So thank you.
Thank you so much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the hearing ended.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Statement of Hon. Michael Chong
______
My Experience with the People's Republic of China
I was first elected to Parliament in 2004 and represent the
electoral district of Wellington-Halton Hills in Ontario, Canada, where
I was raised. Like millions of Canadians and Americans, my parents were
immigrants. My mother immigrated from the Netherlands in the 1960s. My
father immigrated from Hong Kong in 1952, and I have extended family
living in both the Netherlands and Hong Kong. Today, tens of millions
of North Americans have family living abroad and who are at risk of
being targeted by authoritarian states.
The ties between Canada and Hong Kong are longstanding and deep.
During the Second World War, some two thousand Canadian soldiers of the
Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers defended Hong
Kongers against a vicious, surprise attack that took place
simultaneously with the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941; half
the Canadian soldiers were casualties of the ensuing battle. Hong Kong
is ``Canada's Pearl Harbor''. Today, some 300,000 Canadian citizens
live in Hong Kong.
During my time in Parliament, I have served in the federal cabinet
as President of the Queen's Privy Council, Minister of
Intergovernmental Affairs, and Minister for Sport, and have chaired
several House of Commons Standing Committees. In September 2020, I was
appointed Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Official
Opposition and have served in this role since. In our Westminster
system of government, my mandate is to hold the Canadian government
accountable on foreign policy and to serve as part of a ``government-
in-waiting''.
Several years after Xi Jinping became President of the People's
Republic of China (PRC), it became clear the PRC was increasingly
violating a number of international norms, laws, and treaties. This
included violations of the Sino-British Joint Declaration (which
guaranteed Hong Kongers liberties and freedoms for fifty years from
1997), its detention of Western journalists, and its increased military
belligerence in the South China Sea. At the time, I voiced my criticism
of the PRC, which usually resulted in the PRC embassy requesting a
meeting with me to exchange views.
After my appointment as Shadow Minister, my criticisms of the
government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) increased in
response to President Xi's increasing violations of the rules-based
international order and repression in the PRC and abroad, including the
wrongful detention of Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor,
increasing evidence of a Uyghur genocide, threats to national security,
and theft of intellectual property. These criticisms were amplified
following my September 2020 appointment because my position meant I was
speaking and acting on behalf of my parliamentary party.
On November 18, 2020, the House of Commons adopted a motion I
introduced (Opposition Motion (Foreign policy towards China)), which
called on the Canadian government to ``make a decision on Huawei's
involvement in Canada's 5G network within 30 days'' and ``develop a
robust plan, as Australia has done, to combat China's growing foreign
operations here in Canada and its increasing intimidation of Canadians
living in Canada.'' \1\ On February 22, 2021, the House of Commons
adopted another motion I introduced (Opposition Motion (Religious
minorities in China)), which recognized the PRC's actions towards
Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims as a genocide.\2\ Both motions
received support from members of every parliamentary party. In response
to the second motion, and in coordination with the United States and
United Kingdom, the Canadian government imposed sanctions ``in response
to human rights violations in Xinjiang'' on March 22, 2023.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ House of Commons, Vote Detail-23--Members of Parliament--House
of Commons of Canada (ourcommons.ca), 18 November 2020.
\2\ House of Commons, Vote Detail-56--Members of Parliament--House
of Commons of Canada (ourcommons.ca), 22 February 2021.
\3\ Global Affairs Canada, Canada joins international partners in
imposing new sanctions in response to human rights violations in
Xinjiang, 22 March 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response, on March 27, 2021, the PRC sanctioned me for the
Canadian government's imposition of sanctions on March 22, 2023, along
with the Chair of the United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom (USCIRF), Gayle Manchin and Vice Chair of the USCIRF,
Tony Perkins.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China,
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Announces Sanctions on Relevant US and
Canadian Individuals and Entity (fmprc.gov.cn), 27 March 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsequently, I concluded the PRC's sanctions on me and others were
proof of our effectiveness and continued to speak up in defense of
democracy, freedom, and the rules-based international order.
On May 1st of this year, I learned through a report in a newspaper,
The Globe and Mail, that a PRC diplomat working out of the consulate in
Toronto had, since 2020, been gathering information to further target
me and my family in Hong Kong.\5\ The source for the Globe report was
an internal July 2021 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
assessment shared with the newspaper by an un-
disclosed source. The Canadian government subsequently confirmed the
existence of the CSIS assessment.\6\ In response to the public release
of this information, the Canadian government declared the diplomat, Mr.
Zhao Wei, ``persona non grata'' on May 8, 2023.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The Globe and Mail, China views Canada as a `high priority' for
interference: CSIS report--The Globe and Mail, 1 May 2023.
\6\ The Globe and Mail, `No one person' responsible for Ottawa
failing to warn Michael Chong he was being targeted, national-security
adviser says--The Globe and Mail, 1 June 2023.
\7\ Global Affairs Canada, Canada declares Zhao Wei persona non
grata--Canada.ca, 8 May 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 9, 2023, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and
Development (Global Affairs Canada) informed me, and publicly revealed,
that I was a target of a disinformation campaign on the Chinese social
media platform WeChat between May 4 and 13, 2023. According to the
Department's findings, large volumes of false and misleading narratives
about me were shared, including on my ``background, political stances,
and family's heritage'' and that the PRC's role in the information
operation is ``highly probable.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Global Affairs Canada, Rapid Response Mechanism Canada detects
information operation targeting member of Parliament--Canada.ca, 9
August 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These are the reported instances of the PRC's targeting of me to
date.
Transnational Repression vs. Foreign Interference
Transnational repression and foreign interference are terms that
are often interchangeable. Generally, transnational repression is
defined as authoritarian governments' extraterritorial efforts to
silence, deter, undermine, and threaten dissidents and activists who
oppose them. Foreign interference is defined in Canadian law as foreign
state ``activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to
the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a
threat to any person.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ CSIS, Foreign Interference and You, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRC's Foreign Interference Threat Activities in Canada
My experience is but one case of PRC foreign interference in
Canada. Many other cases go unreported and unnoticed, and the victims
often suffer in silence.
CSIS continues to observe PRC foreign interference threat
activities in Canada. CSIS has assessed that foreign interference
``poses one of the greatest strategic threats to Canada's national
security.'' \10\ CSIS has stated that the PRC's foreign interference in
Canada is a ``significant threat to the integrity of our political
system and democratic institutions, social cohesion, economy and long-
term prosperity, and fundamental rights and freedoms.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Public Safety Canada, Countering Foreign Interference, March
10, 2023.
\11\ CSIS, Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference--
Revised Speaking Notes, p. 2, February 9, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Canada continues to be a target of the PRC, which is ``seeking to
advance their political, economic and security interests to the
detriment of Canada's,'' and the threat is a ``growing concern.'' \12\
This has direct implications for the approximate 1.7 million Canadians
of Chinese descent living in Canada (4.7 per cent of the country's
population).\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Public Safety Canada, Foreign Interference and Hostile
Activities of State Actors (publicsafety.gc.ca), 20 August 2021.
\13\ Statistics Canada, The Daily--The Canadian census: A rich
portrait of the country's religious and ethnocultural diversity
(statcan.gc.ca), 26 October 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRC foreign interference activities target a variety of diaspora
groups in Canada using various tactics. Some of these activities are
documented in a report of the House of Commons Special Committee on the
Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship titled A Threat to
Canadian Sovereignty: National Security Dimensions of the Canada-
People's Republic of China Relationship.
One tactic used by the PRC is to target Canadian university
campuses. The Special Committee heard testimony from Chemi Lhamo, who
was targeted by the PRC after she spoke up about Tibetan human rights
and ran for the 2019 student elections at the University of Toronto's
Scarborough campus. She told the Special Committee she ``received
thousands of harassing comments on social media, including rape and
death threats, because of her Tibetan identity'' and that they
continued after being elected student president.\14\ Ms. Lhamo stated
her threats were connected to the PRC's mission in Canada and that the
Communist Party of China (CCP) ``coerces Chinese international students
into following CCP party lines and protesting initiatives that are seen
as threatening PRC interests.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ CACN, A Threat to Canadian Sovereignty: National Security
Dimensions of the Canada-
People's Republic of China Relationship (ourcommons.ca), May 2023, 19-
20.
\15\ Ibid, 19-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rukiye Turdush's experience is another example of the PRC's foreign
interference on Canadian university campuses. Ms. Turdush is the
Research Director of the Uyghur Research Institute. She testified at
the Special Committee about the harassment she faced following her talk
about the plight of Uyghurs at McMaster University's Muslim Students'
Association in 2019. She stated that ``the McMaster Chinese Students'
Association reported the event to the PRC embassy and published a
statement condemning the presentation [ . . . and] that the PRC embassy
in Ottawa later praised students who had protested her talk for their
patriotism.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Ibid, 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many Chinese international students are coerced by the PRC into
participating in the PRC's foreign interference activities on
university campuses. Cheuk Kwan, past chair of the Toronto Association
for Democracy in China, testified at the Special Committee, ``about
Chinese international students who were `compelled' to `demonstrate
against pro-Hong Kong rallies' '' after threats had been made ``to
withhold their government scholarships or harm their families back home
if they [did not] comply.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ CACN, The Breach of Hong Kong's High Degree of Autonomy: A
Situation of International Concern (ourcommons.ca), February 2021, 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other foreign interference tactics used by the PRC include
targeting Chinese language media and social media in Canada, as well as
the establishment of illegal PRC ``police service centres'' in Canada.
CSIS has assessed that Chinese language media in Canada, including
newspapers, radio and television broadcasters, are targeted by the PRC.
In a 2021 briefing note to the Canadian Prime Minister, CSIS explained
that ``Chinese-language media outlets operating in Canada and members
of the Chinese-Canadian community are primary targets of PRC-directed
foreign influenced activities.'' \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ CSIS, Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference--
Revised Speaking Notes, p. 9, February 9, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Special Committee's report on Hong Kong highlighted testimony
from Guy Saint-Jacques, former Canadian Ambassador to the PRC, who was
``struck by the extent to which Canadian media publishing in Mandarin
reflected the views expressed in Beijing during the Meng Wanzhou
affair.'' \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ CACN, A Threat to Canadian Sovereignty: National Security
Dimensions of the Canada-
People's Republic of China Relationship (ourcommons.ca), May 2023, 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The report also highlighted the testimony of Victor Ho, former
editor of Sing Tao Daily (Canada's largest Chinese language newspaper):
[Mr. Ho] provided the example of a half-hour ``radio speech''
by China's Consul General in Vancouver on 23 July 2020.
According to Mr. Ho, during the speech, which was ``programmed
in newscast airtime,'' the Consul General asked Chinese
Canadians to support the National Security Law while also
suggesting that there were ``very few people in Canada trying
to slander'' the law and ``attempting to cause trouble overseas
as well.'' In Mr. Ho's view, the Consul General ``treats
Chinese Canadians as Chinese nationals, when of course they are
not.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Ibid, 41.
Chinese language social media is another medium for foreign
interference. CSIS has observed ``social media being leveraged to
spread disinformation or run foreign influenced campaigns designed to
confuse or divide public opinion or interfere in healthy public
debate.'' \21\ The Special Committee`s national security report
concluded that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ CSIS, Foreign Interference Threats to Canada's Democratic
Process, July 2021, 6.
Disinformation and influence campaigns designed to divide
public opinion and interfere with public debate are
increasingly being spread through social media. WeChat and
other social media applications monitored by the PRC provide a
powerful tool for the PRC to censor information, manipulate
public sentiment, and to monitor and intimidate diaspora.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ CACN, A Threat to Canadian Sovereignty: National Security
Dimensions of the Canada-
People's Republic of China Relationship, May 2023.
After assessing recent activity on WeChat in May of this year, the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development concluded that it
is ``highly probable'' that the PRC played a role in the information
operation that was spreading disinformation about me.\23\ It is
estimated that WeChat has over one million users in Canada and that the
disinformation regarding me was viewed by between two and five million
WeChat users globally.\24\ Clearly, the PRC is using social media
channels like WeChat as a tool for foreign interference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Global Affairs Canada, WeChat account activity targeting
Canadian parliamentarian suggests likely foreign state involvement
(international.gc.ca), 9 August 2023.
\24\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As in the United States, the PRC has been documented to have
established illegal ``police service centres'' in Canada, most notably,
in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. The PRC describes them as
``service stations'' that were established during the pandemic to help
Chinese nationals with administrative matters, such as driver's
licenses and other documents, and that they are run by volunteers.\25\
These stations have been assessed by human rights groups as a tool to
``threaten and monitor Chinese nationals abroad.'' \26\ This includes
coercing persons in Canada back to the PRC. For example, a U.S.
indictment unsealed in federal court in Brooklyn, New York on October
22, 2023, revealed that an individual in Canada was coerced back to the
PRC.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Reuters, Canada police probe alleged Chinese `police stations'
in Montreal, Reuters, 9 March 2023.
\26\ BBC, Canadian police investigate Chinese `police stations' in
Quebec--BBC News, 9 March 2023.
\27\ DOJ, Six Individuals Charged with Conspiring to Act as Illegal
Agents of the People's Republic of China, October 20, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PRC foreign interference threat activities also target Canada's
general elections. In the 2021 election, Kenny Chiu (former Member of
Parliament for Steveston-Richmond East, British Columbia) was targeted
and was the subject of disinformation. The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism
(RRM) in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
observed Chinese Communist Party media accounts spreading a hostile
narrative about Kenny Chiu and the Conservative Party of Canada's
election platform, saying inaccurately that anyone with ties to China
would be ``considered a spokesperson for the Chinese government'' \28\
and that ``all individuals or groups with ties to China would be
required to register.'' \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Unclassified, G7 RRM Canada. p. 1, Monday, October 18, 2021.
\29\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PRC foreign threat activities have also targeted the
fundamental right to peacefully protest in Canada. In response to a
peaceful rally organized in August 2019 in Vancouver backing Hong
Kong's anti-extradition protests, pro-PRC counter-protesters allegedly
organized through the PRC consulate in Vancouver threatened those at
the rally. Threats were made through social media and in person by pro-
PRC counter-protestors.\30\ Co-founder Cherie Wong of the Pro-Hong Kong
group ``Alliance Canada Hong Kong'' and other pro-Hong Kong activists
received threats, including rape and murder.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Ibid.
\31\ CBC News, ``We know where your parents live'': Hong Kong
activists say Canadian police helpless against online threats,
September 10, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There have also been suggestions that the PRC paid protesters to
support the daughter of Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei, Meng Wanzhou, at
her extradition hearing that took place in Vancouver.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ CBC News, The strange tale of the paid protesters supporting
Meng Wanzhou at her extradition hearing, January 21, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recently, the PRC is utilizing a new foreign interference tactic by
creating ``wanted lists'' and offering bounties for the arrest of those
living overseas. Last year, the government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region placed Victor Ho on a ``wanted list,'' allegedly
for violations of Hong Kong's National Security Law, but in fact for
his speaking up in Canada in favor of Hong Kong's democracy and human
rights. This year, the government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region offered HK$1 million [USD$128,000) bounties for
the arrest of eight democracy activists based overseas, all of whom are
believed to be living in Canada, the United States, Britain and
Australia. Out of the eight, at least two have ties to Canada (Dennis
Kwok and Elmer Yuen).
Responding to PRC Foreign Interference Threat Activities
Foreign interference is a complex national security threat to
Canada \33\ and requires a suite of measures to combat. CSIS has stated
that foreign interference can be countered through investigating and
monitoring, utilizing threat reduction measures, reducing PRC access to
critical economic sectors, conducting stakeholder engagement, publicly
``calling out'' foreign state actors and prosecuting individuals and
entities.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ CSIS, Foreign Interference and You (canada.ca), 2021, 2.
\34\ CSIS, Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference--
Revised Speaking Notes, p. 11, February 9, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foreign interference also requires cooperation among allied
democracies. The 2023 report from the Canadian government's National
Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians emphasized the
need for ``cooperation with allies on foreign interference.'' \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ NSICOP, 2022 Annual Report, p. 17, July 19, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One area for cooperation should include the sharing of best
practices among the Five Eyes intelligence alliance about when to
release information to the public about the PRC's foreign interference
threat activities. Often intelligence gathered about foreign
interference does not meet the evidentiary standard required to
commence a prosecution, yet still constitutes a serious threat that
needs to be countered. In those cases, Five Eyes intelligence agencies
have advised governments that sunlight and transparency is a tool that
can be used. In 2021, CSIS provided a briefing to the Canadian Prime
Minister on foreign interference stating, ``Canada can make use of a
policy that is grounded in transparency and sunlight in order to
highlight the point that FI [foreign interference] should be exposed to
the public.'' \36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ CSIS, Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference--
Revised Speaking Notes, 9 February 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, in 2022 the U.K.'s MI5 went public about a PRC agent
in the U.K. Parliament, Christine Lee. MI5 informed the Speaker about
the security threat this individual presented, and in turn, the Speaker
emailed all members of the U.K. House of Commons, identifying this
individual as a security threat.\37\ Members took appropriate action,
cut off contact with this individual, and the integrity of the U.K.
Parliament was protected. Sunlight and transparency worked, and the
integrity of U.K.'s democracy was ensured.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ The Independent, Christine Lee: Security warning to MPs over
Chinese spying threat, The Independent, 13 January 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transparency in party nominations (primaries) and general
elections, including the disclosure of information regarding foreign
interference, is particularly sensitive because of the impact these
disclosures can have on party nominations and elections; the timely
release of information about foreign interference while maintaining the
confidence of all political parties and candidates are equally
important if we are to protect democracies against foreign interference
in the electoral process. Exchanging best practices in this area is
another area in which democracies can learn from each other.
Another area for cooperation is exchanging information on effective
legislative measures that can be implemented to prosecute PRC agents
carrying out foreign interference activities. A foreign agent registry
can be a useful tool to combat foreign interference. Recently, the U.S.
foreign agent registry was used to shut down a PRC ``police station''
in lower Manhattan and two individuals were arrested for acting as PRC
agents.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ DOJ, U.S. Attorney Announces Charges Against Co-Director of
Think Tank for Acting as an Unregistered Foreign Agent, Trafficing in
Arms, Violating U.S. Sanctions Against Iran, and Making False
Statements to Federal Agents, July 10, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. has had a foreign agent registry (Foreign Agent Registry
Act) since 1938,\39\ while Australia adopted the Foreign Influence
Transparency Scheme Act 2018 in 2019.\40\ This past summer, the U.K.
adopted the National Security Act 2023, which establishes a
registry.\41\ The Canadian government has announced it will introduce
legislation for a registry but has yet to introduce one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Foreign Agents Registration Act, Foreign Agents Registration
Act, Foreign Agents Registration Act (justice.gov), retrieved 30 August
2023.
\40\ Australian Government, Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme
Act 2018, April 11, 2019.
\41\ U.K. Public General Acts, National Security Act 2023, July 11,
2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the threshold for a registry is too high, then it will not
capture the activity needed to be countered. On the other hand, if the
threshold for a registry is too low, then it will capture much activity
unrelated to foreign interference. Exchanging information on effective
legislative models for a registry is an area where democracies can
learn from each other.
Translating intelligence into evidence is often difficult but
essential if individuals engaged in foreign interference are to be
successfully prosecuted. A clear definition of what constitutes foreign
interference and establishing clear evidentiary standards that are
accepted by the intelligence community and law enforcement alike are
critical if those engaged in foreign interference are to be
successfully prosecuted.
Foreign interference often takes place alongside corruption,
including money laundering and covert enrichment. Enhancing financial
transparency through a beneficial ownership registry covering
corporations, trusts and real estate is critical to combatting the
corruption that often accompanies foreign interference. In addition,
freezing and seizing the assets of individuals engaged in foreign
interference would serve as a deterrent and remove the profit motive.
Best practices and coordination on financial transparency, asset
freezes, and forfeiture should be shared among allied democracies.
Foreign interference often takes place through the deliberate
spreading of disinformation. Democracies should share best practices on
how to combat this disinformation while upholding our cherished
freedoms of thought, belief, opinion, and expression, including freedom
of the press and other media of communication. Recently, I was part of
a parliamentary delegation to the Republic of China (Taiwan), where we
met with Audrey Tang Feng, the Minister of Digital Affairs. Taiwan is
ground zero for the PRC's disinformation campaigns, and Taiwan has a
well-
developed multi-faceted policy grounded in building resilience among
Taiwanese society while protecting fundamental freedoms.
Repression with the PRC can also be better countered through better
coordination and cooperation among allied democracies. The North
American and European Union free trade areas collectively comprise
about 43 per cent of global GDP.\42\ This immense purchasing power
should be used to counter repression and uphold human rights.
Furthermore, Canada is a signatory, along with the U.S. and Mexico, of
the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). Article 23.6 of the
Agreement requires signatories to ban the import of products produced
using forced labor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ World Bank, GDP, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is evidence that the PRC is forcing the Uyghur minority in
Xinjiang province to harvest cotton and tomatoes. Since CUSMA has come
into effect, the U.S. has interdicted and seized thousands of shipments
from Xinjiang from entering the United States. Canada, conversely, only
stopped one shipment of cotton products from the PRC at the border, and
these products were later released.\43\ The Canadian government can
learn from best practices in the U.S. to counter repression within the
PRC while upholding the rules-based international order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ The Globe and Mail, Only shipment Canada has seized on
suspicion of forced labour was released after challenge from importer,
The Globe and Mail, 27 May 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Canada must work toward a stronger defense and security partnership
with the United States, our Euro-Atlantic allies, and democratic
partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Canada must look for every
opportunity to strengthen these partnerships to ensure we meet the
challenge of rising authoritarianism and preserve our fundamental
freedoms, democratic institutions, and the rules-based international
order.
Statement of Yana Gorokhovskaia
______
Transnational Repression Committed by the People's Republic of China--
Evidence from Freedom House
Thank you, Chairman Smith, Co-chairman Merkley, and distinguished
members of the commission, for the opportunity to share information
about the scope and scale of the global transnational repression
campaign carried out by the People's Republic of China (PRC). I will
use my time to first describe the ways in which the PRC intimidates,
harasses, harms, and otherwise tries to silence critics, diaspora
members, and exiles living beyond its borders and second, to explain
how this campaign has evolved to threaten people in new ways. I'll
conclude with suggestions for policies that can be adopted by
democratic governments, including by the United States, to better
protect people targeted by the PRC.
The People's Republic of China is one of the least free countries
in the world. Freedoms there have deteriorated rapidly over the last
decade, and especially since 2017, under the leadership of Xi Jinping.
The country now ranks near the very bottom among the 195 countries
assessed every year in Freedom in the World, our global survey of
political rights and civil liberties.\1\ Like other authoritarian
governments, the PRC also exports oppression abroad as a way of
maintaining its regime at home.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2023: China,'' https://
freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even though Chinese officials routinely reference the government's
policy of noninterference, Beijing seeks to dictate, sometimes through
use of physical force, the terms of free speech, association, movement,
assembly, and even religious expression of individuals thousands of
miles away. Today, China is carrying out the world's most sophisticated
and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression, using a wide
array of physical, digital, and psychological tactics to attempt to
silence those it views as threats to the regime.
Freedom House has compiled a database of direct physical incidents
of transnational repression--including assassinations, abductions,
assaults, detentions, and unlawful deportations--that spans 2014 to
2022 inclusive.\2\ After our last update, the database now includes 854
cases. This is a conservative estimate based only on public, verified
cases of direct attacks which excludes incidents that are harder to
confirm, such as the intimidation of family, digital surveillance, and
online harassment. Even so, a clear picture of the PRC's role in this
global phenomenon has emerged. China is responsible for 30 percent of
the coded cases--nearly twice as many as Turkey, the second most
prolific perpetrator in the database.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Yana Gorokhovskaia, Nate Schenkkan, and Grady Vaughan, Still
Not Safe: Transnational Repression in 2022, Freedom House, April 2022,
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/
FH_TransnationalRepression2023_0.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This statistic tells only one part of the story. The PRC has
targeted people in at least 36 countries, including those living in
democracies. Among the victims are pro-democracy activists,
journalists, students, human rights defenders, artists, former
insiders, civil society organizations, as well as whole ethnic and
religious groups like the Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Falun Gong
practitioners, and others who simply criticize the Chinese Communist
Party.
Beijing's transnational repression toolkit is diverse. It continues
to rely on well-practiced tactics of intimidation such as forcing
family members to call their relatives abroad in order to urge them to
stop engaging in activities like protest or human rights activism,
objectionable to the PRC.\3\ Members of the diaspora are sometimes
recruited or coerced into informing on each other.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Sam Judah, ``China Using Families as `Hostages' to Quash Uyghur
Dissent Abroad,'' BBC, July 31, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
66337328.
\4\ Gulchehra Hoja, ``With Threats and Intimidation, China Coerces
Uyghurs in Turkey to Spy on Each Other,'' RFA, February 5, 2023,
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghur-turkey-
02052023210957.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It also continues to abuse established mechanisms of international
cooperation, like Interpol's notifications system and extradition
agreements, which allow it to co-opt agencies of foreign states in
order to repress. Idris Hasan, a Uyghur activist,
was detained on a Red Notice requested by China after he landed at the
airport in Casablanca in March 2021.\5\ He has been in prison for more
than two years. Despite the fact the that the Red Notice was cancelled
shortly after his arrest, Idris is in danger every day of being
deported because Morocco and China have an extradition agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Nicholas Muller, ``The Continued Imprisonment of Idris Hasan,''
The Diplomat, July 1, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/the-
continued-imprisonment-of-idris-hasan/; https://menarights.
org/en/articles/2-years-detention-uyghur-activist-idris-hasan-must-be-
released.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PRC menaces people living in democracies. In addition to the
problem of overseas police stations that my colleague from Safeguard
Defenders has described, China has sent police officers into foreign
countries to surveil and intimidate targeted individuals, sometimes in
cooperation with the government \6\ and sometimes clandestinely.\7\
Signaling a dangerous evolution of this tactic, evidence has emerged
over the last year that the PRC is co-opting former members of domestic
law enforcement agencies to harass, coerce, stalk, and surveil people
living in the U.S. and Canada.\8\ The Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Department of Justice, as well as their Canadian counterparts,
have begun to pursue these cases. There has been at least one
successful criminal prosecution in New York state to date. However, it
is worth underlining that the employment of former law enforcement
officials by the PRC to act as proxies in the transnational repression
campaign may amplify the fear that members of the diaspora feel,
demonstrating that the PRC is able to co-opt officials in democratic
states to carry out its repressive schemes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Michael E. Miller and Matthew Abbott, ``China Hoped Fiji Would
Be a Template for the Pacific. Its Plan Backfired,'' The Washington
Post, August 21, 2023, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/china-fiji-police-mou-
pacific-islands/.
\7\ Sebastian Rotella and Kirsten Berg, ``Operation Fox Hunt: How
China Exports Repression Using a Network of Spies Hidden in Plain
Sight,'' ProPublica, July 22, 2021, https://www.propublica.org/article/
operation-fox-hunt-how-china-exports-repression-using-a-network-of-
spies-hidden-in-plain-sight.
\8\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Federal Jury Convicts Three
Defendants of Interstate Stalking of Chinese Nationals in the U.S. and
Two of Those Defendants for Acting or Conspiring to Act on Behalf of
the People's Republic of China,'' U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern
District of New York, June 20, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/
pr/federal-jury-convicts-three-defendants-interstate-stalking-chinese-
nationals-us-and; Robert Fife and Steven Chase, ``Former Mountie
Targeted B.C. Real Estate Tycoon for China, RCMP Allege,'' The Globe
and Mail, August 21, 2023, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/
article-rcmp-officer-charged-bc-entrepreneur/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PRC's toolkit of repression is growing, with each new tactic
exploiting a previously undetected vulnerability and adapting to the
responses of democratic countries. Wang Jingyu was a teenager when he
fled China in 2019 after posting comments online critical of the CCP
and supportive of pro-democracy protests. In 2021, he was detained in
Dubai while on a layover on his way to the U.S. He was held in
detention for weeks and the UAE authorities allowed Chinese embassy
officials to interrogate the teen.\9\ His release was secured as a
result of media attention and international pressure. But Wang
continues to be targeted. Beginning last year, bomb threats were made
in his name, and in the names of other activists and journalists,
against Chinese embassies in the Netherlands and Norway.\10\ These
threats predictably activated the security and public safety responses
of European law enforcement, resulting in police investigations,
questioning, and even the brief detention of some of the targeted
individuals. Like the co-opting of former law enforcement agents
working in democracies, ``swatting,'' or harassment carried out by
alerting police or emergency services through false reporting, is meant
to cause psychological stress and demonstrate the reach of the PRC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Voice of America, ``Teen, Fiancee Flee to Netherlands to Avoid
Extradition Back to China,'' July 21, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/
east-asia-pacific_teen-fiancee-flee-netherlands-avoid-extradition-back-
china/6208514.html.
\10\ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Alison Snyder, ``Fake Bomb
Threats Used to Harass China Critics,'' Axios, April 2, 2023, https://
www.axios.com/2023/03/29/chinese-activists-false-bomb-threats; Jemimah
Steinfeld, ``Critics of Beijing Face Increasing Impersonation
Attacks,'' New Lines Magazine, August 21, 2023, https://
newlinesmag.com/reportage/critics-of-beijing-face-
increasing-impersonation-attacks/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PRC is the world's worst abuser of internet freedom
domestically; \11\ it also employs tactics of digital authoritarianism
in its transnational repression campaign. These tactics, which include
mass trolling, smear campaigns,\12\ threats and intimidation, spoofing
accounts, and even doxing of personal information, are meant to
intimidate critics and journalists, drown out reports of human rights
abuses, and apply psychological pressure on the targets. These tactics
are also often gendered; women face not only violent but sexualized
digital threats in response to work that shines a critical light on the
PRC.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Freedom House, ``Freedom on the Net 2022: China,'' https://
freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-net/2022.
\12\ Wang Gang and Liam Scott, ``Trolling of Female Asian
Journalists on Rise as Beijing Seeks to Discredit Media,'' Voice of
America, January 2, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/trolling-of-female-
asian-journalists-on-rise-as-beijing-seeks-to-discredit-media/
6898789.html.
\13\ Albert Zhang and Danielle Cave, ``Smart Asian Women Are the
New Targets of CCP Global Online Repression,'' Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, June 3, 2022, https://www.
aspistrategist.org.au/smart-asian-women-are-the-new-targets-of-ccp-
global-online-repression/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CCP's campaign of transnational repression is a threat not only
to the targeted individuals and groups but also to state sovereignty,
democratic institutions, and the exercise of fundamental rights.
Building resilience and imposing accountability are key to curbing the
CCP's campaign of transnational repression. Steps to better protect
against the CCP's campaign of transnational repression, both in the
United States and abroad, include:
1. Codifying a definition of transnational repression, which will
facilitate the tracking of incidents at home and abroad, distinguish
attacks from ordinary crime, and coordinate inter-agency action, in
addition to serving as a basis for any other laws that may be needed.
2. Training for government officials, including law enforcement,
who may encounter transnational repression. Several agencies, including
the FBI, Department of State, and Department of Homeland Security, have
begun instituting trainings, but they vary in consistency and content.
Coordinated, mandated requirements across agencies could help ensure
that officials are equipped with matching and sufficient information to
help protect those at risk and to not unwittingly become a player in an
authoritarian regime's campaign of transnational repression. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation has begun this effort.
3. Conducting strategic, consistent, and culturally sensitive
outreach to communities that are at risk of experiencing transnational
repression in order to equip them with the resources to report these
activities.
4. Using voice and vote within international institutions to limit
the ability of Interpol member states to target individuals through the
misuse of Red Notices and other alerts.
5. Deploying targeted sanctions against Chinese officials for the
use of transnational repression and screening Chinese diplomats for a
history of harassing diaspora members in their postings.
More details about these recommendations, and additional
recommendations, are available in our reports.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Freedom House, ``Policy Recommendations: Transnational
Repression,'' https://freedomhouse.org/policy-recommendations/
transnational-repression#US.
I should note that several pieces of legislation to address
transnational repression have been introduced or will be introduced in
the near future. Thank you, Co-chairman Merkley and Chairman Smith for
your introduction of the Transnational Repression Policy Act, which
Freedom House supports. We look forward to working with you and your
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
staff to see this passed into law.
Addressing transnational repression committed by the government of
the People's Republic of China is a matter of urgency. It is imperative
that Congress, in a bipartisan fashion, come together with the
executive branch and like-minded partners to protect those at risk and
defend democratic institutions and fundamental rights. We appreciate
the leadership of the Commission on this issue, and I look forward to
your questions.
Statement of Laura Harth
Chairman Smith, Chairman Merkley, distinguished members of the
Commission, it is an honor testifying before you today on behalf of
Safeguard Defenders.
Most people will know us for the report released exactly one year
ago today, which exposed the formal cooperation between public security
authorities in China and united front-linked groups around the world in
the setting up and running of over 100 so-called ``overseas police
service centers'' in more than 50 countries around the world. On the
exclusive basis of open-source evidence from Chinese authorities and
State/Party media, we were able to link at least three of these
stations to ``persuasion to return'' operations that took place in
Spain, Serbia and France.
While the revelations of 110 Overseas and its follow-up Patrol and
Persuade contributed to jumpstarting a conversation on the PRC's
transnational repression in countries where that was not previously the
case, in particular in Europe, we have and will continue to highlight
how these are but the tip of the iceberg in what Freedom House rightly
defines as ``the world's most sophisticated, comprehensive, and far-
reaching campaign of transnational repression.''
Within this campaign, Safeguard Defenders has focused its
documentation as well as its direct-action efforts on countering one of
its most extreme iterations: involuntary returns. While not new, the
scale on which PRC authorities are coercing individuals to return to
China to face prosecution has exploded over the course of the past
decade, with official--yet partial--numbers released annually claiming
well over ten thousand returns from over 120 countries in the world
between the start of Operation Fox Hunt in 2014 and October 2022. We
will soon release additional evidence on such operations in targeted
countries.
The often-clandestine methods for these returns have been set in
stone by the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in a
written legal interpretation to the 2018 National Supervision Law that
vastly expanded the non-judicial body's reach: ``extradition,''
``repatriation,'' ``off-site prosecution,'' ``persuasion,'' ``luring
and entrapment,'' and ``kidnapping.''
The so-called ``persuasion to return'' method is the one used most
frequently. Threats and harassment--or worse--against family members
back home or direct threats and harassment of individuals overseas by
covert PRC agents, individuals linked to its embassies or consulates,
private investigators and security firms, coopted private individuals,
rabid nationalists or even victims themselves: the Chinese Communist
Party has set up a true whole of society effort to exert control over
diaspora communities worldwide and silence dissent.
These efforts clearly undermine the most fundamental freedoms of
targeted communities, severely infringe the rights and due process of
individuals coerced into returning and constitute a grave violation of
the territorial and judicial sovereignty of other nations. The climate
of suspicion and widespread fear further isolate targeted communities
and individuals from their environment, and may expose individuals that
have been co-opted or coerced into doing the CCP's bidding to criminal
liability.
To effectively counter such a massive undertaking, democracies need
to respond with a similar whole of government approach that recognizes
transnational repression for the domestic threat it is, one that is
inextricably linked to the CCP's influence operations. Speaking from a
European experience, we are but at the very beginning of such an
endeavor and will need continued concerted allied efforts to move
beyond the stage of timid condemnation to effective and coordinated
transnational counteraction to match the CCP's efforts. Working towards
joint definitions, sharing of information and best practices is an
essential step in this direction. It is in our view equally key to end
the legitimization of the PRC's illegal practices through judicial and
police cooperation agreements, at the bilateral but also at the
multilateral level. It is no coincidence the PRC has been pushing the
signing and ratifying of such agreements at an accelerated rate during
the same timeframe in which its involuntary returns operations have
exploded.
These agreements were often pushed through within economic and
cultural cooperation packages, but the signing of similar agreements in
particular by Western countries has equally acted as a most effective
``gateway'' for other countries to sign on, as we discovered firsthand
during court extradition proceedings in a European country. As
awareness on the overall human rights situation in the PRC grows,
democratic nations are increasingly becoming aware of the intrinsic
risks of these agreements. However, we continue seeing remarkable
efforts by PRC authorities to expand their cooperation footprint in
these fields in the Global South.
In this regard I'd like in particular to severely question the
legitimacy of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's MoU with the CCP's
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection--and its State front the
National Commission of Supervision--and its acceptance of this body--
that cannot be described but as the internal police force of the
Chinese Communist Party--as the Chinese focal point for all work under
the Convention Against Corruption.
While PRC propaganda dubs these types of agreements as a
``demonstration of the international community's trust in its judicial
system,'' they directly contribute to a heightened sense of fear within
targeted communities and subvert the international rules-based order.
Ending such legitimization is a crucial part in rebuilding trust
with targeted communities. And allow me to conclude with an appeal to
them. The question we receive time and time again from democratic
governments willing to engage on the issue is: ``we need the victims to
come forward.''
The U.S. and Australia have already set up exemplary multilingual
dedicated hotlines to report transnational repression efforts, also
anonymously. To encourage this best practice elsewhere, Safeguard
Defenders has today released a pilot guide with reporting channels in a
series of countries, which we will continue to update and hopefully
grow with similarly dedicated hotlines.
While we understand the personal toll for victims to come forward
and the mistrust that may exist towards local authorities who, often
and for too long, have maintained preferential channels of
interlocution with those seeking to exert control at the behest of the
CCP, the time to come forward and thus contribute to build a democratic
whole of society effort to counter transnational repression is now.
Please do so.
* * *
A report by Safeguard Defenders entitled Involuntary Returns--China's
Covert Operation to Force `Fugitives' Overseas Back Home, appears under
Submissions for the Record.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Statement of Rushan Abbas
My name is Rushan Abbas. I am an Uyghur-American, a mother and a
Uyghur rights activist. I am the founder and Executive Director of
Campaign For Uyghurs (CFU). I currently live in Falls Church, Virginia
but I was born in Urumqi, the capital city of the so-called `Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region.' Xinjiang is a name that has been designated
by the Chinese government and means the ``New Frontier.'' However, it
is important to note that historically and geographically, this area
has been known as East Turkistan. This name pays respect to the Uyghur
and other Turkic groups who have inhabited the region for centuries.
My activism is focused on the human rights and freedoms of the
Uyghur people. The situation in East Turkistan has raised global
concerns, as there have been multiple determinations by U.S. NGOs and
other government entities of systemic discrimination against Uyghurs by
the Chinese government amounting to crimes against humanity and
genocide. By raising awareness and speaking out against these
injustices, I hope to counter Chinese propaganda and contribute to the
international dialogue and efforts to safeguard the rights and dignity
of Uyghurs.
Introduction to Transnational Repression (TNR)
Thank you for giving me the platform to testify about China's
transnational repression and long-arm policing of Uyghurs in the
diaspora. It is essential to shed light on the various tactics employed
by the Chinese government to intimidate and silence Uyghurs who live on
American soil. Surveillance is an ever-present reality that we face
collectively as Uyghurs in the region, and as diaspora members. The
feeling of being constantly watched weighs heavily on my mind. There
have been occasions where I have suspected the presence of Chinese
agents within our communities, keeping a tight watch on our activities
and reporting back to their superiors.
The presence of online surveillance, including hacking attempts and
strange online activities, as well as systematic hate speech
dissemination through bot accounts, and libel targeted at myself and
other Uyghur individuals, jeopardize the safety of Uyghur individuals
by creating online echo chambers of hate and disinformation.
However, it is the targeting of our families that has caused
immense distress and anguish within the Uyghur diaspora. The Chinese
government's ruthless approach extends to our loved ones who still
reside in East Turkistan. We hear stories of harassment, arbitrary
detention, and forced disappearance, all meant to exert pressure on us
and to deter any attempts to expose the truth about the atrocities
being committed against the Uyghurs.
These threats and intimidation tactics have created a suffocating
atmosphere of fear, making it challenging for Uyghur diaspora members
to speak out, testify in public, or participate in interviews. We are
torn between our moral obligation to fight for the survival of our
people, who are being systematically erased in the region, and our
familial obligation of minimizing potential risk to vulnerable
relatives.
It is essential for the international community to understand the
gravity of the threats faced by the Uyghur diaspora and to support and
amplify the courageous voices that speak out. By standing in solidarity
with us, you send a powerful message to the CCP that we are not alone
and at the very least, the United States stands for its constituents'
safety. Together, we can shed light on the Chinese government's
transnational repression and work towards bringing about justice and
accountability for the countless victims of these heinous human rights
abuses.
Personal Story
My family's personal experience serves as a harrowing testament to
the grave repercussions faced by Uyghur activists and their loved ones
who dare to use their freedom of speech to advocate for human rights.
In 2018, we received news that 24 of my husband's family members had
gone missing and were likely detained. I spoke up about the unjust
arrests and highlighted the Uyghur genocide and crimes against humanity
being committed by the Chinese government, on September 5, 2018. On
September 11th, exactly five years ago, the authorities arbitrarily
detained my sister, Dr. Gulshan Abbas, who, to this day, remains a
victim of their unjust actions. It was only in December 2020 that we
received indirect information through a third party, confirming her
unfair sentencing on fabricated charges of `terrorism' and `social
disruption.' The spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
later verified these distressing revelations during a press conference.
My sister is an apolitical person and the circumstances surrounding
her abduction are direct retribution imposed upon my own activism,
highlighting the Chinese Communist Party's utilization of transnational
kin punishment and repression. This excruciatingly painful situation
unveils the extent to which Chinese authorities resort to arbitrary
detention, persecution, and a flagrant disregard for justice to quash
dissent and promote their own political agenda.
I also stand before you today to share a deeply distressing story
that reveals another dark reality of China's transnational repression.
In January 2023, my father-in-law, Abdulkarim Zikrullah Idris,
tragically left this world at the age of 81. What is truly
heartbreaking is that our family learned of his passing on August 15th,
seven months after it occurred. The exact date and circumstances
surrounding his death remain shrouded in uncertainty, leaving us in a
state of anguish and longing for closure.
In the era of instant communication, internet and advanced
technologies like AI, Uyghurs encounter radio silence when seeking
updates on the well-being of their loved ones. The last time my husband
was able to communicate with his father was on April 25, 2017, and for
the past 6 and a half years, we have been uninformed about his location
and health, until recently. I must also add that my husband has not
been able to see his father for more than twenty years, preventing him
from bidding a final farewell or participating in a proper burial.
My mother-in-law, Habibehan Idris, has been reported to be outside
of the camps, while her children, Turanisahan Idris, Bu'Aisha Idris,
Bu'Hadiqa Idris, and Abdurahim Idris, are missing and reportedly
detained, and their spouses and children are also missing. She
currently battles illness, which is made all the more challenging by
the absence of the caregiving support that her children would have
provided because they too have also been imprisoned by the Chinese
government.
The absence of closure and being forced to live in the unknown
about the fate of our family members is a blatant violation of basic
human rights by the Chinese regime, and underscores the ongoing
suffering endured by the Uyghurs.
CFU Program Director Arslan Hidayat's in-laws, his father-in-law
Abdurashid Tohti, mother-in-law Tajigul Qadir, and two brothers-in-law
Ametjan Abdurashid and Mohamed Ali Abdurashid have been missing since
mid-2017. The Chinese government refused to provide any information
about these detained individuals. The only information they have is
that they have been given long-term prison sentences for fabricated
charges of ``disturbing social order'' and ``preparing to commit
terrorist activities.''
The Chinese government claims to be operating in accordance with
the ``rule of law'' and commits to protecting ``the public's right to
information'' in court rulings in our homeland. However, none of these
assertions seem to hold true in the cases involving Uyghurs.
China's Intimidation Tactics
As mentioned before, due to China's transnational repression and
intimidation tactics, Uyghurs are hesitant to speak out, testify, or
participate in interviews. This reluctance stems from the threats
issued by the Chinese government, which have created an atmosphere of
fear and suppression. Consequently, Uyghurs refrain from sharing their
experiences and knowledge, depriving the world of valuable insights and
hindering efforts to shed light on the situation.
Amnesty International's research, captured in the study ``Nowhere
Feels Safe,'' involved interviews with individuals from Uyghur, Kazakh,
Uzbek, and other ethnic backgrounds residing in 22 countries. An
important revelation emerged: approximately two-thirds hesitated to
link their names to the study, driven by concerns over potential
consequences for themselves or their families stemming from Chinese
authorities.
The report `` `We Know You Better Than You Know Yourself': China's
Transnational Repression of the Uyghur Diaspora'' revealed that around
two-thirds of Uyghurs surveyed have been directly threatened and
experienced threats to their family while living in the U.K. and about
4 in 5 Uyghurs report being directly threatened or having their
families threatened by Chinese authorities while living in Turkey.
The Chinese government employs various methods, such as phone
calls, emails, or social media messages, to intimidate Uyghur diaspora
members. These tactics involve harassment, threats, or warnings that
aim to instill fear and dissuade individuals from persisting in their
activism or advocacy efforts. This direct form of communication can
evoke intense intimidation, leaving Uyghur diaspora members feeling
vulnerable and anxious.
Instances in the United States exemplify these tactics. Uyghurs in
the U.S. have reported receiving phone calls from Chinese authorities
or even family members in the region, warning them that their online
activities or activism could lead to the detention of or harm to their
relatives. An illustrative case involves an Uyghur American who carried
a photograph of his detained sister as a symbol of his advocacy against
the CCP's abuses. When his parents contacted him, they delivered a
distressing ultimatum: to ensure his sister's safety, he was pressured
to suspend his activism. This situation underscores the extent of
pressure and coercion exerted on Uyghur diaspora members to silence
their voices.
Safeguard Defenders' recent report ``Targeted in Turkiye, China's
Transnational Repression Against Uyghurs'' further exposed China's
tactics of threatening the Uyghur community into stopping activism
work; producing pro-China propaganda; and/or spying on other Uyghurs.
The report identifies how the CCP's patterns of harassment are
organized by local Chinese police and state agents that are operating
in collaboration with employees within Chinese embassies. They have
formulated networks in East Turkistan that are structured around
specific Uyghur neighborhoods or districts in China. Their networks
involve cooperation among Chinese police, ``Neighborhood Working
Groups,'' and Chinese police operatives. The Chinese police exploit
intelligence gathered through these transnational networks, and
information known by family members in the region, to exert control
over Uyghurs in the diaspora. Although the report is on Uyghurs in
Turkey, most of the tactics in the report being used by Chinese police
are also being used against Uyghurs in China and share stark
similarities to those used against Uyghur Americans.
The specific repression tactics include threatening to harm their
family in East Turkistan, using coercion to compel the Uyghur community
into collaboration by refraining from processing their passport renewal
requests, offering financial incentives, and even luring them with what
they yearn for the most: reconnecting with their families. Uyghurs in
the diaspora are coerced to become informants, remain silent about
human rights violations in the Uyghur region, or take part in pro-CCP
propaganda. The report `` `We Know You Better Than Yourself': China's
Transnational Repression of the Uyghur Diaspora'' (2023) also indicates
a significant shift in the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) approach
since 2017, with a heightened emphasis on deploying Uyghur informants,
employing intimidation tactics to silence open discourse among Uyghurs,
and enlisting them to contribute to the creation of favorable
depictions of China.
I have been a target of attacks and harassment by Uyghurs in the
diaspora whose family members are in detention back home. They have
used tactics such as hate speech, libel, and blackmail to discredit my
advocacy and reinforce disinformation and propaganda by the CCP. They
are being reported to the FBI.
Uyghurs in exile are monitored closely, both physically and
digitally. This surveillance can range from monitoring online
activities and social media presence to physical surveillance,
including tracking movements, infiltrating community organizations, and
attending public events where Uyghur diaspora members gather. Chinese
security agents or informants may be present within these communities,
keeping a watchful eye on their activities and reporting back to
authorities. The objective of conducting such surveillance is to keep
tabs on Uyghur activists, advocates, and community members, instill a
sense of constant scrutiny, and create a climate of fear.
Furthermore, Uyghurs abroad frequently experience calls from family
members or law enforcement personnel, pressuring them to disclose
details about their current location, educational institution, and
information concerning other Uyghurs hailing from the same hometown as
the inquiring official, thus falling under their surveillance
``jurisdiction.'' It's essential to note that the Chinese Communist
Party has no rightful claim to personal and identifiable information of
Uyghurs living outside China; however, these individuals are compelled
to provide information under
duress.
The Chinese government makes a point of using tactics that put
immense pressure on diaspora members, instilling fear of potential
consequences for their loved ones who remain in East Turkistan. This
involves using family members as leverage to pressure, coerce, or
silence Uyghurs abroad. Families experience harassment, arbitrary
detention, and even forced disappearance, leaving Uyghur diaspora
members torn between raising awareness about the atrocities and
protecting their vulnerable relatives.
By using these tactics, the Chinese government aims to suppress
dissent, maintain control over the diaspora community, and discourage
Uyghurs from advocating for the rights of their fellow Uyghurs. These
actions create a climate of fear and vulnerability, making it difficult
for Uyghur diaspora members to openly express their concerns, share
information about human rights abuses, or support international efforts
to hold China accountable for its actions. As such, it has become
increasingly crucial to support and amplify the voices of the diaspora
community, empowering them to share their experiences while ensuring
their safety and protection.
Legislative and Policy Recommendations
In addressing China's transnational repression and supporting
Uyghurs in the diaspora, there are several policy suggestions and
legislative steps that can be considered.
We recommend the United States introduce and pass legislation that
explicitly condemns China's transnational repression tactics, focusing
on the protection of Uyghur activists, advocates, and their families.
The legislation can provide legal remedies for cases of harassment,
intimidation, or threats faced by Uyghur community members, enabling
them to seek justice and hold perpetrators accountable. It can also
establish mechanisms for individuals to report incidents and receive
support.
The introduction of the Transnational Repression Policy Act (TRPA)
on March 16th, 2023, by Senator Jeff Merkley, Senator Marco Rubio,
Senator Ben Cardin, and Senator Bill Hagerty--members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, is a good start. The TRPA, if enacted,
would greatly assist Uyghurs facing transnational repression by China.
This commitment from the United States would strengthen efforts to
advocate for Uyghur rights and work towards a more secure and just
global environment for all individuals affected by transnational
repression.
The U.S. Government should consider implementing targeted sanctions
on Chinese officials and entities involved in transnational repression
and human rights abuses against the Uyghur community. These sanctions
could include freezing assets, restricting access to financial systems,
and imposing travel bans. By targeting those responsible for human
rights violations, the U.S. sends a strong message that such actions
will have consequences and discourages other countries from engaging in
similar behavior.
The United States can engage in diplomatic efforts to mobilize
international support in addressing the issue of transnational
repression carried out by China. This could involve championing
resolutions or joint statements at the United Nations and other
international forums, urging countries to explicitly condemn China's
actions and take a firm stance against transnational repression.
Collaborating with like-minded countries, the U.S. could also establish
multilateral initiatives aimed at investigating and countering China's
repressive actions.
The U.S. should work closely with its allies and partners to
strengthen intelligence sharing related to transnational repression
activities carried out by China. Enhanced collaboration allows for the
identification of networks and individuals involved in such activities
and helps build a comprehensive understanding of China's methods. The
intelligence gathered could be used to expose tactics, support legal
action, and strengthen advocacy efforts.
The United States can take steps to raise awareness about China's
transnational repression and the threats faced by the Uyghur diaspora.
This could involve supporting media campaigns, hosting public events,
and sponsoring educational initiatives that inform the public about the
situation. Additionally, the U.S. Government can work with human rights
organizations, media outlets, and Uyghur community representatives to
create safe platforms for Uyghurs to share their testimonies, ensuring
their voices are heard and their stories are documented.
In an era of extensive surveillance, protection of digital rights
is crucial. The U.S. could introduce policies and initiatives to
strengthen online privacy, encryption standards, and cybersecurity
practices, specifically focused on the Uyghur diaspora. These efforts
could involve providing resources, training, and guidance on secure
digital practices, while also advocating for international agreements
and norms that condemn state-sponsored hacking and cyber espionage
activities.
By implementing these policy suggestions, the United States
Government can take a proactive approach in addressing China's
transnational repression, supporting the Uyghur diaspora, and fostering
international collaboration to seek justice and accountability for
Uyghurs.
Conclusion
It is crucial that we shed light on the plight of countless
families torn apart by China's reprehensible tactics. By denying basic
human rights and resorting to arbitrary detention, the Chinese
government seeks to silence those who speak up for justice and
challenge their oppressive regime. The agony faced by my family is not
unique; it is a testament to the suffering endured by many others who
fall victim to the same repressive tactics. As we remember my family
members, my relatives, my loved ones, let us also advocate for the
rights of those unjustly imprisoned, offer support to their loved ones
left behind, and strive for a world where transparency, empathy, and
justice prevail. Only through consistent and unwavering efforts can we
hope to make a difference in the lives of those affected by
transnational repression and bring an end to this cycle of suffering.
______
Statement of Hon. Chris Smith
Today's hearing, ``Countering China's Global Transnational
Repression Campaign,'' will come to order.
In June 2021, on the 32nd anniversary of the 1989 Student Democracy
Protests which, as we all know, ended in the horrific Tiananmen Square
Massacre, I visited Liberty Sculpture Park in Yermo, California, to
witness the unveiling of a sculpture made by the artist Chen Weiming.
It was a 20-foot-tall statue that morphed Xi Jinping's skull with a
coronavirus molecule, and Chen named it ``CCP Virus.'' It was a bold
work of art, rightfully assigning blame to the CCP and Xi Jinping for
the horrific pandemic that shook our world.
I was honored to attend, to see Chen's work, and to join him and
other heroes of Chinese democracy in speaking out against the
atrocities committed by the CCP.
Less than two months later, the sculpture was gone. It was
vandalized and then burned to the ground, likely by a band of CCP
agents targeting Chen and other Chinese democracy activists here in the
U.S. to punish and scare them into silence. Unfortunately, Chen's is
not a rare case.
With us that day in Yermo was Wei Jingsheng, perhaps the greatest
advocate for Chinese human rights and democracy of our time. Very few
people know this, but in May 2022, while driving right here in
Washington, DC, a car swerved in front of Wei's car and suddenly braked
in front of him while another rammed him from behind. Both cars quickly
fled the scene. Wei believes, and I also believe, that this was an
attempt on his life.
This, incidentally, is the same tactic that I have heard used
against another Chinese individual who ran afoul of the CCP.
And the list goes on.
Major Xiong Yan, who served in the U.S. Army and who ran for
Congress in New York City, was stalked and harassed by Chinese agents
here in the U.S.
Pastor Bob Fu, a leading advocate on behalf of Christians and human
rights defenders trying to escape China, was threatened with a bomb at
his home in Texas.
The brave 8 Hong Kongers who had bounties placed on their heads
just this past summer, solely for speaking out against the atrocities
happening in their beloved Hong Kong, and whose families were harassed.
Indeed, I note, this group includes a number of individuals whose
outspokenness led them to testify here at the China Commission, so this
is really personal.
It also becomes personal when I hear about a fellow legislator from
a sister democracy who has been harassed for speaking out about human
rights in China. MP Michael Chong of Canada was harassed for what
Senator Merkley and I have repeatedly done, calling the Chinese
Communist Party's treatment of Uyghurs what it is: a genocide. And
though Michael has been harassed, he is not intimidated, and he will be
joining us here today to tell us his story.
My friends, the CCP has waged a pervasive coercive campaign around
the world against anyone who does not agree with the Party. They target
Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, dissidents, activists, students,
journalists, or anyone who dares to state their ``unapproved'' opinions
about the PRC.
The CCP uses modern technology to digitally harass and surveil
individuals around the globe. They abuse the Interpol system to punish
and force the return of those who exercise their freedom of speech
while abroad. They detain and harass dissidents' families and friends
back in China to unjustly attempt to coerce silence--like the sister of
Rushan Abbas; Rushan will join us here this morning. And they even use
direct physical assaults beyond their borders to control what is said
about their country and its wrongdoings.
Recently we've seen them go so far as to set up shop right here in
the United States, establishing illegal ``police stations'' in New York
City to surveil and harass Chinese emigrants on our soil.
The CCP's strategy of trying to rewrite global norms has succeeded
in too many cases. This has led to self-censorship and curtailment of
basic freedoms even here in the U.S.
Students, scared to speak out. Journalists, scared to write. Free
citizens, scared to attend gatherings.
All of this is happening beyond China's borders, and within ours.
Indeed, as Michael Chong's testimony illustrates, and as underscored in
news just this past weekend from Great Britain, where an alleged spy
worked at Parliament, it is also happening within our legislatures.
We cannot and will not let the Chinese Communist Party scare us
into submission through these tactics.
Today we will hear from experts and victims alike, who have seen
these stories up close. We must work to protect the freedoms of speech,
assembly, and opinion--both here in the U.S. and elsewhere.
______
Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley
Thank you very much, Chairman Smith. Transnational repression is
central to the Chinese Communist Party's strategy of silencing critics
of Chinese policy around the world. It affects so many of the Uyghurs,
Hong Kongers, Tibetans, human rights advocates, journalists, and others
this Commission works with on a daily basis. This hearing gives us a
chance to give a platform to some of the victims and experts from
across the globe who have been most engaged in trying to identify ways
we can address this vexing challenge.
We know from past testimony that it isn't easy, as the Chinese
Communist Party's sophisticated tactics seem to know no bounds and
bring the power of a ruthless state against individual dissidents,
members of the Chinese diaspora, and, insidiously, their family members
in China.
That's why it's so critical that we redouble the effort to wrap our
minds around the dimensions of this threat, to raise awareness
globally, to identify ways to build common cause with those who have
been targeted--religious groups, activists, journalists, politicians--
as well as governments sick and tired of the brazen violation of
sovereignty that transnational repression represents.
Last year I chaired another hearing on this topic to hear about
what the Biden Administration is doing about it, and I am proud that
one of the officials at the forefront of that work, Under Secretary
Uzra Zeya, is now one of our commissioners. The State Department is
dedicated and is continuing to apply significant time and attention to
developing a more comprehensive strategy to counter, deter, and
mitigate these threats. We have also seen the Department of Justice
make important strides in pursuing criminal charges against groups and
individuals accused of engaging in transnational repression.
But despite these efforts, this Commission's reporting shows how
far we have to go. We continue to track a disturbing number of cases of
transnational repression both here in the United States and abroad,
with the knowledge that countless others are taking place and likely
not being reported on. I imagine that for every case we hear about,
there's another ten we don't know about. We have seen egregious
harassment campaigns, even against legislators around the world
including the Honorable Michael Chong who is here, a member of the
Canadian House of Commons. We have seen relentless targeting of young
activists who have spoken out bravely against the increasingly
repressive conditions in Hong Kong. And we have seen the unrelenting
pressure that continues to be directed at Uyghurs around the world.
We know that this is, as Freedom House calls it, ``the most
sophisticated, global, and comprehensive'' campaign of transnational
repression in the world. It relies on surveillance technology, spyware,
threats to individuals through phone calls or face-to-face
intimidation, and even harassment of family members and friends still
in China. As Safeguard Defenders revealed in an eye-opening report
earlier this year, the PRC is also responsible for establishing at
least 102 ``overseas service stations'' in at least 53 countries,
breaching national sovereignty and coercing Chinese diaspora members to
return to the PRC for criminal investigation.
All of this requires that the United States and as many other
governments as possible--and we do need international cooperation to
make this effective--make it a priority to address this, difficult as
it will be. That's why earlier this year I introduced the Transnational
Repression Policy Act, joined on a bipartisan basis by my colleagues
Senator Rubio, Senator Cardin, and Senator Hagerty in the Senate, to
hold foreign governments and individuals accountable when they stalk,
intimidate, or assault people across borders. I appreciate Chairman
Smith's work to lead the House companion to this legislation. If
enacted, the Transnational Repression Policy Act would mandate
additional U.S. Government reporting on the issue, require training for
U.S. diplomatic and law enforcement personnel, bolster intelligence
community efforts to track and share information on these incidents,
and develop a more effective tip line for victims and witnesses. I'm
working to get this bill passed, I think it's essential that we do, and
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today who are bringing
their experience, their stories, to bear on this very important issue.
______
Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern
Good morning. I join my colleagues in welcoming our witnesses and
the public to today's CECC hearing on transnational repression.
Transnational repression occurs when governments reach across
borders to silence dissent among diasporas and exiles, through
assassinations, illegal deportations, abductions, digital threats,
Interpol abuse, and family intimidation.
Our focus today is on the practices of the People's Republic of
China, but transnational repression can be carried out not just by
unfriendly governments but also strategic allies. It can target people
anywhere they or their families reside or visit, even in democracies
like the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Australia, South Africa, and
here in the United States.
That is why I worked with Senator Merkley during the 117th Congress
as he led the development of the Transnational Repression Policy Act,
and why I am proud to co-lead that same bill (H.R. 3654) in the House
this Congress with Chairman Smith. It is critically important to make
sure that the U.S. Government has the tools it needs to confront this
global challenge both domestically and internationally.
I turn now to China. Freedom House's database on transnational
repression now includes information on 854 direct physical incidents
committed by 38 governments in 91 countries around the world since
2014. China is an origin country for 253 of those recorded incidents, a
stunning 30 percent.
As we will hear today, the PRC targets abroad the same populations
it represses internally, especially Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and
Tibetans. State agents linked to the security and police forces have
engaged in forced rendition of asylum seekers, street assaults, digital
surveillance, online harassment, and the coercion and intimidation of
family members and friends of dissidents.
We must be sure that we have the knowledge and capacity to protect
the people who are the targets of these practices, especially those who
are within U.S. jurisdiction. And we must do a better job of engaging
with partner countries and strengthening multilateral strategies to
counter the PRC's actions, which violate international human rights--
among them the right to freedom of expression, association, asylum, and
freedom of movement, and the prohibition on arbitrary detention. I look
forward to hearing the witnesses' testimonies and their
recommendations.
______
Statement of Hon. Dan Sullivan
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your outstanding leadership on this.
It is great to see my colleague from the U.S. Senate and Co-chair
Senator Merkley. This is such an important topic. The effort--often
successful--of the Chinese Communist Party to reach far beyond its
borders to target critics in the diaspora communities throughout the
world is outrageous.
But let's face it, it's just one of many outrageous things Beijing
is doing across the board. We need to continue to recognize and
highlight, as this Commission has been doing, the brutal nature of the
Chinese Communist Party regime we are dealing with, especially under
the dictatorial rule of Xi Jinping. Look no further than the string of
strange disappearances that we've seen in China in their government in
the last couple of months. The Chinese foreign minister and former
ambassador to the United States disappeared. This was Xi Jinping's
right-hand man until recently. The commander and deputy commander of
the PLA rocket forces--gone. And now, apparently the defense minister
is gone. Who knows what's going on here. But to be clear, this is the
sort of regime we're dealing with--a regime whose officials suddenly
disappear without any explanation. They're probably somewhere in China
with bullets in their heads in ditches.
This is the way the CCP operates. And now Xi Jinping is trying to
export this.
Just a couple of months ago, authorities in Hong Kong issued arrest
warrants for activists and lawyers accused of violating the CCP-imposed
national security law, specifically for people who no longer live in
Hong Kong, or anywhere in China, for that matter.
Hong Kong has declared that it will pursue these people for life.
And it's not unthinkable that they could one day make good on grabbing
them. Of course, I'm not worried about the United States aiding in
their return, or the UK, or Australia, or Japan, or other places where
they now reside. But life is long. They all travel. One day, they could
find themselves in the hands of a government all too eager to burnish
their credentials with Beijing.
This is one of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, I'm working with
Representative John Curtis on a bill to press the Biden administration
to sanction the prosecutors and judges and other officials responsible
for enforcing these unjust Hong Kong laws. The days of the independence
of the Hong Kong judiciary system and the rule of law in Hong Kong are
unfortunately long gone.
Beijing has seen to that. Now we need to do what we can to try to
even up the scales on behalf of the people of Hong Kong.
Mr. Chairman, there is one more issue that I want to just raise in
my opening statement. These kinds of aggressive actions are also
targeting Americans directly, and even, remarkably, during times of
tragedy. I'd like to submit for the record this New York Times story
that just broke last night entitled, ``China Sows Disinformation About
Hawaii Fires Using New Techniques.'' This story that just broke in the
New York Times talks about how, when wildfires swept across Maui last
month killing over 100 Americans, the CCP unleashed its information
warriors. They said on the internet that the disaster was not natural.
In a flurry of false posts and lies that spread across the internet,
they said the natural disaster was the result of a secret weather
weapon being tested by the United States military and intel agencies.
To bolster this lie, they posted photographs that were generated by
artificial intelligence programs.
Mr. Chairman, as we all know, when countries suffer natural
disasters, even adversaries come together to help each other. Not under
Xi Jinping's rule. The Chinese Communist Party is now trying to sow
discord among Americans as we sadly bury our own dead in Hawaii. This
is outrageous and I call on the Chinese ambassador to the United States
to formally apologize to our country. But Mr. Chairman, he won't,
because if he did, he'd disappear too. We all know that.
One final thing, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say how honored I am
to join this Commission. It has such a great history, especially under
your leadership. At a time when many people are raising questions about
Congress's decisions in the past relating to China, for example
extending MFN 20 years ago, it is good to remind Americans that, at the
same time, Congress also established organizations like this one to
keep a critical eye on human rights. I think there may be more Congress
can do to live up to this Commission's mandate, perhaps even expand it.
But as the new guy here, I'm eager to learn from my colleagues about
how the Commission works and I'm very honored to be a part of that.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I again am very glad to be here and look
forward to working with you and all of the members of this
distinguished Commission.
______
Statement of Hon. Uzra Zeya
Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Co-chair Merkley,
Ranking Member McGovern, and fellow commissioners. I am honored to be
with you all today for this important discussion on the increasingly
pervasive and concerning use of transnational repression by PRC
authorities.
Transnational repression--or TNR--is a global phenomenon, but the
PRC's efforts are especially pervasive, pronounced, and persistent. The
PRC uses TNR to harass and threaten Uyghurs, Tibetans, members of other
ethnic and religious minority groups, Hong Kongers, and PRC citizens
and non-PRC citizens living abroad, who seek only to exercise their
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
As we've heard from the Co-chairmen and Ranking Member, the PRC
utilizes a wide variety of tactics, including online harassment, exit
bans on or imprisonment of family members of targeted individuals, the
misuse of international law enforcement systems such as INTERPOL, and
pressure on other governments to forcibly return targeted individuals
to the PRC.
The sheer breadth and depth of their efforts cannot be ignored and
should not be permitted to continue. It is a direct affront to national
sovereignty and impacts people all over the world, including U.S.
citizens and individuals residing in the United States. This is why,
since 2021, the Biden-Harris Administration has made combating
transnational repression a global human rights priority.
One way we have sought to counter this scourge is through our
diplomatic engagement and tools. We continue to engage the PRC
directly, making clear in no uncertain terms that their conduct is
unacceptable and must stop. We have not and we will not keep quiet in
the face of these transgressions. We have used sanctions as an
accountability tool as well. Specifically, in March 2022, we imposed
visa restrictions on PRC officials responsible for, or complicit in,
transnational repression.
This Administration energized the interagency to combat TNR in the
United States, as well. U.S. Government agencies have increased their
domestic engagement with communities targeted by the PRC. This outreach
helps to create improved two-way communication, which both enhances our
understanding of the threat and helps those affected more quickly
access government assistance when they are targeted--or even before
this occurs.
We have also jumpstarted international cooperation to drive a
global response because it is not only Americans and U.S. residents who
have suffered abuses. Specifically, we deployed interagency teams to
meet with foreign counterparts to raise their awareness of this threat
and to share our own lessons learned.
One example of this effort is the recent launch of a G7 Rapid
Response Mechanism Working Group on TNR. This coalition will raise
international awareness of the threat TNR poses to democratic values
and deepen our shared commitment to countering it.
The experiences and details presented by today's panelists will
surely highlight the very real threat of the PRC's transnational
repression activities, as well as the need for governments,
legislators, activists, and others to continue to work even more
closely together to counter it. Hearing your stories, and in some cases
learning from what you have gone through personally, are vitally
important as we advance our common cause.
The Administration welcomes Congress's ongoing leadership on these
issues and we look forward to deepening our collaboration.
Thank you for this opportunity to speak and thank you all for
coming together today to confront this challenge.
Submissions for the Record
----------
[Reprinted from the New York Times, September 11, 2023]
China Sows Disinformation About Hawaii Fires Using New Techniques
By David E. Sanger and Steven Lee Myers
When wildfires swept across Maui last month with destructive fury,
China's increasingly resourceful information warriors pounced.
The disaster was not natural, they said in a flurry of false posts
that spread across the internet, but was the result of a secret
``weather weapon'' being tested by the United States. To bolster the
plausibility, the posts carried photographs that appeared to have been
generated by artificial intelligence programs, making them among the
first to use these new tools to bolster the aura of authenticity of a
disinformation campaign.
For China--which largely stood on the sidelines of the 2016 and
2020 U.S. presidential elections while Russia ran hacking operations
and disinformation campaigns--the effort to cast the wildfires as a
deliberate act by American intelligence agencies and the military was a
rapid change of tactics.
Until now, China's influence campaigns have been focused on
amplifying propaganda defending its policies on Taiwan and other
subjects. The most recent effort, revealed by researchers from
Microsoft and a range of other organizations, suggests that Beijing is
making more direct attempts to sow discord in the United States.
The move also comes as the Biden administration and Congress are
grappling with how to push back on China without tipping the two
countries into open conflict, and with how to reduce the risk that A.I.
is used to magnify disinformation.
The impact of the Chinese campaign--identified by researchers from
Microsoft, Recorded Future, the RAND Corporation, NewsGuard and the
University of Maryland--is difficult to measure, though early
indications suggest that few social media users engaged with the most
outlandish of the conspiracy theories.
Brad Smith, the vice chairman and president of Microsoft, whose
researchers analyzed the covert campaign, sharply criticized China for
exploiting a natural disaster for political gain.
``I just don't think that's worthy of any country, much less any
country that aspires to be a great country,'' Mr. Smith said in an
interview on Monday.
China was not the only country to make political use of the Maui
fires. Russia did as well, spreading posts that emphasized how much
money the United States was spending on the war in Ukraine and that
suggested the cash would be better spent at home for disaster relief.
The researchers suggested that China was building a network of
accounts that could be put to use in future information operations,
including the next U.S. presidential election. That is the pattern that
Russia set in the year or so leading up to the 2016 election.
``This is going into a new direction, which is sort of amplifying
conspiracy theories that are not directly related to some of their
interests, like Taiwan,'' said Brian Liston, a researcher at Recorded
Future, a cybersecurity company based in Massachusetts.
If China does engage in influence operations for the election next
year, U.S. intelligence officials have assessed in recent months, it is
likely to try to diminish President Biden and raise the profile of
former President Donald J. Trump. While that may seem counterintuitive
to Americans who remember Mr. Trump's effort to blame Beijing for what
he called the ``China virus,'' the intelligence officials have
concluded that Chinese leaders prefer Mr. Trump. He has called for
pulling Americans out of Japan, South Korea and other parts of Asia,
while Mr. Biden has cut off China's access to the most advanced chips
and the equipment made to produce them.
China's promotion of a conspiracy theory about the fires comes
after Mr. Biden vented in Bali last fall to Xi Jinping, China's
president, about Beijing's role in the spread of such disinformation.
According to administration officials, Mr. Biden angrily criticized Mr.
Xi for the spread of false accusations that the United States operated
biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine.
There is no indication that Russia and China are working together
on information operations, according to the researchers and
administration officials, but they often echo each other's messages,
particularly when it comes to criticizing U.S. policies. Their combined
efforts suggest a new phase of the disinformation wars is about to
begin, one bolstered by the use of A.I. tools.
``We don't have direct evidence of coordination between China and
Russia in these campaigns, but we're certainly finding alignment and a
sort of synchronization,'' said William Marcellino, a researcher at
RAND and an author of a new report warning that artificial intelligence
will enable a ``critical jump forward'' in global influence operations.
The wildfires in Hawaii--like many natural disasters these days--
spawned numerous rumors, false reports and conspiracy theories almost
from the start.
Caroline Amy Orr Bueno, a researcher at the University of
Maryland's Applied Research Lab for Intelligence and Security, reported
that a coordinated Russian campaign began on Twitter, the social media
platform now known as X, on Aug. 9, a day after the fires started.
It spread the phrase, ``Hawaii, not Ukraine,'' from one obscure
account with few followers through a series of conservative or right-
wing accounts like Breitbart and ultimately Russian state media,
reaching thousands of users with a message intended to undercut U.S.
military assistance to Ukraine.
China's state media apparatus often echoes Russian themes,
especially animosity toward the United States. But in this case, it
also pursued a distinct disinformation campaign.
Recorded Future first reported that the Chinese government mounted
a covert campaign to blame a ``weather weapon'' for the fires,
identifying numerous posts in mid-August falsely claiming that MI6, the
British foreign intelligence service, had revealed ``the amazing truth
behind the wildfire.'' Posts with the exact language appeared on social
media sites across the internet, including Pinterest, Tumblr, Medium
and Pixiv, a Japanese site used by artists.
Other inauthentic accounts spread similar content, often
accompanied with mislabeled videos, including one from a popular TikTok
account, The Paranormal Chic, that showed a transformer explosion in
Chile. According to Recorded Future, the Chinese content often echoed--
and amplified--posts by conspiracy theorists and extremists in the
United States, including white supremacists.
The Chinese campaign operated across many of the major social media
platforms--and in many languages, suggesting it was aimed at reaching a
global audience. Microsoft's Threat Analysis Center identifed
inauthentic posts in 31 languages, including French, German and
Italian, but also in less prominent ones like Igbo, Odia and Guarani.
The artificially generated images of the Hawaii wildfires
identified by Microsoft's researchers appeared on multiple platforms,
including a Reddit post in Dutch. ``These specific A.I.-generated
images appear to be exclusively used'' by Chinese accounts used in this
campaign, Microsoft said in a report. ``They do not appear to be
present elsewhere online.''
Clint Watts, the general manager of Microsoft's Threat Analysis
Center, said that China appeared to have adopted Russia's playbook for
influence operations, laying the groundwork to influence politics in
the United States and other countries.
``This would be Russia 2015,'' he said, referring to the bots and
inauthentic accounts Russia created before its extensive online
influence operation during the 2016 election. ``If we look at how other
actors have done this, they are building capacity. Now they're building
accounts that are covert.''
Natural disasters have often been the focus of disinformation
campaigns, allowing bad actors to exploit emotions to accuse
governments of shortcomings, either in preparation or in response. The
goal can be to undermine trust in specific policies, like U.S. support
for Ukraine, or more generally to sow internal discord. By suggesting
the United States was testing or using secret weapons against its own
citizens, China's effort also seemed intended to depict the country as
a reckless, militaristic power.
``We've always been able to come together in the wake of
humanitarian disasters and provide relief in the wake of earthquakes or
hurricanes or fires,'' said Mr. Smith, who is presenting some of
Microsoft's findings to Congress on Tuesday. ``And to see this kind of
pursuit instead is both, I think, deeply disturbing and something that
the global community should draw a red line around and put off-
limits.''
* * *
David E. Sanger is a White House and national security
correspondent. In a 38-year reporting career for The Times, he has been
on three teams that have won Pulitzer Prizes, most recently in 2017 for
international reporting. His newest book is ``The Perfect Weapon: War,
Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age.''
Steven Lee Myers covers misinformation for The Times. He has worked
in Washington, Moscow, Baghdad and Beijing, where he contributed to the
articles that won the Pulitzer Prize for public service in 2021. He is
also the author of ``The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir
Putin.''
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Statement of Su Yutong
Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for convening
this meeting and inviting me to submit testimony.
As an individual who has faced incredible abuse at the hands of the
Chinese government's crackdown on independent voices and journalists, I
can speak first-hand about my experiences and the treatment I have had
to endure as a journalist, as an activist, and as a woman. Despite
living outside of China, beyond its borders, I am still threatened and
harassed by authorities--often with serious and harmful consequences.
This relentless campaign that I have suffered is designed to scare and
silence me.. But it is obvious that the same people who work to make my
life a living misery are scared too. They fear me and people like me,
who use our voices to draw attention to wrongdoing in a country that
wishes to keep its people in the dark.
I was born in Beijing. Early on, while still in China, I became an
internet activist. Because my work was critical of China's human rights
record, I was frequently placed under house arrest and invited for
``chats'' with the police. On June 3, 2010, I posted the diary of
former Chinese Premier Li Peng on the internet, which details the
suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen student demonstrations by the CCP
authorities. As a result, my home was raided by the Chinese police, my
belongings were confiscated and I was put under house arrest.\1\ With
the help of activists and human rights lawyers I managed to escape to
Hong Kong.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
campaigns/2012/05/china-for-
activists-the-internet-is-like-dancing-in-shackles/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Once in Hong Kong, I started working as a journalist with the
German news agency Deutsche Welle. With the help of the former human
rights officer at the German embassy in China, I secured a German visa
at the German consulate in Hong Kong. On August 11, 2010, I arrived in
Germany, where I continued working for the Chinese department of
Deutsche Welle. I wrote and published nearly 1,500 articles.
Simultaneously with my work as a journalist, I continued with my
work as an activist. In 2011, after the Chinese artist Ai Weiwei was
secretly detained by the Chinese police, I launched a solidarity
campaign on social media. At that time, there was a Chinese-run website
in Germany, called Anti-CNN. They published a photoshopped nude photo
claiming it was me, and described me as Ai Weiwei's mistress.
From that point on, I became a target of continuous harassment by
the Chinese government.
In July of 2014, a fellow journalist, Frank Sieren at Deutsche
Welle, published an article in German and Chinese, in which he
described the Tiananmen Massacre as ``a slip-up by the CCP.'' The piece
sparked a public outcry from a number of pro-democracy activists and
massacre survivors. I was a signatory to an open letter protesting this
article and spoke out against the article on Twitter. On August 19,
2014, I was fired \2\ by Deutsche Welle for doing so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/22/world/
europe/german-broadcaster-fires-chinese-blogger.html; RSF: https://
rsf.org/en/beijing-imposes-its-propaganda-beyond-its-
borders; Der Spiegel: https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/
deutsche-welle-streit-um-twitter-nachricht-zu-tiananmen-massaker-a-
987085.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During this time and after, I was regularly smeared by the official
Chinese media. In August 2014, the Chinese official media Global Times
published two articles calling me an anti-China reporter. This put an
extraordinary amount of pressure on my family in China, who worried
that these attacks forecast their own mistreatment. Chinese Communist
Party authorities did not limit their campaign to traditional media
only. They spread rumors about me on Twitter (now known as X) and other
social media platforms, too. The insults ranged from calling me a
prostitute, to being a German ``dog''; I received death and rape
threats, as well as anonymous messages stating they would kill me and
my whole family. Sometimes, these messages were accompanied by
extremely violent videos. CCP authorities also attempted to bribe me:
unknown people have sent me messages promising me money if I stop my
work, even offering me a passport to return to China. Threats and
harassment of my family have continued.
In November 2014, Beijing State Security called me directly, asking
me not to participate in the protests in Germany. The official insisted
that if I stopped protesting, he could be helpful in securing a chance
to see my parents again. Although I am a Chinese citizen, I have no
right to go back to my country. The State Security used my family to
blackmail me into compliance.
In 2016, I joined Radio Free Asia as a reporter, covering a variety
of issues, including human rights abuses within and outside China. The
harassment continued. In May 2018, someone sent me a private message on
Twitter from a Chinese number, threatening to kill me and my whole
family. Deciding that I needed to do something, I reported this threat
to German authorities--making this instance the first time I had done
so. Because it came from China, I reported the threat to the diplomat
in charge of Chinese affairs of the German Foreign Ministry.
I lived in relative peace until June 2022. Around that time,
threats and harassment became more frequent and persistent. On June 4,
2022, I participated in a protest in front of the Chinese embassy in
Germany, in support of Hong Kong after Beijing's national security laws
had been put in place, completely changing its media and political
landscape. A Chinese man arrived at the scene, and I later learned his
name was ``Zhu Kenan.'' He took our photos and followed us. On the
night of June 4th, he sent me a message via Telegram. He warned me
against criticizing the Chinese government. When I asked him to stop
texting me, he responded by posting a photoshopped nude photo of me
that had first appeared in 2011, circulated on social media and the
internet. I told him I would call the police. But his threats didn't
stop online. He started following me in real life.
Later, I found out that a Hong Kong activist was also threatened
and followed by the same man. We reported the case to German police in
Berlin on June 6, 2022. The case was later transferred to Germany's
State Criminal Police Office, or Landeskriminalamt (LKA), for
investigation. But unfortunately, in July last year, the investigation
was suspended because Zhu Kenan left Germany and returned to China. In
August he sent me a message via Twitter, saying that he was going to
Beijing and wanted to visit my parents' house. When he sent this
message, I learned that my parents and relatives were threatened by
Chinese police and national security.
In June 2022, different men rang the doorbell at my apartment every
night, saying they were responding to a sex advertisement they had seen
online. I told them that I was not a sex worker and I asked how they
got my address and information. Some of them told me my information was
posted on an underground porn website.
These incidents continued throughout the summer. The last such
incident was on August 20th, when I found a strange man waiting outside
my apartment door. When I threatened to call the police, he left in a
hurry. In October last year, I started to report on Chinese overseas
police stations threatening dissidents in Europe; on November 22, I
accompanied Chinese dissident Wang Jingyu in the Netherlands to report
his case to the Berlin police station. Following my reporting on this
issue, unknown people booked two hotel rooms in Berlin under my name,
and I reported it to German police.
Beginning on November 25, 2022, a man named Yilisen Aierken began
to send me threatening and harassing messages. He said he would rape
and kill me. He said there was a group that works for CCP in Europe,
and the people in this group knew my address. He also said they had
published my photos, name and information on porn sites. Yilisen
Aierken continued sending me threatening messages until January, when
the messages abruptly stopped. On the evening of February 11, unknown
persons booked many luxury hotel rooms under my name in Hong Kong,
Macau, New York, Houston, Los Angeles, Istanbul and other cities, and
reported false bomb threats. I kept getting calls from the police
everywhere.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ AXIOS: https://www.axios.com/2023/03/29/chinese-activists-
false-bomb-threats; RFA: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/
harassment-03202023133743.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the advice of the police, I left my apartment in Berlin and
stayed with friends for three months, unable to go home. During this
period, I also received messages offering bribes to quit my work, which
I reported to the police. There was nothing they could do, they
informed me, because offering money to someone is not a crime.
On June 16, 2023, I received a terrifying video from an unknown
person in my Telegram of a person being dismembered. When I saw this
video, I became physically sick. The unknown person also said that my
head would be chopped off. On June 20, I participated in a protest in
front of the German Chancellery, and I discovered that Chinese embassy
staff and CCP agents monitored and secretly photographed the
protesters.
At the end of June, my parents and relatives in China were
threatened by Chinese police and state security. They told my parents
that I participated in anti-China activities and smeared China. They
called me a criminal. Since the beginning of August, many newspapers
and TV stations in Germany have reported the threats to me by Chinese
overseas police stations.
Chinese diplomats stationed in Germany monitored and secretly
photographed Chinese protesters in Germany. After that, I suffered more
serious online smears than ever before. Unknown people spread rumors
and posted photoshopped nude photos on Twitter and other social media
every day to humiliate me. They also insinuated that I have actually
taken money from the Chinese government to discredit me in the eyes of
other activists.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Women in Journalism: https://www.womeninjournalism.org/threats-
all/germany-cfwij-calls-on-german-authorities-to-investigate-
continuous-attacks-on-su-yutong
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I have lived with these threats and rumors for 12 years now. While
the police protection helps me feel somewhat safer, those who harass me
are still free. While many of my harassers are anonymous, some of them
are known to law enforcement yet nothing is being done.
Despite leaving China, I live under threat every day. Despite my
personal pride and refusing to admit it, even to myself, I have been
afraid. Authorities in Germany have been helpful. But it's unclear what
power they have, given that this form of harassment--crossing borders,
crossing continents and time zones--can target me, my loved ones, my
friends, and my fellow journalists and activists at any given time,
without warning. We don't have recourse and they are allowed to
continue doing it with impunity.
We can be living in places where human dignity is respected by the
law, with strong civil societies, and be subject to the whims of a
society that cares little for those things in pursuit of its own wish
to bury the truth, no matter the cost. I have dedicated my life to
lifting up the voices of others, so they can be heard. I want the world
to know my story--and the stories of others like me--who dare to speak
truth to power, and feel the force of reprisal no matter where we
choose to live. My only consolation, though seemingly small, is that
the people and government behind this campaign are also afraid. The
intensity of their threats and harassment mirrors their own fear.
Thank you.
Statement of Levi Browde
______
The Chinese Communist Party's Transnational Repression
Targeting Falun Gong
Mr. Chairman, Co-chairman Merkley, and distinguished members of the
commission, thank you for holding a hearing on this urgent issue and
for allowing me to submit this written testimony. In this document, I
would like to draw your attention to the following dimensions of
transnational repression related to how the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) and its proxies target believers of Falun Gong:
The CCP and its proxies have been carrying out a campaign
of transnational repression against Falun Gong for over two decades,
expanding and refining the tactics, mechanisms, and apparatus that
today target a far wider array of victim communities.
CCP-backed individuals or misinformed Chinese nationals
have physically assaulted Falun Gong practitioners in the United States
and other countries who were trying to raise awareness about violations
of freedom of belief in China; in several recent cases, the attackers
have faced prosecution for their actions.
Ethnic Chinese and non-ethnic Chinese Falun Gong
practitioners on university campuses across the United States have
reported incidents of surveillance, slander, and censorship by Chinese
officials, CCP proxies, or other China-linked individuals.
Dragon Springs, a campus in New York that houses the
training facilities for Shen Yun Performing Arts, faces threats to
strip its non-profit status by Chinese agents, two of whom were charged
by federal prosecutors this May. The campus continues to face ongoing
frivolous lawsuits and surveillance by the CCP.
1. A Two-Decade Campaign of Transnational Repression
Falun Gong, also known as Falun Dafa, is a spiritual practice in
the Buddhist tradition that combines meditation and gentle exercises
with a moral philosophy centered on the core tenets of truthfulness,
compassion, and tolerance.\1\ Descending from an ancient lineage and
introduced publicly in China in 1992, Falun Gong is now practiced in
more than 70 countries, although the largest contingent of believers--
numbering in the tens of millions--remains in China.
Since July 1999, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has engaged in a
systematic and illegal effort to eradicate Falun Gong, deploying
arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings.\2\ This
policy remains one of the most widespread campaigns of persecution in
China today.\3\ Since the inception of this campaign, the CCP's
attempts to intimidate, harass, and suppress Falun Gong practitioners
have not remained within the borders of mainland China. For over 20
years, Falun Gong practitioners outside China--be they Chinese
nationals, members of the diaspora, or non-Chinese believers--have been
a primary target of transnational repression and other forms of
harassment around the world.
In a 2021 report, Freedom House found that the Chinese regime
``engages in the most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign
of transnational repression in the world'' and that among its targets
are Falun Gong practitioners. This is just one example of the
documentation of this long-term effort, with other evidence including
first-hand accounts by victims, leaked CCP documents, congressional
testimonies from defectors, and third-party investigations.
Since July 1999, Falun Gong practitioners outside China have faced
break-ins, physical attacks in Chinatown, an assault on an anti-
censorship technologist in his home in Atlanta, beatings by Chinese
security agents accompanying officials visiting Latin America, and a
shooting of Falun Gong activists in South Africa, among other
incidents. As early as 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted
H. Con. Res. 304, one of the first acts of Congress related to
transnational repression that outlined various attacks on Falun Gong
practitioners that had occurred in the United States and the
intimidation of local U.S. officials supporting their right to freedom
of belief, while requesting measures to protect U.S. residents who
practice Falun Gong.\4\
These attacks have continued over the past 24 years. In a 2021 case
study on transnational repression originating in China, Freedom House
relayed its findings regarding cases of the CCP targeting Falun Gong
since 2014: \5\
Practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual movement banned in
China, also face regular reprisals from China and from Chinese
agents. These include frequent harassment and occasional
physical assaults by members of visiting Chinese delegations or
pro-Beijing proxies at protests overseas, as in cases that have
occurred since 2014 in the United States, the Czech Republic,
Taiwan, Brazil, and Argentina. Media and cultural initiatives
associated with Falun Gong have reported suspicious break-ins
targeting sensitive information, vehicle tampering, and
pressure from Chinese authorities for local businesses to cut
off advertising or other contractual obligations with them.
Multiple Falun Gong practitioners in Thailand have also faced
detention, including a Taiwanese man involved in uncensored
radio broadcasts to China and several cases of Chinese refugees
formally recognized as such by the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). In October 2017, a Falun Gong practitioner
who had survived a Chinese labor camp and become a high-profile
informant on CCP abuses--sneaking a letter into a Halloween
decoration when detained and later filming a documentary with
undercover footage--died of sudden kidney failure in Indonesia.
Some colleagues consider his death suspicious, but no autopsy
was performed.
These incidents are not accidental. Behind them lies a deliberate
policy, massive bureaucratic structures, and guidance from the highest
levels of the CCP security apparatus. Two insiders who defected to
Australia in 2005 offered a glimpse of this system. Hao Fengjun, a
former officer in the extralegal 610 Office security agency in Tianjin,
relayed: ``Falun Gong practitioners all over the world are under CCP
surveillance. I personally received intelligence information about
Falun Gong practitioners in Australia, the United States, and Canada.''
\6\ Chen Yonglin, a former officer in the Chinese consulate in Sydney,
testified before Congress:
In each Chinese mission overseas there must be at least one
official in charge of Falun Gong affairs. The head and the
deputy head of the mission will be responsible for the Falun
Gong affairs. I am aware of there being more than 1,000 Chinese
secret agents and informants residing in Australia, and they
have partaken in efforts to persecute the Falun Gong. The
number in the United States should be higher. The United Front
uses the overseas Chinese diaspora, including students,
businesspeople, media, and so-called Chinese community groups
to influence, manipulate, and pressure foreign citizens,
politicians, and business leaders to toe the Party line on
Falun Gong.\7\
More recently, in a 2015 speech to party cadres from the 610
Office, Meng Jianzhu, then a member of the CCP Central Committee and
head of the Political Legal Affairs Committee that oversees the
security apparatus, called on those listening to ``actively expand and
deepen the overseas battlefield'' against Falun Gong and other banned
religious groups. In the speech, which was leaked and published online
by the Europe-based Association for the Defense of Human Rights and
Religious Freedom, Meng further explains:
The struggle against `Falun Gong' and other xie jiao
organizations is actually a serious political struggle. It is a
political contest with the anti-China forces in the West. . . .
We must strengthen the top-level design, coordinate the
domestic and foreign fronts, and treat the countries and
regions with serious `Falun Gong' activities such as the United
States as the main battlefield. . . . We must fully play our
party's political and institutional advantages, and coordinate
and urge all relevant departments to do a good job on
intelligence information, crackdown control, and education
transformation.\8\
One point of information to note is that unlike other ethnic
minority and exile groups targeted by the CCP, the Falun Gong community
does not consist solely of members of the Chinese diaspora or those who
have fled China. In addition to the many practitioners outside China
who are of Chinese or Taiwanese descent, there are tens of thousands,
if not more, people from a wide range of ethnicities who practice Falun
Gong and have no connection to the country other than practicing this
Chinese spiritual and meditation practice. Many do not speak Chinese
and have never been to China. From Cape Town to Cannes, Bangladesh to
Berlin, Tel Aviv to Tehran, Falun Gong is practiced in over 100
countries and its spiritual teachings have been translated into 50
languages.\9\ Earlier this year, a small community of Falun Gong
practitioners in the African nation of Togo celebrated the 10th
anniversary of Falun Gong's introduction to the country.\10\ These and
other believers are nationals of countries other than China and locally
integrated into everyday society. Nevertheless, because of their faith
and identity as Falun Gong practitioners, the CCP sees them as a threat
and targets them as well. Non-ethnic Chinese adherents have been barred
from parades, been beaten by Chinese thugs in Latin America, or been
detained and deported from European countries when trying to peacefully
demonstrate against visiting Chinese leaders. In Russia, under CCP
pressure, Falun Gong's spiritual text was banned, a situation which the
European Court of Human Rights recently ruled a violation of the
charter.\11\
The Falun Dafa Information Center has been tracking these and other
cases of transnational repression targeting Falun Gong, especially in
the United States, although we are trying to expand our documentation
efforts globally. Within the past three years, Falun Gong practitioners
around the world have continued to experience the long arm of the CCP's
persecution. This testimony highlights three key dimensions of this
broader campaign.
2. Physical Assaults and Prosecutorial Actions
Facing fierce persecution in China alongside systematic censorship,
one way in which Falun Gong practitioners around the world have tried
to counter the negative effects of the CCP's persecution has been to
set up information booths, especially in Chinatowns or at sites
frequented by tourists from mainland China. Volunteers and recent
refugees take turns manning the booths, distributing information
debunking CCP false propaganda about Falun Gong, exposing rights
violations in China, and urging individuals to reconsider their
affiliation with the CCP.
These sites have emerged as a primary target for assault by
individuals affiliated with CCP proxies, or deceived by Chinese state-
run propaganda that demonizes Falun Gong. The attacks tend to be more
frequent in cities where a Chinese embassy or consulate is present.
Since 2008, volunteers at Falun Gong information booths in
Chinatowns, including in New York and San Francisco, have faced such
harassment, heckling, and physical attacks. In some cases, the
attackers had clear links to the CCP and proxy entities like the China
Anti-Cult Association (CACA) but in other cases, they may have been
individuals who were simply incited by CCP propaganda.\12\
The most recent attack happened on February 16, 2023. Zhongping Qi
physically assaulted Falun Gong practitioner David Fang unprovoked,
injuring David's hand, neck, and chin. (The attacker has a history of
verbally abusing Falun Gong booth volunteers.) He often cursed and made
unprovoked slurs towards the volunteers at Falun Gong booths in Queens,
New York. Later that week, police officers from New York's 109th
Precinct arrested and charged Zhongping Qi with third degree
assault.\13\ Mr. Fang, the victim of the attack, told the Falun Dafa
Information Center on September 3:
I was persecuted in China for my faith, and under immense
pressure for years. Soon after I arrived in the United States
this February, I was attacked and became fearful that the CCP
will come to haunt me in New York. I was scared that I would
never be free.\14\
A similar incident happened in 2022. Then 32-year-old Zheng Buqiu
began vandalizing a Falun Gong booth outside Queens Public Library
where he tore down a poster before being stopped by volunteers. Every
day for a week, Zheng destroyed booths across Flushing by punching and
kicking display boards, knocking over tables with informational
booklets, and breaking volunteers' portable speaker by stomping on it.
The attacks continued at three different information booth locations
until NYPD officers arrested Zheng on February 15, 2022. Police charged
him with criminal mischief in the fourth degree and a hate crime. One
volunteer at the booth said that Zheng had been seen with Li Huahong,
the president of the CACA, an entity linked to the 610 Office, who has
herself been arrested four times since 2008 by NYPD for vandalizing
Falun Gong booths, indicating Zheng may not have been acting alone.\15\
In 2019, an individual believed to be affiliated with the Chinese
consulate pretended to be a Falun Gong practitioner for six months,
collecting information and bringing his son to meditation sites in
Hermann Park in downtown Houston. In the fall of that year, the
individual attacked and attempted to sexually assault a female Falun
Gong practitioner in the parking lot. Multiple practitioners witnessed
the incident and after blocking his assault, discovered he was not
actually a Falun Gong adherent. After that incident, this individual
and his son were never seen again.\16\
Such attacks are not limited to the United States. In October 2022,
Chinese nationals Kang Zhao and two accomplices (including Zhao's wife)
in Canberra, Australia, were caught vandalizing signs attached to at
least two Falun Gong practitioners' cars, one of which belonged to
Nancy Dong. After being notified by witnesses, Dong arrived at the
parking lot and tried to film Zhao and his accomplices, as they spray
painted over the sign ``CCP % China'' atop her car. Zhao took Nancy
Dong's phone away and elbow slammed her to the ground by her neck,
proceeding to kick and punch her until she almost lost consciousness.
The altercation led to bruising on her arms and injuries to her lower
body. In December 2022, Zhao was arrested by police after trying to
leave the country. He pleaded guilty in court to charges of common
assault, property damage, and defacing property.\17\
In April 2022, a Westminster court in the United Kingdom sentenced
a pro-CCP individual, Mr. He Renyong, to 16 weeks in prison for
assaulting and harassing Falun Dafa practitioners in Chinatown. The
court dealt the accused a deferred sentence of 18 months, 100 hours of
community service, and over 1,000 pounds ($1,300 USD) in fines and
fees.\18\
3. Surveillance, Slander, and Censorship on University Campuses
The Falun Dafa Information Center released a report analyzing how
the CCP's persecution of Falun Gong impacts students and faculty who
practice Falun Gong on university campuses in the United States, based
on publicly available reports and a survey conducted in early 2023.\19\
The following are five key takeaways from that report:
1. At least 45 university campuses across the United States have
students or faculty who practice Falun Gong. One-fifth of respondents
to a 2023 survey reported feeling uncomfortable self-identifying as a
Falun Gong practitioner due to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda
or other influences.
2. Physical and digital surveillance of both Falun Gong
practitioners and Chinese international students--and resulting Chinese
government reprisals--are a major area of concern. One non-ethnic
Chinese Ph.D. candidate studying in Minnesota reported, ``Whenever I
and my club held a booth for our Falun Dafa student club, there was
always a suspicious Chinese student wandering about and pretend[ing] to
be on their phones and constantly checking on us. They never engaged
with us but were just there to monitor us.'' The same student remarked
that the presence of these individuals seemed to deter Chinese students
from engaging in Falun Gong Club activities on campus.
3. Chinese Student and Scholars Associations (CSSA) have engaged
in multiple attempts since 2017 to censor or penalize Falun Gong-
related activities on U.S. university campuses, with long-term
repercussions even when demands were not met. The associations are
known to have ties to local Chinese consulates. In one case, a graduate
student and Falun Gong practitioner in Illinois had joined the Chinese
Student and Scholars Association (CSSA) to access the resources it
offers to international students from China. He reported that Chinese
diplomats in the United States caused his removal from the group: ``I
was told by the then-CSSA President that the Chinese embassy in Chicago
asked him to remove me from CSSA due to my involvement in Falun Gong
activities. I had a personal website that published content about Falun
Gong. I was later told that somehow the Chinese consulate of Chicago
has noticed my connection with Falun Gong and asked the then-CSSA
administration to remove me from the CSSA.''
4. CCP propaganda demonizing Falun Gong causes apprehension among
practitioners and university representatives. University
representatives have appeared unprepared for false claims made about
Falun Gong and have not always provided equal opportunity for Falun
Gong Club representatives to respond.
5. Chinese-language textbooks being used at some U.S. universities
contain inaccurate and damaging depictions of Falun Gong.
Case Study: Reprisal Campaign for a Film Screening about Confucius
Institutes
A graduate student at a major university in Pennsylvania reported a
month-long, coordinated campaign in March and April 2021 aiming to
slander and delegitimize the Falun Dafa Club for co-hosting an online
screening and panel discussion on the documentary film, In the Name of
Confucius. The club had hosted the event with the Athenai Institute and
Students for a Free Tibet, which the official student government body,
the Graduate and Professional Student Assembly (GAPSA) had also helped
advertise in their newsletter and social media. The film screening was
relevant to campus discussions regarding Confucius Institutes, gifts to
the university from China, and the presence of a CSSA club on
campus.\20\
In the week following the event, at least 79 students and former
graduates associated with the CSSA sent multiple emails to GAPSA, with
complaints that the event promoted by GAPSA was too political. In the
emails, the CSSA members claimed that the Falun Dafa Club, Students for
a Free Tibet, and Athenai Institute were ``anti-China'' organizations
with the mission to slander China and Chinese people. They petitioned
the association to respond to the claims that the Falun Gong Club had
violated university policies, and that the GAPSA promotion of this
event was an act of marginalization against the Chinese community on
campus.\21\ An investigation revealed, though, that many Facebook posts
about the event from Chinese international students revolved around
slandering Falun Gong and opposing the Falun Gong Club's right and
eligibility to host events.\22\ Faculty members involved with GAPSA
held a roundtable on March 30, 2021 to address the petition and the
``controversy,'' inviting groups including GAPSA representatives and
CSSA members to attend; however, the Falun Gong Club president was not
provided a similar presentation opportunity. During a second meeting,
one CSSA member presented a slideshow that included CCP politicized
propaganda against Falun Gong, falsely misrepresenting the faith as a
``cult.''
After a week of deliberation, the faculty members acknowledged that
the Falun Gong Club and its president had not violated any university
policies, but the incident nevertheless had a long-term impact. It is
unclear if the CSSA members were acting of their own accord or under
pressure from Chinese officials, but the attempt fits a pattern
reported at other university campuses of Chinese students lodging
complaints about events critical of the CCP, claiming they promote
anti-Asian hatred.\23\ After this stressful and upsetting experience,
the Falun Gong Club president went on to hold one last documentary
screening of Letter from Masanjia about forced labor in China before
her graduation that June, but reported experiencing ongoing trauma and
anxiety from the harassment. The campaign against In the Name of
Confucius also affected GAPSA, which did not promote this second
documentary screening or future events held by the university's Falun
Gong Club on their social media or in public event notices.
4. Campaign to Monitor and Slander Dragon Springs
Beginning in the early 2000s, Falun Gong practitioners in New York
built a campus with Buddhist-style temple buildings modeled on Tang
Dynasty architecture. The campus is called Dragon Springs. Today, it
also houses two accredited academic institutions--Fei Tian Academy of
the Arts and Fei Tian College--and the training center for Shen Yun
Performing Arts, an internationally renowned classical Chinese dance
company.\24\
According to leaked CCP documents, targeting this campus for
surveillance, espionage, and legal harassment is a priority for the
regime. A 2017 document from the CCP's Henan Provincial Committee
states: ``Tightly focus on the overseas xie jiao core backbones, the
headquarters [Dragon Springs] base and foreign political figures,
carefully organize strategies to strike and divide them. Pay close
attention to the trend of overseas activities of Falun Gong . . .
collect early warnings, forward-looking, action-oriented intelligence
information, and thus serve the overall struggle situation.'' \25\ The
campus has faced vandalism, frequent spying via drones, and localized
social media campaigns spreading falsehoods about the campus.
In an unprecedented case, federal prosecutors charged two men on
May 26, 2023, with attempting to bribe an IRS official with tens of
thousands of dollars in a scheme to help the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) ``topple'' Falun Gong in the United States.\26\ Specifically,
they were charged with manipulating ``the IRS Whistleblower Program,
through bribery and deceit,'' in an attempt to strip an entity run by
Falun Gong practitioners of its tax-exempt status. Given that the
bribery targeted an IRS office in Orange County, New York, the intended
target was most likely Dragon Springs or Shen Yun Performing Arts, both
of which are headquartered in Orange County.
Many who work at the Dragon Springs campus are refugees who escaped
religious persecution or survived torture in China. Many have relatives
back in China who have faced intimidation, harassment, and even arrest
by security forces due to their having family members working at or
attending Fei Tian Academy, Fei Tian College, or working for Shen Yun.
One recent case is Aihua Liu, the mother of U.S. citizens Steven and
Lydia Wang, who was sentenced to four years in prison in China last
month. Steven Wang, her son, is a principal dancer for Shen Yun.\27\
A particularly damaging tactic that the CCP and its apparent
proxies have used, has been to weaponize the U.S. legal system by
filing baseless lawsuits to harm the reputation of Dragon Springs in
the local community and force lengthy, costly legal cases. Since 2019,
the campus or its residents have faced three lawsuits by an American
national who spent 15 years in Tianjin and then moved to the area, and/
or by his associates. The lawsuits purport to relate to environmental
protection but are based on mistruths, ultimately failing in court. All
three of these lawsuits have been dismissed, but the plaintiffs seem
poised to continue filing further suits.
5. Recommendations
The CCP's ongoing campaign against Chinese citizens who practice
Falun Gong remains one of the most severe human rights crises and
sources of religious freedom violations in today's China. As described
above, this campaign of persecution extends internationally. In this
context, the Falun Dafa Information Center urges policymakers and
members of civil society to take the following steps to condemn, deter,
and prevent acts of transnational repression against Falun Gong
believers in the United States and around the world.
(A) Take action to protect Falun Gong communities from transnational
repression
1. Punish diplomats who engage in intimidation, harassment,
surveillance, or pressuring members of the Chinese diaspora to
marginalize Falun Gong or take action against practitioners. Declare
diplomats who commit transnational repression against Falun Gong
targets persona non grata.
2. Investigate and prosecute anyone who assaults Falun Gong
practitioners who were peacefully exercising their right to free
speech, as authorities in New York City have done.
3. Investigate proxy groups, such as the 610 Office-linked Anti-
Cult Association, that are at the forefront of harassing Falun Gong
practitioners in locations such as Flushing, NY.
4. Investigate digital surveillance of Falun Gong communities and
pressure China-based companies like Tencent or ByteDance to be
transparent about moderation policies and data collection. Urge them to
avoid censorship and surveillance of Falun Gong-related information on
popular apps such as WeChat and TikTok outside of China.
5. Ensure that expanding activities to monitor and prevent
transnational repression include Falun Gong. Relevant actions could
include making sure that those working on transnational repression
receive minimal education on Falun Gong, that engagement with
vulnerable communities to collect incidents includes Falun Gong, and
that transparency enforcement for foreign agents includes additional
entities that demonize or harass Falun Gong believers. Ensure that
local Falun Gong community representatives are aware of any available
channels to report incidents of transnational repression.
6. Actively welcome and support Falun Gong refugees fleeing China,
including by ensuring that asylum officers and others in the
immigration system evaluating applications receive at least a minimal
education on Falun Gong.
7. University faculty, administrators, and relevant U.S.
Government agencies must take further action to preempt, monitor,
deter, and counter CCP activities that undermine freedom of expression,
freedom of belief, and non-discrimination for Falun Gong practitioners
and for others on campus.
8. Representatives from relevant congressional committees and U.S.
Government agencies--such as the National Security Council, Department
of Homeland Security, and Department of State--should meet with Falun
Gong representatives, torture survivors, victims of transnational
repression, and relatives of jailed practitioners outside China. This
will enable them to receive up-to-date information about conditions in
China. Given the severity of the persecution in China and risk of
reprisals, it is too dangerous for local adherents to meet with foreign
government officials inside the country. As such, U.S. officials and
diplomatic staff should make a particular priority of meeting with
Falun Gong practitioners prior to their travel to China or during
visits to their home country. High-level officials, including
presidents, vice presidents, prime ministers, secretaries of state, and
religious freedom ambassadors should also meet with Falun Gong torture
survivors, victims of transnational repression, or relatives of jailed
practitioners to better understand conditions in China and to signal
support for their freedom.
(B) Vocally condemn transnational repression against Falun Gong in
public and private
1. U.S. officials should make public statements condemning
incidents of transnational repression targeting individual Falun Gong
practitioners and their families.
2. In meetings with Chinese counterparts, officials should call
for the halt of transnational repression of Falun Gong practitioners,
including at the highest levels of diplomacy.
3. When preparing to meet with consular officials, make use of
publicly available resources or queries to the Falun Dafa Information
Center to ascertain conditions of transnational repression.
4. Local, state, and federal officials should make public
statements on key anniversaries, such as May 13 (World Falun Dafa Day)
and July 20 (the date of the CCP's launch of its violent persecution)--
that express support for U.S. residents and citizens who practice Falun
Gong and condemn ongoing transnational repression.
5. Members of Congress, the U.S. Ambassador to China, and human
rights groups should advocate for the release of imprisoned Falun Gong
practitioners, especially those with family members residing outside
China.
[ENDNOTES follow on next three pages.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Statement of Zhou Fengsuo
______
The CCP's Transnational Repression of Emerging Activists
After the White Paper Movement
introduction
My name is Zhou Fengsuo, and I am a former Tiananmen student leader
and current Executive Director of Human Rights in China, a New York-
based organization that advocates for a more just and democratic
Chinese future. I am honored to provide testimony on the situation of
Chinese students in the United States, which grows more and more
precarious with each passing day. Due to my position as a long-time
activist, I have been lucky enough to meet with hundreds of young
overseas Chinese activists and hear their stories. Last year,
frustration with the Chinese government's repressive policies finally
overflowed and sparked the White Paper Movement, where individuals--
mostly students and young people--around the world protested against
CCP censorship and repression. In the aftermath of these protests, the
CCP has cracked down on anyone who was involved, and has especially
targeted students on U.S. campuses.
Chinese students in the United States played a critical role in the
White Paper Movement. It was their mobilization that eventually forced
the CCP to change their policies. The White Paper protests demonstrated
that student activism abroad is a crucial method of putting pressure on
the Chinese government. We believe that in the future, activism outside
of China will continue to be highly influential, and it is imperative
that we support emerging activism with the goal of promoting change in
China.
However, activism organizations and individual activists all over
the world are now facing harassment and retaliation from the CCP
because of their activities during the White Paper protests. This lack
of security is the main obstacle they are facing. Pushing back on the
long arm of the CCP and resisting its transnational repression is key
to ensuring the future success of the organizations formed after the
White Paper Movement.
From those who have been brave enough to share their situations
with us, we know that the CCP mostly collects information through
online surveillance, as well as through pro-CCP student informants. We
also know that the two most common strategies for suppressing activist
voices are detaining them for questioning if they return to China, and
holding their parents hostage until they agree to stop their activities
or even become informants themselves. In the past year, I have traveled
across the globe to meet with young activists who have been targeted in
the aftermath of the White Paper Movement, learn their concerns, and
discuss how to best support and protect them. Below, I will share just
a few of their stories.
the ccp harasses activists to instill fear
I have interviewed dozens of activists in North America and Europe
who became involved in the pro-democracy movement following the White
Paper protests. Many of them are young college students or recent
graduates who became involved in activism on their college campuses.
Their level of ``activist'' activity ranges from those who merely post
anti-CCP messages on social media to those who attend protests and try
to rally their fellow students.
Many students have told me similar stories of harassment from
Chinese police. Often, there is some key moment of exposure--a phone
number revealed online, a viral social media post, or a classmate
turned informant. There are even cases of email addresses found by
Chinese police through website accounts that should have only been
visible to employees of a U.S. company, which suggests that CCP agents
have managed to access some internal databases.
Once an overseas activist is on the radar of the authorities, the
Chinese police often use one of two strategies: hostage-taking or
direct interrogation. The first strategy involves Chinese police going
to the home of the activist's parents, calling the activist, and
forcing their parents to ask specific questions about their activities
and other contacts before demanding that they stop whatever anti-CCP
actions they have been engaged in. There is, of course, an implicit (or
explicit) threat to their parents if they do not comply. This strategy
is especially common among young overseas activists because so many of
them have parents back in China, who are an easy target for
retaliation.
The second strategy is to detain and question the young activists
themselves, usually when they return home to see their families in
China. Students have told me about being taken away by police and
interrogated for over ten hours at a time. Especially for young people
with little experience in this arena, such detentions are terrifying.
The police threaten their families and tell them they will be thrown in
jail for years in order to elicit a ``confession.'' Many were
interrogated many times over the same kind of question in order to
break their spirit and find inconsistencies. Some were put in a hotel
and questioned for weeks.
No matter which strategy the police employ, the intent is clearly
to frighten the activist into stopping their activities, and to collect
information about their networks. Police often demand that the
activists themselves become informants and spy on other overseas
students and organizations.
I have heard similar stories from activists across the U.S.,
Canada, and Europe. In Europe, several activist organizations are all
but dissolved after constant harassment from CCP agents made them too
afraid to contact one another. Some told me they were even followed,
despite living outside China, which made them so afraid they ceased
their activities altogether and went into hiding. A student on an
American campus was threatened with violence by a classmate, who told
her he would hurt her so she couldn't continue to post anti-CCP
content.
conclusions
From speaking with activists, I have learned several key facts
about the CCP's tactics for transnational repression. First, the
significance of the internet for surveillance purposes cannot be
overstated. It enables direct surveillance by CCP agents and creates
new platforms for self-censorship. Second, students who support the CCP
pose a threat to Chinese students' freedom of speech. They may report
on their classmates, or threaten them directly. Third, the fact that
most Chinese students have family members back home makes them uniquely
vulnerable to ``hostage''-style questioning and pressure from the
authorities.
So far, it seems that most of the information the Chinese police
have on activists comes from online surveillance of social media and
websites. But there are still real concerns about informants within the
Chinese diaspora community. Even though the recent activities by U.S.
law enforcement against informants have been widely positively received
by the Chinese activist community, they need direct and concrete
support from universities and the government in protecting their safety
from the CCP's still-pervasive influence, both online and on the
ground.
From Chinese students' point of view, these are real, serious risks
that create a chilling effect on activism and speech. The situation
does not show signs of improvement; to the contrary, concerning cases
have proliferated in recent years. We should seek to protect Chinese
students and enable them to enjoy the freedom of speech that should be
guaranteed in America.
proposals
1. Universities should be proactive in protecting the right to free
speech of Chinese students, especially against material risks:
a. New students who arrive should be given some sort of rights
training, with an emphasis on free speech;
b. Students should be warned that they can be prosecuted for
threats or for taking threatening action against other students;
c. Chinese Scholars Associations (CSAs) have been an extension of
the CCP's influence on college campuses. These organizations harbor
student informants and create a chilling environment of fear for
Chinese student communities. They should be required to disclose their
association with the Chinese Embassy and other affiliates.
2. Students faced with CCP repression often feel confused and afraid,
which renders them unable to resist under pressure. We need to
establish channels to connect Chinese students with relevant government
offices and institutions so that incidents can be understood quickly,
and help can be provided in an effective, safe, and timely manner.
3. Online surveillance and data leaks should be a major concern for
legislation and enforcement.
4. Facebook recently removed many accounts that are associated with
disinformation. All major social platforms should crack down on these
fake accounts.
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Witness Biographies
The Honourable Michael Chong, P.C., M.P., Member of the House of
Commons, Canadian Parliament, Official Opposition Shadow Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Vice Chair of the Special Committee on the Canada-
People's Republic of China Relationship
Michael Chong was first elected to the Parliament of Canada in 2004
and represents the riding of Wellington-Halton Hills. He is currently
the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Official Opposition and
Vice-Chair of the Special Committee on the Canada-People's Republic of
China Relationship. Mr. Chong has served in the Federal cabinet as
President of the Queen's Privy Council, Minister of Intergovernmental
Affairs, and Minister for Sport. Mr. Chong has also served as chair of
several House of Commons standing committees.
Yana Gorokhovskaia, Ph.D., Research Director for Strategy and
Design, Freedom House
Yana Gorokhovskaia is the Research Director for Strategy and Design
at Freedom House, a non-profit and non-partisan organization devoted to
the support and defense of democracy around the world. Yana has a Ph.D.
from the University of British Columbia and has been published in peer-
reviewed journals and outlets such as Foreign Affairs, Politico, the
Guardian, the Washington Post, and Just Security. At Freedom House,
Yana oversees research-related trends in global freedom and democracy
as well as transnational repression. She has co-authored two reports on
the topic in recent years: ``Still Not Safe: Transnational Repression
in 2022'' and ``Defending Democracy in Exile: Policy Responses to
Transnational Repression.''
Laura Harth, Campaign Director, Safeguard Defenders
Laura Harth is the Campaign Director at Safeguard Defenders, a
human rights NGO that undertakes and supports activities for the
protection of human rights, promotion of the rule of law, and
enhancement of local civil society capacity in some of Asia's most
hostile environments. Focused on the PRC, it also works to counter
growing transnational repression by the Chinese Communist Party around
the world through direct actions, research, and advocacy efforts. Laura
also covers external relations for the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on
China and acts as an adviser to Hong Kong Watch. Previously a
contributor to Hong Kong-based Apple Daily's English edition, she is a
contributor to Italian outlet Formiche and co-authored a Sinopsis
report to expose and counter Chinese Communist Party foreign
interference operations in Italy.
Rushan Abbas, Founder and Executive Director, Campaign for Uyghurs
Rushan Abbas, a Uyghur American activist, has dedicated her life to
championing the rights of the Uyghur people. Beginning her advocacy
during her time at Xinjiang University, she led pro-democracy protests
in 1985 and 1988. After re-
locating to the United States in 1989, her commitment to the cause only
grew stronger. Co-founding the Uyghur Overseas Student and Scholars
Association in 1993, she played a pivotal role in establishing the
Uyghur American Association in 1998 and was elected as its vice
president for two terms.
In response to Beijing's escalating genocidal actions against
Uyghurs in 2017, Abbas co-founded the Campaign for Uyghurs (CFU). This
organization advocates for Uyghur human rights and democratic freedoms,
rallying the international community against the atrocities in East
Turkistan. She pioneered the ``One Voice One Step'' movement,
orchestrating a global protest on March 15, 2018, across 14 countries
and 18 cities against China's mass Uyghur detentions. Her sister's
abduction followed her first public speech in September 2018, as
retaliation for Rushan's activism. In 2020, CFU released the report
``Genocide in East Turkistan,'' meticulously detailing how China's
actions align with the Genocide Convention. Notably, CFU received a
Nobel Peace Prize nomination in February 2022 for its relentless
advocacy. Rushan Abbas engages with global lawmakers, briefing them on
East Turkistan's human rights crisis.
Testifying before Congress multiple times, she sheds light on the
Chinese regime's genocide and crimes against humanity. Rushan currently
serves as a lived experience expert on the Inter-Parliamentary
Taskforce on Human Trafficking and as the Advisory Board Chair of the
Axel Springer Freedom Foundation.
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