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                        CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 
                          COMMISSION ON CHINA  





                             ANNUAL REPORT 
                                  2023

======================================================================= 

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                                MAY 2024

                               __________

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                        CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 
                          COMMISSION ON CHINA  





                             ANNUAL REPORT 
                                  2023

=======================================================================








                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                                MAY 2024

                               __________


 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China









    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]











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                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
                 
52-994 PDF                   WASHINGTON : 2024 


































              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House                                      Senate

                                     

CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey, Chair       JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Co-Chair      
BRIAN MAST, Florida                        ANGUS KING, Maine 
MICHELLE STEEL, California                 TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois  
RYAN ZINKE, Montana                        SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa                         LAPHONZA R. BUTLER, California
JAMES P. MCGOVERN, Massachusetts           MARCO RUBIO, Florida  
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia                  TOM COTTON, Arkansas
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania                   STEVE DAINES, Montana
ANDREA SALINAS, Oregon                     DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska         
                                  

                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                     UZRA ZEYA, Department of State
                  MARISA LAGO, Department of Commerce
                   THEA MEI LEE, Department of Labor
               DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK, Department of State
                  ERIN M. BARCLAY, Department of State

                      Piero Tozzi, Staff Director
                   Matt Squeri, Deputy Staff Director



                                  (II)    
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                  S U M M A R Y  O F  C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Section I. Contents..............................................     v
Section II. Executive Summary....................................     1
Section III. Respect for Civil Liberties.........................    48
    Chapter 1--Freedom of Expression.............................    48
    Chapter 2--Civil Society.....................................    69
    Chapter 3--Freedom of Religion...............................    86
Section IV. Rule of Law in the Justice System....................   105
    Chapter 4--Criminal Justice..................................   105
    Chapter 5--Access to Justice.................................   121
Section V. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process.......   131
    Chapter 6--Governance........................................   131
Section VI. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in 
  Persons........................................................   145
    Chapter 7--Ethnic Minority Rights............................   145
    Chapter 8--Status of Women...................................   155
    Chapter 9--Population Control................................   169
    Chapter 10--Human Trafficking................................   182
Section VII. Worker Rights.......................................   196
    Chapter 11--Worker Rights....................................   196
Section VIII. Other Thematic Issues..............................   214
    Chapter 12--Public Health....................................   214
    Chapter 13--The Environment and Climate Change...............   231
    Chapter 14--Business and Human Rights........................   245
    Chapter 15--North Korean Refugees in China...................   261
    Chapter 16--Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism.............   270
Section IX. Tibet................................................   283
    Chapter 17--Tibet............................................   283
Section X. Xinjiang..............................................   301
    Chapter 18--Xinjiang.........................................   301
Section XI. Hong Kong and Macau..................................   326
    Chapter 19--Hong Kong and Macau..............................   326
Section XII. Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally....   344
    Chapter 20--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.   344
Section XIII. Additional Views of the Commissioners..............   357
                          Section I. Contents

                                                                   Page
Section II. Executive Summary....................................     1
      A. Statement from the Chairs...............................     1
      B. Overview................................................     3
      C. Key Findings............................................     8
      D. Political Prisoner Database.............................    26
      E. Political Prisoner Cases of Concern.....................    30
      F. General Recommendations to Congress and the 
        Administration...........................................    39
      G. Commission Activity July 2022-November 2023.............    46
Section III. Respect for Civil Liberties.........................    48
    Chapter 1--Freedom of Expression.............................    48
      A. Findings................................................    48
      B. Recommendations.........................................    49
      C. Freedom of the Press....................................    51
        1. Party Control of the Media............................    51
        2. Harassment, Detention, and Imprisonment of Journalists    51
        3. Conditions for Foreign Journalists....................    52
      D. In-Person Protest and Assembly..........................    53
        1. White Paper Protests..................................    53
      E. Internet................................................    54
        1. Regulatory Developments...............................    54
        2. Censorship............................................    55
      F. Suppression of Independent Expression before the 20th 
        Party Congress...........................................    56
      G. Art, Entertainment, and Literature......................    59
      H. Educational and Research Institutions...................    60
    Chapter 2--Civil Society.....................................    69
      A. Findings................................................    69
      B. Recommendations.........................................    70
      C. Introduction............................................    72
      D. Regulations and Policy Pertaining to Civil Society......    72
        1. Authorities Expand Control over Social Organizations..    72
        2. Social Organizations Deemed ``Illegal''...............    73
      E. Foreign NGO Activity in China...........................    73
      F. Official Support for Charities and Philanthropic Giving.    74
      G. White Paper Protests....................................    74
      H. Harsh Sentencing of China Citizens Movement Organizers..    76
      I. Government Suppression of Civil Society.................    76
      J. Status of LGBTQ Persons.................................    77
    Chapter 3--Freedom of Religion...............................    86
      A. Findings................................................    86
      B. Recommendations.........................................    87
      C. Introduction............................................    88
      D. International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom......    88
      E. Regulations and Policies Pertaining to Religious Freedom    88
      F. Sinicization of Religious Groups and the 20th Party 
        Congress.................................................    90
      G. Buddhism (Non-Tibetan) and Taoism.......................    90
      H. Islam...................................................    91
      I. Christianity--Catholic..................................    92
        1. Compliance with the Sino-Vatican Agreement............    92
        2. Coercion and Repression of Catholic Communities.......    93
        3. Control of the Catholic Church in Hong Kong...........    94
      J. Christianity--Protestant................................    94
      K. Falun Gong..............................................    95
      L. Other Religious Communities.............................    96
Section IV. Rule of Law in the Justice System....................   105
    Chapter 4--Criminal Justice..................................   105
      A. Findings................................................   105
      B. Recommendations.........................................   105
      C. Introduction............................................   107
      D. Lack of Judicial Independence...........................   107
      E. Arbitrary Detention.....................................   107
      F. Extrajudicial Detention.................................   108
        1. Enforced Disappearance................................   108
        2. Black Jails...........................................   108
        3. Psychiatric Facilities................................   109
        4. Administrative Detention..............................   109
        5. Retention in Custody..................................   110
      G. Abuse of Criminal Provisions............................   110
      H. Restriction of Liberty of Foreign Individuals...........   111
      I. Torture and Abuse.......................................   112
      J. Death in Custody........................................   112
      K. Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location.......   113
      L. Denial of Counsel and Family Visits.....................   113
      M. The Death Penalty.......................................   114
      N. Legal Developments......................................   114
    Chapter 5--Access to Justice.................................   121
      A. Findings................................................   121
      B. Recommendations.........................................   121
      C. Introduction............................................   123
      D. Lack of Judicial Independence and Transparency..........   123
      E. Reform of the Petitioning System........................   123
      F. Persecution of Petitioners..............................   124
      G. Persecution of Legal Professionals......................   125
        1. Enforced Disappearance................................   125
        2. Sentencing............................................   126
        3. Pre-Sentencing Detention..............................   126
Section V. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process.......   131
    Chapter 6--Governance........................................   131
      A. Findings................................................   131
      B. Recommendations.........................................   131
      C. Introduction............................................   133
      D. Xi Jinping Further Solidified Political Power...........   133
      E. Policy Plan Affirmed Undemocratic Political System......   133
      F. Government's Handling of COVID-19 and Related Protests..   134
      G. Government's Response to Other Protests.................   136
      H. Strengthening Grid Management...........................   137
      I. Rural Policies..........................................   137
      J. Online Movement Exposed Corrupt Practices...............   138
      K. PRC Counterespionage Law................................   139
Section VI. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in 
  Persons........................................................   145
    Chapter 7--Ethnic Minority Rights............................   145
      A. Findings................................................   145
      B. Recommendations.........................................   145
      C. Introduction............................................   147
      D. Party and Government Policy toward Ethnic Minorities....   147
      E. Crackdown on Hui Religion and Culture...................   147
      F. Hui Muslims in Yunnan Protest over Planned Partial 
        Demolition of Mosque.....................................   148
      G. Constraints on Language and Ethnic Identity in the IMAR.   149
      H. Mongols Fleeing China Face Transnational Repression, 
        Repatriation.............................................   150
    Chapter 8--Status of Women...................................   155
      A. Findings................................................   155
      B. Recommendations.........................................   155
      C. Introduction............................................   157
      D. Political Representation and Public Participation.......   157
        1. 20th Party Congress: No Female Representation in Top 
          Leadership Body........................................   157
        2. Political Sensitivity over Women's Public 
          Participation..........................................   157
      E. CEDAW Review in May 2023................................   158
        1. Women Political and Religious Prisoners...............   158
        2. Chinese Women's Rights in Law.........................   159
        3. Chinese Influence Efforts at CEDAW....................   159
      F. Gender-Based Violence...................................   160
        1. Domestic Violence: Too Few Protection Orders..........   160
        2. Sexual Harassment and Assault.........................   161
    Chapter 9--Population Control................................   169
      A. Findings................................................   169
      B. Recommendations.........................................   169
      C. International Standards and the PRC's Coercive 
        Population Policies......................................   171
      D. Population Decline and Official Responses...............   172
        1. Official Policies, Actions, and Proposals.............   172
      E. Public Discontent with the Pro-Natal Population Policy..   174
      F. Rights of Unmarried Women with Children.................   175
      G. Continuing Effects of the One-Child Policy..............   175
    Chapter 10--Human Trafficking................................   182
      A. Findings................................................   182
      B. Recommendations.........................................   182
      C. China's Human Trafficking and Forced Labor Obligations 
        under International Law..................................   184
        1. Palermo Protocol......................................   184
        2. ILO Forced Labor Conventions and ILO Indicators of 
          Forced Labor...........................................   184
      D. Cross-Border Trafficking................................   185
      E. Chinese Fishing Companies Sanctioned for Human Rights 
        Abuses...................................................   186
      F. Chinese Companies, Cobalt Mining, and Child Labor in the 
        Democratic Republic of the Congo.........................   186
      G. Domestic Trafficking....................................   186
        1. Political Prisoners Forced to Labor in Hunan Province.   188
        2. International Transplant Organization Refused Organ 
          Transplant Data from the PRC...........................   188
      H. U.N. Human Rights Bodies and Experts Expressed Concern 
        over Forced Labor in the XUAR............................   188
Section VII. Worker Rights.......................................   196
    Chapter 11--Worker Rights....................................   196
      A. Findings................................................   196
      B. Recommendations.........................................   197
      C. Introduction............................................   198
      D. Protecting the Rights of Women in the Workplace.........   199
      E. Worker Strikes and Protests.............................   200
        1. The Zero-COVID Policy and Its Aftermath...............   201
        2. Protests at Foxconn's ``iPhone City'' in October and 
          November 2022..........................................   202
      F. Advocating for Worker Rights............................   203
        1. Continued Suppression of Labor Advocacy and Civil 
          Society................................................   203
        2. The Party's ``Bridge'' to Workers: The All-China 
          Federation of Trade Unions.............................   204
      G. Selected Issues in Chinese Labor Rights.................   204
        1. Retired Workers Protest Changes to Health Insurance...   204
        2. Worker Safety and Industrial Accidents................   205
Section VIII. Other Thematic Issues..............................   214
    Chapter 12--Public Health....................................   214
      A. Findings................................................   214
      B. Recommendations.........................................   215
      C. Introduction............................................   216
      D. COVID-19................................................   217
        1. The End of the Zero-COVID Policy......................   217
        2. The Party's Authoritarian Control of Public Health....   217
        3. Lack of Data Transparency.............................   218
        4. Language about Public Health Risks Deleted from 
          Amendment to PRC Wildlife Protection Law...............   219
        5. Pandemic-Related Protests.............................   219
        6. The COVID-19 Pandemic and Mental Health in China......   220
        7. Propaganda and Disinformation.........................   220
      E. Tenth Anniversary of the PRC Mental Health Law..........   221
        1. Forced Psychiatric Commitment and Involuntary 
          Hospitalization........................................   221
      F. Targeting Public Health Whistleblowers and Advocates....   222
    Chapter 13--The Environment and Climate Change...............   231
      A. Findings................................................   231
      B. Recommendations.........................................   232
      C. Introduction............................................   233
      D. Legal Developments and Guidelines.......................   233
      E. Climate Change..........................................   234
        1. Air Pollution.........................................   235
        2. Challenges in Protecting Water Security...............   236
        3. Impact of Chinese Dams................................   236
      F. Chinese Distant Water Fishing Fleet.....................   237
      G. Wildlife Protection.....................................   237
      H. Environmental Advocacy Despite Suppression of Civil 
        Society..................................................   237
      I. State-Led Model of Environmental Public Interest 
        Litigation...............................................   238
    Chapter 14--Business and Human Rights........................   245
      A. Findings................................................   245
      B. Recommendations.........................................   246
      C. Introduction............................................   247
      D. Corporate Involvement in XUAR Forced Labor..............   247
      E. The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act..................   248
      F. U.S. Federal Employee Retirement Investments Linked to 
        Rights Abuses in the XUAR................................   249
      G. Companies' Role in Government Data Collection, 
        Surveillance, and Censorship across China................   249
        1. Data Collection and Surveillance......................   249
        2. Government Censorship, Removals, and Closures.........   250
      H. Amendments to the PRC Counterespionage Law and Impact on 
        Global Businesses........................................   253
      I. Exporting China's Censorship............................   253
      J. Worker Exploitation and Abusive Labor Practices.........   254
    Chapter 15--North Korean Refugees in China...................   261
      A. Findings................................................   261
      B. Recommendations.........................................   261
      C. Introduction............................................   263
      D. Border Conditions during the COVID-19 Pandemic..........   263
      E. North Korean Workers in China during the COVID-19 
        Pandemic.................................................   265
      F. Trafficking of North Korean Women in China..............   265
      G. Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents............   266
    Chapter 16--Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism.............   270
      A. Findings................................................   270
      B. Recommendations.........................................   270
      C. Introduction............................................   272
      D. Violations of International Commitment to Prevent Racial 
        Discrimination...........................................   272
      E. Expansion of Surveillance Capabilities for Social 
        Control..................................................   273
      F. Surveillance and Tracking of White Paper Protests Using 
        Artificial Intelligence..................................   274
      G. ``Digital China'' Policy Developments...................   274
      H. Malign Influence and Data Sharing on TikTok and WeChat..   275
      I. Increased Repression and Censorship Online..............   276
      J. Ruan Xiaohuan, Anonymous Blogger and Guide to 
        Circumventing the Great Firewall, Sentenced to Seven 
        Years in Prison..........................................   276
      K. Increased Regulation of Generative AI for Social and 
        Political Control........................................   277
      L. Manipulating International Opinion and Increased 
        Harassment Online........................................   277
Section IX. Tibet................................................   283
    Chapter 17--Tibet............................................   283
      A. Findings................................................   283
      B. Recommendations.........................................   284
      C. Status of Negotiations between the Chinese Government 
        and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives................   285
      D. Self-Immolations........................................   285
      E. Religious Freedom for Tibetans..........................   285
        1. The Dalai Lama........................................   287
      F. COVID-19 in the Tibet Autonomous Region.................   287
      G. Mass Biometric Data Collection and Surveillance in 
        Tibetan Areas............................................   289
      H. Language and Cultural Rights............................   289
      I. Restrictions on the Freedom of Expression and the Free 
        Flow of Information......................................   290
        1. Six Tibetan Intellectuals Detained in Sichuan Province   292
      J. Heavy Restrictions Remain on Freedom of Movement, 
        Travel, and Access to Tibet..............................   292
Section X. Xinjiang..............................................   301
    Chapter 18--Xinjiang.........................................   301
      A. Findings................................................   301
      B. Recommendations.........................................   302
      C. Xi Jinping Visits the XUAR..............................   304
      D. Calls for Accountability for China at the U.N. for 
        Rights Abuses in the XUAR................................   304
        1. U.N. Report Documents Rights Violations in the XUAR...   304
      E. U.S. Legislation Targets Organ Harvesting, Seeks 
        Accountability for Genocide..............................   306
      F. Turkic Muslims Sentenced to Lengthy Prison Terms........   306
      G. Forced Labor Involving Turkic and Muslim XUAR Residents.   308
        1. UFLPA Enforcement and Forced Labor Products in the 
          United States..........................................   309
      H. Repressive Surveillance Technology and Security Measures   309
      I. COVID-19-Related Restrictions Lead to Deaths, Medical 
        Issues in the XUAR.......................................   310
      J. Harsh Policies Led to Multiple Deaths and Injuries in 
        Urumqi Fire..............................................   311
      K. Persecution of Ethnic Minority Women in the XUAR........   312
        1. Forced Interethnic Marriages..........................   312
        2. Population Control Measures Targeting Ethnic Minority 
          Women..................................................   312
        3. Rights Organizations Criticize China in Advance of 
          CEDAW Review...........................................   313
      L. Detention of Ethnic Kazakhs.............................   313
        1. Detention of Former Mass Internment Camp Detainee 
          Zhanargul Zhumatai.....................................   314
      M. Freedom of Religion.....................................   314
      N. Transnational Repression of Uyghurs and Other Turkic 
        Muslims..................................................   315
Section XI. Hong Kong and Macau..................................   326
    Chapter 19--Hong Kong and Macau..............................   326
      A. Findings................................................   326
      B. Recommendations.........................................   327
    Chapter 19a. Hong Kong.......................................   328
      C. Introduction............................................   328
      D. United Nations Reviews of Treaty Obligations............   328
      E. Party Control over Hong Kong Further Formalized.........   329
      F. District Council Reform.................................   329
      G. Arbitrary Application of Criminal Provisions............   329
        1. Freedom of Speech.....................................   329
        2. Freedom of the Press..................................   330
        3. Freedom of Association................................   330
        4. Freedom of Civic Participation........................   331
        5. June 4th Arrests......................................   331
      H. Deradicalization Program in Prisons.....................   331
      I. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the NSL................   332
      J. Restrictions on Representation by Foreign Counsel.......   333
      K. Intimidation of Rights Lawyers..........................   333
      L. Academic Freedom........................................   334
      M. Staffing Shortages in the Public Sector.................   335
      N. Suppression of the Press................................   335
      O. Censorship..............................................   336
    Chapter 19b. Macau...........................................   337
Section XII. Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally....   344
    Chapter 20--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.   344
      A. Findings................................................   344
      B. Recommendations.........................................   345
      C. Transnational Repression................................   346
        1. Protesters Abroad Experience Intimidation, Reprisals, 
          and Chilling Effects...................................   347
        2. Overseas Police ``Service Stations''..................   349
        3. Targeting Foreign Politicians and Government Officials   350
      D. Foreign Development Projects............................   350
      E. Efforts to Impede U.N. Human Rights Bodies..............   351
Section XIII. Additional Views of Commission Members.............   357






















                                   XI

                          --------------------

    The Commission's executive branch members have participated 
in and supported the work of the Commission. The content of 
this Annual Report, including its findings, views, legal 
determinations, and recommendations, does not necessarily 
reflect the views of individual executive branch members or the 
policies of the Administration.
    The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 21 to 
0.
-----------------
     Voted to adopt: Representatives Smith, Mast, Steel, Zinke, 
Nunn, McGovern, Wexton, Wild, and Salinas; Senators Merkley, King, 
Duckworth, Brown, Butler, Rubio, Cotton, and Daines. Executive Branch 
Commissioners Zeya, Lago, Lee, and Kritenbrink.
    Voted to abstain: Senator Sullivan.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

                         II. Executive Summary

                       Statement from the Chairs

    This reporting year was marked by Communist Party leader Xi 
Jinping securing his third term as General Secretary, breaking 
from post-Mao ``reform era'' precedent, and by a continued high 
level of state repression, particularly in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR) and areas of the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) inhabited by Tibetans and other ethnic minority 
groups.
    In spite of this--or perhaps because of it--the past year 
also saw the most public demonstrations directed at Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) leadership since 1989's reform protests 
that ended in the Tiananmen Square Massacre. As elaborated more 
fully in the overview below and in the chapters of the Annual 
Report, this combination of factors pushing toward and pulling 
away from the PRC's centralizing governance system forces us to 
question assumptions about the durability of the repressive 
status quo.
    Consistent with our statutory mandate to chronicle the 
PRC's human rights record via our comprehensive Annual Report, 
maintenance of a representative political prisoner database, 
and critical hearings examining expert testimony, the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC, or the 
Commission) has sought to highlight abuses by the CCP and PRC 
authorities on a range of subjects, including worsening 
persecution of religious minorities--including Muslims, 
Christians, Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetan Buddhists and 
those whose faith practices are deemed unorthodox or ``evil 
cults'' (xiejiao) by the Communist Party--and the use of forced 
labor, particularly of oppressed groups such as Uyghurs and 
North Koreans in the PRC.
    The Commission has expanded its focus on the PRC's 
transnational repression, directed primarily at diaspora 
communities in the United States and elsewhere, in particular 
Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other political dissidents.
    The Commission also exposed the increasing use of 
technology as a tool of repression, from ubiquitous 
surveillance cameras to the digital tools used to surveil and 
suppress online religious expression.
    Reflecting a desire by policymakers to expand the range of 
tools available to promote accountability for human rights 
violations, an increasing focus of the Commission has been to 
address complicity by U.S. and foreign corporations with regard 
to CCP oppression.
    The Commission questioned Thermo Fisher Scientific over use 
of its DNA sequencers by police in the XUAR and Tibet, as well 
as the National Basketball Association's squelching of free 
expression of its players--including Enes Kanter Freedom--for 
speech that could be seen to offend the political leadership of 
the PRC, such as with regard to speaking out about atrocities 
in the XUAR or the shrinking political space in Hong Kong.
    The Commission has overseen the implementation of the 
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), perhaps the most 
significant China-focused legislation to have come out of 
Congress in recent decades. The UFLPA, by creating a rebuttable 
presumption that goods originating in the XUAR are tainted by 
forced labor, has put American businesses on notice about 
complicity in human rights abuses in the PRC and requires them 
to either clean up their supply chains or have their goods 
banned from importation. This is having a demonstrable impact 
on corporate behavior.
    There is more that can be done to change how corporations 
view the risks of doing business in the PRC. As we look 
forward, this could be accomplished by linking access to 
capital markets to human rights records and directing the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to compel publicly traded 
corporations to disclose activities that intersect with human 
rights violations in the PRC such as forced labor, forced organ 
harvesting, or compliance with Hong Kong's National Security 
Law.
    Finally, it is critical to note the unity of the Co-Chairs 
and Commissioners in viewing the leadership of the PRC as 
systematically and systemically seeking to redefine the rules 
of the post-World War II international order, including and in 
particular with regard to human rights norms.
    Congress created the CECC in 2000. The way policymakers 
viewed China's trajectory then, both its domestic economic and 
political development and its relationship to the world, seems 
alien to us today. A majority in Congress thought that economic 
liberalization would lead to political liberalization. A 
minority, including the current Chair, did not accept this 
assumption and believed that a failure to put human rights at 
the forefront of engagement would enable Communist Party 
leaders to couple domestic repression with global economic 
integration.
    Back then, the Commission looked at the rule of law, labor 
rights, and other topics as areas for potential progress. By 
contrast, today's Commissioners monitor genocide against 
Uyghurs, technology-enhanced authoritarianism, and Communist 
Party co-optation of religion. This is the harsh reality. 
Commissioners remain resolved to shine a light on this reality 
even as the CCP tries to cover it up. The work of this 
Commission remains as relevant as ever.
    The Commission, and the Co-Chairs, stand united in their 
belief that human rights are universal, to be enjoyed by all--
including by the long-suffering people of China.

Sincerely,

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2994.002

Rep. Christopher H. Smith          Senator Jeffrey A. Merkley
Chair                              Co-Chair

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

                                Overview

    This reporting year, the tension between the Chinese 
Communist Party's continuing efforts to tighten political 
control and the Chinese people's growing frustration with such 
efforts was very evident, making this year one which posterity 
may look back upon as pivotal. Notwithstanding the apparent 
triumph of Xi Jinping's consolidation of power at the 20th 
Party Congress in October 2022 and the vanquishing of 
intraparty rivals--punctuated by the very public removal of 
Xi's predecessor Hu Jintao from the Congress--the Commission's 
2023 reporting year, which spans July 1, 2022 through June 30, 
2023, was also an extraordinary year of public protest. After 
nearly three years of a heavy-handed, top-imposed zero-COVID 
policy that one writer likened to a ``mass imprisonment 
campaign,'' China saw its largest mass protests since 1989, 
with citizens not only speaking out against censorship and 
restrictions on personal liberty but also demanding political 
reform.
    In what became the most iconic image of the reporting year, 
a protester on Beijing's Sitong Bridge hung a banner calling 
for Xi Jinping to step down which quickly went viral, inspiring 
replicative protest statements in numerous cities and leading 
hyper-vigilant Party censors to go so far as to remove 
reference to Sitong Bridge from online maps. CECC Chair 
Representative Chris Smith and Co-Chair Senator Jeff Merkley, 
joined by former chairs Senator Marco Rubio and Representative 
James McGovern, nominated Sitong Bridge protester Peng Lifa--
known as ``Bridge Man,'' as his courage was redolent of 
Tiananmen Square's ``Tank Man''--for a Nobel Peace Prize.
    The chairs and former chairs also nominated, among others, 
Li Kangmeng--a university student from Nanjing, said to be the 
first person to have held up a blank sheet of paper as a 
protest symbol against censorship in what became known as the 
White Paper protests, echoing Hong Kongers' earlier use of 
blank sheets of paper to protest the enactment of the National 
Security Law.
    Anti-COVID-lockdown protests erupted nationwide--one source 
recorded 77 mass protests in 39 cities throughout China from 
November 27 to December 8, 2022--after news that at least 10 
Uyghur residents of an apartment complex in Urumqi perished in 
a fire due to a draconian zero-COVID lockdown that prevented 
their escape and rescue. Other mass protests this past year 
included demonstrations sparked by denial of access to bank 
funds in Henan province, which lasted from May to July 2022. 
Police squelched these protests, as captured on videos posted 
to social media. Additionally, retirees in Liaoning and Hubei 
took part in ``gray hair'' protests after local governments 
slashed promised medical benefits.
    Likewise, the reporting period was marked by labor unrest, 
most notably at a Foxconn facility in Zhengzhou municipality, 
Henan--the world's largest assembly site for Apple iPhones--in 
late October and November 2022. Some workers protested 
management's purported disregard for their health and safety 
during the October protests by escaping the fenced-in compound. 
During the November protests, workers smashed security cameras, 
which in turn led to clashes with baton-wielding security 
forces.
    Protests such as Bridge Man's and the White Paper protests 
are particularly significant because they engaged the Han 
majority and took place in the Han-majority heartland, but 
there were also attempts to pull the peripheries toward the 
center, which was met with consequential resistance. Most 
notable were efforts to erase the cultures of ethnic minorities 
via colonialist and assimilationist policies in Tibetan areas, 
the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) and the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), as well as the near-total 
extinguishing of Hong Kong's unique identity, promised under 
the ``two systems'' framework.
    During the reporting period, PRC officials continued to 
narrow the scope of mother-language education in Tibetan 
regions, the IMAR, and the XUAR, with plans announced or 
underway in some areas to restrict or even eliminate 
instruction in languages other than Mandarin. Criticism of 
these policies has been widespread, including from United 
Nations (U.N.) treaty monitoring bodies and special 
rapporteurs, as well as from this Commission, whose first 
hearing of the 118th Congress addressed ``Preserving Tibet: 
Combating Cultural Erasure, Forced Assimilation, and 
Transnational Repression.''
    Xi Jinping's visit to the XUAR in July 2022 followed the 
end of a five-year plan to achieve ``comprehensive stability'' 
in the XUAR--a ``stability'' characterized by concentration 
camps, forced labor, and mass indoctrination of Uyghurs and 
other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities, aided and abetted 
by Western corporations who source material from the XUAR. U.N. 
experts raised concerns about reports of the ongoing use of 
coercive birth control measures against these groups in the 
XUAR, including forced abortion, sterilization, and the 
placement of contraceptive devices, reportedly resulting in 
``unusual and stark'' population declines in the XUAR in recent 
years.
    The vigorous implementation in Hong Kong of the National 
Security Law led to increasingly constrictive control over a 
former colonial territory whose internal autonomy had been 
``guaranteed'' under the ``one country, two systems'' formula 
to be retained for 50 years following 1997's retrocession. 
Overt protests in Hong Kong have receded in the wake of the 
dismantling of civil society and the heavy-handed prosecution 
of political and democratic opposition figures stripped of 
procedural rights; in the past few years, Hong Kong authorities 
have incarcerated political prisoners at a rate rivaling 
authoritarian regimes like Belarus and Burma. This 
transformation of Hong Kong society precipitated an outflow of 
talent to countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia. Recent harassment of family members of overseas 
activists and restricted access to earned pension funds have 
also worked against the Hong Kong government's efforts to 
retain businesses and maintain confidence in the economy.
    Some of the most outrageous attempts to assert centralized 
control occurred in the area of freedom of religion and belief. 
Under Xi Jinping, the Party has adopted a policy of 
``sinicization'' of religion. During the reporting year, 
authorities took numerous steps to force religious teaching to 
conform with Party dogma or to further tighten state control 
over religious bodies, including:
     the flattening of domes and leveling of minarets 
of mosques not only in Muslim-majority communities in the XUAR, 
but also in Hui Muslim communities with deep roots in China;
     the installation of two Chinese Catholic Patriotic 
Association bishops in contravention of the 2018 Sino-Vatican 
accord that was renewed during the reporting year;
     restrictions upon proselytization of Tibetan 
Buddhism in non-Tibetan regions;
     the promulgation of Measures for the Financial 
Management of Venues for Religious Activities which bring 
religious organizations' finances under the joint oversight of 
the Ministry of Finance and the National Religious Affairs 
Administration, severely hampering their ability to raise and 
disburse funds independently; and
     the increased use of digital surveillance to track 
religious adherents, including, in Henan province, the forced 
downloading of a ``Smart Religion'' app.
    Reactions to attempts to centralize control of religion 
included at least one case of mass protest, in Yuxi 
municipality in Yunnan province, in response to the attempted 
removal of ``Arabic-style'' domes and minarets in May 2023. 
Authorities deployed police in riot gear, who detained dozens 
of protesters, and, reportedly, a People's Liberation Army 
unit. In most cases, however, responses of dissent and 
resistance were more individualized.
    Individual prisoners of conscience, including those whose 
beliefs are founded on conscientious adherence to religious 
tenets, those who advocate for civil and political rights, and 
those who merely associate with a disfavored group, are 
catalogued in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
(PPD), the maintenance and updating of which entails a major 
staff endeavor throughout the year. The PPD contains details 
concerning the unjust imprisonment of 10,889 prisoners of 
conscience--2,615 of whom were currently in detention as of 
June 30, 2023. The cases documented in the PPD are reflective 
of broad trends of government repression, though the total 
number of political prisoners in detention is much larger.
    While active protest and direct criticism of government 
policies garnered the most headlines and attention, a more 
subtle but significant undercurrent emerged in the form of 
passive resistance. Unlike active street protests, where 
panopticon surveillance systems can identify ringleaders and 
vocal participants who then can be targeted for arrest, it is 
harder for authorities as well as outside observers to identify 
Chinese citizens engaging in the more subtle form of protest of 
disengaging from society out of disillusionment with the 
political or economic state of affairs in China.
    The interplay between state tyranny and active or passive 
resistance is captured in one viral protest video that 
circulated last year before ``being scrubbed from Weibo,'' 
China's Twitter-like medium, in which a security officer yelled 
at a protester that he and his descendants would be punished 
``for three generations!'' Such a threat would have been 
effective not only during imperial times but also during the 
Maoist era, when the stain of being a member of an oppressor 
class like that of ``landlord'' was passed on generationally, 
but its efficacy is blunted when the response, as seen in the 
video, is ``We are the last generation!'' The disillusionment 
embodied by this statement can be viewed as a warning to the 
PRC's ruling authorities of rising disaffection, particularly 
among younger generations, exacerbated by significant headwinds 
currently buffeting the PRC, including economic contraction.
    These challenges may be compounded by significant failures 
of governance, demonstrated most vividly this past year by 
authorities' apparent inability to grapple effectively with the 
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The Party's over-long adherence to 
its zero-COVID policy, against the advice of medical and 
scientific experts, superseded putting in place a calibrated 
vaccination campaign that would have reached the most 
vulnerable; careful planning for the end of the policy; or 
coordination of broader healthcare needs. When the zero-COVID 
policy abruptly ended, massive infection rates and large-scale 
deaths ensued among a highly vulnerable population, 
particularly the elderly. The human toll of this governance 
failure reverberated in the form of over a million deaths and 
food, housing, and employment insecurity.
    In spite of all of this, brave and determined people across 
China continue to push back against heavy-handed 
authoritarianism. White Paper protest participants demonstrated 
that ``loose networks of professionals, friends, affinity 
groups, students, and others''--what one activist has called 
``units of resistance''--were able to connect and mobilize mass 
protesters.
    The members of this Commission stand with those fighting 
for a freer future. In addition to advocating for political 
prisoners and shining a light on violations of universally 
recognized human rights, the Commissioners seek to prevent 
American businesses and capital markets from subsidizing 
tyranny, especially by holding to account corporations that are 
complicit in the importation of goods made with forced labor 
and by requiring that they cleanse their supply chains. 
Moreover, the Commission is concerned about reports published 
this past year documenting massive police surveillance programs 
in Tibetan areas that have collected the personal biometric 
data of millions of people, apparently without obtaining the 
consent of subjects and without any reference to a legitimate 
law enforcement need. These reports once again implicate an 
American company in the supply of instruments of repression to 
those seeking to crush ethnic and religious minority 
communities in China.
    The chief legislative focus of the Commission, fully 
implemented during the reporting period, has been the Uyghur 
Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), landmark legislation 
introduced by then-Chairs McGovern and Rubio with lead co-
sponsorship by current Chairs Smith and Merkley. The genius of 
the UFLPA is that it shifts the burden of demonstrating that 
goods are free from forced labor by creating a rebuttable 
presumption that any goods emanating from the XUAR are tainted 
and thus prohibited from importation.
    The implementation of the UFLPA, overseen by the Forced 
Labor Enforcement Task Force and chaired by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), has impacted corporate behavior. 
Businesses are now on notice that they must trace their supply 
chains and, armed with substantial new resources provided by 
Congress, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) now devotes 
unprecedented attention to investigating those supply chains. 
As a result, direct exports from the XUAR have plummeted and 
businesses are changing their practices to speed up production 
capacity elsewhere in the world, increasing the diversification 
and sustainability of their supply chains. A publicly 
accessible CBP dashboard now tracks the number of shipments 
subjected to CBP review and enforcement action. During the 
reporting period, CBP also held a two-day ``tech expo'' for 
companies to underscore the UFLPA's requirements and CBP's 
intention to vigorously implement and enforce its provisions. 
Further actions taken by the Forced Labor Enforcement Task 
Force included expansion of the ``Entity List'' of banned 
Chinese companies tied to forced labor, which the Commission's 
Chairs have called a ``a step in the right direction,'' though 
more needs to be done, as civil society organizations have 
identified thousands of companies based in China that are 
implicated in forced labor violations in the XUAR.
    Other legislation advanced by the Commission's leadership 
seeks to elevate further the nexus between human rights and 
commercial activity. Senators Rubio and Merkley introduced the 
Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act to enhance 
accountability for and assist the victims of genocide, promote 
the preservation of cultural and linguistic heritages repressed 
by the Chinese government, and improve transparency of 
financial flows benefiting the perpetrators of egregious human 
rights abuses. Chairman Smith reintroduced the China Trade 
Relations Act of 2023 that would relink the PRC's Permanent 
Normal Trade Relations status with its human rights record, 
subjecting it to annual review.
    And in a year that saw reports of extraterritorial Chinese 
police stations, also known as ``service stations,'' in the 
United States and elsewhere in the world, the Chair, Co-Chair, 
and two ranking members simultaneously introduced the 
Transnational Repression Policy Act in both the Senate and the 
House.
    Ultimately, notwithstanding efforts by the United States to 
encourage the PRC to safeguard the human rights of its 
citizens, the future direction of China resides decidedly 
within the country itself, and in the contest between 
authorities' efforts to assert broad societal control and the 
Chinese people's efforts to have a say in their own governance. 
Surveying the shifting landscape of the reporting year, with 
its centripetal and centrifugal forces contending, efforts to 
consolidate control continually collided with individual 
aspirations for freedom. This Commission remains committed to 
standing with the people over the powerful.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

                              Key Findings

                         Freedom of Expression

         The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continued to 
        treat PRC news media as its mouthpiece to provide the 
        Party's version of the news and thereby shape public 
        opinion. Xi Jinping framed the role of media as 
        ``ideological'' work in his political report during the 
        20th Party Congress in October 2022.
         Many journalists, other media professionals, 
        and ``citizen journalists'' remained in detention, in 
        prison, or subject to bail conditions as a result of 
        their reporting. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) 
        estimated that China held 114 journalists in detention, 
        and continued to rank China the world's top jailer of 
        journalists overall, and female journalists 
        specifically.
         Authorities continued to harass, surveil, and 
        restrict foreign journalists and Chinese nationals 
        working for foreign media companies. According to the 
        Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC), 
        harassment of foreign and local journalists and their 
        sources significantly increased around the time of 
        politically sensitive events. Of 102 survey respondents 
        representing news organizations from 30 countries and 
        regions, ``100% said China did not meet international 
        standards for press freedoms and reporting last year.''
         Authorities continued to harass, detain, and 
        imprison people who participated peacefully in in-
        person protests, demonstrations, and other gatherings, 
        including those involved in the White Paper protests. 
        During and after the White Paper protests, authorities 
        took at least 30 people into custody and detained at 
        least 100, while also interrogating many more 
        participants about ``sensitive'' topics unrelated to 
        the protests.
         Authorities censored online discussion of 
        sensitive topics in which sources criticized or 
        contradicted official policy or positions, including 
        the September 2022 crash of a bus carrying people to a 
        COVID-19 quarantine site that led to 27 deaths, 
        information about mortgage boycotts involving tens of 
        thousands of people and related protests, and social 
        media posts covering a hospital fire in Beijing 
        municipality that killed 29 in April 2023.
         The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) 
        continued to unveil regulations diminishing freedom of 
        expression in Chinese cyberspace, launching a 
        ``crackdown campaign'' against ``self media,'' or news 
        created by independent users not registered as 
        journalists, and adding requirements to monitor and 
        control commenters and the content of comments on all 
        internet platforms.
         In anticipation of the 20th National Congress 
        of the Chinese Communist Party, authorities launched 
        physical and digital campaigns of ``stability 
        maintenance and security work'' and internet 
        ``purification,'' respectively--to suppress various 
        sources of independent expression.
         Censors continued to suppress various forms of 
        entertainment content that did not conform to the PRC's 
        priorities, including books, comedy shows, and online 
        poetry.
         State security officials continued detaining 
        publishers and editors responsible for material 
        considered sensitive to the Chinese government, 
        including a high-ranking editor at a Party newspaper 
        and a Taiwan-based publisher of books critical of the 
        Party.
         The PRC continued to limit freedom of 
        expression within educational and research 
        institutions, introducing a draft law on widespread 
        ``patriotic education'' and also issuing a guiding 
        opinion that would increase ideological control over 
        legal education.

                             Civil Society

         During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, 
        PRC authorities tightened control over civil society, 
        bolstering oversight of legal nongovernmental 
        organizations (NGOs), which the Chinese government 
        calls ``social organizations'' (SOs), and widely 
        cracking down on the activities, expression, and 
        existence of unregistered or ``illegal social 
        organizations'' (ISOs), including human rights 
        defenders, religious communities, and groups promoting 
        labor rights, women's rights, and the rights of 
        lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning 
        (LGBTQ) persons.
         The Chinese Communist Party and government 
        have pursued and implemented regulatory efforts to 
        ``gatekeep'' registration for SOs, resulting in the 
        lowest rate of registration of SOs since 2008.
         This year, the Chinese Communist Party Central 
        Committee said that it would establish a social affairs 
        work department that aims to improve Party-building in 
        SOs, more firmly entrenching Party control over civil 
        society.
         This past year, the Commission observed 
        efforts to institutionalize an aggressive 2021 campaign 
        that targeted both ISOs and the financial, 
        technological, and administrative infrastructure that 
        enables them to function, taking actions including 
        banning legal organizations from any contact with ISOs.
         The Chinese Communist Party and government 
        continued to incentivize SOs to engage in charity work 
        and service provision in key sectors. Official efforts 
        encouraged philanthropic giving aligned with Party and 
        government goals, using oversight of crowdfunding 
        platforms to both direct funds and exert control over 
        NGOs.
         As of December 8, 2022, the Australian 
        Strategic Policy Institute's China Protest Tracker 
        recorded 77 protests across 39 Chinese cities, 
        demonstrating that, while decentralized and ad hoc, 
        White Paper protesters appear to have leveraged 
        existing networks to generate a temporary but sustained 
        nationwide pressure campaign against the PRC's zero-
        COVID policy.
         In April 2023, PRC authorities sentenced China 
        Citizens Movement organizers and rights defenders Xu 
        Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi to 14 and 12 years in prison, 
        respectively, for ``subversion of state power,'' 
        constituting what one longtime observer of the PRC 
        justice system described as some of the harshest 
        sentences he had seen in over 20 years.
         Chinese government authorities continued to 
        censor and suppress efforts by advocacy groups in the 
        LGBTQ community. In May 2023, the Beijing LGBT Center, 
        one of the largest organizations serving the LGBTQ 
        community, closed, reportedly due to pressure from 
        authorities.
         Although social acceptance of LGBTQ persons 
        and relationships has grown in China in recent years, 
        PRC authorities have continued to tighten control over 
        suspected LGBTQ representation and expression in media 
        and entertainment.

                          Freedom of Religion

         During the 2023 reporting year, the Commission 
        observed ongoing violations of religious freedom by the 
        Chinese Communist Party and government, aimed at 
        increasing state control of believers in both 
        registered and unregistered religious communities.
         The Party and government took steps to 
        implement measures pertaining to religion passed over 
        the last several years, including measures regulating 
        finances, venues, online activity, and religious 
        clergy.
         Authorities required religious groups 
        affiliated with Party-controlled religious associations 
        to participate in educational and ceremonial events 
        surrounding the 20th National Congress of the Chinese 
        Communist Party, designed to reinforce ``sinicization'' 
        among religious bodies.
         The Party and government sought to closely 
        monitor and regulate Taoist and Buddhist groups, 
        ensuring their adherence to the Party line and national 
        agenda. In one instance, authorities used a 
        controversial incident at a Buddhist temple to crack 
        down on religious venues nationwide.
         National Religious Affairs Administration 
        authorities launched searchable databases of approved 
        Buddhist, Taoist, Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic 
        clergy.
         PRC authorities continued to control and 
        forcibly assimilate Hui Muslims throughout the country. 
        According to a joint report released by two 
        nongovernmental organizations, authorities have used 
        counterterrorism policies instituted in Xinjiang to bar 
        a range of Muslim practices, imposed ``sinicization'' 
        to eradicate distinct ethnic and religious 
        characteristics, and have ``scattered'' and relocated 
        Hui communities under the rubric of Xi Jinping's 
        ``poverty alleviation'' campaign.
         The Chinese Communist Party and government 
        have continued their efforts to assert control over 
        Catholic leadership, community life, and religious 
        practice, installing two bishops in contravention of 
        the 2018 Sino-Vatican agreement and accelerating the 
        integration of the church in Hong Kong with the PRC-
        based, state-sponsored Catholic Patriotic Association 
        and its Party-directed ideology.
         PRC authorities continued to violate the 
        religious freedom of Protestants, engaging in pressure 
        campaigns against unregistered churches by detaining 
        church leaders and targeting several influential 
        ``house'' church networks, renewing their campaign 
        against Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province's Early 
        Rain Covenant Church.
         Chinese authorities continued to prosecute 
        Falun Gong practitioners under Article 300 of the PRC 
        Criminal Law, which criminalizes ``organizing and using 
        a cult to undermine implementation of the law.'' In 
        December 2022, Falun Gong practitioner and radio host 
        Pang Xun died after authorities tortured him while in 
        custody.
         The Party's Anti-Cult Association updated 
        their list of xiejiao (a historical term usually 
        translated as ``evil cults'' or ``heretical 
        teachings''), a tool it uses to rank groups according 
        to threat level and communicate its enforcement 
        priorities.

                            Criminal Justice

         The criminal justice system in the People's 
        Republic of China (PRC) remained a political instrument 
        used for maintaining social order in furtherance of the 
        Chinese Communist Party's authoritarian rule. The 
        government punishes criminal acts, but it also targets 
        individuals who pursue universal human rights, 
        particularly when they independently organize or 
        challenge the state's or the Chinese Communist Party's 
        authority.
         The judiciary is unambiguously political, as 
        the chief justice of the Supreme People's Court called 
        for ``absolute loyalty'' to the Party. Moreover, 
        political intervention was evidenced in the case of 
        citizen journalist Fang Bin, detained in 2020 in 
        connection with his reporting on the coronavirus 
        disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak in Wuhan municipality, 
        Hebei province. A leaked document indicated that the 
        court judgment in his case was a result of a decision 
        made by the Party Central Committee Political and Legal 
        Affairs Commission.
         Government officials arbitrarily detained 
        political activists, religious practitioners, ethnic 
        minorities, and rights advocates, including through 
        extralegal means such as ``black jails'' and 
        psychiatric facilities or through criminal prosecution 
        under offenses such as ``picking quarrels and provoking 
        trouble'' or crimes endangering state security. Some 
        detainees, particularly those held incommunicado, 
        reported being mistreated or tortured. After entering 
        the formal legal process, defendants sometimes faced 
        prolonged pretrial detention, closed trials, and 
        delayed sentencing.
         Examples of arbitrary detention during the 
        Commission's 2023 reporting year include the forcible 
        disappearance in Shanghai municipality in March 2023 of 
        Li Yanhe, an editor who published books banned in 
        China. In April, police in Beijing municipality 
        detained human rights lawyer Yu Wensheng and his wife, 
        Xu Yan, as they were on their way to meet the European 
        Union's Ambassador to China.
         Authorities likewise criminally detained 
        participants in the White Paper protests, a series of 
        nationwide citizen protests that took place in November 
        2022 in reaction to the government's harsh COVID-19 
        prevention measures and censorship. Protesters, 
        including Cao Zhixin, Li Yuanjing, Zhai Dengrui, and Li 
        Siqi, were forcibly disappeared for several months 
        before authorities lodged formal criminal charges 
        against them.

                           Access to Justice

         In the annual work report delivered in March 
        2023 at the meeting of the National People's Congress, 
        Supreme People's Court (SPC) President Zhou Qiang 
        emphasized the Chinese Communist Party's absolute 
        leadership over the judiciary and reported having 
        endeavored to strengthen political loyalty, protect 
        political security, and educate court personnel about 
        safeguarding Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's core 
        leadership position. Rather than promoting judicial 
        independence, reform efforts focused on improving 
        organizational and bureaucratic efficiency in 
        accordance with the Party's plans. While the work 
        report claimed there had been improvements to judicial 
        transparency, authorities had removed a significant 
        number of judgments from an online judgment disclosure 
        database, particularly in the areas of criminal cases 
        and administrative litigation.
         Central authorities further formalized the 
        Party's leadership in the petitioning system as part of 
        an institutional reform that aimed at extending the 
        Party's control over society as a whole. The 
        petitioning system (xinfang) operates outside of the 
        formal legal system as a channel for citizens to 
        present their grievances in hopes of triggering 
        discretionary involvement by Party officials in 
        providing a resolution. Under a recently announced 
        institutional reform plan, the government agency that 
        oversaw petitioning was to be led by a functional 
        department of the Party that coordinates and guides 
        work relating to petitions and collecting citizens' 
        suggestions.
         Petitioners continued to face persecution in 
        the form of arbitrary detention in extralegal 
        facilities. Some of those detained suffered 
        mistreatment, including physical assault and electric 
        shock.
         The space for human rights lawyers to operate 
        continued to shrink in the wake of a nationwide 
        crackdown that began in July 2015. As of February 2023, 
        at least 14 human rights lawyers were under different 
        forms of restrictions on their personal liberty: 1 
        lawyer was missing, 4 were serving prison terms, and 9 
        were being held in pre-sentencing detention.

                               Governance

         The PRC moved further away from the collective 
        governance model as Xi Jinping secured a third term as 
        president and general secretary of the Chinese 
        Communist Party, breaking with the established norm of 
        a two-term office designed for peaceful transition of 
        power. Individuals selected to fill other leadership 
        positions had a working relationship with Xi or were 
        described as Xi's loyalists, further reinforcing Xi's 
        political dominance.
         Despite a claimed commitment to promoting 
        democracy, the political system as envisioned by Xi 
        Jinping is fundamentally undemocratic. When delivering 
        his policy objectives, Xi described a political system 
        that was identical to the existing authoritarian system 
        and called it democratic.
         While Xi said community-level self-governance 
        was a manifestation of democracy, it was in fact a grid 
        management system in which communities were divided 
        into discrete units to facilitate monitoring and 
        surveillance. Recent national-level policy that called 
        for the grid to be staffed by police further 
        demonstrated the government's intent on implementing 
        pervasive social control.
         The PRC government's handling of the 
        coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) displayed a pattern 
        of enforcing extreme social control at the expense of 
        citizens' well-being, giving rise to a series of mass 
        protests, to which the government responded with 
        censorship and criminal prosecution.
         Harsh COVID-19 measures disrupted people's 
        lives and prompted a series of large-scale protests, 
        where some protesters called for democratic reforms. 
        The government responded by arresting some of the 
        protesters after the fact, particularly targeting those 
        who were deemed to be influenced by ``Western 
        ideology'' or feminism. Shortly after the protests, the 
        government abruptly reversed the COVID-19 policy 
        without proper transitional measures in place, 
        resulting in many preventable deaths.

                         Ethnic Minority Rights

         During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, 
        Chinese Communist Party and government officials 
        championed the ``integration'' of ethnic minorities, 
        continuing the implementation of policies contravening 
        the rights of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and 
        other ethnic minorities to maintain their own languages 
        and cultures. The October 2022 election of Pan Yue to 
        the Party Central Committee, following his June 2022 
        appointment to the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, 
        indicated that Chinese leader Xi Jinping's policies of 
        assimilation and ``ethnic fusion'' would likely be 
        maintained.
         In May 2023, Hui Muslims in Yunnan province 
        protested over official plans to forcibly remove 
        Islamic features from a 13th-century mosque, plans that 
        reflected authorities' intentions to ``sinicize'' their 
        community. Authorities cracked down on protesters, 
        detaining dozens at the scene and subsequently urging 
        others to surrender to authorities. Hui Muslims 
        interviewed by international media expressed the belief 
        that, following authorities' demolition of domes and 
        minarets of the mosques where they worshipped, 
        authorities would begin to impose tighter restrictions 
        on Muslims' ability to practice their faith.
         In a case exemplifying the risks facing 
        Mongols fleeing China to escape surveillance and 
        persecution, on May 3, 2023, Chinese police officers 
        detained 80-year-old Mongol historian and writer 
        Lhamjab Borjigin in Mongolia and forcibly returned him 
        to China.

                            Status of Women

         Authorities in the People's Republic of China 
        (PRC) have increasingly treated women's public 
        participation as politically sensitive. Cases of 
        official retaliation or punishment against women who 
        have gone public with criticism of the Chinese 
        Communist Party and PRC government are well documented 
        during Chinese leader Xi Jinping's first decade in 
        power. This past year, public security officials 
        reportedly focused on identifying ``feminists'' among 
        those detained for participating in the November 2022 
        anti-COVID lockdown (White Paper) protests.
         In May 2023, a U.N. expert committee reviewed 
        China's compliance with the Convention on the 
        Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
        Women (CEDAW). Submissions from independent 
        nongovernmental organizations to the CEDAW Committee 
        focused on authorities' widespread use of gender-based 
        violence and harassment against women political and 
        religious prisoners in China.
         The 20th National Congress of the Chinese 
        Communist Party in October 2022 illustrated the 
        underrepresentation of female Party members in the 
        Party's seniormost ranks, reflecting male-dominated 
        institutional barriers to political leadership in the 
        PRC. No women were among the 24 individuals selected to 
        join the 20th Party Central Committee Political Bureau 
        or its 7-member Standing Committee, China's paramount 
        policy and decisionmaking body led by Xi Jinping.
         China's ``huge arsenal of laws designed to 
        combat and punish domestic violence'' is failing 
        Chinese women, including those women who have turned to 
        the courts for personal safety protection orders, 
        according to a U.S.-based scholar. According to 
        official data, judges throughout China granted 4,497 
        protection orders in 2022. In contrast, a domestic 
        violence hotline app in China reportedly received 
        13,000 calls in August 2022 alone.
         International reports about gender-based 
        violence in China this past year raised concerns about 
        an official policy that coerces Uyghur women to marry 
        Han men; the use of strip searches to humiliate women 
        rights defenders in detention; and the use of online 
        harassment and threats against women journalists of 
        Chinese and Asian descent as a way to silence their 
        reporting on China.

                           Population Control

         Authorities in the People's Republic of China 
        (PRC) continue to treat population growth, 
        childbearing, and women's fertility in China as subject 
        to official control and policymaking. In response to 
        demographic and economic pressure, PRC authorities 
        ended the one-child policy in 2015, replacing it with 
        the two-child policy in 2016 and the three-child policy 
        in 2021. In July 2022, 17 Party and government entities 
        jointly issued a set of ``guiding opinions'' that aim 
        to incentivize marriage and childbirth by improving 
        healthcare, education, employment conditions, 
        insurance, and other benefits.
         Enforcement of birth limits in China has been 
        characterized by the use of harshly coercive measures 
        in violation of international human rights standards. 
        This past year, U.N. experts raised concerns about 
        reports of the use of coercive birth control measures 
        against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic 
        minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
        Region (XUAR), including forced abortion and 
        sterilization, and the placement of contraceptive 
        devices, that reportedly resulted in ``unusual and 
        stark'' population declines in the XUAR from 2017 
        through 2019.
         Among the supportive measures to boost the 
        population suggested during the March 2023 meeting of 
        the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
        was improving the rights of unmarried parents. Although 
        several municipalities and at least one province 
        reportedly allow unmarried women to register the birth 
        of children, those children are not eligible for the 
        household registration (hukou) permits that are crucial 
        for access to public services. Moreover, an unmarried 
        woman lost a lawsuit in July 2022 against a hospital in 
        Beijing municipality which refused to allow her to 
        undergo a procedure to freeze her eggs. An appeal 
        hearing was held in May 2023, but the decision has not 
        been announced.
         Many young people reportedly are reluctant to 
        marry and have children due to the high cost of raising 
        children, low incomes, and a weak social safety net. 
        Public opinion reflected unease with the government's 
        focus on population growth as a national responsibility 
        for the rising generation of young adults.

                           Human Trafficking

         Multiple U.N. human rights bodies and experts 
        expressed concern over the People's Republic of China's 
        (PRC) government-sponsored forced labor in the Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). U.N. bodies and 
        experts expressed concern that such forced labor was 
        systematic and policy-driven in nature and called on 
        the PRC government to end forced labor programs in the 
        XUAR.
         In December 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department 
        ``sanctioned two individuals, Li Zhenyu and Xinrong 
        Zhuo, and the networks of entities they control, 
        including Dalian Ocean Fishing Co., Ltd. and Pingtan 
        Marine Enterprise, Ltd.,'' for their connection to 
        serious human rights abuses.
         Political prisoners including Lee Ming-cheh 
        and Cheng Yuan were forced to work while in detention. 
        Both Lee and Cheng were convicted under broad and 
        vaguely defined state security charges for their 
        exercise of rights recognized under international law.
         Examples of cross-border trafficking during 
        the Commission's 2023 reporting year included women and 
        girls from Cambodia trafficked in China, Chinese 
        nationals forced into international online scamming 
        schemes in Cambodia, and Chinese nationals subjected to 
        abusive practices in state-funded investment projects 
        abroad.
         An international non-profit said that data 
        involving human organs and tissues from the PRC would 
        not be accepted for submission for its meetings or 
        publications due to ``the body of evidence that the 
        [PRC] stands alone in continuing to systematically 
        support the procurement of organs or tissue from 
        executed prisoners.''

                             Worker Rights

         The U.N. committee that reviewed China's 
        compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, 
        Social and Cultural Rights in February 2023 highlighted 
        worker rights violations in China and called on the 
        People's Republic of China (PRC) government to address 
        unsafe working conditions; widespread discrimination 
        against migrant workers; gender and ethnic 
        discrimination; lack of protection for workers in the 
        informal economy; and inadequate access to various 
        employment-related benefits.
         Gender discrimination in the workplace in 
        China was a focal issue this past year as PRC 
        authorities aimed to strengthen the legal framework and 
        guidelines on safeguarding women's rights in the 
        workplace. Women are the primary victims of sexual 
        harassment in the workplace in China, but access to 
        legal relief is rare. In a case that epitomized China's 
        emerging #MeToo movement, a former female intern at 
        state media outlet China Central Television (CCTV) who 
        brought a lawsuit against a male CCTV television host 
        in 2018 for sexual harassment lost her final appeal in 
        August 2022 based on what a court in Beijing 
        municipality said was ``not sufficient'' evidence.
         China Labour Bulletin, a nongovernmental 
        organization in Hong Kong, documented 830 strikes and 
        other labor actions in 2022 on its Strike Map and 2,272 
        public requests on its Worker Assistance Helpline Map 
        in 2022. More than 87 percent of these strikes and 
        labor actions and nearly 90 percent of requests for 
        assistance were related to wage arrears.
         Worker protests overlapped with frustration at 
        the harsh and disproportionate measures imposed under 
        China's zero-COVID policy and the economic impact of 
        the pandemic after those measures were lifted. Protests 
        in late October and November 2022 at Foxconn's factory 
        campus in Zhengzhou municipality, Henan province--the 
        largest assembly site of Apple iPhones in the world--
        demonstrated worker dissatisfaction with Foxconn's 
        management of worker health and safety and deceptive 
        recruitment promises.
         PRC authorities' suppression of worker 
        representation and independent labor advocacy in China 
        has left little space for workers to organize, express 
        their grievances, or negotiate satisfactory remedies. 
        In May 2023, a migrant workers' museum on the outskirts 
        of Beijing municipality closed after 15 years due to 
        its impending eviction.
         Changes to one of China's major health 
        insurance programs led to street protests by thousands 
        of retired workers in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong 
        province; Wuhan municipality, Hubei province; and 
        Dalian municipality, Liaoning province. Authorities in 
        Wuhan detained Zhang Hai and Tong Menglan for 
        expressing support for the protesters.

                             Public Health

         The People's Republic of China (PRC) 
        government and Chinese Communist Party's public health 
        response to the spread of the Omicron variant of 
        coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) continued to 
        reflect Chinese leader Xi Jinping's political 
        priorities. The consequences were massive infection 
        rates throughout China and the deaths of an estimated 1 
        million to 1.5 million people in December 2022 and 
        January 2023 alone, following the abrupt 
        discontinuation of the majority of the prevention and 
        control measures associated with the zero-COVID policy 
        on December 7, 2022. The Party's rigid adherence to the 
        policy's implementation superseded putting in place a 
        robust vaccination campaign, careful planning for the 
        discontinuation of the policy itself, or coordination 
        of the broader healthcare needs of the Chinese 
        population.
         PRC authorities vastly underreported the 
        number of deaths in China following the discontinuation 
        of the zero-COVID policy. Moreover, in March 2023, the 
        international scientific community also criticized the 
        PRC government for not sharing data gleaned in January 
        2020 from the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak in 
        Wuhan municipality, Hubei province.
         Numerous public protests against zero-COVID 
        policy restrictions took place from October 2022 
        through January 2023. Observers pointed to anger and 
        frustration with the PRC authorities' pandemic measures 
        as catalyzing the participation of ``a broad range of 
        contentious constituencies'' in these protests.
         Official media messaging about the impact of 
        the pandemic in China swerved between claims of China's 
        historic success in saving lives and disinformation 
        that blamed ``hostile powers'' for developments that 
        did not support uplifting propaganda. The Party also 
        condemned ``Western media'' for undermining the 
        official narrative of its ``important contributions to 
        the global fight against the pandemic . . ..''
         The PRC Mental Health Law reached its tenth 
        year of implementation in May 2023, but key 
        provisions--including the prohibition on the abuse of 
        forcible psychiatric commitment and supporting the use 
        of the principle of voluntary hospitalization--have not 
        yet been achieved. Authorities' use of forcible 
        psychiatric commitment continued to be a tool of 
        political repression.
         Individual and organized public health 
        advocacy continues in China, but the personal and 
        professional risks of organized public health advocacy 
        that authorities deem politically sensitive or even 
        threatening are evident in ongoing or new detentions 
        this past year, including Cheng Yuan, co-founder of the 
        advocacy organization Changsha Funeng; He Fangmei and 
        Li Xin, advocates for the victims of defective 
        vaccines; and Ji Xiaolong, who criticized senior 
        officials in Shanghai municipality for the lengthy 
        lockdown there in spring 2022.

                   The Environment and Climate Change

         While China's leaders pledged to prioritize 
        efforts to protect the environment and to realize their 
        carbon emissions targets, observers raised doubts about 
        the People's Republic of China's (PRC) ability to 
        achieve senior officials' climate goals. According to 
        scholars, the PRC government views a leadership role in 
        international environmental governance as one route to 
        achieving global leadership. PRC officials have used 
        their ``ecological civilization'' framework--under 
        which they seek to ``selectively . . . achieve [their] 
        environmental goals''--to strengthen authoritarian 
        governance.
         In 2022, the PRC government approved the 
        highest number of new coal-powered energy plants in 
        seven years, increasing the country's coal power 
        capacity by more than 50 percent from the previous 
        year. According to international observers, China's 
        substantial increase in coal plant construction 
        threatened global climate efforts. China's high levels 
        of air pollutants contributed to negative health 
        effects, including stillbirths and premature death.
         China remained the world's leading emitter of 
        CO2, with emissions rising four percent to 
        reach a record high in the first quarter of 2023. China 
        also remained the world's leading emitter of methane, 
        which is 25 times more potent than carbon dioxide as a 
        greenhouse gas. China has not signed the Global Methane 
        Pledge to cut methane emissions 30 percent by 2030.
         China experienced many extreme weather events 
        this past year, including a heatwave, drought, heavy 
        rainfall and floods, and sandstorms, that experts 
        linked to climate change.
         China's distant water fishing (DWF) fleet was 
        reportedly involved in illegal, unreported, and 
        unregulated fishing practices that threaten ocean 
        ecosystems and wildlife populations, as well as 
        economic livelihoods.
         Although PRC authorities continued to suppress 
        civil society on a range of issues that authorities 
        deem politically sensitive, environmental 
        nongovernmental organizations have remained viable 
        platforms for education and advocacy. Nevertheless, 
        environmental advocacy in China has narrowed as 
        organizations strategically focus their work within the 
        bounds of government policy narratives or pursue 
        collaboration with local governments.
         In January 2023, the Supreme People's Court 
        issued ten guiding cases for environmental public 
        interest litigation (PIL). The procuratorate has a key 
        role in prosecuting environmental PIL cases, which 
        requires navigating between local government resistance 
        to environmental protection standards and holding 
        agencies environmentally accountable. Scholars have 
        observed that the procuratorate's ``reliance on top-
        down political support may ultimately hinder [PIL's] 
        expansion and stability.''

                       Business and Human Rights

         Chinese and international businesses are at 
        risk of complicity in--and of profiting from--the 
        Chinese Communist Party and government's use of forced 
        labor to suppress ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Reports of state-
        sponsored forced labor implicate supply chains of 
        industries and products including automobile 
        manufacturing, red dates, and cotton and the garment 
        industry.
         Investigations found that Chinese fast fashion 
        direct-to-consumer retailers Shein and Temu are linked 
        to the XUAR and have exploited the US$800 de minimis 
        threshold, which allows vendors to send shipments below 
        that value without having to report basic data.
         A May 2023 report detailed how the U.S. 
        Federal Government's employee retirement plan, the 
        Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), included options to invest 
        in Chinese companies that are on watchlists or are 
        sanctioned by the U.S. Government for their ties to 
        forced labor in the People's Republic of China (PRC) or 
        surveillance efforts in the XUAR.
         Chinese and international companies were 
        reported to be supporting the Chinese government's data 
        collection, surveillance, and censorship. Some examples 
        include:

                  China-based video surveillance manufacturer 
                Uniview developed Uyghur recognition technology 
                and co-authored ethnicity and skin color 
                tracking policy standards;
                  Bresee, Uniview's sister company, provided 
                artificial intelligence support relating to 
                ethnicity tracking and facial recognition;
                  U.S.-sanctioned Dahua and Hikvision and New 
                Jersey-based video surveillance manufacturer 
                Infinova developed various ``alarms'' to help 
                police identify and detect potential political 
                protests;
                  Apple removed full AirDrop functionality in 
                China by setting a 10-minute limit for the 
                file-sharing feature;
                  Thermo Fisher Scientific sold DNA equipment 
                to police in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 
                where Human Rights Watch identified mass 
                involuntary DNA collection programs; and
                  HSBC and PayPal HK targeted the League of 
                Social Democrats, one of the last pro-democracy 
                parties in Hong Kong, with forced closures of 
                their accounts.

         Leading up to the PRC Counterespionage Law's 
        July 1, 2023 effective date, the Commission observed 
        reports of Chinese authorities targeting global firms 
        including U.S.-headquartered corporation Mintz Group 
        and U.S. consulting firm Bain & Company.
         Abusive practices toward workers were found in 
        Chinese factories of third-party printing inkjet and 
        toner cartridge manufacturers.

                     North Korean Refugees in China

         Heightened security along the China-North 
        Korea border due to the coronavirus disease 2019 
        (COVID-19) pandemic and the Chinese government's 
        pervasive surveillance technology, increased the risk 
        of being caught by Chinese police and has significantly 
        reduced the defection rate of North Korean refugees. As 
        a result of the closed border, many North Korean 
        workers are stranded in China and are living in dire 
        conditions without any income, leaving them vulnerable 
        to human trafficking. With the easing of COVID-19 
        restrictions, defection attempts and detentions rose, 
        as authorities have intensified their measures to 
        capture and subsequently repatriate North Korean 
        refugees.
         According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
        the situation of human rights in the Democratic 
        People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), as of June 30, 2023, 
        an estimated 2,000 North Korean refugees were awaiting 
        repatriation in China. Additionally, experts point out 
        that the cost of defection, which involves paying 
        intermediaries or ``brokers'' to arrange an escape, has 
        greatly increased due to the risks associated with 
        defecting from North Korea.
         Repatriated North Koreans remain vulnerable to 
        torture, imprisonment, forced labor, and execution. 
        According to the Citizens' Alliance for North Korean 
        Human Rights (NKHR), a nongovernmental organization 
        advocating for human rights in North Korea, Chinese 
        companies and the DPRK government likely derive 
        financial benefits from forcibly repatriating refugees 
        to North Korea, where they are allegedly subjected to 
        forced labor in detention facilities operated by the 
        DPRK government. This forced labor reportedly involves 
        the production of goods for Chinese businesses at 
        considerably reduced costs.

                  Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

         In contravention of its signed and ratified 
        commitment to the International Convention to End All 
        Forms of Racial Discrimination, the People's Republic 
        of China (PRC) has continued to facilitate the 
        development and use of domestic standards and 
        surveillance technologies that employ racial profiling 
        and thus encouraged discrimination on the basis of 
        ethnicity.
         The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
        Party and the State Council jointly released the ``Plan 
        for the Overall Layout of Building a Digital China,'' 
        which prioritizes the digitalization of governance in 
        China, interconnectedness and efficiency across China's 
        digital infrastructure, and expansive control of data 
        using next-generation technologies.
         International observers reported that PRC 
        authorities have increased investments in next-
        generation data-intensive technologies, such as ``smart 
        city'' projects and police geographic information 
        systems designed to better surveil and control society.
         This past year, Party and government agencies 
        released regulations concerning generative artificial 
        intelligence (AI) to ensure that AI-generated content 
        puts the PRC in a positive light, downplays criticism, 
        and excludes content that authorities deem to be a 
        threat to social stability.
         PRC authorities carried out digital 
        surveillance and censorship to suppress the White Paper 
        protests that took place throughout China in late 
        November 2022 in opposition to harsh zero-COVID 
        measures. Leaked directives revealed Chinese 
        authorities initiated the highest ``emergency 
        response'' level to restrict protesters' access to 
        virtual private networks (VPNs) and instructional 
        materials for accessing foreign news and social media 
        apps.
         During the reporting year, a report documented 
        PRC authorities using advanced technology and ethnic 
        minority online ``influencers'' to present a rosy 
        picture of life in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
        Region in 1,741 videos spread out among 18 YouTube 
        accounts with 2,000 to 205,000 followers, as part of a 
        larger effort to deny the PRC's ongoing genocide in the 
        region.
         Authorities implemented technological upgrades 
        to the PRC's censorship mechanisms, together known as 
        the Great Firewall, during the 20th National Congress 
        of the Chinese Communist Party. Information emerged 
        this past year about blogger Ruan Xiaohuan, an 
        information security expert who provided online 
        guidance to circumvent the Great Firewall, and who was 
        sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for ``inciting 
        subversion of state power.''

                                 Tibet

         The Commission did not observe any interest 
        from People's Republic of China (PRC) officials in 
        resuming formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama's 
        representatives, the last round of which, the ninth, 
        was held in January 2010.
         The PRC continued to restrict, and seek to 
        control, the religious practices of Tibetans, the 
        majority of whom practice Tibetan Buddhism. Authorities 
        in Tibetan areas issued prohibitions on forms of 
        religious worship, particularly during important 
        religious events or around the times of politically 
        sensitive anniversaries, and restricted access to 
        religious institutions and places of worship, including 
        Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and temples. The PRC 
        continued to assert control over the process of 
        selection and recognition of Tibetan Buddhist 
        reincarnated teachers, including the Dalai Lama.
         The Commission did not observe reports of 
        Tibetan self-
        immolations that occurred during the 2023 reporting 
        year, the first year since 2021 in which no self-
        immolations were reported to have occurred. Chinese 
        authorities reportedly continued to harass family 
        members of Tibetans who had self-
        immolated in the past.
         International observers expressed concern over 
        reports in recent years of PRC policies aimed at 
        severely restricting the domains of usage of Tibetan 
        and other local languages, including school closures, 
        reduction in school instruction in languages other than 
        Standard Mandarin, and a network of colonial boarding 
        schools that house a majority of Tibetan school-age 
        children.
         Reports published this year documented police-
        run programs in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Qinghai 
        province in which officials have collected sensitive 
        biometric information from millions of Tibetans and 
        other local residents in recent years. The DNA, blood 
        sample, and iris scan collection programs reportedly 
        are employed as forms of social control, surveillance, 
        and repression of the residents of Tibet.
         In contravention of international human rights 
        standards, officials punished residents of Tibetan 
        areas for exercising protected rights, including the 
        expression of religious belief, criticism of PRC 
        policies, and sharing information online. Notable cases 
        this past year included those of writer Rongbo Gangkar, 
        a writer and translator detained since 2021 after he 
        led a discussion at a meeting in which he advocated 
        celebration of the Dalai Lama's birthday; Thubsam, 
        accused of sending ``information about Tibet'' to 
        individuals in Europe and India, and later sentenced to 
        two years in prison for ``leaking state secrets'' and 
        ``separatism''; and Jamyang, also known as Zangkar 
        Jamyang, a writer detained in June 2020 and held 
        incommunicado until information emerged in March 2023 
        on his four-year sentence related to his advocacy for 
        Tibetan language rights in schools.

                                Xinjiang

         Research published this past year indicated 
        that Turkic and Muslim individuals formerly detained in 
        mass internment camps continued to serve long prison 
        terms. Official figures on prosecutions in the Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) released in February 
        2022 and analyzed by Human Rights Watch showed that 
        more than half a million people had been sentenced and 
        imprisoned in the region since 2017, when authorities 
        began carrying out the mass detention, in both prisons 
        and mass internment camps, of Turkic Muslims.
         On August 31, 2022, minutes before the end of 
        her tenure, then-U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
        Rights Michelle Bachelet issued a long-awaited report 
        on human rights in the XUAR, determining that Chinese 
        authorities had committed a wide range of serious human 
        rights violations as part of counterterrorism and 
        counter-extremism strategies. In particular, the report 
        found that the ``arbitrary and discriminatory 
        detention'' of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim 
        ethnic groups in the XUAR may constitute crimes against 
        humanity.
         During this reporting year, authorities in the 
        XUAR maintained a system of forced labor that involved 
        former mass internment camp detainees and other Turkic 
        and Muslim individuals. Officials continued two 
        distinct types of forced labor--one involving current 
        and former mass internment camp detainees, and the 
        other, referred to as ``poverty alleviation through 
        labor transfer'' (tuopin zhuanyi jiuye), involving 
        people who usually have not been detained, often 
        referred to as ``surplus labor.''
         Zero-COVID measures and discriminatory 
        policies toward Uyghurs reportedly caused or 
        contributed to deaths and injuries during a fire that 
        took place on November 24, 2022, at a high-rise 
        apartment building in Urumqi municipality, XUAR. 
        Immediately following the incident, authorities 
        suppressed information about the fire, which they 
        viewed as a national security issue, including by 
        holding Uyghur survivors for questioning at a local 
        hotel and confiscating their phones, and by detaining 
        neighbors and acquaintances of victims who posted about 
        the fire on social media.
         A report published in November 2022 by the 
        Uyghur Human Rights Project provided evidence showing 
        that Chinese Communist Party and government authorities 
        had incentivized and likely forced marriages between 
        Han Chinese and Uyghur and other Turkic individuals in 
        the XUAR since at least 2014. The report outlined how 
        authorities promoted the assimilation of Uyghurs and 
        other ethnic minorities through interethnic marriages 
        against a backdrop of government and Party birth 
        restriction policies and policies to encourage Han 
        Chinese in-
        migration and the movement of ethnic minority laborers 
        out of the XUAR.
         Reports published this past year indicated 
        that XUAR officials continued to arbitrarily detain and 
        hold in detention ethnic Kazakhs, members of an ethnic 
        group numbering around 1.5 million in the region. 
        Kazakhstan-based relatives of many ethnic Kazakhs who 
        have been detained in the XUAR since 2017 have 
        campaigned publicly for their release.

                          Hong Kong and Macau

         Two United Nations committees reviewed Hong 
        Kong's compliance with its human rights obligations, 
        finding that the Hong Kong government had ``de facto 
        abolished the independence of the judiciary'' through 
        the National Security Law (NSL), and calling for the 
        repeal of the NSL and sedition provisions under the 
        Crimes Ordinance. In particular, the Human Rights 
        Committee noted several areas of concern, including--
        the potential for the transfer of defendants to 
        mainland China; the excessive and unchecked power of 
        the chief executive and the police regarding 
        enforcement measures; and the lack of legal certainty 
        concerning the definition of ``national security'' and 
        grounds for extraterritorial application.
         In May 2023, Chief Executive John Lee proposed 
        a bill that would change the composition of District 
        Councils, which are community-level bodies that advise 
        the government on matters affecting residents in each 
        district. Although District Councils have limited 
        influence in policymaking, they serve as the last 
        institution through which residents can directly choose 
        their representatives. Under the reform plan, the 
        number of directly elected seats would be significantly 
        reduced, and all candidates would be subject to a 
        vetting process designed to exclude candidates 
        considered to be disloyal to the government.
         Hong Kong authorities continued to prosecute 
        individuals for violating the National Security Law, 
        under which basic procedural rights, such as trial by 
        jury and presumption of innocence, are disregarded. 
        Hong Kong extended the restrictions on procedural 
        rights to crimes that the government deems to involve 
        national security, augmenting authorities' ability to 
        punish people for peacefully exercising their 
        universally recognized rights. Hong Kong authorities 
        also applied the law extraterritorially, charging 
        people with criminal offenses for actions committed 
        outside of Hong Kong, creating a chilling effect that 
        had a global reach.
         The prison system augmented the enforcement of 
        the ``deradicalization program'' that is designed to 
        treat political prisoners as extremists and to instill 
        in them a sense of hopelessness and fear, deterring 
        them from future political activism. The program uses 
        tactics including mandatory propaganda movie-watching, 
        confession sessions, and corporal punishment, all of 
        which escalated drastically this past year, according 
        to one former detainee.
         After the prosecution unsuccessfully tried to 
        prevent a foreign lawyer from representing pro-
        democracy entrepreneur Jimmy Lai in a criminal case, 
        John Lee sought an intervention from the National 
        People's Congress Standing Committee, which issued an 
        interpretation affirming the chief executive's power to 
        certify whether a foreign lawyer should be admitted in 
        a particular case. While the interpretation did not 
        create a blanket ban on foreign lawyers, some analysts 
        were concerned that the interpretation had the broader 
        effect of allowing the chief executive to ``bypass 
        unwelcome court decisions'' and giving them unchecked 
        power ``to rule by decree'' over a broad range of 
        issues.

            Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

         The People's Republic of China (PRC) continued 
        a multi-
        faceted campaign of transnational repression against 
        critics, Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and others to stifle 
        criticism and enhance control over emigrant and 
        diaspora communities. After engaging in China-related 
        protests abroad, some individuals experienced reprisal 
        from Chinese authorities, intimidation or harassment 
        from unidentified individuals, or self-censorship due 
        to fear of reprisal. Authorities in the United States 
        reported criminal charges against or arrested several 
        groups and individuals involved in such PRC-led 
        transnational repression plots.
         Prompted by reporting from the international 
        nongovernmental organization (NGO) Safeguard Defenders 
        this past year, governments, international media, and 
        NGOs investigated extraterritorial Chinese police 
        stations, also known as ``service stations,'' around 
        the globe with reported connections to Chinese law 
        enforcement authorities. Reporting also detailed some 
        of the ``service stations' '' activities, including 
        persuading alleged criminal suspects to return to 
        China.
         The Commission observed reports that the PRC 
        is targeting foreign politicians to influence them to 
        support the Chinese Communist Party. This past year, 
        former Solomon Islands Premier Daniel Suidani claimed 
        he was ousted from his post due to PRC political 
        influence operations, while Canadian intelligence 
        officials announced they had evidence of PRC influence 
        operations targeting Canadian policymakers Michael 
        Chong, Jenny Kwan, and Erin O'Toole.
         Chinese-owned companies and banks responsible 
        for foreign development projects continued allowing 
        abusive conditions for workers abroad. This past year, 
        multiple reports detailed forced labor conditions for 
        workers in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and non-BRI 
        Chinese projects abroad, including physical and sexual 
        violence, withholding of wages, and debt bondage.
         Chinese authorities continued to attempt to 
        influence U.N. processes, including efforts to prevent 
        the publication of the Office of the U.N. High 
        Commissioner for Human Rights' report on human rights 
        violations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
        (XUAR) and Chinese Communist Party- and government-
        affiliated NGOs monopolizing time dedicated to civil 
        society organizations during the review of the 
        Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
        Discrimination against Women in May 2023.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

                      Political Prisoner Database

                            Recommendations

    When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a 
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official 
travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration 
officials are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) (https://
        www.ppdcecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information 
        on a prisoner or groups of prisoners. Consult a 
        prisoner's database record for more detailed 
        information about the prisoner's case, including their 
        alleged crime, specific human rights that officials 
        have violated, stage in the detention process, and 
        location of detention or imprisonment, if known.
          Advise official and private delegations traveling to 
        China to present Chinese officials with lists of 
        political and religious prisoners compiled from 
        database records.
          Urge U.S. state and local officials and private 
        citizens involved in business, economic, academic, or 
        other exchanges with China to explore the database, and 
        to advocate for the release of political and religious 
        prisoners in China.

                    A Powerful Resource for Advocacy

    The Commission's 2023 Annual Report provides information 
about Chinese political and religious prisoners \1\ in the 
context of specific human rights and rule-of-law abuses. Many 
of the abuses result from the Chinese Communist Party and PRC 
government's application of policies and laws. The Commission 
relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly 
available online database maintained by the Commission, for its 
research, including the preparation of the Annual Report, and 
routinely uses the database as a resource to prepare summaries 
of information about, and support advocacy for, political and 
religious prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration 
officials. The Commission invites the public to read about 
issue-specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of 
this Annual Report, and to access and make use of the PPD at 
https://www.ppdcecc.gov.
    The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information 
that is reliable and up to date. Commission staff members work 
to maintain political prisoner records based on the staff 
members' areas of expertise. Commission staff aim to provide 
objective analysis of information about individual prisoners, 
and about events and trends that drive political and religious 
imprisonment in China, and work on an ongoing basis to add and 
update records of political and religious imprisonment to the 
PPD.
    When the PPD was first launched, the Dui Hua Foundation, 
based in San Francisco, and the former Tibet Information 
Network, based in London, shared their extensive experience and 
data on political and religious prisoners in China with the 
Commission to help establish the database. The Commission 
relies on its own staff research for prisoner information, as 
well as on information provided by nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs); groups that specialize in promoting human 
rights and opposing political and religious imprisonment; and 
other public sources of information.

                          POLITICAL PRISONERS

    Overview. As of June 30, 2023, the PPD contained 10,889 
records of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of 
those, 2,615 are cases of ``active detentions,'' referring to 
records of political and religious prisoners currently known or 
believed to be detained or imprisoned, or under coercive 
controls. There are 8,274 records of prisoners who are known or 
believed to have been released, who were executed, who died 
while imprisoned or soon after release, or who escaped. The 
Commission notes that there are considerably more cases of 
current political and religious detention in China than are 
contained in the PPD.
    Ethnic Group. Of the records of active detentions, 1,629 
contained information on the prisoners' reported or presumed 
ethnicity. Of those, 750 were Tibetan, 496 were Uyghur, 292 
were Han, 34 were Kazakh, 28 were Mongol, and 9 were Hui. Of 
the 986 prisoners without recorded ethnicities, many were 
likely Han.
    Religion. Of the records of active detentions, 1,587 
contained information on the prisoner's religious affiliation. 
649 were Tibetan Buddhists, 460 were Falun Gong practitioners, 
243 were Muslim, 82 were Protestants, 22 were adherents of 
Mentu Hui (also known as the Association of Disciples), 18 were 
Jehovah's Witnesses, 17 were Yi Guan Dao members, 13 were 
members of the Church of Almighty God (also known as Eastern 
Lightning), and 14 were Catholic.
    Sex. Of the records of active detentions, 1,633 were of 
male prisoners, 693 were of female prisoners, and 289 records 
did not contain information on the prisoner's sex.
    Sentencing. Of the records of active detentions, 1,339 
pertain to individuals serving prison sentences. Of those 1,339 
prisoners, 1,246 were serving fixed-term sentences, 63 were 
serving life sentences, 23 were sentenced to death with a two-
year reprieve, and 7 were sentenced to death.
    Place of Detention. The table below shows the number of 
active detentions in each province-level administrative 
division:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region                 604    Hubei province                                     41
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sichuan province                                  380    Jiangxi province                                   38
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tibet Autonomous Region                           235    Shanxi province                                    34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guangdong province                                174    Shaanxi province                                   31
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qinghai province                                  136    Fujian province                                    31
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gansu province                                     86    Jilin province                                     28
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beijing municipality                               82    Shanghai municipality                              23
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liaoning province                                  81    Yunnan province                                    21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Heilongjiang province                              76    Chongqing municipality                             17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hong Kong SAR                                      71    Zhejiang province                                  16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shandong province                                  67    Ningxia Hui Autonomous                             15
                                                         Region
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Henan province                                     64    Tianjin municipality                               13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hebei province                                     62    Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region                    9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region                   47    Guizhou province                                    7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anhui province                                     45    Macau SAR                                           0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hunan province                                     43    Hainan province                                     0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jiangsu province                                   43
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Powerful Database Technology

    Since its launch in November 2004, the PPD has served as a 
unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and 
Administration, other governments, NGOs, educational 
institutions, and individuals who research political and 
religious imprisonment in China, or who advocate on behalf of 
such prisoners. The Commission has previously undertaken work 
to upgrade or enhance the PPD, including two major projects in 
2010 and 2015.
    In 2020 and 2021, the Commission carried out the most 
significant upgrade to the PPD to date, modernizing the PPD and 
housing it on a current software platform to keep the system 
secure and sustainable. This upgrade streamlined certain 
elements of the PPD's data fields and public interface while 
maintaining the PPD's capacity to record and display a wide 
variety of data types. The enhancements to the PPD include a 
more intuitive public search function, the publication of 
prisoners' prior detention records, a detention timeline to 
display expanded details of prisoners' detentions, and 
permanently archived source links to fight censorship and link 
rot.
    The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power 
to handle the scope and complexity of political imprisonment in 
China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is 
structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful search 
engine. Each prisoner's record describes the type of human 
rights violation by Chinese authorities associated with their 
detention. These include violations of the right to peaceful 
assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and 
freedom of expression, including the freedom to advocate 
peaceful social or political change and to criticize government 
policy or government officials.
    The upgraded design of the PPD still allows anyone with 
access to the internet to search the database and download 
prisoner data without providing personal information to the 
Commission, and without the PPD downloading any software to the 
user's computer.


    Notes to Section II--Political Prisoner Database

    \1\ The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual 
detained or imprisoned for exercising their human rights under 
international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, 
freedom of association, and freedom of expression, including the 
freedom to advocate peaceful social or political change, and to 
criticize government policy or government officials. (This list is 
illustrative, not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners documented in 
the PPD were detained or imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights 
guaranteed to them by China's Constitution and law, or by international 
human rights standards, or both. Chinese security, prosecutorial, and 
judicial officials sometimes seek to distract attention from the 
political or religious nature of imprisonment by convicting a de facto 
political or religious prisoner under the pretext of having committed a 
generic crime. In such cases, defendants typically deny guilt, but 
officials may attempt to coerce confessions using torture and other 
forms of abuse, and standards of evidence are poor. A defendant may 
authorize someone to provide their legal counsel and defense, as the 
PRC Criminal Procedure Law guarantees in Article 33, yet officials may 
deny the counsel adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the 
counsel's access to evidence, and not provide the counsel adequate time 
to prepare a defense.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

                  Political Prisoner Cases of Concern

    Members of Congress and the Administration are encouraged 
to consult the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) 
for credible and up-to-date information on individual prisoners 
or groups of prisoners. The Cases of Concern in the 
Commission's 2023 Annual Report highlight a small number of 
individuals whom Chinese authorities have detained or sentenced 
for peacefully exercising their internationally recognized 
human rights. Members of Congress and the Administration are 
encouraged to advocate for these individuals in meetings with 
Chinese Communist Party and government officials. For more 
information on these cases and other cases raised in the Annual 
Report, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Name PPD Record No.           Case Summary (as of June 30, 2023)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ruan Xiaohuan                    Date of Detention: May 10, 2021
2023-00101                       Place of Detention: Yangpu District
                                  Public Security Bureau (PSB) Detention
                                  Center, Shanghai municipality
                                 Charge(s): Inciting subversion of state
                                  power
                                 Status: Sentenced to seven years
                                 Context: Ruan was detained in
                                  connection with writings posted to his
                                  blog and on his Twitter account, under
                                  the handle ``Program-think.'' For over
                                  10 years, Ruan anonymously provided
                                  guidance on his blog for circumventing
                                  government internet censorship, and
                                  wrote political analysis critical of
                                  Chinese authorities, including
                                  coverage of the 1989 Tiananmen
                                  protests. On a separate website, he
                                  also documented high-ranking
                                  officials' hidden wealth.
                                 Additional Information: Ruan was
                                  reportedly the chief information
                                  security engineer for the 2008 Beijing
                                  Summer Olympics.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peng Lifa                        Date of Detention: October 13, 2022
(Peng Zaizhou)                   Place of Detention: Unknown location
2022-00176                        believed to be in Beijing municipality
                                 Charge(s): Unknown
                                 Status: Detained
                                 Context: On October 13, 2022, days
                                  before the beginning of the 20th
                                  National Congress of the Chinese
                                  Communist Party, Peng, also known
                                  online as Peng Zaizhou, hung banners
                                  from Beijing's Sitong Bridge calling
                                  for PRC leader Xi Jinping to step
                                  down, criticizing the official
                                  response to COVID-19, and calling for
                                  elections. Following Peng's detention,
                                  information on his case was unclear,
                                  including his whereabouts, his
                                  condition and treatment in custody,
                                  and what charges, if any, he was
                                  facing.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tonyee Chow Hang-tung            Date of Detention: June 4, 2021
2021-00514                       Place of Detention: Tai Lam Centre for
                                  Women, Hong Kong Special
                                  Administrative Region (SAR)
                                 Charge(s): Inciting others to join an
                                  unauthorized assembly; inciting
                                  subversion of state power; failure to
                                  comply with notice to provide
                                  information
                                 Status: Detained
                                 Context: On June 4, 2021, Hong Kong
                                  police arrested Tonyee Chow Hang-tung,
                                  alleging that she had incited others
                                  to join a candlelight vigil
                                  commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen
                                  protests, which police had declined to
                                  authorize on public health grounds.
                                  Police released her on bail but
                                  arrested her again on June 30,
                                  accusing her of inciting others to
                                  join an unauthorized assembly on July
                                  1, the anniversary of Hong Kong's
                                  handover. Chow was a rights lawyer and
                                  vice chair of the nongovernmental
                                  organization (NGO) Hong Kong Alliance
                                  that organized June 4th vigils
                                  annually. In September, police
                                  arrested Chow and several other Hong
                                  Kong Alliance members for failing to
                                  surrender documents relating to the
                                  organization's operations,
                                  additionally charging her with
                                  ``inciting subversion of state power''
                                  under the National Security Law (NSL).
                                  Chow has been sentenced to a total of
                                  22 months in prison for two charges
                                  relating to unauthorized assembly. In
                                  December 2022, the Hong Kong High
                                  Court overturned a 15-month sentence
                                  related to the unauthorized assembly.
                                  The charges brought under the NSL
                                  remained pending as of June 2023.
                                 Additional Information: In May 2023,
                                  the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary
                                  Detention held that Chow's detention
                                  was arbitrary, and called on Hong Kong
                                  authorities to release her.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jimmy Lai                        Date of Detention: August 10, 2020
Chee-ying                        Place of Detention: Stanley Prison,
2020-00323                        Hong Kong SAR
                                 Charge(s): Collusion with a foreign
                                  country or with external elements to
                                  endanger national security; conspiracy
                                  to defraud
                                 Status: Detained
                                 Context: On August 10, 2020, Hong Kong
                                  police took Jimmy Lai Chee-ying into
                                  custody on suspicion of ``collusion
                                  with a foreign country or with
                                  external elements to endanger national
                                  security'' under the National Security
                                  Law (NSL) and ``conspiracy to
                                  defraud.'' Lai is the founder of the
                                  now-defunct Apple Daily, which media
                                  sources have described as a pro-
                                  democracy publication. On the same day
                                  he was taken into custody, police also
                                  detained nine other individuals,
                                  including Lai's two sons and other
                                  democracy advocates and newspaper
                                  executives. Police did not disclose
                                  the specific facts underlying the NSL
                                  charge, and did not explain why the
                                  fraud charge, which was based on an
                                  alleged breach of a commercial lease,
                                  rose to the level of a criminal
                                  offense. Observers have said the
                                  arrests were authorities' efforts to
                                  suppress the free press and to
                                  intimidate pro-democracy advocates.
                                  Lai was formally charged under the NSL
                                  on December 11. He was briefly
                                  released on bail but has remained in
                                  detention since December 2020.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lhamjab Borjigin                 Date of Detention: May 3, 2023
2019-00105                       Place of Detention: Xilingol
                                  (Xilinguole) League, Inner Mongolia
                                  Autonomous Region (IMAR)
                                 Charge(s): Unknown
                                 Status: Detained
                                 Context: PRC authorities reportedly
                                  seized Lhamjab Borjigin, an 80-year-
                                  old ethnic Mongol historian and
                                  writer, in Mongolia, where he had fled
                                  to in March 2023. He was forcibly
                                  returned to his home in the IMAR, but
                                  detailed information on his detention,
                                  including if authorities criminally
                                  detained or subjected him to other
                                  coercive measures, was unavailable.
                                 Additional Information: Authorities
                                  previously detained Lhamjab Borjigin
                                  in 2018, reportedly because of his
                                  self-published Mongolian-language
                                  history of the Cultural Revolution. In
                                  August 2019, a Xilingol court
                                  sentenced him to one year in prison,
                                  suspended for two years, on charges
                                  related to ``separatism.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Li Yuhan                         Date of Detention: October 9, 2017
2017-00361                       Place of Detention: Shenyang Municipal
                                  No. 1 PSB Detention Center, Liaoning
                                  province
                                 Charge(s): Picking quarrels and
                                  provoking trouble; fraud
                                 Status: Tried, awaiting sentencing
                                 Context: A lawyer, Li previously
                                  represented rights lawyer Wang Yu,
                                  whom authorities detained in a
                                  crackdown on human rights legal
                                  professionals that began in mid-2015.
                                  Authorities held Li in extended pre-
                                  trial detention from 2017 until her
                                  trial before the Heping District
                                  People's Court in Shenyang on October
                                  20, 2021.
                                 Additional Information: Li suffers from
                                  various health conditions including
                                  heart disease, hypertension, and
                                  hyperthyroidism. Staff at the
                                  detention center reportedly urinated
                                  on her food, denied her hot water for
                                  showering, denied her medical
                                  treatment, and threatened that they
                                  would beat her to death. In March
                                  2018, Li went on a hunger strike to
                                  protest mistreatment, which prompted
                                  detention center officials to force-
                                  feed her. Detention center officials
                                  blocked her lawyer from meeting her,
                                  citing the COVID-19 pandemic.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
He Fangmei                       Date of Detention: October 9, 2020
2019-00185                       Place of Detention: Xinxiang Municipal
                                  PSB Detention Center, Henan province
                                 Charge(s): Bigamy; picking quarrels and
                                  provoking trouble
                                 Status: Tried, awaiting sentencing
                                 Context: He Fangmei, also known by her
                                  online handle ``Sister Thirteen,''
                                  began her public health advocacy after
                                  her daughter became disabled due to a
                                  defective vaccine. She was detained by
                                  officials in Huixian county, Xinxiang,
                                  who allegedly prevented her from
                                  taking her daughter to receive medical
                                  care. She and her husband Li Xin were
                                  accused of ``bigamy'' and ``picking
                                  quarrels and provoking trouble''; Li
                                  was sentenced to 5 years in prison.
                                  He, who was seven months pregnant when
                                  detained, gave birth to a third child
                                  in custody. The couple's disabled
                                  daughter is unable to obtain adequate
                                  medical care or to attend school,
                                  while their son was reportedly placed
                                  with a local resident who previously
                                  surveilled He.
                                 Additional Information: Authorities
                                  previously detained He in 2019 for
                                  ``picking quarrels and provoking
                                  trouble'' after she was petitioning in
                                  Beijing. A Henan province court tried
                                  her, but in January 2020 authorities
                                  withdrew the charge for lack of
                                  sufficient evidence.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rahile Dawut                     Date of Detention: December 2017
2018-00552                       Place of Detention: Unknown location in
                                  the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
                                  (XUAR)
                                 Charge(s): Unknown
                                 Status: Sentenced to prison term of
                                  unknown length
                                 Context: Uyghur ethnographer Rahile
                                  Dawut disappeared in December 2017 and
                                  was believed to have been held in a
                                  mass internment camp. In July 2021,
                                  sources confirmed that she had been
                                  sentenced to prison, possibly in
                                  December 2020, on unknown charges.
                                  Friends and other observers suggested
                                  authorities may have detained her due
                                  to her efforts to preserve Uyghur
                                  culture and heritage, or her foreign
                                  connections. She formerly taught at
                                  Xinjiang University and is well
                                  regarded for her scholarly research on
                                  traditional Uyghur culture.
                                 Additional Information: At least one of
                                  Dawut's graduate students also
                                  reportedly disappeared.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Niu Xiaona                       Date of Detention: April 19, 2021
2023-00113                       Place of Detention: Ha'erbin
                                  municipality, Heilongjiang province
                                 Charge(s): Organizing and using a cult
                                  to undermine implementation of the law
                                 Status: Sentenced to 15 years
                                 Context: Authorities in Ha'erbin
                                  detained Niu and her elderly mother
                                  Tuo Wenxia in connection with their
                                  practice of Falun Gong. Police
                                  separately released Tuo and Niu on
                                  bail, but in March 2022 took Niu back
                                  into custody. Niu is disabled due to
                                  rheumatoid arthritis, which causes her
                                  chronic pain and severe mobility
                                  problems. In September 2022, a railway
                                  court in Ha'erbin sentenced her to 15
                                  years in prison, citing a 14-year
                                  sentence handed down to Niu in 2004,
                                  which she served outside prison due to
                                  her disability; the court wrote that
                                  Niu had not provided official records
                                  of her having served the sentence.
                                 Additional Information: The Dui Hua
                                  Foundation described Niu's 15-year
                                  sentence as ``one of the longest
                                  prison sentences known to have been
                                  given to Falun Gong practitioners
                                  convicted of the sole offense of
                                  Article 300 [of the PRC Criminal
                                  Law].''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ding Jiaxi                       Date of Detention: December 26, 2019
2013-00307                       Place of Detention: Linshu County PSB
                                  Detention Center, Linyi municipality,
                                  Shandong province
                                 Charge(s): Subversion of state power
                                 Status: Sentenced to 12 years
                                 Context: Ding Jiaxi is a disbarred
                                  lawyer and rights advocate involved in
                                  the China Citizens Movement (formerly
                                  known as the New Citizens' Movement).
                                  His December 2019 detention is linked
                                  to other rights advocates detained the
                                  same month following a gathering at
                                  which participants discussed Chinese
                                  politics and civil society. Police
                                  from Yantai municipality, Shandong,
                                  placed Ding under ``residential
                                  surveillance at a designated
                                  location'' (RSDL) before Linyi police
                                  arrested him in June 2020 for
                                  ``inciting subversion of state
                                  power,'' a charge later changed to the
                                  more serious ``subversion of state
                                  power.'' Ding and Xu Zhiyong have
                                  alleged that officials tortured them
                                  in custody, including by restraining
                                  them in ``tiger chairs'' during
                                  prolonged interrogations. In June
                                  2022, the Linshu County People's Court
                                  held closed trials for Xu and Ding; in
                                  April 2023, the court sentenced Xu to
                                  14 years in prison and Ding to 12
                                  years. Both appealed their sentences.
                                 Additional Information: Ding served a
                                  prison sentence from 2013 to 2016 due
                                  to his anti-corruption and government
                                  transparency advocacy. Authorities
                                  sentenced him to three years and six
                                  months in prison for ``gathering a
                                  crowd to disrupt public order'' in
                                  connection with planned demonstrations
                                  calling on officials to disclose their
                                  wealth.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xu Zhiyong                       Date of Detention: February 15, 2020
2005-00199                       Place of Detention: Linshu County PSB
                                  Detention Center, Linyi municipality,
                                  Shandong province
                                 Charge(s): Subversion of state power
                                 Status: Sentenced to 14 years in prison
                                 Context: Xu Zhiyong is a prominent
                                  legal advocate and one of the
                                  initiators of the China Citizens
                                  Movement (previously known as the New
                                  Citizens' Movement). His detention is
                                  connected to the December 2019
                                  gathering that also led to Ding
                                  Jiaxi's detention. Xu evaded a police
                                  search for 50 days prior to his
                                  detention, during which time he
                                  publicly urged Xi Jinping to leave
                                  office over the government's handling
                                  of the COVID-19 outbreak. Prior to
                                  Xu's arrest in June 2020, authorities
                                  held him under RSDL in Beijing
                                  municipality. Xu and Ding Jiaxi have
                                  alleged that officials tortured them
                                  in custody, including by restraining
                                  them in ``tiger chairs'' during
                                  prolonged interrogations. In June
                                  2022, the Linshu County People's Court
                                  held closed trials for Xu and Ding; in
                                  April 2023, the court sentenced Xu to
                                  14 years in prison and Ding to 12
                                  years. Both appealed their sentences.
                                 Additional Information: On February 16,
                                  2020, Beijing police detained Li
                                  Qiaochu, a women's and labor rights
                                  advocate and Xu's partner; on June 18,
                                  authorities released her on bail and
                                  subsequently arrested her in March
                                  2021. Xu served four years in prison
                                  from 2013 to 2017 for his rights
                                  advocacy work. In November 2020, the
                                  U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary
                                  Detention found Xu's detention to be
                                  arbitrary and in violation of the
                                  Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qurban Mamut                     Date of Detention: Unknown date in late
2019-00191                        2017
                                 Place of Detention: Unknown location in
                                  the XUAR
                                 Charge(s): Unknown
                                 Status: Sentenced to 15 years
                                 Context: XUAR authorities detained
                                  Qurban Mamut, the retired editor-in-
                                  chief of the Xinjiang Cultural
                                  Journal, in or around late 2017,
                                  possibly in connection with his work
                                  as editor. He was initially held in a
                                  mass internment camp, but further
                                  information on his detention was
                                  unavailable. In April 2022,
                                  authorities confirmed that he was
                                  serving a 15-year prison sentence
                                  ``for political crimes,'' but did not
                                  say which court sentenced him, when,
                                  or on what specific charges. His
                                  whereabouts are unknown.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yang Rongli                      Date of Detention: August 7, 2021
2009-00428                       Place of Detention: Yaodu District PSB
                                  Detention Center, Linfen municipality,
                                  Shanxi province
                                 Charge(s): Fraud
                                 Status: Formally arrested and indicted,
                                  awaiting trial
                                 Context: Yang and her husband Wang
                                  Xiaoguang, both pastors at Linfen's
                                  unregistered Golden Lampstand Church,
                                  were among approximately a dozen
                                  church leaders and members detained in
                                  a lengthy campaign targeting the
                                  church and its members over their
                                  refusal to join the official Three-
                                  Self Patriotic Movement.
                                 Additional Information: Yang was
                                  previously sentenced to seven years in
                                  prison, served from 2009 to 2016,
                                  after she and other Shanxi church
                                  leaders went to Beijing municipality
                                  to petition about an attack against a
                                  house church. In 2018, local
                                  authorities forcibly demolished Golden
                                  Lampstand Church's building.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zhou Deyong                      Date of Detention: April 23, 2021
2021-00516                       Place of Detention: Binhai District PSB
                                  Detention Center, Dongying
                                  municipality, Shandong province
                                 Charge(s): Organizing and using a cult
                                  to undermine implementation of the law
                                 Status: Sentenced to eight years
                                 Context: Dongying police detained Zhou
                                  Deyong, an oilfield engineer, at his
                                  home and seized Falun Gong materials
                                  reportedly belonging to his wife, a
                                  Falun Gong practitioner who lives in
                                  the United States. A Dongying court
                                  sentenced him in April 2023 to eight
                                  years in prison. His detention may be
                                  connected with a crackdown on Falun
                                  Gong in Dongying begun in November
                                  2020.
                                 Additional Information: U.S. officials,
                                  including Florida Rep. Gus Bilirakis
                                  and Sen. Marco Rubio, have advocated
                                  on his behalf and called for his
                                  release.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Gangkye) Drubpa Kyab            Date of Detention: March 23, 2021
2012-00092                       Place of Detention: Unknown location in
                                  Sichuan province
                                 Charge(s): Unknown; possibly inciting
                                  separatism
                                 Status: Sentenced to 14 years
                                 Context: Drubpa Kyab, or Gangkye Drubpa
                                  Kyab, was one of six Tibetan
                                  intellectuals detained in Kardze
                                  (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture,
                                  Sichuan, between late 2020 and early
                                  2021. They were sentenced on March 23,
                                  2021, to prison terms ranging from 4
                                  years to 14 years, but other details
                                  on their cases were largely
                                  unavailable. The exact charges against
                                  Gangkye Drubpa Kyab and his
                                  whereabouts in custody were unknown.
                                 Additional Information: Gangkye Drubpa
                                  Kyab was previously sentenced to five
                                  years and six months in prison for
                                  alleged membership in an anti-
                                  Communist organization. Following his
                                  2016 early release, authorities
                                  detained and tortured him after he
                                  publicly displayed an image of the
                                  Dalai Lama.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rongbo Gangkar                   Date of Detention: Unknown date in
2023-00002                        early 2021
                                 Place of Detention: Unknown location
                                  believed to be in Rebgong (Tongren)
                                  county, Malho (Huangnan) Tibetan
                                  Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai
                                  province
                                 Charge(s): Unknown
                                 Status: Detained
                                 Context: A Tibetan writer and
                                  translator, Rongbo Gangkar was
                                  detained in early 2021 near Rebgong's
                                  Rongbo Gonchen Monastery. Information
                                  on his case was limited until 2022,
                                  when reports emerged that his
                                  detention was connected with a public
                                  meeting, possibly in Rebgong, at which
                                  he advocated celebration of the Dalai
                                  Lama's birthday. Further details on
                                  his detention, including his precise
                                  whereabouts, the charges against him,
                                  if any, and his condition in custody,
                                  were unavailable.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Executive Summary

Executive Summary

                  General Recommendations to Congress
                         and the Administration

    The Commission makes the following recommendations for 
Administration and congressional action.

     Robust Enforcement of Forced Labor Restrictions. 
The Administration should fully implement the Uyghur Forced 
Labor Prevention Act (Public Law No. 117-78, UFLPA), including 
by regularly expanding the ``Entity List'' of companies found 
to be complicit in forced labor and greater integration of 
innovative technologies to assist enforcement of the UFLPA. 
Congress should provide robust appropriations in support of 
enforcement, consider legislation to reduce the de minimis 
level for duty-free shipment so that PRC-based companies cannot 
circumvent the import restrictions required by the law, and 
explore whether existing customs transparency laws provide 
sufficient transparency for air, land, and rail cargo. In 
addition, the Administration should:

          Employ existing funds for new technologies to assist 
        in UFLPA enforcement, particularly ``pilot projects'' 
        such as geospatial search and rescue; unmanned maritime 
        vessels; remote sensing; mesh networking; satellite 
        communications; and DNA traceability tools to assist in 
        UFLPA enforcement;
          Focus UFLPA enforcement on fast fashion and online 
        retail companies such as Temu and SHEIN and others 
        using the existing $800 duty-free threshold to import 
        goods made with forced labor including by considering 
        placing a ``Withhold Release Order'' on Temu and SHEIN, 
        blocking all imports until they can demonstrate the 
        ability to ensure clean supply chains for the goods 
        they sell online;
          Expand the list of priority enforcement sectors 
        regularly--to auto parts, aluminum, rayon, electronic 
        goods, and fishing industry, for example--to ensure 
        that no company profits from atrocities; and
          Encourage foreign governments and legislatures to 
        adopt their own national legislation or regulations 
        modeled on the UFLPA and create opportunities for 
        Members of Congress to engage with parliamentary 
        counterparts globally on forced labor, sanctions, and 
        atrocity accountability.

     Prioritize Atrocity Crime Accountability. Congress 
should pass the bipartisan Uyghur Genocide Accountability and 
Sanctions Act (S. 1770) and the Uyghur Policy Act (H.R. 2766) 
to target both government officials and companies assisting 
with policies of forced sterilization and mass surveillance in 
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and appropriate 
sufficient funds to keep expanding the broadcasts and 
programming of the Uyghur Service of Radio Free Asia. The 
Administration should fund programs to document and preserve 
evidence of genocide and crimes against humanity committed in 
the XUAR and more robustly use existing sanctions authorities 
found in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (Public Law No. 
116-145) to hold PRC officials accountable for atrocity crimes, 
particularly those identified by the ``Xinjiang Police Files.'' 
In addition, the Administration should:

          More aggressively employ available sanctions to 
        target PRC officials and entities responsible for 
        policies of forced sterilization and forced abortions 
        of Uyghur women and forced separation of children from 
        their families;
          Coordinate with allies and partners to press for the 
        formation of a U.N. Commission of Inquiry for the XUAR 
        or the appointment of a U.N. special rapporteur to 
        address the PRC's atrocities;
          Request an open debate or an Arria-formula briefing 
        at the U.N. Security Council on the situation in the 
        XUAR;
          Ensure that export controls are up to date and 
        prohibit U.S. companies from assisting Chinese 
        companies engaged in digital or biometric surveillance 
        that aids in the commission of atrocity crimes in the 
        XUAR; and
          Seek additional funding for personnel for the various 
        sanctions offices at the Department of the Treasury and 
        Department of State, to more efficiently gather 
        information and vet suspected perpetrators' eligibility 
        for sanctions.

     Support the People of Hong Kong. The 
Administration should employ more robustly the sanctions 
authorities found in the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy 
Act (Public Law No. 116-76) and the Hong Kong Autonomy Act 
(Public Law No. 116-149) including those for financial 
institutions and target specifically prosecutors, judges, and 
other individuals complicit in the dismantling of Hong Kong's 
autonomy and rights protections. Congress should pass the Hong 
Kong Judicial Sanctions Act (S. 3177 / H.R. 6153), which 
requires a review of all sanctions with possible application in 
those areas. In addition:

          The Administration should coordinate sanctions and 
        messaging about political prisoners in Hong Kong with 
        the United Kingdom and other like-minded nations to 
        amplify the impact of diplomatic efforts;
          The Administration should expand media accelerator 
        and investigative journalism projects to preserve the 
        flow of independent news and information from Hong Kong 
        and create academic residency programs for Hong Kong 
        journalists and executives whose news and media outlets 
        were shuttered due to abuse or threats under the 
        National Security Law;
          The Administration should remove barriers for Hong 
        Kong residents to receive U.S. visas, including by 
        extending Priority 2 refugee status to those attempting 
        to exit Hong Kong for fear of political persecution, 
        and publish a plan to address the long-term status and 
        treatment of Hong Kong citizens in the United States;
          Congress should permanently extend the prohibition on 
        sales of police equipment and crowd control technology 
        to the Hong Kong police; and
          Congress should pass the Hong Kong Economic and Trade 
        Office Certification Act (S. 490 / H.R. 1103) to 
        consider removal of the diplomatic privileges given to 
        Hong Kong's three offices in the United States.
     Assist Victims of Persecution. Congress and the 
Administration should work to accelerate processing times for 
current refugee and asylum cases and ensure that the expansion 
of the annual cap on refugees admitted to the United States is 
used to increase protection and resettlement of those fleeing 
PRC persecution, prioritizing steps to:

          Ensure that sufficient funding and authorities are 
        available for psychological and medical support for 
        victims of genocide and crimes against humanity, 
        particularly in countries of first asylum, through 
        programs authorized by the Torture Victims Protection 
        Act (Public Law No. 102-256);
          Engage with countries with significant populations of 
        Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing persecution 
        in China and with the United Nations High Commissioner 
        for Refugees (UNHCR) to stop forced deportations to the 
        People's Republic of China;
          Recognize as persons of special humanitarian concern 
        those Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic 
        minorities living outside the United States and who 
        experienced egregious human rights abuses in the XUAR, 
        so they are eligible for Priority 2 processing for 
        refugee resettlement by the United States; and
          Prohibit the use of INTERPOL notices on their own to 
        deny immigration or asylum benefits, particularly when 
        the notice comes from a country with whom the United 
        States does not have an extradition agreement.
     End Transnational Repression. Congress should pass 
the Transnational Repression Policy Act (S. 831 / H.R. 3654) to 
provide resources and additional authorities to U.S. law 
enforcement agencies to constrain the PRC's ability to commit 
acts of transnational repression, increase accountability for 
perpetrators of such acts, and to better protect those at risk 
of intimidation and harassment, including by:

          Imposing targeted sanctions on perpetrators and 
        enablers of acts of transnational repression;
          Making additional U.S. law enforcement resources and 
        information readily available to U.S. residents 
        experiencing intimidation and surveillance;
          Creating proactive law enforcement outreach efforts 
        to diaspora communities and accessible, safe, and 
        secure portals to report coercion or intimidation;
          Training State Department and law enforcement 
        personnel to recognize and combat transnational 
        repression; and
          Creating a ``whole-of-government'' strategy to 
        address transnational repression and better coordinate 
        law enforcement and diplomatic actions.

     Create Global Resiliency to Economic Coercion. The 
Administration and Congress should work together to create a 
strategy for reducing the use of trade restrictions or other 
economic coercion to advance the PRC's interests that includes:
          Creation of an interagency group within the U.S. 
        Government to counter economic coercion through 
        identification of vulnerable industries and sectors of 
        the U.S. economy, coordination of anti-coercion relief 
        tools across the U.S. Government and with allies and 
        partners, and creation of robust public diplomacy 
        messaging to build support and resiliency among 
        targeted partners;
          Identification of trade barriers that need to be 
        revised either to impose retaliatory tariffs on Chinese 
        imports as part of joint action with allies and 
        partners or to buy products targeted by the PRC though 
        economic coercion;
          Deployment of expert economic response teams to 
        assist countries facing economic coercion or challenges 
        related to worker rights violations, environmental 
        protections, debt restructuring, and other human rights 
        concerns created as a result of Belt and Road 
        Initiative projects; and
          Advancing the Group of Seven (G7) leaders' statement 
        on economic coercion, including coordinated action with 
        allies at the World Trade Organization or other 
        international institutions to challenge boycotts and 
        trade restrictions that undermine the integrity of the 
        rules-based global economic order.

     Expand Responses to Digital Authoritarianism. The 
Administration should work with like-minded allies to develop 
clearer multilateral frameworks and norms for the use of AI-
driven biometric surveillance and high-standard internet 
governance principles that support freedom of expression and 
other fundamental freedoms. In addition, the Administration and 
Congress should work together to:

          Ensure that the ``China Censorship Monitor and Action 
        Group'' (22 U.S.C. 3363) is implemented and integrated 
        fully into the interagency process and has sufficient 
        resources to address the impacts of censorship and 
        intimidation of American citizens and legal residents 
        and be a critical part of a whole-of-government 
        response to digital authoritarianism;
          Utilize the Digital Ecosystem Fund at the U.S. Agency 
        for International Development (USAID) and the Digital 
        Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership at the State 
        Department to enable affirmative alternatives to the 
        PRC's digital infrastructure through targeted 
        investments, capacity building, and access to private-
        sector expertise;
          Develop an export control regime for critical and 
        emerging technologies that includes a strong 
        consideration of human rights abuses;
          Require companies exporting dual-use technologies to 
        report on the human rights impacts of their products;
          Expand resources for the Open Technology Fund and 
        other internet freedom entities within the U.S. Agency 
        for Global Media to distribute proven and effective 
        anti-censorship tools globally, provide media literacy 
        to help users circumvent China's ``Great Firewall,'' 
        and provide digital security training for civil society 
        advocates and journalists to help identify and counter 
        foreign government propaganda efforts;
          Create a set of standards that tests all foreign 
        digital platforms, such as WeChat, for their potential 
        to conduct espionage while operating in the United 
        States and signal to foreign governments and actors 
        that utilizing digital authoritarian tools against U.S. 
        residents or companies will incur a significant cost, 
        including but not limited to U.S. sanctions; and
          Amend the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
        Modernization Act (Title XVII, Public Law No. 115-232) 
        to trigger a Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
        United States (CFIUS) review of any foreign company 
        seeking to acquire U.S. assets controlling or 
        collecting biometric information of Americans and 
        coordinate such screening processes with allies.

     Confront the Challenge of Malign Influence 
Operations. The Administration should end operations of all PRC 
security agencies in the United States, including Ministry of 
Public Security and subordinate branches, to prevent 
surveillance and intimidation of diaspora communities and 
intelligence gathering activities. To further address the 
challenge of PRC malign influence operations in the United 
States and globally, the Administration and Congress should 
work together to:

          Use the ``Countering Chinese Influence Fund'' to 
        build the capacity of independent investigative 
        journalists and civil society organizations in 
        countries with Belt and Road Initiative projects to 
        expose corruption; malign influence tactics; and 
        environmental, social, and governance risks;
          Ensure that the recommendations produced by the 
        Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) within the 
        Office of the Director of National Intelligence are 
        implemented and shared widely with allies and partners;
          Expand the ``Protected Voices'' initiative at the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide resources 
        for U.S. residents to protect themselves from PRC 
        propaganda, intimidation, and cyber-attacks;
          Develop a multi-stakeholder action plan with 
        universities, foundations, think tanks, film production 
        companies, publishers, nongovernmental organizations, 
        and state and local governments so that their 
        interactions with foreign governments or entities 
        uphold standards of academic freedom, corporate ethics, 
        and human rights;
          Require U.S. educational institutions, think tanks, 
        and other nongovernmental organizations to publicly 
        report all foreign gifts, grants, contracts, and in-
        kind contributions that exceed $50,000 as part of their 
        annual tax filings to maintain non-profit status;
          Expand Mandarin-language training in U.S. schools and 
        colleges by creating and funding the Liu Xiaobo Fund 
        for the Study of Chinese Language;
          Update and expand the requirements of the Foreign 
        Agents Registration Act (FARA) to cover individuals and 
        other entities lobbying on behalf of foreign 
        governments, entities, or organizations working on 
        educational or scientific pursuits to restrict 
        acquisition of technologies banned under U.S. export 
        controls, and ban lobbying on behalf of entities 
        affiliated with the People's Liberation Army, the 
        Ministry of State Security, or others complicit in 
        egregious human rights abuses; and
          Support educational and cultural exchange programs, 
        including restoration of the Fulbright exchange program 
        in China and Hong Kong and preservation of the 
        scholarship and exchange programs for Tibetans, as a 
        valuable resource and to maintain positive influence 
        channels with the Chinese people.

     Form Global Coalition to Advance Human Rights 
Diplomacy. The Administration should issue a policy directive 
to require that human rights, the rule of law, and democratic 
governance goals are embedded in the critical mission 
strategies of all U.S. Government entities interacting with the 
PRC and to create action toolkits to share with like-minded 
allies that include coordinated messaging, sanctions, political 
prisoner advocacy, atrocity prevention, import restrictions to 
address forced labor, infrastructure and development models 
that respect human rights, and programing initiatives that 
address the rights violations that affect the largest number of 
China's citizens. In addition, the Administration should 
empower senior officials from the State Department and the 
National Security Council to coordinate regional bureaus and 
directorates to mainstream human rights diplomacy on China 
within the Administration and with key allies and partners. In 
addition, Congress should replace the now closed Open Source 
Fund with a new federal entity that will translate and maintain 
collections of important open-source Chinese-language materials 
from the PRC and provide access to all government-sponsored 
research projects.
     Protect North Korean Refugees. Congress should 
pass the North Korea Human Rights Reauthorization Act (S. 584 / 
H.R. 3012) and the Administration should coordinate with the 
South Korean government on public messaging and other 
initiatives to protect North Korean refugees facing severe 
human rights abuses and forced deportation by the PRC, 
including through briefings at the U.N. Security Council while 
South Korea is a member of the Security Council, establishing 
multilateral ``first asylum'' arrangements for North Korean 
asylum seekers, and gaining access to North Koreans in China 
for the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and 
humanitarian organizations.
     Strengthen International Organizations. The 
Administration should work with allies and partners to ensure 
that the governance structures of entities like the 
International Telecommunication Union, the International Labour 
Organization, INTERPOL, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, and the World Health Organization (WHO) meet the 
highest standards of transparency, accountability, and reform; 
uphold universal human rights; and address pressing 
transnational challenges.
     Preserve Threatened Cultures and Languages. 
Congress and the Administration should respond to threats to 
the cultural and linguistic heritages of repressed groups in 
the PRC through the development of assistance programs, both in 
the United States and around the world, to preserve threatened 
cultures and languages. The Administration should expand grant 
programs to assist Uyghur, Mongol, and other ethnic and 
religious minorities in cultural and linguistic preservation 
efforts and leverage the tools available in the Tibetan Policy 
and Support Act (Public Law No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 3119) to 
help sustain the religious, linguistic, and cultural identity 
of the people of Tibet. The Administration should prioritize--
and Congress should fund--research, exhibitions, and education 
related to these efforts.
     Condition Access to U.S. Capital Markets. Congress 
should strengthen disclosure and auditing requirements for any 
listed Chinese companies in U.S. capital markets to ensure that 
American retirement and investment dollars do not fund 
companies with links to the PRC's security apparatus, genocide, 
or other malevolent behavior that undermines U.S. interests and 
work with the Administration to:
          Require issuers of securities to disclose to the 
        Securities and Exchange Commission whether they have 
        business activities with entities in the XUAR 
        identified as complicit in the use of forced labor or 
        other gross violations of human rights or have any 
        transactions with companies placed on the Treasury 
        Department's Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial 
        Complex Companies List (NS-CMIC List) and the Commerce 
        Department's Entity List and Unverified List.

     Stop Organ Harvesting. Congress should pass the 
Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act (H.R. 1154 / S. 761) to impose 
sanctions and other penalties for anyone involved in human 
trafficking for the purpose of organ removal and expand annual 
reporting by the State Department on the practice in China and 
worldwide. The Administration should organize allies and 
partners at the U.N. Human Rights Council to support the 
concerns raised by the PRC's ``organ harvesting'' practices by 
U.N. human rights experts and seek independent oversight of the 
PRC organ transplantation system.
     Create a Special Advisor for Political Prisoners. 
The Administration should consider creating the position of 
Special Advisor for Political Prisoners within the State 
Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to 
develop and coordinate diplomatic strategies to gain the 
release of political and religious prisoners; end the PRC's 
unacceptable use of ``exit bans''; and to serve as a resource 
to former political prisoners living in the United States 
seeking guidance on their travels abroad and medical and 
psychological care.
     Advocate for Political Prisoners. The State 
Department should develop lists with information about 
political prisoners, and Members of Congress and Administration 
officials, at the highest levels and at every opportunity, 
should raise specific political prisoner cases in meetings with 
PRC officials. Experience demonstrates that consistently 
raising individual prisoner cases and the larger human rights 
issues they represent can result in improved treatment in 
detention, lighter sentences or, in some cases, release from 
custody, detention, or imprisonment. Members of Congress are 
encouraged to consult the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database for reliable information on cases of political and 
religious detention in China and in Hong Kong, and to advocate 
for individual prisoners through the Tom Lantos Human Rights 
Commission's ``Defending Freedoms Project.''

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

              Commission Activity July 2022-November 2023

                                HEARINGS

         The Dismantling of Hong Kong's Civil Society 
        (July 2022)
         Control of Religion in China through Digital 
        Authoritari-
        anism (September 2022)
         China's Zero-COVID Policy and Authoritarian 
        Public Health Control (November 2022)
         CECC at 20: Two Decades of Human Rights Abuse 
        and Defense in China (December 2022)
         Preserving Tibet: Combating Cultural Erasure, 
        Forced Assimilation, and Transnational Repression 
        (March 2023)
         Implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor 
        Prevention Act and the Impact on Global Supply Chains 
        (April 2023)
         One City, Two Legal Systems: Political 
        Prisoners and the Erosion of the Rule of Law in Hong 
        Kong (May 2023)
         North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger 
        of Forced Repatriation from China (June 2023)
         Corporate Complicity: Subsidizing the PRC's 
        Human Rights Violations (July 2023)
         Countering China's Global Transnational 
        Repression Campaign (September 2023)
         From Bait to Plate--How Forced Labor in China 
        Taints America's Seafood Supply Chain (October 2023)
         From Cobalt to Cars: How China Exploits Child 
        and Forced Labor in the Congo (November 2023)

                             ANNUAL REPORT

         2022 Annual Report (November 2022)

                          COMMISSION ANALYSIS

         Hong Kong Prosecutors Play a Key Role in 
        Carrying Out Political Prosecutions (July 2022)
         Hong Kong's Civil Society: From an Open City 
        to a City of Fear (October 2022)
         One City, Two Legal Systems: Hong Kong Judges' 
        Role in Rights Violations under the National Security 
        Law (May 2023)

                                LETTERS

         Commissioners Ask President Biden to Sanction 
        Hong Kong Prosecutors (July 2022)
         Chairs Seek UN Investigation on Forced Family 
        Separations in Tibet (November 2022)
         Commissioners Ask Thermo Fisher if Its 
        Products Are Involved in Human Rights Abuses in Tibet 
        (December 2022)
         Bipartisan Group of Lawmakers Seeks Answers 
        from Administration about Enforcement of Forced Labor 
        Legislation (April 2023)
         Chairs Ask British Prime Minister to Take 
        Action on Behalf of Jimmy Lai and Other Political 
        Prisoners in Hong Kong (June 2023)

                          LETTERS (CONTINUED)

         Chairs Write Administration Saying Entity List 
        Additions a ``Step in the Right Direction'' but Robust 
        Enforcement of UFLPA Still Needed (June 2023)
         Chairs Ask Milwaukee Tool about Reported 
        Forced Labor in Its Supply Chain (July 2023)
         Chairs Seek Meeting with U.N. High 
        Commissioners to Avert North Korean Refugee Crisis 
        (August 2023)
         Chairs Call for the Release of Ilham Tohti on 
        the Ninth Anniversary of His Sentencing (September 
        2023)
         Chairs Say UFLPA Enforcement Must Be 
        Prioritized (September 2023)
         Chairs Ask NBA and NBPA for Stance on Forced 
        Labor and Freedom of Expression (October 2023)
         Chairs Seek Export Controls on Technology Used 
        for Mass Biometric Data Collection in Tibet (October 
        2023)
         Chairs Ask Homeland Security Department to 
        Restrict U.S. Imports of Seafood from China (October 
        2023)
         Letter to Costco and ADI Raises Concerns about 
        Sale of Hikvision and Dahua Products (November 2023)

                       OTHER COMMISSION ACTIVITY

         Unpacking the CCP's Malign Influence Efforts 
        in the Solomon Islands--A Conversation with Daniel 
        Suidani (April 2023)
         ``Hong Kong Summit 2023'' by Hong Kong 
        Democracy Council (HKDC) (July 2023)
         Taiwan International Religious Freedom Summit: 
        Advancing the Global Challenge in Religious Freedom, 
        Human Rights, and Democracy (September 2023)
         ``China's Destruction of Freedom in Hong Kong: 
        What Xi Jinping's Crackdown Means for America,'' 
        Symposium by the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong 
        Foundation (CFHK) (October 2023)
         ``Like We Were Enemies in a War: China's Mass 
        Internment, Torture and Persecution of Muslims in 
        Xinjiang,'' Senate Rotunda exhibit of illustrations by 
        Molly Crabapple from the AI report (October 2023)
         ``Transatlantic Cooperation--Crafting U.S.-EU 
        Policy Alignment,'' roundtable by All-Party 
        Parliamentary Group on Hong Kong (APPG-HK) (October 
        2023)

Freedom of Expression

Freedom of Expression

                    III. Respect for Civil Liberties

                         Freedom of Expression

                                Findings

         The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continued to 
        treat PRC news media as its mouthpiece to provide the 
        Party's version of the news and thereby shape public 
        opinion. Xi Jinping framed the role of media as 
        ``ideological'' work in his political report during the 
        20th Party Congress in October 2022.
         Many journalists, other media professionals, 
        and ``citizen journalists'' remained in detention, in 
        prison, or subject to bail conditions as a result of 
        their reporting. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) 
        estimated that China held 114 journalists in detention, 
        and continued to rank China the world's top jailer of 
        journalists overall, and female journalists 
        specifically.
         Authorities continued to harass, surveil, and 
        restrict foreign journalists and Chinese nationals 
        working for foreign media companies. According to the 
        Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC), 
        harassment of foreign and local journalists and their 
        sources significantly increased around the time of 
        politically sensitive events. Of 102 survey respondents 
        representing news organizations from 30 countries and 
        regions, ``100% said China did not meet international 
        standards for press freedoms and reporting last year.''
         Authorities continued to harass, detain, and 
        imprison people who participated peacefully in in-
        person protests, demonstrations, and other gatherings, 
        including those involved in the White Paper protests. 
        During and after the White Paper protests, authorities 
        took at least 30 people into custody and detained at 
        least 100, while also interrogating many more 
        participants about ``sensitive'' topics unrelated to 
        the protests.
         Authorities censored online discussion of 
        sensitive topics in which sources criticized or 
        contradicted official policy or positions, including 
        the September 2022 crash of a bus carrying people to a 
        COVID-19 quarantine site that led to 27 deaths, 
        information about mortgage boycotts involving tens of 
        thousands of people and related protests, and social 
        media posts covering a hospital fire in Beijing 
        municipality that killed 29 in April 2023.
         The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) 
        continued to unveil regulations diminishing freedom of 
        expression in Chinese cyberspace, launching a 
        ``crackdown campaign'' against ``self media,'' or news 
        created by independent users not registered as 
        journalists, and adding requirements to monitor and 
        control commenters and the content of comments on all 
        internet platforms.
         In anticipation of the 20th National Congress 
        of the Chinese Communist Party, authorities launched 
        physical and digital campaigns of ``stability 
        maintenance and security work'' and internet 
        ``purification,'' respectively--to suppress various 
        sources of independent expression.
         Censors continued to suppress various forms of 
        entertainment content that did not conform to the PRC's 
        priorities, including books, comedy shows, and online 
        poetry.
         State security officials continued detaining 
        publishers and editors responsible for material 
        considered sensitive to the Chinese government, 
        including a high-ranking editor at a Party newspaper 
        and a Taiwan-based publisher of books critical of the 
        Party.
         The PRC continued to limit freedom of 
        expression within educational and research 
        institutions, introducing a draft law on widespread 
        ``patriotic education'' and also issuing a guiding 
        opinion that would increase ideological control over 
        legal education.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Give greater public expression, including at the 
        highest levels of the U.S. Government, to the issue of 
        press freedom in China, condemning the harassment and 
        detention of both domestic and foreign journalists; the 
        denial, threat of denial, or delay of visas for foreign 
        journalists; and the censorship of foreign media 
        websites. Consistently link press freedom to U.S. 
        interests, noting that censorship and restrictions on 
        journalists and media websites prevent the free flow of 
        information on issues of public concern, including 
        public health and environmental crises and food safety, 
        and act as trade barriers for foreign companies 
        attempting to access the Chinese market.
          Sustain, and where appropriate, expand, programs that 
        develop and widely distribute technologies that will 
        assist Chinese human rights advocates and civil society 
        organizations in circumventing internet restrictions so 
        as to improve their ability to access and share content 
        protected under international human rights standards--
        as well as to protect their own information from 
        China's surveillance and interference. Continue to 
        maintain internet freedom programs for China at the 
        United States Agency for Global Media to provide 
        digital security training and capacity-building efforts 
        for bloggers, journalists, civil society organizations, 
        and human rights and internet freedom advocates in 
        China.
          Increase media literacy and transparency with regard 
        to Chinese state-sponsored propaganda, censorship, and 
        disinformation, including through greater support and 
        funding for graduate-level area studies programs and 
        language study, and greater support for media literacy 
        efforts for international audiences. Provide forums for 
        scholars, civil society advocates, journalists, and 
        technology experts to discuss and disseminate ``best 
        practices'' in Chinese media literacy.
          Highlight the fact that content creators who 
        criticize the Chinese government on U.S. social media 
        face risk of harassment, censorship, and demonetization 
        efforts.
          Consider ways to ensure transparency on social media 
        and consistency in labeling content from foreign 
        governments across different social media platforms.
          Urge Chinese officials to end the detention and 
        harassment of rights advocates, lawyers, journalists, 
        and others subjected to reprisals for exercising their 
        right to freedom of expression. Call on officials to 
        release or confirm the release of individuals detained 
        or imprisoned for exercising freedom of expression, 
        such as Zhang Zhan, Sophia Huang Xueqin, Cheng Lei, 
        Kamile Wayit, Zhang Hai, Tong Menglan, Ruan Xiaohuan, 
        Guo Yi, Li Yanhe, Dong Yuyu, and other political 
        prisoners mentioned in this Report and documented in 
        the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.

Freedom of Expression

Freedom of Expression

                         Freedom of Expression

                          Freedom of the Press

                       PARTY CONTROL OF THE MEDIA

    During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, international 
observers continued to report harsh conditions for press 
freedom in China. Freedom House's 2022 Freedom in the World 
report scored China 0 out of 4 for ``free and independent 
media,'' \1\ and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked China 
179th out of 180 countries and territories in its World Press 
Freedom Index.\2\ These dismal conditions continue to violate 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),\3\ which China has signed but not ratified.\4\
    The Chinese Communist Party continued to treat Chinese news 
media as its mouthpiece to provide the Party's version of the 
news and thereby shape public opinion.\5\ In his political 
report to the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party in October 2022, Xi Jinping framed media as ``ideological 
work,'' calling on Party authorities to use the media to 
``shape a new pattern of mainstream public opinion.'' \6\ The 
following month, in observance of China's National Journalists' 
Day, state-run media outlet Xinhua published an article calling 
on the media in China to ``review the task earnestly entrusted 
by General Secretary Xi Jinping'' and ``be the broadcasters of 
the Party's policies and positions from start to finish.'' \7\ 
In line with these stated policy goals, state authorities 
continued to control the media to promote messaging favorable 
to the Party and Xi Jinping,\8\ as the Party maintained direct 
control over China's major media groups, including sending 
daily notices to every media outlet with detailed guidelines 
for the day's reporting.\9\

         HARASSMENT, DETENTION, AND IMPRISONMENT OF JOURNALISTS

    This past year, many journalists, other media 
professionals, and ``citizen journalists''--non-professionals 
who publish independently to circumvent official 
restrictions\10\--remained in detention, prison, or subject to 
bail conditions as a result of their reporting. RSF recorded 
its highest-ever number of imprisoned journalists worldwide\11\ 
and continued to rank China the world's ``biggest jailer of 
journalists.'' \12\ For example, on April 30, 2023, PRC 
authorities reportedly released citizen journalist Fang Bin 
from prison briefly before taking him to Wuhan municipality, 
Hubei province, to be placed under surveillance and 
control.\13\ Many others remained in jail or detention, 
including citizen journalist Zhang Zhan, who continued to serve 
a four-year prison sentence in Shanghai municipality for 
``picking quarrels and provoking trouble'' \14\ in connection 
with her independent reporting on coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) conditions in China.\15\
    In addition, RSF again ranked China the world's top jailer 
of female journalists.\16\ Authorities continued to hold 
journalist Sophia Huang Xueqin--whom they detained in September 
2021 and who previously reported on sexual harassment and pro-
democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong\17\--in pretrial 
detention in Guangdong province on suspicion of ``inciting 
subversion of state power.'' \18\ In September 2022, Radio Free 
Asia reported that Huang had dismissed her lawyer, ``suggesting 
she is under huge pressure to plead guilty and `confess' to the 
charges against her.'' \19\ Reports have also indicated that 
Huang requires urgent medical attention for severe weight loss 
and other untreated long-term conditions.\20\ Authorities also 
continued to hold Australian citizen and China Global 
Television Network journalist Cheng Lei\21\--who had written 
openly on Facebook about concerns with the Chinese government's 
response to COVID-19, among other topics \22\--more than 16 
months after trying her behind closed doors and three years 
after initially detaining her for allegedly ``illegally 
supplying state secrets overseas.'' \23\ According to Deutsche 
Welle, Cheng's eyesight has deteriorated during her time in 
detention, and authorities refused to allow her family to call 
or visit her and delayed sending letters she wrote for 
months.\24\ Bloomberg News also reported on June 14, 2022, that 
Chinese state authorities released Bloomberg journalist Haze 
Fan on ``bail pending investigation'' in January 2022, more 
than a year after she was detained on suspicion of crimes 
related to ``national security.'' \25\

                   CONDITIONS FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS

    This past year, authorities continued to harass, surveil, 
and restrict foreign journalists and Chinese nationals working 
for foreign media companies. According to a survey of the 
Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC) completed in 
January 2023, harassment of foreign journalists spiked around 
the time of politically sensitive events, and harassment and 
intimidation of their Chinese colleagues and Chinese sources 
increased dramatically in 2022.\26\ Of 102 survey respondents 
representing news organizations from 30 countries and regions, 
``100% said China did not meet international standards for 
press freedoms and reporting last year.'' \27\ The FCCC survey 
further found that online harassment remained pervasive, 
``fall[ing] disproportionately on female journalists of East 
Asian descent, as well as Chinese employees of foreign news 
organizations.'' \28\ In Shanghai and Beijing municipalities, 
public security officials reportedly harassed and held in 
custody foreign journalists attempting to cover what came to be 
known as the White Paper protests.\29\ Moreover, the FCCC 
reported that ``journalists from multiple outlets were 
physically harassed by police while covering the unrest.'' \30\ 
In one case, Shanghai public security officials reportedly beat 
and kicked BBC journalist Edward Lawrence and held him for 
several hours before releasing him.\31\ In a separate case, 
Shanghai public security officials reportedly took into custody 
Swiss journalist Michael Peuker and his cameraman, both of 
Radio Television Suisse's RTS Info, for about an hour.\32\ 
Officials reportedly confiscated their equipment and later 
returned it.\33\ As for journalist visas, although COVID-19 
restrictions were lifted in December 2022, PRC authorities 
subjected foreign journalists to lengthy administrative delays 
citing ``geopolitical tensions,'' resulting in more than half 
of foreign news organizations still waiting in March 2023 for 
their visas to be renewed.\34\

                     In-Person Protest and Assembly

    This past year, authorities continued to harass, detain, 
and imprison people who participated peacefully in protests, 
demonstrations, and other gatherings, violating Articles 19, 20 
and 21 of the ICCPR.\35\ While the true numbers of protests and 
detentions remained unclear, Freedom House documented over 
2,000 ``dissent events'' between June 2022 and March 2023 and 
found ``direct evidence'' of detentions in 92 of them from June 
2022 to January 2023.\36\ Protesters demonstrated in response 
to a variety of issues, such as the PRC government's COVID-19 
response, reductions in medical benefits, delayed housing 
construction, and more.\37\ Selected examples include:

         Medical benefits: In February 2023, crowds of 
        elderly people--some sources estimated ``thousands''--
        gathered in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, and 
        Dalian municipality, Liaoning province, to protest a 
        reduction in medical benefits that reportedly occurred 
        as a result of health insurance reform measures.\38\ 
        Public security officials detained protesters and their 
        supporters, such as COVID-19 victim family member Zhang 
        Hai \39\ and Wuhan taxi driver Tong Menglan,\40\ and in 
        at least one case, public security officials reportedly 
        warned a local man not to participate in the 
        gatherings.\41\
         Bank protests: From May to July 2022, 
        authorities suppressed peaceful protests by bank 
        depositors in Henan province.\42\ Following the 
        freezing of depositors' accounts at several banks in 
        Zhengzhou municipality in connection with a government 
        investigation into the banks, some depositors took 
        steps to organize protests.\43\ In at least one case, 
        authorities appeared to manipulate the health code apps 
        of protesters, triggering COVID-19 quarantine measures 
        that restricted individuals' movement.\44\ In one 
        protest that took place in July, large numbers of 
        unidentified individuals arrived at the scene and used 
        violence to disperse protesters.\45\ Some depositors 
        said that authorities pressured them to delete 
        information about the protests from their phones, and 
        that authorities and employers visited them and their 
        family members and warned them not to protest, warning 
        of consequences ``including threat of job loss.'' \46\

                          WHITE PAPER PROTESTS

    During and after demonstrations that came to be called the 
White Paper protests, Chinese authorities harassed and 
intimidated participants and eyewitness journalists. 
International nongovernmental organization Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders reported that authorities definitely took at least 30 
people involved with the White Paper protests into custody as 
of February 2023, though they estimate that over 100 may have 
been detained in total.\47\ Prompted by news of a fire at an 
apartment building under COVID-19 lockdown conditions in Urumqi 
municipality, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, that resulted 
in at least 10 fatalities,\48\ protesters expressed grievances 
about zero-COVID measures.\49\ In addition, some protesters 
held up blank pieces of paper to underscore censorship in 
China, and some expressed the need for human rights and freedom 
in China, calling for Party General Secretary Xi Jinping to 
``step down,'' and even for an end to the Chinese Communist 
Party.\50\ Beginning on November 26, 2022, over 77 protests 
took place across 39 cities in China for several days,\51\ 
prompting some analysts to assert that these demonstrations 
were the most widespread in China since 1989.\52\
    In the weeks following the protests, authorities tracked, 
harassed, and detained protesters and onlookers.\53\ According 
to the Washington Post, protesters in Beijing and Shanghai 
municipalities experienced ``heightened digital surveillance, 
strip searches, threats against their families, and being 
forced into physical duress during interrogation.'' \54\ 
Detentions and interrogations of some protesters reportedly 
served as opportunities for authorities to question 
participants about other topics deemed ``sensitive,'' including 
participation in feminist organizations and the use of banned 
messaging apps such as Telegram.\55\ Public security officials 
questioned and later detained a group of friends who 
participated in the demonstrations: Li Yuanjing,\56\ Li 
Siqi,\57\ Zhai Dengrui,\58\ Cao Zhixin,\59\ Qin Ziyi,\60\ Yang 
Liu,\61\ Yang's boyfriend Lin Yun,\62\ and Xin Shang,\63\ 
questioning at least some of the female detainees about 
feminist content they had shared online, asking if they were 
``feminists'' or ``lesbians.'' \64\ Some had studied 
abroad,\65\ and authorities reportedly asked some if they were 
``backed by foreign forces,'' \66\ consistent with remarks 
around the same time from other senior officials regarding the 
protests.\67\ After being accused of ``picking quarrels and 
provoking trouble,'' \68\ authorities reportedly released Xin 
in February 2023; \69\ Qin, Yang, and Lin on bail in 
January;\70\ and Li Yuanjing, Li Siqi, Zhai, and Cao on bail in 
April.\71\ Authorities also detained a number of individuals 
belonging to ethnic minority groups connected to the protests, 
including Uyghur university student Kamile Wayit,\72\ Tibetan 
university student Tseyang Lhamo,\73\ and four Tibetan women 
working at a restaurant in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan 
province, Dzamkar,\74\ Dechen,\75\ Delha,\76\ and Kalsang 
Drolma.\77\ [For more information about the White Paper 
protests, see Chapter 2--Civil Society and Chapter 6--
Governance. For more information about ethnic minorities in 
China, see Chapter 7--Ethnic Minority Rights and Chapter 17--
Tibet.]

                                Internet

                        REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS

    The Chinese Communist Party's cyber regulatory authority, 
the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), implemented 
additional regulations this year that restrict freedom of 
expression in the cyber sphere. Selected examples follow:

         Online comment requirements: In November 2022, 
        the CAC revised the Internet Comment Service Management 
        Provisions (``Provisions''), requiring internet 
        platforms that offer commenting functions to monitor 
        and control commenters and the content of comments.\78\ 
        For example, the revised Provisions require social 
        media account operators to report ``illegal and 
        unhealthy'' content and punish the commenters through 
        account restrictions,\79\ as well as evaluate the 
        ``credibility'' of users and prorate functionality 
        accordingly.\80\ The revised Provisions also require 
        operators of social media accounts to ``carry forward 
        the core values of socialism.'' \81\
         ``Self Media'' controls: The CAC launched a 
        two-month campaign in March 2023 targeting ``self 
        media,'' or news independently created and posted on 
        social media or the internet by independent users who 
        are not registered as journalists.\82\ To control the 
        spread of information in this emerging sphere, the 
        directive calls for all online platforms to crack down 
        on ``self media rumors,'' including information from 
        the specific sectors of ``public policy, the 
        macroeconomic situation, major disasters, hotly debated 
        incidents, etc.'' \83\

                               CENSORSHIP

    Adhering to the above regulations and many others, this 
past year authorities and social media platforms censored 
online discussion of selected topics in which sources 
criticized or contradicted official policy or positions and 
continued to prosecute some internet users who posted content 
deemed sensitive. Selected examples follow:

         Guo Feixiong: In May 2023, the Guangzhou 
        Intermediate People's Court in Guangzhou municipality, 
        Guangdong province, sentenced human rights activist 
        Yang Maodong (pseudonym Guo Feixiong) \84\ to eight 
        years in prison for ``inciting subversion,'' after 
        detaining him since December 2021.\85\ Prosecutors 
        cited essays Guo had written over many years and a pro-
        democracy website he helped establish.\86\
         Ruan Xiaohuan: In early 2023, the Shanghai No. 
        2 Intermediate People's Court sentenced blogger Ruan 
        Xiaohuan\87\ to seven years in prison on charges of 
        ``inciting subversion of state power'' for his 
        administration of an anonymous blog that published 
        technical advice on how to circumvent China's ``Great 
        Firewall.'' \88\ The blog in question, ``program-
        think,'' had in its twelve years amassed a large 
        following within China and hundreds of posts, 
        discussing topics such as the 1989 Tiananmen protests, 
        information security, and the criticism of the Chinese 
        Communist Party.\89\ [For more information about Ruan, 
        see Chapter 16--Technology-Enhanced Authoritarian- ism]
         White Paper protests: Following the beginning 
        of the White Paper protests, local authorities 
        reportedly issued directives calling for censorship of 
        protest content and suppression of censorship 
        circumvention tools, such as virtual private 
        networks.\90\ Even though officials continued to censor 
        online posts about the White Paper protests, citizens 
        attempted to remember the protests, as seen in a WeChat 
        post showing a photo at the steps of Communication 
        University of China, Nanjing, in Nanjing municipality, 
        Jiangsu province, where the first person held aloft a 
        piece of blank paper.\91\ The WeChat account was linked 
        to a student photography association affiliated with 
        Beijing Youth Daily, a Party-run media outlet 
        administered by the Communist Youth League.\92\ The 
        photo reportedly was quickly censored.\93\
         Mortgage boycotts: Authorities attempted to 
        censor online information about mortgage boycotts 
        involving tens of thousands of people and related 
        protests.\94\ Beginning in July 2022, international 
        media reported a significant increase in protests, as 
        well as threats of payment boycotts, among mortgage 
        borrowers in China who were paying in advance for 
        unfinished properties that developers had stopped 
        building due to financial constraints.\95\ 
        Subsequently, internet and social media content and 
        blocked keyword searches related to the issue were 
        deleted,\96\ and some online platforms in China 
        reportedly banned shared files that contained 
        information about the issue.\97\
         COVID-19 remembrance: After declaring victory 
        over COVID-19 in February 2023, authorities in China 
        have worked to shape the online narrative surrounding 
        the pandemic and its impacts.\98\ Censors shut down 
        discussions on social media about the psychological 
        effects of China's ``zero-COVID'' policy and shut down 
        social media commemorations of the first anniversary of 
        Shanghai's lockdown.\99\
         Hospital fire: After a fire in a Beijing 
        municipality hospital killed 29 people in April 2023, 
        Chinese state media did not report on the event for 
        eight hours, while many citizens' social media posts 
        discussing the fire in real time quickly 
        disappeared.\100\ Some Weibo users compared the event 
        to the fire in Urumqi municipality, Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region, which sparked the White Paper 
        protests only a few months earlier, and many posted on 
        social media to condemn the apparent censorship of the 
        fire.\101\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Suppression of Independent Expression before the 20th Party Congress
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In anticipation of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist
 Party, authorities launched a campaign of physical and digital efforts--
 ``stability maintenance and security work'' \102\ and internet
 ``purification,'' respectively--to suppress independent expression.
 Amid speculation that Party General Secretary Xi Jinping would secure a
 precedent-breaking third presidential term at the 20th Party
 Congress,\103\ which he did,\104\ some Chinese and international
 experts said that authorities sought to suppress expression that they
 viewed as ``extreme,'' ``destabilizing,'' or distracting from the
 positive image they desired for the 20th Party Congress.\105\ Official
 reports from sectors including the internet, television, public
 security, and local government called for a ``safe and stable political
 and social environment,'' ``correct political views,'' and ``public
 opinion guidance'' in the context of the 20th Party Congress.\106\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Suppression of Independent Expression before the 20th Party Congress--
                                Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Authorities characterized their efforts as follows:
 
  Physical: Officials implemented a ``stability maintenance and security
 work'' campaign, which included a ``hundred-day'' summer public
 security operation that reportedly resulted in the detention of over
 1,430,000 suspects by late September 2022.\107\ An official
 characterized the operation as focused on criminal cases, disorder, the
 protection of vulnerable groups in society, safety hazards, drunk
 driving, and traffic accidents,\108\ while other official reports
 linked the operation to the prevention of ``group petitioning''
 (petitioners are those who use the petitioning system, or xinfang, to
 report grievances to authorities);\109\ control of ``key persons''
 (zhongdian ren, persons of ``key'' interest to security
 authorities);\110\ ensuring loyalty to the Party;\111\ and establishing
 the political nature of ``stability'' for the 20th Party Congress.\112\
  Digital: The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) said that its
 2022 and 2023 Lunar New Year internet ``purification'' campaigns
 contained a focus on serving the interests of the 20th Party
 Congress,\113\ and in reviewing the 2022 campaign, a senior CAC
 official reported that as of mid-August 2022 authorities had ``cleaned
 up'' over 2,350,000 short videos and ``dealt with'' over 220,000
 livestreaming and short video accounts.\114\
 
  Selected cases of suppression follow:
 
  Sitong Bridge protest: Three days before the start of the 20th Party
 Congress, authorities in Beijing municipality detained a protester--
 whom observers widely reported was Peng Lifa\115\--after he hung
 banners from Beijing's Sitong Bridge that called for the removal of Xi
 Jinping, criticized authorities' response to COVID-19, and called for
 elections, among other things.\116\ Subsequently, individuals across
 China--in 30 cities, according to one source\117\--engaged in other
 forms of protest that echoed themes from Peng's protest.\118\ Beijing
 authorities detained at least one person in connection with hanging up
 posters related to Peng's protest: Guo Yi.\119\ In some other
 locations, authorities detained or held for questioning people who
 published or shared online content related to the incident, such as Gu
 Guoping,\120\ Xu Kun,\121\ and Wu Jingsheng.\122\ In addition,
 authorities reportedly ordered Beijing print shops to review the
 content of orders,\123\ and authorities censored related content
 online, including content that could be interpreted as carrying
 indirect connotations, such as a song titled ``Sitong Bridge'' that
 predated the incident.\124\ A China Digital Times analyst characterized
 the post-protest censorship as ``the strictest crackdown I have seen in
 years, in terms of the sheer breadth of things they are taking down.''
 \125\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Suppression of Independent Expression before the 20th Party Congress--
                                Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Critics and petitioners: Some China-based rights advocates
 characterized restrictions on critics and petitioners before and during
 the 20th Party Congress as particularly strict.\126\ From September 12
 through October 22, 2022, Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch reported more
 than 60 cases in various locations in which authorities or unidentified
 individuals subjected rights advocates, lawyers, petitioners, and
 others to ``stability maintenance'' measures following the 20th Party
 Congress, including detention, home confinement, extralegal detention,
 and harassment.\127\ As in past cases, authorities reportedly took some
 high-profile critics on forced ``vacations,'' including Gao Yu,\128\
 Shen Liangqing,\129\ Hu Jia,\130\ and Li Meiqing.\131\ In one case,
 authorities in Suzhou municipality, Anhui province, reportedly
 sentenced petitioner Li Bencai\132\ to 2 years and 10 months in prison
 for ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble'' \133\ after he told
 Suzhou authorities that he would travel to Beijing to petition if they
 did not provide redress for his grievance.\134\ Another petitioner, Wu
 Jixin, characterized Li's sentence as a warning to petitioners ahead of
 the 20th Party Congress.\135\
  Internet content about senior Party leaders: A Wall Street Journal
 (WSJ) analysis released two days before the start of the 20th Party
 Congress found that it was ``essentially impossible to search [online]
 for viewpoints about [Xi Jinping] or other senior politicians that
 don't offer unstinting praise.'' \136\ The WSJ found that searches
 related to Xi or other senior Party officials returned results
 predominantly from state-affiliated sources, notifications that results
 could not be displayed, or zero results.\137\ In July 2022, China
 Digital Times reported that social media platforms Weibo and Bilibili
 announced that they would crack down on ``typos'' and ``homophones,''
 \138\ which the author noted internet users in China have ``long
 employed'' to avoid censorship online, including censorship of
 references to senior officials.\139\
  Social media: Some social media users in China reportedly said that
 content controls on social media platforms such as Weixin, Douyin, and
 Weibo--including the blocking of chat groups and the dissemination of
 warning messages from public security authorities about spreading or
 believing ``rumors'' online--increased in the lead-up to the 20th Party
 Congress, curtailing freedom of expression.\140\ In August 2022,
 Chinese and international media reported that authorities even froze
 social media accounts belonging to high-profile pro-Party internet
 users Sima Nan and Kong Qingdong for nationalistic commentary deemed
 too extreme and, thus distracting from the 20th Party Congress.\141\
  Enhanced blocking of censorship circumvention tools: Less than two
 weeks before the start of the 20th Party Congress,\142\ Great Firewall
 Report, a censorship monitoring platform, said that ``more than 100
 users [in China] reported that at least one of their transport layer
 security (TLS) based censorship circumvention servers had been
 blocked,'' \143\ which TechCrunch referred to as a ``fresh round of
 crackdowns in the run-up to the [20th Party Congress].'' \144\ TLS is
 an internet security protocol\145\ that Great Firewall Report estimated
 ``more than half of China's netizens who circumvent online censorship''
 use.\146\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Art, Entertainment, and Literature

    This past year, Chinese authorities continued to censor, 
suppress, and detain people for various forms of artistic and 
entertainment content that did not conform to the Chinese 
Communist Party line. The following are illustrative examples 
of multimedia censorship:
         New book publishing in China declined 
        significantly this year, continuing a trend throughout 
        Xi Jinping's leadership.\147\ According to a report 
        released in March 2023, ``there were 25,000 fewer book 
        titles released in China in 2022 than in 2021,'' 
        including a drop of 5,000 new original Chinese titles, 
        and a drop of 20,000 in imported titles in 
        translation.\148\ Several Chinese book editors 
        indicated that they believe this decline is due to 
        tightening controls on content deemed appropriate by 
        the Party.\149\
         As for book publishers, state security 
        officials continued detaining publishers and editors 
        responsible for material considered sensitive by the 
        Chinese government. Chinese authorities detained 
        Taiwan-based publisher Li Yanhe, who has published 
        books critical of the Party's history and politics, in 
        March 2023, confirming a month later that Li was 
        ``under investigation by national security organs on 
        suspicion of engaging in activities endangering 
        national security.'' \150\ Dong Yuyu, columnist and 
        deputy editor of the editorial section at the Party-run 
        newspaper Guangming Daily, was placed under 
        ``residential surveillance at a designated location'' 
        for six months before being formally arrested on 
        suspicion of ``espionage.'' \151\
         Chinese authorities fined several stand-up 
        comedians this year as punishment for jokes made about 
        the Party or domestic policies. In November 2022, 
        authorities fined Li Bo 50,000 yuan for joking about 
        the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown.\152\ Later, the Beijing 
        Municipal Bureau of Culture and Tourism fined the 
        Shanghai municipality-based Xiaoguo Culture Media 
        comedy studio around 13 million yuan (US$1.9 million) 
        for a joke made by its popular comedian, Li Haoshi, 
        during two live performances in Beijing municipality in 
        March 2023.\153\ In his joke, Li Haoshi reportedly 
        compared the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) well-
        known slogan of ``maintain exemplary conduct, fight to 
        win'' to two stray dogs chasing a squirrel.\154\ The 
        joke garnered responses from multiple groups, as 
        Beijing police opened an investigation into Li's 
        performance, the China Association of Performing Arts 
        issued a notice calling for its members to boycott Li, 
        and the PLA's Western Theater Command posted on WeChat 
        criticizing Li's words as ``shameless remarks.'' \155\
         Authorities continued to censor poetry in 
        connection with sensitive events.\156\ In September 
        2022, authorities reportedly banned poet Hu Minzhi from 
        social media platforms Weibo and Douyin after she 
        published a poem that Radio Free Asia described as 
        ``apparently satirizing people's lack of agency around 
        the [P]arty [C]ongress.'' \157\ In August 2022, 
        following the death of Jiang Zongcao--wife of former 
        Party official and high-profile critic Bao Tong (who 
        subsequently died in November 2022)\158\--authorities 
        reportedly required review and approval of poems 
        submitted by mourners.\159\ One former participant in 
        the 1989 Tiananmen protests said, ``You couldn't even 
        submit an elegiac couplet, either physically or online, 
        particularly if it was signed by someone like me, or 
        [veteran journalist Gao Yu].'' \160\

                 Educational and Research Institutions

    This past year, the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
continued to control freedom of expression within educational 
and research institutions. Selected examples follow:

         In June 2023, a draft law to strengthen 
        ``patriotic education'' came before the National 
        People's Congress Standing Committee, aimed at 
        ``integrat[ing] love for the country, love for the 
        Party, and the love of socialism.'' \161\ The draft 
        bill includes nine ``main content'' points of patriotic 
        education, including explicitly political areas such as 
        ``the theories of Xi Jinping'' and Marxism, as well as 
        ``excellent traditional culture'' aspects.\162\ 
        Although the draft includes guidance for educational 
        institutions,\163\ it also contains requirements for 
        online content providers, cultural institutions, and 
        civil society groups, while charging the PLA to enforce 
        the law's provisions.\164\ Foreign analysts have voiced 
        concerns with the tight ideological nature of the draft 
        law, arguing that, if passed, it would allow PRC 
        authorities to criminalize ``anything they don't like, 
        [including] ideas or comments,'' as unpatriotic.\165\
         In February 2023, the State Council General 
        Office and Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
        General Office issued an opinion that called for 
        increasing ideological control over legal 
        education.\166\ The opinion calls for adherence to 
        ideological concepts developed by the Party and 
        associated with Xi Jinping, and it calls for 
        ``insisting on the correct political orientation'' in 
        legal education.\167\

Freedom of Expression

Freedom of Expression

    Notes to Chapter 1--Freedom of Expression

    \1\ Freedom House, ``China,'' in Freedom in the World 2023, March 
2023.
    \2\ Reporters Without Borders, ``China,'' World Press Freedom Index 
2023, accessed May 9, 2023.
    \3\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) on December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19.
    \4\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed June 8, 
2023.
    \5\ Reporters Without Borders, ``The Great Leap Backward of 
Journalism in China,'' December 7, 2021; Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 16, 
2022), 348.
    \6\ Xi Jinping, ``Gaoju Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida qizhi, wei 
quanmian jianshe shehui zhuyi xiandaihua guojia er tuanjie fendou--Zai 
Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Ershi ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui shang de 
baogao'' [Raise high the great banner of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, wage a united struggle to comprehensively establish a 
modern socialist country--Report at the 20th National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party], October 16, 2022, People's Daily, sec. 8(1).
    \7\ ``Zuo Dang he renmin xinlai de xinwen gongzuozhe--Jizhe Jie 
daolai zhi ji chongwen Xi Jinping Zong Shuji de zhunzhun zhutuo'' [Be 
media workers the Party and people can rely on--As National 
Journalists' Day arrives, review the task earnestly entrusted by 
General Secretary Xi Jinping], Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily, 
November 7, 2022. See also ``Zhongguo Jizhe Jie, Xi Jinping jiyu 
meitiren zhongcheng, jianding, chuanbo Dang zheng'' [On China National 
Journalists' Day, Xi Jinping tells media professionals to faithfully 
and firmly disseminate Party policy], Radio Free Asia, November 8, 
2022.
    \8\ Reporters Without Borders, ``The Great Leap Backward of 
Journalism in China,'' December 7, 2021; Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 16, 
2022), 348.
    \9\ Reporters Without Borders, ``China,'' World Press Freedom Index 
2023, accessed May 9, 2023; Freedom House, ``China,'' in Freedom in the 
World 2023, March 2023.
    \10\ See, e.g., Yumeng Luo and Teresa M. Harrison, ```How Citizen 
Journalists Impact the Agendas of Traditional Media and the Government 
Policymaking Process in China,'' Global Media and China 4, no. 1 
(2019): 72, 74.
    \11\ Reporters Without Borders, ``2022 Round-up: Journalists 
Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,'' December 14, 2022, 5.
    \12\ Reporters Without Borders, ``2022 Round-up: Journalists 
Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,'' December 14, 2022, 9; 
Reporters Without Borders, ``2021 Round-up: Journalists Detained, 
Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,'' updated December 21, 2021, 6.
    \13\ Safeguard Defenders (@SafeguardDefend), ``#COVID whistleblower 
#FangBin forced from Beijing to Wuhan and placed under surveillance and 
partial control. Should highlight what @jeromeacohen dubbed ``non-
release release,'' and covered by our report #ChinasFalseFreedom,'' 
Twitter, May 3, 2023, 4:49 a.m.; Grace Tsoi, ``Fang Bin: China COVID 
Whistleblower Returns Home to Wuhan after Jail,'' BBC, May 2, 2023; 
Vivian Wang, ``They Documented the Coronavirus Crisis in Wuhan. Then 
They Vanished,'' New York Times, February 14, 2020, updated January 24, 
2023. For more information on Fang Bin, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2020-00140.
    \14\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 293.
    \15\ Reporters Without Borders, ``2022 Round-up: Journalists 
Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,'' December 14, 2022, 7; 
William Yang, ``Zhang Zhan chuan jiankang zhuangkuang gaishan Fang Bin 
anjian reng pushuo mili'' [Zhang Zhan reports her health has improved; 
Fang Bin's case is still unraveling], Deutsche Welle, February 15, 
2022; For more information on Zhang Zhan, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2020-00175.
    \16\ Reporters Without Borders, ``2022 Round-up: Journalists 
Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,'' December 14, 2022, 6-7; 
Reporters Without Borders, ``2021 Round-up: Journalists Detained, 
Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,'' updated December 21, 2021, 6.
    \17\ Chen Zifei, ``Concerns Grow over Treatment of Detained #MeToo 
Activist after She `Fires' Attorney,'' Radio Free Asia, September 20, 
2022; Index on Censorship, ``Awards: Journalism 2022,'' October 28, 
2022.
    \18\ Reporters Without Borders, ``2022 Round-up: Journalists 
Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,'' December 14, 2022, 7. For 
more information on Huang Xueqin, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2019-00454.
    \19\ Chen Zifei, ``Concerns Grow over Treatment of Detained #MeToo 
Activist after She `Fires' Attorney,'' Radio Free Asia, September 20, 
2022.
    \20\ Helen Davidson, ``Journalist Held without Trial in China Said 
to Need Urgent Medical Attention,'' Guardian, February 16, 2023.
    \21\ Rod McGuirk, ``Australia `Deeply Troubled' by Chinese 
Espionage Case,'' Associated Press, January 19, 2023. For more 
information on Cheng Lei, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2020-00246.
    \22\ Eryk Bagshaw, ``From Suburban Melbourne to Detention in 
Beijing: The Rise of a TV Anchor,'' Sydney Morning Herald, September 1, 
2020.
    \23\ ``Australia Says `Deep Concerns' over Journalist Detained in 
China,'' Al Jazeera, March 31, 2023; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
``2022 nian 3 yue 31 ri Waijiaobu fayanren Wang Wenbin zhuchi lixing 
jizhehui'' [Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin hosts 
regular press conference on March 31, 2022], March 31, 2022; Eva Dou, 
``Beijing Holds Closed-Door Trial for Australian Journalist Cheng 
Lei,'' Washington Post, March 31, 2022; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing 
Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, 
amended December 26, 2020, effective March 1, 2021, art. 111.
    \24\ William Yang, ``Cheng Lei: Australian Journalist's Dire Prison 
Conditions,'' Deutsche Welle, September 6, 2022.
    \25\ Madeleine Lim, ``China Has Released Bloomberg News Staffer 
Haze Fan on Bail,'' Bloomberg, June 14, 2022.
    \26\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Zero COVID, Many 
Controls: Covering China in 2022,'' March 1, 2023, 14.
    \27\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Zero COVID, Many 
Controls: Covering China in 2022,'' March 1, 2023, 1.
    \28\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Zero COVID, Many 
Controls: Covering China in 2022,'' March 1, 2023, 7.
    \29\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (@fccchina), ``FCCC 
statement on the harassment of journalists covering the unrest in 
Beijing and Shanghai, November 28, 2022,'' Twitter, November 28, 2022, 
2:28 a.m.; Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Zero COVID, Many 
Controls: Covering China in 2022,'' March 1, 2023, 7.
    \30\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (@fccchina), ``FCCC 
statement on the harassment of journalists covering the unrest in 
Beijing and Shanghai, November 28, 2022,'' Twitter, November 28, 2022, 
2:28 a.m.
    \31\ ``China COVID: BBC Journalist Detained by Police during 
Protests,'' BBC, November 28, 2022.
    \32\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Shanghai Police Detain 
Foreign Journalists Covering Anti-Lockdown Protests, Beat BBC 
Correspondent Edward Lawrence,'' November 28, 2022.
    \33\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Shanghai Police Detain 
Foreign Journalists Covering Anti-Lockdown Protests, Beat BBC 
Correspondent Edward Lawrence,'' November 28, 2022.
    \34\ Wang Yun, ``Foreign Journalists in China Face Official 
Obstruction, Expulsions and Visa Delays,'' Radio Free Asia, March 2, 
2023.
    \35\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) on December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 20-21.
    \36\ Freedom House, ``China Dissent Monitor 2023,'' Issue 3 
(January-March 2023), May 31, 2023; Freedom House, ``China Dissent 
Monitor 2022,'' Issue 2 (October-December 2022), February 14, 2023. The 
number of detentions from dissent events was only reported in Issue 2, 
with data from June 2022 to February 2023.
    \37\ See, e.g., Freedom House, ``China Dissent Monitor 2022,'' 
Issue 1 (June-September 2022), October 7, 2022, 1; Freedom House, 
``China Dissent Monitor 2022,'' Issue 2 (October-December 2022), 
February 14, 2023, 1; Gu Ting, ``In Wuhan, Thousands of Retirees 
Protest Slashed Medical Benefits,'' Radio Free Asia, February 8, 2023.
    \38\ Gu Ting, ``In Wuhan, Thousands of Retirees Protest Slashed 
Medical Benefits,'' Radio Free Asia, February 8, 2023; Verna Yu, 
``Elderly Chinese People Protest in Wuhan against Medical Benefits 
Cuts,'' Guardian, February 9, 2023; ``Chinese Retirees Take to Streets 
over Plan to Cut Health Benefits,'' Al Jazeera, February 26, 2023.
    \39\ Gu Ting, ``Wuhan `Baifa Yundong' duo ren beibu qiuhou 
suanzhang zhaoran ruojie,'' [Many people in Wuhan's ``White Hair 
Movement'' were detained, abundantly clear retaliation came after the 
event], Radio Free Asia, February 22, 2023; Ye Bing, ``Lianghui qian 
weiwen zhenya kangyizhe ji yiyi renshi Wu fei nan shu gongmin jizhe 
Zhang Hai shilian huo cheng Fang Bin di'er?'' [Maintaining stability by 
and suppressing protesters and dissidents before the Two Sessions,: 
Wuhan pandemic victim family member and citizen journalist Zhang Hai 
incommunicado, will he be the second Fang Bin?is it possible that 
citizen journalist Zhang Hai lost contact or became Fang Bin number 
two?], Voice of America, February 26, 2023. For more information on 
Zhang Hai, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 
2023-00068.
    \40\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Tong Menglan yin shengyuan 
`Baifa Yundong' bei daibu'' [Tong Menglan arrested for supporting the 
``White Hair Movement''], April 7, 2023; Rights Defense Network, 
``Wuhan Tong Menglan erzi: Guanyu wo fuqin Tong Menglan bei zhuabu de 
qingkuang tongbao'' [Son of Wuhan's Tong Menglan: Situation bulletin on 
the detention of my father Tong Menglan], April 12, 2023. For more 
information on Tong Menglan, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2023-00105.
    \41\ Gu Ting, ``In Wuhan, Thousands of Retirees Protest Slashed 
Medical Benefits,'' Radio Free Asia, February 8, 2023; Verna Yu, 
``Elderly Chinese People Protest in Wuhan against Medical Benefits 
Cuts,'' Guardian, February 9, 2023.
    \42\ Wenxin Fan, ``Large Chinese Bank Protest Put Down with 
Violence,'' Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2022.
    \43\ Wenxin Fan, ``Large Chinese Bank Protest Put Down with 
Violence,'' Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2022; Lili Pike and Alex 
Leeds Matthews, ``China's Mortgage Boycotts: Why Hundreds of Thousands 
of People Are Saying They Won't Pay,'' Grid, August 29, 2022.
    \44\ Wenxin Fan, ``Large Chinese Bank Protest Put Down with 
Violence,'' Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2022.
    \45\ Wenxin Fan, ``Large Chinese Bank Protest Put Down with 
Violence,'' Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2022.
    \46\ Engen Tham and Martin Quin Pollard, ``China's Henan Bank 
Customers Face Harassment, Job Loss over Protests,'' Reuters, July 12, 
2022.
    \47\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Free All `Blank 
Paper' Protestors,'' January 20, 2023, updated February 22, 2023.
    \48\ See, e.g., Eva Rammeloo, ``What Happened to the Man Who Led 
the Chants against Xi Jinping?,'' 1843, Economist, November 29, 2022.
    \49\ Lyric Li, ``China Clamps Down on `Zero COVID' Protests, 
Loosens Some Pandemic Measures,'' Washington Post, November 29, 2022; 
Jessie Yeung, ``Rare Protests Are Spreading across China. Here's What 
You Need to Know,'' CNN, November 28, 2022.
    \50\ Lyric Li, ``China Clamps Down on `Zero COVID' Protests, 
Loosens Some Pandemic Measures,'' Washington Post, November 29, 2022; 
Eva Rammeloo, ``What Happened to the Man Who Led the Chants against Xi 
Jinping?,'' 1843, Economist, November 29, 2022; Jessie Yeung, ``Rare 
Protests Are Spreading across China. Here's What You Need to Know,'' 
CNN, November 29, 2022.
    \51\ Nathan Ruser (@Nrg8000), ``From Monday to Thursday this week, 
our China protest monitor tracked 9 new protests against strict COVID-
measures. Mostly in university campuses, where certain campuses appear 
to be lagging behind in loosening up their COVID-Zero policies. See our 
map/heatmap,'' Twitter, December 9, 2022, 7:01 a.m.
    \52\ See, e.g., Patricia M. Thornton, ``The A4 Movement: Mapping 
Its Background and Impact,'' China Leadership Monitor 75, no. 1 (Spring 
2023), March 1, 2023; Nick Schifrin and Teresa Cebrian Aranda, 
``Thousands in China Protest Zero-COVID Policy in Largest 
Demonstrations in Decades,'' PBS NewsHour, November 28, 2022; Lindsay 
Maizland, ``From Tiananmen to COVID: Modern China's Protests in 
Photos,'' Council on Foreign Relations, December 1, 2022.
    \53\ Cate Cadell and Christian Shepherd, ``Tracked, Detained, 
Vilified: How China Throttled Anti-COVID Protests,'' Washington Post, 
January 4, 2023.
    \54\ Cate Cadell and Christian Shepherd, ``Tracked, Detained, 
Vilified: How China Throttled Anti-COVID Protests,'' Washington Post, 
January 4, 2023.
    \55\ Vivian Wang and Zixu Wang, ``In China's Crackdown on 
Protesters, a Familiar Effort to Blame Foreign Powers,'' New York 
Times, January 26, 2023; Emily Feng, ``China's Authorities Are Quietly 
Rounding Up People Who Protested against COVID Rules,'' NPR, January 
11, 2023.
    \56\ Vivian Wang and Zixu Wang, ``In China's Crackdown on 
Protesters, a Familiar Effort to Blame Foreign Powers,'' New York 
Times, January 26, 2023. For more information on Li Yuanjing, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00035.
    \57\ Vivian Wang and Zixu Wang, ``In China's Crackdown on 
Protesters, a Familiar Effort to Blame Foreign Powers,'' New York 
Times, January 26, 2023. For more information on Li Siqi, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00036.
    \58\ Vivian Wang and Zixu Wang, ``In China's Crackdown on 
Protesters, a Familiar Effort to Blame Foreign Powers,'' New York 
Times, January 26, 2023. For more information on Zhai Dengrui, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00037.
    \59\ Shen Lu and Liyan Qi, ``In China, Young Women Become 
Accidental Symbols of Defiance,'' Wall Street Journal, January 25, 
2023. For more information on Cao Zhixin, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00033.
    \60\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Free All `Blank 
Paper' Protestors,'' January 20, 2023, updated February 22, 2023. For 
more information on Qin Ziyi, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2023-00057.
    \61\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Free All `Blank 
Paper' Protestors,'' January 20, 2023, updated February 22, 2023. For 
more information on Yang Liu, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2023-00039.
    \62\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Free All `Blank 
Paper' Protestors,'' January 20, 2023, updated February 22, 2023. For 
more information on Lin Yun, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2023-00040.
    \63\ Rights Defense Network, ``Yin `Bai Zhi Kangyi Yundong' zai 
Beijing zao xingshi juliu reng bei jiya de Xin Shang de xiangguan 
xinxi'' [Information about Xin Shang, who was criminally detained in 
Beijing for the ``White Paper Protests'' and is still in custody], 
January 29, 2023. For more information on Xin Shang, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00051.
    \64\ Vivian Wang and Zixu Wang, ``In China's Crackdown on 
Protesters, a Familiar Effort to Blame Foreign Powers,'' New York 
Times, January 26, 2023; Shen Lu and Liyan Qi, ``In China, Young Women 
Become Accidental Symbols of Defiance,'' Wall Street Journal, January 
25, 2023; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Free All `Blank 
Paper' Protestors,'' January 20, 2023, updated February 22, 2023; Emily 
Feng, ``China's Authorities Are Quietly Rounding Up People Who 
Protested against COVID Rules,'' NPR, January 11, 2023.
    \65\ Iris Zhao, ``UNSW Alumna Li Yuanjing among Women Detained by 
Chinese Police after Attending Zero-COVID Protests,'' Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation, February 4, 2023. Goldsmiths, University of 
London, ``Responding to Reports of the Detention of a Former Student,'' 
January 31, 2023. Center for East Asian Studies, University of Chicago, 
``Statement on Recent Blank Paper Protests in China,'' accessed January 
23, 2023. Rights Defense Network, `` `Bai Zhi Kangyi Yundong' zhong zai 
Beijing zao jubu renyuan zuixin qingkuang tongbao: (2023 nian 1 yue 20 
ri)--shi yu ren bei qubao huoshi, jiu ren bei pibu'' [Latest situation 
bulletin- on the people detained during the ``White Paper Protests'' in 
Beijing (January 20, 2023)--Over 10 people released on bail conditions, 
9 people approved for arrest], January 20, 2023; Jenny Tang, ``Calls 
Grow among Overseas Universities, Activists for Release of Chinese 
Protesters,'' Radio Free Asia, February 1, 2023.
    \66\ Shen Lu and Liyan Qi, ``In China, Young Women Become 
Accidental Symbols of Defiance,'' Wall Street Journal, January 25, 
2023.
    \67\ Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in 
Strasbourg, ``Questions-reponses lors du diner-debat organise par 
l'Association de la Presse Diplomatique'' [Questions and answers during 
the dinner debate organized by the Diplomatic Press Association], 
December 14, 2022; ``Chen Wenqing zhuchi zhaokai Zhongyang Zhengfa 
Weiyuanhui quanti huiyi qiangdiao, yi youli jucuo guanche luoshi Dang 
de Ershi Da jingshen, jianjue weihu guojia anquan he shehui wending'' 
[While hosting the convening of a plenary meeting of the Political and 
Legal Affairs Commission, Chen Wenqing emphasizes taking strong 
measures to implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress, resolutely 
safeguarding national security and social stability], Xinhua, November 
29, 2022; Cate Cadell and Christian Shepherd, ``Tracked, Detained, 
Vilified: How China Throttled Anti-COVID Protests,'' Washington Post, 
January 4, 2023; Kinling Lo, ``Diplomat Blames `Foreign Forces' for 
Boosting China's COVID-19 Protests,'' South China Morning Post, 
December 15, 2022; Lily Kuo, Pei-Lin Wu, and Theodora Yu, ``Chinese 
Police Are Knocking on Protesters' Doors, Searching Cellphones,'' 
Washington Post, November 30, 2022.
    \68\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 293.
    \69\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Xin Shang,'' Prisoners of 
Conscience Database, Mainland China, updated March 20, 2023.
    \70\ Rights Defense Network, `` `Bai Zhi Kangyi Yundong' zhong zai 
Beijing zao jubu renyuan zuixin qingkuang tongbao: (2023 nian 1 yue 20 
ri)--shi yu ren bei qubao huoshi, jiu ren bei pibu'' [Latest situation 
bulletin on the people detained in the ``White Paper Protests'' in 
Beijing (January 20, 2023)--Over 10 people released on bail conditions, 
9 people approved for arrest], January 20, 2023.
    \71\ Huizhong Wu, ``4 Protesters against China's COVID Policy 
Released on Bail,'' Associated Press, April 20, 2023.
    \72\ Jane Tang, ``U.S.-Based Uyghur Man Calls on China to Release 
His 19-Year-Old Sister,'' Radio Free Asia, January 26, 2023. For more 
information on Kamile Wayit, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2023-00045.
    \73\ Yangchen Dolma, ``China Arrested Four Tibetan Women for 
Allegedly Protesting against Restrictions of `Zero-COVID Policy,' '' 
Tibet Post International, December 7, 2022. For more information on 
Tseyang Lhamo, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 
2023-00034.
    \74\ Yangchen Dolma, ``China Arrested Four Tibetan Women for 
Allegedly Protesting against Restrictions of `Zero-COVID Policy,' '' 
Tibet Post International, December 7, 2022. For more information on 
Dzamkar, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-
00041.
    \75\ Yangchen Dolma, ``China Arrested Four Tibetan Women for 
Allegedly Protesting against Restrictions of `Zero-COVID Policy,' '' 
Tibet Post International, December 7, 2022. For more information on 
Dechen, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-
00042.
    \76\ Yangchen Dolma, ``China Arrested Four Tibetan Women for 
Allegedly Protesting against Restrictions of `Zero-COVID Policy,' '' 
Tibet Post International, December 7, 2022. For more information on 
Delha, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-
00043.
    \77\ Yangchen Dolma, ``China Arrested Four Tibetan Women for 
Allegedly Protesting against Restrictions of `Zero-COVID Policy,' '' 
Tibet Post International, December 7, 2022. For more information on 
Kalsang Drolma, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 
2023-00044.
    \78\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Hulian Wang Gentie Pinglun 
Fuwu Guanli Guiding [Internet Comment Service Management Provisions], 
issued November 16, 2022, effective December 15, 2022, arts. 7-8. See 
also Brenda Goh and Ella Cao, ``China Revises Rules to Regulate Online 
Comments,'' Reuters, November 16, 2022.
    \79\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Hulian Wang Gentie Pinglun 
Fuwu Guanli Guiding [Internet Comment Service Management Provisions], 
issued November 16, 2022, effective December 15, 2022, art. 10.
    \80\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Hulian Wang Gentie Pinglun 
Fuwu Guanli Guiding [Internet Comment Service Management Provisions], 
issued November 16, 2022, effective December 15, 2022, art. 8.
    \81\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Hulian Wang Gentie Pinglun 
Fuwu Guanli Guiding [Internet Comment Service Management Provisions], 
issued November 16, 2022, effective December 15, 2022, art. 9.
    \82\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Guanyu kaizhan `Qinglang 
Congyan Zhengzhi ``Zimeiti'' Luanxiang' Zhuanxiang Xingdong de 
Tongzhi'' [Circular on launching the special action of ``Cleaning and 
Strictly Rectifying `Self-Media' Chaos''], issued March 2, 2023, 
effective March 12, 2023; Zhou Kexin, ``China's New Crackdown Targets 
`Self Media,' '' Bitter Winter, March 22, 2023.
    \83\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Guanyu kaizhan `Qinglang 
Congyan Zhengzhi ``Zimeiti'' Luanxiang' Zhuanxiang Xingdong de 
Tongzhi'' [Circular on launching the special action of ``Cleaning and 
Strictly Rectifying `Self-Media' Chaos''], issued March 2, 2023, 
effective March 12, 2023; Zhou Kexin, ``China's New Crackdown Targets 
`Self Media,' '' Bitter Winter, March 22, 2023.
    \84\ For more information on Guo Feixiong, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2005-00143.
    \85\ ``China Sentences Activist to 8 Years' Imprisonment,'' Voice 
of America, May 13, 2023; Rights Defense Network, ``Guo Feixiong (Yang 
Maodong) jiashu shoudao Zhonggong dangju zhengshi daibu Guo Feixiong de 
tongzhi shu'' [Family of Guo Feixiong (Yang Maodong) receive notice of 
Guo Feixiong's formal arrest from Chinese Communist Party authorities], 
January 17, 2022.
    \86\ Chris Buckley, ``Chinese Dissident Sentenced to 8 Years after 
He Tried to Fly to His Dying Wife,'' New York Times, May 12, 2023.
    \87\ For more information on Ruan Xiaohuan, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00101.
    \88\ PEN America, ``Chinese Authorities Should Immediately Release 
Blogger Sentenced to 7 Years in Prison,'' March 23, 2023; Erik Crouch, 
Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Chinese Blogger Ruan Xiaohuan 
Sentenced to 7 Years in Prison,'' March 30, 2023.
    \89\ Liam Scott, ``China Jails Iconic Blogger Who Helped Others 
Evade Censorship,'' Voice of America, April 14, 2023; PEN America, 
``Chinese Authorities Should Immediately Release Blogger Sentenced to 7 
Years in Prison,'' March 23, 2023.
    \90\ ``Minitrue: Three Leaked Censorship Directives Target Anti-
Lockdown Protests and Censorship-Circumvention Tools,'' China Digital 
Times, November 30, 2022.
    \91\ `` `White Paper Movement' Remembrance by Party-Affiliated 
Student Press Association Censored on WeChat,'' China Digital Times, 
May 3, 2023.
    \92\ `` `White Paper Movement' Remembrance by Party-Affiliated 
Student Press Association Censored on WeChat,'' China Digital Times, 
May 3, 2023.
    \93\ `` `White Paper Movement' Remembrance by Party-Affiliated 
Student Press Association Censored on WeChat,'' China Digital Times, 
May 3, 2023.
    \94\ ``Homebuyers Boycott Mortgage Payments on Stalled Housing 
Projects,'' China Digital Times, July 19, 2022; ``China Mortgage 
Boycott Data Erased by Censors as Crisis Spreads,'' Bloomberg, July 15, 
2022; ``China Censors Strive to Filter or Erase Details of Mortgage 
Protests,'' Reuters, July 20, 2022; Huileng Tan, ``China's Mortgage 
Protests: Why People Are Refusing to Pay Their Housing Loans--and What 
It Means for the Country's $18 Trillion Economy,'' Business Insider, 
July 26, 2022.
    \95\ See, e.g., ``China Mortgage Boycott Data Erased by Censors as 
Crisis Spreads,'' Bloomberg, July 15, 2022; Laura He, ``China Scrambles 
to Defuse Alarm over Mortgage Boycotts and Banks Runs,'' CNN, July 18, 
2022; Lili Pike and Alex Leeds Matthews, ``China's Mortgage Boycotts: 
Why Hundreds of Thousands of People Are Saying They Won't Pay,'' Grid, 
May 26, 2023.
    \96\ ``China Mortgage Boycott Data Erased by Censors as Crisis 
Spreads,'' Bloomberg, July 15, 2022; ``China Censors Strive to Filter 
or Erase Details of Mortgage Protests,'' Reuters, July 20, 2022.
    \97\ ``China Mortgage Boycott Data Erased by Censors as Crisis 
Spreads,'' Bloomberg, July 15, 2022; ``China Censors Strive to Filter 
or Erase Details of Mortgage Protests,'' Reuters, July 20, 2022; 
``Homebuyers Boycott Mortgage Payments on Stalled Housing Projects,'' 
China Digital Times, July 19, 2022.
    \98\ David Bandurski, ``Whitewashing China's Record on COVID,'' 
China Media Project, January 9, 2023; Wenxin Fan and Shen Lu, ``China 
Seeks to Write Its Own History of Battle with COVID-19,'' Wall Street 
Journal, April 12, 2023.
    \99\ Wenxin Fan and Shen Lu, ``China Seeks to Write Its Own History 
of Battle with COVID-19,'' Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2023.
    \100\ Sha Hua, ``Chinese Authorities Arrest 12 after Beijing 
Hospital Fire Kills at Least 29,'' Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2023; 
``Beijing wu xinwen: Changfeng Yiyuan dahuo hou, meiti yu shejiao 
pingtai shisheng de 8 xiaoshi'' [No news in Beijing: After the 
Changfeng Hospital fire, the media and social media platforms were 
silent for 8 hours], Initium Media, April 19, 2023.
    \101\ Sha Hua, ``Chinese Authorities Arrest 12 after Beijing 
Hospital Fire Kills at Least 29,'' Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2023.
    \102\ The Commission observed reports that used minor variations in 
the phrasing of these terms. For example, some referred to ``stability 
maintenance and security work.'' See, e.g., Han Wen, ``Zhongshi luzhi 
bao ping'an, yongyi qian xing zai chuzheng'' [Faithfully perform the 
duty of safeguarding security, courageously move forward and set forth 
again], Tianjin Daily, October 26, 2022. Some others referred to 
``security and stability maintenance work.'' See, e.g., Zhejiang 
Provincial Public Security Bureau, ``Wang Chengguo zai Jinhua dudao 
jiancha Dang de Ershi Da anbao weiwen gongzuo'' [Wang Chengguo oversees 
and inspects the security and stability maintenance work for the 20th 
Party Congress in Jinhua], Zhejiang Provincial People's Government, 
October 21, 2022. Some others referred to ``petitioning, security, and 
stability maintenance work.'' See, e.g., Kaijiang County People's 
Government, ``Pang Zuocheng diaoyan Dang de Ershi Da xinfang anbao 
weiwen gongzuo'' [Pang Zuocheng inspects petitioning, security, and 
stability maintenance work for the 20th Party Congress], October 14, 
2022. Despite the variations in phrasing, those reports consistently 
linked ``stability maintenance'' and ``security'' efforts to the 20th 
Party Congress. This chapter of the Commission's 2023 Annual Report 
uses ``stability maintenance and security work'' as a shorthand for 
those collective variations.
    \103\ See, e.g., ``Safeguards for Xi's Stratospheric Rise,'' China 
Media Project, February 2, 2022; Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers, 
``In Turbulent Times, Xi Builds a Security Fortress for China, and 
Himself,'' New York Times, August 6, 2022; Stella Chen, ``China's Top 
Police Chief Warns Law Enforcement to Stay Alert to Risk of `Colour 
Revolution' Ahead of Major Communist Party Gathering,'' South China 
Morning Post, September 18, 2022.
    \104\ ``China's Xi Secures Third Term as Head of Communist Party,'' 
Deutsche Welle, October 23, 2022.
    \105\ Gu Ting, Chen Zifei, and Amelia Loi, ``China Steps Up 
Domestic Censorship, Overseas Propaganda Ahead of Party Congress,'' 
Radio Free Asia, August 24, 2022; ``China Bans Nationalist Blogger Who 
Rallied against Tech Giant,'' Bloomberg, August 24, 2022.
    \106\ See, e.g., Beibei District People's Government, ``Quanqu Dang 
de Ershi Da weiwen anbao gongzuo diaodu hui zhaokai'' [District-wide 
20th Party Congress stability maintenance and security work dispatch 
meeting convened], October 10, 2022; PRC Ministry of Justice, 
``Shanghai shi Jianyu Guanli Ju Dangwei juxing zhuanti xuexi hui'' 
[Shanghai Municipal Prison Management Bureau Party Committee holds 
special study session], September 21, 2022; Zhang Hui and Yang Haihua, 
``Pingba qu Dang de Ershi Da weiwen anbao ji xiaji zhi'an daji zhengzhi 
`bai ri xingdong' zhuanti gongzuo hui zhaokai'' [Pingba district work 
meeting for 20th Party Congress stability maintenance and security, 
summer law and order crackdown ``100-day operation'' convenes], Xinhua, 
August 25, 2022; Dong Fanchao, ``Zhongshi luxing Dang he renmin fuyu de 
xin shidai shiming renwu'' [Faithfully carry out the mission and tasks 
given by the Party and the people in the new era], Legal Daily, 
reprinted in People's Daily, May 26, 2022; Beijing Municipal Radio and 
Television Bureau, ``Beijing shi Guangbo Dianshi Ju guanyu kaizhan 
`Qingchun Zhongguo Meng' xiying Dang de Ershi Da wangluo shiting 
jingpin chuangzuo xiangmu zhengji pingxuan huodong de tongzhi'' 
[Circular of the Beijing Municipal Radio and Television Bureau on 
launching the collection and selection of the top 20 online audio-
visual creation projects of the `Youth Chinese Dream' to welcome the 
Party], reprinted in Beijing Municipal People's Government, March 28, 
2022; ``Guifan wangluo chuanbo zhixu, buduan qianghua `guan xuan yiti' 
'' [Regulate cyber communication order, ceaselessly improve the 
``integration of management and propaganda''], CCTV, March 18, 2022.
    \107\ Zhang Yanling, ``Gong'an Bu: `Bai ri xingdong' yilai pohuo 
xing'an 64 wan yu qi, zhuahuo xianfan 143 wan yu ming'' [Ministry of 
Public Security: Over 640,000 criminal cases cracked, over 1,430,000 
suspects nabbed since the beginning of the ``hundred-day campaign''], 
China Internet Information Center, reprinted in China Release, 
September 27, 2022; ``90 Percent of Chinese Respondents Say They Have 
No Worries about Going Out in Nights: Poll,'' Global Times, September 
27, 2022.
    \108\ Zhang Yanling, ``Gong'an Bu: `Bai ri xingdong' yilai pohuo 
xing'an 64 wan yu qi, zhuahuo xianfan 143 wan yu ming'' [Ministry of 
Public Security: Over 640,000 criminal cases cracked, over 1,430,000 
suspects nabbed since the beginning of the ``hundred-day campaign''], 
China Internet Information Center, reprinted in China Release, 
September 27, 2022.
    \109\ ``Gong'an Bu bushu kaizhan xiaji zhi'an daji zhengzhi `bai ri 
xingdong' '' [Ministry of Public Security deploys the `hundred-day 
campaign' to crack down on public security this summer], Xinhua, June 
26, 2022.
    \110\ Hengyang Municipal People's Government, ``Shi gong'an ju 
zhaokai Dang wei hui yanjiu Dang de Ershi Da anbao weiwen gongzuo'' 
[Municipal public security bureau convenes Party committee meeting to 
research security and stability maintenance work for the 20th Party 
Congress], July 19, 2022.
    \111\ Wang Wenjun, ``Ding Xiaoqiang zai quanshi gong'an jiguan Dang 
de Ershi Da anbao weiwen gongzuo dongyuan bushu hui shang qiangdiao, 
quanli da hao da ying anbao weiwen zhe chang yingzhang, jianjue quebao 
zhengzhi anquan shehui anding renmin anning'' [At municipality-wide 
mobilization and deployment meeting of public security agencies for 
20th Party Congress security and stability maintenance work, Ding 
Xiaoqiang emphasizes making a full effort to fight well and win the 
tough battle of security and stability maintenance, resolutely ensure 
political security, social stability, and peace for the people], 
Yuncheng Daily, September 29, 2022.
    \112\ Zhang Hui and Yang Haihua, ``Pingba qu Dang de Ershi Da 
weiwen anbao ji xiaji zhian daji zhengzhi `bai ri xingdong' zhuanti 
gongzuo hui zhaokai'' [Pingba district work meeting for 20th Party 
Congress stability maintenance and security, summer law and order 
crackdown ``100-day campaign'' convenes], Xinhua, August 25, 2022.
    \113\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Zhongyang Wangxin Ban 
qidong `Qinglang 2023 nian chunjie wangluo huanjing zhengzhi' 
zhuanxiang xingdong'' [Cyberspace Administration of China launches 
``Purification 2023 new year internet environment rectification'' 
campaign], January 18, 2023; Cyberspace Administration of China, 
``Quanguo hulian wang weifa he buliang xinxi jubao shouli chuzhi 
yitihua jizhi jianshe tuijin hui zai Jing zhaokai'' [Meeting to advance 
construction of a national integrated mechanism for receiving and 
processing illegal and unhealthy internet information convenes in 
Beijing], reprinted in Legal Daily, January 28, 2022; ``Guifan wangluo 
chuanbo zhixu, buduan qianghua `guan xuan yiti' '' [Regulate cyber 
communication order, ceaselessly improve the ``integration of 
management and propaganda''], CCTV, March 18, 2022.
    \114\ Cao Yan et al., ``Zhongyang Wangxin Ban: 2022 nian yilai 
qingli weigui duan shipin 235 wan yu tiao'' [Cyberspace Administration 
of China: Cleaned up over 2.35 million short videos that violated 
regulations since the beginning of 2022], CCTV, reprinted in Sina, 
August 18, 2022.
    \115\ For more information on Peng Lifa, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00176.
    \116\ See, e.g., Li Yuan, ``China's Protest Prophet,'' New York 
Times, December 7, 2022; Gao Feng, ``Zhongguo duo di gongmin zhuanfa 
`Sitong Qiao kangyi shijian' zao jingfang koucha, shilian'' [Citizens 
across multiple locations in China detained and questioned by police, 
or go missing, after reposting about the ``Sitong Bridge protest''], 
Radio Free Asia, October 27, 2022; Tessa Wong, ``China Congress: How 
One Man on a Bridge Marred Xi Jinping's Big Moment,'' BBC, October 22, 
2022; Feng Yibing, ``Beijing Banner Protest Ripples Outward as China 
Maintains Silence,'' Voice of America, October 20, 2022; `` `Bridge 
Man' Peng Zaizhou's Mission Impossible and His ``Toolkit for the 
Removal of Xi Jinping,' '' China Change, October 19, 2022; Gao Feng et 
al., ``Beijing Banner Protester Lauded as China's New Tank Man, or 
`Bridge Man,' '' Radio Free Asia, October 14, 2022.
    \117\ Lili Pike, `` `Depose the Traitorous Despot': How China's 
`Bridge Man' Unleashed a Global Protest against Xi Jinping,'' 
Messenger, October 21, 2022.
    \118\ Lili Pike, `` `Depose the Traitorous Despot': How China's 
`Bridge Man' Unleashed a Global Protest against Xi Jinping,'' 
Messenger, October 21, 2022; Jenny Tang, ``Overseas Solidarity with 
Beijing `Bridge Man' Protest Sparks Fears of Retaliation,'' Radio Free 
Asia, October 19, 2022.
    \119\ Sun Zhe, ``Feminist and LGBT Activist Held for 3 Months for 
Sticking Up Posters of `Bridge Man,' '' Radio Free Asia, February 6, 
2023; Rights Defense Network, ``Yin xiangying Sitong Qiao yongshi Peng 
Zaizhou er zai Beijing zao zhuabu de Guo Yi (Edith) nushi de xiangguan 
xinxi tongbao'' [Update regarding relevant information for Guo Yi 
(Edith), detained in Beijing for echoing brave Sitong Bridge man Peng 
Zaizhou], February 2, 2023. For more information on Guo Yi, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00054.
    \120\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai gongmin Gu Guoping qi yin 
zai Tuite shang zhuantie Sitong Qiao yongshi Peng Zaizhou wen tu bei 
jingfang daizou hou yi huoshi'' [Citizen from Shanghai Gu Guoping, 
taken away by police for sharing text and images of the brave Sitong 
Bridge man Peng Zaizhou on Twitter, is released], October 27, 2022. For 
more information on Gu Guoping, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2016-00027.
    \121\ Sun Cheng, ``Kunming yiyi renshi Xu Kun shengyuan Sitong Qiao 
kangyi, bei jingfang dai zou xunwen'' [Kunming dissident Xu Kun speaks 
out in support of Sitong Bridge protest, taken away by police for 
questioning], Radio Free Asia, October 16, 2022. For more information 
on Xu Kun, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 
2019-00495.
    \122\ Gao Feng, ``Zhongguo duo di gongmin zhuanfa `Sitong Qiao 
kangyi shijian' zao jingfang koucha, shilian'' [Citizens across 
multiple locations in China detained and questioned by police, or go 
missing, after reposting about the ```Sitong Bridge protest''], Radio 
Free Asia, October 27, 2022. For more information on Wu Jingsheng, see 
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00166.
    \123\ Jenny Tang, ``Overseas Solidarity with Beijing `Bridge Man' 
Protest Sparks Fears of Retaliation,'' Radio Free Asia, October 19, 
2022.
    \124\ Gao Feng et al., ``Beijing Banner Protester Lauded as China's 
New Tank Man, or `Bridge Man,' '' Radio Free Asia, October 14, 2022; 
``Beijing Bridge Protest Scraped from Web as Censorship Tightens before 
Party Congress,'' China Digital Times, October 13, 2022.
    \125\ Tessa Wong, ``China Congress: How One Man on a Bridge Marred 
Xi Jinping's Big Moment,'' BBC, October 22, 2022.
    \126\ Gu Ting, ``Beijing Police Ban Drones, Expel Petitioners, 
Migrant Workers Ahead of CCP Congress,'' Radio Free Asia, September 21, 
2022; Gu Ting and Chingman, ``Chinese Dissidents, Activists Await 
Release from House Arrest, Forced `Vacation,' '' Radio Free Asia, 
October 25, 2022.
    \127\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Zhonggong Ershi Da jiang 
zhaokai gongmin bei weiwen qingkuang (yi)'' [The situation of citizens 
who were subjected to stability maintenance before the 20th Party 
Congress convened (1)], September 12, 2022; Civil Rights & Livelihood 
Watch, ``Zhonggong Ershi Da jiang zhaokai gongmin bei weiwen qingkuang 
(er)'' [The situation of citizens who were subjected to stability 
maintenance before the 20th Party Congress convened (2)], September 18, 
2022; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Zhonggong Ershi Da jiang 
zhaokai gongmin bei weiwen qingkuang'' [The situation of citizens who 
were subjected to stability maintenance before the 20th Party Congress 
convened], September 21, 2022; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, 
``Zhonggong Ershi Da jiang zhaokai gongmin bei weiwen qingkuang (si)'' 
[The situation of citizens who were subjected to stability maintenance 
before the 20th Party Congress convened (4)], September 26, 2022; Civil 
Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Zhonggong Ershi Da jiang zhaokai gongmin 
bei weiwen qingkuang (wu)'' [The situation of citizens who were 
subjected to stability maintenance before the 20th Party Congress 
convened (5)], September 30, 2022; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, 
``Zhonggong Ershi Da jiang zhaokai gongmin bei weiwen qingkuang (liu)'' 
[The situation of citizens who were subjected to stability maintenance 
before the 20th Party Congress convened (6)], October 6, 2022; Civil 
Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Zhonggong Ershi Da jiang zhaokai gongmin 
bei weiwen qingkuang (qi)'' [The situation of citizens who were 
subjected to stability maintenance before the 20th Party Congress 
convened (7)], October 11, 2022; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, 
``Zhonggong Ershi Da jiang zhaokai gongmin bei weiwen qingkuang (ba)'' 
[The situation of citizens who were subjected to stability maintenance 
before the 20th Party Congress convened (8)], October 16, 2022; Civil 
Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Zhonggong Ershi Da zhaokai gongmin bei 
weiwen qingkuang (jiu)'' [The situation of citizens who were subjected 
to stability maintenance as the 20th Party Congress convened (9)], 
October 17, 2022; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Zhonggong Ershi Da 
zhaokai gongmin bei weiwen qingkuang (shi)'' [The situation of citizens 
who were subjected to stability maintenance as the 20th Party Congress 
convened (10)], October 22, 2022.
    \128\ For more information on Gao Yu, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2004-05037.
    \129\ For more information on Shen Liangqing, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00317.
    \130\ For more information on Hu Jia, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2004-05295.
    \131\ Gu Ting and Chingman, ``Chinese Dissidents, Activists Await 
Release from House Arrest, Forced `Vacation,' '' Radio Free Asia, 
October 25, 2022; Feng Yibing, ``Beijing Banner Protest Ripples Outward 
as China Maintains Silence,'' Voice of America, October 20, 2022. For 
more information on Li Meiqing, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2016-00036.
    \132\ For more information on Li Bencai, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00165.
    \133\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 293.
    \134\ Gao Feng, ``Ershi Da weiwen jiduanhua, Anhui qiangchai hu 
tiaojie tuoxie hou fan bei panxing'' [20th Party Congress stability 
maintenance becomes extreme, Anhui resident whose home was forcibly 
demolished reaches compromise through mediation, sentenced anyway], 
Radio Free Asia, October 10, 2022.
    \135\ Gao Feng, ``Ershi Da weiwen jiduanhua, Anhui qiangchai hu 
tiaojie tuoxie hou fan bei panxing'' [20th Party Congress stability 
maintenance becomes extreme, Anhui resident whose home was forcibly 
demolished reaches compromise through mediation, sentenced anyway], 
Radio Free Asia, October 10, 2022.
    \136\ Liza Lin, ``Do Chinese People Like Xi Jinping? You Won't Find 
an Easy Answer Online,'' Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2022; 
``Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Ershi ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui 16 ri shangwu 
zai Renmin Dahui Tang kaimu Xi Jinping daibiao di shijiu jie Zhongyang 
Weiyuanhui xiang Dang de Ershi Da zuo baogao'' [The 20th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China opened in the Great Hall of 
the People on morning of the 16th; on behalf of the 19th Central 
Committee, Xi Jinping delivered a report to the 20th Party Congress], 
Xinhua, October 16, 2022.
    \137\ Liza Lin, ``Do Chinese People Like Xi Jinping? You Won't Find 
an Easy Answer Online,'' Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2022.
    \138\ ``Bilibili/Weibo, jielian tongzhi--Hanzi--zhengzhi--
biantizi'' [Bilibili/Weibo, successive circulars--Chinese characters--
rectification--variant words], Sohu, July 13, 2022.
    \139\ ``List of Derogatory Nicknames for Xi Leaked amid Crackdown 
on `Typos,' '' China Digital Times, July 20, 2022.
    \140\ Gu Ting, ``China Steps Up Social Media Censorship, `Upgrades' 
Great Firewall Ahead of Congress,'' Radio Free Asia, October 7, 2022.
    \141\ See, e.g., Shuzi Jie, ``Sima Nan bei jinyan, shengxia 1,000 
wan fensi fengzhong lingluan!'' [Sima Nan blocked, 10,000,000 fans left 
in disarray!], Sina, August 20, 2022; Xinlu Liang, ``Nationalistic 
Blogger Sima Nan Banned from Chinese Social Media,'' South China 
Morning Post, August 23, 2022; ``China Bans Nationalist Blogger Who 
Rallied against Tech Giant,'' Bloomberg, August 24, 2022; Gu Ting, Chen 
Zifei, and Amelia Loi, ``China Steps Up Domestic Censorship, Overseas 
Propaganda Ahead of Party Congress,'' Radio Free Asia, August 24, 2022.
    \142\ ``Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Ershi ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui 16 
ri shangwu zai Renmin Dahui Tang kaimu Xi Jinping daibiao Di Shijiu jie 
Zhongyang Weiyuan Hui xiang Dang de Ershi Da zuo baogao'' [The 20th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China opened in the Great 
Hall of the People on morning of the 16th; on behalf of the 19th 
Central Committee, Xi Jinping delivered a report to the 20th Party 
Congress], Xinhua, October 16, 2022.
    \143\ Great Firewall Report, ``Large Scale Blocking of TLS-Based 
Censorship Circumvention Tools in China,'' reprinted in GitHub, October 
4, 2022.
    \144\ Rita Liao and Zack Whittaker, ``Popular Censorship 
Circumvention Tools Face Fresh Blockade by China,'' TechCrunch, October 
5, 2022.
    \145\ See, e.g., ``What Is TLS (Transport Layer Security)?,'' 
Cloudflare, accessed November 9, 2022.
    \146\ Rita Liao and Zack Whittaker, ``Popular Censorship 
Circumvention Tools Face Fresh Blockade by China,'' TechCrunch, October 
5, 2022.
    \147\ ``A New Era for China's Readers,'' China Media Project, April 
25, 2023.
    \148\ ``A New Era for China's Readers,'' China Media Project, April 
25, 2023.
    \149\ ``A New Era for China's Readers,'' China Media Project, April 
25, 2023.
    \150\ ``Beijing Confirms Missing Taiwan Publisher Li Yanhe Is under 
National Security Investigation,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in 
Hong Kong Free Press, April 26, 2023. For more information on Li Yanhe, 
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00241.
    \151\ Vivian Wang, ``China Accuses a Liberal Columnist of 
Espionage,'' New York Times, April 24, 2023; Rights Defense Network, 
``Zao Zhonggong dangju yi `jiandiezui' zhengshi daibu de Guangming 
Ribao pinglun bu fuzhuren Dong Yuyu de anqing ji jianli'' [The case and 
resume of Dong Yuyu, deputy director of the commentary department of 
Guangming Daily, who was formally arrested by the Chinese Communist 
authorities on ``espionage charges''], May 7, 2023; For more 
information on Dong Yuyu, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2023-00140.
    \152\ Vanessa Cai, ``Chinese Comedy Troupe Hit with US$2 Million 
Penalty for Jokes about People's Liberation Army,'' South China Morning 
Post, May 17, 2023.
    \153\ Chang Che and Olivia Wang, ``No Joke: China Fines a Comedy 
Firm $2 Million for `Insulting' the Military,'' New York Times, May 17, 
2023; Vanessa Cai, ``Chinese Comedy Troupe Hit with US$2 Million 
Penalty for Jokes about People's Liberation Army,'' South China Morning 
Post, May 17, 2023; Fan Wang, ``China Fines Comedy Troupe $2M for Joke 
about the Military,'' BBC, May 17, 2023.
    \154\ Chang Che and Olivia Wang, ``No Joke: China Fines a Comedy 
Firm $2 Million for `Insulting' the Military,'' New York Times, May 17, 
2023.
    \155\ Vanessa Cai, ``Chinese Comedy Troupe Hit with US $2 Million 
Penalty for Jokes about People's Liberation Army,'' South China Morning 
Post, May 17, 2023.
    \156\ Lily Kuo, ``Student Poetry Contest in China Becomes 
Unexpected Outlet for Dissent,'' Washington Post, April 24, 2022.
    \157\ Fong Tak Ho and Gu Ting, ``Chinese Poet's Account Deleted 
after Satirical Poem Ahead of Party Congress,'' Radio Free Asia, 
September 29, 2022.
    \158\ Chris Buckley and Vivian Wang, ``Bao Tong, 90, Dies; Top 
Chinese Official Imprisoned after Tiananmen,'' New York Times, November 
21, 2022.
    \159\ Gao Feng, ``Police Stop Mourners Attending Funeral of Jiang 
Zongcao, Wife of Former Top CCP Aide,'' Radio Free Asia, August 25, 
2022.
    \160\ Gao Feng, ``Police Stop Mourners Attending Funeral of Jiang 
Zongcao, Wife of Former Top CCP Aide,'' Radio Free Asia, August 25, 
2022; Michael Forsythe and Chris Buckley, ``Journalist Missing Ahead of 
Tiananmen Anniversary,'' New York Times, April 29, 2014.
    \161\ National People's Congress, ``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Aiguo 
Zhuyi Jiaoyu Fa (cao'an)'' [PRC Patriotic Education Law (draft)], June 
26, 2023; Ryan Ho Kilpatrick, ``Legislating Love for the Ruling 
Party,'' China Media Project, June 30, 2023. For an unofficial English 
translation of the draft law, see ``P.R.C. Patriotic Education Law 
(Draft),'' translated in China Law Translate, June 29, 2023.
    \162\ National People's Congress, ``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Aiguo 
Zhuyi Jiaoyu Fa (cao'an)'' [PRC Patriotic Education Law (draft)], June 
26, 2023, art. 6; ``P.R.C. Patriotic Education Law (Draft),'' 
translated in China Law Translate, June 29, 2023, art. 6.
    \163\ National People's Congress, ``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Aiguo 
Zhuyi Jiaoyu Fa (cao'an)'' [PRC Patriotic Education Law (draft)], June 
26, 2023, arts. 14-15; ``P.R.C. Patriotic Education Law (Draft),'' 
translated in China Law Translate, June 29, 2023, arts. 14-15.
    \164\ National People's Congress, ``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Aiguo 
Zhuyi Jiaoyu Fa (cao'an)'' [PRC Patriotic Education Law (draft)], June 
26, 2023, arts. 11, 12, 20, 22, 24, 30; ``P.R.C. Patriotic Education 
Law (Draft),'' translated in China Law Translate, June 29, 2023, arts. 
11, 12, 20, 22, 24, 30.
    \165\ Ryan Ho Kilpatrick, ``Legislating Love for the Ruling 
Party,'' China Media Project, June 30, 2023; Hsia Hsiao-hwa and Gu 
Ting, ``Planned Chinese Law Would Mandate the Study of `Xi Jinping 
Thought' in Schools,'' Radio Free Asia, June 27, 2023.
    \166\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and 
State Council General Office, Guanyu Jiaqiang Xin Shidai Faxue Jiaoyu 
he Faxue Lilun Yanjiu de Yijian [Opinion on Strengthening Legal 
Education and Legal Theory and Research in the New Era], February 26, 
2023, sec. 1(1). See also ``China Releases Key Guideline on Legal 
Education, Stresses Firm Stand to Oppose Western Erroneous Views,'' 
Global Times, February 27, 2023.
    \167\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and 
State Council General Office, Guanyu Jiaqiang Xin Shidai Faxue Jiaoyu 
he Faxue Lilun Yanjiu de Yijian [Opinion on Strengthening Legal 
Education and Legal Theory and Research in the New Era], February 26, 
2023, sec. 1(1).

Civil Society

Civil Society

                             Civil Society

                                Findings

         During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, 
        PRC authorities tightened control over civil society, 
        bolstering oversight of legal nongovernmental 
        organizations (NGOs), which the Chinese government 
        calls ``social organizations'' (SOs), and widely 
        cracking down on the activities, expression, and 
        existence of unregistered or ``illegal social 
        organizations'' (ISOs), including human rights 
        defenders, religious communities, and groups promoting 
        labor rights, women's rights, and the rights of 
        lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning 
        (LGBTQ) persons.
         The Chinese Communist Party and government 
        have pursued and implemented regulatory efforts to 
        ``gatekeep'' registration for SOs, resulting in the 
        lowest rate of registration of SOs since 2008.
         This year, the Chinese Communist Party Central 
        Committee said that it would establish a social affairs 
        work department that aims to improve Party-building in 
        SOs, more firmly entrenching Party control over civil 
        society.
         This past year, the Commission observed 
        efforts to institutionalize an aggressive 2021 campaign 
        that targeted both ISOs and the financial, 
        technological, and administrative infrastructure that 
        enables them to function, taking actions including 
        banning legal organizations from any contact with ISOs.
         The Chinese Communist Party and government 
        continued to incentivize SOs to engage in charity work 
        and service provision in key sectors. Official efforts 
        encouraged philanthropic giving aligned with Party and 
        government goals, using oversight of crowdfunding 
        platforms to both direct funds and exert control over 
        NGOs.
         As of December 8, 2022, the Australian 
        Strategic Policy Institute's China Protest Tracker 
        recorded 77 protests across 39 Chinese cities, 
        demonstrating that, while decentralized and ad hoc, 
        White Paper protesters appear to have leveraged 
        existing networks to generate a temporary but sustained 
        nationwide pressure campaign against the PRC's zero-
        COVID policy.
         In April 2023, PRC authorities sentenced China 
        Citizens Movement organizers and rights defenders Xu 
        Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi to 14 and 12 years in prison, 
        respectively, for ``subversion of state power,'' 
        constituting what one longtime observer of the PRC 
        justice system described as some of the harshest 
        sentences he had seen in over twenty years.
         Chinese government authorities continued to 
        censor and suppress efforts by advocacy groups in the 
        LGBTQ community. In May 2023, the Beijing LGBT Center, 
        one of the largest organizations serving the LGBTQ 
        community, closed, reportedly due to pressure from 
        authorities.
         Although social acceptance of LGBTQ persons 
        and relationships has grown in China in recent years, 
        PRC authorities have continued to tighten control over 
        suspected LGBTQ representation and expression in media 
        and entertainment.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:
          Call on the Chinese government to release civil 
        society advocates and staffers, in particular veteran 
        human rights defenders Xu Zhiyong, Ding Jiaxi, and 
        Chang Weiping, feminist and labor rights advocate Li 
        Qiaochu, journalist and gender rights advocate Sophia 
        Huang Xueqin, labor rights advocate Wang Jianbing, and 
        other civil society and rights advocates detained for 
        peacefully exercising their human rights, especially 
        their rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and 
        association, guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of 
        Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
        and Political Rights.
          Encourage the Chinese government to revise its 
        regulatory framework for civil society organizations, 
        including the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas 
        Nongovernmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland 
        China and the PRC Charity Law, to conform with 
        international human rights standards regarding freedom 
        of association, assembly, and expression.
          Urge the Chinese government to abide by its 
        international legal obligations with respect to Chinese 
        citizens' freedom of association, assembly, and 
        expression and cease the unlawful harassment and 
        arbitrary detention of civil society advocates and the 
        closing of civil society organizations and online 
        accounts of advocates.
          Continue to fund, monitor, and support programs 
        globally that promote human rights, democracy, and the 
        rule of law in mainland China and Hong Kong.
          Facilitate the participation of Chinese civil society 
        advocates and human rights defenders in relevant 
        international forums, to the extent that such 
        participation remains independent of Chinese government 
        control and does not endanger individuals.
          Work with U.S. allies and partners to counter PRC 
        efforts to block civil society groups from obtaining 
        consultative status at the United Nations.
          Support non-profit leadership and advocacy trainings 
        for Chinese, Hong Kong, Tibetan, and Uyghur advocates 
        who are now living outside of China and convene a 
        periodic summit of stakeholders regarding the path 
        forward for Chinese civil society, offline and online.
          Consider shifting support to more fluid models of 
        advocacy, including ``loose networks of professionals, 
        friends, affinity groups, students'' and other like 
        groupings, recognizing the constricting space for civil 
        society organizations.
          Consistent with commitments made by PRC delegations 
        at various U.N. treaty body reviews, encourage the 
        Chinese government to provide information about 
        measures taken to adopt comprehensive anti-
        discrimination legislation, indicating how such 
        legislation will explicitly protect LGBTQ persons, 
        among other groups.
          Maintain funding, oversight, and evaluation of 
        foreign assistance programs in China that support human 
        rights advocacy as part of civil society programming. 
        To the extent practicable under current conditions, 
        consider boosting funding for programs focused on 
        rights advocacy, capacity building, and leadership 
        training for Chinese lawyers and human rights 
        advocates.
          Continue to arrange events at the U.N. Human Rights 
        Council in Geneva and at U.N. Headquarters in New York 
        on ongoing human rights violations in China.

Civil Society

Civil Society

                             Civil Society

                              Introduction

    Domestic civil society in the PRC has continued to develop 
along distinct axes. On the one hand, ``social organizations'' 
(shehui zuzhi)--the government's term for civil society 
organizations--that have registered and operate under Chinese 
Communist Party and government oversight persist, explicitly 
appealing to official priorities. On the other, despite the 
near-complete marginalization of independent civil society, ad 
hoc and fluid networks have emerged and adapted to an 
environment that--while highly restricted--remains in flux. 
Participants in the White Paper protests over coronavirus 
disease 2019 (COVID-19) lockdowns demonstrated that loose 
networks of professionals, friends, affinity groups, students, 
and others were able to develop and maintain connections to 
mobilize public protest and follow-on actions. Falling between 
government-sanctioned ``social organizations'' and diffuse 
protest movements, some civil society groups continued to 
occupy a diminished ``gray zone,'' including foreign 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that maintained a presence 
in the PRC despite a precarious legal status. Groups serving 
China's LGBTQ community have traditionally sought to operate in 
this ``gray zone,'' \1\ but authorities have exerted increased 
pressure on the sector in recent years, resulting in diminished 
space in which to operate. In a development that illustrated 
the dire situation for civil society, in April 2023, a Chinese 
court handed down harsh sentences to civic participation 
advocates Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi, shocking many observers 
and sending a chilling message to Chinese civil society.

           Regulations and Policy Pertaining to Civil Society

          AUTHORITIES EXPAND CONTROL OVER SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

    This reporting year, civil society experts observed efforts 
to ``gatekeep'' registration for social organizations (SOs), 
ensuring that only organizations amenable to Chinese Communist 
Party control operate with legal protections, a process which 
has stalled the growth of the sector and rendered groups deemed 
undesirable increasingly vulnerable.\2\ According to the Blue 
Book on Social Organizations' 2022 report,\3\ the rate of 
registration for SOs in 2021 reached its lowest point since 
2008, likely a result of low approval rates.\4\ In December 
2021, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) issued the 14th Five-
Year Plan for the Development of Social Organizations, which 
called on regulators to make registration more difficult and 
emphasized Party-building and political work within SOs, 
building on the existing trend toward lower approval rates.\5\ 
In addition to limiting the number of SOs and ensuring that 
they reflect the Party line, official guidance has also called 
for MCA regulators to consider sectoral, regional, and issue 
area distribution in issuing SO approvals.\6\ For example, the 
2023 MCA nationwide conference on social organization and 
management work stressed that officials should ``optimize 
distribution,'' providing additional criteria by which the 
Party and government might deny registration to social 
organizations.\7\
    Along with gatekeeping measures, this year the Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee said that it would establish 
a new social affairs work department, which will expand the 
Party's role in civil society.\8\ According to the Party and 
State Institutional Reform Plan (2023), the social affairs work 
department will centralize public opinion gathering and 
petitioning processes and will ``improve Party-building'' in 
nongovernmental entities, including SOs.\9\ These reforms will 
be instituted at the national level by the end of 2023 and at 
the local level by 2024.\10\ One political scientist said that, 
under the department, ``the freedom of civil organizations will 
be squeezed even further,'' adding that they ``will be turned 
into organs serving the needs of the [P]arty.'' \11\

                SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS DEEMED ``ILLEGAL''

    The Chinese government labels social organizations that do 
not seek to register with the MCA, those that are denied 
approval, and those that are explicitly banned as ``illegal 
social organizations'' (ISOs) and aims to root them out. This 
past year, the Commission observed efforts to institutionalize 
an aggressive 2021 campaign that targeted both ISOs and the 
financial, technological, and administrative infrastructures 
that enable them to function, including any ties or cooperation 
with legal social organizations.\12\ For example, in November 
2022, nearly a year after announcing that it would extend the 
crackdown measures indefinitely by ``regularizing'' the 
campaign, the MCA released a draft of Measures for the Annual 
Inspection of Social Groups.\13\ The draft measures stated that 
even holding a function with an ISO would be automatic grounds 
for a group to fail inspection, undermining a strategy that 
many unregistered or illegal groups have relied upon in order 
to survive and access resources: attaching themselves to legal 
social organizations.\14\ The government has also used the 
public to monitor and report on potential ISOs: through its 
online platform, the MCA offered a searchable database to 
determine whether a social organization is legal or not and 
allows users to report ``misbehaving civil society.'' \15\
    While authorities have published several tranches of 
organizations newly designated as illegal over this past year, 
one 2022 study observed a practice of ``strategic opacity 
around politically sensitive organizations,'' whereby the 
government refrains from publicly listing politically sensitive 
organizations, even when those groups are already known to be 
banned.\16\ For example, the MCA's publicly available lists 
omit any mention of several prominent feminist and labor rights 
organizations, whose closures are known and have been well-
documented.\17\ Scholars Diana Fu and Emile Dirks have posited 
that the omission of politically sensitive groups from public 
databases likely reflects the government's desire to limit 
awareness of such groups and preserve its ``. . . discretionary 
power to handle threatening groups in a manner unconstrained by 
formal law or regulations.'' \18\

                     Foreign NGO Activity in China

    During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, foreign 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) maintained a presence in 
the PRC despite occupying a legally precarious position in the 
country under the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas 
Nongovernmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland China, 
which is supervised by the Ministry of Public Security.\19\ 
Since the law's implementation in 2017, some experts and others 
involved with NGO work in China have expressed concern that 
aspects of the law remained ambiguous and open to varying 
interpretations.\20\ In August 2022, ChinaFile's China NGO 
Project concluded that such ambiguity was ``a feature, not a 
bug, of the system,'' designed to allow local officials to use 
``unspoken protocols'' to selectively enforce the law.\21\ In 
December 2022, Tsinghua University's Institute for Philanthropy 
published an article echoing concerns about inconsistent 
application of the NGO law but reaffirmed the importance of 
``strictly controlling'' organizations and activities that 
threaten China's national security.\22\ Foreign NGOs that have 
opted to remain in the country have focused on projects related 
to poverty alleviation, philanthropy and development, 
disability services and rights, health, children's issues, and 
education, while industry associations representing a 
particular industry or professional sector made up 80% of new 
organizations registering under the law in 2021.\23\

        Official Support for Charities and Philanthropic Giving

    The Chinese Communist Party and government continued to 
promote social organizations (SOs) focused on charity work and 
service provision in key sectors and to encourage philanthropic 
giving aligned with Party and government goals.\24\ As online 
crowdfunding platforms have grown increasingly popular, the 
government has used its oversight of the platforms to funnel 
resources to charities working on Party and government 
priorities and to limit which SOs are able to utilize the 
platforms to conveniently access resources.\25\ According to a 
peer-reviewed study by several scholars based at universities 
in China, by regulating these platforms, ``the government [is 
able to] strengthen its supervision over crowdfunding 
activities and mitigate its resource shortages.'' \26\ 
Crowdfunding and online philanthropy platforms, predominately 
run by for-profit Chinese technology companies, have launched 
initiatives centered on state policy priorities and have used 
language that echoes official propaganda.\27\ For example, in 
2021, Tencent chose ``common prosperity'' as the theme for its 
popular ``99 Giving Day,'' \28\ and in 2022, around 60% of 
donations generated by the event went toward ``rural 
revitalization,'' \29\ a major policy priority under Xi 
Jinping.\30\

                          White Paper Protests

    In late November 2022, PRC citizens in locations throughout 
the country took part in protests against the government's 
``zero-COVID policy.'' These protests were precipitated by a 
fatal fire in Urumqi municipality, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, in which residents were unable to escape the burning 
building, reportedly because some entries and exits to the 
building were blocked due to particularly severe zero-COVID 
restrictions.\31\ Although authorities have worked to dismantle 
independent civil society and organized expressions of 
discontent under Xi Jinping,\32\ the protests against zero-
COVID lockdowns--popularly known as the ``blank paper,'' \33\ 
White Paper, or ``A4'' protests\34\--illustrate that, even in 
the absence of formally constituted rights groups, ``invisible, 
unorganized, informal networks'' came together in what a 
leading activist has termed ``units of resistance.'' \35\ 
Reuters reported that the protests have been publicized by 
``tight knit groups of friends'' passing information along in a 
decentralized manner.\36\ In one instance, a group of young 
women in Beijing who were criminally detained for attending a 
November 27, 2022, protest [see Government Suppression of Civil 
Society in this chapter] shared information about a vigil for 
Urumqi fire victims on the messaging service WeChat, which the 
friend group used to keep in touch and organize social 
events.\37\ After meeting at vigils and protests, attendees 
expressed feeling energized by finding that they were not alone 
in their frustration at the lockdowns.\38\ As the protests 
spread, participants used online messaging platforms like 
WeChat and Telegram to form new, location-specific groups; 
organize and publicize events; and provide support for 
protesters navigating law enforcement and possible 
detention.\39\ As of December 8, 2022, the Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute's China Protest Tracker recorded 77 protests 
across 39 Chinese cities, demonstrating that, while the 
protests were decentralized and ad hoc, protesters appear to 
have leveraged existing networks to generate a temporary, but 
sustained, nationwide pressure campaign against zero-COVID.\40\
    Authorities then used these existing networks, such as 
friend groups, alumni and professional networks, and others to 
identify, monitor, and detain protesters. Protesters and 
reporters alike claim that public security officials 
infiltrated WeChat and Telegram groups created to coordinate 
protest activities.\41\ According to multiple accounts, public 
security officials took into custody a large number of women 
participants, some of whom were asked during interrogations 
whether they ``were feminists, lesbians, or backed by foreign 
forces,'' likely based on content detainees shared with friends 
on online platforms.\42\ Activists and observers have pointed 
out that the Chinese government appears to be scapegoating 
feminists and members of the LGBTQ community for the 
protests.\43\
    [For more information about the White Paper protests, see 
Chapter 1--Freedom of Expression and Chapter 12--Public Health. 
For more on the government's handling of the protests, see 
Chapter 6--Governance. For more on the government's use of 
technology to suppress the protests and identify protesters, 
see Chapter 16--Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Harsh Sentencing of China Citizens Movement Organizers
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In April 2023, People's Republic of China (PRC) authorities sentenced
 China Citizens Movement (CCM) organizers and rights defenders Xu
 Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi to 14 and 12 years in prison, respectively, for
 ``subversion of state power,'' in connection with a CCM-organized
 gathering in Xiamen municipality, Fujian province, in 2019.\44\ The CCM
 focused on cultivating ``ordinary'' Chinese people's identity as
 citizens, encouraging them to exercise the rights and responsibilities
 guaranteed by China's Constitution; it regularly held open gatherings
 and remained loosely constituted in order to bypass official
 repression.\45\ The Linshu County People's Court in Linyi municipality,
 Shandong province, issued the verdicts nearly a year after a secret
 trial, during which authorities barred family members from attending
 and prevented their lawyers from speaking under threat of
 disbarment.\46\ Experts, fellow rights defenders, and family members of
 the two men expressed shock at the length of the sentences, which many
 believe were intended to exert a chilling effect on the already-
 decimated rights defender community.\47\ William Nee of Chinese Human
 Rights Defenders described the sentences as two of the longest he had
 seen in over twenty years observing China's criminal justice
 system.\48\ In a statement dictated after being denied access to pen
 and paper, Xu Zhiyong said that he still had a dream of a China that
 was ``truly a country of the people, its government chosen by ballots,
 not violence.'' \49\ Similarly deprived, Ding dictated a statement,
 saying he believed that, ``the megalomania of dictatorship and the
 eternal one-party state is fast coming to an end, and the social
 transformation of China is growing closer, day by day.'' \50\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                Government Suppression of Civil Society

    This past year, the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
continued to suppress human rights advocacy and civil society 
activity through arbitrary detention, arrest, surveillance, and 
other means. Official suppression included the following 
representative examples:
         In December 2022, Beijing municipality police 
        detained Cao Zhixin, Li Yuanjing, Li Siqi, and Zhai 
        Dengrui, members of a group of friends living in 
        Beijing, on suspicion of ``picking quarrels and 
        provoking trouble'' in connection with their attendance 
        at a November vigil honoring victims of a fatal fire in 
        Urumqi municipality, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
        Region.\51\ Authorities released the four women on bail 
        in April 2023.\52\
         Authorities forcibly closed and banned as 
        ``illegal social organizations'' several prominent 
        unregistered or ``house'' churches, including Changchun 
        Sunshine Reformed Church in Changchun municipality, 
        Jilin province;\53\ Linfen Covenant Church in Linfen 
        municipality, Shanxi province;\54\ and Xi'an Church of 
        Abundance in Xi'an municipality, Shaanxi province.\55\ 
        [For more information on suppression of unregistered 
        Protestant churches, see Chapter 3--Freedom of 
        Religion]
         In February 2023, authorities took into 
        custody rights defender Zhang Hai for his participation 
        in a protest over cuts to retirees' medical benefits in 
        Wuhan municipality, Hubei province.\56\ [For more 
        information about the retirees' protests, see Chapter 
        1--Freedom of Expression and Chapter 12--Public 
        Health.]
         In June 2023, the Feng County People's Court 
        in Baoji municipality, Shaanxi province, sentenced 
        rights lawyer Chang Weiping to three years and six 
        months in prison for ``subversion of state power,'' 
        also in connection with the 2019 China Citizens 
        Movement gathering in Xiamen municipality, Fujian 
        province [See box titled Harsh Sentencing of China 
        Citizens Movement Organizers above].\57\ In 2020, Chang 
        posted a video on YouTube, saying that Baoji 
        authorities had tortured him while holding him in 
        residential surveillance at a designated location, a 
        form of secret detention.\58\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         Status of LGBTQ Persons
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Chinese government authorities continued to censor and suppress
 advocacy groups in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
 questioning (LGBTQ) community,\59\ yet claimed in international fora
 that all citizens enjoy access to rights protections.\60\ During the
 third review of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
 Cultural Rights (ICESCR) held in Geneva, Switzerland, on February 15-
 16, 2023, and in its submissions in advance of the review, the PRC
 delegation addressed concerns about the status of LGBTQ persons,
 stating that ``Chinese citizens have equal access to all the rights
 guaranteed by the Constitution and the law. Our existing legal system
 does not contain the concept of LGBT.'' \61\ Similarly, PRC delegates
 claimed during the May 2023 review of China by the Committee on the
 Elimination of Discrimination against Women that ``The Constitution and
 laws of China do not discriminate against [LGBTQ], they are viewed as
 normal people and there is no special accommodation for them'' and that
 the law protects women from sexual- and gender-based violence.\62\
 Members of the LGBTQ community in China, nevertheless, reportedly
 continue to face violence, including domestic violence.\63\ Moreover,
 ``individuals and organizations working on LGBTQ matters reported
 discrimination and harassment from authorities'' according to the State
 Department.\64\ In response to the U.N. Human Rights Council Working
 Group's non-binding recommendation that China ``adopt legislation
 within one year [of their 2018 Universal Periodic Review] prohibiting
 discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in
 all public and private sectors and provide for positive duties on the
 part of government to promote equality on these grounds,'' PRC
 delegates claimed that they had ``accepted and already implemented''
 the recommendation although the Commission could not find evidence that
 they had done so.\65\ The Economist reported that Chinese domestic
 coverage of the treaty body reviews omitted mention of LGBTQ issues,
 including Chinese delegates' claims that the PRC did not discriminate
 against LGBTQ persons.\66\
------------------------------------------------------------------------



------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Status of LGBTQ Persons--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Although social acceptance of LGBTQ persons and relationships seemed
 to be growing in recent years, rhetoric in Party and state-controlled
 media may indicate decreased official tolerance for LGBTQ speech,
 association, and popular representation.\67\ One LGBTQ rights advocate
 who writes under the penname ``Comrade A Qiang'' observed a marked
 decrease in state-owned media acknowledging LGBTQ identity or
 encouraging tolerance of LGBTQ-identified persons, especially since
 2022.\68\ In one case from March 2023, after the California-based
 Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences awarded the movie
 ``Everything Everywhere All at Once'' the Oscar for Best Picture,
 official Party news media outlet People's Daily reprinted an article
 using the euphemistic term ``Westernized lifestyle'' instead of
 identifying a character as LGBTQ, implying that such an identity or
 relationship is inherently ``Western,'' and therefore problematic.\69\
 Some experts believe that this view has been encouraged under Xi
 Jinping as part of a nationalist agenda and amid concerns about
 demographic decline.\70\
 
                     Closure of Beijing LGBT Center
 
  In May 2023, the Beijing LGBT Center, one of China's largest NGOs
 serving the LGBTQ community, announced its immediate closure.\71\ While
 the organization did not explicitly state that it was forcibly closed
 by the government, advocates and observers say that the Center had been
 under ongoing and significant pressure.\72\ The Center's announcement
 attributed the closure to ``force majeure,'' which a reporter described
 as ``a common euphemism for government action.'' \73\ According to an
 expert on LGBTQ issues in China, the organization had been subject to
 multiple crackdowns, including police raids and social media bans.\74\
 In May 2023, members of the LGBTQ community connected with the Center
 described being questioned by the police for participating in LGBTQ-
 related events.\75\ Prior to the Center's May 2023 closure, authorities
 had reportedly constrained the Center from operating, yet prevented it
 from closing down altogether for fear of drawing international
 censure.\76\ The Beijing LGBT Center is the most recent of several
 major groups in China focused on LGBTQ persons to close since 2020.\77\
 Scholar and LGBTQ rights advocate Stephanie Yingyi Wang observed that
 the closure of the Beijing LGBT Center signals a ``new era'' for the
 LGBTQ movement and LGBTQ persons in China, who have been increasingly
 relegated to online-only spaces for community building as physical
 community spaces like Beijing LGBT Center are shuttered.\78\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Status of LGBTQ Persons--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Prominent Cases
 
  This past year, though the court system remains open to hearing
 grievances, several Chinese court cases illustrate the difficulties
 members of the LGBTQ community faced when seeking redress for
 discrimination and legal protection for LGBTQ expression. These
 include:
 
   In January 2023, China-based LGBTQ advocacy and community
   services group Tongyu reported on a discrimination case that gay
   flight attendant Chai Cheng brought against his employer, state-owned
   enterprise China Southern, saying that he had lost his job after
   being publicly outed as a gay man.\79\ According to a recording Chai
   made after the incident, his supervisor asked if he was a member of
   any ``gay social organizations,'' cautioned that such organizations
   ``should not be allowed to gain leverage over our state-owned
   enterprise,'' and expressed concern that Chai's behavior was
   inconsistent with the increased emphasis on morality in official
   propaganda around ``socialist core values.'' \80\ The Shenzhen
   municipality, Guangdong province, court dismissed Chai's
   discrimination lawsuit, saying that China Southern had not violated
   the law by grounding Chai for six months without pay before firing
   him, which Tongyu pointed out reflects China's failure to enact anti-
   discrimination laws protecting LGBTQ persons.\81\
   In February 2023, two students at Tsinghua University filed a
   lawsuit against the Ministry of Education with an intermediate court
   in Beijing, seeking to overturn disciplinary actions the university
   took against them for passing out rainbow flags on campus.\82\ The
   two have appealed through university, municipal, and national-level
   bureaucracies, which have to date upheld Tsinghua's decision.\83\
   They also filed a lawsuit, which the court has not heard, arguing
   that the Ministry of Education was required to hear the case and
   asserting that their educational rights had been violated.\84\
 
                        Entertainment Guidelines
 
  PRC authorities have continued to tighten control over suspected LGBTQ
 representation and expression in media and entertainment. In July 2022,
 the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) held a
 symposium on the production of television series, with NRTA deputy
 director Zhu Yonglei reiterating previous guidance that media producers
 ``firmly resist `sissy man' aesthetics.'' \85\ In a January 2023
 report, the U.S.-based research group Internet Protocol Video Market
 found that Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok, censors pro-LGBTQ
 viewpoints and prohibits ``unhealthy and non-mainstream views on
 marriage and love,'' conforming with content guidelines mandated by the
 PRC government.\86\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Civil Society

Civil Society

    Notes to Chapter 2--Civil Society

    \1\ For a discussion of LGBTQ groups' efforts to operate in the 
diminished ``gray zone'' for civil society in China by rebranding and 
refocusing, and by using China's courts to challenge discrimination 
against the LGBTQ community, see Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 16, 2022), 84-87.
    \2\ Holly Snape, ``Cultivate Aridity and Deprive Them of Air: 
Altering the Approach to Non-State-Approved Social Organisations,'' 
Made in China Journal 6, no. 1 (January-April 2021): 55; Council on 
Foundations, ``Nonprofit Law in China,'' updated August 2022, accessed 
September 12, 2023; Can Cui and Jie Wu, ``Alternative to Civil Society 
Governance: Platform Control over the Third Sector in China,'' Journal 
of Asian Public Policy (August 25, 2022): 5; Emile Dirks and Diana Fu, 
``Governing `Untrustworthy' Civil Society in China,'' China Journal 89, 
no. 1 (January 2023): 15. Social organizations must register with the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs in order to operate legally, register for 
charitable status, or raise funds, so groups that are unable to 
register will likely face difficulty operating and are vulnerable to 
legal sanctions. Furthermore, Emile Dirks and Diana Fu found that, in 
cases where they were able to determine the reason for a ban, failure 
to register was the most common reason for which authorities banned 
social organizations, rendering the organization ``illegal'' and 
subject to government crackdown.
    \3\ The Blue Book on Social Organizations is published yearly by 
the Social Sciences Academic Press (China), an imprint of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and provides analysis of the sector 
over the previous year. Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 
``Guanyu women'' [About us], accessed June 28, 2023; Social Sciences 
Academic Press (China), ``Shehui zuzhi lanpishu--tushu'' [Blue book on 
social organizations--library], accessed June 28, 2023.
    \4\ ``Fabu: `Zhongguo Shehui Zuzhi Baogao (2022)': Zongliang baochi 
zengzhang dan zengsu wei 2008 nian yilai zui di'' [Released ``China 
Social Organizations Report (2022)'': Overall growth maintained, but 
rate of growth is the lowest since 2008], NGO Watch, China Development 
Brief, November 15, 2022.
    \5\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan 
Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the Development of Social 
Organizations], issued October 8, 2021, secs. 3(1), 3(3); Shawn Shieh, 
``The 14th Five Year Plan for Social Organizations and the Future of 
Civil Society in China,'' NGOs in China (blog), January 4, 2022. For 
detailed coverage of the 14th Five-Year Plan for Social Organizations, 
see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report 
(Washington: November 16, 2022), 79-81.
    \6\ Zhongguo Shehui Zuzhi Dongtai (@chinanpogov), ``Minzhengbu 
zhaokai 2023 nian quanguo shehui zhuzhi dengji guanli gongzuo huiyi'' 
[Ministry of Civil Affairs convenes 2023 Nationwide Conference on 
Social Organization Registration and Management Work], WeChat post, 
January 6, 2023, 4:18 a.m.; Ministry of Civil Affairs, `` `Shisi Wu' 
Shehui Zuzhi Fazhan Guihua'' [``14th Five-Year'' Plan for the 
Development of Social Organizations], issued October 8, 2021, sec. 
3(3). The concept of ``optimiz[ing] distribution'' is explained as 
balancing the number and type of organizations working in a region or 
on a particular issue area in section 3(3) of the 14th Five-Year Plan.
    \7\ Zhongguo Shehui Zuzhi Dongtai (@chinanpogov), ``Minzhengbu 
zhaokai 2023 nian quanguo shehui zuzhi dengji guanli gongzuo huiyi'' 
[Ministry of Civil Affairs convenes 2023 Nationwide Conference on 
Social Organization Registration and Management Work], WeChat post, 
January 6, 2023, 4:18 a.m.
    \8\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa `Dang he Guojia Jigou 
Gaige Fang'an'' [Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State 
Council release ``Party and State Institutional Reform Plan''], Xinhua, 
March 16, 2023; Jane Cai, ``China Seeks to Tighten Grip with New Social 
Work Department,'' South China Morning Post, March 17, 2023.
    \9\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa `Dang he Guojia Jigou 
Gaige Fang'an' '' [Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State 
Council release ``Party and State Institutional Reform Plan''], Xinhua, 
March 16, 2023; Jane Cai, ``China Seeks to Tighten Grip with New Social 
Work Department,'' South China Morning Post, March 17, 2023.
    \10\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa `Dang he Guojia Jigou 
Gaige Fangan' '' [Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State 
Council release ``Party and State Institutional Reform Plan''], Xinhua, 
March 16, 2023; Jane Cai, ``China Seeks to Tighten Grip with New Social 
Work Department,'' South China Morning Post, March 17, 2023.
    \11\ Jane Cai, ``China Seeks to Tighten Grip with New Social Work 
Department,'' South China Morning Post, March 17, 2023.
    \12\ ``Minzhengbu: Daji zhengzhi feifa shehui zuzhi zhuanxiang 
xingdong zhuanru changtaihua zhengzhi jucuo lidu bu jian, biaozhun bu 
jiang'' [Ministry of Civil Affairs: The special operation to crackdown 
on and rectify illegal social organizations has been regularized; 
regulatory measures will not be weakened, standards will not be 
dropped], People's Daily, January 26, 2022. The initial campaign was 
laid out in the 2021 ``Circular on eliminating the breeding grounds for 
illegal social organizations.'' Ministry of Civil Affairs, Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection, Central Organization Department, 
et al., ``Guanyu chanchu feifa shehui zuzhi zisheng turang jinghua 
shehui zuzhi shengtai kongjian de tongzhi'' [Circular on eliminating 
the breeding grounds for illegal social organizations and cleansing the 
ecological space for social organizations], March 22, 2021; Holly 
Snape, ``Cultivate Aridity and Deprive Them of Air: Altering the 
Approach to Non-State-Approved Social Organisations,'' Made in China 
Journal 6, no. 1 (January-April 2021): 57--58. For prior coverage of 
the Circular, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 
Annual Report (Washington: March 21, 2022), 231.
    \13\ ``Minzhengbu: Daji zhengzhi feifa shehui zuzhi zhuanxiang 
xingdong zhuanru changtaihua zhengzhi jucuo lidu bu jian, biaozhun bu 
jiang'' [Ministry of Civil Affairs: The special operation to crackdown 
on and rectify illegal social organizations has been regularized; 
regulatory measures will not be weakened, standards will not be 
dropped], People's Daily, January 26, 2022; Ministry of Civil Affairs, 
``Minzhengbu guanyu `Shehui Tuanti Niandu Jiancha Banfa (zhengqiu 
yijian gao)' gongkai zhengqiu yijian de tongzhi'' [Ministry of Civil 
Affairs circular on soliciting public comment regarding the ``Measures 
for the Annual Inspection of Social Groups (draft for the solicitation 
of public comment)''], issued November 11, 2022, art. 12(5).
    \14\ ``Minzhengbu: Daji zhengzhi feifa shehui zuzhi zhuanxiang 
xingdong zhuanru changtaihua zhengzhi jucuo lidu bu jian, biaozhun bu 
jiang'' [Ministry of Civil Affairs: The special operation to crackdown 
on and rectify illegal social organizations has been regularized; 
regulatory measures will not be weakened, standards will not be 
dropped], People's Daily, January 26, 2022; Ministry of Civil Affairs, 
``Minzhengbu guanyu `Shehui Tuanti Niandu Jiancha Banfa (zhengqiu 
yijian gao)' gongkai zhengqiu yijian de tongzhi'' [Ministry of Civil 
Affairs circular on soliciting public comment regarding the ``Measures 
for the Annual Inspection of Social Groups (draft for the solicitation 
of public comment)''], issued November 11, 2022, art. 12(5); Holly 
Snape, ``Cultivate Aridity and Deprive Them of Air: Altering the 
Approach to Non-State-Approved Social Organisations,'' Made in China 
Journal 6, no. 1 (January-April 2021): 55, 58.
    \15\ Emile Dirks and Diana Fu, ``Governing `Untrustworthy' Civil 
Society in China,'' China Journal 89, no. 1 (January 2023): 18.
    \16\ Emile Dirks and Diana Fu, ``Governing `Untrustworthy' Civil 
Society in China,'' China Journal 89, no. 1 (January 2023): 18-19.
    \17\ Emile Dirks and Diana Fu, ``Governing `Untrustworthy' Civil 
Society in China,'' China Journal 89, no. 1 (January 2023): 18-19.
    \18\ Emile Dirks and Diana Fu, ``Governing `Untrustworthy' Civil 
Society in China,'' China Journal 89, no. 1 (January 2023): 20-21.
    \19\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingwai Feizhengfu Zuzhi Jingnei 
Huodong Guanli Fa [PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-
Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland China], passed April 
28, 2016, effective January 1, 2017; Office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China: Newly Adopted Foreign NGO Law 
Should Be Repealed, U.N. Experts Urge,'' May 3, 2016.
    \20\ Bertram Lang and Heike Holbig, ``Civil Society Work in China: 
Trade-Offs and Opportunities for European NGOs,'' GIGA Focus Asia, 
German Institute for Global and Area Studies, 2018; Thomas Lum, ``Human 
Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress,'' 
Congressional Research Service, updated July 17, 2017; Siodhbhra 
Parkin, ``How China Regulates Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations,'' 
ChinaFile, Asia Society, August 27, 2019. Additionally, Parkin points 
out that this lack of clarity has resulted in foreign NGOs exercising 
an abundance of caution in their behavior.
    \21\ ``The Major Questions about China's Foreign NGO Law Are Now 
Settled,'' China NGO Project, ChinaFile, Asia Society, August 8, 2022. 
In the post, the China NGO Project announced that it would be closing, 
since its mission had largely been to help explain and clarify the 
Foreign NGO Law. If, as they posited, any remaining ambiguity was by 
design, further explication would not be possible.
    \22\ Xiao Xue and Chen Xiaochun, ``Guizhi zhili: Zai Hua jingwai 
fei zhengfu zuzhi de guizhi gaige tanxi'' [Regulatory governance: An 
analysis of the regulatory reform of foreign nongovernmental 
organizations in China], Zhongguo Fei Yingli Pinglun [China Nonprofit 
Review] 29, no. 1 (September 2022), reposted on Institute for 
Philanthropy Tsinghua University WeChat, December 20, 2022; ``The Major 
Questions about China's Foreign NGO Law Are Now Settled,'' China NGO 
Project, ChinaFile, Asia Society, August 8, 2022.
    \23\ Ford Foundation, ``China in the World,'' accessed March 20, 
2023; ``Ford Foundation Representative on Supporting Disability 
Inclusion,'' trans. Bi Yidan, China Development Brief, January 17, 
2023; World Vision China, ``About Us: Work Areas,'' accessed April 30, 
2023; Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, ``Our Work: China,'' accessed 
April 30, 2023; US-China Business Council, ``About the US-China 
Business Council,'' accessed April 30, 2023; ``The Major Questions 
about China's Foreign NGO Law Are Now Settled,'' China NGO Project, 
ChinaFile, Asia Society, August 8, 2022.
    \24\ For background on the PRC's promotion of social organizations 
engaged in charity and service provision work in key sectors, see 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report 
(Washington: November 16, 2022), 79-80. For more on past Party and 
government efforts to direct private philanthropy toward PRC 
development goals, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 16, 2022), 84.
    \25\ Can Cui and Jie Wu, ``Alternative to Civil Society Governance: 
Platform Control over the Third Sector in China,'' Journal of Asian 
Public Policy (August 25, 2022): 4, 5, 14.
    \26\ Can Cui and Jie Wu, ``Alternative to Civil Society Governance: 
Platform Control over the Third Sector in China,'' Journal of Asian 
Public Policy (August 25, 2022): 4, 5, 14.
    \27\ China Philanthropy Research Institute, ``2022 nian cishan 
shiye shi da jinzhan yu fazhan qushi'' [Ten big advancements and 
development trends in charitable work in 2022], January 17, 2023; Can 
Cui and Jie Wu, ``Alternative to Civil Society Governance: Platform 
Control over the Third Sector in China,'' Journal of Asian Public 
Policy (August 25, 2022): 10; Zeyi Yang, ``Tencent Dominates Digital 
Donations in China. That's the Problem.,'' Protocol, September 15, 
2021; ``Charity--China Style,'' Beijing Review, June 1, 2023.
    \28\ Zeyi Yang, ``Tenent Dominates Digital Donations in China. 
That's the Problem.,'' Protocol, September 15, 2021; Xinlu Liang, 
``Tencent's China Charity Drive Shows Poorest Provinces Have the 
Smallest Number of Groups Fundraising for Them,'' South China Morning 
Post, October 18, 2021.
    \29\ Dou Feitao, ``99 Gongyi Ri shouguan: Tengxun gongyi jin liu 
cheng mukuan guanzhu xiangcun zhenxing'' [99 Charity Day ends: Nearly 
60 percent of Tencent charity fundraising focuses on rural 
revitalization], Workers' Daily, September 11, 2022.
    \30\ Genevieve Donnellon-May, ``China's Push to Advance Rural 
Revitalization,'' Diplomat, February 12, 2022.
    \31\ Emily Feng, ``How a Deadly Fire in Xinjiang Prompted Protests 
Unseen in China in Three Decades,'' NPR, November 28, 2022; Christian 
Shepherd and Lily Kuo, ``Deadly Xinjiang Fire Stokes Discontent over 
China's Covid Restrictions,'' Washington Post, November 26, 2022; 
``China's Covid-Zero Lockdown in Xinjiang Has Just Hit 100 Days,'' 
Bloomberg, November 16, 2022; ``Harsh Lockdowns Have United the 
Chinese,'' Economist, December 1, 2022.
    \32\ Jia Ao, ``Ten Years under Xi Jinping: The Chilling Effect on 
China's Civil Society Groups,'' trans. Luisetta Mudie, Radio Free Asia, 
October 14, 2022.
    \33\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Free All `Blank 
Paper' Protestors,'' January 20, 2023.
    \34\ Billy Perrigo, ``Why a Blank Sheet of Paper Became a Protest 
Symbol in China,'' Time, December 1, 2022.
    \35\ Shen Lu and Liyan Qi, ``In China, Young Women Become 
Accidental Symbols of Defiance,'' Wall Street Journal, January 25, 
2023.
    \36\ Eduardo Baptista, ``Dating Apps and Telegram: How China 
Protesters Are Defying Authorities,'' Reuters, November 29, 2022.
    \37\ Shen Lu and Liyan Qi, ``In China, Young Women Become 
Accidental Symbols of Defiance,'' Wall Street Journal, January 25, 
2023.
    \38\ Verna Yu, `` `We Just Want to Live in a Normal World': China's 
Young Protesters Speak Out, and Disappear,'' Guardian, February 7, 
2023; Vivian Wang, ``A Protest? A Vigil? In Beijing, Anxious Crowds Are 
Unsure How Far to Go,'' New York Times, November 28, 2022.
    \39\ Eduardo Baptista, ``Dating Apps and Telegram: How China 
Protesters Are Defying Authorities,'' Reuters, November 29, 2022; 
Vivian Wang, ``A Protest? A Vigil? In Beijing, Anxious Crowds Are 
Unsure How Far to Go,'' New York Times, November 28, 2022.
    \40\ Nathan Ruser (@Nrg8000), ``From Monday to Thursday this week, 
our China protest monitor tracked 9 new protests against strict COVID-
measures . . . '' Twitter, December 9, 2022, 7:01 a.m.; Shen Lu and 
Liyan Qi, ``In China, Young Women Become Accidental Symbols of 
Defiance,'' Wall Street Journal, January 25, 2023; Keith Bradsher, 
Chang Che, and Amy Chang Chien, ``China Eases `Zero Covid' Restrictions 
in Victory for Protesters,'' New York Times, December 7, 2022; Kathy 
Huang and Mengyu Han, ``Did China's Street Protests End Harsh COVID 
Policies?,'' Asia Unbound (blog), Council on Foreign Relations, 
December 14, 2022.
    \41\ Emily Feng, ``China's Authorities Are Quietly Rounding Up 
People Who Protested against COVID Rules,'' NPR, January 11, 2023; Zeyi 
Yang, ``How Telegram Groups Can Be Used by Police to Find Protesters,'' 
MIT Technology Review, February 8, 2023; Vivian Wang, ``A Protest? A 
Vigil? In Beijing, Anxious Crowds Are Unsure How Far to Go,'' New York 
Times, November 28, 2022.
    \42\ Shen Lu and Liyan Qi, ``In China, Young Women Become 
Accidental Symbols of Defiance,'' Wall Street Journal, January 25, 
2023; ``A Group of Friends Attended a Vigil in Beijing. Then One by 
One, They Disappeared,'' CNN, January 23, 2023.
    \43\ Emily Feng, ``China's Authorities Are Quietly Rounding Up 
People Who Protested against COVID Rules,'' NPR, January 11, 2023. This 
has also been asserted by several other sources, including a Beijing-
based activist quoted by the Wall Street Journal. Shen Lu and Liyan Qi, 
``In China, Young Women Become Accidental Symbols of Defiance,'' Wall 
Street Journal, January 25, 2023; ``A Group of Friends Attended a Vigil 
in Beijing. Then One by One, They Disappeared,'' CNN, January 23, 2023.
    \44\ Vivian Wang, ``China Sentences Leading Rights Activists to 14 
and 12 Years in Prison,'' New York Times, April 10, 2023. For more 
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 
2005-00199 on Xu Zhiyong and 2013-00307 on Ding Jiaxi.
    \45\ Vivian Wang, ``China Sentences Leading Rights Activists to 14 
and 12 Years in Prison,'' New York Times, April 10, 2023; Eva Pils, 
``From Independent Lawyer Groups to Civic Opposition: The Case of 
China's New Citizen Movement,'' Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 19, 
no. 1 (2017): 132-36.
    \46\ Christian Shepherd, ``China Jails Human Rights Activists for 
Years over Private Gathering,'' Washington Post, April 10, 2023; 
Christian Shepherd, ``They Wanted Rule of Law, So China Tried Them in 
Secret,'' Washington Post, June 24, 2022; Mimi Lau and Guo Rui, 
``Chinese Rights Advocate Xu Zhiyong on Trial for State Subversion amid 
Secrecy and Tight Security,'' South China Morning Post, June 23, 2022.
    \47\ Vivian Wang, ``China Sentences Leading Rights Activists to 14 
and 12 Years in Prison,'' New York Times, April 10, 2023; Keith Zhai 
and Sha Hua, ``China Sentences Human-Rights Activists to Prison for 
Subversion,'' Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2023; Office of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Comment by U.N. Human Rights 
Chief Volker TUrk on Sentencing of Human Rights Defenders in China,'' 
April 10, 2023; Helen Davidson, Amy Hawkins, and Verna Yu, ``Outcry 
over Lengthy Jail Terms Handed to China Human Rights Lawyers,'' 
Guardian, April 11, 2023.
    \48\ Keith Zhai and Sha Hua, ``China Sentences Human-Rights 
Activists to Prison for Subversion,'' Wall Street Journal, April 10, 
2023.
    \49\ Xu Zhiyong, `` `A Democratic China Must Be Realized in Our 
Time, We Cannot Saddle the Next Generation with This Duty'-Xu Zhiyong's 
Court Statement,'' trans. China Change editors, China Change, April 9, 
2023.
    \50\ Ding Jiaxi, ``Authoritarianism Shall Perish--Ding Jiaxi's 
Court Statement,'' trans. China Change editors, China Change, April 9, 
2023.
    \51\ Rights Defense Network, `` `Bai Zhi kangyi yundong' zhong zai 
Beijing zao jubu renyuan zuijin qingkuang tongbao: (2023 nian 1 yue 20 
ri)--Shi yu ren bei qubao huoshi, jiu ren bei pibu'' [Latest situation 
bulletin on those detained as part of the Beijing ``White Paper 
protests'': (January 20, 2023)--Ten people released on bail, nine 
people approved for arrest], January 20, 2023; Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, ``Cao Zhixin,'' March 24, 2023; Shen Lu and Liyan Qi, ``In 
China, Young Women Become Accidental Symbols of Defiance,'' Wall Street 
Journal, January 25, 2023; Shen Lu, ``Chinese Protesters Released after 
Four Months in Jail,'' Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2023. For more 
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 
2023-00035 on Li Yuanjing, 2023-00036 on Li Siqi, 2023-00037 on Zhai 
Dengrui, and 2023-00033 on Cao Zhixin.
    \52\ Rights Defense Network, `` `Bai Zhi kangyi yundong' zhong zai 
Beijing zao jubu renyuan zuijin qingkuang tongbao: (2023 nian 1 yue 20 
ri)--Shi yu ren bei qubao huoshi, jiu ren bei pibu'' [Latest situation 
bulletin on those detained as part of the Beijing ``White Paper 
protests'': (January 20, 2023)--Ten people released on bail, nine 
people approved for arrest], January 20, 2023; Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, ``Cao Zhixin,'' March 24, 2023; Shen Lu and Liyan Qi, ``In 
China, Young Women Become Accidental Symbols of Defiance,'' Wall Street 
Journal, January 25, 2023; Shen Lu, ``Chinese Protesters Released after 
Four Months in Jail,'' Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2023. For more 
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 
2023-00035 on Li Yuanjing, 2023-00036 on Li Siqi, 2023-00037 on Zhai 
Dengrui, and 2023-00033 on Cao Zhixin.
    \53\ Gao Zhensai, ChinaAid Association, ``Kuaixun: Jilin Changchun 
`Yangguang zhi Jia' Guizheng Jiaohui bei zhengshi qudi'' [Breaking 
news: Changchun, Jilin ``Sunshine House'' Reformed Church was 
officially banned], September 16, 2022.
    \54\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Shanxi Linfen Shengyue 
Jiayuan Jiaohui ji Asilan Xuetang bei qudi'' [Shanxi Linfen Covenant 
House Church and Aslan School shut down], November 20, 2022.
    \55\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association ``Xi'an Fengsheng Jiaohui bei 
zhengshi qudi'' [Xi'an Church of Abundance was officially banned], 
August 21, 2022.
    \56\ Rights Defense Network, ``Yin zhichi Wuhan tuixiu lao ren 
kangyi yigai de `baifa yundong' Wuhan xinguan feiyan nan shu, weiquan 
renshi Zhang Hai yijing bei pibu'' [Rights defender and Wuhan COVID-19 
surviving family member Zhang Hai has been detained for supporting 
Wuhan retirees' ``White Hair Movement'' health insurance reform 
protests], April 1, 2023. For more information on Zhang Hai, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00068.
    \57\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhuming renquan lushi Chang Weiping 
jin bei Zhonggong dangju yi dianfu guojia zhengquan zui panchu youqi 
tuxing 3 nian 6 ge yue'' [Famous human rights lawyer Chang Weiping was 
sentenced today by Chinese Communist Party authorities to 3 years and 6 
months in prison for the crime of subversion of state power], June 8, 
2023. For more information on Chang Weiping, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2020-00014.
    \58\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhuming renquan lushi Chang Weiping 
jin bei Zhonggong dangju yi dianfu guojia zhengquan zui panchu youqi 
tuxing 3 nian 6 ge yue'' [Famous human rights lawyer Chang Weiping was 
sentenced today by Chinese Communist Party authorities to 3 years and 6 
months in prison for the crime of subversion of state power], June 8, 
2023.
    \59\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022--China 
(Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),'' March 20, 2023, 76; Human 
Rights Watch, ``China,'' in World Report 2023: Events of 2022, 2023; 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Closure of LGBT NGO Signals 
Disappearing Civic Space in China,'' May 22, 2023; James Palmer, 
``LGBTQ Spaces Are Shrinking in China,'' Foreign Policy, May 16, 2023; 
Zhijun Hu, `` `Don't Say Gay' Is Happening in China Too. But It Can't 
Turn Back the Clock,'' Diplomat, December 3, 2022; Larissa Gao, Carina 
Cheng, Oliver Hu, and Brigitte Pu, ``For China's LGBTQ Community, Safe 
Spaces Are Becoming Harder to Find,'' NBC, June 13, 2023. For 
background on past censorship and suppression of the LGBTQ community in 
China, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual 
Report (Washington: November 16, 2022), 84-87; Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 21, 2022), 
235-37; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report 
(Washington: December 2020), 259-60.
    \60\ United Nations Office in Geneva, ``5th Meeting, 73rd Session, 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)'' [Video 
file], U.N. Web TV, February 15, 2023, 1:06:13, 1:17:02; U.N. Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Third 
Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 
of the Covenant--China, Replies of China to the List of Issues in 
Relation to Its Third Periodic Report, E/C.12/CHN/RQ/3, May 11, 2022, 
para. 12; Nathan Wei, ``China's U.N. Statements about LGBTQ Issues 
Don't Match the Government's Policies at Home,'' China Project, March 
1, 2023; ``China Response to Same-Sex Marriage Request in the U.N., 
Rainbow Awards, accessed March 9, 2023. For past examples of PRC 
representatives' statements in U.N. forums seemingly expressing support 
for LGBTQ rights, see, e.g., Darius Longarino, ``Precarious Progress: 
Advocacy for the Human Rights of LGBT People in China,'' OutRight 
Action International, December 16, 2020, 7-8.
    \61\ United Nations Office in Geneva, ``5th Meeting, 73rd Session, 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)'' [Video 
file], U.N. Web TV, February 15, 2023, 1:06:13, 1:17:02; U.N. Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Third 
Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 
of the Covenant--China, E/C.12/CHN/RQ/3, May 11, 2022, para. 12; Nathan 
Wei, ``China's U.N. Statements about LGBTQ Issues Don't Match the 
Government's Policies at Home,'' China Project, March 1, 2023; ``China 
Response to Same-Sex Marriage Request in the U.N.,'' Rainbow Awards, 
accessed March 9, 2023.
    \62\ United Nations Office in Geneva, ``1978th Meeting, 85th 
Session, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW)'' [Video file], U.N. Web TV, May 12, 2023, 2:07:32; U.N. 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Replies 
of China to the list of issues and questions in relation to its ninth 
periodic report, CEDAW/C/CHN/RQ/9, March 9, 2023; U.N. Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Ninth Periodic Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 18 of the Convention-China, 
CEDAW/C/CHN/9, December 16, 2020; ``Positive and Cliched: How the 
Chinese Government Responded to LBT Issues During Its CEDAW Review,'' 
Rainbow Awards, accessed May 28, 2023.
    \63\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022--China 
(Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),'' March 20, 2023, 76; Yulian 
Lu, ``Domestic Violence among LGBT+People in China: Results from a 
National Court Rulings Review,'' Journal of Family Violence, September 
11, 2023.
    \64\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022--China 
(Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),'' March 20, 2023, 76. See also 
Nathan Wei, ``China's U.N. Statements about LGBTQ Issues Don't Match 
the Government's Policies at Home,'' China Project, March 1, 2023; 
Human Rights Watch, ``China,'' in World Report 2023: Events of 2022, 
2023; ``The Struggle for LGBTQ Labor Rights in China: How a Gay Flight 
Attendant's Lost Discrimination Suit,'' Rainbow Awards, accessed May 
29, 2023; Darius Longarino and Yanhui Peng, ``What a Gay Flight 
Attendant's Lost Discrimination Case Says about LGBTQ Rights in 
China,'' Diplomat, January 24, 2023. For background discussion of 
social and legal discrimination against the LGBTQ community in China 
and lack of relevant legal protections, see Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 16, 
2022), 84-87; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual 
Report (Washington: March 21, 2023), 235-37; Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report (Washington: December 2020), 
259-60.
    \65\ Nathan Wei, ``China's U.N. Statements about LGBTQ Issues Don't 
Match the Government's Policies at Home,'' China Project, March 1, 
2023; Human Rights Watch, ``China,'' in World Report 2023: Events of 
2022, 2023; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on 
the Universal Periodic Review-China, A/HRC/40/6 26, December 26, 2018; 
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review-China (Addendum), A/HRC/40/6/Add.1, February 15, 2019, 
para. 2(28.90). When asked by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights to ``indicate any concrete steps taken to adopt 
comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation or to review the existing 
anti-discrimination laws'' and to ``provide information on the measures 
taken, and their effectiveness, to combat the widespread social stigma 
and discrimination against disadvantaged and marginalized individuals 
and groups, including . . . lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and 
intersex persons'' the PRC responded that ``Popularization of and 
education on science are being carried out to promote a correct 
understanding of sex and gender and appropriate treatment of sexual 
minorities and to eliminate discrimination among the public.'' U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Implementation of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Third Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 
and 17 of the Covenant-China, E/C.12/CHN/RQ/3, May 11, 2022, para. 12;
    \66\ David Rennie and Alice Su, ``Why Are China's LGBT Support 
Groups Closing Down?,'' May 30, 3023, in Drumtower, podcast, Economist, 
16:50.
    \67\ A range of views exist regarding social acceptance of LGBTQ 
persons in China, based on reporting, government policy, and public 
polling over the past ten years. Multiple sources assess that social 
acceptance seemed to have been growing, while acknowledging ongoing 
challenges and government repression. See, e.g., James Palmer, ``LGBTQ 
Spaces Are Shrinking in China,'' Foreign Policy, May 16, 2023; 
``China's LGBTQ+ Community Seize Census Chance to Stand Up and Be 
Counted,'' Guardian, November 26, 2020; Zhijun Hu, `` `Don't Say Gay' 
Is Happening in China Too. But It Can't Turn Back the Clock,'' 
Diplomat, December 3, 2022; ``Gay Culture Gains Increasing Acceptance 
in China,'' Times of India, December 8, 2014.
    \68\ `` `Ah Qiang' Zhijun Hu, Fellow,'' People, Carr Center for 
Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, accessed September 6, 
2023; A Qiang, ``A Qiang tongzhi: Jiang tongxinglian shuo cheng 
`shenghuo Xihua,' rang ren bu'an!'' [Comrade A Qiang: Description of 
homosexuality as ``Westernized lifestyle'' is disturbing], China 
Digital Times, March 15, 2023. It is unclear the extent to which 
growing state disapproval has affected social acceptance. In its 2022 
report, the CECC concluded that, while societal attitudes in China 
toward some LGBTQ issues are trending toward more acceptance, reporting 
indicates a decline in government and institutional support of LGBTQ 
organizations and rights. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 16, 2022), 84.
    \69\ A Qiang, ``A Qiang tongzhi: Jiang tongxinglian shuo cheng 
`shenghuo Xihua,' rang ren bu'an!'' [Comrade A Qiang: Description of 
homosexuality as ``Westernized lifestyle'' is disturbing], China 
Digital Times, March 15, 2023; ``How Nationalism Is Making Life Harder 
for Gay People in China,'' Economist, July 17, 2021; Tim Culpan, 
``China's Crackdown Has a Straight Eye for the Queer Guy,'' Bloomberg, 
September 18, 2021.
    \70\ ``How Nationalism Is Making Life Harder for Gay People in 
China,'' Economist, July 17, 2021; James Palmer, ``LGBTQ Spaces Are 
Shrinking in China,'' Foreign Policy, May 16, 2023; Tim Culpan, 
``China's Crackdown Has a Straight Eye for the Queer Guy,'' Bloomberg, 
September 18, 2021.
    \71\ Beijing LGBT Center (@Beitong2021), ``Ting yun gonggao'' 
[Closure announcement], WeChat post, May 15, 2023; James Palmer, 
``LGBTQ Spaces Are Shrinking in China,'' Foreign Policy, May 16, 2023; 
Larissa Gao, Carina Cheng, Oliver Hu, and Brigitte Pu, ``For China's 
LGBTQ Community, Safe Spaces Are Becoming Harder to Find,'' NBC, June 
13, 2023; Huizhong Wu, ``Beijing LGBT Center Shuttered as Crackdown 
Grows in China,'' Associated Press, May 16, 2023; Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, ``Closure of LGBT NGO Signals Disappearing Civic Space in 
China,'' May 22, 2023; Zhao Yuanyuan, ``Beijing LGBT Center Shutters 
after 15 Years, Citing Uncontrollable Factors,'' China Project, May 16, 
2023.
    \72\ James Palmer, ``LGBTQ Spaces Are Shrinking in China,'' Foreign 
Policy, May 16, 2023.
    \73\ James Palmer, ``LGBTQ Spaces Are Shrinking in China,'' Foreign 
Policy, May 16, 2023.
    \74\ Jinghua Qian (@qianjinghua), ``Beijing LGBT+ Center is 
absolutely pivotal to queer advocacy and social welfare in China and it 
was basically the last major, long-running organisation . . .,'' 
Twitter, May 15, 2023, 9:57 a.m.
    \75\ William Yang, ``Beijing Tongzhi Zhongxin xuanbu ting yun 
Zhongguo LGBTQ yundong hequ hecong?'' [Beijing LGBTQ Center announces 
closure, where does China's LGBTQ movement go from here?], Deutsche 
Welle, May 16, 2023; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Closure of LGBT 
NGO Signals Disappearing Civic Space in China,'' May 22, 2023.
    \76\ William Yang, ``Beijing Tongzhi Zhongxin xuanbu ting yun 
Zhongguo LGBTQ yundong hequ hecong?'' [Beijing LGBTQ Center announces 
closure, where does China's LGBTQ movement go from here?], Deutsche 
Welle, May 16, 2023; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Closure of LGBT 
NGO Signals Disappearing Civic Space in China,'' May 22, 2023.
    \77\ ShanghaiPRIDE, ``The End of the Rainbow,'' August 13, 2020; 
Steven Jiang, `` `End of the Rainbow': Shanghai Pride Shuts Down amid 
Shrinking Space for China's LGBTQ Community,'' CNN, August 16, 2020; 
Huizhong Wu, ``China LGBT Rights Group Shuts Down amid Hostile 
Environment,'' Associated Press, November 5, 2021; Huizhong Wu, 
``Beijing LGBT Center Shuttered as Crackdown Grows in China,'' 
Associated Press, May 16, 2023. Other groups to have closed include 
Shanghai PRIDE, which ceased all operations in 2020, and LGBT Rights 
Advocacy China, a national legal advocacy NGO, which shut down in 2021 
due to government pressure.
    \78\ Stephanie Yingyi Wang, ``Fare Thee Well Beijing LGBT Centre,'' 
Made in China Journal, June 8, 2023; Zhao Yuanyuan, ``Beijing LGBT 
Center Shutters after 15 Years, Citing Uncontrollable Factors,'' China 
Project, May 16, 2023; Larissa Gao, Carina Cheng, Oliver Hu, and 
Brigitte Pu, ``For China's LGBTQ Community, Safe Spaces Are Becoming 
Harder to Find,'' NBC, June 13, 2023.
    \79\ Darius Longarino and Yanhui Peng, ``What a Gay Flight 
Attendant's Lost Discrimination Case Says about LGBTQ Rights in 
China,'' Diplomat, January 24, 2023; Tongyu (@tongyu2005-ii), ``Rang 
falu kanjian duoyuan xingbie: Zhongguo duoyuan xingbie quanyi dashi ji 
(shang)'' [Let the law see gender diversity: Major events in gender 
diversity rights in China in 2022 (part 1)], WeChat post, January 17, 
2023.
    \80\ Darius Longarino and Yanhui Peng, ``What a Gay Flight 
Attendant's Lost Discrimination Case Says about LGBTQ Rights in 
China,'' Diplomat, January 24, 2023; Tongyu (@tongyu2005-ii), ``Rang 
falu kanjian duoyuan xingbie: Zhongguo duoyuan xingbie quanyi dashi ji 
(shang)'' [Let the law see gender diversity: Major events in gender 
diversity rights in China in 2022 (part 1)], WeChat post, January 17, 
2023.
    \81\ Darius Longarino and Yanhui Peng, ``What a Gay Flight 
Attendant's Lost Discrimination Case Says about LGBTQ Rights in 
China,'' Diplomat, January 24, 2023; Tongyu (@tongyu2005-ii), ``Rang 
falu kanjian duoyuan xingbie: 2022 Zhongguo duoyuan xingbie quanyi 
dashi ji (shang)'' [Let the law see gender diversity: Major events in 
gender diversity rights in China in 2022 (part 1)], WeChat post, 
January 17, 2023.
    \82\ Ding Yuan and Darius Longarino, ``2 College Students in China 
Were Disciplined for Giving Out Pride Flags. Can the Law Help Them?,'' 
Diplomat, April 28, 2023.
    \83\ Ding Yuan and Darius Longarino, ``2 College Students in China 
Were Disciplined for Giving Out Pride Flags. Can the Law Help Them?,'' 
Diplomat, April 28, 2023.
    \84\ Ding Yuan and Darius Longarino, ``2 College Students in China 
Were Disciplined for Giving Out Pride Flags. Can the Law Help Them?,'' 
Diplomat, April 28, 2023.
    \85\ Tongyu (@tongyu2005-ii), ``Mei yi ge shengyin dou yinggai bei 
tingjian: 2022 Zhongguo duoyuan xingbie quanyi dashi ji (xia)'' [Every 
voice should be heard: Major events in gender diversity rights in China 
in 2022 (part 2)], WeChat post, January 28, 2023; Zhijun Hu, `` `Don't 
Say Gay' Is Happening in China Too. But It Can't Turn Back the Clock,'' 
Diplomat, December 3, 2022.
    \86\ Allison Hung and Charles Rollet, ``Douyin Bans Pro-LGBT 
Content,'' IPVM, January 3, 2023.

Freedom of Religion

Freedom of Religion

                          Freedom of Religion

                                Findings

         During the 2023 reporting year, the Commission 
        observed ongoing violations of religious freedom by the 
        Chinese Communist Party and government, aimed at 
        increasing state control of believers in both 
        registered and unregistered religious communities.
         The Party and government took steps to 
        implement measures pertaining to religion passed over 
        the last several years, including measures regulating 
        finances, venues, online activity, and religious 
        clergy.
         Authorities required religious groups 
        affiliated with Party-controlled religious associations 
        to participate in educational and ceremonial events 
        surrounding the 20th National Congress of the Chinese 
        Communist Party, designed to reinforce ``sinicization'' 
        among religious bodies.
         The Party and government sought to closely 
        monitor and regulate Taoist and Buddhist groups, 
        ensuring their adherence to the Party line and national 
        agenda. In one instance, authorities used a 
        controversial incident at a Buddhist temple to crack 
        down on religious venues nationwide.
         National Religious Affairs Administration 
        authorities launched searchable databases of approved 
        Buddhist, Taoist, Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic 
        clergy.
         PRC authorities continued to control and 
        forcibly assimilate Hui Muslims throughout the country. 
        According to a joint report released by two 
        nongovernmental organizations, authorities have used 
        counterterrorism policies instituted in Xinjiang to bar 
        a range of Muslim practices, imposed ``sinicization'' 
        to eradicate distinct ethnic and religious 
        characteristics, and have ``scattered'' and relocated 
        Hui communities under the rubric of Xi Jinping's 
        ``poverty alleviation'' campaign.
         The Chinese Communist Party and government 
        have continued their efforts to assert control over 
        Catholic leadership, community life, and religious 
        practice, installing two bishops in contravention of 
        the 2018 Sino-Vatican agreement and accelerating the 
        integration of the church in Hong Kong with the PRC-
        based, state-sponsored Catholic Patriotic Association 
        and its Party-directed ideology.
         PRC authorities continued to violate the 
        religious freedom of Protestants, engaging in pressure 
        campaigns against unregistered churches by detaining 
        church leaders and targeting several influential 
        ``house'' church networks, renewing their campaign 
        against Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province's Early 
        Rain Covenant Church.
         Chinese authorities continued to prosecute 
        Falun Gong practitioners under Article 300 of the PRC 
        Criminal Law, which criminalizes ``organizing and using 
        a cult to undermine implementation of the law.'' In 
        December 2022, Falun Gong practitioner and radio host 
        Pang Xun died after authorities tortured him while in 
        custody.
         The Party's Anti-Cult Association updated 
        their list of xiejiao (a historical term usually 
        translated as ``evil cults'' or ``heretical 
        teachings''), a tool it uses to rank groups according 
        to threat level and communicate its enforcement 
        priorities.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Call on the Chinese government to guarantee freedom 
        of religion to all citizens in accordance with its 
        international human rights obligations. Stress to PRC 
        authorities that freedom of religion includes the right 
        to freely adopt beliefs and practice one's religion 
        without government interference.
          Call for the release of religious leaders and 
        practitioners whom Chinese authorities confined, 
        detained, or imprisoned for peacefully pursuing their 
        religious beliefs, including lay Buddhist Wu Aping; 
        Muslim imam Ma Zichang; Catholic bishop Augustine Cui 
        Tai; Protestant pastors Lian Changnian, Li Jie, and Han 
        Xiaodong; and Falun Gong practitioners Zhou Deyong and 
        Peng Shuming, as well as those confined, detained, or 
        imprisoned in connection with their association with 
        those citizens. The Administration should use existing 
        laws to hold accountable Chinese government officials 
        and others complicit in severe religious freedom 
        restrictions, including the sanctions available in the 
        Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 
        (Public Law No. 114-328) and the International 
        Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (Public Law No. 105-292). 
        Ensure that conditions related to religious freedom are 
        considered when negotiating trade agreements.
          Call on the Chinese government to fully implement 
        accepted recommendations from the November 2018 session 
        of the U.N. Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic 
        Review, including: taking necessary measures to ensure 
        that the rights to freedom of religion and to religious 
        culture and expression are fully observed and 
        protected; cooperating with the U.N. human rights 
        system, specifically U.N. special procedures mandate 
        holders; taking steps to ensure that lawyers working to 
        advance religious rights can practice their profession 
        freely and promptly investigating allegations of 
        violence and intimidation impeding their work; and 
        considering possible revisions to legislation and 
        administrative rules to provide better protection of 
        freedom of religion.
          Call on the Chinese government to repeal Article 300 
        of the PRC Criminal Law, which criminalizes 
        ``organizing and using a cult to undermine 
        implementation of the law'' and Article 27 of the PRC 
        Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which 
        provides for detention or fines for organizing or 
        inciting others to engage in ``cult activities'' and 
        for using a ``cult'' or the ``guise of religion'' to 
        ``disturb social order'' or to harm others' health.

Freedom of Religion

Freedom of Religion

                          Freedom of Religion

                              Introduction

    During the 2023 reporting year, the Commission observed 
ongoing violations of religious freedom by the Chinese 
Communist Party and government, aimed at increasing control of 
believers in both registered and unregistered communities.\1\ 
Authorities implemented a series of measures issued over the 
past several years, targeting the finances, funding structures, 
leadership, use of venues, online activities and content, and 
doctrinal autonomy of religious institutions.\2\ The Party and 
government also used the occasion of the 20th National Congress 
of the Chinese Communist Party to ensure ideological conformity 
of religious groups with the policy of ``sinicization'' 
(zhongguohua), defined by Xi Jinping in his speech at the 20th 
Party Congress as ``actively guid[ing] religion to adapt to 
socialist society.'' \3\ Religious practitioners, communities, 
and institutions faced increased surveillance as the National 
Religious Affairs Administration (NRAA) rolled out several 
major digital oversight and enforcement initiatives.

           International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom

    Both Chinese and international law guarantee religious 
freedom. Under international law, freedom of religion or belief 
encompasses both the right to form, hold, and change 
convictions, beliefs, and religions--which cannot be 
restricted--and the right to outwardly manifest those beliefs, 
which can be limited by certain justifications.\4\ These 
principles are codified in various international instruments, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).\5\ Article 36 of China's Constitution guarantees 
citizens ``freedom of religious belief'' and protection for 
``normal religious activities.'' \6\ However, by leaving terms 
such as ``normal'' undefined, China's Constitution fails to 
protect the same range of beliefs and outward manifestations as 
is recognized under international law.\7\ Nevertheless, China's 
Constitution and other legal provisions\8\ align with the ICCPR 
in prohibiting discrimination based on religion\9\ and loosely 
parallel the ICCPR's prohibition on coercion\10\ by forbidding 
groups or individuals from compelling citizens to believe or 
not believe in any religion.\11\ China's Constitution prohibits 
``making use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt 
social order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with 
the educational system of the State.'' \12\

        Regulations and Policies Pertaining to Religious Freedom

    Since 2022, the Party and government have taken steps to 
draft and implement measures pertaining to religion, bolstering 
their control over religious believers in both registered and 
unregistered communities. These include:

         Measures for the Financial Management of 
        Venues for Religious Activities (2022).\13\ These 
        measures bring religious venues' finances more directly 
        under the joint oversight of the Ministry of Finance 
        and the NRAA.\14\ They require that venues provide all 
        donors with a numbered receipt issued by the provincial 
        religious affairs bureau.\15\ According to one pastor, 
        this allows the state to more closely supervise foreign 
        donations and further weakens the independence of 
        local, government-affiliated churches, which previously 
        enjoyed some level of financial autonomy.\16\
         Measures for the Administration of Internet 
        Religious Information Services (2022).\17\ In July 
        2022, provincial authorities in multiple provinces 
        reported holding trainings for the implementation of 
        the measures.\18\ In Guangdong province, authorities 
        announced that hundreds of candidates had qualified as 
        auditors and would be tasked with monitoring and 
        licensing religious content in accordance with the 
        measures.\19\ Providers of online religious content and 
        internet users attempting to access such content or to 
        openly discuss religion reported reduced freedom to 
        operate in light of the measures.\20\ In one instance, 
        the China-based Catholic mobile application CathAssist 
        announced that it would be shutting down operations 
        indefinitely after repeatedly attempting to procure a 
        license under the new requirements.\21\ Several 
        religious websites in China reported censorship of 
        certain religious words on WeChat, including the words 
        ``Christ,'' ``church,'' and ``Bible.'' \22\
         Measures for the Administration of Religious 
        Personnel (2021).\23\ In February 2023, the NRAA rolled 
        out a database of ``approved'' Buddhist and Taoist 
        clergy, in a first step toward developing similar 
        databases for all religious groups in compliance with 
        the Measures for the Administration of Religious 
        Personnel (2021).\24\ In May 2023, the NRAA announced 
        the rollout of databases for Muslim, Protestant, and 
        Catholic clergy.\25\
         Measures for the Management of Venues for 
        Religious Activities. In March 2023, the NRAA released 
        a draft for comment of new measures governing sites for 
        religious activity that would heavily regulate the use, 
        funding, personnel, accepted activities, and other 
        aspects of religious sites, in effect covering ``all 
        aspects'' of religious life, according to one advocacy 
        group.\26\ When adopted, they will replace the 2005 
        measures by the same name.\27\ The draft version of the 
        new measures includes additional ideological content 
        and ideological requirements for religious sites, 
        including a requirement that sites establish an 
        education system and regularly organize study sessions 
        for personnel on Party guidelines, PRC law, and Chinese 
        traditional culture, among other topics.\28\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Sinicization of Religious Groups and the 20th Party Congress
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, Chinese Communist Party
 authorities required religious groups affiliated with Party-controlled
 religious associations to participate in educational and ceremonial
 events surrounding the 20th Party Congress that were designed to
 reinforce ``sinicization'' among religious bodies. Taoist and Buddhist
 state-affiliated institutions held trainings to study the ``spirit of
 the 20th Party Congress,'' and official Islamic and Protestant
 religious communities organized joint viewings of the event.\29\
 Religious associations also produced reports for the 20th Party
 Congress, with the chairman of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement--the
 organization governing Protestant churches in China--publishing a
 lengthy article on the status of the ``sinicization'' of religion in
 China and announcing the formulation of a new Five-Year Plan for the
 sinicization of Christianity.\30\ Members of unregistered and sensitive
 religious groups faced increased repression during the lead-up to the
 20th Party Congress.\31\ According to Radio Free Asia and ChinaAid
 Association, in the months preceding the Congress, authorities
 escalated ``stability maintenance'' efforts, for example harassing
 clergy and members of Shouwang Church in Beijing municipality and Early
 Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province.\32\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Buddhism (Non-Tibetan) and Taoism

    The Chinese Communist Party and government's relationship 
with Buddhist and Taoist groups has continued to reflect the 
tension between appropriation of these groups by PRC leadership 
and coercive control,\33\ both of which infringe on the ability 
of these religious groups to exercise their freedom of religion 
in accordance with international standards.\34\ Consistent with 
the Party and central government's ``sinicization'' policy, PRC 
officials have embraced Taoist and Buddhist groups that are 
perceived as serving the Party's agenda, closely regulating 
them to ensure they continue to do so.\35\ To this end, in 
February 2023, Xinhua reported that the Buddhist Association of 
China (BCA) and the Taoist Association of China had launched a 
searchable online database of Buddhist and Taoist religious 
personnel indicating who is permitted to participate in state-
sanctioned religious activities, citing concerns about 
``fraud.'' \36\ One Buddhist monk said that, because he did not 
appear in the database, he would not be able to register with a 
temple or participate in any religious activities.\37\
    PRC authorities have also continued to seek closer 
alignment of Buddhist and Taoist religious identity with the 
Party and government's conception of China's national identity, 
emphasizing the Chinese character of these faiths and guarding 
against ``outside influence.'' Consequently, the Party and 
government have closely circumscribed the ``eastward movement'' 
of Tibetan Buddhism outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region and 
Tibetan areas, limiting the number of Han Chinese Buddhists 
studying at Tibetan Buddhist institutions and largely 
prohibiting Tibetan Buddhists from preaching outside of Tibetan 
areas.\38\ In Yunfu municipality, Guangdong province, local BCA 
officials issued a notice calling on all Buddhist temples, 
institutions, and religious sites to ``resolutely resist'' the 
``illegal'' preaching of Tibetan monks.\39\ According to the 
notice, the unauthorized spread of Tibetan Buddhism outside of 
Tibetan areas poses a threat to believers, families, property, 
and ``social harmony'' and impedes the growth of non-Tibetan 
schools of Buddhism in the region.\40\ [For information on 
religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists, see Chapter 17--
Tibet.]
    In an apparent effort to maintain the patriotic integrity 
of Chinese Buddhism and respond to public outcry, public 
security officers in Xuanwu district, Nanjing municipality, 
Jiangsu province, raided Nanjing's Xuanzang Temple after 
reports emerged on social media that the temple housed memorial 
tablets dedicated to five Japanese war criminals and an 
American missionary known for protecting Chinese refugees in 
the city during the Japanese occupation.\41\ Following the 
raid, Xuanwu public security officials criminally detained lay 
Buddhist Wu Aping, who paid for the tablets in an attempt to 
``resolve grievances'' and ``relieve suffering,'' according to 
her televised confession.\42\ Following the incident, the BCA 
and the National Religious Affairs Administration launched a 
nationwide campaign to ``rectify'' Buddhist temples, requiring 
that Buddhist institutions cultivate the ``correct'' 
perspective on national security, history, culture, national 
identity, and religion, with ``zero tolerance of any behavior 
jeopardizing national interests and hurting national 
feelings,'' leading some observers to posit that the incident 
is being used as a pretext for tightening ideological oversight 
of Buddhism at the national level.\43\

                                 Islam 

    This past year, PRC authorities continued to exert control 
over and forcibly assimilate Hui Muslims throughout the 
country.\44\ According to a joint report by Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders (CHRD) and Hope Umbrella International 
Foundation (HUIF) released in March 2023, the Chinese Communist 
Party and government have taken a three-pronged approach to 
targeting the Hui Muslim minority group: using counterterrorism 
policies instituted under the ``strike hard'' campaign in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to bar and sanction a range 
of Muslim religious practices; imposing ``sinicization'' 
policies to eliminate expressions of cultural and religious 
distinctiveness and promote assimilation; and using the pretext 
of Xi Jinping's flagship ``poverty alleviation'' program to 
``scatter'' and ``relocate'' Hui communities through mass 
resettlement projects.\45\ These resettlement projects--many of 
which originated prior to Xi but have since been adopted as 
``poverty alleviation''--have disproportionately targeted Hui 
Muslims throughout the country.\46\ For example, since 1983, 
authorities in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region have used an 
``ecological migration'' program to relocate Hui Muslims, often 
to other minority areas, supposedly for purposes of 
environmental protection, poverty alleviation, and ``ethnic 
unity,'' though scholars have maintained that the stated 
objectives are cover for ``dispersing and dislocating ethnic 
minority groups.'' \47\ As recently as 2020, government-led 
``labor transfer'' programs have targeted Hui Muslims by 
recruiting them for job opportunities in outside regions and 
provinces, sometimes citing explicitly political reasons, such 
as ``social stability'' and national unity.\48\ CHRD and HUIF 
have also reported that Hui Muslim participants in government-
led labor transfer programs have been unable to practice their 
religion due to lack of religious accommodations in areas where 
they have been relocated.\49\
    The Commission also observed the continued demolition of 
``Arab-style'' domes and minarets on mosques, in one case 
leading to large-scale protests: \50\
         In August 2022, authorities in Fangshan 
        district, Beijing municipality, began ``rectification'' 
        of Doudian Mosque, built in 2013 and the largest in 
        northern China, to remove Arabic language and elements 
        of ``Arab style'' from the mosque's building.\51\ One 
        Beijing-based scholar of religion, Xi Wuyi, described 
        the decision to ``sinicize'' Doudian Mosque as 
        symbolically significant, because it demonstrates ``the 
        capital persisting in the orderly advancement of the 
        sinicization of religion in China.'' \52\
         Authorities in Zhaotong municipality, Yunnan 
        province, also began ``rectification'' work on Zhaotong 
        East Mosque, according to photographs provided to 
        Bitter Winter, an online magazine that reports 
        primarily on religious repression in China, and 
        published in September 2022.\53\ Zhaotong municipality 
        has been the site of previous demolitions: according to 
        religious freedom organization Christian Solidarity 
        Worldwide, only three out of more than 100 local 
        mosques retained their domes and minarets, as officials 
        had removed them from nearly all of the mosques 
        there.\54\
         In May 2023, authorities in Nagu township, 
        Tonghai county, Yuxi municipality, Yunnan, attempted to 
        ``sinicize'' the historic Najiaying Mosque, by removing 
        its ``Arab-style'' dome and minarets.\55\ According to 
        witness reports, thousands of residents of the 
        majority-Muslim township gathered at the mosque to 
        protest the removals after construction cranes were 
        seen entering the mosque's courtyard.\56\ Authorities 
        also deployed hundreds of police in riot gear and a 
        People's Liberation Army unit to the site.\57\ When 
        police forcibly prevented residents from entering the 
        mosque for noontime prayer, several protesters 
        reportedly threw bricks and bottles at them.\58\ One 
        local source told CNN that authorities detained dozens 
        of protesters.\59\ U.S.-based Hui rights advocate Ma Ju 
        said that Imam Ma Zichang, who led protesters in prayer 
        outside the mosque, was among those detained.\60\ 
        Authorities had previously announced plans to conduct a 
        similar ``rectification'' of the culturally and 
        historically significant Grand Mosque in Shadian 
        township, Gejiu city, Honghe Hani and Yi Autonomous 
        Prefecture, Yunnan, in June 2023.\61\ [For more on the 
        Yunnan mosque demolition protests, see Chapter 7--
        Ethnic Minority Rights.]
[For more information on Uyghur, Hui, and other Muslims in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and other locations, see 
Chapter 7--Ethnic Minority Rights and Chapter 18--Xinjiang.]

                         Christianity--Catholic

               COMPLIANCE WITH THE SINO-VATICAN AGREEMENT

    The Chinese Communist Party and government have continued 
their efforts to assert control over Chinese Catholic 
leadership, community life, and religious practice.\62\ The 
Sino-Vatican Agreement of 2018 established a mechanism for 
appointing bishops who are in ``full communion'' with the pope 
and ``recognized by authorities of the People's Republic of 
China.'' \63\ According to one expert, the original agreement 
allowed for a possible two-year extension of the agreement ``to 
be followed by a formal agreement or its suspension.'' \64\ 
After first extending the agreement in 2020, the Holy See 
renewed it on a provisional basis in 2022, a ``clear sign that 
. . . there is a desire to continue the dialogue but also a 
certain dissatisfaction with the results.'' \65\
    In November 2022, the Bishops' Conference of the Catholic 
Church in China (BCCCC) ``installed'' Bishop Peng Weizhao--at 
the time serving as Holy See-recognized bishop of the diocese 
of Yujiang in Jiangxi province, a historic diocese not 
recognized by Chinese authorities--as the ``auxiliary bishop of 
Jiangxi,'' a designation not recognized by the Holy See.\66\ 
The Holy See characterized the action as not being in 
conformity with the 2018 Agreement.\67\ The Holy See also cited 
reports that the appointment followed ``prolonged and intense 
pressure by the local authorities.'' \68\ On April 3, 2023, 
AsiaNews reported that a new bishop would be installed in the 
diocese of Shanghai, considered China's most important and the 
destination for a popular Chinese Catholic pilgrimage.\69\ On 
April 4, the BCCCC held a ceremony installing Monsignor Shen 
Bin as bishop of Shanghai, which the Holy See said it learned 
of after the event had taken place, and then only from media 
reports.\70\ At the installation, Shen said that he would 
continue to promote the tradition of ``loving the country and 
loving religion,'' persevere in ``independence and self-
governance,'' and pursue the ``sinicization'' of 
Catholicism.\71\

            COERCION AND REPRESSION OF CATHOLIC COMMUNITIES

    During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, officials 
exerted pressure on both registered and unregistered Catholic 
communities, taking coercive action against churches and 
detaining members of the clergy. In Baoding municipality, Hebei 
province, authorities have targeted the Baoding diocese, home 
to one of the oldest and largest unregistered communities in 
China, forcibly detaining or disappearing at least 10 priests 
since April 2022.\72\ One of the priests detained in 2022 and 
later released reported that authorities subjected the men to a 
program of political indoctrination, after which several 
consented to join the official church, while authorities have 
kept those who did not consent under surveillance and prevented 
them from exercising their pastoral ministry roles.\73\ 
Authorities also demolished at least two unregistered Catholic 
properties, including a church in Luancheng district, 
Shijiazhuang municipality, Hebei, and a residence for nuns and 
priests in Datong municipality, Shanxi province.\74\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Control of the Catholic Church in Hong Kong
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  This past year, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region authorities
 accelerated efforts to more closely align the Roman Catholic Church in
 Hong Kong with the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA). In July 2022,
 Reuters reported that the Holy See's unofficial envoy in Hong Kong had
 warned Catholic missions in Hong Kong to prepare for a rollback of
 religious freedom protections and the possible institution of mainland-
 like restrictions on religious bodies.\75\ Over the ensuing months,
 Hong Kong Catholic bishops participated in two meetings with CPA
 counterparts.\76\ In November 2022, the CPA, the Bishops' Conference of
 the Catholic Church in China (BCCCC), and the Holy Spirit Study Centre
 of the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong jointly organized an online
 exchange focused on the ``sinicization'' of Catholicism, with BCCCC
 Chair Shen Bin presiding over the opening of the exchange and Hong Kong
 bishop emeritus Cardinal John Tong offering the opening prayer and
 delivering a speech.\77\ In April 2023, Hong Kong bishop Stephen Chow
 visited Beijing municipality on a trip that was the ``first of its
 kind'' for a Hong Kong bishop since 1994.\78\ At a prayer service in
 Beijing, Bishop Chow said that Hong Kong Catholics should ``love the
 country and the church.'' \79\ [For more information on the suppression
 of civil society in Hong Kong, see Chapter 19--Hong Kong and Macau.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        Christianity--Protestant

    During this reporting year, PRC authorities continued to 
violate the religious freedom of Protestants, engaging in 
pressure campaigns against unregistered churches by detaining 
their leaders and surveilling their activities and 
participants.\80\ Local authorities also continued to use the 
charge of ``fraud'' to target several influential unregistered 
or ``house'' churches and networks, indicating that such 
churches are understood by Chinese Communist Party and 
government officials to constitute an ongoing threat.\81\ 
Widespread violations of Protestants' freedom of religion 
included:

     Renewed crackdown on Early Rain Covenant Church.

          In August 2022, Wuhou district, Chengdu municipality, 
        Sichuan province, public security officers raided and 
        forcibly dispersed a Sunday worship gathering of Early 
        Rain Covenant Church (ERCC) members at a tea house in 
        Wuhou, registering attendees' names and 
        information.\82\ Authorities took into custody writer 
        Xing Hongwei, known as A Xin, when he refused to 
        register, criminally detaining him on suspicion of 
        assaulting a police officer, though ERCC maintains that 
        Xing did not initiate the physical altercation that 
        ensued.\83\
          Over the past year, at least four ERCC leaders and 
        members reported that property managers at their places 
        of residence attempted to forcibly evict them and their 
        families after pressure from local authorities because 
        of their connection with the church.\84\
          In late February 2023, prior to the annual meetings 
        of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's 
        Political Consultative Conference in March, authorities 
        in Chengdu began to harass ERCC leaders and members, in 
        an effort to deter them from holding Sunday worship 
        services.\85\ When the church continued to hold 
        services, Jintang county public security and Bureau of 
        Ethnic and Religious Affairs personnel raided the 
        church on March 12, taking into custody pastor Wu 
        Wuqing and at least six other church leaders, with 
        police beating deacon Jia Xuewei.\86\ Authorities 
        released all seven the same day but several days later 
        administratively detained pastor Ding Shuqi and member 
        Shu Qiong.\87\

     Prominent ``house'' church networks targeted.
          In August 2022, public security officers in Yaodu 
        district, Linfen municipality, Shanxi province took 
        into custody Linfen Covenant Church pastors Li Jie and 
        Han Xiaodong, and Li's wife, Li Shanshan, placing them 
        under ``residential surveillance at a designated 
        location'' (RSDL, a form of secret detention), later 
        criminally detaining Li Jie and Han Xiaodong on 
        suspicion of ``fraud.'' \88\ Authorities detained two 
        other Linfen Covenant coworkers and banned the church 
        and its associated school as ``illegal social 
        organizations.'' \89\ [For more information on 
        ``illegal social organizations'' and being designated 
        as such, see Chapter 2--Civil Society--Regulations and 
        Policy Pertaining to Civil Society--Social 
        Organizations Deemed ``Illegal.'']
          In August 2022, Baoqiao district, Xi'an municipality, 
        Shaanxi province, public security officers raided the 
        residences of Xi'an Church of Abundance pastors Lian 
        Changnian and Lian Xuliang, placing them under RSDL for 
        six months along with coworker Fu Juan, during which 
        time they report that they were tortured and physically 
        abused.\90\ In March 2023, they were arrested on 
        suspicion of ``fraud.'' \91\

     Digital surveillance and control of religion.
          This past year, as part of the Henan Bureau of Ethnic 
        and Religious Affairs' ``Smart Religion'' program, 
        Henan province launched a mobile phone application that 
        believers must use to register in advance of attending 
        a religious service.\92\

                               Falun Gong

    Chinese authorities continued to crack down on the practice 
and propagation of Falun Gong, prosecuting Falun Gong 
practitioners under Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law, which 
criminalizes ``organizing and using a cult to undermine 
implementation of the law.'' \93\ The Falun Gong-affiliated 
website Minghui reported the deaths of dozens of Falun Gong 
practitioners due to mistreatment while in custody and hundreds 
of cases of Falun Gong practitioners being sentenced by 
authorities, apparently for their connection with Falun 
Gong.\94\ In its submission for the review of China's 
compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, the Dui Hua Foundation noted 
that women are disproportionately represented in criminal cases 
involving ``unorthodox religious groups'' and that most of 
these women belong to Falun Gong and the Church of Almighty God 
(see Other Religious Communities in this chapter).\95\ 
Moreover, Dui Hua reports that Chinese authorities have meted 
out ``hefty prison sentences'' to both male and female Falun 
Gong practitioners in ``key roles.'' \96\
    Chinese public security officials have continued to subject 
Falun Gong practitioners to torture, physical abuse, and 
mistreatment while in custody.\97\ Examples from this reporting 
year include:
         In February 2023, a Twitter user identifying 
        himself as a friend of Sichuan Radio and Television 
        host and Falun Gong practitioner Pang Xun asserted that 
        authorities had beaten Pang to death while in custody, 
        posting a video of Pang's dead body.\98\ Public 
        security officials in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan 
        province, initially detained Pang in 2020 in connection 
        with his alleged dissemination of Falun Gong leaflets, 
        sentencing him to five years in prison for ``organizing 
        and using a cult to undermine implementation of the 
        law.'' \99\
         In December 2022, Minghui reported that the 
        Taonan Municipal People's Court in Taonan city, 
        Baicheng municipality, Jilin province, had sentenced 
        Chinese traditional medicine doctor and Falun Gong 
        practitioner Peng Shuming to five years in prison for 
        ``organizing and using a cult to undermine 
        implementation of the law.'' \100\ Taonan Public 
        Security Bureau (PSB) Detention Center officials 
        physically abused Peng while in custody.\101\ Minghui 
        also reports that local authorities interfered with 
        Peng's lawyer's efforts to defend his client.\102\

                      Other Religious Communities

         According to a report produced by the Church 
        of Almighty God, the PRC central government has 
        continued to crack down on this new religious movement 
        as part of a three-year campaign launched in 2020, 
        sentencing over one thousand practitioners to prison 
        terms of over three years in 2022.\103\
         This past year, the Chinese Communist Party's 
        Anti-Cult Association published an updated list of 
        xiejiao, a historical term usually translated as ``evil 
        cults'' or ``heretical teachings'' and used by the 
        Party to refer to new religious movements it perceives 
        as threatening.\104\ The list includes Falun Gong, the 
        Church of Almighty God, the Association of Disciples, 
        the Shouters, and the Unification Church among its top 
        ten entries.\105\ One expert on the regulation of new 
        religious movements in China says that the Anti-Cult 
        Association lists xiejiao in order of perceived threat 
        level.\106\

Freedom of Religion

Freedom of Religion

    Notes to Chapter 3--Freedom of Religion

    \1\ ``Registered'' religious communities refer to religious 
communities, institutions, or venues that register with one of the 
state-affiliated patriotic religious associations established to 
oversee religion in China: the Buddhist Association of China, the 
Chinese Taoist Association, the Chinese Christian Council, the Catholic 
Patriotic Association, the Islamic Association of China, and the Three-
Self Patriotic Movement. ``Unregistered'' communities refer to those 
communities, institutions, or venues that opt not to register with the 
state-affiliated oversight bodies, either on the basis of religious 
convictions, because registration may be too onerous, or for other 
reasons. For more information on the use, practice, and significance of 
registration for religious groups in China, see Sarah Cook, Freedom 
House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, 
and Resistance under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017, 15, 32-33, 53; Office 
of International Religious Freedom, U.S. Department of State, ``2022 
Report on International Religious Freedom: China (Includes Hong Kong, 
Macau, Tibet, and Xinjiang),'' May 15, 2023; Eleanor Albert and Lindsay 
Maizland, ``Religion in China,'' Council on Foreign Relations, updated 
September 25, 2020.
    \2\ National Religious Affairs Administration and Ministry of 
Finance, Zongjiao Huodong Changsuo Caiwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the 
Financial Management of Venues for Religious Activities], passed 
January 28, 2022, effective June 1, 2022; National Religious Affairs 
Administration, Zongjiao Jiaozhi Renyuan Guanli Banfa [Measures for the 
Administration of Religious Personnel], effective May 1, 2021; National 
Religious Affairs Administration et al., Hulianwang Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu 
Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious 
Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, effective March 1, 
2022; National Religious Affairs Administration, Guojia Zongjiao Shiwu 
Ju guanyu ``Zongjiao Huodong Changsuo Guanli Banfa (zhengqiu yijian 
gao)'' gongkai zhengqiu yijian de tongzhi [Notice of solicitation of 
public comments on the National Religious Affairs Administration 
``Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activities (draft 
for public comment)''], reprinted in China Christian Council and Three-
Self Patriotic Movement Online, March 28, 2023.
    \3\ Xi Jinping, ``Gaoju Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida qizhi, wei 
quanmian jianshe shehui zhuyi xiandaihua guojia er tuanjie fendou--zai 
Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Ershi ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui shang de 
baogao'' [Raise high the great banner of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, wage a united struggle to comprehensively establish a 
modern socialist country--report at the 20th National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party], October 16, 2022, reprinted in Xinhua, 
October 25, 2022.
    \4\ Paul M. Taylor, Freedom of Religion: U.N. and European Human 
Rights Law and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
19, 24, 203-4.
    \5\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, 
art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 18. Article 18 of the ICCPR 
upholds a person's right to ``have or adopt a religion or belief'' and 
the ``freedom . . . to manifest [that] religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching.'' Article 18 also prohibits coercion 
that impairs an individual's freedom to freely hold or adopt a religion 
or belief. See also Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted 
and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly resolution 36/55 of November 
25, 1981. China has signed and stated its intent to ratify the ICCPR, 
which obligates China to refrain in good faith from acts that would 
defeat the treaty's purpose. State Council Information Office, ``Guojia 
Renquan Xingdong Jihua (2016-2020 Nian)'' [National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2016-2020)], September 29, 2016, sec. 5; United Nations 
Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, adopted May 23, 1969, entry into force January 27, 1980, art. 
18.
    \6\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xian Fa [PRC Constitution], passed 
and effective December 4, 1982, amended March 11, 2018, art. 36.
    \7\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xian Fa [PRC Constitution], passed 
and effective December 4, 1982, amended March 11, 2018, art. 36; Liu 
Peng, ``A Crisis of Faith,'' China Security 4, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 30.
    \8\ See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xian Fa [PRC 
Constitution], passed and effective December 4, 1982, amended March 11, 
2018, art. 36; State Council, Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli [Regulations on 
Religious Affairs], issued November 30, 2004, amended June 14, 2017, 
effective February 1, 2018, art. 2; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong 
Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed July 5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, 
amended December 29, 2018, art. 12.
    \9\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 26.
    \10\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 18(2).
    \11\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xian Fa [PRC Constitution], passed 
and effective December 4, 1982, amended March 11, 2018, art. 36; State 
Council, Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli [Regulations on Religious Affairs], 
issued November 30, 2004, amended June 14, 2017, effective February 1, 
2018, art. 2.
    \12\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xian Fa [PRC Constitution], passed 
and effective December 4, 1982, amended March 11, 2018, art. 36; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 18; U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or 
Religion), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, July 30, 1993, para. 8. The ICCPR 
does allow State Parties to restrict outward manifestations of religion 
or belief, but such restrictions must be ``prescribed by law and . . . 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.''
    \13\ National Religious Affairs Administration and Ministry of 
Finance, Zongjiao Huodong Changsuo Caiwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the 
Financial Management of Venues for Religious Activities], passed 
January 28, 2022, effective June 1, 2022.
    \14\ National Religious Affairs Administration and Ministry of 
Finance, Zongjiao Huodong Changsuo Caiwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the 
Financial Management of Venues for Religious Activities], passed 
January 28, 2022, effective June 1, 2022, art. 54; ``Guojia Zongjiao 
Shiwu Ju fuzeren jiu `Zongjiao Huodong Changsuo Caiwu Guanli Banfa' da 
jizhe wen'' [Responsible person from the National Religious Affairs 
Administration responds to reporters' questions about the ``Measures 
for the Financial Management of Venues for Religious Activities''], 
United Front Work Department News, April 7, 2022; ChinaAid Association, 
``ChinaAid's 2022 Annual Persecution Report,'' February 13, 2023, 12; 
``Communist Party Grabs Religious Funding,'' AsiaNews, April 15, 2022; 
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Monasteries Face Tighter 
Control under New Religious Financial Management Measures,'' June 1, 
2022.
    \15\ National Religious Affairs Administration and Ministry of 
Finance, Zongjiao Huodong Changsuo Caiwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the 
Financial Management of Venues for Religious Activities], passed 
January 28, 2022, effective June 1, 2022, art. 26; ``Guojia Zongjiao 
Shiwu Ju fuzeren jiu `Zongjiao Huodong Changsuo Caiwu Guanli Banfa' da 
jizhe wen'' [Responsible person from the National Religious Affairs 
Administration responds to reporters' questions about the ``Measures 
for the Financial Management of Venues for Religious Activities''], 
United Front Work Department News, April 7, 2022; Sun Cheng, ``Zhongguo 
tuichu zongjiao changsuo caiwu guanli xin gui juankuan jianguan geng 
yan'' [China releases new religious venue financial management 
measures, more strictly overseeing donations], Radio Free Asia, April 
22, 2022; ChinaAid Association, ``ChinaAid's 2022 Annual Persecution 
Report,'' February 13, 2023, 12; ``Communist Party Grabs Religious 
Funding,'' AsiaNews, April 15, 2022; International Campaign for Tibet, 
``Tibetan Monasteries Face Tighter Control under New Religious 
Financial Management Measures,'' June 1, 2022.
    \16\ Sun Cheng, ``Zhongguo tuichu zongjiao changsuo caiwu guanli 
xin gui juankuan jianguan geng yan'' [China releases new religious 
venue financial management measures, more strictly overseeing 
donations], Radio Free Asia, April 22, 2022.
    \17\ National Religious Affairs Administration et al., Hulianwang 
Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of 
Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, 
effective March 1, 2022.
    \18\ ``Quanguo xing zongjiao tuanti lianxi huiyi di ershi ci huiyi 
kaishi'' [Twentieth joint conference of nationwide religious groups 
begins], United Front Work Department News, July 7, 2022; Guangdong 
Province Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission, ``Guangdong sheng 
minzu zongjiao shiwu weiyuanhui guanyu hulianwang zongjiao xinxi shenhe 
renyuan nengli ceshi jieguo de gonggao (er)'' [Guangdong province 
ethnic and religious affairs commission announcement regarding the 
results of the internet religious information auditors aptitude test 
(two)], July 11, 2022; Attonoy Li, ``Reviewing How the Administrative 
Measures for Internet Religious Information Services Carried Out in 
Past Months before September 1,'' China Christian Daily, September 2, 
2022. For past coverage of the Measures on the Administration of 
Internet Religious Information Services, see Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 14, 
2022), 99-100.
    \19\ ``Quanguo xing zongjiao tuanti lianxi huiyi di ershi ci huiyi 
zhaokai'' [Twentieth joint conference of nationwide religious groups 
begins], United Front Work Department News, July 7, 2022; Guangdong 
Province Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission, ``Guangdong sheng 
minzu zongjiao shiwu weiyuanhui guanyu hulianwang zongjiao xinxi shenhe 
renyuan nengli ceshi jieguo de gonggao (er)'' [Guangdong province 
ethnic and religious affairs commission announcement regarding the 
results of the internet religious information auditors aptitude test 
(two)], July 11, 2022; Attonoy Li, ``Reviewing How the Administrative 
Measures for Internet Religious Information Services Carried Out in 
Past Months before September 1,'' China Christian Daily, September 1, 
2022; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report, 
(Washington: November 14, 2022), 99--100.
    \20\ ChinaAid Association, ``ChinaAid's 2022 Annual Persecution 
Report,'' February 13, 2023; Gao Zhensai, ChinaAid Association, 
``Zhongguo shou ge Tianzhujiao ruanjian `Tianzhujiao xiao zhushou' 
wangzhan ji yingyongchengxu bei po ting yun'' [China's first Catholic 
software website and app ``CathAssist'' forced to shut down], August 
26, 2022; Attonoy Li, ``Christian Websites Commanded to Delete Mass 
Religious Keyword Articles,'' China Christian Daily, July 26, 2022.
    \21\ Gao Zhensai, ChinaAid Association, ``Zhongguo shou ge 
Tianzhujiao ruanjian `Tianzhujiao xiao zhushou' wangzhan ji 
yingyongchengxu bei po ting yun'' [China's first Catholic software 
website and app ``CathAssist'' forced to shut down], August 26, 2022. 
In order to register, the app's developer said it would be required to 
significantly reduce its ``function and content,'' which it was 
unwilling to do.
    \22\ Attonoy Li, ``Christian Websites Commanded to Delete Mass 
Religious Keyword Articles,'' China Christian Daily, July 26, 2022.
    \23\ National Religious Affairs Administration, Zongjiao Jiaozhi 
Renyuan Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of Religious 
Personnel], effective May 1, 2021.
    \24\ United Front Work Department, ``Fojiao, Daojiao jiaozhi 
renyuan xinxi chaxun xitong shangxian, jia heshang jia daoshi wuchu 
dunxing!'' [Buddhist, Taoist clergy information search system is 
online, fake Buddhist monks and Taoist priests have nowhere to hide!], 
February 22, 2023; Gao Feng, ``China Rolls Out Searchable Public 
Databases of Officially Approved Religious Leaders,'' Radio Free Asia, 
February 23, 2023; National Religious Affairs Administration, Zongjiao 
Jiaozhi Renyuan Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of 
Religious Personnel], effective May 1, 2021.
    \25\ Sun Jincheng, ``Yisilanjiao, Tianzhujiao, Jidujiao jiaozhi 
renyuan xinxi chaxun xitong shangxian fabu'' [Muslim, Catholic, 
Christian clergy information online search system is released], Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference News, May 24, 2023.
    \26\ National Religious Affairs Administration, Guojia Zongjiao 
Shiwu Ju guanyu ``Zongjiao Huodong Changsuo Guanli Banfa (zhengqiu 
yijian gao)'' gongkai zhengqiu yijian de tongzhi [Circular on 
Solicitation of Public Comments on the National Religious Affairs 
Administration ``Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious 
Activities (draft for public comment)''], reprinted in China Christian 
Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement Online, March 28, 2023; Gao 
Zhensai, ChinaAid Association, ``Chutai `Zongjiao Huodong Changsuo 
Guanli Banfa (yijian zhengqiu gao)', Zhongguo jiama zongjiao huodong 
changsuo guankong'' [Releasing the ``Measures for the Management of 
Venues for Religious Activities (draft for public comment),'' China 
ratchets up control over venues for religious activities], April 6, 
2023.
    \27\ Xie Baoshu, Rights Defense Network, ``Zhongguo zhengfu ni fabu 
xin gui, jiajin yankong zongjiao ziyou kongjian'' [Chinese government 
plans to issue new regulations, intensifying strict control over the 
space for religious freedom], April 4, 2023.
    \28\ National Religious Affairs Administration, Guojia Zongjiao 
Shiwu Ju guanyu ``Zongjiao Huodong Changsuo Guanli Banfa (zhengqiu 
yijian gao)'' gongkai zhengqiu yijian de tongzhi [Circular on 
Solicitation of Public Comments on the National Religious Affairs 
Administration ``Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious 
Activities (draft for public comment)''], reprinted in China Christian 
Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement Online, March 28, 2023, art. 
36; Xie Baoshu, Rights Defense Network, ``Zhongguo zhengfu ni fabu xin 
gui, jiajin yankong zongjiao ziyou kongjian'' [Chinese government plans 
to issue new regulations, intensifying strict control over the space 
for religious freedom], April 4, 2023.
    \29\ China Islamic Association, ``Zhongguo Yi Xie zuzhi jiti 
shoukan Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Ershi Ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui kaimu'' 
[The China Islamic Association organized a group viewing of the 20th 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party], October 16, 2022; 
Zhang Lili, China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement, 
``(Zonghe) Quanguo ge shenxue yuanxiao zuzhi guankan Dang de Ershi Da 
kaimu hui zhibo'' [(Summary) Seminaries nationwide organize viewings of 
the 20th Party Congress opening broadcast], October 17, 2022; Buddhist 
Association of China, ``Zhongguo Fojiao Xiehui `xuexi guanche Dang de 
Ershi Da jingshen peixun ban' zai Zhongyang Shehui Zhuyi Xueyuan 
juban'' [Buddhist Association of China holds a ``study and implement 
the spirit of the 20th Party Congress training class'' at the Central 
Socialism Institute], November 22, 2023; Ma Feng and Wu Shumei, China 
Islamic Association, ``Zhongguo Yisilanjiao Xiehui chuanda xuexi Dang 
de Ershi Da jingshen'' [China Islamic Association conveys and studies 
the spirit of the 20th Party Congress], October 28, 2022; United Front 
Work Department, ``Qingdao shi Daojiao jie juban xuexi guanche Dang de 
Ershi Da jingshen zhuti jiaoyu peixun ban'' [Qingdao municipality 
Taoist community held an educational training class on the theme of 
studying and implementing the spirit of the 20th Party Congress], April 
10, 2023.
    \30\ ``Xu Xiaohong: Shinian mo yi jian, chixu tuijin Jidujiao 
zhongguohua zou shen zou shi'' (Xu Xiaohong: Ten years of sharpening a 
sword, continue to advance the deepening and realization of the 
sinicization of Christianity], China Weiyan Religion Magazine, 
reprinted by China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement 
Online, October 8, 2022.
    \31\ ``Ershi Da weiwen? Beijing Shouwang Jiaohui zhanglao zao 
jinzu, huiyou bei jingfang chuanhuan'' [20th Party Congress stability 
maintenance? Beijing Shouwang Church elder confined, church members 
summoned by police], Radio Free Asia, August 14, 2022; Yu Bing, 
ChinaAid Association, ``Beijing Shouwang Jiaohui You Guanhui Zhanglao 
bei jin chumen huiyou bei chuanhuan'' [Beijing Shouwang Church Elder 
You Guanhui confined, church members summoned by police], August 13, 
2022; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Zhonggong Ershi Da zaiji, Qiuyu 
Shengyue Jiaohui Dai Zhichao Chuandao bei chixu jianjin zai jia'' [As 
the 20th Party Congress nears, Early Rain Covenant Church Preacher Dai 
Zhichao continues to be confined to his home], October 15, 2022; Dilnur 
Sultanov, ``Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture: Crackdown on Islam 
Intensifies,'' Bitter Winter, October 7, 2022; Yu Bing, ChinaAid 
Association, ``Zhonggong Ershi Da qian Hengyang Jidutu Chen Wensheng he 
qizi bei jingcha daizou'' [Hengyang Christian Chen Wensheng and wife 
taken away by police before the 20th Party Congress], October 13, 2022; 
``Yunnan Kunming Falun Gong xueyuan Zhonggong Ershi Da qian zao 
saorao'' [Falun Gong practitioners in Kunming, Yunnan, met with 
harassment prior to the 20th Party Congress], Minghui, November 11, 
2022.
    \32\ ``Ershi Da weiwen' Beijing Shouwang Jiaohui zhanglao zao 
jinzu, huiyou bei jingfang chuanhuan'' [20th Party Congress stability 
maintenance? Beijing Shouwang Church elder confined, church members 
summoned by police], Radio Free Asia, August 14, 2022; Yu Bing, 
ChinaAid Association, ``Beijing Shouwang Jiaohui You Guanhui Zhanglao 
bei jin chumen huiyou bei chuanhuan'' [Beijing Shouwang Church Elder 
You Guanhui confined, church members summoned by police], August 13, 
2022; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Zhonggong Ershi Da zaiji, Qiuyu 
Shengyue Jiaohui Dai Zhichao Chuandao bei chixu jianjin zai jia'' [As 
the 20th Party Congress nears, Early Rain Covenant Church Preacher Dai 
Zhichao continues to be confined to his home], October 15, 2022.
    \33\ Nathan VanderKlippe, ``How China Is Turning Religion into 
Another State-Controlled Tool to Support Its Communists Ideals,'' Globe 
and Mail, June 30, 2021; Weishan Huang, ``The Sinicization of Buddhism 
and Its Competing Reinventions of Tradition,'' in ed. Richard Madsen, 
The Sinicization of Chinese Religions: From Above and Below (Leiden: 
Brill, 2021), 65, 67, 69, 83; Ian Johnson, ``China's New Civil 
Religion,'' New York Times, December 21, 2019.
    \34\ Paul M. Taylor, Freedom of Religion: U.N. and European Human 
Rights Law and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
19, 24, 203-4; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and 
proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 
10, 1948, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 18. See also 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted and proclaimed by 
U.N. General Assembly resolution 36/55 of November 25, 1981; State 
Council Information Office, ``Guojia Renquan Xingdong Jihua (2016-2020 
Nian)'' [National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-2020)], 
September 29, 2016, sec. 5; United Nations Conference on the Law of 
Treaties, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 23, 
1969, entry into force January 27, 1980, art. 18.
    \35\ Nathan VanderKlippe, ``How China Is Turning Religion into 
Another State-Controlled Tool to Support Its Communists Ideals,'' Globe 
and Mail, June 30, 2021; Weishan Huang, ``The Sinicization of Buddhism 
and Its Competing Reinventions of Tradition,'' in ed. Richard Madsen, 
The Sinicization of Chinese Religions: From Above and Below (Leiden: 
Brill, 2021), 65, 67, 69, 83; Ian Johnson, ``China's New Civil 
Religion,'' New York Times, December 21, 2019.
    \36\ United Front Work Department, ``Fojiao, Daojiao jiaozhi 
renyuan xinxi chaxun xitong shangxian, jia heshang jia daoshi wuchu 
dunxing!'' [Buddhist, Taoist clergy information search system is 
online, fake Buddhist monks and Taoist priests have nowhere to hide!], 
February 22, 2023; ``Fojiao, Daojiao jiaozhi renyuan xinxi chaxun 
xitong shangxian fabu'' [Buddhist, Taoist clergy information search 
system released online], Xinhua, February 22, 2023; Gao Feng, ``China 
Rolls Out Searchable Public Databases of Officially Approved Religious 
Leaders,'' Radio Free Asia, February 23, 2023.
    \37\ Gao Feng, ``China Rolls Out Searchable Public Databases of 
Officially Approved Religious Leaders,'' Radio Free Asia, February 23, 
2023.
    \38\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Containing the `Eastward 
Movement of Tibetan Mysticism': Targeting Chinese Buddhist 
Practitioners at Larung Gar Academy,'' January 20, 2022; ``Han Chinese 
Seek Spiritual Salve in Tibetan Buddhism,'' Economist, October 26, 
2022; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report 
(Washington: November 14, 2022), 101.
    \39\ Rights Defense Network, ``Guangdong sheng Yunfu shi Fojiao 
Xiehui xianzhi Zangchuan Fojiao zai Zhongguo neidi chuanbo'' [Yunfu 
Municipality, Guangdong Province, Buddhist Association restricts the 
spread of Tibetan Buddhism in mainland China], July 22, 2022; 
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Ban on Tibetan Buddhist Teachers in 
Guangdong's Yunfu City,'' August 4, 2022.
    \40\ Rights Defense Network, ``Guangdong sheng Yunfu shi Fojiao 
Xiehui xianzhi Zangchuan Fojiao zai Zhongguo neidi chuanbo'' [Yunfu 
Municipality, Guangdong Province, Buddhist Association restricts the 
spread of Tibetan Buddhism in mainland China], July 22, 2022; 
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Ban on Tibetan Buddhist Teachers in 
Guangdong's Yunfu City,'' August 4, 2022. The notice also accuses 
Tibetan monks of using their position to conduct fraud and sexual 
exploitation, and promote ``separatist'' activities.
    \41\ Nanjing Municipality Party Committee and Government 
Investigation Group, ``Guanyu Nanjing Xuanzang Si gongfeng qinhua Rijun 
zhanfan paiwei shijian diaocha chuli qingkuang de tongbao'' [Notice 
regarding the investigation and handling of the Nanjing Xuanzang Temple 
enshrining China-invading Japanese Army war criminals situation], 
Nanjing Daily, reprinted in Nanjing Municipal People's Government, July 
25, 2022; Tang Jiajie, ``Wu Aping dianshi chanhui Zhongguo Fojiao dei 
you aiguo zhuyi yishi?'' [Wu Aping televised confession: Must Chinese 
Buddhism be patriotic?], Radio Free Asia, July 25, 2022; Ye Zhanhang, 
``China to Rectify Religious Sites after Temple Honors War Criminals,'' 
Sixth Tone, July 27, 2022; Cyril Ip, ``China Detains Woman over Temple 
Offerings for Japanese War Criminals Linked to Nanking Massacre,'' 
South China Morning Post, July 25, 2022; Zhu Yaozu, ``The Xuanzang 
Temple Incident: Who Was the Agent Provocateur?,'' Bitter Winter, July 
29, 2022.
    \42\ Nanjing Municipality Party Committee and Government 
Investigation Group, ``Guanyu Nanjing Xuanzang Si gongfeng qinhua rijun 
zhanfan paiwei shijian diaocha chuli qingkuang de tongbao'' [Notice 
regarding the investigation and handling of the Nanjing Xuanzang Temple 
enshrining China-invading Japanese Army war criminals situation], 
Nanjing Daily, reprinted in Nanjing Municipal People's Government, July 
25, 2022; Tang Jiajie, ``Wu Aping dianshi chanhui Zhongguo Fojiao dei 
you aiguo zhuyi yishi?'' [Wu Aping televised confession: Must Chinese 
Buddhism be patriotic?], Radio Free Asia, July 25, 2023; Ye Zhanhang, 
``China to Rectify Religious Sites after Temple Honors War Criminals,'' 
Sixth Tone, July 27, 2022. According to the South China Morning Post, 
Wu appears to have a documented history of mental illness. Cyril Ip, 
``China Detains Woman over Temple Offerings for Japanese War Criminals 
Linked to Nanking Massacre,'' South China Morning Post, July 25, 2022. 
For more information on Wu Aping, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2023-00174.
    \43\ Buddhist Association of China, ``Zhongguo Fojiao Xiehui fachu 
tongzhi yaoqiu quanmian kaizhan qingcha he guifan siyuan sheli paiwei 
gongzuo'' [Buddhist Association of China issues notice requiring 
comprehensively launching investigation and regulation of temple 
memorial tablets work], July 26, 2022; Ye Zhanhang, ``China to Rectify 
Religious Sites after Temple Honors War Criminals,'' Sixth Tone, July 
27, 2022; Zhu Yaozu, ``The Xuanzang Temple Incident: Who Was the Agent 
Provocateur?,'' Bitter Winter, July 29, 2022.
    \44\ For recent coverage of PRC authorities' efforts to control and 
forcibly assimilate Hui and other ethnic minority Muslims, see, e.g., 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report 
(Washington: November 14, 2022), 101-2; Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 31, 2022), 
99-101.
    \45\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International 
Foundation, ``Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?,'' March 22, 2023.
    \46\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International 
Foundation, ``Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?,'' March 22, 2023. While 
Hui Muslims make up only 35 percent of Ningxia residents, they have 
constituted the majority of those resettled.
    \47\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International 
Foundation, ``Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?,'' March 22, 2023.
    \48\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International 
Foundation, ``Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?,'' March 22, 2023.
    \49\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International 
Foundation, ``Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?,'' March 22, 2023.
    \50\ For more information about previous efforts to remove ``Arab-
style'' domes and minarets from mosques see, e.g., David R. Stroup, 
``China: Removing `Arab-Style' Features from Country's Biggest Mosques 
the Latest Move in Campaign of Muslim Assimilation,'' Conversation, 
September 28, 2021; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 
Annual Report (Washington: November 14, 2022), 101.
    \51\ Gao Feng, ``Yisilanjiao zhongguohua: Huabei zuida qingzhensi 
mianlin waiguan zhenggai'' [Sinicization of Islam: North China's 
largest mosque faces facade renovation], Radio Free Asia, September 13, 
2022.
    \52\ Gao Feng, ``Yisilanjiao zhongguohua: Huabei zuida qingzhensi 
mianlin waiguan zhenggai'' [Sinicization of Islam: North China's 
largest mosque faces facade renovation], Radio Free Asia, September 13, 
2022.
    \53\ Chen Tao, ``Hui Mosques and Cemeteries `Sinicized' in Qinghai, 
Yunnan, Beijing, and Shanghai,'' Bitter Winter, September 23, 2022.
    \54\ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, ``China: Hui Muslims Beaten as 
Officials Demolish Mosque Domes and Minarets,'' June 21, 2022; 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report 
(Washington: November 14, 2022), 163-64.
    \55\ Vivian Wang, ``Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in 
China,'' New York Times, June 8, 2023; Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, 
``Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in 
Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, May 30, 2023, updated June 2, 2023; Ruslan 
Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of 
Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023.
    \56\ Vivian Wang, ``Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in 
China,'' New York Times, June 8, 2023; Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, 
``Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in 
Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, May 30, 2023, updated June 2, 2023; Ruslan 
Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of 
Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023.
    \57\ Vivian Wang, ``Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in 
China,'' New York Times, June 8, 2023; Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, 
``Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in 
Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, May 30, 2023, updated June 2, 2023; Ruslan 
Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of 
Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023.
    \58\ Vivian Wang, ``Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in 
China,'' New York Times, June 8, 2023; Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, 
``Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in 
Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, May 30, 2023, updated June 2, 2023; Ruslan 
Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of 
Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023.
    \59\ Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, ``Thousands of Ethnic Minority 
Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, May 30, 
2023, updated June 2, 2023.
    \60\ Ma Ju (@majuismail1122), ``!!Ju Najiaying renshi chongchu 
chongwei, maoxian chuan lai de xinxi . . . '' [!!According to the 
information from the Najiaying people who broke out of the siege . . . 
], Twitter, June 2, 2023, 9:03 p.m. For more information on Ma Zichang, 
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00137.
    \61\ Ruslan Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over 
Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023. 
According to Yusupov, officials visited Shadian residents during 
Ramadan to discuss the plans and pressure residents to accept them. 
Following the Najiaying protests in Nagu, Shadian residents reported a 
heavy police presence in the town and on local expressways.
    \62\ Francis X. Rocca and Elaine Yu, ``Vatican and China Renew 
Agreement on Bishops as Beijing Tightens Control of Religion,'' Wall 
Street Journal, October 22, 2022; ``China Wants to `Sinicise' Its 
Catholics,'' Economist, November 22, 2022. For past coverage of the 
Chinese Communist Party and government's efforts to assert control over 
the Catholic Church, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 14, 2022), 102-3; 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report 
(Washington: March 31, 2022), 101-3.
    \63\ ``New Bishop Ordained in China,'' Vatican News, September 8, 
2021. For more on the Sino-Vatican Agreement, see Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 
31, 2022), 101-2.
    \64\ Gianni Criveller, ``A Second Renewal of the Agreement on 
Episcopal Appointments Announced,'' AsiaNews, October 22, 2022.
    \65\ Gianni Criveller, ``A Second Renewal of the Agreement on 
Episcopal Appointments Announced,'' AsiaNews, October 22, 2022. 
Analysts have attributed the dissatisfaction to the Party-controlled 
Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church in China (affiliated with 
the official Catholic Patriotic Association) unilaterally appointing 
bishops in apparent violation of the agreement. The text of the 
agreement has not been made public, so it cannot be determined 
definitively whether the appointments constitute violations of the 
agreement, but the Holy See has indicated in its statements and 
official interviews that the content of the agreement governs the 
appointment of bishops. For more on the Sino-Vatican Agreement, see 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report 
(Washington: March 31, 2022), 101-2.
    \66\ ``Tianzhujiao Jiangxi Jiaoqu juxing fuli zhujiao jiuzhi 
yishi'' [Catholic Diocese of Jiangxi holds installation ceremony for 
the auxiliary bishop], Catholic Church in China, November 24, 2022; 
``Holy See: Regret for Installation Ceremony of Bishop in China,'' 
Vatican News, November 26, 2022.
    \67\ ``Tianzhujiao Jiangxi Jiaoqu juxing fuli zhujiao jiuzhi 
yishi'' [Catholic Diocese of Jiangxi holds installation ceremony for 
the auxiliary bishop], Catholic Church in China, November 24, 2022; 
``Holy See: Regret for Installation Ceremony of Bishop in China,'' 
Vatican News, November 26, 2022.
    \68\ ``Holy See: Regret for Installation Ceremony of Bishop in 
China,'' Vatican News, November 26, 2022.
    \69\ ``Chinese Bishop Shen Bin Transferred to Shanghai, Holy See 
Learns of Move from Media'' Vatican News, April 4, 2023; ``Tianzhujiao 
Shanghai Jiaoqu juxing zhujiao jiuzhi yishi'' [Catholic Diocese of 
Shanghai holds ceremony for installation of bishop], Catholic Church in 
China, April 4, 2023; ``Shen Bin New Bishop of Shanghai: `Unilateral' 
Appointment, Vatican Agreement Broken,'' AsiaNews, April 4, 2023; US-
China Catholic Association, ``A New Bishop for Shanghai,'' April 6, 
2023; ``New Bishop of Shanghai Set for Tomorrow: Bishop Shen Bin in 
Pole Position,'' AsiaNews, April 3, 2023.
    \70\ ``Chinese Bishop Shen Bin Transferred to Shanghai, Holy See 
Learns of Move from Media'' Vatican News, April 4, 2023; ``Tianzhujiao 
Shanghai Jiaoqu juxing zhujiao jiuzhi yishi'' [Catholic Diocese of 
Shanghai holds ceremony for installation of bishop], Catholic Church in 
China, April 4, 2023; ``Shen Bin New Bishop of Shanghai: `Unilateral' 
Appointment, Vatican Agreement Broken,'' AsiaNews, April 4, 2023; US-
China Catholic Association, ``A New Bishop for Shanghai,'' April 6, 
2023; ``New Bishop of Shanghai Set for Tomorrow: Bishop Shen Bin in 
Pole Position,'' AsiaNews, April 3, 2023.
    \71\ ``Tianzhujiao Shanghai Jiaoqu juxing zhujiao jiuzhi yishi'' 
[Catholic Diocese of Shanghai holds ceremony for installation of 
bishop], Catholic Church in China, April 4, 2023.
    \72\ ``Underground Priest Goes Missing in Baoding While Others Are 
Released after `Brainwashing,' '' AsiaNews, April 13, 2023; For more 
information on the 10 priests, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database records 2005-00261 on Yang Jianwei, 2023-00014 on Chen Hechao, 
2023-00015 on Ji Fuhou, 2023-00016 on Ma Ligang, 2023-00017 on Yang 
Guanglin, 2023-00018 on Shang Mancang, 2023-00020 on Zhang Chunguang, 
2023-00021 on Yin Shuangxi, 2023-00022 on Zhang Shouxin, and 2023-00023 
on Zhang Zhenquan. For another example of authorities targeting the 
underground church in Baoding, see ``In Baoding Bishop An Threatens to 
Withhold the Sacraments from Those Who Do Not Register,'' AsiaNews, 
July 30, 2022.
    \73\ ``Underground Priest Goes Missing in Baoding While Others Are 
Released after `Brainwashing,''' AsiaNews, April 13, 2023.
    \74\ Sun Cheng, ``Hebei Luancheng yi Tianzhujiao dixia jiaohuitang 
zao qiang chai dangdi zhujiao pilu xiangqing'' [Underground Catholic 
Church in Luancheng, Hebei, was forcibly demolished, local bishop 
reveals], Radio Free Asia, July 12, 2022; ``Datong Diocese: Authorities 
Demolish Priests' and Nuns' House with Pickaxe,'' AsiaNews, February 
23, 2023.
    \75\ Greg Torode, ``Vatican Envoy in Hong Kong Warns Catholic 
Missions to Prepare for China Crackdown,'' Reuters, July 5, 2022.
    \76\ Catholic Patriotic Association, ``Di er jie Neidi-Xianggang 
Tianzhujiao zhongguohua shenxue fenxiang jiaoliu hui zaixian zhaokai'' 
[The second virtual Mainland-Hong Kong Catholic sinicization exchange 
was convened], November 18, 2022; ``Bishop Chow Invites the Archbishop 
of Beijing to Visit Hong Kong,'' AsiaNews, April 22, 2023.
    \77\ Catholic Patriotic Association, ``Di er jie Neidi-Xianggang 
Tianzhujiao zhongguohua shenxue fenxiang jiaoliu hui zaixian zhaokai'' 
[The second virtual Mainland-Hong Kong Catholic sinicization exchange 
was convened], November 18, 2022.
    \78\ ``Bishop Chow Invites the Archbishop of Beijing to Visit Hong 
Kong,'' AsiaNews, April 22, 2023.
    \79\ ``Bishop Chow Invites the Archbishop of Beijing to Visit Hong 
Kong,'' AsiaNews, April 22, 2023.
    \80\ ChinaAid Association, ``ChinaAid's 2021 Annual Persecution 
Report,'' March 7, 2022. For coverage of PRC authorities' violation of 
the religious freedom of Protestant Christians in previous years, see, 
e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report 
(Washington: November 14, 2022), 103-4; Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 31, 2022), 
103-4.
    \81\ Sarah Eekhoff Zylstra and Zhang San, ``Chinese Christians 
Adapt under New Restrictions,'' The Gospel Coalition, March 30, 2023; 
Rights Defense Network, ``Shanxi Linfen Shengyue Jiayuan Jiaohui 
jiao'an jinzhan tongbao: (2023 nian 1 yue 15 ri)--5 ren bei qisu dao 
jianchayuan [Shanxi's Linfen Covenant House Church case progress 
update: (January 15, 2023)--five people were indicted by the 
procuratorate], January 15, 2023; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, 
``Linfen Shengyue Jiayuan Jiaohui san wei Jidutu shexian `zhapian' an 
bei jianchayuan tuihui buchong zhencha'' [The case of three Christians 
from Linfen Covenant House Church suspected of ``fraud'' was returned 
to the procuratorate for additional investigation], February 4, 2023; 
ChinaAid Association, ``Leaders of Xi'an Church of Abundance 
Transferred to Detention Center,'' February 21, 2023. For more on the 
use of ``fraud'' charges to target unregistered Protestant churches 
during the Commission's previous reporting year, see Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 
14, 2022), 83, 103.
    \82\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Chengdu jingfang baoli 
chongji Qiuyu Shengyue Jiaohui zhuri juhui, zuojia A Xin bei dashang 
zhuazou'' [Chengdu police violently attack Early Rain Covenant Church 
Lord's day gathering, writer A Xin injured and detained], August 14, 
2022.
    \83\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Chengdu jingfang baoli 
chongji Qiuyu Shengyue Jiaohui zhuri juhui, zuojia A Xin bei dashang 
zhuazou'' [Chengdu police violently attack Early Rain Covenant Church 
Lord's day gathering, writer A Xin injured and detained], August 14, 
2022; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Qiuyu Shengyue Jiaohui jiu 
huiyou A Xin `shexian xi jing zui' bei xingju fa shengming, Duihua 
Yuanzhu gaodu guanzhu'' [Early Rain Covenant Church member A Xin 
criminally detained on suspicion of ``assaulting police,'' ChinaAid 
Association extremely concerned], August 15, 2022.
    \84\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Chengdu Qiuyu Shengyue 
Jiaohui huiyou Shu Qiong yijia bei bipo mianlin banjia'' [Chengdu Early 
Rain Covenant Church member Shu Qiong's family faced with forced 
eviction], October 1, 2022; ChinaAid Association, ``Xinan Minzu Daxue 
zhuzhou wei nue qiangbi Qiuyu Shengyue Jiaohui huiyou Kang Guofu tui zu 
banjia'' [Southwest Minzu University cooperates with oppression, 
forcing Early Rain Covenant Church member Kang Guofu to forfeit his 
rent and move], February 19, 2023; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, 
``Chengdu jingfang xiepo fangdong weiyue tui zu, qugan Qiuyu Shengyue 
Jiaohui huiyou Li Benli'' [Chengdu police force landlord to renege [on 
rental agreement] and decline [future] rent; drive out Early Rain 
Covenant Church member Li Benli], March 15, 2023; Yu Bing, ChinaAid 
Association, ``Chengdu jingfang, `qian bi' exing chixu shengji: zhunbei 
`qingchang' juzhu tongyi shequ de Qiuyu Shengyue Jiaohui huiyou Shu 
Qiong, Chen Yan he Mudaoyou Xu Jiali san jia'' [Chengdu police ``forced 
eviction'' evil continues to escalate: [telling] Early Rain Covenant 
Church members Shu Qiong, Chen Yan, and catechumen Xu Jiali, who live 
in the same housing community, [to] prepare to ``clear out''], March 
21, 2023.
    \85\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Xinwen zongshu: 2 yue 24-3 
yue 5 ri, qingkan Zhonggong Sichuan dangju ruhe feijinxinji zunao Qiuyu 
Shengyue Jiaohui juhui'' [News summary: February 24-March 5, observe 
the Sichuan Chinese Communist Party authorities rack their brains 
trying to figure out how to stop Early Rain Covenant Church from 
gathering], March 6, 2023.
    \86\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Qiuyu Shengyue Jiaohui Zhuri 
juhui zaoshou Chengdu dangju chongji, duo ren bei daizou, youren bei 
baoli ouda'' [Early Rain Covenant Church Lord's Day gathering suffered 
an attack by Chengdu authorities, many people were taken away, some 
were violently beaten], March 12, 2023.
    \87\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Qiuyu Shengyue Jiaohui Zhuri 
juhui zaoshou Chengdu dangju chongji, duo ren bei daizou, youren bei 
baoli ouda'' [Early Rain Covenant Church Lord's Day gathering suffered 
an attack by Chengdu authorities, many people were taken away, some 
were violently beaten], March 12, 2023; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, 
``Qiuyu Jiaohui Ding Shuqi Chuandao, Shu Qiong yin canjia hui bei 
xingzheng juliu'' [Early Rain Covenant Church Preacher Ding Shuqi and 
Shu Qiong administratively detained for participating in gathering], 
March 17, 2023.
    \88\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shanxi Linfen Shengyue Jiayuan 
Jiaohui jiao'an jinzhan tongbao: (2023 nian 1 yue 15 ri)--5 ren bei 
qisu dao jianchayuan [Shanxi's Linfen Covenant House Church case 
progress update: (January 15, 2023)--five people were indicted by the 
procuratorate], January 15, 2023; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, 
``Linfen Shengyue Jiayuan Jiaohui san wei Jidutu shexian `zhapian' an 
bei jianchayuan tuihui buchong zhencha'' [The case of three Christians 
from Linfen Covenant House Church suspected of ``fraud'' was returned 
to the procuratorate for additional investigation], February 4, 2023.
    \89\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shanxi Linfen Shengyue Jiayuan 
Jiaohui jiao'an jinzhan tongbao: (2023 nian 1 yue 15 ri)--5 ren bei 
qisu dao jianchayuan [Shanxi's Linfen Covenant House Church case 
progress update: (January 15, 2023)--five people were indicted by the 
procuratorate], January 15, 2023; Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, 
``Linfen Shengyue Jiayuan Jiaohui san wei Jidutu shexian `zhapian' an 
bei jianchayuan tuihui buchong zhencha'' [The case of three Christians 
from Linfen Covenant House Church suspected of ``fraud'' was returned 
to the procuratorate for additional investigation], February 4, 2023; 
``Linfen shi Yaodu qu Minzhengju guanyu yifa qudi feifa shehui zuzhi 
`Shengyue Jiayuan Jiaohui', `Asilan Xuetang' de tonggao'' [Yaodu 
district, Linfen municipality, Bureau of Civil Affairs announcement 
regarding the prohibition according to law of the illegal social 
organizations `Covenant House Church' and `Aslan School'], Linfen 
Municipal Government Online, November 16, 2022; Yu Bing, ChinaAid 
Association, ``Shanxi Linfen Shengyue Jiayuan Jiaohui ji Asilan Xuetang 
bei qudi'' [Shanxi's Linfen Covenant House Church and Aslan School shut 
down], November 20, 2022.
    \90\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Genzong baodao: Xi'an 
Fengsheng Jiaohui Lian Changnian Mushi, Lian Xuliang Mushi fuzi tong 
bei zhiding jianshi juzhu, houzhe hai zao ouda zhi shang'' [Follow-up 
report: Xi'an Church of Abundance father-and-son, Pastor Lian Changnian 
[and] Pastor Lian Xuliang were placed in residential surveillance at a 
designated location together, [and] the latter was beaten and injured], 
August 22, 2022; ChinaAid Association, ``Xi'an Fengsheng Jiaohui Lian 
Changnian Mushi deng san ren zai bei zhiding jianshi juzhu qijian 
zaoshou kuxing'' [Xi'an Church of Abundance Pastor Lian Changnian and 
[two] others subjected to torture while under residential surveillance 
at a designated location], February 23, 2023; Christian Solidarity 
Worldwide, ``House Church Pastors Describe Torture in Secret 
Detention,'' China Corner, February 28, 2023; ChinaAid Association, 
``Leaders of Xi'an Church of Abundance Transferred to Detention 
Center,'' February 21, 2023.
    \91\ Yu Bing, ChinaAid Association, ``Xi'an Fengsheng Jiaohui Lian 
Changnian, Lian Xuliang Mushi, Fu Juan Chuandao zao jingfang gouxian 
`zhapian zui', bei zhengshi daibu'' [Xi'an Church of Abundance's Lian 
Changnian, Pastor Lian Xuliang, and Preacher Fu Juan, charged by police 
with ``fraud,'' are formally arrested], March 23, 2023.
    \92\ Gao Zhensai, ChinaAid Association, ``Henan Christians Must 
Submit Online Form to Attend Church,'' March 6, 2023. According to 
ChinaAid, religious believers must enter extensive personal details in 
order to attend services, including their name, phone number, 
occupation, date of birth, address, and identification number. While 
the app does not appear to be designed exclusively for use by 
Protestant Christians, as of June 30, 2023, all reporting and details 
about the app have come from Christians familiar with the app, and it 
is unclear if members of other religious faiths are also being asked to 
register through the app at this time.
    \93\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 300. For past CECC coverage of PRC 
authorities' efforts to crack down on Falun Gong using Article 300 of 
the PRC Criminal Law, see, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 14, 2022), 104-5; 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report 
(Washington: March 31, 2022), 104-5.
    \94\ ``Reported in 2022: 172 Falun Gong Practitioners Die in the 
Persecution of Their Faith,'' Minghui, January 7, 2023; ``Reported in 
2022: 633 Falun Gong Practitioners Sentenced for Their Faith,'' 
Minghui, January 8, 2023.
    \95\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Submission of the Dui Hua Foundation, an 
NGO in Special Consultative Status with ECOSOC, to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, for the State Report on 
China at the 85th Session,'' April 2023, 2.
    \96\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Submission of the Dui Hua Foundation, an 
NGO in Special Consultative Status with ECOSOC, to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, for the State Report on 
China at the 85th Session,'' April 2023, 4.
    \97\ For past coverage of PRC officials subjecting Falun Gong 
practitioners to physical abuse, torture, and mistreatment in custody, 
see, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual 
Report (Washington: November 14, 2022), 104-5; Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 31, 2022), 
104-5.
    \98\ ``30-Year-Old Falun Gong Practitioner Beaten to Death in 
Prison, Tweet on Death Goes Viral,'' Falun Dafa Information Center, 
February 18, 2023; Rights Defense Network, ``Huoxing 5 nian bing zao 
Zhonggong dangju canku pohai cansi yu zhong de yuan Sichuan Renmin 
Guangbo Dianshi Tai zhuchiren, Falun Gong xueyuan Pang Xun de jianli'' 
[Biography of former Sichuan People's Radio and Television host Pang 
Xun, who was sentenced to five years and cruelly persecuted to death in 
prison by Chinese Communist Party authorities], Minghui, February 16, 
2023.
    \99\ ``30-Year-Old Falun Gong Practitioner Beaten to Death in 
Prison, Tweet on Death Goes Viral,'' Falun Dafa Information Center, 
February 18, 2023; Rights Defense Network, ``Huoxing 5 nian bing zao 
Zhonggong dangju canku pohai cansi yu zhong de yuan Sichuan Renmin 
Guangbo Dianshi Tai zhuchiren, Falun Gong xueyuan Pang Xun de jianli'' 
[Biography of former Sichuan People's Radio and Television host Pang 
Xun, who was sentenced to five years and cruelly persecuted to death in 
prison by Chinese Communist Party authorities], Minghui, February 16, 
2023.
    \100\ ``Peng Shuming'' [Peng Shuming], Minghui, updated January 7, 
2023; ``Zao kuasheng bangjia gouxian Shandong Peng Shuming bei Jilin 
fayuan wang pan wu nian,'' [Cross-provincial kidnapping [and] false 
charges, Peng Shuming of Shandong unjustly sentenced to five years by 
Jilin court], Minghui, December 4, 2022.
    \101\ ``Peng Shuming'' [Peng Shuming], Minghui, updated January 7, 
2023.
    \102\ ``Peng Shuming'' [Peng Shuming], Minghui, updated January 7, 
2023; ``Zao kuasheng bangjia gouxian Shandong Peng Shuming bei Jilin 
fayuan wang pan wu nian,'' [Cross-provincial kidnapping [and] false 
charges, Peng Shuming of Shandong unjustly sentenced to five years by 
Jilin court], Minghui, December 4, 2022; Rights Defense Network, 
``Huoxing 5 nian de Shandong sheng Falun Gong xueyuan Peng Shuming de 
anqing ji jianli'' [Case and biographical information on Falun Gong 
practitioner Peng Shuming of Shandong province, who was sentenced to 5 
years], December 29, 2022.
    \103\ The Church of Almighty God, 2022 Annual Report on the Chinese 
Communist Government's Persecution of the Church of Almighty God, 
February 8, 2023.
    \104\ China Anti-Cult Association, ``Jingti! Jingti! Jingti! Zhexie 
dou shi xiejiao'' [Warning! Warning! Warning! These are all cults], 
July 26, 2022. For information on the translation and application of 
the term xiejiao, see Richard Madsen, ``Introduction,'' in The 
Sinicization of Chinese Religions: From Above and Below (Leiden: Brill, 
2021), 7; Dui Hua Foundation, ``The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious 
Groups in China,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, March 29, 2022, 3-4; 
Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern 
China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 29, 339-40; J. 
Gordon Melton, ``Xiejiao, Cults, and New Religions,'' in ed. Richard 
Madsen, The Sinicization of Chinese Religions: From Above and Below 
(Leiden: Brill, 2021), 148, 152-54. Melton traces Chinese leaders' use 
of the term xiejiao to characterize new religious movements across the 
Qing Dynasty, Nationalist, and PRC governments, observing that ``China 
has a long history of banning dissenting groups as heretical and/or 
chaotic, a threat to the public and political order.''
    \105\ China Anti-Cult Association, ``Jingti! Jingti! Jingti! Zhexie 
dou shi xiejiao'' [Warning! Warning! Warning! These are all cults], 
July 26, 2022.
    \106\ Massimo Introvigne, ``Xie Jiao: China Updates the List--With 
Some New Entries,'' Bitter Winter, August 30, 2022.

Criminal Justice

Criminal Justice

                 IV. Rule of Law in the Justice System

                            Criminal Justice

                                Findings

         The criminal justice system in the People's 
        Republic of China (PRC) remained a political instrument 
        used for maintaining social order in furtherance of the 
        Chinese Communist Party's authoritarian rule. The 
        government punishes criminal acts, but it also targets 
        individuals who pursue universal human rights, 
        particularly when they independently organize or 
        challenge the state's or the Chinese Communist Party's 
        authority.
         The judiciary is unambiguously political, as 
        the chief justice of the Supreme People's Court called 
        for ``absolute loyalty'' to the Party. Moreover, 
        political intervention was evidenced in the case of 
        citizen journalist Fang Bin, detained in 2020 in 
        connection with his reporting on the coronavirus 
        disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak in Wuhan municipality, 
        Hebei province. A leaked document indicated that the 
        court judgment in his case was a result of a decision 
        made by the Party Central Committee Political and Legal 
        Affairs Commission.
         Government officials arbitrarily detained 
        political activists, religious practitioners, ethnic 
        minorities, and rights advocates, including through 
        extralegal means such as ``black jails'' and 
        psychiatric facilities or through criminal prosecution 
        under offenses such as ``picking quarrels and provoking 
        trouble'' or crimes endangering state security. Some 
        detainees, particularly those held incommunicado, 
        reported being mistreated or tortured. After entering 
        the formal legal process, defendants sometimes faced 
        prolonged pretrial detention, closed trials, and 
        delayed sentencing.
         Examples of arbitrary detention during the 
        Commission's 2023 reporting year include the forcible 
        disappearance in Shanghai municipality in March 2023 of 
        Li Yanhe, an editor who published books banned in 
        China. In April, police in Beijing municipality 
        detained human rights lawyer Yu Wensheng and his wife, 
        Xu Yan, as they were on their way to meet the European 
        Union's Ambassador to China.
         Authorities likewise criminally detained 
        participants in the White Paper protests, a series of 
        nationwide citizen protests that took place in November 
        2022 in reaction to the government's harsh COVID-19 
        prevention measures and censorship. Protesters, 
        including Cao Zhixin, Li Yuanjing, Zhai Dengrui, and Li 
        Siqi, were forcibly disappeared for several months 
        before authorities lodged formal criminal charges 
        against them.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Publicly advocate for political prisoners. PRC 
        officials have deprived individuals of liberty on 
        unsubstantiated criminal charges and have suppressed 
        their political rights. Our prior experiences 
        illustrate that consistently and prominently raising 
        individual prisoner cases can result in improved 
        treatment in detention, lighter sentences, or, in some 
        cases, release from custody, detention, or 
        imprisonment. Specific cases of prisoners can be found 
        in this chapter and other chapters in this report. For 
        additional cases, refer to the Commission's Political 
        Prisoner Database and the Tom Lantos Human Rights 
        Commission's Defending Freedoms Project.
          Continue to advocate for the U.S. citizens and lawful 
        permanent residents whom PRC authorities have 
        arbitrarily detained or prevented from leaving the 
        country.
          Prioritize diplomatic efforts to end PRC authorities' 
        use of arbitrary detention. The Administration should 
        urge PRC officials to end all forms of arbitrary 
        detention and raise this issue in all bilateral 
        discussions and in multilateral institutions of which 
        the United States and China are members. The 
        Administration should create public diplomacy campaigns 
        and support media efforts to raise global awareness 
        about the detention of political and religious 
        prisoners in ``black jails,'' psychiatric institutions, 
        compulsory drug detoxification centers, police and 
        state security detention centers, and in mass 
        internment camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
        Region. In addition, the Administration should consider 
        funding nongovernmental projects that assist 
        individuals with collecting and submitting evidence of 
        PRC officials' complicity and responsibility in the 
        arbitrary detention of political and religious 
        prisoners.
          Take the necessary steps to ensure that U.S. 
        businesses are not complicit in PRC abuses of police 
        power. The Administration and Members of Congress 
        should take the necessary steps to prohibit the export 
        of U.S. surveillance technologies and equipment to PRC 
        security services. Members of Congress should hold 
        public hearings and private meetings with companies 
        from their districts to raise awareness of the risk of 
        complicity in human rights abuses and privacy 
        violations that U.S. companies working in China may 
        face. Topics of meetings could include complicity in 
        the use of artificial intelligence technology and 
        surveillance equipment used to monitor human rights 
        advocates, religious believers, and ethnic minority 
        groups in China.
          Voice support for human rights advocates in China. 
        Members of Congress and Administration officials should 
        regularly meet with members of Chinese civil society, 
        rights defenders, and other people targeted by PRC 
        authorities. The Administration and Members of Congress 
        should discuss with Chinese counterparts the importance 
        of protection for such individuals in a wide range of 
        bilateral and multilateral discussions.

Criminal Justice

Criminal Justice

                            Criminal Justice

                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, PRC officials 
continued to use the criminal justice system and other forms of 
detention to arbitrarily detain individuals. As of February 
2023, the human rights monitor group Rights Defense Network 
documented 1,486 cases of active detention, which it estimated 
to be a small fraction of the total number of political and 
religious prisoners in China.\1\ Institutionally, the judiciary 
is unambiguously political, as the chief justice of the Supreme 
People's Court (SPC) called for absolute loyalty to the Party, 
and continuing political intervention undermines defendants' 
right to a fair trial, especially in political cases.

                     Lack of Judicial Independence

    As then SPC Chief Justice Zhou Qiang delivered the court's 
work report in March 2023, he reiterated the regulatory 
requirement that judicial officers must be absolutely loyal to 
the Party and to General Secretary Xi Jinping.\2\ Evidence of 
the judiciary taking orders from the Party was seen in the case 
of citizen journalist Fang Bin, whom the Jiang'an District 
People's Court in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, convicted 
and sentenced in connection with his reporting of COVID-19 
death tolls in Wuhan around February 2020.\3\ According to a 
leaked document, the Party Central Committee Political and 
Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC) recommended the specific 
criminal offense to invoke and the length of sentence to 
impose, both of which the court adopted.\4\ In particular, the 
PLAC considered whether Fang should be charged with ``inciting 
subversion of state power'' but opted for the less political-
sounding offense of ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble,'' 
fearing that ``hostile forces'' would accuse the PRC government 
of suppressing COVID-19-related reporting.\5\

                          Arbitrary Detention

    Authorities' use of arbitrary detention, including through 
extralegal or extrajudicial means, did not abate during this 
reporting year. The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
considers a detention arbitrary if 1) it has no legal basis, 2) 
it is used to suppress the exercise of universal human rights, 
3) the detainee's due process rights are violated, 4) asylum 
seekers or refugees are subjected to prolonged detention, or 5) 
the detention is discriminatory on grounds such as religion, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, and political opinion.\6\ 
Arbitrary detention violates international human rights 
standards\7\ and China's Constitution, which prohibits unlawful 
deprivation or restriction of a person's liberty.\8\ All forms 
of arbitrary detention are prohibited under international law, 
including ``detention within the framework of criminal justice, 
administrative detention, detention in the context of migration 
and detention in the health-care settings.'' \9\

                        Extrajudicial Detention

    Types and examples of extrajudicial detention are as 
follows:

                         ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE

    Reports of enforced disappearance continued to emerge this 
past year.\10\ Enforced disappearance is any form of 
deprivation of a person's liberty carried out by the government 
or with its acquiescence, followed by a refusal to acknowledge 
the detention or to disclose the detainee's whereabouts.\11\ 
Examples are as follows:

         Li Yanhe (also known by his pen name Fucha), 
        an editor involved in publishing books banned in China, 
        disappeared after traveling from Taiwan to Shanghai 
        municipality in March 2023 to visit his family.\12\ In 
        April 2023, the spokesperson for the PRC Taiwan Affairs 
        Office confirmed that PRC authorities had detained Li 
        and were investigating him for allegedly ``endangering 
        state security.''\13\
         In October 2022, days before the 20th National 
        Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, physicist Peng 
        Lifa (also known as Peng Zaizhou) staged a solo protest 
        in Beijing municipality, during which he displayed 
        banners on a bridge, speaking out against the 
        government's harsh COVID-19 policies, and demanding 
        political reforms, including Xi Jinping's removal.\14\ 
        Authorities immediately detained Peng, holding him at 
        an undisclosed location.\15\
         Gao Zhisheng, a human rights lawyer, remained 
        missing for more than five years after his 
        disappearance in August 2017.\16\ Previously, 
        authorities sentenced him to three years in prison for 
        ``inciting subversion of state power'' and subjected 
        him to constant surveillance after his release from 
        prison in 2014.\17\

                              BLACK JAILS

    The informal term ``black jail'' refers to buildings such 
as hotels and training centers that government officials or 
their agents use to detain people.\18\ These extralegal 
detention facilities operate under different names, including 
``assistance and service centers'' or ``legal education 
centers.'' \19\ Their existence and use have no legal basis, 
and people detained in such sites--many of whom are 
petitioners\20\ and Falun Gong practitioners\21\--do not know 
when they will be released and do not have any procedural 
protection.\22\
    Some people held in ``black jails'' suffer mistreatment. 
Petitioner Feng Youmiao, for example, was denied access to 
water and daily necessities when she was held in a ``black 
jail'' in February 2023 in Anqing municipality, Anhui province. 
A group of unidentified individuals seized her in Beijing and 
transported her back to Anqing, her hometown, in an apparent 
attempt to stop her from filing complaints about the forcible 
demolition of her property.\23\ Similarly, petitioner Yin 
Dengzhen reported that people who extralegally held her in 
September 2022 in a hotel room in Shiyan municipality, Hubei 
province, beat her and refused to release her despite her 
having suffered from food poisoning, which prevented her from 
eating for two days.\24\ Yin's captors claimed that COVID-19 
measures were the basis of the detention, but it was reportedly 
a stability maintenance measure ahead of the 20th Party 
Congress, given Yin's history of petitioning.\25\

                         PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES

    Forcibly committing individuals without mental illness to 
psychiatric facilities (bei jingshenbing) for acts such as 
expressing political opinions or grievances against the 
government continued during this past year,\26\ despite 
domestic legal provisions prohibiting such abuse.\27\ In 
particular, the U.N. Principles for the Protection of Persons 
with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care 
provide that a ``determination that a person has a mental 
illness shall be made in accordance with internationally 
accepted medical standards'' and must not be based on 
``political . . . or any other reason not directly relevant to 
mental health status.'' \28\
    According to secondary sources examined by nongovernmental 
organization Safeguard Defenders, ``99 people had been locked 
up in psychiatric wards 144 times in the seven years from 2015 
to 2021, covering 109 hospitals in 21 provinces, municipalities 
or regions across China.'' \29\ Legal prohibition appears to be 
ineffective, as ``[d]octors and hospitals are either coerced 
by, or collude with, the authorities by allowing [arbitrary 
detention] to take place.'' \30\ In December 2022, for example, 
authorities in Tianjin municipality committed university 
lecturer Wu Yanan to Tianjin Sheng'an psychiatric facility 
after she voiced support on social media for student 
protesters.\31\ Thereafter, social media posts from Wu's and 
her parents' accounts admitted that Wu was suffering from 
mental illness, but a person familiar with the situation 
doubted the authenticity of the posts, adding that it was 
authorities' attempt to stigmatize someone who dared to speak 
out.\32\

                        ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION

    PRC authorities continued to use administrative detention 
to suppress freedoms such as protest,\33\ movement,\34\ 
religion,\35\ and seeking redress.\36\ Administrative detention 
is one of several types of administrative penalties authorized 
by the PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law and 
the PRC Administrative Punishment Law\37\ and is referenced in 
about 90 domestic laws and regulations.\38\ Some political 
detainees are subjected to further criminal detention and 
prosecution after completion of administrative detention.\39\ 
Examples from this past year are as follows:

         Police in Ha'erbin municipality, Heilongjiang 
        province, ordered Zhang Wangce to serve 10 days of 
        administrative detention after Zhang posted on social 
        media about his experience of being arbitrarily 
        detained in a psychiatric hospital.\40\
         In October 2022, government officials in Lhasa 
        municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region, administratively 
        detained 22 Tibetans to undergo an ``internet security 
        education'' program after they had posted on the 
        internet information about pandemic-related 
        difficulties that people were experiencing.\41\
         In June 2022, domestic security protection 
        officers in Longnan municipality, Gansu province, 
        ordered rights defender Long Kehai to serve 20 days of 
        administrative detention, accusing him of watching 
        violent videos online and disseminating rumors.\42\ 
        Authorities later criminally prosecuted Long and 
        sentenced him to two years in prison based on an 
        indictment alleging that Long ``had abusively scolded 
        the country's leader and the socialist system.'' \43\

                          RETENTION IN CUSTODY

    The PRC Supervision Law\44\ authorizes the National 
Supervisory Commission (NSC) and its local branches to 
investigate suspected official misconduct using methods 
including ``retention in custody'' (liuzhi), an extrajudicial 
form of detention that allows NSC officials to hold individuals 
without legal representation.\45\ The law applies to 
``Communist Party members or public sector personnel--virtually 
anyone working directly or indirectly for the government.'' 
\46\ According to an official report, the Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection and the NSC detained 5,006 persons 
under ``retention in custody'' in 2021 as part of their efforts 
to investigate corruption.\47\
    Individuals retained in custody are held incommunicado and 
some reported being tortured. For example, entrepreneur Mu 
Deming--in the course of appealing his six-year sentence 
imposed by the Shuangjiang County People's Court in Lincang 
municipality, Yunnan province--testified that investigators 
deprived him of sleep, interrogated him for 18 hours each day 
in an interrogation chair, and pressured him by detaining his 
wife, causing him physical and mental harm.\48\ Investigators 
denied having tortured Mu but said that the injuries were 
caused by the ``solemness of liuzhi.'' \49\

                      Abuse of Criminal provisions

    PRC authorities continued to suppress the exercise of 
universal human rights through the use of criminal charges. 
Commonly applied criminal charges include the following:
         Crimes endangering state security is a 
        category of 12 offenses that carry a maximum penalty of 
        life imprisonment and possibly the death penalty and 
        have been lodged against government critics and rights 
        lawyers.\50\
         Picking quarrels and provoking trouble. 
        Authorities used ``picking quarrels and provoking 
        trouble'' under Article 293 of the PRC Criminal Law to 
        punish individuals including petitioners and rights 
        advocates.\51\ Chinese legal experts describe this 
        criminal charge as a ``pocket crime,'' in that it ``is 
        so broadly defined and ambiguously worded that 
        prosecutors can apply it to almost any activity they 
        deem undesirable, even if it may not otherwise meet the 
        standards of criminality.'' \52\ Lawyer and National 
        People's Congress delegate Zhu Zhengfu continued to 
        call for abolishing this criminal offense, as he has 
        since 2008, on grounds that it is vague and may 
        infringe on citizens' free speech right.\53\
         Other Criminal Law provisions. Authorities 
        continued to charge members of religious communities 
        and spiritual movements with ``organizing and using a 
        cult to undermine implementation of the law'' under PRC 
        Criminal Law Article 300.\54\
    In addition, authorities accused individuals of other 
criminal offenses, including ``gathering a crowd to disturb 
social order'' \55\ and ``illegal business activity'' \56\ on 
account of activities protected under international human 
rights standards.\57\

    Additional cases of note from this past year include the 
following.

         Feminist and labor rights advocate Li Qiaochu 
        remained in pretrial detention as of June 2023 on the 
        charge of ``inciting subversion of state power.'' \58\ 
        After taking Li into custody in February 2020, 
        authorities held her incommunicado, releasing her on 
        bail two months later.\59\ They formally arrested her 
        in March 2021, holding her in Linyi municipality, 
        Shandong province, after she had advocated for other 
        detainees and made public the mistreatment that law 
        lecturer and civil society advocate Xu Zhiyong suffered 
        during his detention.\60\ The indictment alleged that 
        Li had maintained a blog for Xu that advocated toppling 
        the socialist system.\61\ As of April 2023, Li was 
        suffering from depression and auditory 
        hallucinations.\62\
         Dong Yuyu, a journalist at Party-run news 
        outlet Guangming Daily, was indicted for ``espionage'' 
        around March 2023.\63\ Authorities in Beijing 
        municipality detained Dong in February 2022 when he was 
        having lunch with a Japanese diplomat, who also was 
        detained.\64\ The Washington, D.C.-based National Press 
        Club in May 2023 issued an open letter signed by 120 
        journalists and academics and called on the PRC 
        government to drop the charge, as ``[m]eetings with 
        foreign diplomats and journalists, as well as 
        fellowships abroad, should not be construed as evidence 
        of espionage . . ..'' \65\
         Beginning in late November 2022, police in 
        Beijing detained people who peacefully protested the 
        government's harsh zero-COVID policy and censorship 
        around it, including Cao Zhixin, Li Yuanjing, Zhai 
        Dengrui, and Li Siqi, on the charge of ``picking 
        quarrels and provoking trouble.'' \66\ [For more 
        information on the late November 2022 protests against 
        the zero-COVID policy, see Chapter 1--Freedom of 
        Expression, Chapter 2--Civil Society, Chapter 6--
        Governance, and Chapter 12--Public Health.]

             Restriction of Liberty of Foreign Individuals

    The PRC government continued to arbitrarily restrict the 
liberty of foreign individuals as leverage to advance its 
political goals,\67\ a practice that has sharply escalated 
since 2018, as observed by the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute (ASPI).\68\ In a report published in August 2020, 
ASPI noted that this type of arbitrary detention often involved 
``enforced disappearances, unusual trial delays, harsh 
punishments, prolonged interrogations and lack of transparency 
to maximise the effects of coercion.'' \69\ Furthermore, 
Chinese authorities are ``known to reinstate Chinese 
citizenship to detainees to prevent them from being repatriated 
. . ..'' \70\
    For example, U.S. citizen Mark Swidan has been in prison 
since 2012, as the Jiangmen Municipal Intermediate People's 
Court in Guangdong province in April 2023 dismissed the appeal 
of his reprieved death sentence stemming from a drug-related 
case that the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found 
to be arbitrary.\71\ In other cases, some foreign nationals who 
are not otherwise held at a detention facility are prevented 
from leaving China, an opaque practice referred to as an ``exit 
ban.'' \72\ Such bans can be the result of a civil lawsuit or 
part of the government's effort to pressure overseas relatives 
to return to China for law enforcement investigations.\73\ 
About 30 U.S. citizens are currently estimated to be subject to 
an exit ban, as in the case of Henry Cai, whom authorities have 
prevented from leaving China since 2017 in connection with two 
civil cases that he previously was unaware of and for business 
debts that he said were not his.\74\

                           Torture and Abuse

    Reports indicate that the practice of torture and abuse of 
detainees continues in China, a violation of the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, to which China is a signatory.\75\ For example, 
after rights lawyer Zhou Shifeng completed his seven-year 
prison term in September 2022, his relatives relayed that when 
he was held incommunicado in a guesthouse in Tianjin 
municipality between July 2015 and January 2016, armed police 
placed him under constant surveillance and ordered him to 
continually sit on a high stool with only brief periods of 
rest.\76\ After being transferred to Tianjin Municipal Prison, 
Zhou was ordered to sit on the floor and was watched by two 
other inmates.\77\ In an effort to prevent Zhou from drafting 
complaints about his custodial conditions, prison officials 
restrained both his hands and feet with shackles weighing 50 
kilograms.\78\ Additionally, authorities only allowed him to 
call his family twice in seven years, a privilege that other 
inmates enjoyed at least once a month.\79\

                            Death in Custody

    Multiple reports of custodial death emerged this past year, 
including the following:

         In September 2022, Dong Jianbiao died in 
        Chaling County Prison in Zhuzhou municipality, Hunan 
        province, while serving a three-year sentence stemming 
        from a domestic dispute with his ex-wife over how to 
        help their daughter Dong Yaoqiong, whom authorities 
        forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital after she 
        had splashed ink onto a poster of General Secretary Xi 
        Jinping in 2018.\80\ At the morgue, Dong Jianbiao's 
        family observed extensive bruises and bleeding in the 
        anus, contradicting authorities' assertion that Dong 
        had died of diabetes.\81\ Domestic security protection 
        officers demanded that the body be cremated within five 
        days and detained Chen Siming, who had publicized 
        Dong's injuries.\82\
         In December 2022, Falun Gong practitioner Pang 
        Xun died in custody in Jiazhou Prison in Leshan 
        municipality, Sichuan province, while serving a five-
        year sentence in connection with disseminating Falun 
        Gong materials.\83\ Authorities claimed that Pang died 
        from hyperthyroidism, but his body showed what appeared 
        to be ``electric baton marks, bruises, and binding 
        marks'' and signs of incontinence.\84\

           Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location

    PRC authorities continued to abuse the form of detention 
known as ``residential surveillance at a designated location'' 
(RSDL), which the PRC Criminal Procedure Law reserves for 
situations where the detainee does not have a permanent 
residence or if the case involves state security or 
terrorism.\85\ The law does not provide for the right to family 
visits, requiring only that the family be notified of the fact 
of the detention within 24 hours if possible; it does not 
require the disclosure of the detention location.\86\ The law 
further subjects counsel visits to approval by the 
investigation unit.\87\ A group of U.N. experts deemed it 
``analogous to incommunicado and secretive detention and 
tantamount to enforced disappearance,'' which heighten the risk 
of torture and abuse.\88\ Given the measure's lack of effective 
oversight and legal certainty, some experts have called for it 
to be abolished.\89\
    Some reports indicate that authorities tortured detainees 
during RSDL and used the measure without invoking the criminal 
offenses that warrant its application. For example, police in 
Xi'an municipality, Shaanxi province, detained local Christians 
Lian Changnian, his son Lian Xuliang, and Fu Juan on the charge 
of ``fraud'' in connection with church activities and detained 
them under RSDL between August 2022 and February 2023.\90\ 
During detention, police reportedly beat them, deprived them of 
food, and denied them access to a bathroom.\91\ As of June 
2023, Lian Changnian and the others continued to be held in 
pretrial detention.\92\ In addition to religious practitioners, 
authorities also enforced RSDL on people who exercised their 
right to free speech.\93\ In June 2022, for example, police in 
Yantai municipality, Shandong province, detained Sun Fugui 
(also known as Sun Jian) under RSDL after Sun posted on social 
media content that referenced the violent suppression of the 
1989 Tiananmen protests.\94\ Previously, the university that 
Sun studied at expelled him for posting protest videos online 
and criticizing the school's handling of the COVID-19 
pandemic.\95\ Sources do not show that authorities charged Sun 
with criminal offenses relating to state security or terrorism, 
the two grounds under which RSDL may be legally applied.\96\

                  Denial of Counsel and Family Visits

    The Commission observed cases in which PRC authorities 
denied detainees the right to counsel and family visits, in 
violation of international law.\97\ While domestic legal 
provisions permit counsel and family visits, they do not 
describe such visits as rights.\98\ In particular, the PRC 
Criminal Procedure Law does not provide for family visits per 
se but permits visitation only if the family member is acting 
as a defense representative.\99\ The law likewise circumscribes 
counsel visits during the investigation phase of a case if it 
involves state security, requiring prior permission by relevant 
authorities.\100\
    Authorities did not allow rights lawyer Xie Yang to meet 
with his lawyer until May 2023, over a year after police in 
Changsha municipality, Hunan province, took him into custody in 
January 2022 for showing support for a teacher whom authorities 
committed to a psychiatric hospital.\101\ In another case, in 
May 2023, authorities refused to allow an aunt to visit He 
Fangmei's two minor children, whom authorities had detained in 
Gongji Psychiatric Hospital in Xinxiang municipality, Henan 
province.\102\ Authorities detained He Fangmei and her husband, 
Li Xin, in October 2020, because they began petitioning, 
calling for stricter government regulations after their elder 
daughter was rendered disabled due to a defective vaccine.\103\ 
He Fangmei's younger daughter was born in and never left the 
psychiatric hospital, and sources do not indicate that the 
children suffer from mental illness.\104\

                           The Death Penalty

    China continued to lead the world in the number of 
executions conducted in 2022, according to Amnesty 
International's 2022 annual report on death sentences and 
executions.\105\ Amnesty International estimated the number of 
executions in China to be somewhere in the thousands, but this 
figure could not be substantiated by official sources due to 
the lack of transparency, as PRC authorities deem death penalty 
information to be a ``state secret.'' \106\ Under the PRC 
Criminal Law, a total of 46 crimes carry the death penalty, 
nearly half of which are nonviolent crimes.\107\ In October 
2022, two U.N. experts avowed that the imposition of the death 
penalty in nonviolent crimes ``fail[ed] the `most serious 
crime' standard for the application of capital punishment under 
international law.'' \108\
    Under PRC law, nonviolent crimes that carry the death 
penalty include corruption offenses, which are susceptible to 
being abused to serve political objectives. In its 2022 report, 
Amnesty International identified 10 cases in which former 
officials were convicted on corruption charges and were 
sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve.\109\ Among them 
were high-ranking Party officials Sun Lijun and Fu Zhenghua, 
who were sentenced in September 2022.\110\ According to a U.S.-
based scholar, the timing of Fu's sentence--imposed before the 
20th Party Congress in mid-October--was ``no coincidence, and 
was intended as a warning to Xi's rivals and detractors within 
the highest echelons of the CCP.'' \111\

                          Legal Developments 

    In October 2022, the Supreme People's Court and three other 
official bodies issued an opinion directing their counterparts 
at the provincial level to implement a pilot program in 
selected prefecture-level municipalities to provide defense 
counsel for eligible criminal defendants.\112\ The pilot 
program was the latest development in an initiative that began 
in October 2017, which provided criminal defendants in eight 
provinces with legal representation during trial.\113\ The new 
pilot program extended coverage to pretrial stages, including 
investigation and indictment.\114\ It also complemented the 
plea leniency system, which reportedly has been used in over 85 
percent of criminal cases since its establishment in 2018.\115\

Criminal Justice

Criminal Justice

    Notes to Chapter 4--Criminal Justice

    \1\ Rights Defense Network, ``Weiquan Wang: Zhongguo dalu zaiya 
zhengzhifan, liangxinfan yuedu baogao (2023 nian 2 yue 28 ri) di 89 qi 
(gong 1486 ren) (yi)'' [Rights Defense Network: Monthly report on 
political prisoners and prisoners of conscience detained in mainland 
China (February 28, 2023) No. 89 (total 1,486 persons) (I)], February 
28, 2023.
    \2\ Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhengfa Gongzuo Tiaoli [Chinese Communist 
Party Regulations on Political-Legal Work], effective January 13, 2019, 
arts. 7, 8; Supreme People's Court, ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo 
baogao'' [Work Report of the Supreme People's Court], March 7, 2023, 
27.
    \3\ Rights Defense Network, ``Hubei Wuhan gongmin jizhe, renquan 
hanweizhe Fang Bin zao mimi shenpan huoxing 3 nian de jueding laizi 
Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengfawei de zhijie bushu fayuan jiushi baishe 
yifa zhiguo jiushi xiaohua'' [Hubei Wuhan citizen journalist Fang Bin 
was tried in closed proceedings and was sentenced to 3 years in prison. 
The case was arranged directly by the Central PLAC and the court was 
only going through the motions, illustrating that rule-based governance 
is a joke], April 23, 2023.
    \4\ Rights Defense Network, ``Hubei Wuhan gongmin jizhe, renquan 
hanweizhe Fang Bin zao mimi shenpan huoxing 3 nian de jueding laizi 
Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengfawei de zhijie bushu fayuan jiushi baishe 
yifa zhiguo jiushi xiaohua'' [Hubei Wuhan citizen journalist Fang Bin 
was tried in closed proceedings and was sentenced to 3 years in prison. 
The case was arranged directly by the Central PLAC and the court was 
only going through the motions, illustrating that rule-based governance 
is a joke], April 23, 2023.
    \5\ Rights Defense Network, ``Hubei Wuhan gongmin jizhe, renquan 
hanweizhe Fang Bin zao mimi shenpan huoxing 3 nian de jueding laizi 
Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengfawei de zhijie bushu fayuan jiushi baishe 
yifa zhiguo jiushi xiaohua'' [Hubei Wuhan citizen journalist Fang Bin 
was tried in closed proceedings and was sentenced to 3 years in prison. 
The case was arranged directly by the Central PLAC and the court was 
only going through the motions, illustrating that rule-based governance 
is a joke], April 23, 2023.
    \6\ See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention at its 78th session, (19-27 April 2017), A/HRC/WGAD/2017/5, 
July 28, 2017.
    \7\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, 
art. 9; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 9.
    \8\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xian Fa [PRC Constitution], passed 
and effective December 4, 1982, amended March 11, 2018, art. 37.
    \9\ U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, Deliberation No. 11 on Prevention of Arbitrary Deprivation 
of Liberty in the Context of Public Health Emergencies, May 8, 2020, 
para. 7.
    \10\ ``Taiwan Baqi Wenhua zongbian yi zai Zhongguo shilian Luweihui 
biao guanzhu'' [Chief editor of Taiwan Baqi Culture believed to have 
been disappeared in China, Mainland Affairs Council expresses 
concerns], Radio Free Asia, April 20, 2023.
    \11\ U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on 
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Addendum, Best Practices on 
Enforced Disappearances in Domestic Criminal Legislation, A/HRC/16/48/
Add.3, December 28, 2010.
    \12\ ``Taiwan Baqi Wenhua zongbian yi zai Zhongguo shilian Luweihui 
biao guanzhu'' [Chief editor of Taiwan Baqi Culture believed to have 
been disappeared in China; Mainland Affairs Council expresses 
concerns], Radio Free Asia, April 20, 2023; Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, ``China: Immediately Release Detained Journalists on World 
Press Freedom Day,'' May 1, 2023.
    \13\ Yin Yanhui, ``Guotaiban: Li Yanhe shexian congshi weihai 
guojia anquan huodong zhengzai jieshou guojia anquan jiguan diaocha'' 
[State Council Taiwan Affairs Office: Li Yanhe was under investigation 
by state security authorities on suspicion of endangering state 
security], Global Times, April 26, 2023.
    \14\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Peng Lifa (Peng Lifa),'' 
December 29, 2022.
    \15\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Winners Named for the 2023 
Cao Shunli Memorial Award for Human Rights Defenders: Xu Qin and Peng 
Lifa,'' March 14, 2023.
    \16\ ``Zhongguo yiyi renshi Gao Zhisheng turan cong jiali shizong'' 
[Chinese dissident Gao Zhisheng suddenly disappeared from his home], 
Radio Free Asia, August 14, 2017; Michael Bristow, ``Gao Zhisheng 
shizong wu nian BBC zhuanfang Geng He: `Wo beipo zai zhangfu he haizi 
zhijian zuo xuanze' ''[Five years after Gao Zhisheng's disappearance; 
Geng He says in a BBC exclusive interview: ``I was forced to make a 
choice between my husband and my child''], BBC, November 19, 2022.
    \17\ ``Zhongguo yiyi renshi Gao Zhisheng turan cong jiali shizong'' 
[Chinese dissident Gao Zhisheng suddenly disappeared from his home], 
Radio Free Asia, August 14, 2017; Michael Bristow, ``Gao Zhisheng 
shizong wu nian BBC zhuanfang Geng He: `Wo beipo zai zhangfu he haizi 
zhijian zuo xuanze' '' [Five years after Gao Zhisheng's disappearance; 
Geng He says in a BBC exclusive interview: ``I was forced to make a 
choice between my husband and my child''], BBC, November 19, 2022.
    \18\ ``Zhongguo heijianyu daguan'' [Overview of black jails in 
China], Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2019.
    \19\ ``Zhongguo heijianyu daguan'' [Overview of black jails in 
China], Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2019.
    \20\ See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Ren Chunhua bei 
guan `xuexiban' zao nueda'' [Ren Chunhua detained in ``study class,'' 
suffered beating], August 10, 2021.
    \21\ See, e.g., Li Chencai, ``Hebei Honghe binguan she heijianyu 
geng duo neimu xianwei renzhi'' [Hotel in Honghe, Hebei, has black jail 
installed, more rarely known inside information], Epoch Times, November 
17, 2021.
    \22\ ``Zhongguo heijianyu daguan'' [Overview of black jails in 
China], Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2019.
    \23\ Rights Defense Network, ``Anhui nu fangmin Feng Youmiao zai 
Jing bei bangjia hui qiujin heijianyu yuqing shehui guanzhu'' [Female 
petitioner Feng Youmiao from Anhui is sent back from Beijing, held in 
black jail; calls on public to pay attention to the case], February 5, 
2023.
    \24\ Rights Defense Network, ``Hubei weiquan renshi Yin Dengzhen 
bei qiujin heijianyu yi shi tian yi shiwu zhongdu'' [Hubei rights 
defender Yin Dengzhen has been detained for ten days, believed to be 
suffering from food poisoning], September 19, 2022.
    \25\ Rights Defense Network, ``Hubei weiquan renshi Yin Dengzhen 
bei qiujin heijianyu yi shi tian yi shiwu zhongdu'' [Hubei rights 
defender Yin Dengzhen has been detained for ten days, believed to be 
suffering from food poisoning], September 19, 2022.
    \26\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Mental Torture: China Is Locking Up 
Critics in Psychiatric Facilities,'' August 16, 2022.
    \27\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingshen Weisheng Fa [PRC Mental 
Health Law], passed October 26, 2012, effective May 1, 2013, arts. 27, 
29, 30, 32, 75(5), 78(1); Supreme People's Procuratorate, Renmin 
Jianchayuan Qiangzhi Yiliao Zhixing Jiancha Banfa (Shixing) [Measures 
on the Examination of Implementation of Compulsory Medical Treatment by 
People's Procuratorates (Trial)], issued May 13, 2016, effective June 
2, 2016, arts. 9, 12.
    \28\ Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness 
and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care, adopted by U.N. General 
Assembly resolution 46/119 of December 17, 1991, principle 4(1), (2).
    \29\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Mental Torture: China Is Locking Up 
Critics in Psychiatric Facilities,'' August 16, 2022.
    \30\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Mental Torture: China Is Locking Up 
Critics in Psychiatric Facilities,'' August 16, 2022.
    \31\ Yitong Wu, ``Punishment for Supporting Protests: Philosophy 
Lecturer Sent to Psychiatric Hospital,'' Radio Free Asia, December 15, 
2022. For more information on Wu Yanan, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2022-00205.
    \32\ Yitong Wu, ``Punishment for Supporting Protests: Philosophy 
Lecturer Sent to Psychiatric Hospital,'' Radio Free Asia, December 15, 
2022.
    \33\ Rights Defense Network, ``Weiquanwang qianglie yaoqiu 
Zhonggong liji shifang quanbu `Baizhi Kangyi' yundong zhong bei bu 
renshi'' [Rights Defense Network strongly demands that the CCP 
immediately release everyone who was detained during the ``White Paper 
Protest'' movement], January 5, 2023.
    \34\ ``Chujing hou fanguo liangming Zhongguo Jidutu zao pan `touyue 
guojing zui' '' [Two Chinese Christians convicted of ``illegal border 
crossing'' after returning to the country from abroad], Radio Free 
Asia, November 7, 2022.
    \35\ ChinaAid Association, ``Shanxi dangju chongji Taiyuan Xuncheng 
Guizheng Jiaohui ertong xialingying, An Yankui chuandaoren deng si ren 
bei xingzheng juliu'' [Shanxi authorities attack the summer school of 
Xuncheng's Reformed Church, four people including An Yankui 
administratively detained], July 27, 2023.
    \36\ Rights Defense Network, ``Liaoning fangmin Li Xiaodong yin 60 
tian nei sanci shangfang bei gong'an juliu qi tian'' [Petitioner Li 
Xiaodong from Liaoning detained for seven days by public security 
officials for petitioning three times within 60 days], January 15, 
2023.
    \37\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhi'an Guanli Chufa Fa [PRC Public 
Security Administration Punishment Law], passed August 28, 2005, 
amended October 26, 2012, effective January 1, 2013, art. 10; Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa [PRC Administrative Penalty Law], 
passed March 17, 1996, amended January 22, 2021, effective July 15, 
2021, art. 9.
    \38\ Ministry of Public Security, Weifan Gong'an Xingzheng Guanli 
Xingwei de Mingcheng ji Qi Shiyong Yijian [Opinion on the Titles and 
Applicable Laws for Public Security Administrative Violations], issued 
August 6, 2020.
    \39\ See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Hunan 
chuandaoren yin juhui bei juliu zhuan xingju'' [Preacher in Hunan 
detained for gathering transferred to criminal detention], June 12, 
2023.
    \40\ Rights Defense Network, ``Ha'erbin gongmin Zhang Wangce yin 
zai baoguang Ha'erbinshi Nangang jingcha bei juliu 10 ri'' [Zhang 
Wangce, citizen of Harbin, detained for 10 days for exposing [unlawful 
conduct] by police in Nangang, Harbin], June 11, 2023.
    \41\ Rights Defense Network, ``Xizang Zizhiqu Lasa shushi ren yin 
fabu yiqing dongtai xinxi ji zao juliu jieshou `wangluo anquan jiaoyu' 
'' [Dozens of people in Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region, are detained 
for disseminating dynamic pandemic control information, receive 
``internet security education''], October 15, 2022.
    \42\ Rights Defense Network, ``Gansu Huixian minzhu weiquan renshi 
Long Kehai zai Chengdu zao qiangxing qianfan juliu'' [Democracy and 
rights advocate Long Kehai from Hui county, Gansu province, is detained 
after being forcibly returned from Chengdu], June 27, 2022. For more 
information on Long Kehai, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2019-00490.
    \43\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Long Kehai yin Tuite yanlun 
huoxing liang nian'' [Long Kehai sentenced to two years for speech on 
Twitter], February 10, 2023.
    \44\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law], 
passed and effective March 20, 2018.
    \45\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law], 
passed and effective March 20, 2018, art. 22.
    \46\ Amnesty International, ``China: New Supervision Law a Systemic 
Threat to Human Rights,'' March 20, 2018.
    \47\ ``Zhao Leji zai shijiu jie Zhongyang Jiwei liu ci quanhui 
shang de gongzuo baogao'' [Zhao Leji presents work report at the Sixth 
Plenary Session of the Nineteenth Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection], February 24, 2022.
    \48\ ``Qiyejia tongchen zao xingxun shoushang, Jianchawei renyuan: 
Zheshi liuzhi yansuxing dai lai de'' [Entrepreneur painfully recounts 
experience of being injured due to torture, Supervision Commission 
officials say: This is caused by the serious nature of liuzhi], Sina, 
August 16, 2022.
    \49\ ``Qiyejia tongchen zao xingxun shoushang, Jianchawei renyuan: 
Zheshi liuzhi yansuxing dai lai de'' [Entrepreneur painfully recounts 
experience of being injured due to torture, Supervision Commission 
officials say: This is caused by the serious nature of liuzhi], Sina, 
August 16, 2022.
    \50\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, arts. 102-5, 107-13.
    \51\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended and effective November 4, 
2017, art. 293; Luo Xiang, ``Pocket Monsters: How `Pocket Crimes' Warp 
China's Legal System,'' Sixth Tone, January 7, 2019.
    \52\ Luo Xiang, ``Pocket Monsters: How `Pocket Crimes' Warp China's 
Legal System,'' Sixth Tone, January 7, 2019; Frances Eve, Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders, ``Twitter Becomes Chinese Government's Double Weapon: 
Punishing Dissent and Propagating Disinformation,'' May 11, 2020.
    \53\ ``Zhongguo Lianghui: Renda daibiao Zhu Zhengfu chixu tiyi 
quxiao xunxin zishi zui `dingxing yanzhong quefa yansu xing' '' [Two 
Sessions in China: NPC delegate Zhu Zhengfu continues to call for 
abolishing picking quarrels and provoking troubles as a criminal 
offense, saying that ``the definition seriously lacks integrity''], 
BBC, March 2, 2023.
    \54\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended and effective November 4, 
2017, art. 300; U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 
``2023 Annual Report,'' April 2023.
    \55\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ```Yin `Baizhi Kangyi 
Yundong' zai Beijing bei zhuabu reng bei jiya de Li Siqi nushi 
xiangguan xinxi'' [Information relating to Ms. Li Siqi, who was taken 
into custody and detained in connection with the ``White Paper Protest 
Movement''], January 26, 2023.
    \56\ See, e.g., ``Anhui Wuhu jiaohui `feifa jingying' an kaiting 
Xuande Xuetang liang jiaoshi bei jianshi juzhu'' [Court hearing 
commences in the case concerning ``illegal business activities'' 
charges against a church in Wuhu, Anhui; two teachers from Xuande 
Academy subjected to residential surveillance], Radio Free Asia, 
January 15, 2023.
    \57\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, 
art. 18, 19, 20; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 18, 19, 21.
    \58\ ``Li Qiaochu an zaici bei gezhi Li bingqing yanzhong'' [The 
case of Li Qiaochu is adjourned again; Li's poor health condition is 
serious], Radio Free Asia, June 22, 2023. For more information about Li 
Qiaochu, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2020-
00129.
    \59\ Independent Chinese PEN Center, ``Zhuming renquan hanweizhe 
nuquan renshi Li Qiaochu jinri shengri yi bei jiya jin 2 nian'' [Today 
is the birthday of renowned human rights defender and feminist Li 
Qiaochu, who has been in detention for nearly 2 years], January 13, 
2023.
    \60\ Independent Chinese PEN Center, ``Zhuming renquan hanweizhe 
nquan renshi Li Qiaochu jinri shengri yi bei jiya jin 2 nian'' [Today 
is the birthday of renowned human rights defender and feminist Li 
Qiaochu, who has been in detention for nearly 2 years], January 13, 
2023. For more information on Xu Zhiyong, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2005-00199.
    \61\ Independent Chinese PEN Center, ``Zhuming renquan hanweizhe 
nuquan renshi Li Qiaochu jinri shengri yi bei jiya jin 2 nian'' [Today 
is the birthday of renowned human rights defender and feminist Li 
Qiaochu, who has been in detention for nearly 2 years], January 13, 
2023.
    \62\ ``Li Qiaochu an zaici bei gezhi Li bingqing yanzhong'' [The 
case of Li Qiaochu is adjourned again; Li's poor health condition is 
serious], Radio Free Asia, June 22, 2023.
    \63\ ``Guanya yunian `Guangming Ribao' pinglunbu fu zhuren Dong 
Yuyu bei kong jiandie zui'' [Dong Yuyu, deputy director of the opinion 
section of ``Guangming Daily'' who has been detained for more than a 
year, accused of espionage], Radio Free Asia, April 25, 2023.
    \64\ ``Guanya yunian `Guangming Ribao' pinglunbu fu zhuren Dong 
Yuyu bei kong jiandie zui'' [Dong Yuyu, deputy director of the opinion 
section in ``Guangming Daily'' who has been detained for more than a 
year, accused of espionage], Radio Free Asia, April 25, 2023.
    \65\ National Press Club, ``National Press Club Leadership Signs 
Open Letter On Chinese Journalist Yuyu Dong,'' May 31, 2023.
    \66\ Rights Defense Network, ``Baizhi Yundong zhong zai Beijing zao 
zhuabu de Cao Zhixin, Li Yuanjing, Zhai Dengrui, Li Siqi si ren yi 
huoshi'' [Cao Zhixin, Li Yuanjing, Zhai Dengrui, and Li Siqi, who were 
detained in Beijing in connection with the White Paper movement, have 
been released], April 20, 2023.
    \67\ Daren Nair and Harrison Li, ``Free Kai Li, American Held in 
China,'' October 13, 2021, in Pod Hostage Diplomacy; Michael Martina, 
``Exclusive: American Barred from Leaving China Returned to U.S. before 
Biden-Xi Meeting,'' Reuters, November 18, 2021; James Griffiths, 
``Which Canadians Are Left in Chinese Prisons?,'' Globe and Mail, 
September 28, 2021.
    \68\ Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, ``Opinion: There Is Nothing 
Diplomatic about Hostage Diplomacy,'' Star, March 10, 2021; Fergus 
Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie, Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, ``The Chinese Communist Party's Coercive Diplomacy,'' Policy 
Brief, Report No. 36/2020.
    \69\ Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie, Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, ``The Chinese Communist Party's Coercive 
Diplomacy,'' Policy Brief, Report No. 36/2020.
    \70\ Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie, Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, ``The Chinese Communist Party's Coercive 
Diplomacy,'' Policy Brief, Report No. 36/2020.
    \71\ Jennifer Hansler and Nectar Gan, ``US `Disappointed' by 
Chinese Court's Decision to Uphold Death Sentence for American 
Citizen,'' CNN, April 14, 2023; U.N. Human Rights Council, Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 72/2019 concerning Mark 
Swidan (China), A/HRC/WGAD/2019/72, February 5, 2020.
    \72\ James T. Areddy and Brian Spegele, ``Dozens of Americans Are 
Barred from Leaving China, Adding to Tensions,'' Wall Street Journal, 
November 13, 2022.
    \73\ James T. Areddy and Brian Spegele, ``Dozens of Americans Are 
Barred from Leaving China, Adding to Tensions,'' Wall Street Journal, 
November 13, 2022.
    \74\ James T. Areddy and Brian Spegele, ``Dozens of Americans Are 
Barred from Leaving China, Adding to Tensions,'' Wall Street Journal, 
November 13, 2022.
    \75\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted by U.N. General 
Assembly resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 
26, 1987; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), accessed July 6, 2023. China signed the 
CAT on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988.
    \76\ ``Zhou Shifeng qi nian laoyu yu qinren tonghua jin liang ci 
fadai wushi jin jiaoliao'' [Zhou Shifeng allowed to talk to his family 
members only two times over his seven-year prison term; ordered to wear 
shackles weighing fifty kilograms as punishment], Radio Free Asia, 
December 15, 2022.
    \77\ ``Zhou Shifeng qi nian laoyu yu qinren tonghua jin liang ci 
fadai wushi jin jiaoliao'' [Zhou Shifeng allowed to talk to his family 
members only two times over his seven-year prison term; ordered to wear 
shackles weighing fifty kilograms as punishment], Radio Free Asia, 
December 15, 2022.
    \78\ ``Zhou Shifeng qi nian laoyu yu qinren tonghua jin liang ci 
fadai wushi jin jiaoliao'' [Zhou Shifeng allowed to talk to his family 
members only two times over his seven-year prison term; ordered to wear 
shackles weighing fifty kilograms as punishment], Radio Free Asia, 
December 15, 2022.
    \79\ ``Zhou Shifeng qi nian laoyu yu qinren tonghua jin liang ci 
fadai wushi jin jiaoliao'' [Zhou Shifeng allowed to talk to his family 
members only two times over his seven-year prison term; ordered to wear 
shackles weighing fifty kilograms as punishment], Radio Free Asia, 
December 15, 2022.
    \80\ Gao Feng and Yitong Wu, ``Father of Woman Who Splashed Xi 
Jinping Poster with Ink Dies Suddenly in Jail,'' Radio Free Asia, 
September 26, 2022; `` `Pomo nuhai' fuqin Dong Jianbiao yuzhong 
quanshen shang siwang guobao yaoqiu 5 ri nei huohua'' [Dong Jianbiao, 
father of ``Ink Splash Girl,'' died in prison with injuries all over 
his body; domestic security protection personnel demanded cremation 
within 5 days], Channel C HK, September 26, 2022.
    \81\ Gao Feng and Yitong Wu, ``Father of Woman Who Splashed Xi 
Jinping Poster with Ink Dies Suddenly in Jail,'' Radio Free Asia, 
September 26, 2022; `` `Pomo nuhai' fuqin Dong Jianbiao yuzhong 
quanshen shang siwang guobao yaoqiu 5 ri nei huohua'' [Dong Jianbiao, 
father of ``Ink Splash Girl,'' died in prison with injuries all over 
his body; domestic security protection personnel demanded cremation 
within 5 days], Channel C HK, September 26, 2022.
    \82\ Gao Feng and Yitong Wu, ``Father of Woman Who Splashed Xi 
Jinping Poster with Ink Dies Suddenly in Jail,'' Radio Free Asia, 
September 26, 2022; `` `Pomo nuhai' fuqin Dong Jianbiao yuzhong 
quanshen shang siwang guobao yaoqiu 5 ri nei huohua'' [Dong Jianbiao, 
father of ``Ink Splash Girl,'' died in prison with injuries all over 
his body; domestic security protection personnel demanded cremation 
within 5 days], Channel C HK, September 26, 2022. For more information, 
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2018-00343 on 
Dong Yaoqiong, 2018-00413 on Dong Jianbiao, and 2020-00174 on Chen 
Siming.
    \83\ Rights Defense Network, ``Yuan Sichuan Sheng Renmin Guangbo 
Diantai zhuchiren, Falun Gong xueyuan Pang Xun zai yu zhong zao pohai 
zhisi'' [Former host of Sichuan Provincial People's Broadcast and 
Television Station and Falun Gong practitioner Pang Xun died in prison 
from persecution], February 13, 2023; Rights Defense Network, ``Huoxing 
5 nian bing zao Zhonggong dangju canku pohai cansi yuzhong de yuan 
Sichuan Renmin Guangbo Dianshitai zhuchiren Falun Gong xueyuan Pang Xun 
de jianli'' [Brief biography of former host of Sichuan People's 
Broadcast and Television Station and Falun Gong practitioner Pang Xun, 
who died in prison as a result of cruel persecution by Chinese 
Communist authorities while serving a 5-year sentence], February 16, 
2023; ``30-Year-Old Falun Gong Practitioner Beaten to Death in 
Prison,'' Falun Info, February 14, 2023. For more information on Pang 
Xun, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-
00065.
    \84\ Rights Defense Network, ``Yuan Sichuan Sheng Renmin Guangbo 
Diantai zhuchiren, Falun Gong xueyuan Pang Xun zai yu zhong zao pohai 
zhisi'' [Former host of Sichuan Provincial People's Broadcast and 
Television Station and Falun Gong practitioner Pang Xun died in prison 
from persecution], February 13, 2023; Rights Defense Network, ``Huoxing 
5 nian bing zao Zhonggong dangju canku pohai cansi yuzhong de yuan 
Sichuan Renmin Guangbo Dianshitai zhuchiren Falun Gong xueyuan Pang Xun 
de jianli'' [Brief biography of former host of Sichuan People's 
Broadcast and Television Station and Falun Gong practitioner Pang Xun, 
who died in prison as a result of cruel persecution by Chinese 
Communist authorities while serving a 5-year sentence], February 16, 
2023; ``30-Year-Old Falun Gong Practitioner Beaten to Death in 
Prison,'' Falun Info, February 14, 2023.
    \85\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 
2018, art. 75.
    \86\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 
2018, art. 75.
    \87\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 
2018, art. 75.
    \88\ U.N. Human Rights Council, ``Mandates of the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention; the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special 
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of 
association; the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
defenders; the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and 
lawyers; the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy; the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; and the Special 
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment,'' OL CHN 15/2018, August 24, 2018.
    \89\ Letter from Mandate of the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention et al., OL CHN 15/2018, August 24, 2018; Letter Mandate of 
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders et 
al., AL CHN 16/2020, August 13, 2020; China Human Rights Lawyers 
Concern Group, ``It's No Secret that China's Residential Surveillance 
in Designated Location is Secret Detention,'' Jurist, December 16, 
2020; Guo Shuo, ``Lun zuowei `chao yiya shouduan' de zhiding jusuo 
jianshi juzhu zhidu'' [Discussion on the system of residential 
surveillance at a designated location, a system known as ``a measure 
that goes beyond detention''], Wuhan University Journal 69, no. 6 
(November 2016): 119-25; Hu Yingshuai and Ye Gengqing, ``Zhiding jusuo 
jianshi juzhu feichu zhi biyao'' [The necessity of abolishing 
residential surveillance at a designated location], website of Lawyer 
Zhou Chuikun, reprinted in Sohu, March 14, 2020.
    \90\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Xi'an Fengsheng Jiaohui 
zaici bei yanqi jiya'' [Detentions of people in Xi'an Fengsheng Church 
case are again extended], June 22, 2023.
    \91\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Xi'an Fengsheng Jiaohui 
zaici bei yanqi jiya'' [Detentions of people in Xi'an Fengsheng Church 
case are again extended], June 22, 2023.
    \92\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Xi'an Fengsheng Jiaohui 
zaici bei yanqi jiya'' [Detentions of people in Xi'an Fengsheng Church 
case are again extended], June 22, 2023.
    \93\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zao Zhonggong dangju qiangpo shizong 
bannian de yuan Ludong Daxue shuoshi yanjiusheng Sun Fugui huoshi'' 
[Former Ludong University graduate student Sun Fugui released after 
being forcibly disappeared for half a year by Chinese Communist 
authorities], February 1, 2023.
    \94\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zao Zhonggong dangju qiangpo shizong 
bannian de yuan Ludong Daxue shuoshi yanjiusheng Sun Fugui huoshi'' 
[Former Ludong University graduate student Sun Fugui released after 
being forcibly disappeared for half a year by Chinese Communist 
authorities], February 1, 2023.
    \95\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zao Zhonggong dangju qiangpo shizong 
bannian de yuan Ludong Daxue shuoshi yanjiusheng Sun Fugui huoshi'' 
[Former Ludong University graduate student Sun Fugui released after 
being forcibly disappeared- for half a year by Chinese Communist 
authorities], February 1, 2023.
    \96\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Zao Zhonggong dangju 
qiangpo shizong bannian de yuan Ludong Daxue shuoshi yanjiusheng Sun 
Fugui huoshi'' [Former Ludong University graduate student Sun Fugui 
released after being forcibly disappeared by Chinese Communist 
authorities], February 1, 2023.
    \97\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 14(3)(b); United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Mandela Rules), 
adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2015/20, A/C.3/70/L.3, 
September 29, 2015, rules 58, 61; Body of Principles for the Protection 
of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by 
U.N. General Assembly resolution 43/173 of December 9, 1988, principles 
18, 19.
    \98\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Kanshousuo Tiaoli [PRC Public 
Security Detention Center Regulations], issued and effective March 17, 
1990, arts. 28, 32; Kanshousuo Liusuo Zhixing Xingfa Zuifan Guanli 
Banfa [Management Measures for Carrying Out Punishment in Public 
Security Detention Centers], passed August 20, 2013, effective November 
23, 2013, arts. 45, 46; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jianyu Fa [PRC Prison 
Law], passed and effective December 29, 1994, art. 48; Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed July 
1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 2018, arts. 38, 39, 293.
    \99\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 
2018, arts. 33(3), 39.
    \100\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 
2018, art. 39.
    \101\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Xie Yang (Xie Yang),'' 
September 6, 2016. For more information on Xie Yang, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00295.
    \102\ Rights Defense Network, ``Ge renquan jigou lianshu: Huyu wei 
zai Zhongguo bei guanzai jingshen bingyuan liang nian duo de 6 sui he 2 
sui nuhai caiqu jinji xingdong de gongkaixin'' [Joint letter by various 
human rights organizations: Open letter calling for urgent action for 
the 6- and 2-year-old girls who have been detained in a psychiatric 
hospital in China for more than two years], July 8, 2023.
    \103\ Rights Defense Network, ``Ge renquan jigou lianshu: Huyu wei 
zai Zhongguo bei guanzai jingshenbingyuan liang nian duo de 6 sui he 2 
sui nuhai caiqu jinji xingdong de gongkaixin'' [Joint letter by various 
human rights organizations: Open letter calling for urgent action for 
the 6- and 2-year-old girls who have been detained in a psychiatric 
hospital in China for more than two years], July 8, 2023.
    \104\ Rights Defense Network, ``Ge renquan jigou lianshu: Huyu wei 
zai Zhongguo bei guanzai jingshenbingyuan liang nian duo de 6 sui he 2 
sui nuhai caiqu jinji xingdong de gongkaixin'' [Joint letter by various 
human rights organizations: Open letter calling for urgent action for 
the 6- and 2-year-old girls who have been detained in a psychiatric 
hospital in China for more than two years], July 8, 2023.
    \105\ Amnesty International, ``Death Sentences and Executions 
2022,'' Amnesty International Global Reports, ACT 50/6548/2023, May 16, 
2023, 21.
    \106\ Amnesty International, ``Death Sentences and Executions 
2022,'' Amnesty International Global Reports, ACT 50/6548/2023, May 16, 
2023, 6, 24.
    \107\ China Against the Death Penalty, reprinted in World Coalition 
Against the Death Penalty, ``The Status Quo of China's Death Penalty 
and the Civil Society Abolitionist Movement,'' February 15, 2022.
    \108\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``UN 
Experts Warn of Associated Torture and Cruel Punishment,'' October 10, 
2022.
    \109\ Amnesty International, ``Death Sentences and Executions 
2022,'' Amnesty International Global Reports, ACT 50/6548/2023, May 16, 
2023, 26.
    \110\ ``Former Chinese Deputy Police Minister Sentenced for 
Graft,'' Associated Press, September 23, 2022; William Zheng, ``Former 
Chinese Justice Minister Fu Zhenghua Jailed for Life for Corruption,'' 
South China Morning Post, September 22, 2022.
    \111\ Tang Yuanyuan, ``Xi Jinping `Warns His Opponents' with 
Suspended Death Sentences to Former Top Cops,'' Radio Free Asia, 
September 23, 2022.
    \112\ Supreme People's Court et al., Gaofayuan Gaojianyuan 
Gong'anbu Sifabu guanyu jinyibu shenhua xingshi anjian lushi bianhu 
quan fugai shidian gongzuo de yijian [Opinion of Supreme People's 
Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and 
Ministry of Justice concerning the pilot program to further deepen the 
work on the complete coverage for legal defense in criminal cases], 
issued October 12, 2022.
    \113\ Supreme People's Court et al., Gaofayuan Gaojianyuan 
Gong'anbu Sifabu guanyu jinyibu shenhua xingshi anjian lushi bianhu 
quan fugai shidian gongzuo de yijian [Opinion of Supreme People's 
Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and 
Ministry of Justice concerning the pilot program to further deepen the 
work on the complete coverage for legal defense in criminal cases], 
issued October 12, 2022.
    \114\ Supreme People's Court et al., Gaofayuan Gaojianyuan 
Gong'anbu Sifabu guanyu jinyibu shenhua xingshi anjian lushi bianhu 
quan fugai shidian gongzuo de yijian [Opinion of Supreme People's 
Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and 
Ministry of Justice concerning the pilot program to further deepen the 
work on the complete coverage for legal defense in criminal cases], 
issued October 12, 2022.
    \115\ Supreme People's Court et al., Gaofayuan Gaojianyuan 
Gong'anbu Sifabu guanyu jinyibu shenhua xingshi anjian lushi bianhu 
quan fugai shidian gongzuo de yijian [Opinion of Supreme People's 
Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and 
Ministry of Justice concerning the pilot program to further deepen the 
work on the complete coverage for legal defense in criminal cases], 
issued October 12, 2022; Xu Hanqing, ``Chen Weidong: Shixian xin shidai 
xingshi bianhu de gao zhiliang fazhan'' [Chen Weidong: Achieving the 
high quality development of criminal defense in the new era], Legal 
Daily, December 2, 2022.

Access to Justice

Access to Justice

                           Access to Justice

                                Findings

         In the annual work report delivered in March 
        2023 at the meeting of the National People's Congress, 
        Supreme People's Court (SPC) President Zhou Qiang 
        emphasized the Chinese Communist Party's absolute 
        leadership over the judiciary and reported having 
        endeavored to strengthen political loyalty, protect 
        political security, and educate court personnel about 
        safeguarding Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's core 
        leadership position. Rather than promoting judicial 
        independence, reform efforts focused on improving 
        organizational and bureaucratic efficiency in 
        accordance with the Party's plans. While the work 
        report claimed there had been improvements to judicial 
        transparency, authorities had removed a significant 
        number of judgments from an online judgment disclosure 
        database, particularly in the areas of criminal cases 
        and administrative litigation.
         Central authorities further formalized the 
        Party's leadership in the petitioning system as part of 
        an institutional reform that aimed at extending the 
        Party's control over society as a whole. The 
        petitioning system (xinfang) operates outside of the 
        formal legal system as a channel for citizens to 
        present their grievances in hopes of triggering 
        discretionary involvement by Party officials in 
        providing a resolution. Under a recently announced 
        institutional reform plan, the government agency that 
        oversaw petitioning was to be led by a functional 
        department of the Party that coordinates and guides 
        work relating to petitions and collecting citizens' 
        suggestions.
         Petitioners continued to face persecution in 
        the form of arbitrary detention in extralegal 
        facilities. Some of those detained suffered 
        mistreatment, including physical assault and electric 
        shock.
         The space for human rights lawyers to operate 
        continued to shrink in the wake of a nationwide 
        crackdown that began in July 2015. As of February 2023, 
        at least 14 human rights lawyers were under different 
        forms of restrictions on their personal liberty: 1 
        lawyer was missing, 4 were serving prison terms, and 9 
        were being held in pre-sentencing detention.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Call attention to the arbitrary detention of rights 
        lawyers such as Ding Jiaxi, Xu Zhiyong, Chang Weiping, 
        Li Yuhan, Chen Jiahong, Qin Yongpei, Yu Wensheng, and 
        Xie Yang, and urge the Chinese government to 
        unconditionally exonerate them and other similarly 
        situated lawyers.
          Highlight and discuss with Chinese officials cases of 
        human rights lawyers such as Liang Xiaojun, Xu Zhiyong, 
        Lin Qilei, Xie Yang, Lu Siwei, Ren Quanniu, and Xi 
        Xiangdong, whose law licenses were revoked or whose 
        ability to practice law was otherwise restricted 
        because of their legal representation and advocacy in 
        cases that Chinese authorities deemed politically 
        sensitive.
          Continue to designate and impose sanctions under the 
        Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 
        United States Code Sec. Sec.  10101-103) on Chinese 
        officials responsible for arbitrarily detaining or 
        otherwise persecuting petitioners, human rights 
        lawyers, and advocates.
          Urge the Chinese government to protect the 
        fundamental civil and professional rights of China's 
        lawyers, investigate all allegations of abuse against 
        them, and ensure that those responsible for abuse are 
        brought to justice.
          Urge the Chinese government to end all forms of 
        harassment or persecution against the family members of 
        human rights lawyers and advocates, including 
        surveillance and restrictions on their freedom of 
        movement.

Access to Justice

Access to Justice

                           Access to Justice

                              Introduction

    The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), which China signed and expressed its intention to 
ratify,\1\ provides that all persons are equal before the 
courts; it also obligates a State Party to ensure that people 
have enforceable legal remedies for any violation of the rights 
and freedoms recognized in the convention, even if the 
violation has been committed by an official.\2\ While China's 
Constitution recognizes certain universal human rights,\3\ 
citizens do not have any legal channel through which to assert 
or protect them.\4\ Moreover, instances of ongoing persecution 
of human rights lawyers and political control over the 
judiciary and the legal profession are inconsistent with the 
relevant ICCPR provisions.

             Lack of Judicial Independence and Transparency

    In the annual work report delivered in March 2023 at the 
meeting of the National People's Congress, Supreme People's 
Court (SPC) President Zhou Qiang emphasized the Chinese 
Communist Party's absolute leadership over the judiciary and 
reported having endeavored to strengthen political loyalty, 
protect political security, and educate court personnel about 
safeguarding Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's core 
leadership position.\5\ Rather than promoting judicial 
independence, reform efforts focused on improving 
organizational and bureaucratic efficiency in accordance with 
the Party's plans.\6\
    The report also claimed that authorities had established an 
open and transparent judiciary, citing the establishment of a 
court judgment disclosure database and a court hearing 
broadcasting platform.\7\ Experts who regularly used the 
judgment disclosure database, however, observed a marked 
decline in the number of judgments available, especially in 
criminal and administrative cases.\8\ A decline that began 
before February 2022 continued as of March 2023, as a 
practitioner in China noted that only 31 judgments in 
administrative proceedings were available in 2023, a decline 
from 554,534 in 2019. \9\ The practitioner noted that before 
the judgments were pulled from the database, the SPC stopped 
publishing administrative litigation judgments in 2021, a 
practice followed by province-level high people's courts in 
2022.\10\

                    Reform of the Petitioning System

    Central authorities further formalized the Party's 
leadership of the petitioning system as part of institutional 
reforms aimed at extending the Party's control over society as 
a whole. The petitioning system (xinfang), also known as the 
``letters and visits system,'' is overseen by the National 
Public Complaints and Proposals Administration (Guojia 
Xinfangju; NPCPA). NPCPA operates outside of the formal legal 
system as a channel for citizens to present their grievances in 
hopes of triggering discretionary involvement by Party 
officials in providing a resolution.\11\ Traditionally, 
although petitioners rarely saw any results, the system 
remained widely used, especially among people who lacked the 
financial means to file court cases.\12\ Besides treating 
xinfang as an alternative to litigation, some petitioners used 
it to challenge unfavorable court judgments, which created a 
conflict with the court and increased the workload on the 
petitioning system.\13\ To address the issue, the PRC in 2013 
began to require cases to be resolved through legal channels 
such as litigation, arbitration, and administrative review, 
unless a case fell outside of areas covered by existing 
laws.\14\ Despite being a government entity, the NPCPA in May 
2022 began to be governed by regulations passed by the Party, 
which recognized xinfang as an important aspect of the Party's 
work on the masses.\15\
    As announced in a March 2023 institutional reform plan, the 
Party and the government jointly elevated the NPCPA to an 
organization directly under the State Council rather than one 
that was managed through its general office.\16\ The NPCPA is 
led by the newly created Social Affairs Work Department, a 
functional department of the Party that coordinates and guides 
work relating to petitions and collecting citizens' 
suggestions.\17\ The new department is additionally tasked with 
pushing Party objectives among non-Party entities such as 
industry associations, private enterprises, and newly emerging 
economic and social organizations.\18\ A Central Party School 
professor explained that the Social Affairs Work Department 
unified functions from several government bodies to strengthen 
the Party's comprehensive leadership through all levels of 
government.\19\ A U.S.-based analyst observed that the new 
department was designed to target petitioners and extend the 
Party's control to non-state entities.\20\

                       Persecution of Petitioners

    PRC authorities continued to harass petitioners and 
restrict their liberty, especially around major events such as 
the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 
October 2022 and the annual meeting of the National People's 
Congress in March 2023.\21\ Radio Free Asia reported in 
September 2022 that authorities had erected metal barriers 
around the NPCPA building, a move that multiple interviewees 
said they had not seen before.\22\ Around that time, some 
petitioners were expelled from Beijing municipality by police 
or were prevented from traveling there after their health code 
(a zero-COVID measure) was arbitrarily changed from green to 
red.\23\ Authorities likewise restricted the movement of 
dissidents by placing them under surveillance or forcing them 
to travel elsewhere, lifting such measures only after the 
conclusion of the national event.\24\

    Multiple petitioners suffered mistreatment during 
detention; for example--

         According to an October 2022 report, in 2020, 
        prison authorities in Shenyang No. 1 Municipal Prison 
        in Liaoning province reportedly subjected Lin Mingjie 
        to electric shocks at least twice, including by placing 
        an electrode in his mouth.\25\ Lin began petitioning 
        because of the unjust demolition of his family's home 
        and detention of his brother.\26\ Authorities had 
        sentenced Lin twice--in 2018 and in 2020--on the charge 
        of ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble'' in 
        connection with his petitioning.\27\ His case in 2020 
        also involved the charge of ``unlawful use of an 
        information network.'' \28\ After his detention in 
        2019, authorities prevented counsel visits for over 
        nine months.\29\
         Tong Bin, a petitioner in Wuchang district, 
        Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, suffered five 
        broken ribs from an assault carried out by a group of 
        ``social maintenance workers'' as he walked out of a 
        court building, after having filed a complaint in 
        August 2022 concerning the unlawful demolition of his 
        home.\30\ The assailants had warned Tong not to sue the 
        department responsible for the demolition, which Tong 
        ignored.\31\
         In July 2022, police in Beijing summoned Liu 
        Hongxia for questioning after she established a 
        workshop helping other petitioners produce video 
        recordings of their complaints.\32\ The next day, 
        officials from Liu's hometown in Zhengzhou 
        municipality, Henan province, physically assaulted Liu 
        before returning her to Zhengzhou, where they detained 
        her in a hotel room.\33\ Previously, Liu helped produce 
        videos, including one in support of complaints against 
        the NPCPA head and another one commemorating a rights 
        defender who died in detention under unknown 
        circumstances.\34\

                   Persecution of Legal Professionals

    Due to authorities' use of criminal prosecution and law 
license revocation, the space for rights lawyers has 
essentially disappeared after the 2015 nationwide ``709 
Crackdown,'' according to lawyers interviewed by Radio Free 
Asia.\35\ Having had their law licenses revoked, some lawyers 
sought employment in fields other than law, and those who 
provided paralegal services faced difficulties or 
unemployment.\36\ According to a tally prepared by the 
organization The 29 Principles, as of February 2023, at least 
14 human rights lawyers were under different forms of 
restrictions on their personal liberty: one lawyer was missing, 
four were serving prison terms, and nine were being held in 
pre-sentencing detention.\37\ The organization also documented 
the cases of many other lawyers who were disbarred or had been 
detained previously.\38\ Some examples of the enforced 
disappearance, sentencing, and pre-sentencing detention of 
human rights lawyers are as follows:

                         ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE

         Gao Zhisheng, a human rights lawyer, remained 
        missing more than five years after his disappearance in 
        August 2017.\39\ Previously, authorities sentenced him 
        to three years in prison for ``inciting subversion of 
        state power'' and subjected him to constant 
        surveillance after his release from prison in 2014.\40\
         Lawyer Tang Jitian was released in January 
        2023, after having been detained by domestic security 
        protection personnel at an undisclosed location in 
        Jilin province for nearly 400 days.\41\ Tang's 
        disappearance occurred in December 2021 when he was 
        preparing to travel to a human rights event hosted by 
        the European Union.\42\

                               SENTENCING

         In April 2023, the Linyi Municipal 
        Intermediate People's Court in Shandong province 
        sentenced lawyer Ding Jiaxi and legal scholar Xu 
        Zhiyong to 12 and 14 years in prison, respectively, on 
        the charge of ``subversion of state power,'' some three 
        years after their initial detentions.\43\ The case was 
        based on their promotion of the China Citizens 
        Movement, which called for a peaceful transition to 
        constitutional governance and full recognition of 
        individuals' status as citizens.\44\ Authorities 
        detained Xu and Ding after they joined a social 
        gathering with like-minded friends in December 2019 in 
        Xiamen municipality, Fujian province.\45\ Some 20 
        participants of the gathering were either detained, 
        summoned repeatedly, or forced into self-exile.\46\ Xu 
        and Ding suffered torture while being held 
        incommunicado, including food and sleep deprivation and 
        prolonged interrogation while being bound to an 
        interrogation chair.\47\ In November 2020, the U.N. 
        Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) noted that 
        ``Xu's political views and . . . his human rights 
        advocacy appear[ed] to be the sole reason for his 
        arrest and detention.'' \48\ Likewise, the WGAD in 
        September 2021 concluded that Ding`s detention was 
        arbitrary and further expressed concern that China's 
        history of human rights violations ``indicates a 
        systemic problem with arbitrary detention in China, 
        which amounts to a serious violation of international 
        law.'' \49\
         In March 2023, the Nanning Municipal 
        Intermediate People's Court in Guangxi Zhuang 
        Autonomous Region, sentenced lawyer Qin Yongpei to five 
        years in prison for ``inciting subversion of state 
        power'' because he organized the ``Disbarred China 
        Lawyers Club'' with other similarly situated lawyers 
        who had lost their law licenses as a result of their 
        rights defense work.\50\ A closed trial was held in 
        December 2021, some two years after his initial 
        detention in October 2019.\51\ In an opinion adopted in 
        August 2022, the WGAD concluded that Qin's detention 
        was arbitrary, and expressed concerns regarding 
        authorities' denial of family visits and overcrowded 
        conditions in Qin's detention facility.\52\ The WGAD 
        further noted that ``under certain circumstances, 
        widespread or systematic imprisonment or other severe 
        deprivation of liberty in violation of the rules of 
        international law may constitute crimes against 
        humanity.'' \53\

                        PRE-SENTENCING DETENTION

         As of April 2023, lawyer Li Yuhan continued to 
        await her sentencing, five and a half years after her 
        initial detention in October 2017.\54\ At the age of 
        74, Li suffered from multiple health conditions that 
        required daily medication, but authorities denied Li's 
        lawyer's multiple applications for medical parole.\55\
         Public interest lawyer Chang Weiping was one 
        of the December 2019 Xiamen gathering participants 
        subjected to arbitrary detention.\56\ Authorities in 
        Baoji municipality, Shaanxi province, released him on 
        bail in January 2020 but detained him again in October 
        2020 after he recounted in a video recording his 
        experience of being tortured during his previous 
        detention.\57\ Authorities charged him with 
        ``subversion of state power'' and denied him counsel 
        visits until September 2021.\58\ Chang told his lawyer 
        that he was again subjected to torture, including sleep 
        and food deprivation, in addition to prolonged 
        interrogation in an interrogation chair, which caused 
        permanent numbness in his fingers and psychological 
        damage.\59\ In July 2022, the Baoji Municipal 
        Intermediate People's Court tried Chang in a closed 
        proceeding, and authorities prevented Chang's family 
        from traveling to the court, using COVID prevention 
        measures as justification.\60\ Chang was sentenced to 
        three years and six months in prison in June 2023, 
        nearly a year after his trial.\61\
         As of March 2023, lawyer Xie Yang remained in 
        pretrial detention after authorities in Changsha 
        municipality, Hunan province, criminally detained him 
        in January 2022 on the charges of ``inciting subversion 
        of state power'' and ``picking quarrels and provoking 
        trouble.'' \62\ Xie's detention took place after he 
        called public attention to the involuntary commitment 
        of a pregnant woman to a psychiatric hospital.\63\
         In September 2022, domestic security 
        protection personnel in Yulin municipality, Guangxi 
        Zhuang Autonomous Region, detained lawyer Chen Jiahong, 
        accusing him of ``picking quarrels and provoking 
        trouble.'' \64\ Chen's detention took place six months 
        after he had completed a three-year prison term for 
        ``inciting subversion of state power,'' and was 
        possibly related to his criticism of the 
        government.\65\
         In April 2023, police detained lawyer Yu 
        Wensheng and his wife Xu Yan, charging them with 
        ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble.'' \66\ A 
        European Union (EU) spokesperson said that the 
        detention took place when the couple was en route to a 
        scheduled meeting with EU officials and that PRC 
        authorities likely were aware of the meeting.\67\ PRC 
        authorities reportedly prevented lawyers from 
        representing the couple.\68\

Access to Justice

Access to Justice

    Notes to Chapter 5--Access to Justice

    \1\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed July 8, 
2023; State Council Information Office, ``Guojia Renquan Xingdong Jihua 
(2016-2020 nian)'' [National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-
2020)], September 29, 2016, sec. 5.
    \2\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 2(3), 14.
    \3\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xian Fa [PRC Constitution], passed 
and effective December 4, 1982, amended March 11, 2018, arts. 33-48.
    \4\ Luoyang Municipal Intermediate People's Court, Henan province, 
Xingzheng Caidingshu [Administrative order], (2018) Yu 03 Xing Zhong 
No. 368, November 28, 2018, reprinted in China Judgments Online, 
January 14, 2019; Thomas E. Kellogg, ``Arguing Chinese 
Constitutionalism: The 2013 Constitutional Debate and the `Urgency' of 
Political Reform,'' University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review 11, no. 
3 (2016): 349; Paul Gewirtz, ``Constitutional Enforcement: Who Should 
Do It and How?,'' China Law Review, 4 (2016): 5.
    \5\ ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao'' [Supreme People's Court 
work report], March 7, 2023, secs. 1, 6.
    \6\ ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao'' [Supreme People's Court 
work report], March 7, 2023, sec. 5.
    \7\ ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao'' [Supreme People's Court 
work report], March 7, 2023, sec. 5.
    \8\ Luo Jiajun and Thomas Kellogg, ``Verdicts from China's Courts 
Used to Be Accessible Online. Now They're Disappearing.,'' ChinaFile, 
Asia Society, February 1, 2022.
    \9\ Luo Jiajun and Thomas Kellogg, ``Verdicts from China's Courts 
Used to Be Accessible Online. Now They're Disappearing.,'' ChinaFile, 
Asia Society, February 1, 2022; ``Xingzheng susong anli: Dang Caipan 
Wenshu Wang buzai gongkai xingzheng susong de caipan wenshu shi . . . 
'' [Administrative litigation case examples: When China Judgments 
Online no longer publishes judgments in administrative litigation 
cases], Weixin, reprinted in China Digital Times, March 22, 2023.
    \10\ ``Xingzheng susong anli: Dang Caipan Wenshu Wang buzai gongkai 
xingzheng susong de caipan wenshu shi . . . '' [Administrative 
litigation case examples: When China Judgments Online no longer 
publishes judgments in administrative litigation cases], Weixin, 
reprinted in China Digital Times, March 22, 2023.
    \11\ Stella Chen, ``Petitioning,'' CMP Dictionary, China Media 
Project, May 20, 2022; Carl F. Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to 
Formal Chinese Legal Institutions,'' Stanford Journal of International 
Law (2006): 105.
    \12\ Lu Dewen, ```Jieju' nu jiaoshi juebi xin shijian: yi tiao 
guiyi de shangfang zhi lu'' [``Solution'' female teacher's last letter 
incident: a strange road of petitioning], People's Daily, August 6, 
2019; Carl F. Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese 
Legal Institutions,'' Stanford Journal of International Law (2006): 
106.
    \13\ Wan Yi, ``Xinfang yu sifa fenli kaoyan sifa quanwei'' 
[Separation of petitioning and judiciary as a test for the authority of 
the judiciary], Beijing Daily, reprinted in National Public Complaints 
and Proposal Administration, May 15, 2014. The National Public 
Complaints and Proposal Administration (Guojia Xinfang Ju) was formerly 
known in English as the National Bureau of Letters and Visits.
    \14\ National Public Complaints and Proposal Administration, 
``Guojia Xinfang Ju jiedu `Yifa Fenlei Chuli Xinfang Suqiu Gongzuo 
Guize' '' [National Public Complaints and Proposal Administration 
interprets ``Regulations for Sorting Petitions in Accordance with 
Law''], May 30, 2019.
    \15\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, 
Xinfang Gongzuo Tiaoli [Regulations on Complaints and Proposals Work], 
passed January 24, 2022, effective May 1, 2022, arts. 34.
    \16\ Jane Cai, ``China Seeks to Tighten Grip with New Social Work 
Department,'' South China Morning Post, March 17, 2023; ``Zhonggong 
Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa `Dang he Guojia jigou gaige fangan'' [Party 
Central Committee and State Council issues Institutional reform plan of 
the Party and State Council], Xinhua, March 16, 2023, sec. 1(4); 
Changhao Wei, Taige Hu, and Zewei (Whiskey) Liao, ``A Guide to China's 
2023 State Council Restructuring,'' NPC Observer, March 23, 2023.
    \17\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa `Dang he Guojia jigou 
gaige fangan'' [Party Central Committee and State Council issues 
``Institutional reform plan of the Party and State Council], Xinhua, 
March 16, 2023; Jane Cai, ``China Seeks to Tighten Grip with New Social 
Work Department,'' South China Morning Post, March 17, 2023.
    \18\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa `Dang he Guojia jigou 
gaige fangan'' [Party Central Committee and State Council issues 
``Institutional reform plan of the Party and State Council''], Xinhua, 
March 16, 2023, sec. 1(4).
    \19\ Ye Hongmei and Zhang Lu, ``Zujian Zhongyang Shehui Gongzuo Bu, 
Zhongyang Keji Weiyuanhui youhe shenyi? Zhuanjia jiedu'' [What are the 
implications for creating the Central Social Affairs Work Department 
and the Central Technology Commission? Experts provide explanations], 
Beijing News, reprinted in 163.com, March 17, 2023.
    \20\ Wu Guoguang, ``Guoshi guangxi: Shehui zhuyi de huapi pi 
buxiaqu le?--Zai ping Zhonggong zujian Zhongyang Shehui Gongzuo Bu'' 
[Guang analyzing national affairs: Can the facade of socialism be 
sustained any longer? Commenting again on the Central Committee's 
establishment of the Central Social Affairs Work Department], Voice of 
America, April 12, 2023.
    \21\ See, e.g., Gu Ting, ``Guojia Xinfang Ju shiwu qianli bei 
weifeng fangmin Ershi Da qijian kong shangfang wumen'' [National Public 
Complaints and Proposals Administration unprecedently cordoned off; 
petitioners worry that there is no place to file petitions during the 
20th Party Congress], Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2022; Gu Ting, 
``Lianghui qianxi Beijing jingfang soubu fangmin bing jiangqi qianfan 
yuanju zhudi'' [Beijing police detain petitioners and return them to 
their place of residence during the Two Sessions], Radio Free Asia, 
February 20, 2023.
    \22\ Gu Ting, ``Guojia Xinfang Ju shiwu qianli bei weifeng fangmin 
Ershi Da qijian kong shangfang wumen'' [National Public Complaints and 
Proposals Administration unprecedently cordoned off; petitioners worry 
that there is no place to file petitions during the 20th Party 
Congress], Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2022.
    \23\ Gu Ting, ``Guojia Xinfang Ju shiwu qianli bei weifeng fangmin 
Ershi Da qijian kong shangfang wumen'' [National Public Complaints and 
Proposals Administration unprecedently cordoned off; petitioners worry 
that there is no place to file petitions during the 20th Party 
Congress], Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2022.
    \24\ Gu Ting, ``Lianghui weiwen jieshu yiyi renshi ji fangmin luxu 
huoshi'' [Social stability maintenance around the Two Sessions ends; 
dissidents and petitioners are being released], Radio Free Asia, March 
15, 2023.
    \25\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Liaoning Lin Mingjie fuxing 
qijian lu zao kuxing'' [Lin Mingjie of Liaoning suffers torture 
repeatedly], October 22, 2022.
    \26\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Liaoning Lin Mingjie fuxing 
qijian lu zao kuxing'' [Lin Mingjie of Liaoning suffers torture 
repeatedly], October 22, 2022.
    \27\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Liaoning Lin Mingjie fuxing 
qijian lu zao kuxing'' [Lin Mingjie of Liaoning suffers torture 
repeatedly], October 22, 2022.
    \28\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Liaoning Lin Mingjie fuxing 
qijian lu zao kuxing'' [Lin Mingjie of Liaoning suffers torture 
repeatedly], October 22, 2022.
    \29\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Liaoning Lin Mingjie fuxing 
qijian lu zao kuxing'' [Lin Mingjie of Liaoning suffers torture 
repeatedly], October 22, 2022.
    \30\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Wuhan fangmin Tong Bin zai 
fayuan bei daduan leigu'' [Wuhan petitioner Tong Bin suffers broken 
ribs from an assault at courthouse], August 6, 2022.
    \31\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Wuhan fangmin Tong Bin zai 
fayuan bei daduan leigu'' [Wuhan petitioner Tong Bin suffers broken 
ribs from an assault at courthouse], August 6, 2022.
    \32\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Liu Hongxia yin bangzhu 
fangmin weiquan bei ouda ruanjin'' [Liu Hongxia was beaten and placed 
in soft detention for helping petitioners defend their rights], July 8, 
2022.
    \33\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Liu Hongxia yin bangzhu 
fangmin weiquan bei ouda ruanjin'' [Liu Hongxia was beaten and placed 
in soft detention for helping petitioners defend their rights], July 8, 
2022.
    \34\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Liu Hongxia yin bangzhu 
fangmin weiquan bei ouda ruanjin'' [Liu Hongxia was beaten and placed 
in soft detention for helping petitioners defend their rights], July 8, 
2022.
    \35\ Kai Di, ``Xi Jinping zhixia de Zhongguo weiquan lushi hai 
sheng duoshao shengcun kongjian?'' [How much space is left for rights 
lawyers in China to survive under Xi Jinping's rule?], Radio Free Asia, 
November 23, 2022.
    \36\ Kai Di, ``Xi Jinping zhixia de Zhongguo weiquan lushi hai 
sheng duoshao shengcun kongjian?'' [How much space is left for rights 
lawyers in China to survive under Xi Jinping's rule?], Radio Free Asia, 
November 23, 2022.
    \37\ The 29 Principles, ``List of Oppressed Chinese Human Rights 
Lawyers (22/2/2023 Updated),'' February 22, 2023.
    \38\ The 29 Principles, ``List of Oppressed Chinese Human Rights 
Lawyers (22/2/2023 Updated),'' February 22, 2023.
    \39\ Wang Yun, ``Zhongguo yiyi renshi Gao Zhisheng turan cong jiali 
shizong'' [Chinese dissident Gao Zhisheng suddenly disappeared from his 
home], Radio Free Asia, August 14, 2017; Michael Bristow, ``Gao 
Zhisheng' shizong wu nian BBC zhuanfang Geng He: `Wo bei po zai zhangfu 
he haizi zhijian zuo xuanze'' [Five years after Gao Zhisheng's 
disappearance; Geng He says in a BBC exclusive interview: ``I was 
forced to make a choice between my husband and my children], BBC, 
November 19, 2022.
    \40\ Wang Yun, ``Zhongguo yiyi renshi Gao Zhisheng turan cong jiali 
shizong'' [Chinese dissident Gao Zhisheng suddenly disappeared from his 
home], Radio Free Asia, August 14, 2017; Michael Bristow, ``Gao 
Zhisheng' shizong wu nian BBC zhuanfang Geng He: `Wo bei po zai zhangfu 
he haizi zhijian zuo xuanze'' [Five years after Gao Zhisheng's 
disappearance; Geng He says in a BBC exclusive interview: ``I was 
forced to make a choice between my husband and my children], BBC, 
November 19, 2022; ``Guoji Teshe piping Zhongguo zaici qiujin Gao 
Zhisheng'' [Amnesty International criticizes China for detaining Gao 
Zhisheng again], BBC, December 6, 2011.
    \41\ Mak Yin-ting, ``Tang Jitian bei wugu guanya jin sibai tian hou 
huoshi'' [Tang Jitian released after being detained for nearly 400 days 
for no reason], Radio France Internationale, January 14, 2023.
    \42\ Mak Yin-ting, ``Tang Jitian bei wugu guanya jin sibai tian hou 
huoshi'' [Tang Jitian released after being detained for nearly 400 days 
for no reason], Radio France Internationale, January 14, 2023.
    \43\ Mak Yin-ting, ``Xu Zhiyong deng liang ming Zhongguo wei quan 
renshi huo zhongxing 14 nian he 12 nian `709' yilai zuizhong'' [Xu 
Zhiyong is one of two Chinese rights defenders to receive heavy 
sentences of 14 and 12 years; heaviest since ``709''], Radio France 
Internationale, April 10, 2023.
    \44\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Release Xu Zhiyong 
and Ding Jiaxi Ahead of U.N. Anti-Torture Day,'' June 16, 2022; Xu 
Zhiyong, ``The Citizens Movement,'' China Change, June 21, 2022.
    \45\ Xue Xiaoshan, `` `Xiamen Juhui An' zhounian huigu (yi): 
Yichang juhui'' [Anniversary review of the ``Xiamen Gathering Case'' 
(I): A gathering], Radio Free Asia, December 23, 2020; Human Rights in 
China, ``Xiamen Juhui An'' [The Xiamen Gathering Case], December 8, 
2021.
    \46\ Xue Xiaoshan, ```Xiamen Juhui An' zhounian huigu (yi): Yichang 
juhui'' [Anniversary review of the ``Xiamen Gathering Case'' (I): A 
gathering], Radio Free Asia, December 23, 2020.
    \47\ Human Rights in China, ``Xiamen Juhui An'' [The Xiamen 
Gathering Case], December 8, 2021; Luo Shengchun (@luoshch), 
``#DingJiaxi zai Yantai bei kuxing zuotian xiawu, Peng Jian lushi 
dengdai jin 48 ge xiaoshi zhongyu di er ci huijian dao Jiaxi! . . . '' 
[#DingJiaxi tortured in Yantai yesterday afternoon, lawyer Peng Jian 
finally met Jiaxi for the second time after waiting for 48 hours! . . . 
], Twitter, February 4, 2021, 9:44 a.m.
    \48\ U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, Opinion No. 82/2020 concerning Xu Zhiyong (China), A/HRC/
WGAD/2020/82, March 2, 2021, para. 74.
    \49\ U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, Opinion No. 30/2021 concerning Ding Jiaxi, Zhang Zhongshun 
and Dai Zhenya (China), A/HRC/WGAD/2021/30, November 12, 2021, paras. 
84-85.
    \50\ Gao Feng, ``Guangxi lushi Qin Yongpei `shan dian' zui cheng 
panqiu wu nian'' [Guangxi lawyer Qin Yongpei sentenced to five years 
for ``inciting subversion''], Radio Free Asia, March 31, 2023; U.N. 
Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
41/2022 concerning Qin Yongpei (China), A/HRC/WGAD/2022/41, September 
28, 2022, para. 25.
    \51\ U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, Opinion No. 41/2022 concerning Qin Yongpei (China), A/HRC/
WGAD/2022/41, September 28, 2022, paras. 8, 14.
    \52\ U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, Opinion No. 41/2022 concerning Qin Yongpei (China), A/HRC/
WGAD/2022/41, September 28, 2022, para. 67.
    \53\ U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, Opinion No. 41/2022 concerning Qin Yongpei (China), A/HRC/
WGAD/2022/41, September 28, 2022, para. 68.
    \54\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Li Yuhan lushi anjian 
zuixin qingkuang'' [Current situation of the case of lawyer Li Yuhan], 
April 16, 2023.
    \55\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Li Yuhan lushi anjian 
zuixin qingkuang'' [Current situation of the case of lawyer Li Yuhan], 
April 16, 2023.
    \56\ Human Rights in China, ``Xiamen Juhui An'' [The Xiamen 
Gathering Case], December 8, 2021.
    \57\ Human Rights in China, ``Xiamen Juhui An'' [The Xiamen 
Gathering Case], December 8, 2021.
    \58\ Human Rights in China, ``Xiamen Juhui An'' [The Xiamen 
Gathering Case], December 8, 2021.
    \59\ Human Rights in China, ``Xiamen Juhui An'' [The Xiamen 
Gathering Case], December 8, 2021.
    \60\ ``Mi shen kaiting zai ji weiquan lushi Chang Weiping de qi er 
jiaren zao weidu'' [Before secret trial begins, wife and child of 
rights lawyer Chang Weiping were surrounded], Radio Free Asia, July 25, 
2022.
    \61\ ``Human Rights Lawyer Chang Weiping Jailed for 3.5 Years by 
China for State Subversion,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Hong 
Kong Free Press, June 9, 2023.
    \62\ Rights Defense Network, ``Weiquan Wang: Zhongguo dalu zaiya 
zhengzhi fan, liangxin fan yuedu baogao (2023 nian 3 yue 31 ri) di 90 
qi (gong 1500 ren) (qi)'' [Rights Defense Network: Monthly report on 
political prisoners and prisoners of conscience currently detained in 
mainland China (March 31, 2023) issue no. 90 (total 1500 persons) (7)], 
March 31, 2023.
    \63\ Rights Defense Network, ``Bei qiangpo shizong de Hunan renquan 
lushi Xie Yang yi zao xingshi juliu'' [Forcibly disappeared Hunan human 
rights lawyer Xie Yang has been criminally detained], January 17, 2022.
    \64\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zao xingshi juliu de Guangxi renquan 
lushi Chen Jiahong yi bei pibu'' [Criminally detained Guangxi human 
rights lawyer Chen Jiahong has been formally arrested], November 16, 
2022; Independent Chinese PEN Centre, ``Chuyu jin bannian Guangxi lushi 
Chen Jiahong zaiyin shufa shenxian lingyu'' [Having been released from 
prison for only half a year, Guangxi lawyer Chen Jiahong is detained 
again for his calligraphy], October 27, 2022.
    \65\ Independent Chinese PEN Centre, ``Chuyu jin bannian Guangxi 
lushi Chen Jiahong zaiyin shufa shenxian lingyu'' [Having been released 
from prison for only half a year, Guangxi lawyer Chen Jiahong is 
detained again for his calligraphy], October 27, 2022.
    \66\ ``Renquan lushi Yu Wensheng ji qizi Xu Yan bei yi xunxin zishi 
zui xingshi juliu'' [Human rights lawyer Yu Wensheng and his wife Xu 
Yan criminally detained on the charge of picking quarrels and provoking 
trouble], Radio Free Asia, April 15, 2023; Gregorio Sorgi, ``China 
Arrests Human Rights Activists En Route to EU Embassy in Beijing,'' 
Politico, April 14, 2023.
    \67\ Gregorio Sorgi, ``China Arrests Human Rights Activists En 
Route to EU Embassy in Beijing,'' Politico, April 14, 2023.
    \68\ Gao Feng, ``EU Lodges Protest over China's Detention of Rights 
Lawyer and Activist Wife,'' Radio Free Asia, April 17, 2023.

Governance

Governance

           V. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

                               Governance

                                Findings

         The PRC moved further away from the collective 
        governance model as Xi Jinping secured a third term as 
        president and general secretary of the Chinese 
        Communist Party, breaking with the established norm of 
        a two-term office designed for peaceful transition of 
        power. Individuals selected to fill other leadership 
        positions had a working relationship with Xi or were 
        described as Xi's loyalists, further reinforcing Xi's 
        political dominance.
         Despite a claimed commitment to promoting 
        democracy, the political system as envisioned by Xi 
        Jinping is fundamentally undemocratic. When delivering 
        his policy objectives, Xi described a political system 
        that was identical to the existing authoritarian system 
        and called it democratic.
         While Xi said community-level self-governance 
        was a manifestation of democracy, it was in fact a grid 
        management system in which communities were divided 
        into discrete units to facilitate monitoring and 
        surveillance. Recent national-level policy that called 
        for the grid to be staffed by police further 
        demonstrated the government's intent on implementing 
        pervasive social control.
         The PRC government's handling of the 
        coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) displayed a pattern 
        of enforcing extreme social control giving rise to a 
        series of mass protests, to which the government 
        responded with censorship and criminal prosecution.
         Harsh COVID-19 measures disrupted people's 
        lives and prompted a series of large-scale protests, 
        where some protesters called for democratic reforms. 
        The government responded by arresting some of the 
        protesters after the fact, particularly targeting those 
        who were deemed to be influenced by ``Western 
        ideology'' or feminism. Shortly after the protests, the 
        government abruptly reversed the COVID-19 policy 
        without proper transitional measures in place, 
        resulting in many preventable deaths.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Support U.S. research programs that document and 
        analyze the governing institutions and ideological 
        campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as 
        its relationship with companies, government agencies, 
        legislative and judicial bodies, and nongovernmental 
        organizations (NGOs).
          Encourage Chinese authorities to ratify the 
        International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
        and release individuals detained or imprisoned for 
        exercising their rights to freedom of speech, 
        association, and assembly.
          Support organizations working in and outside of China 
        that seek to work with local governments and NGOs to 
        improve transparency, especially with regards to 
        efforts to expand and improve China's open government 
        information initiatives.

Governance

Governance

                               Governance

                              Introduction

    Xi Jinping secured a third term for the top offices for the 
government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the 
Chinese Communist Party, substantiating speculations that his 
repressive policies might continue indefinitely.\1\ The past 
year was marked by large scale protests and by the hardship 
that citizens endured due to the government's abrupt and 
unprepared reversal of pandemic control measures. In what may 
be a response to the protests, PRC authorities planned to 
strengthen a nationwide grid management system to enhance its 
capacity to surveil citizens and expanded law enforcement 
efforts in rural areas.

             Xi Jinping Further Solidified Political Power 

    Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) moved farther away from the collective governance 
model this past year. Xi secured his norm-breaking third term 
as the General Secretary and President, having received 
unanimous votes at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party in October 2022 and the 14th National People's 
Congress in March 2023, respectively.\2\ Officials tapped to 
join the Party Central Committee and senior positions in the 
State Council were identified as having close ties with Xi, 
prompting observations that ``[l]oyalty to Xi was clearly the 
first and most important criterion for elite promotion . . ..'' 
\3\ The newly appointed Premier Li Qiang, for example, had 
worked with Xi for decades but lacked experience in the central 
government.\4\ Prior to his appointment, Li enforced Xi's 
signature zero-COVID policy in Shanghai municipality to the 
detriment of the city's economic and social well-being, a 
record that some observers interpreted as a display of loyalty 
to Xi.\5\ Some leadership successions also broke with the 
customary retirement age limit, reportedly to make room for 
Xi's loyalists, and thus reinforcing Xi's political dominance 
and disrupting a mechanism, which according to some was 
designed for peaceful transition of power within a 
nondemocratic system.\6\
    The 20th Party Congress also amended the Party Constitution 
to reflect the Party's policy priorities. Among the changes 
were the addition of language confirming the Party being the 
highest political power, and the phrases ``Four 
Consciousnesses,'' ``Four Matters of Confidence,'' and ``Two 
Safeguards,'' which refer to principles requiring Party members 
to maintain confidence in the socialist system and to uphold 
and follow Xi Jinping as ``the core leader of the Central 
Committee.'' \7\

           Policy Plan Affirmed Undemocratic Political System

    Despite claimed commitment to promoting democracy, the 
political system as envisioned by Xi Jinping is fundamentally 
undemocratic. Prior to assuming his third five-year term as 
Party General Secretary, Xi Jinping delivered a policy plan to 
``[b]asically realize socialist modernization'' by 2035, a 
process that included improvements on ``whole-process people's 
democracy.'' \8\ This term was first coined by Xi in 2019, and 
has since been used in Party propaganda.\9\ The political 
system outlined in the plan mirrors the existing authoritarian 
system, one which the Party controls directly or 
indirectly.\10\
    According to Xi, Chinese citizens exercise state power 
through people's congresses that are democratically elected at 
all levels, and the Party consults citizens' opinion through 
multiparty cooperation and institutions like the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).\11\ He 
additionally called for improvements on community-level self-
governance, which he claimed to be a manifestation of 
democracy.\12\ Appealing to nationalism, Xi expressed the need 
for using the United Front to rally the people's support, 
including uniting overseas Chinese, handling ethnic affairs 
with a ``distinctively Chinese approach,'' and insisting that 
religions ``must be Chinese in orientation . . ..'' \13\
    Contrary to Xi's claims, people's congresses are not 
democratically elected at all levels, and public participation 
at local levels is not only limited but also subject to 
political interference, such as through candidate selection and 
harassment of independent candidates.\14\ In contrast to the 
stated function of soliciting public opinion, the CPPCC is 
tasked with co-opting non-Party members to advance the Party's 
objectives; only eight satellite parties are permitted to 
exist, and all of them are controlled by the Chinese Communist 
Party.\15\ Community-level self-governance to which Xi referred 
is ``essentially a militarisation of society'' in which 
communities are divided into discrete management units subject 
to monitoring and surveillance, as explained by China Media 
Project.\16\ Moreover, Xi's emphasis on the sinicization of 
ethnic minority groups violates the cultural and social rights 
of millions of individuals in China.\17\

         Government's Handling of COVID-19 and Related Protests

    The PRC government's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic 
displayed a pattern of enforcing social control at the expense 
of citizens' well-being, giving rise to a series of mass 
protests, to which the government responded with censorship and 
criminal prosecution. Authorities began imposing zero-COVID 
measures in early 2020 after the initial stage of the outbreak, 
intending to isolate every infected person through methods such 
as mass testing, contact tracing, quarantine facilities, and 
citywide lockdowns.\18\ Authorities started to intensify 
enforcement in March 2022, when a highly transmissible virus 
variant spread across China, affecting millions of people.\19\ 
During these lockdowns, authorities suspended public 
transportation and prohibited citizens from leaving their 
homes, interrupting their access to food, necessities, and 
medical services.\20\ Stores and eateries closed, and dozens of 
private hospitals shut down or declared bankruptcy due to their 
income declining from their efforts to comply with zero-COVID 
directives, which required them to divert resources away from 
non-COVID care.\21\ Some people committed suicide as a result 
of their inability to access health services other than COVID 
treatment.\22\ According to Associated Press, an epidemiologist 
of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention wrote 
in an internal document that excessive controls under the zero-
COVID policy had ``no scientific basis,'' but he publicly 
maintained that the policy was ``absolutely correct'' because 
authorities had ordered him to advocate for it.\23\
    COVID-19 measures likewise posed a public safety hazard. 
For example, ``[p]andemic controls imposed by Chinese 
authorities around, and possibly inside, [an] apartment 
building had delayed [firefighters'] response'' in a fatal fire 
in Urumqi municipality, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 
according to people close to the incident; although the 
government denied such claims.\24\
    The fire in Urumqi followed a series of protests against 
harsh and disproportionate COVID measures, including the solo 
protest staged by Peng Lifa (also known as Peng Zaizhou).\25\ 
On October 13, 2022--three days before the opening of the 20th 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party--Peng hung 
banners from Sitong Bridge in Beijing municipality that 
criticized the government's harsh COVID-19 measures and called 
for political reforms and Xi Jinping's resignation.\26\ 
Authorities immediately detained Peng, removed the banners, and 
censored social media posts about the protest.\27\ Despite 
censorship, Peng's message spread across China, partly through 
graffiti and peer-to-peer connectivity such as Apple's Airdrop 
functionality.\28\ As news of the deadly fire in Urumqi on 
November 24 spread, impromptu vigils shifted into protests 
against the excesses of zero-COVID policy measures. Thereafter, 
thousands of people joined protests in at least 18 cities and 
79 higher education institutions across China,\29\ many of whom 
held up blank sheets of paper to show defiance in the face of 
censorship, giving rise to the name White Paper protests and 
similar variations.\30\ Some protesters also called for Xi's 
resignation in a rare direct attack on the country's 
leadership.\31\
    About a week after the nationwide protests, the government 
lifted key aspects of the zero-COVID policy, effectively 
reversing the zero-COVID policy.\32\ The abrupt policy reversal 
presented a new set of challenges that the Chinese government 
was not adequately prepared for, such as the surge in COVID 
infections and deaths.\33\ As of March 2023, the World Health 
Organization's (WHO) data showed sharp increases in confirmed 
cases and deaths beginning in mid-December 2022, coinciding 
with the policy reversal.\34\ Factors including low vaccination 
rate among seniors, and shortages in hospital supplies and 
staff contributed to many deaths that some experts said could 
have been avoided.\35\ Funeral homes saw a steep increase in 
demand,\36\ and health officials in Beijing reported that 
``emergency services were overwhelmed with more than 30,000 
calls per day.'' \37\ In his Spring Festival remarks to the 
nation in January 2023, Xi Jinping acknowledged the healthcare 
shortages in rural areas, exhorting local cadres to be of 
assistance.\38\ A U.S.-based health expert explained that the 
zero-COVID policy had exacerbated the situation because ``the 
government controlled distribution . . . had left rural 
hospitals and clinics undersupplied.'' \39\ Rural residents did 
not receive sufficient support from Party cadres, and one 
villager complained that ``the government's presence has almost 
disappeared'' after reopening.\40\
    Nevertheless, the government's presence was felt by some 
White Paper protesters as authorities hastened efforts to 
detain them beginning in mid-December 2022.\41\ According to 
one tally, police had detained over 100 people as of February 
2023, with a significant number of them being women.\42\ 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders observed that some of the 
detentions seemed to be aimed at ``punishing youth with 
`Western ideology' or connection to `feminists.' '' \43\ Among 
those detained on criminal charges were Cao Zhixin, Li Siqi, Li 
Yuanjing, and Zhai Dengrui, whom PEN International and 24 other 
rights groups said were being held by PRC authorities in 
violation of their fundamental rights of free expression and 
peaceful assembly.\44\

                Government's Response to Other Protests

    Besides the White Paper protests, other large-scale 
protests took place across China, prompted by grievances 
concerning issues important to people's daily lives, including 
bank savings, housing, and healthcare. Freedom House 
``documented 668 incidents of protest and other dissent in 
mainland China from June to September 2022.\45\ Of these, 77 
percent were demonstrations, marches, and obstructing roads.'' 
\46\ Despite authorities' efforts to ``reduce the ability of 
citizens to mobilize,'' ``people manage[d] to form 
decentralized movements that increase the impact of their 
dissent.'' \47\ Some illustrative examples are as follows:
         In July 2022, over 1,000 people gathered in 
        Zhengzhou municipality, Henan province, as part of a 
        series of protests based on allegations that several 
        rural banks had frozen their deposits since April.\48\ 
        Police detained over 200 protesters, and a group of 
        unidentified people wearing white t-shirts (who were 
        reportedly deployed by the government) forcibly 
        dispersed the peaceful protesters, beating some of 
        them.\49\ Despite censorship, video footage of the 
        violent dispersal circulated on the internet, prompting 
        public criticism.\50\ Earlier in June, the Zhengzhou 
        Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision 
        said it had disciplined five officials for tampering 
        with COVID-19 health codes trying to prevent bank 
        customers from traveling to Zhengzhou.\51\
         Also in July 2022, about 200 homebuyers 
        gathered in front of the China Banking and Insurance 
        Regulatory Commission branch office in Wuhan 
        municipality, Hubei province, to ask the government to 
        address the growing issue of real estate developers 
        being unable to complete construction of apartments 
        that they had presold and that homebuyers had been 
        paying a mortgage on.\52\ The protest was part of a 
        larger boycott in which homebuyers in some 342 
        incomplete projects threatened to stop mortgage 
        payments unless the construction was completed on 
        schedule.\53\ Authorities responded with censorship, 
        and a protest involving over 1,000 people in Xi'an 
        municipality, Shaanxi province, went unreported in 
        Chinese media and online sources.\54\ Local police 
        ``maintained social stability'' by means including 
        calling a homebuyer repeatedly to ask her not to 
        complain to higher authorities in Beijing and 
        transporting protesters, through deceit or force, away 
        from the protest site by bus.\55\
         In February 2023, retirees in at least three 
        cities protested changes in the public health insurance 
        program that they perceived as having disadvantaged 
        them.\56\ The changes excluded many types of medication 
        and reduced the amount of medical expense 
        reimbursement, but these cuts reportedly did not affect 
        government officials.\57\ Although authorities did not 
        use force to disperse the protests, they took people 
        into custody after the fact, including Zhang Hai, who 
        publicly expressed support and reposted video footages 
        of the protests.\58\
    [For more information on the protests, see Chapter 1--
Freedom of Expression, Chapter 2--Civil Society, and Chapter 
12--Public Health.]

                     Strengthening Grid Management

    The series of large-scale protests may have led the PRC 
government to further bolster the existing social control 
apparatuses, including the grid management system, which 
divides communities into discrete units to facilitate 
surveillance and monitoring.\59\ In explaining how the protests 
were possible under the PRC's pervasive social control, a 
scholar surmised that the system might be ineffective in 
quelling society-wide discontent given the large amount of 
manpower required for monitoring people.\60\ In an apparent 
attempt to address the deficiency,\61\ the Ministry of Public 
Security issued a three-year plan in March 2023 and declared a 
commitment to increase investment in the grid management 
system.\62\ The three-year plan called for strengthening police 
presence in communities by increasing the number of grid-style 
local police stations and by assigning one police officer to 
each village or grid unit by 2025.\63\ While the plan did not 
specify the size of each grid unit, it could comprise 15 to 20 
households based on existing practice.\64\ The plan encompassed 
duties, such as correcting bad behavior of youths, intervening 
in family disputes and resolving couple conflicts.\65\ Police 
also were tasked with training lay citizens into ``volunteer 
police'' to help achieve community self-governance.\66\ While 
some localities had promoted similar initiatives before, it was 
``the first time these requirements have been made at the 
national level,'' according to South China Morning Post.\67\ 
Previously, grid managers were not required to be police 
officers, as indicated by a 2018 job posting.\68\
    The establishment of the new National Data Bureau may have 
an impact on the grid management system, given that 
digitization and informatization are central features of 
it.\69\ In a March 2023 joint institutional reform plan, the 
Party and the PRC government created the National Data Bureau, 
to be managed by the National Development and Reform 
Commission, a State Council department.\70\ The new bureau is 
tasked with pushing forward the national strategic plan called 
``Digital China,'' of which grid management is a component, 
according to an expert.\71\ One analyst noted that there were 
18 local data authorities previously, and creating a new 
national entity could help ``coordinate disjointed local data 
policies.'' \72\

                             Rural Policies

    As central authorities rolled out a food security campaign, 
local officials--operating in a tightening grid management 
system--destroyed farmers' crops to force conformity with 
national goals. A policy document released jointly by the Party 
Central Committee and the State Council in February 2023 
emphasized the importance of food security and laid out nine 
objectives aimed at increasing agricultural output.\73\ 
Prioritizing rural development, central authorities called for 
building a robust Party-led rural administration system under 
which Party cadres are to promote obedience to the Party and to 
visit people's homes to bolster the grassroots level ``self-
governance'' system that relies on grid management.\74\
    The document also stressed the need for protecting and 
strictly controlling the use of farmland,\75\ the 
implementation of which, however, may have contributed to the 
abuse of power by rural management officers (nongguan) of local 
administrative units known as ``rural comprehensive 
administrative law enforcement brigades.'' \76\ Established 
pursuant to a 2018 central directive, the brigades are tasked 
with enforcement duties in all aspects of agricultural 
production and are authorized to impose coercive measures 
including administrative detention.\77\ The planting season of 
spring 2023 was the first mass public deployment of rural 
management officers, who reportedly destroyed crops and 
confiscated livestock in carrying out the food security 
campaign.\78\ China Change, a U.S.-based organization that 
monitors human rights in China, observed that, in the face of 
the government's push to boost grain production, poultry and 
fish farmers and those who grow other types of crops have 
become targets of the crackdown.\79\

               Online Movement Exposed Corrupt Practices

    Public outcry over a violent crime led to an uptake of 
citizens using the internet to voice their grievances, some of 
which involved alleged collusion between police and criminals; 
while authorities addressed some of these claims, at least one 
complainant suffered retribution. Widely circulated video 
footage of a violent gender-based attack perpetrated by 
suspected gang members that took place in June 2022 in Tangshan 
municipality, Hebei province, drew public concern.\80\ A report 
prepared by the provincial government concluded that the 
police's handling of the case was ``slow and improper,'' and 
some people ``wondered if local police were involved with local 
criminal figures.'' \81\ Following the incident, at least two 
other people in Tangshan used online platforms to recount their 
experiences of also having been victims of crimes, to which 
local police responded by detaining the alleged perpetrators as 
part of a half-month-long campaign against crime (although it 
is unclear how the campaign was different from regular law 
enforcement duties).\82\ Internet users elsewhere followed 
suit, among them police officers, including some who reported 
incidents in which their superiors allegedly tampered with 
evidence to shield perpetrators from criminal liability.\83\
    In one example, Liu Jian, a police officer in Bengbu 
municipality, Anhui province, made a post on social media 
saying that over ten officials beat him, destroyed evidence, 
and later tried to discredit him by spreading rumors that he 
was mentally ill.\84\ He said he reported the incident to 
authorities to no avail.\85\ After the post, the Central 
Political and Legal Affairs Commission and Ministry of Public 
Security verified Liu's claims, but public security officials 
in Anhui detained him in August 2022 on a criminal charge.\86\

                        PRC Counterespionage Law

    In April 2023, the National People's Congress Standing 
Committee amended the PRC Counterespionage Law, expanding the 
scope of the law's application.\87\ The law invokes the concept 
of a ``holistic view of national security,'' \88\ which covers 
over 20 broad categories including political, economic, 
cultural, social, data, and food security.\89\ The amendment 
inserts a clause to prohibit illicit gathering of materials 
``relating to national security and national interest,'' \90\ 
which one scholar described as ``unworkably vague on its face'' 
and noted that it would give security authorities broad 
discretion.\91\ Observers expressed concern that the amended 
law would further restrict legitimate information gathering 
activities by due diligence professionals and journalists.\92\

Governance

Governance

    Notes to Chapter 6--Governance

    \1\ PEN America, ``Freedom to Write Index 2022,'' April 2, 2023; 
Qin Gang and Cheryl Tung, ``China's Congress Gives Nod to Third 
Presidential Term for Supreme Leader Xi Jinping,'' Radio Free Asia, 
March 10, 2023.
    \2\ ``Linghang xin shidai xin zhengcheng xin huihuang de jianqiang 
lingdao jiti--Dang de xin yijie zhongyang lingdao jigou chansheng 
jishi'' [Collective leadership that takes the lead in navigating in the 
new era, new journey, and new glory--A record of how the new central 
Party leadership group came into being], Xinhua, October 24, 2022; ``Xi 
Jinping quanpiao dangxuan guojia zhuxi zhongyang junwei zhuxi'' [Xi 
Jinping unanimously elected the nation's president and military 
commission chairman], Global Times, March 10, 2023.
    \3\ See, e.g., Chris Buckley et al., ``China's Communist Party 
Congress for His 3rd Term, Xi Jinping Surrounds Himself with 
Loyalists,'' New York Times, October 30, 2022;Cheng Li and Mallie 
Prytherch, ``China's New State Council: What Analysts Might Have 
Missed,'' Brookings Institution, March 7, 2023.
    \4\ Cheng Li and Mallie Prytherch, ``China's New State Council: 
What Analysts Might Have Missed,'' Brookings Institution, March 7, 
2023; Vivian Wang, ``China Appoints Li Qiang, a Xi Loyalist, as 
Premier,'' New York Times, March 11, 2023.
    \5\ Vivian Wang, ``China Appoints Li Qiang, a Xi Loyalist, as 
Premier,'' New York Times, March 11, 2023; Keith Bradsher and Chang 
Che, ``China's New Premier Needs to Revive Growth. How Far Will Loyalty 
Get Him?,'' New York Times, March 13, 2023; Huizhong Wu, ``China's 
Other Top Leaders Bring Loyalty to Xi, Experience,'' Associated Press, 
March 8, 2023.
    \6\ ``Decoding the 20th Party Congress,'' Asia Society Policy 
Institute, accessed June 14, 2023; Ling Li, ``The Hidden Significance 
and Resilience of the Age-Limit Norm of the Chinese Communist Party,'' 
Asia-Pacific Journal 20, no. 19 (December 15, 2022).
    \7\ Zhongguo Gongchandang Dangzhang [Chinese Communist Party 
Constitution], passed October 22, 2022, preamble, art. 3(2).
    \8\ Xi Jinping, ``Report to the 20th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China,'' October 16, 2022, 19.
    \9\ Stella Chen, ``Whole-Process Democracy,'' in CMP Dictionary, 
China Media Project, November 23, 2021; ``Chinese Democracy in 9 
Screenshots,'' China Digital Times, December 13, 2021.
    \10\ Xi Jinping, ``Report to the 20th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China,'' October 16, 2022, 31-34.
    \11\ Xi Jinping, ``Report to the 20th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China,'' October 16, 2022, 32-33.
    \12\ Xi Jinping, ``Report to the 20th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China,'' October 16, 2022, 33, 47.
    \13\ Xi Jinping, ``Report to the 20th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China,'' October 16, 2022, 33-34.
    \14\ See, e.g., Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padr i Miquel, Nancy 
Qian, and Yang Yao, ``The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence on the Autocrat's Trade-off,'' National 
Bureau of Economic Research, November 2017, 10-11; Qiao Long, 
``Guangdong Tianwu cun huanjie xuanju houxuanren zao konghe bei bi 
tuixuan'' [In Guangdong's Tianwu village election, candidate is 
threatened and forced to withdraw], Radio Free Asia, March 4, 2021; 
``China Protest Village Leader Lin Zuluan Convicted,'' BBC, September 
8, 2016; John Sudworth, ``China Elections: Independent Candidates Fight 
for the Ballot,'' BBC, November 17, 2016.
    \15\ Shannon Tiezzi, ``What Is the CPPCC Anyway?,'' Diplomat, March 
4, 2021; State Council, ``Ba da minzhu dangpai'' [Eight major 
democratic parties], March 9, 2020; State Council, `` `Zhongguo 
zhengdang zhidu' baipi shu'' [White paper on China's political party 
system], November 15, 2007; Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese 
Kuomintang et al., ``Guanyu minzhu dangpai zuzhi fazhan ruogan wenti 
zuotanhui jiyao'' [Minutes of forum on several questions on the 
organization and development of democratic parties], June 3, 1996; 
Andrew Jacobs, ``Non-Communist Parties Lend China an Air of Pluralism, 
Without the Mess,'' New York Times, March 14, 2013.
    \16\ ``Grid Based Management,'' in CMP Dictionary, China Media 
Project, April 16, 2021.
    \17\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 18, 27.
    \18\ ``What Is China's `Zero-COVID' Policy?,'' Voice of America, 
November 28, 2022; ``Haobu dongyao jianchi `dongtai qingling' zong 
fangzhen'' [Unwavering support for the ``dynamic zero-COVID'' overall 
direction], People's Daily, May 6, 2022; ``Timeline: China's COVID-19 
Outbreak and Lockdown of Wuhan,'' Associated Press, January 22, 2021; 
Lucy Swan and Faisal Ali, ``Deadly Apartment Fire in the Far West of 
the Country Triggers Unprecedented Demonstrations,'' Guardian, November 
29, 2022.
    \19\ ``What Is China's `Zero-COVID' Policy?,'' Voice of America, 
November 28, 2022; ``Haobu dongyao jianchi `dongtai qingling' zong 
fangzhen'' [Unwavering support for the ``dynamic zero-COVID'' overall 
direction], People's Daily, May 6, 2022; ``Timeline: China's COVID-19 
Outbreak and Lockdown of Wuhan,'' Associated Press, January 22, 2021; 
Lucy Swan and Faisal Ali, ``Deadly Apartment Fire in the Far West of 
the Country Triggers Unprecedented Demonstrations,'' Guardian, November 
29, 2022; Wang Pengfei and Xu Zhiwei, ``Jinji shukun, guanjian shi 
baozhang renliu he wuliu changtong'' [The key to economic relief is to 
ensure the unimpeded flow of people and goods], Caixin, June 2, 2022; 
Xu Wen, Dong Hui, and Wang Han, ``Wuhu xian 1 ming ganran zhe ji 
fengcheng quanguo zhishao 22 di `zaifeng' '' [Entire city of Wuhu 
locked down with one case of infection, at least 22 localities 
currently under lockdown], Caixin, April 18, 2022.
    \20\ Tessa Wong, ``Xi'an: The Messy Cost of China's COVID Lockdown 
Playbook,'' BBC, January 6, 2022; J. Stephen Morrison, Scott Kennedy, 
and Yanzhong Huang, ``China's Zero-COVID: What Should the West Do?,'' 
Center for Strategic & International Studies, June 27, 2022; Wenxin 
Fan, ``China's COVID Fight Disrupts Businesses, Food Supplies as Cases 
Spread,'' Wall Street Journal, October 27, 2022; David Kirton, 
``Shenzhen Shuts Most Public Transport as China Battles Multiple 
Outbreaks,'' Reuters, September 2, 2022.
    \21\ Alexandra Stevenson and Keith Bradsher, ``China's Great `Zero-
COVID' Guessing Game,'' New York Times, November 9, 2022; David 
Stanway, ``COVID and Bust: China's Private Health System Hurt by Tough 
Coronavirus Controls,'' Reuters, July 6, 2022.
    \22\ Ceren Ergenc, ``China Suddenly Abandoned Its Zero COVID 
Policy. How Did It Start in the First Place?,'' Diplomat, January 28, 
2023; Sang Jiejia, ``Sang Jiejia: Bi bingdu geng kepa de shashou 
`qingling' zhengce'' [Sang Jiejia: ``Zero-COVID'' policy is a killer 
more frightening than viruses], Minzhuzhongguo.org, October 3, 2022.
    \23\ Dake Kang, ``Ignoring Experts, China's Sudden Zero-COVID Exit 
Cost Lives,'' Associated Press, March 24, 2023.
    \24\ Austin Ramzy and Wenxin Fan, ``China's COVID Protests Began 
with an Apartment Fire in a Remote Region,'' Wall Street Journal, 
December 1, 2022. See also ``Deadly Xinjiang Blaze Prompts Anger at 
COVID Zero Policy,'' Bloomberg, November 25, 2022.
    \25\ Gao Feng et al., ``Beijing Banner Protester Lauded as China's 
New Tank Man, or `Bridge Man,' '' Radio Free Asia, October 14, 2022; `` 
`Bridge Man' Peng Zaizhou's Mission Impossible and His `Toolkit for the 
Removal of Xi Jinping,' '' China Change, October 19, 2022.
    \26\ Gao Feng et al., ``Beijing Banner Protester Lauded as China's 
New Tank Man, or `Bridge Man,' '' Radio Free Asia, October 14, 2022; `` 
`Bridge Man' Peng Zaizhou's Mission Impossible and His `Toolkit for the 
Removal of Xi Jinping,' '' China Change, October 19, 2022.
    \27\ Gao Feng et al., ``Beijing Banner Protester Lauded as China's 
New Tank Man, or `Bridge Man,' '' Radio Free Asia, October 14, 2022; `` 
`Bridge Man' Peng Zaizhou's Mission Impossible and His `Toolkit for the 
Removal of Xi Jinping,' '' China Change, October 19, 2022.
    \28\ `` `Bridge Man' Peng Zaizhous Mission Impossible and His 
`Toolkit for the Removal of Xi Jinping,' '' China Change, October 19, 
2022.
    \29\ ``Zhongguo fanfengkong kangyi chao chixu `Bai Zhi Yundong' 
yinfa guoji guanzhu' '' [As anti-lockdown protests continue in China, 
``White Paper movement'' draws international attention], Radio Free 
Asia, November 28, 2022.
    \30\ Chang Che and Amy Chang Chien, ``Memes, Puns and Blank Sheets 
of Paper: China's Creative Acts of Protest,'' New York Times, November 
28, 2022; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Free `White Paper' Protesters,'' 
January 26, 2023. Some sources report that ``tens of thousands'' of 
people joined the protests, although Commission staff did not find any 
systematic estimate of the number of protesters. See, e.g., Nick 
Schifrin and Teresa Cebrian Aranda, ``Thousands in China Protest Zero-
COVID Policy in Largest Demonstrations in Decades,'' PBS, November 28, 
2022.
    \31\ Richard C. Bush, Diana Fu, Ryan Hass, Patricia M. Kim, and 
Cheng Li, ``Around the Halls: The Outcomes of China's 20th Party 
Congress,'' Brookings Institution, October 25, 2022; William Yang, 
``Jing Hu deng di baofa jietou kangyi Shanghai shiweizhe: Xi Jinping 
xiatai!'' [Protests broke out in places including Beijing and Shanghai; 
Protesters in Shanghai: Xi Jinping step down!], Deutsche Welle, 
November 27, 2022; Li Yuan, ``China's Protest Prophet,'' New York 
Times, December 7, 2022; Simone McCarthy and Kathleen 
Magramo,``Residents `Revolt' over Oppressive COVID Lockdowns in China's 
Guangzhou,'' CNN, November 15, 2022; Lucy Swan and Faisal Ali, ``Deadly 
Apartment Fire in the Far West of the Country Triggers Unprecedented 
Demonstrations,'' Guardian, November 29, 2022.
    \32\ State Council Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism for 
COVID-19, ``Guanyu jinyibu youhua luoshi xinguan feiyan yiqing fangkong 
cuoshi de tongzhi'' [Circular regarding further improvements on control 
measures for the novel coronavirus], December 7, 2022;Frances Mao, 
``China Abandons Key Parts of Zero-COVID Strategy after Protests,'' 
BBC, December 7, 2022.
    \33\ Dake Kang, ``Ignoring Experts, China's Sudden Zero-COVID Exit 
Cost Lives,'' Associated Press, March 24, 2023; Tony Munroe, ``China 
Reports Huge Rise in Covid Deaths after Data Criticism,'' Reuters, 
January 14, 2023.
    \34\ World Health Organization, ``China Situation [regarding COVID-
19 confirmed cases and deaths],'' accessed March 27, 2023.
    \35\ Dake Kang, ``Ignoring Experts, China's Sudden Zero-COVID Exit 
Cost Lives,'' Associated Press, March 24, 2023.
    \36\ Matthew Loh, ``So Many People Are Dying from COVID in China 
That a Crematorium Is Giving Families 5 to 10 Minute Slots to Mourn 
Victims,'' Insider, January 4, 2023.
    \37\ Matthew Loh, ``So Many People Are Dying from COVID in China 
That a Crematorium Is Giving Families 5 to 10 Minute Slots to Mourn 
Victims,'' Insider, January 4, 2023; Chai Rong, ``Beijing Jijiu 
Zhongxin: Xinguan wu zhengzhuang, qingzheng huanzhe wu boda 120, wei 
jiwei zhongzheng huanzhe liuchu rexian tongdao'' [Beijing Emergency 
Center: For those who are asymptomatic for COVID or have mild 
infections, don't call 120, leave the hotline open for those who are 
critically ill], Beijing Daily, December 10, 2022.
    \38\ ``Xi Jinping chunjie qianxi shipin lianxian kanwang weiwen 
jiceng ganbu qunzhong xiang quanguo ge zu renmin zhiyi xinchun de 
meihao zhufu'' [On New Year's Eve, Xi Jinping conveys greetings to 
grassroots cadres and the masses through video conference, delivering 
beautiful blessings of the new spring to people of all ethnicities 
nationwide],
    \39\ Xiaoshan Xue, ``In Rural China, Shortages of Treatment, 
Doctors Prove Deadly,'' Voice of America, February 3, 2023.
    \40\ Xiaoshan Xue, ``In Rural China, Shortages of Treatment, 
Doctors Prove Deadly,'' Voice of America, February 3, 2023.
    \41\ Kawashima Shin, ``China: Exploiting the `White Paper Protests' 
to Revoke the Zero-COVID Policy,'' Diplomat, January 30, 2023; Chinese 
Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Free All `Blank Paper' Protestors,'' 
January 20, 2023.
    \42\ Tessa Wong and Grace Tsoi, ``The Protesters Who've Gone 
Missing as China Deepens Crackdown,'' BBC, February 18, 2023.
    \43\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Free All `Blank 
Paper' Protestors,'' January 20, 2023.
    \44\ PEN International et al., ``Chinese Authorities Must Release 
`Blank Paper' Protesters and Allow Free Expression on COVID-19 
Pandemic,'' March 8, 2023. For more information, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database records 2023-00033 on Cao Zhixin, 2023-
00036 on Li Siqi, 2023-0035 on Li Yuanjing, and 2023-00037 on Zhai 
Dengrui.
    \45\ Kevin Slaten, Freedom House, ``Grassroots Protests Are 
Frequent in Xi Jinping's China,'' November 17, 2022.
    \46\ Kevin Slaten, Freedom House, ``Grassroots Protests Are 
Frequent in Xi Jinping's China,'' November 17, 2022.
    \47\ Kevin Slaten, Freedom House, ``Grassroots Protests Are 
Frequent in Xi Jinping's China,'' November 17, 2022.
    \48\ ``Zhongguo Henan baofa kangyi jihui weiquan yinhang chuhu zao 
ouda'' [Protest broke out in Henan, China; bank depositors suffer 
beating as they defend their rights], BBC, July 11, 2022; Nectar Gan, 
``China Arrests Hundreds in Rural Banking Scandal,'' CNN, August 30, 
2022.
    \49\ ``Zhongguo Henan baofa kangyi jihui weiquan yinhang chuhu zao 
ouda'' [Protest broke out in Henan, China; bank depositors suffer 
beating as they defend their rights], BBC, July 11, 2022; Nectar Gan, 
``China Arrests Hundreds in Rural Banking Scandal,'' CNN, August 30, 
2022; Wenxin Fan, ``Large Chinese Bank Protest Put Down with 
Violence,'' Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2022.
    \50\ Wenxin Fan, ``Large Chinese Bank Protest Put Down with 
Violence,'' Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2022.
    \51\ Qu Peng, ``Dianxing luan zuowei wu ren shou chufen'' [Model 
case of abuse of official power; five people disciplined], China 
Discipline Inspection and Supervision News, reprinted in Ministry of 
Justice, June 24, 2022.
    \52\ Cao Li and Rebecca Feng, ``China Faces Growing Pressure to 
Address Mortgage Protests,'' Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2022.
    \53\ Cao Li and Rebecca Feng, ``China Faces Growing Pressure to 
Address Mortgage Protests,'' Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2022; 
``Analysis: China's Mortgage Boycott Quietly Regroups as Construction 
Idles,'' Reuters, September 18, 2022.
    \54\ Cao Li and Rebecca Feng, ``China Faces Growing Pressure to 
Address Mortgage Protests,'' Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2022; 
``Analysis: China's Mortgage Boycott Quietly Regroups as Construction 
Idles,'' Reuters, September 18, 2022; ``Zhongguo lanweilou fengbao 
kuoji guozi beijing jianan wuzhu Hubei Jianguanju qian kangyi'' [The 
storm of incomplete real estate projects in China expands and affects 
state-backed construction company; homebuyers protest at Supervision 
Commission in Hubei], Central News Agency, July 21, 2022.
    \55\ Tang Jiajie, Zheng Chongsheng, and Kai Di, `` `Ting tai' 
fengbao kuoda Zhongguo weiwen, jiushi liang nan'' [Storm of ``mortgage 
halt'' expands; social stability and saving the market are both 
difficult in China], Radio Free Asia, July 20, 2022; ``Analysis: 
China's Mortgage Boycott Quietly Regroups as Construction Idles,'' 
Reuters, September 18, 2022.
    \56\ Oiwan Lam, ``Chinese `White-Hair' Protestors Denounce Medical 
Insurance Reform,'' Global Voices, March 6, 2023; ``Hundreds Protest in 
China over Health Insurance Reforms,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted 
in Voice of America, February 15, 2023.
    \57\ Gu Ting, ``Zhongguo xin yibao zhidu xiaosheng luodi minzhong 
fudan jiazhong'' [China's new medical insurance system quietly 
implemented, increases people's burden], Radio Free Asia, March 9, 
2023; ``Hundreds Protest in China over Health Insurance Reforms,'' 
Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Voice of America, February 15, 2023.
    \58\ Rights Defenders Network, ``Yin zhichi Wuhan tuixiu laoren 
kangyi yigai de `Baifa Yundong' Wuhan xinguan feiyan nanshu, weiquan 
renshi Zhang Hai yijing bei pibu'' [Family member of victim of Wuhan 
novel coronavirus rights defender Zhang Hai formally arrested for 
supporting elderly people's protest of medical reform in the ``White 
Hair Protests''], April 1, 2023.
    \59\ ``Grid Based Management,'' in CMP Dictionary, China Media 
Project, April 16, 2021.
    \60\ ``Live with Lizzi Lee, Featuring Lynette Ong,'' (transcript of 
video), China Project, December 5, 2022.
    \61\ Vanessa Cai, ``China Is Deploying More Officers for Grass-
Roots Policing across the Country,'' South China Morning Post, April 4, 
2023.
    \62\ Ministry of Public Security, ``Gonganbu yinfa `Jiaqiang xin 
shidai gongan paichusuo gongzuo san nian xingdong jihua (2023-2025 
nian)' '' [Ministry of Public Security issues ``Three-year action plan 
to strengthen public security of the new era (2023-2025)''], March 29, 
2023; Vanessa Cai, ``China Is Deploying More Officers for Grass-Roots 
Policing across the Country,'' South China Morning Post, April 4, 2023.
    \63\ Ministry of Public Security, ``Gonganbu yinfa `Jiaqiang xin 
shidai gongan paichusuo gongzuo san nian xingdong jihua (2023-2025 
nian)' '' [Ministry of Public Security issues ``Three-year action plan 
to strengthen public security of the new era (2023-2025)''], March 29, 
2023; Vanessa Cai, ``China Is Deploying More Officers for Grass-Roots 
Policing across the Country,'' South China Morning Post, April 4, 2023.
    \64\ ``Zhongguo chutai xin baojia zhi: Baomi jiankong shang bao 20 
hu yi wangge'' [China rolls out a new baojia system: Secret 
surveillance to report to superior; one unit comprises 20 households], 
Radio Free Asia, April 10, 2018.
    \65\ Ministry of Public Security, ``Gonganbu yinfa `Jiaqiang xin 
shidai gongan paichusuo gongzuo san nian xingdong jihua (2023-2025 
nian)' '' [Ministry of Public Security issues ``Three-year action plan 
to strengthen public security of the new era (2023-2025)''], March 29, 
2023.
    \66\ Ministry of Public Security, ``Gonganbu yinfa `Jiaqiang xin 
shidai gongan paichusuo gongzuo san nian xingdong jihua (2023-2025 
nian)' '' [Ministry of Public Security issues ``Three-year action plan 
to strengthen public security of the new era (2023-2025)''], March 29, 
2023; Guo Yuanpeng, ``Renmin Ribao dianjing: Yijing bu zhishi 
`yingjing' '' [People's Daily selects a highlight: Volunteer police do 
not just ``rise to the occasion''], People's Daily, July 9, 2014.
    \67\ Vanessa Cai, ``China Is Deploying More Officers for Grass-
Roots Policing across the Country,'' South China Morning Post, April 4, 
2023.
    \68\ ``Zhongguo chutai xin baojia zhi: Baomi jiankong shang bao 20 
hu yi wangge'' [China rolls out a new baojia system: Secret 
surveillance to report to superior; one unit comprises 20 households], 
Radio Free Asia, April 10, 2018.
    \69\ ``Grid Based Management,'' in CMP Dictionary, China Media 
Project, April 16, 2021; Wang Yimin, ``Jiaqiang shuzi zhengfu jianshe 
quanmian tisheng zhengfu luzhi nengli'' [Strengthen the construction of 
digital government, comprehensively augment government's ability to 
perform its duties], People's Daily, July 1, 2022; David Dorman, ``Xi 
Jinping Presses for Digital Government. OK, but What's Digital 
Government?,'' Digital China Wins the Future, April 19, 2022.
    \70\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa `Dang he guojia jigou 
gaige fangan' '' [Party Central Committee and State Council issue 
``Institutional reform plan of the Party and State Council''], Xinhua, 
March 16, 2023; National Development and Reform Commission, ``Main 
Functions of the NDRC,'' accessed April 10, 2023.
    \71\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa `Dang he guojia jigou 
gaige fangan' '' [Party Central Committee and State Council issue 
``Institutional reform plan of the Party and State Council''], Xinhua, 
March 16, 2023; David Dorman, ``Xi Jinping Presses for Digital 
Government. OK, but What's Digital Government?,'' Digital China Wins 
the Future, April 19, 2022.
    \72\ Qiheng Chen, ``China's New National Data Bureau: What It Is 
and What It Is Not,'' China Project, March 20, 2023.
    \73\ Party Central Committee and State Council, Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Guowuyuan guanyu Zuohao 2023 Nian Quanmian Tuijin Xiangcun Zhenxing 
Zhongdian Gongzuo de Yijian [Opinion of the Party Central Committee and 
State Council on the Key Tasks for Comprehensively Promoting Rural 
Revitalization], February 13, 2023.
    \74\ Party Central Committee and State Council, Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Guowuyuan guanyu Zuohao 2023 Nian Quanmian Tuijin Xiangcun Zhenxing 
Zhongdian Gongzuo de Yijian [Opinion of the Party Central Committee and 
State Council on the Key Tasks for Comprehensively Promoting Rural 
Revitalization], February 13, 2023, sec. 8(28), (29), (30).
    \75\ Party Central Committee and State Council, Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Guowuyuan guanyu Zuohao 2023 Nian Quanmian Tuijin Xiangcun Zhenxing 
Zhongdian Gongzuo de Yijian [Opinion of the Party Central Committee and 
State Council on the Key Tasks for Comprehensively Promoting Rural 
Revitalization], February 13, 2023, sec. 2(6).
    \76\ Wang He, ``Wang He: `Nongguan' luanxiang yu Zhonggong tongzhi 
fulan'' [The chaos caused by rural management officials and corruption 
under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party], Epoch Times, April 27, 
2023; ``Word of the Week: Nongguan (Nongguan)--Rural Management 
Officials, or `Legalized Bandits'?,'' China Digital Times, May 2, 2023.
    \77\ ``2018 nianzhong pandian nongye nongcun fazhi jianshe wenbu 
tuijin'' [2018 year-end tally: Rule of law development in agriculture 
and rural areas steadily advanced], Fangzheng County Agriculture and 
Economy Comprehensive Information Platform, December 14, 2018; ``In 
Zealous Effort to Increase Grain Production, China Deploys Force and 
Coercion to `Manage' the Countryside,'' China Change, April 30, 2023.
    \78\ ``Word of the Week: Nongguan (Nongguan)--Rural Management 
Officials, or `Legalized Bandits'?,'' China Digital Times, May 2, 2023.
    \79\ ``In Zealous Effort to Increase Grain Production, China 
Deploys Force and Coercion to `Manage' the Countryside,'' China Change, 
April 30, 2023. See also Gu Ting, ``Zhongguo zhengfu xiang nongmin 
fafang yibaiyi yuan caizheng butie guli nongmin zhongliang'' [Chinese 
government disburses 10 billion yuan in subsidies to farmers to 
encourage grain production], Radio Free Asia, April 17, 2023.
    \80\ ``Tangshan: Chinese Police Deputy Dismissed over Attack on 
Female Diners,'' BBC, June 21, 2022.
    \81\ ``Tangshan: Chinese Police Deputy Dismissed over Attack on 
Female Diners,'' BBC, June 21, 2022.
    \82\ Yang Fan and Qi Leijie, ``Tangshan lianxu chuxian shiming 
jubao anjian: Yi zhuahuo 6 ming xianyiren'' [Real-name reports continue 
to emerge in Tangshan: 6 suspects already in custody], Xinhua, June 13, 
2022.
    \83\ ``Ji minzhong wangluo shiming jubao fengchao hou, duodi 
jingcha ye jiaru `wangluo shangfang' dajun'' [Following the trend of 
internet users reporting incidents using their real names, police 
officers from different places also join the ``online petition'' 
crowd], China Digital Times, July 5, 2022.
    \84\ ``Ji minzhong wangluo shiming jubao fengchao hou, duodi 
jingcha ye jiaru `wangluo shangfang' dajun'' [Following the trend of 
internet users reporting incidents using their real names, police 
officers from different places also join the ``online petition'' 
crowd], China Digital Times, July 5, 2022.
    \85\ ```Ji minzhong wangluo shiming jubao fengchao hou, duodi 
jingcha ye jiaru `wangluo shangfang' dajun'' [Following the trend of 
internet users reporting incidents using their real names, police 
officers from different places also join the ``online petition'' 
crowd], China Digital Times, July 5, 2022.
    \86\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Liu Jian yin jubao tanfu 
bei yi shandian zui daibu'' [Liu Jian arrested for subversion because 
he reported corruption], August 30, 2022; Rights Defense Network, 
``Weiquanwang: Zhongguo dalu zaiya zhengzhifan, liangxinfan yuedu 
baogao (2023 nian 3 yue 31 ri) di 90 qi (gong 1500 ren) (si)'' [Rights 
Defense Network: Monthly report on political prisoners and prisoners of 
conscience currently detained in mainland China (March 31, 2023) Issue 
No. 90 (total 1500 persons) (four)], March 31, 2023. Note that Rights 
Defense Network reports that the basis of Liu's detention is ``picking 
quarrels and provoking trouble.''
    \87\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Jiandie Fa [PRC Anti-Espionage 
Law], passed November 1, 2014, amended April 26, 2023, effective July 
1, 2023; Jeremy Daum, ``Bad as It Ever Was: Notes on the Espionage 
Law,'' China Law Translate, May 2, 2023; ``Pinglun. Cheng Xiaonong: 
Zhongguo xin ban `Fan Jiandie Fa' de yongyi'' [Commentary. Cheng 
Xiaonong: The motive behind China's new version of Anti-Espionage Law], 
Radio Free Asia, May 15, 2023.
    \88\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Jiandie Fa [PRC Anti-Espionage 
Law], passed November 1, 2014, amended April 26, 2023, effective July 
1, 2023, art. 2.
    \89\ ``Xi Jinping Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang'' 
[Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New 
Era], Platform for Learning Xi (Xue Xi Pingtai): Holistic view of 
national security (Zongti guojia anquan guan), accessed June 14, 2023.
    \90\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Jiandie Fa [PRC Anti-Espionage 
Law], passed November 1, 2014, amended April 26, 2023, effective July 
1, 2023, art. 4(3).
    \91\ Jeremy Daum, ``Bad as It Ever Was: Notes on the Espionage 
Law,'' China Law Translate, May 2, 2023.
    \92\ ``Pinglun. Cheng Xiaonong: Zhongguo xin ban `Fan Jiandie Fa' 
de yongyi'' [Commentary. Cheng Xiaonong: The motive behind China's new 
version of Anti-Espionage Law], Radio Free Asia, May 15, 2023; Peter 
Humphrey, ``China's New Anti-Spy Law Is Just the Beginning,'' Politico, 
May 24, 2023.

Ethnic Minority Rights

Ethnic Minority Rights

    VI. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

                         Ethnic Minority Rights

                                Findings

         During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, 
        Chinese Communist Party and government officials 
        championed the ``integration'' of ethnic minorities, 
        continuing the implementation of policies contravening 
        the rights of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and 
        other ethnic minorities to maintain their own languages 
        and cultures. The October 2022 election of Pan Yue to 
        the Party Central Committee, following his June 2022 
        appointment to the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, 
        indicated that Chinese leader Xi Jinping's policies of 
        assimilation and ``ethnic fusion'' would likely be 
        maintained.
         In May 2023, Hui Muslims in Yunnan province 
        protested over official plans to forcibly remove 
        Islamic features from a 13th-century mosque, plans that 
        reflected authorities' intentions to ``sinicize'' their 
        community. Authorities cracked down on protesters, 
        detaining dozens at the scene and subsequently urging 
        others to surrender to authorities. Hui Muslims 
        interviewed by international media expressed the belief 
        that, following authorities' demolition of domes and 
        minarets of the mosques where they worshipped, 
        authorities would begin to impose tighter restrictions 
        on Muslims' ability to practice their faith.
         In a case exemplifying the risks facing 
        Mongols fleeing China to escape surveillance and 
        persecution, on May 3, 2023, Chinese police officers 
        detained 80-year-old Mongol historian and writer 
        Lhamjab Borjigin in Mongolia and forcibly returned him 
        to China.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Develop programming, both in the United States and 
        around the world, to preserve threatened cultures and 
        languages. The Administration should expand grant 
        programs to assist Uyghur, Mongol, and other ethnic and 
        religious minorities in cultural and linguistic 
        preservation efforts. The Administration should 
        prioritize, and Congress should fund, research, 
        exhibitions, and education related to these efforts.

          Urge the PRC government to abide by the protections 
        guaranteed to ethnic minorities to speak, use, and 
        receive an education in their mother tongue, under 
        China's Constitution, the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy 
        Law, and international human rights treaties, including 
        the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
        Rights (ICCPR) and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
        the Child. Urge Chinese authorities to repeal policies 
        that infringe upon the rights of ethnic minorities to 
        teach and learn in their own language. Press Chinese 
        officials to release political prisoners who were 
        detained for their advocacy of language education 
        rights.
          Urge Chinese authorities to allow Hui and other 
        predominantly Muslim ethnic minority populations to 
        freely engage in Islamic religious rituals, as a matter 
        of their right to religious freedom, and in accordance 
        with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
        ICCPR, as well as China's Constitution, which prohibit 
        discrimination based on religion.

Ethnic Minority Rights

Ethnic Minority Rights

                         Ethnic Minority Rights

                              Introduction

    Authorities based the framework for the PRC's ethnic 
classification system, which divides the country into 56 ethnic 
groups (minzu), on an ``Ethnic Classification Project'' carried 
out by ethnologists and linguists primarily in the 1950s.\1\ 
PRC authorities officially recognize 55 ethnic minority groups 
(shaoshu minzu), influenced by the Stalinist definition of 
``nationality,'' and nominally grant them a form of territorial 
autonomous governance in prescribed regions.\2\ Anthropologist 
Gerald Roche of La Trobe University described the framework as 
a hierarchy that not only prioritizes the Han Chinese ethnicity 
and the Mandarin Chinese language but also subordinates other 
ethnic groups and languages, including unrecognized 
languages.\3\ [For more information on Chinese authorities' 
suppression of ethnic minority languages, see Chapter 17--
Tibet.]

          Party and Government Policy toward Ethnic Minorities

    During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, Chinese 
Communist Party and government authorities implemented policies 
that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express 
their cultural and religious identities in contravention of the 
PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law \4\ and international human 
rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.\5\ Chinese leader Xi 
Jinping promoted a historical narrative centering Han Chinese 
cultural identity and maintaining that all ethnic groups 
originated from a single Chinese nation.\6\ Party and 
government officials also championed the ``integration'' of 
ethnic minorities, continuing the implementation of policies 
contravening the rights of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and 
other ethnic minorities to maintain their own languages and 
cultures.\7\ The October 2022 election of Pan Yue to the Party 
Central Committee, following his June 2022 appointment to the 
State Ethnic Affairs Commission, indicated that Xi's policies 
of assimilation and ``ethnic fusion'' would likely be 
maintained.\8\ Pan has long endorsed such policies and has 
emphasized the need for different ethnic groups and religions 
to integrate into ``Chinese civilization.'' \9\

                 Crackdown on Hui Religion and Culture

    During this reporting year, authorities implemented 
campaigns in Hui religious communities that were aimed at 
``sinicizing'' Islamic practices,\10\ a trend observers say 
limits Hui Muslims' ability to practice their religion and 
culture.\11\ Authorities demolished and removed features such 
as domes and minarets from mosques throughout China which serve 
Hui communities in order to ``sinicize'' the mosques and 
eradicate elements viewed as ``Arabic'' or ``Middle Eastern.'' 
\12\ According to U.S.-based Hui rights advocate Ma Ju, in 
Yunnan province alone, authorities have removed the domes and 
minarets from over two hundred mosques.\13\
    In a report released in March 2023, Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders and Hope Umbrella International Foundation documented 
a wide range of Party and government persecution of Hui Muslims 
in recent years.\14\ The report described how Party and 
government authorities carried out the mass detention of Hui 
Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the 
name of counterterrorism; closed mosques and detained Hui 
religious leaders as part of ``sinicization'' efforts; and 
displaced Hui communities as part of ``poverty alleviation'' 
programs.\15\ In addition, the report documented the harassment 
and detention of lawyers representing or seeking to represent 
Hui individuals detained for religious reasons.\16\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Hui Muslims in Yunnan Protest over Planned Partial Demolition of Mosque
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In May 2023, Hui Muslims in Yunnan protested over official plans to
 forcibly remove Islamic features from a 13th-century mosque,\17\ plans
 that reflected authorities' intentions to ``sinicize'' their
 community.\18\ On May 27, following the morning prayer, construction
 vehicles entered the courtyard of Najiaying Mosque, which is located in
 Nagu township, Tonghai county, Yuxi municipality, Yunnan, an area with
 a predominantly Hui Muslim population.\19\ Hundreds of police officers
 in riot gear also surrounded the mosque and blocked its entrance.\20\
 Authorities reportedly planned to demolish four minarets and a domed
 roof of the mosque--Arabic-style features that authorities approved in
 2004 when the current mosque was constructed but that a court ruled
 illegal in 2020.\21\ Official plans called for the replacement of these
 features with traditional Chinese architectural features.\22\ Thousands
 of residents took to the streets to protest, with some residents
 throwing objects, such as water bottles and bricks, at police.\23\
 Police officers hit some members of the crowd with batons when they
 demanded to enter the mosque for noon prayers, escalating the
 clash.\24\ Authorities also detained dozens of protesters at the
 scene.\25\ Among those detained was imam Ma Zichang, who had led a
 crowd of protesters in prayer at the gate of the mosque.\26\ Police
 retreated hours later, allowing the protesters to temporarily return to
 the mosque.\27\
  On May 28, Tonghai authorities issued a notice saying that the
 protests had ``seriously disrupted social order'' and that those who
 surrendered themselves by June 6 would be given a lighter
 punishment.\28\ By May 29, authorities deployed drones to surveil
 residents, used loudspeakers to urge protesters to turn themselves in,
 and blocked internet and phone services with signal jammers.\29\
 Residents told Agence France-Presse on May 29 that several hundred
 police officers remained in Nagu.\30\ Residents in the nearby town of
 Shadian, in Gejiu city, Honghe Hani and Yi Autonomous Prefecture,
 Yunnan--where authorities had announced similar plans to destroy
 Islamic features of the town's Grand Mosque--said that security
 personnel patrolled the town's streets on May 28.\31\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Hui Muslims in Yunnan Protest over Planned Partial Demolition of Mosque
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In June, international observers posted online an official notice
 issued on June 15, indicating that authorities would resume demolition
 work at the Najiaying Mosque on June 17.\32\ Bitter Winter, an online
 magazine that covers religious freedom in China, reported on June 28
 that local police had recently called many residents living near the
 Najiaying and Shadian mosques to instruct them not to use virtual
 private networks (VPNs) to access international social media platforms
 or to take or post pictures or videos related to the ``sinicization''
 of the mosques.\33\
  Nagu and Shadian are two important centers for Muslim worship and the
 education of imams, and Hui Muslims there have historically protested
 against official religious persecution.\34\ The Najiaying Mosque in
 Nagu and the Grand Mosque in Shadian are among the last mosques serving
 Hui worshippers that have not had their Islamic features removed by
 authorities.\35\ Local officials attempted to coerce residents of Nagu
 and Shadian into showing they agreed with plans for the ``alteration''
 of Najiaying Mosque and the Grand Mosque, visiting residents' homes to
 pressure them into agreement, and, in Shadian, threatening to reduce
 teachers' pay and investigate business owners' tax returns.\36\ As
 Harvard anthropologist Ruslan Yusupov observed, since residents were
 not willing to say they agreed, authorities ``attempt[ed] to resolve
 the emergent stalemate through a show of force and intimidation.'' \37\
 Hui Muslims in Nagu interviewed by international media expressed the
 belief that, following authorities' demolition of domes and minarets,
 authorities also would begin to impose tighter restrictions on Muslims'
 ability to practice their faith.\38\ [For more information on freedom
 of religion for Muslims in China, see Chapter 3--Freedom of Religion
 and Chapter 18--Xinjiang.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Constraints on Language and Ethnic Identity in the IMAR

    During this reporting year, officials in the Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region (IMAR) continued to implement policies 
suppressing the use of Mongolian as a language of instruction 
in schools in the region.\39\ The right of ethnic minorities to 
receive an education in their mother tongue is protected under 
international law\40\ and is also protected under the PRC 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.\41\ In April 2023, the Southern 
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (SMHRIC) reported 
that, according to the principal of a middle school in Hohhot 
municipality, IMAR, central government authorities had directed 
schools throughout the region to adopt Mandarin Chinese as the 
language of instruction for all subjects beginning in September 
2023.\42\ SMHRIC published an audio recording it said was 
provided by the parent of a student at the middle school, 
during which the principal can also be heard telling parents 
that their school would implement the new policy beginning in 
May 2023.\43\ SMHRIC's report followed protests that took place 
in the IMAR in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian 
language instruction in several subjects in schools\44\ as well 
as regional regulations that took effect in January 2022 
regarding language, education, and ethnic unity that solidified 
official control and assimilation efforts.\45\

   Mongols Fleeing China Face Transnational Repression, Repatriation 

    In a case exemplifying the risks facing Mongols fleeing 
China to escape surveillance and persecution, on May 3, 2023, 
PRC police officers took into custody 80-year-old Mongol 
historian and writer Lhamjab Borjigin in Mongolia and forcibly 
returned him to China.\46\ It is unclear whether security 
authorities criminally detained Lhamjab Borjigin and, if so, 
what the criminal offense is for which he was detained.\47\ In 
a statement he wrote in March 2023 after he fled to Mongolia, 
Lhamjab Borjigin noted that authorities in the IMAR had 
required him to report regularly to the local public security 
bureau.\48\ Public security officials restricted Lhamjab 
Borjigin's activities and movement after he was sentenced by a 
court in Xilinhot city, Xilingol (Xilinguole) League, IMAR, in 
or around August 2019, to one year in prison, suspended for two 
years.\49\ In April 2019, the court had tried him on charges 
related to ``national separatism,'' ``sabotaging national 
unity,'' and ``illegal publication and illegal distribution,'' 
according to the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information 
Center.\50\ In July 2018, an official from the Xilinhot City 
People's Procuratorate reportedly told Lhamjab Borjigin that 
the criminal charges against him were connected to his 
Mongolian-language history of the Cultural Revolution.\51\
    In another case of a Mongol from China experiencing 
transnational repression, in October 2022, Mongol language 
advocate Adiyaa \52\ was harassed by individuals sent by the 
PRC embassy in Thailand while he was held in a Thai immigration 
detention center.\53\ Adiyaa arrived in Thailand in February 
2021 after fleeing China with seven family members.\54\ The 
individuals sent by the PRC embassy reportedly comprised 
Chinese police and public security personnel who attempted to 
make Adiyaa sign documents admitting to violating Chinese laws 
and agreeing to return to China, which he refused to do.\55\ At 
the time of his detention, Adiyaa had obtained refugee status 
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR).\56\ Thai immigration authorities released Adiyaa on 
bail around early November 2022,\57\ and the UNHCR subsequently 
resettled Adiyaa in Canada.\58\ [For more information on 
Adiyaa, see Chapter 20--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and 
Globally.]

Ethnic Minority Rights

Ethnic Minority Rights

    Notes to Chapter 7--Ethnic Minority Rights

    \1\ Thomas Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic 
Classification in Modern China (University of California Press, 2011), 
3-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ See, e.g., Uradyn Bulag, ``Nationality/Minzu,'' China Columns, 
Made in China Journal, September 4, 2020. Uradyn Bulag discusses the 
complex historical and political forces that have influenced Chinese 
leaders' use and promotion of the concepts of nation, nationality, 
race, and ethnicity denoted by the term ``minzu.'' See also ``Minzu,'' 
Xinjiang Documentation Project, University of British Columbia, 
accessed September 30, 2022; State Ethnic Affairs Commission, reprinted 
in PRC Central People's Government, ``Zhongguo minzu'' [China's ethnic 
groups], accessed June 13, 2023; Thomas Mullaney, Coming to Terms with 
the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China (University of 
California Press, 2011), 11-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Gerald Roche, ``Articulating Language Oppression: Colonialism, 
Coloniality and the Erasure of Tibet's Minority Languages,'' Patterns 
of Prejudice 53, no. 5 (2019): 490, 493-501, 514.
    \4\ The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law contains protections for 
the languages, religious beliefs, and customs of ethnic minority 
``nationalities'' in addition to a system of regional autonomy in 
designated areas. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyu Zizhi Fa [PRC 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, effective October 
1, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, arts. 10, 11, 21, 36, 37, 47, 49, 
53.
    \5\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, 
arts. 22, 27; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 1; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. 
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry 
into force March 23, 1976, art. 27; Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 
18, 1992, arts. 2, 4; James Millward, ``China's New Anti-Uyghur 
Campaign,'' Foreign Affairs, January 23, 2023; ``Interview: `They Are 
Away from Their Families, Language, Religion and Culture.,' '' Radio 
Free Asia, February 8, 2023.
    \6\ Chris Buckley, Vivian Wang, and Joy Dong, ``One Nation Under 
Xi: How China's Leader Is Remaking Its Identity,'' New York Times, 
October 11, 2022. See also ``Xi Jinping zai Wenhua Chuancheng Fazhan 
Zuotanhui shang qiangdiao dan fu qi xin de wenhua shiming nuli jianshe 
Zhonghua minzu xiandai wenming'' [Xi Jinping emphasized at the 
Symposium on Cultural Inheritance and Development [the need to] take up 
the new cultural mission and strive to build the modern civilization of 
the Chinese nation], People's Daily, June 3, 2023.
    \7\ Chris Buckley, Vivian Wang, and Joy Dong, ``One Nation Under 
Xi: How China's Leader Is Remaking Its Identity,'' New York Times, 
October 11, 2022; James Millward, ``China's New Anti-Uyghur Campaign,'' 
Foreign Affairs, January 23, 2023; Southern Mongolian Human Rights 
Information Center, ``New Details Confirm China's Goal of Total Erasure 
of Mongolian Language Education in Southern Mongolia,'' April 11, 2023; 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Will the Hui be Silently Erased?-- A 
groundbreaking report on the Chinese government's campaign to eliminate 
Hui Muslim identity and the crisis of survival for the Hui and Islam in 
China,'' March 22, 2023; The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law contains 
protections for the languages, religious beliefs, and customs of ethnic 
minority ``nationalities'' in addition to a system of regional autonomy 
in designated areas. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyu Zizhi Fa [PRC 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, effective October 
1, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, arts. 10, 11, 21, 36, 37, 47, 49, 
53; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by 
U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, arts. 
22, 27; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 
1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 1; International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 
1976, art. 27; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by 
U.N. General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992, arts. 2, 
4. For a discussion of officials' implementation of policies 
contravening the rights of ethnic minorities to maintain their own 
languages and cultures during the 2022 reporting year, see 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report 
(Washington: November 2022), 162-165. See also ``Ma Rong: Jinyibu 
zhulao Zhonghua minzu gongtongti yishi'' [Further forge the common 
consciousness of the Chinese nation], Global Times, July 10, 2022.
    \8\ Aaron Glasserman, ``Touting `Ethnic Fusion,' China's New Top 
Official for Minority Affairs Envisions a Country Free of Cultural 
Difference,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, February 24, 2023; Chris 
Buckley, Vivian Wang, and Joy Dong, ``One Nation Under Xi: How China's 
Leader Is Remaking Its Identity,'' New York Times, October 11, 2022; 
``(CPC Congress) List of Members of 20th CPC Central Committee,'' 
Xinhua, October 22, 2022. The term ``ethnic fusion'' (minzu ronghe) 
refers to non-Han ethnic groups' adoption of the language and customs 
used by the Han Chinese ethnic group.
    \9\ Aaron Glasserman, ``Touting `Ethnic Fusion,' China's New Top 
Official for Minority Affairs Envisions a Country Free of Cultural 
Difference,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, February 24, 2023; Chris 
Buckley, Vivian Wang, and Joy Dong, ``One Nation Under Xi: How China's 
Leader Is Remaking Its Identity,'' New York Times, October 11, 2022; 
``Pan Yue: Yi Dang de Ershi Da jingshen wei zhiyin, fenli tuijin zhulao 
Zhonghua minzu gongtongti yishi gongzuo'' [Pan Yue: Guided by the 
spirit of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 
strive to promote the work of building the common consciousness of the 
Chinese nation], Research on Agency Party-building, no. 11, 2022, 
reprinted in Lanzhou University Party Committee United Front Work 
Department.
    \10\ Vivian Wang, ``Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in 
China,'' New York Times, June 8, 2023; Chen Tao, ``Hui Mosques and 
Cemeteries `Sinicized' in Qinghai, Yunnan, Beijing, and Shanghai,'' 
Bitter Winter, September 23, 2022.
    \11\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International 
Foundation, ``Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?--A Groundbreaking Report 
on the Chinese Government's Campaign to Eliminate Hui Muslim Identity 
and the Crisis of Survival for the Hui and Islam in China,'' March 22, 
2023; James Jennion, ``China's Repression of the Hui: A Slow Boil,'' 
Diplomat, June 15, 2021; Emily Feng, `` `Afraid We Will Become the Next 
Xinjiang': China's Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,'' NPR, September 26, 
2019; ``Hui Muslims and the `Xinjiang Model' of State Suppression of 
Religion,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, March 29, 
2021.
    \12\ Chen Tao, ``Hui Mosques and Cemeteries `Sinicized' in Qinghai, 
Yunnan, Beijing, and Shanghai,'' Bitter Winter, September 23, 2022; 
``China Remodels Major Mosque in Beijing to Remove Middle Eastern 
Influence,'' Radio Free Asia, September 13, 2022; William Yang, 
``China's Campaign to `Sinicize' Islam Curbs Religious Freedom,'' 
Deutsche Welle, June 7, 2023. See also Emily Feng, ``Afraid We Will 
Become The Next Xinjiang': China's Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,'' NPR, 
September 26, 2019; Jessica Batke, ``Planting the Flag in Mosques and 
Monasteries,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, December 13, 2022.
    \13\ Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, ``Thousands of Ethnic Minority 
Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, June 2, 
2023.
    \14\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International 
Foundation, ``Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?--A Groundbreaking Report 
on the Chinese Government's Campaign to Eliminate Hui Muslim Identity 
and the Crisis of Survival for the Hui and Islam in China,'' March 22, 
2023.
    \15\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International 
Foundation, ``Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?--A Groundbreaking Report 
on the Chinese Government's Campaign to Eliminate Hui Muslim Identity 
and the Crisis of Survival for the Hui and Islam in China,'' March 22, 
2023.
    \16\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International 
Foundation, ``Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?--A Groundbreaking Report 
on the Chinese Government's Campaign to Eliminate Hui Muslim Identity 
and the Crisis of Survival for the Hui and Islam in China,'' March 22, 
2023.
    \17\ Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, ``Thousands of Ethnic Minority 
Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, June 2, 
2023; Christian Shepherd and Vic Chiang, ``Chinese Police Clash with 
Protesters over Plans to Demolish Mosque,'' Washington Post, May 29, 
2023.
    \18\ Ruslan Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over 
Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023.
    \19\ Ruslan Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over 
Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023; 
``Hui Muslims and Police Clash in China's Yunnan over Mosque Dome 
Demolition,'' Radio Free Asia, May 30, 2023.
    \20\ Ruslan Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over 
Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023; 
``Hui Muslims and Police Clash in China's Yunnan over Mosque Dome 
Demolition,'' Radio Free Asia, May 30, 2023; Nicholas Yong, ``Yunnan 
Protest: Mosque Closure Sees Clashes with Security Forces,'' BBC, May 
30, 2023.
    \21\ Ruslan Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over 
Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023; 
Emily Feng, ``The Plan to Remove a Mosque's Domes in China Sparks Rare 
Protest,'' NPR, May 31, 2023; Amy Hawkins and Chi Hui Lin, ``Protesters 
Clash with Police in China over Partial Demolition of Mosque,'' 
Guardian, May 30, 2023; Nicholas Yong, ``Yunnan Protest: Mosque Closure 
Sees Clashes with Security Forces,'' BBC, May 30, 2023.
    \22\ Vivian Wang, ``Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in 
China,'' New York Times, June 8, 2023. See also Ruslan Yusupov, 
``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic 
Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023.
    \23\ Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, ``Thousands of Ethnic Minority 
Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, June 2, 
2023; Vivian Wang, ``Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in 
China,'' New York Times, June 8, 2023.
    \24\ Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, ``Thousands of Ethnic Minority 
Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, June 2, 
2023.
    \25\ Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, ``Thousands of Ethnic Minority 
Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, June 2, 
2023; Emily Feng, ``The Plan to Remove a Mosque's Domes in China Sparks 
Rare Protest,'' NPR, May 31, 2023.
    \26\ Ma Ju (@majuismail1122), ``!!Ju Najiaying renshi chongchu 
chongwei, maoxian chuan lai de xinxi . . ..'' [!!According to the 
information from the Najiaying people who broke out of the siege], 
Twitter, June 2, 2023, 9:03 p.m. For more information on Ma Zichang, 
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00137.
    \27\ Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, ``Thousands of Ethnic Minority 
Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, June 2, 
2023; Ruslan Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial 
Demolition of Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023.
    \28\ Mingcheng Tonghai [Famous City Tonghai] (@lymbth), ``Guanyu 
duncu xiangguan weifa fanzui xianyi ren tou'an zishou de tonggao'' 
[Notice urging relevant criminal suspects to surrender], WeChat post, 
May 28, 2023; Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, ``Thousands of Ethnic 
Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, 
June 2, 2023.
    \29\ Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, ``Thousands of Ethnic Minority 
Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, June 2, 
2023; Emily Feng, ``The Plan to Remove a Mosque's Domes in China Sparks 
Rare Protest,'' NPR, May 31, 2023.
    \30\ ``Unspecified Numbers Arrested after Partial Mosque Demolition 
Sparks Protests in Southwest China,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted 
in Hong Kong Free Press, May 30, 2023.
    \31\ Ruslan Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over 
Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023.
    \32\ Ma Ju (@majuismail1122), ``Najiaying zuixin qingkuang!!'' [The 
latest situation in Najiaying!!], Twitter, June 15, 2023, 7:35 a.m.; 
Wlodek Cieciura (@Frogdeck), ``The administration of the Najiaying 
mosque announced yesterday . . .,'' Twitter, June 16, 2023, 1:57 p.m.; 
Chen Tao, ``Yunnan, `Sinicization' of Mosques, Temporarily Suspended 
After Protests, Started Again,'' Bitter Winter, June 28, 2023.
    \33\ Chen Tao, ``Yunnan, `Sinicization' of Mosques, Temporarily 
Suspended After Protests, Started Again,'' Bitter Winter, June 28, 
2023.
    \34\ Ruslan Yusupov, ```Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over 
Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023; 
Emily Feng (@EmilyZFeng), ``2/ In my years of reporting on faith 
communities in China . . .,'' Twitter, May 31, 2023, 8:06 p.m.
    \35\ Ruslan Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over 
Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023; 
Vivian Wang, ``Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in China,'' New 
York Times, June 8, 2023.
    \36\ Ruslan Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over 
Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023; 
Vivian Wang, ``Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in China,'' New 
York Times, June 8, 2023.
    \37\ Ruslan Yusupov, ``Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over 
Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,'' China Project, May 30, 2023.
    \38\ Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, ``Thousands of Ethnic Minority 
Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,'' CNN, June 2, 
2023; Vivian Wang, ``Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight over Faith in 
China,'' New York Times, June 8, 2023. See also William Yang, ``China's 
Campaign to `Sinicize' Islam Curbs Religious Freedom,'' Deutsche Welle, 
June 7, 2023.
    \39\ For a discussion of the official implementation of policies 
restricting the use of the Mongolian language in schools in the IMAR in 
recent years, see, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 164-165; Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 
2022), 117-120.
    \40\ Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by U.N. General 
Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992, arts.2(1), 4(2-4); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. 
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry 
into force March 23, 1976, art. 27. See also PEN America, ``Decision to 
Ban Uyghur Language in Xinjiang Schools an Attack on the Minority 
Group's Linguistic and Cultural Rights,'' August 3, 2017.
    \41\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyu Zizhi Fa [PRC Regional 
Ethnic Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, effective October 1, 1984, 
amended February 28, 2001, arts. 36, 37.
    \42\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``New 
Details Confirm China's Goal of Total Erasure of Mongolian Language 
Education in Southern Mongolia,'' April 11, 2023. See also ``China 
Orders Mongolian-Medium Schools to Switch to Mandarin by September,'' 
Radio Free Asia, April 11, 2023.
    \43\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``New 
Details Confirm China's Goal of Total Erasure of Mongolian Language 
Education in Southern Mongolia,'' April 11, 2023.
    \44\ James Leibold, ``The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping's 
Mongolian Crackdown,'' China Leadership Monitor 70 (Winter 2021), 
December 1, 2021; Christopher P. Atwood, ``Bilingual Education in Inner 
Mongolia: An Explainer,'' Made in China Journal, August 30, 2020; 
Christian Shepherd and Emma Zhou, ``Authorities Quash Inner Mongolia 
Protests,'' Financial Times, September 9, 2020. For more information on 
the fall 2020 protests, see Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 117--19.
    \45\ Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing 
Committee, Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Jiaoyu Tiaoli [Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region Education Regulations], passed September 29, 2021, effective 
January 1, 2022, arts. 8-10; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's 
Congress Standing Committee, Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Shishi ``Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongyong Yuyan Wenzi Fa'' Banfa [Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region Measures on the Implementation of the ``PRC Standard 
Spoken and Written Language Law''], passed September 29, 2021, 
effective January 1, 2022, arts. 1-4, 7-15, 18-26; James Leibold, ``The 
Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping's Mongolian Crackdown,'' China 
Leadership Monitor 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021. For more 
information on the regulations issued in January 2022, see 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report 
(Washington: November 2022), 164--65.
    \46\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Chinese 
Police Makes Arrest on Mongolian Soil, Deporting Prominent Writer,'' 
May 11, 2023; Safeguard Defenders, ``Chinese Police Kidnaps Writer in 
Mongolia,'' June 12, 2023. For more information on Lhamjab Borjigin, 
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00105 and 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report 
(Washington: December 2020), 131.
    \47\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Chinese 
Police Makes Arrest on Mongolian Soil, Deporting Prominent Writer,'' 
May 11, 2023.
    \48\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``A 
Testimony by Southern Mongolian Dissident Writer Lhamjab Borjigin,'' 
March 27, 2023.
    \49\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``A 
Testimony by Southern Mongolian Dissident Writer Lhamjab Borjigin,'' 
March 27, 2023; ``Ethnic Mongolian Author Sentenced, Placed Under 
`Community Correction' Order,'' Radio Free Asia, September 16, 2019.
    \50\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Writer 
Tried behind Closed Doors as `National Separatist', Pending Sentence,'' 
April 11, 2019.
    \51\ ``Neimeng qi xun zuojia jiu zuo fanyi Hanzi zao qingsuan, 
dangju niyi fenlie zui qisu'' [Translation into Chinese of Inner 
Mongolian 70-year-old writer's old work is condemned; authorities plan 
to prosecute for separatism], Radio Free Asia, July 23, 2018.
    \52\ Adiyaa's name is listed as Wu Guoxing on Chinese 
identification documents. Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information 
Center, ``Tortured by Chinese State Security Agents in Thailand, 
Southern Mongolian Activist Faces Deportation,'' November 1, 2022; 
``Ethnic Mongolian UN-Registered Refugee Threatened by Chinese Agents 
in Bangkok,'' Radio Free Asia, November 3, 2022.
    \53\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Tortured 
by Chinese State Security Agents in Thailand, Southern Mongolian 
Activist Faces Deportation,'' November 1, 2022; ``Ethnic Mongolian UN-
Registered Refugee Threatened by Chinese Agents in Bangkok,'' Radio 
Free Asia, November 3, 2022.
    \54\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Tortured 
by Chinese State Security Agents in Thailand, Southern Mongolian 
Activist Faces Deportation,'' November 1, 2022.
    \55\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Tortured 
by Chinese State Security Agents in Thailand, Southern Mongolian 
Activist Faces Deportation,'' November 1, 2022; ``Ethnic Mongolian UN-
Registered Refugee Threatened by Chinese Agents in Bangkok,'' Radio 
Free Asia, November 3, 2022.
    \56\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Tortured 
by Chinese State Security Agents in Thailand, Southern Mongolian 
Activist Faces Deportation,'' November 1, 2022; ``Ethnic Mongolian UN-
Registered Refugee Threatened by Chinese Agents in Bangkok,'' Radio 
Free Asia, November 3, 2022.
    \57\ ``Ethnic Mongolian UN-Registered Refugee Threatened by Chinese 
Agents in Bangkok,'' Radio Free Asia, November 3, 2022.
    \58\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Chinese 
Police Makes Arrest on Mongolian Soil, Deporting Prominent Writer,'' 
May 11, 2023.

Status of Women

Status of Women

                            Status of Women

                                Findings

         Authorities in the People's Republic of China 
        (PRC) have increasingly treated women's public 
        participation as politically sensitive. Cases of 
        official retaliation or punishment against women who 
        have gone public with criticism of the Chinese 
        Communist Party and PRC government are well documented 
        during Chinese leader Xi Jinping's first decade in 
        power. This past year, public security officials 
        reportedly focused on identifying ``feminists'' among 
        those detained for participating in the November 2022 
        anti-COVID lockdown (White Paper) protests.
         In May 2023, a U.N. expert committee reviewed 
        China's compliance with the Convention on the 
        Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
        Women (CEDAW). Submissions from independent 
        nongovernmental organizations to the CEDAW Committee 
        focused on authorities' widespread use of gender-based 
        violence and harassment against women political and 
        religious prisoners in China.
         The 20th National Congress of the Chinese 
        Communist Party in October 2022 illustrated the 
        underrepresentation of female Party members in the 
        Party's seniormost ranks, reflecting male-dominated 
        institutional barriers to political leadership in the 
        PRC. No women were among the 24 individuals selected to 
        join the 20th Party Central Committee Political Bureau 
        or its 7-member Standing Committee, China's paramount 
        policy and decisionmaking body led by Xi Jinping.
         China's ``huge arsenal of laws designed to 
        combat and punish domestic violence'' is failing 
        Chinese women, including those women who have turned to 
        the courts for personal safety protection orders, 
        according to a U.S.-based scholar. According to 
        official data, judges throughout China granted 4,497 
        protection orders in 2022. In contrast, a domestic 
        violence hotline app in China reportedly received 
        13,000 calls in August 2022 alone.
         International reports about gender-based 
        violence in China this past year raised concerns about 
        an official policy that coerces Uyghur women to marry 
        Han men; the use of strip searches to humiliate women 
        rights defenders in detention; and the use of online 
        harassment and threats against women journalists of 
        Chinese and Asian descent as a way to silence their 
        reporting on China.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Publicly and privately urge Chinese officials to 
        respect the freedom of expression and assembly of all 
        rights advocates and to refrain from harassing and 
        intimidating independent women's rights advocates who 
        seek to increase awareness of gender inequality and 
        sexual harassment. Raise the cases of women whom PRC 
        authorities have detained for their efforts to advocate 
        for human rights, to document social and political 
        developments, to peacefully express their opinions on 
        social media, and to practice their religious faith 
        without government repression, including Huang Xueqin, 
        Li Qiaochu, He Fangmei, Rahile Dawut, Niu Xiaona, Li 
        Kangmeng, Xu Na, Kamile Wayit, and other women 
        mentioned in this report and in the Commission's 
        Political Prisoner Database.
          Urge Chinese authorities to publicly expand the 
        commitment to gender equality through measures such as 
        increasing the number of women at the highest levels of 
        political leadership, instituting gender equality and 
        anti-harassment training in government workplaces, and 
        challenging discriminatory attitudes based on gender, 
        through public education.
          Acknowledge recent legal developments in China aimed 
        at promoting the welfare of women and gender equality. 
        These include the amended PRC Law on the Protection of 
        Women's Rights and Interests and new guidelines that 
        include provisions to improve women's rights and 
        conditions in the workplace. Encourage the government 
        to strengthen formal support services for 
        implementation--for example, by increasing funding for 
        health services or shelters for women experiencing 
        violence, providing funding and support for lawyers to 
        provide legal services, and allowing independent 
        lawyers and advocates to assist with the promotion and 
        implementation of laws related to gender equality 
        through lawsuits and public campaigns.
          In light of the lack of sufficient data on women's 
        conditions in China, as raised by experts on the U.N. 
        committee that reviewed China's compliance with the 
        Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
        Discrimination against Women in May 2023, encourage the 
        collection, analysis, and public availability of data 
        on disparities in economic and social factors based on 
        gender so as to monitor changes and develop policies 
        and programs that contribute to gender equality and 
        rights protection for women, including those with 
        disabilities, the elderly, and ethnic minorities.
          Support international exchanges among academics, 
        legal advocates, nongovernmental organizations, and 
        others that focus on the implementation and enforcement 
        of recently adopted laws promoting gender equality. In 
        particular, facilitate and support technical assistance 
        programs that would help all those working in and with 
        the judiciary to effectively implement the PRC Anti-
        Domestic Violence Law and the PRC Law on the Protection 
        of Women's Rights and Interests. Train law enforcement, 
        as the first point of contact, to address reports of 
        violence in a way that does not undermine victims' 
        concerns or safety. Urge provincial-level government 
        officials to implement new provisions that hold 
        employers responsible for enforcing protections against 
        gender discrimination and sexual harassment in the 
        workplace.

Status of Women

Status of Women

                            Status of Women

                              Introduction

    Chinese Communist Party and PRC government authorities--
through policy, law, and action--continued to violate women's 
human rights, including women's rights to freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and assembly, digital 
privacy, and rights relating to childbearing and familial 
relations and participation in political and public life. 
Moreover, by not adequately implementing laws and regulations 
aimed at protecting women from discrimination, domestic 
violence, and other practices harmful to women, the government 
failed to fulfill its obligations under China's domestic laws 
and policies and its commitments under the U.N. Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), which it ratified in 1980.\1\

           Political Representation and Public Participation

 TWENTIETH PARTY CONGRESS: NO FEMALE REPRESENTATION IN TOP LEADERSHIP 
                                  BODY

    In October 2022, Xi Jinping secured a third term as the 
Chinese Communist Party's General Secretary during its 20th 
National Congress, breaking with the two-term norm established 
in the post-Mao period.\2\ Xi did not break the longstanding 
underrepresentation of women in the Party's seniormost 
ranks,\3\ however, neglecting to select a senior female Party 
member to join the Central Committee Political Bureau 
(Politburo) despite the presence of at least one female Party 
member on the Politburo over the past 20 years.\4\ The 
exclusion of women from seniormost positions of political power 
is a consequence of the Party's male-dominated system, 
according to experts.\5\ Official statements that support 
female cadre inclusion\6\ have not been met with institutional 
and cultural changes to facilitate career advancement for 
female cadres.\7\ Thus, 24 men, including Xi Jinping, sit on 
the 20th Central Committee Politburo, 6 of whom were selected 
by Xi to join him on the Politburo Standing Committee--the 
PRC's paramount political decision- and policymaking group.\8\ 
One researcher observed that Xi's centralization of power and 
appointment of male loyalists around him has further 
marginalized Chinese women's overall participation in 
politics.\9\ Further evidence of the lack of women in Party 
leadership is the absence of female Party Secretaries for any 
of China's 31 provinces and province-level municipalities and 
autonomous regions,\10\ a senior-level position seen as a 
potential channel for promotion to the Central Committee.\11\ 
The inclusion of 11 women among the full 205-member 20th 
Central Committee\12\ and 22 women among the 171 alternate 
members\13\ is consistent with previous rates of female 
representation.\14\ [For more information on developments 
during the 20th Party Congress, see Chapter 6--Governance.]

        POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OVER WOMEN'S PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

    China's authoritarian suppression of women's public 
participation continued this past year at the same time that 
officials espoused high-minded rhetoric on gender equality and 
amended legislation to strengthen the legal framework for 
women's rights.\15\ The suppression has been ascribed to Party 
leaders' perception that women's public participation may be 
politically sensitive,\16\ particularly women's public claims 
of sexual harassment.\17\ When tennis star Peng Shuai accused 
retired male Party leader Zhang Gaoli--formerly a Politburo 
Standing Committee member and Vice Premier of the State 
Council--of sexual assault in November 2021,\18\ the All-China 
Women's Federation, the Party's ``bridge'' to women, is not 
known to have commented publicly about Peng's claims.\19\ 
Moreover, Zhang was highly visible during the 20th Party 
Congress, sitting with other senior leaders in the front row of 
seats,\20\ while Peng has been incommunicado since February 
2022.\21\ Cases of official retaliation against, or detention 
of, women who have criticized the Party are well documented 
during Xi Jinping's decade in power,\22\ including former 
Central Party School instructor Cai Xia, feminist advocate 
Zheng Churan, critic Dong Yaoqiong, and publisher Geng 
Xiaonan.\23\ This past year, public security officials focused 
on identifying ``feminists'' among the November 2022 anti-COVID 
lockdown (White Paper) protesters, some of whom were later 
detained.\24\ [For further information on the detention of 
anti-lockdown protesters who were targeted for feminist 
interests, see Chapter 1--Freedom of Expression.]

                        CEDAW Review in May 2023

    In May 2023, the U.N. Committee on the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW 
Committee) reviewed the Chinese government's compliance with 
CEDAW.\25\

                WOMEN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PRISONERS

    Reports from independent nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) to the CEDAW Committee described the PRC's use of 
gender-based violence and harassment against women political 
and religious prisoners in China. As evidence, the NGOs 
described dozens of cases in which PRC authorities used 
arbitrary detention\26\ and prolonged detention;\27\ sexual 
violence against Uyghur and other Turkic-speaking women;\28\ 
strip searches and other forms of physical and emotional 
torture while in detention;\29\ the denial of adequate food and 
medical treatment, unsanitary conditions;\30\ and reprisals 
against women in detention.\31\ Although the total number of 
women detained in China for the peaceful exercise of their 
human rights is not known, the San Francisco-based Dui Hua 
Foundation has entered over 14,700 cases of women political 
prisoners in its database, of whom more than 2,000 were 
believed to be in detention at the time of its written 
submission to the CEDAW Committee in April 2023.\32\ Select 
cases of women in detention as of June 30, 2023, include the 
following.\33\

         He Fangmei has been a target of official 
        harassment for her advocacy of vaccine safety following 
        the illness of one her children from a defective 
        vaccine.\34\ Authorities have kept her in detention in 
        Xinxiang municipality, Henan province, since October 
        2020.\35\
         Li Qiaochu is detained in Linyi municipality, 
        Shandong province, in connection with exposing online 
        the torture in detention of her partner--citizen rights 
        and legal advocate Xu Zhiyong--and lawyer activist Ding 
        Jiaxi.\36\ Authorities detained Li in February 2020 the 
        day after Xu was detained, and released her on bail in 
        June 2020, yet have denied bail since her formal arrest 
        on February 26, 2021, despite her serious depression 
        and other ailments in detention.\37\
         Rahile Dawut, a Uyghur folklore scholar and 
        former faculty member at Xinjiang University, was 
        ``disappeared'' by officials in December 2017.\38\ It 
        is believed that authorities initially held her in a 
        mass internment camp, and it was later confirmed that 
        she was criminally prosecuted and sentenced to a prison 
        term of unknown length.\39\
         Niu Xiaona is a disabled Falun Gong 
        practitioner whom authorities in Heilongjiang province 
        sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment in 2022 under 
        Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law--the crime of 
        ``organizing and using a cult organization to undermine 
        implementation of the law.'' \40\ She suffers from 
        rheumatoid arthritis and is unable to walk or attend to 
        her daily needs without assistance.\41\ The Dui Hua 
        Foundation commented that Niu's sentence is ``one of 
        the longest prison sentences known to have been given 
        to Falun Gong practitioners convicted of the sole 
        offense of Article 300.'' \42\

                     CHINESE WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN LAW

    The PRC delegation's presentation on May 12, 2023, to the 
CEDAW committee and its prior written documentation featured 
the Chinese government's passage of laws as a means of 
strengthening women's rights.\43\ They highlighted the PRC 
Anti-Domestic Violence Law (passed in 2015),\44\ a provision in 
the PRC Civil Code (2020) regarding sexual harassment,\45\ and 
extensive revisions to the PRC Law on the Protection of Women's 
Rights and Interests (Women's Rights Law, 2022).\46\ While the 
amended Women's Rights Law, which went into effect on January 
1, 2023, contains commendable legal provisions,\47\ 
practitioners\48\ and scholars\49\ alike have previously 
pointed to gaps between the law in theory and in practice in 
China, finding that the ``social reality rampant with gender 
inequalities has rendered most gender legislation in China 
merely guidelines instead of implementable laws. . ..'' \50\ 
Additionally, experts have linked the Party's public focus on 
``defining women's interests'' and the promotion of women's 
rights legislation with Party efforts toward ``consolidation of 
power and societal stabilization.'' \51\ Considered within this 
context, a Hong Kong-based legal expert described the amended 
Women's Rights Law as ``an apparatus response to President Xi 
Jinping's frequent mention of gender equality.'' \52\

                   CHINESE INFLUENCE EFFORTS AT CEDAW

    PRC authorities' efforts to influence the U.N. system were 
evident in advance of and during the May 2023 CEDAW review and 
demonstrated the ``worrying ways in which China pursues 
influence over the composition, role and attributions of the 
[U.N. Treaty Bodies], and active government efforts to deter 
inputs from independent NGOs, while facilitating inputs from 
government-aligned organisations,'' according to the NGO 
International Service for Human Rights.\53\ One indication of 
China's ``pursuit of influence'' is the election in late 2020 
of an All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) vice president, Xia 
Jie, to the 23-member CEDAW Committee for a standard three-year 
term (2021-2024).\54\ Xia did not appear to have an active role 
in asking Chinese delegates questions during the two public 
CEDAW Committee sessions on May 12, 2023,\55\ but her ACWF 
affiliation\56\ is seemingly at odds with the Committee mandate 
for experts to ``serve in their personal capacities, and not as 
representatives of the States parties which present their 
candidature.'' \57\ Organizations affiliated with the Chinese 
Communist Party and PRC government\58\ submitted more than one-
third of the 52 nongovernmental reports to the CEDAW 
Committee.\59\ Several of these purported ``nongovernmental'' 
groups gave oral reports to the CEDAW Committee on May 8, 2023, 
during time reserved for NGOs.\60\

                         Gender-Based Violence

              DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: TOO FEW PROTECTION ORDERS

    China's ``huge arsenal of laws designed to combat and 
punish domestic violence'' is failing Chinese women, including 
those who have turned to the courts for personal safety 
protection orders, according to a U.S.-based legal scholar.\61\ 
According to the data provided in the Supreme People's Court 
(SPC) annual work reports to the National People's Congress, 
judges granted 11,272 protection orders between 2017 and 
2021.\62\ In March 2023, an SPC vice president claimed that the 
courts granted 34 percent more protection orders in 2022 over 
those issued in 2021, which equals 4,497 protection orders, 
based on the SPC's report of 3,356 orders issued in 2021.\63\ A 
domestic violence hotline app using WeChat as a platform 
reportedly received 13,000 calls in August 2022 alone.\64\ The 
government does not publish comprehensive data about domestic 
violence in China,\65\ complicating research, policymaking, and 
the provision of services to domestic violence victims.\66\
    The SPC released Provisions on Several Issues on the 
Application of the Law in Handling Cases of Personal Safety 
Protection Orders (``Provisions'') in July 2022,\67\ adding to 
regulatory and guiding documents issued in the past three years 
aimed at improving access to protection orders.\68\ Judges, 
however, have hindered the granting of protection orders by 
turning to mediation between the domestic violence victim and 
batterer;\69\ not accepting many forms of evidence; and 
maintaining an overly high standard of proof to establish 
domestic violence claims.\70\ The new Provisions attempt to 
clarify the scope of acceptable evidence in protection order 
applications and expand the circumstances that constitute 
domestic violence, including emotional abuse.\71\ The 
Provisions also highlight that applications for protection 
orders are no longer linked to divorce proceedings,\72\ as they 
were prior to the PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law.\73\

                     SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT

    Reports of sexual harassment and assault in China continued 
to be a focus of public concern this past year,\74\ including 
accusations on social media of sexual harassment at 
universities\75\ and in the workplace,\76\ and in videos and 
photos of brutal assaults of women by men.\77\ In one of the 
most notorious incidents recently captured on video and widely 
shared on social media, a man and his companions assaulted four 
women in June 2022 at a restaurant in Tangshan municipality, 
Hebei province, after one of the women rebuffed a sexual 
advance.\78\ Authorities reportedly prevented many domestic 
journalists from reporting about the Tangshan incident, and 
harassed and detained journalists Mao Huibin\79\ and Zhang 
Weihan.\80\ Hundreds of social media accounts reportedly were 
shut down for alleged rumormongering.\81\ In September 2022, a 
court in Langfang municipality, Hebei, sentenced the main 
assailant in the Tangshan incident to 24 years in prison on 
multiple charges, mostly related to organized crime.\82\ 
Critics were concerned that authorities had downplayed the 
gender-based nature of the violence, noting that authorities 
attempted to allay public opinion by claiming only a few ``bad 
actors'' were involved,\83\ emphasizing law and order,\84\ and 
censoring content linked to gender and women's rights.\85\

    The Commission also continued to observe reports this past 
year about PRC authorities' use of sexual harassment, 
censorship, and violence to target women they deem threatening 
to the Party, including the following:
         Coerced interethnic marriage in the Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). In November 2022, the 
        Uyghur Human Rights Project reported on the Chinese 
        government policy since 2018 to coerce ethnic 
        intermarriage between Han men and Uyghur women as part 
        of its ``de-extremification'' program in the XUAR.\86\ 
        In some reported cases, Uyghur women agreed to marry 
        Han men due to threats that the women's family members 
        would be placed in mass internment centers or that an 
        interethnic marriage would lead to the release of 
        detained family members.\87\
         Women human rights defenders strip-searched in 
        police stations and detention centers. In an April 2023 
        report, Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported 
        findings from a series of interviews it held with about 
        a dozen women human rights defenders in China.\88\ 
        Interviewees described instances of being taken into 
        detention centers or police stations during which 
        public security officials subjected them to strip 
        searches as a form of punishment or reprisal for their 
        rights advocacy.\89\
         Harassment of women journalists of Chinese or 
        Asian descent. The Foreign Correspondents' Club of 
        China documented the online harassment of Chinese and 
        Asian women journalists in its 2022 survey of working 
        conditions in China.\90\ This is consistent with a 
        report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
        (ASPI) in June 2022, which documented gender-based 
        cyberstalking and cyber-harassment of women journalists 
        of Chinese or Asian descent outside China.\91\ One of 
        the ASPI researchers described the motivation behind 
        the harassment as an effort ``to silence the view of 
        these women and also [to] serve as a deterrence against 
        others reporting critically on China . . ..'' \92\

Status of Women

Status of Women

    Notes to Chapter 8--Status of Women

    \1\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 
of December 18, 1979, entry into force September 3, 1981; United 
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, accessed 
April 30, 2023. China signed CEDAW on July 17, 1980, and ratified it on 
November 4, 1980.
    \2\ Guoguang Wu, ``New Faces of Leaders, New Factional Dynamics: 
CCP Leadership Politics Following the 20th Party Congress,'' China 
Leadership Monitor 74, December 1, 2022.
    \3\ ``Xi Jinping zai dapo 20 nian chuantong wu nuxing jinru 
zhongyang zhengzhiju'' [Xi Jinping breaks another 20-year tradition, no 
women enter the Central Committee Political Bureau], Voice of America, 
October 24, 2022. Women make up approximately 30 percent of the Party's 
97 million members.
    \4\ ``Xi Jinping zai dapo 20 nian chuantong wu nuxing jinru 
zhongyang zhengzhiju'' [Xi Jinping breaks another 20-year tradition, no 
women enter the Central Committee Political Bureau], Voice of America, 
October 24, 2022. Wu Yi joined the 16th Party Congress Politburo in 
2002. See also Cheng Li, ``The Reshuffling Report: Female 
Representation in the Chinese Leadership Prior to the Party Congress,'' 
China-US Focus, June 9, 2022.
    \5\ Erin Hale, ``China's Communist Party at 100: Where Are the 
Women?,'' Al Jazeera, June 30, 2021; Mimi Lau, ``Why Are Women Unlikely 
to Win Promotion Race at China's Communist Party Congress?,'' South 
China Morning Post, October 2, 2022. In a recently published book, 
scholar Jerome Doyon analyzed Party activity at several elite 
universities, showing the already highly masculine culture of the Party 
at an early stage of participation. Jerome Doyon, Rejuvenating 
Communism (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2023), 9, 
99-100. See also Vanessa Cai, ``State Councillor Shen Yiqin The One 
Woman at the Top of Chinese Politics,'' South China Morning Post, March 
12, 2023.
    \6\ ``Xi Jinping: Gaoju Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida qizhi wei 
quanmian jianshe shehui zhuyi xiandaihua guojia er tuanjie fendou--zai 
Zhongguo Gongchandang di ershi ci Quanguo Daibiao dahui shang de 
baogao'' [Hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics and strive in unity to build a modern socialist country 
in all respects--report given at the Chinese Communist Party 20th 
National Party Congress], October 16, 2022, reprinted in Xinhua, 
October 25, 2022; Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangcheng [Constitution of the 
Chinese Communist Party], adopted September 6, 1982, amended October 
22, 2022, art. 35. Article 35 states that ``The Party attaches great 
importance to the training and promotion of female officials and ethnic 
minority officials.''
    \7\ Xinhui Jiang, Sarah Eaton, and Genia Kostka, ``Provinces in 
Command: Changes in Prefectural Appointments from Hu Jintao to Xi 
Jinping (2003-2020),'' Journal of Contemporary China 32, no. 144 
(2023); Jerome Doyon, Rejuvenating Communism (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 2023), 9-10, 97-99, 116; Alexandra 
Stevenson, ``Leadership Changes Reveal That in China, Men Still Rule,'' 
New York Times, October 23, 2022.
    \8\  ``The 20th Politburo,'' South China Morning Post, accessed 
April 20, 2023.
    \9\ Ahana Roy, ``20th Party Congress and Women in China's Elite 
Politics,'' Organisation for Research on China and Asia, October 4, 
2022.
    \10\ ``31 ge sheng shi qu Dangwei, Renda changweihui, zhengfu, 
Zhengxie si tao banzi yibashou mingdan (jianli)'' [List of the first-
in-command (bios) for the four groups: 31 provincial, province-level 
municipality and autonomous region Party committees, NPC Standing 
Committee, government, and CPPCC], China Economic Net, May 31, 2023.
    \11\ Cheng Li, ``The Reshuffling Report: Provinces: The Key to 
Pekingology,'' China-US Focus, March 8, 2022; Rahul Karan Reddy and 
Omkar Bhole, ``Xi's Loyalists: A Breakdown of China's New Leadership'' 
Organisation for Research on China and Asia, November 3, 2022; Cheng 
Li, ``The Reshuffling Report: Provinces: The Ongoing Reshuffling of 
Provincial Party Committees,'' China-US Focus, March 27, 2022.
    \12\ ``List of Members of 20th CPC Central Committee,'' Xinhua, 
October 22, 2022.
    \13\ ``Women Fill 8.8% of China's Top Body as Xi's Patriarchy Rolls 
On,'' Bloomberg, October 22, 2022; ``List of Alternate Members of 20th 
CPC Central Committee,'' Xinhua, October 22, 2022.
    \14\ Cheng Li, ``The Reshuffling Report: Female Representation in 
the Chinese Leadership Prior to the Party Congress,'' China-US Focus, 
June 9, 2022; Sierra Janik, Daniel Blaugher, and Jonathan Ray, U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, ``Women in China's 
Leadership,'' March 30, 2022.
    \15\ Chen Jun, ``Zhongguo xin xiuding de Funu Quanyi Baozhang Fa de 
juti luoshi he jiandu mianlin tiaozhan'' [Practical implementation and 
oversight of China's newly revised Law on the Protection of Women's 
Rights and Interests encounters challenges], Voice of America, November 
8, 2022.
    \16\ Alexandra Stevenson, ``Leadership Changes Reveal That in 
China, Men Still Rule,'' New York Times, October 23, 2022; Paul Eckert, 
``Interview: `There Have Been Many Years of Build-up to This Moment,' 
'' Radio Free Asia, November 29, 2022.
    \17\ Xinhui Jiang and Yunyun Zhou, ``Coalition-Based Gender 
Lobbying: Revisiting Women's Substantive Representation in China's 
Authoritarian Governance'' Politics & Gender 18, no. 4 (December 2022): 
981, 987-88.
    \18\ Emily Feng, ``Peng Shuai, the Chinese Tennis Star, Denies 
Sexual Assault by Government Leader,'' NPR, February 6, 2022.
    \19\ Chen Xiaoping, ``Shishi dajia tan: Yan Geling wei ba hai muqin 
fennu fasheng zao engsha, `Quanguo Fulian' yi yan bufa gai jiesan?'' 
[Let's discuss current events: Yan Geling was blocked after her angry 
comments on behalf of the mother of eight children, should the ``ACWF'' 
be disbanded for not saying anything at all?], Voice of America, 
February 18, 2022. See also Yunyun Zhou, `` `Being a Good Daughter of 
the Party'? A Neo-Institutional Analysis of the All-China Women's 
Federation Organisational Reforms in China's Xi Era,'' Chinese 
Perspectives, 2019-2, June 8, 2019; Xinhui Jiang and Yunyun Zhou, 
``Coalition-Based Gender Lobbying: Revisiting Women's Substantive 
Representation in China's Authoritarian Governance,'' Politics & Gender 
18, no. 4 (December 2022): 981, 987-88.
    \20\ Charis Chang, ``This Man Was Accused of Rape, Now He's Meeting 
with China's Elite,'' SBS News, October 17, 2022; Andrea J. Worden, 
``What Does the 20th Party Congress Mean for Peng Shuai and the Future 
of the WTA in China?,'' Andrea J. Worden's Words (blog), October 27, 
2022.
    \21\ Emily Feng, ``Peng Shuai, the Chinese Tennis Star, Denies 
Sexual Assault by Government Leader,'' NPR, February 6, 2022.
    \22\ Alexandra Stevenson, ``Leadership Changes Reveal That in 
China, Men Still Rule,'' New York Times, October 23, 2022; Jing Wei, 
``Why Do So Few Women Hold High Office in the Ruling Chinese Communist 
Party?,'' Radio Free Asia, October 19, 2022. See also Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 
2022), 172.
    \23\ See, e.g., Chris Buckley, ``Cai Xia Was a Communist Party 
Insider in China. Then She Denounced Xi.,'' New York Times, October 14, 
2020; Chen Pinjie, ``Duihua Zheng Churan: Nuquan de chenggong shi yi ge 
guocheng'' [A conversation with Zheng Churan: The success of women's 
rights is a process], Radio Free Asia, April 9, 2023; Candice Chau, `` 
`Ink Girl' Who Defaced Xi Jinping Poster Reappears, Says She Can't Take 
Intense Surveillance,'' Hong Kong Free Press, December 2, 2020; Mimi 
Lau, ``Chinese Businesswoman Jailed after Voicing Support for Beijing 
Critic,'' South China Morning Post, February 9, 2021. For more 
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 
2015-00118 on Zheng Churan, 2018-00343 on Dong Yaoqiong, and 2020-00228 
on Geng Xiaonan.
    \24\ Emily Feng, ``China's Authorities Are Quietly Rounding Up 
People Who Protested against COVID Rules,'' NPR, January 11, 2023; Shen 
Lu and Liyan Qi, ``In China, Young Women Become Accidental Symbols of 
Defiance,'' Wall Street Journal, January 25, 2023.
    \25\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
``Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women Commend China on Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation, Ask about 
Women's Political Participation and Sex-Selective Abortions,'' May 12, 
2023; U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), ``85th Session (8-26 May 2023) Schedule of Dialogues (as of 31 
March 2023),'' accessed May 13, 2023.
    \26\ The 29 Principles, ``Submission to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women under the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,'' April 12, 
2023; ``Joint Submission by PEN International, PEN America, and 
Independent Chinese PEN Center (3 PEN Centers) to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) ahead of its 
consideration of the People's Republic of China's ninth period report 
at the 85th Session in May 2023,'' April 11, 2023.
    \27\ The 29 Principles, ``Submission to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women under the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,'' April 12, 
2023.
    \28\ The Rights Practice, ``Submission to the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) for Consideration 
in its Ninth Periodic Report of the People's Republic of China,'' April 
6, 2023, para. 40.
    \29\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``CHRD Submission to the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women for its 
Consideration of the Ninth Periodic Report of the People's Republic of 
China (85th Session),'' April 8, 2023.
    \30\ The Rights Practice, ``Submission to the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) for Consideration 
in its Ninth Periodic Report of the People's Republic of China,'' April 
6, 2023, paras. 19, 42.
    \31\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``CHRD Submission to the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women for its 
Consideration of the Ninth Periodic Report of the People's Republic of 
China (85th Session),'' April 8, 2023; The 29 Principles, ``Submission 
to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women,'' April 12, 2023.
    \32\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Submission of the Dui Hua Foundation, an 
NGO in Special Consultative Status with ECOSOC, to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, for the State Report on 
China at the 85th Session,'' April 2023.
    \33\ Guidelines from the CEDAW secretariat on NGO participation in 
the 85th session instructed NGOs to ``Anonymize the names of any 
alleged victims, witnesses and perpetrators referred to in the report 
by replacing them with their initials and ensure that no photographs of 
alleged victims, witnesses or perpetrators are included.'' Secretariat, 
U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), ``Participation by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),'' 
April 2023, sec. V.
    \34\ ``Fears Grow in China over Safety of Disappeared, Pregnant 
Vaccine Campaigner,'' Radio Free Asia, October 27, 2020; Dai Ju, `` 
`Yimiao Baobao zhi Jia' faqi ren He Fangmei an chaoqi jiya reng wei 
panjue: nu'er zhijin zhiliu jingshenbing yuan'' [In ``Vaccine Babies' 
Home'' founder He Fangmei's case, prolonged detention without a 
verdict: her daughter is stranded at a psychiatric hospital until 
today], NGOCN, February 1, 2023. See also Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, ``CHRD Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women for its Consideration of the Ninth 
Periodic Report of the People's Republic of China (85th Session),'' 
April 8, 2023. For more information on He Fangmei, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00185.
    \35\ Dai Ju, `` `Yimiao Baobao zhi Jia' faqi ren He Fangmei an 
chaoqi jiya reng wei panjue: nuer zhijin zhiliu jingshenbing yuan'' [In 
``Vaccine Babies' Home'' founder He Fangmei's case, prolonged detention 
without a verdict: her daughter is stranded at a psychiatric hospital 
until today], NGOCN, February 2, 2023.
    \36\ ``Feminist Activist Li Qiaochu Struggles with Mental Health in 
Detention,'' Radio Free Asia, August 30, 2021; Civil Rights & 
Livelihood Watch, ``Lushi di yi ci xianxia huijian Li Qiaochu'' [For 
the first time, lawyer meets offline with Li Qiaochu], March 22, 2023. 
For more information on Li Qiaochu, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2020-00129.
    \37\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Li Qiaochu muqin di shi ci 
shenqing qubao houshen'' [Li Qiaochu's mother's tenth application for 
(Li's) release on bail conditions], March 26, 2022; ``Chinese Police 
Hold Women's Rights Activist Thousands of Miles from Home,'' Radio Free 
Asia, February 8, 2021. See also Li Qiaochu, ``120 Days in Secret 
Detention,'' China Change, January 11, 2021.
    \38\ ``Joint Submission by PEN International, PEN America, and 
Independent Chinese PEN Center (3 PEN Centers) to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) ahead of its 
consideration of the People's Republic of China's ninth period report 
at the 85th Session in May 2023,'' April 11, 2023; Shohret Hoshur and 
Gulchehra Hoja, ``Noted Uyghur Folklore Professor Serving Prison Term 
in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, July 13, 2021. For more 
information on Rahile Dawut, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2018-00552.
    \39\ Shohret Hoshur and Gulchehra Hoja, ``Noted Uyghur Folklore 
Professor Serving Prison Term in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 
July 13, 2021.
    \40\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 300; ``Ha'erbin canji nuzi Niu Xiaona 
feifa pan 15 nian'' [Niu Xiaona, a disabled woman from Harbin, 
sentenced to 15 years in prison], Minghui, November 7, 2022. For more 
information on Niu Xiaona, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2023-00113.
    \41\ ``Elderly Mother and Disabled Daughter Face Prosecution for 
Practicing Falun Gong,'' Minghui, August 7, 2021.
    \42\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Submission of the Dui Hua Foundation, an 
NGO in Special Consultative Status with ECOSOC, to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, for the State Report on 
China at the 85th Session,'' April 2023, sec. v.
    \43\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
``Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women Commend China on Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation, Ask about 
Women's Political Participation and Sex-Selective Abortions,'' May 12, 
2023; ``Ninth Periodic Report Submitted by China under Article 18 of 
the Convention, due in 2018,'' CEDAW/C/CHN/9, December 16, 2020, paras. 
12, 16, 19-28, 36, 45, 46, 67; ``Replies of China to the list of issues 
and questions in relation to its ninth periodic report,'' CEDAW/C/CHN/
RQ/9, March 9, 2023.
    \44\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Jiating Baoli Fa [PRC Anti-
Domestic Violence Law], passed December 27, 2015, effective March 1, 
2016.
    \45\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Dian [PRC Civil Code], passed 
May 28, 2020, effective January 1, 2021, art. 1010.
    \46\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Funu Quanyi Baozhang Fa [PRC Law on 
the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests], passed April 4, 1992, 
amended October 30, 2022, effective January 1, 2023; Xiaozhu Zhong, 
``China: Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests 
Revised,'' Global Legal Monitor, Library of Congress, January 13, 2023.
    \47\ Ethan Michelson, ``Decoupling: Gender Injustice in China's 
Divorce Courts,'' Contemporary Chinese Society Lecture Series, Fairbank 
Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University, February 1, 2022.
    \48\ Chen Jun, ``Zhongguo xin xiuding de Funu Quanyi Baozhang Fa de 
juti luoshi he jiandu mianlin tiaozhan'' [Practical implementation and 
monitoring of China's newly revised Law on the Protection of Women's 
Rights and Interests encountering challenges], Voice of America, 
November 8, 2022.
    \49\ Ethan Michelson, ``Decoupling: Gender Injustice in China's 
Divorce Courts,'' Contemporary Chinese Society Lecture Series, Fairbank 
Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University, February 1, 2022.
    \50\ Xinhui Jiang and Yunyun Zhou, ``Coalition-Based Gender 
Lobbying: Revisiting Women's Substantive Representation in China's 
Authoritarian Governance,'' Politics & Gender 18, no. 4 (December 
2022): 983-84. See also Ethan Michelson, ``Decoupling: Gender Injustice 
in China's Divorce Courts,'' Contemporary Chinese Society Lecture 
Series, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University, 
February 1, 2022.
    \51\ Xinhui Jiang and Yunyun Zhou, ``Coalition-Based Gender 
Lobbying: Revisiting Women's Substantive Representation in China's 
Authoritarian Governance,'' Politics & Gender 18, no. 4 (December 
2022): 983-84.
    \52\ Stella Chen, ``Will China's Updated Women's Rights Law 
Actually Help Women?,'' South China Morning Post, November 5, 2022.
    \53\ Vincent Ploton and Sarah M. Brooks, International Service for 
Human Rights, ``China and UN Treaty Body System,'' December 2022, 4.
    \54\ ``Quanguo Fulian fu zhuxi, shujichu shuji Xia Jie dangxuan 
Lianheguo Xiaochu dui Funu Qishi Weiyuanhui weiyuan'' [ACWF vice 
president and secretariat member Xia Jie elected a member of the U.N. 
CEDAW Committee], Xinhua, November 13, 2020. Based on the brief bios 
for CEDAW Committee members, Xia Jie has significantly less experience 
on CEDAW issue areas compared to her fellow Committee members who bring 
decades of experience working on gender rights in government, law, 
academia, and civil society. See, e.g., Esther Eghobamien-Mshelia 
[Nigeria], ``Biographical Data Form of Candidates to the Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,'' accessed April 19, 
2023; Marianne Mikko [Estonia], ``Biographical Data Form of Candidates 
to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women'' 
accessed April 19, 2023; Leticia Bonifaz Alfonzo [Mexico], 
``Biographical Data Form of Candidates to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women,'' accessed April 19, 2023.
    \55\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
``Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women Commend China on Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation, Ask about 
Women's Political Participation and Sex-Selective Abortions,'' May 12, 
2023.
    \56\ Vincent Ploton and Sarah M. Brooks, International Service for 
Human Rights, ``China and UN Treaty Body System,'' December 2022, 9; 
Letter from the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to 
the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International 
Organizations in Switzerland, CHN/HR/2023/44, April 24, 2023. The 
letter contains the names of members of China's delegation to CEDAW. 
Xia Jie's ACWF colleague Huang Xiaowei is listed as the ``head of 
delegation'' that represented China at the May 12, 2023, day-long 
review.
    \57\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, 
``Membership Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women,'' accessed April 19, 2023.
    \58\ Reza Hasmath, Timothy Hildebrandt, and Jennifer Y.J. Hsu, 
``Conceptualizing Government-Organized Non-Governmental 
Organizations,'' Journal of Civil Society 15, no. 3 (2019): 1-3.
    \59\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner of Human Rights, 
``CEDAW--Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women 85 Session (08 May 2023-26 May 2023), Country: China, 
Info from Civil Society Organizations (for the session),'' accessed 
April 2023. These organizations include the ACFTU Women Workers' 
Committee, Center for Human Rights Studies at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, China Association for NGO Cooperation, China 
Association of Marriage and Family Studies, China Disability Research 
Society, China Ethnic Minorities' Association for External Exchanges, 
China Family Planning Association, China Population and Development 
Research Center, China Union of Anthropological and Ethnological 
Sciences, China Women Judges Association, China Women's University, 
China Women's Development Foundation, China Women's Research 
Association, Female Lawyers Association of the All China Lawyers 
Association, Global Women's Development Institute of China Women's 
University, Human Rights Institute of Southwest University of Political 
Science and Law, Women's Law Research Institute of Beijing Law Society, 
and Women's Studies Institute of China.
    \60\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Civil 
Society Organizations Brief the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women on the Situation of Women in Timor-Leste, 
Germany, China and Sao Tome and Principe,'' May 8, 2023.
    \61\ Ethan Michelson, ``Decoupling: Gender Injustice in China's 
Divorce Courts,'' Contemporary Chinese Society Lecture Series, Fairbank 
Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University, February 1, 2022. See 
also Ethan Michelson, Decoupling: Gender Injustice in China's Divorce 
Courts (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 471-72.
    \62\ ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao (zhaiyao)'' [Supreme 
People's Court work report (summary)], March 7, 2023, sec. 3; ``Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao (zhaiyao)'' [Supreme People's Court work 
report (summary)], March 8, 2022, sec. 3; ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 
gongzuo baogao'' [Supreme People's Court work report], March 8, 2021, 
sec. 3; ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao'' [Supreme People's Court 
work report], May 25, 2020, sec. 3; ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo 
baogao'' [Supreme People's Court work report], March 12, 2019, sec. 4; 
``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao'' [Supreme People's Court work 
report], March 9, 2018, sec. 4; ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao'' 
[Supreme People's Court work report], March 12, 2017. According to 
Supreme People's Court (SPC) work reports from 2018 through 2022, 
courts issued 2,154 protection orders in 2017, 1,589 protection orders 
in 2018, 2,004 protection orders in 2019, 2,169 protection orders in 
2020, and 3,356 protection orders in 2021, for a total of 11,272 
between the years 2017 and 2021. The SPC did not report on the number 
of protection orders issued in 2016 in its 2017 work report. However, 
it reported a total of 13,000 protection orders in its 2023 work 
report, noting that the total represented protection orders issued over 
the past five years.
    \63\ Jiang Xiaotian, Guo Ruomei, and Liu Man, ``Zhuanfang He 
Xiaorong: Rang jiabao wuchu dunxing, qu nian qianfa renshen anquan 
baohu ling zeng san cheng'' [Exclusive interview with He Xiaorong: Let 
domestic violence have nowhere to hide, the number of personal safety 
protection orders issued last year increased by 30 percent], Southern 
Metropolitan Daily, March 8, 2023; ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo 
baogao (zhaiyao)'' [Supreme People's Court work report (summary)], 
March 8, 2022, sec. 3.
    \64\ Albee Zhang and Ryan Woo, ``Thousands Call New Chinese 
Domestic Violence Helpline App,'' Reuters, September 1, 2022.
    \65\ Weiping (Equality), `` `Fan Jiating Baoli Fa' shixing qi 
zhounian jiance baogao'' [Monitoring Report on the Seventh Anniversary 
of Implementation of the ``Anti-Domestic Violence Law''], March 2, 
2023; Human Rights Institute, Southwest University of Politics and Law, 
``Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women in the People's Republic of China: A civil 
society report submitted to the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women with regard to the review 
of China's 9th periodic national report,'' February 10, 2023, 2-3.
    \66\ China National Centre for Domestic Violence Crisis 
Intervention, ``A Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women on the Ninth Periodic Report of the 
People's Republic of China,'' accessed April 22, 2023, secs. II.4, 
III.3.
    \67\ Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu Banli Renshen Anquan Baohu Ling 
Anjian Shiyong Falu Ruogan Wenti de Guiding [Provisions of the Supreme 
People's Court on Several Issues on the Application of Law in Handling 
Cases of Personal Safety Protection Orders], passed July 14, 2022, 
effective August 1, 2022.
    \68\ Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Quanguo Fulian Jiaoyubu Gong'anbu 
Minzhengbu Sifabu Weisheng Jiankangwei guanyu Jiaqiang Renshen Anquan 
Baohu Ling Zhidu Guanche Shishi de Yijian  [Supreme People's Court, 
All-China Women's Federation, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Public 
Security, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Justice, and National 
Health Commission Opinion on Strengthening the Implementation of the 
Personal Safety Protection Order System], March 3, 2022; Huang Yue, 
``Quanguo Fulian Quanyi Bu fabu `Jiating Baoli Shouhai Ren Zhengju 
Shouji Zhiyin' zhidao jiating baoli shouhai ren youxiao shouji he 
guding zhengju'' [ACWF Department of Rights and Interests issued 
``Guidelines on Evidence Collection for Victims of Domestic Violence'' 
to instruct victims of domestic violence to effectively collect and 
secure evidence], Xinhua, November 25, 2021.
    \69\ Jue Jiang, ``The Family as a Stronghold of State Stability: 
Two Contradictions in China's Anti-Domestic Violence Efforts,'' 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 33, no. 2 (August 
2019): 228-51, Social Science Research Network, updated June 9, 2020, 
4.
    \70\ Weiping (Equality), `` `Fan Jiating Baoli Fa' shixing qi 
zhounian jiance baogao'' [Monitoring Report on the Seventh Anniversary 
of Implementation of the ``Anti-Domestic Violence Law''], March 2, 
2023, secs. 2.2, 3.3; Jeremy Daum, ``A Closer Look at New Rules for 
Domestic Violence Protection Orders,'' China Law Translate, July 27, 
2022, para. 3.
    \71\ Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu Banli Renshen Anquan Baohu Ling 
Anjian Shiyong Falu Ruogan Wenti de Guiding [Provisions of the Supreme 
People's Court on Several Issues on the Application of Law in Handling 
Cases of Personal Safety Protection Orders], passed July 14, 2022, 
effective August 1, 2022; Jeremy Daum, ``A Closer Look at New Rules for 
Domestic Violence Protection Orders,'' China Law Translate, July 27, 
2022.
    \72\ Center for Human Rights Studies, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, ``Progress Made by China in Judicial Remedies for Women's 
Rights and Suggestions on Improvement,'' accessed June 2023, sec. II.4.
    \73\ Jue Jiang, ``The Family as a Stronghold of State Stability: 
Two Contradictions in China's Anti-Domestic Violence Efforts,'' 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 33, no. 2 (August 
2019): 228-51, Social Science Research Network, updated June 9, 2020, 
6.
    \74\ ``Zhuanfang: Zhongguo gongzhong dui xingbie baoli shijian 
wujie gandao juewang'' [Exclusive interview: Chinese public feels 
despair over the lack of solutions to incidents of gender violence], 
Deutsche Welle, June 14, 2022; Alexandra Stevenson and Zixu Wang, 
``Battling Violence and Censors, Women in China Become `Invisible and 
Absent,' '' New York Times, September 6, 2022. See also Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 
2022), 175-76; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual 
Report (Washington: March 2022), 155-56.
    \75\ See, e.g., Holly Chik, ``Chinese University Says Professor 
Fired after Sex Accusations Made Public,'' South China Morning Post, 
January 26, 2023; Zhao Yuanyuan, ``Famed Chinese Drama Teacher Accused 
of Sexual Assault and Predatory Behavior,'' China Project, September 
21, 2022.
    \76\ See, e.g., Zhao Yuanyuan, ``Ex-NIO Intern Assaulted by 
Colleague Accuses Chinese EV Maker of Toxic Workplace Culture,'' China 
Project, March 7, 2023; Seulkee Jang, ``Female North Korean Worker in 
China Falls Victim to Sexual Assault,'' Daily NK, March 3, 2023.
    \77\ See, e.g., Manya Koetse, ``Hunan Man Kills Wife by Running 
Over Her Twice with SUV,'' What's on Weibo, July 1, 2022; Manya Koetse, 
``Online Anger over Zhejiang Man Being Detained for 10 Days after Acid 
Attack on Wife,'' What's on Weibo, February 18, 2023; Gu Ting, ``Henan 
Hua xian nanzi sha qi an yinfa jingmin chongtu'' [Case of the man who 
murdered his wife in Hua county, Henan, incited clashes between police 
and the public], Radio Free Asia, March 27, 2023.
    \78\ Vivian Wang, ``Brutal Beating of Women in China Highlights 
Risk of Saying `No,' '' New York Times, June 15, 2022; Manya Koetse and 
Miranda Barnes, `` `What Happened in Tangshan?' The Violent Restaurant 
Incident Everyone Is Talking About,'' What's on Weibo, June 11, 2022.
    \79\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Mao Huibin yin fabu 
Tangshan shijian bei xingju'' [Mao Huibin criminally detained for 
publishing about the Tangshan incident], August 16, 2022; Rights 
Defense Network, ``Yin zai wangshang fabu Tangshan da ren shijian xinxi 
zao xingshi juliu de Hebei Hengshui zi meiti ren Mao Huibin jia ren jin 
shoudao xingju tongzhishu'' [Family of Mao Huibin, independent 
journalist from Hengshui, Hebei, who was criminally detained for 
posting information online about the Tangshan assault incident, receive 
notice of criminal detention], August 15, 2022; Committee to Protect 
Journalists, ``Chinese Journalist Mao Huibin Arrested after Publishing 
Articles about Tangshan Incident,'' August 15, 2022. For more 
information on Mao Huibin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2022-00148.
    \80\ International Federation of Journalists, ``China: Journalist 
Detained and Harassed for Reporting on Restaurant Attack,'' June 22, 
2022.
    \81\ Manya Koetse, ``Unanswered Questions Linger in the Aftermath 
of Tangshan BBQ Restaurant Beating Incident,'' What's on Weibo, June 
17, 2022.
    \82\ Guangyang District People's Court, Langfang municipality, 
Hebei province, ``Chen Jizhi deng e shili zuzhi weifa fanzui an yi shen 
gongkai xuanpan'' [Announcement of first-instance court decision in the 
criminal case of Chen Jizhi and other evil-doers who organized to 
violate the law], September 23, 2022; Cao Li and Liyan Qi, ``China 
Jails Gang Members over Attack on Women,'' Wall Street Journal, 
September 23, 2022; Donald J. Clarke, ``The Tangshan Gang Verdict: Some 
Comments,'' China Collection, September 23, 2022.
    \83\ ``Zhuanfang: Zhongguo gongzhong dui xingbie baoli shijian 
wujie gandao juewang'' [Exclusive interview: Chinese public feels 
despair over the lack of solutions to incidents of gender violence], 
Deutsche Welle, June 14, 2022.
    \84\ Brian Wong, ``The Long Road to Ending Gendered Violence in 
China,'' USALI Perspectives 3, no. 9, December 1, 2022.
    \85\ ``Zhuanfang: Zhongguo gongzhong dui xingbie baoli shijian 
wujie gandao juewan'' [Exclusive interview: Chinese public feels 
despair over the lack of solutions to incidents of gender violence], 
Deutsche Welle, June 14, 2022; Vic Chiang and Lily Kuo, ``After 
Restaurant Attack, Authorities Continue to Gaslight China's Women,'' 
Washington Post, June 23, 2022.
    \86\ Andrea J. Worden and Nuzigum Setiwaldi, ``Forced Marriage of 
Uyghur Women: State Policies for Interethnic Marriages in East 
Turkistan,'' Uyghur Human Rights Project, November 2022.
    \87\ Andrea J. Worden and Nuzigum Setiwaldi, ``Forced Marriage of 
Uyghur Women: State Policies for Interethnic Marriages in East 
Turkistan,'' Uyghur Human Rights Project, November 2022.
    \88\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``CHRD Submission to the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women for its 
Consideration of the Ninth Periodic Report of the People's Republic of 
China (85th Session),'' April 8, 2023.
    \89\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``CHRD Submission to the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women for its 
Consideration of the Ninth Periodic Report of the People's Republic of 
China (85th Session),'' April 8, 2023.
    \90\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Zero Covid, Many 
Controls: Covering China in 2022,'' March 1, 2023, 7.
    \91\ Albert Zhang and Danielle Cave, ``Smart Asian Women Are the 
New Targets of CCP Global Online Repression,'' Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, Strategist, June 3, 2022.
    \92\ Amelia Loi and Mary Zhao, ``For Female Journalists, Covering 
China Comes at a Cost,'' Radio Free Asia, March 20, 2023.

Population Control

Population Control

                           Population Control

                                Findings

         Authorities in the People's Republic of China 
        (PRC) continue to treat population growth, 
        childbearing, and women's fertility in China as subject 
        to official control and policymaking. In response to 
        demographic and economic pressure, PRC authorities 
        ended the one-child policy in 2015, replacing it with 
        the two-child policy in 2016 and the three-child policy 
        in 2021. In July 2022, 17 Party and government entities 
        jointly issued a set of ``guiding opinions'' that aim 
        to incentivize marriage and childbirth by improving 
        healthcare, education, employment conditions, 
        insurance, and other benefits.
         Enforcement of birth limits in China has been 
        characterized by the use of harshly coercive measures 
        in violation of international human rights standards. 
        This past year, U.N. experts raised concerns about 
        reports of the use of coercive birth control measures 
        against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic 
        minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
        Region (XUAR), including forced abortion and 
        sterilization, and the placement of contraceptive 
        devices, that reportedly resulted in ``unusual and 
        stark'' population declines in the XUAR from 2017 
        through 2019.
         Among the supportive measures to boost the 
        population suggested during the March 2023 meeting of 
        the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
        was improving the rights of unmarried parents. Although 
        several municipalities and at least one province 
        reportedly allow unmarried women to register the birth 
        of children, those children are not eligible for the 
        household registration (hukou) permits that are crucial 
        for access to public services. Moreover, an unmarried 
        woman lost a lawsuit in July 2022 against a hospital in 
        Beijing municipality which refused to allow her to 
        undergo a procedure to freeze her eggs. An appeal 
        hearing was held in May 2023, but the decision has not 
        been announced.
         Many young people reportedly are reluctant to 
        marry and have children due to the high cost of raising 
        children, low incomes, and a weak social safety net. 
        Public opinion reflected unease with the government's 
        focus on population growth as a national responsibility 
        for the rising generation of young adults.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          In bilateral meetings, urge PRC government officials 
        to abolish all birth restrictions on families, and 
        employ an approach toward population policy based on 
        international human rights standards.
          Urge PRC authorities to end all coercive population 
        control practices targeting Uyghur and other ethnic 
        groups in the XUAR and elsewhere. Use authorities 
        provided in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
        Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law No. 106-113) and the 
        Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 
        (Public Law No. 114-328) to sanction Chinese officials 
        involved in the formulation, implementation, or 
        enforcement of coercive population control policies, 
        including those officials who have forced women to 
        undergo sterilizations and abortions in the XUAR and 
        elsewhere.
          Support the Uyghur Genocide Accountability and 
        Sanctions Act (S. 1770), which gives the President 
        authority to impose sanctions on individuals 
        responsible for or complicit in forced sterilizations 
        and forced abortions in the XUAR.
          Address in bilateral dialogue and in relevant 
        multilateral institutions the regional humanitarian and 
        security concerns stemming from the sex ratio imbalance 
        exacerbated by the PRC's population control policies, 
        including concerns about human trafficking, increased 
        internal and external migration, and other social, 
        economic, and political problems.
          Urge the PRC government to reform the household 
        registration (hukou) system to extend legal citizenship 
        to millions of persons who were born notwithstanding 
        the previous one- or two-child policies and who 
        therefore lack access to education, medical care, 
        government services, and legal protection of their 
        rights.

Population Control

Population Control

                           Population Control

   International Standards and the PRC's Coercive Population Policies

    Despite calls from experts and other observers to remove 
all birth limits in China on both demographic and human rights 
grounds,\1\ the People's Republic of China (PRC) has continued 
to implement a birth limit policy--the ``three-child policy''--
in violation of international standards.\2\ The one-child 
policy, in force from 1980 through 2015, restricted most 
couples to one child,\3\ though it was implemented locally with 
exceptions, most commonly in rural areas and for ethnic 
minority groups.\4\ Policy enforcement under the National 
Population and Family Planning Commission\5\ involved the 
participation of local officials\6\ and birth planning workers 
in rural villages and in urban work units and neighborhoods, 
who used fines to punish couples for exceeding birth limits, 
intrusively monitored women's fertility, issued birth permits, 
and employed coercive measures such as forced placement of 
intrauterine devices (IUDs), forced sterilizations, and forced 
abortions.\7\ Scholars have traced the use of these practices 
to the PRC's purported voluntary birth limit campaign begun in 
the 1970s.\8\
    Coercive controls imposed on families, as well as 
additional abuses engendered by the PRC population and family 
planning system, violate standards set forth in the 1995 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the 1994 
Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on 
Population and Development.\9\ China was a state participant in 
the negotiation and adoption of both documents.\10\ Acts of 
official coercion committed in the implementation of population 
control policies also contravene provisions of the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, which China has ratified.\11\ Scholars, 
moreover, have begun to theorize that forced abortion may 
constitute an international crime, noting that ``reproductive 
violence is increasingly being recognized as a distinct form of 
harm requiring legal recognition, protection, and redress.'' 
\12\ The U.S. State Department has noted that coercive birth 
control measures employed against Uyghurs and other 
predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) constitute acts of genocide and 
crimes against humanity.\13\
    Experts at the United Nations highlighted the use of 
coercive birth control measures against Uyghurs and other 
predominantly Muslim minority groups in the XUAR in the August 
2022 assessment of human rights concerns in the XUAR issued by 
the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights\14\ 
and during treaty body reviews in February and May 2023.\15\ 
Beginning in 2016, officials in the XUAR reportedly used forced 
abortion and sterilization as a means of limiting births among 
ethnic minority groups in the region.\16\ Research published in 
2022 found that implementation of the policy had ``drastically 
reduced birth rates of ethnic groups'' in the XUAR.\17\ In the 
August 2022 assessment of human rights concerns in the XUAR, 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights noted the reduction 
in births from 2017 to 2019 in the XUAR, calling the decline in 
2018 ``unusual and stark.'' \18\ The assessment also 
highlighted the sharp increase in the XUAR, in 2017 and 2018, 
in sterilizations and the placement of intrauterine devices 
(IUDs), particularly in comparison to locations elsewhere in 
China.\19\ The assessment describes these measures as 
violations of ``the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health compris[ing] sexual and reproductive freedom'' and ``an 
expansive notion of religious `extremism', raising further 
concerns about discriminatory enforcement of these policies 
against Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minorities.'' 
\20\ Similarly, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, in the concluding observations of its review 
of China's implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in February 2023,\21\ said 
that it ``remains concerned about reports that coercive 
measures, such as forced abortions, sexual violence, forced 
sterilizations and torture, have been and are employed to 
accompany enforcement of family planning policies in the [XUAR] 
and in predominantly Uighur-populated areas, and that these 
have been a cause of the unusual and stark difference in birth 
rates, sterilizations and intrauterine device [IUD] placements 
in those areas in comparison with the rest of the State party. 
. ..'' \22\ The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women that reviewed China's 
compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women in May 2023 called for 
``immediate steps to end, prevent and criminalize the use of 
coercive measures'' against women in the XUAR, as well as the 
investigation and prosecution of those responsible for these 
measures, and ``adequate compensation'' to the victims.\23\ 
[For more information on the August 2022 assessment by the 
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, see 
Chapter 18--Xinjiang.]

               Population Decline and Official Responses

    In January 2023, the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
announced that in 2022, the total population of China declined 
to 1,411,750,000--a decrease of 850,000 from the prior 
year.\24\ The announcement marked the first officially reported 
countrywide population decline since the widespread famine that 
resulted from the implementation of the Great Leap Forward in 
China (1958 to 1962),\25\ in which an estimated 30 million died 
of starvation.\26\ Birth rates also declined for the sixth 
straight year, from 7.52 births per thousand in 2021 to 6.77 
births per thousand in 2022 \27\--a trend that experts expect 
will continue.\28\

               OFFICIAL POLICIES, ACTIONS, AND PROPOSALS

    To address what senior officials refer to as the ``great 
challenge'' of the aging population and the below-replacement 
birth rate, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
Political Bureau announced the adoption of a universal three-
child policy in May 2021,\29\ allowing all couples to have up 
to three children.\30\ In July 2021, the Party Central 
Committee and the State Council promulgated the policy change 
in the ``Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party and the State Council on Optimizing Childbirth 
Policies to Promote Long-Term Balanced Population 
Development.'' \31\ Through an amendment to the PRC Population 
and Family Planning Law in August 2021,\32\ PRC authorities 
established a legal basis to promote an increased birth rate, 
balance the overall sex ratio, ``optimize'' the population 
structure, raise ``population quality,'' and ``protect rights 
and interests of women in employment.'' \33\ The shift to the 
three-child policy, however, has not altered the basic premise 
of PRC authorities' continuing ``claim [of] sovereignty over 
childbearing of Chinese citizens,'' as observed by political 
scientist Tyrene White.\34\
    At the seniormost level this past year, Party General 
Secretary Xi Jinping reiterated the importance of population 
growth at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party in October 2022, saying that the PRC would raise the 
birth rate and ``pursue a proactive national strategy'' in 
response to the aging population.\35\ Prior to this, seventeen 
Party and government agencies jointly issued the ``Guiding 
Opinions on Further Improving and Implementing Active Fertility 
Support Measures'' (``Guiding Opinions'') in July 2022, which 
outline ways to ``strengthen reproductive health education and 
services, prevent unwanted pregnancies and reduce induced 
abortion for non-medical reasons.'' \36\ The Guiding Opinions 
also call for improvement in healthcare, insurance, childcare, 
education, employment, housing, taxation, and social services 
aimed at creating ``a friendly atmosphere to raise children'' 
and achieving ``balanced population development.'' \37\ Some 
local governments, in an effort to increase birth rates, 
reportedly have begun to offer parents a range of subsidies and 
supportive measures for having children.\38\ The Guiding 
Opinions also incorporate a gender-specific focus on women in 
the workplace with the creation of ``family-friendly 
workplaces,'' such as promoting designated rooms for women to 
rest when pregnant or nursing, and stronger implementation of 
labor safeguards.\39\ Preventing discrimination against women 
in the workplace is also addressed in the amended PRC Law on 
the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests, passed in 
October 2022 by the National People's Congress.\40\ [For more 
information on gender discrimination in the workplace, see 
Chapter 11--Worker Rights.]
    In one effort to promote population growth, the China 
Family Planning Association (CFPA) announced in August 2022 the 
selection of 20 districts, municipalities, and one division of 
the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region as sites in the ``2022 New Type of 
Marriage and Childbirth Culture Construction Pilot Projects'' 
\41\ and added 20 more pilot sites in May 2023.\42\ While the 
National Health Commission is the government entity in charge 
of implementing population control policy, the CFPA--as a 
``mass organization'' under the Party--transmits Party policy 
to the people through propaganda and grassroots 
mobilization.\43\ The new CFPA-administered pilot projects seek 
to reform cultural norms as a means of increasing the birth 
rate, such as reducing the burden of costly marriage customs 
like ``bride prices'' in rural areas and expensive 
weddings.\44\ Staff working for the local family planning 
association in Miyun district, Beijing municipality--one of the 
first 20 pilot sites--reportedly will be assessed in part on 
their success in increasing marriages and births.\45\ A 
professor of demography at Renmin University in Beijing 
observed that the pilot projects may provide illustrative 
local-level experience to inform policymaking and 
implementation absent public consensus about the meaning of the 
``new marriage and childbirth culture.'' \46\
    During the March 2023 annual legislative meetings of the 
National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), several CPPCC members publicly 
proposed various incentives to promote population growth.\47\ 
While the CPPCC is not a policymaking body, its members have 
the political space to raise suggestions to the government and 
thus can function as a conduit for public opinion.\48\ Among 
the range of proposals were granting equal rights to children 
of unmarried parents; providing subsidies for a couple's first 
child, rather than just for second and third children; and 
expanding free public education and access to fertility 
treatments.\49\

         Public Discontent with the Pro-Natal Population Policy

    Even as central authorities and local governments have 
sought to encourage families to have more children, many young 
people reportedly are reluctant to marry and have children.\50\ 
They note factors including the high cost of raising children, 
low incomes, and a weak social safety net.\51\ Online 
commentary and media reports, moreover, reflected unease in 
Chinese public opinion with the government's focus on 
population growth as a national responsibility for the rising 
generation of young adults.\52\ Some social media users 
expressed resentment that the government seems to view people 
as ``human mines'' (renkuang) who produce children to be 
exploited for economic benefit.\53\ The viral term ``lying 
flat'' (tangping)--which expresses a state of inertia as a form 
of resistance--has been linked to the younger generation's 
frustration with the government's official expectations that 
young people must work hard and have children with little 
promise of reward.\54\ A video of a man refusing to leave home 
for a quarantine facility during the lockdown in Shanghai 
municipality in spring 2022 went viral on social media, 
resonating with those concerned about raising a child in 
authoritarian China.\55\ Responding to an official who 
threatened him with punishment that would ``affect your family 
for three generations,'' the man said, ``We are the last 
generation, thank you.'' \56\ A demographer also pointed to the 
discontent expressed by young Chinese people over PRC 
authorities' continuing claim that childbearing is a ``state 
affair.'' \57\ Although birth and marriage rates have been 
declining around the world, the ``swift and sharp fertility 
crashes'' taking place in China are unusual and reflect a 
``revolutionary, wildfire change in national mood,'' according 
to the demographer.\58\ Similarly, a Beijing-based political 
analyst said that young people's growing discontent with 
authoritarian rule and reluctance to have children pointed to 
an ``irreconcilable conflict'' with China's goal of economic 
growth and the ``bankruptcy'' of its economic model, which had 
relied on a cheap and abundant labor supply.\59\
    This past year, several researchers linked declining birth 
rates, in part, to Chinese women's resistance to the official 
population control policy after bearing the brunt of its 
violent implementation for decades, including forced abortion, 
contraception, and sterilization.\60\ Moreover, the researchers 
described the official pro-natal policy as another 
manifestation of the government's attempt to control women's 
fertility.\61\ Some observers also expressed concern that the 
government's pro-natalist push could contribute to the further 
erosion of women's rights, pointing out that the government's 
failure to enforce measures preventing workplace discrimination 
has contributed to gender discrimination for working women.\62\ 
In a commentary for the Lowy Institute, an Australian think 
tank, a scholar wrote that ``[w]omen's rights in the Party's 
strategy have not emerged out of respect for human rights and 
individual choice. Rather, women are primarily viewed as a 
resource to be deployed for the benefit of the party state.'' 
\63\ Authorities also have amplified ``traditional gender 
roles'' in official Chinese media outlets, as illustrated by 
the rhetorical claim that ``women will find fulfillment through 
marriage and motherhood.'' \64\

                Rights of Unmarried Women with Children

    The PRC does not explicitly ban unmarried women from having 
children, but many services, such as pre-natal healthcare and 
maternity leave benefits, require proof of marriage.\65\ At a 
press conference in August 2022, an official from the National 
Healthcare Security Administration said that there is no 
national-level restriction on access to maternity benefits for 
unmarried mothers, and said local governments cannot ask women 
to provide marriage certificates in order to access 
benefits.\66\ Beijing municipality and several provinces 
reportedly now allow single women to receive maternity leave 
benefits, and Sichuan province began to allow unmarried parents 
in February 2023 to register births in order to qualify for 
some benefits.\67\ But while the births may be registered, 
those children are not eligible for enrollment in the household 
registration (hukou) system, which is critical to access public 
services.\68\ In vitro fertilization for single women remained 
illegal throughout most of China, but media outlets reported in 
2023 that health officials had begun discussing the possibility 
of allowing single women to freeze their eggs.\69\ The issue is 
being litigated in court: In July 2022, a court in Beijing 
ruled in favor of a hospital that refused to freeze the eggs of 
a single woman, sparking online debate about the fairness of 
the ban.\70\ The woman, surnamed Xu, appealed the decision at 
the Beijing No. 3 Intermediate People's Court in May 2023, but 
the court did not announce its decision at the time.\71\

               Continuing Effects of the One-Child Policy

    The legacy of the one-child policy continues to negatively 
affect many in China. This reporting year, two journalists 
concluded that the policy, which limited most families in China 
to one child, ``exacted a huge social and human cost on Chinese 
society. Forced abortions, sterilizations, the use of 
intrauterine contraceptive devices as well as hefty financial 
penalties left physical and emotional scars on millions of 
women and traumatized families.'' \72\ The government's 
population control policies, coercively enforced for decades, 
also contributed to the use of sex-selective abortion due to 
the preference for sons, especially in rural areas.\73\ The sex 
ratio imbalance in China is stark, with researchers estimating 
30 million fewer women in China as a result of the one-child 
policy.\74\ Experts have attributed numerous social problems to 
the gender imbalance, with one saying the consequences ``will 
be felt in the generation ahead.'' \75\ The sex ratio imbalance 
has intensified competition for brides in rural areas, driving 
up already financially burdensome ``bride prices.'' \76\ 
Observers have also linked the sex ratio imbalance to the 
trafficking of women within China and from abroad into China 
for purposes of forced marriage and commercial sexual 
exploitation.\77\ The PRC's enforcement of population control 
policies has also led to other long-term harmful effects. An 
estimated 13 million people born in violation of China's 
population control policies were not registered under the hukou 
system and therefore lack access to certain social welfare 
benefits, public services, and the rights conferred by 
citizenship, including formal identification, education, and 
employment.\78\ [For more information on the trafficking of 
women, see Chapter 10--Human Trafficking.]

Population Control

Population Control

    Notes to Chapter 9--Population Control

    \1\ Yaqiu Wang, ``It's Time to Abolish China's Three-Child 
Policy,'' in Essays on Equality: The Politics of Childcare (London: The 
Global Institute for Women's Leadership, King's College London, 2023), 
54-57; Farah Master, ``Time and Money for Love: China Brainstorms Ways 
to Boost Birth Rate,'' Reuters, March 15, 2023; ``Ren Zeping: Kaifang 
bing guli shengyu ke bu ronghuan'' [Ren Zeping: It is imperative to 
liberalize and encourage childbearing], Northeast Net, January 18, 
2023; Ren Zeping, ``Ren Zeping: Quanmian er hai hou fan'er chuxian 
shengyu duanya, ying liji quanmian fangkai bing guli shengyu'' [Ren 
Zeping: Following the universal two-child policy, a fertility drop-off 
nevertheless occurred; [the policy] should be fully relaxed immediately 
and fertility should be encouraged], Yicai, February 3, 2021; Keith 
Zhai, ``China Considers Lifting All Childbirth Restrictions by 2025,'' 
Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2021; Sui-Lee Wee, ``China Says It Will 
Allow Couples to Have 3 Children, Up from 2,'' New York Times, 
September 27, 2021.
    \2\ Yaqiu Wang, ``It's Time to Abolish China's Three-Child 
Policy,'' in Essays on Equality: The Politics of Childcare (London: The 
Global Institute for Women's Leadership, Kings College London, 2023), 
54-57; Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the 
Fourth World Conference on Women on September 15, 1995, and endorsed by 
U.N. General Assembly resolution 50/203 on February 23, 1996, Annex I, 
paras. 9, 17. The Beijing Declaration states that governments that have 
participated in the Fourth World Conference on Women reaffirmed their 
commitment to ``[e]nsure the full implementation of the human rights of 
women and of the girl child as an inalienable, integral and indivisible 
part of all human rights and fundamental freedoms'' (Annex I, para. 9); 
``[t]he explicit recognition and reaffirmation of the right of all 
women to control all aspects of their health, in particular their own 
fertility, is basic to their empowerment'' (Annex I, para. 17). United 
Nations Population Fund, Programme of Action, adopted at the Cairo 
International Conference on Population and Development, September 13, 
1994, paras. 7.2, 8.25. Paragraph 7.2 states, ``Reproductive health 
therefore implies that people . . . have the capability to reproduce 
and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in 
this last condition are the right of men and women to be informed and 
to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of 
family planning of their choice. . ..'' Paragraph 8.25 states, ``In no 
case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning.''
    \3\ Susan Greenhalgh, ``Why Does the End of the One-Child Policy 
Matter?,'' in eds. Jennifer Rudolph and Michael Szonyi, The China 
Questions: Critical Insights into a Rising Power (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2018), 183.
    \4\ Gu Baochang, Wang Feng, Guo Zhigang, and Zhang Erli, ``China's 
Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth 
Century,'' Population and Development Review 33, no. 1 (March 7, 2007): 
131-36.
    \5\ Rita Cheng, ``Women Harmed by China's Draconian Family Planning 
Policies Still Seek Redress,'' Radio Free Asia, April 8, 2022; Li 
Wanxiang, ``Wei renmin jiankang fuwu: Xin zujian de Guojia Weisheng 
Jiankang Weiyuanhui riqian guapai'' [Serve the people's health: Newly 
formed National Health Commission recently was launched], Economic 
Daily, April 4, 2018; ``China to Merge Health Ministry, Family Planning 
Commission,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, March 10, 2013; Andrew 
Mullen, ``Explainer: China's One-Child Policy: What Was It and What 
Impact Did It Have?,'' South China Morning Post, June 1, 2021.
    \6\ Daniel C. Mattingly, ``Responsive or Repressive? How Frontline 
Bureaucrats Enforce the One Child Policy in China,'' Comparative 
Politics 52, no. 2 (2020): 2, 4-6.
    \7\ Shui-yin Sharon Yam and Sarah Mellors Rodriguez, ``Reproductive 
Realities in Modern China: A Conversation with Sarah Mellors 
Rodriguez,'' Made in China Journal, March 29, 2023; Daniel C. 
Mattingly, ``Responsive or Repressive? How Frontline Bureaucrats 
Enforce the One Child Policy in China,'' Comparative Politics 52, no. 2 
(2020): 2, 4-6; Martin King Whyte, Wang Feng, and Yong Cai, 
``Challenging Myths about China's One-Child Policy,'' China Journal 74, 
(July 2015): 150-52.
    \8\ Martin King Whyte, Wang Feng, and Yong Cai, ``Challenging Myths 
about China's One-Child Policy,'' China Journal 74, (July 2015): 150-
52.
    \9\ Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the 
Fourth World Conference on Women on September 15, 1995, and endorsed by 
U.N. General Assembly resolution 50/203 on February 23, 1996, Annex I, 
paras. 9, 17; United Nations Population Fund, Programme of Action, 
adopted at the Cairo International Conference on Population and 
Development, September 13, 1994, paras. 7.2, 8.25.
    \10\ United Nations, Report of the Fourth World Conference on 
Women, A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, September 15, 1995, chap. II, para. 3, 
chap. IV, para. 12. China was one of the participating States at the 
Fourth World Conference on Women, which adopted the Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action. United Nations, Report of the International 
Conference on Population and Development, A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1, 
September 13, 1994, chap. II, sec. C, chap. VI, para. 1.
    \11\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by U.N. General Assembly 
resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987, 
art. 1; U.N. Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the 
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at Its 1391st 
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, February 3, 
2016, para. 51. In 2016, the U.N. Committee against Torture noted its 
concern regarding ``reports of coerced sterilization and forced 
abortions, and . . . the lack of information on the number of 
investigations into such allegations . . . [and] the lack of 
information regarding redress provided to victims of past violations.'' 
See also Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 
December 18, 1979, entry into force September 3, 1981, art. 16.1(e). 
Under article 16.1(e), ``States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters 
relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: . . . The same rights 
to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their 
children and to have access to the information, education and means to 
enable them to exercise these rights[.]'' See also International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by U.N. General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force 
March 23, 1976, art. 17. Under Article 17 of the ICCPR, ``No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour 
and reputation.''
    \12\ Ciara Laverty and Dieneke de Vos, ``Forced Abortion as an 
International Crime: Recent Reports from Northern Nigeria,'' Just 
Security, December 23, 2022.
    \13\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--China 
(Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),'' March 30, 2021; Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ``2021 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--China (Includes Hong Kong, 
Macau, and Tibet),'' April 12, 2022; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ``2022 Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices--China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),'' March 
20, 2023. See also U.S. Department of State, ``Determination of the 
Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang,'' January 19, 2021; 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report 
(Washington: March 2022), 273-74, 280-81.
    \14\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, paras. 104-14.
    \15\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee 
at its 30th Meeting (3 March 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, 
para. 70; Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
``Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women Commend China on Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation, Ask about 
Women's Political Participation and Sex-Selective Abortions,'' May 12, 
2023; U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Concluding Observations on the Ninth Periodic Report of China, 
adopted by the Committee at its 58th Session (8-26 May 2023), CEDAW/C/
CHN/CO/9, May 31, 2023, paras. 43-44.
    \16\ ``China Cuts Uighur Births with IUDs, Abortion, 
Sterilization,'' Associated Press, June 29, 2020; Nathan Ruser and 
James Leibold, ``Family De-Planning: The Coercive Campaign to Drive 
Down Indigenous Birth-Rates in Xinjiang,'' International Cyber Policy 
Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Policy Brief Report no. 
44 (2021): 4, 7, 16. See also Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 280-81.
    \17\ Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, ``The Xinjiang Papers: An 
Introduction,'' February 10, 2022, 5.
    \18\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, paras. 107-8.
    \19\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, para. 108.
    \20\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, paras. 112-13.
    \21\ Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the 
United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations 
in Switzerland, ``China Participates in 3rd Review of Implementation on 
Intl Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,'' February 16, 
2023.
    \22\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee 
at its 30th Meeting (3 March 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, 
para. 70. See also Office of the U.N. High Commissioner on Human 
Rights, ``Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Commends 
China for Efforts to Reduce Poverty, Asks about Measures to Protect 
Ethnic Minorities from Reported Forced Labour and the Coverage of the 
Social Welfare System,'' February 17, 2023. In response to the CESCR's 
questions about these rights violations in the XUAR, the Chinese 
delegation denied the allegations, saying that ``forced contraception 
was prohibited.'' Regarding the population decline in the region, the 
delegation said, ``The population in southern Xinjiang had dropped, but 
this was in line with China's population trend. The drop had nothing to 
do with forced sterilization or arbitrary detention.''
    \23\ U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Concluding Observations on the Ninth Periodic Report of China, 
adopted by the Committee at its 58th Session (8-26 May 2023), CEDAW/C/
CHN/CO/9, May 31, 2023, para. 44(d).
    \24\ Wang Pingping, ``Wang Pingping: Renkou zongliang le you 
xiajiang chengzhenhua shuiping jixu tigao'' [Wang Pingping: Total 
population has slightly declined, urbanization levels continue to 
increase], Economic Daily, January 18, 2023.
    \25\ Ian Johnson, ``China: Worse Than You Ever Imagined,'' New York 
Review of Books, November 22, 2012.
    \26\ Alexandra Stevenson and Zixu Wang, ``China's Population Falls, 
Heralding a Demographic Crisis,'' New York Times, January 17, 2023; 
Brook Larmer and Jane Zhang, ``China's Population Is Shrinking. It 
Faces a Perilous Future.,'' National Geographic, March 22, 2023.
    \27\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical 
Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2022 National 
Economic and Social Development,'' February 28, 2023; ``China: Birth 
Rate 2022,'' Statista, January 2023; Alexandra Stevenson and Zixu Wang, 
``China's Population Falls, Heralding a Demographic Crisis,'' New York 
Times, January 17, 2023.
    \28\ Alexandra Stevenson and Zixu Wang, ``China's Population Falls, 
Heralding a Demographic Crisis,'' New York Times, January 17, 2023; 
Shucai Yang, Quanbao Jiang, and Jesus J. Sanchez-Barricarte, ``China's 
Fertility Change: An Analysis with Multiple Measures,'' Population 
Health Metrics 20, no. 1 (March 31, 2022): 12.
    \29\ ``Quanwei kuaibao: San hai shengyu zhengce lai le'' 
[Authoritative announcement: Three-child policy has arrived], Xinhua, 
May 31, 2021.
    \30\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou yu Jihua Shengyu Fa [PRC 
Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, 
effective September 1, 2002, amended August 20, 2021, art. 18; 
``Quanwei kuaibao: San hai shengyu zhengce lai le'' [Authoritative 
announcement: Three-child policy has arrived], Xinhua, May 31, 2021. 
See also Sui-Lee Wee, ``China Says It Will Allow Couples to Have 3 
Children, Up from 2,'' New York Times, September 27, 2021.
    \31\ Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Youhua Shengyu Zhengce 
Cujin Renkou Changqi Junheng Fazhan de Jueding [Decision of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council on 
Optimizing the Fertility Policy and Promoting the Long-term Balanced 
Development of the Population], Xinhua, July 20, 2021.
    \32\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou yu Jihua Shengyu Fa [PRC 
Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, 
effective September 1, 2002, amended August 20, 2021, art. 18.
    \33\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou yu Jihua Shengyu Fa [PRC 
Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, 
effective September 1, 2002, amended August 20, 2021, art. 18; 
Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Youhua Shengyu Zhengce Cujin 
Renkou Changqi Junheng Fazhan de Jueding [Decision of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council on 
Optimizing the Fertility Policy and Promoting the Long-term Balanced 
Development of the Population], Xinhua, July 20, 2021.
    \34\ Tyrene White, ``Policy Case Study: Population Policy,'' in ed. 
William A. Joseph, Politics in China: An Introduction, Third Edition 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 435. White's comment about 
ongoing control of fertility in China by PRC authorities was made in 
relation to the shift to the two-child policy in 2016, but it remains 
relevant for the shift to the three-child policy. See also Nicholas 
Eberstadt, ``Opinion; China's Collapsing Birth and Marriage Rates 
Reflect a People's Deep Pessimism,'' Washington Post, February 28, 
2023.
    \35\ ``Xi Jinping tichu, zengjin minsheng fuzhi, tigao renmin 
shenghuo pinzhi'' [Xi Jinping proposes to improve the people's 
livelihood and well-being and improve the people's quality of life], 
Xinhua, October 16, 2022; Yew Lun Tian and Martin Quin Pollard, ``Xi 
Says China Will Seek to Lift Birth Rate in Face of Ageing Population,'' 
Reuters, October 16, 2022.
    \36\ National Health Commission et al., Guanyu Jinyibu Wanshan he 
Luoshi Jiji Shengyu Zhichi Cuoshi de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinions on 
Further Improving and Implementing Supportive Measures to Encourage 
Childbirth], July 25, 2022, sec. 2(3). For an unofficial translation of 
the Guiding Opinions, see ``Guiding Opinions on Further Improving and 
Implementing Measures to Support Stimulation of Childbirth,'' 
translated in China Law Translate, August 16, 2022. China Family 
Planning Association, ``The Protection and Promotion of Human Rights in 
the Fields of Population, Family and Reproductive Health In China 
(2020-2022),'' February 16, 2023, sec. 3.
    \37\ National Health Commission et al., Guanyu Jinyibu Wanshan he 
Luoshi Jiji Shengyu Zhichi Cuoshi de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinions on 
Further Improving and Implementing Supportive Measures to Encourage 
Childbirth], July 25, 2022, secs. 4(8-9), 7(16-18).
    \38\ Luo Wangshu and Wang Xiaoyu, ``Nation Takes Steps to Encourage 
More Births,'' China Daily, August 17, 2022; Farah Master, ``Factbox: 
How China Is Seeking to Boost Its Falling Birth Rate,'' Reuters, 
January 17, 2023.
    \39\ National Health Commission et al., Guanyu Jinyibu Wanshan he 
Luoshi Jiji Shengyu Zhichi Cuoshi de Zhidao Yijian [Guiding Opinions on 
Further Improving and Implementing Supportive Measures to Encourage 
Childbirth], July 25, 2022, sec. 7(16-18).
    \40\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Funu Quanyi Baozhang Fa [PRC Law on 
the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests], passed April 3, 1992, 
amended October 30, 2022, effective January 1, 2023, arts. 42, 46-49. 
For an unofficial translation, see ``PRC Law on the Protection of the 
Rights and Interests of Women,'' translated in China Law Translate, 
October 30, 2022.
    \41\ China Family Planning Association, ``Zhongguo Jisheng Xie 
guanyu Queding 2022 Nian Xinxing Hun Yu Wenhua Jianshe Shidian Xiangmu 
Danwei de Tongzhi'' [Circular of the China Family Planning Association 
on the 2022 New Type of Marriage and Childbirth Culture Construction 
Pilot Projects], August 24, 2022.
    \42\ Dong Ruifeng and Tian Xiaohang, ``Yingzao shengyu youhao 
shehui huanjing di er pi xin shidai hun yu wenhua jianshe shidian 
xiangmu jiang kaizhan'' [Creating a birth-friendly social environment: 
The second batch of pilot projects for the construction of marriage and 
childbearing culture in the new era will be launched], People's Daily, 
May 19, 2023; ``Pilot Projects Launched in 20 More Cities to Build New-
Era Marriage Culture,'' Global Times, May 14, 2023; Liyan Qi, 
``Enforcers of China's One-Child Policy Are Now Cajoling People to Have 
Three,'' Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2023.
    \43\ China Family Planning Association, ``Zhongguo Jisheng Xie 
jianjie'' [China Family Planning Association brief introduction], 
December 28, 2018; Yanfei Hu and Gavin Hilson, ``Philanthropic 
Foundations and Institutional Change under Rigid Authoritarianism: 
Exploring the Ford Foundation's Historical Grantmaking in the Chinese 
Family Planning Field (1991-2005),'' Journal of Social Policy (2023): 
6. See also Judith Audin and Jerome Doyon, ``Intermediary Political 
Bodies of the Party-State: A Sociology of Mass and Grassroots 
Organisations in Contemporary China,'' China Perspectives, no. 2 
(2019): 3-4.
    \44\ Dong Ruifeng and Tian Xiaohang, ``Yingzao shengyu youhao 
shehui huanjing: Di er pi xin shidai hun yu wenhua jianshe shidian 
xiangmu jiang kaizhan'' [Creating a birth-friendly social environment: 
The second batch of pilot projects for the construction of marriage and 
childbearing culture in the new era will be launched], People's Daily, 
May 19, 2023; ``Pilot Projects Launched in 20 More Cities to Build New-
Era Marriage Culture,'' Global Times, May 14, 2023.
    \45\ Liyan Qi, ``Enforcers of China's One-Child Policy Are Now 
Cajoling People to Have Three,'' Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2023.
    \46\ Zhao Meng, ``40 ge dishi shidian, jiujing hewei xinxing hun yu 
wenhua?'' [With 40 local pilot sites, what exactly is the new marriage 
and childbearing culture?], Jiemian, May 18, 2023.
    \47\ Farah Master, ``Time and Money for Love: China Brainstorms 
Ways to Boost Birth Rate,'' Reuters, March 15, 2023; Zhao Yusha, 
``Motions, Proposals for China's 2023 Two Sessions Focus on Boosting 
Birth Rate,'' Global Times, March 1, 2023.
    \48\ Shannon Tiezzi, ``What Is the CPPCC Anyway?,'' Diplomat, March 
4, 2021.
    \49\ Farah Master, ``Time and Money for Love: China Brainstorms 
Ways to Boost Birth Rate,'' Reuters, March 15, 2023; Zhao Yusha, 
``Motions, Proposals for China's 2023 Two Sessions Focus on Boosting 
Birth Rate,'' Global Times, March 1, 2023.
    \50\ Christian Shepherd and Lyric Li, ``China Wants More Babies. 
Women Want the Right to Say No,'' Washington Post, January 23, 2023; 
Charmaine Jacob, ``China Is Facing a Population Crisis but Some Women 
Continue to Say `No' to Having Babies,'' CNBC, April 9, 2023; Alexandra 
Stevenson and Zixu Wang, ``China's Population Falls, Heralding a 
Demographic Crisis,'' New York Times, January 16, 2023; Mei Fong and 
Yaqiu Wang, ``How to Fix China's Population Crisis: Say Sorry to 
Women,'' in Disruptive Asia 5, 2022, Asia Society Australia; He 
Huifeng, ``Why Are China's Gen Z Women Rejecting Marriage, Kids More 
than Their Male Counterparts?,'' South China Morning Post, January 6, 
2022; Nectar Gan, ``Chinese Millennials Aren't Getting Married, and the 
Government Is Worried,'' CNN, January 29, 2021; Helen Davidson and 
Verna Yu, ``Millions of Missing Women: China Grapples with Legacy of 
One-Child Policy as Population Ages,'' Guardian, November 14, 2022.
    \51\ Farah Master, ``Time and Money for Love: China Brainstorms 
Ways to Boost Birth Rate,'' Reuters, March 15, 2023.
    \52\ He Huifeng, ``Why Are China's Gen Z Women Rejecting Marriage, 
Kids More than Their Male Counterparts?,'' South China Morning Post, 
January 6, 2022; Farah Master, ``Time and Money for Love: China 
Brainstorms Ways to Boost Birth Rate,'' Reuters, March 15, 2023; 
Christian Shepherd and Lyric Li, ``China Wants More Babies. Women Want 
the Right to Say No,'' Washington Post, January 23, 2023; Alexandra 
Stevenson and Zixu Wang, ``China's Population Falls, Heralding a 
Demographic Crisis,'' New York Times, January 16, 2023; Nectar Gan, 
``Chinese Millennials Aren't Getting Married, and the Government Is 
Worried,'' CNN, January 29, 2021; Helen Davidson and Verna Yu, 
``Millions of Missing Women: China Grapples with Legacy of One-Child 
Policy as Population Ages,'' Guardian, November 14, 2022.
    \53\ Christian Shepherd and Lyric Li, ``China Wants More Babies. 
Women Want the Right to Say No,'' Washington Post, January 23, 2023; 
Chauncey Jung, ```Human Mines': China's Population Policy Flip-Flops 
Spark Anger,'' Diplomat, January 31, 2023; ``[Mingan ciku] Renkuang'' 
[[Sensitive Lexicon] Human Mine], China Digital Times, January 7, 2023; 
RFA Chinese (@RFA--Chinese), ``Ji `tangping,' `run' zhihou, #renkuang 
huo le!. . ..'' [Following after ``laying flat'' and ``Run away,'' 
#human mine is now viral! . . . ], Twitter, January 5, 2023, 7:28 p.m.
    \54\ Yi-Ling Liu, ``9 Viral Phrases That Explain China's Work 
Culture,'' Rest of World, February 10, 2023; Verna Yu, ```The Last 
Generation': The Young Chinese People Vowing Not to Have Children,'' 
Guardian, January 20, 2023; He Huifeng, ``Why Are China's Gen Z Women 
Rejecting Marriage, Kids More than Their Male Counterparts?,'' South 
China Morning Post, January 6, 2022. See also Jill Disis, ``China 
Blasts `996' Excessive Work Culture,'' CNN, August 27, 2021.
    \55\ Li Yuan, ```The Last Generation': The Disillusionment of Young 
Chinese,'' New York Times, May 24, 2022.
    \56\ Verna Yu, ```The Last Generation': The Young Chinese People 
Vowing Not to Have Children,'' Guardian, January 20, 2023; Barclay 
Bram, ``The Last Generation: Why China's Youth Are Deciding against 
Having Children,'' Asia Society Policy Institute, January 2023.
    \57\ Nicholas Eberstadt, ``Opinion; China's Collapsing Birth and 
Marriage Rates Reflect a People's Deep Pessimism,'' Washington Post, 
February 28, 2023.
    \58\ Nicholas Eberstadt, ``Opinion; China's Collapsing Birth and 
Marriage Rates Reflect a People's Deep Pessimism,'' Washington Post, 
February 28, 2023. See also Mei Fong and Yaqiu Wang, ``How to Fix 
China's Population Crisis: Say Sorry to Women,'' in Disruptive Asia 5, 
2022, Asia Society Australia; ``In Fast-Aging China, Elder Care Costs 
Loom Large,'' Voice of America, May 23, 2021.
    \59\ Verna Yu, ```The Last Generation': The Young Chinese People 
Vowing Not to Have Children,'' Guardian, January 20, 2023.
    \60\ Mei Fong and Yaqiu Wang, ``How to Fix China's Population 
Crisis: Say Sorry to Women,'' in Disruptive Asia 5, 2022, Asia Society 
Australia; Barclay Bram, ``The Last Generation: Why China's Youth Are 
Deciding against Having Children,'' Asia Society Policy Institute, 
January 2023. See also Yun Jiang, ``Beijing and the Birth Rate: A 
Question of Human Rights for Women,'' Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 
March 8, 2023.
    \61\ Mei Fong and Yaqiu Wang, ``How to Fix China's Population 
Crisis: Say Sorry to Women,'' in Disruptive Asia 5, 2022, Asia Society 
Australia.
    \62\ Mei Fong and Yaqiu Wang, ``How to Fix China's Population 
Crisis: Say Sorry to Women,'' in Disruptive Asia 5, 2022, Asia Society 
Australia.
    \63\ Yun Jiang, ``Beijing and the Birth Rate: A Question of Human 
Rights for Women,'' Interpreter, Lowy Institute, March 8, 2023. See 
also Nicholas Eberstadt, ``Opinion; China's Collapsing Birth and 
Marriage Rates Reflect a People's Deep Pessimism,'' Washington Post, 
February 28, 2023.
    \64\ Yun Jiang, ``Beijing and the Birth Rate: A Question of Human 
Rights for Women,'' Interpreter, Lowy Institute, March 8, 2023.
    \65\ Helen Davidson, ``Chinese Province Ends Ban on Unmarried 
People Having Children,'' Guardian, January 30, 2023.
    \66\ Luo Meihan, ``Amid Pro-Birth Blitz, China Pledges Benefits for 
Single Moms,'' Sixth Tone, August 18, 2022; Chad de Guzman, ``Why One 
of China's Largest Provinces Is Lifting Birth Limits--Even for 
Unmarried Parents,'' Time, February 2, 2023.
    \67\ Liyan Qi, ``Single Mothers in China Face Fewer Hurdles as 
Beijing Tries to Boost Births,'' Wall Street Journal, February 15, 
2023; Meaghan Tobin, ``China Province to Offer Benefits to Single 
Parents as Birthrate Drops,'' Washington Post, January 31, 2023.
    \68\ Shui-yin Sharon Yam and Sarah Mellors Rodriguez, 
``Reproductive Realities in Modern China: A Conversation with Sarah 
Mellors Rodriguez,'' Made in China Journal, March 29, 2023; Meaghan 
Tobin, ``China Province to Offer Benefits to Single Parents as 
Birthrate Drops,'' Washington Post, January 31, 2023.
    \69\ Yang Caini, ``China Mulls Allowing Single Women to Freeze 
Eggs,'' Sixth Tone, March 14, 2023; Farah Master and Xiaoyu Yin, 
``China Weighs Giving Single Women IVF Access to Stem Population 
Decline,'' Reuters, April 28, 2023.
    \70\ Tara Subramaniam, ``Unmarried Woman Loses Bid to Freeze Her 
Eggs--and Sparks a Gender Equality Debate in China,'' CNN, July 29, 
2022.
    \71\ Kai Di, ``Zhongguo shouli danshen nuxing dong luan an ershen, 
dangshiren: pan faguan weihu shengyu quan'' [Second-instance trial for 
China's first-ever lawsuit of a single woman freezing her eggs, 
plaintiff: hopes the judge will protect the right to give birth], Radio 
Free Asia, May 9, 2023.
    \72\ Helen Davidson and Verna Yu, ``Millions of Missing Women: 
China Grapples with Legacy of One-Child Policy as Population Ages,'' 
Guardian, November 14, 2022.
    \73\ Mei Fong and Yaqiu Wang, ``How to Fix China's Population 
Crisis: Say Sorry to Women,'' in Disruptive Asia 5, 2022, Asia Society 
Australia; Albee Zhang and Farah Master, ``China's First Population 
Drop in Six Decades Sounds Alarm on Demographic Crisis,'' Reuters, 
January 18, 2023; Helen Davidson and Verna Yu, ``Millions of Missing 
Women: China Grapples with Legacy of One-Child Policy as Population 
Ages,'' Guardian, November 15, 2022. For more on the intersection of 
the one-child policy and traditional preference for sons, see Xiaojia 
Bao et al., ``Where Have All the Children Gone? An Empirical Study of 
Child Abandonment and Abduction in China,'' Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 208 (April 1, 2023); Emily Feng, ``China's 
Former 1-Child Policy Continues to Haunt Families,'' NPR, July 4, 2021; 
Andrew Mullen, ``Explainer: China's One-Child Policy: What Was It and 
What Impact Did It Have?,'' South China Morning Post, June 1, 2021.
    \74\ Laura Silver and Christine Huang, ``Key Facts about China's 
Declining Population,'' Pew Research Center (blog), December 5, 2022; 
``China: Population by Gender 2022,'' Statista, January 17, 2023; 
Ravinder Kaur, ``Gender and Demography in Asia (India and China),'' in 
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History, 2020; Carl Minzner, ``Xi 
Jinping Can't Handle an Aging China,'' Foreign Affairs, May 2, 2023. 
Minzner directly links the sex ratio imbalance to the widespread 
practice of sex-selective abortion.
    \75\ Mei Fong and Yaqiu Wang, ``How to Fix China's Population 
Crisis: Say Sorry to Women,'' in Disruptive Asia 5, 2022, Asia Society 
Australia; Zhibo Tan, Shang-Jin Wei, and Xiaobo Zhang, ``Deadly 
Discrimination: Implications of `Missing Girls' for Workplace Safety,'' 
Journal of Development Economics 152, (September 2021): 1, 8; ``China's 
Demographic Challenges: The Long-Term Consequences of the One-Child 
Policy,'' Global Affairs and Strategic Studies, Universidad de Navarra, 
June 30, 2021; Emily Feng, ``China's Former 1-Child Policy Continues to 
Haunt Families,'' NPR, July 4, 2021.
    \76\ Nicole Hong and Zixu Wang, ``In China, Marriage Rates Are Down 
and `Bride Prices' Are Up,'' New York Times, March 26, 2023.
    \77\ Marta Kasztelan, ```I Was Screaming for Help': Sold as Brides 
in China, Few Cambodian Women Escape Their Fate,'' South China Morning 
Post, August 21, 2022; Zhibo Tan, Shang-Jin Wei, and Xiaobo Zhang, 
``Deadly Discrimination: Implications of `Missing Girls' for Workplace 
Safety,'' Journal of Development Economics 152, (September 2021): 1, 8; 
Cheryl Heng, ``China Home to 30 Million Men in Search of a Bride, 
Census Shows,'' South China Morning Post, May 17, 2021; Eleanor Olcott, 
``China's Chained Woman Exposes Horror of Beijing's One-Child Policy,'' 
Financial Times, March 7, 2022. See also Heather Barr, ``China's Bride 
Trafficking Problem,'' Diplomat, October 30, 2019.
    \78\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--China 
(Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),'' March 20, 2023, 72; Samantha 
A. Vortherms, ``China's Missing Children: Political Barriers to 
Citizenship through the Household Registration System,'' China 
Quarterly 238 (June 2019): 309, 312.

Human Trafficking

Human Trafficking

                           Human Trafficking

                                Findings

         Multiple U.N. human rights bodies and experts 
        expressed concern over the People's Republic of China's 
        (PRC) government-sponsored forced labor in the Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). U.N. bodies and 
        experts expressed concern that such forced labor was 
        systematic and policy-driven in nature and called on 
        the PRC government to end forced labor programs in the 
        XUAR.
         In December 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department 
        ``sanctioned two individuals, Li Zhenyu and Xinrong 
        Zhuo, and the networks of entities they control, 
        including Dalian Ocean Fishing Co., Ltd. and Pingtan 
        Marine Enterprise, Ltd.,'' for their connection to 
        serious human rights abuses.
         Political prisoners including Lee Ming-cheh 
        and Cheng Yuan were forced to work while in detention. 
        Both Lee and Cheng were convicted under broad and 
        vaguely defined state security charges for their 
        exercise of rights recognized under international law.
         Examples of cross-border trafficking during 
        the Commission's 2023 reporting year included women and 
        girls from Cambodia trafficked in China, Chinese 
        nationals forced into international online scamming 
        schemes in Cambodia, and Chinese nationals subjected to 
        abusive practices in state-funded investment projects 
        abroad.
         An international non-profit said that data 
        involving human organs and tissues from the PRC would 
        not be accepted for submission for its meetings or 
        publications due to ``the body of evidence that the 
        [PRC] stands alone in continuing to systematically 
        support the procurement of organs or tissue from 
        executed prisoners.''

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Fully implement the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention 
        Act (UFLPA) and regularly update and expand the lists 
        of entities identified as complicit in forced labor, 
        pursuant to this law. Congress should also increase 
        funding to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to 
        bolster CBP enforcement of the UFLPA.
          Monitor and support the Tier 3 designation for China 
        in the annual U.S. State Department Trafficking in 
        Persons Report. As part of that designation, employ the 
        actions described in Section 110 of the Trafficking 
        Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) as amended (22 
        U.S.C. Sec. 7107) to address government-sponsored 
        forced labor. Ensure that significant traffickers in 
        persons in China are identified and sanctioned under 
        Section 111 of the TVPA as amended (22 U.S.C. 
        Sec. 7108).
          Consider actions, including through legislation as 
        needed, that bolster supply chain transparency, 
        including by requiring supply chain mapping, 
        disclosure, comprehensive human rights due diligence, 
        and country of origin labels for goods purchased and 
        sold online.
          Provide humanitarian pathways for victims of human 
        trafficking in the PRC, including protections for those 
        seeking asylum to ensure they are not deported to the 
        PRC and are resettled in countries that have no 
        extradition agreement with China, including the United 
        States.

Human Trafficking

Human Trafficking

                           Human Trafficking

     China's Human Trafficking and Forced Labor Obligations under 
                           International Law

                            PALERMO PROTOCOL

    As a State Party to the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children (Palermo Protocol),\1\ China is obligated to combat 
human trafficking and enact legislation criminalizing human 
trafficking as defined in the Palermo Protocol.\2\ The Palermo 
Protocol definition of human trafficking comprises three 
components:

         the action of recruiting, transporting, 
        harboring, or receiving persons;
         the means of coercion, deception, or control; 
        and
         the purpose of exploitation, including sexual 
        exploitation, forced labor, or the forced removal of 
        organs.\3\

    Under the Palermo Protocol, crossing international borders 
is not required for an action to constitute human trafficking, 
such as in cases of government-sponsored forced labor.\4\

    ILO FORCED LABOR CONVENTIONS AND ILO INDICATORS OF FORCED LABOR

    In addition to its obligations under the Palermo Protocol, 
China has committed to obligations to combat forced labor under 
International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. In 2022, 
the National People's Congress Standing Committee ratified the 
ILO's Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and Abolition of Forced 
Labour Convention of 1957.\5\ The Forced Labour Convention 
defines forced labor as ``all work or service which is exacted 
from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which 
the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.'' \6\ The 
ILO's Abolition of Forced Labour Convention prohibits China 
from using forced labor ``as a means of political coercion or 
education'' or ``as a means of racial, social, national or 
religious discrimination.'' \7\

    The ILO provides eleven indicators of forced labor to help 
``identify persons who are possibly trapped in a forced labour 
situation.'' \8\ The indicators include--

         abuse of vulnerability;
         deception;
         restriction of movement;
         isolation;
         physical and sexual violence;
         intimidation and threats;
         retention of identity documents;
         withholding of wages;
         debt bondage;
         abusive working and living conditions; and
         excessive overtime.\9\

    In this chapter, these ILO indicators are used to identify 
possible cases of human trafficking and forced labor that 
occurred during the Commission's 2023 reporting year.\10\

                        Cross-Border Trafficking

    During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, China 
remained\11\ both a source and destination country for human 
trafficking across international borders. Examples of cross-
border trafficking during this reporting year include the 
following:
         Women and girls trafficked in China. Reporting 
        from the South China Morning Post found that women and 
        girls from Cambodia were trafficked in China for forced 
        marriage and sexual exploitation.\12\ According to the 
        reporting, these women and girls were often promised 
        improved economic circumstances through marriage or 
        employment before being forced into exploitative 
        situations.\13\ Decades of government-imposed birth 
        limits combined with a traditional preference for sons 
        have led to a sex ratio imbalance in China.\14\ This 
        imbalance has created a demand for marriageable women 
        that may contribute to human trafficking for the 
        purpose of forced marriage.\15\
         Chinese nationals forced to conduct 
        international online scams linked to Belt and Road 
        Initiative (BRI) projects in Cambodia. During the 
        reporting year, Al Jazeera and other news outlets 
        reported that Chinese nationals forced individuals from 
        China and other parts of Asia to work in compounds in 
        Cambodia to carry out scam operations targeting people 
        around the world.\16\ Individuals forced to work were 
        often promised employment in Cambodia or elsewhere, but 
        instead were forced to work in online scamming.\17\ In 
        addition to being deceived by traffickers, individuals 
        were subjected to abusive practices including 
        restriction of movement, confiscation of identity 
        documents, physical violence, and debt bondage, which 
        the ILO has identified as indicators of forced 
        labor.\18\ Multiple reports linked the increase in 
        scamming in Cambodia to the influx of Chinese state-
        sponsored investment to Cambodia through the BRI.\19\ 
        For example, China Labor Watch (CLW) stated that 
        Chinese and Cambodian officials bear responsibility for 
        the human trafficking and scamming taking place in 
        Sihanoukville, Cambodia, ``because Sihanoukville is an 
        economic zone created between China and Cambodia under 
        the BRI.'' \20\
         Presence of forced labor indicators in state-
        funded BRI investment projects abroad. In November 
        2022, CLW and Axios reported that Chinese workers in 
        PRC-funded BRI investment projects abroad were 
        subjected to abusive practices that are indicators of 
        forced labor, such as abuse of vulnerability, 
        deception, physical violence, retention of identity 
        documents, and withholding of wages.\21\ These 
        indicators were observed in projects located in 
        countries including Serbia, Algeria, Indonesia, the 
        Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Singapore.\22\
    [For information on trafficking of North Koreans in China, 
see Chapter 15--North Korean Refugees in China.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Chinese Fishing Companies Sanctioned for Human Rights Abuses
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In December 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department ``sanctioned two
 individuals, Li Zhenyu and Xinrong Zhuo, and the networks of entities
 they control, including Dalian Ocean Fishing Co., Ltd. and Pingtan
 Marine Enterprise, Ltd.,'' for their connection to serious human rights
 abuses.\23\ Distant water fishing vessels owned by Dalian and Pingtan
 had previously been implicated in subjecting Indonesian crewmembers to
 forced labor.\24\ In response to the April 2023 delisting of Pingtan
 Marine from the NASDAQ, an analyst at C4ADS stated that ``[t]he
 ultimate perpetrators of the environmental and human rights violations
 committed by these vessels are those who own them and finance them, and
 it's these people who should be punished for these crimes.'' \25\ Both
 Dalian and Pingtan received subsidies to expand their distant water
 fishing operations from the Chinese government,\26\ and the Chinese
 distant water fishing fleet is heavily subsidized by the Chinese
 central and local governments.\27\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


  Chinese Companies, Cobalt Mining, and Child Labor in the Democratic 
                         Republic of the Congo

    Reports highlighted poor working conditions and child 
labor\28\ in cobalt\29\ mines in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), some of which were connected directly to Chinese 
companies.\30\ According to the United States Geological Survey 
and other sources, 70 percent of mined cobalt comes from the 
DRC, the majority of which is exported to China.\31\ Under the 
U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Chinese 
companies should seek to avoid ``contributing to adverse human 
rights impacts through their own activities, and address such 
impacts when they occur.'' Global demand for cobalt mined in 
the DRC is expected to increase given growing global demand for 
electric vehicles.\32\ According to the United States 
Geological Survey, U.S. domestic supply of cobalt is several 
times smaller than the top global producers of cobalt, and 
``[m]ost U.S. cobalt supply consisted of imports and secondary 
(scrap) materials.'' \33\ [For more information on the role of 
businesses in human rights abuses, see Chapter 14--Business and 
Human Rights.]

                          Domestic Trafficking

    During this reporting year, the Commission continued\34\ to 
observe reports concerning cases of domestic human trafficking 
in China:

         Reported trafficking cases in Hebei province. 
        In September 2022, the Party-run media outlet Global 
        Times reported that authorities ``solved 22 cases of 
        abducting and trafficking women and children, and 
        recovered 17 missing and abducted women and children'' 
        in Hebei.\35\ These figures likely include cases of 
        illegal adoption.\36\
         Chinese girl sold into marriage by parents in 
        Sichuan province. In February 2023, Chinese Central 
        Television and Sixth Tone reported that the parents of 
        a sixteen-year-old girl in Sichuan attempted to force 
        their daughter into marriage in exchange for 260,000 
        yuan (approximately US$38,000).\37\ The girl 
        subsequently fled to Guangdong province and found a 
        job.\38\ When relatives of the man she was sold to 
        marry attempted to forcibly return her to Sichuan, the 
        girl escaped in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 
        and informed local authorities that her parents had 
        sold her into marriage.\39\ Social media users 
        criticized the fact that authorities eventually 
        returned the girl to her family who had sold her, and 
        according to Sixth Tone, representatives of the women's 
        federation in Sichuan said that they would visit the 
        girl monthly ``to ensure her safety.'' \40\
         Court judgments issued in case of chained 
        woman in Jiangsu province. In April 2023 a court in 
        Xuzhou municipality, Jiangsu, sentenced a man to nine 
        years in prison for domestic abuse and unlawful 
        detention,\41\ while five others received sentences of 
        eight to thirteen years for their roles in trafficking 
        a woman.\42\ The defendants in the case were sentenced 
        after a video showing the woman living in a shed with a 
        chain around her neck went viral on China's social 
        media platforms in early 2022.\43\ Despite government 
        censorship of online discussions of the case, many 
        internet users expressed dissatisfaction with the 
        sentencing and called for stricter punishments.\44\ 
        Observers also noted that the case did not include any 
        rape charges and some accused authorities of using the 
        verdict to obfuscate China's serious ongoing human 
        trafficking problems.\45\ [For more information on 
        government censorship, see Chapter 1--Freedom of 
        Expression.]
         In Hong Kong, migrant domestic workers (MDWs) 
        remained\46\ at risk of exploitation. Two regulations--
        one requiring MDWs to live with their employers (live-
        in rule)\47\ and another requiring them to leave Hong 
        Kong within two weeks of contract termination\48\--
        contributed to MDWs' risk of exploitation.\49\ In 
        November 2022, the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
        expressed concerns that these two regulations continued 
        ``to put migrant domestic workers at high risk of abuse 
        and exploitation by their employers'' and ``prevent 
        them from reporting exploitative employment and abuse, 
        owing to fears of losing their jobs and having to leave 
        Hong Kong.'' \50\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Political Prisoners Forced to Labor in Hunan Province
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Prior to and during the Commission's 2023 reporting year,
 nongovernmental organization volunteer Lee Ming-cheh,\51\ Shi Minglei,
 wife of human rights advocate Cheng Yuan,\52\ and another former
 prisoner reported that authorities forced political prisoners to work
 while they were detained at Chishan Prison, located in Yuanjiang city,
 Yiyang municipality, Hunan.\53\ Lee was held at Chishan Prison until
 April 15, 2022, and as of June 30, 2023, Cheng was still held
 there.\54\ According to Lee and another former prisoner, gloves made at
 Chishan Prison were exported to the United States.\55\ The definition
 of forced labor under the International Labour Organization's (ILO)
 Forced Labour Convention makes an exception for labor performed ``as a
 consequence of a conviction in a court of law.'' \56\ Both Lee and
 Cheng, however, were convicted under broad and vaguely defined state
 security charges\57\ for their exercise of rights recognized under
 international law--including the right to freedom of expression.\58\
 Under the Palermo Protocol, the ``abuse of power or of a position of
 vulnerability'' to subject someone to forced labor is a form of human
 trafficking,\59\ and the ILO Abolition of Forced Labour Convention
 prohibits the use of forced labor ``as punishment for the expression of
 political views.'' \60\ [For more information, see Chapter 14--Business
 and Human Rights.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------


  INTERNATIONAL TRANSPLANT ORGANIZATION REFUSED ORGAN TRANSPLANT DATA 
                              FROM THE PRC

    International experts continued\61\ to raise concerns about 
forced organ removal in the PRC. In an October 2022 statement, 
the International Society for Heart and Lung Transplantation 
(ISHLT) said that data involving human organs and tissues from 
the PRC would not be accepted for ISHLT-sponsored meetings or 
publications.\62\ ISHLT said it made this decision in response 
to what it called ``the body of evidence that the government of 
the People's Republic of China stands alone in continuing to 
systematically support the procurement of organs or tissue from 
executed prisoners.'' \63\ Previously, in a paper published in 
July 2022 in the American Journal of Transplantation, two 
researchers noted that ``the inherently coercive circumstances 
in which condemned prisoners are held impairs their (or their 
families') capacity to give free and informed consent to donate 
organs upon death.'' \64\ Under the Palermo Protocol, the 
``abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability'' to achieve 
consent in the removal of organs is a form of human 
trafficking.\65\

  U.N. Human Rights Bodies and Experts Expressed Concern over Forced 
                           Labor in the XUAR

    PRC government-sponsored forced labor\66\ contravenes 
international human rights standards and China's international 
obligations.\67\ During this reporting year, multiple U.N. 
human rights bodies and experts expressed concern over the PRC 
government's sponsoring and using forced labor in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).\68\ In particular, certain 
U.N. human rights bodies and experts expressed concern that 
forced labor in the XUAR was systematic and policy-driven in 
nature,\69\ and there were multiple calls to end forced labor 
programs in the XUAR.\70\
    In its August 2022 assessment of human rights concerns in 
the XUAR, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) stated that it shared concerns previously laid 
out by the ILO supervisory bodies regarding the treatment of 
religious and ethnic minorities in China, including 
``indicators suggesting measures severely restricting the free 
choice of employment'' by Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities 
in China,\71\ and that the employment schemes ``appear to be 
discriminatory in nature or effect and to involve elements of 
coercion . . ..'' \72\ [For more information on forced labor 
and other human rights abuses in the XUAR, see Chapter 18--
Xinjiang. For more information on the risk of corporate 
complicity in forced labor in the XUAR, see Chapter 14--
Business and Human Rights.]

Human Trafficking

Human Trafficking

    Notes to Chapter 10--Human Trafficking

    \1\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters, 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, accessed June 21, 
2023, art. 12.
    \2\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by 
U.N. General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, arts. 5.1, 9.1. See also U.N. Human Rights 
Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, A/HRC/35/37, 
March 28, 2017, para. 14.
    \3\ U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, ``The Crime,'' accessed January 
25, 2023. Note that for children younger than 18 years old, the means 
described in Article 3(a) are not required for an action to constitute 
human trafficking. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by 
U.N. General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a), (c), (d). For information on how 
international standards regarding forced labor fit into the framework 
of the Palermo Protocol, see International Labour Office, International 
Labour Organization, ``Human Trafficking and Forced Labour 
Exploitation: Guidelines for Legislation and Law Enforcement,'' 2005, 
7-15; International Labour Organization, ``Questions and Answers on 
Forced Labour,'' June 1, 2012. The International Labour Organization 
lists ``withholding of wages'' as an indicator of forced labor. See 
also Peter Bengsten, ``Hidden in Plain Sight: Forced Labour 
Constructing China,'' openDemocracy, February 16, 2018.
    \4\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by 
U.N. General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a); Anti-Slavery International, ``What 
Is Human Trafficking,'' accessed January 25, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 
``Smuggling and Trafficking Human Beings,'' July 7, 2015; Rebekah Kates 
Lemke, Catholic Relief Services, ``7 Things You May Not Know about 
Human Trafficking, and 3 Ways to Help,'' January 5, 2020. For examples 
of human trafficking reports that list government-sponsored forced 
labor in China as part of human trafficking, see Office to Monitor and 
Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``2023 
Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 15, 2023, China; Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, ``Global Supply Chains, Forced Labor, 
and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,'' March 2020, 9.
    \5\ International Labour Organization, ``China Ratifies the Two ILO 
Fundamental Conventions on Forced Labour,'' August 12, 2022; Nadya Yeh, 
``China Ratifies Two International Treaties on Forced Labor,'' 
SupChina, April 20, 2022. See also International Labour Organization, 
ILO Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 
28, 1930; International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 105) 
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, January 17, 1959; Aaron 
Halegua and Katherine Zhang, ``Opposing Forced Labor in Xinjiang,'' 
USALI Perspectives 3, no. 18 (February 28, 2023): 2-3.
    \6\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29) 
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, arts. 1, 25. As 
a signatory to the ILO Forced Labour Convention, China is required to 
prohibit the use of forced labor and make the use of forced labor 
``punishable as a penal offence.''
    \7\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 105) 
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, January 17, 1959, art. 1(a), 
(e). See also Phoebe Zhang, ``China Ratifies Forced Labour Conventions 
Ahead of Visit by UN Rights Chief,'' South China Morning Post, April 
21, 2022.
    \8\ International Labour Organization, ``ILO Indicators of Forced 
Labor,'' October 1, 2012.
    \9\ International Labour Organization, ``ILO Indicators of Forced 
Labor,'' October 1, 2012.
    \10\ One non-ILO metric that estimates the in-country prevalence of 
trafficking-related problems is Walk Free's 2023 Global Slavery Index. 
The Australia-based international human rights organization estimates 
that ``5.8 million people were living in modern slavery in China on any 
given day in 2021.'' In Asia and the Pacific, eighteen countries have a 
higher ``[e]stimated prevalence of modern slavery (per 1,000 of 
population)'' than China, and eight countries have a lower estimated 
prevalence of modern slavery. Out of 160 countries globally, 108 
countries have a higher estimated prevalence of modern slavery than 
China, and 51 countries have a lower estimated prevalence. In the 
context of its report on global slavery, Walk Free states that ``modern 
slavery covers a set of specific legal concepts including forced 
labour, debt bondage, forced marriage, other slavery and slavery-like 
practices, and human trafficking.'' Walk Free,``Global Slavery Index/
Country Study: Modern Slavery in China,'' accessed February 28, 2024; 
Walk Free, ``Global Slavery Index,'' May 2023, 118; Walk Free,``Global 
Slavery Index: World Map,'' accessed February 28, 2024; Walk Free, 
``Global Slavery Index: Terminology,'' accessed February 28, 2024.
    \11\ For information on cross-border trafficking to and from China 
in previous reporting years, see Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 199; 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report 
(Washington: March 2022), 164; Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 2020 Annual Report (Washington: December 2020), 177; 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2019 Annual Report 
(Washington: November 18, 2019), 160.
    \12\ Marta Kasztelan, `` `I Was Screaming for Help': Sold as Brides 
in China, Few Cambodian Women Escape Their Fate,'' South China Morning 
Post, August 21, 2022.
    \13\ Marta Kasztelan, `` `I Was Screaming for Help': Sold as Brides 
in China, Few Cambodian Women Escape Their Fate,''South China Morning 
Post, August 21, 2022.
    \14\ Marta Kasztelan, `` `I Was Screaming for Help': Sold as Brides 
in China, Few Cambodian Women Escape Their Fate,''South China Morning 
Post, August 21, 2022; Eleanor Olcott, ``China's Chained Woman Exposes 
Horror of Beijing's One-Child Policy,'' Financial Times, March 8, 2022.
    \15\ Eleanor Olcott, ``China's Chained Woman Exposes Horror of 
Beijing's One-Child Policy,'' Financial Times, March 8, 2022; Kelley E. 
Currie, John Cotton Richmond, and Samuel D. Brownback, ``How China's 
`Missing Women' Problem Fuels Trafficking, Forced Marriage,'' South 
China Morning Post, January 13, 2021.
    \16\ See, e.g., Al Jazeera, ``Forced to Scam: Cambodia's Cyber 
Slaves'' [Video file], YouTube, July 15, 2022; David Pierson, `` `I Was 
a Slave': Up to 100,000 Held Captive by Chinese Cybercriminals in 
Cambodia,'' Los Angeles Times, November 1, 2022; ``Cambodian Police 
Raid Alleged Cybercrime Trafficking Compounds,'' Reuters, September 21, 
2022.
    \17\ Al Jazeera, ``Forced to Scam: Cambodia's Cyber Slaves'' [Video 
file], YouTube, July 15, 2022; David Pierson, `` `I Was a Slave': Up to 
100,000 Held Captive by Chinese Cybercriminals in Cambodia,'' Los 
Angeles Times, November 1, 2022.
    \18\ Al Jazeera, ``Forced to Scam: Cambodia's Cyber Slaves'' [Video 
file], YouTube, July 15, 2022; David Pierson, `` `I Was a Slave': Up to 
100,000 Held Captive by Chinese Cybercriminals in Cambodia,'' Los 
Angeles Times, November 1, 2022.
    \19\ China Labor Watch, ``The Aftermath of the Belt and Road 
Initiative: Human Trafficking in Cambodia,'' August 19, 2022; Tessa 
Wong, Bui Thu, and Lok Lee, ``Cambodia Scams: Lured and Trapped into 
Slavery in South East Asia,'' BBC, September 21, 2022.
    \20\ China Labor Watch, ``The Aftermath of the Belt and Road 
Initiative: Human Trafficking in Cambodia,'' August 19, 2022.
    \21\ Han Chen, ``Report: Chinese Workers Overseas Trapped in State-
Backed Projects,'' Axios, November 29, 2022; China Labor Watch, 
``Trapped: The Belt and Road Initiative's Chinese Workers,'' November 
2022, 31-34, 45-47, 50-51, 57, 59, 64, 65, 83-86; International Labour 
Organization, ``ILO Indicators of Forced Labor,'' October 1, 2012.
    \22\ China Labor Watch, ``Trapped: The Belt and Road Initiative's 
Chinese Workers,'' November 2022, 45-47, 50-51, 64-65, 75-76, 83-84.
    \23\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, ``Treasury Targets Serious 
Human Rights Abuse aboard Distant Water Fishing Vessels Based in the 
People's Republic of China,'' December 9, 2022. In May 2021, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued a Withhold Release Order 
requiring ``CBP personnel at all U.S. ports of entry to begin detaining 
tuna, swordfish, and other seafood harvested by vessels owned or 
operated by the Dalian Ocean Fishing Co., Ltd.'' U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, ``CBP Issues Withhold Release Order on Chinese 
Fishing Fleet,'' May 28, 2021. In April 2023, NASDAQ delisted Chinese 
fishing company Pingtan Marine. NASDAQ, ``Delisting of Securities of 
Pingtan Marine Enterprise Ltd.; SRAX, Inc.; SVB Financial Group; 
Signature Bank; Codiak BioSciences, Inc.; PLx Pharma Inc.; Virgin Orbit 
Holdings, Inc.; Kalera Public Limited Company; Pear Therapeutics, Inc.; 
and Intelligent Med,'' April 28, 2023.
    \24\ In addition to Dalian Ocean Fishing and Pingtan Marine, a 2021 
report by Greenpeace and Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia found evidence 
that the crews of 15 Chinese companies subjected Indonesian crewmembers 
to forced labor. The companies are China Aquatic Products, CNFC 
Overseas Fishery, Fujian Pingtan County Ocean, Guangdong Zhanhai 
Pelagic, Haimen Changtai Pelagic, Ocean Star Fujian Pelagic Fish, 
Rizhao Jingchang Fishery, Shandong Lanyue Sea-Fishing, Shandong Lidao 
Oceanic, Shandong Shawodao Ocean Fishery Co., Ltd, Zhangzhou Wushui 
Ocean Fishing, Zhejiang Hairong Ocean, Zhoushan Hongrun Ocean, Zhoushan 
Mingxiang Marine Fish, Zhoushan Ningtai Ocean Fish, and Zhoushan Xinhai 
Fishery Co. Ltd. Greenpeace and Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia, 
``Forced Labour at Sea: The Case of Indonesian Migrant Fishers'' May 
31, 2021, 8-9, 14-21; Karen McVeigh and Febriana Firdaus, `Hold On 
Brother': Final Days of Doomed Crew on Chinese Shark Finning Boat,'' 
Guardian, July 7, 2020; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 165.
    \25\ Anna Wheeler, C4ADS, ``NASDAQ Delists Pingtan Marine 
Enterprise Ltd,'' May 9, 2023.
    \26\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, ``Treasury Targets Serious 
Human Rights Abuse aboard Distant Water Fishing Vessels Based in the 
People's Republic of China,'' December 9, 2022.
    \27\ Mark Godfrey, ``China's Coastal Cities Competing for Distant-
Water Catch with Generous Subsidies,'' SeafoodSource, January 26, 2022; 
Sally Yozell and Amanda Shaver, Stimson Center, ``Shining a Light: The 
Need for Transparency across Distant Water Fishing,'' November 1, 2019; 
Ian Urbina, ``Subsidizing China's Fishing Fleet,'' Outlaw Ocean 
Project, accessed March 31, 2023; Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, ``Fisheries Support Estimate,'' accessed 
March 31, 2023. For a case in which government officials promoted 
consumption of distant water catches, see Mark Godfrey, ``China 
Promoting Consumption of Distant-Water Catch to Tame Inflation, 
Conserve Local Fisheries,'' SeafoodSource, February 2, 2023.
    \28\ According to the International Labour Organization, ``[t]he 
term `child labour' is often defined as work that deprives children of 
their childhood, their potential and their dignity, and that is harmful 
to physical and mental development.'' International Labour 
Organization, ``What Is Child Labour,'' accessed April 4, 2023. See 
also International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 182) Worst 
Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, art. 3; International Labour 
Organization, ILO Recommendation (No. 190) Worst Forms of Child Labour, 
June 17, 1999 art. 3; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, 
entry into force December 25, 2003, art. 3.
    \29\ Cobalt is primarily used to create lithium-ion batteries, 
which are used in smartphones, computers, and electric vehicles. U.S. 
Department of Labor, ``2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or 
Forced Labor,'' September 2022, 45; United States Geological Survey, 
U.S. Department of the Interior, ``Cobalt,'' January 2023; Jennifer 
Smith, ``Devastating Photos of Cobalt Mines in Democratic Republic of 
Congo That Power Apple,'' Daily Mail, January 30, 2023.
    \30\ U.S. Department of Labor, ``2022 List of Goods Produced by 
Child Labor or Forced Labor,'' September 2022, 45; Zelda Caldwell, 
``Testimony: China-Backed Cobalt Mines in Congo Exploit 40,000 Child 
Workers,'' Catholic News Agency, July 16, 2022; Pete Pattisson, `` 
`Like Slave and Master': DRC Miners Toil for 30p an Hour to Fuel 
Electric Cars,'' Guardian, November 8, 2021.
    \31\ Alan Neuhauser, ``EVs Will Continue to Run on Child Labor,'' 
Axios, July 12, 2022; United States Geological Survey, U.S. Department 
of the Interior, ``Cobalt,'' January 2023. See also Luiza Ch. Savage, 
``How America Got Outmaneuvered in a Critical Mining Race,'' Politico, 
December 2, 2020.
    \32\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ``Protect, Respect and Remedy'' Framework, HR/PUB/11/04, June 
16, 2011, principle 13.
    \33\ Cobalt Institute, ``Cobalt Market Report 2022,'' May 2023, 3, 
39, 40.
    \34\ United States Geological Survey, U.S. Department of the 
Interior, ``Cobalt,'' January 2023.
    \35\ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual 
Report (Washington: November 2022), 199-201.
    \36\ ``27,600 Criminal Suspects Arrested in N. China's Hebei during 
100-Day Crackdown on Crimes Threatening Social Security: Ministry of 
Public Security,'' Global Times, September 1, 2022.
    \37\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed 
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, 
effective March 1, 2021, art. 240. The PRC Criminal Law defines 
trafficking as ``abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, 
fetching, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of 
selling [the victim].'' The illegal sale of children for adoption thus 
can be considered trafficking under Chinese law. In contrast, under the 
Palermo Protocol, illegal adoptions constitute trafficking only if the 
purpose is exploitation. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, 
entry into force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). See also U.N. General 
Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of Its 
First to Eleventh Sessions, Addendum, Interpretive Notes for the 
Official Records (Travaux Preparatoires) of the Negotiation of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols Thereto, A/55/383/Add.1, November 3, 2000, para. 66.
    \38\ Li Xin, ``Cops Rescued Minor Forced into Marriage, Then Sent 
Her Back Home,'' Sixth Tone, February 21, 2023; CCTV (@yangshiwang), 
``16 sui taohun shaonu bei song hui, wangyou que zai danxin . . . '' 
[16-year-old girl who escaped from marriage sent back home, but 
netizens are still concerned], WeChat post, February 20, 2023, 8:07 
p.m.
    \39\ Li Xin, ``Cops Rescued Minor Forced into Marriage, Then Sent 
Her Back Home,'' Sixth Tone, February 21, 2023.
    \40\ Li Xin, ``Cops Rescued Minor Forced into Marriage, Then Sent 
Her Back Home,'' Sixth Tone, February 21, 2023; CCTV (@yangshiwang), 
``16 sui taohun shaonu bei song hui, wangyou que zai danxin . . . '' 
[16-year-old girl who escaped from marriage sent back home, but 
netizens are still concerned], WeChat post, February 20, 2023, 8:07 
p.m.
    \41\ Li Xin, ``Cops Rescued Minor Forced into Marriage, Then Sent 
Her Back Home,'' Sixth Tone, February 21, 2023.
    \42\ ``A Court in East China Sentences 6 Criminals to 8-13 Ys in 
Prison for the Controversial and Tragic Case of Fengxian Chained 
Woman,'' Global Times, April 7, 2023.
    \43\ ``A Court in East China Sentences 6 Criminals to 8-13 Ys in 
Prison for the Controversial and Tragic Case of Fengxian Chained 
Woman,'' Global Times, April 7, 2023.
    \44\ ``A Court in East China Sentences 6 Criminals to 8-13 Ys in 
Prison for the Controversial and Tragic Case of Fengxian Chained 
Woman,'' Global Times, April 7, 2023; Liyan Qi, ``In China, Footage of 
a Chained-Up Rural Mother of Eight Draws Outcry,'' Wall Street Journal, 
February 1, 2022.
    \45\ Vivian Wang and Joy Dong, ``Sentencing in China's `Chained 
Woman' Trafficking Case Revives Online Outrage,'' New York Times, April 
7, 2023.
    \46\ Yitong Wu and Chingman, ``Chinese Court Jails Six People for 
Abuse and Trafficking in Chained Woman Case,'' Radio Free Asia, April 
7, 2023; Vivian Wang and Joy Dong, ``Sentencing in China's `Chained 
Woman' Trafficking Case Revives Online Outrage,'' New York Times, April 
7, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual 
Report (Washington: November 2022), 174, 200-201, 231-32.
    \47\ For information on human trafficking in Hong Kong from 
previous reporting years, see Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2020), 168; Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report (Washington: December 
2020), 180; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2019 Annual 
Report (Washington: November 18, 2019), 164; Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2018 Annual Report (Washington: October 10, 2018), 
181-82; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2017 Annual Report 
(Washington: October 5, 2017), 189-90; Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2016 Annual Report (Washington: October 6, 2016), 
189-90.
    \48\ Immigration Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region Government, ``Employment Contract for a Domestic Helper 
Recruited from Outside Hong Kong,'' November 2016, item 3.
    \49\ Immigration Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region Government, ``Cong waiguo shoupin lai Gang jiating yonggong 
qianzheng/yanchang douliu qixian shenqing biao'' [Visa/Extension of 
stay application form for domestic helpers coming to Hong Kong from 
abroad], May 2023, sec. 6(ii).
    \50\ Stop Trafficking of People, Branches of Hope, ``Pathway to 
Justice or a Road to Nowhere: Trafficked Migrants' Experience of 
Seeking Justice in Hong Kong,'' May 2023; Peter Yeung, ```Tools More 
than Humans': HK Domestic Workers Fight for Rights,'' Al Jazeera, May 
1, 2013.
    \51\ U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the 
Fourth Periodic Report of Hong Kong, China, adopted by the Committee at 
its 3912th Session (27 July 2022), CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, November 11, 
2022, art. 31; U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee 
at its 30th Meeting (3 March 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, 
art. 111. In March 2023, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights recommended the Hong Kong government ``amend the two-
weeks rule and the live-in requirement'' to enable MDWs to enjoy their 
full rights.
    \52\ For more information on Lee Ming-cheh, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00248.
    \53\ For more information on Cheng Yuan, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00300.
    \54\ Ben Blanchard, ``Freed Taiwanese Activist Lee Ming-Che Says He 
Was Subjected to Forced Labour in Mainland Jail but Was Not Tortured,'' 
Reuters, May 10, 2022; Mindy Shi Minglei, ``Milwaukee Tool: STOP Using 
Chinese Prisoners of Conscience as Slave Labor,'' Change.org, accessed 
April 6, 2023.
    \55\ Rui Di, ``Tai NGO huodong renshi Li Mingzhe Zhongguo dalu wu 
nian xingman fanhui Taiwan'' [Taiwan NGO activist Lee Ming-cheh returns 
to Taiwan after completing five-year sentence in mainland China], Radio 
France Internationale, April 15, 2022; Bochen Han, ``Chinese Rights: 
Ex-NBA Player Enes Kanter Freedom and Wife of Jailed Activist Cheng 
Yuan Speak on US `Corporate Complicity,' '' South China Morning Post, 
July 13, 2023.
    \56\ Zhen Wang, ``Chinese Prisoners Say Forced Labor Has Been Used 
to Manufacture Milwaukee Tool Gloves,'' Wisconsin Watch, May 10, 2023; 
Mindy Shi Minglei, ``Milwaukee Tool: STOP Using Chinese Prisoners of 
Conscience as Slave Labor,'' Change.org, accessed April 6, 2023. See 
also Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1307.
    \57\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29) 
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, art. 2.1, 
2.2(c); International Labour Organization, ``Ratifications of CO29--
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29),'' accessed January 20, 2023. 
Article 2.1 defines forced or compulsory labor as ``all work or 
service'' which is exacted from any person under the menace of any 
penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself 
voluntarily. China ratified this Convention on August 12, 2022, and it 
will enter into force on August 12, 2023.
    \58\ Nectar Gan and Brett McKeehan, ``China's Propaganda Machine Is 
Intensifying Its `People's War' to Catch American Spies,'' CNN, October 
18, 2021; Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``UN 
Human Rights Chief Says China's New Security Law Is Too Broad, Too 
Vague,'' July 7, 2015; Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, ``China: Shock at Continued Crackdown on Human Rights Defenders 
and Lawyers--UN Expert,'' December 10, 2020. See also Human Rights 
Watch, ``Xi Is Bending Chinese Law to His Will,'' November 30, 2021.
    \59\ ``China Jails Taiwan Activist Lee Ming-Che for `Subversion,' 
'' BBC, November 28, 2017; International Federation for Human Rights, 
``China: Release Taiwanese Activist Li Ming-Che,'' March 19, 2020; 
Rights Defense Network, ``Changsha Funeng gongyi an zhi Cheng Yuan bei 
panxing 5 nian youqi tuxing'' [Cheng Yuan, of Changsha Funeng public 
interest case, sentenced to 5 years in prison], August 5, 2021; U.N. 
Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinions 
adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its Eighty-
Seventh Session (27 April-1 May 2020), Opinion No. 11/2020 concerning 
Cheng Yuan, Liu Dazhi and Wu Gejianxiong (China), Advance Edited 
Version, A/HRC/WGAD/2020/11, June 5, 2020, paras. 3(b)(c)(e), 63. See 
also International Service for Human Rights,``UN Experts Analyse 
China's Abuse of National Security to Curtail Human Rights,'' January 
27, 2022; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, 
art. 19; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19.
    \60\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by 
U.N. General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, arts. 3, 5.1, 9.1; United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, accessed June 10, 2023, art. 12.
    \61\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 105) 
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, January 17, 1959, art. 1(a). 
In 2022, the National People's Congress Standing Committee ratified the 
ILO's Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and Abolition of Forced Labour 
Convention of 1957. International Labour Organization, ``China Ratifies 
the Two ILO Fundamental Conventions on Forced Labour,'' August 12, 
2022. The arbitrary arrest and detention of political prisoners also 
contravenes Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), and Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976; United Nations 
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, accessed February 22, 2023; Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General 
Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948.
    \62\ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual 
Report (Washington: November 2022), 200; Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 166; 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2019 Annual Report 
(Washington: November 18, 2019), 89.
    \63\ Are Martin Holm et al., ``International Society for Heart and 
Lung Transplantation Statement on Transplant Ethics,'' Journal of Heart 
and Lung Transplantation 41, no. 10 (October 2022): 1307-8.
    \64\ Are Martin Holm et al., ``International Society for Heart and 
Lung Transplantation Statement on Transplant Ethics,'' Journal of Heart 
and Lung Transplantation 41, no. 10 (October 2022): 1307-8.
    \65\ Matthew P. Robertson and Jacob Lavee, ``Execution by Organ 
Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,'' American Journal 
of Transplantation 22, no. 7 (July 2022): 1809.
    \66\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by 
U.N. General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, art. 3.
    \67\ Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Driving Force: Automotive Supply 
Chains and Forced Labor in the Uyghur Region,'' Helena Kennedy Centre 
for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, December 2022, 
9-10; `` `To Make Us Slowly Disappear': The Chinese Government's 
Assault on the Uyghurs,'' Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of 
Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2021, 38-
39; Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is 
Obscured in International Supply Chains,'' Helena Kennedy Centre for 
International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 2021; 
Shohret Hoshur, ``Chinese Company Transfers Thousands of Uyghurs from 
Xinjiang to Nanjing,'' Radio Free Asia, November 13, 2021; Shohret 
Hoshur, ``After 4 Years in Detention, Uyghur Brothers Forced to Work at 
Factories in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, January 12, 2022.
    \68\ PRC government-sponsored forced labor constitutes human 
trafficking under the Palermo Protocol, a crime against humanity under 
the Rome Statute, and contravenes China's obligations under the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights; and the ILO's Forced Labour and Abolition 
of Forced Labour conventions. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, 
entry into force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a), (c), (d); Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entry into 
force July 1, 2002, art. 7; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) 
of December 10, 1948, art. 23. Article 23 states, ``Everyone has the 
right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable 
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.'' 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. 
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry 
into force March 23, 1976, art. 8; United Nations Treaty Collection, 
Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, accessed February 22, 2023; International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 
2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, 
art. 6; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
accessed May 15, 2023; International Labour Organization, ILO 
Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 
1930, arts. 1, 2, 25; International Labour Organization, ILO Convention 
(No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, January 17, 1959, 
art. 1.
    \69\ These bodies and experts included the U.N. Special Rapporteur 
on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and 
consequences; the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights; the International Labour Organization-affiliated Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations; and the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. U.N. Human Rights 
Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery, Including Its Causes and Consequences, Tomoya Obokata, A/HRC/
51/26, July 19, 2022, para. 23; Office of the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China, August 
31, 2022, paras. 121, 128; Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, ``Xinjiang Report: China Must Address Grave Human Rights 
Violations and the World Must Not Turn a Blind Eye, Say UN Experts,'' 
September 7, 2022; U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee 
at its 30th Meeting (3 March 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, 
paras. 50-51. See also Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, ``Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Commends 
China for Efforts to Reduce Poverty, Asks about Measures to Protect 
Ethnic Minorities from Reported Forced Labour and the Coverage of the 
Social Welfare System,'' February 17, 2023.
    \70\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China, August 31, 2022, paras. 124-27; 
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Xinjiang 
Report: China Must Address Grave Human Rights Violations and the World 
Must Not Turn a Blind Eye, Say UN Experts,'' September 7, 2022.
    \71\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China, August 31, 2022, para. 151(i); U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding 
Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, Including Hong 
Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 30th 
Meeting (3 March 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, paras. 50-51.
    \72\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China, August 31, 2022, paras. 124-27. See 
also International Labour Organization, Report of the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
International Labour Conference, 110th Session, February 9, 2022, 518, 
520, 688-89.
    \73\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China, August 31, 2022, para. 128.

Worker Rights

Worker Rights

                           VII. Worker Rights

                             Worker Rights

                                Findings

         The U.N. committee that reviewed China's 
        compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, 
        Social and Cultural Rights in February 2023 highlighted 
        worker rights violations in China and called on the 
        People's Republic of China (PRC) government to address 
        unsafe working conditions; widespread discrimination 
        against migrant workers; gender and ethnic 
        discrimination; lack of protection for workers in the 
        informal economy; and inadequate access to various 
        employment-related benefits.
         Gender discrimination in the workplace in 
        China was a focal issue this past year as PRC 
        authorities aimed to strengthen the legal framework and 
        guidelines on safeguarding women's rights in the 
        workplace. Women are the primary victims of sexual 
        harassment in the workplace in China, but access to 
        legal relief is rare. In a case that epitomized China's 
        emerging #MeToo movement, a former female intern at 
        state media outlet China Central Television (CCTV) who 
        brought a lawsuit against a male CCTV television host 
        in 2018 for sexual harassment lost her final appeal in 
        August 2022 based on what a court in Beijing 
        municipality said was ``not sufficient'' evidence.
         China Labour Bulletin, a nongovernmental 
        organization in Hong Kong, documented 830 strikes and 
        other labor actions in 2022 on its Strike Map and 2,272 
        public requests on its Worker Assistance Helpline Map 
        in 2022. More than 87 percent of these strikes and 
        labor actions and nearly 90 percent of requests for 
        assistance were related to wage arrears.
         Worker protests overlapped with frustration at 
        the harsh and disproportionate measures imposed under 
        China's zero-COVID policy and the economic impact of 
        the pandemic after those measures were lifted. Protests 
        in late October and November 2022 at Foxconn's factory 
        campus in Zhengzhou municipality, Henan province--the 
        largest assembly site of Apple iPhones in the world--
        demonstrated worker dissatisfaction with Foxconn's 
        management of worker health and safety and deceptive 
        recruitment promises.
         PRC authorities' suppression of worker 
        representation and independent labor advocacy in China 
        has left little space for workers to organize, express 
        their grievances, or negotiate satisfactory remedies. 
        In May 2023, a migrant workers' museum on the outskirts 
        of Beijing municipality closed after 15 years due to 
        its impending eviction.
         Changes to one of China's major health 
        insurance programs led to street protests by thousands 
        of retired workers in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong 
        province; Wuhan municipality, Hubei province; and 
        Dalian municipality, Liaoning province. Authorities in 
        Wuhan detained Zhang Hai and Tong Menglan for 
        expressing support for the protesters.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Promote and support bilateral and multilateral 
        exchanges among government officials, academics, legal 
        experts, and civil society groups to focus on labor 
        issues such as freedom of expression, freedom of 
        association, collective bargaining, employment 
        discrimination, occupational health and safety, and 
        wage arrears. Support capacity-building programs that 
        strengthen Chinese labor and legal aid organizations 
        defending the rights of workers. Recognizing the 
        challenges of safeguarding the rights of gig economy 
        workers, convene exchanges to develop international 
        standards on labor rights for workers in the digital 
        platform economy, such as transparency in contractual 
        labor relationships, data privacy, and dispute 
        resolution, among others.
          Advocate for the immediate release or confirmation of 
        the release of individuals detained for supporting 
        workers and labor rights, such as Xiao Gaosheng, Fang 
        Ran, Wang Jianbing, and Zhang Hai.
          Call on the Chinese government to respect 
        internationally recognized rights to freedom of 
        association and collective bargaining and allow workers 
        to organize and establish independent labor unions. 
        Raise concern in all appropriate trade negotiations and 
        bilateral and multilateral dialogues about the Chinese 
        Communist Party's role in collective bargaining and 
        elections of trade union representatives, emphasizing 
        that wage rates should be determined by free bargaining 
        between labor and management.
          Whenever appropriate, integrate meaningful civil 
        society participation into bilateral and multilateral 
        dialogues, meetings, and exchanges. Invite 
        international unions and labor nongovernmental 
        organizations (NGOs) and domestic civil society groups 
        from all participating countries to observe relevant 
        government-to-government dialogues.
          Encourage compliance with fundamental International 
        Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. Request that the 
        ILO increase its monitoring of core labor standards in 
        China, including freedom of association and the right 
        to organize.

Worker Rights

Worker Rights

                             Worker Rights

                              Introduction

    The Commission's 2023 reporting year overlapped with the 
final months of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
government's coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic 
control and prevention measures--known as the ``zero-COVID'' 
policy--and the abrupt end of most of those measures in 
December 2022.\1\ The harsh and disproportionate implementation 
of the policy\2\ and the lack of preparation for the 
consequences of the policy's end\3\ contributed to worsening 
conditions for worker rights in China and exacerbated worker 
precarity.\4\ Multiple worker protests during this past year 
were linked to frustrations with zero-COVID policy 
implementation\5\ as well as to long-term problems in worker 
rights protections.\6\ High rates of youth unemployment (ages 
16 to 24) were reported this past year--19.3 percent in June 
2022\7\ and 20.4 percent in April 2023.\8\ Chinese technology 
companies also laid off thousands of employees\9\ due in part 
to the PRC government's regulatory crackdown on the technology 
sector.\10\ Many employed in the platform economy--such as 
those doing courier and delivery work--worked excessively long 
hours, were vulnerable to work-related health hazards,\11\ and 
were often without access to formal labor relationships that 
safeguard rights provided in Chinese labor law.\12\ The PRC 
government encouraged workers over 60 years old who had already 
retired to return to active work in light of demographic 
changes to the population, but individuals in this age group 
are not adequately protected by labor law in China.\13\
    Worker rights were a focal issue in February 2023 when a 
U.N. committee examined China's compliance with the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).\14\ The ICESCR deals directly with the right to work 
in Articles 6 through 8, and includes standards of gender 
equality and non-discrimination in other articles that 
implicate workplace rights.\15\ In a 2005 General Comment 
regarding Article 6 and other ICESCR provisions, the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted that ``[t]he 
right to work is essential for realizing other human rights and 
forms an inseparable and inherent part of human dignity.'' \16\ 
The committee's concerns during two review sessions and 
criticisms in subsequent concluding observations about the 
Chinese government's violations of worker rights under the 
ICESCR included the following highlights:\17\

         The lack of a right to form independent trade 
        unions and limits on freedom of association;\18\
         Gender discrimination and sexual harassment of 
        women in the workplace;\19\
         Discrimination against migrant workers, 
        especially as a consequence of the household 
        registration (hukou) system;\20\
         Discrimination against workers from ethnic 
        minority groups, particularly in the use of forced 
        labor;\21\
         Unpaid wages to workers, and precarious labor 
        conditions and access to social security and pension 
        schemes for workers engaged in informal work and 
        platform labor;\22\
         Unsafe working conditions, intensified by the 
        COVID-19 pandemic.\23\

    The committee commended China's ratification of two 
International Labour Organization (ILO) forced labor 
conventions,\24\ to which the PRC approved ratification in 
April 2022 and completed in August 2022.\25\ Despite the PRC 
official delegation's denials of the existence of forced labor 
of Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other ethnic minority groups in 
China,\26\ the committee urged the PRC government to 
``immediately dismantle all systems of forced labour in place, 
both private and public, including at the local level, and 
release all individuals subject to forced labour.'' \27\ [For 
more information on forced labor in China, see Chapter 10--
Human Trafficking, Chapter 14--Business and Human Rights, and 
Chapter 18--Xinjiang.]

            Protecting the Rights of Women in the Workplace

    Gender discrimination in the workplace remained a pervasive 
problem for women in China,\28\ an issue that has been 
heightened by the PRC government's promotion of childbearing to 
counterbalance the aging population.\29\ Employers reportedly 
have circumvented paying for maternity leave by not hiring 
female workers, subjecting pregnant women to harassment or 
firing them, and canceling business registrations to dissolve 
employment relationships.\30\ A survey by a Chinese recruitment 
website found that 61.2 percent of women said they had been 
asked about their marriage or childbirth plans during job 
recruitment in 2022.\31\ China Labour Bulletin (CLB), a 
nongovernmental organization in Hong Kong, recorded 14 cases in 
2022 regarding pregnancy and maternity leave violations in 
China on its map of workers posting ``calls-for-help'' on 
social media\32\--11 involved a lack of payment of wages or 
provision of benefits during maternity leave, and 3 involved 
women who were penalized or fired due to their pregnancy or 
maternity leave.\33\
    Women are the primary victims of sexual harassment in the 
workplace in China,\34\ but they face multiple difficulties in 
bringing forward claims of sexual harassment, including a lack 
of reporting channels at the workplace,\35\ fear of 
retaliation,\36\ expensive and time-consuming judicial 
procedures, and feelings of shame.\37\ In a case that 
epitomized China's emerging #MeToo movement,\38\ a former 
female intern at the state media outlet China Central 
Television (CCTV) who brought a lawsuit against a male CCTV 
television host in 2018 for sexual harassment lost her final 
appeal in August 2022.\39\ The appeals court in Beijing 
municipality found that the evidence she submitted was ``not 
sufficient.'' \40\ Until the recent legal changes to the PRC 
Civil Code\41\ and the PRC Law on the Protection of Women's 
Rights and Interests,\42\ sexual harassment in Chinese law was 
not clearly defined, and Chinese courts have not been willing 
to accept various forms of evidence.\43\ Access to legal relief 
has been rare in cases where women brought workplace sexual 
harassment claims to court.\44\ In a June 2022 study, 
researchers found only 133 instances of civil or administrative 
trials involving workplace sexual harassment between 2002 and 
2020.\45\ Judges reportedly referenced sexual harassment in 92 
of those cases, but sexual harassment victims won in only 4 
cases from among 13 in which the victim was the plaintiff.\46\ 
Moreover, figures cited by an ILO expert committee suggest that 
in China, as ``alleged victims bear the burden of proof, only a 
small percentage of the lawsuits filed result in a [ruling 
against] the alleged perpetrator and rarely in compensation for 
the victim.'' \47\ Women continued to turn to social media to 
make sexual harassment accusations.\48\ In April and May 2023, 
about two dozen women posted online about sexual harassment 
they were subjected to by a prominent screenwriter.\49\
    This past year, PRC authorities aimed to strengthen the 
legal framework on safeguarding women's rights in the 
workplace,\50\ with amendments to the PRC Law on the Protection 
of Women's Rights and Interests, effective January 1, 2023,\51\ 
a multi-agency guiding opinion that describes certain benefits 
for pregnant employees and those on maternity leave;\52\ a 
variety of ``model'' legal cases;\53\ and practical reference 
materials for employers.\54\ Previously, experts have pointed 
to gaps between ``how the law works in theory and the social 
reality rampant with gender inequalities has rendered most 
gender legislation in China merely guidelines instead of 
implementable laws.'' \55\ But in an assessment of women's 
rights protection in China submitted to the U.N. Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Center for 
Human Rights at the state-affiliated China Academy of Social 
Sciences expressed confidence that newly issued ``remedial 
measures,'' particularly those in the amended Law, will ``deal 
with the problem of the lack of effectiveness of rights 
remedies.'' \56\

                      Worker Strikes and Protests

    The PRC government does not publicly report on the number 
of worker strikes and protests, making it difficult to obtain 
comprehensive information on worker actions.\57\ Official 
censorship of news outlets and social media,\58\ the harassment 
and detention of citizen journalists and labor advocates,\59\ 
and restrictions on foreign journalists (heightened during the 
COVID-19 pandemic),\60\ limited access to information about 
labor unrest in China. PRC law does not explicitly prohibit 
Chinese workers from striking.\61\ In some instances, 
authorities have prosecuted such activity as a disturbance of 
public order under Chinese criminal law.\62\

Worker Strikes and Other Labor Actions by Sector Based on China Labour 
                    Bulletin's (CLB) Strike Map \63\

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Total
 Year      Manufacturing        Construction        Transportation        Services         Other     number docu-
                                                                                                        mented
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2022   4.5%                 48%                 21.5%                 21%             4.9%          830
        (37)                 (399)               (179)                 (174)           (41)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2021   6.0%                 38.4%               33.6%                 14.4%           7.5%          1,094
        (66)                 (420)               (368)                 (158)           (82)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2020   10.9%                44.8%               19.5%                 18%             6.9%          800
        (87)                 (358)               (156)                 (144)           (55)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2019   13.8%                42.8%               12.3%                 23.0%           8.0%          1,385
        (191)                (593)               (171)                 (319)           (111)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2018   15.4%                44.8%               15.9%                 16.8%           7.1%          1,706
        (263)                (764)               (272)                 (286)           (121)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    CLB documented 830 strikes and other labor actions in 
2022.\64\ CLB uses traditional media and social media reports 
to compile its data on worker actions, and acknowledges that it 
can document only a small percentage of all such activity given 
limits on information in China.\65\ While the 2022 data shows a 
24.1 percent decrease in labor actions from 2021,\66\ CLB also 
documented 2,272 instances on its map of workers posting 
``calls-for-help'' on social media in 2022.\67\ More than 87 
percent of strikes and worker actions from its ``Strike Map'' 
\68\ and nearly 90 percent of the documented calls-for-
assistance were related to wage arrears,\69\ underscoring a 
long-term trend. In the first months of 2023, CLB also noted an 
uptick in protests among workers in the manufacturing sector, 
similarly linked to unpaid wages.\70\

                THE ZERO-COVID POLICY AND ITS AFTERMATH

    Many worker protests this past year involved frustration 
with measures imposed under the harsh zero-COVID policy and the 
economic impact of the pandemic after those measures were 
lifted. As one Chinese labor advocate observed, ``Workers have 
been the most susceptible group under the pandemic, with both 
the immaterial threat of the virus and the material crisis in 
their livelihoods compelling them to protest.'' \71\ The 
following examples illustrate a range of worker actions related 
to the zero-COVID policy:

         Migrant workers in ``urban villages.'' \72\ In 
        Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, migrant 
        workers living in ``urban villages'' primarily in the 
        textile manufacturing hub of Haizhu district, protested 
        food scarcity and lockdowns in mid- and late November 
        2022.\73\ In addition, sources reported that hundreds 
        of workers had been released from quarantine 
        facilities, but the ``urban villages'' in the area were 
        blocked off, leaving some workers unhoused and without 
        food.\74\
         Medical students. With Chinese hospitals 
        overburdened as a result of the discontinued zero-COVID 
        policy,\75\ medical students voiced concerns during 
        protests in December 2022 about equal pay for equal 
        work, inadequate pandemic protective measures at 
        hospitals, and maintaining scheduled holiday leave.\76\
         Factory workers. In January 2023, protests at 
        several factories throughout the country that had 
        produced COVID-19 testing materials erupted as 
        factories were shut down following the end of the zero-
        COVID policy, with workers left unpaid.\77\ Many of the 
        workers were hired as ``dispatch'' labor, through 
        third-party recruiting agents, a form of labor that has 
        allowed employers to avoid paying workers under legal 
        loopholes.\78\
         Public sector workers. In December 2022, 
        former COVID-19 public workers--often referred to as 
        ``big whites'' (da bai) for the white hazmat suits they 
        wore--held protests in multiple locations related to 
        wage arrears.\79\


------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protests at Foxconn's ``iPhone City'' \80\ in October  and November 2022
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Protests in late October and November 2022 at Foxconn's factory
 complex in Zhengzhou municipality, Henan province, reflected worker
 dissatisfaction with Foxconn's management of worker health and safety,
 and misleading recruitment promises. As the largest manufacturing base
 of Apple iPhones in the world, Foxconn's Zhengzhou plant is staffed by
 an estimated 200,000 workers,\81\ with a reported capacity for
 300,000.\82\ In October 2022, as COVID-19 cases were rising in
 Zhengzhou and some parts of the city went into lockdown,\83\ some
 Foxconn workers tested positive for COVID-19 despite the ``closed-
 loop'' arrangement--in which employees stayed on the factory campus,
 moving between factory workshops and on-site dormitories--instituted by
 Foxconn to prevent the spread of infection and maintain production.\84\
 Foxconn reportedly was not prepared for the COVID-19 outbreak in
 Zhengzhou and did not provide adequate medical treatment, food, or
 hygienic conditions for workers who were quarantined for testing
 positive.\85\ Without access to credible information about conditions,
 workers feared falling ill from the proximity of COVID-19-positive
 employees, and protested in October by leaving in the hundreds and
 possibly thousands, including by climbing over fences.\86\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Protests at Foxconn's ``iPhone City'' \80\ in October  and November
                             2022--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Foxconn worked to boost recruitment of seasonal workers with promises
 of higher wages and bonuses after the October protests.\87\ Some of
 these workers were recruited by recruiting agents at companies as well
 as by local officials in Henan.\88\ Employing an excessive percentage
 of temporary seasonal workers, a cohort who are not provided full
 employment benefits,\89\ was previously documented as a labor rights
 violation at Apple's Foxconn sites in China.\90\ In late November,
 protests broke out when seasonal workers reportedly learned that they
 would only be eligible for the higher wage and bonuses they had been
 promised during recruitment outreach if they worked two additional
 months.\91\ Thousands of workers participated in the November protests,
 and video shared on social media showed scenes of violence, including
 workers smashing surveillance cameras\92\ and public security officials
 beating workers.\93\ Apple reportedly sent staff to the Zhengzhou
 facility in November to work with Foxconn managers to respond to
 workers' concerns.\94\ Foxconn subsequently offered cash payouts to
 workers to quit and depart the site, and promised a larger bonus to
 those willing to stay through January 2023.\95\ A source told Reuters
 that 20,000 workers described as ``new hires'' left the Zhengzhou
 Foxconn complex in connection to the November protests.\96\ Foxconn
 again raised wages and bonuses at the Zhengzhou facility for a
 recruitment push in May 2023.\97\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Advocating for Worker Rights

       CONTINUED SUPPRESSION OF LABOR ADVOCACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY

    Labor unrest this past year spotlights the need for robust 
rights protection of workers, but PRC authorities' suppression 
of worker representation and independent labor advocacy has 
left little space for workers to organize, express their 
grievances, or negotiate satisfactory remedies.\98\ Reflecting 
on multiple detentions of labor advocates since 2015 and the 
closure of labor nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in 2018 
and 2019, a former labor advocate in China described current 
conditions for worker rights in China as ``slow-burn 
repression.'' \99\ In May 2023, a migrant workers' museum on 
the outskirts of Beijing municipality--a hub of migrant 
workers' nongovernmental space--closed after 15 years due to 
its impending eviction.\100\ The Commission continued to 
monitor cases of detained labor advocates, such as Xiao 
Gaosheng (also known as Xiao Qingshan) whom authorities 
sentenced to four years and six months in prison in March 
2023,\101\ and Fang Ran and Wang Jianbing, both of whom 
authorities held in pretrial custody since detaining them in 
August 2021\102\ and September 2021,\103\ respectively.

 THE PARTY'S ``BRIDGE'' TO WORKERS: THE ALL-CHINA FEDERATION OF TRADE 
                                 UNIONS

    Chinese law violates international worker rights standards 
with regard to the right to organize independent trade unions 
and engage in collective bargaining.\104\ The Chinese Communist 
Party-led All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is the 
only trade union organization permitted to represent worker 
rights.\105\ Categorized as a ``mass organization,'' the ACFTU 
acts as an intermediary organization between the Party and 
workers,\106\ and is required to adhere to the leadership of 
the Party.\107\ The ACFTU has been criticized for not 
effectively representing workers' rights to employers\108\ and 
aligning itself with enterprise management rather than 
workers.\109\ In recent years, PRC leader Xi Jinping tasked the 
ACFTU with institutional reform\110\ and greater ideological 
discipline, the latter of which includes vigilance against 
``hostile forces' interference in rights protection'' 
activities and the creation of independent or grassroots trade 
unions, according to an article in the Party's official 
theoretical journal Seeking Truth (Qiushi).\111\ Although two 
labor experts from CLB reported that the ACFTU has made some 
progress in expanding unionization to gig- and tech-sector 
workers this past year,\112\ another expert observed that the 
ACFTU has not developed institutional channels to effectively 
handle labor disputes in these new employment sectors.\113\

                Selected Issues in Chinese Labor Rights

                  RETIRED WORKERS PROTEST CHANGES TO 
                            HEALTH INSURANCE

    Retired workers protested in the streets in the thousands 
this past year in opposition to the PRC government's policy 
change to Urban Workers' Basic Health Insurance, one of China's 
two health insurance schemes.\114\ Reported protests took place 
in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province (two in late 
December 2022 and one in early January 2023);\115\ in Wuhan 
municipality, Hubei province, on February 8, 2023,\116\ and 
February 15, 2023;\117\ and in Dalian municipality, Liaoning 
province, on February 15, 2023.\118\ The policy change 
authorized local municipal governments to reduce the amount of 
money provided each month to workers' personal health insurance 
accounts and increase amounts to larger pooled accounts that 
are meant to support more expensive healthcare costs.\119\ 
Retired workers, who primarily used the funds in their personal 
accounts for medicine and outpatient services, expressed 
concern that they would no longer be able to pay at a time when 
costs were increasing.\120\ An article in the Economic Daily, 
an official media outlet, called for a ``rational'' perspective 
on the policy change following the protests, claiming that 
those insured could anticipate long-term benefits as the health 
insurance system improves over time.\121\ But with municipal 
government pooled accounts depleted due to pandemic prevention 
costs,\122\ one expert envisioned difficulties in meeting 
retired workers' health needs, among other public goods.\123\ 
While the Commission did not observe a widespread crackdown 
following the protests, Wuhan public security authorities 
reportedly investigated participants and detained at least five 
individuals who publicly supported the protesters in 
Wuhan,\124\ including Zhang Hai\125\ and Tong Menglan.\126\ 
Authorities previously had targeted Zhang for his advocacy on 
behalf of COVID-19 victims in China,\127\ following his 
father's death from COVID-19 in February 2020, in Wuhan.\128\

                 WORKER SAFETY AND INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS

    Official reports do not provide an accurate or 
comprehensive picture of workplace accidents or ongoing 
challenges to workplace safety in China.\129\ The head of the 
Ministry of Emergency Management (MEM)--an agency that is 
responsible for oversight of worker safety--asserted in March 
2023 that workplace accidents had decreased by 46.9 percent 
based on 2017 levels, though no actual numbers were mentioned 
in the People's Daily report on his comments.\130\ Government 
data showed a continued decline in workplace deaths.\131\ 
According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), 
20,963 people died in workplace accidents in 2022,\132\ 
compared to 26,307 deaths in 2021.\133\ Lacking disaggregated 
data from the NBS, it is unclear whether this statistic 
includes data from the service sector, such as delivery 
drivers, or from deaths linked to construction.\134\ False 
reporting and underreporting obscures the truth about workplace 
accidents: in one such case this past year, local officials in 
Qianxi county, Tangshan municipality, Hebei province, reported 
two ``missing'' workers, resulting from the flooding of an iron 
ore mine in September 2022.\135\ It was later discovered that 
at least 14 miners had died and that the local officials 
attempted to avoid a provincial-level investigation of the 
incident, which would be triggered by a higher number of 
reported deaths.\136\
    The Commission monitored several deadly fires and coal mine 
accidents in China this past year, including the following:

         Fires. A November 2022 fire at a textile 
        workshop located in an industrial district in Anyang 
        municipality, Henan province, caused the death of 38 
        people, most of whom were described as elderly women, 
        making it the worst workplace fire in China in a 
        decade, according to China Labour Bulletin (CLB).\137\ 
        A spark from the unlicensed use of a welding machine 
        reportedly ignited flammable cotton wool floating in 
        the air of the first floor of a two-story building, 
        with the textile workshop on the second floor.\138\ 
        Experts quoted in the Party's English-language outlet 
        Global Times emphasized that businesses should 
        prioritize emergency escape plans and awareness.\139\ 
        At a May 2023 press conference, an MEM official 
        confirmed that a welding machine was the source of the 
        fire.\140\ At the same MEM press conference, the 
        official indicated that illegal welding had caused 
        fatal fires\141\ at a storage facility in Cangzhou 
        municipality, Hebei, in March 2023, that killed 11 
        people,\142\ and at a factory in Wuyi county, Jinhua 
        municipality, Zhejiang province, in April 2023, that 
        had caused the deaths of 11 people.\143\ A fire at a 
        private hospital in Beijing municipality in April 2023 
        killed 29 elderly patients and staff, and injured 39, 
        and reportedly was the deadliest fire in two decades in 
        Beijing.\144\ At a June 2023 press conference, the 
        political commissar (zhengwei) of the National Fire and 
        Rescue Administration\145\ reported that many of the 
        deadly fires that took place in the past year were 
        linked to illegal electric welding and construction, 
        and safety oversight failures of leased workshop 
        spaces.\146\
         Coal mine accidents. The number of coal mine 
        accidents in China reportedly has nearly doubled, with 
        168 accidents in 2022 compared to 91 accidents in 2021, 
        according to official data from the National Mine 
        Safety Administration (NMSA).\147\ NMSA also reported 
        245 deaths in 2022--the highest number in six 
        years.\148\ The increase in coal mine-related deaths is 
        concurrent with the PRC government's expansion of coal 
        mining in China in 2022, estimated to have increased by 
        the equivalent of two new coal mines each week in 
        2022.\149\ Reported accidents included a mine collapse 
        in Gansu province in July 2022, which resulted in the 
        death of 10 and 7 injured;\150\ an open-pit mine 
        collapse in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in 
        February 2023, which resulted in 53 reported dead or 
        missing;\151\ and a landslide at a mine near Leshan 
        municipality, Sichuan province, in June 2023, which 
        reportedly killed 19.\152\ Other coal mine accidents 
        with reported deaths this past year took place in 
        Shanxi province\153\ and Guizhou province.\154\ CLB 
        observed that the PRC government's response to coal 
        mine disasters is reactive, following ``a familiar 
        pattern in China of a repeating cycle of serious 
        workplace accidents, dramatic rescues, and 
        investigations that ultimately fail to prevent the next 
        accident.'' \155\

Worker Rights

Worker Rights

    Notes to Chapter 11--Worker Rights

    \1\ Dake Kang, ``Ignoring Experts, China's Sudden Zero-COVID Exit 
Cost Lives,'' Associated Press, March 24, 2023; Yanzhong Huang, 
``China's Hidden COVID Catastrophe,'' Foreign Affairs, February 16, 
2023.
    \2\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong SAR, China, and Macao SAR, China, adopted by the 
Committee at its 30th Meeting (March 3, 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 
22, 2023, paras. 82-83; Dake Kang, ``Ignoring Experts, China's Sudden 
Zero-COVID Exit Cost Lives,'' Associated Press, March 24, 2023; 
Yanzhong Huang, ``China's Hidden COVID Catastrophe,'' Foreign Affairs, 
February 16, 2023.
    \3\ Minxin Pei, ``The Sudden End of Zero-COVID: An Investigation,'' 
China Leadership Monitor 75 (Spring 2023), March 1, 2023.
    \4\ Zuo Yue, ``Why Were the White Paper Protests Comprised of Three 
Movements? Understanding the Revolutionary Features and Limitations of 
the Anti-Lockdown Protest Wave,'' Matters, January 3, 2023, translated 
and reprinted in Chuang (blog), January 20, 2023; Anasua Bhattacharya 
and Tapas Ray, ``Precarious Work, Job Stress, and Health-related 
Quality of Life,'' NIOSH Science Blog, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, August 9, 2022; Chris Kingchi Chan, Eric Florence, and Jack 
Qiu, ``Editorial--Precarity, Platforms, and Agency: The Multiplication 
of Chinese Labour,'' China Perspectives 2021, no. 1.
    \5\ Freedom House, ``China Dissent Monitor 2022,'' Issue 2 
(October--December 2022),'' February 14, 2023.
    \6\ Freedom House, ``China Dissent Monitor 2023,'' Issue 3 
(January--March 2023),'' May 31, 2023.
    \7\ Daisuke Wakabayashi, ``China's Economy Hits a Slump as COVID 
Policy Takes a Toll,'' New York Times, July 15, 2022.
    \8\ Robin Wigglesworth, ``The Chinese Youth Unemployment 
Phenomenon,'' Financial Times, May 24, 2023. See also ``China Has a 
Youth Unemployment Problem; Guangdong Province Spearheads a Plan to 
Send 300,000 Youth to the Countryside by the End of 2025,'' China 
Change, April 7, 2023.
    \9\ Tracy Qu and Iris Deng, ``China's Big Tech Not Yet Done with 
Lay-offs as 2022 Nears Its End,'' South China Morning Post, December 8, 
2022.
    \10\ Kevin Lin, ``Dwindling Economic Opportunities for China's 
Youth Fuels Discontent,'' News Lens, December 9, 2022.
    \11\ See, e.g., Li Jianan, ``Waimai qishou shenye songcan tuzhong 
cudao songyi, pingtai reng dui qi liang bi dai song dingdan kou kuan'' 
[Food delivery man collapsed while making a late-night delivery and was 
sent to the hospital, but the platform still deducted money from his 
two pending orders], Paper, April 15, 2023; ``Delivery Workers, Trapped 
in the System,'' Renwu, September 8, 2020, translated and reprinted in 
Chuang (blog), November 12, 2020.
    \12\ Li Lei, ``Revised Labor Rules Sought as Gig Work Rises,'' 
China Daily, April 4, 2023; China Labour Bulletin, ``The Platform 
Economy,'' April 21, 2023.
    \13\ Lo Hoi-ying, ``China Population: Re-employment of Elderly an 
`Urgent, Realistic Problem to Be Solved,' '' South China Morning Post, 
May 30, 2023.
    \14\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976; United Nations 
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed June 8, 2023. China 
signed and ratified the ICESCR on October 27, 1997, and March 27, 2001, 
respectively. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Seventy-third Session, Summary Record of the 5th Meeting (February 15, 
2023), E/C.12/2023/SR.5, February 23, 2023; U.N. Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Seventy-third Session, Summary Record of 
the 7th Meeting (February 16, 2023), E/C.12/2023/SR.7, February 23, 
2023.
    \15\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, arts. 2(2), 3-9, 
10(2-3); U.N. Economic and Social Council, ``The Right to Work, General 
Comment No. 18, Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights,'' adopted on November 24, 2005, E/C.12/GC/
186, February 2006.
    \16\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 18, Article 6 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Right to Work, adopted on 
November 24, 2005, E/C.12/GC/186, February 2006, para. 1.
    \17\ International Service for Human Rights et al., ``UN Committee 
Lambasts China for Trampling Economic, Social and Cultural Rights at 
Home and Abroad,'' March 7, 2023.
    \18\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Seventy-third Session, Summary Record of the 5th meeting (February 15, 
2023), E/C.12/2023/SR.5, February 23, 2023, para. 52; U.N. Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the 
Third Periodic Report of China, Including Hong Kong SAR, China, and 
Macao SAR, China, adopted by the Committee at its 30th Meeting (March 
3, 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, paras. 55-57.
    \19\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Seventy-third Session, Summary Record of the 5th meeting (February 15, 
2023), E/C.12/2023/SR.5, February 23, 2023, paras. 19, 46; U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Seventy-third 
Session, Summary Record of the 7th Meeting (February 16, 2023), E/C.12/
2023/SR.7, February 23, 2023, para. 5; U.N. Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the Third 
Periodic Report of China, Including Hong Kong SAR, China, and Macao 
SAR, China, adopted by the Committee at its 30th Meeting (March 3, 
2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, paras. 7-8, 33-34, 43-44, 52-
53.
    \20\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Seventy-third Session, Summary Record of the 5th meeting (February 15, 
2023), E/C.12/2023/SR.5, February 23, 2023, paras. 19, 46, 50, 81; U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding 
Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, Including Hong Kong 
SAR, China, and Macao SAR, China, adopted by the Committee at its 30th 
Meeting (March 3, 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, paras. 37-38, 
64-67, 72-73.
    \21\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Seventy-third Session, Summary Record of the 5th Meeting (February 15, 
2023), E/C.12/2023/SR.5, February 23, 2023, paras. 42-45, 55; U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Seventy-third 
Session, Summary record of the 7th meeting (February 16, 2023), E/C.12/
2023/SR.7, February 23, 2023, paras. 5-7, 52; U.N. Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the 
Third Periodic Report of China, Including Hong Kong SAR, China, and 
Macao SAR, China, adopted by the Committee at its 30th Meeting (March 
3, 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, paras. 7-8, 35-36, 50-51, 
65.
    \22\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Seventy-third Session, Summary Record of the 5th meeting (February 15, 
2023), E/C.12/2023/SR.5, February 23, 2023, paras. 39, 46, 50, 55; U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding 
Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, Including Hong Kong 
SAR, China, and Macao SAR, China, adopted by the Committee at its 30th 
Meeting (March 3, 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, paras. 52-54, 
58-67.
    \23\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Seventy-third Session, Summary Record of the 5th meeting (February 15, 
2023), E/C.12/2023/SR.5, February 23, 2023, paras. 48-49, 82; U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Seventy-third 
Session, Summary Record of the 7th Meeting (February 16, 2023), E/C.12/
2023/SR.7, February 23, 2023, paras. 5-6, 33; U.N. Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the 
Third Periodic Report of China, Including Hong Kong SAR, China, and 
Macao SAR, China, adopted by the Committee at its 30th Meeting (March 
3, 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, paras. 52-53, 78-79, 82-83.
    \24\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong SAR, China, and Macao SAR, China, adopted by the 
Committee at its 30th Meeting (March 3, 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 
22, 2023, para. 3(a).
    \25\ Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the 
United Nations Office at Geneva and other International Organizations 
in Switzerland, ``China Deposits the Instruments of Ratification of Two 
ILO Forced Labour Conventions,'' August 12, 2022.
    \26\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Seventy-third Session, Summary Record of the 5th Meeting (February 15, 
2023), E/C.12/2023/SR.5, February 23, 2023, paras. 70-72. See also U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Seventy-third 
Session, Summary Record of the 7th Meeting (February 16, 2023), E/C.12/
2023/SR.7, February 23, 2023, para. 52.
    \27\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong SAR, China, and Macao SAR, China, adopted by the 
Committee at its 30th Meeting (March 3, 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 
22, 2023, paras. 50-51.
    \28\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace Discrimination,'' July 7, 
2020.
    \29\ Feng Haining, ``Pojie zhichang yinxing xingbie qishi yao you 
`xinzhao mengzhao' '' [Breaking through hidden gender discrimination in 
the workplace will require ``new and fierce tactics''], Yangcheng 
Evening News, reprinted in China Economic Net, February 15, 2023; 
Jessica Bahr, ``China Says It Has Revamped Women's Safety Legislation. 
What Could Change for Chinese Women?,'' SBS News, October 31, 2022; Liu 
Yuanju, ``20 cuoshi ciji shengyu renmen fanying lengdan, yinwei shehui 
hai zai `chengfa shengyu' '' [Lukewarm response to 20 measures to 
encourage childbirth, because society still ``punishes giving birth''], 
Phoenix New Media, August 18, 2022.
    \30\ Zilan Qian, ``Pregnancy Discrimination in the Workplace: Three 
Major Problems Faced by Chinese Female Workers,'' What's on Weibo, 
March 21, 2023.
    \31\ Zhao Li, ``Nuxing qiuzhi bei wen shifou yuanyi 3 nian bu 
shengwa'' [Female jobseekers are asked if they are willing to wait 
three years until having a baby], Legal Daily, February 14, 2023.
    \32\ China Labour Bulletin, ``An Introduction to China Labour 
Bulletin's Workers' Calls-for-Help Map,'' November 26, 2020.
    \33\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workers' Calls-for-Help Map,'' data 
for January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022, accessed July 6, 2023.
    \34\ Wang Qian and Yu Shulin, ``Zhichang xing saorao de jiuji 
kunjing ji caipan chulu--jiyu sifa anli de fenxi'' [Workplace sexual 
harassment's legal relief dilemma and adjudication channels--an 
analysis based on judicial cases], Human Rights, no. 2 (2022), June 30, 
2022.
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harassment's legal relief dilemma and adjudication channels--an 
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Shehui Baozhangbu, Zhufang Chengxiang Jianshebu, Zhongguo Renmin 
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multiple places in China, ironic banner in Henan prompts heated 
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24, 2022.
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Chinese iPhone Factory,'' Associated Press, November 23, 2022.
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Apple Shares,'' Reuters, November 25, 2022.
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3, 1976, art. 8; International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and 
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thousands of workers, forging ahead in the new era and building a new 
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2021; Cary Hung, ``Reshuffles at Propaganda Organs Underscore Their 
Importance to Party,'' South China Morning Post, May 18, 2014.
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``Chengzhen zhigong jiben yiliao baoxian he chengxiang jumin yiliao 
baoxian you shenme qubie?'' [What are the differences between urban 
workers' basic health insurance and urban and rural residents' health 
insurance?], Wuhan Economic & Technological Zone, December 12, 2022; 
Xinxin Chen, John Giles, Yao Yao, Winnie Yip, Qinqin Meng et al., ``The 
Path to Healthy Ageing in China: A Peking University--Lancet 
Commission,'' Lancet Commissions 400, no. 10367 (December 3, 2022): 
1984-5. China currently has two main forms of health insurance: Urban 
Workers' Basic Medical Insurance and Urban & Rural Residents' Basic 
Medical Insurance.
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[Guangzhou masses continue to protest, demanding the return of their 
health insurance funds], People's News, January 29, 2023; Civil Rights 
& Livelihood Watch, ``Guangzhou tuixiu renyuan kangyi yibao feiyong 
jiangdi'' [Retirees in Guangzhou protest decrease in health insurance 
funding], January 13, 2023.
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Medical Benefits,'' Radio Free Asia, February 8, 2023.
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xinzheng' jiazhong jingji fudan'' [In Wuhan, more than ten thousand 
gathered again en masse to oppose the ``new health insurance policy'' 
for increasing economic burden], Radio Free Asia, February 15, 2023.
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demonstrations erupted again in Wuhan and Dalian, retirees protested 
cuts to healthcare insurance benefits], Voice of America, February 15, 
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Triggers Protests among Elderly,'' ThinkChina, Lianhe Zaobao, February 
23, 2023.
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Medical Benefits,'' Radio Free Asia, February 8, 2023; Christian 
Shepherd, ``China's Elderly Protest Health Insurance Cuts in Wuhan, 
Dalian,'' Washington Post, February 16, 2023.
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[Rationally consider the reform of personal health insurance accounts], 
Economic Daily, February 21, 2023.
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shu gongmin jizhe Zhang Hai shilian huo cheng Fang Bin di er?'' 
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the Two Sessions, Wuhan pandemic victim family member and citizen 
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    \133\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical 
Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2021 National 
Economic and Social Development,'' February 28, 2022, sec. XII.
    \134\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical 
Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2022 National 
Economic and Social Development,'' February 28, 2023, sec. XII.
    \135\ Yuanyue Dang, ``Local Officials Tried to Cover Up Scale of 
Chinese Mine Disaster by Hiding Bodies, Report Finds,'' South China 
Morning Post, May 6, 2023.
    \136\ Yuanyue Dang, ``Local Officials Tried to Cover Up Scale of 
Chinese Mine Disaster by Hiding Bodies, Report Finds,'' South China 
Morning Post, May 6, 2023.
    \137\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Garment Factory Fire in Anyang Takes 
38 Lives, Injures 2,'' November 29, 2022.
    \138\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Garment Factory Fire in Anyang Takes 
38 Lives, Injures 2,'' November 29, 2022; Xu Yelu, ``Xi Urges 
Production Safety after Deadly Fire Accident Kills 38 in C. China,'' 
Global Times, November 22, 2022.
    \139\ Xu Yelu, ``Xi Urges Production Safety after Deadly Fire 
Accident Kills 38 in C. China,'' Global Times, November 22, 2022.
    \140\ Zhao Limei, ``Hebei, Zhejiang liang qi zhongda huozai shigu 
jun you weigui dianhan zuoye yinfa'' [Two major fire disasters in Hebei 
and Zhejiang were caused by illegal welding], China Youth Daily, May 
10, 2023.
    \141\ Zhao Limei, ``Hebei, Zhejiang liang qi zhongda huozai shigu 
jun you weigui dianhan zuoye yinfa'' [Two major fire disasters in Hebei 
and Zhejiang were caused by illegal welding], China Youth Daily, May 
10, 2023.
    \142\ Shen Du, ``Hebei Cang xian feiqi lengku huozai zhi 11 ren 
yunan, shigu xianchang sizhou quan bei xun hei, gongren zao qiang dong 
jiuyuan'' [A fire at a derelict cold storage facility in Cang county, 
Hebei, resulted in 11 dead, the scene of the accident was completely 
blackened, workers cut holes into the wall to save people], Shangyou 
News, March 29, 2023.
    \143\ Yao Silu, ``Jinhua: Wuyi huozai daijia jiwei canzhong, anquan 
shengchan shi yadao yiqie de shouyao renwu'' [Jinhua: Wuyi fire exacted 
grievously heavy cost, safe production is the overriding priority], 
Paper, April 19, 2023.
    \144\ Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, ``A Hospital Fire Killed 29 in 
Beijing, but Residents Were Kept in the Dark for Hours,'' CNN, April 
19, 2023; Manya Koetse, ``Beijing Changfeng Hospital Fire: Five Things 
To Know,'' What's on Weibo, April 19, 2023; Kai Di, Jing Wei, and Jenny 
Tang, ``Beijing Police Hold Hospital Chief, Construction Contractor 
over Deadly Fire,'' Radio Free Asia, April 20, 2023.
    \145\ Hou Liqiang, ``National Fire and Rescue Administration 
Inaugurated in Beijing,'' China Daily, January 6, 2023.
    \146\ Zhao Limei, ``Changfeng Yiyuan huozai deng zhong teda shigu 
dou yin weigui donghuo huo dianhan zuoye suozhi'' [The fire at 
Changfeng Hospital and other major accidents were all caused by 
violations of fire regulations or electric welding operations], China 
Youth Daily, June 8, 2023.
    \147\ Muyu Xu, ``China's Coal Mine Accidents Rise amid Push for 
Higher Production,'' Reuters, February 24, 2023.
    \148\ Muyu Xu, ``China's Coal Mine Accidents Rise amid Push for 
Higher Production,'' Reuters, February 24, 2023.
    \149\ Global Energy Monitor and Centre for Research on Energy and 
Clean Air, ``China Permits Two New Coal Power Plants Per Week in 
2022,'' February 2023, 2.
    \150\ ``Working Group Sent to Investigate Gansu Coal Mine Collapse 
That Kills 10, Injures 7,'' Global Times, July 24, 2022.
    \151\ ``Zhongguo guanfang: Neimeng lutian meikuang tanta, 53 ren 
shilian huo siwang'' [Chinese official: Inner Mongolia open-air coal 
mine collapses, 53 missing or dead], CNA, March 9, 2023.
    \152\ Andrew Hayley, ``Landslide at Mine in China's Sichuan 
Province Kills 19,'' Reuters, June 4, 2023.
    \153\ Li Dan, ``Shanxi liang meikuang fasheng anquan shigu bei 
zeling tingchan zhengdun'' [Safety incidents at two coal mines in 
Shanxi, ordered to suspend production for rectification], Securities 
Times, May 30, 2023.
    \154\ Yang Jun and Zhou Huiying, ``Coal Mine Toll Rises to 6 in 
Guizhou,'' China Daily, March 20, 2023.
    \155\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Coal Mine Collapse in Inner Mongolia 
Kills Five, Injures Six, and Leaves Dozens Missing,'' February 23, 
2023.

Public Health

Public Health

                      VIII. Other Thematic Issues

                             Public Health

                                Findings

         The People's Republic of China (PRC) 
        government and Chinese Communist Party's public health 
        response to the spread of the Omicron variant of 
        coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) continued to 
        reflect Chinese leader Xi Jinping's political 
        priorities. The consequences were massive infection 
        rates throughout China and the deaths of an estimated 1 
        million to 1.5 million people in December 2022 and 
        January 2023 alone, following the abrupt 
        discontinuation of the majority of the prevention and 
        control measures associated with the zero-COVID policy 
        on December 7, 2022. The Party's rigid adherence to the 
        policy's implementation superseded putting in place a 
        robust vaccination campaign, careful planning for the 
        discontinuation of the policy itself, or coordination 
        of the broader healthcare needs of the Chinese 
        population.
         PRC authorities vastly underreported the 
        number of deaths in China following the discontinuation 
        of the zero-COVID policy. Moreover, in March 2023, the 
        international scientific community also criticized the 
        PRC government for not sharing data gleaned in January 
        2020 from the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak in 
        Wuhan municipality, Hubei province.
         Numerous public protests against zero-COVID 
        policy restrictions took place from October 2022 
        through January 2023. Observers pointed to anger and 
        frustration with the PRC authorities' pandemic measures 
        as catalyzing the participation of ``a broad range of 
        contentious constituencies'' in these protests.
         Official media messaging about the impact of 
        the pandemic in China swerved between claims of China's 
        historic success in saving lives and disinformation 
        that blamed ``hostile powers'' for developments that 
        did not support uplifting propaganda. The Party also 
        condemned ``Western media'' for undermining the 
        official narrative of its ``important contributions to 
        the global fight against the pandemic. . ..''
         The PRC Mental Health Law reached its tenth 
        year of implementation in May 2023, but key 
        provisions--including the prohibition on the abuse of 
        forcible psychiatric commitment and supporting the use 
        of the principle of voluntary hospitalization--have not 
        yet been achieved. Authorities' use of forcible 
        psychiatric commitment continued to be a tool of 
        political repression.
         Individual and organized public health 
        advocacy continues in China, but the personal and 
        professional risks of organized public health advocacy 
        that authorities deem politically sensitive or even 
        threatening are evident in ongoing or new detentions 
        this past year, including Cheng Yuan, co-founder of the 
        advocacy organization Changsha Funeng; He Fangmei and 
        Li Xin, advocates for the victims of defective 
        vaccines; and Ji Xiaolong, who criticized senior 
        officials in Shanghai municipality for the lengthy 
        lockdown there in spring 2022.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Increase support to international technical 
        assistance and exchange programs on emerging and 
        zoonotic infectious diseases, and global public health 
        preparedness and response. Strengthen information 
        sharing, particularly drawing on the legal framework 
        established in the International Health Regulations 
        (IHR). Contribute to the international community's 
        efforts to improve the IHR provisions and 
        communications channels to effectively respond to 
        public health emergencies.
          Call on the Chinese government to strengthen 
        implementation of the PRC Mental Health Law (MHL) and 
        stop using forced psychiatric commitment to retaliate 
        against and silence persons with grievances against the 
        government or persons who express opinions critical of 
        authorities. Promote a human rights-based approach in 
        developing an array of mental health services for a 
        broader range of the Chinese population, many of whom 
        suffered heightened levels of depression and anxiety as 
        a result of harsh zero-COVID policy implementation.
          Urge the Chinese government to end the unlawful 
        detention and official harassment of individuals in 
        China who have shared opinions and information about 
        COVID-19. Release or confirm the release of individuals 
        detained, held in home confinement or a psychiatric 
        facility, or imprisoned for exercising freedom of 
        expression, such as Zhang Zhan, Zhang Hai, Wu Yanan, 
        Ding Yan, and Ji Xiaolong.

Public Health

Public Health

                             Public Health

                              Introduction

    The People's Republic of China (PRC) government and Chinese 
Communist Party's public health response to the spread of the 
Omicron variant of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
continued to be shaped by Chinese leader Xi Jinping's political 
priorities. The consequences of political prioritization were 
massive infection rates throughout China and the deaths of an 
estimated 1 million to 1.5 million people from December 2022 
through January 2023 alone, following the abrupt 
discontinuation of the majority of the prevention and control 
measures associated with the zero-COVID policy on December 7, 
2022.\1\ Under the policy, Chinese authorities concentrated 
resources on testing, tracing, and quarantine during the three 
years of the COVID-19 pandemic. Implementation of the policy in 
China at the start of the pandemic initially saved lives, but 
the ``economically disruptive and ultimately socially damaging 
zero-COVID program'' resulted in ``the same, if not worse, 
health consequences in the end,'' according to public health 
expert Yanzhong Huang.\2\ The Party's adherence to zero-COVID 
implementation superseded putting in place a robust vaccination 
campaign,\3\ careful planning for the discontinuation of the 
zero-COVID policy itself,\4\ or coordination of the broader 
healthcare needs of the Chinese population.\5\
    International legal standards on public health include 
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, which proclaims the ``right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health'' and the ``prevention, treatment and control 
of epidemic . . . diseases.'' \6\ The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights allows governments to impose some 
restrictions on freedom of expression in cases of public 
emergency, yet such restrictions must meet ``standards of 
legality, proportionality, and necessity.'' \7\ Chinese 
citizens expressed pent-up dissatisfaction with the zero-COVID 
policy in numerous public protests that took place primarily 
from October 2022 through January 2023.\8\ Some citizens 
criticized the expansion of digital surveillance under the 
guise of pandemic prevention.\9\ International criticism also 
was unsparing: U.N. experts pointed to the Chinese government's 
record of COVID-related public health governance during reviews 
of China's treaty body obligations this past year.\10\ The 
World Health Organization and international scientists 
continued to raise questions about the lack of transparency 
with COVID-19-related data from Wuhan municipality, Hubei 
province, the epicenter of the pandemic outbreak. [For further 
information on how the COVID-19 pandemic intersected with other 
core human rights and thematic areas monitored by the 
Commission, see Chapter 1--Freedom of Expression, Chapter 2--
Civil Society, Chapter 6--Governance, Chapter 11--Worker 
Rights, Chapter 17--Tibet, and Chapter 18--Xinjiang.]

                                COVID-19

                    THE END OF THE ZERO-COVID POLICY

    In October 2022, more than 200 million Chinese reportedly 
were under some form of lockdown as the PRC government sought 
to control the spread of COVID-19 throughout the country.\11\ 
The zero-COVID policy, which was put into place in spring 2020, 
required residents in China to adhere to prevention and control 
measures that included the lockdowns of factories,\12\ city 
districts, and entire municipalities;\13\ daily testing; 
contact tracing; and sudden collective quarantines when 
individual cases of infection were discovered in residential 
blocks and apartment complexes.\14\ With daily management of 
the policy left to local officials, urban neighborhood 
committees,\15\ and public health workers clad in white 
hazardous materials suits, implementation of the policy 
featured uneven and sometimes disproportionately harsh measures 
that left residents subjected to health, food, and employment 
insecurity.\16\ This past year also saw two of the lengthiest 
lockdowns in China during the past three years: these were in 
the Tibet Autonomous Region\17\ and in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region,\18\ neither of which are Han-majority ethnic 
areas.
    The risk of nationwide infection and death may have 
precluded considerations of ending the policy before the 20th 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 
2022 when Xi Jinping secured his third term as Party General 
Secretary.\19\ Official statements before and during the 20th 
Party Congress reiterated unswerving support of ongoing 
implementation of a policy that had become entwined with Xi's 
leadership.\20\ Adjustments to the policy were announced on 
November 11, 2022,\21\ reflecting a perception that ``the 
political imperative of sticking with zero-COVID was greatly 
reduced after the end of the party congress on October 22,'' as 
political scientist Minxin Pei observed.\22\ Xi reportedly 
continued to demand implementation of the modified policy even 
as the rate of infection rose.\23\ Nationwide anti-lockdown 
protests at the end of November 2022,\24\ economic pressure 
from leading regional officials in China,\25\ and at least one 
reported letter from a business leader\26\ contributed to the 
government's decision to end most of the policy's prevention 
and control measures on December 7, 2022,\27\ including the use 
of the digital health code app, daily testing, and travel 
restrictions inside China.\28\ Local governments and hospitals 
were not prepared for the policy change\29\ or the onslaught of 
patients and need for beds, equipment, and medicine.\30\ An 
estimated 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese population became 
infected with COVID-19 within one month of the zero-COVID 
policy's end.\31\

           THE PARTY'S AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL OF PUBLIC HEALTH

    The Party's authoritarian control of public health measures 
in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic in China raised many concerns 
with regard to human rights, media control, and governance, 
topics which were discussed at a Commission hearing on November 
15, 2022.\32\ In one of the policy developments that reflects 
senior authorities' responses to the pandemic, the Party 
Central Committee and State Council issued an opinion on the 
medical health system in March 2023.\33\ The opinion contains 
provisions on epidemic prevention, based on lessons learned 
from COVID-19.\34\ One provision reinforces the expanded use of 
grid management as a public health tool, a development during 
the COVID-19 pandemic in China,\35\ which imposes ``a 
responsibility system for community disease prevention and 
control areas'' and a ``grid-based grassroots disease 
prevention and control network.'' \36\ Another provision calls 
for improving the early warning system in detecting epidemics, 
epidemic prevention and control, and emergency response 
systems,\37\ a system that authorities established following 
the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 
2003.\38\ The primacy of Party leadership in the public health 
system, including hospital management, also features in the 
opinion.\39\ The Party's entrenchment in hospital management is 
essential to understanding the early spread of COVID-19: at the 
time of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan municipality, Hubei 
province, local hospitals reported first to the Party, which 
gave ``officials in Wuhan an opening to control and distort 
information about the virus,'' and allowed the virus to spread, 
according to the New York Times.\40\

                       LACK OF DATA TRANSPARENCY

    PRC authorities' lack of transparency about the 
consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic domestically and 
worldwide does not conform to international standards on access 
to information during a pandemic, including the right to 
information regarding accurate public health information and 
sharing data with scientists and public health professionals 
who aim to prevent future pandemics.\41\
    World Health Organization (WHO) officials, multiple 
countries, \42\ and the international scientific community\43\ 
questioned the accuracy of official data provided by the PRC 
government this past year. In February 2023, experts estimated 
that the number of deaths in China resulting from the end of 
the zero-COVID policy likely ranged from 1 million to 1.5 
million.\44\ In contrast, the official number of confirmed 
deaths from the start of the pandemic through February 2023 was 
83,150.\45\ PRC authorities later reported to the WHO a total 
of 121,490 confirmed deaths from COVID-19 from January 20, 
2020, through July 5, 2023.\46\ PRC official estimates only 
included individuals who died in a hospital, using a ``narrow 
definition of what counts as a COVID-19 death,'' as the New 
York Times put it.\47\ One source of regularly reported data 
from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, that provides the number of 
marriages, divorces, and cremations, was not reported for the 
fourth quarter of 2022 or the first quarter of 2023, which 
observers interpreted as an attempt to suppress the numbers on 
deaths once the zero-COVID prevention and control measures were 
discontinued in the fourth quarter of 2022.\48\ Additionally, 
few data are available on the prevalence in the Chinese 
population of long COVID\49\--a condition that includes a range 
of symptoms following the initial infection and that can last 
for months or years.\50\
    Another ongoing concern during the COVID-19 pandemic is 
that PRC authorities have withheld scientific data gathered 
from the outbreak epicenter of Wuhan municipality, Hubei 
province, from the international scientific community. This 
concern came into sharp relief this past year when previously 
unavailable data was used in a research paper by Chinese Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC) scientists.\51\ The 
information was raw sequencing data obtained in January 2020 
from the wet market in Wuhan that remains a focus of COVID-19 
origins research.\52\ The data were found posted on an 
international genomic data platform in March 2023, but 
reportedly were subsequently removed at the request of the CCDC 
scientists.\53\ WHO Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus 
subsequently commented, ``These data could have--and should 
have--been shared three years ago.'' \54\


------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Language about Public Health Risks Deleted from Amended PRC Wildlife
                             Protection Law
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In the wake of the outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan, the National
 People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee banned the consumption of
 terrestrial wildlife in February 2020, a prohibition that lasted
 through June 2022.\55\ Revisions to the PRC Wildlife Protection Law
 (WPL) were among several legislative projects added to the list of NPC
 legislative priorities in spring 2020, which aimed to improve public
 health.\56\ During this same period, an international health guideline
 by the WHO and co-authoring organizations released in 2021\57\ along
 with other scientific publications have emphasized the risks to public
 health from the sale of wildlife for human consumption.\58\ During the
 WPL revision process, Chinese experts highlighted the need to
 incorporate public health concerns in the law,\59\ but even though the
 first draft of the amended WPL in October 2020 contained language about
 the ``prevention of public health risks,'' \60\ neither the second
 draft in September 2022 nor the final version included that
 language.\61\ The final version of law also loosened some COVID-19
 restrictions on wildlife farming.\62\ According to the South China
 Morning Post, ``environmentalists say [the WPL] is riddled with
 loopholes and will encourage the commercial breeding and use of
 wildlife.'' \63\ [For more information on the PRC Wildlife Protection
 Law, see Chapter 13--The Environment and Climate Change.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                       PANDEMIC-RELATED PROTESTS

    Collective and individual public protests related to the 
zero-COVID policy and its abrupt end were a significant 
development in China this past year. Observers pointed to anger 
and frustration with the Chinese government's pandemic measures 
as catalyzing the participation of ``a broad range of 
contentious constituencies'' in these protests.\64\ 
Intersecting human rights concerns were reflected in the 
protests, such as the right to health\65\ when workers 
protested inadequate medical care when COVID-19 broke out at 
Foxconn's ``iPhone City'' in October 2022,\66\ the critique of 
censorship\67\ by university students and urban residents who 
held blank sheets of paper during the White Paper protests in 
November 2022,\68\ and protests linked to economic and food 
insecurity\69\ resulting from the lengthy lockdowns in Lhasa 
municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region, in October 2022\70\ and 
in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, in November 
2022.\71\ The protests across China that emerged from vigils 
for the victims of a deadly fire in Urumqi municipality, 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, on November 24, 2022, drew 
comparisons with the historical phenomenon of Chinese citizens' 
leveraging public mourning as a platform for freedom of 
expression and assembly.\72\ Additionally, the discontinuation 
of the zero-COVID policy resulted in factories throughout the 
country that had produced COVID-19 testing materials ceasing 
production and leaving workers unpaid, which sparked worker 
protests in January 2023.\73\
    Despite the control of information and restrictions on 
journalists during the pandemic,\74\ individual protests were 
reported, such as a cinematographer in Shanghai municipality, 
who used a loudspeaker to broadcast nonsensical zero-COVID 
slogans in his neighborhood, based on phrases he reedited from 
official propaganda.\75\ In Beijing municipality, an artist 
tagged eight COVID-19 testing sites with graffiti in August 
2022 with the words ``I'm numb after three years,'' \76\ and a 
protester draped a large banner over Sitong Bridge in October 
2022 that criticized the policy and Xi Jinping.\77\

            THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND MENTAL HEALTH IN CHINA

    The COVID-19 pandemic and the zero-COVID policy contributed 
to deteriorating mental health for many age groups and 
communities in China.\78\ An editorial in the Lancet, an 
international medical journal, predicted the ``shadow of mental 
ill-health adversely affecting China's culture and economy for 
years to come.'' \79\ Similarly, Winnie Yip, a public health 
researcher at Harvard University, identified the broad 
psychosocial needs of the Chinese population, exacerbated by 
the COVID-19 pandemic, as a critical issue the Chinese 
government will have to address in its efforts to improve the 
public health system in coming years.\80\ While individuals in 
many countries experienced psychological stressors during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the zero-COVID policy exacerbated these 
stressors with isolation at home (including being locked into 
one's apartment or home), a sense of dread of being transferred 
at any time to quarantine centers, inadequate access to medical 
care, widespread food and employment insecurity, and other 
forms of social disruption.\81\ Reports of suicide in China 
were linked to the zero-COVID policy.\82\ The Ministry of 
Health did not release comprehensive data about the number of 
suicides reportedly because the statistics are considered a 
``state secret.'' \83\

                     PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION

    This past year, official media messages about the impact of 
the pandemic in China swerved between claims of China's 
historic success in saving lives and disinformation that blamed 
``hostile powers'' for developments that did not support the 
uplifting propaganda. At the 20th Party Congress in October 
2022, Xi Jinping and other senior Party officials emphasized 
the correctness of the zero-COVID policy and affirmed its 
continuation.\84\ The Party's ``decisive victory'' would later 
be broadcast in Party media outlets, such as People's Daily and 
Seeking Truth (Qiushi), to shape a post-pandemic narrative.\85\ 
The Party condemned ``Western media'' and the U.S. Government 
specifically for undermining the PRC official narrative of its 
``important contributions to the global fight against the 
pandemic. . .. '' \86\ When the zero-COVID policy was 
discontinued, officials accused ``Western media'' of insulting 
``China's adjustment of its pandemic prevention and control 
policies.'' \87\ PRC officials also blamed ``hostile forces,'' 
including foreigners, for instigating anti-lockdown (White 
Paper) protests in November 2022.\88\ Moreover, PRC officials 
continued to repeat and insinuate through disinformation that 
the United States is the origin of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that 
causes COVID-19.\89\

             Tenth Anniversary of the PRC Mental Health Law

     FORCED PSYCHIATRIC COMMITMENT AND INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION

    The PRC Mental Health Law (MHL) reached its tenth year of 
implementation in May 2023, but key provisions in the MHL--
including the prohibition of the abuse of forcible psychiatric 
commitment\90\ and stipulating the use of the principle of 
voluntary hospitalization\91\--have not yet been achieved.\92\ 
PRC authorities' use of forcible psychiatric commitment (bei 
jingshenbing) has been a tool of political repression and 
``stability maintenance.'' \93\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch 
(CRLW), an NGO in China that has long monitored forcible 
psychiatric commitment,\94\ reported seven cases of forcible 
psychiatric commitment in 2022, five of which involved 
petitioners who sought resolution to grievances such as an 
injury from a defective vaccine and miscarriages of 
justice.\95\ The other two cases involved zero-COVID policy 
criticism:\96\ Wu Yanan, an assistant professor of philosophy 
at Nankai University in Tianjin municipality, had expressed 
support to anti-lockdown protesters in November 2022 before 
being forcibly committed;\97\ and Ding Yan, a restaurant 
operator in Nanjing municipality, Jiangsu province, posted a 
public letter to Xi Jinping in which she criticized COVID-19 
measures.\98\
    Chinese experts have documented high rates of involuntary 
hospitalization for persons with mental health disorders since 
the MHL went into effect, a trend that many found to be 
inconsistent with the principle of voluntary hospitalization in 
the MHL and limitations in using involuntary hospitalization 
only when an individual is at risk of self-harm or harm to 
others.\99\ In a book-length study released in 2023, a 
researcher found that ``given the vagueness in the MHL, the 
practice of taking a person to a mental health facility for 
diagnostic assessment against his or her will, even without any 
evidence of harm or dangerousness, appears to be generally 
tolerated in both medical practice and legal proceedings . . 
..'' \100\ In an editorial to The Lancet Psychiatry, experts 
based in Shanghai municipality urged a shift toward a rights-
based approach in the provision of mental health services in 
China, and specified the need for greater clarity in voluntary 
treatment and involuntary admission criteria; ``alternatives to 
coercion''; the establishment of monitoring mechanisms; and 
involving persons with mental health disorders ``proactively 
and meaningfully . . . in all processes related to their 
care.'' \101\ The U.N. experts who reviewed China's compliance 
with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) in August 2022 were critical of the MHL's authorization 
of involuntary psychiatric commitment, condemning it as a form 
of deprivation of liberty and security of the person under 
Article 14 of the CRPD.\102\

          Targeting Public Health Whistleblowers and Advocates

    Reports about the death of elderly physician Jiang Yanyong 
on March 11, 2023, recalled the pattern of PRC political 
sensitivity to public health emergencies and official 
repression of public health whistleblowers.\103\ In April 2003, 
Jiang took a considerable personal and professional risk by 
exposing the severity of the severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) outbreak; his assessment of SARS not only contradicted 
official statements at the time,\104\ but also challenged PRC 
official secrecy and misinformation.\105\ In subsequent years, 
authorities detained him after he wrote in 2004 about his 
hands-on experience in treating injured students and bystanders 
at the time of the PRC's violent suppression of the Tiananmen 
Square pro-democracy movement on June 4, 1989;\106\ they 
prevented Jiang from traveling abroad to receive human rights 
awards;\107\ they would not allow lawyers and a political 
reformer to visit him;\108\ and ultimately they censored 
information in China about his death\109\ and funeral.\110\ 
International media outlets observed parallels between Jiang 
and Li Wenliang,\111\ the physician in Wuhan municipality, 
Hubei province, who had posted some of the earliest information 
about the COVID-19 outbreak via social media in December 2019, 
and then anonymously revealed the story of his official 
reprimand to a Chinese media outlet in late January 2020.\112\ 
Li subsequently revealed his identity before his death from 
COVID-19 in February 2020.\113\ An October 2022 investigative 
report in the New York Times revisited the circumstances of his 
death, highlighting the political sensitivities that 
remain.\114\ External medical practitioners--whom the New York 
Times had review the records of Li's medical care in the last 
weeks of his life at Wuhan Central Hospital--did not find any 
evidence that politics compromised the quality of Li's 
care.\115\ Nevertheless, as the New York Times noted, the 
official announcement of Li's death contained not only 
misinformation about the actual time of his death but also 
misleading information about the use of a life-saving medical 
technology.\116\ Furthermore, hospitals in Wuhan have 
restricted medical doctors' access to the records of COVID-19 
patients from the initial outbreak.\117\
    During this reporting period, the Commission continued to 
monitor the detention of public health advocates, including the 
following:

         Cheng Yuan, the co-founder of the anti-health 
        discrimination NGO Changsha Funeng, continued to serve 
        a five-year prison sentence for alleged ``subversion of 
        state power'' at Chishan Prison in Hunan province, 
        where prison authorities reportedly have subjected him 
        to abusive conditions of forced labor.\118\ [For more 
        information on forced labor in Chishan Prison, see 
        Chapter 14--Business and Human Rights.]
         The detentions of He Fangmei and Li Xin, wife 
        and husband advocates for victims of defective 
        vaccines, in Huixian county, Xinxiang municipality, 
        Henan province, in October 2020, have been linked to 
        official retaliation against their advocacy.\119\ 
        Authorities reportedly are keeping two of their three 
        children, including a 7-year-old daughter with 
        disabilities ascribed to a defective vaccine, at a 
        psychiatric hospital despite He's explicit request to 
        place the children with her elder sister.\120\
         Ji Xiaolong, another defective vaccine 
        activist, was criminally detained in August 2022 by 
        authorities in Shanghai municipality in connection with 
        his criticism of Shanghai officials' management of the 
        COVID-19 lockdown in spring 2022.\121\ Ji reportedly 
        called for the resignation of Li Qiang, Shanghai Party 
        Secretary during the lockdown,\122\ who was appointed 
        China's Premier in March 2023.\123\

Public Health

Public Health

    Notes to Chapter 12--Public Health

    \1\ Dake Kang, ``Ignoring Experts, China's Sudden Zero-COVID Exit 
Cost Lives,'' Associated Press, March 24, 2023.
    \2\ Yanzhong Huang, ``China's Hidden COVID Catastrophe,'' Foreign 
Affairs, February 16, 2023.
    \3\ Smriti Mallapaty, ``Can China Avoid a Wave of Deaths If It 
Lifts Strict Zero COVID Policy?,'' Nature 612, (December 8, 2022): 8.
    \4\ Raffaele Huang and Liyan Qi, ``China Missed a Window to Be 
Better Prepared for Covid-19 Surge,'' Wall Street Journal, December 1, 
2022.
    \5\ ``Challenges Confronting China's Healthcare System Post-COVID: 
A Conversation between Winnie Yip and William Hsiao,'' Critical Issues 
Confronting China Series, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard 
University, March 29, 2023; COVID-19 and China's Authoritarian Public 
Health Control, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 117th Cong. (2022) (testimony of Yanzhong Huang, Senior Fellow 
for Global Health, Council on Foreign Relations and Professor, School 
of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University).
    \6\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 12(1), 
(2)(c); United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
accessed July 15, 2023. China signed the convention on October 27, 
1997, and ratified it on March 27, 2001. See also Office of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, CESCR General Comment No. 14: The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), adopted 
at the Twenty-second Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, August 11, 2000, para. 16.
    \7\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19; United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, accessed July 15, 2023. China has signed but not 
ratified the ICCPR. Daphne Eviatar, ``Human Rights Guidelines for the 
Fight Against COVID-19,'' Just Security (blog), March 27, 2020; U.N. 
Human Rights Council, Disease Pandemics and the Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David 
Kaye, A/HRC/44/49, April 23, 2020, paras. 16, 20, 63(e-f).
    \8\ William Hurst, ``Chinese Protesters Are Out in Record Numbers. 
What Changed?,'' Monkey Cage, Washington Post, November 28, 2022; Xinlu 
Liang, ``Chinese Migrant Workers Protest amid Covid-19 Lockdowns in 
Guangzhou,'' South China Morning Post, November 15, 2022; 
``Yixueshengmen de kangzheng shike'' [The moment of struggle for 
medical students], Labor Bulletin (Gonglao Xiaobao), December 14, 2022; 
Xiaoshan Huang and Gu Ting, ``Angry Workers Clash with Police in 
Chongqing after Test-Kit Maker Fires Thousands,'' Radio Free Asia, 
January 9, 2023.
    \9\ Frederik Kelter, ``As China Doubles Down on `Zero-COVID,' Some 
Have Had Enough,'' Al Jazeera, October 13, 2022; Patricia M. Thornton, 
``Grid Meets Web: How COVID-19 Extended the Party-State's Social 
Control Capacity at the Grassroots,'' China Leadership Monitor 76, June 
7, 2023.
    \10\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong SAR, China, and Macao SAR, China, adopted by the 
Committee at its 30th Meeting (3 March 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 
22, 2023, E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 3, 2023, paras. 76-85.
    \11\ Ryan McMorrow, Sun Yu, Gloria Li, Hudson Lockett, and Primrose 
Riordan, ``China Lockdowns Reach Record Level as Coronavirus Cases 
Soar,'' Financial Times, November 22, 2022; Bruce Haring, ``China Locks 
Down More Than 232 Million, Isolates Macau Hotel as `Zero-Covid' Policy 
Continues,'' Deadline, October 30, 2022.
    \12\ Eli Friedman, ``Escape from the Closed Loop,'' Boston Review, 
November 28, 2022.
    \13\ Yvette Tan, ``China Covid: Millions Back in Lockdown as 
Beijing Doubles Down on Zero-Covid,'' BBC, October 28, 2022.
    \14\ China's Zero COVID Policy and Authoritarian Public Health 
Control, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
117th Cong. (2022) (testimony of Yanzhong Huang, Senior Fellow for 
Global Health, Council on Foreign Relations and Professor, School of 
Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University).
    \15\ Ryan McMorrow, Sun Yu, Gloria Li, Hudson Lockett, and Primrose 
Riordan, ``China Lockdowns Reach Record Level as Coronavirus Cases 
Soar,'' Financial Times, November 22, 2022; Patricia M. Thornton, 
``Grid Meets Web: How COVID-19 Extended the Party-State's Social 
Control Capacity at the Grassroots,'' China Leadership Monitor 76, June 
7, 2023.
    \16\ See, e.g., Robert Barnett, ``In Tibet, Officials' Pursuit of 
Zero-COVID Sent Tens of Thousands into Mass `Isolation' Facilities,'' 
ChinaFile, Asia Society, November 1, 2022; Lily Kuo, Lyric Li, Vic 
Chiang, and Pei-Lin Wu, ``Shanghai's Covid Siege: Food Shortages, 
Talking Robots, Starving Animals,'' Washington Post, April 15, 2022; 
Phoebe Zhang, ``Officials Apologise after Covid Lockdown Causes Food 
Shortages for Hundreds of Thousands in Chinese City,'' South China 
Morning Post, September 8, 2022; ``China Covid Lockdowns Leave 
Residents Short of Food and Essential Items,'' BBC, September 12, 2022.
    \17\ Yvette Tan, ``China Covid: Millions Back in Lockdown as 
Beijing Doubles Down on Zero-Covid,'' BBC, October 28, 2022; Robert 
Barnett, ``In Tibet, Officials' Pursuit of Zero-COVID Sent Tens of 
Thousands into Mass `Isolation' Facilities,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, 
November 1, 2022.
    \18\ Wenxin Fan, ``Xinjiang Protests of Monthslong Covid Lockdown 
Erupt After a Deadly Fire,'' Wall Street Journal, November 25, 2022.
    \19\ Minxin Pei, ``The Sudden End of Zero-Covid: An 
Investigation,'' China Leadership Monitor 75, March 1, 2023; Dake Kang, 
``Ignoring Experts, China's Sudden Zero-COVID Exit Cost Lives,'' 
Associated Press, March 24, 2023; China's Zero COVID Policy and 
Authoritarian Public Health Control, Hearing of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2022) (testimony of Rory 
Truex, Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs, 
Princeton University).
    \20\ Minxin Pei, ``The Sudden End of Zero-Covid: An 
Investigation,'' China Leadership Monitor 75, March 1, 2023; Yuen Yuen 
Ang, ``The Problem with Zero: How Xi's Pandemic Policy Created a Crisis 
for the Regime,'' Foreign Affairs, December 2, 2022; Nectar Gan, ``Xi 
Jinping Sends Warning to Anyone Who Questions China's Zero-Covid 
Policy,'' CNN, May 6, 2022.
    \21\ Ryan Woo and Tony Munroe, ``China Shortens Quarantines as It 
Eases Some of Its COVID Rules,'' Reuters, November 11, 2022.
    \22\ Minxin Pei, ``The Sudden End of Zero-Covid: An 
Investigation,'' China Leadership Monitor 75, March 1, 2023.
    \23\ Minxin Pei, ``The Sudden End of Zero-Covid: An 
Investigation,'' China Leadership Monitor 75, March 1, 2023.
    \24\ Chris Buckley, ``After Xi's Coronation, a Roar of Discontent 
against His Hard-Line Politics,'' New York Times, updated June 20, 
2023.
    \25\  William Zheng, ``How Political and Economic Pressure Led to 
Beijing's Abrupt U-Turn on Zero-Covid,'' South China Morning Post, 
January 10, 2023.
    \26\ Keith Zhai, ``Letter from Apple Supplier Foxconn's Founder 
Prodded China to Ease Zero-Covid Rules,'' Wall Street Journal, December 
8, 2022.
    \27\ Laney Zhang, ``China: Management of COVID-19 Downgraded,'' 
Global Legal Monitor, Library of Congress, January 6, 2023.
    \28\ Laney Zhang, ``China: Management of COVID-19 Downgraded,'' 
Global Legal Monitor, Library of Congress, January 6, 2023; Dake Kang, 
``Ignoring Experts, China's Sudden Zero-COVID Exit Cost Lives,'' 
Associated Press, March 24, 2023.
    \29\ Xiaoshan Huang, Chingman, Gu Ting, and Gulchehra Hoja, 
``Chinese Hospitals Seek Ventilators, Medical Supplies amid Ongoing 
COVID-19 Wave,'' Radio Free Asia, December 20, 2022; Yanzhong Huang, 
``China's Hidden COVID Catastrophe,'' Foreign Affairs, February 16, 
2023.
    \30\ Lingling Wei and Jonathan Cheng, ``Why Xi Jinping Reversed His 
Zero-Covid Policy in China,'' Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2023.
    \31\ James Glanz, Mara Hvistendahl, and Agnes Chang, ``How Deadly 
Was China's Covid Wave?,'' New York Times, February 15, 2023.
    \32\ China's Zero COVID Policy and Authoritarian Public Health 
Control, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
117th Cong. (2022) (testimony of Yanzhong Huang, Senior Fellow for 
Global Health, Council on Foreign Relations; testimony of Sarah Cook, 
Research Director for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, Freedom House; 
testimony of Rory Truex, Assistant Professor of Politics and 
International Affairs, Princeton University).
    \33\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and 
State Council General Office, Guanyu Jinyibu Wanshan Yiliao Fuwu Tixi 
de Yijian [Opinion on Further Improving the Medical Health Services 
System], March 23, 2023, sec. 1(1).
    \34\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and 
State Council General Office, Guanyu Jinyibu Wanshan Yiliao Fuwu Tixi 
de Yijian [Opinion on Further Improving the Medical Health Services 
System], March 23, 2023, sec. 1(1). See also ``Challenges Confronting 
China's Healthcare System Post-COVID: A Conversation between Winnie Yip 
and William Hsiao,'' Critical Issues Confronting China Series, Fairbank 
Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University, March 29, 2023.
    \35\ Patricia M. Thornton, ``Grid Meets Web: How COVID-19 Extended 
the Party-State's Social Control Capacity at the Grassroots,'' China 
Leadership Monitor 76, June 7, 2023; Qiao Long and Chingman, ``China to 
Hand Law Enforcement Powers to Local Officials under `Grid' System,'' 
Radio Free Asia, July 15, 2021. See also Jessica Batke, ``For China's 
Urban Residents, the Party-State Is Closer than Ever: A Q&A with Taisu 
Zhang,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, March 30, 2023.
    \36\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and 
State Council General Office, Guanyu Jinyibu Wanshan Yiliao Fuwu Tixi 
de Yijian [Opinion on Further Improving the Medical Health Services 
System], March 23, 2023, sec. 3(4).
    \37\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and 
State Council General Office, Guanyu Jinyibu Wanshan Yiliao Fuwu Tixi 
de Yijian [Opinion on Further Improving the Medical Health Services 
System], March 23, 2023, sec. 2(2).
    \38\ Guo Rui, ``Coronavirus: Why Did China's Multimillion-Dollar 
Early Warning System Fail?,'' South China Morning Post, March 13, 2020.
    \39\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and 
State Council General Office, Guanyu Jinyibu Wanshan Yiliao Fuwu Tixi 
de Yijian [Opinion on Further Improving the Medical Health Services 
System], March 23, 2023, secs. 5(1), 7.
    \40\ Steven Lee Myers and Chris Buckley, ``China Created a Fail-
Safe System to Track Contagions. It Failed.,'' New York Times, December 
22, 2020.
    \41\ U.N. Human Rights Council, ``Disease Pandemics and the Freedom 
of Opinion and Expression,'' Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, David Kaye, A/HRC/44/49, April 23, 2020. See also World 
Health Organization, World Organization for Animal Health, and U.N. 
Environment Programme, ``Reducing Public Health Risks Associated with 
the Sale of Live Wild Animals of Mammalian Species in Traditional Food 
Markets,'' April 12, 2021, 1.
    \42\ Joyu Wang and Liyan Qi, ``WHO Says China Is Undercounting 
Covid Deaths, Asks for More Reliable Data,'' Wall Street Journal, 
January 5, 2023; Ken Moritsugu and Huizhong Wu, ``Lack of Info on 
China's COVID-19 Surge Stirs Global Concern,'' Associated Press, 
December 29, 2022.
    \43\ James Glanz, Mara Hvistendahl, and Agnes Chang, ``How Deadly 
Was China's Covid Wave?,'' New York Times, February 15, 2023.
    \44\ James Glanz, Mara Hvistendahl, and Agnes Chang, ``How Deadly 
Was China's Covid Wave?,'' New York Times, February 15, 2023. See also 
Dennis Normile, ``Models Predict Massive Wave of Disease and Death If 
China Lifts `Zero COVID' Policy,'' Science 378, no. 6624 (December 6, 
2022).
    \45\ James Glanz, Mara Hvistendahl, and Agnes Chang, ``How Deadly 
Was China's Covid Wave?,'' New York Times, February 15, 2023.
    \46\ ``China Says 239 People Died from COVID-19 in June in a 
Significant Uptick,'' Associated Press, July 6, 2023.
    \47\ James Glanz, Mara Hvistendahl, and Agnes Chang, ``How Deadly 
Was China's Covid Wave?,'' New York Times, February 15, 2023.
    \48\ Wenxin Fan and Shen Lu, ``China Seeks to Write Its Own History 
of Battle with Covid-19,'' Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2023; Liyan 
Qi, ``Enforcers of China's One-Child Policy Are Now Cajoling People to 
Have Three,'' Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2023.
    \49\ Hao Tan, Jiayan Liu, and Fanrui Zeng, ``China Needs a 
Scientific Long COVID Recovery-Support Platform,'' Lancet 40, no. 
10374, (February 4, 2023).
    \50\ ``Toward a Deeper Understanding of Long COVID,'' NIH Research 
Matters, National Institutes of Health, June 6, 2023.
    \51\ Jon Cohen, ``Chinese Researchers Release Genomic Data That 
Could Help Clarify Origin of COVID-19 Pandemic,'' Science, March 29, 
2023; Jimmy Tobias, ``How the Media Botched the Raccoon Dog Theory of 
Covid-19,'' Intercept, May 10, 2023.
    \52\ Benjamin Mueller, ``W.H.O. Accuses China of Hiding Data That 
May Link Covid's Origins to Animals,'' New York Times, March 17, 2023.
    \53\ Michael Safi and Eli Block, `` `Being Truthful Is Essential': 
Scientist Who Stumbled upon Wuhan Covid Data Speaks Out,'' Guardian, 
March 27, 2023; Jon Cohen, ``Chinese Researchers Release Genomic Data 
That Could Help Clarify Origin of COVID-19 Pandemic,'' Science, March 
29, 2023.
    \54\ Benjamin Mueller, ``W.H.O. Accuses China of Hiding Data That 
May Link Covid's Origins to Animals,'' New York Times, March 17, 2023.
    \55\ Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui guanyu 
Quanmian Jinzhi Feifa Yesheng Dongwu Jiaoyi, Gechu Lan Shi Yesheng 
Dongwu Hanxi, Qieshi Baozhang Renmin Qunzhong Shengming Jiangkang 
Anquan de Jueding [National People's Congress Standing Committee 
Decision on the Comprehensive Prohibition of Illegal Wildlife Trading, 
Elimination of the Bad Habit of Excessive Eating of Wildlife, and 
Effective Protection of the People's Lives, Health and Safety], passed 
and effective February 24, 2020; State Administration for Market 
Regulation, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, and National 
Forestry and Grassland Administration, ``Fabu gonggao tingzhi zhixing 
`Guanyu Jinzhi Yesheng Dongwu Jiaoyi de Gonggao' '' [Announcement on 
the termination of the implementation of ``Announcement on the Ban of 
Wildlife Trade''], June 17, 2022. See also Amanda Whitfort, ``COVID-19 
and Wildlife Farming in China: Legislating to Protect Wild Animal 
Health and Welfare in the Wake of a Global Pandemic,'' Journal of 
Environmental Law 33, no. 1 (March 2021).
    \56\ Yang Zekun, ``Public Health Legislation Strengthened,'' China 
Daily, July 29, 2022.
    \57\ World Health Organization, World Organization for Animal 
Health, and U.N. Environment Programme, ``Reducing Public Health Risks 
Associated with the Sale of Live Wild Animals of Mammalian Species in 
Traditional Food Markets,'' April 12, 2021, 1.
    \58\ Michael Worobey, Joshua I. Levy, et al., ``The Huanan Seafood 
Wholesale Market in Wuhan Was the Early Epicenter of the COVID-19 
Pandemic,'' Science 377, no. 6609 (July 26, 2022); Xiaowei Jiang and 
Ruoqi Wang, ``Wildlife Trade Is Likely the Source of SARS-CoV-2,'' 
Science 377, no. 6609 (July 26, 2022).
    \59\ Wang Chen and Jiang Yifan, ``The Legal Proposals Shaping the 
Future of Wildlife in China,'' China Dialogue, April 3, 2020. See also 
Lingyun Xiao et al., ``Why Do We Need a Wildlife Consumption Ban in 
China?'' Current Biology 31, no. 4 (February 2, 2021).
    \60\ Gao Hucheng, NPC Environmental and Resources Protection 
Committee, ``Guanyu `Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yesheng Dongwu Baohu Fa 
(Xiuding Cao'an)' de shuoming'' [Explanation of ``PRC Wildlife 
Protection Law (Draft Amendment)''], October 13, 2020, reprinted in 
NPC, January 9, 2023; Lin Fangzhou, ``Yesheng Dongwu Baohu Fa xiuding 
Cao'an chushen: Ni zengjia fangfan gonggong weisheng fengxian neirong'' 
[First review of Wildlife Protection Law draft: Proposes to increase 
content on the prevention of public health risks], Southern 
Metropolitan Daily, October 13, 2020.
    \61\ Jiang Yifan and Aron White, ``Second Draft Revision of China's 
Wildlife Protection Law `A Big Step Backwards,' '' China Dialogue, 
October 13, 2022; ``China's Return to Wildlife Farming `A Risk to 
Global Health and Biodiversity,' '' Guardian, December 15, 2022; 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yesheng Dongwu Baohu Fa [PRC Wild Animal 
Protection Law], passed November 8, 1988, amended December 30, 2022, 
effective May 1, 2023.
    \62\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yesheng Dongwu Baohu Fa [PRC Wild 
Animal Protection Law], passed November 8, 1988, amended December 30, 
2022, effective May 1, 2023; ``China's Return to Wildlife Farming `A 
Risk to Global Health and Biodiversity,' '' Guardian, December 15, 
2022.
    \63\ Echo Xie, ``While Animal Origin of Covid-19 Remains a Mystery, 
Will Revised Law in China Help Prevent More Diseases Jumping from 
Wildlife to People?,'' South China Morning Post, January 26, 2023. See 
also Michael Standaert, ``How Effective Are China's Attempts to Reduce 
the Risk of Wildlife Spreading Disease to Humans?,'' Ensia, November 5, 
2020.
    \64\ William Hurst, ``Chinese Protesters Are Out in Record Numbers. 
What Changed?,'' Washington Post, November 28, 2022; Manfred Elfstrom, 
``Today's Protests in China Have Been Years in the Making,'' Jacobin, 
December 13, 2022; William Hurst, ``What the Protests Tell Us about 
China's Future,'' Time, December 5, 2022; Zuo Yue, ``Three Autumn 
Revolts: Breaking the Ice on China's `Anti-Lockdown Movement,' '' 
translated in Chuang (blog), January 20, 2023; Patricia M. Thornton, 
``The A4 Movement: Mapping its Background and Impact,'' China 
Leadership Monitor 75, March 1, 2023.
    \65\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 12; United 
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed June 8, 
2023. China signed and ratified the ICESCR on October 27, 1997, and 
March 27, 2001, respectively.
    \66\ Eli Friedman, ``Escape from the Closed Loop,'' Boston Review, 
November 28, 2022.
    \67\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19; United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, accessed July 15, 2023. China has signed but not 
ratified the ICCPR.
    \68\ Jody Rosen, ``How Do You Protest in the Face of Censorship? An 
Empty Sign.,'' New York Times, December 22, 2022.
    \69\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, arts. 6, 7, 11(2); 
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
accessed June 8, 2023. China signed and ratified the ICESCR on October 
27, 1997, and March 27, 2001, respectively.
    \70\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``200 Detained in Tibet's Capital Lhasa over 
COVID Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, November 3, 2022; ``Hundreds in 
Tibetan Capital Stage Rare Protest against Covid Lockdowns,'' Agence 
France-Presse, October 29, 2022.
    \71\ Chang Che and John Liu, ``Covid Lockdown Chaos Sets Off a Rare 
Protest in a Chinese City,'' New York Times, November 16, 2022.
    \72\ Jeffrey Wasserstrom, ``Mourning Becomes China,'' Atlantic, 
December 12, 2022.
    \73\ Xiaoshan Huang and Gu Ting, ``Angry Workers Clash with Police 
in Chongqing after Test-Kit Maker Fires Thousands,'' Radio Free Asia, 
January 9, 2023. See also International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 7.
    \74\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Zero Covid, Many 
Controls: Covering China in 2022,'' March 1, 2022, 2, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12.
    \75\ Zixu Wang, ``China's `Absurd' Covid Propaganda Stirs 
Rebellion,'' New York Times, September 29, 2022.
    \76\ Rights Defense Network, ``Yin kangyi guodu fangyi er zao 
xingshi juliu de Zhongyang Mei Yuan biyesheng Zhang Donghui yin 
jianchayuan chesu er wu zui huoshi'' [Criminally detained for 
protesting the extreme pandemic prevention measures, Central Academy of 
Fine Arts graduate Zhang Donghui is released without charge when the 
procuratorate withdraws lawsuit], December 10, 2022. For more 
information about Zhang Donghui, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2022-00202.
    \77\ Christian Shepherd, `` `New Tank Man': Rare Protest in Beijing 
Mars Xi Jinping's Moment,'' Washington Post, October 14, 2022.
    \78\ See, e.g., Jianyin Qiu, Bin Shen, Min Zhao, Zhen Wang, Bin 
Xie, and Yifeng Xu, ``A Nationwide Survey of Psychological Distress 
among Chinese People in the COVID-19 Epidemic: Implications and Policy 
Recommendations,'' editorial, General Psychology 33, no. 2 (2020); 
Vincent Ni and Xiaoqian Zhu, ``Covid Forces China to Face Mental Health 
Crisis a Long Time in the Making,'' Guardian, April 20, 2022; Wang 
Xiaoyu, ``Teens More Likely to Get Mental Health Issues from 
Restrictions,'' China Daily, June 9, 2022; Vivian Wang, `` `Very 
Fragile': Shanghai Wrestles with Mental Health Impact of Lockdown,'' 
New York Times, June 29, 2022; Farah Master and Xiaoyu Yin, `` `It Felt 
Like My Insides Were Crying': China COVID Curbs Hit Youth Mental 
Health,'' Reuters, August 29, 2022; Brian J. Hall, Gen Li, Wen Chen, 
Donna Shelley, and Weiming Tang, ``Prevalence of Depression, Anxiety, 
and Suicidal Ideation during the Shanghai 2022 Lockdown: A Cross-
Sectional Study,'' Journal of Affective Disorders 330 (June 2023).
    \79\ ``Mental Health After China's Prolonged Lockdowns,'' 
editorial, Lancet 399, no. 10342 (June 11, 2022).
    \80\ ``Challenges Confronting China's Healthcare System Post-COVID: 
A Conversation between Winnie Yip and William Hsiao,'' Critical Issues 
Confronting China Series, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard 
University, March 29, 2023, 44:36--48:35; Dorinda (Dinda) Elliott, 
``How a Slowing Economy--and Big Hospitals--Are Challenging Healthcare 
Reform in China,'' Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies (blog), Harvard 
University, April 9, 2023.
    \81\ See, e.g., Wang Xiaoyu, ``Teens More Likely to Get Mental 
Health Issues from Restrictions,'' China Daily, June 9, 2022; Vivian 
Wang, ``Shanghai Wrestles with Mental Health Impact of Lockdown,'' New 
York Times, June 29, 2022; Brian J. Hall, Gen Li, Wen Chen, Donna 
Shelley, and Weiming Tang, ``Prevalence of Depression, Anxiety, and 
Suicidal Ideation during the Shanghai 2022 Lockdown: A Cross-Sectional 
Study,'' Journal of Affective Disorders 330 (June 2023).
    \82\ See, e.g., Yang Caini, ``A Woman Dies in China's COVID 
Lockdown, Again,'' Sixth Tone, November 7, 2022; Xiang Kai and Han Wei, 
``Woman Hangs Herself in Makeshift Covid Quarantine Hospital,'' Caixin, 
November 24, 2022.
    \83\ ``Chinese Health Ministry Won't Release Lockdown Suicide 
Statistics amid COVID-19 Surge,'' Radio Free Asia, November 8, 2022.
    \84\ Minxin Pei, ``The Sudden End of Zero-Covid: An 
Investigation,'' China Leadership Monitor 75, March 1, 2023.
    \85\ Nicole Huang and Zixu Wang, `` `China Moves to Erase the 
Vestiges of `Zero Covid' to Deter Dissent,'' New York Times, February 
28, 2023; Ma Xiaowei, ``Laolao baowo kangyi zhanlue zhudong quan san 
nian kangji xinguan yiqing qude juedingxing shengli'' [Firmly grasp the 
initiative of the anti-epidemic strategy and achieve decisive victory 
in the three-year fight against the coronavirus epidemic], Seeking 
Truth, April 1, 2023.
    \86\ People's Daily (pseud. Zhong Sheng), ``It's Irresponsible for 
History to Ignore China's Contributions to COVID-19 Fight,'' People's 
Daily, January 9, 2023; ``Meifang ying liji tingzhi weibei kexue de 
fanzhi naoju (Zhong Sheng)'' [The U.S. side must immediately desist in 
this anti-intellectual farce that violates science (Zhong Sheng)], 
People's Daily, March 30, 2023. People's Daily notes in its January 9, 
2023, editorial that ``Zhong Sheng'' is a ``pen name often used . . . 
to express its views on foreign policy and international affairs.'' 
David Bandurski, ``Pen Names for Power Struggles,'' China Media 
Project, June 23, 2022. David Bandurski of China Media Project 
explained that ``Zhong Sheng'' is one of a number of pen names used by 
the People's Daily that encode political messaging from a Party 
department or an individual or individuals. Moreover, he added that 
``Zhong Sheng''--a homophone for ``bell tone'' and ``China's voice''--
is the ``official pen name used routinely for important pieces on 
international affairs on which the leadership wishes to register its 
often scathing view.''
    \87\ David Bandurski, ``Whitewashing China's Record on Covid,'' 
China Media Project, January 9, 2023.
    \88\ Ken Bredemeier, ``China Vows `Resolute' Crackdown as Protests 
Mount,'' Voice of America, November 30, 2022.
    \89\ Jon Cohen, ``Anywhere but Here,'' Science 377, no. 6608 
(August 16, 2022); Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Wang Wenbin's Regular Press Conference on February 15, 
2023,'' accessed February 17, 2023; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin's Regular Press Conference 
on February 16, 2023,'' accessed February 17, 2023.
    \90\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingshen Weisheng Fa [PRC Mental 
Health Law], passed October 26, 2012, effective May 1, 2013, amended 
April 27, 2018, art. 28; Zhiying Ma, ``Promises and Perils of Guan: 
Mental Healthcare and the Rise of Biopolitical Paternalism in 
Contemporary China,'' Medicine Anthropology Theory 7, no. 2 (September 
30, 2020): 162-3.
    \91\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingshen Weisheng Fa [PRC Mental 
Health Law], passed October 26, 2012, effective May 1, 2013, amended 
April 27, 2018, art. 30; Ding Chunyan, ``Involuntary Detention and 
Treatment of the Mentally Ill: China's 2012 Mental Health Law,'' 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 37, no. 6 (November--
December 2014), sec. 3.6.
    \92\ Ding Chunyan, ``Involuntary Detention and Treatment of the 
Mentally Ill: China's 2012 Mental Health Law,'' International Journal 
of Law and Psychiatry 37, no. 6 (November--December 2014), 588.
    \93\ Yanxi Mou, ``Drugged and Detained: China's Psychiatric 
Prisons,'' Safeguard Defenders, August 2022, 18-19, 25.
    \94\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2013 nian Zhongguo weiwen 
yu renquan nianzhong baogao'' [2013 year-end report on stability 
maintenance and human rights in China], February 3, 2014; Civil Rights 
& Livelihood Watch, ``2014 nian Zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan 
(bei jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao'' [2014 year-end report on mental 
health and human rights in China (forcible psychiatric commitment)], 
January 14, 2015; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2015 nian Zhongguo 
jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong zongjie'' 
[2015 year-end summary on mental health and human rights in China 
(forcible psychiatric commitment)], February 8, 2016; Civil Rights & 
Livelihood Watch, ``2016 nian Zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan 
(bei jingshenbing) nianzhong zongjie'' [2016 year-end summary on mental 
health and human rights in China (forcible psychiatric commitment)], 
January 26, 2017; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2020 Zhongguo 
jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao'' 
[2020 year-end report on mental health and human rights in China 
(forcible psychiatric commitment)], March 3, 2021.
    \95\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2022 nian Zhongguo jingshen 
jiankang yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao'' [2022 year-
end report on mental health and human rights in China (forcible 
psychiatric commitment)], April 14, 2023.
    \96\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2022 nian Zhongguo jingshen 
jiankang yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao'' [2022 year-
end report on mental health and human rights in China (forcible 
psychiatric commitment)], April 14, 2023.
    \97\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Wu Yanan yin wangshang 
yanlun bei yi jingshenbing wei you kouya'' [Wu Yanan was detained on 
the basis of mental illness due to online comments], December 16, 2022; 
Yitong Wu, ``Punishment for Supporting Protests: Philosophy Lecturer 
Sent to Psychiatric Hospital,'' Radio Free Asia, December 15, 2022; Ye 
Bing, ``Bai Zhi yundong duo ming kangyi renshi bei xingju huo chuanhuan 
weiquan lushi yiwu fayuan bei buzhe zao kongxia saorao'' [Many 
protesters from the White Paper movement have been criminally detained 
or summoned for questioning, rights defense lawyers who provided legal 
aid services to those detained have been intimidated and harassed], 
Voice of America, December 16, 2022. For more information on Wu Yanan, 
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00205.
    \98\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Ding Yan zhixin Xi Jinping 
bei songru jingshenbing yuan'' [Ding Yan sends letter to Xi Jinping, 
and is forcibly committed to a psychiatric institution], June 8, 2022; 
Rights Defense Network, ``Xunzhao bei Zhonggong dangju qiangzhi song 
jingshenbing yuan hou qiangpo shizong de Jiangsu Nanjing nu renquan 
hanweizhe Ding Yan qingkuang de tongbao'' [Situation report regarding 
search for Nanjing, Jiangsu female human rights defender Ding Yan, who 
was forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital by Chinese Communist 
Party authorities and later forcibly disappeared], June 23, 2022; `` 
`Gei Xi Jinping xie gongkai xin `bei jingshenbing' hou you `bei 
shizong' '' [``Forcibly disappeared'' after being ``forcibly 
committed'' for writing an open letter to Xi Jinping], Radio Free Asia, 
June 23, 2022. For more information about Ding Yan, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00126.
    \99\ Hao Yao, Jingjing Huang, and Yifeng Xu, ``10-Year Review of 
China's Mental Health Law: A Call for Action to Promote Human Rights in 
Mental Health,'' Lancet Psychiatry 10, no. 2 (January 29, 2023): 80-81; 
Yarong Ma, Jie Zhang, Robert Rosenheck, and Hongbo He, ``Why Did 
China's Mental Health Law Have a Limited Effect on Decreasing Rates of 
Involuntary Hospitalization?,'' International Journal of Mental Health 
Systems 16, no. 1 (July 2, 2022): 1-2.
    \100\ Bo Chen, Mental Health Law in China: A Socio-Legal Analysis 
(Routledge, New York: 2023), 99.
    \101\ Hao Yao, Jingjing Huang, and Yifeng Xu, ``10-Year Review of 
China's Mental Health Law: A Call for Action to Promote Human Rights in 
Mental Health,'' Lancet Psychiatry 10, no. 2 (January 29, 2023): 80-81.
    \102\ U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
Concluding Observations on the Combined Second and Third Periodic 
Reports of China, CRPD/C/CHN/CO/2-3, October 10, 2022, paras. 32-33.
    \103\ Repression has been notable against HIV/AIDS activists, 
including Wan Yanhai, Hu Jia, Gao Yaojie, and the late Wang Shuping. 
See, e.g., Joe Amon, ``The Truth of China's Response to HIV/AIDS,'' Los 
Angeles Times, July 11, 2010; Tania Branigan, ``HIV/Aids Activist Flees 
China for US,'' Guardian, May 10, 2010; Jonathan Watts, ``Profile: Wan 
Yanhai, Director of the Aizhixing Institute of Health Education,'' 
Lancet 364, (July 3, 2004); ``Public Security Officials Detain Activist 
Hu Jia, Intensify Surveillance of Others,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, May 5, 2008; Yibing Feng, ``Beijing Banner Protest 
Ripples Outward as China Maintains Silence,'' Voice of America, October 
20, 2022; Kathleen McLaughlin, ``The AIDS Granny in Exile,'' Buzzfeed 
News, December 1, 2013; Emily Langer, ``Shuping Wang, Whistleblower Who 
Exposed China's HIV/AIDS Crisis, Dies at 59,'' Washington Post, 
September 25, 2019; Wang Shuping, ``How I Discovered the HIV Epidemic 
and What Happened to Me Afterwards,'' China Change, September 27, 2012; 
``[404 wenku] 1995-2020: Zaoyaozhemen'' [(404 archive) 1995-2000: The 
Rumormongers], China Digital Times, February 13, 2020.
    \104\ Susan Jakes, ``My Meeting with Jiang Yanyong, the Chinese 
Doctor Who Dared Speak the Truth about SARS,'' NPR, March 18, 2023; Amy 
Qin, ``Jiang Yanyong, Who Helped Expose China's SARS Crisis, Dies at 
91,'' New York Times, March 14, 2023.
    \105\ Yanzhong Huang, ``The SARS Epidemic and Its Aftermath in 
China: A Political Perspective,'' in eds. Stacey Knobler et al., 
Institute of Medicine, Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next 
Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary (National Academies Press, 
Washington, D.C.: 2004): 123-24.
    \106\ Amy Qin, ``Jiang Yanyong, Who Helped Expose China's SARS 
Crisis, Dies at 91,'' New York Times, March 14, 2023.
    \107\ Josephine Ma, ``Chinese Military Surgeon Who Blew the Whistle 
on Sars Cover-Up Dies at 91,'' South China Morning Post, March 13, 
2023; Joseph Kahn, ``SARS Doctor Barred from Leaving China,'' New York 
Times, July 13, 2007.
    \108\ Pu Zhiqiang (@puzhiqiang), ``Ganggang de zhi, Jiang Yanyong 
xiansheng zuotian xianshi, ganen ta wei shiren zuo de yiqie . . ..'' 
[I've only just learned that Mr. Jiang Yanyong passed away yesterday, I 
thank him for everything he did for the world . . ..], Twitter, March 
13, 2023, 1:20 a.m.
    \109\ William Farris (@wafarris), ``The death of SARS whistleblower 
Jiang Yanyong shows how Baidu's censorship has changed over time . . 
..'' Twitter, March 18, 2023, 10:30 p.m.
    \110\ Josephine Ma, ``Chinese Military Surgeon Who Blew the Whistle 
on Sars Cover-Up Dies at 91,'' South China Morning Post, March 13, 
2023; Amelia Loi and Gu Ting, ``Chinese Authorities Censor Funeral of 
Military Doctor Who Broke Silence on SARS,'' Radio Free Asia, March 14, 
2023.
    \111\ Amy Qin, ``Jiang Yanyong, Who Helped Expose China's SARS 
Crisis, Dies at 91,'' New York Times, March 14, 2023; Joel Keep and 
David Heslop, ``Detention of Citizen Journalists Who Reported on the 
Outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan,'' letter, Global Biosecurity 5, no. 1 
(April 2023).
    \112\ Han Qian, ``Beiqing shen yidu: shou xunjie de Wuhan yisheng: 
11 tian hou bei bingren chuanran zhu jin geli bingfang'' [Beiqing in-
depth: disciplined Wuhan doctor: 11 days later, he was infected by a 
patient and isolated in quarantine unit], Beijing Youth Daily, 
reprinted in China Digital Times, January 27, 2020; ``Minitrue: Delete 
`Disciplined Doctor Now in Isolation Ward,' '' China Digital Times, 
January 30, 2020.
    \113\ Muyi Xiao et al., ``How a Chinese Doctor Who Warned of Covid-
19 Spent His Final Days,'' New York Times, October 6, 2022. The 
government later rescinded the official reprimand of Li Wensheng and 
named him a national ``model healthcare worker'' and martyr. Consul-
General of the PRC in Sydney, Australia, ``The Truth on the So-Called 
China Covering-Up the COVID-19 and Therefore Delaying Other Country's 
Response--Reality Check of US Allegations against China on COVID-19 
(III),'' May 10, 2020.
    \114\ Muyi Xiao et al., ``How a Chinese Doctor Who Warned of Covid-
19 Spent His Final Days,'' New York Times, October 6, 2022.
    \115\ Muyi Xiao et al.,``How a Chinese Doctor Who Warned of Covid-
19 Spent His Final Days,'' New York Times, October 6, 2022.
    \116\ Muyi Xiao et al., ``How a Chinese Doctor Who Warned of Covid-
19 Spent His Final Days,'' New York Times, October 6, 2022.
    \117\ Muyi Xiao et al., ``How a Chinese Doctor Who Warned of Covid-
19 Spent His Final Days,'' New York Times, October 6, 2022. See also 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report 
(Washington: March 2022), 191.
    \118\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Jiashu huijian le Cheng 
Yuan bing gongkai panjueshu'' [Family members met with Cheng Yuan, also 
made public court decision], June 14, 2023; U.N. Human Rights Council, 
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its 
eighty-seventh session, 27 April--1 May 2020, Opinion No. 11/2020 
concerning Cheng Yuan, Liu Dazhi and Wu Gejianxiong (China). For more 
information on Cheng Yuan, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2019-00300.
    \119\ Rights Defense Network, ``Henan renquan hanweizhe Li Xin, He 
Fangmei fufu shuangshuang ru yu jin liang nian, qi san weicheng nian 
zinu renquan jingquang kanyou'' [Henan human rights defenders Li Xin 
and He Fangmei, a husband and wife, both have been imprisoned for two 
years, their three minor children's human rights conditions are 
worrying], August 9, 2022.
    \120\ Changsha Funeng et al., ``Joint Letter Urges Freeing of 
Activist He Fangmei's Children,'' July 8, 2023; Dai Ju, `` `Yimiao 
Baobao zhi Jia' faqiren He Fangmei an chaoqi jiya reng wei panjue: nuer 
zhi jin zhiliao jingshenbing yuan'' [``Vaccine Babies' Home'' founder 
He Fangmei's case of prolonged detention without a verdict: her 
daughter is stranded in a psychiatric hospital], NGOCN, February 1, 
2023. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database records 2016-00297 on Li Xin and 2019-00185 on He Fangmei.
    \121\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``As Party Congress Looms, 
Dissidents Languish and Party Ramps Up Ideological Control,'' October 
5, 2022; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Ji Xiaolong yin changdao 
minzhong hujiu bei qubao houshen'' [Ji Xiaolong is released on 
guarantee pending investigation for advocating that the masses rescue 
each other], May 2, 2022; William Nee, ``Xi Jinping Has Critics in 
China. They Have Paid a Steep Price.,'' Diplomat, October 14, 2022. For 
more information on Ji Xiaolong, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2018-00526.
    \122\ Qi Desai and Cheryl Tung, ``Shanghai Police Detain Zero-COVID 
Critic Who Called on Local Leader to Resign,'' Radio Free Asia, 
September 2, 2022.
    \123\ Keith Bradsher and Chang Che, ``China's New Premier Needs to 
Revive Growth. How Far Will Loyalty Get Him?,'' New York Times, March 
13, 2023.

The Environment and Climate Change

The Environment and Climate Change

                   The Environment and Climate Change

                                Findings

         While China's leaders pledged to prioritize 
        efforts to protect the environment and to realize their 
        carbon emissions targets, observers raised doubts about 
        the People's Republic of China's (PRC) ability to 
        achieve senior officials' climate goals. According to 
        scholars, the PRC government views a leadership role in 
        international environmental governance as one route to 
        achieving global leadership. PRC officials have used 
        their ``ecological civilization'' framework--under 
        which they seek to ``selectively . . . achieve [their] 
        environmental goals''--to strengthen authoritarian 
        governance.
         In 2022, the PRC government approved the 
        highest number of new coal-powered energy plants in 
        seven years, increasing the country's coal power 
        capacity by more than 50 percent from the previous 
        year. According to international observers, China's 
        substantial increase in coal plant construction 
        threatened global climate efforts. China's high levels 
        of air pollutants contributed to negative health 
        effects, including stillbirths and premature death.
         China remained the world's leading emitter of 
        CO2, with emissions rising four percent to 
        reach a record high in the first quarter of 2023. China 
        also remained the world's leading emitter of methane, 
        which is 25 times more potent than carbon dioxide as a 
        greenhouse gas. China has not signed the Global Methane 
        Pledge to cut methane emissions 30 percent by 2030.
         China experienced many extreme weather events 
        this past year, including a heatwave, drought, heavy 
        rainfall and floods, and sandstorms, that experts 
        linked to climate change.
         China's distant water fishing (DWF) fleet was 
        reportedly involved in illegal, unreported, and 
        unregulated fishing practices that threaten ocean 
        ecosystems and wildlife populations, as well as 
        economic livelihoods.
         Although PRC authorities continued to suppress 
        civil society on a range of issues that authorities 
        deem politically sensitive, environmental 
        nongovernmental organizations have remained viable 
        platforms for education and advocacy. Nevertheless, 
        environmental advocacy in China has narrowed as 
        organizations strategically focus their work within the 
        bounds of government policy narratives or pursue 
        collaboration with local governments.
         In January 2023, the Supreme People's Court 
        issued ten guiding cases for environmental public 
        interest litigation (PIL). The procuratorate has a key 
        role in prosecuting environmental PIL cases, which 
        requires navigating between local government resistance 
        to environmental protection standards and holding 
        agencies environmentally accountable. Scholars have 
        observed that the procuratorate's ``reliance on top-
        down political support may ultimately hinder [PIL's] 
        expansion and stability.''

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Call on the PRC government to release environmental 
        advocates and to cease its censorship of environmental 
        reporting and follow international standards on freedom 
        of speech, association, and assembly, including those 
        contained in the International Covenant on Civil and 
        Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human 
        Rights, and China's Constitution. Highlight to Chinese 
        officials the important role that civil society and 
        independent media, including the foreign media, can 
        play in strengthening environmental monitoring, 
        transparency, and improving the environment.
          In meetings with Chinese officials, raise the 
        detentions of environmental advocates Dorje Dragtsal, 
        Sengdra, Rinchen Namdrol, Tsultrim Gonpo, Jangchub 
        Ngodrub, Dongye, Sogru Abu, and Namse.
          Build global coalitions with allies and partners to 
        address forced labor in the solar power and critical 
        mineral supply chains, and press the PRC to end 
        sanctions on research institutes and individual 
        scholars, allowing them to continue important 
        environmental work in China.
          Call on the PRC government to abide by international 
        environmental and human rights standards in Chinese-
        owned distant water fishing (DWF) operations, and to 
        cooperate with individual nations and international 
        bodies in protecting fish stocks and protecting 
        endangered species in the world's oceans.
          Consider legislation that requires proof of 
        provenance for seafood imports--especially from regions 
        heavily fished by China's distant water fishing fleet.
          Call on the PRC government to cooperate with the 
        United States and other countries to implement the 
        goals spelled out in the ``U.S.-China Joint Glasgow 
        Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s,'' 
        the Glasgow Climate Pact, and other agreements like the 
        2023 Sunnylands Agreement, and to measurably reduce 
        China's carbon emissions in order to meet its ``dual-
        carbon'' pledge of having carbon emissions peak by 2030 
        and to become carbon neutral by 2060.
          Encourage Chinese officials to invest in lower-
        emission sources of energy and to provide incentives to 
        local governments to transition from coal to lower-
        emission sources of energy.
          Call on the PRC government to provide great 
        transparency in emissions data.
          Call on the PRC government to end its financing of 
        nonrenewable energy projects abroad, including those 
        projects implemented through the Belt and Road 
        Initiative.
          Support efforts by Chinese and U.S. groups working to 
        use satellite analysis and remote sensing to monitor 
        environmental problems and supply chains in China.
          Recognize China as a developed country in 
        international agreements and organizations and hold it 
        accountable to associated commitments it has made.

The Environment and Climate Change

The Environment and Climate Change

                   The Environment and Climate Change

                              Introduction

    Statements from the United Nations reflect an emerging 
global consensus on the need for collective action to protect 
the environment.\1\ In July 2022, based on the resolution of 
the U.N. Human Rights Council in October 2021, the U.N. General 
Assembly adopted a resolution declaring access to ``a clean, 
healthy, and sustainable environment'' a universal human right, 
and called upon states, international organizations, and 
business enterprises to ``scale up efforts'' to ensure a clean, 
healthy and sustainable environment for all.\2\ China was among 
eight countries that abstained from voting on the 
resolution.\3\ Previously, in November 2021, Chinese Communist 
Party General Secretary Xi Jinping wrote to the United Nations 
COP26 climate summit in support of multilateral consensus and 
cooperation on climate change, and said ``China will continue 
to prioritize ecological conservation and pursue a green low-
carbon path to development.'' \4\ China has ratified the 2015 
Paris Agreement on climate change and is a party to the U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.\5\
    While China's leaders pledged to prioritize efforts to 
protect the environment and to realize their carbon emissions 
targets,\6\ observers raised doubts about their ability to 
achieve the country's climate goals.\7\ In his opening speech 
for the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
in October 2022, Xi Jinping pledged to prioritize environmental 
protection and conservation, and to promote green 
development.\8\ Scholars Judith Shapiro and Yifei Li observed 
that the PRC government views a leadership role in 
international environmental governance as one route to 
achieving global leadership.\9\ According to Shapiro and Li, 
the PRC's ``ecological civilization'' framework serves to 
strengthen authoritarian governance in China and export it 
abroad, in addition to achieving environmental goals.\10\

                   Legal Developments and Guidelines

    Observers wrote that China is pursuing conflicting goals 
for environmental protection and economic growth. While PRC 
central authorities have continued to pass and submit laws, 
issue restrictions, and strengthen the role of courts in 
environmental protection, analysts have written that the PRC's 
economic and environmental goals remain in conflict, that near-
term goals are insufficiently ambitious to fulfill long-range 
commitments, and that PRC actions abroad in Belt and Road 
Initiative projects may worsen climate change.\11\ Climate 
experts interviewed by an environmental news organization 
expressed concerns about China's ability to decarbonize in 
light of challenges posed by uncertain growth, its focus on 
energy security, and geopolitical contention.\12\
    Government actions in the past year aimed at environmental 
protection included the following:

         In February 2023, the Supreme People's Court 
        issued an opinion instructing lower courts to 
        prioritize environmental protection when selecting and 
        deciding cases, in order to ``guide'' corporate 
        behavior according to official carbon reduction 
        goals.\13\
         The revised PRC Wildlife Protection Law, 
        effective May 31, 2023, tightened prohibitions on the 
        sale, consumption, transport, and hunting of wild 
        animals.\14\ Biologists and animal protection 
        advocates, however, say that significant loopholes in 
        the law allow the commercial use and captive breeding 
        of wildlife, which creates the conditions for the 
        potential emergence and transmission of zoonotic 
        disease to humans.\15\ China has been a party to the 
        Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
        of Wild Fauna and Flora since 1981.\16\
         The PRC Yellow River Protection Law, effective 
        April 1, 2023, aims to protect ecological and water 
        resources in the Yellow River basin, with special 
        emphasis on limiting groundwater use.\17\ Regional 
        overreliance on Yellow River groundwater has caused 
        significant ecological degradation and resource 
        depletion.\18\ The law stipulates that groundwater 
        withdrawal shall not exceed amounts set by local 
        governments, in accordance with amounts set by 
        provincial and national-level authorities.\19\ 
        Previously, the PRC's Yellow River Conservancy 
        Commission reportedly raised concerns about the 
        deteriorating quality of the river's water, citing 
        ``grave'' pollution.\20\
         The PRC Black Soil Protection Law, effective 
        August 1, 2022, aims to protect arable land with black 
        humus topsoil in four northeastern provincial-level 
        regions, largely in order to ``safeguard national food 
        security.'' \21\ According to reporting by Bloomberg, 
        Mao-era deforestation policies resulted in a steep 
        decline in black soil quality, posing a threat to food 
        production.\22\ Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized 
        the importance of food security, partly in response to 
        global uncertainty.\23\

                             Climate Change

    In March 2023, the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change warned that the window of opportunity to limit global 
warming to within 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) 
of pre-industrial levels was closing, and that humanity must 
achieve ``deep, rapid, and sustained'' reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2030.\24\ China remained the world's leading 
emitter of CO2, with emissions rising four percent 
to a record high in the first quarter of 2023.\25\ The PRC also 
remained the world's leading emitter of methane, which is 25 
times more potent than carbon dioxide as a greenhouse gas.\26\ 
China, however, has not signed the Global Methane Pledge to cut 
methane emissions 30 percent by 2030.\27\
    This past year, Chinese leaders took what analysts called a 
``cautious approach'' to the country's commitments to reducing 
carbon emissions.\28\ Even as officials reaffirmed the 
country's commitment to reaching carbon neutrality,\29\ and the 
country invested in low-carbon energy sources,\30\ authorities 
remained reliant on coal power, including to generate 
electricity, threatening China's climate commitments.\31\ At 
the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Xi Jinping reaffirmed 
his 2020 dual-carbon pledge, without mentioning the previously 
stated dates of reaching peak carbon emissions before 2030 and 
carbon neutrality before 2060, and emphasized support for 
environmental protection while continuing to use coal as a 
source of energy.\32\ Xi Jinping also pledged that China would 
use coal more efficiently, diversify its energy sources, and 
ensure the security of its energy supply.\33\
    In 2022, authorities approved the highest number of new 
coal-powered energy plants in seven years, about two per week, 
increasing the country's coal power capacity by more than 50 
percent from the previous year.\34\ China's carbon emissions, 
which in recent years have accounted for around 31 percent of 
the global total, were still rising as of December 2022.\35\ 
According to international observers, China's substantial 
increase in coal plant construction threatens global climate 
efforts.\36\ According to the results of the 2023 Climate 
Change Performance Index, China's plans to increase coal 
production by 2030 by over five percent (compared to 2019) are 
incompatible with the goal of containing global warming within 
1.5 degrees Celsius.\37\
    China experienced numerous extreme weather events in 2022 
and 2023 that the World Meteorological Organization and others 
have linked to climate change.\38\ Events observers linked to 
climate change included a heatwave in summer 2022; \39\ 
droughts that affected 5.5 million people in July 2022; \40 
\heavy rainfall and floods in summer 2022; \41\ and sandstorms 
in early 2023.\42\

                             AIR POLLUTION

    China continued to experience high levels of air pollution, 
contributing to negative health effects, including stillbirths 
and premature death.\43\ Over one million people are estimated 
to die each year from the effects of ambient air pollution in 
China.\44\ Studies found that exposure to particulate air 
pollution caused a significant increase in cardiopulmonary and 
cardiorespiratory conditions, sometimes resulting in death, and 
one study showed a link between particulate air pollution and 
the deaths of children under five years old.\45\ Researchers 
estimated that exposure to air pollution in China has caused 
64,000 stillbirths a year.\46\
    During the annual meetings of the National People's 
Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
(``Two Sessions'') in March 2023, then Premier Li Keqiang 
claimed that municipalities at or above the prefectural level 
experienced good or excellent air quality in 86.5 percent of 
the days over the previous five years.\47\ The Ministry of 
Ecology and Environment (MEE) reported that air quality in 
these municipalities had decreased, however, in the first two 
months of 2023, compared to the previous year.\48\ In addition, 
during the Two Sessions, Beijing municipality and its 
surrounding areas experienced moderate to severe levels of air 
pollution, in what Bloomberg reported was the worst air quality 
to affect the meetings in at least a decade.\49\
    Evidence indicates that air pollution originating in 
mainland China has spread to Taiwan and South Korea. In 
February 2023, air pollution from mainland China caused 50 
``orange alerts'' in Taiwan, indicating unhealthy air quality 
levels.\50\ A study published by the European non-profit 
organization Centre for Economic Policy Research in February 
2023 showed a strong link between increased mortality in South 
Korea and air pollution coming from China.\51\

                CHALLENGES IN PROTECTING WATER SECURITY

    Recognized by the United Nations as a human right,\52\ 
equitable access to safe and clean drinking water is a stated 
policy priority of the PRC government,\53\ which reportedly 
views water security as a means of maintaining social stability 
and establishing political legitimacy.\54\ Despite the 
government's efforts to enhance ecological protection and 
reduce water pollution, including, for instance, a World Bank-
assisted project covering parts of the Yangtze River basin, 
citizens continued to face difficulties accessing water.\55\ 
The Yangtze River spans ``19 provinces and provides the main 
source of water for almost 600 million people.'' \56\ It is, 
however, severely polluted with plastic debris, chemicals, 
heavy metals, and waste from factories, agricultural 
production, and local communities.\57\ Water shortages in the 
river's middle and downstream areas were exacerbated by a 
heatwave-induced drought during the summer of 2022,\58\ an 
extreme weather event that emerged from China's history of 
ground temperature increase at a rate above the global 
average.\59\ Experts warned that ``China is on the brink of a 
water catastrophe,'' especially should a multiyear drought 
occur.\60\ [For information on the Yellow River and the PRC 
Yellow River Protection Law, see ``Legal Developments and 
Guidelines'' in this chapter.]

                         IMPACT OF CHINESE DAMS

    Dams built by the PRC government, both in China and abroad, 
continued to contribute to environmental damage and rights 
violations.\61\ The PRC government's widespread buildup of dams 
along the Mekong River on both sides of China's border has 
contributed to flooding, drought, rapidly changing water 
levels, destruction of fish populations, and loss of 
sediment.\62\ These environmental shifts in the region have 
also adversely affected local communities in countries such as 
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, creating food 
insecurity, forced relocation, and low harvests for farmers and 
fishers.\63\ Beyond Southeast Asia, PRC dam projects have 
caused environmental and social damage in Latin America, as 
evidenced by a report submitted to the U.N. Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in February 2023 by the 
International Service for Human Rights and a coalition of Latin 
American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).\64\ The report 
documents environmental and social violations of 14 Chinese 
infrastructure projects in the region, including the impact of 
the PRC government's hydroelectric complex on the Santa Cruz 
River, which was reportedly rushed through construction without 
a thorough environmental impact study.\65\ One of the NGOs 
noted that local communities had not consented to the 
construction of additional dams, telling the news organization 
Dialogo Chino: ``The communities have said many times that they 
don't want more dams in the region.'' \66\ [For more 
information about Chinese development projects abroad, see 
Chapter 20--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.]


------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Chinese Distant Water Fishing Fleet
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The Chinese distant-water fishing (DWF) fleet was reportedly involved
 in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing practices that
 threatened ocean ecosystems and wildlife populations, as well as
 economic livelihoods.\67\ A report by Mongabay, an international non-
 profit conservation and environmental news platform, which was based on
 interviews with dozens of former employees of Dalian Ocean Fishing,
 found that the partially state-owned fishing company conducted illegal
 shark finning operations.\68\ According to reports from this and
 previous years, Chinese DWF vessels also have targeted endangered and
 protected marine life, including sharks, dolphins, turtles, and
 seals.\69\ The PRC reportedly uses the Chinese fishing vessels to
 project state power and influence,\70\ and the Chinese DWF fleet--the
 largest in the world\71\--is heavily subsidized by the Chinese
 government.\72\ According to the Environmental Justice Foundation,
 ``China's state subsidies have allowed the grossly overcapacity fleet
 to exploit the waters of developing nations that rely on marine
 resources for livelihoods and food security.'' \73\ [For information on
 forced labor in the Chinese distant water fishing fleet, see Chapter
 10--Human Trafficking.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                          Wildlife Protection

    The revised PRC Wildlife Protection Law (WPL), effective 
May 1, 2023, tightens restrictions on illegal wildlife trade 
and strengthens wild animal habitats and the rescue and 
breeding of endangered wildlife.\74\ The amended WPL also urges 
internet platforms to enforce a zero tolerance policy against 
illegal wildlife trade, and aims to hold logistics companies 
accountable for illegal involvement in shipping wildlife 
products.\75\ During this reporting year, the Commission 
observed reports of wildlife from Africa, South America, and 
Southeast Asia sent to China as part of the illegal wildlife 
trade.\76\ Mongabay described such trade between South America 
and China as ``a lucrative trade, fueled by corruption,'' and 
affiliated with illicit entrepreneurs and criminal 
networks.\77\

      Environmental Advocacy Despite Suppression of Civil Society

    With PRC authorities continuing to suppress civil society 
on a range of issues that authorities deem politically 
sensitive, environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) 
have remained viable platforms for education and advocacy.\78\ 
Nevertheless, environmental advocacy in China has narrowed as 
organizations strategically focus their work within the bounds 
of government policy narratives\79\ or in collaboration with 
local governments.\80\ Some ENGOs have shifted from monitoring 
air quality to collecting carbon emissions data to aid in 
climate governance, in spite of challenges in obtaining 
data.\81\ ENGOs also have collected evidence and pressured 
local officials through public interest lawsuits and public 
calls for action,\82\ but their efforts to file environmental 
public interest cases have been obstructed by the costs 
associated with such cases and hurdles in establishing standing 
as plaintiffs.\83\
    Citizens continued to raise concerns related to the 
environment through public advocacy. In July 2022, residents of 
Huludao municipality, Liaoning province, turned to an 
unofficial approach to express their grievances as their 
official petitions to the local government were disregarded\84\ 
and their plans to protest resulted in police summonses.\85\ In 
collaboration with the performance artist ``Nut Brother,'' \86\ 
residents called a public pay phone in Beijing municipality on 
July 9 and 10,\87\ and described serious pollution in Huludao 
and its health effects, to volunteers and others in Beijing who 
answered the phone.\88\ Nut Brother has staged multiple 
environmental performance art events in China,\89\ and 
conceptualized the project as a way to bring Huludao's 
residents' voices to the center of Chinese politics.\90\ 
Huludao officials held a press conference on July 20 in 
response to publicly reported air pollution, promising to 
monitor and regulate emissions produced by local companies.\91\ 
Authorities reportedly also detained a Huludao resident for 24 
hours, after which she posted a video repudiating her 
statements in prior videos about local pollution.\92\ In 
November 2022, Nut Brother reportedly suspended his performance 
art activity due to pressure from local authorities.\93\

      State-led Model of Environmental Public Interest Litigation

    The National People's Congress formalized the environmental 
public interest litigation (PIL) system in 2017, authorizing 
lawsuits against government agencies and private parties, for 
violating the national and public interest.\94\ In January 
2023, the Supreme People's Court issued ten guiding cases for 
environmental PIL, aimed at guiding courts in conducting fair 
trials and increasing judicial protection of the environment by 
addressing such issues as pollution, illegal mining, destroying 
forests, and protecting natural relics.\95\ The procuratorate 
has a key role in prosecuting environmental PIL cases,\96\ 
which requires the agency to navigate a ``delicate balance'' 
between local government resistance to environmental protection 
standards and holding agencies environmentally accountable, 
according to scholars who authored a report on procuratorate-
led PIL published this past year.\97\ Yet, these scholars also 
observed that the procuratorate's ``reliance on top-down 
political support may ultimately hinder [PIL's] expansion and 
stability.'' \98\ Another obstacle to environmental PIL is the 
vague criteria for determining the type and scope of 
environmental public interest cases, contributing to the 
hesitance of procuratorate offices ``to file public interest 
litigation against ambiguous acts of pollution and damage to 
the ecology.'' \99\

The Environment and Climate Change

The Environment and Climate Change

    Notes to Chapter 13--The Environment and Climate Change

    \1\ The Human Right to a Clean, Healthy and Sustainable 
Environment, adopted by U.N. Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/RES/
48/13 of October 8, 2021, 1-3. In October 2021, the U.N. Human Rights 
Council for the first time recognized ``the right to a clean, healthy 
and sustainable environment as a human right that is important for the 
enjoyment of human rights.'' U.N. Human Rights Council, The Right to a 
Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment: Non-Toxic Environment--
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights 
Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and 
Sustainable Environment, David R. Boyd, A/HRC/49/53, January 12, 2022, 
paras. 1, 6, 29; ``Access to a Healthy Environment, Declared a Human 
Right by UN Rights Council,'' U.N. News, October 8, 2021. See also U.N. 
General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of 
Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, 
Healthy and Sustainable Environment, John H. Knox, A/73/188, July 19, 
2018, paras. 19, 42, 59.
    \2\ The Human Right to a Clean, Healthy and Sustainable 
Environment, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 76/300 of July 
28, 2022; U.N. / GA Resolution Right to Clean Environment, U.N. 
Audiovisual Library, July 28, 2022; ``UN General Assembly Declares 
Access to Clean and Healthy Environment a Universal Human Right,'' U.N. 
News, July 28, 2022.
    \3\ United Nations Meeting Coverage, ``With 161 Votes in Favour, 8 
Abstentions, General Assembly Adopts Landmark Resolution Recognizing 
Clean, Healthy, Sustainable Environment as Human Right,'' GA/12437, 
July 28, 2022. According to a U.N. press release, ``The representative 
of China said her country's national human rights action plan includes 
a section on environmental rights. China recognizes the aspirations of 
the co-sponsors to promote discussions on environmental matters; 
however, there is no agreement on the right to the environment--
specifically, on its definition and relationship to other human rights. 
She requested more time, patience and efforts to avoid undue haste, 
expressing concern that a reference to common but differentiated 
responsibilities was not included in the text. For such reasons, China 
abstained.''
    \4\ Xi Jinping, ``Full Text of Xi Jinping's Statement at COP26 
Climate Summit,'' Nikkei Asia, November 2, 2021.
    \5\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XXVII, Environment, 
Paris Agreement, accessed August 25, 2023; Gregor Erbach and Ulrich 
Jochheim, ``China's Climate Change Policies: State of Play Ahead of 
COP27,'' European Parliamentary Research Service, October 2022, 2. As 
described in the European Parliamentary Research Service report, 
``[China] belongs to the non-Annex I group of developing countries, 
which have less strict requirements and are entitled to support from 
the developed countries listed in Annex I of the convention. Nationally 
determined contributions (NDC) set out parties' targets and commitments 
to climate action with updates every five years.'' See also State 
Council Information Office, ``Full Text: Responding to Climate Change: 
China's Policies and Actions,'' October 27, 2021; Hongqiao Liu and 
Xiaoying You, ``Q&A: What Does China's New Paris Agreement Pledge Mean 
for Climate Change?,'' Carbon Brief, December 16, 2021; Lindsay 
Maizland, ``Global Climate Agreements: Successes and Failures,'' 
Council on Foreign Relations, updated November 4, 2022; Jon Greenberg, 
``Is the Paris Climate Agreement Easier on China and India Than on the 
US?,'' PolitiFact, Poynter Institute, January 26, 2021. The Paris 
Agreement obliges participating countries to set their own goals and 
publicly report their progress but lacks concrete enforcement 
mechanisms. China's most recent NDC submission reaffirms Xi Jinping's 
pledge at the U.N. General Assembly in September 2020 to have China's 
carbon dioxide emissions peak before 2030 and to achieve carbon 
neutrality (net-zero emissions) before 2060. The submission did not 
give a specific date for peak emissions, and some observers expressed 
disappointment that the submission did not contain more aggressive 
targets.
    \6\ State Council, ``Report on the Work of the Government,'' March 
5, 2023. In March 2023, then Premier Li Keqiang called for controlling 
pollution, protecting and restoring ecosystems, improving policies for 
``green development,'' advancing energy conservation and carbon 
reduction, as well as using resources efficiently. Echo Xie, `` `Two 
Sessions' 2023: China Puts Spotlight Back on Fossil Fuel and Emission 
Targets for Post-Covid Rebound,'' South China Morning Post, March 7, 
2023. Similarly, Zhang Endi, vice chairman of the China Zhi Gong Party 
Central Standing Committee, said that achieving carbon neutrality 
requires an energy revolution, technological revolution, and a gradual 
move from fossil energy to non-fossil energy. Pang Xinshan, ``Zhang 
Endi: Goujian xiandai nengyuan tixi tongchou tuijin tan dafeng tan 
zhonghe'' [Zhang Endi: Building a modern energy system, coordinating 
the promotion of peak carbon emissions and carbon neutrality], People's 
Daily, March 7, 2023.
    \7\ Echo Xie, `` `Two Sessions' 2023: China Puts Spotlight Back on 
Fossil Fuel and Emission Targets for Post-Covid Rebound,'' South China 
Morning Post, March 7, 2023.
    \8\ Xi Jinping, ``Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist 
Country in All Respects: Report to the 20th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China,'' October 16, 2022, 12, 19, 43-45; David 
Stanway, ``Xi Jinping Vows to Prioritize Environment, Protect Nature 
and Promote Green Lifestyles,'' Reuters, October 16, 2022.
    \9\ Judith Shapiro and Yifei Li, ``China's Coercive 
Environmentalism Revisited: Climate Governance, Zero Covid and the Belt 
and Road,'' International Quarterly for Asian Studies 53, no. 3 
(November 9, 2022): 335.
    \10\ Judith Shapiro and Yifei Li, ``China's Coercive 
Environmentalism Revisited: Climate Governance, Zero Covid and the Belt 
and Road,'' International Quarterly for Asian Studies 53, no. 3 
(November 9, 2022): 327-28, 333. Shapiro and Li found that the Chinese 
government has used the framework of ``ecological civilization'' to 
``selectively to achieve its environmental goals'' while promoting 
obedience to the state. See also Yifei Li and Judith Shapiro, China 
Goes Green: Coercive Environmentalism for a Troubled Planet (Cambridge, 
U.K.: Polity, 2020), 16-19.
    \11\ Judith Shapiro and Yifei Li, ``China's Coercive 
Environmentalism Revisited: Climate Governance, Zero Covid and the Belt 
and Road,'' International Quarterly for Asian Studies 53, no. 3 
(November 9, 2022): 327-36; Lindsay Maizland, ``China's Fight Against 
Climate Change and Environmental Degradation,'' Council on Foreign 
Relations, updated November 4, 2022; Xin Wang and Ping Lei, ``Does 
Strict Environmental Regulation Lead to Incentive Contradiction?--
Evidence from China,'' Journal of Environmental Management 269 (2020): 
1.
    \12\ Xiaoying You, ``As Xi Jinping Reaffirms Climate Goals, China 
Faces Economic and Geopolitical Headwinds,'' Climate Home News, October 
26, 2022.
    \13\ Supreme People's Court, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu Wanzheng 
Zhunque Quanmian Guanche Xin Fazhan Linian Wei Jiji Wentuo Tuijin Tan 
Dafeng Tan Zhonghe Tigong Sifa Fuwu de Yijian [Opinion of the Supreme 
People's Court on the Complete and Accurate Implementation of the New 
Development Concept and the Provision of Judicial Services to Actively 
and Steadily Promote Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality], issued 
February 17, 2023; Supreme People's Court, ``China's Top Court Issues 
Guideline on Environmental Protection,'' February 20, 2023; Isabella 
Kaminski, ``China Strengthens Role of Courts in Meeting Carbon 
Targets,'' Climate Home News, March 7, 2023. For more on China's 
international commitments under the Paris Agreement, which it ratified 
in 2016, see Gregor Erbach and Ulrich Jochheim, ``China's Climate 
Change Policies: State of Play Ahead of COP27,'' European Parliamentary 
Research Service, October 2022, 2; United Nations Climate Change, 
``Parties & Observers,'' accessed September 5, 2023; Paris Agreement, 
adopted by Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change on December 12, 2015, entry into force November 4, 
2016; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XXVII, Environment, 
Paris Agreement, accessed August 25, 2023.
    \14\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yesheng Dongwu Baohu Fa [PRC 
Wildlife Protection Law], passed November 8, 1988, amended and 
effective December 30, 2022, arts. 5-7, 15, 17, 28; ``China Revises Law 
on Wildlife Protection,'' Xinhua, January 3, 2023.
    \15\ Echo Xie, ``While Animal Origin of COVID-19 Remains a Mystery, 
Will Revised Law in China Help Prevent More Diseases Jumping from 
Wildlife to People?,'' South China Morning Post, January 26, 2023.
    \16\ Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora, signed March 3, 1973, entry into force July 1, 
1975; ``List of Contracting Parties,'' Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, accessed August 
25, 2023. China acceded to the convention on January 8, 1981.
    \17\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanghe Baohu Fa [PRC Yellow River 
Protection Law], passed October 30, 2022, effective April 1, 2023; Yang 
Caini, ``After the Yangtze, China Passes Law to Protect Yellow River,'' 
Sixth Tone, November 1, 2022; ``Yellow River Protection Law Takes 
Effect,'' Xinhua, April 1, 2023; ``China Focus: Facilitating `Mother 
River' Protection with Sound Legal System,'' Xinhua, April 3, 2023. In 
2021, China passed the complementary PRC Yangtze River Protection Law. 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Changjiang Baohu Fa [PRC Yangtze River 
Protection Law], passed December 26, 2020, effective March 1, 2021.
    \18\ Yang Caini, ``After the Yangtze, China Passes Law to Protect 
Yellow River,'' Sixth Tone, November 1, 2022.
    \19\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanghe Baohu Fa [PRC Yellow River 
Protection Law], passed October 30, 2022, effective April 1, 2023; Yang 
Caini, ``After the Yangtze, China Passes Law to Protect Yellow River,'' 
Sixth Tone, November 1, 2022.
    \20\ Tania Branigan, ``One-Third of China's Yellow River `Unfit for 
Drinking or Agriculture,' '' Guardian, November 25, 2008.
    \21\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hei Tudi Baohu Fa [PRC Black Soil 
Protection Law], passed June 24, 2022, effective August 1, 2022; Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ``Black Soil 
Protection Law of the People's Republic of China,''December 15, 2022. 
The PRC Black Soil Protection Law mainly focuses on protecting the land 
for agricultural use, ensuring soil fertility is not negatively 
affected by agricultural operations, and promoting its efficient use, 
and specifying its use for ``grain and oil crops, sugar crops, 
vegetables and other agricultural products.''
    \22\ ``The Rich, Black Soil That Fed a Growing China Is Washing 
Away,'' Bloomberg, April 22, 2022.
    \23\ Mandy Zuo, ``China Food Security: With New Law, Can Beijing 
Reverse Loss of Arable Land, or Will Policies Go to Seed at Grass-Roots 
Level?,'' South China Morning Post, June 27, 2023; Zongyuan Zoe Liu, 
``China's Farmland Is in Serious Trouble,'' Foreign Policy, February 
27, 2023.
    \24\ Core Writing Team, H. Lee and J. Romero (eds.), 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ``Climate Change 2023: 
Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change,'' Geneva, Switzerland, 2023, v, vii, 10-11, 19, 24-25, 68, 88-
89, 92, 97, 161; Brad Plumer, ``Climate Change Is Speeding Toward 
Catastrophe. The Next Decade Is Crucial, U.N. Panel Says.,'' New York 
Times, March 20, 2023.
    \25\ Laura He, ``China's Record Carbon Emissions Expected to Peak 
Due to Clean Energy Push, Report Says,'' CNN, May 12, 2023; Harry 
Stevens, ``The United States Has Caused the Most Global Warming. When 
Will China Pass It?,'' Washington Post, March 1, 2023; Lauri Myllyvirta 
and Qi Qin, ``Analysis: China's CO2 Emissions Hit Q1 Record 
High after 4% Rise in Early 2023,'' Carbon Brief, May 12, 2023.
    \26\ Olivia Rosane, ``China, World's Leading Methane Polluter, 
Drafts Plan to Cut Emissions,'' EcoWatch, November 18, 2022; ``China 
Surprises at COP 27 with Draft Methane Plan,'' Energy Mix, November 21, 
2022; ``New Coal Mine Projects Seen Swelling Global Methane Emissions 
by a Fifth,'' Reuters, March 15, 2022; Deborah Gordon, RMI, ``Methane: 
A Threat to People and Planet,'' July 7, 2021. See also Ryan Driskell 
Tate and Yedan Li, Global Energy Monitor, ``Why China's Coal Mine Boom 
Jeopardizes Short-Term Climate Targets,'' May 2022.
    \27\ Olivia Rosane, ``China, World's Leading Methane Polluter, 
Drafts Plan to Cut Emissions,'' EcoWatch, November 18, 2022; ``China 
Surprises at COP 27 with Draft Methane Plan,'' Energy Mix, November 21, 
2022. For more information on the Global Methane Pledge, see Climate 
and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants, 
``About the Global Methane Pledge,'' accessed August 28, 2023.
    \28\ Yujie Xue, ``Climate Change: China's Xi Jinping Affirms Net-
zero Commitment while Touting Coal's Near-term Value for Energy 
Security,'' South China Morning Post, October 21, 2022.
    \29\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Special Representative Wang Yi 
of President Xi Jinping Attends and Addresses the Informal Leaders' 
Roundtable on Climate Action,'' September 22, 2022; ``COP 27: China 
Climate Envoy Says Beijing Committed to Carbon Neutrality,'' Reuters, 
November 8, 2022.
    \30\ ``Global Low-Carbon Energy Technology Investment Surges Past 
$1 Trillion for the First Time,'' Bloomberg NEF, January 26, 2023; Eric 
Ng, ``Renewable Energy: What China Is Doing on Solar and Wind Power 
Storage to Secure Supply amid Weather Challenges,'' South China Morning 
Post, January 29, 2023.
    \31\ Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air and Global Energy 
Monitor, ``China Permits Two New Coal Power Plants per Week in 2022,'' 
February 2023, 3; Echo Xie, ``Two Sessions' 2023: China Puts Spotlight 
Back on Fossil Fuel and Emission Targets for Post-Covid Rebound,'' 
South China Morning Post, March 7, 2023.
    \32\ Xi Jinping, ``Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist 
Country in All Respects: Report to the 20th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China,'' October 16, 2022, 44; ``Full Text: 
Statement by Xi Jinping at General Debate of 75th UNGA,'' China Daily, 
September 23, 2020; Genevieve Donnellon-May and Mark Yaolin Wang, ``Xi 
Jinping's `Green Leap Forward' Will Shape China's Environmental 
Future,'' South China Morning Post, November 2, 2022; Yujie Xue, 
``Climate Change: China's Xi Jinping Affirms Net-zero Commitment while 
Touting Coal's Near-term Value for Energy Security,'' South China 
Morning Post, October 21, 2022; David Stanway, ``Xi Jinping Vows to 
Prioritise Environment, Protect Nature and Promote Green Lifestyles,'' 
Reuters, October 16, 2022.
    \33\ Xi Jinping, ``Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist 
Country in All Respects: Report to the 20th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China,'' October 16, 2022, 45-46; Yujie Xue, 
``Climate Change: China's Xi Jinping Affirms Net-zero Commitment while 
Touting Coal's Near-term Value for Energy Security,'' South China 
Morning Post, October 21, 2022. See also Yujie Xue, `` `Two Sessions': 
Coal at Core of China's Power Infrastructure Even as Beijing Pushes 
Clean Energy Use, Government Work Report Shows,'' South China Morning 
Post, March 6, 2023; Pang Xinshan, ``Zhang Endi: Goujian xiandai 
nengyuan tixi tongchou tuijin tanda fengtan zhonghe'' [Zhang Endi: 
Building a modern energy system and promoting carbon neutrality in a 
coordinated manner], People's Daily, March 7, 2023.
    \34\ Centre for Research on Energy and Global Energy Monitor, 
``China Permits Two New Coal Power Plants per Week in 2022,'' February 
2023.
    \35\ Paul Bledsoe, ``Protesting China's Climate Catastrophe,'' 
RealClearEnergy, December 13, 2022; Betty Wang and Meera Gopal, ``ASPI 
Climate Action Brief: China,'' Asia Society Policy Institute, July 20, 
2023; Andy Tay, ``By the Numbers: China's Net-Zero Ambitions,'' Nature, 
April 5, 2022.
    \36\ Centre for Research on Energy and Global Energy Monitor, 
``China Permits Two New Coal Power Plants per Week in 2022,'' February 
2023; ``Despite Green Pledges, China Increases Coal Plant 
Constructions,'' FairPlanet, March 13, 2023; Peter Hannam, ``Confusion 
Surrounds China's Energy Policies as GDP and Climate Goals Clash,'' 
Guardian, February 28, 2023.
    \37\ Jan Burck et al., Germanwatch, NewClimate Institute, and 
Climate Action Network International, ``2023 CCPI: Climate Change 
Performance Index: Results: Monitoring Climate Mitigation Efforts of 59 
Countries Plus the EU--Covering 92% of the Global Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions,'' 2023, 3, 23. According to the 2023 CCPI, `` . . . the 
Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) is an independent monitoring 
tool for tracking the climate protection performance of 59 countries 
and the EU . . . The climate protection performance of those countries, 
which together account for 92% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, is assessed in four categories: GHG Emissions, Renewable 
Energy, Energy Use and Climate Policy.''
    \38\ World Meteorological Organization, ``Extreme Weather in China 
Highlights Climate Change Impacts and Need for Early Warnings,'' August 
24, 2022. See also David Stanway, ``China Warns of More Extreme Weather 
in 2023,'' Reuters, February 6, 2023.
    \39\ Joe Lo, ``China Warns of More Floods and Heatwaves in 2023,'' 
Climate Home News, February 6, 2023. An expert attributed the increased 
frequency, intensity, and duration of heat waves to human-induced 
climate change. Starting in June 2022, a heatwave lasting more than 70 
days dried up lakes and reservoirs, damaged crops, and caused forest 
fires in the Yangtze River Basin. In August, up to 267 weather stations 
registered record high temperatures. In February 2023, a spokesman for 
the China Meteorological Administration said that China's southern 
regions must prepare for more high temperatures, and northern regions 
must prepare for heavy floods. See also Pinya Wang et al., ``North 
China Plain as a Hot Spot of Ozone Pollution Exacerbated by Extreme 
High Temperatures,'' Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 22, no. 7 
(2022): 4706.
    \40\ World Meteorological Organization, ``Extreme Weather in China 
Highlights Climate Change Impacts and Need for Early Warnings,'' August 
24, 2022; David Stanway, ``China Warns of More Extreme Weather in 
2023,'' Reuters, February 6, 2023. Starting in July 2022, provinces and 
cities along the Yangtze River experienced moderate to severe drought. 
Sharp decreases in rainfall in Chongqing municipality and Sichuan 
province led to reduced hydropower output and restrictions on 
industrial operations. Government authorities warned of high forest 
fire danger in Chongqing and Sichuan.
    \41\ World Meteorological Organization, ``Extreme Weather in China 
Highlights Climate Change Impacts and Need for Early Warnings,'' August 
24, 2022. In July 2022, parts of northern China experienced unusually 
heavy rainfall, more than in the previous year. Floods occurred in 
Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Sichuan, and Gansu provinces, and in Qinghai 
province, the latter of which caused many casualties.
    \42\ Zhang Siran, ``China Extreme Weather: China Works to Tackle 
Sandstorms, Restore Clean Air,'' CGTN, April 23, 2023; Zhao Yusha, 
``Latest Sandstorm in N. China Sweeps 2.29 Million Square Kilometers, 
Impacting 409 Million People: Officials,'' Global Times, April 11, 
2023; ``Sandstorms Cover China, South Korea and Thailand in a Yellow 
Blanket of Dust--in Pictures,'' Guardian, April 14, 2023. In early 
2023, severe sandstorms hit 15 provincial-level regions, including 
Beijing and Shanghai.
    \43\ Mandy Zuo, `` `Airborne Baby Killer': 64,000 Die in Womb Each 
Year as a Result of Polluted Air in China Despite Official Efforts to 
Tackle Problem,'' South China Morning Post, December 4, 2022; Peng Yin 
et al., ``The Effect of Air Pollution on Deaths, Disease Burden, and 
Life Expectancy Across China and Its Provinces, 1990-2017: An Analysis 
for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2017,'' Lancet Planetary Health 
4, no. 9 (September 1, 2020): e387. See also Pinya Wang et al., ``North 
China Plain as a Hot Spot of Ozone Pollution Exacerbated by Extreme 
High Temperatures,'' Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 22, no. 7 (April 
11, 2022): 4710; U.N. Human Rights Council Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, David 
R. Boyd, A/HRC/40/55, January 8, 2019, para. 26.
    \44\ World Health Organization, ``Air Pollution in China,'' 
accessed August 8, 2023; Qingli Zhang et al., ``Overview of Particulate 
Air Pollution and Human Health in China: Evidence, Challenges, and 
Opportunities,'' Innovation 3, no. 6 (November 8, 2022): 1.
    \45\ Qingli Zhang et al., ``Overview of Particulate Air Pollution 
and Human Health in China: Evidence, Challenges, and Opportunities,'' 
Innovation 3, no. 6 (November 8, 2022): 1-3; Tiantian Li et al., 
``Ambient Fine Particulate Matter and Cardiopulmonary Health Risks in 
China,'' Chinese Medical Journal 136, no. 3 (February 10, 2023): 287-
91; Xiaowei Xue et al., ``Hourly Air Pollution Exposure and the Onset 
of Symptomatic Arrhythmia: An Individual-Level Case-Crossover Study in 
322 Chinese Cities,'' Canadian Medical Association Journal 195, no. 17 
(May 1, 2023): e601-2, e609. Particulate air pollution refers to solid 
or liquid matter that is suspended in the air, including smoke, soot, 
dust, and pollen. Douglas W. Dockery, ``Health Effects of Particulate 
Air Pollution,'' Annals of Epidemiology 19, no. 4 (April 2009): 1, 
reprinted in National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of 
Health.
    \46\ Mandy Zuo, `` `Airborne Baby Killer': Pollution in China Sees 
64,000 Stillborn Babies a Year,'' South China Morning Post, December 4, 
2022; Tao Xue et al., ``Estimation of Stillbirths Attributable to 
Ambient Fine Particles in 137 Countries,'' Nature Communications 13 
(November 29, 2022): 4. See also Pinya Wang et al., ``North China Plain 
as a Hot Spot of Ozone Pollution Exacerbated by Extreme High 
Temperatures,'' Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 22, no. 7 (April 11, 
2022): 4707, 4710. A scientific study published in 2022 estimated that 
approximately 100 daily excess deaths occurred because of the 
combination of high temperatures and severe ozone pollution in a region 
of northeast China.
    \47\ State Council, ``Report on the Work of the Government,'' March 
5, 2023.
    \48\ Ministry of Ecology and Environment, ``Shengtai Huanjing bu 
tongbao 2 yue he 1-2 yue quanguo huanjing kongqi zhiliang zhuangkuang'' 
[Ministry of Ecology and Environment February bulletin and notice on 
the national ambient air quality in January--February], March 16, 2023.
    \49\ Liu Lican, ``Serious Air Pollution During Two Sessions,'' 
China Dialogue, March 9, 2023; Dan Murtaugh, ``No Blue Skies in Beijing 
as Smog Hangs over Landmark Meeting,'' Bloomberg, March 5, 2023.
    \50\ Keoni Everington, ``Air Pollution from China Triggers 50 
Orange Alerts in Taiwan,'' Taiwan News, February 20, 2023.
    \51\ Seonmin ``Will'' Heo, Koichiro Ito, and Rao Kotamarthi, 
``International Spillover Effects of Air Pollution: Evidence from 
Mortality and Health Data,'' VoxEU, Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, February 10, 2023.
    \52\ U.N. General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the U.N. General 
Assembly on July 28, 2010, A/RES/64/292, August 3, 2010, 2; U.N.-Water, 
``Water Security & the Global Water Agenda: A UN-Water Analytical 
Brief,'' revised October 2013, 11.
    \53\ Hou Liqiang and Minlu Zhang, ``Country's Water Governance 
Proposals at the UN Event Widely Praised,'' China Daily, updated March 
27, 2023; Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the 
U.N., ``Speech by Minister Li Guoying at the General Debate of the 
Plenary Session of the 2023 U.N. Water Conference,'' March 23, 2023.
    \54\ Gabriel Collins and Gopal Reddy, ``China's Growing Water 
Crisis,'' Foreign Affairs, August 23, 2022; Genevieve Donnellon-May, 
``Water Warriors: How China's River Chiefs Aim to Tackle Water 
Pollution,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, August 4, 2023, 2.
    \55\ World Bank, ``Deepening Ecological Protection and Water 
Pollution Control in China's Yangtze River Basin,'' March 30, 2023.
    \56\ World Bank, ``Deepening Ecological Protection and Water 
Pollution Control in China's Yangtze River Basin,'' March 30, 2023.
    \57\ Richard Buettner, ``The Yangtze River: Navigating the 
Pollution Disaster,'' GeoAffairs, May 27, 2023; Lin Zi, ``China's Plan 
to Clean Up ``New Pollutants,' '' China Dialogue, August 9, 2022; 
Genevieve Donnellon-May, ``How China Is Responding to Its Water Woes,'' 
Diplomat, September 7, 2022.
    \58\ Karina Tsui and Ian Livingston, ``China Hit by Drought, 
Floods, as Yangtze River Runs Dry,'' Washington Post, August 18, 2022; 
Ryo Inoue, Record Drought, Heat Wave Dries Up River Basins in Areas of 
China,'' Asahi Shimbun, August 29, 2022.
    \59\ David Stanway, ``China Warns That Its Temperatures Are Rising 
Faster Than Global Average,'' Reuters, August 4, 2022; Hongzhou Zhang, 
``Climate Change Threatens China's Rice Bowl,'' East Asia Forum, August 
5, 2023.
    \60\ Gabriel Collins and Gopal Reddy, ``China's Growing Water 
Crisis,'' Foreign Affairs, August 23, 2022.
    \61\ Jack Silvers, ``Water Is China's Greatest Weapon and Its 
Achilles Heel,'' Harvard Political Review, October 16, 2020; Brian 
Eyler, ``Science Shows Chinese Dams Are Devastating the Mekong,'' 
Foreign Policy, April 22, 2020; Human Rights Watch, ``Underwater: Human 
Rights Impacts of a China Belt and Road Project in Cambodia,'' August 
10, 2021; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual 
Report (Washington: November 2022), 244.
    \62\ Nicholas Muller, ``The Precarious State of the Mekong,'' 
Diplomat, November 24, 2022; Buasawan Simmala and Christy Lee, 
``China's Mekong River Dams Expected to Worsen Southeast Asian 
Economies during Drought,'' Voice of America, August 4, 2023; Kanupriya 
Kapoor, Simon Scarr, Phuong Nguyen, Clare Trainor, Manas Sharma, and 
David Stanway, ``Starving the Mekong,'' Reuters, December 15, 2022.
    \63\ Kanupriya Kapoor, Simon Scarr, Phuong Nguyen, Clare Trainor, 
Manas Sharma, and David Stanway, ``Starving the Mekong,'' Reuters, 
December 15, 2022; Buasawan Simmala and Christy Lee, ``China's Mekong 
River Dams Expected to Worsen Southeast Asian Economies during 
Drought,'' Voice of America, August 4, 2023; Nicholas Muller, ``The 
Precarious State of the Mekong,'' Diplomat, November 24, 2022; ``Thai, 
Chinese Backers Sign Power Purchase Agreement for Mekong River Dam in 
Laos,'' Radio Free Asia, March 23, 2023.
    \64\ International Service for Human Rights et al., ``China: Human 
Rights and Chinese Business Activities in Latin America,'' February 
2023, 6, 14, 24-26; Fermin Koop, ``Latam NGOs Raise Concerns on Chinese 
Investments to UN Body,'' Dialogo Chino, March 17, 2023; U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2021 Report to Congress, 
November 2021, 214, 220, 228-29. The NGO report lists 13 Chinese 
companies and 6 Chinese financiers responsible for 14 development 
projects in nine Latin American countries. As explained by the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission report, due to the PRC's 
unique governance rights with respect to private firms, all of the 
firms in question are under the control and jurisdiction of the PRC 
government.
    \65\ International Service for Human Rights et al., ``China: Human 
Rights and Chinese Business Activities in Latin America,'' February 
2023, 24-36.
    \66\ Fermin Koop, ``Latam NGOs Raise Concerns on Chinese 
Investments to UN Body,'' Dialogo Chino, March 17, 2023.
    \67\ Janet Coit and Richard W. Spinrad, U.S. Interagency Working 
Group on Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, ``National 
5-Year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
Fishing (2022-2026),'' accessed September 5, 2023, 7, A1-3; David 
Leonhardt, ``China's Huge Appetite for Fish,'' New York Times, 
September 27, 2022; Mike Studeman, ``China's Rampant Illegal Fishing Is 
Endangering the Environment and the Global Economy,'' Newsweek, January 
24, 2023; Philip Jacobson and Basten Gokkon, ``Exclusive: Shark Finning 
Rampant across Chinese Tuna Firm's Fleet,'' Mongabay, November 1, 2022. 
See also Ian Urbina, ``Subsidizing China's Fishing Fleet,'' Outlaw 
Ocean Project, September 2, 2021.
    \68\ Philip Jacobson and Basten Gokkon, ``Exclusive: Shark Finning 
Rampant across Chinese Tuna Firm's Fleet,'' Mongabay, November 1, 2022. 
See also Philip Jacobson and Basten Gokkon, `` `It Was a Shark 
Operation': Q&A with Indonesian Crew Abused on Chinese Shark-Finning 
Boat,'' Mongabay, December 2, 2022.
    \69\ Philip Jacobson and Basten Gokkon, ``Exclusive: Shark Finning 
Rampant across Chinese Tuna Firm's Fleet,'' Mongabay, November 1, 2022; 
Environmental Justice Foundation, ``Global Impact of Illegal Fishing 
and Human Rights Abuse in China's Vast Distant Water Fleet Revealed,'' 
April 5, 2022; Environmental Justice Foundation, ``The Ever-Widening 
Net: Mapping the Scale, Nature and Corporate Structures of Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing by the Chinese Distant-Water 
Fleet,'' March 30, 2022, 17, 30, 35, 37; Ian Urbina, ``Subsidizing 
China's Fishing Fleet,'' Outlaw Ocean Project, September 2, 2021. See 
also Environmental Justice Foundation, ``On the Precipice: Crime and 
Corruption in Ghana's Chinese-Owned Trawler Fleet,'' October 2022.
    \70\ ``China's Deep-Water Fishing Fleet Is the World's Most 
Rapacious,'' Economist, December 8, 2022.
    \71\ ``China's Deep-Water Fishing Fleet Is the World's Most 
Rapacious,'' Economist, December 8, 2022; Steven Lee Myers et al., 
``How China Targets the Global Fish Supply,'' New York Times, September 
26, 2022.
    \72\ ``China's Deep-Water Fishing Fleet Is the World's Most 
Rapacious,'' Economist, December 8, 2022; Mike Studeman, ``China's 
Rampant Illegal Fishing Is Endangering the Environment and the Global 
Economy,'' Newsweek, January 24, 2023; Philip Jacobson and Basten 
Gokkon, ``Exclusive: Shark Finning Rampant across Chinese Tuna Firm's 
Fleet,'' Mongabay, November 1, 2022; Environmental Justice Foundation, 
``The Ever-Widening Net: Mapping the Scale, Nature and Corporate 
Structures of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing by the 
Chinese Distant-Water Fleet,'' March 30, 2022, 6, 12; Environmental 
Justice Foundation, ``At What Cost? How Ghana Is Losing Out in Fishing 
Arrangements with China's Distant Water Fleet,'' 2021.
    \73\ Environmental Justice Foundation, ``Global Impact of Illegal 
Fishing and Human Rights Abuse in China's Distant Water Fleet,'' April 
5, 2022.
    \74\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yesheng Dongwu Baohu Fa  [PRC 
Wildlife Protection Law], passed November 8, 1988, amended and 
effective December 30, 2022. See also the following unofficial 
translation: ``Wildlife Protection Law of the PRC (2022 Version),'' 
translated in China Law Translate, December 31, 2022; ``China Revises 
Law on Wildlife Protection,'' Xinhua, January 3, 2023.
    \75\ International Fund for Animal Welfare, ``China Passes Revised 
Law to Strengthen Protection of Wildlife,'' January 3, 2023.
    \76\ Alexia Tata, ``Peace, Poaching and Pangolins in Central 
Africa,'' United States Institute of Peace, April 25, 2023; Sharon 
Guynup, ``A Fast-Growing Pipeline: The Amazon-to-Southeast Asia 
Wildlife Trade,'' Mongabay, October 18, 2022; Carolyn Cowan, ``Myanmar 
Wildlife Trade Remains Opaque, Despite Focus on Border Hubs,'' 
Mongabay, July 7, 2022.
    \77\ Sharon Guynup, ``A Fast-Growing Pipeline: The Amazon-to-
Southeast Asia Wildlife Trade,'' Mongabay, October 18, 2022.
    \78\ Yuan Ye, ``In China, a New Generation of Climate Activists 
Suddenly Emerges,'' Sixth Tone, November 9, 2022; Jia Ao, ``Ten Years 
under Xi Jinping: The `Chilling' Effect on China's Civil Society 
Groups,'' Radio Free Asia, October 14, 2022.
    \79\ Yuan Ye, ``In China, a New Generation of Climate Activists 
Suddenly Emerges,'' Sixth Tone, November 9, 2022.
    \80\ Nina Jeffs, ``Climate Action in China: Four Levers to Advance 
Gender and Social Equality,'' Chatham House, March 2023, 27-28.
    \81\ Lin Zi, ``From Smog to Carbon: Chinese NGOs in Transition,'' 
China Dialogue, January 4, 2023.
    \82\ Lin Zi, ``From Smog to Carbon: Chinese NGOs in Transition,'' 
China Dialogue, January 4, 2023; China's Environmental Challenges and 
U.S. Responses, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 117th Cong. (2021) (testimony of Dr. Jessica C. Teets, Associate 
Professor, Middlebury College).
    \83\ Sasha Kong, ``China's Climate Litigation Policy Must Change,'' 
FairPlanet, February 3, 2022; Yu Zhuang, ``The Challenge of Litigation 
Costs and Damage Assessment Fees in Environmental Public Interest 
Litigation in China,'' Comparative Jurist: William & Mary Law School's 
International and Comparative Law Blog, May 13, 2017. See also Helen 
Davidson, `` `You Follow the Government's Agenda': China's Climate 
Activists Walk a Tightrope,'' Guardian, August 16, 2021; China's 
Environmental Challenges and U.S. Responses, Hearing of the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2021) 
(testimony of Dr. Jessica C. Teets, Associate Professor, Middlebury 
College).
    \84\ Aowen Cao and Emily Feng, ``A Public Payphone in China Began 
Ringing and Ringing. Who Was Calling?,'' NPR, October 3, 2022.
    \85\ Christian Shepherd and Vic Chiang, ``A Chinese Artist Fights 
Pollution with Rock Music,'' Washington Post, July 26, 2022.
    \86\ Hu Meng, ``Qingkuang you dian fuza--Jianguo Xiongdi de linglei 
huanbao yu linglei yishu'' [The situation is sort of complex--Nut 
Brother's alternative environmental protection and alternative art], 
Initium, September 18, 2022.
    \87\ ``Severe Pollution in Seaside City Inspires Creative 
Protest,'' China Dialogue, July 21, 2022.
    \88\ Aowen Cao and Emily Feng, ``A Public Payphone in China Began 
Ringing and Ringing. Who Was Calling?,'' NPR, October 3, 2022.
    \89\ Christian Shepherd and Vic Chiang, ``A Chinese Artist Fights 
Pollution with Rock Music,'' Washington Post, July 26, 2022; Katerina 
Sushko, ``Performance Artist Sheds Light on China's Environmental and 
Social Issues,'' Arts Help, accessed August 28, 2023; Chris Buckley and 
Adam Wu, ``Amid Smog Wave, an Artist Molds a Potent Symbol of Beijing's 
Pollution,'' New York Times, December 1, 2015.
    \90\ Aowen Cao and Emily Feng, ``A Public Payphone in China Began 
Ringing and Ringing. Who Was Calling?,'' NPR, October 3, 2022.
    \91\ ``Huludao shi huiying quyu kongqi you yiwei: you wenti, xian 
ting zai gai'' [Huludao municipality responds to odd-smelling air in 
locality; if there's a problem, first stop it, then make changes], 
Phoenix Net, July 22, 2022.
    \92\ Aowen Cao and Emily Feng, ``A Public Payphone in China Began 
Ringing and Ringing. Who Was Calling?,'' NPR, October 3, 2022.
    \93\ Yuan Ye, ``In China, a New Generation of Climate Activists 
Suddenly Emerges,'' Sixth Tone, November 9, 2022.
    \94\ Yueduan Wang and Ying Xia, ``Judicializing Environmental 
Politics' China's Procurator-Led Public Interest Litigation against the 
Government,'' China Quarterly 253 (March 2023): 90. See also Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [PRC Civil Procedure Law], passed 
April 9, 1991, amended and effective June 27, 2017, art. 55; Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa [PRC Administrative Procedure 
Law], passed April 4, 1989, amended and effective June 27, 2017, art. 
25.
    \95\ Supreme People's Court, ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan huanjing gongyi 
susong zhuanti zhidaoxing anli xinwen fabuhui'' [Press conference of 
the Supreme People's Court on the topic of environmental public 
interest litigation guiding cases], January 11, 2023; China Justice 
Observer, ``SPC Releases Guiding Cases on Environmental Public Interest 
Litigation,'' February 13, 2023.
    \96\ Wei You, Shan Liang, Lei Feng, and Zexuan Cai, ``Types of 
Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China and Exploration of 
New Frontiers,'' International Journal of Environmental Research and 
Public Health 20, no. 4 (February 13, 2023): 6-7.
    \97\ Yueduan Wang and Ying Xia, ``Judicializing Environmental 
Politics' China's Procurator-Led Public Interest Litigation against the 
Government,'' China Quarterly 253 (March 2023): 90-91.
    \98\ Yueduan Wang and Ying Xia, ``Judicializing Environmental 
Politics' China's Procurator-Led Public Interest Litigation against the 
Government,'' China Quarterly 253 (March 2023): 90.
    \99\ Wei You, Shan Liang, Lei Feng, and Zexuan Cai, ``Types of 
Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China and Exploration of 
New Frontiers,'' International Journal of Environmental Research and 
Public Health 20, no. 4 (February 13, 2023): 11.

Business and Human Rights

Business and Human Rights

                       Business and Human Rights

                                Findings

         Chinese and international businesses are at 
        risk of complicity in--and of profiting from--the 
        Chinese Communist Party and government's use of forced 
        labor to suppress ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Reports of state-
        sponsored forced labor implicate supply chains of 
        industries and products including automobile 
        manufacturing, red dates, and cotton and the garment 
        industry.
         Investigations found that Chinese fast fashion 
        direct-to-consumer retailers Shein and Temu are linked 
        to the XUAR and have exploited the US$800 de minimis 
        threshold, which allows vendors to send shipments below 
        that value without having to report basic data.
         A May 2023 report detailed how the U.S. 
        Federal Government's employee retirement plan, the 
        Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), included options to invest 
        in Chinese companies that are on watchlists or are 
        sanctioned by the U.S. Government for their ties to 
        forced labor in the People's Republic of China (PRC) or 
        surveillance efforts in the XUAR.
         Chinese and international companies were 
        reported to be supporting the Chinese government's data 
        collection, surveillance, and censorship. Some examples 
        include:

                  China-based video surveillance manufacturer 
                Uniview developed Uyghur recognition technology 
                and co-authored ethnicity and skin color 
                tracking policy standards;
                  Bresee, Uniview's sister company, provided 
                artificial intelligence support relating to 
                ethnicity tracking and facial recognition;
                  U.S.-sanctioned Dahua and Hikvision and New 
                Jersey-based video surveillance manufacturer 
                Infinova developed various ``alarms'' to help 
                police identify and detect potential political 
                protests;
                  Apple removed full AirDrop functionality in 
                China by setting a 10-minute limit for the 
                file-sharing feature;
                  Thermo Fisher Scientific sold DNA equipment 
                to police in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 
                where Human Rights Watch identified mass 
                involuntary DNA collection programs; and
                  HSBC and PayPal HK targeted the League of 
                Social Democrats, one of the last pro-democracy 
                parties in Hong Kong, with forced closures of 
                their accounts.

         Leading up to the PRC Counterespionage Law's 
        July 1, 2023 effective date, the Commission observed 
        reports of Chinese authorities targeting global firms 
        including U.S.-headquartered corporation Mintz Group 
        and U.S. consulting firm Bain & Company.
         Abusive practices toward workers were found in 
        Chinese factories of third-party printing inkjet and 
        toner cartridge manufacturers.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Work with like-minded governments and legislatures to 
        encourage implementation of policies and legislation 
        similar to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act 
        (Public Law No. 117-78), which prohibits the 
        importation of goods made in whole or in part in the 
        XUAR.
          Consider actions, including legislation as needed, 
        that bolster supply chain transparency, such as 
        requiring supply chain mapping, corporate disclosures, 
        comprehensive human rights due diligence, and country 
        of origin labels for goods purchased and sold online.
          Increase U.S. Customs and Border Protection funding 
        to bolster its ability to monitor imported goods for 
        links to forced labor in the PRC.
          Partner with like-minded governments to decrease 
        reliance on imports from China and increase dialogue 
        towards enhancing greater cooperation to resist PRC 
        economic coercion.
          Consider introducing a resolution in the United 
        Nations to request a new Special Representative on the 
        issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
        and other business enterprises to be appointed by the 
        Secretary-General.
          Enhance interagency coordination to ensure alignment 
        about companies that are sanctioned or blacklisted to 
        avoid potential investments in Chinese or international 
        firms implicated in genocide and crimes against 
        humanity in the XUAR.
          Engage U.S. companies on human rights issues in China 
        such as forced labor, government surveillance, 
        government censorship, and worker rights. Such 
        engagement should include:
                  Encouraging companies that source a 
                significant percentage of their products from 
                China to trace the supply chain of these goods 
                to ensure that they are not linked to PRC 
                state-sponsored forced labor. Members should 
                encourage such companies to protect both 
                workers and whistleblowers at their factories 
                and facilities in China and worldwide;
                  Encouraging companies to change their 
                approach to conducting due diligence in China, 
                moving beyond codes of conduct and third-party 
                factory audits, which have proven to be 
                ineffective and even harmful;
                  Encouraging companies to consider 
                implementing diversification plans to best 
                protect themselves against PRC raids, bans, and 
                economic coercion;
                  Encouraging companies to consider 
                implementing Taiwan insurance plans to protect 
                their employees in the event of a PRC invasion 
                of Taiwan; and
                  Holding public hearings and private meetings 
                with companies to raise awareness of the risk 
                of complicity in human rights abuses and 
                privacy violations that U.S. companies working 
                in China face.

Business and Human Rights

Business and Human Rights

                       Business and Human Rights

                              Introduction

    The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
state that businesses have a responsibility to seek to avoid 
``causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts.'' 
\1\ China-based companies and international companies that seek 
to operate in the People's Republic of China (PRC) may find 
themselves complicit in, or at risk of complicity in, the PRC's 
human rights violations including surveillance, data 
collection, censorship, crimes against humanity,\2\ and 
genocide.\3\
    Former U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises John Ruggie referred to complicity 
as ``indirect involvement by companies in human rights abuses--
where the actual harm is committed by another party, including 
governments and non-State actors . . . it may not matter that 
the company was merely carrying out normal business activities 
if those activities contributed to the abuse and the company 
was aware or should have been aware of its contribution. The 
fact that a company was following orders, fulfilling 
contractual obligations, or even complying with national law 
will not, alone, guarantee it legal protection.'' \4\

               Corporate Involvement in XUAR Forced Labor

    Companies that do business in, source from, or work with 
companies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) are 
at risk of complicity in the human rights abuses being 
committed by the Chinese Communist Party and government in the 
region. In July 2022, U.N. Special Rapporteur on contemporary 
forms of slavery Tomoya Obokata issued a report which found 
that in some instances, forced labor involving Uyghurs, 
Kazakhs, and other ethnic minorities in the XUAR ``may amount 
to enslavement as a crime against humanity.'' \5\ In August 
2022, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
released an assessment of human rights concerns in the XUAR 
which included evidence of forced labor in ``labor transfer'' 
programs and in programs using the labor of current and former 
mass internment camp detainees.\6\ With the release of the 
assessment, one expert advised it ``was no longer possible for 
any state, business or individual to have plausible deniability 
about the wide-ranging human rights abuses that have, and are 
continuing to occur, in [the XUAR].'' \7\ The use of audits to 
determine whether products are free of forced labor in the XUAR 
remains unreliable.\8\
    During the 2023 reporting year, the Commission observed the 
following reports detailing evidence of supply chains 
implicated or at risk of complicity in state-sponsored forced 
labor among minorities from the XUAR:

         Automobile Manufacturing. In December 2022, 
        Sheffield Hallam University's Helena Kennedy Centre for 
        International Justice and non-profit research 
        organization NomoGaia released a report documenting how 
        the production of automobile manufacturing materials, 
        ranging from ``hood decals and car frames to engine 
        casings, interiors and electronics,'' were found to be 
        connected to Uyghur forced labor.\9\ International 
        automobile brands implicated included BMW, Ford, Honda, 
        Mercedes-Benz, Nissan, Tesla, Toyota, Volkswagen, and 
        Audi.\10\
         Red Dates. In August 2022, the Uyghur Human 
        Rights Project published a report revealing how red 
        dates have a high risk of being tainted by forced labor 
        due to fruit intercropping with XUAR cotton and the 
        Xinjiang Construction and Production Corps' (XPCC)\11\ 
        involvement in red date production.\12\ The report 
        documented more than 70 brands of red dates grown or 
        processed in the XUAR distributed by U.S.-based 
        wholesalers, including Blooming Import and Growland 
        Inc., which sell red dates online and to local stores 
        in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area.\13\ These 
        included at least three brands of dates labeled with 
        ``Bingtuan,'' representing the XPCC, on their 
        packaging.\14\
         Cotton and the Garment Industry. According to 
        an April 2023 report by the U.S. Department of 
        Agriculture's Foreign Agricultural Service, roughly 91 
        percent of China's total cotton production occurs in 
        the XUAR, with roughly one-third of the region's cotton 
        output produced by the XPCC.\15\ A report by scholar 
        Adrian Zenz detailed ongoing labor transfer programs 
        involved in the XUAR's cotton industry and the 
        continued prevalence of the handpicking of cotton, 
        despite official claims to the contrary.\16\ A 
        Bloomberg investigation found that garments of Chinese 
        online fast fashion brand Shein shipped to the U.S. are 
        made with XUAR cotton\17\ and a global supply chain 
        company found that products sold in the U.S. on e-
        commerce site Temu are linked to the XUAR.\18\ In May 
        2023, three Europe-based nongovernmental organizations 
        and a Uyghur plaintiff filed a complaint requesting a 
        French judicial investigation into garment companies 
        Uniqlo, SMCP, Inditex, and Skechers USA for concealing 
        crimes against humanity and their reported links to 
        Uyghur forced labor.\19\

                 The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act

    Effective since June 21, 2022, the Uyghur Forced Labor 
Prevention Act (UFLPA; Public Law No. 117-78) establishes a 
rebuttable presumption that all goods made in whole or in part 
in the XUAR have been made with forced labor, and that the 
importation of such goods is prohibited by Section 307 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930.\20\ During this reporting year, however, 
Shein and Temu were reported to be exploiting the US$800 de 
minimis threshold\21\ to avoid scrutiny of the goods they 
import into the United States.\22\ In March 2023, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection published a public dashboard to disclose 
enforcement statistics about shipments that have been subject 
to the UFLPA.\23\ Industries displayed on the dashboard include 
electronics, apparel, footwear, and textiles; industrial and 
manufacturing materials; agriculture and prepared products; 
consumer products and mass merchandising; pharmaceuticals, 
health, and chemicals; machinery; base metals; and automotive 
and aerospace.\24\ [For information on how government-sponsored 
forced labor violates international standards prohibiting human 
trafficking and forced labor, see Chapter 10--Human 
Trafficking. For more information on government-sponsored 
forced labor in the XUAR, see Chapter 18--Xinjiang.]


------------------------------------------------------------------------
 U.S. Federal Employee Retirement Investments Linked to Rights Abuses in
                                the XUAR
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In addition to global supply chains, U.S. federal employee retirement
 investments have also been found to be linked to crimes against
 humanity and genocide in the XUAR. A May 2023 report detailed findings
 by research and advocacy group Coalition for a Prosperous America and
 consulting firm Kilo Alpha Strategies about how the U.S. federal
 government's employee retirement plan, the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP),
 included options to invest in Chinese companies that are on watchlists
 or are sanctioned by the U.S. Government.\25\ Companies listed as
 options in the TSP include Changhong Meiling Co. Ltd., which develops
 electronics and is linked to XUAR forced labor; Huafu Fashion Co. Ltd.,
 which is tied to forced labor in the XUAR's cotton industry; Xiamen
 Meiya Pico Information Company, which contributed to the PRC's
 surveillance efforts in the XUAR; and Xinjiang Daqo New Energy Co.,
 which is linked to forced labor in the XUAR's solar industry.\26\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

   Companies' Role in Government Data Collection, Surveillance, and 
                        Censorship across China

    PRC law authorizes the government to collect individuals' 
data from companies without adequate protection for the 
internationally recognized right to privacy, and in the absence 
of an independent judiciary.\27\ For example, the PRC 
Cybersecurity Law requires companies to provide technical 
support to authorities conducting criminal investigations or 
``safeguarding national security.'' \28\ While the law does not 
specify what such technical support entails,\29\ in the past, 
Chinese companies have processed bulk data to assist PRC 
intelligence services.\30\ The PRC National Intelligence Law 
requires entities operating in China--including companies--to 
support authorities engaged in ``intelligence work,'' without 
defining what the government considers ``intelligence work.'' 
\31\ [For more information on data collection and surveillance, 
see Chapter 16--Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism.]

                    DATA COLLECTION AND SURVEILLANCE

    Companies were reported to be supporting the PRC's data 
collection and surveillance efforts. Reporting from technology 
research firm IPVM found that China-based video surveillance 
manufacturer Uniview, a key supplier of PRC surveillance 
technology, developed Uyghur recognition technology and co-
authored ethnicity and skin color tracking policy standards to 
support security forces and government projects.\32\ Bresee, 
Uniview's sister company and a partner of Huawei, provided 
artificial intelligence (AI) support relating to ethnicity 
tracking and facial recognition.\33\ China-based camera 
manufacturer Dahua developed ``banner alarms'' to detect 
unfurled banners in ``indoor halls or relatively empty outdoor 
[city] squares [and] roads'' to identify potential political 
protests, while Hikvision created protest-related ``alarms'' to 
help police track and locate crowds.\34\ New Jersey-based video 
surveillance manufacturer Infinova also produced surveillance 
cameras with the ``unfurled banner detection'' capability, 
according to IPVM.\35\
    In November 2022, intelligence company Recorded Future 
published a report detailing PRC government procurement of 
products from American companies for surveillance or data 
collection purposes.\36\ For example, California-based Western 
Digital and Seagate Technology sold surveillance-specialized 
hard disk drives to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 
government entities--including the U.S.-sanctioned Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps (XPCC).\37\ Public security 
bureaus in the XUAR, including in Urumqi municipality and 
Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, procured Seagate's SkyHawk 
series of surveillance-specialized storage products.\38\ The 
Hainan Province Public Security Department purchased hardware 
from U.S. companies IBM, Cisco, Comtech, and Motorola Solutions 
to assist with command center communications, mass surveillance 
and intelligence gathering.\39\ The report also highlighted how 
Ryan Technologies, a California-based information technology 
consulting firm,\40\ facilitated the transfer of foreign 
technology, including from the United States, to public 
security entities in China.\41\
    PRC government tenders revealed police purchased DNA 
equipment from Thermo Fisher Scientific to be used in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR),\42\ where Human Rights Watch 
identified mass involuntary DNA collection programs.\43\ The 
Commission wrote to Thermo Fisher in December 2022 to inquire 
about the possibility that Thermo Fisher DNA sequencers and 
kits may have been used by TAR law enforcement agencies in mass 
DNA collection programs in recent years.\44\ Although Thermo 
Fisher replied to the Commission in January 2023,\45\ Tibetan 
activists raised concerns that the company had not thoroughly 
addressed the issues at hand.\46\ Human Rights Watch previously 
raised concerns about the company's sales of DNA sequencers to 
XUAR government entities.\47\ [For more information about how 
mass biometric data collection violates human rights in the 
TAR, see Chapter 17--Tibet. For more information on human 
rights violations and biometric data collection in the XUAR, 
see Chapter 18--Xinjiang.]
    Because companies must comply with demands to provide 
information and access to data under the PRC's cybersecurity 
and data security laws,\48\ several foreign governments 
highlighted privacy and security concerns for overseas users of 
TikTok, owned by Chinese company ByteDance.\49\ Locations, 
internet protocol (IP) addresses, and personal financial 
information of TikTok users, creators, and businesses are 
reportedly accessible via servers in China.\50\ [For 
information on TikTok's role in government censorship, see 
below in this section.]

             GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP, REMOVALS, AND CLOSURES

    The PRC government restricted freedom of expression during 
this reporting year, and companies were both targets and 
enablers of Chinese government censorship. Examples include:

         Chinese platforms removed content that does 
        not support PRC narratives.

                  In March 2023, the Cyberspace Administration 
                of China launched a campaign to ban media 
                deemed as ``rumors, harmful information, and 
                false news'' in ``self-media'' (zi meiti)\51\ 
                resulting in closure of more than 66,600 
                accounts on Chinese social media platforms, 
                including microblog Weibo, and video-sharing 
                platforms Kuaishou and Douyin.\52\
                  Weibo blocked hashtags, including 
                ``Haidian,'' ``Beijing,'' and ``Sitong 
                Bridge,'' following an October 2022 banner 
                protest, which took place at Sitong Bridge, 
                located in Haidian district, Beijing 
                municipality.\53\ Leading up to the anniversary 
                of the 1989 Tiananmen protests and their 
                violent suppression, Chinese search engine 
                Baidu censored search results for maps relating 
                to Sitong Bridge.\54\
                  ByteDance's news platform Toutiao removed an 
                essay that suggested Xi Jinping was responsible 
                for China's high levels of youth unemployment, 
                according to China Digital Times in April 
                2023.\55\ The essay belonged to the ``Kong 
                Yiji'' genre that addresses how college 
                graduates are choosing between unemployment in 
                pursuit of a white-collar career or stability 
                in a blue-collar career.\56\
                  ByteDance's video-sharing platform Douyin 
                censors content that criticizes the Chinese 
                Communist Party and government,\57\ as well as 
                other content.\58\ On June 2, 2023, Douyin 
                issued censorship guidance banning official 
                accounts from posting content, and ``key 
                opinion leaders'' from posting advertising 
                content on and around June Fourth.\59\ The 
                guidance also included a warning to monitor 
                comment sections of old posts for symbols 
                relating to the 1989 democracy movement and the 
                violent suppression of the Tiananmen 
                protests.\60\

         Apple removed:

                  the social networking app ``Damus'' in China. 
                The app, which had the ability to evade 
                government censorship and included ``content 
                that is illegal,'' had failed a PRC government 
                security assessment.\61\
                  websites in Hong Kong by aligning the privacy 
                policy of their browser, Safari, in Hong Kong 
                with Tencent's filter which blocks 
                ``deceptive'' websites.\62\ Among those 
                websites temporarily blocked by the filter were 
                GitLab, a code-sharing website; Coinbase, a 
                cryptocurrency exchange platform; and Mastodon, 
                a social media platform.\63\
                  full AirDrop functionality in China, by 
                setting a 10-minute limit to the file-sharing 
                feature for Apple products.\64\ AirDrop was 
                previously commonly used by protesters in 
                mainland China to circumvent official 
                censorship, and in Hong Kong to coordinate with 
                other protesters.\65\
         Disney removed content in Hong Kong. In 
        February 2023, the Financial Times reported that an 
        episode of ``The Simpsons'' was removed from Disney 
        Plus, Disney's streaming service, in Hong Kong.\66\ The 
        episode, which initially aired in October 2022, made a 
        reference to ``forced labour camps where children make 
        smartphones'' in China.\67\ The Hong Kong government 
        and Disney did not comment on whether the government 
        requested the removal.\68\ A Hong Kong-based scholar 
        speculated that Disney engaged in self-censorship to 
        maintain its business ties in China.\69\ [For more 
        information on censorship in Hong Kong, see Chapter 
        19--Hong Kong and Macau.]
         AI chatbots created by Chinese companies such 
        as Alibaba, Baidu, and SenseTime Group Inc.,\70\ are 
        required to adhere to PRC regulations, including two 
        new regulations on generative AI: the Provisions on the 
        Administration of Deep Synthesis Internet Information 
        Services\71\ and draft Measures for the Management of 
        Generative Artificial Intelligence Services.\72\ Under 
        these two new regulations and similar to prior internet 
        regulations, technology companies would be responsible 
        for content management and censorship.\73\ According to 
        a China law expert, ``. . . unclear standards for 
        permissible content and harsh penalties could lead 
        service providers to over-censor, or hobble their 
        products, as they try to avoid liability. 
        Unfortunately, this type of chilling effect is common 
        in Chinese speech regulation.'' \74\
         HSBC and PayPal HK targeted the League of 
        Social Democrats (LSD), one of the last pro-democracy 
        parties in Hong Kong.\75\ The LSD posted on Facebook 
        about the forced closure of their PayPal HK account in 
        October 2022.\76\ PayPal cited ``excessive risks'' as 
        the reason for the closure of the LSD's account.\77\ In 
        April and May 2022, HSBC closed three bank accounts 
        belonging to the LSD, hindering the LSD from continuing 
        their work and receiving donations from supporters.\78\ 
        In a letter to HSBC, the leader of the LSD described 
        the forced closures as an act to ``reduce the freedom 
        of expression and freedom of choice of ordinary 
        Hongkongers.'' \79\ The forced termination of the LSD's 
        PayPal and HSBC accounts are likely to be politically 
        motivated to obstruct the LSD's work in light of the 
        National Security Law.\80\

[For more information on censorship and suppression of 
expression, see Chapter 1--Freedom of Expression.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Amendments to the PRC Counterespionage Law and Impact on Global
                               Businesses
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Given the lack of safeguards for the freedoms of expression and
 association in the PRC, international corporations doing business in
 China are at risk of not only corporate complicity, but also government
 raids or investigations, and subject to the legal risks of
 noncompliance with PRC laws.
  In April 2023, the National People's Congress Standing Committee
 amended the PRC Counterespionage Law (effective July 1, 2023) in ways
 that may negatively affect government transparency and subject company
 employees to arbitrary detention.\81\ The revised law broadened the
 definition of acts of ``espionage,'' and further granted state security
 agencies authority to investigate such activities.\82\ Under the law's
 expanded application, foreign enterprises may trigger investigations
 and ``face unexpected risks'' by conducting what are otherwise normal
 business operations such as recruitment of local talent, cross-border
 projects, and research initiatives with overseas partners.\83\
  An expert advised that ``what due-diligence firms do in China puts
 them in conflict with how China thinks about information and what
 information should be shared with foreigners.'' \84\ Leading up to the
 revised PRC Counterespionage Law's effective date, the Commission
 observed how Chinese authorities were targeting global firms with raids
 and investigations.\85\ For example, in March 2023, Chinese authorities
 raided the Beijing municipality office of Mintz Group, a U.S.-
 headquartered corporation, and held five local staff members
 incommunicado.\86\ Prior to the raid, Mintz Group reportedly conducted
 due diligence work examining supply chain links to forced labor in the
 XUAR.\87\ Chinese police, in addition, visited the Shanghai
 municipality office of U.S. consulting firm Bain & Company more than
 once to interrogate employees and to confiscate computers and
 phones.\88\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Exporting China's Censorship

    In July 2022, the U.S. International Trade Commission 
issued a report which found ``some businesses consider the 
costs of complying with Chinese censorship as part of the cost 
of doing business in China . . ., while other firms may not 
consider complying with Chinese censorship to be costly, as the 
benefits of gaining access to the Chinese market outweigh the 
costs associated with Chinese censorship.'' \89\ Companies can 
face expulsion from the Chinese market, loss of revenue, or 
other forms of punishment for speech or actions that do not 
align with PRC narratives or censorship guidelines.\90\ As a 
result, international companies often self-censor or assist the 
PRC in exporting censorship for the sake of maintaining market 
access, while Chinese companies operating overseas adhere to 
PRC censorship.\91\ Instances of exported censorship and self-
censorship outside of China during this reporting period 
include:

         Tencent's WeChat censoring content overseas, 
        including posts that were ``positive towards the United 
        States,'' with an account being shut down after posting 
        an article that favorably reviewed the 2020 U.S. 
        presidential election.\92\ In September 2022, WeChat 
        warned users outside of China that their personal data, 
        including browsing and search history, would be 
        transmitted to China, raising concerns about censorship 
        from users overseas.\93\ Overseas WeChat users from the 
        Chinese diaspora are often hesitant to publicly 
        disclose their experiences of censorship and harassment 
        due to fears of government retaliation against their 
        family members in China.\94\ [For more information 
        about transnational repression by the PRC government, 
        see Chapter 20--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and 
        Globally.]
         Social media app TikTok, owned by Chinese 
        company ByteDance suspending or banning U.S.-based 
        accounts of those critical of PRC rights abuses, 
        including non-profit Acton Institute's account, for 
        posts about the documentary ``The Hong Konger: Jimmy 
        Lai's Extraordinary Struggle for Freedom,'' \95\ and 
        professional basketball player Enes Freedom's account, 
        for posting about the PRC's human rights 
        violations.\96\ TikTok also tracked or filtered 
        ``sensitive'' posts, such as queries about the violent 
        suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, and 
        independence for Hong Kong and Taiwan.\97\
         China-based video game developer miHoYo's 
        censorship of international versions of its games, by 
        applying domestic censorship rules which led to warning 
        or banning players who used ``sensitive'' words or 
        phrases when setting up their profiles.\98\ Such 
        censorship appears to be expanding on miHoYo's past-
        reported practice of replacing such ``sensitive'' 
        phrases with asterisks in chat feeds.\99\

            Worker Exploitation and Abusive Labor Practices

    The lack of protection for Chinese workers under Chinese 
law and the lack of enforcement of existing Chinese laws allow 
for abusive practices toward workers in Chinese factories of 
global businesses. The Chinese Communist Party-led All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) remains the only trade union 
organization permitted under Chinese law.\100\
    A report by China Labor Watch, a U.S.-based nongovernmental 
organization, found instances of abuse and rights violations in 
Chinese factories of third-party printing inkjet and toner 
cartridge manufacturers Zhuhai Mingtu Technology Co. Ltd., and 
Zhuhai Chaojun Co. Ltd., under Dinglong Co. Ltd., in Zhuhai 
municipality, Guangdong province.\101\ The report included 
examples of workers' unpaid overtime, unsafe working 
conditions, discriminatory recruitment processes, illegal 
employment of underage workers, and psychological abuse.\102\ 
The report also detailed the absence of unions or independent 
worker representatives for workers to freely address workplace 
issues.\103\
    Information emerged during this reporting year on forced 
labor by prisoners at Chishan Prison, located in Yuanjiang 
city, Yiyang municipality, Hunan province. Lee Ming-cheh, a 
Taiwanese human rights activist held in Chishan Prison from 
2017 to 2022, detailed how he was forced to make gloves bearing 
the branding of American tool manufacturing company Milwaukee 
Tool while in prison.\104\ Shi Minglei described how prison 
authorities have subjected her husband Cheng Yuan, the co-
founder of an anti-health discrimination nongovernmental 
organization who currently is imprisoned in Chishan Prison, to 
forced labor to sew gloves.\105\ A May 2023 investigative 
report detailed that political prisoners were forced to produce 
gloves in Chishan Prison for Shanghai Select Safety Products, 
which is one of the suppliers for Milwaukee Tool.\106\ [For 
more information on the rights of workers in China, see Chapter 
11--Worker Rights.]

Business and Human Rights

Business and Human Rights

    Notes to Chapter 14--Business and Human Rights

    \1\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights HR/PUB/11/04, June 16, 2011, 
principle 13.
    \2\ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by 
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, July 
17, 1998, entry into force July 1, 2002, art. 7; Council on Foreign 
Relations, ``China's Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,'' updated 
September 22, 2022. See also Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 258, 307.
    \3\ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by 
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, July 
17, 1998, entry into force July 1, 2022, art. 6; Newlines Institute for 
Strategy and Policy and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, ``The 
Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China's Breaches of the 1948 
Genocide Convention,'' March 2021, 49-50; Beth Van Schaack, ``Genocide 
Against the Uyghurs: Legal Grounds for the United States' Bipartisan 
Genocide Determination,'' Just Security, January 27, 2021; Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide 
Convention), approved by U.N. General Assembly resolution 260 (III) of 
December 9, 1948, entry into force January 12, 1951, art. 2; United 
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, accessed July 11, 
2023.
    \4\ U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, 
April 7, 2008, paras. 73, 80.
    \5\ U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, 
Tomoya Obokata, A/HRC/51/26, July 19, 2022, paras. 23-24. See also Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, entry into force 
July 1, 2002, art. 7(c).
    \6\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, paras. 118-23.
    \7\ John Power, ``UN Report on Xinjiang Ups Pressure on Brands from 
Nike to Airbnb,'' Al Jazeera, September 1, 2022.
    \8\ ``Common Concerns about Addressing Uyghur Forced Labor,'' 
Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam 
University, Issue Brief 4 (May 2023). For a discussion on audits in the 
XUAR from the Commission's 2022 reporting year, see Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 
2022), 260.
    \9\ Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Driving Force: Automotive Supply 
Chains and Forced Labor in the Uyghur Region,'' Helena Kennedy Centre 
for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, December 2022.
    \10\ Laura T. Murphy et al., ``Driving Force: Automotive Supply 
Chains and Forced Labor in the Uyghur Region,'' Helena Kennedy Centre 
for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, December 2022, 
1, 14, 36, 41.
    \11\ The XPCC is a paramilitary organization that advances Chinese 
Communist Party control over the XUAR. U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
``Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global 
Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order,'' July 31, 2020. For a 
discussion of the XPCC and its links to human rights abuses in the XUAR 
from the Commission's 2020 reporting year, see Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report (Washington: December 2020), 
240-41.
    \12\ Nuzigum Setiwaldi, Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Fruits of 
Uyghur Forced Labor: Sanctioned Products on American Grocery Store 
Shelves,'' August 28, 2022, 1, 5, 7-8.
    \13\ Nuzigum Setiwaldi, Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Fruits of 
Uyghur Forced Labor: Sanctioned Products on American Grocery Store 
Shelves,'' August 28, 2022, 1, 13, 15, 24.
    \14\ Nuzigum Setiwaldi, Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Fruits of 
Uyghur Forced Labor: Sanctioned Products on American Grocery Store 
Shelves,'' August 28, 2022, 1, 12.
    \15\ Global Agricultural Information Network, Foreign Agricultural 
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, ``Cotton and Products Annual: 
People's Republic of China,'' April 5, 2023, 3.
    \16\ Adrian Zenz, ``Coercive Labor in the Cotton Harvest in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Uzbekistan: A Comparative 
Analysis of State-Sponsored Forced Labor,'' Journal of Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies 56, no. 2 (June 2023): 4-5, 18-19.
    \17\ Sheridan Prasso, ``Shein's Cotton Tied to Chinese Region 
Accused of Forced Labor,'' Bloomberg, November 20, 2022.
    \18\ Sheridan Prasso, ``Temu Sells Products in US Linked to Forced 
Labor in China's Uyghur Region, Analysis Shows,'' Bloomberg, June 13, 
2023.
    \19\ Sherpa, Collectif Ethique sur l'Etiquette, and European Uyghur 
Institute, ``Uyghur Forced Labor: NGOs File New Complaint Requesting 
Judicial Investigation against Garment Companies,'' May 17, 2023. The 
NGOs filed the new complaint after the prosecutor's office closed the 
inquiry on a complaint they filed in April 2021, saying it lacked 
jurisdiction to prosecute the offense.
    \20\ Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law 117-78). See 
also U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``CBP Issues Region-Wide 
Withhold Release Order on Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,'' 
January 13, 2021; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``Uyghur Forced 
Labor Prevention Act: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Operational 
Guidance for Importers,'' June 13, 2022.
    \21\ Josh Zumbrun, ``How a Trade Loophole May Be Letting in Chinese 
Imports Made with Forced Labor,'' Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2023; 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, ``Bipartisan Group of 
Lawmakers Seeks Answers From Administration about Enforcement of Forced 
Labor Legislation,'' April 11, 2023. The de minimis threshold allows 
vendors to send shipments without having to report basic data, if the 
value is under US$800.
    \22\ Sheridan Prasso, ``Shein's Cotton Tied to Chinese Region 
Accused of Forced Labor,'' Bloomberg, November 20, 2022; Ana Swanson 
and Claire Fu, ``Congress Spotlights `Serious' Forced Labor Concerns 
with Chinese Shopping Sites,'' New York Times, June 22, 2023.
    \23\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``Uyghur Forced Labor 
Prevention Act Statistics,'' accessed June 12, 2023.
    \24\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``Uyghur Forced Labor 
Prevention Act Statistics,'' accessed June 12, 2023. See chart titled 
``Shipment Count by Industry and Exam Result.''
    \25\ Valerie Bauman and Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Chinese Firms That 
Threaten U.S. Security Can Get Investment from Federal Employees,'' 
Newsweek, May 22, 2023.
    \26\ Valerie Bauman and Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Chinese Firms That 
Threaten U.S. Security Can Get Investment from Federal Employees,'' 
Newsweek, May 22, 2023. For more information on individual companies, 
see the chart titled ``Sanctioned Chinese Companies Available Via 
TSP.'' For Changhong Meiling Co. Ltd., see the fourth slide; for Huafu 
Fashion Co. Ltd., see the seventh slide; for Xiamen Meiya Pico 
Information Company and Xinjiang Daqo New Energy Co., see the tenth 
slide.
    \27\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, 
art 12; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 17; United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, accessed May 30, 2023. China has signed but not 
ratified the ICCPR. See also U.N. Human Rights Council, The Right to 
Privacy in the Digital Age, Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/39/29, August 3, 2018, paras. 5-
11, 17, 23; U.N. General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by U.N. General 
Assembly on December 18, 2013: 68/167. The Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age, A/RES/68/167, January 21, 2014.
    \28\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wangluo Anquan Fa [PRC Cybersecurity 
Law], passed November 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017, art. 28; 
National Counterintelligence and Security Center, ``Safeguarding our 
Future,'' June 20, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 216.
    \29\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wangluo Anquan Fa [PRC Cybersecurity 
Law], passed November 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017, art. 28; Donald 
C. Clarke, ``The Zhong Lun Declaration on the Obligations of Huawei and 
Other Chinese Companies under Chinese Law,'' Social Science Research 
Network, posted March 28, 2019, 9-11; Amnesty International, ``When 
Profits Threaten Privacy--5 Things You Need to Know about Apple in 
China,'' February 27, 2018.
    \30\ Zach Dorfman, ``Tech Giants are Giving China a Vital Edge in 
Espionage,'' Foreign Policy, December 23, 2020.
    \31\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Qingbao Fa [PRC National 
Intelligence Law], passed June 27, 2017, effective June 28, 2017, arts. 
7, 14; Donald C. Clarke, ``The Zhong Lun Declaration on the Obligations 
of Huawei and Other Chinese Companies under Chinese Law,'' Social 
Science Research Network, posted March 28, 2019, 9-11; Murray Scot 
Tanner, ``Beijing's New National Intelligence Law: From Defense to 
Offense,'' Lawfare (blog), July 20, 2017.
    \32\ Charles Rollet and Conor Healy, ``Uniview PRC China 
Investigation: State Surveillance, Xinjiang/Tibet, and the CCP,'' IPVM, 
February 20, 2023.
    \33\ Charles Rollet and Conor Healy, ``Uniview PRC China 
Investigation: State Surveillance, Xinjiang/Tibet, and the CCP,'' IPVM, 
February 20, 2023.
    \34\ Charles Rollet, ``Dahua Selling Protestor / Banner Alarms, 
Deletes Evidence,'' IPVM, May 30, 2023; Johana Bhuiyan, ``Police in 
China Can Track Protests by Enabling `Alarms' on Hikvision Software,'' 
Guardian, December 29, 2022; Federal Register, ``Addition of Certain 
Entities to the Entity List,'' October 9, 2019. China-based companies 
Dahua and Hikvision were sanctioned by the United States in 2019.
    \35\ Charles Rollet, ``Dahua Selling Protestor / Banner Alarms, 
Delete Evidence,'' IPVM, May 30, 2023.
    \36\ Zoe Haver, ``The Role of US Technology in China's Public 
Security System,'' Insikt Group, Recorded Future, November 1, 2022, 22.
    \37\ Zoe Haver, ``The Role of US Technology in China's Public 
Security System,'' Insikt Group, Recorded Future, November 1, 2022, 22.
    \38\ Zoe Haver, ``The Role of US Technology in China's Public 
Security System,'' Insikt Group, Recorded Future, November 1, 2022, 40.
    \39\ Zoe Haver, ``The Role of US Technology in China's Public 
Security System,'' Insikt Group, Recorded Future, November 1, 2022, 18, 
19.
    \40\ Ryan Technologies Group, LLC, (webpage), accessed June 29, 
2023.
    \41\ Zoe Haver, ``The Role of US Technology in China's Public 
Security System,'' Insikt Group, Recorded Future, November 1, 2022, 2, 
12, 13.
    \42\ Mara Hvistendahl, ``Tibetan Police Bought Thermo Fisher DNA 
Equipment, Chinese Government Documents Show,'' Intercept, September 
13, 2022.
    \43\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: New Evidence of Mass DNA 
Collection in Tibet,'' September 5, 2022.
    \44\ Letter from Jeffrey A. Merkley, James P. McGovern, Marco 
Rubio, and Christopher H. Smith, Commissioners, Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, to Marc N. Casper, Chairman, President and CEO, 
Thermo Fisher Scientific, December 15, 2022.
    \45\ Letter from Marc N. Casper, Chairman, President and CEO, 
Thermo Fisher Scientific, to Jeffrey A. Merkley, Christopher H. Smith, 
Marco Rubio, and James P. McGovern, Commissioners, Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, January 24, 2023.
    \46\ Free Tibet, Students for a Free Tibet, and International Tibet 
Network, ``Tibet Group Response to Thermo Fisher's Flawed Reply to the 
Congressional Executive Commission on China,'' February 28, 2023.
    \47\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Minority Region Collects DNA from 
Millions,'' December 13, 2017.
    \48\ Kristen E. Busch, ``TikTok: Recent Data Privacy and National 
Security Concerns,'' CRS Insight, Congressional Research Service, 
IN12131, March 29, 2023; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wangluo Anquan Fa 
[PRC Cybersecurity Law], passed November 7, 2016, effective June 1, 
2017, arts. 9, 28; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shuju Anquan Fa [PRC Data 
Security Law], passed June 10, 2021, effective September 1, 2021, arts. 
24, 35; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Geren Xinxi Baohu Fa [PRC Personal 
Information Protection Law], passed August 20, 2021, effective November 
1, 2021, arts. 13, 26, 35, 58(4).
    \49\ Kelvin Chan, ``Here Are the Countries That Have Bans on 
TikTok,'' Associated Press, April 4, 2023; Sapna Maheshwari and Amanda 
Holpuch, ``Why Countries Are Trying to Ban TikTok,'' New York Times, 
May 23, 2023.
    \50\ Alexandra S. Levine, ``TikTok Creators' Financial Info, Social 
Security Numbers Have Been Stored in China,'' Forbes, May 30, 2023; 
Emily Baker-White, ``TikTok Parent ByteDance Planned to Use TikTok to 
Monitor the Physical Location of Specific American Citizens,'' Forbes, 
October 20, 2022.
    \51\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Guanyu kaizhan `Qinglang 
Congyan Zhengzhi ``Zi Meiti'' Luanxiang Zhuanxiang Xingdong de 
tongzhi'' [Circular on launching the special action of ``Cleaning and 
Strictly Rectifying the Chaos of `Self Media' ''], issued March 2, 
2023, effective March 12, 2023; Li Xin, ``China Targets Self-Media 
Accounts to Rein in Rumors,'' Sixth Tone, March 13, 2023.
    \52\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Qinglang Congyan 
Zhengzhi `Zi Meiti' luanxiang zhuanxiang xingdong qude jieduanxing 
chengxiao'' [Special action of ``Cleaning and Strictly Rectifying the 
Chaos of `Self Media' '' has achieved results], May 27, 2023.
    \53\ Daisuke Wakabayashi and Claire Fu, ``China's Internet Censors 
Race to Quell Beijing Protest Chatter,'' New York Times, October 14, 
2022.
    \54\ Amy Hawkins, ``Chinese Censors Remove Protest Site Sitong 
Bridge from Online Maps,'' Guardian, June 2, 2023.
    \55\ ``Censors Delete Essay That Blames Xi Jinping for Poverty of 
`Kong Yiji,' '' China Digital Times, April 12, 2023.
    \56\ ``Censors Delete Essay That Blames Xi Jinping for Poverty of 
`Kong Yiji,' '' China Digital Times, April 12, 2023; Michael Schuman, 
``The End of Optimism in China,'' Atlantic, June 29, 2023. See also 
``Word(s) of the Week: `Kong Yiji Literature' (Kong yiji wenxue).'' 
China Digital Times, March 29, 2023.
    \57\ Allison Hung and Charles Rollet, ``Douyin Bans Pro-LGBT 
Content,'' IPVM, January 3, 2023.
    \58\ ``How Douyin Censors Anti-PRC, Communist Party Content,'' 
IPVM, December 28, 2022.
    \59\ ``Minitrue: June 4 Content Restrictions for Douyin Official 
Accounts and Key Opinion Leaders,'' China Digital Times, June 2, 2023.
    \60\ ``Minitrue: June 4 Content Restrictions for Douyin Official 
Accounts and Key Opinion Leaders,'' China Digital Times, June 2, 2023.
    \61\ Gu Ting and Chingman, ``Apple Takes Down Anonymous Social 
Media App Damus from China App Store,'' Radio Free Asia, February 3, 
2023; Damus (@damusapp), ``That was fast,'' Twitter, February 2, 2023, 
1:54 p.m.
    \62\ Sam Biddle, ``Apple Brings Mainland Chinese Web Censorship to 
Hong Kong,'' Intercept, January 26, 2023.
    \63\ Sam Biddle, ``Apple Brings Mainland Chinese Web Censorship to 
Hong Kong,'' Intercept, January 26, 2023; Newley Purnell, ``American 
Tech Giants Are Slowly Cutting Off Hong Kong Internet Users,'' Wall 
Street Journal, June 12, 2023.
    \64\ Zachary M. Seward, ``Apple Hobbled a Crucial Tool of Dissent 
in China Weeks before Widespread Protests Broke Out,'' Quartz, November 
27, 2022.
    \65\ Zachary M. Seward, ``Apple Hobbled a Crucial Tool of Dissent 
in China Weeks before Widespread Protests Broke Out,'' Quartz, November 
27, 2022.
    \66\ Chan Ho-him, ``Disney Cuts `Simpsons' Episode with China 
Labour Camp Reference in Hong Kong,'' Financial Times, February 6, 
2023; Sara Fischer and Rebecca Falconer, ``Disney Drops `Simpsons' 
Episode in Hong Kong That Mentions `Forced Labor,' '' Axios, February 
6, 2023.
    \67\ Chan Ho-him, ``Disney Cuts `Simpsons' Episode with China 
Labour Camp Reference in Hong Kong,'' Financial Times, February 6, 
2023; Sara Fischer and Rebecca Falconer, ``Disney Drops `Simpsons' 
Episode in Hong Kong That Mentions `Forced Labor,' '' Axios, February 
6, 2023.
    \68\ Chan Ho-him, ``Disney Cuts `Simpsons' Episode with China 
Labour Camp Reference in Hong Kong,'' Financial Times, February 6, 
2023.
    \69\ Chan Ho-him, ``Disney Cuts `Simpsons' Episode with China 
Labour Camp Reference in Hong Kong,'' Financial Times, February 6, 
2023.
    \70\ Raffaele Huang, ``China Moves to Censor AI,'' Wall Street 
Journal, April 11, 2023.
    \71\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Public 
Security, and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Hulian 
Wang Xinxi Fuwu Shendu Hecheng Guanli Guiding [Provisions on the 
Administration of Deep Synthesis Internet Information Services], passed 
November 3, 2022, effective January 10, 2023. See also the unofficial 
translation: ``Provisions on the Administration of Deep Synthesis 
Internet Information Services,'' translated in China Law Translate, 
December 11, 2022.
    \72\ Cyberspace Administration of China, ``Guanyu `Shengchengshi 
Rengong Zhineng Fuwu Guanli Banfa' (zhengqiu yijian gao)' gongkai 
zhengqiu yijian de tongzhi'' [Circular regarding the open solicitation 
of comments on the ``Measures for the Management of Generative 
Artificial Intelligence Services (draft for comment)--April 11, 2023. 
See also the following unofficial translation: ``Translation: Measures 
for the Management of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services 
(Draft for Comment)--April 2023,'' translated in China Law Translate, 
April 11, 2023.
    \73\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Public 
Security, and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Hulian 
Wang Xinxi Fuwu Shendu Hecheng Guanli Guiding [Provisions on the 
Administration of Deep Synthesis Internet Information Services], passed 
November 3, 2022, effective January 10, 2023; Cyberspace Administration 
of China, ``Guanyu `Shengchengshi Rengong Zhineng Fuwu Guanli Banfa' 
(zhengqiu yijian gao)' gongkai zhengqiu yijian de tongzhi'' [Circular 
regarding the open solicitation of comments on the ``Measures for the 
Management of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services (draft for 
comment)], April 11, 2023; Laney Zhang, ``China: Provisions on Deep 
Synthesis Technology Enter Into Effect.,'' Global Legal Monitor, 
Library of Congress, April 26, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission 
on China, 2019 Annual Report (Washington: November 18, 2019), 45-46; 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report 
(Washington: December 2020), 243-44; Congressional-Executive Commission 
on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 217-18; 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report 
(Washington: November 2022), 262-64.
    \74\ Jeremy Daum, ``Overview of Draft Measures on Generative AI,'' 
China Law Translate, April 14, 2023.
    \75\ Lea Mok, ``HSBC Terminates Bank Accounts of Hong Kong 
Opposition Party League of Social Democrats Without Giving Reason,'' 
Hong Kong Free Press, June 5, 2023.
    \76\ Hong Kong League of Social Democrats (Shehui minzhu lianxian), 
``PayPal HK fa han zhongzhi fuwu. Jingqing zhichizhe gaiyong qita 
tujing juankuan'' [PayPal HK sends a letter to terminate service. 
Supporters, please find other ways to donate], Facebook, October 12, 
2022; Peter Lee, ``PayPal HK Halts Payments to Hong Kong Pro-Democracy 
Group, Citing Unspecified `Excessive Risks,' '' Hong Kong Free Press, 
October 13, 2022.
    \77\ Peter Lee, ``PayPal HK Halts Payments to Hong Kong Pro-
Democracy Group, Citing Unspecified `Excessive Risks,' '' Hong Kong 
Free Press, October 13, 2022.
    \78\ Lea Mok, ``HSBC Terminates Bank Accounts of Hong Kong 
Opposition Party League of Social Democrats Without Giving Reason,'' 
Hong Kong Free Press, June 5, 2023.
    \79\ Tom Grundy, ``Hong Kong Opposition Party League of Social 
Democrats Urges HSBC to Reverse Unexplained Account Closures,'' Hong 
Kong Free Press, June 19, 2023.
    \80\ Lea Mok, ``HSBC Terminates Bank Accounts of Hong Kong 
Opposition Party League of Social Democrats Without Giving Reason,'' 
Hong Kong Free Press, June 5, 2023; Tom Grundy, ``Hong Kong Opposition 
Party League of Social Democrats Urges HSBC to Reverse Unexplained 
Account Closures,'' Hong Kong Free Press, June 19, 2023; Peter Lee, 
``PayPal HK Halts Payments to Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Group, Citing 
Unspecified `Excessive Risks,' '' Hong Kong Free Press, October 13, 
2022.
    \81\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Jiandie Fa [PRC Counterespionage 
Law], passed November 1, 2014, amended April 26, 2023, effective July 
1, 2023. See also the following unofficial translation: ``Counter-
Espionage Law of the P.R.C. (2023 ed.),'' translated in China Law 
Translate, April 26, 2023.
    \82\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Jiandie Fa [PRC Counterespionage 
Law], passed November 1, 2014, amended April 26, 2023, effective July 
1, 2023; Todd Liao, ``China's New `Anti-Espionage Law' Raises Complex 
Compliance Issues for Multinational Corporations,'' Morgan Lewis, May 
2023, 2-3, 5. See also the following unofficial translation: ``Counter-
Espionage Law of the P.R.C. (2023 ed.),'' translated in China Law 
Translate, April 26, 2023.
    \83\ Todd Liao, ``China's New `Anti-Espionage Law' Raises Complex 
Compliance Issues for Multinational Corporations,'' Morgan Lewis, May 
2023, 3-4.
    \84\ Elaine Yu and Dan Strumpf, ``U.S. Companies in China Worry Due 
Diligence Will End in Spy Dramas,'' Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2023.
    \85\ Michael Martina and Yew Lun Tian, ``China Detains Staff, Raids 
Office of US Due Diligence Firm Mintz Group,'' Reuters, March 24, 2023; 
Demetri Sevastopulo, Ryan McMorrow, and Leo Lewis, ``Chinese Police 
Question Employees at Bain's Shanghai Office,'' Financial Times, April 
26, 2023.
    \86\ Michael Martina and Yew Lun Tian, ``China Detains Staff, Raids 
Office of US Due Diligence Firm Mintz Group,'' Reuters, March 24, 2023.
    \87\ James Pomfret and Engen Tham, ``Exclusive: US Consultancy 
Mintz's Executives Leave Hong Kong after China Raid,'' Reuters, May 19, 
2023.
    \88\ Demetri Sevastopulo, Ryan McMorrow, and Leo Lewis, ``Chinese 
Police Question Employees at Bain's Shanghai Office,'' Financial Times, 
April 26, 2023.
    \89\ United States International Trade Commission, ``Foreign 
Censorship, Part 2: Trade and Economic Effects on U.S. Businesses,'' 
July 2022, 42.
    \90\ Freedom House, ``China'' in Freedom on the Net 2022: 
Countering an Authoritarian Overhaul of the Internet, October 2022; 
United States International Trade Commission, ``Foreign Censorship, 
Part 1: Policies and Practices Affecting U.S. Businesses,'' February 
2022, 36; Human Rights Foundation, ``Corporate Intimidation & 
Censorship in China: Recommendations for Foreign Companies,'' June 
2020; How China Uses Economic Coercion to Silence Critics and Achieve 
Its Political Aims Globally, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2021); Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 
261, 263-64.
    \91\ Human Rights Foundation, ``Corporate Intimidation & Censorship 
in China: Recommendations for Foreign Companies,'' June 2020; Freedom 
House, ``China'' in Freedom on the Net 2022: Countering an 
Authoritarian Overhaul of the Internet, October 2022.
    \92\ Seth Kaplan, ``China's Censorship Reaches Globally through 
WeChat,'' Foreign Policy, February 28, 2023.
    \93\ Yitong Wu and Chingman, ``WeChat Warns Users Their Likes, 
Comments and Histories Are Being Sent to China,'' Radio Free Asia, 
September 8, 2022.
    \94\ Seth Kaplan, ``China's Censorship Reaches Globally through 
WeChat,'' Foreign Policy, February 28, 2023.
    \95\ Acton Institute, ``Acton Institute's TikTok Account Suspended 
for Posting Content about Jimmy Lai Documentary, Hong Kong,'' May 3, 
2023.
    \96\ Enes Freedom (@EnesFreedom), ``I bought myself a second phone 
and downloaded Tiktok to start posting about #China's human rights 
abuses. It literally took the #CCP one week to ban me permanently. 
Tiktok is a Chinese Communist surveillance vehicle!,'' Twitter, March 
23, 2023, 11:09 a.m.; Drew Harwell, ``TikTok Admits It Banned Former 
NBA Player Critical of China,'' Washington Post, March 24, 2023. Enes 
Freedom's TikTok account was reinstated after the March 23, 2023 
congressional testimony of TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew in front of the 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce. David Shepardson and Rami 
Ayyub, ``TikTok Congressional Hearing: CEO Shou Zi Chew Grilled by US 
Lawmakers,'' Reuters, March 24, 2023.
    \97\ Alexandra S. Levine, ``TikTok Parent ByteDance's `Sensitive 
Words' Tool Monitors Discussion of China, Trump, Uyghurs,'' Forbes, May 
1, 2023.
    \98\ Yitong Wu, ``Youxi gongsi shencha yonghu wanjia fa mingan ci 
zao fengsha'' [Gaming company censors users and players are banned for 
posting sensitive words], Radio Free Asia, June 28, 2023.
    \99\ Helen Davidson, ``Genshin Impact Players Say Chinese Game 
Censors `Taiwan' and `Hong Kong' Chat,'' Guardian, October 8, 2020; 
Joseph Allen, ``Genshin Impact Censors Hong Kong and Other Words in 
Chat,'' TechRaptor, October 7, 2020; Josh Ye, ``Western Gamers Up in 
Arms After Mega-Hit Genshin Impact Censors Words Like `Taiwan' and 
`Hong Kong' in Chat Feeds,'' South China Morning Post, October 8, 2020.
    \100\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC Trade Union Law], 
passed April 3, 1992, amended August 27, 2009, arts. 9-11; 
International Labour Organization, Interim Report--Report No. 391, Case 
No. 3184 (China), Complaint date February 15, 2016, October 2019, para. 
149.
    \101\ China Labor Watch, ``Abuse in the Printing Supply Chain,'' 
January 31, 2023.
    \102\ China Labor Watch, ``Abuse in the Printing Supply Chain,'' 
January 31, 2023.
    \103\ China Labor Watch, ``Abuse in the Printing Supply Chain,'' 
January 31, 2023, 7.
    \104\ ``Human Rights Advocates Raise Concerns That Milwaukee Tool 
Gloves Are Made with Forced Labour in a Chinese Prison; Incl. Co. 
Responses,'' Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, December 22, 
2022.
    \105\ ``Human Rights Advocates Raise Concerns That Milwaukee Tool 
Gloves Are Made with Forced Labour in a Chinese Prison; Incl. Co. 
Responses,'' Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, December 22, 
2022.
    \106\ Zhen Wang, ``Chinese Prisoners: We Were Forced to Make 
Milwaukee Tool Gloves for Cents Each Day,'' Wisconsin Watch, May 4, 
2023.

North Korean Refugees in China

North Korean Refugees in China

                     North Korean Refugees in China

                                Findings

         Heightened security along the China-North 
        Korea border due to the coronavirus disease 2019 
        (COVID-19) pandemic and the Chinese government's 
        pervasive surveillance technology, increased the risk 
        of being caught by Chinese police and has significantly 
        reduced the defection rate of North Korean refugees. As 
        a result of the closed border, many North Korean 
        workers are stranded in China and are living in dire 
        conditions without any income, leaving them vulnerable 
        to human trafficking. With the easing of COVID-19 
        restrictions, defection attempts and detentions rose, 
        as authorities have intensified their measures to 
        capture and subsequently repatriate North Korean 
        refugees.
         According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
        the situation of human rights in the Democratic 
        People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), as of June 30, 2023, 
        an estimated 2,000 North Korean refugees were awaiting 
        repatriation in China. Additionally, experts point out 
        that the cost of defection, which involves paying 
        intermediaries or ``brokers'' to arrange an escape, has 
        greatly increased due to the risks associated with 
        defecting from North Korea.
         Repatriated North Koreans remain vulnerable to 
        torture, imprisonment, forced labor, and execution. 
        According to the Citizens' Alliance for North Korean 
        Human Rights (NKHR), a nongovernmental organization 
        advocating for human rights in North Korea, Chinese 
        companies and the DPRK government likely derive 
        financial benefits from forcibly repatriating refugees 
        to North Korea, where they are allegedly subjected to 
        forced labor in detention facilities operated by the 
        DPRK government. This forced labor reportedly involves 
        the production of goods for Chinese businesses at 
        considerably reduced costs.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Urge Chinese authorities to grant legal status to 
        North Korean women and men who marry or have children 
        with citizens of the People's Republic of China. Ensure 
        that children born of such marriages are granted 
        resident status and access to basic rights in 
        accordance with Chinese law and international 
        standards.
          Urge the United Nations to use its influence in 
        calling upon China to ensure that North Korean women 
        and girls who have become victims of trafficking are 
        not penalized for breaking immigration law, while 
        ensuring their provision of temporary residence permits 
        and essential services; and facilitate unrestricted 
        access for the United Nations High Commissioner for 
        Refugees and relevant humanitarian organizations to 
        North Korean trafficking victims in China.
          Reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act (Public 
        Law No. 108-333) to equip the nominated Special Envoy 
        for Human Rights in North Korea with all the necessary 
        tools to provide humanitarian assistance to North 
        Korean refugees in China.
          Work with like-minded allies and partner countries to 
        fully implement the recommendations of the U.N. 
        Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic 
        People's Republic of Korea, as they pertain to the 
        refugees in China.
          Consistent with the assistance programming authorized 
        by the North Korean Human Rights Act, and coordinating 
        with the South Korean government and other allies and 
        partners, fund programs that assist North Koreans 
        outside of North Korea, including projects to stop 
        trafficking, protect refugees, and amass concrete 
        information about the situation of North Koreans in 
        China.

North Korean Refugees in China

North Korean Refugees in China

                     North Korean Refugees in China

                              Introduction

    The Chinese government considers North Korean refugees in 
China to be illegal migrants and maintains a policy of forcible 
repatriation based on a 1998 border protocol with the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).\1\ Repatriated 
North Koreans often face torture, imprisonment, forced labor, 
execution, forced abortions, and sexual violence.\2\
    Regardless of an individual's reason for leaving the DPRK, 
the treatment of forcibly repatriated refugees by the DPRK 
government renders North Koreans in China as refugees sur place 
who fear persecution upon return to their country of origin.\3\ 
Jung Hoon Lee, who formerly served as the Republic of Korea's 
Ambassador for North Korean Human Rights, testified at a 
Commission hearing in June 2023 that, while famine-related 
economic migrants are not categorized as refugees under 
international legal standards, ``the case of North Koreans is 
different; the main reason for their defection to a foreign 
country--economic plight--is the political outcome of a failed 
socialist system under totalitarian rule.'' \4\
    The forced repatriation of North Korean refugees by the 
Chinese government contravenes China's international 
obligations under the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, to which China has 
acceded.\5\ Under the principle of non-refoulement, China is 
also obligated under the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to refrain 
from forcibly repatriating persons if there are ``substantial 
grounds for believing that [they] would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.'' \6\

             Border Conditions during the COVID-19 Pandemic

    Heightened security along the China-North Korea border and 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) travel restrictions have 
deterred refugees from attempting to cross the border and 
contributed to a significant decline in the number of North 
Koreans reaching South Korea via China.\7\ After arriving in 
China, North Korean refugees are monitored by surveillance 
technology--artificial intelligence (AI)-based facial 
recognition software and video cameras--which has made it 
increasingly difficult for North Korean refugees who lack legal 
identification documents to travel internally using public 
transportation in China.\8\ In 2021 and 2022, 63 and 67 North 
Koreans reached South Korea, respectively, the lowest numbers 
recorded since South Korea's Ministry of Unification began 
tracking arrivals in 1998.\9\ Meanwhile, a COVID-19-related 
border closure enforced by North Korean authorities beginning 
in January 2020 prevented Chinese officials from repatriating 
North Koreans who previously fled to China.\10\

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2994.001


    According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation 
of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
as many as 2,000 North Korean refugees were detained in China 
as of September 2022.\12\ The Citizens' Alliance for North 
Korean Human Rights (NKHR), a nongovernmental human rights 
group, expressed concern that when the border closure is 
lifted, mass repatriation will begin, incentivized by the 
potential to exploit refouled refugee labor.\13\ The group's 
findings suggested that repatriated North Koreans provide free 
forced labor for textiles, fake eyelashes, and wigs labeled 
``Made in China,'' although they are produced in North Korean 
detention facilities.\14\
    The increased risks associated with illegally crossing the 
North Korean border into China and, subsequently, neighboring 
countries during the COVID-19 pandemic reportedly led to a rise 
in the financial expenses related to defection.\15\ The fees 
paid to brokers, who aid North Koreans in navigating the route 
from North Korea to South Korea through China, have escalated 
from thousands of dollars before the pandemic to tens of 
thousands of dollars per person.\16\ After escaping North 
Korea, refugees face the possibility of repatriation and 
ensuing abuse and maltreatment.\17\ Despite such risks and 
higher expenses, North Koreans' attempts to defect to South 
Korea increased as COVID-19 restrictions eased.\18\ This rise 
in attempted defections resulted in an increase in detentions, 
as PRC authorities intensified their efforts to apprehend and 
ultimately repatriate North Korean refugees.\19\


------------------------------------------------------------------------
       North Korean Workers in China during the COVID-19 Pandemic
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In July 2022, the U.S. State Department estimated that between 20,000
 and 100,000 North Korean workers remained in China, where many are
 subjected to forced labor and abusive working conditions.\20\ Due to
 the pandemic-related closure of borders, North Korean workers who had
 arrived before the pandemic were unable to return home after their
 contracts with local companies had expired.\21\ In written testimony
 presented at a Commission hearing, Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director
 of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, cited comments made
 by Jung Gwang-il, North Korean defector and director of an activist
 group who provided information about the difficulties facing such
 workers.\22\ According to Jung, North Korean workers in China
 reportedly faced challenges finding employment after their initial
 contracts ended during the COVID-19 pandemic.\23\ Consequently,
 according to Jung, these predominantly female workers, previously
 employed in sewing factories, were ``sold'' by local brokers to work in
 temporary jobs.\24\ This situation resulted in widespread malnutrition
 among the workers, who often resorted to salvaging and boiling
 discarded vegetables from local markets.\25\ Some workers reportedly
 committed suicide due to their inability to remit sufficient funds back
 home to compensate for the bribes that they paid to be sent abroad.\26\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

               Trafficking of North Korean Women in China

    According to human rights organizations and survivors of 
trafficking, thousands of women who aim to flee North Korea are 
exploited by human smugglers and sex traffickers.\27\ 
Conditions for North Korean women in China reportedly worsened 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, because pandemic-related border 
restrictions left North Koreans unable to leave the country and 
employment opportunities ended, leaving North Korean women 
vulnerable to sex traffickers.\28\
    During the May 2023 review of China's compliance with its 
obligations under the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),\29\ a member of the CEDAW 
Committee asked the Chinese delegation about the PRC 
government's forcible repatriation of North Korean women 
refugees in China to the DPRK, and inquired about the legal 
path to refugee status for North Korean women who have children 
in China.\30\ In response, one of the Chinese delegates 
asserted that North Korean women are in China for ``economic 
reasons'' and are not eligible for legal protections.\31\ A 
joint submission by two civil society organizations to the 
CEDAW Committee highlighted the vulnerability of North Korean 
women in China to sex trafficking and forced marriage, as well 
as the lack of rights protections for North Korean women and 
their children.\32\ According to a civil society advocate, this 
was the ``first time that the CEDAW has discussed China's role 
in perpetuating human rights abuses against North Korean 
women.'' \33\

              Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents

    The children of undocumented North Korean mothers and 
Chinese fathers continue to be deprived of legal protections 
guaranteed under Chinese law.\34\ In its 2022 human rights 
report, the U.S. State Department estimated that approximately 
30,000 children in China who were born to North Korean mothers 
and Chinese fathers were unregistered.\35\ Under the PRC 
Nationality Law, all children born in China are entitled to 
Chinese nationality if either parent is a Chinese citizen.\36\ 
North Korean mothers and Chinese fathers, however, frequently 
encounter difficulties in obtaining birth registration and 
nationality documents for their children.\37\ The U.S. State 
Department also noted that some Chinese fathers have avoided 
registering children in order to prevent authorities from 
discovering their North Korean partner's undocumented 
status.\38\ Without proof of resident status, these children 
may not legally access educational and other public 
services.\39\ The denial of nationality rights and access to 
education for these children contravenes China's obligations 
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\40\

North Korean Refugees in China

North Korean Refugees in China

    Notes to Chapter 15--North Korean Refugees in China

    \1\ U.N. General Assembly, Report on the Situation of Human Rights 
in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, A/74/268, August 2, 2019; 
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Reviews the Report of China,'' 
August 13, 2018. The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination expressed concern that ``China continued to deny refugee 
status to asylum-seekers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
and it also continued to forcibly return them to their country of 
origin, regardless of a serious threat of persecution and human rights 
violations.'' Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ministry of State 
Security and People's Republic of China Ministry of Public Security, 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gong'anbu Chaoxian Minzhu Zhuyi Renmin 
Gongheguo Guojia Baoweibu guanyu zai Bianjing Diqu Weihu Guojia Anquan 
he Shehui Zhixu de Gongzuo Zhong Xianghu Hezuo de Yidingshu [Mutual 
Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and 
Social Order in the Border Areas], signed July 8, 1998, effective 
August 28, 1998, arts. 4, 9. The protocol commits each side to treat as 
illegal those bordercrossers who do not have proper visa certificates, 
except in cases involving ``calamity or unavoidable factors.''
    \2\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China 
(Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),'' March 20, 2023, 56-57; North 
Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced Repatriation from 
China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
118th Cong. (2023) (written statement of Joanna Hosaniak, Deputy 
Director General, Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights); 
North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced Repatriation 
from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Jung Hoon Lee, Dean, Graduate School 
of International Studies, Yonsei University and Former Ambassador-at-
Large for North Korean Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Republic of Korea); North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of 
Forced Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (written statement of Suzanne 
Scholte, Chair, North Korea Freedom Coalition); U.N. General Assembly, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, A/76/392, October 8, 2021, 
paras. 8, 13, 19; ``Husbands of Undocumented North Koreans Beg China 
Not to Deport Their Wives,'' Radio Free Asia, November 15, 2021; Office 
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, `I Still Feel the Pain 
. . ..' Human Rights Violations against Women Detained in the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea,'' September 1, 2020, paras. 23, 
65, 67, 80; Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
``Report: Women Detainees Face Serious Human Rights Violations,'' July 
28, 2020; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Protect 7 North Koreans Fleeing 
Oppression,'' May 14, 2019; Roberta Cohen, ``Legal Grounds for 
Protection of North Korean Refugees,'' Brookings Institution, September 
13, 2010; U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, ``Refugee Protection and 
International Migration,'' January 17, 2007, paras. 20-21.
    \3\ U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, ``Refugee Protection and 
International Migration,'' January 17, 2007, paras. 20-21; Human Rights 
Watch, ``China: Protect 7 North Koreans Fleeing Oppression,'' May 14, 
2019; Roberta Cohen, ``Legal Grounds for Protection of North Korean 
Refugees,'' Brookings Institution, September 13, 2010.
    \4\ North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 
Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Jung Hoon Lee, 
Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University and 
Former Ambassador-at-Large for North Korean Human Rights, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea).
    \5\ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by the 
U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons on July 28, 1951, entry into force April 22, 1954, 
arts. 1(A)(2), 33(1). Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, as amended by 
the 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee as someone who, ``owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country . . ..'' Article 33 of the 1951 Convention mandates that, 
``No Contracting State shall expel or return (`refouler') a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.'' United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter V, Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
accessed April 1, 2021. China acceded to the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees on September 24, 1982. Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution A/RES/
2198 of December 16, 1966, entry into force October 4, 1967, art. 1; 
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter V, Refugees and Stateless 
Persons, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, accessed April 1, 
2021. China acceded to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
on September 24, 1982.
    \6\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by U.N. General Assembly 
resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987, 
art. 3. Article 3 states that ``No State Party shall expel, return 
(`refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.'' United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, 
Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, accessed April 1, 2021. China signed 
the Convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 
1988. U.N. Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the 
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st 
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, February 3, 
2016, para. 46.
    \7\ North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 
Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Robert R. King, 
Former Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues, U.S. 
Department of State); Robert R. King, ``Number of North Korean 
Defectors Drops to Lowest Level in Two Decades,'' Center for Strategic 
& International Studies, January 27, 2021.
    \8\ North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 
Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission On China, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Hanna Song, 
Director of International Cooperation, Database Center for North Korean 
Human Rights); Kim Myung-Sung, ``Anmyeoninshik-euro miheng-gamsi, 
talbukmin ssimalineun Jungguk AI'' [Chinese AI that tracks and monitors 
using facial recognition, suppressing North Korean defectors], Chosun 
Ilbo, May 24, 2023; Anthony Kuhn, ``North Korean Defectors May Face 
Deportation by China as COVID Border Controls Ease,'' NPR, April 25, 
2023.
    \9\ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, ``Policy on North 
Korean Defectors,'' accessed April 26, 2023. The Ministry of 
Unification does not provide the number of North Korean defectors for 
the years 1999 and 2000.
    \10\ Kang Hyun-kyung, ``Clock Ticks for China's Massive 
Repatriation of N. Korean Defectors,'' Korea Times, March 28, 2023.
    \11\ The Commission notes that the number of North Koreans entering 
South Korea from January to June 2023 was 99, which is a significant 
increase from 63 and 67 in 2021 and 2022. The Ministry of Unification 
of the Republic of Korea attributed the increase to the relaxation of 
domestic and international travel restrictions in China. For more 
analysis, see Ifang Bremer, ``Number of North Korean Defectors Entering 
South Korea Doubles in Second Quarter,'' NK News, July 18, 2023.
    \12\ Kang Hyun-kyung, ``Clock Ticks for China's Massive 
Repatriation of N. Korean Defectors,'' Korea Times, March 29, 2023; Kim 
Myong-song, ``2000 N.Korean Defectors `Held in China,' '' Chosun Ilbo, 
September 19, 2022.
    \13\ North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 
Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (written statement of Joanna 
Hosaniak, Deputy Director General, Citizens' Alliance for North Korean 
Human Rights).
    \14\ North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 
Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (written statement of Joanna 
Hosaniak, Deputy Director General, Citizens' Alliance for North Korean 
Human Rights); Christy Lee, ``Rights Activists Say China Neglecting 
North Korean Refugees,'' Voice of America, June 15, 2023.
    \15\ North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 
Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission On China, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Hanna Song, 
Director of International Cooperation, Database Center for North Korean 
Human Rights); Sang-Hun Choe, ``For North Koreans in China, Seeking 
Freedom Is More Perilous Than Ever,'' New York Times, July 5, 2023.
    \16\ Choe Sang-Hun, ``For North Koreans in China, Seeking Freedom 
Is More Perilous Than Ever,'' New York Times, July 9, 2023. See also 
``Defection Brokers for North Koreans, Are They Bad?'' Daily NK, April 
4, 2005.
    \17\ Roberta Cohen, ``Can the UN Secretary-General Help the 2,000 
North Koreans Detained in China?,'' Diplomat, July 5, 2023.
    \18\ North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 
Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Hanna Song, 
Director of International Cooperation, Database Center for North Korean 
Human Rights).
    \19\ North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 
Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Hanna Song, 
Director of International Cooperation, Database Center for North Korean 
Human Rights).
    \20\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' July 2022, 327-
28; U.N. Security Council, Note by the President of the Security 
Council, S/2022/132, March 1, 2022, paras. 168, 170, 172; U.N. Security 
Council, Resolution 2397 (2017), S/RES/2397 (2017), December 22, 2017, 
para. 8; Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, 22 
U.S.C. Sec.  9401, sec. 302(a).
    \21\ Kim Soonhi, ``North Korean Workers in China Near 3rd Year 
Stuck There,'' Asahi Shimbun, January 18, 2023; North Korean Refugees 
and the Imminent Danger of Forced Repatriation from China, Hearing of 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) 
(testimony of Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director, U.S. Committee for 
Human Rights in North Korea).
    \22\ North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 
Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Greg Scarlatoiu, 
Executive Director, U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea); 
Uri Friedman, ``Coming of Age in North Korea,'' Atlantic, August 26, 
2016.
    \23\ North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 
Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Greg Scarlatoiu, 
Executive Director, U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea).
    \24\ North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 
Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Greg Scarlatoiu, 
Executive Director, U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea).
    \25\ North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 
Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Greg Scarlatoiu, 
Executive Director, U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea).
    \26\ North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 
Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Greg Scarlatoiu, 
Executive Director, U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea).
    \27\ Choe Sang-Hun, ``After Fleeing North Korea, Women Get Trapped 
as Cybersex Slaves in China,'' New York Times, September 13, 2019; 
Nicola Smith, ``Inside China's `Red Zone' Where North Korean Women Are 
Sold as Slaves,'' Telegraph, March 24, 2023.
    \28\ Nicola Smith, ``Inside China's `Red Zone' Where North Korean 
Women Are Sold as Slaves,'' Telegraph, March 24, 2023.
    \29\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
``Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women Commend China on Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation, Ask about 
Women's Political Participation and Sex-Selective Abortions,'' May 12, 
2023; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
``85th Session (8-26 May 2023) Schedule of Dialogues (as of 31 March 
2023),'' accessed May 13, 2023.
    \30\ Ifang Bremer, ``UN Committee Questions China about Forced 
Deportation of North Korean Women,'' NK News, May 16, 2023; Office of 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Experts of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Commend China on 
Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation, Ask about Women's Political 
Participation and Sex-Selective Abortions,'' May 12, 2023.
    \31\ Ifang Bremer, ``UN Committee Questions China about Forced 
Deportation of North Korean Women,'' NK News, May 16, 2023; Office of 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Experts of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Commend China on 
Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation, Ask about Women's Political 
Participation and Sex-Selective Abortions,'' May 12, 2023.
    \32\ International Federation for Human Rights and Database Center 
for North Korean Human Rights, ``Joint Submission for the Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 85th Session,'' 
April 11, 2023.
    \33\ Ifang Bremer, ``UN Committee Questions China about Forced 
Deportation of North Korean Women,'' NK News, May 16, 2023.
    \34\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' July 2022, 176, 
328.
    \35\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China 
(Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),'' March 20, 2023, 57; Office to 
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, 
``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' July 2022, 328. See also Jenna 
Yoojin Yun, ``30,000 North Korean Children Living in Limbo in China,'' 
Guardian, February 5, 2016.
    \36\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoji Fa [PRC Nationality Law], 
passed and effective September 10, 1980, art. 4. Article 4 of the PRC 
Nationality Law provides that, ``Any person born in China whose parents 
are both Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese 
national shall have Chinese nationality.''
    \37\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' July 2022, 328. 
See also Jenna Yoojin Yun, ``30,000 North Korean Children Living in 
Limbo in China,'' Guardian, February 5, 2016.
    \38\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China 
(Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),'' March 20, 2023.
    \39\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China 
(Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),'' March 20, 2022, 57; Office to 
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, 
``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' July 2022, 328. See also Jenna 
Yoojin Yun, ``30,000 North Korean Children Living in Limbo in China,'' 
Guardian, February 5, 2016. Two June 2023 reports about the recent 
death of a 12-year-old boy--the son of a North Korean mother and 
Chinese father from Changbai Korean Autonomous County, Baishan 
municipality, Jilin province--noted the vulnerability of these 
children. The boy reportedly died in a car accident while attempting to 
search for his mother, whom Chinese authorities repatriated to the DPRK 
in 2019. A source told Daily NK that local public security officials 
not only did not investigate the missing person report from the boy's 
grandmother, but also did not confirm the boy's identity until after 
his death. Following public criticism, the police station in the 
district where the boy's death took place issued a notice to village 
heads in its jurisdiction to provide nationality and household 
registration to unregistered children in similar circumstances whose 
paternity could be verified. Jeong Tae Joo, `` `Stateless' Child of a 
N. Korean Defector Dies in Car Accident in Changbai County,'' Daily NK, 
June 8, 2023; Mun Dong Hui, ``Tuo Beimin nuxing he Zhongguo nanxing 
zhijian chusheng de wu guoji ertong chu zai `baohu sijiao' '' [Children 
born of defector North Korean women and Chinese men exist in a ``dead 
corner without protection''], Daily NK, June 2, 2023.
    \40\ Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by U.N. General 
Assembly resolution 44/25 of November 20, 1989, entry into force 
September 2, 1990, arts. 2, 7, 28(1)(a). Under the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, China is obligated to register children born 
within the country immediately after birth and also to provide all 
children with access to education without discrimination on the basis 
of nationality. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 24.

Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

                  Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

                                Findings

         In contravention of its signed and ratified 
        commitment to the International Convention to End All 
        Forms of Racial Discrimination, the People's Republic 
        of China (PRC) has continued to facilitate the 
        development and use of domestic standards and 
        surveillance technologies that employ racial profiling 
        and thus encourage discrimination on the basis of 
        ethnicity.
         The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
        Party and the State Council jointly released the ``Plan 
        for the Overall Layout of Building a Digital China,'' 
        which prioritizes the digitalization of governance in 
        China, interconnectedness and efficiency across China's 
        digital infrastructure, and expansive control of data 
        using next-generation technologies.
         International observers reported that PRC 
        authorities have increased investment in next-
        generation data-intensive technologies, such as ``smart 
        city'' projects and police geographic information 
        systems designed to better surveil and control society.
         This past year, Party and government agencies 
        released regulations concerning generative artificial 
        intelligence (AI) to ensure that AI-generated content 
        puts the PRC in a positive light, downplays criticism, 
        and excludes content that authorities deem to be a 
        threat to social stability.
         PRC authorities carried out digital 
        surveillance and censorship to suppress the White Paper 
        protests that took place throughout China in late 
        November 2022 in opposition to harsh zero-COVID 
        measures. Leaked directives revealed that Chinese 
        authorities initiated the highest ``emergency 
        response'' level to restrict protesters' access to 
        virtual private networks (VPNs) and instructional 
        materials for accessing foreign news and social media 
        apps.
         During the reporting year, a report documented 
        PRC authorities using advanced technology and ethnic 
        minority online ``influencers'' to present a rosy 
        picture of life in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
        Region in 1,741 videos spread out amoung 18 YouTube 
        accounts with 2,000 to 205,000 followers, as part of a 
        larger effort to deny the PRC's ongoing genocide in the 
        region.
         Authorities implemented technological upgrades 
        to the PRC's censorship mechanisms, together known as 
        the Great Firewall, during the 20th National Congress 
        of the Chinese Communist Party. Information emerged 
        this past year about blogger Ruan Xiaohuan, an 
        information security expert who provided online 
        guidance to circumvent the Great Firewall, and who was 
        sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for ``inciting 
        subversion of state power.''

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Urge the U.S. State Department to submit an inter-
        state complaint to the Committee on the Elimination of 
        Racial Discrimination (CERD) to hold PRC authorities 
        and complicit companies accountable for the development 
        and use of ``ethnicity tracking'' technology. The CERD 
        is obligated to hear all inter-state complaints.
          Consider legislation to prohibit foreign governments 
        from exploiting information and communications 
        technology products that operate in the U.S. to protect 
        citizens' data and freedom of expression.
          Consider adopting legislation to ban the social media 
        app WeChat from federal employees' and contractors' 
        devices. The U.S. Department of Defense, Transportation 
        Security Administration, and several states have 
        already banned WeChat from their employees' devices.
          Encourage the U.S. representatives to the Freedom 
        Online Coalition and other bodies to leverage the 
        coalition's AI and human rights expertise to support 
        alternate facial recognition standards for 
        surveillance, such as privacy-preserving computer 
        vision systems that automatically censor faces and 
        deanonymize those necessary for investigative leads.
          Urge cloud infrastructure providers to offer 
        preferential rates to U.S. Government-funded 
        circumvention tools, to ensure that federal funds have 
        the maximum impact by enabling a greater number of 
        users to circumvent the Great Firewall.
          Impose diplomatic and financial penalties on PRC 
        officials and state media outlets that engage in 
        bullying, intimidation, and harassment of journalists.
          In interactions with Chinese officials, call for the 
        release of political prisoners currently detained or 
        imprisoned for the peaceful exercise of their human 
        rights, such as Ruan Xiaohuan, He Binggang, and Zhang 
        Yibo, all three of whom aimed to assist Chinese 
        citizens in circumventing PRC censorship. The records 
        of detained individuals in the Commission's Political 
        Prisoner Database provide a useful resource for such 
        advocacy. Urge PRC officials, law enforcement, and 
        security forces to end the use of arbitrary detention, 
        disappearance, beatings, torture, and intimidation to 
        suppress and punish individuals for the peaceful 
        exercise of their rights.

Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

                  Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, the Chinese 
Communist Party and government expanded their use of technology 
in an attempt to control public opinion in China and 
internationally, and to restrict freedom of expression and 
freedom of movement, often in violation of international 
treaties. Authorities have widely deployed such technology at 
the expense of human rights and democratic principles and 
institutions.

           Violations of International Commitment to Prevent
                         Racial Discrimination

    Prior to and during the reporting year, Chinese 
surveillance companies promoted the use of standards and the 
sale of surveillance equipment that has the capacity to target 
Uyghurs, Tibetans, and members of other ethnic minority groups 
by tracking people's skin color and using facial attributes as 
an analytical factor. Several reports published during this 
reporting year showed that PRC public security bureaus had 
contracted with Chinese surveillance technology companies 
Dahua, Hikvision, and Uniview to continue to develop 
surveillance systems that tracked protesters and ethnic and 
religious minorities.\1\ The PRC government's use of these 
technologies violated its ratified commitments to the 
International Convention to End All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD).\2\ According to Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) general 
recommendation No. 36 on Preventing and Combating Racial 
Profiling by Law Enforcement Officials, ``States should also 
ensure the adoption and periodical revision of guidelines and 
codes of conduct . . . in the programming, use and 
commercialization of algorithms that may lead to racial 
discrimination . . ..'' \3\
    In 2021, IPVM, a U.S.-based company that monitors security 
technology, reported that Uniview, Hikvision, Dahua, and 
NetPosa coordinated with PRC public security authorities to 
write ``ethnicity tracking'' standards--including the use of 
various ``personal attributes, such as skin color''--to 
facilitate the surveillance of Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other 
ethnic groups in China.\4\ While official guidance reportedly 
only ``recommended'' the use of these racial and ethnic-coded 
standards in police surveillance work, one source indicated 
that Chinese public security bureaus must use the standards 
when conducting camera surveillance.\5\ Examples of such 
``recommended'' standards are national standards said to be 
produced by the Ministry of Public Security using ethnicity 
detection and skin color in facial recognition applications and 
searchable databases for video analysis systems; and another 
standard, issued by the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region's 
(XUAR) Market Supervision Administration Bureau, for 
``technical database requirements'' for XUAR public security 
officials to estimate the probability that someone belongs to a 
particular ethnic group.\6\ In October 2022, a Dahua 
salesperson reportedly remarked that the company used cameras 
with ethnicity tracking features.\7\ In an August 2022 letter 
to the Federal Communications Commission, Dahua stated it had 
``never implemented'' a product to target a specific ethnic 
group for commercial use, but was silent as to government 
use.\8\
    This past year, two think tanks concluded that PRC 
authorities provide strong commercial incentives for companies 
to develop surveillance technology for public security, giving 
them little reason not to follow the government's policy 
direction.\9\ For example, one researcher determined that 
Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) companies, specifically 
those working on facial recognition, that received public 
security contracts from a city with ``above median surveillance 
capacity,'' developed more software products than those that 
did not receive such contracts.\10\ Chinese governments at 
different levels are some of the largest purchasers of AI 
surveillance products because local government officials' 
prospects for promotion depend, at least in part, on their 
track record in ``maintaining social stability.'' \11\ 
Researchers also found a direct relationship between social 
unrest and a subsequent increase in the next quarter of public 
security technology contracts.\12\

       Expansion of Surveillance Capabilities for Social Control

    This past year, authorities expanded surveillance 
capabilities to increase social control by promoting new data-
intensive technologies. Analysts estimated that local 
governments and companies in Chinese cities would spend US$50 
billion by the end of 2024 on ``smart city'' technologies, such 
as collecting data through smartphones, quick response (QR) 
code readers, point of sale machines, air quality monitors, and 
radio frequency identification chips used to store biometric 
information in identification cards.\13\ The PRC's capacity to 
collect data was illustrated by the leak in July 2022 of the 
Shanghai National Police database, which contains information 
on 1 billion Chinese residents and several billion case 
records, including names, addresses, birthplaces, national ID 
numbers, mobile telephone numbers, ethnicity, and details of 
related police cases.\14\ The database also included a label 
for ``people who should be closely monitored,'' a reference to 
people whom public security authorities deem to be risks or 
possible threats to social stability, and whom they thus target 
for surveillance.\15\ In May 2023, IPVM reported that Songjiang 
district in Shanghai municipality was designated a digitization 
``case study,'' with the goal of digitally transforming 
Shanghai's public security bureaus so that they are able to 
access a set of data modules, one of which can alert public 
security about foreign journalists in Shanghai who have 
traveled to the XUAR.\16\ Another of the data modules 
reportedly can identify Uyghurs arriving in Shanghai and verify 
their addresses.\17\ According to an analysis of government 
procurement notices published in May 2023 by China Digital 
Times, 30 provincial governments over a period of 17 years 
signed at least 803 contracts, worth 6.2 billion yuan (almost 
US$902 million), for police geographic information systems 
(PGIS).\18\ PGISs are used to predict and plot unlawful 
activities and patterns, which in China can include anti-
government protests, and other measures related to social 
stability.\19\ As late as May 2023, Dahua marketed a 
surveillance system called ``Jinn'' that conducts grassroots-
level monitoring or ``social governance,'' and that reportedly 
has a feature that can alert public security officers if a 
banner is unfurled in public for too long.\20\

           Surveillance and Tracking of White Paper Protests
                     Using Artificial Intelligence

    Chinese authorities carried out digital surveillance and 
censorship to suppress individuals who participated in protests 
against harsh zero-COVID measures known as the White Paper 
protests that took place throughout China in late November 
2022. Leaked directives revealed that Chinese authorities had 
initiated the highest ``emergency response'' level to restrict 
protesters' access to virtual private networks (VPNs) and 
related instructional materials for promoting access to foreign 
news and social media apps.\21\ The Cyberspace Administration 
of China (CAC) issued draft rules in June 2023 to regulate the 
creation of ad hoc networks, using tools such as Bluetooth and 
Apple's AirDrop, by requiring real-name verification, and 
automatically defaulting them to the ``off'' position ten 
minutes after activation.\22\ While Chinese authorities used AI 
to identify people in videos, the surveillance system struggled 
to capture the variety of videos that protesters uploaded.\23\ 
Observers believe Chinese authorities used data from cell phone 
towers to identify and interview individuals whose phone 
signals were determined to be in the same area as the 
protests.\24\ Chinese telecommunication companies are legally 
required to turn over certain metadata including user accounts' 
real (``legal'') names, operating time and type, network source 
and destination address, network source ports, client hardware 
characteristics, user-released information records, and chat 
logs related to activity that ``mobilizes'' public sentiment or 
causes ``major changes in public opinion.'' \25\ [For 
information about the detention of White Paper protesters, see 
Chapter 1--Freedom of Expression, Chapter 2--Civil Society, and 
Chapter 6--Governance.]

                 ``Digital China'' Policy Developments

    PRC officials continued to promote ``Digital China,'' one 
of Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's long-term strategic 
plans, which prioritizes the digitalization of governance in 
China and expansive control of data.\26\ In March 2023, the 
Party Central Committee and State Council jointly released the 
``Plan for the Overall Layout of Building a Digital China'' 
(Digital China),\27\ which a commentator on technology 
observed\28\ provides ``a framework for contextualizing the 
roles of digital infrastructure [and] the data economy.'' \29\ 
The same commentator highlighted Digital China's ambitious 
timeframe and scale, noting that ``the plan'' specifies that 
the foundation for a Digital China should be completed by 2025 
and should include building an interconnected and efficient 
digital infrastructure, expanding data resources, and 
increasing government digitalization.\30\ An analysis from 
Bitter Winter, an online magazine that reports primarily on 
religious repression in China, called attention to one 
dimension of the Party's role in Digital China's 
implementation, whereby ``local [Chinese] Communist Party 
committees'' will expand internet access to every village in 
China while also ``bringing control and surveillance'' over all 
Chinese citizens.\31\
    In an analysis of the strategic underpinnings of Digital 
China, experts at the Pacific Forum concluded that the Party 
``considers the `control of data' to be essential to its own 
survival, on par with the control of media, the military, and 
personnel.'' \32\ They contend that Digital China is a ``grand 
strategy'' to create the world's first data-driven governance 
society--which PRC officials refer to as Smart Society--the 
success of which is meant to demonstrate the Party's supremacy 
by wielding technology to better provide for Chinese 
citizens.\33\ The March 2023 planning document on Digital China 
added an international development component overlapping with 
the Digital Silk Road, as one of the points of Digital China is 
to ``. . . establish an international exchange and cooperation 
system for the digital domain . . . jointly establish a high 
quality `Digital Silk Road'; and actively develop `Silk Road e-
commerce.' ''\34\ In March 2023, authorities created a new 
ministry-level national data bureau, under the State Council's 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), per the 
Digital China mandate.\35\ An NDRC researcher characterized the 
new bureau as responsible for the ``management of data through 
its entire life cycle,'' saying that ``processes like data 
generation, transmission, storage, processing and handling, 
circulation and trading, and development and use, will all be 
within the scope of the new bureau's overall planning and 
management responsibilities.'' \36\ Data and technology are 
central to Digital China's implementation, not only in more 
effectively providing public goods to Chinese citizens, but 
also in manipulating artificial intelligence (AI) and big data 
for social and political control.\37\

         Malign Influence and Data Sharing on TikTok and WeChat

    Under PRC law, technology companies operating in China are 
required to share data with authorities upon request, thus 
infringing on users' privacy.\38\ The government has passed a 
range of legal provisions that require technology companies' 
and their employees' compliance regarding state secrets and 
information harming national security and economic 
development.\39\ The PRC Cybersecurity Law requires companies 
and individuals within China to provide technical support and 
assistance to public security and state security entities, 
which a researcher at the Hoover Institution interpreted as 
making networks, data, and communication available to these 
entities.\40\
    Both TikTok and WeChat continued to collect data 
internationally and send it back to China, where PRC 
authorities could access it. Internet 2.0, a joint U.S. and 
Australian cybersecurity firm, published a report in July 2022 
showing that TikTok had sent a large amount of data to China 
and concluded that it was engaging in data harvesting.\41\ In 
May 2023, Forbes revealed that foreign content creators' tax 
data is stored on servers in China and is accessible by Chinese 
employees.\42\ In December 2022, TikTok's parent company 
ByteDance said that two of its employees, in the course of 
investigating a company information leak, had improperly 
accessed user data, including the internet protocol (IP) 
addresses of two journalists that would reveal their physical 
location.\43\ The Australian Financial Times (AFT) reported 
that TikTok had updated its algorithms for broadcast and 
moderation of livestreams, relying on a team of engineers that 
included at least a dozen affiliated with ByteDance, some of 
whom were working in China.\44\ An Australian senator told AFT 
that he was concerned the engineers' access to overseas data 
could be used to create algorithms that suppress content 
critical of the Party and elevate supportive content.\45\
    In September 2022, Freedom House reported that in 21 of 30 
assessed countries, PRC state-owned media outlets strongly 
influenced the direction of news content accessible to Chinese 
speakers, especially via the social media platform WeChat.\46\ 
Diaspora outlets that post on WeChat must conform to WeChat's 
censorship requirements.\47\ Since WeChat does not have an 
advanced search function, users view stories determined by 
WeChat's algorithm instead of actively searching for content 
that must conform with PRC provisions requiring technology 
companies to spread ``positive energy'' and not ``disrupt 
economic and social order.'' \48\ According to two Wall Street 
Journal reporters who wrote a book on digital surveillance in 
China, Chinese security personnel may have access to a ``back-
end portal'' to monitor conversations and behavioral data on 
WeChat.\49\ Authorities also have used WeChat as a tool of 
political repression against foreign entities and 
individuals.\50\ This past year, Allen Shen, a candidate for 
the Minnesota House of Representatives, alleged that he could 
not post on WeChat because of his political positions about 
China.\51\

               Increased Repression and Censorship Online

    The PRC increased digital repression with targeted 
censorship campaigns and digital upgrades to the Great Firewall 
timed to the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party in October 2022. One expert expressed the belief that 
China's internet censorship likely had a technological upgrade 
with better deep packet inspection to identify and block 
transmitted data deemed undesirable.\52\ Around the same time, 
the PRC blocked transport layer security (TLS) data for anti-
censorship programs, and not just the ports, on a massive scale 
for the first time.\53\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Ruan Xiaohuan, Anonymous Blogger and Guide to  Circumventing the Great
              Firewall, Sentenced to  Seven Years in Prison
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In February 2023, the Shanghai Municipal No. 2 People's Court
 sentenced Ruan Xiaohuan, an anonymous blogger with professional
 expertise in information security, to seven years' imprisonment, two
 years' deprivation of political rights, and a fine on the charge of
 ``inciting subversion of state power.'' \54\ Until his detention in May
 2021, Ruan not only provided guidance on how to circumvent China's
 censorship tools to access information outside China, he also wrote
 about sensitive topics, such as political analysis critical of Chinese
 authorities, the 1989 Tiananmen protests, and the hidden wealth of
 Chinese officials.\55\ Authorities reportedly used the registration
 information from an old account on Douban, a social media website, that
 used a similar online name and had content criticizing the government,
 in order to apprehend him.\56\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 Increased Regulation of Generative AI
                    for Social and Political Control

    PRC agencies are regulating the technology behind 
generative AI, such as ChatGPT, to ensure that AI-generated 
content depicts China in a positive light, downplays criticism, 
and excludes other content that Party and government 
authorities deem to be threats to social stability. One analyst 
found that the PRC's approach to governing generative AI 
products is relatively ``piecemeal,'' focused on specific 
usages of the technology, in contrast with, e.g., the European 
Union's attempt at a more comprehensive governance plan.\57\ 
Two such regulatory efforts this past year included the 
following:

         In December 2022, the Cyberspace 
        Administration of China (CAC), Ministry of Industry and 
        Information Technology, and Ministry of Public Security 
        jointly released new provisions on AI-generated text, 
        images, videos, and virtual scenes.\58\ The provisions 
        are meant to ``dispel rumors,'' prevent the 
        dissemination of ``fake news,'' and prohibit the use of 
        AI content generation in ``activities . . . endangering 
        national security'' or ``disrupting economic and social 
        order.'' \59\
         In April 2023, the CAC released draft measures 
        requiring that generative AI technology ``must not 
        subvert state power, . . . incite separatism, . . . 
        promote ethnic hatred, ethnic discrimination, . . . 
        [or] promote content that may disrupt economic and 
        social order.'' \60\ PRC authorities frequently cite 
        ``social stability'' to justify controlling online 
        content, and these draft measures suggest officials are 
        concerned about ChatGPT reporting on issues that 
        authorities deem to be politically sensitive, such as 
        the genocide in the XUAR.\61\

            Manipulating International Opinion and Increased
                           Harassment Online

    This past year, the Commission observed reports of PRC 
authorities using advanced technology and third parties as 
``influencers'' to present a rosy picture of life in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) as part of a larger 
effort to deny the ongoing genocide in the XUAR. In a statement 
published in August 2022, the U.S. State Department concluded 
that the PRC had engaged in efforts to ``manipulate'' and 
``dominate'' global discourse about the XUAR and to 
``discredit'' reporting about genocide and crimes against 
humanity against ethnic and religious minority groups in the 
region.\62\ In a related propaganda effort studied by 
researchers at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
(ASPI), multichannel corporations closely tied to the Party and 
government have used and in some cases produced videos of young 
``influencers'' from among Uyghur, Kazakh, and other ethnic 
minority groups in China to promote propaganda on foreign media 
platforms.\63\ The ASPI researchers analyzed 1,741 videos 
distributed among 18 YouTube ``influencer'' accounts, with an 
estimated 2,000 to 205,000 followers for each account.\64\ The 
Party reportedly has paid as much as US$620,000 to online 
influencers and production companies for propaganda and to 
counter international human rights documentation.\65\
    PRC authorities continued to harass and intimidate 
individuals who tried to report on China's human rights record 
or report stories that diverge from official narratives. An 
ASPI report concluded that the Party was ``successfully 
silencing governments, businesses and civil society 
organizations globally and deterring them from criticising the 
CCP's [human] rights record and actions,'' in part by using 
Facebook as a tool in information operations, both to heighten 
PRC preferred ``positive'' narratives and to disseminate 
disinformation.\66\ Freedom House reported that online 
harassment of journalists, especially of women of East Asian 
descent, had increased, and linked the increase to Chinese 
official media outlets naming specific journalists.\67\ [For 
more information, see Chapter 20--Human Rights Violations in 
the U.S. and Globally.]

Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

    Notes to Chapter 16--Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

    \1\ Donald Maye and Charles Rollet, ``Dahua Race and Skin Color 
Analytic Cameras,'' IPVM, October 17, 2022; Charles Rollet and Conor 
Healy, ``Uniview PRC China Investigation: State Surveillance, Xinjiang/
Tibet, and the CCP,'' IPVM, February 20, 2023; IPVM, ``Hikvision 
Platform Set Alarms on Falun Gong, Protesters, Religion,'' December 29, 
2022; Johana Bhuiyan, ``Police in China Can Track Protests by Enabling 
`Alarms' on Hikvision Software,'' Guardian, December 29, 2022.
    \2\ ``Dahua and Hikvision Co-Author Racial and Ethnic PRC Police 
Standards,'' March 30, 2021; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by U.N. 
General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of December 21, 1965, entry into 
force January 4, 1969. Ethnicity tracking standards are defined as 
using race, including skin color, to search video surveillance footage 
and databases. IPVM found evidence that while ``ethnicity tracking'' 
could be focused on any ethnic group, the standards are focused on 
Uyghurs and Tibetans.
    \3\ U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
General Recommendation No. 36 on Preventing and Combating Racial 
Profiling by Law Enforcement Officials, CERD/C/GC/36, November 24, 
2020, para. 63.
    \4\ ``Dahua and Hikvision Co-Author Racial and Ethnic PRC Police 
Standards,'' March 30, 2021; ChineseStandard.net, ``Chinese Standard 
GB/T, GBT, GB,'' accessed May 31, 2023.
    \5\ ``Dahua and Hikvision Co-Author Racial and Ethnic PRC Police 
Standards,'' March 30, 2021; ChineseStandard.net, ``Chinese Standard 
GB/T, GBT, GB,'' accessed May 31, 2023.
    \6\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Market Supervision 
Administration Bureau, ``Gong'an shipin tuxiang xinxi xinyong xitong--
Di er bufen: shujuku jishu yaoqiu'' [Video and image information 
application system for public security--Part 2: Technical requirements 
for database], December 15, 2018, reprinted in IPVM; ``Dahua and 
Hikvision Co-Author Racial and Ethnic PRC Police Standards,'' March 30, 
2021.
    \7\ ``Dahua Racial Analytics and Human Rights Abuses--Explainer 
Video,'' IPVM, November 17, 2022.
    \8\ ``Dahua Racial Analytics and Human Rights Abuses--Explainer 
Video,'' IPVM, November 17, 2022; Andrew D. Lipman, ``Dahua Technology 
USA Inc. Request for Confidential Treatment of Dahua Ex Parte ET Docket 
No. 21-232,'' IPVM, August 29, 2022.
    \9\ Bulelani Jili, ``China's Surveillance Ecosystem & the Global 
Spread of Its Tools,'' Digital Forensic Research Lab, Atlantic Council, 
October 2022, 4-5; Ilaria Massocco, ``The AI-Surveillance Symbiosis in 
China,'' Big Data China, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, July 27, 2022.
    \10\ Ilaria Massocco, ``The AI-Surveillance Symbiosis in China,'' 
Big Data China, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 
27, 2022.
    \11\ Ilaria Massocco, ``The AI-Surveillance Symbiosis in China,'' 
Big Data China, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 
27, 2022.
    \12\ Ilaria Massocco, ``The AI-Surveillance Symbiosis in China,'' 
Big Data China, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 
27, 2022.
    \13\ Josh Chin and Liza Lin, Surveillance State: Inside China's 
Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control (New York: St. Martins' 
Press, 2022), 126-27.
    \14\ Brenda Goh, Sophie Yu, Stella Qiu, Eduardo Baptista and Josh 
Ye, ``Hacker Claims to Have Stolen 1 Bln Records of Chinese Citizens 
from Police,'' Reuters, July 6, 2022; Karen Hao and Rachel Liang, 
``China Police Database Was Left Open Online for Over a Year, Enabling 
Leak,'' Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2022; Zack Whittaker and Carly 
Page, ``A Huge Data Leak of 1 Billion Records Exposes China's Vast 
Surveillance State,'' TechCrunch, July 7, 2022.
    \15\ Karen Hao and Rachel Liang, ``China Police Database Was Left 
Open Online for Over a Year, Enabling Leak,'' Wall Street Journal, July 
6, 2022; Qian Gang, ``Preserving Stability,'' China Media Project, 
September 14, 2012.
    \16\ ``Shanghai Police Track Uyghurs and Foreign Journalists 
Visiting Xinjiang,'' May 2, 2023; International Business Machines 
Corporation, ``Creating a Data Module,'' November 4, 2021.
    \17\ ``Shanghai Police Track Uyghurs and Foreign Journalists 
Visiting Xinjiang,'' IPVM, May 2, 2023.
    \18\ Arthur Kaufman and Adam Yu, ``Cloud Cover: Police Geographic 
Information System Procurement across China, 2005-2022,'' China Digital 
Times, May 2023, 1-2.
    \19\ Arthur Kaufman and Adam Yu, ``Cloud Cover: Police Geographic 
Information System Procurement across China, 2005-2022,'' China Digital 
Times, May 2023, 1-2, 4.
    \20\ Charles Rollet, ``Dahua Selling Protestor / Banner Alarms, 
Deletes Evidence,'' IPVM, May 30, 2023; Gulchehra Hoja and RFA 
Investigative, ``In China, AI Cameras Alert Police When a Banner Is 
Unfurled,'' Radio Free Asia, June 5, 2023; Samantha Hoffman and Peter 
Mattis, ``China's Proposed `State Security Council', Social Governance 
under Xi Jinping,'' Asia Dialogue, University of Nottingham Asia 
Research Institute, November 21, 2013.
    \21\ Cindy Carter, ``Minitrue: Three Leaked Censorship Directives 
Target Anti-Lockdown Protests and Censorship-Circumvention Tools,'' 
China Digital Times, November 30, 2022; Helen Davidson, ``China Brings 
in `Emergency' Level Censorship over Zero-COVID Protests,'' Guardian, 
December 2, 2022; Liza Lin, ``China Clamps Down on Internet as It Seeks 
to Stamp Out COVID Protests,'' Wall Street Journal, December 1, 2022.
    \22\ TechSlang, ``What Is an Ad Hoc Network? A Short Definition of 
Ad Hoc Network,'' accessed June 12, 2023. Ad hoc networks, which are 
often called peer-to-peer networks, allow devices (such as computers 
and cell phones) to connect to each other without the use of internet/
Wi-Fi, similar to tools such as Bluetooth and Apple's AirDrop. 
Alexander Boyd, ``Netizen Voices: Apple Restricts AirDrop in China 
after Sitong Bridge Protest,'' China Digital Times, November 11, 2022. 
Protesters reportedly used Bluetooth and Apple's AirDrop to share 
content about protests or to coordinate actions, as the decentralized 
nature of the devices allowed them to evade Great Firewall censorship 
and the requirements to use one's real name and identity. Kelly Ng, 
``Chinese Censors Take Aim at AirDrop and Bluetooth,'' BBC, June 8, 
2023; Paul Best, ``Apple Restricts AirDrop File-Sharing in China That 
Protesters Have Used,'' Fox Business, November 27, 2022; Cyberspace 
Administration of China, Jin Juli Zizuwang Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding 
(zhengqiu yijian gao) [Provisions on the Management of Proximity Ad Hoc 
Networks (draft for public comment)], issued June 6, 2023, arts. 2, 6-
8.
    \23\ Paul Mozur, Muyi Xiao, and John Liu, `` `Breach of the Big 
Silence': Protests Stretch China's Censorship to Its Limits,'' New York 
Times, November 30, 2022; Paul Mozur, Claire Fu, and Amy Chang Chien, 
``How China's Police Used Phones and Faces to Track Protesters,'' New 
York Times, December 2, 2022.
    \24\ Paul Mozur, Claire Fu, and Amy Chang Chien, ``How China's 
Police Used Phones and Faces to Track Protesters,'' New York Times, 
December 2, 2022; Cate Cadell and Christian Shepherd, ``Tracked, 
Detained, Vilified: How China Throttled Anti-COVID Protests,'' 
Washington Post, January 5, 2023.
    \25\ Cate Cadell and Christian Shepherd, ``Tracked, Detained, 
Vilified: How China Throttled Anti-COVID Protests,'' Washington Post, 
January 5, 2023; Cyberspace Administration of China, Juyou Yulun 
Shuxing huo Shehui Dongyuan Nengli de Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Anquan 
Pinggu Guiding [Provisions for Security Assessments of Internet 
Information Services with Public Opinion Attributes or Social 
Mobilization Capabilities], issued November 15, 2018, arts. 3, 5. For 
additional information on ``real-name registration,'' see Jyh-An Lee 
and Ching-Yi Liu, ``Real-Name Registration Rules and the Fading Digital 
Anonymity in China,'' Washington International Law Journal 25, no. 1 
(January 1, 2016): 11-17.
    \26\ David Dorman and John Hemmings, ``Digital China: The Strategy 
and Its Geopolitical Implications,'' Issues and Insights, Pacific Forum 
International, 23, no. 2 (February 2023): 1-3; China Cyberspace, `` 
`Zhongguo Wangxin' zazhi fabiao `Xi Jinping zongshuji zhiyin woguo 
shuzi jichu sheshi jianshe shuping' '' [``China Cyberspace'' magazine 
publishes a ``Review of General Secretary Xi Jinping's Guide to the 
Construction of My Country's Digital Infrastructure''], reprinted in 
People's Daily, April 10, 2023; ``Xi Jinping: shishi Guojia Dashuju 
Zhanlue jiakuai jianshe Shuzi Zhongguo'' [Xi Jinping: implement the 
National Big Data Strategy to accelerate the construction of Digital 
China], December 9, 2017.
    \27\ Zac Haluza, ``Building a Digital China,'' Root Access 
(Substack), March 7, 2023; ``Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa `Shuzi 
Zhongguo Jianshe Zhengti Buju Guihua' '' [Central Committee and State 
Council publish ``Plan for the Overall Layout of the Construction of 
Digital China''], Xinhua, February 27, 2023.
    \28\ Zac Haluza, ``Building a Digital China,'' Root Access 
(Substack), March 7, 2023; ``Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa `Shuzi 
Zhongguo Jianshe Zhengti Buju Guihua'' [Central Committee and State 
Council publish ``Plan for the Overall Layout of the Construction of 
Digital China''], Xinhua, February 27, 2023.
    \29\ Zac Haluza, ``Building a Digital China,'' Root Access 
(Substack), March 7, 2023; ``Zac Haluza,'' Root Access (Substack), 
accessed June 30, 2023; `` `Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa `Shuzi 
Zhongguo Jianshe Zhengti Buju Guihua' '' [Central Committee and State 
Council publish ``Plan for the Overall Layout of the Construction of 
Digital China''], Xinhua, February 27, 2023.
    \30\ Zac Haluza, ``Building a Digital China,'' Root Access 
(Substack), March 7, 2023; ``Zac Haluza,'' Root Access (Substack), 
accessed June 30, 2023; `` `Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa `Shuzi 
Zhongguo Jianshe Zhengti Buju Guihua' '' [Central Committee and State 
Council publish ``Plan for the Overall Layout of the Construction of 
Digital China''], Xinhua, February 27, 2023.
    \31\ Tan Liwei, ``The Digital China 2023 Plan: Is There Something 
New?,'' Bitter Winter, March 6, 2023; `` `Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan 
yinfa `Shuzi Zhongguo Jianshe Zhengti Buju Guihua' '' [Central 
Committee and State Council publish ``Plan for the Overall Layout of 
the Construction of Digital China''], Xinhua, February 27, 2023.
    \32\ David Dorman and John Hemmings, ``Digital China: The Strategy 
and Its Geopolitical Implications,'' Issues and Insights, Pacific Forum 
International, 23, no. 2 (February 2023): 1.
    \33\ David Dorman and John Hemmings, ``Digital China: The Strategy 
and Its Geopolitical Implications,'' Issues and Insights, Pacific Forum 
International, 23, no. 2 (February 2023): 1.
    \34\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa `Shuzi Zhongguo Jianshe 
Zhengti Buju Guihua''' [Central Committee and State Council publish 
``Plan for the Overall Layout of the Construction of Digital China''], 
Xinhua, February 27, 2023; ``Assessing China's Digital Silk Road 
Initiative: A Transformative Approach to Technology Financing or a 
Danger to Freedoms?,'' Council on Foreign Relations, 2020.
    \35\ Jian Xu, ``What Does China's Newly Launched National Data 
Bureau Mean to China and Global Data Governance?,'' Internet Policy 
Review, April 25, 2023.
    \36\ Li Guangqian, ``Wei Shuzi Zhongguo jianshe zhuru xin dongli'' 
[Injecting new momentum in the construction of Digital China], Legal 
Daily, reprinted in Economic Daily, March 15, 2023; David Dorman, ``The 
National Data Bureau's Five Toughest Battles,'' Digital China Wins the 
Future, March 16, 2023. See also Qin Chen, ``Why Does China Want to 
Build a National Data Center System?,'' TechNode, May 17, 2022.
    \37\ David Dorman and John Hemmings, ``Digital China: The Strategy 
and Its Geopolitical Implications,'' Issues and Insights, Pacific Forum 
International, 23, no. 2 (February 2023): 1; Mercator Institute for 
China Studies, ``The CCP's Vision for Digital Transformation, with 
Rebecca Arcesati,'' May 6, 2022, 0:00-6:05; Matthew Johnson, ``China's 
Grand Strategy for Global Data Dominance,'' CGSP Occasional Papers 
Series, Hoover Institution, no. 2 (April 2023): 7.
    \38\ U.N. Human Rights Council, The Right to Privacy in the Digital 
Age, Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/48/
31, September 13, 2021.
    \39\ Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the 
Management of Internet Information Services], issued September 25, 
2000, amended January 8, 2011, arts. 5, 14-16; Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Guojia Anquan Fa [PRC National Security Law], passed and 
effective July 1, 2015, art. 77; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia 
Qingbao Fa [PRC National Intelligence Law], passed July 1, 2015, art. 
7; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wangluo Anquan Fa [PRC Cybersecurity Law], 
passed November 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017, arts. 6, 9, 12, 28, 
67-68; Matthew Johnson, ``China's Grand Strategy for Global Data 
Dominance,'' CGSP Occasional Papers Series, Hoover Institution, no. 2 
(April 2023): 32; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Mima Fa [PRC Password Law], 
passed October 26, 2019, art. 26; Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Yunyong 
Dashuju Jiaqiang Dui Shichang Zhuti Fuwu he Jianguan de Ruogan Yijian 
[Several Opinions of the General Office of the State Council Regarding 
Using Big Data to Strengthen Market Principle Service and Supervision], 
June 24, 2015; Cyberspace Administration of China, Jishi Tongxin Gongju 
Gongzhong Xinxi Fuwu Fazhan Guanli Zanxing Guiding [Interim Provisions 
on the Management of the Development of Instant Messaging Tools of 
Public Information Services], issued and effective August 7, 2014, 
arts. 2, 6, 8. This is a sample and not an exhaustive list.
    \40\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wangluo Anquan Fa [PRC Cybersecurity 
Law], passed November 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017, art. 28; Matthew 
Johnson, ``China's Grand Strategy for Global Data Dominance,'' CGSP 
Occasional Papers Series, Hoover Institution, no. 2 (April 2023): 32.
    \41\ Thomas Perkins and David Robinson, ``TikTok Analysis,'' 
Internet 2.0, July 17, 2022, 1, 13-14; ``Data Harvesting vs Data 
Mining,'' Java T point, accessed June 6, 2023.
    \42\ Alexandra Levine, ``TikTok Creators' Financial Info, Social 
Security Numbers Have Been Stored in China,'' Forbes, May 30, 2023.
    \43\ Salvador Rodriguez, ``TikTok Parent ByteDance Says Employees 
Improperly Accessed User Data,'' Wall Street Journal, December 22, 
2022; Glenn Thrush and Sapna Maheshwari, ``Justice Dept. Investigating 
TikTok's Owner over Possible Spying on Journalists,'' New York Times, 
March 17, 2023.
    \44\ Max Mason, ``TikTok Code Being Worked On from China Prompts 
Fresh Alarm,'' Australian Financial Review, June 5, 2023.
    \45\ Max Mason, ``TikTok Code Being Worked On from China Prompts 
Fresh Alarm,'' Australian Financial Review, June 5, 2023.
    \46\ Sarah Cook, Angeli Datt, Ellie Young, and BC Han, Freedom 
House, ``Beijing's Global Media Influence: Authoritarian Expansion and 
the Power of Democratic Resilience,'' September 2022, 8.
    \47\ Sarah Cook, Angeli Datt, Ellie Young, and BC Han, Freedom 
House, ``Beijing's Global Media Influence: Authoritarian Expansion and 
the Power of Democratic Resilience,'' September 2022, 8-9.
    \48\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, and State 
Administration for Market Regulation, Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Suanfa 
Tuijian Guanli Guiding [Provisions on the Administration of Internet 
Information Service Algorithm Recommendations], issued December 31, 
2021, effective March 1, 2022, art. 6; ``Positive Energy,'' China Media 
Project, April 16, 2021. ``Positive energy'' in this context means 
content that puts the PRC in a positive light and is not critical or 
negative. Zeyi Yang, ``The Dark Side of a Super App like WeChat,'' MIT 
Technology Review, October 18, 2022; Tracy Qu, ``China's Algorithm Law 
Takes Effect to Curb Big Tech's Sway in Public Opinion,'' South China 
Morning Post, March 1, 2022.
    \49\ Josh Chin and Liza Lin, Surveillance State: Inside China's 
Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 2022), 111.
    \50\ Seth Kaplan, ``China's Censorship Reaches Globally through 
WeChat,'' Foreign Policy, February 28, 2023.
    \51\ Seth Kaplan, ``China's Censorship Reaches Globally through 
WeChat,'' Foreign Policy, February 28, 2023.
    \52\ Gu Ting, ``China Steps Up Social Media Censorship, `Upgrades' 
Great Firewall Ahead of Congress,'' Radio Free Asia, October 17, 2022; 
Ericka Chickowski, ``Deep Packet Inspection Explained,'' AT&T 
Cybersecurity Blog, AT&T Business, October 20, 2020. Deep packet 
inspection refers to the creation of a virtual ``checkpoint'' to 
monitor and stop specific data in transit between devices.
    \53\ Rita Liao and Zack Whittaker, ``Popular Censorship 
Circumvention Tools Face Fresh Blockade by China,'' TechCrunch, October 
5, 2022; Great Firewall Report, ``Large Scale Blocking of TLS-Based 
Censorship Circumvention Tools in China,'' Net4People BBS, GitHub, 
October 4, 2022. TLS is an encrypted method for users to communicate 
with websites.
    \54\ Rights Defense Network, ``Yishen huoxing qi nian de wangluo 
gongchengshi Ruan Xiaohuan (wangming Biancheng Suixiang) ershen yanqi'' 
[Second-instance hearing of network engineer Ruan Xiaohuan (webname 
Program-Think), who was sentenced to seven years, has been postponed], 
May 21, 2023; Gao Feng, ``Shanghai Court Jails Blogger for Seven Years 
over `Subversive' Posts,'' Radio Free Asia, March 22, 2023; Nectar Gan, 
``An Influential Chinese Blogger Disappeared from the Internet. This 
Woman Says She Knows Why,'' CNN, March 29, 2023. For more information 
about Ruan Xiaohuan, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
record 2023-00101.
    \55\ Rights Defense Network, ``Yishen huoxing qi nian de wangluo 
gongchengshi Ruan Xiaohuan (wangming Biancheng Suixiang) ershen yanqi'' 
[Second-instance hearing of network engineer Ruan Xiaohuan (webname 
Program-Think), who was sentenced to seven years, has been postponed], 
May 21, 2023; Nectar Gan, ``An Influential Chinese Blogger Disappeared 
from the Internet. This Woman Says She Knows Why,'' CNN, March 29, 
2023.
    \56\ Rights Defense Network, ``Yishen huoxing qi nian de wangluo 
gongchengshi Ruan Xiaohuan (wangming Biancheng Suixiang) ershen yanqi'' 
[Second-instance hearing of network engineer Ruan Xiaohuan (webname 
Program-Think), who was sentenced to seven years, has been postponed], 
May 21, 2023.
    \57\ Graham Webster, ``How Will China's Generative AI Regulations 
Shape the Future? A DigiChina Forum,'' DigiChina, April 19, 2023; 
Spencer Feingold, ``The EU's Artificial Intelligence Act, Explained,'' 
World Economic Forum, March 28, 2023. The European Union AI Act, also 
known as the Artificial Intelligence Act, focuses on strengthening 
rules around data quality, transparency, human oversight, and 
accountability, and addresses ethical questions regarding the 
implementation of artificial intelligence in various sectors and 
scenarios through a risk classification system.
    \58\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, and Ministry of Public Security, Hulianwang 
Xinxi Fuwu Shendu Hecheng Guanli Guiding [Provisions on the Management 
of Deep Synthesis of Internet Information Services], issued December 
11, 2022, effective January 10, 2023, arts. 4, 6, 11, 23; Karen Hao, 
``China, a Pioneer in Regulating Algorithms, Turns Its Focus to 
Deepfakes,'' Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2023; Afiq Fitri, ``China 
Has Just Implemented One of the World's Strictest Laws on Deepfakes,'' 
Tech Monitor, January 10, 2023.
    \59\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, and Ministry of Public Security, Hulianwang 
Xinxi Fuwu Shendu Hecheng Guanli Guiding [Provisions on the Management 
of Deep Synthesis of Internet Information Services], issued December 
11, 2022, effective January 10, 2023, arts. 4, 6, 11, 17, 23; Karen 
Hao, ``China, a Pioneer in Regulating Algorithms, Turns Its Focus to 
Deepfakes,'' Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2023; Afiq Fitri, ``China 
Has Just Implemented One of the World's Strictest Laws on Deepfakes,'' 
Tech Monitor, January 10, 2023; Hine Emmie and Luciano Floridi, ``New 
Deepfake Regulations in China Are a Tool for Social Stability, but at 
What Cost?,'' Nature Machine Intelligence 4, no. 7 (2022): 608-10.
    \60\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Guojia Hulianwang Xinxi 
Bangongshi Guanyu ``Shengchengshi Rengong Zhineng Fuwu Guanli Banfa 
(Zhengqiu Yijian Gao)'' Gongkai Zhengqiu Yijian de Tongzhi [Cyberspace 
Administration of China Circular on Public Comment on the 
Administrative Measures for Generative Artificial Intelligence Services 
(draft for public comment)], April 11, 2023, arts. 4 (1),7.
    \61\ Helen Davidson, `` `Political Propaganda': China Clamps Down 
on Access to ChatGPT,'' Guardian, February 23, 2023; China Daily 
(@zhongguoribo), ``#ChatGPT zai shejiang wenti shang he Mei zhengfu 
koujing yizhi,'' [#ChatGPT is consistent with the US government on 
Xinjiang-related issues#], Weibo post, February 19, 2023, 8:00 p.m.; 
Hine Emmie and Luciano Floridi, ``New Deepfake Regulations in China Are 
a Tool for Social Stability, but at What Cost?,'' Nature Machine 
Intelligence 4, no. 7 (2022): 608-10.
    \62\ U.S. Department of State, ``PRC Efforts to Manipulate Global 
Public Opinion on Xinjiang,'' August 24, 2022; U.S. Department of 
Justice, ``40 Officers of China's National Police Charged in 
Transnational Repression Schemes Targeting U.S. Residents,'' April 17, 
2023.
    \63\ Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, and Hsi-Ting Pai, ``Frontier 
Influencers: The New Face of China's Propaganda,'' International 
Cyberpolicy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Policy Brief 
65 (October 20, 2022): 11-12, 36-42.
    \64\ Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, and Hsi-Ting Pai, ``Frontier 
Influencers: The New Face of China's Propaganda,'' International 
Cyberpolicy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Policy Brief 
65 (October 20, 2022): 11-12, 36-42; Daria Impiombato and Hsi-ting Pai, 
``How Chinese Influencers Are Dodging YouTube's Anti-Propaganda 
Rules,'' Rest of World, November 30, 2022; Fergus Ryan, `` `Guerrilla' 
Influencers Are Pushing Chinese Propaganda on YouTube,'' Nikkei Asia, 
December 4, 2022.
    \65\ Max Mason, ``How Beijing Uses TikTok's Sister App to Spread 
Propaganda,'' Australian Financial Review, December 6, 2022.
    \66\ Albert Zhang and Tilla Hoja, ``China's Information Operations 
Are Silencing and Influencing Global Audiences on Xinjiang,'' 
Strategist (blog), Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 20, 
2022.
    \67\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``Beijing's Global Media Influence 
2022: Authoritarian Expansion and the Power of Democratic Resilience,'' 
September 2022.

Tibet

Tibet

                               IX. Tibet

                                 Tibet

                                Findings

         The Commission did not observe any interest 
        from People's Republic of China (PRC) officials in 
        resuming formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama's 
        representatives, the last round of which, the ninth, 
        was held in January 2010.
         The PRC continued to restrict, and seek to 
        control, the religious practices of Tibetans, the 
        majority of whom practice Tibetan Buddhism. Authorities 
        in Tibetan areas issued prohibitions on forms of 
        religious worship, particularly during important 
        religious events or around the times of politically 
        sensitive anniversaries, and restricted access to 
        religious institutions and places of worship, including 
        Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and temples. The PRC 
        continued to assert control over the process of 
        selection and recognition of Tibetan Buddhist 
        reincarnated teachers, including the Dalai Lama.
         The Commission did not observe reports of 
        Tibetan self-
        immolations that occurred during the 2023 reporting 
        year, the first year since 2021 in which no self-
        immolations were reported to have occurred. Chinese 
        authorities reportedly continued to harass family 
        members of Tibetans who had self-immolated in the past.
         International observers expressed concern over 
        reports in recent years of PRC policies aimed at 
        severely restricting the domains of usage of Tibetan 
        and other local languages, including school closures, 
        reduction in school instruction in languages other than 
        Standard Mandarin, and a network of colonial boarding 
        schools that house a majority of Tibetan school-age 
        children.
         Reports published this year documented police-
        run programs in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Qinghai 
        province in which officials have collected sensitive 
        biometric information from millions of Tibetans and 
        other local residents in recent years. The DNA, blood 
        sample, and iris scan collection programs reportedly 
        are employed as forms of social control, surveillance, 
        and repression of the residents of Tibet.
         In contravention of international human rights 
        standards, officials punished residents of Tibetan 
        areas for exercising protected rights, including the 
        expression of religious belief, criticism of PRC 
        policies, and sharing information online. Notable cases 
        this past year included those of writer Rongbo Gangkar, 
        a writer and translator detained since 2021 after he 
        led a discussion at a meeting in which he advocated 
        celebration of the Dalai Lama's birthday; Thubsam, 
        accused of sending ``information about Tibet'' to 
        individuals in Europe and India, and later sentenced to 
        two years in prison for ``leaking state secrets'' and 
        ``separatism''; and Jamyang, also known as Zangkar 
        Jamyang, a writer detained in June 2020 and held 
        incommunicado until information emerged in March 2023 
        on his four-year sentence related to his advocacy for 
        Tibetan language rights in schools.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:
          Work with the United Nations to help set up visits by 
        U.N. human rights officials, including the High 
        Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur 
        on minority issues, and the Special Rapporteur on the 
        right to education, to Tibetan areas of China to 
        independently assess the human rights situation there, 
        free of any restrictions or hindrances by Chinese 
        Communist Party or government officials, to be followed 
        by a full report to the United Nations on their 
        findings.
          Adopt and implement appropriate legislation to 
        prohibit American companies doing business with Chinese 
        police and other law enforcement agencies in Tibet from 
        selling or providing equipment used by those forces in 
        gross human rights violations, including mass coercive 
        biometric data-gathering and surveillance programs.
          Work with government officials, parliamentarians, and 
        nongovernmental organizations in like-minded countries 
        to pressure the Chinese government and Communist Party 
        to respect, as a matter of the right to religious 
        freedom and as recognized under Chinese and 
        international law, that it is the right of Tibetan 
        Buddhists to identify and educate all religious 
        teachers, including the Dalai Lama, in a manner 
        consistent with Tibetan Buddhist practices and 
        traditions.
          Urge the Chinese government to cease treating the 
        Dalai Lama as a security threat, and encourage the 
        resumption of genuine dialogue, without preconditions, 
        between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama or 
        his representatives.
          In interactions with Chinese officials, call for the 
        release of Tibetan political prisoners currently 
        detained or imprisoned for the peaceful exercise of 
        their human rights. The records of detained Tibetans in 
        the Commission's Political Prisoner Database provide a 
        useful resource for such advocacy. Urge the Chinese 
        government and its law enforcement and security forces 
        to end the use of arbitrary detention, disappearance, 
        beatings, torture, and intimidation to suppress and 
        punish Tibetans for the peaceful exercise of their 
        rights.
          Urge the Chinese government to invite representatives 
        of governments and international organizations to meet 
        with Gedun Choekyi Nyima, whom the Dalai Lama 
        recognized as the 11th Panchen Lama, and his parents, 
        all three of whom disappeared shortly after his 
        recognition as Panchen Lama in 1995.

Tibet

Tibet

                                 Tibet

  Status of Negotiations between the Chinese Government and the Dalai 
                      Lama or His Representatives

    During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, the Commission 
did not observe any interest on the part of People's Republic 
of China (PRC) officials in resuming formal negotiations with 
the Dalai Lama or his representatives. The last round of 
negotiations, the ninth, was held in January 2010.\1\

                            Self-Immolations

    The Commission did not observe reports of Tibetan self-
immolations that occurred during the 2023 reporting year, the 
first year since 2021 in which no self-immolations were 
reported to have occurred.\2\ The Commission has observed 154 
self-immolations reported to focus on political or religious 
issues since 2009 in Tibetan areas.\3\ Radio Free Asia reported 
that Chinese authorities in Gansu and Sichuan provinces 
continued to harass family members of Tibetans who had self-
immolated, denying them employment opportunities, preventing 
them from taking university admissions exams, and in at least 
one case imprisoning the nephew of a self-immolator for 
contacting people outside Tibet.\4\

                     Religious Freedom for Tibetans

    The PRC continued to restrict, and seek to control, the 
religious practices of Tibetans, particularly practitioners of 
Tibetan Buddhism. International observers and rights advocacy 
groups reported on continuing violations of international human 
rights standards, including the right to freely worship and to 
choose one's own religion, that result from PRC religious 
policy and its implementation.\5\ PRC officials exercise 
political control and supervision of Tibetan Buddhist monastic 
and educational institutions through the United Front Work 
Department's National Religious Affairs Administration.\6\ [For 
more information on religion and religious freedom in China, 
see Chapter 3--Freedom of Religion.]
    During the 2023 reporting year, PRC organizations continued 
to target Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns with propaganda in 
ideological education sessions held at monastic institutions 
and other sites.\7\ These propaganda efforts included the study 
of Chinese Communist Party ethnic and religious policy 
initiatives and priorities, such as the ``sinicization'' of 
Tibetan Buddhism and managing the practice of Tibetan Buddhism 
``to adapt to socialist society''; \8\ as well as Chinese legal 
provisions, including the Measures on the Management of the 
Reincarnation of Living Buddhas\9\ and local religious 
regulations.\10\ These study sessions emphasized the Party and 
government's primacy over and control of religious 
institutions\11\ and monks' and nuns' responsibilities to be 
loyal to and supportive of the Party and government.\12\ The 
propaganda campaigns at monastic institutions placed special 
focus this year on the 20th National Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party,\13\ and authorities across Tibet reportedly 
ordered monks to watch broadcasts of the 20th Party Congress at 
their monasteries.\14\
    PRC authorities in Tibetan areas issued prohibitions on 
forms of religious worship, particularly during important 
religious events or around the times of politically sensitive 
anniversaries, and restricted access to religious institutions 
and places of worship, including Tibetan Buddhist monasteries 
and temples.\15\ Examples from this past year included:
         Ganzi TAP: Prohibitions on religious 
        celebrations for the Dalai Lama's birthday.\16\ 
        Authorities in some Tibetan areas, including Kardze 
        (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan 
        province, stepped up surveillance of Tibetans around 
        the time of the Dalai Lama's July 6 birthday, 
        reportedly stationing informants in some homes to 
        ensure that residents were not conducting religious 
        rituals in celebration.\17\ Authorities also warned 
        Tibetans not to share images on their phones and 
        threatened those found with images of the Dalai Lama on 
        their phones with detention or imprisonment.\18\
         Detention for creating unauthorized WeChat 
        group. In July 2022, police in Sershul (Shiqu) county, 
        Kardze (Ganzi) TAP, took into custody Lotse,\19\ 
        accusing him of setting up a WeChat group without 
        registering it with authorities.\20\ The WeChat group, 
        ``Happy 80th Birthday'' (in Tibetan, ``80 `khrungs skar 
        ''), had approximately 100 members ``from across 
        Tibet,'' and was created to celebrate the birthdays of 
        Tibetan religious figures.\21\
         Warning against celebrating the birthday of 
        Kirti Rinpoche. Sichuan province authorities warned 
        Tibetans against online celebrations of the August 8 
        birthday of Kirti Rinpoche, the exiled Tibetan Buddhist 
        religious leader of Kirti Monastery, located in Ngaba 
        (Aba) county, Ngaba (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous 
        Prefecture (T&QAP), Sichuan.\22\ In 2021, authorities 
        in Aba and Dzoege (Ruo'ergai) counties banned religious 
        activities at Kirti Monastery around the same date.\23\
         Death in custody and police torture. On August 
        24, 2022, police in Serthar (Seda) county, Kardze 
        (Ganzi) TAP, detained five Tibetan residents of Serthar 
        after they lit incense for a religious ceremony and 
        prayed in public.\24\ Officials initially held Chugdar, 
        Gelo, Tsedo, Bamo, and Kori\25\ at a Serthar detention 
        facility and refused to let their families visit them 
        in detention or send them food.\26\ On August 26, 
        authorities told Chugdar's family that he had died in 
        custody and told them that they could only collect his 
        body if they signed a document stating that police had 
        not caused his death, offering financial compensation 
        in return for compliance.\27\ Sources alleged that 
        police tortured the five detainees and that this 
        torture had caused Chugdar's death.\28\
         Prison sentences for sending donations 
        abroad.\29\ Information emerged in November 2022 on the 
        April 2021 detentions of Rachung Gedun and Sonam 
        Gyatso, two senior monks at Kirti Monastery.\30\ 
        Chinese authorities accused the two monks of having 
        sent donations to the Dalai Lama and Kirti Rinpoche, 
        both of whom live in exile in India.\31\ In July 2022, 
        an unidentified court sentenced Rachung Gedun to three 
        years in prison, and Sonam Gyatso to two years.\32\

                             THE DALAI LAMA

    Reports continued to emerge this year of Chinese 
authorities penalizing Tibetans for expressions of reverence 
for the Dalai Lama, including through harassment and 
surveillance, detention, and imprisonment. Authorities in 
Tibetan areas reportedly detained Tibetans in connection with 
celebrations or observances of the Dalai Lama's birthday, 
discussions of him and well-wishes for him online, and 
possession of his image or recordings of his teachings, 
including the following cases:

         Rongbo Gangkar.\33\ On an unknown date in or 
        around early 2021, authorities in Rebgong (Tongren) 
        county, Malho (Huangnan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, 
        Qinghai province, detained Rongbo Gangkar, a Tibetan 
        writer and translator, near Rebgong's Rongbo Gonchen 
        Monastery.\34\ Based on information from local sources, 
        Radio Free Asia (RFA) later reported that officials had 
        detained Rongbo Gangkar after he led a discussion at a 
        meeting in which he advocated celebration of the Dalai 
        Lama's birthday.\35\ Rongbo Gangkar's whereabouts in 
        custody were unconfirmed, but one source told RFA that 
        authorities held him at a Rebgong detention 
        facility.\36\
         Sisters detained over Dalai Lama photo. On 
        July 11, 2022, police in Amdo (Anduo) county, Nagchu 
        (Naqu) municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 
        detained Yudron, a young Tibetan woman.\37\ Several 
        weeks earlier, Amdo county officials had detained 
        Yudron's older sister Dzumkar\38\ after finding a photo 
        of the Dalai Lama on an altar during a search of their 
        house.\39\ Police transferred both women to an unknown 
        detention facility or facilities in Lhasa municipality, 
        TAR.\40\
         Detention for possession of Dalai Lama images, 
        pendant. On August 12, 2022, authorities in Lhasa 
        detained Karma Samdrub\41\ on suspicion of ``contacting 
        separatists'' after he was found with images of the 
        Dalai Lama in his car and on a pendant he was 
        wearing.\42\

                COVID-19 in the Tibet Autonomous Region

    After the rapid spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-
19) across Tibet beginning in mid-2022, the subsequent official 
response of lockdowns and sending residents to mass quarantine 
centers in parts of the TAR led to widespread criticism of 
``zero-COVID'' measures and to the largest protests in Tibet 
since 2008. Following COVID-19 outbreaks in August 2022, 
authorities ordered lockdowns in parts of the TAR including 
Lhasa and Shigatse (Rikaze) municipalities and Ngari (Ali) 
prefecture, confining residents to their homes, enforcing 
frequent testing, and sending thousands of residents to mass 
quarantine centers.\43\ In September and October, sources 
reported that Lhasa residents were publicly complaining about 
authorities' failure to control the outbreaks and to provide 
food, medicine, and adequate housing conditions for those in 
lockdown or in quarantine facilities.\44\ Online commenters 
reported inappropriate use of quarantine orders, including for 
those who were not confirmed to have COVID-19, uninhabitable 
conditions and inadequate food at quarantine centers, and 
severe difficulties in obtaining food and financial support for 
people forced to stop working.\45\ In late September, at least 
five Lhasa residents reportedly committed suicide under the 
strain of lockdown conditions.\46\
    Despite a public apology by Lhasa's vice mayor in late 
September,\47\ officials responded to residents' discontent 
over zero-COVID measures by censoring online complaints and 
investigating and detaining hundreds of people for expressing 
their grievances.\48\ On October 10, the Lhasa Public Security 
Bureau announced that it had ordered administrative punishments 
for over 1,000 people suspected of violating anti-COVID 
measures.\49\ Heavy communications restrictions in the TAR 
limited reporting on these detainees, but information was 
available on some individual cases, including mother and 
daughter Rigzin Drolma and Tashi Yangkyi, detained in Lhasa in 
August for sharing ``illegal photos,'' ostensibly referring to 
the COVID-19 situation in Tibet;\50\ and Yidam, one of two 
people detained in Lhasa after they organized volunteers to 
create stone prayer engravings for victims of COVID-19.\51\ 
Outside the TAR, Tibetan language teacher Gontse was detained 
in Sichuan province in August for sharing photos and videos of 
lockdown conditions in Lhasa.\52\
    After TAR authorities announced in late October that they 
would partially relax some of the lockdown restrictions, 
hundreds of protesters demonstrated in Lhasa against continuing 
COVID controls.\53\ Sources reported that many of the 
protesters appeared to be Han Chinese migrant workers demanding 
permission to leave Tibet to return to their homes elsewhere in 
China.\54\ Of approximately 200 protesters detained in 
connection with the Lhasa protests, 47 were Tibetan; 
authorities reportedly discriminated against Tibetan detainees 
by holding them in custody for longer periods (14 days in 
detention, compared with 1 day for many non-Tibetan detainees), 
interrogating them repeatedly and denying them adequate 
food.\55\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mass Biometric Data Collection and Surveillance in Tibetan Areas
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  During the past year, rights and technology monitoring groups
 documented massive police surveillance programs in Tibetan areas where
 officials have been collecting sensitive biometric information from
 millions of Tibetans and other local residents.\56\ Human Rights Watch
 wrote in September 2022 about DNA collection programs in the TAR in
 recent years, in which public security officials collected blood
 samples, apparently without obtaining consent, and possibly without any
 way for individuals to refuse to participate.\57\ A Citizen Lab report,
 also published in September, found that public security officials had
 collected between 919,000 and 1.2 million DNA samples in the TAR
 between 2016 and 2022.\58\ Some DNA collection programs took place at
 primary schools, targeting children and reportedly without parental
 involvement or consent.\59\ Citizen Lab found that Tibetan Buddhist
 monasteries and resident monks were also targets for DNA
 collection.\60\ In December 2022, Citizen Lab separately reported on an
 iris scan collection program in Qinghai province from 2019 to 2022.\61\
 The program, also organized by public security agencies, may have
 collected around 1.2 to 1.4 million iris scans in those three years,
 amounting to between 21 and 25 percent of Qinghai's population.\62\
  Public security officials have offered a range of justifications for
 the biometric data collection programs, but the author of the Citizen
 Lab reports found that the DNA collection program ``is a form of social
 control directed against Tibet's people'' \63\ and that the Qinghai
 iris scan collection program ``effectively treat[s] entire communities
 as populated by potential threats to social stability.'' \64\ Both the
 DNA and iris scan collection programs are notable for being operated
 separate from any criminal investigation.\65\
  In light of concerns over these programs, in December 2022, the
 Commission wrote to Thermo Fisher Scientific, an American company that
 manufactures DNA kits and sequencers that police in the TAR have
 purchased,\66\ to inquire into Thermo Fisher's knowledge of how its
 products are used by police and other security forces, and the extent
 to which the company was taking steps to prevent its products from
 being used in human rights abuses.\67\ In response, Thermo Fisher's
 president and chief executive officer wrote that the company believed
 that the use of its products by TAR police was ``entirely consistent
 with . . . routine forensics investigations''; \68\ the company did not
 address concerns that law enforcement agencies in the TAR have engaged
 in human rights abuses.\69\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                      Language and Cultural Rights

    China's Constitution and laws contain provisions affirming 
the freedom of ethnic minorities to ``use and develop'' \70\ 
their languages, yet Chinese authorities continued to threaten 
linguistic rights in Tibetan areas, including through 
implementation of policies promoting or enforcing the use of 
Mandarin Chinese instead of Tibetan, as well as policies of 
neglect with regard to minority languages. PRC ethnic policy 
ignores unrecognized linguistic communities, including in 
Tibetan areas,\71\ and individuals or communities with 
languages that lack official recognition are deprived of access 
to official support in education and other government 
services.\72\ The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
to which China is a State Party,\73\ recognizes and protects 
the rights of ethnic and linguistic minority groups to use 
their languages.\74\ [For more information on language rights 
and ethnic policy, see Chapter 7--Ethnic Minority Rights.]
    Chinese authorities restricted the scope of Tibetan-
language education, or announced plans to do so, in parts of 
Tibet. In Ngaba (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, 
Sichuan province, education officials reportedly began to phase 
out the use of Standard Tibetan as an instructional language in 
primary and secondary schools in early 2023, relegating 
Tibetan-language study to a single class.\75\ Radio Free Asia 
reported that the 2023 nationwide university entrance 
examinations (gaokao) were only offered in Mandarin Chinese, 
and not regional languages, for the first time.\76\ Prefectural 
education bureau officials in Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture, Sichuan, announced that Tibetan-language classes 
would not be offered at all in primary schools beginning in 
2024.\77\
    International observers expressed concern over recent 
reports of PRC policies aimed at severely restricting the 
domains of usage of Tibetan and other local languages and 
threatening the cultural rights of Tibetans. In a November 2022 
letter, four U.N. Special Rapporteurs ``express[ed] serious 
concern about . . . a series of oppressive actions against 
Tibetan educational, religious[,] and linguistic 
institutions,'' including school closures, reduction in school 
instruction in languages other than Standard Mandarin, and a 
network of colonial boarding schools that house a majority of 
Tibetan school-age children.\78\ Six U.N. Special Rapporteurs, 
in a February 2023 letter to the Chinese government expressing 
concern over labor transfer programs in Tibetan areas, noted 
that the programs were ``eroding Tibetan minority languages, 
cultural practices, and religion'' in both execution and 
intent.\79\
    In its March 2023 concluding observations on China's 
compliance with the International Convention on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the U.N. Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights urged China to afford all citizens 
the ``right to enjoy fully their own cultural identity and take 
part in cultural life [and] to ensure the use and practice of 
their language and culture[,]'' and called on China ``to 
abolish immediately the coerced residential (boarding) school 
system imposed on Tibetan children and allow private Tibetan 
schools to be established.'' \80\ The Committee also called on 
China to ``take adequate measures to protect cultural diversity 
and the cultural practices and heritage of religious 
minorities'' over concerns about the ``systematic and massive 
destruction of religious sites'' in China.\81\

    Restrictions on the Freedom of Expression and the Free Flow of 
                              Information

    During the 2023 reporting year, Tibet remained\82\ one of 
the most closed-off areas in the world, with tight restrictions 
on communications into and out of the region.\83\ Chinese 
authorities continued to restrict contact between Tibetans in 
Tibetan areas of China and individuals or groups abroad, 
including by punishing or threatening to punish those found to 
have contact with Tibetans in exile--often those in India--or 
who have shared information in Tibet about Tibetans living 
abroad.\84\ Chinese authorities also strictly monitored online 
communications platforms to find and punish Tibetans who were 
alleged to have committed crimes online.\85\ Illustrative 
examples of Tibetans detained by Chinese authorities in 
connection with online expression included:
         Yangdron.\86\ On November 15, 2022, public 
        security officials in Damshung (Dangxiong) county, 
        Lhasa municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 
        detained Yangdron, a restaurant owner and Damshung 
        resident, reportedly in connection with her criticism 
        on social media of Chinese authorities' misrule and 
        abuse of power in Tibet.\87\
         Thubsam.\88\ On May 3, 2022, public security 
        officials in Kardze (Ganzi) county, Kardze (Ganzi) 
        Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, 
        detained Thubsam, a 28-year-old Tibetan craftsman 
        originally from Sershul (Shiqu) county, Kardze TAP.\89\ 
        Authorities reportedly accused him of sending 
        ``information about Tibet'' to individuals in Europe 
        and India.\90\ His whereabouts in custody were not 
        reported, but on November 21, officials from the Ganzi 
        TAP Intermediate People's Court told his wife and 
        brother that the court had sentenced him to two years 
        in prison for ``leaking state secrets'' and 
        ``separatism.'' \91\
         Palgon.\92\ In August 2022, police in Golog 
        (Guoluo) TAP, Qinghai province, detained Palgon, a 30-
        year-old Tibetan writer and former teacher from Pema 
        (Banma) county, Golog TAP, after he contacted Tibetans 
        living abroad and offered prayers to the Dalai 
        Lama.\93\ Detailed information on his detention, 
        including his whereabouts, his condition in custody, 
        and the official accusation against him, was 
        unavailable; authorities did not provide Palgon's 
        family this information either.\94\
         Yangtso.\95\ On March 2, 2023, police in 
        Namling (Nanmulin) county, Shigatse (Rikaze) 
        municipality, TAR, detained Yangtso, a 23-year-old 
        Namling resident and restaurant employee, after 
        checking her phone and finding that she had sent photos 
        and videos to someone outside China; the content of the 
        photos and videos was not reported.\96\ Her family was 
        unable to visit her in detention at an unidentified 
        facility in Shigatse.\97\
         Guru Kyab.\98\ In late December 2022, 
        information emerged about the case of Guru Kyab, a 
        Tibetan resident of Chigdril (Jiuzhi) county, Golog 
        TAP, whom Chinese authorities detained on an unknown 
        date in 2021 for corresponding with Tibetans living 
        outside China.\99\ Detailed information on his 
        detention was limited, but sources reported that he 
        served a prison sentence of at least one year until his 
        release in November 2022.\100\ He went to India in 2016 
        and maintained contact with people there upon his 
        return to Tibet.\101\ Following the end of his sentence 
        in November 2022, authorities kept Guru Kyab under 
        post-release restrictions as a ``high-level suspect 
        target.'' \102\
    In December 2022, the TAR People's Congress Standing 
Committee passed the TAR Regulations on the Administration of 
Network Information Security (the Regulations) to comply with 
requirements of the PRC Cybersecurity Law and the PRC National 
Security Law.\103\ The Regulations, which took effect on 
February 1, 2023, officially promote the creation and 
dissemination of several types of online content,\104\ prohibit 
others,\105\ and require that internet service providers, 
alongside public and state security agencies, create platforms 
to facilitate reporting by individuals or organizations of 
``behavior threatening network information security.'' \106\ 
While the Regulations do not define this behavior, the list of 
content types which individuals and groups are prohibited from 
creating, sharing, downloading, or forwarding includes content 
that:

         publicizes the symbols of ``Tibetan 
        independence'' organizations or their members' images, 
        comments, and activities;\107\
         ``distorts and slanders human rights 
        conditions in Tibet''; \108\
         ``distorts or undermines the use of Standard 
        Mandarin Chinese as the national commonly used language 
        and script''; \109\ and
         ``distorts and slanders Chinese religious 
        policy and laws'', pointing to legal measures by which 
        the PRC asserts its control over the selection and 
        recognition of reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist 
        teachers.\110\

         SIX TIBETAN INTELLECTUALS DETAINED IN SICHUAN PROVINCE

    In September 2022, the Kardze (Ganzi) Intermediate People's 
Court in Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan, 
sentenced six Tibetan writers and intellectuals to prison terms 
ranging from 4 to 14 years on charges including ``inciting 
separatism.'' \111\ Chinese authorities detained the six--
Drubpa Kyab, Tsering Drolma, Samdrub, Gangbu Yubum, Senam, and 
Pema Rinchen--between late 2020 and spring 2021, and while the 
Commission observed reports of their detentions as early as 
2021, further reporting on their detentions did not emerge 
until October 2022.\112\ Detailed information on their cases, 
including what Chinese authorities alleged was evidence of 
``inciting separatism,'' remained unavailable.\113\ Each of the 
six prisoners had previously been detained by Chinese 
authorities at least once.\114\

Heavy Restrictions Remain on Freedom of Movement, Travel, and Access to 
                                 Tibet

    This reporting year, Chinese authorities maintained heavy 
restrictions on physical access to Tibet and movement within or 
from Tibet, with periodic intensification of physical 
restrictions and inspection and surveillance at ``politically 
sensitive'' times of year.\115\ The Foreign Correspondents' 
Club of China reported that no foreign reporters surveyed who 
applied for access to report in the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(TAR) in 2022 were granted such permission.\116\ Authorities in 
Lhasa municipality, TAR, restricted the numbers of visitors at 
the Jokhang Temple and the Potala Palace around the time of the 
Dalai Lama's birthday in July 2022.\117\ Prior to the Tibetan 
New Year (Losar) in February 2023, TAR authorities reportedly 
conducted raids in several municipalities and stepped up 
surveillance on residents,\118\ leading some Tibetans to ask 
relatives living abroad not to contact them for fear of 
official scrutiny and possible retaliation.\119\ Lhasa 
officials also ordered the temporary closure of the Jokhang 
Temple complex for several days in March 2023 around the time 
of the March 10 anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising,\120\ 
and increased inspections in the area around the Jokhang and 
other major religious sites several days later, coinciding with 
the March 14 anniversary of the 2008 Tibetan protests.\121\
    Chinese authorities in Tibetan areas sought to prevent 
Tibetans from traveling to India. In December 2022, security 
officials in Shigatse (Rikaze) municipality, TAR, detained 
three Tibetans, accusing them of ``having plans to travel to 
India.'' \122\ The three--Dradul, Sonam Gyatso, and Gonkyab--
were reportedly returning from a pilgrimage visit to Sekhar 
Guthog Monastery in Lhodrag (Luozha) county, Lhokha (Shannan) 
municipality, TAR, near the border with Bhutan.\123\

Tibet

Tibet

    Notes to Chapter 17--Tibet

    \1\ U.S. Department of State, ``Report to Congress on Tibet 
Negotiations, Section 613(b) of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 
U.S.C. 6901 note),'' accessed June 15, 2022.
    \2\ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report 
(Washington: March 2022), 296; Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 283.
    \3\ This cumulative total does not include six deaths by self-
immolation of Tibetans in 2012 and 2013. Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, ``CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,'' January 
10, 2017. See also International Campaign for Tibet, ``Self-Immolation 
Fact Sheet,'' accessed June 8, 2023.
    \4\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``Chinese Authorities in Tibet Go After 
Relatives of Self-Immolating Protestors,'' Radio Free Asia, April 5, 
2023.
    \5\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, 
art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 18.
    \6\ See, e.g., ``Huangnan zhou Fojiao jie shenru kaizhan `yao 
zuohao sengni, xian zuohao gongmin' zhuti jiaoyu shijian huodong'' 
[Malho Prefecture Buddhists thoroughly launch education and 
implementation activity on the theme of ``to be good monks and nuns, 
first be good citizens''], Qinghai Province United Front Work 
Department, July 29, 2022; Nyingtri Municipality Religious Small 
Leading Group Office for ``Three Consciousnesses'' Education, ``Linzhi 
shi `san ge yishi' jiaoyu zongjiao daibiao renshi xuanjiang tuan shenru 
Motuo xian zongjiao lingyu kaizhan Dang de Ershi Da jingshen ji `san ge 
yishi' jiaoyu xuanjiang'' [Nyingtri municipality's ``three 
consciousnesses'' education and religious representatives propaganda 
group thoroughly penetrates Metog county's religious sphere to launch 
education and propaganda on the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and 
the ``three consciousnesses''], reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region 
United Front Work Department, November 26, 2022. See also International 
Campaign for Tibet, ``Party Above Buddhism: China's Surveillance and 
Control of Tibetan Monasteries and Nunneries,'' March 2021, 10-11.
    \7\ For past Commission coverage, see, e.g., Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 
2022), 283-84.
    \8\ See, e.g., Mindrolling Monastic Management Committee, ``Zhanang 
xianwei shuji Tang Yong fu Minzhulin Si kaizhan `san ge yishi' jiaoyu 
xuanjiang huodong'' [Dranang county committee secretary Tang Yong 
visits Mindrolling Monastery to launch ``three consciousnesses'' 
education and propaganda activity], reprinted in Tibet Autonomous 
Region United Front Work Department, August 5, 2022.
    \9\ See, e.g., ``Huangnan zhou Fojiao jie shenru kaizhan `yao 
zuohao sengni, xian zuohao gongmin' zhuti jiaoyu shijian huodong'' 
[Malho Prefecture Buddhists thoroughly launch education and 
implementation activity on the theme of ``to be good monks and nuns, 
first be good citizens''], Qinghai Province United Front Work 
Department, July 29, 2022.
    \10\ See, e.g., ``Huangnan zhou Fojiao jie shenru kaizhan `yao 
zuohao sengni, xian zuohao gongmin' zhuti jiaoyu shijian huodong'' 
[Malho Prefecture Buddhists thoroughly launch education and 
implementation activity on the theme of ``to be good monks and nuns, 
first be good citizens''], Qinghai Province United Front Work 
Department, July 29, 2022; Lhasa Municipal United Front Work 
Department, ``Lasa shi Fojiao Xiehui juban shoujie Xizang Fo Xueyuan 
Lasa shi ge simiao fenyuan xueyuan peixun ban'' [Lhasa Municipal 
Buddhist Association holds first training session for various Lhasa 
monastery branches of the Tibetan Buddhist Institute], reprinted in 
Tibet Autonomous Region United Front Work Department, August 2, 2022.
    \11\ See, e.g., Mindrolling Monastic Management Committee, 
``Zhanang xianwei shuji Tang Yong fu Minzhulin Si kaizhan `san ge 
yishi' jiaoyu xuanjiang huodong'' [Dranang county committee secretary 
Tang Yong visits Mindrolling Monastery to launch ``three 
consciousnesses'' education and propaganda activity], reprinted in 
Tibet Autonomous Region United Front Work Department, August 5, 2022; 
Nyingtri Municipality Religious Small Leading Group Office for ``Three 
Consciousnesses'' Education, ``Linzhi shi `san ge yishi' jiaoyu 
zongjiao daibiao renshi xuanjiang tuan shenru Motuo xian zongjiao 
lingyu kaizhan Dang de Ershi Da jingshen ji `san ge yishi' jiaoyu 
xuanjiang'' [Nyingtri municipality's ``three consciousnesses'' 
education and religious representatives propaganda group thoroughly 
penetrates Metog county's religious sphere to launch education and 
propaganda on the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the ``three 
consciousnesses''], reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region United Front 
Work Department, November 26, 2022.
    \12\ See, e.g., Chamdo Municipality United Front Work Department, 
``Changdu shi Jiangda xian `si ge tuchu' chixu tuijin zongjiao jie `san 
ge yishi' jiaoyu'' [In Jomda county, Chamdo municipality, ``four 
prominents'' continue to carry forward education for the religious on 
the ``three consciousnesses''], reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region 
United Front Work Department, December 30, 2022; Mindrolling Monastic 
Management Committee, ``Zhanang xianwei shuji Tang Yong fu Minzhulin Si 
kaizhan `san ge yishi' jiaoyu xuanjiang huodong'' [Dranang county 
committee secretary Tang Yong visits Mindrolling Monastery to launch 
``three consciousnesses'' education and propaganda activity], reprinted 
in Tibet Autonomous Region United Front Work Department, August 5, 
2022; Sog County Committee United Front Work Department, ``Naqu shi 
zongjiao jie `san ge yishi' jiaoyu xuanjiang tuan di er xuanjiang 
fentuan shenru Suo xian kaizhan `san ge yishi' jiaoyu xuanjiang 
huodong'' [Nagchu municipality religious sector's ``three 
consciousnesses'' education and propaganda group's second propaganda 
branch deeply penetrates Sog county to launch ``three consciousnesses'' 
educational and propaganda activities], reprinted in Tibet Autonomous 
Region United Front Work Department, July 5, 2022.
    \13\ See, e.g., Nyingtri Municipality Religious Small Leading Group 
Office for ``Three Consciousnesses'' Education, ``Linzhi shi `san ge 
yishi' jiaoyu zongjiao daibiao renshi xuanjiang tuan shenru Motuo xian 
zongjiao lingyu kaizhan Dang de Ershi Da jingshen ji `san ge yishi' 
jiaoyu xuanjiang'' [Nyingtri municipality's ``three consciousnesses'' 
education and religious representatives propaganda group deeply 
penetrates Metog county's religious sphere to launch education and 
propaganda on the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the ``three 
consciousnesses''], reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region United Front 
Work Department, November 26, 2022.
    \14\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``Tibetans in Lhasa Forced to Watch China's 
20th Party Congress,'' Radio Free Asia, October 17, 2022.
    \15\ See, e.g., Sangyal Kunchok, ``Tibetans Skirt Tight Chinese 
Surveillance to Mark the Dalai Lama's 87th Birthday,'' Radio Free Asia, 
July 6, 2022.
    \16\ Yangchen Dolma, ``Chinese Authorities Tightened Control of 
Tibetans on the Occasion of Birthday of His Holiness the Dalai Lama,'' 
Tibet Post International, July 13, 2022.
    \17\ Yangchen Dolma, ``Chinese Authorities Tightened Control of 
Tibetans on the Occasion of Birthday of His Holiness the Dalai Lama,'' 
Tibet Post International, July 13, 2022; Sangyal Kunchok, ``Tibetans 
Skirt Tight Chinese Surveillance to Mark the Dalai Lama's 87th 
Birthday,'' Radio Free Asia, July 6, 2022.
    \18\ Yangchen Dolma, ``Chinese Authorities Tightened Control of 
Tibetans on the Occasion of Birthday of His Holiness the Dalai Lama,'' 
Tibet Post International, July 13, 2022.
    \19\ For more information on Lotse, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2022-00142.
    \20\ ``80 `khrungs skar bsu zhes pa'i tshogs pa btsugs rkyen bod mi 
blo tshe `dzin bzung byas'' [Tibetan Lotse, organizer of group called 
Happy 80th Birthday, detained], Tibet Times, July 25, 2022; Sangyal 
Kunchok, ``Tibetan Arrested for Creating `Unlawful' WeChat Group,'' 
Radio Free Asia, July 27, 2022; Tibet Watch, ``Tibetan Arrested for Not 
Registering WeChat Group,'' July 27, 2022.
    \21\ ``80 `khrungs skar bsu zhes pa'i tshogs pa btsugs rkyen bod mi 
blo tshe `dzin bzung byas'' [Tibetan Lotse, organizer of group called 
Happy 80th Birthday, detained], Tibet Times, July 25, 2022; Sangyal 
Kunchok, ``Tibetan Arrested for Creating `Unlawful' WeChat Group,'' 
Radio Free Asia, July 27, 2022; Tibet Watch, ``Tibetan Arrested for Not 
Registering WeChat Group,'' July 27, 2022.
    \22\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``China Warns Tibetans Not to Post Birthday 
Wishes Online for Exiled Abbot,'' Radio Free Asia, August 4, 2022.
    \23\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``China Warns Tibetans Not to Post Birthday 
Wishes Online for Exiled Abbot,'' Radio Free Asia, August 4, 2022; 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report 
(Washington: November 2022), 284.
    \24\ Paldan, ``Gser rta nas bod mi lnga `dzin bzung byas te bod mi 
gcig bsad yod `dug'' [Five Tibetans from Serta detained, one killed], 
Tibet Times, September 19, 2022; Tibet Watch, ``Tibetan Killed in 
Police Detention in Serthar County,'' September 20, 2022; Sangyal 
Kunchok, ``Chinese Authorities Allegedly Torture 5 Tibetans, 1 to 
Death, for Praying in Public,'' Radio Free Asia, September 21, 2022; 
Central Tibetan Administration, ``Tibet: Two Tibetans Died from Police 
Torture in Kham Karze,'' September 30, 2022.
    \25\ For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database records 2023-00005 on Chugdar, 2023-00006 on Gelo, 2023-00007 
on Tsedo, 2023-00008 on Bamo, and 2023-00009 on Kori.
    \26\ Paldan, ``Gser rta nas bod mi lnga `dzin bzung byas te bod mi 
gcig bsad yod `dug'' [Five Tibetans from Serta detained, one killed], 
Tibet Times, September 19, 2022; Tibet Watch, ``Tibetan Killed in 
Police Detention in Serthar County,'' September 20, 2022; Sangyal 
Kunchok, ``Chinese Authorities Allegedly Torture 5 Tibetans, 1 to 
Death, for Praying in Public,'' Radio Free Asia, September 21, 2022; 
Central Tibetan Administration, ``Tibet: Two Tibetans Died from Police 
Torture in Kham Karze,'' September 30, 2022.
    \27\ Paldan, ``Gser rta nas bod mi lnga `dzin bzung byas te bod mi 
gcig bsad yod `dug'' [Five Tibetans from Serta detained, one killed], 
Tibet Times, September 19, 2022; Tibet Watch, ``Tibetan Killed in 
Police Detention in Serthar County,'' September 20, 2022; Sangyal 
Kunchok, ``Chinese Authorities Allegedly Torture 5 Tibetans, 1 to 
Death, for Praying in Public,'' Radio Free Asia, September 21, 2022; 
Central Tibetan Administration, ``Tibet: Two Tibetans Died from Police 
Torture in Kham Karze,'' September 30, 2022.
    \28\ Paldan, ``Gser rta nas bod mi lnga `dzin bzung byas te bod mi 
gcig bsad yod `dug'' [Five Tibetans from Serta detained, one killed], 
Tibet Times, September 19, 2022; Tibet Watch, ``Tibetan Killed in 
Police Detention in Serthar County,'' September 20, 2022; Sangyal 
Kunchok, ``Chinese Authorities Allegedly Torture 5 Tibetans, 1 to 
Death, for Praying in Public,'' Radio Free Asia, September 21, 2022; 
Central Tibetan Administration, ``Tibet: Two Tibetans Died from Police 
Torture in Kham Karze,'' September 30, 2022.
    \29\ For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database records 2022-00194 on Sonam Gyatso and 2022-00195 on Rachung 
Gedun.
    \30\ Yangchen Dolma, ``China Sentences Tibetan Monk to Two Years in 
Prison for Allegedly Sending Money Abroad,'' Tibet Post International, 
November 4, 2022; Dangqiu, ``Xizang Aba xian you yi sengren yin 
gongyang Dalai Lama er zaodao jubu panxing'' [Another monk in Ngaba 
county, Tibet, detained and sentenced for offerings to Dalai Lama], 
Voice of Tibet, November 8, 2022; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and 
Democracy, ``Prosecuting Tibetan Buddhists for Making Offerings to 
Spiritual Teachers Is a Violation of Freedom of Religion and Belief,'' 
November 10, 2022.
    \31\ Yangchen Dolma, ``China Sentences Tibetan Monk to Two Years in 
Prison for Allegedly Sending Money Abroad,'' Tibet Post International, 
November 4, 2022; Dangqiu, ``Xizang Aba xian you yi sengren yin 
gongyang Dalai Lama er zaodao jubu panxing'' [Another monk in Ngaba 
county, Tibet, detained and sentenced for offerings to Dalai Lama], 
Voice of Tibet, November 8, 2022; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and 
Democracy, ``Prosecuting Tibetan Buddhists for Making Offerings to 
Spiritual Teachers Is a Violation of Freedom of Religion and Belief,'' 
November 10, 2022.
    \32\ Yangchen Dolma, ``China Sentences Tibetan Monk to Two Years in 
Prison for Allegedly Sending Money Abroad,'' Tibet Post International, 
November 4, 2022; Dangqiu, ``Xizang Aba xian you yi sengren yin 
gongyang Dalai Lama er zaodao jubu panxing'' [Another monk in Ngaba 
county, Tibet, detained and sentenced for offerings to Dalai Lama], 
Voice of Tibet, November 8, 2022; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and 
Democracy, ``Prosecuting Tibetan Buddhists for Making Offerings to 
Spiritual Teachers Is a Violation of Freedom of Religion and Belief,'' 
November 10, 2022.
    \33\ For more information on Rongbo Gangkar, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00002.
    \34\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``Tibetan Writer Held by China for 
`Discussing' Dalai Lama,'' Radio Free Asia, December 30, 2022. 
Information about Rongbo Gangkar's detention was limited, and detailed 
reports on his case emerged outside China only in 2022. Lubum, ``Bod 
nang gi rtsom pa po rong bo gangs dkar lags rgya nag gzhung gis `dzin 
bzung byas `dug'' [Tibetan writer Rongbo Gangkar detained by Chinese 
authorities], Radio Free Asia, June 8, 2022; International Campaign for 
Tibet, ``Tibetan Intellectuals and Writers Detained in Recent Spate,'' 
June 30, 2022.
    \35\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``Tibetan Writer Held by China for 
`Discussing' Dalai Lama,'' Radio Free Asia, December 30, 2022.
    \36\ Lubum, ``Bod nang gi rtsom pa po rong bo gangs dkar lags rgya 
nag gzhung gis `dzin bzung byas `dug'' [Tibetan writer Rongbo Gangkar 
detained by Chinese authorities], Radio Free Asia, June 8, 2022; 
Sangyal Kunchok, ``Tibetan Writer Held by China for `Discussing' Dalai 
Lama,'' Radio Free Asia, December 30, 2022.
    \37\ ``Bod rigs bud med gyu sgron lags `dzin bzung byas `dug'' 
[Tibetan woman Yudron detained], Tibet Times, July 13, 2022; Sangyal 
Kunchok, ``Tibetan Woman Arrested for Dalai Lama Photo,'' Radio Free 
Asia, July 14, 2022. For more information on Yudron, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00132.
    \38\ ``Bod rigs bud med gyu sgron lags `dzin bzung byas `dug'' 
[Tibetan woman Yudron detained], Tibet Times, July 13, 2022; Sangyal 
Kunchok, ``Tibetan Woman Arrested for Dalai Lama Photo,'' Radio Free 
Asia, July 14, 2022. For more information on Dzumkar, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00127.
    \39\ ``Bod rigs bud med gyu sgron lags `dzin bzung byas `dug'' 
[Tibetan woman Yudron detained], Tibet Times, July 13, 2022; Sangyal 
Kunchok, ``Tibetan Woman Arrested for Dalai Lama Photo,'' Radio Free 
Asia, July 14, 2022.
    \40\ ``Bod rigs bud med gyu sgron lags `dzin bzung byas `dug'' 
[Tibetan woman Yudron detained], Tibet Times, July 13, 2022; Sangyal 
Kunchok, ``Tibetan Woman Arrested for Dalai Lama Photo,'' Radio Free 
Asia, July 14, 2022.
    \41\ For more information on Karma Samdrub, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00185.
    \42\ Lobsang Tenchoe, ``Tibetan Youth Arrested for Possession of 
Dalai Lama Photo,'' Tibet Express, August 25, 2022; Sangyal Kunchok, 
``Chinese Authorities Arrest Tibetan Man for Having a Photo of the 
Dalai Lama,'' Radio Free Asia, August 25, 2022; Tibet Watch, ``Another 
Tibetan Arrested for Possessing Photos of the Dalai Lama,'' August 26, 
2022.
    \43\ Sonam Lhamo, ``Tibetans Reveal Harsh Conditions under China's 
Zero COVID Policy,'' Radio Free Asia, September 15, 2022; Vivian Wang, 
`` `At the Breaking Point': Tibetans, under Lockdown, Make Rare Cries 
for Help,'' New York Times, September 16, 2022; Manya Koetse, 
``Residents in Locked Down Lhasa Say Local Epidemic Situation Is a 
`Giant Mess,'' What's on Weibo, September 16, 2022; Tibetan Centre for 
Human Rights and Democracy, ``China's Zero-COVID Policy Must Be 
Compatible with Human Rights,'' September 18, 2022.
    \44\ Vivian Wang, `` `At the Breaking Point': Tibetans, under 
Lockdown, Make Rare Cries for Help,'' New York Times, September 16, 
2022; Manya Koetse, ``Residents in Locked Down Lhasa Say Local Epidemic 
Situation Is a `Giant Mess,' '' What's on Weibo, September 16, 2022; 
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China's Zero-COVID 
Policy Must Be Compatible with Human Rights,'' September 18, 2022; 
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Violations Continue 
after China Issues Rare Public Apology for COVID Failure in Tibet,'' 
September 25, 2022; Robert Barnett, ``In Tibet, Officials' Pursuit of 
Zero-COVID Sent Tens of Thousands into Mass `Isolation' Facilities,'' 
ChinaFile, Asia Society, November 1, 2022.
    \45\ Vivian Wang, `` `At the Breaking Point': Tibetans, under 
Lockdown, Make Rare Cries for Help,'' New York Times, September 16, 
2022; Manya Koetse, ``Residents in Locked Down Lhasa Say Local Epidemic 
Situation Is a `Giant Mess,' '' What's on Weibo, September 16, 2022; 
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China's Zero-COVID 
Policy Must Be Compatible with Human Rights,'' September 18, 2022; 
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Violations Continue 
after China Issues Rare Public Apology for COVID Failure in Tibet,'' 
September 25, 2022; Robert Barnett, ``In Tibet, Officials' Pursuit of 
Zero-COVID Sent Tens of Thousands into Mass `Isolation' Facilities,'' 
ChinaFile, Asia Society, November 1, 2022.
    \46\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China's Zero-
COVID Policy Pushes Five Tibetans to Commit Suicide in Three Days,'' 
September 27, 2022; Sangyal Kunchok, ``At Least 5 Tibetans in Lhasa End 
Their Lives amid Harsh Chinese COVID Lockdown,'' Radio Free Asia, 
September 29, 2022.
    \47\ Zhuang Pinghui, ``Officials in Tibet's Capital Lhasa Apologise 
for Handling of Lockdown after String of Complaints,'' South China 
Morning Post, September 18, 2022; International Campaign for Tibet, 
``Lhasa Authorities Admit Mishandling COVID Outbreak, Silence Tibetan 
Outrage,'' September 26, 2022.
    \48\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Lhasa Authorities Admit 
Mishandling COVID Outbreak, Silence Tibetan Outrage,'' September 26, 
2022; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Tibetans 
Subjected to Discrimination and Detention amid Massive Protests against 
China's Zero-COVID Policy,'' November 29, 2022.
    \49\ Lhasa Municipal Public Security Bureau (@Ping'an Lasa), ``Lasa 
gong'an chachu duo qi she yi weifa anjian'' [Lhasa PSB investigates 
many cases of suspected epidemic-linked lawbreaking], WeChat post, 
October 10, 2022, 8:51 a.m.
    \50\ Kalsang Choephel, ``Ma smad gnyis `dzin bzung byas rjes bu mo 
bkra shis dbyangs skyid gar yod cha med du gyur'' [After mother and 
daughter are detained, no information on whereabouts of daughter Tashi 
Yangkyi], Tibet Times, August 16, 2022; Dasang, ``Yiqing qijian Xizang 
Naqu yi dui munu wugu zaoju, yi ren xialuo buming'' [During epidemic, 
mother and daughter in Nagchu, Tibet, detained for no reason, 
whereabouts of one of them unknown], Voice of Tibet, August 17, 2022. 
For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
records 2022-00181 on Rigzin Drolma and 2022-00182 on Tashi Yangkyi.
    \51\ ``Ma ni rdo brkos tshogs pa btsugs rkyen bod mi gnyis `dzin 
bzung byas'' [Two Tibetan organizers of mani stone engraving group 
detained], Tibet Times, March 7, 2023; Dangqiu, ``Xizang Dangxiong xian 
liang Zangren jin yin zujian tuandui wei si yu xinguan wangling diaoke 
liuzi zhenyan bian zaobu'' [Two Tibetans in Damshung county, Tibet, 
detained only for organizing group to carve mani engravings for COVID 
dead], Voice of Tibet, March 14, 2023. For more information on Yidam, 
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database Record 2023-00099.
    \52\ Tibet Watch, ``Tibetan Arrested after Making Social Media Post 
about Lhasa Lockdown,'' September 26, 2022; Sangyal Kunchok and Lobsang 
Gelek, ``Tibetan Teacher Arrested for Online COVID Posts,'' Radio Free 
Asia, September 27, 2022. For more information on Gontse, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00179.
    \53\ ``Protests Spread in Lhasa over COVID-19 Restrictions,'' Radio 
Free Asia, October 27, 2022; ``Han Chinese Migrants Stream Home from 
Lhasa, Causing Traffic Jams,'' Radio Free Asia, October 28, 2022; 
``Hundreds in Tibetan Capital Stage Rare Protest against COVID 
Lockdowns,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Hong Kong Free Press, 
October 29, 2022; ``Authorities Allow Tibetans in Lhasa to Travel in 
Region amid COVID Wave,'' Radio Free Asia, November 2, 2022; Sangyal 
Kunchok, ``200 Detained in Tibet's Capital Lhasa over COVID Protest,'' 
Radio Free Asia, November 3, 2022; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and 
Democracy, ``Tibetans Subjected to Discrimination and Detention amid 
Massive Protests against China's Zero-COVID Policy,'' November 29, 
2022.
    \54\ ``Protests Spread in Lhasa over COVID-19 Restrictions,'' Radio 
Free Asia, October 27, 2022; ``Han Chinese Migrants Stream Home from 
Lhasa, Causing Traffic Jams,'' Radio Free Asia, October 28, 2022; 
``Hundreds in Tibetan Capital Stage Rare Protest against COVID 
Lockdowns,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Hong Kong Free Press, 
October 29, 2022; ``Authorities Allow Tibetans in Lhasa to Travel in 
Region amid COVID Wave,'' Radio Free Asia, November 2, 2022; Sangyal 
Kunchok, ``200 Detained in Tibet's Capital Lhasa over COVID Protest,'' 
Radio Free Asia, November 3, 2022; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and 
Democracy, ``Tibetans Subjected to Discrimination and Detention amid 
Massive Protests against China's Zero-COVID Policy,'' November 29, 
2022.
    \55\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``200 Detained in Tibet's Capital Lhasa over 
COVID Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, November 3, 2022; Tibetan Centre for 
Human Rights and Democracy, ``Tibetans Subjected to Discrimination and 
Detention amid Massive Protests against China's Zero-COVID Policy,'' 
November 29, 2022.
    \56\ The biometric data gathering programs recall similar efforts 
carried out by Chinese security officials in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region during the ongoing campaign of arbitrary mass 
detentions there targeting Uyghurs and members of other predominantly 
Muslim ethnic groups. Emile Dirks, ``Mass DNA Collection in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region from 2016-2022,'' Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global 
Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, September 13, 2022.
    \57\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: New Evidence of Mass DNA 
Collection in Tibet,'' September 5, 2022.
    \58\ Emile Dirks, ``Mass DNA Collection in the Tibet Autonomous 
Region from 2016-2022,'' Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & 
Public Policy, University of Toronto, September 13, 2022.
    \59\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: New Evidence of Mass DNA 
Collection in Tibet,'' September 5, 2022.
    \60\ Emile Dirks, ``Mass DNA Collection in the Tibet Autonomous 
Region from 2016-2022,'' Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & 
Public Policy, University of Toronto, September 13, 2022.
    \61\ Emile Dirks, ``Mass Iris Scan Collection in Qinghai 2019-
2022,'' Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, 
University of Toronto, December 14, 2022.
    \62\ Emile Dirks, ``Mass Iris Scan Collection in Qinghai 2019-
2022,'' Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, 
University of Toronto, December 14, 2022.
    \63\ Emile Dirks, ``Mass DNA Collection in the Tibet Autonomous 
Region from 2016-2022,'' Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & 
Public Policy, University of Toronto, September 13, 2022.
    \64\ Emile Dirks, ``Mass Iris Scan Collection in Qinghai 2019-
2022,'' Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, 
University of Toronto, December 14, 2022.
    \65\ Emile Dirks, ``Mass DNA Collection in the Tibet Autonomous 
Region from 2016-2022,'' Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & 
Public Policy, University of Toronto, September 13, 2022; Emile Dirks, 
``Mass Iris Scan Collection in Qinghai 2019-2022,'' Citizen Lab, Munk 
School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, 
December 14, 2022.
    \66\ Mara Hvistendahl, ``Tibetan Police Bought Thermo Fisher DNA 
Equipment, Chinese Government Documents Show,'' Intercept, September 
13, 2022. Thermo Fisher was previously found to have supplied DNA 
sequencing equipment to police in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR), and only announced in 2019 that they would stop selling or 
servicing genetic sequencers there. In 2021, however, the New York 
Times reported that authorities in the XUAR were still buying Thermo 
Fisher-made equipment. Sui-Lee Wee, ``China Still Buys American DNA 
Equipment for Xinjiang despite Blocks,'' New York Times, October 22, 
2021.
    \67\ Letter from Jeffrey A. Merkley, James P. McGovern, Marco 
Rubio, and Christopher H. Smith, Commissioners, Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, to Marc N. Casper, President and Chief Executive 
Officer, Thermo Fisher Scientific, December 15, 2022.
    \68\ Letter from Marc N. Casper, Chairman, President, and CEO, 
Thermo Fisher Scientific, to Jeffrey A. Merkley, Christopher H. Smith, 
Marco Rubio, and James P. McGovern, Commissioners, Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, January 24, 2023.
    \69\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: New Evidence of Mass DNA 
Collection in Tibet,'' September 5, 2022; Emile Dirks, ``Mass DNA 
Collection in the Tibet Autonomous Region from 2016-2022,'' Citizen 
Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of 
Toronto, September 13, 2022; Free Tibet, Students for a Free Tibet, and 
International Tibet Network, ``Tibet Group Response to Thermo Fisher's 
Flawed Reply to the Congressional Executive Commission on China,'' 
February 28, 2023.
    \70\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xian Fa [PRC Constitution], passed 
and effective December 4, 1982, amended March 11, 2018, art. 4; 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyu Zizhi Fa [PRC Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, effective October 1, 1984, amended 
February 28, 2001, art. 10; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongyong 
Yuyan Wenzi Fa [PRC Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese 
Language], passed October 31, 2000, effective January 1, 2001, art. 8.
    \71\ See, e.g., State Council Information Office, ``Minzu Quyu 
Zizhi Zhidu zai Xizang de Chenggong Shijian'' [Successful Practice of 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet], September 6, 2015, sec. 6. The 
State Council white paper on the ethnic autonomy system in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region refers to bilingual education policy in Tibetan and 
Chinese, but does not mention use of other languages in schools or any 
other context.
    \72\ Gerald Roche, ``Articulating Language Oppression: Colonialism, 
Coloniality and the Erasure of Tibet's Minority Languages,'' Patterns 
of Prejudice 53, no. 5 (2019): 498.
    \73\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, accessed June 8, 2023. China 
signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on August 29, 1990, 
and ratified it on March 2, 1992.
    \74\ Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by U.N. General 
Assembly resolution 44/25 of November 20, 1989, entry into force 
September 2, 1990, art. 30.
    \75\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Chinese 
Medium Education Imposed in Schools across Ngaba despite Criticisms 
from Tibetan Scholars and Educators,'' May 1, 2023.
    \76\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``China Is Requiring Tibetan Students to Take 
College Entrance Exams in Mandarin Only,'' Radio Free Asia, June 13, 
2023.
    \77\ Free Tibet, ``Chinese Authorities Plan to Bar All Tibetan 
Classes in Primary Schools in the Kham Karze Region,'' June 16, 2023.
    \78\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Letter 
from the Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues; the 
Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights; the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to education and the Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of religion or belief to Wang Yi, State Councilor and Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, AL CHN 6/2022, November 11, 2022. See also Tibet 
Action Institute, ``Separated from Their Families, Hidden from the 
World: China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools inside Tibet,'' 
December 2021.
    \79\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Letter 
from the Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of 
slavery, including its causes and consequences; the Special Rapporteur 
in the field of cultural rights; the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
development; the Special Rapporteur on minority issues; the Special 
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance and the Special Rapporteur on 
trafficking in persons, especially women and children, AL CHN 14/2022, 
February 6, 2023, 1. The Special Rapporteurs drew comparisons with 
forced labor and mass detention campaigns carried out in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region. See also Office of the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, ``OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 
31, 2022.
    \80\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee 
at its 30th Meeting (3 March 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, 
para. 89.
    \81\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee 
at its 30th Meeting (3 March 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, 
paras. 90-91.
    \82\ See, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 
Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 290; Freedom House, 
``Countries and Territories,'' in Freedom in the World 2022, February 
2022.
    \83\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report: 
Tibet,'' accessed March 9, 2023; Freedom House, ``Countries and 
Territories,'' in Freedom in the World 2023, March 2023.
    \84\ See, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 
Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 290-91; Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 
2022), 301-2.
    \85\ See, e.g., Dangqiu, ``Xizang Dangxiong xian yi nuzi yin piping 
Zhonggong guanyuan lanyong quanli duidai Zangren er zaobu'' [In 
Damshung county, Tibet, woman detained because of criticizing CCP 
officials' abuse of power and treatment of Tibetans], Voice of Tibet, 
November 22, 2022; Luosang, ``Xizang Rikaze yi funu bei kong xiang 
jingwai chuansong zhaopian er zao jubu'' [Woman in Shigatse, Tibet, 
detained, accused of sending photos abroad], Voice of Tibet, March 6, 
2023.
    \86\ For more information on Yangdron, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00028.
    \87\ ``dbyangs sgron lags `dzin bzung byas te gar yod cha med du 
gyur'' [After being detained, Yangdron disappears], Tibet Times, 
November 21, 2022; Dangqiu, ``Xizang Dangxiong xian yi nuzi yin piping 
Zhonggong guanyuan lanyong quanli duidai Zangren er zaobu'' [In 
Damshung county, Tibet, woman detained because of criticizing CCP 
officials' abuse of power and treatment of Tibetans], Voice of Tibet, 
November 22, 2022.
    \88\ For more information on Thubsam, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00191.
    \89\ ``thub bsam zhu ba'i bod mi zhig la lo gnyis kyi btson `jug 
khrims thag bcad yod `dug'' [Thubsam, a Tibetan, sentenced to two years 
in prison], Tibet Times, November 24, 2022; Yangchen Dolma, ``China 
Jailed a Young Tibetan for Two Years for Allegedly Sending Information 
to the World,'' Tibet Post International, November 24, 2022; Dangqiu, 
``Xizang Shiqu yi Zangren zao dangju yi xielu guojia jimi wei ming 
panchu 2 nian tuxing'' [In Sershul, Tibet, Tibetan man sentenced to 2 
years in prison for leaking state secrets], Voice of Tibet, November 
28, 2022.
    \90\ ``thub bsam zhu ba'i bod mi zhig la lo gnyis kyi btson `jug 
khrims thag bcad yod `dug'' [Thubsam, a Tibetan, sentenced to two years 
in prison], Tibet Times, November 24, 2022; Yangchen Dolma, ``China 
Jailed a Young Tibetan for Two Years for Allegedly Sending Information 
to the World,'' Tibet Post International, November 24, 2022; Dangqiu, 
``Xizang Shiqu yi Zangren zao dangju yi xielu guojia jimi wei ming 
panchu 2 nian tuxing'' [In Sershul, Tibet, Tibetan man sentenced to 2 
years in prison for leaking state secrets], Voice of Tibet, November 
28, 2022.
    \91\ ``thub bsam zhu ba'i bod mi zhig la lo gnyis kyi btson `jug 
khrims thag bcad yod `dug'' [Thubsam, a Tibetan, sentenced to two years 
in prison], Tibet Times, November 24, 2022; Yangchen Dolma, ``China 
Jailed a Young Tibetan for Two Years for Allegedly Sending Information 
to the World,'' Tibet Post International, November 24, 2022; Dangqiu, 
``Xizang Shiqu yi Zangren zao dangju yi xielu guojia jimi wei ming 
panchu 2 nian tuxing'' [In Sershul, Tibet, Tibetan man sentenced to 2 
years in prison for leaking state secrets], Voice of Tibet, November 
28, 2022.
    \92\ For more information on Palgon, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2023-00038.
    \93\ ``Chinese Authorities Detain Tibetan Writer for Contacting 
People in Exile,'' Radio Free Asia, January 25, 2023.
    \94\ ``Chinese Authorities Detain Tibetan Writer for Contacting 
People in Exile,'' Radio Free Asia, January 25, 2023.
    \95\ For more information on Yangtso, the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2023-00084.
    \96\ ``phyi phyogs su `brel ba yod pa'i nyes ming gyogs te dbyangs 
mtsho lags `dzin bzung byas'' [Yangtso detained for crime of having 
contact with foreigners], Tibet Times, March 4, 2023; Luosang, ``Xizang 
Rikaze yi funu bei kong xiang jingwai chuansong zhaopian er zao jubu'' 
[Woman in Shigatse, Tibet, detained, accused of sending photos abroad], 
Voice of Tibet, March 6, 2023.
    \97\ ``phyi phyogs su `brel ba yod pa'i nyes ming gyogs te dbyangs 
mtsho lags `dzin bzung byas'' [Yangtso detained for crime of having 
contact with foreigners], Tibet Times, March 4, 2023; Luosang, ``Xizang 
Rikaze yi funu bei kong xiang jingwai chuansong zhaopian er zao jubu'' 
[Woman in Shigatse, Tibet, detained, accused of sending photos abroad], 
Voice of Tibet, March 6, 2023.
    \98\ For more information on Guru Kyab, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00029.
    \99\ Paldan, ``bod mi zhig lo gcig lhag btson `jug byas nas klod 
grol btang'' [Tibetan released after over a year in prison], Tibet 
Times, December 30, 2022; Zhacuo, ``Xizang Jiuzhi xian yi Zangren jin 
yin yu jingwai lianxi bian zao panchu 1 nian duo, huoshi hou reng shou 
jianshi'' [In Chigdril county, Tibet, Tibetan man sentenced to more 
than 1 year because of contacting foreigners, after release still under 
surveillance], Voice of Tibet, January 2, 2023.
    \100\ Paldan, ``bod mi zhig lo gcig lhag btson `jug byas nas klod 
grol btang'' [Tibetan released after over a year in prison], Tibet 
Times, December 30, 2022; Zhacuo, ``Xizang Jiuzhi xian yi Zangren jin 
yin yu jingwai lianxi bian zao panchu 1 nian duo, huoshi hou reng shou 
jianshi'' [In Chigdril county, Tibet, Tibetan man sentenced to more 
than 1 year because of contacting foreigners, after release still under 
surveillance], Voice of Tibet, January 2, 2023.
    \101\ Paldan, ``bod mi zhig lo gcig lhag btson `jug byas nas klod 
grol btang'' [Tibetan released after over a year in prison], Tibet 
Times, December 30, 2022; Zhacuo, ``Xizang Jiuzhi xian yi Zangren jin 
yin yu jingwai lianxi bian zao panchu 1 nian duo, huoshi hou reng shou 
jianshi'' [In Chigdril county, Tibet, Tibetan man sentenced to more 
than 1 year because of contacting foreigners, after release still under 
surveillance], Voice of Tibet, January 2, 2023.
    \102\ Paldan, ``bod mi zhig lo gcig lhag btson `jug byas nas klod 
grol btang'' [Tibetan released after over a year in prison], Tibet 
Times, December 30, 2022; Zhacuo, ``Xizang Jiuzhi xian yi Zangren jin 
yin yu jingwai lianxi bian zao panchu 1 nian duo, huoshi hou reng shou 
jianshi'' [In Chigdril county, Tibet, Tibetan man sentenced to more 
than 1 year because of contacting foreigners, after release still under 
surveillance], Voice of Tibet, January 2, 2023.
    \103\ Xizang Zizhiqu Wangluo Xinxi Anquan Guanli Tiaoli [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Regulations on the Administration of Network 
Information Security], passed December 9, 2022, issued January 20, 
2023, effective February 1, 2023, art. 1.
    \104\ Xizang Zizhiqu Wangluo Xinxi Anquan Guanli Tiaoli [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Regulations on the Administration of Network 
Information Security], passed December 9, 2022, issued January 20, 
2023, effective February 1, 2023, art. 10.
    \105\ Xizang Zizhiqu Wangluo Xinxi Anquan Guanli Tiaoli [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Regulations on the Administration of Network 
Information Security], passed December 9, 2022, issued January 20, 
2023, effective February 1, 2023, art. 11.
    \106\ Xizang Zizhiqu Wangluo Xinxi Anquan Guanli Tiaoli [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Regulations on the Administration of Network 
Information Security], passed December 9, 2022, issued January 20, 
2023, effective February 1, 2023, art. 9.
    \107\ Xizang Zizhiqu Wangluo Xinxi Anquan Guanli Tiaoli [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Regulations on the Administration of Network 
Information Security], passed December 9, 2022, issued January 20, 
2023, effective February 1, 2023, art. 11(4).
    \108\ Xizang Zizhiqu Wangluo Xinxi Anquan Guanli Tiaoli [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Regulations on the Administration of Network 
Information Security], passed December 9, 2022, issued January 20, 
2023, effective February 1, 2023, art. 11(6).
    \109\ Xizang Zizhiqu Wangluo Xinxi Anquan Guanli Tiaoli [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Regulations on the Administration of Network 
Information Security], passed December 9, 2022, issued January 20, 
2023, effective February 1, 2023, art. 11(6).
    \110\ Xizang Zizhiqu Wangluo Xinxi Anquan Guanli Tiaoli [Tibet 
Autonomous Region Regulations on the Administration of Network 
Information Security], passed December 9, 2022, issued January 20, 
2023, effective February 1, 2023, art. 11(8).
    \111\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``6 Tibetan Writers and 
Former Political Prisoners Sentenced to 4 to 14 Years,'' October 20, 
2022. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database records 2012-00092 on Drubpa Kyab (or Gangkye Drubpa Kyab), 
2022-00163 on Tsering Drolma, 2013-00275 on Samdrub, 2014-00219 on 
Gangbu Yubum, 2022-00134 on Senam (or Seynam), and 2022-00164 on Pema 
Rinchen.
    \112\ Tibet Watch, ``Six Tibetans Arrested Ahead of CCP's Centenary 
Celebration,'' April 19, 2021; Sangyal Kunchok, ``Six Tibetan Writers, 
Activists Sentenced by China on `State Security' Charges,'' Radio Free 
Asia, October 18, 2022; Yangchen Dolma, ``China Jails Six Writers and 
Activists in Tibet from 4-14 Year Term over `Inciting Separatism,' '' 
Tibet Post International, October 18, 2022; Dangqiu, ``Xizang Seda xian 
yu Luhuo xian 6 ming Zangren bei kong `fenlie guojia' er zao pan 4 zhi 
14 nian tuxing'' [6 Tibetans in Seda and Luhuo counties detained for 
``separatism'' and sentenced to 4 to 14 years in prison], Voice of 
Tibet, October 19, 2022; International Campaign for Tibet, ```6 Tibetan 
Writers and Former Political Prisoners Sentenced to 4 to 14 Years,'' 
October 20, 2022.
    \113\ Tibet Watch, ``Six Tibetans Arrested Ahead of CCP's Centenary 
Celebration,'' April 19, 2021; Sangyal Kunchok, ``Six Tibetan Writers, 
Activists Sentenced by China on `State Security' Charges,'' Radio Free 
Asia, October 18, 2022; Yangchen Dolma, ``China Jails Six Writers and 
Activists in Tibet from 4-14 Year Term over `Inciting Separatism,' '' 
Tibet Post International, October 18, 2022; Dangqiu, ``Xizang Seda xian 
yu Luhuo xian 6 ming Zangren bei kong `fenlie guojia' er zao pan 4 zhi 
14 nian tuxing'' [6 Tibetans in Seda and Luhuo counties detained for 
``separatism'' and sentenced to 4 to 14 years in prison], Voice of 
Tibet, October 19, 2022; International Campaign for Tibet, ``6 Tibetan 
Writers and Former Political Prisoners Sentenced to 4 to 14 Years,'' 
October 20, 2022.
    \114\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``6 Tibetan Writers and 
Former Political Prisoners Sentenced to 4 to 14 Years,'' October 20, 
2022.
    \115\ See, e.g., Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Zero 
COVID, Many Controls: Covering China in 2022,'' March 1, 2023, 10; 
Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report: Tibet,'' 
accessed March 9, 2023.
    \116\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Zero COVID, Many 
Controls: Covering China in 2022,'' March 1, 2023, 10.
    \117\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``Tibetans Skirt Tight Chinese Surveillance 
to Mark the Dalai Lama's 87th Birthday,'' Radio Free Asia, July 6, 
2022.
    \118\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``China Increases Surveillance, Security in 
Run-Up to Tibetan New Year Celebrations,'' Radio Free Asia, February 
21, 2023; Lobsang Gelek, ``Tibetans Tell Relatives Abroad Not to Call 
Them during Tibetan New Year,'' Radio Free Asia, February 23, 2023.
    \119\ Lobsang Gelek, ``Tibetans Tell Relatives Abroad Not to Call 
Them During Tibetan New Year,'' Radio Free Asia, February 23, 2023.
    \120\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``China Closes Sacred 
Temple around Tibetan National Uprising Day,'' March 7, 2023.
    \121\ Sangyal Kunchok, ``On Lhasa Riot Anniversary, Chinese 
Authorities Search Tibetans, Keep Up Surveillance,'' Radio Free Asia, 
March 15, 2023.
    \122\ ``rgya gar du `bro rtsis yod pa'i nyes ming `og bod mi gsum 
`dzin bzung byas'' [Three Tibetans detained on suspicion of preparing 
to go to India], Tibet Times, December 25, 2022; Zhacuo, ``Xizang 
Rikaze shuming Zangren wugu zaodao Zhonggong jingfang jubu'' [Several 
Tibetans in Shigatse, Tibet, arbitrarily detained by CCP police], Voice 
of Tibet, December 26, 2022.
    \123\ ``rgya gar du `bro rtsis yod pa'i nyes ming `og bod mi gsum 
`dzin bzung byas'' [Three Tibetans detained on suspicion of preparing 
to go to India], Tibet Times, December 25, 2022; Zhacuo, ``Xizang 
Rikaze shuming Zangren wugu zaodao Zhonggong jingfang jubu'' [Several 
Tibetans in Shigatse, Tibet, arbitrarily detained by CCP police], Voice 
of Tibet, December 26, 2022. For more information, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database records 2023-00030 on Dradul, 2023-00031 on 
Sonam Gyatso, and 2023-00032 on Gonkyab.

Xinjiang

Xinjiang

                               X. Xinjiang

                                Xinjiang

                                Findings

         Research published this past year indicated 
        that Turkic and Muslim individuals formerly detained in 
        mass internment camps continued to serve long prison 
        terms. Official figures on prosecutions in the Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) released in February 
        2022 and analyzed by Human Rights Watch showed that 
        more than half a million people had been sentenced and 
        imprisoned in the region since 2017, when authorities 
        began carrying out the mass detention, in both prisons 
        and mass internment camps, of Turkic Muslims.
         On August 31, 2022, minutes before the end of 
        her tenure, then-U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
        Rights Michelle Bachelet issued a long-awaited report 
        on human rights in the XUAR, determining that Chinese 
        authorities had committed a wide range of serious human 
        rights violations as part of counterterrorism and 
        counter-extremism strategies. In particular, the report 
        found that the ``arbitrary and discriminatory 
        detention'' of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim 
        ethnic groups in the XUAR may constitute crimes against 
        humanity.
         During this reporting year, authorities in the 
        XUAR maintained a system of forced labor that involved 
        former mass internment camp detainees and other Turkic 
        and Muslim individuals. Officials continued two 
        distinct types of forced labor--one involving current 
        and former mass internment camp detainees, and the 
        other, referred to as ``poverty alleviation through 
        labor transfer'' (tuopin zhuanyi jiuye), involving 
        people who usually have not been detained, often 
        referred to as ``surplus labor.''
         Zero-COVID measures and discriminatory 
        policies toward Uyghurs reportedly caused or 
        contributed to deaths and injuries during a fire that 
        took place on November 24, 2022, at a high-rise 
        apartment building in Urumqi municipality, XUAR. 
        Immediately following the incident, authorities 
        suppressed information about the fire, which they 
        viewed as a national security issue, including by 
        holding Uyghur survivors for questioning at a local 
        hotel and confiscating their phones, and by detaining 
        neighbors and acquaintances of victims who posted about 
        the fire on social media.
         A report published in November 2022 by the 
        Uyghur Human Rights Project provided evidence showing 
        that Chinese Communist Party and government authorities 
        had incentivized and likely forced marriages between 
        Han Chinese and Uyghur and other Turkic individuals in 
        the XUAR since at least 2014. The report outlined how 
        authorities promoted the assimilation of Uyghurs and 
        other ethnic minorities through interethnic marriages 
        against a backdrop of government and Party birth 
        restriction policies and policies to encourage Han 
        Chinese in-
        migration and the movement of ethnic minority laborers 
        out of the XUAR.
         Reports published this past year indicated 
        that XUAR officials continued to arbitrarily detain and 
        hold in detention ethnic Kazakhs, members of an ethnic 
        group numbering around 1.5 million in the region. 
        Kazakhstan-based relatives of many ethnic Kazakhs who 
        have been detained in the XUAR since 2017 have 
        campaigned publicly for their release.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:

          Codify the definition of and punishment for crimes 
        against humanity in U.S. law, and vote to create a 
        binding international convention on crimes against 
        humanity at the United Nations.
          Create a formal coordination group on Uyghur refugee 
        admissions with Canada and other like-minded countries.
          Seek to ensure full implementation of the Uyghur 
        Human Rights Policy Act, including obligations 
        regarding the documentation of human rights abuses in 
        the XUAR; the protection of American citizens and 
        residents from harassment and coercion by the Chinese 
        government; and the Chinese government's acquisition 
        and development of mass surveillance technology.
          Urge Chinese authorities to immediately cease all 
        programs involving the forced labor of mass internment 
        camp detainees and prisoners in the XUAR, along with 
        programs involving the forced labor of other ethnic 
        minority individuals within and outside the XUAR.
          Raise concerns about China's treatment of Uyghurs and 
        other Turkic and Muslim ethnic minorities during the 
        Universal Periodic Review of China at the United 
        Nations in early 2024.
          Coordinate with allies and partners to advocate for 
        the formation of a U.N. commission of inquiry to 
        investigate forced labor abuses involving Turkic and 
        Muslim XUAR residents.
          Work with allies and partners to raise awareness 
        about the transnational repression of Uyghurs and other 
        Turkic Muslims from the XUAR, including through 
        discussion of digital rights. Seek ways to ensure that 
        Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in the United States 
        and other countries can be free from surveillance, 
        intimidation, and harassment by Chinese Communist Party 
        and government actors.
          Work with allies and partners to counter third 
        countries' cooperation with China in conducting 
        transnational repression, including the refoulement, 
        surveillance, and harassment of Uyghurs and other 
        Turkic and Muslim Chinese nationals. Impose sanctions, 
        including freezing assets and restricting travel, on 
        officials in China and third countries who participate 
        in such transnational repression. Advocate for the 
        appointment of a U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
        transnational repression.
          Prioritize the resettlement of Uyghurs, ethnic 
        Kazakhs, and other Turkic and Muslim refugees in the 
        United States, including by creating a Priority 2 
        designation for them in the United States' refugee 
        admissions program. Urge other like-minded countries to 
        implement similar refugee resettlement programs for 
        Turkic and Muslim refugees from China. Identify 
        countries likely to deport Turkic and Muslim refugees 
        from China and engage these countries through 
        diplomatic channels to prevent such deportations.
          Direct the U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for 
        International Development to create programming to 
        provide care for former mass internment camp detainees, 
        to include such psychosocial counseling and other 
        assistance as may be necessary to address the trauma 
        they have faced.
          Work with officials at American universities to 
        protect Uyghur and other Turkic and Muslim students who 
        hold a Chinese passport and/or who speak out about 
        human rights abuses in the XUAR, and ensure that they 
        enjoy freedom of expression and are protected from 
        harassment and threats to their safety.
          In interactions with Chinese officials, call for the 
        release of Uyghur political prisoners currently 
        detained or imprisoned for the peaceful exercise of 
        their human rights. The records of detained Uyghurs in 
        the Commission's Political Prisoner Database provide a 
        useful resource for such advocacy. Urge the Chinese 
        government and its law enforcement and security forces 
        to end the use of arbitrary detention, disappearance, 
        beatings, torture, and intimidation to suppress and 
        punish Uyghurs for the peaceful exercise of their 
        rights.

Xinjiang

Xinjiang

                                Xinjiang

                      Xi Jinping Visits the XUAR 

    In July 2022, Chinese leader Xi Jinping made a visit to the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) for the first time 
since April 2014, which international observers viewed as 
promoting a single Chinese identity for all ethnic groups in 
the region.\1\ While visiting the city of Shihezi, Xi praised a 
division of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 
(XPCC) for its contributions to ``social stability.'' \2\ Xi's 
visit to the region came several months before the 20th 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 
2022 and his bid for an unprecedented third term as General 
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.\3\ The visit also 
followed the completion of a five-year plan for achieving 
``comprehensive stability'' in the XUAR as outlined by then-
Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi in a classified speech 
in June 2018.\4\ In his speech, Zhao described Xi's knowledge, 
support, and direction of mass detentions and other repressive 
policies in the region.\5\ The first year of the plan started 
around the time mass internment camps appeared in 2017, and 
ended in 2021, when the region was slated to reach 
``comprehensive stability.'' \6\ By the time of Xi's July 2022 
visit, many former mass internment camp detainees were either 
serving prison sentences or taking part in forced labor.\7\

CALLS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CHINA AT THE U.N. FOR RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE 
                                  XUAR

------------------------------------------------------------------------
           U.N. Report Documents Rights Violations in the XUAR
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  On August 31, 2022, minutes before the end of her tenure, U.N. High
 Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet issued a long-awaited
 report on human rights in the XUAR, determining that Chinese
 authorities had committed a wide range of serious human rights
 violations as part of counterterrorism and counter-extremism
 strategies.\8\ In particular, the report found that the ``arbitrary and
 discriminatory detention'' of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim
 ethnic groups in the XUAR may constitute crimes against humanity.\9\
 The report of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
 also specifically documented rights abuses committed by Chinese
 authorities, including cultural and religious persecution, rape,
 torture, violations of reproductive rights, and forced labor.\10\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
     U.N. Report Documents Rights Violations in the  XUAR--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Many rights advocates and other observers praised the report, with
 some calling it a powerful vindication of efforts to document rights
 abuses,\11\ while others criticized the report's delayed release and
 its failure to refer to the rights abuses in the region as
 genocide.\12\ In early September 2022, a number of independent U.N.
 experts known as Special Procedures issued a statement calling the
 report ``comprehensive and principled,'' and calling for the U.N. Human
 Rights Council to convene a special session on China, in addition to
 other actions.\13\ PRC officials had long sought to block the
 publication of the report, and succeeded both in delaying its
 publication and reportedly in watering down text regarding the forced
 sterilization of women.\14\ The report's issuance followed a May 2022
 visit by Bachelet, in her capacity as U.N. High Commissioner for Human
 Rights, to the XUAR that was highly criticized by human rights
 groups\15\ and scholars,\16\ who said she failed to hold Chinese
 authorities accountable for their repression of Uyghurs and other
 ethnic minorities in the region.\17\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additional examples of U.N. actions on human rights in the 
XUAR include the following:

         On October 6, 2022, the U.N. Human Rights 
        Council voted against a proposal, led by the United 
        States, to hold a debate on the human rights situation 
        in the XUAR, with 19 Council Member States voting 
        against the proposal, 17 supporting the proposal, and 
        11 abstaining from the vote.\18\ Human rights advocates 
        expressed concern over the Council's rejection of the 
        proposal, with Amnesty International Secretary General 
        Agnes Callamard noting that it ``puts the U.N.'s main 
        human rights body in the farcical position of ignoring 
        the findings of the U.N.'s own human rights office.'' 
        \19\
         On November 24, 2022, the U.N. Committee on 
        the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, acting under 
        its early warning and urgent action procedure,\20\ 
        issued a decision calling on China to release all 
        individuals who had been arbitrarily detained and to 
        take other actions to improve the human rights 
        situation in the XUAR.\21\
         In March 2023, in its concluding observations 
        on the third periodic report of China, the U.N. 
        Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
        called for an end to rights violations against Turkic 
        and Muslim peoples in the XUAR and expressed concern 
        over worker rights, forced homestay programs, forced 
        birth control measures, and the destruction of 
        religious sites in the XUAR.\22\
         In May 2023, during its review of China, 
        members of the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of 
        Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) 
        questioned Chinese representatives about human rights 
        violations against Uyghur and other Turkic Muslim 
        women, including forced birth control measures, forced 
        marriage, forced labor, detention, and sexual 
        violence.\23\ [For information on reports submitted to 
        the Committee in advance of its review of China, see 
        Persecution of Ethnic Minority Women in the XUAR in 
        this chapter.]

  U.S. Legislation Targets Organ Harvesting, Seeks Accountability for 
                                Genocide

    Legislation introduced in the U.S. Congress during the 
Commission's 2023 reporting year targeted human rights abuses 
affecting Uyghurs and others in China. In March 2023, the House 
of Representatives passed H.R. 1154, the Stop Forced Organ 
Harvesting Act of 2023, by a vote of 413 to 2.\24\ The bill 
aims to combat forced organ removal perpetrated against Uyghurs 
and other Turkic Muslims in the XUAR, as well as other 
political prisoners, and authorizes sanctions against 
individuals complicit in organ harvesting.\25\ In May 2023, S. 
1770, the Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act of 
2023, was introduced in the U.S. Senate.\26\ The bill calls for 
the expansion of sanctions on Chinese officials and entities 
that are complicit in the genocide of Uyghurs, among other 
provisions.\27\

            Turkic Muslims Sentenced to Lengthy Prison Terms

    Research published this past year indicated that Turkic and 
Muslim individuals formerly detained in mass internment camps 
continued to serve long prison terms.\28\ Official figures on 
prosecutions in the XUAR released in February 2022 and analyzed 
by Human Rights Watch showed that more than half a million 
people had been sentenced and imprisoned in the region since 
2017, when authorities began carrying out the mass detention, 
in both prisons and mass internment camps, of Turkic 
Muslims.\29\ As reported by Human Rights Watch in September 
2022, data showing a sharp increase in sentences of more than 
five years in 2017 indicates that the ``the vast majority of 
the 540,826 people prosecuted most likely remain in prison.'' 
\30\ According to a researcher at Human Rights Watch, Chinese 
officials may have intended to deflect attention from mass 
detention in the XUAR by using formal prosecutions, but many of 
the convictions imposed ``just add to the crimes against 
humanity of wrongful imprisonment against Uyghurs and other 
Turkic people.'' \31\ Authorities did not hold trials for many 
of those sentenced to prison.\32\ A report published by Sky 
News in May 2023 found that authorities had decommissioned some 
mass internment camps, converting some facilities into schools 
and abandoning others, and had expanded and enhanced security 
features in prisons.\33\ Scholar Adrian Zenz testified at a 
March 2023 congressional hearing that, beginning in 2019, 
authorities significantly expanded high-security detention 
facilities in the XUAR and began shifting detainees from mass 
internment camps to both prisons and forced labor programs.\34\ 
According to Zenz, current XUAR Communist Party Secretary Ma 
Xingrui appears to have continued the institutionalization of 
both mass detention and forced labor in the region that was 
begun by his predecessor, Chen Quanguo.\35\
    Cases of Uyghurs sentenced to long-term imprisonment that 
were reported this past year include the following:

         Setiwaldi Kerim.\36\ In March 2023, Radio Free 
        Asia (RFA) reported that in 2017, authorities in Atush 
        (Atushi) city, Kizilsu (Kezilesu) Kyrgyz Autonomous 
        Prefecture, detained Uyghur middle school teacher and 
        writer Setiwaldi Kerim, later sentencing him to 19 
        years in prison for ``promoting separatism'' in his 
        writings and for his role in creating textbooks for 
        middle and high school students.\37\ Setiwaldi Kerim, 
        who is in his early fifties, was one of a number of 
        people authorities detained for their work on the 
        textbooks, including Uyghur writer and editor Yalqun 
        Rozi \38\ and former XUAR Education Bureau director 
        Sattar Sawut.\39\
         Ablajan Ayup.\40\ In December 2022, the Rights 
        Defense Network (RDN) reported that in December 2018, 
        authorities secretly sentenced Uyghur pop singer 
        Ablajan Ayup to 11 years in prison on unknown 
        charges.\41\ According to RDN, he was sentenced in 
        connection with his promotion of Uyghur culture and for 
        comments he made during a March 2017 interview with the 
        BBC about using music to make cross-cultural 
        connections that authorities deemed politically 
        sensitive.\42\ In March 2018, prior to his 
        imprisonment, authorities reportedly detained Ablajan 
        Ayup in a mass internment camp in the XUAR.\43\
         Abduqadir Jalalidin.\44\ In January 2023, RFA 
        reported that authorities had tried renowned Xinjiang 
        Normal University professor and poet Abduqadir 
        Jalalidin in the second half of 2019 and later 
        sentenced him to life imprisonment on unknown 
        charges.\45\ In April 2018, RFA reported that 
        authorities detained him in January 2018 and initially 
        held him in a mass internment camp.\46\
         Imanem Nesrulla and Ayhan Memet.\47\ In 
        November 2022, RFA reported that in December 2018, an 
        unnamed court in the XUAR sentenced 60-year-old Uyghur 
        veterinary worker Imanem Nesrulla to 15 years in prison 
        on charges related to terrorism and ``inciting ethnic 
        hatred.'' \48\ A resident of Qumul (Hami) municipality, 
        XUAR, she had visited her son, Munirdin Jadikar, in the 
        Netherlands in 2014 in order to attend his wedding.\49\ 
        In 2018, Munirdin Jadikar's sister-in-law, Ayhan Memet, 
        informed him via the social media platform WeChat that 
        authorities had detained his mother in a mass 
        internment camp.\50\ In 2019, Munirdin Jadikar learned 
        from an unnamed source that authorities also had 
        detained Ayhan Memet for informing him of his mother's 
        detention.\51\ In 2021, Dutch authorities told Munirdin 
        Jadikar that Chinese embassy officials said authorities 
        had sentenced both his mother and sister-in-law to 15 
        years in prison.\52\ According to the Chinese embassy 
        officials, Ayhan Memet was sentenced for ``illegally 
        providing national intelligence to foreign forces.'' 
        \53\ A police officer interviewed by RFA reportedly 
        said that Imanem Nesrulla was thought to have been 
        detained for having traveled abroad.\54\

    As in the past reporting year,\55\ reports emerged 
documenting the deaths of individuals in mass internment camps 
and prisons or shortly after they were held in camps or 
prisons. Examples include the following:

         Omer Huseyin, a 55-year-old former hatip 
        (Muslim preacher), and his brother, Semet Huseyin, who 
        was around 60 years old.\56\ Authorities detained the 
        men and their two brothers, all of whom were residents 
        of Korla (Ku'erle) city, Bayangol (Bayinguoleng) Mongol 
        Autonomous Prefecture, in September 2017, in connection 
        with their religious activities, later sentencing Omer 
        Huseyin to 5 years and Semet Huseyin to 12 years in 
        prison.\57\ Omer Huseyin, whom authorities detained for 
        making the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca in 2015, reportedly 
        died of liver cancer while in prison in February 
        2022.\58\ Semet Huseyin reportedly died of stomach 
        cancer in a prison hospital in 2021.\59\
         Abdulla Sawut, a 72-year-old Uyghur author who 
        died in December 2022 after being released from a 
        detention facility in ill health two months 
        earlier.\60\ Authorities in Kizilsu (Kezilesu) Kyrgyz 
        Autonomous Prefecture detained Abdulla Sawut in 2017, 
        accusing him of involvement in ``separatism.'' \61\ 
        Authorities released him to his family's custody around 
        October 2022 when his health deteriorated due to an 
        unspecified illness, and he died because of his 
        inability to access medical treatment or adequate food 
        due to a COVID-19-related lockdown in his hometown.\62\
         Ilham Rozi, a 57-year-old Uyghur former 
        propaganda official in Aksu city, Aksu prefecture, who 
        died of an unspecified illness in March 2023, five days 
        after authorities released him from prison.\63\ 
        Authorities sentenced Ilham Rozi to 15 years in prison 
        on charges related to ``separatism'' after detaining 
        him in 2019.\64\ Authorities detained Ilham Rozi, who 
        formerly served as deputy head of the Aksu prefecture 
        propaganda department, for having invited Uyghur writer 
        and editor Yalqun Rozi and Uyghur professor and poet 
        Abduqadir Jalalidin to give lectures at schools in 2012 
        and 2013.\65\

        Forced Labor Involving Turkic and Muslim XUAR Residents

    During this reporting year, authorities in the XUAR 
maintained a system of forced labor that involved former mass 
internment camp detainees and other Turkic and Muslim 
individuals.\66\ Officials oversaw two distinct types of forced 
labor--one involving current and former mass internment camp 
detainees, and the other, entitled ``poverty alleviation 
through labor transfer'' (tuopin zhuanyi jiuye), involving 
people who usually have not been detained, often referred to as 
``surplus labor.'' \67\ A report published by Adrian Zenz 
documented the use of both types of forced labor in cotton 
production in the XUAR and noted that ``the primary driver of 
labor coercion in cotton production is labor transfer policies 
and not internment camps.'' \68\ A report issued by then-U.N. 
High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet in August 
2022 also found evidence of forced labor in ``labor transfer'' 
programs and in programs using the labor of mass internment 
camp detainees.\69\
    In July 2022, U.N. Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms 
of slavery Tomoya Obokata issued a report which found that in 
some instances, forced labor involving Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and 
other ethnic minorities in the XUAR ``may amount to enslavement 
as a crime against humanity.'' \70\ Obokata cited ``excessive 
surveillance, abusive living and working conditions, 
restriction of movement through internment, threats, physical 
and/or sexual violence and other inhuman or degrading 
treatment'' as indicators of the act of enslavement.\71\
    In its annual report released in February 2023, the 
International Labour Organization's (ILO) Committee of Experts 
expressed concern about the forced labor of Uyghurs and other 
ethnic minorities in the XUAR.\72\ The Committee stressed the 
need for the Chinese government to enact legislation that 
explicitly defines and prohibits direct and indirect 
discrimination as set out in the Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention.\73\ The Committee further urged the 
Chinese government to clarify how it ensured compliance with 
the equal rights provisions contained in its Labour Law of 1994 
and the revised Vocational Education Law (2022), and ``to 
confirm that the Employment Promotion Law of 2007 prohibits 
discrimination based on colour, national extraction, social 
origin and political opinion.'' \74\

          UFLPA ENFORCEMENT AND FORCED LABOR PRODUCTS IN THE 
                             UNITED STATES

    In spite of the enforcement, beginning in June 2022,\75\ of 
the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), which bans 
importation to the U.S. of goods made in the XUAR,\76\ some 
products made in the XUAR continued to be imported into the 
U.S. In August 2022, the Uyghur Human Rights Project published 
a report documenting the presence of more than 70 brands of red 
dates grown or processed in the XUAR in stores in and around 
Washington, D.C.\77\ These included at least three brands of 
dates likely produced or processed by the Xinjiang Production 
and Construction Corps.\78\ According to trade analysts at U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), one of the challenges 
facing CBP officials is XUAR producers' use of entities outside 
of the XUAR to ship products outside of China, in order to 
conceal the origin of their products.\79\
    A report published by Sheffield Hallam University and non-
profit research organization NomoGaia in December 2022 
indicated that more than 100 international automobile and 
automotive parts manufacturers were at risk of sourcing from 
companies in the XUAR that employ forced labor.\80\ The 
report's authors found that links between Western automotive 
companies and Uyghur forced labor were present and expanding in 
all aspects of manufacturing, ranging from ``hood decals and 
car frames to engine casings, interiors and electronics.'' \81\ 
Automobile parts imported into the United States by companies 
at risk of sourcing forced labor products in the XUAR include 
aluminum alloy wheels produced by Xinfa Wheels; lithium-ion 
batteries produced by CATL (also known as Contemporary Amperex 
Technology or Ningde Times New Energy Technology); and tires 
from a subsidiary of Double Coin (Xinjiang) Kunlun Engineering 
Tire Co., Ltd., among others.\82\ [For more information on 
forced labor involving Turkic and Muslim XUAR residents, see 
Chapter 14--Business and Human Rights and Chapter 10--Human 
Trafficking.]

        Repressive Surveillance Technology and Security Measures

    Reports published this past year indicated that XUAR 
authorities have used both technological and human surveillance 
to comprehensively monitor and control Turkic and Muslim groups 
in the XUAR.\83\ The report issued in August 2022 by the Office 
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights on human rights 
conditions in the XUAR documented allegations of the Chinese 
government's use of ``extensive forms of intensive surveillance 
and control'' directed at Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim 
ethnic groups.\84\ In March 2023, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights while countering terrorism, cited concerns over XUAR 
authorities' collection of residents' biometric data, as well 
as the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau's use of drones.\85\ 
Scholars Gerald Roche and James Leibold described how 
authorities in the XUAR surveilled and identified Uyghurs and 
others considered ``a danger to the stability and prosperity of 
the community,'' marking them for further monitoring or 
detention in camps or prisons.\86\
    Researchers, journalists, and others documented XUAR 
authorities' use of surveillance cameras, including those 
produced by Chinese surveillance technology company Hikvision, 
to monitor and restrict Uyghurs and others in the XUAR.\87\ In 
April 2023, Axios reported that, based on a recording of a 
meeting held by Hikvision, the company was aware that some of 
its contracts in the XUAR discussed targeting the Uyghur 
population.\88\ Authorities have used footage from surveillance 
cameras produced by Hikvision to track and detain Uyghurs and 
others in the XUAR.\89\ In March 2023, three former mass 
internment camp detainees spoke at a U.N. panel about how 
Hikvision cameras monitored detainees' every movement, marking 
them for punishment if they violated camp rules.\90\
    In May 2023, Human Rights Watch reported that police in the 
XUAR had abused surveillance technology in the implementation 
of a phone search program used to flag Turkic Muslims for 
interrogation.\91\ Human Rights Watch's investigation found 
that more than half of the files flagged on residents' mobile 
phones during the searches, which took place in 2017 and 2018, 
appeared to be common Islamic religious materials, such as 
readings of the Quran.\92\

  COVID-19-Related Restrictions Lead to Deaths, Medical Issues in the 
                                  XUAR

    During this reporting year, authorities in the XUAR imposed 
lockdowns and other restrictions on the freedom of movement and 
travel in response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
pandemic, restrictions that reportedly resulted in deaths, 
starvation, and lack of access to medicine and medical care. 
Officials implemented some of the longest lockdowns in the 
country in the region.\93\ In October 2022, authorities 
suspended train and bus service in and out of the XUAR and 
reduced flight capacity to and from the region, in order to 
prevent the spread of COVID-19 from the XUAR to other parts of 
China.\94\ In September 2022, Radio Free Asia reported that at 
least 13 people in a village in Hotan prefecture, XUAR, had 
died as a result of poisoning from disinfectant sprayed in and 
around their homes as part of official measures to combat 
COVID-19.\95\ Due to a strict anti-COVID-19 lockdown that began 
in early August, some residents of Ghulja (Yining) city, Ili 
(Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR, reportedly died due 
to starvation, a lack of medical care, or a lack of 
medicine.\96\ During the lockdown, authorities locked some 
residents of the Ghulja area inside their homes.\97\ Unverified 
videos and other postings regarding Uyghurs in Ghulja 
experiencing health problems or medical issues caused or 
exacerbated by effects of the lockdown were widely circulated 
on Chinese social media.\98\ An official directive that was 
leaked and posted online called on government or Party 
personnel to flood microblog Weibo with positive posts about 
Ili, since this location name was trending due to messages 
posted by Uyghurs begging for assistance.\99\ In September, Ili 
officials held a press conference to apologize for residents' 
lack of access to medical services during the lockdown.\100\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Harsh Policies Lead to Multiple Deaths and Injuries in Urumqi Fire
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Zero-COVID measures and discriminatory policies toward Uyghurs
 reportedly caused or contributed to deaths and injuries during a fire
 that took place on November 24, 2022, at a high-rise apartment building
 in Urumqi municipality, XUAR. According to officials, 10 people died in
 the fire and 9 were injured, but reports from international media and
 civil society cast doubt on the official death toll, saying local
 sources indicated that up to 40 or more residents may have died in the
 fire.\101\ Local officials told RFA that all of those who died were
 Uyghurs.\102\ International media and civil society also reported that,
 contrary to official reports, the apartment building had ``recently
 been placed under a stricter level of lockdown,'' \103\ and that
 residents' doors had been locked shut from the outside, preventing
 their escape.\104\ In addition, according to international reports,
 firefighters may have been hampered in their efforts by both zero-COVID
 restrictions and anti-terrorism controls targeting local Uyghurs.\105\
  Among the victims of the fire identified in international media
 reports were Qemernisa Abdurahman and four of her children, Shehide,
 Imran, Abdurahman, and Nehdiye, all five of whom reportedly died of
 smoke inhalation.\106\ Qemernisa Abdurahman's husband Memet'eli
 Metniyaz was reportedly serving a lengthy prison sentence at the time
 of the fire, and her oldest son, Ilyas Memet'eli, was detained in
 either a prison or a mass internment camp.\107\ Many other men who had
 formerly lived at the apartment building were reportedly also detained
 in prisons or camps.\108\
  Immediately following the incident, authorities suppressed information
 about the fire, which they viewed as a national security issue,\109\ by
 holding Uyghur survivors for questioning at a local hotel and
 confiscating their phones;\110\ detaining neighbors and acquaintances
 of victims who posted about the fire on social media;\111\ and
 detaining a 24-year-old woman living in Urumqi for 10 days for
 ``spreading rumors'' online after she posted about the fire's death
 toll on Weibo.\112\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Harsh Policies Lead to Multiple Deaths and Injuries in  Urumqi Fire--
                                Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  On November 25, sparked by news of the fire, residents of Urumqi began
 protesting against zero-COVID restrictions, and within days, protests
 spread to dozens of cities across China.\113\ Many Han Chinese
 residents within and outside of the XUAR participated in protests, but
 Uyghurs were reportedly too frightened to take part, due to their fear
 of harsh treatment from authorities.\114\ In December 2022, authorities
 in Atush (Atushi) city, Kizilsu (Kezilesu) Kyrgyz Autonomous
 Prefecture, XUAR, detained Uyghur university student Kamile Wayit, in
 connection with a social media post she made regarding the protests and
 with communications she had with her brother in the United States.\115\
 In June 2023, international media reported that according to the
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, authorities had sentenced her to prison
 for an unspecified length of time for the crime of ``advocating
 extremism.'' \116\ Authorities detained dozens of people throughout
 China in relation to the protests, but reports indicated that at least
 some of those detained had been released by April, including a number
 of individuals released on bail.\117\ [For more information on the
 protests that took place after the November 24 fire in Urumqi, see
 Chapter 1--Freedom of Expression and Chapter 12--Public Health.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Persecution of Ethnic Minority Women in the XUAR

                      FORCED INTERETHNIC MARRIAGES

    A report published in November 2022 by the Uyghur Human 
Rights Project provided evidence that Chinese Communist Party 
and government authorities had incentivized and likely forced 
marriages between Han Chinese and Uyghur and other Turkic 
individuals in the XUAR since at least 2014.\118\ The report 
noted that the rate of Uyghur-Han intermarriage had been 
increasing since 2018 due to state promotion, following a 
period between 1990 and 2010 in which the rate of Uyghur-Han 
marriages had declined significantly due to interethnic 
tensions.\119\ The report showed that forced marriages were 
part of a range of state-sponsored gender-based violence 
targeting Uyghur women, alongside ``sexual assault, forced 
sterilization, forced use of birth control devices, [and] 
forced abortions.'' \120\ The report outlined how authorities 
promoted the assimilation of Uyghurs and other ethnic 
minorities through interethnic marriages against a backdrop of 
government and Party birth restriction policies and policies to 
encourage Han Chinese in-migration and the movement of ethnic 
minority laborers out of the XUAR.\121\ Forced marriage 
violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, and the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children 
(Palermo Protocol).\122\

      POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES TARGETING ETHNIC MINORITY WOMEN

    Reports continued to emerge this past year of XUAR 
authorities' implementation of population control measures 
targeting Turkic Muslim women in the region. The report issued 
by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
August 2022 regarding the human rights situation in the XUAR 
raised concerns over a sharp decline in birth rates beginning 
in 2017 in primarily Uyghur-majority areas, which corresponded 
with an ``unusually sharp'' rise in sterilizations and IUD 
placements in the XUAR.\123\ The report cited allegations of 
birth control forced upon Uyghur and Kazakh women, as well as 
interviewees' accounts of the risk of detention as punishment 
for noncompliance.\124\ However, this section of the report was 
reportedly weakened because of pressure from PRC officials, who 
sought to minimize discussion of forced sterilization since it 
is one of the acts constituting genocide.\125\

    RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS CRITICIZE CHINA IN ADVANCE OF CEDAW REVIEW

    In April 2023, Uyghur advocacy organizations submitted 
reports to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee), in advance of 
the Committee's review of China, that documented China's 
violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women.\126\ For example, the Uyghur 
Human Rights Project (UHRP) criticized China's response to the 
List of Issues transmitted by the Committee in 2021, including 
China's failure to provide disaggregated data on declining 
Uyghur birth rates in response to concerns about the forced 
abortion and forced sterilization of Uyghur women. UHRP 
additionally challenged China's insistence that it protects 
women's right to marry freely, despite evidence indicating that 
the Chinese government has forced Uyghur women into interethnic 
marriages.\127\

                      Detention of Ethnic Kazakhs

    Reports published this past year indicated that XUAR 
officials continued to arbitrarily detain and hold in detention 
ethnic Kazakhs, members of an ethnic group numbering around 1.5 
million in the region.\128\ Kazakhstan-based relatives of many 
ethnic Kazakhs who have been detained in the XUAR since 2017 
have campaigned publicly for their release.\129\ According to a 
Kazakh activist and an ethnic Kazakh formerly detained in the 
XUAR who were interviewed by Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 
authorities required people seeking permission to leave the 
XUAR to go abroad to first register relatives as ``hostages,'' 
in an effort to discourage them from talking about their 
detainment.\130\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Detention of Former Mass Internment Camp Detainee Zhanargul Zhumatai
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The case of ethnic Kazakh Zhanargul Zhumatai exemplifies the risks
 facing former detainees who speak publicly about their past detention,
 and highlights the potential for official retaliation against their
 relatives.\131\ On February 10, 2023, authorities detained 47-year-old
 Zhanargul Zhumatai at a family member's home in the XUAR.\132\ A
 musician and former journalist who had lived in Kazakhstan and held a
 Kazakh residence permit, she had also spoken out about the rights of
 ethnic Kazakh herders in the XUAR.\133\ In 2017, on a visit back to the
 XUAR from Kazakhstan, Zhanargul Zhumatai was detained and held in a
 mass internment camp for two years, reportedly for having Facebook and
 Instagram apps (deemed as ``non-mainstream'' software) on her phone and
 for having traveled to Kazakhstan, considered by PRC officials to be a
 ``focus country.'' \134\ While detained in the camp, she developed an
 ulcer that was treated incorrectly, and lost more than 66 pounds, and
 she also suffered from heart palpitations as a result of her camp
 detention.\135\ Following her release from the camp, she spoke to
 international media and other international observers about her
 detention and subsequent surveillance and police harassment.\136\ She
 said that after she spoke out about her experiences, security personnel
 pressured her to check into a psychiatric hospital in order to avoid
 being detained.\137\ In January 2023, she received a visa to return to
 Kazakhstan, and submitted an application for a new passport to Chinese
 authorities.\138\
  On February 13, authorities detained Zhanargul Zhumatai's mother,
 sister, and two brothers, which a police officer said was due to their
 failure to stop Zhanargul Zhumatai from speaking with foreign
 journalists.\139\ It was unclear where authorities held Zhanargul
 Zhumatai and her family members, and whether or not authorities charged
 them with any crimes.\140\ As of August 15, 2023, the Commission had
 not observed reports indicating that authorities had released Zhanargul
 Zhumatai or any members of her family from detention.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additional representative cases of ethnic Kazakhs formerly 
detained in the XUAR that were reported on this past year 
include those of writer and businesswoman Zhazira Asenqyzy, 
whose fractured skull remained untreated during her time in a 
mass internment camp;\141\ Sarsenbek Akbar, a veterinarian, 
trader, and former village head who was detained in a mass 
internment camp for two to three years, possibly for having the 
messaging app WhatsApp installed on his cell phone;\142\ and 
Baqytkhan Myrzan, a 60-year-old imam who died around March 2023 
in a prison in Urumqi municipality, where he was serving a 14-
year sentence for performing an Islamic ritual at a religious 
function.\143\

                          Freedom of Religion

    XUAR government officials curtailed Muslim residents' 
freedom to practice their religious beliefs, including by 
implementing restrictions on prayer and reciting the Quran at 
home\144\ and by holding Turkic Muslims in detention for 
practicing Islam.\145\ As in previous reporting years,\146\ 
XUAR officials imposed controls on Muslims' observance of 
Ramadan.\147\ In Turpan municipality, police reportedly 
assigned Uyghur villagers and members of neighborhood 
committees to monitor local residents, in order to ensure that 
no one was fasting.\148\ According to a rights advocate who 
documents the rights of ethnic Kazakhs in the XUAR, authorities 
in Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture carried out ``mass 
detentions'' of religious figures in the lead-up to Ramadan, 
focusing on individuals who had previously been detained.\149\
    Reports published this past year showed that authorities 
have sentenced Turkic Muslims in the XUAR to lengthy prison 
terms.\150\ In one example, RFA reported that in 2018, an 
unidentified court in Keriye (Yutian) county, Hotan (Hetian) 
prefecture, sentenced Uyghur imam Memet Musa and his son Osman 
Memet to 10 and 6 years in prison, respectively, for their 
religious activities.\151\ Authorities in Keriye detained Memet 
Musa in 2017 for ``illegally'' providing religious instruction 
to his son when he was a child;\152\ authorities detained Osman 
Memet in the same year for reciting the Quran at several local 
funerals.\153\ [For more information on official restrictions 
on Muslims' right to practice their faith throughout China, see 
Chapter 3--Freedom of Religion.]

      Transnational Repression of Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims

    Reports published this past year documented the PRC's 
continued transnational repression of Uyghurs and other Turkic 
Muslims through harassment and intimidation, in order to 
prevent them from speaking out about human rights conditions in 
the XUAR.\154\ A report authored by researchers David Tobin and 
Nyrola Elima and published by Sheffield Hallam University in 
April 2023 documented how PRC authorities have shifted their 
methods of transnational repression in order to evade 
international scrutiny.\155\ Citing official documents, 
individual case studies, and other materials, the authors 
showed how PRC authorities surveilled Uyghurs in the United 
Kingdom and Turkey, using threats to their family members in 
the XUAR to compel them to spy on other Uyghurs or refrain from 
engaging in human rights advocacy.\156\ The report also 
documented the risks of long-term detention and deportation 
facing Uyghurs who flee to Thailand from China.\157\

Xinjiang

Xinjiang

    Notes to Chapter 18--Xinjiang

    \1\ James T. Areddy and Chun Han Wong, ``China's Xi Made Rare Visit 
to Xinjiang,'' Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2022; James Millward, 
``(Identity) Politics in Command: Xi Jinping's July Visit to 
Xinjiang,'' China Story, August 16, 2022; Alim Seytoff, ``Xi Jinping's 
Xinjiang Visit May Signal New Emphasis on the Assimilation of 
Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, July 19, 2022. See also ``Xi Jinping zai 
Xinjiang kaocha shi qiangdiao wanzheng zhunque guanche xin shidai Dang 
de zhi Jiang fanglue jianshe tuanjie hexie fanrong fuyu wenming jinbu 
anju leye shengtai lianghao de meihao Xinjiang'' [During his visit to 
Xinjiang, Xi Jinping emphasized that it is necessary to fully and 
accurately implement the Party's Xinjiang governance strategy in the 
new era, and to build a beautiful Xinjiang that is united, harmonious, 
prosperous, well-off, civilized, progressive, living and working in 
peace, and has a good environment], Xinhua, July 15, 2022.
    \2\ ``Xi Jinping zai Xinjiang kaocha shi qiangdiao wanzheng zhunque 
guanche xin shidai Dang de zhi Jiang fanglue jianshe tuanjie hexie 
fanrong fuyu wenming jinbu anju leye shengtai lianghao de meihao 
Xinjiang'' [During his visit to Xinjiang, Xi Jinping emphasized that it 
is necessary to fully and accurately implement the Party's Xinjiang 
governance strategy in the new era, and to build a beautiful Xinjiang 
that is united, harmonious, prosperous, well-off, civilized, 
progressive, living and working in peace, and has a good environment], 
Xinhua, July 15, 2022; James Millward, ``(Identity) Politics in 
Command: Xi Jinping's July Visit to Xinjiang,'' China Story, August 16, 
2022; James T. Areddy and Chun Han Wong, ``China's Xi Made Rare Visit 
to Xinjiang,'' Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2022.
    \3\ James T. Areddy and Chun Han Wong, ``China's Xi Made Rare Visit 
to Xinjiang,'' Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2022; Chris Buckley et 
al., ``China's Communist Party Congress: For His 3rd Term, Xi Jinping 
Surrounds Himself with Loyalists,'' New York Times, October 30, 2022; 
Vladimir Isachenkov and Kim Tong-hyung, ``Xi Awarded 3rd Term as 
China's President, Extending Rule,'' Associated Press, March 10, 2023.
    \4\ Zhao Kezhi, ``Zai tingqu Xinjiang Zizhiqu gong'an he wending 
gongzuo huibao shi de jianghua'' [Speech given while listening to the 
report on public security and stability work on the Xinjiang Autonomous 
Region], June 5, 2018, 2, 6, translated in Victims of Communism 
Memorial Foundation, ``Xinjiang Police Files''; Adrian Zenz, ``Public 
Security Minister's Speech Describes Xi Jinping's Direction of Mass 
Detentions in Xinjiang,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, May 24, 2022.
    \5\ Zhao Kezhi, ``Zai tingqu Xinjiang Zizhiqu gong'an he wending 
gongzuo huibao shi de jianghua'' [Speech given while listening to the 
report on public security and stability work on the Xinjiang Autonomous 
Region], June 5, 2018, 1, 7, 9, translated in Victims of Communism 
Memorial Foundation, ``Xinjiang Police Files''; Adrian Zenz, ``Public 
Security Minister's Speech Describes Xi Jinping's Direction of Mass 
Detentions in Xinjiang,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, May 24, 2022.
    \6\ Adrian Zenz, ``Public Security Minister's Speech Describes Xi 
Jinping's Direction of Mass Detentions in Xinjiang,'' ChinaFile, Asia 
Society, May 24, 2022; Zhao Kezhi, ``Zai tingqu Xinjiang Zizhiqu 
gong'an he wending gongzuo huibao shi de jianghua'' [Speech given while 
listening to the report on public security and stability work on the 
Xinjiang Autonomous Region], June 5, 2018, 6, translated in Victims of 
Communism Memorial Foundation ``Xinjiang Police Files.''
    \7\ James Millward, ``China's New Anti-Uyghur Campaign,'' Foreign 
Affairs, January 23, 2023. See also Human Rights Watch, ``China: 
Xinjiang Official Figures Reveal Higher Prisoner Count,'' September 14, 
2022; The Chinese Communist Party's Ongoing Uyghur Genocide, Hearing of 
the Select Committee on the CCP, U.S. House of Representatives, 118th 
Cong. (2023) (testimony of Adrian Zenz, Senior Fellow and Director of 
China Studies, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation), 14, 53.
    \8\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, para. 143; Vicky 
Xiuzhong Xu, Daria Impiombato, and Nathan Ruser, ``UN Uyghur Report 
Leaves No Room for Denial and No Excuse for Inaction,'' Strategist, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 3, 2022.
    \9\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, para. 148.
    \10\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022. For 
documentation of cultural and religious persecution, see paras. 80-93; 
for rape, see paras. 73 and 78; for torture, see paras. 1, 6, 70, 74-
78, and 145; for violations of reproductive rights, see paras. 79, 104-
14, and 146; and for forced labor, see paras. 1 and 115-28.
    \11\ Austin Ramzy, ``For Uyghurs, U.N. Report on China's Abuses Is 
Long-Awaited Vindication,'' New York Times, September 1, 2022; 
``Opinion: The U.N. Report on China's Atrocities against the Uyghurs Is 
Damning,'' editorial, Washington Post, September 2, 2022; Reid 
Standish, ``After Years of Chinese Pressure, Uyghur Activists Welcome 
UN Report on Xinjiang Abuses,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
September 1, 2022.
    \12\ Austin Ramzy, ``For Uyghurs, U.N. Report on China's Abuses Is 
Long-Awaited Vindication,'' New York Times, September 1, 2022; Stuart 
Lau, ``China Direct: Damning UN Report--Crimes against Humanity--No Fan 
of Gorbachev,'' Politico, September 1, 2022; Jo Smith Finley, 
``Comment: UN Report on Abuse of Uyghurs Misses a Vital Word: 
Genocide,'' Newcastle University Press Office, September 7, 2022.
    \13\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
``Xinjiang Report: China Must Address Grave Human Rights Violations and 
the World Must Not Turn a Blind Eye, Say UN Experts,'' September 7, 
2022.
    \14\ Emma Farge, ``Exclusive: China Seeks to Stop UN Rights Chief 
from Releasing Xinjiang Report--Document,'' Reuters, July 20, 2022; 
Jacob Fromer, Finbarr Bermingham, and Robert Delaney, ``China Lobbying 
at UN to Block Xinjiang Report Publication, Document Shows,'' South 
China Morning Post, July 21, 2022; Austin Ramzy, ``For Uyghurs, U.N. 
Report on China's Abuses Is Long-Awaited Vindication,'' New York Times, 
September 1, 2022; William Nee, ``China's Heavy-Handed Push to Prevent 
a UN Report on Xinjiang,'' Diplomat, August 1, 2022; Stuart Lau, 
``China Direct: Damning UN Report--Crimes against Humanity--No Fan of 
Gorbachev,'' Politico, September 1, 2022; Mercedes Page, ``A Tragedy in 
Xinjiang, a Tragedy for the UN,'' Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 
September 2, 2022.
    \15\ ``Dozens of NGOs Call on UN Rights Chief to Resign after China 
Visit,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in News24, June 8, 2022.
    \16\ Rachel Cheung, ``UN Human Rights Chief Is Silent on China's 
Abuses in Xinjiang, and Scholars Are Fuming,'' Vice, June 8, 2022.
    \17\ See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 
Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 306.
    \18\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Human 
Rights Council Adopts 21 Texts and Rejects One Draft Decision, Extends 
Mandates on Older Persons, Right to Development, Arbitrary Detention, 
Mercenaries, Slavery, Indigenous Peoples, Safe Drinking Water and 
Sanitation,'' October 6, 2022; Patrick Wintour, ``UN Vote to Ignore 
Human Rights Abuses in China Leaves West in Dead End,'' Guardian, 
October 6, 2022.
    \19\ Amnesty International, ``China: Xinjiang Vote Failure Betrays 
Core Mission of UN Human Rights Council,'' October 6, 2022; Patrick 
Wintour, ``UN Vote to Ignore Human Rights Abuses in China Leaves West 
in Dead End,'' Guardian, October 6, 2022.
    \20\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``About 
Early Warning and Urgent Procedures,'' accessed March 10, 2023.
    \21\ U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
``China: UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Calls 
for Probe into Xinjiang Rights Violations,'' November 24, 2022; U.N. 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ``Prevention of 
Racial Discrimination, Including Early Warning and Urgent Action 
Procedure, Decision 1 (108) (Advance Unedited Version),'' November 23, 
2022. See also Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted by U.N. General Assembly 
resolution 34/180 of December 18, 1979, entry into force September 3, 
1981; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, accessed June 20, 2023. China signed CEDAW on July 17, 1980, and 
ratified it on November 4, 1980, thereby committing to undertake the 
legal rights and obligations contained in these articles.
    \22\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee 
at its 30th Meeting (3 March 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, 
paras. 35-36, 52-53, 68-71, 90-91.
    \23\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``UN Committee Grills China on 
Widespread Gender-Based Violence Targeting Uyghur Women,'' May 12, 
2023.
    \24\ Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act of 2023, H.R. 1154, 118th 
Cong. (2023); ``H.R.1154-118th Congress (2023-2024): Stop Forced Organ 
Harvesting Act of 2023,'' Congress.gov, accessed August 18, 2023. The 
Senate version of the bill, S. 761, was introduced on March 9, 2023. 
Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act of 2023, S. 761, 118th Cong. (2023), 
Congress.gov, accessed August 18, 2023.
    \25\ Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act of 2023, H.R. 1154, 118th 
Cong. (2023), sec. 6; Michael Finan, ``Smith's Legislation to Combat 
Chinese Communist Party's Ghoulish Industry of Stealing People's Organs 
Clears Major Hurdle on Its Way to House Floor,'' Office of Congressman 
Chris Smith, February 28, 2023; Victims of Communism Memorial 
Foundation, ``VOC Applauds Passage of Organ Trafficking Bill in House, 
Urges Senate Approval,'' March 29, 2023; Ruth Ingram, ``Organ 
Harvesting from Uyghurs: Evidence Grows, the U.S. Reacts,'' Bitter 
Winter, June 19, 2023. See also Matthew P. Robertson and Jacob Lavee, 
``Execution by Organ Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in 
China,'' American Journal of Transplantation, April 4, 2022, 2.
    \26\ Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act of 2023, S. 
1770, 118th Cong. (2023).
    \27\ Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act of 2023, S. 
1770, 118th Cong. (2023), sec. 2; ``Rubio, Merkley Introduce Landmark 
Legislation to Hold the CCP Accountable for Crimes in Xinjiang,'' 
Office of Senator Marco Rubio, May 31, 2023; Marti Flacks, ``What's 
Next for the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act?,'' Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, June 21, 2023.
    \28\ For information from the 2022 reporting year on the formal 
imprisonment of Turkic Muslims previously held in mass internment 
camps, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual 
Report (Washington: November 2022), 303-304.
    \29\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Xinjiang Official Figures Reveal 
Higher Prisoner Count,'' September 14, 2022; Emily Feng and John 
Ruwitch, ``The United Nations Says Crimes against Humanity May Have 
Happened in China's Xinjiang,'' NPR, August 31, 2022.
    \30\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Xinjiang Official Figures Reveal 
Higher Prisoner Count,'' September 14, 2022. As noted by Human Rights 
Watch, the Xinjiang High People's Court has not released data on 
official sentencing figures or sentencing breakdowns for the years 
following 2017.
    \31\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Xinjiang Official Figures Reveal 
Higher Prisoner Count,'' September 14, 2022.
    \32\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Xinjiang Official Figures Reveal 
Higher Prisoner Count,'' September 14, 2022.
    \33\ Helen Ann-Smith et al., ``What's Happened to China's Uyghur 
Camps?,'' Sky News, May 18, 2023.
    \34\ The Chinese Communist Party's Ongoing Uyghur Genocide, Hearing 
of the Select Committee on the CCP, U.S. House of Representatives, 
118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Adrian Zenz, Senior Fellow and 
Director of China Studies, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation), 
1:15:27-1:16:07 and 1:50:24-1:50:49. Adrian Zenz refers to mass 
internment camps as ``vocational centers'' and ``reeducation camps.''
    \35\ The Chinese Communist Party's Ongoing Uyghur Genocide, Hearing 
of the Select Committee on the CCP, U.S. House of Representatives, 
118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Adrian Zenz, Senior Fellow and 
Director of China Studies, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation), 
27, 46. See also Ma Xingrui, ``Wei shixian Xinjiang shehui wending he 
changzhi jiu'an tigong jianqiang baozhang'' [Provide a strong guarantee 
for the realization of social stability and long-term stability in 
Xinjiang], People's Daily, April 21, 2022.
    \36\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Teacher Confirmed Detained in 
Xinjiang for Work on Literature Textbooks,'' Radio Free Asia, March 3, 
2023; Shohret Hoshur, `` `Mening yengi dersxanam' namliq kitabning 
aptori setiwaldi kerimning 19 yilliq kesilgenliki ashkarilandi'' [The 
author of ``My New Classroom'' Setiwaldi Kerim revealed to have been 
sentenced to 19 years], Radio Free Asia, March 1, 2023. For more 
information on Setiwaldi Kerim, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2023-00131.
    \37\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Teacher Confirmed Detained in 
Xinjiang for Work on Literature Textbooks,'' Radio Free Asia, March 3, 
2023; Shohret Hoshur, `` `Mening yengi dersxanam' namliq kitabning 
aptori setiwaldi kerimning 19 yilliq kesilgenliki ashkarilandi' [The 
author of ``My New Classroom'' Setiwaldi Kerim revealed to have been 
sentenced to 19 years], Radio Free Asia, March 1, 2023.
    \38\ For more information on Yalqun Rozi, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00379.
    \39\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Teacher Confirmed Detained in 
Xinjiang for Work on Literature Textbooks,'' Radio Free Asia, March 3, 
2023; Shohret Hoshur, `` `Mening yengi dersxanam' namliq kitabning 
aptori setiwaldi kerimning 19 yilliq kesilgenliki ashkarilandi'' [The 
author of ``My New Classroom'' Setiwaldi Kerim revealed to have been 
sentenced to 19 years], Radio Free Asia, March 1, 2023. For more 
information on Sattar Sawut, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2019-00385.
    \40\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Bei panxing 11 nian de 
zhuming Weiwu'er zu xin shengdai geshou Abulajiang Awuti Ayoupu de 
anqing jianli'' [The case and biography of the famous Uyghur new-
generation singer Ablajan Awut Ayup who was sentenced to 11 years in 
prison], December 2, 2022. For more information on Ablajan Ayup, see 
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00444.
    \41\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Bei panxing 11 nian de 
zhuming Weiwu'er zu xin shengdai geshou Abulajiang Awuti Ayoupu de 
anqing jianli'' [The case and biography of the famous Uyghur new-
generation singer Ablajan Awut Ayup who was sentenced to 11 years in 
prison], December 2, 2022.
    \42\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Bei panxing 11 nian de 
zhuming Weiwu'er zu xin shengdai geshou Abulajiang Awuti Ayoupu de 
anqing jianli'' [The case and biography of the famous Uyghur new-
generation singer Ablajan Awut Ayup who was sentenced to 11 years in 
prison], December 2, 2022.
    \43\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Bei panxing 11 nian de 
zhuming Weiwu'er zu xin shengdai geshou Abulajiang Awuti Ayoupu de 
anqing jianli'' [The case and biography of the famous Uyghur new-
generation singer Ablajan Awut Ayup who was sentenced to 11 years in 
prison], December 2, 2022; ``Popular Uyghur Singer's Whereabouts 
Unknown, Believed Detained in Xinjiang Re-Education Camp,'' Radio Free 
Asia, May 18, 2018.
    \44\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Sha'ir we edib Abduqadir Jalalidinning 
muddetsiz kesiwetilgenliki ashkarilandi'' [It has been revealed that 
the poet and writer Abduqadir Jalalidin has been sentenced to life], 
Radio Free Asia, January 19, 2023. For more information on Abduqadir 
Jalalidin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 
2018-00268.
    \45\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Sha'ir we edib Abduqadir Jalalidinning 
muddetsiz kesiwetilgenliki ashkarilandi'' [It has been revealed that 
the poet and writer Abduqadir Jalalidin has been sentenced to life], 
Radio Free Asia, January 19, 2023.
    \46\ ``Prominent Uyghur Scholar Detained in Xinjiang Capital 
Urumqi: Official,'' Radio Free Asia, April 25, 2018.
    \47\ Shohret Hoshur, ``China Sentences Mother of Uyghur Dutch 
Airman to 15 Years for Visiting Him Abroad,'' Radio Free Asia, November 
17, 2022. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database records 2023-00026 on Imanem Nesrulla and 2023-00027 on Ayhan 
Memet.
    \48\ Shohret Hoshur, ``China Sentences Mother of Uyghur Dutch 
Airman to 15 Years for Visiting Him Abroad,'' Radio Free Asia, November 
17, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Gollandiye hawa armiye kapitani muniridin 
yadikarning qomuldiki apisi we yenggisi 15 yilliq kesiwetilgen'' [Dutch 
Air Force Captain Munirdin Jadikar's mother and sister-in-law in Qumul 
sentenced to 15 years], Radio Free Asia, November 15, 2022.
    \49\ Shohret Hoshur, ``China Sentences Mother of Uyghur Dutch 
Airman to 15 Years for Visiting Him Abroad,'' Radio Free Asia, November 
17, 2022.
    \50\ Shohret Hoshur, ``China Sentences Mother of Uyghur Dutch 
Airman to 15 Years for Visiting Him Abroad,'' Radio Free Asia, November 
17, 2022.
    \51\ Shohret Hoshur, ``China Sentences Mother of Uyghur Dutch 
Airman to 15 Years for Visiting Him Abroad,'' Radio Free Asia, November 
17, 2022.
    \52\ Shohret Hoshur, ``China Sentences Mother of Uyghur Dutch 
Airman to 15 Years for Visiting Him Abroad,'' Radio Free Asia, November 
17, 2022.
    \53\ Shohret Hoshur, ``China Sentences Mother of Uyghur Dutch 
Airman to 15 Years for Visiting Him Abroad,'' Radio Free Asia, November 
17, 2022. The officials were likely referring to Article 111 of the PRC 
Criminal Law, which forbids individuals from ``unlawfully supplying 
state secrets or intelligence'' to a foreign entity. Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised 
March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, effective March 1, 2021, 
art. 111.
    \54\ Shohret Hoshur, ``China Sentences Mother of Uyghur Dutch 
Airman to 15 Years for Visiting Him Abroad,'' Radio Free Asia, November 
17, 2022.
    \55\ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual 
Report (Washington: November 2022), 305.
    \56\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Former Uyghur Muslim Preacher Confirmed Dead 
in Prison in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, December 28, 2022; 
Shohret Hoshur, ``Korla qarayulghun meschitining sabiq xatibi omer 
huseyin turmide jan uzgen'' [Omer Huseyin, a former preacher at the 
Qarayulghun Mosque in Korla, has died in prison], Radio Free Asia, 
December 16, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Korla qarayulghunda `terbiyelesh' 
ke eketilgen 4 qerindashtin ikkisi turmide jan uzgen'' [Two of 4 
brothers who were taken to ``education'' in Qarayulghun, Korla, died in 
prison], Radio Free Asia, December 22, 2022. For more information, see 
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2023-00133 on Omer 
Huseyin and 2023-00134 on Semet Huseyin.
    \57\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Former Uyghur Muslim Preacher Confirmed Dead 
in Prison in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, December 28, 2022. 
Shohret Hoshur, ``Korla qarayulghunda ``terbiyelesh'' ke eketilgen 4 
qerindashtin ikkisi turmide jan uzgen'' [Two of 4 brothers who were 
taken to ``education'' in Qarayulghun, Korla, died in prison], Radio 
Free Asia, December 22, 2022.
    \58\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Former Uyghur Muslim Preacher Confirmed Dead 
in Prison in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, December 28, 2022; 
Shohret Hoshur, ``Korla qarayulghun meschitining sabiq xatibi omer 
huseyin turmide jan uzgen'' [Omer Huseyin, a former preacher at the 
Qarayulghun Mosque in Korla, has died in prison], Radio Free Asia, 
December 16, 2022.
    \59\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Former Uyghur Muslim Preacher Confirmed Dead 
in Prison in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, December 28, 2022; 
Shohret Hoshur, ``Korla qarayulghunda ``terbiyelesh'' ke eketilgen 4 
qerindashtin ikkisi turmide jan uzgen'' [Two of 4 brothers who were 
taken to ``education'' in Qarayulghun, Korla, died in prison], Radio 
Free Asia, December 22, 2022.
    \60\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Renowned Uyghur Poet Dies Following Prison 
Release in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, December 29, 2022. For more 
information on Abdulla Sawut, see the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database record 2023-00132.
    \61\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Renowned Uyghur Poet Dies Following Prison 
Release in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, December 29, 2022; Shohret 
Hoshur, ``Ataqliq edib we sha'ir abdulla sawut turmidin kesel chiqip 
dawalinalmay jan uzgen'' [The famous writer and poet Abdulla Sawut died 
after getting sick from prison without treatment], Radio Free Asia, 
December 29, 2022.
    \62\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Renowned Uyghur Poet Dies Following Prison 
Release in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, December 29, 2022; Shohret 
Hoshur, ``Ataqliq edib we sha'ir abdulla sawut turmidin kesel chiqip 
dawalinalmay jan uzgen'' [The famous writer and poet Abdulla Sawut died 
after getting sick from prison without treatment], Radio Free Asia, 
December 29, 2022.
    \63\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Propaganda Chief Confirmed Dead 5 
Days after Being Released from Jail,'' Radio Free Asia, March 17, 2023; 
Shohret Hoshur, ``Aqsu wilayetlik teshwiqat bolum bashliqi ilham 
rozining turmidin chiqip 5 kundin keyin wapat bolghanliqi delillendi'' 
[It has been confirmed that Aksu Prefectural Publicity Department Head 
Ilham Rozi has died five days after leaving prison], Radio Free Asia, 
March 13, 2023. For more information on Ilham Rozi, see the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00197.
    \64\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Propaganda Chief Confirmed Dead 5 
Days after Being Released from Jail,'' Radio Free Asia, March 17, 2023; 
Shohret Hoshur, ``Aqsu wilayetlik teshwiqat bolum bashliqi ilham 
rozining turmidin chiqip 5 kundin keyin wapat bolghanliqi delillendi'' 
[It has been confirmed that Aksu Prefectural Publicity Department Head 
Ilham Rozi has died five days after leaving prison], Radio Free Asia, 
March 13, 2023.
    \65\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Propaganda Chief Confirmed Dead 5 
Days after Being Released from Jail,'' Radio Free Asia, March 17, 2023; 
Shohret Hoshur, ``Aqsu wilayetlik teshwiqat bolum bashliqi ilham 
rozining turmidin chiqip 5 kundin keyin wapat bolghanliqi delillendi'' 
[It has been confirmed that Aksu Prefectural Publicity Department Head 
Ilham Rozi has died five days after leaving prison], Radio Free Asia, 
March 13, 2023; Uyghur Hjelp, ``List of Uyghur Intellectuals Imprisoned 
in China from 2016 to the Present (Last Updated by Abduweli Ayup 
December 31, 2022),'' accessed March 27, 2023. For more information, 
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2019-00379 on 
Yalqun Rozi and 2018-00268 on Abduqadir Jalalidin.
    \66\ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual 
Report (Washington: November 2022), 306; Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 278-
79; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report 
(Washington: December 2020), 302-3.
    \67\ The Chinese Communist Party's Ongoing Uyghur Genocide, Hearing 
of the Select Committee on the CCP, U.S. House of Representatives, 
118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Adrian Zenz, Senior Fellow and 
Director of China Studies, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation), 
13-14; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, 
Tomoya Obokata, A/HRC/51/26, July 19, 2022, para. 23; Office of the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR Assessment of Human 
Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's 
Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, para. 118.
    \68\ Adrian Zenz, ``Coercive Labor in the Cotton Harvest in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Uzbekistan: A Comparative 
Analysis of State-Sponsored Forced Labor,'' Journal of Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies 56, no. 2 (June 2023): 4.
    \69\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, paras. 118-23.
    \70\ U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, 
Tomoya Obokata, A/HRC/51/26, July 19, 2022, paras. 23-24. See also Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, entry into force 
July 1, 2002, art. 7(c).
    \71\ U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, 
Tomoya Obokata, A/HRC/51/26, July 19, 2022, para. 24. See also Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, entry into force 
July 1 2002, art. 7(c).
    \72\ International Labour Organization, Report of the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
International Labour Conference, 111th Session, February 17, 2023, 604-
9.
    \73\ International Labour Organization, Report of the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
International Labour Conference, 111th Session, February 17, 2023, 604, 
606. China ratified the Convention in 2006. See also International 
Labour Organization, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention, 1958 (No. 111), arts. 1-5.
    \74\ International Labour Organization, Report of the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
International Labour Conference, 111th Session, February 17, 2023, 606. 
See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed 
July 5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, amended December 29, 2018, 
arts. 12-14; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhiye Jiaoyu Fa [PRC Vocational 
Education Law], passed May 15, 1996, amended April 20, 2022, effective 
May 1, 2022, arts. 9, 10; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiuye Cujin Fa [PRC 
Employment Promotion Law], passed August 30, 2007, effective January 1, 
2008.
    \75\ Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Department of State, ``Implementation 
of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act,'' June 21, 2022.
    \76\ Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law 117-78). The 
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law No. 117-78) establishes 
a rebuttable presumption that all goods made in whole or in part in the 
XUAR have been made with forced labor, and that the importation of such 
goods is prohibited by Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930. See also 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold 
Release Order on Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,'' January 
13, 2021; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``Uyghur Forced Labor 
Prevention Act: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Operational Guidance 
for Importers,'' June 13, 2022.
    \77\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Fruits of Uyghur Forced Labor: 
Sanctioned Products on American Grocery Store Shelves,'' August 2022, 
1, 2, 13.
    \78\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Fruits of Uyghur Forced Labor: 
Sanctioned Products on American Grocery Store Shelves,'' August 2022, 
1, 12.
    \79\ Evan Conceicao and Melissa Whalen, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, ``Implementing the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act: A 
Challenge Worth the Effort,'' January 5, 2023. As of June 20, 2023, 
Customs and Border Protection had denied or detained under review more 
than US$752 million worth of shipments under the Uyghur Forced Labor 
Prevention Act. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``Uyghur Forced 
Labor Prevention Act Statistics,'' accessed May 19, 2023.
    \80\ Laura Murphy, Kendyl Salcito, Yalkun Uluyol, Mia Rabkin, and 
an anonymous team of authors, Helena Kennedy Centre for International 
Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, and NomoGaia, ``Driving Force: 
Automotive Supply Chains and Forced Labor in the Uyghur Region,'' 
December 2022, 1, 50, Annex C.
    \81\ Laura Murphy, Kendyl Salcito, Yalkun Uluyol, Mia Rabkin, and 
an anonymous team of authors, Helena Kennedy Centre for International 
Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, ``Driving Force: Automotive 
Supply Chains and Forced Labor in the Uyghur Region,'' December 2022.
    \82\ Laura Murphy, Kendyl Salcito, Yalkun Uluyol, Mia Rabkin, and 
an anonymous team of authors, Helena Kennedy Centre for International 
Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, and NomoGaia, ``Driving Force: 
Automotive Supply Chains and Forced Labor in the Uyghur Region,'' 
December 2022, 22-23, 37, 47-48.
    \83\ See, e.g., ``Lookout Discovers Long-Running Surveillance 
Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs,'' Lookout, November 10, 2022; Gulchehra 
Hoja, ``Driverless Police Surveillance Cars Hit Streets of Xinjiang's 
Karamay,'' Radio Free Asia, July 14, 2022; Office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights 
Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of 
China,'' August 31, 2022, paras. 99-101; Gerald Roche and James 
Leibold, ``State Racism and Surveillance in Xinjiang (People's Republic 
of China),'' Political Quarterly 93, no. 3 (2022): 446-48; Jessica 
Batke, ``Participation in Xinjiang Surveillance Program Can Lead to 
Smoother Career Enhancement,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, July 5, 2022; 
Yang Mingfang and A'er Dake, ``Fenlie jianshe xin shidai Zhongguo tese 
shehui zhuyi Xinjiang'' [Strive to build a socialist Xinjiang with 
Chinese characteristics in the new era], People's Daily, August 10, 
2022.
    \84\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, paras. 94-103.
    \85\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Human 
Rights Implications of the Development, Use and Transfer of New 
Technologies in the Context of Counter-Terrorism and Countering and 
Preventing Violent Extremism: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while 
Countering Terrorism,'' Fionnuala Ni Aolain, A/HRC/52/39, March 1, 
2023, paras. 20, 31.
    \86\ Gerald Roche and James Leibold, ``State Racism and 
Surveillance in Xinjiang (People's Republic of China),'' Political 
Quarterly 93, no. 3 (2022): 447-48.
    \87\ See, e.g., Amos Zeeberg, ``A Tiny Blog Took on Big 
Surveillance in China--and Won,'' Wired, April 4, 2023; Bethany Allen-
Ebrahimian and Ina Fried, ``Exclusive: Hikvision Internal Review Found 
Xinjiang Contracts Targeted Uyghurs,'' Axios, April 17, 2023; Adrian 
Wooldridge, ``China's Surveillance State Will Be the West's Future, 
Too,'' Bloomberg, September 12, 2022; Ruth Ingram, ``Activists Call for 
Complete Ban on Hikvision, Dahua, and Other Firms That Make 
Surveillance Tech Used in Xinjiang,'' China Project, April 6, 2023.
    \88\ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Ina Fried, ``Exclusive: Hikvision 
Internal Review Found Xinjiang Contracts Targeted Uyghurs,'' Axios, 
April 17, 2023.
    \89\ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Ina Fried, ``Exclusive: Hikvision 
Internal Review Found Xinjiang Contracts Targeted Uyghurs,'' Axios, 
April 17, 2023; ``Hikvision Cameras Used to Catch Uyghurs Featured in 
Xinjiang Police Files,'' IPVM, June 14, 2022; Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, 
``Report: Hikvision Cameras Help Xinjiang Police Ensnare Uyghurs,'' 
Axios, June 14, 2022.
    \90\ Ruth Ingram, ``Activists Call for Complete Ban on Hikvision, 
Dahua, and Other Firms That Make Surveillance Tech Used in Xinjiang,'' 
China Project, April 6, 2023.
    \91\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Phone Search Program Tramples 
Uyghur Rights,'' May 4, 2023. See also Darren Byler, ``Within the 
Operational Enclosure: Surveillance and Subversion in Northwest 
China,'' Logic(s) Magazine, no. 19 (2023).
    \92\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Phone Search Program Tramples 
Uyghur Rights,'' May 4, 2023.
    \93\ John Liu et al., ``China's COVID-Zero Lockdown in Xinjiang Has 
Just Hit 100 Days,'' Bloomberg, November 17, 2022; Yew Lun Tian, 
``Protests Erupt in Xinjiang and Beijing after Deadly Fire,'' Reuters, 
November 26, 2022.
    \94\ ``China's Vast Xinjiang Hit with COVID-19 Travel 
Restrictions,'' Associated Press, October 6, 2022.
    \95\ Shohret Hoshur, ``COVID Disinfectant Poisoning Kills at Least 
13 Uyghurs in Village in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, September 30, 
2022.
    \96\ Shohret Hoshur, ``22 Die of Starvation in One Day under COVID 
Lockdown in Xinjiang's Ghulja,'' Radio Free Asia, September 21, 2022; 
Uyghur Human Rights Project, `` `We Are Dying': Desperate Messages from 
Uyghurs Facing Starvation and Death under Zero COVID Lockdowns,'' 
September 9, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Lack of Uyghur-Language Emergency 
Services Leads to More Deaths in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, October 
4, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``As Many as a Dozen Dead amid Shortages 
Caused by Xinjiang COVID Lockdown,'' Radio Free Asia, September 10, 
2022.
    \97\ Eva Dou and Vic Chiang, ``Stuck in China's COVID Lockdown, 
People Plead for Food, Medical Care,'' Washington Post, September 12, 
2022; Uyghur Human Rights Project, `` `We Are Dying': Desperate 
Messages from Uyghurs Facing Starvation and Death under Zero COVID 
Lockdowns,'' September 9, 2022. See also Isobel Cockerell, `` `They're 
Trying to Kill Us': Uyghurs in Xinjiang Suffer Brutal COVID Lockdown,'' 
Coda Story, September 23, 2022.
    \98\ Eva Dou and Vic Chiang, ``Stuck in China's COVID Lockdown, 
People Plead for Food, Medical Care,'' Washington Post, September 12, 
2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``22 Die of Starvation in One Day under COVID 
Lockdown in Xinjiang's Ghulja,'' Radio Free Asia, September 21, 2022; 
Josephine Ma, ``Coronavirus: Authorities Apologise for Medical Woes in 
Locked Down Xinjiang Prefecture,'' South China Morning Post, September 
10, 2022; Dake Kang, ``Under COVID Lockdown, Xinjiang Residents 
Complain of Hunger,'' Associated Press, September 14, 2022; Isobel 
Cockerell, `` `They're Trying to Kill Us': Uyghurs in Xinjiang Suffer 
Brutal COVID Lockdown,'' Coda Story, September 23, 2022.
    \99\ ``Minitrue: Flood Weibo Comments on Xinjiang Prefecture's 
Lockdown,'' China Digital Times, September 9, 2022. See also Eva Dou 
and Vic Chiang, ``Stuck in China's COVID Lockdown, People Plead for 
Food, Medical Care,'' Washington Post, September 12, 2022.
    \100\ ``Xinjiang Yili: Fangyi zhong que you yixie duanban he buzu, 
zhide shenke fansi'' [Yili, Xinjiang: There are indeed some 
shortcomings and deficiencies in epidemic prevention, which are worthy 
of deep reflection], People's Daily, September 9, 2022; Josephine Ma, 
``Coronavirus: Authorities Apologise for Medical Woes in Locked Down 
Xinjiang Prefecture,'' South China Morning Post, September 10, 2022. 
See also Cyril Ip, ``Chinese Internet Users Detained over Xinjiang 
COVID-19 `Rumours,' '' South China Morning Post, September 12, 2022; 
Dake Kang, ``Under COVID Lockdown, Xinjiang Residents Complain of 
Hunger,'' Associated Press, September 14, 2022.
    \101\ Rita Cheng and Shohret Hoshur, ``Deadly Fire in Xinjiang 
Prompts Protests across China over Strict COVID Lockdowns,'' Radio Free 
Asia, November 26, 2022; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Must 
End Reprisals against Protestors, Investigate Urumqi Fire, Free 
Detainees,'' December 2, 2022; Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, and Enwer 
Erdem, `` `I Hold China Accountable': Uyghur Families Demand Answers 
over Fire That Triggered Protests,'' CNN, December 1, 2022; Isabel van 
Brugen, `` `They Never Care': Angry Relatives of China Fire Victims 
Dispute Death Toll,'' Newsweek, November 28, 2022.
    \102\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Victims in Urumqi Fire That Sparked 
Protests Were All Uyghurs, Officials Confirm,'' Radio Free Asia, 
December 2, 2022.
    \103\ Chang Che and Amy Chang Chien, ``Protest in Xinjiang against 
Lockdown after Fire Kills 10,'' New York Times, November 25, 2022.
    \104\ ``Uyghur Man's Agony after Five Relatives Died in Urumqi 
Fire,'' Agence-France Presse, reprinted in France 24, November 28, 
2022; Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, and Enwer Erdem, `` `I Hold China 
Accountable': Uyghur Families Demand Answers over Fire That Triggered 
Protests,'' CNN, December 1, 2022; David Tobin (@ReasonablyRagin), 
``Urumchi is not Zhengzhou . . .,'' Twitter, November 26, 2022, 8:48 
a.m.; Isabel van Brugen, `` `They Never Care': Angry Relatives of China 
Fire Victims Dispute Death Toll,'' Newsweek, November 28, 2022.
    \105\ Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, and Enwer Erdem, `` `I Hold 
China Accountable': Uyghur Families Demand Answers over Fire That 
Triggered Protests,'' CNN, December 1, 2022; Chang Che and Amy Chang 
Chien, ``Protest in Xinjiang against Lockdown after Fire Kills 10,'' 
New York Times, November 25, 2022; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 
``China Must End Reprisals against Protestors, Investigate Urumqi Fire, 
Free Detainees,'' December 2, 2022.
    \106\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Victims in Urumqi Fire That Sparked 
Protests Were All Uyghurs, Officials Confirm,'' Radio Free Asia, 
December 2, 2022; Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, and Enwer Erdem, `` `I 
Hold China Accountable': Uyghur Families Demand Answers over Fire That 
Triggered Protests,'' CNN, December 1, 2022.
    \107\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Otta koyop ketken qemernisaning yoldishi we 
chong oghlining turmide ikenliki delillendi'' [Husband and eldest son 
of Qemernisa, who burned to death in the fire, confirmed in prison], 
Radio Free Asia, December 9, 2022; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 
``China Must End Reprisals against Protestors, Investigate Urumqi Fire, 
Free Detainees,'' December 2, 2022; Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, and 
Enwer Erdem, `` `I Hold China Accountable': Uyghur Families Demand 
Answers over Fire That Triggered Protests,'' CNN, December 1, 2022. For 
more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
records 2023-00219 on Memet'eli Metniyaz and 2023-00220 on Ilyas 
Memet'eli.
    \108\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Must End Reprisals 
against Protestors, Investigate Urumqi Fire, Free Detainees,'' December 
2, 2022.
    \109\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Must End Reprisals 
against Protestors, Investigate Urumqi Fire, Free Detainees,'' December 
2, 2022.
    \110\ Abduweli Ayup (@AbduwelA), ``Henipe is in screenshot of 
people in #UrumqiFire were crying to be rescued . . .,'' Twitter, 
November 29, 2022, 4:20 p.m.
    \111\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Must End Reprisals 
against Protestors, Investigate Urumqi Fire, Free Detainees,'' December 
2, 2022.
    \112\ Manya Koetse, ``The 11.24 Urumqi Fire: Mourning and Anger at 
Lives Lost in Apartment Building Inferno,'' What's on Weibo, November 
25, 2022; ``Nuzi zaoyao Wulumuqi huozai shigu siwang renshu bei 
xingju'' [Woman criminally detained for spreading rumors about death 
toll in Urumqi fire], Urumqi Municipality Public Security Bureau, 
reprinted in Guancha Weixin account, November 25, 2022.
    \113\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Must End Reprisals 
against Protestors, Investigate Urumqi Fire, Free Detainees,'' December 
2, 2022; Nathan Ruser (@Nrg8000), ``For our 4th China Protest Map 
Tracker . . .,'' Twitter, December 2, 2022, 7:16 a.m.; Rita Cheng and 
Shohret Hoshur, ``Deadly Fire in Xinjiang Prompts Protests across China 
over Strict COVID Lockdowns,'' Radio Free Asia, November 26, 2022.
    \114\ ``China Protests Shine Light on Limits of Uyghur 
Solidarity,'' Agence-France Presse, reprinted in Radio France 
Internationale, December 12, 2022; Jo Smith Finley, ``China Protests: 
Uyghur People Have Suffered Most from Draconian Zero-COVID Policies but 
Are Too Terrorised to Join In,'' Conversation, December 1, 2022; Rachel 
Cheung, ``For the First Time, Chinese Protesters Are Standing with 
Uyghurs. Will It Last?,'' Vice, December 12, 2022; Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, ``China Must End Reprisals against Protestors, Investigate 
Urumqi Fire, Free Detainees,'' December 2, 2022; Rebecca Wright, Ivan 
Watson, and Enwer Erdem, `` `I Hold China Accountable': Uyghur Families 
Demand Answers over Fire That Triggered Protests,'' CNN, December 1, 
2022.
    \115\ Jane Tang, ``U.S.-Based Uyghur Man Calls on China to Release 
His 19-Year-Old Sister,'' Radio Free Asia, January 26, 2023; Shohret 
Hoshur, ``Detained Uyghur Student Awaits Outcome of Probe into Her Case 
in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, April 28, 2023. For more information on 
Kamile Wayit, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 
2023-00045.
    \116\ Amy Hawkins, ``Uyghur Student Convicted after Posting 
Protests Video on WeChat,'' Guardian, June 8, 2023. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was likely referring to Article 120-3 of the PRC 
Criminal Law, which forbids individuals from ``advocating terrorism or 
extremism'' by producing or distributing books, audio or visual 
materials, or other items, or by giving lectures or publishing 
information that ``advocates terrorism or extremism.'' Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised 
March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, effective March 1, 2021, 
art. 120-3.
    \117\ Shen Lu, ``Chinese Protesters Released after Four Months in 
Jail,'' Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2023; Tessa Wong and Grace Tsoi, 
``The Protesters Who've Gone Missing as China Deepens Crackdown,'' BBC, 
February 18, 2023; Shohret Hoshur, ``Detained Uyghur Student Awaits 
Outcome of Probe into Her Case in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, April 
28, 2023.
    \118\ Andrea J. Worden and Nuzigum Setiwaldi, Uyghur Human Rights 
Project, ``Forced Marriage of Uyghur Women: State Policies for 
Interethnic Marriages in East Turkistan,'' 2022, 1, 4-5, 6-38.
    \119\ Andrea J. Worden and Nuzigum Setiwaldi, Uyghur Human Rights 
Project, ``Forced Marriage of Uyghur Women: State Policies for 
Interethnic Marriages in East Turkistan,'' 2022, 3-4.
    \120\ Andrea J. Worden and Nuzigum Setiwaldi, Uyghur Human Rights 
Project, ``Forced Marriage of Uyghur Women: State Policies for 
Interethnic Marriages in East Turkistan,'' 2022, 1-2.
    \121\ Andrea J. Worden and Nuzigum Setiwaldi, Uyghur Human Rights 
Project, ``Forced Marriage of Uyghur Women: State Policies for 
Interethnic Marriages in East Turkistan,'' 2022, 34-37.
    \122\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, 
art. 16; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 34/
180 of December 18, 1979, entry into force September 3, 1981, art. 16; 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by U.N. 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into 
force December 25, 2003, arts. 3, 5. See also Andrea J. Worden and 
Nuzigum Setiwaldi, Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Forced Marriage of 
Uyghur Women: State Policies for Interethnic Marriages in East 
Turkistan,'' 2022, 37-38.
    \123\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
``OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, 
paras. 107-8.
    \124\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
``OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, 
paras. 104, 111, 113.
    \125\ Stuart Lau, ``China Direct: Damning UN Report--Crimes against 
Humanity--No Fan of Gorbachev,'' Politico, September 1, 2022. See also 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Genocide Convention), adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly 
resolution 260 (III) of December 9, 1948, art. 2(d).
    \126\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Parallel Submission to the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),'' 
April 2023; World Uyghur Congress, ``WUC Submission to the UN Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women for Consideration on 
the Report on China Concerning the Rights of the Uyghur and Other 
Turkic and Muslim Women,'' April 11, 2023.
    \127\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Parallel Submission to the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),'' 
April 2023. See also Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted by U.N. General Assembly 
resolution 34/180 of December 18, 1979, entry into force September 3, 
1981, arts. 12, 16.
    \128\ See, e.g., Joanna Lillis, ``Kazakhstan: Xinjiang Detainees' 
Relatives Mark Anniversary at Chinese Consulate,'' Eurasianet, 
September 29, 2022; ``Relatives `Held Hostage': Ethnic Kazakhs Fear 
Chinese Persecution after Settling Abroad,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, March 6, 2023; Amelia Loi, Gu Ting, and Jewlan, ``As Ramadan 
Begins, China's Muslims Face Fasting Bans, Monitoring and Arrest,'' 
Radio Free Asia, March 23, 2023.
    \129\ Joanna Lillis, ``Kazakhstan: Xinjiang Detainees' Relatives 
Mark Anniversary at Chinese Consulate,'' Eurasianet, September 29, 
2022; ``Relatives `Held Hostage': Ethnic Kazakhs Fear Chinese 
Persecution after Settling Abroad,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
March 6, 2023; Nurtai Lakhanuly, ``Ethnic Kazakh Man Reunites with 
Relatives in Almaty after Years in Xinjiang Labor Camp,'' Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, February 9, 2023.
    \130\ ``Relatives `Held Hostage': Ethnic Kazakhs Fear Chinese 
Persecution after Settling Abroad,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
March 6, 2023.
    \131\ Shohret Hoshur, ``China Arrests Family of Kazakh Singer 
Supposedly Contacted by Foreign Reporter,'' Radio Free Asia, February 
21, 2023; Chris Rickleton, ``Ethnic Kazakh in Xinjiang Sends `Extremely 
Rare' SOS in Bid to Escape Arrest, China,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, January 6, 2023; Christoph Giesen and Katharina Graca Peters, 
`` `I Want To Live': A Victim of Repression in Xinjiang Awaits New 
Life,'' Der Spiegel, January 24, 2023. For more information on 
Zhanargul Zhumatai, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
2023-00085.
    \132\ ``Xinjiang Camp Survivor Arrested Trying to Visit 
Kazakhstan,'' Eurasianet, February 13, 2023; Colum Murphy, Lucille Liu, 
and James Mayger, ``China Detains Ethnic Kazakh Activist in Xinjiang, 
Scholar Says,'' Bloomberg, February 15, 2023.
    \133\  Gu Ting and Hsia Hsiao-hwa, ``Xinjiang State Security Police 
Detain Outspoken Ethnic Kazakh Musician,'' Radio Free Asia, February 
13, 2023; ``Xinjiang Camp Survivor Arrested Trying to Visit 
Kazakhstan,'' Eurasianet, February 13, 2023.
    \134\ Christoph Giesen and Katharina Graca Peters, `` `I Want To 
Live': A Victim of Repression in Xinjiang Awaits New Life,'' Der 
Spiegel, January 24, 2023; ``Zhanargul Zhumatai, Entry 48985,'' 
Xinjiang Victims Database (www.shahit.biz), accessed April 10, 2023. 
The term ``focus country'' likely refers to a list of 26 countries 
officials deem it suspicious for Uyghurs to visit. The 26 countries 
reportedly include Algeria, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Pakistan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kenya, Libya, South Sudan, Nigeria, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Russia, and Turkey. Josh 
Chin and Clement Burge, ``Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China's 
Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life,'' Wall Street Journal, 
December 19, 2017; Rights Defense Network, ``26 guo bei lie she kong 
mingdan Xinjiang 10 duo ming Musilin bei panxing'' [26 countries put 
onto an involved-with-terrorism list, more than 10 Muslims sentenced in 
Xinjiang], December 10, 2017.
    \135\ Christoph Giesen and Katharina Graca Peters, `` `I Want To 
Live': A Victim of Repression in Xinjiang Awaits New Life,'' Der 
Spiegel, January 24, 2023; ``Conversation on Skype and Telephone on 
Monday 2 January 2023, Afternoon 2 pm, Central European Time (CET) 
Between Rune Steenberg (in Schleswig, Gernamy) and Zhanargul Zhumatay 
(in Urumchi, Xinjiang, PRC,'' Xinjiang Victims Database 
(www.shahit.biz), accessed April 10, 2023; Chris Rickleton, ``Ethnic 
Kazakh in Xinjiang Sends `Extremely Rare' SOS in Bid to Escape Arrest, 
China,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 6, 2023; Gu Ting and 
Hsia Hsiao-hwa, ``Xinjiang State Security Police Detain Outspoken 
Ethnic Kazakh Musician,'' Radio Free Asia, February 13, 2023.
    \136\ Christoph Giesen and Katharina Graca Peters, `` `I Want To 
Live': A Victim of Repression in Xinjiang Awaits New Life,'' Der 
Spiegel, January 24, 2023; ``Conversation on Skype and Telephone on 
Monday 2 January 2023, Afternoon 2 pm, Central European Time (CET) 
Between Rune Steenberg (in Schleswig, Gernamy) and Zhanargul Zhumatay 
(in Urumchi, Xinjiang, PRC,'' Xinjiang Victims Database 
(www.shahit.biz), accessed April 10, 2023; Tasnim Nazeer, ``No Escape: 
Camp Survivor Describes Life under House Arrest in Xinjiang,'' 
Diplomat, January 10, 2023; ``Xinjiang Camp Survivor Arrested Trying to 
Visit Kazakhstan,'' Eurasianet, February 13, 2023.
    \137\ Chris Rickleton, ``Ethnic Kazakh in Xinjiang Sends `Extremely 
Rare' SOS in Bid to Escape Arrest, China,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, January 6, 2023; ``Conversation on Skype and telephone on 
Monday 2 January 2023, afternoon 2 pm, Central European Time (CET) 
Between Rune Steenberg (in Schleswig, Gernamy) and Zhanargul Zhumatay 
(in Urumchi, Xinjiang, PRC,'' Xinjiang Victims Database 
(www.shahit.biz), accessed June 20, 2023.
    \138\ Christoph Giesen and Katharina Graca Peters, `` `I Want To 
Live': A Victim of Repression in Xinjiang Awaits New Life,'' Der 
Spiegel, January 24, 2023.
    \139\ Shohret Hoshur, ``China Arrests Family of Kazakh Singer 
Supposedly Contacted by Foreign Reporter,'' Radio Free Asia, February 
21, 2023. For more information on Nurghay Isha, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00147.
    \140\ Shohret Hoshur, ``China Arrests Family of Kazakh Singer 
Supposedly Contacted by Foreign Reporter,'' Radio Free Asia, February 
21, 2023.
    \141\ Nurtai Lahanuly and Farangis Najibullah, ``Chinese-Kazakh 
Writer, Businesswoman Struggles to Rebuild Life after Abuse in Xinjiang 
Camp,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 17, 2022. For more 
information on Zhazira Asenqyzy, see the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database record 2023-00199.
    \142\ ``Xinjiang Camp Survivor Arrested Trying to Visit 
Kazakhstan,'' Eurasianet, February 13, 2023; Nurtai Lakhanuly, ``Ethnic 
Kazakh Man Reunites with Relatives in Almaty after Years in Xinjiang 
Labor Camp,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 9, 2023; 
``Sarsenbek Akbar, Entry 1072,'' Xinjiang Victims Database 
(www.shahit.biz), accessed April 12, 2023; Charlie Campbell, ``The 
Entire System Is Designed to Suppress Us': What the Chinese 
Surveillance State Means for the Rest of the World,'' Time, November 
21, 2019.
    \143\ ``Ethnic Kazakh Religious Scholar Dies in Correctional Camp 
in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 9, 2023; 
``Entry 2139, Baqythan Myrzan,'' Xinjiang Victims Database 
(www.shahit.biz), accessed April 12, 2023. For more information on 
Baqytkhan Myrzan, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
record 2023-00198.
    \144\ ``Yiqing qijian jujia song `Gulanjing' yu qiqian Weiwu'er 
Musilin zao chufa'' [Over 7,000 Uyghur Muslims punished for reciting 
the Quran at home during the epidemic], Radio Free Asia, November 1, 
2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Most Uyghurs Banned from Praying on Islamic 
Holiday, Even in Their Homes,'' Radio Free Asia, April 27, 2023.
    \145\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Imam Sentenced for Providing 
Religious Instruction to Son in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, September 
8, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Woman Serving 21 Years in Jail for 
Sending Children to Religious School,'' Radio Free Asia, March 1, 2023. 
For more information on Ayshemhan Abdulla, who was detained for sending 
her children to private Islamic religious schools decades prior to her 
detention, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 
2023-00195.
    \146\ For information on official religious restrictions enforced 
during Ramadan in previous reporting years, see, e.g., Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 
2022), 101, 311; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 
Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 283; Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report (Washington: December 2020), 
306.
    \147\ Shohret Hoshur, ``China Using Spies to Keep Muslim Uyghurs 
from Fasting during Ramadan,'' Radio Free Asia, April 10, 2023; Amelia 
Loi, Gu Ting, and Jewlan, ``As Ramadan Begins, China's Muslims Face 
Fasting Bans, Monitoring and Arrest,'' Radio Free Asia, March 23, 2023; 
Gu Ting, ``Musilin Zhaiyue: Xinjiang zhongxiaoxue yaoqiu xuesheng 
jianshi jiazhang'' [Muslim Ramadan: Primary and secondary schools in 
Xinjiang require students to monitor parents], Radio Free Asia, March 
23, 2023; Shohret Hoshur, ``Most Uyghurs Banned from Praying on Islamic 
Holiday, Even in Their Homes,'' Radio Free Asia, April 27, 2023.
    \148\ Shohret Hoshur, ``China Using Spies to Keep Muslim Uyghurs 
from Fasting during Ramadan,'' Radio Free Asia, April 10, 2023.
    \149\ Amelia Loi, Gu Ting, and Jewlan, ``As Ramadan Begins, China's 
Muslims Face Fasting Bans, Monitoring and Arrest,'' Radio Free Asia, 
March 23, 2023; Gu Ting, ``Musilin Zhaiyue: Xinjiang zhongxiaoxue 
yaoqiu xuesheng jianshi jiazhang'' [Muslim Ramadan: Primary and 
secondary schools in Xinjiang require students to monitor parents], 
Radio Free Asia, March 23, 2023.
    \150\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Imam Sentenced for Providing 
Religious Instruction to Son in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, September 
8, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Woman Serving 21 Years in Jail for 
Sending Children to Religious School,'' Radio Free Asia, March 1, 2023.
    \151\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Imam Sentenced for Providing 
Religious Instruction to Son in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, September 
8, 2022; ``Jiedu Xinjiang: Weiwu'er ahong fuzi zao jianjin; `qingling 
zhengce' daozhi wuzi duanque'' [Interpreting Xinjiang: Uyghur imam 
father and son imprisoned; ``zero-COVID policy'' leads to shortage of 
supplies], Radio Free Asia, September 16, 2022. For more information, 
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2023-00066 on 
Memet Musa and 2023-00081 on Osman Memet.
    \152\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Imam Sentenced for Providing 
Religious Instruction to Son in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, September 
8, 2022; ``Jiedu Xinjiang: Weiwu'er ahong fuzi zao jianjin; `qingling 
zhengce' daozhi wuzi duanque'' [Interpreting Xinjiang: Uyghur imam 
father and son imprisoned; ``zero-COVID policy'' leads to shortage of 
supplies], Radio Free Asia, September 16, 2022.
    \153\ Shohret Hoshur, ``Uyghur Imam Sentenced for Providing 
Religious Instruction to Son in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, September 
8, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, ``Keriyede oghligha diniy telim bergen diniy 
zat 10 yilliq, telim alghan oghli 6 yilliq kesilgen'' [In Keriye, 
religious figure sentenced to 10 years for teaching son religion, son 
sentenced to 6 years for receiving teachings], Radio Free Asia, 
September 2, 2022.
    \154\ See, e.g., David Tobin and Nyrola Elima, `` `We Know You 
Better than You Know Yourself': China's Transnational Repression of the 
Uyghur Diaspora,'' University of Sheffield, April 13, 2023; Carl Dinnen 
and Khadija Kothia, ``Wolf Warrior Diplomacy: How China Is Crushing 
Dissent on British Soil,'' ITV News, February 16, 2023; Lu Xi, ``Taochu 
Xinjiang hou Weiwu'er ren, Hasake ren reng zao guo'an saorao'' [After 
fleeing Xinjiang, Uyghurs and Kazakhs are still harassed by state 
security], Radio Free Asia, February 24, 2023. For information on the 
transnational repression of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in 
previous years, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 
Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 310-11, 348-50; 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report 
(Washington: March 2022), 140.
    \155\ David Tobin and Nyrola Elima, `` `We Know You Better than You 
Know Yourself': China's Transnational Repression of the Uyghur 
Diaspora,'' University of Sheffield, April 13, 2023, 22, 55.
    \156\ David Tobin and Nyrola Elima, `` `We Know You Better than You 
Know Yourself': China's Transnational Repression of the Uyghur 
Diaspora,'' University of Sheffield, April 13, 2023, 24, 30-32, 44-50, 
67-73. See also James Gooderson, ``China `Offering Persecuted Uighur 
Muslims Thousands of Pounds to Spy for Them,' '' LBC, February 20, 
2023; Carl Dinnen and Khadija Kothia, ``Wolf Warrior Diplomacy: How 
China Is Crushing Dissent on British Soil,'' ITV News, February 16, 
2023; Gulchehra Hoja, ``With Threats and Intimidation, China Coerces 
Uyghurs in Turkey to Spy on Each Other,'' Radio Free Asia, February 5, 
2023.
    \157\ David Tobin and Nyrola Elima, `` `We Know You Better than You 
Know Yourself': China's Transnational Repression of the Uyghur 
Diaspora,'' University of Sheffield, April 13, 2023, 74-92.

Hong Kong and Macau

Hong Kong and Macau

                        XI. Hong Kong and Macau

                          Hong Kong and Macau

                                Findings

         Two United Nations committees reviewed Hong 
        Kong's compliance with its human rights obligations, 
        finding that the Hong Kong government had ``de facto 
        abolished the independence of the judiciary'' through 
        the National Security Law (NSL), and calling for the 
        repeal of the NSL and sedition provisions under the 
        Crimes Ordinance. In particular, the Human Rights 
        Committee noted several areas of concern, including--
        the potential for the transfer of defendants to 
        mainland China; the excessive and unchecked power of 
        the chief executive and the police regarding 
        enforcement measures; and the lack of legal certainty 
        concerning the definition of ``national security'' and 
        grounds for extraterritorial application.
         In May 2023, Chief Executive John Lee proposed 
        a bill that would change the composition of District 
        Councils, which are community-level bodies that advise 
        the government on matters affecting residents in each 
        district. Although District Councils have limited 
        influence in policymaking, they serve as the last 
        institution through which residents can directly choose 
        their representatives. Under the reform plan, the 
        number of directly elected seats would be significantly 
        reduced, and all candidates would be subject to a 
        vetting process designed to exclude candidates 
        considered to be disloyal to the government.
         Hong Kong authorities continued to prosecute 
        individuals for violating the National Security Law, 
        under which basic procedural rights, such as trial by 
        jury and presumption of innocence, are disregarded. 
        Hong Kong extended the restrictions on procedural 
        rights to crimes that the government deems to involve 
        national security, augmenting authorities' ability to 
        punish people for peacefully exercising their 
        universally recognized rights. Hong Kong authorities 
        also applied the law extraterritorially, charging 
        people with criminal offenses for actions committed 
        outside of Hong Kong, creating a chilling effect that 
        had a global reach.
         The prison system augmented the enforcement of 
        the ``deradicalization program'' that is designed to 
        treat political prisoners as extremists and to instill 
        in them a sense of hopelessness and fear, deterring 
        them from future political activism. The program uses 
        tactics including mandatory propaganda movie-watching, 
        confession sessions, and corporal punishment, all of 
        which escalated drastically this past year, according 
        to one former detainee.
         After the prosecution unsuccessfully tried to 
        prevent a foreign lawyer from representing pro-
        democracy entrepreneur Jimmy Lai in a criminal case, 
        John Lee sought an intervention from the National 
        People's Congress Standing Committee, which issued an 
        interpretation affirming the chief executive's power to 
        certify whether a foreign lawyer should be admitted in 
        a particular case. While the interpretation did not 
        create a blanket ban on foreign lawyers, some analysts 
        were concerned that the interpretation had the broader 
        effect of allowing the chief executive to ``bypass 
        unwelcome court decisions'' and giving them unchecked 
        power ``to rule by decree'' over a broad range of 
        issues.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:
          Continue to support Hong Kong pro-democracy activists 
        who have been charged, detained, or imprisoned under 
        the National Security Law or for other political 
        reasons, including Joshua Wong, Jimmy Lai, Albert Ho, 
        Cyd Ho, Lee Cheuk-yan, Leung Kwok-hung, Benny Tai, 
        Claudia Mo, Tam Tak-chi, Tiffany Yuen, Lester Shum, 
        Andy Li, and Tony Chung.
          Develop a strategy to implement the measures 
        suggested by 50 independent U.N. human rights experts 
        in a joint letter dated July 2020, which included 
        creating a special session to evaluate China's human 
        rights violations; establishing an impartial and 
        independent mechanism to monitor, analyze, and report 
        on China's human rights practices; and engaging in 
        dialogue with China to demand that it fulfill its human 
        rights obligations.
          Fully implement the sanctions in the Hong Kong Human 
        Rights and Democracy Act (Public Law No. 116-76) and 
        the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law No. 116-149), 
        including those for financial institutions and 
        individuals complicit in the dismantling of Hong Kong's 
        autonomy and rights protections and the PRC 
        government's violation of the 1984 Sino-British 
        Declaration, an international treaty. Congress should 
        pass the Hong Kong Judicial Sanctions Act (S. 3177 / 
        H.R. 6153, 118th Cong.), which requires a review of all 
        sanctions with possible application in these areas. 
        Congress likewise should pass the Hong Kong Economic 
        and Trade Office (HKETO) Certification Act (S. 490 / 
        H.R. 1103, 118th Cong.), which requires the President 
        to remove the extension of certain privileges, 
        exemptions, and immunities to the HKETO if Hong Kong no 
        longer enjoys a high degree of autonomy from the PRC. 
        Work with allies and partners at the U.N. and other 
        multilateral organizations to issue frequent public 
        statements and engage in other diplomatic efforts to 
        seek the release of political prisoners and address 
        violations of international human rights standards.
          Work to speed up processing times for refugee cases 
        already in the system and consider expanding the annual 
        cap on refugees admitted to the U.S. in an increased 
        effort to protect those fleeing PRC persecution. 
        Prioritize steps to remove barriers to properly vetted 
        Hong Kong residents receiving U.S. visas, particularly 
        those attempting to exit Hong Kong for fear of 
        political persecution. Pass the Hong Kong Safe Harbor 
        Act (S. 295 / H.R. 461) and the Hong Kong People's 
        Freedom and Choice Act of 2021 (H.R. 4276).
          Advocate for freer and more transparent access by 
        foreign journalists to Hong Kong and Macau.

Hong Kong and Macau

Hong Kong and Macau

                          Hong Kong and Macau

                               Hong Kong

                              Introduction

    Following the enactment of the National Security Law (NSL) 
in 2020, residents left Hong Kong in large numbers, and many 
businesses likewise have relocated.\1\ In response, Chief 
Executive John Lee made assurances that the government valued 
the rule of law,\2\ but the government continued to restrict 
fundamental rights and carry out political prosecutions, and 
further implemented a program that treats political prisoners 
as extremists.

              United Nations Reviews of Treaty Obligations

    This past year, the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) conducted reviews concerning the Hong Kong government's 
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), respectively, 
and subsequently issued concluding observations.\3\ Notably, 
the committees were critical of the language and enforcement of 
the NSL, finding that the Hong Kong government had ``de facto 
abolished the independence of the judiciary'' \4\ and calling 
for the repeal of the NSL and sedition provisions under the 
Crimes Ordinance.\5\ In particular, the HRC noted several areas 
of concern, including--the potential for the transfer of 
defendants to mainland China; the excessive and unchecked power 
of the chief executive and the police regarding enforcement 
measures; and the lack of legal certainty concerning the 
definition of ``national security'' and grounds for 
extraterritorial application.\6\ The HRC also implicitly 
disagreed with several rulings by Hong Kong's highest court, as 
they undermined a range of fundamental rights; these rulings 
include--
         abandoning the ``presumption of bail'' in 
        national security cases;
         extending due process restrictions to crimes 
        not provided in the NSL; and
         affirming the chief executive's emergency 
        power to bypass the legislature and enact regulations 
        that carry criminal penalties.\7\
    The CESCR likewise highlighted that the Hong Kong 
government had applied the NSL in a way that undermined 
education and cultural rights, noting with concern the 
censorship of academic work and satiric content and the 
dismissal and arrest of students, school faculty, and content 
creators.\8\
    In response, the Hong Kong government ``strongly objected'' 
to the ``so-called concluding observations,'' characterizing 
the committees' criticisms as ``unsubstantiated'' and ``utterly 
perplexing,'' while attempting to justify its restrictive 
measures by saying that rights are ``not absolute.'' \9\

            Party Control over Hong Kong Further Formalized

    As announced in a March 2023 institutional reform plan, the 
Hong Kong and Macao Work Office of the Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee was established under the name of the 
preexisting Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State 
Council, which it replaced.\10\ This is akin to the 
organizational arrangement in mainland China wherein Party 
officials exert de facto control over a function through a body 
bearing the name of a government agency.\11\ Observers 
interviewed by Voice of America said that the reform plan was 
intended to strengthen and formalize Party leadership as the 
Party replaces the government, predicting that Party 
interference in Hong Kong's affairs would become more apparent 
going forward.\12\

                        District Council Reform

    In May 2023, Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu proposed a 
bill that would change the composition of District 
Councils,\13\ community-level bodies that advise the government 
on matters affecting residents in each district.\14\ Under 
Lee's plan, the number of directly elected seats would be 
reduced to 88, about 19 percent of the total 470 seats, 
representing a drop from 94 percent in 2019.\15\ The remaining 
councilors would be selected by pro-government committees.\16\ 
The proposal also introduced a screening mechanism to vet 
candidates and another mechanism for monitoring and punishing 
district councilors for performance that ``falls short of the 
public expectation.'' \17\ The changes, intended to protect 
``national security,'' were a response to the 2019 elections in 
which most of the district council seats were won by pro-
democracy candidates, whom a Chinese official had described as 
``anti-China destabilizing forces.'' \18\ While Lee denied that 
the reform would undermine democracy, observers noted that the 
new system would render the elections undemocratic and would 
limit the government's ability to gauge the public's needs.\19\

              Arbitrary Application of Criminal Provisions

    Hong Kong authorities continued to prosecute individuals 
for violating various criminal provisions and the NSL, under 
which basic procedural rights, such as trial by jury and 
presumption of innocence, are disregarded.\20\ Hong Kong 
extended the restrictions on procedural rights to persons 
charged with crimes deemed by the government to involve 
national security,\21\ augmenting authorities' ability to 
punish people for peacefully exercising their universally 
recognized rights, including the following:

                           FREEDOM OF SPEECH

    In September 2022, District Court Judge Kwok Wai-kin 
sentenced five speech therapists each to one year and seven 
months in prison for publishing three children's books with 
``seditious intent.'' \22\ The defendants were Lorie Lai Ming-
ling, Melody Yeung Yat-yee, Sidney Ng Hau-yi, Samuel Chan Yuen-
sum, and Marco Fong Tsz-ho.\23\ The books were stories about 
sheep being harmed by wolves, where the wolves represented the 
Hong Kong and PRC governments.\24\ The judge found that 
publishing the books was ``a brainwashing exercise'' and sowed 
``the seed of instability . . . in the PRC and HKSAR,'' adding 
in dictum that it was ``morally wrong for [the defendants] to 
say that Hong Kong and PRC are separate . . ..'' \25\ 
Previously, Judge Kwok was suspended from handling political 
cases by the former chief justice for making biased comments in 
a different case, but he was reinstated by the new chief 
justice, Andrew Cheung, who had a record of issuing decisions 
supportive of the government's position.\26\
    In another case, Ma Chun-man appealed his five years and 
nine months' sentence on the charge of ``inciting secession'' 
for using slogans during the 2019 protests that advocated for 
Hong Kong independence.\27\ Ruling on the appeal, the High 
Court in August 2022 reduced the sentence to five years, but 
maintained that the offense was of a serious nature since ``the 
mere absence of force or threat of force did not make the 
circumstances less serious.'' \28\

                          FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

    Judge Kwok Wai-kin also presided over the trial of two 
former editors of the now-defunct news outlet Stand News in 
which they were accused of publishing 17 articles with 
``seditious intent.'' \29\ The defendants were editor-in-chief 
Chung Pui-kuen and acting chief editor Patrick Lam.\30\ Defense 
counsel asserted: ``If the press were in danger of breaking the 
law whenever they criticised the government, then they might 
just as well just give up their jobs.'' \31\ The judge admitted 
large volumes of previously unproduced evidence proffered by 
the prosecution mid-trial.\32\ For example, in February 2023, 
three months into the trial, the judge admitted four boxes of 
additional documents over the objection of the defense counsel, 
who argued that the submissions were unfairly late and that she 
was not afforded the opportunity to review them.\33\
    As of May 2023, Jimmy Lai Chee-ying, founder of pro-
democracy newspaper Apple Daily, remained in detention, serving 
a prison term of five years and nine months on fraud charges 
related to a commercial lease and awaiting trial on national 
security charges for allegedly calling on foreign countries to 
sanction the PRC and Hong Kong officials.\34\ Lai requested 
that the trial be terminated on the grounds that his case would 
be heard by a panel of judges instead of a jury.\35\ Three High 
Court judges denied his request, saying that they were not 
biased against him.\36\ In a letter dated March 2023, a group 
of five U.N. experts expressed ``grave concern relating to the 
arrest, detention and multiple prosecutions of Jimmy Lai and 
the forced closure of the news outlet Apple Daily which appear 
to be related to his criticism of the Chinese government and 
his support for democracy in [the] Hong Kong SAR.'' \37\

                         FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

    In November 2022, the West Kowloon Magistrates Court 
convicted six trustees of the 612 Humanitarian Fund, whose aim 
was ``to provide legal, humanitarian and financial support to 
protesters during the 2019 protests,'' \38\ for failing to 
apply for registration for the fund.\39\ The trustees were 
Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, Margaret Ng Ngoi-yee, Hui Po-keung, Cyd Ho 
Sau-lan, Denise Ho Wan-see, and Sze Ching-wee.\40\ The judge 
found that the fund's ``political nature'' made it ineligible 
for exemption from registration as a charitable fund and 
dismissed the defendants' argument that the government's 
interpretation of the law violated their right of free 
association.\41\
    As of May 2023, rights lawyer Tonyee Chow Hang-tung was 
serving a prison term on charges of ``unauthorized assembly'' 
related to the annual vigils commemorating the violent 
suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\42\ In December 
2022, the High Court overturned one of her convictions, holding 
that the police failed to consider measures that could 
facilitate an assembly before categorically banning it.\43\ The 
prosecution appealed the decision, and a hearing was scheduled 
for August 2023 before the Court of Final Appeal.\44\

                     FREEDOM OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION

    High Court Judges Andrew Chan, Alex Lee, and Johnny Chan 
presided over a trial in a case where the prosecution accused 
47 people of ``conspiracy to commit subversion'' for their role 
in an unofficial primary election in July 2020, which took 
place ahead of the Legislative Council election.\45\ Although 
the primary proceeded peacefully,\46\ the prosecution described 
it ``as an unlawful scheme to seriously disrupt, undermine and 
interfere with the performance of duties and functions of the 
political powers that be.'' \47\ Among those detained are Nobel 
Peace Prize nominee Joshua Wong Chi-fung, law professor Benny 
Tai Yiu-ting, journalist and Legislative Council member Claudia 
Mo Man-ching, labor union leader Carol Ng Man-yee, and social 
activist Leung Kwok-hung.\48\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            June 4th Arrests
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Hong Kong police detained at least 31 people in connection with their
 commemoration on June 4, 2023, of the violent suppression of the 1989
 Tiananmen protests, and lodged a range of criminal charges including
 ``breaching public peace,'' ``disorderly conduct,'' and ``seditious
 acts.'' \49\ Some of those detained were carrying flowers or candles or
 holding a copy of a play that depicted the Tiananmen protests.\50\
 Ahead of the anniversary, the Hong Kong government refused to clarify
 whether public mourning was illegal and deployed some 6,000 police
 across the city to conduct ```stop and search'' operations.\51\ Volker
 Turk, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, found the Hong Kong
 government's actions alarming and called for the ``release of anyone
 detained for exercising freedom of expression & peaceful assembly.''
 \52\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  Deradicalization Program in Prisons

    In June 2023, the Washington Post published an article 
based on interviews with 13 former inmates convicted of 
protest-related offenses and two employees at the Hong Kong 
Correctional Services Department, who provided details about 
the implementation of a deradicalization program, officially 
termed ``targeted rehabilitation,'' over this past year.\53\ 
The program targets detainees under the age of 21 and is 
designed to weaken their desire to engage in political 
activities and encourage them to leave Hong Kong.\54\ Daily 
reports on high-profile prisoners were prepared by prison 
guards with the help of counterterrorism teams.\55\ Inmates 
enrolled in the program were asked to watch propaganda films, 
learn Chinese history to ``enhance their sense of 
nationality,'' and write apology letters and read them aloud in 
front of their parents.\56\ One interviewee said he and other 
inmates were beaten by prison guards for failing to recite 
prison regulations.\57\ Psychological evaluations used to 
detect self-harm tendencies transformed into confession 
sessions where detainees were ``pushed to express remorse over 
their political actions and acknowledge that their views were 
extreme.'' \58\ Reacting to this development, a former detainee 
observed that the current program was a drastic escalation from 
what he experienced when he was imprisoned between 2021 and 
2022.\59\

                Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the NSL

    Hong Kong authorities invoked national security charges for 
acts committed outside of Hong Kong, deterring participation in 
protest activities abroad.\60\ Examples included the following:
         In August 2022, the Security Bureau condemned 
        three people living abroad--Elmer Yuen Gong-yi, Victor 
        Ho Leung-mau, and Baggio Leung Chung-hang--for 
        allegedly having committed subversion under the NSL by 
        establishing a committee to organize elections outside 
        of Hong Kong.\61\ The Bureau further urged the public 
        to disassociate themselves from people who contravene 
        the law.\62\ Shortly thereafter, Yuen's daughter-in-
        law, whom the Hong Kong Free Press identified as a 
        ``pro-Beijing lawmaker,'' announced in a newspaper 
        advertisement that she was severing family ties with 
        Yuen.\63\
         In November 2022, a Portuguese national, Wong 
        Kin-chung, who had been living in the United Kingdom, 
        was arrested by national security police after he 
        returned to Hong Kong to look after his mother, who 
        suffers from dementia.\64\ Wong was reportedly a leader 
        of the Hong Kong Independence Party and had made social 
        media posts that called for Hong Kong's 
        independence.\65\
         In March 2023, national security police 
        arrested a student living in Japan who had returned to 
        Hong Kong to renew her identity card.\66\ Police 
        alleged that she had ``incited secession'' by ``posting 
        about Hong Kong independence on social media.'' \67\ 
        After Japan's chief cabinet secretary expressed concern 
        over the case, the Hong Kong office of the PRC Ministry 
        of Foreign Affairs called his comment an intervention 
        in internal affairs and warned of ``severe retaliation 
        by 1.4 billion Chinese people.'' \68\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Restrictions on Representation by Foreign Counsel
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Hong Kong and PRC authorities placed restrictions on legal
 representation in national security cases, further strengthening the
 government's influence over court cases. In October 2022, a trial court
 granted British lawyer Timothy Owen permission to represent Jimmy Lai
 Chee-ying, who was facing national security charges, including
 conspiracy to collude with a foreign country.\69\ Under Hong Kong law,
 a court has discretion to allow a lawyer who is not admitted to the
 Hong Kong bar to provide legal representation in a particular case if
 he or she has relevant experience in advocacy in court.\70\ The
 Secretary for Justice challenged the trial court's decision, arguing
 that foreign lawyers were unfit to handle cases involving national
 security.\71\ The government's appeal was dismissed both by the Court
 of Appeal and Court of Final Appeal, Hong Kong's highest court.\72\
 Immediately after the Court of Final Appeal's decision, Chief Executive
 John Lee asked the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee
 to interpret the NSL, citing concerns that foreign lawyers might be
 subject to pressure by countries that were ``hostile'' to the NSL.\73\
 The NPC Standing Committee is authorized to interpret the NSL under
 Article 65 of the law, but similar interpretations in the past were
 reportedly perceived by the public as acts undermining judicial
 independence.\74\
  In December, the NPC Standing Committee issued an interpretation of
 the NSL, holding that courts should ask the chief executive to certify
 whether a foreign lawyer should be admitted; otherwise, a determination
 would be made by the Committee for Safeguarding National Security (an
 entity created by the NSL and chaired by the chief executive).\75\
  In March 2023, the Hong Kong government proposed a legislative
 amendment that would create a presumption against admitting foreign
 lawyers in national security cases and would require foreign lawyers
 and courts to obtain a certificate from the chief executive before
 making or granting an application for admission.\76\ In support of the
 government's position, Secretary for Justice Paul Lam Ting-kwok said
 the right to choose lawyers was not absolute, adding that the chief
 executive would not disclose the reasons when rejecting overseas
 lawyers in specific cases, as doing so could pose national security
 risks.\77\
  While these official actions did not create a blanket ban on foreign
 lawyers, some analysts expressed concern that the NPC Standing
 Committee's interpretation had the broader effect of allowing the chief
 executive and his Committee to ``bypass unwelcome court decisions'' and
 giving them unchecked power ``to rule by decree'' over a broad range of
 issues.\78\ The Legislative Council unanimously passed the government's
 proposed amendment in May 2023.\79\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     Intimidation of Rights Lawyers

    In December 2022, Reuters reported on an exodus of human 
rights lawyers following the passage of the NSL.\80\ One Hong 
Kong lawyer reported that ``she knew of at least 80 Hong Kong 
lawyers who had moved to Britain.'' \81\ Michael Vidler, for 
example, decided to leave Hong Kong after a judge named his law 
firm in a judgment, which Vidler interpreted as a call for 
national security police to investigate him.\82\ Despite 
Vidler's efforts to keep his travel arrangements private, a 
group of reporters from PRC-backed media outlets ``descended on 
[him] as a mob at the check-in counter, taking photos of [his] 
travel documents,'' leading him to believe that the reporters 
had access to information provided by official sources.\83\ 
Vidler's departure followed that of Paul Harris, who left after 
being questioned by national security police and who was 
similarly harassed by reporters from PRC-affiliated media 
outlets.\84\ Other means of intimidation included ``[a]nonymous 
threats sent by text message and email[,] GPS tracking devices 
placed under a car, and Chinese `funeral money' sent to an 
office.'' \85\

                            Academic Freedom

    In his October 2022 policy address, Chief Executive John 
Lee called for an ``enhanced School Development and 
Accountability framework'' to bolster staff accountability and 
enhance national education, including raising awareness of 
safeguarding national security.\86\ As part of the policy, the 
Education Bureau extended the national security test 
requirement for new public school teachers to teachers at all 
subsidized schools and kindergartens, beginning in the 2023-
2024 school year.\87\ A teacher from Hong Kong said it was the 
first time that teachers were required to take political 
attitude tests.\88\
    In December 2022, the Education Bureau updated the 
Guidelines on Teachers' Professional Conduct, adding language 
requiring teachers to ``consciously safeguard national 
security, social order and public interest.'' \89\ The 
guidelines further require teachers to report any illegal or 
immoral conduct to school administrators and prohibit them from 
``[advocating] the disruption of social order'' or getting 
involved in acts that violate the NSL or other laws.\90\ In 
explaining the guidelines, the Secretary for Education said in 
an interview that it would be unprofessional for teachers to 
``casually talk about'' the 1989 Tiananmen protests either in 
class or on social media.\91\ A former secondary school teacher 
said that the guidelines' lack of clarity around the scope of 
permissible speech created a gray area that increased the risk 
that a teacher would be the subject of a complaint.\92\ A 
former education official similarly expressed that the 
guidelines reduce teachers' professional autonomy and make them 
subservient to the government.\93\
    The Education Bureau also rolled out a new curriculum for 
junior secondary school that emphasizes national security and 
omits content about ``freedom, rule of law, social justice, 
[and] democracy,'' requiring students to learn about the 
political structure of China and not of other countries.\94\ 
The new curriculum was intended to complement the now-
redesigned high school version of the subject.\95\
    At the university level, students at the University of Hong 
Kong reported that the school had asked them to take a course 
about national security, a requirement that was prescribed by 
regulations.\96\ An expert conjectured that it was part of a 
program in which the government would push ideological 
education emphasizing that ``national security takes precedence 
over human rights and freedoms.'' \97\ The university also 
installed a new program requiring library patrons to register 
before accessing some politically sensitive books or archival 
materials, which a Hong Kong policy researcher said would 
create a perception of being monitored that could ``deter 
researchers from pursuing certain sensitive topics.'' \98\
    According to official figures, an increasing number of 
students were leaving public universities before completing 
their courses, continuing a trend that began in the 2019-2020 
academic year.\99\ A similar uptick was seen in academic staff 
departures.\100\ One professor observed that ``the imposition 
of the NSL was the decisive factor [for virtually all faculty 
departures],'' adding that the ``NSL de facto put an end to 
academic freedom. Academics either self-censor or leave . . .. 
[F]aculty members now have to consider if they can cover a 
topic or not, and if something they say will be reported by a 
student to the NSL police.'' \101\

                Staffing Shortages in the Public Sector

    As in the education sector, civil servants and healthcare 
professionals resigned from their positions at a rate that may 
affect the government's capacity to provide public services, 
potentially affecting people's rights to public health and 
security. A union leader attributed the increased resignation 
rates of civil servants to factors such as stress brought on by 
``the chief executive's new initiatives, including the launch 
of key performance indicators (KPIs), and an emergency 
mobilisation protocol,'' the latter of which may require 
overtime work and deployment during days off.\102\ In the 
public health sector, the increasing attrition rate lowered the 
physician-to-patient ratio, averaging 2 physicians per 1,000 
people, which was far below other developed countries, as the 
Secretary for Health recognized.\103\ The shortage of staff 
also lengthened the average wait time to over eight hours in 
the accident and emergency departments during peak influenza 
season.\104\
    To address the staff shortage, Chief Executive John Lee 
proposed requiring ``qualified healthcare professionals to 
serve in public healthcare institutions for a specified period 
of time, and admitting qualified non-locally trained dentists 
and nurses.'' \105\ The proposed work-hour requirement drew 
criticism from a former government official, who said that it 
would become another ``push factor that prompts more doctors 
and nurses to leave public hospitals.'' \106\ The government's 
efforts to attract foreign-trained doctors resulted in 10 
successful recruitments as of March 2023, below the 100-doctor 
target.\107\ A medical student studying in the U.K. commented 
that with the disbandment of the HA Employees Alliance (a union 
for public hospital employees) in June 2022, doctors no longer 
had a channel to exercise their rights, which disincentivizes 
them from working in Hong Kong.\108\ A former union leader said 
that the high salary being offered to medical professionals in 
Hong Kong is offset by a heavier workload.\109\

                        Suppression of the Press

    The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) released 
an October 2022 report with findings\110\ that were consistent 
with declining press freedom and public confidence in news 
media in Hong Kong.\111\ The report identified 12 media outlets 
that closed in response to the NSL and noted that ``the 
continuing exodus of journalists and news outlets . . . [and] 
the loss of independent on-the-ground reporting [will make] it 
harder for the global community and Hong Kong's own citizens to 
[monitor developments there].'' \112\ The IFJ noted that, due 
to NSL-related concerns, the report could no longer be 
published by the Hong Kong Journalists Association, breaking 
from a tradition that began in 1993.\113\
    This trend of diminishing press freedom is echoed in the 
October 2022 announcement by Peter Langan that he and a team of 
journalists had resigned from the South China Morning Post 
(SCMP) after the newspaper allegedly refused to publish a 
report concerning human rights conditions in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).\114\ Specifically, the report 
showed that since 2016 (when the Chinese government reversed 
the one-child policy), there has been a nationwide drop in the 
use of sterilization and birth control devices across China 
except in the XUAR, indicating a policy of ethnic-based 
discrimination.\115\ After the announcement, the SCMP 
threatened Langan with unspecified actions for the continued 
use of the unpublished report, to which Langan responded that 
it would have been ``unethical to conceal the killing of a 
valid piece of journalism . . ..'' \116\
    Another veteran journalist, Ronson Chan Ron-sing, chair of 
the Hong Kong Journalists Association, was arrested at a 
homeowners' meeting that Chan was covering, on the charge of 
``obstructing a police officer'' after he failed to produce his 
identification card as demanded by a police officer.\117\ Chan 
cited privacy concerns, referencing a 2019 incident where a 
police officer displayed Chan's ID card on a livestream video, 
thereby disclosing Chan's personal information.\118\

                               Censorship

    The Hong Kong government directly or indirectly censored 
media content and restricted the manner of media distribution, 
including the following examples:
         Ahead of a bookfair scheduled for July 2022, 
        the applications of at least three vendors that sold 
        politically sensitive books were denied in an opaque 
        approval process.\119\ The bookfair was organized by 
        Hong Kong Trade Development Council, a statutory body 
        created to promote trade in Hong Kong, which said ``the 
        books displayed were not vetted in advance but vendors 
        were legally responsible for what they sold.'' \120\ 
        These vendors also expressed difficulty in finding 
        alternative venues and printers willing to print their 
        publications.\121\
         After the Film Censorship Ordinance was 
        amended in November 2021 to provide for national 
        security as a basis for censorship,\122\ Hong Kong 
        authorities applied the law to censor films for 
        political content.\123\ For example, the Office for 
        Film, Newspaper and Article Administration demanded 
        that a half-second scene showing the 2014 Umbrella 
        Movement be cut as a condition for a film to be 
        released.\124\ As of August 2022, authorities had 
        denied permission to release or demanded redactions in 
        at least 10 films.\125\ In October, authorities 
        similarly demanded redactions in three films produced 
        in Taiwan but declined to disclose the basis of their 
        decision.\126\ While the films were non-political, they 
        reportedly showed the flag of the Republic of China 
        (Taiwan), a protest scene, and dialogue that referred 
        to ``the Republic of China.'' \127\
         According to a government report released in 
        April 2023, the Leisure and Cultural Services 
        Department has been reviewing library holdings since 
        2021, removing books that it deems to be 
        ``disadvantageous to national security.'' \128\ Four 
        investigative journalists reported that Hong Kong 
        libraries had 468 titles concerning political figures 
        or political content as of the end of 2020, but a tally 
        done in May 2023 showed that 195 of those titles had 
        been removed, an almost 42 percent drop over two 
        years.\129\
         In May 2023, Hong Kong newspaper Ming Pao 
        terminated a political satire cartoon series by Zunzi 
        (pen name of Wong Kei-kwan) that had been running for 
        four decades.\130\ Ming Pao's decision came after 
        Zunzi's cartoons had been repeatedly criticized by 
        government officials.\131\ Secretary for Security Tang 
        Ping-keung expressed agreement with the decision, 
        saying that the newspaper should not let itself be used 
        to mislead the public or ``to incite dissatisfaction 
        towards the government,'' \132\ phrasing that resembles 
        that of the criminal offense of seditious 
        intention.\133\

                                 Macau

    The U.N. Human Rights Committee reviewed Macau's compliance 
with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and adopted its concluding observations in July 
2022.\134\ The Committee noted with concern the lack of legal 
safeguards against police abuse of surveillance, the harassment 
of journalists, the suppression of display of political 
messages, and undue restrictions on peaceful assembly.\135\ The 
Committee further expressed serious concern that the Electoral 
Affairs Commission in 2021 disqualified 21 candidates from the 
Legislative Assembly election due to their perceived disloyalty 
to the government, relying on surveillance records obtained 
without the candidates' knowledge.\136\ The concluding 
observations likewise pointed out that the Macau government 
invoked ``national security'' in ways that undermined judicial 
independence and other substantive rights.\137\
    In August 2022, the government proposed to amend the Law on 
Safeguarding National Security, expanding its scope to cover 
non-violent acts and people outside of Macau, including those 
who are not residents of Macau.\138\ The government also 
proposed applying the law to any ``organization or group,'' 
expanding beyond the political organizations and groups subject 
to the existing law.\139\ Observers expressed concern that the 
amended law would be arbitrarily applied to speech and would 
criminalize contact with nongovernmental organizations.\140\

Hong Kong and Macau

Hong Kong and Macau

    Notes to Chapter 19--Hong Kong and Macau

    \1\ Logan Wright, Atlantic Council, ``Fractured Foundations: 
Assessing Risks to Hong Kong's Business Environment,'' March 7, 2023.
    \2\ ``Hong Kong's New Leader Says Rule of Law Is a Fundamental 
Value for City,'' Reuters, June 30, 2022; ``Hong Kong's Lee Lauds Order 
after `Chaos' in Sales Pitch for City,'' Al Jazeera, October 19, 2022.
    \3\ U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the 
Fourth Periodic Report of Hong Kong, China, adopted by the Committee at 
its 3912th meeting (July 22, 2022), CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, November 11, 
2022; U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee 
at its 30th Meeting (3 March 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023.
    \4\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee 
at its 30th meeting (3 March 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, 
para. 100.
    \5\ U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the 
Fourth Periodic Report of Hong Kong, China, adopted by the Committee at 
its 3912th meeting (July 22, 2022), CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, November 11, 
2022, paras. 14-16.
    \6\ U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the 
Fourth Periodic Report of Hong Kong, China, adopted by the Committee at 
its 3912th meeting (July 22, 2022), CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, November 11, 
2022, para. 13.
    \7\ Eric Lai, ``UN Human Rights Committee Criticizes Rulings of 
Hong Kong's Top Court,'' Diplomat, July 29, 2022; U.N. Human Rights 
Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of 
Hong Kong, China, adopted by the Committee at its 3912th meeting (July 
22, 2022), CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, November 11, 2022, paras. 15, 17, 35.
    \8\ U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of China, 
Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted at the 
Committee's 30th meeting (March 3, 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 
2023, paras. 126, 128.
    \9\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``HKSAR Government Strongly Objects 
to Unfair Criticisms from UN Human Rights Committee,'' July 27, 2022; 
Hong Kong SAR Government, ``HKSAR Government Strongly Objects to 
Unfounded and Misleading Concluding Observations of UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,'' March 7, 2023.
    \10\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa 'Dang he guojia jigou 
gaige fang'an' '' [Party Central Committee and State Council issues 
``Institutional reform plan of the Party and state agencies''], Xinhua, 
March 16, 2023, sec. 1(5); Oasis Hu and Xi Tianqi, ``Decision to Set Up 
New HK, Macao Work Office Receives Wide Support,'' China Daily, March 
17, 2023.
    \11\ Yang Liu and Xinyi Zhang, ``How Does the CPC Rule China? A 
Technical Look,'' Beijing Channel, February 8, 2023.
    \12\ Gao Feng, ``Gang Ao Ban gai Zhonggong zhishu jigou, Dang guan 
Xianggang zhongji mubiao `Yi Guo Yi Zhi?'' [Hong Kong and Macao Office 
becomes an entity directly under the Chinese Communist Party; is the 
ultimate goal of Party governing Hong Kong ``One Country, One 
System''?], Voice of America, March 17, 2023.
    \13\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Govt Unveils DC Reform Plans,'' 
May 2, 2023.
    \14\ District Councils Ordinance (Cap. 547), sec. 61.
    \15\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Govt Unveils DC Reform Plans,'' 
May 2, 2023; ```Revamp of District Councils Has to Put Hong Kong Back 
on Track,'' editorial, South China Morning Post, May 4, 2023; ``Hong 
Kong Reduces Directly-Elected Seats in District Polls,'' Al Jazeera, 
May 3, 2023.
    \16\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Govt Unveils DC Reform Plans,'' 
May 2, 2023; ``Revamp of District Councils Has to Put Hong Kong Back on 
Track,'' editorial, South China Morning Post, May 4, 2023.
    \17\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Govt Unveils DC Reform Plans,'' 
May 2, 2023; ``Revamp of District Councils Has to Put Hong Kong Back on 
Track,'' editorial, South China Morning Post, May 4, 2023.
    \18\ ``Hong Kong Reduces Directly-Elected Seats in District 
Polls,'' Al Jazeera, May 3, 2023; Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Govt 
Unveils DC Reform Plans,'' May 2, 2023.
    \19\ Hillary Leung, ``Hong Kong District Council Reform `Destroys 
Final Bastion of Democracy,' Paul Zimmerman Says, Will Not Stand 
Again,'' Hong Kong Free Press, May 8, 2023; ``Beijing Is Destroying the 
Last Vestiges of Democracy in Hong Kong,'' editorial, Washington Post, 
May 7, 2023.
    \20\ ``Hong Kong's Largest National Security Trial to Begin with 47 
in Dock,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in France 24, February 3, 
2023; High Court of Hong Kong SAR, Court of First Instance, Tong Ying 
Kit v HKSAR, HCAL 1601/2020, [2020] HKCFI 2133, August 21, 2020, para. 
40; Samuel Bickett, ``The Court of Final Appeal Must End Indefinite 
Pre-Trial Detentions,'' Samuel Bickett on Hong Kong Law & Policy, 
January 13, 2022; Samuel Bickett, ``The Hong Kong 47 Committed No Crime 
. . . So Why Are So Many of Them Pleading Guilty?,'' Samuel Bickett on 
Hong Kong Law & Policy, August 20, 2022; U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Hong Kong, 
China, adopted by the Committee at its 3912th meeting (July 22, 2022), 
CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, November 11, 2022.
    \21\ Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong SAR, HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi 
Sidney, FAMC No. 32 of 2021, [2021] HKCFA 42, December 14, 2021, paras. 
27, 29.
    \22\ Kelly Ho, ``5 Hong Kong Speech Therapists Jailed for 19 Months 
Each for Sedition over Children's Books,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 
September 10, 2022.
    \23\ Human Rights Watch, ``Hong Kong: Children's Book Authors 
Convicted,'' September 7, 2022.
    \24\ District Court of Hong Kong SAR, HKSAR v Lai Man-ling and 
others, DCCC 854/2021, [2022] HKDC 1004, September 10, 2022, para. 30.
    \25\ District Court of Hong Kong SAR, HKSAR v Lai Man-ling and 
others, DCCC 854/2021, [2022] HKDC 1004, September 10, 2022, paras. 30, 
39.
    \26\ Samuel Bickett, ``How Kwok Wai-Kin Rose from Disgrace to 
Become a Powerful National Security Judge (Part 1),'' Samuel Bickett on 
Hong Kong Law & Policy, March 6, 2023.
    \27\ Kelly Ho, ``Hong Kong Protester `Captain America 2.0' Wins 
Appeal against National Security Sentence, Jail Time Reduced to 5 
Years,'' Hong Kong Free Press, August 3, 2022.
    \28\ High Court of Hong Kong SAR, Court of Appeal, HKSAR v Ma Chun 
Man, CACC 272/2021, [2022] HKCA 1151, August 3, 2022, paras. 95, 99.
    \29\ Lea Mok, ``Hong Kong Journalists Plead Not Guilty to Sedition 
as Trial against Defunct Outlet Stand News Begins,'' Hong Kong Free 
Press, October 31, 2022.
    \30\ Lea Mok, ``Hong Kong Journalists Plead Not Guilty to Sedition 
as Trial against Defunct Outlet Stand News Begins,'' Hong Kong Free 
Press, October 31, 2022.
    \31\ Lea Mok, ``Hong Kong Journalists Plead Not Guilty to Sedition 
as Trial against Defunct Outlet Stand News Begins,'' Hong Kong Free 
Press, October 31, 2022.
    \32\ Lea Mok, ``Sedition Trial against Hong Kong Outlet Stand News 
Adjourned Again after Prosecution Submits New Documents,'' Hong Kong 
Free Press, February 3, 2023; Samuel Bickett, ``How Kwok Wai-Kin Rose 
from Disgrace to Become a Powerful National Security Judge (Part 1),'' 
Samuel Bickett on Hong Kong Law & Policy, March 6, 2023.
    \33\ Lea Mok, ``Sedition Trial against Hong Kong Outlet Stand News 
Adjourned Again after Prosecution Submits New Documents,'' Hong Kong 
Free Press, February 3, 2023; Lea Mok, ``Hong Kong Journalists Plead 
Not Guilty to Sedition as Trial against Defunct Outlet Stand News 
Begins,'' Hong Kong Free Press, October 31, 2022.
    \34\ Candice Chau, ``National Security Trial of Hong Kong Media 
Tycoon Jimmy Lai Estimated to Take 83 Days,'' Hong Kong Free Press, May 
30, 2023.
    \35\ Kanis Leung, ``Hong Kong Court Rejects Publisher Jimmy Lai's 
Bid to Terminate His National Security Trial,'' Associated Press, May 
29, 2023.
    \36\ Kanis Leung, ``Hong Kong Court Rejects Publisher Jimmy Lai's 
Bid to Terminate His National Security Trial,'' Associated Press, May 
29, 2023.
    \37\ Mumba Malila, Irene Khan, Clement Nyaletsossi Voule, Margaret 
Satterthwaite, and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, ``Letter from Mandates of the 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression; the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly and of Association; the Special Rapporteur on the Independence 
of Judges and Lawyers and the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering 
Terrorism, AL CHN 1/2023,'' March 17, 2023, 4.
    \38\ Civicus, ``Hong Kong: Conviction of Trustees and Secretary 
from 612 Humanitarian Fund Another Blow to Civil Society,'' December 2, 
2022.
    \39\ West Kowloon Magistrates' Courts of Hong Kong SAR, Xianggang 
Tebie Xingzhengqu su Chen Rijun ji ling wu ren [HKSAR v. Joseph Zen and 
others], WKS 4829-4834/2022, [2022] HKMagC 12, paras. 5, 80.
    \40\ West Kowloon Magistrates' Courts of Hong Kong SAR, Xianggang 
Tebie Xingzhengqu su Chen Rijun ji ling wu ren [HKSAR v. Joseph Zen and 
others], WKS 4829-4834/2022, [2022] HKMagC 12, paras. 5, 12, 80.
    \41\ West Kowloon Magistrates' Courts of Hong Kong SAR, , Xianggang 
Tebie Xingzhengqu su Chen Rijun ji ling wu ren [HKSAR v. Joseph Zen and 
others], WKS 4829-4834/2022, [2022] HKMagC 12, paras. 5, 12, 80.
    \42\ William Gallo and Lee Juhyun, ``Pressured by China, South 
Korean NGO Stands Firm on Rights Award,'' Voice of America, May 12, 
2023; Front Line Defenders, ``Chow Hang-Tung Wins Appeal in Tiananmen 
Vigil Case,'' accessed August 15, 2023.
    \43\ Hong Kong SAR High Court, Hong Kong SAR v Chow Hang-tung, HCMA 
51/2022, [2022] HKCFI 3692, December 14, 2022, paras. 54, 70.
    \44\ Hong Kong SAR Court of Final Appeals, ``Forthcoming Leave 
Application (etc.) Hearings,'' accessed June 7, 2023.
    \45\ Chris Lau and Brian Wong, ``Hong Kong National Security Trial: 
Prosecutors Accuse 47 Opposition Figures of Plotting to Turn 
Legislature into `Lethal Constitutional Weapon' against Beijing,'' 
South China Morning Post, February 6, 2023.
    \46\ Freedom House. ``Hong Kong,'' in Freedom in the World 2022: 
The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule, accessed March 2, 2023.
    \47\ Chris Lau and Brian Wong, ``Hong Kong National Security Trial: 
Prosecutors Accuse 47 Opposition Figures of Plotting to Turn 
Legislature into `Lethal Constitutional Weapon' against Beijing,'' 
South China Morning Post, February 6, 2023; ``Xianggang zuida guo'an 
an: 47 ren chuxuan an kaishen de guanjian kandian'' [Biggest national 
security case in Hong Kong: key points in the Hong Kong 47 case as 
trial commences], Deutsche Welle, February 6, 2023.
    \48\ Holmes Chan and Su Xinqi, ``Hong Kong Activists Fade from View 
as National Security Case Drags,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in 
Hong Kong Free Press, April 7, 2022; K.K. Rebecca Lai, David Pierson, 
and Tiffany May, ``The 47 Pro-Democracy Figures in Hong Kong's Largest 
National Security Trial,'' New York Times, February 6, 2023.
    \49\ ``Dozens Arrested in Hong Kong on Tiananmen Crackdown 
Anniversary,'' Al Jazeera, June 5, 2023.
    \50\ ``Dozens Arrested in Hong Kong on Tiananmen Crackdown 
Anniversary,'' Al Jazeera, June 5, 2023; ``Hong Kong Police Arrest Pro-
Democracy Figures on Tiananmen Square Anniversary,'' Guardian, June 4, 
2023.
    \51\ ``Dozens Arrested in Hong Kong on Tiananmen Crackdown 
Anniversary,'' Al Jazeera, June 5, 2023; ``Hong Kong Police Arrest Pro-
Democracy Figures on Tiananmen Square Anniversary,'' Guardian, June 4, 
2023.
    \52\ U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (@UNHumanRights), ``We 
are alarmed by reports of detentions in #HKSAR linked to June 4 
anniversary . . .,'' Twitter, June 4, 2023, 1:49 p.m.; ``Dozens 
Arrested in Hong Kong on Tiananmen Crackdown Anniversary,'' Al Jazeera, 
June 5, 2023.
    \53\ Shibani Mahtani, ``Hong Kong Prisons Work to Compel Loyalty to 
China among Young Activists,'' Washington Post, June 8, 2023.
    \54\ Shibani Mahtani, ``Hong Kong Prisons Work to Compel Loyalty to 
China among Young Activists,'' Washington Post, June 8, 2023.
    \55\ Shibani Mahtani, ``Hong Kong Prisons Work to Compel Loyalty to 
China among Young Activists,'' Washington Post, June 8, 2023.
    \56\ Shibani Mahtani, ``Hong Kong Prisons Work to Compel Loyalty to 
China among Young Activists,'' Washington Post, June 8, 2023.
    \57\ Shibani Mahtani, ``Hong Kong Prisons Work to Compel Loyalty to 
China among Young Activists,'' Washington Post, June 8, 2023.
    \58\ Shibani Mahtani, ``Hong Kong Prisons Work to Compel Loyalty to 
China among Young Activists,'' Washington Post, June 8, 2023.
    \59\ Samuel Bickett (@SamuelBickett), ``The `patriotic' 
brainwashing in Hong Kong's prisons, especially for juveniles, has 
escalated drastically since I was in prison in 2021-22, and since 
reports just a few months ago that these sessions amounted to form 
filling . . ..'' Twitter, June 9, 2023, 4:43 p.m.
    \60\ Pak Yiu, ``Overseas Hong Kongers Fear Long Reach of National 
Security Law,'' Nikkei, April 21, 2023.
    \61\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Security Bureau Severely Condemns 
Some Persons Suspected of Breaching National Security Law,'' August 3, 
2022; Candice Chau, ``Activists behind Exiled Hong Kong `Parliament' 
Plan Suspected of Subversion, Security Bureau Says,'' Hong Kong Free 
Press, August 3, 2022.
    \62\ Candice Chau, ``Activists behind Exiled Hong Kong `Parliament' 
Plan Suspected of Subversion, Security Bureau Says,'' Hong Kong Free 
Press, August 3, 2022; Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Security Bureau 
Severely Condemns Some Persons Suspected of Breaching National Security 
Law,'' August 3, 2022.
    \63\ Almond Li, ``Hong Kong Lawmaker Takes Out Newspaper Ad to 
Disown Pro-Democracy Father-in-Law Accused of Subversion,'' Hong Kong 
Free Press, August 5, 2022.
    \64\ Brian Wong, ``Hongkonger Who Returned to Look After Ill Mum 
Denied Bail on National Security Grounds for Allegedly Seditious 
Posts,'' South China Morning Post, November 3, 2022; Xiao Jingyuan, 
``You Ying qianfan Gang mou `du' `Xianggang Duli Dang' toumu luowang'' 
[Head of ``Hong Kong Independence Party'' arrested after secretly 
returning to Hong Kong from England to conspire to promote 
``independence''], Wen Wei Po, November 3, 2022.
    \65\ Xiao Jingyuan, ``You Ying qianfan Gang mou `du' `Xianggang 
Duli Dang' toumu luowang'' [Head of ``Hong Kong Independence Party'' 
arrested after secretly returning to Hong Kong from England to conspire 
to promote ``independence''], Wen Wei Po, November 3, 2022.
    \66\ Pak Yiu, ``Overseas Hong Kongers Fear Long Reach of National 
Security Law,'' Nikkei, April 21, 2023.
    \67\ Pak Yiu, ``Overseas Hong Kongers Fear Long Reach of National 
Security Law,'' Nikkei, April 21, 2023.
    \68\ Peter Lee, ``Japan Voices Concern after Hong Kong Student 
Arrested over Speech Whilst Abroad; Beijing Blasts `Intervention,' '' 
Hong Kong Free Press, April 28, 2023; Office of the Commissioner of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Poeple's Republic of China in the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, ``Waijiaobu zhu Gang Gongshu 
duanchu Ri fang tingzhi lingren buchi de zhengzhi biaoyan'' [Office of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hong Kong urges Japan to stop 
disdainful political show], April 27, 2023.
    \69\ Secretary for Justice v Timothy Wynn Owen KC, Bar Council of 
the Hong Kong Bar Association, FAMV No. 591 of 2022, [2022] HKCFA 23, 
November 28, 2022, para. 1.
    \70\ Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap. 159), sec. 27(4).
    \71\ Secretary for Justice v Timothy Wynn Owen KC, Bar Council of 
the Hong Kong Bar Association, FAMV No. 591 of 2022, [2022] HKCFA 23, 
November 28, 2022, para. 9.
    \72\ Secretary for Justice v Timothy Wynn Owen KC, Bar Council of 
the Hong Kong Bar Association, FAMV No. 591 of 2022, [2022] HKCFA 23, 
November 28, 2022, paras. 6, 34.
    \73\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Statement by Chief Executive on 
Submitting Report to CPG on National Security Law and Recommendation to 
Request Interpretation of National Security Law from NPCSC,'' November 
28, 2022.
    \74\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 
passed and effective June 30, 2020, art. 65; Candice Chau, ``Explainer: 
Beijing's First Interpretation of Hong Kong's National Security Law,'' 
Hong Kong Free Press, January 8, 2023.
    \75\ Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui guanyu 
``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu Guojia 
Anquan Fa'' Di Shisi Tiao he Sishiqi Tiao de Jieshi [Interpretation by 
the National People's Congress Standing Committee Concerning Article 14 
and Article 47 of the ``PRC Law on Safeguarding National Security in 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region''], passed December 30, 
2022; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 
passed and effective June 30, 2020, art. 12.
    \76\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Lawyers Bill to Be Tabled,'' March 
21, 2023.
    \77\ Cannix Yau and Kahon Chan, ``Hong Kong National Security Law: 
City Leader Won't Offer Explanation if Foreign Lawyers Barred from 
Trials, Justice Minister Says,'' South China Morning Post, April 8, 
2023.
    \78\ Ben Rigby, ``Beijing Overrules Hong Kong Courts to Allow 
Authorities to Bar British Barristers from Security Law Trials,'' 
Global Legal Post, January 3, 2023; Dennis W.H. Kwok, ``The Case of 
Jimmy Lai Shows: Beijing Makes the Rules in Hongkong,'' Friedrich 
Naumann Foundation for Freedom, February 17, 2023; Sophie Reib, ``More 
Bad News for What's Left of Hong Kong's Rule of Law,'' MERICS, February 
3, 2023.
    \79\ Jessie Pang, ``Hong Kong Restricts Foreign Lawyers from 
National Security Cases,'' Reuters, May 10, 2023.
    \80\ James Pomfret, Greg Torode, Anne Marie Roantree, and David 
Lague, ``Lawyers Exit Hong Kong as They Face Campaign of 
Intimidation,'' Reuters, December 29, 2022.
    \81\ James Pomfret, Greg Torode, Anne Marie Roantree, and David 
Lague, ``Lawyers Exit Hong Kong as They Face Campaign of 
Intimidation,'' Reuters, December 29, 2022.
    \82\ James Pomfret, Greg Torode, Anne Marie Roantree, and David 
Lague, ```Lawyers Exit Hong Kong as They Face Campaign of 
Intimidation,'' Reuters, December 29, 2022.
    \83\ James Pomfret, Greg Torode, Anne Marie Roantree, and David 
Lague, ``Lawyers Exit Hong Kong as They Face Campaign of 
Intimidation,'' Reuters, December 29, 2022.
    \84\ James Pomfret, Greg Torode, Anne Marie Roantree, and David 
Lague, ``Lawyers Exit Hong Kong as They Face Campaign of 
Intimidation,'' Reuters, December 29, 2022; Greg Torode and James 
Pomfret, ``Ex-Chief of Hong Kong Barristers Says He Left City after 
Police Interview,'' Reuters, March 2, 2022.
    \85\ James Pomfret, Greg Torode, Anne Marie Roantree, and David 
Lague, ``Lawyers Exit Hong Kong as They Face Campaign of 
Intimidation,'' Reuters, December 29, 2022.
    \86\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``The Chief Executive's 2022 Policy 
Address,'' October 19, 2022, secs. 82, 123(ii).
    \87\ Education Bureau, Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Education Bureau 
Circular No. 13/202; Requirement for Newly-appointed Teachers to Pass 
the Basic Law and National Security Law Test,'' EDB(TPDSD)/3/1 C, 
October 24, 2022, paras. 3, 4; Hong Kong SAR Government, ``The Chief 
Executive's 2022 Policy Address,'' October 19, 2022, sec. 125(ii).
    \88\ Chen Zifei and Lee Yuk Yue, ``Hong Kong Teachers Told to 
Inform on Students, Colleagues in Free Speech Crackdown,'' Radio Free 
Asia, December 21, 2022.
    \89\ Education Bureau, Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Guidelines on 
Teachers' Professional Conduct,'' 2022, 4; Henry Ho, ``EDB's Guidelines 
on Teachers' Conduct Are Timely, Necessary,'' editorial, China Daily, 
December 23, 2022.
    \90\ Education Bureau, Hong Kong SAR Government, ``Guidelines on 
Teachers' Professional Conduct,'' 2022, 8, 9.
    \91\ ``Xianggang Jiaoyuju tui `Jiaoshi Zhuanye Caoshou Zhiyin' 
ketang huo shejiao pingtai buke suibian ti `Liusi Shijian' '' [Hong 
Kong Education Bureau to issue ``Guidelines on Teachers' Professional 
Conduct''; ``June Fourth Incident'' may not be casually mentioned], 
Radio Free Asia, November 2, 2022.
    \92\ Chen Zifei and Lee Yuk Yue, ``Hong Kong Teachers Told to 
Inform on Students, Colleagues in Free Speech Crackdown,'' Radio Free 
Asia, December 21, 2022.
    \93\ Chen Zifei and Lee Yuk Yue, ``Hong Kong Teachers Told to 
Inform on Students, Colleagues in Free Speech Crackdown,'' Radio Free 
Asia, December 21, 2022.
    \94\ Peter Lee, `` `Core Values,' Including Democracy, Dropped from 
Hong Kong's New Junior Secondary School Curriculum,'' Hong Kong Free 
Press, October 14, 2022.
    \95\ Peter Lee, `` `Core Values,' Including Democracy, Dropped from 
Hong Kong's New Junior Secondary School Curriculum,'' Hong Kong Free 
Press, October 14, 2022.
    \96\ Hoi Man Wu, Cheryl Tung, and Chen Zifei, ``Hong Kong 
University Requires Students to Take `National Security Education' 
Class,'' Radio Free Asia, July 26, 2022.
    \97\ Hoi Man Wu, Cheryl Tung, and Chen Zifei, ``Hong Kong 
University Requires Students to Take `National Security Education' 
Class,'' Radio Free Asia, July 26, 2022.
    \98\ Candice Chau and Marie Brockling, ``Exclusive: University of 
Hong Kong Makes Library Users Register to Access Some Politically 
Sensitive Books,'' Hong Kong Free Press, October 31, 2022.
    \99\ Yojana Sharma, ``Exodus of University Students and Professors 
Continues,'' University World News, January 24, 2023.
    \100\ Yojana Sharma, ``Exodus of University Students and Professors 
Continues,'' University World News, January 24, 2023.
    \101\ Yojana Sharma, ``Exodus of University Students and Professors 
Continues,'' University World News, January 24, 2023.
    \102\ Candice Chau, ``Over 900 Hong Kong Civil Servants Quit in 3 
Months in 2022, Gov't Document Reveals,'' Hong Kong Free Press, January 
13, 2023.
    \103\ Tony Cheung, ``Doctors, Nurses Have Social Duty to Make 
Sacrifices for City, Hong Kong Leader Says on Plan to Fight Shortfall 
with Forced Service Period in Public Sector,'' South China Morning 
Post, November 8, 2022; Lu Yingshan and Lao Xianliang, ``01 Zhuanfang 
Lu Chongmou: Xia yue Yingguo qiang rencai duanqi ji zhao baiming haiwai 
yisheng zan de shiduo ren'' [01 Interview with Lo Chung-mau: Traveling 
to England next month to find talents; expected to recruit one hundred 
overseas doctors but only has 10 or so right now], HK01, March 4, 2023.
    \104\ Martin Lee, ``Why Is the HK Public Hospital System on the 
Brink of Collapse?'' Pacific Prime Hong Kong, May 4, 2023.
    \105\ Hong Kong SAR Government, ``The Chief Executive's 2022 Policy 
Address,'' October 19, 2022, para. 84.
    \106\ Tony Cheung, ``Doctors, Nurses Have Social Duty to Make 
Sacrifices for City, Hong Kong Leader Says on Plan to Fight Shortfall 
with Forced Service Period in Public Sector,'' South China Morning 
Post, November 8, 2022.
    \107\ Lu Yingshan and Lao Xianliang, ``01 Zhuanfang Lu Chongmou: 
Xia yue Yingguo qiang rencai duanqi ji zhao baiming haiwai yisheng zan 
de shiduo ren'' [01 Interview with Lo Chung-mau: Traveling to England 
next month to find talents; expected to recruit one hundred overseas 
doctors but only has 10 or so right now], HK01, March 4, 2023.
    \108\ Dong Shuyue, ``Gangguan fu Ying quan yisheng huiliu 
yikesheng: Xianggang zhi you qian Yingguo jiao ziyou'' [Hong Kong 
official travels to England to persuade doctors to return; medical 
student: Hong Kong only has money, England offers more freedom], Radio 
Free Asia, April 4, 2023.
    \109\ Dong Shuyue, ``Gangguan fu Ying quan yisheng huiliu 
yikesheng: Xianggang zhi you qian Yingguo jiao ziyou'' [Hong Kong 
official travels to England to persuade doctors to return; medical 
student: Hong Kong only has money, England offers more freedom], Radio 
Free Asia, April 4, 2023.
    \110\ International Federation of Journalists, ``The Story That 
Won't Be Silenced: Hong Kong Freedom of Expression Report 2021/22,'' 
October 2022, 4.
    \111\ International Federation of Journalists, ``The Story That 
Won't Be Silenced: Hong Kong Freedom of Expression Report 2021/22,'' 
October 2022, 3; Tom Grundy, ``Ex-Editor Who Quit after Xinjiang Story 
Axed Dismisses SCMP Letter Warning of `Further Action' if He Publishes 
It,'' Hong Kong Free Press, October 28, 2022.
    \112\ International Federation of Journalists, ``The Story That 
Won't Be Silenced: Hong Kong Freedom of Expression Report 2021/22,'' 
October 2022, 13, 39.
    \113\ International Federation of Journalists, ``The Story That 
Won't Be Silenced: Hong Kong Freedom of Expression Report 2021/22,'' 
October 2022, 34.
    \114\ Tom Grundy, ``Team of Journalists Resigned after SCMP Axed 3-
Part Series on Xinjiang Abuses, Ex-Editor Says,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 
October 25, 2022.
    \115\ Tom Grundy, ``Team of Journalists Resigned after SCMP Axed 3-
Part Series on Xinjiang Abuses, Ex-Editor Says,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 
October 25, 2022.
    \116\ Tom Grundy, ``Ex-Editor Who Quit after Xinjiang Story Axed 
Dismisses SCMP Letter Warning of `Further Action' if He Publishes It,'' 
Hong Kong Free Press, October 28, 2022.
    \117\ Hillary Leung, ``Hong Kong Press Group Chief Ronson Chan 
Feared Privacy Breach When Asked for ID by Police, Court Hears,'' Hong 
Kong Free Press, June 13, 2023; ``Hong Kong Journalist Group Chief 
Ronson Chan Pleads Not Guilty to Obstructing Police Officers While 
Reporting,'' The Standard, May 16, 2023.
    \118\ Hillary Leung, ``Hong Kong Press Group Chief Ronson Chan 
Feared Privacy Breach When Asked for ID by Police, Court Hears,'' Hong 
Kong Free Press, June 13, 2023.
    \119\ Sum Lok-Kei, ``Hong Kong Publishers Excluded from Book Fair 
over Politically Sensitive Material,'' Guardian, July 22, 2022.
    \120\ Sum Lok-Kei, ``Hong Kong Publishers Excluded from Book Fair 
over Politically Sensitive Material,'' Guardian, July 22, 2022.
    \121\ Sum Lok-Kei, ``Hong Kong Publishers Excluded from Book Fair 
over Politically Sensitive Material,'' Guardian, July 22, 2022.
    \122\ Film Censorship Ordinance (Cap. 392), sec. 10; Hong Kong SAR 
Government, ``Film Censorship Rules Gazetted,'' November 5, 2021.
    \123\ ``Guoqu yinian zui `weixian' de Xianggang dianying men: 
Baiban ziwo shencha, ye nabudao yizhang yingzheng?'' [The most 
``dangerous'' Hong Kong films in the past year: Cannot obtain 
permission to release film despite all kinds of self-censorship?], 
Initium, January 3, 2023.
    \124\ ``[Guo'an shidai] Gang Jinmajiang duanpian `Anfang Yekong' 
yin banmiao huamian beiju zaici gongying zhijin yu 10 dianying tonglei 
qingkuang'' [[The age of national security] Short film that won the 
Hong Kong Golden Horse Award ``Losing Sight of a Longed Place'' was 
denied another release due to a half-second scene; at least 10 films 
suffered similar fate], Radio Free Asia, August 11, 2022.
    \125\ ``[Guo'an shidai] Gang Jinmajiang duanpian `Anfang Yekong' 
yin banmiao huamian beiju zaici gongying zhijin yu 10 dianying tonglei 
qingkuang'' [The age of national security] Short film that won the Hong 
Kong Golden Horse Award ``Losing Sight of a Longed Place'' was denied 
another release due to a half-second scene; at least 10 films suffered 
similar fate,'' Radio Free Asia, August 11, 2022.
    \126\ Li Chengxin, ``Xianggang dianying shencha: Sanbu Taiwan pian 
beipo cheying, zhengzhi hongxian shifou `huidao wushi niandai'' [Film 
censorship in Hong Kong: Three Taiwanese films forced to give up 
showing, has political red line ``returned to the fifties''], BBC, 
October 31, 2022.
    \127\ Li Chengxin, ``Xianggang dianying shencha: Sanbu Taiwan pian 
beipo cheying, zhengzhi hongxian shifou `huidao wushi niandai'' [Film 
censorship in Hong Kong: Three Taiwanese films forced to give up 
showing, has political red line ``returned to the fifties''], BBC, 
October 31, 2022.
    \128\ Audit Commission, ``Gonggang tushuguan de guanli'' 
[Management of public libraries], accessed May 16, 2023, para. 9; 
``Shenji baogao/Tushuguan fang du youze ruan duikang burong qingshi'' 
[Audit Commission Report: Libraries have a duty to prevent calls for 
Hong Kong independence; soft resistance cannot be treated lightly], Ta 
Kung Pao, April 27, 2023.
    \129\ Zheng Luming, Chen Yiying, Shi Jinyu, and Lin Li, ``Shenji 
chu huguo'an hou tushuguan duo xiang zuopin xiajia tongji: She zhengzhi 
ziliao liangnian shao sicheng Tang Jiahua: Yi jieshi zhunze buying 
shuibian shencha'' [After Audit Commission calls for protecting 
national security, many titles have been taken down from libraries: 
materials with political content dropped by 40 percent in two years; 
Ronny Tong: The government should interpret the standard and should not 
arbitrarily censor books], Ming Pao, May 15, 2023.
    \130\ Verna Yu, ``Hong Kong Political Cartoonist Axed after 40 
Years Following Criticism from Officials,'' Guardian, May 11, 2023.
    \131\ Verna Yu, ``Hong Kong Political Cartoonist Axed after 40 
Years Following Criticism from Officials,'' Guardian, May 11, 2023.
    \132\ Verna Yu, ``Hong Kong Political Cartoonist Axed after 40 
Years Following Criticism from Officials,'' Guardian, May 11, 2023.
    \133\ Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200), sec. 9(1).
    \134\ U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the 
Second Periodic Report of Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 
3912th meeting (22 July 2022), CCPR/C/CHN-MAC/CO/2, November 11, 2022.
    \135\ U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the 
Second Periodic Report of Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 
3912th meeting (22 July 2022), CCPR/C/CHN-MAC/CO/2, November 11, 2022, 
paras. 32, 34, 38.
    \136\ U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the 
Second Periodic Report of Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 
3912th meeting (22 July 2022), CCPR/C/CHN-MAC/CO/2, November 11, 2022, 
para. 42.
    \137\ U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the 
Second Periodic Report of Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 
3912th meeting (22 July 2022), CCPR/C/CHN-MAC/CO/2, November 11, 2022, 
paras. 30, 34, 40.
    \138\ Macau SAR Government, ``Aomen Tebie Xingzhengqu xiugai `Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa' zixun wenben,'' [Consultation document for amending 
the ``Law on Safeguarding National Security'' by the Macau SAR 
Government], 2022, secs. 2.1, 2.2, 2.7.
    \139\ Macau SAR Government, ``Aomen Tebie Xingzhengqu xiugai `Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa' zixun wenben,'' [Consultation document for amending 
the ``Law on Safeguarding National Security'' by the Macau SAR 
Government], 2022, sec. 2.5.
    \140\ Gao Feng, ``Aomen ni xiuding Guo'an Fa yu Xianggang kanqi 
feibaoli xingwei ke goucheng fenlei guojia zui'' [Macau proposes to 
amend the National Security Law to catch up with Hong Kong; non-violent 
conduct may constitute secession], Voice of America, August 24, 2022.

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

         XII. Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

            Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

                                Findings

         The People's Republic of China (PRC) continued 
        a multi-
        faceted campaign of transnational repression against 
        critics, Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and others to stifle 
        criticism and enhance control over emigrant and 
        diaspora communities. After engaging in China-related 
        protests abroad, some individuals experienced reprisal 
        from Chinese authorities, intimidation or harassment 
        from unidentified individuals, or self-censorship due 
        to fear of reprisal. Authorities in the United States 
        reported criminal charges against or arrested several 
        groups and individuals involved in such PRC-led 
        transnational repression plots.
         Prompted by reporting from the international 
        nongovernmental organization (NGO) Safeguard Defenders 
        this past year, governments, international media, and 
        NGOs investigated extraterritorial Chinese police 
        stations, also known as ``service stations,'' around 
        the globe with reported connections to Chinese law 
        enforcement authorities. Reporting also detailed some 
        of the ``service stations''' activities, including 
        persuading alleged criminal suspects to return to 
        China.
         The Commission observed reports that the PRC 
        is targeting foreign politicians to influence them to 
        support the Chinese Communist Party. This past year, 
        former Solomon Islands provincial Premier Daniel 
        Suidani claimed he was ousted from his post due to PRC 
        political influence operations, while Canadian 
        intelligence officials announced they had evidence of 
        PRC influence operations targeting Canadian 
        policymakers Michael Chong, Jenny Kwan, and Erin 
        O'Toole.
         Chinese-owned companies and banks responsible 
        for foreign development projects continued allowing 
        abusive conditions for workers abroad. This past year, 
        multiple reports detailed forced labor conditions for 
        workers in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and non-BRI 
        Chinese projects abroad, including physical and sexual 
        violence, withholding of wages, and debt bondage.
         Chinese authorities continued to attempt to 
        influence U.N. processes, including efforts to prevent 
        the publication of the Office of the U.N. High 
        Commissioner for Human Rights' report on human rights 
        violations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
        (XUAR) and Chinese Communist Party- and government-
        affiliated NGOs monopolizing time dedicated to civil 
        society organizations during the review of the 
        Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
        Discrimination against Women in May 2023.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to take the following actions:
          Prepare a comprehensive strategy against China's 
        transnational repression within the U.S. and globally, 
        including addressing ``service stations'' connected to 
        PRC law enforcement. This may include identifying and 
        protecting individuals likely to be targeted, sharing 
        intelligence among appropriate law enforcement 
        entities, and imposing sanctions on perpetrators and 
        enablers of these coercive operations.
          Consider legislation on accountability measures, such 
        as sanctions, against foreign government officials who 
        return individuals to the PRC where they are at risk of 
        torture and other human rights abuses in violation of 
        the principle of non-refoulement.
          Show support to foreign political leaders and 
        government officials who have been targeted by the 
        Chinese government in retaliation for speaking out 
        against the PRC's human rights abuses. This may include 
        providing platforms for these individuals to speak 
        about their experiences to increase awareness of the 
        PRC's use of political coercion or working closely with 
        them to coordinate appropriate responses to China.
          Call on the host governments of Chinese foreign 
        development projects and the United Nations to insist 
        that Chinese entities provide increased transparency in 
        their development projects abroad. This might include 
        publication of rigorous environmental, social, and 
        governance risk assessments; detailed data regarding 
        Chinese state involvement; terms of agreements for 
        projects with state involvement; and evaluation of 
        human rights safeguards.
          Offer alternative options for countries hosting 
        Chinese development projects, including assistance in 
        restructuring unfair debts with China or promotion of 
        investment projects in which the United States may have 
        a competitive advantage.
          Ensure broad, sustained U.S. engagement in U.N. 
        bodies with human rights functions to ensure that these 
        bodies can prevent further Chinese influence efforts 
        that distort universal human rights principles. This 
        should include putting forth qualified U.S. candidates 
        to serve on those bodies, encouraging allies and 
        partners to do the same with their candidates, and 
        building coalitions to support those candidates.

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

            Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

                        Transnational Repression

    During the Commission's 2023 reporting year, the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) continued a multi-year campaign of 
transnational repression to enhance control over critics, 
Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and others.\1\ ``Transnational 
repression'' refers to transnational efforts to stifle dissent 
or independent organizing within emigrant or diaspora 
communities.\2\ Freedom House has called China's transnational 
repression campaign ``the most sophisticated, global, and 
comprehensive . . . in the world.'' \3\ In some cases, 
authorities harassed or intimidated the China-based relatives 
of overseas targets as an indirect way to compel compliance 
from the targets themselves,\4\ a tactic referred to as 
``coercion by proxy.'' \5\ Selected examples of transnational 
repression from this past year follow.
         Transnational repression charges in the United 
        States. This past year, the U.S. Department of Justice 
        (DOJ) criminally charged individuals connected with the 
        PRC in transnational repression plots against 
        individuals in the United States. This included seven 
        individuals accused of pressuring a U.S.-based Chinese 
        national to return to China as part of a PRC-led 
        international extralegal repatriation effort known as 
        ``Operation Fox Hunt.'' \6\ In another case, the DOJ 
        charged 44 individuals in April 2023--including 40 
        Ministry of Public Security (MPS) officers and two 
        officials from the Cyberspace Administration of China 
        (CAC)--in a transnational repression scheme targeting 
        U.S. residents in which the defendants reportedly 
        created thousands of fake social media accounts to 
        harass individuals ``whose political views and actions 
        are disfavored by the PRC,'' and worked with an 
        employee of a U.S. telecommunications company to remove 
        such individuals from the company's platform.\7\ 
        Finally, in May 2023, the DOJ announced the arrest of 
        Litang Liang, a man living in Massachusetts who had 
        allegedly been ``providing PRC government officials 
        with information on Boston-area individuals and 
        organizations; organizing a counter-protest against 
        pro-democracy dissidents; providing photographs of and 
        information about dissidents to PRC government 
        officials; and providing the names of potential 
        recruits to the PRC's Ministry of Public Security.'' 
        \8\

         Uyghurs. This reporting year, the Commission 
        observed the release of multiple reports detailing new 
        findings of Chinese transnational repression targeted 
        at Uyghur diaspora members. In its August 2022 report 
        on human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region (XUAR), the Office of the U.N. High 
        Commissioner for Human Rights noted the problem of 
        coercion by proxy for Uyghur families separated across 
        national boundaries.\9\ According to that report, fear 
        of reprisals against XUAR-based relatives is a common 
        reason for Uyghurs to cut off communication with their 
        family members when they or their family members live 
        abroad.\10\ As an example, the report cited one 
        instance of a man's wife, children, and over 30 other 
        relatives in the XUAR refusing contact with him out of 
        fear of reprisals.\11\ In a separate report, David 
        Tobin and Nyrola Elima of the University of Sheffield 
        shared further examples, including one of an anonymous 
        Uyghur man who has received harassing phone calls and 
        threats to him and his family by XUAR police for years, 
        while previously living in Turkey and now the U.K.\12\ 
        [For more information about transnational repression of 
        Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, see Chapter 18--
        Xinjiang.]

         Lhamjab Borjigin. PRC police took into custody 
        the prominent Mongol writer Lhamjab Borjigin\13\ in May 
        2023 at his residence in Mongolia's capital of 
        Ulaanbaatar before forcibly returning him to his home 
        in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) on the 
        same day.\14\ Lhamjab Borjigin has written several 
        books on Mongolian history, and escaped ``residential 
        surveillance'' in the IMAR in March 2023 to live in 
        Mongolia and publish a new history of the suppression 
        of Mongolian identity by the Chinese Communist 
        Party.\15\ The Mongolian government released an 
        official statement asserting Lhamjab Borjigin left 
        Mongolia voluntarily without any Chinese police 
        operation, though analysts from Safeguard Defenders 
        assert that ``it appears that Mongolia had allowed the 
        arrest to take place.'' \16\ [For more information on 
        the case of Lhamjab Borjigin, see Chapter 7--Ethnic 
        Minority Rights.]

         Mayflower Church. Chinese state security 
        continued to harass members of the Shenzhen Holy 
        Reformed Church, also called the Mayflower Church,\17\ 
        who left China between 2019 and 2020 seeking religious 
        asylum after facing intensifying government 
        persecution.\18\ After flying to Thailand from South 
        Korea to appeal directly to the U.N. refugee agency 
        office in Bangkok, members of the Mayflower Church 
        reported receiving dozens of ``harassing phone calls'' 
        from Chinese officials accusing them of committing 
        national security offenses, while authorities in China 
        interrogated and intimidated their relatives.\19\ 
        International advocacy, including by the U.S.-based 
        Christian rights group ChinaAid Association and U.S. 
        government agencies, led to the release of Mayflower 
        Church members from Thai prison and their subsequent 
        journey to the U.S. in April 2023.\20\ [For more 
        information on religious persecution in China, see 
        Chapter 3--Freedom of Religion.]

  PROTESTERS ABROAD EXPERIENCE INTIMIDATION, REPRISALS, AND CHILLING 
                                EFFECTS

    This past year, international media reported cases of 
individuals who, after engaging in China-related protests 
outside of China, were subjected to reprisals from Chinese 
authorities, intimidation or harassment from unidentified 
individuals, or self-censorship due to fear of reprisals. 
Selected examples follow.

         Hong Kong. On the first day of the 20th 
        National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 
        Beijing municipality,\21\ protesters outside the 
        Chinese consulate in Manchester, United Kingdom, 
        displayed banners that criticized Party General 
        Secretary Xi Jinping, demanded the end of the Party, 
        and called for Hong Kong independence.\22\ A man who 
        later identified himself as Chinese Consul-General 
        Zheng Xiyuan \23\ kicked one banner and pushed down 
        another, and Chinese consular staff tried to take a 
        poster from protesters during the demonstration.\24\ A 
        violent confrontation with protesters then ensued.\25\ 
        One protester reported that individuals inside the 
        consulate gates grabbed his hair, pulled him inside the 
        gates, and assaulted him.\26\ Following the incident, 
        U.K. authorities reported that they had initiated an 
        investigation.\27\ In a separate case, a Hong Kong 
        resident who had previously visited the U.K. reported 
        that officials identifying themselves from the 
        ``national security office'' summoned him upon his 
        return to Hong Kong and warned him that his 
        participation in recent protests in the U.K. 
        ``constitute[d] terrorist activities.'' \28\ After 
        issuing these threats, the officials released the man 
        without a formal bail note, and the man left Hong Kong 
        soon thereafter.\29\ [For more information about 
        authorities' efforts to suppress peaceful expression in 
        connection with the 20th Party Congress, see Chapter 
        1--Freedom of Expression. For more information about 
        conditions in Hong Kong, see Chapter 19--Hong Kong and 
        Macau.]
         Support of Peng Lifa. Some cases were 
        connected to displays of solidarity abroad with Peng 
        Lifa's protest in Beijing municipality shortly before 
        the 20th Party Congress.\30\ Beijing authorities 
        immediately detained Peng in October 2022 after he hung 
        banners calling for the removal of Xi Jinping and 
        criticizing authorities' response to COVID-19 among 
        other demands, in calls that were subsequently echoed 
        through social media posts and posters in China and 
        abroad.\31\ Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that some 
        Chinese students studying abroad posted messages in 
        support of Peng anonymously, which a Chinese student in 
        the U.S. told RFA was out of concern about potential 
        reprisals against family and friends in China.\32\ In 
        one case, a Chinese national studying in Washington 
        state reported that, after he expressed support for 
        Peng online, police in Beijing pressured his family to 
        convince him not to be a ``traitor.'' \33\ [For more 
        information about Peng Lifa's protest, see Chapter 1--
        Freedom of Expression.]
         Solidarity with White Paper protesters. 
        Diaspora communities showed solidarity with the 
        November 2022 White Paper protests in China against 
        harsh ``zero-COVID'' measures and censorship,\34\ by 
        publicly protesting in locations throughout the world. 
        Members of the Hong Kong diaspora abroad expressed 
        fears about using their real names or showing their 
        faces while participating in these protests, out of 
        concern that Hong Kong authorities might pursue them 
        under extraterritorial provisions in Hong Kong's 
        national security law \35\ or retaliate against their 
        friends and family back in Hong Kong.\36\ [For more 
        information about White Paper protests, see Chapter 1--
        Freedom of Expression, Chapter 2--Civil Society, 
        Chapter 6--Governance, and Chapter 12--Public Health.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Overseas Police ``Service Stations''
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Prompted by reporting from the international nongovernmental
 organization (NGO) Safeguard Defenders this past year, governments,
 international media, and NGOs investigated extraterritorial Chinese
 police stations, also known as ``service stations'' \37\ around the
 globe with connections to Chinese law enforcement authorities. In
 September and December 2022, Safeguard Defenders reported that Chinese
 public security bureaus from three municipalities in Jiangsu, Fujian,
 and Zhejiang provinces, and one county in Zhejiang,\38\ had established
 in total 102 such stations in at least 53 countries, with some dating
 back to 2016.\39\ While at least one Chinese public security bureau
 reportedly signed bilateral agreements with some host countries in
 question, Safeguard Defenders reported that three other public security
 bureaus in China established ``service stations'' illegally, breaching
 ``territorial and judicial sovereignty'' of the host countries.\40\
 Subsequently, authorities in the United States, Austria, Canada, Chile,
 the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
 Nigeria, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United
 Kingdom announced investigations into the existence and activities of
 these service stations.\41\ As a result of one such investigation, the
 United Kingdom's Security Minister, Tom Tugendhat, reported in June
 2023 that China had closed ``service stations'' across Britain, and
 that an investigation into those sites did not reveal any illegal
 activity by the Chinese state in the U.K.\42\ Meanwhile, the U.S.
 Department of Justice charged two individuals in connection with
 ``opening and operating an illegal overseas police station'' in New
 York City ``for a provincial branch of the [Ministry of Public
 Security] of the PRC.'' \43\
 
  Reporting from this past year also provided additional details about
 the activities of the ``service stations'' over the years. Some sources
 reported that the ``service stations'' connected Chinese citizens
 abroad with local authorities in China--via telephone, video
 conference, or postal mail--to facilitate driver's license renewals,
 telehealth exams, and notary services, as well as dispute resolution
 services that included litigation and mediation.\44\ Nevertheless, in
 at least four cases, ``service stations'' reportedly facilitated the
 ``persuasion'' of alleged criminal suspects to return to China from
 abroad, specifically from Serbia in 2018,\45\ France in 2019, \46\
 Spain in 2020, \47\ and Mozambique in 2022. \48\ In July 2022,
 authorities from Nantong municipality, Jiangsu, reported that the
 ``Nantong Police and Overseas Liaison stations have assisted in the
 capture or persuasion to return of 80 `criminal suspects' to China''
 from unspecified countries \49\ since the ``service stations'' were
 launched in 2016.\50\ ``Persuasion to return'' is part of broader
 international efforts by PRC authorities to target alleged corruption
 suspects, critics of government and Party officials, and members of
 ethnic minority emigrant and diaspora communities.\51\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

         targeting foreign politicians and government officials

    This reporting year, the Commission also observed reports 
that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is targeting foreign 
politicians and government officials to influence them to 
support the Chinese Communist Party. Selected examples include 
the following:

         Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands Prime 
        Minister's office announced that China provided US$2.49 
        million in funds to be spent at the Prime Minister's 
        discretion in 2021, which were subsequently distributed 
        to 39 out of 50 members of the Solomon Islands' 
        parliament that year.\52\ These payments prompted 
        ``criticism the payments were politically motivated'' 
        because the 39 paid politicians were supporters of 
        Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, who has been 
        instrumental in developing Sino-Solomon Islands 
        relations.\53\ Moreover, former provincial Premier 
        Daniel Suidani, a public critic of the Solomon Islands' 
        diplomatic ties with the PRC and its corrupt practices 
        in his province, was ousted from his seat in February 
        2023, and has claimed the PRC orchestrated a political 
        operation to influence members of his government to 
        vote for a motion of no confidence to remove him from 
        his post.\54\
         Canada. Canada's intelligence agency, the 
        Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) informed 
        multiple Canadian politicians in May 2023 of Chinese 
        influence operations targeted at them. The Canadian 
        newspaper Globe and Mail revealed that, according to 
        CSIS, Toronto-based PRC diplomat Zhao Wei had ordered 
        the monitoring and potential intimidation of Hong Kong-
        based relatives of Canadian Member of Parliament (MP) 
        Michael Chong, who previously sponsored a motion in 
        2021 condemning the PRC's treatment of Uyghurs as 
        ``genocide.'' \55\ Similarly, MP Jenny Kwan stated 
        later in May 2023 that CSIS had informed her that China 
        had targeted her in a foreign interference campaign and 
        that she ``would continue to be a target,'' likely due 
        to her activism related to human rights in Hong Kong 
        and Uyghurs in the XUAR.\56\ Canada's former 
        Conservative Party Leader Erin O'Toole also reported 
        that CSIS had identified PRC-organized misinformation 
        campaigns against him in the 2021 election, reportedly 
        because O'Toole opposed the use of Huawei technology in 
        Canada and criticized the PRC's human rights 
        record.\57\

                      Foreign Development Projects

    The Commission observed multiple reports of human rights 
violations this past year tied to Chinese corporations' and 
banks' involvement in foreign development projects, including 
those associated with its state-sponsored Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI). In November 2022, China Labor Watch (CLW), an 
NGO based in the U.S., detailed forced labor conditions for 
Chinese workers in BRI projects in multiple countries.\58\ 
Drawing on data from correspondence with over 2,000 workers in 
eight countries across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, CLW 
found ``systematic violations of the rights of Chinese workers 
in BRI-affiliated projects.'' \59\ In interviews with workers, 
CLW found that interviewees raised grievances that correspond 
to International Labor Organization indicators of forced labor 
or human trafficking in as high as 85 percent of cases 
(retention of identity documents).\60\ The CLW report 
documented issues such as predatory sub-contracting 
arrangements that shield companies from accountability; false 
advertising regarding salaries and other working conditions 
overseas; allowing or forcing workers to work overseas without 
required work visas; illegal contracting practices; passport 
seizures; arbitrary wage withholding and fines; surveillance, 
intimidation, and physical abuse at job sites; and corruption 
and collusion with host country authorities to suppress worker 
complaints.\61\ In one specific case from this past year, CLW 
reported a variety of these issues--plus multiple worker 
deaths--at PT Virtue Dragon Nickel Industrial Park (the 
Industrial Park) in Indonesia,\62\ which reportedly had 
investment from state-owned China First Heavy Industries.\63\ 
In January 2023, workers at the Industrial Park reportedly went 
on strike in response to poor working conditions, which 
resulted in violent conflict between workers and security 
personnel and the deaths of an Indonesian worker and a Chinese 
worker.\64\
    In addition to cases involving BRI projects, other Chinese 
foreign development initiatives were connected to human rights 
abuses as well this year. Selected examples include the 
following:
         Solomon Islands stadium. Workers at a Chinese 
        state-funded stadium complex construction zone in the 
        Solomon Islands spoke to the New York Times about the 
        project's unjust labor practices.\65\ Workers reported 
        unfulfilled promises of pay, lack of any safety 
        training, and incidents of Chinese supervisors hitting 
        workers in the head as punishment.\66\
         Latin America projects. A coalition of Latin 
        American NGOs submitted a report to the U.N. Committee 
        on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in 
        February 2023, documenting violations of environmental 
        and social standards in the region by companies and 
        banks over which the PRC has effective control and 
        jurisdiction.\67\ The NGOs analyzed 14 projects led by 
        Chinese companies or with Chinese financing, carried 
        out in nine Latin American countries in infrastructure, 
        energy, and extraction sectors.\68\ In doing so, the 
        group revealed ``violations of the rights of indigenous 
        peoples, the right to health, a healthy environment, 
        water, food, housing, labor rights, and various civil 
        and political rights,'' which the PRC failed to make 
        sufficient efforts to prevent.\69\
         Zimbabwe mining. The U.S. Department of 
        State's 2022 Zimbabwe Country Report on Human Rights 
        Practices reported common themes of PRC-owned companies 
        abusing workers in Zimbabwe.\70\ Specifically, it cites 
        reports of ``physical, sexual, and emotional abuse of 
        workers; unsafe working conditions; underpayment or 
        nonpayment of wages; unfair dismissals; firings without 
        notice; failure to abide by collective bargaining 
        agreements; and failure to report health and safety 
        incidents.'' \71\

               Efforts to Impede U.N. Human Rights Bodies

    Chinese authorities continue to make efforts to influence 
processes and procedures within the U.N. system to prevent 
public reporting of China's human rights violations to the 
international community.\72\ In July 2022, Reuters reported on 
a letter authored by Chinese authorities urging Michelle 
Bachelet, then the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, not 
to publish a report on human rights concerns in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), which ultimately was released 
by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
on August 31. \73\ Chinese authorities reportedly circulated 
the draft letter for signature by other countries' 
authorities.\74\ The Financial Times later reported that 
Bachelet confirmed authorities from China and other countries 
had contacted her directly and asked her not to publish the 
OHCHR report.\75\ Additionally, this past year, 
``nongovernmental'' organizations affiliated with the Chinese 
government and the Chinese Communist Party submitted 
approximately one-third of the 52 nongovernmental reports to 
the committee of experts who reviewed China's compliance with 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination in May 2023.\76\ According to the International 
Service for Human Rights, such ``nongovernmental'' 
organizations typically echo PRC official talking points about 
China's self-proclaimed human rights achievements, at the same 
time that their participation ``reduces the time and space for 
independent NGOs to interact'' with U.N. treaty body 
experts.\77\ [For more information about the OHCHR's report on 
human rights concerns in the XUAR, see Chapter 18--Xinjiang. 
For more information about Chinese influence efforts at the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
China review in May 2023, see Chapter 8--Status of Women.]

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

    Notes to Chapter 20--Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and 
Globally

    \1\ Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, ``Out of 
Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational 
Repression,'' February 2021; Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 16, 2022), 348.
    \2\ See, e.g., Dana M. Moss, The Arab Spring Abroad: Diaspora 
Activism against Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2021), 5; Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, ``Out 
of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational 
Repression,'' February 2021, 1; Safeguard Defenders, ``Involuntary 
Returns: China's Covert Operation to Force `Fugitives' Overseas Back 
Home,'' January 2022, 8-9; Dana M. Moss, ``Transnational Repression, 
Diaspora Mobilization, and the Case of the Arab Spring,'' Social 
Problems 63 (2016): 480-82; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
``Transnational Repression,'' last accessed June 27, 2023; 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report 
(Washington: November 16, 2022), 348.
    \3\ Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, ``Out of 
Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational 
Repression,'' February 2021, 15.
    \4\ See, e.g., James T. Areddy, ``China's Displeasure with a 
Bookseller Follows Him to Florida,'' Wall Street Journal, January 28, 
2023; Mia Ping-chieh Chen, Yitong Wu, and Chingman, ``Chinese Police 
Pressure Family of U.S.-Based Student over Support for `Bridge Man,' '' 
Radio Free Asia, October 21, 2022.
    \5\ Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, ``Out of 
Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational 
Repression,'' February 2021, 2; Fiona Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas, 
Freedom House, ``At Home and Abroad: Coercion-by-Proxy as a Tool of 
Transnational Repression,'' July 2020.
    \6\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Two Arrested and 13 Charged in 
Three Separate Cases for Alleged Participation in Malign Schemes in the 
United States on Behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of 
China,'' October 24, 2022.
    \7\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``40 Officers of China's National 
Police Charged in Transnational Repression Schemes Targeting U.S. 
Residents,'' April 17, 2023.
    \8\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Massachusetts Man Indicted for 
Acting as an Illegal Agent of the People's Republic of China,'' May 15, 
2023.
    \9\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, para. 138.
    \10\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, para. 135.
    \11\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022, paras. 135, 138.
    \12\ David Tobin and Nyrola Elima, ``We Know You Better Than You 
Know Yourself: China's Transnational Repression of the Uyghur 
Diaspora,'' University of Sheffield, April 13, 2023, 47-50.
    \13\ For more information on Lhamjab Borjigin, see the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00105 and Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report (Washington: December 
2020), 131.
    \14\ Massimo Introvigne, ``China Kidnaps Southern Mongolian 
Dissident in Mongolia,'' Bitter Winter, May 15, 2023; PEN America, 
``PEN America Condemns China's Arrest of Exiled Mongolian Writer and 
Historian Lhamjab A. Borjigin,'' May 12, 2023; Safeguard Defenders, 
``Chinese Police Kidnaps Writer in Mongolia,'' June 12, 2023.
    \15\ Massimo Introvigne, ``China Kidnaps Southern Mongolian 
Dissident in Mongolia,'' Bitter Winter, May 15, 2023; PEN America, 
``PEN America Condemns China's Arrest of Exiled Mongolian Writer and 
Historian Lhamjab A. Borjigin,'' May 12, 2023; Qiao Long and Sun Cheng, 
``Thousands Held in Inner Mongolia as Crackdown on Language Protesters 
Continues,'' Radio Free Asia, trans. and ed. Luisetta Mudie, October 
20, 2020.
    \16\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Chinese Police Kidnaps Writer in 
Mongolia,'' June 12, 2023.
    \17\ Chun Han Wong, ``Chinese Christians Detained in Thailand While 
Seeking U.N. Protection,'' Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2023. This 
article explains that ``American activists and politicians have 
described the congregation as the `Mayflower Church,' drawing a 
parallel with the English pilgrims who in 1620 traveled to what was to 
become the U.S.''
    \18\ Chun Han Wong and Josh Chin, ``A Christian Congregation Fled 
Xi Jinping's China, but Escaping Control Had a Price,'' Wall Street 
Journal, June 2, 2021; Chun Han Wong, ``Chinese Christians Detained in 
Thailand While Seeking U.N. Protection,'' Wall Street Journal, March 
31, 2023.
    \19\ Tassanee Vejpongsa and Dake Kang, ``Beijing Hounds Chinese 
Church Seeking Safety Overseas,'' Associated Press, September 7, 2022; 
Chun Han Wong, ``Christian Church That Fled China Seeks Refugee Status 
from United Nations,'' Wall Street Journal, September 5, 2022.
    \20\ ChinaAid Association, ``A Great Good Friday Reunion--Mayflower 
Church Lands in Texas,'' April 9, 2023.
    \21\ ``Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Ershi ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui 16 
ri shangwu zai Renmin Dahui Tang kaimu Xi Jinping daibiao Di Shijiu jie 
Zhongyang Weiyuanhui xiang Dang de Ershi Da zuo baogao'' [The 20th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China opened in the Great 
Hall of the People on morning of the 16th; on behalf of the 19th 
Central Committee, Xi Jinping delivered a report to the 20th Party 
Congress], Xinhua, October 16, 2022.
    \22\ Adam Parker, ``Chinese Consulate Attack: This Is What Really 
Happened,'' Sky News, October 21, 2022, 0:19-0:23, 0:55-0:57.
    \23\ ``Chinese Consul General in Manchester Admits to Pulling Hong 
Kong Protester's Hair,'' Radio Free Asia, October 20, 2022; Adam 
Parker, ``Chinese Consulate Attack: This Is What Really Happened,'' Sky 
News, October 21, 2022; Inzamam Rashid, ``Chinese Consul-General 
Defends Actions after Being Seen Pulling Protester's Hair in 
Manchester,'' Sky News, October 20, 2022. In images and video of the 
incident, a man wearing a beret and a mask can be seen pulling Chan's 
hair. Based on images and video of the incident, that man is the same 
man who emerged from the Consulate grounds, kicked a protest banner, 
pushed down another protest banner, and then went back inside the 
Consulate grounds. After the incident, during an interview with Sky 
News, Chinese Consul-General in Manchester Zheng Xiyuan identified 
himself as having pulled protester Bob Chan's hair during the incident.
    \24\ Adam Parker, ``Chinese Consulate Attack: This Is What Really 
Happened,'' Sky News, October 21, 2022; ``Chinese Consul General in 
Manchester Admits to Pulling Hong Kong Protester's Hair,'' Radio Free 
Asia, October 20, 2022; Lily Kuo and Vic Chiang, ``Hong Kong Protester 
Dragged into Chinese Consulate in Manchester and Beaten,'' Washington 
Post, October 18, 2022.
    \25\ Adam Parker, ``Chinese Consulate Attack: This Is What Really 
Happened,'' Sky News, October 21, 2022, 1:00-2:25.
    \26\ ``Police Appeal for Video Footage after `Absolutely 
Unacceptable' Attack on Protester at Chinese Consulate in Manchester,'' 
Sky News, October 20, 2022.
    \27\ Greater Manchester Police, ``Investigation Underway after 
Assault of Man outside Chinese Consulate,'' October 17, 2022.
    \28\ Yuan Yang, ``Hong Kong Activists in the UK Fear the Long Reach 
of Police Repression,'' Financial Times, January 6, 2023.
    \29\ Yuan Yang, ``Hong Kong Activists in the UK Fear the Long Reach 
of Police Repression,'' Financial Times, January 6, 2023.
    \30\ Li Yuan, ``China's Protest Prophet,'' New York Times, December 
7, 2022; Gao Feng, ``Zhongguo duo di gongmin zhuanfa `Sitong Qiao 
kangyi shijian' zao jingfang koucha, shilian'' [Citizens across 
multiple locations in China detained and questioned by police, or go 
missing, after reposting about the ``Sitong Bridge protest''], Radio 
Free Asia, October 27, 2022; Tessa Wong, ``China Congress: How One Man 
on a Bridge Marred Xi Jinping's Big Moment,'' BBC, October 22, 2022; 
Yibing Feng, ``Beijing Banner Protest Ripples Outward as China 
Maintains Silence,'' Voice of America, October 20, 2022; `` `Bridge 
Man' Peng Zaizhou's Mission Impossible and His `Toolkit for the Removal 
of Xi Jinping,' '' China Change, October 19, 2022; Gao Feng et al., 
``Beijing Banner Protester Lauded as China's New Tank Man, or `Bridge 
Man,' '' Radio Free Asia, October 14, 2022. For more information on 
Peng Lifa, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 
2022-00176.
    \31\ See, e.g., Gao Feng, ``Zhongguo duo di gongmin zhuanfa `Sitong 
Qiao kangyi shijian' zao jingfang koucha, shilian'' [Citizens across 
multiple locations in China detained and questioned by police, or go 
missing, after reposting about the ``Sitong Bridge protest''], Radio 
Free Asia, October 27, 2022; Tessa Wong, ``China Congress: How One Man 
on a Bridge Marred Xi Jinping's Big Moment,'' BBC, October 21, 2022; 
Yibing Feng, ``Beijing Banner Protest Ripples Outward as China 
Maintains Silence,'' Voice of America, October 20, 2022; `` `Bridge 
Man' Peng Zaizhou's Mission Impossible and His `Toolkit for the Removal 
of Xi Jinping,' '' China Change, October 19, 2022; Gao Feng et al., 
``Beijing Banner Protester Lauded as China's New Tank Man, or `Bridge 
Man,' '' Radio Free Asia, October 14, 2022; Lili Pike, `` `Depose the 
Traitorous Despot': How China's `Bridge Man' Unleashed a Global Protest 
against Xi Jinping,'' Messenger, October 21, 2022; Li Yuan, ``China's 
Protest Prophet,'' New York Times, December 7, 2022.
    \32\ Jenny Tang, ``Overseas Solidarity with Beijing `Bridge Man' 
Protest Sparks Fears of Retaliation,'' Radio Free Asia, October 19, 
2022.
    \33\ Mia Ping-chieh Chen, Yitong Wu, and Chingman, ``Chinese Police 
Pressure Family of U.S.-Based Student over Support for `Bridge Man,' '' 
Radio Free Asia, October 21, 2022; Chen Pinjie, ``Zai Mei liuxuesheng 
loulian shengyuan `Sitong Qiao yongshi' Zhongguo jingcha zhaoshang 
jiaren'' [Student studying abroad in the United States shows face in 
solidarity with ``Sitong Bridge man,'' Chinese police seek out his 
family], Radio Free Asia, October 20, 2022.
    \34\ Lyric Li, ``China Clamps Down on `Zero Covid' Protests, 
Loosens Some Pandemic Measures,'' Washington Post, November 29, 2022; 
Eva Rammeloo, ``What Happened to the Man Who Led the Chants against Xi 
Jinping?,'' 1843, Economist, November 29, 2022; Jessie Yeung, ``China's 
Lockdown Protests: What You Need to Know,'' CNN, November 29, 2022.
    \35\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu 
Guojia Anquan Fa [PRC Law on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region], passed and effective June 30, 
2020, art. 38. For recent analysis on Hong Kong judges and the National 
Security Law, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, ``One 
City, Two Legal Systems: Hong Kong Judges' Role in Rights Violations 
under the National Security Law,'' May 2023.
    \36\ Yuan Yang, ``Hong Kong Activists in the UK Fear the Long Reach 
of Police Repression,'' Financial Times, January 6, 2023.
    \37\ Different sources use different terms to refer to these 
entities, such as ``overseas service stations,'' ``overseas police 
service stations,'' ``110 overseas'' (named after China's national 
emergency phone number), and ``bringing you close from afar, it's 110 
overseas'' (tianya ruo bilin, haiwai 110). See, e.g., Safeguard 
Defenders, ``110 Overseas: Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild,'' 
September 2022, 3, 10-11; Zheng Jiangluo, `` `Tianya ruo bilin, haiwai 
110,' Fuzhou gong'an anxia kuajing bianqiao fuwu `kuai jin jian'' [With 
``bringing you close from afar, it's 110 overseas,'' Fuzhou Public 
Security presses ``fast forward'' on services for overseas Chinese], 
China News, February 16, 2022. This chapter uses ``service stations'' 
as a shorthand for these various terms.
    \38\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Patrol and Persuade: A Follow-Up 
Investigation to 110 Overseas,'' December 2022, 5. These are the 
Nantong Municipal Public Security Bureau, Jiangsu province; Wenzhou 
Municipal Public Security Bureau, Zhejiang province; Fuzhou Municipal 
Public Security Bureau, Fujian province; and Qingtian County Public 
Security Bureau, Lishui municipality, Zhejiang.
    \39\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Patrol and Persuade: A Follow-Up 
Investigation to 110 Overseas,'' December 2022, 5; Safeguard Defenders, 
``110 Overseas: Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild,'' September 
2022. The December report supplements information in the September 2022 
report.
    \40\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Patrol and Persuade: A Follow-Up 
Investigation to 110 Overseas,'' December 2022, 20-21.
    \41\ Safeguard Defenders, ``14 Governments Launch Investigations 
into Chinese 110 Overseas Police Service Stations,'' November 7, 2022; 
Phelim Kine, Cristina Gallardo, and Joseph Gedeon, ``Why China's Police 
State Has a Precinct near You,'' Politico, April 19, 2023; Tom 
O'Connor, `France, Germany Probe China `Police Stations' after NYC 
Suspects Arrested,'' Newsweek, April 20, 2023.
    \42\ ``Britain Says China Has Closed Unofficial Police Stations in 
UK,'' Reuters, June 6, 2023.
    \43\ Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, ``Two 
Arrested for Operating Illegal Overseas Police Station of the Chinese 
Government,'' April 17, 2023.
    \44\ See, e.g., ``Gedi zuixin huiqiao jucuo chutai: sheji huanling 
jiashi zheng, she qiao jiufen deng'' [Latest measures benefiting 
overseas Chinese debut in multiple locations: involving renewing 
driver's licenses, disputes involving overseas Chinese, and more], 
Overseas Chinese Net, reprinted in China News, June 21, 2022; ``Hao 
xiaoxi! Zai Yidali Fuzhou ji qiaobaomen, Zhongguo jiazhao guoqi deng 
zhexie yewu bu yong huiguo jiu ke banli la!'' [Good news! Fuzhou 
residents abroad in Italy, you can now handle matters like expired 
driver's licenses without going back to China!], ITHome, March 30, 
2022; ``Fuzhou gong'an `haiwai 110' kaitong, Niriliya Beining cheng 
fuwu zhan qidong'' [Fuzhou public security opens ``110 overseas,'' 
service station, Benin City, Nigeria service station launched], Chinese 
Headlines Nigeria, January 23, 2022.
    \45\ People's Public Security News, ``Qingtian jingfang jiji dazao 
`Fengqiao jingyan' haiwaiban'' [Qingtian county police establish 
``Fengqiao Experience'' overseas], reprinted in Xinlan Network, 
Zhejiang Internet, Broadcast, and Television, May 23, 2019; Safeguard 
Defenders, ``110 Overseas: Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild,'' 
September 2022, 16.
    \46\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Patrol and Persuade: A Follow-Up 
Investigation to 110 Overseas,'' December 2022, 26.
    \47\ ``Cong Xibanya Madeli dao Qingtian `jian qiao zhi jia' quan 
fan zhui tao xianyi ren'' [From Madrid, Spain to Qingtian, the ``home 
for prosecutors and overseas Chinese'' persuades fugitive suspect to 
return], Zhejiang Daily, reprinted in Baidu, January 18, 2020; Lishui 
Municipal People's Procuratorate, ``Jian qiao zhi jia' hengkua Ou Ya 
9200 gongli shipin lianxian, chenggong quan fan fanzui xianyi ren'' 
[``Home of Overseas Prosecutors'' spanned 9200 kilometers across Europe 
and Asia in a video call to successfully persuade a criminal suspect to 
return], January 15, 2020; Safeguard Defenders, ``110 Overseas: Chinese 
Transnational Policing Gone Wild,'' September 2022, 16-17.
    \48\ Fuzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau, ``Pianzi' zai yiguo 
bei pian, guiqiao `heihu' cunbu nanxing, kuaguo zhiwu qinzhan nanban . 
. . qing lianxi `haiwai 110'!'' [Scammers in foreign countries scammed, 
`residence-less' overseas Chinese who returned can't move an inch, 
transnational business difficult to conduct . . . please contact ``110 
overseas''!], reprinted in China Peace Net, July 29, 2022; ``Fuzhou 
gong'an `haiwai 110' kaitong, Niriliya Beining cheng fuwu zhan qidong'' 
[Fuzhou public security opens ``110 overseas'' service station, Benin 
City, Nigeria service station launched], Chinese Headlines Nigeria, 
January 23, 2022.
    \49\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Patrol and Persuade: A Follow-Up 
Investigation to 110 Overseas,'' December 2022.
    \50\ ``Shengwei Changwei diaoyan de zhe ge `jingqiao liandong' 
daodi shi shenme'' [Provincial Party Standing Committee investigates 
``police and overseas liaison,'' what does it do, after all?], Nantong 
Municipal Public Security Bureau, reprinted in Jiangsu Belt and Road 
Portal, July 18, 2022, saved in archive.today, November 23, 2022.
    \51\ See, e.g., Safeguard Defenders, ``Involuntary Returns: China's 
Covert Operation to Force `Fugitives' Overseas Back Home,'' January 
2022, 12; Edward White and Victor Mallet, ``How Xi Jinping's Anti-
Corruption Crusade Went Global,'' Financial Times, February 22, 2022; 
Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of 
Justice, ``Countering Threats Posed by the Chinese Government inside 
the U.S.,'' January 31, 2022; Cholpon Orozobekova, ``Kidnapped by 
China: Beijing's Battle against Dissidents and Free Speech,'' Diplomat, 
October 7, 2016. In 2018, the Party's Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection authorized ``persuasion to return'' in the context of the 
PRC's international manhunts for corruption suspects. Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory 
Commission, `` `Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa' shiyi: Di liu 
zhang Fan Fubai Guoji Hezuo di wushi'er tiao'' [``PRC Supervision Law'' 
interpretation: Article 52 of Chapter 6--International Cooperation to 
Counter Corruption], July 4, 2018.
    \52\ Kristy Needham, ``Distribution of Chinese Funds by Solomon 
Islands PM Raises Questions,'' Reuters, August 25, 2022.
    \53\ Cleo Paskal, ``Former Malaita Premier (and Noted China Critic) 
Gets Bipartisan Support for U.S. Visa,'' Diplomat, April 1, 2023; 
Kristy Needham, ``Distribution of Chinese Funds by Solomon Islands PM 
Raises Questions,'' Reuters, August 25, 2022.
    \54\ Hoi Man Wu, ``Former Solomon Islands Official Ousted from Post 
`After Turning Down Chinese Bribes,' '' Radio Free Asia, May 2, 2023; 
Cleo Paskal, ``Former Malaita Premier (and Noted China Critic) Gets 
Bipartisan Support for US Visa,'' Diplomat, April 1, 2023.
    \55\ Steven Chase and Robert Fife, ``Trudeau Asks for Probe into 
CSIS Report China Targeted MPs,'' Globe and Mail, May 1, 2023; Steven 
Chase and Robert Fife, ``CSIS Head Tells MP Michael Chong That He and 
Family Were Targeted by China,'' Globe and Mail, May 2, 2023; Paul 
Vieira, ``Canada Expels Chinese Diplomat Following Alleged Threat to 
Conservative Lawmaker,'' Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2023; Yonette 
Joseph and Vivek Shankar, ``China Retaliates after Canada Expels Its 
Diplomat amid Interference Concerns,'' New York Times, May 9, 2023.
    \56\ Paula Newton and Caitlin Hu, ``Canada's Ex-Conservative Party 
Leader Says Chinese Misinformation Campaign Targeted Him in Last 
Election,'' CNN, May 31, 2023.
    \57\ Paula Newton and Caitlin Hu, ``Canada's Ex-Conservative Party 
Leader Says Chinese Misinformation Campaign Targeted Him in Last 
Election,'' CNN, May 30, 2023; ``Erin O'Toole: China Targeted Me in 
Election, Says 2021 Rival to Canada's Trudeau,'' Reuters, reprinted in 
Guardian, May 30, 2023.
    \58\ China Labor Watch, ``Trapped: The Belt and Road Initiative and 
Its Chinese Workers,'' November 22, 2022.
    \59\ China Labor Watch, ``Trapped: The Belt and Road Initiative and 
Its Chinese Workers,'' November 22, 2022, 2, 8.
    \60\ China Labor Watch, ``Trapped: The Belt and Road Initiative and 
Its Chinese Workers,'' November 22, 2022, 28-29; International Labor 
Office, International Labor Organization, ``ILO Indicators of Forced 
Labor,'' October 1, 2012; International Labor Organization, 
``Indicators of Trafficking of Adults for Labor Exploitation,'' 
accessed March 7, 2023.
    \61\ China Labor Watch, ``Trapped: The Belt and Road Initiative and 
Its Chinese Workers,'' November 22, 2022, 9-13, 15-17, 19, 21-22.
    \62\ China Labor Watch, ``Trapped: The Belt and Road Initiative and 
Its Chinese Workers,'' November 22, 2022, 58-61. See also Rachel 
Cheung, ``Workers Keep Dying at This Chinese Nickel Mining Company in 
Indonesia,'' Vice, February 7, 2023.
    \63\ China Labor Watch, ``Trapped: The Belt and Road Initiative and 
Its Chinese Workers,'' November 22, 2022, 58; Jack Hewson, ``China's 
Virtue Dragon Joins Indonesian Nickel Rush,'' Nikkei Asia, December 7, 
2016; China First Heavy Industries, ``Guanyu women'' [About us], 
accessed March 6, 2023; ``China First Heavy Industries (CFHI),'' China 
Daily, April 22, 2019.
    \64\ Rachel Cheung, ``Workers Keep Dying at this Chinese Nickel 
Mining Company in Indonesia,'' Vice, February 7, 2023.
    \65\ Damien Cave, ``China's Mad Dash into a Strategic Island Nation 
Breeds Resentment,'' New York Times, January 24, 2023.
    \66\ Damien Cave, ``China's Mad Dash into a Strategic Island Nation 
Breeds Resentment,'' New York Times, January 24, 2023.
    \67\ Fermin Koop, ``Latam NGOs Raise Concerns on Chinese 
Investments to U.N. Body,'' Dialogo Chino, March 17, 2023; 
International Service for Human Rights et al., ``China: Human Rights 
and Chinese Business Activities in Latin America,'' February 2023, 6, 
14, 24; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ``2021 
Report to Congress,'' November 2021, 214, 220, 228-29. The report lists 
13 Chinese companies and 6 Chinese financiers responsible for 14 
development projects in 9 Latin American countries. All of the firms in 
question are under the control and jurisdiction of the PRC government.
    \68\ International Service for Human Rights et al., ``China: Human 
Rights and Chinese Business Activities in Latin America,'' February 
2023, 6, 14, 24; Amazon Watch, ``U.N. Human Rights Committee Calls on 
China for Mechanisms to Investigate and Punish Harmful Activities of 
Its Companies and Banks Abroad,'' March 15, 2023; Fermin Koop, ``Latam 
NGOs Raise Concerns on Chinese Investments to U.N. Body,'' Dialogo 
Chino, March 17, 2023.
    \69\ International Service for Human Rights et al., ``China: Human 
Rights and Chinese Business Activities in Latin America,'' February 
2023, 6, 14, 24; Amazon Watch, ``U.N. Human Rights Committee Calls on 
China for Mechanisms to Investigate and Punish Harmful Activities of 
Its Companies and Banks Abroad,'' March 15, 2023.
    \70\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Zimbabwe,'' 
March 20, 2023.
    \71\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Zimbabwe,'' 
March 20, 2023.
    \72\ Human Rights Watch, ``The Costs of International Advocacy: 
China's Interference in United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms,'' 
September 5, 2017; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 
Annual Report (Washington: November 16, 2022), 355-56.
    \73\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``OHCHR 
Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, People's Republic of China,'' August 31, 2022; Emma Farge, 
``Exclusive: China Seeks to Stop U.N. Rights Chief from Releasing 
Xinjiang Report--Document,'' Reuters, July 19, 2022.
    \74\ Emma Farge, ``Exclusive: China Seeks to Stop U.N. Rights Chief 
from Releasing Xinjiang Report--Document,'' Reuters, July 19, 2022.
    \75\ Yuan Yang and Henry Foy, ``Under Tremendous Pressure': The 
Battle behind the U.N. Report on China's Xinjiang Abuses,'' Financial 
Times, September 14, 2022.
    \76\ Office of the U.N. High Commissioner of Human Rights, CEDAW--
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 85 Sessions (08 May 2023-26 May 2023), Country: China, Info from 
Civil Society Organizations (for the session), accessed April 2023. 
These organizations include the ACFTU Women Workers' Committee, Center 
for Human Rights Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
China Association for NGO Cooperation, China Association of Marriage 
and Family Studies, China Disability Research Society, China Ethnic 
Minorities' Association for External Exchanges, China Family Planning 
Association, China Population and Development Research Center, China 
Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, China Women Judges 
Association, China Women's University, China Women's Development 
Foundation, China Women's Research Association, Female Lawyers 
Association of the All China Lawyers' Association, Global Women's 
Development Institute of China Women's University, Human Rights 
Institute of Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Women's 
Law Research of Beijing Law Society, and Women's Studies Institute of 
China.
    \77\ Vincent Ploton and Sarah M. Brooks, International Service for 
Human Rights, ``China and U.N. Treaty Body System,'' December 2022, 15.

Additional Views of Commission Members

Additional Views of Commission Members

              XIII. Additional Views of Commission Members

           Additional Views of Chairman Christopher H. Smith

(joined by Senator Marco Rubio, Senator Tom Cotton, Representative Ryan 
                K. Zinke, and Representative Brian Mast)

    The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) 
maintains bipartisan unity with regards to documenting human 
rights abuses by the People's Republic of China (PRC). 
Nonetheless, some views do diverge, reflective of larger 
divisions on social and political issues in the United States.
    In the 2021 and 2022 reporting year, former Commissioner 
Senator James Lankford issued Additional Views, noting inter 
alia that the citation of non-binding recommendations of United 
Nations treaty monitoring bodies and independent experts divert 
attention away from the PRC's failure to meet its hard-law 
obligations contained in treaties duly ratified. Such concerns, 
which have not been addressed fully in this reporting year, are 
shared by those who join these Additional Views. Moreover, for 
avoidance of confusion, insofar as the report cites non-binding 
recommendations of the monitoring bodies for treaties ratified 
by the PRC but which the United States has declined to ratify, 
such recommendations are entirely without probative value with 
respect to discerning the United States' obligations under 
international law.
    Furthermore, the report continues to elevate 
disproportionately issues important to certain domestic, 
partisan constituencies, to the detriment of those Chinese 
citizens who suffer from the grossest violations of human 
rights. With respect to reporting on those who identify as 
members of the LGBTQ community, it is important to note that 
such individuals continue to have recourse to the judicial 
system, which, although flawed, allows them to adjudicate 
grievances, something which is denied members of disadvantaged 
groups, such as predominantly-Muslim Central Asians, including 
Uyghurs, Kazakhs and Kirghiz, and practitioners of religions 
that are persecuted by the Chinese Communist Party, such as the 
Falun Gong. Consistent with the overall crackdown on civil 
society organizations, on which we report, the space for 
organizations that fall under the LGBTQ umbrella is 
constricting. Individuals, however, are not imprisoned on the 
basis of their perceived sexual orientation, and social spaces 
still exist and are not subject to restrictions akin to those 
borne by members of religions that are unregistered or 
designated ``evil cults.''
    We also have concern that the reporting on this particular 
social issue, which remains controversial in the United States, 
will be used improperly to leverage certain positions in intra-
American debates. We remain particularly concerned at the use 
of an elastic ``non-discrimination'' principle that can be used 
to undermine freedoms that have been deemed fundamental since 
the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, in particular freedom of 
religion and freedom of speech.
    In terms of the next report, such imbalances must be 
addressed and resolved. In addition, there is a need to move 
away from a model which presumes that the PRC is moving towards 
adherence to a rules-based international order and instead 
provides a more clear-eyed assessment of its intentions as 
expressed through its actions.
    Thus we vote in favor of this annual report, with the 
inclusion of this statement.

                Additional Views of Senator Jeff Merkley
                    and Representative Jim McGovern

    Throughout its 22-year history, the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China (the Commission) has gained a reputation 
for producing accurate, thorough and well-sourced reporting on 
developments in human rights and rule of law in the People's 
Republic of China (PRC). The Commission's work products are 
cited by Members of Congress, executive branch policymakers, 
advocates and experts, and immigration lawyers supporting 
asylum claims of those fleeing persecution in China.
    The Commission's reputation for quality and integrity is 
due to the dedication of the hard-working, non-partisan 
Commission staff who are experts in their field. As former 
chairs of the Commission, we have seen this dedication first-
hand, and recognize that the positive contributions made by the 
Commission over the last two decades would not be possible 
without the staff's commitment to accuracy and faithful 
adherence to the Commission's mandate.
    This mandate requires the Commission to ``monitor the acts 
of the People's Republic of China which reflect compliance with 
or violation of human rights, in particular, those contained in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
[ICCPR] and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
[UDHR]'' and ``monitor the development of the rule of law in 
the People's Republic of China.''
    Throughout the Commission's history, the staff, guided by 
this mandate, have employed international human rights 
standards as the benchmark against which to assess the PRC 
government's behavior. To this end, they have looked to the 
places where such standards are codified, debated and 
adjudicated: United Nations conventions, treaties and 
declarations; UN treaty bodies including the Human Rights 
Committee, charged with monitoring compliance with the ICCPR; 
and the UN Human Rights Council. They rely on the work of 
international human rights practitioners, including UN special 
procedures mandate-holders, major non-governmental 
organizations and academic and legal experts on international 
human rights law.
    The respect that the Commission has commanded for the 
integrity of its work is due to its rigorous adherence to these 
standards - standards that are determined by international law 
independent of domestic political considerations.
    We are concerned that there are efforts underway to 
constrict or redefine the standards by which the Commission 
assesses the PRC's behavior, represented, for example, by the 
additional views submitted by a former Commissioner in the 
previous two annual reports of the Commission.
    One argument that has been made is that the Commission 
should focus on the most egregious human rights abuses by the 
PRC. But the Commission's mandate is framed by the UDHR which 
encompasses the full range of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights recognized internationally. The 
mandate provides no basis for the Commission to focus attention 
only on ``egregious'' abuses, the definition of which would 
inevitably be subject to debate and arbitrariness.
    A second argument is that the Commission's focus should be 
limited to the PRC's so-called ``hard law'' obligations, with a 
related complaint that it is inappropriate to cite UN treaty 
monitoring bodies and other independent experts whose findings 
are generally not binding.
    There are a number of problems with this argument and the 
related critiques, beginning with the fact that the UDHR is a 
declaration, not a treaty, and that the PRC has not ratified 
the ICCPR. If the Commission were limited to a ``hard law'' 
standard, it would thus put itself out of compliance with its 
own mandate and would be unable to assess China's behavior with 
regard to the two instruments specifically cited therein.
    Second, when a country ratifies a human rights treaty, its 
first obligation is to translate the treaty commitments into 
domestic law; that is how the commitments become justiciable. 
That the PRC often fails to do this is an obstacle to those 
commitments becoming ``hard law'' at the domestic level. It 
makes no sense to give the PRC a pass on compliance with its 
rights obligations because it actively chooses not to make 
those obligations justiciable.
    Third, in the absence of strong domestic laws to enforce 
rights obligations, victims' only recourse is to precisely 
those UN mechanisms - the treaty bodies and other independent 
experts - that some argue should not be cited at all. To adopt 
a ``hard law'' standard is to tell the people of China that 
they should not be able to seek remedy within the international 
human rights system when their own government denies them 
remedy under its own law.
    Taken together, the effect of these views would put the 
Commission in the position of explicitly instructing the PRC as 
to which human rights standards it is free to ignore. We do not 
believe that most Commissioners, much less the advocates and 
survivors we work with, think the Commission should be in the 
business of letting the PRC off the hook.
    A third argument is that the Commission's annual report has 
become a platform for arbitrating social and political issues 
that are contentious in the U.S., which were it true, should 
presumably be avoided. We concur. This is why adherence to 
international human rights standards is so critically 
important.
    This Commission has received expert testimony on the ways 
in which the Chinese government, under direction of the 
Communist Party, is attempting to change the definition of 
human rights to suit its own purposes and ideology. Just as the 
PRC must not be allowed to redefine human rights to its liking, 
neither should the United States.
    A clear example of the latter was the 2020 report of the 
``Commission on Unalienable Rights'' convened by the State 
Department under Secretary Mike Pompeo. That body, based on a 
particular and limited reading of U.S. history, posited a 
hierarchy of human rights that privileged property rights and 
religious liberty, a conception starkly different from the 
corpus of international human rights law developed through the 
UN system. The effect of the adoption of such a conception 
would be to posit that the discrimination suffered by a 
religious believer is legitimate while discrimination suffered 
by an LGBTQ person is not. This is tantamount to viewing human 
rights through the lens of domestic politics rather than the 
lived experience of people in China and elsewhere.
    It would be grave disservice, and a dereliction of duty, to 
people in China if the Commission were to take the position 
that the human rights that they should be able to enjoy are 
limited to those that some politicians in the United States say 
they are entitled to, rather than to the full range to which 
they are entitled to under international human rights law. Such 
a position would mimic the behavior of the Chinese Communist 
Party, and we reject it.

                Additional Views of Senator Dan Sullivan

    The Commission has produced a very valuable compendium 
highlighting abuses of universal human rights - as is its 
annual tradition. From Hong Kong to Xinjiang to religious 
liberty, the report establishes an excellent basis for 
congressional action. I will carefully consider the many 
recommendations for policy over the coming year.
    I have two primary concerns with the report:
    First, the Commission's statutory mandate singles out two 
United Nations documents against which to evaluate the state of 
human rights in China: the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
However, the report cites several additional UN conventions. 
These include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, none of which have been ratified by the 
U.S. Senate. All existed prior to the adoption of the 
Commission's creation in 2000, and Congress explicitly excluded 
them from consideration.
    It makes little sense to cite Chinese compliance with 
documents over which there is no consensus in the United States 
itself. Citing them implies the Commission's consent to their 
contents, something the Senate has not provided.
    Second, environment and climate change are not a part of 
the Commission's statutory mandate. This is for good reason, as 
they are not human rights issues. I appreciate the Commission's 
cooperation in modifying certain report language. However, 
there is no basis in the Commission's mandate to address 
emissions, the Global Methane Pledge, or any other 
environmental issue.
    Expanding the Commission's focus to additional areas beyond 
its statutory mandate risks opening it to an ever-expanding set 
of issues in an increasingly adversarial U.S.-China 
relationship. In turn, this risks drawing focus away from its 
critical focus on human rights.
    For these reasons, despite the fine work the Commission 
staff has put into this report and the vast majority of it with 
which I agree, I abstain from voting on this year's report.