[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SUPPORTING A DEMOCRATIC AND SECURE MOLDOVA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 12, 2023
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Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe
[CSCE118-4]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via www.csce.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-923 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION
U.S. HOUSE
U.S. SENATE
JOE WILSON, South Carolina Chairman BEN CARDIN, Maryland Co-Chairman
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee Ranking Member ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama Ranking Member
EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE LAWLER, New York THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
VICTORIA SPARTZ, Indiana
MARC VEASEY, Texas
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Department of State - to be appointed
Department of Defense - to be appointed
Department of Commerce - to be appointed
C O N T E N T S
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Page
COMMISSIONERS
Hon. Joe Wilson, Chairman, U.S. House from South Carolina........ 1
Hon. Mike Lawler, U.S. House from New York....................... 2
Hon. Ben Cardin, Co-Chairman, U.S. House, from Maryland.......... 3
Hon. Deborah Ross, U.S. House, from North Carolina............... 5
Hon. Marc Veasey, U.S. House, from Texas......................... 6
Hon. Steve Cohen, Ranking Member, U.S. House, from Tennessee..... 8
Hon. Emanuel Cleaver, U.S. House, from Missouri.................. 13
Hon. Richard Blumenthal, U.S. Senate, from Connecticut........... 14
Hon. Victoria Spartz, U.S. House, from Indiana................... 26
WITNESSES
Dan Bischof, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs............................................... 6
Igor Grosu, President of the Parliament of the Republic of
Moldova........................................................ 17
Doina Gherman, Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee of the
Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.......................... 23
Ambassador [ret.] William Hill, Global Fellow at the Wilson
Center......................................................... 20
SUPPORTING A DEMOCRATIC AND SECURE MOLDOVA
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY & COOPERATION IN
EUROPE,
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Wednesday, July 12, 2023.
The Hearing Was Held From 10:11 a.m. To 11:35 a.m., Room
2020 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC,
Representative Joe Wilson [R-SC], Chairman, Commission for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
Committee Members Present: Representative Joe Wilson [R-
SC], Chairman; Senator Ben Cardin [D-MD], Co-Chairman;
Representative Steve Cohen [D-TN], Ranking Member;
Representative Mike Lawler [R-NY]; Representative Marc Veasey
[D-TX]; Representative Emanuel Cleaver [D-MO]; Senator Richard
Blumenthal [D-CT]; Representative Victoria Spartz [R-IN] Other
Members Present: Representative Deborah Ross [D-NC].
Witnesses: Dan Bischof, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for European Affairs; Igor Grosu, President of the
Parliament of the Republic of Moldova; Doina Gherman, Chair of
the Foreign Relations Committee of the Parliament of the
Republic of Moldova; Ambassador [ret.] William Hill, Global
Fellow at the Wilson Center.
OPENING STATEMENT OF JOE WILSON, CHAIRMAN, U.S. HOUSE, FROM
SOUTH CAROLINA
Chairman Wilson: [Sounds gavel.] Good afternoon. On behalf
of the United States Helsinki Commission, I would like to
welcome everyone to be here today as we discuss the support for
the democratic and secure Moldova.
I am honored to pass the gavel to one of our newest
commissioners, a really special member who has a deep affection
for the people of Moldova. He likes them so much he married a
Moldovan, Okay? Let's make it really clear. [Laughter.] We are
really grateful that Michael Lawler of New York, who is been
very active and engaged as a member of the Helsinki Commission
and a powerful advocate for Moldova, within just a--for a just
and durable European security system. Mr. Chairman, I want to
thank you for your efforts in organizing the hearing. I will
now turn to Mr. Lawler for his opening statement before hearing
from our Co-Chairman, Senator Ben Cardin, all the way from
Maryland.
Mr. Lawler, the gavel is yours.
STATEMENT OF MIKE LAWLER, U.S. HOUSE, FROM NEW YORK
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Chairman Wilson, and
thank you, Co-Chairman Cardin, for your leadership on the
Commission and your roles in putting today's hearing together.
I am honored to take the gavel today. I am also honored to be
joined by my wife, Doina, who is here to listen to the hearing.
The purpose of this hearing is to discuss the significance
of Moldova's role in European peace and security. This small
country has an outsized importance in the regional dynamics of
Eastern Europe and has played a central role in standing up to
Russia long before Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine. This will be
a very important discussion, and I want to thank everyone here
for joining us today as we discuss a country and a set of
issues that is particularly near and dear to my heart. As
mentioned, my wife, Doina, was born in Moldova. She was raised
there. Her family still lives in a village called Mih'ileni in
the county of Shuldunest [ph]. I am lucky to have visited their
village and the country multiple times.
Through my family and my work in Congress, particularly on
the Helsinki Commission, the Foreign Affairs Committee, and my
co-chairmanship of the House Moldova Caucus, I am continuously
reminded of the powerful impact of the Moldovan people in
Europe and here in the United States. Just a little over a
month ago my wife and I were in Chicago for the 9 Annual
Moldovan-American Convention. We got to meet with President
Sandu, Ambassador Ursu, and many others, as well as our own
State Department officials and USAID, to discuss the important
relationship between the United States and Moldova.
Moldovans have been dealing with Russian aggression for
ages, let alone since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Moscow still maintains a military presence in the breakaway
region of Transnistria, and leveraging ethnic and language
differences, its economic weight and energy dominance to
control Moldova's future and deny its people the independence
they deserve. Like Ukraine, Moldova does not have the security
guarantees that come with NATO membership. Like Ukraine, the
country has fallen victim to Putin's imperial appetites and
vocal Soviet nostalgia.
Crucially, the Moldovan people have rejected this malign
agenda and courageously resisted Russian pressure and
blackmail. The election of President Maia Sandu in 2020, and a
reformist parliament in 2021, demonstrated loudly and clearly
that Moldovans wanted to move toward European integration.
President Sandu's Government has answered that call and
embarked on an ambitious reform agenda. We have seen real
progress in recent years, culminating in the European Union
granting the country candidate status in their quest for
membership. This is a tremendous achievement that might have
seen unthinkable only a few years ago.
Moldova has also stepped up to assist their Ukrainian
neighbors. Moldova has taken in more Ukrainian refugees per
capita than any other country in Europe and is actively working
to ensure these refugees have access to employment, education,
and more during their stay. They do so, despite Russia's
continued blackmail, threats, and energy embargos. Moreover,
the Kremlin continues to conspire through friends and proxies
to sow unrest in Moldova, undermine confidence in reforms, and
stoke economic dislocation.
They have done so in many other places. Russia believes
they can use Moldova's budding democracy against itself and,
once again, extend Moscow's empire of kleptocracy. We cannot
let this happen. We must work with our allies to support
Moldova's democratic reform agenda, anticorruption endeavors,
and security needs. We must bolster investment in Moldova's
economy and do what we can to ensure an imminent invitation to
join the European Union. Today's hearing serves as a platform
to explore how we can deepen the U.S.-Moldova partnership with
Moldova. We are privileged to have distinguished witnesses with
us today who will provide valuable insights into these pressing
issues.
Our first witness, Mr. Dan Bischof, the acting deputy
assistant secretary of State for European affairs, will provide
us with an overview of U.S. policy toward Moldova. He will shed
light on the specific ways the United States is showing support
for the Sandu administration and how we can continue to enhance
existing assistance.
The second panel of witnesses will include Moldova's
President of the Parliament Mr. Igor Grosu. He will underscore
the significance of U.S.-Moldova relations, highlight ongoing
cooperation on reforms, and shed light on the opportunities and
challenges that lie ahead. Accompanying President Grosu is
Doina Gherman, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee of the
Moldovan Parliament. I am sure we all appreciate Mr. Grosu and
Ms. Gherman's traveling to the United States to provide their
perspectives.
Last, we will have the privilege of hearing from former
Ambassador William Hill, an independent expert with deep
experience in Moldova, including as former head of the OSCE
mission there. Ambassador Hill's remarks will offer us valuable
recommendations as we navigate the complexities of supporting
Moldova's democratic aspirations and countering security
threats.
I thank all of you for your participation and look forward
to a rich and purposeful discussion here today. With that, I am
going to turn it over and recognize the Co-Chairman of the
Helsinki Commission, Senator Cardin, for opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF BEN CARDIN, CO-CHAIRMAN, U.S. SENATE, FROM
MARYLAND
Senator Cardin: Well, Chairman Lawler, first of all, thank
you very much for your work in helping to organize this
extremely important hearing of the Helsinki Commission, and to
Chairman Wilson for his leadership on this Commission. He was
extremely helpful to me when I chaired the commission in the
last Congress, and we work together on these issues. Today's
hearing is just another example of that bipartisan cooperation
that we have on the Helsinki Commission.
Representative Wilson and I just returned from Vancouver
for the annual meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. I
mention that because one of the major accomplishments of that
Vancouver conference was the Vancouver declaration that is
very, very strong in unity and support for Ukraine. We made
it--we make it very clear that there is no division among the
participating states that were there in Vancouver and our
strong support for Ukraine sovereignty, and doing everything we
can to make sure that Ukraine is successful.
We authored an amendment to that declaration in regards to
Moldova, to thank Moldova for what they have done in the war
effort in accepting refugees under extremely challenging
circumstances for their country. We talk about U.S. taxpayers
providing help to Ukraine, and we have. I think $75 billion in
military assistance to date. Countries like Moldova have made
tremendous sacrifices in dealing with welcoming the refugees
and being the front line to defend us against Russia's
aggression. We thank you very much for your help in regards to
the unity and making clear that we stand with Ukraine. We will
be there until there is total victory in protecting their
sovereignty.
It is been a long time since we have had a hearing in this
Commission on Moldova. The last one, I was told, was March
2020. That takes us back, of course, before the Russia
aggression in Ukraine, but also before COVID. It is nice that
we are all here together and can actually have a hearing in
person. Moldova has changed a great deal. As the chairman
indicated, they have elected a government that is reform
government, a Pro-West Government. We appreciate that. We
appreciate that they are taking on corruption, to fight
corruption in their own country. That they are on path, we
hope, for EU integration, with candidate status given in 2022.
That is an extremely positive step.
We have seen them strengthen their democratic institutions
in combating corruption. We are looking for how the United
States can strengthen that partnership, what we can do to help.
there is ways we can help you in sending a clear message
against those who are trying to prevent the type of democratic
reform. We have done that with some of our sanctions against
some of the former government individuals who abused their
power. We also can do that through economic and strategic
partnerships. I hope that we will have a chance to talk about
how we can build on those relationships during this hearing.
It is particularly nice to have fellow parliamentarians
here. It is nice to have an executive agency, but it is the
parliamentarians that we particularly can identify with. We
welcome you here, and we look forward to your testimony. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Co-Chairman Cardin.
Now, I will recognize the Chairman of the Helsinki
Commission Congressman Joe Wilson from South Carolina.
Chairman Wilson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our hearing today
is a rich and pointed discussion about Moldova, a small country
that has loomed large with its strategic position in Eastern
Europe, and what it has become to represent in democracy
struggle against war criminal Putin's aggression and malign
intent. Sadly, war criminal Putin is sacrificing young Russians
to death for Putin's personal benefit of oil, money, and power.
Moldova is on the frontlines of Putin's assault on the basic
fabric of European security and global world peace. It also
represents, sadly, an early indicator of, Russia's aggressive
intent toward the region as a whole. Like Ukraine and like
Georgia, Moldova has been torn asunder by Russian proxies and
held hostage by a web of economic interests, corruption, and
energy blackmail.
In this way, Moldova is another reminder of Moscow's
longstanding role as both Europe's chief arsonist and self-
appointed firefighter. In Moldova, it has done so, as in many
places, the Putin regime has created or exaggerated and
exacerbated problems, which it used to deepen its influence to
dominate its neighbors and breed corruption and servitude,
leaving no crisis behind. However, Moldova is also an example
of a country whose people have powerfully rejected Putin's
malign agenda. In electing President Maia Sandu and a
parliament of reformers, Moldova has moved at breakneck speed
toward democracy and its European destiny, winning, very
significantly, the European Union candidate status just last
year.
Meanwhile, it has flung its doors open to Ukrainian
citizens, demonstrating their country's incredible humanity
despite their own share of challenges. Moldova is important not
just because Putin seeks to harm it. Moldova is important
because it is a flashing reminder of how some countries in
Europe have been left open to Putin pillaging, which only
encourages Moscow to press further on its imperial agenda,
bringing us to this destructive invasion, and tragic, of
Ukraine. The United States must not ever allow that to happen
again in Europe. That is that European security should not be
divided into haves and have nots but should be inclusive and
protective especially of those at greatest risk, particularly
from Putin invasion and aggression.
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses
today on how we can support our Moldovan friends. It is
particularly meaningful to have our parliamentarians here. It
is just so inspiring to have you here and speak to the American
people and it just is heartwarming. God bless. With this, I
yield. I thank you for your attention.
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Chairman. I now recognize
Commissioner Cleaver for any opening remarks he may like to
give. Good? Okay. I will now recognize my Moldova caucus Co-
Chair Deborah Ross, for an opening remark.
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH ROSS, U.S. HOUSE, FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Representative Ross: Well, thank you so much, particularly
to Chairman Wilson and Co-Chairman Cardin, and Representative
Lawler for leading the hearing today, and for allowing me to
participate--since I am not an official member.
My home State of North Carolina has enjoyed a strong and
unwavering bond with Moldova, dating back to 1999. For example,
Moldova has been paired with North Carolina in the Department
of Defense's National Guard State Partnership Program for more
than a quarter of a century. As Co-Chairs of Moldova Caucus,
Representative Lawler and I have worked diligently to bolster
support for the country as it navigates a complex set of
challenges, and a dangerous one at that.
Moldova gained independence, as we all know, from the
Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, the country has faced
continuous threats from Russia--threats that have only been
exacerbated by Russia's unprovoked and unconscionable invasion
of Ukraine in February 2022. Moldova applied for EU membership
and was granted candidate status in June 2022. This is an
important step in the right direction. Representative Lawler
and I led a letter with support from 11 of our colleagues
asking Secretary Blinken and the State Department to continue
expressing support for Moldova's EU candidacy.
Moreover, we submitted an amendment to the NDAA that
supports Moldova's defense modernization with the help of the
United States. Today, President Sandu is working tirelessly to
make sure Moldova stays on the path of freedom and democracy.
The United States has a real responsibility to continue to
support her administration at this precarious moment.
Safeguarding Moldova's precious democratic institutions is
imperative if we are to help secure a more peaceful and
prosperous future for the Moldovan people. Thank you so much
for allowing me to speak. I yield back.
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Representative Ross.
I will now recognize Commissioner Veasey for an opening
remark.
STATEMENT OF MARC VEASEY, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TEXAS
Representative Veasey: Thank you very much. I am really
glad that we are here having this discussion today,
particularly as it centers around Moldova. This country is very
important in the scheme of things, particularly right now with
everything that is happening in the Ukraine, and Russia's
aggressions, and the statements that Russia has made about
various countries and about how Russian-speaking citizens are
being treated in those countries. We should take every threat,
and we should take every statement, we should take all of them
very seriously.
Moldova is obviously a country that is small and does not
necessarily have the largest defense budget and population,
like some other European countries. A lot of experts think that
if the Ukraine situation were not to go the right way, that
Moldova would definitely be next on Putin's list. When you hear
Putin say things and make statements saying that Gorbachev's
biggest mistake was not keeping the Soviet Union together, we
know that this is someone that thinks in historical terms. I
think it is all the more important that we are having this
hearing today. I look forward to learning more and appreciate
the Commission getting together to have this hearing. Thank
you. I am going to yield back.
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Representative Veasey.
At this time I will now recognize Mr. Bischof to provide
witness testimony for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAN BISCHOF, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Mr. Bischof: Well, good afternoon. I would like to thank
Chairman Wilson and Cardin, and Ranking Members Cohen and
Wicker for convening this hearing today. I appreciate the
opportunity to discuss the ways the United States is
demonstrating its support for Moldova's sovereignty, titorial
integrity, and continued democratic development. The Helsinki
Commission's active engagement with Moldova has been critical
in deepening our bilateral relationship.
Moldova's on the front line of our strategic priorities for
Europe--strengthening democracy, rule of law, enhancing
European energy security, and ensuring our continued unity in
standing up to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. With
the support of Congress, the administration has committed
approximately $628 million since February of last year to help
Moldova address the impacts of Russia's war, build political
and economic resilience, and deepen Euro Atlantic integration.
Moldovan voters sent a clear message in their 2020 and 2021
elections. They called for tangible progress on the country's
path to European integration, which means a renewed fight
against corruption and more accountable institutions enforcing
the rule of law. The United States has worked closely with
Moldova to advance these objectives. For example, the State
Department and USAID have supported Moldova's multistage effort
to increase justice sector transparency and integrity. U.S.
assistance to civil society is reinforcing its critical role
and working with the government to strengthen Moldova's
democracy, promote accountability, and advance an inclusive
human rights agenda.
Moldova's hard work was reflected in the European Council's
decision to grant Moldova EU candidate status last year. We
engage continuously with EU counterparts and member states to
align our support for Moldova as it moves toward EU accession.
On security, Moldova is investing in defense of its sovereignty
and titorial integrity, consistent with its constitutionally
guaranteed neutrality. The United States is committed to
supporting Moldova's military modernization along with efforts
to strengthen border security and law enforcement capacity.
U.S. Defense assistance to Moldova increased from $3.3 million
in 2021 to $29.6 million last year, and we have seen similar
investment increases through the EU's European Peace Facility.
In the economic and energy sphere, Russia's War against
Ukraine has caused deep shocks for Moldova, elevating inflation
and energy prices, and cutting off export markets. With
extensive U.S. and EU support, Moldova has connected its
electrical grid to the to the rest of Europe and began trading
gas in European markets for the first time, both critical steps
in reducing dependence on a Russia-controlled energy supply.
This administration, with the support of Congress, is
allocating an additional $300 million for Moldova's energy
security to offset energy shocks and drive long-term energy
security. We have also helped Moldova increase global
competitiveness in key sectors, such as tech and high value
agriculture, and unlock new opportunities in Western markets.
We greatly appreciate Moldova's continued generosity in
welcoming more than 860,000 refugees from Ukraine since
Russia's invasion in February of last year, more than 100,000
of whom are still there in Moldova, with many hosted in private
homes. The United States and international partners will
continue to support Moldova in addressing the immediate and
long-term impacts of the humanitarian crisis caused by Russia's
War against Ukraine.
Across these priorities, we continue to see Russia's
attempts to undermine Moldova's reform trajectory through
ongoing instability fomented by the continued presence of
Russian troops on Moldovan territory, energy coercion,
destabilization campaigns, and illicit financing of Kremlin-
controlled political entities. The United States has worked
with Moldova and our European partners to build Moldova's
resilience and counter Russia's malign efforts in the
information space.
Last, the United States remains committed to supporting
OSCE-led efforts to promote a peaceful, comprehensive, and
lasting settlement of the Transnistria conflict at the OSCE and
beyond, we will continue to call on Russia to fulfill its
longstanding commitments to withdraw its troops and munitions
from Moldova, where they remain entrenched without Moldova's
consent.
As President Biden said earlier this year, the United
States is proud to stand with President Maia Sandu and the
freedom-loving people of Moldova. The United States will
continue to advance Moldova's democracy, prosperity, and
security as we support the Moldovan people in building their
chosen European future. Thank you again for your time today,
and I look forward to your questions.
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Mr. Bischof.
I want to recognize my colleague and the ranking member of
the Helsinki Commission, Congressman Cohen, to give some
opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF STEVE COHEN, RANKING MEMBER, U.S. HOUSE, FROM
TENNESSEE
Representative Cohen: Thank you, Mr. Lawler. I apologize
for being a little bit late, I had to get a passport to get
over here from Rayburn. Also a tour guide. [Laughter.] A very
unusual spot for us to have a hearing.
I appreciate your remarks, sir. Moldova's important to
America and to democracy. It is also, unfortunately, important
to Russia, which desires to fulfill Peter the Great's ambitions
through his successor in interest, Mr. Putin and Moldova's just
the next step after Ukraine, in his mind. The best way we can
protect Moldova is to protect Ukraine. If Russia retreats or
finds a reason to enter into a treaty which ceases hostilities
with Ukraine, Moldova will be secure. If Russia for some reason
wins, Moldova is in danger. I am sure Poland, and Lithuania,
and Estonia, and Latvia will be as well. Finland and Sweden,
for Mr. Putin's desires have no limits.
His desires are such that they extend into the afterlife,
and the hope that he will be right up there with Lenin. The
sooner the better. That he will be remembered as Peter the
Great part two. We have to support democracy throughout the
world. NATO does that. The United States has done a great job
with seeing that Sweden was permitted in. I am sure President
Biden had much to do with Mr. Erdogan's decision, which I was
very pleased to see as a Co-Chair of the Turkey caucus that
Turkey stopped its hold on Sweden's entry into NATO and agreed
to it, so NATO's gotten stronger. That is good for Moldova, and
it is good for the world.
Moldova has had problems in the past, but they are
eliminating corruption, or trying to, and have more democratic
society. That is important that they do that. When they were so
close to being under the thumb of the Soviet Union, it is
natural that they would have problems with corruption because
that is kind of the stock and trade of the Soviet Union, it
was, and then Russia. They deal in corruption as a way of life.
That is what they have done with the oligarchs.
That was the most mainlining of corruption in--probably in
the world of the last couple--200 years. Divvy up the country
to your friends. Give them all these riches. The idea that you
are doing something good for the country, which you are not, of
course. I appreciate being here. I always appreciate being in
the same room with Mr. Wilson, who has given me the opportunity
to visit Cannon 210, that I never seen before and probably will
never see again. With that, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Ranking Member.
At this time, I will afford myself 5 minutes to ask
questions. Mr. Bischof, I have long believed that if Russia was
successful in its war against Ukraine, they would not stop
there. That countries like Moldova would be next on their
target list. I believe, in addition to supporting the Ukrainian
people and their government in defending their sovereignty,
that this war goes well beyond that and is about ensuring that
our allies in Eastern Europe, writ large, are able to ensure
their own sovereignty. What--does the administration agree with
that assessment and line of thinking? If so, how has that been
taken into account during deliberations about the war in
Ukraine?
Mr. Bischof: Perhaps I will talk a bit about Russia in
Moldova and the concerns that we have there, because I think
you bring up a very important point. One thing we have heard
from our Moldovan friends is that if we want to help Moldova,
we do need to help Ukraine. I think that is an important
starting point for what we do.
That said, as we have said since Russia started as its
unprovoked unjustified full-scale invasion of Ukraine last
year, we have not seen an immediate military threat by Russia
against the Republic of Moldova. Russia's violations of
Moldovan airspace, however, to launch missile attacks on
Ukraine are an unacceptable risk and demonstrate blatant
disrespect for Moldova's sovereign territory. Now, we are
firmly committed to supporting Moldova's constitutional
neutrality as well as sovereignty and its territorial
integrity.
We are taking the following measures to support Moldova in
countering the threats from Russia, including upping our
security assistance from 3.3 million dollars 2 years ago to
29.6 million dollars last year. We are actually developing--
excuse me--deploying a cyber defense adviser to the Ministry of
Defense in Moldova and strengthening critical infrastructure
protection. We know we are getting support from allies via NATO
defense Capacity Building Initiative that was mentioned in
today's communique that came out from NATO, which is also good.
Also, we are working on border and internal security to address
emerging threats. We have provided approximately $30 million
for border security assistance.
We do have--besides for the military threat, we do have
concerns about Russian disinformation and their efforts to
destabilize Moldova. Russia's had a long history of malign
influence both in Moldova and in the region. We have worked
closely with Moldova to build its resilience and to counter
longer term efforts by Russia to undermine their democratic
institutions. On June 5, we designated seven leading members of
a Russian intelligence-linked malign influence group for their
role in the Russian Federation's destabilization campaign and
continued malign influence campaigns in Moldova. We are
confident in the Moldovan Government's ability to manage this
challenge as we continue to share information with them to
inform their response.
Representative Lawler: As Moldova seeks EU status that
would certainly, you know, improve their economy and their
security, as a member of the EU, I think obviously when we look
at the situation in Ukraine, when we look at other parts of the
world, the Indo Pacific, shared economic prosperity is critical
to ensuring peace. I think, obviously, for a country like
Moldova, which has taken in over 800,000 refugees--they have
about 2.6 million people living there currently. It is--the
future of their economy is critical. What are we doing, what is
the State Department doing, what is USAID doing to help improve
investment in Moldova, particularly as it relates to trade
diversification and their agricultural and wine industries?
Mr. Bischof: Well, thank you for that question. I think
you, again, bring up an excellent point about EU accession. We
are fully supportive of Moldova's EU aspirations and the
reforms that are necessary inside of Moldova before it is able
to accede to the EU. We have talked about the European Council
granting its candidate status last year. The EU recommended
nine priority actions for Moldova to complete to advance that
integration, including steps on combating corruption and
justice reform, public administration and financial management,
and promoting human rights.
Moldova seeks to open accession talks by the end of this
year. Ultimately, that is a decision for the EU and the member
states. Our underlying assistance is helping Moldova implement
the reforms that will benefit its EU accession. I think that is
perhaps the single best thing we can do to help Moldova economy
and trade is to complete these reforms.
Representative Lawler: Appreciate it.
My time is expired. I will now recognize Chairman Wilson
for 5 minutes.
Chairman Wilson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, I am very
happy to point out how smart Congressman Lawler is to marry
over his head a Moldovan. We have shared family heritage in
that regard. As we are showing our appreciation for the people
of Central and Eastern Europe, my oldest son was smart enough
to marry a Polish American. Over and over again, we could say
that we appreciate Central and Eastern Europe, but the American
relationship is so strong and it is exciting too that we have
just been joined by the Ambassador from Romania and members of
the national assembly. The extraordinary relationship between
the two great countries of Moldova and Romania so strong, and I
always like to point out my hometown, the sister city of
Columbia, South Carolina, is Cluj Napoca in Transylvania,
Romania. There is contact, after contact, after contact.
With that in mind, what is the situation? Aside from direct
military action, what is the most likely avenues that Russia
poses to the people of Moldova? How can the United States
contribute to mitigating the risk and enhancing the security of
the people of Moldova?
Mr. Bischof: Thank you for that question. It is nice to see
our Romanian friends. I think Moldova may have no better friend
than Romania. It has been a privilege to work with my
counterparts inside the Romanian embassy since I have taken on
this role.
To answer your question, I think that for years, as we have
talked about, Russia has supported influence and
destabilization campaigns in the region which involve
weaponizing corruption to further its goals. Russia has pushed
its narrative by supporting influence agents. It simultaneously
takes advantage of corruption to advance its own interests. We
have worked closely with Moldova to build the resilience, as I
mentioned, and to counter longer-term efforts. We have
designated seven leading members of a Russian intelligence-
linked malign influence group. That is extremely important. We
are, again, confident in the Moldovan Government's ability to
manage the challenge.
I would like to talk a little bit about energy security,
however, because I think that is also important. We have
supported Moldova's efforts to diversify away from Russian
energy supplies. There has been significant progress. With--you
know, with Congress assistance, we have set aside $300 million
in energy-related assistance, including money for budget
support, development of high-priority electric power generation
projects, and 85 million dollars to improve Moldova's
capability to procure energy supplies from alternative sources.
I think this weaning off of cheap Russian energy sources is
also something extremely important the United States can
continue to do to support Moldova and to separate from Russia.
Chairman Wilson: I am glad you mentioned energy because
Romania has become a real leader in promoting small modular
reactors, clean energy, and in fact we will be--Americans could
be copying Romania and following the Romanian path to re-
achieving energy independence because of small modular
reactors. In fact, obviously we like Romania so much that we
copied their name, Transylvania, as part of the region I
represent. We have to acknowledge that it was Transylvania was
first in Romania, not in North and South Carolina. We still
claim it.
With this in mind, was your assessment of Moldova's
progress since the Party of Action and Solidarity has come to
power? Could you highlight some of the notable achievements or
the positive developments?
Mr. Bischof: It has been a real pleasure to work with
President Maia Sandu and her administration. We have fully
supported Moldova's democratic reform agenda and the priorities
that she and her administration have outlined. This is
reflected in the substantive increase of U.S. assistance,
including $628 million since February of last year. We have
also seen a real uptick in the number of visits that we have--
high level visits--including President Sandu's meetings with
President Biden and Vice President Harris, as well as visits to
Moldova by Secretary Blinken, Administrator Power, Ambassador
Thomas-Greenfield, among others.
On their accomplishments, they have certainly laid out an
ambitious political and economic reform agenda. We are engaged
across all reform priorities. There is a multistage effort
underway to improve integrity and transparency in the justice
sector and to combat corruption, including reforms to the
electoral code in line with recommendations by OSCE ODIHR and
the Venice Commission. As well as passage of legislation to
improve protections against gender-based violence, as well as
countering discrimination and hate-based crimes. We are working
closely with the government, as well as civil society, to press
for continued progress to improve protections for vulnerable
communities, including women, Roma, the Jewish community,
persons with disabilities, and LGBTQI+ persons.
Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much for your service.
Again, it is so exciting to see the progress of the country of
Moldova. We wish the best for the people of Moldova, and how
thoughtful they are for the people of Ukraine. I yield back.
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Chairman Wilson.
I will now recognize the Co-Chair of the Moldova caucus,
Representative Ross, for 5 minutes.
Representative Ross: Thank you so much. We have talked
about the increase in defense spending and assistance for
Moldova, and that it is increased to $29.6 million. What
actions has the State Department taken to make sure that this
funding is used constructively? Are there benchmarks for future
funding?
Mr. Bischof: Well, thank you for that question. I think,
because I also cover Ukraine, you know, our concerns about
assistance are always there. We intend always to be good
stewards of the taxpayer dollars. If you all permit me to take
back that question and get you a more detailed answer about the
sort of benchmarks we are looking at going forward as well as
the safeguards that we have in place.
Representative Ross: That would be great. I have another
question. How can Congress better support Moldova's
humanitarian efforts to assist the Ukrainian refugees?
Mr. Bischoff: It is certainly been such a good news story,
you know what Moldova has done. I think the whole world is
grateful for that. As we have talked about, more than 860,000
refugees were welcomed to Moldova. More than 100,000 are still
there. I think we are all extremely impressed with their
management of this unprecedented wave of refugees. I think
perhaps the most impressive thing of all is that many of them
are in private homes or with families. This is a testament
really to the generosity and humanity of the Moldovan people.
We have provided $96 million in humanitarian assistance, the
U.S. has, through international humanitarian organizations, to
help with refugee relief efforts, address immediate response
needs, and promote longer-term integration. I think that is a
need that will not go away. I was recently in Berlin, and I met
with some of our locally employed staff out of our embassy in
Kyiv, who have relocated to Germany. Obviously, the conditions
in Ukraine are not quite right for many Ukrainians to go back.
I think that is one area where we will continue to need to help
other countries.
Representative Ross: My final question, we have in North
Carolina quite a strong relationship with Moldova, and on the
defense side, and as far as cultural exchanges, and also
economic exchanges. We are now engaging in some training of
local elected officials through our university system. You
know, the Federal Government does not have to do everything.
Are there things that our State Governments can do to help when
we have this strong relationship with Moldova?
Mr. Bischof: That is also an excellent question. The State
Department recently has stood up an office that does more,
like, state-and city-level diplomacy as ways to put people
together. I would like to touch base with that office and come
back to you with some concrete ideas on things we can do.
Suffice it to say North Carolina is famous for your
relationship with Moldova. It is something that is deeply
appreciated.
Representative Ross: Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Representative Ross.
We will now recognize Commissioner Cleaver, for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF EMANUEL CLEAVER, U.S. HOUSE, FROM MISSOURI
Representative Cleaver: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being with us today. We are witnessing, I
think, a valiant effort by the Ukraine to enter into the United
Nations [sic; NATO]. I think our State Department, president
are all moving in the right direction. Moldova also wants to be
a part of the EU, and probably they would like to join in
something that would create--may create some additional
problems for us, and that is NATO. What do you think we, the
United States, should do with Moldova wanting to have EU
membership? I think they have candidate status. Is the next
step going to create more problems with Russia becoming nervous
about their borders?
Mr. Bischof: It is a challenging question. Obviously, we
are fully supportive of Moldova's EU aspirations. You mentioned
the candidate status from last year. We know that the EU has
recommended nine priority actions for Moldova, and we think
they are making good headway on them. We also see our
assistance to Moldova as directly helping them prepare for that
EU accession. It is a more difficult question to say on Russian
reaction. I would say that we are firmly committed to assisting
Moldova in this effort and their Euro-Atlantic integration.
That will not change.
Representative Cleaver: Now, there the predominant language
is Romanian? I ask because, of course, Putin has the philosophy
that if they speak--if anybody speaks Russian on a street
corner, the Nation belongs to Russia. Where does Russian fit
into the language community in Moldova? Percentage wise, if you
have that.
Mr. Bischof: I am not aware of how widely spoken Russian is
inside of Moldova. I will probably ask that the follow-on main
star of the hearing answer that question. I think he is
probably better positioned than I am. I am--I think that the
influence of Russia certainly is there. There are--that is
something that causes us concern.
Representative Cleaver: My concern is whether or not there
is an area in Moldova that is Russian, right? Primarily
Russian.
Mr. Bischof: Yes. Okay, so maybe perhaps we could talk
about Transnistria for a minute, if that is Okay? Just to say
we firmly support Moldova's sovereignty and territorial
integrity. On that basis, we support the OSCE-led 5+2 process
to find a comprehensive, peaceful, and lasting settlement that
would allow for special status for Transnistria within a
territorial hole in sovereign Moldova. We continue to encourage
Chisinau now and Tiraspol to work together to identify
solutions to pressing concerns of communities on both sides of
the Dniester River.
We are pleased to see the sides continuing to meet to
discuss these concerns. We support the critical role of the
OSCE mission to Moldova in advancing the settlement process.
That said, we recognize that under the current circumstances,
the 5+2 format faces challenges. Ultimately, it is up to
Chisinau and Tiraspol to identify a suitable political solution
that--excuse me--that respects Moldova's sovereignty and
territorial integrity. That is Transnistria. Apologies for--
Representative Cleaver: Thank you.
Representative Lawler: Thank you. Thank you, Commissioner.
I would just note, under my experience, most people in Moldova
are able to speak both Romanian and Russian. In addition, many
can speak French. That is generally what is taught in the
schools. My wife speaks Romanian, Russian, French, and English.
I speak English for anybody counting. [Laughs.] With that, I
will introduce Commissioner Blumenthal, senator from
Connecticut, for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, U.S. SENATE, FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for convening this bipartisan hearing into a very,
very important topic. Moldova certainly is of strategic
importance, although many Americans--I am tempted to say most
Americans--do not appreciate how important it is. I apologize
if I am going to be repeating some of what you may have already
said.
I am interested in knowing what the degree of infiltration
is by Russia in terms of numbers of troops. I understand the
energy sources have been largely separated. Militarily and
economically, what is the degree of Russian influence,
infiltration, perhaps dominance in some areas?
Mr. Bischof: Since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine
last year, we have not seen any immediate Russian military
threat to Moldova. Obviously, we are in constant communication
with our Moldovan counterparts, and to the extent possible we
share information with them on a regular basis. There has been
violations of Moldovan airspace by the Russians to launch
missile attacks, which is an unacceptable risk and demonstrates
blatant disrespect for Moldovan sovereign territory. We are
firmly committed to supporting Moldova as its--as it has its
own constitutional neutrality, but also its own sovereignty and
territorial integrity. I think that the greater challenges we
have are their malign influence, Russia's malign influence and
destabilization efforts, which they have done for years.
Senator Blumenthal: Those destabilization efforts would
consist of disinformation and cyber? Maybe you can elaborate a
little bit.
Mr. 1Bischof: Sure. On that, mostly what we see are in they
involve weaponizing corruption to further its own goals. Russia
pushes its narrative by supporting influence agents and
simultaneously takes advantage of corruption to advance its own
interests. As I said, it is had a long history of this malign
influence both in Moldova and across the region. We have worked
very closely with our Moldova counterparts to build resilience
among them and to counter these longer-term effects by Russia
to undermine the democratic institutions.
Senator Blumenthal: In terms of airspace, do they have any
realistic way to stop the Russians? How important strategically
is it for the Russians to be using that airspace for their
missiles?
Mr. Bischof: I think perhaps in this venue, there is only
so much I can say. I would be happy to come and brief
separately on that for you. I think as far as the violations of
airspace, I probably ought to leave it there for now.
Senator Blumenthal: Is that an area where the United States
should be more directly involved?
Mr. Bischof: I think that we are doing what we can on the
airspace issue. I think, again, this might be better for a
separate venue.
Senator Blumenthal: In terms of corruption, I know you have
talked about this before, is there more that the United States
can be doing to help? I know that we are providing help in
anticorruption measures, but is there more that we can be
doing?
Mr. Bischof: Absolutely. You know, the best part is that we
are partnering with a country that has this as a priority, to
fight against corruption. They have made significant progress.
Our Bureau of INL and USAID are supporting Moldova's multistage
vetting process to improve integrity within the justice sector,
including prosecutors, judges, and their oversight bodies. This
process has occasionally encountered vested interests seeking
to maintain the status quo, but Moldova continues to implement
the necessary reforms.
We have also seen progress and Moldova's ability to
investigate and prosecute high-level corruption, while
safeguarding the independence of its judiciary. Moldova has a
small but robust civil society and independent journalists.
They continue to actively engage the government on reforms.
Then finally, in the financial sector, Moldovan authorities
continue to implement measures to increase financial sector
oversight and transparency in line with its IMF reform program
and international standards.
Senator Blumenthal: Am I correct in saying that the
Russians store ammunition in Moldova? I noticed that Ambassador
Hill makes a reference--or nearby in the region?
Mr. Bischof: If it is Okay with you, sir, I will take this
question back and provide you a separate answer.
Senator Blumenthal: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Commissioner Blumenthal.
Now, I will recognize Commissioner Veasey for 5 minutes.
Representative Veasey: Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary,
I know that the United States has imposed sanctions on several
Moldovan oligarchs, but for some reason the former president
Dodon has not been subject to any sanctions. Can you explain
why he would not be subject to sanctions?
Mr. Bischof: It is a difficult question. We do not
typically preview sanctions. We are continuing to work with our
interagency colleagues from the State Department, with other
agencies to consider all the tools that we have, including
sanctions and visa restrictions, in order to promote
accountability and support Moldova's capacity to hold corrupt
actors accountable. I think you probably recall last fall in
October we designated two fugitive oligarchs, Vladimir
Plahotniuc, and Ilan Shor, along with a larger group of
individuals and entities, for their involvement in corruption
and Kremlin-linked efforts.
Following what we did, other countries--the U.K., EU, and
Canada have announced similar designations against corrupt
actors threatening Moldova's democracy. Then on May 30 of this
year, the EU imposed restrictive measures including asset
freezes and travel bans on seven individuals under a newly
established regime targeting people responsible for actions
aimed at destabilizing, undermining, or threatening the
sovereignty and independence of Moldova.
I share this to show you we are leading the way on this,
and we are also working with likeminded countries to go after
those people who are fomenting these things inside of Moldova.
This is something--sorry to--and you may hear this from the
speaker. It has been completely welcomed by the Moldovan
Government. They celebrated this when it happened last fall. It
was a major bilateral success.
Representative Veasey: You talked about the military, you
know, help that they need. You talked about the energy security
piece, which is obviously very key, particularly when they were
bad Russian--when there are bad European winners. Is there any
other thing that needs to be done that can really help Moldova
sort of mitigate some of the risks that they have with being so
close to Russia?
Mr. Bischof: I am just double checking my notes to see,
because, you know, the key areas that I came in that I wanted
to share with you were the anticorruption reforms, I think we
have discussed that, energy security and diversification,
extremely important. Third is the security assistance. You
mentioned that. Then finally, what were--we have done and what
we are continuing to do on refugees. I think those are perhaps
the four main areas that I would focus on as we go forward. We
are making good progress. Moldova is making great progress on
these things. I would like to continue to work on those.
Representative Veasey: Are they doing enough, as it relates
to social media and other sorts of manipulation in that area?
Mr. Bischof: I know that we are working with civil society
groups to improve the way that information is presented. Your
detailed question on social media, I would need to get back to
you on that.
Representative Veasey: Okay. Okay. Then also too, because
you you have mentioned Transnistria several times. What is your
sense of what the average person there ultimately wants?
Because I think that because of the sort of peculiar situation
of where they sit, and, of course, how they can ultimately
affect Moldova's overall security, that is a very sensitive
area. When people there say that this is what they ultimately
want to see, exactly what is it? Can you give us a sense of
that?
Mr. Bischof: It is a challenging question. I think that
there is a significant human rights situation in Transnistria
that bears talking about. De facto authorities continue to
restrict fundamental freedoms and hold political prisoners.
Progress on human rights in Transnistria is a critical piece of
Moldova's reform progress, and it is imperative for their
future EU accession. Obviously, the State Department regularly
engages on political prisoner cases, pressing for release and
encouraging our colleagues in Chisinau to prioritize the work
of public authorities focused on improving human rights in
Transnistria. So I think, you know, by way of answer to your
question, I think the people there want what all people want.
They want freedom and the ability to have the right to speak.
We are quite concerned about the human rights situation there.
Representative Veasey: Yes, yes. No, thank you. I am almost
out of time. Thank you.
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Commissioner Veasey.
Oh, one follow-up question on Commission Veasey's line of
questioning with respect to Ilan Shor, who is currently in
Israel. Has the State Department done anything with respect to
seeking extradition to Moldova?
Mr. Bischof: It is a difficult question for me, because I
am not able to comment on ongoing law enforcement matters. This
is exactly the kind of question I can take back and give you a
separate answer on, sir.
Representative Lawler: I would appreciate a separate
answer. Thank you.
With that, I want to thank our witness, Mr. Bischof, for
his testimony. That concludes panel one. We will now welcome
our guests here from Moldova for panel two. I would ask that
Mr. Grosu and Ms. Gherman and Mr. Hill join us at the witness
table.
All right. Well, thank you for joining us here today. I
will now ask Mr. Grosu to provide his testimony and give him 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF IGOR GROSU, PRESIDENT OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Mr. Grosu: Honorable Chair Lawler, honorable Members of the
Congress, distinguished audience, thank you for organizing this
discussion. It is important for us to talk about the essence of
events occurring in Eastern Europe, in particular in the
Republic of Moldova. It is a country that has been for almost 1
year and a half in close proximity of a brutal war in which
thousands of innocent people are dying, and which forced
millions of Ukrainians to flee their homes. Today, Ukraine is
fighting to keep us safe, to keep Europe safe. Ukraine needs
our assistance.
From the very first day of the invasion, Moldova joined the
international community in condemning the war of Russian
Federation against Ukraine and requesting the immediate
cessation of aggression. The Republic of Moldova, a country
with less than 3 million people, sheltered more than half a
million of refugees who fled the war. At the peak of the
influx, our country's population increased by 4 percent. About
more than 80,000 refugees have chosen to further stay with us.
At the invitation of Mr. Stefanchuk, Chairman of the
Verkhovna Rada, I personally visited Kyiv and its suburbs
Bucha, Irpin. What I saw there can only be called a genocide.
Peaceful men, elders, women, and children killed in their homes
just because they had the pride to call themselves Ukrainians.
When Russia started the war against Ukraine, all our states
institution worked hard to keep the peace. We did our best to
ensure that all the citizens of Moldova, including those living
in the separatist Transnistria region, continue to live in
peace.
While we are struggling to keep the peace, our economy and
our society bear the weight of Russian war against Ukraine. The
high price of natural gas and the Russian attempt to weaponize
gas and oil supply triggered an unprecedented energy crisis. We
were blackmailed by Kremlin people in the middle of winter,
that we would freeze and have no electricity because of our
position on the war. We resisted.
The United States of America, the European Union member
states, stood by us. We have light, heating, and a safe
tomorrow. We managed to get rid of the Kremlin natural gas
blackmail and we strengthening energy independence of the
Republic of Moldova. For the first time in our history, we are
able to procure gas the advantage and in the interest of our
citizens. Also for the time, we made stocks that provides gas
during the winter. The government set up in record time the
fund for the reduction of energy vulnerability, which provides
support for the most vulnerable citizens. Our friends, the
United States of America, Romania, European Union, Germany,
France Sweden, extend loans, grants, and direct budgetary
support to help Moldova overcome the energy crisis this winter.
This war has disrupted logistic chain throughout the
region. We adapted in record time together with colleagues from
Ukraine and Romania. We relaunch the traffic on the Berezino-
Basarabeasca railway station, through which the connection with
the port in Romania is ensured. We facilitated the transit of
thousands of shipments by providing a green corridor for them.
The floating bridge over the Prut River, Leova-Bumb'ta, was
built in no time. It is the first new bridge over the Pruit
built since the country's independence by Republic of Moldova
and Romanian brothers. We are grateful to USAID for supporting
the border crossing infrastructure.
Moldova become the first non-EU country to join the
connecting Europe facility, the most important instrument for
building infrastructure projects in the European Union. We
synchronized European electric transmission network, ENTSO-E,
and started the construction of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau
overhead power line. The internal security hub was established
and the EU partnership mission was launched, which will further
help strengthening resilience and maintaining public order in
combating threats in differen--of different nature.
Ladies and gentlemen, all this time we have faced a wide
spectrum of hybrid threats from disinformation and propaganda
to cyberattacks and energy pressure. Kremlin, through its
servant in Chisinau, is doing everything to divide us, to make
us argue with each other, to make us weak in the face of
threats. With the support of Congress and United States
administration, by introducing sanctions against Kremlin's main
agents, the threats from individuals contributing to the
destabilization of the domestic situation have been eliminated.
At the initiative of the President Maia Sandu, the Center
for Strategic Communication in Combating Disinformation, to be
created--is to be created. This information has been--this
institution has been especially--has been especially designed
to fight propaganda coming from Moscow, propaganda from outside
because we know how extensive the implications of this
disinformation can be. While the action that we have undertaken
so far have not been enough, now everyone understand how
serious this subject is. Some countries have already been
successful in combating propaganda. We will learn from these
countries. We suspended the broadcast licenses of six TV
stations that misinformed or manipulated public opinion.
We no longer want to be part of structures and agreements
that have no value. The presence of the Republic of Moldova in
the Commonwealth of Independent States structures did not and
does not bring any benefit to Moldovans. After one of the
founding countries of Commonwealth Independent States, the
Russian Federation, barbarically attacked another founding
State, Ukraine, occupying its territories and killing its
citizens, this organization can no longer be called a
commonwealth. Therefore, during the current parliamentary
session we initiated the procedure for withdrawal of the
Republic of Moldova from the agreement of the Inter-
Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent
States. We are considering withdrawing from many more
agreements. We will denounce everything that goes against our
national interest.
Despite the crisis that befell Moldova, we started making
changes in the most important areas. We firmly and loudly
declare both at the authorities and citizens level that we see
the future of Moldova in the great European family. We intend
to advance on the complex path of European integration. The
efforts to transform the country are focusing on the justice
system reform and the fight against corruption. These are the
key commitment of the government I represent, and we will see
them through. We are determined to have honest judges and
prosecutors, as evidenced by the vetting process that we are
now in full swing. Our country was damaged due to the weak and
corrupt judicial system. Therefore, a total cleaning and reset
of the justice system was indeed needed.
All this systematic reform to improve the functioning
system of the market economy bring us ever closer to our
aspiration to bring Europe home to the Republic of Moldova. We
are working to fulfill the nine recommendations of the European
Commission intended to consolidate the rule of law and to
prepare our integration into a single European market. The
assistance provided by the United States was crucial to advance
our goal, especially during these challenging times. We are
extremely grateful for your support and for the trust you have
in Moldova transformation. We would like to especially comment
on the effort of the U.S. Congress in bolstering our resolve to
consolidate democracy, improve the living standards to our
citizens. Through this joint efforts, we will manage to restore
our peace--to restore peace in the European continent, promote
democratic values, integrate European future for the Republic
of Moldova. Thank you.
Representative Lawler: Thank you. President Grosu.
I now recognized Ambassador Hill for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM HILL, AMBASSADOR, GLOBAL FELLOW AT THE
WILSON CENTER
Mr. Hill: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
Lawler, Chairman Wilson, and other members of the Commission, I
want to thank you for the opportunity to testify on Moldova, a
subject to which I have devoted a substantial I have developed
a deep affection. It is also a great pleasure for me to return
to the Helsinki Commission. I first worked with commissioners
and staff in 1985, and have consistently come back and worked
with the Commission, met frequently over the succeeding four
decades. It is always, always great to be back here and to
contribute to your work.
I have already submitted written testimony, which I request
to be accepted into the record. In my oral remarks today, I
would like to emphasize and elaborate a few points from this
testimony. The key thing, as you have heard, Moldova today
faces grave threats, no argument. The war in Ukraine is
terrible. At the same time, there are unprecedented
opportunities.
Russia's expansion of the war, the massive attack on
Ukraine in February 2022, upended both of the regional and
global political and security order. The war has had a
particularly great effect in this respect on Moldova. For a
time, Moldova had a realistic fear that Russian troops in
southern Ukraine would reach the Moldovan border. The most
immediate military threat has passed. The Moldovan military is
dealing with effects of the war, such as missiles--stray
missiles, or missiles intentionally traversing its airspace,
but--and is responding to that with U.S. assistance that should
be continued. I welcome that. Hundreds of thousands of
Ukrainian refugees have been either given passage, and over a
hundred thousand are still being sheltered in Moldova despite
the strain this has put on Moldova.
Moldova's relations with Russia have deteriorated markedly
since February 2022 despite President Sandu's efforts when she
came into office to create a decent and stable working
relationship. This is because of the war in Ukraine certainly,
but there are other factors. Historically, Russia has sought to
ensure a friendly, pliable government in Chi'in'u by its
influence and support for the breakaway Transnistrian region.
Transnistria is not an aim in itself for Russia, but a means to
an end of controlling all of Moldova.
Since 2014, Russia has not really been able to supply
people--resupply people or physical goods to Transnistria, so
they have begun to work through other means such as energy or
political destabilization in Moldova. Since October 2021,
Russia has manipulated both supply and price of natural gas to
Moldova. Moldova is a hundred percent dependent--or has been--
was a hundred percent dependent on Russia for its energy. This
is changing. It is difficult, and what has happened because of
the difficulties in finding new supplies, prices for energy
have gone up sometimes 10 times more in Moldova. This has
resulted in unhappy consumers and political discontent, and it
is a real threat to the regime--to the current administration,
excuse me, in Chi'in'u, and the U.S., I believe, should do
everything it can to help meet the immediate threat of high
energy prices as well as the longer-term process that Speaker
Grosu has described of finding alternative sources and building
infrastructure.
Russia has also injected itself into domestic politics in
Moldova. I will cite only two instances--there is just not
enough time to go into all of the details--but Russia has
centered on the 'OR Party, the smaller of the two opposition
parties represented currently in Moldova's parliament.
Members--parliamentarians from the 'OR Party have been up in
Petersburg and Moscow consulting with the Russians, and the 'OR
Party has helped organize and lead massive protests against
economic and energy, you know, prices in Moldova during the
past winter. This relationship continues.
In Gagauzia, as elsewhere, Moscow takes advantage of real
economic problems--the autonomous region of Gagauzia--takes
advantage of real economic problems and legitimate social,
economic, and political aspirations to try to seek political
destabilization and change in government in Moldova. These
Russian efforts can and are being countered, but this creates
problems and diverts the attention of the Moldovan government
from other, you know, key things that they are trying to do.
Finally, Transnistria--over three decades Moldova has been
best known internationally for the separatist problem, the
separatist conflict that has remained unresolved with the
Transnistrian region. Without going into the complicated
history of efforts at seeking a political settlement, just let
me say that I believe the war in Ukraine has opened a window
for making real progress on bringing Transnistria back into
Moldova.
Transnistria today is very different from the Soviet quasi
--the Soviet region that it was when it broke away from Moldova
in 1990-92. Left Bank businesses, enterprises on the Left Bank
have been really integrated into Moldova's economic and legal
space through the EU Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
instituted in 2015. They register in Moldova, they operate
according to Moldovan law. They are inspected by Moldovan
Customs.
Transnistria--the Sheriff conglomerate in Transnistria has
a football team that is in the European Champions League. They
have no real desire to go back to Russia and--to Russia for
these things.
Local authorities and--many local authorities, elites on
the Left Bank, irrespective of what they might say or show in
public, are not supportive of Russia's war in Ukraine, and see
the war as a real threat to the security and stability of their
own region and their livelihoods. Now Transnistria still
receives support from Russia economically. There are 1,500,
1,600 Russian troops in Transnistria; about a quarter of those
are so-called peacekeepers. The rest are guarding one large
base that has about 20,000 metric tons of old Soviet-era
ammunition there. An equally significant problem is a large
number of civilian officials sprinkled through Transnistrian
civilian and security institutions. The Moldovan Government--
not just this one, but every Moldovan Government since
independence has asked the Russians to withdraw their troops,
and the Russians continue to fail to do that. They should do
that right away.
The larger question--it is going to take a while to deal
with the Russian influence that remains, I have spent a lot of
time in Transnistria. I lived in Moldova for 7 years during two
terms as the OSCE head of mission, and I would say today, more
than ever, the vast majority of citizens living in Moldova's
Transnistrian region desire the same things as their
counterparts on the Right Bank. They want peace, stability, and
the possibility, the capability of pursuing prosperity.
The war in Ukraine has shaken--although not totally
eliminated--a considerable degree of popular faith in the
region in Russia. This, I believe, creates a real opportunity
to convince, for, you know, international and Moldovan domestic
efforts, to convince Left Bank elites and citizens that their
way forward is to be found in and with--together with Chi'in'u.
I think that the U.S. should join in international efforts and
in supporting Moldova in the effort to make progress on this
score.
I have not mentioned corruption at all, which is the main--
the main point of this government. They are making progress,
but it is going to take a lot of time, so they are going to
need support in the anti-corruption efforts, rooting they are
concentrating on the judiciary and prosecutors, but money
laundering--massive money laundering from Russia through to
Europe was a problem over the last decade, and they are working
on that, too, in terms of the banking, insurance, and
securities industries. There are results, but these efforts are
going to take time to show really lasting changes.
Consider our own experience. It took 40 years or more to
deal with the Cosa Nostra and to root them out of American
life. These things do not happen at once.
The Moldovan is dedicated to anti-corruption and European
integration. These are goals that we should and must help them
pursue because Moldova is a key element in the changes in
Europe and the region, and it is a key element in Ukraine's
success, too.
I will just close. Twenty years ago I helped eliminate over
500 Russian Soviet-era tanks, armored personnel carriers, and
heavy artillery from Moldova's Transnistrian region. Imagine
what the front behind Odessa would look like if those things
were still there. This was largely because of U.S. assistance
and working through the OSCE. We need to continue these efforts
--bilaterally, with the OSCE, with the EU, other international
bodies in order to help Moldova make it through this time of
challenge and achieve their aspirations in joining Europe,
fighting corruption, and bringing Transnistria with them in
this.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and all of the commissioners for
this opportunity to appear before you today and to express
these views. Thank you.
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Ambassador. I would just
let members know we have about 20-plus minutes or so for
questions, so we will try to move expeditiously.
Mr. Grosu, since the election of President Sandu and the
change in power in the legislature that followed suit, leaving
your party in the majority, things have certainly changed in
Moldova, and in my opinion, for the better.
What are your priorities as speaker that the parliament is
currently working on?
Mr. Grosu: Thank you, Chair. For this year, immediate
priority, I say for--not only for Moldova but for Ukrainian
also --is to be able to fulfill all the recommendations that we
see from the European Union, and at the end of the year, to be
able to receive the opening of the negotiation for European
integration.
It is crucial, it is strategic for our--for both countries,
and of course, it will encourage those big part of the society
that desire to be a part of the European Union. The role of the
parliament is a crucial one because it is a place where we vote
the laws, but it is also the place where we explain to the
people, yes, for all meetings from the parliament, why we
promoting this reform or that reform, especially the justice
reform. The justice reform is core reform in our European path
because it took other sectors like investment, or climate, or
social protection, health--it is directly dependent on the
progress in justice reform.
Thank you for United States position--tough position, and
you was the first country that applied the sanctions against
oligarch and those who work in partnership with Russian
Federation, trying to destabilize the political situation,
paying for protests, trying to corrupt the politicians, and we
have, fortunately, the politicians that are corrupted by the
Russian Federation.
One of them now is sentenced already for 15 years. We are
speaking about Shor--he is now in Israel. We have to continue
because the people--Moldavian people, what they are waiting
for, they are waiting for justice.
Representative Lawler: Have you received, with respect to
Mr. Shor, has there been any dialog with the government in
Israel with respect to extradition?
Mr. Grosu: The last information that we have is we sent it
to the Israeli authorities--all needed updated documents after
the final decision of the appeal court, now are looking for the
actions of Israeli authorities.
Representative Lawler: Very good. Ms. Gherman, given the
focus on accession to the EU, and your role as chair of the
foreign relations committee of the Parliament, what work are
you focused on with respect to strengthening the relationships
within the EU and really helping advance the cause with respect
to accession to the EU?
STATEMENT OF DOINA GHERMAN, CHAIR OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Ms. Gherman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,
dear friends of Moldova.
First of all, I would like to thank you, and we are really
grateful for your strong commitment to support Moldovan people
and Moldova's European path. Of course, today our country's
efforts are concentrated around the national project of
European integration. It is our first priority, and we are
working hard on those nine recommendations formulated in the
opinion of European Commission.
Also, there is a second important process, mainly on the
platform of committee on foreign affairs and European
integration, and it is about the key--[inaudible]. We have
already created all those 35 needed groups accordingly to their
recommendations, working hard. We do not seek for shortcuts. We
know that it is a hard and long path, but we are really
optimistically looking ahead, and it is a unique challenge. We
are just living historic times now in Moldova.
It is not about only the will of the political class, of
the presidency, or government, or parliament. It is the will
and the choice of the majority of the citizens of the Republic
of Moldova. A real example in this sense, it was the National
Assembly of European Moldova on the 21 of May, about 80,000
people joined in the center of capital in Chi'in'u and just
declared hard that our path--Moldova's path is European and
that our place is in the European Union.
Representative Lawler: Thank you. Now my time has expired,
so I will now recognize Chairman Wilson for 5 minutes.
Chairman Wilson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, President
Grosu and Chairwoman Gherman and Ambassador Ursu, being here
with you today is a dream come true. I had always hoped that we
would have the opportunity to meet with leaders of a free and
democratic Moldova in Central and Eastern Europe, and so it is
so exciting to be here with you.
Then it is also exciting to be joined by Congresswoman
Victoria Spartz. She was born in the Soviet Union, and now she
is a champion for her birthplace, Ukraine. It--who would
imagine that something like this could occur, and particularly
for me. I campaigned in high school for U.S. Senator Barry
Goldwater of Arizona who was running for president, and he
championed Why Not Victory--liberation of his ancestral home,
Poland, and Central and Eastern Europe. To see this come to
life, and then--flash forward--I had the opportunity to be an
election observer in 1990 in Bulgaria, and so it was so
exciting. When I got there, it was stepping back to the 1930's,
and things that I could identify. I used to pump gas, and so a
service station in Bulgaria at that time looked like an
outhouse with a pump out front, and I would have not known what
it was but there were a line of cars a mile long because there
was no gas. Then I found out they were not cars; they were two-
stroke motorcycle engines with plastic covers. Now when I go
back to Bulgaria, it is a Circle K with a Wendy's.
Then I am very excited to see the number of people who
drive X5s there in Bulgaria, and we want the same in Moldova,
and that is the X5s BMWs are made in South Carolina, and we
want everybody in Moldova to have one. I think that is real
important.
How far things have come, and with that, actually--and,
hey, you should be aware, too, this is bipartisan. I was so
happy Congresswoman Ross pointed out the program--the State
partnership program. The National Guard has a wonderful
program, and I am so grateful to know that North Carolina,
which has great professionalism, is working with you.
With that in mind, what other specific areas can the United
States provide what resources to promote democratic
institutions and overall resilience to face the threats--and
for each of you, and Mr. President, and Chairwoman.
Mr. Grosu: Thank you. I would say that, first of all, in
order to help us, please continue to help Ukraine. This is the
most--the crucial approach, and please do the best you do and
continue to help our neighbors that are fighting for our
liberty, they are fighting for liberty of Europe, entire world.
In case of Moldova, of course there are areas that are
very, very important for us in energy security, despite the
fact we managed this--those last two winters to protect our
infrastructure, to protect our citizens, our industry. We
understand that we have to invest, to continue to invest and to
diversify the sources of energy, to invest in renewables, so
please, we would like to strengthen this sector.
Defense sector--yes, we are a neutral country, which is
mentioned in our constitution, but in case of neutral
countries, they have in a double manner to invest in the
defense, and we saw how fragile is the security, especially the
protection of aerospace. We already in the process of
strengthening our defense capacity, aerospace protection. We
benefit from the cooperation of United States and also of
European Peace Facility.
The last--but not the least--it is the business
environment. We understand that it is hard to promote the
investment climate, to improve the investment climate due to
the security reason, but this is the core sector that will
allow us--beside the security issues--to increase the people
living conditions, and they trust in our European integration
path.
Thank you.
Chairman Wilson: Madam Chair?
Ms. Gherman: In fact, today Moldova is the most vulnerable
neighbor of Ukraine, and this unjust war has led to significant
security challenges, many crises--economic, energy sectors--but
despite all these crises, Moldova has resisted in the last
year.
It is about giving hope to our citizens, and the
consolidation of the whole society around the project of
European integration is a priority for us as a parliamentary
majority, as a governing party. It is extremely important now
to continue to support our neighbors and friends, Ukraine, and
we strongly believe that Ukraine will win, and together with
Ukraine--Moldova and Ukraine.
My appeal to each of one is not to uncouple Moldova from
Ukraine because a safe Ukraine is a safe Moldova, and a safe
Ukraine is a safe Europe. Just please continue to be with us,
and continue to support as well as Ukraine's and Moldova's.
Chairman Wilson: Best wishes for continued success. I yield
back. Thank you.
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Chairman Wilson. I now
recognize Representative Ross for 5 minutes.
Representative Ross: Mr. Chairman, since Congresswoman
Spartz has not had an opportunity to speak, and I have spoken
quite a lot, and the hour is getting late, I will yield all of
my time to her, and thank you.
Representative Lawler: Thank you.
STATEMENT OF VICTORIA SPARTZ, U.S. HOUSE, FROM INDIANA
Representative Spartz: Thank you. I really appreciate it.
Well, I will try to be brief. Thank you for being here, and I
understand the challenges you have, so I will just kind of
quickly just get to the questions. I apologize if you already
covered this question.
I think, Mr. Grosu, this question for you. You know--and I
know--I think Ambassador mentioned that it is important to have
lasting changes; you know, it is changes that is actually
structural changes when you deal with issues of corruption and
really strengths of--of weakness of democratic institution. It
is been a problem. It is over 30 years as opposed--so the
country still struggles with that.
Can you give me three examples of some of the concrete
reforms, structural reform you are doing in your judicial
system, electoral system, or your financial system
transparency--just specific legislation, give me examples that
you make sure that you actually address it?
Mr. Grosu: Thank you. Speaking about the justice reform,
like Ukraine, we applied--how to say-- an ordinary--not an
ordinary approach of preventing the judges--those who candidate
for superior courts.
Representative Spartz: Do you have your judges elected or
are they appointed?
Mr. Grosu: Well, we have all them--all those eight that are
already in the superior court of magistracy, they are passing
through this process of--
Representative Spartz: What about the downstream, you know,
like a local and other judges? Do you elect judges or are they
actually appointed by president?
Mr. Grosu: We will continue with this process with other
judges--all judges. They have to pass through this process.
Representative Spartz: What is this process? You start
electing or you appoint--because I see the problems--
Mr. Grosu: No, no, no.
Representative Spartz: What is your process? Are you
changing--
Mr. Grosu: No, they are not elected by the voters. They are
appointed--
Representative Spartz: Who is it that actually appoint
them?
Mr. Grosu: The new composition of the Superior Council of
Magistracy--those who pass the pre-vetting, this--
Representative Spartz: Who appoints this council?
Mr. Grosu: A part was appointed by the parliament, no
judge--those who are no judges was appointed by the parliament.
They represent the civil society, they are coming from the
civil society, and the judges, they are appointed by general--
Representative Spartz: They are reevaluated--are they
reevaluated?
Mr. Grosu: They are appointed by general assembly of the
judges from the Republic of Moldova.
Representative Spartz: They are reelected every few years
or--
Mr. Grosu: No, they have a mandate--
Representative Spartz: Well, just one thing, and I do not
need to get--I see the problems a lot of time why there is
centralization of power happen in a lot of former republics
because there is so much at executive level central government
appointment of prosecutors and judges. I do not want to get in
details, but it is very--if you want to have--you know, look,
we have a lot of judges, prosecutors selected at different
levels, and voters have some input.
You know, what about your lateral system? Are you looking
at some of financial systems, specific laws where you improve
in framework to have more stability?
Mr. Grosu: Speaking about electoral system, political
system, let's say, we have proportional system, and in our
opinion, the corruption is coming the most--the region of
corruption is coming from the political parties.
Representative Spartz: Are people elected by party lists,
or they actually represent you like here?
Mr. Grosu: That is why we invested in the Central Electoral
Commission that should be very careful and, yes, have enough
capacity to monitor and evaluate how the parties are financed,
how they spend--
Representative Spartz: I see big problems, and I am not
going to--you know, but a lot of time when there is a party
list, a lot of countries--and I am just saying I do not
understand your system. People start serving the party versus
in United States. I do not care sometimes party does not like
me, and I am very outspoken, but as long as my voters like me,
I get elected. It is important, that input and connection. I
just wanted to share with you some of the observations that I
have seen in a lot of Post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine.
They have huge challenges with that, too.
What about financial system and transparency? What are you
trying to do there?
Mr. Grosu: Yes. Yes, yes. We improved the bank ownership
transparency, so all the owners of--that have a--yes, they
participated to playing in the banking system, they have to
prove who they are, how they get the money, yes, and how
transparent is the sector. We improved the capacity of national
bank, and those who could not--or was not able to argue the
origin of the money, so we took--the national bank take it.
Representative Spartz: Yes, it is very important. I am
just--I am not--I have only got 15 seconds left, but I just
kind of wanted to share my observation.
Ms. Gherman--I am not sure if I say your name correctly--
just quickly from you from Transnistria situation, you know,
are you doing something to deal with the situation? It was so
cold, peacekeeper contentions are still existing there because
this is not a big issue, but as Ambassador said, it is an
opportunity.
Are you taking any steps as the government to resolve this
situation because I think Moldova has an opportunity to become
strong country, but has to deal with that situation?
Ms. Gherman: Yes, thank you for the question. Of course,
the message is the same. We request to withdraw the troops from
the Moldovan territory. We are consequent, but still now
concentrating all our efforts on European integration. We
believe that we cannot just put together the process of the
European integration and the Transnistrian conflict, so there
are two different processes, and two different terms of period.
Representative Spartz: Well, I think my time has expired.
Thank you.
Representative Lawler: Thank you, Commissioner Spartz.
I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today. It is
an important conversation to have. The United States and the
relationship with Moldova is critical to me, on a personal
level, but certainly to our countries it is important to see
Moldova continue to do the work that has been done in recent
years to reform, to address the corruption that had gone on in
prior administrations, to take on the oligarchs, to continue to
grow the economy, to address the energy challenges, and
certainly, to continue to build those relationship with the
European Union. I think the accession into the EU is critical
for Moldova's future. Obviously, the relationship with Romania
has been very strong, and we thank the Romanian Government for
continuing to be a strong ally to Moldova. Certainly we want to
see a free and prosperous Moldova moving forward. I appreciate
your testimony, I appreciate the work that all of you are
doing. Ambassador, thank you for providing your insights into
Moldova and the conflict in the region, as well as obviously
some of the historical view on Transnistria,
Again, thank you for this valuable testimony. With that, we
will conclude this hearing, but I thank you very much on behalf
of the Helsinki Commission for coming here and participating in
this hearing today. [Sounds gavel.]
[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the hearing ended.]
?
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Additional Submissions for the Record
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Additional Submission for the Record
______
STATEMENT OF DANIEL R. BISCHOF DIRECTOR FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Good afternoon! I would like to thank Chairmen Wilson and Cardin
and Ranking Members Cohen and Wicker for convening this hearing today.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the ways the United States is
demonstrating its support for Moldova's sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and continued democratic development. The Helsinki
Commission's active engagement with Moldova has been critical in
deepening our bilateral relationship.
Moldova is on the frontline of our strategic priorities for
Europe--strengthening democracy and rule of law, enhancing European
energy security, and ensuring our continued unity in standing up to
Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.
With the support of Congress, the Administration has committed
approximately $628 million since February 2022 to help Moldova address
the impacts of Russia's War, build political and economic resilience,
and deepen Euro-Atlantic integration.
Moldovan voters sent a clear message in their 2020 and 2021
elections. They called for tangible progress on the country's path to
European integration which means a renewed fight against corruption and
more accountable institutions enforcing the rule of law. The United
States has worked closely with Moldova to advance these objectives. For
example, the State Department and USAID have supported Moldova's multi-
stage effort to increase justice sector transparency and integrity.
U.S. assistance to civil society is reinforcing its critical role in
working with the government to strengthen Moldova's democracy, promote
accountability, and advance an inclusive human rights agenda.
Moldova's hard work was reflected in the European Council's
decision to grant Moldova EU candidate status in 2022. We engage
continuously with EU counterparts and member states to align our
support for Moldova as it moves toward EU accession.
On security, Moldova is investing in defense of its sovereignty and
territorial integrity--consistent with its constitutionally guaranteed
neutrality. The United States is committed to supporting Moldova's
military modernization, along with efforts to strengthen border
security and law enforcement capacity. U.S. defense assistance to
Moldova increased from $3.3 million in 2021 to $29.6 million in 2022,
and we have seen similar investment increases through the EU's European
Peace Facility.
In the economic and energy sphere, Russia's War against Ukraine has
caused deep shocks for Moldova, elevating inflation and energy prices
and cutting off export markets. With extensive U.S. and EU support,
Moldova has connected its electrical grid to the rest of Europe and
begun trading gas in European markets for the first time--both critical
steps in reducing dependence on a Russia-controlled energy supply.
This Administration, with the support of Congress, is allocating an
additional $300 million for Moldova's energy security to offset energy
shocks and drive long-term energy security. We also have helped Moldova
increase global competitiveness in key sectors--such as tech and high-
value agriculture--and unlock new opportunities in Western markets.
We greatly appreciate Moldova's continued generosity in hosting
more than 700,000 refugees from Ukraine since February 2022, over
100,000 of whom are still there, with many hosted in private homes. The
United States and international partners will continue to support
Moldova in addressing the immediate and long-term impacts of the
humanitarian crisis caused by Russia's War against Ukraine.
Across these priorities, we continue to see Russia's attempts to
undermine Moldova's reform trajectory through ongoing instability
fomented by the continued presence of Russian troops on Moldovan
territory, energy coercion, destabilization campaigns, and illicit
financing of Kremlin-controlled political entities. The United States
has worked with Moldova and our European partners to build Moldova's
resilience and counter Russia's malign efforts in the information
space.
Last, the United States remains committed to supporting OSCE-led
efforts to promote a peaceful, comprehensive, and lasting settlement of
the Transnistria conflict. At the OSCE and beyond, we will continue to
call on Russia to fulfill its longstanding commitments to withdraw its
troops and munitions from Moldova, where they remain entrenched without
Moldova's consent.
As President Biden said earlier this year, the United States is
proud to stand with President Maia Sandu and the freedom-loving people
of Moldova. The United States will continue to advance Moldova's
democracy, prosperity, and security as we support the Moldovan people
in building their chosen European future.
Thank you again for your time today. I look forward to your
questions.
MOLDOVA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM H. HILL, GLOBAL FELLOW WOODROW WILSON
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
I wish to thank the Helsinki Commission, in particular Chairman
Wilson and Co-Chairman Cardin, for this opportunity to address the
dramatic changes in the region, posing both existential threats and
rare opportunities for the Republic of Moldova. Russia's aggression and
expansion of the war in Ukraine has upended the regional and global
political and security orders. The Russian advance toward Odesa in the
spring of 2022 and the flow of hundreds of thousands of refugees from
Ukraine into and through Moldova tested the capacity of Moldova's
society and government and threatened the very existence of the
Moldovan State. Moldova's Government and people responded bravely and
generously to these challenges.
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
The most immediate threats posed to Moldova by Russia's war in
Ukraine have receded somewhat, but the effects of the war on Europe's
political and security order have provided real opportunities for
Moldova. The European Union officially declared Moldova a potential
candidate for membership, and Chisinau has now met three of the nine
conditions set by Brussels for opening membership negotiations. Russian
political interference and manipulation of natural gas supplies and
prices have inflicted hardships on Moldova's population and government,
but have also opened a possible path to ending Moldova's total
dependence on Russia for its energy. Finally, the political and
economic upheaval created by the war in Ukraine offers opportunities
for further progress in integrating the Transnistrian region into
Moldova's social, economic, and political structures, against the
background of a regional geopolitical reorientation.
Moldova was already in the midst of a fundamental social and
political transformation before the geopolitical crisis caused by
Russia's massive attack on Ukraine in February 2022. President Maia
Sandu was elected in November 2020 on a platform calling for an all-out
fight against Moldova's massive corruption as the key element in
movement toward integration with Europe. President Sandu's Party of
Action and Solidarity [PAS] won a decisive victory in July 2021
legislative elections, obtaining a comfortable working majority in
parliament. Since then, President Sandu and her government have been
engaged in continuous efforts to root out and replace corrupt
officials, especially in the judicial system, and to mitigate the
effects of almost a decade of a captured State.
These efforts are showing some modest success, but will take time.
The prospect of EU membership, along with continued support and
assistance from the U.S., will increase the prospect of meaningful,
lasting improvements. There are other major challenges facing Moldova
with which the U.S. and our Allies can be helpful. Russia's energy
blackmail has caused economic distress, with domestic political
consequences. This short-term issue must be addressed successfully to
ensure the present government's ability to continue with its longer-
term reform efforts. While the fighting in Ukraine has not physically
touched Moldova, the consequences of the war have created social,
economic, and security challenges for which continuing external support
and assistance will be required.
These needs and challenges are interconnected, not easily separate,
and need to be addressed with a comprehensive policy of support and
assistance for Moldova's process of domestic reform and geopolitical
reorientation. In this testimony, I will address the following key
elements:
The political and demographic background to Moldova's
current situation;
The ongoing fight against corruption, strengthening of
rule of law, and the problem of government and institutional capacity;
Russian political meddling on the right bank, including
Gagauzia, and economic pressure brought against the Moldovan
government;
Economic and energy issues, including those resulting
from Russian pressure and Russia's war in Ukraine;
Security issues facing Chisinau, including effects of the
war and the Russian military presence in the Transnistrian region; and
The current State of relations between Chisinau and
Tiraspol and prospects for integrating the Transnistrian region.
MOLDOVA'S COMPLEX ELECTORAL MAP
Maia Sandu and the Party of Action and Solidarity [PAS] first came
to power in June 2019 in a broad national revolt against 10 years of
corrupt oligarchic rule, the latter years of which were dominated by
now-fugitive oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc. Sandu became Prime Minister
in a short-lived left-right coalition with the pro-Moscow Socialist
Party [PSRM]. After the coalition fell apart, Sandu successfully
challenged President and PSRM head Igor Dodon in the November 2020
Presidential elections on an anti-corruption, pro-European integration
platform. Her party then won a resounding victory in legislative
elections in July 2021, giving PAS both the presidency and an absolute
majority in the parliament.
In achieving these landmark victories, Sandu and PAS extended their
appeal beyond the traditional center-right electorate composed
primarily of Romanian speakers, with Moldovan or Romanian surnames,
especially in the capital region. In elections over the thirty years
since Moldova achieved independence the Moldovan electorate has been
almost equally split between two blocs: one right and center-right
oriented toward Romania and the West, and another left and center-left
composed of Russian speakers and ethnic Slavs, and oriented toward
Russia or Russian culture. In her 2020 and 2021 campaigns President
Sandu made inroads into this second bloc with her anti-corruption
message.
The other major factor in President Sandu and PAS's electoral
success in 2020-2021 was a massive increase in voting by the Moldovan
diaspora, almost all of which tilted heavily in Sandu's favor. At least
500,000 Moldovan citizens live and work abroad, most of these of prime
working age. Most of these were thought to be potential center-right,
pro-Europe voters, so left and left-center Chisinau leaders long
resisted measures to facilitate voting by the diaspora. For a number of
reasons, including the pandemic, voting by the diaspora was made easier
in 2020. The result was massive support for Sandu and PAS. It is not
yet clear whether this pattern will continue in elections expected in
2024 and 2025. Whatever the results of future elections may be, the
2020-2021 votes have presented President Sandu and PAS a rare
opportunity to effect far-reaching, fundamental reforms in Moldova's
governance, economy, and political orientation.
ANTI-CORRUPTION, RULE OF LAW, AND GOVERNANCE
The central message of President's Sandu's campaigns and
administration is anti-corruption. Throughout the post-cold war period
Moldova has been plagued by endemic corruption. This phenomenon
increased in scope over the past decade, as Moldova's government and
economy were increasingly dominated by Vladimir Plahotniuc and an array
of allies and associates. The oligarchic capture of the Moldova State
was best exemplified by the so-called ``theft of the century'' of
November-December 2014, when approximately one billion dollars--almost
10 percent of Moldova's GDP at that time--was looted from three major
Moldovan banks through a complex series of non-performing loans.
While some of the principal culprits in this massive theft have
been identified, indicted, or convicted, responsibility and involvement
for this theft extended deep into Moldovan elites from all political
parties. The theft is also only the most notable of a number of corrupt
schemes and arrangements that looted the Moldovan economy over the past
decade. Major political figures, government officials at all levels,
prosecutors, and especially the courts were all deeply involved in this
widespread corruption. Many anti-corruption investigations and
prosecutions during the 2010's were actually political reprisals by
leaders of one party against another, rather than real efforts to
reform the system. This was the situation which President Sandu and PAS
inherited when they came to power at the beginning of this decade.
The Sandu administration has concentrated on reforming and re-
staffing the justice system, as the core of its anti-corruption
efforts. This makes considerable sense, since corrupt judges and
corrupt prosecutors were a key part in the system that allowed
oligarchs such as Plahotniuc to prosper and seize control of the State
apparatus. The current administration has also undertaken to
restructure and reform the country's banking, securities, and insurance
systems, all of which were deeply involved in money laundering and
other corrupt activities during the reign of the oligarchs. The Sandu
administration has also sought to reverse high-profile corrupt deals,
such as the franchise for the control of Chisinau Airport.
Finally, the government is pursuing those involved in corruption,
but the process is difficult. Vladimir Plahotniuc has fled prosecution,
and his precise whereabouts remain unclear. After many delays, Ilan Sor
has been convicted of involvement in the 2014 theft. He leads his
political party of the same name from exile in Israel, which has
declined to extradite him because of his Israeli citizenship. Other
criminal cases are in progress; many of those involved have fled to
countries beyond the reach of Moldovan justice.
The current administration is re-building the judicial system from
the ground up. It has been a long, deliberate, and slow process.
Institutions and processes have been developed to vet judges and
prosecutors. Many have been removed, and some new, trustworthy
candidates have been identified. The process is especially difficult,
and not just in the justice system. Moldova is a small country, with a
sizable portion of its working age population in residence abroad.
Since so many political actors and government officials were touched by
the past decade's corruption, it is especially hard to identify and
place in responsible positions those who are untainted, whether because
they were not at all involved, or were in government but did not
participate in illicit activities.
The personnel dilemma facing Moldova's anti-corruption activities
is an impediment to almost all of Moldova's current reform efforts. The
government simply does not have enough capable people. Financial
assistance can help, and the US and the EU are providing a great deal.
However, external donors also need to provide people, and to help
convince talented Moldovans to return to their country to join and
assist in the reform efforts. It took over 20 years for corruption in
Moldova to reach its dimensions at the fall of Plahotniuc in 2019. It
will take considerable time to eradicate, but I believe progress is
being made.
RUSSIAN POLITICAL MEDDLING
At the start of her administration President Sandu took a
conciliatory posture toward Russia and the Russophone elements in
Moldovan society. Moscow did not respond with a similar approach. In
August 2021 Russia offered a favorable deal on natural gas supplies in
return for a Transnistrian settlement on terms long known to be
unacceptable to Moldova. When Chisinau declined the package deal,
Moscow quickly began a pressure campaign involving manipulation of
natural gas prices and supplies. This pressure has continued and at
times intensified after the Russian attack and expansion of the war in
February 2022.
The aim of this pressure has been to ensure dominant Russian
influence in Moldova as a whole, not just the Transnistrian region, and
a friendly, compliant administration in Chisinau. In my view this has
always been Russia's aim since 1992 in supporting the breakaway
administration in Tiraspol. Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine in
2014 Russia has been physically cutoff from Transnistria and unable to
continue its substantial physical and personnel support to that region.
Moscow has thus been forced to resort to other means, such as the
energy weapon, to influence the government in Chisinau.
The chief other lever with which Moscow has sought to influence
Chisinau is involvement in Moldovan politics. Before 2021 Russia
provided clear, consistent, considerable support to the Socialist Party
[PSRM] and President Igor Dodon. In return, Dodon and the PSRM were
seen generally to follow a political line favorable to Moscow. However,
Moscow was clearly disappointed by the poor performances of Dodon and
the PSRM in the 2020-2021 elections, and began looking for other
political actors to support in Moldova.
Russian authorities quickly settled on exiled oligarch Ilan Sor and
the Sor Party, the smaller of the two opposition parties represented in
the parliament elected in 2021. Even though Sor uses his own
considerable wealth to bankroll his party, Moscow has provided
considerable funds to the Sor Party. Sor Party deputies have been seen
frequently traveling to Russia to meet with their counterparts. Sor
Party representatives, with advice and support from Moscow, have been
among the leaders of massive demonstrations in Moldova over the winter
of 2022-2023 protesting energy prices and economic conditions in
Moldova.
Moscow has also meddled in the traditionally pro-Russian Gagauz
Autonomous Region. Russia has prompted sympathizers in Gagauzia to
protest high energy prices and various Chisinau policies. Most notable,
Moscow provided strong support for the winning Sor Party candidate in
the recent elections of a new regional Governor [Bashkan]. During the
campaign Moldova refused entry to a senior Russian official seeking to
visit Gagauzia, and an investigation is ongoing into financing of the
Sor candidate's campaign. Nonetheless, the victorious candidate,
Evgeniia Gutul, will be inaugurated Bashkan next week.
The Russian efforts and discontent in Gagauzia are concerning, but
the danger to the region and the country should not be exaggerated. The
U.S. has provided considerable developmental assistance to the region
over the past two decades; the warm reception recently given by the
outgoing Governor to U.S. Ambassador Kent Logsdon is evidence that
sentiment in the region is not solely pro-Russian. In my estimation
there are substantial elements, likely a majority, in Gagauzia ready to
work with Chisinau, the EU, and the U.S., given the proper approach. A
few symbolic steps from Chisinau costing little or nothing might
encourage such positive interaction.
Russian disinformation also poses an ongoing problem in Moldova.
Russian language media have always had considerable influence, in part
due to widespread primary use of the Russian language, even among
ostensibly ethnic Moldova population. The level and anti-government
tone of Russian disinformation heightened after February 2022. Chisinau
shut down several of the most egregious outlets for Kremlin
disinformation. Contrary to some Kremlin allegations, Russian language
media remain readily available in Moldova for those who seek
information in that language.
ECONOMIC AND ENERGY ISSUES
I have already mentioned Moscow's energy pressure on Chisinau, but
it is worth examining energy and economic issues in a bit more detail.
Moldova, including its Transnistrian region, since gaining independence
has been one hundred percent dependent on Russia for its energy,
primarily from natural gas delivered in pipelines through Ukraine and
onward to the Balkans. From time to time Moscow has used gas prices or
delivery interruptions to pressure Moldova. So the pressure campaign
begun in 2021 was not unprecedented.
Moldova's energy and economic landscape is also inextricably
involved in the Transnistrian question, since Moldova has traditionally
received a major portion of its electricity from the massive power
plant in Cuciurgan in the south of the Transnistrian region on the
border with Ukraine. While the following is a gross oversimplification
of the history and current practice, basically Transnistria has
received natural gas from Russia for free, which enables it to sell
electricity to Moldova at relatively low prices. This in turn
facilitates the operation of many enterprises and economic activity in
general on both the left and right banks of the Nistru in Moldova.
The war in Ukraine since 2022 has disrupted this pattern, causing
Moldova urgently to seek other suppliers of energy and complicating
Chisinau's energy relationship with the Transnistrian region. Prior to
2022 Chisinau had begun to purchase electricity from Ukraine, but the
war has made that impossible for the moment. Both Moldova and Ukraine
have connected to the European energy grid, and Chisinau has begun to
purchase some electricity from Romania. Over the past decade a gas
pipeline has been constructed from Iasi in Romania to Chisinau, which
has a capacity sufficient to supply Moldova's capital with its energy
needs. The pipeline has recently been put into use, and as I understand
it gas supplies other than redirected gas from Russia are being
identified.
The current administration in Chisinau has expressed a desire and
intent to end the country's dependence on Russian energy. This should
be seen in the broader context of Europe's overall movement away from
usage and dependence on Russian energy. This process involves
challenges both in identifying supplies and in managing prices. For
over a year and a half, key officials from Chisinau and Tiraspol have
negotiated division of reduced natural gas deliveries from Russia and
prices for electricity produced by the Cuciurgan plant. Light and heat
for the population on both banks have been maintained, but prices have
soared, rising tenfold and more at times. This has become a critical
political issue in Moldova, as Russia, its Sor Party allies, and the
rest of the opposition seek to use energy price protests to destabilize
and topple the government.
In my view, assistance with this energy transition is probably one
of the most important and the most urgent acts by which the U.S. can
assist the current Government of Moldova. We share and support many of
the aspirations and policies of the current government. However, long-
term anti-corruption, rule of law, and governance reforms are much less
likely if the current administration is replaced because of energy
issues with another which seeks to take the country in an entirely
different direction.
SECURITY ISSUES
At the beginning of her administration President Sandu sought to
fashion a cooperative, if not friendly relationship with Russia.
Moscow's actions made that impossible, first with its attempt to mis-
use the Transnistrian question and energy pressure and then with the
war in Ukraine. Even after Russia's massive attack on Ukraine in
February 2022, Chisinau sought to avoid burning bridges with Moscow,
not immediately joining international sanctions against Russia.
The most immediate effect of the war in Ukraine on Moldova was a
massive flow of refugees. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians fleeing
the fighting crossed into and through Moldova into the EU. For months
at any one point there were at least 100,000 Ukrainian refugees
resident in Moldova; tens of thousands still remain. Moldova has been
exceptionally generous, especially given its limited capacity. Many
refugees have been housed with Moldovan families, and Ukrainian
children are being allowed to attend school in Moldova. This has been a
particularly heavy burden on one of the poorest countries in Europe,
yet one gracefully accepted by the government and population.
In the initial stage of the Russian attack, during the advance
through Kherson toward Mykolaiv, Moldovan authorities legitimately
feared that Russian forces might reach Odesa and joint with the small
Russian contingent in Transnistria. Fortunately, that did not happen.
Since mid-2022 Moldova's greatest concern from the hostilities in
Ukraine has been the occasional Russian rockets that have flown across
and sometimes landed on Moldovan territory. There were also several
bombings in the Transnistrian region, but in general Moldova has not
suffered from violence or military action from the war in Ukraine.
As a result of its experience during the heightened war in Ukraine,
the Moldovan government has undertaken to modernize its armed forces.
The aim, as I understand it from Moldovan officials, is not so much to
defend Moldova against a massive military attach as to acquire the
capability to protect Moldovan citizens against the fallout of
conflicts in the region or small scale action, for example the ability
to track and defend against occasional intrusions into its air space.
Other military equipment simply needs to replaced or updated, as most
of Moldova's equipment still dates from the cold war era.
To effect this modernization Moldova and its Defense Ministry is
working closely with the EU and NATO. While there has been some public
discussion of whether Moldova should maintain the neutrality embedded
in its constitution or possibly seek NATO membership, as of now there
is no change in the country's neutral status. As a potential candidate
for EU membership, Moldova is aligned in that sense. Moldova has also
increasingly condemned Russia's war against Ukraine, and has joined
international sanctions. For these and other reasons, Moldova's
relations with Russia have grown increasingly testy, with frequent
mutual accusations and denunciations. In my estimation, there is little
prospect these relations will improve until and unless Russia ends its
war against Ukraine.
The best-publicized security issue in the Moldova-Transnistria
settlement process is the continuing presence of Russian troops in
Moldova's Transnistrian region and Moscow's repeated failure to heed
Chisinau's demands that they be withdrawn. This is an important issue
of principle, and is a sine qua non of any settlement, but it is
probably far from the most difficult security issue. The number of
Russian troops is relatively small--1500-1600--and most of the enlisted
personnel are local residents; only a smaller number of officers are
actually from Russia. The overall figure includes the Russian troops
which are part of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces established by the July
21, 1992 Cease Fire Agreement. I have been on the record since 2005
that this peacekeeping force can and should be replaced by an
international civilian monitoring mission.
Transnistrian authorities have at least as many men under arms as
the Moldovan government, in the Transnistrian Army, the Ministry of
State Security [MGB] forces, and militarized Internal Ministry [police]
forces. The biggest problem to demilitarization and integration of the
region in my estimation is probably posed by the MGB. All of these
institutions on the left bank are populated at all levels with
secondees from Russia or local residents with Russian passports who see
their primary allegiance to Moscow. The removal to Russia of these
individuals should be encouraged and ensured. From my own observations
over an extended period and from what I have been told by those who
should know, there is little or no desire at any level in the uniformed
military and security forces on the left bank actually to fight. This
should help in a process of reintegration.
The major Russian military property remaining in the Transnistrian
region is the ammunition depot and base at Colbasna. Of an initial
42,000 metric tons of ammunition of all types, roughly 21,000 metric
tons remained after the withdrawals of 2003-2004. The OSCE Mission last
visited the Colbasna base in 2007; the Mission has a comprehensive
inventory of the ammunition remaining in Colbasna dating from that
time. While this inventory was accurate at that time, it is almost
certain that some ammunition has been removed in the interim for use in
Russian military exercises in Transnistria. As a first step, a new,
comprehensive, transparent inventory of the ammunition stocks remaining
in Colbasna should be performed.
Disposing of the ammunition in Colbasna will likely be a lengthy,
expensive task. In 2003-2004 ammunition was transported from Colbasna
across Ukraine by train to bases in the Russian Federation. It is hard
to envision any geopolitical circumstances in the foreseeable future
which would allow such shipments to resume. International agreement
might be reached to sell some of this ammunition to acceptable buyers,
but most of it will likely need to be destroyed onsite. From 2001 on
the OSCE Mission conducted extensive studies on possible destruction of
the ammunition onsite. Most approaches involved constructing new
factories and/or augmenting existing enterprises, all at substantial
cost, especially to ensure physical security and environmental
protection. The one bright spot in this issue is that the conditions at
the base under which the ammunition was stored, when OSCE experts had
access to it, were generally fairly safe and secure. Given proper
control of access and physical security, disposition of the ammunition
should be able to be accomplished in a systematic, non-urgent manner.
THE TRANSNISTRIAN QUESTION
Since the brief war in 1992 Moldova's Transnistrian region has
received political, financial, material, and personnel support from
Russia. In return, Transnistrian authorities repeatedly professed their
loyalty to and alliance with Russia. The search for a political
settlement of the Transnistrian conflict has been close to a solution
in 1997 and 2003. The Five Plus Two negotiations facilitated by the
OSCE, the latest iteration in this process, had considerable success in
resolving practical issues from 2014 to 2020. However, the pandemic and
war in Ukraine have basically stalemated the 5+2. The OSCE Mission
provides a forum and support for direct working contacts between
Chisinau and Tiraspol, but the Mission lately has been hobbled by
Russian obstructionism in the OSCE's Vienna headquarters.
Russia complains that there has not been a 5+2 meeting for over 2
years. However, it is impossible to conceive of Russian and Ukrainian
representatives working harmoniously in this forum while the war in
Ukraine continues. Russia has also not made any proposals that would
warrant consideration and action in the 5+2. Instead, Moscow seems to
be using the lack of action in the negotiating process as a lever to
seek influence or concessions in other areas.
The PAS Government seems fully engaged and absorbed by Moldova's
potential EU candidacy, and has shown relatively little interest in the
Transnistrian question. Many PAS members apparently see Transnistria as
an impediment to European integration. The government's Deputy Prime
Minister and Bureau for Reintegration continue to work, and PAS
deputies in parliament established a special commission on
Transnistrian reintegration. To my knowledge not much new or of note
has come of these efforts.
In my view, the Moldovan Government may be missing an opportunity.
The Transnistria of 2023 is not the same separatist, pro-Soviet entity
that first broke away from Moldova in 1990. The region's economy and
society are dominated by the Sherrif conglomerate, which may pay lip
service to Russia but is hardly subservient. Transnistrian enterprises
have since the late 1990's been oriented toward the European market.
Since 2015 left bank enterprises have been a part of the Moldovan DCFTA
with the EU, thus operating fully within the Moldovan legal and
economic space. The region is thus well on its way to integration
within Moldova; it is the political relationships that have yet to be
defined.
Sherrif's relationship with Moscow has always been rocky. Russia's
February 2022 expansion of the war in Ukraine created risks and
disruptions that dismayed Sherrif and many other left bank enterprises
and elites. Transnistrian elites were always happy to receive political
and economic support from Moscow, but they also depended on regional
stability and good working relationships with their counterparts in
Ukraine and Moldova. Russia's war against Ukraine disrupts a
comfortable status quo with no apparent concomitant benefits for
Transnistrians. Tiraspol has nothing to gain by supporting or joining
the war against Kyiv, and a lot to lose.
In these circumstances I believe a timely and moderate approach by
Chisinau could reaffirm what many Transnistrians already realize
privately: integration with Moldova is their best course to maintain
stability and pursue prosperity. Complicated issues of property rights
and local political authorities will need to be settled. While
difficult, such questions are not insoluble. Leaders from Chisinau and
Tiraspol have settled such questions before; given mutual trust and
flexibility, they might again.
There is no guarantee of success, but the present geopolitical
upheaval in Europe and the world because of Russia's war against
Ukraine offers Chisinau a rare opportunity to break with the status quo
that has dominated the past thirty years. Moldova has already done so
in terms of its political and economic relationship with Europe by
becoming a potential EU candidate. Chisinau and Tiraspol have enough
common aspirations and interests that they might also make such a break
with three decades of separation, and move together toward Europe.
WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. DO?
First of all, keep doing what we already are. Moldova's reforms are
going to take some time, and will need continued support in the form of
both money and personnel;
Second, on an urgent basis help Moldova find alternative sources
and provide energy--heat and light--to Moldovan consumers at affordable
prices;
Third, encourage the government to develop a plan for Transnistrian
integration and to begin implementation of that plan while
circumstances are propitious;
Fourth, support the OSCE Mission as the best instrument for
facilitating contacts, dialog, and cooperation between Chisinau and
Tiraspol;
Fifth, offer continued political, financial, and personnel support
for demilitarization of the region, including destruction or withdrawal
of Russian ammunition stored at Colbasna;
Sixth, encourage Chisinau to pursue a stance of inclusion and
cooperation toward Gagauzia in parallel with U.S. and EU assistance to
the region;
Seventh, actively encourage and participate in multilateral and
coordinated international support for Moldova's transformation,
including reintegration of the Transnistrian region and European
integration.
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