[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES AND THE IMMINENT
DANGER OF FORCED REPATRIATION FROM CHINA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 13, 2023
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Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-477 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House Senate
CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey, Chair JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Co-chair
JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts MARCO RUBIO, Florida
BRIAN MAST, Florida TOM COTTON, Arkansas
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia STEVE DAINES, Montana
MICHELLE STEEL, California ANGUS KING, Maine
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ANDREA SALINAS, Oregon DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa
RYAN ZINKE, Montana
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
DANIEL K. KRITENBRINK, Department of State
MARISA LAGO, Department of Commerce
THEA MEI LEE, Department of Labor
UZRA ZEYA, Department of State
ERIN BARCLAY, Department of State
Piero Tozzi, Staff Director
Matt Squeri, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Statements
Opening Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a U.S. Representative from
New Jersey; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 1
Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley, a U.S. Senator from Oregon; Co-
chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China............. 4
Statement of Hon. Zachary Nunn, a U.S. Representative from Iowa.. 7
Statement of Robert R. King, former Special Envoy for North
Korean Human Rights Issues, U.S. Department of State........... 9
Statement of Jung-Hoon Lee, Dean, Graduate School of
International Studies, Yonsei University and former South
Korean Ambassador-at-Large for North Korean Human Rights....... 11
Statement of Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, Legal Analyst, Transitional
Justice Working Group.......................................... 13
Statement of Hanna Song, Director of International Cooperation,
Database Center for North Korean Human Rights.................. 16
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
King, Robert R................................................... 38
Lee, Jung-Hoon................................................... 40
Shin, Ethan Hee-Seok............................................. 45
Song, Hanna...................................................... 62
Smith, Hon. Chris................................................ 70
Merkley, Hon. Jeff............................................... 71
McGovern, Hon. James P........................................... 72
Submissions for the Record
Submission of Joanna Hosaniak, Deputy Director General, Citizens'
Alliance for North Korean Human Rights......................... 74
Submission of Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director, U.S. Committee
for Human Rights in North Korea................................ 76
Submission of Suzanne Scholte, Chair, North Korea Freedom
Coalition...................................................... 82
CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form.......................... 85
Witness Biographies.............................................. 86
(iii)
NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES AND THE IMMINENT DANGER OF FORCED REPATRIATION
FROM CHINA
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TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 2023
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was held from 10:03 a.m. to 12:09 p.m., in Room
2020, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC,
Representative Chris Smith, Chair, Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, presiding.
Also present: Senator Jeff Merkley, Co-chair, and
Representatives Nunn and Wild.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW JERSEY; CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
CHINA
Chair Smith. This hearing on the desperate plight of North
Korean refugees who face imminent danger of forced repatriation
from China will come to order.
Some of you may have crossed the Potomac River to attend
this hearing today. It flows, as we all know, beside our
nation's capital past many iconic landmarks. For those who are
currently watching this hearing from South Korea, the Han River
flowing through Seoul likewise holds tremendous historical,
cultural, and economic importance.
However, for many North Koreans who brave the treacherous
journey across the Yalu and Tumen Rivers--natural borders
between North Korea and China--those rivers represent only
sorrow and terror. These rivers have been their only means to
escape from the world's cruelest family dictatorship,
necessitating desperate crossings by small boat, swimming
directly, or walking across frozen waters amid the bitter
Korean winter--all while knowing that an alert border guard
with shoot-to-kill orders could end their lives in an instant.
Even after successfully crossing the Yalu and Tumen Rivers,
the plight of a North Korean refugee can rapidly take a turn
for the worse. Startling estimates indicate that up to 80
percent of female North Korean refugees become victims of human
traffickers, who exploit them in the lucrative sex trade
industry. It is believed that the illicit trade generates over
$105 million annually for North Korean and Chinese criminal
networks.
I would note, parenthetically, that in one of my previous
hearings, Suzanne Scholte--and without objection her comments
will be made part of the record--came and she brought two
women, a mother and a daughter. Now, their story was that the
other sister, the woman's daughter escaped--I would put that in
quotation marks--to China. She was sold into slavery, into sex
trafficking. The mother and daughter then went into China
looking for that daughter, and they were enslaved as well. All
three of them forced into sex trafficking. But by the grace of
God and some very, very kind-hearted and empathetic people,
they were able to escape, and they made their way to South
Korea, and ultimately to our hearing room to tell their amazing
stories. That is the plight of so many of these women who make
their way into China.
The lucky ones try to remain hidden. According to a recent
report by Global Rights Compliance, an international human
rights law firm, there are approximately half a million female
North Koreans, some as young as 12, hiding in border regions,
for if they are discovered they face the likelihood of forced
repatriation or, to use the technical term, refoulement, to
North Korea.
Today's hearing is especially timely because we have good
reason to believe that such repatriation is imminent, as North
Korea reopens its border following extended closure in the wake
of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is reported that approximately
2,000 North Korean refugees, perhaps many more, are awaiting
imminent forced repatriation which would subject them to severe
human rights violations upon their return to North Korea, some
of which we will hear about in testimony from our amazing panel
that is assembled here today.
I shared this deep concern regarding the perilous situation
of North Korean refugees in China directly with Antonio
Guterres, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, when he
visited my office on April 27th. I believe that while there are
limits to what our government and the South Korean government
can do to influence China's decision making--although we need
to do everything we can possibly do to influence that--the U.N.
is well positioned and ideally suited to use its influence,
given how much the Chinese government seeks validation from,
and indeed seeks to influence, the United Nations system.
So, again, I ask with deep respect of Secretary-General
Guterres: Please use your influence to the utmost to dissuade
the Chinese government from forcibly repatriating these
refugees. It is also extremely important that the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, take on
a more active role on behalf of these refugees.
One of our highly distinguished witnesses today, who will
be coming in via Zoom, Ambassador Jung-Hoon Lee, points out in
his testimony--and I quote just a small part of it--``The legal
tools are there for the UNHCR to do more for the North Korean
defectors. The UNHCR concluded a bilateral agreement with China
in 1995 that granted the UNHCR staff in China unimpeded access
to refugees within China. Determining who is a refugee requires
interviewing the prospective asylum seekers. With China
strictly preventing UNHCR access to North Koreans near the
border, the process towards refugee recognition has been
completely thwarted,'' he states. ``The forcible repatriation
of North Koreans seeking refugee status in China is a blatant
breach of Beijing's obligations under the 1951 U.N. Convention
Related to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.''
On May 30th, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women issued the findings of its review
of China, calling for unrestricted access by the UNHCR and
relevant humanitarian organizations to victims of trafficking
from North Korea in China. CEDAW has also recommended that
China regularize the status of North Korean women who face
human rights violations, such as forced marriage and human
trafficking, and refrain from cracking down on them due to
their undocumented status.
Against all of this moral pressure and legal pressure as
well, there are malign incentives--both political and
economic--for the People's Republic of China to repatriate
refugees to North Korea. North Korea and its dictator Kim Jong-
un view those who flee the dictatorship as traitors, which
gives China a political incentive to placate a communist ally
that remains a thorn in the side of the United States and all
freedom-loving people. A written submission for this hearing,
which I ask to be entered into the record and without
objection, from Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human
Rights, a human rights NGO based in Seoul, sheds light on the
disturbing economic incentives that China has in forcibly
repatriating these refugees.
According to their ongoing investigation, ``There is a high
probability that a portion of products originating from North
Korea but produced for Chinese companies have been made in
prisons detaining repatriated North Korean refugees from China
using forced labor and other human rights violations.'' This
suggests that businesses in China are profiting from the
exploitation of repatriated North Korean refugees, an issue
that demands thorough investigation and accountability.
There is, of course, a role that both the South Korean
government and our government, and indeed Congress and this
Commission, can play. The CECC does report on the situation of
North Korean refugees in China in its annual report, and this
year will likely issue a stand-alone report on the issue, while
today's hearing is an example of how we can bring attention to
this impending humanitarian crisis and disaster. I myself have
chaired seven congressional hearings on North Korean human
rights, and I have also introduced new legislation, H.R. 638,
the China Trade Relations Act of 2023, that withdraws China's
Permanent Normal Trade Relations, or PNTR, status unless there
are substantial and sustained improvements in human rights,
including how it treats refugees within its borders.
The refugees in question are not mere statistics. Each and
every one of these people is an individual with inherent
rights, hopes, dreams, and aspirations. China has failed to
confront the human traffickers who prey on vulnerable North
Koreans. Indeed, they are complicit. If Beijing wishes to be
recognized as a true leader in the global community, it must
not be complicit in the plight of North Korean refugees in
China who are under imminent danger of repatriation. Human
rights transcend mere privilege. They are an inherent
entitlement. We cannot turn a blind eye to China's complicit
and flagrant violations of these rights.
I am looking forward to our distinguished witnesses. And
I'm very proud to introduce our co-chair of this Commission,
Senator Merkley.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON; CO-
CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Co-chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith. This
Commission tries to do its part to shine a light on the plight
of North Korean refugees in China, with this year marking the
20th year that we have dedicated a chapter of our annual report
to this topic. Yet, we last held a hearing on this eleven years
ago, so this hearing is way overdue. And thank you for
arranging it.
In many ways, not much has changed. In fact, the
announcement for the Commission's first public event on North
Korean refugees, way back in 2004, included many of the same
characterizations we'll hear about today--desperate individuals
fleeing North Korean government prosecution and severe food
shortages--and Chinese authorities' willful refusal to assess
any of these individuals as refugees, stonewalling U.N. Refugee
Agency efforts to help those in need.
Precisely because so little has changed is why we can't
avert our eyes. Human rights abusers play a waiting game,
waiting for the world to grow weary, outrage to dissipate, and
people to move on. But those who are suffering cannot move on.
The North Korean and Chinese governments are playing the same
cynical game, and we can't let them off the hook. As we'll hear
about today, the Chinese government has obligations under
Chinese law, under international law, and in accordance with
basic humanitarian decency, to provide individualized
determination of the refugee status of asylum seekers.
Instead, China's approach flouts the principle that anyone
has the right to seek asylum, treating all North Korean
escapees as illegal immigrants. If anything, this is backwards
and all North Koreans who escape to China should be understood
to be at risk. The 2014 U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human
Rights in North Korea was clear. The forcible repatriation of
thousands of North Koreans subjects them to crimes against
humanity. Just being a North Korean in China means an
individual would be in grave peril if sent back to North Korea.
The U.N. Commission of Inquiry was equally clear about
that. China's approach violates the international principle of
nonrefoulement, which is supposed to guarantee that nobody will
be repatriated to a country where they would face torture;
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment; and other irreparable
harm. Irreparable harm is what awaits the vulnerable North
Koreans that Chinese authorities plan to send back to the
gulag.
As much as has not changed on this topic over the last two
decades, we're also holding this hearing because of what has
changed. COVID-19 changed much in our world, and the landscape
of North Korean defection is no different. Border closures and
tougher travel restrictions on both sides of North Korea's
border with China made defection more difficult and more
expensive. Now, the potential easing of North Korea's border
closures raises the specter that China will again start
forcibly repatriating North Koreans.
The other thing that has changed is the same thing we
observe in so many other contexts: China's Orwellian
surveillance state supercharges its ability to keep an eye on
the people it seeks to control--including, sadly, North Korean
refugees. Vulnerable people facing either repatriation or
hiding now face a much more difficult task in remaining hidden
or in receiving help without catching the attention of
authorities who wish them ill. This all leaves a bleak
situation for North Korean refugees in China, but those of us
fighting for human rights should not shy away from the
challenge, and instead must redouble our efforts.
I look forward to our witnesses' counsel on what we can do.
And just on a personal note, I traveled to South Korea and to
the China/North Korea border where the three highways exist, a
few years ago. In South Korea I met with refugees, some of whom
had swum across the border, some of whom had crossed the land
border with China, some who had come through the Demilitarized
Zone.
And one young woman whom I'll never forget, escaped only to
be returned as a teenager with her father. He faced horrific
punishment. She faced less harsh punishment, but still a very
difficult course. He encouraged her to escape again, knowing
what would happen to his family. But she actually did succeed.
And I think about that father trying to get his daughter to
freedom, knowing the torture that he would be facing. Anyway,
we're going to hear from you all, as experts, and I'm so glad
you've come to share your knowledge, your experiences. Thank
you.
Chair Smith. Thank you, Senator Merkley, very much.
I'd now like to welcome our distinguished panel, beginning
first with Ambassador Robert King, a long-time friend dating
back to when he served as chief of staff to Congressman Tom
Lantos and as Democratic staff director of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee from 2001 to 2008. All told, he spent 25
years on the Hill, which is a very long time. Ambassador King
came and served with great distinction as Special Envoy for
North Korean Human Rights Issues at the U.S. Department of
State from 2009 to 2017, which also makes him critically
positioned to give testimony to us today as he did previously
in December of 2017, before a Foreign Affairs Committee hearing
that I chaired. He did a tremendous job then and is a fount of
knowledge and insight, and counsel and wisdom.
Ambassador King has also been a senior advisor to the Korea
Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
And it is in that capacity that both he and I served as
panelists at a conference not so long ago cohosted by Stanford
University, entitled ``North Korean Human Rights at a New
Juncture.'' This is a pleasure to welcome back Ambassador King.
Bob, thank you for being here.
Then we'd like to introduce our next panelist, who will be
Ambassador Jung-Hoon Lee, who is currently the dean at the
Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University
in South Korea. Like Ambassador King, Ambassador Lee is also
critically positioned, well suited to serve as a witness, for
he served as the inaugural ambassador-at-large on North Korean
Human Rights for the Republic of Korea, as well as its
ambassador for human rights overall. It was in this capacity
that he appeared before our Commission in 2014, briefing
Congress about the human rights abuses and crimes against
humanity in North Korea. His academic affiliations include a
visiting professorship at Keio University in Japan, and senior
fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School.
Ambassador Lee currently advises the Korean government as
chair of the National Unification Advisory Council's
International Affairs Committee, chair of the Ministry of
Unification's newly created commission for North Korean human
rights, and policy advisor to the National Security Council. He
is a board member of the Committee for Human Rights in North
Korea in Washington, DC, and he is, as is Ambassador King, an
international patron of Hong Kong Watch in London, which
advocates on another issue very close to the hearts of members
of this Commission. Ambassador Lee received his B.A. from Tufts
University, an M.A.L.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, and his Ph.D. from the University of Oxford St.
Antony's College. Again, welcome Ambassador Lee.
We'll then hear from another distinguished witness, Dr.
Ethan Hee-Seok Shin. Dr. Shin is a legal analyst at the Seoul-
based human rights documentation NGO Transitional Justice
Working Group. He too testified before Congress almost a year
ago in a hearing of the Tom Lantos Commission, again,
evaluating the openness towards refugees signaled by the new
Yoon administration. He offered cutting-edge policy
recommendations at that time, and we look forward to benefiting
again from Dr. Shin's testimony on an urgent and equally
important issue.
It is my understanding that Dr. Shin has been interviewing
North Korean escapees who make their way to South Korea through
China, in order to record enforced disappearances and other
grave human rights violations, to make submissions to the U.N.
human rights experts on their behalf, and set up Footprints, an
online database of the people taken by North Korea. He is an
advocate for ending China's policy of indiscriminate
refoulement for the North Korean refugees without
individualized determination, an issue raised at the U.N.
Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
as I mentioned just a few moments ago. Dr. Shin holds a Ph.D.
in international law from Yonsei University in South Korea, and
an LL.M. from Harvard Law School. Welcome back, Dr. Shin.
And finally, we'll hear from Hanna Song, who is here to
share her incredible insight into the current situation for
North Korean defectors in China, along with some new up-to-date
satellite images. Currently, she is Director of International
Cooperation and a researcher at the Seoul-based North Korean
human rights NGO Database Center for North Korean Human Rights,
or NKDB. In this capacity, Ms. Song has been given rare access
to North Korean escapees from China. Her organization,
officially established in 2003, has recorded over 130,000
entries related to human rights violations in its unified human
rights database, carried out advocacy based on the data, and
has also provided resettlement support to North Korean
escapees.
NKDB has interviewed over 20,000 North Korean escapees who
have resettled in South Korea. Through interviewing North
Korean escapees who have recently entered South Korea since the
pandemic, NKDB has been able to examine the current situation
in China and how COVID-19 has changed the landscape of North
Korean defection. Ms. Song will share today for the first time
some of the satellite images of the Chinese detention center
where North Korean refugees are believed to be detained. As
NKDB's director, Ms. Song has briefed diplomats, policymakers,
and foreign correspondents on the human rights situation in
North Korea. She has created partnerships with international
stakeholders, research institutions and universities, and NGOs
overseas.
I'd now like to recognize Commissioner Nunn.
STATEMENT OF HON. ZACHARY NUNN,
A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM IOWA
Representative Nunn. Chairman Smith, thank you very much
for holding this very important hearing today. To the panel
that is with us, we are privileged to both learn from you and
hopefully take away some of the key insights on where the
United States can be a leader with allies in Asia to be doing
the right thing. As we look at the grave human rights
violations being committed by North Korea, we see a China that
is complicit.
In my military service, I've been privileged to serve on
the DMZ in South Korea with our allies in the area and witness
the defectors who come across to the South seeking a better
life not only for themselves, but for the country that they
know and have loved so well, that of all of the Korean people.
They are constantly stymied by the fact that a totalitarian
regime in Pyongyang is suppressing not only their right to free
speech but their very existence in the world.
Today we're going to be examining the brutal circumstances
of North Koreans who have tried to leave their home, the lack
of cooperation by Xi to provide them any safe haven, and the
asylum seekers who stand at the border in detention
facilities--not those who have tried to flee to South Korea,
but those who have gone north to China only to be rebuffed and
returned to a heinous situation. The people of North Korea,
let's make no mistake about it, are being murdered, starved,
and worked to death every year under Kim Jong-un.
With limited references to be able to cite because of the
dark kingdom's suppression of any information leaving North
Korea, we know this: The number of people killed in North Korea
every year is estimated at between 300,000 and 800,000. That's
the equivalent of my congressional district back in Iowa being
wiped out in one year. It is believed that there are roughly 15
to 25 mass forced labor camps throughout the country as well,
where individuals are forced to toil for the interest of one
individual who puts himself before an entire nation.
And on the other hand, we have China, the United States'
main trading partner in Asia and one of the largest benefactors
of international financing institutions, and a force in its own
right under the global influence of the Belt and Road
Initiative. But the reality has never been clearer: China and
North Korea are criminals of human rights, cut from the same
cloth. Recent reports show that there are currently 2,000 North
Korean asylum seekers being held in detention centers near the
China-North Korea border. These individuals have endured
unimaginable horrors to both themselves and, importantly, to
their families.
They have escaped one of the most oppressive nations on
Earth, only to be thrown straight back into that meat grinder
by the Chinese government. According to the United States
Department of State, the North Korean refugees repatriated from
China face forced labor, forced abortions, torture, and even
execution. These crimes against humanity have only increased
under the severity of Kim Jong-un's rule. China's refusal to
acknowledge not only the sins of North Korea, but to be
complicit in returning these individuals, makes them equally
culpable.
For the past two decades, this committee has examined
China's blatant ignorance when it comes to international
commitments to refugees and has noted that China denies
humanitarian organizations the ability to help those who are
most in need, and falsified critical data relating to the scope
and severity of North Korea's refugee crisis, intentionally
misinforming the rest of the world. China's continued
repatriation of North Korean refugees signals to the rest of
the world that the Chinese Communist government has never been,
nor will it ever be, a safe harbor for freedom and liberty for
those seeking a better life, whether those fleeing North Korea
or those within its own borders.
Here in the United States, we must not forget the liberty
and freedom we enjoy every day, particularly when in stark
relief to what's going on in Asia. On this Commission, our men
and women in uniform, all those working to spread democracy
around the world, are behind those struggling in places like
North Korea, and even those in China. So, Mr. Chair, I call on
this bipartisan Commission, with the administration, to
continue holding the CCP accountable for its inaction, and Kim
Jong-un specifically for his role as a grave human rights
violator, and for the hope of all those wishing to live a freer
and more prosperous life.
Further, I would specifically ask the premier of China and
Beijing to condemn Kim Jong-un's regime. It is well past time
that we hold these individuals accountable, that they cooperate
with asylum seekers and grant hope to those trapped in a land
of darkness. Additionally, I call on our international
institutions to decrease their tolerance for inclusion of
nations that continually violate human rights and to close
loopholes that allow countries like China to exploit
international financial institutions to fund the autocracies
occurring across the globe, without holding themselves
accountable to the same standards.
And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time but
thank our speakers today for their frontline evidence being
entered into testimony today. You are the front line and the
safeguard of what we're doing going forward. Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Chair Smith. Commissioner Nunn, thank you very much for
your comments, and the background you bring to this Commission
is extraordinary.
I would say to our witnesses, as I go to Ambassador King,
that normally there's a five-minute rule. But you know, what
you have to impart is so important, if you go up to 10 that
would be fine. The important thing is that you really have your
say. We need to hear it, then we will go to questions. So,
Ambassador King, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT R. KING, FORMER SPECIAL ENVOY FOR NORTH
KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador King. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-
chairman. The Commission has played a very important role in
terms of calling attention to the human rights violations of
China, and I'm grateful for the opportunity to talk about these
particular issues that we're dealing with with the North
Koreans.
The flow of Koreans back and forth between northeastern
China and the Korean Peninsula is something that has been going
on for centuries. There are something like 25 million North
Koreans, 50 million South Koreans. But there are also 2 million
Koreans living just across the border in China. So there's a
lot of economic and family relationships that continue to play
a role in terms of moving back and forth. The issues of North
Koreans going through China and to China has been something
that over time has changed.
During the Cultural Revolution when conditions were
difficult in China, there were Chinese who were coming to North
Korea, which with Soviet assistance was doing very well
economically. In the 1990s, when North Korea was facing fairly
serious problems with the collapse of communist support
elsewhere, there were significant numbers of North Koreans who
went to China and were able to find jobs there, as they were
being employed.
One of the things that I found very interesting was when I
was in China on the North Korean-Chinese border, Sinuiju and
Dandong, there were a large number of North Korean citizens who
were employed in China who were returning to North Korea. We
happened to walk into the train station and saunter around to
see what was going on. The numbers were significant. These were
young women who were working as seamstresses. They were living
and working in China, but they were North Koreans. And this
kind of activity back and forth has been something that's been
going on for some time.
There are differences among North Koreans who are going to
China. There are North Koreans who find jobs in China through
the North Korean government--source of employment, a source of
funding for the North Korean government. And they're able to do
it. The North Korean government, of course, takes a healthy
rake-off for providing the workers. There is a second group of
North Koreans who work in China. These are North Koreans who go
on their own, who illegally cross the border, who work
illegally in China, but there are opportunities. There are lots
of Korean speakers in the areas they go to, and they're able to
find opportunity, find jobs, and support themselves and their
families.
And there's a third group of North Koreans who go into
China. And those are North Koreans without the approval of
their government who are seeking to flee North Korea because of
the human rights abuse and other violations. And there are
significant numbers of North Koreans who go to China to get out
of North Korea because it's fundamentally the only way to get
out of North Korea. Other options are not really viable. The
safest route is going through China.
There are some interesting changes that have taken place
recently. The COVID pandemic has created great difficulty for
North Koreans who are attempting to leave North Korea. One of
the things the North Korean government has done; it's done very
little to deal with the problem of COVID, rejected offers of
vaccine; but they have very strict requirements limiting public
contact, limiting movement of people, and so forth. The net
effect has been that the North Koreans who try to leave the
country are being stopped by border patrols who are trying to
prevent North Koreans returning, because they might be infected
with COVID.
COVID has created real difficulties in terms of these
numbers. There are large numbers of North Koreans over the last
couple of decades who have left North Korea and been able to
find homes elsewhere, primarily in South Korea, some in the
United States, some in Europe. Over the last two decades, there
are somewhere in the neighborhood of 34,000 North Koreans who
have left North Korea, primarily through China, and been able
to get out and go to South Korea.
The numbers have varied over time. The highest one-year
total of escapees was 2,700 in 2011. From 2012 to 2016, there
were 1,500 a year that were getting out. From 2017 to 2019,
1,100 a year were successfully getting out. When the first
COVID case was diagnosed in China in November 2019, the North
Koreans shut the border. The number of individuals who were
able to leave North Korea and find their way to South Korea
during 2020 was 229. In 2022, that number was 67. So from a
high of over 2,700, we're down now to 34 who have escaped so
far this year.
In addition to the numbers who've gone to South Korea,
there are a few who've come to the United States, somewhere
around 200 over the last couple of decades. There are about 600
who found places in England, the United Kingdom. There are a
few others that have found opportunities elsewhere. But the
numbers are down. The North Korean government has created
problems because it is so afraid of the spread of COVID that
they have stopped North Koreans from being returned. The
Chinese have arrested North Koreans. The North Koreans will not
accept them. And this has created problems, difficulties for
the North Koreans who are trying to deal with these problems.
The difficulty with North Koreans not being able to return
to North Korea means people who want to return, who have
families there and want to return, are not able to be there.
They're held by the Chinese. The Chinese hold them in camps,
where they are basically prisoners, so they can repatriate them
to North Korea. There are offers from South Korea and other
countries to take North Korean refugees. Those are denied. The
Chinese will not release these individuals. They're going to
return them to North Korea.
I met with Chinese government officials when I was special
envoy on several occasions to raise concern about their
treatment of North Koreans who are captured in China to see if
there's some way of pressing the Chinese to take a more humane
approach to these issues. I was singularly unsuccessful. I met
with North Korean officials at the United Nations in New York,
at the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva. I visited China on
a number of occasions, met with senior officials in the foreign
ministry, with senior officials in the Party's international
department. All of them said: These are North Koreans. The
North Korean people want them back. We will return them.
We need to continue the effort to press the Chinese because
these people are being denied their free choice of where they
want to go. And they're being held in inhumane conditions in
China. If they are returned to North Korea, the North Koreans
will send them to prison. Some of them will not survive
imprisonment there. We need to continue the effort to press the
North Koreans to allow these people not to be held. And we need
to press the Chinese to release the North Koreans they are
holding and who are not being returned to North Korea, because
the North Koreans are not willing to hold them.
We need to continue to call attention to the problem
because one of the ways of getting the Chinese to pay attention
to the issue is to create bad publicity for China, and hope
that it eventually moves them to do the right thing. I look
forward to questions and look forward to continuing the
discussion on this serious problem. Thank you.
Chair Smith. Ambassador King, thank you so very much.
I'd now like to yield such time as he may consume to
Ambassador Lee, who is joining us up on the board there.
Ambassador Lee.
STATEMENT OF JUNG-HOON LEE, DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, YONSEI UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER SOUTH
KOREAN AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS
Ambassador Lee. Good morning. Good morning and greetings
from Korea. I thank Chairman Chris Smith--it's great to see you
again--and Co-chair Jeff Merkley, Representative Zachary Nunn,
ranking members of Congress and the executive branch for giving
me this opportunity to address you today. I'm greatly honored
to provide a statement to this Commission on the situation of
North Korean refugees in China. The last time I attended a
congressional hearing was, as you mentioned, in June 2014, when
I was invited by you, Chairman Smith, to the House Subcommittee
on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
At that time, I emphasized that genocide on top of crimes
against humanity was being perpetrated in North Korea. Well,
nine years have passed. But sadly, no progress has been made.
Deprivation of fundamental human rights continues as people
languish under the near eight-decade-long tyranny of the Kim
dynasty. In a normal state, national security is pursued to
ensure human security. Yet, in North Korea national security
ensures only regime security. The state takes no responsibility
to protect its own people. It is no wonder North Koreans resort
to taking refuge across the border. They do so because there's
no hope in a country ruled by political prisons, torture,
hunger, and public execution, completely devoid of the
fundamental right to an adequate standard of living, not to
mention life.
So why no progress? I will point to five factors. Number
one, despite the outstanding findings and recommendations made
by the Commission of Inquiry in 2014, the U.N. has failed to
follow up, especially on accountability measures. Number two,
South Korea's Moon Jae-in government pursued for five years a
delusional peace policy that totally disregarded human rights
issues. Such a policy had an impact even on the U.S. as well.
The Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act, H.R. 3446, is a case in
point. It calls for peace but completely ignores human rights.
Number three, the media's fixation on Kim Jong-un's nuclear
ploy, as well as his public persona, which has had the effect
of downplaying human rights. Number four, the previous Trump
administration's ill-conceived attempt to woo Kim Jong-un,
which helped to skirt human rights issues. And finally, and
this was mentioned by Ambassador Bob King, COVID-19, and the
complete closure of North Korea's border, also contributed to
the lack of progress because the country was completely shut
down.
The plight of the North Korean refugees in China stands out
as one of the most troubling challenges to the UNHCR. We
wouldn't have this conversation if Beijing adhered to its
obligations under the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention and its 1967
protocol, not to mention its 1995 special agreement with the
UNHCR. I'll refer the Commission to my written text for
details. What I'd like to do here is make two suggestions for
consideration.
My first suggestion is to apply pressure on the UNHCR's
Beijing office to do justice to its mandate. Pursuant to its
1995 agreement with China, the UNHCR should have unimpeded
access to North Korean asylum seekers in China. But as we all
know, North Koreans in China are off limits to the UNHCR. The
refugee agency should assert its right to binding arbitration.
This really should be done now, since several thousand North
Korean detainees are in danger of imminent repatriation.
My second suggestion to the China Commission is to
benchmark the international campaign that was launched against
South Africa's apartheid system in the 1970s and the '80s. What
did the U.N. General Assembly do to South Africa? In 1974, the
Credentials Committee of the General Assembly denied South
Africa its credentials and suspended all its activities in the
United Nations. I say it's time to reexamine the U.N.
credentials of North Korea too. If South Africa was bad enough
to be suspended from all U.N. activities for 20 years,
shouldn't the U.N. General Assembly be doing the same to North
Korea until the nonproliferation and human rights goals are
met?
I would think yes. But what has the U.N. done instead? It
recently elected North Korea to the executive board of the WHO,
and in June last year the U.N. permitted North Korea to assume
presidency of the disarmament conference. This is absolutely
laughable. If we don't take real action today, I assure you I
could be invited back to a congressional hearing in 2033, and
we will be echoing the same old rhetoric. That's 10 more years
of human suffering in North Korea.
I'd like to conclude by commending the China Commission
again for holding today's hearing. Your attention represents a
beacon of hope for those North Koreans in China desperately
yearning for freedom. And I thank you so much for that. Thank
you.
Chair Smith. Ambassador Lee, thank you so very much for
your statement and your recommendations.
I'd like now to yield to Dr. Shin.
STATEMENT OF ETHAN HEE-SEOK SHIN, LEGAL ANALYST, TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE WORKING GROUP
Mr. Shin. Congressman Smith, Senator Merkley, and esteemed
members of the Congressional-Executive Committee on China,
thank you for inviting me to speak at today's hearing. Eleven
years ago, as the members have mentioned, this Commission held
a hearing on China's repatriation of North Korean refugees. It
is with a very heavy heart that I note the continuation of
China's unconscionable policy toward North Korean refugees
today.
Last month, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) expressed its concern that
China ``is a country of destination for trafficking in women
and girls from North Korea for purposes of sexual exploitation,
forced marriage, and concubinage'' and that ``North Korean
women and girls, defectors, are categorically classified as
`illegal migrants' and some are forcibly returned.'' CEDAW
recommended that China protect North Korean victims of
trafficking, to give the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
UNHCR, full and unimpeded access, and to allow their children
to leave China with their mothers.
Beijing's longstanding policy of repatriation of North
Korean refugees has resulted in their suffering of crimes
against humanity in North Korea, as documented by the U.N.
Commission of Inquiry in 2014. It is difficult to obtain
accurate information about North Korean escapees in China
because of Pyongyang and Beijing's deliberate policy of
information blackout. While it is not impossible to pierce this
fog of totalitarianism, various measures, accelerated and
justified during the COVID pandemic, are making it ever more
difficult to contact or assist North Korean refugees.
North Korea diverted scarce resources not only for WMD
development, but also for building a security wall along the
Chinese border, which is not unlike the Berlin Wall, to
permanently imprison its own population. One might call it a
Juche wall. On the Chinese side, the proliferation of CCTVs,
coupled with AI-based facial recognition and surveillance of
WeChat devices, first tested in Xinjiang and then expanded to
China proper, has made North Korean refugees' internal movement
difficult. The cost of moving within China has skyrocketed as a
result, and even alternative escape routes to Mongolia have
resulted in many arrests in Inner Mongolia (Southern Mongolia).
Since the early 2000s, Beijing's official position has been
to handle North Koreans in accordance with its domestic law,
international law, and humanitarian principles. However,
China's policy fails to meet any of these three purported
criteria. Article 32 of the PRC constitution provides that the
PRC may grant asylum to foreigners who request it on political
grounds. Moreover, Article 46 of the Exit and Entry
Administration Law, which was enacted in 2012, states that
foreigners applying for refugee status may, during the
screening process, stay in China on the strength of temporary
identity certificates issued by public security organs.
However, China has failed to institute a screening process
for North Korean asylum seekers and to provide them with
temporary identity certificates. China has similarly failed to
extend national legal protection to ethnic refugees from
Myanmar. If China cannot respect its own national law, one
might ask how it can expect to be respected by the rest of the
international community. China ratified the Refugee Convention
in 1982, as you know, in response to the influx of Han Chinese
and other ethnic minorities or refugees from Vietnam and Laos,
and it has even allowed UNHCR to access asylum seekers from
Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Eritrea.
For the North Korean asylum seekers, however, China
categorically rejects the individualized determination of their
status, and denies UNHCR access. China also continues forcible
repatriation of North Korean escapees, who should be protected
by the principle of non-refoulement, not only under the Refugee
Convention and its Protocol, but also under the Torture
Convention, as was highlighted for the first time by the U.N.
Human Rights Council's North Korean Human Rights Resolution
this April.
China has even repatriated South Korean POWs who had
escaped from North Korea, as in the case of Mr. Han Man-taek in
2005, contrary to China's legal obligations under the Geneva
Convention. Beijing cites treaties with Pyongyang to justify
its policy of deportations, but they cannot overrule human
rights norms enshrined in the Universal Declaration and human
rights treaties.
While Beijing uses the term ``humanitarian principles'' as
meaningless diplomatic rhetoric, some Chinese people actually
display humanitarian consideration for North Korean refugees.
One North Korean escapee recounted that public security agents
who apprehended her released her because they determined that
their job was bringing criminals to justice, not arresting and
deporting innocent women whose only crime was fleeing North
Korea.
It is well known that pregnant North Korean women sent back
to North Korea, and their babies, face abortion or infanticide
to avoid ``corruption'' of Korean racial purity by Chinese
blood. I cannot think of any country other than North Korea
that carries out mass abortions or infanticides on such a
racist ground. Nor can I think of any country other than China
that would enable such mass abortions or infanticides against
``its own blood.''
China has even ignored UNHCR's proposal in 2004 to create a
special humanitarian status for North Koreans. In recent years,
certain localities in China have issued ``resident permits'' to
North Korean women married to Chinese men. But they are
primarily a means of control, to enable a systematic monitoring
of North Korean women with limited freedom of movement locally.
In short, the existence of North Korean women is tolerated only
insofar as they serve as wives to sometimes abusive Chinese
husbands and as mothers to their children, deprived of
individual freedom or agency.
Given the dire human rights and humanitarian crisis that
will unfold in the event of the resumption of forced
repatriation, the international community must act now to
pierce the fog of totalitarianism and hold Beijing accountable
to its domestic law, international law, and humanitarian
principles. The international community must call upon Beijing
to release information concerning: 1. the number of North
Korean detainees that are awaiting deportation to North Korea;
2. the number of North Koreans who have been issued ``residence
permits''; 3. the known number of children born between North
Korean women and Chinese husbands; and 4. the procedure for
applying for refugee status by North Koreans, if one exists.
China also needs to end the return of North Korean
refugees, implement the process for individualized
determination of status for North Korean asylum seekers,
provide them with temporary documentation, and permit North
Korean refugees and their children to resettle in third
countries, such as South Korea. Concerned governments must make
recommendations to China during its Universal Periodic Review
at the Human Rights Council, which is scheduled for next
January. The international community should also ensure that
Chinese nationals responsible for North Korea's crimes against
humanity are documented by the U.N. accountability mechanism
for North Korea.
Another option to consider is to expand the High
Commissioner for Human Rights Office in Seoul, which currently
only has a mandate over North Korea, into a regional office for
Northeast Asia, including China, similar to the OHCHR regional
office for Southeast Asia in Bangkok. The UNHCR also needs to
speak up for North Korean refugees in China, as it had done up
to 2013--instead of praising China's Belt and Road Initiatives
as ``definitely'' helpful with global refugee work.
Given his extensive experience handling the issue during
his previous stint as the high commissioner for refugees, U.N.
Secretary-General Antonio Guterres should lead diplomatic
efforts with interested states to engage President Xi Jinping
on this issue. In the summit statement in April, South Korea
and the United States pledged to strengthen cooperation to
promote human rights in the DPRK, as well as to resolve the
issues of abductions, detainees, and unrepatriated prisoners of
war, and condemn the DPRK's blatant violation of human rights
and the dignity of its own people in its decision to distribute
its scarce resources to WMD development.
In the same vein, the two governments should issue
bilateral and multilateral statements expressing concern about
North Korean refugees, including at the U.N. General Assembly
and Security Council. In addition to Magnitsky sanctions, given
that North Korean refugees repatriated to North Korea provide
slave labor that serves Chinese businesses in northeastern
China, Congress can also consider strengthening existing
sanctions legislation to require Chinese exporters from this
area to provide proof that North Korean labor was not involved
in their supply chains.
I would like to conclude by conveying a message to the
Commission from Ms. Kim Jeong-ah, a courageous North Korean
woman escapee who had to leave behind one daughter in North
Korea and another in China when fleeing to South Korea. She
told me to share with you the pain of continuing her human
rights advocacy despite being diagnosed with liver cirrhosis
after 14 years of forced separation with her daughter in China
because of a Chinese man she was forced to marry through human
trafficking. She says she will continue to struggle because the
heart-wrenching pain of North Korean women escapees like her is
not an event from 14 years in the past, but an ongoing ordeal.
So long as China persists with its policy of repatriation, this
will continue.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Chair Smith. Thank you so very much. We will now turn to
Ms. Hanna Song.
STATEMENT OF HANNA SONG, DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION,
DATABASE CENTER FOR NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS
Ms. Song. Mr. Chair, Mr. Co-chair, esteemed members of the
Commission, thank you for holding this session today regarding
the urgent and critical situation faced by North Korean
refugees in China. Today on behalf of those who cannot be here
physically today, I hope to shed light and be a voice for the
thousands of silenced North Koreans who have sought refuge in
China, only to face unimaginable hardship and persecution.
I want to begin by sharing the story of Ms. Kim, who my
organization met just a few weeks ago, who entered South Korea
in early 2023. She was trafficked into China at the young age
of 18, after simply wandering into a train station in Chongjin,
North Korea, looking for her mother who had gone missing. After
entering a forced marriage to a man decades older than her, for
over ten years she lived in constant hiding, evading
authorities and struggling for survival. Tragically, an
accident exposed her lack of identification, leading to her
capture by the Chinese public security bureau, and subsequent
repatriation to North Korea.
In North Korea, she endured unspeakable torture and
punishment, was labeled a traitor to the state and sentenced to
five years in prison. Upon her release in 2019 in North Korea,
she bravely crossed the border again, this time determined to
reach South Korea. However, her plans were thwarted by the
onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, leaving her trapped in China
for four long years, under increasing surveillance and constant
fear of recapture, knowing very well what would happen if she
were to return to North Korea a second time. In 2023, she
finally found a broker who warned her of impending
repatriations. Desperate to avoid her previous fate, she took a
leap of faith, paying a steep price to secure her passage to
South Korea.
Ms. Kim's journey embodies the resilience and courage of
those who strive for freedom against all odds. However, sadly,
her new beginning in South Korea is not the reality for the
thousands of North Koreans who are currently detained in
detention facilities in China. Time is of the essence, and we
must act swiftly. In China, we believe there are over 10,000
North Koreans who are residing secretly without legal status or
protection. They are refugees by the clear definition of the
1951 Refugee Convention. Their stories are filled with
unimaginable suffering, and their quest for freedom is both
courageous and urgent.
However, the fate that awaits them upon forced repatriation
to North Korea is beyond comprehension. As was described by my
fellow witnesses, arbitrary detention, torture, forced labor,
and even execution are the grim realities that these North
Koreans face. And the fear they carry is not unfounded. It is
supported by documented evidence and countless testimonies of
those who have escaped the clutches of the oppressive North
Korean regime.
Shockingly, the Chinese government still determines and
labels these as illegal economic migrants, and forcibly
repatriates them under a bilateral border protocol signed with
North Korea. Our database at NKDB has recorded over 8,125 cases
of forced repatriation, and over 32,000 cases of other human
rights violations, such as torture, sexual violence, and
executions associated with those who have been forcibly
repatriated.
And unfortunately, the plight of the North Korean refugees
is further exacerbated by the threat posed by China's
surveillance technology. China's increased use of advanced
surveillance tools, such as facial recognition and biometric
systems, has become a repressive weapon targeting the most
vulnerable, an issue that this very Commission has raised in
the past. And we cannot forget that this includes North Korean
refugees as well.
These technologies enable monitoring and trafficking of
individuals in China, leaving no room for anonymity and
invisibility, making it increasingly difficult for escapees to
avoid repatriation. The living conditions of North Korean
escapees in China during the implementation of China's zero-
COVID policy have been dire. As Ambassador Robert King
mentioned, before the COVID-19 pandemic, there were around
1,000 to 2,000 North Korean escapees who would reach South
Korea every year. However, the combination of China's
surveillance technology and North Korea's extreme border
measures, including shoot-on-sight orders and their expanded
fences, has caused a drastic decline. As was already mentioned,
only 67 individuals successfully reached South Korea last year.
Video cameras and facial recognition software have played a
significant role in suppressing these numbers, making escape an
almost insurmountable challenge for North Koreans.
NKDB has recently spoken to many who have revealed a
distressing reality. Broker fees have skyrocketed. In the past,
in the early 2000s to 2010s, broker fees were about US$1,500
Just before the COVID-19 pandemic, $15,000 per person to bring
a person to freedom. Now, as of early 2023, close to $40,000
needs to be paid to brokers to allow safe passage. However,
over the past three years, broker fees have not only
skyrocketed, but many brokers are scared to put themselves at
risk.
We have heard of people offering $75,000 to a broker and
who were rejected because the broker himself faced security
concerns. Even brokers face significant obstacles in supporting
defections from North Korea through China, as China has
embraced electronic payment systems tied to identification,
making cash transactions nearly impossible. Meanwhile, the
proliferation of facial recognition technology, QR codes, and
China's many surveillance efforts has severely restricted the
movement of North Koreans.
The decline in defections is not due to a diminished desire
among North Koreans to escape this repressive regime. Rather,
it reflects the mounting difficulties imposed by China's
pervasive surveillance measures. Regrettably, this situation
has allowed China to achieve its objective of effectively
curbing successful defections, further cementing its control.
As COVID-19 restrictions ease, we have witnessed North Koreans
in China attempting to defect to South Korea once again,
seeking that freedom. Tragically, these attempts over the past
few months have resulted in increased arrests.
NKDB, over the past few months, has received many accounts
from North Korean escapees in South Korea, who have shared the
distressing experiences of their family members who have been
apprehended and detained in China while attempting to flee
again. Chinese authorities who had been previously hesitant to
actively arrest these individuals due to the repatriation
challenges have now intensified their efforts once again to
forcibly repatriate them to North Korea.
The closure of the Chinese/North Korean border due to the
COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a sharp increase in the
number of North Korean refugees who have been detained awaiting
repatriation. If the border were to reopen and forced
repatriation resumed, a dire humanitarian crisis would unfold.
Reports from survivors detail horrifying experiences of
torture, beatings, electric shocks, and sexual violence. These
acts are designed to instill fear and further subjugate these
individuals.
However, without access to firsthand accounts from
detainees or inside sources, it becomes increasingly
challenging to see the complete scope of these circumstances
within which North Korean refugees are being held. To gain
insight into the situation, NKDB, my organization, has been
closely monitoring the six established repatriation routes for
any notable changes, particularly during this COVID-19
pandemic.
There are six known detention facilities that are run by
the Public Security Border Defense Corps on the Chinese side of
the border in the cities of Dandong, Tonghua, Changbai,
Longjing, Tumen, and Helong, where North Koreans are detained
before repatriation. Examination of satellite imagery provided
by NK Pro, based in South Korea, based on information provided
by NKDB, reveals significant developments at the facility,
particularly in Helong, which we can see behind me today.
Helong is known for repatriating North Korean refugees to Musan
in North Hamgyong province.
What we can see here in these two images is one from 2019,
before the pandemic, and the second one reveals construction
after the COVID-19 pandemic. We can see new fencing and
additional facilities surrounding a watchtower overlooking the
border. Furthermore, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in
the summer of 2021, new buildings were erected within the
premises of the detention centers, as well as the renovation of
the existing new building, which we can see by the change in
the roof's tiles in the images behind me.
These observations raise compelling questions. Why did they
need to build and expand these detention facilities in the
first place? And who was mobilized to construct these
facilities? The inability to directly answer essential
questions about the detention facilities in China is deeply
troubling. In the past, NKDB and other organizations have had
access to North Korean escapees who have shared their harrowing
experiences and bravely shed light on the human rights
violations, as well as the facilities in China. However, the
current lack of access hampers our ability to fully comprehend
the conditions within these facilities.
This knowledge gap poses significant concerns. It allows
for impunity, an increase in human rights violations, and a
lack of accountability. When we cannot fully investigate and
understand the operations and practices within these detention
facilities, perpetrators of human rights violations are
emboldened. The absence of external scrutiny enables violations
to occur without consequences, perpetuating a climate of
unchecked mistreatment, and further eroding the rights and
dignity of individuals.
The lack of transparency and accountability undermines the
principles of justice and human rights. Just across from the
facility that we can see in these images lies Musan County, a
border town housing one of North Korea's largest iron mines.
When North Korea reopens its border with China, Beijing is
expected to repatriate these North Korean escapees back to
North Korea, where they will be forced to endure forced labor.
The eyes of the world at this moment are fixed on the
highly anticipated opening of the North Korean/Chinese border.
This not only impacts trade and economic exchanges, but also
presents a unique opportunity to prevent North Koreans from,
once again, being isolated from the rest of the world. North
Korea, as we know, is the most isolated country in the world.
And COVID-19 did more damage to the North Korean people than
any sanctions could ever do.
However, amidst this anticipation, we must not overlook the
fate of those currently detained at the border who anxiously
await repatriation. These individuals have risked everything to
escape an oppressive regime. They have found themselves in a
precarious situation. The fear of being forcibly returned to
North Korea, where they face severe punishment and persecution,
weighs heavily on their hearts, as they've been detained for
close to three years.
I want to echo the recommendations that my fellow witnesses
have mentioned ahead of me. It is imperative that the United
States Government and the international community take every
possible measure to prevent the forced repatriation of North
Korean refugees and provide them with the necessary protection.
Robust diplomatic efforts are imperative to urge China to
refrain from forcibly repatriating these vulnerable
individuals. And we strongly recommend facilitating the safe
passage of North Korean refugees to South Korea, to the U.S.,
and other third countries.
There have been instances in the past where North Korean
refugees have been brought directly from China on commercial
airlines through clandestine efforts by the South Korean
government. This can be done again. We call upon China to grant
the Red Cross access to detention facilities, as well as the
UNHCR, who must be empowered to exercise their mandate. The
lives of these individuals hang in the balance. They have
endured unimaginable suffering and live in constant fear. As a
global community, we bear the responsibility to protect and
support those who have risked everything in their pursuit of
freedom.
I thank the Commission again for bringing light to the
issue. And I believe that we can create a future where no North
Korean refugee is left behind. Thank you, again.
Chair Smith. Ms. Song, thank you so very much for your
testimony. Thank you for bringing that satellite imagery, which
shows a buildup, not a builddown, towards more incarceration
and abuse. So thank you for that, and all of your comments
today.
I have a number of questions. I'll start off with a few,
then yield to my colleagues. And then if we can, we'll have a
second round to go into some further issues. You know, one
thing that troubles me deeply, and from your testimony I know
it troubles all of you, is this lack of action. Why the
inaction? Is the United States doing enough? Is South Korea
doing enough? And maybe, above all, is the United Nations doing
enough, because it does have the responsibility? As you pointed
out, Ambassador Lee, in your comments, the U.N. has failed to
follow up.
Their 2014 U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in
the Democratic Republic of Korea identified the state's
systematic and widespread crimes against humanity, including
forced labor, forced abortion, infanticide, public execution, a
massive gulag system, and overseas abductions. And you pointed
out that the predicament of the North Korean escapees in China
was also highlighted in that report, accusing China of aiding
and abetting crimes against humanity. OK, it's all there. Good
statement. We had hearings about it. We asked that it be
implemented. And, as Ambassador Lee pointed out, the U.N. has
failed to follow up.
Why this lack of concern? And, as a matter of fact, we seem
to be going in the wrong direction at the U.N. As you pointed
out, Ambassador Lee, when the North Korean government gets a
slot on the WHO, on the executive committee, and serve as
president last year of the Disarmament Conference--I mean, that
is, like, the theater of the absurd to be doing that. You don't
stand up to human rights abuse by enabling the abuser. You just
don't do it. It doesn't work. It never has worked. And I think
your comment about apartheid--and I was here in 1980, and '81,
'82, and when we did sanctions against apartheid. And it was
right that we did sanctions. And the U.N. was all-in on that.
So I think your point, Ambassador Lee, about the U.N.
credentials, is a very significant recommendation. And
hopefully we can follow up on it.
But your point about the Beijing office of UNHCR not doing
enough--it does start at the top. And I would hope that in
Geneva and New York there would be a pivot--really this is an
opportunity. This is all imminent. It's going to happen any day
now, any week now. And this crisis could be averted if the
U.N., I think, could be very robust. So why aren't we doing
enough?
Let me just state parenthetically too, that in the past
there was criticism leveled by Andrew Natsios, you remember, in
2014. He used to be the head of USAID and also ran a human
rights organization dedicated to North Korea. And he made the
point, Why did we separate human rights from the nuclear talks?
You know, when they failed and burned out, yes, Ambassador King
did yeoman's work. But he's one man. There should be a whole-
of-government approach so that every time we talk to the North
Koreans, human rights is there at the table as well, so that
hopefully we get some amelioration of these abuses.
Without objection, all of your full statements--I know Dr.
Shin, you had 16 pages--single-spaced. All of you spent a great
deal of time putting together very, very good and excellent
testimony--will be made a part of the record. You point out,
the legal tools are there for the UNHCR to do more for the
North Korean defectors. Why aren't they doing it? And why
aren't we doing more?
Ambassador King.
Ambassador King. We can always do more. And we should be
doing more. One of the problems the United Nations encounters
is that there are a lot of countries who have similar problems.
One of the reasons why it was much easier to make progress on
South Africa, is there were a number of African countries who
had recently become members of the United Nations who were
concerned about what was happening in South Africa.
Unfortunately, we don't have that same numerical advantage in
terms of dealing with North Korea.
One of the things that I think we need to be careful of is
that this isn't going to be a quick thing. It's going to take
time. We have made progress. We've created--there's a special
rapporteur that the United Nations established, who reports to
the U.N. Human Rights Council, reports to the General Assembly
once a year, to both bodies. Issues are raised. The North
Koreans are called on the carpet.
We're not moving troops to North Korea to solve the
problem, but we are putting pressure on North Korea, and the
thing that we need to keep in mind is that we've got to keep
the pressure consistent. We've got to keep it up. We've got to
continue. It isn't going to happen overnight but we make
progress eventually.
The North Koreans, who have been reluctant to allow any
U.N. officials to come to North Korea, actually allowed the
Special Rapporteur on persons with disabilities to come to
North Korea to see what they've done and the North Koreans, in
the disability area, have made progress.
They haven't made the progress that they ought to make on
human rights. But we can't give up. We've got to keep pushing,
and I think the important thing here is that we've got to
continue, keep it up, continue to press and continue to do, and
eventually I'm hopeful that we'll be able to find some
progress.
Chair Smith. Ambassador Lee.
Ambassador Lee. Yes. I mean, it's such an important
question that you raise, Chairman Smith. The problem with North
Korea is that the world is not doing enough because the world
does not know enough about what is going on in that country.
When it comes to, for example, famine in Africa or a
refugee crisis in the Middle East, we have vivid visual
pictures like documentaries, photos. Journalists are allowed to
go in so we have pictures of little babies with their bellies
bloated from hunger, dying in the arms of their mother.
So we have these pictures, but we don't have any of that
when it comes to North Korea because North Korea is the most
closed-off, cocooned society in the world, period. So it's
very, very important that we continue to make progress and we
continue to make efforts to get as much information as possible
into that country and out of that country. And I'm really
hoping that we'll have drones sophisticated enough, not just
for military uses--you know, Hanna showed the satellite images,
but I hope that eventually we'll have much clearer images of
what is going on in these political prison camps.
That's one of the reasons--I mean, to answer your question
as to why we aren't doing enough--it's probably because, in
general, a lot of people just don't know what's going on. I
mean, what is the image of a North Korean human rights
violation that comes to your head? It's very difficult to
capture an image.
So I think we have to make every effort to come up with
something that the world can rally around, to have an iconic
picture of what North Korean human rights is all about.
And also we have to name and shame. How many times have
there been cases of--I mean, it's not just North Korean
defectors in danger of being repatriated imminently once the
borders open. It's been happening over three decades--and where
was the UNHCR every time this has happened?
So we have to ``call them out''--I mean, certainly China,
but the UNHCR as well. We also have to put faces to the names--
I think the NKDB does an excellent job--the organization that
Hanna Song is involved with--of keeping track of all the North
Korean defectors who found sanctuary in South Korea. But we
have to put a human picture, a name to every individual who
suffers and keep monitoring.
I know that the China Commission is about monitoring, so we
have to keep monitoring each and every individual and keep
track of what is happening to these people even when they get
repatriated back to North Korea.
So there's a gargantuan task ahead, but we have to make
these efforts so that their stories will be heard better in the
world.
Chair Smith. Thank you, Ambassador.
Dr. Shin.
Mr. Shin. Thank you.
I agree with everything that Ambassador Lee and Ambassador
King just said. I just want to add that I believe we lost this
very critical momentum which was built up after the 2014 COI
report under the previous administrations in both countries
where these kinds of talks or diplomatic negotiations with
Pyongyang basically excluded the human rights theme. It
resulted in not only this loss of momentum but was also this
big setback for the North Korean human rights movement.
For example, in South Korea's case we had a couple of North
Korean defectors who came by sea who were sent back to North
Korea in November of 2019. I believe that the current
governments in both countries are more committed to the North
Korean human rights issues but it will take some time to regain
this kind of momentum not only at the national level but also,
for example, at the U.N. Security Council where the public
discussion of North Korean human rights issues has stopped
since 2017.
And I also want to add that there are other countries, for
example, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Laos, where the few North
Korean escapees that have somehow made it from China--those
countries are not necessarily friendly toward the refugees and,
again, that's another area where the international community,
perhaps, can redouble diplomatic efforts to make it a more safe
place for those North Korean refugees.
Thank you.
Chair Smith. Ms. Song.
Ms. Song. Thank you for your question, Chairman.
I want to echo what Ambassador Lee said--the world doesn't
do enough because it doesn't know enough. Governments,
including the U.S., including Canada, the EU, they spend
millions of dollars tracking naval ships to see if North Korea
is evading sanctions. How much are they spending on monitoring
human rights violations?
Many North Korean institutions are designated by the U.S.
Government, the EU, and by the U.K. to be perpetrators of human
rights violations. But are we doing enough in terms of
monitoring North Korea's violations of human rights as we are
for weapons development sanctions? I think that is where we can
start. That is something we can begin to do even today.
And, secondly, in terms of why the UNHCR is not doing more,
I think many think that just because of China and North Korea's
unique diplomatic ties it's easy to not expect China to do
more.
However, what we can see--Russia is an interesting example.
Russia--as we all know at the moment--as we are all following,
is responsible for some of the most serious war crimes and
human rights violations this very modern day.
However, Russia allows UNHCR to have access to North Korean
refugees who are in the country. There are many overseas
laborers in Russia who have been dispatched by the North Korean
government to make a profit for their own regime and many
choose to escape. Many will leave their logging sites, their
construction sites, and seek refuge and they seek refuge via
the UNHCR.
As we mentioned earlier, about 67 escapees came to South
Korea last year. The majority of these people were overseas
laborers. The majority of them did not come directly from North
Korea or from China but from Russia, the Middle East, and
African states where they have been working as forced laborers
and had access to U.N. agencies.
The U.N. is doing more in other countries. We cannot let
them just use the excuse that China is a difficult country to
work with. Russia is a difficult country to work with, yet they
are doing more there. So that is an example that we can take
and I hope this Commission can push forward on that as well.
Chair Smith. Thank you.
Co-chair Merkley.
Co-chair Merkley. Thank you, and I wanted to start by
recognizing that our testimony has established that over
several decades we've had the same basic conditions, and,
Ambassador King, you noted your efforts as a special envoy and
how difficult it was to make progress.
In 2017, Senator Markey and I went to South Korea. We met
with refugees, and asked the question, Why is China so
resistant to facilitating the passage of refugees who come from
North Korea on to South Korea or to other nations in the
region?
The answer we received was this. China is absolutely
committed to maintaining North Korea as a buffer against the
West and they fear that if they have a humane refugee policy or
refugee policy that follows international law, that basically
North Korea will collapse because the whole elite world in
North Korea wants to get out of North Korea, wants their
children to get out of North Korea.
Is this the right explanation as to why China has been so
resistant to honoring the Geneva Convention, honoring its own
law? And if, in fact, that is an accurate assessment, how does
that affect our strategy in terms of gaining ground on the
issues we're talking about today?
Ambassador King.
Ambassador King. Thank you very much for your question, for
your comments, and for your interest and concern on this issue.
I think the Chinese definitely want to have a buffer.
They're much more comfortable having North Korea immediately on
their border than having a democratic open society like South
Korea.
But I think there are other things as well. I think the
Chinese are concerned about their own internal situation. That,
again, is a regime that is very repressive. North Korea is
worse, and it's hard to find one worse than China but North
Korea is, and simply allowing the kinds of things that we seek
in terms of allowing North Koreans to leave, to freely go, to
be able to make decisions on their own fate is something they
don't want to allow in their own country.
So yes, they want a buffer, but also they are concerned
about the possibility of the example that that might show.
Co-chair Merkley. So it makes it even harder, another
example.
So this brings me, Ambassador Lee, to your commentary about
the power of the UNHCR and the value or the potential with
binding arbitration. I had not heard before today's testimony
about this UNHCR power. `How powerful is this? Do we have a
strategy in which we could really drive the UNHCR, given the
difficulty of persuading China to otherwise honor the Geneva
Convention?
Ambassador Lee, are you still with us?
Ambassador Lee. Yes. Thank you. Thank you for your
question.
I'm not so sure if we can consider what's available to the
UNHCR as a powerful tool. What I was saying is, in the case
that the UNHCR is prevented from doing its job in China, it can
resort to this binding arbitration, which means that if there's
a conflict of interest between the Chinese government and the
UNHCR in the work that the UNHCR is doing in China, within 45
days it can call for arbitration, and an arbitrator agreed upon
by both sides will come in and try to resolve the issue.
But as far as I know--I don't think I'm wrong--that's never
been the case and, you know, why is then UNHCR not being much
more proactive or much more progressive in dealing with this
issue? It's probably because the refugee agency is--you know,
is concerned that if it really tried to take on the North
Korean refugee issue that China might just kick them out and
that is not completely out of the question, knowing what China
does to any organizations or businesses that do things counter
to the national interests of China.
Now, that might not work out but, you know, I'm just very
disappointed that it's not actually using all the contractual
legal tools on hand to deal with China simply because China
doesn't want it to do so.
Can I just raise the point that you've made about the North
Korean refugees and China being afraid of a mass exodus and
that this could create instability even in China.
There is a case in 2017--I don't know if you're aware of
this--but The Guardian reported in 2017 that China was secretly
making plans to have a network of refugee camps along the 880-
mile border with North Korea, you know, in case there were some
sort of--that there might be a collapse.
Later on, of course, the Chinese foreign ministry denied
this. But, you know, there was a leak by internal documentation
and at that time it was a state-run telecom giant called China
Mobile that revealed the plan, which was carried by the
Guardian.
So China has been thinking about this for many years. So,
it's not completely out of the question to hope that China
might come along in setting up some sort of, even temporary
settlement sanctuaries for the refugees from North Korea.
Co-chair Merkley. Thank you, Ambassador.
And you mentioned some other ideas about encouraging China
to set up a corridor for refugees to Mongolia, Vietnam, Burma,
Laos, or possibly granting amnesty to illegal aliens and then
the refugee camps. It is really frustrating that we haven't
found an effective way to push China.
And Dr. Shin--and I think I'll stop with this question--in
terms of the Chinese government's own law to set up a screening
process for those who assert their desire for asylum--that's
required, as I understand it, by Chinese law. It's required by
the refugee convention--as you think about the different tools
we have and how little effect we've had so far--and I'll extend
this question to both you and Ms. Song--what is the most
effective way we can apply pressure?
Mr. Shin. Thank you for the question, Senator.
It's obviously not easy to persuade the Chinese government
on this issue because they view this from a very geopolitical
point of view--that if they have this kind of change of policy
it could lead to not only the collapse of the North Korean
state but also their own regime as well.
But I think China at least is more amenable to this kind of
international discourse and pressure than North Korea is, which
is why we should utilize all available U.N. and other
diplomatic mechanisms.
And I will say that, with respect to implementing the
refugee processing procedure, I think it's important to
basically tell China also that their take on this issue is
somewhat driven by paranoia as well--that there is historical
precedent back in 1989, when the collapse of East Germany
basically happened--when Hungary, which was ruled by a
communist but reformist government at the time, opened its
borders with Austria and allowed hundreds of thousands of East
Germans to exit to West Germany through this corridor.
And that's the kind of fear I understand that China has,
which might have made more sense in the 1990s. But at present I
think that many U.N. officials, too, consider that that kind of
scenario is very unlikely even if China reconsiders and changes
its policy with respect to North Korean refugees.
So both putting on this kind of diplomatic pressure and at
the same time trying to persuade the Beijing government to view
this issue from a somewhat different--more realistic
perspective, too, hopefully could lead to a more humane policy
from Beijing.
And I think it's important also that we have a consistent
message on this topic, that we don't--especially now that the
Chinese and North Korean government may at any moment end the
border restrictions--that this issue will not be something that
we will just forget but something that the international
community will continue to observe and monitor.
Thank you.
Co-chair Merkley. Thank you, Dr. Shin.
Ms. Song.
Ms. Song. Thank you, Senator.
To echo what Ethan said in terms of diplomatic pressure, I
would just like to add another layer of what we can do from the
bottom up, not just governments but what China can do right now
and what we have been able to see happening in recent news.
As we had heard from the statements before, many of the
women who go to China are trafficked to men from northeastern
provinces in China who have had difficulty in marrying anybody
else in China, which is why they will traffic and bring women
over from North Korea.
As a result there are many families where the mother or the
wife is from North Korea and their husbands, when they know
that their wives are in danger of being repatriated, will
pressure their local government, local municipalities, local
governments, to recognize this marital status and to recognize
the children who are born to the North Korean mother and
Chinese father.
Now, this does not mean these women are recognized as
asylum seekers or recognized as refugees, but it's a start.
They have limited--very limited, but they do have some type of
identification, some type of rights to stay at least within
China and that's where we can at least protect those who are in
China at this very moment.
This doesn't, of course, address the issue of those who are
detained at the border at this very moment. But what we can
begin with is looking at ways in which we can engage with and
persuade the Chinese government to provide protection measures
to the many women who are in China because they are married to
their own Chinese citizens and are mothers to their own Chinese
youth as well.
Co-chair Merkley. So Ms. Song, I had heard a lot about
women who tried to escape North Korea being married off to
farmers. I hadn't heard about trafficking that involved some
other form of pulling women out of North Korea for the purpose
of marrying them.
Am I understanding from your description that that also
takes place?
Ms. Song. Often the farmers--not all men in these rural
areas will be looking for a spouse--but often they know that
their chances increase if it is somebody from North Korea
because the prices are lower as well and so they will ask the
broker to find them a wife and then the broker will often bring
somebody from North Korea.
Co-chair Merkley. Thank you.
Chair Smith. Commissioner Wild.
Representative Wild. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Merkley, for convening this important hearing.
The testimony has made it clear that this is a tragic and
enormous problem, which doesn't in any way suggest that the
U.S. and international organizations shouldn't be tackling it,
but it certainly is a very difficult one to tackle and I
appreciate the very succinct and specific recommendations that
we've heard today.
Let me just start with you, Ms. Song. I'm curious about the
fact that nearly three-quarters of the escapees from North
Korea are women. Why--and, by the way, I had to step out
briefly. I'm sorry if I missed the reason for that. But could
you just enlighten me?
Ms. Song. Representative Wild, there are two factors that
we can consider as to why the majority of the escapees are
women.
Firstly, it's an internal factor in North Korea wherein
women have relatively more freedom of movement compared to the
men. Despite the fact that the men are not compensated for
their work, they are still expected to report to their
factories, their workplace, every day.
On the other hand, women are given the work status of being
a housewife and they use that to their advantage by being able
to travel to different provinces and that is how North Korea,
in fact, has been able to survive despite the Great Famine in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. It was the women who went to
the markets. It was the women who went to China, smuggled
goods, and were able to keep the economy alive.
At the same time, it's also the women who are vulnerable to
being trafficked to China because of the pull factor from
China, as I mentioned to Senator Merkley before.
Representative Wild. Well, and I was going to get to that.
I was just curious about why so many more women than men. Do
these women generally travel in groups, or individually, when
they are attempting to escape?
Ms. Song. Mostly individually, because if they are caught
as a group it is very clear that they are trying to escape the
country. And if there is more evidence that they are trying to
escape their country, then they are labeled a political
criminal.
But if they are traveling as an individual they--before
COVID, of course, they could bribe the state officials,
convince them by saying, Oh, I was just going to China to do
some trade. I was going to come back, and in that case it would
be seen as an economic crime, which is seen to be less severe
than political crime.
Representative Wild. And so the subject that you brought up
of women being brokered, I guess, to marry farmers and other
men in China, is that sometimes presented as an alternative to
incarceration for them if they are caught as escapees?
Ms. Song. There are a few cases in which the North Korean
officials sell these women to Chinese men. It's often that they
are middlemen from the Korean-Chinese ethnic group who are
brokering them.
Representative Wild. I really meant on the Chinese end of
things, is that something that's offered--offered is a bad
word--as an alternative to being imprisoned or is that strictly
something that happens on the black-market level?
Ms. Song. I think they are separate issues.
Representative Wild. Okay.
Ms. Song. But there are cases in which, if a North Korean
woman is married to a Chinese man, he can use his network in
China to be able to prevent his wife from being incarcerated
and sent back to North Korea.
Representative Wild. Okay. Thank you very much.
And so to the group at large and particularly Mr. Shin,
maybe you could lead on this--are there recommendations for the
international community to formulate a gender-based approach to
this huge problem?
Mr. Shin. Thank you, Congresswoman.
That's, I think, definitely a relevant point and I just
wanted to add to what Hanna said earlier that it's a sad fact
of life for most North Koreans that the only way that they can
escape from the country is through this kind of trafficking
unless you're a very rich person in North Korea, and that also
kind of accounts for why there are so many more women refugees
than men refugees--very different from other refugee
situations.
Representative Wild. And I'm sorry for interrupting. But if
you happen to be a very wealthy person who wants to leave North
Korea, do you still have to escape or are there semi-legal
methods of doing so?
Mr. Shin. You can win permits from the North Korean
government through official channels but it's more likely that
they will be using this under--well, black-market channels
because the North Korean government keeps a very close tab on
its citizens if they want to leave the country. They don't
usually allow it for the typical reasons that we would consider
legitimate.
Representative Wild. Thank you. Okay. Sorry for
interrupting. Is there something you would recommend that could
be gender based? And I'll ask the others if anybody has
anything to offer on that after Mr. Shin.
Mr. Shin. Sure. Just following up on the recommendation
from CEDAW that these women should be recognized by the Chinese
government in many cases as victims of trafficking and that
they should be accorded protection under the Palermo Protocol,
the treaty concerning human trafficking.
NGOs are somewhat cautious about this way we approach the
issue as a simple, straightforward trafficking one because,
ironically, the North Korean government and also the Chinese
government have been very active in rounding up the human
traffickers and their rationale is that these brokers are
traffickers and--which is partly true, but they're not really
as interested in protecting these trafficked women and girls as
they are in using this as a legitimate tool to clamp down on
the movement of people from North Korea to China.
So basically we would recommend that while China, or North
Korea even, claims to enforce the trafficking law, you should
take into consideration this kind of very gendered aspect of
the refugee flow.
Representative Wild. And Ambassador King or Ambassador Lee,
do either of you want to respond in any way as to whether there
should be a gender-based approach to this?
Ambassador Lee. Yes. The numbers speak for themselves. It's
well known that a very high percentage, over 80 percent of the
refugees, are women. But I wouldn't stop at just taking a
gender-based approach to the North Korean refugee crisis in
China.
There's also a religion-based approach that should be
taken, and a children-based approach, also. I think it has to
be multifaceted. The children issue--there's a very well-known
NGO activist in South Korea by the name of Tim Peters, who
works on these children born of mixed marriage in China and the
number is quite staggering. I mean, he quotes as many as 40,000
to 50,000 kids in China who just roam the streets and try to
make a living in China. So, certainly gender, but also
religion, and also children-based approaches are necessary.
And if I may take the opportunity to go back to one
aspect--a question that was raised by Co-chair Merkley in terms
of taking action, doing something about it.
When I became the human rights ambassador in 2013, one of
the first things I did was to make a CD and write letters to
almost 30 celebrities in Hollywood, trying to reach out to them
to--you know, hoping that they would take on the North Korean
human rights issue.
But, unfortunately, I did not get any response from any of
them, and these were all very famous people that I wrote to,
like Angelina Jolie and George Clooney, Oprah Winfrey.
I know that CECC is a very influential organization of the
Congress. I think it really would be a huge help to get some of
the celebrities or athletes on board to take on the North
Korean human rights issue--the refugee issue in China.
We've had limited--I know Ambassador Bob King tried to do
this. But if the Congress can get on board and really find some
celebrities to take this issue on, I think it will be a huge
event--a huge plus for the campaign.
Representative Wild. Thank you. That actually leads to
another question that I have. But I would like to ask, if you
don't mind, can you forward this Commission a copy of the
letter that you sent to these celebrities so that we can review
it and perhaps formulate our own letter and attach yours?
Because I think that's very, very important.
It does lead to the question that I had about the overall
international community's approach to this situation and
whether it should be a high-profile approach or a behind-the-
scenes approach. And I guess I don't really understand whether
high-level pressure, celebrity pressure, and that kind of thing
has any kind of impact on the president and other leaders in
North Korea.
Can you just tell me that first? Or are they oblivious to
high-level celebrity pressure?
Ambassador King. North Korean leaders are oblivious to
everything.
Representative Wild. Okay. Thank you, Ambassador King.
Ambassador King. High-level celebrities, Clooney, Oprah--
won't make any difference.
Representative Wild. It won't make a difference.
Ambassador King. And that's largely because they're so
isolated, insulated from any pressure from their own people or
anyone else. They do feel some pressure from the Chinese, to
some extent from the Russians. They feel some pressure from the
United Nations. But this is a regime that is so totalitarian
that they are really----
Representative Wild. Although, as we have seen, they are
responsive to flattery by certain--by a certain United States
president and who seemed to revel in that, correct?
Ambassador King. Yes. They revel in it, but it doesn't last
very long.
Representative Wild. Okay. So I wanted to--I was intrigued
by Ambassador Lee's recommendation about launching an
international campaign similar to the one that was done with
South Africa, and I'd be curious--perhaps, Ambassador Lee, you
could answer this first--but I'd be curious to hear from any of
you--what would a first step be to do something like what was
done with South Africa?
Ambassador Lee. Yes. Well, I think we have to first
understand the U.N. General Assembly procedures, because when
that happened in 1974, of course, the president of the U.N.
General Assembly took the initiative and then later on there
was a vote at the General Assembly.
The thing is, this is not an expulsion. There is a specific
article that deals with expulsions but, you know, that's more
of a U.N. Charter case, and in such a case the Security Council
has a say--which means that it's just not going to work because
of China and Russia.
But in the case of 1974 South Africa, you know, it happened
within the General Assembly. That's what gives me hope that it
might be possible without the interference of the Security
Council.
So I think we have to see who the members of the
Credentials Committee are and make some diplomatic approaches
to the president of the General Assembly and proceed as such.
Now, it may not work. But, you know, just the fact that
these sorts of efforts are being made is huge pressure on the
DPRK to get its act straight.
Now you were earlier wondering, you know, does it really
matter? I think it does because when the COI report came out
and particularly recommending that the North Korean
perpetrators--the human rights issue be referred by the
Security Council to the International Criminal Court--North
Korea responded very, very sensitively.
So they don't like the international community finding out
about all the human rights violations that are going on in
North Korea. So if some of the very high-profile celebrities
start talking about human rights abuses and situations in North
Korea, I think it would matter.
Representative Wild. And who should the person or group of
persons be who would approach the U.N. General Assembly, the
credentials committee? Who would you recommend that be?
Ambassador Lee. I think it has to be done at the
governmental level. So there has to be some coordination
between the U.S. and South Korean governments. But, you know,
I'm not speaking as a government official. It's just my
personal idea. So please don't consider this in any way as a--
--
Representative Wild. No, I understand. I just find it to be
an intriguing idea.
And Ambassador King, do you, with your many years of
experience with North Korea, think that that is a reasonable
approach? Is that a good approach? The reason I'm asking is
because what I'm hearing is that, while they may be sensitive
to criticism, since they don't really have any feedback or
repercussions from their own citizens, it's very hard to
penetrate a government like that and to effectuate any kind of
change.
Do you have any thoughts on what a first step would be to--
--
Ambassador King. You know, the North Koreans are sensitive
to international pressure. When North Korea looks bad
internationally they are concerned about that fact. That
happened when the Commission of Inquiry report was published in
the Human Rights Council in 2014.
The North Koreans were suddenly--the foreign minister, for
example, who had not attended the New York September meetings
where all of the high-level officials attend; for the first
time in 14 years the North Korean foreign minister showed up.
So there is an effect. One of the things that has been very
positive in terms of putting pressure on North Korea is
debating North Korea's human rights in the Security Council.
When the report came out from the Commission of Inquiry,
the issue was taken up in the Security Council. At the time the
United States worked cooperatively with other countries. The
Security Council does not take action unless all five permanent
members agree. But you can have a discussion as long as you
have a majority of nine members of the Security Council calling
for a discussion.
And so we had a program going of annual discussions of
North Korea's human rights problems at the Security Council.
This raised it to the level of--it's not just something we're
dealing with in this organization that deals with human rights.
It's something the Security Council is concerned about and
talks about.
Representative Wild. And which countries does North Korea
most worry about being influenced by this negative publicity
about their human rights abuses? I mean, China, obviously, but
who else?
Ambassador King. China and Russia, but they're not going to
object.
Representative Wild. Right.
Ambassador King. They're not going to be a problem. But
basically the good countries of the world. They want respect
from----
Representative Wild. Okay. So is it a matter of respect
mostly?
Ambassador King. Part of it is respect. The North Koreans
are sensitive about their stature. North Korea has some real
questions about its legitimacy. There is a Korea and there's a
sense that there's one Korea, and when you look at North Korea
and it's being discussed in the Security Council and they're
having votes against North Korea because of its human rights,
it questions the legitimacy of the North Korean government and
so there's value in continuing to do this.
This is one reason why the Security Council debate was
important and why it was very unfortunate that the United
States has stepped in two or three times to block that from
happening.
We're back on track now. It's taking place. We need to
continue this effort of questioning the credentials of the
North Koreans, and that is the way to put pressure on them.
Representative Wild. I've gone way over my allotted time
but let me just ask Mr. Shin and Ms. Song, do either of you
want to add anything else to any of the prior discussion in
response to my questions?
Mr. Shin. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I think I definitely agree with everything that has been
discussed thus far and I also want to add that--given the
difficulty the Security Council has had in reaching any
agreement about North Korea these days, perhaps the General
Assembly is also an important forum, as was the case with
Ukraine and other countries' situations.
And I just also want to add that, since we are at the CECC
meeting here, China's responsibility--that's one aspect that
has not been fully or adequately raised over the past few
years.
It has been raised in the COI report, for example, but it
hasn't--even the NGOs, quite frankly, have not really focused
on the role that China has been playing and I think it's
important to hold China accountable for what's happening in
North Korea because at the end of the day, they are the
enabler, and it's also important for the reason that Xi Jinping
probably cares more about these kinds of international
repercussions than Kim Jong-un would. So----
Representative Wild. So it's an indirect effect.
And Ms. Song, did you want to say anything?
Ms. Song. Yes. The only other thing I would add to what has
been already mentioned in terms of the launching of an
international campaign is that we shouldn't just be thinking
about what the North Korean leadership thinks of having an
international campaign but what the North Korean people would
react to.
One of the reasons why the North Korean human rights issue
hasn't had as much attention despite the fact that it's been
going on for 25, 30 years in which NGOs have been continuously
coming to the Hill, going to the U.N., raising this issue is,
unfortunately, even many North Korean escapees who live in
South Korea and the U.S. are still afraid to speak out.
They're afraid of the repercussions that their family would
face but also afraid that they will be shunned, locked away,
and not given the recognition that they need. So having more
North Korean voices at the table I think is crucial.
Having the recognition that many other vulnerable and
minority groups have, being heard by the international
community, is such a source of strength which I think would
allow us to have more information and know more about this very
isolated country.
Representative Wild. Thank you very much. That's a really
important point. They certainly deserve to know of our support
and our condemnation of the actions of China, which is most
relevant, of course, to this Commission.
I thank you all for a really excellent presentation. With
that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chair Smith. Thank you very much, Ms. Wild.
Without objection we will have three written submissions--
from Greg Scarlatiou, Suzanne Scholte, and Joanna Hosaniak.
Without objection they will be made a part of the record.
And before I go to just a couple of final questions I
especially want to thank--we have an amazing group of people
who staff the China Commission, just an amazing group that are
scholars, who do the due diligence, the hard work of knowing
what is really going on and rejecting surface appeal
argumentation--they go far beyond that. So I want to thank them
for their help with not just this hearing but with all the work
we do.
I especially want to thank Jungahn Kim, who's our special
advisor, a fellow, who did yeoman's work on this hearing but
also provides the Commission, with just tremendous insight,
especially as it relates to Korea--North Korea and South--and
China. I want to thank Piero Tozzi, who's our staff director,
who just has done a tremendous amount of work, and he speaks
fluent Chinese so, you know, when we get into discussions,
particularly with interlocutors who would rather speak Chinese,
there's Piero, and I sit there, and I have to get translation
from both--on both sides. I want to thank Matt Squeri, who's
Senator Merkley's top staffer on the Commission, for his
tremendous work. And Scott Flipse, who has been with the
Commission and does tremendous work. As I've pointed out
before, some of the bills that have become law, including the
Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, were his idea. So I
want to thank you all, and I don't want to leave anybody out,
but we do have a great Commission, group of staffers, and I'm
just so grateful for the work that they do.
Just a brief question on the issue of the Security Council.
We know that South Korea just won a seat as a nonpermanent
member, 180 votes in their favor out of 192 potential. So it
was an overwhelming show of support for South Korea.
And Hwang Joon-kook, the ambassador to the United Nations,
made a very good statement. He did not mention, but I'm sure he
will, the North Korea issue as it relates to the forced
repatriation of people from China.
But this would seem to me to be a prime opportunity,
working with the United States, I would hope, and other
democracies--to ensure that there is robust discussion about
these individuals--human rights in general, obviously, in North
Korea but also to really focus on this imminent forced
repatriation.
You know, delay is denial for them. If we delay and say
someday something good might happen there, well, we have 2,000-
plus more victims, some of whom may be executed, tortured, and
all the other terrible things. So I think we need to be doing
whatever we can to assist the South Koreans as they assume that
very important position.
I also, you know--and perhaps you want to speak to that,
our distinguished panel--but Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kritenbrink recently went to
China. We don't know exactly what was talked about. There were
some critics, including myself, who wished that he would have,
given the proximity of his visit to the Tiananmen Square
massacre remembrance, mentioned something about that. And I
think when you look to see what they've done in Hong Kong, they
being Xi Jinping, they actually shut down not only the country
but even any remembrance, which they claimed didn't happen, you
know.
You go on their social media--and I've done it in internet
cafes in Beijing--and type in Tiananmen Square, Tiananmen
Square massacre, and you get a bunch of pretty pictures--no
tanks, no bayonets--and they say nobody died.
When the Chinese defense minister Chi Haotian came here for
a visit--he had been operational commander for the Tiananmen
Square massacre--he was received at the White House by Bill
Clinton with a 19-gun salute. He should have been sent to The
Hague for crimes against humanity. He had the audacity to say
nobody died at Tiananmen Square. Nobody.
He was asked a question at the Army War College--I put
together a hearing in two days. We had people who were there
who told the story about all the death and mayhem and violence
committed by the People's Liberation Army.
So the hope is that that would have been raised. But we
need to direct, I think, our comments and our focus on the
administration here as well, including Secretary Blinken as
well as Secretary Kritenbrink, to really raise this issue now,
this matter of urgency because once these people are returned,
who knows--God knows what's going to happen to them in terms of
the violence they will suffer. So there needs to be a sense of
urgency, which, perhaps, you might want to amplify a bit on
right now.
And, finally, I guess I'll just leave it at that and just
ask if you can answer those or maybe speak about those two
issues--the Security Council and trying to get our
administration to do even more right now and to pivot.
Ambassador King. One of the things that I'm encouraged
about is that my successor has been nominated by the President,
has actually had a hearing in the Senate. I'm sorry Senator
Merkley isn't here. I'd like to see the Senate actually vote on
that nomination so that she can take her place.
It is helpful to have a special envoy for North Korea human
rights issues, and I think it's encouraging that we've got
that, and I think that's an important step forward. I think
it's very useful to have discussions like we've had today.
Thank you for having this session and being able to air
these issues because I think that makes a big difference in
terms of raising the level of consciousness here in the United
States but also in North Korea thanks to Voice of America and
Radio Free Asia, who are getting the word out on this. Thank
you for doing that.
Chair Smith. Ambassador Lee.
Ambassador Lee. Yes. President Yoon Suk-yeol is very much
committed to improving the human rights situation in North
Korea and also raising the issue on a global scale.
Ambassador Hwang Joon-kook, whom you've mentioned, who is
South Korea's ambassador to the United Nations, is a very good
friend of mine and he is also very stout on the human rights
issue.
So it's fantastic news that South Korea has just joined the
Security Council as its nonpermanent member--that's 1 out of 10
nonpermanent memberships--and I'm sure that we'll make every
effort to get the North Korean human rights issue back on the
agenda of the Security Council.
We have to remember that you have, like, over 10 Security
Council resolutions and sanctions on North Korea but none of
them--none of them are on North Korean human rights. They're
all on North Korean missiles and nuclear tests.
So I think it's important that the Security Council--as we
now take a nonpermanent membership--try to bring the human
rights issue to the fore so that resolutions can be adopted on
this issue as well.
Chair Smith. Dr. Shin.
Mr. Shin. Thank you.
So, yes, it's really encouraging that South Korea has
recently been elected to the Security Council for the next two
years and we, certainly, hope for the resumption of the public
briefing and discussion of the North Korean human rights
situation.
Now, it's probably not going to be easy, given the
requirement for nine votes from supporting countries for this
kind of procedural vote, but we hope that these kinds of
diplomatic efforts will be redoubled. And I think it's also
interesting that you mentioned the Tiananmen Square incident
and other Hong Kong issues, and I think we noticed this kind of
connection between the North Koreans and the refugees in China
and also the other issues in China during the CEDAW
discussions. So we hope that that kind of discourse might also
take place at the U.N. level as well.
And I hope, as Ambassador King said, that Julie Turner's
appointment as the special envoy will take place sooner rather
than later. Thank you.
Ms. Song. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
As you mentioned, it's very important that the issue of
North Korean human rights is raised at the Security Council,
and we hope that South Korea's seat at the table will make that
more likely.
But, as you mentioned, I think it would be even more
important to tie it to the Chinese issue. In the past, there
have been discussions and advocacy efforts to just raise the
issue of North Korean human rights at the Security Council. But
having this transnational element I think would allow more
international attention to be brought to the issue.
In terms of what the U.S. Government could do more of, last
Human Rights Day Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated
the North Korean border guards to be put on the U.S. sanctions
list--the Magnitsky-style sanctions. Yet, the public security
border defense corps on the Chinese side who are also very
responsible, as we have seen and discussed today, they are not
being held accountable for their involvement in the
repatriation of North Koreans.
So we hope that we'll be able to see more of these
designations and appointments of all who are involved in the
human rights violations that are perpetrated against North
Koreans.
Chair Smith. If I could just give you the last word on
this, Hanna Song.
You had mentioned in your discussion about satellite
imagery that at least one Chinese detention center had been
enlarged. I wonder what you think is necessitating that, and if
you could speak to the issue of the wall that's apparently
being built. The Guardian and Reuters have both reported on it.
What does that signal in terms of relations between China and
North Korea?
Ms. Song. As I mentioned in my statement, unfortunately
it's difficult to know exactly what the situation is without
speaking to those who have either been detained there or have
passed through. In the past when NKDB has gathered data on
these six detention facilities, we either did field
investigations in China itself or were able to speak to former
officials who worked in the detention facilities or North
Korean escapees who had been detained there once and were able
to come safely to South Korea.
What we can only do at the moment is pose some questions.
From our understanding from the many testimonies that we've
gathered from North Korean escapees, they're not subjected to
forced labor on the Chinese side. They're subjected to forced
labor on the North Korean side because they're only detained in
China for a few weeks, the longest a few months, before they
are forcibly repatriated.
Now what we're facing is a different issue because some of
them have been detained there for as long as three years. We
don't have concrete evidence for this, but this is something
that we can monitor: Is China now subjecting North Korean
detainees to forced labor during their long detention within
these detention facilities?
I think that is an area in which more investigations need
to be done either by satellite imagery or, hopefully, we will
be able to have more access on the ground. That is something
that NKDB is looking at.
In terms of the fencing on the Chinese side, that, again,
shows China's responsibility in preventing and restricting
North Koreans' freedom of movement and how they should also be
subject to accountability measures, and not just the DPRK
government.
Chair Smith. Thank you.
Would any of you like to make any final word? Your
testimony has been outstanding.
If not, I thank you again for conveying to this Commission
the wisdom and knowledge that you have certainly well honed,
and this hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]
?
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
------
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Robert R. King
The flow of ethnic Koreans back and forth from what is now North
Korea to adjacent border areas in Northeastern China is a centuries old
phenomenon. As international boundaries are now configured, North Korea
has a population of some 25 million people, essentially all of whom are
ethnic Koreans. The adjacent areas of Northeastern China (the Chinese
province of Jilin, and to a lesser extent the provinces of Heilongjiang
and Liaoning) are primarily ethnic Han Chinese, but that area also
includes a Korean minority population of some 2 million people.
Historically, there has been a considerable flow of ethnic Koreans
back and forth between China and northern Korea. From the 1950s to the
1990s China was undergoing the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, while
North Korea was relatively stable and more prosperous. There was a
modest flow of ethnic Koreans from China to North Korea for employment
during that time. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, assistance for
North Korea was cut back, and North Korea went through serious economic
difficulty, particularly in the 1990s with the North Korean famine. At
that same time, post-Mao China was undertaking significant economic
reforms, and the Chinese economy was flourishing. Over the last couple
of decades, many North Koreans have gone to China seeking work.\1\ Many
have gone with the approval of the North Korean government, but others
have gone without Pyongyang's sanction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Hazel Smith, ``Explaining North Korean Migration to China''
including 11 translated Chinese documents on cross-border migration
between China and North Korea, The Wilson Center Publication, online at
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/explaining-north-korean-
migration-to-china.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That economically driven population movement of ethnic Koreans is
still going on in the border areas of China and Korea. During the time
that I was Special Envoy from 2009-2017, I made a point of visiting
ethnic Korean areas of Northeastern China to get a feel for what was
happening in the border area. I found it very interesting that ethnic
Koreans who were Chinese nationals were getting work permits for
employment in South Korea. There were direct flights from the largest
``Korean'' city in China, Yenji in Jilin Province, to Seoul. That
flight was packed with ethnic Koreans with Chinese nationality and
passports, but who were working in South Korea.
I also saw some of this labor flow in the Chinese city of Dandong,
which is located on the west side of the Yalu River, directly across
from the North Korean city of Sinuiju. At the train station in Dandong
rail passenger cars were loaded with travelers going to North Korea. I
was there just before the Korean autumn harvest holiday of Chuseok, and
more than a hundred North Korean young women were boarding the train to
return to their homes in North Korea for the holiday. All were dressed
in matching clothes. They were apparently working as seamstresses at a
Chinese clothing factory, but they were clearly North Korean.
The point I want to make is that historically, culturally, and
economically for centuries there are and have been extensive ties
between ethnic Koreans who have lived in Northeastern China with
Koreans living in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. Those ties
continue.
North Korean Escapees Go Through China
In addition to North Koreans who have found employment
opportunities in China and are working abroad with the knowledge and
approval of the North Korean government, there is a second group of
North Koreans who seek employment in China without going through
official North Korean government channels. There are also North Koreans
who go without official approval to Northeast China in order to escape
from the repressive North Korean regime and seek opportunities to live
and work elsewhere. This third group of North Koreans seek to escape
the repressive Pyongyang government, and the vast majority seek
ultimately to resettle in South Korea.
For Koreans who want to leave North Korea, the easiest and safest
route out of the North is through China.
The 160-mile-long Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) boundary
between North and South Korea is heavily fortified. Tens of thousands
of troops guard both sides of the border. For North Korean citizens to
get into the border zone many miles from the actual border requires
special documentation. Furthermore, getting through the heavily guarded
DMZ is difficult. An estimated 2 million explosive land mines are
located in the border zone.
Exiting through the 10-mile-long Russian-North Korean
border is also not easy. It is too small a boundary to be significant.
It is in the remote northeast corner of North Korea, and Russian troops
guard that border and immediately return escapees they capture to the
North Korean government.
Leaving by boat from the east or west coast of North
Korea is difficult. Coastal areas are closely guarded, access to boats
is difficult, and naval vessels patrol the sea boundaries.
The 850-mile border with China includes river boundaries
and some forested mountainous areas. While this is by far the most
accessible escape route, it is illegal to leave North Korea, and it is
also illegal to enter China without proper documentation.
North Koreans who reach Northeast China are able to find
assistance, mostly from other Koreans, to help them cross Chinese
territory from the Northeast corner of the country to the Southwest
border. They are able surreptitiously to cross into more hospitable
countries, including Laos, Thailand, and others. From there they are
able to find help eventually to reach South Korea, the United States or
European countries. Traveling through more densely populated parts of
China makes it easier to blend in with crowds and avoid detection.
Escape is difficult and dangerous, but there has been some success in
getting out of North Korea and China.
The Disruptive Impact of COVID
The COVID pandemic, however, has changed conditions and made it
much more difficult for North Koreans to escape the North. In dealing
with the pandemic, countries around the world have limited travel,
tightened restrictions on movement, and increased border controls. The
North Korean government has significantly tightened its already
strictly guarded borders to prevent the return of potentially infected
individuals to North Korea. Although tighter border controls due to
COVID are focused on North Koreans returning illegally from China and
elsewhere, the tighter border controls and the increased presence of
North Korean police in border areas have also made it far more
difficult for escapees to leave the North.
China has likewise tightened its borders because of COVID, and this
has made it more difficult than in the past to get into China.
Furthermore, to prevent internal COVID spread, the Chinese government
has also made travel inside the country even more difficult and
restricted than in the past. Getting from the North Korean border to
the southwest of China has become even more difficult now than it was
before.
Statistics show the precipitous decline in the numbers of escapees
arriving from North Korea who are able to reach South Korea. \2\ The
total number of escapees arriving in South Korea since counting began
in the year 2000 has been about 34,000 North Koreans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Figures from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Unification,
``Policy on North Korean Defectors,'' https://www.unikorea.go.kr/
eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/.
2011: Highest one-year total was 2,706 escapees
2012-2016: annual average number of escapees--1,500
2017-2019: annual average number of escapees--1,100
The first COVID case was diagnosed in China in November 2019. Since
that time, the number of North Koreans reaching South Korea has
plummeted:
2020: 229 individuals
2021: 63
2022: 67
2023: (partial year--1st quarter) 34
North Korean escapees going to South Korea are significantly more
numerous than those going to other countries. By legislation the United
States has sought to make clear our willingness to welcome North Korean
escapees to our country. The numbers who have come, however, have been
modest. The largest number admitted in one year to the United States
was 12--admitted in 2017 and 2021. North Korean refugees admitted to
the U.S. number around 200 over the last two decades. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Robert R. King, ``Number of North Korean Defectors Drops to
Lowest Level in Two Decades,'' https://www.csis.org/analysis/number-
north-korean-defectors-drops-lowest-level-two-decades
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
About a thousand North Koreans have been admitted to European
countries in the last two decades, with the largest number going to the
United Kingdom, which has admitted somewhat over 600. \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Eve Watling, ``Inside London's community of North Korean
defectors,'' Independent, February 13, 2020, online at https://
www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/photography/north-korea-
defectors-london-traces-left-behind-catherine-hyland-new-malden-
a9333311.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese Treatment of North Korean Escapees
Chinese government agencies carefully guard entrance to and exit
from China. North Koreans who enter China illegally are apprehended and
imprisoned in China. They are not permitted to leave China, and they
are handed over to the government of North Korea. \5\ But because of
COVID restrictions, the North Korean government has apparently only
accepted a small number of its citizens who have been apprehended by
Chinese authorities since 2020 when the COVID outbreak began. The
Chinese have unsuccessfully sought to return these North Korean
citizens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Roberta Cohen, ``China's Forced Repatriation of North Korean
Refugees Incurs United Nations Censure,'' Brookings, 7 July 2014,
online at https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-forced-
repatriation-of-north-korean-refugees-incurs-united-nations-censure/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In March of this year, Elizabeth Salmon, the UN Special Rapporteur
on human rights in North Korea, told the UN Human Rights Council in
Geneva: ``Due to border closures, over a thousand North Korean escapees
have been detained in China indefinitely,'' and she added that forcibly
repatriated individuals are at severe risk of being sent to North
Korean political prison camps if they are returned to the North. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Elizabeth
Salmon,'' United Nations Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner,
Document A/HRC/52/65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the beginning of the COVID pandemic, however, the North
Korean government has refused to accept its own citizens back when the
Chinese government seeks to return them. The Chinese government appears
to be detaining North Korean citizens who are found in China illegally.
In July 2021, Human Rights Watch suggested that some 50 refugees were
repatriated to North Korea by Chinese officials. \7\ This appears to be
a single instance and not the beginning of a return of all escapees who
were apprehended in China.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ``China Restarts Forced Return of Refugees to North Korea,''
Human Rights Watch, July 22, 2021, online at https://www.hrw.org/news/
2021/07/22/china-restarts-forced-returns-refugees-north-korea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the various reports on North Korean escapees being detained in
China, there has been no effort to distinguish between North Koreans
seeking to leave the North and find refuge in South Korea or elsewhere
and North Koreans who were seeking economic opportunities in China.
As the U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights, I met with
Chinese diplomats at the United Nations in New York and others at the
UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. I also made official visits to China
on several occasions where I met with officials of the Chinese Foreign
Ministry and the Chinese Communist Party's International Liaison
Department to raise United States concerns regarding North Korean
refugees. The Chinese officials were polite, but they showed no concern
for the humanitarian impact of Chinese treatment of North Korea
escapees.
The Chinese government would not discuss North Korean escapees with
United Nations officials who were resident in China or who were
traveling to Beijing from Geneva. UN officials were able to deal with
Chinese government officials regarding refugees from South Asia and
Southeast Asia, but Chinese government officials refused to discuss
North Korean refugees with UN officials.
Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate the Congressional-Executive
Commission's interest and attention to the treatment of North Korean
refugees by Chinese officials and the humanitarian tragedy that China's
policy is creating.
Prepared Statement of Jung-Hoon Lee
When the 2012 UNGA resolution (A/RES/66/290) stressed the ``right
of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and
despair,''\1\ it appeared the UN was determined to reach out to the
most vulnerable in all corners of the world. When it comes to North
Koreans, this commitment has proven to be more rhetorical than
substantive. In North Korea, the people's fundamental rights, including
``freedom from fear and want,'' are systematically trampled. Those who
manage to escape to China in search of a better life do not fare much
better. China's discriminatory policy leaves North Korean refugees with
two choices: forcible repatriation or inhumane treatment in hiding. The
plight of the North Korean refugees in China stands out as one of the
most troubling challenges to the UNHCR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ United Nations General Assembly, Transforming Our World: The
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1, Resolution adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly (September 25, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Korean Refugees in China: An Overview
In the 1990s, facing severe political persecution and starvation,
North Koreans fled the country en masse to take refuge in China. Up to
200,000 North Koreans crossed the border in search of a better
livelihood. The fortunate few made it out of China to countries like
Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar before finding safety in South Korea or
other countries willing to take them in as asylum-seekers. This pattern
of exodus has continued for nearly three decades. Today, there are
34,000 defectors living in South Korea. Having peaked in 2009 at 2,914,
the number has significantly dwindled since 2020 due to COVID-19 border
shutdown, stringent crackdown by both Chinese and North Korean
authorities, and the Moon Jae-in government's aversion to addressing
the defector issue in favor of placating Beijing and Pyongyang.
When caught, the asylum seekers are forcibly repatriated since
Beijing considers them ``illegal economic migrants,'' not refugees.
Those who are returned to North Korea often join 120,000 others in
gulags (political prison camps). Their lives filled with fear, hunger,
and persecution are well chronicled by some of the escapees from these
camps.
Although the North Korean defectors are recognized as refugees by
the UN, the Chinese government prevents them from receiving
international protection and assistance. Without institutional support,
North Korean refugees struggle not only to find food and livelihood but
also to avoid capture and repatriation. In the event of repatriation,
the punishment ranges from torture, incarceration, starvation, and even
death. The North Korean refugee situation is particularly urgent
because while the problem continues unabated, international concern
over the longstanding crisis has weakened due to attention being
channeled towards North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. Although
the denuclearization goal remains a compelling responsibility for the
global community, such goal should not hamper efforts to address North
Korea's other problem--``crimes against humanity.''
The COI Finding and Recommendation
In February 2014 the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights
in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) identified the
state's systematic and widespread ``crimes against humanity,''
including forced labor, forced abortions, infanticide, public
executions, a massive gulag system, and overseas abductions.\2\ The
predicament of the North Korean escapees in China was also highlighted,
accusing China of ``aiding and abetting'' crimes against humanity. By
forcibly repatriating North Koreans, China was found to be in violation
of the non refoulement principle. China continues to violate this
international human rights law which supposedly guarantees that ``no
one should be returned to a country where they would face torture,
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other
irreparable harm.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (A/HRC/25/CRP.1) (February 2014).
\3\ OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/
Issues/Migration/GlobalCompact
Migration/ThePrincipleNon-
RefoulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of course the fundamental problem with the North Korean refugees
begins in their country of origin--North Korea. But China's position on
interpreting their status as ``illegal economic migrants'' certainly
compounds the problem.\4\ The Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) in China has not helped the situation simply by
remaining silent despite not having access to these ``migrants.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Redoubling Crackdowns on Fleeing
North Koreans.'' (September 3, 2017). https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/
03/china-redoubling-crackdowns-fleeing-north-koreans
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The legal tools are there for the UNHCR to do more for the North
Korean defectors. The UNHCR concluded a bilateral agreement with China
in 1995 that granted the UNHCR's staff in China unimpeded access to
refugees within China. Determining who is a refugee requires
interviewing the prospective asylum-seekers. With China strictly
preventing UNHCR access to North Koreans near the border, the process
towards refugee recognition has been completely thwarted. The forcible
repatriation of North Koreans seeking refuge in China is a blatant
breach of Beijing's obligations under the 1951 UN Convention Related to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
The 1951 Convention defines a refugee as ``a person who, owing to a
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion, is outside the country of their nationality, and is unable to
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to rely on the protection of that
country, or to return there, for fear of persecution.'' \5\ That's
North Koreans in China. The fact that North Korean refugees face
detention, prison terms, torture, or in extreme cases, execution when
repatriated back to North Korea is sufficient to classify them as
``asylum-seekers'' or refugees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Atle Grahl-Madsen, ``Refugees, UN High Commissioner.'' In
Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol.
5 (Amsterdam, 1985), 257.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Causal Link between Songbun System and Refugee Status
It is true that famine-related economic migrants cannot be
classified as refugees in the traditional international legal sense.
But the case of North Koreans is different; the main reason for their
defection to a foreign country--economic plight--is the political
outcome of a failed socialist system under totalitarian rule.
The connection between political power and economic deprivation of
a large percentage of the North Korean population can be traced to the
state-sponsored discrimination policy known as songbun. North Korea is
a society steeped in social stratification based on each individual's
political-ideological background as determined by the Workers' Party of
Korea (WPK). All North Korean citizens are classified into either the
basic class (Kibon-gyech'ung), wavering class (Pokjab-gyech'ung), or
hostile class (Chokdae-gyech'ung). Songbun is the source of systemic
discrimination based on the evaluation of a person's religious,
political, and family background spanning three generations, as well as
his or her current behavior and perceived loyalty to the state. This
system underpins the state's socio-economic exclusion policies
responsible for an inter-generational discriminatory scheme that
determines who receives what kind of food, healthcare, education, job,
and even residence.\6\ The songbun class system is strictly enforced by
North Korea's secret police, the Ministry for Protection of the State
(Kukga Bowisong), which target the perceived ``enemies of the state''
in the lowest songbun class. Those targeted are not only deprived of
socio-economic opportunities, but often persecuted in the vast network
of North Korea's detention centers, including political prison camps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ For a discussion on songbun as a tool of the state, see Greg
Scarlatoiu, ``Human Security in North Korea,'' International Journal of
Korean Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Fall 2015), pp. 128-31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is not surprising that most of the victims of the widespread
famine in the 1990s were those of the low songbun class, as they were
the first to be cut from the government's public distribution system
(baegupjedo). The famine led to the exodus of tens of thousands of
North Koreans, primarily residents of the northernmost areas bordering
China--North Hamkyong Province in particular. These areas were, and
still are, largely mining areas, where many people had been sent as a
form of punishment for their poor songbun background. With
international humanitarian agencies prevented from reaching out to
these people, many of them escaped to China as the only means to ensure
their survival.
The right to food is one of the most fundamental human rights
ensured under the existing international laws. Denial of food,
especially as a weapon of persecution, can therefore substantiate a
claim to refugee status by those denied. The songbun system thus causes
repeated attempts to defect, further aggravating the cycle of
deprivation and persecution. Cognizant of this systemic problem, the
COI found that there was enough evidence to recognize many North
Koreans as refugees fleeing persecution or refugees sur place, entitled
to international protection.\7\ Women, who constitute 70-80% of
repatriated refugees, are particularly hard-hit as they are subjected
to trafficking while in China, and to forced abortion, infanticide, and
sexual abuse upon return.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (A/HRC/25/CRP.1) (February 2014), p. 130.
\8\ Daye Gang and Joanna Hosaniak, They Only Claim That Things Have
Changed: Discrimination against Women in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, NKHR Briefing Report No. 8 (Life & Human Rights
Books, Citizens Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, 2018), pp. 38-
46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The principle of non-refoulement guarantees that no one should be
returned to a country where they would face ``torture, cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm
irrespective of their migration status.'' This measure is explicitly
stipulated in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (ICPPED), and other international human rights, refugee,
humanitarian and customary law.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, ``The
principle of non-refoulement under international human rights law.''
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/Global
CompactMigration/ThePrincipleNon-
RefoulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where's UNHCR?
The UNHCR's lack of access to North Korean refugees is generally
viewed as the main reason for its ineffectiveness. But in actuality,
the 1995 agreement between the UNHCR and China gives the UNHCR
unimpeded access to all refugees within China. Why, then, has the UNHCR
not done more to help the North Korean refugees? The UNHCR Beijing
Office is, after all, responsible for determining refugee status in
China, as well as for providing life-sustaining assistance such as
accommodation, living allowances and access to basic health care. The
fact that China permits the presence of the UNHCR office in Beijing
suggests at least a minimum level of professional partnership. In fact,
China and the UNHCR have enjoyed a cooperative relationship, for
example, in working together in the 1980s to support the Vietnamese
refugees in China. The UNHCR has also provided training for Chinese
government officials and held joint symposiums to address refugee
protection issues. Thus, the lack of cooperation on North Korean
refugees appears to be more an exception than the rule.
This raises the question why the UNHCR has not been more aggressive
in obtaining access to interview the escapees. It is also puzzling that
the UNHCR has never opted to invoke binding arbitration regarding
China's refusal to allow access to North Korean defectors. Binding
arbitration in the event of a bilateral dispute is permissible as
stipulated in the 1995 UNHCR-China agreement. In such a case, China is
obligated to accept an arbitrator acceptable to both parties within a
45-day period.
Clearly, the UNHCR has failed to do its job on the North Korean
refugee issue. At the very least, the UNHCR should have been more vocal
in condemning Beijing's refusal to provide legal protection for female
refugees from being trafficked within China. China, after all, is
obligated under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, adopted by the General Assembly in
December 1979, and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, adopted by the
General Assembly in November 2000, to take measures to safeguard
against the trafficking of women and children inside its own borders.
Short-term Suggestions
Despite its shortcomings, the UNHCR remains the best
instrument available to deal with the North Korean refugee issue. But
its presence in China will be ineffective until it begins to assert its
right to ``binding arbitration'' with China. UNHCR should be pressed to
do this, especially regarding the current detainees in danger of
imminent repatriation against their will.
UNHCR could also convince Beijing to open an official
corridor--``underground railroad''--through which North Korean refugees
could pass, escorted by UNHCR officials on their way to Mongolia,
Vietnam, Myanmar, or Laos.
Beijing can be persuaded to periodically allow amnesty
for ``illegal aliens,'' a conduct more becoming of a P5 and an aspiring
global leader.
A semblance of a refugee camp or a temporary settlement
for the escapees to provide a much-needed shield from human rights
violations would mean a major breakthrough. Considering many refugee
camps are erected impromptu, establishing one specifically for North
Korean refugees should not be complicated in practical terms. It's just
a matter of political will.
Accountability Requires Strong Political Will
Reinforce the existing international sanctions by
addressing loopholes.
Benchmark international campaign against South Africa's
apartheid system.
UNGA Credentials Committee should be prodded to re-
examine the credentials of the DPRK pursuant to its Rule 29. Question
is: If South Africa was bad enough to be suspended from all UN
activities for twenty years, shouldn't the UNGA consider doing at least
the same to North Korea until the nonproliferation and human rights
goals are met?
What has the UN done instead? It recently elected North
Korea to the executive board of the World Health Organization and in
June 2022 permitted North Korea to assume presidency of the Conference
on Disarmament. Such display of weakness in not dealing with countries
like North Korea will only lead to the perpetuation of the human
suffering in that country.
This text is extracted from the author's original article published as
``UN's Human Security Challenge: The Plight of North Korean Refugees in
China'' in the Journal of International Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1
(Summer 2020), pp. 39-75.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Chris Smith
Some of you may have crossed the Potomac River to attend this
hearing today. It flows alongside our nation's capital past many iconic
landmarks. For those who are currently watching this hearing from South
Korea, the Han River flowing through Seoul likewise holds tremendous
historical, cultural, and economic importance.
However, for many North Koreans who brave the treacherous journey
across the Yalu and Tumen Rivers--natural borders between North Korea
and China--those rivers represent only sorrow and terror. These rivers
have been their only means of escape from the world's cruelest family
dictatorship, necessitating desperate crossings by small boat, swimming
directly or walking across frozen waters amid the bitter Korean
winter--all while knowing that an alert border guard with shoot-to-kill
orders could end their lives in an instant.
Even after successfully crossing the Yalu or Tumen Rivers, the
plight of a North Korean refugee can rapidly take a turn for the worse.
Startling estimates indicate that up to 80% of female North Korean
refugees become victims of human traffickers, who exploit them in the
lucrative sex trade industry. It is believed that this illicit trade
generates over $105 million annually for North Korean and Chinese
criminal networks.
The lucky ones try to remain hidden. According to a recent report
by Global Rights Compliance, an international human rights law firm,
there are approximately half a million female North Koreans, some as
young as 12, hiding in border regions. If they are discovered, they
face the likelihood of forced repatriation--or to use the technical
term, ``refoulement''--to North Korea.
Today's hearing is especially timely because we have good reason to
believe that such repatriation is imminent, as North Korea reopens its
border following its extended closure in the wake of the COVID
pandemic.
It is reported that approximately 2,000 North Korean refugees are
awaiting imminent forced repatriation, which would subject them to
severe human rights violations upon their return to North Korea, some
of which we will hear about in testimony from our witnesses.
I shared this deep concern regarding the perilous situation of
North Korean refugees in China directly with Antonio Guterres, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, when he visited my office on
April 27. I believe that while there are limits to what our government
and the South Korean government can do to influence Chinese decision
making in this regard, the UN is well positioned to use its influence,
given how much the Chinese government seeks validation from, and indeed
seeks to influence, the United Nations system. So I ask again,
Secretary-General Guterres, please use your influence to the utmost to
dissuade the Chinese government from forcibly repatriating these
refugees.
It is also extremely important that the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Filippo Grandi take a more active
role on behalf of these refugees.
One of our highly distinguished witnesses today, Ambassador Jung-
Hoon Lee, points out that ``The legal tools are there for the UNHCR to
do more for the North Korean defectors. The UNHCR concluded a bilateral
agreement with China in 1995 that granted the UNHCR's staff in China
unimpeded access to refugees within China. Determining who is a refugee
requires interviewing the prospective asylum seekers. With China
strictly preventing UNHCR access to North Koreans near the border, the
process towards refugee recognition has been completely thwarted. The
forcible repatriation of North Koreans seeking refuge in China is a
blatant breach of Beijing's obligations under the 1951 UN Convention
Related to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.''
On May 30, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women issued its Findings of their review of China, calling for
unrestricted access by the UNHCR and relevant humanitarian
organizations to victims of trafficking from North Korea in China.
CEDAW has also recommended that China regularize the status of North
Korean women who face human rights violations such as forced marriage
and human trafficking, and refrain from cracking down on them due to
their undocumented status.
Against this moral pressure, however, are malign incentives--both
political and economic--for the People's Republic of China to
repatriate refugees to North Korea. North Korea and its dictator Kim
Jong Un view those who flee the dictatorship as traitors, which gives
China a political incentive to placate a Communist ally which remains a
thorn in the side of the United States and our allies. Economically, a
written submission for this hearing, which I ask to be entered into the
record, from Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), a
human rights NGO based in Seoul, sheds light on the disturbing economic
incentives that China has in forcibly repatriating these refugees.
According to their ongoing investigation, ``There is a high probability
that a portion of products originating from North Korea but produced
for Chinese companies have been made in prisons detaining repatriated
North Korean refugees from China using forced labor and other human
rights violations.'' This suggests that businesses in China are
profiting from the exploitation of repatriated North Korean refugees,
an issue that demands thorough investigation and accountability.
There is of course a role that both the South Korean government,
and our government, and indeed Congress and this Commission, can play.
The CECC does report on the situation of North Korean refugees in China
in its annual report--and this year the CECC will likely issue a stand-
alone report on the issue--while today's hearing is an example of how
we can bring attention to this impending humanitarian disaster. I
myself have chaired seven congressional hearings on North Korean human
rights, and I have also introduced new legislation--H.R 638, the China
Trade Relations Act of 2023--that withdraws China's Permanent Normal
Trade Relations (PNTR) status unless there are substantial and
sustained improvements in human rights--including how China treats
refugees within its borders.
The refugees in question are not mere statistics; they are
individuals with inherent rights, hopes, dreams, and aspirations. China
has failed to confront the human traffickers who prey on vulnerable
North Koreans. If Beijing wishes to be recognized as a true leader in
the global community, it must not be complicit in the plight of North
Korean refugees in China who are under imminent danger of repatriation.
Human rights transcend mere privilege; they are an inherent
entitlement. We cannot turn a blind eye to China's complicit and
flagrant violations of human rights.
I eagerly anticipate exploring further avenues of collaboration--
including with the Government of South Korea--to emphasize the
significance of this issue as we explore our policy options through our
witnesses' testimony.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley
This Commission tries to do its part to shine a light on the plight
of North Korean refugees in China, with this year marking the 20th year
that we have dedicated a chapter of our Annual Report to this topic.
Yet we last held a hearing on this 11 years ago, so this hearing is way
overdue and thank you for arranging it. In many ways, not much has
changed. In fact, the announcement for the Commission's first public
event on North Korean refugees, way back in 2004, included many of the
same characterizations we'll hear about today: desperate individuals
fleeing North Korean government persecution and severe food shortages;
Chinese authorities' willful refusal to assess any of these individuals
as refugees; stonewalling UN Refugee Agency efforts to help those in
need.
Precisely because so little has changed is why we can't avert our
eyes. Human rights abusers play a waiting game, waiting for the world
to grow weary, outrage to dissipate, and people to move on. But those
who are suffering cannot move on. The North Korean and Chinese
governments are playing the same cynical game, and we can't let them
off the hook.
As we'll hear today, the Chinese government has obligations under
Chinese law, under international law, and under basic humanitarian
decency to provide individualized determination of the refugee status
of asylum seekers. Instead, China's approach flouts the principle that
anyone has the right to seek asylum, treating all North Korean escapees
as illegal immigrants. If anything, this is backward, and all North
Koreans who escape to China should be understood to be at risk. The
2014 UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights in North Korea was clear:
The forcible repatriation of thousands of North Koreans subjects them
to crimes against humanity. Just being a North Korean in China means an
individual would be in grave peril if sent back to North Korea. The UN
Commission of Inquiry was equally clear about that: China's approach
violates the international principle of non-refoulement, which is
supposed to guarantee that nobody will be repatriated to a country
where they would face torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment;
and other irreparable harm. Irreparable harm is what awaits the
vulnerable North Koreans that Chinese authorities plan to send back to
the gulag.
Though much has has not changed on this topic over the last two
decades, we're holding this hearing because of what has changed. COVID-
19 changed much in our world, and the landscape of North Korean
defection is no different. Border closures and tougher travel
restrictions on both sides of North Korea's border with China made
defection more difficult and more expensive. Now, the potential easing
of North Korea's border closures raises the specter that China will
again start forcibly repatriating North Koreans. The other thing that
has changed is the same thing we observe in so many other contexts:
China's Orwellian surveillance state supercharges its ability to keep
an eye on the people it seeks to control, including North Korean
refugees. Vulnerable people facing either repatriation or hiding now
face a much more difficult task in remaining hidden or in receiving
help without catching the attention of authorities who wish them ill.
This all leaves a bleak situation for North Korean refugees in
China, but those of us fighting for human rights should not shy away
from the challenge and instead must double our efforts. I look forward
to our witnesses' counsel on what we can do, and just on a personal
note, I traveled to South Korea and to the China/North Korea border
where the three highways exist a few years ago. In South Korea I met
with refugees, some of whom had swum across the border, some of whom
had crossed the land border to China, some who had come through the
Demilitarized Zone. I'll never forget one young woman who had escaped
only to be returned as a teenager with her father. He faced horrific
punishment. She faced less harsh punishment but still a very difficult
course. He encouraged her to escape again, knowing what would happen to
his family; she actually did succeed, and I think about that father
trying to get his daughter to freedom knowing the torture that he would
be facing. We're going to be hearing from you all as experts and I'm so
glad you've come to share your knowledge, your experiences. Thank you.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern
Good morning. I join my colleagues in welcoming those present to
today's hearing on the risk of refoulement of North Korean refugees to
China, in contravention of international law. I regret that I am unable
to join you in person.
The mandate of this Commission is to examine grave human rights
violations committed by the People's Republic of China against its own
people. But today we are focused on potential rights violations the
Chinese state may commit against citizens of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, also known as North Korea. The concern is that as
North Korea relaxes its COVID-era border restrictions, the PRC may
begin to deport back to the DPRK North Koreans who entered China
without proper documents, where they could be severely punished,
tortured or even killed.
Every country has requirements in place to control who can enter
its territory. If someone crosses an international border without
having the required documents in hand, usually a passport and visa or
work permit, and they are caught, they may face sanctions, including
deportation. Anyone who enters a country without going through regular
channels may face this risk, unless they are seeking asylum.
An asylum seeker is a person who has left their country and is
seeking protection from persecution and serious human rights violations
in another country, but who hasn't yet been legally recognized as a
refugee. Asking for asylum is a human right, and governments are
obligated under international law to evaluate the situation of each
person who requests it.
The issue is that the PRC routinely labels all North Koreans who
are in its territory without proper documents as ``illegal economic
migrants.'' As we will hear today, many, maybe even most, may be
economic migrants. But there's no way to know for sure without looking
at each person's case. To not allow people from North Korea, a country
that is infamous for the severity of the human rights abuses it
commits, to be considered for asylum, is a human rights violation.
But even if all the North Koreans in China were ``illegal economic
migrants,'' under international law, the PRC may not repatriate them to
the DPRK. As a state party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967
Protocol, and the UN Convention against Torture, the PRC may not
forcibly return North Koreans if they would be at risk of persecution
or torture upon return. As you will hear today, the North Korean
authorities have criminalized departure from the country without
permission and there are many credible reports of the serious
mistreatment to which returnees are subjected. For the PRC to forcibly
return people to the DPRK, knowingly placing their well-being and even
their lives at risk, violates human rights as well as basic principles
of human decency.
This problem is not new. The same alarm was raised when news broke
of the detention and possible deportation of North Koreans by the PRC
in 2017 and in 2021. As we will also hear today, the problem is not
limited to China; Russia engages in the same practice. So what can be
done?
First, the Senate can approve the Administration's nomination of
Julie Turner to serve as Special Envoy on North Korean Human Rights
Issues, a position that was vacant throughout the Trump Administration.
I was glad to see that Ms. Turner's nomination was placed on the Senate
calendar on June 1.
Second, according to the information that is available to us, many
North Koreans who enter China without documents are seeking to transit
through to other countries. The U.S. should encourage the PRC to either
provide them asylum or give them safe passage to South Korea or another
safe third country.
Third, the option for North Korean refugees to resettle in the
United States should remain available. Even though the numbers are
small, the door must remain open.
Fourth, the Administration should continue to encourage and support
the International Red Cross and the UN refugee agency in their efforts
to track what is happening to North Koreans in China, Russia, and
elsewhere, and to persuade governments to never forcibly return them to
the DPRK.
I expect today's witnesses will have additional recommendations. I
am especially interested in how to protect the well-being of the North
Koreans who are victims of this situation--unable to survive in their
country of birth, and unable to reach safety. They should be the focus
of our concern.
Finally, as a strong believer in the human right to food, I thank
Jung-Hoon Lee, one of today's witnesses, for recognizing that ``The
right to food is one of the most fundamental human rights ensured under
the existing international laws. Denial of food, especially as a weapon
of persecution, can therefore substantiate a claim to refugee status by
those denied.''
Thank you.
------
Submissions for the Record
------
Statement of Joanna Hosaniak
Honorable Chairs and members of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights
would like to thank the Commission for the opportunity to submit this
written statement. In consideration of the issue of forced repatriation
of North Korean refugees from China, it is important to consider the
often-overlooked economic and trade relations of China with the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK/North Korea) and how
policies of refoulement of refugees by China benefit Chinese companies
and both states.
The Chinese government's classification of North Korean refugees as
illegal economic migrants, and their deportation to DPRK to face
extreme punishment, prevents North Koreans (a majority women and girls)
from accessing necessary resources, such as administrative or legal
procedures, to legalize their status in China under domestic or
international law. They are vulnerable to deportation back to North
Korea, even in cases where they are victims of trafficking or qualify
as refugees. Those who are deported face a range of harsh punishments,
including lengthy prison terms, torture, and forced labor in detention.
It is often argued that China is pursuing such policies to maintain
political ties with North Korea, and to prevent destabilizing the
regime. However, looking from the economic perspective, the continued
repatriation of North Korean refugees from China provides an unimpeded
supply of free forced labor for North Korea's detention centers, which
often produce products for China-based companies at significantly lower
cost. This is extremely concerning as it suggests that Chinese
businesses are profiting from the abuse of North Korean refugees. As
such, the Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights would like
to request that the Commission look into this intricate supply chain
and business connections between China and North Korea and how they
affect abuses faced by the North Korean refugees.
1. crimes against humanity in north korean supply chain
and connection to the refugee issue
The Citizens' Alliance's years-long ongoing investigation into the
role of the North Korean regime's top structures in export linked to
large-scale human rights abuses (Report: ``Blood Coal Export from North
Korea'') has revealed that the DPRK sustains its economic system
through a coercive quota system, which requires civilians to submit
quotas of goods for the export of minerals, agricultural and livestock
products, metal, construction materials, etc. This pyramid of extortion
is enforced through each Ministry and Party organ and is imposed on
every citizen throughout society.
The quotas of goods are also fulfilled using forced labor and
slavery in detention centers. In particular, detained populations
produce the top commodities for export, which are often the target of
the most restrictive international sanctions, such as coal and
minerals. Our investigative findings indicate that production in
detention centers is based on intergenerational discrimination based on
the songbun system, which determines which citizens will replenish the
slave labor force in the infamous prison system. North Koreans deported
from China, most of whom are women, are held in detention facilities
that sustain themselves and provide revenue for the regime through
forcing labor upon detainees. The lower the songbun, the more
vulnerable a deported North Korean is to harsher work and life
conditions in detention.
The hunting system for prisoners and slave labor is enforced by the
Ministry of State Security (MSS/secret police) which, together with the
Ministry of People's Safety (MPS/police) and Korea People's Army (KPA),
sits under the current leader in the State Affairs Commission--the top
organ of the State. The law enforcement ministries have numerous
subsidiaries that are corporations trading in the production obtained
through slave labor in detention centers. These companies have their
intermediaries operating in China to supply their products to China-
based businesses.
The MSS is the primary investigative authority dealing with persons
deported from China who have crossed the border with the aim of finding
work or seeking asylum in third countries, or as victims of
trafficking.
Former MSS Officers and prosecutors from North Korea reported
during Citizens' Alliance's investigation that the seriousness of
crimes is evaluated based on the discriminatory songbun classification,
using biased information unverified by an independent court.
Furthermore, these insiders reported that women repatriated from China
should consider themselves ``lucky'' to be released from pre-trial
detention to police custody where they faced trial and subsequent
detention in a kyohwaso prison (long-term correctional prison with
forced labor) operated by MPS or police. This is because it is the MSS,
not any independent decision-maker or court, that decides at the pre-
trial secret investigation stage, which women will remain in MSS
custody, with the risk of being sent to an MSS political prison camp
from which a release is unlikely, and which women will be handed over
to MPS custody to face trial and sentence in an MPS-operated detention
facility.
Women interviewed after 2012 also reported an increase in the
punishment for border crossing; five years in a kyohwaso prison on
average for illegal border crossing. This reflects reported legislative
amendments to North Korean criminal law and should be viewed and
further analyzed through the lens of the quota system of production in
detention centers, which forms a vicious cycle of hunting for free
forced labor. Women have always been, and continue to be, the primary
victims of this cycle. In this way, the MSS is providing a constant
supply of slave labor.
2. production ``made in china'' in north korean detentions
Similar to political prison camps operated mostly by MSS, the
kyohwaso prisons operated by MPS are also major sites of production
(mining, lumbering, farming, production of goods). Women repatriated
from China who served sentences in those prisons have been reporting
for more than a decade that some kyohwaso prisons have been operating
large wards for women deported from China where women produced
textiles, wigs, or fake eyelashes labeled ``Made in China''.
In recent years the data provided from the General Administration
of Customs in China disclosed the increasing import of such beauty
products from North Korea to China. According to NK Pro, Chinese import
of wigs or eyelashes from North Korea jumped from 37 metric tons in
December 2022 to 121 metric tons in April 2023 and constituted 71
percent of China's overall trade with North Korea. According to a Radio
Free Asia report from 2021, a 20-kilogram (44-pound) box of raw
materials for wig manufacturing costs 7,000 yuan (about U.S. $1,100),
but the finished products made from those materials can earn a profit
of more than 30,000 yuan (about $4,600). While some of these products
have been stockpiled due to closed borders with China during the
pandemic, this type of product constitutes substantial earnings for the
North Korean regime (valued at $22.6 million in April) and Chinese
companies.
Reports indicate at least 1,000 prisoners in Chinese prisons are
awaiting deportation to North Korea because of the closed border. Given
high production in North Korean detention centers for Chinese
companies, the reopening of borders will cause a surge in deportations
from China that will only exacerbate grave human rights violations and
labor exploitation used for the benefit of Chinese companies.
3. conclusion
This statement provides a general overview of the worrying
situation of forced repatriation of North Korean refugees from China to
North Korea, which is accompanied by their forced labor in detention
facilities in North Korea. These detention facilities are used to
supply products for Chinese companies, leading to a cycle of
exploitation and human rights abuses.
It is clear that further action must be taken in order to combat
this issue, including pressuring Chinese officials into ceasing all
forms of forced repatriation and enforcing stricter regulations
regarding businesses engaging in unethical practices within their
borders. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the importer to ensure
that their products have not been produced using forced labor.
For this reason, U.S Customs and Border Protection has issued a
notice of enforcement guidance for companies importing goods from North
Korea and China. Currently, cosmetic and beauty products such as wigs
or eyelashes that are produced also in North Korean detention
facilities are not listed on the sanctions lists. But even if they are
included in the future, it is not preventing Chinese companies from
maintaining business relations with North Korean companies and
benefiting from the trade. Due to the lack of transparency on the
Chinese side, U.S. authorities should adopt in the North Korean case a
similar approach to its position on Chinese production in Xinjiang.
There is a high probability that a portion of products originating
from North Korea but produced for Chinese companies has been made in
prisons detaining repatriated North Korean refugees from China using
forced labor and other human rights violations, in some cases amounting
to crimes against humanity. All products sold by Chinese companies,
especially those registered in Jilin Province bordering North Korea,
can therefore be assumed to have used forced labor unless due diligence
can prove otherwise. Such products should be restricted from
international export, given that free, unrestricted export enables
supply extracted from detained North Koreans to flow through Chinese
companies.
Accordingly, Congress needs to consider expanding the existing
sanctions regime to require exporters of products reported as
originating from China's border regions with North Korea to demonstrate
that they did not entail prison labor or slave labor from North Korea.
By creating such a presumption and shifting the burden of proof from
U.S. authorities to Chinese exporters, the latter would have a strong
incentive to root out prison labor or slave labor from their supply
chain.
Our organization also calls upon the United States to raise issues
and make recommendations concerning China's policy of forcible
deportation for North Korean refugees and the exploitation of North
Korea's prison labor at China's fourth Universal Periodic Review (UPR)
which is scheduled to take place in January or February 2024. It would
be helpful to also call for China to disclose the number of North
Koreans arrested and forcibly repatriated or waiting in detention to be
repatriated each year.
It is also necessary for governments to consider updating and
strengthening the UN's accountability work for North Korea's crimes
against humanity, including China's responsibility, taking into
consideration the accountability mechanisms for Syria and Myanmar
created by the UN in 2016 and 2018 respectively, to prepare case files
for future judicial process.
Third countries like Mongolia, Vietnam, and Laos where many North
Korean escapees in China are heading to in search of freedom must also
be compelled to respect the principle of non-refoulement and give them
free passage to South Korea or other countries where they want to
resettle.
Your consideration of these matters and solutions is very much
appreciated.
______
Statement of Greg Scarlatoiu
The witness wishes to thank the Congressional-Executive Commission
on China for the invitation to submit this written testimony. The
witness wishes to thank and credit HRNK's team for the thorough,
tireless, and effective work invested into this report, especially
Ingyu Choe, Raymond Ha, Rick Herssevoort, Doohyun Kim, Elizabeth J.
Kim, Kaylee Kim, Daniel McDowall, and Isabella Packowski. The witness
also wishes to thank the North Korean escapees and human rights leaders
who answered the questionnaire designed in support of this report,
including Ji Seong-ho, Jung Gwang-il, Kang Cheol-hwan, Lee So-yeon, Lee
Hyun-seung, Ko Young-hwan, Kim Ji-eun, Phillip Lee, Kim Sung-eun, and
many others who chose to remain anonymous.
The Issue
North Koreans who manage to escape Kim Jong-un's oppressive,
totalitarian regime often first flee to China, where they have no
protected legal status or opportunity to seek asylum. As a result,
North Koreans seldom find safety in China and are highly vulnerable,
living under the constant threat of deportation to North Korea. North
Korean escapees face serious hardships and challenges in China. They
are victims of human rights violations committed by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and by Chinese individuals. The status of North
Koreans in China has decidedly worsened under COVID. HRNK is currently
assessing how the human security and human rights of North Koreans have
been affected by restrictions imposed under the pretext of COVID
prevention, including that of North Koreans who are trapped in China.
Living Conditions
Living conditions for North Koreans in China are appalling. In
addition to these harsh conditions, North Koreans are vulnerable to
physical, emotional, and sexual exploitation.\1\ For the most part,
North Korean refugees hide in isolated refuges, which may come in the
form of hidden rooms in cities like Yanji or isolated rural settlements
in the mountains. These shelters are often of very low quality, lacking
proper sanitation and running water. The only facility available is the
kang, a ``raised platform heated by underfloor pipes upon which the
Korean household sleeps, eats, and spends any leisure time.'' \2\ The
situation is so poor that one individual, in a letter to the UN, stated
that ``we North Korean refugees in China
[ . . . ] live worse than dogs in a mountain hut.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Hazel Smith, ``North Koreans in China: Defining the Problems
and Offering Some Solutions,'' Research Paper for the Center for East
Asian Studies (2005): 124.
\2\ Ibid., 125.
\3\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This lifestyle is very turbulent and insecure. Scholars like Andrei
Lankov have described it as a ``hybrid of shuttle trading, smuggling,
and fugitive status,'' as these people live under the constant fear of
being caught by either the Chinese or North Korean authorities.\4\
Their condition is ``akin to indentured servitude,'' given the extreme
dependence of North Korean refugees on their employers for all aspects
of life.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Andrei Lankov, ``North Korean Refugees in Northeast China,''
Asian Survey 44, no. 6 (2004): 871.
\5\ Joel Charny, ``North Koreans in China: A Human Rights
Analysis,'' International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 13, no.
2 (2004): 83; Smith, 125.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finding work is paramount to their survival. North Korean refugees
may find work in remote mountainous farming areas. They may provide
other forms of casual or unskilled labor, such as becoming waiters,
dishwashers, construction workers, or maids.\6\ The remuneration which
refugees receive for their work is abysmal. As a result of the North
Koreans' ``illegal'' status in China, their wages are far below that of
the locals. There are structural barriers to filing complaints about
working conditions due to the absence of legal protections.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Smith, 125; Lankov, 862.
\7\ Smith, 125.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Korean Women in China
Women represent the majority of North Koreans who escape to China.
North Koreans flee into China for different reasons, many desperate to
escape the oppression under the Kim regime and seeking economic
survival. North Korean women and girls are often lured to China by
human traffickers under the premise of finding work. As a result, many
are sold as ``brides'' to rural Chinese men or forced into prostitution
or online sex work. Based on HRNK's interviews with escapees, many are
subject to exploitation and abuse. Because China considers North Korean
refugees to be ``illegal economic migrants,'' these women and girls are
even more vulnerable to abuse. They can be turned over to the
authorities, arrested, and refouled despite a credible fear of
persecution by the North Korean authorities. Those who are repatriated
are subject to torture and inhumane treatment at detention facilities
in North Korea. North Korean women suspected of having become pregnant
with Chinese men even suffer forced abortions and infanticide.
Women and girls face abject conditions in China's ``Red Zone,'' a
region in China in which authorities hunt refugees to send back to
North Korea. Although the numbers are still disputed, it is estimated
that up to 500,000 female North Koreans, some as young as 12, hide in
this region. They are subjected to systematic rape, sexual slavery,
forced marriage, unwanted pregnancy, forced labor, and cybersex
trafficking. This mistreatment has become normalized within the region.
Additionally, the COVID pandemic and associated lockdown measures have
made movement much more difficult for these individuals. As many as 80%
of female North Korean refugees fall into the hands of human
traffickers and are sold into the sex trade, which is estimated to
generate more than $105 million a year for Chinese and North Korean
organized crime networks.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Julian Ryall, ``North Korean girls exploited in China's `Red
Zone','' Deutsche Welle, Mar 27, 2023. https://www.dw.com/en/north-
korean-girls-exploited-in-chinas-red-zone-report/a-65137209.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Korean Children in China
Children are another vulnerable group of North Koreans living in
China. This includes children who have traveled with their families,
children of ``mixed'' marriages, and orphans. More recently, there has
been a growing prevalence of stateless children in China, born outside
of North Korea but not in possession of Chinese citizenship. Life for
these children is extremely arduous. For the most part, they remain
indoors to avoid detection. Because very few of these North Korean
children speak Chinese, this increases the risk of detection and
creates barriers to accessing education.\9\ Some live in shelters
provided by humanitarian organizations or churches and receive basic
schooling.\10\ Not all children are so fortunate, and only a handful
have access to even this very basic form of education.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Ibid.
\10\ Ibid., 126.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A significant number of children are orphans and cross the border
in groups. These are almost always boys aged between 12 and 18. Groups
are generally made of up of 10 to 15 people, but can sometimes be as
large as 30.\11\ These children are known as kkotjebi (``fluttering
swallows'') and could often be seen wandering the streets in cities
like Yanji during the famine of the 1990s.\12\ The area in which these
orphan groups can be found is enormous. While most live in the
northeastern region of China, some go as far as Beijing or to the
provinces further south. Some even go to Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar,
and Thailand.\13\ Having initially crossed the border, these groups may
work for loggers in exchange for shelter and meet up with other North
Korean children once they reach a city. Frequently, they beg from South
Korean tourists, though this is particularly risky because they become
easy targets to spot as a result of their ragged clothing.\14\
Additionally, the general health of these orphans sets them apart.
Chung Byung-ho discusses how ``many of them have visible signs of
malnutrition in their faces and bodies, and most are very short for
their age. Many are also afflicted with various skin diseases.'' \15\
In extreme cases, a 16-year-old boy may be just 132 centimeters tall,
or an 18-year-old may speak with a voice that has not broken yet. In
terms of housing, these orphans will live in secret shelters.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Chung Byung-ho, ``Living Dangerously in Two Worlds: The Risks
and Tactics of North Korean Refugee Children in China,'' Korea Journal
43, no. 3 (2003): 199.
\12\ Ibid.; Smith, 125.
\13\ Chung, 194.
\14\ Ibid, 202.
\15\ Chung, 203.
\16\ Ibid., 205.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of the severe famine of the 1990s in North Korea, a new
group of young people has emerged--stateless children. Having been born
outside of North Korea, they do not have legal status there. They
cannot legally reside in China, and they are not eligible for Chinese
citizenship. Additionally, as marriages between North Koreans and
Chinese citizens are illegal, these refugees are similarly not afforded
Chinese citizenship, and therefore are denied basic rights such as
health, education, or welfare.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Smith, 126; Charny, 87.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recent Developments and China's International Legal Obligations
With the gradual loosening of border restrictions and easing
pandemic prevention measures, North Korean escapees are at great risk
of being forcibly repatriated to North Korea. According to UN Special
Rapporteur Elizabeth Salmon, if repatriated, these escapees risk being
sent to a kwan-li-so, where they will be subjected to a myriad of human
rights abuses, including torture.\18\ As of October 2022, the UN
estimated that there were as many as 2,000 North Koreans currently
detained by Chinese authorities as illegal migrants, at risk of being
forcibly returned to North Korea.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Anthony Kuhn, ``North Korean defectors in China face
deportation as COVID border controls ease,'' NPR, April 25, 2023.
https://www.npr.org/2023/04/25/1169464713/north-korea-
defectors-deportation-china.
\19\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Report
of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
DPRK to the General Assembly, 2022.'' https://seoul.ohchr.org/en/node/
495.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to its international legal obligations under the 1951 UN
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, China must recognize North Korean
nationals fleeing persecution in their homeland as refugees sur place,
precisely because they face a credible fear of persecution upon
refoulement. Both China and North Korea are in violation of
international law and basic human rights and should be held
accountable. In the aftermath of the COVID pandemic, North Koreans in
China are even more vulnerable. They remain in hiding without access to
adequate healthcare, or they have been detained by Chinese police as
they await North Korea's border reopening.
Special Rapporteur Salmon has called on China to not repatriate the
North Korean escapees once border restrictions are lifted. However, in
response to Special Rapporteur Salmon's comments at the UN Human Rights
Council in March, China stated that ``those North Koreans who have
entered China illegally are not refugees,'' and that China ``attaches
great importance to protecting the legal rights of foreign nationals in
China, and to suppressing trafficking in women and children.'' However,
the escapees' legal status is irrelevant. Under international law,
according to Special Rapporteur Salmon, if people are deported to face
persecution, torture, or other serious human rights violations, then
``these states are prohibited from transferring or removing individuals
from their jurisdiction to a place where these awful things may
happen.'' \20\ These concerns were most recently reiterated during the
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW)'s 85th session in Geneva in May. The committee raised concerns
about the forced deportation of North Koreans in China and the (lack
of) legal protection, particularly North Korean women and their
children. Beijing reiterated its stance that North Korean women come to
China for ``economic reasons'' and therefore do not qualify for legal
protection. According to Chinese authorities, North Koreans engaging in
illegal activities will be ``sent back to their country.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Kuhn, ``North Korea defectors in China face deportation.''
\21\ Ifang Bremer, ``UN committee questions China about forced
deportation of North Korean women,'' NK News, May 16, 2023. https://
www.nknews.org/2023/05/un-committee-questions-china-about-forced-
deportation-of-north-korean-women/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimates of the North Korean Population in China
Due to COVID-related restrictions in both North Korea and China, it
has become even more difficult than before to assess the approximate
number of North Koreans in China. The sources contacted for this report
provided a wide range of estimates regarding the North Korean refugee
population in China, ranging from as few as 5,000 to as many as
250,000. This reflects the difficulty of obtaining accurate estimates
due to the refugees' precarious status in China. Ms. Kim Ji-eun, a
Seoul-based reporter for Radio Free Asia, derived an estimate of
100,000 to 200,000 based on her experience with WeChat groups (quan)
formed by North Korean refugees in China to exchange information. Each
group typically has between 300 to 600 members, and she estimates that
there are dozens, if not hundreds, of such chat groups.
There are also a variety of estimates regarding the number of
officially dispatched North Korean workers in China. Nevertheless,
multiple sources report that most of these workers are in the three
northeastern provinces of Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang.
According to ROK National Assemblyman Ji Seong-ho of the People
Power Party, the ROK government estimated that there were 50,000 North
Korean workers in China prior to the onset of the COVID pandemic. While
this number has likely fallen due to restrictions on overseas workers
placed by UN Security Council resolutions 2375 and 2397, he added that
most of these workers have likely remained in China after the
expiration of their visa.
Ms. Kim Ji-eun estimated that there are between 120,000 and 150,000
North Korean workers in China who have not been able to return due to
COVID-related border restrictions. According to a source in Dandong,
around one year into the COVID pandemic, the DPRK consulate in Dandong
gathered the passports of all North Korean workers dispatched to the
region to extend their visas. During this process, it was revealed that
there were 100,000 North Korean workers in Dandong. Ms. Kim added that
there are also industrial parks in Yanji, Changchun, and nearby areas
that host between 5,000 and 6,000 North Korean workers. The highest
estimate came from an individual involved in rescuing North Korean
refugees, who put the number of officially dispatched North Korean
workers in China at 500,000.
There was a narrower range of estimates regarding the number of
North Koreans who are currently held in detention by Chinese
authorities, ranging from around 100 to 3,000. Assemblyman Ji Seong-ho
reported that there are at least 1,300 in detention, mostly in the
three northeastern provinces. Pastor Kim Sung-eun of the Caleb Mission
gave a similar estimate of 1,200 North Korean escapees who were
arrested during the COVID pandemic and are currently being held in
detention facilities operated by China's border security forces,
located along the Sino-North Korean border. A former North Korean
overseas worker stated that the Chinese police appear to have been
carrying out more frequent arrests of North Korean refugees recently.
Some information is also available about the number of North Korean
escapees being held at specific facilities. Mr. Kang Chol-hwan of the
North Korea Strategy Center noted that there are at least 500 held in
detention facilities across China, including those in Beijing, Dandong,
and Shenyang. This includes officially dispatched workers and North
Korean officials who were caught while trying to escape. Mr. Kang
specifically noted that 280 are held at a police detention facility in
Shanghai. Mr. Jung Gwang-il of No Chain stated that 300 are held at the
border holding facility in Tumen, and another 300 at a jail in Yanji.
According to escapee testimony received last month by Ms. Lee So-yeon
of the New Korea Women's Union, 400 North Korean refugees are being
detained at a border police station in Jilin Province, awaiting
repatriation to North Korea.
Ms. Kim Ji-eun, who estimated that there are between 500 and 1,000
North Koreans in detention in China, stated that these individuals
would likely be repatriated to North Korea once border restrictions are
lifted. A representative of an organization involved in rescuing North
Korean refugees put the number of detainees at 3,000, but also reported
that these individuals are awaiting repatriation. A former North Korean
overseas worker noted that when these refugees are repatriated, North
Korea's Ministry of State Security officers are likely to impose
harsher punishments than before and extort the detainees more severely,
as no refugees have been repatriated in the past 2 to 3 years due to
COVID.
New Trends and Developments
The sources contacted for this report provided noteworthy
information about recent developments in the situation of dispatched
North Korean workers and North Korean refugees in China.
Assemblyman Ji Seong-ho, based on testimony from North Korean
escapees who have recently arrived in South Korea, noted that North
Korea appears to be sending workers overseas under the guise of sending
students or military personnel. He noted that this practice merits
further investigation.
Ms. Kim Ji-eun also stated that the North Korean and Chinese
authorities have made secret arrangements to send North Korean workers
across the border. These workers, mostly women between 19 and 30 years
old, are selected from the border areas and quietly taken across the
border at night by bus. They do not have passports, and they do not go
through customs when crossing the border.
Pastor Kim Sung-eun stated that last year, he saw a large
industrial park being built at the North Korea-China Free Trade Zone in
Tumen, Jilin Province. Some North Korean workers had already arrived at
this site. Others at the site said that more workers were expected to
be sent there from North Korea. The Chinese government has a perception
that North Korean workers are meticulous, skilled workers who are
cheaper to employ than Chinese workers.
Mr. Jung Gwang-il drew attention to the dire situation of North
Korean workers in China who could not return home due to COVID-related
restrictions. These workers, mostly young women who worked at sewing
factories, were out of work once their initial contract expired. The
economic slowdown in China due to COVID only added to their troubles.
These workers were ``sold'' by local brokers to carry out various kinds
of short-term work, and some of these North Korean women resorted to
working at local restaurants. Many suffer from malnutrition, with some
resorting to collecting and boiling vegetables that were thrown away at
local markets. Mr. Jung added that some of these women have reportedly
committed suicide, as they could not send enough money back home to
repay the bribe they gave to be sent overseas.
Ms. Kim Ji-eun added that if North Korean workers fall ill while in
China, they pay out of pocket for medical treatment. Official
representatives of North Korean companies sometimes provide an
interpreter if someone must go to the hospital, but they do not provide
additional assistance. If a North Korean worker is seriously ill and
admitted to a hospital, Chinese doctors and nurses are forbidden from
speaking directly to such patients. In these instances, the North
Korean worker is essentially left to die.
Lastly, Mr. Jung Gwang-il reported that some local authorities are
allowing female North Korean refugees to remain in China. Specifically,
in rural areas of Heilongjiang Province, North Korean women who have
married Chinese men and have given birth to two or more children are
issued temporary identification papers by local officials. These
children are also officially registered in the hukou system. This
practice reportedly stems from the recognition that the father will
face difficulties in raising the children alone if the North Korean
mother is forcibly repatriated.
Consequences of Repatriation
There was broad agreement among multiple sources regarding the
consequences of forcible repatriation for North Korean refugees.
Refugees who are judged to have crossed the border for economic reasons
are sentenced to time at a mobile labor brigade (ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae)
or a long-term prison-labor facility (kyo-hwa-so). In these instances,
detainees can use bribes or rely on connections to reduce their
sentence. Assemblyman Ji Seong-ho noted that the minimum sentence is 6
months at a kyo-hwa-so, and Ms. Kim Ji-eun noted that the sentence can
range from 5 to 15 years at a kyo-hwa-so. Ms. Kim added that 90% of all
forcibly repatriated North Korean refugees eventually die after their
return, since conditions at the kyo-hwa-so are extremely harsh. An
escapee who left North Korea in 2019 reported that the punishment for
repatriated refugees depends on how long the refugee has stayed in
China. Another North Korean escapee who spent almost 20 years in China
added that the punishment is more severe for those who have spent more
time in China. This witness further noted, however, that it is possible
for North Korean refugees to use bribes and connections to be released
from detention from local and municipal authorities while in China.
North Korean refugees who attempted to escape to South Korea or
encountered Christianity during their escape attempt are punished
severely. These individuals are sentenced to death or sent to political
prison camps (kwan-li-so). Mr. Kang Chol-hwan noted that since 2014,
all North Korean refugees who have been forcibly repatriated are sent
to kwan-li-so.
North Korean workers who were officially dispatched overseas are
subject to investigation upon return. Assemblyman Ji Seong-ho noted
that officially dispatched workers who encountered South Koreans,
Americans, or other Westerners or watched unauthorized content (e.g.,
YouTube) while overseas are investigated by the Ministry of State
Security or the Overseas Workers' Bureau. Any workers who are found to
have engaged in such conduct are immediately returned to North Korea.
He added that the punishment depends on the seriousness of the
violation, and that such individuals are unlikely to be sent overseas
again. Mr. Ko Young-hwan, a policy advisor to the ROK Ministry of
National Defense, stated that workers who have encountered a South
Korean citizen (or missionary) while overseas are sentenced to 1 to 5
years at a kyo-hwa-so.
Ms. Kim Ji-eun provided a similar account. Korean Workers' Party
(KWP) authorities or security agencies (Ministry of Social Safety,
Ministry of State Security) conduct a preliminary investigation of
workers who have returned to North Korea. Workers must confess and
declare any infractions they committed during their time overseas. If
they are discovered trying to hide such violations, they are subject to
further investigation by security agencies, where they may be detained
during interrogation. They may be able to avoid punishment by paying a
bribe, but this bribe may be so large that they must pay almost all the
money they earned and retained while overseas.
Multiple sources confirmed that officially dispatched workers who
are caught while trying to escape while overseas are treated no
differently from North Korean refugees who are caught in China during
escape attempts. After being forcibly repatriated, they are given, at
minimum, a life sentence and may be sentenced to death. Mr. Phillip Lee
of Unification Hope Mission noted that 10% to 20% of North Korean
escapees were originally officially dispatched workers.
If an officially dispatched worker escapes while overseas, there
are consequences for the worker's family members back home in North
Korea. This applies not only to officially dispatched workers, but also
to other North Korean refugees who have escaped. Assemblyman Ji Seong-
ho stated that due to an increase in the number of escapees over the
years, it is now difficult for the North Korean authorities to punish
the remaining family members of all escapees. Nevertheless, these
family members are subject to close surveillance by the Ministry of
State Security, and they are forbidden from holding key official
positions in North Korea. A North Korean escapee who arrived in South
Korea in 2020 stated that remaining family members would be under
``severe surveillance.'' Mr. Phillip Lee also noted that remaining
family members will not be able to join the KWP or attend college.
Other sources also reported that remaining family members are
typically banished to remote areas of North Korea. Ms. Kim Ji-eun noted
that this is to make it difficult for the escapee to establish contact
with remaining family members. She added that the remaining family
members will be completely ostracized by others in North Korea.
Policy Recommendations
Further research and documentation are needed to clarify the
number, status, and humanitarian situation of North Korean refugees and
officially dispatched workers currently trapped in China.
China must be persuaded to cease and desist its policy of refouling
North Korean refugees, under the pretext that they are ``illegal
economic migrants.'' This is a direct and blatant violation of China's
obligations under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the 1967
Additional Protocol.
Both the U.S. Government and U.S. civil society must urgently seek
ways to reach out to the North Koreans trapped in China and educate
them on the path to seeking asylum in the United States.
North Korean refugee protection and rescue must become a pillar of
U.S. North Korea human rights policy, in accordance with the letter and
the spirit of the U.S. North Korean Human Rights Act.
In order to provide the resources necessary for North Korean
refugee protection and rescue, the North Korean Human Rights Act, which
expired in September 2022, must be reauthorized.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Witness Biographies
Robert R. King, Former Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights
Issues, U.S. Department of State
Ambassador Robert R. King served as Special Envoy for North Korean
human rights issues at the U.S. Department of State (2009-2017). Since
that time, he has been a senior advisor to the Korea Chair at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a senior fellow
at the Korea Economic Institute, and a board member of the Committee
for Human Rights in North Korea. Previously, Ambassador King served for
25 years on Capitol Hill (1983-2008) as chief of staff to Congressman
Tom Lantos (D-California) and as Democratic staff director of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee (2001-2008). King is the author of Patterns
of Impunity: Human Rights in North Korea and the Role of the U.S.
Special Envoy. With Gi-Wook Shin he edited The North Korean Conundrum:
Balancing Human Rights and National Security. (Both are published by
the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia and Pacific Research Center at Stanford
University.)
Jung-Hoon Lee, Dean, Graduate School of International Studies,
Yonsei University & Former South Korean Ambassador-at-Large for North
Korean Human Rights
Jung-Hoon Lee is the Dean and Professor of International Relations
at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He
is the former Ambassador for Human Rights for the Republic of Korea as
well as its inaugural Ambassador-at-Large for North Korean Human
Rights. His academic affiliations include a visiting professorship at
Keio University and he is a Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School.
Prof. Lee currently advises the government as Chair of the National
Unification Advisory Council's International Affairs Committee, Chair
of the Ministry of Unification's newly created Commission for North
Korean Human Rights, and Policy Advisor to the National Security
Council. Internationally, he is a Board Member of the Committee for
Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) in Washington, DC, an International
Patron of the Hong Kong Watch in London, and an Advisory Council Member
of the International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute, also
based in London. He received his BA from Tufts University, MALD from
the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, and D.Phil. from the University
of Oxford (St. Antony's College).
Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, Legal Analyst, Transitional Justice Working
Group
Dr. Ethan Hee-Seok Shin is a legal analyst at Seoul-based human
rights documentation NGO Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG). He
has been interviewing North Korean escapees who make their way to South
Korea through China to record enforced disappearances and other grave
human rights violations, made submissions to the UN human rights
experts on their behalf and set up FOOTPRINTS, an online database of
the people taken by North Korea. He is an advocate for ending China's
policy of indiscriminate refoulement for North Korean refugees without
individualized determination and has helped raised the issue recently
at the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW). He holds a Ph.D. in international law from Yonsei University
in South Korea and an LL.M. from Harvard Law School.
Hanna Song, Director of International Cooperation, Database Center
for North Korean Human Rights
Hanna Song is the Director of International Cooperation and a
researcher at the Seoul-based North Korean human rights NGO, the
Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB). NKDB, officially
established in 2003, has recorded over 130,000 entries related to human
rights violations in its database, carries out advocacy based on the
data, and also provides resettlement support to North Korean escapees.
NKDB has interviewed over 20,000 North Korean escapees who have
resettled in South Korea. Through interviewing North Korean escapees
who have recently entered South Korea since the pandemic, NKDB has been
able to examine the current situation on the ground in China and how
COVID-19 has changed the landscape of North Korean defection. As
Director, Ms. Song has briefed diplomats, policymakers, and foreign
correspondents on the human rights situation in North Korea. She has
created partnerships with international stakeholders, with research
institutions, universities, and NGOs overseas. As a researcher, she has
documented human rights violations in NKDB's Unified Human Rights
Database--the largest repository on North Korean human rights
violations. She has published reports on the human rights situation in
North Korea's military, humanitarian assistance sent to North Korea,
the Sustainable Development Goals, and the Universal Periodic Review.
She has appeared in The Economist, Financial Times, and BBC among other
international news outlets.
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