[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SAFEGUARDING THE HOMELAND FROM
UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM,
LAW ENFORCEMENT,
AND INTELLIGENCE
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 10, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-86
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-350 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California
Dan Bishop, North Carolina J. Luis Correa, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Tony Gonzales, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Nick LaLota, New York Robert Garcia, California
Mike Ezell, Mississippi Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Anthony D'Esposito, New York Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Laurel M. Lee, Florida Thomas R. Suozzi, New York
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Dale W. Strong, Alabama LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Elijah Crane, Arizona
Stephen Siao, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE
August Pfluger, Texas, Chairman
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island,
Tony Gonzales, Texas Ranking Member
Anthony D'Esposito, New York J. Luis Correa, California
Elijah Crane, Arizona Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Thomas R. Suozzi, New York
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Michael Koren, Subcommittee Staff Director
Brittany Carr, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Shri Thanedar, Michigan, Ranking
Nick LaLota, New York Member
Laurel M. Lee, Florida Robert Garcia, California
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Vacancy, Subcommittee Staff Director
Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Seth Magaziner, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
The Honorable Shri Thanedar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Keith Jones, Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner of Air
and Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Robert W. ``Wes'' Wheeler, Jr., Assistant Director, Critical
Incident Response Group, Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 18
Mr. Brad Wiegmann, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for National
Security, Department of Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 18
Panel II
Mr. Jeffery Baumgartner, Vice President, National Security and
Resilience, Berkshire Hathaway Energy:
Oral Statement................................................. 44
Prepared Statement............................................. 45
Mr. Paul Schwennesen, Co-Director, Global Strategy Decisions
Group:
Oral Statement................................................. 48
Prepared Statement............................................. 49
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Prepared Statement of Cathy L. Lanier, Chief of Security,
National Football League..................................... 51
APPENDIX
The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Letter From the U.S. Chamber of Commerce....................... 61
Statement of GB Jones, Chief Safety and Security Officer for
FIFA World Cup 2026.......................................... 62
SAFEGUARDING THE HOMELAND FROM UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS
----------
Tuesday, December 10, 2024
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law
Enforcement, and Intelligence, and the
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. August Pfluger
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Pfluger, Gimenez, Bishop, Higgins,
Gonzales, LaLota, D'Esposito, Crane, Green, Magaziner, Correa,
Thanedar, and Kennedy.
Also present: Representatives Malliotakis and Smith.
Mr. Pfluger. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and
Intelligence, and Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime
Security will come to order.
Without objection, the gentlewoman from New York, Ms.
Malliotakis, and the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, are
permitted to sit on the dais and ask questions of the
witnesses.
The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from
expert witnesses from the Federal Government and as well as the
private sector about the growing threat of unmanned aerial
systems, more commonly known as UAS or drones.
We will hear from two panels today, and our first panel
consists of 3 witnesses from the Federal Government.
Good afternoon. I would like to welcome you all to today's
important hearing on the threats posed by unmanned aircraft or
aerial systems, UAS or drones and the threat to U.S. national
security and the policy solutions that could mitigate these
risks.
Before we begin, I would like to personally recognize 2
individuals, Congresswoman Dan Bishop and Congressman Anthony
D'Esposito, for their service to the subcommittee and to our
Nation, and I wish them well in their future endeavors.
As we sit here today, we're at a critical juncture in the
evolution of military technology, commercial innovation, and
cybersecurity. UAS have become a transformative force. They
have been used in countless positive ways that include
revolutionizing many industries like agriculture, logistics,
film production, and others while also improving capabilities
for humanitarian relief and law enforcement.
However, as with any powerful technology, UAS have also
introduced significant security challenges. In recent years the
proliferation of UAS both domestically and abroad has raised
serious concerns regarding the potential misuse and criminal
activities, espionage and, more alarmingly, in threats to U.S.
national security. From foreign adversaries seeking to exploit
UAS for surveillance and intelligence gathering to the growing
risk of UAS being weaponized to attack critical infrastructure,
sports stadiums, our vulnerabilities are clear.
The risks posed by commercial and military grade UAS in the
hands of rogue states, non-state actors, terrorist
organizations, and even individuals cannot be overstated. There
have already been several troubling incidents where UAS have
been used to penetrate air space comprising not only our
national security but public safety.
Threats to our homeland can also derive from the
manufacturing of products that Americans frequently use. A
glaring example is the wide-spread use of drones manufactured
by Da-Jiang Innovations, DJI, a Chinese company whose products
are deeply embedded in U.S. industries and critical sectors.
These systems raise national security including risk of
unauthorized data access and systemic vulnerabilities.
Multiple U.S. departments and agencies have already
admonished against or banned the procurement of certain UAS
originating in the People's Republic of China in recognition of
the threats they pose. Just this past October reports indicated
that CBP is blocking the importation of some UAS produced by
DJI due to potential violations of the Uyghur Forced Labor
Prevention Act which is a law that prohibits the importation of
goods into the United States produced in whole or in part with
forced labor out of the PRC.
We must work to protect U.S. communications equipment while
strengthening U.S. supply chains by ensuring foreign
manufactured technologies that pose security threats cannot
operate in U.S. networks. The threats posed by UAS continues to
present challenges.
The U.S. border is one of the most significant
vulnerabilities when it comes to this type of threat. UAS have
already been used to circumvent traditional border security
measures such as fences, walls, and surveillance towers. UAS
have been used to smuggle drugs and weapons across the border
and surveil CBP locations for human smugglers to then evade
detection.
CBP officials have consistently raised concerns that Mexico
narco-terrorist gangs are using weaponized UAS only a short
distance from the U.S. border and in many cases operating
inside the United States.
UAS also pose a significant threat to critical
infrastructure, including power grids, oil refineries,
airports, water treatment plants, and transportation systems. A
single UAS carrying explosives could potentially cause wide-
spread damages, interrupt services, and result in significant
economical loss to our homeland.
Additionally, recent events illustrate the diverse roles
UAS have played in both state-on-state conflict and asymmetric
engagements such as those in Ukraine and Israel as well as
their use in potential intelligence-gathering operations near
sensitive military installations at home and abroad. We must
learn from these conflicts to help protect our homeland
security.
DHS and DOJ were given counter-UAS authorities as part of
the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 which became law as
part of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. The current
authorities provided under the act are set to expire on
December 20, 2024, just 1 week from now.
Over the past years DHS and DOJ have used these authorities
to engage in activities to protect covered facilities and
assets against credible threats posed by UAS, not withstanding
laws such as the Wiretap Act or the Aircraft Sabotage Act that
could otherwise limit such activities.
It is imperative that we not only make sure that the
current authorities are extended to protect our national
security but also work together to responsibly reform the
current legal authorities that provide Federal agencies with
critical tools to mitigate credible threats posed by UAS.
I would like to applaud Chairman Green as well as Ranking
Member Thompson for their bipartisan work alongside Members on
T&I and Judiciary for introducing H.R. 8610, the Counter-UAS
Authorities Security Safety and Reauthorization Act of 2024.
This legislation will renew and reform current counter-UAS
legal authorities. The legislation will also modify and improve
counter-UAS authorities of the Federal Aviation Administration,
enhance important protections for the civil liberties of
Americans using UAS in a legal and responsible manner, and
strengthen public safety in communities throughout this Nation.
For instance, the legislation requires DHS to establish a
counter-UAS mitigation pilot program under which selected State
and covered law enforcement agencies may operate approved
counter-UAS mitigation systems and mitigate unauthorized UAS
operations on behalf of covered entities at a number of sites
each.
Today we are going to hear from experts in the fields of
national security, law enforcement, defense, and technology who
will provide insights into the threats posed by the UAS and
family of systems to our homeland and efforts to address these
challenges.
I just want to say, if you are watching the news today, we
have had several incidents that have occurred and are occurring
right now in places like New Jersey. Recently we had an
incident at Langley Air Force Base. The threat is real.
This hearing I think will address many topics. Maybe we
don't have all of the answers that come out of this hearing,
but my hope is that by having this hearing, by asking both the
Government and non-Governmental panel, that we can get to the
right questions, and we can--if we don't have the right
policies in place, then let's get those policies in place. If
we do and the authorities are there, then let's figure out what
we can continue to do to keep our homeland safe.
There are many aspects of this, but the most important
aspect is the safety and the security of every American citizen
and the life that we live here.
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panels
today and working in a bipartisan manner.
[The statement of Chairman Pluger follows:]
Statement of Chairman August Pfluger
December 10, 2024
Good afternoon. I would like to welcome you all to today's
important hearing on the threats posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS), or drones,\1\ to U.S. national security, and the policy
solutions that could mitigate these risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ An unmanned aircraft is defined in U.S. Code as an aircraft
that is operated without the possibility of direct human intervention
from within or on the aircraft. An unmanned aircraft system (UAS), or
drone, generally refers to the entire drone system, including both the
unmanned aircraft and ground control unit. As such, an unmanned
aircraft is generally considered a subpart of a UAS rather than a
synonym because it only refers to the aircraft, not the entire system.
See, 49 U.S.C. 44801(11)-(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Before we begin, I would like to personally recognize 2
individuals, Congressman Dan Bishop and Congressman Anthony D'Esposito,
for their service to this subcommittee and our Nation. I wish them well
in their future endeavors.
As we sit here today, we are at a critical juncture in the
evolution of military technology, commercial innovation, and
cybersecurity. UAS have become a transformative force.
They have been used in countless positive ways that include
revolutionizing industries like agriculture, logistics, and film
production, while also improving capabilities for humanitarian relief
and law enforcement.
However, as with any powerful technology, UAS have also introduced
significant security challenges.
In recent years, the proliferation of UAS both domestically and
abroad, has raised serious concerns regarding their potential misuse in
criminal activities, espionage, and more alarmingly, in threats to U.S.
national security.
From foreign adversaries seeking to exploit UAS for surveillance
and intelligence gathering, to the growing risk of UAS being weaponized
to attack critical infrastructure, sports stadiums, our vulnerabilities
are clear.
The risk posed by commercial and military-grade UAS in the hands of
rogue states, non-state actors, and even terrorist organizations cannot
be overstated. There have already been several troubling incidents
where UAS have been used to penetrate air space, compromising not only
national security but public safety.
Threats to our homeland can also derive from the manufacturing of
products that Americans frequently use.
A glaring example is the wide-spread use of drones manufactured by
Da Jiang Innovations (DJI), a Chinese company whose products are deeply
embedded in U.S. industries and critical sectors. These systems raise
national security concerns, including risks of unauthorized data access
and systemic vulnerabilities.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, Release Cybersecurity Guidance on Chinese-Manufactured
UAS for Critical Infrastructure Owners and Operators (Jan. 17, 2024),
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/release-cybersecurity-guidance-
chinese-manufactured-uas-critical-infrastructure-owners-and-operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multiple U.S. departments and agencies have already admonished
against or banned the procurement of certain UAS originating in the
People's Republic of China, in recognition of the threats they pose.
Just this past October, reports indicated that CBP is blocking the
importation of some UAS produced by DJI due to potential violations of
the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which is a law that prohibits
the importation of goods into the United States produced, in whole or
in part, with forced labor out of the People's Republic of China.
We must work to protect U.S. communications equipment, while
strengthening U.S. supply chains by ensuring foreign-manufactured
technologies that pose security threats, cannot operate in U.S.
networks.
The threats posed by UAS continues to present challenges.
The U.S. border is one of the most significant vulnerabilities when
it comes to this type of threat.\3\ UAS have already been used to
circumvent traditional border security measures, such as fences, walls,
and surveillance towers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Border Security Report Fiscal Year 2018. Border Security Report
Fiscal Year 2018 / U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
UAS have been used to smuggle drugs and weapons across the border
and surveil CBP locations for human smugglers to evade detection.
CBP officials have consistently raised concerns that Mexican narco-
terrorist gangs are using weaponized UAS only a short distance from the
U.S. border.
UAS also pose a significant threat to U.S. critical infrastructure,
including power grids, oil refineries, airports, water treatment
plants, and transportation systems.
A single UAS carrying explosives could potentially cause wide-
spread damage, interrupt services, and result in significant economic
losses to our homeland.
Additionally, recent events illustrate the diverse roles UAS have
played in both state-on-state conflict and asymmetric engagements, such
as those in Ukraine and Israel, as well as their use in potential
intelligence-gathering operations near sensitive military installations
at home and abroad.
We must learn from these conflicts to help protect our homeland
security.
DHS and DOJ were given counter-UAS (C-UAS) authorities as part of
the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018, which became law as part
of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.
The current authorities provided under the Act are set to expire on
December 20, 2024.
Over the past several years, DHS and DOJ have used these
authorities to engage in activities to protect covered facilities and
assets against credible threats posed by UAS, notwithstanding laws such
as the Wiretap Act or the Aircraft Sabotage Act, that could otherwise
limit such activities.
It is imperative that we not only make sure that the current
authorities are extended to protect our national security, but also
work together to responsibly reform the current legal authorities that
provide Federal agencies with critical tools to mitigate credible
threats posed by UAS.
I'd like to applaud Chairman Green and Ranking Member Thompson for
their bipartisan work, alongside Members on T&I and Judiciary for
introducing H.R. 8610, the Counter-UAS Authority, Security, Safety, and
Reauthorization Act of 2024.
This legislation will renew and reform current counter-UAS legal
authorities.
The legislation will also modify and improve counter-UAS
authorities of the Federal Aviation Administration, enhance important
protections for the civil liberties of Americans using UAS in a legal
and responsible manner, and strengthen public safety in communities
throughout the Nation.
For instance, the legislation requires DHS to establish a counter-
UAS mitigation pilot program under which selected State or covered law
enforcement agencies may operate approved counter-UAS mitigation
systems and mitigate unauthorized UAS operations on behalf of covered
entities at a number of covered sites each.
Today, we will hear from experts in the fields of national
security, law enforcement, defense, and technology, who will provide
insight into the threats posed by UAS to our homeland, and efforts to
address these challenges.
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panels today and
working in a bipartisan fashion to urgently address these issues.
Mr. Pfluger. I now recognize the Ranking Member on the
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and
Intelligence, the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Magaziner,
for his opening statement.
Mr. Magaziner. My thanks, Chairman Pfluger, for calling
this important hearing and all of my colleagues for
participating.
The proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems has created
a technological arms race between criminals who use UAS
technology to plot acts of terror, traffic fentanyl and other
illegal substances, and invade the privacy of ordinary
Americans and law enforcement agencies tasked with keeping our
homeland safe.
Both the criminals and law enforcement agencies are
innovating at a rapid rate, and it is important that the
Federal Government keep up. The time has come for Congress to
expand the authority of Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies to better utilize monitoring, tracking,
and signal-jamming technologies to protect critical areas,
including our borders, large public events, prisons, and
sensitive Government facilities while also ensuring the civil
liberties of drone operators.
This is the goal of H.R. 8610, the Counter-UAS Authorities
Security Safety and Reauthorization Act, authored by Chairman
Green and Ranking Member Thompson which I'm proud to have
cosponsored.
For years DHS, DOJ, and other agencies have briefed this
committee on the threats posed by malicious and unauthorized
UAS. We have seen drones shot down at airports in this country
and around the world. Major sporting events have been
interrupted with players rushed from the field when
unauthorized drones with unknown motives entered restricted air
space.
Just a few weeks ago the FBI arrested a white supremacist
in Tennessee who planned to use a drone with an explosive
payload to attack a power grid.
However, it must also be said that drones are useful tools
for many occupations and hobbyists. They can be useful for
search and rescue, navigation, agriculture, and more, and these
positive aspects remind us that we must take a measured
approach to the issue.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses about how
best to balance the benefits and risks of UAS. Moreover, I hope
that this hearing will help lay additional groundwork for
getting H.R. 8610 over the finish line.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Magaziner follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Seth Magaziner
December 10, 2024
Proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems has created a
technological arms race between criminals who use UAS technology to
plot acts of terror, traffic fentanyl and other illegal substances, and
invade the privacy of ordinary Americans, and law enforcement agencies
tasked with keeping our homeland safe.
Both criminals and law enforcement agencies are innovating at a
rapid rate, and it is important that the Federal Government keep up.
The time has come for Congress to expand the authority of Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agencies to better utilize monitoring,
tracking, and signal-jamming technologies to protect critical areas,
including our borders, large public events, prisons and sensitive
Government facilities, while also ensuring the civil liberties of drone
operators.
This is the goal of H.R. 8610, the ``Counter-UAS Authority
Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act,'' authored by Chairman Green
and Ranking Member Thompson--which I am proud to have co-sponsored.
For years, DHS, DOJ, and other agencies have briefed this committee
on the threats posed by malicious and unauthorized drones.
We have seen drones shut down airports in this country and around
the world. Major sporting events have been interrupted with players
rushed from the field when unauthorized drones with unknown motives
entered restricted air space.
And just a few weeks ago, the FBI arrested a white supremacist in
Tennessee who planned to use a drone with an explosive payload to
attack the power grid.
However, it should also be said that drones are useful tools for
many occupations and hobbyists--they can be used for photography,
search and rescue, navigation, and agriculture. These positive aspects
remind us that we must take a measured approach to this issue.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses about how best to
balance the benefits and risks of unmanned aerial systems. Moreover, I
hope that this hearing will lay additional groundwork for getting H.R.
8610 over the finish line.
Mr. Pfluger. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Transportation and Maritime Security, the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Gimenez, for his opening statement.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today we are examining the growing threats posed by
unmanned aerial systems, UAS or drones, and exploring solutions
to better protect our homeland from this evolving technology.
The popularity and accessibility of drones have skyrocketed
in recent years today. There are more than 880,000 registered
drone operators in the United States with countless others
operating drones without proper registration or training. While
many of these operators use drones for legitimate purposes,
recreational, commercial, or otherwise, there's an undeniable
threat from those who misuse this technology either through
ignorance of the rules and regulations or with malicious
intent.
Uninformed operators can inadvertently disrupt air traffic
or encroach on sensitive areas creating safety risks that
strain our law enforcement and the aviation systems. While
uninformed operators presents a risk, their potential impact is
negligible compared to the dangers posed by nefarious actors
with malicious intent. Nefarious actors, including
transnational criminal organizations, terrorists, and foreign
adversaries can exploit drones to evade traditional security
measures, gather intelligence, smuggle contraband, disrupt
transportation systems, or even launch attacks on our homeland.
The threat from nefarious actors is both real and
escalating. Along our borders drones are increasingly employed
by cartels to smuggle drugs and surveil law enforcement
operations. We must consider all appropriate actions to ensure
that foreign adversaries like the Chinese Communist Party are
not using drones under the guise of legitimate activities to
relay sensitive information back to China or other entities
that seek to harm the United States.
Critical infrastructure such as airports, power plants, and
ports face growing risks from rogue drones capable of
conducting surveillance, causing disruptions, or carrying out
acts of sabotage.
These risks are not hypothetical. Since 2021, the
Transportation Security Administration has documented nearly
2,000 drone sightings near U.S. airports with major airports
experiencing drone incursions almost daily.
Furthermore, between 2021 and 2022, the FBI reported 235
incidents of suspicious drone flights at or near chemical
plants in Louisiana. Similar UAS activity is also observed at
oil storage facilities in Oklahoma and natural gas facilities
in Texas, highlighting the growing threat to critical energy
infrastructure.
Beyond our borders the conflict in Ukraine has highlighted
the weaponization of drones in modern warfare. Both sides have
employed drones for reconnaissance, targeting, and direct
attacks underscoring the ability to use drones to transform the
dynamics of conflict.
These lessons, both from domestic incidents and
international conflicts, should serve as a wake-up call for us
to bolster our defenses against the misuse of drones within the
United States.
Looking ahead, the stakes will only continue to rise with
major global events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup of which
many games will be played in my home town of Miami and the 2028
Summer Olympics coming to the United States. We must be ready
to confront these threats to safeguard critical infrastructure
and ensure the safety of travelers, participants, and
spectators. We have a responsibility to defend against drone
threats, and the need for action is clear. We must act swiftly.
Today's hearing is an opportunity to better understand the
full scope of the challenges posed by drones and to explore
innovative solutions to mitigate these risks.
I want to thank my colleague from Texas, Representative
Pfluger, as well as my colleagues from the Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence for
partnering with us to host this important hearing.
Thank you to our witnesses, Deputy Executive Assistant
Commissioner Jones, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Wiegmann,
and Assistant Director Wheeler for appearing before the
subcommittees.
I look forward to hearing about how we can better counter
rogue drones, safeguard critical infrastructure, and ensure our
policies keep pace with this evolving technology.
I yield back.
[The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
Today, we are examining the growing threats posed by unmanned
aerial systems (UAS), or drones, and exploring solutions to better
protect our homeland from this evolving technology.
The popularity and accessibility of drones have skyrocketed in
recent years. Today, there are more than 880,000 registered drone
operators in the United States, with countless others operating drones
without proper registration or training.
While many of these operators use drones for legitimate purposes--
recreational, commercial, or otherwise--there is an undeniable threat
from those who misuse this technology, either through ignorance of the
rules and regulations or with malicious intent.
Uninformed operators can inadvertently disrupt air traffic or
encroach on sensitive areas, creating safety risks that strain our law
enforcement and aviation systems.
While uninformed operators present a risk, their potential impact
is negligible compared to the dangers posed by nefarious actors with
malicious intent.
Nefarious actors--including transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs), terrorists, and foreign adversaries--can exploit drones to
evade traditional security measures, gather intelligence, smuggle
contraband, disrupt transportation systems, or even launch attacks on
our homeland.
The threat from nefarious actors is both real and escalating. Along
our borders, drones are increasingly employed by cartels to smuggle
drugs and surveil law enforcement operations.
We must consider all appropriate actions to ensure that foreign
adversaries, like the Chinese Communist Party, are not using drones
under the guise of legitimate activities to relay sensitive information
back to China or other entities that seek to harm the United States.
Critical infrastructure, such as airports, power plants, and ports,
face growing risks from rogue drones capable of conducting
surveillance, causing disruptions, or carrying out acts of sabotage.
These risks are not hypothetical--since 2021, the Transportation
Security Administration has documented nearly 2,000 drone sightings
near U.S. airports, with major airports experiencing drone incursions
almost daily.
Furthermore, between 2021 and 2022, the FBI reported 235 incidents
of suspicious drone flights at or near chemical plants in Louisiana.
Similar UAS activity was also observed at oil storage facilities in
Oklahoma and natural gas facilities in Texas, highlighting the growing
threat to critical energy infrastructure.
Beyond our borders, the conflict in Ukraine has highlighted the
weaponization of drones in modern warfare. Both sides have employed
drones for reconnaissance, targeting, and direct attacks, underscoring
the ability to use drones to transform the dynamics of conflict.
These lessons, both from domestic incidents and international
conflicts, should serve as a wake-up call for us to bolster our
defenses against the misuse of drones within the United States.
Looking ahead, the stakes will only continue to rise. With major
global events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, of which many games will
be played in my home town of Miami, and the 2028 Summer Olympics coming
to the United States, we must be ready to confront these threats to
safeguard critical infrastructure and ensure the safety of travelers,
participants, and spectators.
We have a responsibility to defend against drone threats, and the
need for action is clear--we must act swiftly.
Today's hearing is an opportunity to better understand the full
scope of the challenges posed by drones and to explore innovative
solutions to mitigate these risks.
I want to thank my colleague from Texas, Representative Pfluger, as
well as my colleagues from the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law
Enforcement, and Intelligence, for partnering with us to host this
important hearing.
Thank you to our witnesses, Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner
Jones, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Wiegman, and Assistant
Director Wheeler, for appearing before the subcommittees.
I look forward to hearing about how we can better counter rogue
drones, safeguard critical infrastructure, and ensure our policies keep
pace with this evolving technology.
Mr. Pfluger. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, the
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Thanedar, for his opening
statement.
Mr. Thanedar. Good afternoon. Thank you to both gentlemen
and Ranking Member Magaziner for holding today's hearing as
well as to our witnesses for joining us.
Over the past few years, the use of unmanned aerial
systems, also known as drones, has become common across a wide
range of applications. Drones have become increasingly
affordable and useful within agriculture, law enforcement,
search and rescue, photography, and other industries. However,
as the air space becomes more and more crowded with unmanned
aircraft, we must ensure the Government is prepared and
empowered to protect the safety and security of U.S. critical
infrastructure and the American public.
In 2018, Congress enacted initial authorities for the
Executive branch to begin testing and operating counter-drone
technologies, also known as C-UAS technologies. Those
authorities have kick-started the interagency coordination and
technology development needed to carry out such a complex
effort, but the authorities remain limited and have relied on 1
short-term extension after another.
I hope Congress will act early next year to advance
legislation to extend and expand these authorities. As we do
so, we must ensure the Government's counter-drone activities
appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties and do not
have unintended impacts on the safety of the national airspace.
As Ranking Member of the Transportation and Maritime
Security Subcommittee, I am especially interested in making
sure airports are protected from threats exposed by drones.
Already we have seen major airport shutdowns due to errant
drones causing significant delays.
Introducing new technologies that affect radio signals is
especially sensitive within the airport environment and other
urban environment, so we must ensure such technologies are
carefully tested.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
how Congress can push our counter-drone efforts into a new
phase in a major yet meaningful manner.
Again, I thank our witnesses and my colleagues.
I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thanedar follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Shri Thanedar
December 10, 2024
Over the past few years, the use of unmanned aerial systems--also
known as drones--has become common across a wide range of applications.
Drones have become increasingly affordable and useful within
agriculture, law enforcement, search-and-rescue, photography, and other
industries.
However, as the air space becomes more and more crowded with
unmanned aircraft, we must ensure the Government is prepared and
empowered to protect the safety and security of U.S. critical
infrastructure and the American public.
In 2018, Congress enacted initial authorities for the Executive
branch to begin testing and operating counterdrone technologies, also
known as CUAS technologies.
Those authorities have kickstarted the interagency coordination and
technology development needed to carry out such a complex effort, but
the authorities remain limited and have relied on one short-term
extension after another.
I hope Congress will act early next year to advance legislation to
extend and expand these authorities.
As we do so, we must ensure the Government's counterdrone
activities appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties and do not
have unintended impacts on the safety of the national air space.
As Ranking Member of the Transportation and Maritime Security
Subcommittee, I am especially interested in making sure airports are
protected from threats posed by drones.
Already, we have seen major airports shut down due to errant
drones, causing significant delays.
Introducing new technologies that affect radio signals is
especially sensitive within the airport environment and other urban
environments, so we must ensure such technologies are carefully tested.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about how
Congress can push our counterdrone efforts into a new phase in a
measured yet meaningful manner.
Mr. Pfluger. Other Members of the committee are reminded
that opening statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
December 10, 2024
In June, Democrats and Republicans in the House came together to
introduce legislation to extend and expand the Federal Government's
counter-drone authorities, which were first authorized in 2018.
H.R. 8610, the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and
Reauthorization Act of 2024, as amended, would extend these critical
national security authorities for until October 2029 and, importantly,
increase privacy and civil liberty protections.
I was proud to have worked with my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle on the legislation and pleased to see it advanced through the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
Although it looks like the bill won't get across the finish line
this year, I hope that the relevant committees will prioritize moving
it early next Congress.
Due to the increasingly common usage of drones, it is critical that
Federal agencies can protect certain facilities and assets from
nefarious unmanned aircraft systems.
Just last month, in Tennessee, a white supremacist extremist
planned to attack a power grid with an explosive drone.
If the attack had been successful, it could have left thousands of
Americans without power and disrupted critical services, including
financial, transportation, and emergency services.
And this is just one example of malicious uses of drones.
At the same time, ensuring that Federal agencies' counterdrone
activities uphold Americans' Constitutional rights to privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties is just as important.
Backyard hobbyists use drones for recreational purposes,
journalists use them to capture images of major news stories, and in my
home State of Mississippi, we have found drones useful for surveying
the damage wrought by disasters, including the 2023 tornadoes in my
district.
So, we must ensure that those uses and liberties are not infringed
upon.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the threats
posed by drones and strategies to protect U.S. critical infrastructure
and the public.
Mr. Pfluger. I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this very important topic, and I
ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you.
Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in
the affirmative.
I'll now introduce the witnesses.
Mr. Keith Jones is the deputy executive assistant
commissioner for Air and Marine Operations. He has over 32
years of law enforcement experience. Notably he has helped
found the San Diego sector's Border Patrol search, trauma, and
rescue team and was the principal primary driver of its
national expansion.
Mr. Robert Wheeler Jr. serves as the assistant director of
the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group. His
responsibilities include providing expertise in crisis
management, negotiations, hazardous devices and tactical
operations, behavioral assessment, surveillance, and aviation.
He joined the division in July of this year.
Mr. Brad Wiegmann serves as the deputy assistant attorney
general for national security at the U.S. Department of
Justice. He has spent his career as a Government attorney with
legal experience at the Department of Defense, the Department
of State, and at the National Security Council.
We thank all of you for being hearing today.
We will now begin with opening statements. I know that you
have submitted written statements as well, and thank you for
that. If you'll please adhere to the 5-minute summary of your
statements.
We'll start with Mr. Jones. You're now recognized.
STATEMENT OF KEITH JONES, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER OF AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Chairman.
Good afternoon. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner,
Chairman Gimenez, and Ranking Member Thanedar, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to be
here today on behalf of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to
discuss the CBP authorities and capabilities dedicated to
countering threats posed by the malicious use of unmanned
aircraft systems commonly called UAS or drones.
Throughout my 33-year career in border security, first with
U.S. Border Patrol and now Air and Marine Operations, I've
witnessed transnational criminal organizations or TCOs and
other malicious actors leveraging technology to circumvent U.S.
law enforcement.
In recent years I devoted significant time to understanding
the increasing UAS threat to border security and coordinating
CBP's strategic response. Air and Marine Operations is CBP's
executive agent for counter-UAS operations. We work alongside
our U.S. Border Patrol and Office of Field Operation
counterparts to detect, track, and mitigate the threat of these
aircraft along our borders. We also collaborate with our DOJ
and FBI partners on investigations, as well as CBP innovation,
the DHS science and technology directorate, the Department of
Defense, private industry to identify technologies that can
improve our mitigation and domain awareness capabilities.
I'd like to emphasize 3 important aspects of this subject
today: First, the current state of UAS threats to border
security; second, how our critical authorities enable us to
respond; and, finally, the importance of improving CBP's domain
awareness capabilities and technology to detect and mitigate
UAS threats.
First, UAS activity on the border is increasing rapidly.
During a recent 6-week period CBP sensors recorded more than
6,900 drone flights within close proximity of our borders. It
is these flights, particularly those in areas of high illicit
activity, that present the greatest threat to the safety of
CBP's front-line personnel, pose a serious collision risk to
our crude aircraft, and diminish the effectiveness of our
border security operations.
Although intent cannot be derived from border proximity
alone, through our intelligence processes CBP has associated a
large percent of these drone flights with nefarious activities
on the ground.
TCOs have fully integrated UAS technology into their
operations. Of most concern to CBP is the wide use of drones to
conduct reconnaissance of CBP law enforcement personnel, their
locations, and their activities. This technology enables
smugglers to guide noncitizens or transport contraband across
the border without encountering any law enforcement.
Additionally, to a lesser extent, TCOs have used drones to
fly contraband over the border. Most drones have limited
payload capacity. An average recreational drone can carry only
a few pounds, but the potential risk is still significant. A
few pounds of narcotics, specifically fentanyl, or a few pounds
of explosives could cause serious harm.
The increasing use of UAS brings me to my second point. The
authorities provided by Congress through the Preventing
Emerging Threats Act are essential for CBP to detect and
counter this serious threat. In accordance with the act, DHS
policy guidance, and internal policy, CBP conducted counter-UAS
operations in 10 high-risk sectors along the Southwest and
Northern Border as authorized by the DHS Secretary. Our
operations targets specific threats to covered facilities or
assets while safeguarding privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties.
Obtaining authorization to implement counter-UAS operations
is a rigorous and precise process, requires a credible threat
determination based on extensive analysis and evidence, as well
as correlation with actionable law enforcement information.
Using our authorities and targeted approach, CBP mitigated
86 UAS threats at the border in fiscal year 2023 and 60 in
fiscal year 2024. CBP also mitigated 16 UAS as Special Event
Assessment Rating, or SEAR, events in fiscal year 2023 and 49
in fiscal year 2024. CBP has mitigated 3 unmanned aircraft
systems so far in fiscal year 2025.
Finally, TCOs are rapidly obtaining larger, more
maneuverable drones with a higher capacity for payloads and the
ability to fly longer, higher, and farther.
We're also tracking the threat of drones used for kinetic
attacks with payloads of explosives, firearms, or weapons of
mass destruction. We're already seeing drug cartels in Mexico
use drones to attack the military police and their rivals which
means the CBP needs these critical authorities, advance
technology to maintain the strategic advantage and continued
commitment to achieving persistent domain awareness.
CBP is dedicated to our security mission, and with your
support we will continue to counter this rapidly-evolving
threat and expand our risk-based implementation of Counter-UAS
operations along the border.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Keith Jones
December 10, 2024
introduction
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, Chairman Gimenez,
Ranking Member Thanedar, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S. Customs
and Border Protection's (CBP) capabilities and efforts to counter
threats posed by the malicious use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS
\1\ or ``drones''\2\) along U.S. borders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The term ``unmanned aircraft system'' means an unmanned
aircraft and associated elements (including communication links and the
components that control the unmanned aircraft) that are required for
the operator to operate safely and efficiently in the national air
space system. See 49 U.S.C. 44801(12).
\2\ For the purposes of this statement, ``drone'' refers to the
aircraft portion of a UAS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP's Air and Marine Operations (AMO) safeguards our Nation by
anticipating and confronting security threats through its aviation and
maritime law enforcement expertise, innovative capabilities, and
partnerships at the border and beyond. AMO interdicts unlawful people
and cargo approaching U.S. borders, investigates criminal networks,
provides domain awareness in the air and maritime environments, and
responds to contingencies and national taskings. AMO is CBP's executive
agent for counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) efforts and we work
closely with the U.S. Border Patrol, Office of Field Operations (OFO),
and other intelligence community and law enforcement partners to
identify and assess UAS threats and coordinate appropriate responses.
The modern border environment is dynamic, requiring CBP to
continually adapt its strategies to counter emerging threats and
shifting conditions. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are
increasingly expanding their influence across and beyond the Southwest
and Northern Borders. These criminal organizations leverage
sophisticated tactics and extensive networks and have access to nearly
unlimited resources. TCOs also continually adjust their operations,
implementing new tactics and techniques to circumvent law enforcement
detection and interdiction. As the guardian of our Nation's borders,
CBP deploys advanced technology and capabilities that enable it to
adapt to emerging threats to our borders and increase its ability to
detect and interdict illegal activity in the air, land, and maritime
domains.
In the last 10 years, the advancements in UAS technological
capabilities, combined with a compact design and affordability, have
immensely expanded the use of UAS for a broad range of commercial,
governmental, and recreational purposes, including transport and
delivery, critical infrastructure management, agriculture, search and
rescue, disaster response, public safety, coastal security, and other
tasks. While CBP supports the lawful use of technology, UAS are
increasingly being exploited for malicious use, threatening national
security and public safety--a matter of paramount concern for CBP. The
expanded use of UAS for malicious purposes requires CBP to enhance its
domain awareness and detection capabilities to identify and counter
these smaller and more agile threats across the border environment.
My testimony today describes the current threats to border security
posed by the malicious use of UAS and how CBP uses its C-UAS
authorities and capabilities to address this expanding threat. My
testimony also explains the rigorous processes required to gain
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership and Department of
Transportation (DOT)--including Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)--
approval and authorization to conduct C-UAS activities, which are
designed to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, and
ensure aviation safety.
threats to u.s. border security from the malicious use of uas
The UAS threat in the border environment can take several forms.
Throughout border regions, CBP personnel have observed UAS being used
to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance of their operations,
personnel, and facilities and have identified a multitude of unmanned
aircraft used in furtherance of criminal activity such as smuggling,
trafficking, and conveyance of illicit materials.
Along the Southwest Border especially, CBP continues to experience
high numbers of incidents involving illicit use of UAS to facilitate
unlawful movement of people and narcotics. During a recent 6-week
period,\3\ CBP recorded more than 6,900 drone flights within close
proximity of the Southwest Border.\4\ It is these flights, particularly
those in areas of high illicit activity, that pose the greatest risk to
CBP's--and our partners'--operations, personnel, and crewed aircraft.
Although intent cannot be derived from border proximity alone, using
its robust intelligence process, CBP has associated a large percent of
these drone flights with nefarious activities on the ground.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Between October 1, 2024, and November 16, 2024.
\4\ Any drone detected within 500 meters of either side of the
border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TCOs and other malicious actors use UAS to conduct reconnaissance
of CBP personnel and operations to pass information to contacts on the
ground to assist such contacts in determining where to guide non-
citizens or transport contraband. The use of drones for illicit cross
border activity is not only wide-spread, but highly organized and
integrated into TCO operations. This illicit activity threatens the
safety of our front-line personnel, poses a collision risk to our
aircraft, and adversely affects our border security operations.
current cbp c-uas authority and operations
Pursuant to the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018, codified
at 6 U.S.C. 124n, ``Protection of certain facilities and assets from
unmanned aircraft,'' CBP conducts UAS detection and C-UAS \5\
activities as part of its response to countering evolving and dynamic
threats in the border environment, while ensuring the protection of
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The term ``counter-UAS system'' means a system or device
capable of lawfully and safely disabling, disrupting, or seizing
control of an unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft system. See 49
U.S.C. 44801(5). Although this term, as defined in statute, does not
encompass UAS detection, references to ``C-UAS'' activities throughout
this testimony are intended to include both UAS detection and
mitigation activities including those that do not require relief from
Federal criminal laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Among other things, and notwithstanding select criminal provisions
from which section 124n offers relief, the Act authorizes the Secretary
of Homeland Security to provide DHS personnel with certain assigned
duties (i.e., certain CBP personnel), specific statutory relief
necessary to perform the C-UAS protective mission. The statute allows
CBP to take certain actions to detect, identify, monitor, track, and
mitigate UAS which pose a credible threat. The actions authorized in
the Act include electronic detection, electronic mitigation through
communications signal intercept and interruption, kinetic/physical
mitigation, and device seizure. This authority expressly enables the
protection of ``covered facilities or assets'' identified by the
Secretary in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation \6\ from
credible UAS threats that relate to specific DHS mission sets,
including CBP security and protection missions. The Act also authorizes
protection of shared DHS and Department of Justice (DOJ) mission sets
including protection of National Special Security Events (NSSE) and
Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) events; provision for support to
State, local, territorial, Tribal, or campus law enforcement (upon
request of the chief executive officer of the respective State, Tribe,
or territory) for mass gatherings that are limited to a specific time
frame and location; and protection of an active Federal law enforcement
investigation, emergency response, or a security function that is
limited to a specified time frame and location.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Defined in the Preventing Emerging Threats Act as any facility
or asset that is identified as high-risk and a potential target for
unlawful unmanned aircraft activity by the Secretary or the Attorney
General, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation with
respect to potentially-impacted air space, through a risk-based
assessment; is located within the United States; and directly relates
to a select authorized DHS mission, or authorized joint DHS or DOJ
mission, See 6 U.S.C. 124n(k)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with the Act and the DHS Secretary's policy guidance,
CBP implemented a C-UAS policy and, subsequently, its first operations
plan to designate the Yuma Border Patrol Sector as a ``covered facility
or asset'' in July 2020 after extensive discussion and review to ensure
lawful and efficient operational implementation. CBP is committed to
conducting its C-UAS activities with precision, identifying and
targeting illicit activity while safeguarding lawful commercial and
recreational drone use.
Currently, CBP conducts C-UAS operations under 6 U.S.C. 124n in
10 high-risk sectors along the Southwest and Northern Borders which
have received covered facility or asset designation. These operations
target-specific credible threats rather than persistent, wide-spread
use across all border regions. Authorization for CBP C-UAS operations
requires a risked-based assessment which involves evaluating threat
information to include extensive analysis and evidence of threats
against the covered facility or asset, including reports of visual
observations and correlation with actionable law enforcement
information. All C-UAS operations are required to adhere to applicable
statutory and policy parameters to ensure operational integrity and
compliance with all legal restrictions and privacy protections.
Additionally, all CBP C-UAS operators attend a 5-day training course
that includes instruction on legal parameters and restrictions.
C-UAS operations are an essential border security capability to
address evolving UAS threats. CBP implemented its risk-based C-UAS
approach within a framework that ensures rigorous analysis, interagency
coordination, and clear documentation of a credible threat to identify
and target nefarious operators and devices amongst the increasing
amount of drone traffic. Using this approach, CBP mitigated \7\ 86 UAS
at the border in fiscal year 2023 and 60 UAS in fiscal year 2024. CBP
also mitigated 16 UAS at SEAR events in fiscal year 2023 and 49 in
fiscal year 2024. CBP has mitigated 3 UAS so far in fiscal year
2025.\8\
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\7\ Generally, mitigation involves disrupting the signal between a
drone and its controller, causing the drone to activate its pre-
programmed recovery protocol, such as returning to its designated
``home'' location or hovering in place. If this action does not
neutralize the threat, certain C-UAS systems can emulate the controller
to redirect the drone to a secure or DHS-preferred location.
\8\ As of November 16, 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-UAS authorities will become even more critical as the UAS threat
evolves. All evidence indicates that TCOs are pursuing the use of
larger drones with more maneuverability, more payload capacity, and
greater capability to fly longer, higher, and farther. CBP needs these
critical authorities to be extended beyond the current termination date
of December 20, 2024, along with the latest C-UAS equipment, to
continue efforts to counter these rapidly-evolving threats and expand
risk-based implementation of C-UAS operations to additional locations
along the Southwest and Northern Borders.
c-uas policy and authorization process
To standardize the application of C-UAS authorities, DHS
established a C-UAS Program Management Office (PMO) within the Office
of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY). The PMO coordinates CBP's C-UAS
activities to ensure alignment with Departmental policy and serves as
the primary liaison for interagency partners, particularly DOT and the
FAA.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The FAA is statutorily responsible for the safe and efficient
management of the navigable air space of the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Obtaining operational authorization to deploy C-UAS technology in
support of CBP's border security mission requires a rigorous assessment
and the use of an established approval process so that the potential
safety risks to the National Airspace System (NAS) associated with the
use of such technology can be appropriately mitigated. These
assessments identify covered facilities or assets and consider
traditional risk elements such as threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences. These assessments also include FAA evaluation of
collateral risks to the NAS, including potential interference with
airport communications and aircraft navigation systems, and whether
temporary flight restrictions or other measures are necessary. When
coordination and deconfliction requirements are complete, DHS and FAA
sign a coordination memorandum, then complete a rigorous internal
review and oversight processes before the DHS Secretary designates the
facility or asset as a ``covered facility or asset'' pursuant to the
Act, a prerequisite for CBP to take C-UAS actions. This collaborative
approach enables DOT, including the FAA, to preserve aviation safety,
enables security experts and professionals to perform their protective
security mission, and enables senior DHS leadership visibility into C-
UAS operations.
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections
In the conduct of all its operations, CBP is committed to
protecting the civil rights, civil liberties, and personal privacy of
citizens and visitors, as well as conducting operations with openness
and accountability.
Pursuant to the Act, CBP may intercept or acquire command-and-
control communications from a UAS, but only to the extent necessary to
support C-UAS actions authorized by the DHS Secretary to protect a
designated covered facility or asset. CBP may only intercept, acquire,
access, maintain, or use communications to or from a UAS in a manner
consistent with the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution and
applicable Federal laws and Department policies. In addition to those
privacy protections in the Act, DHS applies Section 222 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as amended, to require all component C-UAS
programs to submit a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) and obtain DHS
Privacy Office approval prior to deploying C-UAS technology. The
Privacy Office uses the PTA to determine the need for a Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA), which includes measures to mitigate privacy risks.
DHS has published multiple C-UAS PIAs for public consumption consistent
with requirements outlined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See, e.g., https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsallpia-085-
counter-unmanned-aircraft-systems-C-UAS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP seeks to ensure that C-UAS activities collect only information
authorized by law and necessary to identify and address UAS threats.
CBP policies include measures to respect the lawful use of UAS without
compromising the protection of a covered facility or asset. These
policies continually undergo review and revision based on lessons
learned and to ensure consistency with DHS policy guidance.
the future landscape of uas threats
Opportunities for TCOs and other threat actors to leverage drone
technology will only expand. Advancements like multi-drone control,
autonomous flight plans, obstacle avoidance, extended communication
ranges, and longer battery life necessitate continual reassessment of
CBP's detection and response strategy.
DHS's--and by extension, CBP's--statutory authority to conduct C-
UAS operations to mitigate threats posed by UAS to a covered facility
or asset terminates on December 20, 2024. Therefore, we look forward to
working with Congress on expeditious reauthorization of this authority.
We appreciate the support we have received from your subcommittees,
whose commitment to the security of the American people has enabled the
continued deployment of advanced technology and capabilities that CBP
needs to secure the border.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
your questions.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Jones.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Wheeler for his opening
statement of 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT W. ``WES'' WHEELER, JR., ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
Mr. Wheeler. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Pfluger,
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Magaziner, Ranking Member
Thanedar, other distinguished Members of the committee.
Appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf of the FBI.
I currently serve as the assistant director of our Critical
Incident Response Group in Quantico, Virginia. I've done that
since July as you mentioned. In that capacity I lead the FBI's
efforts regarding both our pre-crisis planning and response to
critical incidents and major investigations, which includes
responsibility for our counter-unmanned aircraft program.
As UAS use continues to rapidly grow among the public
commercial and military and law enforcement sectors, this
technology also lends itself to increase malicious use by
state, non-state, and lone actors as you know. This technology
poses some unique security challenges for us. Just this year
alone we've seen concerning increase in the use of UAS in the
commission of crimes with the intent to cause injury to U.S.
persons on U.S. soil.
A Chinese national recently pled guilty to 2 misdemeanor
counts for using a UAS to conduct espionage at a U.S. Naval
facility in January. We believe UAS are being flown for similar
purposes over sensitive facilities across the United States.
Just last month a subject was arrested and charged in
Tennessee for attempting to use a UAS with an explosive device
to destroy an energy facility. That is the same case mentioned
by the Ranking Member. That subject was driven by an ideology
to disrupt society through the collapse of the national power
grid.
Those are 2 examples of the evolving ways that UAS are
being used to harm us and our interests.
With the enactment of the 2018 Preventing Emerging Threats
Act, the FBI was granted the authority necessary to mitigate a
range of UAS threats in the protection of special events,
emergency response, Federal investigations, personnel, and
facilities. Specifically the legislation authorizes DOJ and our
partners at DHS to conduct counter-UAS operations in limited
circumstances to identify, track, and mitigate credible
threats.
I'd stress the importance for reauthorization of the
counter-UAS authority that as you know expires December 20.
Failure to extend the authorities beyond then would cause
significant impacts on our ability to protect the public.
A durable extension is also extremely important. Our
experience has taught us that short-term extensions to counter-
UAS authority effectively prevent the bureau and our partners
from budgeting and staffing it in ways which would allow us to
execute a long-term strategy. We know that Congress is
considering extensions of 5 years or more, and we thank you for
that consideration.
The FBI strongly supports pursuing expanded counter-UAS
authorities for State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners
as robustly and swiftly as prudently possible. SLTT partners
have repeatedly informed us that existing counter-UAS
authorities are inadequate.
Since our counter-UAS authority was granted in 2019, the
FBI has adopted 69 operational missions using its authority and
provided limited support to 121 other events. We've detected
over 1,000 UAS in violation of Federal law during these
missions. One example, at the Boston Marathon this past April,
our team mitigated a UAS threat which resulted in the capture
and prosecution of a subject.
The FBI cannot alone protect the over 40,000 Special Event
Assessment Rating, or SEAR, events annually held in the United
States along with the countless other requests for counter-UAS
support at mass gatherings. The use of counter-UAS to protect
against this situation is crucial and can only be fully
addressed by expanding the capability to include our State and
local partners.
In closing, we will remain committed to protect Americans
by countering the malicious use of this technology. The
reauthorization or long-term extension of this legislation is
central to continue our mission in combatting the evolving
threat. We look forward to working with you in establishing
sustainable strategies to mitigate the threat going forward.
Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Wheeler and Mr.
Wiegmann follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Robert W. ``Wes'' Wheeler, Jr. and Brad
Wiegmann
December 10, 2024
Good morning, Chairman Pfluger, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member
Magaziner, Ranking Member Thanedar, and other distinguished Members of
the committee, and thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf
of the Department of Justice (``the Department'' or ``DOJ''). The
Department is committed to continuing to protect the American people
from the threat of illicit drone use, whether in the form of reckless
flying over mass gatherings, contraband smuggling into correctional
facilities, surveillance of sensitive Government operations, or any
other illegal activity. Our current authority under the Preventing
Emerging Threats Act of 2018, codified at 6 U.S.C. 124n (`` 124n''),
is crucial but inadequate. The Department strongly supports the
administration's legislative proposal to extend and expand our
authorities to protect against illicit use of unmanned aircraft systems
(``UAS''). The 2 pillars of this counter-UAS (``C-UAS'') proposal are
expanding Federal protective coverage for the most vulnerable sites--
such as airports and critical infrastructure--and empowering our State,
local, Tribal, and territorial (``SLTT'') law enforcement partners to
engage in C-UAS efforts nationwide, subject to restrictions and
oversight. We look forward to discussing the details with the
committee, but we believe that both pillars are necessary to address
the threat.
i. the threat posed by misuse of drones
A. The Threat Continues to Grow
The use of UAS technology in the United States continues to grow
rapidly. Along with significant benefits come significant risks.
Commercial use of UAS already generates billions of dollars in economic
growth. As of October 1, 2024, over 791,000 UAS in the United States
are registered with the Federal Aviation Administration (``FAA'') with
more drones required to be registered that simply are not. Law
enforcement and public safety use of UAS allows officials to perform
critical missions, from accident rescues to tactical incursions, while
reducing risk to personnel and the public.
Alongside these immense benefits, however, is the threat UAS pose
in the hands of nation-state adversaries, terrorists, criminals, and
irresponsible operators. As noted in the administration's ``Domestic
Counter-UAS National Action Plan'' (``Action Plan''), UAS threats can
take several forms, including:
platforms designed or modified to conduct kinetic attacks
using payloads of explosives, firearms, or weaponized chemical,
biological, or nuclear material;
cyber attacks against wireless devices or networks;
espionage;
the illicit trafficking of narcotics and contraband; and
monitoring law enforcement activity.
Beyond use by actors with criminal intent, in some cases UAS have
been used by operators without knowledge of or regard for regulatory
boundaries. Those operators pose a hazard to Government operations,
commercial activities, and the public.
The threat of UAS-enabled terrorist attacks remains significant. In
2016, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (``FBI'') director testified
that ``given their retail availability, lack of verified identification
requirement to procure, general ease of use, and prior use overseas,
UAS will be used to facilitate an attack in the United States against a
vulnerable target, such as a mass gathering.'' Since that statement,
the threat of weaponized UAS attacks manifested itself within the
United States on 2 occasions, though fortunately we were able to
disrupt the plots:
(i) In November 2024, the Department arrested and charged
Skyler Philippi of Columbia, Tennessee, with attempting to use
a UAS as a weapon of mass destruction to destroy an energy
facility. Philippi had conducted research on past attacks on
the U.S. electrical system and allegedly concluded that
attacking with firearms would not be sufficient; instead, he
planned to use a UAS laden with explosives. He allegedly
planned to use the UAS to attack the power grid, leaving
thousands of Americans and critical infrastructure like
hospitals without power. As alleged, Philippi was a self-styled
``accelerationist'' who hoped his actions would ``shock the
system'' and lead to civil unrest.\1\
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\1\ https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/man-arrested-and-charged-
attempting-use-weapon-mass-destruction-and-destroy-energy-facility.
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Importantly, current law does not contain clear authority
for the Federal Government, SLTT law enforcement, or the
private sector to mitigate or, for certain technologies,
even detect UAS that threaten critical infrastructure.
(ii) Also in November 2024, Edward Kelley of Maryville,
Tennessee, was convicted of a conspiracy to murder Federal
employees, in part through the planned use of weaponized
drones. While awaiting trial for crimes he committed at the
United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, Kelley planned an
attack on the Knoxville FBI Field Office that would have used
car bombs and incendiary devices appended to drones as revenge
against law enforcement for his prior arrest.\2\
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\2\ https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-jury-convicts-man-
conspiring-murder-fbi-employees#.
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As we will discuss in more detail, expansion of current C-UAS
authorities would enable our Federal and SLTT partners to build our
collective C-UAS capabilities and awareness to better identify and
thwart future similar attacks.
Espionage-by-UAS also became a domestic reality in the past year.
In January 2024, Chinese national Fengyun Shi flew a UAS over the
Newport News Shipbuilding--a highly secure naval shipbuilding complex
in Norfolk, Virginia--and took extensive photos and videos. Shi was
arrested before boarding a flight to China. He later pleaded guilty to
2 misdemeanor counts under a World War II-era statute that is part of
the Espionage Act and received a 6-month sentence.\3\
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\3\ https://www.startribune.com/u-student-from-china-receives-6-
month-prison-term-for-taking-drone-photos-over-naval-shipyard/
601162150.
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UAS also continue to be used for other crimes, sometimes with fatal
consequences. In October 2024, a man in Los Angeles, California
allegedly used a UAS to drop off fentanyl and other narcotics to
buyers, one of whom died of a fatal overdose.\4\ All of these examples
during this calendar year demonstrate that we must not underestimate
the ingenuity of criminals to achieve their unlawful objectives using
this technology.
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\4\ https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/lancaster-man-arrested-
charges-he-used-drone-fly-fentanyl-including-customer-who-later.
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B. The Threat Posed to Prisons
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (``FBOP'') is also seeing an increase
in the criminal use of UAS in the prison context. Between 2015 and
2019, the Department of Justice reported 130 drone incidents--typically
involving criminals using UAS to deliver drugs, cell phones, weapons,
or other contraband--in Federal prisons alone, and that count is likely
low compared to actual incidents. FBOP adopted its formal UAS
incursions reporting policy in 2018. After reporting instructions went
into effect, the number of incidents recorded increased by 87
percent.\5\ Similar incidents at State and local prisons and jails are
frequent. Unlike staff at Federal facilities, SLTT correctional
personnel are not covered by the C-UAS authorities provided by Congress
to DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security (``DHS'').
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\5\ https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/addressing-contraband-
prisons-and-jails-threat-drone-deliveries-grows.
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To note just a few recent examples, in September of this year, a
man pled guilty to providing contraband, including drugs, to the
Federal Correctional Complex in Yazoo City, Mississippi.\6\ In August
2024, DOJ charged 23 defendants with conspiracy to use UAS to deliver
methamphetamine, marijuana, and cell phones to Georgia State prisons.
Operation Night Drop identified 2 networks of prison inmates and
outside conspirators who used UAS and other methods to deliver large
quantities of drugs, cell phones and other contraband to Smith State
Prison in Glennville, Telfair State Prison in McRae-Helena, and various
other Georgia State prisons.\7\ Eighteen months before that, the
Department brought charges against 4 men in California for a long-
running conspiracy to distribute drugs and other contraband via drones
at 6 California State prisons.\8\ These schemes are happening with
greater frequency and effect.
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\6\ https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdms/pr/tennessee-man-pleads-
guilty-using-drone-fly-marijuana-yazoo-city-federal-correctional.
\7\ https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdga/pr/pair-indictments-charge-
conspiracies-use-drones-deliver-illegal-drugs-contraband-cell.
\8\ https://www.justice.gov/usao-edca/pr/four-indicted-scheme-
deliver-drugs-state-prisons-drone.
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C. FBI Protection of Mass Gathering from the UAS Threat
When it enacted 124n in 2018, Congress facilitated certain C-UAS
missions by the DOJ and DHS, including the protection of Special Event
Assessment Rating (``SEAR'') events. Since the law's enactment, the FBI
has conducted 139 UAS detection and C-UAS protection operations at
large events, ranging from the Major League Baseball World Series to
the New Year's Eve celebration in Times Square, where national defense
temporary flight restrictions were in place. During those operations,
the FBI detected 1,624 UAS operating in violation of Federal law,
located the operator in 500 instances, and attempted technical
mitigation against 129 UAS. The FBI also continues to provide
protection from UAS threats at a limited number of other special events
and in support of Federal investigations, including those in response
to UAS incursions at military installations.
When available and appropriate, DOJ pursues criminal charges for
UAS misuse at mass gatherings. For example, in February 2024, DOJ
charged an individual with felonies related to flying a UAS over M&T
Bank stadium during the National Football League's AFC Championship
game in Baltimore, Maryland in January 2024.\9\ In September 2024, a
Boston man was charged with unlawfully flying a UAS in restricted
National Defense Airspace when he flew his UAS near the finish line at
the Boston Marathon in April 2024. The UAS flight prompted law
enforcement and bomb technicians to seize the device mid-air, land it,
and evaluate its threat to the public.\10\
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\9\ https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/pennsylvania-man-facing-
federal-felony-charges-illegally-operating-drone-during-national.
\10\ https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/boston-man-charged-
violating-national-defense-airspace.
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While constituting an impressive track record that prevented or
significantly minimized the impact of UAS misuse, the FBI's covered
events represent only 0.05 percent of the over 240,000 special events
during that time period for which potential C-UAS protection could have
been authorized under 6 USC 124n. That number makes clear that the
demand for such support to protect our communities has far outstripped
the Federal Government's limited resources. We cannot do this alone.
ii. the administration's consolidated c-uas legislative proposal
A. Overview of the Administration Proposal
Starting in 2021, Executive branch agencies that are confronting
the growing threat from UAS collaborated to identify the critical gaps
in law and policy that impede our ability to defend our national
security interests and public safety from UAS threats. The product of
that work was the administration's Action Plan. At the top of the
Action Plan's recommendations was a recommendation to ``Expand
Legislative Exemptions for UAS Detection and C-UAS Mitigation
Activities.'' The Executive branch also assembled a legislative
proposal that would implement some of the recommendations and greatly
improve our protections against all types of UAS misuse.
Specifically, the administration's proposal would expand the
current 124n authority in targeted ways based on our experience under
the law and our assessment of the growing threat. Current 124n
authority will lapse this month, so our existing programs must be
reauthorized to avoid shutting down FBI's ability to protect mass
gatherings. The authority is essential because, without it, use of the
most effective types of UAS detection and C-UAS technologies could
violate criminal laws, including those that prohibit destroying or
disabling aircraft and intercepting signals and communications. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. 32 (the Aircraft Sabotage Act); 18 U.S.C. 2510 et
seq. (the Wiretap Act, also known as Title III); 18 U.S.C. 3121-3127
(the Pen/Trap Statute).
Based on experience gained since 2018, the administration's
legislative proposal would close additional gaps that currently leave
us vulnerable to UAS threats. Current law makes no provision for
permanent protection of transportation facilities such as civilian
airports; for critical infrastructure such as power plants or oil
refineries or chemical facilities; or for high-risk prisoner
transports. Gaps in legal authorities leave sensitive Federal
facilities, such as CIA headquarters, vulnerable to both intelligence
collection by foreign states and physical attacks by hostile actors.
Current law also lacks a provision to make Federal C-UAS efforts more
efficient by allowing DOJ and DHS to fulfill each other's statutory
missions, and those of the Departments of Defense (``DoD'') and Energy
(``DOE''), in exigent circumstances. Perhaps most critically, 124n
does not authorize SLTT law enforcement to engage in any kind of C-UAS
activity that would otherwise violate Federal law. The absence of such
authority has hamstrung their efforts. Neither DOJ nor DHS has the
resources to fill the thousands of requests each year we receive to use
our authority to assist our SLTT partners.
The administration's legislative proposal would fill these gaps in
the following ways:
B. Authorizing Limited SLTT C-UAS Programs
(i) Authorizing SLTTs to Use Pre-Approved Detection-Only
Equipment
The legislation would authorize all SLTT law enforcement as well as
the owners or operators of airports or critical infrastructure to use
Federally-vetted UAS detection-only capabilities, subject to conditions
and safeguards. As noted above, experience has shown that the demand
for protection across the country from UAS-based threats greatly
exceeds the Federal Government's capacity. We need to empower SLTT law
enforcement agencies across the country, which are primarily
responsible for keeping our citizens safe at the local level, to take
the steps needed to protect their communities from this emerging
threat. We also need to allow critical infrastructure operators to take
steps to protect their own facilities and assets.
Notably, the ``detection-only'' technology that this part of the
bill would authorize would not include authority to mitigate the drone
through jamming or to otherwise disrupt drones or other aircraft.
Rather, the information obtained through detection of drone signals can
disclose the location of the drone operator, so that law enforcement or
security personnel can locate that operator and address the threat
through more traditional means. The detection technology authorized for
use would be tested and evaluated by DHS or DOJ, and approved by the
FAA, the Federal Communications Commission (``FCC''), and the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (``NTIA'') to ensure
that each system does not adversely impact the national air space
system. Only technologies on an approved list--maintained by DHS, in
coordination with DOJ, FCC, NTIA, and FAA--could be employed consistent
with the exemptions in the law. Any non-Federal entity using detection-
only authority must also issue a written policy certifying compliance
with the privacy protections in the bill and comply with any additional
guidance issued by the Secretary of DHS or the Attorney General. This
``detection-only'' authority would provide significant public safety
benefits and could be safely employed today.
(ii) Mitigation Pilot
The legislation would also authorize a limited pilot program for
SLTT law enforcement entities, subject to a 6-year sunset provision.
DOJ and DHS could designate annually up to 12 SLTT law enforcement
entities to engage in both UAS detection and UAS mitigation activities,
consistent with the safeguards and oversight required in the bill.
Those entities would be required to receive appropriate training and
vetting to enable them to both detect and mitigate UAS threats to
covered facilities or assets, including mass gatherings. Because these
operations could include use of more sensitive mitigation technology,
all of their activities would have to be coordinated in advance with
Federal partners including the FAA, which could withhold approval if
the FAA identifies a risk to the national air space system from a
proposed operation. Moreover, all activities would be carried out under
the direct oversight of the DOJ or DHS. This is an initial step that
will allow Congress, the Executive branch, and SLTT law enforcement
entities to evaluate costs and benefits, learn best practices, and
employ transformative technology with controls that will continue to
ensure air space safety and the proper use of the radiofrequency
spectrum through required coordination with Federal authorities. As
with the detection-only authority, SLTT pilot program participants
could only use equipment on an authorized list maintained by DHS, in
coordination with DOJ, FCC, NTIA, and FAA.
C. Expanding Coverage to Airports and Critical Infrastructure
The legislation would also give DHS the authority to protect
transportation sites, such as airports, and other critical
infrastructure from UAS threats. Critical infrastructure and airports
are acutely vulnerable to UAS incursions as current law makes no
provision for their sustained C-UAS protection. The administration's
proposed language would fix this gap and authorize Federal personnel to
protect such facilities.
D. Mutual Support Authority
DHS and DOJ also currently lack the authority to assist each other,
as well as DoD and DOE, with the protection of assets legally eligible
for C-UAS protection. A Pentagon-led table-top exercise identified this
gap as a chief impediment to fully effective Federal protection, and
therefore as a key vulnerability in the U.S. C-UAS posture. The
administration's proposal would ensure that DHS and DOJ are authorized
to help protect the Nation's most critical and vulnerable
infrastructure in exigent circumstances and when other resources are
lacking.
E. Prisoner Transports
The legislation would expressly authorize the U.S. Marshals Service
(``USMS'') to protect high-risk prisoner transports using UAS detection
or mitigation technology. Current authority covers courthouses and
prisons but does not expressly address prisoner transports. The bill
would close this gap and allow the use of technology where, for
example, we believe there is a substantial risk involving a terrorist
or organized crime figure whose confederates could use drones to attack
or monitor a transport.
F. Expanding Protections for Privacy and Civil Liberties
The legislation and its implementing policies will continue to
ensure that we respect privacy and Constitutional rights as we conduct
our UAS detection and mitigation activities, by limiting Government
actions toward protected First Amendment activities and regulating what
information may be collected and shared. It is important to note that
the technologies that we employ typically detect the presence of drones
operating in a specific space and the only communications that are
identified are the electronic data passed between the operator's
controller and the UAS. Those communications direct the physical
operation of the drone. The technologies used by the Department do not
extract text messages, e-mail, or internet search histories from phones
or tablets used to control drones, nor do they allow law enforcement to
listen to voice calls. Specifically, the detection systems collect
information such as the drone vendor and model; drone and controlling
device serial number and media access control, or MAC, address;
geolocation of the drone; location of the controller; and the most
recent takeoff location and ``home'' location. This is much like the
information required to be broadcasted by manned aircraft, and similar
to that which the FAA now requires most drones to broadcast under the
Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft rule. However, for drones
that do not comply with FAA requirements, it is critical that the
Government can collect the information unilaterally, exercise
discretion on when to use jamming or take-over technology by seeking
out the operator first (time and circumstances permitting), and make
more informed decisions.
Importantly, under the proposed legislation, SLTT entities and the
owners or operators of airports or critical infrastructure who operate
detection technologies would be required to adhere to the same privacy
protections imposed on Federal law enforcement under the existing 2018
law. Currently, any parties who operate such equipment do so without
explicit legal authority and without privacy safeguards.
G. Sunset
The administration's Action Plan recommended terminating the sunset
provision and permanently enacting the exemptions that Congress
provided to DOJ and DHS in 2018. Terminating or significantly extending
the period of these authorities would give us more certainty as we plan
for the future. Experience gained over the past 4 years has
demonstrated both the value of C-UAS activity by DOJ and DHS, and that
these operations can be conducted safely and with strong safeguards for
privacy and civil liberties. Long-term exemptions will enable us to
invest more resources in this mission with confidence that it will
continue far into the future. The legislative proposal retains the
requirements for semi-annual briefings to specified committees, thereby
ensuring appropriate Congressional oversight.
conclusion
In closing, the proposed legislation by itself will not eliminate
the threats presented by malicious or irresponsible use of drones.
However, it will significantly enhance our ability to mitigate this
threat in a manner that is measured, responsible, and consistent with
the FAA mandate to integrate drones safely into the national air space
system. As the United States seeks to lead the world by integrating
uncrewed aviation into the national air space, Congress must build
security into the frameworks that support UAS integration by ensuring
that those responsible for protecting the public have the authority
they need to do so. Integration and security must go together.
The provisions we have discussed are doubtless not the only
possible formulation for legislation to improve on the status quo. But
any successful bill should include at least some version of those 2
pillars: (i) Expanding Federal protective coverage for the most
vulnerable sites--such as airports and critical infrastructure--and
(ii) empowering SLTT law enforcement partners to engage in detection-
focused C-UAS efforts nationwide, subject to appropriate restrictions
and oversight.
We appreciate the opportunity to testify today, and we would be
pleased to answer your questions.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Wheeler.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Wiegmann for his opening
statement of 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF BRAD WIEGMANN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Wiegmann. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Pfluger,
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Magaziner, Ranking Member
Thanedar, and other distinguished Members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the
Department of Justice.
As my colleagues have just said, we are committed to
continuing to work hard to protect the American people from the
threat of illicit drone use, but to do so most effectively we
need additional legal authority. As drones become more and more
prevalent in our air space, merely continuing with our current
authorities is insufficient to address the current scale of the
threat.
More than 2 years ago I and others from DHS and the FAA
testified before a Senate committee about this growing threat
and the need for a more durable and significantly expanded
legal framework. Since that time the Congress has provided
extensions of existing counter-drone authority while
considering how best to expand it. We are very grateful that
both the House and the Senate continue to agree that this
authority must not lapse.
The Department is eager to share with you the lessons
gained from our experience to help reach consensus about how
much and in what way to expand the existing law.
Now, the reason we need legal authority is that without it
use of the most effective types of drone detection and counter-
drone technologies could violate criminal laws, including those
that prohibit destroying or disabling aircraft in flight and
intercepting signals and communication.
As has just been said, our current authorities will lapse
within the next 10 days unless reauthorized, so our first
priority is for Congress to reauthorize the existing law. But I
know that this committee and others have also been working on
legislation to go well beyond that, and we are eager to work
with Congress on a bill to help keep the American people safe.
Now, as described in our written testimony, the 2 most
important issues for us are, No. 1, broadening the types of
sites that law enforcement can protect from nefarious and
suspicious drone uses, so, for example, to cover, as was
mentioned in the opening statements, airports and critical
infrastructure like power plants and chemical facilities. So we
need to expand the types of sites that can be protected.
Then, No. 2, as my colleague from the FBI just mentioned,
it's about empowering State and local law enforcement and
operators of critical infrastructure to engage in counter-drone
efforts themselves nationwide.
This is not a job the Federal Government can do alone. The
FBI can only cover a tiny fraction, less than half of 1
percent, of the tens of thousands of events throughout the
country each year that might need counter-drone support to
protect public safety. So the demand for protection across the
country just vastly exceeds available Federal resources.
To be clear, this activity can and must be done while
safeguarding Americans' privacy and civil liberties. The
technologies that we employ typically detect only
communications being passed between the operator's controller
and the drone to detect its activities--to direct its
activities. They do not extract text messages, email, or
internet search histories from phones or tablets used to
control drones, nor do they allow law enforcement to listen to
voice calls.
We collect information such as the drone vendor and model,
the drone and controlling device serial number, the geolocation
of the drone, the location of the controller, and the most
recent take-off and home location. This is very much like the
information required to be broadcast by manned aircraft and
which is now required under FAA's remote ID regulation to be
broadcast by drones as well. We use this information to further
investigate when a crime involving a drone is suspected.
As required in current law, DOJ will continue to have
guidance that contains explicit protections for privacy and
civil liberties and associated training. State and local law
enforcement if empowered to engage in this activity would be
required to adhere to the same rules.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. I'd be happy
to answer your questions.
Mr. Pfluger. I thank the witnesses for their opening
statements.
Members will now be recognized by order of seniority for 5
minutes of questioning. An additional round of questioning may
be called after all Members have been recognized and also
knowing that we have a second panel.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Let's just start with current events, and I'll ask an open-
ended question. What is going on in New Jersey?
Mr. Wheeler. So, sir, the FBI in our Newark Field Office,
along with the State and local partners there, are--or the
bureau is actively investigating the situation you mentioned,
just the unexplained sighting of drone activity over that part
of New Jersey, including proximity to sensitive sites and areas
of concern.
So we do not attribute that to an individual or a group
yet. We're investigating, but I don't have an answer of who's
responsible for that, of one or more people that are
responsible for those drone flights. We're actively
investigating. What the bureau has done to aid our State and
local partners is what we generally do, enlist the help of the
interagency, enlist the help of the public. There's a tip line
there, that 1-800-CALL-FBI, tips.FBI for information from the
public that could help us resolve this. It is concerning.
There----
Mr. Pfluger. Is the public at risk? Is public safety at
risk? Are we concerned that there are nefarious intentions that
could cause either national security or a public safety
incident that would put Americans at risk?
Mr. Wheeler. There's nothing that is known that would lead
me to say that, but we just don't know, and that's the
concerning part.
Mr. Pfluger. I think the fact that we have these unknown
drones, UAS, that are flying over either critical or sensitive
facilities is exactly why we're having this hearing.
Mr. Jones--well, actually, for anybody on the panel, let me
just say, you know, we go back to last year there were
incidents, including Langley Air Force Base, where for over a
week we had unknown drones flying over a very sensitive
military installation with F-22s and other, you know, weapon
systems on the ground, and I think that was cause for concern.
So from a DHS standpoint, either on a border mission or
from FBI or DOJ, you mentioned, Mr. Wheeler, we don't
necessarily have the authorities we need. Why can't we take
action against these drones that are flying over sensitive
sites? Why are we not taking action against drones that are
flying over sensitive sites?
Mr. Wheeler. So authority exists to mitigate a UAS in
flight when authorized, and that could certainly apply to a
sensitive site. I would be a little measured in speaking for
the Department of Defense for those sites that are in question
here, but I will say that we're, for the FBI, in a position,
close liaison relationship with the Department of Defense and
those areas that you mentioned and will help in every way
possible. But for securing those particular sites in this way,
it is a DOD equity.
Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Jones, for the border, I was down in the
RGV last year, and they told me that they had over 20,000
incidents just in a quarter of drones that were being operated
by cartels. What's the danger along the Southern Border to our
citizens, the safety of our citizens from drones?
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Chairman.
So you touched on the volume. The volume of activity within
the 500 yards of our contiguous border on the south and even on
the north is staggering. We have deployed detection technology.
You mentioned 20,000. The significant threat is counter-
surveillance. They are surveilling law enforcement activities.
They're doing this 24/7, 365. You know, historically we've had
to--they've had to have high ground or terrain. Now, everywhere
is the high ground. They have a tactical advantage.
Mr. Pfluger. So they can see what's going on?
Mr. Jones. Exactly.
Mr. Pfluger. Do you have the authority to mitigate those
physically or by other means?
Mr. Jones. So the Secretary has designated certain areas
along our border as covered facilities, so, yes, the capability
exists and the authority exists in those covered areas.
Mr. Pfluger. Have those types of mitigations taken place?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Mr. Pfluger. Are we actively mitigating?
Mr. Jones. We are actively mitigating, yes, sir.
Mr. Pfluger. How many--my time has expired, but how many
events are we experiencing per year on the Southern Border?
Mr. Jones. So, for example, last year if we look at 45,000
detections on the Southwest, of those, 2,500, plus or minus,
actually made an incursion. So now we're talking about a very
small subset. A lot of the surveillance is taking outside of
our jurisdiction in foreign air space. That makes it
particularly challenging for mitigation.
Mr. Pfluger. I bet we'll get back to these. My time has
expired.
I now recognize the Ranking Member for his 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
You know, I'll pick up on this same line of questioning.
When a number of us visited the Southern Border last year, we
heard from your officers about the challenges that drones were
posing. One question I have is I understand they're being used
primarily by the cartels for surveillance, you know, to see
where your officers are so they can, you know, more effectively
traffic people, narcotics, firearms, et cetera, across the
border.
Do you see any evidence of the cartels using drones to
actually move some of that contraband? Like I'm thinking
specifically of fentanyl. Are they using UAS to actually move
fentanyl across the border?
Mr. Jones. We have yet to see fentanyl being moved via UAS.
We have seen other narcotics, albeit in small quantities. From
a cost model, it's not as effective for cartels because the
payload capacity is so small they have to make multiple trips.
We have seen cocaine. We have seen heroin. We have seen
methamphetamine. We've seen weapons. So there is a threat of
moving contraband across our borders.
Mr. Magaziner. So the numbers, of course, are staggering. I
think at one point in your written testimony you alluded to
periods of as many as a thousand detections a week, but the
number of mitigations at the Southern Border was 86 in fiscal
year 2023 and 60 in fiscal 2024. So why so few as a percentage
of the whole? What are the barriers that you're facing?
Mr. Jones. Well, again, many of these detections occur in
foreign air space. Thereby, we cannot mitigate. Actually a very
small percentage actually incur into the United States. So, for
example, on the Southwest Border, only 5 percent of that large
number actually effect an incursion. Of that we have very
strict criteria, and they met the criteria. So the 60 that we
mitigated in fiscal year 2024 actually met the criteria for
mitigation.
Mr. Magaziner. So I'm going to ask about both the 5 percent
and the 95 percent then. So the 5 percent that do come into our
air space, is the criteria too narrow, you know, to bring them
down? Why again so few?
Mr. Jones. Well, again, one of the things that's notable
here is that those are not 2,500 unique identifiers. You have
repeat offenders. So we take down or mitigate one drone of that
large number, that could be responsible for hundreds of
detections across the border.
Mr. Magaziner. I see. So these are events, not necessarily
individual drones, these statistics?
Mr. Jones. That's correct.
Mr. Magaziner. OK. So on the 95 percent--or really, I
guess, the 100 percent, even if you don't have the authority to
bring them down, those that are over foreign air space, do you
still have the ability, the technological ability to track
where the operators are and to alert Mexican or Canadian
authorities as to where the operators are? Can you explain what
that process is like?
Mr. Jones. Absolutely. We do communicate directly with our
foreign partners, and our communication is healthy. Our sharing
of information is healthy. So what you just described is
exactly what we do.
Mr. Magaziner. Is it working? Does it happen? I mean, when
you notify Mexican authorities, for example, that, hey, we've
got a drone and we know where the operator is, I mean, are they
pursuing the operators? Do you have success stories? Again, are
there gaps that need to be filled in that process? Can you
elaborate?
Mr. Jones. Again, we have to rely on our--so in the case of
the government of Mexico, we have to rely on our Mexican
partners to respond. A lot of times these are in areas that are
not highly populated. They're very difficult to get to. They're
also controlled by cartels. So by the time law enforcement
responds, it's very challenging for them. It's not from lack of
effort or lack of communication. It's just a very difficult
environment.
Mr. Magaziner. With the minute that I have left, I'll shift
to Mr. Wiegmann.
On the issue of special events, of SEAR events, can you
just elaborate a little bit more about why it is so important
that the State and locals have expanded authorities? What
should the appropriate guardrails be, you know, for those
expanded authorities?
Mr. Wiegmann. Yes. Each year the FBI can cover a number of
special events, and DHS covers some as well. So we're talking
about big events, like the Super Bowl, the World Series, the
Indianapolis 500, that sort of thing. But, obviously, those are
not the only events that could be subject to an attack or a
drone threat.
You have many other football games, baseball games, soccer
games, the World Cup, if you add them all up, just folks on
sporting events, even forgetting about New York Times New
Year's celebration, there's all manner of events, so we can
only cover a tiny fraction of those in any given year.
So if Congress gives the authority to State and locals to
engage in the same activity, that vastly expands the scope of
what counter-drone protection could be identified.
Mr. Magaziner. I'll just note for the record--thank you--I
understand the need to expand that authority for the State and
locals for these special events.
Mr. Wiegmann. Yes.
Mr. Magaziner. I will just highlight, though, I think
training is going to be very important in this because there
are plenty of people who fly drones at, you know, high school
football games and stuff for legitimate reasons. We'll just
need to make sure that the State and locals have the training
to know how to kind-of go after the bad guys without overly
penalizing the good guys, but I take your broader point.
I yield back.
Mr. Wiegmann. Absolutely. That's a big part of it, the
training.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Gimenez.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know that we face significant threats now from the
technology that we have right now, but right around the corner,
if not already here, is AI. So some of the techniques that we
use to mitigate current drones won't work on AI because they
won't be piloted. They'll just be given a mission. They'll be
given parameters of what to hit, and they'll hit it by
themselves. They don't need to be piloted.
Do we have any capabilities to actually go kinetic,
actually knock these things down either through, you know, some
kind of a projectile or with high energy that fries the
systems? Do we have any of that available anywhere?
Mr. Jones. Thank you for the question.
So without tipping our hand to our adversaries, I think it
would probably be best and we look forward to providing you
detailed briefing on our capabilities, kind-of where our heads
are at, and we share your concern.
Mr. Gimenez. Yes, because I think that that not only
concerns me as far as Customs and Border Protection and our
personnel but also airports, large events, et cetera, where
these drones can be used for really destructive purposes, so
I'm really, really worried about that.
Mr. Jones, you said that you had legal authority to
disable, to mitigate drones in certain areas. We have about a
2,000-mile-long border. So those areas, how many miles of the
2,000 do you actually have the authority to mitigate these
drones?
Mr. Jones. Chairman, again, we're starting to get into an
area I'm not comfortable with in an open forum, but we'd love
to talk those details with you behind closed doors.
Mr. Gimenez. I take that to mean there's not too many
miles, OK. So that's fair enough.
Have you seen any kind of--we know that the cartels,
especially the Mexican cartels, are working with the CCP, the
Chinese Communist Party. The CCP provides the chemicals to the
cartels who then produce the fentanyl that's killing thousands
of Americans every single year.
Do you see any link between--we see that link. Do we see
any links between the CCP, China, and the drones, the
technology that's being used to surveil our border and that's
being used to help the cartels in their quest to transport
people, drugs, guns, everything into the United States?
Mr. Jones. It's no secret that the preponderance of the UAS
technology is manufactured in China and that the cartels are
using that very technology. We share your concerns. There's a
reason why we don't use Chinese drones and whether they
knowingly or unknowingly are potentially collecting information
for the government of China.
Mr. Gimenez. That's it. That's all the questions I have.
Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Thanedar for his questioning.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chair Pfluger.
The operation of C-UAS technologies to intercept drones is
sensitive as it generally requires seizure of property without
a warrant. To do so, C-UAS technology operators must hack into
the signal used to control the drones, which often involves
hacking into the operator's cell phone or computer. As such,
Congress has waived certain wiretapping and other privacy
protections for agencies to carry out these activities.
As DHS and DOJ have began to operate C-UAS technologies,
what have your agencies done to formally enshrine protections
for privacy and civil liberties, any one of you?
Mr. Wheeler. Sir, I can speak for the way that the FBI
conducts the mission.
We're very sensitive to those concerns. The information
that is captured electronically from the technology that we use
is just the information that has to do with the control of the
drone, the flight, the telemetry data, if you will. Even if it
is from--if it is being operated by a personal device like a
cell phone, for example, the technology that we use does not
capture any other information from there, and we're very
sensitive to how that is collected.
Whatever that information that we collect, we don't
maintain it if it's not a threat, if it is not part of a case.
If it is part of something that we investigate, then our
regular guidelines of legal process and how we would maintain
evidence apply. But we're very sensitive to privacy concerns
and making sure we get it right and do it correctly.
Mr. Thanedar. All right. Thank you so much.
Congress is currently considering authorizing a pilot
program for State, local, Tribal, and territorial law
enforcement agencies to operate C-UAS technologies. Expanding
these authorities must be done carefully as doing so requires
waiving wiretapping protections and other critical protections
to protect privacy and civil liberties.
How can we ensure the operation of such technologies
potentially by a large number of law enforcement agencies will
be closely coordinated with and overseen by Federal
authorities?
Mr. Wiegmann, most critically, how can we protect privacy
and civil liberties?
Mr. Wiegmann. Thank you for the question.
So if the pilot program, the State and local pilot program
you mentioned is adopted, there would have to be--the law would
require training for all State and local officials. It would
also require them to follow the same procedures that my FBI
colleague just mentioned in terms of the type of technology
they can use, type of data that they can collect, the rules of
engagement, what type of facilities they can craft so they can
do it safely and would have to work with the FAA.
All of their activities would have to be approved by DHS
and the Department of Justice working with FAA. So it's quite a
labor-intensive process that we're envisioning under the State
and local pilot program to basically get State and local
authorities up and running so that they can mirror and do the
same things that we do at the Federal level, and that includes
privacy and civil liberties.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you. Thank you so much.
I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Is it--how do I pronounce your name? Is it ``Wiegmann'' or
is it ``Wigmann''?
Mr. Wiegmann. It's ``Wigmann.''
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Wiegmann, I want to bore into this just a
little bit more. Some of the questions have indicated and then
the answers indicate that you've got to be careful about
revealing specific technological things. But I noted one thing
when you were testifying you said the reason that you need
expanded authorities--I believe I got this right--is that the
effect of technologies to deal with this could violate laws on
intercepting aircraft in flight and intercepting transmissions.
Did I get that correct?
Mr. Wiegmann. That's right.
Mr. Bishop. Maybe you can just help me understand a little
bit better. If you've got like a mass spectator event, which is
one thing that's been raised, it seems to me--how do you have
like a--and you've also said--several of you have made the
point that, you know, how you intercept data to prevent
intruding on privacy and certainly certain types of data. I
must tell you that has a sophistication level I don't really
understand.
Why not just have a rule that anybody who flies a drone
near a mass spectator event the drone is going to be destroyed
in the air? Is that something that it would be hard to do? Then
why do you need to intercept data in order to do that? If the
object is there, destroy it.
Mr. Wiegmann. So it's a good question. I think the way it
works, as I understand it--and my colleagues can talk about
this operationally--if you had, let's say, a football game and
you would have a perimeter, it would be declared as a temporary
flight restricted area.
Mr. Bishop. OK.
Mr. Wiegmann. So around that you are going to have a buffer
zone. You have an area where it's a no-go, and then you have a
larger area around that where you might want to detect what's
flying, and then you have a larger area around that where you
might be tracking, but, you know, regular commercial drone use
is OK.
So as they're getting closer and closer to the facility,
you're detecting originally the signals to see what is that
drone. You're trying to identify a drone. Oh, is that----
Mr. Bishop. Kind-of like a long-distance radar or something
like that?
Mr. Wiegmann. Exactly. So is that a UPS drone that's just
delivering a package somewhere? Let it go on its way. If it's
getting closer, right into the zone where you're just going to
have to do something against it, so it's kind-of a calibrated
thing. As you get closer and closer, then that's where you take
the opportunity to use the technology to jam it, most
frequently, rather than destroy the drone. You're interfering
with its navigation in a way that confuses it and requires it
to land.
That's what they do in these scenarios is to make it land
somewhere rather than, like, it's not the same as, like,
shooting it out of the sky is my understanding how it works.
You're instead using electronic things to bring it down. So
that's essentially how it works.
Mr. Bishop. Is the technology--and I've always been curious
about that. The first time I asked it in a hearing a couple of
years ago, there was a, you know, twitter of laughter
throughout the room about the naivete of thinking you could
destroy the thing in the air. I guess maybe if it leaves debris
to fall or something, I could understand that.
Mr. Wiegmann. It could be dangerous also, I think. If you
were just to, like, kinetically destroy it, I imagine there
would be some hazards with that.
Mr. Bishop. Should the average person looking at this or
the average Congressman trying to understand it believe that
these technologies where you can use electronics to force the
device to land are successful or have a high degree of
reliability? Maybe I'll direct that to Mr. Jones.
Mr. Wiegmann. Yes.
Mr. Jones. So there's also nondestructive kinetic
capabilities. So one thing from a law enforcement perspective
we have to remember is if we can capture a drone, there's a
forensic capability that allows us to glean information.
Mr. Bishop. Yes.
Mr. Jones. So that's important to us, as well as avoiding
or minimizing any collateral damage. We have to be very careful
in any application of force in public areas. Responsible law
enforcement, first do no harm.
Mr. Bishop. Is any witness, you know, able to testify--
because what you've essentially laid out is we've had a series
of short-term reauthorizations of the authorities that now
exist, and the issue is you want to expand the authorities.
I have concerns, especially after a variety of ways in
which I think Government authority has misused power to
intercept information or learn information about the American
people and has gone too far, what are the--can anybody describe
what the hesitancy is and why they're not significant or why
they should be overruled and proceed with this more expanded
authority?
Mr. Wiegmann.
Mr. Wiegmann. Hesitancy in adopting the expanded authority
or----
Mr. Bishop. Yes, yes.
Mr. Wiegmann. That's kind-of hard for us to answer because
we support expanding the authority.
Mr. Bishop. I understand.
Mr. Wiegmann. But I think that it's important to recognize
when you talk about intercepting signals, and so forth, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, as Assistant Director
Wheeler just mentioned, the types of signals that we're getting
are the same types of information that is actually required to
be broadcast and that anyone can pick up with a drone today.
That's the FAA's rule.
So we're not talking--there is, I guess, a privacy
interest, but it's the same type of information that we're now
requiring--and it's a new regulation, but requiring drones to
broadcast so that anyone can pick up, because it's really just
about the communications between the drone and the controller
so that we can figure out where is that person, what's the
registration, what's the model, how do we deal with it? So I
think the privacy interest is limited.
Mr. Bishop. My time has expired. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today, very
timely issue for all of us I think. Your testimony and the
questions show a little bit of a tension here between private
property, private rights, but I think the bigger one here is
protecting public safety.
A couple of times back home I had the chance to see some
drones flying over my house looking in my backyard,
frustrating, angry, didn't have any kinetic weapons with me, so
they came and went. But on a serious note, I'm home to
Disneyland. Worldwide it's still viewed as an American private
enterprise symbol. I've got the Anaheim Ducks Arena, Ocvibe,
that's being built right now, the Anaheim Ducks, SoFi Stadium
nearby, World Soccer Cup coming to our area very soon, Olympics
coming soon, so a target-rich environment, so to speak.
What you're saying, Mr. Wiegmann, specifically you said
that the Federal Government does not have the bandwidth to
really protect all of these sites, yet we're still not at a
point where we can share the authority information with State,
local, Federal authorities. I hope we don't have to wait for a
Federal law to be passed to get there.
My local sheriff in Orange County has a fusion center.
Fusion centers exist across the Nation where Federal, State,
local, FBI, every agency collaborate, share information,
because when it comes to these drones, time is of the essence.
Authority to neutralize these things is of the essence.
I guess my question to each and every one of you, starting
with Mr. Jones, do you know of any efforts right now to
coordinate with our locals to begin sharing, creating the local
authority to be more effective at protecting our citizens?
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. I would like to speak broadly and just--outside
of just counting UAS, we are working with our Federal, State,
and local partners on a daily basis. There is counter-fentanyl,
counter-UAS, just general public safety. They're our partners.
We're all on the same team. We need the authority----
Mr. Correa. I'm glad to hear you say that. Go ahead.
Mr. Jones. We need the authority to designate select State
and local law enforcement, and then with approved equipment,
you know, just like my colleague stated----
Mr. Correa. We need a Federal law.
Mr. Jones. Yes, we do.
Mr. Correa. Some of us here could probably do something
like that, Mr. Chairman.
I hope we can also--I didn't hear it, I know, Mr. Gimenez's
question talked a little bit about Mexico cooperation. Any
there? This is something that deals with both sides of the
border.
Mr. Jones. Like I stated earlier, our relationship and our
information sharing with Mexico is healthy, both at the local
level through the U.S. Border Patrol Foreign Operations
Branches, as well as our communications with Mexico City.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wheeler, the same question to you. Do you know of any
efforts to coordinate past laws to help us work with the locals
to protect our citizenry?
Mr. Wheeler. Sure. I would illustrate as maybe a good
example for the situation in New Jersey and our Newark division
we talked about earlier, the FBI Newark JTTF, comprised of a
lot of State and local officers that work on the JTTF, are our
people that are actively investigating this matter.
Mr. Correa. Are there any efforts to pass legislation that
you're aware of to give the locals the authority to neutralize/
monitor these aerial vehicles?
Mr. Wheeler. Well, that's not my purview to--for the
legislation, but I can tell you----
Mr. Correa. That you're aware of.
Mr. Wheeler [continuing]. I support capacity building for
our State and local partners.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Wiegmann, my last 30 seconds.
Mr. Wiegmann. That's what we're here for, Congressman.
There's a Senate bill. There's a couple of House bills. All of
them----
Mr. Correa. Good.
Mr. Wiegmann [continuing]. To different degrees would
provide additional authority to the States, both at a minimum
to do detection only and then, on a pilot program, to do
mitigation as well. So that's----
Mr. Correa. Beyond those bills, do you see any--beyond
those bills, any other authorities that are needed to be vested
in the locals to do their job?
Mr. Wiegmann. I think those bills are where we should focus
in coming up with something that will work.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm out of
time. I yield.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentleman's time is expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
It's been referenced that there are Federal laws against
intercepting aircraft or intercepting communication signals,
and it's been cited today regarding the absence of a specific
Federal law authorizing local law enforcement to use existing
technologies to mitigate against an unmanned aerial system
threat or a drone threat.
Let me say that, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Tenth
Amendment already extends such rights to the sovereign States.
Let me say that the current law, the current Federal law
that authorizes specific Federal law enforcement agencies to
use existing and emerging technologies to mitigate against
unmanned aerial systems, yes, that authorizes those specific
Federal agencies to deploy that technology, but in no way does
the current law prohibit the rights of the sovereign State to
authorize their own State and local law enforcement to use
existing technologies and emerging technologies in a law
enforcement capacity.
Mr. Wiegmann, is it against the law for one American to
strike another American? Yes, it is. It's not a trick question.
Is that against the law?
Mr. Wiegmann. You know, obviously, it depends on the
context.
Mr. Higgins. Of course. There's a general law against that.
Mr. Wiegmann. Yes.
Mr. Higgins. Is it allowed for a law enforcement officer
who has probable cause to detain you or arrest you, is it
allowed for him to strike you in order to effect that arrest?
Yes, of course, he can.
Is there a law against me crashing my car into yours
purposefully? Yes, there is.
But, Mr. Jones, are you familiar with the PIT maneuver? Of
course. Law enforcement have been using this for decades. We
use our vehicle to crash into a suspect's vehicle in a
particular manner reflective of our training in order to effect
the arrest.
We're using the current training standards and the
technology of our vehicle that we have deployed to effect that
arrest. That's not a vehicle crash, it's a law enforcement
action.
It's broadly known, everyone knows it's against the law for
one American to shoot another one; but a law enforcement
officer, in order to effect arrest, if he needs to escalate to
lethal force, we know a law enforcement officer has that
authorization through Federal and State law.
So yes, there's plenty of laws. You guys love to cite these
laws that exist that we cannot intercept an aircraft. We
understand that. But if intercepting the aircraft is a law
enforcement action which using existing technology to mitigate
against an unmanned aerial threat, Mr. Chairman, these
technologies exist.
Absolutely, our local and State law enforcement entities
should have access to the same technologies that we seem to be
very protectively reserving for only select Federal agencies.
So, Mr. Jones, you had stated earlier, good sir--and thank
you for wearing the badge, my brother. You had stated earlier
that, yes, you're deploying these systems.
But please clarify for America that there are great
restrictions on actually deploying the technology to land a
drone. You're using the technology primarily to track criminal
drones, but you're not using that technology primarily to land
drones, which is what the technology does.
Am I correct in that assessment or not, Mr. Jones?
Mr. Jones. Well, both are true. We are using technology to
track the drones. We are also using technology and electronic
means to intercept and land the drone at a place of our
discretion.
Mr. Higgins. Give us the numbers by percentage. If you
track 100 drones, how many are you landing?
Mr. Jones. Well, like I stated earlier, for fiscal year
2024, Southwest Border, we actually landed 60 of them,
mitigated 60 of those aircraft.
Mr. Higgins. Sixty of the 45,000 that you encountered?
Well, there you go. That's what I'm saying. You're using the
technology to track, but you're not using the technology to
fully mitigate.
So this is what we've been talking about for a year, Mr.
Chairman. This technology, by Tenth Amendment right, belongs to
the sovereign States, and they should be allowed to fully
deploy it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentleman's time is expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Gonzales.
Mr. Gonzales. Thank you, Chairman.
You know, sometimes I feel like I'm in The Twilight Zone up
here. Like month after month people come before us, they
testify, and you don't get a lot of answers. It's concerning.
It's frustrating.
You're telling me we don't know what the hell these drones
are--in New Jersey are? Is that correct?
Mr. Wheeler. That's right.
Mr. Gonzales. That's crazy. I mean, that's crazy. That's
madness that we don't know what these drones are. You're
telling me that a lot of these--Mr. Jones, you're telling me
that 90 percent--95 percent of these drones along the U.S.-
Mexico border we can't interact because they're not in U.S.
territory?
Mr. Jones. That is correct. A large proportion of them stay
in foreign air space.
Mr. Gonzales. I'll tell you what, there are a lot of
Americans that are very frustrated right now that are
essentially questioning, Where are my taxpayer dollars going?
You know, this DOGE craze that's kind-of starting to take hold.
This is very real. I mean, this is going to come.
People are going to have to come before the carpet and
they're going to have to explain every single line item. What
do you do here? What does this get?
So, let me ask a very specific question. Mr. Wheeler, how
much of the FBI budget goes toward counter-UAS?
Mr. Wheeler. So the technical part of operational budget
that I have within the Critical Incident Response Group is less
than $500,000.
Mr. Gonzales. Five hundred thousand dollars? That's
nothing. Why is it so low?
Mr. Wheeler. Well----
Mr. Gonzales. No wonder we don't know what the hell is
going on, $500,000.
Mr. Wheeler. So that number doesn't capture the--like the
FBI Newark investigation, for example. That--the budget
allocation for what we're doing investigatively is not captured
in that number. But for the technology we use and the way we
deploy it, just under $500,000.
Mr. Gonzales. We want to help you. I mean, this is a
committee, we--you know, the Chairman is putting this together
because we want to know those topics. The American people
deserve to know the truth on this, and we also deserve to have
actions on it. If it's a budget issue, no problem.
But it's also a, ``what is our money getting us?'' Clearly,
not a whole lot. Something needs to change, though, and I'm
trying to figure out what that something is. Just month after
month, it's the same-old, same-old. From a CBP standpoint, Mr.
Jones, do you know what the current budget of CBP is for
counter-UAS?
Mr. Jones. I can tell you that direct appropriations for
counter-UAS was zero last year.
Mr. Gonzales. Zero? So--yes.
Mr. Jones. CBP took it out of HIDTA, and we will continue
to take it out of HIDTA. Now, I can't tell you exactly what
that number is. I have a general ballpark. But we can discuss
that. I'll provide that as a get-back to you.
Mr. Gonzales. Another committee that I sit on is
Appropriations, so I see a lot of things through the lens of
dollars and cents. If you're putting zero on the board, you're
probably not going to get a lot of success, and it's not fair.
You know, a lot of people talk about the border. I
represent the border, nearly half of the Southern Border. I've
been out there with these agents in the middle of nowhere that
are essentially alone and unafraid, you know, making do with
what they have.
It's not fair to them, and ultimately, it's not fair to us
to have them combat against some of these drones that are
happening with a zero budget. I mean, it's just madness.
So, you know, I guess--I have another line of questioning,
but I don't want to embarrass anyone. I would just say I would
be very interested in partnering up and figuring out what we
need to do in order to find--answer some of these questions.
What resources do you need?
The technology is already out there. Drones, this isn't
new. Drones are 100 years old. This isn't state-of-the-art. I
mean, drones are old technology. The fact that we don't know
what's flying in our air space is only the tip of the iceberg
what's to come.
We have to fix this, and I want to partner up to fix this.
Part of that is finding out the proper resources you need,
training, authorities. I get the authorities piece. But it's a
cradle-to-grave type of situation. It cannot just be--the
answer can't be we don't know and the answer can't be zero. I
mean, we got to do better than that. If we don't, I suspect
not-good things will happen.
So thank you, gentlemen, for coming before us and
testifying. I look forward to partnering with all your
agencies.
I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
D'Esposito.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Chairman.
I sort-of feel the same way as my good friend, Mr.
Gonzales. This is like deja vu. We've been talking about this
for a long time, and it seems to be not getting much answers.
I mean, the Chairman and I visited New York City probably
close to 2 years ago. We met with the leadership in the NYPD.
It was probably one of the most rapidly-growing drone use in
the country. My vision on jurisdiction of taking down drones
may be different from others here, but first, I think it's
important to quickly focus on stuff back at home.
I mean, these drones over New York and New Jersey flying
over critical infrastructure, flying over some of, whether it's
the Verrazzano Bridge or others, I mean, I have to agree with
my colleagues.
The fact that we continue to say that we don't know what
they are, we don't know what they're doing, I mean, the
American people are looking at us and they think that we are
lying to them, because they think, How could you possibly not
have answers to drones flying over some of the most critical
air space in the country?
So, I mean, if we're expecting the American people to
believe in the information that we're giving them, I think we
do need to do better. That's none of your fault. I mean, the
fact that there is only a, you know, half--what is it, a half a
million dollars in drone expenditures, appropriations, that's
absolutely insane and I hope that it's something that my
colleagues work on.
But as many have already pointed out, drones continue to
rapidly advance and become more readily available. Along with
the expansion, threats from drones being used by bad actors
have only increased, as all of you have mentioned. Right now,
counter-UAS authorities are restricted from local law
enforcement agencies, leaving it largely in the hands of
Federal agencies.
So, Mr. Wiegmann or Mr. Wheeler, a very simple question: Do
Federal agencies have the ability to assist local law
enforcement agencies with their counter-UAS capabilities
everywhere and every time it's needed?
Mr. Wiegmann. Not today. That's what we're seeking from the
Congress.
Mr. Wheeler. That is absolutely correct.
Mr. D'Esposito. Are there events and places that would
benefit from counter-UAS capabilities that Federal agencies are
simply not able to cover?
Mr. Wiegmann. Absolutely, there are.
Mr. Wheeler. Yes.
Mr. D'Esposito. In your submitted statement, you both said,
``We need to empower State, local, Tribal and territorial law
enforcement agencies across the country, which are primarily
responsible for keeping our citizens safe at the local level,
to take the steps needed to protect their communities from the
emerging threat.''
This past year, right in my district, in the middle of my
district in Nassau County, we hosted the 2024 International
Cricket World Cup, including the India-Pakistan match. While
there were drone-related threats from ISIS ahead of the
tournament, the Federal Government was only able to assist with
their counter-UAS capabilities for a small portion of the
tournament.
What is the current impact of local law enforcement not
having these authorities? I'll leave that to any of you.
Mr. Wheeler. Well, I think that's the main thing is
capacity. We need more capacity to be able to do the mission,
and we strongly support State and local jurisdictions having
that capacity and authority and ability to help.
Mr. D'Esposito. Right. I think what's--I'm sorry, Mr.
Wiegmann, I didn't mean to interrupt.
Mr. Wiegmann. That's right. Just to answer your question
also, Mr.--Congressman Gonzales, as well, I mean, I think all
of us on the panel share your view that we need to do more and
more resources. If we do get the authorities, we will certainly
need more resources.
Even if State and locals are doing it, that will require
training and additional work and approval on our end. So more
resources, more authorities, those are all things that we would
support.
Mr. D'Esposito. I think it's important to point down and to
spread the message, because I think there's a lot of false
information being spread about law enforcement agencies trying
to say that, well, they don't want this added enforcement. They
don't want to take on this responsibility.
I mean, we had a hearing in this room just hours ago where
the commissioner of the Nassau County Police Department,
Patrick Ryder, was here. He has been advocating in his position
as commissioner, as his position as a member of the Major City
Chiefs, that this is something that local law enforcement
agencies, not only do they need it, they want it.
I think that we have the opportunity throughout this
country to make sure that law enforcement agencies, there is
some sort of consolidation. There are many law enforcement
agencies that border one another that could help each other
deal with this, I'll call it a burden but this added burden,
but they're willing to do it.
Why? Because it makes sure that people can be kept safe. We
can make sure that in instances like the World Cup back in my
district or as Mr. Gimenez was talking about, the Summer Games
in Miami, I mean, to depend on the Federal Government and the
Federal Government is telling us, Well, we can only help you
some of the time, even when you have threats from ISIS, I mean,
that's a huge problem and it's one that we need to address not
only here today, but moving forward.
Mr. Chairman, my time is expired, but thank you for
continuing to bring this to light.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentleman's time is expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing today.
Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today.
I got an article right here, ``Mystery drones spotted over
New York, New Jersey prompts calls for Federal investigation.''
I believe this was Breitbart News.
I want to start with you, Mr. Wheeler, from the FBI. What
can you tell us about what you guys do know?
Mr. Wheeler. So the public reports and what we have from
eyewitness sightings, some of those very credible police
personnel and others, are what we describe as unidentified
drones.
We do not know the particular specifics of what those
drones are. Some are described as being slightly larger than a
commercial available drone, fixed wing as well as rotary.
We have helped analyze with our partners' video and
pictures of what those look-alikes would have been submitted.
Part of that is these over 3,000 tips from the public and to
look at that. But as I briefly stated, we don't know the people
responsible behind that, and that's what we're working on----
Mr. Crane. Yes. What did you say you guys were the FBI was
spending on counter-drone?
Mr. Wheeler. My budget that would specifically include; the
technology that we use.
Mr. Crane. Was it $500,000?
Mr. Wheeler. Five hundred thousand dollars.
Mr. Crane. That doesn't seem nearly adequate. Why do you
feel like there isn't a push within the FBI to keep up with
modern warfare and modern threats?
Mr. Wheeler. So we're----
Mr. Crane. What is the budget for the FBI right now?
Mr. Wheeler. Roughly $11 billion.
Mr. Crane. OK. Why do you think as warfare changes, and as
you know, sir, warfare is changing drastically right now
overseas especially with Ukraine and Russia and the development
of drone technology, why isn't the FBI taking this threat more
seriously, and that's obviously reflected by the budget that
you guys have assigned to counter-drone technology.
Mr. Wheeler. I have a limited capability that is embedded
within our Emerging Threats Unit for surveillance issues. That
allocation of resources, that research, that operational
deployment of our capability is what we have today. I would
imagine that this would grow over time.
Mr. Crane. What do you think that some of these terrorist
cells that might be in the country right now or maybe even
outside of our borders what do you think that they're looking
at when they see a hearing like this and they see that you guys
still after almost a month don't know who these drones are what
do you think that they're thinking?
Mr. Wheeler. So, I would be measured in how we speak about
our capability, and what our limitations and capacity is.
However I'll say to you that it's not as good as I wish it was,
and we'll continue to work to make it better.
Mr. Crane. Well, when you're only spending $500,000 a year,
it's probably not going to be very good, is it?
Mr. Wheeler. The only thing I would say about that is that
this is an enterprise-wide problem, it's not just a
technological problem. That most of that $11 billion budget for
the FBI gets after threats to Americans, this being one of
them.
The way we apply resources, personnel, operational, all of
that to include technology to get after a threat that would
threaten American lives, I don't think that $500,000 for the
technology part of it adequately captures our commitment to
protecting Americans.
Mr. Crane. I want to shift real quick because you guys have
been talking about using electronic warfare to counter some of
these drones.
What about drones that aren't susceptible to counter-
warfare, like your fiber optic drones; what are you guys doing
about those?
I'll start with you, Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. So all options are on the table right now. We
are using--we are exploring kinetic options to complement the
electronic.
Mr. Crane. You know you can buy those right now and they're
really not that expensive. Are you aware of that, Mr. Jones?
Mr. Jones. I'm aware there's a lot of different
technologies out there. We have experimented with some that
have been very successful.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Malliotakis, is
recognized.
Ms. Malliotakis. Thank you, Chairman Pfluger.
Thank you all for being here today. I just want to follow-
up on what my colleague asked regarding what happened in New
York and New Jersey.
These drones, unmanned aircrafts have also flown over my
district. A number of constituents have seen them over a power
plant in Brooklyn. They were coming over the Verrazzano Bridge.
I will remind everyone or explain to everyone here that
Verrazzano Bridge connects Staten Island and Brooklyn, and on
the Staten Island side, you have Fort Wadsworth, which is a
U.S. Coast Guard Sector New York base.
Then in the Brooklyn side right on the other side of the
Verrazzano Bridge, you have Fort Hamilton, which is a U.S. Army
installation. So, it is very concerning to me that we have
these objects. We are not sure if they're drones or unmanned
aircrafts, but they are flying over sensitive infrastructure
and facilities.
The fact that we don't know what they are or who's behind
them or what they're doing is very concerning to me,
particularly in a post-Chinese spy balloon world. OK.
The fact that this administration allowed for a Chinese spy
balloon to go across the country over multiple military
installations is very concerning. That we could potentially be
having this happen again is--it's like astounding to me that
this is even happening without any type of intervention.
You say it's no known threat, but is there still a
possibility of there being a threat? At the end of the day,
that's what my constituents want to know.
Mr. Wheeler. Yes. I am cognizant, and we all are in the
FBI, of what the threat can look like, any way of across the
spectrum of sophisticated state actors/adversaries that want to
hurt us all the way through counterterrorism matters, cyber,
WMD, criminal, all the way down to a nuisance drone that could
cause harm. So that's the wide spectrum that concerns me every
day.
Ms. Malliotakis. And--OK. Want to finish your sentence?
Mr. Wheeler. I'll just mention it concerns me that we don't
know the answer to your question yet.
Ms. Malliotakis. Are you working with the Pentagon, with
FAA, with DHS, with your partners to try to identify this?
Because I don't put it all on just the FBI. I think this is--I
mean, why is--what is Homeland Security doing? Do you have any
idea? Have you----
Mr. Wheeler. I wouldn't speak for another department, but I
will say that the way we do business is extremely collaborative
in the interagency, and especially with our State and local
partners.
Ms. Malliotakis. So who is taking the lead here on this
particular issue, identify these drones and aircrafts?
Mr. Wheeler. Well, we have an investigation open predicated
on the--an idea that there's unsafe operation in the air space,
which is a Federal violation that we have some jurisdiction
for.
But it would help us know sort-of what lane this falls in
when we know the people that are responsible and what this is
all about, to your point earlier. We're actively investigating
and would like to answer those questions. I don't have a better
answer.
Ms. Malliotakis. What if they were carrying chemical
weapons or something? We just don't--I mean, this could be
already--this could be a much worse conversation we could be
having right now, because these things have been flying all
over New York, New Jersey, over military installations.
I don't know. I think--I don't know what's going on there,
but these agencies need to figure it out and try to get to the
bottom of what's going on. I think it's very concerning.
Is there a possibility--if hopefully it is not a threat, is
it a possibility it would fall under this System Assessment and
Validation of Emergency Responders program, the SAVER program?
This is a program under Department of Homeland Security Science
and Technology, where they are testing various technology for
search-and-rescue, disaster response, and it could be part of
the law enforcement assessment. Do you think that's a
possibility?
Because my Army base doesn't know about it. My NYPD doesn't
know about it. So I guess my question is, why wouldn't the
local authorities know if this was part of a testing of
security technologies for first responders?
Mr. Wheeler. I don't know that to be the case, and I
couldn't really comment on that.
Ms. Malliotakis. OK. Well, just again, I would love to
speak to you off-line at some point and maybe share some
information with you. But I would really just urge if you could
speak to your colleagues and counterparts in these other
departments and--because we need to get to the bottom of what's
going on here.
If it is something that is not nefarious and is one of--
part of these public safety applications that are being tested,
they need to coordinate with the local authorities, so my guys
in New York NYPD, they know that it's not a threat.
Mr. Wheeler. I would agree.
Ms. Malliotakis. Thank you.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentlelady yields.
This will be the last questioning from--for the first
panel. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey,
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman--Chairmen,
both of you, for allowing me to sit in on this hearing.
I've been in Congress 44 years, and I have lost track of
the number of times when we seemingly did not adequately assess
a threat. I had one of my service members from the Marines in
the barracks in Lebanon when that terrible horrible deed was
committed by Iran. I--actually, after we got hit in Dar es
Salaam and Nairobi in 1998 by al-Qaeda, I chaired all the
hearings.
We had the chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff come and
testify, as Admiral Crowe. They kept saying, everyone, no one
thought that al-Qaeda would hit there. Maybe in the Middle East
but not there.
I wrote a bill called the Embassy Security Act. It was
signed into law. I added it to an appropriations bill, big
thick bill. It was all about setbacks and Mylar on the windows,
a lot of good things. It did mitigate I think some of the
concerns there.
But we always seem to miss something, and I'm very
concerned that we're missing something here. I've raised the
issue as has my colleague, Malliotakis and others in New Jersey
and New York, about these drone sightings.
So last night, I was on the beach in Island State Park in
Ocean County with the sheriff. He's--he has been working every
single night. He's got his own tethered drones chronicling.
One of his officers, 2 nights ago, saw 50 drones come in
off the ocean right there. So he thought maybe they'll
replicate it. They didn't, but we thought it was a possibility.
Then last night, we had a number of other people there,
including a commanding officer from the Coast Guard, who said
that 1 of their 47-foot motor lifeboats was followed by between
12 and 30 of these drones as they went through the water,
followed right behind them, you know. I said, what's the rules
of engagement? I mean, you do it if you're fighting against,
you know, a narcotrafficker or something. They said, We don't
know, we don't have any.
So I did reach out to the commanding officer at the Joint
Base, which is also in my district, and talked to him, had a
very good conversation. Colonel Anthony Smith, Joint Base Fort
Dix-McGuire, the 87th Air Wing, Air Base Wing, today.
I said, I know you have the capability--you've put out
press releases--to identify and bring down drones. Why can't
you deploy them at least to the ocean, bring one of these down,
find out who's doing it? They have the capability.
He said, we don't have the authority, only within the
parameters of our base. Well, there's a national interest here.
Our jets fly over the ocean all the time for training, so that
perimeter is larger.
So I did write Secretary Lloyd Austin asking that that
capability that may be sitting in a closet somewhere--I know
they use it all the time--but, you know, bring it out. I'm not
saying you got to share it with the sheriffs. It would be nice.
Just do it yourself in the interests of the American public.
So I would ask if you would echo that request. I mean, DOD
has got the capability. Maybe Homeland Security does as well.
When we had a Zoom meeting with Secretary Mayorkas--our
Governor put it together, and I appreciated that. But I asked
him, Why can't we just track where they go to? Seemingly,
they're going out to sea to something, a ship. We don't know
for sure. But they came in off the--off the, you know, from the
ocean.
So the question really is, can't we just get DOD to share?
In my first term, DOD and VA did a great thing, the DOD-VA
sharing agreement for health care capabilities. It was
fantastic. Why can't the DOD share this with Homeland Security,
with FBI and others so that you can go out and find out who
they are?
Maybe it's China. I chair the China Commission. You know,
I've had 115 hearings on it. I'm barred from going there now.
China--and I'm on their hit list. Xi Jinping is a monster. You
know, look what Putin is doing. They're all capable of doing
horrible things to our people. Now they're threatening my good
friend and colleague from New York and, of course, New Jersey
big time.
So let's go get that DOD capability and find out and put to
rest the question, Who is it? We can bring one down tomorrow.
Your thoughts.
Mr. Wheeler. Sir, I'd just say, I share your concern. I
share a lot of frustration. I'm more than willing to continue
working with the Department of Defense to try to get better.
Mr. Smith. Again, if they don't have the authority, they
can do it on an emergency basis. Just send that capability out
to the ocean or to the beach, because they're coming in every
day. Figure out which one it is and bring them down, and then
retrieve it and find out what's going on.
As my good friend, Malliotakis, Congresswoman Malliotakis
said, you know, the thing with the balloon was mind-boggling,
you know, over our bases, and we didn't see that that was a
threat. Well, this I think is a very serious threat.
So, please, if you could get DOD to share that capability.
Maybe Homeland has it. I don't know. Maybe you have it
somewhere, but I know DOD has it. Thank you. Appreciate it.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentleman's time is expired.
I thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony, for
being here today, and for the Members and the questions.
We will now dismiss this first panel, take a brief 2- to 3-
minute recess while we arrange for the second panel of
witnesses.
[Recess.]
Mr. Pfluger. The committee will come to order.
I am pleased to have the second distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this very important topic, and I
ask that our witnesses please rise and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you. You may be seated.
Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in
the affirmative.
I'd now like to formally introduce our second panel. Mr.
Jeffrey Baumgartner serves as the vice president for national
security and resilience at Berkshire Hathaway Energy; and Dr.
Paul Schwennesen serves as the co-director of the Global
Strategy Decisions Group, also my classmate from the United
States Air Force Academy, class of 2000.
Thank you for being here.
We will now recognize Mr. Baumgartner for your opening
statement of 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JEFFERY BAUMGARTNER, VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
SECURITY AND RESILIENCE, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY ENERGY
Mr. Baumgartner. Chairman, Ranking Members, and Members of
the subcommittees, thank you for inviting me to testify. My
name is Jeffrey Baumgartner, and I serve as the vice president
of national security and resilience policy at Berkshire
Hathaway Energy.
Today, I want to discuss how unmanned aerial systems
threaten critical infrastructure. Berkshire Hathaway Energy
businesses provide reliable, secure, low-cost energy to more
than 13 million customers in the United States, Great Britain,
and Canada.
Our commitment to our customers requires us to secure our
infrastructure from all threats, including those posed by
unmanned aerial systems. Critical infrastructure is the
backbone of our economy and security, yet energy sector
infrastructure and the transportation, communications, and
water sector infrastructure we rely on face increasing threats
from UAS, and the stakes for ensuring resilience and security
could not be higher.
In recent years, UAS technology has become more accessible,
affordable, and advanced. While these innovations offer immense
potential, like enabling faster damage assessments of energy
infrastructure, they also empower malicious actors.
Adversaries can use UAS to surveil facilities, deliver
hazardous payloads, disrupt operations, and even conduct cyber
intrusions. The Department of Homeland Security's 2025 Homeland
Threat Assessment highlights UAS as a persistent and growing
risk to critical infrastructure.
This warning isn't hypothetical. Last month, Federal agents
arrested an individual planning to use a UAS to attack an
electric substation. I hope we can proactively address the UAS
threat before a significant incident occurs.
Despite the pervasiveness of the threat, existing Federal
laws and regulations have not kept pace with the rapid
proliferation of UAS technology.
Current frameworks primarily address safety and air space
management, but lack robust provisions to counter malicious UAS
activities. This leaves critical infrastructure companies
vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated threats.
To address these risks, we must modernize our defenses
while balancing the security measures with civil liberties. A
comprehensive strategy that incorporates technology innovation,
appropriate legal frameworks, and public-private collaboration,
is essential.
I hope we can prioritize the following actions: No. 1,
grant critical infrastructure companies limited authority to
deploy advance detection and counter-UAS technologies.
Investments in cutting-edge counter-UAS systems will ensure we
can address current and emerging threats effectively.
No. 2, identify formal mechanisms for sharing actionable
information about UAS threats and enable law enforcement at all
levels with the tools and legal authorities to address UAS
threats effectively.
The third is advanced research and development.
Collaborative R&D will improve the ability to neutralize UAS
threats without collateral damage.
The fourth and final, develop a comprehensive strategy to
align regulatory, technological, and operational efforts at
Federal, State, and local levels, while addressing privacy
concerns and establishing clear legal parameters for UAS
operations.
The private sector owns most of the critical infrastructure
that provides key services, but protecting these assets is a
collaborative effort. The National Security Memorandum on
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience rightly
emphasizes this partnership.
However, existing counter-UAS authorities for DHS and the
Department of Justice are set to expire soon. Failing to renew
and expand current authorities risks leaving critical
infrastructure defenseless against the evolving UAS threat.
The window of opportunity to address these challenges is
closing. By modernizing our defenses, updating our legal
frameworks and fostering collaboration, we can safeguard
critical infrastructure, protect public safety, and maintain
our leadership in security and innovation.
We are ready to work alongside this committee, a coalition
of critical infrastructure companies, and relevant stakeholders
to effectively protect our critical services against the
evolving UAS threat.
Thank you for holding this hearing and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Baumgartner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeffrey Baumgartner
December 10, 2024
Chairman Pfluger, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Magaziner,
Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of both subcommittees, thank you
for the opportunity to testify. My name is Jeffrey Baumgartner, and I
am vice president of national security and resilience policy at
Berkshire Hathaway Energy. Berkshire Hathaway Energy owns energy
production facilities, utilities, natural gas pipelines and a liquid
natural gas import, export, and storage facility. Our locally-managed
businesses share a vision for a secure and sustainable energy future.
Delivering low-cost, secure, and reliable energy service each day to
more than 13 million customers and end-users throughout the United
States, Great Britain, and Alberta, Canada, is at the core of
everything we do. That is why we are committed to securing our energy
services from all hazards, including unmanned aerial systems (UAS). I
appreciate your invitation to discuss this important topic on behalf of
Berkshire Hathaway Energy's businesses.
Critical infrastructure forms the backbone of our Nation's economy,
security, and public health. These assets--including energy facilities,
transportation hubs, communications networks, and water systems--are
increasingly vulnerable to a wide range of threats from UAS. Berkshire
Hathaway Energy's businesses have customers or energy infrastructure in
35 States, and our energy services enable our customers' way of life.
Today, demand for electricity is growing dramatically across the
economy to support evolving customer needs, as well as critical
technologies like artificial intelligence and the proliferation of data
centers that fuel our digital lives. Natural gas has grown to represent
over 40 percent of electric generation as of 2023,\1\ making protection
of pipelines, compressor stations and related infrastructure
particularly important. Providing secure, resilient, and low-cost
energy services is a responsibility we take seriously so that our
customers can thrive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. Energy Information Administration, What is U.S.
electricity generation by energy source? (February 2024), https://
www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the evolving threat landscape
In recent years, the accessibility, affordability, and
sophistication of UAS have surged. This technological proliferation has
benefited a variety of industries with legitimate use-cases. We are
hopeful that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Part 108
rulemaking will advance our businesses' ability to fly UAS beyond
visual line of sight (BVLOS) to enable faster damage assessments of
energy infrastructure and restoration times for our customers and your
constituents. Simultaneously, however, the ease of procuring cheap,
sophisticated UAS has empowered malicious actors.
Adversaries can use UAS to:
1. Conduct Surveillance.--Equipped with cameras or sensors, UAS can
collect sensitive information about critical infrastructure
layouts and operations.
2. Deliver Payloads.--UAS can carry explosives, incendiary devices,
or hazardous materials, posing a direct physical threat.
3. Disrupt Operations.--By interfering with air space near airports
or power lines, UAS can cause significant disruptions.
4. Enable Cyber Intrusions.--UAS equipped with hacking tools can
breach wireless networks and disrupt communications.
Incidents in the United States and around the world highlight the
urgency of this issue. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security
released its 2025 Homeland Threat Assessment in October. The annual
assessment highlighted that the intelligence community ``continue[s] to
observe concerning UAS activity over sensitive critical infrastructure
sites, which could interfere with regular facility operations, disrupt
emergency response or authorized flight operations, and provide
intelligence to malign actors.''\2\ The assessment raises instances
where malicious actors have ``considered using UAS to conduct
intelligence collection, to drop explosives and other items on U.S.
critical infrastructure for disruption purposes, and to endanger
takeoffs and landings at airports via the mere presence of UAS.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Threat
Assessment 2025 (October 2024), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/2024-10/24_0930_ia_24-320-ia-publication-2025-hta-final-30'sep24-
508.pdf.
\3\ Id.
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Critical infrastructure sectors--including energy, transportation,
and communication--are particularly vulnerable. As the 2025 Homeland
Threat Assessment highlighted, unauthorized UAS activities can disrupt
operations, cause physical damage, and facilitate espionage. We have
observed UAS flights over substations, pipeline compressors, and our
liquid natural gas plant that may be providing intelligence for future
attacks. The potential for UAS to carry hazardous payloads, such as
explosives or conductive materials, further amplifies the risk to
public safety and national security. For example, last month, Federal
agents arrested an individual in Tennessee who planned to use a UAS to
fly explosives into an electric substation. He was charged with
attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction and attempting to
destroy an energy facility.\4\ When arrested, the individual was in the
process of executing his planned attack, having armed the explosive
device and powered up the UAS he intended to use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ U.S. Department of Justice, Man Arrested and Charged with
Attempting to Use a Weapon of Mass Destruction and to Destroy an Energy
Facility in Nashville (November 2024), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
man-arrested-and-charged-attempting-use-weapon-mass-destruction-and-
destroy-energy-facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
proactive authorities to address the threat
Despite the clear and present dangers with UAS, existing Federal
laws have not kept pace with the rapid advancement and proliferation of
UAS technology. The FAA has established regulations for UAS operations,
but these regulations primarily address safety and air space management
and lack robust provisions for countering malicious UAS activities.
In pursuing the imperative to enhance counter-UAS capabilities, it
is essential to balance security measures with the protection of civil
liberties. Legislation must include safeguards to prevent abuse of
authority and ensure that counter-UAS operations do not infringe upon
individuals' rights to privacy and lawful UAS use. Implementing
oversight mechanisms, transparency in operations, and clear
accountability standards will help maintain public trust and uphold
democratic principles.
While agencies like the FAA and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) have made strides in regulating the use of UAS, significant gaps
remain to fully address the threats:
1. Limited Detection Capabilities.--Critical infrastructure owners
and operators lack legal access to the most effective tools to
detect, identify, and track UAS.
2. Legal Constraints.--Existing laws restrict private sector and
local authorities from deploying counter-UAS technologies, even
for self-defense.
3. Coordination Challenges.--There is no standardized protocol for
coordination among Federal, State, and local entities in
response to UAS incidents.
4. Expiring Authority.--Existing counter-UAS authorities for DHS
and the Department of Justice are set to expire later this
month, threatening to leave a critical gap in the legal
framework necessary to effectively detect and counter UAS
threats in the public and private sectors.
request from critical infrastructure
To mitigate these threats, I propose the following actions:
1. Enhance Detection and Countermeasures.--Expand authorities for
advanced detection technologies such as radar, radio frequency
sensors, and AI-based tracking systems. Enable appropriate
critical infrastructure owners and operators to work with law
enforcement to deploy counter-UAS tools at high-risk sites with
a limited authority that balances the need to address this
pressing threat with respect for privacy and safety.
2. Strengthen Public-Private Partnerships.--Establish formal
mechanisms for information sharing between the Government and
private sector, ensuring timely dissemination of intelligence
to prevent significant threats. Create incentives for
infrastructure owners to adopt robust UAS security measures,
and empower Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies
with the necessary tools and legal authority to address UAS
threats within their jurisdictions.
3. Advance Research and Development.--Fund research and development
programs focused on innovative UAS countermeasures and threat
analysis. Promote joint exercises and simulations to test the
resilience of critical infrastructure against both physical and
cyber threats and the ability to neutralize threats without
collateral damage.
4. Develop a Framework for Countering UAS Threats.--Direct DHS, in
collaboration with the FAA and the Department of Defense, to
lead the development of a comprehensive strategy that aligns
regulatory, technological, and operational efforts to
systematically address UAS risks. Establish a clear legal
framework that defines the parameters for counter-UAS
operations, including addressing privacy concerns, ensuring
compliance with existing laws, and providing guidelines for the
use of force in UAS mitigation efforts. Combine these efforts
with appropriate State and Federal penalties for malicious use
of UAS near protected facilities, including critical
infrastructure.
closing
The proliferation of UAS presents both opportunities and
challenges. Critical infrastructure security is a shared responsibility
and a national imperative. While most critical infrastructure is owned
by the private sector, government at all levels can and must play a
role in protecting this infrastructure, especially when there is a
growing need to defend against nation-state actors. The U.S. Government
has long recognized the private sector is on the front lines of
critical infrastructure protection, as recently embodied in National
Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience.\5\ To harness the benefits of this technology while
mitigating its risks, Congress must prioritize the enactment of
comprehensive counter-UAS legislation that enables an industry-
Government partnership to address the evolving threat. By doing so, the
United States can safeguard its critical infrastructure, protect public
safety, and maintain its position as a leader in technological
innovation and security.
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\5\ White House, National Security Memorandum on Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience (April 2024), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/04/30/
national-security-memorandum-on-critical-infrastructure-security-and-
resilience/.
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The window of opportunity for Congress to address the escalating
UAS threat is narrowing. With existing counter-UAS authorities set to
expire and the rapid advancement of UAS technology, the time for action
is now. Failure to enact comprehensive legislation will leave critical
infrastructure vulnerable to malicious UAS activities, resulting in
potentially devastating consequences for national security and public
safety.
The threat of UAS to critical infrastructure is no longer
theoretical--it is a reality demanding urgent and coordinated action.
By modernizing our defenses, updating our legal frameworks, and
fostering collaboration, we can ensure our infrastructure remains
secure against this evolving threat. I am hopeful that my testimony
underscores the industry's commitment to security and our willingness
to work with both public and private partners across all sectors to
address all threats to U.S. energy security. Thank you again for
holding this hearing.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Baumgartner.
The Chair now recognizes Dr. Paul Schwennesen for his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF PAUL SCHWENNESEN, CO-DIRECTOR, GLOBAL STRATEGY
DECISIONS GROUP
Mr. Schwennesen. Chairmen Pfluger and Gimenez, Ranking
Members Magaziner and Thanedar, and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today about safeguarding the homeland from unmanned aerial
systems.
So I have rearranged my remarks, easily in the back, hoping
to give you guys something a little more tangible to work with
so that we're not just repeating and risking the constant
repetition of the problem. I think we acknowledge the problem.
We have a real train wreck coming.
I think it goes a little bit unsaid. I think we lack a lot
of the technical know-how on how to deal with this, on how to
assess and neutralize these threats. But there is somebody who
does know, and that's the Ukrainians.
Having recently observed first-hand the astonishing
evolution in drone operations in Ukrainian-occupied Kursk, I
think the message for me, at least, has finally sunk home.
Unmanned systems are not just an iteration. They are, indeed, a
revolution in the application of lethal force.
The world's most advanced weapons and tactics are being
developed and deployed at scale in the Ukraine Russian front at
remarkably low-cost, and without central direction, and these
facts hold radical implications for the next major shooting war
between great powers.
We need to learn from the Ukrainians. The United States is
rapidly losing its strategic military advantage in this new
technical environment. There can be little doubt that China,
North Korea, Iran, and other emergent powers are eagerly
sending observers and technicians to the front lines in
occupied Ukraine to very carefully note the revolution in
weapons delivery and to adopt it into doctrines which seek to
invert the military strengths of their larger, better-equipped,
better-trained Western geopolitical adversaries.
We need to learn from Ukraine. In short, the rules of the
arms race have been fundamentally rewritten to favor small,
cheap, easily mastered weapon systems. More important still,
these disproportionate advantages are not a one-time effect.
They amplify in a positive feedback loop through each iteration
cycle. New tech gets better exponentially faster and is
deployed far more quickly than legacy countermeasures.
In Ukraine, the source of this immense innovation reservoir
is the highly-adaptable, highly-diffused emerging engineering
base of Ukrainian technicians. Uncountable tech workers
routinely work full days in their civilian capacity, then leave
their jobs to go work in pop-up tech facilities until late at
night. The whole country is on deck. They have created an
ecosystem of invention, a web only loosely coordinated through
the Ministry of Defense.
The advances in hardware and software they produce are
channeled into a robust system of decentralized training
facilities, and in less than 3 weeks, an FPV drone operator can
be mission-ready. Operators with no previous battlefield
experience have been credited with as many as 1,500 confirmed
kills. The disproportionality is vast.
This is perhaps the main takeaway in a total-war, peer-to-
peer scenario. If technology allows one side of a conflict to
impose extraordinary damage on the exquisite, expensive,
difficult-to-master weapon systems of their adversary, and can
do so at a fraction of the cost expended by their enemy, it
doesn't require an economist to see where that leads.
It is easy to be a critic, but I am convinced the United
States and its NATO allies have a very narrow window of
opportunity to address this major shift in comparative
advantage. Current operations in Ukraine have shown what a
scrappy, innovative force can do to a large, hidebound military
machine. It would be well to take note.
So some of the scenarios looking forward: I think the most
likely is that the United States will fall behind the leading
edge of UAS development and deployment and will only start to
respond in the aftermath of a crisis, and we're seeing some of
that already in New Jersey.
We don't need a Pearl Harbor or a 9/11 to wake us up. We're
already awake. We need to deal with this now. So the best case
is possibly conceivably that we can avoid this kind of
depressing scenario through a well-orchestrated demonstration.
Historical examples, such as the sinking of the
Ostfriesland--Air Force people know this well--show that it is
sometimes possible to break entrenched paradigms by publicly
demonstrating the current system's vulnerabilities.
When understood by the right audiences, these
demonstrations can shift doctrine development and tactical
training in new and constructive ways, preferably before the
lessons are learned the hard way.
We need to learn from Ukraine. It's time to get a task
force to mop up information, go out there, sponge this stuff
up, and learn from what they're doing and learn this
information from in theater and get up to speed as soon as
possible. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schwennesen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul Schwennesen
the `drone wars' in ukraine--and what it means for america
Chairmen Pfluger and Gimenez, Ranking Members Magaziner and
Thanedar, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today about safeguarding the homeland from
unmanned aerial systems.
Almost exactly a year ago, a sniper team I helped convene engaged a
Russian machine gun position near Bakhmut. While a handful of drones in
the sector (both Russian and Ukrainian) encouraged a certain discretion
on our part, they operated in a surveillance role only--while artillery
and infantry assault forces fulfilled their traditional roles. One year
later, such an operation would be effectively impossible--the hyper-
advancements in weaponized drone technology would make such a
comparatively exposed position untenable. The implications of this
shift in tactical realities on U.S. and allied national security is
only just beginning to dawn on the transatlantic defense establishment.
I confess it freely--I was a latecomer to recognize the enormous
implications of drones (or ``Uncrewed Autonomous Systems'' if you
must). I'd seen them deployed in Ukraine over nearly 3 years and felt
(and wrote!) that while significant, drones represented merely an
iteration in a manageable arms race. Like Stacie Pettyjohn and others,
I felt that the hype risked overstating the case. Having once again
observed first-hand the astonishing evolution in operations in
Ukrainian-occupied Kursk, however, I think the message has finally sunk
home: unmanned systems are not just an iteration, they are indeed a
revolution in the application of lethal force.
The United States defense establishment does not appear equipped,
technically or psychologically, to respond to this looming threat. I
must emphasize--in the starkest terms--that the comparative advantage
in modern weaponry has fundamentally and perhaps permanently shifted
toward small, cheap, attritable, evolutionary systems. Expensive legacy
weapons-systems, traditional procurement conventions, and standard
training regimens are increasingly obsolete. The world's most advanced
weapons and tactics are being developed and deployed (at scale) in the
Ukraine-Russian front at remarkably low-cost and without central
direction--and these facts hold radical implications for the next major
shooting war between great powers.
The United States is rapidly and unwittingly losing its strategic
military advantage in this new technical environment. There can be
little doubt that China, North Korea, Iran, and other emergent powers
are eagerly sending observers and technicians to the front lines in
occupied Ukraine to carefully note the revolution in weapons delivery
and to adopt it into doctrines which seek to invert the military
strengths of their larger, better-equipped, better-trained Western
geopolitical adversaries.
Technical advances, particularly in first-person view (FPV) drone
deployment, mean that between 100 grams and 50 kilograms of high
explosive can be delivered to within 50cm\2\ from 10km away,
practically anywhere on earth, indefinitely and from every direction on
the compass; flying through trees and terrain at high speed and inches
off the ground. Rapid advances in navigation technology mean that the
primary counter to drone deployment (frequency jamming) is increasingly
irrelevant. Artificial-intelligence navigation modules that are capable
of terrain navigating to their target are readily available. Small
drones made of radar-transparent composites (even cardboard!) are
likewise increasingly available, making drone interdiction an
increasingly difficult prospect.
It is not just the technical advances that got my attention--the
tactics of employment are equally striking. Ukrainians are, for
instance, landing ambush drones on roads deep in enemy territory which
can be activated to attack armored traffic when it appears. They use
``carrier drones''--heavy-lift units that will carry 4 or more FPV
drones into the battlespace to be deployed against multiple targets.
They are using heavy drone decoys to draw anti-drone fire, then hit the
source with smaller attack units. They have advanced laser-guided
munitions being deployed at altitude. They are perfecting techniques to
protect operators from counter-fire. They are dropping explosives,
unseen and unheard from 5,000 feet directly into fighting holes by
detecting body heat. There is no more ``blending in with the
terrain''--it is irrelevant. The cost of losing a drone is negligible
and with zero loss of life.
In short, the rules of the arms race have been fundamentally
rewritten to favor small, cheap, easily-mastered weapons systems. More
important still, these disproportionate advantages are not a one-time
effect--they amplify in a positive feedback loop through each iteration
cycle. New tech gets better exponentially faster and is deployed far
more quickly than legacy countermeasures.
In Ukraine, the source of this immense innovation reservoir is the
highly-adaptable, highly-diffuse engineering base of Ukrainian
technicians. Uncountable tech workers routinely work full days in their
civilian capacity, then leave their jobs to work at pop-up tech
facilities until late at night. They have created an ecosystem of
invention, a web only loosely coordinated through the Ministry of
Defense's newly-minted Unmanned Systems Service (an independent branch
of the Ukrainian military). The advances in hardware and software they
produce are channeled into a robust system of decentralized training
facilities which operate on state-managed ``polygon'' ranges and
private testing facilities. In less than 3 weeks, an FPV drone operator
can be mission-ready: Operators with no previous battlefield experience
have been credited with as many as 1,500 confirmed kills. Again, the
disproportionality is vast.
And this is perhaps the main takeaway in a total-war, peer-to-peer
scenario: such wars are heavily defined by economic considerations--the
side that produces more materiel while absorbing material losses
ultimately prevails. Training, esprit de corps, fighting spirit--all
are dependent on the products of a functional economy. Look no further
than the Confederate States Army or the German Wehrmacht--their
legendary fighting spirits ultimately collapsed under the sheer mass of
the other side's more efficient war machine. If technology allows one
side of a conflict to impose extraordinary damage on the exquisite,
expensive, difficult-to-master weapons systems of their adversary, and
can do so at a fraction of the cost expended by their enemy--well, it
doesn't require an economist to see where that leads.
It is easy to be a critic, but I am convinced that the United
States and its NATO allies have a very narrow window of opportunity to
address this major and growing shift in comparative advantage. Current
operations in Ukraine have shown what a scrappy, innovative force can
do to a large, hidebound military machine--it would be well to take
note.
scenarios
Least Likely.--The U.S. Department of Defense will quickly
integrate UAS technology and training from Ukraine into its mainstream,
operational-level, front-line units. It would take an unprecedented
level of commitment from all levels of the command structure and an
extraordinary degree of political cooperation to shift the status quo.
Most Likely.--The United States will fall farther and farther
behind the leading edge of UAS deployment and will only begin to
respond in the aftermath of a crisis. My discussions with Capitol Hill
legislators, front-line military leaders, defense analysts, and
doctrine scholars lead invariably to the same independent conclusion:
the American defense procurement system is too vast, and the regulatory
frameworks too inscrutable, to meaningfully adopt UAS capabilities into
existing defense doctrine or practice. An event akin to Pearl Harbor or
9/11, with the physical destruction of tens of billions of dollars of
hardware and a substantial loss of life will be required to jumpstart
the innovation cycle and break down the thickets of red tape which make
initiative next to impossible.
Best Case.--Conceivably, this kind of depressing scenario can be
avoided through a well-managed artificial crisis. Historical examples,
such as the famous sinking of the Ostfriesland, show that it is
sometimes possible to break entrenched paradigms by publicly
demonstrating the current system's vulnerabilities. When understood by
the right audiences, these demonstrations can shift doctrine
development and tactical training in new and constructive ways--
preferably before the lessons are learned the hard way.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Dr. Schwennesen.
The Chair will note that we had a third expert on the
panel, Mrs. Cathy Lanier from the National Football League,
unfortunately, unable to join today. However, the Chair asks
unanimous consent to enter Ms. Lanier's testimony into the
record. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Cathy Lanier follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cathy L. Lanier, Chief of Security, National
Football League
December 10, 2024
Chairman Pfluger, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Magaziner,
Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the subcommittees, thank you
for the opportunity to testify today regarding the National Football
League's efforts--in conjunction with several other sports
organizations including NASCAR, Major League Baseball, and the NCAA--to
address the significant and growing threats posed by unlawful drone
activity in and around our games and other major events. Unlawful drone
activity risks the safety and security of the tens of millions of fans
and stadium-goers who attend major sporting events each year across the
country.
I joined the National Football League in September 2016 after more
than 26 years in local law enforcement in the District of Columbia. At
the NFL, for the past 8 years, I have overseen the security policies
and personnel that protect the 1,700 professional players, the hundreds
of coaches and other staff associated with our 32 clubs, and the 17
million fans who attend our games each year. Club security officials
and I work closely with local law enforcement officials, Federal
authorities, stadium owners, and many others to provide a safe and
secure environment for our fans to enjoy the games. In addition, I have
served on the Homeland Security Advisory Council, and participated in
the Department of Homeland Security's Critical Infrastructure
Partnership Advisory Council Working Groups. I also served on the
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) UAS Detection and Mitigation
Systems Aviation Rulemaking committee.
I last had the privilege of testifying in September 2018, before
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs when
Congress was considering this same issue. Congress subsequently
included the Preventing Emerging Threats Act in the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2018. That law took an important first step in protecting the
homeland against rogue drones by providing counterdrone authority to
Federal law enforcement officials at the Department of Justice and the
Department of Homeland Security. Back then, and ever since, the NFL and
other sports leagues have urged Congress to enact legislation that
would take the appropriate next steps to meet this growing threat by
providing counterdrone authority to State and local law enforcement
officials, which are the entities that actually lead the work to
provide safety and security at nearly all of our stadiums. They are at
the front line providing on-the-ground protection to fans, players, and
stadium and event officials. To be clear: We are not seeking mitigation
authority for the NFL or other sports organizations. We seek that
authority for the law enforcement partners with whom we work in
ensuring a safe and secure environment for our events.
drone incursions are growing
In the 6 years since my earlier testimony, we have witnessed a
sharp increase in the number of threats, incidents, and incursions by
unauthorized drones, especially over the last 4 years. In 2022, we
experienced 2,537 rogue drone flights into the restricted air space
above stadiums during NFL games, and in 2023, the number of incursions
grew to 2,845. To put these numbers in context, when I testified in
2018, we had tracked about a dozen incursions by drones at stadiums
during games in the 2017 season. In the 2018 season, we tracked 67
drone incursions at games. Even accounting for the increased
sophistication of our drone tracking abilities today, these statistics
almost certainly understate the total number of events. Yet, even with
that limitation, these statistics demonstrate the dramatic increase in
drone incursions--rising by more than 20,000 percent between 2017 and
2023.
These incursions at NFL games included the following:
In 2019, during the Super Bowl in Atlanta, an FBI team
detected a drone in the restricted air space moments before 6
Air Force F-16s prepared to conduct a flyover before the game.
Fortunately, the FBI team was able to communicate with the
flyover team to prevent a collision.
A Ravens vs. Bengals game was delayed in November 2023
because of a drone flying over the stadium bowl. After stadium
authorities detected the drone, State law enforcement officials
were notified and located the drone operator, who was
interviewed by officials, including local FBI agents.
In January 2024, the AFC championship game between the
Ravens and the Chiefs was paused because a drone violated the
restricted air space. Stadium authorities notified State law
enforcement officials, who located the drone operator. The
drone operator was questioned by State and Federal law
enforcement and charged with 3 felony counts related to
operating an unregistered drone, serving as an airman without a
certificate, and violating national defense air space. The
operator subsequently pled guilty to a misdemeanor.
Each and every one of these incursions violated long-standing law.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the FAA
established flight restrictions over stadiums and other large
gatherings. Congress subsequently strengthened and codified these
requirements. The current version of the temporary flight restriction
prohibits all aircraft operations over certain sporting events from 1
hour before until 1 hour after the event, from ground level to 3,000
feet, and within a radius of 3 nautical miles. In addition to NFL
games, this flight restriction applies to Major League Baseball games,
NCAA Division I football games, and NASCAR, Indy Car, and Champ Series
races. The flight restrictions designate the air space as National
Defense Airspace, and any operator who knowingly or willfully violates
the flight restriction may be subject to criminal penalties.
This stadium and sporting event flight restriction is well-
established and geographically and temporally limited. The FAA has a
thorough and robust process for considering and approving waivers,
which has effectively served the sports organizations, broadcast
operators, and others for more than 2 decades. State and local law
enforcement officials, however, still lack the authority to enforce the
long-standing TFRs by taking action against rogue drones.
Our national security and intelligence agencies continue to warn
that terrorist groups and other bad non-state actors consider stadiums
and other mass gatherings attractive targets for attack. In fact,
earlier this year, Islamic State propaganda specifically encouraged
attacks on stadiums, including referencing the Paris Summer Olympics.
And social media posts recently threatened drone attacks at the Cricket
World Cup on Long Island, New York.
h.r. 8610, the counter-uas authority security, safety, and
reauthorization act
Given the persistent threat, the NFL and other sports leagues have
been leading proponents of legislation--the Safeguarding the Homeland
from Threats Posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act (S. 1631 and H.R.
4333)--that builds on the 2018 law and provides more robust and
effective protections for the homeland in general, and major sporting
events in particular. That bipartisan bill, which was first introduced
in the previous Congress and reintroduced in this one, expands
counterdrone authority to State and local law enforcement agencies
through a 6-year pilot program, subject to Federal oversight.
In addition, we have appreciated the opportunity to work with
senior leadership and staff of this committee, as well as the
Transportation and Infrastructure and Judiciary Committees, to revise
and improve H.R. 8610, the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and
Reauthorization Act. We recognize the significance of the work,
diligence, and cooperation of the committees to come together to
introduce and mark up this bill in September.
The current version of H.R. 8610 is a step in the right direction.
It would ensure that existing authorities for the Department of Justice
and Department of Homeland Security do not expire, and it starts the
process of empowering local law enforcement to keep fans safe.
Nonetheless, we encourage the committee to make additional improvements
to the legislation that gives sports leagues and our law enforcement
partners the additional tools we need to better protect our fans.
We appreciate that the bill provides for a pilot program for State
and local law enforcement counterdrone capabilities, and that the
proposal explicitly includes stadiums in the definition of covered
sites. As amended, the bill limits the pilot program to only 5
agencies, potentially expanding to 15, and further limits the program
to just 4 covered sites per agency. First, we strongly recommend
expanding the pilot program to adequately protect fans attending major
sporting events. Specifically, we encourage the committee to increase
the number of agencies and remove the cap on the number of sites that
each agency could protect. These changes would better help us protect
more fans in more places in a more expeditious time frame across the
country.
Second, the regulatory process imposed by the bill is unnecessarily
complicated and cumbersome, which will result in bureaucratic barriers
that delay the deployment of counterdrone capabilities. Federal law
already provides a proven framework for implementing counterdrone
authority, approving technology, and selecting sites for protection, as
outlined in the Preventing Emerging Threats Act and implemented by
Federal agencies. The NFL supports maintaining this established
framework, as proposed by S. 1631/H.R. 4333. In our view, there is no
need to fix what already is working.
Third, we recommend that the provisions in the bill related to
advanced drone detection technology, which is used to detect, track,
and identify drones, be expanded to authorize deployment by critical
infrastructure owners and operators, including trained stadium security
personnel. Our stadium security personnel already have access to
passive drone detection technology, and they should have direct access
to and use of advanced drone detection technology, without needing to
engage an intermediary. Detection technology has been used safely for
years, and it does not present the more complicated legal issues
associated with drone-mitigation authorities. Detection is not the same
as disabling or ``bringing down'' a drone. That is a law enforcement
function. By allowing private parties to use more sophisticated
detection technology, we can better assist law enforcement partners.
congress should prioritize enacting counterdrone authority for the
stadium tfr
Finally, we encourage the committee to consider prioritizing TFR-
protected sporting events as a foundation for enacting any counterdrone
legislation, and to do so as soon as possible. Given the growing threat
of drones at stadiums and sporting events, and the long-standing and
well-established flight restrictions over games and events, Congress
should act now to extend counterdrone authority to State and local law
enforcement agencies for the narrow, mission-specific, and time-limited
purpose of protecting the sports stadium-TFRs when they are in effect.
We recognize that certain stakeholders have raised privacy and
civil liberty concerns around counterdrone expansion--particularly when
exercising counterdrone missions in certain circumstances or areas.
Under current law, however, drones and other aircraft are simply not
permitted in areas protected during a TFR. A drone operator flying a
drone over a crowded stadium is already breaking the law. Therefore, we
believe any privacy or civil liberty concerns are diminished
significantly in the context of using proven counterdrone technology to
enforce long-standing TFRs around sporting events.
Furthermore, Congress, the FAA, and national security agencies have
made considerable strides in implementing a comprehensive regulatory
structure for drone operations that lay the groundwork for immediately
expanding counterdrone authority to State and local law enforcement to
protect stadiums during live events. These steps included implementing
Remote ID, adopting a comprehensive program for remote pilot
certification, creating registration and labeling requirements for
drones, and implementing Congress's modification of the hobbyist
exemption, all of which the sports leagues supported.
Due to the Federal counterdrone authorities under current law,
stadium operators and law enforcement now have a proven track record of
safe, successful, and secure use of counterdrone capabilities at many
NFL stadiums. As of today, Federal law enforcement authorities have
safely and effectively provided counterdrone protections at 6 NFL
stadiums that have hosted a Super Bowl. Technology, air space safety,
and telecommunications questions have all been addressed at these
stadiums, and we have a proven record of deploying counterdrone
capabilities safely and effectively at these stadiums. The same
technologies that have already been cleared for use in the National
Airspace and safely deployed at these same stadiums should be permitted
for use by State or local law enforcement to keep fans safe at games
throughout the season.
The time to act to keep fans safe is now. Even in the waning days
of the 118th Congress, we urge you to take any possible steps that will
start to protect more of our fans from the threats of illicit drone
use. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I would be
happy to address your questions.
Mr. Pfluger. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of
questioning, as we did prior.
Dr. Schwennesen, I'd like to focus on something here.
Policy versus technology, what is our issue right now? Is it
not enough technology? Is it not keeping up with the
technology--as you mentioned, maybe we're being outmaneuvered
in a lot of cases by the Russians and the Ukrainians may have
some information that we can learn from; or is it a policy
issue here as we protect the homeland, or is it both?
Mr. Schwennesen. I do think it's both. I think it's a
combination of the two. I think we have created a policy
thicket of bureaucracy that basically stifles the innovation
space. I do think we have a technical know-how problem, or at
least we can--or at least we know for a fact that Ukrainians
have a technical know-how solution, right?
I think if we're able to reduce some of the--some of the
bureaucratic barriers to innovation, allow people to tinker and
experiment and learn at the operational military level, this
needs to happen like yesterday, right?
We can't--we can't do the same old business of doing a 2\1/
2\-year request for proposal and wait for things to come back.
We just can't do this business as usual. We do not have that
time.
Mr. Pfluger. As we sit here, you listened to the testimony.
We currently have UAS's flying over New Jersey. We heard from
Mr. Smith in New Jersey that they were flying over Coast Guard
vessels last night.
How is this possible? Why are we not responding? What do we
need to do? What actions need to be taken?
Mr. Schwennesen. That's a very difficult one to answer. Of
course, I can't speak for them, but I have a suspicion that
people are frozen with fear of what would happen in an
administrative situation in which they took action and they
were punished for doing so.
That they shot down a drone, God forbid, and the debris hit
somebody's house, and all of a sudden they're on front-page
news. So people are acting out of a sort-of sense of self-
restraint here, which is being promoted by our policy
environment.
Mr. Pfluger. So when it comes to technology, we need to
focus on our offensive technology, lessons learned in the
Ukrainian conflict where they're leveraging UAS systems
everywhere.
We need to focus on our counter-UAS technology, and our
policy needs to improve in order to counter it, and then give
the authorities that we need while protecting privacy of
citizens here.
Mr. Schwennesen. Yes. I would say so, absolutely.
Mr. Pfluger. I'll come back to you in a second.
Mr. Baumgartner, what's the--what's the most catastrophic
event in the energy industry critical infrastructure that we
need to be thinking about and planning for to prevent?
Mr. Baumgartner. I mean, luckily we haven't seen a
significant incident. I think from an imagination perspective,
certainly something with a payload, like the gentleman from
Tennessee who was planning an incident to drop a payload into a
substation.
You could imagine that at larger scale and impacting or
identifying more critical infrastructure from generations of
substations, or even on the pipeline side a liquid natural gas
import/export facility.
Mr. Pfluger. So my district, the Permian Basin, 6 million
barrels a day, needs to be protected. The authorities in some
cases, as you recommended in your testimony, should be
delegated to private companies, in some cases, to both identify
and also mitigate, if needed.
Mr. Baumgartner. I think that energy infrastructure in your
district should be considered to be protected. Now, how that--
how that gets to a place where we can do that as the private
sector, there are probably steps to get there. You know, we
have great relationships with local, State, Federal law
enforcement and are happy to take an intermediary step to work
with them to ensure that we understand the technology, the
appropriate technology is in place, and we can implement that
technology in a future state.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you.
Dr. Schwennesen, we'll go back to the services for a second
and the race for technology. Let's focus on the Air Force, our
alma mater, the Air Force Academy.
How would you characterize the responses that we're seeing
out of DOD, specifically the Air Force? Are they doing it fast,
is it neat in its approach, or is it just average?
Mr. Schwennesen. Right. I think it is below average. It
gives me no pleasure to say that, but I think we are not taking
it seriously enough.
Again, it is as if everyone sees the train coming, everyone
agrees the train is coming, and yet, no one is taking any steps
to get out of its way. Everyone is assuming that somebody else
is doing it and there is just no sense of urgency or coherent
activity to address this, address this issue. Again, that's
easy for me to say. It's easy for me to throw spears from the
sidelines.
But I do think that one of the things we can do is leverage
our very good relationships we have with Ukraine. We've given
them a lot of resources, and they are quite willing and eager
to give us something back in return for it. We should be
mopping that information up right now. We should be sending
people there right now.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you very much. My time is expired.
I recognize the Ranking Member for his questions.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you both.
Dr. Schwennesen, I want to begin by commending you and
thanking you for your assistance to the Ukrainians. You know, I
have to remind, unfortunately, some of my colleagues from time
to time that Vladimir Putin is not our friend, that the cause
of the Ukrainians is the cause of freedom and democracy, and
that Russia continues to pose a threat not just to Ukraine, but
to American interests all over the world.
So I just want to thank you for the work that you're doing
over there, because that is the front line of freedom today.
Mr. Schwennesen. Thank you.
Mr. Magaziner. I was interested in your written testimony
when you expressed some skepticism in the effectiveness of
signal-jamming technology to mitigate risks from UAS on the
battlefield. I was wondering if you could expand on that.
Why are you sort-of skeptical about the effectiveness or
the promise of signal-jamming and other counter-UAS technology
on the battlefield, and also writ large?
Mr. Schwennesen. Sure. I claim no engineering expertise in
drone warfare, but all I can do is say what I've seen, which is
that in the world's most intense EW battle space, which is the
Ukrainian Russian front at the moment, it is an electronic
warfare chaos, right?
So, what people used to think about the ability to jam
drones, which is what some of the speakers we had here are
talking about, which is, you know, 2 years old, which at this
point is effectively a century-old obsolete information,
jamming doesn't work the way we think it does.
There are so many new developing technologies on countering
the counters, right? They've already gone multiple layers ahead
of us. At this point, they're doing AI pixel-lock technology
that doesn't have any RF frequency whatsoever. They're doing
ambush technology where they're not needing to have any kind of
communication between operator and drone.
So, you know, again, I don't know the specifics beyond what
I've just seen the tip of the iceberg, which is that, you know,
the jamming solution is not a one-size-fits-all. That's the
silver bullet. It might be a piece of a suite, but that's only
a piece.
Mr. Magaziner. I recognize that you've thought about this
in sort of the DOD space more, perhaps, than homeland, you
know, domestic law enforcement, et cetera, but I imagine the
lessons are transferrable.
What do we need to do specifically in order to go from
being laggards to leaders on this? You referenced procurement
issues and kind-of speeding that up. You referenced, you know,
bringing a spirit of, I guess, inventiveness and innovation.
But are there other specific things? I mean, is there
training that we should be looking at deploying across the
Federal Government? Is there some kind of specific workaround
to procurement rules that you would recommend? Like, what are
the nuts and bolts of what we should be doing in order to take
back the advantage?
Mr. Schwennesen. Yes. I do think Yankee ingenuity is one of
our comparative strengths, and we need to take advantage of it.
One of the ways to do that--this is not an especially sexy
solution and, you know, so I say that with apologies in
advance, but I think one example of an idea is to, at the DOD
level, get drones down to the absolute operational level of
unit, so they can begin to tinker.
There is--you know, as Elon Musk says, Move fast and break
things. You need to learn on the fly. You need to learn in the
trenches how these things are operated. It isn't enough to do
this from a centrally-managed top-down approach in which we're
going to go through this entire, you know, typical cycle and
then deliver the tool to the warfighter, you know, wrapped with
a ribbon. It doesn't work that way anymore. We have to give it
to them and let them develop it on the fly.
Mr. Magaziner. Empower the people on the front lines to
innovate. That makes sense.
Mr. Baumgartner, I apologize, I only have a minute left,
but I wanted to explore this importance of cooperation between
private industry and particularly State and local law
enforcement.
What are the best practices there that you've noticed, and
are there things that we can do to support those kinds of
collaborations?
Mr. Baumgartner. Well, we work very hard to establish and
maintain those relationships in all the States and localities
that we serve. I think it is--it does become about manpower and
hours spent in doing that collaboration.
So, there are certainly challenges to maintaining that, but
I think fusion centers are a great opportunity to engage in a
wide variety of State and local efforts at one location. I
think there are other similar opportunities.
Like, in our sector we have the Electricity Information
Sharing and Analysis Center, that also convenes those State and
local partners in a regional fashion, and we're able to
effectively have those conversations and maintain those
relationships in that forum as well.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you both.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Ranking Member.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes, and I'm not going to
take 5 minutes.
But, Mr. Schwennesen, I totally agree with you that we have
a problem here in the United States in dealing with these
systems, not only for warfare, but also for protecting the
homeland.
I would think that what--part of the problem is that you
got $500,000 in the FBI, I'm sure you have $500,000 in some
other agency, and you got all these agencies working on the
same issue and it's not really centralized.
There's no planning, et cetera. Maybe airports are trying
to do their thing, and the FBI is trying to do their thing, and
Customs and Border Protection is trying to do their thing.
Would it be beneficial to try to put this all together and
just focus on the unmanned aerial system threat in the
homeland?
Mr. Schwennesen. I have to say I lean that way. I hate to
beat a dead horse here, but the Ukrainians have, once again,
shown some ways to deal with this. They have stood up their
entire separate new force, very much like the Marine Corps or
the Air Force. They've set up the Unmanned Aerial Systems
Service in the Ukrainian Department of Defense in order to do
precisely that, in order to address this entire new sector of
technology and how it's to be developed and applied.
Mr. Pfluger. Probably one of the advantages that the
Ukrainians had is that they had no Air Force, basically, right?
So, by necessity, they needed to come up with something
different that actually combated the threat.
We have an Air Force. Unfortunately, what happens is that
you have the resistance to change. UAS, unmanned systems, et
cetera, are a threat to the people that fly the planes, OK?
So we do need to look at this in an entirely--an entirely
different way, and so not only on the DOD side, where we do
need to have the private-sector innovate. The RFP should be,
Hey, I want to knock out--I want to sink Chinese ships, all
right, and just as simple as that.
If you ask DOD to do that, they'll come up with an aircraft
carrier that costs $10 billion and all these, you know,
systems. The Ukrainians are sinking Russian ships in the Black
Sea with the little boats with, you know, maybe 5- or 600
pounds of TNT on them, a whole bunch of them. You can't
possibly take them all out, and basically boom.
No submarine, because that's the other thing we need to
look at. Well, maybe we need to, you know, have these really
expensive submarines with torpedoes and stuff, the old way of
fighting war. We need to look at the new way of fighting war.
But here, it's Homeland Security.
Look, I'm convinced that we're going to have a problem.
We'll wake up when something happens, because that's always
what we do. We should be waking up right now.
So one of the things maybe that we should be looking at is
how do we centralize a Homeland Security kind of focus on
unmanned systems and how we protect all our infrastructure,
airports, you know, the energy system, our electricity, our
grid, all that. All that is vulnerable. So, you know, that's
all I have to say.
I'll yield my time back. I recognize the gentleman from New
York, Mr. D'Esposito.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schwennesen, I know it was discussed earlier, and I
wish some of those on the other side were here to listen,
because sometimes when we talk about Russia, China, and Iran,
we're, you know, referred to as fear mongers. But the
proliferation of drone technologies from foreign adversaries
like Russia, like China, like Iran has impacted conflicts
across the globe.
What is the risk of such technology being transferred or
replicated by domestic actors in the United States, or by
transnational criminal organizations across our borders? How
can we disrupt the supply chains?
Mr. Schwennesen. Well, the risk is 100 percent. I mean, if
it hasn't happened already--I'm sure it has, but if it hasn't,
it's about to happen.
Mr. D'Esposito. Definitely has.
Mr. Schwennesen. Right, right. How do we mitigate it is--
again, this is the elephant in the room. I think the only way
to mitigate these kind of threats is to out-innovate the threat
itself. This is something that we've been traditionally good
at. It's something that we have the technical know-how and the
capacity to do. Right now we just have not opened the gates. We
have not gotten our juices flowing, as they say, to address
these threats and out innovate the threat.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you.
I know we have to go vote, so I'm going to make this quick.
But, Mr. Baumgartner, just last month a Tennessee man was
arrested for plotting to use a drone carrying an explosive to
destroy a national power substation. We know that there have
been additional incidents of suspicious drone activity near
substations. I think this is critically important, especially
in the time we are in where there is this big push for
alternate energy sources, whether it's battery storage, whether
it's wind storage, without really doing the work to make sure
that we can protect these assets.
In addition to cyber concerns, what physical security risks
do drones pose to energy sector assets?
Mr. Baumgartner. A great question.
I think payloads are, obviously, as witnessed in the
Tennessee case, but you could simply ram a drone into some of
our infrastructure. We do take a defense, in-depth approach and
try to add shielding and obfuscate certain targets. But on top
of that you could also see a situation and we've seen published
cases where they've actually used drones to enable a cyber
intrusion as well.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. I thank the gentleman from New York.
I thank all of the witnesses for their valuable testimony
and the Members for their questions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to
respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will
be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Letter From the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
December 9, 2024.
The Honorable August Pfluger,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and
Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC
20515.
The Honorable Seth Magaziner,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and
Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC
20515.
The Honorable Carlos Gimenez,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, U.S.
House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Shri Thanedar,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairmen Pfluger and Gimenez, and Ranking Members Magaziner
and Thanedar: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce (``Chamber'') respectfully
submits the following statement for the record for the House Homeland
Security Subcommittee Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and
Intelligence and Transportation Maritime's joint hearing titled
``Safeguarding the Homeland from Unmanned Aerial Systems.'' We
appreciate the committees' on-going efforts to address the public
safety threats posed by illicit unmanned aircraft, or drones, to our
Nation's critical infrastructure, sporting and entertainment events,
and airports.
Drones provide substantial economic, social, and national security
benefits to the United States and it is crucial that we take a global
lead in this innovative technology. However, the potential misuse and
illicit use of drones presents major public safety, national security,
and economic concerns. These concerns include endangering the flying
public, disrupting major sporting and entertainment events, enabling
criminal and terrorism threats to public safety, and espionage of our
most advanced critical infrastructure facilities. These risks are not
hypothetical, given the number of unauthorized drone intrusions, close
calls, and use of drones globally for malicious purposes.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sara Ruberg, Man Planned to Use Drone With Explosive to Attack
Substation, U.S. Says, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 4, 2024), https://
www.nytimes.com/2024/11/04/us/columbia-energy-facility-weapon-mass-
destruction.html; James Tutten, FBI Investigates After Large Drones
Seen Flying Near Military Base and Trump's Bedminster Golf Club, WFTV9
(Dec. 4, 2024), https://www.wftv.com/news/local/fbi-investigates-after-
large-drones-seen-flying-near-military-base-trumps-bedminster-golf-
club/UU7N062Y6VAZNCM18N3G07XYT4/; Gordon Lubold, Lara Seligman, and
Aruna Viswanatha, Mystery Drones Swarmed a U.S. Military Base for 17
Days. The Pentagon Is Stumped, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 12, 2024),
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/drones-military-
pentagon-defense-331871f4: Russian Drones Attack Critical
Infrastructure in Ukraine's West, Air Force Says, REUTERS (Dec. 2,
2024), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-drone-attack-
leaves-parts-ukraines-ternopil-without-power-military-says-2024-12-03;
UAS Sightings Report, Federal Aviation Administration (accessed Dec. 9,
2024), https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/public_records/
uas_sightings_report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Presently, four Federal agencies have the legal authority to
utilize counter-drone detection and mitigation technologies to protect
certain sensitive facilities and operations. While we support the
missions of those Federal agencies to use counter-drone technologies,
those Federal agencies do not have sufficient resources and adequate
legal authorities to fully protect the full scope of sensitive
facilities and operations. Congress can remedy this issue by
responsibly expanding detection and mitigation authorities to other key
Federal Government agencies and functions that currently do not possess
these authorities, detection authorities for private-sector entities,
and limited mitigation authority for State and local enforcement
through a pilot program. Expanding the aperture of entities that
possess counter-drone authorities conserves limited Federal resources
and empowers Federal agencies to prioritize protecting the most
sensitive assets and operations.
We recognize the complexities presented by employing counter-drone
technologies, and support placing reasonable and tailored guardrails on
expanded counter-drone use to address important policy goals including
protecting privacy and civil rights, ensuring aviation safety,
addressing spectrum interference, continuing Federal oversight of the
national air space, and allowing lawful commercial activity. However,
policy makers should ensure that any counter-drone framework minimizes
red tape for law enforcement and the private sector while also being
practical to implement, otherwise, the benefits of expanded detection
and mitigation authorities will not be realized.
Ensuring public safety and the security of the national air space
is an important priority for the U.S. Chamber, and a tailored counter-
drone framework plays a significant role in achieving that objective.
We urge you to act on this important issue.
Sincerely,
Tom Quaadman,
Senior Vice President Economic Policy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
______
Statement of GB Jones, Chief Safety and Security Officer for FIFA World
Cup 2026
Tuesday, December 10, 2024
Good afternoon, Chairman Pfluger, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member
Magaziner, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the subcommittee. I
am G.B. Jones, chief safety and security officer for FIFA World Cup
2026 US, Inc. (FWC26). Thank you for the opportunity to provide written
testimony on today's hearing about countering unmanned aerial systems
(C-UAS).
For over 31 years, I spent my career in Federal, State, and local
law enforcement, including as a municipal police officer, deputy
sheriff, Minnesota State trooper, and FBI agent. At the FBI, I served
in various roles including an assistant special agent in charge, the
FBI's on-scene commander during the interagency response to 3 separate
mass shooting events, and as the FBI's deputy on-scene commander for
counterterrorism operations in Baghdad, Iraq. I also served as the unit
chief of the special events management unit at FBI headquarters, where
I directed counterterrorism preparedness programs, including those
related to special event and aviation security. I was as an FBI pilot
and am currently rated as an FAA Part 107 commercial remote pilot.
Before joining FWC26, I worked at the National Football League
(NFL) as the director of investigation and security services for
international and special events, helping to lead the safety and
security efforts around Super Bowls and international NFL games across
the globe, including C-UAS efforts. While air space security and safety
were the primary concerns, I also developed an appreciation for the
many positive uses of commercial drones and pioneered the effort to
integrate commercial drones safely and thoughtfully into the secure air
space around NFL games and events. This required careful coordination
with numerous stakeholders, including Federal, State, and local law
enforcement and private security officials, and fundamental air space
domain awareness. With respect to drones and other aircraft over our
critical infrastructure, it is essential to understand who are the good
guys, who are the bad guys, and how to differentiate them. That is the
perspective I offer in my testimony to you today.
Over the next 2 years, the United States will be at the center of
the world's largest sport--soccer. In the summer of 2025, the United
States will host the FIFA Club World Cup, a first-of-its-kind
tournament bringing the world's best club teams to the United States to
compete in the most inclusive and merit-based global club competition
in history. Sixty-three matches will be played in 12 stadiums in 11
cities in the United States. The following summer in 2026, Canada,
Mexico, and the United States will host the FIFA Men's World Cup, which
will be the largest, most-watched sporting event in history, with 104
matches taking place throughout North America. The United States will
hold 78 of these matches across 11 U.S. host cities and will host
almost all 48 eligible teams at base camps across the Nation,
delivering an enormous economic opportunity for communities and
businesses across all industries.
In addition, the FIFA Club World Cup 2025 and the FIFA World Cup
2026 will kick off a mega decade of global sports in the United
States--bringing large-scale soccer tournaments, the LA 2028 Summer and
the Salt Lake City 2034 Winter Olympic Games, Rugby World Cups, and
other events to our country.
In preparation for the 2 tournaments, FWC26 is responsible for
organizing the FIFA Club World Cup 2025 and the FIFA World Cup 2026,
and safety and security remain top priorities. Drones are one of the
major security challenges. We are concerned about nefarious payloads,
WMD and HazMat threats, intellectual property rights theft, and other
security threats. But we are also keenly focused on safety threats
associated with illegal drone activity. In 2016, a EURO 2016 match
between Albania and Serbia was abandoned after a drone carrying a
political banner caused a mass brawl on the pitch. In 2019, a La Liga
Match between Athletic Bilbao and Real Madrid was suspended after a
drone carrying a political banner ignited passions and interrupted the
game. Safety and security threats to the FIFA Club World Cup 2025 and
FIFA World Cup 2026, and the use of UAS as a threat vector, remain
significant concerns.
The threat posed by drones has been well-documented, and for at
least the last 4 years, potential solutions have been articulated to
Congress through studies, hearings, and other efforts. To date, no
action has been taken on one of the most important recommendations--
expansion of response and mitigation authorities beyond Federal
authorities to State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners.
I am concerned about the capacity of U.S. Federal law enforcement
to protect the upcoming sporting events with enough cUAS equipment and
trained personnel. Unlike multi-jurisdictional resource-sharing
agreements, Emergency Management Assistance Compacts, and other mutual
aid agreements which can be leveraged to mitigate other threats, there
is no mechanism for the Federal Government to seek and receive support
to manage the UAS threat from any other partners. There is a clear
solution. Skilled State, local, Tribal, and territorial officers see
threats beyond their communities. They are better trained and better
informed than ever before. They think globally, and act locally. Yet
they are powerless to respond to UAS threats because Congress has not
acted to empower law enforcement authorities outside the Federal
Government to address UAS threats in their local communities.
Successful UAS threat mitigation for the Club World Cup and World
Cup will require collaboration between private-sector vendors, security
teams, and all law enforcement jurisdictional levels. There are models
for this kind of collaboration in the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task
Forces, in the public safety bomb technician program, and in other
multi-jurisdictional, inter-disciplinary task forces where Federal,
State, and local law enforcement and homeland security partners train
to the same standard, are equipped with compatible and interoperable
equipment, and deploy with the requisite authorities to mitigate the
threats. We must look at these models for guidance in addressing the
UAS threat.
Over the next 2 years, the FIFA Safety and Security Department will
focus on strategies and innovative approaches to bolster UAS threat
detection and response capabilities. We will work with Federal partners
to request Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs) that will create the
``authority to act'' against criminal drone intrusions. We will work
with law enforcement partners to conduct comprehensive assessments of
the stadiums to identify and patrol logical launch and land locations,
we will placard ``no drone zones,'' we will embark on education
campaigns and public service announcements, and we will work with
stadiums to enhance technical capabilities to detect drones. We will
create UAS response strategies which integrate technology and human
factors, we will train security and local law enforcement, and we will
exercise our protocols to minimize the time from identification to
response. But none of these things permit the local law enforcement
partners who are embedded in stadium command posts with us to take
definitive action against rogue drones which may be bearing down on our
matches in defiance of the law, the placards, and the education
campaigns. We need Congress's help.
As a first step, Congress should reauthorize the Preventing
Emerging Threats Act to renew the authorities granted to Federal
partners to mitigate drone threats. This is necessary to preserve the
ability of Federal law enforcement to respond to current threats. As a
complement to this, we support pending requests from the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) for additional resources for training,
equipment, and personnel for counter-UAS (cUAS) operations which will
benefit protection of the FIFA Club World Cup, World Cup, and other
major events. Thoughtfully, the DHS cUAS Program Office has articulated
a plan to build the cUAS capacity of several key DHS component agencies
to address drone threats more effectively within their areas of
jurisdiction. These same resources could then be activated in tandem to
deploy to protect major special events or critical infrastructure as a
single, unified, and interoperable cUAS task force. At the conclusion
of the incident or event, cUAS personnel would return to their
component agencies to resume their normal duties. This plan builds
capacity and resilience in the components, and across DHS, beyond
anything that exists in U.S. Government cUAS operations today.
Following reauthorization of current authorities, we urge Congress
to consider future reauthorizations with a longer term of
effectiveness. This would send a strategic signal to Federal agencies
that the UAS threat merits an investment in time, training, resources,
and capital improvements. With a long-term strategy, Federal agencies
would be encouraged to plan beyond the 1-year cycle to focus on
development of training, technology, and mitigation tools and
strategies that would lead to more robust defenses against UAS threats.
The United States is playing host to large-scale, international
sporting events nearly every year for the next 10 years. Strategic
leadership and thoughtful investment in cUAS efforts will pay
protective dividends for at least the next decade.
Finally, we ask Congress to consider expanding mitigation authority
to appropriately-trained and equipped State, local, Tribal, and
territorial law enforcement partners. Informed by Federal guidance and
leadership, the development of consistent training, selection of
interoperable tools, and creation of compatible response policies
across multiple State, local, Tribal, and territorial agencies will
create a fabric of cUAS responders with the expertise to respond to
drone threats across the country. This will not only build capacity in
individual communities, but through interoperable processes and
procedures, Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial officers
will have the ability to couple their efforts to protect against
threats to international special events and respond to incidents of
national significance such as natural disasters or criminal or
terrorist attacks.
In closing, the United States has an incredible opportunity in the
next decade to leverage large-scale sporting events like the FIFA Club
World Cup 2025 and the FIFA World Cup 2026 for generational, positive
economic impacts. To ensure communities across our country realize
those impacts, delivering safe and secure sporting events is paramount.
We look forward to working with the committee, Congress, and the
Federal Government to deliver the safe and exciting tournaments in 2025
and 2026.
Thank you to the Chairmen for the invitation and thank you to the
Members for your time.
[all]