[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FUTURE OF FAMS: EVALUATING THE
FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL MISSION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME
SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 24, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-80
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-982 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California
Dan Bishop, North Carolina J. Luis Correa, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Tony Gonzales, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Nick LaLota, New York Robert Garcia, California
Mike Ezell, Mississippi Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Anthony D'Esposito, New York Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Laurel M. Lee, Florida Thomas R. Suozzi, New York
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Dale W. Strong, Alabama LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Elijah Crane, Arizona
Stephen Siao, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Shri Thanedar, Michigan, Ranking
Nick LaLota, New York Member
Laurel M. Lee, Florida Robert Garcia, California
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Vacancy, Subcommittee Staff Director
Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Shri Thanedar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. John A. Casareti, Founder and President, Air Marshal
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 7
Ms. Tina Won Sherman, PhD, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 10
THE FUTURE OF FAMS: EVALUATING THE
FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL MISSION
----------
Tuesday, September 24, 2024
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in
room 310 Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Gimenez, Higgins, LaLota, Lee,
Thanedar, and Kennedy.
Mr. Gimenez. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security
will come to order. Without objection, the Chairman may declare
the subcommittee in recess at any point.
Today's hearing will examine Federal Air Marshal Service's
mission set and the future of the agency. I now recognize
myself for an opening statement.
Today's subcommittee is examining the Federal Air Marshal
Service and its role in securing the commercial aviation sector
of the United States. Terrorist organizations and rogue nation-
states have targeted the commercial aviation sector since its
inception.
In the 1970's and the 1980's, terrorists carried out
notorious hijackings across the world, including the 1977
hijacking of Lufthansa flight 181 by the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, and the 1985 hijacking of Transworld
Airlines flight 847 by Hezbollah.
While most prior incidents involved hijackers seizing
passengers and crew as hostages and demanded ransom for their
release, the nature of the threats shifted dramatically with
the al-Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001. As the nature of
the threat evolved, so has the role of the Federal air
marshals.
While the U.S. Government has deployed air marshals on
commercial flights since the early 1960's, today's Federal Air
Marshal Service was formally established in response to the
September 11 attacks.
After September 11, waves of volunteers stepped forward
from other law enforcement agencies and from all walks of life
to sign up for the air marshal mission and the organization
became part of the newly-established Transportation Safety
Administration.
Twenty years later, after the September 11 attacks, a
threat to the commercial aviation sector continues to evolve.
Fortunately, our capabilities to counter terrorist threats
against commercial aviation have also advanced. There is a
vetting of potential terrorists in between when an airline
ticket is purchased and the day of the flight gives law
enforcement more time to foil terrorist plots before they can
be carried out.
TSA is continuing to improve its screening equipment, and
my colleagues and I on this subcommittee continue to advocate
for the agency to speed up its deployment of new technology to
ensure airports have modern capable systems at their security
checkpoints.
TSA also offers training like the Federal flight desk
officer program to airline flight crews to respond to in-flight
threats. It is critical that we are proactive in staying ahead
of the threat and continually look for opportunity to sharpen
our capabilities and advance our technologies. In this context
I believe it is essential to re-evaluate the role of the
Federal air marshals in aviation security. We're concerned that
air marshals are not being utilized effectively.
It was recently reported that former Congresswoman Tulsi
Gabbard was monitored by Federal air marshals during commercial
flights because her name appeared on TSA's Quiet Skies Program.
The Quiet Skies Program means to prevent terrorist attacks not
only to surveil law-abiding citizens traveling on commercial
flights.
Additionally, I'm concerned about the deployment of Federal
air marshals to the Southwest Border. While TSA has assured the
committee that these deployments did not impact normal FAMS
operations, it is troubling to me that the border crises have
escalated to the point of needing additional personnel surge to
the border. It's long past time for the Biden-Harris
administration to get this crisis under control.
Two weeks ago we commemorated the 23rd anniversary of the
September 11 attacks. In the wake of this somber occasion, it
is important that the subcommittee continue to work proactively
to secure the commercial aviation sector and prevent an attack
like that from ever happening again. This subcommittee must
utilize its oversight authority over the Federal Air Marshal
Service to ensure that taxpayer dollars are being used
efficiently and effectively in the mission to return terrorists
and other criminals from targeting the commercial aviations
sector. We must ensure that the Federal Air Marshal Service
faithfully and effectively fulfills its mission to safeguard
the passenger aviation sector.
Thank you to our witnesses, Ms. Won Sherman and Mr.
Casaretti for appearing before this subcommittee. I look
forward to your testimony.
[The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
Today, this subcommittee is examining the Federal Air Marshal
Service and its role in securing the commercial aviation sector in the
United States.
Terrorist organizations and rogue nation-states have targeted the
commercial aviation sector since its inception.
In the 1970's and 1980's, terrorists carried out notorious
hijackings across the world, including the 1977 hijacking of Lufthansa
Flight 181 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the
1985 hijacking of Trans World Airlines Flight 847 by Hezbollah.
While most prior incidents involved hijackers seizing passengers
and crew as hostages and demanding ransom for their release, the nature
of the threat shifted dramatically with the al-Qaeda attacks on
September 11, 2001.
As the nature of the threat evolved, so has the role of Federal air
marshals.
While the United States Government has deployed air marshals on
commercial flights since the early 1960's, today's Federal Air Marshal
Service was formally established in response to the September 11
attacks.
After September 11, waves of volunteers stepped forward from other
law enforcement agencies and from all walks of life to sign up for the
air marshal mission, and the organization became part of the newly-
established Transportation Security Administration.
Twenty-three years after the September 11 attacks, the threat to
the commercial aviation sector continues to evolve.
Fortunately, our capabilities to counter terrorist threats against
commercial aviation have also advanced.
Diligent vetting of potential terrorists in between when an airline
ticket is purchased and the day of the flight gives law enforcement
more time to foil terrorist plots before they can be carried out.
TSA is continuing to improve its screening equipment, and my
colleagues and I on this subcommittee continue to advocate for the
agency to speed up its deployment of new technology to ensure airports
have modern, capable systems at their security checkpoints.
TSA also offers trainings like the Federal Flight Deck Officer
Program to airline flight crews to respond to in-flight threats.
It is critical that we are proactive in staying ahead of the threat
and continually look for opportunities to sharpen our capabilities and
enhance our technologies.
In this context, I believe it is essential to reevaluate the role
of Federal air marshals in aviation security.
I am concerned that air marshals are not being utilized
effectively.
It was recently reported that former Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard
was monitored by Federal air marshals during commercial flights because
her name appeared on TSA's Quiet Skies program.
The Quiet Skies program aims to prevent terrorist attacks, not
unduly surveil law-abiding citizens traveling on commercial flights.
Additionally, I am concerned about the deployments of Federal air
marshals to the Southwest Border.
While TSA has assured the committee that these deployments did not
impact normal FAMS operations, it is troubling to me that the border
crisis has escalated to the point of needing additional personnel
surged to the border--it is long past time for the Biden-Harris
administration to get this crisis under control.
Two weeks ago, we commemorated the 23rd anniversary of the
September 11 attacks.
In wake of this somber occasion, it is important that this
subcommittee continues to work proactively to secure the commercial
aviation sector and prevent an attack like that from ever happening
again.
This subcommittee must utilize its oversight authority over the
Federal Air Marshal Service to ensure that taxpayer dollars are being
used efficiently and effectively in the mission to deter terrorists and
other criminals from targeting the commercial aviation sector.
We must ensure that the Federal Air Marshal Service faithfully and
effectively fulfills its mission to safeguard the passenger aviation
sector.
Thank you to our witnesses, Ms. Won Sherman and Mr. Casaretti, for
appearing before the subcommittee.
I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Thanedar, for his opening
statement.
Mr. Thanedar. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez,
for holding this hearing today, and thank you to our witnesses
for being here. We look forward to listening to you and with
us.
This is our subcommittee's first hearing since we
commemorated the anniversary of September 11 attack a couple
weeks ago, so it is truly time to evaluate the state of Federal
Air Marshal Service. FAMS have evolved significantly since
September 11, 2001, when only 33 air marshals were in service
working under the Federal Aviation Administration.
In the following months and years, FAMS expanded
exponentially hiring hundreds and eventually thousands of
marhals to protect our skies. Today FAMS carry out an essential
mission every day serving as the last line of defense to secure
commercial flights for--from terrorist attacks.
TSA has evolved its methods for assigning FAMS to flights
to ensure coverage is driven by its regions and risk
assessment. Thanks to the leadership of Ranking Member Thompson
and the support of Congress, TSA has also evolved--paid for
FAMS along with the rest of the TSA work force finally, placing
employees on equal footing with counterparts at other Federal
agencies.
However, other aspects of FAMS have changed little over
more than 20 years and may be in need of reform. Far too long
FAMS have voiced dissatisfaction with the day-to-day realities
of serving as air marshals. The job of an air marshal is
extremely demanding as FAMS must stay alert and focused during
long-haul flights, travel on little rest, and spend significant
time away from loved ones and support networks.
FAMS has struggled with impacts to their health, including
their mental health. Tragically, according to TSA data, since
2002, 16 FAMS have taken their own lives. Sadly, this
experience is far too common among law enforcement within the
Department of Homeland Security and throughout the country.
I'm proud to have co-sponsored Ranking Member Thompson's
bill, the DHS Suicide Prevention and Resiliency for Law
Enforcement Act, which would help address the challenges facing
FAMS and other DHS law enforcement personnel. Congress must
consider whether FAMS requires additional reforms to protect
the health and well-being of its employees and ensure the
ability to continue to secure air travel.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about their
recommendation for the future of the Federal air marshal
services.
Thank you, and I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thanedar follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Shri Thanedar
September 24, 2024
This is our subcommittee's first hearing since we commemorated the
anniversary of the September 11 attacks a couple weeks ago, so it is a
fitting time to evaluate the state of the Federal Air Marshal Service.
FAMS has evolved significantly since September 11, 2001, when only 33
air marshals were in service, working under the Federal Aviation
Administration.
In the following months and years, FAMS expanded exponentially,
hiring hundreds and eventually thousands of marshals to protect our
skies. Today, FAMs carry out an essential mission every day, serving as
the last line of defense to secure commercial flights from terrorist
attacks. TSA has evolved its methodology for assigning FAMs to flights
to ensure coverage is driven by intelligence and risk assessments.
Thanks to the leadership of Ranking Member Thompson and the support
of Congress, TSA has also evolved pay for FAMs, along with the rest of
the TSA workforce, finally placing employees on equal footing with
counterparts at other Federal agencies.
However, other aspects of the FAMS have changed little over more
than 20 years and may be in need of reform. For far too long, FAMs have
voiced dissatisfaction with the day-to-day reality of serving as air
marshals. The job of an air marshal is extremely demanding, as FAMs
must stay alert and focused during long-haul flights, travel on little
rest, and spend significant time away from loved ones and support
networks.
FAMs have struggled with impacts to their health, including their
mental health. Tragically, according to TSA data, since 2002, 16 FAMs
have taken their own lives. Sadly, this experience is far too common
among law enforcement within the Department of Homeland Security and
throughout the country.
I am proud to cosponsor Ranking Member Thompson's bill, the DHS
Suicide Prevention and Resiliency for Law Enforcement Act, which would
help address the challenges facing FAMs and other DHS law enforcement
personnel. Congress must consider whether FAMS requires additional
reforms to protect the health and well-being of its employees and
ensure their ability to continue to secure air travel.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about their
recommendations for the future of the Federal Air Marshal Service.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ranking Member. Other Members of
the committee are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
September 24, 2024
Originally established in 1961 and expanded exponentially the wake
of 9/11, today the Federal Air Marshal Service employs several thousand
FAMs who fly armed on domestic and international flights. Every day,
FAMs protect commercial flights against hijackings, explosive attacks,
and other terrorist threats.
I want to express my gratitude to the air marshals who work long
hours under difficult conditions to help keep the flying public secure.
We may not be able to thank each of them personally, but their service
and sacrifice--and that of their families--is truly appreciated.
I am proud to have championed the effort to boost pay for all TSA
employees, including FAMs, to put them on the same footing as their
peers at other Federal agencies. While increasing pay is a critical
part of the effort to support the TSA workforce, more remains to be
done to support FAMs.
I hope this hearing will help Congress address long-standing
challenges and the need for further reform at the agency. I am
particularly focused on supporting the health and well-being of FAMs,
who have long expressed health concerns as a result of their demanding
duties and schedules.
In 2012, a study by Harvard Medical School on reportedly found that
75 percent of FAMs were sleep-deficient when flying domestic missions
and 84 percent when flying international missions.
In 2020, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that
FAMs in every office GAO visited stated that health issues were a key
quality of life concern. Tragically, TSA has lost 16 FAMs to suicide
since 2002.
Last year, the Committee on Homeland Security approved my bill,
H.R. 2577, the DHS Suicide Prevention and Resiliency for Law
Enforcement Act, which would help address suicides and mental health
among DHS law enforcement, including FAMs. I look forward to reaching
an agreement with the Senate on the bill so it can go to the President
to be signed into law.
I hope our witnesses will share their thoughts today about what
more TSA can do to support FAMs and what Congress can do to support
those who are on the front lines securing the homeland.
Mr. Gimenez. Again, I am pleased to have this distinguished
panel of witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I
ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have
answered in the affirmative. Thank you and please be seated.
I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Mr.
John Casaretti is the founder and president--and president of
the air marshal--of the Air Marshal Association. Ms. Tina Won
Sherman serves as director for the Homeland Security and
Justice Team at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. I
thank both of our distinguished witnesses for being here today.
I now recognize Mr. Casaretti for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JOHN A. CASARETTI, FOUNDER AND
PRESIDENT, AIR MARSHAL ASSOCIATION
Mr. Casaretti. Good morning, Chairman Gimenez,
distinguished Members of this committee. My name is John
Casaretti. I'm the president of the Air Marshal Association.
The AMA represents thousands of current and former air
marshals, and approximately half the flying air marshals are
voluntary members.
I was working as a custom inspector in New York City on
September 11, 2001. I worked at the ground zero clean-up and
Fresh Kills recovery effort for 7 months, then joined the
Federal Air Marshal Service shortly thereafter. Those
experiences created a sincere and personal desire to ensure
that FAMS mission is successful.
Currently, FAMS are part of the TSA. The TSA mission is a
screen pass to the property at our Nation's airports. It's an
important mission, but it's not a law enforcement mission. Air
marshals believe their lack of law enforcement culture makes
the TSA either unable or unwilling to develop the FAMS service
to its fullest potential.
As I testified to this committee in November 2021, the
agency security strategy must evolve and the FAM mission must
be redefined. We cannot be just another layer of TSA
bureaucracy.
The Air Marshal Associations met with TSA Administrator
Pekoske on numerous occasions and we provided him with a
detailed future paper that outlines some strategies to better
utilize Federal air marshals. A key focus of the AMA future
committee was the need for FAMS to be criminal investigators.
Currently, there are no Federal agents available to investigate
transportation incidents at airports and local authorities can
only investigate to the limit of State law. Simply put, Federal
interests are not being met at airports.
Air marshals also do not fully understand their role within
TSA initiatives. A current concern from our members is the TSA
Quiet Skies Program. FAMS complain that they're not getting
briefings, that they do not know why they are assigned to
specific QS missions, that they have been given no specific
task to complete.
The TSA will claim that Quiet Skies is a useful and
effective measure, but we disagree. To our knowledge, no Quiet
Skies mission has resulted in the identification of a
terrorist, of a terrorist plot being uncovered, or a terrorist
action being stopped. Because of the question of programs like
Quiet Skies, the Air Marshal Association worked with former
Congressman Hice to enact the Strengthening Aviation Security
Act in the 115th Congress. The law required TSA to tell
Congress what specific intelligence is used to assign FAMS on
missions. Many years later we're still waiting for this report.
Another recent misstep has been the AVO program, which
assigns FAMS to airports without specific mission or
clarification of their authority. While we agree that assigning
FAMS to airports is a step in the right direction, the FAMS
must be in power to investigate any security incident or
insider threat that they may encounter.
There are simply too many operational criticisms to cover
in this short statement. However, there are a multitude of
other TSA missteps that need to be mentioned and may help
explain why FAM morale is so low. For example, the AMA was
forced to sue the agency in Federal court for Constitutional
rights violations, management misconduct, and for lack of due
process during agency investigations.
The AMA is also suing for back pay and overtime for work
performed since 2013. Even now FAMS can be assigned to shifts
over 20 hours without receiving overtime due to misguided
agency policies. FAMS are also required to remain on call 24/7
without compensation. Sadly, the TSA believes it can behave
this way because Congress authorized it. Public law 107-71 of
2001, commonly referred to as the ATSA, essentially gives the
TSA the authority to do whatever it wants. Prior administrators
have even testified during open Congressional hearings that
they do not have to answer Congressional questions and have
also resisted subpoenas.
This TSA defiance of Congress originates at the TSA Office
of Chief Counsel and aided by DHS Office of General Counsel.
TSA will do nothing without the permission of the chief
counsel. This top-down control of TSA decisions by
unaccountable attorneys who are detached from the mission has
paralyzed the air marshals.
All FAMS understand that law enforcement is a demanding
job, but no FAMS signed up to be on call without compensation,
to work punishing schedules, to endure management abuse, or to
be subjected to investigations that violate our basic rights.
The issues air marshals face have brought some agents and
their families to the breaking point. We have lost many to
suicide and other mental health issues. I have personally lost
friends and I've watched families crumble.
Air marshals tell the AMA that they want to be removed from
the TSA and placed into a law enforcement agency. Since 2001,
an entire generation of FAMS was made to work for 20 years
under difficult conditions and then retire without fair
compensation. The FAMS that remain do not want to share this
fate. Responses to 2 recent surveys show that between 83 and 93
percent of air marshals want to leave the TSA. Simply put, they
don't trust the TSA after 23 years.
I'd like to thank this committee for being--for holding
this hearing and for the opportunity to testify before you
today.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Casaretti follows:]
Prepared Statement of John A. Casaretti
September 24, 2024
Good morning, Chairman Gimenez and distinguished Members of this
committee.
My name is John Casaretti, and I am the president of the Air
Marshal Association. The AMA represents thousands of current and former
air marshals, and approximately half of flying air marshals are
voluntary members.
I was working as a Customs Inspector in New York City on September
11, 2001. I worked at ground zero and the Fresh Kills landfill for 7
months, and then joined the Federal Air Marshal Service shortly after
recovery operations ended. Those experiences created a sincere and
personal desire to ensure the FAM mission is successful.
Currently, the FAMS are part of the Transportation Security
Administration. The TSA mission is to screen passengers and property at
our Nation's airports. It is an important mission, but it is not a law
enforcement mission. Air marshals believe that a lack of law
enforcement culture makes the TSA either unable or unwilling to develop
the FAM Service to its fullest potential.
As I testified to this committee in November 2021, the agency's
security strategy must evolve, and the FAM mission must be redefined.
We cannot be just another layer of TSA bureaucracy.
The Air Marshal Association has met with TSA Administrator Pekoske
on numerous occasions, and we provided him with a detailed Future Paper
\1\ that outlined some strategies \2\ to better utilize Federal air
marshals.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://airmarshal.org/news-1/f/08042021-ama-future-committee-
final-recommendations.
\2\ https://airmarshal.org/news-1/f/ama-evolution-committee-covid-
update.
\3\ https://airmarshal.org/news-1/f/fam-1811-committee-paper.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A key focus of the AMA Future committee was the need for FAMs to be
Criminal Investigators in the 1811 series.\4\ Currently, there are no
Federal agents available to investigate transportation incidents at
airports, and local authorities can only investigate to the limits of
State law. Simply put, Federal interests are not being met at airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ https://airmarshal.org/news-1/f/ama-fams-evolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air marshals also do not fully understand their role within certain
TSA initiatives. A current concern from our members is the TSA Quiet
Skies program. FAMs complain that they are not given briefings, they do
not know why they are assigned to QS missions, and that they have been
given no specific tasks to complete.
The Quiet Skies program mimics the rule sets used by border
agencies within the Federal Inspection Service areas. But the metrics
and data points used to anchor arbitrary border inspections were never
designed, or intended, to send highly-trained agents, like air
marshals, on anti-terrorism missions.
The TSA will claim that Quiet Skies is a useful and effective
measure, but we disagree. To our knowledge, no Quiet Skies mission has
resulted in the identification of a terrorist, a terrorist plot being
uncovered, or a terrorist action being stopped.
Because of questionable programs like Quiet Skies, the Air Marshal
Association worked with former Congressman Hice to enact the
Strengthening Aviation Security Act in the 115th Congress.\5\ The law
required the TSA to tell Congress what specific intelligence is used to
assign FAMs on missions. Many years later, we are still awaiting this
report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ https://airmarshal.org/news-1/f/ama-supports-hr-4467.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another recent agency misstep has been the AVO program, which
assigns FAMs to airports without a specific mission or clarification of
their authority. While we agree that assigning FAMs to airports is a
step in the right direction, the FAMs must be fully empowered to
investigate any security incident or insider threat they might
encounter.
There are simply too many operational criticisms to cover in this
short statement. However, there are a multitude of other TSA missteps
which need to be mentioned, and may help explain why FAM morale is so
low.
For example, the AMA was forced to sue the agency in Federal court
for Constitutional rights violations, management misconduct, and for
lack of due process during agency investigations.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2022/06/20/2465651/
0/en/Federal-Air-Marshal-Union-Sues-TSA-for-Violating-Constitutional-
Rights.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The AMA is also suing the TSA for back pay and overtime for work
performed since 2013.\7\ Even now, FAMs can be assigned to shifts of
over 20 hours, without receiving overtime, due to misguided agency
policy. FAMs are also required to remain on call 24/7 without
compensation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/05/29/2041197/
0/en/US-Court-certifies-class-of-air-marshals-for-unpaid-overtime.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sadly, the TSA believes it can behave this way because Congress
authorized it. Public Law 107-71 of 2001, commonly referred to as the
ATSA, essentially gives the TSA the authority to do whatever it wants.
Prior administrators have even testified during open Congressional
hearings that they do not have to answer Congressional questions, and
have also resisted subpoenas.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/TSA-
Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This TSA defiance of Congress originates at the TSA Office of Chief
Counsel, aided by the DHS Office of General Counsel. TSA will do
nothing without the permission of the chief counsel. This top-down
control of TSA decisions, by unaccountable attorneys who are detached
from the mission, has paralyzed the air marshals.
All FAMs understand that law enforcement is a demanding job, but no
FAM signed up to be on call without compensation, to work punishing
schedules, to endure management abuse, or to be subjected to
investigations that violate our basic rights.
The issues air marshals face have brought some agents, and their
families, to the breaking point. We have lost many FAMs to suicide and
other mental health issues. I have personally lost friends, and have
watched families crumble.
______
Air marshals tell the AMA they want to be removed from the TSA and
placed into a law enforcement agency. Since 2001, an entire generation
of FAMs were made to work for 20 years under difficult conditions, then
retire without fair compensation. The FAMs that remain do not want to
share that fate.
Responses on 2 recent AMA surveys show that between 83 percent \9\
and 93 percent \10\ of air marshals want to leave the TSA. Simply put,
air marshals do not trust the TSA after 23 long years. We need to find
a different path forward.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ https://www.surveymonkey.com/results/SM-
lMrbvlJk4IqtbUISQPuX_2FQ_3D_3D/.
\10\ https://airmarshal.org/news-1/f/membership-responds-to-ama-
priorities-survey.
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I would like to thank this committee for holding this hearing, and
for the opportunity to testify before you today.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Casaretti.
I now recognize Ms. Sherman for 5 minutes to summarize her
opening statements.
STATEMENT OF TINA WON SHERMAN, PH D, DIRECTOR, HOME-
LAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Sherman. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar,
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to
testify this morning on behalf of GAO. Twenty-three years after
9/11, threats to aviation security remain prevalent and have
evolved beyond terrorists from the cockpit to now also included
threats from explosives, insiders, cybersecurity, and more.
Tasked with remaining confident in the Nation's civil
aviation system, the Federal Air Marshal Service or FAMS
assigns armed Federal law enforcement officers to provide an
on-board security presence on selected domestic and
international flights by U.S. carriers. To provide as much
coverage as possible, FAMS uses a deployment strategy that
involves identifying flights and determining how to divide its
resources between in-flight and ground-based security.
GAO 2016 examine a range of issues related to FAMS and has
also highlighted 2 key areas where FAMS could strengthen its
efforts. Those are organizational performance and work force
management. Regarding organizational performance, GAO has made
8 recommendations to FAMS and TSA since 2016 and 6 of them
implemented. These recommendations include comprehensively
reporting on performance information and assessing the
effectiveness of its countermeasures.
We also recommended that FAMS consider risk when setting
annual targets for domestic and international flights to
achieve its mission priorities. Without doing so, FAMS cannot
ensure it's devoting its resources to the highest-risk flights.
FAMS has since revised its deployment strategy and no longer
uses annual targets, so it did not implement a recommendation.
We continue to believe that risk should be a key consideration
in any FAMS-supporting strategy.
Regarding work force management, GAO has made 12
recommendations to FAMS and TSA and all but one have been
implemented. These recommendations span assessing the health
and fitness of the FAMS work force to facilitate employee
access to COVID testing during the pandemic.
We also recommend that FAMS monitor air marshals work hours
against scheduling guidelines. FAMS has developed a standard
report showing air marshals' actual work and rest hours are
consistent with its guidelines but does not provide the report
to leadership or produce it on a regular basis. Doing so would
fully address our recommendation.
In 2023 FAMS issued a new road map to guidance efforts. The
road map outlines 5 priorities and efforts to identify and
align funding, prioritize risk and allocate resources, and
improve operational and mission support. It also states that
implementation would not be fully realized until the end of
this year.
To support the subcommittee's oversight role, future
Congressional studies could examine FAMS progress in
implementing the road map and whether it contains specific
strategies to help achieve its objectives. GAO's guide to
managing and assessing performance of Federal organizations
could be used to help Congress determine if FAMS is achieving
its objectives.
Congressional oversight could also cover the degree to
which FAMS supports the overall heath and wellness of its air
marshals. GAO strategic human capital management body of work
includes leading practices to address those and other workforce
challenges.
In closing, protecting the civil aviation system and its
evolving threats is critical to our Nation's transportation
security, and GAO is prepared to continue to assist the
subcommittee in its oversight of FAMS and TSA. I'd like to
thank my GAO colleagues for your support in advance of this
hearing and to the subcommittee for their focus on this
important topic.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sherman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tina Won Sherman
Tuesday, September 24, 2024
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-24-107824, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
Twenty-three years after 9/11, the threat of terrorist attacks to
civil aviation and the need for effective security measures remains of
significant concern. FAMS deploys air marshals on selected flights to
deter and address such threats. In June 2023, FAMS issued a road map
that describes the mission, vision, and priorities of the agency.
This statement discusses GAO's portfolio of work on FAMS and its
progress addressing prior GAO recommendations.
This statement is based on prior GAO reports published from May
2016 through June 2021, along with updates on FAMS's efforts to address
previous GAO recommendations. For these reports, GAO reviewed TSA and
FAMS documentation, analyzed data, and interviewed agency officials.
For recommendation updates, GAO reviewed FAMS and TSA documentation and
met with officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made 20 recommendations related to FAMS in the reports covered
by this statement. DHS agreed with all of them. As of August 2024, 17
have been implemented; 1 has been partially implemented; 2 have been
closed--no longer valid. GAO will continue to monitor the agency's
progress.
federal air marshal service.--recommendations to address organizational
performance and workforce challenges largely implemented
What GAO Found
The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) is a component within the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). In prior work, GAO identified various challenges
affecting FAMS. These generally fall into two areas: (1) organizational
performance and (2) workforce management. As of August 2024, FAMS and
TSA have largely implemented GAO's 20 recommendations.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
One example of a closed recommendation to address organizational
performance relates to the effectiveness of TSA's aviation security
countermeasures. In 2017, GAO reported on the costs and effectiveness
of TSA's passenger aviation security countermeasures, including FAMS.
GAO found that TSA did not have methods to assess its effectiveness in
deterring attacks on the U.S. aviation system. As a result, GAO
recommended that TSA explore and pursue methods to do so. TSA addressed
this by commissioning several studies and using them to inform
leadership decisions about new or revised countermeasures. As a result,
TSA should now be better-positioned to understand and improve its
efforts to deter attacks on the U.S. aviation system.
The open, partially-addressed, recommendation to address workforce
management challenges focuses on FAMS's tracking of the time its air
marshals spent on and off their shifts. In 2020, GAO found that FAMS
did not monitor air marshals' work hours against its guidelines for
shift lengths and rest periods. GAO recommended that FAMS monitor the
extent to which air marshals' actual shifts and rest hours are
consistent with scheduling guidelines. As of August 2024, FAMS
developed reports with this information, but it had not used them to
help manage its workforce.
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)--a component within the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration
(TSA). FAMS's stated mission is to detect, deter, and defeat criminal,
terrorist, and hostile activities that target our Nation's
transportation systems.
In the 23 years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, TSA has
spent billions on a wide range of programs designed to enhance aviation
security.\1\ For example, FAMS deploys armed Federal law enforcement
officers--air marshals--to provide an on-board security presence on
selected flights of U.S. air carriers traveling domestically and around
the world. To cover as many flights as possible, FAMS has a deployment
strategy that involves identifying flights and determining how to
divide resources between in-flight and ground-based security.
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\1\ In fiscal year 2023, FAMS's total appropriation was $735
million and for fiscal year 2025, FAMS has requested $843 million.
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To effectively carry out its work, FAMS must continually ensure
alignment between its core mission and the resources necessary to
achieve it. In June 2023, FAMS issued a road map that, in part,
describes the mission, vision, and priorities of the agency.\2\
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\2\ Transportation Security Administration, Law Enforcement/Federal
Air Marshal Service Roadmap (June 2023).
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My statement today discusses GAO's portfolio of work on FAMS and
its progress addressing our recommendations. This statement is based on
prior GAO reports published from May 2016 through June 2021, along with
selected updates on FAMS's efforts to address previous GAO
recommendations.\3\ For these reports, GAO reviewed FAMS documentation,
analyzed data, and interviewed agency officials. For recommendation
updates, we reviewed FAMS and TSA documentation and met with FAMS and
TSA officials.
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\3\ GAO, COVID-19: Federal Air Marshal Service Should Document Its
Response to Cases and Facilitate Access to Testing, GAO-21-595
(Washington, DC: June 23, 2021); Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal
Service Has Taken Steps to Address Workforce Issues, but Additional
Actions Needed, GAO-20-125 (Washington, DC: Feb. 12, 2020); Aviation
Security: Actions Needed to Systematically Evaluate Cost and
Effectiveness Across Security Countermeasures, GAO-17-794 (Washington,
DC: Sept. 11, 2017); Federal Air Marshal Service: Actions Needed to
Better Incorporate Risk in Deployment Strategy, GAO-16-582 (Washington,
DC: May 31, 2016); and Federal Air Marshal Service: Additional Actions
Needed to Ensure Air Marshals' Mission Readiness, GAO-16-764
(Washington, DC, Sept. 14, 2016).
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More detailed information on the objectives, scope, and
methodologies of our prior work can be found in each of the reports
listed at the end of this statement. We conducted the work on which
this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted
Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
fams and tsa have largely implemented gao's recommendations
Since 2016, we have made 20 recommendations to address various
challenges affecting FAMS. These generally fall into two areas: (1)
organizational performance and (2) workforce management.\4\ As of
August 2024, FAMS and TSA have largely implemented our recommendations.
As figure 1 illustrates, 17 have been implemented, 1 has been partially
implemented, and 2 have been closed as no longer valid.\5\
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\4\ Managing organizational performance can include efforts to
measure and assess performance. Managing the workforce can include
efforts to acquire, develop, and retain staff.
\5\ GAO may close a recommendation as no longer valid when a
program or approach has been significantly changed since GAO's
recommendation. GAO continues to monitor FAMS's progress in
implementation.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Actions to Better Manage FAMS Organizational Performance
With respect to the 8 recommendations we made concerning
organizational performance challenges, FAMS and TSA have implemented 6
but did not implement the remaining 2. Examples of actions taken in
response to our recommendations include:
FAMS took action to report comprehensively on performance
categories.--In May 2016, we reported on the performance
information FAMS shared with TSA and DHS. We found that the
performance measure FAMS used to assess the extent to which it
met its flight coverage and resource use targets was not clear
or objective.\6\ This measure--the TSA coverage score--was a
composite score for 11 performance categories, including air
marshal coverage of certain domestic and international
flights.\7\ The measure lacked clarity because, for example, it
aggregated flight coverage and resource allocation information,
which made it difficult to interpret. It also lacked
objectivity because, as a composite measure, it did not show
performance below or above desired levels in the 11
categories--information that would aid decision making. As a
result, we recommended that FAMS report the performance results
for each of the 11 categories that comprise the TSA coverage
score to FAMS and TSA leadership.
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\6\ GAO-16-582.
\7\ Further detail about these categories has been designated
sensitive security information and thus cannot be included in a public
testimony.
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In 2017, FAMS began reporting the more complete information to both
FAMS and TSA leadership on a regular basis.\8\ As a result,
DHS, TSA, and FAMS leadership had more complete information
about FAMS performance, including where FAMS performance was
below targets. We therefore closed this recommendation as
implemented.
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\8\ FAMS now refers to this as the ``Composite Index of Federal Air
Marshal Service Risk-Based Flight Coverage Goals.''
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TSA took action to assess the deterrent effect of
countermeasures.--In September 2017, we reported on the costs
and effectiveness of TSA's passenger aviation security
countermeasures, including FAMS.\9\ We found that TSA did not
have methods to assess its effectiveness in deterring attacks
on the U.S. aviation system. As a result, we recommended that
TSA explore and pursue methods to assess the deterrent effect
of TSA's passenger aviation security countermeasures.
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\9\ GAO-17-794.
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TSA addressed this recommendation by commissioning several studies.
For example, TSA studied threat shifting--the response of an
adversary to its perception of countermeasures or procedures--
as a means to understand and influence deterrence. TSA
officials explained that they used the studies' results to
inform leadership decisions about new or revised
countermeasures. By pursuing these methods, TSA could better
understand and improve its efforts to deter attacks on the U.S.
aviation system. We closed this recommendation as implemented.
FAMS has not set annual targets for its coverage of domestic
and international flights.--In our May 2016 report, mentioned
above, we found FAMS could better incorporate risk in its
deployment strategy.\10\ For example, we found that FAMS did
not consider risk when deciding how to initially divide annual
resources between domestic and international flights to achieve
its mission priorities. With this approach, FAMS attempted to
maximize the total number of flights it could cover, but
because this model did not account for risk, FAMS could not
ensure it is devoting its resources to the highest-risk flights
overall. As a result, we recommended that FAMS incorporate risk
into its method for initially setting annual target numbers of
average daily international and domestic flights to cover.
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\10\ GAO-16-582.
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In March 2018, FAMS revised its deployment methodology to no longer
set these annual targets. We closed this recommendation as no
longer valid. In November 2020, agency officials said that FAMS
was evaluating its concept of operations and planned to make
further adjustments to their deployment strategy.
Actions to Better Manage the FAMS Workforce
With respect to the 12 recommendations we made concerning workforce
management challenges, FAMS and TSA have implemented 11 and FAMS is
making progress in implementing the remaining recommendation. Examples
of actions taken in response to our recommendations include:
FAMS took action to assess the health and fitness of its
workforce.--In February 2020, we assessed FAMS's workforce
issues, including air marshals' quality of life.\11\ We found
that although FAMS had assessed individuals' health, such as by
requiring medical exams, the agency had not comprehensively
assessed the health of its workforce as a whole--a step that
would enable it to look for broader health trends and risks. As
a result, we recommended that FAMS develop and implement a plan
to assess the health and fitness of the FAMS workforce.
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\11\ GAO-20-125.
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In October 2022, FAMS began tracking injuries among the workforce,
including the number, type, and geographic location of
individuals with injuries. With this information, FAMS
management can better ensure its workforce can fulfill its
national security mission. We closed this recommendation as
implemented.
FAMS took action to facilitate employee access to COVID-19
testing.--In June 2021, we reported on FAMS's response to
COVID-19.\12\ We found that air marshals faced barriers getting
tested for COVID-19 and FAMS had not been routinely
facilitating employee access to such testing. As a result, we
recommended that FAMS routinely facilitate employee access to
COVID-19 testing.
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\12\ GAO-21-595.
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In March 2022, FAMS began making COVID-19 tests available to
employees. By routinely facilitating employee access to
testing, FAMS helped employees better ensure their health, the
health of others, and FAMS's continued security operations. We
closed this recommendation as implemented.
FAMS has taken some action toward monitoring air marshals'
work hours against scheduling guidelines.--In our February 2020
report we found that FAMS did not monitor air marshals' actual
shifts and rest periods against FAMS's scheduling
guidelines.\13\ As a result, we recommended that FAMS do so.
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\13\ GAO-20-125. At the time of our review, FAMS's guidelines
identified a 10-hour maximum for domestic work shifts. In certain
circumstances, however, air marshals could be scheduled to work longer
than 10 hours. In addition, FAMS's guidelines identified a 16-hour
minimum rest following domestic flights exceeding 8 hours of flight
time and a 12-hour minimum rest following domestic flights lasting 8
hours of flight time or less.
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As of August 2024, FAMS has developed a standard report describing
the extent to which air marshals' actual work and rest hours
were consistent with the guidelines. However, FAMS has not
produced the report regularly and provided it to leadership.
According to agency officials, FAMS plans to implement the
report before the end of 2024. To fully address this
recommendation, FAMS will need to use this report to understand
the extent to which air marshals' actual work hours are
consistent with the guidelines. We consider this recommendation
open-partially implemented and will continue to monitor FAMS's
progress.
In conclusion, protection of our Nation's civil aviation system
amidst evolving threats is critical to overall transportation security.
Our prior recommendations prompted FAMS's and TSA's actions to address
organizational performance and workforce management challenges. We
stand ready to support future Congressional oversight.
gao contacts and staff acknowledgements
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ms. Sherman.
Members will now be recognized by order of seniority for
their 5 minutes of questioning. I now recognize myself for 5
minutes.
Mr. Casaretti, your testimony was somewhat troubling to me.
How many FAMS are there? How many Federal air marshal personnel
are there?
Mr. Casaretti. Chairman, I'm not sure if I'm supposed to be
releasing that in open testimony, and specifically I can only
guess. I don't work with the agency directly, so I would----
Mr. Gimenez. We'll find that out. Not a problem. OK.
Thanks. I'm interested in--where is it that you would want the
FAMS to be? I mean, you don't want it to be under TSA, but
where would you recommend that it should be? Should you be your
own agency separate or should you be under some other law
enforcement branch of Federal Government?
Mr. Casaretti. I think the FAMS want to be under law
enforcement. We've had this conversation with--amongst
ourselves and with different staff. The best fit would be in a
law enforcement, not a regulatory agency. Standalone probably
would be more problematic than its worth, and the air marshals
just want to make sure that there is an intelligence basis for
them going on these flights, that they have a meaningful
contribution to the security in so much that they can do
investigative work and try and find the problems before they
get on the aircraft as well.
We've toyed around with DOT looking into the authority of
that. There's been a lot of speculation and questions about
whether or not we could become HSI agents and whether or not
the duties in the air are going to be a collateral duty. Those
are promising, but I think there's going to be an issue with
the shifting authority from 49C over to 19 USC authority, so
we're still talking about that. We have no answer. We're hoping
this committee can figure it out for us.
Mr. Gimenez. Yes, but we're going to be looking to you, the
people, to tell us hey, where do you think you best lie? I
guess we're going to look at it ourselves. When you have--when
you are assigned to a flight, are you assigned to a mission, or
are you just--are these things random, or how does that--how
does that work?
Mr. Casaretti. So the missions--a lot of the missions are
random, but there are QS and those types of flights, or SMCs
that they say----
Mr. Gimenez. Could you speak English for me, please. I'm
not--I don't speak TSA-ese.
Mr. Casaretti. I understand. Special mission coverages they
say are intelligence-based missions. Quiet Skies they say are
intelligence-based missions. Unfortunately, we don't feel that
the rule sets that they're using to create these missions are
necessarily intelligence.
One of the reasons why we worked with Congressman Hice in
the past was because we were trying to flush out exactly what
they were doing with intelligence and why they thought these
missions were of higher risk that require a Federal agent to be
placed on it for antiterrorism measures. It just didn't make
sense to us.
What we found out was they borrowed or they thought that
they would borrow a rules set system from Customs, which is
called automated targeting system, which puts these rules in
place, and they grab people that happen to stumble into it like
a net. I worked for Customs and I used to deal with this
before. That system was designed to be used in the border area.
It was designed to have inspectors actually asking questions of
these people that might stumble across a rule set. So in that
scenario, it works very well, because you have eye-to-eye human
law enforcement contact with the individual that may have
stumbled across the rule set.
Air marshals can't do anything like that. They're assigning
an air marshal on the flight based upon these single data
points. I don't consider that intelligence and a lot of the air
marshals don't either.
Mr. Gimenez. The Quiet Skies Program, how does one get on
that list?
Mr. Casaretti. You have to trigger one of the rules.
There's rules that they make and they're triggered, and if you
happen to trigger it, you're on the program.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. So I guess we're going to have to have a
Classified briefing with TSA to find out how one gets on that
list and how in the world does a former Congresswoman get on
that list. So when somebody is in the Quiet Skies Program,
anytime they fly, they're going to be seen. Somebody is going
to be with them. Is that what you're telling me?
Mr. Casaretti. They're going to--there is a high risk
they're going to have an air marshal on the flight. I don't
know if they're going to have a job on the flight, but they'll
become the flight.
Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. I think that's better in a
Classified setting as to how one gets there and why certain
people are on it. I'm certainly very interested in why
certainly people are on it, but I'm not going to have it here
in this hearing. So my time is up and I now recognize the
Ranking Member from Michigan.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you, witnesses, for your testimony today. Mr. John
Casaretti from the Air Marshals Association, thank you so much
for being here. I also want to thank the men and women of--for
the air marshals and the work that you've done to keep us all
safe. I really appreciate it, especially those of us who fly
fairly frequently. We appreciate the good work that your
members do.
In your testimony, you described some of the challenges
facing air marshals, including their punishing schedule. Would
you please walk us through what kind of schedule would be
typical for an air marshal during the week, you know, how--when
they're asked to perform or be on a flight what information do
they have, what training do they have, what is expected of
them, and how taxing could that be.
Mr. Casaretti. Yes, Ranking Member. There is--a regular day
would be unknown at this point, because schedule changes happen
all the time. They'll pretty much be on stand-by, which affects
their personal lives. They may be called to get on a flight
early. They may be told at the end of their shift to be on a
flight that lasts for 8 or 9 hours, so a lot of the problems
that the FAMS face is that they have families, they have child
care. There's dogs to walk. There's things to do that can't be
dropped at the drop of a hat.
As far as the long work days are concerned, our
international missions can run on our longest-haul flights, you
know, 16 to 20 hours, and that doesn't include the pre-mission
briefings. It doesn't include the breakdown or the meeting with
foreign authorities to lock up weapons, getting to the hotel.
By the time you actually have your time to yourself, you may
have worked a triple shift and you're pretty much wiped out,
but then you've got to go to sleep, find food in some cases off
times at the destination city and get your sleep in, maybe a
get workout if you can, and get right back on the aircraft and
do it again. So you're working on a constant sleep deprivation
and your circadian rhythm is knocked out of whack.
A problem that we found over the years is the other demands
that you have to meet when you get back specifically going to
the office, doing specific training, even things like firearms
or physical fitness becomes really hard because you're on this
huge sleep deprivation. You're away from your children and your
families. You're groggy. You cannot keep up with what's going
on at home because you're so disjointed. That's one of the
things that I was mentioning before about families being torn
apart and crumbling. You can't get it all together when you're
on this constant 27-day deployment that's lasted in some cases
for 20 years.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you.
Dr. Sherman, I have a--in 2020 GAO heard from many air
marshals that they were experiencing extreme fatigue, mental
health issues, difficulty maintaining a healthy diet, and
increased frequency of illness. GAO also cited survey data
showing that only 44 percent of air marshals felt protected
from health and safety hazards. What actions did GAO recommend
TSA should take to address these health concerns?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you. In particular I'd like to highlight
from that work. One has to do with scheduling deadlines and
ensuring that there is adherence by FAMS to the TSA scheduling
guidance for those air marshals. That wasn't something that was
being documented and that is some action that the FAMS has
since taken.
Also, the other quality of life considerations that have
come up in terms of physical fitness assessments, and while
those assessments were being carried out on a regular basis,
they weren't also being documented. There wasn't a lot of
information that was easily accessible and there wasn't
information in some type of a system that would allow FAMS to
look across the work force and really better understand the
physical fitness and, of course, the mental health issues as
well of the work force. So we made those recommendations.
I just wanted to also add that for this committee we are
planning to start up work in the near term to look at DHS law
enforcement officers' mental health and wellness and we look
forward to supporting the committee's oversight in that area.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Dr. Sherman. My time is up, so I
yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ranking Member. I now recognize the
gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Lee.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Sherman, I'd like to pick up right where you left off
and talk a little bit further about the Federal Air Marshals'
road map and some of the initiatives that are outlined there.
Can you tell me, are there any particular initiatives in that
road map that have not yet been implemented that you think are
important for the road map?
Ms. Sherman. Yes. Thank you. So we actually have in GAO
taken a look at the implementation of that road map since this
issuance from last year. In fact, stated in the document itself
at the very end, it highlights the fact that it was going to
take about 18 months at the end of this year for largely kind-
of a substantive invitation to occur and even another 6 months
before there are sufficient performing measures to understand
the efforts.
As part of that road map, there's absolutely, though, areas
that we think that will help to potentially address some of
these issues but also to keep FAMS at bay, or I should say--
sorry, at pace with current threats. For example, building or
increasing field-based capabilities to be able to address some
of the additional threats around insiders in cybersecurity that
are continuing to emerge.
Ms. Lee. Tell us a little bit more about that, if you
would. Any specific recommendations or insight about how they
might build those field-ready capabilities?
Ms. Sherman. Yes. No insight at this stage. It's something
that we absolutely believe is important for us to take a closer
look at in terms of the implementation of the road map, whether
or not the strategies that are being carried out align with the
objectives and the priorities that are set forth, and we also
think that it would be a good time for us to revisit the FAMS
deployment strategy and get a better understanding of progress
made there as well.
Ms. Lee. Mr. Casaretti, turning to you, how do the
operational air marshals on the ground feel about that road
map? Is it your assessment that they are supportive of it, that
they are believers in it, or are there concerns about it?
Mr. Casaretti. Congresswoman, I don't think the air
marshals even understand the road map. We had submitted a
detailed future committee with a bunch of recommendations and
I've spoken to the current and former directors about
implementing it and making us more able to meet insider threats
on the ground and have meaningful work at the airport, but
nothing really has been done.
Even the AVO program I mentioned earlier in my statement,
FAMS are just placed in airports without training, without
guidance, and they are pretty much told to walk around. We
don't think that's an effective use of us. In a lot of ways,
it's an insult of what we know in our experience.
Ms. Lee. On that point, if you would help us with just a
little bit of background. Those who are currently serving in
the Federal air marshal program, are they sworn law enforcement
officers?
Mr. Casaretti. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Lee. So you all have the ability and the background and
the training to be doing that sort of investigation insider
threat assessment and things that you refer to.
Mr. Casaretti. Yes and no. The reason I'll say no is
because we've suffered an incredible brain drain over the last
few years. The air marshals that came on post-9/11 like myself,
they've mostly retired, and we have now air marshals that came
on and have no other law enforcement experience except what TSA
has taught them. We're not in love with what TSA has taught us.
A lot of us has crutched off of our prior training and
experience to do actions at airports. I myself was on a ground
team twice around for about 2 years and 2 months and I was able
to develop a lot of case work, but that was all based upon my
prior training and experience, none of was what taught to me in
the FAMS service.
So I think there's a real challenge right now that
trainings got bumped up, which is why we keep going back to
training. We have a fresh group of people and they need to be
taught how to do this kind of work.
Ms. Lee. I'd like to hear a little bit more about what you
just described. So during your work on the ground team, you
were able to develop and make cases. So for us, at some point
an FBI agent or HSI agent could bring a Federal case, build an
investigation, but you clearly are seeing a role for the
Federal Air Marshals to do more and to do more of that front-
line work investigating and bringing cases. Could you describe
for us the types of things, the types of situations and cases
that you have investigated and what you think the air marshals
can be adding if they were given appropriate training?
Mr. Casaretti. Of course. A lot of the cases I've developed
were based upon plain view and me being at the airport, basic
law enforcement tactics. You put yourself in the place where
you can see bad things happening. What we were doing at the
time was we had a training of the TSA BDO component, behavioral
detection officers. They were under the Federal Air Marshals
for a short time. So I trained them on bag searches, I trained
them on properly dumping out a bag to feel the weight of it in
case there was precursor chemicals in it.
When they did that kind of search, I was able to see a lot
of things, because they were doing a proper search. Things that
were uncovered were multiple credit cards unsigned going
foreign. So that's a CMIR, Currency Monetary Instrument
Reporting Act violation, and I was able to notify customs
about. You'll see if you're down by the areas where baggage is
being screened, you may see a lot of organics coming through an
E-scan machine. I was able to seize $110,000, get a DEA agent
on-site and do 13 arrests and close 2 cases the following day
in Newark.
There are ways to build the air marshals into current TSA
operations to utilize us as law enforcement and as
investigators, but TSA is so risk-adverse they do not want us
to do these things. I think one of the things that we have been
trying to get them to do is to look at intelligence, to deploy
us based upon intelligence, and to look at what we're able to
do at the airports so we can identify these insider threat
incidents and we can get some case work developed. If we
develop case work at the airport, it will naturally lead to
intelligence, and that will naturally keep the whole domain
safer.
Ms. Lee. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from
New York, Mr. LaLota.
Mr. LaLota. Not yet Florida, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gimenez. You'll get there eventually.
Mr. LaLota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say thanks
for your leadership and bringing us all together on the Federal
Air Marshal Service. To our witnesses for your expertise, your
informing this panel is important to how we craft our policies
and set our budgets, and I want to say thanks for being here
and for your professionalism.
This month marks the 23rd anniversary of the tragic events
of September 11 which serve as a catalyst for the creation and
expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Service as we know it
today, and as we as a committee and we as the public who
reflect on that fateful day, it's important to recognize that
the aviation security landscape has evolved significantly since
23 years ago.
Originally tasked with ensuring the safety and security of
passengers, crew, and aircraft, the Federal Air Marshal Service
has played a vital role in deterring and responding to in-
flight threats. However, the effectiveness of FAMS is now
subject to on-going discussion given the limited deployment of
air marshals only covering an estimated 5 to 6 percent of daily
commercial air flights and the high operational costs involved
amounting to $735 million in 2023.
Dr. Sherman, good morning. Thanks so much for being with us
here today. Can you tell us what has the GAO's work revealed
about the Federal Air Marshal Service's contribution to
aviation security, Doctor?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you for asking that question. What we've
identified is that it's been challenging and difficult for TSA
to understand FAMS and air marshals' ability to be able to be
effective as an aviation security countermeasure. We looked
back just a few years ago across all of the aviation security
layers or countermeasures that TSA has, and FAMS stood out as
one of the few where understanding effectiveness was very
limited.
We can understand and appreciate the challenge of doing so,
because essentially one of the primary contributions that FAMS
has is to be a deterrent--to deter attacks, and that's
difficult to quantify, that's difficult to measure, but there
are ways for the air marshals and for the relevant programs to
be able to get closer to an understanding of that deterring
factor so that we have a better sense of the cost effectiveness
and we also have an opportunity, or at least FAMS and TSA
would, to essentially optimize or right-size the use of its
resources.
Mr. LaLota. Given that complex and ever-changing threat
environment that you described where the adversaries have
shifted from traditional hijacking tactics to cyber threats,
insider attacks, and even drone-related disruptions, we must
now understand how FAMS has adapted its mission and whether its
contributions remain impactful. A follow-up question to that is
how has FAMS adjusted its operations and deployment strategy to
adapt to these new threats?
Ms. Sherman. Yes. We've talked a little bit about ground-
based operations already, considering Viper teams, support of
transportation security officers at the airport, providing
security and law enforcement assistance not only at the
airport, but also in transportation hubs and service in the
kind of maritime space to providing other types of assistance
or support as intelligence is identified.
That moved toward ground-based deployment as not only
something that is a function of the changing integral threats,
but it's actually something that FAMS has been interested and
has had a desire to move toward since I think 2010 or 2011 in
part to help address some of the physical and mental wellness
challenges that we were talking about earlier.
Mr. LaLota. I want to get into that a little bit more, but
with the remaining time I have left, just about a minute, we,
Congress, this panel especially knows the nature of the job
includes frequent travel and long hours, and we know that can
take a toll on the morale and mental health of our Federal Air
Marshals, and we have a specific appreciation for that.
Understanding how air marshals view their roles, leadership in
FAMS and TSA, the factors contributing to job satisfaction or
dissatisfaction is crucial in how we can assess, how we can
improve engagements, morale, and retention among air marshals.
With about the 30 seconds I have remaining, Mr. Casaretti,
I want to thank you again for being here with us today. Tell
the panel here how the air marshals generally feel about their
role. How is morale? How is everybody doing?
Mr. Casaretti. Congressman, morale is low. It got a bump,
because we finally have equal pay to the rest of our peers in
law enforcement, but none of the other issues have been solved,
and that's one of the big problems. Over and over again I
talked to FAMS from across the country on a weekly basis, and
it always comes back to the simple fact that the FAM does not
know why they're on the specific flight they're on. That's
usually what we always get back to. What is the specific
intelligence to the flight that I'm on? No one can tell us.
Even with the program I related earlier with Quiet Skies,
they say there's specific intelligence and you will get a PDF
with the picture of the individual, but you have no job and is
there is no specific reason for you to be on that flight that's
identified, so we're being told to sit on an airplane, but we
have no job.
It turns out that me myself in my entire career, my agency
never really told me I had a job except if you see them get on
a plane, take care of it. If you see a violent incident, take
care of it. Other than that, I feel like my entire career was
squandered, except for my own proactive efforts at the airport.
Mr. LaLota. I can tell you, and I'll yield back in a
moment, Mr. Chairman, but under the Chairman's leadership, this
panel cares about the morale of the leadership and the morale
leads to more effectiveness which leads to safer skies. It's an
important mission that we should all strive to, and I
appreciate your testimony today.
Chairman, I yield.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from
Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Casaretti, Dr. Sherman, thank you for being here today.
There's been on-going discussion in my office for quite some
time, and of course I support the enforcement of the law and
protection of our travelers. We all travel a lot.
You know, it has always been to me as an American
comforting to know even as a cop, you know, when I was a full-
time cop and sometimes I would travel on a pretty regular basis
to participate in the training somewhere or to interact in some
manner with other law enforcement, so even being a cop on an
airplane, it was always reassuring to think maybe there is an
air marshal on a plane. Try and identify the guy, you know,
maybe it's that guy, maybe it's that guy. It's just the way
it's supposed to work.
So being a supporter and a cop myself, it was that much
more troubling as a constitutionalist when it began to be
brought to my attention that maybe the air marshal service has
been co-opted by some darker force within the Federal
Government that would oppress the freedoms and rights,
including the very, very basic freedom to travel the land that
Americans enjoy.
So I paid very close attention to the initial
whistleblowers that came forward and spoke to me in my office
and we performed our due diligence. We discovered a letter that
I had not known of prior that was offered by--at that time the
Democrat Chairman of this committee and the Ranking Member of
this committee just after January 6 essentially instructing TSA
to find ways to interact with and obstruct the travel of
conservatives that had come to the Capitol region in the time
frame before January 6th and after January 6th.
Well, that bothered the hell out of me that such a thing
could happen. So we started looking into it, and some
disturbing things have come to light, and some things that we
thought perhaps were disturbing, they were settled. Where we
are right now as a body, as a committee, and we're responsible
to perform for the American people and to support our oath to
the family. Support the Constitution of these United States,
far more important than anything Republican or Democrat. But
Americans need to hear from you that the air marshal services
are not being used to follow around conservative Americans that
have been tagged as some high-risk individual. Do you support--
if an American supports a particular candidate for President,
does that put an American potentially in a high-risk category
that they would be followed by the air marshals, Mr. Casaretti?
Mr. Casaretti. Congressman, I don't believe that specific
thing would put you in the category, but I believe there is the
discretion and the leeway for TSA to develop a rule set that
has a high likelihood of catching any type of person it wants
to. So everything is rules-based, because there is no tough
oversight of the rules they're using. They can make any rule
they want to, and yes, it could----
Mr. Higgins. Exactly. The freedom to travel the land, I
mean, it's a foundational principle. You're not actually living
in a free land if you're not free to travel the land. If we're
being watched and tracked and followed and spied upon by agents
that we, the people, you know, provide to protect the citizenry
allegedly from some legitimate threat to air travel, it's
disturbing and troubling.
I have several questions that I'm going to never get to but
were prepared in writing for you, Mr. Casaretti, and you, Dr.
Sherman. Just 3 or 4 questions each. We're going to provide
those in writing. I hope to have a timely answer on those
questions.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the subcommittee convening on
this important topic, and I yield.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, gentleman from Louisiana. We're
going to go through a second round, so I'll start off. Mr.
Casaretti, when something happens in TSA at the line, something
which is illegal, somebody brings a weapon, et cetera, and
they're apprehended, who apprehends them?
Mr. Casaretti. Chairman, local law enforcement are called
to respond. It's very unlikely that there will be a Federal
charge on it, so they have the TSA reimbursement program. They
pay for local law enforcement to be available to TSA and TSA
will call them.
One of my big complaints about this system is that Federal
Air Marshals are not automatically on the local notification
system, so if there ever were an opportunity to examine Federal
interests in these incidents, we don't even have the
opportunity to, because city, State, and local comes and does
whatever they're going to do, seize or invest our evidence or
just arrest the individual, and we don't get a piece of it.
Mr. Gimenez. Do you have arrest powers?
Mr. Casaretti. I'm sorry?
Mr. Gimenez. Does the Federal Air Marshal Service, do you
have arrest powers?
Mr. Casaretti. Yes.
Mr. Gimenez. You do. OK. If something happens on an
aircraft, again, some incident, et cetera, that may be a
violation of law, who gets called for that?
Mr. Casaretti. So different situation. That's our special
aircraft jurisdiction. We share concurrent jurisdiction on
those things with the FBI. There are a lot of things on the
aircraft we wouldn't get involved in that are low-level. We
would just activate and do something if there was a threat to
life and the aircraft itself.
Mr. Gimenez. Somebody assaults, let's say, a flight
attendant. Would you be involved in that? Would the Federal Air
Marshal Services be involved in that? Or would you be doing the
arresting, or it would be somebody else?
Mr. Casaretti. Absolutely. On flight, we'd take care of the
incident, obviously arresting the individual. Usually a hand-
off to local law enforcement would happen, or if there was a
responding agent able to respond, the FBI might be notified and
they might respond.
Mr. Gimenez. One final question that I have is, and I do
intend to have a Classified briefing about the Quiet Skies and
how people get on it and what the rules are and because,
obviously, it needs to be in a Classified setting, but I'm also
concerned as my colleague from Louisiana about how--what these
rules are and how certain people get on them. We've heard of
some names that are on it. They're frankly quite disturbing as
to why they would be on it.
But I'm going to have--my final question is about the
scheduling. It would seem to me that an air marshal, a system
like that that goes on flights and surveils flights and
protects flights, would be very--the scheduling and the work
hours would be quite similar to what the aircraft personnel or
the pilot, the co-pilots, the flight attendants would follow.
Do you follow that kind of schedule or is it something
completely different?
Mr. Casaretti. It is completely different insomuch that
airline employees are able to change their shifts. They're
feeling tired, they give up a trip. Air marshals can't do that.
There is a variety of reasons why they can't, especially when
you're talking about international deployments, because there's
country clearances to be considered, so you will not be able to
switch an individual off an aircraft when they've already been
cleared to go to that destination.
However, the local or the CONUS trips, the continental U.S.
trips, that's a whole different story. If there was more like a
flight attendant or a pilot schedule, there would be the
ability to swap back and forth when you feel tired so you can
stay healthy. There is no ability for air marshals to do that,
and I think that's a huge difference that affects why we're
unhealthy.
Mr. Gimenez. Do you get paid overtime for anything over 40
hours?
Mr. Casaretti. There is a provision of the FLSA that says
we have to work 43, and because we're grouped in with regular
law enforcement, we're paid on a rotating shift schedule, so
what that basically means is TSA is able to game our schedules
to deny us a lot of overtime pay. In the example I was using
earlier about a 20-hour workday, they may have a shift that
crosses midnight and the TSA says oh, that doesn't count
anymore, it's a brand new day. So you got 8 hours of straight
time and 8 hours of straight time, and therefore, hey, you only
got 3 hours of overtime. But then they'll put you on a short
domestic trip the next day so they're able to erase that
overtime. It disappears.
Mr. Gimenez. I mean, there's a Fair Labor Standards Act. Do
you follow the Fair Labor Standards Act in terms of overtime,
et cetera? You're not executive personnel. You're hourly
personnel, right? Or are you not?
Mr. Casaretti. The Court has ruled that we are covered
under the FLSA, so we are under the FLSA. What we don't enjoy
are the rest breaks and things like that that are mandated when
we're on a flight. There's no break time.
Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. OK. I yield back and I recognize
the Ranking Member.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Mr. Casaretti, for your testimony.
So when you have longer flights, like 14-, 16-hour flights, are
there multiple air marshals on those flights?
Mr. Casaretti. Our assignments are based upon risk. The
longer flights, usually it's a larger team, and that's also on
the size of the aircraft itself. You have a working area that
you can cover, a line of sight and where you can observe
things, so if it's a bigger aircraft, obviously, we need
multiple teams, one to cover the flight deck, one to take care
of maybe bombs in the back of the aircraft if we find one, so
there is larger teams and larger aircraft.
Mr. Thanedar. OK. Now, the GAO's report came out before
COVID, and I believe that FAMS were classified as essential
employees and they're required to fly missions throughout the
pandemic, which I imagine would have made mental health
challenges even worse. How would you describe the mental state
of most air marshals today? What resources do you believe would
help air marshals who are struggling with their mental health?
Mr. Casaretti. I think the mental state of most air
marshals that have been flying for a long time is strained, and
that's because it's a compounding thing month after month where
you're having issues and not being home and not being able to
contribute meaningfully to home life and contributions.
For instance, one of the GAO reports that's in front of me,
just to reference the estimated shift time, 29 percent of air
marshals shifts were over 18 hours in 2019. That's just
directly prior to the pandemic really affecting how we fly. If
you're being scheduled almost 30 percent over 18-hour workdays,
notwithstanding your commute and other things that you have to
do to prepare, there's almost no time at home. You just cannot
have a home life.
My own family suffered terribly and we made a decision as a
family for my wife to quit and home school our kids, and we've
done that for 12 years just because it was the only time I
could get with my family. So if you're not able to make those
kinds of changes to your life, things devolve quickly, and we
have a very high divorce rate in the FAMS.
Mr. Thanedar. Typically, on an average, how many hours
would they work per week?
Mr. Casaretti. It varies. It depends on your scheduling.
Mostly it depends on where your field office is located.
Coastal field offices have a lot of international flights where
a lot of the middle-of-the-country field offices do a lot of
multiple-leg flights, 3, 4 a day, so it just depends.
Mr. Thanedar. Are there hourly workers? Are there exempt
salary workers?
Mr. Casaretti. Air marshals are--it's FLSA workers, so we
get paid a salary, but we get paid hourly for overtime
purposes.
Mr. Thanedar. All right. Thank you so much.
Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Kennedy, do you have any questions? OK.
Thank you.
I will now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana again,
Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Sherman, in your statement, you stated that since 2016,
we've made 20 recommendations to address various challenges
affecting the Federal Air Marshal Services.
These generally fall into two areas. No. 1, organizational
performance, and No. 2, work force management. Is that from
your statement?
Ms. Sherman. That's correct.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, ma'am. Well, I'm going to ask you, Dr.
Sherman, are you familiar with the fact that air marshals,
generally speaking, is as broadly reflected in survey after
survey? Air marshals want to do law enforcement work. They
don't want to do political work. That's why they want out from
under TSA. When you survey air marshals again and again and
again, they don't want to be a part of TSA, because they feel
that TSA is like political--has become a political extension of
whoever is in charge. Air marshals want to have law enforcement
missions on the plane.
Mr. Casaretti, is that an accurate reflection of your
surveys that show that 83 and 93 percent of air marshals want
to leave TSA? Simply put, air marshals do not trust the TSA.
After 24 years, that they want to be removed and placed in a
law enforcement agency. Why? Because they want to perform law
enforcement missions. Is that generally accurate?
Mr. Casaretti. That's correct.
Mr. Higgins. OK. So when you have a letter, Dr. Sherman,
I'm going to ask you if they'll be more effective? If in your
opinion the field air marshals are being more efficient, more
effective agency performing for the American people and the law
enforcement role, which is what they originally intended to do,
not as political spies or political extensions of the
weaponization of some political agenda out of this Executive
branch or that Executive branch. These guys don't want to do
that. They want to do law enforcement.
So you're looking into the efficiency of the agencies
talking about organizational performance and work force
management when morale is low and turnover is high because the
work force is not happy with the role that they're playing,
then of course it will be less efficient than if you flip that
switch. What survey after survey shows is that these guys want
to do law enforcement work, not political work.
But I ask you each to reflect upon these words from the
letter on January 11, 2021 written by Chairman Bennie Thompson,
who was the Chair of this committee at that time, Ranking
Member now, Ranking Member John Katko, Republican. We were in
the Minority. Sent a letter to TSA Administrator Pekoske--
nobody knew about this letter, by the way. Took me a year-and-
a-half to find out about this letter--to Pekoske asking for
updates on current efforts to disrupt ``the travel of white
supremacists''. Options available for ``denying air carrier
service'' to individuals posing a potential threat following
January 6. There you go, that pesky right to travel the land
that Americans that enjoy Constitutional protections are
supposed to enjoy.
So we have the 2 top guys, Democrat and Republican, signing
a letter to the--I almost used an acronym I'm not supposed to
use in here, the man in charge at TSA saying hey, we want you
to report to us on what you're doing to follow around using
field air marshal services, to follow around these Republicans
that came to the capital region on January 6.
That's political stuff. This is why these guys don't want
to be a part of TSA, this is why their performance is lagging,
this is why turnover is high, this is why morale is low.
So Mr. Casaretti, in my remaining 30 seconds, we covered a
broad topic there. Should this body take action to make the
field air marshals services a stand-alone law enforcement
agency? I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. Casaretti. Thank you, Congressman.
I think that would be the best for the American people. I
think we need to be out of the bureaucratic agency we find
ourselves in, just be an arm of that. We need to be released to
do the law enforcement work we all signed up to do.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, sir. Thank you, ma'am for being
here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. I thank the witnesses for their
valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The
Members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions
for the witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to respond to
these in writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(D) the hearing record will
be held open for 10 days. Without objection, this subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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