[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FAA REAUTHORIZATION: ENHANCING AMERICA'S
GOLD STANDARD IN AVIATION SAFETY
=======================================================================
(118-2)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 7, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-791 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
Rick Larsen, Washington, Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford,
Ranking Member Arkansas
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Daniel Webster, Florida
District of Columbia Thomas Massie, Kentucky
Grace F. Napolitano, California Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Steve Cohen, Tennessee Brian Babin, Texas
John Garamendi, California Garret Graves, Louisiana
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiavid Rouzer, North Carolina
Andre Carson, Indiana Mike Bost, Illinois
Dina Titus, Nevada Doug LaMalfa, California
Jared Huffman, California Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Julia Brownley, California Brian J. Mast, Florida
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Puerto Rico
Mark DeSaulnier, California Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Salud O. Carbajal, California Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Greg Stanton, Arizona, Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Vice Ranking Member Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
Colin Z. Allred, Texas Vice Chairman
Sharice Davids, Kansas Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois Lance Gooden, Texas
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire Tracey Mann, Kansas
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts Burgess Owens, Utah
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Marilyn Strickland, Washington Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Chuck Edwards, North Carolina
Patrick Ryan, New York Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Robert Menendez, New Jersey Eric Burlison, Missouri
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon John James, Michigan
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan Brandon Williams, New York
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Mike Collins, Georgia
Mike Ezell, Mississippi
John S. Duarte, California
Aaron Bean, Florida
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri, and Chairman, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Louisiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, opening
statement...................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hon. Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Aviation,
opening statement.............................................. 7
WITNESSES
David H. Boulter, Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation
Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, oral statement........ 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety
Board, oral statement.......................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Capt. Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International, oral statement.................................. 23
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Peter J. Bunce, President and Chief Executive Officer, General
Aviation Manufacturers Association, oral statement............. 29
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Ed Bolen, President and Chief Executive Officer, National
Business Aviation Association, oral statement.................. 37
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Kerry Buckley, Ph.D., Vice President, Center for Advanced
Aviation System Development, MITRE Corporation, oral statement. 47
Prepared statement........................................... 48
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Submissions for the Record by Hon. Sam Graves:
Statement of the American Society of Civil Engineers......... 53
Statement of James Viola, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Helicopter Association International.............. 55
Statement of Robert Rose, Co-founder and Chief Executive
Officer, Reliable Robotics Corporation..................... 123
Submissions for the Record by Hon. Rick Larsen:
Statement of John Samuelsen, International President,
Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO................ 62
Letter of February 6, 2023, to Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and
Hon. Rick Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, from Sean M. O'Brien,
General President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters.. 125
Submissions for the Record by Hon. Scott Perry:
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association et al. v. County of
Santa Clara, California, FAA Docket No. 16-22-08........... 68
Article, ``Study finds no elevated lead levels in Reid-
Hillview Airport's soil. The results are bound to intensify
debates around the closure of the San Jose airport,'' by
Gabriel Greschler, Bay Area News Group, June 11, 2022,
updated: June 13, 2022..................................... 69
Article, ``County study found lead within limits in soil
around Reid-Hillview. Officials sat on results until
journalists pressed for release,'' by Eric Blinderman,
AOPA, June 15, 2022........................................ 71
APPENDIX
Questions to David H. Boulter, Acting Associate Administrator for
Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, from:
Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford............................... 127
Hon. Colin Z. Allred......................................... 128
Hon. Troy A. Carter.......................................... 129
Questions to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National
Transportation Safety Board, from:
Hon. Grace F. Napolitano..................................... 130
Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr........................... 131
Hon. Dina Titus.............................................. 132
Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr..................................... 132
Hon. Greg Stanton............................................ 132
Hon. Patrick Ryan............................................ 134
Questions to Capt. Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots
Association, International, from:
Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr........................... 134
Hon. Dina Titus.............................................. 135
Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr..................................... 135
Hon. Greg Stanton............................................ 135
Questions to Peter J. Bunce, President and Chief Executive
Officer, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, from:
Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr........................... 135
Hon. Greg Stanton............................................ 136
Questions from Hon. Colin Z. Allred to Ed Bolen, President and
Chief Executive Officer, National Business Aviation Association 136
February 2, 2023
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: LMembers, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure
FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Aviation
RE: LFull Committee Hearing on ``FAA Reauthorization:
Enhancing America's Gold Standard in Aviation Safety''
_______________________________________________________________________
I. PURPOSE
The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will
meet on Tuesday, February 7, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. ET in Room
2167 of the Rayburn House Office Building for a hearing titled,
``FAA Reauthorization: Enhancing America's Gold Standard in
Aviation Safety.'' The hearing will focus on improving safety
across the National Airspace System (NAS) in advance of
Congress acting to reauthorize the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) statutory authorities which expire on
October 1, 2023. Members will receive testimony from the FAA,
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), General
Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), National Business
Aviation Association (NBAA), the MITRE Corporation, and the Air
Line Pilots Association (ALPA).
II. BACKGROUND
The primary mission of the FAA is ensuring civil aviation
safety.\1\ The FAA has the responsibility to certify, monitor,
and regulate the safety and operations of the civil aviation
sector, including airlines, general aviation, unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS), airports, commercial space transportation,
repair stations, and aircraft manufacturers, as well as
establish licensing and training requirements for pilots and
other aviation related professionals.\2\ Congress periodically
reauthorizes the FAA and other Federal civil aviation programs
through an FAA reauthorization bill. The FAA was last
reauthorized when Congress passed and the President signed the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, which provisions expire on
October 1, 2023.\3\
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\1\ Mission, FAA, available at https://www.faa.gov/about/mission.
\2\ See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 106(g).
\3\ FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat.
3186.
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Aviation safety in the United States has greatly improved
over the last decade. Only three passengers on scheduled
domestic passenger air carriers have died as the result of
aircraft accidents since 2012 compared to the decade prior,
which saw 140 passenger fatalities.\4\ In 11 of the last 13
years, there have been no passenger fatalities in scheduled
United States passenger air carrier operations.\5\ This
improvement in safety occurred despite increasing passenger
enplanements, which grew by 50 percent between 2002 and
2019.\6\
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\4\ NTSB, U.S. Civil Aviation Statistics (2021), available at
https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/Pages/research.aspx, (last visited Jan. 31,
2023) [hereinafter Civil Aviation Statistics].
\5\ Id.
\6\ Id.
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General aviation has also become safer, with the number of
fatal and nonfatal accidents trending downward since 2000.\7\
Experts suggest this has been due to numerous factors,
including advancements in aircraft equipment and technologies,
improved pilot training, improved education programs, and
advocacy efforts across the general aviation community.\8\
Preliminary general aviation safety data shows the fatality
rate per 100,000 flight hours has steadily declined in the past
few decades.\9\ The average rate from 2012 to 2020 was 1.07,
while the preceding decades were 1.29 and 1.49
respectively.\10\
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\7\ Bureau of Transp. Statistics, U.S. General Aviation Safety
Data, available at https://www.bts.gov/content/us-general-aviationa-
safety-data (last visited Jan. 31, 2023) [hereinafter General Aviation
Safety Data].
\8\ Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation & Operations of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 114th Cong., (Apr. 28, 2015)
(statement of Margaret Gilligan, Assoc. Admin. for Aviation Safety,
FAA); see also John Zimmerman, General Aviation Safety Trends: What
Should We Worry About?, Plane&Pilot Magazine (Dec. 13, 2021), available
at https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/news/pilot-talk/2021/12/13/general-
aviation-safety-trends-what-should-we-worry-about/; see also General
Aviation Safety Continues To Improve, Plane&Pilot Magazine, (Dec. 18,
2019), available at https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/article/general-
aviation-safety-continue-improve/.
\9\ General Aviation Safety Data, supra note 7.
\10\ Id.
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Despite these marked advancements, significant room for
improvement remains. In 2021, the NTSB reported 1,157 general
aviation accidents, 43 commuter and on-demand accidents, and 24
commercial air carrier accidents.\11\ An accident rate of 2-3
accidents per month for scheduled air carriers suggests there
still exist potential safety risks that could result in
injuries or fatalities if left unaddressed.\12\
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\11\ Civil Aviation Statistics, supra note 4.
\12\ See id.
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Subsequently, the FAA and Congress, in partnership with
industry, labor, and the travelling public, have fought to make
air travel as safe as possible. Some efforts to improve
aviation safety include the requirement for and implementation
of Safety Management Systems (SMSs), the introduction of the
FAA Compliance Program, and the Alaska Aviation Safety
Initiative. In the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Congress
included more than 90 safety-focused provisions, underpinning
the fact that safety in the aviation industry is a top priority
in the United States.\13\ As the Committee begins to draft the
next FAA reauthorization bill, Members will have the
opportunity to examine and evaluate FAA safety programs,
guidance, and procedures to determine what legislative changes
the Committee should consider in the ongoing effort to improve
safety and uphold our Nation's gold standard for aviation
safety in a global industry.
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\13\ FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, 132
Stat. 3186.
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``THE GOLD STANDARD'' OF SAFETY
The previous conventional wisdom for regulating aviation
safety was a reactionary posture that focused on addressing
safety concerns in the wake of aviation accidents. More
recently, the FAA has sought to be more proactive with certain
aspects of safety oversight and regulation by participating in
programs and initiatives which would ideally prevent future
incidents and accidents. Examples of these proactive
preventative efforts include the introduction of SMSs, the FAA
Compliance Program, Aviation Safety Information Analysis and
Sharing (ASIAS), and the establishment of initiatives focused
on specific sectors of aviation like the Commercial Aviation
Safety Team (CAST) and the General Aviation Joint Steering
Committee (GAJSC). In aggregate, these safety efforts have
fostered a more collaborative approach with aviation
stakeholders, designed to improve communication and problem-
solving when addressing potential safety hazards.\14\
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\14\ United States State Safety Program (SSP), FAA, available at
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/about/initiatives/sms/
reference_library/AVS-210503-001-Supporting-
US_State_Safety_Program.pdf.
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SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS)
An SMS is a ``formal, top-down, organization wide-approach
to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of
safety risk controls.'' \15\ In 2015, the FAA promulgated a
rule requiring part 121 commercial aviation operators to
develop and implement SMSs across their organizations and
outlined the basic requirements for those systems.\16\
Subsequently, and partially in response to a Congressional
directive in the Aircraft Certification Reform and
Accountability Act (P.L. 116-260), the FAA issued a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) requiring SMSs for large aircraft
manufacturers, part 135 air carriers, and certain general
aviation air tour operators.\17\ Additionally, the FAA is in
the process of issuing a final rule requiring certain airports
to develop and maintain an SMS.\18\
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\15\ Safety Management System (SMS), FAA, available at https://
www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sms.
\16\ Safety Management Systems for Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental
Operations Certificate Holders, 80 Fed. Reg. 1,307 (Jan. 8, 2015) (to
be codified at 14 C.F.R. 5 & 119).
\17\ Safety Management Systems, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,932 (Jan. 11, 2023)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R., 14 C.F.R. 5, 21, 91,119, 121,135),
available at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2022-28583.
\18\ Safety Management System for Certificated Airports, 86 Fed.
Reg. 47,266 (Aug. 24, 2021) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. 139),
available at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2021-17847.
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COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
Users of the NAS are required to adhere to all applicable
laws and regulations set forth by the Federal government,
including applicable directives and orders issued by the FAA.
As the aviation sector has evolved and become more complex
however, the FAA has come to recognize that a purely punitive
strategy can potentially hinder the reporting of serious
problems.\19\ Therefore, to avoid and preempt serious safety
risks, the FAA has incentivized the voluntary disclosure of
mistakes, even inadvertent ones, by otherwise safe operators to
improve aviation safety by stimulating self-improvement,
information sharing, and expediting corrections.\20\ To advance
this regulatory approach, the FAA established the Compliance
Program, which emphasizes a culture of voluntary adherence to
safety standards and self-reporting errors in order to receive
fair consideration in return, and reserving legal enforcement
actions for when absolutely necessary.\21\
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\19\ Compliance Program, FAA, available at https://www.faa.gov/
about/initiatives/cp.
\20\ Id.
\21\ Id.
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AVIATION SAFETY INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND SHARING
Because the United States has taken a systemwide approach
to ensuring aviation safety, the FAA has prioritized the
ability of all users of the NAS to share in collecting and
disseminating pertinent safety information.\22\ To create a
process for open and free information sharing, the FAA
introduced the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
(ASIAS) system.\23\ This program is a comprehensive database of
safety data and analysis from government and industry sources,
including data from voluntary sources.\24\ Many stakeholders
from the general aviation industry, aircraft maintenance and
repair stations, manufacturers and universities participate in
ASIAS, and more than 99 percent of the voluntary information
has been provided by United States air carriers.\25\ The FAA
intends to integrate more stakeholders into ASIAS, such as the
corporate/business communities, light general aviation
community, and the helicopter industry, as the system continues
to evolve.\26\
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\22\ See Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing, FAA
(Apr. 8, 2019), available at https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/aviation-
safety-information-analysis-and-sharing-program-1.
\23\ Id.
\24\ Id.
\25\ Id.
\26\ Id.
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COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY TEAM AND GENERAL AVIATION JOINT STEERING
COMMITTEE
In 1998, the FAA launched an initiative known as ``Safer
Skies,'' which was intended to reduce fatal accidents by
2007.\27\ To achieve this goal, the FAA established the
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) \28\ and the General
Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC).\29\ The CAST is
comprised of representatives from the FAA, NASA, and industry
stakeholders, and works to reduce commercial aviation fatality
risks through data collection and analysis. As part of this
effort, the FAA and NASA have the goal of transitioning to a
``prognostic safety analysis.'' \30\ As the aviation system's
safety rates have greatly improved over the decades, CAST has
moved beyond the ``historic approach of examining past accident
data to a proactive approach that focuses on detecting risk and
implementing strategies before accidents or serious incidents
occur.'' \31\ The safety enhancements that were implemented as
a result of the CAST contributed to reducing the fatality risk
for commercial aviation in the United States by 83 percent
between 1998 and 2008.\32\
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\27\ U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO/RCED-00-1, Aviation
Safety: Safer Skies Initiative Has Taken Initial Steps To Reduce
Accident Rates by 2007 (2000), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/
rced-00-111.pdf.
\28\ History, Commercial Aviation Safety Team (2022), available at
https://www.cast-safety.org/apex/
f?p=102:1:8843473943394::NO::P1_X:history.
\29\ General Aviation Safety, FAA (July 30, 2018), available at
https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/general-aviation-safety.
\30\ Commercial Aviation Safety Team (2022), available at https://
www.cast-safety.org/apex/f?p=102:1 [hereinafter CAST].
\31\ Commercial Aviation Safety Team, FAA (Sept. 3, 2021),
available at https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/commercial-aviation-safety-
team.
\32\ CAST, supra note 30.
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The GAJSC ``works to improve general aviation safety
through data-driven risk reduction efforts focused on
education, training, and enabling new equipment in general
aviation aircraft.'' \33\ The GAJSC, which is also comprised of
representatives from government and industry, utilizes a
consensus-based approach and safety data analysis to develop
strategies for the reduction of fatal general aviation
accidents.\34\
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\33\ About Us, General Aviation J. Steering Comm. (2022), available
at http://www.gajsc.org/about-us/.
\34\ Id.
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ALASKA AVIATION SAFETY INITIATIVE
Aviation in Alaska is a vital necessity given that 82
percent of Alaskan communities are inaccessible by road.\35\
However, aviation operators in Alaska face unique challenges
compared to operators in the contiguous states--due in large
part to the state's challenging geography, unpredictable
weather, and relative lack of aviation and air traffic control
infrastructure. In 2021, the FAA initiated the Alaska Aviation
Safety Initiative (FAASI).\36\ In consultation with Alaska
aviation community stakeholders, the FAA developed 11 initial
recommendations to address safety hazards specific to Alaska.
These include enhancing weather reporting capabilities by
installing Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS) at
airports, promoting education and outreach regarding the
benefits of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out
(ADS-B Out) equipage in certain airspace, and maximizing safety
collaboration with operators in Alaska.\37\ Attention to
Alaska's unique circumstances is not new however; previous
similar efforts have fallen far short of initial expectations,
necessitating Congressional oversight.\38\
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\35\ Statewide Aviation, Alaska Dept. Of Transp. And Pub.
Facilities, available at https://dot.alaska.gov/stwdav/.
\36\ FAA, FY22 FAASI Progress Report (2022), available at https://
www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-09/FY22-FAASI-Progress-Report.pdf.
\37\ FAA, 2022 FAASI Roadmap (2022), available at https://
www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-02/FAASI%20Roadmap.pdf.
\38\ Colleen Mondor, The FAA's latest Alaska aviation safety report
harkens back to a whole lot of history, The Midnight Sun, (Nov. 18,
2021), available at https://midnightsunak.com/2021/11/18/mondor-the-
faas-latest-report-harkens-back-to-a-whole-lot-of-history.
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AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION, MAINTENANCE, AND OPERATIONS
The FAA issues type, production, and airworthiness
certificates to aviation manufacturers in the United States and
aviation products, in order to ensure the safety of the
aircraft that are operated within the United States by United
States entities.\39\ The FAA also issues operating
certificates, pilot certificates, and other credentials to much
of the industry's workforce in order to ensure an acceptable
level of safety.\40\ A vast compilation of laws and regulations
dictates the standards necessary for safe aircraft design,
operation, and maintenance.
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\39\ See Licenses & Certificates, FAA, available at https://
www.faa.gov/licenses_certificates (last updated Nov. 15, 2022).
\40\ See id.
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In 2020, Congress passed, and the President signed, the
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (P.L.
116-260), which made several reforms to the certification
process of large passenger aircraft in response to the 2018 and
2019 Boeing 737 MAX accidents.\41\ These reforms include
requiring aircraft manufacturers to implement and develop an
SMS, addressing how manufacturers present pilot training
standards to their customers, and requiring manufacturers to
better account for realistic pilot responses to non-normal
conditions when designing aircraft, among other things.\42\
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\41\ Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260,
134 Stat. 2309.
\42\ Id.
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The FAA also issued a final rule in 2016, which made
changes to how it certifies small airplanes typically used for
general aviation purposes.\43\ This rule was developed to
foster innovation and reduce costs for small plane
manufacturing, allowing for updates to aircraft design that
improved safety.\44\ With this rule, the FAA transitioned from
certain prescriptive-based standards to performance-based
standards that were more flexible and encouraged
innovation.\45\
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\43\ Revision of Airworthiness Standards for Normal, Utility,
Acrobatic, and Commuter Category Airplanes, 81 Fed. Reg. 96,572 (Dec.
30, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. 21, 23, 35, 43, 91, 121, 135),
available at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2016-30246.
\44\ Press Release, FAA, New Certification Rules for Small
Airplanes Becomes Effective (Sep. 5, 2017), available at https://
www.faa.gov/newsroom/new-certification-rule-small-airplanes-becomes-
effective.
\45\ Id.
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ISSUES WITH FOREIGN VALIDATION OF U.S. AEROSPACE PRODUCTS
In 2011, the United States and European Union entered into
a bilateral aviation safety agreement (BASA).\46\ This
bilateral agreement facilitated cooperation on airworthiness
certification of civil aviation products imported and exported
between the two regions. More specifically, it was intended to
(1) promote reciprocal acceptance of safety findings and
approvals and (2) leverage the resources and expertise of each
certification system.\47\
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\46\ Agreement Between the United States of America and the
European Community on Cooperation in the Regulation of Civil Aviation
Safety, U.S.-E.U., Dec. 6, 2013, available at https://www.faa.gov/
aircraft/air_cert/international/bilateral_agreements/baa_basa_listing/
media/EU-US-agreement-R0A5.pdf.
\47\ ``The Aviation Safety Agreement Between the US and the EC'',
FAA (Aug./Sept. 2011), available at https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/
repair/media/EASA_EU_roadshows.pdf [hereinafter Aviation Safety
Slides].
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In January 2021, the Director-General of the European Union
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Mr. Peter Ky, appeared before
the European Parliament's Committee on Transport and Tourism to
discuss recertification of the Boeing 737 MAX.\48\ In his
presentation, Mr. Ky stated, `` . . . we [EASA] will increase
our level of involvement [and] our level of independent review
of U.S. projects in order to build our own safety
assessments.'' \49\ The US-EU BASA was developed and agreed to
based upon the existence of certification systems that produce
equivalent results (even though their processes and procedures
may be different).\50\ Some Congressional leaders have
expressed concerns that if EASA or other countries follow
through on making certification and validation process changes
that conflict with BASA's tenant of reciprocity, it would
jeopardize the bilateral agreements and diminish the current
trust and ability for the organizations to improve global
aviation safety.\51\
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\48\ Cathy Buyck, EASA To Strengthen Safety Reviews of U.S.-
certified Aircraft, AINOnline (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://
www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2021-01-25/easa-
strengthen-safety-reviews-us-certified-aircraft.
\49\ Id.
\50\ Aviation Safety Slides, supra note 45.
\51\ Letter from Ranking Member Sam Graves, House Comm. on Transp.
& Infrastructure, Ranking Member Garret Graves, House Subcommittee on
Aviation to Secretary Peter Buttigieg, U.S. Dept. of Transp. (Feb. 11,
2021), available at https://transportation.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
2021-02-11_-_letter_to_buttigieg_re_easa.pdf.
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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an
independent Federal investigator of transportation accidents,
including all aircraft incidents and accidents, and commercial
space accidents.\52\ The NTSB makes safety recommendations to
the Secretary of Transportation and others based on the
findings of these investigations. While Federal agencies are
required by law to respond to all NTSB recommendations, the
NTSB does not have regulatory authority to require agencies to
adopt these recommendations.\53\ Additionally, the NTSB
oversees pilot certification appeals \54\ and fulfills the
important role of providing assistance to victims of
transportation accidents and their families.\55\
The FAA and other stakeholders will often consider studies
and recommendations of the NTSB to improve aviation safety. A
recent example occurred when the FAA issued the proposed rule
requiring commuter, charter, and air tour operators, as well as
certain manufacturers to develop and maintain an SMS.\56\ This
proposed rule was prompted in part by the NTSB issuing
recommendations for aviation stakeholders to institute an
SMS.\57\
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\52\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1131.
\53\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1135.
\54\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1133.
\55\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1136.
\56\ Safety Management Systems, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,932 (Jan. 11, 2023)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R., 14 C.F.R. 5, 21, 91,119, 121,135),
available at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2022-28583.
\57\ Id.
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The NTSB has several outstanding safety recommendations
which have not been resolved, such as a recommendation to the
FAA to require cockpit voice recorders (CVR) with a minimum 25-
hour recording capacity to be installed on all newly
manufactured aircraft.\58\ The NTSB noted in a 2018 report that
34 of their investigations since 2002 would have benefitted
from a 25-hour capacity CVR had it been installed.\59\ This
number has increased to 40 as of January 18, 2023.\60\
Additionally, the NTSB has made a number of other
recommendations to improve aviation safety, including the
installation of cockpit image recorders in commercial aircraft
\61\ and establishment of a structured flight data monitoring
program for Part 135 charter operators.\62\
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\58\ NTSB, Safety Recommendation A-18-030 (2018), available at
https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A-18-030-031.pdf.
\59\ NTSB, ASR-1804, Aviation Safety Recommendation Report--
Extended Duration of Cockpit Voice Recorders (2018), available at
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/
ASR1804.pdf.
\60\ E-mail from NTSB Gov't and Industry Affairs staff to Subcomm.
on Aviation staff, (January 18, 2023, 10:52 a.m. EST) (on file with the
Committee).
\61\ NTSB, Safety Recommendation A-15-007 and A-15-008 (2014),
available at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A-15-
001-008.pdf.
\62\ NTSB, Safety Recommendation A-16-035 (2016), available at
https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A-16-034-042.pdf.
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III. WITNESSES
LMr. Dave Boulter, Associate Administrator for
Aviation Safety (Acting), FAA
LThe Honorable Jennifer Homendy, Chair, NTSB
LCapt. Jason Ambrosi, President, ALPA
LMr. Pete Bunce, President and Chief Executive
Officer, GAMA
LMr. Ed Bolen, President and Chief Executive
Officer, NBAA
LMs. Kerry Buckley, PhD, Vice President, Center
for Advanced Aviation System Development, MITRE Corporation
FAA REAUTHORIZATION: ENHANCING AMERICA'S GOLD STANDARD IN AVIATION
SAFETY
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2023
House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room
2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sam Graves (Chairman
of the committee) presiding.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. I call the hearing to order.
I would ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized
to declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
And, without objection, it is so ordered.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes to give an opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAM GRAVES OF MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN,
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Today, the committee obviously
formally kicks off our work on the Federal Aviation
Administration's reauthorization. A strong bipartisan
reauthorization is my top legislative priority, and I look
forward to working with Ranking Member Larsen to complete a
bill on time.
As a professional pilot and an active user of the system, I
am extremely proud of our aviation system, including its safety
record. In this committee, there continues to be a bipartisan
commitment to safety and maintaining U.S. leadership and
credibility as the gold standard for aviation safety.
In 11 of the past 13 years, there have been no passenger
fatalities on scheduled domestic passenger flights, despite the
fact that passenger ridership has increased by 50 percent
between 2002 and 2019, before the pandemic. General aviation is
safer, with the number of fatal and nonfatal accidents trending
downwards since 2000. Congress and the FAA, in partnership with
industry and with labor and the traveling public, have fought
to make air travel as safe as possible. And our safety record
and safety culture are testaments to that.
However, recently there have been some incidents that
reemphasize why getting an FAA reauthorization done on time is
so critical. On January 13, we had a runway incursion that
occurred at JFK International Airport with two passenger planes
nearly running into each other as one crossed an active runway.
And just this past weekend, at Austin International Airport, a
cargo plane was cleared to land on the same runway where a
passenger aircraft was beginning its takeoff roll.
It shows that even following the safest decade in our
history, our aviation system is clearly in need of some urgent
attention. As Mr. Boulter says in his testimony, ``complacency
and stagnation are equal threats to a safety culture.'' The
previous conventional wisdom for regulating safety always
focused on addressing concerns after an aviation accident. Now,
the FAA seeks to mitigate risks before accidents happen.
In addition, the NTSB, National Transportation Safety
Board, has several open safety recommendations that I think
warrant review. The committee is going to be reviewing all such
recommendations while reauthorizing the NTSB as part of this
FAA reauthorization.
In conclusion, I want to assure you all, particularly those
of us who are here today who have lost loved ones to aviation
accidents, we all share the common goal of enhancing the United
States gold standard in aviation safety, and that safety
remains our top priority.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how
we can further improve safety as we craft the bill this year.
And I now recognize Ranking Member Larsen for his opening
statement.
[Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves of Missouri, Chairman, Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure
Today, the Committee formally kicks off its work on the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) reauthorization. A strong bipartisan
reauthorization is my top legislative priority, and I look forward to
working with Ranking Member Larsen to complete a bill on time.
As a professional pilot and active user of the system I am
extremely proud of our aviation system, including its safety record. In
this Committee, there continues to be a bipartisan commitment to safety
and maintaining U.S. leadership and credibility as the gold standard
for aviation safety.
In 11 of the past 13 years, there have been no passenger fatalities
on scheduled domestic passenger flights--despite passenger enplanements
increasing by 50 percent between 2002 and 2019. General aviation is
safer, with the number of fatal and nonfatal accidents trending
downward since the year 2000. Congress and the FAA, in partnership with
industry, labor, and the travelling public, have fought to make air
travel as safe as possible. Our safety record and safety culture are
testaments to that.
However, recently there have been incidents that reemphasize why
getting an FAA reauthorization done on time is critical. On January
13th, a runway incursion occurred at JFK International Airport when two
passenger planes nearly collided as one crossed an active runway. And
just this past weekend, at Austin International Airport, a cargo plane
was attempting to land on the same runway where a passenger plane was
beginning to take off.
It shows that even following the safest decade in our history, our
aviation system is clearly in need of urgent attention. As Mr. Boulter
says in his testimony, complacency and stagnation are equal threats to
a safety culture. The previous conventional wisdom for regulating
safety focused on addressing concerns after aviation accidents. Now,
the FAA seeks to mitigate risks before accidents happen.
In addition, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has
several open safety recommendations that warrant review. The Committee
will be reviewing all such recommendations while reauthorizing the NTSB
as part of the FAA bill.
In conclusion, I want to assure you all, particularly those with us
here today who have lost loved ones to aviation accidents, that we all
share the common goal of enhancing the United States' gold standard in
aviation safety, and that safety remains our top priority. I look
forward to hearing from today's witnesses on how we can further improve
safety as we craft this year's bill.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING
MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, and good morning. And
thank you, Chairman Graves, for calling today's hearing on
aviation safety to kick off our efforts to develop and pass the
next Federal Aviation Administration reauthorization bill.
In this hearing, we will evaluate different policies,
programs, and technologies that have led to the U.S. becoming a
global leader in aviation safety and what improvements still
need to be made.
According to the FAA, commercial aviation fatalities in the
U.S. have decreased by 95 percent over the last 25 years. While
this downward trend clearly demonstrates the great strides made
in U.S. aviation safety and should be applauded, clearly more
work needs to be done.
For instance, just last month, the FAA's safety notice
system, also known as Notice to Air Missions, or NOTAM system,
failed when a contractor inadvertently deleted a file on a
NOTAM database, leaving the FAA to ground flights nationwide.
Though the outage was initially caused by human error, the
system's lack of redundancies and outdated technology were what
allowed it to happen in the first place.
While the FAA is in the midst a multiyear NOTAM
modernization effort, we do need to strengthen the IT
infrastructure that supports the National Airspace System. That
is why I, along with Chairman Graves, supported the recent
passage of Representative Stauber and DeSaulnier's NOTAM
Improvement Act, to create a task force to evaluate and
recommend improvements in the NOTAM system.
Aircraft certification has also been a priority of this
committee for the last several years. In the wake of the tragic
Boeing 737 MAX accidents and crashes, this committee conducted
a nearly 2-year investigation into the design, development, and
certification of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. The results led
to Congress passing the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act in 2020, to restore the integrity of the
FAA's aircraft certification process and make air travel safer.
I look forward to hearing from FAA Acting Associate
Administrator for Aviation Safety, Dave Boulter, on the status
of these key reforms, the agency's progress, and any reasons
for delay. Also of particular interest is how the new airspace
entrants, such as advanced air mobility aircraft and drones,
will integrate safely into the NAS. Manufacturers and operators
need timely guidance and regulatory certainty from the FAA to
plan for and meet the agency's new certification and operating
requirements.
And finally, aviation safety issues are not limited to just
the FAA. It requires multiple industries and agencies to
coordinate. For instance, just a year ago, the nationwide
deployment of 5G wireless rightfully raised aviation safety
concerns over potential interference with aircraft radio
altimeters.
Due to the actions of this committee, the FAA, and aviation
stakeholders, the telecoms finally came to the table and
coordinated with the FAA, the NTIA, and the FCC to develop a
plan allowing for the deployment of 5G while maintaining
aviation safety. A little later I will distribute the actual
meanings of those acronyms, but to save time, I won't read them
out loud here. In fact, the FAA is briefing this committee on
its 5G efforts later today.
The best way to address these and other critical aviation
safety issues is through a bipartisan, long-term FAA
reauthorization bill. The 2018 law was the first significant
multiyear authorization since 2012, and the first 5-year
authorization since 1982. According to the FAA, the signing of
that long-term bill freed the agency from the uncertainty of
more short-term extensions and authorized the reliable,
predictable funding that the FAA needed to invest in critical
priorities.
I look forward to working with Chairman Graves and the
members of this committee to ensure the FAA has the necessary
funding and long-term certainty it needs. And I am glad to see
the witnesses that we have today. I look forward to the
testimony from all the witnesses.
As this committee considers the upcoming FAA
reauthorization, we remain committed to ensuring the highest
level of aviation safety here in the U.S. to continue to be the
global gold standard. So, thank you. I look forward to tackling
these issues to ensure the safety of the flying public.
[Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Graves, for calling today's
hearing on Aviation Safety--to kick off our efforts to develop and pass
the next Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization bill.
In this hearing, we will evaluate the different policies, programs
and technologies that have led to the U.S. becoming a global leader in
aviation safety and what improvements still need to be made.
According to the FAA, commercial aviation fatalities in the U.S.
have decreased by 95 percent over the last 25 years.
While this downward trend clearly demonstrates the great strides
made in U.S. aviation safety and should be applauded, more work still
needs to be done.
For instance, just last month, the FAA's safety notice system, also
known as the Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) system, failed when a
contractor inadvertently deleted a file on a NOTAM database, leading
the FAA to ground flights nationwide.
Though the outage was initially caused by human error, the system's
lack of redundancies and outdated technology were what allowed it to
happen in the first place.
While the FAA is in the midst of a multi-year NOTAM modernization
effort, we must do more to strengthen the IT infrastructure that
supports the national airspace system (NAS).
That is why I, along with Chairman Graves, supported the recent
House passage of Representative Stauber and DeSaulnier's NOTAM
Improvement Act, to create a task force to evaluate and recommend
improvements to the NOTAM system.
Aircraft certification has also been a priority of this committee
for the last several years.
In the wake of the tragic Boeing 737 MAX accidents, this committee
conducted a nearly two-year investigation into the design, development
and certification of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft.
The results led Congress to pass the Aircraft Certification, Safety
and Accountability Act in 2020, to restore the integrity of the FAA's
aircraft certification process and make air travel safer.
I look forward to hearing from FAA Acting Associate Administrator
for Aviation Safety, Dave Boulter, on the status of these key reforms,
the agency's progress, and any reasons for delay.
Also of particular interest, is how new airspace entrants, such as
advanced air mobility (AAM) aircraft and drones, will integrate safely
into the NAS.
Manufacturers and operators need timely guidance and regulatory
certainty from the FAA to plan for and meet the agency's new
certification and operating requirements.
Finally, aviation safety issues are not limited to just the FAA; it
often requires multiple federal agencies and industries to coordinate.
For instance, just one year ago, the nationwide deployment of 5G
wireless rightfully raised aviation safety concerns over potential
interference with aircraft radio altimeters.
Due to the actions of this committee, FAA and aviation
stakeholders, AT&T and Verizon finally came to the table and
coordinated with the FAA, the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) and the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to develop a plan allowing for the safe deployment of
5G while also maintaining aviation safety.
In fact, the FAA is briefing this committee on its 5G efforts later
today.
The best way to address these and other critical aviation safety
issues is through a bipartisan, long-term FAA reauthorization bill.
The 2018 FAA reauthorization law was the first significant multi-
year reauthorization since 2012, and the first five-year
reauthorization since 1982.
According to the FAA, ``the signing of that long term bill, freed
the agency from the uncertainty of more short-term extensions and
authorized the reliable, predictable funding the FAA needed to invest
in critical priorities.''
I look forward to working with Chairman Graves and the members of
this committee to ensure the FAA has the necessary funding and long-
term certainty it needs.
Finally, I'm glad to see the range of witnesses we have today.
We have the FAA and NTSB, who are responsible for ensuring safe
aviation and commercial space operations, and representation from
aviation labor, manufacturers, operators, and technical experts.
I look forward to hearing your testimony.
As this committee considers the upcoming FAA reauthorization, we
remain committed to ensuring the highest level of aviation safety.
Thank you and I look forward to tackling these issues to ensure the
safety of the flying public.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thanks, Rick.
Due to the significance of today's kickoff hearing, I do
want to recognize the ranking member and chairman of the
subcommittee for opening statements, too.
So, Representative Graves.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GARRET GRAVES OF LOUISIANA, CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for having this timely hearing on aviation safety.
First of all, if you look back over the past decade, we
just had the safest decade in aviation history where, let's be
clear, the goal is zero deaths, but in the last 10 years, we
have had three fatalities on scheduled passenger airlines as
compared to the previous decade--about 140.
Now you look at what is happening in the news today,
whether it is incursions and close calls, you have seen the
failure of the air traffic control system, you have seen
problems with airports and airlines, information systems
including staffing and reservation systems. We need to all be
very concerned about what is going on because, let's keep in
mind, what we have on the horizon is a fundamental change or
transformation in our aviation system with the entrance of
various new technologies into the National Airspace System. We
have to make sure that we are thinking ahead, making sure that
the regulatory structure, the organizational structure of the
FAA is one that is able to facilitate safely, facilitate safely
these new entrants into the market.
On the general aviation side, we have continued to see
progress as well with roughly over 100,000 flight-hours, I
believe, over the last decade. Preliminary data shows that we
have had 1.07 fatalities. If you look in previous decades, it
is 1.35 and 1.49. So, we are certainly moving in the right
direction in regard to commercial and general aviation safety.
Let me say it again. Coming back to what we have seen in
just recent months, we all need to be alarmed by what is
happening. We need to ensure that we not just can continue this
trend in aviation safety on the commercial and the GA side, but
that we can also continue to be the country that facilitates
new technology and entrants into the market in a way that does
not hinder the entrepreneurs that are investing in new
technologies.
Right now, the alarm bells should be going off across the
aviation industry. Our system is stretched and stressed to
capacity. Demand is projected to go nowhere but up.
Exacerbating that, we are well aware of the increased demand
that we are going to see with pilots, with A&P, and other types
of aviation jobs or workforce. And we need to make sure, again,
that we are able to be proactive and meet the growing demands.
Part of that demand is going to be driven by new entrants.
In the next 10 years, aerospace will involve an ever increasing
number of drones; the introduction of electric aircraft,
including electric vertical takeoff and landing, eVTOL; the
reintroduction of civil supersonic aircraft; and expanded use
of commercial space transportation vehicles. I wish my buddy,
Mr. Babin, were here to hear that.
Our regulatory organizational structure must adapt if we
are going to safely integrate new entrants into the market.
Safety doesn't mean eliminating risk entirely. The old joke
about the safest airplane is the one that doesn't fly still
applies. Our role and the FAA's role is to manage risk and
ensure safety, but also ensure that we can continue to reap the
incredible benefits of aviation and flight.
Our global leadership in aviation begins with global
leadership in aviation safety. And the only way to maintain our
gold standard is to continue to enhance it. I am going to say
it again. The goal is zero.
We have an opportunity to rise to the moment and address
the root causes of these recent incidents and safely integrate
new operators, all while ensuring that our safety culture is as
robust as possible. The aviation system is telling us something
is wrong, and we need to listen. The only way we can ensure
safety is by being proactive in our upcoming FAA
reauthorization bill and fixing issues before they become
problems.
I look forward to working with the committee members and
our witnesses on provisions in the 2018 FAA reauthorization
bill that, let's make note, is still not fully implemented, to
ensure America continues to lead the world in innovation and
aviation safety.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the hearing,
and I yield back.
[Mr. Graves of Louisiana's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Garret Graves of Louisiana, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Aviation
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for having this timely
hearing on aviation safety.
We just had the safest decade in aviation history. In the last 10
years, we've had three fatalities on scheduled passenger airlines as
compared to the previous decade--about 140. On the general aviation
side, we've continued to see progress as well, with a preliminary
average fatality rate of 1.07 death per 100,000 flight hours, down from
1.35 and 1.49 in the last two decades, respectively. Now let's be
clear--the goal is zero fatalities.
Despite these improvements, alarm bells should be going off across
the aviation industry. Just look at what's happening in the news today:
runway incursions and close calls, failures in the air traffic control
system, problems with airports and airlines' information systems
(including staffing and reservation systems). Our system is stretched
and stressed to capacity, and demand is projected to go nowhere but up.
We're all well aware of the increased demand that we're going to see
with pilots, mechanics, as well as other positions within the aviation
workforce, and we need to make sure that we're able to be proactive
about meeting growing demands because there are fundamental
transformations on the horizon for the National airspace system.
In the next 10 years, the aerospace industry will involve an ever-
increasing number of drones, the introduction of electric aircraft,
including electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL), the
reintroduction of civil supersonic aircraft, and the expanded use of
commercial space transportation vehicles. We must build on our record
of improving aviation safety while being the country that facilitates
new technologies and entrants into the market in a way that does not
hinder the entrepreneurs that are investing in these new technologies.
Our regulatory organizational structure must adapt if we're going
to safely integrate new entrants into the market. Safety doesn't mean
eliminating risk entirely. The old joke about ``the safest airplane is
the one that doesn't fly'' still applies. Our role, and the FAA's role,
is to manage risk and ensure safety while reaping the incredible
benefits of flight. Our global leadership in aviation begins with
global leadership in aviation safety. And the only way to maintain our
gold standard is to continue to enhance it. I'm going to say it again--
the goal is zero fatalities.
We have an opportunity to rise to the moment and address the root
causes of these recent incidents and safely integrate new operators,
all while ensuring that our safety culture is as robust as possible.
The aviation system is telling us something's wrong, and we need to
listen. The only way we can ensure safety is by being proactive in our
upcoming FAA reauthorization bill and fixing issues before they become
problems.
I look forward to working with the Committee members and our
witnesses on provisions in the 2018 FAA reauthorization bill, which is
still not fully implemented, to ensure America continues to lead the
world in innovation and aviation safety. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to
thank you for the hearing, and I yield back.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Mr. Cohen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE COHEN OF TENNESSEE, RANKING
MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I thank you and the
ranking member for holding this important hearing today. I am
deeply honored to serve as the ranking member of this Aviation
Subcommittee and working with Chairman Garret Graves to
formulate our next FAA reauthorization bill.
In 2018, the FAA reauthorization law was passed with
Chairman Shuster. Congress included more than 90 safety-focused
provisions, ranging from flight attendant fatigue to secondary
flight deck barriers on passenger aircraft, to the integration
of uncrewed aircraft systems into our National Airspace System.
It also included another important provision, that I authored,
to require the FAA to establish minimum dimensions for
passenger seats on airplanes to protect the safety of the
flying public.
Shockingly, even though the FAA was congressionally
mandated to act on this provision within 1 year, the FAA did
not even begin cabin evacuation testing until late November and
December of 2019, well after the 1-year deadline. And during
its testing, they limited their study to able-bodied
individuals between the ages of 18 and 60. This means lap
children, seniors, people with disabilities, non-English
speakers, larger individuals, and more were not included, far
from a representative sample of people who are on an airplane
and would need to evacuate.
The FAA itself acknowledged that the test relied on able-
bodied adult subjects under the age of 60, and the result
provided, quote, ``useful but not necessarily definitive
information regarding the effects of seat dimensions on safe
evacuations for all populations.'' It was flawed, and it was
congressionally mandated to conduct a study, and it should have
done an appropriate one.
In August, the FAA finally initiated a public comment
period to assist in its determination on whether minimum seat
dimensions are necessary. The FAA received over 26,000 comments
from the flying public, the majority of which articulated the
miserably dreadful experiences these small seats provide.
Probably the most miserable experience most Americans have in
terms of comfort is when they are on an airplane.
Mr. Garret Graves is right, it was the safest year yet. It
was also the most uncomfortable decade.
As we begin our work in our next reauthorization bill, it
is imperative that this issue be reexamined. That is why
Senator Duckworth and I will introduce our bill, the Emergency
Vacating of Aircraft Cabin Act, a.k.a. the EVAC Act, the E-V-A-
C. This bill would ensure that the aircraft evacuation
standards do a better job of taking real life conditions into
account to ensure all passengers can safely evacuate in an
emergency.
Our bill is supported by a wide variety of stakeholders
such as AARP, Captain Sully Sullenberger, the Association of
Flight Attendants, the Allied Pilots Association, and more.
This committee should also look at establishing a
moratorium on further seat shrinkage on airplanes and requiring
the FAA to reconduct its testing before it promulgates a rule
that could lead to even smaller seats.
I look forward to continuing to work on this issue with
Senator Blumenthal.
In addition to this important passenger safety issue, I
look forward to working on some other safety issues: Improving
conditions for passengers with disabilities, including for
individuals who use powered wheelchairs; updating the Air
Carriers Access Act to close the service gap in air travel for
passengers with disabilities; establishing airplane temperature
standards on flights for passengers and crewmembers alike. How
many times have we been freezing on airplanes?
Implementing a longstanding NTSB recommendation, Jim Hall
decades ago made this proposal and still says how important it
is--and it is--addressing deficiencies in commercial aviation
black box requirements. They can be made to float and be
recovered without having to go to the bottom of the oceans, as
we have had to do in other situations.
Ensuring outdoor concerts are protected by the same
temporary flight restrictions as sporting events and preventing
air rage incidents is giving the FAA the necessary tools to
enforce relevant civil and criminal penalties.
While aviation safety has continued to improve over the
last decade, we shall remain vigilant and ensure we consider
all our airspace users as we craft the next reauthorization
bills. Yes, we only had three deaths in the United States, but
we had lots of deaths in Southeast Asia that were caused by an
American company that built airplanes that were probably
responsible for those crashes and the loss of those lives.
I look forward to hearing from our esteemed witnesses
today, and I thank you all for being here. And look forward to
the next bill. I yield back.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
I would ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full
statements be included in the record.
And, without objection, that is so ordered.
And since your written testimony is going to be made a part
of the record, the committee asks that you try to limit
yourself to 5 minutes.
And, with that, our first witness is Mr. David Boulter, who
is the Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety at
the FAA.
Mr. Boulter.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID H. BOULTER, ACTING ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR
FOR AVIATION SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; HON.
JENNIFER L. HOMENDY, CHAIR, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
BOARD; CAPT. JASON AMBROSI, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL; PETER J. BUNCE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, GENERAL AVIATION MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION;
ED BOLEN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NATIONAL
BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION; AND KERRY BUCKLEY, Ph.D., VICE
PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR ADVANCED AVIATION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT,
MITRE CORPORATION
TESTIMONY OF DAVID H. BOULTER, ACTING ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR
FOR AVIATION SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Boulter. Thank you, and good morning.
Chair Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I am
David Boulter. I am the Acting Associate Administrator for
Aviation Safety at the Federal Aviation Administration, a role
I have held for almost a year.
During my career, I have been fortunate to serve in
numerous aviation roles, both in industry and with commercial
air carriers, and in Government. Over the past 25 years, my
Government service includes positions in the FAA as an aviation
safety inspector, a senior representative in Afghanistan,
director of operations for multiple flight operations within
the agency, and an executive for the FAA's flight program. My
permanent position is the executive director of flight
standards. I believe my breadth of real-world experience has
given me a commonsense approach that focuses on safety and
constantly moving forward. In my mind, complacency and
stagnation are equal threats to safety.
In December 2020, Congress passed the Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act, with more than
100 provisions for the FAA to implement. I thank the committee
for its leadership in passing this important legislation, and
we have completed more than half of its directives.
The important work we have accomplished includes
strengthening oversight of manufacturers that have delegated
authority through the Organization Designation Authorization,
ODA, program; instituting the Voluntary Safety Reporting
program for FAA safety employees; and recently issuing a notice
of proposed rulemaking that would require aircraft
manufacturers, on-demand and for-hire--part 135--and air tour
operators to implement a safety management system. We remain
focused on implementation of this legislation and continue to
make significant strides in fulfilling its requirements.
I also want to thank the families of the victims of Lion
Air flight 610, Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, and Continental
flight 3407 for their tireless advocacy. The work on behalf of
your loved ones has improved aviation safety for everyone.
In recent months, the agency has made important headway in
meeting additional mandated obligations aimed at improving
safety and moved a number of rules forward. I am proud to say
that in my 1-year tenure, we have published seven aviation
safety rulemaking actions stemming from congressional
direction.
The commercial aviation system, as you have heard earlier,
in the United States currently operates at an unprecedented
level of safety, but we do not take that for granted. We
achieved this safety record because we have made concerted
effort to continually evolve how we approach safety oversight,
both in detecting risks and responding to risks identified. The
key to this approach is a commitment to sharing data through
open and transparent safety culture to detect risk and address
problems before accidents occur. We approach each day knowing
we have big shoes to fill from the day before.
Our mission is continuous improvement in safety, even as we
see significant changes on the horizon to how people and
packages might travel by air in our busiest cities and across
the country. The FAA is rising to that occasion. We are taking
steps to establish a regulatory framework that enables
innovation and manages the identified risks commensurate with
the desired operations. This ensures that all new entrants will
benefit from 120 years of lessons learned since the Wright
brothers made their first controlled flight.
I would like to acknowledge my fellow panel members. I am
encouraged that you have asked representatives from a wide
range of aviation interests to speak today. As we all know,
aviation safety is a team sport, and we all share the mutual
goal of making the world's safest mode of transportation even
safer. While we all have specific roles to play, we understand
the solemn trust that the public has placed in all of us.
Today, I want to briefly share some of the actions we are
taking to fulfill our safety mission, which extends from
general aviation to commercial and air carrier operations.
Evolving our regulatory structure is necessary to enable new
users of the airspace and to support innovation and new
commercial operations with aircraft and technologies that are
evolving at a pace not previously seen in our industry.
Sustaining the agency's safety record will be dependent
upon the ability to be agile in our regulations yet firm in our
enforcement. And although we recognize the need to adapt new
technologies, we must also manage risk and be deliberative when
necessary. The FAA is using modern tools and philosophies to
develop a regulatory environment that ensures aviation safety
remains paramount. It is an exciting time in aviation, and we
have a lot to look forward to. This also means there is no
shortage of work ahead.
Finally, we will continue to engage with the aviation
community, our labor partners, and industry stakeholders on
addressing the safety and sustainability challenges that face
our industry. Our collaborative efforts with longstanding
groups like the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, the General
Aviation Joint Safety Committee, and the U.S. Helicopter Safety
Team help us achieve our collective safety mission and continue
to push the envelope in finding ways to enhance safety for all
stakeholders.
We look forward to continued support from the committee and
subcommittee on maintaining the safest aviation system in the
world during this time of rapid innovation.
Thank you, sir.
[Mr. Boulter's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of David H. Boulter, Acting Associate Administrator
for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration
Chair Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I am David Boulter, and
I serve as the acting associate administrator for aviation safety at
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a role I have held for
almost a year. During my career, I have been fortunate to serve in
numerous aviation roles both in industry with commercial air carriers
and in government. Over the past 25 years, my government service
includes positions in the FAA as an aviation safety inspector, director
of operations for multiple legacy FAA flight programs, senior FAA
representative in Afghanistan, and executive for the FAA's Flight
Program. My permanent position is the executive director of flight
standards. I believe the breadth of my real-world experience has given
me a common-sense approach that focuses on safety--and on constantly
moving forward. In my mind, complacency and stagnation are equal
threats to a safety culture.
In December 2020, Congress included the Aircraft Certification,
Safety, and Accountability Act, with more than 100 provisions for the
FAA to implement, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021. I thank
the Committee for its leadership in passing this important legislation,
and we have completed more than half of its directives. I also want to
emphasize the efforts of the families of the victims of the Lion Air
Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. This legislation would
not have been possible without your tireless advocacy on behalf of your
loved ones. The important work we have accomplished includes
strengthening oversight of manufacturers that have delegated authority
through the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program,
instituting the Voluntary Safety Reporting Program for FAA safety
employees, and recently issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking that
would require aircraft manufacturers, on-demand and for-hire operations
(14 CFR Part 135), and air tour operators to implement a safety
management system. We remain focused on implementation of this
legislation and continue to make significant strides in fulfilling its
requirements.
In recent months, the agency has made important headway in meeting
additional statutory obligations aimed at improving safety and has
moved a number of those rulemaking projects forward. I am proud to say
that in my one-year tenure, we have published seven aviation safety
rulemaking actions stemming from congressional direction.
At all times, the safety of the traveling public has been our top
priority. The commercial aviation system in the United States currently
operates at an unprecedented level of safety, but we do not take that
for granted. We achieved this safety record because we have made a
concerted effort to evolve in how we approach safety oversight--both in
detecting risks and in responding to the risks identified. Key to this
approach is a commitment to sharing data through an open and
transparent safety culture to detect risks and address problems before
accidents occur.
Our mission is continuous improvement in safety--even as we see
significant changes on the horizon to how people and packages might
travel by air in our busiest cities and across the country. The FAA is
rising to that occasion. We are taking steps to establish a regulatory
framework that enables innovation and manages the identified risks
commensurate with desired operations. This ensures that new entrant
aircraft and operators--including those seeking to conduct advanced air
mobility (AAM) operations--will benefit from 120 years of lessons
learned since the Wright brothers made their first controlled flight.
I would like to acknowledge my fellow panel members. I am
encouraged that you asked representatives from a wide range of aviation
interests to speak today. As we all know, aviation safety is a team
effort, and we all share the mutual goal of making the world's safest
mode of transportation even safer. While we all have specific roles to
play, we understand the solemn trust that the public has placed in us.
I think it is important to take a moment to recognize National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Chair, Jennifer Homendy, and the
important collaborative relationship between our two agencies. We work
jointly on accident investigations, with the FAA providing support with
real-time information, technical data, transportation to accident
scenes, and aviation safety inspector/accident investigator support and
cooperation. We also collaborate on safety priorities, to include FAA
responses to NTSB safety recommendations. Since 2011, the FAA has
annually closed more recommendations than it has received, and the
number of open recommendations for FAA (222) is at its lowest point in
more than two decades. The FAA takes the NTSB's role seriously and
devotes a tremendous amount of time and attention to addressing their
recommendations.
Safety Highlights
Today, I want to briefly share some of the actions we are taking to
fulfill our safety mission, which extends from general aviation to
commercial and air carrier operations.
Evolving our regulatory structure is necessary to enable new users
of the airspace, and support innovation and new commercial operations
with aircraft and technologies that are evolving at a pace not
previously seen in our industry. Sustaining the agency's safety record
will be dependent upon the ability to be agile in our regulations, yet
firm in our enforcement. Although we recognize the need to adapt to new
technologies and enable their use, we must also manage risk and be
deliberative in our decisions. The FAA is using modern tools and
philosophies and incorporating performance-based regulation where
possible to develop a regulatory environment that ensures aviation
safety remains paramount. We have several recent examples of rulemaking
that demonstrate our continued commitment to improving safety and
providing flexibility to users of the National Airspace System (NAS).
In November, we issued two final rules. The first
requires a commercial balloon pilot to hold a valid second-class
medical certificate when flying for compensation or hire (other than
flight instruction)--a standard that aligns with what every other
commercial pilot must hold. The second final rule requires applicants
to demonstrate the integrity of the airplane structure in the presence
of pilot-commanded rudder pedal reversals. Adopting the new load
condition will protect the airplane from excessive loads on the
vertical stabilizer.
In December, we published a proposed rule that would
revise standards for the design of proposed transport category
airplanes. These standards would reduce the likelihood of potentially
catastrophic risks due to undetected failures. For example, the changes
would improve the likelihood that an operator discovers a failure
before it develops into an unsafe condition. This would allow the FAA
to address, and require an applicant to address, the more integrated
nature of modern transport airplane systems.
Beginning last month, flight attendants are now
guaranteed additional and uninterruptible rest that aligns with what
pilots receive, ensuring a crew is not fatigued when they report for
duty. In January we also extended the duration of aircraft registration
certificates from three to seven years--a benefit to all aircraft
owners and the FAA. Both of these final rules were prompted by the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018.
While these past few months have been busy, we have fully staffed
additional rulemaking projects and expect great progress in 2023. The
resulting rules will have important implications for certain aircraft,
operations, and pilots as we look to enhance the safety of existing
operations, continue to normalize certain aspects of operations with
unmanned aircraft, and integrate new entrant aircraft into our national
airspace.
We issued a proposed rule for secondary flight deck
barriers on certain airplanes used in commercial service last fall,
took public comment, and are working to address comments and finalize
the rule. This rule would protect the flightdeck from unauthorized
intrusion when the flightdeck door is open.
We have a project that will propose to modernize special
airworthiness certification of piloted aircraft as well as a project
that would define a regulatory process for determining airworthiness
for certain unmanned aircraft. We are also developing rules to enable
unmanned aircraft to be flown beyond visual line of sight.
Finally, we have a special federal aviation regulation on
powered-lift--or SFAR--for the integration of certain AAM aircraft into
the NAS. This rule would enable a path forward for qualifying pilots as
well as determining which operating rules apply to powered-lift. This
proposal is a critical step for the United States to usher in the next
era of aviation.
Other Safety Initiatives
Our work to improve aviation safety does not stop at our borders.
As Congress has directed in section 243 of the FAA Reauthorization Act
of 2018, we continue our efforts as a global leader in aviation, and
much of the globe is watching in anticipation of our plans for
integrating new entrant aircraft into the NAS and the desired
operations envisioned by manufacturers and future operators. The
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Personnel Training and
Licensing Panel is tackling pilot qualification for AAM aircraft and
the U.S. has been leading this activity. At the ICAO Assembly this past
September, the FAA proposed that ICAO establish an advisory group that
would connect all aspects of the AAM ecosystem as the world works to
enable this industry. The proposal was well-received and work has begun
to stand up a study group. We look forward to supporting that effort.
In addition to our important work on rules and the development of
international consensus standards, we would be remiss to not mention
how we support the aviation industry through the issuance of guidance
and information to support rule implementation and operations by all
airspace users. The FAA published one of the highly anticipated
advisory circulars on flightpath management in November. This document
provides both guidance and recommended practices for operators to
implement operational procedures and training for managing the
airplane's flight path, which includes manual flight operations and
managing automated systems. Addressing pilot overreliance on automation
through this guidance remains safety-critical. The foundation of its
content originated from recommendations from our Air Carrier Training
Aviation Rulemaking Committee and is a wonderful example of how
industry and government can come together to address a challenge and
achieve a common goal--enhancing safety.
In October, we published a revision to our guidance that supports
recreational operations of unmanned aircraft and aligns with the
statutory permissions afforded to those flyers by the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018.
Another huge accomplishment was the consolidation and updating of
six-related advisory circulars into a single Aviation Weather Handbook
that was published in November. This technical reference streamlines
pilot access to all of the FAA's weather documentation and is designed
to support everyone who operates in the NAS--from recreational pilots
to commercial pilots and dispatchers. Having current technical
information about weather is a critical component to safe flying and
pilot decision making and it is important that the FAA continue to
support airspace users with handbooks like this.
Moving Forward
It is an exciting time in aviation, and we have a lot to look
forward to--this also means there is no shortage of work ahead of us. I
am extremely proud of the work our staff is doing to address the
breadth of aviation safety work we have in front of us. With
innovation, it is important we continue to develop and train our
workforce so we can continue to meet the regulatory needs of this
industry and our safety mission. We are executing workforce strategies
to do this while also onboarding diverse talent with the right
expertise to strengthen our workforce. The development and expansion of
the professional aviation workforce in general is also critical to our
industry, and we are proud to promote exciting careers like being an
aviation mechanic or a pilot through Aviation Workforce Development
grants.
Finally, we will continue to engage with the aviation community,
our labor partners, and industry stakeholders, on addressing the safety
and sustainability challenges that face our industry through our
established committees and outreach events. Our collaborative efforts
with long-standing groups like the Commercial Aviation Safety Team
(CAST), the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee (GAJSC), and the
U.S. Helicopter Safety Team (USHST), help us achieve our collective
safety mission and continue to push the envelope in finding ways to
enhance safety for all stakeholders. Through the more recent
establishment of the Eliminate Aviation Gasoline Lead Emissions (EAGLE)
team a year ago, we partnered with aviation stakeholders to find a safe
and practical path to eliminate the use of leaded aviation fuel by no
later than 2030 without adversely affecting the existing piston-engine
fleet.
Thank you for this opportunity to share information on some of our
most important work. We look forward to continued support from the
committee and subcommittee on maintaining the safest aviation system in
the world during this time of rapid innovation.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Next, we have the Honorable
Jennifer Homendy, who is Chair of the National Transportation
Safety Board.
Thanks for being here.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JENNIFER L. HOMENDY, CHAIR, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Ms. Homendy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Ranking Member Larsen and members of the committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
NTSB's priorities with respect to aviation safety.
This weekend will mark the 14th anniversary of the crash of
Colgan Air 3407. And I want to recognize the families who have
worked so hard to champion safety to avoid more tragedies.
As you know, the NTSB investigates every civil aviation
accident in the United States, participates in over 400 foreign
investigations each year, and maintains all civil aviation
accident data. In the 14 years since Colgan, there have been
only 2 other years in which there was a passenger fatality as a
result of an accident involving a U.S. air carrier. In that
time, the number of deaths in the U.S. due to all aviation
accidents have decreased by roughly one-third. This is an
incredible safety record. And it is a testament to the efforts
of this committee, Congress, the FAA, industry, labor, and
families to take the lessons learned from our independent
investigations to advocate for and make changes to improve
safety.
Yet tragedies still occur. We still investigate over 1,000
accidents every year. And we also see incidents like the near
collision in Austin this past weekend, which could have been
catastrophic.
It is important the FAA reauthorization consider these
challenges and how to meet them safely in general aviation,
charter, commuter, and air medical operations, and for large
passenger and cargo air carriers. My written statement details
several areas where safety improvements are needed, but I want
to briefly highlight a couple of priorities.
First is the safety of commercial aviation operations
governed under part 91, which carry paying passengers but are
not subject to the same or similar standards as other
commercial operations. This includes some air tour and
sightseeing flights, parachute jump flights, and living history
flights. We have investigated fatal accidents in these
operations from Vermont to Hawaii, in Texas, New York,
California, and Connecticut, impacting some of your States and
your constituents.
We are reviewing the FAA's recent actions to require safety
management systems for part 135 operations and part 91 air
tours. Their proposed rulemaking is a major step forward, but
we remain concerned that other commercial operations aren't
included, meaning not all paying members of the public on these
types of flights will be protected. We should take this
opportunity to strengthen safety for all passengers.
Second, I want to thank the committee, and particularly
Congressman Stauber and Congressman DeSaulnier, for your
leadership in addressing problems with NOTAMs. This includes
those identified in the 2017 incident where an Air Canada
flight almost landed on four other planes on a taxiway in San
Francisco. Another issue in that incident was the cockpit voice
recorder was overwritten before it could be removed.
We continue to have investigations, such as the incident
last month at JFK and now Austin where the data isn't available
to our investigators due to the current time limitation. We
have recommended that the FAA require new and existing aircraft
have 25-hour recorders that is consistent with standards of our
European counterparts and adopted by ICAO, rather than the
current 2-hour recording that is the standard in the United
States. The ability to have accident data from cockpit audio,
as well as image recorders, is critical for making sure that
we, operators and flightcrew members, know why accidents and
incidents occur and how to prevent them.
Finally, emerging technologies already here and on the
horizon. Commercial space, uncrewed aircraft, new and different
power sources like batteries, and different kinds of fuels,
bring new complex challenges that we must be prepared for. The
NTSB will stand ready as always to investigate accidents and
make recommendations to improve safety. I trust that as the
committee works on FAA reauthorization, that you will consider
these issues and that you will also consider the resources
necessary to support the independent investigations of the NTSB
and the mission we are able to carry out.
To that end, we look forward to also working with you on
NTSB reauthorization. The purpose of the mandate you have given
us to conduct independent investigations is to improve safety.
Investments made in the NTSB are investments in maintaining
America's gold standard for safety.
Thank you.
[Ms. Homendy's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National
Transportation Safety Board
Good morning, Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and members
of the Committee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) to testify before you today regarding America's
place as the global leader in aviation safety.
As you know, the NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by
Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United
States and significant events in other modes of transportation--
highway, rail, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the
probable cause of the events we investigate and issue safety
recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we
conduct transportation safety research and special investigations, and
coordinate the resources of the federal government and other
organizations to assist victims and their family members who have been
impacted by major transportation disasters. We also serve as the
appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and
mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and the United States Coast Guard, and adjudicate appeals of
civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.
The NTSB does not have authority to promulgate operating standards,
nor do we certificate organizations, individuals, or equipment.
Instead, we advance safety through our investigations and
recommendations, which are issued to any entity that can improve
safety. Our goal is to identify issues and advocate for safety
improvements that, if implemented, would prevent injuries and save
lives.
Over the last several decades, the critical efforts of operators,
manufacturers, labor unions, private aircraft owners and pilots, the
FAA, Congress, and the NTSB have led to significant advances in
technology and important legislative and regulatory changes that have
contributed to the current level of aviation safety. These efforts,
many of which have been in response to the lessons learned from NTSB
investigations, should serve as an example for industry, labor,
regulators, and policymakers in other modes of transportation regarding
the need for a collaborative approach to safety. However, we cannot
become complacent.
In my testimony today, I want to acknowledge the record of aviation
safety over the last decade-plus, discuss the role of the NTSB in
improving safety, and address the further work that needs to be done to
implement some of the over 300 aviation NTSB safety recommendations
that are currently open.\1\ Specifically, I want to highlight more work
that needs to be done to:
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\1\ A report of all currently open safety recommendations related
to aviation is available at https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/
query-builder/route/?t=published&n=27
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improve the safety of general aviation and passenger-
carrying operations,
improve the availability of recorder data to operators
and investigators,
improve turbulence avoidance and mitigation of injuries
due to turbulence,
reduce fatigue-related accidents, and
learn from incidents that show the potential for
catastrophic accidents.
I also want to discuss emerging aviation technologies that may pose
safety challenges.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity
today, as we talk about aviation's incredible safety record, to mention
the opposite direction we are going in for road safety, which affects
the hundreds of thousands of employees in the aviation industry who
travel to and from work every day at airports, airline facilities,
manufacturing centers, federal buildings, trade association offices,
and other places of work.
A Record Level of Safety
Since 2010, the US aviation system has experienced a record level
of safety, as the number of deaths associated with US civil aviation
accidents decreased from 541 in 2009 to 376 in 2021, a decrease of
roughly one-third.\2\ Approximately 91 percent of aviation fatalities
in 2021 occurred in general aviation accidents, with the remainder (27
total) in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 commuter
and on-demand operations, which include charters, air taxis, air tours,
and air medical services flights (when a patient or medical personnel
are on board). A preliminary review of data for 2022 shows that 18
people were killed in accidents involving Part 135 operations last
year.
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\2\ National Transportation Safety Board, 2002-2021 civil aviation
accident statistics.
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Ten of those fatalities were the result of one accident--the
September 4, 2022, crash of a De Havilland Canada DHC-3 Otter into
Mutiny Bay, near Freeland, Washington. The scheduled flight was
operated by Northwest Seaplanes, which was doing business as Friday
Harbor Seaplanes.
Working with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) and the University of Washington's Applied Physics Laboratory,
the wreckage was located underwater at a depth of approximately 190
feet. The wreckage recovery operation was completed by the US Navy's
Supervisor of Salvage and Diving on September 30, 2022, with about 85
percent of the airplane recovered from the seafloor. The operator's
insurance did not cover the cost of the recovery, and, because
examination of the wreckage was critical to our investigation, we paid
$1.7 million for the operation from our regular appropriations.
Examination of the wreckage indicated that a part of the airplane's
pitch trim control system had separated into two pieces after becoming
unscrewed. A lock ring, which was designed to prevent this from
happening, was not recovered, and there was no evidence that the pieces
separated due to the force caused by the accident. Our investigation is
ongoing and, at this time, we do not know if the lock ring was present
before the airplane impacted the water or why it was missing during the
airplane examination. However, our findings raised concerns that a
missing or an improperly installed lock ring on other DHC-3 airplanes
could result in a catastrophic loss of control. As a result, we issued
urgent safety recommendations to the FAA and Transport Canada to
require all DHC-3 operators to immediately inspect the lock ring and
report their findings.\3\ By taking such action, this identified safety
issue could be addressed without having to wait for the investigation
to be completed.
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\3\ National Transportation Safety Board. Require Immediate One-
Time Inspection of De Havilland Canada DHC-3 Horizontal Stabilizer
Actuator. Rpt. No. AIR-22/08 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2022).
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I want to acknowledge and thank the FAA for taking quick action and
issuing an emergency airworthiness directive on November 2, 2022--
within a week of the recommendation being issued--requiring operators
to inspect their aircraft lock rings.
I highlight this accident because it is an example of how the
investigative process works to compel prompt action for safety
improvements. The use of a party system, in which we designate the
regulators, operators, and manufacturers who have information relevant
to the investigation to provide technical expertise during the fact-
finding phase of the investigation, has been our practice for decades
because it is the most effective way to investigate major
transportation accidents. The party system also ensures that the
appropriate regulatory agencies and the parties whose products or
services were involved in the accident or incident will have access to
factual information so that they can initiate any necessary safety
actions without delay.
Our investigation of the Mutiny Bay crash also shows the importance
of working with foreign investigative authorities and organizations. In
this case, once the safety concern was identified, the aircraft
manufacturer, Viking Air Limited, a technical adviser to the
Transportation Safety Board of Canada, published a service letter
recommending that all DHC-3 operators confirm that the lock ring is
present and correctly engaged on their aircraft.
NTSB's Role in Maintaining Safety
The purpose of our aviation investigations is to find safety issues
and identify trends that must be addressed to improve aviation safety,
as well as to provide information to the flying community about lessons
learned. Investments made in the NTSB to hire investigators and
researchers, train them on emerging technologies, and provide them the
technology needed to keep pace with advances in the industry, as well
as to strengthen our cybersecurity efforts and data analytics
capabilities, are investments that help maintain the nation's role in
the world as the standard bearer for safety.
Our Office of Aviation Safety currently consists of 115 employees,
83 of whom are accident investigators. The office handles over 1,300
accidents and incidents annually. These include investigations of
aviation, uncrewed aircraft systems, advanced air mobility, and
experimental aircraft accidents and incidents, as well as certain
commercial space mishaps. We also participate in about 450
investigations annually of airline accidents and incidents in foreign
countries that involve US carriers, US-manufactured or -designed
equipment, or US-registered aircraft, such as the recent accidents in
Indonesia and Ethiopia involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft.
Our current authorization expired at the end of the last fiscal
year (FY). As you know, we transmitted a reauthorization proposal to
the previous Congress, requesting resources and hiring flexibilities to
increase the number of investigators throughout the agency.\4\ I
testified on our goals to right-size our agency. I am happy to report
that, since last April, we have already made great progress toward our
goals to ensure that our employees have the right skill set, staffing
up to our highest level since 2017 to 414 people on October 1, 2022. In
FY 2022, we hired 57 people, the highest number in 10 years. Our
reauthorization proposal anticipates adding roughly 15 new employees
per year through 2027, in addition to filling the vacancies that will
occur through retirements and separations.
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\4\ National Transportation Safety Board Draft Reauthorization Act
of 2022. Washington, DC: NTSB.
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In addition, since the start of 2022, we have significantly reduced
the backlog of investigations open for more than 2 years by filling
open investigative and technical review positions, reassigning
investigations that could be expedited, using reemployed annuitants to
broaden the pool of report reviewers in the short-term, enhancing
employee performance standards, and developing quality metrics and a
means to track them for all investigations.
We will transmit an updated reauthorization proposal to Congress in
the coming weeks, and I look forward to working with you on legislation
that will allow us to hire professionals with the needed skills,
purchase the equipment necessary for those skilled professionals to do
their jobs, and invest in staff training and development. Our workforce
is our greatest asset and is essential to our mission to make
transportation safer and to maintain our status as a leader in safety--
here and internationally.
Safety in General Aviation and Revenue Passenger-Carrying Operations
The vast majority of our investigations involve general aviation
accidents. Lessons learned from those investigations have contributed
to the improved safety of general aviation over the years. In fact,
since 2010, 96 percent of all NTSB investigations were in the aviation
mode, and of those, 94 percent were in general aviation, meaning that
general aviation investigations account for roughly 90 percent of our
total investigations. Since 2001, the rate of fatal accidents in
general aviation operations has largely trended downward. In 2001, the
fatal accident rate per 100,000 flight hours was 1.274, and although it
has been as high as 1.381 (in 2005) and as low as .935 (in 2017) over
the last 20 years, in 2021, the rate was .951.\5\
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\5\ National Transportation Safety Board, 2002-2021 civil aviation
accident statistics.
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Although general aviation safety has improved in the last decade,
we do see areas where additional effort is needed. Our general aviation
accident investigations have exposed safety issues and identified
trends that resulted in safety recommendations.\6\ Most general
aviation operations under 14 CFR Part 91 are for noncommercial personal
or business use, while most commercial operators are regulated under
Part 135 or Part 121. However, the NTSB is particularly concerned about
the safety of various revenue passenger-carrying operations that are
conducted under Part 91, including the following:
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\6\ In 2022, we issued 10 recommendations as a result of general
aviation accident investigations. These recommendations concern carbon
monoxide sensors, hazardous icing conditions in Alaska, and technical
issues with particular models of aircraft.
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certain nonstop commercial air tour flights,
sightseeing flights conducted in helicopters and hot air
balloons,
nonstop intentional parachute jump flights,
living history flight experience sightseeing flights,
glider sightseeing flights,
air combat/extreme aerobatic experience flights, and
tour flights conducted under the premise of student
instruction or training flights.
In March 2021, we adopted a report to address the safety of these
operations.\7\ We also included this issue on our Most Wanted List of
Transportation Safety Improvements for 2021-2023.\8\
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\7\ National Transportation Safety Board. Enhance Safety of Revenue
Passenger-Carrying Operations Conducted Under Title 14 Code of Federal
Regulations Part 91. Rpt. No. AAR 21/03 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2021).
\8\ 2021-2023 Most Wanted List.
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These operations, which carry thousands of paying passengers each
year, are not held to the same maintenance, airworthiness, and
operational standards as air carrier, commuter, and on-demand
operations. Members of the public who pay to participate in such
operations are likely unaware that these operations have less stringent
safety requirements than other commercial aviation operations.
As I wrote to you last summer, we issued recommendations to the FAA
to apply greater safety requirements and more comprehensive oversight
to revenue passenger-carrying operations.\9\ As detailed in that
letter, these recommendations address four categories of identified
deficiencies (which do not apply to personal or business use of general
aviation aircraft where no charge is made):
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\9\ NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy. Letter for the record regarding
the July 13, 2022, House Transportation and Infrastructure hearing,
``The State of General Aviation.''
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The need for an appropriate framework for Part 91 revenue
passenger-carrying operations. The operating rules for Part 91 general
aviation, which include revenue passenger-carrying operations, do not
require operating certificates, operations specifications, FAA-accepted
general operations manuals, FAA-approved training programs, or FAA-
approved maintenance programs, all of which are required for Part 135
operations and address commuter and on-demand operations, such as most
commercial air tours. Because Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying
operators are not required to have initial and recurrent pilot training
programs, the operators have no formal method to determine if pilots
are adequately prepared for the responsibilities associated with the
company's operations.
The NTSB's review demonstrated that the FAA should be
implementing one level of safety for all commercial air tour operators,
especially given the longstanding safety concerns in this area. In
addition, to address other Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying
operations, the NTSB recommended that the FAA develop national safety
standards, or equivalent regulations, for revenue passenger-carrying
operations that are currently conducted under Part 91. These standards,
or equivalent regulations, should include, at a minimum for each
operation type, requirements for initial and recurrent training and
maintenance and management policies and procedures.
The need to address regulatory loopholes and omissions.
The FAA created certain exceptions to Part 91 rules that allow some
operations to be conducted outside of the scope of regulatory and
oversight requirements that apply to operations conducted under an
operating certificate. However, some Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying
operators have exploited specific exceptions in federal regulations by
carrying revenue passengers for purposes other than the exceptions
intended, allowing them to avoid more stringent regulatory
requirements. For example, two of the accident flights we reviewed were
inappropriately operating under the student instruction exemption, even
with the knowledge of the local FAA office.
The NTSB recognizes that other regulatory loopholes and
omissions might also exist; therefore, we recommend that the FAA
identify shortcomings in 14 CFR 119.1(e) that would allow revenue
passenger-carrying operators to avoid stricter regulations and
oversight and to address these loopholes as part of a new framework for
Part 91 operations.
The need for increased federal aviation oversight. Part
91 revenue passenger-carrying operators are not subject to the same
level of FAA oversight and surveillance as Part 135 operators. The NTSB
concludes that the FAA's oversight and surveillance of Part 91 revenue
passenger-carrying operations do not ensure that these operators are
properly maintaining their aircraft and safely conducting operations.
The FAA needs to provide its inspectors with sufficient guidance to
pursue more comprehensive oversight of Part 91 revenue passenger-
carrying operators. Such guidance and oversight could help ensure that
these operators are properly maintaining their aircraft and safely
conducting operations.
The need for safety management systems. Operators need to
establish a safety management system (SMS), which is an effective way
to manage and mitigate risks in aviation operations. The FAA has
described SMSs as a ``formal, top down business-like approach to
managing safety risk.'' The four components of an SMS are safety
policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion.
Only Part 121 air carriers (generally larger airlines and regional
carriers, as well as cargo carriers) are currently required to
incorporate an SMS into their operations; the FAA has only encouraged
all other operators to voluntarily implement an SMS.
Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying and Part 135 operators would
benefit from an SMS to ensure that operational risks are sufficiently
mitigated. In addition, it is critical that the FAA oversee these
operators' SMSs to ensure that mitigations are in place to address
potential safety hazards.
On January 10, 2023, the FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
to update and expand the requirements for SMSs and to require Part 135
operators and certain Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operators to
develop and implement an SMS. We are continuing to review the proposed
rule and its relation to our safety recommendations, but we welcome the
FAA's action on this issue. FAA oversight is critical to ensuring
operators adhere to the principles and processes of an effective SMS.
The NTSB has investigated many accidents involving operators whose
deficient SMS failed to identify and mitigate the conditions that
contributed to the accident. For example, the NTSB's investigation of
the January 26, 2020, helicopter crash in Calabasas, California,
revealed that although Island Express, the Part 135 operator, had
implemented an SMS, its lack of a documented policy and safety
assurance evaluations hindered its effectiveness of its SMS. We
recommended that Island Express participate in the FAA's voluntary SMS
program. Island Express responded that it was not going to implement
our recommendation.\10\
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\10\ See Island Express Helicopters Inc. responses to Safety
Recommendation A-21-7.
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Install Crash-Resistant Recorders and Establish Flight Data Monitoring
Programs
Another issue on our Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety
Improvements calls on the FAA to mandate crash-resistant recorders in
all revenue passenger-carrying operations and to require flight data
monitoring and analysis programs. However, operators should not wait
for mandates to do so; they can realize the safety benefits of these
technologies now.
In aviation, data, audio, and video recorders capture and store
critical information that can help investigators determine the cause of
accidents while helping companies and operators take immediate steps to
prevent accidents. However, many passenger-carrying commercial
aircraft, such as charter planes and air tours (under Part 135 and Part
91), are still not equipped with these critical technologies, even
though recorders are readily available, easily installed, and largely
affordable. The availability of recorded data will also be critical for
the operation of advanced air mobility aircraft, some of which will
likely operate under Part 135 and are not currently required to have
recorders.
Recorders not only help determine the cause of an accident, they
also help companies and operators establish effective safety management
strategies. These operators should have flight data monitoring programs
in place that analyze recorder data and use that information to adjust
procedures and enhance crew training to prevent accidents from
happening in the first place. Although some operators have
implemented--or are in the process of implementing--recorder programs
and systems, we are concerned that many will not do so without the
FAA's action.
In addition to the need for all revenue passenger-carrying aircraft
to be equipped with recorders, we have also been concerned about
current FAA requirements for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs). Current
FAA regulations require 2-hour CVR recording capability and provide
guidance to the flight crew on how to safeguard CVR data after an
accident or incident. Despite this, valuable CVR data continues to be
overwritten and therefore unavailable for safety investigations, as
happened in the 2017 incident in which an Air Canada flight overflew
four other air carriers on the taxiway in San Francisco, as well as in
the recent runway incursion incident involving two Part 121 operators
at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Our ongoing
experience with overwritten CVR recordings demonstrates the limitations
of the current 2-hour recording requirement, particularly in cases
where relevant data were overwritten due to the following:
a delay in reporting a safety event that was not
immediately recognized to be of a serious nature until further data
review,
a failure to immediately deactivate the CVR following
arrival after a safety event, or
the time remaining in the flight after a safety event,
which exceeded the CVR's 2-hour recording duration.
As a result of these concerns, in 2018, we issued recommendations
to the FAA to address the need to install CVRs with a minimum 25-hour
recording capability on all newly manufactured airplanes required to
have a CVR, and to retrofit these CVRs on existing aircraft required to
have flight recorders.\11\
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\11\ National Transportation Safety Board. Extended Duration
Cockpit Voice Recorders. Rpt. No. ASR-18/04 (Washington, DC: NTSB
2018).
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Preventing Turbulence-Related Injuries
Turbulence-related accidents are the most common type of accident
involving air carriers, accounting for more than a third of Part 121
accidents from 2009 through 2018. Most of these accidents resulted in
one or more serious injuries but no aircraft damage. Flight attendants
were the most commonly injured in these accidents, accounting for 78.9
percent of all seriously injured persons. We are currently
investigating a Part 121 accident that occurred on December 18, 2022,
in which Hawaiian Airlines flight 35 experienced severe convectively
induced turbulence at 40,000 feet, about 40 minutes from landing at
Honolulu International Airport. Of the 291 passengers and crew, 25 were
injured, 6 seriously. The airplane sustained minor damage.
On August 10, 2021, we released a safety research report that
examined the prevalence and risk factors of turbulence-related
accidents in Part 121 air carrier operations; assessed the
effectiveness of policies, programs, technologies, and other applicable
safety countermeasures; and made 21 new recommendations to improve
turbulence avoidance and injury mitigation.\12\ These recommendations
call for improvements in the reporting and sharing of information
regarding turbulence risks, the use of data to revise guidance on when
flight attendants should be secured in their seats to prevent injuries,
and efforts to increase the use of child restraint systems.
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\12\ National Transportation Safety Board. Preventing Turbulence-
Related Injuries in Air Carrier Operations Conducted Under Title 14
Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Rpt. No. SS-21/01. (Washington,
DC: NTSB 2021).
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Reducing Flight Crew Fatigue
Fatigue degrades a person's ability to stay awake, alert, and
attentive to the demands of safely controlling an aircraft. The NTSB
has investigated many air carrier accidents involving fatigued flight
crews, including Colgan Air flight 3407. In 2006, we issued a safety
recommendation to the FAA as a result of our investigation of the
October 19, 2004, crash of Corporate Airlines flight 5966 in
Kirksville, Missouri, to modify and simplify the flight crew hours-of-
service regulations to take into consideration factors such as length
of duty day, starting time, workload and other factors shown by recent
research, scientific evidence, and current industry experience to
affect crew alertness.\13\ Current FAA rules that prescribe flight- and
duty-time regulations for all flight crewmembers and certificate
holders under Part 121 exclude operators who conduct cargo
operations.\14\ We disagree with this exclusion, as many of the
fatigue-related accidents that we have investigated over the years
involved cargo operators. We also believe that, because of the time of
day that cargo operations typically occur, such operations are in
greater need of these requirements. We continue to believe that the FAA
should include all Part 121 operations, including cargo operations,
under these requirements.
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\13\ NTSB. Collision with Trees and Crash Short of the Runway,
Corporate Airlines Flight 5966 BAE Systems BAE-J3201, N875JX
Kirksville, Missouri. Rpt. No. AAR-06/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2006).
NTSB Safety Recommendation A-06-10.
\14\ Federal Aviation Administration, Flightcrew Member Duty and
Rest Requirements, 14 CFR Parts 117, 119, and 121.
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Wrong Surface Operations and Runway Incursions
We also investigate numerous aviation safety incidents each year.
In fact, we have completed more than 800 aviation incident
investigations in the past 20 years, resulting in several safety
recommendations. For example, our investigation of the 2017 Air Canada
incident in San Francisco resulted in recommendations to the FAA
regarding the presentation of information to pilots (such as through
notices to air missions, known as NOTAMs) as well as technology to
detect wrong runway or other surface landings. I want to thank
Representatives Stauber and DeSaulnier for their leadership in the
House passing the NOTAM Improvement Act 2 weeks ago, which will help
address issues that we identified in our investigation.
Several factors are considered when deciding which safety incidents
merit an NTSB-led investigation. Safety risk and the possibility that a
repeat event could lead to a catastrophic outcome are among the key
considerations. The potential for findings related to regulatory
standards or safety oversight that could lead to systemwide safety
improvements, as opposed to local or isolated improvements, are also
considered. By weighing these factors, we ensure that resources are
applied to investigate incidents with the potential for greatest effect
on public safety. Wrong surface operations and runway incursions are
examples of such concerning incidents.
For example, in June 2022, we initiated investigations into two
wrong runway landings by Part 121 operators. On June 8, FedEx flight
1170 landed on the wrong the runway at Tulsa International Airport in
Oklahoma.\15\ The captain and first officer were not injured, and the
aircraft was not damaged. The flight was cleared for a visual approach
and landing on runway 18L; however, the airplane landed on runway 18R.
The airplane was operated as a Part 121 cargo flight from Fort Worth
Alliance Airport in Fort Worth, Texas.
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\15\ NTSB. Preliminary Report for DCA22LA126.
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On June 21, United Airlines flight 2627 was cleared for a visual
approach and landing on runway 28C at the Pittsburgh International
Airport in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, but instead lined up with and
landed on runway 28L.\16\ None of the 174 occupants aboard the airplane
were injured and the aircraft was not damaged. The regularly scheduled
passenger flight was operating under the provisions of Part 121 from
the Chicago O'Hare International Airport.
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\16\ NTSB. Preliminary Report for DCA22LA133.
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Although there were no injuries or damages due to these two
incidents, they, along with the Air Canada event already mentioned,
illustrate the potential for a catastrophic accident due to wrong
surface operations. Both the Tulsa and Pittsburgh investigations are
ongoing, and preliminary reports have been issued.
Emerging Transportation Technologies
Advances in technology are transforming transportation and hold
promise for improving transportation safety, but they also pose new
challenges. The integration of high-volume drone operations, advanced
air mobility aircraft, commercial airliners, general aviation aircraft,
and commercial space vehicles all together in the National Airspace
System is increasing the complexity of airspace operations and
management and is also likely to increase our accident and serious
incident investigation workload over the next 5 years. This diverse
platform of operations will also require enhanced--and in some cases,
all new--skill sets and capabilities as the complexity and breadth of
operations grows. In addition, new technologies, such as autonomous
systems, introduce more complexity to the traditional aviation workload
as well as to operational functions, such as changes to the FAA's
flight certification process. Our involvement in these emerging areas,
with appropriate coordination with the FAA (particularly in commercial
space mishap investigations), will support the growth of these
industries by assuring the public that investigations are being
conducted impartially and that safety issues are identified.
Our Road Safety Crisis
We believe that the only acceptable number of deaths and serious
injuries in all modes of transportation is zero. We have more work to
do in aviation to achieve that goal, as we will discuss today. However,
the greatest risk to aviation employees and aircraft owners and
operators is on our nation's roads, where about 95 percent of all US
transportation deaths--nearly 43,000 in 2021--occur. Millions of people
are injured each year.
The following five of the ten items on our Most Wanted List of
Transportation Safety Improvements are related to road safety:
Implement a Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Speeding-
Related Crashes
Protect Vulnerable Road Users through a Safe System
Approach
Prevent Alcohol- and Other Drug-Impaired Driving
Require Collision-Avoidance and Connected-Vehicle
Technologies on all Vehicles
Eliminate Distracted Driving
We are calling for a Safe System Approach for our roads that
prioritizes the lives. A Safe System recognizes that human error is
inevitable, but it should never cost someone their life or result in a
serious injury. A Safe System addresses all aspects of road safety--
speed, road design, vehicles, road users, and postcrash care. We must
make better safety investments, from road treatments to strong traffic
safety laws and robust education efforts, to mitigate injury risks for
all road users. I hope that we can continue to work together and take
some of the lessons learned from the collaborative approach to safety
in aviation to address our road safety crisis.
Conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to further discuss these safety
issues and recommendations with the Committee. We recognize the
progress that has been made; yet, there will always be room for
improvement. We stand ready to work with the Committee to continue
improving aviation safety, which includes ensuring that the NTSB has
the resources needed to carry out our mission.
I am happy to answer your questions.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you very much.
Next, we are going to go to Captain Jason Ambrosi, who is
the president of the Air Line Pilots Association.
Thanks for being here, Captain.
TESTIMONY OF CAPT. JASON AMBROSI, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Ambrosi. Thank you, Chairman Graves, Ranking Member
Larsen, and the committee members. I am Captain Jason Ambrosi,
president of the Air Line Pilots Association, International,
which represents more than 67,000 pilots in the United States
and Canada. And I remain a current and qualified international
captain on the Boeing 767.
Like many airline pilots, I began my career flying for a
regional airline. I was hired by Delta Air Lines in 2000, 18
months before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 would change our
industry forever.
The loss of Continental flight 3407 in which 50 people died
near Buffalo, New York, also changed our industry forever.
Later this week, we will mark the 14th anniversary of that
accident. It was the final in a series of tragedies that led
this Nation to commit to becoming the gold standard in aviation
safety.
The passage of the 2010 FAA bill played a critical role in
our Nation's achievement of this goal. Because of it, U.S. air
transportation benefits from landmark safety improvements such
as pilot qualification, experience, and training requirements,
and safety management systems based on enhanced Voluntary
Safety Reporting programs.
Through the bill, Congress also ensured U.S. pilots had
science-based fatigue rules and training in areas such as
mentoring and leadership, high-altitude operations, adverse
weather, and stall prevention and recovery. These and other
safety improvements in a 2010 FAA bill and the presence of at
least two experienced and trained pilots working together on
every airliner flight deck have been critical.
Collaborative efforts by labor, industry, and Government
have also been key. Safety programs like CAST and ASIAS have
been game changers that apply state-of-the-art analytics to
aviation and position the United States on the leading edge of
safety analysis. Together, these advances have brought us to
where we are today.
It is no accident that the airline passenger fatality rate
has dropped by 99.8 percent since the law was passed in 2010.
We have set the gold standard. And I know we share a common
goal in ensuring we never accept bronze or silver. This
extraordinary record demonstrates that the current system is
working in the way it was intended. The United States is
creating thousands of new pilots each year who have the
experience and training they need to ensure this Nation
maintains its place as the global safety leader.
As an airline pilot who has flown for more than 25 years
and worked for both regional and mainline carriers, I can tell
you that all U.S. passengers deserve one level of safety. In
the upcoming FAA reauthorization, Congress has a historic
opportunity to maintain and expand this country's global
leadership in safety for all Americans, whether they fly out of
major hubs or small rural airports.
We thank the committee for passing the aircraft
certification reform bill to improve the entire certification
system. Continuing to modernize the air traffic infrastructure
and NOTAM system is also important. We urge lawmakers to
consider modernization funding that spans multiple
reauthorization and appropriation cycles so that the FAA has
stable, long-term resources to increase aviation safety and
efficiency.
The U.S. air transportation system's gold standard of
safety has made this country a global leader. This Nation can
never become complacent about aviation safety, especially as we
work to integrate new and expanding users into the shared
national airspace. Any new technology, system, or a change in
procedure or regulation must maintain or improve the current
level of safety.
We know that this committee is interested in inspiring more
young people to consider aviation professions, and we applaud
you in your effort, because it is a great time to be an airline
pilot. ALPA hopes the reauthorization process can also create
more opportunities for people of all backgrounds to become
airline pilots. Lawmakers can align Federal funding support for
education required to become an airline pilot with that of
other highly skilled professions and make aviation education
more accessible to minorities and underrepresented groups.
ALPA is ready to work with all aviation stakeholders to
keep this country leading the world in aviation safety, open
the doors of opportunity for everyone who aspires to fly, and
ensure that communities large and small have the safe air
service they deserve.
Thank you.
[Mr. Ambrosi's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Capt. Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots
Association, International
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for giving me
the opportunity to join you today to talk about FAA reauthorization and
enhancing America's gold standard in aviation safety. We believe
there's great opportunity for industry stakeholders to work together on
new policy priorities, solve problems, improve the aviation system,
launch new projects, and ensure our continued role as global aviation
leader. We look forward to collaborating in this first reauthorization
meeting through the successful passage of the bill.
I'm a current international captain on the Boeing 767 and the
president of the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA),
which represents more than 67,000 professional airline pilots flying
for 39 airlines in the United States and Canada. ALPA is the world's
largest pilot union and non-governmental aviation safety organization.
We are the recognized voice of the airline piloting profession in North
America, with a history of safety and security advocacy spanning nearly
92 years. As the sole U.S. member of the International Federation of
Air Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA), ALPA has the unique ability to
provide airline pilot expertise to aviation safety issues worldwide,
collaborate on global improvements, and to incorporate an international
dimension to safety advocacy.
The U.S. is the gold standard when it comes to aviation safety. We
not only have the safest aviation system in the world, but it is also
seen by others around the globe as the best. This perception has been
tested in recent years, but U.S. aviation remains on top. While today
is the safest period in air transportation, that outcome is not
guaranteed moving forward. We must remain constantly vigilant and
identify every opportunity for improvement and steadfastly advocate for
implementation. Sadly, we are nearing the 14th anniversary of the
Continental Connection, Colgan Air, Flight 3407 accident in Clarence
Center, New York that fatally injured all 49 passengers and crew on
board and one person on the ground. The Colgan accident was a turning
point in the airline industry \1\--a point to which we must never
return. Remarkably, since the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010, triggered by this accident, was
signed into law, more than 10 billion passengers \2\ have traveled
safely in our skies to their destinations.\3\
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\1\ The Colgan Air accident was the last in a series of high-
profile fatal regional airline accidents including Comair 5191, August
27, 2006 in Lexington, KY; Corporate Airlines 5966, October19, 2004 in
Kirksville, MO; and Pinnacle 3701, October 14, 2004 in Jefferson City,
MO, that highlighted deficiencies in pilot training and flight
experience.
\2\ According to the United States Bureau of Transportation
Statistics. See, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/
Data_Elements.aspx?Data=4 for passengers.
\3\ While airline accidents are rare in the U.S., even one fatal
injury is one too many. The U.S. airline industry has experienced two
passenger fatalities since 2009. The first occurred in 2018 on a
Southwest Airlines flight when the engine cowling failed and punctured
the aircraft fuselage. The second occurred in 2019 when a PenAir
flight, Alaska's second-largest regional/commuter airline, overran the
runway on landing sending debris into the fuselage fatally injuring a
passenger.
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This remarkable safety achievement was not accomplished by chance
or any one action. This success results from decades of industry-wide
work and commitment to create the safest air transportation system in
the world. There are numerous significant parts of aviation safety that
have and continue to directly contribute to the gold standard and the
benefits are immeasurable. Becoming the gold standard in aviation
safety is the result of decades of stakeholder collaboration; data
collection and analysis; hazard identification and risk mitigation; as
well as critical changes and improvements to regulations, pilot
qualification and training, airline operations and maintenance,
technology, safety, security, and oversight.
Prior to the passage of the Aviation Safety and FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2010 (the ``Act''), the passenger airline industry lost
approximately 1,100 passengers in airline accidents over a 20-year
period. Since the unanimous passage of that landmark safety
legislation, the airline passenger fatality rate has reduced by 99.8
percent. The numerous congressional mandates in the bill created
comprehensive changes to how airlines do business and significantly
raised the safety bar. The Act resulted in regulations that improved
the collection of and access to pilot records to help provide employers
a more complete picture of new hires; established a training
requirement for crewmember mentoring and leadership to help captains
more effectively mentor first officers; and forced government and
industry to reexamine pilot fatigue resulting in science-based flight
and duty limitations and rest requirements for all Part 121 passenger
operations along with Fatigue Risk Management Plans for all airlines.
Mistakenly, cargo operations were carved-out from these life-saving
requirements and correcting this error remains one of ALPA's top
priorities.
In the years following the passage of the Act, the airline industry
ushered in sweeping changes to pilot qualifications and training and
aviation safety that have profoundly improved airline operations and
directly contribute to the U.S. gold standard in aviation safety. One
of the most significant changes was the requirement that each flight
crewmember for a Part 121 air carrier hold an airline transport pilot
certificate. The previous standard for first officers to possess only a
commercial certificate was established decades prior and did not keep
pace with the changes to and increased complexity of aircraft and
airline operations. Congress recognized the critical importance for
both pilots on the flight deck to possess an airline transport pilot
certificate and the experience commensurate with the responsibility of
transporting passengers.\4\ We are grateful for Congress's unwavering
commitment to maintaining higher standards for first officers and
rejecting attempts to return to a point in our aviation history when
first officers were held to lower safety standards.
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\4\ The ``1,500 Hour Rule'' is a distracting misnomer. It is
important to note that in parallel with the requirement that all
airline pilots possess an ATP, Congress gave the FAA discretion to
grant credit toward the 1,500 hours required for an ATP for certain
academic training courses. As a result, the FAA created the ATP with
restricted privileges (R-ATP), which allows first officers to fly
airline operations with fewer than 1,500 hours. Military pilots are
hired with 750 hours, pilots with four-year aviation degrees are hired
with 1,000 hours, and pilots with two-year aviation degrees are hired
at 1,250 hours of flight experience time.
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Additionally, Congress directed the FAA to modify the requirements
for an ATP to improve operating in a multi-pilot flight deck
environment, in adverse weather and at high altitudes, stall and upset
recovery training, and remedial training programs for flight
crewmembers with a history of training deficiencies. Rule changes also
required first officers to have a type rating for the aircraft they
will operate, have additional flight time requirements, and complete an
ATP Certification Training Program designed to prepare the applicant to
operate safely in those operations which require an ATP. The same
rulemaking that established the ATP/R-ATP requirements, also ensured
minimum experience requirements for first officers before serving as
pilot-in-command in Part 121 airline operations.
The Act also required Part 121 airlines to establish a Safety
Management System (SMS) that would include, at a minimum, an aviation
safety action program, a flight operational quality assurance program,
a line operations safety audit, and an advanced qualification program.
SMS is used to identify, address, and reduce organizational and
systemic risks. The goal of SMS is to identify active failures and
inadequate defenses so that hazards can be contained while preventative
measures can be reinforced. SMS adds value to an organization's safety
structure by identifying hazards and mitigating risks before they
develop into full accidents. The systems are complex and require
assessments of human factors and their relation to other workplace
components. A successful SMS incorporates a collaborative effort
between the organization, labor, regulator, manufacturers, and other
stakeholders to build a robust and diverse SMS team. The team's
objective is to leverage data and knowledge to collectively build risk
assessments, design systemic improvements, and support a positive
safety culture. The U.S. airline industry is a leader in using data not
only to understand what happened in a past event, but also to prevent
that same event from happening again. The aviation industry expertly
uses data to achieve long-term risk reduction and monitor emerging
safety trends. A positive safety culture encourages and supports
employees to report safety issues that may not otherwise be discovered.
In the airline segment, we see safety culture driven by the FAA
through compliance philosophy, which emphasizes compliance actions over
enforcement for correcting unintentional deviations and its dedication
to programs such as Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
(ASIAS) program. SMS thrives on voluntary safety reporting programs
that collect information on day-to-day operations. Voluntary safety
reporting programs are the core of aviation safety risk management that
provide critical data and unique information. These programs allow us
to identify risk in the system before an accident occurs so that the
changes necessary to mitigate the risks can be implemented. Analysis is
done at individual organizations but the greatest value stems from
large-scale industry-wide data sharing programs like ASIAS that has
analyzed millions of reports and other data.
The transition in ASIAS to use data fusion, matching data from
multiple sources on the same event, has been an incredible advancement
for safety analysis. The program is now able to thread together
multiple data points from airlines, manufacturers, maintenance, in-
flight, dispatchers, Air Traffic Control, airports, and various sectors
of the FAA. Data points can be fused together to create a cohesive
picture of the operating environment including pilot reports, ATC
reports, flight data, and other external datapoints such as weather.
There is risk in aviation and we must develop organizational resilience
through proactive safety enhancements. The clear path to make these
enhancements is through large scale collaborative data collection and
analysis. In aviation, we focus on the safety of the complete system.
By bringing all components of the operation together, we can develop
better risk management techniques, effectively mitigating risks by
designing the entire system to be safer rather than focusing on a
single component.
Last year marked the 25th anniversary of the Commercial Aviation
Safety Team (CAST), which embodies the power and purpose of safety data
collection and industry collaboration. ALPA is a proud founding member
of and strong leader in CAST. CAST is the catalyst behind the industry
transition from a forensic approach to safety to a data-driven,
nonpunitive, risk-predictive model--a proactive approach that has
changed the way safety work is conducted in the U.S. Analysis is done
to identify opportunities for improvement within areas such as
training, procedural designs, and other aspects of an operation.
Voluntary safety reporting programs are the core of aviation safety
risk management within the U.S. for the unique information they are
capable of providing. The transition to data-based analysis and large-
scale information sharing through ASIAS referenced above is due to the
efforts in CAST.
The collaboration between government, labor, and industry that CAST
made possible has improved aviation safety and reduced the U.S.
commercial aviation fatality risk by more than 83 percent. Data and
collaboration--coupled with two experienced, highly-trained, and well-
rested pilots--are keys to creating and maintaining the safest air
transportation system in the world. These programs are built upon a
collaborative model that differentiates U.S. aviation safety from the
rest of the world. Government, labor, and industry share data and other
information in a manner and at a level that no other country does. This
is, in part, due to the protection of aviation safety data that has
helped these programs thrive. In the U.S., there are legal protections
regarding the use of safety related data. Protections need to be
stronger and go further to protect today's data and for future
evolution of data sharing programs, the U.S. is unique in protecting
aviation safety data.
An example of the critical work done by CAST and ASIAS is the
Airplane State Awareness (ASA) report and studies. The goal of this
initiative was to reduce Loss of Control-Inflight (LOC-I) accidents and
incidents, historically one of the highest fatal accident categories.
CAST chartered various working groups of experts to analyze a subset of
accidents and incidents related to LOC-I events specifically involving
attitude and energy complications. After thorough review, 11 actionable
Safety Enhancements (SEs) were developed through the CAST process to
reduce the risk of LOC-I events through training, operations, and
design changes while adding redundancy to the overall system. By
addressing risks and hazards through a systemic view, CAST has been
able to help design a safer operational environment. This is only
possible through the voluntary data submitted by front-line workers
through programs like ASAP and FOQA. CAST takes a data driven approach
to tackle risks like ASA and develop mitigation strategies based on
real experiences from pilots.
The safety enhancements are currently implemented at Part 121
airlines and primarily focus on enhancing training to include more
real-world scenarios and nonstandard situations. Four of the SEs target
training opportunities to verify that pilots have the skills necessary
to recognize situations that may lead to undesirable aircraft states
and ample experience correcting these scenarios in a training
environment. Other enhancements focus on the design of visual displays
and indicators on the flight deck to effectively communicate aircraft
state to pilots to proactively prevent loss of control. Industry
collaborated on these solutions to ensure they are not only effective
but also can be realistically implemented. Other SEs were developed
from this safety topic to look at the future of managing this risk
through research and design initiatives.
The goal of this work was to reduce the risk of these types of
accidents in the U.S. by 70% in 2018 and 80% by 2025. Data from the
NTSB can confirm that LOC-I is not a defining cause of an accident in
2021 and is no longer considered a leading defining cause of accidents
for Part 121 air carriers in the U.S. CAST successfully leverages
industry input and data to reduce risk. To effectively manage ASA and
other risks, a structured, systemic approach is necessary, as one
mitigation will not be a complete or failsafe solution. Equally
important is input from industry during each phase of the development
process to ensure that proposed solutions are realistic in the
operating environment. Our pilots are the single voice for this part of
the process. An oversimplification of this extremely detailed and
complex work, but hopefully enough explanation that demonstrates how
labor, industry, and government work together to develop safety
solutions that prevent accidents.
There are a multitude of factors that work in parallel and in
conjunction with all other parts of system safety that brought us to
where we are today. Removing or modifying requirements, without
implementing an equivalent level of safety or higher, will disrupt the
system and cause gaps where risks can slip through. Only changes that
maintain or improve the current level of safety can be made to the
aviation safety system we rely on today. Given the extraordinary safety
track record we have achieved together, that should be the lens through
which we evaluate any proposal to modify our existing gold standard
safety system.
The future of aviation holds many changes in aircraft, technology,
new entrants, types of operations, etc. and there will always be
pursuit of innovation, especially with the development of UAS, RPAS,
and Advanced Air Mobility aircraft. We must ensure that any
introduction of new technology, new systems, and changes in procedures
or regulations result in an improvement to the current level of safety
in our aviation system. One constant, above all, must remain--safety
first. The airline safety system works and everything we do to change,
modernize, be more innovative, or increase efficiency must be done with
a commitment to safety first. Safety is not mutually exclusive from any
of these endeavors. We have the foundation, experience, expertise, and
tools to welcome the next generation of aviation without compromising
on safety.
One thing we know for sure is that aviation is fluid and often
fragile in the wake of dynamic change as demonstrated during the
pandemic. Despite the rapid changes to the industry, safety remained
the first priority and CAST stakeholders quickly pivoted to focus on
changes and what new risks might be introduced to the system. In short
order, CAST created a new resource, ``Safety Elements to Monitor During
a Period of Dynamic Change,'' that gave operators direction and support
related to new risks caused by the pandemic while managing other
operational risks. While the aviation safety system that we have
developed over several decades remains unmatched, there will always be
challenges and opportunities for improvement.
Today is a very exciting time in aviation as we build for the
future. Aircraft and product certification, as well as standards
development in the U.S., will continue to be challenged by the number
and types of projects to date and those expected consistently for years
ahead. We acknowledge the importance of keeping pace with global
aviation and the need to complete certification projects more
efficiently, but that can never happen at the expense of safety. The
FAA must be appropriately funded and resourced so that it is equipped
to handle certification and crucial standards work without pressures to
move faster.
As the global aviation leader, other countries nip at our heels in
efforts to assert a leadership role. Recent issues with our
certification system left us vulnerable to those attacks. That's why we
thank the Committee for passing the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act (ACSAA) of 2020. ACSAA mandated changes to improve
the entire aircraft certification system. While that work is underway,
we must work together to ensure we do not move more quickly on
certification projects simply to avoid criticism. Rather, we must work
together to improve the system so that it is both safe and efficient.
The ACSAA included safety improvements such as requiring aircraft
manufacturers to implement SMS in their lines of business and therefore
ensuring that any changes in process and design are thoroughly
evaluated and risks are identified and mitigated. This requirement
aligns with FAA proposals to expand SMS to other domains. The FAA is in
the process of finalizing rules for SMS at our nation's airports, which
we fully support, and recently proposed to expand the requirement to
operators such as charter and on-demand operators, tour operators, and
others.
Congress can continue to help improve the safety level of our
National Airspace. Continued modernization of our air traffic
infrastructure and NOTAM system is critical. In the past, Congress has
given direction on modernization but only provided partial funding for
resources necessary to start but not enough to finish the modernization
needed. Congress should consider modernization funding mechanisms that
may span multiple reauthorization and appropriation cycles that would
provide the FAA adequate resources needed to complete specific tasks
such as modernization. Congress should consider whether use of the
Airport and Airways Trust Fund may be such a funding mechanism.
Congress has the authority to task and authorize the FAA to utilize the
trust fund available as a funding source for a specific task
independent of annual appropriations.
Another challenge we face is continued attempts to solve market
issues with solutions that negatively impact safety. For example, the
most vital safety feature on any airliner is having at least two
experienced, highly-trained, and well-rested pilots on the flight deck.
Yet, some stakeholders actually try to claim that there would be no
safety impact if one or both pilots were removed to lower operational
costs. This is an absurdity that we will continue to fight.
Additionally, business models and practices abroad impinge on our
safety standards when carriers not meeting our safety threshold are
permitted to enter U.S. airspace and land at our airports. Safety
should never give way to competitive advantage. Similarly, here in the
U.S., an air carrier is attempting to circumvent the regulations for a
business advantage by setting up an alter ego operator to transport
passengers under a different standard rather than remaining under the
highest, most stringent standard under FAR Part 121.\5\ Collectively,
we all must continue to call out these deceptive attempts to gain a
competitive edge while sacrificing safety.
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\5\ See, application of SkyWest Charter, LLC for a Commuter Air
Carrier Authorization at DOT-OST-2022-0071.
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Lastly, because we have become incredibly safe for so long,
complacency is an ever-present risk. We must remain watchful, and
safety-focused to prevent complacency and notions that we are ``safe
enough'' from entering the system. Mass-scale information and data
sharing helps prevent complacency from setting in. Awareness of issues
in all parts of the system informs stakeholders that risks exist even
if not experienced by a particular stakeholder. We all must be
constantly reminded that our safety record could change in an instant
by one event: that's why we must fight complacency just as fiercely as
any other threat. Through hard, often tragic, lessons learned and
cutting-edge safety data analysis, we have developed the global gold
standard for aviation safety here in the United States. It is our
solemn responsibility--lawmakers, pilots, and citizens--to ensure we
enjoy this standing for decades to come. Thank you for this opportunity
to participate in this important discussion today.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you very much.
I have got to step out for a second to meet with the
Missouri Adjutant General, but I will be listening in the
antechamber. But I want to introduce Mr. Pete Bunce, who is the
president of GAMA, the General Aviation Manufacturers
Association. Thanks for being here.
Pete.
TESTIMONY OF PETER J. BUNCE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, GENERAL AVIATION MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Bunce. Thank you, Chairman Graves and Ranking Member
Larsen, for allowing me to be in front of you today.
We have got a lot of work to do with the FAA
reauthorization. I was very encouraged by yours last night and
this morning about the bipartisan nature with which we are
going to approach this, because we have to correct some things
that are not going in the right direction, particularly in
aircraft certification.
We talk about the gold standard, and when you look at how
we do rulemaking, it is the gold standard of how we started. We
do an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee to start with. We
bring in experts from all over the planet, regulatory
authorities, and the best from industry. And we go ahead and do
rulemaking, talk about doing rulemaking, set the framework for
it. And then what happens? It sits on the shelf.
And a prime example of this is, as you all know, ACSAA that
was passed just a couple of years ago. One of the primary
tenets in that was safety management systems. We did that in
2014, and that rule sat on the shelf for manufacturers until
recently, an NPRM, a notice of proposed rulemaking, was just
issued. But it goes much further than that. We are at the 14th
anniversary of the Miracle on the Hudson. We went and did the
advanced Aviation Rulemaking Committee, talking about flocking
bird tests. That has sat on the shelf now since 2015. But EASA,
the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, they promulgated
their rule. These examples go on and on.
To Mr. Boulter's credit, those rules that are in his
purview because he is a man of action, and he is taking the
reins and is actually making things happen, have been able to
advance rules in his area. But some of these really large rules
go up, and they sit at FAA legal, or they go into the black
hole of DOT or get delayed in the transmission of OMB, and they
just sit there and sit there. All the while, EASA promulgates
the rules, as they should, because they were part of the
rulemaking committee, and that becomes the world standard for
the rule. There is something wrong with that process.
But worse than that is, during that entire time, we have
aviation specialists, mainly in Mr. Boulter's area, that have
to focus on being able to do exemptions, special conditions,
and what we call equivalent level of safety analysis each and
every time because a rule is not out there that the
manufacturers just simply have to say, we have complied with
the rule and the FAA checks that. That sucks up resources that
doesn't allow us to do the technology improvements that you
talked about, Chairman Graves, in being able to move the ball
forward, because the resources just aren't there. And that
causes delay, after delay, after delay.
Exacerbating that is the new people within the workforce in
aircraft certification. Forty percent of that workforce has
less than 2 years of experience. Now, that is in the aircraft
certification branch. The way we used to do it prepandemic is
we would train new specialists basically through on-the-job
training from the older, what we called the old heads, that
imparted their knowledge. One of the dispersed places where we
live now where specialists are, that training isn't available.
And I know that I have talked with Chairman Sam Graves and
Ranking Member Larsen about this, we have got to fix that.
We can do joint training between industry and Mr. Boulter's
regulators and aviation specialists, and we can do it. We can
have Boeing people go train at Gulfstream on a different coast
and vice versa, Pratt people up in Connecticut go to GE in
Ohio. We can do that to have the safeguards in there, but we
have got to fix the training, because only through that, then
we can have accountability in the workforce with timelines that
we can start bringing technology on board, like technology that
will allow a pilot to see if somebody has been cleared for
takeoff on the runway because they can actually see the
pictorial display in the cockpit or a safe taxi route if
somebody is on an active runway. And we can do that with color
presentation. But we will never be able to certify that
technology unless we have the technicians available and the
rules to facilitate it.
Lastly, international validations. Right now, and as you
saw in the prep material that the chairman put out for this
hearing, we have a system right now where we have people having
great scrutiny across the Atlantic Ocean on equipment that we
certify and vice versa. We're not implementing the bilateral
safety agreement like it was meant to and what we do by the
technical implementation procedures. We aren't measuring it.
And we are hoping that this committee will demand from the FAA
metrics and an ability and an annual report to be able to say
how we are improving in the areas of validation.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[Mr. Bunce's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter J. Bunce, President and Chief Executive
Officer, General Aviation Manufacturers Association
Chairman Sam Graves and Ranking Member Rick Larsen, on behalf of
the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) and its member
companies, thank you for convening today's hearing which focuses on
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization and how to
reverse current trends that are tarnishing the U.S. as the gold
standard in aviation safety. All aviation stakeholders need to adopt
``an all-hands on deck'' approach as we work together to plot and
navigate the industry's future path for safety and innovation. The goal
should be to ensure a robust FAA oversight process that builds on the
strength of every participant in the certification and regulatory
process to deliver safety and technology improvements in the most
effective manner possible.
GAMA represents more than 140 of the world's leading manufacturers
of general aviation airplanes and rotorcraft, engines, avionics,
advanced air mobility aircraft, components, and related services and
technologies. GAMA members are also providers of maintenance and repair
services, fixed-based operations, pilot and maintenance training, and
aircraft management companies. GAMA companies have facilities in 48
states and 27 countries. A recent economic impact study determined that
the general aviation industry supports $247 billion in economic output
and 1.2 million jobs in the U.S.\1\
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\1\ General Aviation's Contributions to the U.S. Economy, 2018
Price Waterhouse Coopers Study on behalf of Aircraft Electronics
Association (AEA), Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA),
Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), General Aviation Manufacturers
Association (GAMA), Helicopter Association International
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We want to state the deep appreciation we have for this Committee
and the U.S. Congress for their commitment to improving aviation safety
and fostering innovation and growth in the aviation industry. Chairman
Graves and Ranking Member Larsen, we look forward to working with you,
House Aviation Subcommittee Chair Garret Graves and Ranking Member
Steve Cohen, and the entire membership of the full committee on these
issues. We want to commend you for moving quickly on this hearing given
the importance of reauthorizing the FAA by the September 30, 2023,
deadline. Your timely work on reauthorizing the FAA is essential as
this is a transformative time for the aviation industry and U.S.
transportation system, the likes of which has not been seen since the
dawn of the Jet Age.
ACSAA and Safety Management Systems
GAMA recognizes the congressional engagement and work that
culminated in the December 2020 passage of the Aircraft Certification,
Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA) \2\. In the aftermath of the
Boeing 737 MAX accidents, GAMA engaged with aviation stakeholders to
examine the issues raised by these accidents and find solutions to
improve the safety and strength of the aviation system. Many of the
provisions included in ACSAA bolstered efforts long championed by GAMA
and were touted by GAMA when the legislation passed. These include
increasing resources for the FAA safety workforce and oversight
activities, improving safety decision-making for new technologies, and
facilitating the FAA's international engagement in safety promotion and
improvements in safety cooperation.
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\2\ Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (P.L.
116-260)
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Of critical importance to GAMA was the ACSAA direction to FAA to
promulgate a rulemaking to implement safety management systems (SMS)
for manufacturers. For years, GAMA has been a strong supporter of the
development of SMS standards for aviation manufacturers and maintenance
organizations. We participated as the industry co-chair of the Part 21
SMS Aviation Rulemaking Committee, which submitted its recommendations
to FAA in 2014. Since then, SMS standards and best practices have been
developed and voluntarily implemented by manufacturers on both sides of
the Atlantic Ocean, including the European Union Aviation Safety
Agency's (EASA) SMS rules for manufacturers that will become applicable
in March of this year. SMS improves safety and fosters a robust and
continuous safety and oversight culture that permeates from top to
bottom in an organization and across lines of business which positively
impacts a company's management, employees, products, and services. We
strongly endorse appropriate implementation of SMS standards and look
forward to reviewing and commenting on the FAA's long overdue, recently
proposed SMS rule as it moves to final publication.
As the Committee approaches FAA Reauthorization, GAMA believes that
we can build on areas identified when the ACSAA legislation was being
considered, and with it now law, ensure it is successfully implemented.
Your work on FAA Reauthorization will play a crucial role in furthering
the goals of ACSAA's intent by helping to address regulatory delays
that are significantly hindering safety and industry innovation;
strengthen the FAA's technical capabilities and leverage industry
expertise; improve U.S. engagement and activity internationally; and
provide the framework for continuous improvement in the FAA's
certification process.
Today, I want to outline each of these areas in more detail and
show how FAA reauthorization can address them with some policy ideas
for your consideration.
Regulatory Process Improvement
Unfortunately, despite the good work of thousands of dedicated FAA
employees, delays in the promulgation of rulemaking, policies, and
guidance have inhibited the progression of safety-enhancing
aeronautical products through the certification system. Contributing to
these delays is a large backlog of technical standards, policy memos,
orders, and advisory circulars. Improvements are needed to the overall
process to address development of safety standards such as those
covered under ACSAA, cybersecurity and pilot training standards, as
well as to facilitate advances in new technology. Another reminder of
this backlog happened last month when the 14th anniversary of the
Miracle on the Hudson was observed while the flocking bird test
requirement developed in the aftermath of that accident still has not
been issued as a final rule. Finally, the status of processing
regulations and guidance for certification lacks the degree of
transparency, including with other aviation authorities, and most
importantly, the accountability within the FAA and the Department of
Transportation (DOT), necessary to ensure progress in maintaining
safety, security, and U.S. leadership and competitiveness.
Industry actively supports the FAA and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) through the development of industry standards and
participation in federal aviation rulemaking and advisory committees
(ARAC). The FAA's comprehensive consultative process should be the
source of envy of all and the model for gathering comments from the
public, industry, and safety experts. However, the FAA and DOT internal
administrative process has resulted in significant delays to promulgate
and implement the results of these consultative efforts which
negatively impacts this collective strength. This has slowed progress
in safety and innovation and forces the FAA and industry to go through
administratively burdensome and time-consuming alternative processes
such as exemptions, special conditions, and issue papers. Ironically,
this also impacts the FAA's global leadership, as other aviation
authorities move forward with promulgating and implementing the
technical safety work completed by the U.S. advisory groups. This
leaves the FAA and U.S. aviation industry behind due to these
procedural delays.
As an example, an FAA ARAC working group submitted recommendations
to the FAA in 2016 for the establishment of aircraft system information
cybersecurity and protection requirements. Pending rulemaking,
cybersecurity is currently addressed by the FAA through project-by-
project special conditions and issue papers whereas EASA promulgated
and adopted cybersecurity requirements based on the ARAC
recommendations in July 2020.
Part of the delay for the cybersecurity rule is because it is part
of a larger package focused on modernizing transport airplane
requirements, which has not been able to move through the rulemaking
bureaucracy. Ironically, this failure has led to more delays and
heavier administrative burden on the agency and industry because rather
than having updated rules that apply to all projects, every single
certification project is instead subject to a series of rulemakings
that consider the same special conditions, exemptions, and equivalent
level of safety for each project again and again.
GAMA proposes that the FAA, with DOT participation, immediately
establish an internal regulatory process review team. The team should
be tasked with developing recommendations within 90 days to improve the
timeliness, transparency, and performance accountability in the
promulgation of rules, regulatory policies, guidance, and other
materials necessary for certification and approval of new aircraft,
equipment, training, and operations. The team should base these
recommendations on the comprehensive review of the regulatory processes
referenced earlier, including consideration of streamlining processes
and eliminating redundant or unnecessary review by certain FAA and DOT
offices, and others given the apolitical and technical subject matter
of these regulatory, safety, and compliance materials.
The review should also consider the potential need for hiring
additional FAA safety personnel and others whose focus is moving
forward new and revised regulatory policy and guidance documents in a
more expeditious fashion. The review team should also propose how to
put in place quarterly scorecards on progress--to include data on the
number of rules, policy, and guidance documents in process each quarter
along with ``elapsed time'' from start to publish, as well as the
number of documents still in the queue waiting to start the process.
These quarterly scorecards could be used to measure actual progress and
identify bottlenecks that need to be addressed to speed up the process
moving forward. FAA should be directed to brief the Committee on these
recommendations and an action plan to implement them within 30 days of
completion of the review team's work.
Looking forward to the emerging advanced air mobility (AAM) sector,
it is critical that the FAA, DOT and the Office of Management and
Budget complete the rulemaking they call the ``powered-lift'' special
federal aviation regulation (SFAR) to establish the necessary
regulatory requirements for commercial operations and pilot
certification for electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL)
vehicles no later than December 2024. This is the FAA's announced
completion date which is necessary to enable the expected entry into
service of initial AAM aircraft. The Committee should hold the FAA to
that commitment. However, as previously discussed, there are
significant concerns about DOT's administrative process for rulemaking,
so we also propose that Congress puts in place an interim solution that
would allow for this new category of ``powered-lift'' aircraft (e.g.,
the new certification path for eVTOL) to operate commercially under
specified existing regulations if the FAA fails to publish these rules
by the deadline. This proposed interim path would not be used or go
away once the FAA issues the final SFAR. Congress should also direct
the FAA to continue activities and actions to enable certification and
entry into service of other types of AAM vehicles and technologies and
operations not addressed by the ``powered-lift'' SFAR such as
simplified vehicle operations, autonomy, instrument flight rules, and
airspace integration.
FAA Technical Capabilities
Tied closely to ACSAA's focus, the FAA needs a strong and capable
workforce to meet the safety expectations of the flying public.
According to FAA, 40% of the engineers in the FAA Aircraft
Certification Office have less than two years of FAA certification
experience, which underscores the urgency of the current workforce
challenge. GAMA believes an emphasis must be placed on the workforce
responsible for aircraft certification at the project level to ensure
the FAA has an adequate level of staff resources, including for
necessary training. There have also been recent departures in key
certification management positions and those must be filled with
strongly capable, effective managers with deep technical expertise
especially given the overall inexperience in the workforce. Given these
staffing challenges, the FAA should consider whether their current work
from home policy is conducive to the successful training and
integration of these new employees. Additionally, the FAA should detail
their efforts to ensure the current policy does not present obstacles
to timely agency decision-making.
The FAA has recognized the ongoing challenge to identify and
attract talent into key safety positions and has maintained an Aviation
Workforce Plan in the hope of addressing these needs. However, the
agency needs to continue to explore training opportunities and
financial incentives as well as partnering with industry to facilitate
the effectiveness of the FAA's safety workforce. This effectiveness can
also be enhanced by holding FAA certification and flight standards
employees accountable to agreed-upon certification and validation plans
and processes.
Finding highly qualified individuals to tackle evolving technology
such as flight crew interface (human factors), system safety, autonomy,
propulsion methods, software, and artificial intelligence is
challenging. Other government agencies have addressed similar problems
by establishing partnerships with industry without ceding or
compromising, in any respect, their regulatory authority. For example,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has a Professional
Accounting Fellows Program that allows the appointment of highly
qualified industry individuals to positions requiring specialized or
unique skills within the SEC.
In FAA reauthorization, the Committee should direct the FAA to
conduct a new review of its engineering, pilot, and inspector staffing
needs related to aircraft certification compliance and system safety
and designee oversight activities, including a comparative industry
compensation and benefits analysis to identify competitive salaries
which will bolster retention and attract experienced industry engineers
and inspectors to the FAA. This analysis should include consideration
of special pay or hiring incentives for hard-to-fill positions such as
flight test pilots, software experts, system safety engineers, and
autonomous systems specialists and how personnel reforms the agency was
given in the 1990s could help achieve this end.
Additionally, the Committee should provide clear authorization for
the establishment of a training exchange program for the FAA and
industry workforce responsible for safety certification activities.
This should facilitate the FAA providing detailed technical training to
company employees and designees on aviation safety regulatory
requirements, policy, and guidance. The program should also authorize
the provision of detailed technical training by companies, without
cost, to FAA employees on company engineering, analysis, test, modeling
methodologies, compliance processes, and aviation products and
technologies. The FAA should also establish a demonstration fellowship
program like the one at the SEC, with appropriate safeguards,
permitting the appointment of highly qualified individuals from
industry to temporary positions within the FAA or from FAA to industry.
We believe these initiatives can provide critical understanding about
new technologies and processes while recognizing the need to ensure
impartiality. The review should also consider the minimum training
necessary for FAA employees who conduct examinations and tests, perform
oversight, and determine technical compliance and approvals for the
issuance of design approvals and certificates.
Within both these exchange programs and other areas, to be
successful in its safety and oversight mission, the FAA must rely on
the best available expertise and experience. This expertise is
facilitated by using industry professionals, where appropriate, to
conduct examinations, perform tests, determine compliance, and issue
approvals and certificates. The FAA delegation program makes available
to the FAA the world's leading expertise and experience across all
aviation technical disciplines and with FAA and global certification
processes. In addition, this also includes industry involvement in
technical boards to provide expertise and knowledge to support
development of necessary safety standards and the better utilization of
groups like the congressionally created Safety Oversight and
Certification Advisory Committee (SOCAC).
Validation and International Engagement
Aviation is a global industry and to promote safety and maintain
U.S. leadership, the FAA must place a priority on working with other
aviation authorities and policymakers. This includes engagement with
key international partners at the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) as well as ensure compliance and strengthen the
effectiveness of bilateral safety agreements.
GAMA's membership faces impediments with validation in the
international marketplace. Congress rightfully focused on international
leadership and engagement in the 2018 FAA Reauthorization \3\, and we
believe that a renewed attention is merited. The FAA certification
office has created an International Validation branch to improve this
activity, but the office has been slowly ramping up and lacks the full-
time employees with the training, understanding and relationships
necessary to effectively manage the implementation of validation
programs under bilateral agreements with foreign authorities. It is
critical that this branch be given the resources and tools it needs to
be successful, and Congressional support will help ensure the
effectiveness of bilateral agreements and validation programs essential
for the global export of U.S. products.
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\3\ FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254)
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GAMA proposes that Congress requires an annual report from the FAA
evaluating type validation program performance under bilateral
agreements and outlining plans and recommendations for improvement. The
report should include an evaluation of the following: outgoing and
incoming validation program data such as number and type of projects,
timeline milestones and related metrics; analysis of the use of
implementation tools such as validation workplan and risk-based
involvement safety emphasis items; stakeholder perspectives and data on
validation performance to include FAA aircraft certification offices,
FAA International Validation Branch, bilateral authority, and industry
applicants; delineation of FAA training to employees on validation and
outreach conducted to improve processes; and a description of
engagement with international certification authorities to maximize
safety cooperation and the use of another certifying authority's
approvals.
More broadly, the Committee should also direct the FAA to develop a
plan, in proactive coordination with the aviation industry, to enhance
U.S. aviation safety leadership and activities internationally on areas
including but not limited to safety enhancing technologies, automation,
general aviation innovation, uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and AAM.
This plan should consider the future direction and strategy of U.S.
engagement with ICAO; how to facilitate acceptance of mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) such as airworthiness
directives and other safety documents; and promotion of standards
harmonization and adoption. In addition, better alignment of FAA
technical assistance and training in countries or regions with U.S.
certified aircraft operations and industry activity to enhance aviation
safety should be considered including resolution of any issues
hindering the provision of this technical assistance. Reauthorization
should also make it clear that the FAA Administrator has authority to
approve any international travel requests for FAA employees to support
these critical activities.
Continuous Certification Improvement
GAMA also believes emphasis should be placed on examining the
future enhancement and continuous improvement to FAA certification
processes. When the certification process is efficient, effective, and
predictable, it fosters investment in safety innovation and strengthens
the U.S. aviation system and economy. The current certification process
was developed in the 1960s and reflects an era when aircraft were
simpler. This process takes a document-centric approach that is very
transactional in nature. In this traditional approach, each regulatory
requirement is mapped to a document that demonstrates compliance. Each
document ``shows'' compliance to individual airworthiness requirements
and is then reviewed for an additional check, and compliance is
``found.'' In the 1960s, the processes did not envision the extent of
computer modeling and simulation that the industry is capable of today.
Nor did it envision the highly integrated complex aircraft that achieve
today's safety standards.
The use of modern computer systems would allow the regulator and
industry to access models in real time as the project evolves,
providing a more accurate and timelier picture of the program and
better matching performance demands of today's complex aircraft.
Similarly, in lieu of extensive flight-testing that may pose risks
without compensating benefits, tools exist today that allow these
activities to be conducted through integrated labs, and computational
models and simulation. However, the FAA lacks the requirements, policy,
and even a vision for a future state of aircraft certification where
these capabilities are leveraged to their greatest extent.
It is GAMA's recommendation that the Committee direct the FAA to
contract with a federally funded research center or other qualified
entity to evaluate how best to foster continuous improvements in the
certification system. This should include examining model-based systems
engineering techniques and new means to validate and verify aircraft
designs, particularly with software. The study should also review other
countries' certification processes to identify the best procedures,
practices, and tools that could be adopted by the U.S. and evaluate
policies to enable the increased use of simulators/integrated test
facilities to reduce use of high-risk flight testing. The review should
include input from FAA certificate holders and also be focused on
fostering advancement of safety management systems. To further this
critical review, the FAA should be directed to utilize the SOCAC to
help facilitate implementation of ACSAA as well as look at other
improvements for the certification process.
While I have focused my testimony to this point on these critical
certification issues and regulatory improvements, the Committee also
can take action on the following issues that will benefit safety and
the aviation system:
Advancing Workforce Development in the Aerospace Sector
An important complement to efforts to enhance FAA's technical
workforce is to attract and retain a competent and capable workforce
for the aviation industry and at our member companies. Our industry is
currently struggling to fill technically skilled jobs to operate,
maintain, and manufacture aircraft. This workforce challenge will
become even more acute as aviation evolves through innovation, which
will require a workforce that is more diverse and with broader
competencies and new skill sets. We appreciate the leadership shown by
the Committee in this area.
The 2018 FAA reauthorization provided DOT with the authority to
provide up to $10 million in grants to facilitate workforce development
of pilots and maintenance providers.\4\ We appreciate and thank members
of this committee and the Congress for the important funding provided
to date.
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\4\ FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254), Sec. 625
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Our membership believes the scope and funding for these programs
should be significantly expanded, particularly given our understanding
that demand for this funding has been significant. We also believe the
program should specifically include manufacturing workers as an area of
focus to complement the prior focus on pilots and maintenance. In
addition, the upcoming reauthorization should include a provision to
measure results and provide feedback from participants, engage school
counselors more directly in aviation workforce efforts, and facilitate
training to teachers on how to start and conduct a successful aviation
education program. Attention should also be paid to track how a program
applicant will connect students with either jobs or the next step in
the education process (for example, from high school to college or a
technical school) to sustain a pipeline of talent to the industry long-
term and emphasize activities that engage, educate, and equip
participants to directly feed into the aviation sector and provide the
next generation of safety-focused aviation professionals.
Managing and Coordinating Spectrum Use
Our membership utilizes spectrum and supports efforts to ensure its
availability to meet aviation's operational and safety requirements.
There has been a clear lack of coordination amongst industry and
government stakeholders to consider all impacts of spectrum use and
facilitate desired outcomes. This ultimately has significantly negative
impacts upon aviation and broader stakeholders, including those in the
telecommunications sector seeking to deploy and utilize spectrum. While
we know there are limits to how this issue can be addressed in an FAA
reauthorization bill, we believe that there are still some steps that
can be taken in the legislation to ensure the protection of aviation
safety and enhance coordination while efforts continue more broadly.
We suggest policymakers require the FAA to coordinate with a
reputable third party (such as the National Academy of Science) to
report to the Committee on a strategy for protecting aviation equities
in the radio spectrum. The strategy should include a process for the
FAA and the aviation community to properly and thoroughly review
proposed spectrum reallocations (including through auctions) to ensure
that any comments, objections, or technical concerns from aviation
stakeholders in any FCC proceeding are definitively assessed and
addressed at a technical level to those stakeholders' satisfaction. The
report should also develop an improved spectrum process and road map
that could help meet the future needs of the aviation system in a way
that also supports other private sector applications that are rapidly
expanding and have societal value.
Addressing Piston-Engine Aircraft Fleet Fuel
The FAA has joined with aviation and petroleum industry
stakeholders to work toward transitioning to lead-free aviation fuels
for piston-engine aircraft by the end of 2030. The Eliminate Aviation
Gasoline Lead Emissions (EAGLE) initiative will expand and accelerate
government and industry actions and investments as well as establish
the necessary policies and activities to permit both new and existing
general aviation aircraft to operate lead-free, without compromising
aviation safety and the economic and broader public benefits of general
aviation. We recognize that this is very ambitious, and each of the
organizations involved is fully committed to EAGLE's success with work
well underway.
The importance of this initiative to general aviation and U.S.
transportation infrastructure cannot be overstated. There are more than
13,000 different airports which service a U.S. fleet of roughly 170,000
piston-engine general aviation aircraft. This year, the Environmental
Protection Agency is moving forward with an endangerment finding which
will trigger a process under the Clean Air Act for regulatory activity
to eliminate lead emissions and ban the current 100-octane low-lead
(LL). The clock is ticking, and we need to move quickly to facilitate
deployment of a viable unleaded replacement fuel or fuels. The fuel or
fuels should be FAA approved as meeting the safety requirements of the
existing fleet of aircraft and should also be economically produced and
distributed to reach the market of airports across the U.S. In the
interim, the safety and viability of general aviation depend on
ensuring the continued, uninterrupted availability of 100-octane LL
fuel at airports until an unleaded solution is identified and widely
available. Additionally, the EAGLE initiative is currently looking at
areas for potential federal investment to facilitate this transition
and we would like to work with Congress as these initiatives are
developed.
Aviation Funding Stability
GAMA recognizes that this Committee has supported legislation in
the past to provide targeted stability for the aviation system to
function in the event of a U.S. government shutdown. This initiative is
important for protecting the air traffic system and critical elements
of aviation safety.
Prior legislative efforts proposed enabling the FAA to tap into the
Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF) during a lapse in appropriations,
to ensure no FAA employees are furloughed or work without pay. We know
from experience that shutdowns are harmful to the FAA, the economy,
small business, and safety. As a result, we encourage policymakers to
work together in a bipartisan manner to ensure that FAA is sufficiently
authorized and funded so it can provide, without interruption, its
critical safety oversight and management and operation of the air
traffic control system.
Air Traffic and Strategic Plan
The FAA should also be directed to revitalize their strategic plan
and vision for the modernization of the air traffic control system. The
past modernization effort placed a milestone in 2025, but this should
not be the end of efforts to make the National Airspace System (NAS)
safer, increase its capacity, or improve the efficiency of the NAS to
realize environmental, operational, and financial benefits. The FAA
needs to be challenged as part of the reauthorization to look to the
future and present a clear plan.
The new plan must continue to build on past successes in deploying
Performance Based Navigation (PBN), especially for departures and
arrivals; shifting strategic air-to-ground communication from voice to
data communications; and deploying a second-to-none surveillance
infrastructure. It must also address emerging challenges including the
operation of new entrants like UAS and powered-lift aircraft or AAM, as
well as commercial space operations. The FAA should collaborate with
stakeholders on this long-term vision and strategic plan to develop the
future flight plan but also ensure near-term initiatives for
sustainment and modernization within the agency's budget horizon are
fully addressed.
Closing
As I have discussed in this testimony, the aviation manufacturing
sector's advancement of safety and substantial contribution to the U.S.
GDP depend on the FAA functioning at 100% of its capability; the FAA's
ability to undertake in a timely manner the regulatory actions,
approvals, and engagement to bring aircraft, engines, avionics, and
other new technologies and products to the U.S. and global marketplace;
the FAA's effectiveness in working with industry to strengthen its
safety oversight and technical expertise; and the FAA's global
leadership and engagement to foster regulatory cooperation among
aviation authorities. The actions of this Committee are essential in
the success of these efforts, and we appreciate your consideration of
GAMA's views on FAA reauthorization today. We look forward to working
with you to ensure the FAA and the aviation industry represents the
gold standard.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana [presiding]. Thank you, Colonel.
Next, we have Ed Bolen, president and chief executive
officer of the National Business Aviation Association. You are
recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF ED BOLEN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION
Mr. Bolen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Larsen and members of the committee.
I think it has been stated today that the U.S., since the
Wright brothers, has been the world leader in all aspects of
aviation. And the foundation of our success in aviation has
been safety. Working together, legislators, regulators, and
industry, we have made aviation the safest mode of
transportation. It is an incredible record of success.
But I think everybody here knows a great threat to success
is complacency. It takes constant improvement to get to be the
best. It takes constant improvement to stay the best. If you
are not constantly improving, you are not keeping up. And with
this FAA reauthorization bill, we have an opportunity to remain
the best, to constantly get better, to avoid complacency, and
to make sure that we never fall behind.
NBAA comes forward to this hearing today with 10
recommendations where we can provide targeted solutions to
recognized challenges. And the first is: Let's get a bill done.
Ranking Member Larsen talked about space between 2012 and 2018.
We had over 20 continuing resolutions. CRs don't help us
constantly improve.
The second thing I would say is don't allow safety to ever
be shut down. In the past we learned that Government shutdowns
impact the FAA. It doesn't have to be that way. The FAA is a
safety organization. We have a trust fund. We have unobligated
balances. We can use those balances to make sure the important
safety work continues to get done regardless of the
environment.
I would also urge us to encourage innovation. The FAA has
got a mission to promote safety and efficiency. They can do
that by enabling the technologies, the performance standards,
the operations that enhance safety sustainability and allow us
to have more air mobility, providing access for everyone.
Digitization. My friend, Colonel Bunce, talked about how we
would find ourselves at times in black holes. Digitization will
help us understand where things are and how we can get them
done quicker. This includes the registration, certification,
permits of exemption, letters of authorization, even medicals.
Digitization is something we need to make sure we are doing and
we are doing well.
Workforce is a critical part of our ability to stay the
world's best. In the last FAA bill, we required a Women in
Aviation Advisory Board, a youth task force. Recommendations
are coming forward. What we need to do now is look at those
recommendations and see what is actionable. We need to attract
and develop and retain the best and the brightest. That means
looking in new places, finding underrepresented communities and
allowing them to populate our industry, our workforce, and the
FAA itself.
We also need to focus on ensuring privacy for people who
are on general aviation aircraft. We know as recently as
yesterday the DOT talked about the danger to security when
people have real-time information where specific individuals
are. We need to focus on SMS. A new notice of proposed
rulemaking has been issued. SMS is a remarkable safety tool,
but it has to be done right. The tool has to be sized for the
job. You can't use a saw when you need a scalpel.
We need to get the NOTAMs right. We talked about it today.
This is something that we have been working on for a very long
time. But in a world where there is a lot of data available, we
have got to condense it to information and make sure it is
always out there.
We need to also address the 5G issue that we have been
working on so hard. We have got to make sure that we have got
alternative means of compliance or radar altimeter set for GA
airports and make sure we are able to do that.
And finally, we need to continue to work together:
Congress, the FAA, and industry. Where we have seen dramatic
advancement is when we share our information, when we
collaborate, in the commercial world through CAST and in the
general aviation world through our joint steering committees.
Together we can ensure we remain the gold standard.
Thank you very much.
[Mr. Bolen's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ed Bolen, President and Chief Executive Officer,
National Business Aviation Association
Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, thank you for holding this
hearing to address aviation safety. On behalf of the National Business
Aviation Association's (NBAA's) 11,000-member companies, I am honored
to testify at this hearing.
NBAA's members, many of which are small businesses, rely on general
aviation aircraft to meet some portion of their transportation needs.
These aircraft provide connectivity to communities in every state and
nearly every congressional district, which is especially critical to
communities with little or no airline service. Business aviation is
keeping small businesses globally competitive and bolstering our
national economy with 1.2 million American jobs and $247 billion in
economic output.
The aviation industry overall--from commercial aviation, to general
aviation, manufacturing, Advanced Air Mobility and other emerging
technologies and associated businesses--accounts for more than five
percent of the United States gross domestic product. Considering the
vast challenges facing the FAA, and the opportunities that lay ahead,
swift passage of a new 5-year, bipartisan authorization will help set
the agency on a stronger path for the future and ensure continued
success of the industry. The NBAA urges Congress to prioritize on-time
passage of FAA Reauthorization before the current law expires on
September 30, 2023. We applaud Chairman Graves for setting a goal of
passing a bill through the House of Representatives by July 1, 2023,
and for getting to work right away with today's hearing.
A Legacy of Safety Leadership
NBAA appreciates Chairman Graves and Ranking Member Larsen for
choosing safety as the topic for the Committee's first hearing on FAA
reauthorization. Since the dawn of flight, safety has been integral to
everything we do, on the ground and in the air. Since NBAA was founded
in 1947, we have been intentional in developing partnerships with
government leaders and other stakeholders to deliver the products,
procedures and policies that continually increase the safety of flight.
Because of this continued, comprehensive focus on innovative
approaches to safety, aviation is the safest mode of transportation,
and the U.S. stands as the global leader in aviation safety. Safety is
not a destination, it is a journey and a practice that requires
vigilance and a supportive culture to thrive. Although the business
aviation community has built an impressive safety record, there is room
for improvement and we will continue to strive to do better.
An FAA reauthorization bill offers an opportunity to consider not
only the innovations that have made America the world's aviation safety
leader, but also the additional measures that will be needed to
maintain this leadership position five, 10 and 25 years from now.
General aviation (GA) has a strong role to play in shaping the future,
in part because it is the proving ground for the industry. GA is where
aviation was born, and it's the point of entry for many in the
community, from the pilot's first hours of flight to the mechanic's
first oil change. NBAA and the business aviation community greatly
appreciate the opportunity to be an active participant in the
development of this safety plan for the future through a new General
Aviation title under FAA Reauthorization.
Safety Leadership Through Pioneering Technologies
As this committee knows, many of the technologies and solutions
that have revolutionized aviation safety were born in the business
aviation community. We led the way with GPS, a transformative
navigation and safety technology. We led the way in development of
airborne collision-avoidance systems that ensure situational awareness
at all altitudes. We led the way in developing enhanced vision systems
that can identify unanticipated ground obstructions in thick fog, and
see through clouds to locate terrain while in flight.
We partnered with the FAA in integrating the Reduced Vertical
Separation Minimum (RVSM) technology that has vastly increased the
efficiency and safety of aviation system management. Similarly, we were
the early adopters of Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-
B), a cornerstone technology for ushering in the next generation
aviation system's enhancements to safety, as well as efficiency and
sustainability.
Safety Leadership Through Data-Based Programs
Of course, the deployment of world-leading technologies has been
only one piece of the safety equation for aviation. The development and
implementation of innovative programs that identify the root causes of
safety threats, and offer proven ways to eliminate them, is also a key
building block for a solid safety foundation.
For example, 20 years ago, NBAA and its members joined with the
International Business Aviation Council in developing the safety
focused International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations (IS-
BAO), a set of best practices focused on safety management as a data-
driven team effort, including pilots and cabin crew, schedulers,
dispatchers, maintenance technicians and others. Since the program's
founding, more than 700 business aviation operators in 35 countries
have become IS-BAO registered, improving their safety risk profile.
Today, the business aviation community is an active participant in
a variety of government-industry programs that aggregate operational
data to identify risks, capture behaviors that contribute to accidents,
and pinpoint ways to mitigate those events. As just one example, we can
point to the FAA's Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
program, also known as ``ASIAS,'' in which more than 150 organizations
capture and coordinate data and other information critical to avoiding
a variety of unusual events, including bird strikes, mid-air
collisions, course deviations and other aviation safety hazards.
NBAA has promoted ASIAS through discussions at our National Safety
Forum on specific aviation hazards, during the NTSB Roundtable
discussion at NBAA Business Aviation Convention and Exhibition (NBAA-
BACE), in articles published in NBAA's safety-focused Business Aviation
Insider magazine, and through our ongoing engagement at the ASIAS
Executive Board and GA Issues Analysis Team governance levels within
the program.
As part of Safer Skies, launched in 1998, the FAA and the general
aviation community jointly pursue a goal of reducing GA fatal
accidents. The General Aviation Joint Safety Committee (GAJSC) uses a
data-driven, consensus-based approach to analyze safety data to develop
specific interventions that will mitigate the root causes of accidents.
The GAJSC focuses on proactively assessing data to identify new
emerging issues and threats to general aviation safety, analyze them,
and develop mitigation strategies to address and prioritize safety
issues to prevent accidents. NBAA, a founding member of the GAJSC, has
supported the valuable safety studies and analyses conducted by this
group, and worked to educate our members on the tools created to
address specific safety risks.
The current goal is a safety improvement over the FY18 target of
1.00 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours to a FY28 target of 0.89
fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours.
Leadership in Safety Policy Development
A comprehensive approach to safety involves not just an investment
in new technologies, or simply the development of risk-mitigation
programs, but also a continuing commitment to an effective and tailored
policy framework that matches the size and operational realities of
business aviation. For a safety mandate to realize the benefits it
seeks, it must have flexibility to scale, to fit the largest commercial
operation, or the smallest charter business. NBAA and its members have
led the way in this area.
For example, the business aviation community has most recently been
focused on a policy proposal put forward by the FAA in January, which
would extend the requirement for implementation of Safety Management
System (SMS) programs beyond those for the airlines to many business
aircraft operations.
While NBAA and its members have always supported rigor in ensuring
everyone involved in a flight maintains a premium on safety, we know
that an SMS suited for the largest airline will not likely be
transferable to a small operation with a single airplane.
We can look outside of the United States to learn lessons as we
review the FAA's new proposal. Our focus will be on ensuring that any
resulting program is not only flexible, but also meaningful in driving
safety, rather than confusion due to compliance burdens and other
missteps that have been characteristic of the introduction of SMS for
business aviation in Canada and elsewhere.
Canada's SMS implementation in the mid-2000s created significant
industry concerns due to lack of scalability and the government's poor
transition from a historic view of prescriptive oversight to one where
risk is defined by the operator. As a result, it has taken nearly two
decades to modernize those initial regulations so that they reflect the
vast diversity of operations subject to the mandates involved.
A similar operator experience with the SMS rollout in New Zealand
was recently publicly shared in AvWeb:
``We've gone through SMS in New Zealand . . . We were promised
from the start that it would be scaled to the size of our
operations, but in the end we had to do all the requirements,
even if the CAA [Civilian Aviation Authority] guys acknowledged
it made little sense for us . . . The hardest part of
implementation was a lack of understanding from CAA about SMS,
since they were quite new to it as well, so we had little
effective guidance (despite a lot of effort on their part) and
a lot of inconsistent directives.''
The U.S. aviation industry cannot afford to repeat the poorly
developed SMS deployment we have seen elsewhere. We must get this right
from the start in order to leverage the safety benefits that we know
SMS can deliver. The business aviation community has experience
partnering with the government in the development of effective,
customized policies, and we enthusiastically welcome the same approach
to the consideration of SMS requirements for our sector.
A Culture That Recognizes Safety Achievement
A key strategy for continually enhancing business aviation's safety
posture is to cultivate and acknowledge excellence in safety leadership
within the industry. Everyone--from the pilot, to the cabin crew, to
the dispatcher, to the maintenance technician and beyond--has an
important role in the safety of flight.
With this in mind, NBAA in 2022 launched its Business Aviation
Safety Manager Certificate Program. This completely online
accreditation was designed to educate individuals to effectively manage
a business aviation organization's proactive safety efforts. It
includes an in-depth look at the four elements of an SMS, including
Safety Policy, Risk Management, Safety Assurance and Safety Promotion,
as well as modules on Safety Leadership and Emergency Response.
The effort goes beyond initial education, by connecting certificate
applicants to each other, in a community of engagement through peer-to-
peer learning that fosters continuous safety improvement across the
board, while also meeting the specific operational needs of any given
aviation operation. In just a single year since this program's launch,
more than 300 people have completed the course, obtaining recognition
for safety leadership, while building an enduring peer community of
safety advocates in business aviation.
NBAA honors safety leadership in other important ways. For several
decades the association has annually issued its Flying Safety Awards, a
standards-based honor that recognizes exceptional achievement in safe
flying operations, and pays tribute to the skill of a company's
management, maintenance, pilot and support-personnel teams. NBAA's
Safety Committee, one of its oldest committees, administers the
annually issued Dr. Tony Kern Professionalism in Aviation Awards, which
specifically honor individuals for outstanding professionalism and
leadership in support of aviation safety. The committee's newest honor,
the Above and Beyond Award, is given to individuals whose application
of safety best practices played a key role in avoiding injury, loss of
life, or catastrophic aircraft damage in hazardous flying
circumstances.
Leveraging the Safety Benefits of New Technology
A solid foundation of safety has been built over the last several
decades through products that enhance safety, programs that ensure
safety remains job one in aviation, policies that build on the many
gains made in flight safety, and, promotion of leadership in the safety
arena. That said, the aviation landscape is continually evolving, and
the industry's approach to safety must evolve with it.
Consider the continuing breakthroughs in aviation technology that
are delivering a myriad of benefits--from speed, to fuel efficiency, to
safety--and how those advances might offer an opportunity to update
regulations to match the safety benefits they deliver. For example,
current federal mandates require pilots to use supplemental oxygen at
high altitudes in pressurized aircraft. If one pilot leaves the
controls of an airplane while it is at high altitude, the remaining
pilot at the controls is required to use an oxygen mask, to reduce the
possibility of an accident caused by a decompression incident, until
the other pilot has returned to the controls. The development of new
technologies allow for the oxygen requirement to be reconsidered:
specifically, advances made in pressurization and hull design have
introduced multiple layers of safety not available decades ago, and
have dramatically reduced the need for a supplemental oxygen mandate to
address a depressurization event.
We commend Congress for recognizing this reality by amending the
rule on supplemental oxygen under the Federal Aviation Administration
Reauthorization Act of 2018, for operations conducted under Part 121,
to allow a crew to operate safely up to 41,000 feet without
supplemental oxygen. The NBAA is urging Congress to apply the same
standard to operations conducted under FAR Part 135.
Accelerating Technology Upgrades to Improve Safety
As important as new technologies are in offering game-changing ways
of thinking about safety, it is equally important to ensure that
critical legacy technologies receive the resources needed to stay at
the cutting edge.
As one example, the United States Notice to Air Missions System
(USNS) is a critical aviation safety technology. The USNS is intended
to provide always-up-to-date safety notices for pilots, with real-time
information about airports and airspace to help ensure a flight is
conducted safely.
Unfortunately, needed upgrades to the technology that would provide
for enhanced customization of information and other beneficial safety
features are years behind schedule. As a practical matter, a pilot
might be required to needlessly sift through reams of NOTAM information
about a flight to ensure its safety.
For well over a decade, NBAA has urged the FAA to modernize the
NOTAM infrastructure and enhance the system to ensure pilots have ready
access to machine-readable, filterable and useful information in the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) format used by the
rest of the world.
In 2019, the FAA and industry formed the Aeronautical Information
Reform Coalition, which has been working collaboratively on NOTAM
reform, with NBAA leading the coalition on behalf of the industry.
Under the coalition's guidance, the FAA has begun to transition the
USNS to a new Federal NOTAM System (FNS), but the completion date has
been met with repeated delays, and the needed enhancements have yet to
be delivered.
Unfortunately, as is typically the case with technological
upgrades, delays ultimately come with a cost: on January 10, 2023, the
FAA issued a nationwide ground stop due to the need for a USNS reboot,
following a system outage. Not only did the ground stop impact all
operators; it also created a cascading effect on aviation system
operations that was incredibly difficult to recover from, despite the
full outage lasting only a few hours.
We applaud the leadership of the House of Representatives in
passing the NOTAM Improvement Act of 2023; however, more must be done
to bolster the system so that it utilizes the most updated technologies
to best inform its users' decisions about safety and other aspects of a
flight.
As the administration and Congress investigate what caused the USNS
outage, NBAA recommends the establishment of clear goals and
accountability measures for the implementation of FNS, including
implementation of an FNS with an enhanced capability to deliver
machine-readable, filterable and useful information in the format used
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); the completion
of a robust, reliable backup system to FNS, and; an agreement to a
deadline for the complete transition to FNS. We urge Congress to
provide the FAA with the resources necessary to achieve these goals.
Leveraging Technology the Right Way to Capture Safety Benefits
Technology advancements can deliver undeniable societal benefits,
but sometimes come with challenges that require mitigation. A recent
breakthrough in telecommunications technology and the Federal
Communications Commission's sale of frequency spectrum adjacent to
bandwidth used by aviation equipment created a critical safety threat
to aviation users.
NBAA has been an active party in discussions with regulators and
industry stakeholders to determine suitable mitigations that would
enable such networks to safely coexist with critical aviation systems.
Beginning in 2015, NBAA and a broad coalition of aviation
stakeholders raised detailed safety concerns about the potential for 5G
interference with radio altimeters.
The mitigations to ensure that 5G power levels around many of the
nation's airports remain lower than allowed by telecommunications
providers were extended over the course of the past year but are about
to expire. Currently, only some of the business aviation fleet have
alternate means of compliance, allowing them to continue all-weather
access to most airports. For a significant portion of our fleet, there
is not yet an approved retrofit solution to upgrade the radar altimeter
with filters to protect from 5G interference.
Over the coming months, we respectfully recommend that the FAA
dedicate the necessary resources to approve alternate means of
compliance or the radar altimeter modifications needed for the general
aviation fleet to safely operate across our nation's entire airport
network. We appreciate the Subcommittee's continued attention to this
critical safety matter.
Similarly, when the FAA transitioned from ground-based radar to
ADS-B, a real-time precision, shared situational awareness system for
pilots and controllers, some unintended privacy and security concerns
came with it.
Through ADS-B, unencrypted signals that provide an aircraft's
flight identification, precise position, and other detailed data are
widely broadcast to the public. The real-time location positioning of
aircraft has enabled flight stalking and harassment on the internet and
in person, creating a serious safety and security threat.
Individuals who have received threats are in danger because their
real-time movements and travel plans are available to the public.
Competitors and nation-states can track where a business aircraft is
flying, presenting industrial security concerns. This means that to
protect passengers and operators of general aviation aircraft, the FAA
must do more to prioritize the development of additional security
measures.
For example, the FAA should expedite its work to improve the
Privacy ICAO Address (PIA) program, which allows operators to obtain a
random ``aircraft address'' code, which can provide additional security
and is not tied to publicly available FAA aircraft registration
records. The FAA should also explore the limitations of the PIA
program. For example, currently the codes cannot be used for
international flights or even extended for overwater operations in the
United States.
Also, the FAA should work internally and with international
partners so that privacy addresses can be utilized for all flights. The
FAA also must plan for the future by studying how to encrypt ADS-B
signals from aircraft, developing relevant equipage standards, and
engaging with affected stakeholders for a more effective privacy
solution.
We firmly believe that no one should be required to surrender their
safety, security and business intelligence because they board an
aircraft--just as people's movements aboard airlines, railroads, and
other modes of transportation are not the business of cyber-stalkers.
Addressing Human Factors to Strengthen Safety
As noted earlier, technologies, and their implications for
aviation, are a key element in the safety formula, but technology
cannot replace the human element in the equation. That's why the
business aviation community places a sharp strategic focus on human
factors--how fatigue, stress, confusion and other influences can impact
decision-making--in thinking about safety.
Take, for example, the misperceptions that can lead a pilot to take
off or land from a wrong taxiway, runway, or even a wrong airport.
These incidents are known as wrong surface events. They often involve
human factors, and reducing them is a top priority for FAA, NBAA and
the industry. We are actively working with the FAA and other
stakeholders in the Surface Safety Group focused on developing tools to
increase situational awareness for pilots at airports with a high
number of wrong surface incidents.
The association recently participated in the FAA's Surface Safety
Symposium, which brought together commercial airlines, ground vehicle
drivers and general aviation pilots and operators to discuss and
develop solutions to runway and surface safety challenges. NBAA also
provided a platform to the FAA Runway Safety organization at its
October 2022 NBAA-BACE, which included 20,000 attendees from across the
industry, to have a booth presence in the Exhibit Hall and to engage
with attendees during the Meet the Regulators session.
NBAA is also working to reduce runway excursions, another event
often driven by human factors, in which an airplane inappropriately
exits a runway. Like incursions, these events require strategically
driven mitigation planning, along with tools developed by experts for
industry. To that end, the association has gathered some of the best
expertise on excursions at events, including our National Safety Forum
in 2022, and continues to publish resources, including our guide for
Reducing Business Aviation Runway Excursions.
Another important part of the work to address the impact of human
factors on aviation safety lies in our sector's focus on mental health
and fitness for duty. More than a small-bore approach to myriad, stand-
alone psychological and physical symptoms, the work in this area looks
at the whole person, recognizing that aviation is a physically and
mentally demanding environment in which a clear mind and well-rested,
healthy body is essential to safe business aircraft operations,
maintenance and management.
Studies confirm the prevalence of this concern, as well as the need
for both action and compassion on the matter: one recent report \1\
concluded that nearly 60% of pilots avoid seeking health care due to
the fear of losing their aviation medical certificate. NBAA is
concerned that some aeromedical certification requirements may
needlessly impede eligibility for pilot certification, severely
dissuading pilots from seeking treatment for a troubling condition.
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\1\ Hoffman et al. 2022. Healthcare Avoidance in Aircraft Pilots
Due to Concern for Aeromedical Certificate Loss. J Occup Environ Med.
64(4):e245-e248.
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As with so many other aspects of aviation safety, partnerships
between industry and government can produce solutions to the problem
without compromising safety, and we have proven successes with such an
approach.
For example, we have worked with the FAA to develop multiple
pathways for Aviation Medical Examiners (AMEs) to issue airmen medical
certificates at the conclusion of an exam, thereby minimizing wait
times for FAA reviews. We have also emphasized the need for AMEs to
research and identify for aviators the full menu of pharmacological
treatment options that can safely be used in the aviation environment
to address a given condition, and to better define the criteria for
requiring or deferring neurocognitive testing.
We continue to be an active partner in educating the business
aviation community on these policies; in the past year alone, NBAA
hosted an interactive News Hour webinar and a National Safety Forum
discussion with aviation mental health experts and the FAA Federal Air
Surgeon. We have engaged with the aviation community on these policies
at events such as the Experimental Aviation Association's annual
AirVenture Oshkosh show, the University of North Dakota's yearly
Aviation Mental Health Symposium, as well as regularly held FAA Human
Intervention Motivational Study and InfoShare Conferences and FAA GAJSC
meetings, among others.
Collectively, these efforts will help address misperceptions about
mental wellness and fitness for duty, while reducing barriers that
interfere with obtaining treatment and healthcare, getting pilots the
help they need, maintaining pilots' livelihoods, aiding employers in
understanding the readiness of their workforce--and, most importantly,
enhancing safety.
Building an Aviation Workforce for the Future
While safety is the cornerstone to the success of the aviation
industry, the sector cannot thrive without a strategic approach to
attracting and retaining the next generation of skilled professionals
across all capacities. Aviation is currently facing a shortage of
qualified pilots, technicians and other workers. According to the
Boeing company, more than 600,000 new pilots and technicians are needed
to address projected growth in the next 20 years.
NBAA applauds congressional approval of the Promoting Service in
Transportation Act, which was passed into law through the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA).
Through targeted public service announcements authorized by the
Transportation Workforce Outreach Program in the IIJA, we will start a
new dialogue on transportation careers, focusing on the availability of
advanced technology and good-paying jobs today. With continued growth
and demand for STEM workers, we must remain competitive by educating
students about the exciting innovations and technologies under
development in the transportation industry. We support the full$5
million appropriation for this program and appreciate the efforts of
this Committee with House Appropriators.
We look forward to building on programs from the 2018 FAA bill,
including grant programs to support the education of future aircraft
pilots and the recruitment of much-needed aviation maintenance
technicians. Carefully reviewing and adopting recommendations of the
Youth Access to American Jobs in Aviation Task Force and the Women in
Aviation Advisory Board will be an excellent starting point for
additional workforce provisions.
At our largest event, NBAA-BACE, we host a ``Careers in Business
Aviation Day'' that provides workforce development programming as part
of the ``Collegiate Connect'' initiative. We continue these efforts at
NBAA's regional events and targeted educational programs by offering
student-focused programming to educate young people about the many
career opportunities in business aviation. Through partnerships with
non-profit organizations, NBAA is also helping to expose, recruit and
retain new professionals from underrepresented communities. These
initiatives will help to ensure that the industry remains competitive
and reflects a more diverse workforce.
NBAA also actively sponsors targeted initiatives to attract,
develop and retain underrepresented segments of the population. This
includes our sponsoring partnership with The Red Tail Flight Academy,
whose volunteer leaders focus on recruitment that bolsters diversity
within the aviation industry, including free training for future
pilots. We are pleased that this program, inspired by the Tuskegee
Airmen, graduated its first class of future leaders last year. We are
also a proud partner with Flying Classroom, a program launched by
aviation pioneer Barrington Irving that aims to teach all students
about careers in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics.
Meeting the Mission of Safety and Efficiency
The FAA's mission is to provide the safest, most efficient
aerospace system in the world. To meet that mission, the agency must
continually review and improve its processes and systems.
Over the last few years, a significant backlog has developed in a
number of areas, including medical certification, aircraft registry,
letters of authorization and other approvals. These delays slow
commerce and detract from the agency's mission.
There is an opportunity to enhance efficiency while at the same
time providing new tools to FAA managers to improve work flows,
troubleshoot and maintain accountability, by transitioning analog
processes to digital platforms. Digitizing the application process for
review and approvals of certification, registration, Petitions for
Exemption and Letters of Authorization would greatly improve efficiency
at the FAA. Moving to a digital environment would deliver processing
efficiencies that would benefit both the workforce and industry
services and increase transparency for both the FAA and industry. Under
FAA reauthorization, the NBAA recommends that the Congress direct the
Administrator to identify and execute three programs within the agency
for digitization.
Threats to the safety and efficiency mission of the FAA have taken
on an even more profound meaning when the agency has been faced with
the government shutdowns that have taken place in recent years. When
such a scenario presents itself, several weeks and countless work hours
prior to a looming shutdown are spent preparing each of the FAA's lines
of business for the lapse in federal spending and the inevitable,
devastating disruptions to the FAA's core functions.
If a shutdown does come to pass, thousands of FAA employees are
furloughed, delaying training, pilot certifications and safety
authorizations, and halting the movement of new aircraft into service.
In short, on several levels, an agency shutdown amounts to an alarming
safety concern.
Some steps have been taken to address this concern; for example,
NBAA appreciates the committee's work in deeming the FAA's Aircraft
Registry an essential service under the FAA Reauthorization Act of
2018. That said, further steps need to be taken to provide for the
continuity of business at the agency, and solutions are available.
For example, during a shutdown, taxes continue to be paid into the
Airport and Airway Trust Fund, which could be used to continue
operations, or pay FAA employees. NBAA urges Congress, under the FAA
Reauthorization, to provide the agency with additional flexibility to
use trust fund revenues to continue operations during a government
shutdown.
The United States has a treasured asset in the National Airspace
System. It is unmatched around the world in its size, diversity of
users, complexity of airspace and safety record.
Our aviation system, as a public asset, is best overseen by the
federal government and Congress to serve all Americans. Congress should
codify that the U.S. aviation system should be managed efficiently,
safely, and provide access for all stakeholders by leveraging proven
tools and airspace-management techniques to address recurring
challenges such as weather, congestion, equipment failure and national
emergencies, even as we continue to transform the aviation system to
meet the needs of the future.
Applying the FAA's Gold Standard to New Entrants
America has a unique opportunity to enhance its gold standard in
aviation safety and export its approach to safety globally through the
safe and efficient integration of new technologies including Advanced
Air Mobility or electric vertical lift and takeoff (eVTOL), unmanned
aircraft systems and electric aircraft, among other new technologies.
Modern aviation was born on America's shores with the first powered
flight in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. We led the transition from piston
engines to the jet age. We pioneered air traffic control technology and
airspace policies that created the safest, most efficient and most
diverse air traffic system in the world. Our robust aviation
infrastructure is unparalleled and our workforce, while greatly
affected by the COVID pandemic, remains the most agile, innovative and
sought-after in the world. We have the potential to continue to lead
the next phase in the evolution in aviation with AAM, the public demand
is high, but competition with other nations to be first is fierce and
rapidly advancing.
Among other considerations, this means the FAA will need to keep
pace with the type certifications and promised regulatory schedule, so
that the first AAM commercial operations can occur as soon as 2024.
Transparency, predictability and accountability are key markers on this
path. The FAA should enable utilization of existing infrastructure to
accommodate initial operations, and focus on hiring the workforce with
the right technical expertise to facilitate the safe integration of new
technologies.
Achieving these milestones over the next five years will be
critical, if we are to fully scale this promising new technology, and
NBAA is pleased to know that this Committee will include a New Entrants
title in FAA Reauthorization to help achieve this goal.
In short, we stand at a pivotal juncture--the investments and
policy decisions we make today will determine whether we harness the
full safety, economic, environmental and national security potential of
AAM and maintain our position as a global leader in aviation and
aerospace.
Aviation Safety in Focus on the Horizon
The next FAA reauthorization will require new ways of thinking
about aviation safety in order to prepare for ever-more complexity: new
entrants, new technologies, new flight-mission profiles, new
infrastructure needs. Here are three guiding principles for ensuring
America's continued safety leadership in the global aviation system:
1. Strengthen and improve critical FAA systems to meet the
agency's mission of safety and efficiency and maintain the America's
position as the global leader in aviation through a strategic approach
that includes: digitizing the aircraft registry and pilot medical
certification systems; establishing clear goals and accountability
measures for the implementation of the Federal Notam System (FNS); and
coordinating the timely delivery of type certifications and regulations
to enable the integration of Advanced Air Mobility and other new
technologies;
2. Implement strategic solutions to bolster the workforce and
attract and retain the next generation of skilled aviation
professionals across the industry to ensure the nation's gold standard
in safety;
3. Mitigate the serious safety and security threat that emerged
with Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) by making
improvements to the Privacy ICAO Address (PIA) program.
The general aviation community appreciates the work of this
Committee on the 2018 Reauthorization, which set the stage for many of
the next-generation developments we are witnessing. Our industry looks
forward to continued engagement as we develop policy solutions that
strengthen our unrivaled national airspace system, sustain vigilance
across the industry on safety and maintain the role of the United
States as the world leader in aerospace.
NBAA appreciates this Committee's continued leadership and
willingness to engage with all stakeholders on priorities for a long-
term FAA reauthorization bill, and we look forward to a robust
discussion about aviation safety.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Bolen. And thank
you for your specific recommendations as we work on the
reauthorization of the 2018 bill.
Our final witness is Dr. Kerry Buckley, vice president of
the Center for Advanced Aviation System Development with MITRE
Corporation.
Dr. Buckley, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF KERRY BUCKLEY, Ph.D., VICE PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR
ADVANCED AVIATION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT, MITRE CORPORATION
Ms. Buckley. Thank you.
Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and distinguished
members of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on the
past, the present, and the future of aviation safety.
My name is Kerry Buckley. I am a vice president at the
MITRE Corporation. It is a nonprofit corporation chartered to
operate in the public interest, which includes operating
federally funded research and development centers, or FFRDCs,
on behalf of Federal agency sponsors. We currently operate six
FFRDCs, including the FAA's Center for Advanced Aviation System
Development.
MITRE has supported the FAA for more than 60 years as a
trusted and objective mission partner, providing technical
expertise in air traffic management systems engineering,
aerospace operations, airspace design, and systems automation
and integration.
The United States has achieved our excellent safety record
through continuous world leading innovation, from automated
collision avoidance systems half a century ago, to satellite-
based position, navigation, and surveillance today.
The aerospace community's shared commitment to safety has
facilitated the trust and cooperation required for
collaborative safety analysis and data sharing focused on
detecting risks before they result in accidents. Participants
in the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing, or
ASIAS, program, voluntary submit sensitive data, such as
onboard flight operations, quality assurance data, and safety
reports, to identify shared safety risks before they result in
incidents. Over 45 airlines representing over 99 percent of
domestic commercial operations, as well as general aviation and
rotorcraft operators, benefit from their participation. ASIAS
should build on this history of success by increasing the
velocity at which data is collected and analyzed, advancing its
predictive capabilities, and expanding research access to the
shared data environment to enable collaborative analytics.
Looking forward, we have a new set of challenges and
opportunities: Software-intensive systems, autonomous aircraft,
and cybersecurity to name a few, combined with developments in
the UAS and commercial space industries. Many of these
innovations cannot come to fruition without an effective FAA.
As both the aerospace regulator and operator of the air traffic
control system, the FAA is often a pacesetter in the
development and implementation of new systems and technologies.
On the operational side, its modernization programs establish
the air traffic control infrastructure affecting not only
safety but also capacity and efficiency.
Delays in modernization programs increase both sustainment
costs and the eventual cost of modernization, squeezing the FAA
budgets from both sides. Ensuring that modernization plans
begun under the NextGen are completed, especially those for
trajectory-based operations, should be a priority.
There is a risk to system reliability and safety if we do
not accelerate the shift from sustainment to modernization.
This will require both substantially reducing sustainment costs
and prioritizing those modernization activities most critical
to mass evolution.
Today, the FAA assures safety for commercial and general
aviation through a rigorous process of regulation, approvals,
and compliance checking. These processes are appropriate for
mature industry but are not agile in the face of innovation in
an increasingly diverse landscape because they presuppose an
ability to match legacy regulations to new vehicles and
operational concepts.
Congress and FAA should consider moving to a performance-
based system which leverages safety management systems,
including those in industry and in Government, to monitor
overall safety-based outcomes. Working with Congress, the FAA
can create an appropriate regulatory framework while retaining
the authority to spot check compliance.
Safety also means ensuring our systems are resilient and
protected from cyber adversaries. Risks to the FAA from cyber
attacks and cyber compromise are substantial. Modernizing its
computer and automation systems addresses legacy risk, but
there is a continuing need to assess FAA systems for
vulnerabilities to emerging threats and to apply proven
technologies and methodologies to prevent, detect, respond to,
and remediate cyber risk.
MITRE is a proud part of the aerospace community focused on
innovation. We will continue to support the FAA and the
aerospace community in the search for solutions to our most
pressing challenges so we can all realize the benefits to a
safe and modern aerospace system.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. And I am
happy to answer any questions the committee may have.
[Ms. Buckley's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kerry Buckley, Ph.D., Vice President, Center for
Advanced Aviation System Development, MITRE Corporation
Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and distinguished members
of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you on the past, present, and future
vision of aviation safety. My name is Kerry Buckley, and I am a Vice
President at The MITRE Corporation, a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit
corporation. We are chartered to operate in the public interest, which
includes operating federally funded research and development centers,
or FFRDCs, on behalf of federal agency sponsors. We currently operate
six FFRDCs.
I am also the General Manager and Director of MITRE's Center for
Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD), which is the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA's) FFRDC. MITRE has supported the FAA
for more than 60 years as a trusted and objective mission partner,
providing technical expertise in air traffic management systems
engineering, aviation operations, airspace design, and systems
automation and integration.
The United States has the largest, most efficient, and safest
aerospace system in the world. We have achieved this safety record
through a shared commitment to safety by members of the aviation
community, from ground crews deicing aircraft, to FAA inspectors, and
from aircraft designers to mechanics.
We have also achieved this safety record through continuous, world-
leading innovation: from automated collision avoidance systems a half
century ago to satellite-based position, navigation, and surveillance
today. U.S. aviation continues to be a leader in, among other areas,
the application of human factors and the development of simulator-based
training.
The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in Innovation and Safety
It was the aviation community's shared commitment to safety that
facilitated the trust and cooperation required for the development of
the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing, or ASIAS program,
a collaborative safety analysis and data sharing initiative focused on
detecting risks before they result in accidents.
The FAA, aviation industry, and MITRE launched ASIAS in 2007. ASIAS
enables risk-based assessments of emerging systemic hazards as the
foundation of decision-making to advance safety. This public-private
partnership (PPP) is an active, robust example of how 15 years of
dedicated collaborative data sharing can have a positive impact in
advancing safety.
Since its inception, ASIAS has completed over 150 studies, which
have resulted in the voluntary adoption of systemic mitigations,
including over 20 Commercial Aviation Safety Team, or CAST, safety
enhancements, as well as numerous other localized mitigations to reduce
aviation risk.
One example is an ASIAS study that identified the reasons behind
the higher-than-expected incidence of flap misconfigurations on
takeoff. It concluded that the potential for takeoff misconfiguration
events occurs most frequently when flights are running behind schedule
and pilots feel rushed to complete their takeoff duties. In particular,
freezing temperatures and deicing conditions can interfere with the
normal checklist flow for departures.
To reduce the risk of human error identified by ASIAS, the FAA
issued Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 14005 to quickly raise
awareness of the potential for flap misconfiguration during takeoff. It
did so within weeks of the ASIAS findings to alert flight crews about
the issue before it could become a more significant risk as the winter
season approached and temperatures dropped. Three subsequent CAST
safety enhancements were adopted to reduce the number of flap
misconfiguration events on takeoff.
In 2015, ASIAS received the Department of Transportation Safety
Award, and in 2018 ASIAS and CAST received the Aviation Week Laureate
Award, which recognized this unparalleled collaboration between
government and industry to improve aviation safety. Having exceeded its
first 10-year goal in reducing U.S. commercial aviation fatality risk
by 83%, CAST now aims for further reductions in risk, leveraging
industry data and analytical tools from ASIAS.
MITRE is privileged to be the ASIAS Trusted Third Party, serving as
the trusted bridge between government, industry, and other
participants. MITRE serves as data steward, providing the secure data
environment and related capabilities to protect and manage stakeholder
data and results, while also executing technical work to answer
partner-approved research questions.
ASIAS information is used solely for the identification,
monitoring, and mitigation of systemic safety issues. ASIAS
stakeholders voluntarily submit sensitive data (e.g., on-board Flight
Operations Quality Assurance data and safety reports), enabled by
assurances in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 193 that the
safety information they disclose will not be used punitively. While 14
CFR Part 193 provides protection from punitive action, participants in
ASIAS are voluntarily providing sensitive data daily, and they must
trust that it will be protected from other uses that could impact their
business. Trust is the bedrock of the ASIAS program.
When ASIAS launched 15 years ago, four commercial airlines agreed
to participate and share data for the greater good. Today, there are
over 45 participating airlines, representing over 99% of all U.S.
domestic commercial operations. Ten years ago, the program expanded to
include general aviation, and today MITRE has executed over 150 data
sharing and participation agreements with general aviation operators
and data aggregators. Most recently ASIAS expanded to include
participants from the rotorcraft community.
The ASIAS process starts with the intake and integration of various
types of data to create a holistic ``flight story.'' Crucially, ASIAS
processes require data de-identification (for example, the names or
other identifying information for participating organizations and
individuals), ensuring that the focus remains on addressing systemic
safety issues in a non-punitive manner. This data is the foundation for
studies and metrics that identify systemic hazards and their
contributing factors. Study results are shared with safety teams, such
as CAST and the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee, or GAJSC, to
develop mitigation solutions, such as adoption of procedures, training,
or equipment to reduce the likelihood of accidents in the future.
Public-private partnerships like ASIAS ensure success by moving at
the speed of trust. Trust has been a core value critical to the health
and success of ASIAS since its inception. To endure, public-private
partnerships like ASIAS require a foundation of trust in each partner's
commitment, believing that each party will follow through in good faith
according to their agreements. Trust underlies a public-private
partnership's ability to adapt to changing circumstances and
objectives.
The ASIAS model has been so successful that it has been leveraged
in other industries. One example is the Partnership for Analytics
Research in Traffic Safety, or PARTS. PARTS applies the same
collaborative principles we learned from ASIAS to the automobile
industry, which is itself experiencing rapid innovation. MITRE has
worked with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
and nine original equipment manufacturers, or OEMs, that together
represent almost 80% of the U.S. market, to increase safety for the
American driving public. Moving at the speed of trust has enabled PARTS
to rapidly move from initial exploratory meetings in 2017 to executing
agreements and finishing an initial Phase 1 pilot study by 2019.
Partners proved willing and able to transfer sensitive data
including OEM build records, warranty records, and crash records, and
work collaboratively to conduct safety research. They agree that this
model offers an improved ability to gain real-world insights into the
performance of safety technologies, offering opportunities to learn
from each other and improve safety for all. This is particularly
striking in an industry that competes on safety, often highlighting
safety achievements in television advertisement and other marketing
materials.
PARTS recently released the results of the largest government-
automaker study to date about the real-world performance of advanced
driver assistance systems (ADAS) in passenger vehicles. This study
shows that vehicles equipped with forward collision warning (FCW) and
automatic emergency braking (AEB) avoid approximately half of front-to-
rear crashes and that AEB performs in all conditions--even when
roadway, weather, and lighting conditions are not ideal. The study also
shows that vehicles equipped with active intervention technologies to
help drivers stay in their lane are effective in single-vehicle crashes
that lead to serious injury. A key strength of the study was the scope
of cross-industry data on which it was based, made possible by the
PARTS collaboration. Participating auto manufacturers provided vehicle
equipment data for 47 million passenger vehicles from model years 2015-
2020. Added to that was data from 12 million police-reported crashes
from 13 states, provided by NHTSA. MITRE combined these data sources to
analyze the effectiveness of six ADAS features in avoiding roadway
crashes: FCW, AEB, and Pedestrian AEB (all designed to help prevent
collisions) and lane departure warning, lane keeping assistance, and
lane centering assistance--features designed to help ensure that
drivers remain on the roadway. The report, prepared by MITRE, was
published in November 2022.
Another example leveraging the ASIAS model is the Railroad
Information Sharing Environment (RISE), which is a voluntary, non-
regulatory, non-punitive, data-driven safety partnership consisting of
railroad stakeholders, including Federal Railroad Administration, to
advance railroad safety.
These examples illustrate how industry working together at the
speed of trust can achieve great things for the American public. With
the support of a trusted third party, like MITRE, this model could be
applied to other safety-sensitive and critical areas like pipelines,
supply chain, and more.
That said, the National Airspace System (NAS) continues to expand
and change both in capability, via FAA's Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen) initiatives, and in operational tempo,
with the advent of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and the continued
growth of aerospace operations. New safety challenges demand rapid
implementation of solutions to discover and prevent hazards before they
become incidents or accidents.
ASIAS should increase the velocity at which data is collected,
processed, and analyzed to share safety intelligence more quickly with
its stakeholders and the broader aviation community. Additionally, new
entrants, such as UAS, offer new challenges to aviation safety. ASIAS
should look to adapt to these emerging risks and create new tools to
analyze previously unknown concerns.
In the future, ASIAS must also advance its predictive capabilities.
ASIAS already has tools to proactively identify and examine safety
concerns that can lead to accidents; however, predictive capabilities
could go further by anticipating the likelihood of future outcomes. For
example, artificial intelligence (AI) would give safety teams and
stakeholders the awareness and tools necessary to more rapidly inform
decision makers of safety issues.
Additionally, ASIAS can have an even greater impact by increasing
external collaboration on analyses conducted by the program. ASIAS
should identify ways to evolve shared data environments where internal
program analysts, external stakeholders, and aviation safety
researchers can come together to spur innovation while adhering to the
program governance requirements. It is through this collaboration that
the ASIAS program can continue to be a leader in the global adoption of
a non-punitive safety culture.
Modernizing and Integrating Safe National Aerospace Operations
The FAA's NextGen modernization program has, over the past 20
years, achieved critical advances in efficiency and safety, including
Performance-Based Navigation standards, satellite-based operations, and
data analytics for accident prediction and prevention. NextGen has
created a strong foundation for where we are today--at the precipice of
a new and more challenging evolutionary leap.
Looking forward, we have a new set of challenges and opportunities.
Software-intensive systems, autonomous aircraft, and cybersecurity, to
name a few, combined with developments in the UAS and commercial space
industries. New approaches to addressing these challenges will continue
to improve safety and facilitate the operations of all participants,
from new entrants to the original entrant: America's general aviation.
But many of these innovations cannot come to fruition without an
effective FAA. As both the aerospace regulator and the operator of the
air traffic control system, the FAA is often a pacesetter in the
development and implementation of new systems and technologies. On the
regulatory side, it determines what is allowed and what is mandated,
and the processes and standards to do so must keep pace with the
aviation environment.
While safety is the overriding objective, the FAA has an essential
role in increasing efficiency, capacity, and opportunities for growth
in aviation. The FAA-published Charting Aviation's Future: Operations
in an Info-Centric NAS outlines how the agency will build on NextGen
and the foundations of Trajectory-Based Operations to create a more
agile and flexible NAS for all airspace users. When NextGen
implementation began in 2008, few could have predicted the multitude of
new technologies, operations, and opportunities in aerospace and multi-
modal transportation systems that the next 15 years would bring. This
future requires more agile and scalable automation solutions that can
extend to many more air traffic facilities, while also ensuring that
these solutions are resilient to adversaries and system failures. The
future NAS must safely accommodate these transformational changes, and
the FAA's vision serves as an initial approach to do that.
In addition, the Department of Defense's (DoD) airspace needs for
readiness training and research continue to evolve, placing additional
demands on the NAS as a shared resource. A cross-agency perspective is
vital to safely accommodate these competing demands for airspace in a
flexible and efficient manner. In this regard, I want to commend this
Committee for supporting Section 1093 of the Fiscal Year 2023 National
Defense Authorization Act, which authorized the FAA and DoD to conduct
a pilot program to explore new ways to manage special activity airspace
to better meet the needs of both organizations.
Enactment of a forward-looking FAA Reauthorization bill will better
position and enable the FAA to deliver on its daily operations, its
modernization efforts, and its role in research and development. Delays
in modernization programs increase both sustainment costs and the
eventual cost of modernization, squeezing the FAA's budget from both
sides. Ensuring that the modernization plans begun under NextGen are
completed, especially those for Trajectory-Based Operations, should be
a priority. There is a risk to system reliability and safety if we do
not accelerate the shift from sustainment to modernization. This will
require both substantially reducing sustainment costs and prioritizing
those modernization activities most critical to NAS evolution. Planning
and carrying out the necessary streamlining and improvement activities
poses a considerable strategic challenge for the FAA, involving many
competing demands and priorities that FAA has historically struggled to
balance.
Moving Toward a Safe and Optimized Regulatory Framework
Today, the FAA assures safety for commercial and general aviation
through a rigorous process of regulation, approvals, and compliance
checking. These processes are appropriate for a mature industry with
aviation operations that have been standardized over decades of
development. However, they are not agile in the face of innovation and
an increasingly diverse fleet because they presuppose an ability to
match legacy regulations to new vehicles and operational concepts. As a
result, the FAA must issue numerous waivers and exemptions, and
dedicate significant staff effort to adapt the traditional ``means of
compliance'' regulatory approach to these new entrants. Within this
system, the FAA's primary means of scaling to demand is to delegate
authority to review compliance, but with new entrants and technologies,
that option creates challenges and concerns around the FAA's limited
familiarity with the new product or service.
The scale and complexity of the NAS are compounded by the speed of
change. We all are familiar with nearly daily updates to the software
on our phones and computers. Under the current regulatory approach,
changes to software on aviation systems on the ground and in the air
require the same level of rigor and review as changing physical
components such as engines. The current approval processes were not
designed to support daily changes and an iterative product design
process, and cybersecurity threats make the need for daily changes more
necessary than ever. To keep pace with innovation while ensuring the
safety of the NAS, a system is needed that scales by holding regulated
parties accountable not just for compliance, but also for the safety
performance of their products and services.
The FAA describes this performance-based system in the U.S. State
Safety Program (US SSP) submitted to the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). It presents how the FAA will evolve its safety
management practices in a holistic manner by building on safety
management principles to proactively address emerging risk. Such a
data-driven, proactive management of safety performance is possible
through the collaborative efforts of all parties to monitor their
safety mitigations and anticipate points of weakness in the system.
Collaboration is different from more delegation, as a performance-
based system leverages the safety management systems of operators,
manufacturers, maintenance and repair stations, airports, the air
traffic organization, and others to monitor the safety performance of
the entire system from a 360-degree perspective. This focuses the
approval and oversight functions on the highest risk areas based on
performance data, and more importantly on predictions of growing areas
of concern. Multiple perspectives provide independent verification of
the data and events.
A performance-based regulatory system, by combining ubiquitous data
from the digital revolution with advanced analytics to manage safety
performance, could work in ways that are more predictive, adaptive, and
agile.
Predictive: Advanced analytics such as AI could drive
proactive adjustments to mitigations, inform holistic review strategies
for organizations in greater need of oversight, and provide more timely
safety intelligence to guide actions that resolve areas of higher risk.
Adaptative: The emphasis on monitoring performance will
provide FAA and the community with a basis for creating performance-
based standards and regulations that are adaptable to innovations of
the emerging fleets. The FAA needs authority to flexibly respond to the
diversity of ideas from industry.
Agile: Safety management systems manage risk by
continuous, incremental adjustments and self-correction. This should
shorten the time that risks remain in the system by creating a
community effort to spot and correct issues from multiple
perspectives--operator, OEM, maintainer, etc.
By accelerating its transition to a data-driven performance-based
agency, the FAA can significantly advance its goals of improving
safety, increasing efficiency, and remaining world leading. To do so,
the FAA needs the legislative authority to deploy this approach.
Working with Congress, the FAA can create the appropriate regulatory
framework focused on performance safety outcomes while retaining the
authority to spot check compliance.
In addition, the FAA must continue to build a robust safety culture
across its workforce, including use of Safety Management Systems, and a
program of continuous safety training. This includes applying objective
and repeatable methods to ensure adequate staffing to meet operational
needs while balancing emerging workforce trends, in addition to
evaluating potential improvements to how to accomplish medical
certification for key roles like pilots and air traffic controllers to
enable a modernized and more human centered, data-driven risk-based
approach.
Achieving World-Class Cybersecurity
Safety also means ensuring our systems are resilient and protected
from cyber adversaries. NAS dependency on GPS is increasing. Risks to
the FAA from cyber-attack and cyber-compromise are substantial. As the
FAA continues to evolve its computer and automation systems, those
risks grow.
As cybersecurity adversaries become more sophisticated and threats
increase, there is a continuing need to assess FAA systems for
vulnerabilities to emerging threats. As digital transformation
accelerates across private industry and government, new capabilities
such as cloud, the proliferation of mobile devices, and a growing need
for data sharing across the aerospace ecosystem, increase the need for
a modernized cybersecurity approach that is built upon appropriate
authentication and authorization. The infusion of proven cybersecurity
technologies and methodologies into FAA operational capabilities must
keep pace with modernization efforts.
Closing Remarks
Ensuring that the FAA retains its position as a global leader will
require a collaborative partnership with industry to map the future.
Industry, academia, international partners, and other associations,
non-profits, and FFRDCs, must work with the FAA to innovate together.
Likewise, interagency cooperation has never been more crucial than
right now.
At The MITRE Corporation, we are a proud part of the aerospace
community focused on innovation. As many of you know, MITRE has been
and continues to be involved in every safety innovation and safety
challenge that I have mentioned today, and more. We will continue to
support the FAA and the aerospace community in the search for solutions
to our most pressing challenges so we can all realize the benefits of a
safe and modern aerospace system.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide a statement. I am happy to
answer any questions the Committee may have.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Dr. Buckley.
I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements
be included in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
On behalf of Chairman Sam Graves, I ask unanimous consent
to enter into the record statements by the American Society of
Civil Engineers and by the Helicopter Association
International.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of the American Society of Civil Engineers, Submitted for the
Record by Hon. Sam Graves
Introduction
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) thanks the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure for holding a hearing on
aviation safety. ASCE has long advocated for investing in the safety
and efficiency of our transportation network, including the aviation
system. Aviation infrastructure allows people to travel to their
destinations, facilitates the movement of goods, and plays a key role
in the nation's economy.
America's aviation infrastructure received a long-overdue boost in
November 2021 with the enactment of the Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act (IIJA), which ASCE strongly supported. The legislation
includes an investment of $25 billion in airports through three
programs, which concentrate on air traffic control facility
improvements, ``airside'' projects such as runways, and terminal
development and connections. This historic achievement--the largest
investment in our nation's critical infrastructure systems in a
generation--will be instrumental in generating economic growth and
narrowing the infrastructure investment gap.
Passage of the IIJA provides a unique opportunity to improve the
safety and resilience of our nation's aviation infrastructure. As the
118th Congress gets under way, ASCE looks forward to working with the
committee to build on the investments provided through the IIJA and
urges a timely reauthorization of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
programs to ensure aviation safety and optimize investments from the
infrastructure bill.
ASCE looks forward to working with the committee to pass an FAA
reauthorization bill. ASCE urges Congress to reauthorize FAA programs
before they expire on September 30, as these program are critical to
ensuring that our nation's airports receive robust and reliable funding
over the upcoming years.
ASCE's 2021 Report Card for America's Infrastructure
Every four years, ASCE publishes its Report Card for America's
Infrastructure, which grades the nation's major infrastructure
categories using an ``A'' to ``F'' school report card format. The most
recent Report Card \1\, released in March 2021, evaluated 17 categories
of infrastructure and reflected an overall ``C-'' grade. This grade
marks an increase from the ``D+'' recorded in 2017, indicating the
country has made some progress in recent years. However, 11 categories
remained in the ``D'' range, including aviation, which received a
``D+'' \2\. Often, it is these categories where we have failed to make
investments needed to maintain the assets that were built 50 years ago
or more.
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\1\ https://infrastructurereportcard.org/
\2\ https://infrastructurereportcard.org/cat-item/aviation-
infrastructure/
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Fortunately, the IIJA makes progress to reverse decades of
underinvestment in many of these lowest categories and represents a
significant down payment on the $2.5 trillion infrastructure investment
gap that was identified in the 2021 Report Card.
Efficient implementation of the IIJA will play a major role in
raising the grades for infrastructure categories such as aviation and
making our nation's infrastructure fit for the future. Under pre-COVID-
19 projections, our aviation system was set to have a 10-year, $111
billion funding shortfall. While the IIJA provides $25 billion for the
nation's aviation infrastructure, Congress now needs to optimize these
investments and ensure reliable funding going forward through the
reauthorization of FAA programs.
Failure to Act: Economic Impacts of Status Quo Investment Across
Infrastructure Systems
ASCE's report titled Failure to Act: Economic Impacts of Status Quo
Investment Across Infrastructure Systems \3\ found that inadequate
infrastructure--including in the aviation sector--significantly hampers
economic growth. Failure to invest in aging infrastructure negatively
impacts numerous aspects of the economy, including GDP, jobs, personal
disposable income, and business sales. Declining airport infrastructure
affects our nation's ability to import and export goods efficiently,
driving up costs for American consumers.
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\3\ https://infrastructurereportcard.org/the-impact/failure-to-act-
report/
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Failure to Act's trends-extended analyses indicate that funding
will be available to cover only 57% (approximately $3.5 trillion) of
infrastructure needs through 2029, and 56.6% ($7.3 trillion) by 2039
for the aggregate of surface transportation, water transportation,
airports, water, wastewater, and electricity systems. For airports
specifically, funding will be available to cover only about 53% of
needs through 2029. The report found that airports face a funding gap
of $111 billion through 2029, a gap which is projected to grow to $281
billion through 2039.
Underperforming infrastructure at our airports and coastal ports
will have a negative impact on overall trade. Failure to Act estimated
a cumulative export decrease of $2.38 trillion between 2020 and 2039.
The decline in these logistics sectors will be driven by lower trade of
manufactured, agricultural, and extracted products that require
wholesaling and storage services.
Effective implementation of the IIJA and close cooperation between
federal, state, and local agencies can help improve deficient aviation
infrastructure systems while strengthening the economy. As the nation
continues to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, investments in
airports can provide both immediate and long-term boosts to the
struggling American economy and ensure the country remains globally
competitive in trade and commerce.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization
Looking ahead, one of ASCE's legislative priorities for this year
is reauthorization of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) programs
before they expire. ASCE supports a multi-year bill that increases
funding for aviation infrastructure, invests in resilience, and
advances the safe and efficient delivery of projects.
The FAA reauthorization funds programs that are vital for the
safety and efficiency of the nation's aviation system.
Timely passage of a reauthorization bill is key because FAA
programs expire on September 30. Prior to the FAA Reauthorization Act
of 2018, the FAA operated under a series of short-term authorizations,
leading to costly delays in investment decisions. A prompt, multi-year
reauthorization would prevent uncertainty with future projects and FAA
programming.
ASCE also urges lawmakers to protect airport infrastructure funding
by increasing Airport Improvement Program (AIP) funding levels and
eliminating the federal cap on the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC). The
AIP and the PFC are two critical revenue mechanisms. The AIP, a major
infrastructure investment program for airports, has had the same annual
authorization level of $3.35 billion for over a decade. The PFC, which
is levied on each enplaning passenger at a commercial airport, has a
federally mandated cap of $4.50. PFC fees can be used to fund FAA-
approved projects that enhance safety or capacity, reduce noise, or
increase air carrier competition. With a federally mandated cap on how
much they can charge passengers, airports struggle to keep up with
infrastructure investment needs.
Across all sectors of infrastructure, ASCE supports sustainability
and resilience projects. Specific to aviation, ASCE asks Congress to
dedicate funds for these types of projects and direct the FAA to work
with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) on resiliency initiatives for
coastal airports. Resilience to both natural and man-made disasters is
key for airports. A strong cybersecurity network bolsters the
resilience of the aviation system in the event of communication and
passenger services issues. Because airports serve as gateways for
critical supplies during and after natural disasters, it is important
they develop facilities assessments and recovery strategies that can be
implemented when these events occur.
Additionally, ASCE recommends a reauthorization that accommodates
alternative delivery and advanced construction methods that can
expedite projects and reduce costs. ASCE also acknowledges the
importance of aviation services to less populous communities. ASCE asks
Congress to address the needs of small communities by supporting the
Essential Air Service Program and the Small Community Air Service
Development Program.
Conclusion
ASCE remains a staunch supporter of investing in aviation
infrastructure and promoting safety. A safe and reliable aviation
infrastructure system facilitates the movement of people to their
destinations and goods to market.
With the passage of the IIJA, the nation is on the precipice of a
long-awaited period of infrastructure investment. The progress of this
investment will be assisted immensely with the passage of a robust,
multi-year reauthorization of FAA programs. ASCE thanks the committee
for holding this hearing and stands ready to assist lawmakers working
on effective implementation of the IIJA and successful reauthorization
of the FAA.
Statement of James Viola, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Helicopter Association International, Submitted for the Record by Hon.
Sam Graves
On behalf of the members of the Helicopter Association
International (HAI), thank you for the opportunity to provide
testimony.
As the professional trade association for the international
vertical flight industry, HAI represents more than 1,100 companies and
over 16,000 industry professionals in more than 65 countries. Each
year, HAI members safely operate more than 3,700 helicopters and
remotely piloted aircraft approximately 2.9 million hours. HAI is
dedicated to the promotion of vertical flight as a safe, effective
method of commerce and to the advancement of the international vertical
flight community.
For more than 70 years, HAI has provided support services and set
industry safety guidelines for the international vertical aviation
community. There is no higher priority than safety for HAI. We
appreciate the House Transportation and Infrastructure's continued
focus on safety, and we look forward to continuing to work together on
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization legislation.
In this testimony, I will provide HAI's position on some of the
most pressing safety issues facing the vertical aviation industry
today.
Leadership
Strong FAA leadership is vital to ensure that the U.S. national
airspace system (NAS) remains the envy of the world. Vertical aviation
is on the cusp of major technological advancement with the entrance of
Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) electric vertical takeoff and landing
(eVTOL) aircraft and uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS). Recent progress
on policy development is encouraging, but efficiency and interagency
coordination remain an issue. We appreciate Congress for acknowledging
this issue by passing the AAM Coordination and Leadership Act, and we
encourage the committee to remain vigilant on implementation. FAA has
not had a confirmed Administrator for far too long. There are more than
two dozen leadership positions that remain vacant. It is imperative
that effective leaders are appointed to those positions and that
sufficient resources are provided.
FAA Preemption Authority
Uniform federal authority is an essential predicate to maintaining
safe transportation in the nation's airspace. A critical element of
safety in the National Airspace (NAS) is the standardization of
aviation regulations--and therefore operational processes and
procedures. Federal preemption of aviation regulation designates the
FAA as the sole regulatory authority over US aviation. This clearly
defined FAA authority has created an operating environment for US
aviation that provides a system of safety for all operators of all
categories of aircraft.
Infrastructure
FAA recently issued guidance that would limit access to
infrastructure for both current and future VTOL aircraft. According to
the guidance, AAM aircraft would not have access to heliports, nor
would helicopters have access to vertiports. This contradicts previous
plans that FAA made public less than a year ago, and it would
undoubtedly limit the success of AAM in the U.S. since it will require
all new infrastructure to be permitted for operations to begin. There
is no inherent safety benefit to arbitrarily restricting access in this
manner. Whether or not a VTOL aircraft can take off or land at
vertiport or heliport should be based on performance of the aircraft.
We urge the committee to ensure FAA maintains access to new and
existing infrastructure for both current and future VTOL aircraft.
Technology
The FAA's recent Notice to Airman (NOTAM) system failure has
illuminated an issue that has long been a major concern--FAA is working
with antiquated technology and must be modernized. We appreciate the
recent House passage of the NOTAM Improvement Act of 2023, and we are
hopeful to see legislation introduced and passed in the Senate. As the
committee continues its work on FAA Reauthorization legislation, HAI
urges the prioritization of modernizing other systems and technology.
UAS Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Aviation Rulemaking Committee
(ARC) Report
HAI was pleased to serve on the BVLOS ARC, and we remain committed
to supporting the safe integration of UAS in the NAS. However, the ARC
report included several recommendations that, if enacted, will
compromise aviation safety. Primary, among other concerns, were
recommendations to establish ``Shielded Areas'' and to undermine
foundational ``Right of Way'' rules that have protected airspace users
for decades. For the sake of safety, we ask the committee to reject the
concept of ``Shielded Areas'' as proposed in the BVLOS ARC Final Report
and prevent the segregation of airspace and any fundamental changes to
``right-of-way'' rules. Performance-based detect and avoid requirements
for UAS BVLOS operations is a practical solution that would maintain
safety for helicopters and other aircraft that operate in low altitudes
across this country.
Performance-Based Requirements
Mandating the use of specific equipment as an answer to industry-
wide safety issues is ineffective, potentially hazardous, and prevents
the industry from being able to realize the benefits of a holistic
approach to safety.
HAI supports the Vertical Aviation Safety Team (VAST) and the US
Helicopter Safety Team (USHST) in the vision of a US helicopter
community with zero fatal accidents. To support this vision, safety
solutions need to be performance based and considerate of the diverse
set of aircraft mission profiles, as well as the complexity of
installation requirements for varying aircraft makes, current and
future.
Prescriptive legislation and regulations do not support the
flexibility necessary for the industry to leverage the advantages of
all safety technologies and may close the door to the development and
implementation of future innovative safety technologies.
As aviation is an international industry, it is also important to
take into consideration the regulatory approach of other countries. The
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) are changing to focus on performance-based
regulation.
Airspace
Airspace congestion resulting in reduced access to low-level
instrument flight rules (IFR) routes is of serious concern for current
helicopter operations and future AAM operations. Aircraft,
communication, and navigation technology advancement has far outpaced
the development of vertical aviation IFR routes. Helicopter operators
and pilots struggle to find direct, safe, reliable routes that address
the specific needs and capabilities of rotorcraft. Increasing the
number of low-level IFR routes will serve helicopters and future AAM
and provide spacing from higher level IFR fixed wing traffic.
Spectrum Policy
Prior to deployment, safety concerns over 5G interference with
radio altimeters were raised by industry, multiple agencies, and
Congress. FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-23-13 places
restrictions on rotorcraft operations that are required to have a radio
altimeter. The restrictions apply to part 135 rotorcraft operations and
part 91 night vision goggle (NVG) operations. FAA approved a petition
for exemption submitted by HAI that enables NVG operations for
helicopter air ambulances. Unlike part 121 operations, helicopter
operators have not been required to retrofit or replace radio
altimeters, but we understand that FAA may reevaluate the restrictions
in the AD after July 2023 when additional 5G providers enter the market
and power levels increase. We encourage the committee to ensure FAA has
sufficient authority to provide waivers and exemptions. Should FAA
determine that radio altimeter retrofits and replacements are necessary
for rotorcraft, we request the committee consider funding for operators
to cover related equipage costs. We would also request that the
committee ensure that any equipage required by FAA is implemented in a
manner that is respectful of the practical considerations of
development, manufacturing and availability of instruments that are not
affected by 5G cell tower signals.
National Parks Overflights Advisory Group (NPOAG)
HAI has grave concern with how the FAA and the National Park
Service (NPS) is handling the implementation of the air tour management
plans (ATMPs) for 23 eligible national parks areas. Our concerns relate
specifically to the transparency of the completion process, operational
safety, and lack of economic considerations. HAI firmly believes
congressional engagement with FAA and the NPS is needed to ensure
National Park Oversight and Advisory Group (NPOAG) involvement on the
development of these plans. Industry is willing to work with other
stakeholders, the FAA, and the NPS to develop a plan that benefits all
involved.
Workforce Development
Due to pandemic-related economic disruptions, many seasoned pilots
and technicians retired early over the past year. This has only
exacerbated the shortage of the skilled personnel the industry needs to
operate safely and efficiently. We appreciate Congress setting up the
Aviation Workforce Development Grants programs in the 2018
Reauthorization Act and likewise express gratitude for the funds made
available for the programs. The grants have encouraged collaboration
between schools, aviation companies, unions, and government to find new
solutions to overcome the existing skills gap and help more Americans
pursue aviation careers. HAI strongly encourages continued support of
the grant programs including expanding the eligibility of the program
to include innovate state programs that enable outreach and education
to students to get started in the aviation industry.
Commitment to Safety
Ensuring the safety of those who fly--whether pilots, crews, or
passengers--is always HAI's top priority. HAI has worked with safety
advocates worldwide to address continued safety improvements for the
vertical flight industry. The following is an overview of the
initiatives that HAI has established for the important work of safety.
Safety Management System
HAI's Safety Management System (SMS) Program allows operators and
maintenance providers to elevate their safety--effectively and
affordably. A SMS is a formal approach to managing safety and risk,
including organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, and
procedures to identify and control risk. The four components of an
SMS--safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and
safety promotion--work together in providing a safety culture. An SMS
is vital to reducing the number of accidents in our industry, ensuring
that every person in an organization, agency, or business understands
that they are responsible for safety.
HAI's SMS Program services allow users to verify their compliance
with current and future international and domestic regulations. While
not all civil aviation authorities currently require SMS programs for
all operators and maintenance providers, HAI and the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have recommended the development and
adoption of safety reporting systems that allow for data to be
collected and analyzed and corrective action taken where necessary.
HAI has partnered with providers to offer scalable SMS solutions to
member businesses. Additionally, the association supports requiring SMS
programs for all operations carrying passengers for hire. HAI strongly
recommends that all aviation operations, not just those carrying paying
passengers, implement an SMS program. HAI is pleased to have expanded
the scope of its SMS Program by partnering with the Aircraft
Electronics Association (AEA) to provide the latter's SMS for aircraft
maintenance at no additional cost to HAI members.
Aviation Safety Action Program
An ASAP helps flight operators identify and reduce possible flight
safety concerns and mitigate risks. It's an easy, open, self-reporting
initiative offering third-party facilitation, tracking, and
recommendations for corrective action so operators can enhance their
overall safety culture. HAI enjoys a partnership with the Air Charter
Safety Foundation to make the foundation's ASAP available to HAI
members.
Flight Risk Assessment Tool
When implementing a SMS, one of the most critical components to
develop is a Flight Risk Assessment Tool (FRAT). Because every flight
has some level of risk, it is critical that pilots can differentiate,
in advance, between a low-risk flight and a high-risk flight, and then
establish a review process and develop risk mitigation strategies. A
FRAT enables proactive hazard identification, is easy to use, and can
visually depict risk. It is an invaluable tool in helping pilots make
better go/no-go decisions.
HAI has a partnership with Swiss company NGFT Solutions to offer a
FRAT module to HAI members. This safety tool's simple question-and-
answer format is designed to help operators objectively and truthfully
evaluate the potential risks of an upcoming flight and any aerial work
sites. Once the possible risks are identified, mitigation prompts help
operators think through strategies to reduce the risk and make flying
safer.
Land and Live
HAI promotes the Land and Live program to encourage pilots to
execute precautionary landings when continued safety of flight is in
perceived or actual jeopardy. Examples of situations include, but are
not limited to, deteriorating or unsafe weather conditions, uncertainty
of aircraft integrity, or potential incapacitation of a required crew
member.
HAI worked with the US Helicopter Safety Team to produce the award-
winning ``56 Seconds to Live'' education program. This program provides
pilots with real world examples to encourage pilots to make
precautionary landings when flight conditions deteriorate.
Vertical Aviation Safety Team
One of the most significant safety projects HAI undertook is co-
leading the Vertical Aviation Safety Team (VAST). I'm honored to serve
as a co-advisor for this group with Miguel Marin, representing the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). VAST is a public-
private initiative to enhance worldwide flight-operations safety in all
segments of the vertical flight industry. Team members comprise
international regional safety teams; safety authorities, including
civil aviation authorities (CAAs); and other industry stakeholders that
work to improve global vertical flight safety. VAST's vision is a
global vertical flight community with zero fatal accidents achieved
through cooperation and collaboration.
In the past, international aviation safety information has tended
to stay within separate organizational and national silos. VAST intends
to break down these silos so that aviation safety information can flow
freely globally. To achieve this end, VAST is engaging its regional
safety teams to receive, integrate, harmonize, and distribute aviation
safety data, programs, and recommendations worldwide. Additionally,
VAST serves as an arbiter between the regional safety teams to ensure
collaboration on and coordination of these initiatives, as well as the
sharing of final output.
International regional safety teams, which consist of national and
industry stakeholders, are formed to improve the safety of civil
vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) operations in their respective
national airspace systems.
In addition to national civil aviation authorities such as the US
FAA and the CAAs of the United Kingdom, Sudan, and Colombia, aviation
safety authorities include jurisdictional agencies, such as ICAO and
the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and nationally
recognized safety organizations such as the NTSB in the United States,
the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, and the Transport Accident
Investigation Commission in New Zealand.
Other industry stakeholders include original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs), training providers, aircraft operators, service
providers, and vertical flight industry associations such as HAI, the
European Helicopter Association, and the Association for Uncrewed
Vehicle Systems International.
VAST has five chief goals:
1. Establish the organization as the world's most trusted source
for vertical flight safety information and resources
2. Establish working groups to represent key segments and issues
relevant to the global VTOL industry
3. Formalize leadership positions, working groups, and advisory
roles for participating organizations and individuals
4. Identify, collect, harmonize, and deliver centralized access to
safety information and resources from participating stakeholder
entities
5. Provide and coordinate a forum where regional safety teams,
safety authorities, and other industry stakeholders work together on
vertical flight safety issues.
Conclusion
I thank the committee for the opportunity to provide the
perspective of the vertical flight industry and look forward to
continuing our work together on these important issues.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Prior to Member questioning, I
want to let the Members and the panel know that votes are
currently predicted to be about 1:30. If that happens, we may
end up taking a brief recess and coming back. If this occurs, I
just want the witnesses to be aware that we may have to take a
break.
With that, we are going first turn to the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Webster, for questions.
Mr. Webster, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate
all this. I thank each one of you for your presentation.
Lots of questions. I don't know where to start. Captain
Ambrosi, we as a committee are continuing to conduct rigorous
oversight on the issue of 5G C-band and what its effect is on
safety. How are you and your organization engaged in this issue
and keeping everybody up to speed?
Mr. Ambrosi. Well, thank you, Congressman, for the
question. ALPA is engaged on the issue. I am pleased to report
that at most carriers, progress is being made towards the
deadline in July. However, it is unfortunate that we got to
where we are today on this issue. There should have been a
better collaboration between the FAA and the FCC on this issue.
It is something that this body should look at going forward.
And we are happy to continue collaborating on the issue.
Mr. Webster of Florida. So, going forward, what
recommendations would you have to keep everybody engaged?
Mr. Ambrosi. Well, the FCC obviously should have
coordinated with the FAA on this issue early on in the process.
So, we are behind the scenes now. We are trying to fix this
after the fact. So, I can assure you that our pilots and our
members are taking this very seriously and working to ensure
that every flight is operated in the safest fashion possible.
Mr. Webster of Florida. So, what are you doing to keep your
members up to speed on the problems or whatever?
Mr. Ambrosi. So, the airlines, individual airlines
disseminate data to the members or to their pilots of where it
is. The NOTAM system has information that says which airports
have an issue, which airports may not. Individual fleets, some
airlines have multiple different airplanes, so, some fleets
have been converted sooner than others. And we as an
association also disseminate safety messages to our members on
an ongoing basis.
But right now, progress is being made, but we do urge the
FCC and FAA and the cell phone carriers to continue taking this
issue very seriously.
Mr. Webster of Florida. So, do you think it is better today
as far as just keeping people up to speed?
Mr. Ambrosi. It is better than it was. In my opinion--I
have only been on the job for a month, but in my opinion, it is
better than it was a year ago.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Well, I had another question, and
that was, do you think that those communications, especially
with the FCC, is there some sort of snag that we could help
with, improve, or change so that there would be more
collaboration?
Mr. Ambrosi. That is an important question, sir. And I
would like to take that back to my engineering or safety team
and find out specifically what they feel would be the best way
forward. And I will have my team share that with your office
and the committee.
Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. Thank you very much.
Thanks, each one of you, for appearing today. We really
appreciate it. It is very good information.
I yield back.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. The gentleman's time
has expired.
Five minutes to the ranking member, Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
First question I have is for Dr. Buckley. And if you could
just maybe briefly explain why the--you live on acronyms--no.
Could you explain why the ASIAS system as a voluntary system
works in terms of collecting data, using that data, dealing
with it objectively as opposed to mandating this process?
Ms. Buckley. Yes. Thank you for the question on the ASIAS
program. Certainly as we have heard, commercial aviation is
safer than it has ever been, and it really is through the
collaborative engagements through CAST and data sharing through
programs like ASIAS. We are learning more and more and taking
proactive actions to addressing emerging issues faster than
ever.
Since the CAST's inception, the fatality risk in commercial
aviation, as we have heard, has dropped 94 percent, resulting
in the safest period in aviation history. Their work, along
with new aircraft regulations and other activities, have
virtually eliminated the traditional common causes of
commercial accidents, which are controlled flight into terrain,
weather, and wind shear.
But having exceeded this goal, their 10-year goal of
reducing fatality risk by 83 percent, they are looking for
further risk reductions, and leveraging industry and data
analytic tools from ASIAS. The ASIAS environment operated by
the MITRE Corporation is a data environment in which we are the
third-party trusted partner to bring in data from the operators
themselves, as well as Government and other types of data, you
can think about weather and other type of infrastructure data.
What we use that data to develop are these models to
understand systemic accidents or threats to accidents or
issues, and the key to this is that all of the parties
participating build their participation and collaboration on
trust. So, we protect the privacy of those who provide it. It
is a nonpunitive environment.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Can I pause you there?
Ms. Buckley. Please.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Because I want to get to a
different question with someone else. But do you think this
process can flex to apply to the new entrants, the eVTOL drone
users, or is it specific to the current system we have among
carriers and other operators?
Ms. Buckley. Absolutely. And we are very much encouraging
that shift. So, we already have rotorcraft, and general
aviation is part of that. Certainly UAS, AAM, and eVTOLs, we
believe, could really benefit from the type of analytics and
data sharing that ASIAS offers. And in fact, we see that in
other modes of transportation as well.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. Great. Thanks.
Mr. Boulter, of course, we are doing the reauthorization
coming up, and I appreciate your comments.
We have heard the concerns in certification. To achieve
what we want to do in the reform bill, we need people at the
FAA. And we have, certainly over the pandemic and probably for
other reasons, we have lost people at the FAA and other
agencies, and we are trying to get new people in. But with new
people comes less experience until they are more experienced.
Do you have a comment on whether or not that is holding FAA
back moving forward on certification reforms or on
certification generally?
Mr. Boulter. As Mr. Bunce said, it is probably a higher
volume than normal for the number of folks with not a lot of
experience inside of aircraft certification. But some of these
people come from industry and others comes right out of
college. We look at this as an opportunity.
I agree with Mr. Bunce that we need to look for unique ways
to train folks up and maybe accelerate their training beyond
on-the-job training. But we think we have the right numbers of
folks. Congress has been very generous to us. For 2023, we
added 200 additional folks in aviation safety. A year before
that I think it was another 20O. So, that is part of it as
well. We have plussed up our numbers so that would put more new
people in the system.
We are confident that--we look at this as a real
opportunity. The folks we are bringing on bring different
skills to us. Obviously, engineering schools are way different
today than they were 30 years ago. Having folks of all
different backgrounds and different skills really will help us
in the long run. It is going to be a little bit of pain in the
short run, obviously, with that many folks in training, but I
think some of these training opportunities we may have could
accelerate that.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. All right. Mr. Chair, just in the
final moments, I want to as well recognize the presence of
Colgan families who are here and thank them for their continued
advocacy for aviation safety for the entire flying public. I
appreciate you all being here. Thank you very much.
And finally, I would ask unanimous consent to enter into
the record a statement from the Transport Workers Union's
president, John Samuelsen.
Mr. Graves of Missouri [presiding]. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Statement of John Samuelsen, International President, Transport Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Rick Larsen
I offer this statement on behalf of more than 155,000 members of
the Transport Workers Union of America (TWU). The TWU is the largest
airline union in the U.S. Our members include flight attendants, ramp
workers, mechanics, dispatchers, pilot instructors, and other
professionals who keep our national airspace operating safely across 17
airlines.
The safety of America's airspace was built and is maintained by the
frontline workers responsible for implementing our safety rules on a
daily basis. Flight attendants, mechanics, dispatchers, ground workers,
and pilots strive to sustain a culture of safety at our airlines while
facing increasing headwinds. While many measures--including
fatalities--continue to showcase the incredible safety possibilities in
our system, several others--including unruly passenger behavior--
demonstrate the need for continued improvements and oversight.
As Congress prepares to reauthorize the FAA before the current
authorization expires on September 30, 2023, we urge you to directly
address several issues currently undermining the safety of our air
system.
Reestablish one level of safety and security for aircraft maintenance
FAA-certified aircraft maintenance and repair stations, regardless
of location, are all statutorily obligated to the same safety
standards. Despite this requirement (and despite twice being directed
by Congress to ensure one level of safety for these facilities), the
FAA continues to allow repair facilities located outside of the U.S. to
operate on lower safety and security standards. The FAA exempts the
aircraft maintenance facilities it certifies outside the U.S. from
security background checks and drug and alcohol testing for safety
critical workers, risk-based safety and security evaluations for
facilities, unannounced FAA inspections, and certification standards
for mechanics and technicians.
The collective weight of these exemptions has created a structural
disadvantage for U.S.-based maintenance workers which is incentivizing
offshoring American jobs and increasing our exposure to security and
safety threats. As the TWU has previously testified to before this
Committee, we are reaching a tipping point where the amount of
maintenance being performed out of the country cannot be controlled for
by the maintenance performed domestically. Fewer than half of the
286,000 mechanics working on U.S. aircraft are in the U.S.
The single largest beneficiary of this offshoring is the government
of China, which owns and operates nearly 100 FAA-certified facilities
employing more than 23,000 workers maintaining and overhauling U.S.
aircraft. These facilities perform repairs deep inside of airframes and
engines, often in places inaccessible in between repairs which may be
as long as 10-years apart. And they are doing so without any meaningful
oversight from the U.S. government.
Last Congress, this Committee recognized the significant threat of
unregulated maintenance facilities and passed the Global Aircraft
Maintenance Safety Improvement Act by a wide, bipartisan margin. The
bill enjoys the support of the Chairs and Ranking Members of the full
committee and the Aviation subcommittee and went on to pass the House
by 374-52 last October. We urge you to include this bill in its
entirety in this year's FAA reauthorization.
Prevent assaults on airline workers
Assaults on flight attendants, gate agents, and other customer
facing workers in the airline industry have reached a critical level.
In 2021, the FAA recorded almost 6,000 unruly passenger events onboard
aircraft and in airports. These incidents of passengers assaulting,
spitting on, and harassing safety critical personnel pose a major
threat to our airspace system. The threat of assault is also driving
these workers out of the industry, as well as slowing recruitment
efforts.
While many of these incidents in 2021 were related to mask
mandates, more than a third of the reported assaults had nothing to do
with mask enforcement and we have not seen these numbers return to pre-
pandemic levels since the mask mandate was lifted. Incidents of assault
in our air system were on the rise before the pandemic and actions to-
date have not slowed the trend. We must reduce the number of assaults
onboard aircraft and in airports to ensure a safe workplace for cabin
crews and gate personnel.
Federal law already prohibits assaulting, interfering with, or
intimidating air crews, TSA agents, and airport workers with security
duties (49 USC 46503 and 46504). The penalties for these activities
include fines and jail time; however, nothing prevents these assailants
from immediately returning to the commercial air system. Airlines are
forbidden by anti-trust laws from sharing information on potentially
dangerous passengers--even those who have posed significant security
threats.
The Protection from Abusive Passengers Act would prohibit violent
passengers from utilizing the national airspace after they have been
convicted or fined for violating existing federal law. These assailants
would also lose access to trusted traveler programs like TSA pre-check.
This bill provides frontline aviation workers with a critical level of
protection. This is a commonsense change that we urge the committee to
support.
Additionally, advanced self-defense training is a proactive step
which would allow crew members to protect themselves in cases of an
assault or security threat made against the aircraft. Advanced self-
defense training is already offered as a TSAapproved optional training
for pilots and flight attendants and provides comprehensive hands-on
and traditional classroom style training in self-defense best practices
and techniques, tailored to the passenger aircraft environment. This
training should be mandatory for flight attendants. Specifically, this
type of training will improve flight attendant capabilities in
deterring attackers by providing appropriate and effective responses to
an assailant, including the use of force and appropriate restraint
techniques.
To round out these protections, the previous FAA reauthorization
included a requirement for airlines to develop Employee Assault
Prevention and Response plans to address violence against frontline
aviation workers. While most airlines have submitted these plans, the
FAA does not believe they have the authority to enforce them or
penalize airlines who ignore this requirement. The next FAA
reauthorization must clarify the FAA's powers here to include these
plans in each airline's safety management system.
Ensure aircraft dispatching remains safe
Aircraft dispatchers are FAA-licensed professionals who have
operational control of all commercial aircraft on the ground.
Dispatchers plan flights, handle weight and balance issues (including
fuel consumption), and work collectively with pilots and air traffic
controllers to safely move each flight from takeoff to touchdown. Each
dispatchers is responsible for as many as 50 flights at a time. This
function requires a significant level of focus, a large amount of
highly interconnected infrastructure, and a high degree of security--
which is why the FAA had never allowed dispatchers to operate in remote
locations away from a dispatching center. In August of 2020, without
explanation or a protocol for safety oversight, the FAA authorized two
airlines to remotely dispatch aircraft. While couched as an emergency
pandemic response, the FAA has expanded this authorization several
times without explanation or even direction to their safety inspectors
on how to ensure these carriers are meeting minimum safety standards.
Remote dispatching raises significant safety concerns. FAA rules
require dispatching duties to be performed in a secure environment
protected from physical and cyberattacks; that dispatching workstations
be capable to handling massive amounts of weather, traffic, and other
data up-to-the-minute; that dispatchers be subject to random and
reasonable suspicion drug and alcohol testing; and that work sites have
distraction mitigations, spot inspections, and other standards in place
to prevent a degradation of safety. These requirements are difficult or
impossible to apply in work-from-home conditions. Congress must act to
ensure the integrity of these rules are not undermined in the name of
convenience.
Enable reliable tracking and reporting of toxic cabin air incidents
To create breathable air at cruise altitudes, most aircraft pull
oxygen from over their wings, warm this air over the engines, and
compress it before venting the air into the cabin. This air is then
filtered and a portion of it is recirculated. However, when engine or
compressor malfunctions occur, engine oil, jet fuel, or other harmful
fluids can gasify and leak into the cabin air supply. These ``fume
events'' can produce potent nerve agents when inhaled or absorbed
through the skin and can have severe, negative health effects for
flight crew and passengers alike.
The Cabin Air Safety Act requires air monitoring equipment and
detectors be installed on commercial aircraft, the creation of a robust
system of data collection and reporting requirements, and flight crew
training on identifying and detecting fume events in real time. These
measures will help ensure aircraft cabin air is safe for passengers and
flight crew members.
Set standards for the next generation of aircraft to be safely
integrated into our existing structure
New technologies must always be judged by their ability to meet
existing safety standards and create good, high-quality jobs. As
aircraft begin to be used in new ways--such air taxis and drone
delivery--we must ensure that this new equipment is living up to the
rules currently in place that have made the U.S. airspace the safest in
the world. Additionally, to the extent that aircraft are entering
spaces currently served by other modes of transportation, Congress must
take steps to ensure that no mode is disadvantaged as a result of the
federal government's actions.
Continue to allow airline workers to benefit from state labor
protections
Airline jobs have been, historically, great jobs. This is a highly
unionized sector with competitive pay and benefits for most crafts.
However, in recent years, airlines have attempted to carve out their
workers from state and local labor protections--including minimum
wages, meal & rest breaks, and family and medical leave. Such a change
would be disastrous for hundreds of thousands of airline workers who
would instantly see their labor standards reduced. This would severely
harm recruitment efforts in the industry and push the best and
brightest of future generations into other jobs with better labor
protections.
Proponents of federal pre-emption in this area fail to account for
workers' response should the airline industry suddenly become the worst
employer in an area. It will not help recruit new pilots, mechanics,
ramp workers, flight attendants, or others into the industry if they
are guaranteed a higher wage, time off to care for their families, and
opportunities for rest breaks at every other employer competing for
their talent.
Additionally, worker advocates would be forced to lobby for these
protections at the federal level, splitting Congress' focus and
undermining the safety goals of our system.
Thank you for your work to enhance the safety of America's
airspace. The TWU stands ready to support your work to quickly
reauthorize the FAA and to make the reforms noticed above.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Garret.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
Mr. Boulter, I understand you are not the Acting
Administrator, but I am sitting here listening to Colonel Bunce
and Mr. Bolen express extraordinary concern about the FAA in
terms of its, I guess I will use the term ``agility'', to
respond to new entrants into the market. I will tell you, my
personal opinion is that I think the FAA is using an antiquated
structure that is based upon on a 737 rather than new entrants
into the market. I think that both the regulatory and the
organizational structure are not, I guess, structured in a way
that is going to truly be able to facilitate new technology.
I am concerned that we are actually going to lose our
leading edge in technology in the United States to other
countries that are more agile. And I have strong concerns about
the lack of certainty or predictability that some of these
entrepreneurs or investors are looking at as they are trying to
make U.S.-based companies.
Look, let's be clear, we have come in, this committee, this
Congress has come in and banned foreign drones and others. We
are trying to facilitate U.S. innovators and entrepreneurs.
Could you comment on some of the concerns that were raised by
other panelists about the FAA and just its ability to be agile
and to facilitate some of the new entrants in the market as we
are watching some other challenges happen in aviation?
Mr. Boulter. We strongly believe, in working with Acting
Administrator Nolen, that we owe a path to new entrants. We owe
them a regulatory path. At the same time, that regulatory path
needs to have safety as its foremost concern. When we don't get
those paths out there, as Mr. Bunce said, then it causes us
more work. And now we are into exemptions and other things
where we could be doing rulemaking.
I am absolutely focused on: Get those paths available. We
have taken a tack on powered-lift, which is eVTOL, to be able
to get those to market. We have made commitments to getting
those there before the first eVTOL is certified. We will
continue to do that. We are going to look at all of our
regulatory pieces. We have pushed more actions through in the
last 6 months than we have probably in the last 3 years.
Anything we can do to get more agile.
We have to be agile and safe. But we hear you, and I
absolutely am concerned about the time it takes us, because at
the end of the day, if we don't build those paths, then the
applicants don't know what path to go down. And we need to
build those paths, but safely integrate technology into the
National Airspace System.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I just want to reiterate that I
have very strong concerns about the current trajectory. I think
that the panelists have legitimate concerns about
predictability and agility at the FAA. It is going to be a key
issue as we work on the reauthorization bill. But I also want
to make note that we still have significant portions of the
2018 bill that haven't been implemented. And so, we are going
to need the FAA to certainly show a higher degree of resolve in
moving forward on the new legislation as we enact that.
Dr. Buckley, MITRE has previously conducted research to
help the FAA analyze aviation delays and improve upon the
flight delays and I think just the overall passenger
experience.
Can you talk a little bit about the results of your
research there and what should be taken away in terms of our
ability to be able to improve efficiency of the aviation
system?
Ms. Buckley. Yes, thank you.
MITRE, as the FAA's FFRDC, would have been looking at
advanced both air traffic management and operations studies and
efficiencies in automations for a number of years. We work in
partnership with the operators of the ATO, as well as our
associations and pilot members and bring them into our
laboratory to really look at some of the new automated
technologies that can help and ensure safety; but also, we look
at capacity inefficiency as well.
One of those that I mentioned earlier was trajectory-based
operations. That is something that we feel is a priority. That
is looking at the 4D approach that really helps the efficiency
and the safety of understanding the trajectories and to help
our controllers and our operators.
I would say that the foundations that the NextGen program,
of which many of these programs that you reference are part of,
is a foundation for where we are going in the future, and that
is around the info-centric NAS. So, again, that gets into
understanding and modernizing the backplane and what some of
these new approaches, these control approaches and
modernization activities need to run on.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Dr. Buckley.
I yield back.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Eleanor.
Ms. Norton. This hearing is particularly important to me
and my constituents. There are two airports in this region, in
the National Capital region, and I am cochair of the Quiet
Skies Caucus.
I hear regularly from not only my constituents but from
fellow members about airport noise. And this question is for
Ms. Buckley. Airport noise is not only a nuisance; it can
affect health and safety. Ms. Buckley, can airspace design be
utilized to reduce aviation noise and increase safety?
Ms. Buckley. Thank you for the question.
Airspace design does have a role in reducing noise and
safety and sustainment as well. MITRE was involved in the
execution of Metroplex, which was a large-scale FAA NextGen
program that looked at congested high-traffic airports and was
able to optimize the use of airspace in those Metroplex areas
and save billions of dollars both on fuel and showed proven
changes in terms of noise as well in those urban areas.
So, yes, there are techniques that can be doing that. The
FAA and MITRE have been looking at those through the Metroplex
program and will continue to do so.
Ms. Norton. I am pleased to hear that.
Mr. Bunce, in 2021, the General Aviation Manufacturers
Association committed to achieving net-zero carbon emissions by
2050. That, of course, is in line with the Paris Agreement to
limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. This commitment to
carbon neutrality is admirable given that communities of color
and low-income groups in the United States are exposed to
higher levels of air pollution.
So, my question for you, Mr. Bunce, is what changes should
Congress enact to the Federal Aviation Administration
reauthorization in order to achieve a net-zero aviation future?
Mr. Bunce. Representative Norton, if you look at our
commitments, and it is business aviation working together with
our commercial brethren to those net-zero commitments, one of
the biggest wedges in that is sustainable aviation fuel; and
this Congress and the last Congress actually helped us a lot
with the blended fuel tax credit and some other initiatives
that were in there to start building out more production
capability for sustainable aviation fuel. That is going to be
huge.
But the other part of this is if you look at how we develop
those for both commercial and general aviation, the wedge for
technology starts to grow pretty dramatically in the 2030s. So,
we need to be able to set the stage now to do what Mr. Boulter
talked about and what a lot of us are pushing for is just being
able to facilitate that rapid ability to certify new technology
out there.
So, think about electric augmentation of existing engines
that we have that are out there burning traditional fossil
fuel, hopefully soon a lot of SAF, but we have got that
capability, a lot of, in the advanced air mobility capability
that we can extend with better battery-powered density
technology to be able to provide essential air service to a lot
of rural communities out there.
So, it is probably the most exciting time in aviation since
the dawn of the jet age, as long as we can get this technology
certified, and that is where this FAA reauthorization can
really help us as a Nation and as a planet.
Ms. Norton. Thank you.
Captain Ambrosi, you mentioned a current U.S.-backed base
carrier that is attempting to circumvent the FAA safety
standards. By utilizing foreign-based flightcrews, airlines can
evade the FAA safety standards--I was shocked to learn that--
safety standards for crews leading to decreased safety in
American airspace.
Is there currently any mechanism to prevent this kind of
crude outsourcing that reduces safety in the name of corporate
profit?
Mr. Ambrosi. Well, thank you, Congresswoman, for the
question. Short on time, so, I will say quickly that the
Department of Transportation looks at every foreign airline
application to come into the U.S. So, Congress' pressure on the
Department of Transportation to ensure that the public interest
test that is currently in legislation is applied to that to
prevent foreign airlines from undermining U.S. labor standards.
Ms. Norton. I am pleased to hear that.
I yield back.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thanks.
Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Boulter, last July I raised the issue
surrounding Santa Clara County's ban on 100 Low Lead.
Unfortunately, the concerns I raised went unheeded. I have got
an affidavit from a Reid-Hillview Airport business owner and
the lack of 100 Low Lead, which has contributed to at least one
misfueling incident that I am aware of and to one accident
resulting from the aircraft running out of fuel.
Can I ask unanimous consent to have the affidavit entered
into the record?
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association et al. v. County of Santa Clara,
California, FAA Docket No. 16-22-08, Submitted for the Record by Hon.
Scott Perry
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, DC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION, et al,
Complainants,
v. FAA Docket No. 16-22-08
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, CALIFORNIA
Respondent.
DECLARATION OF NIKNAM NICKRAVESH
I, Niknam Nickravesh, being over 18 years of age and otherwise fully
competent to testify state that:
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein.
2. I am the owner of multiple businesses that operate at Reid-
Hillview Airport (KRHV), including Nik's Aircraft, LLC and Flying S
Aviation. I am also the Director of Maintenance for Nice Air Aviation.
3. I am aware of an accident that occurred on July 22, 2022, that
involved a Piper PA-32-301 aircraft, registration number N300BH (the
``Aircraft''), shortly after it departed from RHV.
4. Prior to this accident, the Aircraft underwent maintenance at
Flying S Aviation. When the maintenance on the Aircraft began, I
estimated that the Aircraft had approximately 30 gallons of 100LL on
board total. The maintenance performed on the Aircraft included engine
run-ups. At the conclusion of maintenance on the aircraft, I personally
observed the aircraft had little to no fuel remaining as a result of
the engine run-ups in the left tank.
5. To the best of my knowledge, the Aircraft requires 100LL.
6. It is my understanding that the operator of the Aircraft was
aware of the Aircraft's fuel status but was not able to obtain 100LL
fuel at RHV. As a result, the Aircraft departed RHV with little to no
fuel remaining. It is my understanding that the operator of the
Aircraft intended to fly to San Jose International Airport (KSJC) to
obtain 100LL.
7. After the accident occurred, I was told by an NTSB accident
investigator that the Aircraft had run out of fuel.
8. I am personally aware of multiple instances involving transient
aircraft that arrive at RHV anticipating to fuel with 100LL, unaware
that it is not available at RHV. As a result of the lack of
availability of 100LL, these aircraft depart without refueling.
9. I am personally aware of a misfuelling incident at a Santa
Clara County airport, where the pilot mistakenly self-fueled their
Christen Eagle aircraft with 94UL fuel, which cannot safely and legally
use 94UL fuel. The error was identified before takeoff.
I AFFIRM under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct to the best of my personal knowledge.
DATED: 1/6/2023
Niknam Nickravesh
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Boulter, can you tell us what is
precipitating the ban and the drive to get rid of 100 Low Lead
knowing that one-third of the gasoline fleet is powered by that
fuel? What drives this decision?
Mr. Boulter. Obviously, the harm in lead emissions from
those aircrafts.
Mr. Perry. So, I would agree with you that is what is
driving it. And do you have knowledge of the fact that the
county's study regarding Santa Clara County and Reid-Hillview
in particular found that the lead found was within the limits
but that that information was suppressed by the government
there? Are you aware of that?
Mr. Boulter. I am not. That is outside my area.
Mr. Perry. Well, I want to make you aware of it. I have got
a couple of articles here that outline that.
I would like to ask unanimous consent to have them entered
into the record.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Article, ``Study finds no elevated lead levels in Reid-Hillview
Airport's soil. The results are bound to intensify debates around the
closure of the San Jose airport,'' by Gabriel Greschler, Bay Area News
Group, June 11, 2022, updated: June 13, 2022, Submitted for the Record
by Hon. Scott Perry
Study finds no elevated lead levels in Reid-Hillview Airport's soil
The results are bound to intensify debates around the closure of the
San Jose airport
by Gabriel Greschler
Bay Area News Group, June 11, 2022, updated: June 13, 2022, at 4:49
a.m.
https://www.mercurynews.com/2022/06/11/study-finds-no-elevated-lead-
levels-in-reid-hillview-airports-soil/
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
SAN JOSE, CA_January 18: Pilot Sal Khan of Hayward disembarks from a
Cessna airplane at Reid-Hillview Airport in San Jose, Calif., on Jan.
18, 2022. (Dai Sugano/Bay Area News Group)
A Santa Clara County-commissioned study released Wednesday found
that soil samples taken at Reid-Hillview Airport in San Jose did not
contain lead levels that exceed local, state or federal standards.
The results paint a clearer picture of the extent to which lead has
contaminated the Evergreen neighborhood airport since the release last
August of an airborne lead study ordered by the county that concluded
children who live around Reid-Hillview have elevated levels of the
contaminant in their blood.
The latest study examined soil from 32 locations spread across the
airport. Scientists took samples from Reid-Hillview's surface up to six
inches deep in the soil--and then from one foot to 18 inches deep.
Similar research was conducted at San Martin Airport, the other county-
owned airport 23 miles south of Reid-Hillview.
``Results of this study determined that total lead was not detected
above San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Board Environmental
Screening Levels, (Environmental Protection Agency) Regional Screening
Levels, or California Total Threshold Level Concentration trigger
values in any of the soil samples collected during investigations at
either airport,'' the study states.
The highest concentration of lead at Reid-Hillview was found in a
dry soil sample on the corner of Cunningham Avenue and Capitol
Expressway, at 46.7 milligrams per kilogram. The sample fell below
local, state and federal danger levels which range from 50 to 800
milligrams per kilogram.
Katharine Hammond, an exposure expert and professor at UC
Berkeley's School of Public Health, said she isn't surprised with the
soil sample results and that they don't contradict the August airborne
study's findings.
Particulate matter coming out of an engine like an airplane is so
light, Hammond said, that contaminates will likely not settle on the
ground but get blown outside of the airport's immediate vicinity.
``Imagine you took a handful of sand, which are fairly big
particles, and you held your hand in the middle of a dining room table
and threw the sand up in the air,'' Hammond said. ``Most of it would be
on the table or around the table. But if you took a handful of smaller
particles like flour and threw it up in the air, it is going to be all
over the place, not just on the dining room table.''
Hammond said it is also likely there are some soil samples that
exceed the ones found on the corner of Cunningham and Capitol
Expressway. She explained that when sampling is conducted across a
tract of land, there are usually areas that contain higher amounts of
contamination not included in an analysis.
The new soil study is bound to intensify debates surrounding the
planned closure of Reid-Hillview Airport.
Proponents of the closure claim that the airport's piston-engine
airplanes, which still rely heavily on leaded fuel, present a health
hazard to surrounding residents and that the area could be better and
more safely used for much-needed housing.
But opponents of the closure view the lead danger as overblown,
saying the contamination is caused by other sources and that proposals
for housing are simply a land grab.
A copy of the soil report was provided to this news organization
after a public records request asking for the study's results went
unanswered for weeks. The contract for the report was $130,000,
according to County Executive Jeff Smith. The research was conducted by
Jacobs Engineering, a Dallas-based firm.
District 2 Supervisor Cindy Chavez, who called for the August lead
study and is a driving force behind closing Reid-Hillview, had not read
the new soil study and was not immediately available for comment, a
spokesperson said.
In May, under the direction of Chavez, San Jose-based nonprofit
group Latinos United for a New America began canvassing the surrounding
neighborhood of Reid-Hillview to educate residents about the county's
airborne lead study from August. In addition, the nonprofit's
representatives will ``promote the importance of healthy habits for
lead prevention, refer residents to lead testing resources, and
identify residents interested in further information and future
engagement opportunities.''
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
SAN JOSE_April 27: An airplane descends past a row of palm trees at
Eastridge Mall for a landing at Reid-Hillview Airport in San Jose,
Calif., on Monday, April 27, 2020. (Randy Vazquez/Bay Area News Group)
Efforts to close Reid-Hillview have been underway for decades. More
recently, county supervisors voted in 2018 to stop providing federal
grant dollars to the airport, which will lead to Reid-Hillview's
closure in 2031.
After the August lead study came out, county officials stopped
providing leaded fuel at Reid-Hillview and San Martin at the start of
this year in an effort to reduce further contamination, a move that was
criticized by Federal Air Administration officials who felt that county
officials hadn't consulted them.
The county's airports now only sell unleaded fuel. However, many
airplanes can only run on leaded, which has led to pilots refueling at
surrounding Bay Area airports before landing at Reid-Hillview or San
Martin.
In February, county officials informed the Eastridge Little League
that they had to leave their baseball diamonds at Reid-Hillview in
response to the August blood lead study. The baseball league, which has
been playing at the fields since 1972, will vacate the site June 28,
according to league president Johnny Cisneros.
Cisneros is currently in talks with the county to receive funding
through 2025, but he said he's unsure whether he'll agree to the terms,
putting the league's future in limbo.
Article, ``County study found lead within limits in soil around Reid-
Hillview. Officials sat on results until journalists pressed for
release,'' by Eric Blinderman, AOPA, June 15, 2022, Submitted for the
Record by Hon. Scott Perry
County study found lead within limits in soil around Reid-Hillview
Officials sat on results until journalists pressed for release
by Eric Blinderman
AOPA, June 15, 2022
https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2022/june/15/county-study-
found-lead-within-limits-in-soil-around-reid-hillview
The Mercury News of San Jose, California, reported that a study
conducted by Santa Clara County found that soil samples taken at Reid-
Hillview of Santa Clara County Airport contained lead levels below
local, state, or federal safety limits.
Reid-Hillview of Santa Clara County Airport. Photo by Mike Fizer.
The soil report was released to the news organization on June 8
only ``after a public records request asking for the study's results
went unanswered for weeks,'' according to the newspaper. The $130,000
study was conducted by a Dallas-based firm, which according to the
newspaper, examined samples from 32 locations around the airport, taken
at various depths into the soil. A similar study was also conducted at
San Martin Airport.
``We all want lead out of aviation fuel, but the transition needs
to be done safely and smartly,'' said AOPA President Mark Baker. ``The
fact that the county sat on these findings, and then were essentially
forced to release them, is telling. The county hid these findings and
then turned around and prohibited the sale of certain aviation fuel
required for thousands of aircraft. This prohibition significantly
increases the risk of misfuelling and imposes serious safety concerns
for pilots.''
On January 1, Santa Clara County banned the sale of 100LL Reid-
Hillview and San Martin airports, citing a contested airborne lead
study in 2021 ordered by the county. AOPA and other associations, pilot
groups, and airport businesses quickly pointed out that many of the
200,000 aircraft in the current general aviation piston fleet require
higher-octane fuel to fly safely, and that misfuelling can cause
detonation and engine malfunction resulting in catastrophic engine
failure. Pilots and aircraft owners in the county whose aircraft
require higher-octane fuel are forced to find it outside the county
before landing at their home airports.
In addition, the Avgas Coalition led by AOPA sent a letter on May 6
to Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg and acting FAA Administrator
Billy Nolen, outlining the need for 100LL fuel to be available at our
nation's airports while the industry works with the Biden
administration to find a fleetwide unleaded fuel solution as quickly as
possible.
The Avgas Coalition is a broad partnership of those who represent
many facets of the transition to an unleaded avgas future. This
coalition has a single-minded purpose of steering the GA industry to an
unleaded future and advocating for a smart and safe transition that
works for the entire GA fleet.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Boulter, it seems to me, knowing that this
airport was built in 1937, that most of the residents around it
that now seek to have it closed are using this opportunity, so
to speak, so contrived, to close what they don't like. I am
wondering what the FAA is doing.
And I understand that you have got now G100UL, which will
replace 100 Low Lead. So, I get that.
What is the cost of 100 Low Lead on the average, and what
is the cost per gallon of the new replacement fuel?
Mr. Boulter. Sir, I am not aware of those numbers.
Mr. Perry. Shouldn't you be aware of that? One-third of all
gasoline engines use 100 Low Lead. Wouldn't that be something
you would know?
Mr. Boulter. Sir, I am an Aviation Safety Organization. We
are----
Mr. Perry [interrupting]. But this is about safety. We
already had one plane that crashed because they didn't get
fuel. The airport banned the fuel, even though it wasn't
allowed to. What has the FAA done about the ban?
Mr. Boulter. The FAA is continuing to work towards that.
So, our airports division, which is outside my purview, is
working that issue aggressively.
Mr. Perry. They are working it aggressively. So, are other
airports going to be allowed to ban it?
Mr. Boulter. Sir, I would not know that.
Mr. Perry. Well, who would know it?
Mr. Boulter. I could certainly set you up with our airports
division.
Mr. Perry. It seems to me, sir, that if we are going to
have a replacement fuel, and apparently we do, which is great,
you have to make sure that it is widely available and that it
is affordable. And if that is not the case, that we cannot
allow airports to unilaterally ban it and have the FAA continue
to sanction that type of operation.
I am sure that you, or I hope, maybe you are not familiar,
with the Grant Assurance or Grant Assurance 22. Are you
familiar with that?
Mr. Boulter. Somewhat familiar, sir. Grant Assurance is run
by the division of airports in the agency.
Mr. Perry. So, it says that if you are going to have a
public airport, you have got to provide the fuel and other
services, right. That is essentially what it says. Yet the FAA
is allowing airports to ban the fuel for political reasons.
Let's just face it. That is what it is. It is political
reasons. It has nothing to do with science. The articles
clearly show it has nothing to do with science.
And what is the FAA doing about it? What are they going to
do about it?
Mr. Boulter. Sir, I do know that our airports division is
working that very specific issue.
Mr. Perry. Well, they don't seem to be very effective.
I go back to the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Graves, in
agility. They are working the issue.
Here is what we know. We have a fuel that has worked for a
very, very long time that is readily available and affordable,
and we are allowing airports to ban it. And now there are
crashes and misfueling incidents that are occurring, and the
FAA is working on it very diligently.
You know what I know? When you're up in the sky and it gets
quiet unexpectedly, you are not concerned about the FAA working
on it very aggressively and diligently.
You have got a situation on your hands, sir. You are
failing.
I yield.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Boulter, in my opening statement, and I presume you
heard some of it, I mentioned the problems we had with getting
the FAA to look into seat size as far as safety, and they went
way over their congressional mandate.
You are familiar with all of that, aren't you?
Mr. Boulter. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohen. It wasn't on your watch, though?
Mr. Boulter. No.
Mr. Cohen. Can you assure us that you will get a study? You
will look at the comments, the 26,000 comments that were pretty
strongly concerned about seat size and get some type of a
resolution of that before you allow seats to be shrunk anymore?
Mr. Boulter. Sir, I heard your opening statement. I fly a
lot myself. I am not a small person. I understand the comfort
level. You have my assurance that we will get through those
comments, and we will look at next steps.
Mr. Cohen. Well, can you assure me you won't allow the
airlines to reduce the size of the seats of the pitch until you
have gone through the comments and maybe even done another
study? Because the last study was obviously--it was failed from
the beginning. Whoever came up with that, not having anybody
over 60 and not having any people with disabilities and no pets
on the plane and no children on the plane and all of that, that
was insane. That was not a representative sample.
Mr. Boulter. Sir, we have some ethical standards we have to
meet with human subjects. Most evacuations do cause injuries.
So, any research around evacuations, we have to be very
careful.
We also looked at--we commissioned an Aviation Rulemaking
Committee that looked at 300 actual evacuations. So, these are
airplanes that evacuated. In those 300, they looked at did the
people get out? Did seat pitch affect that? So, we think with
the study we did and the follow-on, looking at 300 actual
evacuations, and we'll look through the comments and then, sir,
we will go from there.
I can't promise the seat size until which time we get
through the data.
Mr. Cohen. Concerning the Boeing situation, has the FAA
started to go back to what it should have never given up, is
that review of the airplanes and not sub it out to the
manufacturer?
Mr. Boulter. We still have delegated oversight in every
manufacturer in the country, but we have strengthened our
oversight of those companies that have delegated authorities.
We have created an office that reports directly to me, that
writes the policy, looks at effectiveness of our delegation
programs. And, sir, we are not afraid to pull back those
delegations if they are not done to our standards.
Mr. Cohen. You feel comfortable with the situation at
Boeing now?
Mr. Boulter. I think that it is a journey. As I said today,
we can never sit still. I am comfortable where we are today. We
need to continue to improve. We have reset that relationship,
sir.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you.
Ms. Homendy, were you at the NTSB when Jim Hall was there?
Ms. Homendy. I was not, but he calls me often.
Mr. Cohen. Good. So, you know how interested he is? How
smart he is? How outstanding he is?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. He is phenomenal. Is he watching?
Mr. Cohen. I hope so. Hi, Jim. No, I have no idea if he is
watching.
But he has been very insistent on this rule about the black
boxes. Can you assure me that you will make Jim Hall and the
flying public happy by getting some type of a change so that
they don't have to go to the bottom of the ocean, but those
things will float?
Ms. Homendy. Sir, I don't have the authority to mandate
that, but as the NTSB, we continue to work on that
recommendation. That recommendation is critical. We issued a
2015 report on it. I will state that the recommendation to FAA
currently is ``open--unacceptable.'' So, we will continue
working with the FAA on trying to move them towards
implementation.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you.
I yield back. Mr. Crawford!
Mr. Crawford [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. I
appreciate it.
I will yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. Boulter, the root cause of Notice to Air Missions
system failure in January doesn't appear to be due to a cyber
attack. And if I am repeating this, I apologize. This may have
already been addressed.
But we need to anticipate future attacks on the system that
is meant to keep our industry, our aviation industry safe. With
the increased prevalence of ransomware service across every
sector of our economy, and since the ever-changing technology
used in aviation safety is software based, does the FAA have a
thorough cybersecurity plan? And are you working with CISA on a
coordinated response should an attack happen?
Mr. Boulter. I don't own those systems, and, obviously, my
IT ability to turn the mic on.
But anyway, we own some systems in aviation safety,
obviously, and the agency has a robust cyber system.
But when you talk about air traffic system, sir, the Air
Traffic Organization, I can certainly have our Government
affairs hook you up with the right people in that system.
Mr. Crawford. Can you comment as to the nature of your
relationship with CISA with regard to cybersecurity? I mean,
that seems to me that would be integral in this environment.
Mr. Boulter. Yes, I know our IT department has a
relationship with CISA, but you would have to ask them how
deeply that is.
Mr. Crawford. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Bolen, I am going to turn my attention to you for just
a quick second. NBAA's advanced air mobility, or AAM,
roundtable, is a forum for high-level policy planning with
sector leaders to help chart a course for integrating AAM
technologies in the Nation's airspace and infrastructure.
What are NBAA and the roundtable doing right now to ensure
AAM operation safety is paramount?
Mr. Bolen. Well, clearly we believe that advanced air
mobility is good for the United States and good for the world.
It has the opportunity to create affordable, accessible,
sustainable aviation for communities that don't have it to the
level we can have it in the future.
So, what we are doing is trying to build on some of the
progress that was made in the last Congress, including the AAM
Coordination and Leadership Act and the Advanced Air Mobility
Infrastructure and Modernization Act.
Beyond that, we are working to increase awareness on
Capitol Hill and move toward what comes after the certification
of the aircraft into the operations. We want to make sure that
we have the appropriate air traffic and airport system so that
we will have charging stations, be able to leverage airports
and heliports and create vertiports for the infrastructure, as
well as air traffic systems that are able to integrate aircraft
above 400 feet.
So, moving from certification of an aircraft into
operations is the big focus as we move forward.
Mr. Crawford. I directed this question to your colleague on
the panel, Mr. Boulter, but is there any address of cyber in
what you guys are dealing with?
Mr. Bolen. Every manufacturer, everyone in the industry is
very focused on cyber. It is, obviously, a front issue. We
believe it can be done. We are able to operate today. We are
able to operate across other industries. Banking and other
things can be secure. We believe that it is important to build
it in as we move forward and understand what the evolving
threats are.
Mr. Crawford. I mean, I will ask you, just in the 1\1/2\
minutes that I have left. Do you have a relationship with CISA
so that you have the sharing up and down the chain so that you
are more aware and they are more aware of the threats that may
be prevalent in your space?
Mr. Bolen. We are trying to work through that as an
industry. We had an opportunity. Several of us in the industry
have met with the White House and worked through conversations
with the Office of Science and Technology Policy, with the
National Security Council, with the Department of Defense to
try to make sure that we stay on top of these important issues.
Mr. Crawford. Thank you.
I yield back and recognize Mr. Garamendi for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Two things I would like to focus on here. All of the
questions that have been asked, all of the testimony that has
been given, indicate that the FAA and all of its various parts
of its organization has two fundamental problems: one,
organization; two, an inability to get the job done for lack of
resources.
And so, for each and every one of you, if you could respond
in writing to the committee and/or to me about what you need in
terms of resources to carry out your task.
Just listening to the testimony here, each one of you said,
well, it is going to take too much time. We don't have the
resources. So, I won't ask you to comment all the way down
until I get past my second question.
But it seems to me that as we do the reauthorization here,
fundamentally we have to deal with the FAA that is not
organized to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing aviation
industry. All of you have testified to that already. So, I
would appreciate that information back from you.
What do you need to get the job done? Personnel? Resources?
Organizational structure and the like? What are the
shortcomings? What are your suggestions about how to properly
organize and fund the FAA to carry out the multiple tasks?
The question I want to get to deals with air cabin. We have
carried a bill with Senator Blumenthal for the last 3, 4 years
now, and it is the Cabin Air Safety Act. Right now there is, in
most planes, no monitoring of the air quality.
We have been at this a long time, and we do know from
multiple incidents and testimony from pilots, as well as
aircrew, that there is all too often fume events in airplanes.
And so, I want to get to this.
And Captain Ambrosi, if you could comment on this, on what
you and your colleagues in the air experience. And then we will
come back to, well, why can't we get this done.
Mr. Ambrosi. Well, thank you, sir, for the question and on
your support on this issue.
We absolutely support your initiative. Pardon the pun, but
smoke and fumes don't fly in an airplane. It is a problem, and
we have far too many of these events. We do support and we need
monitoring of this to get to the root cause.
Basically, there is data that shows maintenance may be
overservicing the auxiliary power unit, and it creates an issue
where there is some smoke; but there are too many of these
anecdotal of where it may be coming from. We need to truly get
down to brass tacks and study it because it is not good for the
health of the traveling public, but our fellow cabin
crewmembers and pilots spend a lot more time in the air than
anybody, and it is a concern for us.
So, we support that initiative and are happy to
collaborate.
Mr. Garamendi. Would any of the other witnesses care to
comment on this?
I know that here in Washington, DC, if you want to rent out
your house, you are required to put in smoke detectors and
carbon monoxide detectors, and occasionally somebody will come
along and check and see if it is done.
I don't understand why the airline industry cannot and will
not do this just routinely, but they won't. So, apparently we
need a law.
So, I think what I would like to do is to deal with this
issue, continue to ask the committee here to pass this
legislation out of this House and literally force the airline
industry to get on with it and to provide the monitoring
devices so that the cabin crews know what is going on.
And I am going to go back to the first question. This is
the larger question about the reauthorization of the FAA. It is
our opportunity, in fact, it is our responsibility to write
legislation so that the FAA is properly organized to carry out
the multiple tasks, which all of you have talked about here
today, and properly fund it. It is not presently that by your
testimony and by the questions of many of my colleagues.
And with that, I will yield back.
Mr. Crawford. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Babin is recognized for 5 minutes.
Dr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all, you witnesses, for being here today.
I am thrilled to hear everyone highlight the successes of
the past decade in terms of safety, and many of you in your
organization should be celebrated just for that.
However, there is a lot of room for improvement. An example
is just 3 days ago in my great State of Texas, at Austin-
Bergstrom International Airport, two planes were less than 100
feet away from a catastrophic collision that would have put
more than 130 people's lives at risk, and that is unacceptable.
As many of you stated, we can't take our eye off the ball.
We have got to work together. We have got to keep getting
better. We have to continue to innovate and improve, and I want
to applaud all of you for being here, to being a part of that
process with this committee.
But from my perspective, recent disruptions and groundings
appear to be due in large part to reliance on outdated
technology and systems, some of which are built on software
that is decades old, like the NOTAM system.
The commercial connected aviation system sector has made
major strides in leveraging the latest in cloud computing,
predictive analytics, and inner link systems. These, aligned
with all the current cyber standards, offer reliable and stable
solutions to Government and to industry.
It is striking to see that the failure to use or partner
with the right software and service providers could directly
result in a disruptive impact on our passengers, the airlines
themselves, and shaking public confidence in our air
operations.
There are a number of examples of commercial connected
software providers that have emerged over the last decade or
so, but Houston is home to FlightAware, owned by Collins
Aerospace's Connected Aviation Solutions business, which
provides real-time data and services to airlines, airports, and
the Government that would provide substantial benefit to the
FAA and to operators.
Other types of software include advanced flight profile
optimization to help optimize flightpath based on real-time
weather and traffic data to optimize routes, as well as new
traffic management software systems that benefit from the
innovative software advancements.
So, Acting Director Boulter, thank you for being here.
These questions are for you.
How do we use this upcoming FAA reauthorization to
accelerate the migration from outdated legacy software systems
that are used by the FAA and industry to the best solutions
available to date? And is this a matter of providing direction
or are there other obstacles?
Mr. Boulter. Sir, I think we all have the same interest
that the systems be state of the art. My area in aviation
safety does not own the air traffic systems, but we can
certainly have our air traffic folks come in and brief you on
their plans going forward on all of those. All of those you
talked about are all air traffic systems. And as a safety
organization, it is important that that technology continue to
improve.
Dr. Babin. OK.
Then how do we support greater use of commercial data
services by the FAA either as a replacement or a complement to
current legacy systems?
Mr. Boulter. Again, sir, I don't speak for the Air Traffic
Organization on how to do that. I know that, in my previous job
running the agency's airplanes, we did use commercial services
in that.
But you are talking about using those same commercial
services maybe into the air traffic system. That would have to
be something air traffic would have to look at very, very
carefully.
Dr. Babin. OK.
Well, in the space sector, I represent Johnson Space
Center, as an example. We have seen great success with the
Department of Commerce leveraging commercial space data, and I
believe this could be a successful model for the FAA to buy
commercial aviation data to improve its capabilities.
Is there anyone else would like to comment on that?
Mr. Bunce. Mr. Babin?
Dr. Babin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bunce. I think if we look at the NOTAM system as a
pilot, several of us are doing that, it is an antiquated system
overall.
One of the things that--we look at AI, artificial
intelligence, and we look at a capability. It is very difficult
to certify, perhaps, in an aircraft, but commercial services
can go use AI to sift through the mountains of data that come
in. Because we are talking about NOTAMs from airports across
the world that use old systems, like teletype systems to be
able to transmit runway closures and things like that.
A perfect application for AI and FlightAware, as one of the
leaders in this, is to be able to sift through that information
and give us as pilots some very good data of what is pertinent
to the mission that we are going on. And so, I think I would
urge this committee to really look at that capability out there
in the commercial sector.
Dr. Babin. Thank you very much, Mr. Bunce, sir.
I will just yield back since my time is just about out.
Thank you.
Dr. Van Drew [presiding]. Next I would ask Ms. Brownley to
speak.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Boulter, I am increasingly concerned about the FAA's
oversight of aircraft maintenance facilities outside of the
United States. The FAA is now more than 10 years overdue on a
congressional mandate to close this gap with respect to drug
and alcohol testing.
Last year the House passed, and I will say overwhelmingly
so, another bill directing the FAA to ensure that U.S.
certified maintenance facilities meet the same safety standards
regardless of where they are located. And I am hopeful this
language will be part of the upcoming FAA reauthorization
legislation from this committee.
So, my question is when will the FAA complete its
rulemaking on drug and alcohol testing at maintenance
facilities outside of the United States? And what plans do you
have to bring the safety standards at these facilities in line
with those domestically?
Mr. Boulter. We are in work as we speak on the notice of
proposed rulemaking to push that forward into our rulemaking
docket. So, we are working on building that rule for drug and
alcohol testing of foreign repair stations.
As far as other standards, we have robust international
offices that look at those U.S. repair stations in foreign
countries, and our data is showing us that they currently meet
those standards; but we will absolutely make this rulemaking
for that gap you identified.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you for that.
Ms. Homendy, the FAA does not conduct unscheduled
inspections of the maintenance facilities they certify outside
of the United States. The FAA does not require the mechanics at
these facilities to hold any U.S. certification or undergo any
background check before handling safety-sensitive work.
Since the beginning of the pandemic, the FAA has conducted
almost no in-person inspections of these facilities at all. The
few that are happening are still done over video conference.
Does the NTSB believe that the FAA's current oversight of
the repair stations they certify outside of the United States
is sufficient to protect the safety of our airspace?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question.
The NTSB doesn't have any recommendations currently on
foreign repair stations.
Ms. Brownley. Absolutely none?
Ms. Homendy. We do not.
Ms. Brownley. But based on what I just laid out, based on
those facts, do you think that there is a need to look into
that?
Ms. Homendy. Our recommendations are based on accidents and
incidents that we investigate, and this has not come up in any
of our accident investigations.
Ms. Brownley. Mr. Boulter?
Mr. Boulter. I do know we are traveling back to those
repair stations outside of the United States, and also, in some
cases, especially with our bilateral partners, we have them
just like we do to theirs, inspect their repair stations. They
inspect our repair stations that are in their countries as part
of our bilateral agreement.
Ms. Brownley. Well, it seems to me that this committee, as
I said, overwhelmingly supported that these maintenance
facilities outside the United States be brought up to the same
safety standards as we have domestically. You are saying that
it already is. We determined that it wasn't. So, I think that
there is somewhat of a disagreement there.
Mr. Boulter. I certainly can go back and look at the data
and see where we are on our surveillance of those repair
stations, but we have exactly the same goal that you do, ma'am,
which is that if you are at a U.S. certificated repair station,
that the safety is exactly the same.
Ms. Brownley. And so, and you are also saying what I laid
out in terms of NTSB and that questioning is that you are now
undergoing all of these inspections and that is well underway?
Mr. Boulter. We have started to return to the ones that
we--we didn't travel due to COVID, but we are pushing out to do
the ones that--we don't go to every repair station. Again,
through bilaterals, we do have inspections from the host
nation's CAA, but those that we do not, our folks are getting
back on the road and will do those evaluations.
Ms. Brownley. And so, can you give me a sense of what being
back on the road means?
Mr. Boulter. They will do the inspections in person in
those foreign countries.
Ms. Brownley. OK.
I wanted to also ask you, Mr. Boulter, in terms of general
aviation safety technology--I see that I don't have time for
this question. So, I will yield my time back.
Dr. Van Drew. Mr. Rouzer.
Mr. Rouzer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I
appreciate your testimony very much.
In a previous life, I served in the Bush administration
under W at a particular Federal agency, and so, it was my
observation that a lot of Federal agencies share a lot of the
same hurdles: dilapidated commuter systems, old equipment, a
lot of stovepiping, not much communication within agencies, and
I know that that can be a real challenge.
It strikes me that given the important role of FAA and the
safety of our air system, and if you look at it this way, too,
business and investment goes where it is welcome. It doesn't go
where it is not welcome. The regulatory modernization I think
of the agency and the whole space, so to speak, is really
important.
Mr. Boulter, can you comment on that a little bit? And this
is following up on some of the comments that Mr. Graves made,
as well as, to some extent, Mr. Babin. What can we do as we
reauthorize FAA? We have this reauthorization bill. What can we
include in there to help encourage, to help facilitate the
regulatory modernization that we need, if you can speak to that
a little bit more?
Mr. Boulter. Well, first and foremost is, we have the
President's budget. We obviously need to be funded at that
request level, and anything we can do to be more agile, whether
it is how we work, all the hoops we jump through, anything we
can do to bring our--the pace of technology, as we all know,
has increased, but the pace of our processes has not. My number
one goal in the Aviation Safety Organization is to get that
speed without ever degrading safety but to build those paths
for technology, to make sure that we don't leave people
wondering what the path is to operation. What is operation
going to look like? What are the certification standards of the
aircraft going to look like?
So, we are really focused on how do we move faster but, at
the same time, deliberative enough, deliberative to the point
of using our tools for risk analysis and keeping the level of
safety or, frankly, we like to continue to improve safety and
speed up the clock a little bit.
Mr. Rouzer. OK. I have got a couple of other questions I
want to make sure I get in. So, I'm going to move to those real
quick, but related.
So, what is FAA's plan for addressing aircraft avionics and
ground system cybersecurity? And, specifically, how will
responsibility and oversight be managed in partnership with the
TSA?
Mr. Boulter. Currently, we have standards for ensuring the
aircraft are protected against lots of things, right, on the
avionics, from interference, from any type of--if there is
connection between the back end and, say, the systems that,
when you are on your iPhone and on board, that those are
separate from the avionics system.
So, we already have certification standards, but we are
always looking at those to make sure that those standards are
appropriate for the current risk.
Mr. Rouzer. So, what are you doing to address stovepiping
in the agency specifically?
Mr. Boulter. Well, as you know, every box is an opportunity
to stovepipe. We know that we have to behave differently. We
are looking at AAM. We are looking at across the organization:
how do we do this, from vertiports, to aircraft certification,
which, of course, is an Aviation Safety Organization, the
operations, and air traffic integration, right.
We are actually working together, sitting down as a team
every 2 weeks with the Administrator and walking through what
our plan is to be able to across the agency make available AAM
in the airspace on delivery.
Mr. Rouzer. Ms. Homendy, can you speak real quickly to the
application and purpose of the NTSB's Most Wanted List, and has
this list been a useful tool for enhancing aviation safety?
Ms. Homendy. That is a great question.
I worked on this committee for 14 years, and I was the
biggest advocate for the Most Wanted List. It is fantastic for
getting out what our priorities are.
However, as the head of the agency, my priorities have
changed. I feel that the Most Wanted List, which at the time
was created in 1990 to communicate our most important safety
issues, is negative. When you call something most wanted, you
think of the FBI's top most wanted criminals.
In addition to that, my biggest concern is that the Most
Wanted List is taking resources from our investigator staff,
and right now 50 percent of our Most Wanted List is on highway
safety. Our recommendations don't change whether we have a Most
Wanted List or we do have a Most Wanted List. Our
recommendations will always be there.
But to staff the 50 percent, that's highway safety, we are
using seven investigators to help do that from our Office of
Highway Safety. We can't continue to do that. We have to make
sure that we are working to carry out our core mission of
accident investigation. So, I have asked one of my colleagues
to take a look at the Most Wanted List and to recommend
something else, whether it is something on our website that
communicates our recommendations; but currently it is not
something I think we should continue to support.
Mr. Rouzer. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Sorry to go
over.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you.
Next would be Mr. Stanton.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this
outstanding hearing, a good start to our process for FAA
reauthorization.
An important aspect of improving aviation safety is
incorporating new technologies, and we have seen those benefits
take shape in the implementation of NextGen. On the other hand,
aviation stakeholders have expressed concern that the FAA is
falling behind other civil aviation authorities in utilizing a
technology called space-based ADS-B, which gives pilots and
controllers real-time surveillance and situational awareness.
Space-based ADS-B was developed in the United States and is
currently used in 41 countries for air traffic control, air
traffic flow management, search and rescue, and data analytics.
Chairwoman Homendy, as we work to reduce aviation
accidents, has the NTSB looked at this technology? And
shouldn't expanded use for search and rescue and accident
investigations be part of the solution?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you so much for the question.
Space-based ADS-B is certainly more precise, and that will
help in our investigations. We don't do search and rescue, but
we do partner with other agencies when that does occur so that
more precise information leads to a better outcome in an
investigation.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you.
Mr. Boulter, small drones are playing an increasingly
significant role in the inspection of America's critical
infrastructure. I have seen firsthand the efforts of the
Arizona Department of Transportation to inspect bridges that
improves worker safety, decrease carbon emissions, and increase
infrastructure resilience.
However, some forms of infrastructure inspections require
the small drones to fly outside the line of sight of the remote
pilot while shielded by the infrastructure they are inspecting.
The FAA waiver process can take months to complete and
consumes significant resources for the FAA and operators, even
for those low-risk, low-altitude infrastructure inspections.
The FAA has stated that it intends to streamline and
standardize the low-risk, beyond-visual-line-of-sight waiver
process, which might include summary grants or pre-defined risk
assessment.
Can you commit to the committee today that the FAA will
publish a streamlined process to enable low-risk, high-value
inspections this year, consistent with the FAA safety and
environmental goals?
Mr. Boulter. Sir, I don't know if I can commit to this
year, but I can absolutely commit to--that is important to us.
It is work intensive to do the approvals you talk to, and we
need those folks, frankly, to do--with those low-risk
operations, if we can make those more automated and/or summary
grants, then we can use--have those folks focus on rulemaking,
which is what our next goal is, to get all of the--a lot of the
recommendations from BVLOS, Beyond Visual Line of Sight ARC,
into a rulemaking.
So, we need to do it. The current process is not only labor
intensive for industry but labor intensive for us.
Mr. Stanton. Is there a timeline you are willing to commit
to today?
Mr. Boulter. Not today, sir. I would have to look into it a
little bit more, but it is absolutely one of many priorities to
get that done so that we can----
Mr. Stanton [interrupting]. We will follow up regularly
with you on this important issue.
Mr. Boulter. OK. Absolutely.
Mr. Stanton. My question also for you. I would like to
commend the FAA's efforts on 5G spectrum and finding a path
forward to this point that ensures aviation is safe and
uninterrupted while the telecommunications industry deploys 5G.
However, I am still concerned about the upcoming deadlines
and airlines potentially not being able to retrofit their
aircraft in the heart of summer peak season, leading to
operational issues for aviation.
Additionally, I understand there are ongoing conversations
with the telecommunications industry on long-term mitigations
for the continued deployment of 5G without disruption to
aviation.
Can you provide us an update on the status of conversations
with the telecommunications industry on long-term mitigations
on 5G?
Mr. Boulter. So, the current mitigations are voluntary.
They are approved through their license with the FCC to raise
the power to their limits, and that is our concern. With that,
that introduces risk and, hence, getting the radar altimeters
updated. So, we continue to bring all of the stakeholders
together and work with the wireless companies to continue that,
their voluntary----
Mr. Stanton [interrupting]. Thank you very much. I want to
get one final question in here.
Last year our colleague, Congressman Langevin, was denied
boarding due to a lithium-ion battery which powered his
wheelchair even though the battery met all FAA safety
standards.
Are there additional steps we should be doing right now in
Congress as part of the FAA reauthorization to ensure that
those who rely on mobility devices powered by lithium-ion
batteries are not denied boarding?
Mr. Boulter. Sir, we can certainly work with our Office of
Hazardous Materials Safety and make sure that the current
authorizations are well-known in the airline industry so that
that does not happen.
Mr. Stanton. OK. We will be following up regularly on this
important issue as well. Thank you.
I yield back.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you.
I yield 5 minutes to myself.
First of all, very quickly, I wanted to just publicly thank
the chairman for appointing me as vice chairman, and I look
forward to working with all of you over these issues, both the
Members, as well as people that are active participants.
I want to welcome you to the first preparation for this
year's FAA reauthorization. And, obviously, the United States
of America led the world in 20th-century aviation, but we
cannot take our leadership for granted. Congress must ensure
that American aviation technology remains number one, the best
in the world.
I am concerned that the Federal Aviation Administration is
falling short in this technological mission. The FAA is run by
fine, hard-working folks dedicated to keeping the public safe.
Often their jobs are made more difficult by a bureaucratic
agency structure that was designed over 60 years ago, if we go
back in time. This has led to disturbing trends of
underperforming technology projects, including our drones, and
even the Notice to Air Missions system.
As Congress drafts authorization legislation for the FAA,
we should examine how the agency's outdated organizational
structure contributes to these recent technological
disappointments.
The FAA came to the Congress in 2021 asking for help with
its organizational structure. The FAA claimed it needed new
tools to coordinate the integration of advanced aviation
technologies. This year's FAA bill is the opportunity to
develop these tools and set the agency up for real success.
I have introduced a proposal that solves the coordination
problem by evolving the NextGen organization into an office of
advanced aviation. I am actively working with colleagues across
Congress and the aviation stakeholder community to prepare this
proposal for the FAA reauthorization. We have been working on
it for about 2 years. This hearing will provide valuable
information for this effort.
I direct my question to Mr. Boulter, the FAA's Acting
Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety.
Mr. Boulter, the FAA came to Congress 2 years ago and said
it was time to evolve the NextGen organization. This
organization plays a vital role in overcoming our aviation
technology challenge. May you please describe the FAA's current
plans for NextGen?
Mr. Boulter. Sir, I am not aware of what the agency's plans
are for NextGen. Inside of aviation safety, I can just tell you
what you talk about, we are committed to working across the
agency to bring AAM forward.
Dr. Van Drew. OK. Maybe you could next time we meet tell us
a little more about your thoughts on NextGen. Thank you.
I am also going to ask you, based on stakeholders being
deeply frustrated with the FAA's approach to drone
certification, do you all have a plan to change the drone
certification process? And what role will aviation safety play
in that process?
Mr. Boulter. Sir, we issue hundreds of exemptions a month.
I think it is hundreds a month right now on allowing drone
operations, drones over 50 pounds because we do not have
regulations in place.
So, we are working on building a rulemaking set based on
the Beyond Visual Line of Sight ARC, the great recommendations
that our Aviation Rulemaking Committee gave us. We are building
that out as we speak, and we will continue to work towards a
rule set for the drones bigger than 50 pounds and certainly
commercial operations and agricultural operations and drones.
Dr. Van Drew. What is your timeframe for that?
Mr. Boulter. The rulemaking system is not quick, but we
expect to have what we need to have done here from an aviation
safety perspective later this year or early next year.
Dr. Van Drew. How do you feel you have done with drones in
general and with 5G?
Mr. Boulter. I think in 5G, I think bringing everybody
together in a place that we don't hold a lot of authority--we
don't hold any authority on the signal. I think the way we
worked that collaboratively across the Government and with the
industry should be commended.
I think in the drone environment, I think we could have
moved out with rulemaking much sooner than this rather than
being in this exemption world.
Dr. Van Drew. Which is one of the things I think we have to
work on is just making things move faster, more efficiently,
and more focused.
I appreciate your time. Thank you. And I appreciate all
your work.
Our next gentleman up is Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to all
the witnesses at this hearing this morning.
In Chicago, the city council lifted up standards
specifically acknowledging the importance of addressing
security and stabilizing the workforce. This year airport
service workers, including caterers, de-icers, baggage
handlers, wheelchair attendants, aircraft cleaners, and cargo
workers, among others, will see their minimum wage pay increase
to $18 on March 1st.
I am excited that one of these frontline workers, Diana
Ordaz Quezada, will be attending the State of the Union tonight
as my guest. Diana makes air travel possible for the elderly
and people with disabilities at Midway International Airport
and ensures they are transported to their destinations safely.
She is on her feet for nearly 10 hours a day, walking
30,000 steps while pushing passengers and handling their
baggage.
Diana is frequently told to stay for mandatory overtime,
which is difficult for her as a mother of five to balance work
and family needs. Diana is one example of the impacts of
chronic turnover and wages that have barely improved in 20
years in these airport service jobs. This is a dangerous
combination, not only to have experienced staff leave the
industry, but there are few incentives to bring new people into
the workforce who do difficult and essential work at airports.
I am proud to be following that approach and reintroducing
the Good Jobs for Good Airports Act with my colleague
Congresswoman Norton to ensure our taxpayer dollars are
advancing a safe, secure infrastructure inside and outside
airports.
To Mr. Boulter, given the significant investments of
Federal money into airports throughout the country, do you
agree that it will be important for us to look at the
connection between security, establish strong wage and benefit
standards for service workers at our Nation's airports, and
when thinking about how to ensure the gold standard of safety
and security in our aviation system?
Mr. Boulter. Sir, safety is important to us in all aspects
of aviation. The Aviation Safety Organization kind of ends as
you get off the airplane and then into the airport's
organization. I can certainly steer you to the airports folks
and have you talk about your concerns with them, as they run
the ground side in grants and safety standards of airports.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Well, thank you for at least
acknowledging their important role, since you don't have
jurisdiction.
Mr. Chairman, if there is no objection, I would like to
yield the rest of my time to Mr. Cohen.
Dr. Van Drew. No objection.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you, Mr. Garcia.
I will be quick. When I was talking to Mr. Hall's favorite
employee at NTSB, she kind of gave me an answer that allowed me
to shift to Mr. Boulter, and he is responsible for seeing that
there are improvements to the black boxes and that they don't
sink to the bottom of the ocean.
You are familiar that in 2015, NTSB issued a safety
recommendation calling for all aircraft use and extended over
water operations to be equipped with cockpit voice recorder and
flight data recorder whose recovery does not require underwater
retrieval; but yet, nothing has happened with that. And it is
listed as an ``unacceptable response'' by the FAA for their
failure to act on this provision.
Mr. Boulter, can you assure me that there will be an
acceptable response and that response will be that the public
is protected because we will have floating cockpit recorders
mandated by the FAA?
Mr. Boulter. I can assure you we will look at it. I am
unfamiliar with that particular recommendation. We will look at
that, sir. And I will have to take an IOU on that. Where we are
on that I am not aware right this second.
Mr. Cohen. Well, I appreciate your taking a look at it, but
that is not a very good answer as far as I am concerned.
And since Mr. Hall is one of the great heroes of aviation
protections and safety, and this is his passion and desire to
see this done to protect the public. I mean, it was a flight
that was from South America to Europe, and it crashed somewhere
there in the Pacific, and it took months. I think it was 6 or 7
months to find the flight recorder.
Ms. Homendy, can you edify Mr. Boulter to that problem in
36 seconds or less?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, I mean, I would just say that underwater
recovery, especially when you have a very large debris field,
is not only expensive but it can take significant time, and it
is very difficult. So, that is why we recommended that we have
them so that they would float.
But it is ``open--unacceptable'' and hoping that FAA can
take action.
Mr. Cohen. So, the FAA can save a lot of money and maybe
save some lives if they did this.
Ms. Homendy. Save a lot of money and save a lot of time and
get us to what happened after a significant tragedy sooner.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Boulter. I assume that will be a
yes answer now?
Mr. Boulter. As I said, sir, let me--I will give you that
we were paying attention to every single ``open--unacceptable''
and every--we have a great relationship with the NTSB,
sometimes harder to implement than the ``recommend,'' but we
will take a look at that, and I will get back to you, sir.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, sir. And I will tell Mr. Hall.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you. I was going to try to be humorous
and ask if that included balloons, but let that sink into the
ocean. I will let it go.
Mr. LaMalfa.
Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
I am glad we are getting a good prompt start on our
hearings for FAA reauthorization, so that we do this properly
and thoughtfully as we wind through the beginning of the
session.
So, again, I just bounced from another committee, so, I
hope I am not asking these too redundant from what has already
been covered today. I have been concerned about pilot training
and pilot availability and such. My information has that we are
about 8,000 pilots short of a full complement nationwide. And,
of course, that makes it much more difficult on the pilots
themselves being asked to do even more. It affects routes. And
my concern is especially of rural routes, small airports,
things like that, in that it just makes it that much tougher
for travel.
So, the FAA has issued--I have here--9,500 certifications
in the last couple of years. Pretty good. But they didn't quite
keep up with the decrease for active pilots.
It is noted today that the National Airspace System has
become safer over time. Improvements and safety of our
airspace, I believe, is prudent to reexamine the regulations
requirements for what it takes to become a pilot. That is
something we can look at.
The training exam process to become a pilot in the U.S. can
cost above $100,000. The FAA requires 1,500 hours of flight
training, known as the 1,500-hour rule. Military pilots can do
half that number. And some college graduates can have that
number reduced to 1,000 or 1,250 hours.
So, let me line this up for Captain Ambrosi. With
improvements in the airspace system, do you believe we can be
in a position to reconsider the minimum hours required for
pilots, maybe especially military? Are there other requirements
that can be reexamined, not to lower the level of safety or
diligence, but that is reasonable within the context of what we
are looking at here?
Mr. Ambrosi. Well, thank you for your question. I can
understand the plight of rural communities. But first and
foremost, airlines make decisions on economics on where they
allocate airplanes. It is not up to pilots. And I will tell you
that, in the last year, there were 10,000 airline transport
pilot certificates issued, more than pilots jobs in commercial
airline business.
So, we have a training backlog. COVID was obviously a major
pandemic. It is great that we are all back in person here, but
there is a training backlog. But there are more pilots today at
major airlines than there were prepandemic, but they are flying
less because they are all making their way through training.
So, we have a situation where, when these pilots get back to
where they belong, they will be more efficient and we will able
to do more.
But as far as rural communities, I would suggest that
airlines use economics. They are flying many of those airplanes
to more profitable cities now. They have upgauged over the last
decade. And the smaller airplanes, when I started, were 30-
passenger airplanes or smaller. Now, the smallest airplane was
50, and they are getting rid of the 50-passenger airplanes for
economics.
Mr. LaMalfa. Right.
Mr. Ambrosi. Not because of a lack of pilots.
Mr. LaMalfa. I wasn't saying, sir, that it was necessarily
because of the pilots. It just might be an effect further down
the chain that might see less. My focus mostly was on, would we
be helping out the process if we had a harder look at the
1,500-hour rule or some other portion of the requirements that
could be brought more into line with what is really needed. If
you have--former military, if you have others, could some of
these credits, for example, is there more ways to expand
credits and get that number lower and still not reduce adequate
training?
Mr. Ambrosi. Well, I will go back to we are at the safest
period in aviation history right now, and a lot of that is
because of these very rules. So, there is a significant credit
for military, half of what the requirement is. There is a
significant credit, as you mentioned, for the pilots that have
gone to a 4-year college where they have gotten advanced
academics.
The system is working. There is a process in place. If
someone has an alternate suggestion, the FAA has a process,
that Congress has given that to the FAA, to review those and
see what else is out there. However, again, I will reiterate,
we are at this--this last decade is the safest in aviation
history, and we should exercise caution----
Mr. LaMalfa [interrupting]. Is my memory correct that
before it got bumped to 1,500, the number was 250? Is that
correct?
Mr. Ambrosi. I don't recall there being a specific minimum.
You had to have a specific licensing. So, it would have been
about 250. And I can tell you from personal experience, sir,
that I was a captain at a regional airline, flying that 30-
passenger turboprop with pilots that had 250, 500 hours as new
hires. And I could qualify that as on-the-job training. And the
traveling public does not deserve to have on-the-job training
in an airliner, regardless of whether you are flying in and out
of a large city or a rural destination.
Mr. LaMalfa. All right. Thank you.
I yield back. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Van Drew. Next, Mr. Allred.
Mr. Allred. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all
of our witnesses for being here. Mr. Boulter, I am right here
for you.
I wanted to also discuss the NOTAM system, because FAA
recently reported to us that it would take until 2030 to
complete fixes and modernize the system. And given that you are
relying on vintage technology, which I think is you all's term,
that timeline seems unacceptably long to me if we want to
maintain our edge in aviation safety. And so, I wanted to
acknowledge that the FAA budget is the same at $3 billion the
year that it was in 2009 for these kinds of improvements. There
is no increase, taking into account things like COVID or other
increased costs that you have had to deal with.
I understand the FAA is seeking $29.4 million this year to
modernize NOTAM. And I wanted to hear from you, Dave, what it
would actually take in terms of funding for us to fix this.
Because it is not just the breakdown that we had as we saw with
I think the Canadian airline incident that it is difficult to
understand, and it seems the NOTAM system doesn't really seem
to be working. So, what is the actual number? What do we need
to do to try and get by 2025 NOTAM updated?
Mr. Boulter. My good friends in air traffic are responsible
for the NOTAM system, but it is my understanding that there is
a desire to go faster in that update to that system. And if
that requires more funding, then they will come back to
Congress and ask for that.
Mr. Allred. So, you are comfortable with the $29.4 million
that you are requesting?
Mr. Boulter. $29.4 million? I am sorry?
Mr. Allred. I think that is what--you are requesting that
this year to modernize.
Mr. Boulter. Yes. Again, not my----
Mr. Allred [interrupting]. Not your area?
Mr. Boulter. Not my area, but certainly, if they need more
than that, I would imagine they would make another request.
Mr. Allred. OK. Well, we have also spoken previously about
5G implementation. Everyone here is talking a lot about it. But
are we just urging manufacturers to develop electronic filters?
Are there other processes in place? Where are we in your
opinion?
And, Captain Ambrosi, if you wanted to also mention what
you think pilots are experiencing in terms of 5G. Because I
have been reading some concerning reports indicating heads-up
display anomalies, autopilot issues, autothrottle shutoffs that
seem to be related to 5G. And obviously, while we want to
implement this, we need do it in the correct way.
Mr. Boulter. Yes. I do believe that looking at the data
that we have that since the power reductions have been agreed
upon, that we are in a good space as far as the risk goes. Not
unusual that--my history, I ran the Flight Inspection
Organization, so, chasing mike ramps around the sky was our
business. And then research and development organizations as
well at which we have done a fair amount of testing with the
wireless companies on FAA airplanes to look at the signal, at
the reduced power reductions we are confident that they are
limited to--very, very limited on any interruptions. And we are
getting reports from pilots, and we keep that open, and we look
at every single one of those reports.
So, I think we are very comfortable there. And we are
comfortable with what we are doing to the poor-performing radar
altimeters. Those are the ones that we are updating--or the
airlines are updating currently.
And then longer term, there are many more people entering
that space. The power is going to go up in July. We are looking
at what are the longer term standards for radar altimeters to
be built in the future so they will be immune to any future
work in the adjacent space, if you will.
Mr. Allred. Captain, I have about 1 minute left, and I
wanted to ask you to weigh in on that, if you can, just from
what you are hearing from your colleagues. But also,
diversifying the kind of pilot workforce, not just by race or
by gender, getting more women into the workforce. Do you have
ideas on how we could go about doing that? Would access to
student loans or programs like that be something that you would
find interesting?
Mr. Ambrosi. Absolutely. So, on the 5G front, I share
everyone's concern that right now that is a voluntary
mitigation and that in July it is going to come back. Airlines
are making good progress on updating their radar altimeters.
Congress could consider in this rate authorization forcing
collaboration between the FCC and the FAA so hopefully stuff
like this doesn't happen again, because this is obviously a
safety problem.
As far as diversifying workforce, we absolutely support
Federal loans. We are a profession. Other professions get
Federal student loans for advanced degrees and, largely, we are
not in that. So, by extending that financing--it is expensive
to become an airline pilot, but we are trying to broaden our
diversification. I personally am trying to turn our
organization into embracing the next generation of aviators,
and I think that is essential. So, we are happy to work
together on whatever we can do to do that. Because we want our
workforce to look more like the--or represent the communities
we serve. I apologize.
Mr. Allred. Thank you, Captain.
I yield back.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you.
Next will be Mr. Westerman.
Mr. Westerman. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to the
witnesses for being here today. I know that a lot of the
Members on our side are my fellow colleagues on the House
Natural Resources Committee. We had another hearing this
morning, but we are back here in full force. And I look forward
to working again on the reauthorization. And I was here in the
last Congress under Chairman Shuster that reauthorized the FAA,
and I know that there is a lot of work that needs to be done.
And I also know that both Chairmen Graveses, the full committee
Chairman Graves and the subcommittee Chairman Graves, have
placed a strong emphasis on general aviation, which is
important to my State and to my district.
And, Mr. Boulter, I know that you are not in the air
traffic control, you are not an air traffic control specialist.
And I am hoping you can pass this along and have a colleague in
the air traffic office follow up with me. I have a small
airport in Mena, Arkansas. You may have heard of that. There
was a movie made about it. It has a major problem with air
traffic control.
When planes dip below 4,000 feet, pilots lose contact with
the Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center. The folks at Mena
have been trying to get a repeater installed so that the pilots
aren't flying blind into the airport, but they haven't met with
any success.
We know that general aviation is critical to rural
economies and small airports, and safety is always of paramount
importance. I have spent more time than I probably needed to,
or obviously not as much as I guess I need to but more than you
would think, traveling to sites on top of mountains where these
repeaters can be located, visiting with officials. And so far,
we have just been able to get nowhere. Coming from--with an
engineering background, this seems just atrocious. It should be
easy do, not that expensive, and should have been done a long
time ago.
So, I would like to know what the FAA's plan is to provide
reg coverage from the western edge of Memphis ARTCC to places
like Mena that are currently cut off from radio contact due to
mountains and other physical topography.
Mr. Boulter. I certainly know Mr. Arel pretty well. My team
is here taking notes, so, we will have Mr. Arel get back to
you, who runs the Air Traffic Organization. I have flown into
Mena myself, and I understand the issues with being able to
pick up the center from Mena.
Mr. Westerman. I am not going to ask what you were flying
into Mena for, but----
Mr. Boulter [interrupting]. I was actually dropping an
airplane off for the paint shop there. I don't know if it is
still in business, but it was many years ago I dropped a
Convair in there for paint.
Mr. Westerman. It wasn't a black airplane in the nineties.
Mr. Boulter. No, it was not. We did it in full daylight.
Mr. Westerman. So, as you know, my understanding is when a
pilot gets ready to take off from Mena, they have to get on
their cell phone and call air traffic control. And there is
also not the greatest cell phone coverage over there. So, I
know that is just a frustration I see in one airport in my
district. I know there must be others around the country, so, I
appreciate you passing that message along. And I look forward
to working on the reauthorization of the bill.
And, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back 1 minute and 27
seconds.
Mr. Nehls [presiding]. I thank you, Mr. Westerman.
We will now have Mr. Auchincloss. You have 5 minutes, sir.
Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to start, Captain Ambrosi, just by voicing my
support for the high standards for pilot training that are in
place now. The flying public, as you say, deserves to know that
those piloting them are fully trained and are not learning on
the job.
I want to turn now to an area that I am going to be
focusing on with FAA reauthorization, which is curb management
at airports. And, Ms. Buckley, I turn to you. Beyond separating
out departing and arriving passengers and creating more access
points to the terminal, proposals to alleviate congestion at
the curb and improve safety include deploying dynamic pricing
models at curbs; addressing vehicular infractions through
automated enforcement; creating offsite ground transportation
centers with fast, automated people movers; and advanced
spatial sensing technologies to monitor congestion and safety
risks.
What is MITRE doing now, if anything, on helping airports
and Congress think about better curb management at our Nation's
airports? And what might Congress do to partner with the work
that you are doing?
Ms. Buckley. Thank you for the question. We certainly think
about transportation from a citizen-centered view as well. It
is a system of systems. So, we think about the continuous
system of planes, trains, and automobiles really working
together. And in terms of the technologies and the ways that we
can model increasing efficiencies at curbside, I think the
opportunities are tremendous.
So, if we think about smart city-like sensors at curbs,
understanding what is needed, all of the potential solutions
that you just mentioned, we have the mechanisms and tools to be
able to model out those solutions to see if any of them really
will lead to the improved performance that you are looking for.
So, I thank you for the question. I think it is an exciting
area to pursue.
Mr. Auchincloss. Well, I look forward to working with MITRE
on that.
And on a broader note, what do you think a trusting public-
private partnership in aviation safety looks like between MITRE
and the public sector?
Ms. Buckley. I would really point to the ASIAS program for
the aviation component, so, operating as a trusted third-party
provider of data where we can bring in sensitive data from
multiple parties and house that in a trusted manner. And as we
mentioned earlier, I think that is a model to move on to other
types of certainly advanced air mobility as well as surface
transportation and modes of transportation, to continue to see
the advantages that we have gotten from these Voluntary Safety
Reporting solutions.
Mr. Auchincloss. Well, I have had the pleasure of visiting
your facility in Bedford and certainly can see the value that
MITRE creates as being, as you said, the objective neutral site
for data sharing and as a center of excellence for our
industry.
Ms. Buckley. Thank you.
Mr. Auchincloss. Final questions are for you, Mr. Boulter.
Some companies are talking about air taxi service which would
compete directly with existing transit and rail service in our
cities. Has the FAA coordinated its planning with the other
modal agencies to ensure it is not preferencing air taxis over
rail or bus service in these areas?
Mr. Boulter. So, as part of our agency response, we
coordinate closely with the Department, and that would be
Department--Department is just now working an interagency
group. So, the Department has the rest of those modes. We would
fully expect the Department is working on that. I don't know
personally, but I do know we are looking, not today, for
getting them into the sky, but as a Department, making sure
that we understand the infrastructure around them.
Mr. Auchincloss. I would encourage that cross-modal
collaboration to continue at the State and local level.
And then finally, commercial aircraft are traditionally
thought of as large jets or turboprops. If eVTOLs become a
reality, that perception many change. In fact, many companies
are already advertising for future commercial service through
our cities in four- to eight-passenger planes. What steps is
the FAA taking to ensure that these smaller aircraft provide
the same level of safety that we have today in our skies?
Mr. Boulter. So, the certification of those devices are
under our current rule set. Obviously they have some unique
characteristics that we are--but we are able to pull from
rotorcraft, pull from fixed-wing aircraft, and then some unique
standards for those so that the design is safe. And that is the
rule we are building right now, the powered-lift. So, you have
airplanes, you have rotorcraft. We are building an in-between
category of things that can do both. And we are learning how
those are working, right----
Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. This is the 10 to negative
9?
Mr. Boulter [continuing]. But we are also not giving up
what we have learned all these years----
Mr. Auchincloss [interposing]. Right.
Mr. Boulter [continuing]. On how to build a good regulatory
structure for operation. So, we are putting them in the middle,
but they benefit from a little bit of both.
Mr. Auchincloss. Right. And I know the Europeans are doing
this as well. And I would just encourage the FAA to work from
first principles on what we decide and not just fastball the
Europeans, which I am not saying we are, but----
Mr. Boulter [interrupting]. No. We are going to fit that
into our rule set. We expect to have that done in the fourth
quarter of 2024.
Mr. Auchincloss. I yield back.
Mr. Nehls. I thank you, sir.
I will give myself 5 minutes of questioning. I will just
make an opening comment.
I would like to thank everybody for being here. I like what
I have heard so far. I thank everybody, what we have all heard.
I like the gold standard, the safety that we have seen for the
past several years.
I am not going to ask you individually, but it would seem
that you would all like to eventually have a boss. I mean, we
don't have an Administrator with the FAA. You haven't had one
for several months now. I believe you had one, but the nominee
isn't going anywhere. It is being delayed in the Senate. And I
think it would be very, very important that this administration
would find a nominee that could actually get Senate
confirmation, because I understand he has an interesting past.
But that is just my point on that.
I would like to start with you, Mr. Boulter. According to a
recent study, nearly 70 percent of general aviation accidents
could have been prevented if aircraft had advanced digital
safety systems. I know industry is working hard to develop
autolanding, autotakeoff, and advanced navigation systems for
general aviation aircraft but are facing frustrating
certification delays.
A primary cause of delays is that various lines of business
at the FAA must be engaged in reviews and often don't
communicate effectively. So, what is the agency doing to ensure
that FAA lines of business better coordinate and work towards
performing concurrent reviews on these lifesaving technologies?
Mr. Boulter. I can only speak for what I am doing and our
team is doing, is that we are looking at these as projects.
That is where we are with AAM, we are looking across the
agency. If it requires cross-agency coordination as a project,
we are going to treat it as a project. We are going to expect
that it continue to move along, depending on its priority.
These are lifesaving. Some of the autoland and some of
those things, emergency landing systems that are being built,
are really a game changer. And we agree with you that the
general aviation accident rate is too high, even though it has
been coming down. Even one death is too many, and that is a
tragedy for whoever is involved.
I can certainly look at where we are on that, but I know
that with my colleagues at the management board in the FAA and
the Acting Administrator, Deputy Administrator insisting upon
that we do not act as we have in the past with stovepipes and
that we work as teams to deliver for the American public.
Mr. Nehls. Fair enough.
Mr. Bunce, I want to thank you, Colonel, for your service
in the Air Force. It is my understanding in your bio you are
from Wisconsin. southern Wisconsin, where is that? Where are
you from?
Mr. Bunce. Milwaukee, sir. But I am a passionate Packers
fan like you.
Mr. Nehls. Yes. Got to get rid of that quarterback. He is
no good anymore. Get rid of the quarterback.
GAMA has significant experience working with companies
seeking FAA certification for advanced safety systems. In
previous testimony, sir, you explained that certification
delays are often caused because the FAA doesn't have the
correct group of technical experts engaged early in the
process.
Can you explain how this issue impacts the certification of
new entrants and advanced safety technologies by the FAA? And
how would you suggest, sir, this committee utilize the upcoming
FAA reauthorization to address this problem?
Mr. Bunce. Well, sir, I addressed in my opening remarks,
when we go ahead and we have this delay in the rulemaking, we
go ahead and require Mr. Boulter's people to be able to do all
kinds of things, like special conditions, exemptions, things
like that, that suck away all the specialists that we could
have working on this new technology.
So, to me, the most important thing that we could do is for
this committee--and they have done so in the past in different
reauthorizations--call for a 90-day review of the internal
processes, not only within the FAA, but what then needs to go
to the Department in rulemaking. And then when things do start
getting delayed, then the process between the Department and
the White House to be able to promulgate these rules.
And what we are seeing is just we are delaying and
delaying. And then we start to add more rules to that existing
rule which further delays it. And it does have a negative
impact on safety.
Mr. Nehls. Fair enough. Thank you.
I will finish with Ms. Homendy. I am looking at your
budget. Fiscal year 2022 is $121.4 million. Fiscal year 2023
you have $129.3 million. Is that enough? Are we good?
Ms. Homendy. It is not enough. The $129 million actually
came down to $127 million because we had to pay for recovery of
an aircraft because insurance didn't pay for it. So, we don't
have the resources that we need. We have asked for $145 million
for fiscal year 2024, which will help us improve training and
get more people on board at the agency.
Mr. Nehls. OK. Thank you.
I now yield to Ms. Hoyle. You have 5 minutes.
Ms. Hoyle of Oregon. Thank you. And I want to thank
everybody for coming and testifying today. It is really
interesting.
So, in recent years, airlines have attempted to carve out
their workers from State and local labor protections, including
minimum wage, work and rest breaks, medical and family leave,
arguing that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 preempted any
of these labor protections that are below the Federal level.
Such an act would severely impede airline worker recruitment,
which there are already issues with. Federal preemption of
State and local labor standards would also force workers to
rely on Congress to intervene in labor disputes, as we saw with
the recent rail strike.
So, my question is for Mr. Boulter. Would you oppose
enactment of any language that would preempt or lower airline
labor standards? And if so, why or why not?
Mr. Boulter. Thanks for the question. Unfortunately, that
is way out of my lane of aviation safety. We are interested in
certainly fatigue and other things for flightcrews. Other parts
of the agency, our legal department, we could have Government
affairs get back to you and answer that question for you.
Ms. Hoyle of Oregon. I think it is important because,
again, worker protections, making sure that people feel safe,
that will help us in recruiting staff, which, again, I think is
important.
And to that end, we have also seen, since the COVID-19
pandemic, a lot more assaults of airline workers and flight
attendants, significant rise in assaults. There were thousands
and thousands of unruly passengers in 2021. There were 2,359
unruly passenger reports in 2022.
So, as part of the 2018 FAA reauthorization, Congress
mandated that air carriers develop employee assault prevention
and response plans to address violence against frontline
aviation workers. While most airlines have submitted plans, the
FAA does not believe they have the authority to enforce them or
hold airlines accountable if they do not submit these plans.
So, again, Mr. Boulter, would the FAA support legislative
language to clarify the FAA's authority to enforce mandatory
employee assault prevention and response plan? Right now,
crewmembers can receive voluntary advanced self defense
training to ensure safety and integrity of the cockpit door.
Would the FAA support mandatory self-defense training for all
airline crewmembers?
Mr. Boulter. Certainly, safety of the airline workers or
any worker, frankly, in America is paramount. I am not sure
where the FAA line is. I would have to probably talk to the
legal department. On board the aircraft, once boarded, most of
those outside of that are handled by law enforcement. But once
boarded, then we have taken a zero-tolerance policy for in-
flight. And the most egregious cases get referred to the
Department of Justice.
Thankfully, I believe the numbers are coming down, at least
the last I saw, a little bit. But even one is unacceptable for
treating in-flightcrew anything other than with respect and
dignity.
Ms. Hoyle of Oregon. Thank you.
And final question, we have talked about trying to recruit
more pilots, and there are barriers, whether they are financial
barriers, and they are significant. And in Oregon, we have some
pilot programs that have really worked well to get more
representation from underrepresented communities, rural
communities, people that aren't affluent, to get into to become
pilots. So, happy to talk to you about that.
But for right now, as you said, I personally don't believe
we should lower standards, but you have a lot of people that
are in training. What do you think about or would you support
increasing the airline pilot retirement age, especially to have
them mentor new pilots coming in, provided that they can show
that they have competency to still fly the planes?
Mr. Ambrosi. Thank you for the question. It is a solution
that is in search of a problem. It puts an uncertain risk in
the environment. So, it goes beyond just raising the retirement
age, which hasn't had enough study. What does happen, though,
is the most senior pilots fly international operations. So,
those pilots will not be allowed to continue flying
international operations past the age of 65. So, those pilots
will be forced to come back and fly domestic flying on a
smaller piece of equipment, thereby going through another
training cycle, a very training cycle that could have been for
a pilot that is coming up that has a longer term ability to
fill that position.
So, it is going to create a shorter term problem for the
airlines and a training problem in that period of time, so, it
is more of a problem than any solution that would offer.
Ms. Hoyle of Oregon. Thank you.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
Now Mr. Mast.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to thank you all for your testimony. Good to see you
all, many of you again. Some of us have spoken recently.
Ms. Homendy, you and I have spoken already. My questions
are reserved for you, so, the rest of you can relax for a
couple of minutes. You are aware of the issue I am going to
speak to you about, it is literally grave concern because of
fatalities.
In numerous communities in Florida, the only real tie to
aviation is that they are planning to tie this train to Orlando
International Airport. But I want to talk to you a little bit
about NTSB, the Brightline train. And just try to understand
something about NTSB is my goal in this conversation.
NTSB reserves its investigations for crashes where you can
learn something new about transportation world, something
unique is happening. I have a pretty correct understanding
there?
Ms. Homendy. We have a specific statutory mandate. And on
rail, it involves a fatality or a serious injury. It includes
grade crossings, but it is--they are the ones that we believe
have significant safety issues that we would like to weigh in
on.
Mr. Mast. So, to give some stats, we are talking about over
the course of basically 5 to 6 years, some of that being test
rail time, some of that being actual retail passengers, paying
passengers, a total of about 75 miles of service, very short
distance of train track running, an area that there has been
freight rail running for many years and other passenger rails
running for many years.
In 2022, 22 fatalities; 2021, 7 fatalities; 2020, another 7
fatalities; 2019, 28 fatalities; 2018, 7 fatalities; 2017, 2
fatalities. At what point does the volume of incidents, some of
them fatal, some of them nonfatal, many of them by suicide,
many of them nonintentional, but at what point does volume of
incident become something unique that needs to be looked at?
And the reason this is very important to my community, the
75 miles that it is running largely doesn't run through my
community right now. But they are expanding, doubling the
length of this track to now run through my community up to the
Orlando International Airport, and it has been captioned that
this is the deadliest train in America per mile. I don't want
it to be the deadliest train in America per mile, but now also
running through the breadth of my community and my community
now having those statistics.
So, at what point does this become the instance, the amount
of instances that we have there make it unique?
Ms. Homendy. Well, I have shared with the staff that I
believe that we should do a special investigation on the
Brightline fatalities and injuries. We recently launched on one
that we thought we could open up an investigation, but
unfortunately it was a suicide, which we do not do
investigations of suicides.
So, we do continue to monitor safety on the line and work
with FRA, who also has a responsibility to investigate those
accidents as well.
Mr. Mast. My understanding was there is--I know the
incident you are talking about. There is one that happened just
a couple of weeks prior to that one that was not a suicide. I
think we made your staff aware of it. They were not tracking
the incidents.
Looking at this, I guess you could say--or I should rather
ask it, I don't want to put words in your mouth. Is there
anything, in your opinion, as we look at this to say that
something has changed to indicate the statistics would be
different in the expanded rail service? Has something changed
to say that the stats will be different?
They went back up again in 2022 to 22 deaths. The year
before there were seven. So, it doesn't look like statistically
there is a decline.
Ms. Homendy. I am not aware of anything. But I will say,
this occurred on the Northeast Corridor before Amtrak closed
all the grade crossings. So, that is how Amtrak dealt with it.
You do have a significant safety problem in Florida. I have
pulled up in a car and almost ended up right on the tracks,
because there will be a light right before and then a light
right after and then you have no idea where you are supposed to
pull up. So, it is a significant issue.
Mr. Mast. One more quick--I don't think I got an answer to
this. You said the incident you spoke of most recently, it was
a suicide, you couldn't investigate it. Does the volume of
incidents equal something that is unique, where there is
something to be unusual and learn because there has been so
many crashes?
Ms. Homendy. I believe so, sir, yes.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, ma'am. I appreciate your testimony
today.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Mast.
We will now go to Ms. Foushee.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all
for being here with us today.
I would like to turn our attention back to diversity in the
aviation workforce. Congressman Allred touched a bit on this,
but I would like to do some followup.
In 2021, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that
only 3.9 percent of pilots in the U.S. aviation industry were
Black. This is an increase of 0.5 percent over the 2020
statistics, but it still does not compare to the 94 percent who
identify as White.
In my home State of North Carolina, Elizabeth City State
University, an HBCU, hosts the only 4-year collegiate aviation
education program in the State of North Carolina, offering
students a bachelor of science degree in aviation science.
With five different concentrations to choose from,
graduates of this program go on to work for large commercial
airlines, defense contractors, Federal agencies, and more. This
program at ECSU is one of few aviation education programs
offered at HBCUs across the Nation, but it is programs and
partnerships like this one that are helping to diversify the
aviation workforce.
So, with that being said, my first question today is for
Captain Ambrosi. Can you talk to us a little bit about how the
Air Line Pilots Association is working with airlines to
diversify training programs and the aviation workforce as a
whole?
Mr. Ambrosi. Well, Representative, thank you for the
question. So, as I stated earlier, we absolutely believe in a
more diverse workforce. I am from Delta. Delta Air Lines has
partnered with universities to try to increase more diverse
workforce and get more folks interested, trying to reach out to
the community largely to get a more diverse workforce
interested in it. It goes beyond that, though, because as we
have spoken, there are hurdles to entry based on expense. It is
very expensive to become an airline pilot. It is a great
profession.
Fortunately, we have negotiated some excellent contracts,
and the regionals are starting to pay more. So, now people see
a light at the end of the tunnel and say, if I am forced to
spend this time and this effort to get there, I will get
somewhere some day that I can have a means to pay back any kind
of student loans that we get through this program.
But we absolutely support Federal legislation to put
student loans--our profession in line with other professions
that allow student loans to become an airline pilot, thereby
bringing more in from the communities we serve in a more
diverse workforce.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you for that.
And a similar question to you, Chair Homendy. Your written
testimony discusses your goal of hiring additional personnel
and rightsizing your agency. Can you discuss any diversity
efforts the agency plans to take when achieving these efforts?
And also, what resources are needed from Congress to achieve
this?
Ms. Homendy. Absolutely. Thank you very much. We are
working to implement the Executive orders that we have
developed strategic plans to hire and recruit and maintain a
diverse workforce. That means a great deal to us. I have
appointed a chief diversity officer. In addition, internally we
are working with HBCUs and others to hire, and looking to
expand who we are working with to recruit employees to the
agency.
Mrs. Foushee. And one followup. And what are the
consequences, in your estimation, of not investing in the
NTSB's workforce now?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. Our workforce is the same size as it was
in 1997, and we have a great mandate. Every time we get an
increase, most of that increase goes to the annual pay increase
for Federal employees, which is also needed, but we need to
expand our workforce, our training for our workforce, to
accomplish the mission that Congress has tasked us to carry
out.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
We will now go to Mr. Stauber.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And I think that Chairman Graves opened this hearing up to
talk about the bipartisanship, the opportunity you have. I
truly believe that. And I have all the faith in both our
chairman and the ranking member, have respect for both of them.
So, I am looking forward to this healthy debate.
Tim and Jordan are probably the only ones in this room that
know this. It was about 6 years ago that I had my 43 hours of
my pilot's license in my logbook. And I did a couple of
landings, and my instructor was in the front seat, and I did
them very well.
And, Captain, you probably know this, that that first solo
flight, I was so glad she didn't have me come to the ramp and
get out and say I am on my own, because I haven't soloed yet.
And unfortunately, a run for Congress and serving the people of
the district have--my private pilot license has eluded me. But
I have to say I am thrilled to be on the T&I Committee and the
Aviation Subcommittee.
We talk about the gold standard. Every witness here, in
your testimony, it is all about safety, making sure that we
bring the gold standard to America and then show the world as
well. I really appreciate all of your testimony.
As you know or some of you may know, and I am going to
start this question out with Captain Ambrosi. The NOTAM system
that we know has failed, Mr. DeSaulnier and I have championed
that out of the House. It passed 424, I think, to 4 or 6. So,
it is a high priority. And by the way, it passed out 4 years
ago, too. It seems like this is more urgent. And I urge you all
to contact your Senators to get this across so we can get that
task force going to make it better.
Can you just describe the current NOTAM system and some of
the concerns? And how important is it that the Senate takes
this up so we can get that task force up and running? We can do
it very quickly.
Mr. Ambrosi. Well, I thank you for the question, sir.
First, go get that pilot's license. All right?
Mr. Stauber. OK.
Mr. Ambrosi. All right. So, the NOTAMs are essential. We
have a very complex job, and getting information and processing
information is essential.
I fly internationally. I go across the ocean, going to
Milan or Venice. I have information from not only the departure
but the destination and every spot in between that we need to
process. So, without NOTAMs and that information, we can't do
our job. So, it is essential.
Now, I support what action they took to restart the system.
There is a system and a backup. I am not going to profess to be
at an engineering level on how the actual systems work, but
they did what they needed to do in that moment. But we do--it
shows that there needs to be an emphasis put on funding and
resources to make sure that that system is improved and
reliable going forward so that we don't have a disruption like
that.
Mr. Stauber. I think that--you talk about funding, we can
talk about funding, but we also need leadership at the senior
levels and not just changing the name from Notice to Airmen to
Notice to Air Missions. If we just have a name change, we are
going to have the systemic failure like we did on January 10
and 11. So, I think it is important that we bring that up.
So, Mr. Boulter, I want to ask you the same thing on the
NOTAM system. What are some of the changes that you would like
to see and some of the recommendations that have come to you
already?
Mr. Boulter. So, obviously as the captain has said, the
NOTAM system is critical to operational control at an airline.
We require an airline to have all information regarding that
flight, both the dispatcher and the pilot to agree that that
can be--you conduct it safely based on the information
available, to which NOTAM is a huge part of that. So, everybody
inside the agency understands the criticality of the NOTAM
system.
From a safety perspective, while it's unfortunate that that
system caused us to go to a ground stop, allowing flights to go
without appropriate information would--we wouldn't be living
into our safety standard.
Mr. Stauber. With just 30 seconds left, I think that we
have to really understand that--and I am asking you to talk to
your Senators, because we can get that task force up and
running maybe before the FAA even reauthed. It is that
important. We can't have another failure.
And I just want to say in my last 20 seconds, I can't tell
you how much I appreciate all of you and your input into making
our aviation the safest. And we are going have robust debates,
but I believe that we are going to continue to lead the world
with the exceptional experience that we have. And I talk to my
pilots friends all the time. It is about safety, safety,
safety, both below the wings and above the wings. Thank you
all.
And I yield back.
Mr. Boulter. Sir, as a former flight instructor, I hope you
will get that solo done.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. DeSaulnier.
Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you. I want to be able to jump in and
thank my colleague for working on the NOTAM bill and the
success we have had.
Mr. Boulter, Jennifer, it is nice to see you. And thanks
for recognizing our work. So, I want to talk about that.
When Air Canada happened, you will remember, because it was
at SFO, and I am a neighbor. Went to the tower, talked to the
people who operated there, talked to the pilots, talked to many
of your predecessors about the NOTAM system and why it was
ignored in that instance.
So, we have all talked about safety. I agree with you, we
should really be proud of what we have done. But in that
instance, we came within 59 feet, according to your
investigation, Jennifer, of having the largest air disaster in
the history of the country. Subsequent to that, in the last
FAA, we worked together. We got a lot of good things in there
to make sure some of the things that had that risk had been
remedied.
The thing I am concerned about is NOTAM and human factors
and the fact that this keeps coming up. And I am haunted by the
ghost of Richard Feynman, if you can remember who he was, and
the minority report from the Challenger discovery where he
called it institutional deviation, where NASA knew the O-rings
were going to fail. Since we just had the anniversary of this,
it is top of my mind. In his genius, Nobel prize winning
physicist saying the institutions knew that it was going to
fail, but they looked past it: institutional deviation.
My frustration with dealing with FAA and your staff, to
tell you the truth, to make sure they are doing what Congress
told them to do. We just allocated $30 million to upgrade the
system in the appropriations bill in the omnibus.
So, Mr. Boulter, how can this committee and the two authors
of the bill and the chair and the ranking member make sure that
you are actually implementing this and sending the message out
that the recommendations from NTSB are being done? Or we are
going to have a disaster and all of the statistics will go
away. All the public will remember was that we brought this up
over and over again. We funded it, and I am worried that we are
hoping it will go away. We need to make that exclamation.
And, Captain, I would love to hear your response, if we
have time. How do we make pilots who are highly trained make
sure they have confidence in that system?
Because we also know from the research that once highly
trained people, whether it is in healthcare or aviation, start
to question the system, they just by human nature don't pay
attention. So, what are we doing, and how can we make sure that
you are doing it right?
Mr. Boulter. Safety obviously, sir, from the Administrator
on down, is our North Star, as he likes to say. And we are
doing everything we can, whether it be NOTAMs or whether it be
these two events. Really the NTSB's teams are out on those two
events, and we are looking at it from a pilot performance piece
of that in aviation safety. And I know air traffic is looking
at those last two events.
No one takes it for granted that these are serious events,
and we need to double down on what is it that is causing these.
What did we miss in our voluntary systems? What have we missed
in our data that would cause these. It always makes----
Mr. DeSaulnier [interrupting]. I am going to interrupt you.
And I would love to follow up with you, but I understand how
these hearings go.
Ms. Homendy, could you comment?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you very much. And it was devastating
what occurred--what could have occurred at SFO in 2017. From
the human factor standpoint, our recommendation on NOTAMs--so,
it is not just about the NOTAM system, it is what is in a
NOTAM. And right now, for that specific flight, you had the
runway closure, which was at the bottom of three pages of
information.
So, as a human being, as a pilot, you have to make
absolutely sure that the flightcrew knows that what you are
presenting to the flightcrew, how you are presenting it, and
that you are presenting the most critical information that they
need. Putting ``there is bird activity'' on the top--show me an
airport where there is not bird activity. And then putting the
runway closure at the bottom doesn't make any sense. They need
to know what is most appropriate, what is most critical for
their flight so they get there safely.
Mr. DeSaulnier. Captain, do you have anything just briefly?
Mr. Ambrosi. Well said. I couldn't agree more. It is not
just the information, it is about how the information is laid
out. But we are professionals, we look through the data. Not
having the data is the biggest problem, so, we are not going to
operate without it. But I couldn't agree more.
Mr. DeSaulnier. Well, I want to follow up with all of you.
And with all due respect, Mr. Boulter, we all believe in
safety, but there is an urgency to this. And I am personally
frustrated with your organization through multiple
administrations and your lack of responsiveness to me. So, I
would love to follow up with you with specifics, with all of
you.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Nehls. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Edwards.
Mr. Edwards, 5 minutes.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
To all of you, thanks for being here this afternoon. I
appreciate the opportunity to work with you from this position.
I am one of the newest members of this committee. I am really
eager to get to know and work with you to provide an incredible
service, a much needed service to all Americans.
My first question is to Mr. Boulter. Our regional airport,
Asheville Regional Airport, broke ground recently to rebuild a
control tower that is 61 years old. We were all celebrating
this and thought that it was a lot of money at $55 million for
that particular project. And then I had a chance to hear from
another major airport in North Carolina, the Charlotte Douglas
International Airport. They are working to break ground on a
new runway at a cost of about $1 billion. And that airport is
about the sixth largest, I understand, in the U.S. or at least
we are going to claim that for today.
But it occurs to me in looking at this regional airport, 61
years old, probably the oldest in the country, and then I
compare that to this huge airport that needs to improve
capacity and safety and look at the price tag on that, that we
need a way--I need to understand a way that we prioritize--as
much as we would like to go out and pay for every project, we
need a way to prioritize these projects.
How are we going to go about doing that together? Do you
put together a list and we arm wrestle over it? What does that
look like for a new Member here?
Mr. Boulter. So, air traffic control towers, for the most
part, are--I am sorry. Air traffic control towers are
prioritized by air traffic, and they have a whole set of
criteria. We could certainly get the air traffic folks that do
that in here to talk to you, sir. And then airports would be
the runways piece, right? So, they are kind of--the air traffic
equipment is the towers in the airports. I know airports
obviously has a whole prioritization system built into theirs.
My days in air traffic, they have a pretty robust system on
facility condition. Obviously 61 years, it is probably time.
So, obviously we could get them in to kind of tell you how
they prioritize air traffic systems and how they prioritize
airports, both of those organizations, be happy to do that.
Mr. Edwards. And thank you. So, am I to assume now that
there is a list of all of these needs in America in some
prioritized order that we will be able to look at as a
committee when we are looking at which ones come first, which
ones could reasonably wait till somewhere down the road?
Mr. Boulter. I believe air traffic has that information for
facilities. And I am not familiar with the airports' version of
that.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you.
It looks like what will be my last question is for Captain
Ambrosi. Also looking at my district, NC-11, we have got two
pilot schools in the entire district. They are only about 20
minutes from one another. And yet we have got some very rural
parts of the district that don't have reasonable access to
pilot schools. And with what I believe the shortage of air
pilots that we are looking at nearing 80,000, and considering
that rural parts of my district might very well have some up
and coming pilots, what can we do? What are we doing to offer
more opportunities for folks that maybe would want a career in
aviation?
Mr. Ambrosi. Thank you for the question. As I have said, we
are encouraging Congress to take action to extend Federal loans
to people of very diverse background and beyond those that just
can afford it. It is very expensive to get into this
profession. And there needs to be an ability for folks that
don't have the money or have the ability to go to the military
to be able to do that. So, absolutely we support legislation to
diversify and offer Federal funding.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I yield.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Bunce, I know the development of better products and
new technology plays an important role in reducing the aviation
industry's impact on the environment. Will the steps you
outline in your testimony to improve the regulatory and
certification process help with progress in this area?
Mr. Bunce. Absolutely, sir. What we are doing on
sustainability is truly impressive. We are an aviation Nation.
We lead the world.
Just noticed the other day on the Mall, I was thinking,
what other industry or what other transportation sector has not
only one but two Smithsonian museums? We are the world leaders.
So, on a sustainability front, we are doing incredible
research on augmented thrust through using electric power
generation in larger and larger aircraft. We are looking at
hydrogen power. We are being able to go ahead and look at
lighter and lighter capability using fly-by-wire technology
that really leverages. As you make the airplane lighter, you
extend range. And so, fuel efficiency really matters to us to
be able to meet our sustainability goal.
So, again, it is a very exciting time. And if we can get
the certification process to be more agile, to be able to be
responsive by implementing some of these recommendations, I
think we can make some great strides.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Captain Ambrosi, looking through your testimony, I see that
you have highlighted the changes to pilot training and
qualifications, and that you also flew for regional airlines
before becoming a captain at Delta Air. Can you explain to the
committee how you built your flying hours and how pilots
generally develop flight-hours prior to receiving their ATP
certificate?
Mr. Ambrosi. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
I, like everyone on this panel, love aviation, so, I was
excited as a young man to go to a 4-year aviation school where
I did an advanced aviation degree. And then I flight
instructed. I flew helicopters for a lengthy period of time. We
had flight instructing and doing commercial photography,
exercising the privileges of my commercial certificate. I flew
multiengine airplanes, teaching folks how to fly on that. I
transitioned to Atlantic Southeast Airlines. Back in the day we
called them commuters, now they are called regionals. But I
flew a 30-passenger turboprop. I got hired probably 1,800 to
1,900 hours of time, of mostly commercial flying. At least
1,500 hours of it was commercial flying.
And there I flew a 30-passenger airplane for a few years,
upgraded to captain at the regional airline where, as I have
mentioned previously, I flew with first officers that had been
hired with 250- to 500-hour range. This was pre-2010 bill, and
at times it was on-the-job training. So, it shouldn't be that
way, but it is no fault of their own.
We are in a more complex system now. Some would think that
automation should make things easier. And as an operator, I can
tell you that sometimes it doesn't. In the more complex
airspace, as we welcome more users in, it is essential that we
make sure that our pilots have the training and experience to
safely carry our passengers.
Mr. Carbajal. I can assure you all the young boys and girls
watching this hearing are saying I want to be like him when I
grow up, all those aircrafts you have flown.
Administrator Boulter, we are in an exciting era in
aviation with new advancements in technology like advanced air
mobility, sustainable aviation fuel, and commercial space
travel. We are poised to transform air travel.
My district is home to Vandenberg Space Force Base, which
also serves as a spaceport. I understand the FAA and the Air
Force signed the commercial space agreement in June of 2021,
aimed at protecting safety and better coordination.
What resources does the FAA have to continue to promote
commercial space infrastructure? And how are you continuing to
prioritize safety?
Mr. Boulter. Thank you, sir.
I can have somebody from commercial space answer your
question for you. Commercial space is a little out of my lane,
but I will be happy to have them talk to you about how they can
do that. Kelvin would be happy to do that, sir.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you, sir.
I yield 5 minutes to Mr. Yakym, 5 minutes.
Mr. Yakym. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all the witnesses for taking time to
inform us on this important topic.
I think this hearing is the best way to kick off our work
on the FAA reauthorization because we must always keep safety
at the forefront of everything we do in aviation. We must look
at every aspect of this policy through the lens of safety in
order to ensure that what we do maintains the sterling
reputation that we know to be American aviation.
Our goal 100 percent of the time, 1,000 times out of 1,000,
is to get passengers, pilots, and flight attendants from point
A to point B safe and sound. And the same goes for everyone on
the ground, too, from mechanics to baggage handlers to air
traffic controllers and gate agents.
And in the unlikely event that something goes wrong, we
must have expert investigators who are ready to get to the
bottom of whatever issue transpired and make recommendations to
prevent future incidents.
With that, I want to turn to an issue that I have heard
from a number of my constituents about in my short time in
Congress. Our community, South Bend, Indiana, recently lost a
feeder flight that connects families and businesses from South
Bend and the surrounding area to the rest of the globe.
What I am trying to figure out is how we bring these types
of feeder flights back to secondary and tertiary markets. I
know that there are probably a lot of things that contribute to
this issue, but I want to focus today on the aviation
workforce.
So, as I survey this witness panel, I see a depth of
knowledge but also a wide range of different facets within the
aviation industry that are represented. So, my question is
this: How do we attract more people into the aviation industry?
Are there barriers from someone starting a career in aviation?
And how do we increase the pool of people wanting to become
pilots or mechanics and join other aspects of the aviation
ecosystem?
And I will start with Mr. Bunce.
Mr. Bunce. Sir, as Mr. Bolen pointed out, in the last
reauthorization, we really looked at youth in aviation and also
women in aviation because, quite frankly, we have already
talked about diversity, but the majority of our workforce is
male dominated. And so, we are missing a great percentage of
the population.
So, our outreach and all of us have programs on board,
whether you are in Government or in industry, that tries to
reach out to youths and tell them be part of this incredible
industry that we have out there; but there are things that we
learned through that study that we hope we can expand upon in
future reauthorizations to be able to say how we appeal to a
young lady is different than how we appeal to a young man. And
we are talking down in middle school.
And if we talk about what you can do for the environment,
we emphasize a sustainability theme, or what you can do in
disaster response, that has a different appeal to a young woman
than it does to a man. So, we have got to be able to adapt.
We have also got to be able to look at demographics out
there and say, OK, there are certain people and certain groups
in our country that have a propensity toward mechanical skills.
We talk a lot about the need for pilots, but I can tell you
that we have an acute need for mechanics and line people and
people to work in our factories.
So, we have got to talk about this industry and the
opportunities, the great pay that is in it, but also an ability
that if you get into it, we will help you further your
education. You work for a company, or a company will have
programs to be able to let you, if you want to go to college or
get a master's and develop those skills further, we will help
you.
Mr. Yakym. All right. Thank you.
Ms. Homendy, same question.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you very much.
Twenty-nine percent of those women who are passionate about
aviation became passionate before they were 10 years old. So,
we have to offer kids opportunities to really develop that
passion for aviation. You can do that through air shows and
education and partnerships.
But I do want to highlight the Women in Aviation Advisory
Board that Pete mentioned, which was required, which was tasked
in the last authorization bill, and I hope we will continue its
work, and they put out the ``Breaking Barriers for Women in
Aviation'' report, which has a number of recommendations: 11
for Congress, 15 for FAA, including nursing accommodations,
which exist in each of these buildings, and 14 for industry.
We have an opportunity to encourage women in the workforce,
but the greatest barriers are discrimination, lack of career
opportunities, lack of flexibility, meaning work-life balance,
and sexual harassment; and I am going to talk about that for
one second.
Seventy-one percent of women in aviation experience sexual
harassment, 81 percent witnessed it, and 51 percent were
retaliated against for reporting it. We have to address these
issues because we want to encourage women. We want to encourage
kids to come into aviation.
It is a fact that I am only the fourth woman to serve as
Chair of the NTSB since 1967, and we have a workforce of less
than 3 percent of mechanics are women, less than 9 percent of
pilots are women, less than 17 percent are air traffic
controllers, 19 percent dispatchers; CEOs, 3 percent.
We have an opportunity, and this aviation industry is so
great for work, and I want to work with the industry and work
with Congress to see how we can enable kids and women and
others to really get excited about aviation because now is the
time.
Mr. Yakym. And as a father of two young girls, I could not
agree more.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Owens [presiding]. Thank you.
Ms. Peltola, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Peltola. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to
be here as the new vice ranking member for the Aviation
Subcommittee. It is a real please to be here.
I represent Alaska, and for Alaskans, aviation really is
just the way that we get around, the way that we get our goods
and services, the way we go to the doctor or the grocery store.
It is really a critical enterprise, and we are always looking
to ensure that we continue to improve aviation safety, as well
as ensure a thriving aviation industry. These are essential to
both the smallest villages and the biggest cities that I
represent.
The other thing, everybody knows this, but safety really is
all about teamwork, and as we work towards an FAA
reauthorization bill this Congress, I want to make sure that
this committee recognizes that achieving safety means ensuring
we have the right processes and standards in place, the right
infrastructure investments, and the right leaders at the table
both nationally and locally to advance aviation as a whole.
And I will focus my question today on aviation safety
efforts in the State of Alaska, also recognizing that the
importance of aviation safety standards really is nationwide.
There isn't anywhere really even in the world where this isn't
critical, and I want to see that the FAA continue to be the
gold standard safety regulator for the aviation industry.
So, my first question is for Mr. Boulter.
In 2021, the FAA, in consultation with Alaska aviation
community stakeholders, developed 11 recommendations to address
Alaska's unique safety hazards through its Alaska Aviation
Safety Initiative, FAASI. And I was wondering what progress has
FAA made in implementing these recommendations? And, more
specifically, can you provide an update on the various weather
observing system updates and installations that are needed and
what the FAA is doing to make these updates in a timely manner?
Mr. Boulter. I would be happy to do that.
Having flown a little bit in Alaska and having
responsibility at one point in my career for all the
navigational aids in Alaska, it is a challenging environment.
The agency has completed about half of those 11. In the
Aviation Safety Organization, we are really working on two,
which is authorization for some of those weather observing
systems so that commercial and other operators can use those
weather reporting systems in their commercial operations and
synchronizing really some of the things we allow in the lower
48 on GPS routes and other GPS-type procedures in Alaska.
So, the Aviation Safety Organization is working on those
two diligently. Our Air Traffic Organization is really about
the weather equipment. We can certainly get an update for you
from them.
Mrs. Peltola. And I would love to extend an invitation for
your office to come to my office and briefing myself and my
staff in more detail.
Mr. Boulter. Absolutely.
Mrs. Peltola. Thank you.
I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Owens. Thank you.
Mr. Kean, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to thank all of our witnesses for
being here today.
As we draft a new authorization, there are several major
areas that this committee must look towards: technical
advantages in aviation since the last reauthorization;
passenger, pilot, and worker safety; workforce training
programs; general aviation; manufacturing; drone policy; and
information sharing to increase efficiency. It is important
that this committee do that with your insights and advice on a
long-term basis, and it needs to be bipartisan like the
previous ones were.
If we are looking at the FAA, Mr. Boulter, how can you lay
out and would you lay out a regulatory framework to enable AAM?
What do you view this industry looking like and how soon? And
how is the FAA going to help facilitate that?
Mr. Boulter. So, we look at operations. We look at the
leading applicants being certified, the devices or the aircraft
being certified at the end of 2024. That is the current
schedule. That schedule is made by the applicant.
We believe that--we have committed to the fourth quarter of
2024 having the operational rules in place and the operational
infrastructure. So, operational infrastructure is not just a
set of rules. It is training to our inspectors. It is the
ability to add those on to commercial certificates, that
environment.
And then what we have learned from the industry, and we
have had a fair amount of listening sessions with them, and we
have been working with each of the applicants that are kind of
in the lead here. What their expectation to do is, we expect
VFR operations in 2025, in some major cities around America and
a limited basis, in scale, moving along in scale as that grows.
We are working with our air traffic colleagues so they can
understand what that looks like, at least at first, and then
what kind of systems are we going to need long term.
Mr. Kean of New Jersey. When would you know of slippage of
that timeline?
Mr. Boulter. We will know--we have a series of goalposts,
if you will.
Mr. Kean of New Jersey. I understand that. I am asking you
when will you understand the slippage in that timeline?
Mr. Boulter. I do know that we have met our first three
goals, and it is on time currently.
Mr. Kean of New Jersey. OK. Thank you.
If I may, also, Dr. Buckley, what visions do you see that
could help the FAA do its job and that we as Congress should
know exists when we are looking at the regulatory framework?
Ms. Buckley. What we really look for is what does it need
to us to transition to this modernized environment so that we
can operate a safe NAS. And what I would encourage Congress and
the FAA to consider is what is that risk and dependency
tradeoff as we move forward to adopt some of these new
technologies.
It is not easy. There are a lot of demands placed on
sustainability, things we have to get right now but then
transition where we need to be. And I think it is that
thoughtful tradeoff at the enterprise level that I would
encourage all of us to look at as we continue to think about
the future.
Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you.
And Mr. Boulter, how will the safety management systems
requirement for part 135, operators and tour operators, improve
safety for the passengers?
Mr. Boulter. The safety management systems are a systematic
approach, and it moves us in the oversight world to a looking
at risk versus looking at strictly compliance. We want
compliance and we want operators to holistically look at risk
across their organization, identify that risk, and put
mitigations in place for that risk.
So, it will change the way--we have seen our relationship
with the major carriers change, and it is a risk-based system.
We keep asking them, what are you doing to identify risk? What
are you doing to control risk? And it is really a change in the
way we think.
Now, the challenge for us, of course, in this is scaling it
from the single pilot, single airplane person to large
operations, and we are beginning to work through that as the
rulemaking moves forward.
Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you.
And thank you, the other members of the panel.
I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Owens. Thank you.
Mr. Moulton, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all our witnesses for sitting here so
long. I know these are long hearings, but we appreciate you and
all that you do.
Piston-powered aircraft produce 70 percent of the total
lead emitted into the air nationwide. There is no safe level
for lead in our children's blood. The research on lead in
aviation fuel is very clear. It is harmful to the health both
of children and adults.
We also know lead can have significant impacts on academic
performance for children, as measured by end of grade test
scores. And I am consistently hearing concerns from my
constituents about leaded fuel.
I understand that unleaded fuel for small piston engines is
not yet cleared for use. The safety of the flying public is a
top priority for the FAA, and we cannot risk prop planes having
sudden engine failure because they are using a fuel that was
not rigorously researched and tested.
That is why the FAA's EAGLE initiative, that is Eliminate
Aviation Gasoline Lead Emissions initiative, is critical. After
a massive undertaking from the aviation industry last
September, a new unleaded gas was finally approved for certain
small planes.
In 1973, before I was born, the U.S. began to phase out
leaded gasoline in cars until it was fully banned in 1996. It
is well past time we put safety first and stop endangering the
health of our constituents with leaded fuel.
So, Mr. Boulter, what is a reasonable timeline to fully
eliminate leaded aviation fuel?
Mr. Boulter. The goal of the EAGLE project is by 2030. As
you said, we have already approved in a limited amount of
airplanes a particular compound that does replace it only in
those airplanes we have approved it in. We will continue to
look at folks that come early to market.
Without a drop-in replacement, though, then the whole
infrastructure around fuel, whether it be--is very difficult if
you have certain blends in certain places and doesn't meet all
the airplanes' needs. So, while we have approved that, we
continue to approve that fuel for others as it is safe in those
particular aircraft engine combinations.
We will continue to do that, and we will continue to work
with EAGLE initiative with industry to not only find a
replacement for 100 Low Lead but the infrastructure required to
be able to deliver it to the airports.
Mr. Moulton. And do you think the 2030 is a goal you are
going to meet, or are you going to miss that?
Mr. Boulter. Obviously, sir, if this was easy, we would
have done it by now, but when you have engines from 1920 to
2023, it is a difficult problem. But I'm convinced that with
industry, if we put our heads together and we really get the
right experts in the room, I believe we will make 2030.
Mr. Moulton. If we were to devote more resources to this,
could we speed up the timeline, or you don't think that is
realistic?
Mr. Boulter. I would have to look into that, sir.
Mr. Moulton. OK.
Until the cost of unleaded fuel is cheaper than existing,
it will be a hard sell to pilots and airlines. And is there a
plan to actually bring down the cost of unleaded fuels to be
more comparable to leaded fuels to help with this transition?
Mr. Boulter. Pete, I don't know if you have anything on the
economics of that, but I certainly don't.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Bunce?
Mr. Bunce. Sir, one fuel has a supplemental type
certificate. There are actually three other fuels in the
testing process. So, up at the FAA Tech Center, we are testing
two in what is called the piston aviation fuel initiative. So,
they are going through that pathway.
So, certainly Congress has funded that program, and we hope
that that continues until they get through that testing
process.
Once we have more fuel out there, obviously, it is supply
and demand. So, if we have got multiple refiners that are
producing the fuel in different places in the country, the
price will go down, but one of the big factors in the cost of
the fuel is the transportation of it. If you have got to truck
it a long distance, that adds costs. So, that is why it has got
to be refined in different sections of the country.
There is really, on the west coast, if you look at what is
happening to get fuel up in Alaska, it comes from, actually,
down in the lower 48 where we have got to ship it up there. So,
transportation adds a lot of cost to it.
Mr. Moulton. So, I understand this is challenging, but
America put a man on the moon faster than this initiative is
going to get done by 2030, from when President Kennedy said
that is where we are going.
So, I hope we can all work together to recognize and
realize this goal for the safety not just of the flying public
but for everybody else in America.
So, thank you all very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Owens. Thank you.
Ms. Chavez-DeRemer, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Thank you for being here toward the
end of the day.
I just have one question for Mr. Bolen in regards to the
view of the National Business Aviation Association. What is the
NBAA's view of FAA's safety management system in regard to the
proposed rulemaking?
Mr. Bolen. Well, thank you very much.
As I indicated earlier, SMS is a powerful tool, and I think
we all recognize the benefits that it has, and we want it to be
something that works at scale for everyone. I think what we see
with the new SMS rule, and it just came out recently, they have
extended the comment period for 90 days, and we are going
through it very carefully to make sure it actually is a tool
that can be useful and not an impediment.
So, we are right now looking at the SMS tools that we have
used, including IS-BAO, something that was developed by the
business aviation community, looking at the scalability, and we
look to provide robust comments to that.
We are in an education phase, and we know that it is
imperative that we get an SMS tool but that it is done at the
right scale. And so, that is really what we are focusing on.
Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. I appreciate that.
As I was reading through the testimony, Mr. Ambrosi, I
think, referenced it, and to scale is difficult sometimes with
the collaboration of 121 airlines; and when you are trying to
factor in labor, organization, regulation, manufacturing, I can
see that it takes time, and so, I appreciate that comment on
the rulemaking.
And I just wanted to ask that question and how you all were
feeling in referencing those rules. So, thank you for that
answer. I don't know if you have any additional details on
that; but if not, I thank you for answering.
And with, I yield back.
Mr. Owens. Thank you.
Mr. Ezell, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the
opportunity to talk about the important work done by this
committee to reauthorize the FAA. These programs and priorities
are critical to continue America's leadership of safety and
innovation in the aviation industry, especially as China and
our adversaries work to expand their presence.
Mr. Boulter, the United States airspace industry is a key
driver of economic growth. How does the FAA utilize the
commercial sector to advance capabilities that have the
potential to make aviation safer and more efficient?
Mr. Boulter. Sir, we couldn't do this without a lot of the
people that sit at this table. Our Commercial Aviation Safety
Team where we have labor, we have everyone at the table, and we
have open and frank dialogue; we look at data; MITRE is our
trusted third-party in that. It is critical to our future that
we do a couple things. One is that we continue to look for data
sources throughout, and we work together, and we also build
tools that can get more predictive.
Our goal in the agency is not just finding what the issue
was after the accident but could we find these issues in a
predictive way. And I believe we are starting to shift to that
in our CAST team. I know that team working together is going to
do great things about moving to a more predictive environment.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
Things are always evolving. As technology continues
developing and American companies innovate, the methods and
materials used to manufacture civil aviation products can
change. Can you speak about the importance of ensuring the
regulatory environment keeps pace with the advancements in
technologies? And how does this make aviation safer?
Mr. Boulter. Whether it be advanced materials or advanced
technology, avionics technology, as you know, has made huge
leaps. It is always a challenge for us to keep refreshing our
workforce, but that is why I look confidently towards the new
hires that we have hired, because they have different skill
sets. While they may need experience in our aircraft
certification business, they come with a great set of skills
that we can move forward.
But I also think some partnerships with industry to learn
more about these advanced materials so that we can--and use
some aviation rulemaking committees to look at how do we
certify some of these advanced technologies.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
Mr. Bunce, can you expand on that a little bit? And what do
you think we need to prioritize to ensure that FAA can certify
products in a timely manner?
Mr. Bunce. Training. Sir, it is all about training and
exactly what Mr. Boulter said. And I know there is a
willingness to be able to work with us, but we have got to
think in a way that looking at the new technologies, whether we
are talking composites, whether we are talking fly by wire,
whether we are talking about electric propulsion, that it is a
team effort.
And we have people that float back and forth between
industry and the FAA, and that is very positive, and that is
very healthy, but if we are able to train together, then we all
have the latest and greatest.
The other thing that also as we have new technology moving
forward is the standards become very important. If we just
stick with rulemaking, as we all know, it just locks us in, and
we can't keep refreshed with the latest in technology.
And I know Mr. Boulter is very committed to being able to
use standards more and more where we get all the experts from
the planet together, and we do it on a periodic basis to
refresh.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you very much.
I would just like to say how much I appreciate all of you
being here today. And being the last guy here, hopefully we
will wind up here pretty quick.
So, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Owens. Thank you.
Mr. Williams, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Williams of New York. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I also would iterate that I admire your endurance
and patience.
So, I come out of the nuclear Navy, and if there is any
community that is more obsessed with safety, track record,
procedures, followup, analysis, some of the most feared words I
have ever heard is ``I am from naval reactors, and I am here to
help.''
So, I appreciate that you are focused on safety. I think I
can relate to that culture from Admiral Rickover.
Mr. Boulter, I am concerned about this unusually close call
on January 13th at JFK International Airport in my State, in
New York. Two aircraft came within seconds of colliding on the
surface of the airfield as they were transiting and moving. One
aircraft missed the correct taxiway and began crossing an
active runway just as another aircraft loaded with passengers
and crew is on its takeoff roll.
We are fortunate that multiple layers of safety systems,
back to the culture of safety, alerted, and one of our
fantastic air traffic controllers made an emergency call to the
aircraft to abort a high-speed takeoff.
The fact that we are talking about a close call and not a
disaster demonstrates the success that you have had and
validates the systems that you have had. I am proud that a
company in my district has a long history of providing that
kind of surface safety for the FAA, and they make surveillance
systems that contributed to the controller's awareness,
situational awareness and able to predict and interdict before
an accident occurred.
But my question, just very straightforward, are you
confident, sir, that the FAA has the funding and the means to
maintain the same level of safety that saved the lives at JFK
where the margin of safety was just a few seconds?
Mr. Boulter. Sir, certainly the President's budget supports
an Aviation Safety Organization. I can't speak to all the air
traffic pieces to that. That system you talk about is an air
traffic system.
But multiple levels of safety are always what we are
looking for as an organization and what we ask of air carriers
and other operators in the system; but, yes, we certainly could
get you some more information on the funding of those systems,
but the Aviation Safety and Oversight Organization, we support
what the President has asked for in the President's budget.
Mr. Williams of New York. OK. It was the ASDE-X system.
Please.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you very much.
We are leading that investigation and also the one in
Austin, and it was the ASDE system. It was the Airport Surface
Detection Equipment system that notified the air traffic
controller that there was an impeding collision.
That only exists at 35 airports across the United States.
It does not exist in Austin. And so, we are going to take a
look at that as part of our investigation, but certainly, that
is something that we need to look at.
Mr. Williams of New York. Well, my daughter lives in
Austin, so, I have a vested interest.
Ms. Homendy. That is right.
Mr. Williams of New York. And that is safety.
With the time I have remaining, I had the privilege of
briefing the NASA ATM-X team for Next Generation air traffic
management. They were looking at Next Generation technologies.
In my case, my expertise in distributed computing or edge
computing.
The culture of safety is almost antithetical to innovation,
and I know that from the nuclear Navy, and most of which is
classified, but very, very difficult for that organization to
adopt new technologies, but they have managed to do that and I
think successfully over the last 30 years.
Can you point me to any program or team specifically--not
within NASA but within the FAA, Mr. Boulter--that really is
tackling this conundrum between innovation and safety? Because
we are not talking about a new technology. We are talking about
an entirely new system of technologies, and I would just be
eager to learn more.
Mr. Boulter. Yes, our Next Generation air traffic system
organization is looking at, what does the future look like?
What does the data centric National Airspace System look like?
We can certainly have them brief you on what they are doing,
sir.
Mr. Williams of New York. All right, thank you. We will
follow up. Thank you.
I yield back, sir.
Mr. Owens. Thank you.
Mr. Van Orden, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Boulter, thankfully, in your written testimony, amongst
all of you, you have mentioned safety approximately 400 times,
and it is critical because we need to make sure that safety
remains paramount. But we heard the word security no more than
15 times.
And, Doctor, I want to thank you. You did the best job I
believe out of any of the panelists or the witnesses during
your verbal testimony bringing out how incredibly important
this is.
So, Mr. Boulter, on January 26th, your colleague, Acting
Director Nolen, presented a debrief to a bipartisan group from
this committee referencing his decision to shut down all air
traffic in the country for a period of approximately 2 hours on
January 11th. During his remarks, he mentioned that the FAA had
a two-person integrity, or TPI, for anyone who could
potentially manipulate the software code in the legacy NOTAMs
database.
I asked him a very straightforward question and that being:
Was the TPI policy pre-existing in relationship to this
incident and was ignored? Or was the policy implemented
following the incident to prevent it from happening again?
Now, unfortunately, he chose not to answer this question
and said that you had an ongoing investigation and that you
would follow the facts. I asked him the question again. He
refused to answer.
So, immediately following this, my staff worked with the
committee to discover that, in fact, you did not have a two-
person integrity policy in place prior to this incident and
that it was implemented following for mitigation purposes.
Now, I laud your decision to do so, but I take exception
that we had to find this out independently. So, by exhibiting a
remarkable lack of forethought by not having a TPI policy in
place prior to this instance, the FAA left our entire Nation's
air industry in peril.
So, I am thankful this was a case of poor management and
delinquent policy standards, as opposed to a malicious actor
targeting aircraft, our aircraft control system, because I
don't know if our aircraft would be flying today if it were.
So, I am going to ask you a question and a followup. Have
you initiated a key nodal analysis of your NOTAM systems within
systems, including the legacy database and the user and systems
interfaces between these entities to identify any other single
point of failure or vulnerability?
Mr. Boulter. So, the Aviation Safety Organization has not,
but my understanding is that the Air Traffic Organization is
doing a deep dive on that system.
Mr. Van Orden. OK. So, did you just tell me that the
Federal--the FAA is not doing a nodal analysis for your NOTAM
systems within systems?
Mr. Boulter. No. The Air Traffic Organization would be
doing that analysis, and I am sure, in their--they are
currently in the middle of that investigation with our IT----
Mr. Van Orden [interrupting]. So, who is directly
responsible for the NOTAM system itself? Is it the air traffic
controllers or----
Mr. Boulter [interrupting]. The Air Traffic Organization
owns the system, and, obviously, our IT organization is
involved as well.
Mr. Van Orden. So, you understand that they are doing this,
but you don't know this for certain?
Mr. Boulter. I do not.
Mr. Van Orden. OK. Please do me a favor. Will you give them
a call after you get out of this meeting? Because if there are
more vulnerabilities and you have not taken the time to do a
key nodal analysis for all of them, the potentiality of the
destruction of our system for maintaining aircraft in this
country is a real thing, especially if there is a malicious
actor.
So, I would think of all the things we talked about today,
that this should be like number one on your list to take care
of this. So, I would like you to report back at some point, in
either written form or a phone call to me, I don't care, that
this is being initiated, to what level it is going to be
initiated, and when the anticipated completion of this
investigation is, because this affects every single human being
on the planet that flies an aircraft.
Mr. Boulter. Sir, we will do that.
Mr. Van Orden. Thank you. That's all I have.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Owens. Thank you.
The chair has been notified that there is a series of votes
occurring on the floor, the House floor. The committee will
stand in recess subject to the call of the chair.
[Recess.]
Mr. Molinaro [presiding]. The Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure will reconvene the previously recessed
hearing.
I will yield myself 5 minutes and then we will get moving.
Thank you.
I joked on my way in. This is kind of like making it from
the kid's table to the adult's table. So, we are grateful.
I wanted to get started. So, I represent the 19th
Congressional District in the State of New York, and we
recognize, in particular, two-thirds of flight delays, and most
of what concerns us exists because of issues in the Northeast
where my district is located. Certainly, we recognize that the
technology, of course, we use is terrifically, in many cases,
outdated.
I know that we have all touched on, and I don't want to
rehash what has been discussed regarding NextGen and the system
upgrades, but to Dr. Buckley, if you could, what other
advancements in use of technology would be appropriate in
particular to address what has been a chronic problem in the
Northeast?
Ms. Buckley. Thank you for the question.
To your point, I think we have the technologies. I think we
understand how to control the airspace. I think we understand
what is needed from a controller perspective. It's moving
toward the right way to implement those.
I think it is training. A lot of it is around workforce
when we look at those particular challenges, and it is making
sure that we have the incentives to not only bring in the
controllers and the training that we need in that area but also
to make sure that we are, again, safety first and understanding
the right way to maintain the presence that we need in that
particular area and manage the very congested traffic that you
are seeing in that airport.
Mr. Molinaro. So, I spent the last 12 years of my life in
local government where I was responsible actually for
overseeing the busiest general aviation airport in New York,
outside of the New York City metropolitan area, what is now the
Hudson Valley Regional Airport.
We focused a great deal on the pipeline to jobs, and I know
that we have all discussed this. And, again, I am not used to
rehashing for the sake of rehashing, but to Mr. Bolen, can you
talk a little bit for us about what additional steps we could
focus on to create that pipeline to the workforce?
What we did in my home county was focus principally on air
traffic--excuse me, on mainframe--I will get it--on mechanics
and technicians directly from creating pipeline from K-12 to
community college to actual hands-on work at our airport. There
are too few of those opportunities.
Perhaps, if you would, just talk a little bit about what
steps we could be taking more broadly to address that pipeline
Mr. Bolen. Well, thank you for the question, and it is an
urgent issue for all of us.
We have already talked a little bit about putting into
action the recommendations from the Women in Aviation Advisory
Board and from the FAA youth task force. Beyond that, I think
we have all recognized that there are a number of untapped
opportunities for us with underrepresented communities to bring
them in.
Some questions were brought up earlier about the
Historically Black Colleges and Universities. I think there are
a lot of programs as well where we are going at a local level
to try to address it.
In New York, for example, we are partnering with the
RedTail Flight Academy to work with young people with the
spirit of the Tuskegee Airmen to try to bring them into our
community and provide scholarships to work them through that.
Tomorrow I am going to be in Miami with Flying Classrooms,
an effort that is being made specifically to bring technicians
in and have them work at Opa-locka.
I think a lot of what we want to do is targeting groups
that may not be aware. So much of what we talk about is, do you
have enough passion to be part of our industry? Have you wanted
to be part of it forever? A lot of people don't know there are
opportunities here. So, we have to get out and make them aware
that this is a great industry and that there are pathways to go
forward.
And then as others have said, we need to find ways to
provide those scholarships and pathways for them to be able to
be part of this.
Mr. Molinaro. Thank you for that.
I would say in the 30 seconds I have left, just I do feel
that we are not adequately tapping those regional airports and
their connection to community schools, community colleges, et
cetera, and I feel like that is a fertile ground to expand the
access to the workforce in a safe and I think pretty productive
way.
I thank you for that.
And for questions, I will yield to Mr. Burchett.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
I appreciate you all being here. As the unrepentant mama's
boy, I feel I have to tell you all somebody said something
earlier in the day at one of our pilots, male pilots of how
little boys will see this and a lot of them will hopefully
start flying.
Well, a lot of little girls might see this, too. My mama
flew an airplane during the Second World War. She was a pretty
cool lady. I am very proud of her.
Daddy was off fighting the Japanese, and mama lost her
eldest brother Roy fighting the Nazis. And she did her part,
17-year-old girl. Didn't have electricity until she was a
senior in high school, and she flew an airplane. I thought that
was pretty cool. So, I just wanted to enter that for the
record. You all get that one for free, as we say.
But Mr. Bunce--I said that name correctly? Is that right?
Bunce? Maybe you do or you don't know, but Cirrus is a plane
manufacturer, and they are in the Knoxville area. They are out
there at the airport, and they have got an important presence
in my district.
It is important that U.S. companies are treated fairly in
terms of validation of U.S. products. I think even more now we
see the influx. I mean, you can think about the Chinese
balloon, but, dadgumit, every time you turn a label over it
says made in China, and it sickens me.
What specifically can we do to improve this situation?
Mr. Bunce. Well, sir, I actually fly a Cirrus, and I
trained down in Knoxville and everything. It's a great and
expanding capability down there.
Mr. Burchett. I will let you come buy me lunch one day.
Mr. Bunce. I would love to.
Mr. Burchett. But you can't because it wouldn't be ethical,
but we will go ahead. Go ahead.
Mr. Bunce. We will make it a cheap lunch.
Mr. Burchett. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bunce. Sir, if we look at foreign validations and
everything, as a result of what happened during the pandemic,
and particularly in the MAX, we had a breakdown in the
confidence between some of our other authorities on what we do
with certification. And what that did is it ratcheted up the
amount of looking at basically the work that was done by FAA by
other authorities as we go and try to validate the products.
With bilateral safety agreements, we are supposed to trust
each other's safety competencies. So, what happens? Well, then
we reciprocate, and the Canadians reciprocate, and it goes back
and forth, and it makes it very tough for us to validate
product.
So, what we would propose is that you, the Congress, ask
for a report from the FAA, first of all, on what metrics they
are using. First of all, if you can't measure it, you don't
know if you are making progress. So, you can get a report to
say how--are we making progress with validations? Are we
working with our foreign authorities?
But equally, or more importantly, is we have got to fully
man with full-time employees the international certification
office. Right now we get told by the FAA, well, we are fully
manned, but they are temporary jobs. And everything is about
relationships. We all know that. That is the way we operate and
get things done up here.
When you go and you have confidence with your counterparts
in EASA, or ANAC in Brazil, or Transport Canada, and we know
how each other's systems works, then we can use the bilateral
to its max effect, and that is how we will make progress.
Mr. Burchett. Are we making any progress?
Mr. Bunce. Very slowly.
Mr. Burchett. Very slowly.
Is there something that we could be doing right now? Are
there laws or rules we need to be passing to ensure that?
Mr. Bunce. I think during the reauthorization, if you look
for being able to get reports from the FAA using the metrics
and timelines, how long it takes to get through the process in
both directions, then that would be helpful.
Mr. Burchett. I am always worried when I see a bill up
here. I have been doing this political thing most of my life,
and there are a lot of studies, and when I was mayor of Knox
County, they wanted to do a study, and I would pay $5 million
for some study and it ended up on a shelf somewhere.
Do we have any assurance that that study will incur some
positive results?
Mr. Bunce. Well, I know that Mr. Boulter will attest, when
you ask for something here in the Congress, the FAA needs to
respond to it. And if it is a recurring request, then you can
check the progress. And I know your staffs do a great job of
being able to go and look at us. They will confirm with
industry that it is correct.
Mr. Burchett. My staff is probably watching this right now,
and they will probably hit me up for a raise after you say
that.
Mr. Bunce. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burchett. Well, all right. I appreciate it. And I
appreciate all of you all.
And I just wanted to throw that plug in there for some of
our female aviators. That is pretty cool. There is a cool
picture or a statue of Amelia Earhart upstairs, and it is
really cool.
I have got a picture on my phone of my mama in it, and it
reminds me of that picture very much. Although, my mama didn't
get lost flying across the Pacific. She did her part for the
effort here and saved our country.
So, thank you all so much for being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry I went over.
Mr. Owens [presiding]. Thank you so much.
Mr. Collins, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Acting Associate Administrator Boulter, the failure of the
NOTAM system on January 11th was pretty much a wakeup call. And
while we still don't have all the answers about what happened,
preliminary reports about a single employee at the FAA causing
a massive disruption and central disaster, it is very alarming.
Now, I am a small businessman. When I identify a problem, I
want to know what the problem is, I want to know what the
solution is, and I want to know how to not have it happen
again.
With that being said, I want to figure out how to
understand because I am new here. And I guess my first question
is NOTAM is Notice to Air Missions. Correct? Is that what it
has always been called?
Mr. Boulter. It used to be Notice to Airmen. It has been
changed to Notice to Air Missions.
Mr. Collins. Was it changed for safety reasons?
Mr. Boulter. I don't know why it was changed.
Mr. Collins. Sir?
Mr. Boulter. I was not involved in the name change, so, I
don't know why it was changed.
Mr. Collins. Do you know how much it cost to change it? Or
better yet, can you tell me how much time the staff spent
writing and implementing this 176-page rule instead of, say,
working on IT or protocol improvements, improved safety in the
National Airspace System?
Mr. Boulter. That wasn't under my purview. I don't have any
idea how much time or effort we spent on that.
Mr. Collins. OK. Well, let's switch gears for a little bit
then.
Has the FAA studied or reviewed if there are any outdated
regulations or standards on the books creating challenges for
aviation workforce recruitment or aircraft innovation but that
are not necessarily improving safety?
Mr. Boulter. As far as--none that I am aware of recently,
but any time we do rulemaking, we look at existing--when we
open a section, we look for: Are all of these still relevant?
Are they still mitigating the risks that they thought they
would?
So, for instance, we are opening up a big section for
powered lift. There will be other things in there we look at to
make sure they are still relevant.
Mr. Collins. All right, thank you.
It just seems to me that with the recent problems that we
have seen, and there have been many, things like changing a
name that you really don't even know if it was for safety or
whether it was for gender purposes reasons or whatever, your
time and money would have been a whole lot better spent on
updating that 30-year-old IT system or improving actual safety
protocols because, obviously, this wasn't even changed for
safety.
Mr. Chairman, that is all I have got. Thank you. And I
yield back my time.
Mr. Owens. Thank you.
Are there any further questions from any of the Members of
the chamber that have not been recognized?
Before we gavel out, I just want to thank you not only for
your service, for your collaboration. I understand that is the
most powerful thing we can do is, first of all, find out where
we are going and collaborate and work on that process.
And I look forward to working with you to make sure that we
have accountability, which, obviously, that is how we get
progress. So, thanks for everything you are doing.
Seeing none, I conclude our hearing for the day. I would
like to thank each of the witnesses again for your testimony.
And I ask for unanimous consent that the record of today's
hearing remain open until such time as the witnesses have
provided answers to any questions that may have been submitted
to them in writing.
Without objection, so ordered.
Also, I ask unanimous consent that the record remain open
for 15 days for additional comments and information submitted
by the Members or witnesses to be included in the record of
today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
The committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
Submissions for the Record
----------
Statement of Robert Rose, Co-founder and Chief Executive Officer,
Reliable Robotics Corporation, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Sam
Graves
Chairman Sam Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the
House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee:
Thank you for holding this hearing to discuss enhancing the safety
of our aviation system. The United States has the world's largest and
safest aviation system, and through the upcoming FAA reauthorization,
Reliable Robotics is committed to working with this Committee to expand
our Nation's leadership role.
Based in Mountain View, CA, Reliable Robotics was founded in 2017
to develop and bring to market aviation safety-enhancing technologies,
including auto-land, auto-taxi, and auto-takeoff, as well as high-
precision navigation and remote piloting capabilities. These
technologies can prevent many common causes of fatal aviation accidents
and save lives today. Our company has more than 110 employees who have
diverse backgrounds in commercial spaceflight, aerospace engineering
and technology and air carrier operations.
Through a wholly owned cargo airline operating under Part 135 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations, we are operating piloted cargo
flights utilizing the Cessna 208 Caravan on behalf of a major carrier.
The Caravan is a single-engine turboprop that can carry more than 3,000
pounds of cargo and connects small towns and communities across the
United States. More than 2,900 Caravans have been delivered to
customers worldwide.
The safety-enhancing technologies that Reliable Robotics is working
with the FAA to certify include an advanced autopilot, actuators,
fault-tolerant flight computer, and high-precision navigation. These
technologies will bring significant safety improvements to the Caravan
fleet and are designed to be adapted to other aircraft types. The
ability to conduct safe auto landings in all weather conditions without
additional ground-based infrastructure will be a game changer for the
Nation's more than 5,000 general aviation airports.
Achieving Transformational Safety Improvements
We are at an inflection point for aviation safety, with many
safety-enhancing technologies, including auto-land, auto-taxi, and
auto-takeoff, within reach for smaller aircraft. While some of these
technologies are available on large commercial aircraft, they are
prohibitively expensive and require costly infrastructure at airports.
With additional leadership and focus from the FAA, we can rapidly make
these technologies available to thousands of aircraft without the need
for additional ground-based infrastructure.
Aircraft such as the Cessna Caravan, are a lifeline to small towns
and communities. They deliver time-critical shipments like medical
supplies and can access thousands of general aviation airports, only a
fraction of which are served by major carriers. However, these aircraft
have yet to benefit from the level of investments and innovation in
safety technology that we have seen in larger cargo and passenger
aircraft.
Safety Technology Can Prevent Accidents
To achieve transformational safety benefits and certify
technologies that can prevent aviation accidents, Congress must use
this FAA reauthorization to provide the agency with additional
leadership and resources. While we applaud the dedicated FAA workforce
and its commitment to aviation safety, the agency is not keeping pace
with innovations in aviation safety.
While major U.S. commercial air carriers have a strong safety
record, we must do more to make aviation safer. Recent studies have
concluded that general aviation operations are between 8 and 15 times
more dangerous than driving, but that 68% of fatal accidents could
potentially have been prevented with safety-enhancing technology.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Hook (U. of Tulsa), Sizoo (FAA), Fuller. ``How Digital Safety
Systems Could Revolutionize Aviation Safety.'' IEEE/AIAA Digital
Avionics Systems Conference. 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, with technologies such as auto-land, auto-take-off, and the
availability of real-time radar surveillance data to pilots, we can
prevent loss of control in flight (LOC-I), controlled flight into
terrain (CFIT), fuel mismanagement, mid-air collisions, and many other
causes of fatal aviation accidents. Also, since most nonfatal general
aviation accidents occur during the take-off and landing phase and are
caused by poor pilot decision-making and proficiency,\2\ these same
technologies would bring significant safety gains.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA). (2020). ``32nd
Joseph T. Nall report.'' 2020.
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Principles for FAA Reauthorization
As Congress holds additional hearings and examines the upcoming FAA
reauthorization in detail, we believe the following principles will
provide the agency with the tools to certify safety-enhancing
technologies and integrate them into the National Airspace System:
Identify a leadership-level position at the FAA empowered
with the resources, decision-making authority, and technical expertise
to identify a lead reviewing organization in the agency for safety
technology certification projects and coordinate concurrent reviews by
other offices.
+ This leader should assess regulatory, legal, and operational
considerations for safety technology certification projects and engage
relevant FAA stakeholders upfront.
Leverage commercially available technology to create a
secure FAA portal to track the real-time status of certification-
related activities.
+ This portal would provide visibility to both applicants and
the FAA on the status of a specific application or document under
review, which offices are scheduled to review the submission, and
timelines for completion of the process.
Engage in robust workforce planning to account for the
anticipated volume of new certification projects and identify the
engineers and subject matter experts needed to manage the workflow
efficiently.
+ The FAA must also evaluate the workforce needs and required
skills for aviation safety inspectors and other professionals necessary
to oversee the integration and operation of safety technologies and new
entrants.
United States Leadership
Utilizing the FAA reauthorization to enact legislation that adheres
to these principles will enhance our Nation's leadership role in
aviation safety. These policies will also generate new high-technology
jobs in the United States. The advanced air mobility industry, which
includes enabling safety technologies, has the potential to create more
than 280,000 new jobs.
The time to act is now, as our competitors, including China and
Europe, are dedicating significant financial and regulatory resources
to aviation safety technologies, and the United States cannot afford to
be left behind.
We look forward to discussing the above principles in more detail
through hearings and other engagements with you and your staff. Thank
you for focusing on safety technologies as part of the FAA
reauthorization and your commitment to the United States aviation
industry.
Letter of February 6, 2023, to Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick
Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
from Sean M. O'Brien, General President, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Rick Larsen
February 6, 2023.
The Honorable Sam Graves,
Chairman,
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Rick Larsen,
Ranking Member,
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Graves and Ranking Member Larsen,
On behalf of 1.2 million members of the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, I write in response to today's Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee Hearing entitled ``FAA Reauthorization:
Enhancing America's Gold Standard in Aviation Safety''.
The Teamsters Union is proud to represent members in every corner
of our nation's transportation network, moving goods and passengers in
each state and in international commerce. This includes tens of
thousands of aviation employees, and hundreds of thousands who
interface with, and rely on, a safe and effective aviation sector. In
fact, the Teamsters represent the greatest diversity of aviation
employees of any labor organization, including pilots, mechanics,
passenger service agents, flight attendants, fuelers, flight
dispatchers and more.
On behalf of these members, we are enthusiastic that the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee is beginning the critical
process of reauthorizing the Federal Aviation Administration through
today's hearing. This reauthorization comes at an incredibly timely
moment. The largely successful return of the industry from the depths
of the COVID-19 pandemic, changing economic conditions, new entrants
and technologies into commercial aviation, and evolving safety and
service issues present ample opportunities for the committee to draft
impactful legislation.
As the Committee hears from today's witnesses and begins to
construct the reauthorization bill, the Teamsters call on the Committee
to develop a bill that:
Promotes aviation safety and high-quality training and
certification regimes.
Addresses critical safety loopholes and gaps in existing
regulation and statute.
Safeguards and creates good American jobs and ensures
that future industry growth benefits the domestic workforce.
Protects airline employees from occupational hazards,
including those presented by unruly passengers.
On these and other items, the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters looks forward to working with your offices as well as those
of Committee members, on a bipartisan basis, to craft an FAA
Reauthorization bill that can be beneficial for the nation's aviation
employees, consumers, and aviation safety.
Signed,
Sean M. O'Brien,
General President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
Appendix
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Questions from Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford to David H. Boulter,
Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation
Administration
Question 1. Has the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA) or any other Federal agency provided recommendations to
the FAA regarding vulnerabilities or potential vulnerabilities of FAA
systems and hardware and has the FAA addressed those concerns? If not,
do you have a roadmap to do so?
Answer. The FAA is regularly audited and assessed by multiple
federal entities, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
CISA, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the DOT Office of
Inspector General (OIG). These audits and assessments augment the
scanning of systems performed by the FAA and assist in identifying any
findings and recommendations related to vulnerabilities in FAA systems.
An example of where this occurs is the DHS Binding Operational
Directive (BOD) 19-02 cyber hygiene scans. The FAA receives
notifications from CISA should a critical or high vulnerability be
detected on an FAA internet-accessible system and then complies within
the remediation timelines. A second example is the CISA Risk
Vulnerability Assessment (RVA) process for identified high value assets
pursuant to BOD 18-02 that requires the FAA to address or develop plans
to address all CISA findings from completed RVA engagements. As of
today, the FAA is in full compliance with these two BODs to ensure
vulnerabilities are remediated or plans are in place to address the
vulnerability in accordance with timelines.
Question 2. How does the FAA work with CISA and other government
agencies to monitor for and identify vulnerabilities of the systems and
hardware of FAA's regulated entities?
Answer. One goal of the FAA's Cybersecurity Strategy is continual
efforts to build and maintain relationships with, and provide guidance
to, external partners in government and industry to sustain and improve
cybersecurity in the Aviation Ecosystem.
Building trust between DHS CISA, Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), and FAA with respect to aviation cybersecurity
stakeholders and FAA's regulated entities is critical to the success of
building an aviation cybersecurity framework that enhances defense,
response, and recovery from a cyber incident and improves resilience.
The FAA is solely responsible for the safety of the civil fleet.
FAA's regulatory authority for civil airplanes manages cyber risks
through the application of design-specific ``special conditions.''
These special conditions carry the weight of regulatory requirements
and mandate that critical airplane systems be protected from
intentional unauthorized electronic interaction (IUEI). FAA partners
with the TSA as their cybersecurity role is focused on airports, ground
systems, airline support systems, and the physical security of
aircrafts.
The FAA is a tri-chair member of the Aviation Cyber Initiative
(ACI). Chartered in May 2019 by the Secretaries of Transportation,
Homeland Security, and Defense, the ACI is a forum for coordination and
collaboration among federal agencies on a wide range of activities
aimed at cyber risk reduction within the aviation ecosystem. Recently,
the ACI has also begun partnering with CISA's Joint Cyber Defense
Collaborative (JCDC).
Additionally, DHS and DOT collaborate on aviation cybersecurity in
a number of other ways as Co-Sector Risk Management Agencies (co-SRMAs)
for the Transportation Systems Sector. The TSA, FAA, and CISA co-chair
the Aviation Government Coordinating Council (AGCC), a group chartered
by DHS to plan, implement, and execute the Nation's critical
infrastructure security and resiliency mission. The AGCC also
coordinates with the Aviation Sector Coordinating Council (ASCC), which
is chaired by industry. Both of these groups were formed under the
auspices of the DHS Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory
Council (CIPAC).
Question 3. Are FAA's regulated entities required to self-report
cyber-attacks? If so, what does the FAA do after receiving such a
report?
Answer. The FAA requires manufacturers and operators to report any
safety-related information and incidents. The FAA has established
processes in place to respond to all reported safety issues.
Question 4. Who is responsible for developing and overseeing the
implementation of the FAA's internal cyber policies and initiatives?
Answer. The FAA Office of Information and Technology Services
(AIT), led by the Chief Information Officer (CIO), oversees and
delegates the responsibility to the Director, Information Security and
Privacy Service, led by the FAA Chief Information Security Officer
(CISO), to lead the development of FAA's information security program
as outlined in FAA Order 1370.121B.
Questions from Hon. Colin Z. Allred to David H. Boulter, Acting
Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation
Administration
Question 1.a. Can you speak to how the FAA is working to ensure air
traffic controllers have sufficient resources, training, and additional
manpower to make sure we don't even come close to incidents like the
narrow miss in Austin on February 4, 2023?
Answer. Each year the FAA transmits a comprehensive controller
workforce plan to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure. The plan is the FAA's blueprint for
ensuring that management of the national airspace takes into account
the need to align controller resources with demand.
Question 1.b. What role can Congress play in that through the FAA
reauthorization process?
Answer. The reauthorization process is an opportunity for Congress
and the Administration to work together to address long-term agency
modernization needs.
Question 2.a. The FAA budget is the same at $3 billion dollars that
it was in 2009, not even accounting for inflation. I understand that
the FAA is seeking $29.4 million this year to modernize NOTAM.What
resources would it take to actually fix the NOTAM system by 2025?
Answer. The investment that is currently being implemented (Federal
NOTAM System Sustainment) addresses two aspects of NOTAM modernization:
the consolidation of the legacy NOTAM system (United States NOTAM
System) functionality into the Federal NOTAM System and the transfer of
the NOTAM system off of the outdated hardware platform onto an
Integrated Enterprise Services Platform.
The resources needed to implement the Federal NOTAM System
modernization and enhancements on an accelerated timeline is underway.
We will need to work internally and with Congress to determine how best
to align resources with needs across the F&E Capital Improvement
Program.
Question 2.b. Is that a realistic goal given your current
resources?
Answer. The FAA will continue to work with the Administration and
Congress to address NOTAM modernization resource needs.
Question 3. As the transition to 5G continues, what steps is the
FAA taking to ensure any related interferences, such as reports
indicating heads up display anomalies, autopilot issues, and
autothrottle shutoffs, do not lead to larger safety concerns?
Answer. The FAA is working to ensure the safe coexistence of
aviation and 5G C-band telecommunications systems in the United States.
Safety remains the FAA's primary mission in this endeavor, and we are
addressing safety concerns by establishing regulations to assure safety
and monitoring operations to assure that those regulations are
performing as intended.
Since December of 2021, the FAA has issued several Airworthiness
Directive (AD) regulations establishing aircraft performance
requirements and operational limitations to address potential hazards
associated with 5G C-band signals interfering with the proper
functioning of aircraft radio altimeters. More recently, in January of
2023, the FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) AD
providing longer-term radio altimetry system performance requirements
enabling ongoing operations of transport category airplanes for
scheduled passenger and cargo operations. We expect to finalize this AD
soon, and we are already tracking the work airlines across the globe
are doing to achieve compliance with these requirements through
upgrades to aircraft radio altimetry systems.
Question 4.a. I understand the FAA has set a deadline of December
2024 to complete the rulemaking related to the ``powered-lift'' special
federal aviation regulation. Knowing that this rule will be
instrumental in ensuring advanced air mobility companies can continue
to drive innovation with clear guidance, can you speak further to the
status of this SFAR?
Answer. The FAA is working closely with the Department of
Transportation and we expect to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking
soon.
Question 4.b. Does the FAA anticipate needing additional resources
to complete it by the deadline you have set?
Answer. The FAA will continue to dedicate the necessary resources
toward promulgating the final rule.
Question 5.a. As the sponsor of the Brian McDaniel Helicopter
Safety Act, to honor my constituent who died in a helicopter accident
in 2018, I was very glad to see the FAA's proposed rulemaking that will
require all commercial air tour operators to have in place a safety
management system (SMS). This proposed rule will make sure tragedies
like Brian's death do not happen again, and I look forward to working
with the FAA to implement this rule. Can you speak to the importance of
this rule and how it will ensure fewer deaths?
Answer. Safety Management System (SMS) is designed to reduce
accidents and fatalities by guiding organizations to proactively
identify potential hazards in the operating environment, analyze the
risks of those hazards, and mitigate those risks to prevent an accident
or incident. Historically, the approach to aviation safety was based on
the reactive analysis of past accidents and the introduction of
corrective actions to prevent the recurrence of those events. An SMS
provides a structured, repeatable, systematic approach to proactively
identify hazards and manage safety risk. Expanding SMS to commuter air
carriers, air tour operators, and manufacturing organizations will
provide these organizations with the ability to develop and implement
mitigations that are appropriate to their environment and operational
structure.
Question 5.b. How does the FAA intend to incorporate stakeholder
feedback into the rule?
Answer. The FAA follows the notice-and-comment requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act, which provide an opportunity for
stakeholders and the public in general to provide feedback on a
proposed regulation. In the past, the FAA has received valuable
comments that resulted in changes that improved the final rule's
efficiency and effectiveness. The FAA will consider each comment
received. The final rule document will include a disposition of the
comments received, which will include the FAA's rationale for its
response to those comments.
Question from Hon. Troy A. Carter to David H. Boulter, Acting Associate
Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration
Question 1. I understand that the FAA is focused on safety and that
the ASIAS program is a cornerstone of that. Similar to NOTAMS, we know
it exists, but the value of such systems is understated, and we have
little insight into how the FAA is prioritizing its funding.
I would like to understand your commitment to the proper
modernization of the ASIAS program. I see very little money being
requested for ASIAS, and that raises concerns similar to NOTAMS that
the FAA has not prioritized this vital safety system in it proper
place.
Does the FAA have sufficient funding to modernize the ASIAS program
in a timely manner that keeps the FAA as the safety gold standard?
Answer. FAA is committed to modernizing the ASIAS program,
including expanding analytical support to the helicopter/rotorcraft
community and improving its capability to process digital flight data.
ASIAS modernization efforts are a key effort to advance more rapid and
accurate predictive safety analysis, and we are working to accelerate
this endeavor. The FAA appreciates the continued support of Congress.
Question from Hon. Grace F. Napolitano to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy,
Chair, National Transportation Safety Board
Question 1. Chair Homendy, in most aviation occupations women make
up less than 20% of the workforce--and for the last sixty years, the
introduction of women into the industry has been largely stagnant.
Having a robust female workforce is critical to the U.S. aviation
industry's safety, sustainability, profitability, and ability to
innovate. What needs to be done to attract, retain, and advance women
in the aviation industry?
Answer. I couldn't agree more. Unfortunately, women are
underrepresented across transportation in every mode and nearly every
job category, especially in roles that tend to pay more, such as upper
management and highly technical positions. As you know, aviation is no
exception. According to the Women in Aviation Advisory Board:
``In most aviation occupations, women make up less than 20% of
the workforce. The largest gender gaps are in senior leadership
positions, professional pilots, and maintenance technicians.
Roughly 5% of airline pilots are women, and only 3.6% of
airline captains are women. By comparison, women represent 47%
of the total U.S. workforce and 26% of people working in STEM
fields globally.
``For the last sixty years, the introduction of women into the
aviation industry--in nearly every functional specialty--has
been stagnant. For example, although the total number of women
holding commercial pilot certificates has increased, the
representation of women as a percentage of the total has
changed only at a rate of about 1% a decade. For women in
aviation maintenance, the rate of change is even slower. In
sixty years, the percent of women in aviation maintenance has
reached only 2.6%--marking one of the greatest gender gaps in
the entire industry.''
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Clearly, more needs to be done to attract, recruit, retain, and
advance women in the aviation and aerospace industries. The Federal
Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-
254, Sec. 602) established a Women in Aviation Advisory Board that was
charged with developing and providing independent recommendations and
strategies to the FAA Administrator to explore opportunities for
encouraging and supporting female students and aviators to pursue a
career in aviation, with the objective of promoting organizations and
programs that are providing education, training, mentorship, outreach,
and recruitment of women for positions in the aviation industry.
The FAA bill (Sec. 601) also required the FAA Administrator to
submit to Congress a report that describes the Administration's
existing outreach efforts to elementary and secondary students who are
interested in careers in science, technology, engineering, art, and
mathematics to prepare and inspire students for aviation and
aeronautical carriers and mitigate an anticipated shortage of pilots
and other aviation professionals.
The Women in Aviation Advisory Board and the Youth Access to
American Jobs in Aviation Task Force both submitted recommendations
pursuant to the legislative mandates. The Board and Task Force
recommendations go hand-in-hand as research shows that early exposure
to aviation and ongoing engagement are essential to the recruitment of
women into the industry.
The Women in Aviation Advisory Board report, Breaking Barriers for
Women in Aviation: Fight Plan for the Future, offers 55
recommendations, including several recommendations to Congress that
would transform aviation if implemented. These include a recommendation
for Congress to increase the amount of available federal financial aid
for careers in aviation. Extending the student debt repayment program
beyond its current date of 2025 could also assist with financial
barriers to entry.
I am very familiar with financial barriers to entry. I have
completed private pilot ground school and several private pilot
lessons; however, the cost of each lesson was close to $200. Those
aspiring to becoming a pilot should fly about 2-3 times a week, but
many people, including me, cannot afford to spend $600 a week in flight
lessons.
I recommend that Congress review and consider including this and
other recommendations in the report in the next FAA reauthorization
bill. I also recommend reauthorizing both the Women in Aviation
Advisory Board and the Youth Access to American Jobs in Aviation Task
Force to enable them to continue joint efforts to implement their
recommendations throughout the industry.
Here is a link to the report: https://www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/
WIAAB_Recommendations_Report_March_
2022.pdf
Questions from Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr. to Hon. Jennifer L.
Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board
Question 1. Chair Homendy, in your written testimony, you mention
your goal is to ``right size [your] agency'' and highlighted various
efforts to hire additional personnel in recent years.
Question 1.a. As Congress considers the NTSB's reauthorization, can
you specifically describe what resources the NTSB's needs to achieve
this and the consequences of not investing in the NTSB's workforce now?
Question 1.b. How will the NTSB ensure that its workforce reflects
the diversity of the nation?
Answer to 1.a. and 1.b. We have seen tremendous growth and
technological advancements in transportation over the last two decades.
We need the right people and the right training to keep pace. To
accomplish this, we need an increase in our authorization levels,
direct-hire authority, and flexible authorities to acquire training on
emerging transportation technologies. Over the last 20 years, the NTSB
has stayed virtually the same size--approximately 400 staff members.
When I became Chair in August 2021, we had 399 staff members. This
year, we have undertaken 62 hiring actions and aim to end the year with
435 people on board. This is being accomplished with the $129.3 million
provided by Congress for fiscal year (FY) 2023. We need at least $145
million in FY 2024, with incremental increases to $185 million in FY
2028, to reach full staffing of 515 by 2028. We need Congress's
continued support for the NTSB's mission and resources.
Currently, 20 percent of our workforce is eligible to retire. Over
the next 5 years, the number of employees eligible to retire will grow
to roughly 50 percent of the agency. If we don't invest now, we will
have fewer people to conduct more and more complex investigations,
delaying findings and recommendations. Lack of investment will
undermine transportation safety now and in the future.
Diverse perspectives help us view an issue from multiple angles;
that, by definition, improves safety. Diverse perspectives allow us to
eliminate blind spots. Therefore, we have taken several steps to ensure
that diversity and equity are central to our hiring goals. First, I
have designated a member of the NTSB's Office of Equal Employment
Opportunity, Diversity, and Inclusion (EEODI) as our agency's chief
diversity officer. Second, the EEODI office hired a diversity, equity,
inclusion, and accessibility program manager to support outreach to
women, underrepresented groups, and persons with targeted disabilities.
Third, as part of our strategic human capital plan, we hired a chief
human capital officer to lead strategic workforce development and
implement policies and procedures to recruit, hire, develop, promote,
and retain a workforce with greater diversity, equity, inclusion, and
accessibility. Finally, the agency continues to participate in
recruitment and other outreach activities at several historically black
colleges and universities and partners with the Chickasaw Nation to
host summer interns.
Investing in and ensuring the diversity of the NTSB workforce, as
planned in our reauthorization proposal, is essential to maintaining
and improving safety in our transportation system. The resources
requested in the NTSB's reauthorization proposal will support
recruitment of talented and diverse investigators, engineers,
attorneys, and support staff. Robust investment in recruiting is
necessary to compete for the best and the brightest and to ensure that
our workforce reflects the diversity of the nation.
Question from Hon. Dina Titus to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair,
National Transportation Safety Board
Question 1. In 2019, the GAO found that more than half of airline
passenger service agents reported being assaulted over the previous
year. In 2021, the FAA received reports of more than 6,000 verbal and
physical assaults in our airspace. While the number came down in 2022,
it is has not returned to pre-pandemic levels which were already
trending upwards.
What effect do these assaults have on the systemic safety of our
airspace?
Answer. Flight attendants play a crucial role in ensuring the
safety of airline passengers. It is essential that passengers comply
with instructions from flight attendants, such as raising seat backs to
ensure safe escape paths, fastening seat belts, and donning emergency
oxygen masks. Although we have not investigated any safety incidents
resulting from recent assaults on flight attendants, we have numerous
investigations showing the critical role flight attendants play in
ensuring passenger safety during emergencies.
Question from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy,
Chair, National Transportation Safety Board
Question 1. Even though the recent reported runway incursions
avoided a serious accident, it's evident that there may be some safety
gaps. Do you feel that the NTSB has sufficient resources and
authorities to investigate these near misses? Are you running into any
trouble getting access to the information you need?
Answer. The NTSB has the authority necessary to investigate
incidents; however, we need resources and additional data to keep pace
with tremendous growth and technological advancements in the National
Airspace System. Our Office of Aviation Safety currently has 113 staff
working on 1,194 domestic and 132 foreign investigations. In the last
year, we have reduced our backlog from over 440 cases open for more
than 2 years to less than 40. However, we can do more with more staff
and better training. Our reauthorization proposal is seeking to grow
our aviation office to 135 staff members this year, and to 160 by 2028.
For the entire agency, we need at least $145 million in fiscal year
(FY) 2024, with incremental increases to $185 million in FY 2028, to
reach full staffing. To ensure we are prepared for the future, our
proposal also includes provisions to acquire training on emerging
technologies, streamline hiring, and diversify our workforce.
Regarding data: cockpit voice records (CVRs) currently only retain
2 hours of information. In some cases, an incident may not immediately
be identified as meeting the reporting criteria, or a flight may be
longer than 2 hours, and CVR data has been overwritten before we have
an opportunity to secure the information. The resulting loss in data
constrains an investigation. Within the last 20 years, the NTSB has
investigated 39 incidents where this critical information was erased.
We have recommended (Safety Recommendations A-18-30 and -31)--and the
technology is available for--25-hour CVRs, ensuring critical data is
available, safety issues can be identified, recommendations can be
made, and we can prevent a tragedy.
Questions from Hon. Greg Stanton to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair,
National Transportation Safety Board
Question 1. As you are well aware, aircraft cockpit voice and data
recorders (affectionately known as ``black boxes'') play a critical
role in assisting the NTSB in their investigations to determine with
greater accuracy the cause of an accident. The data and voice
recordings also play a critical role by helping to inform NTSB safety
recommendations to prevent accident reoccurrence and to maintain the
safety of our national airspace. Today's cockpit voice and data
recorders in the US are only required to record for 2 hours and then
re-write over themselves. In 2018, the NTSB issued a safety
recommendation for the FAA to implement for both a forward fit and
retrofit for 25-hour recordings. In 2015, EASA, the European Civil
Aviation Authority, issued a requirement for extended recording times;
and in 2017 the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) issued
a recommendation on Post Flight recovery of Data--to date, the FAA has
not acted on the NTSB's safety recommendation. Could you discuss the
importance of access to longer recording times from the NTSB's accident
investigation perspective and how doing so would help enhance aviation
safety in the United States?
Answer. In September 2022, the FAA informed us that it had
submitted a rulemaking project for fiscal year (FY) 2020 ``to determine
the feasibility of requiring all newly manufactured airplanes, which
must have a CVR, to be fitted with a CVR capable of recording the last
25 hours of audio.'' However, this project was not accepted by the FAA
Rulemaking Management Council due to competing priorities and
resources. The FAA told us that it was reassessing the scope of this
project and planned to resubmit it for FY 2023 approval. Since January
1, 2022 (14 months ago), the European Union Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA) has required that all newly manufactured aircraft have a CVR
that records at least 25 hours of data. The EASA did not implement a
requirement to retrofit in-service aircraft. Within the last 20 years,
the NTSB has investigated 39 safety incidents where needed information
was not available to investigators because the CVR had overwritten the
data related to the incident (i.e., there were at least 2 hours' worth
of data recorded since the incident).
Question 2. The NTSB has made multiple recommendations regarding
safety equipment the Federal Aviation Administration should require to
be installed and operational in turbine-powered rotorcraft certificated
for six or more passenger seats in the aftermath of accidents: (1)
flight data recorders (FDR) and (2) flight data monitoring and safety
management programs. Back in March 2009 the NTSB recommended in
Aviation Accident Report A-09-02 that all existing turbine-powered
should have a crash-resistant flight recorder system that captures
audio, a view of the cockpit environment to include as much of the
outside view as possible, and parametric data per aircraft and system
installation. In the report, the NTSB noted the long-standing concerns
about the lack of recorded information to guide investigations, help
determine accident causes, and develop recommendations to prevent
recurrences.
On January 26, 2020, a Sikorsky S-76B helicopter collided with
hilly terrain near the city of Calabasas, California. The pilot and
eight passengers were fatally injured, and the helicopter was destroyed
by impact forces and fire. The helicopter was not equipped with a
flight data monitoring (FDM) recorder or cockpit voice recorder (CVR).
The synopsis from the pending NTSB's report recommends that FAA require
all Part 121 and 135 operators to install FDM program, retrofit
turbine-powered aircraft with crash-resistant flight recorders to
record cockpit audio and cockpit images.
Despite these calls to action, The FAA has not adopted NTSB
recommendations for turbine-powered, helicopters to have flight data
monitoring programs or flight data recorders for cockpit audio and
images.
Could you please tell us why this safety recommendation is so
important and how it would benefit helicopter safety and save lives
should the FAA take action?
Answer. Regarding the January 26, 2020, accident involving a
Sikorsky S-76B helicopter that collided with hilly terrain near
Calabasas, California: that helicopter was initially equipped with a
CVR when it was delivered from Sikorsky to the initial operator. The
CVR was subsequently removed by the operator, as permitted by FAA
regulation, during interior modifications.
Recorders are invaluable in identifying safety issues that might
not be known without the recorded data. Two NTSB investigations
illustrate how important recorded data was in identifying important
safety information that would not have been found without the
recorders.
We participated in the 2005 investigation of a Sikorsky S-76C+
helicopter, which experienced an upset and crashed into the Baltic Sea,
killing all 12 passengers and 2 pilots. The helicopter was registered
in Finland, which, unlike the US, requires recorders. This accident was
the first time that the NTSB participated in a helicopter accident
investigation in which a flight data recorder (FDR) was on board.
Without the FDR data, investigators would not have been able to
identify the cause of the crash--failure of rotor actuators.
In our investigation of a Eurocopter AS 350 B3 helicopter that
impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight
near Talkeetna, Alaska, on March 30, 2013, we were able to identify an
important safety issue because the operator (the Alaska State Police)
voluntarily equipped the helicopter with an image recorder. The pilot
became spatially disoriented as weather conditions deteriorated, then
lost control and crashed. The loss of control occurred because the
pilot exceeded the limits of the attitude indicator, which is necessary
for safe escape from reduced-visibility conditions. Without the image
recorder, this unsafe action and gap in pilot training would never have
been identified. Subsequently, we would not have issued three
recommendations to the FAA on training to prevent reoccurrence of this
crash.
Questions from Hon. Patrick Ryan to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair,
National Transportation Safety Board
Question 1. In the 1990's the NTSB recommended a ``One Level of
Safety'' policy, which the FAA adopted in 1996. Under the 1996 ``One
Level of Safety'' rule, the FAA required every passenger airline with
ten or more seats with scheduled commercial service to follow the same
minimum federal safety standards for Part 121 flights. Over time, the
FAA has created exceptions to this rule. One of these exceptions allows
an airline designated as a Part 380 Public Charter under FAR Part 135
with 30 seats or fewer to operate published scheduled flights with
pilots having as little as 500 flight hours. Recently, SkyWest, applied
for a commuter air carrier application DOT to allow its newly formed
public charter subsidiary to utilize this method to have pilots with
fewer flight hours than Part 121 flight standards.
Question 1.a. Would this deviate from the ``one level of safety
policy'' and create two levels of aviation safety for passenger
airlines?
Question 1.b. Should passengers who fly on a passenger airline in
scheduled commercial service with 9-30 seats expect to have lower
flight safety standards than passengers who fly a passenger airline
with greater than 30 seats?
Answer to 1.a. and 1.b. The NTSB has not done any investigations or
studies that directly address this issue. However, we believe that
passengers who pay for commercial transport expect the highest levels
of safety and are not generally aware that, based on the operating
rules, they may be subject to less stringent safety regulations. In our
March 2021 report about the safety of revenue passenger-carrying
operations conducted under Part 91, we concluded the following:
1. The FAA has a responsibility to bolster regulations and
oversight for all revenue passenger-carrying operations.
2. Some operators have been exploiting or inappropriately
capitalizing on the exceptions contained in Part 119.1(e) to avoid the
additional requirements and oversight intended to apply to the types of
revenue passenger-carrying operations being conducted.
Question 1.c. If SkyWest's petition is granted, do you believe that
airline consumers should be made aware of this fact? Should the
passenger airlines who operate flights under the Part 380 exception be
made to fully disclose lesser safety standards to consumers at some
point during the booking process?
Answer. Although we do not have a position on the petition, in
2009, we recommended the FAA require Part 135 on-demand operators to
provide their customers with a written document, correspondence, or
ticket that expressly describes the terms of carriage, including the
regulatory part under which the flight is operated (A-09-78), similar
to what is provided to Part 121 passengers. This would eliminate
uncertainty about the commercial intent of the flight. The FAA did not
act on this recommendation, and it was closed unacceptably in 2013.
Again, when passengers pay for commercial transport, they expect, and
should receive, the highest level of safety.
Questions from Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr. to Capt. Jason
Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International
Question 1. For the past few Congresses, I've led and plan to lead
again in this Congress, the Minorities in Aviation Act, to take that
critical step forward towards diversifying the aviation industry. I
meet with a well renowned African American pilot, Mr. Omar Brock who
goes around Georgia inspiring minority youth who look like him and
might one day want to be just like him. It is great to see individuals
like Mr. Brock take this responsibility upon themselves, however, we
must do our part and that is what I plan to do.
Question 1.a. Mr. Ambrosi, what has your association done to
advocate on behalf of black pilots directly, who are clearly
underrepresented in the industry you represent?
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1.b. On your association's site, under your commitment to
diversity and inclusion it states, ``We are focusing efforts to foster
a future generation of commercial airline pilots that better reflects
the composition of the communities we serve.'' Upon the introduction of
the Minorities in Aviation Act, could I depend on your organization to
support this legislation which would foster that future generation with
diverse commercial airline pilots? Yes or no would suffice.
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2.a. This Committee has previously received testimony from
flight attendants calling attention to cabin air quality, particularly
regarding harmful air contents that can manifest through some
aircrafts' ``bleed air'' systems. Are ALPA members observing or
encountering similar cabin air quality issues?
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2.b. Follow-Up: Are there key differences in issues with
cabin air quality based on different types or generations of aircraft?
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Question from Hon. Dina Titus to Capt. Jason Ambrosi, President, Air
Line Pilots Association, International
Question 1. There is a considerable amount of news about the supply
of pilots, and I recall a proposal from the Senate last year to raise
the age of retirement for pilots to address the issue. I have heard,
however, that the major constraint on flying is pilot utilization,
rather than simple supply. Can you explain what is going on and any
details on the training backlog that affects airline scheduling?
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Question from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Capt. Jason Ambrosi,
President, Air Line Pilots Association, International
Question 1. Captain Ambrosi, can you please speak to the current
safety culture among flight crews and lessons that can be learned from
the recent runway incursion incidents?
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Question from Hon. Greg Stanton to Capt. Jason Ambrosi, President, Air
Line Pilots Association, International
Question 1. Using space-based ADS-B would enable FAA to provide
positive air traffic control in oceanic airspace. How significant is
that for improving safety and efficiency in that airspace?
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Question from Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr. to Peter J. Bunce,
President and Chief Executive Officer, General Aviation Manufacturers
Association
Question 1. In your written testimony you encourage the FAA to
establish various private-public training exchange programs and
aviation fellowship opportunities. Can you elaborate on how such
programs would help boost and diversify the FAA's workforce?
Answer. We believe that by encouraging more collaboration between
FAA and industry will facilitate highly qualified individuals to tackle
evolving technology such as flight crew interface (human factors),
system safety, autonomy, propulsion methods, software, and artificial
intelligence. In doing so, this would further stronger engagement
between the FAA and industry, increase the technical expertise of the
agency, and provide unique opportunities for the FAA's workforce which
in turn will highlight career paths, boost morale and support
diversity. We welcome further engagement with policymakers to
facilitate these important objectives.
Questions from Hon. Greg Stanton to Peter J. Bunce, President and Chief
Executive Officer, General Aviation Manufacturers Association
Question 1. I understand that the FAA has been working for years to
develop a type certification for some drones models, some of which
could be used by GAMA members. Where does the FAA stand among global
peers in advancing drone technology?
Answer. The drone industry is facing similar challenges as all
other aviation industries and sectors when developing and introducing
new technologies, new aircraft, and new types of operations--Current
requirements and standards across aircraft certification, operations,
maintenance, pilot licensing, aircraft control and airspace integration
do not adequately address these new vehicles and operations and
therefore require significant FAA activity and decisions at the policy
level to establish the standards and processes necessary for safety. We
believe GAMA proposals to improve the improve the timeliness,
transparency, and performance accountability in the development and
promulgation of regulatory materials will help address this issue as
well for all of industry.
If the FAA cannot meet these objectives, they risk losing standing
to other aviation authorities which in turn affects industry
competitiveness and U.S. leadership and, more broadly, aviation safety.
Question 2. If type certification is not ultimately the best avenue
and use of agency/company resources to establish airworthiness for
small drones, is there not value for U.S. companies and their investors
to see the FAA finish what it started on these initial certification
activities and get to a place where type certificates can be issued for
those who have been in the pipeline so long?
Answer. GAMA strongly supports a safety continuum approach for FAA
regulation, oversight and processes for the airworthiness and
operations of drones across a broad range of size and types and
locations of operations. This is consistent with the FAA safety
regulation for all other types of aircraft such as airplanes and
helicopters in recreational and commercial operations. It is critical
that the FAA provide industry a transparent roadmap and clear set of
risk-based guidelines for durability and reliability testing for the
type certification of small drones. Clear guidelines are needed to
ensure consistency in the process across small UAS manufacturers and
will save considerable federal resources.
Questions from Hon. Colin Z. Allred to Ed Bolen, President and Chief
Executive Officer, National Business Aviation Association
Question 1. I understand from your testimony you have concerns on
the implementation of the proposed rule to require all commercial air
tour operators to have in place a safety management system (SMS). How
can we work with the small business aviation community to ensure these
requirements are scaled appropriately?
Answer. NBAA and the business aviation community recognize the
value of Safety Management Systems (SMS) and the positive improvements
these programs bring to an operator's safety culture. However, NBAA is
concerned that the upcoming FAA mandate for Federal Aviation Regulation
(FAR) Part 135 and Part 91.147 could take a ``one size fits all''
approach to SMS, be overly prescriptive, and not be scalable to smaller
companies. Congress can help by directing the FAA, as part of its
rulemaking process, to develop a mechanism to verify that an operator's
existing SMS program, many of which are subject to extensive third-
party audits, meets regulatory requirements under development.
Question 2. As you know, Canada and New Zealand recently
implemented similar SMS requirements. What lessons should the FAA and
Congress consider from the implementation process in those countries?
Answer. The SMS implementation challenges experienced in Canada and
New Zealand resulted from two principal shortfalls: poor inspector
preparation and training and insufficient guidance to the industry.
Both issues created a lack of standardization across Canada and New
Zealand, creating regional interpretations for compliance. As a result,
it has taken Canada over two decades to develop the standards and
training necessary to implement scalable SMS programs effectively. The
U.S. aviation industry must find a way to avoid repeating the poorly
developed SMS deployment we have seen elsewhere. We must get this right
from the start in order to leverage the safety benefits that we know
SMS can deliver.
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