[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PERSISTENT CHALLENGES: OVERSIGHT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM,
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 26, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-72
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-458 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Eric Swalwell, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California
August Pfluger, Texas Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Tony Gonzales, Texas Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Nick LaLota, New York Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Mike Ezell, Mississippi Robert Garcia, California
Anthony D'Esposito, New York Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Laurel M. Lee, Florida Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Thomas R. Suozzi, New York
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Elijah Crane, Arizona
Stephen Siao, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE
August Pfluger, Texas, Chairman
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island,
Tony Gonzales, Texas Ranking Member
Anthony D'Esposito, New York J. Luis Correa, California
Elijah Crane, Arizona Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Thomas R. Suozzi, New York
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Michael Koren, Subcommittee Staff Director
Brittany Carr, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Seth Magaziner, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witness
Honorable Kenneth L. Wainstein, Under Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
For the Record
The Honorable Seth Magaziner, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Public Statement on the Hunter Biden Emails.................... 41
Appendix
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Kenneth L. Wainstein.. 47
PERSISTENT CHALLENGES: OVERSIGHT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY'S OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS
----------
Wednesday, June 26, 2024
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism,
Law Enforcement, and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. August Pfluger
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Pfluger, Bishop, D'Esposito,
Crane, and Magaziner.
Mr. Pfluger. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and
Intelligence will come to order.
Without objection, the subcommittee may recess at any
point.
The purpose of this hearing is to conduct oversight of the
Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis--that will be referred to as I&A--and hear from under
secretary for I&A, Mr. Kenneth Wainstein. I now recognize
myself for an opening statement.
We're holding this important hearing to examine and discuss
the role of DHS's office of I&A that helps play a role in
safeguarding our Nation. The United States faces a myriad of
threats from state and non-state actors. We're seeing
authoritarian regimes, such as China, Russia, and Iran, expand
their reach across the globe and challenge the sovereignty of
the United States and our allies.
Our adversaries are not only working to achieve these
objectives through conventional military means but are also
masterfully accomplishing these goals through cyber space and
by using asymmetric tactics that fall just below the threshold
of traditional conflict, more commonly known as gray zone
aggression.
We've seen malign actors utilize state-owned companies and
their technological products to spy on our Nation and gather
sensitive data that advances their strategic goals. Further,
the threats posed by violent extremist groups, like ISIS, al-
Shabaab, al-Qaeda, and others, that continue to operate
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast
Asia present consistent challenges.
Overall, the threats posed by state and non-state actors,
paired with the Department's failure to secure our borders,
have led our Nation down a precarious path that presents a
clear and present danger. Our Nation is almost certainly not
seeing this level of instability since World War II, and these
threats will only continue to metastasize if we don't do
something about it and stop the aggression from our
adversaries.
I highlight the troubling developments because they show
why now, more than ever, our Nation needs an effective and
efficient intelligence enterprise to keep the homeland safe,
secure, and resilient, while not abusing its authorities or
violating the Constitutional rights of Americans.
The men and women that work within I&A are charged with
disseminating intelligence to State, local, Tribal, and
territorial enforcement agencies and other partners, and
develop intelligence from those partners for DHS and the IC to
ensure our communities stay safe.
Over the years and across administrations, I&A has
struggled at times to complete its mission to equip the
homeland security enterprise with timely intelligence and
information needed to keep the homeland safe. Systematic and
documented failures, as detailed by various reports by the DHS
inspector generals, have led to breakdowns in identifying
specific threat streams or have undermined public trust.
For instance, I&A's overt HUMINT intelligence collection
program has raised serious questions and concerns related to
the Department's overreach of its statutory mandate and to
potential violations of the fundamental civil liberties of all
Americans. In fact, part of the program was paused after a
number of DHS officials raised concern about its legality.
These issues have led to high turnover, no clear leadership
or effective oversight, and significant training gaps for its
employees. These incidents within DHS are unacceptable and
erode trust in keeping our Nation safe at a time when our
country faces an elevated threat.
It did not help when DHS unilaterally decided to establish
a now-disbanded homeland intelligence expert group, an action
that continued--an action that continues to raise concerns
about DHS's impartiality and objectivity in furthering its
homeland security mission amidst ever-evolving threats.
These concerns were further exacerbated when DHS then
decided to rebrand the discredited experts group as an advisory
board, claiming that the new board builds upon the expert's
group and will represent diverse perspectives without regard
for political affiliation.
In an effort to address some of these shortcomings within
I&A, Members of this committee have not only conducted
oversight of I&A's operations but also passed various
bipartisan legislative measures designed to improve training
and transparency of I&A's activities.
Today I've asked Under Secretary Wainstein to provide us
with an update on the steps that the Department has taken to
address the long-standing issues associated with I&A that
cannot be fixed with surface-level patches. I'm encouraged to
hear that I&A has been undergoing an internal review, and we
thank Mr. Wainstein for doing that and in a reorganization as
well. But it simply can't be a reshuffling of leadership roles
or just to give the appearance of progress.
We have talked several times throughout the last year about
some of these issues. I've worked with the Ranking Member, Mr.
Magaziner. This subcommittee has worked on truly identifying
and having a conversation that highlights some of the past what
I would call failures but also looks forward to what can be
done to keep our Nation safe.
As we approach the anniversary of 9/11--the 23rd
anniversary of 9/11, I think it's important for all of us to
keep in mind that, in the days leading up to 9/11, the word--
the phrase ``the system was blinking red'' was brought up. That
was part of the 9/11 Commission. It was part of the findings,
and it's part of what I want to frame this subcommittee hearing
today, is that I'm fearful and concerned today that the system
is blinking red in a number of ways.
I think that, even if our intention is to keep this country
safe, we have to look under the hood and get to an
organization, and I appreciate you being here doing that so
that if it is blinking red, which I think it is, that we can
get the oversight done, provide DHS with the appropriate
resources to keep the country safe so that we don't have
another incident like 9/11 again.
I appreciate you being here. I look forward to hearing your
testimony.
[The statement of Chairman Pfluger follows:]
Statement of Chairman August Pfluger
June 26, 2024
We are holding this important hearing to examine and discuss the
role DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) plays in helping
to safeguard our Nation.
The United States faces a myriad of threats from state and non-
state actors across the globe.
We are seeing authoritarian regimes, such as China, Russia, and
Iran expand their reach across our globe and challenge the sovereignty
of our allies and our national security interests.
Our adversaries are not only working to achieve these objectives
through conventional military means but are also masterfully
accomplishing their goals through cyber space and by using asymmetric
tactics that fall just below the threshold of traditional conflict,
more commonly known as gray zone aggression.
We have seen malign actors utilize state-owned companies and their
technological products to spy on our Nation and gather sensitive data
that advances their strategic goals.
Further, the threats posed by violent extremist groups like ISIS,
al-Shabab, al-Qaeda, and others that continue to operate throughout
sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and southeast Asia present
consistent challenges.
Overall, the threats posed by state and non-state actors, paired
with the Department's failure to secure our borders, have led our
Nation down a precarious path that presents a clear and present danger.
Our Nation has almost certainly not seen this level of instability
since World War II, and these threats will only continue to metastasize
as time goes on with weak leadership that invites aggression from our
adversaries.
I highlight these troubling developments because they show why now,
more than ever, our Nation needs an effective and efficient
intelligence enterprise to keep the homeland safe, secure, and
resilient, while not abusing its authorities or violating the
Constitutional rights of Americans.
The men and women that work within I&A are charged with
disseminating intelligence to State, local, Tribal, and territorial law
(SLTT) enforcement agencies and other partners and develop intelligence
from those partners for DHS and the IC to ensure our communities stay
safe.
Over the years, and across administrations, I&A has struggled to
complete its mission to equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with
timely intelligence and information needed to keep the homeland safe.
Systematic and documented failures, as detailed by various reports
by the DHS inspector general, have led to breakdowns in identifying
specific threat streams or have undermined public trust.
For instance, I&A's Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program has
raised serious questions and concerns related to the Department's
overreach of its statutory mandate and to potential violations of the
fundamental civil liberties of all Americans.
In fact, part of the program was paused after a number of DHS
officials raised concerns about its legality.
These issues have led to high turnover, no clear leadership or
effective oversight, and significant training gaps for its employees.
These incidents within DHS are unacceptable and erode the public's
trust in keeping our Nation safe at a time when our country faces an
elevated threat environment.
It did not help when DHS unilaterally decided to establish a now
disbanded \1\ Homeland Intelligence Experts Group, an action that
continues to raise concerns about DHS's impartiality and objectivity in
furthering its homeland security mission amidst ever-evolving threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ On May 2, 2024, the Department of Homeland Security agreed that
the Homeland Intelligence Experts Group would be ``wound down'' and the
Department would ``not reconstitute the Experts Group inconsistent with
the FACA [Federal Advisory Committee Act] or the Homeland Security Act
of 2002.'' See, Joint Notice and Stipulation of Dismissal, No. 1:23-cv-
3322-CRC (May 2, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These concerns were further exacerbated when DHS then decided to
rebrand the discredited Experts Group as an ``Advisory Board,''
claiming that the new board ``builds upon'' the Experts Group and will
represent ``diverse perspectives, without regard for political
affiliation.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS Announces
Creation of the Homeland Intelligence Advisory Board, (May 17, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an effort to address some of these shortcomings within I&A,
Members of this committee have not only conducted robust oversight of
I&A's operations, but also passed various bipartisan legislative
measures designed to improve training and transparency of I&A's
activities.
Today, I have asked Under Secretary Wainstein to provide us with an
update on the steps the Department has taken to address the long-
standing issues associated with I&A that cannot be fixed by surface-
level patches.
While I am encouraged to hear that I&A has been undergoing an
internal review and reorganization, this cannot be simply reshuffling
leadership roles to give the appearance of progress.
Additionally, I look forward to hearing about ways that Congress
and DHS can work together to tackle the threats mentioned at the
beginning of my statement.
This year marks the 23rd anniversary of 9/11.
As we approach this year's anniversary, I can't help but remember
what George Tenet famously said to the 9/11 Commission.
In describing the warning signs leading up in the days before 9/11,
he stated that in his world ``the system was blinking red.''
I am fearful that we are once again ignoring the fact that the
``system is blinking red'' and we are failing to take the necessary
steps to correct course to safeguard the homeland.
I hope and pray that I am wrong in that assessment.
However, hearings like today allow Congress the opportunity to
conduct oversight and assess our Nation's effectiveness in mitigating
the threats posed by a catastrophic attack.
I look forward to the conversation and appreciate Under Secretary
Wainstein for speaking with us today.
Mr. Pfluger. I now recognize the gentleman from Rhode
Island, the Ranking Member, Mr. Magaziner.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman Pfluger, for calling
today's hearing, and also for the constructive conversations
that we've been having around ways that we can support your
efforts to reform and enhance the effectiveness of the office.
Thank you, Under Secretary Wainstein, for joining us this
afternoon.
Today's conversation has to start with remembering why the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis was created, the terror
attacks that took place on September 11, 2001. I remember that
day vividly, and I'm sure everyone else here does as well. The
failures that allowed it to happen were, in large part, due to
the lack of coordination and information sharing at the time
between intelligence agencies and law enforcement.
The terrorism threat that I&A was created to combat
persists today, as does our mission of overseeing the
integration of DHS with the intelligence--between the
intelligence community and law enforcement. We are aware of
some of the challenges that I&A has experienced, but I do want
to also highlight the good work that people there are doing
every day to keep America safe and, to a degree, the success of
I&A can also be measured in the terror attacks that have not
taken place over the last two decades.
That being said, there are challenges that need to be
addressed, and I am pleased that the under secretary has
undertaken a 360-degree review of the organization to realign
the structure and improve the performance of I&A. But the work
continues to assess how I&A meets its intelligence mission and
ensure that it complies with important privacy and First
Amendment and oversight requirements.
I&A plays a critical role in protecting the American people
from violence by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating
intelligence to State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private-
sector law enforcement. It is the only intelligence community
member tasked with providing actionable intelligence to these
partners.
I&A's critical role in helping to secure the homeland is
more necessary today than ever because the United States faces
a wide variety of threats, both domestic and international,
from states and non-state actors. For example, racially and
ethnically motivated violent extremists, including those
motivated by white supremacy, pose a significant threat to our
country according to FBI data. They commit mass shootings and
other violent acts to advance their racist, homophobic,
misogynistic, and bigoted agendas.
At the same time, Secretary Mayorkas recently warned that
ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other foreign terrorist organizations are,
once again, increasingly recruiting and plotting attacks
against Americans at home and abroad. These are serious threats
that require our intelligence community and our law enforcement
agencies to work together to share information, to have access
to timely, actionable intelligence to do their jobs on the
ground.
I look forward to hearing more about the results of the
360-degree review for I&A and the steps that are being taken to
help I&A regain its status as a trusted intelligence partner
and learning what Congress can do to ensure that I&A's critical
mission is carried out to its fullest with respect to privacy,
civil rights, and civil liberties.
With that, I yield back. I thank you again for being here,
and I thank the Chairman.
[The statement of Ranking Member Magaziner follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Seth Magaziner
June 26, 2024
Today's conversation should start with remembering why the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis was created--the terrorist attacks that
took place on September 11, 2001. I remember that day vividly, as I'm
sure all of you do as well. And the intelligence failures that allowed
it to happen were in large part due to a need for stronger coordination
between the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies.
The terrorism threat that I&A was created to combat persists today,
as does our mission of overseeing the integration of DHS with the
intelligence community and law enforcement. We are aware of some of
I&A's challenges, but the success of I&A can be measured in the
terrorist attacks that have not taken place over the last two decades.
I am pleased that Under Secretary Ken Wainstein undertook a ``360
Review'' of the organization to realign the structure and improve the
performance of I&A. However, we must continue to assess how I&A meets
its intelligence mission, and ensure it complies with privacy and
oversight requirements. I&A plays a critical role in protecting the
American people from violence by collecting, analyzing, and
disseminating intelligence to State, local, Tribal, territorial, and
private-sector law enforcement. It is the only intelligence community
member tasked with providing actionable intelligence to SLTTP partners.
I&A's critical role helping secure our communities is more
necessary today than ever before. The United States faces a wide
variety of threats, both domestically and internationally, and from
state and non-state actors. Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent
Extremists--particularly those motivated by white supremacy--pose the
most significant threat to our country per the FBI's data. They commit
mass shootings and other violent acts to advance their racist,
homophobic, misogynistic, and bigoted agendas.
At the same time, Secretary Mayorkas recently warned that ISIS, al-
Qaeda, and other foreign terrorist organizations are increasingly
recruiting and plotting attacks against Americans at home and abroad.
These are serious threats that require our State, local, Tribal, and
territorial law enforcement to have access to timely, actionable
intelligence to do their jobs on the ground in our communities.
I look forward to hearing from Under Secretary Wainstein about the
results of his 360-Degree Review, and the steps it should take to
regain its status as a trusted intelligence partner. I also look
forward to learning about what Congress can do to ensure I&A's crucial
mission is carried out to its fullest and with respect to privacy,
civil rights, and civil liberties.
Mr. Pfluger. I thank the Ranking Member. Other Members of
the committee are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
June 26, 2024
Today's hearing title is accurate. Historically, there have been
``persistent challenges'' at I&A. The MAGA Trump administration tried
to tear apart I&A for political gain, to the detriment of our national
security and Americans' privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
Under Secretary Wainstein has devoted his time in office to
cleaning up the mess left by the Trump administration and so-called
``Acting Secretary'' Chad Wolf. So, thank you, Under Secretary
Wainstein, for your dedication to I&A and for joining us today.
Today's hearing is an opportunity for Members to gain insight into
how Under Secretary Wainstein and the Biden administration have taken
the first steps toward rebuilding I&A's reputation and effectiveness.
Shortly after Under Secretary Wainstein took office, he initiated a
360-Degree Review of the entire Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
Throughout the 360 Review process, Under Secretary Wainstein has
kept Congress up-to-date on his findings. He has been a partner as we
help rebuild and realign I&A to safeguard the office from
politicization and prevent any future harm to our homeland security
apparatus.
Here are just some of the results from Under Secretary Wainstein's
360 Review:
I&A's collection activities will be separated from its
analysis teams, and a new deputy under secretary will oversee
all intelligence collection.
I&A's Open Source Intelligence collectors will be embedded
within I&A's 4 analytic centers to work alongside and in closer
collaboration with analysts and privacy experts.
And I&A will implement a new process to measure and
establish benchmarks for intelligence output and feedback from
customers, then use ``surge'' efforts to cover near-term
priorities.
These reforms--and the others that will emerge from the 360
Review--go a long way toward rebuilding I&A's operations,
effectiveness, and morale following the years I&A was trashed by Trump.
These reforms--and this hearing--have been a long time coming.
Republicans have been in charge of the House for 18 months, but
unfortunately this is the first time this subcommittee has held a
hearing focused on the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. I&A's
mission is critical, particularly at a time when our country is facing
lethal threats from white supremacists, racially motivated violent
extremists, malign foreign governments like China and Russia, and
growing threats from ISIS. Congress should be a partner to I&A and work
to help the Under Secretary rebuild what the Trump administration
broke.
I look forward to hearing from Under Secretary Wainstein on how to
further improve I&A based on the 360-Degree Review. I stand ready to
continue working with Under Secretary Wainstein and committee Members
on this critical effort.
Mr. Pfluger. I'd like to welcome and thank the under
secretary, Mr. Wainstein, for being here today. I ask that our
witness please rise and raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you. You may be seated. Let the record
reflect that the witness has answered in the affirmative.
I'd now like to formally introduce Under Secretary Kenneth
Wainstein, who serves as the Department of Homeland Security's
under secretary for intelligence and analysis. He's responsible
for providing the Secretary, DHS leadership, and all the
components thereof and private-sector partners with the
homeland security intelligence and information needed to keep
the country safe, secure, and resilient.
The office of I&A is a member of and the Department's
liaison to the United States intelligence community. Mr.
Wainstein has served as the chief intelligence officer for DHS
and reports directly to the DHS Secretary and director of
national intelligence.
Prior to his confirmation, Mr. Wainstein spent over 20
years in law enforcement and national security positions in the
Federal Government. Between 1989 and 2001, Mr. Wainstein served
as a Federal prosecutor and held a variety of supervisory
positions.
In 2006, Mr. Wainstein was confirmed as the first assistant
attorney general for national security at the Department of
Justice. In that position, Mr. Wainstein established and led
the new national security division, which consolidated the
Justice Department's law enforcement and intelligence
operations on all national security matters.
In 2008, he was named homeland security advisor by
President George W. Bush. I know for a fact that you come into
this job because you love this country and want to see the
security of our country as the utmost priority.
I appreciate you being here, and the Chair now recognizes
Mr. Wainstein for your opening testimony.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN, UNDER SECRETARY
FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS
Mr. Wainstein. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner,
and distinguished Members of the committee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear today. I thank you also for holding the
roundtable that you held a couple months back about I&A, and
also thank you for your sustained interest in I&A and its
mission. Thank you for also--also, for both of your opening
remarks because they frame the issue and the challenge very
well for the rest of the hearing.
I'd like to frame today's remarks as an update to my last
testimony to this committee back in December 2022, which is
about 6 months or so after I started in this position. In that
hearing, I previewed our plans for significant change at I&A,
and in the last 18 months since then, we put those plans in
place and into action.
We've done that through what you referenced, our I&A 360
review, which has been a rigorous re-examination and
reassessment and reprioritization of our operations that has
proceeded in three stages, the third and final stage of which
we just announced and shared with Congress in April of this
year.
I'd like to give you--I'd like to take my time today to
give you an overview of this process because I think it's the
best way to illustrate the depth of the change that is under
way here at I&A and to address your very valid concern, that
the change is real and deep. It isn't just reshuffling the deck
chairs.
So, in terms of the three stages, the first stage that we
went through implemented last May was a reorganization that
reprioritized four areas of operations within the--within I&A
with the creation of new organizational structures to lead each
area. We created an office of partnerships to enhance the
critical liaison work we do with our State, local, territorial,
Tribal, and private-sector partners. I'll refer to them as our
SLTTP partners.
We created an office of collection to enhance supervision
of our collection activities, an issue that you referenced
earlier. We created an intelligence enterprise program office
to enhance our coordination of the intelligence elements of all
the DHS components. Finally, and very importantly, we created a
transparency and oversight program office to enhance our
ability to protect privacy and civil liberties in our
intelligence operations.
So that was the first stage, the organizational stage. The
second was the topical stage. It involved reprioritizing the
intelligence topics that we pursue and then producing, for the
first time in over a decade, a homeland intelligence priorities
framework, which is a prioritized list of threat topics along
the lines of the DNI's annual national intelligence priorities
framework. That framework now serves as an overarching
strategic document that guides all of our intelligence
activities.
The third stage of our review was the functional stage that
involved examining the utility of the various functions within
our organization against four operating principles. We
developed these principles in consultation with our partners,
including with you all on the Hill, and it's worth taking a
time on--taking a minute on them as they show the direction
that we're taking the organization.
Those guiding principles are the following: First, that
while we serve many different intelligence customers from the
President of the United States on down, our primary external
intelligence customers are our SLTTP partners. In other words,
it is their intelligence needs that are our primary concern.
Second, that we serve those partners' needs primarily by
providing them not with tactical law enforcement type of
intelligence but, instead, with strategic-level threat
intelligence that helps to inform their decision making as
officials and policy makers out in their jurisdictions.
Third, that we focus our resources and operations on those
areas where we at I&A have distinct operational advantages and
defer to other IC agencies where we do not.
Fourth, that we continually strive to build strong
management into our organization and into our culture.
So, based on those four principles, we developed and
announced and are now implementing about 30 different
functional initiatives across I&A. As one example, to advance
our service to our primary SLTTP customers, per the first
principle, we're restructuring our field operation around the
country to make it more responsive to the needs of those
customers. We're also starting a program that will embed State
and local officers and private-sector representatives within
the ranks of I&A.
Next, to enhance our strategic focus, we're embedding our
open-source collectors within our analytic centers to more
directly tether their collection to each center's strategic
analytic efforts. To leverage one of our distinct operational
advantages, i.e., our intra-DHS relationship with CBP and ICE,
we're embedding personnel within those components to access and
generate intelligence reports about the fentanyl-related data
in their systems. We're also, importantly, teaming our HUMINT
collectors up with CBP personnel to conduct field interviews
along the Southwest Border.
Finally, to improve the management support for our work
force, we've created a substantial slate of new training
programs for current and future managers.
So those are just a few examples of the significant change
that is under way at I&A. As I wind up, let me take a moment to
give well-deserved kudos to the work force at I&A. Change like
this isn't easy, and our work force has really been stepping up
and leading into it. As you know, openness to change is not
something that's everywhere in Government, but it is here in
I&A.
That's one of the many reasons I'm proud to be part of the
organization and to be counted among its dedicated
professionals who do so much to protect our homeland security
each and every day.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wainstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein
June 26, 2024
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
the current activities of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department). It is an
honor to share with you the hard work of I&A's dedicated employees, who
tirelessly serve and protect our Nation.
For background, I have served as the under secretary for
intelligence and analysis since June 2022. Prior to this role, I spent
over 20 years in law enforcement and national security in the Federal
Government, including as a Federal prosecutor in both the Southern
District of New York and the District of Columbia, as the director of
the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, as general counsel and then as
chief of staff of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as the
U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia, as the first assistant
attorney general for national security, and as homeland security
advisor for President George W. Bush. I subsequently worked in private
legal practice and served on the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense
before being given the opportunity to return to public service as the
leader of I&A.
Today, I will provide an update to my last testimony before this
committee from December 2022, with a focus on the organizational
improvements, mission prioritization, and functional adjustments that
are driving progress at I&A. First, I find it is helpful to begin with
a brief overview of I&A, its founding, and its core missions because
that context clarifies why the changes we are making today are so
critical. Then, I will walk through the 3 stages of our 360 Review--
which is the top-to-bottom organizational assessment that we started
shortly after I joined I&A.
Now more than ever, I&A is in a state of positive change. We are
adapting to address the current threat environment while ensuring we
always act with full respect for the privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties of the American people.
i. the mission
I&A was established specifically to address the intelligence gaps
exposed by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). As
numerous experts and entities--like the 9/11 Commission--examined and
diagnosed the gaps that allowed the attacks to happen, Congress
undertook the task of building a Federal apparatus to address those
gaps and develop a stronger domestic intelligence capacity. I&A was
established as a critical part of that apparatus and was tasked with
developing a national intelligence network and sharing information with
our Federal and other homeland partners under authorities and
limitations designed specifically for the sensitivities of conducting
intelligence activities in the homeland.
In service of that goal, we at I&A serve 3 core missions:
First, to build and maintain an intelligence program within
the United States that can detect and prevent threats to the
homeland.
Second, to serve as an information-sharing bridge between
Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies and our
State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners
(SLTTP).
And third, to operate with an intensely-focused regard for
privacy and civil liberties, which is a mission that is
completely on par with the other 2.
We emphasize these missions with the recognition that homeland
security can be achieved only in conjunction with the protection of
privacy and civil liberties, and that both objectives can and must be
pursued at the same time. As someone who spent the better part of 15
years as a Federal prosecutor, this dual mission is not a foreign
concept. Just as I had a sworn and equal duty as a prosecutor to both
pursue conviction of the guilty and protect the rights of the accused,
we at I&A have a sworn and equal duty to both prevent threats to
homeland security and protect against incursions into our rights and
freedoms. With that duty in mind, my I&A colleagues are building the
foundational elements of transparency, civil liberties, and privacy
into our intelligence tradecraft in the domestic operating environment.
ii. 360 review and organizational improvements
Upon my confirmation, Secretary Mayorkas asked me to conduct a
``360-degree review'' of I&A and its operations, with a focus on
privacy and civil liberties safeguards. We immediately undertook that
comprehensive operational review, building on the work of my
predecessor John Cohen, who had taken important steps to strengthen
oversight functions after compliance concerns arose in 2020. We brought
in 4 senior advisers with extensive backgrounds in intelligence and
intelligence oversight--Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Hill
veteran Steven Cash, former DHS General Counsel Stevan Bunnell, former
National Counterterrorism Center Director Russ Travers, and, later,
former DHS Inspector General John Roth. They helped me in consulting
with both outside experts and internal I&A personnel to provide input
on the direction of I&A. This 360-review has involved a rigorous and
probing process to examine I&A's structure and mission, with the goal
of providing mission clarity and ensuring we focus our operations and
resources on areas that add the most value to the homeland security
enterprise.
The 360-review encompassed 3 primary stages of prioritization,
which I will explain in detail. They are: (1) organizational
prioritization, (2) topical prioritization, and (3) functional
prioritization. All 3 stages have yielded structural and operational
improvements that have significantly increased our ability to execute
I&A's core missions.
Stage 1: Organizational Prioritization
This first stage of our 360-review focused on a reorganization of
I&A's top-level structure. Through this process, we signaled our
prioritization of certain critical operations with the creation of new
organizational structures to lead and support them. This included: (1)
Creating the Transparency and Oversight Program Office (TOPO), (2)
separating the management of our collection and analysis operations,
and (3) establishing the Intelligence Enterprise Program Office (IEPO)
and reinvigorating the Department's counter threat coordination through
the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC) and the Counter
Threats Advisory Board (CTAB).
1. Establishing the Transparency and Oversight Program
Office
To lead our mission to protect privacy and civil liberties, and to
signal the centrality of this mission to all our activities, we created
a new Transparency and Oversight Program Office led by a highly-
respected veteran DHS attorney, Andy Fausett, who reports directly to
me and the principal deputy under secretary for intelligence and
analysis. This new office unites all the transparency and oversight
functions that were previously dispersed throughout the organization--
the 8 members of the Privacy and Intelligence Oversight Branch, the
personnel handling Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests,
Congressional oversight, and Government Accountability Office (GAO) and
inspector general inquiries, and the organizational ombuds--and
elevates their role within I&A. We now have a strong voice for
oversight and compliance in all our front office decision making and
policy conversations, which has been absolutely critical over the past
year as we have considered and implemented additional changes and
reforms to the organization.
a. Guidance Improvements Under TOPO:
TOPO has been heavily engaged in drafting guidance for our
collectors and analysts. That guidance has been particularly important
for our intelligence efforts directed at domestic violent extremists
(DVEs) and home-grown violent extremists (HVEs) inspired by foreign
terrorist organizations who have engaged in violence in reaction to
recent sociopolitical and geopolitical events. The volume and frequency
of threats to Americans, especially those in the Jewish, Arab American,
and Muslim communities in the United States, have increased, raising
the prospect that violent extremists and lone offenders could target
these communities. It is critical for our intelligence professionals to
examine these threats, and it is our job to give them the guidance to
conduct this mission.
TOPO is focused on providing that clear guidance to our collectors
and analysts on the handling of speech that may be Constitutionally
protected. This guidance is critical, especially in relation to threats
like domestic terrorism, where so much of the information about
potential violence comes from speech that fall squarely within the core
protections of our First Amendment.
b. Oversight Improvements Under TOPO:
Former DHS Inspector General John Roth recently joined TOPO as a
senior advisor for compliance and oversight. John is helping I&A
strengthen its compliance and oversight programs to better ensure
robust adherence to legal and policy requirements and best practices.
This work will, in turn, enhance the quality and speed of I&A's
responses to external oversight entities like the GAO and the
Department's and intelligence community's (IC) Office of Inspector
General.
c. Policy Improvements Under TOPO:
Due to TOPO's strong performance to date, we have recently decided
to move I&A's policy coordination and oversight function to that
office. Better tailored and more routinely-updated policy is essential
to the maturation and oversight of I&A's operations, and we believe
TOPO is uniquely positioned to ensure that policy development is fair,
transparent, thoughtful, and timely. The oversight from TOPO will
ensure that all I&A intelligence policies, existing and future, fully
protect privacy and civil liberties.
2. Establishing the Office of Collection and the Office of
Analysis
As part of the organizational reprioritization, I&A separated the
management of collection and analytic functions, establishing a deputy
under secretary for collection to work alongside the deputy under
secretary for analysis. This increased the supervisory attention
dedicated to both disciplines, which require distinct methods of
management and supervision, particularly with respect to the protection
of privacy and civil liberties. I&A veteran Jim Dunlap has taken the
helm of analysis and, to lead collection, we brought in a highly
respected 20-year veteran from the CIA who has brought an increased
level of rigor to those operations. With this new management structure
in place, we now have the focused management we need both to enhance
the utility and quality of our analysis and to provide constant, hands-
on supervision of our collection activities, which so directly
implicate privacy and civil liberties concerns in the homeland.
3. Enhancing Coordination of the Intelligence Enterprise
As we re-examined the organizational structure of I&A, the
Secretary directed the DHS counterterrorism coordinator, Nick
Rasmussen, and me to assess the effectiveness of the mechanisms for
coordinating threat intelligence and response across the Department's
components and headquarters elements. That assessment resulted in
several reforms to improve coordination and integration of the
Department's intelligence activities as well as the threat policy and
response functions that are informed by those activities.
a. Creating the Intelligence Enterprise Program Office:
We undertook to build a mechanism to strengthen, better coordinate,
and oversee the efforts of the DHS intelligence enterprise, which is
composed of the intelligence programs housed within the DHS components.
In statute, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis--by way
of their dual role as the DHS chief intelligence officer (CINT)--has
the authority to set policy for these offices and coordinate
intelligence capabilities across DHS to enhance threat identification,
mitigation, and response. In practice, I&A has not always had the
resources, mandate, or organizational structure to fully execute this
coordinating and strategic oversight role.
We created the Intelligence Enterprise Program Office (IEPO) to
provide strategic, administrative, and functional support to the CINT
and integrate intelligence policymaking across DHS components. The
office is led by Steve Cash and reports to the under secretary and the
principal deputy under secretary. IEPO is already having a significant
impact. For example, IEPO has developed and implemented a budget
request for the intelligence enterprise to improve resource management
across the Department, as well as rigorous, repeatable, process for
enterprise-wide intelligence topic prioritizations. The latter process
produces an annual document--the Intelligence Enterprise Intelligence
Priorities Framework (IE-HIPF)--which will be modeled on the IC's
National Intelligence Priorities Framework and uses the recently
completed I&A priorities framework as a starting point. Our goal is to
have the IE-HIPF in place to support fiscal year 2025 operations.
b. Enterprise Privacy and Civil Liberties Intelligence
Product Reviews:
Working with TOPO, IEPO is sharing I&A's experience in the privacy
and civil liberties space with the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. For
over a decade, the DHS Office of the General Counsel (OGC), Privacy
Office (PRIV), and Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)
have reviewed I&A's finished analytic products disseminated outside
DHS, ensuring compliance with applicable laws and addressing concerns
related to the protection of privacy and civil liberties. This review
process reflects the Department's commitment to protecting the American
people while upholding our Nation's fundamental values. To build on the
success of this model, the Secretary directed the creation of similar
review processes for the external release of analytic products authored
by other components in the broader DHS Intelligence Enterprise. While
the specific process for review varies among the Component Intelligence
Programs, each process ensures legal, privacy, and civil rights and
civil liberties oversight.
c. Counter Threats Advisory Board:
At the direction of the Secretary, IEPO has worked with the
Counterterrorism Coordinator to revise our approach to the Counter
Threats Advisory Board (CTAB). First established and chartered by the
Secretary as the Counterterrorism Advisory Board in 2010, the CTAB was
reconstituted and renamed following the enactment of legislation in
2020 which, among other things, directed the USIA to chair this
advisory board comprised of the principals of all DHS components and
headquarters entities. While the requirements of that legislation have
since expired, the CTAB has endured with an expanded remit encompassing
all threats within the Department's mission space, not just terrorism.
To make the CTAB meetings more substantive and impactful, we have
scaled back meetings to a quarterly schedule, while maintaining the
ability to call snap meetings when warranted by a crisis or the
emergence of a specific threat. As a result, the CTAB is now a more
focused and directed forum for operational planning and decision making
on key issues, and has recently served as a critical coordinating force
for the Department's response to threats such as transnational
organized crime (TOC) and fentanyl.
d. Homeland Security Intelligence Council:
IEPO has also helped to reenergize the Homeland Security
Intelligence Council (HSIC), which is composed of representatives from
the intelligence elements of each DHS component, ie. each Component
Intelligence Program (CIP). Within the HSIC are 6 functional boards:
(1) Analysis & Production Board; (2) Counterintelligence & Security
Board, (3) Career Force Management Board; (4) Collection & Reporting
Board, (5) Intelligence Systems Board, and (6) the Strategy, Planning &
Resources Board, each of which is co-chaired by a representative from
I&A and from a CIP.
IEPO's leadership has dramatically improved the operationalization
of the HSIC, evolving it from a forum where components provided
primarily rote updates to one for Enterprise coordination and
actionable policy decision making. Since October 2023, the HSIC has
proposed plans to develop specific intelligence enterprise budget
guidance; optimize and execute the Enterprise Homeland Security
Intelligence Priorities Framework; standardize intelligence training;
facilitate better access to originator-controlled information; and
improve information sharing to combat counterintelligence threats to
the Department, among other initiatives.
e. Replacing the NTAS Bulletins:
As a part of our reforms to the CTAB, we also reworked the National
Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS), which was designed to communicate
information about terrorist threats to the American public. NTAS
reports were designed to describe DHS's assessment of the terrorist
threat and the factors driving it, but in recent years, all the
bulletins have stated that the terrorism level is ``heightened.'' To
increase its utility and value as a warning tool, we will henceforth
reserve the NTAS system for situations where DHS needs to alert the
public about a specific or imminent terrorism threat or a change in the
threat level.
I&A will now provide a more general annual update on the threat
environment--including the terrorism assessments that used to be
conveyed through the NTAS--through the Homeland Threat Assessment
(HTA). The HTA will serve as the homeland security counterpart to the
director of national intelligence (DNI) Annual Threat Assessment,
reflecting insights from across the Department, the IC, and other
critical homeland security stakeholders to highlight the most direct,
pressing threats to our homeland during the next year.
Stage 2: Topical Prioritization--Homeland Security Intelligence
Priorities Framework
The organizational reforms I have just outlined have created a
solid foundation to refine the intelligence priorities that underpin
I&A's mission.
The homeland security threat environment that we face today is
arguably as complex and varied as it has ever been. With this diversity
comes the additional challenge of triaging competing priorities and
limited resources, to focus our efforts on those specific threats where
I&A can uniquely contribute, whether that be through homeland-focused
analysis, collection, or information sharing with SLTTP stakeholders.
For the first time in a decade, I&A produced last fall a Homeland
Security Intelligence Priorities Framework (IA-HIPF)--a prioritized
list of national and departmental intelligence topics that will serve
as an overarching strategic document for all our intelligence
operations. This is the product of an in-depth assessment of the
missions where I&A provides unique contributions to the national and
homeland security communities, and involved multiple ``deep dive''
sessions with I&A managers; engagement with I&A's field personnel and
SLTTP partners; and outreach to Congress. Guided by the priorities of
the DNI, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and our homeland security
partners, this engagement resulted in lists of threat topics within the
homeland security mission space. We then then applied the following
criteria to rank the topics:
1. Priority 1.--These are topics for which no other department or
agency provides intelligence support, or topics where I&A makes
unique contributions distinct from the work of other
departments and agencies. The Secretary's priorities are also a
significant factor in determining whether a topic is critical.
2. Priority 2.--These are topics receiving intelligence support
from other departments or agencies, but not to the extent or in
the manner needed by I&A's stakeholders.
3. Priority 3.--These are topics receiving intelligence support
from other departments and agencies where I&A's support would
have only marginal additional value.
The IA-HIPF informs our Program of Analysis (POA) and Operating
Directive (OD), the annual strategic documents that guide our analytic
and collection efforts, respectively. Together, the IA-HIPF, the POA,
and the OD focus our efforts on the most pressing threats and help our
partners understand the threat areas where I&A is best positioned to
provide unique contributions.
Specifically, the IA-HIPF has helped to clearly articulate the
scope of our intelligence missions and activities; to seek, justify,
and allocate resources; to ensure that our efforts match customer needs
inside and outside of DHS; and to manage our workforce, direct action,
and measure our performance. The IA-HIPF will be updated at least
annually to reflect changes in the threat environment and national and
departmental priorities.
As I previously mentioned, I&A is currently organizing a similar
prioritization process for the DHS intelligence enterprise to better
coordinate collection and analysis activities and align them with
Departmental missions and objectives.
Stage 3: Functional Prioritization
The final step in our 360-review has been the prioritization of the
functions we perform in the course of our intelligence work. This
effort has included cataloguing all the duties we perform and examining
their relevant importance to our mission against 4 operating principles
that have guided our decision making throughout this process. Those
principles are:
1. Focus on servicing the intelligence needs of our SLTTP
partners.--Congress made clear that we are the Federal agency
with primary responsibility to share intelligence with and
among our SLTTP partners across the country. As such, our
intelligence work should be primarily guided by the homeland
security needs of those customers.
2. Focus on producing strategic-level intelligence.--Our greatest
value to the national intelligence enterprise is the delivery
of strategic--as opposed to tactical--intelligence that
provides decisional advantage to our SLTTP partners and helps
them prepare for and meet the current homeland security threats
in their areas of responsibility. That is the intelligence gap
that I&A was established to fill. In the domestic context, the
tactical intelligence work is better left to our Federal,
State, and local law enforcement partners whose investigative
work focuses on individual threat actors. While it is
inevitable that some of our intelligence work (especially on
the collection side) will relate to tactical information about
individual threat actors and their activities, we should focus
on providing intelligence that illuminates the broader threat
patterns and trends that our partners should be prepared to
confront and doing so at the lowest classification level
possible to maximize its accessibility and consumption by SLTTP
partners.
3. Focus on leveraging unique capabilities.--In prioritizing our
functions, we endeavor to focus on areas where I&A and DHS can
contribute unique capabilities and distinct operational
advantages. It is for this reason, for example, that we
prioritized topics in the IA-HIPF, POA, and OD based on how
well we could collect on and analyze that topic relative to
other agencies.
4. Focus on building our internal management.--As a relatively
young agency with a broad mission, it is critical that we
continually focus on measures that enhance I&A's management
capabilities, provide support to the workforce, and promote
I&A's growth into a more mature and effective intelligence
agency.
We applied these 4 principles in every stage of our functional
reprioritization process, which has resulted in approximately 30
functional and organization initiatives across I&A, detailed in the
April 9 memorandum entitled ``Direction Regarding the Recommendations
from the I&A 360 Review,'' which I&A shared with Congress. I will
highlight some of the more significant initiatives here:
1. Field Realignment
I&A recently announced a realignment of its field posture to
bolster management and connectivity with headquarters, to improve
intelligence support to our SLTTP partners, and to enhance information
sharing and integration with other components of DHS.
The realignment makes 4 key changes to I&A's Field Intelligence
Directorate. Specifically, it will----
Create 4 divisions within the Field Intelligence Directorate
to provide leadership and oversight of I&A's field presence;
increase connectivity across the directorate, I&A leadership,
and other DHS components; and relieve field staff of
significant administrative, human resources, logistics,
security, and information technology demands;
Realign I&A's existing 12 field regions into 10 regions,
consistent with the regional structure used by other DHS
components, and tailor the internal management structure to
provide consistent levels of supervision and oversight in each
region;
Clarify roles at the individual field officer level to
improve mission focus, professional development, and
accountability; and
Add functional leaders and compliance staff to ensure field
activities focus on the most pressing threats while adhering to
IC and departmental policies and protecting individuals'
privacy and civil liberties.
Importantly, the realignment will collocate I&A field offices with
those of other DHS components. Collocation of office space and secure
work space across DHS components will increase collaboration and
information sharing, and ultimately result in greater efficiency and
cost savings in the long run.
2. Field-HQ Rotational Program
To promote cohesion between the field and headquarters and better
integrate field personnel into overall I&A operations and strategy, we
will initiate a program for bringing field personnel into I&A
headquarters for details of varying lengths starting later this year.
We plan to expand the program and require field personnel to serve such
a detail beginning in fiscal year 2025. Simultaneously, we will develop
a TDY program for headquarters analysts and collectors to complete
rotations to the field to increase their exposure to and understanding
of field operations.
3. Overt Human Intelligence Collection: Focusing on the
Border
In our Overt Human Intelligence Collection (OHIC) Program, we have
undertaken an in-depth review of its policies, rules, and procedures to
ensure they provide the level of governance and oversight needed for
such a sensitive area of operations, as well as an assessment of how
the program can provide the most utility for the Department and our
partners.
We found that the program has been exceptionally valuable for our
mission at the border. Since 2021, I&A has provided intelligence
support for CBP security operations, conducting over 200 overt,
voluntary interviews of special interest migrants that have led to: (1)
a half-dozen referrals to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces for
further investigation, (2) the production of over 400 intelligence
information reports, and (3) the initiation of several successful law
enforcement operations against human smuggling networks.
To build on that success and leverage our relationship with DHS
components with border enforcement responsibility, we will now largely
focus our field interviews on individuals with information about border
security-related threats (such as fentanyl supply chain networks, human
trafficking and narcotics smuggling), and in particular on the
interviews of detained migrants of homeland and national security
interest that we conduct in coordination with CBP along the Southwest
Border. Those interviews generate raw intelligence reporting that
provides information about the illicit narcotics trade, human
smuggling, TOC and other cross-border threats--reporting that is not
conducted by any other intelligence agency outside DHS. While the field
may still submit operational proposals for other field interviews, the
majority of this program will be focused on border-related issues.
4. Open-Source Intelligence
The I&A open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection program has
also yielded valuable information in support of our national and
departmental missions. For example, we have utilized OSINT capabilities
to understand how human smugglers communicate with migrants on social
media and to identify U.S. schools and businesses targeted by foreign
governments for espionage or transnational repression activities.
a. Embedding Collectors in Analytic Mission Centers:
We have recently conducted a review of our OSINT program and
identified several adjustments that we believe will increase the
relevancy of collection to both analysts and SLTTP partners. First, we
have decided to move our OSINT collection staff from their current
office at the DHS St. Elizabeths campus to the Nebraska Avenue Complex
(NAC) to work more closely with I&A's analysis and collection
management personnel. And second, OSINT staff will functionally
integrate within I&A's analytic mission centers to better align
priorities and improve the utility of collection to finished
intelligence production. Collection staff will continue reporting to
the deputy under secretary for collection, but by eliminating physical
and organizational silos, analysts and collectors will have more
opportunities for collaboration and alignment.
b. Focusing on Strategic Intelligence:
Our goal is to recalibrate our open-source collection efforts to
better support strategic intelligence analysis. In recent years, there
has been movement toward more tactical-level open-source collection as
we have increasingly tasked our collectors to report on unfolding
threat situations. There have been numerous occasions where we have
asked them to search, collect, and provide warnings about the
possibility for violence developing around events of heightened
tension, ranging from the January 6, 2021, attacks on the Capitol to
the reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson
Women's Health Organization, and the mass gatherings in the aftermath
of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks in Israel.
For a number of reasons, the OSI collectors are not well-postured
to perform that tactical warning function. First, they operate with
strictly constrained authorities, in that they can only collect
publicly-available information and cannot misrepresent themselves to
access certain chatrooms or types of communications. Second, OSI is a
very small unit, and it lacks the manpower needed to conduct the kind
of wide-ranging internet search that is often necessary to identify
threats in a period of heightened tensions. Finally, OSI has now been
further constrained in dealing with domestic terrorism threats as a
result of language in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2024 (NDAA) that limited our open-source cadre collecting on the
domestic terrorist threat to a handful of collectors.
On those occasions where OSI has been asked to do this tactical
collection, it has done so in parallel with the FBI. The FBI is
similarly called upon to provide warnings in times of heightened
tensions, but unlike I&A, it has investigative collection authorities
that permit more intrusive search techniques upon sufficient
predication. In light of our limited authorities and the statutory
limit on our manpower, we are simply not as well-positioned to
effectively perform tactical open-source threat reporting. Instead, we
will focus our open-source collectors on collection that supports our
strategic intelligence priorities as they embed in the analytic
centers. To preserve some tactical-alert capability in support of
internal DHS needs and requests, we will retain a group of contract
open-source collectors--under an OSI supervisor and subject to OSI
policies--with the Intelligence Watch at the St. Elizabeths campus.
While we will carry out our OSINT collection in the more limited
fashion set out above, we maintain broader concerns about the
Government's ability to conduct the open-source collection that
provides warning about looming threats. We therefore urge Congress to
re-examine the allocation of resources and authorities for this
critical function. This re-examination may ultimately call for a
substantial enhancement of the Government's OSINT effort, given its
critical role in threat warning.
5. Analysis
a. Strengthening Analytic Production:
Our Analytic Advancement Division has already made significant
strides in improving both the quality of our products and their utility
to our consumers--and it shows in the feedback we receive on our
products. To build on that progress, the deputy under secretary for
analysis is implementing a new process to measure and establish
benchmarks for our intelligence output and the feedback from our
customers. We plan to leverage this data to reassess the allocation of
our analysts within mission centers and ensure our posture is tailored
to cover near-term Departmental priorities and needs.
As one example, I&A has clearly displayed the quality of its work
and the agility of its operations in its response to the horrific
attacks on October 7, 2023, and the ensuing conflict between Israel and
Hamas. Through the New Year, I&A produced daily situational reports
about the conflict and its homeland implications for DHS leadership and
our partners to ensure homeland security stakeholders had accurate and
timely information to make decisions, and we continue to produce
similar weekly situational reports. I&A has also published several
products jointly with the FBI and the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC), including an initial Public Safety Notification on October 7,
followed by a Liaison Information Report for private-sector customers,
a Public Service Announcement, and multiple Joint Intelligence
Bulletins, the most recent of which focused on threats to Jewish
communities in the United States and abroad. Our subject-matter experts
also participated with FBI and NCTC in national threat calls with State
and local customers to communicate the state of the homeland threat
environment from a variety of threat actors including foreign terrorist
ideologies, violent extremists inspired by foreign terrorist
organizations, domestic violent extremists, and cyber actors. I&A
continues to partner with IC counterparts to anticipate potential
threats stemming from the heightened tensions surrounding the conflict.
b. SLTTP Fellows Program:
To ensure our analysis is tailored to the needs of SLTTP
stakeholders, we are reestablishing our SLTTP fellows program to create
an analytic cell at I&A staffed by analysts detailed from our SLTTP
partners. This cell will produce focused products to answer our
partners' most pressing security questions, and work with other
analysts at I&A to help them better understand our most critical
audience. This effort will also help to ensure critical information at
the Classified level is reviewed by SLLTP stakeholders and tailored at
the un-Classified level for broader dissemination.
c. Leveraging Investigative Case Files:
Consistent with our reorientation toward strategic-level
intelligence, we will focus on producing strategic intelligence
products based on the investigative holdings of our law enforcement
partner agencies. Although it has long been recognized that the
information in criminal investigative files can be an important source
of strategic intelligence about our homeland security, various
historical obstacles have prevented that information from being fully
leveraged for strategic intelligence purposes. To address that
situation, we are now participating in 2 pilot programs that will have
our analysts reviewing and generating intelligence products from the
case files of our law enforcement agency partners. First, as part of
the Department's counter-fentanyl campaign, our analysts and reports
officers are working closely with Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI) to review fentanyl investigation files and generate products with
actionable intelligence for our Federal and SLTT partners, while
protecting sensitive investigative methods and information as well as
individual privacy and civil liberties. In addition, we are developing
a similar arrangement with the FBI, whereby our analysts will embed
with FBI analysts, have access to FBI systems, and generate
intelligence products regarding domestic terrorism-related patterns and
trends under the strict controls necessary to protect such sensitive
investigative information. With Congress prohibiting NCTC from
producing analytic products about domestic terrorism threats that lack
a foreign or international nexus, it is all the more important that we
work with the FBI to make sure that the information in its domestic
terrorism case files that could prevent or mitigate attacks is reviewed
and turned into actionable strategic intelligence for our SLTTP
partners.
6. Improving Management and Supervision
a. Training and Development:
I&A recognizes that any progress we achieve is due to the dedicated
efforts of the hard-working individuals who make up our work force, and
that our most important job as leaders is to ensure our people have the
resources, support, and direction to execute their role to the best of
their ability. To that end, I&A is continuing to implement new
initiatives to improve the support and supervision of our employees.
For example, we are developing a comprehensive New Managers Orientation
Program to develop foundational supervisory competencies and management
best practices. In tandem, we are also creating a Future Leaders
Roadmap to develop existing managers, an Aspiring Managers Program to
prepare I&A's rising talent for supervisory roles, and new mentorship
programs to provide additional professional development at all levels
of the work force.
These programs expand upon our management team's strong work over
the last 2 years. During that time, we established a New Hire
Orientation Program and delivered the course to over 200 new employees;
facilitated approximately 34,000 on-line trainings through our new
Intelligence Learning Management System; and delivered over 150
additional courses to more than 3,500 students through I&A's
Intelligence Training Academy. We also developed oversight training
that covers I&A's authorities, the Intelligence Oversight Guidelines
and whistleblower protections, and brought on 2 full-time Ombuds to
help our workforce raise concerns with management. To hear from our
work force directly, we also implemented an advanced analytic employee
feedback survey about the management and work environment of I&A's
centers and divisions.
b. Telework Policy Changes:
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, I&A instituted a telework
policy in 2021 that provided I&A staff with telework opportunities
according to their work position and responsibilities. While this
policy was an appropriate means of affording staff with locational
flexibility, it exacted a cost in terms of workforce cohesion and the
effectiveness of the supervision, training, and mentoring that is often
best carried out in person.
Pursuant to direction from the DHS Management Directorate, and
after careful review of various considerations, in April we adopted a
new telework policy for I&A that generally reduces the amount of time
our work force may telework. This change is already increasing
collaboration across our personnel and improving supervisory support
for our work force. The new policy provides that designated senior
telework officials, consisting of I&A senior staff who report to the
under secretary and the principal deputy under secretary for
intelligence and analysis, will determine telework eligibility based on
mission requirements, required access to Classified information,
collaboration and operational needs, position responsibilities, and
other factors. Given their responsibility to support other staff,
supervisors and those designated in leadership positions will generally
be eligible for less telework than non-supervisory staff. This policy
will also prohibit routine telework on the core days of Tuesdays and
Thursdays each week, maximizing in-person collaboration across the
entire I&A work force on those days.
iii. conclusion
Around this time last year, we were engaged in a debate with
lawmakers surrounding our collection authorities, and we are grateful
to Congress for hearing out our concerns and working constructively
with us to reach the agreement that was incorporated into the fiscal
year 2024 NDAA. Even before that law was passed, we immediately began
issuing additional guidance for our work force to address the concerns
raised by Congress. Following the enactment of the NDAA, we have
developed a series of new policies to ensure compliance with its
restrictions and codify the best practices for our intelligence
activities.
That is just one example of the many ways we have improved the
rigor of our operations. Going forward, we want to continue engaging
with Congress and developing solutions together. As I have said many
times, I&A is in a state of positive change. Importantly, the work
force has proven itself very open to that change, and that is one of
the many reasons I am proud to be part of I&A and counted among its
professionals who do so much to protect our homeland security each and
every day.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Under Secretary Wainstein. The--I
thank you for your testimony, again, for your service. The
Members of our subcommittee may have some additional questions,
and we will--we'll ask our--we'll basically go side-by-side and
ask initial questions. If we have additional questions, then
we'll submit those in writing to you.
I now recognize myself for opening questions. I'll start
with the Southern Border. As we've talked about a couple of
times, the fact that we've had from fiscal year--from the
beginning of fiscal year 2021 through present date over 360
individuals who have entered this country in some, way, shape,
or form match the terror watch list, what I want to start by
asking is, what is I&A doing and how is that being reorganized
to better know those individuals and whether or not we're
detaining them? I think the recent arrest of or detainment of 8
Tajik nationals who had ties to ISIS, as reported by DHS,
highlights and frames this particular question.
Can you walk us through what I&A is doing in this
situation?
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, sir. As we discussed--and, by the
way, thank you for the phone call the other day. That was a
very fruitful discussion. But, as we discussed, that is a major
focus of, obviously, DHS and I&A; that being the border and who
is coming across the border.
We have at DHS a very strong screening and vetting
capability. The whole intent of that is to identify people who
might be a threat to the United States and prevent them from
getting in here, either getting a visa, coming across the
border, or if they're here and we learn about that derogatory
information--which we're constantly trying to develop, whether
they're here or not--that we pick them up, and we neutralize
that threat.
I&A plays a very important role in that effort. We,
obviously, are generating intelligence on a regular basis
looking for threats and threat actors. We also are centrally
involved in the screening and vetting operation. We actually do
a lot of the support for the National Vetting Center that is
the--sort-of the intermediary that makes sure that the
information from our national security elements relating to
people who might be encountered on the border gets into the
vetting process, and we provide a lot of the technical support,
as well as the training, for that.
We also do a number of other things that are very focused
on the border, such as we're involved in providing nominations
to the TOC, the Transnational Organized Crime, watch list. As
you know, there is a watch list for TOC, as there was--as we've
had for 20-some years for terrorism. We nominate, based on
information we get from our State and local partners,
individuals for that watch list based on our intelligence work.
That's another area.
Then, you know, as we said, in terms of proactive
intelligence collection, we are focusing our interview efforts
on the border against the threat of people coming across the
border.
Mr. Pfluger. How did the Department on this particular
issue--because these folks, as reported, came in--8 Tajik
nationals came in in January. So I think it leads everyone to
believe that probably 362 is at the very low end of the number
if there were 8 people who have been in the country for, call
it, 5 to 6 months, and then we found them.
How did the Department miss that? Then how did the
Department catch that? What are we doing to make sure that that
never happens again?
Mr. Wainstein. Well, as I think you know, colleagues of
ours from DHS are going to be giving you a Classified briefing,
I believe, right after the recess, and most of this is very
sensitive and Classified, so I'm very limited what I can say on
the record.
But I think it is clear that when those individuals came
across the border and were encountered, there was no derogatory
information that came to the attention of the people on the
border at that time. The derogatory information came to light
later on.
I can say, without getting into the specifics of the work
done after they got here, that I think you've heard from the
FBI and others there was unprecedented cooperation between DHS
and the FBI in working the situation. Beyond that, I think I
would be--I'd have to defer to the--my colleagues who will give
a Classified briefing on this.
But it has been a--it's been a joint effort between us and
our law enforcement friends at the FBI.
Mr. Pfluger. When Director Wray sat here and testified in
front of our committee last, he talked about the threat level
being exceedingly high and used some specific words to describe
that he doesn't believe that it's ever been higher.
Do you think that we are in a period that you agree with
that statement that he says, and then is there a black swan
event, is there some sort of event that keeps you up at night
that I&A is focused on trying to communicate, cooperate, and
help between State, local, Tribal, Federal, all the different
levels?
Mr. Wainstein. Well, let me start with the latter part of
your question. I&A is very much involved in the terrorism
fight, and we are focused on the whole range of terrorism
threats that we face.
Then, to the first part of your question, is this a time of
unique threat? You know, every time that you--when you look at
it, you think it's, like, a unique level of threat. But we are
at a very fraught time, especially after October 7, because
October 7 sort-of energized so many threat vectors from so many
different places and bad actors and is mobilizing potential
terrorists from a variety of different perspectives. That, in
addition to what was already a standing threat of terrorism,
both traditional and foreign terrorism threats, but also
domestic violent extremism that we've seen.
So the overlay of the, sort-of, sustained raised threat
from October 7 on top of what, as we said in our threat
assessment last year, was already a heightened threat does make
this a particularly precarious time in our Nation's history.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you. My initial time has expired. I now
recognize the Ranking Member for his round of questioning.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to pick up, Secretary, on that last point you made
about domestic violent extremism because I know both DHS and
the FBI have flagged domestic violent extremism as one of the
top threats that we face right now. We're talking about home-
grown extremists here who are motivated by racial or ethnic
prejudice, by extremism in their politics or anti-Government
beliefs, by Islamophobia or antisemitism.
But, of course, it can be challenging to find and to
disrupt these plots because, unfortunately, we're often talking
about American citizens who have First Amendment rights as
well.
So can you just expand a little bit on the I&A's role in
fighting domestic terrorism, what can be done to strengthen
DHS's ability to counter domestic extremism? I'll leave it
open-ended like that.
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, sir. Domestic violent extremism,
I think you've heard from Chris Wray and Secretary--Director
Wray, Secretary Mayorkas and others, that, just in terms of the
numbers, it is the--it is the most lethal and most dangerous
threat that we're dealing with right now in terms of the threat
from individuals and small groups who are ideologically
motivated. However, October 7 exacerbated that threat.
Now you see--I was alluding to this a little bit in the
last answer. You see a little bit of the convergence of the
foreign terrorist threat and, sort-of, ideological rhetoric
being picked up by some of the domestic violent extremists here
in the United States. That sort-of--that's kind-of fully
energizing that threat.
In terms of what we have to do at I&A to deal with that,
you put your finger on what is particularly challenging because
a lot of domestic violent extremism grows out of--by
definition, grows out of ideology, and a lot of that ideology
is politically-based and political thought, rhetoric,
communication is the most centrally core protected
Constitutional activity there is.
So it's our job to make sure that, if we're focusing our
collection or our intelligence and our analytical efforts on
domestic violent extremism, we're not focusing on just maybe
extremist discussion, extremist thought. You're allowed to be
extremist in this country. That's what our country is all
about. But we're only focusing on violence.
One of the important things that I highlighted in my
opening statement was I think one of the things I'm most, sort-
of, gratified about that we've done since we got to I&A is the
creation of our Transparency and Oversight Program office and
the success that we've had with that office led by Andy
Fausett, who is here with me today, in really starting to put a
program of oversight--strong program of oversight into our
operations very much because of the complexity of that
challenge, of making sure that we don't do anything that chills
the exercise of Constitutional rights.
Mr. Magaziner. So, again, I'm--thank you for that, and
that's very welcome news. On the topic, again, of domestic
extremism, I&A failed to disseminate actionable intelligence
prior to the January 6 attack on this Capitol when there were
individuals, extremists who came to this building armed with
weapons, with zip ties, intending to commit acts of violence,
and there was open-source communication that suggested that
this was not just political opinions or political extremism
even, but that there were individuals who were contemplating
violence.
So can you tell us now that I&A's ability to find and
disseminate information related to, you know, possible events
like that has improved to the point that we can be more likely
to prevent another January 6 from happening again?
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you. That's--you know, that's an ever-
present concern for us, that a January 6 could happen again or
some other variation of it, right?
I mean, you can look at a lot of events, protests, marches,
whatever, a large part of them is Constitutionally protected,
is fine. But then maybe some subset of the people who are there
engage in terrorism or want to use that as a cover and a
pretext for terrorism. It's very challenging. We have to make
sure that we address the second but not the first part. That's
the oversight challenge that we deal with.
In terms of our capability to do that, we're very focused
on making sure that we don't have another situation where we
have communications that suggest violence and don't get that
information out to our partners.
I can tell you that, in the situations that I've been
involved in the last 2 years where we've had an emergent
situation, crisis situation, we have effectively gotten the
intelligence out both by product and by calls at our State and
local partners. I've been on a number of 3,000-person calls the
day that something happens to say, ``This is what we're
seeing.'' So we're making sure to get that information out.
Let me just mention one thing, though. If you look--my
statement for the record was kind-of long and dry and little
hard to read, but one part of it, I think, is important, which
is there is a function that the Government needs to do, which
is reviewing the open-source environment, looking for the
indicia of coming violence. That's where those indicia we're
seeing back before January 6, it was there. This is open-
source.
We right now, I&A, are very limited in our ability to
actually access a lot of that information because of the
authorities we operate under and the resources we have. The
point of this is not to say that we should have those
authorities or resources, but Congress should think about that.
Something the Government needs to be, sort-of, more--in a
more muscular way and, obviously, under all the limitations we
need to protect Constitutional rights, looking for that kind-
of, you know, threat discussion in the open-source space
because that's where the next alert for the next coming crisis
is going to be.
Mr. Magaziner. I think I&A can play a valuable role there,
and I'll yield back. I'm over time.
Mr. Bishop [presiding]. I thank the gentleman for yielding
back, and I recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Wainstein--is it Wainstein? Wainstein?
Mr. Wainstein. It's Wainstein, sir.
Mr. Bishop. I beg your pardon.
Mr. Wainstein. No problem.
Mr. Bishop. I was hearing you earlier, and I wonder if you
could repeat something. You said that this--you identified a
moment in time as giving rise to a recent substantial increase
in risk of terrorism. You said October 7, the Hamas attack on
Israel.
Tell me again what you said about that. Why do you point to
that as the trigger of this heightened risk?
Mr. Wainstein. Well----
Mr. Bishop. For the United States, homeland.
Mr. Wainstein. Yes, for the homeland.
So what we had is we had, you know, the threat lay down
that--in fact, we issued our annual homeland threat assessment
2 weeks or so before that. So you can look at that. We lay down
the threat, and we determined that it was a heightened threat
of terrorism at that point.
Then, with October 7, you then have--you know, you've got
Hamas attacking Israel; you've got Israel's response; and then
different parties' reaction to both of those things. That is
animated activity by everybody from Hezbollah to the Iranian
Government, which, as you know--and this is public--has engaged
in plotting here in the homeland, reacting to Israel, reacting
to our support to Israel. We have the Houthis, who are now
launching missiles at maritime targets.
We have also--and I was alluding to this earlier, this
interesting, sort-of, strange connection where you have--you do
have some domestic violent extremists here who are not of the--
--
Mr. Bishop. So, talking about the homeland, I sort-of get
why domestic violence extremists, if you see an uptick in
things around the world. But, you know, as Bill Clinton once
said, there's always going to be trouble in this old world. I'm
not sure that the threat picture changed all that dramatically.
It's not a surprise to me that Hamas wanted to do as much harm
to Israel as possible.
So it's--it's interesting to me you point to that, and you
point to--you point to the issue of DBEs. But, if we talked
about that story about the 8 Tajiks who came in who, as you
said, you didn't want to talk about much here, they're not
domestic violent extremists. They're here. You said there was--
see if you can--see what you've said about one statement. You
said there was no--and the Secretary said there was no
derogatory information about them when they crossed the border.
I would think being on the terror watch list and being
affiliated with an ISIS--with ISIS-K or suspected affiliation
would be derogatory. Are you saying that information was not
available to you when they come across?
Mr. Wainstein. My understanding is that when they were
encountered on the border and they were--the responsible
officials checked the data systems, the data systems did not
have the derogatory information in there indicating----
Mr. Bishop. So, see, that concerns me gravely. Then there's
a news story by NBC News--the Chairman said before he walked
out for a few minutes that he hopes we don't see another story
like that, but there's an NBC News story, DHS identifies over
400 migrants brought to the U.S. by an ISIS-affiliated human
smuggling network.
Now, I understand maybe the Secretary has suggested some of
what's in that article is not accurate. What can you say about
that?
Mr. Wainstein. I think what I can say--and I'm sure that my
colleagues will be able to talk about this at greater length in
the Classified briefing--but that the--of those people who were
smuggled in from that network, which, according to the news
reports, has an affiliation with ISIS, there is not information
that suggests that those particular individuals are terrorist
operatives.
Mr. Bishop. Well, see, there's one thing you didn't say.
You talked about October 7. You talked about domestic violent
extremists. You did not say--and it's been curious to me as
I've sat on this podium for a while, no one seems to want to
say opening the doors on the border has exposed us
tremendously.
In November 2022, Christine Abizaid, director of the
counterterrorism center, was here with Wray and the Secretary,
and I asked her if her agency saw a significant threat of
terrorism from the historic level of uncontrolled crossing at
the Southern Border, particularly gotaways. She said, we don't,
actually. Border security is really important. If we look at
the nature of the threat and how it has evolved here in the
United States homeland, it has been striking how the evolution
to lone actors actually reflects how much more difficult it is
for terrorists to enter into the United States. We look
historically at the kind of attacks we have experienced here in
the homeland. None of them have been connected to major illegal
crossings or otherwise from the Southern Border--Southwest
Border.
I think that's clueless. I see stories about Quantico,
people probing. I heard a vice admiral in FOX News saying
they're seeing probing, you know, visits a couple times a week.
Are you prepared to say that opening the border has
subjected the United States with an extravagantly increased
risk of significant terrorism?
Mr. Wainstein. I'm prepared to say that we're hyperfocused
on the threat coming across the border, and that's why I've
detailed all the things that I&A is focusing on.
I'm also prepared to say that CBP, as I understand it,
issues publicly the number of last listed individuals that they
encounter on the border. So we're not trying to sugarcoat or,
you know, hide the fact that there's a threat there. In fact,
I'm being instructed by my Secretary to focus like a laser beam
on that threat.
Mr. Bishop. Well, he's late coming to that conclusion, and
I think--well, we're going to see--I just think it's inevitable
we're going to see in coming years that that has been ignored
to the exclusion of some other far less significant risks.
My time has expired. I'll now recognize the gentleman from
Arizona, Mr. Crane, for his 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Wainstein, for appearing today before the committee.
How often do you meet with Secretary Mayorkas, sir?
Mr. Wainstein. I meet with him pretty much every morning
when we do the President's daily brief together.
Mr. Crane. Your job is to give him intelligence, is that
correct, regarding homeland security?
Mr. Wainstein. To give him intelligence, but also to give
all our partners intelligence and receive intelligence from
them and make sure that it's integrated into our operations,
yes.
Mr. Crane. Recently, Director Wray of the FBI has been
warning that the lights are blinking red as far as terrorism
threats to the U.S. homeland.
Would you agree with his assessment, Mr. Wainstein?
Mr. Wainstein. Sir, I'd agree that we're in a very serious
time, that we have to be very careful. Director Wray lived
through the 9/11 era with me together, and so he knows about
threats.
Mr. Crane. Mr. Wainstein, do you believe that this blinking
red terror threat that we now have in this country is a self-
made, self-inflicted wound, or do you believe that, you know,
our actions and our policies have had really nothing to do with
that?
Mr. Wainstein. Well, I don't know that I'd, sort-of, buy
into either of those two propositions.
I would say that, just like with 9/11--one of the
interesting things about 9/11 is there are a lot of studies
afterwards to, sort-of, ascribe blame, which were really
healthy, and you see that it's always a combination of the bad
actors--bad actions of our adversaries, but also our ability
and willingness to try to head those off.
Mr. Crane. Yes. Let's talk about that, sir. Let's talk
about our ability and our willingness to head those off,
because that's been the problem that many of us have tried to
be the canary in the coal mine about and the American people
see on a daily basis.
They're not--the American people aren't stupid, right?
Mr. Wainstein. No----
Mr. Crane. They're busy, but they're not stupid. They see
what's going on at our Southern Border. As somebody who has
spent a lot of time dealing with security threats, you've got
to be pretty concerned with what's going on at the Southern
Border. I think you know that that's a pretty big conduit
that's leading into this blinking red light that now Director
Wray is warning about.
Would you agree with that, sir?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes. We've--as we were saying earlier today,
the border is an area that we're focusing on because we're so
concerned with the threat down there; threat from a variety of
different areas, not just terrorism. Fentanyl as well.
Mr. Crane. Absolutely.
Mr. Wainstein [continuing]. As well----
Mr. Crane. Absolutely.
Mr. Wainstein. Very serious.
Mr. Crane. We've been talking about that, too.
Mr. Wainstein. Uh-huh.
Mr. Crane. Some of us are wondering, is--is Secretary
Mayorkas, is President Joe Biden, are they not getting the
intel, or are they just not willing to secure the border? Maybe
you can help us answer that question, sir.
Mr. Wainstein. I don't meet with President Biden, but I
meet with Secretary Mayorkas every day, and I can tell you that
he spends a lot of time making sure that I am doing everything
I can and that we're doing everything we can to go after that
threat.
Mr. Crane. Oh, so he's--he's tasked you with making sure
that you're doing everything you can?
Mr. Wainstein. On the intel side, yes, sir.
Mr. Crane. Well, then you're not getting it done, are you?
Mr. Wainstein. I think we're doing----
Mr. Crane. Really?
Mr. Wainstein [continuing]. Contributing pretty well. Uh-
huh.
Mr. Crane. Really?
Mr. Wainstein. Yep.
Mr. Crane. You think you're getting it done? When you look
at the numbers from individuals on the terror watch list for
the last administration and this--and this administration, what
are they, sir, if you know those off the top of your head?
Mr. Wainstein. We are part of a team, and we are--we have a
certain lane, and we're driving down that lane pretty
aggressively right now. We've got a--still have a ways to go,
as I discussed with the Chair and the Ranking Member, in terms
of organizationally really maximizing our capabilities, we're
putting them in place. Our people are stepping up, and we're
focused intently on the threat.
Mr. Crane. Well, sir, I say what I say knowing that you're
ultimately not in--you're ultimately not in charge of the
security of the homeland. That--unfortunately, that
responsibility is above your pay grade and over your head, and
you and I both know that. Your job is to provide intel. Is that
correct?
Mr. Wainstein. Uh-huh. Yes.
Mr. Crane. But you don't get to make--you don't get to
cancel Executive orders that we're keeping the American people
safe, do you, sir?
Mr. Wainstein. I don't have anything to do with the
Executive orders.
Mr. Crane. No, you don't, do you? If you were pushing--if
you wanted to push and pass H.R. 2, it probably wouldn't
matter, would it?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes. But let me--let me say one thing. I am
responsible for the national security. Every one of my team
here and myself----
Mr. Crane. Yes.
Mr. Wainstein [continuing]. We wake up in the morning and
we say we have a responsibility, and it's our job to----
Mr. Crane. I appreciate that. As somebody who served this
country myself, I appreciate you taking ownership and--
accountability, you know, for wanting to secure our national
security.
But we both know that's not getting done, which is why
Director Wray himself is now saying, hey, the lights are
blinking red. We have more threats than even before we did at
9/11. It's not a coincidence, sir. It's not a coincidence at
all.
We've been foolish. We've been arrogant, and we've put
policies in place that not only have cost the lives of
Americans, but are putting countless more at risk today. I'm--I
can't even begin to tell you how disappointed and upset I am as
somebody who has been sent here to try and conduct oversight
and fix this problem.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Bishop. The gentleman yields back. The subcommittee
will proceed to a second round of questioning, and so I
recognize myself for an additional 5 minutes, Mr. Wainstein.
I want to, sort-of, continue the same theme. I appreciate
your inclination to be accountable, Mr. Wainstein, and I'm not
trying to suggest either that you're solely accountable. I
guess the thing I wonder is how we've gotten here.
I read you the quote that Director Abizaid gave in response
to a question from me, and I was trying to get at the thing. I
mean, it seemed to me--I'm a layperson, you're a security
expert. But I think millions of Americans have watched that--
you know, from the beginning--from 2021, from the run-up from
the election to 2021, immediately to an historic level of
cross--border crossing, and we were told all along that the
numbers of gotaways were significant, meaning that they're
holding a substantial number of people coming into the United
States who are never encountering anyone--any of--any
Government official, and to a point, you just said, it's kind-
of chilling. We've got people who are--I don't know how the
terrorist watch list works or what exactly that looks like or
how people get on it and so forth.
But it's incomprehensible that such a thing exists and that
even the vetting is so bad that those people don't get
identified as they come across. Then I remember seeing the news
article on that, and what it indicated was they were arrested,
and then it listed the cities they were arrested in. It was
every major city in America it sounded like.
I don't--but then, you know, I sit up here as a layperson
asking the questions that seem obvious to me. I don't--
candidly, sir, I don't know--I remember your coming out and
making a public statement that the administration is engaged in
reckless policy. I don't think you've done that.
Frankly, Chris Wray has begun sounding increasingly alarmed
in his rhetoric, but I read from you what the director of the
counterterrorism center said. ``We don't really think that's a
risk.''
Now it's--I mean, the evidence is cropping up. So far,
thanks to God, we have not seen a spectacular act of terrorism.
But you're still sitting down here and the priorities you're
identifying are changes in--you know, October 7 attack on
Israel, which sounds like a make weight to me. It is a
tremendously horrific incident, but it's not a change in terms
of the threat picture that has always existed in the Middle
East.
Then you talk about domestic violent extremists. Mr.
Magaziner asked you about risks like January 6. I know that it
is a stock piece in some politics in the United States that
January 6 was as bad as 9/11. I don't honestly remember it that
way. I may be--and maybe some American will disagree with me--
or many Americans, Mr. Magaziner might disagree.
But what accounts for that? I mean, it sounds reckless to
me. You did not--Ms. Abizaid has not, other Members have not
come out and said, ``This is dangerous to the homeland. I'm
accountable.'' I'm not going to sit in my position and see the
risks you're bound to see, that you're not able to tell me
about in detail. Why keep quiet about a risk like that, that we
now see manifested in visits to Quantico, a Chechen conducting
surveillance on an Army--a special forces colonel in Carthage,
North Carolina, leading to a killing; an Eritrean in Gates
County, North Carolina, leading to a stand-off with police and
a shooting.
It just goes on and on. It is--it's not domestic violent
extremists. So what gives?
Mr. Wainstein. Couple things, sir. Thank you for the
question, and I understand where you're coming from. If I could
just clarify one thing. I didn't finish, sort-of, the chain of
reasoning I talked about--I started on about Gaza. You say that
there's no change since October 7. I think if you were to talk
to the Jewish community, they would say quite otherwise.
They're suffering. They are under threat in a way they weren't
before, and that is what I was talking about. The events
overseas have energized threat actors of a variety of different
types, foreign as well as domestic, and they're suffering from
it.
Mr. Bishop. Yes. I agree with that.
Mr. Wainstein. So we've put bulletins out about that
jointly with the FBI. We've been engaged fully with the Jewish
community because this is a sea change, and it's not coming--
it's not going to end.
Mr. Bishop. Yes. I never imagined I would see what I see--
in the Democratic Party, frankly, in our country. But go ahead.
Mr. Wainstein. It's horrendous. But, in terms of the threat
from foreign terrorism, you asked why I'm not saying anything
more about it. I've spent every public moment talking about the
terrorism threat, in particular the threat from foreign
terrorism since--especially since October 7.
If you look at the Tajik situation, that's--you'll get
briefed on that. But, you know, it's not lost on us that the
people who killed over 150 Russians in that theater were from
the same part of the world, OK?
So--and I can tell you that Director Abizaid is working
with my team and me on a daily basis. I'm going to be with her
tomorrow, and we're working on a daily basis on this very
threat and with the Bureau.
The amount of--and I mentioned this earlier. It really is
unprecedented the level of cooperation between us and the
Bureau on these threats, and I say that with a little bit of
perspective because I was in Government in the national
security space up until inauguration day 2009. I left with the
Bush administration and then stepped out of Government and then
stepped back in 2 years ago.
The amount of--in real day-to-day operational coordination
between DHS and FBI that I'm seeing now, we didn't have
anything even close to that back then. So it is unprecedented;
it's real; and we're taking it seriously.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, sir. My time has expired.
I recognize Mr. Magaziner for 5 minutes.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate it. This
started out as a good, productive bipartisan hearing that I
hoped it would be. Of course, now we've gone off the rails. I
just want to correct the record on a few things.
The Anti-Defamation League, the ADL, has reported a
skyrocketing rate of antisemitic violence in this country after
October 7. We've also seen huge spikes in targeting of the
Muslim community in the United States, and oftentimes it is
foreign terrorist organizations who are on-line through
propaganda and otherwise trying to incite people here in the
United States and divide us against each other.
The synagogue in my neighborhood received a bomb threat
just in the week after October 7. That hadn't happened in
years. It's not a coincidence.
So we cannot minimize, we cannot diminish, we cannot sweep
under the rug the very real threat of domestic extremism in
this country, which is on the rise. By the way, even before
October 7, more Americans over the last 5 years have been
killed by domestic extremists than by foreign terrorist
organizations on the homeland.
That doesn't mean that the foreign terror threats aren't
real. They always have been, and they are heightened again
after October 7. But we cannot minimize, we cannot diminish the
very real threat from domestic violent extremism here in the
United States.
It's not just related to October 7 either. How many, 50
people killed at Pulse nightclub in Orlando for no reason other
than it was a gay bar. People killed in Buffalo because they
are African American. People killed in El Paso because they
were immigrants by domestic violent extremists. The threat is
real.
I thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your focus on it and for
trying to keep Americans safe. I will also note, January 6 was
a big deal. If you think it wasn't, talk to the family members
of the Capitol Police officers who lost their lives in the days
following that dark event.
So let's not minimize, let's not diminish--and, by the way,
all of these threats are real: foreign terrorist organizations,
the challenges we're having at the border are all real, but
we're not going to get anywhere by minimizing or sweeping under
the rug or trying to make this a partisan thing.
I'm sorry. The people chanting ``Jews will not replace us''
at Charlottesville, they weren't Democrats. Antisemitism knows
no party in this country, and I can tell you that from personal
experience. Nick Fuentes, the Neo-Nazi having lunch at Mar-a-
Lago is not a Democrat. So neither party has a monopoly on
antisemitism in this country, and let's not politicize that.
Now, with the remaining time that I have left, Mr.
Wainstein, I want to go back and give you a chance to actually
have the time to respond a little bit and talk about
particularly as it relates to the Southern Border, the work
that your office is doing to make sure that we minimize and
intercept as many threats as possible.
So can you please expand on the work that you are doing and
that people under you are doing.
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, sir. Appreciate your comments.
I just--I think I addressed a number of them, but a couple
things I would like to mention. One is fentanyl. The fentanyl
threat is a huge crisis. We're losing 70,000-odd Americans a
year, untold damage to American families and economy. It's
unlike other drug threats which, you know, were labor-
intensive, sometimes difficult to secrete and send across the
border. Fentanyl is easy to produce. There seems to be an
endless stream of precursors coming over from China. It's small
and compact, can be easily secreted into a car or whatever and
gotten across the border. It's really tough, and it's--now we
have, sort-of, knockoff, follow-on types of synthetic opioids.
So this is going to take an all-of-Government effort, and
it's going to require the Executive branch but also Congress.
We are focusing on it both in terms of we're generating
increased amounts of reporting on fentanyl. We're working
closely, in person and in great communication with our State
and local partners who are focusing on that, especially the
Southwest Border partners who have been very supportive of us
along the border.
We're--as I mentioned earlier, we are nominating people for
the TOC watch list, the Transnational Organized Crime watch
list, which is focusing on the border, often on cartel members.
The cartels--and, you know, we don't need to--I don't need to
educate you on what the cartels are doing, but they are having
an outsize effect on our national security because they are now
going beyond just narcotics trafficking into human smuggling
and all sorts of other licit and illicit activities, and they
are--you know, they're unbelievably wealthy based on the
fentanyl.
So we're generating these nominations for the TOC watch
list so that we can better stop cartel members and affiliates
from coming across the borders. Those are, sort-of, two areas
that we're ramping up our activity in.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you for the seriousness with which you
are taking on this very big challenge and all of the challenges
facing our homeland as it relates to security threats. So I
thank you for that work. I'll yield back.
Mr. Bishop. The gentleman yields back. I recognize Mr.
D'Esposito, the gentleman from New York, for 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. D'Esposito. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
sir, for being here this afternoon. The Department of Homeland
Security grants clearances to State, local, Tribal,
territorial, law enforcement officers. Once in receipt of an
approved clearance nomination for a SLTT law enforcement
officer who supports the DHS mission, the DHS office of the
chief security officer or a DHS component with its own personal
security unit will either grant the clearance or deny the
clearance based on the background investigation.
The committee has learned that there exists a serious
backlog of issuing security clearances to these State, local,
and Tribal, territorial, law enforcement officers. In one
Department alone, they currently have nearly 20 members of
service who are still waiting on the process of the security
clearances, and it's been more than a year without any follow-
up by your office for most of them, and there's actually a
handful of them that are waiting 2 years; obviously, resulting
in a serious backlog in which law enforcement officials are
unable to attain--obtain the essential information that they
need in order to conduct investigations. It's having a negative
effect on their ability to receive and use that intelligence
that's critical to not only doing their job but keeping their
communities and this country safe.
So, really, a yes-or-no question. Do you have a
responsibility in providing SLTT law enforcement officers
access to intelligence product, including some at the
Classified level, as well as granting or denying security
clearances to these law enforcement officers based on their
background investigation? Just yes or no?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes, we're involved in the clearance
process, yes.
Mr. D'Esposito. OK. So are you aware that there exists a
serious backlog stemming from your office being able to provide
these clearances?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes. I've been very focused on our role, as
well as the security office's role.
Mr. D'Esposito. OK. I mean, do you agree that the--that, if
the SLTT law enforcement officers are unable to obtain this
information, it's, obviously, going to result in a negative
effect on their ability to receive and utilize or even obtain
this information?
Mr. Wainstein. Absolutely, sir. Look, you put your finger
on a very important issue. I wrestled with this when I was
chief of staff of the FBI back in 2003, back when we were
trying to expand the number of State and locals who had
clearances. You could only have them be fully engaged in
something involving foreign terrorism in particular if a
certain number of them have clearances.
When I came in, we did have a backlog. We had a pretty
significant backlog for resource and procedural reasons. At the
end of last year, we put together a task force that zeroed in
on the backlog and largely got rid of the backlog.
Mr. D'Esposito. OK. So, from last year to today, what was
the backlog, and where is the number at today?
Mr. Wainstein. I don't have the exact number, but I can
tell you this. We largely got rid of the backlog, but then, for
instance, we got 100 applications from another State.
Mr. D'Esposito. Just respecting--respecting both of our
time. So we're saying--we're agreeing that there's a backlog.
We see that there's an issue. You're saying that, when you came
in, obviously, you put together a strategy in order to diminish
that backlog.
So, if we could give--just take a round number guess, where
it was at and where it's at today? I mean, is there a
significant change? Is there, you know, a few people that have
been granted clearance? Are we making a difference that's
actually giving law enforcement officers the intelligence that
they need, or----
Mr. Wainstein. Yes.
Mr. D'Esposito [continuing]. Are we not making a
difference?
Mr. Wainstein. So, sir, I don't have the exact numbers, but
I will get those to you promptly. But I will tell you that we
largely got rid of the backlog. It's crept back up again. We
now have more resources going into that so that we don't allow
the backlog to get out of hand.
Mr. D'Esposito. So do you agree that it is a priority to--
--
Mr. Wainstein. Absolutely.
Mr. D'Esposito [continuing]. Address the backlog and
report--report regularly to Congress on the progress? I mean,
it seems like a common-sense reform.
Mr. Wainstein. Absolutely. My State and local partners are
very energized by this issue. So I hear about it a lot.
Mr. D'Esposito. So will you commit that your office will
address the serious backlog so that our State, local, Tribal,
territorial, law enforcement officers obtain the necessary
information to ensure the public and, obviously, their safety?
Mr. Wainstein. Absolutely. We'll ask Congress for the
resources to make that permanent.
Mr. D'Esposito. My time has just about expired, Mr.
Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Bishop. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize Mr. Crane from Arizona for 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I&A has consistently come under fire for its social media
collection targeting Americans' political views. You claim that
you have safeguards for First Amendment-protected speech, but
by all accounts they come with a huge loophole. If an I&A
officer says that collected protected speech somehow furthers
one of your missions, he can collect that speech all day long.
I&A has claimed a vague counter-terrorism need to target
Americans talking about politics, COVID, environmentalist
issues and so forth. Please explain your method for deciding
which one to monitor to prevent terrorism, please.
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, sir. That is--that goes to the
crux the issue that I was raising earlier, which is how
difficult it is to do this work in this--in the homeland where
the Constitution, obviously, applies, applies strongly, and
it's sacred that we respect the Constitutional right to free
speech and political engagement.
The--so what we do in terms of collection, as well as in
terms of analysis, is we can only do intelligence work as it
relates to communications, political speech if that political
speech does relate to one of our missions. In other words, if
that political speech is coupled, for example, with talking
about coordinating violence in a protest, violence, actual
violence, the type of thing that you were referring to, Ranking
Member Magaziner, pre-January 6, or in the context of any kind
of protest. That's an example. Or efforts--discussing cyber
efforts on-line to undermine the integrity of our critical
infrastructure.
We're seeing that by people domestically. We're also seeing
it by foreign adversaries who are trying to get inside the
systems of our critical infrastructure. So we have to have a
mission, and we actually--in order to do that collection or
analysis. Our Transparency and Oversight Program Office is
doing something very important, which is we're putting in place
a process to make sure that that collector or analyst
identifies what that mission is before they take the step based
on that mission.
So we can go back and audit it and make sure that someone
didn't willy-nilly collect something without a verifiable basis
for doing it. That's one of the big things--big-ticket items
that our TOPO, Transparency and Oversight Office, is pulling
together right now.
Mr. Crane. So, sir, you're saying that you're currently
putting that process in place? Or do you already have that
process written down and your agents are trained on that
process?
Mr. Wainstein. We have guidance in place. We have training
that has been greatly improved over the last few years. Then,
in terms of the accounting afterwards, the audit function, that
is being built right now.
We've gotten some assistance from folks like the inspector
general and the GAO. We actually have the former Inspector
General of DHS John Roth on our staff as a special Government
employee helping us with these kind of systems.
Mr. Crane. Are you prepared and willing to share that
process, the training with the Homeland Security Committee?
Mr. Wainstein. Absolutely. I'm very proud to show it to
you.
Mr. Crane. Great. Thank you, sir.
One thing that I wanted to touch on with the remainder of
my time is I represent half of the Tribes in Arizona. What are
you guys doing to work with the localities, Tribal police to
deal with some of the issues that they're experiencing largely
because of our open border? Like the fentanyl deaths are
skyrocketing on the reservation.
Can you share with us what you guys are doing to coordinate
and work with Tribal police?
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, sir.
I know that they have particular challenges and particular
threats, and we are working our engagement office that engages
with the State and locals.
Like I told you at the beginning, one of the things we've
done is we've elevated that whole function within the
organization. So they report directly to me because it's a huge
priority.
We're meeting with our counterparts, State, local, but also
Tribal partners on a regular basis and particularly those who
are affected down by the border, by all the activity down
there.
I was down at the border for a week, I guess, last year in
Texas and seeing the issues there. Obviously, the same thing,
issues there are playing out in the areas of the reservations
over New Mexico and Arizona. So----
Mr. Crane. Is this something that your office is proactive
in, reaching out to the Tribes? Or do you require them to come
to you for intelligence?
Mr. Wainstein. We reach out to all our partners. But if
it's OK, sir, what I'll do is I can get you a written or verbal
brief about specifically what we're doing with the Tribes.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger [presiding]. The gentleman yields.
Under Secretary, we'll start our third and final round.
Again, appreciate you being here. If folks come in, then
I'll allow them to talk but, otherwise, it will be this group
here.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Last year Politico reported--and I alluded to this in my
opening statement--that DHS's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis has a virtually-unknown program gathering domestic
intelligence called the Overt Human Intelligence Collection
Program. The program has raised concerns even from within DHS
from employees within DHS that the work that was being done
could be illegal.
According to the Politico report, one unnamed employee
quoted in an April 2021 document stated that I&A's office of
regional intelligence is, ``shady'' and, ``runs like a corrupt
government.''
I just want to get your take on not just that quote but
just in general that program. Are you aware that some DHS I&A
employees share concern, wide-spread internal concerns about
legally questionable tactics and political pressure?
Mr. Wainstein. You know, thank you for that, sir.
In fact, we--you might remember we sent you and your fellow
Members a very lengthy letter that explained everything we were
doing in that space.
So, just as a quick backdrop, there--the way this sort-of
became known is we put a pause on one aspect of our human
interviewing program. That was where people, I&A people might
go in and interview folks who are facing charges.
The reason for that--and, remember, I'm a long-time Federal
prosecutor. So I'm sort-of sensitive to this. The reason for
that is, while it might be perfectly legal and Constitutional,
it could be seen as sort-of invading the relationship between
that person and their criminal attorney for their criminal case
because they're facing charges.
So we put a pause on that. That's what sort-of got in the
news and became an issue. I'm fine with that because we--our
rules allowed for something that we should have been more
careful about.
We came to find out when we did an audit that we actually
had never interviewed anybody in that situation, you know,
where we actually after they've been arraigned and received
counsel and had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached.
But our procedures allowed for it. So that necessitated us
going back and redoing, relooking at all the different guidance
for our human intelligence program.
Part of what I've laid out in detail in this statement for
the record is all the work we've done in that space to redo
that program, new guidance, new training, limitations, and then
some of the limitations that were imposed by Congress last year
which, you know, we sort-of worked back and forth with Congress
in a very respectful way to come up with the NDAA resolution
that limited our ability to do that human intelligence
collection.
The last thing I'd say is what I said earlier which is
we're taking those resources, taking that human intelligence
focus and focusing on the border now. So most of that work is
going to be, you know, special interest migrants who are
detained on the border, working with the CBP colleagues, trying
to get information about the threat related to the border.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Under Secretary, and I'm glad you
brought up products.
I think there are a number of questions via letters and
other correspondence that we have to DHS and I&A and just want
to make sure that the Department is tracking those but not only
that, that in a timely manner that you'll commit to responding
to those.
Mr. Wainstein. I'll go--I'll look into whatever's pending
sir. Thank you.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you.
What's your biggest concern right now? What's the priority
for I&A to keep the country safe in the threat environment that
we previously discussed today?
Mr. Wainstein. Well, to talk like a bureaucrat for a
second, one priority is for me is making sure that we can
maximize the ability of I&A to address these threats.
That's why we have this review going on. That's why I
actually welcome this because the more scrutiny, the more
guidance, and the more engagement from Congress, the better
we're going to be able to improve and progress.
Mr. Pfluger. What's I&A's competitive advantage in the IC?
Mr. Wainstein. Our bread and butter--and to step back for a
second, you both spoke about challenges that I&A has had. One
thing that I think people need to recognize, if you go back and
look at sort-of the founding documents, the legislation for
I&A, it's not clear what the core mandate for I&A is.
But, when you sort-of look at what gap it was intended to
fill post-9/11--so you referred to the 9/11 commission report,
which is a brilliant piece of writing, by the way. If you go
back and look at that, you'll see that the, one of the concerns
that was raised is the disconnect between the hundreds of
thousands of State and local, territorial, Tribal, and private-
sector partners who have, you know, security interests and
knowledge and the Federal intelligence and law enforcement
communities.
Our job is to be that connection, to be that bridge, to
share information about the threats facing the homeland with
those SLTTP partners and making sure that we're getting the
information from them that feeds into our intelligence system.
So, for example, I mentioned that we do TOC nominations for
TOC watch lists. A lot of that comes from our State and local
partners who tell us, you know, at Fusion Centers, hey, Ken
Wainstein, here's the information that shows Ken Wainstein's a
cartel member.
We then take that, vet it, and get into it the TOC watch
list. That's the kind of information that we need
bidirectionally from our State and local partners. That's why,
as I said when we talk about the guiding principles, that our
guiding principal is, the first one is our main focus is
providing intelligence to the SLTTP partners. It's not
necessarily getting the PDB. Right? It's good to inform our
Federal decision makers. But the gap that we fill and the
intelligence enterprise is connecting with those SLTTP
partners.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you.
My time has expired.
I recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you again, Secretary.
I know you've taken steps to improve training and
developing the work force at I&A. I'll just plug that I have a
bill, H.R. 4429, the Department of Homeland Security
Intelligence and Analysis Training Act, that would require
standardizing entry-level basic intelligence training for all
new I&A employees.
But could you just take a moment to explain some of the
reforms you're making in addressing training of the work force
at I&A?
Mr. Wainstein. We are--we have improved training, and
this--this predates me. I mean, a lot of the progress I'm
talking about here, by the way, started well before me. So I
don't want to be taking personal credit for all of it and
particularly in the training area.
Some of the things were put in place after, for example,
the Portland situation in 2020 and then the January 6 situation
early 2021 was a recognition that the guidance wasn't
sufficient in certain areas and that the training on that
guidance wasn't sufficient.
So we have ramped up the training, the frequency, and the
substance and quality of the training. Our intelligence
training academy is much better equipped now to handle these
trainings internally, as well as with external partners.
Then we're also--in terms of guidance, obviously, we have
the Transparency and Oversight Program Office, which is making
sure that the guidance is put out as we need it and dealing
with current events and then it gets integrated with the
training.
So, for example, with the campus protests, we put guidance
out because that's a very sensitive, delicate situation. We put
guidance out to our people quickly, once that sort-of came up,
written guidance, and then followed that up with in-person or
actual training to make sure where the left and right
boundaries are.
So there's a lot happening, and I'm happy to give you a
written or verbal briefing on that.
Mr. Magaziner. Terrific.
As I read through the sort-of the third phase report that
you put out as part of the review, there was a lot in there,
but the part that interested me the most related to collection
activities was the intent to basically embed open-source
intelligence collectors within the analytic centers and with
sort-of your partner offices.
I thought that made a lot of sense. You know, we talk about
breaking down silos and kind-of the silo--over-siloing that
allowed 9/11 to happen.
Could you just talk a little bit more about how that's
going, what the thinking behind it was, how it's going
implementation-wise, and what you think the enhanced abilities
of I&A will be as a result of that model?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes, that's--thank you for asking that
because that's sort-of a good example of some of the thought
process that's going on here largely by the team behind me.
So our open-source people for historical reasons were sort-
of in one place separate from the rest of the work force,
actually over at St. Elizabeths, whereas the rest of us are at
the Nebraska Avenue Center.
So they're by themselves, and they weren't physically and
sufficiently operationally integrated with our analysts. Of
course, the collectors are supposed to be serving the analysts
and vice versa. Right? So collection is supposed to feed off of
analysis and vice versa.
So, you know, we made the decision we should move them over
for those reasons, also just management reasons. It was going
to be better to have them sort-of with everybody else.
Then we wanted to--we decided, I think I alluded to this
earlier, that we really need to have them focus on strategic
collection, not just sort-of law enforcement collection about
the threat of the moment. But the point we made earlier, our
main purpose is helping that police chief or city mayor or
Governor or Tribal official understand the threat that's going
to come to his or her jurisdiction today and then down the road
so that they can make resource and policy decisions.
That is--we can only do that if we have our open-source
collectors looking at it through the strategic lens, and that
is only going to happen if they're working with analysts who
are doing strategic products. So that was the thinking.
Mr. Magaziner. Yes, I'll just say, you know, as a former
bureaucrat, when I was State treasurer in Rhode Island, that's
the kind of, you know, nuanced thinking that I think can
actually, you know, create really good results.
So I thank you and your team for that, among the other
actions that you're taking to enhance the organization.
With that, I'll yield back.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wainstein, thank you again for this opportunity.
The--you--you know, a lot--we--early on in your testimony
when we were having a colloquy in the first round, I think, you
talked about events, antisemitic protests and the like around
the country.
Have you guys--do you guys have any information or
indication whether any of that is a product of foreign malign
influence? That is to say, we're all aware we've had fairly
controversial Foreign Influence Task Force at the FBI and the
issue with the foreign malign influence allegedly spread
through social--well, spread through social media and what the
FBI's done to curtain that. We had the Murthy v. Missouri case
that just came out from the Supreme Court today in which they
said there's no standing for people who feel like their speech
was suppressed to challenge that in the United States and then
court.
But what about these--the protests? So it was--and what I
meant when I said earlier about post-October 7 things, I was
just stunned to watch Palestinian flags, 300,000 people, you
know, marching through the streets. I just didn't know that was
the nature of the politics we had in the United States even at
this point.
Then, of course, we've seen all of the protests, some of
them involving significant vandalisms, tent settlements, a lot
of building vandalism at universities across the country.
Is any--are--is there foreign malign influence in that?
Mr. Wainstein. So you put your finger on a very critical
issue.
Obviously, if there were, that would be--if I was aware of
anything, that'd be based on intelligence sources and methods.
Mr. Bishop. So you couldn't talk about it.
Mr. Wainstein. I couldn't speak about it in an unclassified
context.
But let me just say that that is an issue that we in the
intelligence community focus on not just with this round of
protests but with all protests because we're seeing that that
is one of the entries in our adversary's menu. Right?
Try to foment agitation within the United States, sow
discord. We've seen that over and over, and one of the ways of
doing that is to try to sow disorder on the streets. So----
Mr. Bishop. Are there programs, are there Government
resources that are available to deal with that in any way?
So, again, the Foreign Influence Task Force, that's a
publicly-known thing. They're supposed to be--they say they are
working to counter foreign malign influence on social media.
Are there programs or--I guess if you really can't speak it
to, even if you can't speak to the risk, can you talk about
whether there are resources that are devoted to trying to
address that in any way?
Mr. Wainstein. Sure. Once again, I'm answering that as to
any sort of foreign malign influence, sort-of put aside whether
it relates to any particular protest.
Absolutely Foreign Malign Influence Center is up and
running and is focused on that. The FBI obviously, that is a
counterintelligence threat. So a foreign nation-state or
foreign terrorist organization is trying to foment discord with
any groups here in the United States, that is by definition the
counterterrorism--a counterintelligence threat and it's subject
to something that the FBI can investigate. That's the kind of
matter that they do investigate.
Mr. Bishop. OK. For my remaining time, I want to revisit
this same topic a couple of times that I've addressed--tried to
address a couple of times.
I've read from Director Abizaid's response, but I can--
November 2022. I had another crack at her in November 2023, and
I kind-of went at the same issue again, whether the number--
just the sheer volume of cross-border crossings presents a
significant risk of terrorism.
She says at one point, ``I appreciate the question. We
absolutely recognize the kind of vulnerabilities that are
associated with border security across all our ports of entry,
across Southwest Border, and otherwise. But I would maintain,
and I talked to my analysts about this on a regular basis, that
as we look at the global terrorism environment, as we look at
foreign terrorist organizations' intentions to try and seed
operatives into the United States, we don't have indications
that are credible or corroborated that those terrorist
organizations are trying to do that at this time.''
Do you--do you join in that opinion at this time?
Mr. Wainstein. Well, let me answer that in a couple of
ways.
That was obviously an answer at that point in time.
Mr. Bishop. Has it changed?
Mr. Wainstein. November 2022.
Mr. Bishop. This was 2023 actually.
Mr. Wainstein. November 2023. So that was at a point in
time.
In terms of what terrorism threat there is, whether there
are particular threat actors, you know, I would have been to
defer to the FBI NCTC and my colleagues who will give you a
brief in the Closed session.
Mr. Bishop. So you can't really answer the question whether
that still obtains.
Mr. Wainstein. I cannot answer what the intelligence
picture is in an open setting. One way----
Mr. Bishop. It just seems to me, and I will tell you as an
American citizen observing, it seems like the Tajik story, it
seems like the NBC story I related earlier, it seems like the
vice admiral on FOX News saying we're receiving probing visits
a couple of times a week at military installations in the
United States, the--I did a hearing recently in a committee on
the sheer--on the, you know, 1,100 percent increase in Chinese
national migration.
I just--but she--she was prepared to say that, and you
can't say one way or the other today.
Mr. Wainstein. No, keep in mind, I'm answering the question
what the intelligence picture is and telling you that I just
can't do it publicly.
But I can say this. We see that as an area that we need to
focus on, and we're spending a lot of time focusing on it.
We're redirecting resources to focus on the border, and I've
explained why and what we're doing.
So, in terms of the seriousness with which we take that
concern, we're taking it very seriously.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Wainstein.
I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Crane.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to read a headline that was posted about 30 minutes
ago on FOX News and a little bit of the article and have you
respond to it, sir. ``Biden DHS reveals 50 migrants still at
large as ISIS-affiliated smuggling network brings hundreds to
the U.S. The Department of Homeland Security has identified
over 400 individuals brought to the U.S. from Eastern European
and Central Asian countries by an ISIS-affiliated smuggling
network in the past several months, a DHS senior official
confirmed to FOX News on Wednesday. Officials have arrested
over 150 so far that have either been removed, placed in
removal proceedings, or are currently receiving additional
screening. They would not confirm of how many match the terror
watch list. Of the remaining 50 individuals at large, they
acknowledge that a small number may match the terror watch
list.''
Can you respond to that article, sir?
Mr. Wainstein. So I'll give this--generally the same
response I gave before which is, you know, subject to the
Classified briefing that you'll receive on this, which I know
has already been scheduled, which is that the--my understanding
is that, while there was a smuggling network and there are a
certain number of individuals who came through the smuggling
network----
Mr. Crane. An ISIS-affiliated smuggling network.
Mr. Wainstein. A smuggling network for which there's an
ISIS affiliation, there has not been any evidence but for any
of those individuals were terrorist operatives.
Mr. Crane. Why is this still being allowed to happen, sir?
Mr. Wainstein. Why is the smuggling network being allowed
to happen?
Mr. Crane. Yes, I mean, why are we consistently seeing
stories like this?
Mr. Wainstein. I can tell you that we are very focused on
the smuggling networks, and our colleagues at HSI and FBI and
others are really are zeroing in on these networks.
A lot of what we've done at DHS is to work with the FBI to
get a clear understanding of the networks out there. This is--
we spend a lot of time helping to sort-of, to clarify the
picture of what the networks are so that we can----
Mr. Crane. Right.
Mr. Wainstein [continuing]. Anticipate whether any of those
networks are involved in terrorism.
Mr. Crane. I appreciate that you guys are doing that.
But wouldn't you say, sir, that you can have all the
intelligence in the world but if you don't have leaders who are
willing to execute on that intelligence, it doesn't really
matter, does it?
Mr. Wainstein. Well, also what you do need also, and this
is one thing I think is important, and you asked about what I
need or we need. We could use more resources to go to the
border, both DHS but also I&A. You know, the more people we
have down here, interviewing folks along the border, the more
likely we're going to find about bad actors coming across the
border.
Mr. Crane. You say that because you know that your head
shed, your leadership, won't actually change any of the
policies, right?
Mr. Wainstein. I say that because that's a--that's a truism
that right now we are operating with relatively scant
resources.
Mr. Crane. Let me ask you this. Let me ask you this then.
Would we need to--would we need to surge more people to the
border, the same exact Southern Border that we've had now, if
your administration was actually doing its job and protecting
the American people?
Mr. Wainstein. Well, look, I'm not going to get into sort-
of platitudes one way or the other, other than to say that
we're going to go where we see the intel need to be.
From when I went through my confirmation hearing and your
colleague from Texas asked me about the border and I said,
based on what I know as a private citizen outside the
Government still, that's an area where we need to focus our
intelligence efforts, that hasn't changed since I got in.
So we're going to continue to focus there.
Mr. Crane. Yes, let me shift real quick to the advisory
board. According to a May 17, 2024, Department press release,
DHS decided to rebrand its Experts Group as the Homeland
Intelligence Advisory Board. The 19 members of the disbanded
Experts Group have simply been reconstituted as members of the
board. This is troublesome given that it appears DHS is
attempting to mislead Congress and the American public by
simply renaming a controversial advisory committee. We have
also learned that DHS has exempted this board from public
notice reporting and open meeting provisions that are normally
required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
Why is this, sir?
Mr. Wainstein. Well, let me just clarify one thing because,
whenever I hear a question with the word ``mislead,'' I feel
I've got to respond to that.
There was no misleading done at all. In fact, if you look
at the settlement agreement, the public settlement agreement
that ended the litigation, that led to us disbanding the
original group, we said that we have the right to constitute a
new group under the FACA law. We said that in black and white.
The other party in the litigation accepted it. The judge
accepted it.
Mr. Crane. That's great.
Real quick, sir, is it true Mr. Brennan and Mr. Clapper are
on this advisory group?
Mr. Wainstein. They were on the original Experts Group and,
as we announced, we will be----
Mr. Crane. Didn't--didn't both of those judges say that the
Hunter Biden laptop was Russian disinformation?
Why would you want--my question, sir, is: Why would you
want guys that are putting out very false information publicly
to the American people, why would you want them on your
advisory committee?
Mr. Wainstein. I want people who can help us do what I'm
talking about here which is transform an organization. We're
trying to transform an intelligence organization. There's one
person in the world----
Mr. Crane. Is telling the truth a part of helping with
that?
Mr. Wainstein. Could I answer, please?
Mr. Crane. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Wainstein. There's one person in the world who's
recently transformed an intelligence agency, the CIA, John
Brennan. I don't care what his politics are. I care that he's
honest with us, he brings his perspective, and donates his time
to us to help us----
Mr. Crane. Transformed it good or bad?
Mr. Wainstein. That's for others to understand----
Mr. Crane. Yes.
Mr. Wainstein [continuing]. To assess.
Mr. Crane. Exactly.
Mr. Wainstein. But I want to hear that experience.
Jim Clapper, once again, I don't care what his politics
are, but he was the director of national intelligence. He
coordinated all the different----
Mr. Crane. I don't care what his politics are, as long as
he doesn't weaponize them.
Mr. Wainstein. Exactly.
Mr. Crane. But clearly he has, and that's why I asked you:
Didn't both of these guys say that the Hunter Biden laptop was
disinformation? These are intelligence guys. Everybody knew
that that laptop was legitimate.
I yield back.
Mr. Magaziner. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pfluger. The gentleman yields back.
The Ranking Member is recognized.
Mr. Magaziner. I ask unanimous consent to enter into the
record the letter that the gentleman from Arizona is referring
to, which outlines why 4 dozen intelligence officials who
signed it believed based on the available information at the
time that the----
Mr. Pfluger. Can the Ranking Member state the title of the
article?
Mr. Magaziner. It's the letter that the gentleman from
Arizona was referring to that----
Mr. Pfluger. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Magaziner [continuing]. Was signed by multiple
intelligence individuals.
Mr. Pfluger. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Public Statement on the Hunter Biden Emails
October 19, 2020
We are all individuals who devoted significant portions of our
lives to national security. Some of us served in senior positions in
policy departments and agencies, and some of us served in senior
positions in the Intelligence Community. Some of us were political
appointees, and some were career officials. Many of us worked for
presidents of both political parties.
We are all also individuals who see Russia as one of our nation's
primary adversaries. All of us have an understanding of the wide range
of Russian overt and covert activities that undermine U.S. national
security, with some of us knowing Russian behavior inmately, as we
worked to defend our nation against it for a career. A few of us worked
against Russian information operations in the United States in the last
several years.
Perhaps most important, each of us believes deeply that American
citizens should determine the outcome of elections, not foreign
governments. All of us agree with the founding fathers' concern about
the damage that foreign interference in our politics can do to our
democracy.
It is for all these reasons that we write to say that the arrival
on the US political scene of emails purportedly belonging to Vice
President Biden's son Hunter, much of it related to his time serving on
the Board of the Ukrainian gas company Burisma, has all the classic
earmarks of a Russian information operation.
We want to emphasize that we do not know if the emails, provided to
the New York Post by President Trump's personal attorney Rudy Giuliani,
are genuine or not and that we do not have evidence of Russian
involvement--just that our experience makes us deeply suspicious that
the Russian government played a significant role in this case.
If we are right, this is Russia trying to influence how Americans
vote in this election, and we believe strongly that Americans need to
be aware of this.
There are a number of factors that make us suspicious of Russian
involvement.
Such an operation would be consistent with Russian objectives, as
outlined publicly and recently by the Intelligence Community, to create
political chaos in the United States and to deepen political divisions
here but also to undermine the candidacy of former Vice President Biden
and thereby help the candidacy of President Trump. For the Russians at
this point, with Trump down in the polls, there is incentive for Moscow
to pull out the stops to do anything possible to help Trump win and/or
to weaken Biden should he win. A ``laptop op'' fits the bill, as the
publication of the emails are clearly designed to discredit Biden.
Such an operation would be consistent with some of the key methods
Russia has used in its now multi-year operation to interfere in our
democracy--the hacking (via cyber operations) and the dumping of
accurate information or the distribution of inaccurate or
misinformation. Russia did both of these during the 2016 presidential
election--judgments shared by the US Intelligence Community, the
investigation into Russian activities by Special Counsel Robert
Mueller, and the entirety (all Republicans and Democrats) on the
current Senate Intelligence Committee.
Such an operation is also consistent with several data points. The
Russians, according to media reports and cybersecurity experts,
targeted Burisma late last year for cyber collection and gained access
to its emails. And Ukrainian politician and businessman Adriy Derkach,
identified and sanctioned by the US Treasury Department for being a 10-
year Russian agent interfering in the 2020 election, passed purported
materials on Burisma and Hunter Biden to Giuliani.
Our view that the Russians are involved in the Hunter Biden email
issue is consistent with two other significant data points as well.
According to the Washington Post, citing four sources, ``U.S.
intelligence agencies warned the White House last year that Giuliani
was the target of an influence operation by Russian intelligence.''
In addition, media reports say that the FBI has now opened an
invesgation into Russian involvement in this case. According to USA
Today, `` . . . Federal authories are investigating whether the
material supplied to the New York Post by Rudy Giuliani . . . is part
of a smoke bomb of disinformation pushed by Russia.''
We do not know whether these press reports are accurate, but they
do suggest concern within Executive branch departments and agencies
that mirrors ours. It is high time that Russia stops interfering in our
democracy.
Signed by,
Jim Clapper,
Former Director of National Intelligence
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Former Director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
Former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Mike Hayden,
Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Director, National Security Agency
Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
Leon Panetta,
Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Secretary of Defense.
John Brennan,
Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Former White House Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Advisor
Former Director, Terrorism Threat Integration Center
Former Analyst and Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency.
Thomas Finger,
Former Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis
Former Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Department of
State
Former Chair, National Intelligence Council.
Rick Ledge,
Former Deputy Director, National Security Agency.
John McLaughlin,
Former Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Director of Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Director, Slavic and Eurasian Analysis, Central Intelligence
Agency.
Michael Morell,
Former Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Director of Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency.
Mike Vickers,
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Former Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency.
Doug Wise,
Former Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Former Senior CIA Operations Officer.
Nick Rasmussen,
Former Director, National Counterterrorism Center.
Russ Travers,
Former Acting Director, National Counterterrorism Center
Former Deputy Director, National Counterterrorism Center
Former Analyst of the Soviet Union and Russia, Defense Intelligence
Agency.
Andy Liepman,
Former Deputy Director, National Counterterrorism Center
Former Senior Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency.
John Moseman,
Former Chief of Station, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Director of Congressional Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Minority Station Director, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence.
Larry Pfeiffer,
Former Chief of Station, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Director, White House Situation Room.
Jeremy Bash,
Former Chief of Station, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Chief of Station, Department of Defense
Former Chief Counsel, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Rodney Snyder,
Former Chief of Station, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Director of Intelligence Programs, National Security Council
Chief of Station, Central Intelligence Agency.
Glenn Gerstell,
Former General Counsel, National Security Agency.
David B. Buckley,
Former Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Democratic Station Director, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence
Former Counterespionage Case Officer, United States Air Force.
Nada Bakos,
Former Analyst and Targeting Officer, Central Intelligence Agency.
Patty Brandmaier,
Former Senior Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Deputy Associate Director for Military Affairs, Central
Intelligence Agency
Former Deputy Director of Congressional Affairs, Central Intelligence
Agency.
James B. Bruce,
Former Senior Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Senior Intelligence Officer, National Intelligence Council
Considerable work related to Russia.
David Cariens,
Former Intelligence Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency,
50+ Years Working in the Intelligence Community.
Janice Cariens,
Former Operational Support Officer, Central Intelligence Agency.
Paul Kolbe,
Former Senior Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Chief, Central Eurasia Division, Central Intelligence Agency.
Peter Corsell,
Former Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency.
Brett Davis,
Former Senior Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Deputy Director of the Special Activities Center for
Expeditionary Operations, CIA.
Roger Zane George,
Former National Intelligence Officer.
Steven L. Hall,
Former Senior Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Chief of Russian Operations, Central Intelligence Agency.
Kent Harrington,
Former National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, Central
Intelligence Agency
Former Director of Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Chief of Station, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency.
Don Hepburn,
Former Senior National Security Executive.
Timothy D. Kilbourn,
Former Dean, Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis, Central
Intelligence Agency
Former PDB Briefer to President George W. Bush, Central Intelligence
Agency.
Ron Marks,
Former Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
Twice former staff of the Republican Majority Leader Jonna Hiestand
Mendez
Technical Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency.
Emile Nakhleh,
Former Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program,
Central Intelligence Agency
Former Senior Intelligence Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency.
Gerald A. O'Shea,
Senior Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
Served four tours as Chief of Station, Central Intelligence Agency.
David Priess,
Former Analyst and Manager, Central Intelligence Agency
Former PDB Briefer, Central Intelligence Agency.
Pam Purcilly,
Former Deputy Director of Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Director of the Office of Russian and European Analysis, Central
Intelligence Agency
Former PDB Briefer to President George W. Bush, Central Intelligence
Agency.
Marc Polymeropoulos,
Former Senior Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Acting Chief of Operations for Europe and Eurasia, Central
Intelligence Agency.
Chris Savos,
Former Senior Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Officer.
Nick Shapiro,
Former Deputy Chief of Station and Senior Advisor to the Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.
John Sipher,
Former Senior Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Deputy Chief of Russian Operations, Central Intelligence Agency.
Stephen Slick,
Former Senior Director for Intelligence Programs, National Security
Council
Former Senior Operations Office, Central Intelligence Agency.
Cynthia Strand,
Former Deputy Assistant Director for Global Issues, Central
Intelligence Agency.
Greg Tarbell,
Former Deputy Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Analyst of the Soviet Union and Russia, Central Intelligence
Agency.
David Terry,
Former Chairman of the National Intelligence Collection Board
Former Chief of the PDB, Central Intelligence Agency
Former PDB Briefer to Vice President Dick Cheney, Central Intelligence
Agency.
Greg Treverton,
Former Chair, National Intelligence Council.
John Tullius,
Former Senior Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency.
David A. Vanell,
Former Senior Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency.
Winston Wiley,
Former Director of Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency
Former Chief, Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency.
Kristin Wood,
Former Senior Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
Former PDB Briefer, Central Intelligence Agency.
In addition, nine addional former IC officers who cannot be named
publicly also support the arguments in this letter.
Mr. Magaziner. Yes, thank you.
Mr. Pfluger. I thank the witness for his testimony, for his
valuable testimony today.
I thank the Members for the questions.
The Members, like I mentioned at the beginning, may have
further questions, written questions for the witness. We ask
that you respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will
be open for the next 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:34 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X I
----------
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Kenneth L. Wainstein
i&a's overt human intelligence collection program
Question 1. Yes or no: Under Secretary Wainstein, are you aware
that while DHS I&A used the OHIC program ``to gather information about
threats to the U.S.'' the program also included directly questioning
``incarcerated people--circumventing their lawyers,'' which caused many
DHS I&A employees to ``fear that they [were] breaking the law''?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Yes or no: Are you aware that these fears seemingly
caused the temporary halting of ``the portion of the program involving
interviews with prisoners who had received their Miranda rights''?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Yes or no: Are you aware that some field employees were
``worried so much about the legality of their activities that they
wanted their employer to cover liability insurance''?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Yes or no: will you assure the committee that DHS's
Office of Intelligence and Analysis will not abuse its authorities and
violate the Constitutional rights of Americans?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
homeland intelligence experts group and the homeland intelligence
advisory board
Question 1. There have been many questions surrounding the
composition of the DHS Homeland Intelligence Experts Group. The group
features many prominent figures who have been found to be overly
political figures who have made false or misleading claims to promote
their own agendas. These figures include James Clapper, John Brennan,
Paul Kolbe, and Tashina Gauhar.
On October 19, 2020, James Clapper, John Brennan, and Paul Kolbe
signed a public statement attempting to discredit the New York Post's
reporting on Hunter Biden laptop was a product of Russian
disinformation. This story proved to be true, and it is perceived that
these individuals used their positions of power to influence and censor
a news outlet.
Another member of the Homeland Experts Group, Tashina Gauhar, who
previously served as an associate deputy attorney general for the
Department of Justice, was extensively involved in the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's probe into baseless allegations that former
President Trump's campaign colluded with Russia.
Yes or no: Do you agree that it is reasonable to believe that these
concerning actions by some of the members appointed to the group call
into question the group's neutrality?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Yes or no: Are you aware that internal documents from
the Experts Group show that it pursued ways for DHS to enhance efforts
to collect intelligence on U.S. citizens, and reach ``local communities
in a non-threatening way''?\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Miranda Divine, How Biden DHS `intel experts group' plotted to
get `mothers and teachers' to report dissent, N.Y. POST (June 20,
2024), https://nypost.com/2024/06/20/us-news/how-biden-dhs-intel-
experts-group-plotted-to-get-mothers-and-teachers-to-report-dissent/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. Yes or no: Are you aware that in one meeting
discussion by members of the Experts Group, one attendee proposed that
in order to get people to report a concern about their neighbors they
could reclassify political dissent as a ``public health''\2\ crisis?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Follow-up: Did you attend the meeting, in which this was discussed?
If yes, as the under secretary for I&A, did you raise any concerns?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3b. Follow-up: Do you agree or disagree with this
statement?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4a. Yes or no: Are you aware that internal documents from
the Experts Group show that it discussed how ``most of the domestic
terrorism threat now comes from supporters of''\3\ President Trump?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Press Release, America First Legal, EXCLUSIVE--New Docs from
Disbanded DHS Deep State Group Reveal the Biden Admin Views Trump
Supporters as ``Domestic Terrorism Threats'' (June 21, 2024), https://
aflegal.org/exclusive-new-docs-from-disbanded-dhs-deep-state-group-
reveal-the-biden-admin-views-trump-supporters-as-domestic-terrorism-
threats/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Follow-up: Did you attend the meeting, in which this was discussed?
If yes, as the under secretary for I&A, did you raise any concerns?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4b. Follow-up: Do you agree or disagree with this
statement?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5a. Yes or no: Are you aware that internal documents from
the Experts Group show that it discussed classifying someone as a
person likely to commit domestic violent extremist attacks, as those
who support President Trump and are ``in the military'' or are
``religious''?\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Follow-up: Did you attend the meeting, in which this was discussed?
If yes, as the under secretary for I&A, did you raise any concerns?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5b. Follow-up: Do you agree or disagree with this
statement?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6a. Yes or no: Isn't it true that on May 17, 2024, the
Department announced the establishment of a Homeland Intelligence
Advisory Board, which will advise your office on national and homeland
security intelligence matters?
Follow-up: How is it appropriate to shield an advisory board from
the American public when your agency targets Americans and works
largely with publicly-available information to do so?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6b. Follow-up: Yes or no: Do you agree that DHS must
ensure that it demonstrates impartiality in all homeland security
matters especially when DHS I&A faces a number of challenges to
complete its mission to help keep the homeland safe?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
protecting u.s. persons' data and information
Question 1a. Within any intelligence agency, ensuring the proper
use of authorities and safeguarding the rights of citizens remain
enduring priorities for oversight bodies. As you are aware, in
September of last year, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
identified that the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has yet to
fully enact measures designed to oversee compliance with policies aimed
at upholding the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of U.S.
individuals, encompassing citizens and lawful permanent residents.
Yes or no: since GAO released that report, has your agency enacted
measures to address those issues related to the privacy and rights of
American citizens?
Follow-up: Addressing concerns about the abuse of authorities
within intelligence agencies, how does DHS I&A ensure accountability
and ethical conduct among its personnel?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. Follow-up: How does DHS I&A train its personnel to
recognize and report potential misconduct, and what measures are in
place to investigate and address such incidents?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
i&a's role to share information with sltt law enforcement agencies
Question 1a. In March of this year, the Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence convened a
roundtable conversation titled ``Exploring the Role of DHS Intelligence
and Analysis.'' The purpose was to involve pertinent stakeholders in
discussions about I&A's position within the intelligence community,
recent significant activities, its collaboration with Fusion Centers,
and on-going restructuring efforts. This roundtable served as an
informative platform, fostering broader conversations on the
committee's commitment to your agency's success and strategies for
enhancing operational effectiveness.
I&A is the only IC element statutorily charged with delivering
intelligence to our State, local, Tribal and territorial (SLTT) and
private-sector partners and developing intelligence from those partners
for the Department and the intelligence community.
How does I&A prioritize and facilitate the sharing of intelligence
among Federal, State, and local agencies?
Follow-up: Regarding intelligence sharing, what specific mechanisms
or platforms does DHS I&A utilize to ensure timely and effective
communication with its partners across different levels of government?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. Follow-up: As under secretary for intelligence and
analysis, how have you restructured your staff to create a
collaborative and streamlined work environment within the DHS I&A?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1c. Follow-up: What feedback does your agency receive from
these partners regarding the intelligence you are providing?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1d. Follow-up: What measures are in place to guarantee
that the intelligence products and information you furnish are
pertinent, precise, and up-to-date?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
i&a's outstanding on-going issues
Question 1a. For years, I&A has engaged in abusive domestic
intelligence practices targeting Americans' political views and
regularly of little legitimate value. For instance, I&A has engaged in
monitoring political views shared by millions of Americans by tracking
``reactions'' and ``reflections'' of people simply discussing politics
on-line.
In fact, Under Secretary Wainstein, you referred to I&A's recent
failures as a ``rough patch''\5\ resulting in a thorough internal
review to correct abuses.
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\5\ Ellen M. Gilmer, Homeland Intelligence Unit Marred by Missteps
Gets Overhaul, Bloomberg Government (May 4, 2023), https://
about.bgov.com/news/homeland-intelligence-unit-marred-by-missteps-gets-
overhaul-1/.
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Yes or no: Do you agree that I&A has faced challenges to
responsibly accomplish its mandate across administrations?
Follow-up: Yes or no: Isn't it true that you referred to I&A's
recent challenges as a ``rough patch''?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. Follow-up: What did you mean by that statement?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1c. Follow-up: Yes or no: Do you agree that I&A has been
engaged in abusive domestic intelligence practices targeted in
Americans' political views?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1d. Follow-up: Yes or no: Will you commit to ensuring that
I&A does not engage in practices that target Americans' political
views?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1e. Follow-up: Yes or no: Do you agree that DHS should
establish an intelligence oversight office that is actually independent
of I&A, and put policies in place to increase transparency and
accountability?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
i&a's role to help address the surge of special interest aliens
Question 1. A Special Interest Alien (SIA) is a non-U.S. person
who, based on an analysis of travel patterns, potentially poses a
national security risk to the United States or its interests. Tens of
thousands of people designated as SIAs have been detained at the U.S.
Southern Border during the past 2 years, raising worries about the
threat of SIAs illegally entering into the country. What has I&A's role
been in addressing this surge, as well as the increase of Known or
Suspected Terrorists illegally entering into the country?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Please describe in detail I&A's role in assisting DHS's
efforts to screen and vet illegal aliens.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. As the under secretary of I&A, what should Congress or
the Department do to fix this challenge?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
social media collection on political views
Question 1. If I&A's stance is that the agency does not target
political views, what objective criteria do you use to distinguish
political views from extremist views? By all accounts, it appears
entirely subjective.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. Is I&A's social media collection method and criteria
written down in any policy?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2b. Follow-up: If so, would you be willing to share it
with the committee and make it available to the public?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
i&a's shift from raw social media collection to situational reports
Question 1. In your recent realignment, you announced that I&A
would be shifting away from raw social media collection and emphasizing
``situational awareness reports'' and support to analysts. I&A targeted
Americans talking about matters during the Dobbs decision. This was
done in one of your ``SITREPs'' that you've committed to doing more of
now. For those of us who care about free speech, this isn't much
reassurance. How is this supposed pivot meaningful when it involves the
same activities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How many people does your office have performing an
open-source collection function, even if they are not formally part of
the open-source office--including Federal employees, contractors,
collectors embedded with analysts, and the watch?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
[all]