[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IMPLEMENTATION OF BOEING'S COMPREHENSIVE
ACTION PLAN
=======================================================================
(118-70)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 24, 2024
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
58-809 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking Member
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford,
District of Columbia Arkansas
Grace F. Napolitano, California Daniel Webster, Florida
Steve Cohen, Tennessee Thomas Massie, Kentucky
John Garamendi, California Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaian Babin, Texas
Andre Carson, Indiana Garret Graves, Louisiana
Dina Titus, Nevada David Rouzer, North Carolina
Jared Huffman, California Mike Bost, Illinois
Julia Brownley, California Doug LaMalfa, California
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Mark DeSaulnier, California Brian J. Mast, Florida
Salud O. Carbajal, California Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Greg Stanton, Arizona, Puerto Rico
Vice Ranking Member Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Colin Z. Allred, Texas Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Sharice Davids, Kansas Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire Vice Chairman
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts Tracey Mann, Kansas
Marilyn Strickland, Washington Burgess Owens, Utah
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Patrick Ryan, New York Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Robert Menendez, New Jersey Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon Eric Burlison, Missouri
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan Brandon Williams, New York
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Mike Collins, Georgia
Mike Ezell, Mississippi
John S. Duarte, California
Aaron Bean, Florida
Celeste Maloy, Utah
Kevin Kiley, California
Vince Fong, California
Subcommittee on Aviation
Garret Graves, Louisiana, Chairman
Steve Cohen, Tennessee, Ranking
Member
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaic A. ``Rick'' Crawford,
Andre Carson, Indiana Arkansas
Julia Brownley, California Thomas Massie, Kentucky
Mark DeSaulnier, California Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Greg Stanton, Arizona Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Colin Z. Allred, Texas Brian J. Mast, Florida
Sharice Davids, Kansas Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska, Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Vice Ranking Member Tracey Mann, Kansas
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan Burgess Owens, Utah
Dina Titus, Nevada Rudy Yakym III, Indiana, Vice
Salud O. Carbajal, California Chairman
Robert Menendez, New Jersey Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
District of Columbia Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Mike Collins, Georgia
Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio) Aaron Bean, Florida
Kevin Kiley, California
Vince Fong, California
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vii
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Louisiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Aviation,
opening statement.............................................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hon Marcus J. Molinaro, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New York, prepared statement.......................... 53
WITNESSES
Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, oral
statement...................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Fact Sheet--Mammoth Freighters, Submitted for the Record by Hon.
Marcus J. Molinaro............................................. 13
Letter of July 26, 2024, to Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration, from Hon. Jefferson Van Drew,
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Jefferson Van Drew............ 40
APPENDIX
Questions to Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation,
from Hon. Kevin Kiley.......................................... 55
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
September 20, 2024
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Aviation
FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Aviation
RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Implementation of
Boeing's Comprehensive Action Plan''
_______________________________________________________________________
I. PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure will meet on Tuesday,
September 24, 2024, at 10:00 am ET in 2167 Rayburn House Office
Building to receive testimony at a hearing entitled,
``Implementation of Boeing's Comprehensive Action Plan.''
Members will receive testimony from Michael Whitaker,
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), on
the FAA's oversight of The Boeing Company (Boeing), including
the agency's assessment of and actions in response to Boeing's
comprehensive Product Safety and Quality Plan (the Plan),
submitted by Boeing in the wake of a door-plug incident that
occurred during Alaska Airlines flight 1282 on January 5, 2024.
II. BACKGROUND
ALASKA AIRLINES FLIGHT 1282
On January 5, 2024, a relatively new Alaska Airlines Boeing
737 MAX 9 aircraft flying at an altitude of 16,000 feet had one
of its two mid-cabin door-plugs separate from the aircraft
during flight, causing a rapid depressurization of the cabin.
No passengers or flight crew were seriously injured;
fortunately, the two seats immediately next to the door-plug
were not occupied. The following day, the FAA issued an
emergency airworthiness directive temporarily grounding all 737
MAX 9 aircraft with the plug door configuration pending the
results of a limited number of exploratory inspections of part
of the fleet.\1\ On January 24, 2024, based partially on the
results of the exploratory inspections, the FAA approved a
comprehensive inspection regimen that, upon its completion,
would allow 737 MAX 9 aircraft to return to service shortly
thereafter.\2\
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\1\ Christine Boynton, et al., FAA Grounds, Orders Immediate
Inspections of Most Boeing 737-9s, Aviation Week, (Jan. 8, 2024),
available at https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/safety-ops-
regulation/faa-grounds-orders-immediate-inspections-most-boeing-737-9s.
\2\ Amanda Maile and Lea Sarnoff, FAA releases instructions for
airlines to begin inspecting Boeing 737 Max 9 planes, ABC News, (Jan.
24, 2024), available at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/faa-releases-
instructions-airlines-begin-inspecting-boeing-737/story?id=106654582.
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NTSB INVESTIGATION
The National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB's)
preliminary report on the incident, released on February 7,
2024, revealed that when the aircraft was delivered from Boeing
to Alaska Airlines, ``the four bolts that prevent upward
movement of the [door-plug] were missing.'' \3\ The report also
found that the four bolts in question had arrived intact when
the fuselage was delivered to Boeing's facility in Reston,
Washington from Spirit AeroSystems, indicating that such bolts
had been removed at the Boeing facility.\4\
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\3\ NTSB, Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report (2024),
available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA24MA063.aspx.
\4\ Id.
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On August 6 and 7, 2024, the NTSB held a public hearing on
the accident. Chair Jennifer Homendy said on the record that
the accident was avoidable because Boeing has documented and
been aware of its unauthorized production work issues prior to
the accident occurring.\5\ The hearing also confirmed that the
door plug was removed at the Boeing factory in Renton,
Washington, but that the necessary paperwork for its removal
was not created.\6\ Elizabeth Lund, senior vice president of
quality for Boeing Commercial Airplanes, explained that when
workers replaced the door plug temporarily, other workers were
unaware that bolts needed to be reinstalled due to the lack of
documentation.\7\
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\5\ See NTSB, Investigations: In-Flight Mid Exit Door Plug
Separation, NTSB Investigative Hearing (Aug. 6-7, 2024), available at
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA24MA063.aspx.
\6\ Id.
\7\ Id.
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This investigation has raised concerns about quality
control and production issues at Boeing facilities and the
facilities of its 737 fuselage supplier, Spirit AeroSystems.\8\
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\8\ Will Guisbond, NTSB confirms missing bolts, defective rivets
preceded 737 Max 9 door plug incident, The Air Current, (Feb. 6, 2024),
available at https://theaircurrent.com/feed/dispatches/ntsb-confirms-
missing-bolts-defective-rivets-preceded-737-max-9-door-plug-incident/.
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FAA OVERSIGHT ACTIONS
Following the Alaska Airlines flight 1282 accident, and the
subsequent grounding of all Boeing 737 MAX 9 aircraft with
similar door-plug configurations, Administrator Whitaker
announced on January 17, 2024, that the FAA had opened an
investigation into Boeing's manufacturing and production lines.
The investigation extended to subcontractors of Boeing,
particularly Spirit AeroSystems. In the same announcement, the
FAA noted it would conduct a concurrent six-week audit of
Boeing's manufacturing processes.\9\ The FAA also sent an
additional 20 inspectors to Boeing's Washington production
facilities and an additional six inspectors to Spirit
AeroSystems's fuselage production facility in Wichita, Kansas.
Furthermore, the FAA has indicated that some of those
additional inspectors may remain at those factories
permanently.\10\
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\9\ Federal Aviation Administration, Updates on Boeing 737-9 Max
Aircraft (2024), available at https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/updates-
boeing-737-9-max-aircraft [hereinafter Updates on Boeing 737-9 Max
Aircraft].
\10\ Id.
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On February 12, 2024, Administrator Whitaker visited
Boeing's factory floor in Renton, Washington, to hear directly
from Boeing engineers, mechanics, and others about Boeing's
quality control processes. Following the Administrator's site
visit, the FAA announced it would not allow Boeing to increase
its 737 Max production beyond its current rate of 38 jets per
month until the agency was satisfied that Boeing's quality
control issues had improved.\11\ On February 27, 2024,
Administrator Whitaker met with Boeing's then-Chief Executive
Officer (CEO), Dave Calhoun, and other Boeing senior leaders
and imposed a requirement on Boeing to address its production
lapses and ``systemic quality-control issues.'' \12\ The
Administrator gave Boeing a 90-day deadline to provide the FAA
with a comprehensive plan to address the following:
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\11\ Joel Rose & Russell Lewis, NTSB says key bolts were missing
from the door plug that blew off a Boeing 737 MAX 9, NPR, (Feb. 6,
2024), available at https://www.npr.org/2024/02/06/1229528737/ntsb-
boeing-737-max-9-alaska-airlines-door-plug-missing-bolts.
\12\ Updates on Boeing 737-9 Max Aircraft, supra note 12.
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LIdentified production and quality-control
problems;
LFindings of the FAA's audit of Boeing's
manufacturing processes;
LFindings of the FAA's expert panel report on
Organization Designation Authorizations (ODA) for Transport
Airplanes, written and compiled in response to a requirement
from Section 103 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act (ACSAA); \13\ and
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\13\ Federal Aviation Administration, Section 103 Organization
Designation Authorizations (ODA) for Transport Airplanes Expert Panel
Review Report (2024), available at https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/
Sec103_ExpertPanelReview_Report_Final.pdf [hereinafter Section 103 ODA
Review Report].
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LActions Boeing will take to mature its safety
management system (SMS) program.\14\
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\14\ Updates on Boeing 737-9 Max Aircraft, supra note 12.
On March 4, 2024, the FAA announced that the agency had
identified ``multiple instances in which [both Boeing and
Spirit AeroSystems] failed to comply with manufacturing quality
control requirements,'' \15\ findings which resulted from the
Agency's six-week audit of the companies. Non-compliance issues
were found in Boeing's manufacturing process control, parts
handling and storage, and product control.\16\ The FAA
reiterated that these non-compliance issues must be addressed
in Boeing's 90-day comprehensive plan. Boeing presented the
company's comprehensive action plan to the FAA on May 30, 2024.
In response, the FAA stated that ``it will hold Boeing
accountable every step of the way to make sure these changes
happen.'' \17\
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\15\ Id.
\16\ Id.
\17\ Press Release, FAA, FAA Continues to Hold Boeing Accountable
for Implementing Safety and Production Quality Fixes, (May 30, 2024),
available at https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faa-continues-hold-boeing-
accountable-implementing-safety-and-production-quality-fixes.
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FINDINGS OF FAA'S QUALITY-CONTROL AUDIT
The FAA's audit of Boeing and its suppliers revealed
instances of mechanics using liquid soap as a lubricant for
fitting a door seal, despite it not being an approved
lubricant. The FAA observed instances of mechanics at Spirit
AeroSystems cleaning workstations with a wet cheesecloth,
despite this practice not being an approved method of cleaning.
During its six-week audit (January 17, 2024-March 4, 2024), the
FAA found that Boeing had failed 33 of 89 aspects of the
product audit, with a total of 97 instances of alleged
noncompliance, and that Spirit AeroSystems had failed seven of
13 audits.\18\ In general, the audit identified nine areas of
focus which Boeing needed to address: parts and material
control; tool control; foreign object debris (FOD); work
instructions; stamping; training; documentation/command media;
engineering; and quality escapes.\19\
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\18\ Briefing, Federal Aviation Administration, Special Audit Item
Out-brief (Feb. 28, 2024) (on file with Comm.).
\19\ Id.
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FINDINGS OF THE ACSAA ODA EXPERT PANEL REVIEW REPORT:
On February 26, 2024, the FAA issued the report required by
Section 103 of the ACSAA, which established the convening of an
Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) Expert Review
Panel to review and issue recommendations regarding Boeing's
safety culture, ODA, and capability to perform FAA-delegated
functions.\20\ The Expert Review Panel identified 27 findings
and made 53 recommendations across five broad areas.\21\
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\20\ Section 103 ODA Review Report, supra note 13.
\21\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically, the Expert Panel found that many Boeing
employees did not demonstrate knowledge of Boeing's safety
culture efforts. The Expert Panel further identified instances,
including within Boeing's voluntary SMS framework, in which
managers could lead an investigation within their own
respective reporting chains, potentially leading to a
hesitation in an employee's willingness to report safety
concerns. Finally, the Expert Panel also found that the
complexity and amount of SMS documentation, compounded by the
frequency of changing documentation requirements, created
employee confusion, contributing to the delay and improper
development of SMS at Boeing.\22\
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\22\ Id.
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In response to the Expert Review Panel's findings, Boeing
submitted a detailed plan of action, separate and independent
from the comprehensive Product Safety and Quality Plan, which
enumerated corresponding deliverables for each of the Expert
Review Panel's findings and recommendations to the FAA.\23\ The
company's responsive actions fall into four primary areas: (1)
safety culture and reporting systems; (2) the structure and
implementation of Boeing's SMS; (3) the structure and
independence of Boeing's ODA unit; and (4) human factors and
pilot input. Of note is the implementation of an Aviation
Safety Action Program, in coordination with the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM),
restructuring the engineering unit members under its ODA and
expanding the unit member pipeline, and fully implementing the
Flight Deck Design, Operations and Training working group to
formalize and strengthen the role of pilots and flight test
personnel.\24\
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\23\ Boeing, Executive Summary of Product Safety and Quality Plan
(2024), available at https://preview-www.boeing.com/content/dam/boeing/
boeingdotcom/safety/Safety-and-Quality-Plan_Executive%20Summary-5-30-
2024.pdf [hereinafter Boeing Executive Summary].
\24\ Id.
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BOEING'S INDEPENDENT MITIGATION ACTIONS
LEADERSHIP CHANGES
On February 21, 2024, Boeing announced Ed Clark, the head
of Boeing's 737 MAX program at the time, would depart the
company. Simultaneously, Boeing announced that it had created a
new role, Senior Vice President of Quality, and named Elizabeth
Lund to the position. Ms. Lund previously served as Boeing's
Senior Vice President and General Manager of airplane programs
for commercial airplanes.\25\
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\25\ Bill Chappell, How bad is Boeing's 2024 so far? Here's a
timeline, OPB, (Mar. 20, 2024), available at https://www.opb.org/
article/2024/03/20/how-bad-is-boeing-s-2024-so-far-here-s-a-timeline/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On March 25, 2024, Boeing announced that the company's CEO,
Dave Calhoun, would also step down at the end of 2024.
Additionally, Boeing announced that Stan Deal, CEO and
President of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, would retire
effective immediately, replaced by Chief Operating Officer
Stephanie Pope.\26\ On August 8, 2024, Kelly Ortberg replaced
Mr. Calhoun as the President and CEO of Boeing. Mr. Ortberg was
previously the CEO of Rockwell Collins, an avionics
manufacturer.\27\
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\26\ Patrick Smith & Rob Wire, Boeing CEO, other executives
stepping down amid safety crisis, NBC News, (Mar. 25, 2024), available
at https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/boeing-ceo-dave-
calhoun-slew-executives-step-safety-crisis-rcna144882.
\27\ Press Release, The Boeing Company, Boeing Board Names Kelly
Ortberg President and CEO (July 31, 2024), available at https://
boeing.mediaroom.com/2024-07-31-Boeing-Board-Names-Kelly-Ortberg-
President-and-CEO.
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
Meanwhile, in March 2024, Boeing began discussions with its
737 MAX fuselage supplier, Spirit AeroSystems, to reacquire the
company. Boeing had previously spun off a large part of its
manufacturing supply chain and created Spirit AeroSystems in
2009.\28\ On July 1, 2024, Boeing announced that it had entered
into an agreement to reacquire the company for $4.7
billion.\29\
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\28\ Dominic Gates, Boeing seeks to buy Spirit Aero, unit it sold
in push for outsourcing, The Seattle Times, (Mar. 1, 2024), available
at https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-seeks-
to-buy-spirit-aero-19-years-after-selling-off-troubled-wichita-plant/.
\29\ Press Release, The Boeing Company, Boeing to Acquire Spirit
AeroSystems (July 1, 2024), available at https://investors.boeing.com/
investors/news/press-release-details/2024/Boeing-to-Acquire-Spirit-
AeroSystems/default.aspx.
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Boeing has also announced that it has instituted additional
quality controls to inspections at its Renton, Washington
facility, as well as at the Spirit AeroSystems facility that
produces the 737 MAX fuselage in Wichita, Kansas.
Finally, Boeing has taken the following measures to address
quality control concerns:
LDeploying a team of mechanics, inspectors, and
engineers to work alongside the employees at Spirit
AeroSystems;
LOffering expanded training programs for employees
to refocus on the fundamentals of their Quality Management
System (QMS);
LOpening up its factories to air carriers and
operators of the 737 fleet for additional oversight
inspections; and
LHiring a third-party to review the company's QMS
for commercial aircraft and suggest further improvements.\30\
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\30\ Boeing, Updates on Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 and the 737-9
(2024), available at https://www.boeing.com/737-9-updates/jan-15-2024-
boeing-announces-immediate-actions-to-strengthen-quality.
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HIGHLIGHTS FROM BOEING'S COMPREHENSIVE ACTION PLAN \31\
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\31\ Boeing Executive Summary supra note 23.
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The Executive Summary of the Plan outlines the company's
actions since the January 5, 2024, 737 MAX 9 accident to
contain and mitigate risk in its production operations and
supply chain.\32\ It identifies key performance indicators
(KPIs) the company is using to measure the health of Boeing's
production line and quality control reforms. It then enumerates
the actions Boeing will take to improve quality control, as
well as the company's plan to address the issues identified in
both the FAA audit and the Expert Review Panel Boeing Safety
Culture Report.
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\32\ Id.
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The Action Plan also includes items specifically to address
the door-plug incident, including:
LRevising build plans, training, aircraft manual
documentation, and removal and inspection criteria for the Mid-
Exit Door (MED) plug;
LAdding conformance inspections to nine critical
build points;
LAdding new inspections and pre-shipment approval
requirements on fuselages at Spirit AeroSystems;
LProviding supplier bulletins to strengthen focus
on product conformance and reduce the risk of defects being
shipped; and
LProcessing fleet and production inspection
findings through Boeing's SMS and QMS.\33\
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\33\ Id.
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KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS \34\
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\34\ Id.
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The Action Plan identifies six critical, safety-focused Key
Performance Indicators (KPI) that Boeing will use to monitor
production system health, document improvements, and better
identify quality and safety hazards across Boeing's programs.
Those KPIs are:
LEmployee Proficiency, which measures proficient
employees currently staffed to commercial programs as a share
of all employees required for the production at a given rate.
LNotice of Escape Rework Hours, which measures the
number of rework due to (a) internal Boeing fabrication and (b)
supplier-provided escapes to final assembly per month.
LSupplier Shortages, which measures fabrication
and supplier shortages per manufacturing day--not including
weekends--averaged over the month.
LRework Hours per Airplane, which measures the
average final assembly charged rework normalized on a per
airplane basis, based on the date the aircraft was handed off
to the field; this may include `notice of escape rework hours'
caused by a supplier and any other Boeing-based rework.
LTravelers at Factory Rollout, which measures jobs
traveling per airplane from final assembly and rollout;
``traveler'' is defined as incomplete or open work that was
scheduled but not yet completed in final assembly.
LTicketing Performance, which measures average
escapes per airplane at time of FAA ticket; total escapes are
inclusive of all nonconformances and FOD per airplane.\35\
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\35\ Id.
The KPIs will be measured with reference to `control
limits.' These limits are based on safety trends, historical
analysis, and capacity planning. Any future adjustments to the
limits will only be made after consultation with the FAA. The
Plan also details the elevation processes associated with
managing each set of thresholds and how those processes are
tied to Boeing's SMS.\36\
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\36\ Id.
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QUALITY CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Id.
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The Action Plan identifies product safety and quality
attention areas, and attempts to address each with specific
actions like the development of new tools, process changes,
communication improvements, additional control mechanisms, and
other solutions. These attention areas include:
LSafety Management System Improvements--Boeing
will improve its SMS by:
+ L(1) enhancing and streamlining its ``Speak Up'' system
(the employee reporting channel);
+ L(2) reducing `traveled work' (tasks that are ``delayed
and/or completed in a factory location other than what was
originally planned); and
+ L(3) further integrating SMS with Boeing's Quality
Management System (QMS).
+ LThese three areas of focus were selected based on
feedback from the quality standdowns, input from regulators,
and insights from Admiral Kirkland Donald's independent
assessment team established in the wake of the January 5, 2024,
accident.
LSimplification of Processes and Procedures--Based
off feedback from the FAA, the Expert Review Panel, and
employees, Boeing believes that the complexity of its processes
and paperwork pertaining to quality control efforts contributed
to a decrease in quality control.
LSupply Chain Defect Reduction--To address quality
control issues within Boeing's supply chain, it has identified
four areas for improvement:
+ L(1) enhancing data and analytics to provide proactive
notifications of issues,
+ L(2) standardizing supplier oversight and prioritizing
product safety,
+ L(3) simplifying supplier processes and expectations,
and
+ L(4) driving industry change to improve. Boeing is also
increasing its oversight resources at Spirit AeroSystems and
Daher facilities, and strengthening its oversight procedures
over suppliers.
LIncreased Employee Training--New manufacturing
and quality employees will receive two additional weeks of
foundational training, followed by enhanced structured on-the-
job training (SOJT), among other actions.
LProduction System Compliance--Based on the FAA's
audit findings, Boeing will target improvement in four areas of
production:
+ L(1) FOD control,
+ L(2) tool control,
+ L(3) parts and materials control, and
+ L(4) employees' adherence to work instructions.
LInternal Engagement and Communication--Boeing is
assessing its internal communications to elevate its safety
culture and roll out new initiatives. These include full-day
safety/quality standdowns, Employee Involvement Teams (EIT) to
review employee feedback and host problem-solving sessions, a
leadership program for managers, and improving the company's
messaging.
LInstallation Plan Improvements--Boeing is
simplifying the work instructions for mechanics and inspectors,
so it is easier to perform consistently.\38\
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\38\ Id.
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III. WITNESS
LThe Honorable Michael Whitaker, Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration
IMPLEMENTATION OF BOEING'S COMPREHENSIVE ACTION PLAN
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2024
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Garret Graves
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. The Subcommittee on Aviation will
come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized to
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Cohen. I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on
the subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at
today's hearing and ask questions.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Cohen. As a reminder, if a Member wishes to insert a
document into the record, please also email it to
[email protected].
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
I now recognize myself for the purposes of an opening
statement for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GARRET GRAVES OF LOUISIANA, CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I want to begin by thanking
Administrator Whitaker for being here, and I want to thank you
and your team for all of your efforts to keep the subcommittee,
to keep the committee apprised of everything going on regarding
Boeing's corrective action plan in the wake of Alaska Airlines
flight 1282.
I also want to take a minute to thank NTSB and the Chair
for all their efforts to keep us apprised as well. But the FAA
and the staff have been very communicative on the status of
efforts on the action plan, and we are very appreciative of
that.
Look, it is no secret--and we talk about it in almost every
aviation hearing--that the United States has the gold standard
of aviation. Some of the incidents that have happened in recent
months and years have certainly called that into question and
caused us to ensure that we are not--excuse me--to ensure that
we are staying on top of that, ensure that we are continuing to
work to maintain that standard, to improve that standard.
Boeing's continuing challenges that were exemplified by the
Alaska Airlines flight 1282 door plug accident represents one
of the most visible elements of an aviation system that has
been strained and sometimes past the breaking point. In the
wake of the door plug accident, you took immediate action to
enhance oversight of Boeing's production facilities while also
demanding the company develop, present, and, most importantly,
implement a comprehensive action plan to address production
deficiencies.
Today we are here to learn more about how this plan is
being implemented, as well as what we can expect from Boeing
and FAA's oversight of Boeing in the weeks, months, and years
to come.
I do, however, want to issue a word of warning. This latest
challenge comes as your agency is tasked with not only
implementing a historic 1,000-page FAA reauthorization bill
that governs aviation over the next 5 years, a mandate with
explicit timelines in many cases, with urgent actions to
improve aviation efficiency and safety that is going to be
incredibly time-consuming. But I also want to remind you that
the FAA is also tasked with continuing to implement and conduct
oversight over the 2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act, a law that made--a bipartisan law, it came
out of this committee--that made targeted reforms to improve
aircraft certification processes following the two 737 MAX 8
crashes in 2018 and 2019.
We have discussed in the past some of the delays that
implementing provisions from 2016 and 2018 FAA bills, and as I
have said to you, and to be fair, you have inherited much of
this. But I do want to make crystal clear from this committee's
perspective--and I think I speak on behalf of my friend,
Ranking Member Cohen as well--we cannot continue this
trajectory of slow implementation or not implementing.
We did a tremendous amount of work, as did the aviation
teams, in getting to a bipartisan agreement in an environment
where people can't agree upon motherhood and apple pie in this
Congress, and we expect that that is going to be implemented
with urgency at the same time the FAA moves forward with the
Boeing oversight plan. You can walk and chew gum. We are
confident your agency can as well.
Implementation of the 2018 FAA reauthorization bill and
many other necessary initiatives were partially derailed by
FAA's response to the last Boeing oversight challenge. But that
can't happen again. Regardless of the challenges facing FAA and
Boeing, the FAA must be able to move forward and do its full
mission.
So, today, Administrator, I want to hear about the steps
being taken with your agency and Boeing to ensure that we are
minimizing risk and making certain that safety comes first and
foremost in all levels, from the C-suite to the factory floor,
when it comes to building airplanes in Boeing facilities.
We also want to hear about what the FAA is doing beyond the
immediate response to these issues and learn about how the
safety implementation bill is progressing and how FAA is going
to ensure that day-to-day crises don't derail the year-to-year
strategies.
I look forward to hearing your testimony and thank you for
being here today.
[Mr. Graves of Louisiana's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Garret Graves of Louisiana, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Aviation
I want to begin by thanking you, Administrator Whitaker, for
joining us today to update the Subcommittee on Boeing's corrective
action plan in the wake of the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 incident.
I also want to note that we appreciate you and your staff's
continued updates on this important matter, including the briefing
earlier this summer in which you personally briefed members of the Full
Committee on the FAA's oversight of Boeing.
We are here today because it is no secret that America's gold
standard in aviation safety is under the microscope, and the FAA's role
in conducting safety oversight is paramount.
Boeing's continuing challenges, exemplified by the Alaska Airlines
flight 1282 door plug accident, represent the most visible element of
an aviation system that has been strained to, and sometimes past, the
breaking point.
In the wake of the door plug accident, you took immediate action to
enhance oversight of Boeing's production facilities while also
demanding the company develop, present, and most importantly implement
a comprehensive action plan to address production deficiencies.
Today we are here to learn more about how this plan is being
implemented, as well as what we can expect from Boeing, and the FAA's
oversight of Boeing, in the weeks, months, and years to come.
I do, however, want to issue a word of warning.
This latest Boeing challenge comes as your agency is tasked with
not only implementing a historic, thousand-page FAA Reauthorization
bill--a mandate that is without a doubt time-consuming and staff
intensive--but also the 2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act (ACSAA), a law that made targeted reforms to improve
aircraft certification processes following the two 737 MAX 8 crashes in
2018 and 2019.
Your plate is full to say the least, and you've only been at the
helm of the agency since the beginning of this year. Undoubtedly, you
have a unique view of the agency's implementation efforts, and this
hearing is an opportunity to talk about the progress that has been made
on both of those bills.
Implementation of the 2018 FAA Reauthorization bill, and many other
necessary initiatives, were partially derailed by FAA's understandable
response to the last Boeing oversight challenge.
But that can't happen again. Regardless of the challenges facing
FAA and Boeing, the FAA must be able to walk and chew gum at the same
time.
So today, Administrator Whitaker, we want to hear about the steps
being taken at your agency and at Boeing to ensure that we're
minimizing risks and making certain that safety comes first and
foremost at all levels, from the C-suite to the factory floor, when it
comes to building airplanes in Boeing facilities.
But we also want to hear about what the FAA is doing beyond the
immediate response to Boeing's issues and learn about how ACSAA
implementation is progressing and how FAA is going to ensure that day-
to-day crises do not derail year-to-year strategy.
I look forward to hearing your testimony, and I thank you for being
here today.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I now recognize Ranking Member
Cohen for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE COHEN OF TENNESSEE, RANKING
MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you, Administrator Whitaker, for being with us
today.
We are here to discuss Boeing, not Boeing's problem with
getting capsules up to and carrying back astronauts from the
space station, and not concerning their pension plan where they
took from the employees a decade ago, and the employees would
like to get that fixed pension plan back. But we are here to
discuss Boeing's ongoing challenges, as Mr. Graves has well
pointed out, with safety, production quality, and company
culture, which we were reminded of, unfortunately, in dramatic
fashion with the door failure, the plug failure.
Before I get to that, though, I do want to reemphasize what
Mr. Graves mentioned about all of the things that are in the
reauthorization bill.
I get a lot of calls from people, have for years, about the
EVAC Act, and having a process we know we are getting people
off the airplanes in the required time that is set out there.
We are not doing it. And the studies that they do in Oklahoma
City are ridiculous. They don't have sample passengers of a
typical airplane: people who wear braces, who have wheelchairs,
who have crutches, who have babies, who have help dogs, or who
are just old and a bit infirm, or real young and in their
mother's arms.
We have got to have another test soon that has real plane-
like, life-like features. I hope you will look into that and
the other issues we had with safety. A lot of people were
really happy about the issues that we put in there that draw
attention to people with disabilities, to make sure those are
implemented. I know you will, but I want to emphasize that.
The FAA and the NTSB immediately began independent
concurrent investigations on Boeing's plug failure. And we went
over and we saw the items and all, and Ms. Homendy did a great
job.
The FAA also told Boeing to create a plan to address known
issues at the time, and the plan was submitted to the FAA at
the end of May.
Now that Boeing has begun implementing its Safety and
Quality Plan and the FAA has begun conducting its additional
oversight, it is time to examine whether the promised changes
are being made and whether promised improvements are being
attained.
I was real critical of Boeing, and properly so, when the
two plane accidents, the crashes, that Boeing's top dog
resigned finally. First he said he was whatever, but he wasn't
taking a pay cut or anything else. Well, he is gone.
It is amazing this has continued. You thought that would be
a wakeup call. And I have tried since to kind of understand and
think about Boeing as one of America's premier companies, one
that we have been proud of, iconic, and we don't want Airbus to
get all the planes.
But Boeing keeps messing up. For America's interest, Boeing
needs to get its act together. They want to be a good citizen,
be safe. And I know you will oversee them and see that they
are.
Congress must continue to hold Boeing accountable for the
safety of its aircraft, to continue to hold the FAA accountable
also for its oversight of manufacturers' design and production
processes.
Moreover, while we are here today, I would like to go on
record and thank NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy and all the NTSB
investigators, again, for their vigorous efforts as they work
alongside FAA to expose critical issues and increase the safety
of air transportation.
Our subcommittee will work with all the relevant parties to
enact any legislative changes necessary to resolve quality
control problems, strengthen oversight of aircraft
manufacturers and suppliers, and prevent further safety issues
from arising.
I was pleased Boeing chose an engineer and not a
businessperson driven by a bottom line, bottom line that they
were all considering, but their stock keeps going down even
quicker than some of their airplanes have. So, they need to
worry about that.
Thank you, Administrator Whitaker, for being here today,
and I look forward to our discussion and our work over the next
years.
[Mr. Cohen's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Steve Cohen of Tennessee, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Aviation
Thank you, Chairman Graves, and thank you, Administrator Whitaker,
for testifying today.
We are here today to discuss Boeing's ongoing challenges with
safety, production quality and company culture, which we were reminded
of in dramatic fashion by Boeing's door plug accident earlier this
year.
In response, the FAA and NTSB immediately began independent,
concurrent investigations. The FAA also told Boeing to create a plan to
address known issues at the time. That plan was submitted to the FAA at
the end of May.
Now that Boeing has begun implementing its Safety and Quality Plan
and the FAA has begun conducting its additional oversight, it is time
to examine whether promised changes are being made and whether promised
improvements are being attained.
Congress must continue to hold Boeing accountable for the safety of
its aircraft and continue to hold the FAA accountable for its oversight
of manufacturers' design and production processes.
Moreover, while they are not here today, I'd like to go on the
record and thank NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy and all of the NTSB
investigators again for their vigorous efforts as they work alongside
the FAA to expose critical issues and to increase the safety of air
transportation.
Our Subcommittee will work with all relevant parties to enact any
legislative changes necessary to resolve quality control problems,
strengthen oversight of aircraft manufacturers and suppliers, and
prevent further safety issues from arising.
Thank you again, Administrator Whitaker, for being here today, and
I look forward to our discussion.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. The gentleman yields
back.
I recognize Ranking Member Larsen for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING
MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you. Thank you, Chair
Graves, for calling this hearing today.
Today we are really having two hearings in one:
The first, motivated by the aftermath of the January 5th
Boeing 737 MAX door plug accident, which will examine Boeing's
safety culture problems, the FAA's subsequent investigation,
and Boeing's comprehensive action plan to address these issues.
The second, we will evaluate the FAA's general oversight of
U.S. aviation manufacturing and the implications of any
necessary reforms.
Towards this end, we have to ensure the FAA has resources
and tools that it needs to effectively conduct its
investigation and help prevent accidents like this from
happening again.
Just as we did nearly 5 years ago, this committee must
remain vigilant in our oversight and authorization roles and
hold those responsible accountable, wherever the FAA and the
NTSB investigations lead.
Now, on January 5, 2024, a door plug was torn from a 737
MAX 9 aircraft shortly after it departed Portland International
Airport, forcing that flight and the flightcrew to make an
emergency landing and return to Portland. This event was
terrifying to all of those on board, but thanks to the calm and
professional actions of Alaska's flightcrew, everyone returned
to the ground safely.
Shortly thereafter, the FAA cautiously and rightfully
grounded the U.S. 737 MAX 9 fleet for nearly 20 days, and the
NTSB initiated an accident investigation. The FAA also
initiated a concurrent but separate investigation and further
announced an audit of the 737 MAX production lines and its
suppliers.
The FAA has also placed a further safety limitation on
Boeing, prohibiting any increase in the production rate of the
737 MAX aircraft. This limit is still in place and will remain
until the FAA is satisfied that certain, quote, ``quality
control issues uncovered during this process are resolved,''
end quote.
Unfortunately, it is not the first time we have seen
quality control and production issues at Boeing's facilities.
In May of 2021, then-Chair DeFazio and I wrote to the
Department of Transportation, the FAA, and Boeing with concerns
about no less than nine reports of quality control issues at
Boeing production facilities. Since then, there have been
dozens more reports, leading to emergency fixes in the fleet
and halts in production.
Given the pervasiveness of these issues across multiple
locations, experts have pointed to an overarching cultural
problem within the company, and it goes without saying: the
safety culture of any institution flows from the top. However,
a shakeup in leadership is not the final answer--it is only the
beginning. The company must work to revamp its safety culture,
particularly as it relates to its relationship with its
greatest asset: its workers.
The flying public deserves answers, and I am committed to
using all the tools at my disposal to get them.
I do want to highlight what I am hearing back home in
Washington State. In the Pacific Northwest, aviation and
aerospace are part of our DNA. More than 30,000 dedicated women
and men go to work each day at the Boeing plant in Everett and
throughout the State. These are hard-working individuals who
punch the clock day in, day out and make significant
contributions to our local communities.
The consequences of Boeing leadership's repeated safety and
quality missteps are felt hardest by the workforce, who strive
each and every day to ensure Boeing's aircraft remain the
safest in the world but are not always given the resources or
direction to fulfill those duties. They deserve answers as
well.
I am grateful to all the Boeing workers that have come
forward with information for the various Federal investigations
and have made their own recommendations. However, these issues
and the FAA's response extend well beyond Boeing and beyond
Washington State. Boeing is the largest exporter in the
country, so, these issues impact the entire U.S. economy. They
impact workers across the country. They impact passengers'
travel and the confidence of the flying public. They impact the
supply chains that circle the globe.
It is not enough to build airplanes in the U.S. U.S.
aviation must build safe airplanes in the U.S., and how the
Congress and the FAA respond to this event will have lasting
repercussions. We have to get these changes right, and not just
for Boeing's sake, but for the sake of aviation manufacturing
throughout the country and throughout the world.
As more is uncovered, it falls on Congress to support the
FAA and NTSB in their ongoing investigations and to take the
necessary actions to ensure the safety of our skies.
The Boeing 737 MAX 9 door plug accident is yet another
reminder of the importance of this committee's work, of the
FAA's efforts, and what is at stake it if we don't remain
vigilant in addressing systemic safety issues in the U.S.
aviation ecosystem.
Now, with a plan in place to begin Boeing's cultural course
correction, I look forward to hearing from Administrator
Whitaker about how the action plan was developed, what role the
FAA played in its creation, any progress or lack thereof with
its implementation, and how the FAA plans to keep Boeing
accountable to its execution.
The U.S. is the leader in global aviation, and this
committee's efforts, along with the FAA's, will have profound
implications for air travel around the world.
With that, I yield back.
[Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chairman Graves, for calling this hearing on the
``Implementation of Boeing's Comprehensive Action Plan.''
Today, we are really having two hearings in one:
The first, motivated by the aftermath of the January 5th Boeing 737
MAX door-plug accident, will examine Boeing's safety culture problems,
the FAA's subsequent investigation and Boeing's Comprehensive Action
Plan to address these issues.
The second will evaluate the FAA's general oversight of U.S.
aviation manufacturing and the implications of any necessary reforms.
Towards this end, we have to make sure the FAA has the resources
and tools it needs to effectively conduct its investigation and help
prevent accidents like this from happening again.
Just as we did nearly five years ago, this Committee must remain
vigilant in our oversight and authorization roles and hold those
responsible accountable, wherever the FAA and NTSB investigations lead.
On January 5, 2024, a door plug was torn from a 737 MAX 9 aircraft
shortly after it departed Portland International Airport (PDX), forcing
that flight to make an emergency landing and return to Portland.
This event was terrifying to all those on board, but thanks to the
calm and professional action of Alaska's flight crew, everyone returned
to the ground safely.
Shortly thereafter, the FAA cautiously and rightfully grounded the
U.S. 737 MAX 9 fleet for nearly 20 days, and the NTSB initiated an
accident investigation.
The FAA also initiated a concurrent but separate investigation and
further announced an audit of the 737 MAX production lines and its
suppliers.
The FAA also placed a further safety limitation on Boeing,
prohibiting any increase in the production rate of the 737 MAX
aircraft.
This limit is still in place and will remain until the FAA is
satisfied that certain ``quality control issues uncovered during this
process are resolved.''
Unfortunately, this isn't the first time we've seen quality control
and production issues at Boeing's facilities.
In May 2021, then Chair DeFazio and I wrote to the Department of
Transportation, FAA and Boeing with concerns about no less than nine
reports of quality control issues at Boeing production facilities.
Since then, there have been dozens more reports, leading to
emergency fixes in the fleet and halts in production.
Given the pervasiveness of these issues across multiple locations,
experts have pointed to an overarching cultural problem within the
company.
It goes without saying that the safety culture of any institution
flows from the top. However, a shakeup in leadership is not the final
answer--it is only the beginning.
The company must work to revamp its safety culture, particularly as
it relates to its relationship with its greatest asset: its workers.
The flying public deserve answers, and I am committed to using all
the tools at my disposal to get them.
I want to highlight what I'm hearing back home in Washington state.
In the Pacific Northwest, aviation and aerospace are part of our
DNA. More than 30,000 dedicated women and men go to work each day at
the Boeing plant in Everett and throughout the state.
These are hardworking individuals who punch the clock day in and
day out and make significant contributions to our local communities.
The consequences of Boeing leadership's repeated safety and quality
missteps are felt hardest by the workforce--who strive each and every
day to ensure Boeing's aircraft remains the safest in the world but are
not always given the resources or direction to fulfill their duties.
They deserve answers, as well.
And I'm grateful to all the Boeing workers that have come forward
with information for the various federal investigations and have made
recommendations.
However, these issues, and the FAA's response, extend well beyond
Boeing and Washington state.
Boeing is the largest exporter in the country, so these issues
impact the entire U.S. economy.
They impact workers across the country; they impact passengers'
travel and the confidence of the flying public; and they impact supply
chains that circle the globe.
It is not enough to build airplanes in the U.S.--U.S. aviation must
build safe airplanes in the U.S.
How the FAA and we as Congress respond to this event will have
lasting repercussions for decades to come; we have to get this right
and not just for Boeing's sake--for the sake of aviation manufacturing
across the country and the world.
As more is uncovered, it falls on Congress to support the FAA and
NTSB in their ongoing investigations and take the necessary actions to
ensure the safety of our skies.
The Boeing 737 MAX 9 door plug accident is yet another reminder of
the importance of this Committee's work, the FAA's efforts and what is
at stake if we do not remain vigilant in addressing systemic safety
issues in the U.S. aviation ecosystem.
Now, with a plan in place to begin Boeing's cultural course-
correction, I look forward to hearing from Administrator Whitaker about
how the Action Plan was developed, what role the FAA played in its
creation, any progress or lack thereof with its implementation and how
the FAA plans to keep Boeing accountable to its execution.
The U.S. is the leader in global aviation, and this Committee's
efforts, along with the FAA's, will have profound implications for air
travel around the world.
Thank you.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
I would again like to thank our witness, Administrator
Whitaker, for being here today.
Mr. Cohen. Briefly I would like to explain our system,
which I imagine you understand already: the red, the green, and
the yellow. To start, you have got 5 minutes. When you get down
to 4 minutes, the yellow light goes on instead of the green
light. And then when you get to no time left, red, stop.
I ask unanimous consent the witness' full statement be
included in the record.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Cohen. And I ask unanimous consent that the record of
today's hearing remain open until such time as our witness has
provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to him
in writing.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Cohen. I also ask unanimous consent that the record
remain open for 15 days for any additional comments and
information submitted by Members or the witness to be included
in the record of today's hearing.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Cohen. And I also ask that the Administrator be held in
contempt if he doesn't get all that done.
Just a joke. Just a joke.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Reserving the right to object.
As your written testimony has been included in the hearing
record, the subcommittee asks that you limit your oral remarks
to 5 minutes. And with that, Administrator Whitaker, thanks
again for being here, and you are recognized for 5 minutes for
your oral testimony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL WHITAKER, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, Chairman Graves, Ranking Members
Larsen and Cohen, members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to be here today.
In early June, I had the opportunity to brief this
committee on the agency's oversight of Boeing's production and
manufacturing processes, and today I want to provide an update
on our progress since then.
This past February, I directed Boeing to develop a
comprehensive plan to fix its systematic quality control and
production issues. This plan was required to incorporate the
results of FAA's special audit, as well as the findings and
recommendations of the section 103 panel. Boeing provided that
plan to the FAA on May 30th.
Let me be clear. This plan does not mark the end of the
FAA's increased oversight of Boeing and its suppliers. There
must be a profound shift in the company's safety culture to
holistically address its quality assurance and production
challenges. Our goal is to make sure Boeing implements the
necessary changes and has the right tools in place to sustain
those changes in the long term.
Since January 5th, we have added more safety inspectors at
Boeing and Spirit facilities, and we will maintain our
increased onsite presence. Our oversight activities include
more direct engagement with company employees, additional
inspections at critical points of the production process, and
increased auditing of quality systems and build processes.
Our safety inspectors are embedded in each of the Boeing
teams implementing the key components of the plan, allowing us
to provide direct feedback on any proposed changes to the plan.
We are closely reviewing Boeing's performance metrics to
evaluate the overall health of their production system and will
independently assess any early indicators of risk within the
system.
In addition to the work the safety inspectors are doing on
the production oversight, we also have hundreds of FAA
personnel who are focused on other aspects of our Boeing
oversight. These employees are monitoring the in-service fleet
through our continued operational safety program, overseeing
Boeing's ODA, and conducting certification activities.
Addressing these issues also requires the FAA to
continually examine the effectiveness of our own oversight
model. We must be proactive and establish more dynamic
oversight protocols that address changing technologies and
changing business models and allow us to identify and mitigate
risks before they manifest themselves as events.
As a first step, we are reevaluating our current safety
oversight models and establishing a strategy to revamp our
agencywide safety management program. As part of this strategy,
we will reconstitute our executive committee that oversees
regulatory oversight and safety management programs, and this
group, which I will chair, will continually monitor the safety,
performance, and health of the system as a whole, and drive a
process to continuously improve and update our oversight
models.
We are also examining opportunities to better leverage our
vast data resources to become more predictive in identifying
risks across the aviation system. To this end, the agency is
undertaking a fresh look at our current capabilities to provide
more real-time insight into emerging safety trends and to share
relevant data across various components of our safety
ecosystem.
To conclude, I want to stress that the safety and integrity
of our air transportation system relies heavily on the
operators in that system--all operators--having a strong safety
culture, a culture where safety is first, not in name only but
in how the operation is run. Safety must come before financial
incentives, production targets, or operational goals, and
employees must have the ability and, in fact, be encouraged to
speak up and come forward with safety concerns without fear of
reprisal. They must have confidence in the process to know that
their report will be investigated thoroughly. And just as
Boeing must develop a strong safety culture, so must all
operators in our national airspace.
Congress has expanded SMS requirements to most major
operators in the system, including the major airlines, part 135
operators, airports, and aircraft manufacturers. Having a
robust SMS is key to operating safely within our system. It
provides a structured, repeatable, systematic approach to
managing risk. Ultimately, we must ensure that all operators
participate in these programs, including new entrants.
As we integrate these nontraditional operators into our
airspace, whether advanced air mobility or commercial space
operators, they must embrace SMS and the tenets of a healthy
safety culture in order to ensure we continue to have the
safest aerospace system in the world.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here, and I look
forward to your questions.
[Mr. Whitaker's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, Subcommittee Chairman
Graves, Subcommittee Ranking Member Cohen, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today
to provide an update on the FAA's oversight of Boeing's production and
manufacturing system. I want to thank the committee for your hard work
in passing the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. The FAA started
implementation immediately, and we are committed to keeping you and
your staff updated on our progress on a quarterly basis.
I would like to begin by reiterating that the number one priority
for the FAA is the safety of the flying public. As we carry out our
regulatory responsibilities and oversight activities, safety will
always inform our decision-making, and I am prepared to use the full
range of my authority to ensure accountability whether from a
manufacturer, an air carrier, or the FAA's own operations.
Alaska Airlines Flight 1282
On January 5, shortly after departure, Alaska Airlines Flight 1282
experienced rapid depressurization after the left mid exit door plug
blew out of a Boeing 737-9 MAX. Immediately following the accident, on
January 6, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive
grounding all 737-9 MAX airplanes with that particular door plug
configuration.
We mandated and oversaw a thorough inspection and maintenance
process on each of the grounded airplanes before allowing them to
return to service. Our findings during those inspections revealed that
the quality system issues at Boeing were unacceptable and required
further scrutiny. We increased oversight activities including:
Capping production of new Boeing 737 MAX airplanes to
achieve system stability and compliance with required quality control
procedures.
Launching an investigation scrutinizing Boeing's
compliance with manufacturing requirements.
Increasing oversight of the production of new airplanes
with more FAA safety inspectors on-site at all Boeing manufacturing
facilities.
Increasing data monitoring to identify significant safety
issues.
Commissioning an independent analysis of potential
safety-focused reforms around quality control and delegation.
Boeing Comprehensive Plan
This past February, I directed Boeing to develop a comprehensive
action plan within 90 days to address its systemic quality control and
production issues. During the subsequent months, the FAA worked closely
with Boeing as it developed its roadmap and plan for the path forward.
I required this plan to address the findings from the FAA's special
audit as well as the recommendations from the expert review panel
report required by Section 103 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety,
and Accountability Act of 2020 (ACSAA). Boeing provided its plan to the
FAA on May 30, 2024, marking the beginning of the next chapter of
ensuring implementation and a renewed focus on safety at Boeing.
However, this plan does not mark the end of the FAA's increased
oversight of Boeing and its suppliers. There must be a shift in the
company's safety culture to holistically address its systemic quality
assurance and production issues. Our goal is to make sure Boeing
implements the necessary changes and has the right tools in place to
sustain those changes in the long term.
In April of this year, we issued regulations that require Boeing to
have a Safety Management System, which will ensure a structured,
repeatable, systematic approach to identifying hazards and managing
risk.
As part of its comprehensive plan, Boeing has committed to the
following:
Increasing and enhancing employee training, engagement,
and communication;
Encouraging its employees to speak up without fear of
reprisal;
Boosting supplier oversight;
Increasing quality oversight at every step of the
production process, and ensuring things happen in the right sequence
and are approved before moving forward;
Getting more input from users of the system;
Simplifying production processes and procedures; and
Bringing state-of-the-art technology to Boeing tool and
parts management.
To monitor the health of Boeing's production and quality system,
including the impacts of those changes, we also directed Boeing to
identify key performance indicators (KPIs). These KPIs directly
correspond to the targets outlined in its comprehensive action plan to
improve its safety and quality systems and will help assess the
effectiveness of its proposed initiatives. The KPIs provide real-time
visibility into the production system with specific control limits that
will trigger corrective action if needed.
FAA's Oversight Activities
Boeing's manufacturing and production system is complex and multi-
faceted, spanning multiple facilities and thousands of suppliers.
Because of the complexity of its operations, Boeing must have a robust
safety system comprised of multiple layers that can detect and mitigate
identified risks. The FAA will hold Boeing accountable for having an
effective system in place with procedures that ensure the production
and delivery of safe airplanes.
As a result of systemic production quality issues, Boeing must make
significant changes to transform its quality system and ensure the
right layers of safety are in place. As FAA Administrator, I am
directly engaged with Boeing's senior leadership to ensure they execute
the necessary changes to transform Boeing's safety culture and address
its production quality issues. I met with their new CEO, Kelly Ortberg,
last month and reemphasized to him our expectations that these changes
must be sustained in the long term.
The safety and integrity of our air transportation system rely
heavily on having a culture where people come forward with their safety
concerns without fear of reprisal, and they have confidence in the
process to know that their report will be investigated thoroughly.
Boeing must maintain its own robust safety reporting programs and
promote a safe and proactive reporting culture within its
organizations.
We have added more safety inspectors in the Boeing and Spirit
AeroSystems facilities, and we will maintain our increased on-site
presence for the foreseeable future. Our surveillance activities
include:
More engagement with company employees to hear directly
from them and gauge the effectiveness of changes outlined in Boeing's
plan;
Added inspections at critical points of the production
process; and
Increased auditing of quality systems, build processes,
and changes outlined in Boeing's plan.
Our safety inspectors are also monitoring each of Boeing's sub-
teams tasked with implementing the key areas of the plan. Our safety
inspectors are providing direct feedback on Boeing's proposed changes
and monitoring the KPIs to identify potential system risks. The FAA is
closely reviewing the KPIs to monitor Boeing's production system health
and will independently assess any early indicators of risks within the
system.
In addition to the work the safety inspectors are doing on
production oversight, we also have hundreds of other FAA personnel who
are focused on other aspects of our oversight of Boeing. These
employees are monitoring the in-service fleet through our continued
operational safety processes, overseeing Boeing's Organization
Designation Authorization, and conducting certification activities.
Addressing these safety issues also requires that the FAA
continually examine the effectiveness of its own oversight processes
and make the necessary improvements. We must continue to be
increasingly proactive and establish more dynamic oversight protocols
that allow us to anticipate and identify risks before they manifest
themselves as events.
As our first step, we are reevaluating our current safety
management initiatives and establishing a strategy to revamp our
agency-wide safety management program. As part of this long-term
strategy, we are in the process of elevating the role of our Executive
Committee which oversees our regulatory oversight and safety management
programs. To drive the necessary improvements to our oversight model
across the agency, both the Deputy Administrator and I will serve on
the Executive Committee. By doing so, this commitment underscores the
importance of promoting an effective safety culture at every level of
the agency.
As the FAA enhances our oversight models agency-wide, we are also
examining opportunities to leverage the vast internal and external data
resources to become more predictive in identifying risks across the
aviation system. To this end, the agency is undertaking a fresh look at
our current capabilities to provide more real-time insight into any
emerging safety trends and to share relevant data across the various
components of our safety ecosystem.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I look
forward to your questions.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Administrator. I
appreciate your testimony.
The gentleman from Georgia, would you like to go first?
If not, the gentleman from New York?
Mr. Molinaro. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. From New York, Mr. Molinaro is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Molinaro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, if I might, I seek unanimous consent to enter a
statement regarding Mammoth Freighters to the committee.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Fact Sheet--Mammoth Freighters, Submitted for the Record by
Hon. Marcus J. Molinaro
Background
Mammoth Freighters LLC (Mammoth) was founded in December 2020 by
cargo conversion program executives and backed by Fortress Investment
Group LLC to develop and perform United States (U.S.)-based and
manufactured Boeing aircraft passenger to freighter (P2F) conversions.
The launch aircraft type is the Boeing 777. The Mammoth-converted 777
is one of the world's most productive and economical 777 long haul
freighters. Pending Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification
results, the freighter will enter service with global airlines in 2025.
Mammoth's Boeing 777MF converted freighter bolsters U.S.
market leadership over European rivals such as Airbus.
Mammoth freighters are designed and converted in the U.S.
with over 99.5% parts Made in America from suppliers across 22 states.
Mammoth has created over 500 new jobs in Dallas-Fort
Worth and expects to create more than 1,000 direct jobs, not including
job growth at our suppliers.
Mammoth operates out of a large, Fort Worth City-owned
ex-American Airlines maintenance facility at Alliance Airport, where
sister company Aspire MRO performs 777MF conversions.
Mammoth has secured 35 firm orders and more orders are
expected.
Mammoth expects to convert over a dozen airplanes per
year for both the U.S. and global cargo markets.
The Mammoth 777MF prototype is entering the critical test
and final phases of FAA certification with the goal of obtaining
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) approval by February 2025.
Adherence to timelines is key to ensuring project
success.
Status
Understanding FAA resource constraints, Mammoth and the FAA
continue to collaborate with the shared goal of meeting certification
project milestones. The Mammoth team and FAA designated engineering
representatives (DERs) are highly experienced, well-known and
respected. The FAA can leverage Mammoth's expertise and reduce its own
workload through delegation, which will ensure on-time project delivery
and enable U.S. global freight delivery competitiveness.
Immediate FAA Actions Needed:
Ensure adequate resources for the Mammoth project
(ST17720LA-T) despite competing Boeing, Israel Aerospace Industries
(IAI), and other certification projects.
Utilize FAA designees to the fullest extent possible to
alleviate FAA resource challenges.
Review project documents per the current FAA-published
timelines (30-45 days depending on document type).
Conclusion
FAA certification for the Mammoth project by February 2025 is
paramount to extend the useful life of U.S.-produced Boeing 777s to
support U.S. competitiveness and business growth in the global supply
chain, grow U.S. manufacturing jobs across the Mammoth supplier
footprint, and service key existing and prospective Mammoth partners
such as Jetran, Kalitta, DHL International, FedEx, UPS, Air Canada, and
STS Aviation Services.
Mr. Molinaro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Whitaker, thanks very much for being here. I
heard you talk about the changes at FAA to obviously address
the needed oversight: ``process to continuously improve and
update our oversight models.'' Give me a practical application
of what that might look like. And additionally, how might that
change at FAA--how might that change have called into question,
or at least alerted us, of the potential risk of the Alaska
Airlines incident?
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, sir. So, I think one feature is,
we need to not set an oversight model in place and just let it
run forever. So, I think we need to constantly see, are we
looking at the right data, as business models change, as
technology changes.
I think a good example of a more dynamic approach is how we
oversee airlines. We have an index that accounts for about a
dozen different data points, and that index gives us a real-
time picture of how the airlines are doing, how they are
trending. And if we start to see a trend that we don't like, we
implement an audit that is tied to those features.
Mr. Molinaro. So, we know from your report and, of course,
Boeing's response to the incident, what was the trend that
might have been identified in this particular case to have
helped us avert such a tragic situation?
Mr. Whitaker. So, I think if you look at what we have
implemented since January 5th, we put in these key performance
indicators--there are six of them--and they give us a reading
month by month on how Boeing is doing in those six areas.
That includes how much traveled work--how much work is done
out of order in the manufacturing process, for example. That
indicator would have shown that there was a lot of work being
done out of process, which creates a safety risk, because work
is done not on the factory floor but when the airplane has
already been pushed out onto the tarmac and it is not part of
the system.
So, we would have that real-time sort of monthly indicator
to show us if things are moving in the wrong direction.
Mr. Molinaro. So, do you feel confident at this point that
Boeing has--switching to Boeing and attention to Boeing--has
made adequate adjustments to at least the culture to address
these safety issues?
Mr. Whitaker. So, I think there are really two parts to the
plan with Boeing. One is the short term and one is long term,
and I would put culture in the long-term category. It is not a
6-month program. It is a 3-year to 5-year program.
There has been significant progress made, for example, on
traveled work. Boeing moved about 100 inspectors down to
Wichita to Spirit to make sure that the product coming out of
Spirit was properly completed.
So, there has been some short-term progress, but on
culture, I think it is a long-term project, and I have talked
to the board and the CEO about the need to be in it for the
long term and making sure they arrive in that place.
Mr. Molinaro. But it is fair to say that you feel that, at
the very least, both short term and long term, Boeing is making
adequate adjustments to provide for safety in the immediate
situation and address the cultural deficiencies?
Mr. Whitaker. We are currently writing the airworthiness
certificate on each aircraft. Normally that would be delegated
to Boeing, but we have taken that over so that we are making
sure that every airplane that comes out there is safe.
So, we are not to the point where we are turning that over.
We are working with them to develop their safety management
system, and we are in it pretty intensively with them. So, we
are monitoring that progress, there is progress, but they are
not where they need to be yet.
Mr. Molinaro. So, my constituents will ask a very simple
question: Is it safe to fly in a Boeing 737 MAX 9?
Mr. Whitaker. It is safe. We certify each one of them. We
do a final inspection in addition to the Boeing inspection. So,
we are keeping a close eye on them.
Mr. Molinaro. So, I will see you on one.
I do want to just express our appreciation for your
leadership at FAA. I know obviously implementing the
reauthorization package, 1,000-some-odd pages. And for the
airports that I represent or at least the people in the
communities with those airports--regional airports--Binghamton,
Ithaca, and now to a degree the Capital District in Albany, New
York--a greater investment in those smaller regional airports,
critically important not only to moving people but to building
up economies. Look forward to your partnership and grateful
that you are at the helm----
Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Molinaro [continuing]. At this moment. Thanks very
much.
I yield the balance of my time.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. The gentleman from New York yields
back.
The gentleman from Tennessee, Ranking Member Cohen, is
recognized.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Graves.
Mr. Whitaker, as you well know, plans often must be
reviewed, revised during the execution to reflect unforeseen
challenges and factors. Over the past few months, has Boeing
taken any additional steps, outside its Safety and Quality
Plan, in response to new discoveries or new information?
Mr. Whitaker. I am sorry, sir, I am having a little bit of
trouble hearing. Can you just repeat the question, please?
Mr. Cohen. As we all know, plans often must be revised
during execution to reflect unforeseen factors and challenges.
Over the past few months, has Boeing taken any additional
steps, outside its Safety and Quality Plan, in response to any
new information or new discoveries?
Mr. Whitaker. I can't give you specific examples. What I
can say is that we have teams on the ground with Boeing, and
they do give real-time feedback. So, for example, as they are
simplifying business processes or rolling out a tool management
program, they are getting real-time feedback from the FAA, and
the approach and the plan is designed to be flexible to account
for that feedback.
So, I would anticipate that the answer is yes, but I don't
have specific examples to give you.
Mr. Cohen. Do you know if at Boeing, if an employee sees
what he thinks is a problem in manufacturing safety, can he
report that, if he chooses or she chooses, to the union, so
that the union can look into it and take it up to Boeing, or
does he have--are there requirements that it go straight to
Boeing and to the----
Mr. Whitaker [interrupting]. So, the employee has multiple
avenues. They can certainly go to their union. Making sure that
there is a system that encourages them to speak up directly to
Boeing is in place. We are monitoring very closely. That is a
key factor of a good safety culture.
And they can also report directly to FAA through our
website. They can log in to AIR21 Whistleblower and file a
complaint right on our website.
Mr. Cohen. Changing Boeing's culture, systems, and
processes will take time. What changes has the FAA seen so far
in these areas, and which parts of the company have been the
most resistant to any needed cultural changes?
Mr. Whitaker. I think the safety culture change is going to
be a long-term project. They have put together a safety
training program to roll out. That has been put on hold as
union negotiations continue. That is ready to roll out, but I
think it is going to take years of delivering that safety
message and the employees actually seeing that safety is more
important than production for that culture to change. So, it is
going to take a very long-term sustained commitment.
The changes we have seen in the short term have been around
deploying new technologies, assessing employee culture, and
things of that nature.
Mr. Cohen. Did they ever ascertain who the individual was
who didn't put the plugs back on the Alaska airplane?
Mr. Whitaker. That incident is still under investigation
from the NTSB, so, I don't have any additional information to
provide at this time.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you.
And you have met with Mr. Ortberg, I know. Do you think he
will lead the company differently from Mr. Calhoun and his
predecessors, and if so, how?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, I think we have been very careful not
to have opinions on personnel changes. There have been a lot of
personnel challenges, and I have spoken to the board fairly
extensively about what we think management should be focused
on.
I have had those conversations with Mr. Ortberg, too. I
think because he is an engineer, because he comes from
aerospace, I think he has a pretty good understanding of the
need for safety culture, and we will make sure that he pursues
that.
Mr. Cohen. As I understand it, Boeing has purchased or
taken back Spirit. And Boeing at one time had Spirit, separated
it, brought it back. Do you think that is going to help, and do
you think that the costs that are spinning off Spirit and some
of the labor issues they might have had then might have
contributed to less than a perfect situation for the employees'
diligence?
Mr. Whitaker. I do think that the amount of outsourcing
that Boeing undertook strategically created a lot of supply
chain challenges that other companies may not have experienced
if they had more control over their supply chain. And Boeing
seems to be taking a different direction in that approach. We
have been agnostic about whether it is a good idea or a bad
idea for them to execute that specific transaction, but if
Spirit is part of Boeing, it gives us direct authority over
Spirit.
Currently, Boeing has a responsibility to oversee Spirit as
a supplier. So, it gives us a better line of sight into what
they are doing.
Mr. Cohen. Airbus is Boeing's major competitor. Embraer
also produces a lot of airplanes. Do either one of them have
different systems that Boeing could incorporate or needs to
look at and incorporate? Because they haven't, to the best of
my knowledge, have not have these similar problems.
Mr. Whitaker. I think--I don't have intimate knowledge of
the Embraer and Airbus manufacturing challenges. I know that as
we benchmark airworthiness directives and faults and production
faults, we find that there is not a big difference between the
two.
I think when you look at the key indicators we are
monitoring, those would be the same for most manufacturing
facilities.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, sir. In the spirit of George Miller
and Sheila Jackson Lee, who always gave up their time when they
didn't have any time, I give up the rest of my time.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I appreciate the generosity,
Ranking Member Cohen.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sorry about that earlier. I was listening and changing up
some in my questioning and thought pattern, and I want you to
kind of go with me, because I want to kind of set the stage,
first of all.
As it was stated earlier, culture starts at the top, and
that is what shapes and forms the rest of the organization and
where they are going. And I want you to think back through the
entire Department of Transportation--the derailment of the
railroad, the train, over and above--way above average on near-
misses at our airports, even parts falling off of planes.
And I say that because the Department of Transportation
under Pete Buttigieg has had a focus of not hiring qualified
people and looking at qualified people but pushing a social
agenda, or a DEI initiative, to the point where people that are
under this industry, this umbrella of the Department of
Transportation, actually focus more on DEI initiatives instead
of hiring qualified people to build planes or to operate
railroads, waterways, whatever it is, under the purview of the
Department of Transportation.
So, I guess what I want to know on the Boeing side of this
thing is, I know they have opened up to operators so that they
can look at the 737. Have you seen any other thing that you are
concerned with on that airplane?
Mr. Whitaker. Have I seen anything other than what we are--
--
Mr. Collins [interposing]. Yes.
Mr. Whitaker [continuing]. Addressing in the comprehensive
plan? As I mentioned, this is a pretty intensive monitoring
process, so, we meet with their safety team weekly. The
management team meets monthly, and I meet with the CEO
quarterly. Anything that arises gets incorporated into the
plan. So, if anything new comes up, we look at those types of
issues.
Mr. Collins. You know, safety, safety, safety--I have heard
that numerous times, and we haven't even been in the meeting
here 30 minutes or so. So, that is the focus. And I want to
kind of look at one other quick thing before I am finished.
I know that the GAO--the nonpartisan GAO, put out a report
that they assessed 138 systems that you all have. According to
them, 51, or 37 percent, are unsustainable. Fifty-four, or
another thirty-nine percent of them, are potentially
unsustainable. And that the FAA has been extremely slow to
modernize the most critical and at-risk systems.
Now, we are sitting here talking about Boeing, but you have
also got a lot of things at risk in the FAA. And I am just
curious, where is our initiative and where is our push on that
to get this fixed?
Mr. Whitaker. I think the FAA facilities have been somewhat
famously underinvested in over the years. The centers--we have
21 centers that control high-altitude aircraft. Those were
designed to be a maximum life of 50 years. They are now, on
average, between 60 and 70 years old. All these facilities need
to be replaced and upgraded.
It is a fairly heavy lift financially. We have requested $8
billion in next year's budget to begin working on some of that
replacement. There is a huge backlog of sustainment and
modernization and, right now, 90 percent of our budget for
facilities goes on sustainment rather than new systems. So, we
have a lot of work to bring the system up to speed.
Mr. Collins. I would agree.
And, Mr. Chairman, I brought that up, and I want you to
understand where I look at this thing. I go back to the focus
of the Department of Transportation overall, and the focus is
in the wrong area.
Instead of us focusing on making sure that we have the
safest planes and the safest waterways and railroads and
airports and hiring qualified people to do that, this
administration and that agency are focused on social agendas,
and they don't have their focus on making sure that we keep
people safe. And that to me is the bigger issue that we have
underlying right here, right now.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Collins. Mr.
Collins, I do want to apologize to you. You had two or three
people that were in front of you, and they all jetted, and so,
I put you on the spot, and I apologize for that. But thank you
for staying.
I recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr.
Larsen from Washington, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
So, I think it is generally agreed that late 1990s, early
2000s, Boeing began to shift from being an engineering company
to a financial services company, focused on revenue for
shareholder value as primary instead of safety as primary. I
think our investigation showed that when we wrote the reform
bill. It has been the consensus conclusion from a lot of folks.
And what we need to--somebody earlier said we need to move
from thinking just about building the best airplanes in the
world here in the United States. We need to build the safest
airplanes here in the United States. And safety itself is a
shareholder value, and that needs to be communicated to
shareholders at Boeing as well, and they need to expect that
from their leadership because that is what the workers expect
as well. So, that is, I think, very critical.
And on these points, as you move forward in thinking about
safety, the first question I wanted to ask you is about these
key performance indicators, KPIs, the six of them you have
outlined and how you would assess Boeing's progress generally
on each of them. You don't need to go through all six, but how
you assess progress on these KPIs, because they seem to be the
linchpins that you are using to kind of turn Boeing on or off
in terms of progress or moving backwards.
Mr. Whitaker. I think the KPIs cover the key elements of
the plan, so they let us know how they are doing on what they
need to do in the plan. So, for example, we talked about
traveled work. So, if a fuselage leaves Spirit AeroSystems in
Kansas and goes to Seattle, and it has a series of faults in
it, those have to be reworked in an out-of-order sort of
fashion. And I think that--I think that was implicated in the
January 5th event.
So, for example, we measure how much work is done out of
work as one of those metrics. We are measuring how they are
doing with their supply chain, whether they have other
shortages, because supply chain shortages lead to out-of-order
work in the process; how the employee proficiency is doing and
how much rework is done. So, the things that you would expect.
They have been trending in positive directions mostly for
the 737 line, and they have now been rolled out to other lines
at Boeing. So, these will be metrics in place for all the
aircraft that they are building. And what we want to see is
those metrics all be green and stable before there is growth in
production.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. And have you concluded that those
apply directly to building a safer airplane, and is this
process getting incorporated into the safety management system
and the quality management system?
Mr. Whitaker. They are all interrelated, and, in fact, they
are raising the types of issues you would be looking for in a
robust safety management system. So, if you saw a lot of out-
of-sequence work, you would identify that as a risk and you
would say, okay, what do we need to do to mitigate this risk.
So, we are sort of doing that process for them--or overseeing
that process.
But as the safety management system develops, if they are
finding some other problem, they would identify that and
mitigate the risk. We are now there with them to look at those
potential problems.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. So, when we wrote the reform bill
a couple years back, one of the things I had emphasized is that
people say, well, this is a Boeing bill. It is like, it is not
a Boeing bill. This is an FAA bill. It is an aviation
manufacturing bill. This applies to everybody that it applies
to, not just--it applies to certainly Boeing as the source of
the problem, but this gets to the bigger issue of, I said, we
have two hearings really today. One is what is happening at
Boeing. The other one is, what is happening with you at FAA
overseeing the aviation manufacturing process to ensure that we
have a safe aviation manufacturing process.
So, can you talk, can you help us understand your comment
about moving towards a proactive approach versus a reactive
approach as you apply these principles to overseeing the
manufacturing of parts, components, and airframes that go into
flying?
Mr. Whitaker. So, as we look at oversight, we oversee half
a dozen or so major actors in the safety system, if you will:
the airlines, the manufacturers, repair stations and the like,
including the Air Traffic Organization.
For each of those, we want to have metrics that we can look
to, in real time, to see how they are doing and how they are
trending in the way that we do with airlines, with this index I
referred to.
So, this KPI model likely will be a model that we use in
OEMs to oversee how they are doing and give us a real-time idea
of how things are trending that goes all the way up to the
front office of the organization so we have a better view into
the health of the safety ecosystem.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. Thank you.
I yield back, but I will hang around if we get a second
round here. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Ranking Member Larsen.
We now go to Senator Hawley--oh, I am sorry--Congressman
Kiley from California. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kiley. Good morning, Administrator Whitaker. Thank you
for being with us today. I appreciate your testimony and the
thoroughness of your testimony regarding oversight of Boeing
and the comprehensive plan.
Obviously, there has been a great deal of public concern
following the flight 1282 incident, among others, and so, I was
hoping you could take a moment just to sort of speak directly
to my constituents, folks across the country.
What is the best assurance that you can provide people to
give them confidence that these issues are being addressed and
that the use of Boeing aircraft is safe?
Mr. Whitaker. So, I think we are doing--we are engaged in a
very intensive oversight of Boeing. So, we have people on the
floor talking to the employees, watching the inspections take
place. We have put a cap on production, so they can't increase
production beyond what we feel like they can safely accomplish.
When Boeing is ready to deliver an aircraft that they say
is fully in compliance, we then do our own comprehensive review
of that aircraft, and we write the airworthiness certificate
ourselves. So, we are giving a stamp of approval of every
aircraft that is coming off the line. That is not the normal
process that would be in place, so, it is a much heightened
level of scrutiny.
Mr. Kiley. I appreciate that.
Now, of course, Boeing's issues have also been in other
areas, including most recently with regard to their space
operations and the Starliner mission that wasn't able to return
the astronauts from the International Space Station, and now
NASA is relying on SpaceX to bring them home.
And so, that sort of has put in sharp relief an issue that
many have raised regarding perhaps the undue scrutiny that your
agency is giving to SpaceX with a $633,000 fine for launches
last year recently. And then recently as well, delaying the
launch, the fifth mission for Starship, 2 months past what the
license previously said.
So, I was hoping you could speak to that issue and, in
particular, whether you think the delay of the Starship launch
is in the public interest.
Mr. Whitaker. So, I think safety is in the public interest,
and that is our primary focus. With the proposed civil penalty,
it involved a failure to comply with disclosing--well, comply
with the launch requirements before launching. They launched
without a permit. The allegations are that they moved a fuel
farm closer to the population and did not do a risk analysis
before launching. It is the only tool we have to get compliance
on safety matters. I think----
Mr. Kiley [interrupting]. So, how about this delay, are you
saying that the delay of Starship is for safety reasons?
Mr. Whitaker. That--well, the civil penalty matter wasn't
delayed. They launched without a permit. The delay of the
Starship had to do with SpaceX filing an application and not
disclosing that they were in violation of Texas and Federal law
on some matters, and that is a requirement to get a permit.
Mr. Kiley. So, my question, though, is, is it a safety
issue? Is that why it is being delayed?
Mr. Whitaker. I think it is--I think launching these
rockets is a safety issue into the NAS, and I think it is a
situation that requires the same level of safety management and
safety culture that we are working to implement at Boeing,
needs to also exist with commercial space.
Mr. Kiley. Yes, I totally agree with you on that. I am
saying, are the reasons for this delay, which is moving the
launch back from what was previously communicated, are the
reasons for the delay safety related?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, the first reason to delay was that
SpaceX failed to provide an updated sonic boom analysis, so,
there was a 30-day delay due to that. And then the latest delay
was their failure to comply with Texas law, which is a
prerequisite to getting a launch permit.
Mr. Kiley. Okay. So, assuming for the sake of argument that
is true, but these are not safety-related reasons?
Mr. Whitaker. I think the sonic boom analysis is a safety-
related incident, so----
Mr. Kiley [interrupting]. You think the 2-month delay is
necessary to assure a safe launch?
Mr. Whitaker. I think the 2-month delay is necessary to
comply with the launch requirements, and I think that is an
important part of safety culture.
Mr. Kiley. I guess that my concern is--and you have heard
this from former FAA officials, you have heard it from both
sides of the aisle--that our leadership in the commercial space
industry is absolutely vital to U.S. national security, our
global leadership, and yet the FAA does not seem like it is
operating in a way that is conducive with continued innovation
and that this is an issue where we could have resolved that--
whatever the issues you bring up are without delaying this
entire launch by 2 months.
Do you agree that the FAA needs to be reformed in a way
that is better suited towards the type of innovation that we
should be moving towards in the commercial space industry?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, I agree that this is a vital mission.
And I think SpaceX has been a very innovative company, but I
think they are also a mature company. They have been around 20
years, and I think they need to operate at the highest level of
safety, and that includes adopting an SMS program, and it
includes having a whistleblower program.
Mr. Kiley. So, is there any path to moving up that launch?
Mr. Whitaker. Complying with the regulations would be the
best path.
Mr. Kiley. I yield back.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Kiley.
We have the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Stanton, recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for being here, Administrator Whitaker, to
discuss the FAA oversight on Boeing's action plan after the
concerning events we all witnessed this past January.
I would first like to ask about Boeing's safety management
system, the enterprisewide plan across their production system
that includes streamlining employee reporting channels,
addressing traveled work risks, and deepening the integration
between safety and quality measures.
Mr. Whitaker, Boeing committed to mature its SMS as part of
its comprehensive action plan. However, Boeing originally
committed to developing its SMS in 2015, again in 2019, and
today, and it is still not fully developed. In fact, its
current SMS has allowed multiple safety incidents, including
the January 5th 737 MAX door plug accident, to continue to
occur.
What is the FAA doing to ensure Boeing fully develops its
SMS as soon as possible, and how will the FAA ensure Boeing's
SMS can avoid future production safety issues, including the
circumstances leading up to the January 5th door plug accident?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, thank you for that. I think that is the
key question in all of this, because I think a healthy SMS
system is really the key to operating safely, and Boeing has
failed to successfully implement in the past. I think the
difference this time--there are a couple differences. One is
the requirement to have SMS is now mandatory by law, so, they
have to comply with it in order to operate.
And secondly, it is a key element of the comprehensive
plan, and we are monitoring that very intensively going
forward, and they will not be able to grow and increase
production unless they are successful in meeting these safety
challenges.
Mr. Stanton. Has the FAA found any indication Boeing
suppliers contributed to any of the safety lapses the FAA
identified in its initial audit of the door plug accident?
Mr. Whitaker. So, the actual investigation into the door
plug incident is still ongoing, so, I can't comment on that.
But I think it has been well understood that the quality of
products that was coming out of Spirit AeroSystems was not
sufficient, and Boeing has shifted their inspectors down to
Wichita to make sure that that traveled work problem gets
resolved.
Mr. Stanton. What is the agency doing to ensure the
integrity of the U.S. aerospace supply chain?
Mr. Whitaker. So, the supply chain is really a corporate
decision that the OEMs are making. So, some do a lot more in-
house and some delegate. I think Boeing learned that there may
have been too much delegation that led to some of those supply
chain issues. But we are making sure that OEMs are holding
their suppliers to the highest levels of safety, and they are
responsible for the quality of those products.
Mr. Stanton. I want to switch gears here and ask you about
an issue that is very important to the people of my
constituency in Mesa, in the East Valley part of Phoenix. I
want to ask you about the Phoenix-Mesa Gateway's air traffic
control tower. Despite the fact that this is one of the fastest
growing commercial airports in the country, staffing shortages
have forced the airport to reduce operations in the tower.
The FAA reauthorization included my provision directing the
FAA to establish a pilot program to convert high-activity air
traffic control towers operating under the contract tower
program to FAA-staffed visual flight rule towers to alleviate
issues like the one Mesa Gateway is facing. My office heard
from the city of Mesa just last week that FAA officials had a
great meeting with them to discuss next steps forward.
Do you see any challenges with implementing this staffing
solution by the 18-month deadline outlined in the
reauthorization bill?
Mr. Whitaker. I also heard that there was a very productive
meeting, so, hopefully that means that we are on track and we
will work to make sure that we meet that deadline.
Mr. Stanton. Do you, the agency, need anything else from us
and Congress to keep this as an important priority?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, I would just say that our system is
full of very old infrastructure, so, we are constantly in need
of upgrading the infrastructure. The BIL funding for
infrastructure, while extensive, only allowed us to upgrade
about 10 percent of our infrastructure. So, we still have a
significant backlog in that space.
Mr. Stanton. Okay. I just want you to know that that is a
very important issue to the entire airspace issue in the
Phoenix metropolitan region. It is obviously a former Air Force
facility that can grow, and as the number of flights are
growing in and out of the region, it is a real opportunity. And
one of the major limiting factors is having a contract tower,
not it being an FAA tower. So, we got it in the bill. Your
support to make that happen is very much appreciated.
Mr. Whitaker. Great.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you so much.
I yield back.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Stanton.
The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Burchett, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Whitaker--Administrator Whitaker, excuse me--one of the
big issues at Boeing is the breakdown in communication, the way
I see it. I appreciate the Speak Up program, but how is Boeing
improving communication between different teams to ensure
quality control issues do not slip through the cracks?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, making sure that there is a robust
program in place where the employees can speak up is a key
component of the safety management system, and it is required
for success. That is where you get your best information, is
from the floor. So, we are watching very diligently to make
sure that that program is available and is being used. So, we
are doing surveys of employees and talking with folks on the
ground.
But the employees have multiple pathways, including coming
directly to FAA if they don't feel like they can speak up at
Boeing. They can come to our website and file information there
as well.
Mr. Burchett. How will folks be reviewed or responded to
that do those kind of things?
Mr. Whitaker. So, there is--at FAA, we have a very
regimented program to protect identity, and each claim gets
investigated very thoroughly. And we are working to make sure
that that same approach is taken at Boeing so there is no
retaliation. In fact, people should be recognized for speaking
up, and we are seeing an uptick in reports over the course of
this year.
Mr. Burchett. Do we have any metrics that show that it has
improved the operations through this new line of
communications--or old line, I guess I should say?
Mr. Whitaker. I think the best metric is going to be
employee surveys, and I can respond back to your office to see
if we have any additional specific information about that.
Mr. Burchett. Okay. Most of the folks up here, me included,
our space exploration or rocketry skills basically are 4th of
July shooting some bottle rockets or maybe have an Estes rocket
that their dad helped make, a very cool D-2 that the first
launch went into a huge oak tree in my neighbor's yard and
still never been able to recover that.
But I am curious about those poor folks that seem to be
trapped in outer space. Are they--I had a constituent lady,
Denise Lambert I believe was her name, had asked about those
folks. And do we think they are going to get home safely and
soon?
Mr. Whitaker. So, it is a little bit outside my portfolio.
My oversight----
Mr. Burchett [interrupting]. I realize that, but that is--
--
Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. Yes.
Mr. Burchett [continuing]. That is kind of what everybody
is talking about.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes. Well, all I can say is I hope so.
Mr. Burchett. Well, that is a very graded answer, I will
say. Thank you.
Another area of concern, of course, is the employee
training, specifically, employees' adherence to work
instructions. In the comprehensive action plan, they committed
to simplifying work instructions for mechanics and inspectors
so that they be able to perform checks in a consistent manner.
Now, to your knowledge, has Boeing revised any of their
preexisting instructions manuals yet?
Mr. Whitaker. So, my understanding is they have completed
an assessment of the work instructions to identify the areas
where they need to simplify the instructions. So, that process
has been underway. How many have actually been simplified at
this point, I don't know, but I do know that there has been
progress in that space.
Mr. Burchett. Do you think that simplifying the processes
and procedures helps increase consistency during that process?
Mr. Whitaker. It helps increase consistency, it reduces
confusion and conflict, and it needs to correspond with more
training as well.
Mr. Burchett. Did you all consider the stakeholder and the
FAA's feedback when you developed those simplified processes
and procedures?
Mr. Whitaker. Can you say that again?
Mr. Burchett. Did you consider--sorry, I am from east
Tennessee. It is the only place in America where people don't
speak with an accent, so, I guess I can understand you not
getting that.
Did Boeing consider stakeholder and Federal Aviation
Administration feedback when developing simplified processes
and procedures?
Mr. Whitaker. They did. They had the results of our own
audit, they had the results of the section 103 panel that was
put together, and also employee feedback directly.
Mr. Burchett. What about the FAA, have they changed their
approach to oversight of industry compliance?
Mr. Whitaker. We have changed our oversight to Boeing
extensively by having inspectors on the floor, by putting this
cap on production, by having these metrics that we are
monitoring. And then we are looking more broadly at the
oversight models for all segments of aviation, including OEMs.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, since I am a generous soul, I am going to
yield back the remainder, 20 seconds, of my time.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
The gentleman from Tennessee, were you trying to draw a
connection between the rocket that got stuck in the oak tree
and--otherwise it would have reached the International Space
Station? Is that what you were----
Mr. Burchett [interrupting]. I was. I was actually making
the point that that is about my knowledge, and I realize that
is about everybody up here's knowledge. And they have all
googled some really cool stuff on this, I am sure, but the
reality is that is about as far as it goes, Mr. Chairman.
Sorry to deflate everybody's ego on both sides of the
aisle. But if you know how to get that thing out of that oak
tree, I will be with you. My brother climbed up there years
ago, and he never could quite make it to the top.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for pointing out something
very important to me.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Yes. Yes, we will get the full
resources of the Transportation Committee on that. Thank you.
The gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Administrator, before I ask you about Boeing, I want to
switch topics for just a minute. Section 502 of the FAA
reauthorization bill authorized 10 new slot exemptions at DCA
for service to domestic airports either within or beyond the
1,250-mile perimeter.
That decision was supposed to have been made last month.
There was a 60-day deadline. I know it is not right on you, but
I am asking you if you would talk to the Secretary and see if
you can get us some idea of what is happening with that or if
it is coming soon or if there is a problem.
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you. Thank you, ma'am. As you say, it
is a DOT process that has been running, and I know they have
received a lot of comments in that process. And they are
certainly adjudicating those comments, but I will certainly
take that up.
Ms. Titus. Thank you. Thank you.
Reid International Airport is in my district and the air
traffic is just increasing by leaps and bounds. I think we
welcomed 57.6 million passengers last year, and that shattered
the previous record by 5 million.
So, what is happening in the airspace is really important
to our economy, and I am concerned about the safety and
efficiency and all that. So, I appreciate what you are doing.
I would like to ask you, though, about section 430 of the
FAA reauthorization bill, and that requires you all to update
the aviation safety inspector model within 2 years so you can
have a better idea of the workforce.
During a recent Senate hearing, you testified the FAA had
deployed 24 inspectors to Boeing, and your target was 55
inspectors. And then in your testimony today, you mentioned
that you have added some more safety inspectors at Boeing and
at Spirit.
I wondered just how many you have added and what you have
been doing to recruit, hire, and train these new inspectors.
Mr. Whitaker. So, the goal is to have 55 inspectors
deployed at the Boeing and Spirit facilities by the end of the
year. We are on track to do that. I don't know our exact number
today, I think it is in the 40s.
We have been able to hire fairly experienced inspectors on
average with 20 years of experience, and we have also brought
some inspectors in from other areas of FAA. We have a training
program at Oklahoma City that we put new inspectors through and
then on-the-job training. So, we have been able to find good
inspectors and experienced inspectors to deploy onto this
project.
Ms. Titus. So, you are optimistic that you are going to
meet that goal?
Mr. Whitaker. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Titus. Well, that is good to hear.
Another question. Since the Alaska Airlines incident in
January, it has become real apparent, we have heard about it
here today, that there was a need for cultural change at Boeing
when it came to safety. It should have been the priority, but
it kind of slid a bit.
The new CEO, Mr. Ortberg, is an engineer. Are you confident
that this change at the executive level will foster a change in
that culture and help to kind of move Boeing back in the
direction where it should be?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, as you indicated, Mr. Ortberg is an
engineer with an aerospace background. But I am not necessarily
placing my confidence in that solving all problems. So, we are
going to continue our intensive oversight.
I have had a couple of conversations with Mr. Ortberg, and
he understands our focus on that long-term project to change
the safety. And we will stay very engaged to make sure that
happens.
Ms. Titus. The Boeing comprehensive action plan seems to be
a step in the right direction, I have heard you say, but I want
to know how the FAA is going to enforce oversight if they
should fall short of their key performance indicators.
Mr. Whitaker. Well, I think the key difference now between
previous challenges with Boeing is that we have put a
production cap in place. In order for Boeing to meet any of its
other financial objectives, it is going to have to get past
those production levels, which means it has to operate safely.
It has to have a robust safety risk assessment system. And we
are going stay very intensely engaged with them as they go on
that journey.
Ms. Titus. And what are the consequences if they don't meet
those requirements?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, the consequences are they can't
increase production, from our perspective.
Ms. Titus. All right.
Mr. Whitaker. We are not really focused on what the
financial outcomes are. But we are really just focused on
making sure that those indicators are green, they are stable,
and if they are going to grow, they have a plan for how to keep
those indicators green.
Ms. Titus. Okay. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Ms. Titus.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Whitaker, Boeing has made multiple commitments to the
FAA to strengthen certain safety practices in exchange for
deferring civil penalties or other enforcement actions. This
includes settlement agreements made in 2015, 2021, 2024 with
the FAA and the Department of Justice to, among other things,
enhance its safety compliance programs. Despite these
agreements, Boeing has continued to experience multiple safety
issues.
Has the FAA seen any progress in FAA safety compliance
programs as a result of these settlements?
Mr. Whitaker. So, I have been quite focused on--since I
joined 11 months ago, I have been very focused on the events of
January 5th which happened 10 weeks into my tenure. I have done
a little research into some previous efforts, so, I am aware
that there have been challenges before.
That is really one reason why we have taken a different
approach in a couple of key ways. One is that production cap,
which really gives us the leverage we need to make sure these
changes happen, but also getting these key performance
indicators so we have a real-time view on how things are going
on the floor, on the production line, and then also having
direct contact with employees to understand what is happening
on the safety culture.
So, those, I think, make a different situation than there
was before.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Mr. Whitaker, whistleblowers have been an important part of
the investigation process. Since the January 5th accident, we
have been tracking a significant increase in employee concerns.
What is the FAA doing to ensure that any whistleblower
complaints are properly vetted in a timely manner, and has this
increase in quantity resulted in any processing delays?
Mr. Whitaker. So, we have had an increase in quantity. We
have a very regimented program at the FAA. So, these complaints
are immediately examined for safety-of-flight concerns and
analyzed to see if there is immediate action taken, and then
they are assigned to the relevant group that oversees that
particular subject matter area.
We also work to protect the identity of the whistleblower,
and then ultimately respond to that whistleblower with an
outcome after the investigation.
Mr. Carbajal. How have you, what steps have you taken to
safeguard the employees from retaliation, which is a natural
thing that happens in many of these environments?
Mr. Whitaker. So, any allegations of retaliation that we
receive we refer to the Department of Labor which has
jurisdiction over that aspect of employment in the country. So,
they follow those matters through their own processes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Carbajal.
Mr.--actually, you are not here.
I recognize Mr. Johnson from Georgia for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Administrator Whitaker, for sharing your
insights with us today.
The aviation industry is not just dealing with isolated
technical failures; we are confronting a troubling pattern.
Incident after incident has revealed the culture of compromised
safety, diminished trust, and inefficiency.
When passengers board a plane, they place their trust in us
to ensure their safety from takeoff to landing. Likewise, over
1 million aviation workers rely on a safe environment to do
their jobs. Yet tragically, that trust is eroding.
Last month's Boeing tire explosion in Georgia is a stark
reminder of our shared responsibility and the urgent need for
reform. The message is clear: Safety cannot be rushed.
As the FAA has made clear, restoring public confidence in
our air travel must be our top priority. We need a firm
commitment to empower regulatory bodies like the FAA with the
resources and authority to hold companies accountable. Safety
protocols must never be optional or negotiable.
Administrator Whitaker, in your testimony, you mentioned
the FAA has increased the number of safety inspectors at Boeing
and Spirit AeroSystems facilities in response to systemic
production quality issues. Does the FAA have the capacity to
sustain this increased oversight, and are there any plans to
expand it further?
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, sir.
We do have the capacity to maintain this level of
oversight, and we intend to maintain this level of oversight
indefinitely, certainly till we see the culture change and SMS
deployment that is expected, and that is probably measured in
years. So, we are in it for the long term.
We will continue to assess, as we go along, if we have
additional need for additional inspectors. And then we will
either reallocate resources or come back to you and ask for
more.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. All right. In your testimony, you
emphasized the FAA's commitment to safety and the need for
increased oversight and accountability following safety
incidents like the Alaska Airlines flight 1282 incident.
Do you foresee a need for increased resources and
authorities at this time in order to effectively implement the
comprehensive action plan for Boeing to ensure continuous
oversight of its manufacturing processes?
Mr. Whitaker. I believe we have the resources that we need
to carry out this oversight with Boeing. And as we continue to
review our other oversight models in the system, we will keep
this committee informed on whether there are additional needs
for resources or whether we need to reallocate resources
between groups.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you.
In your testimony, you mentioned how the FAA has capped the
production of Boeing 737 MAX airplanes to achieve system
stability and compliance with quality control procedures.
Can you explain what FAA means by system stability and how
it would measure system stability and at what point production
can be safely ramped up again?
Mr. Whitaker. So, one example of system stability is
measuring whether the work is done in the proper sequence. As
an aircraft moves through the production line, there are
specific tasks at specific stations. If those are done out of
order, it creates a risk that there will be some mistake in
that work or that you will have to disassemble some other part
to do an assembly that should have happened earlier in the
process.
So, that is an example of a metric that we look at very
closely to make sure the proper order of assembly is completed,
and that gives us a sense of whether there is stability in the
system.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you.
Boeing's new CEO, Kelly Ortberg, has emphasized the
importance of safety culture reforms. How will the FAA monitor
and verify these cultural shifts within Boeing over the long
term, and what measures will be implemented to ensure that
employees feel safe coming forward with their concerns?
Mr. Whitaker. I think the key metric in that is going to be
employee surveys, and we will be looking at the employee
surveys that Boeing completes and then complete our own level
of assessment of employee surveys. I think that is the best way
of understanding whether the safety culture is taking. We will
also be looking at the number of whistleblower complaints and
how people are--whether they are feeling free to speak up.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Garcia, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Chair, Ranking Member,
and Administrator Whitaker for being here today.
This past July, Boeing announced that it intends to
reacquire Spirit AeroSystems, one of its major suppliers and
manufacturing partners. And they previously had sold Spirit in
2009 as part of a decision to cut costs.
Although reacquiring Spirit would simplify manufacturing
processes and could help reduce errors, the missing bolts that
caused the door plug incident were removed at a Boeing
facility, not Spirit AeroSystems.
Given that the FAA's quality control audit of Boeing
discovered 97 instances of noncompliance, why should we be
confident that Boeing has the capacity to manage the extra
manufacturing responsibilities?
Mr. Whitaker. So, the manufacturer, of course, makes
decisions about supply chain policy and strategy. And Boeing is
making the decision that it can exercise more control over
Spirit if it acquires it. We don't have an opinion on whether
that is a good idea or a bad idea. We just need to make sure
that they are exercising that control.
They have made quite a few changes in the process already
to make sure fewer defects are coming out of Spirit AeroSystems
by moving inspectors down to that facility. But our main focus
is whether they are getting products that are complying with
the type design. So, whether that is through direct ownership
or other means of oversight is really a corporate decision.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Administrator.
And as a followup to that, what is the FAA doing to ensure
that, if this acquisition goes through, that Boeing has the
protocols in place to implement the strong safety standards?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, we will continue to look at the
oversight that they are exercising directly, if they acquire
Spirit. We currently have five inspectors at Spirit. But once--
if this acquisition goes through, then we will also have direct
regulatory authority over Spirit. So, we will be able to have
direct inspections and oversight of their operations.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you.
Next, I would like to focus on worker experience and the
factors that play into Boeing's culture of safety. One of the
items that Boeing outlined in its action plan is to improve the
employee reporting channel called Speak Up. It is crucial that
employees feel empowered to report safety concerns at any point
in the production process, something that has been lacking up
until now.
Boeing has a documented history of prioritizing a high-
production volume and profits over safety. It also has a
history of ignoring and retailing--retaliating--pardon me--
against employees who report concerns. Former engineers of the
company have testified before Congress describing how reporting
safety concerns has been met with hostility.
Boeing's action plan says it aims to improve reporting by
creating, quote, ``a more user-friendly reporting interface and
increasing promotion of the benefits of reporting.'' This
doesn't sound that convincing of an attempt to change a deeply
dysfunctional culture.
Can you elaborate on Boeing's plans to address employee
reporting, and does the FAA plan to conduct oversight on this
action?
Mr. Whitaker. We do plan to conduct oversight. In fact, the
willingness of employees to speak up and identify safety
concerns is really one of the key sources of safety information
for a safety management system. Safety management systems are
designed to find risk, and then the company needs to mitigate
those risks. And employees are a great source of information.
Boeing knows that this is priority. We are monitoring their
deployment of the system, and we will continue to engage with
employees and watch to see the level of reporting that results.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. And are you optimistic that there
will be culture change as it relates to safety practices?
Mr. Whitaker. There has to be culture change. They won't be
able to go back to producing aircraft at the level they want
without that culture change.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Administrator, for your
time.
And I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. The gentlelady from Michigan is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Scholten. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Administrator Whitaker, for joining us again
here today. We really appreciate your time.
I really want to echo the sentiments that our ranking
member said as well. We really do feel there are two hearings
going on today, one about Boeing but one about the overall job
that the FAA is doing, particularly on the air maintenance and
technician staffing that we currently have, obviously a
critical shortage that impacts many aspects of overall aviation
safety.
Can you speak to the progress that Boeing is making as they
implement its action plan for increased mechanic and technician
training goals as well as overall boosting public trust on this
particular issue?
There is only so much that good internal policies can do if
we are not externally communicating them and making sure the
public is aware of it. That provides a critical oversight layer
as well. And then a subpart of that is, what, more broadly, is
the FAA doing to ensure a broad and ready workforce here?
Mr. Whitaker. So, three questions there.
And I will start by, I think the maintenance and training
has been a challenge for Boeing. It has been a challenge
throughout the industry after COVID because of all the
retirements and the loss of, I think, a natural transfer of
knowledge from generation to generation. The best companies
recognize that as a safety risk with their safety management
program, and they mitigate those risks by putting in extra
training, bringing back retired employees to do mentoring,
those types of things.
Boeing recognizes that was a problem. The level of
experience they are getting in their hiring is much lower than
it used to be. So, they are now increasing that training. And
part of the comprehensive plan was assessing those training
levels and deploying more training, and that is underway.
I think as far as the public trust is concerned, I think
the most important thing is that we hold Boeing to all of the
elements of this comprehensive plan and see progress on that
safety culture change and continue to deliver over the years.
It is probably a little bit of a long-term project to rebuild
that trust, but I think it will flow naturally out of having
that safety culture and continuing to improve their operations.
From our perspective, we are also recruiting from the same
pool of potential aviation employers. And we work very hard to
increase the size of that pool and including programs where we
work in elementary schools and in high schools to get younger
students interested in the career field. It is very
competitive, and we have quite a few initiatives underway to
generate interest among younger generations to join this field.
Ms. Scholten. Well, I would encourage you as well to
continue to seek ways that you can get that information out
into the public. I actually disagree that it flows naturally.
While making the internal changes is the most important thing,
the safety concerns that have been raised by high-profile
incidents in the last several years permeate into the public
conscience and really hurt the industry.
It is important for the public to know and for the FAA to
proactively communicate about those things so that the public
can know what they can count on, the measures that are being
taken, and so that they can play an important role in that
critical oversight as well.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes.
Ms. Scholten. I want to move on to one other quick
question. The Alaska Airlines flight 1282 incident was, of
course, unacceptable and tragic. Fortunately, thanks to
coordination between the pilot and air traffic control, no one
was harmed during the emergency. Air traffic control towers are
paramount to everyday flight operations, protecting safety and
efficiency of our National Airspace System.
You know that I have been a huge champion of replacing our
air traffic control tower, one of the oldest FAA-owned air
traffic control towers in the entire country. At 60 years old,
it is the oldest among the top 75 busiest airports in the
entire country.
This tower is out of compliance with safety and ADA
regulations, raising serious safety concerns for west
Michiganders. I am thankful that we have had several productive
conversations, but we are ready to move into the action phase.
So, on behalf of all Michiganders, does the FAA have any
updates that it can give to us today on how it can address
these critical concerns with GRR's air traffic control tower so
that the airport can best be equipped to respond to emergencies
in the, God forbid, event that they might occur?
Mr. Whitaker. So, we can certainly respond directly to your
office on any updates that we may have, but I think it raises a
very important point that our infrastructure is in need of
significant investment across the board. And the 2025 budget
that was presented includes $8 billion to continue the
infrastructure upgrading that happened under BIL, and there is
a lot more to do.
Ms. Scholten. Thank you.
Mr. Whitaker. Thanks.
Ms. Scholten. Thank you for the additional time. I yield
back.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Ms. Scholten.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Auchincloss, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
Welcome back, Administrator.
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you.
Mr. Auchincloss. When you last came here, it was a more
informal roundtable discussion. I asked you about FAA
investigations into the two runway near-misses that had
occurred, both of those flights. One was at Logan, I believe,
and was en route from DCA to Logan. So, they affect my
constituents in Massachusetts. You assured me of a swift,
certain, and comprehensive investigation.
What is the status of those investigations?
Mr. Whitaker. I am happy to respond to your office with any
specifics around those particular investigations. I don't have
that information with me right here.
Mr. Auchincloss. Do you know, have they concluded at this
point?
Mr. Whitaker. They would normally have been concluded by
this point, yes.
Mr. Auchincloss. Okay. So, we would like to see the results
of that investigation----
Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. Sure.
Mr. Auchincloss [continuing]. And any remedial actions that
are being taken.
Similar note, can you talk about the implementation of
increased hiring for new air traffic controllers now that we
have passed the FAA reauthorization and the new statute behind
that? How is that going, and how is the relationship with the
air traffic controllers evolving? I know there was some
friction with the New York issue. Give us an update on the
ATCs.
Mr. Whitaker. I think we have a strong relationship. I was
at the air traffic controller safety conference last week,
speaking. So, I think it is a good relationship.
The hiring process has been fairly intensive. We have
really looked at every possible knob that we can turn to
increase the field of qualified hires. Last year's objective
was 1,650 hires. This year it was 1,800. We announced yesterday
that we have exceeded that slightly for this year. Next year,
the goal will be 2,000, and that will be a heavy lift.
We are continuing to expand capacity at the academy. We are
also working with the CTI schools to develop an enhanced CTI
program that allows the CTI schools, if they have the proper
equipment and the proper curriculum, to train air traffic
controllers so all they have to do is take the aptitude test
and then be hired right into the facilities.
Now, there is a long lead time on that. This would be the
first academic year that we hope to have some students. It will
probably be another year before we start to see more output.
We have also made it easier for military controllers to be
hired in upon retirement. So, it used to be a twice-a-year
event. Now it is a rolling event. So, your retirement date
doesn't matter.
So, we have really kind of looked under every rock to try
to make the system better. I think this year the focus is going
to be making the actual processing part more efficient. It
involves medical, background check, all these other steps that
folks have to go through, so, try to make that process easier.
Mr. Auchincloss. Understood. And, of course, recruitment is
important but also, so is retention, particularly if you are
experienced ATCs. And that requires engagement and solicitation
from the air traffic controllers about their quality-of-life
concerns, their scheduling concerns, their safety concerns. So,
I just encourage you to really----
Mr. Whitaker [interrupting]. In that regard, we have
implemented new fatigue rules that just were rolled out this
year that will make sure that we are having adequate rests
between shifts. So, I think that is going to be not only a
safety enhancement but a quality-of-life improvement as well.
Mr. Auchincloss. Logan is one of the more challenging
airports for the air traffic controllers. We have got an old
tower----
Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. Yes.
Mr. Auchincloss [continuing]. As well.
Mr. Whitaker. I have visited that. Yes.
Mr. Auchincloss. Those women and men work hard and they
work in pretty tough conditions, and we need to ensure that
they are set up for success in their safety mission.
Mr. Whitaker. I would--I actually identify Logan tower as
of an example of our underinvestment----
Mr. Auchincloss [interposing]. Yes.
Mr. Whitaker [continuing]. In the sense----
Mr. Auchincloss [interposing]. We would agree.
Mr. Whitaker [continuing]. We haven't been able to deploy
DataComm in Boston because there is no physical space in that
tower for the computer rooms with adequate air-conditioning and
cooling. So, it is an example of how that old infrastructure is
really hampering modernization.
Mr. Auchincloss. Final question for you. Does the FAA have
any scope or opinion on the decision by some American airlines
to cease flights into Israel? I believe Delta and United have
stopped flying. Is that an area that they check in with the FAA
on, or is that a unilateral decision that they make?
Mr. Whitaker. That would be an airline decision. The role
of FAA really is around NOTAMs and safety of flight, that type
of issue. So, we do communicate with, particularly in this
instance which is constantly changing in real time, and we
provide guidance on NOTAMs and safety.
Mr. Auchincloss. Do you have guidance from the FAA on the
safety of flying into Tel Aviv or Jerusalem?
Mr. Whitaker. I think at this point we are mirroring the
NOTAMs that are put in place by Israel for where you can fly
and don't fly. So, we don't provide anything beyond that. But
we do have--for the carriers that fly to that region, usually
they have a classified status, so we can give them intel
briefings when they make their decisions.
Mr. Auchincloss. Okay. I yield back.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
The gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton,
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As cochair of the Quiet Skies Caucus and the Member who
represents the District of Columbia, which is plagued by
airplane and helicopter noise, I urge the FAA to do more to
combat aviation noise and to engage more with affected
communities on this matter. If the FAA needs additional
authority or resources to combat aviation noise, I urge the FAA
to inform this committee of what it needs.
Mr. Whitaker, safety must be the FAA's top priority. Should
the American public have confidence that it is safe to fly on
Boeing airplanes?
Mr. Whitaker. They should. We write the air worthiness
certificate for each aircraft that comes off the line. We have
inspectors that are on the floor every day overseeing the
process, talking with employees. We are monitoring the health
of the production facility, and we do our own inspection of the
aircraft before they get their air worthiness certificate. So,
they can be confident that the aircraft are safe.
Ms. Norton. Well, I appreciate that.
In its comprehensive action plan, Boeing committed to
encouraging its employees to report safety concerns.
What assurances can the FAA offer that Boeing will not
retaliate against employees for reporting safety concerns?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, this is something that we monitor
closely because the ability of employees to speak up is a key
component of a healthy safety management system and a healthy
safety culture. So, we will watch that closely.
We talk to employees directly. We look at employee surveys
and culture surveys. And if there are any claims of
retaliation, we refer those to the Department of Labor for
investigation.
Ms. Norton. In its comprehensive action plan, Boeing--I
guess I asked that question. I am sorry. Thank you very much.
And I yield back.
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, ma'am.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
The gentleman from California, Mr. DeSaulnier, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, Mr. Graves.
Administrator--sorry. Allergies. That is another problem.
First of all, thank you for the work you have done so far.
Very challenging times. The last time we spoke at the
roundtable, we talked a little bit about the challenges
changing a culture. We have found out a lot since you have been
there, including a story today in the New York Times about the
GAO's report just confirming a lot of things we already knew.
But my question was consistent with our previous
conversation, if you remember it, when you brought up General
Electric. In that conversation, my memory is there had just
been a story about Boeing that it used to be an engineering
company, and it had changed, which is an example of a culture
change in multiple things.
We have done a lot of research on the pharmaceutical
industry. Used to be that people were researchers and they were
chemists and biologists, and then the chief financial officer
became the CEO. Nothing wrong with that.
But then the challenge for you in this culture where safety
is such a premium for long-term investment, whether it is
Boeing or the airlines or any other subcontractor, there is so
much pressure to get return on investment, under the Supreme
Court's decision, that for a publicly traded company, your
number one liability is the better business plan, which means
return on investment.
So, here is an industry that is sort of a utility in an
old-fashioned way where it is a public-private partnership, and
the EU looks at it that way and Japan looks at it this way. But
because of the investment community, starting with Carl Icahn,
I mean, it is sort of a canary in the coal mine when you look
back at this period.
Balancing that responsibility, given these other moving
parts and regulatory and judicial decisions and congressional
decisions, getting Boeing to becoming an engineering company
where the investors value that for long-term and short-term
investments, how do you view that when you--you have got the
inspectors on the ground. You have got risk assessments. They
are worried about liability. Certainly, the air carriers are
worried about that one big incident that will crater return on
investment, which is where I started in the near-miss at SFO.
So, talk to me a little bit about that challenge. You have
very specific regulatory administrative authority in a world
where there is lots of different pressures.
Mr. Whitaker. Well, it is an interesting observation. And I
think I would say that even if profits were your number one
goal, safety really needs to be your number one goal because it
is hard to be profitable if you are not safe. And I think
Boeing certainly has learned that. Whatever money might have
been saved has certainly been lost in the fallout.
So, regardless of what your other objectives are, if you
don't start with safety, your chances of succeeding are very
poor, whether you are an airline or a manufacturer.
So, that is what we are looking at is just to see that
there is a real safety culture, not just ``safety is first'' as
a slogan, but a real safety culture that permeates everything
that is done and comes first before production goals or
operational goals or mission goals or financial goals. So, that
is really our focus.
Mr. DeSaulnier. So, just to follow up on that on the risk
assessment. And I am not complaining about return on
investment. It is just a reasonable rate of return for long
term. So, companies constantly do risk assessment. Boeing has
done it, to the ranking member's earlier questions about risk
assessment, but risk assessment when these competing interests.
So, right now, my sense is that Boeing in the industry has
generally realized, okay, the spotlight is on us. We have got
to let our investment community--but in a world where investors
are instantaneously mobile and could go to a higher rate of
return with--they are looking for lower risks, therein lies, I
think, one of the real challenges to get this as a sustainable
safety culture for as long as possible for all of the
stakeholders, the flying public in particular.
I get it. I understand right now the spotlight is on them.
But if we start moving back to quarterly returns and
pressures--and they are legitimate concerns. I am not--these
are the challenges that we are partners to.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes. And I think our oversight model of
Boeing has certainly changed dramatically this year. So, we
have moved from an audit approach to much more of a boots-on-
the-ground inspection approach. We have got these key
performance indicators that we monitor on a weekly basis so we
can see exactly what is happening in the system. And, of
course, we have a cap in place on production. So, we feel like
we have the tools to monitor this carefully and closely, and I
think this is a model for how we should be monitoring the
safety of the NAS.
Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you. You got my mind started on when
you made the Jack Welch observation.
Mr. Whitaker. Thanks.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
The gentleman from South Dakota, Mr. Johnson, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Administrator, obviously there has been a lot of public
attention paid to the challenges Boeing has faced, as well as
the FAA's role in all of that.
What do you think is the most commonly misunderstood aspect
of what is going on between the FAA and Boeing?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, I think the comprehensive plan, as we
have talked about with Boeing, includes some very short-term
changes. But the ultimate mission is very long term. So, we are
sort of balancing these two: the short term and the long term.
Short term is employee training. It is cutting down on
traveled work. It is deploying tool tracking technology, part
tracking technology. These things are happening, and they are
making progress.
Long term is a years-long process to really change that
safety culture, let the employees feel like it has really
changed, and start to see that evidence.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. So, yes, let's continue to
talk about culture. I thought my colleague immediately prior
did a good job of trying to tease out some of the culture
issues.
Clearly, there are some short-term issues that I think are
complicating your long-term push. I mean, we have got
machinists striking at Boeing. I assume that is an impediment
to some of the culture change?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, the strike stops some of the work that
is going on. So, some of the pilot programs to deploy new
technologies, some of the training certainly is stopping, and
we are monitoring that situation closely. So, when and if
workers go back to work, we will assess how much additional
training might be needed. So, it does interrupt this process,
but the plan itself will still need to be deployed.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. And then we talked a little
bit about new CEO Ortberg being on the job for less than a
month or I guess about a month. I am not really asking about
the top spot. A CEO is incredibly important as a culture
officer, but we also know that culture is a lot--is way more
than just one person.
What is your assessment about the next two or three rungs
of top management? I mean, has the wakeup call been sufficient
enough for them to understand the magnitude of the change that
is needed?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, I have had several conversations with
various board members around the need for a long-term plan on
safety and what needs to happen, what the primary focus ought
to be. They have made some changes at the board level.
Obviously, the CEO changes have been made. And there have been
changes in that next layer of management as well.
So, I can't sort of grade each official in that realm. We
are really just focused on performance and making sure that
they are actually executing the plan and monitoring that very
closely.
So, we have weekly meetings on the floor. We have monthly
meetings of the safety leaders and then quarterly meetings with
the CEO and that senior team. And these are day-long, roll up
your sleeves, go through 8 hours of PowerPoints and tours kind
of meetings to get a sense of how this is going. So, we are
evaluating that at every level.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. You talk about the need to
pursue both some short-term objectives as well as the longer
term mission. What is the most concerning threat in your mind
toward actually accomplishing the long-term goal?
Mr. Whitaker. Sustaining the momentum, and I think this
can't be viewed as a 9- or 12-month project. Year by year, the
message has to be safety, communications have to be safety, and
then the employees have to see it in action. If something is
wrong, an employee says something, the reaction has to be,
okay, let's assess this safety risk and do what we need to, not
hurry up and get back to work.
So, I think on the floor, they are going to be able to
detect whether it is happening.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. You want a heightened urgency,
a focused attention day in and day out.
You talked about these extended meetings, working through
PowerPoints. How do you gauge in these conversations whether or
not real progress is being made?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, those conversations don't necessarily
tell us the real progress. We do surveys of employees. We have
our folks on the ground talking to employees so we can gauge
how they are feeling about speaking up, whether they are seeing
something change. And the inspectors on the floor are able to
understand what the communications are that are coming out. Is
it about production, is it about hurry up, or is it about
safety and training and that type of thing? So, we are
assessing it at all levels.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Very good. Thank you much.
Sir, I yield back.
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Van Drew, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Whitaker, thank you for being here.
I have a very brief statement first before I have some
questions.
For two decades, as we know, Boeing has promoted
unqualified managers who have made disastrous decisions like
outsourcing America's supply chains. And this has happened,
quite frankly, in Government. It has happened in corporate
America. It has happened at just about every level of our
society.
The best way to create opportunity for those who don't have
it is not by lowering standards. It is by increasing education
for them. It is by increasing focus. It is by increasing energy
and meritocracy. I hope as we go forward--because Boeing is a
very physical sign of what has happened, and it is a bigger
issue than just even Boeing. It is something that is running
through our country right now, and it is serious.
And if we want to be number one in the world, which is my
goal always for the United States of America, we need to change
the way we are going about business. We need to help people, to
give them opportunity. But they need to be able to rise to the
occasion, and we need to help them to do that, not to lower the
standards, not to put people in jobs in which they are not
qualified.
So, that is my statement.
In July, I sent you a letter on the FAA reauthorization, as
you know. We heard from your office actually this morning,
which I now submit for the record.
This letter includes an invitation for you to come----
Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Letter of July 26, 2024, to Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration, from Hon. Jefferson Van Drew,
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Jefferson Van Drew
Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515,
July 26, 2024.
The Honorable Michael Whitaker,
Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW,
Washington, DC 20591.
RE: The Federal Aviation Administration's Organizational Structure,
and Programs to Unleash American Aviation
Dear Mr. Whitaker,
On May 16th of this year the FAA Reauthorization of 2024 became
law. This landmark aviation legislation includes policies of great
consequence to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and to my
community of South Jersey. South Jersey has been the proud home of the
FAA's William J. Hughes Technical Center for 65 years. Recently, the
Technical Center served a critical role in the FAA's NextGen airspace
modernization program and is correspondingly located within the
``Office of NextGen.'' The FAA Reauthorization mandates major changes
to these programs and directs the establishment of new organizational
structures.
This policy letter contains views of legislative intent and
recommendations to aid the FAA in executing the FAA Reauthorization and
your broader mission. Major themes include:
That the Airspace Modernization Office (AMO) should adopt
an all-of-agency approach that coordinates business lines to facilitate
the integration of new systems and capabilities into the national air
transportation system.
That the NextGen Office (ANG) should be combined with
certain Program Management Office (PMO) functions to form an AMO with a
direct report line to the Administrator.
That the FAA Technical Center for Advanced Aerospace
should function semi-autonomously under the unitary management of the
Technical Center Director and be organizationally located within AMO.
That the Technical Center is positioned to administer new
programs and capabilities, including the Center for Advanced Aviation
Technologies.
This letter also serves as a personal invitation for you to visit
South Jersey and meet with our robust aviation research community.
Forming the Airspace Modernization Office
``Section 206. Future of NextGen'' gives the FAA until December 31,
2025, to operationalize and sunset the NextGen Office. ``Section 207.
Airspace Modernization Office'' gives a deadline of January 1, 2026, to
establish the eponymous organization. This new AMO has responsibilities
that include research and development, systems engineering, enterprise
architecture, portfolio management, National Airspace System (NAS)
digitization, system interoperability, and a major emphasis on long-
term integration planning.
The FAA's greatest airspace modernization challenge is coordinating
the integration of new entrants and technologies that improve safety.
The AMO presents an opportunity to reorient the FAA organization and
finally solve the integration puzzle. AMO must be broader in scope than
the NextGen project and must be empowered to mobilize dissonant
business lines in common purpose. It must be a distinct office; siloing
it within an existing organization precludes the necessary horizontal
orientation to facilitate coordination. AMO must not be made subsidiary
to an existing business line and so must be a direct report to the
Administrator.
The AMO must adopt an all-of-agency approach that coordinates the
activities of the FAA's many business lines towards the objective of
efficiently integrating new capabilities into our air transportation
system through the development and execution of a cohesive business
plan. Forming this type of organization requires functions from both
ANG and PMO.
ANG should be the foundation for AMO. ANG's current activities
comprise most of the anticipated activities of AMO. However, ANG lacks
the implementation functions necessary for AMO's expanded role. These
functions are presently within PMO.
Although PMO is currently located within the Air Traffic
Organization (ATO), AMO cannot be located within ATO. ATO is an
operational organization and should be exclusively an operational
organization. AMO explicitly will be involved in research and
development. Anything not safety related is a distraction from the
paramount safety mission of ATO. And again, siloing AMO within ATO will
diminish its ability for cross-cutting coordination. Because of these
conflicts, AMO cannot be within ATO. Because PMO is currently within
ATO, and AMO needs PMO capabilities, this means that PMO must be
reorganized.
PMO functions should be distributed appropriately throughout ATO
and AMO. PMO functions can be put into two buckets; maintenance and
acquisition. Components of the PMO related to the maintenance of
systems and support operations going on already today should be
distributed through ATO, most probably to the Technical Operations
Office. Components of the PMO related to the acquisition and deployment
of new capabilities and implementing new systems and services should be
transitioned into AMO to support the integration mission.
Thus, AMO should be a distinct organization with a direct reporting
line to an FAA Administrator who empowers it to coordinate. It should
be formed through the fusion of ANG and the functions of PMO related to
new systems implementation. It should be oriented as a cross-cutting,
all-of-agency organization that coordinates the many FAA business lines
towards the long-term integration of novel systems and capabilities
into our air transportation system.
FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center for Advanced Aerospace
``Sec. 206--Future of NextGen'', in addition to sunsetting NextGen
also establishes the ``William J. Hughes FAA Technical Center for
Advanced Aerospace,'' in Section 106 of Title 49 of the United States
Code. This prestigious section of statutory law now clarifies the
Center's role as a ``technology center'' within the FAA.
Through the codification of the Technical Center, Congress has
defined it as the FAA's permanent and semi-autonomous agent for the
research, development, testing, evaluation, validation and sustainment
of products for use in the NAS.
The Technical Center creates value through coordinating programs,
partnerships, and assets that are interconnected by the physical space
of the New Jersey campus. Previous reorganization proposals confused
this relationship by suggesting a separation between the programmatic
responsibilities of the Technical Center Director and the management of
the physical campus. The law now emphasizes the importance of unitary
management of the programs that flow through the Center, the
partnerships that advance those programs, and the physical assets that
facilitate all activities.
Congress acted on this question by establishing that activities
managed by the Director include ``developing and stimulating technology
partnerships,'' ``managing technology demonstration grants,''
``managing the facilities'', and ``supporting the work of collocated
facilities and tenants,'' all of which occurs through the Director
``providing access to the properties, facilities, and systems of the
Technical Center through appropriate agreements.'' By establishing this
breadth of interconnected responsibilities under the Director, Congress
has decided that unitary management under the Director is best for the
Center and the Nation. While the Director does ultimately report to the
Administrator, this arrangement allows the Center to operate in the
semi-autonomous manner most appropriate for its role as an independent
validator.
The Center's critical role as an independent validator requires it
to lead many activities including the research, development, testing,
evaluation, validation and sustainment of products for use in the
National Airspace System. These activities are broadly captured in
subparagraph (C), which states that the activities of the Technical
Center shall include:
Identifying software, systems, services and technologies that
could improve aviation safety and the operations and management
of the air traffic control system and working with relevant
offices of the Administration to consider the use and
integration of such software, systems, services, and
technologies, as appropriate.
This catch-all language is intended to provide the FAA the
flexibility to route all appropriate research, development, testing,
evaluation, validation and sustainment activities through the Center.
This language importantly emphasizes ``integration,'' which positions
the Center to absorb future programs related to emerging technologies
including UAS, AAM, sustainable aviation fuel, hypersonics, electric
and hydrogen propulsion, commercial space, and the truly limitless
future evolutions of aerospace operations. This integration-specific
language also indicates that the Technical Center must play a central
role in the coordination activities that will soon be managed by the
Airspace Modernization Office.
Consistent with the FAA Reauthorization and the strong arguments
for transitioning ANG assets into AMO, the Technical Center should be
located under AMO. Within AMO, the Technical Center should perform
research, serve as project manager for development, lead independent
validation for Testing and Evaluation program activities, and maintain
laboratories in support of these missions. Importantly, Testing and
Evaluation direction should be kept separate from the program
management locus as the validation function must remain independent.
These activities should flow into systems engineering to facilitate
integration through the broader organization. We also should provide
outside stakeholders greater opportunities to proactively put their
technological solutions in front of the FAA for evaluation, a program
for which is described below.
Emerging Technologies Accelerator Program
The FAA's Fiscal Year 2025 budget generously reflects the
importance of the Technical Center to the FAA and the Nation by
including historic levels of infrastructure investments in the
Technical Center laboratories and electric utility. I am working with
the House Appropriations Committee to fund the Technical Center at your
requested amount, which investments will provide a strong foundation
for the Technical Center's future activities.
An important capability that the Nation must develop is the
Emerging Technologies Accelerator Program. This program will provide an
effective pathway for development, demonstration, and transfer of
technology applications that lead to a tangible operational improvement
to the air transportation system. It will be conducted through the
issuance of solicitations for technological solutions to pressing
aviation problems. It will serve as a bridge between outside
stakeholders and the integration activities being led by the Airspace
Modernization Office.
This program is necessary for the Technical Center to meet its new
statutory objectives of stimulating technology partnerships and
managing technology demonstration grants. The accelerator program
offers a proactive model that provides non-public stakeholders an
opportunity to get novel, beneficially applicable technologies
expeditiously evaluated by the federal government and integrated across
the NAS. This is an essential capability for AMO's new integration
model to achieve maximum effect.
This program was listed in previous budgets and should be relisted
to advance the Technical Center and AMO's new mission. This program
will only receive funding from Congress if it is included in the FAA's
R&D budget request, and so I strongly urge you to develop an FY26
budget request that includes this program at the previously requested
level of $10 million.
Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies
``Sec. 961--Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies,'' of the FAA
Reauthorization directs the agency to establish a Center for Advanced
Aviation Technologies that will support the testing and advancement of
new and emerging aviation technologies. I urge you to prioritize
implementation of this section by developing a national network of test
corridors and summarily establishing the William J. Hughes Technical
Center for Advanced Aerospace as the administrative program lead for
the Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies under the Airspace
Modernization Office.
The Technical Center's newfound statutory jurisdiction largely
encompasses the roles and responsibilities of the Center for Advanced
Aviation Technologies. The slate of tasks includes developing AAM
airspace laboratories, validating air traffic requirements, developing
technology partnerships, and identifying new and emerging aviation
technologies. All these tasks fall squarely within the statutory
jurisdiction of the Technical Center for Advanced Aerospace. These
legal facts dictate that the administration of the Center for Advanced
Aviation Technologies should be led by the Technical Center for
Advanced Aerospace.
Much of the Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies activities
will be conducted through the establishment of multiple national
testing corridors for the evaluation and validation of technologies
such as remote identification, BVLOS and detect-and-avoid. The
Technical Center will need to be the central administrative component
of this program because of its leadership in the validation of systems.
The entire point of testing corridors is validation--it is the
Technical Center's statutory mission to lead that validation process in
pursuit of integration.
While the Technical Center should be the administrative lead in any
case, New Jersey is well-positioned across its geography,
infrastructure and partnerships to host its own testing corridor within
the program.
The geography of New Jersey offers a unique ecosystem of airspaces
with variety and flexibility for AAM testing. The region is proximal to
numerous large commercial airports including JFK, LGA, EWR, PHL, ILM,
and ACY where the Technical Center is located. These include the
densest, most complex airspaces in the country, and will provide a
robust environment for the testing of all sorts of advanced types and
systems. South Jersey has multiple smaller general aviation airports
including MIV, WWD, and OBI. These are in rural areas that offer
substantial low-density airspace for different types of testing
activities.
Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, which houses the United States
Air Force's 305th Air Mobility Wing, is working with South Jersey's
National Aviation Research and Technology Park to establish a civilian/
military dual use UAS/AAM test corridor that can be used as one of
several premier national testing corridors.
The Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies is an exciting
project whose idiosyncrasies fall squarely within the statutory
jurisdiction of the Technical Center. We hope to serve as the
administrative lead for this program and coordinate the validation of
activities of testing ranges that will be established across the
country, including in New Jersey.
Invitation
I formally invite you to come to South Jersey and meet with our
aviation community. I would like for you to meet the many researchers,
businesses, and public officials who are working hard to make this
vision a reality. I hope to work closely together over the coming years
to realize the full potential of the Technical Center, the Federal
Aviation Administration, and the United States of America.
Sincerely,
Jeff Van Drew,
Member of Congress.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
This letter includes an invitation for you to come to South
Jersey and meet with many of our aviation stakeholders.
Can you confirm, and I know that you did this morning, that
you have received the letter and the invitation?
Mr. Whitaker. I look forward to it. Thank you.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you. Me too. Me too. It will be good to
have you in South Jersey.
I have received several questions about the FAA reauth and
the technical center, and I provided this to your team. We
tried to provide you in advance not to blindside you, out of
respect for you and out of respect for the issues.
Under the new FAA law, the NextGen Office will become the
Airspace Modernization Office. The Airspace Modernization
Office cannot succeed without control of program management
functions related to technology integration.
Does the FAA plan on reorganizing the Program Management
Office as a component of the Airspace Modernization Act?
Mr. Whitaker. Thank you, sir.
First off, I will mention, when I was deputy, I had the
opportunity to visit the tech center several times. And I
actually visited it very early in this tenure, but I look
forward to coming there to visit. And I think it is not only a
national treasure, but it is international standards for
airspace research in this space. So, looking forward to that.
The reauth, I will say that we are--and this was mentioned
several times in opening comments. We are treating the
provisions of reauth as a program that we have program
management protocols around. So, we are tracking all of the
various items.
With respect to the reorganization of NextGen, there is a
working group that is looking at best practices, talking to all
the teams within FAA. And we will come up with a plan on how to
reorganize that, and I will keep you informed on that.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Whitaker.
And I know the answers are short, and we will have a lot
more time to speak when you come down to South Jersey. But I
just have a few more, and I appreciate your----
Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. Sure.
Dr. Van Drew [continuing]. Brief answers.
The FAA codified the FAA Technical Center in statute.
Statute means that the technical center, as you know, is now
legally protected from predatory organizations or
reorganizations, that it is locally controlled, and that it is
the FAA's undisputed leader in technology, research, testing,
and validation.
And, again, quick answer. Can you assure me that attempts
to dismantle the tech center are finally over and that, going
forward, the center will be provided the necessary programs,
resources, and authority to execute this new and important
mission?
Mr. Whitaker. I can assure you I agree with those
provisions, and we will uphold that. Yes, sir.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, sir.
Congress is preparing historic infrastructure investments
for the tech center, but we must invest more into programs such
as the Emerging Technology Accelerator, which you are familiar
with. This program would empower the tech center to solicit
partnerships and develop innovative improvements for our
aviation system.
Can we work together, can we work together and get the
Emerging Technology Accelerator in the fiscal 2026 FAA budget
request? Can we do that?
Mr. Whitaker. Yes, sir.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you.
Section 961 of the FAA law established a Center for
Advanced Aviation Technologies. I want to be unequivocal that
under the technical center statute, overall management of this
program legally falls under the center's jurisdiction.
Is the FAA considering the technical center's new statutory
authority in designing this very program?
Mr. Whitaker. We will certainly consider that authority,
and there is a team working on what that advanced center would
look like. So, we will keep you informed of that as well.
Dr. Van Drew. You will. We would love to have that
communication.
South Jersey is prepared to absorb the responsibility. They
are. They are ready to go. I am already working with the United
States Air Force on a drone testing corridor in New Jersey, as
you know. However, I don't think this program should be limited
to a single test range in a single region.
Is the FAA amenable to a program with multiple national
test ranges that are programmatically managed out of the FAA
Tech Center? My last question.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Administrator, if you could be
brief and if you would like to follow up in writing.
Mr. Whitaker. I am sorry.
Dr. Van Drew. Brief answer and then we are done.
Mr. Whitaker. That is still being looked at, but we will
certainly keep you informed on how that plan gets put together.
Dr. Van Drew. Please work with our office on that.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your discretion. I yield back.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Van Drew.
Administrator, I want to say thanks again for being here,
and I appreciate your endurance.
I do have a few questions, and we also want to go to a
quick round 2. Ranking Member Larsen has a few followups.
First of all, soon we are going to have 2,000 aircraft
parts manufacturers and part 135 operators that are going to be
required to have an SMS. But it is also important to keep in
mind that from 2015 to the current, you have had the
requirement that part 121 operators already have an SMS.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. But that still resulted in us
having safety issues and some of the incidents that we are here
talking about today.
In my opinion--and I have heard lots of questions on the
SMS that have occurred here today--the SMS is only as valuable
as, number one, the SMS plan is, meaning, is it truly
applicable and sensitive to the safety threats that may occur
in the manufacturing process?
And number two, the actual execution and oversight of that
SMS--and so, you probably see where I am going. If an SMS
system has been required for part 121 operators and we have had
problems, are we supposed to feel confident that all of these
new operators, hundreds of new operators coming online
operating under part 135, that that is actually going to solve
problems in regard to safety?
Can you explain to me how this is going to be different and
give me some comfort that, moving forward, that the development
of SMS plans and the actual execution and oversight is going to
result in the types of outcomes that I know you and I share in
regard to safety?
Mr. Whitaker. So, I think the rollout of SMS with part 121
carriers has been quite successful, and we see that in action
as they identify risks. We hear about risks from them directly.
They are mitigating those risks.
It certainly takes some time, I think, for companies to
embrace. SMS can sound like an administrative burden until you
really understand the value that it can contribute in keeping
you safe.
One of the things that we saw with Boeing, which clearly
did not take its 2015 mandate to have an SMS system seriously
enough, we found that after the events of January 5th, that we
consciously put Boeing together with some of the carriers to
say, go talk to them. They have been deploying this for a long
time. And Boeing has met with UPS and some of the other
carriers to talk about their SMS and customize it to their own
operation.
So--and it is not a one-size-fits-all. We know some of
these part 135 operators are quite small. So, we need to make
sure we have a streamlined approach so they are not burdened by
that process.
But it is a very effective risk management system, and that
is what we need is every operator constantly evaluating their
risk and then taking steps to mitigate it. That is really the
thing that keeps us safe.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
In my opening, I mentioned the 2020 law that I know Mr.
Larsen and other leadership of the committee felt was
appropriate action, the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act, ACSAA. Here we are 4 years later, and as
you know, major components of that legislation remain
unaddressed or not fully implemented.
Can you tell me how many provisions--do you know how many
provisions of that are not implemented? And give me an idea on
the implementation plan, when we are going to have a 4-year-old
law fully implemented.
Mr. Whitaker. So, my understanding is that we are about 75
percent implemented on that, and we can provide your office
with some more detail about where that implementation is.
It was a very comprehensive and I think very helpful plan,
and we are continuing to not just rest on the designs from that
plan, but to also look at our oversight model more holistically
going forward as well.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Administrator, Hunter told me if I
said something about walking and chewing gum again that he was
going to lash me. But I--look, I will tell you, I think I can
speak on behalf of Mr. Larsen and all of us. No one expected it
was going to take 4-plus years to implement the law. I think we
viewed it with much urgency. We spent a lot of time working
through it and trying to make sure it addressed major issues
that were outstanding.
And with an issue as urgent as that, it is difficult for me
to sit here and understand how it takes 4 years to implement. I
talked in my opening statement about how we just passed a
1,000-page bill. And so, I assure you that all of us up here
have strong concern about the FAA's ability to implement that
with the urgency that we intend.
And so, I would like for you to submit something to us in
the record following up on why this has been so difficult and
so time-consuming.
And I will say it a second time at this hearing. I know
that you have inherited much, but perhaps your feedback could
help us understand how we can write laws in ways that are more
efficient or allow the FAA to implement with the urgency that I
think we intend.
With that, I am going to yield for a second round to Mr.
Larsen for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I appreciate that.
Just some followups that I had on a few of the questions
that have been asked.
One is, after the 90-day plan came out in May, or maybe a
little before that, got a flood of whistleblower calls to the
AIR21 number. A lot of news made about how many calls there
were in local papers back home.
Has that leveled off, or is the rate at which you are
receiving calls the same?
Mr. Whitaker. We have received a large volume of
whistleblower calls, and they get investigated as part of the
process. And we view that as a healthy sign. We want people to
speak up. So, we take each one seriously, and it runs through a
safety analysis and investigation process.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Has the number leveled off in
terms of the rate of calls coming in?
Mr. Whitaker. I will circle back with your office and give
you specifics on the sort of month to month.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. That would be fine.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Back to an earlier question I had
about proactive versus reactive. There is criticism the FAA is
trending behind other civil aviation authorities in
transitioning from a reactive approach to a proactive approach.
Can you highlight, just again for the record, maybe the
three steps to show that the FAA is moving towards a proactive
approach on these issues?
Mr. Whitaker. Well, I think the essence of the proactive
approach is more reliance on data and better tools to analyze
the data. So, right now, if you view the aviation safety system
as a series of layers that protect us from bad outcomes, right
now, we are noticing layers that are failing and then
addressing that. We want to be ahead of that to try to
understand layers that may have some weakness, so, really just
kind of move one step ahead of that process.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Is that changing your
organization at the FAA to do that?
Mr. Whitaker. So, we are going to change the--there is an
executive committee that oversees safety. We are going to
reconstitute that committee. We are going to make sure the
Administrator is on that committee and chairing that committee,
and that is going to be the committee that has a holistic view
of the various actors in the NAS and how they are doing on
safety so we have a sort of NAS-wide view of safety based on
data. That is ambitious, because getting data and analyzing
data is challenging and expensive, but that is the goal.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Getting back to maybe Mr.
Collins' comments earlier about the data systems at the FAA. Is
this thing going to require an additional investment, a new
investment into, more likely than not, software models that use
AI algorithms to search for trends that then can be highlighted
for you all as decisionmakers?
Mr. Whitaker. It is a little early to know what the
investments might be and what our options are. We are running
some trial programs with some outside vendors who are basically
going to show us some capabilities that we could utilize. We
will assess those test cases and start to put together some
assessment.
It is an issue that we have to work extensively with
industry on and also work with our colleagues at IASA and
elsewhere to make sure we have a full set of data. And we
shouldn't all have to reinvent the wheel. We should come up
with a system that allows everybody to have access to data that
gives them insight into safety risks.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. I know we are probably a little
bit aways from it, and this will be the last comment I have and
question. But at some point you are using the KPIs to determine
that on-off switch for production rate increases at the Renton
plant for the 737 MAX. And, again, I am not suggesting that you
are at a point where you can turn that on at all. That is not--
but I do think that getting to that point, as you are getting
to that point, helping us understand the progress on meeting
the KPIs that then lead to that decision, it would be helpful
for us so that we are not surprised by an FAA decision to turn
those lights green on production, just to assure us that,
again, you are doing your work, holding Boeing accountable so
we can do our work to hold you accountable.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes. I will--I think right now, we are
following this labor action which, obviously, has interrupted
production.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes, right.
Mr. Whitaker. I think----
Mr. Larsen of Washington [interposing]. You are not the
only one.
Mr. Whitaker [continuing]. At some point in the future, we
will have a briefing with you on, as production starts to ramp
up, more visibility into how we see that progressing.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Just assure me and assure us that
you are going to----
Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. Yes.
Mr. Larsen of Washington [continuing]. Keep us in the loop
on that----
Mr. Whitaker [interposing]. We will do that.
Mr. Larsen of Washington [continuing]. So it is less of a
surprise.
Mr. Whitaker. Yes.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thanks a lot. I yield back.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Menendez, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
Member.
Thank you for your testimony here today. I know we are in
the homestretch here, and I appreciate your patience.
And I just want to go over a couple of topics first with
respect to Boeing. When we have folks, different industry
participants come in and we talk about safety, often safety is
everyone's number one priority. But, obviously, there is always
the tension between profits and safety.
From your perspective, how has Boeing historically and more
recently handled the tension between prioritizing safety while
also being a moneymaking enterprise?
Mr. Whitaker. I think it is an interesting question. I
would hope that at this point they have concluded that, without
safety, the profits aren't going to follow under any
circumstance. And I think for all operators in our airspace,
whether it is an airline or a manufacturer, if you don't meet
those fundamental safety requirements of building a safety
culture and an open, just culture that allows whistleblowers to
step forward, it is going to be very hard to sustain your
business.
So, hopefully that has been a lesson learned. From our
perspective, that has to be the first order of business. And to
your point, everybody talks about it but not everybody does it,
so, our focus is to making sure they are actually doing it.
Mr. Menendez. Yes. And, obviously, we always hope folks
self-regulate, right, and do right by their customers and by
the entire industry, right, because safety is our number one
priority. You saw that with the FAA reauthorization through
this committee.
But I also find it is sort of thinking about ways that we
can ensure there are guardrails and hardwiring safety being the
priority, because when you do have a series--a time stability
and ensured safety, sometimes the attention shifts, right.
And what we need to ensure for all American people who use
these aircraft, who travel through commercial airlines, to
ensure that people are always focused on safety, even when
there has not been an incident like what we are here to discuss
today, that refocuses back on safety and sort of that
continuous dogged approach to making sure that we are always
best in class.
And safety is something that, on your end and our end, we
want to make sure that we are always thinking about so that way
we don't need an incident to return to the table to have a
conversation about safety.
Mr. Whitaker. And I think one of the things as we look at
our own oversight model is to make sure we are looking at the
right data so we get early indicators when that trend occurs
and someone takes their eye off the ball.
Mr. Menendez. I appreciate it.
If you don't mind, I want just want to switch gears
briefly.
Last time you testified before this committee, we spoke
about the persistent issue of helicopter noise in my district,
New Jersey's Eighth Congressional District. Earlier this month,
we held a workshop with the FAA in Jersey City to begin working
towards a solution. I thank the FAA for their participation in
this workshop. I look forward to continuing to work with you on
putting an end to this problem.
In the interim, I wanted to talk briefly about the FAA
Reauthorization Act and the FAA's efforts to implement the new
law. Section 792 of this law requires the FAA to establish a
Noise Advisory Committee. It is my understanding that the FAA
is currently working to stand up this committee.
Can you provide a brief update on the status of the Noise
Advisory Committee?
Mr. Whitaker. We are scheduled to provide a staff briefing
in just, I think, about 2 weeks on all of the reauth
provisions. So, we will make sure that that is part of that. I
don't have any specific information, but we can get that to
your office directly as well.
Mr. Menendez. And I appreciate it.
And sort of in the coming weeks before we have that staff
meeting, I think what is so incredibly important for us--I
represent a densely populated district. And so, there is a
heliport on one side of the district and New York City on the
other. The Statue of Liberty sits right off our shoreline.
You can tell Dan Goldman the Statue of Liberty is in New
Jersey, not New York. He will appreciate it.
But what I think is important is making sure that as this
Noise Advisory Committee is set up, that sort of in certain
areas where we really deal with noise and noise pollution,
densely populated areas--because we also have Newark airport in
the district--that we get community stakeholders to be a part
of the process. Because it was one of the challenges that we
had with the voluntary air tourism agreements that created
these buffer zones, which actually put helicopters into my
district, right, when we are trying to eliminate or reduce the
volume of trips.
And so, without having the communities that are subject to
all of this noise at the table, I feel like that voice is lost.
And I think it is something that is critically important to
make sure that they are a part of the process. And any way that
we can include stakeholders like that, as you think about the
committee, would be extremely--it would be very much
appreciated by myself and so many others.
Mr. Whitaker. I will. I think that you make a very good
point, and I think that is true. We will do that.
Mr. Menendez. All right. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Whitaker. Thanks.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Administrator, I am going to
recognize myself, and then we will wrap here.
In the FAA bill, I have described a lot of the provisions
we included in there where sort of the Congress acting on
behalf of the Administrator in cases when I think decisions
kind of got backlogged prior to you coming on board.
One of those is on BVLOS, and I know that we had some
pretty strict language with very tight timelines. And I know
that the FAA pushed back a little bit and said timelines were
unreasonable. I would argue that when laws put a timeline in
place, then what an agency should do is calibrate their answer
to the time that is available.
Could you give us an update on the timing for BVLOS which,
of course, is beyond visual line of sight for unmanned systems?
Mr. Whitaker. Yes, sir. I think the internal goal had been
early January since the onset, and we hope to exceed that. We
are hoping to have that out, if not the next few weeks, by the
end of the year.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Okay. Administrator, thank you.
And just along the lines of some of the new entrants in the
market, as you know, there were a number of provisions in the
FAA bill. Those are strong priorities for me and for this
committee in that I am concerned if we don't provide better
certainty for those innovators, for those entrepreneurs, we are
going to see those folks take their resources and go overseas.
And I know that you are aware, in some cases, where that has
occurred.
It is not just about the platforms themselves. It is about
the technology associated with those as well, including some of
the sensors and others, in addition to the conveniences that it
can apply in Louisiana.
We recently had Hurricane Francine, and having the ability
to send out reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned platforms to go
out there and go do some of the recon helps us to triage our
response activities and resources.
And we could sit here and talk for days about all the
application. And I just really want to emphasize to you the
importance of providing predictability, regulatory certainty
for these folks so they can get investment certainty. I think
that is fair, and I think they deserve it.
A few things closer to home. We have a provision related to
NPIAS airports in populated counties or--I know the other 49
States are confused--we call them parishes at home, and I just
want to highlight the provision in the bill related to that.
Very, very important.
We also have another provision related to expanding the use
of innovative technology into the Gulf of Mexico that is really
important, and I would appreciate you working and making sure
that those provisions are prioritized. And we are not talking
about the implementation of them years from now; that hopefully
months from now we can get some clarity on interpretation
there.
Mr. Whitaker. Great. Thank you. I will do that, sir.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Great. Thank you very much.
So, I am going to yield back. And I don't see any other
further questions from the subcommittee, and so, that concludes
our hearing today. And I want to thank the Administrator for
being here and, again, for your perseverance through the
committee.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Submissions for the Record
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Marcus J. Molinaro of New York
Thank you for holding today's hearing, Mr. Chair.
I am pleased that FAA Administrator Whitaker is here today
discussing safety oversight and appreciate his continued leadership.
The FAA's priority is to advance the safety of the nation's
aviation system. Part of this safety mission is the FAA's comprehensive
aircraft certification regulations that cover the airplane from initial
design through final assembly.
I had the opportunity to visit the ASPIRE MRO in Fort Worth, Texas,
where Mammoth Freighters is executing passenger-to-freighter (P2F)
conversions of the Boeing 777 passenger airplane in a state-of-the-art
800,000 square-foot facility. The facility allows Mammoth to convert
over a dozen airplanes per year for both the U.S. and global cargo
markets. The Mammoth and Aspire teams, now well over 700 employees, 150
of which are engineers, have been working on this conversion program
for almost four years. Over $250 million has been invested to date.
Certification of the Boeing 777 conversions will help supply
growing global air cargo freight demand and bolster United States
(U.S.) market leadership over European rivals. Converted freighters
have lower costs and better availability than new freighters, while
reducing our carbon footprint through the replacement of old three and
four engine aircraft. Recycling aging passenger airplanes creates
demand for new, more environmentally friendly passenger airplanes.
Furthermore, Mammoth freighters are designed and converted in the
U.S. with over 99.5 percent parts that are Made in America from
suppliers across 22 states. Mammoth expects to create more than 1,000
direct jobs, not including job growth at their suppliers. They have
secured 35 firm orders, with more expected, from partners such as
Jetran, Kalitta, DHL International, Air Canada, and STS Aviation
Services.
I understand that the program is entering the critical phase of the
certification process with the FAA. I encourage the FAA to meet their
published turnaround times and follow its prior practices and
procedures that the Mammoth team has experienced in previous conversion
programs. By doing this and utilizing the professional safety assets at
its disposal, this critical program can avoid unnecessary delays that
could lead to significant disruptions including potential job losses,
delays in aircraft deliveries and operational impacts to cargo
customers.
FAA certification is paramount to support U.S. global
competitiveness and U.S. job growth, and to maintain the American gold
standard in aviation safety and aircraft conversions.
Appendix
----------
Questions to Hon. Michael Whitaker, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, from Hon. Kevin
Kiley
Question 1. You claimed that SpaceX launched recent Falcon missions
without a permit. SpaceX has said these claims are completely false,
and that the FAA has not alleged previously that the company was not
permitted or licensed to launch these missions. Can you share the
evidence for your claim that SpaceX launched these missions without a
permit?
Answer. To clarify, once a license is granted by the FAA, the
licensee is required to comply with the terms and conditions of the
license as well as any representations the licensee made in its license
application. Notice 2023WA990028 was issued because it appears SpaceX
(1) used a launch control center not listed in its approved
communications plan, and (2) failed to complete a T-2 hour readiness
poll required by its approved communications plan for its PSN Satria
Mission launch on June 18, 2023. The launch was licensed but, for these
reasons, it does not appear that SpaceX was in compliance with the
terms of its license for that launch.
Question 2. You claimed that SpaceX moved a fuel farm closer to the
population without completing a risk analysis statement. SpaceX says
that the new location was twice the distance from the nearest publicly
accessible area, that the company provided the FAA with all the
required analysis, and that the FAA ultimately approved the revised
location. Please supply all correspondence between the FAA and SpaceX
relative to the fuel farm.
Answer. It appears that SpaceX moved the fuel farm to a location
further from a public roadway, but nearer to a publicly accessible
parking area. SpaceX is correct that the FAA did ultimately approve the
revised location but, notably, the FAA informed SpaceX in or around
December 2022 that it would need to update its application to address
the relocated fuel farm, and SpaceX did not provide the FAA with
appropriate supporting data until approximately 9 days before the July
28, 2023 launch, at which point the FAA did not have sufficient time to
address the application change prior to the launch.
Question 3. You claimed that SpaceX failed to provide an updated
sonic boom analysis. SpaceX refutes this and says that the Fish and
Wildlife Service had already reviewed Starship's sonic booms and
determined they had no environmental impact. While SpaceX has
acknowledged it recently provided the FAA data showing a slightly
larger sonic boom area than originally anticipated, the company
maintains this results in no new environmental impact.
Question 3.a. What evidence does the FAA have of a new
environmental impact?
Question 3.b. How long will it take the FAA to make this minor
paperwork update?
Question 3.c. What evidence does the FAA have for your assertion
that this is a safety related incident?
Answer to 3.a., 3.b., & 3.c. SpaceX applied to the FAA to modify
its existing vehicle operator license for the operation of the
Starship/Super Heavy launch vehicle from its existing Boca Chica Launch
Site in Cameron County, Texas. After completing an evaluation of all
applicable Vehicle Operator License requirements, the FAA issued a
modification of SpaceX's Vehicle Operator License for launches of the
Starship/Super Heavy Launch Vehicle Program in Cameron County, TX on
October 12, 2024. The modification authorized Flight 5 of the Starship
Super/Heavy.
As part of its determination to authorize the modification for
Flight 5 of the Starship Super/Heavy, the FAA developed a written re-
evaluation (WR) to determine whether SpaceX's following updates are
substantively consistent with the contents of the 2022 Final
Programmatic Environmental Assessment for the SpaceX Starship/Super
Heavy Launch Vehicle Program at the SpaceX Boca Chica Launch Site in
Cameron County, Texas (2022 PEA):
Proposed project updates to the location of the expended
forward heat shield in the Gulf of Mexico,
Additional information regarding sonic booms resulting
from a landing of the Super Heavy booster,
Updates to sonic boom modeling, and
Updates to use of the water deluge system.
The affected environment and environmental impacts of Starship/
Super Heavy operations at the Boca Chica Launch Site were analyzed in
the 2022 PEA.
Based on the WR, the FAA concluded that the contents of the 2022
PEA remain current and substantially valid and that the decision to
issue a modification of the existing vehicle operator license for
updated operations for the Flight 5 mission profile for Starship/Super
Heavy operations at the Boca Chica Launch Site does not require the
preparation of a new or supplemental EA or EIS to support the Proposed
Action.
The WR was signed on October 12, 2024. For more information, please
view the electronic version of the document on the FAA's website at:
https://www.faa.gov/space/stakeholder_engagement/spacex_starship.
Question 4. You claimed that SpaceX was in violation of Texas state
law. What Texas laws did SpaceX violate?
Answer. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) and
SpaceX signed an agreed order on August 13, 2024, to resolve a TCEQ
investigation report, dated August 2, 2024. The TCEQ report found that
SpaceX discharged wastewater from its Starship/Super Heavy operations
at the launch site into waters of the United States in violation of the
Clean Water Act (CWA) (33 U.S.C. Sec. 1251 et seq.) and Texas
environmental quality and water control laws (30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE Sec.
305.42(a) and TEX. WATER CODE Sec. 26.121(a)(1)). Under the terms of
the agreed order, among other requirements, SpaceX agreed to obtain an
individual Texas Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (TPDES)
industrial wastewater permit and discharge industrial wastewater from
its facility in accordance with this permit. TCEQ stated that SpaceX
paid a penalty assessed by TCEQ as well.
Question 5. Does the FAA need to be reformed to keep up with
innovation in the commercial space industry?
Answer. The Secretary of Transportation (Secretary), in accordance
with Title 51 of the United States Code, regulates and oversees U.S.
commercial space transportation operations, which include launch and
reentry operations worldwide, the operation of launch and reentry
sites, and human space flight missions. This authority has been
delegated by the Secretary to the FAA. Because of this, the FAA does
not need to be reformed to keep up with innovation in the commercial
space industry. AST carries out these authorities to protect public
health and safety, the safety of property, and the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States. In addition to these
important responsibilities, AST is also responsible for encouraging,
facilitating, and promoting commercial space launches and reentries by
the private sector and facilitating the strengthening and expansion of
U.S. space transportation infrastructure while protecting the public
health and safety, the safety of property, and the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States.
While keeping public safety at the forefront, AST strives to
provide operators with maximum flexibility to by regulating launch and
reentry operations only to the extent necessary and in an efficient
manner. As a performance-based rule, 14 CFR part 450 offers applicants
flexibility in how they demonstrate compliance and allows operators to
apply for and the FAA to grant a single license for multiple launches
using different vehicle configurations and mission profiles. However,
in order for a license to authorize multiple mission profiles and
launch vehicle configuration, an operator must be able to submit
license application material to the FAA that describes the different
launch vehicle configurations that it proposes to launch and the
corresponding range of launch parameters (e.g., flight azimuths and
trajectories). New operators that are initially conducting test or
research and development flights tend to have more license
modifications as they continue to expand their flight envelope and make
changes to the launch vehicle configuration. Once an operator's vehicle
configuration and operations stabilize, it should be able to minimize
the number of license modifications.
AST prioritizes regulatory clarity and is working to ensure
industry has a full understanding of how to achieve compliance with
part 450 and how to take advantage of its intended benefits. To
facilitate industry transition to part 450, we have provided an
assortment of aids, including license application checklists, issuing
17 advisory circulars in FY23 and 10 advisory circulars in FY24, as
well as virtual tutorials, office hours, and workshops. Part 450 will
move us in the right direction toward efficiency and workload
reductions for both the government and industry without compromising
safety. As we look to the future, AST will also continue to consider
opportunities to improve the rule to better meet its objectives and
identify other aids and resources to facilitate industry transition to
part 450. Additionally, we are also working to utilize advanced tools
to adapt to the changing landscape. AST is developing a Licensing
Electronic Application Portal (LEAP), which will be used to accept,
modify, exchange, and approve licensing materials under part 450. LEAP
is expected to enhance AST's ability to identify, track, and quickly
resolve questions and issues both internally and externally with
applicants. LEAP will streamline the licensing process for applicants,
provide more transparency into the process, and guide applicants in a
step-by-step process.
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