AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

[H.A.S.C. No. 118–43]

EXAMINING IRREGULARITY IN THE STRATEGIC BASING PROCESS FOR U.S. SPACE COMMAND

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 28, 2023

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
58–429 WASHINGTON : 2025

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, *Chairman*

JOE WILSON, South Carolina
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, *Vice Chair*
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
MATT GAETZ, Florida
DON BACON, Nebraska
JIM BANKS, Indiana
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
LISA C. MCCLAIN, Michigan
RONNY JACKSON, Texas
PAT FALLON, Texas
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida
NANCY MACE, South Carolina
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia
NICK LALOTA, New York
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam
MARK ALFORD, Missouri
CORY MILLS, Florida
RICHARD MCCORMICK, Georgia

ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
RO KHANNA, California
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
ANDY KIM, New Jersey
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
SARA JACOBS, California
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
PATRICK RYAN, New York
JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO, Pennsylvania
JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
JENNIFER L. MCCLELLAN, Virginia
TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
JIMMY PANETTA, California
MARC VEASEY, Texas

CHRIS VIESON, *Staff Director*
FORREST MCCONNELL, *Professional Staff Member*
JEANINE WOMBELL, *Professional Staff Member*
TAYLOR BURNS, *Research Assistant*

CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services 4

WITNESSES

Dickinson, GEN James H., USA, Commander, U.S. Space Command 8
Kendall, Frank, Secretary of the Air Force, USAF 6
Saltzman, Gen B. Chance, USSF, Chief of Space Operations 9

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:
Dickinson, GEN James H. 54
Kendall, Frank 47
Saltzman, Gen B. Chance 61

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted during the hearing.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:
[There were no Questions submitted after the hearing.]

EXAMINING IRREGULARITY IN THE STRATEGIC BASING PROCESS FOR U.S. SPACE COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, September 28, 2023.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order.

Before I offer my opening statement, I want to just summarize why we are here.

In 2019, the last administration resurrected U.S. Space Command, which had been for about 20 years in STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command]. And at that time, it was determined that this new combatant command, which is separate and apart from Space Force—I can't overstate that—was going to need a headquarters. So, in order to ensure for the American people and the various states that wanted to compete for that headquarters, a nationwide competition was held, which Huntsville, Alabama was decided to be the winner.

After that, there were some questions about the competition raised. So, there was a second nationwide competition that was held. So, Huntsville was decided to be the winner in that one again, and Colorado Springs was placed fifth.

There were questions raised by the Colorado delegation about the administration inappropriately involving itself in that decision. The Biden administration conducted a Government Accountability Office [GAO] investigation and an Inspector General [IG] investigation, found that not to be the case.

The last Secretary of the Air Force certified the decision that Huntsville was the winner of the first competition and should be the headquarters. This Secretary of the Air Force recommended to the President that Huntsville should be the permanent base.

Then, on July 31st of this year, the President announced that he had decided to take that decision from the Secretary of the Air Force, who we had been told for two years had the final authority on this from the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of the Air Force. And the President decided to give it to the fifth-place recipient, Colorado Springs.

This is inexplicable, and that is what today is all about. The one reason the President sided for this decision was operational readi-

ness. What you will find from today's hearing is that reason does not exist.

With that, the committee will come to order.

Today, we will examine the striking irregularities in the Biden administration's handling of U.S. Space Command Headquarters.

I want to thank the witnesses for being here and for their service to our Nation.

Unfortunately, the Biden administration has chosen to play politics with our national security. After a long and competitive national process, Huntsville, Alabama was selected as the best location to host the United States Space Command, or SPACECOM.

Huntsville beat out other states in this order: Albuquerque, New Mexico came in second. Bellevue, Nebraska came in third. San Antonio, Texas came in fourth, and in fifth place, Colorado Springs, Colorado. Huntsville, Alabama was selected to host SPACECOM permanently.

Since the end of that competition, which was validated both the GAO and the Biden administration IG, individuals within the Air Force and the Biden administration have attempted to circumvent the results and place SPACECOM's permanent base headquarters in Colorado Springs—in the name of readiness.

Let me be clear. This is not, and has never been, about readiness. General Saltzman, the general officer with day-to-day responsibility for readiness of more than 90 percent of our SPACECOM's assigned forces, says, quote, "It is my belief the permanent location of SPACECOM Headquarters will not impact the readiness of the United States Space Force forces." Close quote.

General Dickinson has stated that Colorado Springs is the, quote, "unmatched", close quote, choice for recruiting civilians to work in SPACECOM. Yet, he currently employs over 360 contractors to fill civilian staffing shortfalls.

Secretary Kendall's remarks highlight another issue that this administration's paper-thin readiness argument does not meet. According to the Air Force documentation, transmitted to the committee just two days ago, Colorado Springs is projected to cost $426 million more than Huntsville, Alabama for the headquarters operations over the next 15 years. That is $426 million, at least, of weapons procurement, research and development, or maintenance for the rest of the Department of Defense (DOD) that this administration has decided to spend on their political manipulation. Hundreds of millions of dollars in readiness lost—just so the President can try to endear himself to a purple state prior to next year's election.

These most recent developments are just the latest in a string of delays and funny math—fuzzy math—with one goal: whitewash the administration's decision to disregard the outcome of a competitive and deliberate selection process that Huntsville, Alabama won.

The Alabama delegation and its members of this committee have conducted a long-term, bipartisan oversight of the SPACECOM basing process. What we found has been alarming.

Not only has the Biden administration dumped millions into Colorado to make it look competitive, using, quote, "provisional headquarters," they appear to have spent even more to legitimize those efforts.

This year, I have demanded documentation and copies of DOD records to account for what has played out in the Pentagon and in Colorado Springs. They show that SPACECOM has already spent $127 million in Colorado, including tens of millions to put up to 800 of our most critical space warfighting decisionmakers in an abandoned, 41-year-old factory—not on a military base, but nine and a half miles away from the base; not in a secure area, in an industrial building next to a middle school, around the corner from an apartment complex, and across the street from the neighborhood. And 90 percent of what is done in that building is classified. This leased space had no proper fence, obsolete security systems, inadequate facilities to handle the highly classified systems our space capabilities rely on.

Documents obtained by this committee show that Colorado Springs is out of space and out of infrastructure, despite the spending spree. Sensitive equipment is running in buildings without proper backup power, and there already is a massive office space shortfall on the bases in the Colorado Springs area.

Despite these facts, on July 31st, President Biden decided that SPACECOM should no longer move to Huntsville, Alabama and would remain in its temporary location in Colorado Springs. The limited documentation provided to the committee doesn't shed much light on why the President picked the location with 30 percent higher construction cost factors to build an enormous, new headquarters building there, but I think the members of this committee know why.

This administration has conveniently ignored the fact that the units providing nearly all of SPACECOM's operational forces are not and were never planned to move, regardless of the SPACECOM Headquarters. There are Space Force personnel in Colorado Springs that are not part of SPACECOM.

They also ignore the fact that SPACECOM's functions have already moved once—from Nebraska to Colorado, when responsibilities were split out of STRATCOM—without problem. There is no justification for these actions except political considerations. It is indefensible to turn the fifth-place finisher into the winner of a basing competition.

Finally, there is an elephant in the room. The Chinese aren't sitting still. This committee has heard time and again that President Xi wants a military ready to forcibly overthrow the government of Taiwan by 2027.

Secretary Kendall and Secretary Dickinson are sure to raise this point as a reason to, quote, "stay the course" in Colorado. This is a rhetorical game.

If there is a war in 2027, General Dickinson's successor will likely fight it from the same headquarters he has today. Those headquarters are leased for the next eight years. They were stood up to make sure that, during the construction process of a permanent headquarters, there would be no diminution of readiness or operations.

This provisional headquarters is, and will remain, fully capable for the next eight years under existing leases. Everyone in this room knows that. The construction of a new, permanent head-

quarters in Alabama will have no impact on the provisional headquarters' operational readiness.

We had a nationwide competition to determine the best site for the permanent SPACECOM Headquarters. Both the Air Force Secretary—both the last Air Force Secretary and the current Air Force Secretary have concurred with and supported the competition results that Huntsville, Alabama is the best location for this permanent headquarters.

We need to demonstrate to the American people that preparedness, and not politics, determines important investments like this, and call for this competition result to be honored.

With that, I yield to my friend and colleague from Washington State, the ranking member, for any opening statement he may have.

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sorry, my chair is falling apart on me here. Just three points on this—as soon as I figure out how to get myself set up here.

First—and I think the chairman illustrated this—this has been a horrible process. And one of the things that I think everyone on this committee—and Congress, for that matter—is owed is an explanation for that; how exactly we bollocksed up a decision to build a command headquarters. We are not talking about a multibillion weapons system here. As I understand, we are talking about building a building and locating, roughly, 1400 people.

And the process has been, through two administrations, I will emphasize, just horribly messed up. And we need to hear more about how that happened and how to make sure that it never happens again.

Second, the most important thing going forward is that we stop the bleeding here at some point and get forward actually working on what it is we are supposed to work on in terms of defending the Nation, instead of arguing endlessly about where to locate one—well, I guess it is probably more than one—building. But, anyway, it is one, just one building.

But the third thing, where I disagree with the chairman, I do not believe that either President Trump or President Biden made this decision based on politics. It is an unfortunate charge that both sides have thrown out there when the decision didn't go the way they wanted it to. I mean, I know a little bit about politics, and I just really can't imagine that some sort of election is going to be determined based on where one 1400-person building is located, whether it is in Alabama or Colorado. So, I don't think politics had anything to do with this.

In fact, I think there were just two basic competing problems here. And, yes, Huntsville, Alabama won the competition. But, as I looked through the RFP [request for proposal] on that, it seemed to simply come down to, where is the cheapest place to build a building? Okay? And it is cheaper to build a building in Huntsville, Alabama than it is in Colorado Springs, or, apparently, in five or six other places.

Is that really the only determining factor in where the best place to put SPACECOM is? I wouldn't think so. I would think that there would be other concerns, other things to think about.

But the way it was structured, it, basically, said, where's the cheapest place to build a building? I don't even know why you had the competition at that point. Anyone could have told you within, like, 30 seconds Huntsville is going to be cheaper than Colorado Springs. So, it is cheaper, yes. Is it better?

And this is where the other side of it—it is not just politics. The people at SPACECOM don't want to move. Okay? They are in Colorado Springs. They have been there; they set it up. And they don't want to move. I don't know exactly why. I don't think it has much to do with preferring Colorado Springs over Huntsville, Alabama. Moving is a pain, and if you don't have to do it, you would rather not. At the end of the day, I think that is what it comes down to.

And President Trump never, as he was sort of walking out of office, made this decision. Okay? It definitely should have been left to the next administration, so that we didn't get into this back-and-forth thing. Again, it was thoroughly investigated. I don't see any evidence whatsoever that President Trump made that decision based on politics. But whatever that decision was, it, certainly, shouldn't have happened at the absolute last minute of his administration.

But President Biden did not decide what he decided because of politics. He decided it because of the assessment that, since you have the Space Command folks, the people who are actually doing the job, wanting to stay in Colorado, that that was a balancing factor. That was why.

But why we couldn't have simply decided this—I mean, just one final point. You know, the studies that looked into, well, was the Trump administration's decision within the rules, basically, the GAO, the IG looked into it. The determination on that came out over a year ago, and we waited a year to make the decision, just sort of twisting in the wind. I don't see why, if we were going to do it, we couldn't have done it a hell of a lot sooner than that.

So, the decision making process has been terrible. I believe that the quicker we can get through this, the better off we are all going to be.

And lastly, I hope that people won't say, "Oh, it's politics on this side; it's politics on that side." No, it was cheaper to build it in Alabama, but folks wanted to stay in Colorado. You know, which one weighs more? You know, one group of people decided one way; one group of people decided the other way, and then, there was a spectacular amount of unacceptable indecision in simply going, "This is what we're doing," that made it all the more worse.

So, I look forward to the hearing, to get some greater explanation and what I may be missing in that analysis, and hopefully, getting to some reasonable answers and moving on with the mission.

With that, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the ranking member.

Now, I would like to introduce our witnesses.

We have the Honorable Frank Kendall, Secretary of the Air Force; General James Dickinson, U.S. Commander of Space Com-

mand; General Chance Saltzman, the Chief of Space Operations, United States Space Force.

And I welcome all of our witnesses.

Secretary Kendall, let's start with you. You are recognized for 5 minutes to summarize your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK KENDALL, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, USAF

Secretary KENDALL. Thank you, Chairman.

We have submitted a statement for the record, but I will summarize briefly.

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and other distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning.

Any basing decision involves a balancing of different, and often competing, factors. In my judgment, the two most important factors in this basing action, ultimately, proved to be:

One, the cost to the taxpayer of constructing and operating a new permanent headquarters facility at any of the six reasonable alternative locations.

And two, the operational risk associated with any transition from the provisional headquarters in Colorado to another location.

President Biden exercised his authority, as Command-in-Chief and Chief Executive, to make the final decision to locate the permanent headquarters of U.S. Space Command in Colorado. I fully support the President's decision.

I would like to summarize how this decision came about. When I became the Secretary of the Air Force in July 2021, the preliminary designation of Huntsville, Alabama as a preferred alternative was under review by the Department of Defense Inspector General and the General Accountability Office, the Government Accountability Office.

I took no action while these reviews were underway. The DOD IG and GAO completed their reviews in the May 2022 timeframe. While neither review found any fundamental flaw in the identification of the preferred alternative of Huntsville, both found deficiencies in the process by which that decision was reached.

The Secretary of Defense directed me, on May 4th, 2022, to conduct a review of concerns expressed by senior military leaders regarding full operational capability for U.S. Space Command.

Subsequently, I directed the Department of the Air Force Strategic Basing Team to conduct a thorough reevaluation of its basing analysis.

There have been three core assumptions underpinning this basing action: the need for a 464,000-square-foot facility; a workforce of 1450 people, and new construction of a permanent headquarters building.

The results of the reevaluation were consistent with earlier results. All six locations were reasonable alternatives, but Huntsville was lower-cost, while remaining in Colorado posed the lowest operational risk.

Under any circumstances, USSPACECOM would achieve its final operational capability, its full operational capability, in its current provisional location of Colorado Springs. As a result, the time to

achieve full operational capability [FOC] was not a major consideration. But the disruption associated with moving the headquarters became a factor to consider.

There would be some operational risk associated with moving the provisional headquarters in Colorado to any other location. General Dickinson expressed the view that the operational risk was significant. The Department of the Air Force Strategic Basing Team believed that potential mitigation measures were available, and I concurred with that conclusion.

In early April 2023, General Dickinson stated that he anticipated declaring full operational capability in the late summer of 2023—earlier than previous estimates—and he would do so without the construction of a new, permanent headquarters building.

I, then, asked General Dickinson to reconfirm SPACECOM's current basing needs and whether there had been any changes. I also asked the Chief of Space Operations, General Saltzman, to provide his perspective on the basing action. The committee has been provided with General Dickinson's response.

General Dickinson stated, in part, that SPACECOM requirements have not changed and will soon be fulfilled, as the Command estimates declaring full operational capability in August 2023. That date has since slipped.

Based on the accelerated threat in space and the progress in the Command, selecting a final headquarters location other than Colorado Springs would greatly reduce readiness, levy significant cost, and impose high risk to mission and force.

And finally, considering the threat, the U.S. Space Command's pending full operational capability, and the situation as a whole, Colorado Springs should be the permanent location for U.S. Space Command Headquarters.

General Saltzman also provided his perspective on the basing action, which he has shared with the committee.

I, then, sent a basing team to Colorado Springs to assess whether the Space Command Headquarters could remain in its current configuration of leased and government-owned facilities. The team concluded that new headquarters building was still necessary.

Over the course of the Department of the Air Force's extensive reevaluation of the basing process, I have kept the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council staff informed regarding the status of the basing team's analysis.

After being informed that our President would make the final decision, I briefed the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Advisor on the results of the Department of the Air Force's review in June of 2023.

Ultimately, my view was that the decision came down to a judgment about the operational risk associated with the relocating versus the reduced cost of the leading alternative of Huntsville, Alabama. My assessment was that the projected cost savings, together with the availability of potential mitigation measures, outweighed the operational risks that have been identified. As a combatant commander, however, for SPACECOM, General Dickinson assessed these considerations quite differently.

On July 31st, 2023, the President announced his decision. I fully support the President's judgment in this matter.

Given the intensifying threat, and with a final decision now having been made by President, we are preparing—we are prepared to move forward with the implementation of this basing decision. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Kendall can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Secretary.

General Dickinson, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. SPACE COMMAND

General DICKINSON. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, ladies and gentlemen of the committee, it is, as always, my honor to appear before you to represent the 18,000 men and women of the United States Space Command.

These patriots perform a vital mission on behalf of the American people—vital because space enables our modern way of life and is critical to defending our Nation. As I testified before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee in March, threats to a safe, secure, stable, and sustainable space domain are increasing rapidly. Our strategic competitors, China and Russia, are fielding counterspace capabilities designed to diminish U.S. influence and military effectiveness. Beijing and Moscow are fully aware of our advancements in space and the enormous benefits to be gained by advancing their own space capabilities, while holding ours at risk.

Since U.S. Space Command's establishment in August of 2019, readiness has been our priority. When I took command in the summer of 2020, then-Defense Secretary Esper directed me to focus on operational readiness.

And we responded to this direction by establishing a 24/7 Joint Operations Center, publishing the first-ever Secretary of Defense (SecDef)-approved Operational Plan for Space, and conducting our first Tier 1 exercise with US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), and validating our headquarters as a synchronized team of professionals. And this is just some of the achievements that we have accomplished.

The U.S. Space Command Headquarters basing decision has been realized following a deliberate and robust selection process. My role in this process was to identify the original headquarters requirements for the permanent location.

As we awaited that decision, our Command remained focused on our primary directive—to be ready to fight and win in space whenever called upon. And we met our Unified Command Plan directives to deliver space effects to the warfighter, protect and defend the space domain, and conduct transregional missile defense planning and operations support.

By our second anniversary in August of 2021, we achieved initial operational capability at our provisional headquarters. And due to the diligent work and professionalism of our staff and components, we will soon reach full operational capability, based on the Command's ability to:

First, execute our Unified Command Plan missions and in conjunction with conducting global campaigning exercises in response to crisis.

Secondly, hold the requisite number of skills across our human capital.

Third, leverage essential infrastructure to enable command and control across our mission and business functions.

Fourth, execute necessary command processes/functions.

And finally, set conditions and requirements for the future fight.

Over the past four years, U.S. Space Command's growth and focus on readiness has translated into the accomplishments of significant tasks and milestones. U.S. Space Command works very closely with the Department of the Air Force, our designated combatant command support agency, to meet our obligations and initiate actions necessary to build our operational readiness.

On July 31st, the President announced his decision for Colorado Springs, Colorado as the permanent location for U.S. Space Command Headquarters. I support the President's decision, which I believe will further enable the Command to maintain mission readiness at the highest levels, while imposing the least disruption to the force.

In my view, selecting Colorado Springs as the permanent basing location for U.S. Space Command best sustains our human capital investments and, ultimately, maintains our readiness at the highest levels, while imposing the least disruption to the mission and workforce. This is especially important as our pacing challenge, the People's Republic of China (PRC), is working to accelerate its modernization and develop the capabilities it assesses are needed to compel unification with Taiwan and counterbalance the United States by 2027.

Our competitors are advancing swiftly with adversarial intent. U.S. Space Command will not slow down. We will meet that advance and we really have no time to lose. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Dickinson can be found in the Appendix on page 54.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Saltzman, you are now recognized for an opening statement.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL B. CHANCE SALTZMAN, USSF, CHIEF OF SPACE OPERATIONS

General SALTZMAN. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

As the Chief of Space Operations, I am the Service Chief responsible for the U.S. Space Force, the military service that secures our Nation's in, to, and from space.

Along with the Service Chiefs from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, I am also a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

And as the chairman has stated, the Space Force is a separate and distinct organization from U.S. Space Command, which is the combatant command tasked with planning, coordinating, integrating, synchronizing, assessing, and when directed by the President, executing global offensive and defensive space operations.

As the Chief of Space Operations, I am the senior uniformed officer responsible for the organizing, training, and equipping of all Space Force forces serving in the United States and overseas. I am

responsible for the generation of ready forces, which are presented to combatant commanders, in order to execute missions on behalf of the Joint Force.

At this time, the overwhelming majority of U.S. Space Force operational units are presented to U.S. Space Command through the Space Force service component called Space Operations Command. Space Operations Command consists of a headquarters element at Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado Springs and subordinate organizations at a number of locations which generate ready forces for missions in space domain awareness; electromagnetic warfare; missile warning; command and control; cyberspace operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; satellite communications; position, navigation, and timing, and orbital warfare.

As the Space Force Service Chief, I am, typically, only involved in the Department of the Air Force strategic basing process when U.S. Space Force units are under consideration. Because this basing action related to a Joint Headquarters for U.S. Space Command, I had only peripheral engagement in this matter, as described in my September 13th, 2023 letter to the committee.

I thank the Congress for their continued support of the U.S. Space Force, the Space Force mission, our guardians, and their families. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Saltzman can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you.

I now recognize myself for questions.

I want to start by emphasizing that, when the President made his announcement on June 31st, the sole reason he gave for deviating from the competition results was General Dickinson indicating there would be diminution in operational readiness, space readiness, if they were to move, period, full stop.

General Saltzman just made reference to the fact that—and you can turn that time limit off—made reference to the fact that he didn't have a part in this, and he's right. Generals, the Space Force is separate and apart from Space Command, and Space Command is a combatant command.

He is here to emphasize what he just said in his opening statement, and that is, the overwhelming operational readiness of our space capabilities is conducted by the Space Force in their Space Operations Center in Colorado Springs, which is not moving. And the portion that doesn't fall under his control, there's small elements of space capabilities in the Army, Marines, and the Navy. They aren't moving. So, this idea that moving Space Command is going to affect operational readiness is just fabricated.

But that is the reason he is here, so people can understand that this Service component, which provides the bulk of the resources to General Dickinson's Command, if needed, is not moving. That is one thing.

General Saltzman, more than 90 percent, as I just said, of SPACECOM's operational forces are provided by the Space Force. Isn't it true that it makes no difference to readiness whether SPACECOM is in Colorado, Alabama, Nebraska, or Texas, because those units that you have are not going anywhere?

You wrote me a letter September 13th saying, "It is my belief that the permanent location of SPACECOM Headquarters will not impact the readiness of U.S. Space Force forces." Close quote.

On April 13th, you wrote Secretary Kendall, quote, "Regardless of the U.S. Space Command Headquarters location, there is very little operational risk to the space missions currently being executed." Close quote.

Are those not your statements?

General SALTZMAN. Yes, sir, those are my statements.

The CHAIRMAN. General Saltzman, as you know, the Service components are responsible for the underlying readiness of their respective units. Those units are, then, offered up to the combatant command for use in operations. Isn't it a fact that you retain ultimate responsibility for over 90 percent of those forces assigned to USSPACECOM?

General SALTZMAN. I have the responsibility to generate readiness for the Space Force forces assigned to U.S. Space Command.

The CHAIRMAN. And those are in Colorado Springs, and they are not moving, no matter where the Space Command Headquarters is located?

General SALTZMAN. They are in a number of locations, including Colorado Springs, and are not moving.

The CHAIRMAN. Correct.

Secretary Kendall, first, I want to applaud you. You did what you thought was right, regardless of the political pressure that you knew was being exerted, and I know that it was being exerted on General Dickinson.

And I want to go to the most important thing you said in your opening statement, and that is, "After considering all these factors, including General Dickinson's observations, my assessment was that the projected cost saving, together with the availability of potential mitigating measures, outweighed the operational risk that had been identified. As the Combatant Commander for the USSPACECOM General Dickinson assessed,...."

You considered these factors, and then, did what you were assigned to do, and that is come up with the best location. And again, I can't overstate this: why have a nationwide competition if we are just going to disregard it? But you didn't, and you are to be applauded.

I understand that you serve at the pleasure of the President and you are going to say, "Yes, sir," and salute, when he decides to do something different. But I will emphasize that, for the last two years, the Secretary of Defense has told this committee, and told me, that the decision on where the basing was going to be, the permanent basing of SPACECOM, was solely in the purview of the Secretary of the Air Force, and whatever he decided was going to be final.

That did not change until the Secretary of the Air Force started indicating in late June that he was probably going to pick Huntsville. That is when, all of a sudden, efforts were made to get General Dickinson to invigorate his arguments that we have seen here today, to give the President a plausible toehold to take away this decision. But, as you have just heard from General Saltzman, there

is no effect on operational readiness, no matter where SPACECOM is.

General Dickinson, I had the chance to come out and visit you in late August and had you take me through all of your buildings. Over a thousand of your 1400 employees are in rented spaces off-base, is that not correct?

General DICKINSON. It is not quite a thousand, but it is about 800.

The CHAIRMAN. Eight hundred I thought were in the Bay Area building. Aren't there another 200 in Newport?

General DICKINSON. So, Bayfield, sir——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I have got Bayfield lease——

General DICKINSON. I have about 800 in Bayfield, and then, the Newport is about 210.

The CHAIRMAN. Two ten, yes.

So, of the 1400 you are expected to have, you are going to have over a thousand of those in two locations—one four and a half miles off-base and the other nine and a half miles off-base, is that accurate?

General DICKINSON. That's accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. And most of the work done in both those buildings is classified, isn't it?

General DICKINSON. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Now, as you have heard me say in my opening statement, they are in residential areas; they are near schools; they don't have fences around them. This operation, this facility, needs to be in a base.

The competition that Huntsville, Alabama won was going to put the building inside Redstone Arsenal in one state-of-the-art building that was one big Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), which is what it should be.

Now, General Dickinson, I met with you when I came out there. I said, "I want you to show me everything that you do out here, all your buildings." And we went through all the buildings.

And I asked you, "Is there anything that you're doing out here that will be interfered with by the construction of a new headquarters building in Huntsville, Alabama, five states away? And as I understand it, it's going to take five years to build this new headquarters. Is there anything about that construction process that would interfere with your operations in Colorado Springs?" And your answer to me was, "No, sir." Is that correct?

General DICKINSON. Chairman—and thank you again for coming out and seeing the great folks working at U.S. Space Command during your visit—and for the brick-and-mortar piece of it that we talked about, building the physical building itself to the standards that we need, it won't have a direct impact on readiness in Colorado Springs until we look at the transition of the workforce and the mission sets from Colorado Springs, in this case, to Huntsville.

The CHAIRMAN. Which would be five years out?

General DICKINSON. It could be five years out, if that is what it is determined to be, the build time for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

General DICKINSON. But, Chairman, I would tell you that, as we get ready for that move, there will probably be civilian—the 60 per-

cent of the headquarters that is civilians where folks will start making decisions that they no longer want to work there and seek employment elsewhere, given the predictability and their personal desire that they would not want to go to Huntsville.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right. And that is what I asked you there. Because you just skipped past my question. And that is, I asked you, "Is there anything about the construction process in Huntsville, Alabama over the next five years that will interfere with your operations here in Colorado Springs," and you said, "No, sir."

But, then, I asked you, I said, "Well, why would you tell the President that it could affect operational readiness?" And that is when you told me, "Well, as we get closer to the move, some of the civilians may not want to move."

Well, clearly, as the Secretary said, there are mitigating factors. You have got five years to plan it and you are moving to the Rocket City, one of the most high-tech cities in America. You are going to find a ready workforce, particularly when you have got five years to plan it. So, that is not a reason.

But, even aside from that, as we have already found out, most of the operations, day-to-day operations, are conducted by the Space Force.

But now, let me go back to a meeting that we had June 7th in the Capitol, where you met with the Alabama delegation and about 20 staffers, and we were talking about this, concern about operational readiness. And you told me that the reason you stood up this provisional headquarters was to ensure that, while a new headquarters was being built, no matter where it was being built, there would be no interruption to operational readiness, and that is the purpose of the provisional headquarters; and that you had 10-year leases, which are now closer to eight, to make sure that there was more than enough time, and to ensure that operational readiness was carried out by your Command, and there would be no interruption.

Have you not achieved that goal, that you have an operationally functioning command that is not going to be affected by construction of a headquarters in another state?

General DICKINSON. I have an operating command right now in the provisional facilities in Colorado Springs.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. And if we were to have a conflict with Taiwan in 2027, you would be ready for it, or your successor would be, because I know your time is up?

General DICKINSON. We would be.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Secretary Kendall, when you spoke with the Alabama—oh, before I leave that point, I want to go back to that June 7th meeting.

In that June 7th meeting after you told me that you had stood that up to make sure you were ready to prevent any kind of readiness interference, I asked you, "Can you envision any circumstance in which you would recommend Colorado Springs for the permanent basing location for SPACECOM?" and your direct answer to me was, "No, sir." Is that not correct?

General DICKINSON. Chairman, there was a misunderstanding in that meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. But that was your answer to me, was it—I asked you a direct question. If you want to follow it up with an explanation—but was that not your answer to me?

General DICKINSON. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. You're under oath, sir.

General DICKINSON. Chairman, I had a misunderstanding with how that question was——

The CHAIRMAN. What was your answer to me?

General DICKINSON. Chairman, I would go back to I had a misunderstanding with what was asked of me of that——

The CHAIRMAN. That was a pretty clear question.

General DICKINSON. Which I clarified in——

The CHAIRMAN. No, you didn't. The next day, you emphasized that the decision rested with the Secretary of the Air Force; you did not mean to infer who should win.

I asked you if you would, under any circumstances, recommend Colorado Springs, and you answered, "No, sir," and then, you went on to explain that Colorado Springs was just set up to be a temporary provisional headquarters while the new headquarters was being built.

But you are right, the letter you sent me the next day said, "I want to make sure you understand I was not impeding the decision of the Secretary of the Air Force, who is going to make the decision"—we thought, until the President decided he didn't like the results.

But that is what you told me, and I want you to know you are under oath. Do not deny that because that would be perjury.

General DICKINSON. Again, Mr. Chairman, I—that was a misunderstanding on my behalf, and the answer——

The CHAIRMAN. That was a very clear question.

General DICKINSON. The answer I gave——

The CHAIRMAN. That was a very clear question, General, and you knew exactly what your answer was.

General DICKINSON. But I did not——

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Kendall—Secretary Kendall. when you spoke to the Alabama delegation on May 23rd, you said, unequivocally, that you had been given the decision authority for SPACECOM.

On June 8th, you wrote me a letter. Quote, "I am committed to making a decision. This is the best long-term interest of the Department of Defense." Close quote.

According to your testimony, you were told that, quote, "The President would make the final decision." Close quote. At some point between June 8th and June 30th, we know from your testimony that you preferred sending the SPACECOM Headquarters to Huntsville.

When were you told that the President would be making the decision instead of you?

Secretary KENDALL. Chairman, it was shortly before the decision was made.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Were you given any reasons?

Secretary KENDALL. The reason is the one that the President has publicly stated, the concerns about readiness, and the readiness manifests itself in the transition process of moving to another loca-

tion. And as General Dickinson indicated, losing the civilian workforce, and then, having to reestablish a trained workforce at the new location.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. I will wait for my second round of questions later.

I just want to pause right here and emphasize, General Saltzman says he takes care of daily readiness, almost all of it, what the Navy and the Army and the Air Force don't do, which is very small.

Secretary Kendall said he considered General Dickinson's concern and found that they were not overriding and there were mitigating factors.

General Dickinson just acknowledged he is ready to operate for the next eight years, no matter where the headquarters is going, and all he needs is to be concerned about replacing maybe some civilian personnel who may not want to move, but he has got five years to do it. There is no readiness concern.

I yield to the ranking member for any questions.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I yield to Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to yield my time now to the gentlelady from Alabama, Congresswoman Sewell.

Ms. SEWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you so much, Colleague Courtney.

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.

And let me start off by saying that Huntsville, Alabama is, unequivocally, the best place for Space Command—not because it is cheaper, although that is really important, cost savings, but because of superior competency and an able and ready workforce.

Huntsville is synonymous with space. Its nickname is the Rocket City. It is the home of the Space and Missile Defense Command, NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, the Missile Defense Agency, and Missile and Space Intelligence Center.

The city has more engineers per capita than anywhere else in this Nation, and we are proud of that in Alabama. No place is more equipped, competent, capable, and better suited to headquarter the Space Command than Huntsville—not just because it is cheaper, but because of superior competencies and an able and ready workforce.

Through two extensive competitions, DOD agreed with this assessment. Huntsville came in first—first place—of those competitions, while Colorado came in fourth and fifth.

Let me repeat: a competition is held for a reason. Criteria are given. And when one particular location meets all of the boxes, including operational readiness, and was chosen first, to go with fourth and fifth—you know, we are a competitive state in Alabama; we love our football. No. 1 means No. 1.

DOD IGA, the DOD's IG found that the process Air Force used, quote, "compiled with law and policy, was reasonable in identifying Huntsville as the preferred permanent location." End quote.

Additionally, there has been a Republican and a Democratic Secretary of the Air Force, and both have found Huntsville to be the best location.

The evidence is overwhelming, gentlemen, and undeniable. While Space Command needs to be in Huntsville, we have made a political decision over a competency decision. And I know that this administration strives for equity; strives to be fair, and this is simply unfair.

I want to focus on workforce and labor issues that I found in your assessment to select Colorado over Alabama. General Dickinson, you asserted that you believe moving SPACECOM Headquarters would impact readiness through a loss of civilian hires. But Secretary Kendall supported moving to Huntsville because DOD could mitigate operational risk using temporary supporting staff. You do so now; you have done so in the past, and you will continue to do so, using temporary staffing support.

The fact is that we could move to Huntsville; build a new headquarters; pay for staffing mitigation to buy down risk, and still come out hundreds of millions of dollars ahead.

General Dickinson, isn't it a fact that we could spend every dime projected in mitigation costs and still come out ahead financially by moving to Huntsville?

General DICKINSON. Congresswoman, I would address your question in this regard: it is that 60 percent of the headquarters today is civilians, whether Department of the Air Force civilians doing great work for us. We know if we were to move, for example, that we would believe about 88 percent of those folks would probably not move.

Ms. SEWELL. Did you conduct any new workforce analysis of the Alabama labor market?

General DICKINSON. I believe the Secretary of the Air Force did during this basing process.

Ms. SEWELL. Did you support and provide the committee any statistical evidence to support a claim that the workforce in Huntsville, Alabama or in the State of Alabama was inadequate, either of you? Secretary Kendall?

Secretary KENDALL. Yes, the workforce was adequate. It would need to be trained, of course, for the specific roles.

Ms. SEWELL. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, beyond everything we have discussed today, another major concern I have in the Air Force decision to locate Space Command in Colorado is that it would geographically cut off a diverse talent pipeline for military and civilian personnel.

Alabama is the home of 14 Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), the most in the country. Colorado is the home of zero. Alabama's population is 27 percent African American, while Colorado's is only 4 percent. This makes a difference when recruiting personnel.

In Huntsville, Alabama, the Space and Missile Command recruits students from Alabama A&M down the road in Huntsville, Alabama, bringing them into the internship program; fostering their full-time employment, and creating an able, ready workforce.

I hope that we can move away from politics and look at the facts. And the facts are the Huntsville will be a better location, the best location for Space Command.

Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. And I would also emphasize they get a lot of engineering graduates from Tuskegee in my district.

The gentleman from Colorado Springs is recognized.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank Secretary Kendall, General Dickinson, and General Saltzman for testifying before the committee today.

And I commend Chairman Rogers for calling this hearing.

I have had serious concerns about flaws in the Air Force's role in the basing decision process from the very beginning. Both the DOD Inspector General and the GAO reports stated that the Air Force process deviated from prior basing decision. It focused on secondary factors rather than America's readiness to exert space dominance. Sure, housing costs, school districts, and such matters are important, but not as important as military readiness.

As an aside, I do want to go on record to say that, even in these secondary considerations, Colorado Springs takes a backseat to no one. After all, according to a popular ranking, it is one of the 10 most desirable places to live in the entire United States and has been for each of the last six years.

People who live in Colorado Springs are fiercely loyal to it and will not move away, no matter how attractive an alternative may be. This loyalty means that moving Space Command anyplace else, no matter where that would be, would produce a dramatic attrition in the civilian portion of the trained workforce at Space Command.

Significantly, the Inspector General's report—I have a copy of it right here—cited the site selection findings that stated that, when FOC, or full operational capability, was considered, Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs rose to the top of the list. I repeat: when full operational capability was considered, Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs rose to the top of the list. That is on page 19 of part two of the Inspector General's report.

Quote: "This assessment supports the selection of Colorado Springs as the preferred alternative and Huntsville as the feasible alternative." End quote. Page 19 of the Inspector General's report.

But, no matter where in the Air Force site selection rankings Colorado Springs or Huntsville, or any other location, are placed, at the end of the day, it is only academic. The Commander-in-Chief, Donald Trump in January 2021 and Joe Biden today, makes the final decision. The site selection rankings are only advisory, and the President can give them as much or as little weight as he wants.

Now, before I ask General Dickinson about the importance of FOC in readiness, I have two quick questions I want to ask the entire panel. Hopefully, this is just a yes-or-no answer, for the sake of time.

First of all, do you support the decision of the President? General Saltzman or Secretary Kendall?

Secretary KENDALL. Yes, I do.

Mr. LAMBORN. General Saltzman?

General SALTZMAN. I can support implementation of the President's decision.

Mr. LAMBORN. And, General Dickinson?

General DICKINSON. Yes, I do. I support his decision.

Mr. LAMBORN. And secondly, did the President have the authority to make this basing decision? Secretary Kendall?

Secretary KENDALL. Yes, he did.

Mr. LAMBORN. General Saltzman?

General SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LAMBORN. And, General Dickinson?

General DICKINSON. Yes, he did.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. And finally, General Dickinson, why is reaching FOC as soon as possible so important, and how many years would it take to duplicate that somewhere else, if it could even be done? And I ask—I yield to you.

General DICKINSON. So, what we have seen over the last four years—and the Command just turned four years in August—we have seen a rapid growth in capability and capacity, in particular, by the PRC. And so, what we have looked at over the last two years, since the January 2021 meeting, was that we have seen increases in counterspace capabilities by the Chinese, dual-purpose satellites, direct-descent satellites. We have seen electromagnetic interference by the Russians. We have seen a whole host of increases in capability and capacity by our competitors.

In response to that, I saw the need that we needed to accelerate and move quickly towards FOC, so that the strategic-level command of U.S. Space Command was trained and ready. And that included bringing on, hiring a workforce, and training and certifying that workforce. And we have done so over the last two years in terms of having events, exercises—actually, real-world events that have pushed us to FOC. And I expect that we will achieve FOC later this calendar year.

But, in terms of the workforce, I can't emphasize enough how important it is that we have a trained and ready workforce, and that workforce provides the command and control, the direction, and the leadership of all of the forces that General Saltzman provides, plus, the other Services, to the combatant command.

And so, moving that would create that operational risk that we are talking about today, in that you would take a trained and ready workforce, and then, have to move them to another geographic location, which would create risk—risk that I have, as the combatant command in the performance of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) missions I have been given by the President.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you so much.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. Slotkin, for any questions.

The gentlelady passes.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for any questions.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank our panelists for joining us today.

I think, as we watch how this decision making has unfolded, we now see an example of how not to make a decision in these realms. We know that we live in a town that is political, but we expect these decisions not to be made within the political realm. I think that what we are seeing here today, unfortunately, is politics entering into this.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield the balance of my time to Mr. Strong.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentleman from Alabama is recognized.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.

I'm disappointed that Chairman Rogers had to call a hearing to get answers that we have been seeking for months.

As I have been saying for years, Redstone Arsenal was, is, and remains to be the best possible location for U.S. Space Command and national security. This isn't an opinion. This isn't speculation. It is a fact supported by the Air Force basing process; a GAO report; a DOD Inspector General report; the Air Force Strategic Basing Team reevaluation in 2022; the Air Force Strategic Basing Team reevaluation in 2023.

Huntsville came in first place and Colorado Springs came in fifth five separate times. I would be willing to bet that at no other point in U.S. history did a President willingly select the fifth-best option for our men and women in uniform. It has never happened.

General Dickinson, I understand you are concerned about workforce retention and believe that a move would pose unnecessary risk to readiness. The military moves constantly; you know it. As you also know, the breakdown of your personnel is roughly 60 percent civilian, 40 percent military. Every analyst shows that SPACECOM personnel, especially military personnel, would be better off in Huntsville, Alabama.

We are grateful for our civilian workforce, but if they don't want to move, they don't have to, and we won't force them, because there are new people waiting to take these jobs.

I'm looking forward to asking questions soon, and yield back the remainder of my time to Mr. Wittman.

The CHAIRMAN. He left.

The gentleman from Georgia is recognized.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't really have a dog in this fight because I'm from Georgia.

[Laughter.]

I know Alabama has got pretty good football teams—well, Alabama had pretty good football teams.

[Laughter.]

But I am very concerned about what happened here. And I have two Air Force bases. I have seen basing decisions made where there is always a tremendous amount of detail, and sometimes my bases have been selected and sometimes others have been selected. But I have accepted that the process works in the best interest of the DOD and our national security.

And the DOD has, historically, been one of the most respected institutions, not just in America—I mean our DOD, America's DOD—but in the world. And I think it is because, up to and until recently, for the most part, they have kept politics out of the decisions.

What Mr. Lamborn said is President Trump had the authority to make the decision and President Biden has the authority to make the decision. The problem with that is, if we go down that path, and that is the way the decisions are going to be made, then, when you have a Republican President, the missions are going to be put

in red states, and when you have a Democratic President, the missions are going to be put in blue states, and a political agenda is going to end up destroying the effectiveness of our DOD and our national security.

And, Secretary Kendall, how many basing decisions does the Air Force make in a given year?

Secretary KENDALL. I don't have the exact number, but we make several.

Mr. SCOTT. Do you know approximately how many have been made since you have been Secretary?

Secretary KENDALL. I would say at least a dozen.

Mr. SCOTT. In any of those, other than this one, has the President given you a directive of where the mission was going to be?

Secretary KENDALL. No, Congressman. This is very unusual, non-standard in many ways. It is a combatant command, first of all, and we rarely do a combatant command. So, obviously, I think, as an agent of the President and the Secretary of Defense in this case, it also went through an unusual process.

We started out with the standard Air Force basing process, but Secretary Esper and the previous administration changed that process rather fundamentally and asked each state, essentially, to put in a bid for the headquarters. So, the basing team stopped the process it would normally conduct, and then, conducted the process directed by Secretary Esper. And that produced six, ultimately, candidates, and then, in the Trump administration, again, there was a decision which involved a meeting in the Oval Office with the President. So, this started out very non-standard.

And then, we had the DOD and IG investigation. So, this is nothing like a normal basing decision, as far as I'm concerned.

Mr. SCOTT. I'm down to two minutes.

I certainly respect you, but it appears political to me. And before I say what I'm about to say, I want you to know I disagree with the way Senator Tuberville did things. I also disagree with Senator Schumer not taking other actions that were available to him to go ahead and get our commanders in position. I think there is blame with Senator Tuberville; I think there is blame with Senator Schumer—blaming both sides over what has happened. But I disagree with what Senator Tuberville did.

But, to me, my concern is it looks like it is payback from the President of the United States, and payback is a very dangerous game to play. Nobody wins when there is payback.

And if we are going to get to the point that politics is going to determine where the mission goes, then what you are going to see is that the people who sit on the top row up here are going to put missions in their districts, and then, when it flips, the missions are going to move to somewhere else. This is a dangerous game.

You answered my question. Since you have been there as Secretary—and I think you have done a good job—the President has never done what Joe Biden did in this case. Is that correct?

Secretary KENDALL. I think it is unusual for a President to intervene in a basing decision in any case, and it was done by President Trump, and then——

Mr. SCOTT. Would you agree with my concern then—and I apologize for interrupting you—that if we continue down this path, if

you have a Republican President that turns around and does the same thing—I mean, you could, 18 months from now, have a Republican President that comes in and says, "You know what? I'm changing the basing decision that Joe Biden made. And so, I'm going to turn around and put it in Huntsville." And then, four years from now, you have another one come in who says, "Well, I'm changing what the last President said."

If we don't follow the process—if we don't follow the process, our national security is going to suffer as a country.

And with that, I would yield.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Before I go to our next Democrat, I do want to address something that was mentioned by my friend from Colorado. I challenge him to show me where the word "advisory" was ever uttered or written in correlation with the competition of the states for the permanent basing of the Space Command. It was a competition for the basing, not an advisory competition.

And with that, I recognize the gentlelady from Alabama for 5 minutes.

Ms. SEWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say for the record that I am an ardent supporter, a passionate supporter of President Biden. And what I believe is that President Biden wasn't given all the facts when he made that decision. And I think that, as a man of integrity, as a man who literally loves this country, would put his life on the line for this country, he would want to know all the facts in making a decision.

So, General Dickinson, I want to know, did President Biden know that you told the entire Alabama delegation—I was sitting there myself—when asked by Chairman Rogers about operational readiness, that it would not be affected if it went to Alabama? You said, quote, "No, sir." Did he know that?

General DICKINSON. I can't tell—I don't know if the President knew that or not.

Ms. SEWELL. I think that we have to give this President the full information.

Secretary Kendall, you said early on, or after your assessment, that Huntsville was the best location. You chose that when you had the authority to do so, right?

Secretary KENDALL. The basic process that I, I ran and my judgment was that, when I weighed operational considerations versus cost, and other factors, that Huntsville was the preferred location.

Ms. SEWELL. Yes. And so——

Secretary KENDALL. But General Dickinson did not agree with that. Both of our positions were made clear, I believe, to the White house.

Ms. SEWELL. Are you sure?

Secretary KENDALL. I, I——

Ms. SEWELL. Did he have full information?

Secretary KENDALL. Yes, I am sure.

Ms. SEWELL. Did he know that five times Huntsville was chosen over Colorado?

Secretary KENDALL. I, I—Congressman, with all due respect, I don't think that is accurate. The IG and GAO reviewed the action; those weren't separate selections——

Ms. SEWELL. Yes, the IG did so because Colorado, the delegation from Colorado, insisted that it was that Trump was being political in this process.

Look, I don't want to—I don't want to talk about politics. I really just want to talk about the facts. And I truly believe that Huntsville is the preferred location because it is the best location. And to say that you don't have temporary staff, that you don't go out and look for temporary civilian staff to fill your workforce gaps, is absolutely summarily wrong. You do, don't you?

Secretary KENDALL. Yes, but all of the—all of the six locations that we were considering were acceptable and could have accommodated the headquarters. They were all viable.

Ms. SEWELL. Right.

Secretary KENDALL. Huntsville did come up——

Ms. SEWELL. And so——

Secretary KENDALL. —first by some of the standards, particularly cost. But Colorado was a very acceptable location. And there was——

Ms. SEWELL. But cost was really a factor——

Secretary KENDALL. There was risk associated with moving from Colorado to any other location. That was recognized from the beginning of the process.

Ms. SEWELL. So, why even have a process if you know that you are going to choose the location that they are currently in? We spent how many manhours, how many dollars—how much of the taxpayer money did we spend in this competition, in this reexamination, in this investigation? And I'm sorry, to go back to the same place that it's in? What was that about? Why have a competition?

Secretary KENDALL. Yes, following the GAO and the IG investigations, there were a number of things that they pointed out that were deficiencies, if you will, in the process. They found no fundamental flaw with what was done, but there were some deficiencies.

There was also the issue that was raised about the disruption associated with moving——

Ms. SEWELL. Yes, sir.

Secretary KENDALL. —and what full operational capability and achieving that would do to the decision.

Ms. SEWELL. Yes, sir.

Secretary KENDALL. So, there were some things we had to go back and look at——

Ms. SEWELL. Can I just say, though, that overarching all of this, the American people, we don't—we do a disservice to the American people to see Alabama versus Colorado battling it out on this at this hearing.

I just want you to know that it is not about politics. I, literally—and I know that the workforce, the able, ready workforce that is there in Huntsville can more than accommodate this, the operational readiness that is being at issue. And operational readiness only came about, like, months before the President made the decision?

So, I just want to ask the question——

Secretary KENDALL. No——

Ms. SEWELL. —General Dickinson, is it correct that you are still using contractors to fill a shortfall in your civilian workforce right

now in Colorado Springs? And isn't it accurate to reflect that lower—that long-term costs of staying in Colorado, you would still have civilians and contractors to fill voids?

General DICKINSON. Congresswoman, it is true that we are using contractors right now to fill out a portion of the workforce. And that is a standard practice as you are standing up a new organization. It is very common across other combatant commands to have a contractor force as well. And so, as we look to hire, continue to hire and fill in the Command, we will continue to use contractors.

Ms. SEWELL. Well, I just want to say, Mr. Chairman, that politics aside, this is really—you know, I am in full support of President Biden; will be voting for him again, but I just think that he was not given the full range of information to make the right decision, because if he had, he would have chosen Huntsville.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I completely agree. I think that the President, unfortunately, relied on General Dickinson's observation, which he has just demonstrated is not accurate.

Whoever follows you as combatant commander is also going to be a four-star general, who is going to have five years and can use contractors, if they need to, if some of the people don't want to move. There is no readiness concern here, no basis for the President to interfere with these competition results. And I agree that the President shouldn't have been given that information, and he would have supported, then, Secretary Kendall's recommendation, which was also the recommendation of his previous Air Force Secretary.

I recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais, for 5 minutes.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Chairman.

And I appreciate our witnesses for being here today.

Secretary Kendall, I appreciate the forthright manner in which you laid out your decisionmaking process as it pertains to U.S. Space Command. You indicated in your statement that the cost savings associated with locating Space Command in Huntsville is what carried the day for you, is that correct?

Secretary KENDALL. That's correct.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. In April, you told the House Appropriations Committee that there was no indication that President Biden would mettle in the decision of where this Space Command was to be located. And you said, I quote, "Lloyd Austin delegated it to me and that's where it stays today."

When did you learn that this decision was out of your hands and would be made by the White House instead?

Secretary KENDALL. It was shortly before the President made the decision.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. I'm sorry, it was when?

Secretary KENDALL. It was shortly before the President made the decision.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. Was Secretary Austin the one who informed you of this change or did it come from the White House?

Secretary KENDALL. It came through the chain of command.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Can you say who?

Secretary KENDALL. Through the Secretary of Defense's office.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. And what did they say to you?

Secretary KENDALL. Nothing more than that the President would be making the decision.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Were you informed—I'm sorry, you may have answered this—were you informed that the White House would be the ultimate decisionmaker before or after they learned of your preference for Huntsville over Colorado Springs?

Secretary KENDALL. I'm not going to go into the details of the decision making process and how it played out. But, as I said in my testimony, I kept the National Security Advisor, the National Security staff at the White House and the Secretary of Defense's office both fully informed throughout this process.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Uh-hum. And, you know, you had explained to them that there were mitigation concerns and that you could remedy some of General Dickinson's concern over operational risk, among other things, and why it was more strategically advantageous to have it in Huntsville than Colorado Springs. But, yet, in your opening statement, you said that you fully support the President's decision. How can that be when, up until it wasn't your decision, that you supported Huntsville?

Secretary KENDALL. The committee has a copy of my briefing which went to the Secretary of Defense and National Security Advisor and fully communicates my views.

At the end of the day, this was an operational decision about operational risk versus cost. The President is the Commander-in-Chief; I'm not. General Dickinson is the commander of our combatant command. He has a direct operational responsibility and I do not. General Saltzman shares with me the responsibility to provide ready forces.

They have a different perspective, and they have the authority to make this decision based on their assessment of risk. And I respect that.

So, while I might have come to a different conclusion, there was adequate basis in the whole record, going all the way back to——

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Yeah.

Secretary KENDALL. —when President Trump made the earlier decision, of full operational capability, and the time to achieve that was a major factor that was added late in that process to the decision making process. And the operational concerns——

Dr. DESJARLAIS. All right. And I shared my—I share my concerns with the gentleman from Georgia who just mentioned that one thing I enjoyed about this committee was that, when witnesses like yourselves come before us, your job is to give your best military advice to the President and the Commander-in-Chief. We just have one Commander-in-Chief. He is ours, regardless of what side of the aisle it was on. It sounds like you gave your best military advice and that was not taken. But, yet, you still fully support the President, and that kind of almost partisanship concerns me.

General Dickinson, you are a native Coloradoan; born in Colorado; grew up in Colorado; went to school in Colorado; cheered for the Broncos, even though they lost 70-to-20.

[Laughter.]

Did you have a personal preference for the Space Command being located in Colorado?

General DICKINSON. I did not.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. That is interesting because I'm from Tennessee—I'm not from Alabama—and I have a personal preference for it being in Huntsville because I border Alabama and I have a lot of constituents that go there.

All things being equal, I would have a preference for my own area, where I'm from and the people who would benefit from that. But things weren't equal. Huntsville was proven to be the better choice. And so, I don't have to feel guilty about my personal preferences, but you are saying that you didn't have a personal preference. But I will take you at your word.

The reversal seemed to be based, at least in part, on your statement that USSPACECOM would be fully operational earlier than previously thought, in August of 2023. Is the U.S. Space Command fully operational?

General DICKINSON. Congressman, we are not fully operational-capable at this moment. I anticipate that we will be so here by the end of the calendar year.

And the reason I'm continuing to review and assess the Command is two reasons.

One is we received an additional Unified Command Plan task in this, in the latest one that came out in May of this year, which is transregional missile defense. So, I'm assessing to make sure that I have got the proper functions and personnel within the headquarters to be able to do that task.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. If the chairman would indulge me just for 10 seconds, I would say that I don't share the same confidence in the ranking member and others that this is not a political decision. It is pretty clear how the State of Alabama votes. It is pretty clear how the State of Colorado votes. It is a swing, it is a swing state, and I personally believe that there is political bias in this decision. And that is detrimental to our military readiness.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, General Bergman, for 5 minutes.

Mr. BERGMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Secretary Kendall, let's start with a positive. Okay? I'm pleased with the Air Force's recent decisions to expedite the clean-up of the Perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) releases at the former Wurtsmith Air Force Base in Oscoda, Michigan. I commend your Department for taking these necessary actions, albeit we could have moved a little faster, but, nonetheless, you know, we are moving in the right direction.

However, this is just a start to ensure that everyone there has safe drinking water. You know, the time for study is long since over; the time for action is now. It is imperative that the Air Force continues the remediation with the sense of urgency that the situation rightly deserves.

And I implore you, please continue to keep us updated on the next steps, as an open and transparent process is imperative to keeping the public informed. Because you know rumor mills are never good news. So, the sooner we can dialog with the Department of the Air Force and the updates, it is going to help us message

to the citizens there in the area about all the good things that are happening.

So, thank you for that.

Now, kind of changing gears to the topic at hand here, in all my years I have never seen a process that was kind of so blatantly disregarded when it came to the time to making a final decision.

By the way, just as an aside, my first Base Realignment and Closure [BRAC] I was involved in was 1979. Okay? This isn't a BRAC, but the idea of the emotion that goes into creating or downsizing or re-missioning bases, it really does become a very emotional, very parochial, very, you know, guard-your-ground situation.

And, you know, we have heard the word "readiness" consistently used as a reason for, or a reason not to. And I would suggest to you that you just use the term "ORM." And I assume that still stands for operational risk management. Is that a true statement? I heard ORM used here in the last couple of minutes.

But, anyway, if I misheard, then let's consider operational risk management. We have to, first of all, before we manage any risk, we have to assess the risk. I would suggest to you what I saw here in how this process has played out, it is not operational risk management; it is organizational risk management. In other words, bureaucracies protecting needless bureaucracies at the expense of the operating forces and the readiness thereof. That concerns me, and any bureaucracy is capable of devolving into that, and then, using someone else or some other entity as the scapegoat for their bad decisions.

And what is at risk here is the readiness of our families. Sure, we can talk about our readiness to fight, our readiness to respond, but families don't need to be whipsawed back and forth by bureaucratic, if you will, jousting. And that is where, when you think about our military members whose spouses are—they are like seven times the national unemployment rate because of the challenges with moving families around.

The idea of making this decision, making it early, making it for the right reasons, and sticking with it, rather than get into a politicization, if that is the right word—I probably added an extra syllable in there. But the point is, that is not only ethically wrong, but it is morally wrong on the part of the readiness for the families itself.

So, I guess the one thing that, again, as I listened to you all speak—and I know this didn't really end up with much questions—but the question is, can anybody tell me what percentage long term you plan to use contractors for? Are you going to have an 80/20 workforce, 90/10, 70/30? Because contractors really don't care. Contractors, you let a contract and they go to work wherever the hell it is. Okay? What is the long-term plan for use of contractors?

General DICKINSON. Mr. Congressman, so the way the work, headquarters is organized right now, 60 percent of them are civilians. In this case, they are Department of the Air Force civilians. Forty percent are military.

The contractors help us in terms of the shortage we may have in the workforce on the civilian side, in terms of being able to do those types of functions for us. Ideally, you eventually wean yourself off the contractor force as you fill out the rest of——

Mr. BERGMAN. Over the long term, is the contractor force less capable and more expensive; more capable, less—than a civilian workforce? Because with contractors, you have speed of movement when it comes to changing, if something changes, where you don't necessarily have that within your civilian workforce. Thoughts?

General DICKINSON. So, I would answer that by saying that it is a function, the number of contracts is a function of how many people you are trying to recruit and hire entering.

Mr. BERGMAN. Okay.

General DICKINSON. And they are a little bit more mobile, if you will, in terms of their functions and the ability to bring them on the team.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. BERGMAN. Yes, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. But I will make the point, the fact is you are using 360 contractors now to fill positions. As I said earlier, whoever follows you is going to be a four-star general; has got five years to plan. By the time that you get ready to move to the new, permanent headquarters in Alabama, if all the civilians don't want to go, you can do what you are doing now, and do what Secretary Kendall found, and use mitigating ways of getting contractors to fill those spots. This is not in any way going to diminish the operational readiness of Space Command when that move occurs.

The gentleman from New York, do you have any questions?

Okay. I think, then, we will go to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Waltz, for 5 minutes.

Mr. Strong from Alabama is recognized. I thought Mr. Waltz was up next. I'm sorry.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Dickinson, in April, you informed Secretary Kendall that Space Command would reach full operational capability this summer in secure workplaces with network connectivity all the way to the special access program levels, our most highly classified programs. That would be great if it weren't for one thing. Colorado Springs has a real space problem. Literally, there is not enough space for your required personnel numbers on Peterson Air Force Base, which does offer force protection.

Are there SPACECOM functions being run out of trailers currently in Colorado?

General DICKINSON. Congressman, on Peterson Space Force Base, next to Building 1, which is where my headquarters is, we have some mobile facilities that are being utilized as SCIFs. But those mobile facilities are inside the security of Peterson.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you.

Aren't you lacking sufficient backup power for multiple buildings?

General DICKINSON. So, we, in terms of the power consumption, the power redundancy, if you will, we are working through that now.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you.

Aren't there over a thousand personnel working at two separate facilities, 4.5 miles and another one 10 miles away from Peterson Space Force Base, with zero force protection, not even a concrete barrier? Is that true?

General DICKINSON. So, the facilities there, Congressman, have been certified by the external agencies for their ability to do the functions we are asking them to do, whether it is SCIFs or whether it is the——

Mr. STRONG. Do they have protection in front of those buildings to keep threats away?

General DICKINSON. No, they do not.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you.

It is just unbelievable that these conditions would be deemed acceptable or appropriate for a four-star command. In Huntsville, Space Command would immediately have move-in-ready facilities, and within 24 months, a brand-new, 400,000-square-foot facility—all within secured Redstone Gateway. And this is before the construction of the permanent headquarters—not to mention Alabama, in their proposal, was going to build and donate new general officer housing. That would have eliminated a $1.5 million purchase for you in that new farm that you bought.

Secretary Kendall, in your statement, you were very clear Space Command's current temporary facility must be replaced and new buildings are required. And that is your judgment, based off findings of the Strategic Base Team that Huntsville was more competitive and just as capable of hosting the permanent headquarters.

Isn't it a fact that the Air Force found we could save $426 million by moving to Huntsville rather than staying in Colorado?

Secretary KENDALL. That's an accurate number. It would be offset by cost of mitigation, however, to some extent.

Mr. STRONG. Is it true that construction in Alabama is easily 30 percent or more cost-effective than Colorado? Is that true?

Secretary KENDALL. That is approximately what our data shows.

Mr. STRONG. Is it also true that maintenance of facilities in Alabama are approximately the same savings for maintenance of buildings in Alabama versus Colorado?

Secretary KENDALL. I believe that is roughly correct.

Mr. STRONG. Out of the six locations considered for Space Command, which one had the higher construction cost estimated? Which one had a higher construction cost estimated than Colorado?

Secretary KENDALL. Colorado Springs was highest.

Mr. STRONG. It was the highest? Was there any facility that was higher to build in than Colorado?

Secretary KENDALL. I don't believe there was among the six candidates.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you.

Isn't the housing allowance substantially higher in Colorado than Alabama? Is that a true statement?

Secretary KENDALL. I would have to check that one for the record. I think it is probably true.

Mr. STRONG. It is true.

And the people wonder why we have a $33 trillion debt. I think these decisions right here are exactly what the people of America are focusing on. It is because of decisions like this which ignore the facts and the expense of the American taxpayer. That is who is paying the bill.

Isn't it true that the Air Force found that the alleged operational risk shared by General Dickinson could easily be mitigated? Is that true, that it could be easily mitigated?

Secretary KENDALL. I don't think the word "easily" was ever used. There were, there were mitigations available.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you.

Did Space Command ever consider these mitigation efforts in their risk assessment?

Secretary KENDALL. In their initial assessment, no. You have been provided with some of those documents, I believe. But, in conversations with my staff, they were discussed.

Mr. STRONG. A lot of documents you provided us reference the May 2022 SPACECOM sensitivity analysis. However, this document hasn't been provided to this committee. That is exactly the point I want; we would love that documentation that has been referenced, but this committee can't get a copy of it.

Was any of the information I just asked included in that analysis? We don't have it.

Secretary KENDALL. I think you do have it. I think in my briefing, in the backup charts, there is one that talks about the cost of mitigation and the estimates that Space Command had and that my staff had.

Mr. STRONG. Well, I know that we have been trying to get it. I hope it is in there and that will answer some of these questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. STRONG. Will you commit to getting the committee, as you have said, if we don't have this, will you commit to getting every member of this committee a copy of that analysis?

Secretary KENDALL. I can't do that. That is deliberative materials. I mean, I would have to review that before we could do that.

Mr. STRONG. General Dickinson——

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fallon, for 5 minutes.

Mr. FALLON. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.

Secretary Kendall, the last couple of weeks, we have been talking in the Subcommittee for Tactical Land and Air—Air and Land, rather—about the next-generation air dominance and what it will take, of course, to win moving forward.

And what we are going to do, we are going to need to be, if we are going to stay No. 1, you would agree that we need to have these fifth-generation fighters, so we can have air superiority, right, basic?

Secretary KENDALL. Yes, we have a large number of modernization programs that we need to move forward with. Next-generation air dominance is one of them.

Mr. FALLON. Secretary, if we got into a conflict with China with, say, the fourth-best fighter aircraft, would that be problematic?

Secretary KENDALL. I think any disadvantage relative to China, or any other adversary, would be problematic.

Mr. FALLON. We would struggle, then, if we weren't No. 1, if we didn't have the best?

Secretary KENDALL. We always strive to have superiority of our——

Mr. FALLON. Of course. Of course, we are the United States military; we want to be No. 1, and we have been for almost 100 years now.

Is USSPACECOM important to our future?

Secretary KENDALL. Yes, it is.

Mr. FALLON. Okay. So, you would agree with me that we want to have the best? We don't want to be fourth or fifth? We want to be No. 1?

Secretary KENDALL. We want to have the most ready capability that we can.

Mr. FALLON. Yes. General Dickinson, are you okay with not having the best resources and equipment available?

General DICKINSON. No, I want——

Mr. FALLON. Of course,

General DICKINSON. —the best resources and equipment.

Mr. FALLON. Absolutely. So, you wouldn't want to be fourth or fifth best; you want to be No. 1?

General DICKINSON. Yes.

Mr. FALLON. Yeah. Okay. So, while I'm not thrilled that San Antonio didn't get awarded and chosen, but this was a study and San Antonio didn't come out on top, did they, Secretary Kendall?

Secretary KENDALL. No, it did not.

Mr. FALLON. No. Colorado Springs didn't come out on top, either, did it?

Secretary KENDALL. It did not come out on top, for some of the criteria that we used to be——

Mr. FALLON. Well, yeah, I mean, it seems like fourth or fifth. I think maybe something—because there was a point value and Colorado Springs scored nine points below? Is that accurate?

Secretary KENDALL. I'm not sure what you are referring to there, Congressman.

Mr. FALLON. In the basing decision. In fact, it was that Huntsville scored—the chasm between Huntsville and Colorado Springs was greater than Colorado Springs and the last?

Secretary KENDALL. Yeah.

Mr. FALLON. Okay.

Secretary KENDALL. I think you are referring to the earlier basing decision analysis that went into——

Mr. FALLON. Yes.

Secretary KENDALL. —that was covering the IG report, is that right?

Mr. FALLON. Yes.

Secretary KENDALL. Okay. I don't recall the point differences in——

Mr. FALLON. And what I found interesting, hearing some parts of this committee hearing, the available workforce, according to this study, Huntsville, Alabama was No. 1. I didn't do the study; you all did. And it is ranked at No. 1.

Secretary KENDALL. And there was reason, based on those criteria, that my recommendation would have been Huntsville.

Mr. FALLON. Yeah.

Secretary KENDALL. But there were operational reasons why Colorado would have been a preferred location.

Mr. FALLON. I think it is a blatant political decision because the guy down the street, the people in Colorado vote for him and not enough people in Alabama do.

And if we continue to have this kind of political garbage infect our military, we are risking No. 1. I don't want American generals—I don't want Republican generals; I don't want Democratic generals. I want American generals, and to put our best interests as a nation and not be infected with this politics.

But I yield the balance of my time to the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

And I do want to follow up with a couple of things.

One, my friend and colleague from Colorado Springs asked earlier, "Did President Biden have the authority, as Commander-in-Chief, to come in and interject himself?" And each of you answered yes.

He didn't see it that way when it was President Trump. In fact, he called for an Inspector General's inspection for abuse of power. And so, I find that rich.

But my friend from Georgia asked the Secretary this question: "Could you remember in recent years any President usurping the authority on a basing decision?" And you said you couldn't.

I have been on this committee 21 years. It has not happened. Because I guarantee you whichever members from the state that it did happen to would have been yelping, just like I'm yelping. This just does not happen.

And as I opened this hearing, it is very disturbing on its face when we have these kind of nationwide competitions and this kind of circumvention comes up at the end which can only be described as political.

With that, we will now go to—who's next?—Mr. LaLota of New York.

Mr. LALOTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman, I'm not from Alabama, no. I'm not from Colorado.

[Laughter.]

I'm proud to be from New York, sir. And we New Yorkers have a good nose for when something smells pretty funky, and this deal smells mighty funky.

Following a defined process with innumerable criteria and metrics aimed to take politics out of the process, Alabama was chosen multiple ranks ahead of Colorado. Yet, Colorado was, ultimately, chosen, and it is clear this committee, both Republicans and Democrats, are skeptical of how fifth place was chosen over first place. And that smells mighty funky.

Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to my good friend, Mr. Strong, who is going to elicit some more facts to inform the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama is recognized.

Mr. STRONG. That you, Mr. LaLota.

You know, a couple of things here. It is funny how you mention both sides of the aisle for questioning this.

General Dickinson, I just thought of this. In 2005, the Missile Defense Agency went through a BRAC. We were told many would not relocate to Huntsville. General Dickinson, I believe you were a

two-star general in Huntsville at that time. Do you remember how that relocation worked out?

General DICKINSON. Congressman, I don't believe I was part of the Missile Defense Agency at that time.

Mr. STRONG. Okay. Well, I can tell you this right here. We were told that the relocation wouldn't work, and I believe the history shows that it was probably the largest percentage to relocate because of how things were handled, greater than 60 percent. And it was a defining moment. And I can tell you this right here, that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in Huntsville, Alabama is alive and well and doing a phenomenal job for our country.

General DICKINSON. Congressman, if I could, I might have been part of MDA. Right now, I can't recall the exact years I was there.

Mr. STRONG. Okay. Secretary Kendall, in your statement, you were very clear about—I am going to yield back for just a second. Mr. Chairman, I have got to look at something here. I want to be sure that it is factual before I do this.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. The gentleman yields back.

The chair now goes to the gentleman from Georgia, Dr. McCormick, for 5 minutes.

Dr. MCCORMICK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Hopefully, I will be less than 5 minutes here.

I think we pretty much addressed the location issues ad nauseam. So, I want to take a little bit of a different tack, if you don't mind.

There are some supply chain issues that we had recently. In 2014, the National Defense Authorization Act reduced the import restrictions on purchase of Russian RD–180 rocket engines.

In March of 2022, after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Russians suspended shipments of the RD–180 and no longer serviced the 24 currently held by the U.S. Government.

I know this is probably outside of the purview you are prepared to answer. The problem this presents is that this rocket engine is used by the United States or the United Launch Alliance Atlas V. Secretary Kendall, how has your Department worked to mitigate this disruption in the RD–180 supply chain?

Secretary KENDALL. I'm familiar with the RD–180 from my previous role as Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

Basically, we basically worked as hard as we could—and Chairman Rogers will remember this—to get off the RD–180 as quickly as we could. At an earlier era, when relations with Russia were different, we developed that dependency. I am not current on how many of those engines we have left, but I believe that we are moving forward with an alternative engine. I will have to get you a more current answer for the record.

Dr. MCCORMICK. Is that, in general, is the supply chain becoming problematic?

Secretary KENDALL. We have had supply chain issues in general, particularly in space, with some of the components—not so much from Russia, but just in general with the supply chain. And we have had to manage those to work through some risks there.

Dr. MCCORMICK. Okay. General Saltzman, I will be quick. Can you explain how Space Force collaborated with the commercial

partners to purchase space location data that is often more accurate than that of our government and what advantages that provides? And I can give you background on it, if you would like. I think you are familiar.

General SALTZMAN. No, I'm not.

Dr. MCCORMICK. Okay. So, Space Policy Directive-3 transferred responsibility from the civilian space situation—it went from Space Force to the Department of Commerce. I think you are probably familiar with that. Then, the Office of Space Commerce has been setting up traffic coordination systems for space (TraCSS), the TraCSS system.

And then, when the transfer is behind schedule, even in the early stages, from my understanding, this new system is merely replicating what the Space Force did previously. And so, in regards to that, can you explain how we are collaborating with commercial industries and how that is either interfering with what you are trying to do, which is tracking, or actually enhancing that? And how can we do better?

General SALTZMAN. I certainly don't think it is interfering. We are working closely with the Department of Commerce to make sure they have the capabilities, the training, the expertise, the procedural aspects, to make sure they can do the space traffic management piece of that space domain awareness mission.

So far, I think they are on track, and we have had good conversations. We are just still early in the process. And so, therefore, we have to, as the Space Force, keep track of all those objects on orbit.

Dr. MCCORMICK. About how long do you think that transition is going to take?

General SALTZMAN. I don't have a good timeline for you, Congressman.

Dr. MCCORMICK. Okay. Thank you.

With that, I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. The chair now goes back to Representative Strong for the balance of his 3 minutes. He said he is now ready to exhaust that. So, we will put 3 minutes on the clock.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you.

General Dickinson, how long did this meeting last in the White House when you recommended Colorado to the President? How long did that meeting last?

General DICKINSON. Congressman, I can't speak to that.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you.

General Dickinson, for Space Command Headquarters, you haven't recommended the most qualified location, Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville; not the second most qualified in New Mexico, or even the third most qualified in Nebraska. You have stalled when you have been asked the hard questions. You gave a brief to Members of Congress that appears to be misleading. You looked us straight in the face and said you couldn't imagine a circumstance where you would recommend Peterson to be Space Command's Headquarters.

I believe the facts are, you know, you think the facts for more than three years showing delay—I believe everybody here knows who is interfering.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.—well, I'm sorry, Missouri, Mr. Alford, for 5 minutes.

Mr. ALFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member.

Thank you to our witnesses for coming in today.

I echo what the chairman and many of my colleagues have said here in this hearing today in voicing their frustration over this administration's decision to move Space Command Headquarters from Huntsville to Colorado Springs.

On January 13th of 2021, Huntsville, Alabama was selected as the preferred permanent location. President Biden and his administration reneged on that decision and decided to move the headquarters from Alabama to Colorado. This was not about selecting the best location. It was purely politics—the politics of abortion in America.

I want to go over a timeline with you of what has transpired. In May of 2020, the competition reopened. In January of 2021, Huntsville, Alabama was selected.

In June, June 24th of 2022, Alabama abortion ban went into effect. In March of 2023, Senator Tuberville of Alabama began holding up promotions until the Department of Defense changed its abortion travel reimbursement policy. On July 31st of 2023, President Biden overrode the two-site selection contest, and that is where we are.

Mr. Secretary, do you know the abortion policy for Colorado?

Secretary KENDALL. I do not, and I want to respond to your allegation here.

Mr. ALFORD. Well, let me get through, and then, we will have time to respond.

But do you know the abortion policy for Colorado?

Secretary KENDALL. I do not.

Mr. ALFORD. Well, it is legal in almost any circumstance up until the moment of birth.

Do you know the abortion policy for Alabama?

Secretary KENDALL. I do not.

Mr. ALFORD. It is illegal.

So, here we have a situation, and I'm not doubting your veracity and what you are saying here today, based on what you believe—and, Generals, it is the same with you—on why this decision was made.

But don't you think that this is an odd set of circumstances when you look at the timeline, that this issue of abortion in America and placing this important headquarters in a state that allows abortion up until time of birth, and taking it away as a punitive measure against Senator Tuberville and against the State of Alabama, which has outlawed abortion in that state. How can that not be part of the President's thinking when we know that he is in favor of abortion in America?

Secretary KENDALL. Let me be clear. I know, in general, that abortion is more restrictive in Alabama than Colorado, but I don't know any of the details of that.

This basing decision, to my knowledge, was never affected in any way by considerations about abortion. That was never discussed in any conversation that I had——

Mr. ALFORD. Well the President is not going to do that, and even a setting, and I know you can't reveal what is talked about in great detail with the President of the United States. But he is not going to say, "Oh, I'm going to not give Alabama this headquarters because I believe in abortion and I want it in a state that has unlimited abortion up until time of birth." He is not going to do that.

He is going to come up with some other reason—funding issues, convenience, not wanting to relocate, for other reasons. This is very disturbing. I think it is disturbing to Americans that this process, when the fifth place is elevated to a winning status. Two competitions.

And so, once again, Mr. Secretary and Generals, I'm not doubting your veracity and your truthfulness in this committee. I am doubting the President of the United States and his motives to fund the abortion industry in America and to place this important headquarters in a state that allows abortion up until birth.

[Disturbance in hearing room.]

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, is it Waltz? The chair now recognize the gentleman from—Mr. Waltz from Florida for 5 minutes.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Secretary, I think you would agree that childcare, quality of schools, quality-of-life considerations are important to readiness as a general matter. I mean, those are things that this Department has repeatedly said, including diversity, as Ms. Sewell said?

Secretary KENDALL. Yes, Congressman, they are a consideration.

Mr. WALTZ. Right. So, just so we are clear on the disparity here of the objective process and how badly Colorado scored, we have energy resilience fifth, less than Alabama. We have childcare third, less than Alabama. We have quality of schools fourth, less than Alabama. We have cost of living last, way less than Alabama. We have affordable housing, which many people on both sides of the aisle say is a critical issue, last, less than Alabama.

But even on the more kind of readiness and operational focus, we have got communications infrastructure last. Available qualified workforce last. I can go down—or less, excuse me, than Huntsville—I can go down an objective list. I think my colleague is right, absolutely right, this is about politics.

Even on the diversity issue, which I have been loud and clear that we need to make decisions based on meritocracy and merit, but even on the diversity issue, as my Democrat colleague pointed out, Colorado is far less diverse than Alabama, as Major League Baseball figured out when they made a politicized decision to move the All-Star Game.

So, when President Trump decided to put this in Alabama, it was based on an objective process. And members of this committee and the media howled and cried that it was all about politics. So, we had multiple—as in your administration came in, Secretary Kendall—we had multiple checks on it—all of which validated it was an objective process to put it in Alabama.

However, this decision, then, gets pulled out of your hands; overrides your recommendation; overrides an objective process; pulled into the White House. And I think the American people have common sense to know what happened.

Colorado is a blue state. Both Senators are Democrats. The Governor is a Democrat. And at the same time, as my colleague pointed out, you have Senator Tuberville making his stand and you have state law changing as it comes to abortion.

Mr. Chairman, this is common sense what happened here. This was a politicized process on a basing decision for a critical command that has never happened before in modern American history. And we need to call it out, Mr. Chairman, and I support you in stopping this.

But what is also at issue here is that we are allowing—Services in this Pentagon are now making personnel decisions based on state law put forward by elected officials.

If we could put this up? And this is what I want to ask you about, Mr. Secretary. You had a three-star general, General Burt, openly state, in the wake of the State of Florida saying we shouldn't have sexualized material for 5- to 8-year-olds, which I would hope most people—I know most people agree with—but at a Gay Pride event said she would put less qualified people if they had concerns about this state law. Do you agree with that approach? Do you disagree with her statement?

Secretary KENDALL. Let me be clear about——

Mr. WALTZ. I would have thought that would be an easy yes.

Secretary KENDALL. She was, I think, addressing a hypothetical and talking about a potential impact.

Mr. WALTZ. No, she said, Mr. Secretary——

Secretary KENDALL. General Burt made——

Mr. WALTZ. —she said this right after what the media, unfairly and wrongly, labeled "Don't Say Gay." Then, she speaks of this event and says, "You know what? If they have concerns about this, and don't feel like"—and we have a quote here—"they can be themselves," she will put less qualified people—Cape Canaveral is pretty important to the Space Force—and to Florida.

Secretary KENDALL. Yeah, I have read the transcript of what she said, and it is as you say, but I think she was still addressing a hypothetical and potential case.

Mr. WALTZ. The DOD Instruction 1350, service members are evaluated only on individual merit, fitness, capability, and performance.

Secretary KENDALL. That's correct.

Mr. WALTZ. That's it. That is absolutely correct.

So, this is, then, incorrect. That is not in accordance with DOD policy. Do you agree?

Secretary KENDALL. I don't think she was talking about how to evaluate people. She was talking about a possible impact——

Mr. WALTZ. "I am compelled to consider a different candidate and perhaps less qualified." She sits on general officer boards. That is an outrageous statement for our readiness, and yet, she is still in the job, correct?

Secretary KENDALL. She is and she realizes that she said some things that she should not have said. And she loves the Department——

Mr. WALTZ. Do you agree that she should not have said that?

Secretary KENDALL. I agree that she was—she did say some things about state laws that were misleading. We do not keep track of state laws.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary KENDALL. We do not assign people based on that.

Mr. WALTZ. Here's the slippery slope. And, Mr. Chairman, if you can indulge? Here's the slippery slope. We can start—we can have a Department in a future administration that allows members to say, "You know what? I don't feel safe because of gun control laws here and out-of-control crime. And therefore, Space Force, I want to go somewhere else, and that needs to be considered."

This and other things like this basing decision have opened a Pandora's box of political issues that this administration, this President, and this Pentagon have allowed to open. And we don't know where that is going to go, except to hurt our military. And, Mr. Chairman, we have to put a stop to it.

And thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Waltz—I mean Mr. Gaetz for 5 minutes.

Mr. GAETZ. I'm going to follow up on Mr. Waltz's comments because I think they were directly on point.

So, you say that this—I appreciate you have been a straight shooter with us, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary KENDALL. Thank you.

Mr. GAETZ. When stuff gets said that is not right, you say, "That's not right. That's not what we should be doing."

So, I appreciate that you say that this isn't how we should think about these things, and that General Burt understands that she made a mistake. But like, when you say things that aren't true, or that are a mistake, you usually have to correct them. Has General Burt said anything to correct this?

Secretary KENDALL. I don't know that she has.

General Saltzman?

Mr. GAETZ. Right. So, that is the problem, right? Again, I do appreciate you being a straight shooter and saying this is not reflective of how our military should think about our service members.

But I would just encourage you that, like, if you, as the civilian leader of the United States Air Force, have this perspective, and a general has a different perspective and they are sharing it, we have got to align those. And I want to align them with your view because I think it is the right one, but that does require a little bit of remediation of the thing that has happened that is wrong.

And that brings us to the substance of this hearing because we have to remediate punishing Alabama, and that really is what is going on here. When you listen to Mr. Strong and others lay out Alabama was, like, first in everything; Colorado was last in everything, and I believe Alabama is being punished because of their abortion policy. I believe they are being punished because they don't adhere to the radical gender ideology that has infected DOD. And I think they are being punished because the senior Senator from Alabama has got these military holds. That is the most obvious explanation.

But I do want to be open-minded, if there is any other. So, General Dickinson, I want you to bring us in the room when you made the recommendation to President Biden to forego the objective process based on merit, and instead, just revert to Colorado.

When Mr. Strong asked you how long that meeting lasted, you declined to answer. Why is that?

General DICKINSON. Congressman, I can't talk about a deliberative type of setting/meeting that was conducted for the basing decision.

Mr. GAETZ. So, you can't even tell us how long the meeting occurred?

General DICKINSON. I cannot.

Mr. GAETZ. Were there notes taken at the meeting?

General DICKINSON. So, Congressman, I wasn't there. I didn't brief the President.

Mr. GAETZ. Oh, okay. So, who did?

General DICKINSON. I can't talk to that.

Mr. GAETZ. See, this is where the American people start to lose confidence because we have a thing that we can actually see, where there was ratings and metrics. And Alabama won the thing you could see. But, then, there is this other thing that you can't see, and Alabama just loses that.

And my worry is that this is about depriving a red state of mission. And we should not do that. And I don't just see it in Alabama. This is the capstone example of what is going on, but I see it in my state. I see it in my community, where missions with no real bases—like there are these phony bases that are put out. But, then, when I ask what the basis is in writing, what analysis has been done, that doesn't really happen.

So, what could you say to the American people that are in red states, that love our military, that want to host a mission, who believe that abortion or gender policies are affecting whether or not they are able to make that contribution to the fight and the national defense?

General DICKINSON. So, Congressman, what I did is I provided my best military advice to Secretary Kendall, which I provided to the committee as well.

Mr. GAETZ. But why does your best military advice seem to run contrary to all of the objective analysis that the American people are able to see?

General DICKINSON. As a combatant commander, my job is to make sure that I am able to conduct and execute the UCP missions given by the President of the United States. So, operational readiness and our ability to do those functions is what I do, as a combatant commander.

Mr. GAETZ. Right, but when, in toto, the analysis we have done would point us to Redstone Arsenal in Alabama, and we ignore that analysis, does that maybe lead us to believe that the analysis was just a performance in the first place?

General DICKINSON. Congressman, I provided my best military advice.

Mr. GAETZ. Right, but what the American people don't understand is, when you have got folks in somewhat of a clandestine process giving their best military advice, and on the other side you

have an objective process that you all just ignore, do you see how it would reduce the trust the American people have in the decision making process when those things are so incongruent?

General DICKINSON. I would offer that I think the American people would trust me in the execution of the duties that I have been given by the President.

Mr. GAETZ. But don't you think it would enhance the trust that the people would have in whatever your best military advice is if there was objective information that backed it up, rather than offering your best military advice that runs contrary to all of the objective information?

General DICKINSON. Well, my viewpoint is a little bit different in the sense that I'm executing these operational-type of missions that have risks that are associated with it.

Mr. GAETZ. I think that the operational mission that the DOD is engaged on is that you all want to become an abortion travel agency.

And it is right that the President can put this thing wherever he wants to put it, but, then, we can decide what to fund. And I think that there is something really rotten in Denmark here, and I am glad we are having this hearing.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The chair now recognized the gentleman from Colorado for any final statements he may have.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to say to my friend from Florida and others who have repeatedly said that there was an objective process that came out with Huntsville No. 1, and you didn't hear me earlier, Mr. Gaetz, but, on page 19 of the Inspector General report for the Department of Defense—and I'm going to ask to have this entire report put into the hearing record with unanimous consent.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The information referred to is retained in committee files and is available upon request.]

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. It is dated May 11th, 2022. And they quote the decision matrix as it stood a day or two before the meeting with President Trump in the White House in January of 2021. So, this is the matrix as it was updated on January 10th of 2021.

And they go over mission as a decision factor, and a lot went into that. They go into infrastructure capacity, and a lot goes into that. Community support, childcare, education, spousal opportunities, et cetera, et cetera, they go into that. Costs to DOD, they go into that. And then, they add a fifth element, "mission impacts to full operational capability."

With this updated fifth category, they come to a different conclusion. The summary says, "The numerical values in this section for each location summarizes the net pros and cons for each location. This assessment supports the selection of Colorado Springs as the preferred alternative and Huntsville as the feasible alternative."

So, those two cities came in——

Mr. GAETZ. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LAMBORN. Yes.

Mr. GAETZ. So, is the gentleman concerned that, for Colorado Springs to move up, a new category had to be added and the rules of the game had to be changed during the game?

Mr. LAMBORN. No. Taking back my time, no, I'm not at all surprised or perturbed because that should have been there from the beginning. Getting military advice as to operational capability or readiness should have been the first thing all along. It should have been the top factor all along. And I am glad it was added, even if it was belatedly.

So, it is incorrect when people say Colorado Springs is four or five, and et cetera, et cetera, and I have heard that repeatedly. On January 10th of 2021, Colorado Springs was the preferred alternative.

So, I just want to set the record straight. This entire report is now in the hearing record. Everyone can look at it.

And I wanted to point that out because there is not this conspiracy to overturn a merit-based approach. When different factors are considered, different results and different cities came up to the top. And right before the White House meeting, Colorado Springs was on top.

And so, a lot of assumptions based on what a different narrative would assume are simply wrong. Colorado Springs was not No. 4 or No. 5.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. That's just not accurate. Colorado Springs came in fifth. I love you, Doug, but that is not accurate.

Listen, I started off this hearing explaining that the whole purpose of the hearing was to emphasize that there is no impact on operational readiness to build a new, permanent headquarters in someplace other than Colorado Springs. Specifically, in this situation, Huntsville, Alabama won.

I think we demonstrated in the first part of this hearing the one thing that General Dickinson had indicated in his concerns expressed to the Secretary, which were, then, later picked up by the President, is that some of the civilians may not want to move. And as we have made clear here, he can use contractors to fill that void, if he has to, or his successor can. But they have got five years to get ready for it. There is going to be no impact.

And plus, the operational readiness has been conducted almost exclusively by the Air Force, anyway. Secretary Kendall made it clear he factored this in. There are mitigating circumstances. There is no effect on operational readiness.

So, what I want to point out about where we are now is, we don't live in a monarchy. We live in a constitutional republic. The President doesn't get to just, from high on, decide this is the way it is going to be, and we all just sit by and say, "Yes, sir." Those in his employ must do that, but we are an equal branch. The judicial branch—I mean the legislative branch now gets its say-so.

The President can intervene and tell his Department personnel what he wants to do. Congress gets to decide what we are going to authorize and what we are going to pay for. It is my intent to make sure that the competition results are honored and that the permanent basing headquarters are authorized and funded to be constructed in Huntsville, Alabama, and during that period of time,

the provisional headquarters in Colorado Springs is fully funded until that completion is made.

But we have some real concerns raised here today. There is no reason to justify what has happened, other than, in my view, political considerations. So, I am going to do what my colleague from Colorado Springs, his delegation did when they felt like President Trump had incorrectly intervened, and I'm going to ask the Inspector General from the Department of Defense to investigate this.

In the meantime, I intend to work to make sure that no funds are authorized or expended to be spent in Colorado Springs for the building of a permanent headquarters.

And with that, I thank the witnesses for their time and their contributions, and the members for their participation.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 28, 2023

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 28, 2023

Statement of
The Honorable Frank Kendall
Secretary of the Air Force
Before the
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives

September 28, 2023

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and other distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning.

I will begin with two introductory comments about the basing decision for the permanent headquarters of United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) and then describe the process my colleagues and I followed over the past sixteen months.

First, President Biden exercised his authority and discretion as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to make the final decision to locate the permanent headquarters of USSPACECOM in Colorado. I fully support the President's decision.

Second, any basing decision involves a balancing of different, often competing, factors. In my judgment, the two most important factors in this basing action ultimately proved to be (1) the costs to the taxpayer of constructing and operating a new permanent headquarters facility at any of the six reasonable alternative locations and (2) the operational risk associated with any transition from the provisional headquarters in Colorado to another location.

When I became the Secretary of the Air Force in July 2021, the final basing location decision for United States Space Command headquarters had not been made and the preliminary designation of Huntsville, Alabama as the preferred alternative, announced by my predecessor, was under review by the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) and the Government

Accountability Office (GAO). Accordingly, I took no action while those reviews were under way.

The DoD IG and GAO reviews were completed in the May 2022 time frame. While neither review found any fundamental flaw in the identification of the preferred alternative of Huntsville, both found deficiencies in the process by which the decision was reached.

Following a recommendation by the DoD IG, the Secretary of Defense directed me on May 4, 2022 to conduct a review of concerns expressed by senior military leaders regarding Full Operational Capability ("FOC") for USSPACECOM.

Subsequently, I directed the Department of the Air Force ("DAF") Strategic Basing Team to conduct a thorough re-evaluation of its basing analysis. In particular, I directed the basing team to implement the recommendations of the DoD IG and GAO reports, complete a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review of the environmental impacts associated with the basing action and re-evaluate each of the evaluation factors. As part of this process, the Commander of USSPACECOM, General Dickinson, was asked to provide specific criteria for assessing FOC.

There have been three core assumptions underpinning this basing action: the need for (1) a 464,000 square foot facility; (2) a workforce of 1,450 personnel; and (3) new construction of a permanent headquarters building. I note that these three basing assumptions are distinct from three requirements that USSPACECOM articulated as priorities: (1) mission success; (2) taking care of our people; and (3) being fiscally responsible.

The results of the re-evaluation conducted by the basing team over the ensuing six months were consistent with earlier results. All six locations were reasonable alternatives, but Huntsville was lower cost, while remaining in Colorado posed the lowest operational risk. The basing team reviewed the risks associated with the time it would take to achieve FOC and determined that, under any circumstances, USSPACECOM would achieve FOC in its

current provisional location of Colorado Springs well before a new headquarters could be built in any location.

As noted and emphasized by USSPACECOM leadership, there would be operational risk associated with the disruption of moving the provisional headquarters in Colorado to any other location. The qualitative judgment about the reduced cost of Huntsville versus the operational risk of moving from Colorado to another location became an important area of focus in the basing decision. As Commander of USSPACECOM, General Dickinson expressed the view that the operational risk was significant. The DAF Strategic Basing Team placed considerable weight on the projected cost savings and, while recognizing the risks to maintaining operational capability, believed that potential mitigation measures were available.

During January and February of 2023, the DAF basing team conducted additional analyses of several long-term trends at each alternative location, including anticipated economic impact, the availability of relevant occupational categories such as aerospace engineers and data scientists, and the cost of living.

In early April 2023, General Dickinson stated that he anticipated declaring FOC in the late summer of 2023 –earlier than previous estimates - and would do so at the provisional leased and government-owned facilities without the construction of a new, permanent headquarters' building. General Dickinson also indicated that his requirements would soon be fulfilled.

In light of this new information, I asked General Dickinson to reconfirm USSPACECOM's current basing needs and whether there had been any changes. I also asked the Chief of Space Operations to provide his perspective on the basing action.

In response, General Dickinson stated, in relevant part:

- USSPACECOM requirements have not changed and will soon be fulfilled as the Command estimates declaring FOC in August 2023;

- Based on the accelerating threat in space and the progress in the command, selecting a final headquarters location other than Colorado Springs would greatly reduce readiness, levy significant costs, and impose high risk to mission and force; and
- Considering the threat, USSPACECOM's pending FOC, and the situation as a whole, Colorado Springs should be the permanent location for USSPACECOM headquarters.

General Saltzman also provided his perspective on the basing action, which he subsequently shared with the Committee via correspondence dated September 13, 2023.

To validate USSPACECOM's current basing needs, I sent a basing team to Colorado Springs to assess whether the Space Command Headquarters could remain in its current configuration of leased and government-owned facilities over the long term. The basing team conducted this review in late May and early June 2023. They concluded that a new headquarters building was still necessary.

Over the course of the DAF's extensive re-evaluation of the basing process, I kept the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council staff informed regarding the status of our basing team's analysis.

After being informed that the President would make the final decision, I briefed the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Advisor on the results of the DAF's review in June 2023. Ultimately, my view was that the decision came down to a judgment about the operational risk associated with relocating versus the reduced costs of the leading alternative of Huntsville, Alabama. My assessment was that the projected cost savings together with the availability of potential mitigation measures outweighed the operational risks that had been identified. As the Combatant Commander for USSPACECOM, General Dickinson assessed these considerations differently.

On July 31, 2023, the President announced his decision. I fully support the President's judgment in this matter.

Over the course of my tenure as Secretary of the Department of the Air Force, the threat posed by our adversaries, particularly China, in the space domain has accelerated dramatically. Against the backdrop of this intensifying threat and with a final decision now having been made by the President, we are prepared to move forward with the implementation of this basing action.

BIOGRAPHY DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FRANK KENDALL



Frank Kendall is the 26th Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the U.S. Air and Space Forces. In this capacity, he directs the Department of the Air Force's annual budget exceeding $173 billion, provides Air and Space forces to combatant commanders for global military operations, and is accountable for the welfare of nearly 700,000 active duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian Airmen and Guardians and their families.

Mr. Kendall has more than 50 years of experience in engineering, management, defense acquisition, and national security affairs across private industry, government, and the military. He was a consultant to defense industry firms, non-profit research organizations, and the Department of Defense in the areas of strategic planning, engineering management, and technology assessment. Additionally, he is an attorney and was active in the field of human rights, working primarily on a pro bono basis.

Earlier in his career, Mr. Kendall was Vice President of Engineering for Raytheon Company, providing management and direction to the engineering functions throughout the company and for internal research and development. He also served as a Managing Partner at Renaissance Strategic Advisors, a Virginia-based aerospace and defense sector consulting firm.

Within government, Mr. Kendall held numerous posts including Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics as well as Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering for Tactical Warfare Programs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is a former member of the Army Science Board and the Defense Intelligence Agency Science and Technology Advisory Board, and was a consultant to the Defense Science Board.

Mr. Kendall is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He served 11 years as an active duty Army officer, including assignments in Germany, teaching Engineering at West Point, and in research and development positions.

EDUCATION
1971 Bachelor of Science, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.
1972 Master of Science, Aerospace Engineering, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Calif.
1980 Master of Business Administration, C.W. Post Center of Long Island University, Orangeburg, N.Y.
1994 Graduate, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pa.
2004 Juris Doctoris, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.

CAREER CHRONOLOGY
1. June 1971 – June 1982, active duty U.S. Army officer, various assignments; continued service as U.S. Army Reserve officer retiring as a lieutenant colonel in January 1999
2. June 1982 – April 1986, Systems Engineer and later Director, Systems Analysis Office, U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Defense Command, Huntsville, Ala.
3. April 1986 – December 1988, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic Defense Systems, U.S. Department of Defense, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
4. January 1989 – September 1994, Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering for Tactical Warfare Programs, U.S. Department of Defense, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
5. December 1994 – November 1996, Vice President for Engineering, Raytheon Company, Herndon, Va.
6. January 1997 – December 2007, private consultant
7. January 2008 – March 2010, Managing Partner, Renaissance Strategic Advisors, Arlington, Va.
8. March 2010 – May 2012, Principal Deputy Under Secretary and also Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, U.S. Department of Defense, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
9. May 2012 – January 2017, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, U.S. Department of Defense, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
10. July 2017 – July 2021, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress, Washington, D.C.
11. July 2017 – July 2021, Member of the Board of Directors, Leidos, Inc., Arlington, Va.
12. July 2021 – present, Secretary of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster

Army Commendation Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Distinguished Public Service Award (four awards)
Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Medal
Presidential Rank Award of Distinguished Executive (Senior Executive Service)
Presidential Rank Award of Meritorious Executive (Senior Executive Service)

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS
2016 Aviation Week and Space Technology Person of the Year (together with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work)

PUBLICATIONS
"Getting Defense Acquisition Right," Defense Acquisition University Press, 2017

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS AND ASSOCIATIONS
Former Chair of the Board of Directors, Tahirih Justice Center
Former Board Member, Amnesty International USA
Former Board Member, Center for Victims of Torture
Former Board Member, Truman National Security Project
Former Board Member, Truman Center

(Current as of May 2022)

Statement of
General James H. Dickinson
Commander, United States Space Command
Before the
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives

September 28, 2023

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, thank you for the opportunity to be here today on behalf of the newest combatant command, United States Space Command. It is my honor and pleasure to appear before this Committee, representing the dedicated men and women of U.S. Space Command and the vital mission that they perform on behalf of the United States.

As outlined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, space is fundamental to all joint military operations. Space touches our lives every day; it is critical to our way of life because it enables modern finance, navigation, communication, and many other capabilities vital to our society and economy. In keeping with goals of the National Defense Strategy, U.S. Space Command operates around the world providing satellite communications; space domain awareness; offensive and defensive space control effects; positioning, navigation, and timing services; transregional missile defense; and defense of the national security space architecture 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and 365 days per year.

Given the criticality of these missions both to national security and our global way of life, since day one of my tenure as the Commander of U.S. Space Command, I have been building, strengthening, and reinforcing the readiness of the Command, with focus on (1) mission success; (2) taking care of our people; and (3) being fiscally responsible. The Joint Force relies on assured access to space capabilities in the face of rapidly increasing threats from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and from the Russian Federation. U.S. Space Command staff must be capable of

integrating these critical global capabilities in partnership with the other combatant commands, numerous agencies across the federal government, a growing list of international Allies and partners, and the increasingly capable commercial sector. I remain committed to ensuring U.S. Space Command is ready to accomplish its assigned missions now and in the future amid an increasingly dynamic threat environment.

Accelerating Threats in Space

As I testified before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in March of this year, challenges to a safe, secure, stable, and sustainable space domain are increasing. The PRC and Russia continue to field capabilities with the intent of putting the space assets of the United States, our Allies, and our partners at risk. As further discussed below, the PRC and Russia are pursuing diverse counterspace capabilities across multiple domains—including cyberspace, electronic warfare (EW), directed energy, and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons—potentially resulting in temporarily deceiving, disrupting, or denying space services or permanently degrading or destroying space-based capabilities. These capabilities are designed to deter a U.S. response to conflict or crisis and ultimately diminish U.S. influence and military effectiveness.

Over the past four years, these competitors' actions have motivated and focused U.S. Space Command to prepare the United States to counter threats in, to, and from space. Today, I would like to highlight some of those key efforts.

In 2019, we rapidly established a 24/7 Joint Operations Center (JOC), the focal point for all friendly and threat information to accomplish our assigned missions. In 2021 our JOC monitored, tracked, and reported China's first fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a hypersonic glide vehicle. Flying

more than 40,000 kilometers and for more than an hour and half, this was the longest flight of any PRC land attack weapon system. This system could enable the PRC to rapidly launch weapons that challenge missile warning and missile defense architectures. Then, in November 2021, the JOC monitored Russia's destructive ASAT test in real time and allowed me to ensure that national leaders had the best information available. With respect to China's ASAT capabilities, in January 2022, a PRC satellite moved a defunct PRC satellite to a high grave-yard orbit above geosynchronous orbit (GEO), demonstrating China's capability to grapple satellites with its robotic arm-equipped satellites. More recently, the JOC has been closely monitoring Russia's counterspace capabilities—to include cyber-attacks and electromagnetic interference against satellite communications networks—deployed in the Ukraine conflict.

As part of our emphasis on countering China and Russia's space capabilities, the U.S. Space Command Directorate of Intelligence created signals intelligence rapid analysis capability and confirmed the capability of non-traditional sensors to provide operational intelligence in space. The Directorate of Plans completed the very first Secretary of Defense-approved operational plan for space. In addition, in June of this year, U.S. Space Command, in partnership with Indo-Pacific Command, conducted its first 24/7 joint exercise, which served as a major step in validating the headquarters staff as a synchronized team. U.S. Space Command also spearheaded space warfighting doctrine development and led the process to update Joint Doctrine Publication 3-14, Space Operations.

Focus on Readiness

Since its inception in August of 2019, rapidly building operational readiness has been the top priority at U.S. Space Command. When the Department of Defense established U.S. Space Command, then-Secretary of Defense Esper gave direction to its first Commander, General John

"Jay" Raymond, to focus on readiness, and later approved the Command's request to accelerate military assignments to propel us toward this goal. When I took command in the summer of 2020, Secretary Esper reiterated that same direction to me.

In August 2019, the initial U.S. Space Command team consisted of approximately 200 personnel and depended heavily on the workforce of both Air Force Space Command and U.S. Strategic Command, which had previously been assigned the space mission. As the U.S. Space Command staff grew, those dependencies abated. Today, U.S. Space Command no longer depends on the workforce of either organization to perform its day-to-day tasks.

U.S. Space Command's growth and focus on readiness has translated into the accomplishment of significant tasks and milestones. U.S. Space Command works very closely with the Department of the Air Force, our designated Combatant Command Support Agent (CCSA), to meet our obligations and initiate actions necessary to build readiness. With all these accomplishments, U.S. Space Command has demonstrated it is an extremely capable organization earlier than anticipated. This Command has significantly reduced the risk to our space architecture, and with continued support and resources, will continue to accomplish its assigned missions.

U.S. Space Command Headquarters

After a robust and thorough basing selection process, the President announced on July 31, 2023, the permanent location for the U.S. Space Command headquarters as Colorado Springs, Colorado. I welcome and fully support the President's final decision on the location of U.S. Space Command's permanent headquarters.

U.S. Space Command's principal role in supporting this process was to identify the original headquarters requirements for the permanent location. A central element of those

requirements is a trained workforce. Including representatives from partner organizations sitting within the headquarters, the projected seating requirement for the headquarters facility is approximately 1,450. To meet the accelerating threat, we have focused on rapidly achieving these workforce objectives and building out our capabilities.

In 2021 and 2022, the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) evaluated the Air Force's process leading up to its January 2021 selection of the preferred permanent location for the U.S. Space Command Headquarters. Upon completion of its review, OIG recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct a review of the concerns expressed by senior military leaders regarding full operational capability (FOC) for USSPACECOM. In May 2022, the Secretary of Defense gave this direction to the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Air Force began a review of risks to operational capability associated with a move from the provisional headquarters location.

In April 2023, I, as Commander of U.S. Space Command, updated the Secretary of the Air Force that U.S. Space Command would achieve FOC earlier than projected. Our FOC criteria focus on executing our mission on our worst day, when we are needed the most. They consist of five criteria: 1) accomplishing our Unified Command Plan mission alongside global campaigning, exercising, and responding to crisis; 2) having the right numbers of skills across our human capital; 3) having the infrastructure needed to support command and control across our mission and business functions; 4) having the necessary command processes and functions in place; and 5) being able to set the conditions and requirements for the future fight. I also relayed my firm view to the Secretary of the Air Force that a move from the provisional headquarters over the next decade would result in a degradation of U.S. Space Command readiness and that this degradation in readiness would coincide with the forecasted attainment by the PRC of full

military modernization. In my experience, such a move would pose unnecessary risk and uncertainty on retention and recruitment of our trained workforce. Based on the nature of the threat and the rapid progress in U.S. Space Command's operational capability, a move presented a high risk to our mission and force at a pivotal time.

In my view, selecting Colorado Springs as the permanent basing location for U.S. Space Command best sustains our human capital investment, is fiscally responsible, and ultimately maintains our readiness at the highest levels while imposing the least disruption to mission and workforce. This opinion reflects my long-standing views, which have not changed. This is especially important as our pacing challenge, the PRC, is working to accelerate its modernization and develop the capabilities it assesses are needed to compel unification with Taiwan and counterbalance the United States by 2027. We are in a critical and strategic competition; we do not have time to lose.

GEN JAMES H. DICKINSON

Commander



U.S. Army General James H. Dickinson is the Commander, U.S. Space Command, the 11th and newest unified combatant command. He assumed command on Aug. 20, 2020, after serving as the first Deputy Commander of U.S. Space Command.

General Dickinson is a native of Estes Park, Colorado and a 1985 graduate of Colorado State University where he earned a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering. He holds a Master of Science in Operations Research and Systems Analysis from the Colorado School of Mines and later earned a Master's degree in Strategic Studies from the United States Army War College.

As the Commander of U.S. Space Command, General Dickinson is responsible for defending U.S. and Allied interests in the space domain while providing space-enabled combat effects to joint warfighters around the world. He exercises combatant command authority over 18,000 Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, Airmen, and Guardians operating ground and space-based systems around the world that provide satellite communication, space domain awareness, offensive and defensive space control effects, and position, navigation, and timing services.

General Dickinson has commanded at every level in the United States Army from Platoon to Combatant Command and is the Senior Air and Missile Defense Officer in the Department of Defense.

January 2022

Statement of
General B. Chance Saltzman
Chief of Space Operations
Before the
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives

September 28, 2023

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

As the Chief of Space Operations (CSO), I am the service chief responsible for the U.S. Space Force, the military service that secures our nation's interests in, to, and from space. Along with the service chiefs from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, I am also a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Space Force is a separate and distinct organization from U.S. Space Command, which is the combatant command tasked with planning, coordinating, integrating, synchronizing, assessing, and when directed by the President, executing global offensive and defense space operations.

As the CSO, I am the senior uniformed officer responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of all organic and assigned Space Force forces serving in the United States and overseas. I am responsible for the generation of ready forces, which are presented to combatant commanders in order to execute missions on behalf of the Joint Force. At this time, the overwhelming majority of U.S. Space Force operational units are presented to U.S. Space Command through the Space Force service component, Space Operations Command (SpOC). SpOC consists of a headquarters element at Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado Springs, and subordinate organizations at a number of locations, which generate ready forces for missions in space domain awareness; electromagnetic warfare; missile warning; command and control; cyberspace operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; satellite communications; position, navigation, and timing; and orbital warfare.

As the Space Force service chief, I am typically only involved in the Department of the Air Force strategic basing process when U.S. Space Force units are under consideration. Because this basing action related to a joint headquarters for U.S. Space Command, I had only peripheral engagement in this matter, as described in my September 13, 2023 letter to the committee.

I thank the Congress for their continued support of the U.S. Space Force, the Space Force mission, our Guardians, and their families.

BIOGRAPHY UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE

GENERAL B. CHANCE SALTZMAN

Gen. B. Chance Saltzman is the Chief of Space Operations, United States Space Force. As Chief, he serves as the senior uniformed Space Force officer responsible for the organization, training and equipping of all organic and assigned space forces serving in the United States and overseas. As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Space Operations and other service chiefs function as military advisers to the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and the President.

Gen. Saltzman is a graduate of Boston University and was commissioned in 1991. He has operational experience with missile and space systems, as a Minuteman III launch officer, and as a satellite operator for the National Reconnaissance Office. He also served as the first Chief of Combat Plans for the Joint Space Operations Center, and later, as Chief of Combat Operations.

Gen. Saltzman has commanded at the squadron, group, and wing levels including the 614th Space Operations Squadron and 1st Space Control Squadron at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California; the 460th Operations Group at Buckley AFB, Colorado; and the Aerospace Data Facility Colorado, Aurora, Colorado. Before serving in his current assignment, Gen. Saltzman was the Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations, Cyber, and Nuclear, United States Space Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.

EDUCATION

1991 Bachelor of Arts, History, Boston University, Mass.
1992 Distinguished Graduate, Undergraduate Missile Training, Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.
1994 Master of Public Administration, University of Montana, Missoula
1997 Air Assault School, Fort Belvoir, Va.
1998 Master of Strategic Management, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
1998 Distinguished Graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2001 Distinguished Graduate, U.S. Air Force Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
2004 Distinguished Graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2005 School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2006 Air War College, by correspondence.
2009 Senior Developmental Education National Fellowship, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
2010 Director of Space Forces Course, National Security Space Institute, Colorado Springs, Colo.
2011 Leadership Enhancement Program, Center for Creative Leadership, Greensboro, NC
2014 Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Joint Professional Military Education II, Norfolk, Va.
2017 Continuous Process Improvement for Executives, Institute for Defense Business, Durham, N.C.
2017 Enterprise Leadership Seminar, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
2018 Leadership Decision Making Course, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
2018 Combined Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2021 Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. March 1992–July 1992, Student, Undergraduate Missile Training, Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.

2. July 1992–June 1996, Missile Combat Crew, 10th Strategic Missile Squadron and Wing Missile Combat Crew Instructor and Evaluator, 341st Strategic Missile Wing, Malmstrom AFB, Mont.
3. July 1996–May 1998, Air Force Intern, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
4. June 1998–June 2001, Flight Commander, OD-Four, National Reconnaissance Office, Onizuka Air Station, Calif.
5. July 2001–June 2003, Instructor, U.S. Air Force Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
6. July 2003–June 2004, Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
7. July 2004–June 2005, Student, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
8. July 2005–June 2006, Chief, Combat Plans Division, Joint Space Operations Center, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
9. July 2006–June 2007, Commander, 614th Space Operations Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
10. July 2007–June 2008, Commander, 1st Space Control Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
11. July 2008–June 2009, National Security Fellow, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
12. July 2009–May 2010, Chief, Strategic Plans and Policy Division, Directorate of Operational Planning, Policy and Strategy, Headquarters Air Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
13. June 2010–June 2012, Commander, 460th Operations Group, Buckley AFB, Colo.
14. June 2012–June 2014, Commander, Aerospace Data Facility – Colorado, Buckley AFB, Colo.
15. June 2014–February 2015, Deputy Director, Plans and Programs, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
16. March 2015–May 2016, Executive Officer to the Commander, Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
17. June 2016–May 2017, Director of Future Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters Air Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
18. June 2017–May 2019, Director of Current Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters Air Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
19. May 2019–May 2020, Deputy Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command; Deputy, Combined Force Air Component Commander, U.S. Central Command, Southwest Asia
20. June 2020-August 2020, Special Assistant to the Vice Chief of the Air Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
21. August 2020-November 2022, Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations, Cyber, and Nuclear, United States Space Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
22. November 2022-Present, Chief of Space Operations, U.S. Space Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

1. July 2005–June 2006, Chief, Combat Plans Division, Joint Space Operations Center, Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., as a major
2. July 2006–June 2008, Chief, Combat Operations Division, Joint Space Operations Center, Vandenberg AFB, Calif., as a lieutenant colonel

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster

Joint Service Achievement Medal
Air Force Achievement Medal

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

Thomas D. White Space Award
National Reconnaissance Office Gold Medal

PUBLICATIONS

"Minimum Deterrence and its Critics," with James Wood Forsyth Jr., Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 2010
"Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons," with James Wood Forsyth Jr. and Gary Schaub Jr., Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2010
"Stay Out: Why Intervention Should Not Be America's Policy," Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 2009
"Introduction to the United States Air Force," with Tom Searle, AFROTC Text (AS200), Airpower Research Institute, 2001

BADGES AND WEAPON SYSTEMS

Command Space Badge
Missile Operations Badge
Air Assault Badge
Weapon Systems: Minuteman III, Defense Support Program, Space Based Infrared System

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant May 15, 1991
First Lieutenant Oct 18, 1993
Captain Oct 18, 1995
Major Aug 1, 2002
Lieutenant Colonel Mar 1, 2006
Colonel Oct 1, 2009
Brigadier General July 3, 2016
Major General Sep 4, 2019
Lieutenant General Aug 7, 2020
General Nov 2, 2022

(Current as of November 2022)

○