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**THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY**

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

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ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

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CONTENTS

	Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS	
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services	1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services	2
WITNESSES	
Edelman, Eric, Vice Chair, Commission on National Defense Strategy	6
Harman, Congresswoman Jane, Chair, Commission on National Defense Strategy	5
APPENDIX	
PREPARED STATEMENTS:	
Joint statement of Congresswoman Jane Harman and Eric Edelman	51
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:	
[There were no Documents submitted.]	
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:	
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]	
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:	
Mr. Davis	63

**THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 18, 2024.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Today we are meeting to receive the findings and recommendations of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy.

I want to thank our witnesses for being here. I also want to thank you both for agreeing to take on this role and continuing to find ways to serve our nation.

I also want to welcome two of our fellow commissioners, Roger Zakheim and Mariah Sixkiller. Thank you both for being here and for your service on this commission as well.

The commission's report is a sobering reality check for our nation. The first lines of the report lay it out pretty clear: quote, "The threats the United States faces are the most serious and most challenging the nation has encountered since 1945 and include the potential for near-term major war. The nation was last prepared for such a fight during the Cold War, which ended 35 years ago. It is not prepared today," close quote.

The Commission is absolutely correct. We are not prepared today. The Commission finds that the current National Defense Strategy completed just two years ago does not adequately address the threat environment we currently face.

Specifically, the Commission highlights the growing alliance between our four largest adversaries: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. They find that the United States is not properly positioned or resourced to counter this combined threat.

The Commission also confirms that we have been—what we have been hearing for years from our combatant commanders, that China is outpacing us on many fronts.

They find that through two decades of focused investment in military modernization China has, largely, negated our military advantage in the Western Pacific.

To restore our advantage they urge a change in culture at the Department of Defense (DOD) to move past bureaucratic risk aver-

sion and adopt an acquisition system that speeds the delivery of innovation.

We heard a lot about that at our field hearing on Monday in Silicon Valley and I look forward to working with my colleagues to address that very concern.

The Commission rejects the current force sizing construct because it does not meet the threat. Instead, they recommend a new construct where the U.S. leads coalitions capable of simultaneously defeating Russia and China while also deterring adversaries.

To achieve that they call for a larger, more integrated military as well as a further strengthening of our allies and partners so they fight along with us.

To find that our Defense Industrial Base has atrophied—they find that our industrial base has atrophied to the point that it can no longer meet the military needs. They call for increased industrial capacity, more competition and partnerships with our allies to share this burden.

They recommend a whole of government approach to leverage not only military might but also our diplomatic and economic power to expand the field of allies and partners.

I think most of us here today wholeheartedly agree with these and other important recommendations by this Commission. But as the Commission points out, all of this will cost more than we are currently spending.

The Commission urges congress to immediately pass the fiscal year '24 defense supplemental to begin a multi-year investment in revitalizing the Defense Industrial Base and delivering innovation to the warfighter.

Then they call for sustained growth in the out years of at least 3 to 5 percent above inflation to ensure the military is properly resourced to deter the very real threats we face.

I agree with them and I know many of my colleagues do as well. But as the Commission notes, it is incumbent on Congress and the administration to make the case to the American people.

As such, I urge my colleagues to share the Commission's report with their constituents and with members who don't serve on House Armed Services Committee (HASC).

Everyone needs to understand that sustaining American deterrence against our adversaries, especially against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, will be very expensive. But they also need to understand that if we fail the price will be catastrophic.

I want to thank the commissioners for their service and for providing us with some very thoughtful recommendations, and with that, I yield to my friend the Ranking Member for any opening statement he may have.

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it, and thanks to our witnesses and thanks, most importantly, to the panel that did this study about our National Defense Strategy. Incredibly helpful to analyze where we're going.

I think the Chairman outlined very well the challenges that we face and, certainly, one of the top line issues whenever you look at a National Defense Strategy is how much should we spend on the Department of Defense (DOD) budget, and the two arguments that I think are really strong that we need to spend more is, number one, we face an incredibly complex threat environment between China, Russia, and then Iran, North Korea, but also we have what we would have thought of as small sort of nuisance groups like the Houthis causing us significant challenges.

So the threats are, you know, probably more complicated than they've ever been in the history of this country.

Second, it is absolutely true that we have the lowest defense budget that we have had since the end of World War II as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). But we also have to face the reality that we have never had a debt that was, I think, a little over \$33 trillion.

Where is Representative Massie with his clock when I need him? It's a very big number. Let's just put it that way.

Number two, there's no way that we can spend enough money so that we can meet all of those threats on their own. It's simply impossible.

It boggles the mind to think what the defense budget would have to be if you imagined how do we have a National Defense Strategy and military large enough to beat Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and all these terrorist groups at the same time.

Can't be done. So, therefore, one of the things that I look forward to talking to you—and I know this is addressed in the report—is how can we get more out of the money we spend, because one sad reality, while certainly our defense budget is, again, the lowest since World War II, we have also spent a lot of money on things that just haven't worked out very well and just a partial list—I'll go back a ways for the first one.

Future combat systems—you know, billions of dollars down the toilet—the expeditionary fighting vehicle, which I think is a particularly good example, because long before it was built you could conclude that it was going to end exactly the way that it ended, which is in the era of missiles being as capable as they are you are no longer going to be able to do a landing in a contested environment. And, yet, we spent \$8 billion answering a question that we should have answered, you know, like the day after it was asked for.

The tanker is way behind. The F-35 Ford-class carrier. So if we're going to make this work we got to stop wasting so much money.

So I hope everyone has a really good conversation about how that happens and how we can fix it, and I think the answer lies in something the Chairman said, something that we talked a lot about at our field hearing two days ago now, I guess, in Silicon Valley, is instead of having a requirements-based budgeting process let's have a problems-based budgeting process.

We walk through all of these requirements. We expand them, expand them, expand them, expand them to the point where you can't possibly ever do even what those requirements ask for and it doesn't solve an actual problem that you face.

You know, I have joked before that I'd like to be like Thanos in the Marvel cinematic universe and snap my fingers and make half of all the regulations go away, and I don't care which half, okay. Just to get us to a better process on that front.

Last note on the budget, which is particularly important today, we need to pass an appropriations bill. Yes, you can argue about what that number should be but not having it is a huge problem, and for all of us on this committee and all of us in the House today we're going to be asked to vote in favor of a six-month Continuing Resolution (CR), which would be devastating to the Defense Department.

That's basically saying we're not going to increase the budget by a penny for six months; we're going to tie their hands so that they have to keep spending money on what they spent it on last year and they can't spend money on new programs.

Anyone who cares about national security should vote against the CR today and I really want to emphasize that. So bottom line is we got to get more out of the dollars we spend—it's a matter of innovation—and then also to understand how warfare has changed.

There's a whole bunch that we said about this but, you know, we have got the problem of shooting down a \$10,000 drone with a \$2 million missile—not a sustainable long-term situation.

It's really all about secure communication, secure information, drones, counter drones, missiles, and missile defense. What are we building now that doesn't fit that picture and let's stop building that and start spending the money where we need to spend it. That's all about innovation, which I want to hear more about.

Lastly, partners and allies, absolutely crucial, and, by the way, a great strength. Let's not underestimate that. Fifty-four nations have come together to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia.

All right. That is an incredible coalition of partners. In Asia we are seeing Japan step up. South Korea, Australia. We are now building partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam. We're working on our partnerships with India. We have the partners and allies. Let's build and strengthen those relationships.

With that, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. Again, I thank them for doing this process and giving us this report, and I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I couldn't agree more with everything the ranking member just said.

Now I'm happy to introduce our very impressive witnesses. We have the Honorable Jane Harman. As the chair of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) Commission she served alongside many of us on HASC for several years representing Los Angeles. Also had the honor of serving with you on Homeland Security, too. Very impressive there as well.

The Honorable Eric Edelman is the Commission's vice chair. He served as ambassador to Finland and Turkey and in numerous senior roles in the DOD including the Undersecretary of Policy for the George W. Bush administration.

With that, Representative Harman, we recognize you first.

**STATEMENT OF CONGRESSWOMAN JANE HARMAN, CHAIR,
COMMISSION ON NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY**

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Smith and members of the committee on HASC. I served here, as you heard, from 1993 to 1999 in the lowest—starting in the lowest seat, I guess, on this side. I can't really remember.

But it was an awesome experience to be on this committee and then on Homeland and then on Intelligence and to work on the security problems we face.

Let me start by saying I'm in violent agreement with both of your opening statements and the bipartisan spirit in which you offer them. A lot of the things you say are in our report which, as I think you all know, was supported on a bipartisan unanimous basis by the members of our Commission, four Democrats and four Republicans.

Behind us, as you have said, are two more Commission members—two more out of the eight of us—Mariah Sixkiller and Roger Zakheim—and the whole crowd is around in Washington today and we are appearing in many places hoping to get the message out.

And thank you for doing this hearing today because you are getting the message out and one of our strong recommendations is the public has to understand what emergency we face and step up to the problems.

And another point, Ranking Member Smith, is that we don't recommend printing money. We recommend raising revenue to pay for the increase that we need for the defense budget that we must have.

So, as you know, Congress created our Commission to review the 2022 National Defense Strategy, or NDS, and to offer a clear-eyed independent view.

It's been a pleasure to serve with the members of our Commission and we believe unanimously that the National Defense Strategy is woefully out of date. It was written in early 2022 before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China and Russia's strategic partnership, and Hamas' horrific attack on Israel last October 7.

As Ambassador Edelman will detail, the threats to our national security have been mounting for two decades and are greater now than at any time since the height of the Cold War and, most of us believe, since World War II.

Our message is basically this. Significant and urgent action is needed but for years our government has failed to keep up. Our entire system, and the Pentagon in particular, are risk averse and slow to act.

You highlighted this problem earlier this week, as you mentioned, in your hearing in California in Silicon Valley on the shortcomings of DOD on technological innovation.

We enthusiastically agree with you and, in my opinion, the change will only happen through the bold bipartisan leadership of this committee and your Senate counterpart.

Our report includes actionable recommendations including one that you are implementing with today's hearing, as I just mentioned, which is informing the public on the dire situation we face.

Unfortunately, another one of our recommendations and the single top request from the Department of Defense will not be imple-

mented because of the unfortunate delay in appropriations bills, and we understand there's another vote today on a six-month CR.

We understand that some of you are opposed to that and we understand why you're opposed to that. It hurts our readiness to continue funding the last budget and not the new starts and innovation that we need.

And so we note that, and I failed to introduce who was—I know he's going to speak next, but our Vice Chairman Eric Edelman whom you introduced it has been an absolute pleasure to work with Eric, who has served on many of the prior commissions and to learn from Eric.

So I yield back my time.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Harman and Mr. Edelman can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Edelman, you're recognized. Your microphone.

**STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ERIC EDELMAN, VICE CHAIR,
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY**

Mr. EDELMAN. There we go. Sorry.

Chairman Rogers, Representative Smith, members of the committee, it's a pleasure to be here as.

As Representative Harman said, I am a recidivist. You all have chartered four of these commissions—2010, 2014, 2018, and now the 2022 Commission. I've served on all four, and several of our commissioners actually have served on previous commissions.

I think just reviewing the work of those commissions, I think, is instructive. In 2010 when we reviewed the then Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) we argued that we were potentially facing a train wreck because the resources for defense were declining but threats appeared to be gathering.

In 2014 we concluded that the Budget Control Act had been a strategic misstep that wrong footed us vis-a-vis our competitors and in 2018 we warned that the U.S. was potentially losing its decisive military edge.

Six years later when we convened as a group I think all of us were persuaded that the threats are more serious than they were before and we have failed to keep pace as a nation.

There is real potential for a near-term war which would hard to be—hard to imagine would not be a global war and there is a chance we could lose such a conflict.

The partnership between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea represents a major shift in the strategic environment. It makes each of those countries stronger militarily, economically and diplomatically, and it weakens our tools to deal with them, and it makes it much likelier that a conflict which erupts in one theater would spread to others.

The force construct that the—both the 2018 and 2022 NDS has proposed to meet the challenge, essentially a one-theater military with additional reserves to deter elsewhere, we believe is inadequate.

There are currently wars in two of the priority theaters going on already and the substantial threat of a third in the Indo-Pacific. The 2022 strategy identified China as the pacing challenge but we

believe that, based on production rates and other indicia, China is outpacing the U.S.

The U.S. still has the world's strongest military with the furthest global reach but when we get within a thousand miles of China's shore we start to lose our military dominance and could find ourselves on the losing end of a conflict.

In addition to its growing and modernized conventional strategic forces China has infiltrated U.S. critical infrastructure networks to prevent or deter us from engaging against it and it is likely to contest our logistics, disrupt power and water at home, and otherwise remove the sanctuary of the U.S. homeland that we have long enjoyed if we were to find ourselves in conflict.

The public, we believe, is not aware of the potential consequences of this kind of attack at home and the U.S. government is not at present organized sufficiently to prepare to stop it.

Our report also describes the threats posed by a reconstituted Russia and what Vladimir Putin may seek to do beyond Ukraine, and the threats from emboldened leaders in Iran, North Korea, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and its affiliates, along with other terrorist groups who remain a potent and increasing threat capable of launching large-scale external attacks.

We share the goal unanimously as a Commission of the NDS of deterring major war and I want to really emphasize that. This is not about trying to get ready for the U.S. to fight a war. This is about deterring war because it's always much less expensive to deter than it is to fight a major conflict.

But we have serious doubts whether the smallest force in decades and an insufficient industrial base, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, can deter increasingly capable and cooperating allies among our adversaries.

We recommend a multi-theater force construct, better use of commercial technology, as you and your colleagues were arguing recently, and strategic investments to restore the U.S. qualitative military edge.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I may close.

Rather than reading into the record our findings and recommendations let me return briefly to an earlier comment.

This committee, as well as your Senate counterpart, is critical to reversing the trends that Vice Chairman Edelman just described. Let me give you a few examples.

As you know, the executive branch is severely stovepiped. The National Defense Strategy itself is by law authored by the Secretary of Defense and focuses internally on DOD. A thought experiment—maybe your committee can help change that.

We credit Secretary of Defense Austin in prioritizing integrated deterrence in the 2022 NDS but DOD simply can't make the rest of the bureaucracy focus on great power competition.

Congress is stovepiped as well, but you all sit on other committees and can work across the House in support of an integrated National Security Strategy across government and with the private sector, and the innovation that you saw in Silicon Valley in my home state of California is innovation we need to protect the security of the United States.

Stovepiping also happens on Appropriations, and I know some of you are—I believe some of you serve on the Appropriations (Approps) Committee. We can't keep pitting defense spending against nondefense spending as if the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Treasury, and even Education and Labor don't contribute to our national defense.

The Commission recommends a broader view of national security and adequate spending across all these accounts. We unanimously recommend returning to the levels of spending as Vice Chairman Edelman just said and all of you, I think, agree on the levels of spending on national defense proportionally as we did in the Cold War.

We also call for paying for it through increases in revenue and reforms to entitlements and other nondiscretionary spending.

I know it is easier for us to say that than for you to do it, but if we're going to get serious about deterring and winning wars on the scale of the Cold War it's necessary.

We also implore the 59 members of this committee to work with your colleagues to stop relying on Continuing Resolutions. These CRs do real harm, especially on procurement, and weaken our hand against our adversaries.

Finally, from your oversight you know full well that getting things done quickly at DOD is almost impossible. We support programs like the Defense Innovation Unit—DIU—the Office of Strategic Capital, and Replicator but these are specifically designated as end runs around the normal Pentagon model.

The culture of the regulations at the Pentagon, as Ranking Member Smith said, are a major impediment to readiness and war fighting. You need to drive change.

Ukraine and Russia are innovating on the battlefield on the scale of weeks, not years. I was in Kyiv last week and prior to that in April and saw this for myself. If DOD can't move at this speed and scale it will lose.

This isn't the culture there and this committee needs to help the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of DOD address it.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee, thank you again for your role in establishing our Commission and inviting us to share our report with you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much for your service and for being here, and I now recognize myself for questions.

I would like to hear a little bit more about this new axis of evil that's fashioned this. How concerned should Americans be about this new alliance between China, Russia, North Korea, and—well, that's it, that coalition. Tell us about what it could mean for us.

Mr. EDELMAN. Chairman Rogers, what we're seeing is Russia right now waging the largest land war in Europe since 1945 but only able to do that in the face of U.S. and other international sanctions and export controls through the financing of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the provision by the PRC of precision machining equipment that has allowed the Russian defense industrial base to go on a three shift a day 24/7 footing that is enabling them to rain death and destruction on civilians in Ukraine with missiles, with drones that first they were provided by Iran but now coming from a factory in Russia built by Iran, and with 152 ammu-

dition—millions of rounds of 152 ammunition provided by North Korea.

What's going back from Russia to these other countries? We don't know the full scope yet, but it may include assistance, for instance, for China in submarine technology, in other kinds of technology that will, again, erode some of our long-standing traditional comparative advantages vis-a-vis China, one of which, as you all know, is undersea warfare.

So there's a growing collaboration among these four bad actors and it's hard to imagine, as I said in my testimony, that if we were in a conflict, say, in the Indo-Pacific over Taiwan or South China Sea that North Korea wouldn't try and take advantage of that at the same time on the Korean Peninsula or that Russia wouldn't take advantage of it to, you know, do something in the Baltic or in the Black Sea region.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are cooperating and we just have to accept that and what it means for us. Back when Representative Harman was on this committee and when I first came on this committee, up until about 10 or 12 years ago the Defense Department had a construct where it was structured to fight two wars successfully simultaneously and defend the homeland, and I remember General Dempsey when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs testifying before us the Defense Department can no longer do that—that at best we could fight one war successfully and defend the homeland, and I'm not sure that we still have that status today. That's unacceptable.

Can you talk to us about—we just described four major threats that are all building. What does it mean for us to see our percentage of defense spending at the level—as a percentage of GDP fall to the level it is now?

What do the American people need to understand about the implications of that level of spending, given that spread of threat that you just talked about?

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, it's not just the level of spending. It's what we spend it on. We continue to fund legacy systems. I know something about this.

I represented an aerospace-dependent district in Los Angeles and fought to the death to keep some programs that could have been, it seems to me, transitioned to more modern programs.

But I was worried about what would happen to the workforce, something we can discuss. We all think that we can generate a workforce for a much more modern military so there won't be unemployment problems in districts. It's just a question of making decisions—smart decisions—about what to spend the money on.

Our view is spend more but spend smarter and pay for it. So on this one-war concept I was surprised—I no longer was here when we downscaled the two-war concept to the one-war concept.

Our committee—our Commission feels on a unanimous basis that that's not even adequate, that we need a multiple theater construct. And that doesn't mean we're fighting two wars or three wars or X wars with boots on the ground but we're fighting.

I mean, think what's going on in the Middle East and think of the assets we have repositioned there because of what can happen, and also think, as we haven't pointed out yet but it's sobering, that

all the four members of this axis of evil have or are about to have nuclear weapons and we don't have any nuclear regime that's sufficient to cover all this.

So our recommendation is a multiple theater concept. We can go into more detail but I'm mindful that my time, I think, is up here.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much.

I yield to the Ranking Member.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. One aspect of that, as we try to, you know, be prepared to deal with all these threats is our production capacity in certain key items and really it's—missile defense is a big part of it and then ammo, as we're seeing in Ukraine.

And I think, you know, we have made some improvements domestically and then also, crucially, with partners. We're starting to make Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) in Australia. We're partnering with Turkey on some 155 rounds. We're working with different folks.

But the scale that we're going to need to be prepared for, given the threats that we face, is great—not just us, but all of our partners.

So what can you tell us about what we need to do to be able to increase production capacity of those key munitions?

Mr. EDELMAN. Representative Smith, there are a couple of different things I think we need to think about and you've touched on many of them, and just to start, you know, at home, we need—one of the reasons we, you know, call for an increase in spending but also for multi-year procurement and not just the authority but also the appropriations to back those multi-year procurements up is to send a signal to industry to be able to make the investments they need to make in both floor space—you know, increasing their floor space for production of munitions but also for taking on the highly skilled workforce and the overhead that that incurs over the long term.

It's not just going to be a blip, a one- or two-year, you know, appropriation that they'll be able to amortize this over a long period of years.

Mr. SMITH. Can I ask you one question about that? This came up at the hearing.

So we hear all the time about the demand signal. That's what industry wants. Now, I have a sarcastic way of looking at one aspect of that.

I mean, the demand signal, basically, is promise us that you're going to pay us for 30 years no matter what happens, what we're going to build. Guarantee us a return no matter what, and I'm sure we would all like that.

But the second part of the problem, as we have discovered, things are changing rapidly, particularly when you're talking about software and some of the smaller parts of this.

So if you make a 30-year commitment to all of these things—sorry, 30, that's an exaggeration—but 10, you know, and then things change how do you pivot?

Now, I think that we can build flexibility into those contracts and one of the things that I hope all of you will consider is something that one of our witnesses said on Monday which was it's not so much we need a long-term demand signal.

As it is, we need to know that you're going to give us the opportunity to buy so that you're not going to lock our competitor in forever and then we just can't compete.

So I think we have to be careful about the demand signal thing and I think of the space launch as being one of the best examples. United Launch Alliance (ULA) was the only game in town so we kept giving them 10-year contracts.

Competition showed up and the competition couldn't do anything because they had a better product now but the competitor that didn't had a 10-year contract.

So how would you balance those two things?

Mr. EDELMAN. You're right. There has to be, you know, balance in this. I don't—I don't disagree with that. I mean, some of this has to do also with changing the way we think about platforms and munitions.

I mean, we're really now operating in a world, and we see this as a—you know, there's a laboratory in front of our faces in Ukraine and in the Middle East. We're in a world now of autonomy, of artificial intelligence, of smart munitions, loitering munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Mr. SMITH. Also, of all of those things you just mentioned being jammed and rendered ineffective unless we can figure out a way around it.

Mr. EDELMAN. Right. And so what you need is to have these systems developed so that they are upgradable, reprogrammable, so that the software side of this can, you know, move inside the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop of the adversary and defeat things like the electronic warfare we have seen the Russians use against some of the commercially presided things we have given the Ukrainians.

So I agree with you.

Ms. HARMAN. If I might just add to that.

Future systems will be much more software and much less hardware. C.Q. Brown was at the Aspen Security Forum where we testified on our recommendations and he said the Defense Department is not a hardware store.

Well, I would say it is too much of a hardware store, and the reason we are recommending lashing up closely with the tech sector and, hopefully, adapting some of the business model of the tech sector which is not risk averse, which is not stovepiped, which is not bureaucratic, is that we will produce things that we can iterate and upgrade quickly that are much less expensive and much more effective.

Mr. SMITH. Sounds good. I'm out of time.

Mr. EDELMAN. Just briefly, Mr. Smith.

Also, you're completely right that we have to work with allies and this is one reason why we stressed that we need to use all elements of national power. It's just not the Department of Defense, the Department of State, with its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regulations is important here.

Mr. SMITH. I'll say quickly as my time runs out, figuring out how to rework the requirements process is crucial to all of this. It gets locked in over this extended period of time. So just a homework as-

signment for all of us that we're going to try to work on going forward.

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio Mr. Turner is recognized.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the Commission and, certainly, our two panelists today. Ambassador and Jane, it's great to see you. I appreciate what you're bringing forward to us as part of our debate and really our to-do list.

Ambassador, I appreciate your reference to Ukraine. I've been in and out of Ukraine with other members of Congress and when I take them there they're struck by that you don't have soldiers fighting; you have operators of drones that are not necessarily soldiers.

You have—your whole acquisition structure is completely changed so that you can move forward innovation to the battlefield. We're not—we're not set up for that, and I appreciate you guys in both the Commission's report and in this testimony highlighting that.

But there's also something that I think is an incredible point that you've made that is a larger to-do list item and that is that the U.S. public is, largely, unaware of the dangers that the United States faces, and the fact that you guys have raised this issue—in fact, you go on to say that they do not appreciate the strength of China and its partnerships or the ramifications of daily life.

If a conflict were to erupt they are not anticipating disruptions to their power, water, or access to all goods in which they rely.

You go on to say, of course, the next Pearl Harbor could occur with the American public being completely unaware. So I'm just going to list a couple of things that the American public are not aware of that I think there's a huge gap between what we deal with every day and what we need to communicate.

And the first one, of course, goes directly to what you guys just said. Our adversaries look at civil society as a valid military target. If there is a conflict with China this is not going to be a regional conflict or a military conflict.

It is going to be a civil society disruption. There will be harm that China will seek to do to the American public in disruptions in both our economic and our social structure.

You guys identify water, power. All of these things, of course, are crucial for civil society.

But also on this side, and the Ranking Member mentioned missile defense, I was just meeting with fellow native Parliamentary Assembly members who are from Europe and they were all acknowledging that their public and our public actually incorrectly believe that we have a working missile defense system to protect us in case there is a nuclear attack.

Europe has nothing. We, of course, do have some ground-based missile defenses that are fielded. But we have an East Coast missile defense site that has been statutorily approved, unbuilt. We have not had administrations risen to the level of saying we're going to—we're going to put these in place.

We already mentioned cyber, but even in space China and Russia are doing anti-satellite programs and, of course, now we have been openly discussing the fact that Russia is developing an anti-satellite nuclear weapon to be put into space.

We know that China is tripling its nuclear weapons program. The United States is barely able to modernize, meaning refurbish and keep what we have. Both China and Russia have fielded hypersonics. We do not even have a fully developed hypersonic program.

I'm concerned that, in part, we don't highlight these things minorly so that we don't alarm the public but also that the public doesn't hear of the inaction.

I think administrations don't inform the public because they don't want the difference between what they should be doing and what is going to—what they are actually doing.

I'd love to get your thoughts on—Jane, how do we address this gap?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, Mr. Turner, I want to commend you for your leadership on a bipartisan basis of the House Intelligence Committee where I also spent a lot of time. It matters that these committees be bipartisan because, after all, the bad guys are not going to check our party registration before they harm us.

First of all, let me say that one of the things we were briefed on—and we had 92 separate meetings with various people including Chairman Rogers—was the possibility that China would engage in a massive cyber attack on our critical infrastructure either in advance of or congruent with doing something—annexing Taiwan or advancing into Taiwan.

And I don't think Americans understand at all how they would feel if all of a sudden their communications go dead, our ports close, et cetera, and transportation nodes are down.

I was here and many of you were here on 9/11 when Congress was unprepared for that attack despite the fact that three major commissions, one of which I served on, had recommended that we pay attention to a possibility of a major attack on U.S. soil.

We were milling around in front of the Capitol. We closed the House and Senate offices. The fourth plane, which went down in Pennsylvania was, most people think, intended to hit the dome of the Capitol and we would have had a continuity of government crisis in America.

It still was a crisis—I don't want to minimize what happened—but I think it would be a crisis on steroids if we don't prepare the American public for what could happen now.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for your hard work, particularly in—I mean, this report obviously took a while and a lot of effort.

On Sunday we celebrated the third anniversary of AUKUS when it was unveiled and in some ways I think it's almost a poster child of really, you know, sort of collaborative recommendations that you're making in terms of how we uplift our industrial base as well

as maximize, you know, some of the great work that our allies are doing.

This committee authorized the pathways—legal pathways for AUKUS to move forward. It was signed into law last December. Permits the U.S. to sell three nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, the first time that’s ever happened, as part of pillar one.

But in pillar two it also knocked down the defense export controls in ITAR in really just an unprecedented way so that, again, the three countries can integrate, you know, really high-end technologies and quantum computing, hypersonics, cyber, and the State Department actually issued the rules in record time also so that there now is a fast lane for the three countries to work together in terms of, you know, raising the bar in terms of deterrence.

We are already seeing classes of Australian enlisted sailors and officers graduating from sub school both in South Carolina in my district up in Groton, Connecticut, and they’re top in the class, by the way, in terms of—which shows a lot about their commitment to this.

The USS Hawaii landed or was docked in Perth a couple days ago and an Australian officer actually was at the helm and drove that Virginia-class submarine into port.

So, you know, again, we’re really seeing this. It’s not just a document. It’s not just paperwork. I mean, this thing is really happening tangibly and quickly in terms of implementing it.

And last night when the three countries issued their statements they already indicated that New Zealand, Canada, and South Korea are now in open negotiations about possibly being included in the pillar two realm and Japan also.

I mean, it’s sort of like AUKUS envy, you know, that people want to get into this sort of approach. So, you know, again, in terms of, you know, the vision that this document lays out maybe you could talk about that, both of you, in terms of just how, you know, AUKUS—and also the speed with which Congress moved to make this real is really what is needed right now.

Mr. EDELMAN. Well, Mr. Courtney, I completely agree with you that this kind of partnership among allies is something that’s important and needed and AUKUS was an important, I think, innovation and I certainly applaud the Congress for what it’s done.

I will tell you that although there’s been a lot of progress—and I know Jim Miller, who succeeded me a couple of times removed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, has been working very hard to try to overcome some of these differences.

When we talked with our United Kingdom (U.K.) and Australian colleagues they don’t think we’re completely there yet. There’s still work that needs to be done on that.

But you’re correct. This is, I think, the wave of the future. I mean, in addition to the other partnerships you mentioned at the time of the NATO summit there was the U.S.-Canada-Finland ice-breaker agreement that was announced.

So this is the wave of the future. We’re going to have to work by, with, and through allies to accomplish a lot of this.

Mr. COURTNEY. The only thing I would note in terms of any of the, you know, concerns people have, it took 13 years for the U.S.

to authorize nuclear technology transfer to the U.K. after World War II. This took literally—

Mr. EDELMAN. I'm well aware.

Mr. COURTNEY. —seven months—

Mr. EDELMAN. I am well aware.

Mr. COURTNEY. —when the proposal came over from Congress.

I'd just—one other point I just would like to make is that Secretary Austin sent over a list of the damage that would be done if the six-month CR went into effect.

In terms of the undersea domain which you mentioned, Mr. Edelman, the Columbia-class program in 2025 was slated to get about a \$4 billion increase so that the USS Wisconsin, which is the second Columbia, can actually get into full production.

There's about an additional \$1.3 billion or \$4 billion in terms of submarine industrial base funding which goes into workforce supply chain facility. Again, all of that would be put on hold and we don't have the time to really afford in terms of that happening.

Hopefully, all of us will vote that CR down later today and move on to a short-term—very short-term CR so we can get a final budget.

With that, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to also thank you both for your work and the other Commission members who are here as well.

Representative Harman, I overlapped with you for a time when you were still in Congress. You and Senator Wayne Allard started the Space Power Caucus and after you left I picked it up and continued that work and have furthered it. So I appreciate what you started there.

I noticed that your conclusions of the Commission, largely, did not replicate but, rather, complement the findings of your colleagues on the Strategic Posture Commission, which was submitted last year, and there's a specific conclusion they have—I want to see if you concur with it—and that is especially in light of the Chinese nuclear breakout our current nuclear modernization program of record is, quote, “necessary but not sufficient,” unquote, to effectively deter two nuclear peers.

Would you agree with that statement of that commission?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, if I might say something about the last discussion, the last time Congress passed an National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on time was 2011 which is the year I left Congress. So, of course, my view is that it was a perfect place until I left.

But more seriously, these CRs are really hurtful. They fund our past budgets, not the budgets we need, and obviously we need a bigger budget and we need to pay for a bigger budget. But I just wanted to put that out there.

We—because there was a different commission and a very good friend, I'm sure, of all of you too, former Senator Kyl was involved with it. We kind of operated in parallel.

But certainly I would agree, and I know that Congressman Turner wrote a big op-ed recently about this, that we're behind and I would agree with you that we do need to do more.

Maybe Ambassador Edelman wants to add to that.

Mr. EDELMAN. Representative Lamborn, we're facing an unprecedented situation which is that as China moves towards being a nuclear peer we have never had to deter two nuclear peers at the same time, and although I agree with members of the Commission on strategic posture who said we don't need to match Russia and China platform for platform, it is almost certainly going to be the case that when New START expires we will not be in a position to—with the force in being to deter.

So some alterations will probably, you know, be necessary. But the modernization program is absolutely crucial, going forward. We have to have both Columbia-class, B-21 and the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Sentinel.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Representative Harman, I noticed you were nodding your head yes when he was making that comment. When it comes to the nuclear modernization of the three legs of the triad would multi-year modernization—multi-year investment by Congress in that program be helpful?

Ms. HARMAN. Absolutely. Multi-year investment in many programs would be helpful. Multi-year procurement and procuring things that will deter or win the next war rather than legacy systems would also be helpful.

Sadly, the appropriations process—and I don't want to offend anyone here who may serve on the Appropriations Committee—doesn't work and Congress plays a very dangerous political game with CRs and the debt ceiling and so forth, and it would be enormously helpful to U.S. security if that stopped.

And I do understand why many here, it sounds like, are going to vote against the CR today, to make a point that this is not the way to be responsible.

Mr. LAMBORN. And, for the record, I want to say the House has sent NDAA and defense appropriation over to the Senate where they're just sitting on it. So there's no reason that a CR has to include defense.

When it comes to AUKUS we had a good discussion about that. My colleague from Connecticut mentioned AUKUS, and so progress has been made in export controls with close allies and working through that.

But, Ambassador, you said more could be done. So progress has been made but more could be done. What specifically could be done better?

Mr. EDELMAN. When you talk to, you know, our partners they will tell you that we are very difficult to do business with because the delays in issuing licenses under ITAR are extensive and complicating and there are other competitors in the marketplace who don't subject them to the same kinds of, you know, rules and regulations that we do.

So we have got to find a way to simplify this process to make it easier to do business with us so we can, you know, partner with our allies and not just allies but other partners.

I mean, if you look at the Middle East you've got a country with which we are closely tied, Israel, that has significant innovative capabilities, some of which were just demonstrated and you've also got Gulf partners who have a lot of money, and there's an obvious synergy there that we ought to be building on because to the point earlier that Chairman Rogers raised, you know, we can't take on this alliance of adversaries alone.

We have to do it with partners. And that's not just in terms of access to territory and bases but it's also going to be industrial production.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

I didn't warn the witnesses I will adhere to the five minutes, going forward. I didn't want you to let—I didn't want that thought to get away from you. That's why I let you go on. But if you'll watch the clock at five minutes we'll be ending it.

But I now turn to my friend from California Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Excellent piece of work done by the Commission. Thank you so very much for the work and for the advice and counsel, most of which we will ignore, starting with the CR.

But we'll—be interesting to see where the votes are after your admonition that we ought to pay attention. 2011—well done, Jane.

Allies, critically important. I do note that we have had significant success in the Pacific building our allies, and as mentioned by the ranking member, 50 some nations supporting Ukraine along with us.

All of government—good luck. Whether we increase the defense budget or not we have seen the State Department radically reduced and its budget probably maybe 40 percent reduction over the last few years. Treasury, Commerce, all of it.

So all of government does require investment. It also requires coordination. Industrial base—I was looking at some issues yesterday. Fortunately, Europe is providing munitions for Ukraine that we apparently cannot provide ourselves and so the industrial base becomes extremely important.

That requires investment. You've mentioned this. I'm going to go through just a list here. There's also a problem that we don't often discuss and that is the consolidation of the Defense Industrial Base. I think we're down to maybe five.

If you want innovation that's not how you get it, and I'm not sure you mentioned this in your report but it's something that is of utmost importance. There are some of us that are concerned about this and pushing forward to try to stop the continuation of the consolidation.

And, finally, I had expected lightning, thunder, and the collapse of this building when you mentioned tax increases. So if you'd like to go through any one of those pick and choose which one you'd like to comment on in the next two and a half minutes and we'll pick it up.

Ms. HARMAN. Well, where to start? I'll start with the consolidation of the industrial base. I was here in the '90s when we downsized the intelligence and defense procurement budgets because we won the Cold War and everyone else lost and they all wanted to be us. So why did we need to spend all this money?

And the result, of course, was that a huge number of the rocket scientists who won the Cold War were out of work, and so when Bill Perry was Secretary of Defense he held what was called the Last Supper. It's an artistic or, I don't know what you would say to—maybe it's a religious term.

But at any rate, the defense firms came in and were told to consolidate and they did consolidate, and there are fewer primes than there were then and that is a problem. But I would suggest that rather than build more primes we need to have a much more diverse industrial base, which is not just defense but also technology, and that's what we're urging, and not only the better—a better system to include software made by the private sector and investments made by the private sector but to include the—to adapt the business models of the private sector which are risk ready and innovative and very different from the business model of the Pentagon.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you.

Ambassador, do you want to pick one or another of those up?

Mr. EDELMAN. I would just, to stick with what our chair was just talking about that the challenge we observed in which your committee at its field hearing also, I think, uncovered is that during the Cold War essentially the Department of Defense was funding most of the basic research in this country and a lot of development of the commercial economy was built on the back of what the Department of Defense did.

But we have a completely different economy now which—in which the department is going to be dependent on developments in the commercial sector of the economy and particularly in the information technology (IT) area, as we were discussing earlier, with software becoming more important, really, in the end of the day, than the hardware, and the hardware becoming more attritable and cheaper.

What we found is that the department is not optimized to deal with that. It's optimized to build big, expensive, vulnerable, you know, platforms that we can't afford to lose and we have got to move away from that model.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your congressional delegation (CODEL)—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GARAMENDI. —and the efforts that you made to enlighten us on change.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to thank our witnesses for joining us today. Thanks so much too for your in-depth assessment about where we stand today as a nation in relation to, Chairman Harman, as you put the growing axes of evil. I'm in 100 percent agreement with you. We are at that point.

The challenge for us is to get the Pentagon to become an agile organization—that is a tall, tall order—and to operate at the speed of relevance. I'd love to get your perspective.

As we look at modernizing, as we look at needing an and strategy—not an or strategy, an and including exquisite platforms, things like aircraft carriers and submarines, things that give us an advantage in many different ways—but also putting into the inventory quickly attritable platforms and expendable platforms and the technology there is incredible.

The laboratory for how that's occurring is happening right now in Ukraine. So how do you see the enterprise and the Pentagon to be able to get that new technology operationalized quickly?

The good thing about attritable platforms and expendable platforms is we can build a lot of them. We can build them really fast, which I believe is that gap closer between the United States and our adversaries.

Ms. HARMAN. Well, let me just offer part of the answer because Ambassador Edelman is very informed about this.

I would just say that the Pentagon on present facts can't get there. They do have innovative programs that Defense Innovation Unit—DIU, which was DIUx, which was set up by the late Secretary Ash Carter—is one of those programs.

It is funded. Its budget is \$1 billion out of \$850 billion. That's a rounding error. And Doug Beck, the very able guy who heads it who has a long career in the private sector, says he can leverage that to \$50 billion. It's still a rounding error.

So programs that are there, Replicator and others, are not at scale and it is certainly my opinion—I think it was all of our opinion—that the Pentagon is not going to get there on its own.

One of the things that Congress could change is the instructions for how to write these National Defense Strategies. If the orders are given differently the Pentagon might be able to take a broader view and might be able to drive change through a very bureaucratic morass that exists there now.

Mr. EDELMAN. Mr. Wittman, I'm a former constituent because until Stafford County got moved to the Seventh—

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes.

Mr. EDELMAN. —so I'm pleased to be able to try and answer your question.

You know, it's very striking—it was very striking to all of us that when you think about the efforts to make the department more innovative, whether it's DIUx, DIU now, the Strategic Capabilities Office—the SCO—the Strategic Investment Office, or some of the things you all have imposed on the department like the European Deterrence Initiative or the Pacific Security Initiative, these are all things that work around the system that we have actually created to stifle and prevent innovation which is the bulk of the bureaucracy of the department.

And I think while all of us believe that the top line has to go up, that we need to spend more money, as Chairman Rogers said, we also very strongly believe what you said, which is that it can't just be all poured into the program of record.

I don't mean to knock those platforms. As you say, we need them. But what we need to have on those platforms is going to be even more important, and while Replicator is a great example of an initiative, first of all, you can't have the Secretary and the Dep-

uty Secretary personally, you know, drive all these things because they don't have enough time in the day to be able to do it.

It's got to be a broader, you know, department wide approach, and even Replicator is going to, you know, produce, I don't know, 10,000 attritable systems.

We're watching Russia and Ukraine deploy millions of these systems on the battlefield and if we get into a high-end conflict in the Indo-Pacific the consumption of munitions is going to be astronomical. It's going to, you know, be eye watering to the American public.

So it gets back to we need to really, I think, go from the bottom up and redo the way, you know, we do these things. And I'd like to go back to something Mr. Smith said because I agree with it violently, which is we have to move from a requirements system where the requirements—you know, everybody can add a requirement in the Pentagon to a new system. No one can take one off. And we need to be solving problems rather than requirements.

Mr. WITTMAN. Yeah. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. I hope everybody took note of what Representative Harman said in response to that suggested change. Quote, "The Department can't get there on their own. It is going to require Congress to force this change."

With that, I recognize my friend from New Jersey Mr. Norcross.

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you, Chairman.

I just want to echo the comments by my colleagues on how important of a discussion this is. It's rare that we are able to sit down and have the overall view.

The good news is we are having it. The bad news is it's massive and it's complex and certainly something that we have talked about for a long time.

But I want to first draw into a comment that Ms. Harman made early on. We know we need the best equipment, the personnel, all those issues, but how can we deal with that sensitive issue that very few people will have the discussion of the hometown favorite—the parochial interest?

They're in my backyard. It goes to the heart of the conversation both Ranking Member and the Chairman had is we have to spend it better.

Now, just for the record, nobody in this room does that. It's the other guys. Talk about how we can actually have a realistic discussion on that issue.

Ms. HARMAN. It's a difficult question.

Mr. NORCROSS. You brought it up.

Ms. HARMAN. I know. I brought it up and I lived it. I represented a defense dependent district in Los Angeles and when bases were going to close or programs were going to shift I fought like heck to save the jobs in my district and sometimes to save the programs.

But there is a way out of this. These new programs that we need—tech-centered programs, many of them software programs—also build jobs and one of the things we need to do is to transition workers who are working on programs that have much less relevance to deterring and winning wars now than they did, transition those workers with the skills needed for the new jobs.

Something that I discovered as a member of this Commission and did not know is that Pell Grants are available for vocational training.

We can use a program that is enormously popular and, I think, still well-funded to train the workforce that we need and when we do that it seems to me we end up with a win-win. Better jobs and better programs.

Mr. NORCROSS. Well, that literally takes me into the next question. When we talk about building the industrial base and we have the capacity it's well known how we got to where we are.

We have all shorted things for years. We have downsized. We have spent less. We understand that.

In terms of building up one of—the number-one focus is, particularly when we're dealing with the submarine base, is the longest lead item which is called a human asset, those who will go to work with their hands and build these things.

The pandemic taught us that it's great, let's sit home and do it on Zoom. You can't build the F-35 from home. You can't build submarines.

Talk about how we can build that long-term item of workers that can put this together.

Mr. EDELMAN. Mr. Norcross, this is one of the reasons why in our report we talk about using all elements of national power.

It can't all just be on the Department of Defense because, as you rightly say and as I was commenting with Representative Smith, you know, if you talk to folks in the Defense Industrial Base they'll tell you that it's—a skilled workforce is the long pole in the tent for, you know, everything they want to do in terms of expansion.

And, you know, with—if Mr. Lamborn were still here I would, you know, say, if you want to know, for instance, why the ground-based strategic deterrent Sentinel is a Nunn-McCurdy breach and is over budget and, you know, behind schedule it's not because the contractor Northrop Grumman doesn't know how to make a—you know, an intercontinental ballistic missile on time and on schedule.

It's because the workforce—we, you know, lack the workforce to pour the kind of specialized, reinforced concrete that you need for new silos and new control rooms.

I mean, there's also problems with environmental regulations but we don't have enough welders. We don't have enough electricians. It goes to Representative Harman's point about Pell Grants for apprenticeships not just for college education.

But this is an important issue and it's one that—it's not really in the remit of the Department of Defense but it's absolutely crucial to the success of our National Defense Strategy.

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you. The recruitment of the service members who put on the uniform extremely important, but the industrial base, those who build the equipment, is also equally important.

And with that, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The chair now recognizes Dr. DesJarlais of Tennessee.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you both for your great work and for being here today.

This is for both of you. The military recruitment crisis is a frequent topic of discussion in this committee. Your report notably highlights the Marine Corps' success in meeting recruiting goals without lowering standards.

What factors contribute to their success and what lesson can other branches take from their approach?

Ms. HARMAN. It's interesting that only the Marines are a success at the moment. I don't know what services all of you served in and I don't want to denigrate others but General—retired General Jack Keane is a member of our group and he was all over this issue, and part of what he thought was that the messages we send are way outmoded. The people who recruit are lower down in the totem pole than should be the people recruiting.

We should have our highest level generals and others doing the recruitment, and also the terms of service need to be adjusted. Moving every two years is bad for families, it's bad for a working spouse and—which happens more and more often, and those terms could be adjusted, too.

So it was—those were the things that we thought about, and we wanted to address that issue and we wanted to address education because that's a huge part of our problem, too.

We can't recruit and retain the talent that we need, and the numbers in the military are going down and that is just a tragedy in terms of the threats to the country.

Mr. EDELMAN. I know in talking to the service secretaries and service chiefs of the Army, Air Force, and the Navy all of them are struggling with this issue and working very hard to try and, you know, overcome some of this.

Again, some of this is a broader kind of national social issue. I mean, we have a declining percentage of 18- and 19-year-olds who can meet the physical standards and, you know, that goes to, you know, broader, you know, social issues that we have to address—obesity and other issues which you, I'm sure, appreciate.

We also have some antiquated health standards that have gotten in the way. You know, is it really the case that if you had childhood asthma that, you know, you shouldn't be able to serve.

So we have got to adjust some of these standards to help the services meet the recruitment goals that they've set for themselves.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you.

Congressman Harman, you have often criticized Congress' addiction to legacy platforms and stressed the need to shift investments towards emerging technologies.

Could you elaborate on this point and, if comfortable, provide some specific examples of systems you believe we should move away from?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, my general proposition is we need less hardware and more software. Not only is that cheaper but it is more attuned to the fights we will face—deter or face in the future, and there are new domains, obviously, that everyone knows about—space, cyber, artificial intelligence (AI)—and all of that has to be thought about in terms of the systems to deter or fight the next war.

In order to pay for that we can't just print money. That's something we—a point we keep making, which is why we think we have to raise revenues and reform entitlements.

But we also can't keep funding things that are demonstrated not to have as high value as these new software iterative platforms.

And we were just asked about what Ukraine can teach us. That's what Ukraine can teach us. Ukraine can teach us that it is—you can build a drone for \$350. My comment is you can't get a cup of coffee in the Pentagon for \$350, and that's our future.

So I don't really want to list legacy programs. Maybe Ambassador Edelman is more fearless than I am. But I can tell you that some of these hardware programs that I'm sure were built in my congressional district in Los Angeles or used to be built there would be better replaced by more software centric, tech-based, and—based programs.

Mr. EDELMAN. Rather than name programs I would just provide as a kind of rule of thumb if it's something that we can hang something that can be modularized, that can be upgraded, that can be turned around very quickly and used on the battlefield by the war fighter by all means keep it. If not, probably a good candidate to get rid of it.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California Mr. Carbajal.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. Thank you to both of you for being here. Thank you for your leadership and your service. You bring a wealth of experience to the table.

Congresswoman Harman, I appreciate your former service because I think you know the reality we all face when announcements are made of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and different types of legacy systems that are going to be changed.

But I think it's important that when we announce those things that we consider the impact to the economy, we consider the impact to the workforce, and that has to be part of any transition, any plan we put out there, because it allows us to give our constituents the confidence that we're going to do everything to mitigate the negative impacts that will result from those changes.

So I think your service and experience is extremely helpful in helping us as we do and go through these exercises in the future. And, for the record, I'm a Marine so thank you for saying great things of the Marine Corps.

The findings of this report add additional context to and further confirm what many of us in Congress have already known, that we are not ready for another war.

I have to say, reading through this report I agree with many of the findings but I have a hard time understanding why the department was not working on some of these important issues already.

Congresswoman Harman and Ambassador Edelman, why do you think we have been caught flatfooted on being prepared for a multi-theater war? You've touched on this already but if you could just reiterate some things.

Ms. HARMAN. Well, let me talk to a fellow Californian and admit that you are right that BRAC and some of those issues are very hard for a sitting member of Congress to deal with.

I remember fighting to preserve what was then called the Los Angeles Air Force Base in my district adjacent to the Aerospace Corporation, and I was successful with a lot of help from others.

And why did I want to preserve it? Because the educational base and the workforce in this area were dependent on the jobs that it would generate.

So it does go back to jobs and it does go back to needing to find new and better jobs for our constituents before we cancel programs or move things around.

So I agree with that. I don't know—I don't know what wisdom I can offer other than to say we carefully went through an inventory of what we would need to deter and win the next war.

Ambassador Edelman says all the time—I don't want to steal his thunder—that the goal is not to fight wars. The goal is to deter wars and we're just not there, and a big problem is public—lack of public awareness.

People have to understand why we need to spend more and what we need to spend it on and this hearing is a good example of public education.

And we would hope that the next president would be—would put this issue much more at the forefront than prior presidents have and make sure that the public is more aware ahead of the next catastrophe than we have been in recent years.

Mr. EDELMAN. I think part of the problem is that for good and sufficient reason the department since 9/11 has been focused very much on the wars that followed against various terrorist groups and that affected the program of record.

It affected how people thought about the future of warfare, and I think there's also—and I would say this in a bipartisan way—I think administrations of both parties tended to look the other way about the developments in terms of China's military power as well as Russia, hoping that things would just get better or not get worse, and we have now found ourselves in the situation that we do.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you.

I have some limited time here, but in the report you point out that the department's research and development (R&D) and procurement systems are overly complex and the department is reliant on antiquated military hardware.

An example you provide of the DOD's breaking this norm is the Space Force because of their ability to move quickly, like, with the Space Development Agency.

What do you think the biggest barrier has been to implementing faster, more efficient R&D and procurement systems across the department? Is it unwillingness from our senior leaders or the department—or has the department explored new systems and not found a better alternative?

Mr. EDELMAN. Just briefly, I would go back to some of the earlier comments we have. I mean, we have got this very massive requirements system that is biased in the direction of certain kinds of systems and makes it harder to get these nontraditional software oriented systems that my colleague has been discussing kind of front and center.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida Mr. Gaetz.
Mr. GAETZ. Chair Harman, you've testified that we need more software and less hardware. I agree. So list the things we need less of.

Ms. HARMAN. I think we need a careful inventory of what hardware platforms are resilient and can be adapted with additional software to deter and fight future wars. I don't have a list—

Mr. GAETZ. Perfect answer, just not to the question I asked. Name a system—

Ms. HARMAN. You asked—

Mr. GAETZ. —that we need less of. Name the program.

Mr. EDELMAN. I would offer up the—

Mr. GAETZ. Hold on. I didn't ask you the question. I asked the chair. Name one.

Ms. HARMAN. Again, I come back to what I said, which is an inventory of which systems would be useful to fight future wars. I don't think we felt it was our job to list a number of systems that need to be canceled but it was a job that—

Mr. GAETZ. Why? Why didn't you think that was your—if the core thesis of the report, which I agree with, by the way, is we need more software, less hardware, does it not seem frivolous to then list the things we need less of?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, the report was a clear-eyed critique of the National Defense Strategy of 2022, which didn't list hardware and software systems. The approach that we took was that we would look at the methodology of the report and assess whether it was valid.

We assessed it wasn't and we then made recommendations for how to adapt it to be more successful.

Mr. GAETZ. Right. But doesn't it seem frivolous—doesn't it seem frivolous to say we need less hardware and then I say, okay, name one thing we should buy one less of and the answer is some sort of like Washington speak?

Like, let's go to the F-35. That's an expensive piece of hardware. We have received testimony in this committee that 29 percent of the F-35s are fully operationally capable and so we fenced 10 of them, and then the appropriators went and restored the 10 we fenced and then added 10 more.

So how does it serve the National Defense Strategy to continually buy \$100 million paperweights?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, let me agree with you on that. I do agree with you, and I think this committee has tried to make good decisions and I remember when I served on it we tried to make good decisions and we got overruled often, not always. It takes—you know, it takes a lot of work in this building to get things to happen.

Mr. GAETZ. Well, it's just corrupt. It's corrupt because—

Ms. HARMAN. But I think you're right. I think—

Mr. GAETZ. It's corrupt because we're buying stuff we know doesn't work and then what the appropriators did was they took that money out of what this committee prioritized, which was childcare for our military families.

Ms. HARMAN. All right.

Mr. GAETZ. And so, like—but it does not advance our case when the people who are sent to critique it then don't come back and say, yeah, here's our assessment. The F-35 doesn't work. We buy too much of them and that should go into tech, into the tech that's going to help us in wars.

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I—and I think that's your call and I'm glad that you made it. I don't think that was our call as the writers of this Commission report. I think our call was to critique a document prepared in the old-fashioned way that we think should change.

Mr. GAETZ. Yeah. Yet, if we don't critique the systems by name it's just—it just sort of—it blends into the ether.

Another question about the National Defense Strategy. So we heard on Monday of this week that there are billions of dollars of materiel—U.S. materiel sitting around in Ukraine that will never be used, that the Ukrainians will not deploy in the fight.

We heard that from the contractor that we curated to come give us testimony in California, and we also know from testimony given before this committee that the inspector general cannot attest to end use monitoring of that very equipment.

So you've got a combination of billions of dollars of equipment and then nonlegally compliant end use monitoring. Does the combination of those factors necessitate us contemplating the risk of a lot of these weapons making their way to the black market and having a National Defense Strategy that will respond to it?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I think it's very important to track the materiel that's sent into Ukraine or any other war theater funded by the United States.

I would note that most of the expenditure for equipment goes to U.S. manufacturers. I think you would agree with that.

Mr. GAETZ. Yeah, but I don't really—okay, this is just one of the craziest arguments. Well, we got billions of dollars sitting over there. We're not monitoring it correctly. Ukrainians aren't using it in the fight but be proud that we're making it here at home?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, that's a problem. I'm not going to argue that. I'm also, having been to Ukraine twice this year including last week, very impressed with what the Ukrainians are able to do on their own and the equipment that they're able to produce which—well, it shows us up.

Mr. GAETZ. Yeah. No, I'd love them to do a little more on their own, frankly.

Final question. Do you contemplate in your critique of the National Defense Strategy the risk of the fact that China can hit a moving target with a hypersonic weapon and we can't? How do you assess that?

Mr. EDELMAN. Yes, we agree that that's a huge problem, and at the beginning of the hearing Chairman Rogers mentioned that and we are behind in hypersonics, Mr. Gaetz. That's just a fact.

Mr. GAETZ. Yeah, tragic. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts Mr. Keating.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It's great to see my former colleague, Representative Harman. Thank you, Ambassador Edelman, for your work together.

I'd like you to just address the American people maybe with your comments because Ambassador Edelman just addressed something that I think is important to the whole discussion and that's for years we have felt in this country that the home base—the homeland is safe, and I think that informs a lot of people—citizens, rightfully so—to say why should we be engaged in so many other things around the world.

But you also said that there's now a threat to that home base. Can you be specific and tell the American public what threat to the homeland you were referring to?

Mr. EDELMAN. Mr. Keating, in the report we talk about the fact that—and this has been, you know, I think, attested to by FBI Director Wray in open testimony—that the Chinese are sitting even today on our critical infrastructure in cyber and that they are prepared, as Mr. Turner was saying earlier in the hearing, to turn off your ATM, to turn off your water, turn off your heat, et cetera.

And so the potential for disruption in the homeland if we get into a conflict is very, very severe, and I don't think the American public is quite ready for that.

I think the hope that we have on this panel unanimously is that, you know, typically, historically in our country we have only responded to a catastrophe, whether it was Pearl Harbor or Task Force Smith in the Korean War or 9/11, and what we hope is that the current crisis—the war in Ukraine, the war in the Middle East—will be sufficient for you to be able to educate—

Mr. KEATING. I think that, you know, cyber threats but, you know, people will be inconvenienced with the ATM. But as a former member of the Homeland Security Committee are there graver threats at home potentially that are in play here in the U.S.?

Representative Harman?

Ms. HARMAN. I didn't hear the last part of your sentence.

Mr. KEATING. Are there greater threats than the ATM being shut off or some of the things that Ambassador Edelman—

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I mean—

Mr. KEATING. —to our homeland—

Ms. HARMAN. Yeah, I think there are.

Mr. KEATING. —here in the United States? Because I think they're looking—so many people are looking at the fact that—and this really falls with the isolationist kind of national debate that's going on, not so much in this committee but even with members of Congress, that, you know, these threats aren't important. We can go it alone. The home base is not threatened here in the—

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I sense you don't agree with that argument either, Mr. Keating, but I would say that—for example, the Port of Los Angeles was in my old congressional district.

Fifty percent of our container traffic goes in through the Ports of L.A. and Long Beach and the supply chain that feeds made in America manufacturing comes through those ports and if those ports close, let's understand that most of the cranes in our ports are made by the Chinese.

Mr. KEATING. That's great—

Ms. HARMAN. —and they're very, very vulnerable.

Mr. KEATING. My time is running out.

Because this is important too right now. There are people out there that are saying, you know, Ukraine falls into that category. It's not that important to us. You know, it's unfortunate what happened but it's not a threat here and this is part of the national debate right now.

Whether it's money, in which maybe you can comment on briefly, if we have to deploy troops in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) if that's the case, you know, the idea of the joint force part of your report or what the threats are specifically to us with Ukraine.

If you could just talk to the American people in the 1:10 that's left.

Ms. HARMAN. Could I just add one thing? And I think Ambassador Edelman will also expand.

This is the public education problem we have. People don't understand that freedom is on the line in Ukraine and that pushing back the Russian illegal aggression is crucial to keeping Russia out of Europe and forcing us to invoke Article 5.

Mr. KEATING. Would it cost us more—I'm down to 45 seconds. I'm sorry.

Will it cost us more if, indeed, Putin is successful in the Baltic threat that you mention?

Ms. HARMAN. Yes, it will cost us more.

Mr. KEATING. That's much more expensive, isn't it?

Mr. EDELMAN. Exactly, Mr. Keating. Conflict is always more expensive than deterrence. That's a lesson we have learned over and over again from history.

So preparedness—you know, the Roman General Vegetius said if you want peace prepare for war and that, you know, remains, I think, a maxim that, you know, would serve us well.

Mr. KEATING. And I hope that part of the report that you did it really represents the importance of joint forces, a transatlantic alliance in particular. I hope people understand the value of that in terms of their tax dollars, in terms of their security.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. It's an excellent point. The money we have spent so far will be nothing compared to what it will cost this nation if we have to go in to Eastern Europe to deal with the problem that results from Russia's success in Ukraine.

The chair recognizes the gentlelady from South Carolina Ms. Mace.

Ms. MACE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to begin by thanking both of you and the entire Commission on the National Defense Strategy for your work and being here with us this morning, and I agree that Congress must ensure America is prepared to meet the challenges of the complex and increasingly dangerous world that we live in, as you all have testified today so far.

I do have a couple questions. You said earlier freedom is on the line in Ukraine. Do you think it's a problem that we have sent billions of dollars over to Ukraine in equipment that we learned this week in our field hearing in California in Silicon Valley that oftentimes isn't working and doesn't work and so the Ukraine military

isn't using U.S. equipment? I mean, how big of a problem is this? What does that tell us about where we are today?

Ms. HARMAN. I think it is a problem and I think what we send ought to work and I think they ought to be well trained to use it.

I do think that most of the appropriations that we have made, that you have made, for equipment going to Ukraine has been spent in the United States and I think that's a good thing. Our industrial base needs a huge—

Ms. MACE. But if it doesn't work and we have just all this money—yeah.

Ms. HARMAN. I'm agreeing, and I do think there needs to be more review of what is going and how it is working, and we're not putting boots on the ground but as someone said—I was in Ukraine last week—we need more sneakers on the ground to make sure that what they are getting works and if it doesn't work that we're not sending it.

Mr. EDELMAN. Representative Mace, if I might just add to what my colleague said.

As far as I know, a lot of what you're talking about is a function of how good Russian electronic warfare is and how much we over the years have neglected the electromagnetic spectrum as a domain of warfare.

So, you know, it's unfortunate. You're correct that this is what's happening. But it's also a lesson for us to learn which we can use, I think, as we prepare ourselves for developing some of these kinds of systems that are software based that we have been talking about this morning.

Ms. MACE. Right. And we clearly haven't learned that lesson because of the way that we are appropriating, the way that we have created DOD to be this gigantic slow-moving bureaucracy.

But we have learned from the lesson of modern day warfare and Russia's invasion of Ukraine is that things in technology have moved so fast and, yet, we're the greatest fighting force in the world we can't keep up with the technology.

Like, how do we fix this problem? We know there's an acquisition problem but how do we fix this? I mean, there's so much happening that we need to have—our forces need to have but we're not prioritizing.

Ms. HARMAN. We agree with you, and Ukraine is a laboratory to experiment. There are a lot of new things that our tech sector is developing that could be tested in Ukraine.

We, unfortunately, have a procurement system built for the 1800s where we—as we were saying earlier we build to requirements. We don't build to solve problems.

We have an industrial base or we have a business model in the Pentagon which is risk averse, in contrast to the business model of the tech sector, and our recommendations are all about lashing the bureaucratic Pentagon model to a vibrant, innovative tech sector and leveraging the vibrant innovation in contrast to the old systems.

Ms. MACE. If you could do one thing what is the small part that can make a big difference in this process? Given the environment that we have today, the acquisition process that we have today, if there was just one small thing you could change that would make

the biggest difference in this to continue our being the best fighting force in the world, to stay ahead of China, to be able to demolish Russia, to be able to potentially demolish Iran if it comes to that in the future, what's the one thing you would do today if you possibly could? Both of you?

Ms. HARMAN. In answer I would give you that is achievable is fund the innovative parts of the Pentagon at scale and reduce funding for the bureaucratic parts.

Ms. MACE. And how much would that—what would that be, the amount of that?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, we have called for an increase in the defense budget. I think you heard that.

Ms. MACE. On the innovation side.

Ms. HARMAN. Not just more but smarter. How much would that be? I mentioned that the budget for DIU—the Defense Innovation Unit—is \$1 billion out of \$850 billion. I can imagine that being 10 times, 20 times that with a reduction in other parts of the budget.

Ms. MACE. If you had—if we could make that \$10 billion tomorrow what would you swap out for it? What would we reduce or exchange for that?

Mr. EDELMAN. I would put the money into accelerating our work on directed energy, high-powered microwaves lasers for missile defense because, to the Chairman's point earlier, we can't be in the situation where we're firing \$2 million missiles at \$60,000 drones in order to keep the Houthis from shutting the Red Sea down.

Ms. MACE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

The reference the gentlelady from South Carolina made to materials aren't being used I want to put that in perspective. It was a witness who was a drone manufacturer making reference to drones that have been sent over there that aren't being used, which does go to the electronic warfare (EW) issue, and I have asked for an accounting of what's not being used.

But I want to make it very clear. The 155s, the Javelins, the Stingers, the ATACMS—the weapon systems we're sending over there are being used and are working.

With that, I now recognize the gentlelady from—she swapped seats on me—Ms. Houlahan from Pennsylvania.

Ms. HOULAHAN. I did because that microphone has always been a difficult thing for me.

Hello, and thank you very much for coming. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I had the pleasure to serve as the ranking member on the Quality of Life Committee, or working group, with Representative Bacon and we looked into a lot of different ways that we could help our service members to have better lives both on and off duty.

We made 31 recommendations—child care issues, pay, health care issues, housing issues, spousal employment, as you mentioned, and other benefits, and as you are aware and have said and some of my colleagues have too there is no way to have an effective military unless we have an effective people in uniform.

And so I very much believe that those 31 recommendations of the Quality of Life Panel ought to be funded and appropriated and passed both—we already did that on the House side and I'm very

much urging the Senate to do that as well as the President to support that.

So this question is for the both of you. How would you prioritize, given all the work that you've done, the quality of life and the obvious expenditures that that will require for all of those things that I've just named against this innovation that we're talking about, the munitions that we know are necessary, and other costly programs in the DOD?

Ms. HARMAN. I don't think it should be a choice. I think we need both. We need the right systems and we need the right workplace environment to recruit the people we need.

Recruitment is down across the military. I'm not sure if it's down in terms of nonmilitary jobs in the Pentagon but it might be, but military billets are very difficult for families and everyone is talking about that, and if we want the best people to serve we have to change the system.

So I think it's great that you have this committee and you've made these recommendations and, frankly, I think to build—again, we have had this long discussion about hardware versus software, bureaucracy versus a much more flexible and adaptable business model.

We can't get there without better people and a better environment for them to serve.

Mr. EDELMAN. Representative Houlahan, I think it's hard to, I think, overestimate how much the all-volunteer force has been a huge comparative strategic advantage for the United States.

Having the kind of professional military force that we have had for the last 50 years has, I think, proven itself over and over in terms of what it is capable of doing and the advantage potentially it gives us over poorly trained, poorly motivated conscript forces that our adversaries have.

So I think it's important to maintain that force but we are facing, you know, some really severe challenges. Quality of life for the forces, as you say, is one of them, although I would note that retention remains high despite our recruiting difficulties.

So I'm more focused, I think, and I think we have been more focused on the question of recruitment and, you know, getting the—keeping the all-volunteer force healthy because we really need it, you know, for the future.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Yeah. I mean, this is an incredibly important conversation to have and I think the problem is it's really hard to talk to people in my community which, you know, I come from a military family.

I grew up as a traveling child. Every year my parents moved. My mother was a trailing spouse. My grandmother, too, and I was active duty in the Air Force, and we really do need to do a better job of treating our men and women in uniform and I really do think we need to appropriate and fund resources for them.

And there will have to be some choices likely, to be honest, and I would emphasize that I think that when you have a broader view of, you know, national security you include our men and women in uniform.

Ms. HARMAN. If I might just add, the fact that members of Congress now—many have military service in their backgrounds—makes Congress a better place. I mean, again, in another century when I was first elected there were very few members who had any military service.

Ms. HOULAHAN. I 100 percent agree, and, in fact, you mentioned that procurement is from the 1800s. I was in procurement as a procurement officer. My job was as a project engineer and program manager in the Air Force and procurement of the 1900s is now the procurement of the 2000s, and with what's left of my time I would just like to know if you think that models like Replicator and DIU can be the new standard. You alluded to that a little bit as being problematic.

With what's left of my time, Ambassador, do you have any comments on that?

Mr. EDELMAN. No. I think those are great initiatives but the problem is that they are not able to, as my colleague said, develop programs at scale and so we need to figure out a way to, you know, take these sort of little pockets of innovation and make it representative of the entire procurement system as opposed to ways to work around it.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both of you for being here.

In your testimony you say, quote, “We unanimously recommend returning to the levels of spending on national defense proportionally as we did in the Cold War,” and I wonder, just simply put, is the world and the threats to America more severe and dangerous today than it was during the Cold War? Just a simple question, Ambassador.

Mr. EDELMAN. Let me try and frame that, Mr. Banks, this way, which is that the Cold War was very dangerous and very serious because of the huge inventories of nuclear weapons on both sides.

Thankfully, the numbers of weapons are lower today but still at very high levels with the United States and Russia and increasingly with China.

What's different about this from the Cold War is we in the Cold War had one adversary who was, largely, an autarchical economy not connected to the global economy and, therefore, had some limits on what it could do economically to compete with us and ultimately to compete with us militarily.

We're now dealing with a multiplicity of threats including one in China that has enormous productive capacity and is deeply tied to the international community and economy and is ramified throughout even our own supply chain.

And so I think the complexity of the challenge is greater and the dangers are potentially greater because of that.

Mr. BANKS. I agree with you.

Ms. Harman, do you have anything to add to that?

Ms. HARMAN. Yeah, I would—I do agree with that. I also would add the fact that in this axis of evil or axis of challenge all coun-

tries either have or are acquiring nuclear weapons and we don't have any really satisfactory regime for nonproliferation anymore, and the fact that they will all have weapons and then the—pick the Middle East—other countries will also buy or develop nuclear weapons. It makes the world exponentially more dangerous.

Mr. BANKS. I served in Afghanistan. I understand that we no longer have troops in Afghanistan but do we still have troops in combat zones around the world?

Mr. EDELMAN. As you know, Mr. Banks, we still have some troops in Syria, some troops in Iraq, and we have other people, obviously, serving in the Middle East both at air bases and at sea who are in areas where active combat is underway.

Mr. BANKS. I just want to confirm that because last week Kamala Harris said before the American people that, quote, "Today there is not one member of the U.S. military who is in active duty in a combat zone," and I wonder, to either one of you, why would she say that? Obviously, there are troops in—you just said Syria, Iraq. They receive combat pay. They are serving in a combat zone.

Either one of you, why would she say that?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, she might be thinking about the fact that we ended the wars, for better or worse, in Afghanistan and Iraq and that so there are no active wars engaging the United States. Are there members of the military at risk? I would say there are.

Mr. BANKS. Yeah, absolutely.

Ambassador, you would agree?

Ms. HARMAN. I agree with my colleague.

Mr. BANKS. Yeah. Obviously, either misguided or a very untrue statement.

You both talk about recruitment. It's very important to me. I chair the Military Personnel Subcommittee and the Navy recently claimed that it will meet its recruitment goal in fiscal year 2024 but only after the Navy significantly lowered its recruiting standards and I wonder if you could give us your take on that.

Does lowering our standards—our recruitment standards—make us more or less prepared to compete with China?

Mr. EDELMAN. Mr. Banks, I think it depends on what standard you're talking about. I think before you joined the hearing I mentioned that we have some health standards, for instance, that now go back to people's childhood asthma, for instance, and whether that ought to be a block to service or not I think is a legitimate issue and there are, you know, other issues like that which I think, you know, can be relaxed without damaging readiness.

But, obviously, you never would like to, you know, lower standards if you don't have to. But we are facing a recruitment crisis and I think we have to think creatively about it and make sure that the standards we do have really are appropriate to service and not blocking people who would like otherwise to serve from doing it.

Mr. BANKS. I agree. My time has expired. Thank you.

Mrs. KIGGANS [presiding]. The chair now recognizes Mr. Deluzio for five minutes.

Mr. DELUZIO. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Good morning. Thank you for being here. I appreciate your time and insights.

I want to focus in on Chapter 7, which is about the defense industrial base and defense production, and I know Mr. Garamendi had some questions and others as well.

The opening quote here, I thought, was telling. Quote, “U.S. industrial production is grossly inadequate to provide the equipment, technology, munitions needed today, let alone given the demands of great power conflict.”

One of the pieces I’ll get into, and you can see it here, is on R&D and I thought there was an important finding here, mentioning the triple decline of defense R&D as a share of federal R&D and then federal R&D as a share of total U.S. R&D and U.S. R&D as a share of global R&D.

And my concern, and I guess I will tee up on this consolidation question, is more spending isn’t leading to more R&D investment. We’re seeing while R&D might decline as a share the defense industrial base is spending more on dividends and stock buy backs.

And so my fundamental question and to me, I think, part of this is around consolidation and competition is what are the things that we can do to increase R&D spending without just handing over more dollars?

Ms. HARMAN. One of the things we talked about was the need to lash together the tech industrial base and the defense industrial base because there are huge benefits from that.

The tech industrial base has a better business model. It is risk ready. It is more flexible and innovative. It focuses on software. It’s less expensive in that sense. Not to say we don’t need hardware but we need more software and iterative platforms.

And so as we see it—we talked about this—the budget—the federal budget we’re spending should be viewed as broader across government agencies and investments by the private sector and I think if we did that the percentage of R&D viewed across all of this would not be lower. It would be higher.

Mr. DELUZIO. Ambassador, anything you want to add to that?

Mr. EDELMAN. I think the point you began with, which is the need for more competition, is the key and I think one of the things we found in our own deliberations and met with a number of the nontraditional companies is that we need to figure out how to pull them across the so-called valley of death so that there is more competition.

Many of those startups are actually doing a lot of independent research and development (IRAD). They’re using their own funds to do investment before having gotten a government contract and they are solving some of the problems or trying to solve some of the problems that the department has but is wedded to this requirements-based system we have been talking about this morning.

Mr. DELUZIO. So in the two minutes that I have left—and to be clear your report talks about this problem and the causes of the weak defense industrial base, noting consolidation and reduced competition in the defense industry.

So in the time that’s left I’ll open it up to both of you. What concrete things can we be doing to foster that competition, to break the hold of so few to get that competition that we need across, I think, the whole defense industrial base and the economy as a whole?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, one of the things we have been saying is the procurement process is broken and it is rigid and it is requirements based. It doesn't solve problems. It adds layers to the requirements for systems which makes them more expensive and sets them up for failure both in terms of production and performance.

So you could change that. This committee has tried to do that over time. I was here back in the day when we tried to get smaller firms involved in the process because we thought that would drive innovation. It probably does. We have fewer primes. There has been consolidation. We talked about that.

But I'm not positive—this is maybe my personal opinion—that more primes are the answer. A more robust defense and technology industrial base is the answer.

Mr. EDELMAN. I'm not sure I have anything to add to that.

Mr. DELUZIO. Okay. Very good. With that, I'll yield back. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mrs. KIGGANS. Thank you. The chair now recognizes Mr. Strong for five minutes.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Ambassador Edelman, in the report the Commission stated that the United States needs to, I quote, "enhance missile defense for the homeland and that the DOD must counter new and emerging threats to the homeland," end quote.

You also offered concurrence to the findings from the 2023 report by the congressional Commission on Strategic Posture of the United States.

Do you also share the view that the Strategic Posture Commission report outlined in further detail that the U.S. should assess the feasibility of adapting homeland missile defense to be capable of countering coercion threats specifically from China and Russia?

If yes, what steps would you recommend this committee consider to adopting homeland missile defense for the future?

Mr. EDELMAN. I do agree with the Strategic Posture Commission and I think some of what they had in mind was the potential of cruise missile attacks.

I mean, you know, obviously we're seeing a war of missiles going on both in Ukraine and in the Middle East, and I would go back, Mr. Strong, to what I said earlier.

We cannot allow ourselves to be on the wrong side of the cost imposition curve, developing extremely expensive missile defense systems to intercept either cruise missiles or UAVs.

We have to be moving towards systems that both are software based like the Israelis with Iron Dome and David's Sling where they've been able to develop algorithms that allow them to reduce the cost per shot of missile defense but also microwaves—high-power microwaves and lasers.

Mr. STRONG. I agree. In recent months we have heard calls for an Iron Dome over the United States. This is, largely, in response to Israel's Iron Dome defense system which has successfully defeated countless short-range rockets and artillery since it's been deployed, much thanks to the engineers out of Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama.

Because of the United States' geographical position and size we're, thankfully, unlikely to face short-range rockets and artillery threats like Israel is facing today.

However, the sentiment of protecting the homeland from missile attack remains valid. Fortunately, the U.S. is on track to deliver the next-generation interceptor for a ground-based midcourse defense system in 2028 which will protect the homeland from long-range ballistic missile threats.

Does this Commission support the next-generation interceptor (NGI) program, given its critical role in defending the U.S.?

Mr. EDELMAN. You know, Mr. Strong, we were not briefed on NGI and have not had a chance to consider it. So it's just not something we were, you know, able to look at.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you. As the Commission highlights in your report, the U.S. defense industrial base is fragile. What investments can the U.S. make specifically as it relates to bolstering our ability to support homeland missile defense growth to ensure we are prepared for defending against the growing threats around the world?

Mr. EDELMAN. Sorry. Could you say that again? I missed the last part.

Mr. STRONG. How can we prepare for defending against the growing threats around the world the ability to support homeland missile defense growth?

Mr. EDELMAN. I think that President Putin really has done us a favor because one of the things he's highlighted is not only the fragility of our defense industrial base but in specific the fact that we can only produce so many, for instance, PAC-3 interceptors a year.

It's shown the limitations. We clearly have to expand that production, you know, capability and a lot of that goes to issues we have already discussed this morning—funding for additional PAC-3 but also long-term investment that will lead the contractors to produce more.

Mr. STRONG. I was troubled to learn a federal permitting agency this week testified in Science, Space and Technology that their agency's employees are only working two or three days a week in office.

Are you aware of any study that you're aware of that shows concern of federal workers not working in person and the lack of productivity that is—that this management practice creates? I was very concerned to learn that and I think that that might be part of our industrial base.

We have got to be sure that federal workers are at work. Have you all had any encounters with this?

Ms. HARMAN. We didn't study the issue but I would certainly say that, speaking for me, I'm very concerned about that and I think it lowers productivity and it lowers the ability to learn and be flexible and innovative if workers are not together.

It doesn't mean every minute and there certainly have been challenges across the country after COVID but, nonetheless, the lack of showing up for work is a huge—I think, a huge problem of our readiness.

Mr. STRONG. I concur. It's very concerning to me.

Mrs. KIGGANS. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. STRONG. Mr. Chairman—

Mrs. KIGGANS. The chair now recognizes Ms. Tokuda for five minutes.

Ms. TOKUDA. Thank you, Madam Chair.

First, I want to thank Ms. Harman, Ambassador Edelman, and all of the members of the Commission for their hard work and service in putting this important report together.

You know, you've laid out the challenges and the urgency of action needed here in Congress and the executive branch and, quite frankly, across American society as a whole. So thank you for your work.

And, of course, I also want to echo the sentiments of many of my colleagues and our leadership on the committee today in terms of avoiding a long-term CR that, quite frankly, would be detrimental to our readiness posture. It sends a negative message to both our allies and our adversaries and we need to do better.

So while the Commission's report covered a broad range of issues that we have discussed today I noticed that it did not discuss in detail issues of military installation infrastructure, sustainment, and resiliency.

This is particularly important for me and this committee. Given that we are facing aging infrastructure across the Department of Defense facilities and installations with significant negative impacts on our ability to maintain even basic operational readiness for both our platforms and people, I am concerned that this is not raised in the Commission's report, and this problem is particularly, you know, of issue and evident in Hawaii, which is on the front lines of the Indo-Pacific, as you know.

One small example is Schofield Barracks, a critical Army base on our island in my district that regularly faces power outages almost weekly due to a lack of resiliency in its electrical grid and that's a problem that's going to cost us at least \$202 million to address over the next few years.

Since the Commission's report did not discuss these in detail would either of you like to share additional views or information regarding infrastructure sustainment and resiliency for the committee's consideration and, perhaps, also elaborate.

The Commission calls, as we have talked about today, for significant increases in defense spending to meet its needs and should these increases also include investments in defense infrastructure and installation resilience?

Mr. EDELMAN. Well, on the latter point, I mean, yes. I mean, obviously we need to have functional infrastructure for our forces, you know, wherever they are, and certainly investment in those facilities is important.

We did not really deal with those issues, ma'am, because we really were focused on the strategy and we did not get into, for instance, the issue of base realignment and excess capacity, which the department complains it has to bear.

And there's a long history—everyone on the committee is aware of it—of previous base realignments that were not completely satisfactory, which is, you know, an understandable reason.

But I do think we probably need to take a look to make sure we're using all of our facilities efficiently across the entire enterprise. That's something I'm not sure we have done, really.

Ms. HARMAN. And to add to that, we did have a discussion of base realignment and closure (BRAC)—a sort of cursory discussion of BRAC, which is so far as I know not been reauthorized after it expired. It was a very difficult thing politically for members of Congress, including me, to deal with.

But you raise something that matters and, certainly, the renovation and rehabilitation and—of facilities is crucial, and some of the—in answer to your question about should some of the new funds be spent on that, absolutely yes.

Ms. TOKUDA. And I think, you know—perhaps I did not state my point as clearly—not so much BRAC but the fact that if we want to talk about our strategy, going forward, right now it's based upon, literally, a crumbling foundation when you take a look at the infrastructure that has to house our men, to be able to have to launch off ships or aircraft. Literally, we are looking at billions of dollars in backlog in many particular cases.

So I think we have to focus, yes, on strategy but also the current state of being which, to me, is woefully inadequate and that has to be part of how we even get to ground because right now we're not even at ground in our ability to truly be able to reflect a strong readiness posture whether it's the Pacific or any other theater, and we're talking about multiple theaters.

I did want to touch briefly also about a little bit we have talked about military recruiting and the fact that we need to attract and reinvest in the civilian workforce as well.

As you know, the House version of the fiscal year '25 defense appropriation bill cuts over \$916 million from the President's budget request for civilian workforce.

The President's budget also departs from the long-standing practice to mean parity between military service members and federal employees. And I do worry—I know my time is running out—that if enacted it's going to push us in the wrong direction in terms of truly recruiting and retaining the very best.

But I will ask one question. As part of this whole of government approach you've said we have had to include education. We have members of this committee and the Congress who've suggested we eliminate the Department of Education. Do you think this would be detrimental to national security, yes or no?

Ms. HARMAN. I think the Department of Education, which was set up when I was working in the—I think the Carter administration does valuable work.

Ms. TOKUDA. Okay. Ambassador?

Mr. EDELMAN. I concur.

Ms. TOKUDA. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. The gentlelady's time has expired.

The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Alabama Ms. Sewell for questions.

Ms. SEWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the congresswoman and the ambassador and your colleagues for the hard work that the Commission did.

Now more than ever we must ensure that our policies and our practices and our spending are strategic and they—strategically aligned to keep us ahead of our adversaries as well as to keep us safe.

My question has to do with the role of space in our defense strategy. Space is already playing a big role in national security and it will only continue to do so.

The Commission credited the DOD with moving rapidly and standing up our Space Force and you also mentioned that we need to do a better job of incorporating new cyber and space technologies at scale.

How can we use lessons learned in deploying Space Force to ensure that we're making efficient decisions and investments in space technology to combat the future?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I'm sure Ambassador Edelman wants to answer this too, but space is a critical domain. Most of our communications that power our military are space based and the U.S. is more dependent on space militarily, I think, and more vulnerable in space militarily than any other country. So we have to get it right.

The interesting thing about Space Force—and I know there was some fight in setting it up and a lot of resistance—

Ms. SEWELL. Just a little bit.

Ms. HARMAN. —is that it's new and so it didn't—it hasn't grown the barnacles that other parts of the Pentagon have and it is more innovative, and I think a challenge will be to keep it that way and have it not revert to the—you know, the age-old bureaucratic practices.

And I just would say from the meetings that we had that the work done by Space Force and the role that it will play in the future are absolutely crucial.

Ms. SEWELL. Ambassador?

Mr. EDELMAN. I would—no, I would just add that I think in our meetings with Space Force and Space Command I think we were extremely impressed with the rapidity with which they've stood up and the good work they're doing for all the reasons my colleague specified, and I think that's a tribute to many of the folks on this committee who worked so hard to make this happen.

Ms. SEWELL. Great. One important takeaway from the Commission is Congress and DEO's—the Defense Department's role in shifting risk adverse culture into one that is agile and responsive.

The Commission's summary states that the U.S. must build the future force, not perpetuate the existing one. What is your top recommendation to Congress that will help DOD make that shift more swiftly?

In some ways I'm asking how can we create a culture of risk tolerance?

Ms. HARMAN. We talked about this earlier in this hearing and talked about the industrial base or the business model of the tech community, which is much better suited to the future challenges in meeting security needs.

It's risk ready. It is innovative. It is software based. It is much more flexible, in contrast to the Pentagon, and the goal would be to introduce at scale more innovative programs in the Pentagon

and to lash the Pentagon up closely with the tech sector, and that's why we talk about all elements of national power.

Power is not just DOD. It is DOD plus other agencies of government plus the tech sector plus allies and partners.

Mr. EDELMAN. I think particularly in a time of rapidly evolving technologies we have to have a little bit more tolerance for failure and that's a hard thing because, you know, when there's a failure it lands on your desk and your constituents expect you to call the people who failed in front of you, et cetera.

And oversight is important. I don't mean to in any way diminish that. But there also has to be a recognition that from time to time we're going to make efforts that are going to fail and that's part of the learning process and that we—you know, we'll move on from that to, hopefully, something that will succeed.

But if we, you know, continually penalize everybody who takes a risk you're not going to get many risk takers.

Ms. SEWELL. Yes. A point of personal privilege before I yield back my time.

I just wanted to say to Congresswoman Harman as one of the first black women to be on the Intelligence Committee your precedent—the precedent you set of excellence is something that I just want to commend you on and to thank you for future women that serve on the Intel Committee.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady yields back.

And I can assure you that when it comes to bureaucratic creep getting into the Space Force I'm on a mission from God to keep that from happening.

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas Mr. Fallon.

Mr. FALLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, in the findings—and I want to thank you all both for your service and your contributions here to—for our republic—I do agree that we need a larger military budget, of course.

We need more innovation. We need to reform and streamline our acquisitions process, and I'd also add probably with the DOD selling and exporting the appropriate weaponry—more appropriate weaponry and technology to our allies would be something when we're talking about budgets that would be a good way to mitigate to some degree.

But I want to share a quote that I just love from Secretary of Defense—former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and he said, I quote, “When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements since Vietnam our record has been perfect. We have got it wrong every time.”

And when you when you look at it—and I'm concerned, of course, what our military and Congress what we're not anticipating, what we're not seeing. I think Ukraine has been—opened our eyes over the last two and a half years.

The safest place you could be 20 years ago on the battlefield was a main battle tank and now that's probably the last place you'd want to be if you had your choice.

And, of course, we need to deter the Chinese Communist Party and its futures—if history is any indicator we’re going to be preparing and deterring that and the next conflict won’t be in that theater. So we have to kind of almost prepare for the unpredictable.

And there’s no doubt that China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea and around the world deserve an immense amount of attention from us and I think they’re getting it because we want to deter that conflict. It’s always better to prevent something rather than having to react to it.

But, nevertheless, we have to examine the globe as a whole and when you look at US Central Command (CENTCOM) and what Iran is doing, unfortunately, this administration wasn’t enforcing the sanctions up to par that it could have and you see them grow their oil exports by \$35 billion, and you can export a lot more mischief and mayhem with that kind of money—with that additional kind of funds.

And so I’d argue as well in Afghanistan and that disastrous pull-out when we left billions of dollars there that certainly opened up and greenlighted Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other terrorist organizations as well.

So what I wanted to ask you both, and if you want to go ladies first to Representative Harman, where are we not properly resourced and focused, in your opinion, in the world to deter conflict and what are our blind spots?

Ms. HARMAN. It’s probably a more complicated answer but I would say we’re not adequately focused on Africa and Latin America. We met with the heads of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Southern Command, both of whom talked about the expanding presence of China in particular in both continents, and I remember that the commander of Southern Command said that at least five countries in Latin America have no confirmed ambassadors and that they view this as an insult.

But it is, obviously, more complicated. We need to have military installations as well as, you know, economic relationships with these countries and we need not to think about what we sometimes call the Global South, which is an insult, as they see it, as an afterthought.

And I do think this administration has made some efforts, as did the Bush administration, with the Millennium Challenge grants in Africa and so forth to reach for Africa.

I think Latin America may be but, you know, you look at things like Venezuela and there’s some huge backward motion in some of these countries which could develop into threats against us and we really have to be, I think, much more sensitive to the fact that a huge part of the world is not our first thought when we think about the security of the world.

Mr. FALLON. Thank you. You are right, too. Just being on CODELS, when countries don’t have an ambassador they do—they want an ambassador of the United States there.

Ambassador?

Mr. EDELMAN. I very much agree with what our chairman has just said about what we heard from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM and the neglect.

I would say two things that I think, one of which you've already adverted to, which is Iran. I do think that whoever wins the election in November one of the first issues on their plate is going to be an Iran that is approaching the nuclear threshold very quickly and this is something that presidents of both parties going back 35 years have said we will not let happen and we need to really, I think, determine whether we're going to let it happen or not and what that entails.

The other thing I would say that we may not be looking at enough is some threats that President Putin has made about putting weapons near the United States in countries that may not wish us well, whether that's Venezuela or somewhere else and, you know, I think we live in a kind of post Cuban missile crisis world where we don't think about this happening again.

But I don't rule out that it could happen again.

Mr. FALLON. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCormick of Georgia is recognized.

Dr. MCCORMICK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm going to split this evenly between the two of you because I have germane questions for both.

We just returned from an amazing field hearing in California that relates back to this question and I'll address this to you, Ambassador.

The Commission's report recently described how insufficient our Defense Industrial Base capacity is for meeting the large-scale requirements we have in conflict. This has, obviously, been exposed by what we're facing in Ukraine but also in our inability to deliver for AUKUS agreements, our inability to supply for paid for items from both Taiwan and Israel.

So basically all the conflicts we could possibly face we're under supplying for and I find it especially concerning that I'm seeing foreign countries who have the exact same challenges we do reacting far more nimbly than we are.

How did we, the United States of America, fall so far behind in our ability to ramp up when we are known historically for being the best at that?

I would suggest maybe our regulation and our government burdensome tactics that we go after contracting and production, or maybe a mistrust of the industry to the government in the way we buy.

But can you tell me what you think is the reason that we are so slow in responding to essentially a wartime need?

Mr. EDELMAN. Representative McCormick, we have discussed some of this earlier before you were able to join and a lot of this, I think, has to do with the shrinkage of the Defense Industrial Base after the end of the Cold War, so a lack of competition.

It's also, I think—I mean, it's a very complex issue because I think it also goes to changes in the way industry operates in a move to just in time inventories, reliance on supply chains that, you know, the primes sometimes don't even know where their weaknesses are in the supply chain.

So there are a raft of different issues. I'm sure regulation is part of it. But in particular what we have been discussing this morning is the requirements heavy system that the Pentagon has for pro-

curement which, as we were saying earlier, allows people to levy more and more requirements and no one can take them off, and it makes for a not very agile, not very flexible—

Dr. MCCORMICK. So that's the difference between us and other nations. Is that correct?

Mr. EDELMAN. It's one of them.

Dr. MCCORMICK. Okay. Yeah. So I—

Mr. EDELMAN. We're not a command economy as the other. I mean, the government can't force industry to do certain things so you don't have, for instance, what the Chinese have with so-called civil-military fusion.

Dr. MCCORMICK. I'm referring more to countries more like-minded to us—Finland, even Ukraine—that have somehow or another turned the corner. Now, granted, maybe they have a little—

Ms. HARMAN. Ukraine is a great example of a country coping with an existential crisis very effectively and producing weapons at scale for them that are much less—much more effective and less expensive than anything we can produce.

Dr. MCCORMICK. And I suggest that when there's a will there's a way. We just need to find our will.

And a segue to you. Thank you for being here, by the way. I really appreciate it.

The Commission also reported that we're "falling short," quote/unquote, of exercising what the National Defense Strategy calls integrated deterrence, when all elements of our national power work together towards a national security objective.

And I happen to be very good friends with AFRICOM's commanding officer or commanding - CINC (Commander-in-Chief) commander, if you will, General Langley, and one thing he talks about is US aid and how it affects the overall projected power, how we have—obviously, we have tens of thousands of people deployed throughout the world but I'm especially concerned with the way that we're not maybe working together with the State Department and the DOD in an integrated fashion to accomplish our mission, which is really essential, especially in areas like that where we're undermanned.

Ms. HARMAN. We totally agree with you and that's why our recommendation is we have to move away from a defense-centric model focused on security to an all aspects of national security model which includes the State Department, AID (US Agency for International Development), other government agencies—lots of other government agencies like the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department—lashed up with the tech sector, lashed up with partners and allies.

That's what China does against us. I mean, they have a whole of world strategy and Belt and Road is part of their strategy.

By the way, I don't know when I will remember to do this but I do want to commend the other members of our Commission. Two of them are sitting right here, Mariah Sixkiller and Roger.

Dr. MCCORMICK. I'm about to lose my time.

Ms. HARMAN. Okay.

Dr. MCCORMICK. So I'll let you do your thank you at the conclusion. But the—what I would suggest is that we do have more com-

prehensive—we used to and we have been replaced by China and their—

Ms. HARMAN. But we thought we were the sole superpower after the Cold War ended and we weren't, and Roger Zackheim and Mariah are enormous contributors to the Commission as are the other four commissioners who are not here and who made a valuable contribution.

Dr. MCCORMICK. Thank you. With that, I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman Mr. Higgins from Louisiana.

Mr. HIGGINS. I thank the chairman and Ranking Member Smith. It's an honor to be able to sit with you here today as the newest member the House Armed Services Committee and it's a great honor to yield a moment to Congresswoman Harman.

Representative Harman, go ahead and introduce your people that are here from the Commission that have not been recognized.

Ms. HARMAN. Well, it's very nice of you, sir. I sat in the bottom row for a while when I was a new member of the committee. So it's an opportunity. You're closer to the witness table.

But Mariah Sixkiller served for years here as the security advisor to Steny Hoyer, which is when I got to know her, and Roger Zakheim runs the Reagan Institute and also served here, I think, on this committee as a staffer, I guess, back in the good old days. I'm not sure exactly what years.

And we should mention that there are two staffers here too. David Grannis is our staff director. He originally worked for me—imagine that—but ultimately was chief of staff to the late great Dianne Feinstein, and Rafi Cohen is at RAND and you worked here, too?

No, he never worked here. He's the only one, unfortunately, who didn't have the privilege of working here.

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, ma'am. I'm grateful you gave me the opportunity for you to be allowed to recognize those folks. We thank you for your work.

Let me jump into some of the work that you did, Representative Harman. You mentioned a couple of things reflective of the culture of the military—I'm an Army veteran—that has impacted recruiting.

And I'm 63 years old. I joined the Army in '89 so from a little bit different era. But you mentioned the absence of civics education, an absence of an understanding of what patriotism is in our institutions.

You said, quote, "Sometimes our worst enemy is us." I have, in research from other committees, the Oversight Committee particularly—my research showed that historically the southern states have regularly provided—eight of the southern states have regularly provided about 70 percent of enlisted personnel to our military and the challenges we're facing currently for recruiting specifically in the Army, which I can relate to, seem to reflect the change of the direction of training as it relates to cultural—sort of the cultural narrative of the country being pushed into training within the confines of DOD.

These soldiers were referred to by one scholar as Bible Belt soldiers or traditional American family values families and those families have begun encouraging their children to refrain from joining.

So how did your Commission get your head wrapped around that dynamic and what would your comments be on that?

Ms. HARMAN. It's a tough issue and it doesn't just apply to military recruiting. It applies to American society writ large and our schools around the country.

I think the lack of civic education—this is something we did talk about, and we also talked about whether national service might be a good antidote to this—but the lack of civic education, the lack of understanding the underpinnings of our country are causing, you know, amazing amounts of disillusionment and anger across our society.

And when we said, you know, one of the enemies is us it's true. It's playing out that way and it hurts. It certainly hurts me as someone who grew up in a different America but it also hurts America's standing in the world.

I mean, I was just in Iraq last week with a number of leaders of a variety of countries and places, all of whom are asking, what's going on in America—what's wrong with you? And that is a really dangerous situation to be in in terms of readiness and security.

Mr. HIGGINS. Ambassador, should the Pentagon back up from trying to raise cultural warriors and focus on raising the most training and the most lethal Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps that we can?

Mr. EDELMAN. Obviously, I think that's what the core of military training needs to be about. I think the declining propensity to serve is a very complex issue.

I mean, I think some of the cultural issues you raise, you know, may well play a role in it but I think there's been a larger depiction of, you know, recent veterans and their struggles with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other issues that have combined to create an atmosphere in which people are less likely, as you say, to recommend service to people they know, people who are influential in the community, less likely to recommend it to young people that they may be mentoring, and I think that's a huge challenge we have to deal with.

Mr. HIGGINS. Well, thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your insight.

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I yield, and thank you for allowing me to serve on your committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Higgins. We are honored to have you here.

And I just want you to know this has been a very impressive panel. This is a very powerful report that you all have put together, and as we go into next year, you know, we have got some work, as you all have made reference to, to wrap this year up.

But the report that you all have yielded is going to be a point of reference that we will be using for the next year to try to get us on the path to a more responsible level of activity in this country to defend ourselves.

So thank you very much for your service. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 18, 2024

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 18, 2024

**Statement of Chair Harman and Vice Chair Edelman
Commission on the National Defense Strategy
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee
September 18, 2024**

Jane Harman

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the House Armed Services Committee – it is good to see many former colleagues and be back at HASC where I served from 1993 to 1999. This Committee, like HPSCI where I also had the honor of serving, has enormous responsibility and an increasingly rare record of bipartisanship.

I am very pleased to be joined by Vice Chairman Eric Edelman to present the bipartisan, unanimous report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy. After releasing it in late July, we are now focused on implementing the recommendations. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the report today.

As you know, Congress created our Commission to review the 2022 National Defense Strategy (or NDS) and offer a clear-eyed, independent view. It has been a pleasure to serve with Eric and the other six commissioners, appointed by the leaders on both sides of the aisle of the Senate, the House, and the two Armed Services Committees.

Our Commission believes unanimously that the National Defense Strategy is woefully out of date. It was written by early 2022, before

Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China and Russia's strategic partnership, and HAMAS' horrific attack on Israel last October 7.

As Ambassador Edelman will detail, the threats to our national security have been mounting for two decades and are greater now than at any time since the height of the Cold War, if not World War II.

Our basic message is this: Significant and urgent action is needed, but for years our government has failed to keep up. Our entire system, and the Pentagon in particular, are risk averse and slow to act. In my opinion, the change needed will only happen through the bold, bipartisan leadership of this Committee and your Senate counterpart.

Our report includes actionable recommendations, including one that you are implementing with today's hearing: better informing the American public. Their support is critical to implement the changes we need to make. Leaders across government need to make the case to the public and get their buy-in now, before the next Pearl Harbor or 9/11.

Unfortunately, another of our recommendations – and the single top request from the Department of Defense – will not be achieved in two weeks when the Congress fails to pass on-time appropriation bills and places DoD and the rest of government under a CR for the 15th year of the past 16. We understand that several of you strongly opposed a six-month CR last week and we agree that tying DoD's hands for that long would be catastrophic to our national security.

Eric Edelman

Several of our Commissioners served on the 2018 NDS Commission. In fact, General Jack Keane and I served in the 2010 Commission, which said that we were facing a train wreck as threats were gathering and U.S. defense spending was decreasing. In 2014, the Commission found that the Budget Control Act had been a strategic misstep and needed to be undone. In 2018, we warned that the United States was losing its decisive military edge.

Six years later, the threats are more serious and we as a nation have failed to keep pace. There is potential for near-term war, and potential that we might lose such a conflict.

The partnership between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is a major shift in the strategic environment. It makes each of those countries stronger militarily, economically, and diplomatically and weakens our tools to deal with them. And it makes it more likely that a future conflict would expand across theaters. We could find ourselves in a global war on the scale of World War II.

The force construct that the NDS proposes to meet this challenge – essentially a one-theater military with additional resources to deter aggression elsewhere – is inadequate. There are wars in two of the priority theaters already and substantial threat for a third with China.

The 2022 defense strategy identifies China as “the pacing challenge.” We find China is in some ways *outpacing* the United States. The U.S. still has the world’s strongest military with the farthest global reach. But when we get within 1,000 miles of China’s shore, we start losing military dominance and could find ourselves on a losing side of a conflict.

In addition to its growing and modernized conventional and strategic forces, China has infiltrated U.S. critical infrastructure networks to prevent or deter us from engaging against it. China is likely able to contest our logistics, disrupt power and water at home, and otherwise remove the sanctuary of the U.S. homeland that we have long enjoyed. The public is not aware of the consequences of an attack at home – and the U.S. Government is not at present prepared to stop it.

Our report also describes the threats posed by a reconstituted Russia and what Vladimir Putin seeks to do beyond Ukraine, and the threats from emboldened leaders in Iran and North Korea. ISIS and its affiliates along with other terrorist groups remain a potent and increasing threat, capable of launching large-scale external attacks.

We share the goal, unanimously as a Commission, of the NDS of deterring major war but we have serious doubts whether the smallest force in decades and an insufficient industrial base can deter increasingly capable and cooperating competitors and adversaries.

We recommend a multi-theater force construct, better use of commercial technology, and strategic investments to restore the U.S. edge.

Jane Harman

Mr. Chairman, rather than read into the record our findings and recommendations, let me return briefly to an earlier comment: this Committee, as well as your Senate counterpart, is critical in reversing the trends that Vice Chairman Edelman just described. Let me give you a few examples.

1. As you know, the Executive Branch is severely stovepiped. The National Defense Strategy itself is, by law, authored by the Secretary of Defense and focuses internally on DoD. We credit Secretary Austin with prioritizing “integrated deterrence” in the 2022 NDS, but DoD simply can’t make the rest of the bureaucracy focus on great power competition.

Congress is stovepiped as well but you all sit on other committees and can work across the House in support of an integrated national security strategy, across government and with the private sector.

2. The same stovepiping happens on appropriations. We can’t keep pitting defense spending against non-defense spending as if the Departments of State, DHS, Treasury, and even Education and Labor don’t contribute to our national defense. The Commission recommends that spending be increased across all elements of national security.


We unanimously recommend returning to the levels of spending on national defense, proportionally, as we did in the Cold War. We also call for paying for it through higher tax rates and reforms to entitlements – I know it is easier for us to say that than you, but if we are going to get serious about deterring and winning wars on the scale of the Cold War, this is necessary.

3. We also implore the 59 members of this Committee to work with your colleagues to stop relying on continuing resolutions and let the government function. You understand the harm that these CRs do, and how they cause the United States to fall behind our adversaries.
4. Finally, from your oversight you know full well that getting things done quickly at DoD is almost impossible. We support programs like the Defense Innovation Unit, the Office of Strategic Capital, and Replicator – but these are specifically designed as end-runs around the normal Pentagon model. The culture and the regulations at the Pentagon are a major impediment to readiness and warfighting. You need to drive change.

Ukraine and Russia are innovating on the battlefield on the scale of weeks, not years. China can build more ships and nuclear weapons in a year than we can in a decade. If DoD can't move at speed and scale, it will lose. That isn't the culture there – and this Committee needs to help the Secretary and Deputy address it.

I have sat where you are now, so I understand the incentives to maintain legacy programs in your district or putting something in the NDAA that you can run on. I get it. But in the Commission's view, we need to be approaching national security as if we could go to war at any time – and doing everything possible to get ready now.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee, thank you again for your role in establishing our Commission and inviting us to share our report with you. We welcome the opportunity to answer your questions.

Jane Harman**Chair, Commission on the National Defense Strategy**

Jane Harman served nine terms in Congress as the U.S. representative for California's 36th congressional district and was ranking member of the Intelligence Committee after 9/11. After leaving the House in 2011, she was the first woman president and CEO of the Wilson Center until 2021. She has served on numerous government advisory boards (Central Intelligence Agency, Director of National Intelligence, DOD, and State Department) and is a member of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board and the NASA and DHS advisory councils. She chairs the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, co-chairs the Board of Freedom House, and is a member of the Aspen Strategy Group, the Munich Security Conference Executive Committee, and the Board of Governors of the National Intelligence University. Harman's book, "Insanity Defense: Why Our Failure to Confront Hard National Security Problems Makes Us Less Safe," was published by St. Martin's Press in 2021.

Ambassador Eric Edelman**Vice Chair, Commission on the National Defense Strategy**

Ambassador Eric S. Edelman retired as a Career Minister from the U.S. Foreign Service on May 1, 2009. He has been a Practitioner in Residence at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. He cochaired the National Defense Strategy Commission, 2017–2018.

Ambassador Edelman served as U.S. Ambassador to Finland and the Republic of Turkey in the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations and was Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs. From 2005 to 2009, he was the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In other assignments, he served as Chief of Staff to the Deputy Secretary of State, special assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and special assistant to Secretary of State George Shultz. He also served in the State Department Operations Center, Prague, Moscow, and Tel Aviv, where he was a member of the U.S. Middle East Delegation to the West Bank/Gaza Autonomy Talks.

He has been awarded the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the Presidential Distinguished Service Award, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award, and several Department of State Superior Honor Awards. In January 2011, he was awarded the Legion d'Honneur by the French government. He holds a B.A. from Cornell University and a Ph.D. in Diplomatic History from Yale.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

SEPTEMBER 18, 2024

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. DAVIS

Mr. DAVIS. In general, do you agree that divesting aircraft and other weapon systems without having newer, upgraded ones ready to go in advance creates a potential national security vulnerability?

Ms. HARMAN. We recognize that there is a tradeoff between divesting existing military programs, which may contribute to a short-term reduction in available platforms and other equipment, and the longer-term need to re-allocate funds to modernize the Joint Force. In general, we recommend a broader distribution of weapons systems that includes the high-end, exquisite capabilities that the Department and Congress prioritize today, but that also includes much greater development and use of less-costly, more numerous systems that reflect the needs of near-peer competitors and protracted conflict.

The Commission's report makes several recommendations to spend taxpayer dollars more effectively and efficiently through reforms to budgeting, R&D, technology adaptation, and acquisition systems but also on buying a different set of capabilities. Reducing spending on systems no longer relevant for the strategic environment is necessary to afford the other investments needed. Ultimately, we believe that spending smarter will have to be accompanied by spending more to acquire the numbers and types of weapon systems required to deter and, if necessary, prevail in combat.

Mr. DAVIS. Considering often budgetary constraints, what should be the long-term factors driving divestment decisions?

Ms. HARMAN. Ultimately, the long-term factors include what programs and equipment will be best suited to warfighting needs given the strategic environment we face. Our Commission believes that the days of uncontested military dominance are over and that the Joint Force will need large numbers of systems, making better use of software updates, working jointly across services and with our allies. Programs that do not meet those needs, or that remain vulnerable to destruction or disruption despite large costs, should be divested.

The Commission also recognizes that the Department of Defense and Congress face disincentives to divesting from existing programs. We recommend that where possible, ending existing programs be paired with creating or expanding other opportunities, to include workforce education and other traditional or non-traditional national security procurement.

Mr. DAVIS. How might Congress collaborate with communities to address workforce needs, especially with the essential industries connected to our national security?

Ms. HARMAN. As described in our final report, we found that there are significant and serious needs in the national security workforces across the U.S. military, the civilian parts of government, and in the defense industrial base. These shortcomings have many causes, but we recommend the following measures:

Improved education and fitness. According to a 2020 Department of Defense, only 23% of U.S. youth meet the eligibility requirements for military service (roughly half of that eligible group were enrolled in college). While the Services have had notable successes with short-term programs to help interested young men and women meet eligibility standards and subsequently enlist, these figures are an indictment of our education and public health system.

Promoting service. We believe that Congress can and should play a larger role in promoting national security service, whether military or civilian, including in defense-related industries. This includes better informing the public of the threats to our national interests and importance of service as well as policies and laws that encourage and enable such service.

Training. We heard from Defense and private sector representatives that the defense industrial base needs both personnel with advanced degrees as well as training in trade work, but there is a shortage in the latter. For decades, U.S. society has promoted college education and diminished the value of skilled trade labor. We recommend that Congress review ways to promote such training, including through grants, contributing to pay for necessary work in certain locations (e.g., necessary trades work in the Sentinel program), and perhaps considering naturalization path-

ways for work in the defense industry as is available following service in the military.

Mr. DAVIS. Can you speak to how the supplemental assistance Congress provided earlier this year to Ukraine, Israel, and our other allies, helps address our industrial base shortfalls here at home?

Ms. HARMAN. The April 2024 supplemental appropriations bill provided critical funding for the security of U.S. allies and partners Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan and made a necessary though not sufficient investment of \$3 billion to expand the capacity of the U.S. submarine industrial base. A majority of the supplemental funding for military weapons and equipment will be spent in the United States in ways that strengthen our defense industrial base, either by funding production of new equipment going to our allies or to produce new equipment to backfill U.S. stocks sent overseas.

We devote an entire chapter of our final report to the shortcomings and recommendations for the U.S. defense industrial base, which is not presently capable of producing the weapons, platforms, equipment, and software needed to prepare for the multiple challenges we face. (We separately discuss the need to broaden our production from the traditional DIB to a broader segment of the U.S. private sector, including the highly innovate tech sector.) The April 2024 supplemental meets several of our Commission's recommendations, including by providing stable funding for companies, investing in additional production infrastructure, and modernizing U.S. stocks of defense goods.

Mr. DAVIS. How might Congress collaborate with communities to address workforce needs, especially with the essential industries connected to our national security?

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