[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-62]
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 20, 2024
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-566 WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eighteenth Congress
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
Chair RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi ANDY KIM, New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MATT GAETZ, Florida ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
DON BACON, Nebraska MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
JIM BANKS, Indiana VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida SARA JACOBS, California
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
RONNY JACKSON, Texas PATRICK RYAN, New York
PAT FALLON, Texas JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
NANCY MACE, South Carolina CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO,
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota Pennsylvania
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
NICK LaLOTA, New York TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
MARK ALFORD, Missouri JIMMY PANETTA, California
CORY MILLS, Florida MARC VEASEY, Texas
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia
LANCE GOODEN, Texas
Chris Vieson, Staff Director
Mark Morehouse, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Taylor Burns, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Aquilino, ADM John C., USN, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. 6
LaCamera, GEN Paul, USA, Commander, United Nations Command, ROK-
U.S. Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea................ 7
Ratner, Dr. Ely S., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-
Pacific Security Affairs....................................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Aquilino, ADM John C......................................... 61
LaCamera, GEN Paul........................................... 107
Ratner, Dr. Ely S............................................ 51
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Wilson................................................... 123
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 123
Mr. Scott.................................................... 124
Mr. Bergman.................................................. 127
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 127
Mr. Gimenez.................................................. 129
Mr. LaLota................................................... 130
Mr. Mills.................................................... 130
Dr. McCormick................................................ 131
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 20, 2024.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:14 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [chairman
of the committee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The meeting will come to order. Today, we
will continue our posture hearings with INDOPACOM (United
States Indo-Pacific Command) and U.S. Forces Korea.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here and their
service to our Nation. Gentlemen, you can be seated.
The Indo-Pacific has some of our Nation's greatest threats.
In North Korea, we have a madman who would rather build an
illegal nuclear arsenal than feed his own starving people. Late
last year, Kim Jong Un declared he was abandoning the
longstanding policy of achieving unification with South Korea.
He announced that South Korea is now ``a hostile country'' and
that North Korea can legally annihilate them.
Alarmingly, he backed up this hyperbole by testing new
nuclear-capable missile technology. The test included a
strategic cruise missile, a submarine-launched cruise missile,
and a solid fuel ballistic missile with maneuverable reentry
vehicle. Each of these missiles were designed to disrupt our
ability to detect them and to evade our missile defenses.
I'm very concerned that the advances in Kim's missile
technology is the result of a strengthening alliance with
Vladimir Putin. Since August, North Korea has shipped millions
of artillery shells, rockets, and ballistic missiles to Russia,
while Russia supplies energy back to North Korea.
Putin is testing missiles on the battlefield of Ukraine
with deadly effect. And Kim is using this firsthand knowledge
to improve his missile technology and tactics -- something he
will rely on if war erupts on the Korean Peninsula.
But Kim is not the only Asian ally Putin has cultivated to
support his illegal invasion of Ukraine. Shortly after the
invasion, Putin and President Xi entered into a, quote, ``no
limits,'' close quote, partnership.
And while China has not yet provided weapons to Russia, Xi
is providing Putin with critical economic and security
assistance. This includes dual-use materials and components for
weapons. Xi can afford to do so because he continues to invest
heavily on building a modern military.
Earlier this month, the PRC (People's Republic of China)
announced it was raising its defense budget by 7.2 percent in
2024. It is the third year in a row in which China has
increased defense spending by 7 percent or more. This
unprecedented level of defense spending is paying off. The PLA
(People's Liberation Army) is building modern military systems
like hypersonic weapons and fifth generation fighters. They can
project power well into the Pacific with a 340-ship navy that
includes a new aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered ballistic
missiles submarines.
They have improved their ability to conduct joint
operations with more realistic exercises and new AI-driven
technologies that will shorten the kill chain. And they are
building a modern nuclear arsenal at a dizzying rate.
China's extraordinary military buildup is certainly
concerning, but what is most alarming is the increasingly
provocative actions Xi has taken in recent years, such as:
pushing out China's borders with new defense agreements and
military bases on foreign nations; threatening our allies in
the region with reckless ship and aircraft intercepts, and
attempting to coerce Taiwan with military exercises and near
daily airspace incursions simulating an invasion of the island.
We have no choice but to take Xi's threats seriously, and
we have to be resolute in our response. We need to accelerate
our own military modernization. We need to enhance training and
readiness in the region, and we need to better distribute
logistics throughout the Pacific.
But we won't prevail in any conflict with the CCP(Chinese
Communist Party) on our own. We need to expand and strengthen
our partnerships in the region. We need to better arm our
allies with agreements like AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom,
and the United States), and we need to expedite the delivery of
arms and training to Taiwan, so they can better defend their
democracy.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on their
assessment of the threats and what support they will need from
this committee to deter them.
And with that, I yield to the ranking member for any
opening statement he may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity and I appreciate your opening statement.
I want to thank our witnesses, in particular, Admiral
Aquilino. I believe this will be your last time before us in a
posture hearing, as change of command is coming up soon. You
have been a tremendous partner, great to work with, certainly,
on the committee, and for those of us who have visited the
region, we can see the incredible work you are doing to advance
U.S. interests. We really appreciate that.
I understand it might also be General LaCamera's last
appearance, depending on how the change of command goes. It
could be a little unpredictable around here, as we have all
learned in the last year. But really appreciate all of your
service to our country.
And I want to really emphasize sort of one of the points of
the chairman's statement. And that is, North Korea, China,
Russia, and how our adversaries are beginning to more and more
align.
The Indo-Pacific is an incredibly important region. We have
had this ongoing debate about what is the No. 1 priority in the
pivot to Asia, and a whole bunch of other debates. What I hope
we all recognize is how interconnected it all is at this point.
Sadly -- and we can throw Iran and other terrorist
organizations like Hamas into that equation -- they are
beginning to coordinate to try to thwart our role in the world
and advance their very, very troubling agenda for the world.
As we have seen what Russia has done in Ukraine; we have
seen what Iran has done throughout the Middle East; we have
seen the things that the chairman just mentioned about China
and North Korea, it is all interconnected, but, certainly, the
Indo-Pacific region is one of the central parts of this focus.
And that focus is to deter our adversaries, and in that part of
the world, that is China and North Korea.
I think we have made a lot of advancements just in the last
year or two in working with partners in the region to be able
to deter those adversaries. And I want to just start there and
make a couple of comments about that before shifting,
specifically, to the United States.
Those partnerships are crucial. We are not going to be able
to deter that alliance that I just described on our own. We
will need partners and allies in the world, and building up
those partnerships is crucial.
Certainly, you know, helping build up the capability of
Taiwan to directly deter China is crucial. Building up South
Korea, but, also, so many other partners in the region. The
work that has been done to bring Japan and South Korea closer
together, working together, has been incredibly important in
the last year; the role that Australia is playing; the AUKUS
agreement that we reached with them; the Quad, working with
Australia, Japan, India, along with us; the work that has been
done just in the last year to improve so much our relations
with the Philippines that have become part of that. Those
partnerships and alliances are going to be crucial to deterring
China.
And it is a very clear vision. We want a rules-based
international order. It is not perfect. It is not always going
to work out exactly right, but there is some structure to it.
China right now -- and I mean to add up the number of
countries -- but it is somewhere between six and 12 countries
in which China claims territory that is now the sovereign
territory of other nations. It is not just Taiwan. Ironically,
one of those countries is Russia. It will be interesting to see
how they work that out in the future.
But China, basically, wants to bully their way across the
globe without any respect for any rules. We need to work with
all those countries in the world that understand what a threat
that is -- not just to U.S. interests, but to global interests.
On our specific efforts, I know Admiral Aquilino has
submitted an unfunded requirements list that has talked about
some of the other capabilities he needs. But from our
witnesses, I would be really interested to hear the
capabilities that we most need to build up to make sure that
the United States is playing its role, but, then, also, linking
those capabilities to what our partners can potentially bring
to that, to that deterrent capability as well.
So, the really interesting part of the world. I look
forward to the testimony from the witnesses. Again, I thank
them all for their service, and I thank the chairman for
holding this hearing.
And I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the ranking member.
I would like to introduce our witnesses. First, we have the
Honorable Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-
Pacific Security Affairs; Admiral John Aquilino, U.S.
Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command.
And it is going to be your last time testifying. Your
service to our country has been admirable and we are going to
miss you. I don't think you are going to miss us, but we are
going to miss you.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. General LaCamera is the Commander, United
States -- or United Nations Command, Korea and U.S. Combined
Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea.
Also, you have done a great service to our Nation, and I
appreciate you, and I hope this is not your last time before
us.
But we will start with Dr. Ratner. You are recognized for
five minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. ELY S. RATNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Ratner. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me to testify today about how the Department of Defense is
strengthening peace, stability, and deterrence across the Indo-
Pacific region.
I'm pleased to be joined today by Admiral Aquilino and
General LaCamera for what will likely mark our last time
sharing a witness table together. And I want to thank both of
my colleagues for their years of military service to the United
States, including as we have worked together closely these past
three years.
Mr. Chairman, in 2022, the National Defense Strategy
identified the People's Republic of China as the Department's
top pacing challenge. Since then, Russia's lawless war in
Ukraine has continued into its third year; we have seen an
outbreak of instability across the Middle East, and the DPRK
continues to engage in destabilizing behavior.
At the same time, the Department's fundamental assessment
of the PRC has not changed. The PRC continues to present the
most comprehensive and serious challenge to our national
security. That is because the PRC remains the only country with
the will, and increasingly the capability, to dominate the
Indo-Pacific region and displace the United States.
Today, the PRC is pursuing its revisionist goals with
increasingly coercive activities in the Taiwan Strait, in the
South and East China Seas, and along the line of actual control
with India and beyond.
But, as I have said here before, conflict in the Indo-
Pacific region is neither imminent nor inevitable. And the
Department is doing more than ever to keep it that way with the
help of U.S. allies and partners.
First, we are supporting our regional friends as they
strengthen their own capabilities. In just the past year, for
example, we have announced landmark bilateral agreements with
Australia, India, and Japan to co-produce or acquire advanced
capabilities that will strengthen deterrence across the region.
Second, we are building on historic momentum with our
allies and partners toward a regional force posture that is
more mobile, distributed, resilient, and lethal. In the past
year, we have continued to implement major announcements with
Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Australia,
and we have concluded a new bilateral defense cooperation
agreement with Papua New Guinea. Thanks to the leadership of
members here, the United States will also extend the economic
assistance at the heart of our Compacts of Free Association
with three key Pacific Island partners into the 2040s.
Third, we are building new initiatives that deepen ties
between our Indo-Pacific friends. For example, after President
Biden's Camp David Summit with President Yoon of the
ROK(Republic of Korea) and Prime Minister Kishida of Japan, our
three countries delivered on a multiyear, trilateral exercise
plan, and we fully activated a real-time DPRK (Democratic
People's Republic of Korea) missile warning data-sharing
mechanism.
With Australia, we are working together to integrate Japan
into our force posture initiatives.
With Thailand and Indonesia, our MRKEE bilateral exercises
have expanded to feature participation from across the region,
and we are investing in the next generation of regional defense
leadership with our friends in ASEAN.
Finally, we are delivering cutting-edge capabilities in the
near term and investing in the capabilities our military will
need to maintain deterrence in the long term. That is why the
President's budget seeks major funding for our air power, sea
and undersea power, nuclear triad modernization, space
capabilities, cybersecurity, and more. We are also developing
new operational concepts that will integrate these
capabilities, enhance our war-fighting advantages, and
ultimately, strengthen deterrence.
Mr. Chairman, with the support of Congress, the Department
has delivered significant results in recent years to strengthen
peace, stability, and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Even so,
we remain clear-eyed about the substantial and growing
challenges ahead, and we know that meeting them will require
heightened urgency, attention, resources, and strong
partnership with Capitol Hill.
Thank you for your time attention, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ratner can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Ratner.
Admiral Aquilino, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN AQUILINO, COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-
PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Aquilino. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith,
and the distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to be here again this year.
This will be my last time, Chairman. I will miss all of
you. We have had many great interactions, and I hope to be
available if you need me in the future.
I do want to thank my family for their support during the
most challenging tour that I have had in my time. And after 40
years of service, I can unequivocally state that the sacrifice
our service members make is a family affair, and I couldn't
have done this job without mine.
The Chairman. Will you suspend just a moment?
I would like somebody from the staff to stand outside this
door and make sure we keep it closed and ask people who have
ingress and egress to come to the anteroom.
I'm sorry, Admiral, go ahead.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks again, Chairman.
The last three years have been the honor of my lifetime
commanding our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians,
Coast Guard men, and the civilians who work tirelessly
alongside our allies and partners to keep the Nation safe and
to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.
And I need to thank all of you. Our work together and your
support, especially in establishing the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative, the American people should know that your efforts
to focus our country's resources on addressing the most
pressing national security challenge our Nation has ever faced
are making a difference. But we have much more to do and we
have to go faster.
When I assumed command, we established the Seize the
Initiative approach to implement the National Defense Strategy.
In order to deter our adversaries, we challenged the Joint
Force to think, act, and operate differently, and we all ought
to do that.
While progress has been made, the risk is still high and it
is trending in the wrong direction. Seize the Initiative has
been challenged by the delayed delivery of construction,
advanced capabilities, and in some cases resources, to
persistently project and maintain forces west of the
International Date Line.
While modernization of the force and the development of new
concepts are essential to our ability to deter, we need to move
at the speed of relevance and the pace required to address the
rapidly evolving security environment.
As required by the NDAA (National Defense Authorization
Act), I have provided my independent assessment of INDOPACOM's
resourcing requirements to inform the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative. And for three years, the requirements we have
submitted have been transparent and consistent. That said, I
acknowledge the requirements have grown, and that is due to a
couple of things.
First, unfunded lists roll over and get included in the
requirement. So, anything previously unfunded shows up.
Second, as we shift from planning and design funds to
military construction, those costs increase.
Third, inflation that we are all dealing with.
And then, lastly, and most importantly, the threat has
continued to grow and accelerate.
In last year's submission, we highlighted the fact that we
expected the ask to increase. So, I will be ready to discuss
that, if anybody would like to.
I continue to reiterate that the requirements outlined in
the assessment have been consistent, 90-plus percent the same
for three years.
As I have said many times, I agree with Secretary Ratner's
assessment that the conflict is not imminent or inevitable, but
our potential adversaries have become increasingly aggressive
and emboldened.
The PRC's unprecedented military buildup and a campaign of
coercive actions continue to destabilize the region, and they
challenge the values and institutions that support a free and
open Indo-Pacific.
We must continue to build upon the progress achieved in the
last few years, and we need to accelerate fielding the key
joint capabilities described in my assessment. These include
the Guam Defense System, our Joint Fires Network, and decision
superiority capabilities, as in AUKUS and the rest of our
multilateral agreements with our partners.
And as I prepare to depart, again, I do want to thank the
Congress for your focus, your challenges, and the many
interactions that I have had with almost all of you during my
three years here. My successor will need your support as well,
and I know you will be prepared to give it to him.
Chairman and Ranking Member, thank you for the opportunity,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Aquilino can be found in
the Appendix on page 61.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
General LaCamera, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL LACAMERA, COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS
COMMAND, ROK/U.S. COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES
KOREA
General LaCamera. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith,
and distinguished members of the committee, it remains my
distinct honor to sit before you today, as the Commander of the
United States Forces Korea, the Combined Forces Command, and
the United Nations Command.
I want to express my sincere appreciation for your
unwavering support to our service members, our civilians, our
contractors, our interagency colleagues, and all of our
families overseas and those who wait at home. We can never take
our eye off the solemn responsibility to take care of those who
have raised their right hand to defend our Constitution and our
way of life, including our families who did not volunteer, but
serve, nonetheless.
I am prepared to discuss those in the security environment
on the Korean Peninsula. It was just over 70 years ago that a
China-supported, Russian-spurned, and opportunistic communist
North Korea decided to illegally invade the south -- plunging
Korea into a very costly armed conflict that is ongoing today.
Twenty-two United Nations states came to the aid of the
Republic of Korea then, and 17 of them continue to support
armistice enforcement today through the United Nations Command.
Defending forward this strategic location allows us to
better protect our people, the Korean people, our homelands,
and reinforce the United States' ironclad commitment to the
Republic of Korea.
Situated on the Asian continent, the Korean Peninsula
shares a northern border with both China and Russia. Although
U.N. Council Resolutions have levied strict sanctions against
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, they have found
refuge in their alliance with the People's Republic of China
and their revitalized partnership with Russia.
In the last year, DPRK has continued developing its
military capabilities, including solid fuel ballistic missile
technology, which violates sanctions. Some of the missile
systems that North Korea has been testing threaten countries
worldwide. North Korea has also been providing military
material support to Russia, assisting in Russia's illegal and
indefensible invasion of Ukraine.
These relationships have allowed the DPRK to circumvent
sanctions, build their weapons program, illegally further
missile technology, sustain their cyber-crime-derived economy,
and threaten the international rules-based order.
During this same time, the U.S.-ROK alliance continued to
adapt to meet the evolving challenges. In April of 2023, the
Presidents of the two countries signed the Washington
Declaration, reaffirming our commitment to mutual defense. They
also announced the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative
Group to strengthen extended deterrence, discuss nuclear
strategic planning, and manage the DPRK threat. We have taken
substantial and concrete steps to follow through on those
commitments.
The Republic of Korea has organized its own strategic
command, giving us another arrow in our quiver.
There have been multiple strategic asset deployments to the
Korean Peninsula, including a nuclear ballistic missile
submarine and the first B-52 landing in the last 40 years.
In August of 2023, the Presidents of the United States and
the Republic of Korea and the Prime Minister of Japan met at
Camp David for a trilateral summit. This historically
significant meeting recognized the importance of advancing the
security and prosperity of our people.
We have made significant progress and follow-through on the
commitments made during the summit, including steps toward the
sharing of real-time missile warning data; increased trilateral
exercises on the sea, and introduction of trilateral air and
cyber exercises.
Over the past three years, my thinking on operations,
activities, and investments continued to evolve. However, what
has not changed is my focus protecting our homelands, preparing
for combat, and taking care of people. Since readiness is
perishable, I will never be satisfied with our level of
training and preparedness.
As the Republic of Korea and the United States conduct
regular military training activities on the peninsula, I am
convinced that DPRK is not only reacting to our activities, but
in many ways mirroring them. We must continue to build
physical, mental, and spiritual readiness through operations
and activities designed to compete in the gray zone with DPRK.
To defend the ROK, we must continue to invest in the 28,500
service members, including bi-, tri-, and multilateral
exercises on and off the peninsula; multi-domain training
integrating live, virtual, and constructive entities, and
continue to experiment with next-generation capabilities in the
exact environment where they will be employed.
To maintain the armistice agreement, our ironclad
commitment, and maintain our combat readiness, we need your
continued support and recognition of the threat to the
homeland.
It is an honor to serve in these three commands. Once
again, thank you for all your support, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General LaCamera can be found in
the Appendix on page 107.]
The Chairman. I thank all the witnesses for their opening
statements.
I recognize myself for the first questions.
Admiral Aquilino, we have seen a growing security
cooperation between China, and Russia, Iran, and North Korea,
especially with respect to the war in Ukraine. What level of
concern do you have about this building of a budding alliance?
And particularly, if Russia were to be successful in Ukraine,
what do you think that alliance could yield?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Chairman.
Again, I have described the security environment as the
most dangerous I have seen in 40 years in uniform, and a big
portion of that is the cooperation, No. 1, between the PRC and
Russia. Again, in President Xi's words, ``a relationship that
has not been seen in 100 years.'' And we should listen to him
when he speaks. They tell us what they are thinking about.
So, that cooperation from those two authoritarian nations
puts us in a different security environment. So, I'm very
concerned about that. It is amplified, as General LaCamera
said, with regard to the DPRK supporting Russia in the form of
ballistic missiles and other munitions and capabilities.
My sense is this is a way to combat the broadened United
States' alliances/partnerships with our like-minded allies and
partners around the region. This is their counter.
But I articulated that we are almost back to the Axis of
Evil when you plug in Iran to this problem set. That set of
cooperation is concerning and it should be concerning to the
whole globe.
So, we ought to act accordingly. We ought to listen to what
they say. We need to absolutely -- and we do every day -- watch
what they do. But we do believe the strategy is right and our
operations that we are executing are delivering the right
message, which is the United States Joint Force, combined with
our allies and partners, is the strongest military power on the
planet.
The Chairman. General, can you give us your assessment of
North Korea's intentions? I know we have been seeing some
actions from them recently. Given the provocative behavior we
have seen from them lately, do you have any kind of vision into
what you think their intentions are?
General LaCamera. Yes, Chairman. I think its top end-state
priority is regime survivability. And he is developing weapons
of mass destruction for that. He is looking for sanctions
relief. And he is preparing to defend his nation, as his top
priorities.
The Chairman. So, you don't see, as far as your view of
things, any anticipated aggression against the south?
General LaCamera. The actions right now, as I stated in my
opening statement, the gray zone activities, military strength,
he has got a military. He is coming out of COVID, just like
everybody else. He is in his winter training cycle right now
and he is testing equipment, and he is also having Russia test
some of his equipment by providing that for the fight in
Ukraine.
The Chairman. Secretary Ratner, what do you think the
biggest challenge is we are going to have in helping Taiwan
develop its capabilities to defend itself?
Mr. Ratner. Congressman, we are working as absolutely
rapidly as we can to fulfill our commitments under the Taiwan
Relations Act. One thing that we have spoken about here before
is the question of resources and providing Taiwan with the
security assistance it needs. And I know that between the
presidential budget for 2024, for 2025, and the national
security supplemental, Congress is considering both enhanced
foreign military financing and presidential drawdown authority
backfill for Taiwan security assistance. And that would be one
way that we could strengthen their resilience and strength and
deterrence.
The Chairman. The chair yields to the ranking member for
any questions he may have.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Dr. Ratner and Admiral Aquilino, let's start with you on
something we haven't talked that much about, and that is India
and the role that they play in all of this. I see them as a
crucial partner certainly, but also a little bit of a swing
vote, in that they have a relationship, certainly, with Russia
and they have relationships, you know, across the world with
many of our adversaries. Getting them to work with us more
going forward, I think is crucial to meeting our needs.
How would you describe our relationship with India, the way
they look at the world, and what we need to be doing to enhance
our relationship with India?
Mr. Ratner. Ranking Member Smith, I would describe the
U.S.-India relationship as growing and stronger than it has
ever been, and absolutely essential to our vision for a free
and open Indo-Pacific. We have been strengthening a number of
areas across the relationship, including in co-production,
where we have made some major strides on jet engines; some new
projects on armored vehicles to integrate our Defense
Industrial Base, which is one important way to make those bonds
all the stronger.
We have been working at the Department to strengthen the
relationships between our private sectors, particularly in
defense technologies. And we have some really important new
initiatives to be doing that.
Admiral Aquilino has been leading a number of important
exercises and operations with the Indians that are enhancing
our operational coordination.
And our defense trade now is valued at over $20 billion,
and India recently announced their decision to acquire over 30
MQ-9Bs, and that is part of, again, a growing defense
relationship between our countries that couldn't be more
important.
Mr. Smith. Sure.
Admiral?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman, thanks.
I was in India two and a half weeks ago to visit with my
partners and to continue to work our mil-to-mil channels
together.
So, No. 1, it is the largest democracy on the planet, and
we have many overlapping values. We also have overlapping
interests, although we don't have always the same interests.
Military to military, we have been executing much more
increased operations and exercises together. They are working
towards becoming more interoperable. They have bought our
helicopters. They have C-130s, as we do. And we continue to
expand, both bilaterally and multilaterally, our actions and
exercises with them.
Mr. Smith. And how do you see their calculation? Because
the biggest alarm bell in all this is, you know, the BRICS
countries, which, obviously, includes Russia and China. But
India is a big part of that. And so, they are working in that
relationship, which is challenging in and of itself. But when
those BRICS countries decided to allow Iran to join them, what
do you think India's calculation is in terms of that? I
understand a little bit Russia and China, but why would India
be part of empowering Iran in that way?
Mr. Ratner. Ranking Member Smith, part of India's strategic
identity, as you know, is as a member of the Global South, they
aspire toward an international system, based on a principle of
multipolarity, and that is reflected in part of their foreign
policy. But, on balance, they have been trending towards
strategic convergence with the United States, and I think we do
share a vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. And we are
going to do whatever we can to nurture and advance that part of
their orientation.
Mr. Smith. Yes, and don't misunderstand me. I see Iran as a
valuable, crucial partner, and I agree with that. I just think
we need to better understand some of their motivations, if we
are going to move them in the right direction.
And then, just quickly, Admiral Aquilino, could you give us
your current assessment of how China is looking at the Taiwan
question? Where do you put the risk? How do you think they are
deciding whether or not to launch a military attack?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Ranking Member Smith.
So, my view is that China would absolutely like to
assimilate Taiwan without a war. And that is evident by their
increasingly aggressive, coercive campaign against Taiwan --
increasingly deploying ships in the vicinity; crossing the
centerline with their air assets; entering their ADIZ with
their aircraft; adjusting flight paths from China to get much
more closer to Taiwan. They are taking all actions to attempt
to get Taiwan to capitulate. Now I don't see that happening.
To back that up, their intent is to build military
capability/capacity, should they need to take action. And as
you know, coming out of the last two meetings, they have not
over the past number of years denounced the use of force. They
continue to keep it on the table. So, that is how I see it
today.
Mr. Smith. I apologize, I'm out of time. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. [Presiding.] I thank the ranking member.
We will now go to Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank each of you for being here today.
And, Admiral Aquilino, it is good to be back with you. We
appreciate your service so much.
I'm the only Member of Congress still serving who has had
the opportunity, sadly, to visit Pyongyang, North Korea. I saw
firsthand the oppression of the people of North Korea. It is
just it is beyond comprehension, the subjugation of the people
there. And when you compare it to South Korea, which is the
exact opposite -- a country of opportunity for its citizens and
the contrast per capita income is pretty clear. In North Korea,
it is $967; South Korea is $44,000. You can't have a clearer
example in the world of the difference between socialism and
capitalism.
With that in mind, you have stated that North Korea is
hoping to leverage their assistance, providing 155 artillery
shells to War Criminal Putin to murder Ukrainians. And they
want to, North Korea wants to receive nuclear and ballistic
missile capability.
What evidence do we have of this exchange of information?
Admiral Aquilino. We certainly have intelligence
information that has shown the support from North Korea to
Russia.
I will turn it over to General LaCamera in a second.
And that is pretty concerning. And as you have stated,
Congressman, all of that technology and all of the funding that
Russia might be putting into North Korea continues to go to
their military buildup, and not their people and to feed them.
So, that is a concern.
Let me turn it over to General LaCamera.
General LaCamera. Thanks, Congressman, and it was good
seeing you on the peninsula last month.
The evidence, I mean, we are still digging into exactly
what is being provided back. But KJU has an opportunity with
the Russians right now to have some of his technology tested on
the battlefield -- and not just his missile technology, but his
artillery and others.
Mr. Wilson. Well, to me, it is really concerning.
Obviously, it is a direct threat to the people of South Korea,
to Japan, but the ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile)
capability to attack and threaten American families. And so,
whatever you can do, we appreciate.
And, Dr. Ratner, I'm concerned that there are reports of
the People's Liberation Army training at a former U.S. military
base in Panama -- with the Chinese military personnel, possibly
20,000, crossing the southern border into the United States.
What information do you have about the training in Panama? And
what is the training level? And is this a danger to American
families?
Mr. Ratner. Congressman, I haven't seen that report. I'm
not aware of a major PLA deployment to Latin America, but I
will take that back and respond to you in an appropriate
setting.
Mr. Wilson. Well, it is so critically important, and
connecting the dots is really not that difficult. And that is
that, if there is a training facility, if there are People's
Liberation Army personnel being trained there, and then,
persons of Chinese military age, unaccompanied, are coming into
the United States due to Biden open borders, every American
family is at risk, and this should be a priority of the Indo-
Pacific, as to the deployment of troops from the Chinese
Communist Party. It is that important.
Admiral Aquilino, as we see the attack of War Criminal
Putin on the democracy of Ukraine, we are so concerned as to
the efforts by War Criminal Putin and, also, allies of Iran and
the Chinese Communist Party. What is your assessment of what
the dictatorial governments are gaining by supporting War
Criminal Putin's invasion of Ukraine?
Admiral Aquilino. So, Congressman Wilson, thanks.
Again, this kind of goes back to Chairman Rogers' question
in the linkage between Russia and the PRC. The PRC is certainly
watching that conflict and they are gaining a lot of lessons
learned on what gets done right and what gets done wrong.
The combination of the two supporting each other, whether
it be in the information space or in the U.N., is concerning,
right? You have a line-up behind the war criminal that you have
identified by other nations, which legitimizes the actions. And
we have to ensure that we don't support that assertion.
Mr. Wilson. Well, again, it is just so important.
Connecting the dots, again, is so easy. War Criminal Putin was
in Beijing prior to February 22nd, 2022, the invasion of
Ukraine, to get a green light.
With that in mind, I yield.
But thank you for your service. It is more important than
ever, as we are in a worldwide invasion of dictators into
democracies. Thank you.
Mr. Ratner. Mr. Chairman, could I just respond to that
question quickly for just a quick intervention?
Because there has been this dialog about the connection
between the theaters, and I think it is really important to
underscore the degree to which standing with Ukraine will help
strengthen deterrents in the Indo-Pacific. It will demonstrate
that there are costs and consequences for this kind of violence
and that the free world will come together.
And I think, notably, if you look at what U.S. allies and
partners in the Indo-Pacific are doing to support Ukraine, that
says a lot. From the ROK to Japan, to Singapore, to Australia -
- all of these countries are providing support in one way or
another to Ukraine because they believe what happens there
matters strategically for them in the Indo-Pacific.
Mr. Wilson. Hey, it is an unintended positive consequence,
just like Sweden and Finland.
I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
We will now go to Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
And thank you to all the witnesses.
And I want to join my colleagues in terms of expressing our
respect and admiration for Admiral Aquilino's service and the
fact that he has always, I think, understood that we are an
independent, separate branch of government. And your testimony
has always, you know, accordingly, treated us in that fashion.
Admiral Aquilino, yourself and your predecessors, Admiral
Harris and Admiral Davidson, have repeatedly testified at these
hearings over the years to stress the importance of our
submarine programs in the Indo-Pacific.
And page 21 of your testimony talks about how the undersea
domain is getting a little more crowded out there with Russia
now with a Pacific fleet, the Severodvinsk and the upgraded
Kilos that are out there.
Can you just express, again for the record, how critical is
the mission of U.S. attack submarines in maintaining a free and
open Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. Certainly, Congressman. Thanks.
Again, the United States' asymmetric advantage of undersea
capabilities, we are second to none and that is a domain that
we need to maintain superiority. We need to maintain capacity
and we need to maintain the industrial base that supports it.
So, again, I should say, as you work the supplemental,
thank you very much for the $3 billion identified towards
supporting the industrial base, the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan. And
as Dr. Ratner said, the linkage between the Ukraine support and
the support for the Indo-Pacific can't be separated. But we
need to maintain those investments in the undersea sets of
capabilities because they allow us to be dominant.
Mr. Courtney. No, and I agree with you about the submarine
industrial base funding, which, again, is spread between not
just production, but also maintenance, which is a critical
effort that we need to protect.
But, as Admiral Harris used to say over and over again,
quantity is also quality in terms of our fleet. We have a
budget that came over that will decommission three Virginia --
sorry -- three Los Angeles class submarines and cut procurement
from two to one, the first time in 13 years.
And just again, in terms of just looking out at our
commitments that we just made, which I enthusiastically support
in terms of the AUKUS sales of three submarines in the 2030s,
you know, can you just comment in terms of how you see that,
how that budget fits in or doesn't fit it, in terms of the next
few decades?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, sir.
So again, with the capabilities that the PRC are producing,
delivering, and continue to support, their numbers and their
capability and capacity are increasing. That's a conscious
decision by the CCP to support a 7.2 percent defense increase,
despite an economy that is on the decline.
And I agree, we are at a point where the capability being
produced does have a quality all of its own as it applies with
capacity. It is the world's largest navy right now. It is soon
to be the world's largest air force, as they continue to
produce.
So, across all Joint Force capabilities, you know, I don't
support a reduction of capacity in the theater, so that we can
continue to deliver the deterrent effects we need.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
I mean, this is not the budget hearing at this point, but,
clearly, the top line for Virginia and shipbuilding in general
is lower than 2024. And as I said, the net numbers really I
think raise tremendous concerns amongst our colleagues.
Really quickly, you know, we have seen in recent news
accounts about the fact that Philippine fishermen are getting
rammed in the East China Sea area and South China Sea area. Can
you comment about whether there is any, like, even version of a
mil-to-mil communication to try and sort of reduce these types
of episodes and incidents, either with the Philippines and the
Chinese navy or the United States or INDOPACOM?
Admiral Aquilino. So, there are procedures in place to
avoid dangerous and unsafe accidents. We have been doing it for
decades. COLREGs is that current environment or procedural set
of guidance.
Additionally, with the PRC, we have, the United States has
a code for unplanned encounters at sea. That should also
separate and avoid those things.
The Philippines can use those. They have communicated with
the PRC. Yet, the PRC continues to execute this belligerent,
dangerous, and aggressive activity to prevent Filipino
fishermen from executing their rights inside of their Exclusive
Economic Zone at Scarborough Shoal.
And they have also prevented the resupply of the Philippine
forces on Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal. Those are not
based in legality. The 2016 Tribunal has ruled that the PRC has
no legal claim to the area of Second Thomas Shoal. Yet, they
continue to drive a perception and they articulate that that is
Chinese sovereign territory. It is not.
Mr. Wittman. I thank Mr. Courtney.
And we will now go to Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for testifying.
Admiral, I would like to congratulate you on your upcoming
retirement and for four decades of service to our country.
Admiral Aquilino, when you appeared before this committee
last year, I said that accelerating the development of our
offensive and defensive hypersonic capabilities was a top
priority. My colleagues agreed and Congress mandated that we
field a defensive capability by 2029.
Last year, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Vice
Admiral Hill, testified that pushing the fielding of the Glide
Phase Interceptor into the 2030s does not meet the threat. Do
you agree with Admiral Hill, first of all, Admiral Aquilino?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman Lamborn.
So, from the INDOPACOM position, right, I have articulated
the requirement -- and it has been consistent for five years --
which is a 360-degree integrated air and missile defense
capability for Guam that would protect our citizens and protect
the forces that we need. And that includes ballistic,
hypersonic, and cruise missile threats. So, the requirement has
remained consistent. The ask has been articulated in my last
three reports and the two reports that Admiral Davidson
submitted before me. This gets to my testimony, which is we
must go faster. And I have articulated that needs to be in
place by 2027.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I like that, 2027. Because I'm concerned
because not only did the Missile Defense Agency recommend
ending the SM-3 Block 1B program -- we can talk about that in a
minute -- but also delaying the Glide Phase Interceptor until
2035. That is eight years later than 2027. So, that is not
responsive to the needs of INDOPACOM, is it?
Admiral Aquilino. Again, sir, I'm the guy who articulates
the requirements and I have set those. Those have been set very
clearly and consistently. Again, this goes to the fact that we
all need to go faster.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. And are you also concerned about the
recommendation in the fiscal year 2025 budget request to
terminate the primary sea-based missile defense interceptor in
the fleet, the SM-3 Block 1B?
Admiral Aquilino. For the requirements that I have set,
Congressman, it doesn't matter to me what provides it. If there
are capabilities that deliver to provide those defenses against
cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats, I'm going to be
okay. So, I will have to go back and look at that particular
weapon and effector to see if it impacts what we need, based on
the requirements. I haven't heard that there is a concern at
this point.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, if you could get back to us on that,
that would be very helpful.We also know, for instance, from Dr.
McCormick testifying in front of a Strategic Forces
Subcommittee hearing, that China has the world's leading
hypersonic arsenal; that we are falling behind China in that
particular regard.
Can you explain the value of having a conventional
offensive hypersonic capability that INDOPACOM could use?
Admiral Aquilino. To execute the strategy and to deliver
the deterrent effects we need, Congressman, it is combined
through what we talk about as decision superiority. Again, the
Chinese will continue to develop weapons that they believe have
advantage and deliver vulnerabilities to the United States. We
need to negate those vulnerabilities, and we need to take
advantage of our capabilities that outmatch theirs.
So, the criteria that I have asked for, and the way we talk
about decision superiority, is in the form of blind, see, and
kill. I need to prevent the adversary from being able to close
their kill chains against our forces. That is the blind piece.
The ``see'' is persistent awareness and understanding of
everything in the battle space at every second real time. And
then, the kill are the networks and the effectors, our weapons
that allow me to deliver effects, if tasked, such that we can
act and deliver those effects at speed well in advance of our
adversaries.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, specifically, would INDOPACOM be able to
use a conventional offensive hypersonic capability, and would
having that somehow be destabilizing, even though China has
that as well today?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, we have certainly identified the
need for that. There are some capabilities that exist. The
Chinese have put production capability in their place, and we
must get to that same place. I don't think it would be
destabilizing.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you so much. I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. I thank Mr. Lamborn.
We will now go to Ms. Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses.
I wanted to, first, talk about Papua New Guinea. As you
know, in April 2022, the Biden administration identified Papua
New Guinea as a partner country to prevent conflict and promote
stability, pursuant to the Global Fragility Act.
Last year, the administration released a 10-year strategy.
As part of that strategy, the interagency has committed to
improved justice systems and professionalized security forces.
The GFA requires the interagency to align all activities in
priority countries.
So, Assistant Secretary Ratner and Admiral Aquilino, can
you both discuss the ways in which INDOPACOM is prioritizing
its engagement in Papua New Guinea to professionalize security
forces and promote justice and accountability, and how you are
coordinating with the State Department and USAID on those
activities?
Mr. Ratner. Maybe I will start, and then, turn it over to
Admiral Aquilino.
Thank you for the question. And, in fact, last week, I had
the opportunity to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee alongside Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink from the
State Department and Michael Schiffer from USAID(United States
Agency for International Development) on the Pacific Islands,
in particular, to talk about the whole-of-government approach.
Because, as it relates to the Pacific islands, only three of
them have militaries. We do security cooperation throughout the
region, but this is very much an effort in which our
development, finance, and diplomacy are front and center. So,
we coordinate with them very closely.
As it relates to Papua New Guinea, in particular, as you
know, last year, we signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement, a
historic agreement, with Papua New Guinea. I had the
opportunity to travel down there with Secretary Austin for the
first visit ever by a Secretary of Defense to Papua New Guinea.
And we have managed to sign a new ship rider agreement that
allows for Coast Guard cooperation. We can help them with
maritime domain awareness.
And we are working, under the Defense Cooperation
Agreement, to strengthen their own capability, as well as to
explore possible access and infrastructure opportunities for
the United States, both maritime and air. And I know INDOPACOM
site survey teams have made one trip down there already late
last year and are going to be executing a second one soon. So,
we are moving out on that agreement.
Admiral Aquilino. Congresswoman, I have been to Papua New
Guinea twice, and I hosted the delegation that negotiated the
DCA at my house prior to the agreement. That is the amount of
importance that I take as it applies to PNG.
Historically, if you go back to World War II, we operated
from bases there, both airfields and seaports. And it is
critical for the support that we would need.
Plus, the people there are wonderful and they have many of
the same values that we do -- of freedoms and the desire to
have a voice free of coercion.
What we have done to date, Dr. Ratner highlighted I have
teams there in Lae that have identified what is it that it
looks like to take the next step, which is to support
construction of capabilities. And we are going to continue to
work to build those out, assuming that the funding is
authorized and appropriated. So, really important.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, and thank you for that. And we will
continue monitoring, since the Global Fragility Act
implementation is a big priority of mine.
I wanted to ask quickly to both of you again about the new
BRAVO AI Battle Lab that INDOPACOM is creating. And if you
could talk more about that and, in particular, how you are
working to ensure warfighters have a clear process for
reporting any new technologies in the AI space that aren't
working or aren't functioning as reliably or responsibly as we
had intended, once they are in use.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, I think that one is for me,
Congresswoman. Thanks.
So, that battle lab is used to develop and build our Joint
Fires Network. I talked about the kill, which is both the
network and the weapons that allow me to close kill chains
across great distances.
We have linked that with DARPA through the previous Assault
Breaker II Program; support from Ms. Shyu in R&E, from ANS,
from CDAO. And we are pulling that together in my headquarters
through our Joint Mission Acceleration Directorate to deliver
those capabilities you are talking about.
And we are trying to get to best of breed. So, we pulled
all of the service programs in and we are trying to integrate
those into a joint capability, whether it be Convergence,
Overmatch, or ABMS, along with the data that is coming from NSA
and our other exquisite sources. We need to pull that together
fast and deliver a capability.
And we are going to demonstrate the first version of that,
of JFN, in Valiant Shield in 2024. The team has worked
incredibly hard and at a pace that I don't think anyone else
could have matched.
Mr. Wittman. I would like to thank Ms. Jacobs.
I will now recognize myself for five minutes.
Gentlemen, thanks again for joining us.
Admiral Aquilino, earlier you spoke to the unfunded
priorities list. We appreciate that, based upon 1302
requirements. We know you are very thoughtful about
prioritizing and protecting the homeland.
One of the things you pointed out, too, was building
capability and capacity quickly -- I would call it at the speed
of relevance -- to increase the risk and uncertainty for the
Chinese, to make sure that when Xi wakes up every morning, he
says, ``No, not today.''
One of the aspects of where we can build that quickly is in
relation to what we know is a vast domestic industrial complex
in China that can do traditional military construction -- that
is, exquisite system construction -- much, much faster than we
can and in a much greater scale.
The one place that I think holds great promise is us being
able to use our technology and innovation in the realm of
expendable and attritable platforms. Can you give us your
perspective about how we pursue that enterprise in the context
of your 1302 requirements? And is there value in talking about,
in the acquisition process, creating some guardrails there to
say, listen, we ought to acquire systems within these price
guardrails? So that we actually get maximum utility and we send
the right demand signal to those innovators and creators out
there, whether it is for attritable platforms or exquisite
platforms.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So, first, let me
start by thanking Secretary Hicks for the initiation of the
Replicator Program. It is exactly what you are talking about.
That $1.2 billion is in my 1302 report because it is critical
to our concept and the ability to deliver multiple dilemmas and
problem sets, should there be activity by our adversary.
So, it is important. There are capabilities, technologies
that have been passed. I believe our industrial base and those
companies who have those capabilities are aware. She has been
through tranche one. We are getting ready to do tranche 2.
So, those capabilities that can deliver those effects, we
are taking all comers to be able to vet; understand which ones
are most effective against my problems, and then, deliver
those. That said, they have to deliver them at scale and they
have to deliver them cheaply. This is the asymmetric advantage.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
Admiral Aquilino. So, we are absolutely supportive, and
they are included in my report.
Mr. Wittman. Fantastic. Thank you.
On your 1302 report, where you talk about the President's
budget, and then, what your 1302 requirements are, we see there
is a big delta there. And you talked to us earlier about
prioritizing those and really going in order of the 42 items
that you placed in that list.
As Congress makes those tough decisions about how do we
place resources properly, give us your perspective on how we
can make sure that we are coming up with the right formula. I
want you to elaborate on maybe what you talked to us about
earlier, about how do we look at that list and the things that
we need to do.
Obviously, we are probably not going to have the resources
to fulfill the list, and you have asked for that, which you
should. But I want to get a little drilldown from you as to how
we should look at doing all we can within the context of the
list you provide us.
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, sir.
So again, I have provided that 1 to N list of priorities
that you have asked for. I would categorize it this way: they
focus around, No. 1, defense of the homeland, which is the Guam
Defense System. That is certainly the top priority.
And then, below there, we get at the blind, see, kill
aspect of this, which includes our Joint Fires Network; our
INDOPACOM Mission Network, which allows us to communicate with
all of our allies and partners. Right now, I have 16 networks
to do that. I would prefer to have one.
Mr. Wittman. Right.
Admiral Aquilino. I would prefer to fund one.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
Admiral Aquilino. I think you would, too.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
Admiral Aquilino. And then, that network tied to the
weapons that can deliver those effects, that would be how I
look at it in the top priorities listed. And so, we are always
ready to work with your staff, should you have further
questions on additional drilldowns.
Mr. Wittman. Absolutely. What would be your message to
those that look at the list and say, ``Well, we can't do
that''?
Admiral Aquilino. I guess what I would say is the process
allows me to input my requirements into the overall PPB&E.
Again, there's tough choices to be made, but I can tell you,
this adversary, as Secretary Ratner said, there is no other
adversary with the capability, capacity, means, and intent to
displace the United States. That is why it is the top priority.
So, you have got to make some tough choices, and I have
articulated the resources I think I need to do that.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. So, you would say -- not to put
words in your mouth -- but you would say that this is an all-
hands-on-deck call moment for folks across the enterprise, both
in the Pentagon, in the Service Branches, and in the industry?
Admiral Aquilino. That is exactly what I would say, and by
the way, with a sense of urgency, and in ways that can get past
our slow and antiquated processes.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Admiral Aquilino.
We will now go to Mr. Deluzio.
Mr. Deluzio. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. I appreciate it.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
Mr. Deluzio. Good afternoon, gentlemen.
And, Admiral Aquilino, I want to echo many of the kind
words passed on/said by my colleagues about your service. But,
as a fellow Naval Academy grad, I would remiss to not mention
that you are also the ``Old Goat,'' the longest-serving grad in
the fleet. So, we are very proud of that.
Admiral, I will start with you. In your testimony, you
mentioned significant PLA, People's Liberation Army, buildup
across all domains. I will quote part of it back to you. ``In
three years since I took command, the PLA has added over 400
fighter aircraft, more than 20 major warships, has more than
doubled its inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles.'' End
quote.
Last year, I asked you about Chinese shipbuilding
investment compared to our own, and you made clear, then, that
the Chinese are building ships at a pace that far exceeds ours.
Has that trend changed at all since this time last year?
Admiral Aquilino. No, Congressman. Matter of fact, it is
one of the key reasons I'm concerned, is that, despite an
economy that has taken a 30 percent hit, as a best estimate,
right, they have prioritized the delivery of military
capability/capacity. It hasn't slowed down. Increased the
budget by 7.2 percent.
Oh, by the way, that is what they advertise. Their budget
process is not very transparent. My assessment is it is larger
than that, and it is way cheaper to deliver stuff when you have
a guaranteed workforce without all of the safeguards that we
put into ours. So, that is why I say the trend is in the wrong
direction.
Mr. Deluzio. And to be clear, we are not talking just about
the fleet for them? We are talking commercial shipbuilding as
well in terms of their capacity and output?
Admiral Aquilino. I'm talking about all capabilities in
their joint force. So, shipbuilding, airplanes, missile
systems, satellites -- across the board.
Mr. Deluzio. Dr. Ratner, do you agree the Chinese
industrial output capacity is, generally, far exceeding that of
the United States?
Mr. Ratner. In some areas, Congressman, yes; in others, no.
Mr. Deluzio. What are some key ones where it isn't?
Mr. Ratner. Where we are still maintaining the advantage,
the undersea capability is one important area, and there are
many others.
Mr. Deluzio. So, I think we can debate the reasons why, the
places we are disadvantaged, that we have gotten there. I think
part of it is lousy industrial policy decisions across decades;
I think a lack of investment in our own industrial base; anti-
competitive behavior by China, and looking globally, others.
I will point to the recent Section 301 Shipbuilding
Petition that I support that several unions -- including the
Steelworkers, IBW, and Machinists -- have brought forward. And
I will quote from that:
``Government interventions to accelerate the development of
the Chinese shipbuilding industry include policy loans from
state-owned banks, equity infusions and debt-for-equity swaps,
the provision of steel plate from state-owned steel producers
at below-market prices, tax preferences, grants, and lavish
financing from China's state-owned export credit agencies.''
End quote.
Dr. Ratner, I will go to you. Do you agree that those types
of unfair trade practices are counterproductive to our efforts
in the region, and thus, hurting our national security?
Mr. Ratner. Yes, there is no doubt, and those are
longstanding issues that we have had with their industrial
policies.
Congressman, what I would say is that, look, the 2022
National Defense Strategy was the first ever that identified
the PRC as the United States' top pacing challenge. And since
that time, the administration has been moving to realign the
budget toward the China challenge and toward the requirements
that Admiral Aquilino has identified.
This year's budget would invest $2.3 billion more in
INDOPACOM than last year. That is a nearly 20 percent increase.
The focus areas of the budget are on the areas that Admiral
Aquilino has largely identified, including in critical
munitions and in MILCON(military construction). And we are
going to continue to work with them to close these gaps.
Mr. Deluzio. Understood. And, look, my point, more broadly,
is that our domestic supply chains and manufacturing prowess
and power are relevant to our security interests across the
globe, certainly in the Indo-Pacific. All the things we need to
produce -- ships, submarines, aircraft, whether it is engines,
pumps, valves, steel, you name it -- we should be doing things
like we are doing with semiconductors.
And I will close with, you know, my particular concern
around steel and the proposed sale of Pittsburgh-based U.S.
Steel to a Japanese company. Of course, our Japanese friends
are important regional partners of ours, but I oppose the deal,
which I think will hurt folks in my part of Pennsylvania, but
also undermine our security interests in manufacturing and
industrial leadership.
I have been proud to see President Biden also oppose it.
And my hope is we see more American icons, like U.S. Steel and
others, rise and be there to deliver for our industrial base.
So, with that, Mr. Wittman, I will -- oh, Mr. Chairman,
excuse me -- I will yield back.
The Chairman. [Presiding.] The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr.
DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
This is not an original question, but after seeing some of
the unfunded mandates and your shortfall in funding, in an open
setting, can you say, roughly, what you are needing to be ready
to fight tonight?
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, thanks, Congressman. Again, I would
categorize it around the defense of Guam system, to be able to
protect those citizens and our military capabilities there. It
is the assets that deliver the ability to blind, see, and kill
our adversary in the form that I have described with regard to
persistent battle space awareness and a real-time capability,
with the networks and weapons that close the kill chain. There
is capability -- and, again, in that report, from one to end,
there is a variety of different sets of capabilities that
deliver those three things broadly. So that is where I would
start. And then there is, again, a number of other things. We
will be ready to talk in detail.
Dr. DesJarlais. Is there a rough number in billions?
Admiral Aquilino. The shortfall that I have identified is
$11 billion.Dr. DesJarlais. 11 billion?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Dr. DesJarlais. I bring that up because right now on the
Hill, the here and now, we know what is going on in Israel. We
know what is going in Ukraine. We know what is going on in the
southern border. We see a supplemental emergency request for
$100 billion. I think 65 billion to go to Ukraine, 14 billion
to Israel, a little bit of money for the border.
But, you know, this isn't maybe the time or place to have
that in an emergency funding. But is it approaching that level?
Compared to those other crises that we are facing as Congress
and funding, where would you three fit this urgency in terms of
funding? Because we are talking $11 billion. There are 100
billion hanging out there waiting to be voted on. Where does
this fit in that picture?
Admiral Aquilino. So I would say this in addition. And this
is the request for the '25 budget, Congressman. Again, I think
the supplemental that you are debating, number oner, we need it
quickly. Number twp, everything that is in there, again, there
is a bunch of it that has been identified that supports the
INDOPACOM needs. There is $3 billion for infrastructure for the
ship maintenance and other things. There is a billion dollars
for INDOPACOM requirements. There is $2 billion in support for
Taiwan. Those are all critical needs for INDOPACOM.
But additionally, all that other money that is supporting
the Ukraine problem set also provides a deterrent value for
INDOPACOM, right? An inability for Russia to succeed is a
deterrent for President Xi in INDOPACOM. So it is a large
number. But it is all tied. And it is beneficial if you look at
the global security environment.
Dr. DesJarlais. Yeah, I guess I would just like to see your
shortfall included in there as part of that. And I get what you
are saying that it is indirectly, but maybe directly
considering the urgency of this threat, we ought to be looking
at it in that light as well.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. I also would like to
see it in there.
Dr. DesJarlais. Yes, sir. Secretary Ratner, last year
China's Military Power Report the Department dedicated a
significant amount of the attention to the PLA's growing
nuclear capabilities. The report estimated that China had over
500 operational nuclear warheads today and will have over 1,000
by 2030. Is there a reason that you refrained from publishing
this when it is beyond 2030. I believe there were previous
iterations reported something like 1,500 estimated warheads by
2035. But such estimates tend to be, you know, either an
underestimation based on the scale and speed in which Chinese
nuclear build-up is occurring. Can you have -- or do you have
an up-to-date estimate past 2030 that you can share with the
committee today?
Mr. Ratner. Congressman, I don't have an open source
estimate to share in this context. But, you are right, we do
aim every year to provide the most up-to-date figure in our
Annual Military Power Report to Congress. And we will aim to do
that again this year.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Are you seeing any signs of
cooperation between either technical, strategic, or otherwise
between the PRC and Russia in terms of their respective nuclear
forces?
Mr. Ratner. Congressman, they are certainly engaging in
dialogue on advanced military capabilities. I think that
question would be better answered in a classified setting.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Also, you're probably going to say
the same thing here. We know there are 300
ICBM(Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) silos at this point.
Do you believe they've loaded any of these or do you not know?
Mr. Ratner. Again, happy to provide information on that in
a classified setting.
Dr. DesJarlais. All right.
Mr. Ratner. Thank you.
Dr. DesJarlais. Fair enough. I am about out of time so I
will stop there. Thank you all for being here today. It means a
lot.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the
witnesses for being here today. Sometimes when talking to
officials within the Department or even some members of the
House, it sounds as if China invading Taiwan in the next few
years is a foregone conclusion.
While I think it is critical that we be prepared for such a
scenario, when Taiwan is taken by force, we should be pursuing
every option to prevent a conflict in the region.
Admiral Aquilino, in your submitted testimony, you speak
about the four lines of effort and the need to move faster on
them to reduce the risk of conflict in the near and mid-term.
Can you speak to your efforts to move faster on these lines of
efforts? Do these lines of efforts also help us reduce the risk
of conflict in the long-term?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. Yeah, absolutely.
The PRC will be a competitor with the United States today,
tomorrow and in the future. They are not going away. So the
strategy articulates that. All of the actions and the
approaches in the four pillars that we have set up, which are
posture, our operations, capabilities, and allies and partners
are designed to give us a sustained persistent advantage. And
by moving faster, that reduces the risk in the near to mid-term
and then continuing to modernize and deliver those capabilities
and things we need in the long-term will maintain that
advantage. All of it, the entire strategic approach by
INDOPACOM is designed to prevent this conflict.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. We have seen China rapidly
accelerate in advancement of space capabilities, particularly
with an increase in launch cadence. Mr. Ratner, does China's
increase in space activity raise cause for concern? How do
partnerships like Five Eyes help us and our allies maintain an
advantage within the space domain in this AOR(Area of
Responsibility)?
Mr. Ratner. Congressman, absolutely it is an area concern
and it is an area where we do see China rapidly modernizing and
investing. And it Is an area in which we are working with our
allies and partners including our Five Eyes partners to think
about how we can manage that capability and the allies will be
an essential part of our response, including our own
investments here at home.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Mr. Ratner, actually Admiral
Aquilino, can you speak to how maintaining superiority in the
space domain is important to countering the threat of China in
your AOR and do you feel you have the capabilities needed to
maintain space superiority?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So I guess I would
answer it this way. The items -- the space capabilities
identified in my 1302 report have been coordinated with both
General Saltzman and the SPACECOM(United States Space Command)
commander. Those are designed to meet my requirements as we
talked about blind, see and kill. So our space base sensing
layer and the other capabilities, we can provide some space are
absolutely required. They also generate and support the
survivability and protection of my force.
So they are absolutely critical. And I am aligned with both
SPACECOM and Space Force as it applies to the asks that are in
my 1302 report.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Mr. Ratner, islands in the Indo-
Pacific are already feeling the effects of climate change and
the field of burn more than most regions in the world. Can you
speak to how climate change impacts our readiness in this
region and what the Biden Administration is doing to counter
this?
Mr. Ratner. Well, Thank you, Congressman. And it is a
really important question. And as we have seeking to deepen our
partnerships in the Pacific Islands, one of the principles upon
which those partnerships is based is that we are meeting our
partners where they are and working with them on what their top
priorities are. And we hear again and again and again from our
partners that they are quite concerned about the challenges of
climate change. I had the opportunity just within the last
couple of weeks to meet with the Deputy Prime Minister of Papua
New Guinea who was here visiting Washington and have had the
opportunity to engage other Pacific Island leaders who are
concerned about this. And it affects our interest as well
insofar as we have seen the effects of major storms, whether it
Guam of other facilities affect our installations.
And so as it relates to the Department itself, our force
posture initiatives and our infrastructure are focused on
building climate resilient infrastructure in the region. And,
of course, more broadly we are approaching a climate issue from
a whole of government approach and the State Department and
other members of the inner agency are vital to that.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am out of time. I
yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. Admiral, I want to
follow-up briefly. He just made the inquiry about the space
capabilities. I didn't notice any requirements or any unfunded
requests on space. Were there?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Chairman, and we can highlight it
with your staff as well.
The Chairman. If you would, please. Thank you.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. Admiral Aquilino, good to see you
again. Is it correct that the President's budget includes
barely half or 58 percent of the capabilities and priorities
that you list as critical in your Seize the Initiative Report?
Admiral Aquilino. Congressman Gallagher, so we have
identified a requirement of 26.5 of which there is an $11
billion shortfall.
Mr. Gallagher. So the total cost of where we are short is
about $11 billion?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gallagher. And can you explain to this committee and
the American people the consequence of failing to find that
funding, which includes money for things like defending Guam
and the Joint Fires Network?
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, I think I would define it in the
form of time, Congressman. So this intent from urgency and to
move faster, any delays in those fundings or reduced fundings,
push everything out. And then those capabilities, we have asked
for deliver not in a relevant time or in a time where they
don't deliver the return effects.
Mr. Gallagher. So the $11 billion is important to find. Do
you know how much expiring funds, expired funding was cancelled
from the Defense Department last year and returned to the
Treasury where it sits in abeyance for five years and then
evaporates? Do you know?
Admiral Aquilino. I don't have that number, sir.
Mr. Gallagher. The answer is $11 billion, which is the
amount of money you need for your critical priorities list. Not
only do we failed to take advantage of money that was
appropriated that we could have rerouted for our priority
theater, the Indo-Pacific to give you the resources you need to
prevent World War III. The Department was actively working
against a legislative effort to give DOD the flexibility to
reroute that money. I would hope going forward we would find a
way to take advantage of that money for our most critical
priorities, particularly stockpiling critical munitions and
surging it west of the international dateline before it is too
late. By some estimates we have lost $125 billion over the last
decade, which is unacceptable. And I fear we are sleepwalking
into a conflict that would be horrific.
Dr. Ratner, in recent years we have seen increasing
attempts by the CCP to expand their political and economic
relationships in the region. I think the Solomon Islands
security deal caught a lot of people by surprise. It was doubly
disheartening given just the history we have and the fact that
a lot of marines paid with their lives for the Guadalcanal and
I think the same geographic that made it important in World War
II makes it important today. All of the islands have less than
24 percent of the world's land mass, but their EEZs are
something like 14 percent of the worldwide total.
We narrowly have avoided failing to renew the compact and
free association states agreements. I guess if you were to
advise this committee to be paying attention to something that
flies under the radar that isn't as sexy as say the defense of
Taiwan or, you know, what we do with Japan and Guam itself,
where would that be? Where in the region do we need to be
spending more time and attention so we can avoid the CCP doing
something like they did in the Solomon Islands?
Admiral Aquilino. Well, thank you, Congressman and fully
agree with you that the renewal of the COFA agreement was a
really important bipartisan achievement for Congress. That is
an area larger than the continental United States that will now
be more free and more peaceful because of it.
Look, I think we have a clear understanding of the PRC's
strategy in the Indo-Pacific and globally. We have articulated
that in the China military power report. They are looking to
gain influence and power. And they are looking to divide U.S.
allies and partners.
There are the areas that are fundamentally important. And
of the focus of this committee. And there are areas where they
are pursuing new initiatives, including overseas basing
initiative which might be one of those areas -- just to answer
your question very specifically, the Military Power Report has
articulated places where we believe the PLA is pursuing basing
opportunities in South Asia and Africa, potentially in the
Western hemisphere. That may be an area of additional committee
attention.
Mr. Gallagher. And then quickly, Admiral Aquilino, if we
don't have access to Guam, Japan, and South Korea either
because of enemy action or political constraints in the
conflict what does that mean for your ability to replenish fuel
and stores and do repairs in the midst of a conflict?
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, Congressman. And, again our
strategy has been to diversity. And, again, if you look at the
posture asks that we have had, they certainly are broad and
expansive across the theater. That is designed to ensure that
if there are any places that we are unable to use that we do
have alternative places to use.
Some of those are land-based. Some of those might be sea-
based. So, again, the approach that we have laid out I think
takes into account resilient, redundant and flexible.
Mr. Gallagher. My time -- I will yield my four seconds
back.
The Chairman. Well, you got a little extra because they
didn't start the clock on you. So you've been very fortunate.
Mr. Gallagher. I appreciate it. I feel fortunate to serve
under your command.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes Ms. McClellan for
five minutes.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this
hearing today and for our witnesses for being here. I want to
follow-up -- well, echo concerns raised by Representative
Courtney about the President's budget only including enough
funding for procurement of one summary in a year instead of the
standard two.
The Pacific Deterrence Initiative was established in the
fiscal year 2021 NDAA to enhance U.S. defense posture in the
Indo-Pacific region by modernizing and strengthening U.S. Armed
Forces, improving logistics, and building our cooperative
capabilities with allies.
In recent years, we have seen the percentage grow and the
program slow year-over-year and this year the President's
budget request calls for $9.9 billion, an almost $5 billion
decrease in spending despite the committee's allocating more
funding year-over-year. Can you, Secretary Ratner, and Admiral
explain the decision to request a cut in funding here and does
the PDI have everything that it needs to be as effective as
possible?
Mr. Ratner. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. And I will just
say on the first issue, as you know, the President's budget
does request $4 billion for the defense industrial base, sorry,
for the submarine industrial base and combined with funding in
the national security supplemental, we believe these
investments would be a major step forward in terms of our
defense industrial base as it relates to our submarine.
So we are very focused on that issue as well. And I would
refer you to Navy Undersecretary Eric Raven's remarks just
within the last week where he described his concerns about the
near-term ability of the industrial base to produce that
additional Virginia class submarine and why it is so important
for the budget to make these investments in the submarine
industrial base to get that capacity back on track so there is
disagreement about the absolute importance and need for those
submarines. And we are investing in the way that we believe is
going to get us fastest there. So that is an important point on
the submarine industrial base.
On the Pacific deterrence initiative, the President's
budget seeks $9.9 billion for PDI(Pacific Deterrence
Initiative), which is consistent with the request last year. So
I am not tracking from the administration a cut to PDI funding,
and we are making major investments in military construction,
and missile defense, exercising training, cyber capabilities
and a number of other important areas with allies and partners.
And we really thank Congress for its leadership in creating
that initiative.
Ms. McClellan. So to be clear, you think the $9.9 billion
provides you everything you need for the PDI to be as effective
as possible.
Mr. Ratner. Congresswoman, the PDI is simply an accounting
mechanism based upon a rubric that Congress established. It by
no means represents the totality of the administration's
investments in the Indo-Pacific nor as it relates to major
security challenges like the PRC and the DPRK.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you. That is a helpful clarification.
My staff recently had the chance to travel to Japan and meet
with our security partners there, who expressed concerns that
ship building and repair capabilities are located almost
exclusively in the United States. And then in times of war or
during a conflict, this could severely constrain our combat
capabilities if we had to send ships all the way back to Hawaii
or San Diego for repairs.
Could you give a sense of your assessment of the risk here
and what the Department and the administration are doing to
ensure we have robust repair capabilities available in the
Pacific if a conflict should break out?
Admiral Aquilino. Well, thanks, Congresswoman. So if we get
to crisis or conflict, I certainly don't want to send the ships
all the way back to the United States to get fixed.
Those ships that are forward stationed in Japan are
repaired in Japan. But having a more set of options for the
maintenance and support and sustainability of the force, no
matter where it comes from, so that it stays forward and can
deliver the deterrent effects we are working towards certainly
would be a positive way forward, I believe.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you. And this one you probably won't
be able to answer, but I am going to ask it and if you could
provide something for the record later.
If you could give some -- help us understand how operating
under a CR (continuing resolution) for the past six months has
impacted readiness and procurement for your operations in the
Indo-Pacific that would be very helpful. And with that, I yield
back.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. I
recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gaetz, for five
minutes.
Mr. Gaetz. Admiral Aquilino, during the Revolutionary War,
I think it was like 15 percent of Americans who fought for
liberty. Does that sound about right, 15, 20 percent?
Admiral Aquilino. I couldn't answer that now, Congressman,
I would have to go back and look.
Mr. Gaetz. I guess I'm just kind of wondering in Taiwan
what percent of the Taiwanese do we assess would actually fight
in the event of kinetic conflict with China.
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, I also don't have that calculation.
What I can tell you is when the Russians invaded Ukraine, that
was a pretty good wakeup signal for a lot of people across the
globe and especially for those people in Taiwan. And we
continue to execute our responsibilities under the Taiwan
Relations Act to ensure we support their ability to defend
themselves.
Mr. Gaetz. And does that act require the development of a
home guard in Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. I would have to go back and look at the
law. I don't specifically know if that --
Mr. Gaetz. I don't think it does. But maybe you could talk
a little bit about what the home guard theory is in Taiwan, how
that would enhance their capabilities.
Admiral Aquilino. Well, what the people in Taiwan have done
is they do have a reserve activation program. President Tsai
just extended that to a one year commitment. So, again, when I
talk about the people in Taiwan taking it seriously, they are.
It includes that approach that you have just articulated.
Mr. Gaetz. And I almost think that is what it is going to
take because I worry that the Taiwanese military may be
infiltrated by the PLA. And that if there is really going to be
a deterrent from a Chinese invasion, that might not come
exclusively from the uniform military or even the reservists.
So we may have to actually, you know, render capability to the
hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese who don't want to be part of
China, right?
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, your point is valid. And, again, I
believe that approach is -- and actions are being taken there.
What I would say is the example -- the best example that I
think exists is when Israel was attacked by the violent
extremists and Hamas, the next day 360,000 Israelis reported
for duty. That's the type of response that I believe we will
take.
Mr. Gaetz. Yeah, but I worry that we conflate the cultural
features there, right? Because what I worry about in Taiwan is
kind of a replay in Afghanistan where we look at some fake
government, and we do the normal kind of DOD thing of large
weapon systems and then we give them to that government and
then the real governing power -- in Afghanistan's case the
Taliban; in Taiwan's case perhaps China -- has the ability to
then repurpose those assets against the United States. So it
just seems to me that you are the guy, you are the person in
charge of this theater. I think you need to know. You need to
have some sort of assessment as to whether or not you're going
to get that Israel level response from the Taiwanese. You know,
what percentage of this group of people is going to stand up
and fight. I am sure we are all continuously informed by events
going on around the world. But in Taiwan specifically, like we
have seen cases where the PLA is infiltrating their government,
their military. And I don't offer that as some sort of
criticism. Heck, I think they try to infiltrate our government
and our military, too.
But I worry. I worry whether or not we are going to be able
to rely on the uniformed service there. So is there a plan at
DOD to kind of make these assessments about a home guard and to
ensure that you have small arms in the hands of these people
that might deter a Chinese invasion?
Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, there absolutely is. And I
would love to talk to you about it in a classified setting.
Mr. Gaetz. Great. No, it is good to know. And is that
consistent with this porcupine theory that we think about often
with Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. I don't use the term porcupine theory. A
lot of people do. What I -- Mr. Gaetz. Why don't you use it? I
heard it a lot on this committee.
Admiral Aquilino. Again I would articulate it in a way that
is in alignment with the law, which is we are providing the
people in Taiwan the ability, capability and training to be
able to defend themselves in time of conflict. That by itself
with regard to a strong Taiwan sets of capabilities is a strong
deterrent.
Mr. Gaetz. Yeah. I just think this is a real important
piece of the homework to emanate from this is to -- we have
talked about this Taiwan Security Engagement Act. I get that.
But I think you and I are both a little unclear as to the
extent to which that authorizes the work with the home guard
that we really need to convert Taiwan into an effective
porcupine because I assess that this is all about time. China
cannot endure an extended war with Taiwan. They can't endure
the sanctions. They can't endure the other consequences. And so
if we could demonstrate to them that that's going to be a
longer period of time, I think that pushes out the
inevitability of a kinetic conflict with Taiwan. So I
appreciate the exchange, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would
like to thank our witnesses for their service.
As a person who is a ranking member on the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on Europe and former chairman, I just have a
question for Admiral, you know, Aquilino. There is a recent
report that I find concerning that Hungary and China have an
inked in agreement allowing Chinese police to patrol streets in
Hungary alongside their local counterpart. They say it is to
boost their security, you know, in well trafficked tourist
areas.
But what I'm concerned about is China's penetrating and
security services dealing with a NATO ally. You know, what,
could you speak to the important no, no, just corporation but
solidarity among our NATO allies in terms of dealing with Indo-
Pacific and taking a united approach on these issues and
concerns about China's activities in that regard and talk to
the importance of that relationship as it affects our policy in
the Indo-Pacific.
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, thanks, Congressman. So again, we
are a globally integrated world like no one has ever seen
before. The PRC's intent, as Dr. Ratner stated, is to, you
know, achieve in an advantageous position, not just regionally
but globally, with regard to some of their basing, their
interaction and their intent to separate the United States from
our relationships with allies and partners.
The police support is a way that they do that. And they
just don't do it in Europe. They are doing that exact model in
the Pacific Islands. So it is a foot in the door. It is a way
to get power, influence, and the ability to take further
actions and set the stage for what you described.
Now that said, I do talk to my other counterparts. You will
hear from all the other combatant commanders the activities and
actions that China is taking in their AOR, whether it be South
America or Europe. And I spoke with General Cavoli last week.
We stay close. The importance of the European nations and the
U.K. understanding that what happens in the Pacific matters to
them is a critical point, and General Cavoli and I synced on
that. He is telling that story.
He visited Japan and Korea two weeks ago as he and I
coordinate to ensure that we are combating these types of
problems from a global perspective.
Mr. Keating. I just want to thank you for your work in that
regard because absent Hungary and some of Hungary's activities,
I have never seen the cooperation with our European coalition
towards the Indo-Pacific greater than it is today alongside the
greater cooperation that you have built in that area to begin
with. Dr. Ratner, do you just want to comment on that for a
moment?
Mr. Ratner. Congressman, I fully agree with you. I think
there is a huge opportunity here to work more with our European
allies in the Indo-Pacific. They are operating there more. Some
of them are resident powers, like France. And we are working
with -- INDOPACOM is working with the U.K., other important
Germany and others who are sending forces. Canada, not a
European power, but part of the Atlantic community, and all of
this contributes to peace and stability and deterrence. And all
of these countries have their own relationships and
partnerships too. And we can coordinate on security cooperation
and together strengthen deterrence in the region.
Mr. Keating. Also, Admiral, if I could, what gaps in our
underwater autonomous vehicles are there and what can we do
looking at next year's authorization and appropriations.
Because I find that a particularly important area, and we don't
want to have any gaps there at a time when it is more necessary
than ever.
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, thanks Congressman. If you don't
mind, I will save gaps discussion for a classified setting.
What I would say is --
Mr. Keating. If you could, just the importance of.
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, the importance is critical, right?
So the ability to deliver swarming type unmanned attritable
capabilities to deliver a problem set for the adversary that
they won't be prepared for and would have a really difficult
time countering, whether it is undersea, on the sea, or above
the sea, all of those capabilities are needed and they are
included in our ask as it applies to the 1302 part.
Mr. Keating. Innovation is so critical in that regard. And
that's more research. That's more development. So I would just
like to close. You know, our whole posture towards the Indo-
Pacific and China's threats really centers on deterrence right
now. And I must say I want to just thank you for bringing up
Admiral and your remarks prior to this.
The importance of Ukraine, we are sitting here now talking
about deterrence. To me I sit here March 20, we are sitting
here not acting on the Ukraine assistance that is so vital, you
know, as a deterrent. Because if we fail there, it is just
going to send a signal that counteracts all the good work we
talked about this morning that you are involved in.
So let's hope we get that done. Hope the speaker puts that
on the floor for a vote. It would pass. And I would yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, gentleman,
for being here. I have a couple questions for Admiral Aquilino
and then one for General LaCamera.
First, I want to ask the question about electronic warfare
in the Pacific theater. I am told that the PACOM requirement
for EA-37s, the new compass call, to provide tremendous amounts
of capability, that the requirement is 22. However, the Air
Force is only funded for 10 of them thus far. And I don't see
any funding plans in the near future.
Can you explain the need for 22 EA-37s and just unpack that
for us a little bit?
Admiral Aquilino. In an unclassified setting, Congressman,
I think what I would say is the ability to deliver the
capabilities that come from a compass call across the broad
spectrum of this theater has the requirements that you have
laid out. So it is critically important that we get to those
numbers. It is critically -- and I guess what I would say is
the only caveat would be those are the mechanism of delivery.
If there are other ways to deliver --
Mr. Bacon. Right.
Admiral Aquilino. -- then we might be able to live with
less. But we do need the capabilities that currently reside in
that aircraft.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. On a similar note, I read where the
Navy, because of the budget restrictions, they only do one new
attack submarine in the upcoming plan. That concerns me because
attack submarines are very important to your war plans. Are we
headed the right direction with our attack submarine force size
or do you see optimism or -- I see pessimism from where I am,
but hopefully I am wrong.
Admiral Aquilino. Again, I will go back to as the
operational commander, the need to dominate and execute our
undersea strategy and approach to be able to deliver a
successful mission accomplishment, the undersea is critically
important. Submarines are an aspect of that.
They are also very important for our office agreement with
the U.K.-Australia as it applies to Pillar 1. So, again, I am
very supportive of continuing or efforts in the undersea
domains.
Mr. Bacon. Do you have enough attack submarines now or do
you see a plan to get there.
Admiral Aquilino. I would say if you asked all of our
combatant commanders, none of us have enough.
Mr. Bacon. Right. On another similar note, I am concerned
about the Air Force structure. For every new fighter we bring
on, the Air Force is eliminating two and a half fighters or two
and a half aircraft. So we are getting smaller.
And I think in the fight that we could have with China --
hopefully, we don't -- we are going to need a bigger force size
than we have now. Could you provide a little bit of your
perspective on the Air Force?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman. Let me make it a little
more broadly and then drill down.
Number one, it will take the entire joint force, as a
matter of fact as you heard Dr. Ratner say, to deter this
adversary, it will take all forms of national power, which is
the design of integrated deterrence.
So as it applies to the joint force, you know, with the
capability capacity that the adversary is building, we need to
continue our capability advantages, and we need to get to the
right capacity.
I don't support a smaller force in the Indo-Pacific. And
specifically when you talk about half the globe, most of it is
water. All of it is air. You know, we need the right capacity
at the maritime and the air component to be able to deliver
deterrent effects, and if deterrence fails, to be able to fight
and win. So I don't advocate for getting smaller.
Mr. Bacon. I appreciate your perspective. And Mr. Chairman,
it seems like something we have to look at it. Our Air Force is
getting smaller at a time when it needs to be getting bigger
and that's a concern.
And General LaCamera, the North Koreans are one of the most
impoverished, malnutrition people on the whole globe. How are
we trying to reach them? Do we have an adequate voice of
America or those kind of capabilities to communicate with the
North Korean people because I see that as being perhaps a weak
spot for the leader of North Korea.
General LaCamera. We are not directly from my command. I
have met with individuals from the State Department and the
things that they are doing.
The Republic of Korea tries to reach them. They have non-
government agencies. They are sending balloons across the
border with messages and limited supplies. But we do not have a
direct -- it is not part of my mission statement to communicate
to them.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Panetta.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman, thanks all
three of you for being here. There was a recent article in the
Economist that talked about -- that title was, Does America's
Army's Future Lie in Europe or Asia? Within that he had a
couple of quotes from a couple generals, including James Rainey
who says that basically now we are going to fight under
constant observation, constant contact. There is no break.
There is no sanctuary.
General Harrington goes on to say that China has optimized
its forces to attack U.S. satellite ships and air bases,
however, but not to find, fix, and finish land formations that
are distributed, mobile, and networked.
And because of that, the article talked about how we
developed these three experimental multi-domain task forces,
two that are in Asia and one that is in Europe. And they can do
a wide range of things from gray zone and hybrid to kinetic and
conventional warfare.
So I would ask if you can expand and elaborate on these
MDTFs, one, too, though also last year's NDAA had mandated a
permanent stationing of Green Berets on the Kinmen Island near
China to train Taiwanese forces when prior SOF, Special
Operation Forces, only made an ad hoc presence on and off the
island.
I was wondering if you could elaborate on the current
special operations force mission in Taiwan as well and if there
is any coordination between the two.
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, Congressman, first let me just say
the article is incorrect. There is no permanent stationing of
U.S. forces there. We can talk in a classified setting for
further evaluation but that is just inherently inaccurate.
Mr. Panetta. On the Kinmen Island?
Admiral Aquilino. Correct.
Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you.
Admiral Aquilino. Now as it applies to the force that you
described, I have a bit of a different view, which is the
entire joint force is at risk of being tracked, targeted, and
employed against. That is maritime, air, and land. There is no
sanctuary for any of the joint force under the structure that
the PRC has built, and our actions requirement movement,
maneuver, protection, and all the things that we have to do.
But there is no sanctuary on the land. So that I inherently
disagree with.
Now that said, I do support the MDTF, and it is focused on
delivering the capabilities that I need in the Indo-Pacific
AOR. But what I would say is it needs all the capabilities that
are designed to go with the MDTF(multi-domain task force). So
the anti-air capability and the anti-ship capability are
lagging. And they need to go to be in there and sooner, right?
This is the urgency theme.
So I support the MDTF. It is absolutely the right design.
But it has to be fully equipped with all the capabilities it is
designed to deliver.
Mr. Ratner. Great. And Congressman, I would just add to
that, in addition to the capabilities that Admiral Aquilino
mentioned, of course we need the political agreements with our
allies and partners to be able to put together the kind of
force posture that you describe of being more distributed, more
networked, more resilient, and more lethal in that scenario
where over the last year, we have made absolute historic
progress.
If you look at the agreements that we have made with Japan,
with the Philippines, with Australia, with Papua New Guinea,
major transformations. Now it will take time, and I agree with
Admiral Aquilino that we need to move absolutely as fast as we
can. But the political structures are in place to do exactly
that thanks to the great work over the last year.
Mr. Panetta. Got it. Secretary Ratner, obviously as you
know, based on the elections recently in Taiwan, the Taiwanese
Democratic Progressive Party won the recent presidential
elections, is going to continue, we hope, President Tsai's
growing relationship with the U.S. Meanwhile, the KMT(The
Kuomintang Party) party won a slight majority in Taiwan's
legislature and is expected to favor more cooperation with
China.
We might expect China to exploit this split in policy and
can anticipate any influence campaigns from the Chinese to
increase favorable policy coming from Taiwan's legislature. How
are we preparing to approach these cross-state relations under
a split Taiwanese government?
Mr. Ratner. Congressman, we look forward to working with
all relevant parties in Taiwan. That includes the incoming
administration.
And as you know, the DPP won that election again from a
leadership perspective. We have had a bipartisan unofficial
delegation go out around the time of the election to meet with
Dr. Lai. The chairwoman of AIT(Advanced Individual Training),
as our envoy, has met with Taiwanese officials. And everything
that we have heard suggests that we are very encouraged by the
message of continuity in terms of the new incoming government.
To your question about the legislative UM, look, we are
committed to working with all parties to advance our critical
reforms. And we would encourage members of Congress to do the
same.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, gentleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Indiana, Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I saw in your
unfunded priorities list that INDOPACOM believes it needs well
over a billion dollars more in air and missile defenses.
So would you agree that it is an urgent priority for
INDOPACOM to get more air and missile defenses to protect our
forces from a potential Chinese missile and air attacks?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, or Congressman, if you are
talking about the Guam shortfall, I think it is about $430
million is we have identified for the ability to put the
defense of Guam system in place. That includes both some of the
integration capabilities and the military construction that is
required.
I have to go back and look at the billion dollar number and
where that is. But I do believe we will absolutely need to
provide increased air and missile defense to support both the
homeland in the form of Guam and wherever our forces are
operating from, I am required to protect them. So we will need
more integrated air and missile defense.
Mr. Banks. Understood. So we agree it is an urgent
priority. It is clear that we don't have enough air and missile
defenses for a fight with China. And I think that is my
takeaway from the billion dollar unfunded priorities list. Yet
we have used well over 100 of these missiles in CENTCOM(Us
Central Command) to shoot down Houthi drones. That cost 100
times less than our own missiles rather than saving them for a
potential fight with China.
So, Admiral, has the high rate of missiles that we are
using in CENTOM reduced the number of air and missile defense
assets that your forces expect to receive next year?
Admiral Aquilino. I don't know if I would view it that way,
Congressman. I think what I would say is for those missiles
coming off the destroyers, those SM2s are resident in my
theater on my destroyers, and we have those.
If you are talking about THAAD and Patriot, which again is
going to be a pretty large portion of what we are going to need
to defend Air Bases and those other places where our forces
are, I don't think those have been employed at the large number
that would impact me.
What I would say is, you know, I commend those sailors and
the joint force and CENTCOM that are executing the protection
mission against both our forces and those tankers. They are
fighting with what they got. And we should never ask them to
stop or conserve.
What we do have to do is move forward on our directed
energy path to be able to get on the right side of this cost
curve. So your point is completely valid, but bottom line,
mission success there, I would never ask them to restrict what
they need to do. But we do need to make sure that the
capabilities that I have identified are delivered at a relevant
time. And then we ought to accelerate the technologies that get
us back in the right place.
Mr. Banks. Yeah, I appreciate your candor on that and well
put and well understand.
Dr. Ratner, has President Biden's failure to deter attacks
on forces by Iranian proxies deprived our forces in INDOPACOM
of vital assets that we might need for a potential fight with
China based on what you just heard the Admiral say?
Mr. Ratner. Congressman, our position is that deterrence in
the Indo-Pacific is real and strong, and we are doing
everything we can to keep it that way.
Mr. Banks. If we don't have enough air and missile defense
assets for one region, how can we expect to be trying to fight
in two different regions? I mean, it is an obvious tradeoff,
right?
Mr. Ratner. Congressman, look, what I would say is
reiterate what I said earlier, which is the 2022 National
Defense Strategy identified the PRC as the top pacing
challenge. And since then, the Department has produced the most
strategy-driven budgets in its history, including investing
$2.3 billion more than last year on Indo-Pacific priorities
upwards of a 20 percent increase year-on-year.
So we are doing everything we can to focus on the pacing
challenge.
Mr. Banks. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. I want to foot stomp an agreement with what
the Admiral said about we should be more aggressively pursuing
directed energy capabilities to support our air defense systems
in CENTCOM and bend that cost curve.
With that, I will recognize the gentleman from Minnesota,
Mr. Finstad.
Mr. Finstad. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Smith, and to our witnesses for testifying today.
China remains the existential threat to America as an
institution and to the American way of life. This is true on
all issues, but especially so on critical issues like defense,
supply chains, and agriculture.
China's 2024 National People's Congress, the Chinese
Communist Party announced a 7.2 percent increase in annual
defense spending. China also had a greater than 7 percent
increase in defense spending in 2023.
Over a 10 years average, China has increased defense
spending at approximately 7.5 percent per year. Considering the
serious investment that China is making in its defense
primarily to prepare to meet and defeat the United States in
war, the budget recently published by the President is woefully
inadequate in meeting our top obligation of keeping American
citizens safe.
Specifically, the United States has made a strategic and
proper choice to build the vast majority of its industrial base
in the private sector. The small businesses and private sector
companies are the hardworking Americans that rely on a healthy,
proper, and sustained demand signal to keep making those
investments in the pursuit of defense of America. A lot of
these jobs and a lot of these companies are happening all over,
rural America, specifically, in my district. And I am proud of
them and what they do to our national defense.
As a Reagan Republican, I believe in peace through
strength. Our ability to project strength originates from the
industrial base. We must invest more in America.
So with that said, Admiral, great seeing you again. With
the combination of the scarcity of resources and your growing
needs and requirements, how badly do you feel the squeeze and
vulnerabilities from the defense industrial base on your supply
chain efforts?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. It is good to see
you, too. Again, I have articulated over three years now the
requirement and the need for the defense industrial base to
ramp up and be prepared. And that is all across the defense
industrial base. That is ship maintenance and sustainment. It
is airplane depot maintenance. It is for the ground force
maintenance of tanks and other military vehicles. It is weapons
production. It is aircraft production. It is ship building.
So critically important for us to be able to have a footing
that enables us to deliver a position of strength, right? This
is not just in time supply and just in time delivery does not
work in the security environment.
Mr. Finstad. Thank you for that. And I will just tell you
having the honor to, you know, travel all over my district and
talk to the folks that are working in the space, the signals
that we here in this body that can send out to the countryside
gives them the security to invest in those needed professions,
whether it is the welders, the pipefitters, the plumbers,
whatever it may be. But it also gives that signal to our job
providers that there is work to be had, and it is a good long-
term proposition for them to invest in.
I would just say I just left the Ag Committee, Mr.
Chairman. And as a farmer myself, and I think about agriculture
and food and food security as a national security piece, I will
tell you China's investment in farmland in the U.S. and
specifically near U.S. military installations is worrisome. It
should be worrisome to each and every one of us.
China is also investing at record levels in farmland all
over the place here. And this can and likely will lead to food
insecurity issues while promoting espionage concerns and really
our ability to project power can be compromised by this
Community China investment in our farmland.
We must pay attention to this before it is too late. And,
Mr. Chairman, I would just say in my closing here that food and
farm security is national security. And I think that this
committee can and needs to talk more about our farmland and the
food security piece because it is a strong component in our
national security.
So I appreciate all of you being here today. I appreciate
the service and the work that you do for our men and women and
for our country. So with that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield
back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
Admiral Aquilino. Could I make a --
The Chairman. Certainly, go ahead.
Admiral Aquilino. So, Congressman, you are highlighting the
Chinese approach, which is all forms of their national power to
deliver an advantage for their objectives. So that is point
one.
Point two, and I should have said this, the supplemental is
so important because it does have in it those things that you
described in the form of the industrial base, $3 billion. And I
thank the Chairman and the committee for supporting that. That
is a great start to getting us back on track. And I thank you,
Chairman.
The Chairman. Sure. Before we go to the next member, I want
to point out that we are going to be called for votes in about
20 minutes so we intend to adjourn this hearing at 1:30. So
with that, the Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Hawaii,
Ms. Tokuda.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Admiral Aquilino, General
LaCamera, since this is your last posturing hearing before this
committee, I join my colleagues in thanking you both for your
service and your leadership in your respective commands.
Admiral, I hope you will continue to visit us in Hawaii and
know that is always going to be home for you. And I especially
appreciate the partnership and commitment to working with the
people of our beloved state over the past few years and
addressing our shared challenges that we have had.
You know, among those shared challenges has been the state
of aging military infrastructure in Hawaii in across the issue,
an issue I am very passionate about. And I know these issues
generally fall on the service budget. But as a critical
customer and user of this infrastructure, INDOPACOM has a
significant stake here.
In Hawaii whether it is the barracks and electrical grid at
Schofield, aging hangers at Kaneohe Bay in my own backyard, the
failing waste water system at Pearl, the ramp at Hickam, the
cumulative impact of these infrastructure issues affects not
just our local communities, but also our readiness and the
quality of life of our service members and our their families.
Admiral Aquilino, in your written testimony, you mentioned
that many infrastructure projects across the AOR still need to
be prioritized by the services with only 12 of over 200
required projects completed in the three years of your command
and 47 high priority MILCON projects still needing to be
funded. I would also note the significant infrastructure gap of
$3.4 billion identified in your unfunded priorities list, which
would suggest that the FY25 budget falls far short of the $4.8
billion in infrastructure needs identified in your Section 1302
report. And that's not even getting to the infrastructure
equities that fall to the services.
I know my friend and colleague Mr. Moylan would agree would
agree with me on how important it is that we stop delaying,
especially in remote places like Hawaii, Guam, and the Pacific
where deferred maintenance and delayed investments lost us not
only time but also resources given the cost increases as well.
Admiral Aquilino, how does the aging military
infrastructure affect INDOPACOM's ability to project power out
into the clusters you mentioned and effectively deter
aggression? And what risks are we imposing on INDOPACOM because
of these delayed investments in our infrastructure?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman. It is good to see
you. So about a year plus ago, again, in coordination with
Congress, I commissioned a study by all the components to
identify what infrastructure in Hawaii would potentially
negatively impact my ability to generate the force and deploy
it?
That was in the wake of, if you remember, we had a couple
of water main breaks. And it gave us an indication that we need
to look at this and ensure that we A, understand it, and then
B, invest in it to fix it.
So that report was developed. I briefed it back to
Congress. And the service components were tasked to go ahead
and put that into their palms and maintain the ability to
generate the force from Hawaii. So we continue to watch that.
I am concerned about power generation and brownouts and
blackouts that we get sometimes. So we are watching it very
closely. And we need to ensure that we reinvigorate the
critical infrastructure required to support and generate the
force in time of crisis.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you very much. I am going to come back.
But I do want to ask another question, Admiral. What about
overseas installations across the Indo-Pacific in places like
Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, what is your assessment of
military infrastructure and deferred maintenance impacts on
readiness and quality of life that we have on those critical
assets?
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, that report I mentioned,
Congresswoman, was tasked for all of our forward station
forces. So it was facilitated or at least was identified based
on the water main on Hawaii. But I had tasked that same
requirement not only for Hawaii, but for Japan and our other
forward station bases.
We were a little better off there. Some of that stuff was
newer. But we are monitoring it. Again, the services are
required to keep that ready.
Ms. Tokuda. Do you especially feel, and was this part of
the report that given extreme weather conditions that we are
seeing that a lot of it also has to do not just with the state
of the current condition but also resiliency, Guam facing the
most super typhoon. But these are more common instances that we
are experiencing. So it was part of that reporting, extreme
weather impacts, climate change in terms of how that might
factor into war gaming and planning?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman. Again, so the
national security impacts of climate change is what we focus
on. And the severity of storms, sea level rise against our
military capabilities, the ability to plan and then built our
construction in a way where it is aligned and can sustain any
of those problem sets, that is how we look at it. So it is
important. We have done a look across all of the nations and
our assets. And we are implementing those requirements to
ensure what we build is able to adhere and stand for a long
time.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you. I know my time is up. I might have
more questions to add to the record. I appreciate the report.
Now it is on us to make sure we urgently follow that in terms
of the due diligence to make sure that it actually done and it
is funded. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Strong.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Chairman Rogers. Thank you, Ranking
Member Smith, and each of our panelists today.
Admiral Aquilino, first I want to thank you for your
faithful service to our country. It has been a great career.
And I appreciate you coming before us. As I shared with you
last year, I am fully on board with providing Indo-Pacific
command with the proper resources and funding to support the
defense of Guam mission.
I know the Army is working to rollout a plan for integrated
missile defense for Guam. However, as each of you know, well
know, we can't just provide weapons systems. There are several
other things needed to support this mission.
What is the defense of Guam 2030 architecture and how does
it align in INDOPACOM budget requests and unfunded priorities?
Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, it is my top priority. I
think the shortfalls we identified across all aspects of what
is needed, right, the purchasing of the capabilities, the
integration of those assets, both the Aegis portion of it, the
Army's portion of it with regard to integrating THAAD, Patriot,
IFPC, LTAMDS.
That architecture that we have designed, again a shortfall
we identified is about $430 million. That also includes
military construction.
So it is the top priority because it is the defense of the
homeland and 170,000 U.S. citizens as well as my ability to
surge and execute the force.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. At present, does Guam's existing
power infrastructure support the on-demand power needs of the
emerging defense of Guam's architecture?
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah. It is critically important. Again
we have taken some steps in the past. I give you this example.
So the Andersen Air Force Base power distribution mechanism is
all underground. And during that storm, we had only small
impacts there. In places where the power distribution was above
ground, the super typhoon went through it pretty badly. We have
to take those next set of steps.
The Air Force has identified $7.2 billion to do that. The
Navy has identified, I think it is $22 something billion. That,
I think, is a combination of the critical infrastructure needed
plus the additional capabilities on the sub-base. So we have to
work through that. But the ability to sustain Guam, certainly
from storms and ultimately from attack, is critically important
to us.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. Admiral and General, earlier this
week we saw yet another reckless attempt by North Korea to
destabilize the Indo-Pacific through three short-range
ballistic missile launches off its Eastern Coast. We currently
have THAAD batteries standing ready to defense against these
type of actions in two locations in the Indo-Pacific, Guam and
South Korea.
Last year, INDOPACOM released an operational needs
statement that advanced THAAD's capabilities to defeat the full
range of advanced ballistic and hypersonic missile threats. Can
you speak to the needs in the upgrade to the THAAD that will be
required to support integrated air and missile defense
requirements?
Admiral Aquilino. Certainly, Congressman, the integration
of all of our ballistic -- well, let me start with the sensing
aspect, right? One, we need to identify it, we need to track
it, and then we need to shoot it.
I don't care what tracks it. I don't care what shoots it.
We just got to hit it. So the integration of those
capabilities, whether they be Aegis from the shore, Aegis from
the sea, THAAD, Patriot, and the other systems I identified,
they all have to come together to be able to execute at speed.
And there is not a lot of time for decisions when you are
talking about, you know, intercontinental ballistic or
ballistic missiles.
So we are working to do that on Guam. And then the
architecture and integration certainly exists across all those
capabilities. Today, we got to get it synchronized, and we got
to be able to operate at pace.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. I will go ahead and mention another
thing. I know today we have mentioned PAC-3, SM2, NGI,
THAAD(Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), Patriot, directed
energy. I want to thank those in the industrial base. Many of
these are Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. And I took a
co-del there with many members. I am just telling you right
now, it is unbelievable. We have got to be prepared. We have
got to get the warfighter what they need to defend our country.
I thank each of you for being here. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Aquilino,
generals and admirals win awards and immortal fame for winning
wars, not preventing them. But for your work over the last
three years, in my humble opinion, I think you are an American
hero.
We are not where we need to be. We have a lot more work to
do. But we are a lot closer to where we need to go because of
your leadership.
You have also been someone who has been willing to engage
in the debate, the debate with our committee that should be a
hallmark of the relationship between the Department of Defense
and our Congress.
You have even been willing to admit when you are wrong. You
and I have had our fair share of debates. I have been willing
to admit that, too. And I think I have had to admit it more
times than you.
But when we fail to participate in that humble and honest
debate, we are ceding one of our supreme advantages over our
authoritarian allies. So it is incredibly important. And you
have set a great example by your leadership so thank you.
Admiral Aquilino, China has been getting steadily more
aggressive in their actions against our allies in the
Philippines, threatening their sovereign territory, their
economy, their sailors, and their ships. How should we respond?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. And again I, too,
appreciate the debates. I will say that I don't have to get it
all right. I just got to get it less wrong than the other guy.
Let me start by saying I am not a hero, right? The heroes
that exist out there are the 380,000 soldiers, sailors,
marines, civilians, and their families. I will pass on your
comments to them because I would have failed without them. They
are incredible.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
Admiral Aquilino. As it applies to Philippines, you know,
it is a really critical hotspot right now that could end up in
a bad place. The continued belligerent and aggressive and
dangerous activity by the PRC against our allies in the
Philippines is concerning to me. The Chinese have no legal
claim to the area that they have articulated as their sovereign
territory and the fact that they are now fire hosing and
ramming Philippine ships attempting to support Philippine
sailors on the Sierra Madre.
So I am concerned where it could go. I would hope that the
international community condemnation of those actions is enough
to get the Chinese to back off. But if it doesn't, it could go
in bad places.
The Philippines, if a sailor or soldier or one of their
members were killed, could invoke Article 5 of the Mutual
Defense Treaty. And that would put our policy decision-makers
in a place that would require really tough choices.
It would be my requirement and responsibility to provide
the Secretary with options if that were to happen.
Mr. Moulton. Dr. Ratner, where do you assess that we have
the strongest advantage over our potential adversaries in
developing those allies and partnerships in the regions, some
of which have really atrophied over the years, and how do you
think about what we need to do from the administration
perspective but also from the congressional perspective to
strengthen those allied relationships and ensure that when Xi
Jinping looks out at the Pacific, he sees a lot of allies and
not just the United States of America?
Mr. Ratner. Thank you, Congressman. A really important
question. And I think the fact of the matter is that today our
most important alliance is in partnerships that are stronger
than they have ever been. So if your question is where are our
strong points? They are in the Republic of Korea, Japan,
Philippines, Australia, India, and among other partners in
ASEAN as it relates to the Indo-Pacific.
I think in terms of what can we do to make them stronger,
we have bilateral agendas with all of these countries where we
are working with them, strengthening their capabilities,
advancing our roles, missions, and capabilities, expanding our
posture opportunities as we talked about earlier.
And one of the most important and innovative elements of
our strategy in the region is the degree to which we are
starting to knit these together. So we have seen unprecedented
cooperation between the United States, the ROK, and Japan. We
are seeing unprecedented cooperation between the United States,
Japan, and Australia, where they have designed their own access
agreements. And we have now seen F-35s from both countries
visit each other.
We are working on the Quad. We are integrating the
Philippines into these structures. So it is not just an
individual hub and spoke model, but a set in a constellation of
partnerships that really strengthens deterrence.
Mr. Moulton. Well, I think where you can have
recommendations for Congress about how we can better support
that work, it is something that we would like to hear. So thank
you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. I would remind
people that we are supposed to adjourn at 1:30, but we are
going to try to get in two more members. Mr. Moylan of Guam and
Mr. Davis of North Carolina. Mr. Moylan of Guam, you are
recognized.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As you know,
my work on the Armed Services Committee has focused on two
issues as the safety of the people of Guam and the need for
resilient civilian infrastructure on Guam, which underpins
military readiness.
I would like to thank the INDOPACOM for having prioritized
the safety of the people of Guam and making missile defense
their number one unfunded priority for FY25. I will also lead
these efforts to ensure that this item is fully funded.
Admiral, on Guam, the military and civilian communities
share one port, one power grid, one set of roadways, and all
other major infrastructures. Yet Guam's infrastructure is being
pushed to the point of failure.
I have put forward several legislation proposals addressing
the problem. However, can you please speak to the military
importance of this infrastructure and any national security
risk posed by allowing this infrastructure to fail?
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, thanks, Congressman. With Guam as a
critical aspect of our strategic approach and the ability to
deter and generate forces both the capability to defense, the
capability to deliver often affects and the ability to sustain
the force through the airport and the seaport that exists
there, Guam is obviously a strategic location and critical to
our approach.
So that says everything has got to work to include the
infrastructure. It has got to be flexible, it has got to be
redundant, and we can't have breaks.
So we talked about the numbers of $7.2 billion on the Air
Force side, 22.4 I think for the Navy side. We have to be able
to get this in a place where we do have sustained, consistent,
flexible, and redundant power, water, and all of the
capabilities needed to generate the force.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you. The next question, Admiral, is 40
percent of our cargo moving through the Port of Guam is
military cargo. The military is the largest consumer of
electrical power on Guam. Yet the load shedding occurs and the
Department of Defense is not affected. And the military is the
only organization exempt in Guam, its local law, from weight
restrictions for vehicles on public roads.
The people of Guam have come to a consensus that the
federal government must contribute to the reconstruction of our
infrastructure. I have responded to this consensus by proposing
legislation such as Typhoon Mawar Reconstruction Act, which
will allow FEMA(Federal Emergency Management Agency) to carry
out necessary construction efforts. Would expanded federal
involvement in Guam's infrastructure make your mission easier?
Admiral Aquilino. From my seat, Congressman, again, it
doesn't matter the mechanism that gets it as long as the
capability can be delivered from Guam and we can support the
military requirements as well as being a good part of the
community because our footprint will increase there. We need to
take that into account. But for me the mechanism doesn't matter
as long as it is ready, in place, resilient, and sustainable.
Mr. Moylan. Okay. Thank you. And, Admiral, for my final
question, a few weeks ago, I had the pleasure of meeting with
Brigadier General Cruz, the Adjutant General of the Guam
National Guard.
He relayed to me his sentiment of wanting his force to have
closeness and presence amongst the force on the island. How
does Guam guard being incorporated into this strategic plan of
future operations on Guam?
Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, for the operations and
actions that we execute from my seat, the integrated joint
force is what is needed. And what that means as it applies to
the Guard and Reserve is that if I go to work, and I can't tell
who is a guardsman and who is active duty, that is what right
looks like.
Now that said on Guam, they are kind of leading the path
here. So in the wake of the storm, they went to full activation
and support directly alongside the Title 10 component that was
supporting there. And that has to happen throughout the region,
not just on Guam.
They currently support and protect the THAAD formation
there. So I think it is probably a pretty good example of what
right looks like for a total integrated force.
Mr. Moylan. I thank you, Admiral, and I just want to say I
appreciate your service. You have been a good friend to the
people of Guam, and you will be missed. But I am sure the next
-- your replacement will have that good relationship as well so
thank you very much, sir.
And on a final note, I would also like to reiterate that my
colleagues and I are still awaiting a clear plan from DOD
regarding Typhoon Mawar's recovery. And with that, Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair, and to the
witnesses for being here today.
Since Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, we have seen
President Putin and Xi develop an increasingly intimate
relationship. Mr. Ratner and General LaCamera, just last week
Russia, China, Iran, completed the at-sea phase of the Sea
Security Belt 2024 exercise near the Gulf of Oman.
What can we learn from the exercise about the growing
Russia-China relationship?
General LaCamera. Thanks, Congressman. I mean, we are
watching the activities in Ukraine. We are watching the
activities in the Middle East. We are watching the training
that goes on and around the Peninsula with China, Russia, and
DPRK and incorporating it into our exercises, making sure that
we understand the capabilities that our adversaries are
developing.
And, you know, as a reminder, the treaty does not name an
adversary of what we have to do to protect the Republic of
Korea.
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, Congressman, I am concerned about
the increasing relationship between the PRC and Russia. Again,
I articulated that the world is more global. It is more
integrated. It is more connected. And the two authoritarian
powers that are focused on delivering the same strategic
objectives is concerning.
I continue to articulate that any win for Russia as it
applies to the Ukraine is a win for China. And that is not in
our best interest. So the continued support to Ukraine is
critical. Again, that is also in the supplemental, but the
critical capabilities that you have identified to go to
INDOPACOM are also critical. So I thank the Congress for the
support and hopefully we can get that passed very soon.
Mr. Davis. I want to thank you for your response and
respect the time, Mr. Chair, we will be submitting any
additional questions. Thank you so much. I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The Chairman now
recognizes General Mr. Garamendi for a brief acknowledgment.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentleman, thank you for your testimony today and your patience
through all of this.
I want to specifically address Admiral Aquilino. I want to
thank you for your extraordinary leadership. You are strong,
intelligent, thoughtful, always informed, and I must say
successful leadership.
It is quite remarkable what you were able to accomplish in
your tenure as the INDOPACOM commander. You have focused the
Department of Defense and the Congress on the most difficult of
all of the regions in this world, and I thank you.
I thank you for the personal relationship we have been able
to build and for what you have done for this nation. And with
that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Well said, and I completely concur. I thank
all of your for your presence and your service to our nation.
And, with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 20, 2024
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 20, 2024
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GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 20, 2024
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. Admiral Aquilino, in your testimony, you state that
North Korea hopes to leverage their assistance to Russia to obtain
technology for their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Is North
Korea receiving military weapon systems or technology from Russia in
exchange?
Admiral Aquilino. It's not clear what, if anything, North Korea has
received thus far. We know North Korea has sent a large amount of
conventional artillery ammunition and rockets to Russia, as well as a
modest number of ballistic missiles. We also know Russia has used them
against Ukraine because the Ukrainians have recovered and analyzed the
debris.
Kim Jong Un likely expects something in return. Putin promised
Russian assistance to Kim's nascent space program when he met with Kim
last September. That assistance could also directly benefit the DPRK's
long-range offensive missile programs, as there are many technologies
common to both space and missile programs. Kim also visited a military
aircraft factory when he was in Russia, strongly suggesting acquisition
of new, more advanced aircraft is a DPRK priority.
Mr. Wilson. General LaCamera, in your testimony you state how
critical training is to maintain readiness and deter our adversaries in
the region. You also state some of the challenges you face in this area
such as the high turnover rate of service members within U.S. Forces
Korea and geographical space constraints.
When taking into consideration the critical role Air and Missile
Defense units add to the Joint-Bilateral fight in the region, are
current policies inhibiting commanders' ability to maintain an adequate
level of readiness to meet the rising threats?
General LaCamera. Shorter tour lengths result in higher personnel
turnover rate, causing more frequent breaks of trained, ready, and
certified Air Defense crews and, thus, overall readiness. Changing
accompanied tours to 36-month tour lengths in the Republic of Korea
would reduce strain on Air and Missile Defense crew readiness,
training, and operational tempo, as well as provide greater stability
for both the units and individual personnel. Additionally, continuing
to provide volunteers of unaccompanied tour extensions from 1-year to
2-years would also provide desired benefits to both the crews and the
volunteering individual.
Mr. Wilson. Dr. Ratner, over the past few years we've witnessed
China extend their influence throughout the Indo-Pacific region with
their projection of military force (including an unprecedented
modernization of their military). In stride, the U.S. has established
and continues to strengthen relationships w/ our multilateral partners
in the region.
Can you characterize the positive impact these relationships, and
the potential impact new partner relationships, have on countering
China's influence in the region?
Follow-Up: Are there any actions Congress or the U.S. Government
can take to establish new relationships to further our efforts?
Mr. Ratner. [No answer was available at time of publication.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. As INDOPACOM looks to build relations with partners
and allies, the Coast Guard can and does play a critical role in
supporting those relationships. Despite the Coast Guard's outsized
impact, there are significant budget disparities compared to other
branches of the military. For example, this year's budget request for
the entire Coast Guard ($12.3 billion) is only slightly larger than
that request for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative alone ($9.9 billion)
and far less than the DoD's $850 billion. What strategies is INDOPACOM
implementing to allocate resources more effectively for burden sharing?
How is DoD supporting the resources that USCG needs to operate? Are
payments keeping pace with operational demands?
Admiral Aquilino. The United States Coast Guard budget falls under
the Department of Homeland Security. We strive to maintain a close
relationship with the Coast Guard to synchronize requirements and
investment strategies. We advocate for resources allocated to centrally
managed funds for operations and activities, especially those involving
security cooperation and countering transnational organized crime, two
areas where capabilities owned by the Coast Guard are highly relevant.
We fully support the Coast Guard's investment in presence in the Indo-
Pacific Region and appreciate the FY2025 Coast Guard budget including
$200 million to expand the program of record for two fast response
cutters in support of the Indo-Pacific Strategy and $63 million to
support training, partnership, and engagement in the theater.
Mr. Garamendi. Under the Navy's FY2025 budget submission, the Navy
is proposing to defer procurement of the second TAGOS-25 class ship
from FY2025 to FY2026. The Navy's proposed FY2025 shipbuilding budget
requests no procurement funding for the TAGOS-25 program. Given the
expense and limitations of T-AGS, have you evaluated alternative
approaches to ocean floor mapping, such as lower cost unmanned maritime
vehicles, which could also enable existing TAGOS ships to focus other
critical intelligence missions?
Admiral Aquilino. The Navy's five current Auxiliary General Ocean
Surveillance, the T-AGOS-19 and -23 class ships, are used primarily for
gathering acoustic intelligence using the Surveillance Towed Array
Sensor System, commonly called SURTASS. These will be replaced by the
T-AGOS-25 at a rate of one per year, excluding FY2025. As a mitigation
measure, the Navy has procured expeditionary SURTASS, or SURTASS-E,
which can be deployed globally using roll-on/roll-off equipment on a
vessel of opportunity.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. During the wars in the Middle East, the men and women of
Special Operations were largely seen as a counter-terrorism force with
little attention given to the impact that SOF has ``left of war.'' What
is the role of SOF in your AOR today?
Admiral Aquilino. In the Indo-Pacific, special operations forces,
or SOF, continue longstanding efforts to enhance partner capacity by
building generational relationships grounded in trust. SOF remain
focused on honing the core maritime capabilities of the Naval Special
Warfare and Marine Raider formations to preserve and strengthen U.S.
warfighting advantage. Multiple SOF elements, including Air Force
Special Operations units, leverage large-scale joint exercises to
experiment with emerging technologies and creative options to extend
the operational reach of the Joint Force in USINDOPACOM.
SOF are a major component of the ``To Be'' posture within the first
island chain, where SOF are establishing critical C2 architectures
enabling interoperability and synchronized operations, activities, and
investments with allies and partners in the first island chain and
periphery of the PRC. These operations, activities, and investments
highlight and exploit PRC aggression against our allies in the South
China Sea and East China Seas to garner increased support for a free
and open Indo-Pacific.
Mr. Scott. Terrorist groups obtain financing through many different
methods. What actions are INDOPACOM taking to combat the financing of
terrorists? Are there areas in which increased collaboration with
interagency partners, allies, or partner nations would lead to cutting
terrorist financing to prevent them from buying weapons and conducting
attacks?
Admiral Aquilino. In the Indo-Pacific Region, terrorist
organizations primarily self-fund using sources such as donations and
member contributions. Fundraising activity is generally opportunistic
and self-directed, and these organizations typically lack an organized
financial network. The situation offers few options for formal
financial institutions and local partner law enforcement to intervene
in the financing of terrorist organizations. However, cumulative years
of intense security pressure by local allies and partners continues to
significantly degrade the abilities of regional terrorist groups to
plan and conduct attacks.
Mr. Scott. India has finally begun decreasing imports of Russian
oil and subsequently increasing U.S. imports. Although INDOPACOM has
taken steps to bolster defense cooperation between the U.S. and India,
what can the interagency to encourage the Indian government to severely
reduce their dependence on Russian oil?
Admiral Aquilino. The U.S.-India Major Defense Partnership has
never been stronger, enabled by increased strategic alignment, improved
military interoperability, and enduring support to India's defense
modernization efforts. I support any efforts that the interagency can
take to further strengthen this partnership and reduce Indian reliance
on Russian oil, and I would refer you to Department of State and the
Department of the Treasury for additional detail on these efforts.
Mr. Scott. How many more State Partnership Program (SPP) Projects
could occur in your AOR if SPP had multiyear funding?
Admiral Aquilino. Multi-year SPP funding will improve engagement
predictability, increase the quality and quantity of engagements, and
leverage long-term planning to provide the best qualified subject
matter experts to participate in engagements. It will allow events to
be conducted throughout the year, as opposed to the compressed third-
and fourth-quarter limitations presented with the current funding model
and its lack of predictability. A five-year funding cycle will also
allow for the introduction of innovative new ideas that require phased
implementation. Multi-year funding will result in a 20 to 50 percent
increase in SPP projects in USINDOPACOM.
Mr. Scott. Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
wrote an article in the December 2023 issue of Proceedings entitled,
``Mine Warfare Could Be Key.'' According to Admiral Winnefeld,
``Offensive mine warfare-in both its current and potential
instantiations-offers an opportunity to present new dilemmas to those
who would threaten U.S. vital interests, but only if we quickly
recapitalize this disruptive, historically proven capability before it
is too late.'' Do you agree with Admiral Winnefeld's assessment?
Admiral Aquilino. Offensive maritime mining is one tool that may be
used to deter or defeat an adversary, as it adds uncertainty to the
adversary's road-to-war calculations. Offensive mining restricts an
adversary's maneuver space, both spatially and temporally. Mining is
relatively cheap and expeditious. Mine clearing operations, on the
other hand, are expensive, dangerous, and time consuming. Remote-
controlled mining technology offers new ways to present dilemmas to an
adversary, and offers a wide range of options to influence the outcome
of high-end conflicts while minimizing the risk of civilian harm.
Mr. Scott. CDR. Justin Cobb, USN, wrote an article in the March
2024 issue of Proceedings entitled, ``The Navy Is Not Prepared for the
Joint Fight in IndoPaCom.'' According to CDR. Cobb, ``What joint all-
domain operations (JADO) and Joint All-Domain Command and Control
(JADC2) are missing is a new all-domain ``Current Tactical Orders and
Doctrine, U.S. Pacific Fleet,'' otherwise known as ``PAC 10'' and
originally issued in 1943 to address continued deficiencies in
operational and tactical execution. Does USINDOPACOM need to re-issue a
new all-domain ``Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Pacific
Fleet,'' otherwise known as ``PAC 10?''
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM executes joint all-domain operations,
activities, and investments to achieve intermediate objectives as
defined in the Theater Campaign Plan and establishes the baseline for
an assessment process. Within this guidance is the requirement for
persistent synchronized operations across the joint force in all
domains, to include allies and partners, coordinated across time and
space. Improvements within the USINDOPACOM Campaign Plan include
expansion of complexity in operations and enhanced global coordination
to create new dilemmas for adversaries while increasing opportunities
of engagement with like-minded countries. This Campaign Plan represents
a modern equivalent of the historic ``PAC 10.''
Mr. Scott. Lieutenant Commander Alex Crosby, U.S. Navy, wrote an
article in the September 2023 issue of Proceedings entitled, ``The
Joint Force Needs a Counter-SOF Strategy.'' According to Crosby,
Strategic conflict will include the threat of adversary SOF, which
demands forethought-i.e., developing a joint strategy for countering
adversary SOF efforts with conventional forces. Integrating joint force
capabilities and Special Operations Command expertise to build such a
strategy is possible and should be prioritized, to provide operational
commanders guidance before conflict erupts.'' Do you agree with
Crosby's assessment? Is the U.S. joint force prepared to counter
adversary special operations forces (SOF) threatening U.S. national
interests in your area of responsibility?
Admiral Aquilino. The joint force is prepared to counter adversary
SOF threatening U.S. national interests in the Indo-Pacific. More
importantly, we are working with our allies and partners to strengthen
their resilience through the doctrinal application of foreign internal
defense and through training, which will be decisive in countering
adversarial SOF.
Mr. Scott. Rear Admiral Patrick Piercey, U.S. Navy (Retired), wrote
an article in the September 2023 issue of Proceedings entitled,
``Planning for the Next War Must Be a Mixture of Art & Science.''
According to Piercey, ``Commander's intent, mission command, all-domain
fires, and the ability to maneuver in the decision space must be
resilient enough to keep going. Creating that resiliency means the
joint force must rebalance toward critical thinking, creativity, and
imagination-otherwise known as the art of war.'' Do you agree with
Piercey's assessment? Does the forces under your command have the
critical thinking, creativity, and imagination to be resilient enough
to absorb the first punch and keep fighting?
Admiral Aquilino. The USINDOPACOM Seize the Initiative approach to
implementing the National Defense Strategy challenges the joint force
to think, act, and operate differently, which includes planning through
operational design to increase the complexity of our activities, create
new dilemmas for adversaries, and reassure like-minded countries.
Through persistent operations, synchronized across all domains with
allies and partners, the combined and joint force improves its
warfighting proficiency. When enabled by a flexible, distributed force
posture, the joint force has the resiliency to respond to regional
crises or conflicts and, if deterrence fails, ``fight tonight.''
Mr. Scott. How confident are you that USINDOPACOM will be able to
rely on foreign commercial vessel contracts to transport battle damaged
ships in the event of a conflict? What is the minimum number of organic
heavy-lift ships needed by USINDOPACOM?
Admiral Aquilino. It depends on which carriers would be willing to
participate in naval salvage or recovery operations, and which would be
pre-positioned in the region at the time of need. Float on/float off
vessels would likely be required for these operations, though the
Department of Defense does not own or operate any. The entire
requirement would need to be contracted.
There are only four organic heavy-lift ships available to
USINDOPACOM, but they are not large enough to support U.S. naval combat
loading. Additional assessments between USINDOPACOM and our partners at
USTRANSCOM are required to better refine the minimum requirement.
Mr. Scott. Dr. Jerry Hendrix, Senior Fellow at the Sagamore
Institute, wrote a March 26, 2024, article in Asia Times entitled,
``China's Maritime Power Cause for Action and Alarm.'' According to Dr.
Hendrix, ``The United States should also seek to pursue repair capacity
in the group of Freely Associated States of Micronesia, the Marshall
Islands and Palau, with which it just recently signed a new Compact of
Free Association. These islands, some of which lie just outside of the
Chinese threat perimeter, possess some superb harbors and airfields but
require investment to modernize their repair capacity.'' How much would
it cost to modernize the repair capacity of the Freely Associated
States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau?
Admiral Aquilino. The Freely Associated States and their
infrastructure are vital to INDOPACOM's ``To Be'' Posture. While
INDOPACOM does not have plans for depot-level repair capabilities in
these states, we do have plans to rely on them for expeditionary
repair, rearm, refuel and resupply activities. For the past few years
INDOPACOM has utilized advance planning and MILCON Planning & Design
funding provided by Congress to study, plan, and design infrastructure
projects to modernize airfields, seaports, and storage facilities in
the Freely Associated States. The funded activities include topographic
surveys, geotechnical surveys, environmental baseline surveys, joint
area development plans and designs of infrastructure projects. The
current cost estimates for the various airfield and seaport investments
are $1.89 billion for Palau, $2.98 billion for the Federated States of
Micronesia, and $750 million for the Marshall Islands.
Mr. Scott. According to Dr. Hendrix, the United States ``should
also seek to better leverage the repair capacity of foreign yards,
perhaps by providing advanced surface-to-air defensive missile systems
to protect those sites.'' Do you agree or disagree with Dr. Hendrix's
assessment?
Admiral Aquilino. There is a global demand for integrated air and
missile defense, or IAMD, a low-density class of assets with high
demand. USINDOPACOM is working closely with allies and partners that
have IAMD capabilities to supplement the defense of critical assets in
theater. The command, along with stakeholders, has a methodology to
identify critical assets, to inform air and missile defense priorities
and determine how to distribute IAMD assets across the theater.
Mr. Scott. Tim Sheehy wrote an article in the March 2024 issue of
Proceedings entitled, ``The Navy Must Reconsider Using Seaplanes.''
According to Sheehy, ``seaplanes rescued thousands of downed airmen and
sailors, resupplied remote operating bases, supported spy and insurgent
networks, and acted as the eyes and ears for fleet commanders at sea
across the Pacific and Atlantic theaters.'' Since there are no
seaplanes in the U.S. inventory today, how do you plan to replicate the
tasks mentioned above that were performed by seaplanes in World War II?
Admiral Aquilino. The USINDOPACOM approach to the recovery of
distressed personnel at sea is via a multifaceted construct relying on
multiple mechanisms, capabilities, and allied or partner capacities. It
does not rely on any one particular technical or technological
application for these mission sets. Having said that, USINDOPACOM would
certainly welcome additional capabilities for long-range and persistent
airborne logistic, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
platforms.
Mr. Scott. China operates the AG600 Sea Dragon. Russia flies the
Be-200 while Japan operates a fleet of US-1As and ShinMaywa US-2s. What
do Japan, China, and Russia know about the capabilities of seaplanes in
the USINDOPACOM AOR that we don't know? Should seaplanes be added to
future Unfunded PRiority Lists? Should the U.S. Air National Guard be
considered as a potential home for U.S. seaplanes if the Navy doesn't
want them?
Admiral Aquilino. China, Russia, and Japan currently all operate
seaplanes in support of civil activities, such as firefighting,
maritime search and rescue, or to transport supplies or personnel to
remote locations. Certainly, in a crisis those seaplanes could be used
to support military operations, and there is no lack of knowledge about
the employment of seaplanes within USINDOPACOM where we have included
the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force US-2 seaplane in large U.S.
and Japanese fleet training exercises. There is currently no
USINDOPACOM requirement for seaplanes specifically, but we do support
the continuous development of new and innovative solutions to
logistical challenges being pursued by the services.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
Mr. Bergman. Admiral Aquilino, how can INDOPACOM make most
efficient use of pre-existing commercial cellular infrastructure to
provide improved availability, security, and resilience for
communications across the AOR?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM utilizes commercial cellular as a
transport option for its approved mobility solution. Leveraging
additional cellular capabilities beyond these approved access solutions
is often limited due to foreign cellular infrastructure
vulnerabilities.
Mr. Bergman. What kind of investments is INDOPACOM making to
develop that concept, especially in advance of potential operations in
2027 or in light of feelings of isolation that servicemembers have
reported while deployed?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM will continue to leverage and build
upon approved mobility solutions and emerging capabilities in support
of future operations. Communicating with friends and family is
essential to the positive morale and well-being of those who are
deployed.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. The U.S. naval fleet is getting widely outpaced by
China. With over 370 Chinese naval vessels vs 280 U.S. naval vessels.
How are patrols and operational tempo affected in the INDOPACOM AOR
with current vessel numbers and the potential pull to CENTCOM to
address the Houthi problem?
Admiral Aquilino. This situation underscores a critically important
difference between the U.S. and PRC navies - we are a global force and
they are not. On a typical day, both navies might have about 75 ships
at sea for operations, exercises or training. For the U.S., those 75
ships will be present in every ocean and every region to advance and
protect the maritime commons for the benefit of all. The portion
available in the western Pacific will be a small percentage of the
total ships underway. By contrast, nearly all of the PLA Navy's 75
ships will be in the western Pacific, as the PLAN only maintains one
out-of-area commitment, a three-ship counter-piracy force in the Gulf
of Aden. This gives the PLAN a consistent numerical advantage of
between 5 and 7 to 1.
Taking INDOPACOM assigned or operating forces and committing them
elsewhere will exacerbate this numerical overmatch. The PRC has shown
no inclination to deploy any assets to assist the international
response, including no actions by the counter-piracy task force already
in the region.
Mr. Waltz. Admiral Paparo recently stated ``Just in the last three
years, step-level changes in the [Chinese military] force levels, the
jointness of those force levels, the rehearsals that are apparent to
the joint force and raising the threshold of warning to the point where
soon we'll be at a point where a force sufficient to execute a profound
military operation is in the field and operating under a fig leaf of
exercise.'' If this is the case, how are your forces postured to
respond to an exercise that could in turn be a PLA offensive?
Admiral Aquilino. I completely agree with ADM Paparo's comments
about diminished warning. The PLA's steady-state posture and operations
could give them the ability to posture for hostilities under the guise
of an exercise, similar to what we saw Russia try to do prior to
invading Ukraine. PLA rehearsals almost certainly are intended - in
part - to desensitize Taiwan and the region to this increased PLA
presence. This is especially concerning when considering ``smaller''
military courses of action, such as China seizing one or more of
Taiwan's offshore islands. This concern is driving a broad effort to
reimagine how we do warning, incorporating more and different
indicators. We continuously monitor PLA activity and adjust our force
posture, training, and our requirements to maintain a credible
deterrence and options should deterrence fail.
Mr. Waltz. Publicly, China disclosed their defense budget as only
$230 billion. European think tanks have estimated that real Chinese
defense spending is at least 30-40 percent higher than the official
budget. Numerous analyses have concluded the Chinese government
excludes significant sums from the official figures to hide the extent
of its military buildup.
With this obvious Chinese military buildup, is INDOPACOM matching
the requirement to deter and compete with China with advanced
technology to achieve joint all domain command and control (JADC)? What
do you need from Congress? How are our allies and partners in the
region responding to meet this growing concern?
Last month, Australia announced a plan to increase its fleet of
warships and boost its defense spending to 2.4% of its GDP, above the
2% target for our NATO allies. Given our level of engagement through
AUKUS, can you describe any increase in interest or engagement from
other nations to engage us for greater naval security cooperation?
Admiral Aquilino. The Joint Fires Network (JFN) is INDOPACOM's
initiative to provide an operational Joint All Domain Command and
Control (JADC2) capability in the Indo-Pacific by 2027. We are
aggressively pursuing JFN in partnership with the services, OSD, Joint
Staff, and allies. We are making progress, but we need to move faster.
I ask for Congress's continued support in resourcing our investments
identified in USINDOPACOM's Independent Assessment report through the
FY2025 appropriation and the FY2024 supplemental. I appreciate the
additional $50 million Congress appropriated in FY24 for JFN. This
funding will allow us to begin fielding the network. I would also
highlight that JFN is the number two priority on my unfunded priorities
list for FY25, and I have requested an additional $122.7 million that
is necessary to ensure the network is ready by 2027.
Allies and partners in the region are all taking steps to buttress
their security in light of the PRC military buildup. Japan, Australia,
the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines have been closely monitoring
the actions of the PRC and have taken several steps to respond to
challenges posed by China's assertive behavior. These include a
combination of diplomatic, economic, and military measures to respond
to China's actions while also seeking to maintain stability and promote
cooperation in the region.
Yes, several nations in the Pacific have expressed interest in and
engaged with the United States for greater naval security cooperation,
largely as a result of aggressive actions by the PRC to assert unlawful
maritime territorial claims. Japan, Philippines, India, Vietnam, and
Taiwan have sought increased maritime security ties with the United
States and our allies. The United States has longstanding alliances and
partnerships in the region, and its naval presence plays a crucial role
in maintaining security and stability.
Mr. Waltz. INDOPACOM recently submitted a required independent
assessment that contained multiple infrastructure related needs. What
MILCON projects were not included in the FY25 budget request or on the
Future Years Defense Program list and why?
Admiral Aquilino.A number of MILCON projects were not included in
the FY2025 budget request including Army major construction for three
Guam Defense System projects on Guam; Air Force and Navy major
construction for airfield and runway improvements at Yap; Navy major
construction for harbor improvements at Palau; Navy major construction
for joint communications upgrades, a consolidated joint communication
center, and a satellite communications center on Guam; and Navy major
construction for an aircraft refueling pit and high explosive magazines
in Hawaii.
The majority of these were not funded because they had not
satisfied the OSD requirement that projects should be at the thirty-
five percent design level at the time of the program budget review. The
planning and design funds that Congress has provided in recent years
have enabled us to move most of these beyond the thirty-five percent
design level since the time of the program budget review.
Mr. Waltz. Following the defueling of Hawaii's Red Hill Bulk Fuel
Storage Facility, the criticality of Guam as an Indo-Pacific logistics
hub is highly elevated. However, Guam is reliant upon only two major
piers for fuel imports - one of which was permanently damaged by
Typhoon Mawar in 2023. As a result, suppliers are forced to limit bulk
fuel delivery to the island, thus further compounding Guam's limited
bulk fuel storage capabilities. Failure to invest in upgrades and
innovation of fuel distribution systems creates supply chain risk,
maintains higher than necessary operational costs, and restricts both
agility and readiness at the tactical, operational, and strategic
levels.
What action is the Department taking to modernize distribution of
fuel and energy assets to Guam and/or promote industry partnerships to
help Guam? Further, how does the Department plan to test the
performance of its operational energy assets in a contested environment
within the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM continues to advocate for an
interconnected fuel posture with various sites throughout the region
that provides the redundancy, resiliency, and flexibility required for
the contested environment. Increasing fuel capacity in Australia, Guam
and other Pacific islands provides survivability to the fuel network.
Continued investment in fuel infrastructure postured west of the
International Date Line and east of potential weapon engagement zones
affords the Department the ability to maneuver from safe distances.
USINDOPACOM participates in Defense Logistics Agency Energy's
annual Installation Planning Review Board, where we submit and advocate
for the prioritization of USINDOPACOM service component military
construction projects across the theater, including Guam. Additionally,
we, along with our fuel mission partners including USTRANSCOM and
Defense Logistics Agency Energy, coordinate closely to grow and develop
relationships with commercial industry and continue to pursue
commercial contracting opportunities with the U.S. petroleum industry
to strengthen integrated deterrence options on Guam and across the
theater.
USINDOPACOM and its service components have tested and will
continue to test operational energy assets during field exercises such
as Talisman Saber in Australia, Balikatan in the Philippines, and
Valiant Shield throughout the Indo-Pacific.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIMENEZ
Mr. Gimenez. You have said that integrated air missile defense for
Guam is your number one priority. Why is it your top priority? Despite
it being your top priority, in your independent assessment, there
remains a substantial shortfall in funding. Given the past five years
that this requirement has been requested, it does not appear we are
making much progress. What is the problem, how have you tried to
address it, and what can we do to advance integrated air missile
defense for Guam?
Admiral Aquilino. Defense of the homeland is USINDOPACOM's number
one priority. As the most forward U.S. territory and a strategic
outpost in the Western Pacific, Guam is critical to projecting power,
maintaining deterrence and stability, and responding to crisis or
conflict in the region. The United States has programmed billions of
dollars in defense capability on Guam to advance those capabilities
including offensive capabilities, command and control, and sustainment.
Establishing the Guam Defense System, a 360-degree, persistent,
layered, and integrated air and missile defense on Guam, remains the
top homeland defense priority for USINDOPACOM and underscores the
seriousness of this responsibility and approach taken to protect more
than 170,000 U.S. citizens on the island.
USINDOPACOM has consistently advocated with OSD for full funding of
the Guam Defense System. As you know, the command provides input to the
budget process, but all decisions are made by the services and OSD.
There are several challenges to fielding an integrated air and missile
defense architecture on Guam including funding levels, environmental
impacts and mitigation, MILCON capacity and prioritization, and local
opposition groups. We must ensure that the funding for the Guam Defense
System is fulfilled, and that work is prioritized. To enable this, all
stakeholders must conduct comprehensive and holistic analysis on the
requirements and the associated costs to accurately inform funding and
development.
Mr. Gimenez. You said Under Secretary Shyu has been incredibly
supportive of your efforts in INDOPACOM. I had the chance to speak with
her on her efforts on rapid acceleration of autonomous systems to deter
China. What has she provided you that has been most effective and most
realistic to be fielded at scale by 2027?
Admiral Aquilino. Under Secretary Shyu's organization has been
actively engaged with the Defense Innovation Unit led Replicator
effort. Replicator-1 is focusing on all domain attritable autonomous
systems to be available in the March 2025 to August 2025 timeframe.
Four autonomous systems were selected for Replicator-1 Tranche-1 for
rapid development. We have worked with other stakeholders to develop
concepts of operations for these four systems. The Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and many other
organizations are now coordinating experimentation plans for
development of tactics, techniques, and procedures for these systems in
parallel with efforts in policy, acquisition, strategic engagement, and
other lines of effort directed by the Defense Innovation Unit.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LALOTA
Mr. LaLota. As our concerns rise with countering peer / near peer
aggression in INDOPACOM and the other COCOMs, we're modernizing our
services with network-enabled capabilities such as real-time common
operating picture with mission command, robotics, AI, the use of
sensors, and the effects of integrated fires. How do you feel C-JADC2
is progressing, and are your networks and modernization pathways
suitable for supporting such capabilities while integrating your
operations with partner forces?
Admiral Aquilino. We are making progress toward partner integration
in line with the C-JADC2 Campaign Plan 2030 FVEY Addendum. The
INDOPACOM Mission Network (IMN) proved successful during KEEN EDGE 24
by integrating two partners enabling trilateral operations.
Mr. LaLota. Can you discuss the importance of merging unmanned
underwater vehicles (UUVs) and artificial intelligence (AI) systems
with our existing manned submarine fleet in the Indo-Pacific, and how
that could enhance our operations and capabilities?
Admiral Aquilino. UUVs will deliver effects, increase forward
operational persistence, and enable clandestine surveillance and combat
reach. UUVs will operate independently from or in cooperation with
crewed vehicles as mission needs dictate; will operate in areas that
are inaccessible to manned submarines and ships; and will address
capability gaps of crewed systems. The integration of AI and machine
learning technologies with unmanned and remotely operated undersea
vehicles is critical to enabling UUVs to operate independently and
autonomously.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLS
Mr. Mills. The PRC's use of corruption is heavily destabilizing the
politics and economics of the Pacific Islands, weakening their
democratic institutions and opening the door for Chinese influence
operations designed to pull them into Beijing's orbit. This political
warfare is leading directly to military advantage for Beijing, as we
saw with the Solomon Islands. How can the Department of Defense assist
the U.S. Freely Associated States fight PRC-linked criminal activity?
If the countries request support, can Joint Interagency Task Force-West
(JIATF-West), JAGs, and others from the Department of Defense work with
their governments to give them the necessary tools to defend themselves
from these attacks?
Admiral Aquilino. The response to pervasive malign Chinese behavior
must incorporate all available instruments of U.S. national power. DOD
can and will play a role, through information sharing and exposing what
the PRC is doing, but the most effective counters are almost certain to
come in the form of economic engagement, assistance with tracking and
countering illegal PRC activities, exposing mis- and disinformation,
and robust and consistent operations in the information domain.
Mr. Mills. There is a lot of talk in the Federated States and
Marshall Islands about U.S. initiatives to support National Security
Council development in their countries, as required under the CONVENE
Act. However, there are conflicting reports about what parts of the
U.S. government are proposing this and what it would look like. Can you
clarify what is being proposed? What government departments and
agencies are involved? What support is going to the existing National
Security Coordination office in Palau?
Admiral Aquilino. The Department of Defense and our interagency
partners have persistently called for the establishment of national
security councils in the Federated States and Marshall Islands. The
Marshall Islands recently established their National Security Office
and has been working with the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies,
the State Department's Global Defense Reform Program, and with Lawyers
without Borders to begin drafting a national security policy.
USINDOPACOM has been engaged in providing training and security
cooperation assistance, where requested, to Palau's established
National Security Coordination office, and maintains a liaison position
in at the embassy to support these activities.
Mr. Mills. Much of the focus in INDOPACOM and around the PRC has
focused on the threat posed by an invasion of Taiwan by China. However,
we have also seen China apply pressure throughout the region. On March
5th, Chinese Coast Guard ships aggressively approached and sideswiped a
Philippine patrol vessel. China's actions injured a Filipino admiral
and four sailors. This is just one example of the increased pressure
China is applying across the region, not just around Taiwan. Is it
possible that China decides to take military or asymmetric actions
elsewhere in the INDOPACOM region in order to set the conditions for a
future invasion of Taiwan? Are we focusing too many resources on a
Taiwan fight and not enough on the broader competition throughout the
region and conflict in other locations? Where do you believe we are
most likely to see conflicts arise outside of the Taiwan AOR?
Admiral Aquilino. By necessity, we dedicate a significant amount of
attention and effort to the most dangerous potential action, a possible
PRC invasion of Taiwan, but we also balance our presence and activities
against all those other situations. Our campaign approach accounts for
gray zone activity, supports our allies and partners in their efforts
to resist PRC pressure, and postures forces for a wide range of
activities. We are prepared and postured to counter PRC actions not
only against Taiwan, but throughout the entire region. Additionally, we
maintain awareness and capabilities to counter the other significant
threats in our region, the DPRK and Russia.
Mr. Mills. China is investing heavily in modernizing its military,
including new armored vehicles which they clearly see value in. Do our
ground forces in the region have the capabilities and resources to
effectively counter concentrated armored forces? The Marines lack any
armor capabilities in their current force structure. Armored forces
have proven vital in past Pacific conflicts and the ongoing conflict in
Ukraine. Do you see a world in which the Army is expected to cover down
any gaps in the Marine's armor capabilities?
Admiral Aquilino. The joint force is postured to fight as a team,
leveraging the strengths of each service against the appropriate
threat. The distribution of armor among ground forces to support
mission objectives is no exception - it is essential. The Marine Corps'
Force Design 2030 is an example of the bold changes we'd like to see
across the Department to re-orient against the PRC threat.
Mr. Mills. Recently, Gen. Paul Nakasone testified before the China
Select Committee that Chinese cyber actors have persistently used
malware to hold our critical U.S. infrastructure at risk - including
those that provide water, electricity, and fuel to Americans. These
efforts are meant to give the Chinese government options during a
potential conflict. What are we doing to ensure all domains are woven
into a comprehensive strategy to counter China?
Admiral Aquilino. We work very closely with the USCYBERCOM team to
integrate campaigning activities to bolster our own resilience and
strengthen that of our allies and partners. Similarly, we integrate
space into all our operations to ensure we have a comprehensive all-
domain approach to executing integrated deterrence.
Mr. Mills. There has been some question surrounding the continued
presence of US forces in Okinawa at their current manning presence. If
those troops were redeployed to other parts of the AOR - for example:
Guam (along China's Second Island Chain line) - how would that impact
our ability to defend our national interests?
Admiral Aquilino. The redeployment of US Forces from Okinawa beyond
agreed upon levels will increase the need for more forward ready forces
to deter and assure, while being persistently postured for contingency
and crisis. Presence in the first island chain is critical to
deterrence and any decrement to capability or force structure there
will be very harmful to that deterrent effect.
Mr. Mills. China is working diligently to shift the military
balance in their favor (amassing ships, missiles, etc.), making Beijing
perilously optimistic. If a conflict with China were to begin in the
next year and the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East were still
ongoing, how do we balance our current level of military aid to partner
nations while also ensuring US forces are fully equipped?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM works with the Department to ensure
we are assigned the forces required to deter, fight, and win, and we
deploy many of these forces forward for maximum effectiveness. In
advance of a conflict with the PRC, USINDOPACOM will request additional
forces and equipment needed from OSD and the Joint Staff. Regarding our
allies and partners, we believe assistance provided now will allow them
to become force multipliers in a crisis - they provide us an asymmetric
advantage not enjoyed by the PRC.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. MCCORMICK
Dr. McCormick. Admiral Aquilino, several combatant commanders have
suggested that the increasingly prevalent UAS threat is a wicked
problem. Additionally, a January 8th Military.Com article titled,
``Marine Units Rotating to Indo-Pacific Don't Have Their Own Counter-
Drone Capabilities, Commanders Say,'' stated commanders in the field
concede ``units do not have capabilities ``to counter UAS at this
time''. They acknowledged that they have limited tools and resources
and in fact stated do not any have organic US made counter-drone
capabilities and must rely on partnered forces to combat the unmanned
aircraft. 1. Do drones and drone swarms pose an increasing threat to US
forces deployed throughout INDOPACOM? 2. Most counter drone and drone
Swarm systems employed today are kinetic - they require a munition,
often an expensive missile. Given the long resupply lines in the
theater, and the inefficiency of these systems to take out swarms, how
are you working with the services to rapidly field new, cost-effective,
counter-swarm technology into theater? Have you evaluated the
effectiveness of low-logistical needs systems like High Powered
Microwave, which rely less on resupply of munitions? 3. What additional
resources do you require to counter the increasing UAS threat utilizing
US made capabilities.
Admiral Aquilino. The recent attacks in the Red Sea, Syria, and
Ukraine demonstrate the increased UAS threat against maritime and land-
based forces. All of our regional threats are investing in a wide range
of UAS systems and we must be prepared to counter this threat.
The Joint Staff and the Services have been conducting studies and
experimentations to address this concern. USINDOPACOM supports these
efforts by ensuring our priorities and specific geographical concerns
are being addressed. One of these concerns is the long resupply lines
as you mentioned. Our science and technology team is conducting several
experimental tests and are currently assessing one low-logistical
system, the palletized high-powered laser, within the theater.
Industry must continue to be innovative in developing counter UAS
solutions to get ahead of this problem set. Working with industry to
drive down costs is essential to our success as our adversaries
maneuver to gain an asymmetric advantage. Increased options and an
increase in production rates of the current C-sUAS systems can help us
meet the growing need to equip our formations.
Dr. McCormick. How would the use of unmanned surface vessels assist
our military's ability to project force while having a dispersed force
structure?
Admiral Aquilino. Modern surface combatants are capital warships
that can project tremendous warfighting force. Smaller unmanned surface
vessels can accomplish less complex or lower-end missions, which allows
for more flexible force projection options that preserve capital
fighting power for those engagements that only a large surface
combatant can fulfill.
Dr. McCormick. Admiral Aquilino, I am glad to see that you are
working with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) to set up a new
directorate called ``Joint Mission Accelerator'' to deliver the
technology you require on time and at scale. 1. How are you ensuring
that requirements from the Combatant Commands are being fulfilled while
the Program Managers may have different priorities? 2. Would flexible
spending authorities, like those at Special Operations Command, be
beneficial to you?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM does not have acquisition authority
and is reliant on the services to field and sustain capabilities to
their forces. We actively participate in the rapid acquisition process
through the Joint Staff, services, and OSD. This participation includes
employing a joint innovation and experimentation program to integrate
and validate DoD emerging capabilities for joint warfighting. However,
if properly resourced in terms of manpower and budget, and if granted
the commensurate authorities, USINDOPACOM could more rapidly develop,
deploy, and employ critical joint capabilities not directly pursued by
the services.