[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-64]
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE
GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 21, 2024
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-479 WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eighteenth Congress
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
Chair RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi ANDY KIM, New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MATT GAETZ, Florida ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
DON BACON, Nebraska MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
JIM BANKS, Indiana VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida SARA JACOBS, California
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
RONNY JACKSON, Texas PATRICK RYAN, New York
PAT FALLON, Texas JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
NANCY MACE, South Carolina CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO,
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota Pennsylvania
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
NICK LaLOTA, New York TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
MARK ALFORD, Missouri JIMMY PANETTA, California
CORY MILLS, Florida MARC VEASEY, Texas
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia
LANCE GOODEN, Texas
Chris Vieson, Staff Director
Walker Barrett, Professional Staff Member
Katy Quinn, Professional Staff Member
Michael Kirlin, Professional Staff Member
Will Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Logan Whelchel, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Kurilla, GEN Michael ``Erik'', USA, Commander, U.S. Central
Command........................................................ 6
Langley, Gen Michael E., USMC, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.... 8
Wallander, Dr. Celeste, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Department of Defense.......... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Kurilla, GEN Michael ``Erik''................................ 91
Langley, Gen Michael E....................................... 125
Wallander, Dr. Celeste....................................... 67
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Rogers................................................... 143
Mr. Wilson................................................... 143
Mr. Scott.................................................... 144
Mr. Gallagher................................................ 145
Mr. Gaetz.................................................... 146
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 146
Mr. Gimenez.................................................. 148
Mr. Strong................................................... 149
Mr. LaLota................................................... 150
Mr. Mills.................................................... 151
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
CHALLENGES IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND
AFRICA
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 21, 2024.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [chairman
of the committee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENT-
ATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Today, we continue our posture hearings with
Arica Command (AFRICOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM).
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and for
your service to our country.
I think many Americans assumed that we could move on from
two decades of conflict in the Middle East and pivot our
attention to the Indo-Pacific. The events of the last six
months have proven that assumption wrong.
The October 7th attack on Israel was barbaric. It was the
most vile attack on the Jewish people since the Holocaust.
Israel has a right to defend itself and has a moral obligation
to ensure its people are free from terrorism. That is why we
need to continue to provide Israel with security assistance, as
they seek to defeat Hamas.
Make no mistake, Hamas would never have attacked if it
wasn't for years of support from Iran. We all know Iran has
been a patron of terrorist militia and the main source of
instability in the region for over 40 years. But over the last
few years, it seems the Ayatollah has become even more
emboldened. And this administration's approach is doing little
to deter him.
In just the last six months, the Ayatollah's terrorist
proxies in Yemen have attacked commercial vessels and coalition
ships over 50 times--sinking one commercial vessel and killing
three crew members aboard another. His Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) hijacked an oil tanker in international
waters and is confiscating the 145,000 metric tons of oil
onboard.
He has okayed the transfer of hundreds of one-way attack
drones to fuel Putin's brutal invasion of Ukraine. Now, he is
entertaining sending Putin ballistic missiles as well.
Last week, he oversaw one of Iran's largest naval
exercises--this time with dozens of warships from China and
Russia. He has increased his stockpile of enriched uranium by
20 percent, giving him enough material for three nuclear
weapons.
He has been applying enormous political pressure on Iraq to
expel U.S. coalition forces, and he has financed, trained, and
equipped terrorist militias that have carried out over 175
attacks on U.S. troops in the region, including the January
attack at Tower 22 that took the lives of three American
soldiers.
The President has responded with airstrikes on terrorist
proxies, which have done little to stop them from lobbing
missiles at ships in the Red Sea. He has threatened more
sanctions on Iran, which have yet to make a dent in the
Ayatollah's war machine.
Then, in January, terrorist rockets and drones were raining
down on U.S. service members. He sent delegations to Iraq to
begin negotiations on reducing U.S. presence. I can't think of
a better illustration of appeasing the Ayatollah than that.
This administration needs to articulate and employ a real
strategy to counter Iran and protect U.S. interests in the
region.
It appears we may also need a new counterterrorism strategy
in Africa. This weekend, the military junta running Niger
announced it was kicking out U.S. forces conducting operations
to counter ISIS and Al Qaeda in the region. This comes on the
heels of reports that Niger is negotiating security-related
deals with Iran and Russia. It appears Niger will soon join
Mali, Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, and Burkina Faso in welcoming
Russian troops and mercenaries into their country.
Meanwhile, Chile is looking to expand its military
footprint beyond the People's Liberation Army (PLA) naval base
in Djibouti, and they have set their sights on the west coast
to give the PLA strategic access to the Atlantic.
China has already built and is currently operating several
large commercial ports along Africa's west coast, as a part of
its Belt and Road Initiative. Unless the administration steps
up, it is only a matter of time before the PLA is operating
with impunity off the Atlantic Coast.
At the end of the day, it is critical for the United States
to have a footprint on the continent. Even a little goes a long
way. The same can be said of U.S. business investments. Africa
is of vital strategic importance to the United States. We can't
let China or Russia become the preferred security or business
partner.
I look forward to hearing General Langley's and Kurilla's
best military advice on how we can counter Iran, Russia, and
China, and better protect U.S. interests in their Area of
Responsibility (AOR)s.
And with that, I yield to my friend and colleague, the
Ranking Member, for any comments he may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
Mr. Smith. I thank the Chairman for his comments.
I thank our witnesses for their leadership and support, and
for being here today.
We had the Indo-Pacific and the Korean commanders in
yesterday. And as I started off that meeting, I will start off
this meeting.
This is a global interconnected problem, and I think that
is the greatest challenge that we face right now. In this
region, the focus is Iran in CENTCOM, but Iran is now
increasingly, as the Chairman alluded to, working with Russia.
Russia is working with China. They are all working with North
Korea. There is this consortium that has formed and is working
together in a way that we haven't seen.
And how do we counter that? How do we rally the rest of the
world to recognize the threat that all of these nations pose
and to work with us to confront that?
In the Mideast, certainly, it starts with Iran. I will
disagree with the characterization of the Chairman; the
administration and DOD responded forcefully to the attacks that
happened at Tower 22 and attacked back to the Shia militias in
Syria and Iraq. And we are now, I think, on 46-47 days without
any of those attacks having happened, and, in part, that is
because Iran has been asking them to stand down because of the
pressure that was put forward. We did not stand back and do
nothing in the face of it.
We do need to figure out something about Yemen. And I look
forward to hearing from the witnesses. Because, despite our
best efforts there, it has been much harder to stop those
attacks. And that, too, is linked with China, as China ships
are able to sail through the Red Sea unfettered because of
their relationship with Iran.
We need to work more to figure out how to reduce Iran's
malign influence, but I will point out that that malign
influence has been going through multiple administrations and
multiple attempts. The maximum pressure campaign under the
previous administration did not stop Iran from attacking both
Saudi Arabia and the UAE and ships in the Persian Gulf at that
point. So, we have to come together and figure out a
comprehensive strategy to deal with this. It is not going to be
a simple solution.
And, yes, in this region, without question, the war in Gaza
right now is the biggest flashpoint. And our support for Israel
is important for a lot of reasons, but one is that they are
threatened in multiple areas. If this war were to spread to
Lebanon; if Hezbollah felt free to attack from Lebanon; if
Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq felt free to attack Israel
from there, we could see this war blow up even further
throughout the Middle East. So, making sure that Israel has a
credible deterrent to those threats is crucial to keeping this
war from spreading and growing, and causing even more suffering
across the region.
I would also point out that the second the October 7th
attacks happened, the President responded by surging U.S.
troops in the region. Any rumors of negotiating to reduce our
presence are just that--rumors. I have asked multiple
officials. There is no such plan. In fact, we have done the
exact opposite since October 7th, and I believe it has had an
impact. It has had an impact on reducing Iran's desire to more
directly attack Israel and to more directly attack U.S.
interests in the region. So, I think that is an incredibly
important part of this.
The other thing that I do want to point out, humanitarian
assistance in Gaza is crucially important. I was just part of a
delegation that was in Egypt and Israel. We went up to the
Rafah gate to see the efforts at getting humanitarian
assistance. We met with Israeli officials.
I understand where they are coming from in terms of their
concern that any assistance that goes into Gaza will wind up in
the hands of Hamas, but that risk is worth taking versus the
risk of the humanitarian catastrophe that is happening in Gaza
right now. We have got to work with Israel to get more
humanitarian assistance and to reduce the human suffering that
is present there.
Now, just a few days ago, for the first time, Israel
allowed aid to come in from a different gate, from further up
north, which is helpful, but we have to continue that pressure.
The effort to try to get aid in from the Mediterranean is also
a positive step.
But I hope that anyone who supports Israel understands that
the suffering in Gaza right now is a huge threat, not just to
the people in Gaza, but to Israel itself. We need to find an
effort--we need to lead an effort to reduce that.
Africa is a huge challenge. I look forward to General
Langley walking through some of the challenges there.
But I do want to dispel the notion that somehow the United
States should just come in by brute force and push out China
and Russia from having influence in Africa. (A) That is not
going to happen; (B) it would be incredibly unwise to do it.
Russia and China are global powers. They are going to be
present.
What we have to make sure is that we maintain our presence,
and in that region it is all about partnerships and alliances.
And this has been frayed, without question. There has been a
lot of instability throughout West Africa, certainly, in Libya
as well, but we do have partners in the region.
I would be interested to hear from General Langley the
partnerships that are most important and most positive, and how
we work going forward to strengthen and build on those
partnerships.
But again, I want to make clear, I don't think it would be
a wise idea for the United States to view Africa as, you know,
some sort of chip in a broader game, that we have to go in and
force our influence on above all else. We have to be able to
balance that with the interests of the nation in the region and
work with them to make sure that we reduce the malign influence
of Russia and China in what is going to be a competitive
environment.
So, I think this is an incredibly important hearing. I
thank our witnesses. I look forward to their testimony and to
the questions and answers.
And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the Ranking Member.
Without objection, the Chair may declare the committee in
recess at any point. There is no objection. So ordered.
I would now like to introduce our witnesses.
The Honorable Celeste Wallander is the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs.
General Erik Kurilla is the Commander, United States
Central Command.
And General Michael Langley is the Commander, United States
Africa Command.
Welcome to our witnesses.
Dr. Wallander, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF DOCTOR CELESTE WALLANDER, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished
members of the House Armed Services Committee, thank you for
inviting me to testify on our defense posture and policy in the
U.S. Central Command, USCENTCOM, and U.S. Africa Command,
USAFRICOM, areas of responsibility, alongside Commanders
General Kurilla and General Langley.
The world has significantly changed since our posture
testimony in 2023. The crises proliferating in both the
USCENTCOM and USAFRICOM AORs have created a level of
instability not seen in years.
Although the Department of Defense finds itself operating
in a dynamic environment, the 2022 National Defense Strategy,
the NDS, is still our guiding light for how the DOD will
operate in the world. DOD applies principles of partnership,
deterrence, diplomacy, integration, and values, as it works to
strengthen integrated deterrence, reduce conflict, and promote
stability. A strong, principled, adaptive U.S. military remains
a central pillar for U.S. leadership in the world, while
supporting a stable and open international system.
First and foremost, we support diplomacy as our preferred
means to achieve our objectives.
Second, sustainable security relies on expanding regional
security constructs, alliances, and partnerships, and
integrating our partners with one another, as well as the
United States. Respect for fundamental freedoms and human
rights expands sustainability in our security partnerships.
As we take decisive action to address threats and
challenges today in the USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM AORs, we
continue to stand with our partners and allies to win what we
view as the competition of coalitions that is becoming
increasingly critical to our common security.
In both regions, we closely monitor efforts by the People's
Republic of China (PRC) to expand its military footprint
through its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to
project and sustain military power further.
In the CENTCOM AOR, a prosperous, peaceful, integrated
Middle East supports the long-term security and prosperity of
the United States. Unfortunately, the Middle East faces several
crises.
Hamas brutally killed 1,200 Israelis on October 7th and
continues to hold some 130 American and Israeli hostages. We
are alarmed at the significant loss of life throughout the
conflict which followed.
Israel has an obligation to protect civilians and uphold
international law and international humanitarian law.
Malign actors across the region--chief among them Iran--
cynically exploit events unfolding in Gaza. Iran-backed militia
groups attacked U.S. and partner forces over 175 times since
October 17th throughout the region, killing three U.S. service
members at Tower 22 in northeast Jordan. A U.S. contractor died
of a heart attack and over 180 service members sustained
injuries during these attacks.
In the Red Sea, the Houthis seek to affect this vital
channel for global trade with at least 50 attacks against
commercial shipping and naval vessels.
We mourn those we have lost. Our prayers are with their
families always.
Amid these crises, the Department of Defense is rising to
the occasion to defend the Nation's values and interests across
the region.
Significant U.S. assistance to Israel aims at ensuring that
what happened on October 7th can never be repeated. The United
States unequivocally stands for the protection of civilian
lives during armed conflict, consistent with the law of war. We
continue to underscore with Israel and regional counterparts,
both publicly and privately, the importance of obligations
related to civilian harm mitigation and risks of conflict to
civilians during Israel's operations against Hamas.
We closely monitor the situation in Lebanon, to Israel's
north. We continue working to contain the conflict, while
deterring state and non-state actors seeking to escalate
tensions.
DOD continues to hold Iran and its proxies accountable for
their attacks on U.S. and coalition forces. We do not seek
conflict in the Middle East, but attacks on American forces
will not be tolerated, and we remain postured and prepared to
use all means necessary to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, while
working to counter Iran's destabilizing activities.
On the AFRICOM AOR, Africa is not merely important, it is
essential. African partnerships are critical for the Department
of Defense to maintain its technological edge, accomplish its
geopolitical and strategic objectives, and power our futures.
Despite Africa's boundless potential, threats such as
political instability, democratic backsliding, and the presence
of violent extremist organizations are the focus of DOD
efforts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the
committee, for inviting us today.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Wallander can be found
in the Appendix on page 67.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Wallander.
General Kurilla, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL ``ERIK'' KURILLA, USA,
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
General Kurilla. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith,
ladies and gentlemen of the committee, on behalf of the
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and
Guardians who serve this Command and our Nation, I welcome the
opportunity to talk to you today.
I recently returned from my 27th trip to the central
region. As I sat here just a year ago, the region was on the
verge of improbable, unprecedented, and transformative
progress. Today, the central region faces its most volatile
security situation in the past half century. This is not the
same central region as last year.
The events of 7 October not only permanently changed Israel
and Gaza, they created the conditions for malign actors to sow
instability throughout the region and beyond. Iran exploited
what they saw as a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reshape
the Middle East to their advantage. Iran has worked for decades
to encircle the region with its proxies, and in the past six
months we have seen every proxy in the Iranian threat network
operationalized--in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, the West Bank,
and Yemen.
Iran's expansive network of proxies is equipped with
advanced, sophisticated weaponry and threatens some of the most
vital terrain in the world--with global and U.S. implications.
Houthi attacks on our warships and international shipping,
coupled with Iranian-aligned militias' attacks on our forces in
Iraq and Syria, are a direct result of an Iranian threat that
has been incrementally spreading.
Violent extremist organizations have also seized on this
opportunity. ISIS surged their attacks in Iraq and Syria
earlier this year, and the risk of attack emanating from
Afghanistan is increasing. I assess ISIS-Khorasan retains the
capability and the will to attack U.S. and Western interests
abroad in as little as six months--with little to no warning.
Strategic competition has also continued to evolve across
the region. China and Russia have been quick to capitalize on
destabilizing influences. They have shown meager interest or
capability to reduce regional tensions, but they have also
increased their efforts to compete with the United States and
pressurize regional partners across all elements of national
power.
Collectively, Iran, Russia, and China are strengthening
their relationships and fostering a chaotic landscape favorable
to their exploitation.
Iran continues to sell 90 percent of its oil to China--
funding Tehran's subversive and malign activities across the
region. And Iran has developed a production pipeline for
supplying weapons to Russia, fueling the war on Ukraine.
The ramifications of this partnership have global
implications. The convergence of crisis and competition makes
the CENTCOM area of responsibility the most likely region to
produce threats against the U.S. homeland, trigger a regional
conflict, and derail the National Defense Strategy.
The CENTCOM region also remains critical to the world's
energy supply and remains essential to the flow of global
commerce. USCENTCOM provides strategic depth to our defense of
the homeland, and security is at risk if we cede this space to
Iran, terrorism, and China.
Iran knows that its decade-long vision cannot be realized
if the countries in the region continue to expand integration
with each other and deepen their partnership with the United
States. Our partners in Levant, the Arabian Gulf, Central and
South Asia are committed to advancing the region, and the
United States remains their partner of choice--for now.
USCENTCOM's strategic approach of people, partners, and
innovation reinforces the vision of an integrated central
region and supports the whole-of-government effort to secure
regional and global interests.
Our people are the bedrock of everything we do. We are
laser-focused on optimizing their talents and highlighting
their character and competence to our partners.
Our strategic advantage remains our strong military-to-
military partnerships, while our adversaries and competitors
rely on parasitic transactional relationships.
We also innovate with our partners, developing approaches,
concept, and technologies to address the threats we face;
protecting our forces and creating depth in our force posture.
These efforts have saved lives.
We are clear-eyed about the task before us. The shockwaves
of the past year continue to reverberate globally. Our service
members are standing the watch side by side with our regional
partners right now. They operate in harm's way every day,
whether at a small outpost in Syria fighting ISIS or a
destroyer knocking down a barrage of ballistic and cruise
missiles fired by Iranian-backed Houthis. And they do so with
honor and courage.
Five of our teammates gave the last full measure of
devotion, as they lived out the oath we swear, protecting the
freedoms we cherish. They represent the very best of us. It is
the honor of my professional life to serve as their commander.
And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kurilla can be found in
the Appendix on page 91.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General Kurilla.
General Langley, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL LANGLEY, USMC,
COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
General Langley. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith,
distinguished committee members, it is an honor to appear
before you today representing the outstanding service members,
civilians, and families of the United States Africa Command.
I'm proud to testify with my friends, Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ASD) Wallander and General Kurilla.
Joining me today is my command senior enlisted leader,
Sergeant Major Michael Woods. He at the heart of AFRICOM's
efforts to help African partners professionalize their enlisted
and Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) forces.
I'm also joined by my US Agency for International
Development (USAID) advisor, minister, counselor, Mrs. Maura
Barry Boyle, and my State Department Foreign Policy Advisor,
Mr. Phil Nelson. They represent AFRICOM's whole-of-government
team and integrated approach to Africa.
Now, in the last year, thanks to your authorities,
resourcing, and support, AFRICOM's all-star team responded to
numerous crises and conflicts across the continent. I'm honored
and proud to serve among them.
Now, today's global events ranging from the Russian
Federation's war in the Ukraine to the Houthis' attacks in the
Red Sea directly impact the lives of millions of Africans.
Terrorism, poverty, food insecurity, climate change, and mass
migration shatter African lives.
These factors sow the seeds of violent extremism and
Russian exploitation across the entire regions of the
continent. We are seeing these impacts, as the threats unfold
in Niger.
Challenges to democratic governance and order continue to
occur across the Sahel, complicating our relations with key
partners. However, working closely with our interagency
partners, we continue to engage on the continent in order to
safeguard U.S. interests and advance our campaign.
Africa's campaign revolves around central themes of
ensuring strategic access, countering threats to the homeland
and U.S. interests, and preparing for and responding to crisis,
and lastly, bolstering our allies and partners. Now, this
campaign places our African partners at the center, achieving
positive change by executing African-led, but U.S.-enabled
operations--all focused on our shared objectives.
In today's dynamic environment, our whole-of-government
partners require appropriate resourcing. I strongly advocate
for our State Department and USAID partners to receive the
resources they need to guarantee our combined success.
Now, in Africa, modest investments and resources go a long
way towards advancing our national security interests. Now
Africa faces many challenges, but offers even more
opportunities. With our African partners at the forefront,
reinforced by our efforts and the efforts of our allies, we
will continue to gain ground towards achieving lasting
security, stability, and prosperity on this crucial continent.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to be here today. I
will look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Langley can be found in
the Appendix on page 125.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General. I thank all of you.
And I recognize myself for questions.
General Kurilla, have the recent conflicts in the Middle
East done anything to strengthen the partnership between Iran,
Russia, and China? And if so, what does that mean for our
security?
General Kurilla. Chairman, thank you.
I am very concerned about this renewed or this new
relationship between Russia, China, and Iran. What we see is
Iran is reliant on China, and Russia is reliant on Iran. Iran
sells 90 percent of its oil, all U.S.-sanctioned, to China. So,
in effect, China is funding Iran's subversive and malign
behavior in the region.
Iran went from hundreds to now thousands of one-way attack
unmanned aerial systems, suicide drones, that they providing to
Russia. They are providing them both complete systems and they
have built a factory for Russia to now produce them themselves,
still reliant on a supply chain. And they are now doing over
100 one-way attack drones a week in Ukraine. What I can talk in
a classified setting is what Russia can provide in return back
to Iran, which is concerning.
We are also seeing China, which gets 50 percent of its oil
from the Middle East, what they are doing in the Middle East to
advance their elements of national power--diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic.
The Chairman. General Langley, how concerned should we be
about China's and Russia's growing footprint in Africa?
General Langley. Chairman, we should be extremely
concerned, as I would say that both are very much exploitative,
when possible, but they are also coercive, when necessary. They
are trying to get what they want. They are trying to replace
the West, and moreover, the United States and our access and
influence across this crucial continent.
We are seeing this through a dis/misinformation campaign.
It is very influential and it really is across the Sahel. But
there are other regions, for geopolitical reasons or
socioeconomic reasons, or even military, which the Russian
Federation offers across the Sahel in exchange for mining
concessions.
So, Chairman, we should really be concerned. We need to get
our act together, collective, as a whole government, our
information campaign.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Wallander, the administration's strategy for dealing
with Iran, obviously, and containing Iran, obviously, isn't
working. What can we expect to be done differently that might
yield some results?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Chairman.
Containing Iran requires a whole-of-government focus, which
entails sanctions, diplomatic work in the U.N. and with global
partners who, similarly, are concerned and affected by Iran's
destabilizing efforts and activities, which we have seen yield
some fruit with global participation in Operation Prosperity
Guardian to defend against Iran-enabled Houthi attacks against
shipping, and also, the European Union (EU) Mission Aspides.
So, it is bringing the international community in, which
sees a clear harm to their interests, but, then, it is also
focusing on building the capabilities and the security
partnerships in the region, which has focused on Gulf countries
and which was advancing quite successfully under General
Kurilla's and CENTCOM's leadership, until the October 7th Hamas
attack on Israel--not by accident.
Iran saw that approach, which was bringing in partners,
building capacity, creating integrated defensive capabilities,
as a threat to their freedom of action. And so, we need to
continue to work with those partners because Iran will be
constrained by the capabilities and the good work of our
partners in the region.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member for any questions
he may have.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Following up on that point, the current dynamic is not to
our advantage, as you described, as Iran has been, you know,
building the partnerships with Russia, and then, getting a
little bit of a free pass in this. The way to shift that
dynamic is to get back to the Saudi Arabia-Israel peace
agreement, with the United States as well.
If, in fact, we were able to get back to a place where
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Israel, and the United States were a leading
partnership against Iranian influence, I think that would
improve things.
But walk us through how that would improve things and what
the path back to that type of partnership is. And that is for
both General Kurilla and Dr. Wallander.
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman Smith.
I think that the first aspect of getting back to that
partnership is working with countries in the region to find a
long-term solution to the plight of the Palestinian people,
which means getting back on the path of a two-state solution;
the creation of a capable, stable, responsible Palestinian
state alongside the state of Israel. That will create the
diplomatic space to get back to discussions with Saudi Arabia
and other Gulf partners on ----
Mr. Smith. And towards that end, if I may--sorry, sorry to
interrupt--I want to be clear. I mean, the reason Israel does
it, they are threatened on multiple sides and there are too
many people around them that have never accepted their right to
exist as a country. And they are trying to figure out how do
they survive in that very complicated world.
How do we convince them that one of the ways they survive
is to embrace the idea of self-governance for the Palestinian
people?
Dr. Wallander. Well, first and foremost, in order to
embrace that possibility, the people of Israel need to feel
secure.
Mr. Smith. Absolutely.
Dr. Wallander. And so, first and foremost is the defeat of
Hamas and the creation of permissive security conditions in
which Israel can, then, look towards that longer future. Those
aspects are interactive and we work, we talk with our Israeli
partners every day about the importance of civilian harm
mitigation and avoiding civilian harm--not only on the moral
merits, and not only because it is consistent with the
international law, but because it is in Israel's interest to
create that----
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you. Sorry. I'm a little tight on
time. I have one question for General Langley and I want to
General Kurilla a chance to response as well.
Go ahead.
General Kurilla. What my Arab partners tell me is just
that, that there has to be a viable process and a path to a
two-state solution, is where they would see being able to come
back to the table and some type of normalization.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
And, General Langley, one of the worst wars and worst
humanitarian crises is going on right now that nobody is really
talking about, and that is the war in Sudan. Can you talk to us
a little bit--is there any prospect of that war slowing down,
coming to an end? What is our role in working with partners in
the region? Because that is a humanitarian crisis, quite
frankly, that rivals Gaza right now, and nobody seems to be
discussing it. What should we be doing about it? What is the
future?
General Langley. Ranking Member, Sudan is still into
consequence right now with Burhan and Hemedti, and this was,
back in 15 April 2023, was a problem. I know that we have
engaged whole-of-government with the State Department going
into Jeddah and trying to get those parties together to solve
it, but it hasn't worked.
So, we are still keeping engagements globally, where other
leaders are going. But I will just tell you, especially the
Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Hemedti, his forces are backed by
some, I will just say, egregious members on the globe that are
pushing for their own great power competition goals in that
country for access.
And I'm talking about the Russian Federation. They would
love a warm water port. They would love to have the port there
in Sudan as their own. That is against our global campaign
plans. I can talk with a higher-level specificity in closed
session. But that is a concern.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you.
And just quickly, General Kurilla, Afghanistan, there's an
interesting--you know, Pakistan is, I mean, more concerned
about the Taliban. What is the potential for partnerships there
to try to help us keep an eye on the Taliban and ISIS, and
whatever else is going on in Afghanistan?
And I apologize, you have got 25 seconds.
[Laughter.]
General Kurilla. Congressman, so I, literally, talked to
the Chief of the Army Staff from Pakistan this morning in a
regular scheduled call. They have tremendous insight into the
violent extremist organizations inside of Afghanistan, and I
think there is tremendous opportunity to be able to partner
with Pakistan on that.
Mr. Smith. Great. Thank you. That is what I wanted.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank each of you for your service.
I really would like to begin today by paying tribute to the
three Army Reservists from Georgia who were killed just seven
weeks ago, murdered by Hezbollah, a puppet of Iran. And you
have already recognized Tower 22. But three young people who
should be remembered: Kennedy Sanders, William Rivers, and
Breonna Moffett. They were killed, and then, additionally,
there were a number of troops who were injured.
And, Madam Secretary, I have sent a letter to Secretary
Austin for an accounting of how many were injured. What are the
conditions? The American people need to know this because the
puppets of Iran have every intent to fulfill their goal of
death to Israel, death to America.
I also want to point out that it is bipartisan, and I agree
with the Ranking Member, that we have global interconnectivity.
The interconnectivity is a war we did not choose, and that is
dictators with rule of gun invading democracies with rule of
law. It began on August 22nd of 2022--February 22nd, 2022--with
War Criminal Putin invading Ukraine. Then, October 7th, the
puppets of Iran invading Israel.
And I think, sadly, much of this relates to the weakness
that was shown of the appeasement by Mr. Biden in Afghanistan.
Thirteen young marines killed at Abbey Gate.
And then, I was really grateful this week, with General
Mark Milley and General Frank McKenzie, it was clearly
identified that the decision to abandon Afghanistan was solely
by Mr. Biden. Mr. Biden, on August 26th, 2021, blamed the
military; said he had letters. That is not accurate. And
indeed, it was his decision which has led to the weakness
around the world and the incredible situations of instability
all over the world.
With that in mind, Doctor, Secretary, in your testimony you
mention the retaliatory strikes of American forces carried out
on targets in Iraq and Syria after the attack on Tower 22. It
has been reported that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
instructors returned home to Iran, once America announced a
warning of our incoming strikes.
Madam Secretary, the purpose of the retaliatory strikes
should be to hold Iran and their puppets accountable for the
act of violence, de-escalate the threat they pose, and deter
further attacks on U.S. service members and our allied
partners. But giving notice, to me, is utterly irresponsible
and it actually underscores weakness. What is the purpose of
giving notice?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
My understanding is the notice that was given is to our
Iraqi partners, who we owe that as part of our partnership, as
part of our strong relationship, and as a matter of respecting
their sovereignty.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I just find it totally irresponsible. And
really, it relates, also, back again to the Houthi attacks--
over 150 on American personnel in the past couple of months.
And there has been really no response.
And they should be alerted. We know trajectory today. We
knew trajectory 150 years ago, where their launch sites were.
They should be notified now that there would be an immediate
response and not given notice. And this is just so
irresponsible.
Equally, to me, General Kurilla, it is shocking to me that
we have Iranian oil exports which would be used to finance the
killing of Americans around the world. Are there any sanctions
to stop these exports?
General Kurilla. All of the Iranian oil is sanctioned right
now, Congressman.
Mr. Wilson. And it is sanctioned. And are there waivers?
How does this occur that there would be sales to China, to the
Chinese Communist Party; let's get real.
And then, additionally, we have incredible and unfortunate
and irresponsible sales and exports from War Criminal Putin to
the world's largest democracy, India, which is inexcusable.
And so, are the sanctions being waived?
General Kurilla. They are not being waived, Congressman.
What is happening is Iran is evading those sanctions by using
an entire ghost fleet, called ``a dark fleet,'' of ships to be
able to go out and do ship-to-ship transfers and using other
methods to bypass those, to get the oil where 90 percent of it
goes to China.
Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate you say, ``China.'' It is the
Chinese Communist Party, and they have every intent of world
domination. And we should be making every intent to protect the
American people and Western civilization.
I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut,
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wallander, on February 13th, the U.S. Senate voted 78-
to-22 to approve a national security package, which, among
other things, included help for Israel to replenish its Iron
Dome Program, funding for Ukraine, and funding for humanitarian
assistance.
When we talk about Iran's malign behavior, I think one of
the most obvious manifestations is the fact that they have now
become a major weapons supplier to Russia in the war in
Ukraine. And actually, one of the reasons why Ukraine is in
such desperate straits right now is because of the torrent of
drones that, again, are being used by Russian forces to weaken
the front line.
Can you just, again, for a moment, just reiterate about why
the U.S. House now has had five weeks to take up the Senate-
passed package, and why it is so desperately important? And it
has a spillover effect into CENTCOM in terms of trying to get
that measure through.
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
Yes, one of the global aspects to the challenges that the
United States, and DOD, in particular, face is that there is
this relationship between Russia and Iran, and they are
enabling one another's development of new technologies,
adaptations of tactics, the use especially of Unmanned Aerial
Vehichles (UAV)s, but also the capabilities on the battlefield.
And so, we are in a competition with helping our partners
stay ahead of both the technical capabilities, the platforms,
and adapting to the growing cooperation between Russia and Iran
on tactics. And we have long warned that the relationship
between Russia and Iran, which is enabling Russia in Ukraine,
is threatening our partners in the region, and we are seeing
that with the ability that the Houthis have to threaten and
actually attack shipping, among other capabilities, that
threaten our partners in the region.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
I mean, again, it is blindingly obvious, if people are
sincere about trying to stop the malign influence of Iran, we
should pass this supplemental package tonight and get it to the
President's desk.
General Kurilla, a few weeks ago, the U.S. Army vessel
General Frank Besson departed Virginia to the Mediterranean,
where they are now setting up a sea pathway to get humanitarian
assistance into Gaza. Can you talk a little bit about just what
steps are being taken to ensure safe transport and, you know,
how this whole pier construction process is going to take
place? I think it is an extraordinary effort. It is not a
substitute for land access for humanitarian assistance, but,
again, I think it is a great example of the Army stepping up.
General Kurilla. Sure, Congressman.
What it is, it is a Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore. It is
coming out of the 7th Transportation Brigade, Expeditionary.
When I commanded the 82nd Airborne Division, it was one of my
subordinate units.
And what they are going to do is set up a floating pier out
at sea, and then, a trident pier, which, basically, comes off
of the beach, to be able to transition humanitarian aid from
Cyprus out to the floating pier, and then, take it by these
Army watercraft onto the pier, and then, push it into a
marshalling yard, and then, for onward distribution.
Right now, five of the ships have departed. And the large,
medium-speed roll-on/roll-off, the Benavidez, was actually
supposed to depart at 1000 this morning. They finished loading
up about 3:00 this morning. And that will be heading across,
and all of that should be arriving in the theater in the first
couple of weeks of April.
Mr. Courtney. And in terms of safety, you know, for the
crew, and also, who is going to be at the receiving end when
this actually makes it to the beach, can you talk about that?
General Kurilla. Yes. Force protection is one of my top
priorities. And right now, my Deputy Commander and much of my
staff is currently in the region in multiple countries, as they
work out the fine details of this.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
And again, Dr. Wallander, the humanitarian component of the
security package, again, it is a global humanitarian
assistance. I mean, obviously, Gaza is in dire need for
assistance, but also it is in General Langley's sphere as well,
in terms of the Sudan, as far as getting humanitarian
assistance into that region.
And can you talk about how that helps us in terms of U.S.
presence in a positive posture?
Dr. Wallander. Well, we have a moral imperative as well,
but, yes, there is a strategic element of this, which is that,
to lay the groundwork for a peaceful resolution, once Israel
has defeated Hamas, we need to be sure that we have the
relationship and we have supported the civilians, the people of
Gaza who require that humanitarian assistance; and the same
element, the value proposition in Sudan of the United States
being there, has to be supported by Congress.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kurilla--and thank you all for being here today--
General, you spoke eloquently about Iran using its proxies in
your AOR. Many of us believe that Iran will continue to use its
proxies to attack us, our allies, and our friends, unless and
until we take direct and forceful action against Iran. There
are many ways that this could take place. I have no
prescription on what that should look like.
Shouldn't we be more forceful against Iran directly?
General Kurilla. Congressman, thank you for the question.
As the combatant commander, I provide options--those
include everything from cyber to kinetic--and identify the risk
associated with those options. And then, the policymakers and
the President make a decision on which options to choose.
I would tell you that, when we look at actions that we have
taken, for instance, in Iraq and Syria, on our last strike that
we did, we hit 85 targets. We killed the commander of Kata'ib
Hezbollah, who was responsible for all of Kata'ib Hezbollah
inside of Syria. We killed Abu Taqwa, the head of Harakat al-
Nujaba, one of the realigned militia group's operational
commanders.
And what that did is that caused them to pause, and a
period of deterrence has been established in Iraq and Syria,
and we are on day 46 right now. But I would tell you all
deterrence is temporal, but I do believe there has to be cost
imposition on Iran for them to be able to cease their malign
behavior.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, thank you.
And I hope, Doctor, or Secretary Wallander, that you take a
message back to the White House that we need to show more
backbone against Iran.
I'm going to shift gears here, General Kurilla, and ask you
about directed energy. And with the engagements that are coming
against the Houthi attacks, many are arguing--and I would
agree--that we are on the wrong side of the cost curve, and
that the cost per shot is unsustainable. And what is even more
important is that we are depleting precision munitions that may
be needed in the future for another fight or for ourselves
somehow.
So, what is the utility of directed energy and why aren't
we doing more to use what we do have? I know it is not
perfected yet, but it has great capabilities against drones and
things like that currently. Why aren't we doing more in the Red
Sea?
General Kurilla. It does, Congressman, and what we also
need to look at--not just directed energy--is high-powered
microwave to be able to go after drone swarms. We do have--just
the Army is losing its transformation and contact. They have
given us 350-kilowatt lasers that are Stryker-based that we
have inside of Iraq right now. We are experimenting with those
and the best and most effective way to use those, to help them
learn from that, to be able to make better systems.
I encourage the Navy to employ directed energy systems. I
know there is at least one destroyer, the Preble I believe,
that has a 60-kilowatt High-Energy Laser with Integrated
Optical-Dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS).
We would welcome being able to bring systems in, but
directed energy is not the panacea. It will be part of a
layered defense. And we have to be able to get further out with
it to be able to bring down these systems when it is only
costing a dollar a shot, minus the acquisition, to be able to
do that.
But I would tell you, what is worse than shooting a million
dollar missile at a $20,000 drone is that $20,000 drone hitting
a $2 billion ship with 300 sailors on it. And I think our Navy
is performing marvelously right now.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, I think I have to agree with everything
that you have just said. Please lean on the Navy to use the
Preble.
And we can continue to make advances in what we learn
operationally under the strain of these attacks, under the
stress of the attacks.
So, I appreciate what you are doing, and I would ask that
you really use more of directed energy and high-powered
microwaves, because there is a capability there that we have
been testing, but not really using operationally. And we need
to start doing that.
I would hate to see a repeat of Tower 22, for instance.
General Kurilla. Yes, Congressman, what I tell all the
Services: give me systems. We will experiment with it. We will
tell you if it works in a real-live environment.
Mr. Lamborn. Fantastic. Thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, just sort off-topic here, but it has been
talked about, the pullout from Afghanistan. It would be good
for all of us to review the total history and timeframe for the
pullout from Afghanistan, recognizing that the previous
administration set a specific date in early March to be out of
Afghanistan. The Biden administration extended that by over six
months.
So, moving on, my question really goes to General Langley
and the work that you are doing in Africa, a continent that is
of specific interest to me, since my wife and I were Peace
Corps volunteers there many, many years ago.
You speak of the whole of government. Please describe in as
much detail as possible what you mean by the whole of
government and use the example of the whole of government in
the eastern part of Africa. What is it? What is necessary? And
then, how the military would participate in that?
General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question.
As we are in a competition environment at the strategic
level, we compete with the PRC and Russia and their offerings
of offering the bright, shiny objects, if you will, to our
African partners. But, collectively, with our whole-of-
government approach with USAID and State Department, and what
they bring together, when we do the AFRICOM, the Africa
campaign plan of OAIs--which is the operations, activities, and
investments--a good portion of that is across the interagency.
So, as far as assurance actions, I would just say, give you
a good example of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Somalia,
as his operations were going in the Hiran region, he used his
clearing forces that we trained to be able to achieve
objectives. And then, by happenstance, USAID, as a result of
the floods and desertification and the drought, came in and
provided. Those clans out there in the central region of
Somalia turned.
That was how the playbook actually works with whole of
government. That is just a clear example. I have numerous
examples down in the southern piece of Africa as well, time
permitting.
Mr. Garamendi. So, it is a combination of USAID and the
State Department. Are there sufficient resources for those two
entities to meet the goals of your operational plan?
General Langley. Congressman, no, there isn't. What the
State Department does and what USAID does, just the way the
budgets are structured, they don't have much flexibility
outside of humanitarian assistance. They need to have the
flexibility to take these budgets and reorient money at the
time and the point of consequence. If we had that, we would
really be more effective in our campaign plans.
Mr. Garamendi. I think it is important for the committee.
We tend to focus on the military piece of this. Is it true that
the military piece of the Africa strategies to success, the
military is small compared to the other whole-of-government
participants?
General Langley. It is, Congressman. But, with modest
investment, we are getting asymmetric synergistic effects with
our asymmetrical approach of being able to codify all of the
activities and investments across the interagency and across
the departments, to metastasize into whole-of-government
effects, desired effects, that protect U.S. interests and,
also, protect the homeland.
Mr. Garamendi. Aside from the Wagner Group, are the
militaries of China and Russia directly involved in Africa?
General Langley. Yes, Congressman, I will start with the
most pressing and immediate acute threat right now across the
Sahel. I would say some of the activities, layered threats that
we have across the Sahel, are actually fueled by the Russian
Federation.
And I say this because, given the demise of Yevgeny
Prigozhin, we thought that the Wagner Group was going to demise
on the continent, but it has gone in another direction. Because
now they are sponsored by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) of the
Russian Federation. That is a concern.
Mr. Garamendi. And I would note that the migration from
that Sahel is a major challenge for our allies in Europe, as
well as in the northern African countries.
With that, I yield back. Thank you very much, General.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Wittman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us today.
General Kurilla, I want to begin with you. Just a few short
years ago, the Army says, ``Hey, we're getting rid of our
watercraft. We're divesting.'' Guess what? Today, the 7th
Transportation Brigade out of Joint Base Langley-Eustis is
spinning up. Guess where they are going? To Gaza. Joint
Logistics Over-the-Shore, they are going to be there. It sounds
like to me there is a little bit of contradiction there.
Anyway, a very difficult mission. It will take them a
little over--well, a little less than a month to get there.
Once they are in CENTCOM, I think they are going to be at
extraordinary risk because they are going to be targeted--
Hamas, the Houthis, Iran-backed terrorist groups in the region.
I think there is going to be extraordinary risk with them
focusing on their job.
The first question: how are you going to protect those
forces? How are you going to make sure that they are not in the
headlines, unfortunately, weeks after by being targeted by
those groups? How are they going to do their job while they are
looking over their shoulder? How is that going to happen? I
want to know what the long-term plan is for that.
Second of all is, how do you sustain protecting that pier?
So, once it is constructed, then, all of a sudden, you have to
look at it and say, ``Well, it's great to have that pier to
have the logistics.'' How do you protect in the long run? So,
how do you protect now, and then, how do you protect in the
future?
General Kurilla. Congressman, force protection is a top
priority for this. My Deputy Commander, like I said, is already
in the region working with our regional partners over there. In
a classified setting, I can talk to you specifically about the
force protection measures that will be there and with our
partners as well.
Mr. Wittman. You know, they are going to be under continual
operations there. So, once the pier is constructed, they are
going to be offloading.
We know, as we speak today, Army personnel, Navy personnel,
civilian personnel, working 24 hours a day at the Port of
Virginia to put together the necessary pieces to be able to go
there into theater and to be able to construct this
infrastructure.
It is interesting to me that we say that there are going to
be no boots on the ground in Gaza. Can you tell me how you
physically make that happen? Because my understanding is the
pier actually connects to shore. There will be some
construction activities onshore. Tell me, are personnel going
to levitate? How are they not going to go from the water to the
shore and have boots on the ground in Gaza?
General Kurilla. Again, Congressman, like I said, I used to
command these; they were one of my subordinate units. I'm very
familiar with how the 7th Transportation and Joint Logistics
Over-the-Shore does this.
We are working with our partners in the region that will
assist with this. And I can talk to you in a classified setting
exactly how this will operate.
Mr. Wittman. So, you are very confident there will be no
U.S. personnel with boots on the ground there?
General Kurilla. There is no plan to put boots on the
ground.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. We look at this in the longer term.
Obviously, this is going to be at risk in that particular area.
Give me a little more idea about what the cost will be for us
to continue to protect that facility.
What is going to happen, we are going to have civilian
ships there coming in with cargo. Obviously, they are going to
be targets. What is the plan--not just to protect the facility
there onshore--but what is the plan to protect the civilian
ships that come in and offload that cargo?
General Kurilla. There will be protection for them,
Congressman, that I can talk about in a classified setting and
tell you exactly how that will work.
Mr. Wittman. And you are confident that we will be able to
protect against all threats?
General Kurilla. Force protection is a top priority for me,
Congressman.
Mr. Wittman. Got you. Very good.
General Kurilla, I know that you talked about the threats
posed by the Houthi in the Red Sea. You know, we see a number
of different assets that they are putting in our direction,
whether it is drone, loitering munitions. I understand the
effort to have to protect our men and women on those ships,
protect our assets. But is it a sustainable, long-term strategy
to use million-dollar munitions to shoot down drones and
loitering munitions that are $10-, $15-, $20,000 apiece?
General Kurilla. Congressman, what is worse than that is
that $20,000 drone----
Mr. Wittman. I understand.
General Kurilla. --hitting a $20 billion ship with
sailors----
Mr. Wittman. I didn't ask you today--listen, I'm not
questioning at all whether we should protect our Sailors, our
Soldiers, our Marines, our Airmen, and our Coast Guardsmen--top
job. Is it sustainable to continue to use those costly
munitions against the price of these threats?
General Kurilla. What we need is for Iran to quit supplying
the Houthis for attack.
Mr. Wittman. I know.
General Kurilla. And we need to----
Mr. Wittman. Listen, you are great at talking around the
question. My question is, is it sustainable--is it
sustainable--to use that level of weaponry against the level of
weaponry that is being used against them?
General Kurilla. If we can degrade that capability on the
ground where they are shooting it from, we can be. And what we
need is the Services to create more cost-effective where it has
the same probability of kill on these munitions. I welcome
directed energy. I welcome high-powered microwave.
Mr. Wittman. So, you would be fully in favor of the Army
doing everything they can to get into the counter-Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS) business?
General Kurilla. I am all about counter-UAS, and if we pass
the supplemental, there's $686 million for counter-UAS in that,
which will save lives.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Quick fact check. General Langley, just quickly, this
historic relationship with the then-Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) in the African countries that sustained itself
in terms of their equipment supply--so, wouldn't you say that
that foundation is historic in nature as well? Just a simple
yes or no.
General Langley. Yes, it is historic.
Mr. Keating. Yes, well, thank you.
So, to say this all occurred in the last two years isn't
factual.
Secondly, Dr. Wallander, is Iraq important to us as a
linchpin to our ability to provide security and economic
benefit in the Middle East?
Dr. Wallander. Iraq is absolutely vital to the ability to
ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS.
Mr. Keating. So us conducting a military strike on Iraq, on
their sovereign territory without telling them would have been
endangering that to some degree. So it was good that we
notified Iraq?
Dr. Wallander. We are in Iraq at the agreement of the Iraqi
government.
Mr. Keating. All right. Thank you. I just wanted to deal
with that.
We have talked here, and it is one of the most critical
things, underpinnings, about this relationship with Iran,
Russia, China. That is so much of an issue. It is one of our
greatest threats going forward. We have a better coalition. One
of our biggest difference makers is the coalition that we have
in Ukraine alone. Over 50 countries are working together. And
that comes back from--dates back to the World War II days where
we came back to the greatest period of prosperity and peace
that we had with sacrifices like 400,000 Americans who died,
including my own uncle, killed in action.
What do you think that coalition is thinking when we sit
here--this is like, well, you know, other than that, Mrs.
Lincoln, how did you enjoy the theater? We are sitting here
about to go home for two weeks tomorrow, going into April. We
still have not acted on a security package that is vital.
People on the front line in Ukraine are dying right now because
this Congress hasn't acted. So what message does that give to
our coalition?
Dr. Wallander. Congressman, there is concern in Europe and
in the Middle East about the way forward for American support.
And I would just emphasize as well that it's very clear that
Russia in particular thinks that it can out-wait us because of
our inability to provide security assistance to vital partners.
Mr. Keating. And what message does this give to our
enemies? What was China thinking as this occurs right here in
this Congress? These are important issues we are talking about.
But presently, right now, today we have to act. What message is
this giving to those countries that we are worried about: Iran,
Russia, China, about our inability to just do what we are
supposed to do, which we pledged to do, provide aid to these
allies?
Dr. Wallander. We have done our best to reassure them with
words, but they're waiting to see our actions.
Mr. Keating. And so we sit here today and try and pin blame
around things. There are 185 Democrats who signed a discharge
petition on that security package. That was a huge bipartisan
package by the Senate. Bipartisan. It does happen around here.
And I know for a fact, just looking at press accounts and
talking to people, there is easily over 100 members--I think
more, on the Republican side--that is about 300 members right
here in this Congress willing to pass that package. Today.
One person is holding that up. The Speaker of this House.
He has the ability to put that on the floor for a vote today.
So as we go around here--you admit you can see my frustration.
As we go around here, ready to go home, and nitpick--and the
important issues, these other things, we are abrogating our own
responsibility to a far greater degree than any of these other
issues. Yet we sit here and bring our military here and try and
nitpick issues to get political advantage when we are not doing
our own job.
I can't tell you how angry that makes me, how disappointed
that makes me, and how I think it affects our security far
greater than anything I have ever seen in over the decade I
have been here. So I would just ask my colleagues and I demand
of the Speaker put that on the floor before we go home and do
the right thing. I yield back.
The. Chairman. The gentleman from Massachusetts yields
back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I don't pretend to speak for every Republican, but
generally speaking I think the majority of us believe that
Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan are three separate issues and it
should be three separate votes. We do not like having multiple
issues tied into the same piece of legislation. And I think
that all three would pass if they were individually put to the
floor.
There are a couple of things that we have asked for in the
Ukraine vote. We have asked for the enforcement of sanctions.
The fact of the matter is President Biden's refusal to enforce
the sanctions that were put in place against Vladimir Putin and
the Kremlin have allowed the Kremlin to become one of the most
cash-rich countries on the face of the earth right now. And as
much as I dislike Putin, he has used that cash to rebuild his
military industrial complex and he has been very effective with
what he has used that cash for.
So we have asked for the enforcement of the sanctions. We
have asked for the U.S. aid to become--to come primarily in the
way of weapons. We have asked for a seizure of the Russian
assets, which I understand while the Biden administration would
agree with us on, maybe some of our NATO partners don't agree
with us on. We will deal with that. And we have asked for the
Biden administration to fulfill our commitment to our NATO and
treaty partners where we told them if you broke your dependency
on Russia for energy that we would supply energy to you.
And what did the Biden administration do? After our NATO
partners spent billions of dollars to increase the capacity to
import Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) and other energy from the U.S.,
the Biden administration canceled it. So that is what we have
asked for, four things as Republicans in the Ukrainian aid
package. Basically just doing what it takes to win. And so that
is what we have asked for.
I will move to you, General Langley. I want to talk about
Africa. I want to talk specifically about Niger. The U.S. has
spent hundreds of millions of dollars in that country, invested
in that country. Less than a year ago it was one of our
strongest partners. We are now being, as I understand it from
the open-source reporting, pushed out of the country and they
have turned towards Russia.
Can you just outline for me how this partnership fell apart
so fast? I mean, so fast. And then how was the Russian military
able to so quickly become, if you will, Niger's apparently
partner of choice now? And it is baffling to me that we just
totally missed this from the standpoint of our intelligence
community. What indicators were there that we missed?
General Langley. Congressman, thanks for your question and
also thank you for getting down onto the continent and even
going into Niger and looking at some of their members of their
government and looking them in their face and assess where they
were in their democracy.
Well, I will say just in answer to your question it's
holistic as we saw the dominoes fall. When I did my assessment
I said, yes, across the Sahel all these countries are at a
tipping point. Mali had already fell. Burkina Faso, as I took
command, had already fell.
And sat there over a year ago over there at the Gaylord
where we had the 30th anniversary of the State Partnership
Program (SPP). And one of the general officers from Niger, as
we were sitting there with General Lyles, from Indiana, said we
are a island of stability in a sea of chaos. You can depend on
us.
So I would say what was--what actually stoked that, the
drivers of--that's why I laid out on the regional
disinformation campaign the Russian Federation had their
playbook. They had their passing game through their
disinformation campaign.
Years ago, seven years ago you only had about 200 folks
across the continent of Africa that were on the internet. Now
there are 600 millions. Very compelling across civil society,
but moreover very compelling in their militaries right now,
driving and putting a wedge between what we teach: law of armed
conflict, civilian-led governance.
I think it's failing because it's being drowned out. And
that's where I ask for more capabilities in the State
Department, in their Global Engagement Center, and also in our
information operations in the military.
Mr. Scott. So the number that you gave, approximately three
times the number that are engaged in social media in the United
States are engaged in social media in Africa. I watched as the
Russians--it was Wagner Group at the time, but Russians,
whatever. They are one in the same, right? French Intelligence,
Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) picked up a mass grave in
Mali, I believe it was, and before the French were able to
convince the government of Mali, or share the intel with them,
that--what Wagner had done, Wagner had used social media to
convince the public that it was the French that had done it. Am
I correct in that?
General Langley. That's how savvy they are, Congressman.
Very savvy. And we need to step up our game as far as being
able to reveal what their activities are and the
disinformation----
Mr. Scott. I agree with you 100 percent. Thank you,
General.
The. Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all the witnesses for being here today.
Last month I went to Israel and the West Bank. I saw
firsthand the devastation this war has caused for both Israelis
and Palestinians. I went to the site of the Nova music festival
where over 250 civilians were murdered. I also saw the violence
against Palestinians by settlers in the West Bank. I have said
time and time again protecting innocent Palestinians and
rooting Hamas out of Gaza are not incompatible goals.
Secretary Wallander, can you speak to why it is important
for this region that we find a solution that ends this conflict
and how Congress can help support these efforts?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. First and foremost
of course the United States supports Israel's right to defend
itself and we agree that the events of October 7 must never--
there must be no chance that that ever recurs. But how Israel
conducts its operations is absolutely vital to Israel's long-
term security and security and stability more generally in the
region. And Secretary Austin and all of the administration
leadership are clear with the Israeli counterparts on that,
offer our assistance, offer actually U.S. military experience
on conducting military operations while maintaining those high
standards.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I appreciate the work being done
balancing diplomacy while securing U.S. interests and
supporting partners and allies in two very complex AORs.
General Langley, good to see you here again. I saw you last
in Africa on one of my trips there. Addressing violent
extremists has been a significant challenge in Africa. Now that
you have served as the commander of AFRICOM for over a year-
and-a-half what other strategies should we be focusing on that
have been--not been widely explored either due to funding
constraints or other limitations to fight insurgency groups in
the AOR?
General Langley. Congressman, first of all, thank you for
your visits to the continent as you went there to assess and
looked at their whole-of-governments. Access to the Global
Fragility Act should be working. They were toured as, yes, we
wanted it in more capacity so it can work like a--what they're
considered in Africa as Marshall Plan.
I think the enduring defeat of violent extremist
organizations is the building out these fragile governments and
their capability to fight. So it's not just a military
solution. It is a whole of government by these countries to be
able to affect some strengthening measures in development of
their democracies. That is the enduring solution. That is the
panacea to violent extremists organizations because as that
ideology, false ideology came down through the Maghreb they
grasped onto it. But we're talking about the Fulani tribes,
we're talking the sheep herders and also--we're also talking
about the farmers. Conflict. So all those layered threats is
causing that problem and it's a--so it's a false caliphate in
which that it can be interdicted, intervened by good governance
and democratic norms.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
General Kurilla, since October 2023 Iranian-backed militias
have launched approximately 100 attacks on U.S. Forces in
Syria. Can you speak to what you are doing to detour Iran and
its proxies from becoming more emboldened especially with
Russia and China's growing influence in the region? How do our
allies help you here?
General Kurilla. So we have a partnership with our partners
inside of Syria that we work with in the enduring defeat of
ISIS. And the same thing with our Iraqi security forces that we
work inside of Iraq for the enduring defeat of ISIS as well.
Specifically, to the attacks inside of Syria we continue to
bolster our defenses, our counter-UAS. The supplemental has 686
million of it for counter-UAS if that is passed. Specifically,
though we have responded to attacks inside of Syria and inside
of Iraq with the most recent attack. We're on about day 46
right now of a temporary deterrence. I have no illusions that
this will be enduring because we do think that they will try
and attack again in the future.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, General. I am out of time. With
that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The. Chairman. I thank the gentleman from California.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
Because we got a lecture on the $100 billion supplement
that hasn't been passed, I got to agree with my colleague Mr.
Scott from Georgia that if we would break these things up they
might get legs.
Dr. Wallander, in this $100 billion supplement, which our
government is very good at writing big checks without really
explaining where it all goes, my understanding was 65 billion
went to Ukraine. How much of that is actually for military
equipment?
Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I believe--I'm sorry, I don't
have the numbers right in front of me. That----
Dr. DesJarlais. Yes, that is the point.
Dr. Wallander. That wasn't----
Dr. DesJarlais. Sixty-five billion is a big number. Admiral
Aquilino just yesterday was talking about a 10 billion
shortfall in unfunded mandates that we need for the China-
Taiwan. And I would argue that China is a greater threat,
immediate threat to us than Russia. So if we would break these
things down, we can actually look at the numbers. It would be a
little easier for Congress to pass and explain to constituents
back home where this money is going when we are having so many
issues here at home: can't secure our own border, et cetera.
But that is not why we are here today.
General Kurilla, it has been over five months since Hamas
attacked Israel on October 7. Six Americans remain alive among
the hostages supposedly in Hamas captivity while two have died.
Can you elaborate here about what efforts are being made to
bring these Americans home?
General Kurilla. Unfortunately, Congressman, it's five
Americans that are left alive right now with the death of one
announced I think two weeks ago. In a classified setting I can
talk to you exactly what we're doing.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. We just don't want to forget about
that, and I know you haven't.
How much operational control does Iran exercise over its
proxy forces? And I ask this because you lend credibility to
the recent reports of the fissures between Iran and its
proxies, as well as among the proxies themselves. And what does
that mean for Iran's regional escalation?
General Kurilla. I would say Iran has tremendous control
over its proxies particularly in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. What steps could the Biden
administration and/or Congress take right now to exploit the
fissures if--you didn't really comment on that--and strengthen
deterrence against the Iran-led escalation?
General Kurilla. Well, Iran must be compelled to cease
their malign behavior and their actions of directing,
supplying, funding, and training these proxies.
Dr. DesJarlais. So do we have plans to interdict that? Are
they in place?
General Kurilla. So that's--if we're specifically talking
about like the Houthis for instance, that is one of the lines
of effort. We want to deny their ability to be resupplied. That
will take a whole of--actually an international effort, much
like we did with counter-piracy, to be able to go after that,
because only two ships can resupply the vast majority of the
equipment that we've destroyed so far of the Houthis.
Dr. DesJarlais. Yes, I mean, they certainly seem undeterred
at this point. And Mr. Wittman brought up, or maybe Mr. Lamborn
brought up the fact that--how do we get at these to deter them?
You said that if we could go at the sources, we could stop
using very expensive interdiction methods. Why are we not going
after them?
General Kurilla. So I'll tell you the--to restore freedom
of navigation of the Red Sea, which is our campaign going on
right now in the Red Sea. It's five efforts. The first one is
to protect the shipping. That's Prosperity Guardian. The other
is to degrade their offensive capability. Third is to deny
Iran's ability to resupply, which we see and we try and
interdict. Unfortunately, we lost Special Operations 1 Chambers
and Special Operations 2 Ingram, both SEALS, in the
interdiction when we got medium-range ballistic missiles and
anti-ship cruise missiles. We have to stop that. We have to
increase the international effort to be able to do the
inspections on the vessels that are going into Hodeidah. We
need to isolate the Houthis in the information environment, and
we have to impose costs on Iran so that there is consequence to
their behavior.
Dr. DesJarlais. And certainly it is not just an American
problem. Where are our partners in the fight? What accounts for
more allies and partners not joining the coalition?
General Kurilla. So we have 24 partners in Operation
Prosperity Guardian. Seventeen of them are public. There is
also an EU mission. Just this very morning about six hours ago
our French partner shot down two anti-ship ballistic missiles.
Our German partner shot an unmanned surface vessel in
collaboration with the Eisenhower. And we destroyed an unmanned
surface vessel as well. Our partners are out there. They are
protecting ships and there are some that are partnering with us
on the offensive actions inside of Yemen.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Let me just finish with this: What
steps is the department taking to resume the pre-October 7
progress on Israel's military integration with the U.S.
regional partners, particularly building on its integration
into CENTCOM and the breakthroughs of the Abraham Accord?
General Kurilla. So we work with--my job is on the
military-to-military level. We work with all of our partners in
the region. Part of that we have several efforts that we do,
everything from integrated air and missile defense,
cybersecurity, maritime security. We do that in these forms
that bring these efforts together. I think there's a diplomatic
effort on the Abraham Accords.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Thank you, sir.
I yield back.
The. Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Smith. Sorry to belabor the Ukraine thing, but I just
want to point out in six months we haven't had a vote on
Ukraine supplemental in the House on any--in any shape, manner,
or form. So if you all got a different way to do it--and I know
there are some who oppose it. And if you oppose it, God bless
you. Mr. Gaetz, yes, I respect that. But if you actually
support Ukraine, you haven't put a vote on, in any form, one
way or the other. Divide it up. This amount, that amount, the
other. But you haven't given the House a vote. And now Ukraine
is hanging on by their fingernails and the only vehicle that we
have that can pass is the one the Senate passed.
So if you got something else, (A) I wish you had given it
to us months ago; but (B) any day, any time put something on
the floor to give us the opportunity to at least have a vote to
support Ukraine. Well, we could do this. We could do that.
Well, what if we did it this way? What if we did it that way?
That is a fascinating conversation while the Ukrainians are
dying and why Putin continues to think he is going to be able
to take Ukraine. Give us a vote on something to help Ukraine.
And the final point on the $60-plus billion, I am going to
get the numbers slightly off here, but well over 30 billion of
that money is to go to restock U.S. munitions. It is going to
us. That is the overwhelming majority of it. I believe the
humanitarian portion is less than 10. I am going to be slightly
off on that, but I see nodding heads out there from people who
know.
But whatever your excuse is--and I have heard every single
excuse going back to six months ago when I had a meeting with
Kevin McCarthy and Jake Sullivan and others, and Kevin was
speculating about, well, we could do this. We could do that.
What if we did it this way? What if we did it that way? And I
said at the time wonderful. Just do it.
Dr. DesJarlais. Would the Ranking Member yield for 10
seconds?
Mr. Smith. I will. And I am sorry. I just want to try to
find some way to get it done because I know there are a lot of
Republicans that do want to get it done. So I am not----
Dr. DesJarlais. I just want to point out there is a----
Mr. Smith. Do something.
Dr. DesJarlais. I want to point out there was a $14 billion
Israeli bill brought to the floor that failed a couple months
ago. Stand alone.
Mr. Smith. I am talking Ukraine for the moment. Okay?
Ukraine. So anyway, I yield back. Thank you for your
indulgence, Mr. Chair.
The. Chairman. The gentleman is welcome.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms.
Slotkin.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you and I firmly agree with the Ranking
Member. Just bring us whatever you want, but bring it forward.
They don't need talking points. They need artillery and air
defenses.
Okay. General Kurilla, it is good to see you. You are one
of the most decorated officers we have in service now. I was
looking through your service record. Panama, Desert Storm,
Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan. You were seriously
wounded in Mosul in 2004 and won the Bronze Star there.
Help us understand in Gaza--you are engaging with your
Israeli counterparts--the military strategy on Rafah and the
military strategy for the next day. We struggled with this as a
country. The United States struggled with counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency. You were wounded in Mosul and we were back
in Mosul taking it back from ISIS in 2017. What in your
understanding is the military strategy for Rafah and do you
support that strategy?
General Kurilla. Congressman, thank you for the question.
My relationship with them as military to military. I do not
advise them on the actual day-to-day operations. I do talk to
the Israeli Chief of Defense on a routine basis.
Ms. Slotkin. And what is your understanding of the plan?
General Kurilla. So what--I would tell you what Israel's
overarching plan--what they have told me in terms of just Gaza
is they want to--they're going after a lot of the leadership
and destroy the strategic tunnels that are in there, strategic
tunnels as defined by those that have command and control and
the ability to manufacture weapons----
Mr. Slotkin. Right.
General Kurilla. --so that they can't use those again. And
what I would tell you when you look at the leadership that's in
there--there's five brigades inside of Gaza: North Gaza City,
Central, Khan, Younis, and Rafah. And underneath those there
are battalions. And there's also specialized battalions much
like we have UAV units or et cetera that they have. They're
going after the leadership of those to do that.
What I do know is, what they have told me is they are not
going to take action until they have the ability to protect the
civilians and move them out of the area. I don't think they
have finalized the plan for that until they do it. I am not
aware of their current plans to be able to do the civilian harm
mitigation for Rafah. They are still----
Ms. Slotkin. Have you asked them?
General Kurilla. I have asked them. They are finalizing
that and they've said they will provide that to me when they
are complete with it.
Ms. Slotkin. And when you were serving in places like Iraq
and Afghanistan, especially as battalion commander, et cetera,
what were your responsibilities around humanitarian aid and
making--and did you--give me your sort of responsibilities as a
military leader around civilian harm reduction and getting
humanitarian aid to those areas where you served?
General Kurilla. So at one point I was the commander of all
of western Mosul as a battalion commander and we wanted to make
sure we took care of the civilians that are underneath our
sector of western Mosul while also going after the elements
that we were trying to fight.
Ms. Slotkin. So you worked to facilitate humanitarian aid
into those areas even as you searched and effectively hunted Al
Qaeda and others?
General Kurilla. That is accurate, Congresswoman.
Ms. Slotkin. Okay. And do you feel like the Israelis are
doing everything in their power to maintain as low as possible
civilian harm?
General Kurilla. I think----
Ms. Slotkin. In our military estimation.
General Kurilla. I think they are very conscious of the
civilian harm. We talked about. Every time I talk to my
counterpart we talk about that. What I am trying to do though
is help alleviate some of the human suffering there and that's
coming either through--we just did an airborne operation of aid
this morning. We've approached now almost a million meals in
the north with eight other countries. We're also working to
increase the land line of communication to bring some in.
There has been some progress in the last two weeks. I
talked to Ambassador Satterfield who is the special
representative for humanitarian efforts and he has seen some
progress. The challenge is internal security and distribution
inside of Gaza. And that is--there is some progress being made.
We just had a conference in Rome with USAID and others on how
the distribution will work when we eventually get the maritime
domain as well.
Ms. Slotkin. What is your understanding given the--again
the United States, we struggled with this so much in Iraq and
Afghanistan--the end game, the day after planning? The fact
that you were injured in 2004 and we were--in Mosul and we were
still dealing with Mosul in 2017 and beyond, what is your
understanding of the military end game for Gaza?
General Kurilla. I think they're still working that, ma'am.
Ms. Slotkin. Yes. Okay. I yield back.
The. Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. I would like to follow up on that, maybe
attempt to simply it. I mean, we are fortunate to live in a
democracy. And, Dr. Wallander, would you say that the United
States military in general holds itself to the highest ethical
standards, moral and ethical standards?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Gallagher. Would you say that our military takes great
effort to avoid civilian casualties wherever possible?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Gallagher. Do you believe the United States
intentionally targets civilians?
Dr. Wallander. I believe the U.S. military does not
intentionally target civilians.
Mr. Gallagher. And in Israel we have a vibrant democracy as
well. This is a great thing. Do you believe that the Israel
Defense Forces hold themselves to a high moral and ethical
standard just as the United States does?
Dr. Wallander. I do believe that the Israeli Defense Forces
hold themselves to that high standard.
Mr. Gallagher. And Israel does not target civilians and
takes steps to avoid civilian casualties wherever possible,
correct?
Dr. Wallander. I believe that is a true statement, sir.
Mr. Gallagher. And is there any evidence at present that
they are--you emphasize in your testimony that they have a
responsibility to protect civilians. I agree. I think they are
doing--going to great lengths to do just that and to uphold
international law. Is there any evidence that they are
violating international law?
Dr. Wallander. I am not aware of any evidence that they are
deliberately targeting civilians.
Mr. Gallagher. And so contrast that, the high moral and
ethical standards of the United States military and our allies
in Israel with Hamas. Hamas is a terrorist organization,
correct?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Gallagher. And Hamas does not care about human life
including the civilians in Gaza, correct?
Dr. Wallander. Worse. Hamas exploits other's concern for
civilian life by placing their capabilities and their fighters
protected by human shields.
Mr. Gallagher. That was going to be my next question. You
anticipated. The use of human shields. And many civilians in
Gaza have died from Hamas rockets landing inside Gaza in Hamas'
attacks on civilians, correct?
Dr. Wallander. I believe there have been such validated
incidents, yes, Congressman.
Mr. Gallagher. The thing I am curious about is Hamas
could--if we apply the same standard, they have a
responsibility to protect human life. Hamas could surrender
today, released all of the hostages and the war presumably
would be over, correct?
Dr. Wallander. If Hamas ended their war against Israel the
conflict could be over today.
Mr. Gallagher. A final question on this front. Do you want
Hamas to be removed from control of Gaza or would you like to
see Hamas regain control of Gaza at the risk of another October
7th-type massacre?
Dr. Wallander. The administration fully supports Israel's
goal of destroying Hamas' ability to conduct these operations.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. I appreciate that. General, talk
to me a little bit about--how do you characterize the
relationship between Iran, Russia, and China? I know the
expanded influence and presence of China in the CENTCOM AOR is
a particular concern for you. Help me understand the connection
between these three entities.
General Kurilla. So, if I could go, Congressman, to just
China and Iran, what we are seeing Iran is selling 90 percent
of its oil. And that is the largest part of their GDP is oil is
being purchased by China. It's all sanctioned oil by the U.S.
So, Iran is dependent upon China. In effect China is funding
their subversive behavior throughout the region, their malign
and subversive behavior.
The relationship between Iran and Russia, that really
started when they asked for them to provide the one-way attack
UASs, specifically the Shahed-136. They started providing
complete systems and they built an actual factory in Russia.
And those same Shahed-136s, a very capable system, are now
going at a rate of over 100 a week from Russia into Ukraine.
And then what I'll talk in a classified setting is the
concerns of what Russia can provide back to Iran. And we're
actually seeing interest of China interested in purchasing some
of Iranian UAVs as well. So it's not interdependent, but it is
a cooperation that is happening between all of them.
Mr. Gallagher. What do you think China's goals are in the
region, the CENTCOM AOR?
General Kurilla. They want to be able to replace the U.S.
as the--as one of the dominant forces in the Middle East.
Mr. Gallagher. And you mentioned our strategic advantage
being our close partnership with our allies whereas, in
contrast to our adversaries, they have a far more transactional
relationship. How do you think the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) views Iran in the region? As a client state? As a source
of hydrocarbons that it can control?
General Kurilla. I think as a source of hydrocarbons, like
they do many of the other countries. Fifty percent of their
energy comes from the Middle East. They import about 70 percent
of their energy.
Mr. Gallagher. I appreciate that, and I yield back the
remainder of my time.
The. Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Panetta.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, ma'am, thank you very much for being here.
Appreciate this opportunity.
Focusing on Niger, clearly, we bet big. Okay? We bet big on
Niger. And right now, we are at a point in which we either want
to double down or we want to fold, unfortunately. And, look, I
get the bet. As I called it in my visits there, it was the
Alamo in an area that I have also now called an area of ``deja-
coups.'' Seems to be happening often.
But now we are dealing in Niger with a military junta, a
military junta that is basically kicking out our partners. It
kicked out France. It revoked a security pact with the EU. And
now, unfortunately, the regional security coalitions in that
area: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
Accra, G5, let's be frank, they lack strength, they lack
credibility.
And then after the meeting that you were at, General
Langley, with Assistant Secretary Phee soon after they kicked--
they ended the security pact with the United States,
unfortunately, or at least that is their intention at this
point. And I appreciate the direct and frank conversations that
you had with the junta at that point, talking about Russia,
talking about the potential agreement to sell uranium to Iran,
but unfortunately it appeared it backfired based on their
statement.
Now at the same time during all of this the United States
has formally declared a coup back in October that legally
prevents the United States from providing the new regime with
security assistance. So, it seems that our approach to Niger
and our approach to this junta is divided and disconnected. And
it is sort of a two-prong approach in that (1), I get it, we
want to support our democracy and our values, but (2) we are
trying to be friendly with this junta. And it is leading to a
point where we have a--kind of a judgment of Solomon in that we
are splitting the goals.
What we don't want is it to leave us with nothing because
we know that nothing will be filled by China, by Russia, by
Iran. We also know that the VEOs, the violent extremists
organizations are not going to stop in Niger. There are going
to be consequences throughout the Sahel.
As the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) put out its
threat--its annual threat assessment last--I think it was
recently, the instability in Sahel is going to raise--
especially in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, raises the
likelihood that the crisis will metastasize and spill over to
the Littorals of Africa.
And so my question to doctor, my question to General
Langley is what is our coherent and consistent strategy towards
Niger and what do we plan to do to prevent Russia, China, and
Iran from filling that void? And what do we plan to do in order
to continue our effort, which I think is necessary, to go after
the VEOs in that area?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. I think you framed
the dilemma and the challenges extremely well and I fully agree
with your assessment.
I would like to clarify that at this point the National
Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP), the self-
identified government of Niger, has not asked or demanded that
the United States military depart. There is actually quite a
mixed message. We are following up and seeking clarification.
What they have declared is that they have declared the SOFA,
the Status of Forces Agreement----
Mr. Panetta. Right.
Dr. Wallander. --to be not operational. They have assured
us that American military forces are protected and they will
take no action that would endanger them. So, while we work
through that with that we are seeking ways to be able to
continue to have access and ability to conduct counter-VEO
operations.
That said, I will just foot stomp something you mentioned,
which is countries that are run by military juntas are not
reliable security partners and part of the value proposition
for us having access in Niger would be a return to democratic
civilian rule in Niger.
Mr. Panetta. Got it. General Langley?
General Langley. Congressman, I'll just give an operational
viewpoint----
Mr. Panetta. Please.
General Langley. --as far as--because this is a question of
strategic access. At the great power competitional level it's
essential. It is essential that we double down within the
authorities that we still have at the imposition of 7008. But I
will just take a regional view on that. We do need to engage
with other countries to increase their partnership and
capacity.
We need more--take the disinformation campaign. We need to
hit it front and center. Front and center. Because Russia does
have a passing game. Now they have a ground game as well with
the Russian corps in--being introduced to Mali, being
introduced in Burkina Faso----
The. Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
The. Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Gaetz.
[Video played.]
Mr. Gaetz. So I guess my--I guess four months after that
exchange, General Langley, you had General Moussa Barmou
overthrow the government in Niger. It won't surprise anybody
here that we trained him. The person who overthrew the
democratically-elected government in Niger went to the National
Defense University, trained at Fort Benning Georgia. So, do we
share core values with Moussa Barmou?
General Langley. Congressman, let me just go ahead and
state that core values is what we start off with, but there is
no syllabus for overthrowing a government. Not in our
institutions.
Mr. Gaetz. Well, they are learning it pretty well even in
the absence of a syllabus, right, because if you look at Chad,
Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger--in a lot of these
countries the coup is led by someone we trained.
Now I put in the National Defense Authorization Act a
requirement for you to issue us a report as to how many coup
leaders our taxpayers have funded the training for. That report
is due tomorrow. Will we be getting it on time?
General Langley. I'll do a follow up on that, Congressman.
Mr. Gaetz. Well, and this was the follow up, right, because
first I asked you in that clip how many coup leaders did we
train. You didn't know. And so then I put it in the law for you
to tell me. The law requires you to tell me by tomorrow. So can
you give us a preview of coming attractions?
General Langley. You get that--you'll get your answer,
Congressman.
Mr. Gaetz. Just----
General Langley. But let me say, let me say there is no
correlation and there's no causation of U.S. training to these
members and the coup----
Mr. Gaetz. Well, that is what I am trying to find out
because in like a dozen countries the coup leaders are people
we trained. Like what a difference a year makes. March 16,
2023, Secretary Blinken calls Niger, quote, ``a model of
resilience, a model of democracy, a model of cooperation.'' One
year and one day later, Dr. Wallander, the spokesperson of the
Nigeri military, Colonel Amadou Abdramane, says, quote, ``The
American presence in the territory in the Republic of Niger is
illegal.'' A year and a day after our government said they were
the model of resilience and democracy they are throwing us out
by the scruffs of our neck.
And so is it safe to say that this failed, General Langley?
General Langley. It's safe to say that there's no
correlation or causation of U.S. training to a coup happening,
period.
Mr. Gaetz. Well, it certainly isn't--there is no causation
or correlation to the training we do creating more--I am trying
to ascertain whether or not all this money we spent in Africa
makes the place less stable or more stable. And just for a
country lawyer like me if we are funding the coup leaders, that
probably strikes me as making it less stable.
Now are you aware of the Iranian efforts to now mine in
Niger, General Langley?
General Langley. Congressman, we could talk about in a
classified session on that.
Mr. Gaetz. Well, I mean, Fox News is reporting it. They are
saying that Iran is working on economic arrangements to get
uranium from Niger.
General Langley. Well, in a classified session we'd would
talk real intel.
Mr. Gaetz. Yes, I guess. I mean, we have spent more than
500 million in the country. What can you say we have got for
that 500 million as we sit here today? If it is like being
turned into an uranium mine, the Russians are the preferred
security partner, and we are training the coup leaders?
General Langley. There is a buy-down on an insurance policy
for protecting the homeland.
Mr. Gaetz. I don't think we are doing that though. I don't
think there is evidence to suggest that.
General Langley. That's your opinion.
Mr. Gaetz. You went to Niger----
General Langley. I respect your opinion----
Mr. Gaetz. Okay. But, General Langley, you went to Niger
and you went to have a meeting with the people we trained who
overthrew the democratically-elected government. And Fox News
is reporting that you didn't even get a meeting with the
principal decision maker. Is that right?
General Langley. I had a meeting with my counterpart.
Mr. Gaetz. Well, here is the quote: ``Sources say last
week's meeting with the junta was extremely difficult. The
administration's envoys did not get to meet with Niger's
principal decision maker.'' Is that a true statement or is that
a false statement?
General Langley. My responsibility is to meet with my
counterpart, not----
Mr. Gaetz. I would just hope that if we are training coup
leaders----
The. Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. The
gentleman's time----
Mr. Gaetz. --could at least book a meeting since it is the
model of democracy----
The. Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Pennsylvania,
Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you very much for the opportunity to
listen and learn from you, and thank you for your service to
the country.
Was hoping, Generals, that I could ask you to reflect a
little bit on some of the history of this nation. Specifically
interested in going back to June 6 of 1944, which was D-Day,
which I am certainly you all know. Can you tell me to the
degree that you recall your education and your history what
happened on that day?
General Kurilla. Obviously that's Operation Overlord going
into Normandy. I did command the 82nd Airborne Division, which
has a strong history and helped liberate--the first city
liberated was Sainte-Mere-Eglise. And we're coming up on our
80th anniversary this year.
Ms. Houlahan. And, General Langley, do you have any
reflections on that day?
General Langley. Yes, I was at the 79th and I'm planning to
going to the 80th. And seeing those members that went across
that beach was memorable. And being able to meet with them was
very telling of those that had what we call common valor. And
that was very striking and it was able to--all the generations
that followed as far as our war fighting ethos and supporting
and protecting our Constitution and serving in the military in
the United States has gone through from the greatest generation
to present.
Ms. Houlahan. Yes, I had the opportunity to go to the 75th
anniversary as well and it was a remarkable observation of a
really powerful moment in history when we were able to liberate
Europe and we were able to lead with our values. And the reason
why I am asking this is I would love to be able to ask you
specific questions about this posture hearing, but I am so
troubled by the fact that I believe history is repeating itself
again. I am so deeply concerned that we are in 1939 again and
that we are ignoring our common shared history which led us
because of isolationism, because of inaction to participating
in World War II arguably too late. Arguably we could have
stopped it earlier than we did and arguably D-Day didn't ever
have to happen, in my opinion.
We are heading into the 80th anniversary of D-Day and my
understanding is the Speaker of the House is really interested
and excited in going to the 80th anniversary of D-Day. And I am
just struck by the irony, I don't even know what the right
word, is that we will observe that and not understand that we
could indeed prevent something like that from happening again
if we, the Congress, could act on the supplemental and on the
Senate's bill that has already passed, if we could help Ukraine
fight the fight that is the fight for all of us for democracies
around the world.
I was hoping that you all could comment on how you are
seeing from your history, your heritage, your careers what is
unfolding in Europe. I recognize that is not your area of
interest right now, but would love to understand how you
reflect on it in terms of the history that we are all facing
right now. And I don't expect any specific answer. I am
genuinely interested in your thoughts.
General Kurilla. I'm keenly interested obviously because we
have Russia in our AOR, Congresswoman. They're in Syria. They
got their--they have a warm water port now in Tartus. They have
an air base in Latakia. And we watch what Russia is doing both
in Ukraine--I talk to Chris Cavoli on a routine basis as he
updates me on what's happening. And I watch Iran's support to
Russia and their illegal invasion of Ukraine.
Ms. Houlahan. He has made it clear, Putin has made it clear
this is an imperial effort to retake Russian territory, so to
speak. And his intentions have been clear and he has executed
on those intentions.
General Langley, do you have any comments as well?
General Langley. As the activities that Russian
Federation's doing on the continent of Africa is very de-
stabilizing. And what they're doing, just from the geopolitical
piece of is, they're trying--they want to change the rules base
international order and they want to reshape the world economic
order as well, just doing it through socioeconomic coercion and
also dependence.
Here we have a military construct and we will put a court
on around your junta, newly-formed governments in exchange for
mining concessions. All those mining concessions go to the
Russian Federation.
Ms. Houlahan. And I appreciate you, gentlemen, very much. I
have only eight seconds left, but the reason I ask these
questions is because I would urge our Speaker to please allow
us to vote on the Senate package so that we cannot have another
D-Day. Thank you and I yield back.
The. Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr.
Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I appreciate all three of you being here. My first
question deals with Iran, so I am looking on the left side of
the dais over there.
Now Iran has attacked us--how many attacks have there been
done against our forces by proxy forces? I lost the count.
General Kurilla. In which country, Congressman.
Mr. Bacon. Just combined. When you look at Iraq, Syria.
General Kurilla. Iraq and Syria, it's about 175 since the--
about 46 days ago. And the Houthis, which is an Iranian proxy,
the number's upwards of 200.
Mr. Bacon. That is an incredible number. What concerns me
is we strike back at the proxy forces and I don't think Iran
cares. I don't think Iran cares if you hit their junior
partners in the nose. They care if you hit them in the nose. So
why haven't we made--gone after Iran more directly, because I
don't think we can deter them by just going after their proxy
forces? That is probably more of a policy question, but I defer
to whoever wants to answer.
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. We have struck. And
I would defer to General Kurilla on details. We have struck
Iranian assets in--that are used to--launched those attacks
against American or partnered forces in Iraq and in Syria. So,
we have struck at those to erode their effectiveness, but also
to signal that we will strike at Iranian forces that are
threatening Americans.
Mr. Bacon. I believe if we don't go after Iran more
directly, they are going to see it as weakness and they are
just going to keep amplifying these attacks. We have already
lost three Americans on the border of Jordan. And I just--I
guess I implore a more aggressive thing because I think in the
end once Iran knows we are serious, they will have those proxy
forces back off. My view anyway.
To General Langley, what is the impact of what is going on
in Niger operationally to us?
General Langley. Thanks for the question, Congressman. As
we approach, our operational approach would be to deter threats
holistically, and the greatest end state is being able to
protect the homeland. All of those violent extremist
organizations, whether we're talking about ISIS Sahel, ISIS
West Africa, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Musilmeen (JNIM) or
any other faction--Boko Haram is still alive and well--we need
to be able to do indications and warnings. We need to be able
to monitor and respond. And that's why we need, you know, long
endurance ISRs so the impacts will be great if we lose our
posture.
Mr. Bacon. Is there alternative countries to Niger that we
can operate out of?
General Langley. Congressman, we're exploring that now. I
can talk more in the closed session about--because it's in the
diplomatic realm right now.
Mr. Bacon. Outside of maybe Egypt what are some other
nations that are working closely with us that we should be
investing in and nurturing better in Africa?
General Langley. I'd say that--I'll just take for East
Africa and Somalia for instance. We're working and to be able
to support the efforts to run the campaign, help President
Hassan Mohamud run the campaign. But there's other countries
there as well: Turkey, UAE, the U.K. So, they call that the
Quint. It's way ahead for sustaining operations in Somalia.
Mr. Bacon. A follow-up to General Kurilla when it comes to
Afghanistan. So, I think we have enough evidence to say Al
Qaeda is reestablishing itself in Afghanistan, or
reconstituting. Their leader was killed there for starters, and
we are reading about training camps. Can you give us a little
more information? What is Al Qaeda doing in Afghanistan?
General Kurilla. In a classified session I can give you
great detail, but I would tell you that we do see the Taliban
as harboring Al Qaeda. They're also harboring Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistani and other violent extremist organizations. The only
one that they're actively fighting is ISIS-Khorasan.
Mr. Bacon. All right. I think it is important for citizens
to know what we can tell them because we saw what happened
prior to 9/11 and now we are seeing the same Taliban regime
partnering with Al Qaeda. And I think there is a future threat
to our country there. So with that, I appreciate your
leadership and thank you for being here today. I yield back.
The. Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair would announce that or remind folks that we are
going to have a classified session after this public session.
So, the public session will end just before 1:00. We will go
into classified session. We will be called for votes at 1:30.
So just as a reminder for awareness.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Moulton from Massachusetts.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In recent months U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria have faced
approximately 167 attacks by Iran-backed militias and in Jordan
three U.S. service members were of course tragically killed by
an Iranian-linked drone attack. So many Americans are wondering
why we still have troops in the region and are asking what our
service members are fighting for.
General Kurilla, how would you explain why maintaining a
small U.S. troop presence in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq serves
U.S. interests as a good investment in our national security
and ultimately makes us safer back home?
General Kurilla. Thanks, Congressman. We have forces in
Iraq and Syria for the enduring defeat of ISIS. And if I could
describe ISIS for you, we have ISIS at large, those that we are
going after every day, every night, about 1,500 inside of Syria
and about 1,000 inside of Iraq.
You have an army--an ISIS army in detention, 9,000 of them
across 27 detention facilities in Syria, about 20,000 inside of
Iraq. I don't worry so much about the detention inside Iraq. I
worry about those that are inside Syria.
And the last category is the next potential generation of
ISIS and those are the ones that are in the Al-Hol and the Al-
Roj camps. Used to be 70,000; now it's down to about 43,000. I
was just there two-and-a-half weeks ago. It is my assessment if
that were to completely pull out, that you would see a
resurgence of ISIS in about one to two years. So, what we are
doing is we are defending forward. We are going after those
forces.
The ones that we specifically target inside of Syria are
those that are trying to break out that ISIS army. And they did
that in January of 2022 where they broke out--there was 4,401
in one detention facility. A thousand made it outside of the
camp, killed 125 of our Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
partners, but there was 450 of them killed. The rest were
captured and about 100 got away.
Mr. Moulton. And to be clear, they are interested in
attacking the United States?
General Kurilla. And the next ones we go after are those
that are doing external operations defined as outside of Iraq
and Syria. And we have thwarted several of those that would be
really against western interests in Eurasia or in Europe.
Mr. Moulton. Would you recommend to the President that we
withdraw our troops from Iraq?
General Kurilla. I would not until the conditions are met
that Iraq can handle that fight by themselves.
Mr. Moulton. Dr. Wallander, would you recommend to the
President that we withdraw our troops from Iraq?
Dr. Wallander. I would not on the conditions that General
Kurilla also articulated.
Mr. Moulton. Dr. Wallander, some suggest that U.S. troops
are just a target for rival nations and actually increased
tension in the region. How would you push back on that
argument?
Dr. Wallander. U.S. forces are a target in particular
because Iran seeks to eject the United States from the Middle
East so that it can have free operational access and effects
that are very contrary to American national security interests
as we're seeing in the Red Sea and elsewhere in the Middle
East.
Mr. Moulton. And of course this isn't just the case in the
Middle East. General Langley, you wrote in your written
statement that quote, ``If we fail in Africa, our strategic
competitors will move in.'' How does the U.S. military presence
in Africa counter Russia and China?
General Langley. So, Congressman, with our approach as
codified in national security strategy building partnership
capacity, but it needs to be African-led. So in order for it to
be African-led in their security construct they're developing
armies. They need our assistance to be able to--so they have
the capability and capacity to deter threats.
Mr. Moulton. And of course China is not just competing with
us in the military realm. So where do you find that you run
into limits of what you are able to do as a military command
going up against the real whole of nation effort from China and
Russia and where does the interagency need to do more?
General Langley. Congressman, across the board. Like I
said, we are losing the disinformation from the Russian
Federation. We need to meet that with the truth. So as far as
the Global Engagement Center from the State Department or other
activities we need to close the say-do gap. We're doing a lot
across USAID and the State Department, and also within DoD, but
we're not telling the story. We're not telling the story
because we're getting drowned out by the disinformation
campaign across civil society and also through the militaries
in the Sahel. And that's what we get. We're not saying that
Russia caused it, but it did accelerate the coup d'etats that
you're seeing in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
Mr. Moulton. So would you say, General, the disinformation
is a national security threat to the United States?
General Langley. Absolutely it is. It really is.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
General Langley. It is very compelling, and especially in
civil society, especially for the young generation that's--the
youth bulge across the African countries.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The. Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Gaetz. I am sorry. Mr. Waltz. Big difference.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Kurilla, these should be I think very easy
questions, but important to get on the record. On the Abbey
Gate families I understand the reinvestigation is complete,
correct?
General Kurilla. The supplemental review is complete and
out of respect for the families we're going to be briefing them
in the next several weeks.
Mr. Waltz. Can I ask, they have repeatedly asked me, that
you have those families together for that briefing rather than
individually?
General Kurilla. One hundred percent, Congressman. They're
all--we've invited them to a specific date and we have many of
them at----
Mr. Waltz. Can I also ask that we have no time limit on
that briefing?
General Kurilla. There will be no----
Mr. Waltz. Like lock them in the room until they are done
asking questions?
General Kurilla. We will stay as long as they want and
answer all the questions they have.
Mr. Waltz. Fantastic. Can I also ask--and here is a tough
one, but can we declassify whatever needs to be declassified to
give them the answers they need or give them temporary read-
ons? I don't care, but let's not have----
General Kurilla. We are doing the latter, Congressman.
Mr. Waltz. Fantastic.
General Kurilla. We'll be giving them all the information
that they require.
Mr. Waltz. That is great to hear. Thank you, General
Kurilla.
Now let's switch to I think some very important statements
you have made on Iran. I think the best way to stop the Houthis
is to dry up the supplies from Iran.
General Kurilla. I agree.
Mr. Waltz. And the best way to do that is to dry up the
cash in Tehran, correct?
General Kurilla. I agree.
Mr. Waltz. And as you have said, that Iran is selling 90
percent of its illegal illicit sanctioned oil to China,
correct?
General Kurilla. Correct.
Mr. Waltz. So really the heart of the matter, and let's
just--nothing like visuals--let's look at all of Iranian oil
that is going this way, right? I mean, the money is here and
the money is coming from here, correct?
General Kurilla. Correct.
Mr. Waltz. Interesting though the oil coming from Gulf and
other partners that are coming through here to Europe, that is
what the Houthis are hitting, correct?
General Kurilla. They are.
Mr. Waltz. So going back to the money in Iran, we have got
Hezbollah being funded by Iran, correct?
General Kurilla. Correct.
Mr. Waltz. We have Hamas being funded by Iran, correct?
General Kurilla. Correct.
Mr. Waltz. We have the Houthis being funded by Iran,
correct?
General Kurilla. Correct.
Mr. Waltz. We have got the--all the militias in Iraq. And
we now have dead Americans because of the money being--going
back to Iran, correct? All roads go back to Iran, but really it
is Chinese money that is fueling Iran, that is fueling
terrorism.
General Kurilla. Ninety percent of the Iranian oil goes to
China.
Mr. Waltz. And yet all of our policy is focused on the
symptoms of the disease, now a port dealing with the
humanitarian crisis in Gaza, a coalition, shooting down $50,000
drone with $2 million missiles. Now the Houthis are threatening
to go at the Indian Ocean as well. We have got shipping being
diverted all the way around the Cape of Good Hope. Our policy
is focused on the symptoms, not the core problems, not the
disease, which is Beijing and their relationship and funding of
Tehran. Would you disagree with that?
General Kurilla. I think Iran is the single biggest malign
actor in the Middle East.
Mr. Waltz. So here is my question, Dr. Wallander,
responsible for policy, how have we fundamentally shifted our
policy to dry up the cash in Iran? And please don't tell me
their oil is sanctioned. I know the sanctions. The House has
passed the Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act (SHIP) Act,
which will put secondary sanctions on the shipping companies,
the ports, the Chinese buyers. Would you support that as a
matter of policy? Secondary sanctions on China.
Dr. Wallander. Congressman, your analysis is compelling. On
the specific question I would have to defer to the Treasury
Department, which is responsible----
Mr. Waltz. So here is the problem, Dr. Wallander, and you
just kicked the can there; nice try, bad policy has these
generals and our military--I mean the bad policy is the tail
wagging the dog here, running around being--as target practice
around the desert and in the Red Sea. Meanwhile what are the
consequences of that? Well, we are burning naval readiness, are
we not, in the Red Sea and in the Mediterranean? General
Kurilla?
General Kurilla. We're using a lot of munitions.
Mr. Waltz. We are using a lot of munitions. We are burning
readiness. For every month that a ship is extended, you are
burning two months that now has to be in dry dock. We are out
of amphibs.
You know the big winner here? The big winner is China.
Because rather than those ships being in the Indo-Pacific, they
are running around the Red Sea and they are running around the
Mediterranean. And now we are going to build a port. I mean, I
know we are going to talk about it in a classified session,
General Kurilla, but are you very--are you extremely concerned
about force protection for that port from----
General Kurilla. Force protection is my priority.
Mr. Waltz. --drones, from missiles, from underwater
unmanned vehicles. All of this will be provided by Iran.
The. Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. The
gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Waltz. This is asinine.
The. Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from
New Jersey, Ms. Sherrill.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. General Kurilla, I believe there
are over a million people in Rafah right now. I was just
recently at the Rafah crossing on the Egyptian side. And then,
we went to Israel.
And the Israelis are suggesting that they are continuing
their plans for an invasion of Rafah. And so, if you're
thinking about the vetting that would need to take place to
move that population and if you're thinking about the
humanitarian corridor that has to happen, would you say that
those--that group of people, that population could be moved out
of Rafah for an invasion in two weeks?
General Kurilla. Madame, I believe the number is about 1.3
million that is in Rafah. I was at the Rafah gate two and a
half weeks ago as well.
I believe it will take weeks. I can't give you--without
seeing their definitive plan, I cannot give you a timeline.
Ms. Sherrill. And, to your knowledge, is there currently a
place in Gaza that is set out to receive 1.3 million people
should they be moved from Rafah?
General Kurilla. I don't know of a place right now, ma'am.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And, as we're looking at the new
require--or not the new, the traditional requirements that the
United States has as outlined in the recently signed National
Security Memorandum 20, the Memorandum reiterates that the
Secretary of State must assess the assurances that human rights
and humanitarian laws are being upheld by a recipient of U.S.
defense articles and services.
As Israel continues its fight to uproot and destroy the
Hamas terror network, we've seen the casualty rates of
civilians, including children, and a looming humanitarian
crisis.
So, can you explain how your headquarters will monitor the
situation, collect information, and report your assessments and
findings to the State Department regarding the requirements of
the National Security Memorandum 20?
General Kurilla. So, I believe that comes from both verbal
and written assurances, from reliable and credible assurances
that they will follow the law of armed conflict with the
weapons provided.
I am not----
Ms. Sherrill. And humanitarian.
General Kurilla. Yes.
Ms. Sherrill. Ensure humanitarian.
General Kurilla. I am not involved in the advising for the
day-to-day ground operations or air operations.
Ms. Sherrill. So, you've not been asked to provide any
information as to whether or not--to provide any information
for the assessment?
General Kurilla. I have not.
Ms. Sherrill. And so, the National Security Memorandum 20
requires assurances to include that the recipient country will
facilitate the transport and delivery of U.S. humanitarian
assistance and U.S. government support of Intergovermental
Organizations (IGO) efforts. Not deny, not restrict, not
impede.
So, Dr. Wallander, what more must Israel do to facilitate
aid? Do you believe Israel should provide security for the
transport and delivery of humanitarian aid?
And what of the practice of turning away full shipments
with a single dual use item?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman. Yes, Israel has an
obligation on many counts for allowing for access to
humanitarian assistance.
We are working with them now. CENTCOM is working now with
Israel on the line of effort on the maritime delivery access.
And we are working daily with Israel on ground transport,
including increasing the number of trucks moving along those
ground transports and access.
And we worked with them on clarifying issues of inspection
that Israel requires to be able to--in order to approve the
movement of a specific shipment.
Ms. Sherrill. And is that ground transport within Gaza as
well? Or, simply ground transport to get to the access points
of Gaza?
Dr. Wallander. The focus of our conversation with Israel is
access to Gaza. And separate arrangements are being worked
right now for the internal security of and internal
distribution, safe distribution of the humanitarian assistance
inside of Gaza.
Ms. Sherrill. And do you intend to publicly provide what
those provisions will be?
Dr. Wallander. Once they are, I think they will become
public once they are finalized. And we're working on that,
because now this maritime access is ready to move.
And we are seeing additional movements on Israel's support
for ground transportation.
Ms. Sherrill. And do you have a timeline for any of this?
Dr. Wallander. I don't have a timeline for you on the
ground transportation right now, Congresswoman. And I think
General Kurilla noted the first half of April on the maritime
access.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady. The Chair now
recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. McClain.
Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Kurilla,
last year you highlighted the fact that you were suffering from
a significant drop in ISR capabilities in Afghanistan since the
August 2021, withdrawal.
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark
Milley, testified this week before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee that the withdrawal was a strategic failure.
In your testimony today, you highlight that both ISIS-
Khorasan (ISIS-K) and Al-Qaeda are using Afghanistan as a safe
haven. You also say that the Taliban's inability or
unwillingness to reign in violent extremist organizations could
destabilize Central and South Asia.
General, do you--due to the continued lack of ISR in
Afghanistan, can you explain how the 2021 withdrawal has opened
up the United States and our allies to increased terror
threats?
General Kurilla. Congresswoman, my number one priority is
to protect the homeland. To prevent an attack from coming out
of Afghanistan.
But, every day I am balancing risks. I'm balancing risks
between attacks in Iraq and Syria, the Red Sea and Afghanistan,
and I'm dynamically shifting ISR to be able to do that and
manage that risk based on the imminent threat.
And we do that on a daily basis. What we are seeing
internal to Afghanistan right now, is an increase in activity
of the violent extremist organizations.
We are working with our partners. That includes Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, who have access into these countries
and tremendous insight both through their Human Intelligence
(HUMINT) networks, to be able to understand exactly what's
happening, to augment the airborne ISR that we have.
Mrs. McClain. With the continued lack of ISR through, how
can the administration actually effectively monitor any Iranian
or CCP influence efforts in Afghanistan?
General Kurilla. So, not all ISR is airborne. So, I would
tell you that, you know, when we look at the intelligence piece
of it, we're looking for HUMINT as well as we try to rebuild
some of the HUMINT network, since we have pulled out, to be
able to monitor that.
And we work through our partners as well.
Mrs. McClain. So, do we have more boots on the ground then?
General Kurilla. We don't have any boots on the ground. So,
what you can have, is you can do over the horizon HUMINT. And
we can also work through partners and allies.
Mrs. McClain. And how are those going?
General Kurilla. I think we are getting some insights. It
is very difficult. There is also in a classified setting, I can
tell you some of the other means in which we monitor them.
Mrs. McClain. Have you requested additional assets be
deployed to Afghanistan?
General Kurilla. I have identified the requirements that I
have to the Department of Defense.
Mrs. McClain. So, you have identified them. Have you
requested them?
General Kurilla. I don't think any combatant commander--I
have requested them.
Mrs. McClain. All right. Okay.
General Kurilla. I don't think any combatant commander has
the numbers they need.
Mrs. McClain. What is the response from the Secretary and
the White House regarding those requests?
General Kurilla. Again----
Mrs. McClain. Or identifications?
General Kurilla. Again, I would say that there's no
combatant commander, Mike Langley included, who doesn't have
all the resources that they require. But, what I do, is
identify the risk of not getting those.
Mrs. McClain. Okay. Maybe we're not tracking here. You have
identified the need, correct?
General Kurilla. Correct.
Mrs. McClain. And what has the response been from the
Secretary and the White House?
General Kurilla. So, we get----
Mrs. McClain. In response to that?
General Kurilla. We receive some assets. Some of the things
I have requested, I have not received. And so, based on that, I
adjust my ISR throughout the region to identify the risk at the
time.
Mrs. McClain. Would you say you receive 10 percent, 20
percent, 80 percent, 90 percent of what you requested?
General Kurilla. I couldn't give you an exact percentage
right now, ma'am.
Mrs. McClain. Give me a gut feel. I'm trying to----
General Kurilla. I want to be accurate if I'm going to
provide.
Mrs. McClain. Because really, this is a big--this is a very
concern.
General Kurilla. Well, it is. And, I mean, so we have--so,
if you look at the requirements, the only place that I'm not
being shot at right now, is Afghanistan.
So, I----
Mrs. McClain. Yet.
General Kurilla. So, I'm adjusting that ISR. Where we were
being shot at in Iraq and Syria, is put it on for protection.
Mrs. McClain. And I understand that. I understand that,
sir. I'm just trying to get an answer to my question. So,
you've requested some.
Some could be a little, a lot. You don't have any gut feel?
You know, I've requested X and I've received Y?
General Kurilla. I do know the number of what I've
requested. A lot of it is bigwig ISR to be able to do things.
And what I can do, is I get ISR in one area, I can shift it
over to another area.
But, we are at a reduced number inside of Afghanistan right
now.
Mrs. McClain. Okay. I mean, I know the world is focused on
violent conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, as they should be, and,
the potential threat of China moving against Taiwan.
But the potential threat of terrorism is looming, right?
Afghanistan right now is a hot bed for terrorism.
General Kurilla. It is.
Mrs. McClain. I mean, it's--Afghanistan has fallen back
into the hands of the Taliban, which has no interest in
deterring terrorism against the west.
It is imperative that Congress provide CENTCOM the
necessary resources to better monitor and engage if necessary,
any potential terror threats. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. The Chair
now recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our
witnesses. First, General Langley, I know that we spoke already
about SOUTHCOM's human right's office.
I just want it on the record, can you commit today to
working with me to try to help AFRICOM create a similar
capacity. And to make sure that we're giving you the resources
that you need on human rights in the region?
General Langley. Yes.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And I also really want to thank you
for your comments earlier on the importance of the whole of
government response to violent extremism, especially through
the Global Fragility Act.
And I was wondering if you could briefly discuss the way in
which DOD has contributed to the Global Fragility Act so far,
and in particular, how the civil affairs teams that's close to
West Africa have been in U.S. strategic interests?
General Langley. Congresswoman, thanks for that question.
Because our integrated approach into the AFRICOM campaign plan,
Global Fragility Act is at the center of that.
I'll just give you an example of, Ambassador Davis Ba in
Cote D'Ivoire, they're on of the first ones to get their
country's plan done. But, as I start with helping them as they
asked us, we want a whole of government approach to fight
terrorism.
So, that's where they are building out their governance.
But, also working on the security construct too, in unison,
codified within that campaign plan.
So, they are showing that they are taking the leading edge
and implementing the spirit and intent of the Global Fragility
Act.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you so much. General Kurilla, I'll turn
to you. As you know, the War Powers Resolution requires the
White House to submit a report within 48 hours of the onset of
hostilities.
A key role in this is to start the 60-day clock as part of
the War Powers Resolution. So, for the purposes of the War
Powers Resolution and the 60-day restriction, when did
hostilities begin with respect to U.S. military involvement in
the Red Sea, Yemen, and the Gulf of Aden against the Houthis
after October 7?
General Kurilla. I believe for the Houthis, I think our
first strike was around 12 January.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Thank you. And, you know, I think it's
important to note, I recognize the Administration views the
strikes against Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria as covered by
both the 2001 and 2002 Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (AUMF).
But, that no one has tried to make that case that the
ongoing hostilities with the Houthis. And so, I hope that I can
receive from your office, and that you can commit to a written
analysis of when the 60-day clock will be running out, and when
and if you'll be coming to Congress for the authorization
needed for the War Powers Resolution.
General Kurilla. I would defer to policy and the
Administration on that one.
Ms. Jacobs. Dr. Wallander?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman. The assessment of
the Interagency Lawyer's Group is that the operations in--
against Houthi thrust and attacks on shipping is covered by the
President's inherent right under Article Two and the authority
of the Combatant Commander to authorize strikes in self-defense
of U.S. assets and forces.
Ms. Jacobs. I think a key part of the War Powers Resolution
is continuing and ongoing, which is a key part of the
Administration's messaging around that. So, I look forward to
continuing this conversation and making sure that you all are
in compliance with the law, the War Powers Resolution.
Lastly, I will turn again to General Langley. We've seen an
increasing number of regional players in Africa, including
Turkey and the UAE. In fact, both of these have recently played
spoilers in various conflicts, particularly in Ethiopia and in
Sudan.
How often do you meet with the UAE and Turkey to raise our
interests on the African context?
And then General Kurilla and Secretary Wallander,
recognizing that we have many priorities and a complicated
relationship with both of those countries, how do we ensure
that our African interests are raised at a high enough level?
General Langley. Congresswoman, as far as Turkey and the
UAE, no direct contact. I'll just say in Somalia with President
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, taking all players, that's going to be
able to help build out his army.
They have established a Quint. But, Ambassador Fish, he
goes to the Quint meetings on that. So, I don't have any direct
mil to mil with them, other than deconfliction of the airspace.
General Kurilla. In terms of Turkey, we have this
deconfliction of airspace in the mil to mil domain, because
that's actually a European Command (EUCOM) country.
Dr. Wallander. And, in terms of our relationship with
Turkey in particular in African and Somalia, Turkey has
contributed to capacity building. And we believe that's
positive.
We just ask that Turkey, in particular, make sure to keep
us informed of those operations.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. The Chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Jackson.
Dr. Jackson Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our
witnesses for being here today. I appreciate your time.
With the recent focus being, most of the time focused on
Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), this hearing is a great
example of why we can't lose focus of the threats in AFRICOM
and CENTCOM. So, I appreciate you being here and giving us an
update on that.
In 2023, I led a Congressional Delegation (CODEL) along
with my colleague, Ms. Jacobs, to CENTCOM and AFRICOM, to learn
firsthand about some of the unique challenges facing the
respective AORs.
Last week, Russia, China, and Iran concluded their annual
Sea Belt--or Sea Security Belt exercise in the Gulf of Oman,
which included a large number of troops, warships, aviation
assets, along with numerous other nations participating through
observer status.
These joint drills promote cooperation between China,
Russia, and Iran, while sending an undeniable signal to the
U.S. and to our allies. The aggression in the Red Sea has
certainly been the focal point for our forces, but a major
joint exercise being conducted by our strongest adversaries
happened right outside of our bases in Bahrain, Qatar, and the
UAE.
General Kurilla, does this type of hostile military
activity cause an increase in the regional tension as the
military ties amongst our adversarial nations grow around us?
How much does it undermine our efforts in the Red Sea? And
what other concerns do you have for CENTCOM?
General Kurilla. Thanks Congressman, I appreciate that. We
call it a CHIRU exercise when it's done in the Indian Ocean. I
don't think it raised reasonable tension, but it just does show
this relationship that we're seeing between China, Iran, and
Russia.
Of interest, the Houthis just announced that Russia and
China have a buy on any movement through the Red Sea. So, what
you are seeing, is Iran is using its proxy to allow access for
Russia and China to go through the Red Sea, while blocking
access to others.
And the Houthis even got it wrong when they hit a ship
about two weeks ago that was carrying Russian oil from the
North Sea to India.
Dr. Jackson Thank you, sir. I appreciate that. And I have
some follow-up questions that I'll ask you in the classified
portion.
I have one more question for you, General Langley. East
Africa sits in a critical area, which has seen corruption and
heightened hostilities from violent and extremist groups such
as Al Shabaab and ISIS.
As I mentioned, I was just in Somalia last year where I got
an understanding of the threats that exist. But, in that
region, the situation on the ground can and does shift daily.
In the last decade, the PRC opened a military base on the
continent of Africa right next to our American base in
Djibouti. Simultaneously, Russia is increasing its footprint
there and hoping also to establish a base in East Africa.
General, as both Russia and China establish significant
footprints on the east coast of Africa, what would be the
impact to AFRICOM and what is going to be the impact to AFRICOM
in the security of our U.S. forces in Djibouti and Somalia?
And what impact does the presence of China and Russia have
on your relationships with other nations in the area and our
ability to continue to establish influence there?
General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question. It
goes part and parcel with what my buddy General Kurilla says.
As we look at the Red Sea and look at the Gulf of Aden and the
impacts, it is very much a strategic sea lines of
communication.
So, I am very much interested in what the thinly veiled
reasons or purpose that the China entrenchment into Doraleh and
Djibouti, as far as their purpose of being there. And they say
it's for counter-piracy or goodwill.
We're not seeing that, because as General Kurilla can
probably attest to, that in the past few months, there have
been a number of mayday calls. And every other country within
the construct that they have executing the--in piracy, or
response to the Houthis activities, China never made one, one
attempt to come to the aid of a ship in distress.
So, it's thinly veiled as far as the purpose of why they're
at Doraleh. I think it's for power projection or A2/AD, anti-
access or air-denial reasons.
Dr. Jackson Thank you, sir. Yes. I think that most of us
here would doubt their stated intentions and don't trust them
at all. I have one more question and then I'm going to defer
mainly to the classified section.
But, I do have some questions about the port in Gaza. And I
would like to know, and I think you said, General Kurilla, that
you might be able to expound upon this, on what kind of
reassurances we are going to have that our troops that are
involved in this are going to be safe?
And then also, for Ms. Wallander, I would like to know as
well, what do we have in place that we can ensure and general
you can contribute to this as well, that we are going to make
sure that these resources are not going to Hamas?
Because it's been my experience that, you know, as much as,
you know, there's a need to help Palestinians that are caught,
that are trapped in this situation, that by in large, it's
almost impossible to do that without resupplying and
refurbishing and taking care of Hamas first, because they
control a lot of what's happening in the region.
So, I'll defer that for the classified section. I know you
can't elaborate too much on that here. So, with that, I yield
back the remainder of my time. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now
recognizes the gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. McClellan.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to
the witnesses for being here today. My first question is for
Secretary Wallander and General Langley.
I have been deeply concerned by the dramatic rate of
democratic backsliding that we see in Africa recently,
particularly in Western Africa. And would like to hear how the
Administration and AFRICOM are working to shore up and support
democratic governments on the continent, especially those that
we would classify as the most vulnerable.
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman. And we share that
concern. Because without stable, reliable, democratic partners,
we see the effects in the Sahel, in Mali, in Burkina Faso,
where actually insecurity has risen with the rise of military
coups and also the access of Russian forces.
Where Russian forces go, insecurity and instability quickly
follow. What we do is something that General Langley so well
laid out, which is the conditions.
Unfortunately, where we see that democratic backsliding,
are created when demagogic leaders claim that they are being
driven by their populations who genuinely are not benefitting
from economic prosperity, or suffering from the effects of
climate change. Are not seeing development, for example, of
their agriculture. And so, their future is viewed as bleak.
And that it is why it is so core to our mission in Africa
to work with the State Department, to work with USAID, the
Department of Agriculture, across the interagency to build
those resiliences and that hope. Because without that, it's
hard to argue to the populations that democratic governance is
delivering for the people.
Ms. McClellan. You actually anticipated my next question.
Which was about how more funding and flexibility for USAID and
the State Department would better facilitate interagency
planning and collaboration for a better whole government
approach to our partners in Africa.
So, I don't know if you want to add anything to that?
Dr. Wallander. It is a longstanding position of the
Department of Defense that we fully support Congress' provision
of capabilities and resources to the State Department, USAID,
and other agencies. Because they are vital partners in creating
stability, security, and therefore stable democracies.
Ms. McClellan. General Langley, anything you'd like to add
on those two questions?
General Langley. ASD Wallander covered--but, she covered 90
percent of it. But, I will just tell you, when we roll down the
streets some last week of Niger and seeing some of the
propaganda of the Russian Federation, or of the Junta, was
telling.
Our strategic communications, we have a ways to go in our
narrative and what our intrinsic value of what we have to offer
these countries and a whole government in building out their
governance. We need to tell a better story. It needs to be
compelling. And it needs to be able to go across civil society,
and on my part, be able to impart good order and discipline
across the forces that is civilian led.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you. And Africa is also an extremely
diverse continent and home to some of the most rapidly
industrializing nations on the planet. How are the
Administration and AFRICOM situating themselves to be nimble
and responsive in this increasingly dynamic region?
Dr. Wallander. Well, I would say we again, work with our
interagency partners to identify promising partnerships, where
there is an interest in reaching high levels of capability and
professionalism in the security sectors, military, but also
other aspects of the security sectors.
And we work very closely with the State Department in
identifying those key countries and opportunities.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you.
General Langley. After my assessment, I went across the
Sahel from East Africa to West Africa, I wanted to go down into
Southern Africa to see what models of success. I saw that with
the Southern Africa development community where it is
collectively. They know what right looks like.
And, with their investments, I think that, just for
example, the Lobito Corridor, and where President Lourenco of
Angola and all the way to Zambia. If they can get that rail
line, and then U.S. investments will prosper under Prosper
Africa, I think that we can have the model of excellence of
what we're searching for.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you, very much. And, Mr. Chair, I
yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fallon.
Mr. Fallon. Sorry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Wallander,
if you could bear with me for a minute. It will make sense in a
minute.
Do you believe that U.S. invasion of Normandy, France, in
June and July of 1944 was justified?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Fallon. I figured you'd say that. According to the
French government, and many and most historians, about 20,000
French civilians were killed in Normandy over that two-month
period.
Who do you think--who do you hold responsible for those
deaths? I mean, Vichy France, Free France, the United States,
Nazi Germany, who do you hold responsible?
Dr. Wallander. An aggregate answer is impossible. One would
have to look at individual operations. But I believe that the
United States' conduct, even 80 years ago, conducts its
operations to prevent civilian harm and does not target
civilians.
Mr. Fallon. Correct. I would hold Nazi Germany at fault.
Because we wouldn't have bombed Normandy had Hitler not invaded
France in May of 1940 to begin with. That's kind of where I'm
getting at. Who's ultimately responsible for that? It's Adolf
Hitler and Nazi Germany. I think we could probably agree with
that in the limited time I have.
Do you believe that we'd have thousands of IDF forces in
Gaza right now had October 7 not happened where 12 hundred
civilians were murdered and 200 innocents taken hostage?
Dr. Wallander. We've been absolutely clear that the reason
for this conflict is Hamas.
Mr. Fallon. Right. So, there would be no, or at least not a
concentration, a massive concentration of forces and IDF forces
in Gaza.
According to--I mean, and we'd also agree, IDF doesn't have
a policy of targeting civilians, unlike Hamas?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, Congressman. That's correct.
Mr. Fallon. Okay. According to many experts, John Spencer
being one of them, who's an urban warfare expert, he said,
given the landscape, the IDF has done a remarkable job in
protecting Palestinian lives in Gaza, which is particularly not
easy, considering the fact that Hamas uses civilians as human
shields, they don't wear uniforms often, and, Hamas has built,
I find this interesting, that they built thousands of war
tunnels, but not one bomb shelter.
And blaming--I think the blame for the civilian deaths in
Gaza is Hamas' burden to bear solely. And they're the ones with
blood on their hands.
Doctor, you said in your opening statement that you support
a long term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I do
as well. A two-state solution in fact, you said with
specificity.
In 2000, Ehud Barak offered Yasser Arafat a two-state
solution, including, remarkably, in today's political
landscape, all of Jerusalem. And Yasser Arafat refused. And he
didn't even want to talk about alternative plans unless it
included a right of return.
And a right of return is so complicated, it is unworkable.
I mean, just from a logistical perspective. I mean, we're not
going to have, I mean, we've seen after conflicts massive human
movement to Poland, Russia, Germany, Kaliningrad, I don't think
the Ottoman Empire is going to be reconstituted.
I certainly don't think the United States is going to give
back the southwest to Mexico. So, those are the hard facts of
history. So, we need to live within the bounds of reality.
How do you--how would you affect a two-state solution,
given the intransigency of the Palestinians on the right of
return issue?
Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I can't get into the details
about negotiations. That would be, you know, with the
international support, it would be between Israel and a
Palestinian entity.
Mr. Fallon. So, that's kind of a--just respectfully that's
really a non-answer. But I do think that we're looking at a
one-state solution, at least from the Palestinian and Hamas'
perspective. And that one-state solution is the rhetoric that
we hear about genocide from the river to the sea. And it's a
genocide of the Jewish people in Israel.
General Kurilla, I want to turn your attention towards
Afghanistan. In 2021, of course, we had a withdrawal. And thank
you for your service by the way.
We were told when we left by the Biden Administration that
there would be, still we would be able to conduct robust
counter-terrorism missions, even though we wouldn't have
physical assets or a presence there.
And then, I think it's interesting that in June of 2023,
Joe Biden said, and I quote, ``Do you remember what I said
about Afghanistan? I said, Al-Qaeda would not be there. I said
it wouldn't be there. I said, we'd get help from the Taliban.
What's going on now? What's going on now, read your press. I
was right.''
And then, in your testimony last week in the Senate, you
said about Afghani--or, about Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan you said
quote, that Al-Qaeda still enjoys safe havens in Afghanistan.
And, in terms of ISIS-K, you stated the Taliban has shown
neither the capability nor the intent to sustain adequate
countermeasures, counter-terrorism pressure.
Is it fair to say that President Biden got that one wrong?
General Kurilla. I do see Al-Qaeda and ISIS-K inside of
Afghanistan.
Mr. Fallon. Okay. Thank you, General. Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Horsford.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Chairman Rogers and to the Ranking
Member for this hearing. As the Chinese Communist Party
continues to strengthen or try to strengthen its influence
across the globe through predatory loans and investment
projects, I recognize the strategic importance of ensuring that
the United States remains the partner of choice amongst African
nations.
In fact, during my recent travels to Ghana and Kenya, I was
encouraged by the breadth of programs that the United States is
supporting to counter CCP influence in the region. Efforts like
the U.S./Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership,
which promote mutually beneficial trade relationships.
General Langley, can you speak to the importance of whole
of government approaches to countering the CCP in Africa?
General Langley. Thanks Congressman. And thank you for
making the trip out there. Every time that Congressional
members, through the CODELs, go down to and engage with our
African partners, is very telling of who their real partners of
choice are and sustaining.
So, with that, yes, big successes in Kenya. I spoke just
previously about what's going on in Angola and the Lobito
Corridor, there's going to be a rail line extended, that is
counter to the Belt and Road Initiative. That is counter to
mining concessions or a supply chain that China is trying to
push forward.
So, I think we're doing all the right things. But, we need
to do more. Whether it's investments in Prosper Africa or
holistically all the other activities that we bring together
whole of government that pushes our partners to lead it, and
us, enable them across the whole of governments, as an answer
to what the false offerings or the unstable offerings that
China is doing through its social, economic, coercive manner.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you. Generals Langley and Kurilla, last
year I asked you to describe the threat China and Russia posed
in your respective areas of responsibility.
Can you describe how in the last year that threat has
evolved and what new challenges you're facing?
General Langley. Thanks for that question as well. I'd say
that access and influence across the periphery of the
continent. So, they have their naval escort task force floating
around. They're doing naval diplomacy.
I need more ships. I need more ships so that we can engage.
We have Obangame Express. We have the Express series, I would
say, writ large at different parts, to include Cutlass Express,
engaging with the naval forces or maritime components of
African countries. China is trying to replicate that. So, I
have one ship. I would like to have another.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you.
General Kurilla. Congressman, thanks for the question. What
we really have seen though is a big change, is that Iran is now
selling 90 percent of its oil to China. Which then China in
effect is funding the malign and subversive behavior of Iran,
which then trains funds and equips their proxies throughout the
region.
We do see the instruments of national power that Iran, that
China is using. And that is the diplomatic, information,
military, and economic. Especially the economic with the Belt
and Road Initiative. We see that throughout the entire region,
it's predominantly focused in the CENTCOM region.
We've seen them increase their diplomatic effort, up-
gunning all their senior defense officials and defense
attaches. Very aggressive in the information environment.
And the military, what they do, is they come in, they open
the Amazon catalog and they say, you can pick anything you
want. We'll give you Prime shipping. We'll finance it and
there's no end user agreement.
And our partners have real security needs. And so, one of
the things that we can do to counter that is improve our
foreign military sales capabilities.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you. In my home state of Nevada, my
constituents are feeling the effects of the climate crisis
every day. The AFRICOM and CENTCOM theater continue to
experience some of the worst, most damaging events. Often, they
are fast occurring and unpredictable.
In June of 2023, U.S. Africa Command and the United States
Institute of Peace, organized the Third Security Implications
of Climate Change Symposium, bringing together leaders from
across the African continent.
General Langley, can you speak to the importance of these
collaborative efforts to address climate-related security
challenges throughout Africa, please?
General Langley. Absolutely. And thanks for that question.
Because as we look at the drivers of instability across the
Sahel, we know that climate change does feed into it.
It causes desertification. It causes flooding. And, also,
it impedes on fresh water access. So, that's what USAID,
they're doing a predictive analysis of the overall effects of
climate change. And, also, groups in ----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gimenez.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman. I was intrigued by my colleague from
Florida and his analysis of really that the source of all this
is actually Chinese money.
Since 90 percent of the oil that Iran is shipping around
the world actually ends up in Chinese hands, then that 500
percent increase in income, revenue that Iran has realized in
the last two or three years, is actually probably coming from
running around or getting around the sanctions imposed on the
sale of oil.
What can we do to, you know, General Kurilla, what can we
do to reimpose--we have the sanctions, to actually enforce
those sanctions?
General Kurilla. Congressman, thanks for the question.
Sanctions work if it's an international effort. So, I would
tell you that there needs to be an international effort in the
whole of government. Our whole of government, diplomatic
information, military, economic, and an international effort to
enforce those.
Mr. Gimenez. But, what can, what can we? What's a physical
thing you can do to enforce that?
Because somehow, you know, we're getting word that somehow
it was enforced in the past, but it's not being enforced now,
these sanctions, which is allowing Iran to gain 500 percent in
revenue, which is being used against us.
General Kurilla. What a lot of Iran does, is use a series
of ghost or dark fleet that are out there not turning on
(automatic identification system (AIS), illegal ship to ship
transfers, to be able to transfer this oil that eventually
makes its way to China.
Mr. Gimenez. Are they circumventing physical intervention?
Or, is it something that you're looking at?
General Kurilla. Yes. They would have to--I would have to
have the authority and the resources to be able to enforce
that.
Mr. Gimenez. Did you have the authority before?
General Kurilla. I did not.
Mr. Gimenez. Okay. Very good. It's also perverse that
somehow, you know, because it's Chinese money that's funding
Iran, that then is funding our adversaries, in effect, it's our
money that's funding our adversaries, because we're China's
number one trading partner.
And so, you know, sitting on the China Select Committee,
I've taken a position that we need to decouple from China as
soon as possible. We need to treat China like we treated the
Soviet Union. We didn't do much business with the Soviet Union.
And, unfortunately, we're addicted to Chinese goods. We're
like drug addicts. And we've got to beat this addiction that we
have for their goods and decouple from them, in order to hurt
them economically so that they can't hurt us physically, which
is really what they want to do.
General Kurilla. And they're taking advantage of it right
now, Congressman when we see what they're doing in the Red Sea,
by getting a pass from the Houthis. And they've created a
separate shipping line that specifically says it will provide
free, you know, safe passage for goods to the Red Sea.
Mr. Gimenez. General, the faster, you know, decoupling from
China can't come fast enough for me, to be honest with you. We
are funding the instrument of our demise, we ourselves, by
doing business and continuing to do business with China.
I want to switch gears a little bit here. Do you believe
that the industrial, that our military-industrial base needs
help?
General Kurilla. It does. And it needs funding. And if the
supplemental is passed, I will tell you that also resupplies
the weapons that I have fired in the Red Sea.
But, a lot of that goes to the industrial base, which
allows also for multi-year production. Because it's an
industrial base. They want to see the incentive of how long is
this going to last for. So, we do need that.
Mr. Gimenez. Well, that's what I was getting to, the
supplement. At least one of the supplements that I've seen from
the Senate, there is $60 billion goes to Ukraine. I would think
most of that is for military aid. There's $10 billion that goes
to humanitarian aid for Ukraine, for Israel, and for Gaza.
What percentage of that $60 billion will actually be spent
here in the United States?
General Kurilla. I can't speak to that. I'll defer to Dr.
Wallander. But, I know that of that supplemental, $2.4 billion
is for CENTCOM, $686 million is for Counter UAS, $157 million
resupplies the SM2 missiles, and various other reimbursements
for the funds that we've already spent.
Mr. Gimenez. Well, could Dr. Wallander, can you answer that
question real quickly?
Dr. Wallander. Yes. The rough estimate that we've heard is
that about half of that $60 billion goes for Presidential
drawdown authority (PDA) and Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative (USAI) authority. All of which, while it is security
systems to Ukraine, goes to replenish U.S. forces or to
directly procure from U.S. industries.
So, all of that money goes to the U.S. economy.
Mr. Gimenez. Well, finally, I want to make this comment.
That, you know, I agree with some, with the members across the
aisle, that we need to take a vote on this.
It would damage America's reputation in the world that if
we walk away from Ukraine. We made them a promise back in the
'90s that we'd have their back. They're fighting the fight. All
they want are the guns and the weapons.
And finally, this one thing, just because Joe Biden doesn't
secure the southern border, doesn't mean that Vladimir Putin
can take Ukraine. That correlation----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Gimenez. To me is insane. Thank you.
The Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
North Carolina, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair and to the
witnesses who are here today. And, General Langley, as a proud
veteran, Air Force I may add, go Devil Dogs, I take great pride
in the work that the North Carolina National Guard has been
doing.
It's my understanding that they have had a tremendous
impact through the State Partnership Program in your areas of
responsibility. Could you elaborate on the specific roles and
contributions of the North Carolina National Guard in the
Republic of Malawi and the Republic of Zambia?
General Langley. Congressman, thank you for that question.
But, let me just say this, we talk about the State Partnership
Program and how it adds to the capacity to our country and our
partners across the continent.
Those countries really treasure that program. Especially
building resiliency, but overall the professionalism. And North
Carolina taking on three different countries on the continent.
General Hokanson, I talk to him all the time. I just
thanked him. That right there is impactful. It's in Southern
Africa, you know, but, what they've already established and
their excellence in Botswana, we're going to be witness to
that, because I'm going to have the Chad conference there in a
few months.
But, I'd just say thank you to you and all the members as
part of the National Guard that are contributing their time to
into, on the continent of Africa and contribute to three
different countries.
Mr. Davis. That means a lot. And we greatly appreciate the
work of North Carolina's Guard and others. General Langley, the
partnership with Morocco stands as testament to a longstanding
friendship rooted in security interests.
Given its rich history and Morocco's strategic
contributions, could you expand on how the collaboration
exercises like African Lion and Phoenix Express fortifies
regional security?
And how does this cooperation influence U.S. AFRICOM's
approach to emerging challenges in North Africa?
General Langley. Yes. Morocco is one of our most closest
non-NATO allies. Moreover, they export security. They do it by
inviting to AFRICOM and the other African countries to be able
to put on a multifaceted air and land demonstration.
But, it's more than that. It builds interoperability of
various African countries. And it builds capacity. They are a
microcosm of what we have, especially and also in their
training and its learning institutions.
They affect both democratic norms and also core values, law
of armed conflict, imparting that to our African partners on
the continent.
Mr. Davis. The Houthis and other Iranian proxies continue
to wreak havoc in the Red Sea. We were talking about that
earlier.
Dr. Wallander and General Kurilla, after President, the
President decided to label the Houthis as a special designated
global terrorist group, what factors do you expect will play
into the decision to redesignate them as a foreign terrorist
organization?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. That was an
important designation, because it opened all kinds of options
for sanctioning and limiting the Houthis' access to resources
and freedom of operation.
The distinction with foreign--we believe that that is
sufficient to allow us to take proactive actions to constrain
their capabilities without creating issues that could have
negative implications for the humanitarian situation in Yemen,
which, as you know, has been really a matter of concern for
many years.
Mr. Davis. Thank you.
General Kurilla. Yes. I defer really to the State
Department. It's a State Department designation and I think Dr.
Wallander outlined the distinction really for the humanitarian
concern.
Mr. Davis. Okay. Well, thank you again for being with us
today. Mr. Chair, with that, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mills.
Mr. Mills. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate everyone
for being here today. I wanted to follow up on a couple of
things. And I apologize if these have been answered, as I had
to step out for another hearing.
We talked about the increase and we know that China,
Russia, Iran, and North Korea has been geopolitically aligned
for quite some time. And you talked about this renewed
relationship.
And I don't necessarily think that's the proper phrase for
it. Maybe a strengthened relationship through import/
exportation increases.
Do you feel that the, and to quote you, sanctioned oil
exports that's going on between Iran to China, has actually
helped to strengthen the relationship in that geopolitical
alliance?
General Kurilla. It has.
Mr. Mills. And would you say that putting stronger
sanctions, as we had in the previous Administration, and
redesignating the Houthis terrorists, which my colleague had
just mentioned a second ago, would help to limit the Iranian
proxy militia's assets and resources?
General Kurilla. I think, Congressman, I think sanctions
have to be imposed internationally, because Iran has become a
master at how to evade sanctions. And they're actually passing
on their best practices to Russia right now.
Mr. Mills. Well, they're passing on their best practices to
Russia. But, China has been the greatest and the most nefarious
when it comes to circumventing sanctions and not following
them. Yet, we still consider them to be, by some people's
context, a competitor, when in reality they're actually an
adversary.
And I think that we need to start recognizing that the
evolution of warfare, and this is something that General
Langley, I really applaud, because he's understood this and
presented it very well. The idea of the evolution of warfare
has gone well beyond the ideas of the first, well, I think,
it's inspired for non-warfare from a kinetic perspective.
We've been in a cyber, a resource, a supply chain, and an
economic, and an influence campaign by China for decades. There
has been an ongoing cold war that in many cases we've ignored
through our failed foreign and domestic policies, which we all
know is intrinsically linked.
And we've allowed China to exploit Africa as a nation to
where now they control 15 of 16 rare earth mineral mines. They
continue to promise railways like they did between Djibouti and
other areas to try and link trade routes.
They promise electrical terminal capabilities with 100 year
leases to try and create these reliances that has weakened
America's ability to be able to compete with them in the non-
kinetic influence capabilities.
So, my question is, is that for AFRICOM, what could we do
to provide more resources and assets to help the fight and to
be more effective in these non-kinetic elements of influence
campaigns for developing nations?
General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question.
Because we know that we can't keep up with the Belt and Road
Initiative of billions of dollars in infrastructure.
But, what our partners are telling us, don't force us to
choose, but we still want you because of the value. The value
of your proposition and the intrinsic value are what the United
States offers holistically is very compelling.
So, I would say that what we're seeing in Southern Africa,
we're seeing some positivity as far as through health diplomacy
resonates. And we need to tell that story better.
Mr. Mills. I completely agree. And I would also say that
speaking with other allies, you know, I sit on the Foreign
Affairs Committee as well, the brick that has come out with the
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and trying to
invite also Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) into this, my
understanding is that it's great in theory to try and in some
way be a counter to the Quad.
But, in reality, there is no actual economic or trade
benefits to it whatsoever. So, it's not worth the paper that
it's written on. So, I think that we give it far more credence
than it needs to.
General Kurilla, I really want to talk to you about
something when we talk about Tower 22. Look, like yourself, I
spent seven years in Iraq. I spent three years in Afghanistan.
I was in Kosovo during that wonderful campaign as well. I've
been in Pakistan, Somalia, helped very much with the 2016, '17
push for Fallujah and Mosul for the private side to help with
Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) teams to retake.
And we know about hardening structures. We've done indirect
fire. Cheap measures actually, with just simple four I-beams
and a top.
Knowing that Tower 22 had had an attack a year prior.
Knowing the geopolitical ramifications of where things were
ramping up. Understanding that Jordan, given the October 7
incident and our increased attacks against Hamas and support of
what's going on, how was it that Tower 22 still had no hardened
structures?
General Kurilla. So, Congressman, the investigation is
still ongoing. I'll be happy to provide that through Office of
Secretary of Defense (OSD) when it's done.
What we did do, is we moved as many T-walls across the AOR
as we could. I think we put like 9,000 over the last year. I
was at Tower 22 about two and a half weeks ago and looked at
the physical construction of the things there.
I think one of the challenges, you had a counter UAS. You
know, I'm having to balance where the greatest risks are for
that. We did have one point in time----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. McCormick.
Mr. Mills. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. General Langley, good
to see you. You look like you're fit. Are you ready to play
rugby with us in late July with the Marines, right?
General Langley. I'm definitely most ready.
Dr. McCormick. I know that we have a significant problem in
AFRICOM, and especially with the influence of Russia and China,
probably exceeding our own over the last couple of decades.
Watching them not only economically tie themselves and actually
exploit Africa, we have some major significant problems just
because of the instability of the governments in those regions
throughout the whole continent.
What kind of assets to you think that you need? And
certainly, what are your major challenges in a broad scale?
I'm going to allow you, we're going to talk about air
defense at one time. But, I think I really want you to kind of
speak comprehensively to the needs that you need in Africa,
which I think is maybe one of our most under-representative
commands of interest.
General Langley. Congressman, thank you very much for that
question. And I'll address China first. China is trying to
replicate what we do that's working on the continent of Africa.
And I will just say, they can't match what we're doing in
health diplomacy and our efforts. What USAID has been able to
achieve in malaria, AIDs, COVID, Ebola, and also the full
throes of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) Program of increasing life expectancy over 20 percent.
China can't compete with that. So, but here's where they're
trying to do it. They're trying to do it in their social and
economic coercion causes of the Belt and Road Initiative.
They also have some aspirations for basing as well. It's a
dual use capacity. I'm concerned about that. But, what we
cannot do, is to double down on what we're doing whole of
government in the military sense, where we have our SFAB, our
security force assistance brigades building to capacity, our
State Partnership Program, our joint combined and exchange
training that we're doing. That's unmatched.
What China is trying to do is they're trying to offer more
seats in what we have our IMET, the International Military
Education and Training. They're trying to match that.
So, I need more seats there. I need more joint exercise
programs, because China is trying to beat us. They're trying to
displace.
Dr. McCormick. You mentioned humanitarian versus the
exploitation of China. And it keys me with a new question too.
Obviously, if we're going to help somebody humanitarian-wise,
everybody appreciates that.
But, we don't always get, I mean, since the book, The Ugly
American, we don't get credit for what we give aid to, because
the governments control who gets credit. And, unfortunately,
the exploitation goes hand in hand with corrupt governments.
And we know Africa has plenty of those to go around.
My question is, when it comes to strategic--placing
ourselves in a place where people recognize what our influence
is, and give credit to the United States, not in a selfish way,
but in a way that is synergistic in our future, how do we make
sure that the people and the governments, both recognize the
United States as good players of us, versus China and their
nefarious methods of exploitation?
General Langley. Sir, within my command I always talk to,
you know, whether it's the J-3 or the J-5, I said, we own the
facts holistically in U.S. gov. But, we don't own the
narrative.
We own the facts. We don't own the narrative. We need to
close that say/do gap, because we're doing some great things.
And we need to tell the story of our intrinsic value.
We need to get better in our information operations. We
need to get better at countering the disinformation operations
whether it's from China or Russia, because there's a story to
be told, especially to our African partners, because it is
compelling.
Dr. McCormick. Then, this question is to both of you,
because it really concerns the strikes and the Houthis and what
they're doing right now to disrupt us.
Using Iranian technologies, Iranian drones, we've done
nothing but facilitate them through the Biden policies. So,
basically allowing the monies, and the production,
dissemination, and encouragement of bad guys to attack not only
us, but all of our allies.
Do you feel like you had the necessary tools to deal with
that in that region right now?
General Kurilla. Congressman, what we do need, we need more
of a whole of government and international effort, particularly
on the denial line of effort. To deny Iran from providing those
weapons in the first place.
There's a U.N. vessel inspection mechanism. Just like we
did for counter-piracy, we need to do for the counter-smuggling
effort. It's land and it's maritime.
We need to isolate the Houthis in the information space.
They say it's about Gaza, the Houthis have not provided one
loaf of bread to Gaza. What they've actually done is delay it
by making it go all the way around the Cape of Good Hope,
increase the cost to it. So, I find their righteous indignation
a little bit laughable.
The other thing we need to do is impose costs on Iran. And
that's a whole-of-government effort to be able to do. Because
they're the ones who are providing the weapons.
Dr. McCormick. From your mouth to God's ears. My time has
expired. Thank you.
The Chairman. And the Chair now recognizes the final member
for the public segment of this hearing, Mr. Moylan for Guam.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, although my focus
of work on the Committee has been for INDOPACOM AOR, I do want
to acknowledge the tremendous service provided by the people of
Guam throughout the global war on terror which continues to
this day.
And currently, there are approximately 100 members of the
Guam Army National Guard serving in the Middle East as part of
Operation Spartan Shield. To these servicemen, I would like to
say, your island is proud and we await your safe return home.
But, I do have one question for you, General Kurilla. So,
the recent Houthis attacks on shipping have forced the Fifth
Fleet into fighting a campaign of contested logistics. So, this
is a problem set which the United States has not had to deal
with in recent memory.
In the future war it's likely Guam would become reliant
upon contested supply chain. Therefore, what lessons are you
learning with specific reference to relevant insights for the
Western Pacific?
General Kurilla. Great question, Congressman. I mean, I
think we are learning a tremendous amount of lessons. And when
the process of actually combining a lot of them to share with
all of our combatantcommand partners, if they're particularly
in the naval domain of what we're learning.
One thing we say, is you can shoot a destroyer and go empty
in a matter of hours. But, it takes weeks to resupply it. We're
learning about underway resupply.
One of the things you have to do is go to a port to
resupply the vertical launch tubes. We need to get back to how
can we do that at sea?
There is a lot of other lessons that we've learned about
the importance of also resilient basing, access basing and
overflight are critical. And we'll share all those with our
combatant commanders as well.
Mr. Moylan. Looking forward to it. I want to thank the
witnesses for your testimony and your service to our nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now will
recess this public portion of the hearing. We will reconvene in
approximately five minutes in Room 2212.
[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 21, 2024
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 21, 2024
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 21, 2024
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. I understand the ULTRA long range ISR platform is
currently being tested in CENTCOM AOR by the Air Force. What are the
long endurance ISR needs of CENTCOM?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Rogers. Given the recent downing of MQ-9s, are low-cost and
attritable ISR capabilities feasible or needed in theater?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Rogers. What is CENTCOM's plan for restoring ISR access to
Afghanistan?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. Dr. Wallander, we have observed the Houthis develop
their capabilities over time. According to Russian Media, which I do
not trust but must consider, the possibility of the Houthis gaining the
ability to manufacture hypersonic missiles. Although there is no
evidence, I feel obligated to address this claim.
Connecting the dots of materiel support between China, Russia,
Iran, and North Korea, is it feasible to assume that the Houthis
possess a hypersonic weapon?
Follow-up: If this were to be true, does CENTCOM have the ability
to defend against this threat currently?
Dr. Wallander. We cannot rule out that the Houthis possess
ballistic missiles that reach hypersonic speeds re-entering the earth's
atmosphere; however, the Department of Defense has no evidence to
suggest the Houthis currently possess or are in the process of
obtaining a maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle or cruise missile.
The Department also remains postured to respond to Houthi threats as
they arise. Since October 7, the Department has demonstrated the
ability to flexibly scale its air defense assets into theater,
including THAAD and Patriot systems, to respond to and defeat threats
from Iran and its proxies.
Mr. Wilson. General Kurilla, it was reported that our forces did
not detect nor track the one-way unmanned aerial system volley via
radar system prior to the Tower 22 attack on January 28th, 2024.
If this is accurate, how are U.S. military forces addressing this
grave mishap and adjusting our Integrated Air and Missile Defense
doctrine to prevent this type of atrocity from happening again?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Wilson. General Kurilla, currently we have approximately 900
troops in Syria guarding Isis members and their families.
Given Assad's alignment with regimes like Russia and Iran, what
risks would we face if U.S. troops were to be pulled out from Syria?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Wilson. General Langley, with the country of Niger's recent
announcement by Niger's ruling military junta to revoke the military
accord no longer allowing military and civilian personnel from the
Department of Defense in the country, we've lost a strategic geographic
location and accompanying air bases for counterterrorism operations in
the region.
How does this decision impact our counterterrorism operations in
the region?
General Langley. Three Key Points:
1) The announcement by Niger's ruling military junta should be
viewed as a statement by a sovereign establishing their negotiation
position. AFRICOM, along with the interagency, believes there is time
to negotiate the contours of our relationship with these current ruling
party of a nation that has been a key partner. However, as the
statement signals, the United States is on the clock to formulate our
policy on Niger following the events of July 26, 2023.
2) We still have U.S. personnel and capabilities at CSL Niamey
(AB101) and CSL Agadez (AB201); continuation of further operations is
contingent on US-Niger key leader engagement. Our planned activities in
Niger and the region support the U.S. National Defense Strategy-
directed objectives. At the military-to-military engagement level, it
is possible to support our mutual interest in a continued CT
partnership and further security cooperation.
3) We have been interested in furthering partnerships outside of
Niger for a while, independent of the current situation in Niger and
informed by the threat spreading towards coastal West African nations.
These African Partners are willing, able, and interested in a
partnership with us that would further their capabilities to counter
terrorism in the region. The current operational environment might
accelerate our investments with others, but again, this depends on
policy decisions made by the US and Niger with regards to our bilateral
relationship and posture.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. Terrorist groups obtain financing through many different
methods. What actions are USCENTCOM taking to combat the financing of
terrorists? Are there areas in which increased collaboration with
interagency partners, Allies, or Strategic partners would lead to
cutting terrorist financing to prevent them from buying weapons and
conducting attacks?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Scott. How many more State Partnership Program (SPP) Projects
could occur in your AOR if SPP had multiyear funding?
General Kurilla. USAFRICOM assesses that dedicated multiyear State
Partnership Program (SPP) funding would enable approximately 15-20 more
projects in existing SPP partner states, above the current 75 planned
in FY24 at a cost of $3M, as a result of anticipated efficiencies and
more predictable planning.
Mr. Scott. Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
wrote an article in the December 2023 issue of Proceedings entitled,
``Mine Warfare Could Be Key.'' According to Admiral Winnefeld,
``Offensive mine warfare--in both its current and potential
instantiations--offers an opportunity to present new dilemmas to those
who would threaten U.S. vital interests, but only if we quickly
recapitalize this disruptive, historically proven capability before it
is too late.'' Do you agree with Admiral Winnefeld's assessment?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Scott. Lieutenant Commander Alex Crosby, U.S. Navy, wrote an
article in the September 2023 issue of Proceedings entitled, ``The
Joint Force Needs a Counter-SOF Strategy.'' According to Crosby,
Strategic conflict will include the threat of adversary SOF, which
demands forethought--i.e., developing a joint strategy for countering
adversary SOF efforts with conventional forces. Integrating joint force
capabilities and Special Operations Command expertise to build such a
strategy is possible and should be prioritized, to provide operational
commanders guidance before conflict erupts.'' Do you agree with
Crosby's assessment? Is the the U.S. joint force prepared to counter
adversary special operations forces (SOF) threatening U.S. national
interests in your area of responsibility?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Scott. Rear Admiral Patrick Piercey, U.S. Navy (Retired), wrote
an article in the September 2023 issue of Proceedings entitled,
``Planning for the Next War Must Be a Mixture of Art & Science.''
According to Piercey, ``Commander's intent, mission command, all-domain
fires, and the ability to maneuver in the decision space must be
resilient enough to keep going. Creating that resiliency means the
joint force must rebalance toward critical thinking, creativity, and
imagination--otherwise known as the art of war.'' Do you agree with
Piercey's assessment? Does the forces under your command have the
critical thinking, creativity, and imagination to be resilient enough
to absorb the first punch and keep fighting?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Scott. Terrorist groups obtain financing through many different
methods. What actions are USAFRICOM taking to combat the financing of
terrorists? Are there areas in which increased collaboration with
interagency partners, Allies, or Strategic partners would lead to
cutting terrorist financing to prevent them from buying weapons and
conducting attacks?
General Langley. USAFRICOM works closely with interagency partners,
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and Homeland
Security Investigations (HSI), to combat terrorist financing by
assisting law enforcement agencies in the development of open cases for
prosecution and/or sanctions. This includes reviewing DoD intelligence
and assessing publicly available security related information to
ascertain the linkages between and/or validate the personnel, process,
and/or wares of illicit activities.
USAFRICOM's collaboration with interagency partners, Allies, or
Strategic partners in the counter threat finance space has been both
strong and productive, limited only by the Command's bandwidth to
collect and process information for law enforcement consideration. In
this regard, USAFRICOM would benefit from more dedicated subject matter
experts to enable such increased collaboration.
Mr. Scott. How many more State Partnership Program (SPP) Projects
could occur in your AOR if SPP had multiyear funding?
General Langley. USAFRICOM assesses that dedicated multiyear State
Partnership Program (SPP) funding would enable approximately 15-20 more
projects in existing SPP partner states, above the current 75 planned
in FY24 at a cost of $3M, as a result of anticipated efficiencies and
more predictable planning.
Mr. Scott. Would you like to see NATO allies with no historical
baggage such as Poland engage more in Africa?
General Langley. Yes. USAFRICOM supports greater engagement in
Africa by all like-minded partners and allies, including Poland, as a
means of enabling greater communication and collaboration on collective
security interests. Given that Africa is NATO's southern flank, many
European security interests have an African nexus. The Command
currently operates a Multinational Cooperation Center to facilitate
such efforts, while being mindful that partner competing interests and
African partner receptiveness ultimately affect the type, depth, and
nature of engagement.
Mr. Scott. USINDOPACOM is developing a novel economic analysis
capability called the Integrated PLA Modernization Activity Tracking
Database and Anomaly Indicators and Warning System Charcoal List (I-
PAC) focused on the People's Republic of China. Would you like a
similar economic analysis capability focused on Communist China,
Russia, and non-state actors in AFRICOM's area of responsibility?
General Langley. Yes, China and Russia's economic activities in
Africa are immense and span the entire continent. An economic analysis
tool would be highly valuable to the Command.
Mr. Scott. Could AFRICOM benefit from the establishment of a Joint
Interagency Task Force-IUUF to detect/deter/and defeat illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing in your area of responsibility?
General Langley. USAFRICOM would benefit from the Joint Interagency
Task Force-IUUF to detect, deter, and defeat illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing, so long as the mission was authorized and
resourced appropriately by higher-level DoD authorities. Foremost, DoD
would require legislative changes to permit assistance to (a) African
partners in detecting and monitoring IUUF activities at sea, and (b)
U.S. and foreign maritime security and law enforcement entities
responsible for IUUF. Further, the effectiveness of a Joint Interagency
Task Force would benefit from additional shore-side, surface and air
assets, dedicated interagency personnel, and increased security
cooperation funding to facilitate a partner-led U.S. enabled activity
to combat IUU-F. Additionally, the establishment of a Joint Interagency
Task Force could be the precursor to a ``Combined Joint Interagency
Task Force,'' which would leverage the authorities and capabilities of
likeminded partners and allies in combating this challenge.
Mr. Scott. What is the demand signal for U.S. Coast Guard personnel
and platforms in AFRICOM?
General Langley. USAFRICOM has requested a cutter to be present in
our AOR year round. We have also asked for additional law enforcement
team support, HQ based U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) officers and
administrative support, and a dedicated maritime engagement team
(similar to that used at NAVCENT in Bahrain). We communicate these
requests to the Coast Guard Headquarters in our annual Service Advocacy
Letters. USAFRICOM supports any USCG request for additional funding
that would enable the USCG to source our validated requirements.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
Mr. Gallagher. How critical is a strengthened military relationship
with Chad to security and stability in the Sahel? How would standing up
a Security Forces Assistance Brigade (SFAB) in Chad serve American
interests in Africa, and would support from this committee in that
effort be welcome?
Dr. Wallander. Since the beginning of the Administration, President
Biden has led a process to refocus U.S. counterterrorism efforts and
promote civilian-led development and good governance approaches to
counter insecurity. Building such partnerships means that our security
arrangements will look different in every country.
In Chad, we have repositioned a small number of U.S.
military personnel, some of whom were already scheduled to depart. This
temporary step is part of an ongoing review of our security
cooperation. We are prepared to discuss this with Chadian authorities
pending the official results of the May 6 presidential election.
Chad maintains a capable and effective military that
gained international recognition during its 13-year deployment as part
of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali (MINUSMA).
On Chad's western border, we have seen VEO groups such as
Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa expand operations further into
countries along the Lake Chad Basin and use Lake Chad for illicit
trafficking and other means of illicit financing. Unfortunately, these
groups have exploited the recent string of coups in the Sahel region,
which has only exacerbated the instability in the Sahel.
On Chad's eastern and southern border, the security
challenges stemming from Sudan and Central African Republic also
threaten regional stability. Past Congressional holds on IMET, Section
333 and PKO funding has impeded strengthening our military
relationship.
The presidential election in May 2024 marked the end of a
37-month transition beginning when a group of military officials took
control of the government in 2021 and pledged to hold democratic
elections. We are closely watching the outcome of the election, which
will further inform our engagement and security cooperation.
DoD appreciates the support and cooperation of the
committee. Long-term stability in the Sahel demands that military
successes against VEOs be coupled with law enforcement and civilian,
democratic governance to establish rule of law and ensure
accountability for human rights violations and abuses. An SFAB advances
U.S. interests through frequent bilateral engagements that contribute
to countering and preventing the factors that can lead to the spread of
terrorism with security forces and promoting respect for human rights
and accountability for security force abuses. SFABs allow us to train
and build the capability of our partner countries by empowering their
forces to address security challenges in the region.
Mr. Gallagher. How critical is a strengthened military relationship
with Chad to security and stability in the Sahel? How would standing up
a Security Forces Assistance Brigade (SFAB) in Chad serve American
interests in Africa, and would support from this committee in that
effort be welcome?
General Langley. Chad is currently a willing and capable military
partner in the Sahel committed to countering violent extremist
organizations (CVEO). Rotations of 2nd Security Forces Assistance
Brigade (SFAB) personnel across Africa have supported U.S. security
interests, particularly by building their military capacity and
contesting our global competitors' aspirations. Similar results in Chad
could be possible, should AFRICOM have the requisite policy decisions,
appropriate authorities, and access. Any support the committee could
provide to enable this partnership would be a welcomed engagement.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GAETZ
Mr. Gaetz. AFRICOM and DoD is responsible for producing the
following report on coups: on page 167 of H.R. 2670 found online here
(https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20230621/115846/BILLS-118-
HR2670-R000575-Amdt-CHMEB4.pdf)
The number of partner countries whose military forces have
participated in security cooperation training or equipping programs or
received security assistance training or equipping authorized under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) or chapter 16
of title 10, United States Code; and (2) lists each instance, during
the period beginning on January 1, 2000, and ending on the date of the
submission of the report, in which a unit of a foreign military force
trained or equipped under the authorities specified in paragraph (1)
subsequently engaged in a coup, insurrection, or action to overthrow a
democratically-elected government, or attempted any such action.
General Langley. In lieu of Section 1209 of H.R. 2670, the Joint
Explanatory Statement requested a briefing from the Secretary of
Defense on support to partner forces, including the processes used to
vet those units, efforts to strengthen observance of, and respect for,
the rule of law, and instances in which such units violated relevant
agreements for such training. I refer you to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for further information on this topic.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. FY25 budget for SOCOM: o Operation Enduring Sentinel
(OES)- OTH monitoring of Afghanistan; increased from $0 to $8.1M for
SOCOM o Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)- war against ISIS; reduced
$508.1M to $494.5M for SOCOM ($14M cut) o Intel- cut approximately
$125M for SOCOM o Maintenace- cut approximately $13.5M for SOCOM As you
testified in your opening statement (GEN Kurilla), we are seeing ``an
increase ISIS-K attacks in the region and desires to export those
attacks beyond Afghanistan to include the US homeland and our interests
abroad.''
Is there still a demand for special forces operators in
the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs with ``criminal groups and terrorists
aligned with al-Qaeda and ISIS exploit[ing] underdeveloped, under-
governed areas to prey on vulnerable populations'' (GEN Langley opening
statement quote)?
Why are we slashing budgetary resources, particularly in
intelligence, with ongoing terrorist threat networks threatening to
continue destabilizing the regions?
Dr. Wallander. Budget--The most active terrorist groups are located
in U.S. Central Command's and U.S. Africa Command's area of
responsibility, particularly in Afghanistan and its neighbors and in
the Sahel. For the department, our goal is to protect the Homeland and
U.S. persons and facilities overseas from terrorist attacks. We are
balancing this goal while also deterring our strategic competitors.
This requires a disciplined, priority-driven approach to resource
management which results in cuts in some areas to ensure success in
higher priority efforts. The decreases in U.S. Special Operations
Command's (USSOCOM) budget, particularly in the overseas operations
portion of the intelligence budget, is reflective of USSOCOM reducing
legacy programs with limited access while in other parts of the budget
USSOCOM is transitioning to more modernized intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, digital ISR capabilities, and
counter-UAS capabilities. USSOCOM will continue to leverage its
authorities to mitigate risk.
Mr. Waltz. China, Russia, and Iran have increased their
partnerships as evident in four recent naval drills, namely the recent
Maritime Belt 2024 drills. These drills are expanding and parallel the
increased tensions of Iran proxy Houthi group attacking innocent
mariners in and around the Red Sea.
Have you seen an increase in technology and capability in Iran and
their proxies as a result of this increased partnership with the
advanced military stemming from China and Russia? Are we properly
evaluating the Iranian and proxy threat in light of this increased
collaboration and partnership?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Waltz. FY25 budget for SOCOM: o Operation Enduring Sentinel
(OES)- OTH monitoring of Afghanistan; increased from $0 to $8.1M for
SOCOM o Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)- war against ISIS; reduced
$508.1M to $494.5M for SOCOM ($14M cut) o Intel- cut approximately
$125M for SOCOM o Maintenace- cut approximately $13.5M for SOCOM As you
testified in your opening statement (GEN Kurilla), we are seeing ``an
increase ISIS-K attacks in the region and desires to export those
attacks beyond Afghanistan to include the US homeland and our interests
abroad.''
Is there still a demand for special forces operators in
the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs with ``criminal groups and terrorists
aligned with al-Qaeda and ISIS exploit[ing] underdeveloped, under-
governed areas to prey on vulnerable populations'' (GEN Langley opening
statement quote)?
Why are we slashing budgetary resources, particularly in
intelligence, with ongoing terrorist threat networks threatening to
continue destabilizing the regions?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Waltz. Pakistan and China have a longstanding relationship that
remains close amid both countries' rivalries with India. China is the
primary source of foreign and military aid to Pakistan. In 2018, the
Trump Administration suspended military and security assistance to
Pakistan, stating that Pakistan had not done enough to assist the U.S.
in fighting terrorism and needed to take ``decisive action'' against
the Taliban and Haqqani network, which were targeting U.S. personnel in
Afghanistan. Last August the Biden Administration renewed their
Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement
(CISMOA) with Pakistan for security cooperation.
What assurances do we have that American assistance
provided to Pakistan will not be shared with China?
What is your confidence in the amount and of the quality
of intelligence that the Pakistanis may be providing us on the growth
of terrorist camps in Afghanistan?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Waltz. The U.S. maintains a stockpile in Israel known as War
Reserves Stock Allies-Israel (WRSA-I).
Given the growing and evolving threats to the United
States and Israel, do you believe WRSA-I contains the appropriate types
and quantities of weapons and munitions, and are they properly
maintained?
If not, what specific changes do you think are necessary?
Since October 7, what portion of WRSA-I has been used?
What is the status of replenishing what has been removed?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Waltz. FY25 budget for SOCOM: o Operation Enduring Sentinel
(OES)- OTH monitoring of Afghanistan; increased from $0 to $8.1M for
SOCOM o Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)- war against ISIS; reduced
$508.1M to $494.5M for SOCOM ($14M cut) o Intel- cut approximately
$125M for SOCOM o Maintenace- cut approximately $13.5M for SOCOM As you
testified in your opening statement (GEN Kurilla), we are seeing ``an
increase ISIS-K attacks in the region and desires to export those
attacks beyond Afghanistan to include the US homeland and our interests
abroad.''
Is there still a demand for special forces operators in
the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs with ``criminal groups and terrorists
aligned with al-Qaeda and ISIS exploit[ing] underdeveloped, under-
governed areas to prey on vulnerable populations'' (GEN Langley opening
statement quote)?
Why are we slashing budgetary resources, particularly in
intelligence, with ongoing terrorist threat networks threatening to
continue destabilizing the regions?
General Langley. Yes, there is a continued demand, both from our
partners and from AFRICOM, for U.S. Special Forces in the AFRICOM AOR.
Terrorist organizations in Africa are expanding their areas of
influence, resisting government pressure, and driving instability. U.S.
Special Forces training and support offers an opportunity to develop
our African partner's counter-VEO capabilities and maintain access
required to act against VEO leadership when necessary. Finally, like my
peers, I believe no Combatant Commander would say he or she has
sufficient intelligence resources and I welcome any assistance this
committee can provide to help fulfill our requirements.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIMENEZ
Mr. Gimenez. The president's supplemental aid request includes
significant funding for Israel's missile defense systems. How important
is this funding? Given the threat from Hezbollah, do you think Israel
will require additional missile defense assets? How urgent is it for
Congress to pass this funding?
Dr. Wallander. I appreciate the Congress passing the bipartisan
National Security Supplemental. This funding, including for missile
defense systems for Israel, is incredibly important, as evidenced by
the successful performance of the integrated ballistic missile defense
capabilities against Iran's attack on Israel on April 13.
On April 13, the world witnessed an unprecedented and
egregious Iranian attack against Israeli territory. Iran and its
proxies launched over 110 medium-range ballistic missiles, more than 30
land-attack cruise missiles, and over 150 uncrewed aerial vehicles from
Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran intended to cause significant damage in
Israel. They failed in their mission to do so, which is a testament to
Israel's military superiority, specifically their ballistic missile
defense, and our collective defense.
The Congress provided critical supplemental funding,
including $4 billion for Israeli procurement of Iron Dome and David's
Sling missile defense systems, $1.2 billion for the Iron Beam defense
system to counter short-range rockets and mortar threats, and $3.5
billion for the procurement of advanced weapons systems, defense
articles, and defense services through the Foreign Military Financing
Program, in addition to other significant funding.
Mr. Gimenez. To date, the U.S. response to Iranian-backed proxy
attacks has largely focused on sanctions and limited military action
against the proxies. Is this sufficient to stop the Iranian attacks? Do
we need more targeted action directly against Iranian interests?
Dr. Wallander. Since October 7, the Department of Defense has
rapidly flowed forces into theater, including two carrier strike
groups, additional fighter aircraft, missile defense platforms, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to deter Iran
from expanding the conflict and promote stability in the region. The
Secretary of Defense has also directed seven strikes against the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran-aligned militia group
(IAMG) infrastructure in Iraq and Syria and two strikes against IAMG
personnel involved in planning and directing attacks against U.S.
forces. These strikes have made clear to Iran that we remain willing
and able to impose costs on Iran, not just its militias, for its
destabilizing actions in the region. IAMGs have attempted,
unsuccessfully, to attack U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria twice since
February 4, underscoring the importance of the Department's response
strikes against Iranian interests and flexible force posture in
deterring Iran-backed attacks.
Mr. Gimenez. The administration recently took action to respond to
the Houthis after months of attacks, but unfortunately the Houthi
attacks continue. Can you discuss the effectiveness of the U.S. and
partner strikes on the Houthis? How can we better achieve deterrence?
Dr. Wallander. The Houthis maintain robust weapons stockpiles from
extensive Iranian supply provided over a decade of conflict with the
Saudi-led Coalition. Although the Houthis have not ceased their
attacks, our coalition and unilateral strikes have likely destroyed
hundreds of Houthi weapons that would otherwise have been available to
conduct attacks on shipping. The Department stands ready and able, in
concert with our international partners, to strike additional Houthi
targets as necessary with the goal of further degrading the Houthis'
ability to sustain their attacks. The Department's strikes continue to
gradually erode the Houthis' ability to sustain the tempo and scale of
their attacks.
The Department of Defense recognizes that military means are
necessary but insufficient to completely stop Houthi attacks and uphold
the exercise of navigational freedoms in the Red Sea and surrounding
waters. Forcing the Houthis to reconsider the viability of their attack
campaign demands a robust whole-of-government, multinational approach
across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic domains.
Accordingly, the Department of Defense is working with interagency
partners to impose costs on the Houthis and isolate them
internationally, deny Houthi weapons resupply, and degrade Houthi
ability to sustain their attacks. While the Department has already
organized two robust multinational coalitions to protect international
shipping and degrade Houthi capabilities, the Department is bolstering
efforts in tandem with our partners and allies to neutralize the
Houthis' ability to restock their weapons inventory. The Department is
also working with interagency partners to publicly expose Iran's role
in facilitating Houthi attacks and highlight that Houthi attacks have
compromised the welfare of the Yemeni people they claim to represent In
conjunction with our interagency partners and in consultation with our
partners and allies, the Department is identifying opportunities to
sever Houthi financial.
Mr. Gimenez. Given your experience with U.S. forces fighting in
urban environments in Iraq, how would you judge the performance of the
Israeli Defense Forces in fighting Hamas? Could you elaborate on the
steps the Israelis are taking to minimize civilian casualties?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Gimenez. To date, the U.S. response to Iranian-backed proxy
attacks has largely focused on sanctions and limited military action
against the proxies. Is this sufficient to stop the Iranian attacks? Do
we need more targeted action directly against Iranian interests?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Gimenez. Is CENTCOM taking any action today to counter the
threat of Hezbollah? What planning has CENTCOM done to prepare for a
potential large-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. STRONG
Mr. Strong. It is my understanding that USAFE-AFAFRICA has
developed and demonstrated an Air Base and Air Defense prototype with
multi-national sensor integration capabilities that can be deployed
quickly to provide crucial all-domain awareness of cruise missile and
Unmanned Aircraft System threats. How could this be expanded to field,
train, and operate advanced ABAD capabilities as quickly as possible?
Dr. Wallander. The DoD welcomes those new and advanced capabilities
that can help us address multi-domain and multi-regional threats.
We work closely across components to ensure our capabilities and
technology can be deployed with staff who can field, train, and operate
these capabilities as quickly as possible.
Mr. Strong. It is my understanding that USAFE-AFAFRICA has
developed and demonstrated an Air Base and Air Defense prototype with
multi-national sensor integration capabilities that can be deployed
quickly to provide crucial all-domain awareness of cruise missile and
Unmanned Aircraft System threats. How could this be expanded to field,
train, and operate advanced ABAD capabilities as quickly as possible?
General Langley. The SKY FORTRESS air detection system demonstrated
February 29, 2024 at Ramstein Air Base is a Ukrainian developed and
deployed system that support operations in Ukraine's fight against
Russia. The demonstration was deemed successful in identifying aircraft
signature, however, no U.S. systems were integrated into the SKY
FORTRESS architecture. As Gen Hecker, CDR USAFE-AFAF, noted in a brief
to the NATO Air Chiefs on April 3, 2024, in order to deploy this system
across the U.S. bases, a rigorous review and approval process would be
required to determine if the system met the stringent hardening and
cyber processes that currently challenge integration of U.S. based
systems.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LALOTA
Mr. LaLota. How do you assess the strategic motivations behind
Russian Private Military Corporations (PMCs) increasingly aligning with
coup juntas in Africa? Are these alignments primarily driven by
economic gains, such as securing access to natural resources, or are
there deeper geopolitical objectives at play, such as undermining US
and Western influence in these regions?
Dr. Wallander. I would defer to the Intelligence Community for the
official assessment.
However, we are closely tracking the concerning trend in the Sahel
and Moscow's growing appeal across the region. Since the dissolution of
PMC Wagner, we have seen Afrika Corps, a paramilitary structure created
by the Russian Ministry of Defense, take its place.
This is a shift from previous PMC models. The Kremlin is more
involved in the so-called PMC deployments than they were in the past.
At the same time, we have seen Moscow increasingly spread anti-
Western sentiment in the Sahel.
We know that Moscow is tapping into anti-Western sentiment to
bolster its influence in the region through disinformation campaigns,
which creates environments permissible to PMC deployments.
We also know that Russia's strategic objectives in Africa, as in
other parts of the world, is to bolster Russia's international
presence, increase the Kremlin's global influence, and to consolidate
minerals while building alternatives to the rules-based system. Russia
leverages its proxies to accomplish its economic and geopolitical
objectives which are aligned.
Mr. LaLota. The administration recently took action to respond to
the Houthis after months of attacks, but unfortunately Houthi attacks
continue. Can you discuss the effectiveness of the U.S. and partner
strikes on the Houthis? How can we better achieve deterrence? How
important is it for Congress to approve emergency supplemental funding
for Israel? What is the impact of delaying passage of this aid?
Dr. Wallander. The Houthis maintain robust weapons stockpiles from
extensive Iranian supply provided over a decade of conflict with the
Saudi-led Coalition. Although the Houthis have not ceased their
attacks, our coalition and unilateral strikes have likely destroyed
hundreds of Houthi weapons that would otherwise have been available to
conduct maritime attacks. The Department stands ready and able, in
concert with our international partners, to strike additional Houthi
targets as necessary with the goal of further degrading the Houthis'
ability to sustain their attacks. The Department's strikes continue to
gradually erode the Houthis' ability to sustain the tempo and scale of
their attacks.
The Department of Defense recognizes that military means are
necessary but insufficient to completely stop Houthi attacks and uphold
navigational freedoms in the Red Sea and surrounding waters. Forcing
the Houthis to reconsider the viability of their attack campaign
demands a robust whole-of-government, multinational approach across the
diplomatic, information, military, and economic domains. Accordingly,
the Department of Defense is working with interagency partners to
impose costs on Iran and the Houthis and isolate them internationally,
deny Houthi weapons resupply, and degrade Houthi ability to sustain
their attacks. While the Department has already organized two robust
multinational coalitions to protect international shipping and degrade
Houthi capabilities, the Department is bolstering efforts in tandem
with our partners and allies to neutralize the Houthis' ability to
restock their weapons inventory. The Department is also working with
interagency partners to publicly expose Iran's role in facilitating
Houthi attacks and highlight that Houthi attacks have compromised the
welfare of the Yemeni people they claim to represent. In conjunction
with our interagency partners and in consultation with our partners and
allies, the Department is identifying opportunities to sever Houthi
financial networks and increasing diplomatic pressure against the
Houthis.
Mr. LaLota. In light of recent developments, such as Niger's junta
ending military cooperation with the US and the formation of the
``Alliance of Sahel States'' by military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso,
and Niger, what adjustments do you believe are necessary for US
military strategy and posture in the Sahel region to address the
growing presence of Russian PMCs and their impact on regional security
dynamics?
General Langley. The SKY FORTRESS air detection system demonstrated
February 29, 2024 at Ramstein Air Base is a Ukrainian developed and
deployed system that support operations in Ukraine's fight against
Russia. The demonstration was deemed successful in identifying aircraft
signature, however, no U.S. systems were integrated into the SKY
FORTRESS architecture. As Gen Hecker, CDR USAFE-AFAF, noted in a brief
to the NATO Air Chiefs on April 3, 2024, in order to deploy this system
across the U.S. bases, a rigorous review and approval process would be
required to determine if the system met the stringent hardening and
cyber processes that currently challenge integration of U.S. based
systems.
Mr. LaLota. The administration recently took action to respond to
the Houthis after months of attacks, but unfortunately Houthi attacks
continue. Can you discuss the effectiveness of the U.S. and partner
strikes on the Houthis? How can we better achieve deterrence? How
important is it for Congress to approve emergency supplemental funding
for Israel? What is the impact of delaying passage of this aid?
General Langley. My primary concern, as it relates to the Houthi
threat, is the protection of U.S. personnel deployed in Africa.
Although I am not part of the planning, execution, or assessment of
U.S. strikes against the Houthis, I appreciate how these strikes
contribute to the protection of my forces, specifically those personnel
stationed in Djibouti. To date, there have been no successful attacks
against those personnel. USAFRICOM will continue to support USCENTCOM
and believes USCENTCOM is best positioned to address policy matters
related to their area of operations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLS
Mr. Mills. Russia's appeal across much of Africa as a security
guarantor and military partner seems to remain strong, even in a post-
Prigozhin sphere of influence. The security packages offered by Russian
PMCs has had greater interest than the traditional agreements offered
by Western countries. For Russia, these partnerships grant access to
valuable natural resources and large sums of revenue that help mitigate
western sanctions. What is AFRICOM doing in these countries (CAR,
Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, etc.) to counter Russian's influence in the
region? How are we leveraging international partnerships to support
African partners? How can we use Russia's missteps and failures in
Ukraine to demonstrate its diminished capabilities as a security
guarantor?
Dr. Wallander. AFRICOM is limited in its engagement with African
countries that already have strong economic and security relationships
with Russia such as Mali and CAR. AFRICOM is focused on engaging those
partners that are vulnerable to exploitation by PMCs and proxies but
have yet to establish strong security ties with Russia.
Many African countries do not want to be involved in a global or
regional strategic competition and look to other international partners
that have the ability to offer suitable alternatives for addressing our
African partner's security concerns. We actively work with our
international and African partners to find alternatives to Russia.
While Russia's missteps in Ukraine have damaged Russia's
credibility with some African partners who are concerned about Russia's
invasion of a sovereign nation, Russia continues to appeal to African
nations because it provides, in some cases, an expedient solution to
those partners' security challenges.
We continue to engage on security issues by providing guidance from
our vast experience globally on a multitude of issues, and we highlight
U.S. strengths in training and military operations. During our
engagements, we also highlight the many deficiencies of Russia's
approach, such as Russia's inability to address the root causes of
instability, lack of respect for governance, and its horrific human
rights track record.
Mr. Mills. China has identified their military's lack of combat
experience as a major weakness. AFRICOM therefore presents a tempting
opportunity for the PRC to conduct asymmetric actions, both
destabilizing the region and providing their soldiers with combat
experience. China form would likely see this take by the PRC and how
can we counter it?
Dr. Wallander. We do not expect the PRC to conduct asymmetric
military actions in the AFRICOM AOR for the purpose of developing
combat experience.
As outlined in the 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR), current
PRC efforts in the AFRICOM AOR primarily consist of combined training
with host nation militaries and UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), aimed
mainly at improving stability and security in areas with significant
PRC investments and infrastructure, improving PRC military proficiency
in overseas operations and security cooperation, and expanding regional
influence.
Mr. Mills. How can we strengthen the partnerships and cooperation
between the United States military and allies in the AFRICOM region?
How can we prevent the collapse of states like we saw in Niger and
counter asymmetric forces who seek to disrupt countries like Niger?
Dr. Wallander. The DoD approach to strengthen partnerships and
prevent state collapse in the AFRICOM AOR is to help African nations
build capacity and capabilities while addressing underlying conditions
that can lead to instability. AFRICOM executes security cooperation
through a variety of means, including but not limited to the Security
Force Assistance Brigade and medical team deployments, institutional
capacity building, multinational exercises like AFRICAN LION,
intelligence and information sharing, and logistical assistance.
Our longstanding and deep security partnerships in African have
provided an advantage that other competitors have been unable to
replicate. Our partners understand that a partnership with the United
States is based on shared-values, shared commitment, and mutual
respect, in contrast to other actors seeking to disrupt African
nations.
Mr. Mills. China has expressed interest in building maritime ports
in West Africa, placing Chinese resources directly on the Atlantic.
What threats would this pose to the security of the United States and
our allies?
Dr. Wallander. Civilian port construction by PRC firms does not
necessarily pose an immediate security threat to the United States or
its allies and partners. The PRC's ability to operate in the Atlantic
depends both on compatible infrastructure and host-nation cooperation
and consent to permit the PLA access and operations.
As outlined in the 2023 CMPR, broader PRC defense engagement with
Western African nations may lead those nations to grant the PLA access
to Atlantic ports, regardless of whether those ports were built or
financed by PRC firms.
Mr. Mills. We have witnessed the situation in the CENTCOM AOR
seriously devolve since Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7th. Our
adversaries have become bolder and our servicemembers in the region
have been targeted numerous times. Yet, we have often failed to take
action against enemy targets, even with adversaries attacking
servicemembers and installations hundreds of times. Can you describe
how potential targets are identified? Can you describe how the decision
is made whether or not to prosecute these targets and who makes that
final decision?
Dr. Wallander. The United States has demonstrated its willingness
to hold Iran directly responsible for militia attacks on our forces.
Since October 7, at the President and Secretary of Defense's direction,
USCENTCOM has conducted seven rounds of strikes against IRGC and Iran-
aligned militia group (IAMG)-associated infrastructure targets in Iraq
and Syria and two strikes against IAMG personnel in Iraq. IAMGs have
largely refrained from attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq or Syria
since February 4, 2024, probably reflecting a deliberate decision by
Iran to back off on attacks to avoid escalation after our response
strikes that month. I am not able to provide additional detail about
our process for selecting and prosecuting targets at an unclassified
level and would defer to USCENTCOM for operational details.
Mr. Mills. The US-Israel relationship is critical to our strategic
goals in the Middle East. We stand steadfast with Israel in our pursuit
to rescue hostages brutally held captive by HAMAS, but most pointedly,
the American hostages who remain in harms way. steps do you believe the
U.S. should be taking to help secure the release of the remaining
hostages in Gaza?
Dr. Wallander. I agree that the U.S.-Israel relationship is
critical to our strategic goals in the Middle East. DoD is focused on
securing the release of hostages held captive by Hamas in Gaza. We will
not rest until all the hostages are home. They should be released
immediately. A negotiated deal for the release of hostages provides the
best chance of seeing many hostages freed in the near term. DoD is
working to facilitate such a diplomatic breakthrough in coordination
with our regional partners. As of April 29, Israel had provided a
realistic and generous proposal to Hamas that would secure the release
of dozens of hostages.
Mr. Mills. In Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen we see the
Iranian proxies attacking U.S. forces, our allies and are interests.
Iranian-backed forces in Iraq and Syria continue to target U.S.
military personnel in the region, including killing three U.S.
servicemen in Jordan in January. Meanwhile, Iran is also continuing to
further its' nuclear capabilities. To date, the U.S. response to
Iranian-backed proxy attacks has largely focused on sanctions and
limited military action against the proxies. Is this sufficient to stop
the Iranian attacks? Do we need more targeted action directly against
Iranian interests? If so, where would you start? What more should the
U.S. be doing to address Iranian support for Hamas and other
Palestinian terrorist groups?
Dr. Wallander. The Department of Defense has bolstered the
defensive capabilities of our partners in the region and conducted both
combined and unilateral action against Iran-backed threats to make
clear to Iran that its destabilizing behavior risks escalation in the
region and direct conflict with the United States. Since October 7, the
Department of Defense has rapidly flowed forces into theater, including
two carrier strike groups, additional fighter aircraft, missile defense
platforms, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to
deter Iran from expanding the conflict and promote stability in the
region. The Secretary of Defense has also directed seven strikes
against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran-aligned
militia group (IAMG) infrastructure in Iraq and Syria and two strikes
against IAMG personnel involved in planning and directing attacks
against U.S. forces. These strikes have made clear to Iran that we
remain willing and able to impose costs on Iran, not just its militias,
for its destabilizing actions in the region. IAMGs have attempted,
unsuccessfully, to attack U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria twice since
February 4, underscoring the importance of the Department's response
strikes and flexible force posture in deterring Iran-backed attacks.
Additionally, in conjunction with our interagency partners and in
consultation with our partners and allies, the Department of Defense
has worked to degrade Iran's ability to fund and arm Hamas and other
Palestinian terrorist groups.
Mr. Mills. The Houthis have been attacking U.S. allies in the Gulf,
Israel, commercial vessels, and even American military ships. Iran is
using the Houthis to further destabilize the Middle East. With Iranian
backing, it appears the Houthis may be preparing for a long-term
confrontation with the United States and our regional allies. The
administration recently took action to respond to the Houthis after
months of attacks, but unfortunately the Houthi attacks continue. Can
you discuss the effectiveness of the U.S. and partner strikes on the
Houthis? How can we better achieve deterrence?
Dr. Wallander. The Houthis maintain robust weapons stockpiles from
extensive Iranian supply provided over a decade of conflict with the
Saudi-led Coalition. While the Houthis have not ceased their attacks,
our coalition and unilateral strikes have likely destroyed hundreds of
Houthi weapons that would otherwise have been available to conduct
attacks on shipping.
The Department stands ready and able, in concert with our
international partners, to strike additional Houthi targets as
necessary with the goal of further degrading the Houthis' ability to
sustain their attacks. The Department's strikes continue to gradually
erode the Houthis' ability to sustain the tempo and scale of their
attacks. The Department of Defense recognizes that military means are
necessary but insufficient to completely stop Houthi attacks and uphold
the exercise of navigational freedom in the Red Sea and surrounding
waters. Forcing the Houthis to reconsider the viability of their attack
campaign demands a robust whole-of-government, multinational approach
across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic domains.
Accordingly, the Department of Defense is working with interagency
partners to impose costs on Iran and the Houthis and isolate them
internationally, deny Houthi weapons resupply, and degrade Houthi
ability to sustain their attacks. While the Department has already
organized two robust multinational coalitions to protect international
shipping and degrade Houthi capabilities, the Department is bolstering
efforts in tandem with our partners and allies to neutralize the
Houthis' ability to restock their weapons inventory. The Department is
also working with interagency partners to publicly expose Iran's role
in facilitating Houthi attacks and highlight that Houthi attacks have
compromised the welfare of the Yemeni people they claim to represent.
In conjunction with our interagency partners and in consultation
with our partners and allies, the Department is identifying
opportunities to sever Houthi financial networks and increasing
diplomatic pressure against the Houthis.
Mr. Mills. Hizballah remains one of the most technically capable
terrorist organizations in the world and a continued security threat to
the US. We know that Hizballah has a presence in every level of
government in Lebanon. What message are you delivering to your
colleagues in the Lebanese Armed Forces about the need to resist
Hizballah? Have you seen any significant effort by the LAF to stop
Hizballah attacks on Israel?
Dr. Wallander. The Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) primary function is
national defense. Despite the ongoing hostilities between Israel and
Hizballah, the LAF focuses on national defense that does not involve
armed confrontation against Israel and instead applies its military
force to secure Lebanon's internal stability and protect territorial
integrity from physical incursion by others, particularly terrorist
groups. The LAF directly prosecutes targets against foreign terrorist
threats, including Syrian Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and Palestinian
armed groups. The LAF in 2007, 2014, and 2017 conducted
counterterrorism operations against these types of threats. These
campaigns directly relied on U.S. Security Sector Assistance (SSA)
provided through Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Building
Partnership Capacity (BPC) programs that delivered maneuver capability
and capacity through rotary utility helicopters, towed artillery, high
mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), logistics trucks, small
arms, munitions, ammunition, and individual protective equipment.
The Government of Lebanon views Lebanese Hizballah as a politically
recognized government party in Lebanon, and will not apply military
force and power against its own citizens or support LAF prosecution on
Lebanese Hizballah targets. However, the LAF's national mission to
support internal stability enables competition with Lebanese Hizballah
across geographic and informational spaces to contain and deter
Hizballah's influence and mobility. This mission counters illicit trade
along Lebanon's northern and eastern borders with Syria and limits
access for foreign Hizballah elements to the country. The LAF has
established four Land Border Regiments (LBR) and one rapid intervention
regiment (IR) that conduct border security operations to protect and
control Lebanon's border with Syria north of the south Litani sector.
In addition to securing the border, these units also enable the
government to employ military force against foreign transnational
criminal organizations and violent extremist organizations outside the
sector of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon support. These border
units also compete with Lebanese Hizballah in social and information
spaces for civil-military relations. The LAF LBRs and IR conduct
defense support to civil authority missions that compete with Lebanese
Hizballah's narrative to Lebanese citizens and enhances the Government
of Lebanon's political influence and public perception amongst the
regional populations during political friction and economic weakness.
Mr. Mills. Russia's appeal across much of Africa as a security
guarantor and military partner seems to remain strong, even in a post-
Prigozhin sphere of influence. The security packages offered by Russian
PMCs has had greater interest than the traditional agreements offered
by Western countries. For Russia, these partnerships grant access to
valuable natural resources and large sums of revenue that help mitigate
western sanctions. What is AFRICOM doing in these countries (CAR,
Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, etc.) to counter Russian's influence in the
region? How are we leveraging international partnerships to support
African partners? How can we use Russia's missteps and failures in
Ukraine to demonstrate its diminished capabilities as a security
guarantor?
General Kurilla. AFRICOM is limited in its engagement with African
countries that already have strong economic and security relationships
with Russia such as Mali and CAR. AFRICOM is focused on engaging those
partners that are vulnerable to exploitation by PMCs and proxies but
have yet to establish strong security ties with Russia.
Many African countries do not want to be involved in a global or
regional strategic competition and look to other international partners
that have the ability to offer suitable alternatives for addressing our
African partner's security concerns. We actively work with our
international and African partners to find alternatives to Russia.
While Russia's missteps in Ukraine have damaged Russia's
credibility with some African partners who are concerned about Russia's
invasion of a sovereign nation, Russia continues to appeal to African
nations because it provides, in some cases, an expedient solution to
those partners' security challenges.
We continue to engage on security issues by providing guidance from
our vast experience globally on a multitude of issues, and we highlight
U.S. strengths in training and military operations. During our
engagements, we also highlight the many deficiencies of Russia's
approach, such as Russia's inability to address the root causes of
instability, lack of respect for governance, and its horrific human
rights track record.
Mr. Mills. The US-Israel relationship is critical to our strategic
goals in the Middle East. We stand steadfast with Israel in our pursuit
to rescue hostages brutally held captive by HAMAS, but most pointedly,
the American hostages who remain in harms way. steps do you believe the
U.S. should be taking to help secure the release of the remaining
hostages in Gaza?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Mills. In Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen we see the
Iranian proxies attacking U.S. forces, our allies and are interests.
Iranian-backed forces in Iraq and Syria continue to target U.S.
military personnel in the region, including killing three U.S.
servicemen in Jordan in January. Meanwhile, Iran is also continuing to
further its' nuclear capabilities. To date, the U.S. response to
Iranian-backed proxy attacks has largely focused on sanctions and
limited military action against the proxies. Is this sufficient to stop
the Iranian attacks? Do we need more targeted action directly against
Iranian interests? If so, where would you start? What more should the
U.S. be doing to address Iranian support for Hamas and other
Palestinian terrorist groups?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Mills. The Houthis have been attacking U.S. allies in the Gulf,
Israel, commercial vessels, and even American military ships. Iran is
using the Houthis to further destabilize the Middle East. With Iranian
backing, it appears the Houthis may be preparing for a long-term
confrontation with the United States and our regional allies. The
administration recently took action to respond to the Houthis after
months of attacks, but unfortunately the Houthi attacks continue. Can
you discuss the effectiveness of the U.S. and partner strikes on the
Houthis? How can we better achieve deterrence?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Mills. Hizballah remains one of the most technically capable
terrorist organizations in the world and a continued security threat to
the US. We know that Hizballah has a presence in every level of
government in Lebanon. What message are you delivering to your
colleagues in the Lebanese Armed Forces about the need to resist
Hizballah? Have you seen any significant effort by the LAF to stop
Hizballah attacks on Israel?
General Kurilla. [No answer was available at the time of
publication.]
Mr. Mills. Russia's appeal across much of Africa as a security
guarantor and military partner seems to remain strong, even in a post-
Prigozhin sphere of influence. The security packages offered by Russian
PMCs has had greater interest than the traditional agreements offered
by Western countries. For Russia, these partnerships grant access to
valuable natural resources and large sums of revenue that help mitigate
western sanctions. What is AFRICOM doing in these countries (CAR,
Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, etc.) to counter Russian's influence in the
region? How are we leveraging international partnerships to support
African partners? How can we use Russia's missteps and failures in
Ukraine to demonstrate its diminished capabilities as a security
guarantor?
General Langley. USAFRICOM is working closely with the interagency
to counter Russian malign influence by offering a different value
proposition, while countering Russia's disinformation efforts in CAR,
Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and elsewhere. USAFRICOM supports U.S.
interagency efforts to curtail Russia's ability to bypass Western
sanctions.
We leverage our international partnerships in Africa by working
together to enable African Partner defense resilience, to address
shared security interests, and to expose and counter threats. Through
unity of effort, we work together toward a safe and secure homeland, as
well as strengthened African Partner defense institutional capacity.
Despite this collaboration, as you have noted, Russia's efforts are
achieving success at displacing the U.S. and its allies from
longstanding partnerships in Africa.
Russia has expanded its influence in Africa as highlighted by gains
in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger). Russia's ability to
deliver equipment and weapons to its traditional African customers has
diminished as a function of its battlefield losses in Ukraine. However,
there is an opportunity to take advantage of Russia's war in Ukraine by
increasing foreign military assistance to countries that normally
purchase Russian military weapons and equipment. Support with
accelerating existing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) procedures would reduce the otherwise very lengthy U.S.
military aid process and would allow AFRICOM to capitalize on Russia's
shortfalls.
Mr. Mills. China has identified their military's lack of combat
experience as a major weakness. AFRICOM therefore presents a tempting
opportunity for the PRC to conduct asymmetric actions, both
destabilizing the region and providing their soldiers with combat
experience. China form would likely see this take by the PRC and how
can we counter it?
General Langley. The PLA almost certainly uses Africa to gain
operational experience by learning from the operation of its only
overseas base in Djibouti, maintaining its only permanent overseas
naval deployment in the Gulf of Aden, and deploying roughly 80% of the
PLA's UN peacekeepers to Africa. These deployments allow the PLA to
gain tactical experience in adverse environments and build overseas
logistics supply chains while bolstering the PRC's image as an
international security partner.
Our best approach to counter the PRC is through a whole of
government, integrated deterrence strategy that responds to the PRC's
global presence with appropriate operations and activities. In
addition, we should bolster our efforts to inform the public and
governments when PLA activities are contrary to the best interests of
African partners and allies in the region.
Mr. Mills. How can we strengthen the partnerships and cooperation
between the United States military and allies in the AFRICOM region?
How can we prevent the collapse of states like we saw in Niger and
counter asymmetric forces who seek to disrupt countries like Niger?
General Langley. USAFRICOM is continuously seeking opportunities to
improve and expand on our partnerships in Africa to promote security,
prosperity, and democracy in close coordination with our interagency
partners. Our collaboration with the U.S. interagency under the Global
Fragility Act is a good example, in that U.S. engagement requires all
elements of whole-of-government effort. USAFRICOM continues to work
with interagency partners to counter malign actors' destabilizing
operations. It is important that all departments and agencies in the
U.S. government receive the resources required, and we burden share
efforts with allies and partners in the region. In the end, African
nations have sovereignty over their decisions.
Mr. Mills. China has expressed interest in building maritime ports
in West Africa, placing Chinese resources directly on the Atlantic.
What threats would this pose to the security of the United States and
our allies?
General Langley. A Chinese naval base on the Atlantic coast of
Africa would enable persistent PLA Navy (PLAN) power projection in the
Atlantic Ocean that spans the west coast of Africa and outward towards
the U.S. east coast. This would be a new and significant change in the
PLAN's capabilities.
[all]