[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PREPARING FOR THE NEXT PANDEMIC:
LESSONS LEARNED AND THE PATH FORWARD
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 14, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-136
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available on: govinfo.gov,
oversight.house.gov or
docs.house.gov
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-441 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman
Jim Jordan, Ohio Jamie Raskin, Maryland, Ranking
Mike Turner, Ohio Minority Member
Paul Gosar, Arizona Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Columbia
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Michael Cloud, Texas Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Gary Palmer, Alabama Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Ro Khanna, California
Pete Sessions, Texas Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
Andy Biggs, Arizona Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York
Nancy Mace, South Carolina Katie Porter, California
Jake LaTurner, Kansas Cori Bush, Missouri
Pat Fallon, Texas Shontel Brown, Ohio
Byron Donalds, Florida Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Robert Garcia, California
William Timmons, South Carolina Maxwell Frost, Florida
Tim Burchett, Tennessee Summer Lee, Pennsylvania
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Greg Casar, Texas
Lisa McClain, Michigan Jasmine Crockett, Texas
Lauren Boebert, Colorado Dan Goldman, New York
Russell Fry, South Carolina Jared Moskowitz, Florida
Anna Paulina Luna, Florida Rashida Tlaib, Michigan
Nick Langworthy, New York Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts
Eric Burlison, Missouri
Mike Waltz, Florida
------
Mark Marin, Staff Director
Mitchell Benzine, Subcommittee Staff Director
Marie Policastro, Clerk
Contact Number: 202-225-5074
Miles Lichtman, Minority Staff Director
Contact Number: 202-225-5051
------
Select Subcommittee On The Coronavirus Pandemic
Brad Wenstrup, Ohio, Chairman
Nicole Malliotakis, New York Raul Ruiz, California, Ranking
Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa Minority Member
Debbie Lesko, Arizona Debbie Dingell, Michigan
Michael Cloud, Texas Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
John Joyce, Pennsylvania Deborah Ross, North Carolina
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Robert Garcia, California
Ronny Jackson, Texas Ami Bera, California
Rich Mccormick, Georgia Jill Tokuda, Hawaii
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on November 14, 2024................................ 1
Witnesses
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Lawrence Tabak, D.D.S, Ph.D., Principal Deputy Director, National
Institutes of Health
Oral Statement................................................... 4
Henry Walke, M.D., M.P.H., Director of the Office of Readiness
and Response, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention
Oral Statement................................................... 6
Hilary Marston, M.D., M.P.H., Chief Medical Officer, U.S. Food &
Drug Administration
Oral Statement................................................... 8
Written opening statements and the written statements of the
witnesses are available on the U.S. House of Representatives
Document Repository at: docs.house.gov.
Index of Documents
----------
* Questions for the Record to: Dr. Marston; submitted by Rep.
Cloud.
* Questions for the Record to: Dr. Tabak; submitted by Rep.
Cloud.
* Questions for the Record to: Dr. Walke; submitted by Rep.
Cloud.
* Questions for the Record to: Dr. Walke; submitted by Rep.
Miller-Meeks.
Documents are available at: docs.house.gov.
PREPARING FOR THE NEXT PANDEMIC:
LESSONS LEARNED AND THE PATH FORWARD
----------
Thursday, November 14, 2024
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Accountability
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:30 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad R. Wenstrup
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Wenstrup, Miller-Meeks, Lesko,
Cloud, Joyce, Greene, McCormick, Ruiz, Dingell, Mfume, Ross,
Garcia, Bera, and Tokuda.
Dr. Wenstrup. Good morning. The Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Pandemic will come to order.
I want to welcome everyone here today.
Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at any
time.
I now recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening
statement.
I would like to thank the witnesses for their testimony at
the Select Subcommittee's final hearing.
The COVID-19 pandemic stands as one of the most devastating
crises in our Nation's history. It claimed the lives of
millions of Americans, disrupted livelihoods, and took a
profound physical, emotional, and economic toll on families and
communities across the country.
Sadly, this likely will not be the last pandemic. There
will be others that test our Nation's preparedness and
resiliency in the future. So, we're here today to look at the
lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic in order to prepare
for and hopefully prevent the next one.
In the last 2 years, the Select Subcommittee has sent 118
investigative letters, conducted 38 transcribed interviews,
held 25 hearings, and reviewed nearly 1 million pages of
documents. The work of the Select Subcommittee revealed serious
flaws in the government's response to the pandemic,
underscoring the need for reforms.
We saw inconsistent, contradictory guidance from the CDC
that sowed confusion and diminished trust. Students were out of
the classroom and told to attend school remotely even when the
science had started to clearly demonstrate it was safe for them
to be back in the classroom.
We saw Americans pressured to receive a vaccine they were
assured that would make them a dead-end for the virus and
prevent reinfection and transmission--something that was known
to be false based on vaccine trials.
And at the NIH, there was a glaring lack of oversight over
Federal grants that posed risk to public health and national
security, and millions in taxpayer dollars funded risky gain-
of-function research in China. We found nefarious behavior by
several federally funded actors--actions that betray the trust
of the American citizens.
We must learn from these errors, take the lessons to heart,
and make fundamental changes. We must establish clearly defined
roles, with an overarching structure that empowers agencies to
act swiftly and effectively in mitigating the spread of novel
viruses, as an example.
It is essential for institutions such as NIAID and CDC to
execute their assigned missions, functions, and tasks and not
stray out of their respective lanes. For example, NIAID is
entrusted with vaccine development, while the CDC is tasked
with controlling and containing the spread of diseases.
Throughout the pandemic, NIAID encroached into CDC's lane by
advising on matters pertaining to containing the spread,
creating confusion among the American people.
Poor decisions made by Federal agencies shattered trust in
our public-health institutions and left Americans questioning
the very leadership that was supposed to protect them.
Decisions made out of lack of knowledge and data is one
thing, but poor decisions must be corrected. To be successful
in the next pandemic, our Federal public-health institutions
must be accountable to the people again. To be successful, our
health organizations must do what they are supposed to do--
protect Americans. Stronger oversight, better accountability,
and improved structure within our agencies are essential.
Congress must consider a dedicated authority to oversee
agency practices, ensuring that agencies act solely within
their areas of statutory responsibilities and subject-matter
expertise and insisting that public-health decisions are
transparent, consistent, and credible.
Let today's hearing be a step toward lasting reforms that
will protect future generations from similar crises. I want to
thank you, and I look forward to a strong on-topic discussion
today.
I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Ruiz for the
purpose of making an opening statement.
Dr. Ruiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When COVID-19 hit our shores in the early months of 2020,
our Nation began one of the most challenging chapters in its
history. We entered a period marked by uncertainty, fear, and a
staggering loss of life.
And in those initial months, we, as Members of Congress and
as a Nation, overcame our differences and came together to
protect and provide relief through the Families First
Coronavirus Response Act and the CARES Act for the American
people in the face of this novel threat.
Since that time, thanks to the life-saving impact of
vaccines and the tireless work of our Nation's scientists and
public-health officials, we have turned the page on the darkest
days of the COVID-19 pandemic.
But during that same period, we have also seen an
unsettling rise in mistrust for our Nation's public-health
officials and misinformation and disinformation about the very
interventions that saved us.
As we began the 118th Congress, we had a rare opportunity
to take a serious, constructive look at these problems and
develop forward-looking solutions to safeguard Americans from
current and future threats. And when I became Ranking Member, I
stood ready to work with any Member on either side of the aisle
who would join me in this objective.
But instead of taking steps forward to prevent and prepare
our Nation for future pandemics, this Select Subcommittee has
spent 2 years fanning the flames of people's mistrust in public
health and taking advantage of their fears. And under the
Republicans' leadership, the Select Subcommittee pursued
vendettas against our Nation's scientists and public-health
officials for partisan gain.
But whether it was allegations that Dr. Fauci caused and
covered up the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic or that our
Nation's public-health officials sought to keep schools and
businesses closed, more than half a million pages of documents,
more than 30 transcribed interviews, and nearly two dozen
hearings failed to turn up evidence to substantiate these
extreme and baseless claims.
And while the Select Subcommittee's probes did reveal
discrete issues of misconduct that must be taken seriously,
including by Dr. Peter Daszak and Dr. David Morens, we must ask
ourselves whether our efforts over the past 2 years have
fulfilled the objective of constructively improving our
Nation's ability to prevent and prepare for the future
pandemics on the issues that matter most and that would have
the most significant impact in those future pandemics.
Look, since day one, I have said that the Select
Subcommittee's mission must be collaborating to develop the
forward-looking solutions that leave our Nation better prepared
for future novel viruses.
I have wanted to examine how we close pathways for novel
viruses to emerge, be they in nature or in a lab; or to focus
on how we can strengthen our schools so that they can be better
prepared to maintain safe, in-person learning during future
pandemics; to look at how we can build on progress in
strengthening infection prevention and control in nursing homes
to keep our seniors safe and save lives; to explore how we can
lay the groundwork for the rapid development of future vaccines
and therapeutics for novel viruses when they inevitably emerge.
And we could've done all these important things, things
that have a high impact, significant ability to curb the deaths
of the next pandemic or possibly even prevent them--and I've
asked for more over the past 2 years--but we didn't. We didn't.
And while we haven't yet come together to tackle these
serious challenges--challenges facing Republicans and Democrats
alike--I have always looked for opportunities to do so.
So, as we begin today's hearing, I want to acknowledge that
I welcome its focus, that I wish that we spent more time
pursuing this subject with more experts, and I hope that we can
commit to a forward-looking discussion about the road ahead.
Because, even after 2 years, I still believe that there is a
lot more to do, and it's not too late to come together and do
the work of saving future lives.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup. Our witnesses today are:
Dr. Lawrence Tabak. Dr. Tabak is the Principal Deputy
Director of the National Institutes of Health and served as
Acting Director of the NIH from December 2021 to November 2023.
Dr. Henry Walke. Dr. Walke is the Director of the Office of
Readiness and Response at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention.
Dr. Hilary Marston. Dr. Marston is the Chief Medical
Officer at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and was a
senior advisor on the White House COVID-19 Response Team.
Pursuant to Committee on Oversight and Accountability rule
9(g), the witnesses will please stand and raise their right
hands.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you
are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Thank you.
Let the record show that the witnesses all answered in the
affirmative.
The Select Subcommittee certainly appreciates you all for
being here today, and we look forward to your testimony.
Let me remind the witnesses that we have read your written
statements and they will appear in full in the hearing record.
Please limit your oral statements to 5 minutes.
As a reminder, please press the button on the microphone in
front of you so that it is on and the Members can hear you.
When you begin to speak, the light in front of you will turn
green. After 4 minutes, the light will turn yellow. When the
red light comes on, your 5 minutes has expired and we would ask
that you please wrap up.
I now recognize Dr. Tabak to give an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE TABAK, DDS, PH.D.
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH
Dr. Tabak. Thank you, Chairman Wenstrup, Ranking Member
Ruiz, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss
the critical role NIH plays in supporting research necessary
for preventing infectious-disease outbreaks and preparing for
the next public-health threat. We are here today because of our
shared belief that taking stock of the lessons learned during
the recent pandemic needs to happen sooner rather than later.
While far too many lives were lost, we are proud of the
research communities and brave research volunteers who
participated in NIH-supported research that delivered a
vaccine, diagnostic tests for home use, and a treatment, all in
under a year--three remarkable feats.
It is fair to say that many thousands of additional people
would've died were it not for the public's investment in NIH-
supported research. But more work is needed to prepare for
future threats, and it is essential to leverage what we've
learned from the COVID-19 pandemic.
To maximize our readiness for future pandemics, NIH must
better coordinate its key assets, such as research and trial
networks, as well as standardize platforms to rapidly evaluate
the efficacy of diagnostic tests.
To ensure that we can evaluate the broadest range of
potential interventions, meaningful collaboration across the
USG, industry, academia, and the public must be forged now.
Plans must be put into place to assess potential interventions
for their value to all communities of our Nation.
It is not currently feasible to characterize and develop
countermeasures for all circulating viruses around the globe.
Therefore, the NIH, led by the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases, has developed a pandemic preparedness
plan that prioritizes development of medical countermeasures
for representative viruses from each of nine virus families.
The knowledge gained will not only provide ready potential
prevention and treatment strategies for the many different
viral variants that could emerge but also the framework for a
rapid research and product-development response to other
viruses within each family in the event of an outbreak.
In addition, by standardizing reagents, models, and data
outputs, NIH's coordinated research networks would be able to
more easily share results and collaborate quickly to enhance
research efforts.
We must also continue to invest in the development of
methods for detecting transmission of virus that can be
deployed in communities equitably and rapidly across the
country. NIH is now applying the so-called RADx approach to
address a range of health problems, including technologies to
reduce the spread of HIV, and developing emergency diagnostics
for emerging threats such as avian flu and then the seasonal
flu.
Finally, NIH knows that we cannot tackle emerging
infectious diseases on our own, and we are working in
partnerships with others to tackle emerging threats across the
globe.
One example is Marburg virus disease, a severe and often
fatal illness in humans clinically very similar to Ebola virus
disease. Currently, there are no FDA-approved therapeutics or
vaccines available. In September of this year, Rwanda reported
cases around their country.
NIH is working with HHS counterparts and international
partners to support research through the ongoing outbreak.
NIAID has supported research on candidate therapeutics and
vaccines for the disease and has helped make these candidates
available in Rwanda to enable patient treatment and vaccination
of contacts and healthcare workers.
NIH remains committed to supporting these efforts and more
to advance pandemic preparedness and enhance the international
research capacity to respond to infectious disease.
Continued success in NIH pandemic preparedness and
biodefense efforts is contingent upon sustained congressional
support. The President's budget request includes $20 billion in
mandatory funding for the Public Health and Social Services
Fund, of which $2.69 billion will support NIH's work.
We appreciate your attention and support for these efforts.
NIH will continue to meet the public-health emergency needs by
advancing high-priority research of these threats.
I thank you for your attention and welcome your questions.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Doctor.
I now recognize Dr. Walke.
And if I mispronounced your name earlier, I apologize.
Dr. Walke. That's OK.
Dr. Wenstrup. Dr. Walke, you can give an opening statement,
please.
STATEMENT OF HENRY WALKE, M.D., MPH
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF READINESS AND RESPONSE
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
Dr. Walke. Thank you. Chairman Wenstrup, Ranking Member
Ruiz, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it's an
honor to be here today.
I'm Henry Walke, the Director of CDC's Office of Readiness
and Response, and I'm here today to discuss how CDC is working
every day to protect our health security and save lives by
putting science into action to help people and communities
prevent, detect, and respond to health threats at home and
abroad.
We're seeing more infectious-disease threats than ever
before, including emerging pathogens like avian influenza;
viral hemorrhagic fevers like Ebola and Marburg; mpox; and
Oropouche a new illness linked with birth defects.
At the same time, many of the leading causes of death and
the largest drivers of healthcare costs for Americans are
noninfectious diseases such as heart disease, stroke, overdose,
and suicide. CDC works in coordination with state and local
health departments around the country to provide communities
with effective strategies to combat all of these threats. With
about 80 percent of our domestic funds going directly to state
and local partners, we dedicate ourselves to partnering with
communities to protect Americans.
We are also in over 60 countries around the world,
increasing laboratory capacity and building work force
expertise so we can identify and stop pathogens at their
source, protecting Americans at home. The relationships CDC
builds in other countries means the first call ministries of
health make when a health threat arises is often to CDC. It's a
matter of national security that we maintain our world-class
expertise to be the first to respond.
The COVID-19 response showed a number of important
successes, but it also exposed challenges and gaps that need to
be filled. CDC, in conjunction with outside stakeholders,
conducted an extensive review of our processes and
organizational structure to document lessons learned and
identify corrective actions. As this Committee has heard
before, the report identified a number of areas for
improvement, including streamlining communication, sharing data
faster, and promoting partnerships.
CDC has implemented over 160 key actions to drive
accountability. These changes are seen every day in how CDC
operates.
Starting last respiratory season, CDC now has a public
dashboard displaying COVID-19, flu, and RSV information all in
one place.
CDC recently made the first-of-its-kind awards with five
private-sector clinical laboratory companies that provide a
warm base of support for rapid and efficient distribution of
diagnostics.
And we're getting data out faster with the launch of the
1CDP data platform that leverages data reported to CDC from
thousands of sources to programs across the entire agency and
shares it back in an action-oriented format for Federal, state,
and local partners.
I'm proud of the work we have done, but I have been at CDC
long enough now to know that we can't do it alone. One of the
core themes identified in moving forward with an effort to
improve and modernize the agency was that CDC needed to bolster
our core capabilities of data analytics, laboratory capacity,
public-health work force, and domestic and global readiness and
response.
Strengthening these core functions would allow CDC to be
nimble enough to address any health challenge, but we need the
necessary funding and authority from Congress if we want to
make the type of lasting change needed to respond to the next
pandemic--or, better yet, to prevent it.
Unfortunately, public-health funding is boosted when there
is a crisis, but much of that funding is allowed to lapse
during peacetime. We've seen this with H1N1, Ebola, Zika, and
now COVID-19.
These resources let us create incredible tools that can be
used in an emergency but also support situational awareness for
other pathogens--for example, our national wastewater system
that gives us an early look at how diseases are progressing; or
the RREDI platform that supports a response-ready agency to use
data to make decisions near-real-time; or our Center for
Forecasting Outbreak Analytics that can now show us when and
where an emerging threat may go, helping communities best
target limited resources; and, more broadly, continuing to
modernize our public-health data capabilities.
Without increased and sustained resources, these
capabilities, which were all largely built with one-time
emergency funds, are at risk of going away. Without authorities
that let us surge and sustain our work force for the next
emerging threat, we'll be back where we started before COVID.
The CDC works every day to achieve our mission of
protecting your communities from health threats. But we can't
be the national-security asset Americans deserve without
bipartisan support. I look forward to speaking with you today
on the ways that we can enhance our collaboration to protect
health and improve lives.
And I'm happy to answer your questions.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
I now recognize Dr. Marston to give an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HILARY MARSTON, M.D., MPH
CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Marston. Thank you so much.
Chair Wenstrup, Ranking Member Ruiz, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
FDA's pandemic preparedness efforts.
Recent events, whether the COVID-19 pandemic, the presence
of highly pathogenic avian influenza in dairy cattle, or the
emergency-induced supply chain disruptions that we're seeing
with Hurricanes Helene and Milton, have all underscored the
need to continue to optimize our Nation's preparedness and
response capabilities.
We know the profound impact that public-health emergencies
and our ability to respond to them have on American lives. This
can range from how global supply chains affect access to foods
and medical products to the value and importance of vaccines,
therapeutics, and diagnostics to address those public-health
threats, reduce suffering, and ultimately save lives.
The additional authorities and funding requested in the
Fiscal Year 2025 President's budget are necessary to address
future public-health threats effectively.
Specifically for FDA, our public-health preparedness
priorities are: one, providing greater transparency into supply
chains; two, fostering medical countermeasure development; and
three, ensuring operational readiness and surge capacity within
the agency.
So, first, supply chains. We need greater transparency into
supply chains to help ensure access to critical medical
products. Supply chains are subject to a range of market forces
that are well beyond FDA's scope. For example, generic drugs,
particularly generic sterile injectables, are most vulnerable
to shortage. We know this. But that's due to market dynamics,
including competition, investment needs, and uncertain demand--
all dynamics beyond the FDA's scope.
FDA has worked within its current authorities to find ways
to prevent and mitigate medical product shortages. Since the
COVID-19 pandemic, we've worked with manufacturers to
successfully mitigate or prevent 586 drug, biologic, and
medical-device shortages. We rely on notifications from
manufacturers to help prevent supply disruptions, and we've
identified changes that could help the agency better mitigate
or prevent shortages.
Specifically, FDA seeks authorities to require FDA
notification when there's increased demand for a product;
require manufacturers to report sources of active
pharmaceutical ingredients and the extent of manufacturer
reliance on them; require labeling to include the original
manufacturer and supply chain information; and require
manufacturers to notify FDA about interruptions or
discontinuances in medical-device manufacturing outside of
public-health emergencies.
Second, the COVID-19 pandemic underscored the importance of
fostering medical countermeasure development as a preparedness
measure.
Throughout the COVID-19 response, FDA's scientists and
employees worked around the clock trying to provide guidance to
manufacturers and researchers, minimizing the time between
clinical development, manufacturing, scale-up, and regulatory
review. This is how FDA was able to help make critical medical
countermeasures, especially COVID-19 vaccines, available as
quickly as possible based on our stringent scientific and
regulatory standards.
We're leveraging the lessons learned from the COVID-19
response in our everyday reviews, including reviews of platform
technologies and improving communications with manufacturers.
Third, ensuring operational readiness and surge capacity is
critical in emergencies.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, we saw FDA staff pulled away
from other work to focus on pandemic work for 3 years, leading
to backlogs and fatigue. Creating a specialized program to
defend against emerging pathogens and other threats would leave
the FDA best positioned to respond to future emergencies and
focus experienced staff to work quickly on medical
countermeasure development.
Critical investments are also needed to increase FDA's
inspectorate work force capacity to conduct oversight of those
products.
The key lessons learned and proposals I'll discuss today
will bridge key gaps to enable a robust and timely response to
future emergencies. They'll help enhance early detection;
provide safe, effective, and accessible medical products; and
maintain health system capacity.
We look forward to continuing to work with Congress to
improve public-health preparedness. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
I now recognize myself for questions, but I do want to take
a moment to thank you all again for being here.
And I would tell you, I appreciate your constructive
reforms that you talk about, actions that have been taken since
the pandemic response, the idea of solutions, and honest self-
reflection that we all need to undergo if we are going to do
better in the future. And I do hope that there can be robust
work with Congress and the agencies and our Federal Government
to do better.
One of the things that we wanted to look at is the grant
process. And we looked into that, and there seem to be, from
Dr. Fauci's testimony, several flaws that I think we can
correct. And we can correct them together for sure, improving
the process. But part of that process is holding those that get
grants accountable for their own responsibilities.
So, Dr. Tabak, this past May, HHS immediately suspended and
proposed debarment for both EcoHealth and Dr. Daszak. And, just
following up, our understanding is that this process remains
ongoing at this time?
Dr. Tabak. That's correct.
Dr. Wenstrup. And does NIH still support the debarment of
EcoHealth and Dr. Daszak?
Dr. Tabak. We do. And we have provided all necessary
documents to the Department.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
At the time HHS announced the suspension, EcoHealth had
three active grants with NIH. These grants had moneys already
outlaid and obligated.
Does the suspension stop future funding on these grants
even if the money has already been obligated but not outlaid?
Dr. Tabak. If the activity occurred before the suspension,
we are, by law, obligated to reimburse them on a case-by-case
basis. Any activities after the suspension are not
reimbursable.
Dr. Wenstrup. Did NIH make any efforts to claw back
already-outlaid funds, or just realized you couldn't?
Dr. Tabak. This has not occurred. This is--going forward
from the suspension, they are not allowed to get additional
funds.
Dr. Wenstrup. OK. Thank you.
One final question for you. Dr. Daszak has routinely said
that the regulations did not require that he provide NIH with
lab notebooks from the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Last year,
NIH put out a new rule regarding this issue.
So, just to clarify, when NIH asked for these lab
notebooks, was Dr. Daszak required to produce them?
Dr. Tabak. He was indeed.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
Dr. Walke, the Select Subcommittee went to Southeast Asia,
Cambodia and Laos in particular, some of us, to get firsthand
experience on how we work with these countries to protect the
United States. And, quite frankly, I find it, as we discussed
yesterday, a good form of diplomacy for the United States. But
while we were there, we had meetings with CDC employees that
were in-country.
Now, you worked in global health. Do you think having U.S.
Government personnel in countries to try to prevent pandemics
from reaching our shores has a large return on investment? And,
briefly, why?
Dr. Walke. Thank you for the question.
Absolutely. CDC has over 60 country offices spread around
the world. We have CDC staff embedded in ministries of health
to work on surveillance or data collection, laboratory
capability, and trying to help improve their work force.
So, when there is a cluster of illness anywhere in the
world, our staff can work closely with ministries of health to
detect that outbreak and then to try to rapidly control the
outbreak at its source so that it actually maintains--that
outbreak is maintained actually within the country or the
region and never makes it to the U.S.
So, it's a national-security asset to have these global
health relationships.
Dr. Wenstrup. Yes, I appreciate that. And I got to see that
firsthand and receive praise to the United States for our
efforts in that area. And it does reduce the potential for a
pandemic to reach our shores, or an epidemic.
The CDC issued hundreds of guidelines during the pandemic.
The Federal and state governments took these guidelines a step
further and imposed mandates. We had mask mandates, vaccine
mandates, vaccine passports. These types of mandates blocked
individuals from seeking personalized medical advice from their
doctors very often.
Do you think in future pandemics ensuring the sanctity of
the doctor-patient relationship is vital?
Your microphone, please.
Dr. Walke. Thank you. Thanks again for the question.
The COVID vaccine saves millions of lives. Related to the
need for continued vaccine--I'm sorry, sir. I forgot your
question. I apologize.
Dr. Wenstrup. I said, do you think in a future pandemic
ensuring the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship is
vital?
Dr. Walke. I----
Dr. Wenstrup. I think that, with mandates, we eliminated
too much of the discussion that a patient can have with their
doctor to talk about--yes, the vaccine saved millions of lives;
I'm convinced of that. But there were things it couldn't do.
And patients wanted to know that.
So, I just wanted your take on maintaining that doctor-
patient relationship.
Dr. Walke. Yes. No medical intervention, including
vaccines, is risk-free, so it's very important for the patient
or the person receiving that medical intervention, a vaccine
for example, to have that strong relationship with their
provider so they have the medical advice that they need. Some
of these patients, for example, have underlying diseases or may
have some complication related to the medical intervention.
So, CDC makes recommendations for the population, for large
communities--for communities at large, but maintaining that
relationship between the provider and the patient helps
interpret those recommendations for the individual.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Doctor.
Dr. Marston, in your written testimony, you emphasize the
need for greater transparency within the medical-product supply
chain--the supply chain issue is very important to me--to help
prevent and mitigate drug shortages. The COVID-19 pandemic
underscored just how fragile the supply chain is, as
unprecedented demand led to severe shortages.
Can you outline specific steps the FDA can take and maybe
has started to take to strengthen supply chain resilience and
prevent drug shortages during future public-health crises?
Dr. Marston. Well, first, I want to say I appreciate the
question, because these shortages are incredibly painful for
communities across the country. They are not a new problem, but
they certainly were laid bare during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Also, it's important to recognize what's causing these
shortages. And the primary causes of the shortages, the long-
term causes, are these weaknesses in the markets, right?
These generic sterile injectables in particular, not
everybody can make them. They need to be sterile; that's an
important thing. You know this as a physician. They can't be
made everywhere. And they require additional upkeep of those
lines, additional care, the ability to have buffer stocks. All
of these things cost money, and unfortunately the profit
margins are very razor-thin.
That is quite clearly beyond the mission of the FDA, but it
is something where we are often trying to work on the fallout
from those issues. So, one of the things that we've been doing
is trying to partner across government for solutions that can
address those market-based issues.
But for the FDA in particular, there are some things that
we can do to improve our ability to provide and mitigate
shortages.
First, we really need to be able to know when there is a
rise in demand that these companies can't keep up with. So,
currently, they are required to tell us if a line goes down and
they can't keep up with supply. But if there's a spike in
demand, for example, as we saw with the children's analgesics a
couple of years ago, they don't need to tell us about that. So
that sets us back in our ability to mitigate.
Second, they don't need to specify their reliance on
different manufacturers for active pharmaceutical ingredients.
They don't need to put those things on their label. So, we have
proposals that would address both of those and require that.
And, third, medical-device manufacturers actually aren't
required to tell us about any supply disruptions outside of a
public-health emergency. So, if a tornado takes out your
factory, which unfortunately is a painfully real example,
you're not required to tell the FDA. We might call you, we
might see it in the news, but it's not a requirement. So
that's, again, something that we want to address.
Dr. Wenstrup. Well, I don't know if you had previously read
my next question, but it sounds like it. Because an idea we
have had is to stand up a manufacturing reserve corps, in
essence, to have trusted companies with capabilities ready to
make things like masks, hand sanitizer, gowns, or vaccines, all
that in place.
So how can the FDA improve its coordination with
manufacturers and healthcare providers to anticipate and meet
surges in demand? And how can Congress help with that as well?
Dr. Marston. So, maintaining those open lines of
communication is one of our lessons learned from the pandemic,
that, early and often, those communications are really what's
needed to make us most effective.
In terms of manufacturers, our small-but-mighty drug-
shortages staff is in close touch with manufacturers of some of
these critical medical products, understanding their
capabilities to make these products and be able to respond
particularly for critical medical products should a supply
disruption occur.
As I mentioned, generic sterile injectables, particularly
drugs like penicillin, these are things that are difficult to
make, right? Not everybody can make them. So, it would be
important to make sure that those manufacturers are qualified
and have good processes in place, don't have an issue with
cross-contamination, for example, which could end up in quite a
bit of damage.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
I now recognize the Ranking Member, Dr. Ruiz from
California, for 5 minutes of questions--or as you see fit.
Dr. Ruiz. Thank you.
As the Select Subcommittee gathers today, our Nation faces
a pivotal moment when it comes to the future of pandemic
prevention and preparedness.
Thanks to the tireless work of the agencies and the
individuals in those agencies sitting before us over the past 4
years, our Nation overcame the darkest days of the COVID-19
pandemic and has taken meaningful strides to strengthen our
public-health infrastructure going forward.
But the possibility of a future pandemic remains very real.
Even today, we are facing emerging viruses like H5N1 which will
continue to require investments of time and resources to
contain. So, we must keep our foot on the gas even if it might
be tempting to let up.
Dr. Walke, let me begin with you. I understand an essential
component of fortifying CDC's readiness for future outbreaks is
providing the agency with expanded authority for robust public-
health data collection.
Why is this reform so important? And what other reforms
should Congress consider going forward to ensure your agency is
best positioned to respond to emerging viruses?
Dr. Walke. Thank you for the question.
Early in the pandemic, as the virus was changing--first we
had the wild type, then Alpha, Beta, Delta, and then Omicron--
we had difficulty trying to understand where transmission was
happening. It was difficult to integrate our laboratory data
with our hospital data with our case-based information in a way
that we could actually create dashboards and make quick
decisions on what to do. Some of our jurisdictions were even
faxing information in around case reports.
With sustained investment from Congress, we made incredible
progress in pulling together that information and creating
those systems so we could create that interoperability between
all those various systems. But in order to keep going forward,
we're going to need sustained investment in our data platforms.
We have a large number of jurisdictions now who, still,
healthcare providers are entering information in manually,
actually, to report case reports. We've made incredible strides
in electronic case reporting, moving from 187 healthcare
facilities before COVID now to over 45,000 healthcare
facilities who are able to quickly give us information around
case reports. So, we need to continue that investment and
actually improve it.
We need authorities, though, as well. Early in the
pandemic, early in an outbreak, before an emergency, a public-
health emergency is declared, we have to collect information
very quickly to understand what's happening, as in COVID, and
we need those policy changes to enable us to collect the
information that's needed to make decisions.
As well, that's a core capability related to data, but I'll
stop there.
Dr. Ruiz. Thank you.
Dr. Marston, one of the great success stories of the
pandemic was the effective and efficient manner in which
scientists and the FDA brought a safe and effective COVID-19
vaccine to the market and distributed throughout our Nation.
What lessons did FDA identify from its work on the COVID-19
vaccine? And how can Congress help to ensure these best
practices remain in place for emerging public-health threats
going forward?
Dr. Marston. Thanks so much for that question and for your
kind words about the work of the professionals at the FDA.
Couldn't agree more with you. I joined the FDA in 2022, so I
was an observer of that work. But, really, a tremendous effort.
A couple of lessons that we learned.
No. 1, continued transparency. We have made sure that our
advisory committees are airing the data that they're seeing,
that we're putting out summaries of our views, of our own
analysis of the data that's provided by manufacturers. We do
our own analysis, right? We don't just take things that are
given to us. Our professionals look into the data themselves.
Second, we have certainly learned a lesson and we have
taken this lesson across the FDA for various medical
countermeasures: the importance of telescoping to industry what
our expectations are going to be, what sort of information that
they're going to need to provide to us. So, we do that in the
form of guidance, and we've done it in vaccines several times,
therapeutics, and diagnostics.
Third is this issue of surge capacity. Our folks are
incredibly dedicated, and they worked around the clock. As I
mentioned, that's led to backlogs, it's led to fatigue. If we
had a cadre of folks who were experts in medical
countermeasures, during, quote/unquote, ``peacetime'' they
could work on those preparedness medical countermeasure
development issues and during a response could jump into
action. That would be tremendously helpful for the
organization.
Dr. Ruiz. Thank you.
Let me conclude with you, Dr. Tabak. While the Select
Subcommittee's efforts did not ultimately shed light on the
origins of the novel coronavirus, they did underscore the
importance of addressing pathways for potential pandemics both
in nature and in labs.
How can we balance the need for continued essential
research to identify and get ahead of future viruses with the
imperative that research take place safely and in a manner that
is transparent to American taxpayers?
Dr. Tabak. Well, as you point out, we do need to take the
appropriate steps to ensure that any research of this type is
done in a safe and efficient manner, but I think we do need to
continue the long-term investment in basic discovery. Because
without the fundamental knowledge of, for example, the
different viral families for which we have less information, we
would be working blind should one of those escape to be a new
emergent pathogen.
We also have to continue to build on the infrastructure
that we have in place to ensure that we are ready for the next
pandemic. And that includes things like, you know, pathogen
surveillance and genomic sequencing and informatics and
structural biology so that we have better understanding of what
potential targets might be.
And then, finally, we have to maintain a flexible domestic
and global clinical-trial network infrastructure so that we can
rapidly deploy potential countermeasures and test them for
their efficacy.
Dr. Ruiz. And what would the ramifications be of cutting
funding to NIH for this and other essential research as a knee-
jerk reaction to the possibility that the novel coronavirus
emerged from a lab incident?
Dr. Tabak. The need for basic discovery is essential. We
need to understand who the pathogens are. We need to understand
how the pathogens transmit. We need to understand what their
mechanisms of action are; what type of disease, what type of
pathology they cause. And we need to support the key
infrastructure that is essential going forward if we are to
successfully defeat any emergent pathogen.
Dr. Ruiz. OK.
And I'm pretty confident that our own labs could attain
that level of security. The question is, how do we work with
adversarial countries to ensure that they're not--that they're
up to code and they're transparent?
Dr. Tabak. As you know, international collaboration and
research is essential. And the pandemic underscored that. But,
unfortunately, when there are instances of noncooperation, we
have to, you know, call that out and hopefully work, you know,
through both diplomatic and other channels to try and bring
those organizations into, you know, a more favorable
compliance.
Dr. Ruiz. Thank you.
Dr. Walke, you mentioned earlier that having investments in
personnel in other countries is very important to be able to
monitor any emerging virus.
In your opinion, do we have--have we mapped the high-risk
animal-to-human potential transmission locations? Are we in the
right places?
Dr. Walke. Thank you for the question.
Related to emerging threats, there's a lot of work being
done, both within CDC and public-health agencies, as well as
the academic world, around where the next emerging threat might
be. There's a number of issues here related to deforestation,
for example, and population movements. But we do have staff
actually in most of these areas--for example, in South America
or in Africa--where we're seeing some of these emerging
threats.
We also place our staff where there's a large burden of
disease--for example, HIV or malaria or tuberculosis. So,
there's a number of different criteria when we make decisions
about where to put our staff.
But, as you have said, it's incredibly important to
actually have that face-to-face people on the ground working
side-by-side with ministries of health, because when something
happens actually, they then work with our staff and ask for
technical assistance and we're actually able to have that
partnership.
Dr. Ruiz. In what other ways, in addition to technical
assistance, are we building the host countries' capacity to
identify any emerging viruses and to better respond to those
emerging viruses, to contain it there?
Dr. Walke. In a similar way that we're trying to build
capacity in this country in data and analytics and laboratory
capacity, that trained public-health work force. And for global
response, we do similar things, actually, in other countries.
We embed within the laboratories and try to make sure that
they have the validated assays available. We work with their
data systems to make sure they can connect with each other. We
actually train their field epidemiologists so that they know
how to go out and collect the information to understand the
transmission of these----
Dr. Ruiz. OK.
Dr. Walke [continuing]. Of these pathogens.
Dr. Ruiz. Well, I really appreciate all of you--thank you--
all of you individually for your tireless work for our
government, for the American people. Thank you for your work
during the pandemic, and thank you for being here.
I yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize the Chairman of the Full
Committee, Mr. Comer from Kentucky.
Mr. Comer. Thank you.
Dr. Tabak, is Dr. David Morens still employed by the NIH?
Dr. Tabak. He is still an employee.
Mr. Comer. When you testified this summer, I asked you a
series of questions about some of Dr. Morens' actions. The
first was if the NIH FOIA Office teaches employees how to avoid
FOIA. You said, and I quote, ``I certainly hope not.''
Are you aware one of your former FOIA officers invoked the
Fifth Amendment when asked about this issue?
Dr. Tabak. I have learned that in the lay press, yes.
Mr. Comer. I then asked if Dr. Morens' deleting emails and
using his personal email to hide his relationship with
EcoHealth was consistent with NIH policy, and you said no.
Do you stand by that?
Dr. Tabak. Absolutely.
Mr. Comer. I then asked if Dr. Morens' sharing internal NIH
deliberations or helping EcoHealth craft responses was
consistent with NIH policy. You said, quote, ``If those actions
occurred, they would not be consistent.''
Do you stand by that?
Dr. Tabak. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. Comer. If I show you proof of those actions, will you
take more employment action against Dr. Morens?
Dr. Tabak. Sir, we are taking the actions necessary in all
cases----
Mr. Comer. OK.
On the screen, in an email chain, it shows an internal NIH
email about a draft letter from Dr. Fauci to Senators Graham
and Paul. Dr. Morens forwarded this first to his Gmail and then
to Dr. Daszak.
Does sharing that draft letter violate NIH policy?
Dr. Tabak. Yes, of course.
Mr. Comer. The next email is the NIH informing Dr. Morens
that the National Security Council will be leading the
communications on the WHO origins report. Dr. Morens forwarded
this first to his Gmail and then to Dr. Daszak.
Does sharing this internal deliberation violate NIH policy?
Dr. Tabak. Yes, it does.
Mr. Comer. The next email is Dr. Daszak soliciting Dr.
Morens' help in responding to NIH. Dr. Morens responded with
his edits to the letter.
But let's not take Dr. Morens' word for it. The attachment
includes comments and track-changes done by Dr. Morens.
Sir, does an NIH employee editing a grantee's oversight
response to NIH violate NIH policy?
Dr. Tabak. It absolutely is inappropriate.
Mr. Comer. Have you read Dr. Morens' transcript of his
interview before the Select Subcommittee?
Dr. Tabak. I have not.
Mr. Comer. Well, I'd like to share you with a few examples
of his testimony.
Dr. Morens was asked if he ever deleted an official record
from his NIH account, and he answered, ``No.''
On January 21, 2022, Dr. Morens wrote, and I quote, ``Twice
in the past, including a month or so ago, I deleted everything
with EHA people from my entire Outlook,'' end quote.
Then, on August 1, 2022, Dr. Morens wrote, and I quote,
``Hopefully no problems with the emails that came to me at my
NIH address. I deleted them quickly,'' end quote.
Did Dr. Morens lie to Congress?
Dr. Tabak. Sir, I don't know if he successfully deleted the
emails or not. If he's a Capstone employee, he would not be
able to delete the emails. It goes out of his----
Mr. Comer. Well, he thought he deleted them.
Dr. Tabak. Well, he may have that thought that, but if he's
a Capstone employee----
Mr. Comer. So----
Dr. Tabak [continuing]. It would remain in the record.
Mr. Comer [continuing]. It looks to me like he lied to
Congress. And that's a felony.
Dr. Tabak. Well, again, I----
Mr. Comer. Dr. Morens was asked if he provided any advice
to Dr. Daszak on how to respond to NIH oversight requests, and
he said, ``No.''
As we discussed and you saw earlier, Dr. Morens personally
edited a letter for Dr. Daszak that was directly related to NIH
oversight of EcoHealth, the company at the center of the entire
COVID pandemic.
Did Dr. Morens lie to Congress?
Dr. Tabak. Again, those types of actions would be
completely inappropriate.
Mr. Comer. ``Yes.'' The answer is ``yes.'' The evidence is
on the screen.
There's evidence that Dr. Morens violated numerous NIH
policies and lied to Congress multiple times. Dr. Tabak, will
you fire Dr. Morens?
Dr. Tabak. As you know, we don't discuss specific personnel
matters, but we are following all of our procedures to the
letter.
Mr. Comer. Well, this appears to me the perfect example of
bureaucratic overreach, the type of bureaucratic overreach I
think the American people sent a loud message to Washington
that they're fed up with. And they want the bureaucracies
dismantled.
And one thing where I think we have bipartisan agreement is
that there were a lot of mistakes made during the COVID
pandemic. That's what the purpose of this Select Committee is
for, and I think this Committee has been very effective in
getting the truth to the American people.
I look forward to working with the incoming Trump
administration to get rid of waste, fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement in the government and get rid of Federal
employees that stand in the way of trying to bring transparency
and efficiency to the Federal Government.
Thank you, Chairman Wenstrup. Thank you for the great work
you've done on this Select Committee.
And I yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
I now recognize Dr. Bera from California.
Dr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, the title of this is ``Lessons Learned and the
Path Forward.'' And there were a lot of lessons learned, and
there's a lot that we should be thinking about.
And this is an area that I've spent my six terms in
Congress thinking about, pre-pandemic. You know, my staff
would, early on, often wonder, like, why are you spending so
much time thinking about this? I'd say, ``Go watch 'Contagion.'
'' And then, unfortunately, you know, we lived it. That wasn't
the hope.
You know, post-Ebola, we put in some things in place, you
know, in terms of having someone who was in charge of pandemic
preparedness at the NSC looking around, programs like the
PREDICT program that, you know, would be out there. And I
visited those folks in Sierra Leone to see what we were doing
to try to have early warning systems and do disease
surveillance.
A lot of that was dismantled in the first Trump
Administration, and we sounded the alarms that it would make us
vulnerable. I'm glad that we've put some of that back.
You know, early in the winter of 2020, we sounded the
alarms when we saw what was going on. We had the first hearing
in Congress about this novel coronavirus and understood it was
something different.
We've now spent the better part of 4 years talking about
COVID origins. I don't think we will ever get to the bottom of
that, because the evidence was probably destroyed. And, you
know, it was unfortunate we weren't able to get to the hot zone
immediately in early 2020.
I would urge us, as Congress and the country, to just
accept both as plausible theories, so we can--you know, if it
is a lab leak, let's actually raise lab standards. Let's have
the ability--if folks are doing gain-of-function research and
other research that is absolutely necessary for preparedness,
let's make sure they're adhering to the highest of lab
standards.
We also know that viruses occur naturally and there are
naturally occurring pathogens. We should do everything we can
to, you know, try to prepare for that, and I think it's time
for us to move on.
You know, we have to better understand, with a novel virus
and a pandemic and a very fluid situation where new information
was coming in, how we get that information, how do we
communicate it to the public. Because what we knew in March
2020 was very different than what we knew in October 2020.
And, again, in a fluid situation where people are scared,
we should spend time thinking about how we allow the scientists
to be the scientists, how we allow the politicians to be the
politicians, but not have the politicians try to be the
scientists and the scientists try to be the politicians. How do
we work together to communicate that, again, to a scared
public.
You know, Dr. Marston, you talked about the critical
vulnerabilities in our supply chain. Those clearly were
exposed. We, as Congress, should do everything we can, with the
rest of the world, to address those critical shortages, think
about what that looks like, and, you know, fairly quickly,
where it makes sense, on APIs, on protective equipment, et
cetera, you know, make sure we've got adequate stockpiles but
we've also got the reserve capacity to flex up very quickly.
Early on, I was involved in lots of conversations that
talked about various strategies of--you know, we knew older
patients were more vulnerable. You know, perhaps this did not
seem to be impacting younger folks as quickly as possible,
given the devastation we were seeing in New York. We made broad
decisions which I think made sense at that juncture, but as we
gained more information, we should've fed that back into
strategies.
You know, I totally understand why in the spring of 2020 we
closed schools. Was that the right decision in the fall of
2020? You know, we've got a perfect ability to--different
states did different things. We should go back and learn from
that and feed that into the future so, if we're faced with the
same dilemma, we have that information.
I still have plenty of questions about why, as this virus
evolved--you know, it came up through the East Coast, through
Italy, into New York, devastated New York. We had the first
naturally occurring case at my home institution, UC Davis, but
it didn't rip through California. You know, I would've expected
to see really bad results in Japan--densely populated area,
they're a little bit more open, an older population. Why did
the virus impact different countries differently? It didn't rip
through India, which, you know, we were incredibly worried
about.
I would hope that we, in an objective way, as a scientific
community, taking politics out of this, could go back and try
to understand the epidemiology. Was it that Japanese culture is
a mask-wearing culture, et cetera.
So, you know, there are plenty of questions that still
remain outstanding. If we could allow the scientists and the
academics to address those things, I would hope that we, as
Congress, could fund those studies, understand it, not to
prosecute anyone or anything else but to actually better
prepare ourselves as a country and the world.
You know, our public-health systems I knew had atrophied.
We had very bad disease surveillance systems. Obviously, we've
stood up wastewater surveillance and other measures. We could
do better, though, to protect our public.
And it is not just naturally occurring pathogens. The
Chairman and I sit on the Intelligence Committee and we talk
about, you know, the vulnerabilities of bad actors, of bio
threats, et cetera. We ought to, as a Congress, in a
nonpartisan way, learn from the past but better prepare
ourselves for the future.
There were real successes as well. You know, I never
would've expected that we would get a vaccine--several vaccines
that were safe and efficacious within 12 months. We did it.
Some of that was because of prior investments in research at
the NIH and elsewhere. Can we get that from 12 months to 3
months?
Can we--the FDA successfully streamlined processes to get
biotherapeutics to market. What are lessons learned there? Can
we take some of those and actually use them to develop those
therapeutics and countermeasures fairly quickly?
I'm out of time. I can go on and on. But I would hope, as
we look forward, we actually do a real, objective analysis
without trying to point--we got things right, and we got things
wrong. Let's actually learn from that, and let's better prepare
for the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wenstrup. You know, I thank you, Dr. Bera. I'm going to
have to take a second to comment on your comment. Because I
agree with you tremendously. Yes, part of what we are doing
here--we had to look back. We can't look forward if we don't
look back and see how we can do things better. And I think you
just gave a very constructive approach to what can be done in
the future. And that's greatly appreciated. And I want people
to hear that.
This Committee is doing a lot of things. Sometimes there's
things people don't like, and sometimes there's things people
do like. But, nonetheless, it's, what are we doing going
forward?
And so, this has been an after-action review. Lessons
learned. And that's how you create the path forward. And I
think you touched on many of those things. And I thank you for
taking your time today to reflect on that.
I now recognize Dr. Miller-Meeks from Iowa for 5 minutes of
questions.
Dr. Miller-Meeks. Well, thank you very much, Chairman
Wenstrup.
And thank you to witnesses for testifying before the Select
Subcommittee today.
And I am going to dovetail a little bit on what my
colleagues just said.
Today being the last scheduled hearing for the Select
Subcommittee, this is my fourth year on this Select
Subcommittee. I would like to take a moment to thank Dr.
Wenstrup and his staff for their incredible leadership
throughout this Congress on investigating and evaluating the
Federal Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Under his direction, we have held key agencies and
witnesses accountable for their actions made during the
pandemic, fulfilling the Oversight and Accountability
Committee's mission to provide a check and balance on the role
and power of Washington, and a voice to the people it serves.
I'm really proud of the work that we have done, and I look
forward to another productive hearing. And, most importantly,
the majority of us on this Committee understood that our
mission was, in fact, to prepare for the next pandemic. And so,
what has been brought up by Dr. Wenstrup and Dr. Bera is
precisely that. I spent 24 years in the military, as well as a
practicing nurse, doctor, former director of the Iowa
Department of Public Health. And, if we don't look back on what
we did and do an after-action report, we don't know how to
buildupon what has gone before, what our errors were.
Dr. Walke, you are the director of the Office of the
Readiness and Response at the CDC where you support the
agency's effort to improve performance for public health
emergencies. And, as you likely know, as I just stated, I was
the director of the Department of Public Health, and I was a
practicing physician prior--before, after, and then prior to
coming to Congress.
And I thank Dr. Bera for his comments about origins. Yes,
we spent a lot of time on origins. But, even in 2020 as a
freshman Congressperson when the media and social media was
trying to portray this as a witch hunt, and it was useless, my
comments in 2021 are the same as they are today. It was
necessary to investigate origins because that's how we prepare
for the next pandemic.
We need to discuss immediate disclosure, which the Chinese
Community Party did not do and are required to do under
international law. We need to discuss lab safety, what type of
laboratory research occurs and what lab environments, and that
it's in the correct lab environment. And, No. 3, we need to
discuss the ethics of certain types of research, i.e., gain-of-
function research. So that's why those were important issues.
And, you know, my next question is going along this line on
how people were treated who engaged in conversations, not
conformity of thought. During the COVID-19 pandemic, I
administered vaccines to Iowans in all 24 counties in my
district but never supported any sort of vaccine mandate or
vaccine passport. And that's because I'm a physician first.
I was and still am critical of the CDC's messaging
surrounding vaccines during the pandemic, largely because it
inserted itself between the doctor-patient relationship, and it
discouraged patients from asking questions. It downplayed and,
in fact, refuted that there was infection-acquired immunity and
herd immunity. People were labeled as antivaxxers, radicals,
and called other demeaning terms simply for questioning whether
novel vaccines that had not been FDA approved were right for
them; or if they needed to be vaccinated if they'd already had
proven disease and immunity; or if, because of their age--and
we saw two of the expert--vaccine experts at the FDA resign
over the FDA's position.
So, as a result, we have seen increased rate of vaccine
hesitancy, which could have a detrimental impact on public
health, especially as we're entering flu season. In most of my
district, for example, rates of vaccine hesitancy are already
at 15 percent. And, as a state senator in 2019 and 2020, I can
tell you there were numerous bills entered and discussed about
prohibiting vaccines.
So, do you believe that the CDC's, I'll call it forceful,
to be diplomatic, guidance on COVID-19 vaccines, and lack of
detailed information on possible adverse outcomes, like when
they downplayed that there was myocarditis in young men, that
it's contributed to the increasing rates of vaccine hesitancy?
Dr. Walke. Thank you for the question. COVID vaccines have
really undergone the most rigorous safety monitoring of any
vaccine in history. And there are----
Dr. Miller-Meeks. I'm sorry. Please don't do that. Please
don't do that. I'm asking you, how is the CDC going to overcome
increasing vaccine hesitancy? And talking to people about the
most rigorous scientific protocol for COVID-19 vaccines is not
going to end that hesitancy. They have people they talk to in
their community. They have young people who have myocarditis.
We have people who were kicked out of the military because they
declined to get a vaccine when they didn't need it. I even was
advised, even though I had strong antibodies, to get the
booster. And I'm a physician and asking the physician, ``Why in
the world would you recommend this when you just tested my
antibodies?'' The purpose of vaccines is to confer immunity.
So, what is the CDC doing on vaccine hesitancy? Have you
worked with outside stakeholders and providers? And how are you
going to meaningfully reduce vaccine hesitancy?
Dr. Walke. We are working with a number of different
external groups to try to improve trust and try to overcome
vaccine hesitancy.
Vaccines are incredibly effective and the best defense. We
also believe that CDC makes recommendations for the general
public. But that relationship between the provider and the
patient is incredibly important to interpret that
recommendation from a public health agency----
Dr. Miller-Meeks. I would wholeheartedly agree, which is
what the CDC should have done and how they should have messaged
during the vaccine, to leave that between the doctor and
patient.
With that, I yield back. Thank you.
Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Mr. Mfume from Maryland for 5
minutes of questions.
Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank you and the Ranking Member for leading us through these
last 2 years of this Subcommittee. And I think it's fair to say
that Members on both sides of the aisle have had an opportunity
to express themselves but also an opportunity to listen to and,
at different points, appreciate the positions of other Members
of this Committee that may not be in line with ours.
I want to thank, in particular, the Ranking Member for
leading us toward a minority report, which as we know submitted
and carried the best thinking, the thoughts, and the position
of those of us on this side of the aisle. And just both of you
for the way you have worked together and the example that you
have put forward.
I always talk about real time when I get a chance to speak
here on this Committee. Because COVID was real time. And there
was no playbook. There were no real guidelines. And we learned,
and we made mistakes in real time.
The one thing that I do want to preface of my remarks is
that we must never, ever, ever forget the millions of people
who died here and all over this globe as a result of this
pandemic. We don't talk about them that much as we get further
and further away. But we cannot do an autopsy of what we went
through without mentioning the fact that so many lives, so many
families were and still are affected by this.
So, we have a special calling, I think, to find in a
bipartisan way those things that will help us in future years
as we look back on this. And it is important, in many respects,
since we are no longer in real time of a disease, that we do
that autopsy, do it the right way, and make sure that this
Congress, at least, leaves behind at the conclusion of the
Select Subcommittee, a path and a way forward, and a number of
suggestions and other things that will help us well into the
future.
Now, I think it's, for me at least, always important to
make sure that there is a public record established, and
sometimes it means through redundancy.
So, I want to speak directly to you, Dr. Walke, Dr. Tabak,
maybe Dr. Marston, and be a little redundant here. But
redundancy is important because, if, in fact, in your positions
and if, in fact, with the expertise that you bear, that you say
what you said prior to this meeting over the last several
years, but that you say it one more time.
So, Dr. Marston, Dr. Walke, give me, please, what you
believe is the way that we can, in this Nation, persuade the
public that approved vaccines are safe and effective while
taking into considerations the things that come up after the
issuance of those vaccines that call attention to special
groups or special circumstance that then ought to be rolled
into how we move forward. Either or both of you if you could.
Dr. Walke. Thank you for the question. Related to mistrust
around vaccines, a Federal agency like CDC can make
recommendations for vaccines and through--and with our other
agencies create the scientific base so that they are the best
defense against hospitalizations and death.
But I remember when I was in the emergency operation center
in 2000 watching the deaths climb. And then, when vaccines
became available, I saw the rates go down. And it was
tremendous. It was magnificent. But then the distrust and the
miscommunication around vaccines started, and we saw those
death rates plateau.
A Federal agency can only do so much. It requires
healthcare providers. And that relationship, it requires
communities, leaders in the communities, and various different
types of leaders actually to trust in leaders----
Mr. Mfume. Well, let me interrupt you here. I'm also trying
to get to what happens when there are new developments after
the issuance of a vaccine? The gentlewoman from Iowa spoke
about enlargement of the heart syndrome and how that was
believed to be affecting certain groups. When those types of
information come forward, how do you evolve then your
presentation of the evidence or of the vaccine? Because, if
not, there's going to be continue to be a great deal of
mistrust.
Dr. Walke. I'll start. Again, we have these adverse events,
surveillance systems in place to detect any adverse event. And
then we have other systems in place to try to see if there is a
cause, if myocarditis was related or not. And, once we have
that type of information, we try to push that out in various
ways, including the scientific publications but also through,
again, various state and local leaders to try to engage with
their communities.
Mr. Mfume. Is that what we did?
Dr. Walke. That is what--we had a multiprong approach to
try to communicate the risk related to vaccines. But, again, I
think we have a--there is a number of different communities in
our country, and we need to do better, I believe, at trying to
reach those communities to talk to them about what are some of
the issues they have with vaccine.
Mr. Mfume. Dr. Tabak----
Dr. Wenstrup. If we can, your time has expired, but I do
want to let Dr. Marston reply as well. I think it was a very
important question that you asked, and I would like to give you
opportunity to reply.
Dr. Marston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to.
So, the truth of the matter is that we worked quite closely
with the CDC on these matters. And the most important lesson, I
think, that we have learned is to show our work and explain our
work.
For example, when we see a safety signal in something like
VAERS, we're going to look in our multiple systems to see if
that actually is something that is plausibly related to the
vaccine. Where then, we then have multiple cases, taking those
analyses and put them into the published literature, we also
present them at advisory committees.
I think one of the things that we are also looking at is
that that's not good enough, right? So that reaches a certain
group of people. The people who are regularly reading the
medical literature, for example. We need to take it a step
further, right, and communicate those things on multiple levels
so that they're easy to understand.
So, one of the things that we've been doing is working with
the clinician community, trying to make sure that they're armed
digestible information that they can then relate at their
patients. Because, you know, people might not be listening to
the Federal Government, the public health agencies. I hope that
they will. But we also want to make sure that we're meeting
people where they are. And, if that's with their local
clinician with their physician, with their nurse, we want to
give those people the info they need.
Mr. Mfume. Thank you. Thank you for the extra time, Mr.
Chairman.
Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Mrs. Lesko from Arizona for 5
minutes of questions.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I ask
questions, I want to say thank you to the Chairman Wenstrup.
Both he and I are ending our careers in Congress, and so I
really appreciate all the work that you've done. I think this
has been a very important Committee, and thank you for inviting
me on it.
I also want to thank the other Members, including the
Ranking Member, Dr. Ruiz. It's been an honor serving with all
of you.
Now, I'm going to get to my question.
Dr. Tabak, I want to followup on what Chairman Comer asked
about and Dr. Morens. It does appear to me from previous
testimony and questions that our staff--that he violated rules,
whether that's FOIAs. He was trying to get around FOIAs. It
appears that he was trying to help EcoAlliance, EcoHealth
Alliance I should say. And why can't you fire him? I don't
understand why it hasn't happened already.
Dr. Tabak. We are following our process.
Mrs. Lesko. What is the process? How long does it take to
fire somebody?
Dr. Tabak. We follow our process.
Mrs. Lesko. What is the process?
Dr. Tabak. The individual is accorded the opportunity to be
present their side of the facts.
Mrs. Lesko. Right.
Dr. Tabak. An individual is then charged with making a
decision as to what should occur. Again, this is hypothetical,
of course, in terms of--I can't discuss any specific case.
Once that decision is provided to the individual staff
member, he or she is allowed to appeal that decision, and then
that goes to a second official for a final adjudication. So,
we're following our process, and that's what we're doing.
Mrs. Lesko. Has this process been started?
Dr. Tabak. I'm not allowed to discuss any specifics of the
process. Over----
Mrs. Lesko. Well, I hope you understand, sir, why, you
know, myself and the American public just don't--they think
this is not a good policy because.
For instance, in a regular company or business, if somebody
violated the rules, you just get fired. Right? And so that's
why I think some of the actions that are being taken with the
next Administration are probably happening because the American
public just don't understand why somebody who seems to have
clearly violated things, you know, the answer is just, ``We're
following the process.''
But my next question is actually for all of you in the
little over 2 minutes I have. The Americans have decreased
trust, less trust in the Federal health agencies after COVID.
And I want to know from each of you if you or your agencies
believe that you played a role in that, and if so how are you
going to change it?
Dr. Tabak. Well, since I have my mic on, I'll start. Of
course, this was a very fluid situation, as you, of course,
appreciate from your work on this Committee. And we understand
that we have to do a much, much better job of being more
transparent, of doing better communication, of getting into
communities, working with trusted partners in communities. You
just can't so-call parachute and expect people to benefit from
your wisdom. You have to have a real conversation with them in
a transparent manner.
Dr. Walke. I would agree with Dr. Tabak. Trust is critical
for a public health agency. There is a number of--the pandemic
was moving quickly. The virus was changing rapidly. We were
putting out a lot of guidance almost weekly. And it became very
difficult, even, to find the information that was needed on our
CDC.gov website. We have made changes. We try to be a lot more
transparent. We have streamlined, actually, our website by
about 60 percent. We tried to move to make it more plain
language so it's more accessible to the American public. So, we
acknowledge that there are challenges here, and we are
responding to them.
Dr. Marston. Yes, I would agree as well. I think one of the
things that we've been working on is how to work in concert
with individuals who are in other settings, clinical settings,
the individuals right before us right now, people who also have
the ear of the American people, and trying to make sure that
we're putting out information that is both high quality, up to
our scientific standards, and digestible.
Mrs. Lesko. Well, thank you all for your answers. I would
say that it is important to be more transparent--and that was
goes back to my question about Dr. Morens, I mean, just saying
procedures. Now maybe there's legal consequences. But that's
like not a very transparent answer in my view.
Also, I want to suggest to all of you, hopefully, you've
heard it before from me is that government mandates--that
backfired. I mean, I don't think there should be government
mandates at all. I don't think they should be suggested because
people don't trust the government. And so that made people less
trustful of the government in my view. And so, with that, I
yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Mr. Garcia from California
for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Robert Garcia of California. Thank you to our
witnesses. I want to thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member
of the Subcommittee for all of their work. And, obviously,
oftentimes Members on this body and Committee disagree. I think
it's important to recognize we lost 1.3 million Americans due
to the pandemic, our single largest loss of life event that
we've had in the modern era. There's over 3,000 people in my
own city of Long Beach died while I was the mayor right before
I got to Congress. Horrific experience to see what the pandemic
did for cities and communities across the country and, of
course, the world.
I want to note a couple of things as this is our closing.
This Committee, I think, one is--I'm hoping that there's two
critical changes that I think are really important on the
Federal level, bills that I've been working on. I want to note
this for all of you. I am very concerned that still the
Department of Health and Human Services does not have the same
emergency buying power the Department of Defense has.
When we went through the pandemic, much of the purchasing
of PPE and testing went through DOD because they have emergency
power to purchase in bulk and purchase and kind of cut the red
tape. That power does not exist for Health and Human Services,
where I personally and many others believe is where those
purchases and where that direction should be coming. It should
be coming HHS, not from DOD. At least it should have the same
purchasing power. So that's something that we're working on. We
have a bill on that.
The second issue I want to note for Members of the
Committee is we have to get to a point where we fully fund the
CDC's National Wastewater Surveillance System. I can't express
how important this is in preventing future pandemics. This is
woefully underfunded. And we have a huge opportunity to allow
and provide the CDC the resources they need to ensure that we
are using this incredible resource now and being able to track
viruses and pandemics to the future, and they were funding this
at its full level, and not actually cutting the CDC and this
program. So those are things that are very concerning to me.
And I want to say one other thing which I think is
important, my last opportunity. Dr. Tabak, I know you're with
the NIH. And I just wanted you to just briefly mention what the
NIH's responsibility is to prevent pandemics that this
Committee is working on?
Dr. Tabak. So, we support and conduct the research that
informs the actions of my colleagues on this panel. We do long-
term basic discovery to learn about viruses. We develop key
infrastructure so that we can be responsive in identifying
newly emergent organisms. We set up appropriate model systems
to test the efficacy of potential countermeasures. We have a
GMP manufacturing facility. And----
Mr. Garcia. And, Doctor, I would be correct to assume that
this is a completely nonpartisan organization. The work is
essential to our Nation's security and preparedness. I have met
folks that I have worked with at the NIH and immense respect
for the scientists, doctors, workers that are there. Would you
agree it's a completely nonpartisan type of work.
Dr. Tabak. Yes, we certainly are not.
Mr. Garcia. Then I want to just leave us a final thought.
I'm very, very concerned that someone that can be entrusted
with Nation's health--RFK, Jr.--has recently said, and I quote,
that he plans to have a big role in the administration as it
relates to health, and has just days ago pledged to gut the
NIH, firing hundreds of scientists and researchers on day one.
[Chart shown.]
Mr. Garcia. And I am going to show--this is from ABC News--
the headline that just appeared a few days ago. If we're
talking about pandemic preparedness--and with all due respect
to the Committee and the work--the fact that we're considering
to bring somebody on with no scientific or medical credentials,
who has falsely claimed for decades that vaccines cause autism,
who has quite frankly said just outrageous comments about
science and medicine, that this person would come in to gut the
NIH, I think is shameful. I think it's shameful.
And, Ms. Greene, you can clap all you want. But it is
shameful; it's dangerous. And, if this Committee is about
pandemic prevention, we should be very concerned as a country
that RFK, Jr. could be put in charge of health when he is a
vaccine denier and has caused great harm to the American
public.
I want to say just, finally, that I'm very concerned that
someone that wants to gut the NIH, HHS, and other services
could be put in charge of health, of any kind, in this country.
So, I want to thank you, sir, for your service at the NIH
and for all of the witnesses that are here.
And, with that I yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Mr. Cloud from Texas for 5
minutes of questions.
Mr. Cloud. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you all for being
here to discuss the lessons learned throughout the COVID
pandemic. Together you all represent the bulk of the
government's response to COVID, or you represent the agencies
that were bulk of the response. And the American people are
very concerned about the government's response, you know. There
was a lot of understanding in the first couple of weeks that
this was novel, and we had to figure it out. But, once the
outbreak kept going, we saw attempts to cover up failures. We
saw blatantly politicized policymaking. We saw Americans
getting deceptive advice while their civil liberties were being
trampled on. Federal public health agencies promoted school
closures that caused long-term learning loss and mental health
problems. Forced mask mandates on toddlers in the face of all
scientific evidence to the contrary. Threatening Americans with
the loss of their livelihood. Their businesses were closed if
they declined new--any experimental vaccine. Along with many,
many, many other grievances that the people would have in the
response that we had.
Now, we got together on Tuesday just so the Chairman can
let us know that this hearing was going to happen, and someone
asked the question and said, ``What do you think the lessons
learned are going to be in the testimony?'' And I kind of
jokingly replied, ``Well, I'm guessing like every other agency
that makes a mistake or has failures in the Federal Government,
they'll probably come and same, 'Well, we need more money and
more authorities.' '' And that's by and large what the
testimony was today. And I'm not saying those discussions don't
need to happen at some point. I mean, it would be very suitable
for the Appropriations Committee. But what we didn't see was an
answer to these questions that remain outstanding for the
American people. And, in an effort to rebuild trust, it's very
important that we answer these questions.
Dr. Tabak, I wanted ask you one of the things that we--that
came up in much of our testimony--Dr. Fauci and Dr. Collins
both indicated to this Committee that, even though their
signatures appear on every grant, basically the process is that
you have people researching the grants, right, at a lower
level, and basically they put it before a committee or a peer-
review committee that receives a priority score. Then it goes
to an advisory council. And then it goes to--at the time it was
Dr. Fauci, for example, when we were talking about the NIH
grant.
Now, this is one of many cases. I've seen this in agency
after agency after agency. These are supposed to be multiple
levers of accountability. And what happens is Dr. Fauci, for
example, said, ``Well, yes, my name's on it, but, you know, I
don't have time to read every grant.'' And that's kind of
understandable. Well, then who is responsible for it? Well,
it's this Committee. Well, this Committee votes on it. Like
block grants to the tune of even sometimes a hundred grants at
the same time. They don't actually read it either.
And so, we end up having these supposed multiple layers of
accountability that turn into multiple layers of plausible
deniability. So, nobody ends up being held to account. And so,
when we're talking about lessons learned, these are the kind of
systemic things within agencies that I would like to hear: What
are we doing to fix these things? What are we doing to make
sure that we don't tread on people's civil rights again? What
are we doing to make sure that we don't threaten the licenses
of medical professionals who are experts in the field that
might have a different view?
These are the kind of things that I'm wondering, how are we
going to make sure that the government stays in check so that
we can begin to restore the trust in the American people?
Can you speak to the grants system, and has anything been
done about that? Because I brought this up in several Committee
hearings since then.
Dr. Tabak. So, again, you described the way grants are
reviewed.
Mr. Cloud. That's my point, though. My point is that needs
to change. So, you know, we brought this up in a number of
Committee hearings how broke this process is. Are you doing
anything to fix those things? Are you doing anything to fix
these other--before you come in and ask is for money, we still
have a guy who committed perjury before Congress who is still
there. Now I understand some of that's statutory, and maybe we
can work together to streamline that process. So, I'm not
putting that on you.
But, when it comes to like we're going to ask the American
people to fund some of these ideas you have, right, I am
concerned about the government having more data I will say. But
what can we do in--I mean, feel free any of you jump in, to fix
these systemic problems so we can--before we go ask the
American people to fund this, what are we doing to fix the
issues that tread on their rights, that took their jobs, that
failed their businesses, that took their medical license, all
these sorts of things.
Dr. Walke. Thank you. I would just start and say that we
have reflected and looked at our internal processes and made a
number of operational changes, including related to revamping
our communication. I talked about trying to clean up our
website and make it more accessible. We've improved our test
development process and had better partnerships with the
private sector. We actually have mechanisms in place now where
the H5N1, we are trying to work with other partners, with
private industries and develop new tests for H5N1 and for
Oropouche.
We've refined our guidance processes in the way we're
sharing with external partners and trying to make standardized
across all of CDC and internal to CDC. When we deployed staff
all around the Nation, we had difficulty with the way we did
that. So, we have actually changed the way we actually are
deploying our staff. And so, all of our staff are moving toward
operational readiness, readiness to respond. So, we have made a
number of changes at CDC.
Mr. Cloud. My time is up.
Dr. Wenstrup. I will allow anyone else to answer that.
Dr. Tabak. Again, the changes we have made are to enhance
our oversight of the awarded grants. Because where we ran it
into difficulties was the failure to catch certain things along
the way with the application that we, you know, talked a lot
about in these hearings. And so, we do have now more fail-safe
signals within our system to prevent oversight of not having a
progress report done in a timely manner, making sure that it's
reviewed in a timely manner, and ensuring that we can't refund
the grant if all the progress reports haven't been received and
reviewed and signed off on. Those are the types of things that
we've done.
Dr. Marston. Sure. We've certainly taken a look at number
of our practices throughout the pandemic. We've been building
on what's worked and moving away from things that are maybe not
as effective.
So, for example, trying to make sure that we are as
transparent as we can be in our reviews, putting our work out.
But then building on that and not just putting out a memo
that's, you know, digestible to a certain portion of
population, but actually taking that a step further and doing
that actually in concert with our colleagues at the CDC.
Second, Emergency-Use Authorizations. Now everybody knows
about EUAs. But, coming into the pandemic, they had really been
used for Zika and Ebola diagnostics for the most part. So, we
learned a lot about Emergency-Use Authorizations, and the
importance of communicating early and often with manufacturers
and putting out our thinking in advance so they weren't
guessing about what we would need to see.
And then, third, as I said, supply chain. We have learned
lessons about the gaps that we have in our understanding of
where products are coming from and the vulnerability that that
creates for the healthcare system.
Dr. Wenstrup. If I can just add to that. I think it's
important for discussion. I think it's in line with what Mr.
Cloud was saying. You know, in some ways, through testimony
from people involved, you know it would be like me signing a
prescription I haven't read. That's a problem. That's a
problem. The buck has to stop somewhere. And these are things
that I think we really need to fix.
I now recognize Ms. Tokuda from Hawaii for 5 minutes of
questions.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, during the pandemic, medical countermeasures like
diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics were essential for
responding to COVID-19 and saving lives. Research and
investment into developing these medical countermeasures even
before COVID-19 hit our shores, quite frankly, gave our public
health workers the critical tools they needed to keep pace with
the virus.
So, with that in mind, I'd like to discuss efforts by your
agencies to lay the groundwork for rapid medical countermeasure
development for if and when, quite frankly, the next pandemic
strikes.
Dr. Tabak or Dr. Walke, what kind of research are you folks
doing investing to prepare in the next generation of medical
countermeasures for future novel viruses? And, quite honestly,
are we already behind the curve due to cuts and misinformation
that were experienced during the previous administration? Are
there concerns about public acceptance of these countermeasures
when they need to be executed as a result of a lot of the
disinformation that we've also seen?
Dr. Tabak. Perhaps I'll start. So, the first step is you
have to identify the offending pathogen, and you have to invest
in representative viruses from nine different viral families in
order to cover the landscape of viruses that are circulating
the globe. And, once you do that and learn as much as possible
about them and understand their lifestyle, you can begin to
think about where you can intervene through so-called
countermeasures. So that's a big part of what NIH does. We
develop model systems so that potential countermeasures can be
rapidly developed. And then, of course, we stand up clinical
trial networks to ultimately see if there is efficacy of
proposed countermeasures in humans. But let me turn it to my
colleague now.
Dr. Walke. A couple of comments. CDC's role in medical
countermeasure development is more on the back end after
actually have medical countermeasures through clinical trials,
and then they're introduced to the public. We do a lot of work
on vaccine effectiveness, real-world vaccine effectiveness
around the Nation. And so, we stood up those networks quickly
to try to understand the effectiveness in various populations
related to the vaccine. And we do similar work actually with
other medical countermeasures.
Ms. Tokuda. Now very briefly because I have limited time
here. Knowing that what we know now as a result of going
through the COVID pandemic, do you feel that we are on track in
terms of really understanding those potential offending
pathogens and where we need to be--when, quite frankly, that
next pandemic could strike, are we prepared to be able to
execute with fidelity to the public that would be accepting of
these countermeasures as well? Just say yes or no if, right
now, are we prepared for what will come next given our current
capacity?
Dr. Tabak. We're better prepared.
Dr. Walke. We're more prepared than we were. Absolutely.
Ms. Tokuda. OK. So, we're more prepared right now. I will
tell you I am very concerned, as Representative Garcia
mentioned, that the incoming administration is already
proposing to streamline NIH, including restructuring the
agency's budget and bypassing its intense peer-review system,
all critical to really create these countermeasures that we are
talking about that will save lives. I'm very concerned that any
attempt to overhaul our Federal agencies in this matter will
result in the loss of our best and brightest scientists, and
threaten the quality and integrity of our agencies' research
and ability to execute to a public that needs to hear from the
very best and brightest in our country.
Dr. Tabak, how important are sustained Federal Investments,
not funding cuts, but sustained Federal investments and public
trust in science and scientists to your agencies' work in
preparing for future health threats. Just a brief response.
Dr. Tabak. History has shown that the sustained investment
is what attracts people to biomedical research and keeps them
into the biomedical research work force.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you.
And, Dr. Marston, how would funding cuts, coupled with
anti-science and anti-vaccine sentiment affect FDA's work in
responding to future health emergencies?
Dr. Marston. Well, I think that one of the things that
we've seen through the course of the pandemic is how stretched
that we were pulling from every corner of the FDA. Funding cuts
will result in exacerbation of that.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you. So honestly we need quite a bit more
resources and capacity to really combat what will ultimately be
on the horizon for us.
And, while I've appreciated the forward-looking focus of
this hearing, I must point out that the incoming administration
poses a serious threat to undo all of the progress that our
witnesses have discussed with us today.
Under the false pretense of making America healthy again,
President-elect Trump and RFK, Jr., have committed to an
extreme agenda that promises to hamstring our Federal health
agencies and the essential work to keep Americans safe. We
cannot let that happen. And I urge my House Republican
colleagues who have spoken in favor of public health and
pandemic readiness today to stand against the dangerous agenda
and support critically needed investments, not cuts, in
pandemic preparedness.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Dr. Joyce from Pennsylvania
for 5 minutes of questions.
Dr. Joyce. Thank you, Chairman Wenstrup, and Dr. Ruiz,
Ranking Member, for convening this important hearing and to our
witnesses for testifying.
During this Committee's investigation of the Federal
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, it has become abundantly
clear that throughout the pandemic, many decisions and many
statements made by public health officials were not based on
science. When Federal officials manipulate or ignore data in
order to fit a narrative, it fractures the trust between the
American people and our public health leaders, and it hinders
our response to developing an adequate ability to address
potential future pandemics. And the trust, we all recognize
from this investigation, from these hearings, has been
fractured.
During the rollout of the COVID-19 vaccine, then CDC
Director Dr. Rochelle Walensky reported that according to data
vaccinated individuals both did not carry the virus and that
they did not get sick. This is not consistent with what
clinical trials and real-world data showed, which is that,
while the vaccines can be somewhat effective, vaccinated
individuals still carry the virus, and vaccinated individuals
still can become sick, and vaccinated individuals can still
transmit the COVID-19 virus.
Dr. Marston, in order to prevent misleading statements,
such as the ones that were made by Dr. Walensky, how can the
FDA more effectively communicate the conclusions of clinical
data used to approve new vaccines?
Dr. Marston. Well, I appreciate your question. And, first,
I'd like to say these vaccines--no medical intervention is
perfect. And I think it's been said to this Committee before
that drinking too much water can cause water toxicity, right?
And we just have to recognize that. That being said, these
vaccines----
Dr. Joyce. We're not talking about water and water
toxicity. We're talking misinformation.
Dr. Marston. So, I think each medical intervention needs to
be taken one by one. Look at the benefits of those and the
risks of those. So, the benefits of these vaccines are very
important, right? We believe that there would have been an
additional 3.2 million deaths had the vaccine not been rolled
out. Incredibly important, hospitalizations on top of that.
We also need to recognize and be transparent about the
risks that are there. So, for example, we discussed some of the
work that we do trying to put out our analyses of risks that
we're seeing in our various data bases, putting those into the
public literature, the published literature; we have done that
on a series of recent cases.
For example, in the New England Journal, in the CDC's MMWR.
So, we try to make sure that we're putting out that information
in our latest thinking on a regular basis.
Dr. Joyce. So, you talk about that collaboration.
Dr. Walke, are the CDC and the FDA regularly communicating
and sharing information in order to ensure that CDC vaccine
guidance is consistent with the scientific evidence and the
clinical data that the FDA is using to review and approve new
vaccines?
Dr. Walke. CDC and FDA have a close working collaboration.
Dr. Joyce. How often does that occur?
Dr. Walke. We're a large organization, and so we
different----
Dr. Joyce. Is it daily? Is it weekly? Is it twice a week?
You talk about a close collaboration. I just need to know, as a
Member of Congress, how close is that collaboration?
Dr. Walke. During the COVID response----
Dr. Joyce. How close is it now? We're talking about being
prepared. How close is that collaboration?
Dr. Walke. It's very close.
Dr. Joyce. Again, timeline. We need that information.
Dr. Walke. On a weekly basis.
Dr. Joyce. And these are weekly meetings? Is there face-to-
face meetings that you hold on a regular weekly basis?
Dr. Walke. At various levels of our organizations, we do
meet on a regular basis.
Dr. Joyce. I find ``regular'' to be a really broad reaching
term. And, by failing to effectively communicate the clinical
data and the results behind the COVID-19 vaccines, the CDC and
the FDA have contributed to growing vaccine hesitancy among the
American people, including from routine childhood vaccinations.
The culpability lies within your agencies. And the responsible
stewardship of Federal funds is critical to the American trust
in public institutions. And, unfortunately, the NIH and the
NIAD have completely failed to exercise effective oversight of
EcoHealth Alliance when they receive grant funding for research
of novel coronavirus, which was conducted at the Wuhan
Institute of Virology.
Dr. Tabak, how is the NIH improving oversight of grant
funding to ensure the failure seen like the EcoHealth Alliance
would never happen again?
Dr. Tabak. We have restated the requirement that
subawardees, which was an example of Wuhan Institute of
Virology, are required to provide all data in a timely manner.
We have made it clear to our staff that progress reports need
to be reviewed in a timely manner and have put so-called red
flags in our automated systems to ensure that a grant can't be
renewed if there's an outstanding that has not been reviewed or
re----
Dr. Joyce. Please define defining manner----
Dr. Tabak. Say it again?
Dr. Joyce. Please define what is in a timely fashion?
You've said that twice to me. What is a timely fashion? A
response before the computer puts up a red flag.
Dr. Tabak. The timing for this is--when you are coming to
the conclusion of a year's period of funding, you are supposed
to provide a progress report. And I believe the window is 2
months. I would have to get back to you.
Dr. Joyce. Please get back to us. Because you're saying, at
the end of a year, you're given an additional 60 days to be
considered providing timely information?
Dr. Tabak. That's correct because it allows you assemble
all the----
Dr. Joyce. What happens if they don't?
Dr. Tabak. And that's the point. Now----
Dr. Joyce. Indeed, it is the point. What happens if that is
not provided?
Dr. Tabak. Then they are contacted. We try and find out
what is the hang-up. And, if they don't provide it, then they
cannot get the next amount of funding.
Dr. Joyce. I think it's clear in the aftermath of our
Federal COVID-19 response, you need to do a lot of work.
There's significant work to be done to repair the trust between
the American people and our public health infrastructure. And,
in order to earn that trust, public health officials must learn
from these large mistakes. And it is my hope that the work of
this Subcommittee will help identify a path forward when
responding to the next public health emergency. My time has
expired.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Ms. Ross from North Carolina
for 5 minutes of questions.
Ms. Ross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Ranking Member.
And thank you so much to our witnesses for joining us
today. Your agencies' tireless work over the past 4 years
allowed us to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic and its
devastating impacts on the health and the economy of our
Nation. I would like to discuss these efforts a bit--in a bit
more detail so that we can continue to identify essential
lessons for ongoing work of pandemic prevention and
preparedness.
I'm not going to ask Dr. Tabak about the NIH's work on the
vaccine because I think that's been covered. But I would like
to again remind everybody that, according to one estimate, the
COVID-19 vaccine has saved more than 3 million lives and
prevented more than 18.5 million hospitalizations.
But I would like to turn to Dr. Marston about how the FDA
has continued work to review and approve updated COVID-19
vaccines to help keep Americans safe from new variants as they
go about their day-do-day lives.
Dr. Marston. Thanks so much for the question. We have been
working in concert with the CDC and their surveillance system
to understand the viral evolution and its potential impact on
vaccine related immunity. We have, on a regular basis, had our
advisory committee meet and look at that information, advising
us on what the composition of an additional vaccine should be.
We have seen in repeated studies that those booster
immunizations are important and that they are saving lives.
One study in Denmark, for example, showed that individuals
who had gotten a boost at the time of the XBB variant had one
quarter the rate of hospitalizations of those who did not. Very
important public health intervention.
Ms. Ross. Thank you very much. And, moving to the CDC, we
know that the CDC played an essential role in the rollout of
the COVID-19 vaccine, which got hundreds of millions of shots
in arms and amounted to the largest vaccination campaign in our
Nation's history. Of course, we need to encourage people get
those boosters now too. So, if you haven't gotten your booster,
please get your booster before the holidays.
But Dr. Walke, how did the CDC work on the COVID-19
campaign and use that campaign to reach into communities to
allow us to reopen as quickly as possible?
Dr. Walke. Thank you for the question. Eighty percent of
CDC's funding from Congress on the domestic side goes out to
states to build state and local infrastructure and
preparedness. Those states actually do a risk assessment and
try to identify those populations that are at greatest risk
when there is an emerging threat. They also do a number of
different exercises to try to distribute that last mile of
medical countermeasures. And so, we activate it. There are
state and local relationships and that infrastructure to try to
distribute the COVID vaccine. We also do a lot of work, as I've
talked about before, related to vaccine effectiveness. And that
was another key role, real-world effectiveness, that CDC
played.
We did see that it was difficult to reach some populations
more than others. And so, understanding where those communities
at greatest risk were, who are being affected, who were hard to
reach, really that relationship between local and state health
departments with CDC was invaluable to try to identify those
pockets where vaccine was not being distributed and then to
quickly try to rectify that situation.
Ms. Ross. Thank you for that. And I clearly saw that in my
home state of North Carolina. And now, of course, we have Dr.
Cohen at the CDC.
I also want to express how grateful I am for the CDC's
efforts to take lessons learned during the pandemic through the
Moving Forward Initiative and use them to inform future-
oriented policies that will leave the country better prepared
for the next pandemic.
To ensure and continue these critical preparedness efforts,
Congress must act to provide additional support to our public
health infrastructure. While public health emergencies can
trigger critical supplemental funding for agencies, the funding
structure is not conducive to preventing future pandemics.
For example, CDC jump-started an innovative wastewater
surveillance program during the pandemic through the use of
emergency supplemental funds. Once this funding dries up, the
agency will no longer have the resources to continue this
program. We must ensure that tools like this are fixtures of
our public health strategy rather than waiting for emergent
situations to implement them.
Another key area that the CDC has focused on is improving
our disease testing infrastructure. To enhance these efforts,
Congress must act to improve the supply of medical laboratory
personnel, a profession that played an indispensable role
during the worse days of the pandemic and is currently facing a
serious work force shortage.
I proudly introduced, and Dr. Bera has joined me in it, the
Medical Laboratory Personnel Shortage Relief Act of 2024, which
would do just that. It's clear that Congress can take steps to
complement the tremendous efforts made by our public health
agencies to ensure that we're ready for the next pandemic.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
I now recognize Ms. Greene from Georgia for 5 minutes of
questions.
Ms. Greene. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This Committee hearing
today is titled ``Preparing for the Next Pandemic: Lessons
Learned and the Path Forward.''
I think one of the greatest lessons that has been learned
here is the government and its powerful agencies should never
use the American people's hard-earned tax dollars to create
viruses that can be unleashed on the world like COVID-19 was.
This led to killing millions of people all over the world.
COVID-19 was funded using the gain of function in a bio lab
in China, and then it was lied about. Dr. Fauci lied to the
American people, abusing his power and position and role, very
powerful role paid for by the American tax people. He lied, and
many, many people died. Not only that, schools were shut down.
People's jobs were shut down. Employment was ended. Small
businesses were shut down. Life as everyone knew it was shut
down. This caused violations of people's First Amendment
rights, freedom of speech, freedom of religion. People couldn't
even go to the beach.
Then suicides hit record highs. And the saddest thing is
there were record suicide rates seen among children and a
mental health crisis released on Americans like never before.
Now there's massive delays in education and loss of
learning. What was absolutely repulsive is the forced masking
requirements of children. Children were not at risk of being
hospitalized or dying from COVID-19, yet children became one of
the worst victims of the malpractice and abuse of power by your
agencies and by people in charge in many cities, states, and
the government. It was absolutely horrendous.
But then there were doctors that came out with treatments
using ivermectin, zinc, vitamin D, and it was labeled horse
paste. And those doctors were attacked and criticized and
called conspiracy theorists. Yet, while those doctors were
actually saving lives, these other patients were being forced
into the hospital, put on respirators, and were actually dying.
My own personal doctor never lost one single patient by
prescribing ivermectin and this other protocol. As a matter of
fact, he saved people's lives. Thank God he did that.
The CDC even changed the definition of ``vaccine.'' The FDA
approved an experimental vaccine through a rushed approval
process that suppressed trials and data that showed that
vaccines didn't work and had side effects that even caused
death.
Fifteen pages of known side effects the FDA wanted sealed
for 75 years. What were they hiding and lying about to the
American people? Well, we know now.
Vaccines have been mandated on the population in order to
work, go to school, and live as functioning citizens in the
United States. Yet people who reported vaccine injuries and
deaths on the VAERS system were ignored; they were mocked; they
were called conspiracy theorists; and they were canceled on
social media when they tried to tell about the horrifying
things that were happening to them or their family members.
The White House even accused the unvaccinated of killing
people, calling it a pandemic of the unvaccinated. And they
said we'll bring a winter of death for yourselves, families,
and hospitals.
But guess what? Vaccines didn't work. And those that were
vaccinated, boosted, continued to catch COVID. Our own
President, President Biden even tested positive for COVID-19
after this summer's Presidential debate. That is unbelievable.
And I can tell you, when you talk about vaccine hesitancy, as
one sitting before you that never took the COVID vaccine, nor
will I take it--thank God--I'm so glad I didn't take it--yes,
this vaccine hesitancy has risen to new heights. And I can tell
you right now, I'll stand here and represent all the Americans
that do not ever want to be forced to take another vaccine that
the government is telling us to take after they created a
deadly virus. I can tell you right now, I'll also represent all
the Americans that never want their children to be forced to be
vaccinated.
Currently, right now, the CDC is recommending the children
as young as 6 months have two doses of the Moderna COVID-19
vaccine or three doses of the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine. So,
vaccine manufacturers continue to make billions and billions of
dollars on a vaccine that doesn't work being forced on
children, innocent children that don't even need it because
they aren't at risk of being hospitalized or dying from this
vaccine.
Not only that, vaccines need to be investigated further.
The rise of autism, learning disabilities, neurological
problems, and so much more that children are suffering from
today absolutely is being forced upon these children and their
families because of these vaccines.
This Committee should have investigated the vaccines, and
it was a failure to not do so. This has literally been a war on
the American people's health, the world's health, but also a
war on our children's health. It's a war that has been waged on
them by our government, Big Pharma, who's making all the money.
Preparing for the next pandemic is actually recognizing
that the last pandemic resulted in crimes against humanity.
People that perpetuated and continue to perpetuate these crimes
need to be prosecuted. And that needs to be starting in the
next administration. And I'm pretty sure our next Attorney
General will do that. And I look forward to seeing that happen.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.
Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Dr. McCormick from Georgia
for 5 minutes of questions.
Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. May I say it's been a
pleasure working with you on this Committee, as well as in
Congress. I wish you all the best in your new endeavors.
When this pandemic began, I wasn't in Congress. As a matter
of fact, when this pandemic ended, I still wasn't in Congress.
I was serving in the emergency department in the Atlanta
suburbs as an ER doc doing night shifts the entire pandemic.
From beginning to end, we learned some things. And I am
going to ask you in a very concise way to state what you
learned during this pandemic. Because we come to an end. And
really this whole Committee has been about what we learned. I
hope we have learned some valuable lessons, and we can admit
humbly where we made mistakes. I know doctors made a lot of
mistakes in treating patients.
So, very briefly, Dr. Walke, what did the CDC learn? And
make that in 30 seconds, if you can, just an overview. What
really did you learn that you did wrong?
Dr. Walke. Thank you for the question.
We learned a number of things through COVID. We learned
that, as the virus changed, we needed to also put out a lot of
different guidance. And, unfortunately, our guidance was more
technical than--the public actually had difficulty
understanding. And so, we've actually made some changes to try
to streamline that guidance and make it more understandable for
the American public.
Dr. McCormick. Would you say that you could've admitted
maybe to making some mistakes in interpreting the data and the
science?
Dr. Walke. You know, the COVID pandemic----
Dr. McCormick. I hope you'll say the right answer, because
it's going to be really important to the follow-on
conversation.
Dr. Walke. The COVID pandemic happened over multiple years.
We certainly made mistakes during that time.
Dr. McCormick. Thank you.
Dr. Walke. We quickly tried to rectify those mistakes, and
we learned and tried to get better throughout the response. And
we continue to do so. We revamped our communication, as I've
said. We've improved our test development process. We've
refined our guidance----
Dr. McCormick. Didn't want to know what you did better; I
want to know what you did wrong. Because that's how we learn,
right? I understand what you did better because we admit to our
mistakes.
How about the NIH, Mr. Tabak? What did the NIH learn that
we did wrong?
Dr. Tabak. We didn't take hold of all of our clinical-trial
networks early on in the pandemic. And, as a result, a number
of underpowered trials were conducted, and that sort of
siphoned away the capacity to do the larger trials that were
ultimately necessary. That was one thing.
A second thing is, we learned that we needed to forge
relationships with industry much sooner to make sure that we
could take advantage of all of their knowledge as we, you know,
considered different potential countermeasures.
Dr. McCormick. OK. Thank you, both of you.
You know, as an ER doc who basically got exposed to a
deadly virus, saw patients who were sick, watched patients die,
watched the science evolve, and watched my fellow physicians
get criticized the whole time by people who were not treating
people, that hurt me a lot. And I think it really decreased the
credibility of people who call themselves scientists, who
didn't even have science at the time; they had guesses. And
they were guessing and outmaneuvering the physicians who were
treating the patients and doing their very best.
I'll tell you a few things that I learned as somebody who
lived through this from the physician/treatment side.
First of all, the CDC gave blanket recommendations that
were not scientific at times, quite frankly. Because we didn't
have science; we didn't know. But they still gave
recommendations that superseded what doctors could do. And it
made people either not trust their doctors or not trust the
CDC. You had to choose sides then. That's wrong. It became--
instead of scientific, it became politically driven, in my
opinion.
I also think that we fell very short in accountability and
transparency at the NIH. I think the way we do our grant
system, and the way that we're trying to come up with the right
answers according to who protects NIH rather than who protects
the people, in my opinion, based on the relevant evidence that
we've received while we're here.
But, mostly, as in any crisis--doesn't matter if it's
banking, housing, climate change, or disease--we should be
hesitant to turn to government for the answers. Bureaucrats and
politicians are not experts and should never be allowed to
infringe upon our inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.
Even when it's scary, we have the right to self-determine.
We, as Americans, must always protect freedom, whether that be
in our protecting of ourselves, which has consequences of
possibly income or travel, or also allowing people to pursue
education, transportation, or the best interests of their
business even if that requires risking their own health or
income. That is America. That is the promise, not of security,
but of opportunity that exists nowhere else in the world.
Your discussion should be with your doctor, not intruded
upon by the government that thinks they know better than both
the doctor and the patient.
We saw how easy it is for the government to take away our
rights, to make our lives miserable, if we don't comply, so
that, as Dr. Fauci said, ``We lose our ideological bullshit,''
quote, in order to get the favor of a government that is ruling
instead of serving. That's what I've learned.
Instead of turning to government for the answers, we allow
people to determine with their healthcare professionals what is
best. And, by the way, we may not agree, and that's OK. The
government should never determine who's right and wrong.
Science, experience, and treatments determine what ends up
being right and wrong, and it's a learning process that should
never be intruded by the government.
With that, sir, I yield. God bless you. Thank you for this
Committee. And let's go forth and do great things.
Dr. Wenstrup. I thank the gentleman. I am reminded of a
Teddy Roosevelt quote. He said, ``It's not the critic who
counts but the man in the arena.'' Thank you for being in the
arena during this difficult time for our country and the world.
I'd now like to yield to Ranking Member Ruiz for a closing
statement if he would like one.
Dr. Ruiz. Thank you.
I, too, want to pause and remember the millions of people
who died due to the pandemic and their families who mourn,
including some of the Members that sit up on this dais who lost
their families, members in the audience, perhaps even our
expert witnesses and staff who are here. It is very important
that we keep front and center and remember them always.
When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, it gripped our Nation with
uncertainty. We knew little about this novel virus, about the
way it spread, the danger it posed, and the damage it would
inflict on our communities. But it was during this time of
significant uncertainty when one thing became increasingly
clear: Our Nation was not where it needed to be when it came to
pandemic preparedness and response.
But with rapid and sustained deployment of COVID-19
vaccines and therapeutics and robust public health investments
in the American Rescue Plan, we left the darkest days of the
pandemic behind us.
This is thanks in large part to the dedicated and
hardworking members of our Nation's health agencies. I want to
offer my thanks again to our witnesses here today representing
some of those agencies and sharing with us the tireless work
they are doing to prevent and prepare for the next pandemic.
I want to make it very clear to the scientists, who never
wanted to delve into politics, who went pre-med and not
political science; I want to send a message to the lab
technicians that work in your agencies; I want to send a
message to the administrators who, day-in and day-out, want to
do the right thing for the mission that your agencies pose; I
want to say thank you. You are not the enemy, and you should
never be demonized. Your work is valuable. Your work is
appreciated. And your work is what is keeping our country safe.
And there will be help, and there will be recognition of
that work, and there will be a positive way forward from this.
So hang tight, buckle up, believe in your work. Know you that
are appreciated by millions of people in this country,
regardless of the demonizations and the disinformation that's
out there and the misinformation that's out there. You're doing
good work. So, I want to thank you.
And know that--keep your integrity, keep your character,
and do the right thing. We have seen and investigated
individuals here that veered from doing the right thing, and
that is not acceptable. So, what you're doing in doing the
right thing, being transparent and open, is what's going to
help us through to the next pandemic.
So--and that is why--this is thanks, what we've been able
to accomplish, in large part to the dedicated and hardworking
members of our Nation's health agencies. And I want to offer my
thanks again to our witnesses here today representing some of
those agencies and sharing with us the tireless work that they
are doing to prevent and prepare for the next pandemic.
Last Congress, Democrats led the House in taking meaningful
steps toward bolstering our pandemic preparedness and response
capabilities with passage of the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2023.
Included in this law were bipartisan provisions from the
PREVENT Pandemics Act, which made several significant reforms
to help ensure we are better prepared when a future pandemic
strikes. These reforms acted to advance our Nation's biosafety
and biosecurity, revitalize our public-health work force,
prevent undue foreign influence in biomedical research, and
enhance our Strategic National Stockpile.
We didn't focus on these during these last 2 years. We
didn't really have a conversation about the positive work that
has resulted from that--from these laws from last Congress and
how they're being implemented. We didn't dive into the positive
things that we learned from the lessons learned.
So, I just really want to highlight them there, that there
is a whole other section of actual work that's being done. And
there still needs to be oversight, there still needs to be
collaboration, there still needs to be a discussion of all
those changes so that we can make sure it moves in that right
direction and, in fact, that we keep them, given all the recent
threats that we've heard today.
Because, ultimately, these policies have charted the course
of a more efficient, streamlined pandemic response for the
future, and they have shown what we can do when we come
together constructively to protect Americans' health and save
lives. And we must work to continue these efforts to strengthen
our supply chains, develop new vaccines, and stay on the
cutting edge with advanced therapeutics.
As an emergency physician and a public health expert,
developing forward-looking solutions that help our Nation
better prevent and prepare for future public-health crises
continues to be my top priority.
So, I hope that today's hearing serves as a reminder of the
important work that our Federal health agencies do for the
American public--it's imperfect, but it's important, and the
results have shown for itself, since we are no longer in the
throes of this pandemic--and that Congress will continue to
support this work, rather than manufacturing distrust or
throwing conspiratorial accusations in our safety systems and
public health as a whole.
And before I end, I know we'll have another session, but
I'm going to take advantage here and thank this hell of a guy,
Miles Lichtman, the director on the Democratic staff team,
Alicia Yass, Dani Walker, and Joseph Romero, who have done
incredible work, who I'm extremely proud of, who have only made
me a better person and a better leader and have done extremely,
extremely important work for the American people. And I want to
thank you all individually.
And I also want to thank the Republican staff. I have seen
firsthand the dedication during some of our travels and work
that we've done. I know your heart's in the right place. Thank
you.
I yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Dr. Ruiz.
In closing, I'd like to thank our panelists once again for
your important and insightful testimony here today. I thought
this was a very good hearing.
I would like to thank you, Dr. Walke, Dr. Marston, Dr.
Tabak, for coming here today to testify at this final hearing
of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic. We
greatly appreciate your insight, and hope that we all will
continue to work on improving our future pandemic response and
that we continue to learn from our past shortcomings.
I had several reasons for not running for office again.
Amongst them, when I was given this responsibility, was, I
wanted it to be seen that I am not here on a political purpose
or a political mission. I'm a physician. Truth matters. Lessons
learned matters. All of those things come into play. Nothing
about chairing this Subcommittee had political gain for me. But
I did want to serve the American people and be able to take
this after-action review and get our lessons learned.
Unfortunately, throughout some of this, some things became
political, unfortunately. Some people had self-interests over
that of all of mankind. And we discovered that, and we worked
our way through that.
And we will have a product for the American people to
absorb and for we as a government to absorb on how we can go
about doing our business and how we can protect the American
people more and save lives and be the leader in the world when
it comes to being able to respond appropriately so that others
may benefit from mistakes we made, that we may benefit from
mistakes we made, and, also, it's a time to applaud some of the
things we did right, which are many, through this whole
process.
I want to thank also staff on both sides. Thank you. Thank
you all. There's been a lot of hard work put in this in the
last 2 years.
Some things we found, not so good. Some things we found,
very good. And we should build on those things. We should build
on those things.
Politics has no place in taking care of people. That's the
bottom line. To me, we can do better, and we're going to
propose to do better, and try to create the environment where
we can do better.
The next pandemic will happen, maybe not in our lifetime,
but let's be better prepared. There's a lot of logistics.
America can lead the way. We can lead the way. We've got too
many good people to not lead the way.
So, there's been a lot of reflection today, and, you know,
I want to go down the line, starting with you, Dr. Tabak, and
ask that each of you will commit in the next 2 weeks, if you
would, to provide this Select Subcommittee your top two lessons
learned through this and how we can work together to overcome
these issues.
You're nodding your head?
Dr. Tabak. Yes, absolutely, sir.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
Dr. Walke. Happy to do so, and thank you.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
Dr. Marston. I didn't realize we were going to get
homework, but yes. Thank you.
Dr. Wenstrup. Oh, we always have homework.
Dr. Wenstrup. Anyway. But, you know, while today was the
last hearing of this Select Subcommittee, our work is not yet
complete. The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic
will be releasing its final report in the coming weeks, and in
this report we can continue our commitment to transparency.
We'll release our findings on the investigations that we have
so thoroughly examined during the past 2 years.
In addition to our findings, we'll include recommendations
for future pandemics based on the lessons learned. It would be
irresponsible for us not to do that. It's not enough to
highlight what went wrong, or terribly wrong, but if we do not
work to find ways to fix it for the future and have a better
process, then we have wasted our time. And I don't think any
one of us here--people that run for office, people that serve
the American people, you do not want to waste your time.
I look forward to releasing our final report. Hope that our
work, which has been extensive, as you know, will be used to
prevent, predict, prepare, and protect us from the future
pandemic, which were my words at the very beginning.
Thank you all.
With that, and without objection, all Members will have 5
legislative days within which to submit materials and to submit
additional written questions for the witnesses, which will be
forwarded to the witnesses for their response.
Dr. Wenstrup. If there is no further business, without
objection, the Select Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:50 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]