[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
.
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-83]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FY25 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 1, 2024
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-375 WASHINGTON : 2025
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
DON BACON, Nebraska RO KHANNA, California
JIM BANKS, Indiana CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama MARC VEASEY, Texas
Whitney Verett, Professional Staff Member
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Owen McGeary, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
WITNESSES
Calvelli, Frank, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space
Acquisition andIntegration..................................... 6
Meink, Dr. Troy E., Principal Deputy Director, National
Reconnaissance Office.......................................... 7
Plumb, Dr. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
Policy......................................................... 5
Wilkerson, Tonya P., Deputy Director, National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency............................................ 9
................................................................. 0
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Calvelli, Frank.............................................. 44
Meink, Dr. Troy E............................................ 62
Plumb, Dr. John F............................................ 29
Wilkerson, Tonya P........................................... 71
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 79
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 83
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 83
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 83
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 86
FY25 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 1, 2024.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:31 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Lamborn
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Lamborn. The meeting will come to order.
The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to review the
fiscal year 2025 budget request for National Security Space
Programs.
Good afternoon to our witnesses, Dr. Plumb, Mr. Calvelli,
Dr. Meink, and Ms. Wilkerson. Thank you all for being here and
thank you for your service to our country.
Today is Dr. Plumb's last appearance before this
subcommittee, and maybe even his last public appearance as the
first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. We thank
you for your service. I want to thank you for your efforts over
the years to normalize the way the Department handles the space
domain. Your work on the Space Strategic Review and Space
Classification Guidance will serve as policy foundation for
those who succeed you. As you stated in your Space Policy
Review last year, our national security space posture considers
"space as a distinct operational domain of national military
power."
Now, long ago, our adversaries determined that space is
vital to the Joint Forces' operation, and they have spent the
last several years developing counter-space weapons to threaten
our troops. Both China and Russia have weaponized space, and we
must catch up to contend with this new reality.
Unfortunately, our governance structures present many
hurdles to maintaining space superiority. We have redefined the
space domain from a support function to a distinct operational
domain. And the policies and directives that underpin who does
what have not kept pace.
Many of these internal documents were last updated a decade
ago. A decade ago we didn't have a Space Force, and SpaceX
hadn't yet demonstrated a first stage landing. Technology and
how we think about space has grown by leaps and bounds since
then.
For example, I am concerned about how we get space-based
information into the hands of the warfighters on a tactically
relevant timeline. Given the retirement of the JSTARS [Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] platform beginning in
the mid-2020s, the Department decided in the fiscal year 2023
budget request to transition Ground Moving Target Indication,
GMTI, from an air platform to a space-based capability.
Since the NRO [National Reconnaissance Office] is procuring
this new system, does that mean NGA [National Geospatial
Agency] should serve its traditional role as clearinghouse for
Joint Force request of scarce national assets?
Or as you, Mr. Calvelli, have argued, is this a purely
title 10 mission that needs to be tasked, owned, and operated
by the Department of Defense?
This is not a trivial bureaucratic turf war. What we decide
here will set the pattern for how we handle the transition to
space from other previously air-based missions. It won't
surprise anyone to hear that this committee believes that the
GMTI mission, and any future systems to follow, must be tasked
and controlled by the Department of Defense.
Last year's bill established the Moving Target Indication
Working Group, co-chaired by the Space Force and the Joint
Staff. So, I look forward to hearing all of your perspectives
on this esoteric but essential issue.
Further, many of the technological advancements that are
driving us to shift these missions to space are being developed
by the cutting edge commercial space industry. We now have
companies that want to provide not only launch services and
communications, but imagery, and rendezvous, and proximity
operations. This committee has long been a proponent of taking
as much advantage of these commercial capabilities as possible.
I was glad to see your office, Dr. Plumb, and the Space
Force released strategies to take advantage of these commercial
develops last month.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how they
are thinking about these commercial capabilities and,
specifically, how they plan to integrate them with the existing
government architecture. In a world of limited budgets, it will
become even more critical for the entire national security
space enterprise to figure out how they leverage these
commercial companies to improve.
I now recognize Ranking Member Moulton for his opening
comments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC
FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn. And welcome to
our panel of witnesses.
Before I begin my remarks, I also want to comment on Dr.
Plumb. I was a little worried you were going to say it is his
last public appearance ever. And we certainly hope that is not
the case because you have been an amazing public servant, and
we have been very, very lucky to have you.
I, personally, have learned a lot from you. And I was,
personally, disappointed when you said you were going to leave,
although you have every right to do what is right for your
family. But we will miss you.
You have helped turn around the space enterprise. I am very
confident with our course right now. I wasn't confident 5 years
ago, and you have been a huge part of making that, that change.
So, thank you so much for your service.
Our national security space architecture is undergoing a
significant transformation, a transformation necessary because
everyday American life is deeply reliant on space. The Global
Positioning System, GPS, probably helped everyone in this room
get somewhere today. And it also provides necessary timing
information to nearly every banking and financial system
worldwide.
And it is no secret that most weapons systems in the
Department of Defense inventory require a GPS signal as well.
In part because of this overall reliance, our adversaries
have been developing, deploying, and demonstrating capabilities
in space and on Earth to deny, degrade, and destroy U.S.
satellites. In just the past two years the People's Republic of
China has almost doubled their number of satellites on orbit to
400, with plans for nearly 1,000 by 2030. And they include
capabilities with inherently offensive applications.
And as we all know now, due to what was essentially an
intelligence leak from Congress, Russia is developing a nuclear
weapon in space. If launched, it would be in direct violation
of the Outer Space Treaty. And if detonated, it would degrade
or destroy nearly every satellite in its path.
These advancements by our adversaries have required a
transformation to a more proliferated, resilient, and protected
U.S. architecture. In addition, the U.S. commercial market has
exploded in the past 5 years.
SpaceX is probably best known, but there are companies
outpacing DoD in innovation across the board, whether that be
in satellite communications, remote sensing, Space Command
awareness, or in developing capabilities to defend and protect
our existing exquisite satellites on orbit today.
While this subcommittee has been pushing both the DoD and
intelligence community to fully embrace commercial
capabilities, that culture shift has been met with considerable
resistance. That is why I am very encouraged by the release of
both the DoD and Space Force commercial space strategies. It is
not enough to simply award contracts, we must have a plan to
fully integrate these innovative capabilities into government
systems to help reinforce our national advantage in space.
We also continue to make significant progress with our
incredible network of allies and partners. The U.S. must
continue to lead by example on establishing norms of behavior
for responsible operations in space.
But not to diminish this progress overall, there are some
areas we should continue to watch closely. In addition to the
pattern of large satellite programs being late and over budget,
the ground system architecture so frequently comes as an
afterthought. We have been notified yet again of delays to the
Next Generation Operational Ground Control Segment, the modern
cybersecure ground system to operate GPS satellites. OCX [Next-
Generation operational control segment] was supposed to be
delivered in 2016 for 3.9 billion. Now 8 years later, and at
almost double that cost, we are still waiting.
Unfortunately, OCX is the most egregious case, but others,
such as ATLAS [Advanced Tracking and Launch Analysis System],
are also experiencing delays and cost overruns.
Mr. Calvelli, I would like to understand how you are
addressing these issues holistically across the Space Force.
Another area this subcommittee must watch is something the
chairman mentioned, the jurisdictional divide between
traditional space-based intelligence collection versus DoD's
[Department of Defense] use of the domain for tactical
applications. The latter is somewhat a new phenomenon. Tactical
missions like surveillance of ground targets are now moving
from land, sea, or air platforms, into orbit.
We must ensure that Government policy does not assume that
all space assets are formal intelligence or title 50 assets or
we may accidentally block our Combatant Commanders from getting
targeting information quickly enough to use it, or block the
services from fully taking advantage of commercial imaging and
sensing.
Space is a fascinating and infinite domain. Until recently,
we only really experienced it through the lens of science
fiction. But in reality, space has been a part of our daily
lives as Americans since the dawn of the Space Race, and our
adversaries are keenly aware of that. Our warfighters
everywhere, on the ground, under the sea, and in the air depend
on space.
The global dependence on space often means relying on
American satellites. We must keep them secure, not only against
the threats we see today, but against what we will face in the
years and decades to come.
I look forward today to today's discussion with our
witnesses on how best to maintain U.S. superiority in space.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
We now turn to our witnesses. Your prepared statements will
be made part of the record.
And it is doubtful that we will be able to have the time to
have a closed session because we do have votes in about 50
minutes. So, we will have time, though, to have a round of
questions from ourselves as Members of the committee and then
go from there.
I would ask that you all keep your statements to 4 minutes
or less rather than 5, just for the sake of time.
Dr. Plumb, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DR. JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Dr. Plumb. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
Ranking Member Moulton, distinguished members of the committee.
I appreciate this chance to testify one last time here on the
2025 space budget for the Department.
This is my last time testifying. Hopefully, not my last
public appearance, sir. I will be departing later this month.
But it has been a true privilege to serve. And I have been
heartened by the bipartisan approach this committee has taken
to space and the defense issues in particular.
And I will say again, I have told you both personally, but
thank you. It means a lot to the country. And I think one of
the reasons we have been able to move forward so much is
because of, of that bipartisan approach. So, I deeply
appreciate it.
We are clearly in a time of rapid change in the space
strategic environment, and it does not favor those who are slow
or resistant to change. China and Russia are both rapidly
fielding space and counter-space capabilities to hold the Joint
Force at risk and to deny us the space-based services that we
rely on.
The scale and scope of these threats present significant
risk to the American people, to our national interests, and to
our allies and partners.
The President's fiscal year 2025 budget requests $33.7
billion for space to help meet these challenges. Some of these
critical investments include 2.4 billion for national security
space launch; 1.5 billion for more resilient Position
Navigation and Timing, PNT; 4.2 billion for more resilient and
protected SATCOM [satellite communications], as well as the
Space Development Agency's proliferated Low Earth Orbit
transport layer; 4.7 billion to develop new missile warning/
missile tracking architectures; and then 12.3 billion for a
range of other capabilities to increase resiliency of our
existing architectures and to protect our interests in space
during competition in crisis and in conflict.
Now, in addition to these investments I just wanted to
touch on the significant progress we have made over the last 2
years on what has become four key strategy and policy
priorities.
I have detailed those in length in my written testimony,
but space control, space cooperation, space classification, and
commercial space integration.
We have obtained presidential guidance to ensure our space
missions and protect and defend the Joint Force from space-
enabled attacks.
We have greatly expanded our space cooperation with allies
and partners, charting a path towards true combined operations
in space that will strengthen collective deterrence.
We have overhauled the Department's space classification
policy to remove unnecessary barriers to information flow
throughout the Joint Force, barriers with our industry partners
and, frankly, just barriers within the Department alone.
We have released the first ever DoD Commercial Space
Integration Strategy to harness the sector's incredible
innovation to enhance our resiliency.
Going forward, the Department will continue to press on all
four lines of effort. I believe the progress we have made and
the foundation we have laid here will pay dividends for years
to come.
So, in closing, and aware of the time, just thank you again
and the committee for your partnership, and your tireless
dedication to the Department and our service members. And I
look forward to this hearing and to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Plumb can be found in
the Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Calvelli, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK CALVELLI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION AND INTEGRATION, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Mr. Calvelli. Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to testify before you today.
With the growing threats in space, we must continue to
transform our space architecture to be more proliferated, more
resilient, so that space can be always counted on during times
of peace, crisis, or conflict.
As the service acquisition executive for space, I am
focused on driving speed into acquisitions and delivering
programs on cost and schedule.
I'd like to highlight some of the progress we have made in
the past year since I, I last testified.
Since the spring of 2023, the Space Development Agency has
delivered 27 satellites to orbit, nearly all of them in around
3 years from contract award to launch. This includes eight new
missile warning/missile tracking satellites and 19 data
transport satellites. And SDA [Space Development Agency]
recently demonstrated the first ever Link 16 network connection
from space.
The Space Rapid Capabilities Office completed and is in the
process of fielding the first 11 of 24 low cost transportable
terrestrial satellite jammers -- terrestrial satellite
communications jammers. These jammers went from contract award
to fielding in about 18 months.
Meanwhile, Space Systems Command continues to make
excellent progress in modernizing both our missile warning and
MILSATCOM [military satellite communications] architectures to
be more resilient. Just a few weeks ago Space Systems Command
launched the first weather system follow-on microwave satellite
to support the pivot to a more resilient, disaggregated, hybrid
weather architecture to meet warfighter needs.
Last September, SSC's [Space Systems Command] technical
response to the space mission, VICTUS NOX, demonstrated the
ability to go from the factory floor to on-orbit operations in
around 5 days.
And since last April there have been seven national
security space launches that delivered critical warfighting
capabilities to orbit.
And, additionally, we continue to take advantage of the
strong space industrial base, including awarding contracts to
non-traditional space companies and implementing our recently
published commercial space strategy.
Simultaneously, we are aggressively tackling challenging
programs to get them over the finish line. We are focused on
delivering the GPS next generation Operational Control Segment,
also known as OCX, and we are making progress towards getting
the system ready to commence operations in 2025.
Another one of our challenging programs that was mentioned
was ATLAS. We have made significant progress since we broke it
up into more manageable deliverables. The program is on
schedule to incrementally deliver Space Command awareness,
command and control capabilities next year to enable
decommissioning of SPADOC [Space Defense Operations Center].
We have also proven we can build small satellites quickly.
However, as we begin to deliver the next tranche of SDA
satellites this fall, getting the military services to adopt
and use these satellites will be key. It doesn't matter how
fast you use them if no one uses them.
Likewise, our ability to maintain assured access to space
for our space capabilities remains paramount. And launch
providers must be ready to scale and meet the increasing
demand.
Finally, we are working to move programs out of the Special
Access Program stovepipes thanks to John and his space
classification policy update in December. This will improve our
ability to integrate space for other domains and enable better
sharing with our allies.
As we continue to drive speed into our acquisitions, our
job and our top priority needs to stay focused on delivering
programs on cost and schedule. We are going to do this by,
first, ensuring that our action strategies and request for
proposal documents are realistic and executable; by
implementing a source selection strategy that leads to awarding
contracts with achievable cost and schedule baselines.
There is no better way to deliver on schedule than actually
getting it right up front, and then, once under contract,
proactively managing the program to deliver the system that
works and deliver it on cost and on schedule.
Given the threats and the increased capabilities of our
competitors, it is critical that we remain focused on
delivering programs on cost and schedule.
Thank you for your time today. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Calvelli can be found
in the Appendix on page 44.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Dr. Meink, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF DR. TROY E. MEINK, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Dr. Meink. Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton, and
distinguished members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be
here today before you. And it is also a pleasure to represent
the people of the National Reconnaissance Office.
For more than 60 years, the NRO has been developing tools
and techniques that advance our national security. Today we are
building on that legacy to innovate and make the United States
even safer and stronger. Space-based intelligence has become a
primary, if "the" primary, means of collection in denied areas.
This is especially critical as our competitors are seeking
to deny our strategic advantage in space. With Congress'
support, and with the continued innovation at the NRO we will
ensure America retains its strategic advantage in space.
Our fiscal year 2025 budget request aims to keep the United
States a world leader in space-based intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. It prioritizes investments in
a diverse and resilient constellation to meet the needs of the
warfighter, intelligence community, and our allies.
We are committed to using taxpayer dollars effectively and
efficiently. I am proud to report that the NRO has just
received our 15th consecutive clean audit for fiscal year 2023.
Our effectiveness and efficiencies are really a result of
the title 10 and title 50 authorities that we have, as NRO is
both the Defense Intelligence -- part of the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise and the Intelligence Community.
Our investments in tools, technologies, both on the ground
and on orbit, ensure our customers get the information they
need, where they need it, faster than ever before.
With the support of Congress, the NRO will continue to
invest in government-engineered and industry-built satellites
that are resilient by design; increasing partnerships that
allow us to maximize our impact; and developing the world's
most advanced tools, information technology, and communications
networks, again allowing us to fuse critical data and deliver
it to our customers any place on Earth.
Over the next decade, the NRO will continue to increase the
number of satellites, both large and small, operating across
multiple orbits.
Later this month, around the 19th, the first phase of our
proliferated architecture is scheduled to launch as NROL-146
out of Vandenberg. We have already launched a number of
demonstrations over the last few years to verify cost and
performance, really to be comfortable and make sure we knew
what we were doing. These systems will increase timeliness of
access, diversified communication pathways, and enhance our
resilience significantly.
For our other ground systems and our on-orbit capabilities,
we are strengthening our cyber defense, eliminating single
points of failure, and hardening our architecture. This will
also enable a much more resilient system going forward.
The NRO has been at the forefront of innovation since our
inception, and today that culture of innovation is even more
critical. Our highly skilled workforce, including both military
and civilians, brings diverse viewpoints and innovative ideas
to solve complex intelligence problems.
A critical example is growing our workforce to be able to
take full advantage of both AI [artificial intelligence], and
machine learning, and automation that is going to be required
to operate and deliver capability to the users.
Partnerships are inherent in who we are. Our workforce is a
blend of government civilians and members of every military
service, primarily the Space Force, but every military service.
As we evolve to meet the changing mission needs, we look
forward to continued collaboration on personnel support from
both our civilian and military partners.
We maximize our partnership when we have colleagues and
partners across the intelligence and defense community to
leverage every possible innovation to optimize collection tools
and effectiveness.
For example, our partnership with U.S. Space Force, and
previously the Air Force, on launch procurement has provided
assured access to space for the NRO's systems for over 15
years. We are fully committed to NSSL [National Security Space
Launch] Phase 3, and have worked very closely with the Space
Force to include all the capabilities that we need to execute
our mission.
Our continued success depends on our ability to adapt and
to innovate faster, not only fast but faster than any of our
potential competitors, and on Congress' continued support for
our mission. New technology, and new partnerships, and the
talents of our workforce are critical to maintaining our
competitive advantage in keeping American safe.
On behalf of the entire NRO workforce, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you here today. Thank you for your
time, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Meink can be found in the
Appendix on page 62.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Ms. Wilkerson, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF TONYA WILKERSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Ms. Wilkerson. Good afternoon, distinguished members of the
subcommittee.
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is our nation's
leading authority for geospatial intelligence, or GEOINT,
providing warfighters, policymakers, intelligence
professionals, and first responders with the decision advantage
they need to carry out national security objectives at home and
abroad, from seabed to space.
The GEOINT we deliver, much of which comes from space-based
systems, conveys not only what, when, and where events are
happening, it also illustrates how they are occurring, the
implications, and what is likely to transpire next.
NGA's GEOINT professionals work across more than 100
locations in the United States and around the world. Dual-
headed as an intelligence agency and combat support agency, NGA
provides GEOINT to the services, combatant commands, and other
federal departments and agencies. This includes tasking,
analysis, and dissemination of national technical means and
commercial imagery, data, and GEOINT analytic services in
support of community requirements.
NGA is committed to maximizing efficient and effective use
of all available GEOINT sensors, including those that are
space-based, enabling collection to be at the right location,
at the right time to meet service and combatant command needs.
Obtaining the data used to produce GEOINT is not a simple
task. NGA's highly skilled intelligence collection
professionals execute a process we call informed collection
orchestration to align national priorities with operational and
analytical needs, and real work world deadlines.
NGA's unique ability to carry out informed collection
orchestration is not only in statute, policy, and practice, it
is rooted in our expertise as leaders in the GEOINT discipline.
It is also central to ensuring that our warfighters and
intelligence professionals alike receive the imagery and
analysis they need, when they need it.
We continue to provide what is needed, when it is needed by
integrating with warfighting headquarters around the world to
incorporate artificial intelligence through programs like
Maven, accelerating their operations and decision speeds. As we
move forward with AI, our goal is safe, responsible, and
accurate application of its capabilities in a way that augments
and enhances our GEOINT workforce.
I would also like to highlight two areas where NGA is
leading within the space domain.
First, we maintain detailed physical characterizations of
our planet from the ocean floor to space, providing critical
data and production of materials necessary for the safe
navigation of air, land, and sea.
Second, NGA also leads the way in guaranteeing assured
precision and accuracy of GPS, maintaining the World Geodetic
System-1984, or WGS-84, reference frame, which is the backbone
for all geolocation. This foundational mission complements the
important work we do to deliver GEOINT that advances national
security priorities.
NGA continues to ensure the security of space because, just
as the United States recognizes the critical role of space, so,
too, do our global competitors. Our most capable and potential
adversaries continue to invest in increasingly threatening
counter-space systems, intent on disrupting or denying critical
space systems and services that not only support our national
security, but also our everyday lives.
NGA remains focused on understanding such capabilities and
providing our warfighters and policymakers the information they
require to counter and deter threats to our national and
commercial assets.
In closing, NGA relies greatly on data obtained from space
systems to deliver vital GEOINT that advances national security
priorities and the security of space. And we are committed to
the partnerships with the United States Space Force, U.S. Space
Command, and NRO to ensure that GEOINT plays the broadest role
possible in understanding adversaries' space and counter-space
threats.
Thank you. And I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wilkerson can be found in
the Appendix on page 71.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
We will now begin our members' questions. We will each have
5 minutes.
I have a question for each one of you, so I will ask for a
concise answer.
Dr. Plumb, in your Commercial Space Integration Strategy
you talk about the possible need for commercial insurance,
commercial war risk insurance, U.S. Government-provided
insurance, and indemnification to be provided for commercial
space providers as part of doing business with the U.S.
Government.
Can you talk a little bit more about what authorities you
think you will need to fully realize this?
Dr. Plumb. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Commercial Space
Integration Strategy is one of the main pieces that was helping
drive some of the writing of this strategy because of a lot of
questions from industry on that. And we were trying to lay flat
what the actual situation is.
I will say for the air domain and for the maritime domain
there is a Government-backed war risk insurance vehicle which
is, we know it as CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet]. You have
heard of CRAF, perhaps, for the air domain. It is really just
for air logistics.
And then there is also the DISA for, D-I-S-A, which is for
the maritime. There is no similar statutory authority for the
space domain. And the Department is not ready to say that we
need that right now. But the Secretary has tasked the
Department to go look and say, hey, what would be those
conditions where we might need it? And part of, of course, is
where would that need to be changed in the statute.
All of those cases, those types of insurance vehicles are
only turned on when the Department wants them. They are not a
blanket agreement. It is only in specific situations the
Department agrees that in this specific case we should use
them.
So, I think there is goodness there. And I think we would
need Congress' help to do that if that was the direction we
would go.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
Ms. Wilkerson, I wanted to give you a chance to give NGA's
perspective when it comes to the future of tasking for GMTI
that you talked about earlier. From your vantage point, what
policy, documents, or directives do you believe support your
position?
Ms. Wilkerson. Thank you for that question. Sir, we look
forward to collaborating with our partners within Space Force
as well as the NRO in a way that allows for the leveraging of
the expertise and skills that are resident in each of our
agencies.
We also anticipate that we will be supporting, have a
supporting role in the MTI Working Group.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
Dr. Meink, one issue that we hear a lot about is how much
we are taking advantage of the commercial market for space
imagery. What steps is the NRO taking to increase the use of
commercial imagery, remote sensing to complement, and
integrate, and augment with Government systems?
Dr. Meink. I guess I will break that into two pieces.
The second piece is we are working closely with NGA and the
rest of the Department to fully integrate commercial services
into an integrated architecture so you can pass them just as
effectively as you can pass any of the national systems. So,
working closely we made great progress on that.
With respect to incorporating new and additional commercial
partners, that has been a big focus of ours. Obviously, we have
a large number of contracts with optical commercial providers.
We also have contracts with radar providers, commercial radar,
commercial radar providers.
And we have a set investment every year that its sole
purpose is to accelerate and work with up-and-coming commercial
partners to advance our capability and help guide them on what
the IC and DoD need so that as they make their investments we
can eventually form more robust partnerships in other than the
just the early development cases.
So, we are doing it across the board.
Mr. Lamborn. Very good. Thank you.
And, finally, Dr. Calvelli, Mr. Calvelli, DoD's commercial
space strategy notes the importance of achieving integration
with commercial entities prior to conflict, to include planning
and training activities.
How would you characterize Space Force's current level of
integration with commercial entities?
Mr. Calvelli. I think today the best investment of that
would be launch. We are relying predominantly on the commercial
launch infrastructure for launching our, our most stressful
missions as well as ones that are less stressful, you know,
like more proliferated kind of systems.
We are also using commercial today in some cases for the
satellite communications systems. And, and I can envision a
future where we are taking advantage of more commercial to do
things like more Space Command awareness. And as it evolves and
becomes more mature, so does space access for mobility and
logistics, on-orbit servicing sort of things as well.
So, I think today, you know, we practice even just the
standpoint of, like, the VICTUS NOX demo, where we actually had
a commercial flight that actually got our satellite to orbit
within about 27 hours from call-up. And I think as we continue
to evolve in taking more advantage of the commercial sectors,
perhaps you are right, we need to include that as part of our
training regimen as well.
Mr. Lamborn. Very good. Thank you so much.
I will now turn to the ranking member for any questions he
might have.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up on this Title 10 versus Title 50
concern that the chairman and I both raised.
Quick story. The Space Force and INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command] recently worked with our industry partners to
notify warfighters of a CCP [Chinese Communist Party] space
launch within 24 hours, and then used commercial imaging
capability to image that same satellite within days, all
unclassified.
This information was really useful to the Commander of
INDOPACOM. Yet, they faced opposition in even doing this
exercise. And we hear consistently that the IC is opposed to
DoD acquiring commercial imagery directly.
Dr. Plumb, as we have heard, there is an outdated DoD
guidance surrounding this issue that was written in the early
2000s. Do you believe that we should take a look at that policy
and update it to reflect a new reality?
Dr. Plumb. Yes.
Mr. Moulton. Might you elaborate?
Dr. Plumb. Look, I think, appreciate the question, and I
just want to be clear. I truly do believe that despite what you
are hearing, we all agree that we need to find a way to make
sure that the warfighter gets the information they need in an
operation relevant timeline. Without doubt, there is no point
in system; that, that is our mission.
I do think what we found in the classification review is
that these policies are very old. The classification policies
was written before any of the commercial space had really
evolved. What you are referring to here, I mean, there is an
NSPD, a presidential document, from 2003. There are other
things, some classified, some not.
But some of these are legacy. And legacy isn't as long
anymore because the commercial innovation has accelerated what
is happening in Space Command so quickly.
So, I think it would be incorrect to not go back and look
and say, hey, are these things, have the, have the memos and
policies evolved with the real situation?
I mean, there was a time when commercial imagery, just as
an example, was the thing. People were, like, this is so
interesting.
Well, now what the product is in the market is not just the
imagery, it is also the analysis of it. And so, that is a
different place than we were 20 years ago. I think these need
to be looked at.
Mr. Moulton. Okay. All right.
Dr. Plumb, as I said in my opening statement, I believe we
have made profound progress in space over the course of your
tenure. I am rather disappointed that you weren't at the
hearing yesterday to enjoy my esoteric jokes that as a physics
major, a fellow physics major I think you would have
appreciated. It would have literally doubled the number of
people laughing in the room.
I don't understand why people don't find jokes about
hypersonics in Chernobyl so enjoyable.
But in any event, I was wondering if you could just take a
minute to reflect on your tenure and think about what are some
of your most proud achievements? What are some of the most
significant areas where we have been able to make progress, or
you have been able to make progress?
Dr. Plumb. First of all, thank you for that opening to the
question.
You know, the four C's that I -- we started with three C's
from the day I got here, and then we ended up with four because
commercial is so important that we had to add that really to my
priority list.
I think we have made a lot of progress on all of those. But
fundamentally, the thing that I think has driven this is trying
to be truly collaborative across the national enterprise with
the IC [intelligence community], with the services, with the
White House, with the State Department, with the Congress as
well, and also with the bipartisan approach here.
I think in the past folks have used classification to keep
people out of decisions. And that tends to backfire. So, I feel
like having that collaborative approach has brought folks along
together and we have been able to iron out things early and
really make progress.
Our focus on China has helped us make progress as well,
sir. Nothing like having something to really focus the mind to
say we need to get, we need to get ready. That is probably the
biggest thing.
Going forward, tremendous facility for implementation. And
I would just say conflict is not inevitable. I have said this
many times. It is not inevitable. If we do our job right, it
will not happen. Right? Deterrence is the goal. But we do have
to be ready.
Mr. Moulton. Well, thank you again for your service.
Mr. Calvelli, the 2018 NDAA [National Defense Authorization
Act] gave authority to the Commander of Space Systems Command
to maintain a watch list of contractors with a history of poor
performance on space contracts. I am just curious, how useful
has this been?
Is it a tool that we could expand?
Mr. Calvelli. It has been, it has been useful. I think it
can be more useful.
I would love to see the tool expanded and given the
authority to me as the service acquisition executive to go and
use the crawl across all the space acquisition enterprise that
are underneath my, my control.
Right now it is only at SSC, under the control of the SSC
commander.
Mr. Moulton. Are there other authorities like that that
would help you better, better maintain control over these
contracts?
Mr. Calvelli. I think that is a key one to get. And I think
starting with that would be ideal.
Mr. Moulton. Okay. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Plumb, I, too, want to join the chorus of those who
thank you for your public service, and certainly wish you well.
I am certain that we will be seeing you in other capacities.
And we all look forward to that.
Dr. Plumb, on page 4 of your written testimony it states,
"Russia is also developing a concerning anti-satellite
capability related to a new satellite carrying a nuclear device
that Russia is developing. This capacity could pose a threat to
all satellites operated by countries and companies around the
globe, as well as to the vital communications, scientific,
meteorological, agricultural, commercial, and national security
services we all depend upon."
Dr. Plumb, this is the first time that the Administration
has approved anyone in an open unclassified session making that
statement. Just yesterday Secretary Austin was asked this
question, and he deferred and requested that the conversation
only occur in a classified setting.
So, this is significant that you have made this statement.
I am assuming the White House has approved your statement
today?
Dr. Plumb. Congressman, the statement, I would say the
National Security Advisor has made similar comments in the last
few days. And it is on the, I believe it is on the
WhiteHouse.gov website. But he has made them and we can get
those to you as well.
Mr. Turner. But in a congressional open --
Dr. Plumb. This is, of course, a congressional one.
Mr. Turner. -- unclassified statement this is the first
time that anyone has said that?
Dr. Plumb. I think that is right, sir. And I do think that
is right it falls to me. But, yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. Well, thank you for making it because you both
characterize the issue and the threat as incredibly
significant.
I want to talk to you a little bit about the issue of
developing. You say that they are developing a concerning anti-
satellite capability.
You, first-off, acknowledge it is a satellite. So, this is
something that is going to be in orbit. Will this be in low-
Earth orbit, geo-orbit? Where is this intended that it would be
located?
Dr. Plumb. Sir, a lot of this gets classified based on
intel sources. So, at the moment I think that is as far as I
can say.
But, right, the concept that we are concerned about is
Russia developing, and if we are unable to convince them
otherwise, to ultimately fly a nuclear weapon in space, which
would be an indiscriminate weapon: doesn't have national
boundaries, doesn't determine between military satellites,
civilian satellites, or commercial satellites.
Mr. Turner. So, Dr. Plumb, you say "developing." Is this
conceptual, something that they put on a napkin somewhere?
Is this they have developed a warhead, they have developed
a satellite, they have married them together? When you say
"developed," what is the current risk for a threat? Is this
something that could be -- let's start with this. Is this
something that could be launched now?
Dr. Plumb. And here is where you have me, again, at a
disadvantage. I would be happy to have this conversation in a
classified session.
If we don't have one after today, as I know you are
constrained for votes, I would be happy to come back in my
remaining tenure and have a one-on-one conversation with you,
sir.
Mr. Turner. Is it an imminent threat?
Dr. Plumb. It is not imminent in the way that we should
have to worry about it right now. But we are concerned about it
at the Department and the entire Administration. And I know
this Congress is taking this deadly seriously.
And we are, as you know, we have just had that United
Nation's Security Council resolution that Russia vetoed, which
may in fact tip their hand on this, that really just reaffirmed
not placing nuclear weapons in outer space, which Russia and
the United States and all space-faring nations have already
signed up not to do. So, this is a concern for us.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Plumb, let's go to, then, what the effects
would be.
Dr. Plumb. Sure.
Mr. Turner. The Secretary testified that it would be
devastating.
You list, you know, scientific, meteorological,
agricultural, commercial, national security. Tell us some of
the things that would be the outcome if this anti-satellite
that carriers a nuclear payload was used in orbit?
Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir.
First of all, you know, just to be clear, modeling on this
needs to be conducted, you have to know the specifics of how a
thing would be used, what type of a detonation it might be.
Where it might be detonated changes the outcome as well.
Some of this modeling probably could be more robust. But,
roughly, in lower orbit in particular, but roughly satellites
that aren't hardened against nuclear detonation in space, which
is most satellites, could be damaged and affected.
And some would be caught in the immediate blast which, you
know, they would not be able to survive the flux of that. And
then others could be damaged over time by going through there
is a dip over the Van Allen Belt over the South Atlantic, and
if those Van Allen Belts are pumped, then radiation damage to
satellites would just naturally occur over time.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Plumb, my time is expiring.
Dr. Plumb. I am sorry, sir. Yes.
Mr. Turner. Would this render the area of the detonation
unusable for a period of time?
Dr. Plumb. So, several analysts do believe that a
detonation in space of the right magnitude in the right
location could render a low-Earth orbit, for example, unusable
for some period of time.
And this was an example that we did in the Sixties.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Plumb, if you might, can you, can you give
us some perspective? You said for a period of time?
Dr. Plumb. I would just, well, again, I don't have those
numbers in front of me. I would just say in the Sixties the
United States detonated a nuclear weapon in space.
Mr. Turner. Right.
Dr. Plumb. Unclassified, Starfish Prime. And that really
rendered the orbits unusable for some period.
Mr. Turner. Could it be a year?
Dr. Plumb. I believe it could. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank
you, Mr. Garamendi, for your generously yielding to me.
I want to thank you, Dr. Plumb, for your many service, many
years of service to our country. And I wish you the best in
whatever you pursue next. Certainly I hope it is staying in
touch with the Federal Government in some way or another.
Innovation and competition from the commercial industry
have lowered the cost of space launch for the U.S. Government
and private industry by a factor of four, saving the DoD
[Department of Defense] tens of billions.
In my district at Vandenberg Space Force Base I have seen
how decreased costs for space access drives investment and
innovation that greatly increases our nation's launch capacity.
Vandenberg had only four launches in 2012, but may have as many
as 50 this year alone, a significant development for the
Department and the U.S. industrial base.
Mr. Calvelli, can you discuss how lower launch costs
brought by commercial innovation and competition in the
National Security Space Launch Program have changed our
national security posture, including enabling the deployment of
proliferated resilient constellations, a significant national
security capability that was only feasible a decade ago, from
the launch cost or capacity perspective? That wasn't feasible.
Mr. Calvelli. I tell you, sir, lowering the lower cost of
launch has been a game changer for us all. It has dramatically
improved our ability to build smaller satellites, to launch
them quicker, to build proliferated constellations. It has
really become sort of an amazing enabler for not only national
security's launch but also for what we are seeing is a
proliferation of commercial space companies now.
We are seeing companies being able to actually launch cost-
effective satellites. So, we are seeing universities building
satellites and CubeSats. We are seeing a whole generation of
young folks starting companies to go off and do serving in
space and to do space missions. People looking at building, you
know, commercial habitats in space. It is amazing.
But a lot, all this is driven and enabled by the lower cost
of launch.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Proliferated LEO [low-earth orbit]
constellations have made services available that used to
require very expensive, exquisite, oftentimes large satellites.
Our domestic Earth observation industry can provide imaging
faster and cheaper than ever before, which is why I am
supportive of the Space Force Tactical Surveillance,
Reconnaissance, and Tracking Program.
This capability provides tremendous benefit for our
combatant command who have asked for this ability.
Mr. Calvelli, can you walk me through how the recent demo
conducted by the Space Force and INDOPACOM demonstrates how
valuable this capability could be to the Department of Defense?
Mr. Calvelli. Yes, sir.
We are off doing a pilot program right now out of Space
Systems Command, and it is going extremely well. And there we
are just very fortunate that the commercial industry has taken
off in terms of commercial analytics that use space sensing as
well as a variety of other sources to, to gather information,
and be able to do rudimentary things that we are able to
provide to the commands in a timely manner.
So, we have invested some dollars in it. Last year we got
some dollars; heading into next year as well. And we continue
on with the pilot. And look forward to reporting back how that
pilot goes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Some argue against the Space Force
moving forward with its program at scale because there could be
duplication with the IC on what is being bought from the
industry, that the Government could be paying for the same data
twice.
Mr. Calvelli, do you believe that concern, that concern
could be overcome by the appropriate policies and structure,
guided by recent commercial space strategies?
Mr. Calvelli. It could be done in policy structure. But I
will tell you that I, I have asked my folks at the working
level, and they say that they have enjoined and they work
cooperatively with the NRO and with NGA to make sure there is
no duplication going on.
So, across the working level the teams are actually doing
great and making sure we don't have any duplication.
So, I am very proud the intelligence community and the
Department of Defense for working together on this.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Mr. Plumb, China and Russia are investing in their space
programs and making advancements. Do you think that fiscal year
2025 budget request for our National Security Space Program is
adequate to maintain space superiority? And what happens if we
fall behind in our space capabilities?
Dr. Plumb. Well, I mean, sir, first of all, first of all I
do think it is adequate. I think, obviously, anyone in the
Department will always prefer to have additional money to put
against additional problem sets. And the Fiscal Restraint Act
or Responsibility Act does put some budget pressure on us as we
look at this.
The one thing I will say as we look at the Space Force, if
we are looking at what can we do in the next 2 years to get
ready for, you know, a potential Taiwan problem set, that
really has some problems with Space Force in particular as kind
of a new service.
It sort of eats seed corn that you can't also think about
the 2030s. And that is a tradeoff we wrestle with every budget.
But I think the Space Force may be more impacted than others.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am out of time. I
yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Mr. DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you.
Mr. Calvelli, the Phase III Acquisition Strategy for the
National Security Space Launch Program allows the Space Force
to select up to three providers for its Lane 2 missions. As I
am sure you are aware, there has been some talk in the media
about consolidation in the launch sector.
If it ultimately comes to fruition, how would this
consolidation impact your Acquisition Strategy for Phase III?
Mr. Calvelli. So, the Phase III Acq. Strategy won't change.
The Phase III Acq. Strategy proposals are in-house and we are
working through them right now. So, that's pretty much set in
stone.
I really like the Phase III Strategy. If you think about
our history, we were under a monopoly in terms of a single
company for launch for decades. And the Air Force, and now the
Space Force, to their credit have done a magnificent job of
cultivating a second provider.
And I think as a nation, one of the best things we possibly
could do is cultivate a third provider as well to launch our
most stressful missions.
On top of that, the Lane 1 is the more commercial-like
missions where we are allowing anybody to on-ramp onto that,
who brings the rocket. And that has demonstrated a test, a
flight.
And so, I am very optimistic with the strategy that we put
together. I don't see that changing. Mergers and acquisitions
happens all the time in industry. We will see what happens over
time. And if any consolidation occurs, we will have to adjust
it then.
Dr. DesJarlais. One concern is that we are trying to chart
out this strategy for the next 10 years, and we are trying to
increase its launch cadence every year. It is imperative if we
get it right.
Can you confidently project a 10-year strategy to deter
China?
Mr. Calvelli. So, it is really a, the launch strategy is
really a 5-year strategy; right? Lane 2 is a 5-year strategy.
Lane 1 is a 5-year strategy with five 1-year options. And so,
we always have the opportunity to adjust the concept at any
point in time.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I am curious to know if you are
planning on maintaining block buys in future procurements.
Certainly this would help maintain healthy supply chains here
in the U.S. But I am interested in understanding how you all
are assessing this idea?
Mr. Calvelli. Yeah. The team does a really great job in
terms of looking out into the future and understanding and
doing what they call their mission allocation process. And so,
we end up doing, you know, block buys as part of Phase II. And
I don't see that changing as part of Lane 2 for Phase III.
Dr. DesJarlais. So, staying on the issue of how we can best
leverage the ever-evolving space industry, and, Dr. Plumb, I
would like to get you in here in addition to Secretary
Calvelli, again I think that the Department is largely doing a
great job leveraging innovation in the private industry to meet
national security objectives in the space domain.
However, a key hindrance to this effort has been the
cumbersome FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] permitting
process for launch and reentry licenses.
How are you working with the FAA and the industry to
improve efficiency in the review and approval process?
Dr. Plumb. Thank you, sir.
I would say that the Department does need the FAA to move,
you know, sometimes more quickly. I do think they have some
funding challenges. I have recently been involved personally in
some conversations with them.
I think the Department generally supports efforts to help
the FAA be able to have enough resources to get this right.
Dr. DesJarlais. Anything to add?
Mr. Calvelli. Just like we mentioned earlier about, you
know, it is always great to look at policies and directives and
update them, I am sure that, you know, the current regulations
that were put in place didn't anticipate what an amazing space
enterprise we were going to have, and space economy for the
country.
And I think that both Congress and the Executive Branch
need to work together to make sure that we have the most
efficient and effective regulations and policies in place to
continue to allow commercial industry to innovate and take
advantage of launch and take advantage of space, as opposed to
being held back.
Dr. DesJarlais. All right, thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Norcross.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman. I would like to thank
all the witnesses for being here today. And certainly, Dr.
Plumb, we appreciate everything you have done and, more
importantly, what you will continue to do.
I want to drill down a little bit further on the
conversation that Mr. Turner started, and the conversation we
have when we start talking about the recent U.N. Security
Resolution that was vetoed by Russia.
But you mentioned an item that brings up the Outer Space
Treaty, early Sixties sometimes, or maybe it was the late
Sixties sign-on, too, that talks about weaponization in space.
More specifically, I think it talked about mass destruction.
Could you brief us quickly on that?
Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir. It is pretty straightforward,
actually, at least for satellites in orbit around the Earth.
Basically says that countries agree not to place nuclear
weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in orbit
around the Earth. And so, the fact that Russia vetoed the
resolution reaffirming a commitment they have already made is
concerning.
Mr. Norcross. The reason I bring that up is the term ``mass
destruction.'' Because when we look at what is going on outside
of what was recently reported, have the Russians and Chinese
always, have they already militarized and weaponized space?
Dr. Plumb. So, if I may, I think you are asking, what you
are asking is a slightly different question --
Mr. Norcross. Exactly.
Dr. Plumb. -- because the Outer Space Treaty does not
preclude military weapons in space, it precludes weapons of
mass destruction in space, and it specifically calls out
nuclear weapons, just to eliminate any confusion.
But if the question is are Russia and China weaponizing
space or militarizing space? Absolutely. Absolutely. They are
developing, and fielding, and deploying a number of counter-
space weapons. Some are ground-based but some are on-orbit.
And I think that, personally, personally think that that is
what makes their kind of continuing championing at the U.N.
their PPWT, which is about not placing weapons on orbit, to be
so hypocritical and, frankly, unbelievable.
You know, at the unclassified level we can say that Russia
is deploying and developing prototype kinetic weapons in space.
We can say that China has developed robotic satellites that
are really, probably, dual-use. They could be used for non-
military purposes but they can clearly also be used for
military purposes like grappling a satellite. And in a
classified session we can go deeper.
But I do think that their proposal at the U.N. just
continues to be both unbelievable, unverifiable, and really
hypocritical based on what they are actually doing.
Mr. Norcross. Exactly the point I am trying to make. There
are weapons in space, mass destruction, crossing every
threshold, particularly with the nuclear side of that equation.
When we look forward to what is coming in space and, quite
frankly, potentially could happen, our nuclear command and
control, and this would be delicate in this environment, in the
event that space were to be blocked, mass destruction somewhere
else, what would cause us any concerns for nuclear command and
control? Space got wiped out, do we still have a way of
addressing those issues?
Dr. Plumb. So, I will just say any good military plan
requires both your primary, your alternate, your contingency
and emergency plan for communications. We do rely heavily on
space for all military missions, but we do need to have plans
for contingency.
Mr. Norcross. Right. But as we look forward, and this is
where I am going with this line of questioning, in addition to
the command and control, putting that aside to be addressed,
our eyes would be put out?
Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norcross. And that is a major concern because then we
won't necessarily know until some other forum would let us know
that there was an attack?
Dr. Plumb. Yeah, I think this is where -- this, this line
of conversation is the type of conversation that needs to be
held with potential adversaries, right, with Russia, with
China. That is why we have routinely said that attacks on our
nuclear plan and control system, including our overhead eyes,
you know, overhead persistent infrared, is, is a preclude to
attack, is a concern. Right? If you are doing this, why are you
doing this outside of getting ready to attack in some
blindness?
And so, these are, they should be off limits things to
prevent escalation in the worst case to a nuclear war.
Mr. Norcross. Exactly my point. Thank you.
And I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Strong.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member
Moulton. Mr. Calvelli, thank you for being here today.
You may have heard a few weeks ago I co-led a bipartisan
letter in support of the National Security Space Launch Program
with Ranking Member Moulton which supported several member --
which is supported by several members of the House Defense
Committee.
I would like to commend the Department for its steps taken
to encourage competition within Phase III of the NSSL program,
specifically the dual lane approach which provides separate
launch opportunities for new entrants and experienced national
security launch providers.
However, I do have concerns about Lane I. What guardrails
does Phase III have to keep any providers, particularly our
experienced providers, with high launch cadences, from
underbidding Lane I launches intended for the new entrants
trying to cut their teeth?
Mr. Calvelli. You know, it is all going to depend on what
the payload is and the mission. And, I mean, the key to entry
into Lane 1 is the ability to actually have launch of the
rocket.
I think I understand your point. And I will have to take
that back to think more through about that.
Mr. Strong. Thank you.
To be clear, there is nothing official within the Phase III
strategy to ensure that smaller new providers are benefitting
from Lane 1 as intended. Is that, is that a fair assessment?
Mr. Calvelli. I think it all depends on the size of the
payroll. If you are launching, you know, just a couple of small
sats, it is going to be more cost effective to go on a small
provider than it is going to be on a more traditional rocket.
Just it is going to cost you a lot less.
Mr. Strong. I understand the point you are trying to make.
But if the Department is truly committed to the dual lane
approach and encouraging new providers to work with the Space
Force, I would personally like to see something a bit more
concrete to protect this.
Mr. Calvelli, how confident are you that the Space Force's
plan for missile warning and tracking capabilities meets
requirements to provide full operational capability within the
necessary time frame?
Mr. Calvelli. Well, I am very confident. We have got a
great architecture already on orbit today with the Space-Based
Infrared System. So, we are flying vehicles with that today.
Those are operational on-orbit and doing great things.
We have their replacements coming through what is called
the Next Gen GEO Program that is continuing to make progress.
And we will see a launch of that in the 2025-2026 time frame.
But we have some challenges making sure that the mission
payload gets delivered. It is about a year late. And we are
tracking that really closely. It should arrive this summer for
integration into the satellite and for launch at the end of
2025, early 2026.
On top of that, we also have pivoted a couple of years back
to start developing a proliferated LEO constellation and a
proliferated MEO [medium-earth orbit] constellation at Medium
Earth Orbit. Both those constellations add a new capability.
The ones in orbit say only the missile warning. These are
now, these systems, the MEO and LEO, will do missile tracking.
So, they will warn you and they will track the missile, which
would be ideal for advanced weapons systems like hypersonics.
Mr. Strong. That is exactly why I, you know, asked that
question. I know you submitted a statement, you highlighted a
concern with the delivery of the timeline for next generation
GEO. And I appreciate that, that answer.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
And I see we are 5 minutes left on the clock over on the
voting in the chamber. But I am going to let Garamendi, Mr.
Garamendi ask any questions he wants to.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Norcross and I developed an additional
question.
Was the 1960 nuclear explosion by the United States
information classified?
Dr. Plumb. No. You can, you can look it up online, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. What did we learn from that?
Dr. Plumb. Well, obviously it was a different time. And, of
course, we were doing nuclear tests and things.
But I think what we learned, if I have my history right, is
that it did significant damage to all the satellites that were
in those orbits. And some failed soon, but some failed over
time and was attributed to that explosion.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I am going to just pose the
question then come back to you in writing because we are out of
time here.And this is for Dr. Plumb and Mr. Calvelli. Commander
of U.S. Space Command cited space domain awareness as the
Command's top priority. Among the escalating threats from China
and Russia, part of what was discussed just a moment ago, do we
have the ability to be aware? And if not, what do we need to do
to be aware at this phase?
If you can come back to us in writing.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 79.]
Mr. Garamendi. Other than that, our careers will be
terminated if we miss our votes. So, we had best be on our way.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Representative.
I want to thank all the witnesses for testifying. I thank
the members for participating. I thank the audience for their
interest.
And we are now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 1, 2024
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 1, 2024
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
May 1, 2024
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Calvelli. Yes, the U.S. Space Force possesses ability
to be aware of space activities through its Space Domain
Awareness (SDA) capabilities. The U.S. Space Force
distinguishes SDA into four functions: 1) Detect/Track/
Identify, 2) Characterization, 3) Threat Warning and
Assessment, and 4) Data Integration and Exploitation. As a
result, the Service has invested in space- and ground-based
sensors and the purchasing of commercial data to be able to
build patterns of life and identify potential threats in the
low, medium, and geosynchronous Earth orbits.
This sensor data can be integrated and exploited to provide
planners, operators, and decision makers a comprehensive
picture to determine the best courses of action. In FY25, USSF
plans to invest $826.3M in critical sensing capabilities,
including continuing construction of the Deep Space Advanced
Radar Capability (DARC) Site 1 at Harold E. Holt Station,
Australia, complete development of the first Ground-Based
Optical Surveillance System (GBOSS) site at White Sands Missile
Range, and purchase optics for the second GBOSS site at Maui.
[See page 23.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 1, 2024
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. It's vitally important that we exercise our National
Technical Means to detect, track, intercept hypersonic threats.
1.Can you please describe the resources the NRO is putting toward
detecting and tracking hypersonic threats? 2. Which organs of the NRO
are responsible for this mission? 3. How is the NRO leveraging
commercial hypersonic entities to ensure it's systems are properly
calibrated and able to detect and track hypersonic threats?
Dr. Meink. This response contains controlled or classified
information. Member office should contact committee staff to review.
Mr. Lamborn. It's vitally important that we exercise our National
Technical Means to detect, track, intercept hypersonic threats.
1. Can you please describe the resources the NGA is putting toward
detecting and tracking hypersonic threats? 2. Which organs of NGA are
responsible for this mission? 3. How is the NGA leveraging commercial
hypersonic entities to ensure it's systems and people are properly
calibrated trained to detect and track hypersonic threats?
Ms. Wilkerson. This response contains sensitive or classified
information. The Member office should contact committee staff to
review.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. Careful attention is being paid to Space Force's
acquisition approach for Phase 3 of the National Security Space Launch
Program, which procures commercial launch services for our key military
satellites. What is the timeline, or date, when you expect Phase 3
awards will be made? Do you expect all Lane 2 Offerors to have
conducted all necessary certification flights in order to allocate
missions this year?
Mr. Calvelli. The NSSL Phase 3 acquisition has two lanes. Lane 1
provides access to diverse and innovative emerging options as they
become available for the more risk-tolerant missions and utilizes a
tailored mission assurance approach. Lane 2 ensures assured access to
space for the hardest, "no-fail" missions by placing a priority on
meeting all NSSL requirements, including full government mission
assurance with NSSL-certified launch vehicles. On June 13, 2024, we
awarded the Phase 3 Lane 1 Indefinite-Delivery Indefinite-Quantity
(IDIQ) contracts to United Launch Alliance, SpaceX, and Blue Origin.
There will be annual Lane 1 IDIQ on-ramping opportunities to allow
emerging launch service providers or systems to compete when ready.
Phase 3 Lane 2 contracts are expected to award in the January 2025
timeframe. We intend to award up to three Lane 2 contracts.
Phase 3 Lane 2 is currently in source selection with specific
bidder information being considered source selection sensitive. Among
other considerations, Lane 2 bidders are being evaluated on their
ability to certify by October 1, 2026. To minimize launch delays due to
launch vehicle readiness, Lane 2 Order Year 1 (FY25) missions will only
be awarded to companies who have completed certification by the
contract award date. Additionally, subsequent missions will only be
assigned to awardees who have completed certification by 1 October of
the respective Order Year.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Mr. Carbajal. We hear about ``buy before you build'' and
``commercial first,'' and there are policies and presidential
directives that provide similar guidance. There is a lot of rhetoric
that seems to push towards leveraging commercial capabilities within
the IC, yet when we examine the budget allocations and requirements
aligned with commercial services, like the NRP (National Reconnaissance
Program) and NGP (National Geospatial-Intelligence Program), the
proportion is relatively small, even with the initial steps of EOCL
(Electro-Optical Commercial Layer), Luno, etc.
The domestic commercial industry has also contributed significantly
in terms of data and analytics that are particularly evident in
missions like those in Ukraine and CENTCOM support, yet the current
investment in leveraging and developing such solutions appears minimal.
Could you elaborate on your plans to allocate resources more
effectively to harness the proven benefits of greater commercial
support and meet these policy and strategic objectives, fostering great
innovation and enabling the unique capabilities that only the
government can provide?
Dr. Meink. This response contains controlled or classified
information. Member office should contact committee staff to review.
Mr. Carbajal. EOCL and Luno aside, how are your organizations
continuing to give the commercial industry an opportunity to meet more
and more of the traditional and legacy requirements that have
previously been met by the government, especially when looking forward?
Dr. Meink. This response contains controlled or classified
information. Member office should contact committee staff to review.
Mr. Carbajal. While the initial steps you've made in programs like
EOCL and LUNO are positive, they are very small relative to overall NRP
and NGP budgets. We've seen significant strategic and operational
mission value in what commercial industry can provide in conflicts
around the world, including preparing for and deterring China. What
strategic objectives and plans do you have in place to cultivate a
strong domestic commercial industrial base, ensuring sufficient
innovation and resilience for potential future conflicts?
Dr. Meink. This response contains controlled or classified
information. Member office should contact committee staff to review.
Mr. Carbajal. We hear about ``buy before you build'' and
``commercial first,'' and there are policies and presidential
directives that provide similar guidance. There is a lot of rhetoric
that seems to push towards leveraging commercial capabilities within
the IC, yet when we examine the budget allocations and requirements
aligned with commercial services, like the NRP (National Reconnaissance
Program) and NGP (National Geospatial-Intelligence Program), the
proportion is relatively small, even with the initial steps of EOCL
(Electro-Optical Commercial Layer), Luno, etc.
The domestic commercial industry has also contributed significantly
in terms of data and analytics that are particularly evident in
missions like those in Ukraine and CENTCOM support, yet the current
investment in leveraging and developing such solutions appears minimal.
Could you elaborate on your plans to allocate resources more
effectively to harness the proven benefits of greater commercial
support and meet these policy and strategic objectives, fostering great
innovation and enabling the unique capabilities that only the
government can provide?
Ms. Wilkerson. The geospatial intelligence commercial industry is
expanding and NGA will take advantage of that evolution. Today, NGA
incorporates a wide range of commercial GEOINT ranging from greenhouse
gas emissions and mining data to commercial computer vision to supply
chain security. We are able to execute global climate security and
economic monitoring efforts that would simply not be possible
otherwise, while also more effectively allocating our analytic
expertise and national resources to the most pressing intelligence and
operational requirements.
Central to our efforts are our upcoming Luno contracts, the use of
Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO) authorities, and NGA's increasing
investment in these capabilities. These efforts will posture NGA to
accommodate an increased demand signal from the DOD and intelligence
community for commercial data and analytic services and encourage
commercial industry to continue to innovate and provide increasingly
viable commercial analytic capabilities in the future. More
specifically, NGA will award the Luno A contract this year for
unclassified, commercial GEOINT-derived computer vision and analytic
services.
Combined with Luno B, for which we recently released a Request for
Proposal, we will have a combined ceiling of $490M. This is a 17-fold
ceiling increase when compared to NGA's old commercial analytics
contract for Economic Indicator Monitoring. Additionally, earlier this
year, NGA announced the solicitation for our firstever CSO, which will
be focused on supporting frontline efforts against illegal, unreported,
and unregulated fishing, illicit trafficking, and other activities
which pose threats to global security.
NGA's continued investments in opportunities like Luno and CSOs
strive to mitigate the historical barriers to entry by providing
opportunities for the commercial sector to work with NGA to understand
and answer our hardest requirements. We are asking industry to propose
innovative solutions not currently available to solve one of our most
difficult operational challenges, using commercial GEOINT to maintain
shareability when working with international partners while preserving
national resources for priorities that cannot be addressed by
commercial. We believe this partnership with our commercial industry
colleagues will unlock promising solutions to some of our customers'
most challenging needs.
Mr. Carbajal. EOCL and Luno aside, how are your organizations
continuing to give the commercial industry an opportunity to meet more
and more of the traditional and legacy requirements that have
previously been met by the government, especially when looking forward?
Ms. Wilkerson. NGA is continually working to increase opportunities
for the commercial industry to meet traditional and legacy requirements
for the community.
First, NGA continues to increase engagements with commercial GEOINT
providers. The Commercial Operations team held 181 company engagements
in FY23 and has already held 171 company engagements as of 3QFY24.
These engagements provide industry partners a better understanding of
NGA's needs and often result in bailment agreements which allow NGA to
test commercial solutions in real world mission scenarios.
Second, NGA expanded outreach to National System for GEOINT
partners about commercial capabilities. This provides the GEOINT
community greater exposure to the potential offered by commercial
solutions and allows them to participate in assessments of those
capabilities.
Third, in addition to the Luno contracts, NGA has begun using
Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO) authorities. In May 2024, we
announced a new CSO opportunity, in partnership with the Defense
Innovation Unit, to broaden maritime awareness globally. Selected
vendors responding to this CSO will pitch their capabilities in early
July 2024, and NGA hopes to select one or more awardees shortly
thereafter.
Mr. Carbajal. While the initial steps you've made in programs like
EOCL and LUNO are positive, they are very small relative to overall NRP
and NGP budgets. We've seen significant strategic and operational
mission value in what commercial industry can provide in conflicts
around the world, including preparing for and deterring China. What
strategic objectives and plans do you have in place to cultivate a
strong domestic commercial industrial base, ensuring sufficient
innovation and resilience for potential future conflicts?
Ms. Wilkerson. NGA has taken a multi-pronged approach to
cultivating a strong domestic commercial industrial base. The agency
will continue to maximize all opportunities and community partnerships,
like the NRO innovation fund, to bring efficiency and innovation to
each of our commercial acquisitions and sustain the most promising and
impactful commercial capabilities.
First, we continue to expand formal partnerships between companies
and NGA, leading to improvements in the technical solutions and
capabilities the companies offer.
Since FY19, NGA has partnered in 43 bailment agreements with over
36 entities. The agreements allow rapid evaluation of a company's
product while simultaneously providing valued insight into current
commercial capabilities and mission needs.
Similarly, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs)
offer low-risk, flexible opportunities for commercial companies,
universities, and other nonfederal entities to engage with NGA on joint
research and development projects. NGA has used CRADAs with several
companies ranging from NUVIEW to Maxar Technologies.
Second, NGA is continuously communicating our needs while we seek
commercial solutions that are not yet mature, helping industry
understand our requirements and our interest. In August of 2024, NGA
will host the first NSG Commercial GEOINT Conference, bringing together
industry and government participants in a classified setting. Further,
NGA released multiple requests for information/proposals for topics
ranging from nonearth imaging to maritime domain awareness, providing
industry the opportunity to offer their innovative solutions to meet
our mission needs.
Finally, we are applying mature commercial solutions to real-world
issues today, sending a critical demand signal that will lead to more
industry investments and innovation.
For example, since the beginning of the Ukraine-Russia crisis, NGA
has worked with commercial partners to increase collection over
Ukraine's Area of Interest. In addition to sharing that commercial
imagery with Ukraine upon collection, we added Commercial Synthetic
Aperture Radar (SAR) collection, demonstrating the value of SAR in a
region with difficult weather conditions. This clearly demonstrated to
DOD, the IC, and commercial industry the scale and scope of the
opportunities for commercial imagery and analytics and will continue to
lead to industry innovation.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. I understand the space force is projecting that our
launch sites will become a bottleneck in the next two years. Should the
nation be investing in expanding our major launch site infrastructure,
such as increase payload processing capacity, to ensure we can get all
the necessary national security assets into space?
Dr. Plumb. [No answer was available at the time of publication.]
Mr. Waltz. An article just came out last week on China's Taijing-4
03 commercial satellite, which captured detailed radar images of the
U.S. Navy's Naval Station Norfolk.
Since 2016, when the Chinese recognized its military organizations
to increase its focus on space, China has deployed 950 satellites
(according to a Pentagon report this last week) that are dual military
and commercial use with over 470 of those as dedicated ISR platforms
for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Are you concerned with how China's rapid deployment and leveraging
of their commercial satellites? In response, how are we leveraging our
commercial satellites as part of the Commercial Augmentation Space
Reserve?
Dr. Meink. This response contains controlled or classified
information. Member office should contact committee staff to review.
Mr. Waltz. We recognize the satellites used to monitor the space
environment are severely limited by the amount of fuel in their tanks.
Late last year, an NBC News article highlighted that, "China
successfully tested the equivalent of a refueling tanker for
satellites, a game-changing innovation that would enable Beijing to
extend the life of satellites that would otherwise expire after running
out of fuel."
I note the Space Force is asking for $20 million in its 2025 budget
request to start developing tools to handle a new mission set called
"Servicing, Mobility, and Logistics" to address the satellite refueling
concern.
Is DoD/SPACECOM developing its own "on-orbit" refueling operations
or are there any commercial providers that the Service is working with
to either provide or develop this capability? If China is already
testing refueling capabilities on-orbit, how does this program enable
us to refuel our own satellites? Is more funding around the corner in
the future years defense plan? o What is your timeline to have this
capability ready to go? o Does the budget request align with this
timeline? o Do you have all the authorities you require to develop or
contract these capabilities with commercial providers?
Dr. Meink. This response contains controlled or classified
information. Member office should contact committee staff to review.
Mr. Waltz. Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS) rapidly integrates
and deploys space-based end-to-end capabilities in response to
Combatant Commander urgent needs within a 24 hour response timeline.
This could be for surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking, or special
communications missions. I note that the FY25 budget request provides
for $30 million for RDT&E for this program. Are you able to comment on
the number of missions conducted in FY24? o How many of those were
conducted with commercial partners? o Is DoD/SPACECOM pleased with
those results?
Dr. Meink. This response contains controlled or classified
information. Member office should contact committee staff to review.
Mr. Waltz. An article just came out last week on China's Taijing-4
03 commercial satellite, which captured detailed radar images of the
U.S. Navy's Naval Station Norfolk.
Since 2016, when the Chinese recognized its military organizations
to increase its focus on space, China has deployed 950 satellites
(according to a Pentagon report this last week) that are dual military
and commercial use with over 470 of those as dedicated ISR platforms
for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Are you concerned with how China's rapid deployment and leveraging
of their commercial satellites? In response, how are we leveraging our
commercial satellites as part of the Commercial Augmentation Space
Reserve?
Ms. Wilkerson. China is unquestionably fielding a broad suite of
diverse imagery collection systems that offer the potential to
significantly improve their situational awareness and ability to
support military operations. While I am concerned by that potential, I
note the more nuanced question - and difficult one to answer - is
whether China is able to effectively task, exploit, and disseminate
information from their growing constellation of satellites.
NGA has found great utility in commercial imagery and analytics,
and we fully support the creation of a Commercial Augmentation Space
Reserve (CASR). While the U.S. Space Force is best positioned to
address your question about how commercial satellite systems might be
integrated within the CASR framework, NGA is postured to manage and
utilize data and services from CASR providers meeting specified U.S.
Government security and interoperability standards during times of
crisis or conflict.
[all]