    [House Hearing, 118 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 118-71]

               A REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE'S

            POSTURE AND CAPABILITIES IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND IN

                       SYNCHRONIZING INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS

                                 TO COUNTER THE

                           PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 APRIL 11, 2024

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    57-372                    WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                        JACK BERGMAN, Michigan, Chairman

    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
    RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 SARA JACOBS, California
    NANCY MACE, South Carolina           JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
    MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas               JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
    CORY MILLS, Florida                  JIMMY PANETTA, California

                    Craig Greene, Professional Staff Member
                   Will T. Johnson, Professional Staff Member
                        Owen McGeary, Research Assistant

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Bergman, Hon. Jack, a Representative from Michigan, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............     1
    Gallego. Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations....     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Harris, Milancy D., Acting Under Secretary of Defense for
      Intelligence and Security, U.S. Department Of Defense..........     3
    Haugh, Gen Timothy D., USAF, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command,
      Director, National Security Agency.............................     5
    Kruse, Lt Gen Jeffrey A., USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence
      Agency.........................................................     6

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Harris, Milancy D............................................    25
        Haugh, Gen Timothy D.........................................    30
        Kruse, Lt Gen Jeffrey A......................................    35

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Keating..................................................    81
        Ms. Jacobs...................................................    81
        Ms. McClellan................................................    82

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Kelly....................................................    85
         A REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE'S POSTURE AND
    CAPABILITIES IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND IN SYNCHRONIZING INTELLIGENCE
               EFFORTS TO COUNTER THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
           Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
                              Washington, DC, Thursday, April 11, 2024.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jack Bergman
    [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACK BERGMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
     MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL
                              OPERATIONS.

        Mr. Bergman. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to
    order.
        I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to
    declare a recess at any time.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        Today we will hear from our witnesses on the Defense
    Intelligence Enterprise's Posture and Capabilities in Strategic
    Competition and in Synchronizing Intelligence Efforts to
    Counter the People's Republic of China.
        The Department's efforts are focused on China as the
    priority of the National Defense Strategy, but once again, as
    we hold this hearing, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been
    raging for more than 2 years; North Korea continues to test
    nuclear missiles; on October 7, Hamas conducted a surprise
    attack on Israel leading to a prolonged violent conflict that
    Iran has leveraged, using its proxies to attack U.S. forces in
    Iraq and Syria, while supporting the Houthi attacks on
    international shipping; and threats from terrorist
    organizations are still persistent across the globe.
        The Defense Intelligence Enterprise has a challenging task
    to support the Department's efforts in strategic competition,
    counter China, and support the remaining Geographic Combatant
    Commanders to counter increased threats in their areas of
    operations, as well as their persistent counterterrorism
    efforts. This is by no means an easy task.
        I am interested in understanding each of your roles in
    synchronizing these efforts and ensuring your organizations
    have the ability -- have the capabilities needed, are resourced
    appropriately, and what capability gaps exist.
        I would like to welcome today's witnesses, all of whom are
    appearing before this subcommittee for the first time in their
    current capacities:
        The Honorable Ms. Milancy Harris, Acting Under Secretary of
    Defense for Intelligence and Security; General Haugh, Director
    of National Security Agency, Chief of Central Security Service,
    and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, and; Lieutenant General
    Kruse, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency.
        In the interests of time, I ask the witnesses to keep their
    opening remarks to 5 minutes or less so that we will have more
    time for closed discussion.
        With that, let me again thank our witnesses for appearing
    before us today. And I will recognize Ranking Member Panetta
    for any opening remarks.

        STATEMENT OF HON. JIMMY PANETTA, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
     CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
                           SPECIAL OPERATIONS

        Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I appreciate this opportunity to be in this seat but also,
    and more importantly, to be part of this very, very important
    hearing. So, thank you for calling it. And thanks to all of the
    witnesses for your time today to appear in front of this
    subcommittee.
        Before we start, though, I do want to take just a quick
    chance to highlight that all of the witnesses are relatively
    new to your positions. So, welcome and congratulations, as that
    really is a testament to your organizations that even as
    leaders transition on to other roles the people that make up
    our defense intelligence enterprise continue to do the great
    work to protect our country.
        So, thank you.
        Now, last year we had this same hearing and we opened up
    the hearing by saying the current global security environment
    is dynamic. Is dynamic. Not only has that not changed, it has
    become, I think we can all admit, even more dynamic.
        We had the horrific attack on Israel by Hamas on October
    7th, the ensuing conflict, and the humanitarian crisis, the
    malign actors that seek to exploit and expand on that conflict
    all across the Middle East.
        We still have Russia as it continues its illegal and unjust
    war which has resulted in enormous damage to Ukraine, the
    people of Russia, and threatens the United States' interests.
        We have Putin who remains defiant as he builds new
    partnerships to provide him the ability to continue that
    conflict.
        We have Iran with its terrorist proxies and its nuclear
    program.
        Then there is North Korea and its nuclear weapons.
        And we have violent extremist organizations who continue to
    carry out deadly attacks, as we saw in Iran and Russia, and
    continue to fill the voids that are present in the continent of
    Africa.
        And, of course, we have the Chinese Communist Party that
    continues to present a considerable challenge. Its willingness
    to act aggressively in contravention to international norms,
    coupled with its extensive efforts to modernize and to
    consolidate its control over the People's Liberation Army.
        All of those are cause for concern, as coercive actions
    orchestrated by the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] continue to
    undermine both regional and global stability.
        Based on my recent travel to the region with Chairman
    Bergman it was good to see, though, the firsthand partnerships
    that the United States has, and continue to grow and
    strengthen, and share intelligence to counter CCP's malignant
    efforts.
        The Defense Intelligence Enterprise is a key component of
    the whole of government approach to containing all of these
    types of threats. Given that the global environment remains
    dynamic, now more than ever this committee remains committed to
    ensuring that your organizations have the resources and
    authorities required to carry out the duty that our country
    asks, our country demands of you. To effectively deal with
    those challenges and to recognize that we are in an era of
    Great Power competition, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
    must be postured and ready to deal with all of those threats.
        The Defense Intelligence Enterprise must remain agile, be
    collaborative across the enterprise, quickly provide releasable
    and actionable intelligence throughout the Department, and
    collaborate with our allies and with our partners.
        That is why this hearing is important and why I look
    forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
        We will now hear from our witnesses, then move into the
    question and answer session. Immediately following one round of
    questions we will reconvene for the classified session which
    will take place in Rayburn Room 2337.
        I now recognize Ms. Harris.

      STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MILANCY D. HARRIS, ACTING UNDER
       SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, U.S.
                         DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Ms. Harris. Chairman Bergman, Representative Panetta, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to
    testify today on the current posture of the Defense
    Intelligence and Security Enterprise to confront the diverse
    array of global threats and challenges facing the United States
    of America and our allies and partners.
        The intelligence and security experts across the Department
    of Defense work tirelessly to address current and future
    threats to our nation on a daily basis. On their behalf, thank
    you to the members of this subcommittee for your ongoing
    support and collaboration.
        I am joined here today by the Director of the National
    Security Agency, Timothy Haugh, and Director of the Defense
    Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Jeffrey Kruse. They
    will be offering their intelligence-informed perspectives on
    how we support our warfighters and characterize the challenges
    facing the United States, our allies, and partners today and in
    the future.
        We look forward to your questions on these challenges and
    how our enterprise is postured to meet them.
        In addition to my remarks today, I have submitted a
    classified statement for the record detailing our fiscal year
    2025 Military Intelligence Program budget request, providing
    further insight into our plans.
        Our number one priority remains addressing our pacing
    challenge, the People's Republic of China. We seek a free and
    open Indo-Pacific Region that is peaceful and secure. Our
    network of regional allies and partners is deep, wide, strong,
    and committed to a shared vision of peace, stability, and
    deterrence.
        The fiscal year 2025 President's Budget Request for the
    Military Intelligence Program postures the Defense Intelligence
    and Security Enterprise to support all of these efforts, and
    more.
        The Department is also actively focused, with our NATO
    [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, in support of
    Ukraine's defense against Russia's invasion. We must remain
    vigilant in safeguarding against a resurgent Russian threat to
    NATO, international security, and the rules-based order.
        The Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise is
    enabling the Department's response to the ongoing conflict
    between Israel and Hamas, as well as other crises in the Middle
    East involving the Houthis, Iranian-affiliated militia groups,
    and violent extremist organizations such as ISIS [Islamic State
    of Iraq and Syria] and Al Qaeda. We will continue to cooperate
    with allies and partners and leverage technology to build an
    enduring and sustainable counterterrorism posture to monitor
    and disrupt terrorist threats.
        Regarding both the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, in order
    to continue the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise's
    support, it is vitally important that Congress approve the
    supplemental funding we have requested. That funding is
    urgently needed to support our allies and partners. If we walk
    away, that will signal that the United States is an unreliable
    partner and embolden would-be aggressors across the globe.
        In our fiscal year 2025 budget request we seek to advance
    crucial programs in the following ways:
        Providing the Department with an information and decision
    advantage over key adversaries, focused on the PRC [People's
    Republic of China];
        Operationalizing defense intelligence and security
    partnerships across the Department, U.S. Government, our allies
    and partners, and the private sector;
        Elevating security and counterintelligence to the maximum
    extent across the Department, and;
        Identifying, recruiting, training, and retaining a
    workforce capable of supporting our mission requirements.
        Finally, before I close I want to emphasize how critical it
    is for Congress to reauthorize Section 702 of the Foreign
    Intelligence Surveillance Act before it expires on April 19th.
        Additionally, recently proposed legislation has sought to
    limit DoD's lawful and appropriate access to and use of
    commercially available information, or CAI, which is used to
    support the full spectrum of DoD [Department of Defense]
    missions. CAI is lawfully obtained by DoD and subject to
    stringent handling procedures to protect the privacy and civil
    liberties of U.S. persons.
        It is important for the effectiveness of the Defense
    Intelligence and Security Enterprise that DoD and Congress have
    the opportunity to collaborate on legislation so as to preserve
    appropriate access to this data.
        In summary, the President's Budget supports the
    Department's programs and authorities needed to address these
    global challenges, maintain our strategic advantages, and
    provide decision-makers and policymakers with information at
    the speed of relevance.
        With that, I again thank the members of this subcommittee
    for your leadership and support. And I look forward to
    answering your questions here, and in our closed session.
        I will now turn to General Haugh for his remarks.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Harris can be found in the
    Appendix on page 25.]
        Mr. Bergman. General Haugh, you are recognized.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL TIMOTHY D. HAUGH, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
           CYBER COMMAND, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

        General Haugh. Chairman Bergman, Representative Panetta,
    and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to be
    with you today representing the men and women of U.S. Cyber
    Command and the National Security Agency.
        Defending the nation is the heart of our mission. The
    People's Republic of China poses a challenge unlike any our
    nation and allies have faced before, competing fiercely in the
    information domain. The men and women of U.S. Cyber Command and
    NSA continue to use the full scope of our authorities and the
    full spectrum of our capabilities to contest the threats posed
    by the PRC, imposing costs, denying benefits, and deterring the
    adversary.
        We will continue to strengthen partnerships across the U.S.
    Government, with foreign partners, and with private industry so
    that we may operate anywhere we are needed. We are ready and
    postured to contest PRC malicious activities, at home and
    abroad.
        While cyberspace threats have increased, we are ready to
    counter these threats with increased strength and capability.
    U.S. Cyber Command and NSA [National Security Agency] continue
    to use capabilities and partnerships to deny the PRC
    opportunities, frustrate their strategic efforts, and
    systematically eradicate intrusions. Our cybersecurity mission
    is protecting the Department of Defense and the Defense
    Industrial Base from adversary nation-states and ransomware
    attacks.
        We are collaborating with U.S. Government partners and
    foreign partners to develop and execute intelligence-driven
    campaigns to counter adversary activities. In addition, we
    continue to identify and share adversary tools and tradecraft,
    enabling public and private partners to further defend against
    these threats.
        Within U.S. Cyber Command and NSA we are making investments
    in our workforce. Our talented, agile, and diverse people
    represent an important competitive advantage across all of our
    mission sets. That is why we are committed to reducing the time
    our new applicants spend in the hiring process, and
    strengthening our expertise, both in-house and through hiring,
    especially those with language and technical skills.
        I remain focused on the reauthorization of Title VII of the
    Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which is of paramount
    importance. FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act]
    Section 702 is absolutely critical to our foreign intelligence
    mission. There is no substitute for this authority. The timely,
    actionable information it provides cannot be replicated by
    other means.
        As you consider reauthorization, I look forward to
    discussion how this tool enables mission success and the
    controls we implement to ensure the protection of the privacy
    and civil liberties of the American people.
        I would like to reiterate my appreciation for the
    opportunity to testify in front of you today, and for the
    committee's continued support of our mission and our people.
        I look forward to our conversation.
        [The prepared statement of General Haugh can be found in
    the Appendix on page 30.]
        Mr. Bergman. Lieutenant General Kruse, you are recognized.

        STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JEFFREY A. KRUSE, USAF,
                 DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

        General Kruse. Chairman Berman, Representative and today's
    Ranking Member Panetta, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
    Defense Intelligence Agency's assessment of the global security
    environment.
        The complexity, trajectory, and rate of change in the
    national security arena is perhaps the highest and most
    consequential we have seen in our lifetime. How we respond
    matters, and our level of innovation, focus, and integration
    must match our adversaries stride for stride. We must position
    ourselves and our capabilities to meet the threats we see now
    and on the horizon, and not simply posture to repeat successes
    of the past.
        DIA and our global workforce in more than 140 nations
    around the globe, partnered with our colleagues all across the
    nation and in the defense intelligence community are at the
    forefront of this task, collecting, analyzing, and
    operationalizing intelligence that underpins policy, diplomacy,
    acquisition and, when needed, combat operations.
        It is an honor to join two of my colleagues in this
    endeavor, Honorable Harris and General Haugh, before the
    committee today.
        In my first 2 months as the 23rd director of the Defense
    Intelligence Agency, I have taken a threefold approach to
    setting our course:
        First, we are intensely integrated with and focused on
    meeting the needs of our warfighters and our allies and
    partners who are engaged in combat operations around the globe.
        Second, we are addressing new and emerging security and
    intelligence challenges that fundamentally alter our operating
    environment, ranging from technology and artificial
    intelligence to cyber and biosecurity, to a growing number of
    adversaries who are interacting and partnering in ways and
    towards ends we have not seen before.
        In these specific areas I have started three 90-day sprints
    addressing foundational military intelligence for cyber, the
    need for integrated force tracking in benign environments, and
    technical intelligence collection.
        Finally, I have focused on partnerships, the one asset our
    adversaries simply cannot match. I have had more than 30
    international engagements, to include hosting more than 70
    foreign military representatives in my first 60 days. Simply
    stated, the scale of national security challenges require a new
    scale in effective national security partnerships.
        My aim in this hearing is to crystallize these challenges
    and growing threats that we see and support this subcommittee
    in its critical work of defending the nation. One of the ways
    Congress can provide its most effective support and defense of
    the nation is to reauthorize Section 702 of the Foreign
    Intelligence Surveillance Act. Although DIA [Defense
    Intelligence Agency] collection does not operate under these
    specific authorities, our all-source analysis mission, our
    ability to operationalize intelligence, and our support to the
    Congress is dependent on those who do.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
    subcommittee today. I am privileged to lead the Defense
    Intelligence Agency and represent the talented and dedicated
    global workforce.
        We are grateful for your continued support. And I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Kruse can be found in
    the Appendix on page 35.]
        Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
        I recognize myself for five minutes.
        First one: question is for you, General Haugh.
        Can you explain how your dual hat as Director of NSA and
    Commander of CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] has benefitted the
    intelligence community as well as the cyber community?
        General Haugh. Thank you very much for the question,
    Chairman.
        So, from what the determination as to how we looked at the
    structure of both Cyber Command and NSA, so having a single
    leader that is able to lead both organizations. What it really
    benefits from both the intelligence community and from
    cyberspace is how we operate within the same operating domain
    within cyberspace and with common partners. We are able to have
    agility, we are able to operate with speed, and able to operate
    with a common intent.
        What that really helps from an intelligence community
    perspective is that as we think about the campaigns that are
    going to be conducted in cyberspace we can start with how are
    we going to protect those key intelligence sources and methods
    that allow the nation to have insights, that allow our
    combatant commanders to have indications and warning, while
    able to generate outcomes in cyberspace that meet the demands
    of our warfighters.
        That speed and agility was something that was looked at
    closely when, in July 2022, both the DNI [Director of National
    Intelligence] and the Secretary of Defense commissioned a joint
    study. They wanted to look at the dual hat construct.
        Their conclusion was that it was in the best interests of
    the nation, and for many of those same reasons, to be able to
    move with speed and agility, the ability to have a common
    conversation, particularly with our foreign partners about how
    we partner together in cyberspace, and then how we can move
    aggressively when we see threats to the nation and the
    Department of Defense.
        So, I have served in both organizations for the
    preponderance of my career and am very comfortable in terms of
    how we execute every single day for both our intelligence
    mission and our cyber mission.
        Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
        The next question is for all of you for a response.
        The DNI and CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] produced an
    open-sourced intelligence strategy for 2024 to 2026 last month.
    How do each of your envision implementing the strategy,
    especially with the capability of AI [artificial intelligence[
    and machine learning, to (1) call down the trove of information
    into a manageable amount for further analysis, and (2) getting
    ahead and staying ahead of our adversaries?
        So, please.
        Ms. Harris. Thank you for the question.
        I will take it from a little bit of the Department's
    perspective before deferring to the directors on their specific
    enterprise efforts.
        From the Department's perspective, the DNI strategy is one
    part of how we think about the open source ecosystem. In the
    Department of Defense we are very focused on making sure we
    make the maximum use of open source information, to include
    commercially available and publicly available information.
        And for the portions of the Department that sit in the IC
    [intelligence community] , we are focused on making sure that
    there is a framework in which they understand how to use that
    information to the maximum degree possible.
        General Haugh. From the NSA perspective, we do not have an
    open source intelligence mission, but we certainly do leverage
    publicly available and commercially available information.
        What we found most benefit from the overall strategy
    itself, it reaffirms how we handle information, how we use it,
    and then how we protect it in a manner consistent with all of
    our oversight, and all of our laws, all of our values. So, we
    leverage that information. It is a critical start point for us,
    and being able to, particularly, fill in gaps when we think
    about cyber threats. It is an area that we have leveraged very
    deeply and we will continue to follow the guidelines we have
    been given by the Department.
        General Kruse. Thank you for the question.
        For DIA in particular, we are also designated as a Defense
    Intelligence Enterprise manager for open source intelligence.
    So, we do this mission each and every day. And as that
    enterprise manager we are also deeply involved in how the rest
    of the enterprise is able to pull together the tactics,
    techniques, procedures that are associated with this particular
    discipline.
        The approach that DIA has taken since being designated as
    this is to take all the steps that are necessary to turn open
    source into the same kind of discipline that we see in signals
    intelligence, in geospatial intelligence, in measurement and
    signals intelligence. How do we normalize that?
        So, across the board DIA has put together a program, and it
    starts to deliver this year. And it is designed to put a
    structure around everything from requirements management, how
    do we do collection, what's the tradecraft associated with
    analysis, how do we do data management across multiple
    organizations? What does a training program look like, for
    whether it is us or whether it is the services that are doing
    open source?
        And then, more importantly, how do we do the data
    cataloging? So, open source data is purchased or collected by
    one organization; we are not doing it across multiple
    organizations.
        We will deliver on the first iteration of that later this
    year. And over a couple of years we intend to institutionalize
    open source across the Department.
        Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
        Mr. Panetta, you are recognized.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Haugh, Russia and China are using sophisticated
    hybrid and irregular warfare tactics while harnessing cyber and
    technological advantages, as we have seen over the past decade
    for sure.
        It has been abundantly clear that also in Ukraine, where
    the forces have merged advanced technology with irregular
    warfare tactics to increase precision on the battlefield and
    control the information space.
        To maintain our advantage the United States should be
    looking at new ways, similar to how the Ukrainians did it, to
    integrate our Special Forces capabilities with advancements in
    cyber and information operations.
        General, can you explain how USCYBERCOM is working with
    SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] to integrate cyber and
    soft capabilities?
        And then, second, what is your assessment of Russia's
    utilization of both cyber and irregular warfare capabilities?
        General Haugh. Thank you very much for that question.
        So, first, how do we think about our partnership with the
    U.S. Special Operations Command?
        We look at that they are teammates in all of the missions
    that we consider. And so, first, both of us do things in
    support of the other combatant commands and our
    responsibilities. We will do those independently and we will
    conduct operations that are linked to those combatant commands.
        But what we are increasingly finding, that there are times
    where we are able to look at something that the Geographic
    Combatant Commander needs, and if we work together with our
    Special Operations teammates, with our Space teammates, we can
    identify opportunities that allow us to produce an effect that
    would be larger than any of us operating independently.
        Mr. Panetta. Can you give me an example?
        General Haugh. So, there are things that we do in
    cyberspace that would require someone to be in theater and to
    leverage what a special operator would be doing in-country or
    in an environment that we don't reach as U.S. Cyber Command.
        So, that is a partnership. We leverage that. And then we
    are able to extend our reach with our Special Operations
    partners.
        That would be an example.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
        General Haugh. The other area that in terms of Russia's
    evolution, your, your second part of your question, I think
    what we saw at the outset of the conflict is Russia operated in
    cyberspace in the same manner that they did in all the other
    domains. Not well planned, it was brute force.
        But we also saw Ukraine take actions that we should learn
    from. They were very effective in moving their data outside of
    the country using Western cloud providers. Gave them
    resiliency.
        And then they also drew upon any number of nations,
    including the United States, for additional cyber defense
    activities. So, they were very effective at the outset.
        What we have seen is an evolution of how Russia continues
    to use their cyber forces. And I think one of the areas that we
    want to watch really closely is how they're using those forces
    from an intelligence aspect versus the cyber effect. And it is
    an area that we will want to watch closely and inform our
    European Command teammates.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
        General Kruse, last year we discussed the USCYBERCOM, NSA,
    China Outcomes Group and the DIA China Mission Group. Can you
    give us an update on those organizations and how they
    collaborate with these other?
        And if you can answer as much as possible now, we can
    follow up in greater detail in the classified session,
    obviously.
        General Kruse. In this session I would certainly be happy
    to cover, in particular, the China Missions Group within DIA, a
    little bit of how we partner. And the -- I will certainly let
    General Haugh talk to the China Outcomes Group.
        So, a little over a year ago my predecessor, after a series
    of studies, put together the requirement if China is our pacing
    threat, how do we integrate all the activities that we do,
    whether it is collection, whether it is analysis, whether it is
    protection of our own networks?
        And how do we do that in a way that we can then build some
    campaigns to create the effects that we need, both to advance
    our interests, advance our collection, or to protect ourselves.
        So, the China Mission Group that we put together pulls
    together for the first time all of our HUMINT [human
    intelligence] collectors, all of our analysis, all of our
    effects generators, if I could use that term in this
    environment, and stitches together what we might do with our
    service partners and with our interagency partners, to include
    the China Outcome Group, and very much focused on ensuring that
    we are taking, identifying collection gaps, and tasking either
    ourselves or others to fill those collection gaps in order to
    create the out-take, the outcomes that we need.
        And one of our important partners is certainly the China
    Outcomes Group.
        Mr. Panetta. General Haugh, on the China Outcomes Group?
        General Haugh. So, the China Outcomes Group is a combined
    effort between NSA and Cyber Command to align our resources in
    support of INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command]. So, we have a
    series of priorities that we have been given by the INDOPACOM
    commander, and that has allowed us to really look at how would
    we provide intelligence today? How would we do that in a
    crisis? How do we think about network defense and
    cybersecurity, both for INDOPACOM and for their partners?
        And then, if we get into a crisis, what are the things that
    U.S. Cyber Command and NSA can do to assist in generating
    options for the INDOPACOM commander?
        That continues to work very well and very closely with the
    INDOPACOM team.
        And I can give you more details in the closed session.
        Mr. Panetta. Thanks to all of the witnesses.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
        Dr. Jackson, you are recognized for five minutes.
        Dr. Jackson of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank
    you to our witnesses for being here today. Really appreciate
    your time.
        Accurate and actionable intelligence for our Joint Force is
    a key component of all of our operations. A well-informed
    intelligence picture from the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
    will be key for decision-makers and military leaders in
    understanding the potential battle space in the Indo-Pacific
    should a conflict with China arise.
        Similar to other resources across the Department, the
    Defense Intelligence Enterprise cannot neglect other AORs [area
    of responsibility] and miss an intelligence collection
    opportunity. The risks remain in those AORs and we have a duty
    to be properly postured.
        My first question is while we must face -- while we must
    focus on countering the Chinese Communist Party and their
    coercive actions, there are very real threats to our national
    security that exist at our own southern border. In recent years
    we have seen a disturbing trend of known terrorists and Chinese
    military age males coming across our southern border.
        As violent extremist organizations and our adversaries
    continue to become more bold and expand their reach, I am very
    concerned about the threats to our homeland. And our
    intelligence will ultimately prove to be probably our greatest
    defense against these possible threats.
        General Kruse, I will start with you.
        Do you have any concerns -- but I will ask this of all of
    you -- do you have any concerns about the threats that may have
    or potentially could come across our southern border based on
    the increased number of known terrorists and Chinese military
    age males who have crossed our border?
        And how has that increased your workload?
        And are we adequately resourced to remain vigilant
    regarding these threats while simultaneously focusing necessary
    resources on INDOPACOM?
        General Kruse. So, let me answer that two ways.
        One is one of the advantages that DIA has in its very
    complex mission is that in addition to DIA itself at the
    headquarters, we also man the J2s [J-2 Joint Staff] at each of
    the combatant commands. And that gives us an ability to stay
    connected to each of the combatant commands' threats, and that
    includes NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM as you are tracking today.
        So, we are infinitely involved, either directly at the
    headquarters or at the commands working the migration issues,
    the human issues or, in the other case you mentioned, PRC
    coming across the southern border.
        We are always concerned about what may come across the
    southern border. We have not seen to date the things that would
    cause us to notify you of increased concern. But that is always
    a pathway.
        And more to talk. I would be happy to talk more in detail
    when we get to the classified session.
        Dr. Jackson of Texas. Yes, sir. Thank you.
        General Haugh. Congressman, as we look at the southern
    border, we just recently participated, the DNI led a look at
    how could we, as an intelligence community, examine how we
    could better provide intelligence as it looks at fentanyl and
    how it makes its way to the United States.
        As we look at that, I think from our perspective in the
    National Security Agency we are proud of the work that we have
    done to be able to illuminate threats. The area that I am
    probably the most concerned about is we are illuminating most
    of those threats from Section 702.
        That has allowed us to see what it looks like for precursor
    chemicals coming from companies in China, how they make their
    way to Mexico, and then how criminal organizations can then
    move those.
        So, I am concerned that we are going to lose our
    opportunity for those insights unless Section 702 is
    reauthorized.
        Dr. Jackson of Texas. Thank you. That is helpful.
        Ma'am?
        Ms. Harris. Thank you for the question.
        I am confident that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is
    fully engaged on these issues. Many of them are a whole of
    government effort. They cross domestic and foreign
    intelligence. And so, we have, I have full confidence that our
    agencies are fully engaged in that effort.
        From my seat, I am constantly monitoring the resource
    trade-offs, that includes making sure we are making the right
    investments and we are not taking unnecessary trade-offs,
    particularly in the counterterrorism space.
        Dr. Jackson of Texas. Okay. I have one more question kind
    of related to that, to the funding issue.
        But, you know, funding for Defense Intelligence Enterprise
    is split into two major components: the National Intelligence
    Program and the Military Intelligence Program. For fiscal year
    2024 it looks like the National Intelligence Program is funded
    at 72.4 billion, and the Military Intelligence Program is
    funded at 29.3 billion, for a grand total of 101.7 billion.
        For fiscal year 2024 the request actually appears to show a
    slight decrease, for a total funding of 101.6 instead of 101.7.
    When you factor in the record inflation that we have seen over
    the last few years, this is really a pretty severe cut.
        So, my question is if I can get some more details on
    exactly what the issues are in the classified session. But I
    would like to ask each of you real quickly, are we adequately
    resourcing the Defense Intelligence Enterprise?
        How are we justifying cutting funding for the Defense
    Intelligence Enterprise at a time like this when we need to
    ensure that our intelligence is rock solid?
        Ms. Harris. I am happy to go into further detail in the
    closed session. But I am confident that there has not been a
    decline in capability in the Military Intelligence Program,
    which is the portion I can speak to.
        I think that the decline that you note is due mostly to
    phased program acquisitions and other factors which I am happy
    to dive into in further details. But I am confident that we
    have not made a reduction in capability, particularly within
    the MIP [military intelligence police].
        Dr. Jackson of Texas. Okay. I am out of time. But does one
    of you want to say something real quick? Otherwise I will yield
    back.
        General Haugh. I would prefer to talk about it in the
    closed session, if you don't mind, Congressman.
        Dr. Jackson of Texas. Yes, sir.
        General Kruse. I would be happy to do the same.
        Dr. Jackson of Texas. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Bergman. Representative McClellan, you are recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member
    Panetta, and to our witnesses for being here today.
        Secretary Harris, one of the key take-aways from the post-
    9/11 era was the importance of our intelligence community
    working together and across agencies to tackle the threats that
    face the nation.
        How did the Defense Intelligence Enterprise work to
    increase collaboration with the rest of the intelligence
    community in fiscal year 2024?
        And what can we expect in fiscal year 2025?
        Ms. Harris. Thank you for the question.
        I think what I can offer is that I think we have only taken
    the lessons of the 9/11 era and applied them to new and
    different challenges. So, as I remarked before, I see the
    entire Defense Intelligence Enterprise really operationalizing
    our partnerships, which means we are no longer just working
    independently with partners but we are thinking about the way
    different agencies can partner with our allies and partners in
    service of common objectives.
        I think you have heard already today some examples of joint
    work that is going on inside of the Department to make sure
    that we are approaching things with a new and different
    informed view that takes into, takes into account all of the
    different talents and capabilities that exist inside the
    Department and uses them to maximum effect.
        Ms. McClellan. Thank you.
        For each of you, what is the most pressing capability gap
    facing the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and your specific
    agency?
        What are you doing to mitigate these gaps?
        And what support do you need from us to help you do so?
        General Haugh. Congresswoman, I think from our perspective
    the areas that the Department has really asked us to look at is
    resiliency. How do we think about ensuring that we can deliver
    intelligence in competition and in crisis, and if deterrence
    fails, in conflict?
        And I think those are areas that we are going to really
    examine closely. And those are things that you will see coming
    through the Department in terms of budget requests as we look
    at those areas the Secretary is asking us to focus on.
        Ms. McClellan. Thank you.
        General Kruse. I think what I would offer is that our most
    pressing capability gap, really not just for us but for
    everyone, when asked this question I always actually go to a
    non-traditional route and I say the thing that I am most
    concerned about is our ability to protect our networks, our
    people, and our data.
        So, whether that is a counterintelligence piece, whether it
    is security of our highly classified networks, whether it is
    the Defense Industrial Base, it is focused on those efforts
    that we need to do there.
        We are all working those. And I think what you will see in
    the budget that has already been submitted are the kinds of
    programs that will help us in that regard.
        Ms. McClellan. Thank you.
        And, General Kruse, how is the Defense Intelligence
    Enterprise looking to incorporate emerging technology such as
    AI into its capabilities, and to ensure that these new
    capabilities will provide the most relevant information for our
    warfighters?
        General Kruse. Thank you for the question.
        We have established an emerging and disruptive technologies
    organization that is focused really in three areas: one is on
    quantum, and that is doing some really good work on how others
    are using quantum computing, quantum comms, and quantum
    sensing.
        We have an organization that is focused on biotechnology
    and biosecurity.
        And then another group that is working specifically on AI
    and counter-AI. And we can certainly talk through what some of
    those lines of efforts might look like.
        We also have a sort of a technology and long-range
    assessments organization that is looking out in the 5 to 20
    year point to see what technology are in research and
    development stages that may not necessarily be military
    technologies yet but could be, if applied. And we track those
    through that position.
        Ms. McClellan. And for some of the work that you are doing
    in the AI space, what steps are you taking to ensure that you
    can identify misinformation that our adversaries may be using
    through AI?
        And the context of the question -- I know I am about to run
    out of time, so you may have to submit an answer later -- 5
    years ago I was at a conference where an expert said that the
    ability of AI to detect misinformation was going to be outpaced
    by the ability of AI to create misinformation.
        And I have been worried about that for five years. So, if
    you could provide some information on what you all are doing to
    try to get ahead of that?
        General Kruse. I would be happy either to take that for the
    record or answer that in classified session.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 82.]
        There is some important work. Your concerns are very valid.
    And it is an issue we have got to stay a step ahead of.
        Ms. McClellan. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
        Mr. Mills, you are recognized for five minutes.
        Mr. Mills. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to our distinguished guests for being here today.
        We have got into a very bad habit of continuing our 1980s
    fashion of understanding warfare to only be kinetic, which has
    been a really big missed opportunity for us. Knowing that the
    evolution of warfare has truly gone to an economic, resourced,
    cyber supply chain, and even a non-kinetic influence operation
    campaign.
        You know, I argue to many that we have been in a cold war
    for about 20-plus years with China as they continue to advance
    their influences, and also to degradate America's confidence in
    our currencies, or in developing nations that they are moving
    away from utilizing American goods as well as for using our
    currency as its primary source.
        In knowing this, what is it that, in my belief personally
    with the China-Russia-Iran-North Korean geopolitical alignment,
    could we not utilize the quantum raters, especially looking at
    things like AI quantum entanglement, self-healing drone
    capabilities, and others, to be utilized in a very similar
    fashion to what President Reagan utilized the Space Race for
    against the Soviet Union, as a way to try to go ahead and
    economically cripple them, knowing the PRC's economics are not
    where they claim it is at, and seeing that they have more
    workforce strikes in the past years than they have in ever its
    history?
        General Haugh. So, Congressman, I will touch on the quantum
    discussion as a start point and then go wherever you would like
    to go.
        So, as we think about quantum we are really thinking about
    it in two ways:
        First, we have a research organization that has been
    involved in quantum research since its inception. Really
    sponsored some of those original studies that enabled the
    original qubit to be employed. So, we continue to partner with
    academia, with industry to look at what are the most
    appropriate applications when we think about quantum.
        The other is how do we prepare the nation for a quantum
    computer to ensure that we have got quantum-resistant
    encryption?
        So, NSA has published our first round of quantum-resistant
    encryption. That is an area that we want to work with the rest
    of the Department to ensure that we deploy so that we are
    prepared when the event that quantum computer is developed and
    employed. So, I think that is an area that we are certainly
    invested in. And we want to continue to advance.
        Mr. Mills. And you think that the quantum entanglement
    capability is advancing at a pace that will see us beat China
    in that race?
        General Haugh. I think this is one that is really difficult
    science. And so, I think it is one we want to make sure as a
    nation from our perspective, with the resources that we have,
    we will employ to continue to drive that research forward.
        Mr. Mills. I appreciate that.
        Yeah, my hope is that we can get to a point where quantum
    entanglement can be utilized in a multi-drone fashion that
    would be able to be deployed to kind of leave our enemies
    blind, deaf, and dumb on the battlefield to give us that
    advantage for the warfighters abroad.
        Ms. Harris, I wanted to ask you your thoughts on, you know,
    how can we leverage our JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command]
    capabilities, relationships with allies in the regions to
    counter China's efforts with regards to Africa?
        Ms. Harris. I am happy to talk in a little bit more detail
    in closed session.
        But I think what we have seen is that those partnerships
    are not just belonging to one organization. And I think where
    we have worked best is where our partnerships inside DoD are
    combined with those of our diplomats, and those of USAID [U.S.
    Agency for International Development], and other U.S.
    Government entities that are working in the region to really
    deepen the conversation, understand the different dynamics at
    play, and figure out how best to work together.
        Mr. Mills. And I guess kind of a follow-on to that because
    I am just curious is, you know, how can we shorten the
    decision-making process between the intelligence community and
    our respective agencies or teams on the ground?
        Ms. Harris. Sir, I think that that is work that is ongoing
    every day. I think we have come a long way in shortening that
    cycle.
        I think we have a focus right now in making sure we are
    sharing information quickly. We are proactively making sure
    that information is releasable to our partners, that
    conversations can happen at the lowest level classification
    that they need to. All of that speeds the pace of decision
    making and the ease of getting information out to our
    operators.
        Mr. Mills. And I know that you all, and again I also can
    speak to sitting in classified briefings and other areas where
    we have seen applies that play a very vital role with regards
    to preventing terrorist attacks by malign actors. But I would
    also argue that the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], who
    has violated that, utilizing backdoor searches at least 287,000
    times, without appropriate reforms these types of warrantless
    searches would be in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment.
        Would you not agree?
        Ms. Harris. I can speak to what the current bill offers,
    which I think is a meaningful set of reforms that gets at some
    of the concerns that have -- that you raise.
        I think that we have made a number of reforms in response
    to concerns. But the bill right now is the most comprehensive
    reforms that we would have, will ever been made to Section 702.
        Mr. Mills. Well, I agree that there are some reforms. The
    FBI is reporting they have 98 percent compliance. But if you
    look at the over 200,000 violations they have, that is still
    over 4,000 a year that they are violating with these illegal
    warrantless searches that are in direct violation of our Fourth
    Amendment.
        And as constitutionalists and those who swear an oath, that
    is our job to protect our Constitution against all enemies
    foreign and domestic, and that means the violations that are by
    Government as well.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Bergman. Mr. Keating, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        2 days ago The Wall Street Journal published a report about
    the private sales of Starlink assets and the shipping them, the
    shipping of them to Russians. Battlefield resources -- I am
    sorry -- battlefield sources in Ukraine.
        Can you comment about the threat of these private sales,
    the public sales or through the black market and, you know,
    what the effect can be on the battlefield in Ukraine?
        But also what it can be in the hands of non-state actors?
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 81.]
        Ms. Harris. I am happy to discuss that question in more
    detail in a closed session.
        I think we have a number of efforts ongoing to address some
    of these issues. But I would need to take that for the record,
    as not all of them fall within my remit within the Department.
        Mr. Keating. Just looking at the, you know, the forming
    axis of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea together, and
    could you comment on their, to the extent you can publicly, on
    the information sharing that might have resulted in that closer
    relationship, and what we could do ourselves to do to try and
    make sure we are not falling into siloing things that we have
    in the past, and that we have on our part greater information
    sharing across the board given the expansion of the cooperation
    of those with that axis?
        General Haugh. So, I can take some of this, Congressman.
        Because I think one of the things that we have worked
    really hard on since the beginning of Russia-Ukraine is how do
    we use intelligence to be able to have the greatest impact
    possible, and how all the elements of the CSAs[OM1] within the
    Department and within the community we are able to generate
    intelligence that can either be used by the Administration to
    identify what Russia is doing, but also to inform our combatant
    commands.
        And I think we have really worked on the tradecraft of how
    do you use intelligence not just for military targeting but to
    create an outcome that gives some advantage? So, in this case,
    how do we expose those activities in a way that someone could
    take an action based on it?
        And we could talk in a little bit more detail in the closed
    session.
        Mr. Keating. Do you think that -- Oh, go ahead. I am sorry.
        Do you think that any of this information sharing is a
    threat, that particularly given Iran in the least, of sharing
    this with their proxy militia forces, malign forces that they
    have?
        General Haugh. So, I think from our perspective, or from my
    perspective as they collaborate it brings the potential for
    transfer of different technology or intelligence, we want to be
    able to limit that wherever we can.
        General Kruse. I would offer to -- it is a great question
    to kind of think through what is it that the coordinations in
    particular that you talked about, Russia, China, North Korea,
    and Iran, what are they doing now that they weren't doing
    before? And what are they increasing?
        And I think what we have seen is the relationships that
    Russia has had to build in order to bring ammunition stocks and
    other weapons to them, some of the historic friction that has
    existed between those countries has going by the wayside.
        And what we don't know is what is North Korea, what is
    China, what is Iran getting in return?
        The information flow that we expect they are getting in
    return is more about technology, more about capabilities. It is
    less focused on sharing information about the U.S. But that
    said, they have shared common interests in their views of what
    is the role in the U.S. and future versus their roles in the
    future.
        And I would be remiss if I did not go back to your question
    on Iran and proxies. We do see information sharing with Iran
    and their proxies, but it is more related about creating
    effects in the battle space that Iran would like to do that
    hide its hand.
        Mr. Keating. I think with the race that is going on between
    the development of artificial intelligence and then our ability
    to deal with that artificial intelligence, how to react to that
    on our own -- you will have to deal with this in classified, I
    understand -- but also on a general sense our enemies, some of
    the countries I just mentioned, are they in a situation where
    you see them developing that kind of capability, too, to
    counter that as well, to keep up with it on the responding side
    of it?
        General Kruse. I think what I would offer is there is at
    least two of those four countries that are deeply focused in
    that area. And in the classified session we can talk it in more
    detail.
        Mr. Keating. Okay. Well, thank you very much.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Bergman. Ms. Jacobs, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you so much
    to our witnesses.
        I know we talked a little bit about Africa and what we are
    doing there. I wanted to ask a little more specifically how we
    are sort of learning lessons and thinking strategically about
    maybe some of the things that we are missing in Africa, and
    making sure, you know, that we are looking not only at sort of
    targeting, but also the dynamics and population.
        You know, for instance, despite all of the investments and
    access we have made in West Africa, the inter-agency was caught
    surprised by the coup in Niger despite the huge amount of
    military assets that we have in that country.
        So, I guess, Lieutenant General Kruse, can you share how
    and why, as much as you can in open hearing, we didn't
    anticipate the coup in Niger; what lessons we have learned from
    that; and how DIA is working to ensure we are gathering
    intelligence that is more focused on local political and
    conflict dynamics, particularly in places where we do have big
    foreign military relationships?
        General Kruse. Thank you for the question.
        And I would offer a little bit of framing and then the
    answer.
        So, for me the framing that really has resulted in I think
    eight military coups in Africa since 2020 are tied to a
    combination of many things. It is humanitarian issues, it is
    food insecurity, it is migration, it is terrorism, it is a
    variety of things that no amount of military presence can, you
    know, overturn.
        And so, when there is a military presence there, what that
    does allow us to do is one of the other organizations that we
    run, the Defense Attache Service, and the Defense Clandestine
    Service, and that does allow us to have a footprint with
    embassies in all of the nations around the globe, that allows
    us to have interagency conversations to see what it is that we
    can detect and what we can do about it.
        And I think in a classified setting we can talk a little
    bit more about what we saw leading up to Niger and perhaps what
    we are doing about it.
        Ms. Jacobs. Okay, great.
        Are there any broad lessons learned on how you are doing
    things different based on sort of what happened in the Sahel
    with the eight coups over the past few years?
        General Kruse. I actually think it is too early to
    understand how those are playing out in a couple of areas. And
    there are a lot of activities still ongoing.
        I think the biggest lesson for us almost goes back to one
    of the previous questions, which is to ensure while we are
    focused on China, while we are focused on some of the high-end
    adversaries, one of the critical responsibilities of the
    intelligence community is to be that guardrail and keep a pulse
    in some of those other areas.
        And so, for us it is about maintaining attache presence and
    other presence and collection within the areas we have talked
    about.
        Ms. Jacobs. Got it. Thank you.
        And I know some of my colleagues have asked about AI
    already. I wanted to ask particularly about AI and sort of the
    ethical principles.
        I know DoD has adopted ethical principles. I think that is
    great. I think there are still a lot of questions about how
    those principles translate into actionable guidelines. And one
    of the things we have been hearing a lot of concern about is
    around AI drones, particularly ones using facial recognition,
    used during military operations.
        So, I guess a question is how accurate is the facial
    recognition technology used by the AI drones?
        And what measures have been taken to ensure that it doesn't
    produce false positives? For whoever wants to answer.
        Ms. Harris. I think we are going to have to take that
    question for the record.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 81.]
        What I can tell you is that the Department is committed to
    ensuring the ethical use of AI. I think you have seen that the
    Department has put that priority first and foremost by
    elevating the position of our chief data and AI officer to a
    direct report to the Secretary.
        There is a focus in the Department to make sure we both
    understand the challenges those tools will face, we will face
    on the battlefield, but also how best to integrate them into
    military operations.
        But I am happy to take back the question for more details.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. Yes, I would appreciate that.
        And you may have to take this back, too, then. Is there
    anything put in place to ensure that AI drones do not
    accidentally target innocent civilians during military
    operations?
        Ms. Harris. Again, I will take the specific question back
    for the record.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 81.]
        But I think as you have heard many seniors from the
    Department say just this week on The Hill, civilian protection
    is at the forefront of all of our operations.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Bergman. Thank you. Well, they have called votes. And
    the open portion of the hearing is now adjourned.
        We will reconvene in Rayburn 2337 for the classified
    session at the conclusion of which, which right now we are
    looking at walking off the floor about 4:45 or 16:45. I am not
    going to give it in Zulu time, so we will just leave it at
    those two to figure it out.
        But we will all walk back from the floor to 2337 as soon as
    possible after that, and we will reconvene there in the
    classified session.
        This portion is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 April 11, 2024

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 April 11, 2024

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    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 April 11, 2024

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                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KEATING

        Ms. Harris. Russia utilizes black markets to obtain advanced
    technologies, consumer electronics, financial services, weapons, and
    other supplies that it is unable to acquire from domestic or legitimate
    international sources.
        This includes commercial satellite communications services, which
    black market operators around the world have long sought to acquire.
    Russian entities operate illicit networks to circumvent sanctions,
    export controls, and other regulations to obtain prohibited goods and
    services. These black-market activities are not unique to Starlink
    services.
        Rather, they reflect broader challenges of enforcing sanctions
    against both state actors and nonstate actors determined to acquire and
    employ weapons and sophisticated enabling capabilities in order to
    advance their objectives. The Department of Defense (DoD), in concert
    with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, and in close
    cooperation with the Government of Ukraine and SpaceX, has been
    investigating and disrupting these illicit Russian activities since
    they first became known several months ago.
        SpaceX has cooperated with the U.S. Government and the Government
    of Ukraine and has been forward-leaning in providing information to
    support investigations and denying service to suspected illicit users.
    These cooperative efforts to disrupt Russian use of Starlink services
    continue, as Russian forces adapt and persist in efforts to regain
    their illicit access.   [See page 17.]
                                     ______

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
        Ms. Harris. Facial recognition technology on drones continues to
    see significant advancements as new algorithms are improving accurate
    detection from higher altitudes, longer distances, and steeper angles;
    however, the accuracy can still vary based on these and other factors,
    such as lighting conditions in the environment.
        To ensure all AI-enabled capabilities are used responsibly, the
    Department is working to improve the ability of operators to understand
    how well models perform on different tasks and in different
    environments, and how to use them most effectively in their mission.
    This work is guided by DoD's AI Ethical Principles and implemented
    through guidance and toolkits that provide hands-on, actionable steps
    AI developers and users can take to ensure responsible use of AI in
    DoD.
        The DoD adopted AI Ethical Principles (Responsible, Equitable,
    Traceable, Reliable, and Governable) in February 2020. These principles
    reflect our nation's longstanding norms and values -- including those
    in the U.S. Constitution, Title 10 of the U.S. Code, and the Law of
    War, -- in the context of AI. These principles provide a foundation for
    the responsible design, development, deployment, and use of AI
    capabilities by the Department.
        In 2021, Deputy Secretary Hicks provided additional guidance by
    publishing six Responsible AI (RAI) tenets -- RAI Governance,
    Warfighter Trust, AI Product and Acquisition Lifecycle, Requirements
    Validation, Responsible AI Ecosystem, and AI Workforce -- to direct the
    Department's holistic, integrated, and disciplined approach for RAI.
    The same memorandum created an RAI Working Council to develop lines of
    effort on how to operationalize the DoD AI Ethical Principles.
        Then, in 2022, DoD released the Responsible AI Strategy & Pathway,
    which lays out the courses of action necessary to put the AI Ethical
    Principles into practice. As part of implementation, the Office of the
    Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer has developed and
    publicly published a Responsible AI Toolkit at https://
    rai.tradewindai.com to enable personnel in assessing the alignment of
    AI systems with the DoD's AI Ethical Principles and to mitigate issues
    or risks identified.   [See page 19.]
        Ms. Harris. DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems,
    establishes Departmental policy and assigns responsibilities for
    developing and using autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in weapon
    systems, including armed platforms that are remotely operated or
    operated by onboard personnel.
        The directive establishes guidelines designed to minimize the
    probability and consequences of failures in autonomous and semi-
    autonomous weapon systems that could lead to unintended engagements,
    which the directive defines as ``[t]he use of force against persons or
    objects that commanders or operators did not intend to be the targets
    of U.S. military operations, including unacceptable levels of
    collateral damage beyond those consistent with the law of war, Rules of
    Engagement, and commander's intent."
        For example, a weapon system accidentally engaging an innocent
    civilian during military operations would be an ``unintended
    engagement." DoD Directive 3000.09 was updated in January 2023. It
    supplements a variety of policies, processes, and frameworks in place
    across the Department to ensure the responsible use of weapon systems,
    including legal reviews of the intended acquisition, procurement, or
    modification of weapon systems for consistency with the Law of War.
        Each of the DoD AI Ethical Principles is included in the current
    version of DoD Directive 3000.09 and the directive also provides
    generally that ``[t]he design, development, deployment, and use of AI
    capabilities in autonomous and semiautonomous weapon systems will be
    consistent with the DoD AI Ethical Principles and the DoD Responsible
    Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway." DoD
    Directive 3000.09 provides for many measures to address the risk of
    unintended engagements.
        For example, the directive calls for rigorous hardware and software
    verification and validation (V&V) and realistic system developmental
    and operational test and evaluation (T&E) as well as the establishment
    of training, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures
    applicable to the system in question.
        In addition, autonomous weapon systems, with certain exceptions,
    must be approved by senior DoD officials through the review process
    outlined in Section 4 of DoD Directive 3000.09 ``Autonomy in Weapon
    Systems" before formal development and again before fielding.
        This holistic, case-by-case process includes, for systems
    incorporating AI capabilities, consideration of whether the deployment
    and use of the AI capabilities in the weapon system will be consistent
    with the DoD AI Ethical Principles and the DoD Responsible AI Strategy
    and Implementation Pathway. These criteria, along with several others,
    must be verified by senior DoD officials before systems undergoing
    review may be developed or fielded.   [See page 20.]
                                     ______

                RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCCLELLAN
        General Kruse. [No answer was available at the time of
    publication.]   [See page 15.]

    =======================================================================

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 April 11, 2024

    =======================================================================

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY

        Mr. Kelly. As you know, CYBERCOM's capability to comprehend and
    counteract malign influence campaigns from foreign adversaries, along
    with their narrative intricacies, is crucial for bolstering cognitive
    security in national defense. I commend the commendable efforts of the
    Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) in identifying and thwarting
    malicious influence campaigns targeting the U.S.
        The FY24 NDAA underscored the perpetual evolution and amplification
    of foreign adversary information and influence campaigns, highlighting
    an augmented necessity to comprehend the genesis of malign influence
    and disinformation, their dissemination and evolution, their channels
    to intended audiences, and their ensuing impact.
        Acknowledging the FY24 NDAA's directive, the Department of Defense
    is tasked with evaluating and proposing recommendations regarding the
    establishment of a narrative intelligence center. CYBERCOM,
    particularly CNMF, has already demonstrated significant collaboration
    with industry and academic institutions in countering malign influence
    campaigns in this domain, and I welcome your sustained engagement in
    this endeavor.
        When can we anticipate the recommendations for establishing a DoD
    national center for narrative intelligence, considering the evolving
    landscape of foreign adversary influence campaigns emphasized in the
    FY24 NDAA? Additionally, how do you intend to capitalize on the
    existing expertise of CYBERCOM, notably CNMF, in tandem with
    collaborations with universities and industry partners, to drive this
    initiative forward?
        General Haugh. U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) is unaware of
    efforts to establish a DoD National Center for Narrative Intelligence
    and defers to the Department of Defense and applicable OSD offices, on
    further recommendations.
        USCYBERCOM understands that, within the U.S. Government, the
    Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) under the Director of National
    Intelligence (DNI), which was established per direction of previous
    NDAAs, is working on understanding foreign adversary influence
    campaigns and challenges from an intelligence perspective.
        USCYBERCOM is also aware of growing interest in these challenges
    outside of the government, specifically in Academia and recent actions
    at the University of Mississippi to establish a National Center for
    Narrative Intelligence (NCNI). We understand this is a new, academia-
    driven effort, with the goal to partner with the private sector, U.S.
    government partners and other universities.
        To date, our interactions have been limited and informal, but we
    are encouraged by Academia's interest and efforts in this area. This
    offers a potential partnership opportunity for the DoD, USCYBERCOM,
    CNMF, and other potential government partners, to work with academic
    partners for additional research and collaboration.
        Finally, USCYBERCOM views the challenge of understanding adversary
    cyber-enabled influence campaigns as part of broader intelligence
    requirements supporting USCYBERCOM. USCYBERCOM remains highly
    interested in the establishment of a dedicated cyber intelligence
    center, which would include understanding the challenges of foreign
    cyber-enabled malign influence.

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