[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-72]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2025 BUDGET REQUEST
FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND
MISSILE DEFEAT PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 12, 2024
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-193 WASHINGTON : 2025
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
DON BACON, Nebraska RO KHANNA, California
JIM BANKS, Indiana CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama MARC VEASEY, Texas
Peter Schirtzinger, Professional Staff Member
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Owen McGeary, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
WITNESSES
Collins, Lt Gen Heath A., USAF, Director, Missile Defense Agency. 6
Gainey, LTG Sean A., USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command........................................ 8
Hill, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
and Missile Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy..................................................... 5
James, LTG Thomas L., USA, Deputy Commander, U.S. Space Command.. 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Collins, Lt Gen Heath A...................................... 51
Gainey, LTG Sean A........................................... 70
Hill, John D................................................. 35
James, LTG Thomas L.......................................... 83
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 97
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 97
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 99
.
FISCAL YEAR 2025 BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFEAT
PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Friday, April 12, 2024.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:44 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Lamborn
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Lamborn. The meeting will come to order.
Thank you all for being here. Thank you for your patience
while we finished a vote series the last few minutes.
First of all, before we do anything else, I am going to ask
unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed to
participate in today's hearing after all subcommittee members
have had an opportunity to ask questions.
Is there any objection?
If not, so ordered. So non-subcommittee members will be
recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
Welcome to our hearing. And thank you, witnesses, for being
here. We have, Mr. John Hill, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space and Missile Defense Policy. Joining him, we
have Lieutenant General Thomas James, the Deputy Commander of
the U.S. Space Command; Lieutenant General Heath Collins, the
Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and Lieutenant General
Sean Gainey, the Commander of U.S. Army Space and Missile
Defense Command.
The subcommittee meets today to review the Department's
fiscal year 2025 budget request for missile defense
capabilities. I have a number of concerns just right off the
bat here. First, the overall level of funding is inadequate
given today's threat environment. The fiscal year 2025 budget
requests $10.4 billion for the Missile Defense Agency. That is
more than $400 million less than last year and almost $1
billion below the level projected for fiscal year 2025 and last
year's FYDP [Future-Years Defense Program].
I want to reiterate this point. The fiscal year 2025 budget
request for the Missile Defense Agency is $960 million, almost
$1 billion below the level planned for in last year's budget.
Further, these draconian cuts are not limited to just fiscal
year 2025. The outyear spending projections included in this
budget envision continued reductions in missile defense
spending.
Compared to the spending plan in the budget submitted last
year, this budget forecasts cutting over $2.6 billion in
missile defense funding between fiscal year 2025 and fiscal
year 2028. To achieve these cuts, this budget would make
several concerning decisions, including terminating the
production line for SM-3 Block 1B interceptor and eliminating
competition by prematurely down selecting to single contractors
on both the next generation interceptor and Glide Phase
Interceptor programs.
I know we will get into these issues in greater detail, but
in the case of the Glide Phase Interceptor, I think it is
important to note that this down selection is occurring 5 years
earlier than planned and before the preliminary design review
is even held. I am extremely concerned that we will simply not
have enough sufficient technical data to make an informed
choice between competing concepts for this program.
The Glide Phase Interceptor is the only capability in
development specifically designed to combat the growing
hypersonic threats we face. It is vitally important to our
national security that we get this program right. We should be
investing in a robust program that delivers an effective
capability to our warfighters on a schedule that meets the
threat. That is why Congress mandated in section 1666 of last
year's defense authorization bill, but this budget would do the
opposite.
Overall, I am concerned that these decisions simply accept
too much risk and that missile defense appears to have become a
bill payer for other capabilities in this budget. This is
difficult to understand given the growth in missile threats,
the extremely high demand for missile defense capabilities from
combatant commanders, and the visible evidence of the value
these capabilities bring to the fight on full display as we
speak in the Red Sea and in Israel and Ukraine.
I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about how
this budget impacts their programs and their assessment of the
risks contained in this budget.
With that, I turn to the ranking member for his opening
remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Moulton. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I will just begin by echoing many of your concerns.
This is obviously a time when missile defense is in use all
around the globe, including by the United States, in great,
great quantity. This is not a technology that seems to be
fading away, and I think my biggest concern is that I just
don't understand the rationale behind many of these cuts.
Now, I have asked a lot of tough questions of leaders like
yourself, Mr. Hill, in particular, about the purpose of
hypersonics. It is in that same vein. We don't understand what
exactly the operational concept is to use hypersonics. That
makes it hard to understand the money we are spending on it.
But likewise, as the chairman said, if we don't understand
why--or we don't understand the rationale behind these cuts, it
becomes very hard to support them, especially in this
environment.
I want to welcome both Lieutenant General James and
Lieutenant General Collins, as this is the first opportunity to
testify in front of the subcommittee in your new roles.
Lieutenant General James, Space Command's role is
increasing in both importance and consequence. And given that
Space Command was recently given responsibility for Department-
level missile defense coordination, it is critical that you and
we understand the complex strategic role missile defense plays
in our national security. You are the first Army space operator
to reach the rank of Lieutenant General, so you must be doing
something right. FA-40s have been an exemplar in the
Department, and this milestone is well overdue, so
congratulations.
Lieutenant General Collins, your unique background across
the spectrum of strategic programs, including space, nuclear
weapons, and missile defense, makes you well prepared to be
director of the Missile Defense Agency. I am encouraged by our
initial discussions that it is imperative that we understand
the larger policy implications of what MDA [Missile Defense
Agency] is developing before we blindly build new systems that
could inadvertently further the proliferation of missile
technology or, in the absolute worse case, result in
destabilization, miscalculation, and escalation to nuclear war.
As I shift to the topic of today's hearing, I want to
remind the subcommittee that missile defense has a mixed legacy
and continues to pose difficult questions about what its
purpose is and should be, under what conditions it actually
makes us safer, and how much and what kind of it we need. That
is why these questions, including what the chairman started
with, are so important.
As I laid out last year, there are five basic scenarios or
levels at which we consider using or not using missile defense.
Behind me is a graphic depicting these levels, which I will use
to frame the rest of my remarks.
The highest level of missile defense, it has been
longstanding policy across nearly every administration that we
are not and will not pursue missile defense to defeat a near-
peer nuclear attack. Despite attempts to change U.S. policy
during last year's NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
cycle to specifically do so, going down this road would be
incredibly destabilizing, technically challenging, and
prohibitively expensive.
Until we can safely rid the world of all nuclear weapons,
which I believe is ultimately necessary for the survival of
humanity itself, we can neither unilaterally disarm nor
unilaterally render useless our adversaries' arsenals. If we
were to try to render all of our adversaries' missiles
incapable through increased missile defenses, they would simply
do what they have arguably already done, develop new, more
complex missiles to defeat those systems. Mutually assured
destruction sounds like a crazy concept when you first read
about it, but it has fundamentally kept us is safe.
The fourth level of missile defense is the area where there
is the most debate. This is where we can argue that our
advancements in missile defense over the past two decades since
pulling out of the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty] treaty
have provided a greater security blanket against aspiring
nuclear powers like North Korea and Iran.
However, as North Korea, or the DPRK [Democratic People's
Republic of Korea], continues to expand their ballistic missile
and nuclear arsenals, we must continually evaluate when we view
them as more of a strategic-level threat and, therefore, rely
on a policy of nuclear deterrence, instead of simply trying to
outnumber their ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]
with interceptors, such as the next generation interceptor
program intends to do.
If we decide to continue to outpace their ballistic missile
expansion, the question is, how do Russia and China respond? I
have argued that they will certainly see that growth as
directly affecting the credibility of their own nuclear forces,
which may have dire unintended consequences.
I hope that in today's discussion, Mr. Hill, you can help
us understand how the Department continues to weigh those
questions and that balance. As this subcommittee evaluates this
year's budget request and the continued missile defense policy
and posture of the United States, we must understand these
implications for ensuring the strategic stability of America
and the world for decades to come.
Now, level three is a nuance that I think is important to
distinguish from a rogue nation, because the size of the system
required to deal with it is very different, but continuing to
have some capability to defend against a small, even single
accidental launch should be maintained.
At level two, the tactical level, the incredible support
Ukraine has received from allies and partners in air and
missile defense has enabled them to fight back against near-
nonstop Russian missile attacks for the past 3 years. Though if
this body cannot get its act together and pass the languishing
supplemental, this is the area in which Ukraine will suffer the
most and will have direct impacts on their ability to maintain
their sovereign country and territory.
In the Red Sea, we are seeing what many thought was not
possible--multinational, coordinated, and effective missile
defense--and obviously this is using a lot of missiles, which
is one of the questions we have about reducing the budget.
While U.S. Navy ships have been at the center of defending
deployed forces, allies, partners, and commercial shipping
vessels from a wide range of air-breathing and ballistic
missile threats, they have been working across the
multinational task force.
The French, German, and U.K. [United Kingdom] Navies have
all intercepted targets in the Red Sea. And while ideally I
believe we need to move towards non-kinetic solutions that flip
the cost curve of missile defense, something the chairman and I
have been pursuing aggressively, no one can deny the incredible
impact today's missile defense systems are having on the Middle
East.
Finally, at the foundational level of missile defense,
simply detecting these threats, we still have much work to do.
However, this past year has marked many successes in domain
awareness. In February, MDA's hypersonic and ballistic tracking
space sensor prototypes were launched, and this budget supports
their ongoing testing through 2027. The Space Development
Agency also launched their wide field-of-view sensors, which
will be a key component of the next generation of missile
warning and missile track architecture replacing the legacy,
quote, big, juicy satellites currently on orbit.
As we evaluate the fiscal year 2025 request for missile
defense programs, I will continue to ask the following
questions: How will expanding U.S. missile defense today impact
strategic stability tomorrow? We are already in an arms race.
Will it make our world more safe? And does each investment
stabilize or destabilize our strategic national security? These
are the questions we must ask ourselves on this subcommittee,
not just with an eye to this year's budget and the NDAA, but in
determining how our decisions will impact the world we leave
for our children.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
We will now move to opening statements from our witnesses.
I would note that your prepared statements will be made part of
the record, but you will each have 5 minutes to make some
opening remarks.
Mr. Hill, let's begin with you.
STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HILL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Mr. Hill. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn and Ranking Member
Moulton and distinguished members of the subcommittee, for the
opportunity to testify today. Thank you as well for including
my full statement in the record.
In brief, my written statement surveys threat developments
in a deteriorating security environment. It stresses the
unmistakable centrality of missiles of all types, including
uncrewed aerial systems, or UAS, in modern warfare, and it
underscores the indispensability of missile defense and missile
defeat capabilities to deterring aggression and to defending
our homeland, our forces deployed around the world, and our
allies and partners. It highlights how those allies and
partners have come to similar conclusions, are increasing their
own investments, and are working with us to meet these
challenges together.
The administration's defense budget request for fiscal year
2025 includes $28.4 billion for missile defense and missile
defeat programs.
I want to acknowledge at the outset of this hearing the
strong support this subcommittee has consistently shown for
missile defense and missile defeat efforts for many years. And
I stand ready to work with you to pass defense authorization
legislation for fiscal year 2025, the 64th consecutive year,
and with all of Congress to pass on-time defense appropriations
legislation for fiscal year 2025.
Today, I must also emphasize, perhaps more than anything
else, the critical urgency of passing the national security
supplemental request, which Congress has now had for nearly 6
months. That request includes desperately needed funding,
funding to support Ukraine in defending its democratic
sovereignty and its very existence against Russia's illegal and
ruthless invasion and Russia's authoritarian aggression,
including relentless barrages of missiles and UAS attacks;
funding to support Israel in defending itself against the
continuing missile UAS and rocket attacks by Hamas and other
groups aligned with Iran; funding to provide critical
humanitarian assistance in Ukraine, Israel, and Gaza, where
innocent civilians are dying every day; funding to support our
Indo-Pacific partners in deterring aggression by the People's
Republic of China; funding to replenish our own military
supplies of munitions and other materiel that we have had to
draw down to meet the urgent needs of allies and partners; and
funding to invest in the capacity of the American industrial
base and workforce that is producing these munitions and weapon
systems, including missile defense systems, that are so vital
to all of these American national security interests.
Chairman Lamborn and Ranking Member Moulton and
distinguished members of this subcommittee, there is simply no
more time for delay. The time to act is now. I cannot
overemphasize. As General Cavoli said just the other day, I
cannot overemphasize the critical importance of Congress coming
together in common purpose and acting with urgency to pass the
national security supplemental request.
Thank you again for convening this crucially important and
timely hearing. Thank you for your attention. And thank you,
each and every one of you, for what you do for your
constituents and the Nation. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
General Collins.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HEATH A. COLLINS, USAF,
DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
General Collins. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking
Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
I appreciate your continued strong support for the missile
defense mission and look forward to the questions today.
I would like to start out by thanking the men and women
behind the development, delivery, and sustainment of the
missile defense system that I represent today, our MDA family,
and the operators of the system, all key partners in this no-
fail mission.
As you mentioned, Chairman, we are requesting $10.4 billion
to develop and deploy homeland missile defenses and improve
regional missile defenses against increasingly diverse and
dangerous missile threats. Our prioritization of decisions will
maximize missile defense system capability, capacity, and
readiness. We continue to work closely with our combatant
commanders and services to help prepare them to fight for the
fight of today and tomorrow.
To defend our homeland from ballistic missile attack, the
ground-based midcourse defense, or GMD system, remains our
Nation's sole protection from limited attacks, with a primary
focus being the advancing North Korean threat. The ongoing
ground-based interceptor, or GBI, service-life extension
program, will continue to improve the GBI reliability and will
help mitigate risk until the next generation interceptor, NGI,
is fielded by the end of 2028.
After 20 years, GMD stands ready, as shown in December of
2023, when we successfully executed a GMD intercept flight test
using the two/three-stage selectable ground-based interceptor
in two stage mode first, demonstrating increased engagement
battle space. We plan to deploy this capability to the entire
fleet by the end of this year.
The NGI program remains on track. Both prime contractors
have successfully executed preliminary design reviews, or PDRs,
and MDA is preparing in the near future to complete a best
value determination and select a single company to continue NGI
development, testing, production, and fielding.
Soon we plan to add the long-range discrimination radar, or
LRDR, to MDA's operational capability baseline by December of
this year. LRDR, delivered to the government last month, will
enhance tracking discrimination and hit assessment against
long-range missile threats. Additionally, the Space Force and
MDA are in the process of formally declaring LRDR ready for
space object detection later this month.
For regional defense, MDA continues to design improvements
to the Aegis ballistic missile defense capability and procure
the Standard Missile-3 Block 2A missiles. In fiscal year 2025,
we will also test and deliver SPY-1 radar upgrades and support
the Navy in future space domain awareness demonstrations.
We will continue U.S. terminal high-altitude aerial
defense, or THAAD, interceptor procurement, fielding and
training support, along with reliability in cybersecurity
improvements. In collaboration with the U.S. Army, we have
fielded the THAAD 4.0 capability to batteries in Korea and on
Guam and are in the process of fielding 4.0 to the all-
remaining THAAD batteries by the end of 2025. THAAD 4.0
integrates Patriot capabilities with THAAD to increase Patriot-
Defended area and engagement opportunities. We will also begin
design work to improve the THAAD system to take on ever-
advancing regional threats.
The Department continues development of a 360-degree
layered missile defense capability for Guam. MDA construction
on the Joint Command Center AN/TPY-6 radar site and launch site
will begin in fiscal year 2025. And by the end of this year, we
will execute a flight experiment with the SM-3 Block 2A against
a medium-range ballistic missile target controlled with the
initial Aegis Guam system using the first TPY-6 transportable
array unit.
Looking forward, MDA continues to pursue end-to-end
capabilities to defeat the serious challenge posed by
hypersonic maneuvering threats. Today, our sea-based terminal
defenses protect assets at sea and forces ashore from
hypersonic threats. Working with the Navy, we anticipate
delivering follow-on increment three capabilities in fiscal
year 2025.
The Glide Phase Interceptor program, or GPI weapons system,
will enable layered defense against hypersonic glide threats.
By the end of fiscal year 2024, in coordination with our future
international partner Japan, MDA will select a single GPI
interceptor design to complete development. We will continue to
develop a mature GPI capability and support the planned
cooperative development of that Glide Phase Interceptor with
Japan.
On the detection and tracking part of the kill chain, as
mentioned by Ranking Member Moulton, we launched the hypersonic
and ballistic tracking space sensor, or HBTSS, prototype
satellites in February to demonstrate fire control solutions
generated against hypersonic maneuvering threats. Following
successful demonstration of HBTSS, the responsibility for
fielding HBTSS like fire control capabilities will be
transferred to Space Force.
I am honored by this opportunity and look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Collins can be found in
the Appendix on page 51.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
General Gainey.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SEAN A. GAINEY, USA, COMMANDING
GENERAL, U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND
General Gainey. Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton,
and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I am honored to
testify before you and represent this incredible one-team
organization of 2,300 soldiers and civilians, spanning 13 time
zones and 19 locations worldwide. These professionals
tirelessly provide space, high-altitude, and missile defense
forces and advance capabilities to the Army and joint
warfighter. I am honored to represent them, and I thank you for
your unwavering support for this team and their families.
In January, I took command of the U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command and Joint Functional Component Command
for Integrated Air and Missile Defense, also known as JFCC-IMD,
also acting as the senior commander for both Fort Greely,
Alaska, and U.S. Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll. Additionally, I
also serve as the Army's lead enterprise integrator for air and
missile defense, and my organization, JFCC-IMD, provides
operational-level missile defense expertise and integrates
trans-regional missile defense functions across the joint and
combined warfighting force.
As the Army's air and missile defense enterprise
integrator, today I will use this role to leverage and
highlight the Army air and missile defense remains the Army's
most heavily deployed force with the highest demand signal
amongst the combatant commands every year. This high op tempo
continues to provide a significant strain on our formations and
families, and we must continue to address their needs.
As you know, the urgency for multi-domain, trans-regional
combat effects continues to increase exponentially. Our adverse
air and missile defense-related threats have rapidly expanded
in recent years in quantity, variety, and sophistication,
rapidly expanding their space R&D [research and development],
instigating cyber attacks, and test complex missile systems. We
see this today in Ukraine and looming on the horizon in the
Pacific. It has never been more imperative that we and our
allies and partners enhance our missile defense and space
capabilities to impose costs on our adversaries, denying them
the benefits of using these weapons and ensuring the
safeguarding of our Nation.
As our adversaries increase their emphasis on space and
missile capabilities, the U.S. Army grows in kind. In December,
the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and the Sergeant
Major of the Army signed the Army space vision supporting
multi-domain operations, specifying the Army's role in
integrating space capabilities into joint and coalition
operations while also interdicting the space capabilities of
adversaries.
It is also increasingly apparent that integrating our space
operations and missile defense operations is of critical
importance to our national security. Our integration is
essential to effectively contribute to strategic deterrence and
respond in crisis. What worked for yesterday's military must
evolve.
Today, we must integrate space and missile defense at the
very onset of our prototyping, concept development, and
application. And we do it all in concert with our Army joint
and coalition partners, one voice together around the globe.
Our allies and partners are critical for layered and tiered
operations to degrade, disrupt, and defeat adversaries, share
burdens, integrate technology, and protect our mutual
homelands.
But all these operational considerations pale in comparison
to the will, determination, and the trust the amazing men and
women that operate and sustain these advance systems. These
soldiers and their families make life-altering sacrifices to
serve across the globe. Thank you for your efforts in
supporting them with timely budget, caring for them and their
families, and building trust with the American people now and
in the years to come. Caring for our soldiers and their
families is paramount to win in any environment around the
globe.
Thank you for supporting such an incredible mission-ready
team. I look forward to addressing your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Gainey can be found in
the Appendix on page 70.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
General James.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS L. JAMES, USA, DEPUTY
COMMANDER, U.S. SPACE COMMAND
General James. Good morning, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking
Member Moulton, and distinguished members of this subcommittee.
It is an honor to be here today representing General Whiting
and the nearly 18,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen,
guardians, DOD [Department of Defense] civilians and
contractors of the United States Space Command. Our expertly
trained and mission-focused workforce remains our most valuable
asset.
As you have heard from my distinguished colleagues here on
the panel, our strategic competitors' offensive missile systems
are significantly increasing in capability and scale. They will
challenge our ability to conduct operations and protect and
defend U.S. and our allies' vital interest. Our competitors are
rapidly evolving, diversifying, and proliferating their
inventories of advanced missiles and technologies. Hypersonic
glide vehicles and cruise missiles pose diverse threats that
will complicate our missile warning and missile defense
missions.
In April 2023, the Unified Command Plan assigned United
States Space Command with the responsibility for trans-regional
missile defense planning and operational support. That decision
was the culmination of a comprehensive study in alignment with
numerous policy documents and with the 2022 Missile Defense
Review. This was a natural fit given our Unified Command Plan
responsibilities, such as space operations and global sensor
manager, as the missile defense mission continues to converge
with the space missions.
Part of the transition of trans-regional missile defense
planning and support missions included alignment of the Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense
under U.S. Space Command, commanded by my good friend,
Lieutenant General Sean Gainey. JFCC-IMD ensured the continued
execution of the responsibilities during the transition without
any mission degradation. We, the United States Space Command,
have integrated JFCC-IMD into our command structures and
processes and are exploring ways to further optimize their
execution of critical missions.
As the global sensor manager, USSPACECOM [U.S. Space
Command] is responsible for planning, managing, and overseeing
the operations of all assigned space domain awareness, missile
defense, and missile warning sensors. Our terrestrial sensors
are a critical enabler to the combatant command and national-
level military command centers, most performing missile
warning, missile defense, and space domain awareness mission
simultaneously.
Our space-based sensors provide the first alert of a
missile launch from anywhere on the planet. They provide this
to our national leaders, the National Military Command System,
combatant commands, and select international partners.
USSPACECOM employs a joint, combined, and partnered approach to
our operations, which expands our access to sensors and their
information. This includes our Combined Space Operations
Center's Commercial Integration Cell and our National Space
Defense Center's Joint Commercial Operations Cell, commensurate
with the Department's recently published Commercial Space
Strategy. The JCO [Joint Commercial Operations] also includes
14 allied partners that are fully integrated into our space
domain operations.
It is vital that we keep pace with the emerging threats and
technologies while ensuring that our sensor architecture
remains optimized and modernized. While we pursue integrating
new capabilities, we must still aggressively leverage and
integrate our legacy sensors in support of our critical missile
warning and missile defense functions today as part of a
comprehensive missile defeat strategy.
Continued funding for research and development for the next
generation of space-based and terrestrial sensor systems is
critical to keep pace with the competitors and the potential
adversaries that we face today. These capabilities must be
resilient, and we must be able to defend and reconstitute them
to achieve space across domain mission assurance for the Joint
Force.
In closing, the 2022 Missile Defense Review states, ``It is
a strategic imperative of the United States to continue
investments and innovation in the development of full-spectrum
missile defeat capabilities to maintain deterrence and offer
protection while hedging against uncertainty. Consistent with
the Missile Defense Review, the Department must explore and
enact the full range of capabilities to counter advanced
adversary offensive missiles and hybrid threats across the
spectrum of conflict.
U.S. Space Command with fellow combatant commands,
services, allies, and interagency, and commercial partners
stands ready to perform our unified command plan
responsibilities to maintain and expand our competitive
advantage. USSPACECOM appreciates Congress' continued support
as we ensure the delivery of space-based capabilities and
achieve our foundational moral responsibility to protect the
Joint Force, the Nation, and our allies through all levels of
competition and conflict.
I have submitted my written statement for the record. Thank
you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General James can be found in
the Appendix on page 83.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
We will now go to questions from the panel--from the
committee.
General Collins, as I talked about in my opening statement,
I am very concerned about the Glide Phase Interceptor. Last
year, the program planned to continue development and to
maintain competition between two industry teams for at least
another 5 years. A preliminary design review, or let's say PDR,
was planned for 2029 with the potential down-select decision
following PDR. Now, the program is planning to select a single
contractor this year without the development activity to prove
out new technologies and with a lot less information.
First, a general question. Competition in a program reduces
risk, drives innovation, and helps ensure the government is
getting a good value. Wouldn't you say that, in general, that
is a fair statement?
General Collins. Yeah. Mr. Chairman, as a career
acquisition officer, competition within an acquisition strategy
does buy down risk, keeps both teams sharp throughout the
acquisition, and intends to--it is a best practice within the
Department, yes, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
So how concerned are you then that making a down-select
decision this early in the program will increase risk?
General Collins. Sir, that is a job that we will be
attacking greatly now with the decision that will be coming
later this fiscal year. There are other mechanisms to manage
competition and risk within a program lower than the prime
level. We certainly will be looking forward to keeping the
program on pace and, based on section 1666, look for
opportunities to bring hypersonic capability to the fight much
sooner.
With the GPI program as established today, working with our
soon international partner Japan, we will continue to look for
opportunities to buy down that risk judiciously, potentially
with competition at a lower level within--at the component or
subsystem level.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. So let's dive a little bit more into
that. What concrete steps--and you have already alluded to
some--can we take to mitigate this risk or to give ourselves
options if technology development doesn't go as planned?
General Collins. Yes, sir. Much of this is--as part of the
decision to come with down selecting, we are in the midst of
upgrading our acquisition strategy and finalizing the decision
criteria for making this decision. Part of that will be
finalizing in taking a look at how to establish the program
and, going forward, depending on the selection and the risks
associated with that particular prime, we will then have to
take a look at, with the prime, the steps that would be taken.
Each prime has a different set of risks based on their designs
and that we would have to specifically identify, based on the
decision, which one would drive what decisions and actions we
would take going forward.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, I still am concerned. I know that you
will do your best to play the hand of cards that you have been
dealt, but I really am concerned about this. I just think we
are taking on too much risk that we otherwise would be able to
mitigate through continuing the competition more into the
future.
This leads to my next set of questions about the program
schedule. You would think that if the program had advanced
sufficiently and technology is mature enough for the government
to select a single prime contractor 5 years earlier than
originally planned, that we would be in a position to
accelerate the schedule, but it looks like the opposite is
happening.
In last year's hearing, your predecessor, Admiral Hill, and
I discussed the program's schedule and how delivering a
capability in 2034 was not adequate. He agreed and said, quote,
``Out in the mid-30s is almost irrelevant. We are not meeting
the threat,'' unquote. But this year's budget would add
additional delay, and now does not anticipate deploying a
capability until 2035.
Do you share Admiral Hill's view that this makes it
irrelevant to go more than 10 years into the future?
General Collins. Sir, I definitely agree with waiting 11
years to bring a hypersonic glide phase capability to the
warfighter is too long, and looking into options within the GPI
program and other options, that could bring an interim
capability sooner. We do have a requirement to come back with
those options to you, and we are working through that. And a
report will be provided by September that goes through those
different option spaces, both within the GPI program and
broader across the missile defense enterprise to try to get any
capability we can out of the weapon systems we have and also
into the future with a GPI program.
Mr. Lamborn. What can you tell us in this setting for the
record that you will do specifically? You already alluded to
the intention to try to accelerate some things, but what are
concrete steps that you are going to be able to take or plan to
take?
General Collins. Yes, sir. Right off the bat, one is we
have engaged with both of our primes that we have on the GPI
program today to identify opportunities that they see within
their industry space and their broader enterprises to come up
with acceleration options that we could be taking within the
program, within the GPI program. Otherwise, I am also looking
across at other weapon systems that we have in place today to
understand what, if any, residual capability they may have and/
or what potential developments, smaller developments could we
take within those other weapon systems that could bring some
type of residual capability or interim capability to the fight.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. I will end my questions
there, but I will just quickly summarize my concerns.
This budget, as proposed, cuts the funding, delays the
schedule, and adds risk to the acquisition approach. I
understand that it will save some dollars and is cheaper, but I
am just not sure it will even lead to success in the long run,
much less address the threats in the meantime.
With that, I turn to the ranking member for any questions
he might have.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly share
some of these same concerns.
Lieutenant General Collins, Lockheed's F-35 and Northrop
Grumman's Sentinel are two examples of programs that currently
have zero competition and are grossly over budget and grossly
behind schedule. Now, you have extensive acquisitions
experience. Can you cite an example of a program that benefited
from down selecting and reducing competition early? When has
such a reduction in competition fielded a better technology
faster and it reduced cost?
General Collins. Ranking Member Moulton, thank you for that
question. Um----
Mr. Moulton. Well, I think the silence speaks volumes.
Let's move on.
Mr. Hill, the Department indicated to this committee that
cancellation of the SM-3 Block 1B was done in part to purchase
more SM-3 Block 2As. We will set aside that there are no
additional 2As in this budget request and focus on the policy
issues I have continued to raise. Is it accurate to say that
SM-3 Block 1B is solely a regional missile defense asset?
Mr. Hill. SM-3 Block 1B is for regional missile defense
against medium-range ballistic missiles.
Mr. Moulton. Is it also accurate to say that SM-3 Block 2A
has been proven to intercept an ICBM-range threat, the type of
threat designed to be handled by the ground-based midcourse
defense system?
Mr. Hill. I believe from a kinematic perspective it has
been shown to be able to intercept at that beginning edge----
Mr. Moulton. Right.
Mr. Hill. --but it is--the operational concepts for it are
as a regional missile defense missile. It is mostly for medium-
range and----
Mr. Moulton. Right. But I am just asking about its ability.
Mr. Hill. I believe as a test--there was a test that was
done----
Mr. Moulton. Yeah. That is a very long way of saying yes.
Mr. Hill. Yeah.
Mr. Moulton. So my question is: was there a policy
evaluation done on how our adversaries, to include China,
Russia, North Korea, would respond to a further increase of SM-
3 Block 2As, which have capability against a strategic missile,
in lieu of the 1B variant, which does not?
Mr. Hill. Yeah, that was done before my time doing this,
but I think the implications of the SM-3 2A, which you are
talking about, being deployed in fleets at different places
around the world is not something that should logically cause
China or Russia to have any concerns from a strategic stability
perspective.
Mr. Moulton. Well, if you could provide that report to the
committee, it would be helpful. When you said there was some
analysis done----
Mr. Hill. No, the decision and that test was before I was
doing the missile defense business, so I can look into the
history of what was done there.
Mr. Moulton. Well, look, the point is that what matters
here for strategic stability is not just what we think is
perfectly logical but what our enemies think, and we have to
consider these concerns when we are making these budgetary
decisions. I think, you know, SM-3 Block 2As have an important
role, but the quantities we are currently buying are about a
third of what was intended for the 1B. And if we suddenly
reverse that and triple our 2A buy, we could very well embolden
our adversaries to further proliferate and advance their
technology in a way that not only makes our regional defense
posture weaker at a time where regional missile defense is of
prime importance, but also impact stability at their strategic
level.
I also get the sense that this decision was not thought
through on an operational business. I mean, General Collins,
from your perspective, is a future Navy fleet equipped with
primarily SM-6 interceptors and some SM-3-2A interceptors
consistent with the direction you see the threat going?
General Collins. Sir, Ranking Member Moulton, good
question. What I would take is, I would be concerned with the
capacity of capabilities that are in a fleet and our ability to
support with enough 2As moving forward given the capacity that
we take from that production line today.
Mr. Moulton. Well, we obviously share those concerns.
General Collins, has MDA completed analysis of the impacts
on this decision on its ability to support and sustain the
current inventory of 1Bs, meet the needs of allies, and support
the Navy's requirements? Has that analysis been completed?
General Collins. Sir, we have not completed that analysis.
We have been waiting for the 2024 appropriation to understand
the amount of money we were going to get within the SM-3 1B
line to support the negotiation for an additional lot of 1Bs.
That work is going on currently today to understand the impact
to both the 1B final lot as well as the future of the 2A line,
all of that to inform what type of sparing would we require
within the 1B line to support the lifecycle of 1Bs.
Mr. Moulton. Well, I think, to quickly summarize as the
chairman did, we both share a concern about the lack of
competition. That seemed to be echoed by your silence. We both
share concern about simply the magazine capacity that we have
if we are reducing the number of regional defense assets we
have at a time when we are using them quite regularly. And I
have additional concerns about what this all means for our
strategic stability that it just sounds like have not been
analyzed or even considered carefully. So we have a lot of
questions, and I think that is important.
Just one final question. Lieutenant General Collins, there
have been a lot of discussions from this subcommittee about the
potential need for a third CONUS [continental United States]
interceptor site. Has JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight
Council] validated any sort of requirement for a third site?
General Collins. No, sir, there is no requirement.
Mr. Moulton. If they were to validate such a requirement,
is the location that was looked at almost 10 years ago at this
point still where you believe that third site should be
located, as the last study explicitly indicated that MDA would
need to relook at the analysis prior to moving forward with any
sort of program once you had a requirement?
General Collins. Sir, that is correct. We would take a look
as, if a requirement for an East Coast site was identified as a
requirement and validated. As mentioned when the final report
came out, we would take a look at the current threat, the
current performance of the system, the current state of affairs
to assess and evaluate what that optimal site would be.
Mr. Moulton. Right. So just to summarize, as of right now,
you don't need a third site. If you were to need a third site,
you wouldn't just go with what was selected 10 years ago, you
would do another analysis.
And, Mr. Hill, I would just add, I hope that we would, per
my questions about strategic stability, look at the
implications of a third site on the views of our adversaries.
Mr. Hill. That is correct. The focus on a third site would
be the things we are already investing in rather than a third
site.
Mr. Moulton. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Representative DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. General Collins, hypersonics have
completely upended our prior conception of the global missile
threat landscape with our ability to evade our legacy detection
systems, and we are now in a position where we are playing
catchup both in our ability to detect and defeat these novel
capabilities. Can you update our committee on how you are
addressing the issue of detection first with the capabilities
like hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor satellites?
And how are you collaborating with SDA [Space Development
Agency] on these and other efforts pertaining to hypersonic
missile defense?
General Collins. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
Hypersonic missile defense is certainly a key focus of the
Missile Defense Agency and protecting our warfighters as we
move forward. The hypersonic ballistic tracking space sensor
that I mentioned in my opening statement and you just
mentioned, that is a prototype set of satellites to demonstrate
our ability in the technology to from space detect, track, and
close the fire control loop against a hypersonic threat, to
take a hypersonic threat and track it throughout its entire
launch, from launch to intercept.
That is a key aspect of our future ability to detect and
eventually intercept hypersonic weapons anywhere on the planet
in the future. To get there, we have worked very closely with
the Space Development Agency. They would be the operational
transition agent for us to take HBTSS and include it within the
future proliferated warfighting space architecture. We have
been working very closely with them, also the Space Warfighting
Analysis Center, the SWAC, part of the Space Force. We have
been working with them to ensure that our long-term fire
control requirements are included within the force design of
any future space architecture.
And so with those relationships within Space Force, we are
ready when we complete the demonstration later this year to
transition into the proliferated warfighting space architecture
tracking layer to pick up on the hypersonic fire control
tracking requirements for Missile Defense Agency.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. On the Glide Phase Interceptor, where
are we at?
General Collins. Yes, sir. We have two primes awarded on
other transaction authority agreements, and both are proceeding
post-system requirements review and working to finalize
designs, as well as tech maturation for each of their designs.
There is a good amount of tech maturation of the design in the
integration of the system that are being worked on.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Is an acceleration research on
hypersonic defense options necessary, and is it technologically
feasible?
General Collins. Sir, we believe hypersonic defense is
feasible. We have, today, a terminal case ability--capability
to intercept hypersonic threats within the SM-6 sea-based
terminal capability within the Aegis weapon system. So we are
already fielded capability to intercept hypersonics in the
terminal phase.
Glide Phase Interceptor, we have identified the technology
areas that need to be matured within that program to do glide
phase intercept farther away from the intended target, and we
are in the midst of burning down all of those technologies to
be able to field this capability. So, yes, we believe that
technology exists with some maturation to come, but we do
believe hypersonic glide phase intercept capabilities is
feasible.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Mr. Hill, what is the Department's
policy on how the U.S. will address near-peer hypersonic
threats to the homeland?
Mr. Hill. As General Collins just described, we are
investing in capabilities as Congress directed. We created--we
designated the Secretary of the Air Force for leading the
cruise missile defense of the homeland project and, of course,
Glide Phase Interceptors, many of them are cruise missiles. So
we will defend them against that, recognizing that in many
cases this is something that an adversary is using and
developing, not in the context of a nuclear strike, but in the
context of potentially defeating our ability to respond. We
want to demonstrate that, no, we have the ability to follow up
on the commitments we have made, and that means we will defend
critical infrastructure in the United States.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Representative Norcross.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member, for
today's hearing, and certainly the witnesses.
We have had a number of discussions on this committee that
talked about the ability to produce the weapons we need, the
interceptors and, quite frankly, the entire industrial base.
Mr. Hill, today you talked about the investment in that
industrial base. So just for the sake of an argument, let's
assume we have the technical expertise to design and build and
we might be able to build a prototype. When you look across the
U.S. missile industrial base and the workforce, are you
comfortable with where we are in terms of being able to produce
the numbers that we are talking about?
Mr. Hill. I think--I am concerned that we have taken a bit
of a holiday and that we are playing some catchup here. I am
concerned that we have an adversary in Russia that is on a war
footing in Ukraine, and we and our allies in Europe all need to
look more carefully at the investments and improve our
abilities to replenish when we draw down munitions and other
key systems.
Mr. Norcross. So you talked about the investment in the
industrial base. What specifically would you point to in this
budget that is actually going to mitigate some of those
concerns?
Mr. Hill. You know, I think it is--there are--focused
particularly on munitions area and expanding capacity, and some
of that is a function of when you are buying in larger
quantities, when you are buying with using the authority that
the committee has given us to have multiyear procurement, now
you are creating an environment in which you are not just
relying on the government's money but companies are also
willing to put their money into expanding their capacity. Those
are ----
Mr. Norcross. So what are we doing to address that exactly?
What signals are we sending industry? And I am very familiar
with much of the ammunition, what we are doing over there.
Mr. Hill. Yeah.
Mr. Norcross. I am more concerned, at least at this
hearing, at our missile industrial base.
Mr. Hill. Yeah.
Mr. Norcross. When you start talking about investing in our
workforce, what does that mean? You can send a signal, but
unless a contract follows it, it is a hollow signal.
Mr. Hill. Right. The contract following it is going to be
the question of the resource allocations in finite budgets.
This is the question that we have been discussing earlier today
about how many are we acquiring.
Mr. Norcross. Well, I am not trying to pin you. Well,
actually, I am----
Mr. Hill. You are.
Mr. Norcross. --trying to pin you down, because we are
doing this to address exactly what we are talking about. And I
get it, we make the decision and all the complexities and
dealing with that and then we say we need it yesterday. I mean,
that is historically what we do. And if we look at some of the
numbers that we are requesting, and particularly Mr. Moulton
and what he was saying, even if you change your mind, they
cannot ramp up in time.
So when we start looking towards investing in that
industrial base, we have to send the signals that are true to
industry, and we have to build it ahead of time because the
longest lead item is not a piece of material; it is a human.
And that is why I continue to bring this up meeting after
meeting.
But with that, I will yield back to the Chairman. Thank
you.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Representative.
Representative Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Could you help me understand why the overall budget numbers
have gone down significantly for missile defense in the
upcoming budget versus what we did last year? That is what it
appears to me. Is it because of the budget caps or maybe there
is other priorities? So I am trying to understand that.
Mr. Hill. Sure. I will start. Definitely, the Fiscal
Responsibility Act did set a ceiling. We had to work within
that ceiling. You had must-pay bills, payroll increases,
healthcare programs, child support, a lot of those things that
go on in the Defense Department. And then you find you are
having to make some choices in your end game.
Mr. Bacon. Right.
Mr. Hill. My readiness today for the things I am working
on, my investment for the future, not easy choices. That is the
general environment.
Mr. Bacon. I think it is something for the Armed Services
Committee to maybe review. Seems like missile defense is an
area that we do not want to be cutting. I mean, I know the
budget has gone up a little bit, but I was just surprised to
see the amount of the cut going on for missile defense.
A second question. I am not sure who is appropriate--the
best to ask this to. It is concerning when you see the bases,
particularly like Iraq, being repeatedly hit out of--from Iran.
What could we be doing better to protect our forward bases from
this, or what are we not doing? I know this could be a theater
commander's question too, but you have a great insight.
General Gainey. Congressman, thank you. I will take that
question.
In my current role and previous roles specifically is the
Army is providing the preponderance of missile defense and
counter-UAS defense for those bases forward. Again, continuing
to add funding for the forward warfighter to employ
capabilities. You heard General Kurilla advocate for the
additional funding that he has requested for additional
counter-UAS capability to proliferate across all of our bases
forward.
We do have capability there now that has proven successful.
We are putting in technology and directed energy and also other
type of kinetic systems, and continuing funding of those
systems will allow us to put in volume additional capability on
those bases.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
It is alarming to see the amount of targeting Iran is doing
at our bases in Iraq, and seems like we should be doing
everything we can to protect against that.
In the last NDAA, we put some missile defense measures in
for Kurdistan. How will that look, you think, or will that be a
hard challenge for you all to accomplish? There was a provision
that helped the Kurds get missile defense in the last NDAA.
Mr. Hill. Yeah, I am sorry, I actually heard Kyrgyzstan,
but----
Mr. Bacon. Well, the Kurds.
Mr. Hill. Kurdistan.
Mr. Bacon. Sorry.
Mr. Hill. No, that is just my hearing. So, absolutely,
support to the Kurds have been part of this. Balancing that
relationship, their relations in the region is also part of
that question.
One of the other--to add to some of General Gainey's
comments as well, we have also in the Red Sea context obviously
struck back at some of those sites where some of these Iran-
aligned militia groups operate, the Houthis most notably, and
that is an essential complement to the force protection the
missile defense provides.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
One last question for General Gainey, if I may. We have
been reading some reports of fatigue and burnout because of the
high ops [operations] tempo for your servicemen and -women.
What can we do to help mitigate that?
General Gainey. The Army has taken a holistic look, and as
you heard me earlier highlight the significant strain on the
force. But what I will tell you is, I am amazed at how those
soldiers continue to respond and continue to maintain a
positive attitude and high reenlistment rate moving forward.
As the Army looks to get after how do we improve the
quality of life and improve the op tempo, goes to our
modernization efforts and continuing supportive funding for our
modernization efforts, because Patriot system is the most
deployed system because it is our workhorse system. As we
modernize with integrated battle command system as the core
point inside of that modernization, we will then integrate
several different effecters and capability that provides the
range of capabilities across several threats. So you will no
longer have to deploy just a Patriot battery; you can now
deploy several different components. And the Army's growth of
that capability in the last R-struct will also add additional
capacity, so that will help moving forward.
Mr. Bacon. Well, we appreciate the men and women who serve
in your command and, in that matter, for all of your all's
commands. And missile defense is such an important mission and
it is in high demand everywhere, so we are grateful to you and
your people.
Mr. Lamborn. Perfect timing. We will now go to
Representative Vasquez.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to the Ranking
Member.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today this
morning.
I have the privilege of representing New Mexico's Second
District, home to White Sands Missile Range. It is the
birthplace of America's space and missile program. And though
White Sands continues to be the Department of Defense's
premiere research and testing facility for our Nation's most
important weapons programs, they also continue to face
struggles maintaining modern technology and facilities.
Now, during my visit to White Sands this January, base
leadership shared with me that their long-range radars, which
are supposed to provide critical tracking capabilities for
weapons testing, have been in service and have not been
upgraded since the 1960s, posing significant challenges to
keeping them operational and in line with modern missile
technology.
Beyond these maintenance challenges, I have understood that
these radar challenges and the failures during tests have
become increasingly frequent, occurring as often as five times
per month and with tracking and accuracies that are off by
hundreds to thousands of yards. Not being able to accurately
track weapons during testing not only poses a safety risk to
the folks that are working there but also to surrounding
communities, but threatens our readiness and national security,
and I think that is completely unacceptable.
We should do everything in our power to ensure White Sands
has the necessary equipment to safely and accurately track
weapons tests so that we are providing our warfighters with the
best tools and information possible to accomplish their
mission.
Lieutenant General Gainey, are diminished testing
conditions like these acceptable to you? And how do deficient
testing standards pose a threat to our national security?
General Gainey. Congressman, thank you for the question.
White Sands Missile Range remains an integral part, as you
know, to our testing in the Army's Air and Missile Defense
Program. As the senior mission commander for Kwajalein Atoll, I
also have strategic testing at those sites where I also
maintain an infrastructure and sensors to be able to get after
that. And I believe continuing funding and improvements of all
of those capabilities are critical to continuing to ensure that
we have the best capability as we test our critical systems
moving forward.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you so much. In New Mexico, as you know,
Lieutenant General, we have a long legacy of not just missile
testing, but a lot of research and development that has
contributed to the strength of this Nation's national security.
We also have a toxic legacy of impacts at local surrounding
communities from testing activities, which is one of the
reasons I am fighting and others here in Congress are fighting
to reauthorize RECA [Radiation Exposure Compensation Act]. And
so we just want to make sure that those technologies are
updated, and that we don't make the same mistakes of the past,
at the same time, protecting national security.
Now, Mr. Hill, given the importance of White Sands testing
capabilities, what is stopping the department currently from
updating these critical testing systems?
Mr. Hill. Congressman Vasquez, I am not familiar with the
specific decisions on those, but we can certainly take the
question. And in the general sense, obviously, the previous
discussions about the overall top line and making tradeoffs
within finite resources I am sure is part of the calculations
that is happening.
Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Mr. Hill. I appreciate you paying
attention to this issue in future budget requests. Now beyond
the missile testing and evaluation done at White Sands, we are
home to the largest manufacturer of space grade solar cells
that are a key component to providing power to our satellites.
Producers in my district power a significant portion of our
Nation's national security satellites directly contributing to
the strength of our missile warning fleet and space.
Mr. Hill, for components like solar cells that are critical
for our missile defense and warning infrastructure, what does
it mean to the Department to have a reliable, domestic supply
chain? And how can Congress help support robust production
capabilities like those in my State?
Mr. Hill. I think these reliable domestic production
chains, we see how important they are across a number of
fields. One of the things that we have done is we most recently
issued our commercial space integration strategy, recognizing
how much innovation is being driven by the commercial side of
space. And understanding that we in the Defense Department need
to shift from trying to contort them into meeting our
requirements to being flexible about our requirements so we can
leverage what they are doing. That would be an example of
creating an environment in which more innovation happens inside
domestic production capacity.
Mr. Vasquez. I appreciate that, Mr. Hill. And we certainly
are at the forefront, I think, of that commercialization, both
in the research and development phase but also know in light
assembly and manufacturing when it comes to all these different
components that are going into these modern systems. And I
appreciate your continued attention and investment to New
Mexico's Second District. Thank you so much. Chairman, I yield
back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative Strong.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, and Ranking Member
Moulton, and I thank each of you for being here today.
General, it is great having each of you in my office last
week. It was interesting to learn that not only is Huntsville
the Rocket City, but it is also apparently the City of Love
since this is where you met your wife, General James.
And I also found out that General Gainey's parents met at
Red Stone Arsenal. So it is interesting to hear that. Red Stone
Arsenal is truly making a name for itself. I have said it
before, and I will say it again, we have got some great things
coming out of Huntsville.
General Collins, just a few weeks ago, General Guillot with
NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] reconfirmed to this committee
that the next generation interceptor is critical for defending
the homeland.
Last spring, your predecessor testified to the benefits of
keeping multiple contractors on the NGI program through
critical design review. But since late last year, we have
learned that this is no longer the plan. This really concerns
me and many others.
Looking back to 2019 when the redesign kill vehicle--RKV--
program was canceled, we had all our eggs in one basket. There
wasn't a backup plan. And because we didn't have a backup plan,
we had to extend the life of our interceptors and start an
entirely new program. This cost taxpayers a lot of money, it
costs us capability, and it costs us time when there is a
ticking clock over in the Indo-Pacific and throughout the
world.
What has changed? Why is MDA now making an earlier than
planned down-select decision before critical design review next
year?
General Collins. Congressman, thanks for that question on
NGI. It is absolutely our foundation for homeland defense into
the future. And we have continued to focus the agency very much
on NGI and its incorporation in no later than 2028.
Two things to note, one we have talked about is certainly
the fiscal realities and the decisions that needed to be made
with--across the missile defense portfolio has been far-
reaching. But second, we have also been keeping the NGI program
on track. Both primes have completed a preliminary design
review. Both have completed full qualification of all of their
parts for the radiation environment. And many of the
subcomponents have been taken to the critical design review
stage of design. All of that brought together, we, the agency,
believe we have a full, in-depth understanding of the designs
from the two primes. We fully understand, and the transition to
production plans and the risks that are still involved with
both primes. And we believe that the level of risk is well
below the Department's standard of making a decision such as
this. So we believe we have the technical depth and knowledge
and understanding of risk as we move forward to make that
decision.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. I know that some very smart people
have done great work to keep our current interceptors in the
game longer, but we cannot keep life-extending the fleet. Is
that right?
General Collins. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. I know that the confidence and NGI
succeeding is high. I credit a big part of that to the
incredible work being done at Red Stone Arsenal with both
industry teams in Huntsville, Alabama. But the consequences of
something going wrong with NGI are much higher now than it was
back in 2019. Would that be a correct statement?
General Collins. Yes, sir. There is still additional risk
ahead of us on the program, and we will continue to stay very
focused on where that risk is. Sorry. We will continue to stay
focused on where that risk is and focus on mitigating that risk
as best as possible.
Mr. Strong. I totally agree. They are much higher this
time, because just as you said, we can't fall back on doing
another life extension of the current system. We have already
used our get-out-of-jail free card with the RKV. I worry that
the Biden administration is wanting to dismantle the
significant industrial capacity that has been built up over
decades. And MDA's budget and plans are taking a detrimental
hit due to some short-sighted decisions here.
Is there a report or study that MDA has conducted that
supports down-selecting before critical design review over
sticking with the original acquisition strategy?
General Collins. No, sir, we do not have any reporter
assessment on that.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. So where budget constraints, the
primary or initial reason for the change in strategy, or is it
because the teams have progressed better than expected?
General Collins. I would have say, sir, it is a combination
of both. Both teams have progressed very, very well. But there
was a catalyst that was driven by the fiscal decision as well.
Mr. Strong. I thank each of you for being here. Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hearing all the
nexus that you have to Representative Strong's district and not
Paradise, which is my district, makes me start questioning your
judgment, I must say. We know our adversaries possess
hypersonic capabilities. Defending against and defeating this
threat is proving to be challenging, both technically and
physically.
General Collins, how are advanced manufacturing
technologies, such as additive manufacturing being utilized to
reduce costs and acquisition timelines for future hypersonic
defense programs?
General Collins. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.
I fully agree with your notes on the difficulty in developing
an industry base to accelerate our hypersonic offensive and
defensive weapons as we move forward. And in my previous job
within the Air Force buying hypersonic weapons, we had the same
challenges is developing the industry base to produce critical
technologies we require for hypersonic weapons.
At the Missile Defense Agency, we are very focused on
bringing any of the new advanced manufacturing capabilities and
technologies to bear to help war and reduce costs of building
hypersonic weapons in the future as well as helping to scale
and increase pace of capacity of lines going forward.
We are very much looking into advanced manufacturing or
additive manufacturing. As you mentioned, we have a group
within our S&T [science and technology] division that is
closely looking at and investing in small business maturation
capabilities of additive manufacturing and particular
capabilities that are required within a hypersonic weapon.
One in particular is carbon/carbon additive manufacturing,
which is key to the front edge thermal protection systems of
our hypersonic weapons. A key technology and a limiting factor
within our ability to scale the industry base. So we are very
much investing across the traditional and nontraditional bases
to ensure we have the manufacturing capability for hypersonic
weapons.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. General Collins, earlier this
year, the Missile Defense Agency, MDA, launched two hypersonic
and ballistic tracking space satellites, HBTSS. MDA received
additional funds in fiscal year 2024 defense appropriation bill
to do calibration testing and training on threat representative
hypersonic targets.
Can you please describe the status of the satellites, and
how MDA is going to execute the additional $25 million for
calibration provided in fiscal year 2024 omnibus?
General Collins. Yes, Congressman, absolutely. It was a
major activity on Valentine's Day of this year when we lost
the----
Mr. Carbajal. That is my anniversary, by the way.
General Collins. Sir, those satellites are still
progressing through launch and early orbit testing. We have a
very slow methodical process whereby we turn on the satellites,
we turn on the payload. Over the last month, we have had first
light, what we call the first time we have turned on the
payloads, and actually looked with them and started taking a
look at the data to calibrate. That calibration continues. We
started to do a number of cooperative activities where there
may be a launch or a test that somebody else is executing. And
we have been using those as capabilities, as opportunities to
calibrate that payload.
Later this summer, we will be executing our first HTB
Hypersonic Testbed One launch in June. That is a launch
specifically designed for our HBTSS satellites to look at a
hypersonic threat and track it through its time of flight. They
use--there will be another HTB2 test later in the summer. Those
are the two same wickets that we are looking at to calibrate
and certify the fire control solution and technology that we
have.
Back to the earlier conversation, another opportunity we
are getting is the Space Development Agency for wide field
review satellites were launched on the same booster. They are
in plane with our two satellites. And so we are actually going
to be able to utilize some testing of the wide field review
capability in concert with RHBTSS technology as well. A key
capability as we look forward to a future missile warning,
missile defense, and missile defense space architecture. Thank
you, sir.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. General James, the value add of
HBTSS is that it will provide fire control quality data to
track and intercept hypersonic threats. Can you speak to the
importance of fire control quality data, the importance of
using threat represent--representative hypersonic targets to
calibrate and train against, and how space command plans to do
that across future year defense programs?
General James. Yes, Congressman, I sure can. Thanks for the
question. I came a long way. I have a few things to say. So
thanks for the question. Absolutely, important, incredible. As
SPACECOM continues to flesh out its transregional missile
defense mission, and we continue to press on that, and we see
those natural links between what you have heard the other
colleagues say here about the convergence of the space and the
missile defense mission. How we use our space assets and
develop those to get at the technology changes we see to your
point, the hyper velocity or the cruise missile threats that we
see, we are going to have to use space-based systems. We are
going to have to be able to provide that level of targeting
quality information. And so, that's exactly the things that we
are looking on as we continue to develop the net centric
command and control systems, and the information systems, like
C2BMC [Command Control Battle Management Communications] as we
continue to press for that. You will see that in our list as an
important factor that we need to continue to press on to
increase our ability to command and control and pass that
information from close to sensor, sensor to best shooter to be
able to make those connections. There is a lot of work that
happening more than just in USSPACECOM, and are tying into all
of that with MDA, with SNDC, Army's convergence, Nimble Titan,
lots of different exercises, JIAMDO. Nimble fire. We exercise
all of those to continue to build our expertise in that.
Absolutely critical because terrestrial sensors are not
going to allow us to track and target the threats that we see
coming the way we have in the past. That will have to be space-
based. And all the things that General Collins just talked
about from SDA and the work with HBTSS from the space force and
other capabilities, absolutely important, and integrating
commercial and integrating the allies. That is an area that
USSPACECOM has done tons of work with over the years, and it
falls naturally to how we are going to move forward with
missile defense.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chair, for the
additional time. Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, it is really more for Lieutenant General
James. Representative Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, I
hope Mr. Secretary General, as you see, that incredibly, this
is bipartisan with the leadership of our chairman and ranking
member, and even including Congressman Carbajal. And so--but
truly, we want you to succeed. And I have a personal interest.
I served 31 years in the Army Guard and our Reserves, and I
really appreciate military service. And I am grateful my oldest
son served in Iraq field artillery. My second son was a doctor
out of track, he was in the Navy, but I still claim him serving
in Baghdad, my third son, Signal in Sinai. And my youngest a
year, Afghanistan as an engineer. So all credit to my wife,
Roxanne, for actually training these guys.
But the bottom line is we want you to succeed. And,
equally, it is more important than ever, Mr. Secretary General,
we are in a conflict we did not choose. And to me, it is a
conflict, a war, between dictators with rule of gun who are
invading democracies with rule of law. Sadly, it began February
24, 2022, when war criminal Putin just murderously invaded
Ukraine, just seeking out civilians to murder civilians. I have
been there to Bucha to see the inhumanity of what has been
done. I actually was in Kiev in August last year possibly for
the first hypersonic missile attack. And the tactic of war
criminal Putin is so inhuman, and that is to attack a civilian
target like an apartment complex, and then that is not the real
attack. Twenty years--twenty minutes later when the first
responders are there, the fire service, the EMS personnel law
enforcement, that is when the real attack occurs.
And it is just shocking to think of the tactics that Putin
has to try to intimidate the people of Ukraine, just as they
did the people of the Aleppo in Syria, and then to come back
and try to intimidate first responders. Then, of course, it
continued on October the 7th when the puppets of the regime in
Tehran invaded and, again, 1,200 innocent civilians mercilessly
murdered intentionally without any sense of propriety or
concept. Indeed not in uniform, just everything that could be a
violation of laws of war they conducted. And then, of course,
sadly we have had over 150 attacks that have occurred in the
Red Sea, as correctly identified by Congressman Moulton in
Iraq. Over and over again, we see these attacks. Over 150. And
then culminating on January the 28th with three young members
of the Army Reserves from Georgia who were killed by a
Hezbollah, again, another puppet of Iran, killing three of our
personnel and wounding 40 others.
And so, it is just incredible to me the challenges that we
have, and we want the best. And wanting the best, General
Gainey, in particular, I am concerned with the level of
deployment of such an important branch, the air defense
artillery. And, actually, I want to commend. It is no surprise,
General, Congressperson Don Bacon was ahead of the curse. And
that is the deployment level that is being conducted. And I
know with the leadership we have, bipartisan, we would like to
back you up in any way to try to address that.
With all of this in mind, General Gainey, in particular,
how are we addressing the technological development of the
Chinese Communist Party war criminal Putin, the regime in
Tehran, the Kim Jong Un? How are we addressing this?
General Gainey. Congressman, thank you for the question and
appreciate your thoughts. As--I will speak first on the Army
perspective. The Army is undergoing its most modernized effort
in several, several years. We are moving from a Patriot centric
force, and I highlighted earlier how we are asking Patriot to
essentially do everything in a fight, give after tactical
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and, in some cases, with
our partners even going after drones with the Patriot system.
The U.S., through our modernization program, U.S. Army, is now
looking at integrated battle command system as the cornerstone
of that system. We have that system in test right now with our
unit out at Fort Bliss. What that unit--that integrate--that C2
system does is it integrates several components and not just a
system. It takes a lower tier air missile defense sensor as the
cornerstone of that capability, and then it adds in other
sensors, whether ground-based sensors or airborne platforms,
and also adds in shooters into that common C2. So now given the
operator to leverage several different sensors to provide
several different effectors against the range of threats. And
also that lower-tier air missile defense sensor provides
significantly more capability than the current system does,
which would allow it to now optimize most of those interceptors
that are part of that C2 system.
And if you look at this challenge from a joint perspective
in my JFCC IMD hat, that is where we look at how do you bring
all of these systems together in a larger C2 construct? And
that is something as we work towards the defensive wall, one of
the areas we are looking at is how do you take the Army
integrative battle command system integrated with some of the
systems that the missile defense agency is putting together on
Guam? And so, therefore, we are looking at we will have an
enduring solution that moves forward that essentially
integrates all those several systems, leverages the sensors and
the shooters together. That is the medium, lower to medium
range.
Now, if you look at the counter UAS in the protection to
the maneuver capability, the Army has also significantly
invested in that area also where we have added several
maneuver, short-range defense systems integrated into our
division in BCPs to be able to provide capability against
cruise missiles. Looking at technology like directed energy,
50-kilowatt directed energy that we have deployed out there
right now testing that capability, and also refielding high-
power microwaves into our formations to be able to get at those
threats.
So if you look at a capability, a system that is able
integrate all of these sensors, all of these effectors, and
then be able to put the proper fires on target, the appropriate
interceptor or effect on the appropriate target, that is how we
are moving forward in modernization. That is how it is going to
allow us to move forward.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. If there is ever a committee that
is faced with a problem, it is this one. I am on a lot of
military committees, and I never had a committee that had so
many acronyms. To try to understand what each and every one of
these things actually is, it is a challenge. But I am going to
try to take this in a different direction. Following on some of
the work that my colleague, Mr. Moulton, put forward earlier in
his remarks, we will forever be playing defense, trying to
catch up with the offense. We can use the NFL [National
Football League], we can use the experience of what we are
hearing here today. Much of this discussion today is about
defense.
And we know that in that defensive environment, there is
great risk. What has happened over the course of the last 23
years is a very significant shift in this entire arena. Prior
to 2002, there was an ABM treaty, an antiballistic missile
treaty. It would do well for all of us to understand the
details of the actual language of the treaty. We usually think
it only applies to intercontinental ballistic missiles. It
didn't. It went beyond that. The United States withdrew from
that. To this day, Russia uses the withdrawal of the--of
America from the ABM treaty to justify their continued buildup
of intercontinental ballistic missile systems and the weapons
that go with it.
Interestingly, in recent days, the last few years, China is
using that very same withdrawal, American withdrawal from the
ABM treaty system to justify its buildup of intercontinental
ballistic missiles, including silos, which this committee has
discussed.
It is fair to argue that that withdrawal from that treaty
has led to the current nuclear arms race, and much of the
discussion today has to do with how we are going to defend
using the GMD system. And my concern here is that we are in a
never-ending cycle of offense followed by defense that presumes
to be successful against the then-known offense, and yet when
we are around.
My point here is that as much time as we are spending on,
in this committee, defense, we ought to be looking at how to
break this cycle of an arms' race. Now you can add the nuclear
piece to it, which you must do, and it becomes even more
significant. It is never-ending. And I know the members of this
committee, and certainly the gentlemen before us understand in
detail what this race is all about, the risks that are in it.
And my question to you, Mr. Hill, is, is it useful for us
policymakers and for you and your team to spend as much time
thinking about how to stop the cycle, or at least slow down the
cycle of offense, defense, defense, offense, and back and
forth, all of which creates greater risk? Mr. Hill, I would
love to hear your thoughts on it.
Mr. Hill. Sure. Congressman Garamendi, very, very key piece
in the entire puzzle of what you are getting after here.
Clearly, there was a time, there was an era when we had someone
we could work with on the other side of a negotiating table.
During the Soviet Union, that era and the Cold War, we did
negotiate agreements with them successfully. We are in a--and
that is a key piece to any kind of arms control situation. Do
you have someone you can work with? Now, you have three, and
you have a very different Russia in some ways in terms of can
you deal with them as a credible negotiating partner right now?
So, it is not to--it is to say you always need to be
thinking about that as one of the pieces of what you have to
work with to try and maintain strategic stability, defense,
offense, as well as can you come up to a confidence level with
somebody on the other side of the table. China's a third player
in this now, which adds to the complications. But I think the
tool never goes away. It is how do you use it in the
environment you have?
Mr. Garamendi. I am going to take 5 more seconds. Every one
of the arms control mechanisms that went into effect during the
Cold War occurred almost immediately after the most difficult
of moments in that Cold War. I will let it go at that. That is
a historical issue. But thank you. I am out of time. And for
me, I am going to spend as much time talking about this as I do
about offense and defense. Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. Representative Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn. First, I would
like to correct the record earlier in this hearing. The ranking
member said that the Department of Defense chose Fort Drum as
the preferred missile defense site for the third homeland
missile defense site nearly 10 years ago. That is incorrect.
Despite the fact that you said that is correct, General
Collins, you are aware that the date that that was designated
was 2019, correct?
General Collins. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Stefanik. So the 10 years ago was incorrect?
General Collins. Yes, ma'am, 4 years ago.
Ms. Stefanik. Great. You also are aware that just last
year, General Milley and Vice Admiral Hill testified in front
of this committee that the construction of a third site at Fort
Drum would be strategically worthwhile, correct?
General Collins. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Stefanik. Are you aware of that testimony?
General Collins. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Stefanik. Yes. And you are also aware that in multiple
NDAAs, the language designating Fort Drum was the preferred
third site for an East Coast missile defense site has been
included in multiple NDAAs. Are you aware of that?
General Collins. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Stefanik. And just let the record reflect, the ranking
member voted in support of that language, not once, but
multiple times, as well as voted for appropriations as did the
majority of the members of this committee.
Now, in the fiscal year 2014 Appropriations Act and the
NDAA, we worked to secure $10 million in planning and design
funds for the Missile Defense Agency to begin construction
activities for a third homeland missile defense site at Fort
Drum.
My question to you, General Collins, is as the director of
MDA, can you confirm to me that this $10 million is being used
as dictated by Congress as explicitly stated by Congress at
Fort Drum to begin the planning and design of a third missile
defense site.
General Collins. Ma'am, the $10 million has been authorized
and appropriated for that purpose, and that is the purpose we
are executing it for.
Ms. Stefanik. And what are you using that for?
General Collins. That is to do the initial planning and
development of design for continental interceptor site to take
it to the 10 percent design level.
Ms. Stefanik. At Fort Drum?
General Collins. We are pursuing an agnostic design that
would support----
Ms. Stefanik. That is not what the language said.
General Collins. By providing and--by doing it as an
agnostic site, we would not slow down the capability to do it.
Ms. Stefanik. That is not what the language that was passed
by Congress said. And you understand that in the NDAA for
multiple years, it had designated Fort Drum. There were three
sites under consideration in three different States. There was
a process and environmental impact study. This has been a very
thorough process. And so, you are saying to me today that the
$10 million is not designated at Fort Drum for the planning and
design?
General Collins. It is--it supports continental interceptor
site at any location that is determined to be optimal in the
future in line with the 2019 memo that the Department signed
out.
Ms. Stefanik. Designating Fort Drum?
General Collins. Fort Drum, and it also designated that
when a requirement was set for a continental site, that there
would have to a be readdress and a reassessment of location
based on performance.
Ms. Stefanik. Even though you said in my office, when we
met General Collins in my office, that you understood that the
$10 million would go to the design planning at Fort Drum as
specified by the NDAA.
General Collins. When a decision--if a decision is made to
pursue a Fort Drum site, the $10 million will be 100 percent in
line with being able to accomplish that.
Ms. Stefanik. But you do understand that multiple NDAAs
Fort Drum has been designated as well as by DOD?
General Collins. I am aware, ma'am, of the report that the
department signed out and the previous NDAAs.
Ms. Stefanik. Okay. Great. With that, I will yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. All right. Thank you. That concludes the
public portion of this hearing. We have votes that will be
called roughly 11:45 or shortly thereafter. So we will be in
recess, and we will go into a closed hearing up in room 2337,
until such time as votes are called, and then we will adjourn
the subcommittee at that point. So we will be in recess and be
upstairs.
[Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the committee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 12, 2024
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 12, 2024
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 12, 2024
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Mr. Moulton. Given that the President recently assigned to
U.S. Space Command the responsibility for coordinating trans-
regional missile defense, how does U.S. Space Command
contribute to the complex and strategic role that missile
defense plays in our national security?
General James. The transfer of the trans-regional missile
defense (TRMD) responsibility aligns with the global sensor
management (GSM) responsibility under USSPACECOM and allows
more efficient use of kinetic and non-kinetic sensor to shooter
chains across multiple Combatant Commands. USSPACECOM is
uniquely positioned to support and contribute to cross-
Combatant Command coordination from the tactical to the
strategic levels. USSPACECOM provides dynamic management of
global terrestrial, afloat, and space-based multi-mission
sensors while optimizing and defending associated command and
control architectures. GSM and TRMD alignment create additional
efficiencies by consolidating policy, planning, assessment,
intelligence, training, and exercise support to the Joint
Force. USSPACECOM provides planning support to other Combatant
Commands, including a global perspective of Ally and Partner
capabilities. USSPACECOM also ensures our defenses continue to
evolve by articulating and emphasizing warfighter requirements;
advising, assessing, and integrating warfighter feedback into
the capability development process; and enabling enhanced
synchronization to future operations.
------
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Mr. Carbajal. How are flight test opportunities being
provided to enable the next generation of intercept systems?
General Collins. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) follows a
rigorous process to develop the MDA Integrated Master Test Plan
(IMTP) on an annual basis, documenting the planned test
opportunities of each system. The IMTP is delivered to Congress
each spring synchronized with the President's Budget
submission. The IMTP development process involves multiple
phases to collect program requirements, design and schedule
tests, cost estimate, and evaluate against budget constraints
aligned with MDA's flight test priorities. This process intakes
program requirements both within and beyond the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) years to ensure long-lead test
resourcing can be addressed within the FYDP. Additionally, the
IMTP development process closely coordinates program test
requirements with other external Department of Defense
stakeholders.
External stakeholders, including but are not limited to the
following:
LDirector, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)
LOffice of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering Director, Developmental Test,
Evaluation, and Assessments (DTE&A)
LCommander, Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD) (representing the
combatant commands)
LCommander, United States (U.S.) Army Test and
Evaluation Command (ATEC)
LCommander, U.S. Air Force Operational Test and
Evaluation Center (AFOTEC)
LDirector, U.S. Navy Operational Test and
Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR);
LSpace Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM)
LCommander, Joint Interoperability Test Command
(JITC).
DOT&E, DTE&A, JFCC IMD, ATEC, AFOTEC, OPTEVFOR, STARCOM,
and JITC members engage with MDA on a weekly basis to develop
flight test opportunities as reflected in the IMTP. These
jointly coordinated test opportunities enable and demonstrate
the capabilities of future Missile Defense System
functionality, including currently documented test schedules
for the Next Generation Interceptor, Glide Phase Interceptor,
and Defense of Guam programs in IMTP v25.1.
Mr. Carbajal. Do existing hypersonic defense strategies
focus on both strategic and conventional adversary threats, or
are these threats being treated separately?
General Collins. Current United States (U.S.) policy
distinguishes between regional hypersonic missile threats and
threats capable of striking the U.S. homeland. It prioritizes
the development of global warning and tracking capabilities to
address all hypersonic threats (threats regionally and to the
homeland), and the development of active and passive defense
capabilities to defend against regional hypersonic threats.
Though the United States maintains the right to defend itself
against attacks from any source, per longstanding policy, the
United States relies on strategic deterrence to address large
and intercontinental-range, nuclear missile threats to the U.S.
homeland from Russia and the People's Republic of China. I
defer to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
for more information on U.S. hypersonic defense strategy and
policy.
Mr. Carbajal. How do the estimated hypersonic interceptor
acquisition quantities compare to quantities for existing
ballistic or cruise missile interceptors?
General Collins. There are currently an approximate 1,650
ballistic missile interceptors which include Ground Based
Interceptor, Standard Missile three, Standard Missile six, and
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. Of the 1,650 ballistic
missile interceptors, approximately 140 interceptors are dual-
use to counter hypersonic threats. These quantities do not
include Service capabilities or cruise missile interceptors
external to the Missile Defense Agency.
------
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Mr. Bacon. I am concerned that, with few exceptions, most
key U.S. military installations lack dedicated land based air
and missile defense:
A) What is the Department of Defense strategy to ensure our
overseas air bases and key installations in Europe, the Indo-
Pacific and the Middle East are defended from air and missile
attack?
B) Has the Department of Defense established a current
critical asset list (CAL) and defended asset list (DAL) for key
military installations and operating locations in Europe, the
Indo-Pacific and the Middle East? Who approves each of these
lists?
C) How does the Department determine which military service
is responsible for developing, resourcing and operating land-
based air and missile defense systems for locations that appear
on each CAL/DAL in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and the Middle
East?
D) How many sites on each CAL in Europe, the Indo-Pacific
and the Middle East are considered undefended (e.g. on the CAL
but not on the DAL)?
E) What organization in DoD is responsible for organizing,
training, equipping and presenting forces to USSNORTHCOM to
defend key military installations in the Continental United
States from cruise and hypersonic missile attack from an
adversary?
Mr. Hill. A) In accordance with the 2022 Missile Defense
Review, the Department of Defense works with allies and
partners to provide threat-based, mission-tailored air and
missile defense of overseas air bases and key installations to
deter and defend against attack and enable conditions for
effective U.S., allied, and partner military operations should
deterrence fail.
This approach seeks to leverage U.S. and partner
capabilities while balancing near-term risk to mission and
forces with longer-term Department of Defense efforts to build
integrated air and missile defense force readiness, capability,
and capacity. We accomplish these objectives through a careful
evaluation of air and missile threats and the assignment of
U.S. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities
through the Department's Global Force Management (GFM) process.
Additional details can be provided in a classified setting.
B) The Department of Defense has established a critical
asset list (CAL) and a defended asset list (DAL) for Europe,
the Indo-Pacific region, and the Middle East. CALs and DALs are
created and approved by combatant commander for their assigned
area of responsibility to address mission requirements and
reduce risk associated with current and emerging air and
missile threats.
C) The Secretary of Defense's initial decision for force
allocation is ordered through the Global Force Management
Allocation Plan (GFMAP). The Secretary directs changes in
military service responsibilities for land-based air and
missile defense informed by CCMD requirements, Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) recommendations, fiscal
considerations, and changes in the national security
environment. The Secretary of Defense determines the assignment
of land-based missile defense assets among the combatant
commands and determines the forces for land-based missile
defense operations through the Global Force Management process.
More than one military service may be tasked to support a CCMD
requirement.
D) The Combatant Commander is responsible for determining
how best to employ assigned military forces to protect assets
on the critical asset list and defended asset list. The number
of assets protected, and level of protection offered are
dynamic and can change rapidly based upon mission requirements,
threats, and available resources. Additional details can be
provided in a classified setting.
E) The Secretaries of the Military Departments, through the
Military Services, are responsible for organizing, training,
and equipping forces (including Reserve Component forces). The
Secretary of Defense determines which forces are assigned or
allocated to USNORTHCOM to defend key military installations in
the continental United States from missile attack.
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