    [House Hearing, 118 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 118-72]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                       ON

                        FISCAL YEAR 2025 BUDGET REQUEST

                            FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND

                            MISSILE DEFEAT PROGRAMS

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                 APRIL 12, 2024

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    57-193                    WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                        DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Chairman

    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
    DON BACON, Nebraska                  RO KHANNA, California
    JIM BANKS, Indiana                   CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
    MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
    DALE W. STRONG, Alabama              MARC VEASEY, Texas

                 Peter Schirtzinger, Professional Staff Member
                    Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                        Owen McGeary, Research Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
    Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Collins, Lt Gen Heath A., USAF, Director, Missile Defense Agency.     6
    Gainey, LTG Sean A., USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and
      Missile Defense Command........................................     8
    Hill, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
      and Missile Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
      for Policy.....................................................     5
    James, LTG Thomas L., USA, Deputy Commander, U.S. Space Command..     9

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Collins, Lt Gen Heath A......................................    51
        Gainey, LTG Sean A...........................................    70
        Hill, John D.................................................    35
        James, LTG Thomas L..........................................    83

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Moulton..................................................    97
        Mr. Carbajal.................................................    97
        Mr. Bacon....................................................    99

    .
    FISCAL YEAR 2025 BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFEAT
                                    PROGRAMS

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                Washington, DC, Friday, April 12, 2024.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:44 a.m., in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Lamborn
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
          COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Lamborn. The meeting will come to order.
        Thank you all for being here. Thank you for your patience
    while we finished a vote series the last few minutes.
        First of all, before we do anything else, I am going to ask
    unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed to
    participate in today's hearing after all subcommittee members
    have had an opportunity to ask questions.
        Is there any objection?
        If not, so ordered. So non-subcommittee members will be
    recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
        Welcome to our hearing. And thank you, witnesses, for being
    here. We have, Mr. John Hill, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Space and Missile Defense Policy. Joining him, we
    have Lieutenant General Thomas James, the Deputy Commander of
    the U.S. Space Command; Lieutenant General Heath Collins, the
    Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and Lieutenant General
    Sean Gainey, the Commander of U.S. Army Space and Missile
    Defense Command.
        The subcommittee meets today to review the Department's
    fiscal year 2025 budget request for missile defense
    capabilities. I have a number of concerns just right off the
    bat here. First, the overall level of funding is inadequate
    given today's threat environment. The fiscal year 2025 budget
    requests $10.4 billion for the Missile Defense Agency. That is
    more than $400 million less than last year and almost $1
    billion below the level projected for fiscal year 2025 and last
    year's FYDP [Future-Years Defense Program].
        I want to reiterate this point. The fiscal year 2025 budget
    request for the Missile Defense Agency is $960 million, almost
    $1 billion below the level planned for in last year's budget.
    Further, these draconian cuts are not limited to just fiscal
    year 2025. The outyear spending projections included in this
    budget envision continued reductions in missile defense
    spending.
        Compared to the spending plan in the budget submitted last
    year, this budget forecasts cutting over $2.6 billion in
    missile defense funding between fiscal year 2025 and fiscal
    year 2028. To achieve these cuts, this budget would make
    several concerning decisions, including terminating the
    production line for SM-3 Block 1B interceptor and eliminating
    competition by prematurely down selecting to single contractors
    on both the next generation interceptor and Glide Phase
    Interceptor programs.
        I know we will get into these issues in greater detail, but
    in the case of the Glide Phase Interceptor, I think it is
    important to note that this down selection is occurring 5 years
    earlier than planned and before the preliminary design review
    is even held. I am extremely concerned that we will simply not
    have enough sufficient technical data to make an informed
    choice between competing concepts for this program.
        The Glide Phase Interceptor is the only capability in
    development specifically designed to combat the growing
    hypersonic threats we face. It is vitally important to our
    national security that we get this program right. We should be
    investing in a robust program that delivers an effective
    capability to our warfighters on a schedule that meets the
    threat. That is why Congress mandated in section 1666 of last
    year's defense authorization bill, but this budget would do the
    opposite.
        Overall, I am concerned that these decisions simply accept
    too much risk and that missile defense appears to have become a
    bill payer for other capabilities in this budget. This is
    difficult to understand given the growth in missile threats,
    the extremely high demand for missile defense capabilities from
    combatant commanders, and the visible evidence of the value
    these capabilities bring to the fight on full display as we
    speak in the Red Sea and in Israel and Ukraine.
        I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about how
    this budget impacts their programs and their assessment of the
    risks contained in this budget.
        With that, I turn to the ranking member for his opening
    remarks.

         STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
    MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Moulton. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I will just begin by echoing many of your concerns.
    This is obviously a time when missile defense is in use all
    around the globe, including by the United States, in great,
    great quantity. This is not a technology that seems to be
    fading away, and I think my biggest concern is that I just
    don't understand the rationale behind many of these cuts.
        Now, I have asked a lot of tough questions of leaders like
    yourself, Mr. Hill, in particular, about the purpose of
    hypersonics. It is in that same vein. We don't understand what
    exactly the operational concept is to use hypersonics. That
    makes it hard to understand the money we are spending on it.
    But likewise, as the chairman said, if we don't understand
    why--or we don't understand the rationale behind these cuts, it
    becomes very hard to support them, especially in this
    environment.
        I want to welcome both Lieutenant General James and
    Lieutenant General Collins, as this is the first opportunity to
    testify in front of the subcommittee in your new roles.
        Lieutenant General James, Space Command's role is
    increasing in both importance and consequence. And given that
    Space Command was recently given responsibility for Department-
    level missile defense coordination, it is critical that you and
    we understand the complex strategic role missile defense plays
    in our national security. You are the first Army space operator
    to reach the rank of Lieutenant General, so you must be doing
    something right. FA-40s have been an exemplar in the
    Department, and this milestone is well overdue, so
    congratulations.
        Lieutenant General Collins, your unique background across
    the spectrum of strategic programs, including space, nuclear
    weapons, and missile defense, makes you well prepared to be
    director of the Missile Defense Agency. I am encouraged by our
    initial discussions that it is imperative that we understand
    the larger policy implications of what MDA [Missile Defense
    Agency] is developing before we blindly build new systems that
    could inadvertently further the proliferation of missile
    technology or, in the absolute worse case, result in
    destabilization, miscalculation, and escalation to nuclear war.
        As I shift to the topic of today's hearing, I want to
    remind the subcommittee that missile defense has a mixed legacy
    and continues to pose difficult questions about what its
    purpose is and should be, under what conditions it actually
    makes us safer, and how much and what kind of it we need. That
    is why these questions, including what the chairman started
    with, are so important.
        As I laid out last year, there are five basic scenarios or
    levels at which we consider using or not using missile defense.
    Behind me is a graphic depicting these levels, which I will use
    to frame the rest of my remarks.
        The highest level of missile defense, it has been
    longstanding policy across nearly every administration that we
    are not and will not pursue missile defense to defeat a near-
    peer nuclear attack. Despite attempts to change U.S. policy
    during last year's NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
    cycle to specifically do so, going down this road would be
    incredibly destabilizing, technically challenging, and
    prohibitively expensive.
        Until we can safely rid the world of all nuclear weapons,
    which I believe is ultimately necessary for the survival of
    humanity itself, we can neither unilaterally disarm nor
    unilaterally render useless our adversaries' arsenals. If we
    were to try to render all of our adversaries' missiles
    incapable through increased missile defenses, they would simply
    do what they have arguably already done, develop new, more
    complex missiles to defeat those systems. Mutually assured
    destruction sounds like a crazy concept when you first read
    about it, but it has fundamentally kept us is safe.
        The fourth level of missile defense is the area where there
    is the most debate. This is where we can argue that our
    advancements in missile defense over the past two decades since
    pulling out of the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty] treaty
    have provided a greater security blanket against aspiring
    nuclear powers like North Korea and Iran.
        However, as North Korea, or the DPRK [Democratic People's
    Republic of Korea], continues to expand their ballistic missile
    and nuclear arsenals, we must continually evaluate when we view
    them as more of a strategic-level threat and, therefore, rely
    on a policy of nuclear deterrence, instead of simply trying to
    outnumber their ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]
    with interceptors, such as the next generation interceptor
    program intends to do.
        If we decide to continue to outpace their ballistic missile
    expansion, the question is, how do Russia and China respond? I
    have argued that they will certainly see that growth as
    directly affecting the credibility of their own nuclear forces,
    which may have dire unintended consequences.
        I hope that in today's discussion, Mr. Hill, you can help
    us understand how the Department continues to weigh those
    questions and that balance. As this subcommittee evaluates this
    year's budget request and the continued missile defense policy
    and posture of the United States, we must understand these
    implications for ensuring the strategic stability of America
    and the world for decades to come.
        Now, level three is a nuance that I think is important to
    distinguish from a rogue nation, because the size of the system
    required to deal with it is very different, but continuing to
    have some capability to defend against a small, even single
    accidental launch should be maintained.
        At level two, the tactical level, the incredible support
    Ukraine has received from allies and partners in air and
    missile defense has enabled them to fight back against near-
    nonstop Russian missile attacks for the past 3 years. Though if
    this body cannot get its act together and pass the languishing
    supplemental, this is the area in which Ukraine will suffer the
    most and will have direct impacts on their ability to maintain
    their sovereign country and territory.
        In the Red Sea, we are seeing what many thought was not
    possible--multinational, coordinated, and effective missile
    defense--and obviously this is using a lot of missiles, which
    is one of the questions we have about reducing the budget.
    While U.S. Navy ships have been at the center of defending
    deployed forces, allies, partners, and commercial shipping
    vessels from a wide range of air-breathing and ballistic
    missile threats, they have been working across the
    multinational task force.
        The French, German, and U.K. [United Kingdom] Navies have
    all intercepted targets in the Red Sea. And while ideally I
    believe we need to move towards non-kinetic solutions that flip
    the cost curve of missile defense, something the chairman and I
    have been pursuing aggressively, no one can deny the incredible
    impact today's missile defense systems are having on the Middle
    East.
        Finally, at the foundational level of missile defense,
    simply detecting these threats, we still have much work to do.
    However, this past year has marked many successes in domain
    awareness. In February, MDA's hypersonic and ballistic tracking
    space sensor prototypes were launched, and this budget supports
    their ongoing testing through 2027. The Space Development
    Agency also launched their wide field-of-view sensors, which
    will be a key component of the next generation of missile
    warning and missile track architecture replacing the legacy,
    quote, big, juicy satellites currently on orbit.
        As we evaluate the fiscal year 2025 request for missile
    defense programs, I will continue to ask the following
    questions: How will expanding U.S. missile defense today impact
    strategic stability tomorrow? We are already in an arms race.
    Will it make our world more safe? And does each investment
    stabilize or destabilize our strategic national security? These
    are the questions we must ask ourselves on this subcommittee,
    not just with an eye to this year's budget and the NDAA, but in
    determining how our decisions will impact the world we leave
    for our children.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
        We will now move to opening statements from our witnesses.
    I would note that your prepared statements will be made part of
    the record, but you will each have 5 minutes to make some
    opening remarks.
        Mr. Hill, let's begin with you.

       STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HILL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
      DEFENSE FOR SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE UNDER
                    SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

        Mr. Hill. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn and Ranking Member
    Moulton and distinguished members of the subcommittee, for the
    opportunity to testify today. Thank you as well for including
    my full statement in the record.
        In brief, my written statement surveys threat developments
    in a deteriorating security environment. It stresses the
    unmistakable centrality of missiles of all types, including
    uncrewed aerial systems, or UAS, in modern warfare, and it
    underscores the indispensability of missile defense and missile
    defeat capabilities to deterring aggression and to defending
    our homeland, our forces deployed around the world, and our
    allies and partners. It highlights how those allies and
    partners have come to similar conclusions, are increasing their
    own investments, and are working with us to meet these
    challenges together.
        The administration's defense budget request for fiscal year
    2025 includes $28.4 billion for missile defense and missile
    defeat programs.
        I want to acknowledge at the outset of this hearing the
    strong support this subcommittee has consistently shown for
    missile defense and missile defeat efforts for many years. And
    I stand ready to work with you to pass defense authorization
    legislation for fiscal year 2025, the 64th consecutive year,
    and with all of Congress to pass on-time defense appropriations
    legislation for fiscal year 2025.
        Today, I must also emphasize, perhaps more than anything
    else, the critical urgency of passing the national security
    supplemental request, which Congress has now had for nearly 6
    months. That request includes desperately needed funding,
    funding to support Ukraine in defending its democratic
    sovereignty and its very existence against Russia's illegal and
    ruthless invasion and Russia's authoritarian aggression,
    including relentless barrages of missiles and UAS attacks;
    funding to support Israel in defending itself against the
    continuing missile UAS and rocket attacks by Hamas and other
    groups aligned with Iran; funding to provide critical
    humanitarian assistance in Ukraine, Israel, and Gaza, where
    innocent civilians are dying every day; funding to support our
    Indo-Pacific partners in deterring aggression by the People's
    Republic of China; funding to replenish our own military
    supplies of munitions and other materiel that we have had to
    draw down to meet the urgent needs of allies and partners; and
    funding to invest in the capacity of the American industrial
    base and workforce that is producing these munitions and weapon
    systems, including missile defense systems, that are so vital
    to all of these American national security interests.
        Chairman Lamborn and Ranking Member Moulton and
    distinguished members of this subcommittee, there is simply no
    more time for delay. The time to act is now. I cannot
    overemphasize. As General Cavoli said just the other day, I
    cannot overemphasize the critical importance of Congress coming
    together in common purpose and acting with urgency to pass the
    national security supplemental request.
        Thank you again for convening this crucially important and
    timely hearing. Thank you for your attention. And thank you,
    each and every one of you, for what you do for your
    constituents and the Nation. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hill can be found in the
    Appendix on page 35.]
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
        General Collins.

        STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HEATH A. COLLINS, USAF,
                    DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

        General Collins. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking
    Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
    I appreciate your continued strong support for the missile
    defense mission and look forward to the questions today.
        I would like to start out by thanking the men and women
    behind the development, delivery, and sustainment of the
    missile defense system that I represent today, our MDA family,
    and the operators of the system, all key partners in this no-
    fail mission.
        As you mentioned, Chairman, we are requesting $10.4 billion
    to develop and deploy homeland missile defenses and improve
    regional missile defenses against increasingly diverse and
    dangerous missile threats. Our prioritization of decisions will
    maximize missile defense system capability, capacity, and
    readiness. We continue to work closely with our combatant
    commanders and services to help prepare them to fight for the
    fight of today and tomorrow.
        To defend our homeland from ballistic missile attack, the
    ground-based midcourse defense, or GMD system, remains our
    Nation's sole protection from limited attacks, with a primary
    focus being the advancing North Korean threat. The ongoing
    ground-based interceptor, or GBI, service-life extension
    program, will continue to improve the GBI reliability and will
    help mitigate risk until the next generation interceptor, NGI,
    is fielded by the end of 2028.
        After 20 years, GMD stands ready, as shown in December of
    2023, when we successfully executed a GMD intercept flight test
    using the two/three-stage selectable ground-based interceptor
    in two stage mode first, demonstrating increased engagement
    battle space. We plan to deploy this capability to the entire
    fleet by the end of this year.
        The NGI program remains on track. Both prime contractors
    have successfully executed preliminary design reviews, or PDRs,
    and MDA is preparing in the near future to complete a best
    value determination and select a single company to continue NGI
    development, testing, production, and fielding.
        Soon we plan to add the long-range discrimination radar, or
    LRDR, to MDA's operational capability baseline by December of
    this year. LRDR, delivered to the government last month, will
    enhance tracking discrimination and hit assessment against
    long-range missile threats. Additionally, the Space Force and
    MDA are in the process of formally declaring LRDR ready for
    space object detection later this month.
        For regional defense, MDA continues to design improvements
    to the Aegis ballistic missile defense capability and procure
    the Standard Missile-3 Block 2A missiles. In fiscal year 2025,
    we will also test and deliver SPY-1 radar upgrades and support
    the Navy in future space domain awareness demonstrations.
        We will continue U.S. terminal high-altitude aerial
    defense, or THAAD, interceptor procurement, fielding and
    training support, along with reliability in cybersecurity
    improvements. In collaboration with the U.S. Army, we have
    fielded the THAAD 4.0 capability to batteries in Korea and on
    Guam and are in the process of fielding 4.0 to the all-
    remaining THAAD batteries by the end of 2025. THAAD 4.0
    integrates Patriot capabilities with THAAD to increase Patriot-
    Defended area and engagement opportunities. We will also begin
    design work to improve the THAAD system to take on ever-
    advancing regional threats.
        The Department continues development of a 360-degree
    layered missile defense capability for Guam. MDA construction
    on the Joint Command Center AN/TPY-6 radar site and launch site
    will begin in fiscal year 2025. And by the end of this year, we
    will execute a flight experiment with the SM-3 Block 2A against
    a medium-range ballistic missile target controlled with the
    initial Aegis Guam system using the first TPY-6 transportable
    array unit.
        Looking forward, MDA continues to pursue end-to-end
    capabilities to defeat the serious challenge posed by
    hypersonic maneuvering threats. Today, our sea-based terminal
    defenses protect assets at sea and forces ashore from
    hypersonic threats. Working with the Navy, we anticipate
    delivering follow-on increment three capabilities in fiscal
    year 2025.
        The Glide Phase Interceptor program, or GPI weapons system,
    will enable layered defense against hypersonic glide threats.
    By the end of fiscal year 2024, in coordination with our future
    international partner Japan, MDA will select a single GPI
    interceptor design to complete development. We will continue to
    develop a mature GPI capability and support the planned
    cooperative development of that Glide Phase Interceptor with
    Japan.
        On the detection and tracking part of the kill chain, as
    mentioned by Ranking Member Moulton, we launched the hypersonic
    and ballistic tracking space sensor, or HBTSS, prototype
    satellites in February to demonstrate fire control solutions
    generated against hypersonic maneuvering threats. Following
    successful demonstration of HBTSS, the responsibility for
    fielding HBTSS like fire control capabilities will be
    transferred to Space Force.
        I am honored by this opportunity and look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Collins can be found in
    the Appendix on page 51.]
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
        General Gainey.

    STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SEAN A. GAINEY, USA, COMMANDING
          GENERAL, U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND

        General Gainey. Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton,
    and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I am honored to
    testify before you and represent this incredible one-team
    organization of 2,300 soldiers and civilians, spanning 13 time
    zones and 19 locations worldwide. These professionals
    tirelessly provide space, high-altitude, and missile defense
    forces and advance capabilities to the Army and joint
    warfighter. I am honored to represent them, and I thank you for
    your unwavering support for this team and their families.
        In January, I took command of the U.S. Army Space and
    Missile Defense Command and Joint Functional Component Command
    for Integrated Air and Missile Defense, also known as JFCC-IMD,
    also acting as the senior commander for both Fort Greely,
    Alaska, and U.S. Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll. Additionally, I
    also serve as the Army's lead enterprise integrator for air and
    missile defense, and my organization, JFCC-IMD, provides
    operational-level missile defense expertise and integrates
    trans-regional missile defense functions across the joint and
    combined warfighting force.
        As the Army's air and missile defense enterprise
    integrator, today I will use this role to leverage and
    highlight the Army air and missile defense remains the Army's
    most heavily deployed force with the highest demand signal
    amongst the combatant commands every year. This high op tempo
    continues to provide a significant strain on our formations and
    families, and we must continue to address their needs.
        As you know, the urgency for multi-domain, trans-regional
    combat effects continues to increase exponentially. Our adverse
    air and missile defense-related threats have rapidly expanded
    in recent years in quantity, variety, and sophistication,
    rapidly expanding their space R&D [research and development],
    instigating cyber attacks, and test complex missile systems. We
    see this today in Ukraine and looming on the horizon in the
    Pacific. It has never been more imperative that we and our
    allies and partners enhance our missile defense and space
    capabilities to impose costs on our adversaries, denying them
    the benefits of using these weapons and ensuring the
    safeguarding of our Nation.
        As our adversaries increase their emphasis on space and
    missile capabilities, the U.S. Army grows in kind. In December,
    the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and the Sergeant
    Major of the Army signed the Army space vision supporting
    multi-domain operations, specifying the Army's role in
    integrating space capabilities into joint and coalition
    operations while also interdicting the space capabilities of
    adversaries.
        It is also increasingly apparent that integrating our space
    operations and missile defense operations is of critical
    importance to our national security. Our integration is
    essential to effectively contribute to strategic deterrence and
    respond in crisis. What worked for yesterday's military must
    evolve.
        Today, we must integrate space and missile defense at the
    very onset of our prototyping, concept development, and
    application. And we do it all in concert with our Army joint
    and coalition partners, one voice together around the globe.
    Our allies and partners are critical for layered and tiered
    operations to degrade, disrupt, and defeat adversaries, share
    burdens, integrate technology, and protect our mutual
    homelands.
        But all these operational considerations pale in comparison
    to the will, determination, and the trust the amazing men and
    women that operate and sustain these advance systems. These
    soldiers and their families make life-altering sacrifices to
    serve across the globe. Thank you for your efforts in
    supporting them with timely budget, caring for them and their
    families, and building trust with the American people now and
    in the years to come. Caring for our soldiers and their
    families is paramount to win in any environment around the
    globe.
        Thank you for supporting such an incredible mission-ready
    team. I look forward to addressing your questions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Gainey can be found in
    the Appendix on page 70.]
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
        General James.

     STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS L. JAMES, USA, DEPUTY
                     COMMANDER, U.S. SPACE COMMAND

        General James. Good morning, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking
    Member Moulton, and distinguished members of this subcommittee.
    It is an honor to be here today representing General Whiting
    and the nearly 18,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen,
    guardians, DOD [Department of Defense] civilians and
    contractors of the United States Space Command. Our expertly
    trained and mission-focused workforce remains our most valuable
    asset.
        As you have heard from my distinguished colleagues here on
    the panel, our strategic competitors' offensive missile systems
    are significantly increasing in capability and scale. They will
    challenge our ability to conduct operations and protect and
    defend U.S. and our allies' vital interest. Our competitors are
    rapidly evolving, diversifying, and proliferating their
    inventories of advanced missiles and technologies. Hypersonic
    glide vehicles and cruise missiles pose diverse threats that
    will complicate our missile warning and missile defense
    missions.
        In April 2023, the Unified Command Plan assigned United
    States Space Command with the responsibility for trans-regional
    missile defense planning and operational support. That decision
    was the culmination of a comprehensive study in alignment with
    numerous policy documents and with the 2022 Missile Defense
    Review. This was a natural fit given our Unified Command Plan
    responsibilities, such as space operations and global sensor
    manager, as the missile defense mission continues to converge
    with the space missions.
        Part of the transition of trans-regional missile defense
    planning and support missions included alignment of the Joint
    Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense
    under U.S. Space Command, commanded by my good friend,
    Lieutenant General Sean Gainey. JFCC-IMD ensured the continued
    execution of the responsibilities during the transition without
    any mission degradation. We, the United States Space Command,
    have integrated JFCC-IMD into our command structures and
    processes and are exploring ways to further optimize their
    execution of critical missions.
        As the global sensor manager, USSPACECOM [U.S. Space
    Command] is responsible for planning, managing, and overseeing
    the operations of all assigned space domain awareness, missile
    defense, and missile warning sensors. Our terrestrial sensors
    are a critical enabler to the combatant command and national-
    level military command centers, most performing missile
    warning, missile defense, and space domain awareness mission
    simultaneously.
        Our space-based sensors provide the first alert of a
    missile launch from anywhere on the planet. They provide this
    to our national leaders, the National Military Command System,
    combatant commands, and select international partners.
    USSPACECOM employs a joint, combined, and partnered approach to
    our operations, which expands our access to sensors and their
    information. This includes our Combined Space Operations
    Center's Commercial Integration Cell and our National Space
    Defense Center's Joint Commercial Operations Cell, commensurate
    with the Department's recently published Commercial Space
    Strategy. The JCO [Joint Commercial Operations] also includes
    14 allied partners that are fully integrated into our space
    domain operations.
        It is vital that we keep pace with the emerging threats and
    technologies while ensuring that our sensor architecture
    remains optimized and modernized. While we pursue integrating
    new capabilities, we must still aggressively leverage and
    integrate our legacy sensors in support of our critical missile
    warning and missile defense functions today as part of a
    comprehensive missile defeat strategy.
        Continued funding for research and development for the next
    generation of space-based and terrestrial sensor systems is
    critical to keep pace with the competitors and the potential
    adversaries that we face today. These capabilities must be
    resilient, and we must be able to defend and reconstitute them
    to achieve space across domain mission assurance for the Joint
    Force.
        In closing, the 2022 Missile Defense Review states, ``It is
    a strategic imperative of the United States to continue
    investments and innovation in the development of full-spectrum
    missile defeat capabilities to maintain deterrence and offer
    protection while hedging against uncertainty. Consistent with
    the Missile Defense Review, the Department must explore and
    enact the full range of capabilities to counter advanced
    adversary offensive missiles and hybrid threats across the
    spectrum of conflict.
        U.S. Space Command with fellow combatant commands,
    services, allies, and interagency, and commercial partners
    stands ready to perform our unified command plan
    responsibilities to maintain and expand our competitive
    advantage. USSPACECOM appreciates Congress' continued support
    as we ensure the delivery of space-based capabilities and
    achieve our foundational moral responsibility to protect the
    Joint Force, the Nation, and our allies through all levels of
    competition and conflict.
        I have submitted my written statement for the record. Thank
    you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General James can be found in
    the Appendix on page 83.]
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
        We will now go to questions from the panel--from the
    committee.
        General Collins, as I talked about in my opening statement,
    I am very concerned about the Glide Phase Interceptor. Last
    year, the program planned to continue development and to
    maintain competition between two industry teams for at least
    another 5 years. A preliminary design review, or let's say PDR,
    was planned for 2029 with the potential down-select decision
    following PDR. Now, the program is planning to select a single
    contractor this year without the development activity to prove
    out new technologies and with a lot less information.
        First, a general question. Competition in a program reduces
    risk, drives innovation, and helps ensure the government is
    getting a good value. Wouldn't you say that, in general, that
    is a fair statement?
        General Collins. Yeah. Mr. Chairman, as a career
    acquisition officer, competition within an acquisition strategy
    does buy down risk, keeps both teams sharp throughout the
    acquisition, and intends to--it is a best practice within the
    Department, yes, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
        So how concerned are you then that making a down-select
    decision this early in the program will increase risk?
        General Collins. Sir, that is a job that we will be
    attacking greatly now with the decision that will be coming
    later this fiscal year. There are other mechanisms to manage
    competition and risk within a program lower than the prime
    level. We certainly will be looking forward to keeping the
    program on pace and, based on section 1666, look for
    opportunities to bring hypersonic capability to the fight much
    sooner.
        With the GPI program as established today, working with our
    soon international partner Japan, we will continue to look for
    opportunities to buy down that risk judiciously, potentially
    with competition at a lower level within--at the component or
    subsystem level.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. So let's dive a little bit more into
    that. What concrete steps--and you have already alluded to
    some--can we take to mitigate this risk or to give ourselves
    options if technology development doesn't go as planned?
        General Collins. Yes, sir. Much of this is--as part of the
    decision to come with down selecting, we are in the midst of
    upgrading our acquisition strategy and finalizing the decision
    criteria for making this decision. Part of that will be
    finalizing in taking a look at how to establish the program
    and, going forward, depending on the selection and the risks
    associated with that particular prime, we will then have to
    take a look at, with the prime, the steps that would be taken.
    Each prime has a different set of risks based on their designs
    and that we would have to specifically identify, based on the
    decision, which one would drive what decisions and actions we
    would take going forward.
        Mr. Lamborn. Well, I still am concerned. I know that you
    will do your best to play the hand of cards that you have been
    dealt, but I really am concerned about this. I just think we
    are taking on too much risk that we otherwise would be able to
    mitigate through continuing the competition more into the
    future.
        This leads to my next set of questions about the program
    schedule. You would think that if the program had advanced
    sufficiently and technology is mature enough for the government
    to select a single prime contractor 5 years earlier than
    originally planned, that we would be in a position to
    accelerate the schedule, but it looks like the opposite is
    happening.
        In last year's hearing, your predecessor, Admiral Hill, and
    I discussed the program's schedule and how delivering a
    capability in 2034 was not adequate. He agreed and said, quote,
    ``Out in the mid-30s is almost irrelevant. We are not meeting
    the threat,'' unquote. But this year's budget would add
    additional delay, and now does not anticipate deploying a
    capability until 2035.
        Do you share Admiral Hill's view that this makes it
    irrelevant to go more than 10 years into the future?
        General Collins. Sir, I definitely agree with waiting 11
    years to bring a hypersonic glide phase capability to the
    warfighter is too long, and looking into options within the GPI
    program and other options, that could bring an interim
    capability sooner. We do have a requirement to come back with
    those options to you, and we are working through that. And a
    report will be provided by September that goes through those
    different option spaces, both within the GPI program and
    broader across the missile defense enterprise to try to get any
    capability we can out of the weapon systems we have and also
    into the future with a GPI program.
        Mr. Lamborn. What can you tell us in this setting for the
    record that you will do specifically? You already alluded to
    the intention to try to accelerate some things, but what are
    concrete steps that you are going to be able to take or plan to
    take?
        General Collins. Yes, sir. Right off the bat, one is we
    have engaged with both of our primes that we have on the GPI
    program today to identify opportunities that they see within
    their industry space and their broader enterprises to come up
    with acceleration options that we could be taking within the
    program, within the GPI program. Otherwise, I am also looking
    across at other weapon systems that we have in place today to
    understand what, if any, residual capability they may have and/
    or what potential developments, smaller developments could we
    take within those other weapon systems that could bring some
    type of residual capability or interim capability to the fight.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. I will end my questions
    there, but I will just quickly summarize my concerns.
        This budget, as proposed, cuts the funding, delays the
    schedule, and adds risk to the acquisition approach. I
    understand that it will save some dollars and is cheaper, but I
    am just not sure it will even lead to success in the long run,
    much less address the threats in the meantime.
        With that, I turn to the ranking member for any questions
    he might have.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly share
    some of these same concerns.
        Lieutenant General Collins, Lockheed's F-35 and Northrop
    Grumman's Sentinel are two examples of programs that currently
    have zero competition and are grossly over budget and grossly
    behind schedule. Now, you have extensive acquisitions
    experience. Can you cite an example of a program that benefited
    from down selecting and reducing competition early? When has
    such a reduction in competition fielded a better technology
    faster and it reduced cost?
        General Collins. Ranking Member Moulton, thank you for that
    question. Um----
        Mr. Moulton. Well, I think the silence speaks volumes.
    Let's move on.
        Mr. Hill, the Department indicated to this committee that
    cancellation of the SM-3 Block 1B was done in part to purchase
    more SM-3 Block 2As. We will set aside that there are no
    additional 2As in this budget request and focus on the policy
    issues I have continued to raise. Is it accurate to say that
    SM-3 Block 1B is solely a regional missile defense asset?
        Mr. Hill. SM-3 Block 1B is for regional missile defense
    against medium-range ballistic missiles.
        Mr. Moulton. Is it also accurate to say that SM-3 Block 2A
    has been proven to intercept an ICBM-range threat, the type of
    threat designed to be handled by the ground-based midcourse
    defense system?
        Mr. Hill. I believe from a kinematic perspective it has
    been shown to be able to intercept at that beginning edge----
        Mr. Moulton. Right.
        Mr. Hill. --but it is--the operational concepts for it are
    as a regional missile defense missile. It is mostly for medium-
    range and----
        Mr. Moulton. Right. But I am just asking about its ability.
        Mr. Hill. I believe as a test--there was a test that was
    done----
        Mr. Moulton. Yeah. That is a very long way of saying yes.
        Mr. Hill. Yeah.
        Mr. Moulton. So my question is: was there a policy
    evaluation done on how our adversaries, to include China,
    Russia, North Korea, would respond to a further increase of SM-
    3 Block 2As, which have capability against a strategic missile,
    in lieu of the 1B variant, which does not?
        Mr. Hill. Yeah, that was done before my time doing this,
    but I think the implications of the SM-3 2A, which you are
    talking about, being deployed in fleets at different places
    around the world is not something that should logically cause
    China or Russia to have any concerns from a strategic stability
    perspective.
        Mr. Moulton. Well, if you could provide that report to the
    committee, it would be helpful. When you said there was some
    analysis done----
        Mr. Hill. No, the decision and that test was before I was
    doing the missile defense business, so I can look into the
    history of what was done there.
        Mr. Moulton. Well, look, the point is that what matters
    here for strategic stability is not just what we think is
    perfectly logical but what our enemies think, and we have to
    consider these concerns when we are making these budgetary
    decisions. I think, you know, SM-3 Block 2As have an important
    role, but the quantities we are currently buying are about a
    third of what was intended for the 1B. And if we suddenly
    reverse that and triple our 2A buy, we could very well embolden
    our adversaries to further proliferate and advance their
    technology in a way that not only makes our regional defense
    posture weaker at a time where regional missile defense is of
    prime importance, but also impact stability at their strategic
    level.
        I also get the sense that this decision was not thought
    through on an operational business. I mean, General Collins,
    from your perspective, is a future Navy fleet equipped with
    primarily SM-6 interceptors and some SM-3-2A interceptors
    consistent with the direction you see the threat going?
        General Collins. Sir, Ranking Member Moulton, good
    question. What I would take is, I would be concerned with the
    capacity of capabilities that are in a fleet and our ability to
    support with enough 2As moving forward given the capacity that
    we take from that production line today.
        Mr. Moulton. Well, we obviously share those concerns.
        General Collins, has MDA completed analysis of the impacts
    on this decision on its ability to support and sustain the
    current inventory of 1Bs, meet the needs of allies, and support
    the Navy's requirements? Has that analysis been completed?
        General Collins. Sir, we have not completed that analysis.
    We have been waiting for the 2024 appropriation to understand
    the amount of money we were going to get within the SM-3 1B
    line to support the negotiation for an additional lot of 1Bs.
    That work is going on currently today to understand the impact
    to both the 1B final lot as well as the future of the 2A line,
    all of that to inform what type of sparing would we require
    within the 1B line to support the lifecycle of 1Bs.
        Mr. Moulton. Well, I think, to quickly summarize as the
    chairman did, we both share a concern about the lack of
    competition. That seemed to be echoed by your silence. We both
    share concern about simply the magazine capacity that we have
    if we are reducing the number of regional defense assets we
    have at a time when we are using them quite regularly. And I
    have additional concerns about what this all means for our
    strategic stability that it just sounds like have not been
    analyzed or even considered carefully. So we have a lot of
    questions, and I think that is important.
        Just one final question. Lieutenant General Collins, there
    have been a lot of discussions from this subcommittee about the
    potential need for a third CONUS [continental United States]
    interceptor site. Has JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council] validated any sort of requirement for a third site?
        General Collins. No, sir, there is no requirement.
        Mr. Moulton. If they were to validate such a requirement,
    is the location that was looked at almost 10 years ago at this
    point still where you believe that third site should be
    located, as the last study explicitly indicated that MDA would
    need to relook at the analysis prior to moving forward with any
    sort of program once you had a requirement?
        General Collins. Sir, that is correct. We would take a look
    as, if a requirement for an East Coast site was identified as a
    requirement and validated. As mentioned when the final report
    came out, we would take a look at the current threat, the
    current performance of the system, the current state of affairs
    to assess and evaluate what that optimal site would be.
        Mr. Moulton. Right. So just to summarize, as of right now,
    you don't need a third site. If you were to need a third site,
    you wouldn't just go with what was selected 10 years ago, you
    would do another analysis.
        And, Mr. Hill, I would just add, I hope that we would, per
    my questions about strategic stability, look at the
    implications of a third site on the views of our adversaries.
        Mr. Hill. That is correct. The focus on a third site would
    be the things we are already investing in rather than a third
    site.
        Mr. Moulton. Great.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
        Representative DesJarlais.
        Dr. DesJarlais. General Collins, hypersonics have
    completely upended our prior conception of the global missile
    threat landscape with our ability to evade our legacy detection
    systems, and we are now in a position where we are playing
    catchup both in our ability to detect and defeat these novel
    capabilities. Can you update our committee on how you are
    addressing the issue of detection first with the capabilities
    like hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor satellites?
    And how are you collaborating with SDA [Space Development
    Agency] on these and other efforts pertaining to hypersonic
    missile defense?
        General Collins. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
    Hypersonic missile defense is certainly a key focus of the
    Missile Defense Agency and protecting our warfighters as we
    move forward. The hypersonic ballistic tracking space sensor
    that I mentioned in my opening statement and you just
    mentioned, that is a prototype set of satellites to demonstrate
    our ability in the technology to from space detect, track, and
    close the fire control loop against a hypersonic threat, to
    take a hypersonic threat and track it throughout its entire
    launch, from launch to intercept.
        That is a key aspect of our future ability to detect and
    eventually intercept hypersonic weapons anywhere on the planet
    in the future. To get there, we have worked very closely with
    the Space Development Agency. They would be the operational
    transition agent for us to take HBTSS and include it within the
    future proliferated warfighting space architecture. We have
    been working very closely with them, also the Space Warfighting
    Analysis Center, the SWAC, part of the Space Force. We have
    been working with them to ensure that our long-term fire
    control requirements are included within the force design of
    any future space architecture.
        And so with those relationships within Space Force, we are
    ready when we complete the demonstration later this year to
    transition into the proliferated warfighting space architecture
    tracking layer to pick up on the hypersonic fire control
    tracking requirements for Missile Defense Agency.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. On the Glide Phase Interceptor, where
    are we at?
        General Collins. Yes, sir. We have two primes awarded on
    other transaction authority agreements, and both are proceeding
    post-system requirements review and working to finalize
    designs, as well as tech maturation for each of their designs.
    There is a good amount of tech maturation of the design in the
    integration of the system that are being worked on.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Is an acceleration research on
    hypersonic defense options necessary, and is it technologically
    feasible?
        General Collins. Sir, we believe hypersonic defense is
    feasible. We have, today, a terminal case ability--capability
    to intercept hypersonic threats within the SM-6 sea-based
    terminal capability within the Aegis weapon system. So we are
    already fielded capability to intercept hypersonics in the
    terminal phase.
        Glide Phase Interceptor, we have identified the technology
    areas that need to be matured within that program to do glide
    phase intercept farther away from the intended target, and we
    are in the midst of burning down all of those technologies to
    be able to field this capability. So, yes, we believe that
    technology exists with some maturation to come, but we do
    believe hypersonic glide phase intercept capabilities is
    feasible.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Mr. Hill, what is the Department's
    policy on how the U.S. will address near-peer hypersonic
    threats to the homeland?
        Mr. Hill. As General Collins just described, we are
    investing in capabilities as Congress directed. We created--we
    designated the Secretary of the Air Force for leading the
    cruise missile defense of the homeland project and, of course,
    Glide Phase Interceptors, many of them are cruise missiles. So
    we will defend them against that, recognizing that in many
    cases this is something that an adversary is using and
    developing, not in the context of a nuclear strike, but in the
    context of potentially defeating our ability to respond. We
    want to demonstrate that, no, we have the ability to follow up
    on the commitments we have made, and that means we will defend
    critical infrastructure in the United States.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
        Representative Norcross.
        Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member, for
    today's hearing, and certainly the witnesses.
        We have had a number of discussions on this committee that
    talked about the ability to produce the weapons we need, the
    interceptors and, quite frankly, the entire industrial base.
        Mr. Hill, today you talked about the investment in that
    industrial base. So just for the sake of an argument, let's
    assume we have the technical expertise to design and build and
    we might be able to build a prototype. When you look across the
    U.S. missile industrial base and the workforce, are you
    comfortable with where we are in terms of being able to produce
    the numbers that we are talking about?
        Mr. Hill. I think--I am concerned that we have taken a bit
    of a holiday and that we are playing some catchup here. I am
    concerned that we have an adversary in Russia that is on a war
    footing in Ukraine, and we and our allies in Europe all need to
    look more carefully at the investments and improve our
    abilities to replenish when we draw down munitions and other
    key systems.
        Mr. Norcross. So you talked about the investment in the
    industrial base. What specifically would you point to in this
    budget that is actually going to mitigate some of those
    concerns?
        Mr. Hill. You know, I think it is--there are--focused
    particularly on munitions area and expanding capacity, and some
    of that is a function of when you are buying in larger
    quantities, when you are buying with using the authority that
    the committee has given us to have multiyear procurement, now
    you are creating an environment in which you are not just
    relying on the government's money but companies are also
    willing to put their money into expanding their capacity. Those
    are ----
        Mr. Norcross. So what are we doing to address that exactly?
    What signals are we sending industry? And I am very familiar
    with much of the ammunition, what we are doing over there.
        Mr. Hill. Yeah.
        Mr. Norcross. I am more concerned, at least at this
    hearing, at our missile industrial base.
        Mr. Hill. Yeah.
        Mr. Norcross. When you start talking about investing in our
    workforce, what does that mean? You can send a signal, but
    unless a contract follows it, it is a hollow signal.
        Mr. Hill. Right. The contract following it is going to be
    the question of the resource allocations in finite budgets.
    This is the question that we have been discussing earlier today
    about how many are we acquiring.
        Mr. Norcross. Well, I am not trying to pin you. Well,
    actually, I am----
        Mr. Hill. You are.
        Mr. Norcross. --trying to pin you down, because we are
    doing this to address exactly what we are talking about. And I
    get it, we make the decision and all the complexities and
    dealing with that and then we say we need it yesterday. I mean,
    that is historically what we do. And if we look at some of the
    numbers that we are requesting, and particularly Mr. Moulton
    and what he was saying, even if you change your mind, they
    cannot ramp up in time.
        So when we start looking towards investing in that
    industrial base, we have to send the signals that are true to
    industry, and we have to build it ahead of time because the
    longest lead item is not a piece of material; it is a human.
    And that is why I continue to bring this up meeting after
    meeting.
        But with that, I will yield back to the Chairman. Thank
    you.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Representative.
        Representative Bacon.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
        Could you help me understand why the overall budget numbers
    have gone down significantly for missile defense in the
    upcoming budget versus what we did last year? That is what it
    appears to me. Is it because of the budget caps or maybe there
    is other priorities? So I am trying to understand that.
        Mr. Hill. Sure. I will start. Definitely, the Fiscal
    Responsibility Act did set a ceiling. We had to work within
    that ceiling. You had must-pay bills, payroll increases,
    healthcare programs, child support, a lot of those things that
    go on in the Defense Department. And then you find you are
    having to make some choices in your end game.
        Mr. Bacon. Right.
        Mr. Hill. My readiness today for the things I am working
    on, my investment for the future, not easy choices. That is the
    general environment.
        Mr. Bacon. I think it is something for the Armed Services
    Committee to maybe review. Seems like missile defense is an
    area that we do not want to be cutting. I mean, I know the
    budget has gone up a little bit, but I was just surprised to
    see the amount of the cut going on for missile defense.
        A second question. I am not sure who is appropriate--the
    best to ask this to. It is concerning when you see the bases,
    particularly like Iraq, being repeatedly hit out of--from Iran.
    What could we be doing better to protect our forward bases from
    this, or what are we not doing? I know this could be a theater
    commander's question too, but you have a great insight.
        General Gainey. Congressman, thank you. I will take that
    question.
        In my current role and previous roles specifically is the
    Army is providing the preponderance of missile defense and
    counter-UAS defense for those bases forward. Again, continuing
    to add funding for the forward warfighter to employ
    capabilities. You heard General Kurilla advocate for the
    additional funding that he has requested for additional
    counter-UAS capability to proliferate across all of our bases
    forward.
        We do have capability there now that has proven successful.
    We are putting in technology and directed energy and also other
    type of kinetic systems, and continuing funding of those
    systems will allow us to put in volume additional capability on
    those bases.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        It is alarming to see the amount of targeting Iran is doing
    at our bases in Iraq, and seems like we should be doing
    everything we can to protect against that.
        In the last NDAA, we put some missile defense measures in
    for Kurdistan. How will that look, you think, or will that be a
    hard challenge for you all to accomplish? There was a provision
    that helped the Kurds get missile defense in the last NDAA.
        Mr. Hill. Yeah, I am sorry, I actually heard Kyrgyzstan,
    but----
        Mr. Bacon. Well, the Kurds.
        Mr. Hill. Kurdistan.
        Mr. Bacon. Sorry.
        Mr. Hill. No, that is just my hearing. So, absolutely,
    support to the Kurds have been part of this. Balancing that
    relationship, their relations in the region is also part of
    that question.
        One of the other--to add to some of General Gainey's
    comments as well, we have also in the Red Sea context obviously
    struck back at some of those sites where some of these Iran-
    aligned militia groups operate, the Houthis most notably, and
    that is an essential complement to the force protection the
    missile defense provides.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        One last question for General Gainey, if I may. We have
    been reading some reports of fatigue and burnout because of the
    high ops [operations] tempo for your servicemen and -women.
    What can we do to help mitigate that?
        General Gainey. The Army has taken a holistic look, and as
    you heard me earlier highlight the significant strain on the
    force. But what I will tell you is, I am amazed at how those
    soldiers continue to respond and continue to maintain a
    positive attitude and high reenlistment rate moving forward.
        As the Army looks to get after how do we improve the
    quality of life and improve the op tempo, goes to our
    modernization efforts and continuing supportive funding for our
    modernization efforts, because Patriot system is the most
    deployed system because it is our workhorse system. As we
    modernize with integrated battle command system as the core
    point inside of that modernization, we will then integrate
    several different effecters and capability that provides the
    range of capabilities across several threats. So you will no
    longer have to deploy just a Patriot battery; you can now
    deploy several different components. And the Army's growth of
    that capability in the last R-struct will also add additional
    capacity, so that will help moving forward.
        Mr. Bacon. Well, we appreciate the men and women who serve
    in your command and, in that matter, for all of your all's
    commands. And missile defense is such an important mission and
    it is in high demand everywhere, so we are grateful to you and
    your people.
        Mr. Lamborn. Perfect timing. We will now go to
    Representative Vasquez.
        Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to the Ranking
    Member.
        Thank you to our witnesses for being here today this
    morning.
        I have the privilege of representing New Mexico's Second
    District, home to White Sands Missile Range. It is the
    birthplace of America's space and missile program. And though
    White Sands continues to be the Department of Defense's
    premiere research and testing facility for our Nation's most
    important weapons programs, they also continue to face
    struggles maintaining modern technology and facilities.
        Now, during my visit to White Sands this January, base
    leadership shared with me that their long-range radars, which
    are supposed to provide critical tracking capabilities for
    weapons testing, have been in service and have not been
    upgraded since the 1960s, posing significant challenges to
    keeping them operational and in line with modern missile
    technology.
        Beyond these maintenance challenges, I have understood that
    these radar challenges and the failures during tests have
    become increasingly frequent, occurring as often as five times
    per month and with tracking and accuracies that are off by
    hundreds to thousands of yards. Not being able to accurately
    track weapons during testing not only poses a safety risk to
    the folks that are working there but also to surrounding
    communities, but threatens our readiness and national security,
    and I think that is completely unacceptable.
        We should do everything in our power to ensure White Sands
    has the necessary equipment to safely and accurately track
    weapons tests so that we are providing our warfighters with the
    best tools and information possible to accomplish their
    mission.
        Lieutenant General Gainey, are diminished testing
    conditions like these acceptable to you? And how do deficient
    testing standards pose a threat to our national security?
        General Gainey. Congressman, thank you for the question.
    White Sands Missile Range remains an integral part, as you
    know, to our testing in the Army's Air and Missile Defense
    Program. As the senior mission commander for Kwajalein Atoll, I
    also have strategic testing at those sites where I also
    maintain an infrastructure and sensors to be able to get after
    that. And I believe continuing funding and improvements of all
    of those capabilities are critical to continuing to ensure that
    we have the best capability as we test our critical systems
    moving forward.
        Mr. Vasquez. Thank you so much. In New Mexico, as you know,
    Lieutenant General, we have a long legacy of not just missile
    testing, but a lot of research and development that has
    contributed to the strength of this Nation's national security.
    We also have a toxic legacy of impacts at local surrounding
    communities from testing activities, which is one of the
    reasons I am fighting and others here in Congress are fighting
    to reauthorize RECA [Radiation Exposure Compensation Act]. And
    so we just want to make sure that those technologies are
    updated, and that we don't make the same mistakes of the past,
    at the same time, protecting national security.
        Now, Mr. Hill, given the importance of White Sands testing
    capabilities, what is stopping the department currently from
    updating these critical testing systems?
        Mr. Hill. Congressman Vasquez, I am not familiar with the
    specific decisions on those, but we can certainly take the
    question. And in the general sense, obviously, the previous
    discussions about the overall top line and making tradeoffs
    within finite resources I am sure is part of the calculations
    that is happening.
        Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Mr. Hill. I appreciate you paying
    attention to this issue in future budget requests. Now beyond
    the missile testing and evaluation done at White Sands, we are
    home to the largest manufacturer of space grade solar cells
    that are a key component to providing power to our satellites.
    Producers in my district power a significant portion of our
    Nation's national security satellites directly contributing to
    the strength of our missile warning fleet and space.
        Mr. Hill, for components like solar cells that are critical
    for our missile defense and warning infrastructure, what does
    it mean to the Department to have a reliable, domestic supply
    chain? And how can Congress help support robust production
    capabilities like those in my State?
        Mr. Hill. I think these reliable domestic production
    chains, we see how important they are across a number of
    fields. One of the things that we have done is we most recently
    issued our commercial space integration strategy, recognizing
    how much innovation is being driven by the commercial side of
    space. And understanding that we in the Defense Department need
    to shift from trying to contort them into meeting our
    requirements to being flexible about our requirements so we can
    leverage what they are doing. That would be an example of
    creating an environment in which more innovation happens inside
    domestic production capacity.
        Mr. Vasquez. I appreciate that, Mr. Hill. And we certainly
    are at the forefront, I think, of that commercialization, both
    in the research and development phase but also know in light
    assembly and manufacturing when it comes to all these different
    components that are going into these modern systems. And I
    appreciate your continued attention and investment to New
    Mexico's Second District. Thank you so much. Chairman, I yield
    back.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative Strong.
        Mr. Strong. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, and Ranking Member
    Moulton, and I thank each of you for being here today.
        General, it is great having each of you in my office last
    week. It was interesting to learn that not only is Huntsville
    the Rocket City, but it is also apparently the City of Love
    since this is where you met your wife, General James.
        And I also found out that General Gainey's parents met at
    Red Stone Arsenal. So it is interesting to hear that. Red Stone
    Arsenal is truly making a name for itself. I have said it
    before, and I will say it again, we have got some great things
    coming out of Huntsville.
        General Collins, just a few weeks ago, General Guillot with
    NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] reconfirmed to this committee
    that the next generation interceptor is critical for defending
    the homeland.
        Last spring, your predecessor testified to the benefits of
    keeping multiple contractors on the NGI program through
    critical design review. But since late last year, we have
    learned that this is no longer the plan. This really concerns
    me and many others.
        Looking back to 2019 when the redesign kill vehicle--RKV--
    program was canceled, we had all our eggs in one basket. There
    wasn't a backup plan. And because we didn't have a backup plan,
    we had to extend the life of our interceptors and start an
    entirely new program. This cost taxpayers a lot of money, it
    costs us capability, and it costs us time when there is a
    ticking clock over in the Indo-Pacific and throughout the
    world.
        What has changed? Why is MDA now making an earlier than
    planned down-select decision before critical design review next
    year?
        General Collins. Congressman, thanks for that question on
    NGI. It is absolutely our foundation for homeland defense into
    the future. And we have continued to focus the agency very much
    on NGI and its incorporation in no later than 2028.
        Two things to note, one we have talked about is certainly
    the fiscal realities and the decisions that needed to be made
    with--across the missile defense portfolio has been far-
    reaching. But second, we have also been keeping the NGI program
    on track. Both primes have completed a preliminary design
    review. Both have completed full qualification of all of their
    parts for the radiation environment. And many of the
    subcomponents have been taken to the critical design review
    stage of design. All of that brought together, we, the agency,
    believe we have a full, in-depth understanding of the designs
    from the two primes. We fully understand, and the transition to
    production plans and the risks that are still involved with
    both primes. And we believe that the level of risk is well
    below the Department's standard of making a decision such as
    this. So we believe we have the technical depth and knowledge
    and understanding of risk as we move forward to make that
    decision.
        Mr. Strong. Thank you. I know that some very smart people
    have done great work to keep our current interceptors in the
    game longer, but we cannot keep life-extending the fleet. Is
    that right?
        General Collins. That is correct, sir.
        Mr. Strong. Thank you. I know that the confidence and NGI
    succeeding is high. I credit a big part of that to the
    incredible work being done at Red Stone Arsenal with both
    industry teams in Huntsville, Alabama. But the consequences of
    something going wrong with NGI are much higher now than it was
    back in 2019. Would that be a correct statement?
        General Collins. Yes, sir. There is still additional risk
    ahead of us on the program, and we will continue to stay very
    focused on where that risk is. Sorry. We will continue to stay
    focused on where that risk is and focus on mitigating that risk
    as best as possible.
        Mr. Strong. I totally agree. They are much higher this
    time, because just as you said, we can't fall back on doing
    another life extension of the current system. We have already
    used our get-out-of-jail free card with the RKV. I worry that
    the Biden administration is wanting to dismantle the
    significant industrial capacity that has been built up over
    decades. And MDA's budget and plans are taking a detrimental
    hit due to some short-sighted decisions here.
        Is there a report or study that MDA has conducted that
    supports down-selecting before critical design review over
    sticking with the original acquisition strategy?
        General Collins. No, sir, we do not have any reporter
    assessment on that.
        Mr. Strong. Thank you. So where budget constraints, the
    primary or initial reason for the change in strategy, or is it
    because the teams have progressed better than expected?
        General Collins. I would have say, sir, it is a combination
    of both. Both teams have progressed very, very well. But there
    was a catalyst that was driven by the fiscal decision as well.
        Mr. Strong. I thank each of you for being here. Mr.
    Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative Carbajal.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hearing all the
    nexus that you have to Representative Strong's district and not
    Paradise, which is my district, makes me start questioning your
    judgment, I must say. We know our adversaries possess
    hypersonic capabilities. Defending against and defeating this
    threat is proving to be challenging, both technically and
    physically.
        General Collins, how are advanced manufacturing
    technologies, such as additive manufacturing being utilized to
    reduce costs and acquisition timelines for future hypersonic
    defense programs?
        General Collins. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.
    I fully agree with your notes on the difficulty in developing
    an industry base to accelerate our hypersonic offensive and
    defensive weapons as we move forward. And in my previous job
    within the Air Force buying hypersonic weapons, we had the same
    challenges is developing the industry base to produce critical
    technologies we require for hypersonic weapons.
        At the Missile Defense Agency, we are very focused on
    bringing any of the new advanced manufacturing capabilities and
    technologies to bear to help war and reduce costs of building
    hypersonic weapons in the future as well as helping to scale
    and increase pace of capacity of lines going forward.
        We are very much looking into advanced manufacturing or
    additive manufacturing. As you mentioned, we have a group
    within our S&T [science and technology] division that is
    closely looking at and investing in small business maturation
    capabilities of additive manufacturing and particular
    capabilities that are required within a hypersonic weapon.
        One in particular is carbon/carbon additive manufacturing,
    which is key to the front edge thermal protection systems of
    our hypersonic weapons. A key technology and a limiting factor
    within our ability to scale the industry base. So we are very
    much investing across the traditional and nontraditional bases
    to ensure we have the manufacturing capability for hypersonic
    weapons.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. General Collins, earlier this
    year, the Missile Defense Agency, MDA, launched two hypersonic
    and ballistic tracking space satellites, HBTSS. MDA received
    additional funds in fiscal year 2024 defense appropriation bill
    to do calibration testing and training on threat representative
    hypersonic targets.
        Can you please describe the status of the satellites, and
    how MDA is going to execute the additional $25 million for
    calibration provided in fiscal year 2024 omnibus?
        General Collins. Yes, Congressman, absolutely. It was a
    major activity on Valentine's Day of this year when we lost
    the----
        Mr. Carbajal. That is my anniversary, by the way.
        General Collins. Sir, those satellites are still
    progressing through launch and early orbit testing. We have a
    very slow methodical process whereby we turn on the satellites,
    we turn on the payload. Over the last month, we have had first
    light, what we call the first time we have turned on the
    payloads, and actually looked with them and started taking a
    look at the data to calibrate. That calibration continues. We
    started to do a number of cooperative activities where there
    may be a launch or a test that somebody else is executing. And
    we have been using those as capabilities, as opportunities to
    calibrate that payload.
        Later this summer, we will be executing our first HTB
    Hypersonic Testbed One launch in June. That is a launch
    specifically designed for our HBTSS satellites to look at a
    hypersonic threat and track it through its time of flight. They
    use--there will be another HTB2 test later in the summer. Those
    are the two same wickets that we are looking at to calibrate
    and certify the fire control solution and technology that we
    have.
        Back to the earlier conversation, another opportunity we
    are getting is the Space Development Agency for wide field
    review satellites were launched on the same booster. They are
    in plane with our two satellites. And so we are actually going
    to be able to utilize some testing of the wide field review
    capability in concert with RHBTSS technology as well. A key
    capability as we look forward to a future missile warning,
    missile defense, and missile defense space architecture. Thank
    you, sir.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. General James, the value add of
    HBTSS is that it will provide fire control quality data to
    track and intercept hypersonic threats. Can you speak to the
    importance of fire control quality data, the importance of
    using threat represent--representative hypersonic targets to
    calibrate and train against, and how space command plans to do
    that across future year defense programs?
        General James. Yes, Congressman, I sure can. Thanks for the
    question. I came a long way. I have a few things to say. So
    thanks for the question. Absolutely, important, incredible. As
    SPACECOM continues to flesh out its transregional missile
    defense mission, and we continue to press on that, and we see
    those natural links between what you have heard the other
    colleagues say here about the convergence of the space and the
    missile defense mission. How we use our space assets and
    develop those to get at the technology changes we see to your
    point, the hyper velocity or the cruise missile threats that we
    see, we are going to have to use space-based systems. We are
    going to have to be able to provide that level of targeting
    quality information. And so, that's exactly the things that we
    are looking on as we continue to develop the net centric
    command and control systems, and the information systems, like
    C2BMC [Command Control Battle Management Communications] as we
    continue to press for that. You will see that in our list as an
    important factor that we need to continue to press on to
    increase our ability to command and control and pass that
    information from close to sensor, sensor to best shooter to be
    able to make those connections. There is a lot of work that
    happening more than just in USSPACECOM, and are tying into all
    of that with MDA, with SNDC, Army's convergence, Nimble Titan,
    lots of different exercises, JIAMDO. Nimble fire. We exercise
    all of those to continue to build our expertise in that.
        Absolutely critical because terrestrial sensors are not
    going to allow us to track and target the threats that we see
    coming the way we have in the past. That will have to be space-
    based. And all the things that General Collins just talked
    about from SDA and the work with HBTSS from the space force and
    other capabilities, absolutely important, and integrating
    commercial and integrating the allies. That is an area that
    USSPACECOM has done tons of work with over the years, and it
    falls naturally to how we are going to move forward with
    missile defense.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chair, for the
    additional time. Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Mr. Lamborn. Well, it is really more for Lieutenant General
    James. Representative Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, I
    hope Mr. Secretary General, as you see, that incredibly, this
    is bipartisan with the leadership of our chairman and ranking
    member, and even including Congressman Carbajal. And so--but
    truly, we want you to succeed. And I have a personal interest.
    I served 31 years in the Army Guard and our Reserves, and I
    really appreciate military service. And I am grateful my oldest
    son served in Iraq field artillery. My second son was a doctor
    out of track, he was in the Navy, but I still claim him serving
    in Baghdad, my third son, Signal in Sinai. And my youngest a
    year, Afghanistan as an engineer. So all credit to my wife,
    Roxanne, for actually training these guys.
        But the bottom line is we want you to succeed. And,
    equally, it is more important than ever, Mr. Secretary General,
    we are in a conflict we did not choose. And to me, it is a
    conflict, a war, between dictators with rule of gun who are
    invading democracies with rule of law. Sadly, it began February
    24, 2022, when war criminal Putin just murderously invaded
    Ukraine, just seeking out civilians to murder civilians. I have
    been there to Bucha to see the inhumanity of what has been
    done. I actually was in Kiev in August last year possibly for
    the first hypersonic missile attack. And the tactic of war
    criminal Putin is so inhuman, and that is to attack a civilian
    target like an apartment complex, and then that is not the real
    attack. Twenty years--twenty minutes later when the first
    responders are there, the fire service, the EMS personnel law
    enforcement, that is when the real attack occurs.
        And it is just shocking to think of the tactics that Putin
    has to try to intimidate the people of Ukraine, just as they
    did the people of the Aleppo in Syria, and then to come back
    and try to intimidate first responders. Then, of course, it
    continued on October the 7th when the puppets of the regime in
    Tehran invaded and, again, 1,200 innocent civilians mercilessly
    murdered intentionally without any sense of propriety or
    concept. Indeed not in uniform, just everything that could be a
    violation of laws of war they conducted. And then, of course,
    sadly we have had over 150 attacks that have occurred in the
    Red Sea, as correctly identified by Congressman Moulton in
    Iraq. Over and over again, we see these attacks. Over 150. And
    then culminating on January the 28th with three young members
    of the Army Reserves from Georgia who were killed by a
    Hezbollah, again, another puppet of Iran, killing three of our
    personnel and wounding 40 others.
        And so, it is just incredible to me the challenges that we
    have, and we want the best. And wanting the best, General
    Gainey, in particular, I am concerned with the level of
    deployment of such an important branch, the air defense
    artillery. And, actually, I want to commend. It is no surprise,
    General, Congressperson Don Bacon was ahead of the curse. And
    that is the deployment level that is being conducted. And I
    know with the leadership we have, bipartisan, we would like to
    back you up in any way to try to address that.
        With all of this in mind, General Gainey, in particular,
    how are we addressing the technological development of the
    Chinese Communist Party war criminal Putin, the regime in
    Tehran, the Kim Jong Un? How are we addressing this?
        General Gainey. Congressman, thank you for the question and
    appreciate your thoughts. As--I will speak first on the Army
    perspective. The Army is undergoing its most modernized effort
    in several, several years. We are moving from a Patriot centric
    force, and I highlighted earlier how we are asking Patriot to
    essentially do everything in a fight, give after tactical
    ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and, in some cases, with
    our partners even going after drones with the Patriot system.
    The U.S., through our modernization program, U.S. Army, is now
    looking at integrated battle command system as the cornerstone
    of that system. We have that system in test right now with our
    unit out at Fort Bliss. What that unit--that integrate--that C2
    system does is it integrates several components and not just a
    system. It takes a lower tier air missile defense sensor as the
    cornerstone of that capability, and then it adds in other
    sensors, whether ground-based sensors or airborne platforms,
    and also adds in shooters into that common C2. So now given the
    operator to leverage several different sensors to provide
    several different effectors against the range of threats. And
    also that lower-tier air missile defense sensor provides
    significantly more capability than the current system does,
    which would allow it to now optimize most of those interceptors
    that are part of that C2 system.
        And if you look at this challenge from a joint perspective
    in my JFCC IMD hat, that is where we look at how do you bring
    all of these systems together in a larger C2 construct? And
    that is something as we work towards the defensive wall, one of
    the areas we are looking at is how do you take the Army
    integrative battle command system integrated with some of the
    systems that the missile defense agency is putting together on
    Guam? And so, therefore, we are looking at we will have an
    enduring solution that moves forward that essentially
    integrates all those several systems, leverages the sensors and
    the shooters together. That is the medium, lower to medium
    range.
        Now, if you look at the counter UAS in the protection to
    the maneuver capability, the Army has also significantly
    invested in that area also where we have added several
    maneuver, short-range defense systems integrated into our
    division in BCPs to be able to provide capability against
    cruise missiles. Looking at technology like directed energy,
    50-kilowatt directed energy that we have deployed out there
    right now testing that capability, and also refielding high-
    power microwaves into our formations to be able to get at those
    threats.
        So if you look at a capability, a system that is able
    integrate all of these sensors, all of these effectors, and
    then be able to put the proper fires on target, the appropriate
    interceptor or effect on the appropriate target, that is how we
    are moving forward in modernization. That is how it is going to
    allow us to move forward.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. If there is ever a committee that
    is faced with a problem, it is this one. I am on a lot of
    military committees, and I never had a committee that had so
    many acronyms. To try to understand what each and every one of
    these things actually is, it is a challenge. But I am going to
    try to take this in a different direction. Following on some of
    the work that my colleague, Mr. Moulton, put forward earlier in
    his remarks, we will forever be playing defense, trying to
    catch up with the offense. We can use the NFL [National
    Football League], we can use the experience of what we are
    hearing here today. Much of this discussion today is about
    defense.
        And we know that in that defensive environment, there is
    great risk. What has happened over the course of the last 23
    years is a very significant shift in this entire arena. Prior
    to 2002, there was an ABM treaty, an antiballistic missile
    treaty. It would do well for all of us to understand the
    details of the actual language of the treaty. We usually think
    it only applies to intercontinental ballistic missiles. It
    didn't. It went beyond that. The United States withdrew from
    that. To this day, Russia uses the withdrawal of the--of
    America from the ABM treaty to justify their continued buildup
    of intercontinental ballistic missile systems and the weapons
    that go with it.
        Interestingly, in recent days, the last few years, China is
    using that very same withdrawal, American withdrawal from the
    ABM treaty system to justify its buildup of intercontinental
    ballistic missiles, including silos, which this committee has
    discussed.
        It is fair to argue that that withdrawal from that treaty
    has led to the current nuclear arms race, and much of the
    discussion today has to do with how we are going to defend
    using the GMD system. And my concern here is that we are in a
    never-ending cycle of offense followed by defense that presumes
    to be successful against the then-known offense, and yet when
    we are around.
        My point here is that as much time as we are spending on,
    in this committee, defense, we ought to be looking at how to
    break this cycle of an arms' race. Now you can add the nuclear
    piece to it, which you must do, and it becomes even more
    significant. It is never-ending. And I know the members of this
    committee, and certainly the gentlemen before us understand in
    detail what this race is all about, the risks that are in it.
        And my question to you, Mr. Hill, is, is it useful for us
    policymakers and for you and your team to spend as much time
    thinking about how to stop the cycle, or at least slow down the
    cycle of offense, defense, defense, offense, and back and
    forth, all of which creates greater risk? Mr. Hill, I would
    love to hear your thoughts on it.
        Mr. Hill. Sure. Congressman Garamendi, very, very key piece
    in the entire puzzle of what you are getting after here.
    Clearly, there was a time, there was an era when we had someone
    we could work with on the other side of a negotiating table.
    During the Soviet Union, that era and the Cold War, we did
    negotiate agreements with them successfully. We are in a--and
    that is a key piece to any kind of arms control situation. Do
    you have someone you can work with? Now, you have three, and
    you have a very different Russia in some ways in terms of can
    you deal with them as a credible negotiating partner right now?
        So, it is not to--it is to say you always need to be
    thinking about that as one of the pieces of what you have to
    work with to try and maintain strategic stability, defense,
    offense, as well as can you come up to a confidence level with
    somebody on the other side of the table. China's a third player
    in this now, which adds to the complications. But I think the
    tool never goes away. It is how do you use it in the
    environment you have?
        Mr. Garamendi. I am going to take 5 more seconds. Every one
    of the arms control mechanisms that went into effect during the
    Cold War occurred almost immediately after the most difficult
    of moments in that Cold War. I will let it go at that. That is
    a historical issue. But thank you. I am out of time. And for
    me, I am going to spend as much time talking about this as I do
    about offense and defense. Thank you.
        Mr. Lamborn. Representative Stefanik.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn. First, I would
    like to correct the record earlier in this hearing. The ranking
    member said that the Department of Defense chose Fort Drum as
    the preferred missile defense site for the third homeland
    missile defense site nearly 10 years ago. That is incorrect.
    Despite the fact that you said that is correct, General
    Collins, you are aware that the date that that was designated
    was 2019, correct?
        General Collins. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Stefanik. So the 10 years ago was incorrect?
        General Collins. Yes, ma'am, 4 years ago.
        Ms. Stefanik. Great. You also are aware that just last
    year, General Milley and Vice Admiral Hill testified in front
    of this committee that the construction of a third site at Fort
    Drum would be strategically worthwhile, correct?
        General Collins. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Stefanik. Are you aware of that testimony?
        General Collins. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Stefanik. Yes. And you are also aware that in multiple
    NDAAs, the language designating Fort Drum was the preferred
    third site for an East Coast missile defense site has been
    included in multiple NDAAs. Are you aware of that?
        General Collins. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Stefanik. And just let the record reflect, the ranking
    member voted in support of that language, not once, but
    multiple times, as well as voted for appropriations as did the
    majority of the members of this committee.
        Now, in the fiscal year 2014 Appropriations Act and the
    NDAA, we worked to secure $10 million in planning and design
    funds for the Missile Defense Agency to begin construction
    activities for a third homeland missile defense site at Fort
    Drum.
        My question to you, General Collins, is as the director of
    MDA, can you confirm to me that this $10 million is being used
    as dictated by Congress as explicitly stated by Congress at
    Fort Drum to begin the planning and design of a third missile
    defense site.
        General Collins. Ma'am, the $10 million has been authorized
    and appropriated for that purpose, and that is the purpose we
    are executing it for.
        Ms. Stefanik. And what are you using that for?
        General Collins. That is to do the initial planning and
    development of design for continental interceptor site to take
    it to the 10 percent design level.
        Ms. Stefanik. At Fort Drum?
        General Collins. We are pursuing an agnostic design that
    would support----
        Ms. Stefanik. That is not what the language said.
        General Collins. By providing and--by doing it as an
    agnostic site, we would not slow down the capability to do it.
        Ms. Stefanik. That is not what the language that was passed
    by Congress said. And you understand that in the NDAA for
    multiple years, it had designated Fort Drum. There were three
    sites under consideration in three different States. There was
    a process and environmental impact study. This has been a very
    thorough process. And so, you are saying to me today that the
    $10 million is not designated at Fort Drum for the planning and
    design?
        General Collins. It is--it supports continental interceptor
    site at any location that is determined to be optimal in the
    future in line with the 2019 memo that the Department signed
    out.
        Ms. Stefanik. Designating Fort Drum?
        General Collins. Fort Drum, and it also designated that
    when a requirement was set for a continental site, that there
    would have to a be readdress and a reassessment of location
    based on performance.
        Ms. Stefanik. Even though you said in my office, when we
    met General Collins in my office, that you understood that the
    $10 million would go to the design planning at Fort Drum as
    specified by the NDAA.
        General Collins. When a decision--if a decision is made to
    pursue a Fort Drum site, the $10 million will be 100 percent in
    line with being able to accomplish that.
        Ms. Stefanik. But you do understand that multiple NDAAs
    Fort Drum has been designated as well as by DOD?
        General Collins. I am aware, ma'am, of the report that the
    department signed out and the previous NDAAs.
        Ms. Stefanik. Okay. Great. With that, I will yield back.
        Mr. Lamborn. All right. Thank you. That concludes the
    public portion of this hearing. We have votes that will be
    called roughly 11:45 or shortly thereafter. So we will be in
    recess, and we will go into a closed hearing up in room 2337,
    until such time as votes are called, and then we will adjourn
    the subcommittee at that point. So we will be in recess and be
    upstairs.
        [Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the committee proceeded in
    closed session.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 April 12, 2024

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 April 12, 2024

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        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 April 12, 2024

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON

        Mr. Moulton. Given that the President recently assigned to
    U.S. Space Command the responsibility for coordinating trans-
    regional missile defense, how does U.S. Space Command
    contribute to the complex and strategic role that missile
    defense plays in our national security?
        General James. The transfer of the trans-regional missile
    defense (TRMD) responsibility aligns with the global sensor
    management (GSM) responsibility under USSPACECOM and allows
    more efficient use of kinetic and non-kinetic sensor to shooter
    chains across multiple Combatant Commands. USSPACECOM is
    uniquely positioned to support and contribute to cross-
    Combatant Command coordination from the tactical to the
    strategic levels. USSPACECOM provides dynamic management of
    global terrestrial, afloat, and space-based multi-mission
    sensors while optimizing and defending associated command and
    control architectures. GSM and TRMD alignment create additional
    efficiencies by consolidating policy, planning, assessment,
    intelligence, training, and exercise support to the Joint
    Force. USSPACECOM provides planning support to other Combatant
    Commands, including a global perspective of Ally and Partner
    capabilities. USSPACECOM also ensures our defenses continue to
    evolve by articulating and emphasizing warfighter requirements;
    advising, assessing, and integrating warfighter feedback into
    the capability development process; and enabling enhanced
    synchronization to future operations.
                                    ------

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL

        Mr. Carbajal. How are flight test opportunities being
    provided to enable the next generation of intercept systems?
        General Collins. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) follows a
    rigorous process to develop the MDA Integrated Master Test Plan
    (IMTP) on an annual basis, documenting the planned test
    opportunities of each system. The IMTP is delivered to Congress
    each spring synchronized with the President's Budget
    submission. The IMTP development process involves multiple
    phases to collect program requirements, design and schedule
    tests, cost estimate, and evaluate against budget constraints
    aligned with MDA's flight test priorities. This process intakes
    program requirements both within and beyond the Future Years
    Defense Program (FYDP) years to ensure long-lead test
    resourcing can be addressed within the FYDP. Additionally, the
    IMTP development process closely coordinates program test
    requirements with other external Department of Defense
    stakeholders.
        External stakeholders, including but are not limited to the
    following:
         LDirector, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)
         LOffice of the Undersecretary of Defense for
    Research and Engineering Director, Developmental Test,
    Evaluation, and Assessments (DTE&A)
         LCommander, Joint Functional Component Command for
    Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD) (representing the
    combatant commands)
         LCommander, United States (U.S.) Army Test and
    Evaluation Command (ATEC)
         LCommander, U.S. Air Force Operational Test and
    Evaluation Center (AFOTEC)
         LDirector, U.S. Navy Operational Test and
    Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR);
         LSpace Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM)
         LCommander, Joint Interoperability Test Command
    (JITC).
        DOT&E, DTE&A, JFCC IMD, ATEC, AFOTEC, OPTEVFOR, STARCOM,
    and JITC members engage with MDA on a weekly basis to develop
    flight test opportunities as reflected in the IMTP. These
    jointly coordinated test opportunities enable and demonstrate
    the capabilities of future Missile Defense System
    functionality, including currently documented test schedules
    for the Next Generation Interceptor, Glide Phase Interceptor,
    and Defense of Guam programs in IMTP v25.1.
        Mr. Carbajal. Do existing hypersonic defense strategies
    focus on both strategic and conventional adversary threats, or
    are these threats being treated separately?
        General Collins. Current United States (U.S.) policy
    distinguishes between regional hypersonic missile threats and
    threats capable of striking the U.S. homeland. It prioritizes
    the development of global warning and tracking capabilities to
    address all hypersonic threats (threats regionally and to the
    homeland), and the development of active and passive defense
    capabilities to defend against regional hypersonic threats.
    Though the United States maintains the right to defend itself
    against attacks from any source, per longstanding policy, the
    United States relies on strategic deterrence to address large
    and intercontinental-range, nuclear missile threats to the U.S.
    homeland from Russia and the People's Republic of China. I
    defer to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
    for more information on U.S. hypersonic defense strategy and
    policy.
        Mr. Carbajal. How do the estimated hypersonic interceptor
    acquisition quantities compare to quantities for existing
    ballistic or cruise missile interceptors?
        General Collins. There are currently an approximate 1,650
    ballistic missile interceptors which include Ground Based
    Interceptor, Standard Missile three, Standard Missile six, and
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. Of the 1,650 ballistic
    missile interceptors, approximately 140 interceptors are dual-
    use to counter hypersonic threats. These quantities do not
    include Service capabilities or cruise missile interceptors
    external to the Missile Defense Agency.
                                    ------

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON

        Mr. Bacon. I am concerned that, with few exceptions, most
    key U.S. military installations lack dedicated land based air
    and missile defense:
        A) What is the Department of Defense strategy to ensure our
    overseas air bases and key installations in Europe, the Indo-
    Pacific and the Middle East are defended from air and missile
    attack?
        B) Has the Department of Defense established a current
    critical asset list (CAL) and defended asset list (DAL) for key
    military installations and operating locations in Europe, the
    Indo-Pacific and the Middle East? Who approves each of these
    lists?
        C) How does the Department determine which military service
    is responsible for developing, resourcing and operating land-
    based air and missile defense systems for locations that appear
    on each CAL/DAL in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and the Middle
    East?
        D) How many sites on each CAL in Europe, the Indo-Pacific
    and the Middle East are considered undefended (e.g. on the CAL
    but not on the DAL)?
        E) What organization in DoD is responsible for organizing,
    training, equipping and presenting forces to USSNORTHCOM to
    defend key military installations in the Continental United
    States from cruise and hypersonic missile attack from an
    adversary?
        Mr. Hill. A) In accordance with the 2022 Missile Defense
    Review, the Department of Defense works with allies and
    partners to provide threat-based, mission-tailored air and
    missile defense of overseas air bases and key installations to
    deter and defend against attack and enable conditions for
    effective U.S., allied, and partner military operations should
    deterrence fail.
        This approach seeks to leverage U.S. and partner
    capabilities while balancing near-term risk to mission and
    forces with longer-term Department of Defense efforts to build
    integrated air and missile defense force readiness, capability,
    and capacity. We accomplish these objectives through a careful
    evaluation of air and missile threats and the assignment of
    U.S. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities
    through the Department's Global Force Management (GFM) process.
        Additional details can be provided in a classified setting.
        B) The Department of Defense has established a critical
    asset list (CAL) and a defended asset list (DAL) for Europe,
    the Indo-Pacific region, and the Middle East. CALs and DALs are
    created and approved by combatant commander for their assigned
    area of responsibility to address mission requirements and
    reduce risk associated with current and emerging air and
    missile threats.
        C) The Secretary of Defense's initial decision for force
    allocation is ordered through the Global Force Management
    Allocation Plan (GFMAP). The Secretary directs changes in
    military service responsibilities for land-based air and
    missile defense informed by CCMD requirements, Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) recommendations, fiscal
    considerations, and changes in the national security
    environment. The Secretary of Defense determines the assignment
    of land-based missile defense assets among the combatant
    commands and determines the forces for land-based missile
    defense operations through the Global Force Management process.
    More than one military service may be tasked to support a CCMD
    requirement.
        D) The Combatant Commander is responsible for determining
    how best to employ assigned military forces to protect assets
    on the critical asset list and defended asset list. The number
    of assets protected, and level of protection offered are
    dynamic and can change rapidly based upon mission requirements,
    threats, and available resources. Additional details can be
    provided in a classified setting.
        E) The Secretaries of the Military Departments, through the
    Military Services, are responsible for organizing, training,
    and equipping forces (including Reserve Component forces). The
    Secretary of Defense determines which forces are assigned or
    allocated to USNORTHCOM to defend key military installations in
    the continental United States from missile attack.

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