[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-65]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FY25 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 21, 2024
GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-192 WASHINGTON : 2025
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
DON BACON, Nebraska RO KHANNA, California
JIM BANKS, Indiana CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama MARC VEASEY, Texas
Whitney Verett, Professional Staff Member
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Owen McGeary, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 1
WITNESSES
Cotton, Gen Anthony J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.. 2
Guillot, Gen Gregory M., USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern Command,
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)............... 4
Plumb, Dr. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.... 2
Whiting, Gen Stephen N., USSF, Commander, U.S. Space Command..... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cotton, Gen Anthony J........................................ 43
Guillot, Gen Gregory M....................................... 96
Plumb, Dr. John F............................................ 21
Whiting, Gen Stephen N....................................... 71
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 121
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Wilson................................................... 125
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 125
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 129
Mr. Strong................................................... 131
FY25 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 21, 2024.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:31 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Lamborn
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you all for being here. We appreciate
that.
We do have votes coming as early as 30 minutes from now, so
I think there are some of us here who are going to want to ask
questions. We will have one round of questions. And mine will
be very brief. And then we will go into a classified session
and see how much we can cover before votes are actually
impending and we have to leave.
So we appreciate your attendance here. I have an opening
statement, but I am going to submit it for the record for the
sake of time.
Mr. Lamborn. And I will now call on the ranking member to
see what he would like to do.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC
FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Moulton. I am going to take the wise counsel following
the chairman's leadership and also submitting my statement for
the record.
We would like to expedite things so that we can get the
votes and then get to the classified session.
Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Then let's go right into our
distinguished witnesses.
We have the Honorable John Plumb, General Anthony Cotton,
General Stephen Whiting, and General Gregory Guillot, if I said
that correctly.
Guillot. Okay, I am way off. I will get that before--okay,
Guillot.
Mr. Plumb, can you start, please?
STATEMENT OF HON. DOCTOR JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, and thank
you, Ranking Member Moulton, Members of the committee. Thanks
for inviting me to testify here. I will keep my remarks short
in the interests of moving to questions.
But just briefly, we are in a very highly dynamic and
challenging security environment. We have competitors who are
modernizing, and diversifying, and expanding their nuclear
arsenals. They are also rapidly fielding space and counterspace
capabilities and developing and fielding advanced missiles in
greater numbers and greater diversity.
The President's budget request for fiscal year 2025 makes
critical investments in the Department's strategic forces
posture: 49 billion for our nuclear enterprise; 33.7 billion
for our space capabilities; and over 28 billion for missile
defense. And across each of these portfolios we are investing
not only in capabilities but in our network of allies and
partners, both of whom provide advantages that our adversaries,
or potential adversaries like Russia and China could never hope
to match.
All of these capabilities, nuclear, space, missile defense,
remain central to our ability to deter, and also central to our
ability to prevail in conflict if deterrence fails.
The Department is committed to making the critical
investments necessary to strengthen our strategic forces
posture. Thanks to this committee for its tireless dedication
to the Department, to our men and women in uniform.
And I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Plumb can be found in the
Appendix on page 21]
Mr. Lamborn. General Cotton.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ANTHONY J. COTTON, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Cotton. Good afternoon, Chairman Lamborn, and
Rankin Moulton, and distinguished members of this committee. It
is an honor to be here today with my command senior enlisted
advisor, senior enlisted leader Sergeant Major Kreamer, and our
privilege to represent the servicemembers and civilians of the
United States Strategic Command.
I have submitted my statement for the record.
As a global warfighting command, STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic
Command] sets conditions across the globe as the ultimate
guarantor of the national and allied security. Excuse me. We do
this in the face of challenges unlike anything America has
encountered.
We are confronting not one but two nuclear peers, the
Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. This
reality, compounded by missile developments in North Korean,
Iran's nuclear ambitions, and the growing relationships between
these nations adds new layers of complexity to our strategic
calculus.
While our legacy systems continue to hold potential
adversaries at risk, it is absolutely critical we continue at
speed with modernization of our nuclear triad. This includes
the land-based ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], the
B-21, the B-52J, the Columbia-class submarine, the Nuclear Sea
Launch Cruise Missile, the long-range standoff weapon, and
numerous related systems, while also focusing on NC3 [nuclear
command, control, and communication] enterprise upgrades and
cybersecurity.
The most important message I want to deliver is this: while
modernization will continue to be the priority, U.S. STRATCOM
and its component forces are ready to deter our adversaries and
respond decisively should deterrence fail.
Thank you. And I will look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Cotton can be found in
the Appendix on page 43]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
General Whiting.
STATEMENT ON GENERAL STEPHEN N. WHITING, USSF, COMMANDER, U.S.
SPACE COMMAND
General Whiting. Chairman Lamborn and Ranking Member
Moulton, members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify. I am pleased to be here beside Dr.
Plumb, General Cotton, and General Guillot.
And I will also abbreviate my opening statement.
Our strategic competitors now hold at risk U.S. and allied
space capabilities. The People's Republic of China and Russia's
actions have transformed space into a contested warfighting
domain. U.S. Space Command's moral responsibility to the Joint
Force, the nation, and our allies is to provide space
capabilities through all levels of competition and conflict.
The U.S. military services are sized with the assumption of
always having access to space. And this is why U.S. Space
Command must protect and defend our critical space systems to
ensure they are available in the face of the growing threats
now arrayed against us.
Inherent in this responsibility is our ability to protect
the Joint Force from space-enabled attack. The Command seeks to
expand our competitive advantage by leveraging every available
asset of the Interagency Joint Force, our allies, partners, and
industry. Yet, it is vital the Command is delivered improved
capability and capacity by 2027 to attain an enduring advantage
over any determined adversary.
I am grateful for Congress' commitment to advance America's
leadership in space. With your continued backing, U.S. Space
Command will ensure space remains sustainable, safe, stable,
and secure for all.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Whiting can be found in
the Appendix on page 71]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
And General Guillot.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
NORTHERN COMMAND, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
(NORAD)
General Guillot. Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a profound
honor to command and represent the women and men of North
American Aerospace Defense Command and the United States
Northern Command.
I am also pleased to appear alongside General Cotton,
General Whiting, and Dr. Plumb.
NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] and
NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] depend on robust space-based
capabilities to execute each of our critical missions. And the
strategic deterrent remains the foundation of our homeland
defense. The strong partnerships I enjoy with my fellow
witnesses are crucial.
The United States and Canada face an extraordinarily
complex strategic environment. Our competitors have fielded
advanced kinetic systems designed to strike civilian and
military infrastructure in North America both above and below
the nuclear threshold.
As stated in the National Defense Strategy, the People's
Republic of China remains our pacing challenge as the People's
Liberation Army modernizes and grows at a rapid pace.
The PRC's [People's Republic of China] expanding nuclear
capability and capacity, along with its development of modern
submarines, missiles, hypersonic weapons all present
significant challenges for homeland defense.
While the PRC's capabilities are growing quickly, Russia is
a threat to the homeland today and is an immediate concern.
Russia retains the world's largest stockpile of strategic and
non-strategic nuclear weapons, and has the capacity to strike
inside North America with air and sea launch precision
conventional weapons.
Despite heavy losses to its ground forces in Ukraine,
Russia has invested heavily in systems that can threaten the
United States, such as advanced guided missile submarines,
hypersonic glide vehicles, and ICBMs. Russia also maintains
significant cyber and undersea capabilities and developmental
systems such as a nuclear torpedo and a nuclear-powered cruise
missile.
Meanwhile, North Korea continues its rhetoric while
testing, test launching increasingly advanced long range
missiles and expanding its ties with Russia and China.
While Iran currently lacks the capability to strike North
America with long range missiles, it is investing in that
capability. Iran also supports violent military groups in the
Middle East and maintains a worldwide network of operational
surrogates.
With those risks firmly in mind, NORAD and NORTHCOM strive
to begin homeland defense well beyond North America. To do so,
both commands are working with the services and Congress to
improve domain awareness in order to detect, track, and defeat
threats ranging from long range ballistic missiles to small
UASs [unmanned aerial systems].
Finally, upon taking command, I began a 90-day assessment
to inform the Department, the Joint Force, and Congress on
NORAD and NORTHCOM's ability to executive assigned tasks and
make recommendations on where the Command can and should do
more. Once complete, I will share my findings and updated
vision for how NORAD and NORTHCOM will best execute the noble
mission of homeland defense.
The challenges facing our nation are real, but there should
be no doubt about NORAD and NORTHCOM'S resolve to deter
aggression and, if necessary, defeat threats to our nation and
our citizens.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear this
afternoon. And I am happy to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Guillot can be found in
the Appendix on page 96]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you all of you for your opening
statements.
I will reiterate what I said earlier. There will be votes
called as early as 4 o'clock. I have some questions I will
submit for the record.
Mr. Lamborn. I am going to ask one very brief question of
Dr. Plumb and then turn it over to my ranking member. And then
everyone has a chance to ask questions. And then if we have
time we will go into a classified session upstairs.
But in no event will we come back and have any continuation
of this hearing after votes are called. It will be a fairly
lengthy vote series and I don't want to keep everybody. And so
we will adjourn whenever votes are called, with about a 10-
minute gap, grace period for us to finish, wrap up what we are
doing and get over for the votes.
Dr. Plumb, very quickly, in its 2022 nuclear posture, the
Administration affirmed the continued need for the triad. Has
there been any changes in the Administration's policy in this
regard?
Dr. Plumb. No, there has not.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Ranking Member Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I will also just ask one question. I am going to direct it
to Dr. Plumb and General Cotton if either of you have comments
on this.
What thinking has the Department done or been doing on what
strategic deterrence looks like with two nuclear peers? What
does the world mean, what does that world mean for our nuclear
posture, our strategy, and our strategy of deterrence?
Dr. Plumb. If it is all right, sir, I will start and then I
will hand it to General Cotton.
So taking it very seriously. I know you and I have talked
about this. The Strategic Posture Commission, helpfully a
bipartisan report that has come out looking at this specific
problem, the Department is using that as a bit of a--as a
reference guide to help us examine and go forward.
The fundamental issue here, as you have pointed out, is
China's growth in their nuclear arsenal--and it's a, you know,
continental-level nuclear arsenal--changes the calculus. We
don't want to be in a situation where we have to have as many
nuclear weapons as Russia, plus as many as China, plus one
more. But we do have to be able to deter both.
And so we are looking at that. I would say roughly we
think, you know, we continue to be sufficient now, program of
record is okay now. But in the future we are going to have to
make adjustments because of this growth of China.
And so we are looking at what things can we credibly do to
help ensure the deterrence will continue to hold through the
2030s, both through our transition and in the face of China's
growing threat.
General Cotton.
General Cotton. Thank you.
Ranking Member Moulton, I would like to add that we have
been looking from Strategic Command ever since I took command
last 15 months ago, and what we are looking at is the strategic
piece that is linked to the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review]
because the NPR allows us to look at posture and sizing. So we
immediately looked at that.
But as I, you know, as I mentioned to you in the office
call, I think it is is really about strategy as well. So we
have actually commissioned a study within STRATCOM with another
group of bipartisan representation to really look at it from a
strategic level when you have two near peers in which you have
to fight, and how do you hold them at risk in order to do that?
And as well, as you know, the triad itself, all legs of it
from delivery systems to the weapons themselves are all being
modernized. So just as important is what does that transition
from legacy system look like to modernize systems moving
forward?
And we have a study that is well underway to make sure that
we don't create any gaps in that transition going forward.
Mr. Moulton. Well, I think that is very encouraging because
the world has certainly changed.
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Representative Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank
each of you for being here today and your service on behalf of
the people of the United States.
General Cotton, in your testimony you state there is a
critical need to modernize our stockpile, infrastructure, and a
robust science and technology base for our strategic deterrent
force. I am grateful to represent the Savannah River Site where
they are working around the clock to bring the plutonium
production facility into operation as soon as possible.
They are also working to replace a 1950s era's building at
the Savannah tritium enterprise.
As the only member of Congress who has ever worked at
Savannah River Site, I know personally of how dedicated the
personnel are to the people of America. With this, with
delaying the modernization put our security at risk. And we are
really grateful that plutonium pit production, which is so
crucial, is absolutely a two-state--two site solution with Los
Alamos and Savannah River.
So what is the status of maintaining our capabilities?
General Cotton. Representative, thank you so much.
And I had the opportunity of actually visiting Savannah
River twice in my recent job and in my former job. You are
absolutely right, the men and women that are there are
incredible Americans and dedicated patriots.
To your point, I think when we think about the products and
components that are going to be required from NNSA [National
Nuclear Security Administration], I want to keep the throttle,
throttle pressed and ensuring that we get pit productions in
the numbers we want.
I also think that we also need to pay attention to the
other rare earth materials that are warranted and needed, not
only tritium, but also lithium and other components that might
be something that can hold them back, if you will, as far as
NNSA and their production.
And then, finally, I think industrial base and making sure
that the brick and mortar, as you know, the things that are
actually being produced and built there, the facility itself
across the enterprise for NNSA to ensure that they can
accomplish all of that to get the buildings built in order to
get the production done.
Mr. Wilson. And, General, thank you so much. And you are
always welcome back to Savannah River Site any time. And please
let me know when you are there because I would like to be with
you. Thank you for your service.
And, Secretary Plumb, you stated in your testimony that
Iran continues to expand their nuclear activities.
Additionally, you also state that at this time ``we believe
Iran is not currently pursuing nuclear weapons.''
Secretary Plumb, I just--that is amazing to me because the
regime in Tehran is pursuing an effort of increasing their
stockpile of highly-enriched uranium. The regime in Tehran is
continuing to develop ICBMs which can only be used with the
intent of striking the United States.
And they make it clear as they chant ``Death to Israel,
Death to America.'' And so it is just really appalling to me
that we are in a war we didn't choose, and that is a war with
dictators with rule of gun invading democracies with rule of
law. And we know that it began February 22, 2022, with war
criminal Putin invading Ukraine. And then October 7, the puppet
Hamas of Iran invaded Israel with mass murder.
The dots are so easy to connect between the Axis of Evil.
And Iran is we know providing drones and missiles to Putin to
murder Ukrainians. In return, their collaboration I just can't
imagine would not include nuclear missile development.
A nuclear bomb would destabilize the Middle East with a
vaporization of Israel. And Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and our
Persian Gulf allies are threatened.
How close is the regime in Tehran to a nuclear weapon?
Dr. Plumb. Thank you, sir.
I don't have a specific time frame for your exact question,
but I will just say my testimony is based on intelligence
assessments, which is you can enrich uranium without pursuing a
nuclear weapon. Obviously you need enriched uranium to build a
nuclear weapon. So I take your point.
As far as how close it is, I don't--perhaps General Cotton
has a, has a kind of an infill from his testimony I don't have
off the top of my head.
Mr. Wilson. My time is up. But, hey, we are dealing with
Iran. They have enough energy and capability, oil and gas, they
don't need to have enriched uranium. There is only one purpose
for them to have enriched uranium, and that is to develop a
nuclear weapon to attack the United States.
I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Representative Carbajal is next on the list.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We all know space is essential to our everyday lives. And I
don't think most people understand this. Not only is space
critical to our national security programs, but we rely on
space to check our weather, our phones, to use a credit card,
and now in some cases for internet connection, just to name a
few.
These capabilities are primarily because of our nation's
robust commercial space industry.
General Whiting, can you speak to the partnership between
Space Command and commercial space companies?
How do commercial space companies help you fulfill your
mission?
General Whiting. Congressman, thank you for the question. I
think one of our nation's principal advantages is our
commercial space industry. It is moving at incredible speed
with innovation, and it outpacing commercial industry from the
rest of the world.
And so today we partner with those companies in a number of
ways. One way is through information sharing, a cell called the
Commercial Integration Cell at Vandenberg Space Force Base in
California.
And then we also leverage services provided by commercial
companies. And so we are always looking at how we can better
both share information and leverage the capabilities that
commercial brings us because we believe that makes us more
effective.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
For those watching, Vandenberg is in my district.
General Whiting, what do you think the biggest challenge is
in space domain? And how can Congress help you overcome this
challenge?
General Whiting. Thank you, Congressman.
Our biggest challenge today is the speed at which the
People's Republic of China continues to develop its space
capabilities. And, in particular, they are developing a number
of counter space weapons systems to hold at risk our space
systems.
They are also using space to enable their terrestrial
forces, their army, their navy, their air force, marines, to
make them more lethal, more precise, and more far-ranging.
So I would ask for Congress' support to continue to invest,
particularly in the United States Space Force, but also in the
other services that provide us capability at U.S. Space
Command, because they have to now take our current
constellations and make them more resilient. They have to
develop systems that we can protect and defend those
constellations. We need capabilities to protect the Joint Force
from the space-enabling capabilities of others. And then we
need a testing and training environment that allows us to know
with confidence that our space systems will work the way we
need them to.
And that is all a lot, that is a lot of new work. And we
need to make sure that we are able to do that.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Space Command's and Space Force's
ability to move quickly has been impressive.
Dr. Plumb, can you elaborate on why a mission like VICTUS
NOX is important?
And why do you think we have seen success when moving
quickly when it comes to space, whether it be Tactically
Responsive Space or Space Development Agency proliferation
satellite architecture?
Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Congressman, for the question, sir.
VICTUS NOX, which is a tactically responsive
launch. I am a big fan of this concept of being able to launch
quickly, in particular in the way it was done there, which is
in response to, you know, simulated threats.
So I think the idea of what you use tactically responsive
launch for, the original thought was maybe use it for
reconstitution, which may have a play here. But I really do
think the idea if there is something new we want to go look at,
how fast can we stack a rocket, get a payload on there, and to
go inspect the thing or, is a really interesting question.
And I think the service has really knocked it out of the
park on that particular-- on that particular mission.
Your second question was about moving faster, I think, in
the Space Development Agency. And as General Whiting just said,
you know partnering with commercial space, which is currently
an economic engine for the United States which we should all be
proud of, one of the things the business community needs to do
is actually innovate its speed so they can close their business
case. And we are trying to figure out how to harness that.
And I think what Derek Tournear is doing at SDA [Space
Development Agency] is really impressive, which is trying to
get the Government to move faster and trying to build on best
of current available and do replenishment with an increasing
technological upgrade as we go. It is a really impressive thing
he is doing. And I think we need to continue to encourage it.
And as I have said in this committee before, that also
means we would need congressional help to make sure that if
something fails or not every single satellite works that we
don't shut down that effort. That is actually built into the
way we want to design going forward.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
I won't have time for your response but I want to put this
question in the record.
Responsible behavior in space is critical to the productive
use of this domain, not only for future generations.
Dr. Plumb, how does the Department encourage responsible
behavior or detour dangerous behavior in this domain?
You don't have to answer. I am out of time.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 121.]
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Just send me the answer.
Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Representative Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you so much, Chairman.
General Guillot, as ballistic missile threats from North
Korea and Iran continue to advance, do you believe that it
would be strategically worthwhile to construct a third homeland
missile defense site at the DoD [Department of Defense] and
Congress' chosen East Coast location at Fort Drum, New York?
General Guillot. Congresswoman, I am aware that there was a
recent assessment that said that such a site was not an
operational necessity.
However, as an operational commander that watches very
closely the advances that our adversaries are making, primarily
Iran and, even more so, North Korea, I think that it is
important for me as the commander to have continually assessed
the threat and see if there are any changes in the threat
environment that would necessitate additional capabilities to
defect--to affect the homeland.
And so I would--sorry.
Ms. Stefanik. General, in my office when you were kind
enough to visit you said it would be strategically worthwhile
and you supported the construction. I understand the assessment
process. But as you and I spoke in my office you said this
would be strategically worthwhile, particularly as we are
considering threats not just of today but of the future as
well.
General Guillot. Yes, Congresswoman. If the assessment came
back that those threats I thought it would be worthwhile to
build that site, a site.
Ms. Stefanik. What would an operational requirement for a
third homeland missile defense site look like?
Dr. Plumb. Congresswoman, that would depend on the threat.
But I think dispersal away from the sites that we have now so
that we don't have all of our proverbial eggs in one basket
would be very important.
And the other would be to make sure that it was located
somewhere in the continental United States where it would have
the kinematic responsiveness to intercept threats that are
coming from a different avenue.
Ms. Stefanik. And Fort Drum meets those requirements.
Dr. Plumb. Well, I would----
Ms. Stefanik. That is the DoD's position, that is Congress'
position that Fort Drum is in fact the location of its
potential East Coast missile defense site. You are aware of
that?
Dr. Plumb. I am aware of that. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Stefanik. And it meets those requirements?
Dr. Plumb. Well, it does. What I am--I think I am asking a
different question is with future capabilities that we may have
I think we would have to assess that. But based on the
previous, yes, I know that Fort Drum was, was the primary
location.
Ms. Stefanik. Great.
And you understand if and when Congress establishes a
requirement for a third homeland missile defense site on the
East Coast you understand that it is DoD's responsibility to
execute that requirement?
Dr. Plumb. I would be the strongest advocate to execute
that requirement if the, if the threat required it. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Stefanik. And then shifting gears here.
Upstate New York, in addition to being home to Fort Drum in
my district, we also are home to another key Arctic unit, the
New York Air National Guard 109th Airlift Wing. And the 109th
Airlift Wing operates the LC-130Hs, or known as the
``Skibirds''. These planes, as you know, are the only platform
in the world that can provide critical logistical support in
and around the Arctic. Yet, they are at the very end of their
operational capability.
Do you believe that the LC-130s have enabled the U.S.
maintain a strategic presence and lead in the Arctic?
Dr. Plumb. Congresswoman, yes, without a doubt. In fact,
just this past week they were in AOR [area of responsibility]
up at Arctic Edge and Ice Camp operation performing that unique
capability.
Ms. Stefanik. We believe, and this is a bipartisan issue
for members of the New York delegation, I just offered a letter
with my colleague Paul Tonko, so bipartisan support, about the
urgent need for their recapitalization.
So I would refer you to that. We will make sure your office
has a copy of that. But that is very important to maintain our
leadership strategically in the Arctic region.
Yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Representative Norcross.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman.
General Cotton, we recently heard that the Sentinel
program, or you heard it triggered the Nunn-McCurdy Act,
indicating there were serious concerns of cost overrun. And
getting less into the actual dollars and cents and time delay,
we are about to approve, hopefully approve a budget and some
money that is going to go into fund the Department of Defense.
And we are facing increasing pressures to fund all our
programs.
We have had the three legs of triad, incredibly important.
If the Sentinel program continues and in the projections
where it is going, it could come to the point that it almost
becomes unaffordable in the way that it is laid out. At what
point do we look at that program and say do we go back to the
drawing board, not so much to recapitalize our existing
Minuteman-IIIs but the requirements, look at a different way of
that third leg of the triad?
Can you comment on that?
General Cotton. Representative Norcross, thanks for the
question.
We have. So, you know, in regards to three Administrations
doing assessments in regards of do we keep a triad or do we go
to something different, all said, we must maintain a triad.
Mr. Norcross. And I am not suggesting that. But within one
of the legs do we look at it differently, not just replicate
and update what the existing ones, but look at a different
configuration?
General Cotton. Well, I don't know about a different
configuration. And I guess I don't know what you, what you mean
by a different configuration.
Mr. Norcross. Probably not a good idea in open session.
General Cotton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norcross. But the idea of just modernizing what we have
to make it more acceptable to, obviously, Father Time. But----
General Cotton. Well, I can answer from this perspective,
Congressman. As far as the requirements that we lay, and that
is my responsibility at STRATCOM----
Mr. Norcross. Sure.
General Cotton. --and then the provider of that capability
has come back to say that we can no--we can only meet that
requirement at a certain amount of time in which that needs to
then be replaced by a more modernized system.
So if that answers your question, and that is what I think
we still must maintain an ICBM leg of some, of some semblance
that probably looks a little different than a Minuteman 3.
Mr. Norcross. So the cost factor, there is no price that we
can put on it? We will pay whatever it takes to get it in?
General Cotton. Well, I would hope, you know, that the Air
Force and everyone will be able to take a look at that and be
able to come to some conclusion on how you can take and make
that. But the requirement for the land-based ICBM has not
changed from my perspective.
Mr. Norcross. There is no question about that.
So, Dr. Plumb, this is I want to throw it into your lane.
Is it time that we look at that leg of how it is currently
required, and then what we might do differently to bring in
those cost issues? I am not suggesting we do away with it, but
do we look at it differently?
Dr. Plumb. So we ought to be careful here because we are
now in a Nunn-McCurdy breach situation, sir. But my
understanding is that one of the requirements of the Congress,
and this is Under Secretary LaPlante's purview in A&S
[acquisition and sustainment] specifically, and not ours, is to
re-look at the requirement and look at other ways it could be
possible to do it, as all requirement under Nunn-McCurdy
breached the congressional statute.
Mr. Norcross. All right. Then let me switch things over to
an easy one.
Let's talk about the electromagnetic spectrum. Something
easy and noncontroversial.
Obviously this is-- rears its ugly head quite often. We
recently went through what Department of Defense wants to keep
versus what the cellular carriers would like to obtain. It is
not going to get any better soon.
What is your assessment, not of where we just came from but
where we are going to be in 5 years with technology, not only
from what the cellular carriers might need for our private
side, but what we might need as a spectrum, and then whether
it's 3.45 GHz [gigahertz], and then it keeps expanding in
different ways that we can get into the spectrum?
Can you give us an assessment of where we are with that, in
5 minutes or less?
Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir.
So I actually just had the pleasure of getting down to
Eglin Air Force Base and seeing some of our electronic warfare
squadron in the Air Force. And I will just say the value of
spectrum to the war fight and the ability to operate in these
bands that we have carved out for ourselves is only going to
grow in importance, and in particular as we focus on China as
our pacing threat where they have been aware of this for a long
time.
We have to maintain what we have to be able to compete. EW
[electronic warfare] in the Ukraine-Russia conflict is
providing lessons for everyone. It is being used every single
day. We have to be ready for that. We have to be able to fight
our, you know, near peer adversaries, not places where we just
have superiority.
Mr. Norcross. My apologies. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Representative Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen, for being here. It has been a treat for me to work
with many of you on the dais out here.
Got to talk to General Guillot about a week ago, so just
some questions that you have done. So I am going to focus a
little more on the STRATCOM and space side.
First of all, I believe it is imperative that we have 400
ICBMs. We can't extend it any longer. So it is real imperative
that the Air Force gets this right and learn from the mistakes
of and get these 400 missiles installed.
This committee is committed overwhelmingly to have three
legs of the triad and do the modernization. So one of the
things that we sometimes think doesn't get the attention it
deserves is the Nuclear Command and Control and, in particular,
from my vantage point, the survivability part of that.
So, General Cotton, can you share with us the current
status of STRATCOM's NC3 modernization efforts and your
roadmap?
General Cotton. Congressman Bacon, thanks for the question.
I am actually quite proud of what the team has done in the
last 15 months in regards to create a roadmap for NC3. I think
when I talked to this committee last year one of my ``go dos''
was to ensure that we could articulate the requirements from a
near term, midterm, and long term perspective.
We were able to do that. It actually culminated with a
deputy's, the DSD, department deputy secretary of defense
meeting which turned into yet a ``go do'' for the service
components on what we need to fight tonight, what we need for
the midterm on activities and modernization of NC3, and then
what will it take for the out years.
We are in the middle of a trade study right now to find the
best fit for, to be frank, the midterm, 0 to 5 years, because
we are already funded. And thank you for being able to fund us
for getting the near term and fight tonight activities done.
So as we prosecute that roadmap it will, it will be able to
show us gaps in seams that could potentially be seen between
zero, five, and five and ten moving forward. So we are quite
proud of the work that is being done there.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
One of the survival aspects for the nuclear C3 is the E-6B
Mercury mission where we have an Airborne Command's command
post for the flag officer onboard that can take over if
STRATCOM is hit, the White House, and the Pentagon. So as you
know, the E-6B is approaching retirement. And this timeline may
accelerate once the Navy has this in its program schedule to
transition in the TACAMO [Take Charge and Move Out] mission to
the C-130J.
So are you confident that the Air Force has a solution or a
program to replace the Airborne Command Post and Looking Glass
missions which today fly on the E-6B?
General Cotton. So part of that trade space study actually
looks at that because that is a gap. And the requirement is
that the E-6B will fly through the 2036 time frame.
So as you have mentioned, the TACAMO acquiring--acquisition
is already underway in the Department of the Navy. So as that
trade space study comes to closure it will identify that gap.
And at that point in time we will need to find, you know, what
is going to be the replacement for the back end of that
airplane, as you mentioned.
Mr. Bacon. And it is imperative that we have this mission.
General Cotton. And it gives second launch capability for
our ICBM force.
Mr. Bacon. Yes.
And so this is very important, Mr. Chairman, that we follow
the Air Force on this because we have got to have this mission.
And we don't have a plan for it yet. We are going to have to
work this, work this part hard.
But, General Whiting, when I came into Congress I turned a
lot of attention on the electronic magnetic spectrum operations
as an old guys coming to CW. But we, we still have a lot of
work to do there. And I know STRATCOM has picked up the
leadership on it.
But I know you were telling me how important EW is to the
space mission. So could you talk a little bit about your role
in the EW realm?
General Whiting. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
You know, our satellites on orbit the only way they can get
their information down to planet Earth is through the EW
spectrum. So it is absolutely vital to all that we do.
And we appreciate the leadership role that the Congress has
taken. And now by U.S. STRATCOM having the military
responsibility for that we have stood up an EM, joint EM office
inside of the U.S. Space Command that is already very busy, and
it is only about 7 months old, that is making sure as we see
EMI in the environment, jamming in the environment, how are we
assessing that? How are we operating through that? And it is
just foundational to all that we do, Congressman.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much.
I will put a question in the record asking about the
importance of the future roles for the B-52 and why it is so
vital to the strategic mission.
But I am out of time, so I will put it in for the record.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I yield.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Representative Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Plumb, you spoke in response to Mr. Norcross about the
Nunn-McCurdy requirement. You went through it very quickly.
There are five specific elements of the law that must be
answered. Are you and the Air Force prepared to answer all five
fully, completely, and honestly?
Dr. Plumb. Congressman, so just to be clear, I don't have
any Nunn-McCurdy statutory authority myself as an A&S thing.
But, yes, of course, the Department will be answering them
fully, and honestly, and correctly.
Mr. Garamendi. General Cotton, same question.
General Cotton. The answer is yes.
Mr. Garamendi. Very good. I think that takes care of that.
Well, I expect that. And we would expect nothing less, sir.
If we were to define strategy in military terms we would
probably say it is aligning unlimited aspirations with limited
amount of money. Unless somebody has found some way to continue
to increase by perhaps 10 percent or 15 percent a year the
Department of Defense budget, strategy means making choices by
the military as well as by us.
General Cotton, you spoke earlier about the need for the
ICBM. You said it is a require--it is required. Can you tell me
in specificity what can not, what can not be done by the other
two legs of the triad that only the ICBM can do?
General Cotton. Congressman Garamendi, I can. The ICBM
provides a responsive--the ICBM provides a responsiveness to
the President of the United States that no other two legs can
provide.
Mr. Garamendi. Really?
General Cotton. That is correct.
Mr. Garamendi. The bomber force and the submarine force is
not responsive?
General Cotton. They are responsive but not as responsive
and quickly can it provide a response as quick as the ICBM if
it was warranted by the President if I was to present, present
options.
Mr. Garamendi. What would be a response?
General Cotton. Well, I would rather not talk in open
session.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, let's say that there is a warning
coming from Mr. or General Whiting that there are incoming
missiles. What is the responsive?
General Cotton. Well, it would be, obviously, up to the
President of the United States on does he want to----
Mr. Garamendi. And how many minutes does he have to decide?
General Cotton. I will not say that here in open, in open
hearing.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, in the public domain it is 15 minutes.
You don't need to respond, but I don't know anybody is going to
be disagreeing with that.
Is that the nature of, is that the definition of
responsive, 15 minutes to make a decision about the launch of
those weapons?
Now, let's assume they were launched, would it make any
difference if it was 15 minutes or 30, 40 minutes that a
submarine----
General Cotton. Well, you are making the assumption,
Congressman, that the difference between the other two legs is
yet another 15 or 20 minutes. And I can get in more details if
we were in a closed environment to tell you what that
difference would really be.
Mr. Garamendi. So they are less responsive.
General Cotton. The survivable leg is the sea leg. The
flexible leg is the air leg. Responsive leg is the ICBM leg.
Mr. Garamendi. In other words, immediate launch or lose it?
It is the use it or lose it, isn't it?
It is not the effect of the launch. The launch would be the
same if it were launched from the submarine or from an
airplane.
General Cotton. That is not quite correct, Congressman,
because I can hold, I can hold different elements at risk with
the different, different legs of the triad.
Mr. Garamendi. We can go into that in detail.
General Whiting, what is your need for programs that are
not in your current budget? Isn't it about $1.3 billion?
General Whiting. Congressman, I just have signed our
unfunded priority list, and that total is about $1.2 billion.
Mr. Garamendi. Could you use any part of the $6 billion
that is currently authorized for the continued progress of the
Sentinel, even though it is now Nunn-McCurdy? Would you like
about maybe a fifth of that?
General Whiting. Congressman----
Mr. Garamendi. About $6 billion we are going to spend on
the Sentinel this year.
General Whiting. Congressman, I don't identify the sources
of the funds, just I know what my requirements are to fulfill
my mission.
Mr. Garamendi. My point is to my colleagues. We do identify
the source. And we do have the responsibility of aligning
strategy with limited money.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. That concludes the questioning portion
of our hearing today.
Let me just add a slight clarification from my perspective.
You threw out a number a minute ago, Representative
Garamendi. There are different numbers that are floating around
out there. And I don't think it would be wise for any of us to
confirm or deny any specific number because I think that that
is really not a topic of discussion we should be having in an
open session like this.
Which leads me to my next point. We will go into recess and
immediately reconvene upstairs and have perhaps a brief
classified hearing because votes will be called shortly.
But we will have a classified hearing for those who are
able to attend. And thank you for your testimony today.
We are in recess.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 21, 2024
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 21, 2024
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GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 21, 2024
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Dr. Plumb. I agree that responsible behavior is critical for
productive and safe use of the space domain. The Department of Defense
(DoD) is leading on this issue. Secretary Austin issued the
Department's ``Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space'' and directed
DoD Components to conduct space operations, unless otherwise directed,
consistent with the Commander, U.S. Space Command recommended ``Tenet-
derived responsible behaviors in space.'' We also strongly support the
commitment announced by the Vice President in April 2022, and
subsequently endorsed by 155 nations at the United Nations, not to
conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing. These
and other initiatives provide guidance for professional military
behavior in space and increase transparency about U.S. military space
operations. Fostering a shared understanding between space operators on
what constitutes responsible behavior contributes to a more stable and
sustainable space environment by reducing the risk of misunderstanding
and miscalculation. [See page 9.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 21, 2024
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. General Guillot, you mention in your statement
that ``the Middle East has amplified the risk that Iran or a
foreign terrorist organization will conduct attacks in the
homeland, either directly or by inspiring homegrown violent
extremists to act in their stead.''
Overall, do you believe our ability to defend the homeland
is keeping pace with these growing threats?
General Guillot. Yes. USNORTHCOM and NORAD take the threat
of a terrorist attack by a state or non-state actor very
seriously and take active measures every day to outpace those
threats. NORAD and USNORTHCOM work closely with the commands'
partners in the intelligence community, federal law
enforcement, and the Department of Homeland Security to ensure
our ability to detect, assess, and mitigate extremist threats.
While I believe the commands are well-positioned against those
threats, I am concerned that the potential lapse of the
authorities provided by Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act
of 2008 would remove a vital tool used by the intelligence
community and federal law enforcement efforts to track
potential extremist plots and other serious threats to the
homeland.
------
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Mr. Bacon. Given we now have 2 peer threats to our NC3
systems, are we positioned adequately with enough redundancy
for planned programs to ensure your successors will continue to
have the necessary redundancy?
Dr. Plumb. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review is clear that
our nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems
must provide command and control of U.S. nuclear forces under
all circumstances, including during and following an
adversary's nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attack. This is
the standard to which the Department designs, builds, and
maintains the many individual components of the overall NC3
architecture. Redundancy is one way to ensure availability
against determined and capable adversaries. The Department is
modernizing legacy systems through planned programs aimed at
retaining required resiliency and redundancy. I am confident
that today's NC3 is fit for this task and that we are
developing the future architectures to provide the nation with
resilient NC3.
Mr. Bacon. The 2024 NDAA assigned a task to the Secretary
of Defense to create the necessary authority to ensure our
senior level of communications across the COCOMs and through
the SECDEF and national security establishment to the
President. What is your understanding of our need for improving
program authorities to ensure you and your successors have the
this capability that the services don't necessarily plan and
program.
Dr. Plumb. Section 1631 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for (FY) Fiscal Year 2024 directed the
Secretary of Defense to establish a Nuclear Command, Control,
and Communications (NC3) Major Force Program to provide
additional insight and prioritization of the defense budget.
The Department is focused on sustainment of today's NC3
systems, while designing and building future systems to support
the directed functions of NC3. While section 1631 is
principally focused on budgeting and prioritization of NC3
programs, my understanding is the Department has the necessary
tools and authorities for sustaining and modernizing NC3
systems. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Space Policy will continue its close collaboration with the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment and U.S. Strategic Command on prioritizing the
sustainment and modernization of NC3 systems.
Mr. Bacon. What is your understanding of the risk to our
NC3 cryptographic capabilities given the rapid advances in
quantum and artificial intelligence? What are the priority
actions necessary to ensure our NC3 enterprise network remains
secure and impervious to these evolving threats?
Dr. Plumb. The technical security measures employed by the
NC3 Enterprise are sufficient to counter the threats posed by
currently fielded quantum and AI technologies. To mitigate
against future threats, the Department of Defense must continue
to coordinate the efforts of U.S. Strategic Command, the
National Security Agency, and other relevant stakeholders to
recruit, develop, and retain expertise required to design,
implement, and operate secure NC3 systems. For quantum
computing in particular, this is accomplished in part through
the framework established by the National Security Memorandum
on ``Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing
While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems.''
Mr. Bacon. Given we now have 2 peer threats to our NC3
systems, are we positioned adequately with enough redundancy
for planned programs to ensure your successors will continue to
have the necessary redundancy?
General Cotton. Yes; thanks to recent budget support, the
Department of Defense is modernizing legacy nuclear command,
control, and communications (NC3) systems through planned
programs to retain required resiliency and redundancy. United
States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is also pursuing
solutions to ensure the Department is positioned to preserve
sufficient capabilities and maintain pace with our adversaries.
Efforts to improve space-based capabilities for both the
missile warning/tracking and multi-orbit satellite
communications are on-going to provide increased resiliency in
these critical mission areas. To address emerging threats, the
Department is developing capability documents to address
requirements needed to pace peer threats.
Mr. Bacon. The 2024 NDAA assigned a task to the Secretary
of Defense to create the necessary authority to ensure our
senior level of communications across the COCOMs and through
the SECDEF and national security establishment to the
President. What is your understanding of our need for improving
program authorities to ensure you and your successors have the
this capability that the services don't necessarily plan and
program.
General Cotton. At present, Department of Defense (DoD)
Directive 3730.02 provides me sufficient authorities to execute
my role as the nuclear command, control, and communications
(NC3) Enterprise Lead. Section 1631 of the 2024 National
Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense to
establish a NC3 major force program (MFP) to provide additional
insight and prioritization of the defense budget. This MFP does
not provide any additional authorities, but does provide
additional focus on the acquisition of future NC3 capabilities.
USSTRATCOM will continue to collaborate with the Office of the
Undersecretary of Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment (OUSD (A&S)) to ensure the budget assessment meets
operational timelines/needs.
Mr. Bacon. Your statement mentioned improving national
level conferencing connectivity. Who will determine this
necessary connectivity and integrate the appropriate data for
this senior level of command. Your fellow commanders have all
mentioned a need to improve their level of connectivity also.
Will this include their and your needs?
General Cotton. USSTRATCOM, through the NC3 Enterprise
Center, coordinating with key stakeholders (Combatant Commands,
Services, and Agencies, DoD Chief Information Officer, and the
Joint Staff), determines the necessary connectivity to
integrate appropriate data for Senior Leaders. Consistent with
current policy and directives, required conferencing
capabilities will meet endurable, survivable, and assured NC3
through all environments and phases of conflict. At present,
USSTRATCOM is developing and implementing modernization
schedules to field enhanced terrestrial and space-based
systems. We designed this modernization to meet the needs of
all NC3 Enterprise Stakeholders.
Mr. Bacon. The B-52 remains the workhorse of America's
manned bomber force. Why are the upgrades to the B-52 so
important for STRATCOM's conventional strike and nuclear
deterrence missions and where do you see risk in completing
these upgrades on schedule?
General Cotton. The B-52 remains a critical nuclear triad
component and provides USSTRATCOM with the air leg standoff
conventional and nuclear strike capacity necessary to execute
my operational requirements. This standoff strike capability
will complement the B-21's penetrating strike capabilities. The
B-52 will remain in the inventory through 2050 and requires the
planned modernization upgrades to remain operationally credible
and capable in a peer or near-peer conflict. The primary B-52
modernization programs include the Commercial Engine
Replacement Program, which replaces 1950s-era engines with
modern replacements having greater fuel efficiency and improved
maintainability to enhance both conventional and nuclear
operations. The RADAR Modernization Program upgrades the 1960s-
era RADAR with a modernized off-the-shelf solution to enhance
conventional and nuclear operations. Finally, communications
upgrades for Very Low Frequency/Advanced Extremely High
Frequency support assured nuclear command and control. The risk
to completing these B-52 upgrades lies in delays to any one
upgrade program affecting the subsequent upgrade programs. The
Air Force must balance upgrade timing and sequencing with both
the day-to-day operational capacity and B-52 maintenance cycle
schedule requirements.
Mr. Bacon. What is your understanding of the risk to our
NC3 cryptographic capabilities given the rapid advances in
quantum and artificial intelligence? What are the priority
actions necessary to ensure our NC3 enterprise network remains
secure and impervious to these evolving threats?
General Cotton. This response includes information at a
higher classification. Member office should reach out to
committee staff to review.
Mr. Bacon. As SACCS and NOVA are upgraded along with all
the other mentioned NC3 upgrades, who will test the integrated
capability since each singular program does not own the
integration problem your successor will face in the 2030s?
General Cotton. There are multiple reviews and tests for
system-of-systems level integration beyond individual program
office tests. USSTRATCOM is now conducting operational
assessment and operational certification programs that include
end-to-end tests to validate the operational state of the NC3
Enterprise, identify risk to the Enterprise, and address
equipment, operations, and personnel issues to resolve or
mitigate risk. We also utilize our technical assessments team,
which performs additional end-to-end tests, characterizes key
technical performance measures, and assists program offices in
identifying and isolating underlying issues. We have also
completed integration reviews (earlier in the design and
development processes) using modern, digital engineering
techniques along with modeling and simulation to ensure
individual system designs are compatible and meet our mission
needs.
Mr. Bacon. Do we have adequate defensive cyber force teams
dedicated to protecting the various segments of NC3 across
space, air, and ground? Can you describe how you ensure
reporting on those systems to ensure the surety and security of
our nuclear weapons?
General Cotton. No, we do not currently have adequate
protections. DoD Combatant Commands, Services, and Agencies
(CC/S/A) cyber staffs execute much of the Department of Defense
Information Network (DoDIN) operations required to secure and
operate the NC3 enterprise systems. These staffs include
Cybersecurity Service Providers (CSSPs) that provide DoDIN
protection services to system owners. CSSP support is aligned
and functional on less than half of the 103 NC3 enterprise
systems. While there are no ``zero risk'' solutions, Services
are fielding defensive cyber capabilities in accordance with
DoD endorsed NC3 system priorities. Additionally, I rely on
United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to provide Cyber
Protection Teams (CPTs) to defend the Nuclear Command and
Control mission. Two CPTs are aligned directly to USSTRATCOM,
and USCYBERCOM augments this capacity as demand dictates. As
our requirements continue to grow, I am confident USCYBERCOM is
leaning forward to provide appropriately manned, trained, and
equipped CPTs to fulfill my NC3 defensive requirements.
Regarding defensive cyber reporting, we rely on multiple
processes to provide a holistic view of the NC3 enterprise and
enable senior leader decision making and direction to ensure
the security of the NC3 enterprise. These processes include:--
Quarterly collection of key cybersecurity metrics from each NC3
system--Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)
that detail key cyber event reporting requirements--
Collaboration with USCYBERCOM regarding direction of cyber
actions across the NC3 enterprise--Incorporating reporting from
DoD entities (NSA, intelligence agencies, USCYBERCOM, etc,)
regarding the cyber readiness of the enterprise.
------
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. DoD suppliers have been linked to Chinese semi-
conductor sources for multiple weapons programs such as the B-
2, Minuteman, Patriot, and the Ohio Class submarine.
LAre you concerned about the integrity of our
supply chains for these programs?
LWhat is the DoD's plan to move U.S. supply chains
to more secure and trusted suppliers operate these vital
strategic programs?
Dr. Plumb. The Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledges and
attempts to mitigate assurance risks stemming from Chinese
foreign influence on suppliers' semi-conductors. This is
critical given the role of semiconductor technology in enabling
DoD's asymmetric technological advantage. DoD must embrace the
innovation that resides in the private sector to support a
secure, modern, and agile industrial base, including investment
in the U.S. workforce in strategic sectors and supply chains.
In this way DoD can minimize the threat posed by the
introduction of foreign components in DoD systems. The DoD
supply chain represents a major competitive advantage that
underpins deterrence and allows DoD to project power with
Allies and partners globally.
To protect national security and support the Joint Force,
it is critical for DoD to have resilient, diverse, and secure
supply chains, especially for critical and emerging
technologies and key military platforms. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment leads the Departmental
effort to prioritize key supply chains, focusing on reducing
dependence on competitive or adversarial foreign sources,
leveraging Allies and partners' competitive advantages to serve
as force multipliers, and building resiliency into those supply
chains for their ability to stand robust against potential
future disruptions. The CHIPS Act incentives will help build a
robust domestic supply chain and workforce to support
semiconductor manufacturing onshore.
Mr. Waltz. DoD suppliers have been linked to Chinese semi-
conductor sources for multiple weapons programs such as the B-
2, Minuteman, Patriot, and the Ohio Class submarine.
LAre you concerned about the integrity of our
supply chains for these programs?
LWhat is the DoD's plan to move U.S. supply chains
to more secure and trusted suppliers operate these vital
strategic programs?
General Cotton. I defer to the Services on supply chain
integrity. As I have previously stated in testimony, the DoD
must harness the innovative power of the private sector to
support a modern industrial strategy that makes public
investments in America's workforce and a defense industrial
base that supports strategic sectors and supply chains,
especially critical and emerging technologies, such as
microelectronics and semi-conductors. The DoD supply chain
represents a major competitive advantage that underpins
deterrence and allows the DoD to project power.
The DoD requires healthy, resilient, diverse, and secure
supply chains to ensure the development and sustainment of
capabilities critical to national security and to build
enduring Joint Force advantages. USSTRATCOM will continue to
support the OUSD (A&S) priority to ensure resilient supply
chains, which focuses on reducing dependence on adversarial
foreign sources for defense critical industries, expanding
cooperation with partners to address challenges, increasing
visibility into DoD supply chains and potential or existing
supply chain challenges, building supply chains that are able
to recover from disruptions, and providing DoD leaders with
guidance to understand implications of supply chain risks.
Mr. Waltz. We recognize the satellites used to monitor the
space environment are severely limited by the amount of fuel in
their tanks.
Late last year, an NBC News article highlighted that,
``China successfully tested the equivalent of a refueling
tanker for satellites, a game-changing innovation that would
enable Beijing to extend the life of satellites that would
otherwise expire after running out of fuel.''
I note the Space Force is asking for $20 million in its
2025 budget request to start developing tools to handle a new
mission set called ``Servicing, Mobility, and Logistics'' to
address the satellite refueling concern.
LIs SPACECOM developing its own ``on-orbit''
refueling operations or are there any commercial providers that
the Service is working with to either provide or develop this
capability?
LIf China is already testing refueling
capabilities on-orbit, how does this program enable us to
refuel our own satellites? Is more funding around the corner in
the future years defense plan? o What is your timeline to have
this capability ready to go? o Does the budget request align
with this timeline? o Do you have all the authorities you
require to develop or contract these capabilities with
commercial providers?
General Whiting. Like any domain, space requires systems
capable of sustained maneuver. USSPACECOM calls this Dynamic
Space Operations, more specifically, Sustained Space Maneuver.
As the Combatant Command for space, USSPACECOM is reliant on
the U.S. Space Force and others to develop and acquire the
systems we operate. We are not developing our own on-orbit
refueling capability, but refueling is a priority to enable
Dynamic Space Operations and we do support the U.S. Space
Force's efforts to provide relevant capabilities. We want to
see them accelerate Sustained Space Maneuver, such as on-orbit
refueling, because this will improve how we operate in space
and unlock new Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. If these
types of capabilities are fielded and presented to USSPACECOM,
I have all the authorities I need to perform on-orbit refueling
and sustained maneuver within the domain. I defer to the U.S.
Space Force to discuss their expected budget request,
additional funding needs, timelines, and acquisition
authorities to meet USSPACECOM's requirements.
Mr. Waltz. Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS) rapidly
integrates and deploys space-based end-to-end capabilities in
response to Combatant Commander urgent needs within a 24 hour
response timeline. This could be for surveillance,
reconnaissance and tracking, or special communications
missions. I note that the FY25 budget request provides for $30
million for RDT&E for this program.
LAre you able to comment on the number of missions
conducted in FY24? o How many of those were conducted with
commercial partners? o Is SPACECOM pleased with those results?
General Whiting. USSPACECOM fully supports TacRS to
validate operational concepts and fully inform the requirements
for the U.S. Space Force to man, train, and equip responsive
space maneuver, replenishment, and reconstitution capabilities.
TacRS is a demonstration led by the U.S. Space Force, and it is
not planned to be presented to USSPACECOM in its current form
as an operational capability. We look forward to collaborating
with the U.S. Space Force on their planned 2024 TacRS launch to
drive development toward an operational TacRS capability set.
Ultimately, USSPACECOM will need a rapid reaction force that
includes:--responsive launch,--available satellites that can be
launched on short notice when tactically required,--
standardized payload integration interfaces,--standardized
ground systems and command and control systems, and--trained
personnel. I defer to U.S. Space Force to discuss the details
of what they've accomplished to date as they seek to test and
develop TacRS capabilities.
Mr. Waltz. I understand the space force is projecting that
our launch sites will become a bottleneck in the next two
years.
LShould the nation be investing in expanding our
major launch site infrastructure, such as increase payload
processing capacity, to ensure we can get all the necessary
national security assets into space?
General Whiting. While launch is not an assigned mission to
USSPACECOM, I fully support investing in launch infrastructure,
including spacecraft processing facilities, to ensure the
launch range does not become a limiting factor to the growth
and innovation of the U.S. space sector. These investments are
critical for assuring access to space for our National
Security, civil, and commercial missions. We do not want to see
U.S. commercial launch providers leaving our U.S. Government
launch ranges if their launch operations become limited by the
infrastructure on those ranges and we do not want meeting our
requirements to be limited by launch capacity.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. STRONG
Mr. Strong. General Whiting, in your testimony to SASC last
month, you stated, ``On-orbit refueling, [among other
capabilities] . . . enable dynamic space operations and change
how this Command achieves and maintains space superiority . . .
Dynamic space platforms purpose-built to support space maneuver
will provide far greater capability and capacity to deter,
surprise, maintain initiative . . . The PRC is moving forward
in this area. The urgency with which we must approach, and
appropriately fund, this critical endeavor cannot be
overstated.'' Thankfully, the President's FY25 budget contains
a new program for ``Space Access, Mobility and Logistics''
(SAML). However, this program is only minimally funded, seems
to have no long-term program certainty or funding, and does not
appear to have much ``urgency.'' Since as you say, the urgency
of these endeavors ``cannot be overstated,'' what message would
it send to our adversaries if Congress were to fully authorize
this program in law this year's NDAA? How would such an effort
further enable and accelerate the capabilities we will need to
for Dynamic Space Operations?
General Whiting. USSPACECOM's requirement for access,
mobility, and logistics in space is near-term and urgent, and I
have communicated this requirement to the Services. Dynamic
Space Operations and Sustained Space Maneuver are underpinned
by these SAML capabilities, and we would like to see these
capabilities accelerated.