[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXPLOITATION AND ENFORCEMENT PART II:
IMPROVING ENFORCEMENT IN COUNTERING UYGHUR FORCED LABOR
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 11, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-48
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
57-069 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
Stephen Siao, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Dan Bishop, North Carolina, Chairman
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Glenn Ivey, Maryland, Ranking
Mike Ezell, Mississippi Member
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Elijah Crane, Arizona Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Yvette D. Clarke, New York
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Sang Yi, Subcommittee Staff Director
Lisa Canini, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Dan Bishop, a Representative in Congress From the
State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Glenn Ivey, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Maryland, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability.................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Ms. Christa Brzozowski, Acting Assistant Secretary, Trade and
Economic Security Policy, Office of Strategy, Policy, and
Plans, U.S. Department of Treasury:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Eric Choy, Executive Director, Trade Remedy Law Enforcement
Directorate, U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Ms. Thea Lee, Deputy Secretary for International Affairs, Bureau
of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Appendix
Question From Honorable Mike Ezell for Eric Choy................. 43
EXPLOITATION AND ENFORCEMENT PART II: IMPROVING ENFORCEMENT IN
COUNTERING UYGHUR FORCED LABOR
----------
Thursday January 11, 2024
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations,
and Accountability,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., at
Room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dan Bishop
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Bishop, Ezell, Strong, Ivey, and
Thanedar.
Chairman Bishop. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability
will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized
to declare the committee in recess at any point.
The purpose of today's hearing is to investigate the
Federal Government's efforts to prevent goods made with Uyghur
forced labor in China from entering the United States. I now
recognized myself for an opening statement.
Today's hearing of the subcommittee follows up on our
previous hearing on enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor
Prevention Act in October. During that October hearing, a panel
of policy experts and industry representatives highlighted on-
going issues and concerns relating to preventing goods made
with Uyghur forced labor from being imported into the United
States. While importing goods made with forced labor has been
against Federal law since 1930, through implementation of the
UFLPA, Congress recognized that China's state-sponsored system
of forced labor represents a unique challenge on account of its
mass scale and the regime's power to obstruct investigations
into forced labor. This is an economic, strategic, and moral
issue, and the UFLPA marked a significant step toward
countering China's predatory and exploitative practices.
Unfortunately, China's use of forced labor in global supply
chains continues to pose a significant enforcement challenge
across a wide range of economic sectors, including textiles,
minerals, and seafood. For example, the overwhelming majority
of cotton used in Chinese textile products is grown in Xinjiang
Province, which the UFLPA specifically singles out as a focal
point of China's state-sponsored forced labor regime. Any
cotton grown in the province is presumptively linked to forced
labor under the UFLPA. Yet CBP's isotopic testing of clothing
samples still found items shipped to the United States made
with cotton from Xinjiang, and CBP detained $46 million worth
of textile and clothing imports for suspected UFLPA violations
since June 2022. Yet CBP's detention rate is just a sliver of
the billions of dollars of textile products the United States
imports annually from China, emphasizing the continuing
challenge in effectively enforcing the UFLPA.
Furthermore, those seeking to profit off goods tainted with
forced labor use a wide range of tactics to obscure forced
labor in the supply chain, such as shipping products through
other countries to disguise the country of origin, mixing
inputs produced with forced labor with clean inputs, and
misrepresenting the origin of the products in question.
Technologies such as isotopic testing can help identify inputs
traced to a geographic area, such as cotton grown in Xinjiang,
but it is not clear how widely or routinely such forensic
technologies are being used.
In our October hearing, several witnesses pointed to the
rapid increase in de minimis shipments as an avenue for
prohibited goods to enter the United States, with de minimis
shipments more than doubling over the last 5 years and more
than 1 billion de minimis shipments entering the United States
in fiscal year 2023. As you would expect, an increase in
shipments increases the chances of contraband getting through.
The majority of these de minimis shipments originate in China.
Our witnesses also highlighted the limited scale of the
UFLPA Entity List. This list contains 30 entities, only 10 of
which have been added since the initial list was published.
Notably, many of those entities on the initial list were
already subject to withhold release orders blocking their
imports, so they were already on the Government's radar. It
seems that the Entity List is merely scratching the surface of
the vast universe of potential entities that could be listed.
Is the interagency process to consider new additions too
cumbersome? Are there ways this process might be improved? More
broadly, given Beijing's resistance to supply chain
investigations for forced labor and its control of information,
does the task force have sufficient capabilities to monitor and
analyze the use of forced labor within China? These are the
questions we hope our witnesses today can help us answer.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine current
efforts to enforce the UFLPA, as well as the challenges
encountered since the law went into effect a year and a half
ago, and, ultimately, to identify ways that enforcement can be
improved and made more effective. These are all serious matters
to consider as this committee carries out its oversight
responsibilities to ensure effective enforcement of the UFLPA.
I want to thank our witnesses from the Department of
Homeland Security's Customs and Border Patrol and the
Department of Labor for joining us today. I look forward to
hearing their testimony.
[The statement of Chairman Bishop follows:]
Statement of Chairman Dan Bishop
January 11, 2024
Today's hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations,
and Accountability follows up on our previous hearing on enforcement of
the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act in October. During that October
hearing, a panel of policy experts and industry representatives
highlighted on-going issues and concerns related to preventing goods
made with Uyghur forced labor from being imported into the United
States.
While importing goods made with forced labor has been against
Federal law since 1930, through implementation of the UFLPA, Congress
recognized that China's state-sponsored system of forced labor presents
a unique challenge on account of its mass scale and the regime's power
to obstruct investigations into forced labor.
This is an economic, strategic, and moral issue, and the UFLPA
marked a significant step toward countering China's predatory and
exploitative practices.
Unfortunately, China's use of forced labor in global supply chains
continues to pose a significant enforcement challenge across a wide
range of economic sectors, including textiles, minerals, and seafood.
For example, the overwhelming majority of cotton used in Chinese
textile products is grown in the Xinjiang province, which the UFLPA
specifically singles out as a focal point of China's state-sponsored
forced labor regime. Any cotton grown in the province is presumptively
linked to forced labor under the UFLPA, yet CBP's isotopic testing of
clothing samples still found items shipped to the United States made
with cotton from Xinjiang and CBP detained $46 million worth of textile
and clothing imports for suspected UFLPA violations since June 2022.
Yet CBP's detention rate is just a sliver of the billions of
dollars of textile products the U.S. imports annually from China,
emphasizing the continuing challenge in effectively enforcing the
UFLPA.
Furthermore, those seeking to profit off goods tainted with forced
labor use a wide range of tactics to obscure forced labor in the supply
chain, such as shipping products through other countries to disguise
the country of origin, mixing inputs produced with forced labor with
clean inputs, and misrepresenting the origin of the products in
question.
Technology such as isotopic testing can help identify inputs traced
to a geographic area, such as cotton grown in Xinjiang, but it is not
clear how widely or routinely such forensic technologies are being
used.
In our October hearing, several witnesses pointed to the rapid
increase in de minimis shipments as an avenue for prohibited goods to
enter the United States, with de minimis shipments more than doubling
over the last 5 years and more than one billion de minimis shipments
entering the United States in fiscal year 2023. As you would expect, an
increase in shipments increases the chances of contraband getting
through. The majority of these de minimis shipments originate in China.
Our witnesses also highlighted the limited scale of the UFLPA
Entity List. This list contains 30 entities, only 10 of which have been
added since the initial list was published.
Notably, many of those entities on the initial list were already
subject to Withhold Release Orders blocking their imports, so they were
already on the Government's radar. It seems that the Entity List is
merely scratching the surface of the vast universe of potential
entities that could be listed.
Is the interagency process to consider new additions too
cumbersome? Are there ways that this process might be improved?
More broadly, given Beijing's resistance to supply chain
investigations for forced labor and its control of information, does
the task force have sufficient capabilities to monitor and analyze the
use of forced labor within China?
These are questions we hope our witnesses today can help us answer.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine current efforts to
enforce the UFLPA, as well as the challenges encountered since the law
went into effect a year-and-a-half ago, and ultimately to identify ways
that enforcement can be improved and made more effective.
These are all serious matters to consider as this committee carries
out its oversight responsibilities to ensure effective enforcement of
the UFLPA. I want to thank our witnesses from DHS, CBP, and the
Department of Labor for joining us today, and I look forward to hearing
their testimony.
Chairman Bishop. If I can get it out of my throat here, I
now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from Maryland,
Mr. Ivey, for his opening statement.
Mr. Ivey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will pass the water
down to you.
But I did want to say to the Chairman again, this is our
second hearing. We had one before. I want to repeat, though, my
deep appreciation for the fact that we are having bipartisan
hearings, that, you know, I am looking at the witnesses, they
are not Republican or Democratic witnesses on there per se. I
think it is a fair opportunity to get actual information in a
nonpartisan way so we can do the things that we need to do to
address whatever issues there may be or provide whatever
additional resources there are.
In fact, the opening statement he gave sounds a lot like
what I had planned on raising as well. So, I do want to thank
all of you all for coming today. My throat is getting bad too
now, so maybe it is that time of year.
But, you know, in the first hearing, we went through a
different panel. We had people come in and they talked about
some of the issues they had from an industry perspective, in
part, you know, with respect to the textile industry in
particular. I did want to expand that out, as I did in the
first hearing, and look at issues beyond the Uyghurs and
textiles. African minerals, for example, is one that I have
particular interest in and to the extent forced labor is
involved there, I have come across articles and other types of
reporting that discuss the extensive issue that is there and
the great problem that it has generated there.
I know there are issues with respect to the supply chain
and how the United States and some of the companies benefit
potentially from that kind of forced labor, and I think we need
to take a look at that as well. So to the extent we can discuss
that today, and, hopefully, I am not blindsiding you because I
don't know that that was the initial request on what to cover
today, but that is certainly an interest of mine.
Then another twist, I guess, too, I know we talked a lot
about the Government's role as a regulator, as an enforcer, and
I will come back to that in a moment. But I also want to talk
today a little bit about or hear from you a little bit about
the Government as a consumer. To the extent we are talking
about textiles, God only knows what the Department of Defense
spends on uniforms and clothing and materials. Are there
additional steps that we could take with respect to that angle,
Government as customer, that could provide extra leverage that
we are not taking advantage of?
Same with other issues, like the minerals. I know that a
lot of those are used in, you know, high-tech devices and
hardware. Are there additional things that the Federal
Government can do?
I want to make sure that we are not just talking the talk,
we are walking the walk as well on our part. So to extent there
is guidance that you can give us or additional things that the
Government can do, probably without legislation, but, you know,
if that is needed, that is fine, but just from a procurement
standpoint, are there additional things that we can do to help
put extra leverage on this issue?
Expanding the Entity List, I know that the Chairman touched
on that a moment ago. I remember from some of the research I
have done and some of the testimony at the first hearing that
it is a lot smaller than I had expected when I started doing
the research on this. The question is, why is that? The
feedback we got was there is potentially risk of, you know,
going too fast and getting the Government in trouble from a due
process standpoint, in other words, putting businesses on the
list that we couldn't prove belong there, even with the
rebuttable presumption in place.
But even given that, you know, my thought, and I think the
Chairman just suggested this as well, it seems to me that there
should be more of these on the list, more businesses on the
list. I don't know, you will have to help me out as well, too,
from a jurisdictional standpoint, because I know there is a
statute that governs the Uyghurs issue that doesn't necessarily
cover all of the minerals or other types of forced labor. I
guess fishing is another one of those, too, so there may be a
separate statute that deals with that. Help walk us through
which ones cover which, and if there are different types of
resources or legislative fixes or regulatory fixes that we
might need to take to address each.
But the Entity List is a big deal for me. The task force
was another one. When I took a look at the statute and I saw I
think it is like seven Federal agencies, and that struck me as
maybe too many cooks in the kitchen. I have been in and out of
Government for a long time, and I know sometimes, you know, we
can get a little more bureaucratic than we need to, and, you
know, especially when you have multiple departments that are
involved. I wasn't able to see if there is somebody who gets to
make the final call and pull the trigger there, because that
might be one of the types of things that we need to revise. I
think the task force may be a statutory arrangement. So if that
is on us, you know, let us know, and we will try and figure out
a way to fix that.
De minimis, the Chair, discussed that already.
Another thing that I remember from the first hearing that I
found disturbing was the release order issue. My recollection
of that, and you might have to set me straight on it, but
sometimes the Government would seize materials that we had
determined had been generated or had been connected or tainted
by forced labor. But it sounded like instead of us, you know,
retaining it or selling it or something like that, that we
released it again. The concern I had about that was, you know,
how does that actually punish the entity that was involved in
this supply chain I'll call it a snafu, just to not be
judgmental about it? But we don't want to do something that
allows them to continue to profit from whatever that material
was.
So if I am mistaken on that, please let me know. But if we
are releasing these materials back to the entities and they are
still benefiting and profiting from the materials that the
Government has now identified was somehow--you know, there was
value-added based on forced labor, I don't think that is the
right way to go, and I am hoping we can figure out a way to
address that.
So I look forward to your testimony. This is not an area
that is my strong suit, so I am here to really listen and learn
from what you are saying. I want to be an active and engaged
partner in making sure that whatever it is that you all need,
additional resources or, you know, statutory language or
regulatory assistance or support, we want to make sure we get
that to you because this is a critical issue.
Forced labor is a huge problem, obviously, for the people
who are forced to do the labor. I think it is also a big
problem for the United States and our labor community because
it really puts businesses in the United States at a very unfair
disadvantage. We want to make sure that we have a level playing
field on that front.
So with that, I yield back to the Chair, and thank you
again for this hearing.
Chairman Bishop. As customary, Ranking Member Ivey opens
with a very thoughtful and incisive opening statement.
So I want to remind other Members of the committee that
opening statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
January 11, 2024
I am pleased that we are holding this subcommittee hearing to
discuss the Biden administration's efforts to implement the Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA).
The Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region of
China have been systematically targeted by the Chinese government,
repressed for their religious beliefs, and exploited for their labor.
The State Department noted in its most recent human rights report
that the Chinese government has subjected the predominately Muslim
Uyghur population to arbitrary imprisonment, forced sterilization,
coerced abortions, rape, torture, and forced labor. UFLPA is an
important means of combatting and addressing the genocide of the Uyghur
people.
The bipartisan law--signed by President Biden 2 years ago--
represents an ambitious new mandate to prohibit goods from entering the
United States that were made wholly or in part using forced labor from
the Xinjiang region of China. UFLPA provided the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) just 6 months to establish new policies and procedures,
hire critical personnel, and begin enforcement.
I look forward to hearing about how DHS and its partners--including
the Department of Labor--have carried out this important work in the 18
months since the law went into effect. As with all new efforts, there
are likely lessons to learn and areas to improve. However, what I don't
doubt is DHS's commitment to fully enforcing UFLPA, as its efforts to
date show.
Consistent with the law, DHS has developed a strategy to prevent
the importation of goods made with forced labor from China and provided
an annual update to this strategy. DHS also publicly identifies
businesses that benefit from Uyghur forced labor on its ``Entity
List.'' To date, DHS has listed 30 such businesses and continues to add
more. These businesses are prohibited from importing goods into the
United States absent compelling evidence that they have undertaken
efforts to remove forced labor from their supply chain.
Finally, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has stopped over
6,300 shipments--valued at over $2 billion--to examine compliance with
the law. CBP has denied entry to more than 2,500 of these shipments,
valued at over $500 million. But DHS has not done this work alone. DHS
relies on a number of Federal partners through the Forced Labor
Enforcement Task Force, including the Department of Labor.
The Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs
provides subject-matter expertise on forced labor, supply chain
tracing, and due diligence to support UFLPA's implementation. The
Bureau also serves as co-chair of the UFLPA Entity List Subcommittee to
help identify businesses associated with Uyghur forced labor.
Additionally, the Bureau plays a key role in ensuring that goods
made with forced labor do not enter the United States from Mexico and
Canada by monitoring for adherence to the terms of our collective trade
agreement. Ultimately, importers are responsible for knowing their
supply chain, avoiding forced labor, and following the law.
However, today, I hope to learn what else Congress can do to
support DHS, the Department of Labor, and the rest of the Federal
Government in their efforts to ensure that importers fulfill their
responsibilities under UFLPA.
In closing, I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member Ivey for
holding this hearing on a topic of bipartisan interest. We all
recognize the success of UFLPA is vital to upholding our Nation's
commitment to the Uyghur people and standing against forced labor in
China.
Chairman Bishop. With our thanks to all of the witnesses
for being here today, I ask that you please rise and raise your
right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Bishop. Let the record reflect that the witnesses
have answered in the affirmative. Thank you. Please be seated.
Let me now formally introduce our witnesses. Ms. Christa
Brzozowski is the acting assistant secretary for Trade and
Economic Security Policy in the Office of Strategy, Policy, and
Plans of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Eric
Choy is the executive director of the Trade Remedy Law
Enforcement Directorate at the U.S. Customs and Border
Protections Office of Trade. Ms. Thea Lee is the deputy under
secretary for international affairs in the Bureau of
International Labor Affairs of the U.S. Department of Labor.
I thank all of the witnesses for being here, and I now
recognize Ms. Christa Brzozowski for 5 minutes for her opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTA BRZOZOWSKI, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
TRADE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY POLICY, OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY,
AND PLANS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
Ms. Brzozowski. Thank you so much. Good morning, Chairman
Bishop, Ranking Member Ivey, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. Thank you again for the opportunity today to
discuss the work of the Department of Homeland Security and the
Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force to combat forced labor and
global supply chains, including from the People's Republic of
China or the PRC.
U.S. laws that prohibit importation of goods made with
forced labor were established almost 100 years ago in the
Tariff Act of 1930. The laws reflect our values to honor
freedom and to protect human rights. They also serve to protect
American workers and legitimate businesses from those who
exploit the vulnerable for their own financial gain.
Congress established the Forced Labor Enforcement Task
Force, or FLETF, in 2020 to facilitate a holistic approach to
combating the scourge of forced labor by leveraging the
authorities of the member agencies to ensure the U.S.
Government is doing everything in its power to eradicate forced
labor from supply chains.
Then, in 2021, Congress passed and the President signed
into law the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, or UFLPA. This
is the strongest tool the United States or any other country
has forged in the fight against the atrocities of forced labor.
The bipartisan passage of the law was a strong signal to malign
actors that we would hold them accountable and that the United
States will not be complicit in the exploitation of the
oppressed.
At DHS, we're very proud to enforce our Nation's forced
labor laws. The Department utilizes resources and authorities
across multiple operational components, including Customs and
Border Protection, Homeland Security Investigations, and a
center that we have that is focused exclusively on countering
human trafficking to advance these goals.
As the chair of the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force,
DHS, with the support and the leadership of the other agencies,
is working hard to facilitate the flow of legitimate trade
while collaborating with a wide range of stakeholders from
across industry, civil society, and others to keep goods made
with forced labor out of U.S. commerce.
The efforts of DHS and the task force also complement the
goals and objectives of a new center set up under DHS, the
Supply Chain Resilience Center, which seeks to minimize
disruptions from all hazards that threaten the supply of key
goods and services, including the risks of unsustainable supply
chains that involve the use of forced labor.
Congress incorporated several key components of the law
that make it uniquely powerful in addressing the PRC's state-
sponsored cruel and inhumane forced labor regime, including the
Entities List and a rebuttable presumption enforcement
mechanism, and we appreciate those strong tools. The task force
identified 20 entities for the inaugural Entity List and
developed the practices and procedures since then for additions
to the list as warranted by the facts and the law. As a result
of those legal guidelines, the task force has expanded the
Entities List by 50 percent, adding two new entities since June
2022, and there is an active pipeline of recommendations being
developed now by the task force.
DHS is conducting a strategic review of every aspect of
this process. We're working closely with our colleagues across
the members of the task force, and our goal is to identify
process improvements that can result in a transparent,
consistent, and, importantly, a scalable process that will
allow us to significantly increase the numbers of entities
included on the Entity List.
We have established a team--DHS has established a team
within my office that is solely devoted to the development and
the administration of the Entity List. We have sought out
subject-matter experts who are critical to our understanding of
the ever-changing Chinese corporate landscape. While we have
shifted considerable resources toward this very important
mission, we look forward to working with Congress to sustain
efforts to fulfill even further this law's mandate.
Since the implementation of the law, DHS has seen
significant evidence that industry is taking responsibility of
understanding their supply chains seriously, including by
shifting and diversifying the supply chains. We think this is a
positive development.
I thank the subcommittee for your support in the fight
against forced labor and for the opportunity to appear here
today, and I look forward to the discussion and to your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzozowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christa Brzozowski
January 11, 2024
introduction
Good morning, Chairman Bishop, Ranking Member Ivey, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the work of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS or the Department) and the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force
(FLETF) to combat forced labor in global supply chains, including from
the People's Republic of China's (PRC) systematic use of forced labor
of certain ethnic and religious minorities.
U.S. laws that prohibit importation of goods made with forced labor
were established almost 100 years ago in the Tariff Act of 1930, as we
recognized the harm that can result from allowing these goods to enter
our markets. The laws reflect our values--to honor freedom and protect
human rights. They also serve to protect American workers and
legitimate businesses from those who exploit the vulnerable for their
own financial gain.
At DHS, we are proud to enforce our Nation's forced labor laws.
These laws align with the administration's objectives to advance the
rights of workers around the world, as outlined in President Biden's
November 2023 memorandum on advancing worker empowerment, rights, and
high labor standards globally. The memorandum represents the first
whole-of-Government approach to advance workers' rights by directing
Federal departments and agencies to elevate labor rights in their work
abroad.
DHS reinforces that commitment with its own initiatives. In early
2023, the Department released the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review,
which added combatting crimes of exploitation, including labor
exploitation, as the sixth DHS mission. The Department continues to
utilize resources and authorities from multiple operational components,
including U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and
Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security Investigations, and the cross-
component Center for Countering Human Trafficking to advance our goals
in this critical mission.
But DHS is not alone in this fight. Recognizing the breadth and
depth of the Executive branch's experience and knowledge in our battle
to end forced labor, Congress established the FLETF to facilitate a
holistic approach to combatting this scourge. The interagency Task
Force leverages the authorities of its member agencies to ensure the
U.S. Government is doing everything in its power to eradicate forced
labor from supply chains. The FLETF drives initiatives that support
enforcement and enhance compliance, utilizing the resources and
expertise of member agencies--DHS, along with the Departments of State,
Labor, Commerce, Justice, and Treasury, and the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative--to collectively fulfill Congress' intent.
I am honored to support the Department's Under Secretary for
Strategy, Policy, and Plans, Robert Silvers, in his role as Chair of
the FLETF. Under the leadership of Secretary Mayorkas, and with the
unwavering support from leadership of the other FLETF agencies, DHS is
facilitating the flow of legitimate trade while collaborating with a
wide range of stakeholders from industry and civil society to keep
goods made with forced labor out of U.S. commerce.
The efforts of DHS and the FLETF also complement the goals and
objectives of DHS's new Supply Chain Resilience Center within DHS's
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans. The new center will enhance the
Department's position to minimize disruptions from all hazards that
threaten the supply of key goods and services and promote economic
security. Toward that end, the center will produce a variety of tools
and resources, to include current best practices, recommendations for
process and policy enhancements, informational reports, and analysis to
help the private sector identify, assess, and close risks to their
supply chains, including the risks of unsustainable supply chains that
involve the use of forced labor.
the uyghur forced labor prevention act (uflpa)
The United States has long recognized and condemned the PRC's on-
going genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs and members
of other ethnic and religious minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region of China. These crimes involve abhorrent abuses,
including arbitrary imprisonment, detention, torture, forced
sterilization, sexual and physical assault, family separation, and
cultural persecution.
The PRC also inflicts systematic forced labor on Uyghurs and other
persecuted minority groups in the region, who must work in the mining,
production, and manufacturing of goods. Civil society and other
reporting indicate that the PRC uses Government directives to threaten
anyone that would resist working in these ``poverty alleviation'' and
other programs with detention or internment. The goods resulting from
this exploitation are exported all over the world and found in the
clothes we wear, the food we eat, and the vehicles we drive.
Recognizing the horrors of the PRC's state-sponsored forced labor
programs, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) in December 2021--the
strongest tool the United States or any other country has forged in the
fight against the atrocities of forced labor. The bipartisan passage of
the UFLPA was a strong signal to malign actors that we would hold them
accountable, and that the United States will not stand by and be
complicit in the exploitation of the oppressed.
Charged with full implementation of the UFLPA in 180 days, the
agencies of the FLETF worked tirelessly to develop and implement a
comprehensive and multi-pronged strategy to prevent the importation of
goods made with forced labor in the PRC, and especially those made with
the forced labor of Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups from Xinjiang.
Congress incorporated several key components into the UFLPA that
make it uniquely powerful in addressing the PRC's state-sponsored cruel
and inhumane forced labor regime. The UFLPA requires the FLETF to
publicly identify certain bad actors that meet the UFLPA Entity List
criteria. The UFLPA also includes a key enforcement mechanism: a
rebuttable presumption that goods mined, produced, or manufactured
wholly or in part in Xinjiang, or by entities identified on the UFLPA
Entity List, are prohibited from importation into the United States.
DHS, and specifically CBP, has devoted significant efforts to enforcing
the rebuttable presumption under the law.
the uflpa strategy and the entity list
As chair of the FLETF, DHS led the development of the UFLPA's
comprehensive strategy to prevent importation of goods made with forced
labor from the PRC. A critical element of that development involved the
FLETF's collaboration and engagement with key stakeholders across
government, industry, civil society, and like-minded international
partners.
Almost immediately after passage of the UFLPA, the FLETF began an
extensive engagement campaign with industry and non-governmental
organizations (NGO's), so that the benefit of these stakeholders'
perspectives and expertise could be incorporated in the FLETF's
implementation of the UFLPA and the development of an overarching
strategy.
The UFLPA also called for the Department of State, our FLETF
partner, to develop and implement a comprehensive diplomatic strategy
to collaborate with like-minded international partners toward a global
response in eradicating forced labor from legitimate trade. The
diplomatic strategy was transmitted to Congress in April 2022, and sets
forth the United States' whole-of-Government approach toward increasing
awareness of and addressing forced labor in Xinjiang with our partners
abroad.
Armed with information from stakeholder engagements and our Federal
partners, the FLETF's strategy provides extensive guidance for
importers, drawing from the Department of Labor's (DOL) Comply Chain
expertise on due diligence in examining supply chains and established a
framework for robust partnerships with industry and civil society.
As part of the UFLPA Strategy, the FLETF identified 20 entities for
the inaugural UFLPA Entity List. Following the passage of the UFLPA,
FLETF member agencies consulted and collaborated, utilizing their
knowledge and expertise in administering other sanctions regimes, to
develop and establish the practices and procedures that would guide
FLETF agencies in building recommendations for additions to the Entity
List, as warranted by the facts and the law.
As a result of those guidelines, the FLETF has expanded the Entity
List by 50 percent, adding 10 new entities since June 2022. DHS and the
FLETF are committed to continuing our expansion of the Entity List, and
fulfilling Congress' intent to shine a light on entities that benefit
from the exploitation of Uyghurs and other persecuted minorities.
DHS has an extraordinary partnership with civil society, whose
research and monitoring efforts are critical to our understanding of
forced labor schemes and efforts to obscure the true origin of goods.
Through our collaboration with NGO's and the development of our own
knowledge base, the FLETF continues to expand our expertise in
identifying and assessing suspected entities, and we anticipate more
additions to the UFLPA Entity List in the coming months. There is an
active pipeline of referrals that our agencies are examining, and we
will continue to move expeditiously to act on these referrals.
Working closely with our esteemed colleague from the DOL, Deputy
Under Secretary Thea Lee and her staff, the FLETF established an Entity
List Subcommittee, co-chaired by DHS and DOL. The subcommittee draws on
its collective experience with other sanction and enforcement regimes
involving forced labor to support and guide our FLETF partner agencies
in developing recommendations and establishing best practices.
The Department continues to review and refine the Entity List
process to better implement Congress' intent for the UFLPA. Internally,
DHS is examining our own processes to identify where we can be more
effective. With experience in building the Entity List and with new
expertise added to the team, DHS is conducting a strategic review of
every aspect of this process: from the way we receive and analyze
information about potential entities, to our analysis of trends and
patterns that can direct us to other suspect supply chains, and finally
to our collaborations with our FLETF partner agencies in making our
determinations. The goal is to identify improvements that can result in
a transparent, consistent, and scalable process that will allow the
FLETF to significantly increase the number of entities it can identify
as meeting the UFLPA's statutory standards for the Entity List.
While we gain proficiency with each recommendation and explore how
we can improve our processes, the FLETF does face challenges in
expanding the Entity List. All FLETF agencies are committed to holding
malign actors accountable for their facilitation and utilization of the
PRC's state-sponsored forced labor programs. But, as the United States'
actions under the UFLPA are gaining attention both here and abroad,
those illicit actors that benefit from the use of forced labor seek new
ways to obscure the true origin of their goods and circumvent our
enforcement of the law.
Companies connected to forced labor in the PRC deploy a wide array
of strategies to hide their wrongdoing, including erasing publicly-
available evidence, shuffling ownership of subsidiaries, renaming
companies known to be involved in forced labor, or bifurcating their
supply chains so that they can maintain a forced labor-tainted supply
chain while still attempting to sell in the U.S. market. We must stay
ahead of those efforts, which are becoming more sophisticated as the
level of scrutiny increases.
To meet the UFLPA's mandate related to the UFLPA Strategy and the
UFLPA Entity List, FLETF agencies have shifted considerable resources
from other priorities to meet this mission. DHS itself has established
a team within my office solely devoted to development and
administration of the UFLPA Entity List, and we have brought on
subject-matter experts who are critical to our understanding of the
ever-changing Chinese corporate landscape, including connections with
PRC-sponsored programs and directives. We appreciate Congress' support,
and we look forward to working with Congress to sustain efforts to
fulfill the UFLPA mandate.
engagements with the private sector and the response to uflpa
We recognize that the committee's focus today is on UFLPA
enforcement. However, we would be remiss if we did not highlight
another critical element of the UFLPA's strategy--to engage and support
the trade community in its effort to implement effective due diligence
protocols that provide transparency and traceability in its supply
chains and identify the possible use of forced labor in their supply
chains. To this end, DHS and CBP have held more than 600 engagements
since passage of the UFLPA, to include representatives from industry,
the NGO community, international partners, and Congress. These
engagements provide the opportunity to arm the trade community with
additional information and guidance so they can enhance their own
compliance programs and conduct effective due diligence. But these
dialogs also inform us of the challenges that industry faces.
DHS and CBP continuously review information to determine what can
be shared with the trade community, whether through CBP's Digital
Dashboard which provides categorized information on detentions made
under the UFLPA, or guidance on current best practices for importers in
providing documentation that traces a shipment's entire supply chain.
With the growing availability of technological tools to monitor and
verify supply chains, DHS showcased many of these resources in CBP's
March 2023 Forced Labor Technology Expo, highlighting the different
mechanisms by which importers can build a robust due diligence program.
We have found that the vast majority of industry leaders are as
repulsed by forced labor as the Department--they share our values and
our abhorrence of these crimes. But, while we support the trade
community's efforts to conduct supply chains due diligence and fully
comply with the UFLPA's requirements, we remind them that the
consequences of producing goods made, wholly or in part, with forced
labor or importing such goods will be severe, and that they will be
held fully accountable for their failure to conduct effective due
diligence.
Following implementation of the UFLPA rebuttable presumption, DHS
has seen significant evidence that industry is taking compliance
seriously. We are still in the early stages of quantifying the impact
of the UFLPA on private-sector behavior, but early data shows
significant promise.
Various supply chain mapping and verification technology companies
report a significant decrease in transactions from entities potentially
subject to enforcement under the UFLPA. Additionally, extensive
anecdotal reporting from the trade community indicates that industry is
taking steps to ensure compliance, including moving their supply chains
out of Xinjiang and diversifying away from suppliers that cannot
deliver the requisite transparency.
We have even learned that some Chinese companies are refusing to
participate in PRC forced labor programs to avoid the risk of losing
access to the lucrative U.S. market. In response to the UFLPA, some
companies looking to secure their supply chains are re-shoring and
sourcing from suppliers in the United States, to the benefit of
domestic producers that have struggled with China's domination in
certain industry sectors.
conclusion
With the passage of the UFLPA, the United States has an increased
ability to prevent goods resulting from the PRC's on-going human rights
abuse against Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups from entering U.S. commerce. With each shipment of
tainted goods that is denied entry into the United States, we take
another step toward justice, accountability, and fair competition. DHS
and the FLETF are always mindful that there is real human suffering
behind the goods that try to make their insidious way into legitimate
markets. And that is why we are so committed to right this wrong.
We are proud to contribute, in partnership with our partner
agencies in the FLETF and with Congress, to the impact of this landmark
legislation. We recognize there is more we can accomplish, but with the
collective will of Congress, the Executive branch, and our like-minded
stakeholders, we can remove the financial incentives that support the
use of forced labor and advance toward our goal of eliminating these
goods from global supply chains.
I thank the subcommittee for your support in our fight against
forced labor, and for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
look forward to taking your questions.
Chairman Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Brzozowski.
I now recognize Mr. Choy for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ERIC CHOY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TRADE REMEDY LAW
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Choy. Good morning, Chairman Bishop, Ranking Member
Ivey, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It's an
honor to testify today on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
role in enforcing the forced labor laws and regulations of the
United States, including the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention
Act, or UFLPA.
Forced labor is an abhorrent issue, abuse of human rights.
It not only affects the living and working conditions of
millions of workers around the world, but it also creates
unfair competition for U.S. business. As part of our critical
mission to uphold our Nation's laws and facilitate legitimate
trade, CBP is committed to preventing goods produced or
manufactured with forced labor from entering U.S. commerce and
promoting accountability for the on-going genocide and crimes
against humanity afflicting Uyghurs and other religious and
ethnic minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region, or the XUAR, of the People's Republic of China.
Since the law took effect in June 2022, CBP has stopped
more than 6,000 shipments of goods valued at more than $2
billion for UFLPA-related enforcement actions. Using resources
provided by Congress, CBP is strengthening our forced labor
enforcement efforts by investing in personnel, training,
outreach, technology, and laboratory science capabilities. The
agency is using technology to map supply chains and research
high-risk commodities to ensure supply chains are free of
forced labor inputs.
CBP is also increasing its analytical and threat detection
capabilities. Through our advanced trade analytic platform, CBP
developed and operationalized analytic models that identify
entities operating in the XUAR, their affiliates, and entities
with whom they share traits or characteristics and indicators
of evasion to further our analysis and enforcement efforts
related to the UFLPA.
Due to the success of utilizing these tools for UFLPA
enforcement, CBP also adopted similar methodologies to identify
routes by which fentanyl and pill presses enter the United
States.
To support compliance efforts, in March 2023, CBP held a
forced labor technical expo to provide private industry the
opportunity to highlight tools and technologies that promote
due diligence. We issue guidance, resources for importers, and
developed an interactive dashboard with statistics on UFLPA
enforcement that provides insights on stopped entries by
industry sector and country of export.
Enforcement alone is not sufficient. CBP continues to
engage with industry and importers to remind them to exercise
reasonable care to ensure goods entering the United States
comply with all laws and regulations. Companies have the most
extensive insights into their supply chains and the
responsibility to monitor their supply chains. CBP encourages
companies to conduct audits, risk assessments, and other acts
of due diligence. In fiscal year 2023, CBP conducted more than
500 such engagements, resulting in improved trade facilitation
for compliant importers.
Although CBP is--additionally, through CBP's 21st Century
Customs Framework Strategic Initiative, we engaged with our
stakeholders on ways to refine CBP's regulatory and statutory
framework to enhance and streamline forced labor enforcement
efforts. We welcome the opportunity to work with Congress to
address these challenges and advance these initiatives
together.
CBP's forced labor enforcement efforts are robust and
effective, but we do face challenges. The record-level volume
of de minimis or low-value shipments contain less detailed data
available for CBP review. De minimis status does not exempt
shipments from CBP review for violations of law, and there is
no exception for de minimis shipments under UFLPA. CBP is
firmly committed to meeting challenges in the de minimis
context, including undertaking initiatives to increase
information availability and assess risk. The agency is working
closely with DHS to develop strategies to address these
challenges that include regulatory changes to increase data
collection and technology enhancements to improve risk
management and targeting. We also look forward to working with
Congress on these initiatives.
CBP's enforcement efforts safeguard all industries from
unfair trade practices. However, some industries, such as
textiles, were highlighted in the UFLPA and have seen increased
scrutiny due to the open-source reporting on the use of forced
labor in the production of raw materials used in their supply
chains. Nearly 17 percent of all shipments stopped by CBP for
UFLPA reviews are textiles, including apparel and footwear, and
approximately 63 percent of these shipments were denied for
noncompliance.
In addition to UFLPA enforcement actions in fiscal year
2023, CBP seized more than 5,000 textile shipments; issued
approximately 19 million in commercial fraud penalties; and
conducted audits, laboratory analysis, and factory verification
visits to identify more than 2 million additional duties owed
to the Government.
CBP continues to strengthen targeting enforcement
activities across all industries to prevent and penalize those
who violate and circumvent tariffs and trade laws, including
forced labor. CBP's forced labor enforcement efforts not only
ensure fair competition and economic security for us domestic
industry, they also have a direct effect on the improvement of
living and working conditions for workers across the world,
including the repayment of millions of withheld wages and
recruitment fees that trap workers in debt bondage.
We appreciate this subcommittee's continued support and we
are grateful that Congress has entrusted us with this important
mission. I'm proud of the incredibly hard work that my
colleagues at CBP have undertaken in response. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Choy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eric Choy
January 11, 2024
introduction
Chairman Bishop, Ranking Member Ivey, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S. Customs and
Border Protection's (CBP) role in enforcing the forced labor laws and
regulations of the United States, including the Uyghur Forced Labor
Prevention Act (UFLPA) and Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930.\1\ I
am honored to represent the dedicated men and women of CBP who work
tirelessly to uphold our Nation's laws and facilitate legitimate trade
to protect our Nation's economy to ensure consumer safety and create a
level playing field for American businesses.
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\1\ 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1307.
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Forced labor is an abhorrent abuse of human rights and an unfair
trade practice. CBP is committed to eliminating forced labor practices
in U.S. supply chains and promoting accountability for the on-going
genocide and crimes against humanity afflicting Uyghurs and other
religious and ethnic minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) through its
enforcement of the UFLPA rebuttable presumption.
cbp's forced labor enforcement activities
Playing a key role in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-led
Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF), CBP is responsible for
enforcing the UFLPA and preventing entry of products made with forced
labor into U.S. commerce.
As described in the FLETF's Strategy to Prevent the Importation of
Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the
People's Republic of China,\2\ the UFLPA charges CBP with enforcement
of a rebuttable presumption that importation of goods mined, produced,
or manufactured wholly or in part in Xinjiang, or produced by entities
identified in the UFLPA Entity List,\3\ are prohibited under Section
307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. Sec. 1307) and not
entitled to entry to the United States. Using resources provided by
Congress, CBP leverages all available tools to enforce the UFLPA by
applying a sophisticated, risk-based approach utilizing dynamic
intelligence, analysis, and data-driven targeting to identify shipments
that warrant further scrutiny while facilitating legitimate trade and
support of human rights.
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\2\ https://www.dhs.gov/uflpa-strategy.
\3\ The UFLPA Entity list is developed from recommendations
submitted by FLETF member agencies based on the examination of
information from a wide variety of sources, including trade data,
reports from civil society organizations, news reports, and other
public and non-public information. The decision to add an entity to the
UFLPA Entity List is determined by majority vote of FLETF member
agencies.
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Since the UFLPA's rebuttable presumption took effect in June 2022,
CBP has stopped more than 6,000 shipments of goods valued at more than
$2 billion for UFLPA-related enforcement action review.\4\ CBP made a
final entry decision on 5,062 of these shipments, including 2,598
shipments, or 51 percent, which were denied entry to the United States.
To date, CBP has received 5 requests for an exception to the rebuttable
presumption, which the Commissioner of CBP may grant if, among other
requirements, CBP determines the importer has provided clear and
convincing evidence that the goods subject to the rebuttable
presumption were not produced wholly or in part by forced labor. In
each case, importers have withdrawn their request for an exception
prior to CBP making its final determination.
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\4\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/trade/uyghur-forced-labor-
prevention-act-statistics.
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Separately from the UFLPA, when CBP investigates forced labor
allegations and has reasonable suspicion of the use of forced labor in
the manufacturing or production of goods entering the United States, it
issues a Withhold Release Order (WRO) that allows CBP to detain the
goods in question at all U.S. ports of entry (POEs) until or unless
importers can prove the absence of forced labor in their supply chain.
In addition, CBP issues a Finding when the agency determines, based
upon probable cause, that forced labor was used in the manufacturing or
production of goods, which allows CBP to seize and forfeit the goods in
question at all POEs and prevent the merchandise from being imported
into the United States.\5\
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\5\ A list of current WROs can be found at https://www.cbp.gov/
trade/forced-labor/withhold-release-orders-and-findings.
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In addition, once a WRO or Finding is issued, an impacted entity
may file a modification petition to provide evidence to CBP that the
forced labor conditions are fully addressed and resolved. CBP will
evaluate this evidence and may choose to modify a WRO or Finding, as
appropriate. CBP considers issuance of a modification to be a
successful outcome in the effort to eradicate forced labor from supply
chains.
In fiscal year 2023, CBP issued 1 WRO and modified 1 Finding and 3
WROs. Over the past 4 years, CBP's forced labor enforcement efforts
resulted in the improvement of living and working conditions for tens
of thousands of workers including repayment of more than $62 million in
withheld wages and recruitment fees trapping workers in debt bondage.
Industry-Specific Enforcement
CBP employs a dynamic, risk-based approach to enforcement that
prioritizes action against the highest-risk goods based on current data
and intelligence to prevent prohibited goods from entering the United
States. CBP enforcement efforts safeguard all industries from unfair
trade practices. However, some industries, such as solar and textiles,
have seen increased scrutiny due to open-source reporting on the use of
forced labor in the production of raw materials used in their supply
chains.
The domestic textile industry is critical to the U.S. economy,
employing more than half-a-million people in this country. Because
imported textiles typically carry a higher duty rate compared to other
U.S. imports, with some as high as 32 percent, violators try to lower
costs through unlawful practices. For example, violators use forced
labor to lower manufacturing costs or misrepresent the country of
origin and mislabel and undervalue shipments to circumvent trade
duties. These types of activities, which undermine legitimate trade,
can be the result of human rights abuses, and threaten U.S. jobs, are a
continuous focus for CBP enforcement.
Regarding forced labor enforcement, nearly 17 percent of all
shipments stopped by CBP for UFLPA review since June 2022 were
textiles, including apparel and footwear. Of these shipments, CBP
released 29 percent after a thorough review process by our Apparel,
Footwear, and Textiles Center of Excellence and Expertise to confirm
the supply chains for those shipments were free of any materials
produced in XUAR or by companies on the UFLPA Entity List. Of all the
shipments reviewed by CBP for UFLPA compliance, approximately 63
percent were denied entry based on the importer's failure to determine
the shipments were free of any materials produced in XUAR or by
companies on the UFLPA Entity List.
In addition to UFLPA enforcement actions, in fiscal year 2023, CBP
seized more than 5,000 textile shipments valued at more than $129
million, issued approximately $19.3 million in commercial fraud
penalties, and conducted audits that identified over $2 million in
additional duty owed to CBP.\6\ Additionally, CBP conducted laboratory
analysis on 323 shipments, 42 percent of which were found to be mis-
declared or mis-described when arriving in the United States. CBP also
conducted 57 factory verification visits around the world through its
Textile Production Verification Team program resulting in approximately
$340,000 in duties recovered and potential further enforcement action.
CBP continues to strengthen targeting and enforcement activities within
this industry to prevent and penalize individuals and entities
violating or circumventing textile tariffs and trade laws--including
forced labor--thus ensuring fair competition and economic security for
U.S. domestic industry.
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\6\ See www.cbp.gov/trade/priority-issues/textiles/textile-
enforcement-statistics.
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Industry Compliance and Due Diligence Support
In conjunction with our enforcement activities, DHS and CBP are
committed to supporting industry's forced labor compliance and due
diligence efforts. Recognizing the value of predictability to our trade
partners, CBP is committed to providing consistent processing and
uniformity of practices across all POEs through our Centers of
Excellence and Expertise (Centers)\7\--including forced labor
enforcement. Centers include subject-matter experts that are focused on
industry-specific areas to increase facilitation and maximize trade
enforcement Nation-wide. They are an essential part of our forced labor
enforcement efforts, providing timely, efficient reviews of shipments
from law-abiding importers and good-faith trade actors and releasing
legitimate shipments into U.S. commerce in as quickly as 7-14 days, on
average. CBP invested in, and continues to provide, training to its
officers Nation-wide who inspect shipments subject to the UFLPA, to
Center import specialists who review supply chain documentation for
connections to the XUAR, and to its regulatory auditors who review
supply chain tracing information during audits of high-risk companies
for forced labor.
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\7\ See www.cbp.gov/trade/centers-excellence-and-expertise-
information.
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CBP continues to engage with industry and importers to remind them
to exercise reasonable care and take all necessary and appropriate
steps to ensure goods entering the United States comply with all laws
and regulations. Companies have the most extensive insight into their
supply chains and a responsibility to proactively monitor their supply
chains to mitigate the risk of importing goods into the United States
that were produced with forced labor. CBP encourages companies to
conduct thorough independent, third-party audits, risk assessments, and
increased supply chain transparency, in addition to other acts of due
diligence, including isotopic testing to determine geographic origins
of materials such as cotton.
CBP acknowledges that many in the trade community may not have
sufficient resources, expertise, or mechanisms to identify indicators
of forced labor in their supply chains. To support our trade partners,
in March 2023, CBP held a Forced Labor Technical Expo to provide
private industry the opportunity to highlight tools and technologies
that promote due diligence by enhancing transparency and verifying
provenance of goods. We also issued guidance on best practices for
importers to demonstrate their merchandise is not subject to the UFLPA
based on lessons learned to date, including documentation that trace a
given product through the entire supply chain.\8\ Additionally, CBP
developed an interactive Dashboard with statistics on UFLPA enforcement
that provides insight for the public on stopped entries by industry
sector and country of export.\9\ As part of our commitment to
transparency and accountability, we continue to assess what additional
data we can publicly report.
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\8\ See CBP Factsheets ``Due Diligence in Supply Chains,''
www.cbp.gov/document/fact-sheets/due-diligence-global-supply-chains,
``Forced Labor--Importer Due Diligence,'' www.cbp.gov/document/fact-
sheets/forced-labor-importer-due-diligence, and Informed Compliance
Publication, ``What Every Member of the Trade Community Should Know:
Reasonable Care,'' www.cbp.gov/document/publications/reasonable-care.
\9\ See www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/trade/uyghur-forced-labor-
prevention-act-statistics.
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Private-sector engagement is a vital part of ensuring CBP is
enforcing forced labor laws while facilitating ethical trade. CBP
routinely engages with civil society organizations, private industry,
and interagency stakeholders on matters related to forced labor
enforcement. In fiscal year 2023, CBP conducted more than 500 such
engagements, including coordination with industry on forced labor
issues through the Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee and
Forced Labor Working Group, resulting in improved trade facilitation
for compliant importers while helping to ensure products entering the
United States are free of forced labor. Collaboration with stakeholders
is a critical component of all of CBP's trade enforcement efforts, and
we are committed to continuing our high level of engagement with the
trade community, including on matters specific to forced labor
enforcement and compliance.
Additionally, through CBP's 21st Century Customs Framework
strategic initiative, we are also engaging with our stakeholders on
ways to refine CBP's regulatory and statutory framework to enhance and
streamline forced labor enforcement efforts. We welcome the opportunity
to work with Congress to address these challenges, and advance these
initiatives, together.
Enforcement Challenges and Initiatives
CBP's forced labor enforcement efforts are robust and effective,
but we do face challenges. For example, 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C)
provides for duty- and tax-free admission of a shipment of merchandise
with an aggregate fair retail value in the country of shipment of $800
or less, imported by 1 person in 1 day. These low-value, de minimis
shipments could contain articles made with forced labor. Presently
there are fewer data elements collected on de minimis shipments, but
CBP and the Treasury Department are considering regulatory changes to
increase the data available for review. This would help address risks
these shipments present, including in the forced labor context. De
minimis status does not exempt shipments from CBP review and
interdiction for violations of law, and there is no exception for de
minimis shipments under the UFLPA. CBP is firmly committed to meeting
challenges in the de minimis context implicating forced labor,
including undertaking initiatives to increase information availability
and assess risk.
Using the resources provided by Congress, CBP is strengthening our
forced labor enforcement efforts by investing in personnel, training,
outreach, technology, and laboratory science capabilities. The agency
is using technology to map supply chains and research high-risk
commodities to ensure supply chains are free of forced labor and XUAR
inputs. Using funding provided by Congress, CBP is increasing its
analytical and threat detection capabilities.
CBP developed and operationalized analytic models that identify
entities operating in XUAR, their affiliates, entities with whom they
share traits or characteristics, and indicators of evasion activities
(e.g., illegal transshipment) to help further our analysis and
enforcement efforts related to UFLPA. Due to the success of utilizing
these tools for UFLPA enforcement, CBP analysts adopted similar
methodologies to identify routes by which fentanyl and pill presses
were entering the United States.
conclusion
Forced labor is a detestable violation and abuse of human rights
and an unfair trade practice; eradicating its existence is an
irrefutable moral imperative. CBP is committed to--and proud of--our
role in combatting forced labor, upholding the rule of law, promoting
respect for human rights, and promoting free and fair trade. CBP will
continue enforcing the UFLPA through implementing the UFLPA rebuttable
presumption and supporting our Government and industry partners.
CBP appreciates the continued support of Congress to execute the
full range of our trade enforcement and facilitation mission. We will
continue to combat fraudulent trade practices and penalize violators,
while promoting lawful trade and protecting domestic industry.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Choy.
I now recognize Ms. Thea Lee for 5 minutes for her opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF THEA LEE, DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR
Ms. Lee. Good morning, Chairman Bishop, Ranking Member
Ivey, Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
Forced labor is all around us. It is an invisible thread in
the fabric of global commerce, woven through the global supply
chains of too many products and industries. Unraveling this
thread requires a multipronged approach involving governments,
business unions, consumers, journalists, academics, and civil
society. With over 75 years of experience working at the
intersection of labor rights, human rights and the global
economy, the Department of Labor's Bureau of International
Labor Affairs, or ILAB, is uniquely positioned to guide the
U.S. Government's efforts to address forced labor throughout
global supply chains. I would like to focus this morning on two
areas of our work.
First, ILAB's reporting and deep expertise bring attention
to global labor abuses and provide a foundational knowledge
that is used by our counterparts throughout the U.S.
Government. Second, ILAB's holistic approach allows us to
address forced labor from multiple perspectives, including in
our role on the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force and the
implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.
ILAB is the leading provider of in-depth research on global
labor abuses. Our 3 flagship reports serve as valuable
resources for research, advocacy, Government action, and
corporate responsibility.
First, our annual findings on the worst forms of child
labor assesses the efforts of U.S. trade beneficiary countries
and territories to eliminate child labor through legislation,
enforcement, policy, and social programs.
Second, our list of products produced by forced or
indentured child labor is intended to ensure that us Federal
agencies do not procure goods made by forced or indentured
child labor as required by Executive Order 13126.
Third, our biennial list of goods produced by child labor
or forced labor, also called the TVPRA, Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act list, serves as a sobering
reminder of how labor exploitation infiltrates our daily lives
through the coffee we drink, the produce we eat, and the
garments we wear. The current TVPRA list includes 159 goods
from 78 countries and areas. Of those goods, 18 are produced by
forced labor in China, including several, like polysilicon,
which is a key element in the production of solar panels, that
involve the use of forced labor from the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region.
Xinjiang is China's far western region, of course, where
hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and
members of other persecuted groups are being arbitrarily
detained and subjected to forced labor, producing goods that
too often enter the U.S. domestic and global supply chains. The
TVPRA list also includes lithium ion batteries from China made
with cobalt that was found to be mined with child labor from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These batteries are found
in dozens of downstream products that we use in our daily
lives, including computers, cell phones, vacuum cleaners,
electric vehicles, and hearing aids.
ILAB's supply chain research underlying the TVPRA list
represents one of the most comprehensive efforts world-wide to
identify labor risks in global supply chains. It supports our
work to enforce U.S. trade laws, enabling ILAB to work with our
partners across the administration and globally to combat
forced labor and child labor in China, the DRC, and around the
world.
As an active and critical member of the Forced Labor
Enforcement Task Force, ILAB is committed to contributing and
leveraging our expertise to support our partner U.S. Government
agencies to take enforcement actions to address labor rights
abuses in global supply chains. ILAB has prioritized work on
the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which is an essential
element in the Biden-Harris administration's efforts to
eradicate forced labor from U.S. supply chains.
Along with DHS, ILAB serves as co-chair of the task force's
UFLPA Entity List subcommittee. My team worked closely with the
other task force agencies developing a methodology and process
to consider in reviewing additions to the Entity List. ILAB is
committed to moving with speed and integrity to expand the
list, ensuring that the process is both robust and legally
sound.
The UFLPA is a powerful new tool in the fight against
forced labor and human rights abuses. While it presents
significant challenges for businesses entangled in complex
global supply chains, it is clearly having a profound impact on
promoting human rights and ethical business practices, even in
its early stage.
As interest in global supply chains continues to grow, ILAB
is in a unique position within the U.S. Government to improve
working conditions and end forced labor. We will use all
available trade enforcement tools, as well as labor diplomacy,
multilateral engagement, and technical assistance to identify
and raise awareness of the risks of labor exploitation world-
wide and to incentivize meaningful actions by both governments
and private companies to prevent egregious violations of labor
and human rights.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thea Mei Lee
January 11, 2024
introduction
Chairman Bishop, Ranking Member Ivey, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Forced labor is all around us. It's an invisible thread in the
fabric of global commerce, woven through the global supply chains of
too many products and industries. Unraveling this thread requires a
multipronged approach involving a range of stakeholders, including
governments, businesses, labor unions, and worker organizations.
According to the International Labor Organization's 2021 Global
Estimates of Modern Slavery, the crime of forced labor affects nearly
28 million people of all ages, backgrounds, and nationalities--nearly 3
million more than in 2016. Fourteen percent of forced labor victims, or
nearly 4 million people, are in state-imposed forced labor. Forced
labor touches virtually all parts of the private economy--services,
manufacturing, construction, agriculture, and mining. And forced labor
appears in businesses of all sizes, in both the formal and informal
sectors. The informal sector includes businesses that operate outside
the legal and regulatory framework established by the government, such
as day labor hired without contract; small-scale farming and fishing;
artisanal mining and quarrying; and manufacturing work performed in
home-based workshops.
With over 75 years of experience working at the intersection of
labor rights, human rights, and the global economy, the Department of
Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) is uniquely
positioned to guide the U.S. Government's efforts to address forced
labor in global supply chains. ILAB works with governments, civil
society, unions, and businesses to strengthen global labor standards,
enforce labor commitments among trading partners, promote racial and
gender equity, and combat international child labor, forced labor, and
human trafficking.
For almost 30 years, ILAB has been a leading actor in efforts to
combat child labor and forced labor around the globe. Child labor is a
subset of working children. It is work below the minimum age for work,
as established in national law, and is often defined as work that
deprives children of their childhood, their potential and their
dignity, and that is harmful to their physical and mental development.
The worst forms of child labor are defined as including all forms of
slavery, including the sale or trafficking of children; debt bondage
and serfdom; forced or compulsory labor; using, procuring or offering a
child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or
pornographic purposes; or for illicit activities, in particular for the
production and trafficking of drugs, and any work that is likely to
harm the health, safety, or morals of children. Forced labor is defined
by ILO Convention 29 as all work or service exacted from any person
under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not
offered themselves voluntarily.
To increase the capacity of governments and other stakeholders to
combat forced labor and child labor and support robust strategies for
improving compliance with international labor standards in global
supply chains, ILAB's Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human
Trafficking funds 49 active projects in 45 countries worth over $286
million. In total, our programs and partnerships have built the
capacity of over 85 countries to address labor exploitation and have
helped countries develop and implement over 400 specific policies,
plans, and programs to combat child labor and forced labor.
Within the U.S. Government, ILAB is the leading provider of in-
depth research on global labor abuses. Our reporting brings attention
to problems and incentivizes governments to address them. Our work with
companies and trade associations advances social compliance and supply
chain transparency. Our capacity-building projects and engagement with
governments help countries pass and enforce labor laws that protect
children and adults from exploitation, including safeguarding
collective bargaining and strengthening worker rights. Our holistic
approach allows us to effectively address forced labor from multiple
perspectives.
pioneering research: informing efforts to eradicate child labor and
forced labor
ILAB's 3 flagship reports on international child labor and forced
labor serve as valuable resources for research, advocacy, Government
action, and corporate responsibility. First, the annual Findings on the
Worst Forms of Child Labor report (TDA Report), mandated by the Trade
and Development Act of 2000, was first released in 2002. It assesses
the efforts of 131 U.S. trade beneficiary countries and territories to
eliminate child labor through legislation, enforcement mechanisms,
policies, and social programs. In our latest edition, released in
September 2023, just 4 countries (Argentina, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire,
and Uzbekistan) received the highest assessment toward the elimination
of the worst forms of child labor, down from 9 countries the previous
year.
The findings also reveal that weak legal frameworks world-wide
allow the worst forms of labor exploitation to persist. To that end, 63
percent of the country-specific recommendations in the report focus on
improving laws and strengthening enforcement, indicating the urgent
need for additional progress in holding accountable those who
perpetrate abuses.
Second, mandated by the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and first published in 2009, the biennial
List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor (TVPRA List) is a
sobering reminder of how labor exploitation infiltrates our daily lives
through the coffee we sip, the produce we eat, and the garments we
wear.
The current TVPRA List includes 159 goods from 78 countries and
areas. In the latest edition, published in September 2022, we added 32
goods, including, for the first time, 10 downstream goods produced with
inputs made with forced labor or child labor. These include solar cells
and modules from China made with polysilicon that have been identified
as being made with adult forced labor from the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (Xinjiang), and lithium-ion batteries from China made
with cobalt ore that was mined with child labor from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. These additions were a result of our expanded
mandate under the Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2018 (TVPRA of 2018), which requires
ILAB to report on goods made with inputs made with forced labor and
reflects the Government's commitment to addressing the worst forms of
labor exploitation in global supply chains.
Finally, the List of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured
Child Labor (EO List), required under Executive Order 13126, is
intended to ensure that U.S. Federal agencies do not procure goods made
by forced or indentured child labor. Under procurement regulations,
Federal contractors who supply products on the EO List must certify
that they have made a good-faith effort to determine whether forced or
indentured child labor was used to produce the items supplied.
Currently, this EO List includes 34 products (ranging from cocoa to
garments to electronics) from 26 countries.
safeguarding global supply chains
ILAB's supply chain research represents one of the first
comprehensive efforts to identify goods produced with inputs made with
forced labor or child labor and further aligns our work with U.S.
enforcement mechanisms in looking at goods made wholly or in part with
forced labor. We see our downstream supply chain research as a critical
step forward in the growing global consensus on the importance of clean
and transparent supply chains and the role that everyone--including
governments, companies, investors, unions, civil society, and
consumers--needs to play to make sure products sold here in the United
States, and globally, are not tainted with forced labor. Our research
is a vital resource for advocacy organizations and companies carrying
out risk assessments and engaging in due diligence on labor rights in
their supply chains and for consumers looking to make ethical choices.
To date, ILAB has completed extensive studies on lithium-ion
batteries, solar panels, and palm fruit. For the past year, ILAB has
also looked at global supply chains in over 30 countries to identify
goods that have inputs made with child labor or forced labor or carry a
significant risk of labor abuse and exploitation in the supply chain.
The sectors cover mining (including critical minerals), agriculture,
seafood, and garments. The research will be published in September
2024, along with ILAB's updated TVPRA List, with the aim of raising
awareness of the global scope of goods made with child labor or forced
labor and catalyzing governments to protect workers, businesses to
ensure their entire supply chain is free from labor abuses, and unions,
civil society, and consumers to hold governments and businesses
accountable.
We know addressing supply chain issues can be daunting for
businesses, so we have also created tools to make it easier to
implement or improve due diligence. The Sweat & Toil mobile app
showcases over 1,000 pages of our research on child labor and forced
labor in an easy-to-use and accessible format. The Better Trade Tool
integrates existing ILAB data on international child labor and forced
labor with U.S. and global trade data to show which global imports have
a higher risk of being made with child labor and forced labor.
Finally, Comply Chain is a comprehensive set of best practices for
businesses to address child labor and forced labor across global supply
chains. These due diligence tools are especially useful to small and
medium-sized enterprises to strengthen compliance efforts.
We are also using technology to innovate around supply chain
traceability. In December 2020, ILAB funded two projects to increase
the downstream tracing of goods made by child labor or forced labor,
with a focus on building a blockchain-powered platform and traceability
matrix to help users identify supply chain traceability elements,
methods, and technologies to address labor risks in diverse supply
chains. Our goal is to expand the number of tracing tools in high-risk
supply chains and to get those tools into the hands of a broad range of
stakeholders to help eliminate child labor and forced labor.
First, the Global Trace Protocol project is in the process of
building a blockchain-powered platform that brings all members of the
cotton supply chain in Pakistan to a single platform, including
farmers, spinners, and fabric mills. The project has also released
reports on the cotton supply chain in Pakistan, the cobalt supply chain
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and a context analysis report
on traceability, which includes an overview of traceability and how to
undertake it in supply chains.
Second, the STREAMS project, which is working in the garment supply
chain in India, is developing a supply chain traceability matrix that
users such as businesses, government officials, and civil society
stakeholders can use to identify which supply chain traceability
elements, methods, and technologies can address relevant forced labor
and child labor risks in diverse upstream and downstream supply chains.
Our supply chain work aims to eliminate labor abuses, including
child labor, in international critical mineral supply chains, many of
which are dominated by Chinese companies. For example, thousands of
children work in informal, artisanal, and small-scale cobalt mines in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That cobalt is then exported to
China where it ends up in lithium-ion batteries. To create a cobalt
supply chain free of labor exploitation, ILAB's technical assistance
programs focus on building the capacity of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo's government to enforce its labor laws, creating systems to
identify and remediate child labor and promote traceability. For
example, one ILAB-funded project is working with the Congolese Ministry
of Labor to recruit and train more than 2,000 new labor inspectors and
controllers to improve labor law enforcement, including within the
mining sector.
Another ILAB-funded project recently launched a Child Labor
Monitoring and Remediation System to combat child labor in cobalt
supply chains. Since the launch of this system in April 2023 at four
mining sites in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, over 2,500 child
laborers have been identified and are being assessed for services.
Similar work is happening in other countries. Through our research,
reporting, and technical assistance, ILAB will continue to address
labor abuses in critical mineral supply chains world-wide.
documenting forced labor in xinjiang, china
For over a decade, ILAB has been highlighting the use of forced
labor in the production of goods from China.
ILAB included 12 goods from China on the original TVPRA List in
2009. The latest TVPRA List includes 18 goods produced by forced labor
in China, including several that involve the use of forced labor in
Xinjiang, China's far western region where hundreds of thousands of
Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other persecuted groups
are being arbitrarily detained and subjected to forced labor producing
goods that enter the domestic and global supply chains. The Chinese
government has given subsidies to companies moving to Xinjiang or
employing members of persecuted groups from Xinjiang in labor transfer
programs. These practices increase demand for workers from persecuted
groups in Xinjiang. Uyghurs and other minorities are often sent to
camps (referred to as Educational Training Centers or Legal Education
Centers) where they are subjected to constant surveillance and
isolation and undergo political indoctrination.
Though the production of these goods through forced labor takes
place primarily in Xinjiang, there have also been credible reports of
mass transfers of Uyghurs and others from Xinjiang to factories across
China. This increases the number of goods potentially made with forced
labor. ILAB continues to monitor the developments and risks in global
supply chains in the region.
Last year, ILAB published two supply chain studies that documented
exploited labor in global supply chains with production points in
China. The first study found forced labor in the production of
polysilicon, a key material used to produce solar panels. Xinjiang
produces nearly half of the world's polysilicon, and its use of forced
labor taints the entire global solar supply chain. China is also a
major producer of photovoltaic ingots and wafers, which often
incorporate and co-mingle polysilicon from Xinjiang with polysilicon
from other sources. These ingots and wafers are used in the production
of solar cells and modules. America's top 4 solar trade partners
(Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, and South Korea) also import large
quantities of solar inputs from China. As a result of this study, ILAB
included photovoltaic ingots and wafers, solar cells, and solar modules
in the TVPRA List, and we further highlight other downstream goods at
risk of having forced labor inputs, such as silica-based products,
solar generators, and semiconductors.
The second study examined cobalt supply chains, a key input to
lithium-ion batteries, which has been found to be mined with child
labor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. With enormous volumes of
this cobalt shipped to China, electronic products around the world are
at risk of being linked to child labor. In 2020, China imported 89.4
percent of its cobalt from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most
of China's cobalt is further refined and used to produce battery
chemicals and components, such as cathodes. China then uses these parts
to produce rechargeable lithium-ion batteries, which are on ILAB's
TVPRA List for having an input made with child labor. In 2020,
countries around the world imported over 41 percent of their lithium-
ion batteries (valued at $16.5 billion) from China. Chinese-
manufactured lithium-ion batteries are found in dozens of downstream
products that we use in our daily lives, including computers, cell
phones, vacuum cleaners, electric vehicles, and hearing aids.
interagency coordination on forced labor enforcement
As an active and critical member of the Forced Labor Enforcement
Task Force (FLETF), ILAB is committed to contributing and leveraging
our research, reporting, and tools to support our partner U.S.
Government agencies to take enforcement actions that ensure global
supply chains are free of human rights abuses.
The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), which directs the
FLETF to develop a strategy for supporting enforcement of the
prohibition on the importation of goods into the United States
manufactured wholly or in part with forced labor in Xinjiang and other
parts of China, is an essential component of the trade enforcement
strategy to address forced labor. The global demand for cheap labor,
including the use of state-sponsored forced labor, makes workers
vulnerable in every part of our global economy. ILAB is committed to
using our research and all of the tools at our disposal to meaningfully
address labor rights violations and abuses, advance efforts to combat
forced labor, and improve transparency and accountability throughout
global supply chains.
The UFLPA provided the U.S. Government with powerful new tools to
combat forced labor, which align with the Biden-Harris administration's
efforts to eradicate forced labor from U.S. supply chains. We take
seriously the mandate from Congress to enforce these provisions and to
prevent American consumers from inadvertently purchasing goods made
with forced labor. The intent of the law is clear: the onus is on
importers to demonstrate they are not in violation of the UFLPA. The
United States has zero tolerance for businesses profiting from genocide
and crimes against humanity.
Since the UFLPA passed in December 2021, ILAB and the FLETF have
prioritized implementing certain UFLPA mandates. ILAB served as co-lead
in drafting substantial portions of the UFLPA Strategy, released in
June 2022, including the comprehensive risk assessment and evaluation
of forced labor schemes, as well as the guidance to importers. The
FLETF drew on ILAB's expertise from Comply Chain, which has guided U.S.
Government due diligence for 10 years and created a standard set of
practices to reduce the likelihood of goods being produced by labor
exploitation, including forced labor. We also heard of the significance
of the UFLPA to the Uyghur American community and the broader Uyghur
diaspora. Addressing forced labor in Xinjiang through the full
implementation and enforcement of the UFLPA is of critical importance
to preventing goods made with forced labor of Uyghurs and members of
persecuted groups from entering the United States.
Upon the release of the UFLPA Strategy, the FLETF established an
internal subcommittee dedicated to developing recommendations for
adding entities to the UFLPA Entity List. ILAB serves as co-chair,
developing a methodology and process for FLETF member agencies to
consider in reviewing entity referrals, as well as guidance for
interpretation of UFLPA Entity List criteria for supporting information
and evidence required for addition. We draw from existing procedural
guidelines to ensure the review and evaluation of information considers
relevant factors, such as source of information, including credibility
and reliability.
ILAB prioritizes the addition of entities that are violating the
law to the UFLPA Entity List. We are committed to ensuring this process
is robust and legally sound. Our teams have applied dynamic and
evolving solutions to new and different pressure points as they arise.
We also acknowledge there are limitations to these efforts, including
the lack of available and current information on forced labor,
especially in China and particularly in Xinjiang. Forced labor is
challenging to identify because many of the indicators are hidden, and
it often happens in legitimate business supply chains. We need to
support organizations, including academics, journalists, civil society,
and labor groups, who are advocating on behalf of vulnerable workers
and risking their lives to make information public.
Our work on the FLETF, implementing the UFLPA, and our mandated
reporting reflect ILAB's commitment to addressing forced labor in
global supply chains and increasing supply chain transparency and
accountability. These expanded forced labor enforcement tools and
mechanisms have also enabled increased engagement with like-minded
partners around the world. Counterparts in Canada, Mexico, the European
Union, the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, and others have sought
out our expertise in research and reporting on identifying and
addressing labor exploitation, in particular forced labor risks, in
global supply chains. These measures have provided opportunities to
leverage our work globally.
conclusion
As attention and interest in global supply chains continue to grow,
ILAB is in a unique position within the U.S. Government to improve
working conditions and end forced labor in these supply chains. We are
also leveling the playing field for responsible businesses. ILAB will
continue to work with our U.S. interagency partners in a whole-of-
Government effort to ensure that there are economic consequences for
those who continue to break laws and profit from labor abuses.
ILAB is committed to ensuring that we use our trade enforcement
tools, as well as labor diplomacy, multilateral engagement, and
technical assistance, to identify and raise awareness of the risks of
labor exploitation in countries and supply chains world-wide.
The UFLPA is a landmark law in the fight against forced labor and
human rights abuses. While it presents significant challenges for
businesses entangled in complex global supply chains, its broader
impact on promoting human rights and ethical business practices is
undeniable. We must continue to implement the UFLPA to its fullest
extent.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Bishop. Thank you, Ms. Lee.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
5 minutes of questioning. An additional round of questioning
may be called after all Members have been recognized. I now
recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
I will say at the inception, I think, as I have learned
more about this issue and I listened, actually, to Ranking
Member Ivey's comments last hearing and his opening statement
today, what seems to elude me is, you know, you got the Uyghur
Forced Labor Protection Act, which is new. You all have made
the point very well that we have got almost 100 years of
experience attempting to control products from forced labor
entering the United States. I don't really discern that much,
really, in your statement so far, or in the report that I read
on this on UFLPA in particular, how big the problem is, any
kind of metric to indicate what, you know, the size of the
problem we confront and how effective we are interdicting the
problem.
There are some indications, like I have heard from textile
industry questions about how broadly and actively we are
applying isotopic testing to indicate maybe we are not doing
enough. The number of entities on the list seems awfully small.
That is what I think Mr. Ivey was saying.
So let me begin with Ms. Brzozowski and say, how does DHS
assess the effectiveness of the efforts in slowing down the
flow of goods made with forced labor in China entering the
United States and more broadly?
Ms. Brzozowski. Thank you for the question, and you're
right out of the gate with a very good one.
This is something that, as I came on board recently and
took over the position I'm now in, I asked my team, how are we
measuring? How are we inspecting our progress? How do we know
that we're doing all that we can do? We say that we're
committed and we want to be making a dent in this.
I'll have to say that the size and extent of the challenge
I think has been well-documented. We know what we're up
against. Our ability to add entities to the list, I think we
do--we are absolutely committed, we agree 100 percent that we
need to scale that. Enactment, work since enactment has really
been focused on setting up a robust and methodologically-sound
process. But I am confident that we're now at the point where
we can really start to grind those wheels and move forward much
quicker.
As to how we are actually--what metrics we're using and how
we're measuring success, right now it is a bit anecdotally what
we're hearing from companies, the types of seizures we're
seeing. We do have confidence that industry is hearing, getting
the message, shifting supply chains, looking at their sources
of where they're getting products.
We also have money that was allocated by Congress to our
science and technology division to do some of that assessment.
We're appreciative of those funds to be able to give us some of
those metrics going forward.
Chairman Bishop. Thank you, ma'am.
Same sort of question to you, Mr. Choy, at CBP. Speak, if
you can, to how rapidly you are implementing isotope testing,
just because I have heard of that a good bit. Also, how do you
measure success in enforcement? Does this amount to sort-of a
posturing of the U.S. Government is not really getting the job,
you know, that sort-of shows our values? Or are we actually
making a tremendous dent and clamping down on this in a way
that is, you know, notable within the supply chain?
Mr. Choy. Thank you, Chairman Bishop, for that question.
I'll start off with addressing kind-of the authorities with
regards to the agencies in our Nation's forced labor
enforcement laws. This goes back to, as mentioned earlier, to
the Tariff Act in 1930, which did create the prohibition of
goods produced with forced labor, prison labor, or the worst
forms of child labor. But, however, there was a consumptive
demand clause within the Tariff Act that said that if the
country didn't produce goods in enough quantity that satiated
the domestic demand, then it was still OK. Right? So it wasn't
until 2016, through the Trade Facilitation, Trade Enforcement
Act, that repealed the consumptive demand clause out of the
Tariff Act.
So we've really been kind-of gone full bore since 2016 to
ramp up the agency's program, but also to supplement a lot of
the efforts that were already on-going within the U.S.
Government, like the Department of Labor's effort as well as
departments----
Chairman Bishop. That is helpful. Address specifically, if
you will, isotopic testing and the degree to which it has been
implemented.
Mr. Choy. Yes, sir. So, we have definitely been going out
in the sense that we have tested the technology and, in fact,
using the Congress--the resources that Congress did provide for
us, we did acquire this past year capabilities in isotopic
testing. So we have--our first lab just stood up in Savannah,
Georgia.
Chairman Bishop. Good to know.
Mr. Choy. Just this past quarter. We expect the other two
labs in New York City and Los Angeles to also stand up here
within the next 6 to 8 months as well. The equipment was
acquired back in fiscal year 2022 and is now getting delivered
and installed, and we've got staff and scientists that we
brought on board as well to do that. So that'll increase our
capacity.
We anticipate we'll be doing more isotopic testing. We
leverage that isotopic testing to investigate where we see
allegations of risk or use of forced labor or in this case,
say, what the XUAR and cotton--where the cotton may be used in
the supply chain.
Chairman Bishop. That is encouraging to hear. I have got a
lot of other great questions, but, unfortunately, my time has
expired, so I will recognize Ranking Member Ivey for his 5
minutes of questioning.
Mr. Ivey. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.
Just sort-of along the lines on the isotopic testing, since
we are on that, so my understanding is that that is primarily
for textiles.
Mr. Choy. Yes, Ranking Member, I appreciate that question.
Yes. Right now, that is currently the capability that is
principally used and proven for textiles. I know that industry
is exploring that. I think there's also national labs that are
looking at that capability to expand, potentially, to see where
it could also be leveraged in other types of commodities. But
right now, it's principally in textiles.
Mr. Ivey. OK. By the way, the textiles industry was here
and was very eager to get an expansion of the isotopic testing
and said that they would be happy to lobby on your behalf for
additional resources to expand that out. I am certainly open to
that as well.
But I did have this question. So with respect to back to
the African minerals issue, and my understanding is that a lot
of the minerals are mined in Africa, but maybe not solely,
using forced labor and child labor; that they are then sent, in
many instances, to China, and then whatever steps are taken
there to integrate those materials into the final product; and
then they get shipped either directly or through other, you
know, other countries to the United States.
How are we able--is there an equivalent to isotopic testing
for minerals? Or, I mean, and if not, how are you able to
figure out--how are we as a Nation able to figure out that
these materials are coming to us via forced labor or child
labor?
Mr. Choy. Thank you, Ranking Member Ivy, for that question.
Certainly, currently, to my understanding, and I can
certainly take it back as well, is that for extractives, there
isn't really a scientific capability to--which includes the
minerals and things like gold and whatnot, to be able to
leverage scientific testing to determine the origin. So,
basically, what we use and rely upon is in our surveillance and
our analysis of supply chains, as well as doing deep in-depth
supply chain reviews with importations we suspect that leverage
sources of forced labor.
Mr. Ivey. Ms. Lee? Yes.
Ms. Lee. I didn't want to interrupt you, sir.
Thank you, Ranking Member Ivey.
I wanted to weigh in on this question because this is
something that the Department of Labor ILAB has also focused
our technical assistance resources on. We have funded a
technical assistance project in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo that can begin to trace the cobalt from its origin in the
artisanal and small mines all the way through to its end use.
Much of it ends up in lithium ion batteries, which are, in
fact, manufactured in China. As we know, China owns maybe 70
percent of the cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and then does process most of that cobalt into lithium
ion batteries that end up in our supply chain.
But so we have a new project that is starting with the
artisanal mines, and that is going to follow the cobalt to
every stage of its subsequent production.
Mr. Ivey. I might, since we are just time-constrained, you
know, you might have to, if you could, send me some sort of
written explanation about the details on that, and if you need
additional resources to build that out, that would be good to
know.
But back to you, Secretary Choy. I mean, I think you
mentioned something about the mineral detection, I think you
said gold. Now, is that--I think from Ms. Lee's perspective, if
she is talking about just tracing it through the supply chain,
if I am hearing you correctly, is there a scientific test for
the actual minerals themselves, Mr. Choy, that you were
referencing or is that something different? If that is the
case, does that mean you have to dismantle whatever the product
is to get the material to test?
Mr. Choy. Ranking Member Ivey, so there is not a scientific
capability to test the origin. What I was referring to was
similar to what Deputy----
Mr. Ivey. Oh.
Mr. Choy [continuing]. Secretary Lee was saying, was that
we rely upon that supply chain tracing, understand who the
entities are at risk, and then following it through the entire
supply chain to the actual us importation.
Mr. Ivey. OK. Then, boy, time runs short, doesn't it? I did
have the question about the addition of entities to the list.
You said something, I guess the list was established in June.
Well, I think I heard from Ms. Brzozowski, was that June
2022 that you mentioned, that 2 have been added since then?
Ms. Brzozowski. Sorry, the initial inaugural list included
20 entities, and since then, so since 2022, we've added an
additional 10.
Mr. Ivey. Ten. OK. All right. Then you mentioned that there
have been more resources--I am running over.
Well, I will yield back, but perhaps we could have a next
round, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. The
gentlemen yields back.
I now recognize Mr. Ezell for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ivey, if I don't use my time, you are welcome to take
some of my time. This is so important. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, as we uncovered in our previous hearing, the
Chinese Communist Party is using the Uyghur slave market to
process seafood caught around the world. This product, of
course, is making it to the American markets using slave labor.
The CCP, who do not care about people, let's just make that--we
know that, they are using their product to sell at artificially
low prices. This creates clear disadvantages for shrimpers and
fishermen along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, which is my
district. It is very concerning, as the fishermen and shrimpers
have contacted me numerous times about this.
Ms. Lee, as a member of the Forced Labor Enforcement Task
Force, we know that seafood that is produced by slave labor is
still reaching the American market. Doesn't this suggest the
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act is not being enforced
properly?
Ms. Lee. Thank you so much, Congressman, for that question.
The allegations of forced labor use in the processing and
also on the fishing of seafood are very, very serious, and we
take them very seriously. I think the Forced Labor Enforcement
Task Force is looking into whether we should be adding seafood
as one of the priority sectors when we update the enforcement
strategy.
I have the privilege of sitting on the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, and we heard some very alarming
testimony from Mr. Ian Urbina, Professor Robert Stumberg from
Georgetown University, with respect to this. We are looking
into all of the allegations. We are also looking into what
tools we have at our disposal to address the allegations of
forced labor and the allegations that Uyghur workers are being
used to process some of the seafood that ends up back in the
United States.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you very much. You know, I strongly
believe that the seafood should be identified, you know, as a
high priority here under the UFLPA. Do you agree with that? If
approved, you know, how quickly could we identify so this could
be, you know, officially recognized?
Ms. Lee. The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force is looking
into that right now. But even before we formally identify
seafood as a priority area, there is nothing that stops our
colleagues in CBP and DHS from looking into shipments or
companies that might be suspicious. I think that is something
that we see as a very high priority indeed. So I share your
sense of urgency, sir.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you. What are some of the factors that you
would consider before adding a new entity to the list? Mr.
Choy? Anybody?
Ms. Brzozowski. Yes, actually, I probably am better able to
take that.
We don't get into this, sharing some of the specific
criteria, but what we are going to look at in general are the
allegations that we are--or recommendations that we're
receiving from member agencies, importantly from the
nongovernmental organizations that are really closest to the
ground in monitoring and doing research on these entities. They
provide some vital inputs.
We are looking at, of course, the supply chain mapping and
other types of research that could give us an indication of the
providence of either the good or the corporate structure of the
entities involved.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you. Mr. Choy, Gulf Coast shrimpers
advocated for the elimination of the consumptive demand
loophole in section 307. Since this loophole was repealed, I
would expect robust enforcement of the prohibition of imports
of goods produced by forced labor. However, CBP did not issue
any withhold release orders in 2023, and CBP has not taken any
additional action regarding seafood since January 2022. Can you
talk to me about this, please?
Mr. Choy. Thank you, Congressman Ezell, for that question.
CBP does take the allegations in the seafood and seafood
industry very seriously. We have enforced robustly by issuing
withhold release orders against fishing vessels and also a
fleet of Chinese vessels as well. Certainly, I think with the
implementation of the UFLPA has had an impact with regards to
our ability to continue or push more rapidly investigations of
the allegations that we have received.
So, but we are right now working robustly where we've
increased staffing to look at the allegations that have come
in, and we are looking at the allegations received in the
seafood industry. We have been in close contact with Ian Urbina
from the Outlaw Ocean Project, as well as other stakeholders
that were involved in that. We have the information that they
have, and we're looking into those allegations. Where we find
kind-of the violations of the law and violations under 307, we
will--you have a commitment, we will enforce.
Mr. Ezell. You will do that?
Mr. Choy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ezell. Yes. You know, I get--you know, growing up there
on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, just about every Saturday during
shrimp season, you can go down on the docks and get fresh
shrimp. But our shrimpers are just being put out of business. I
mean, for generations, they have been doing this stuff, and,
you know, we need to stop that. These people are hard working
and have done this their whole lives, and I need your help. So
I want your commitment from all of you that you will do
everything you can within your power to help us get this back
on track.
So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Bishop. The gentlemen yields back.
The subcommittee has its own expert on isotope testing, and
he is sitting on my left. That is Mr. Thanedar, and I recognize
him for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman Bishop. Thank you for
holding this hearing and certainly welcome the expertise of our
witnesses.
Just, Mr. Choy, we have spoken a lot today about what the
Government can be doing to stop forced labor goods from
entering the country. However, at the end of the day, private
companies, including importers and retailers, are the ones
responsible for following the U.S. laws.
A few questions. How can companies help ensure that their
supply chain are free of forced labor? How has CBP engaged with
private sector to educate them on their responsibilities?
Mr. Choy. Congressman Thanedar, thank you for that
question.
CBP has engaged very robustly with industry. Together with
the Department, we have engaged--have well over 500 engagements
with industry, with stakeholders, international stakeholders,
with civil society, and with our partners across the
Government, principally to highlight, especially when we engage
with industry, the responsibility that you mentioned, that
industry has to maintain good due diligence within their supply
chains.
With regards to the effects that Assistant Secretary
Brzozowski had mentioned is that we have seen effects where
industry has been leveraging the tools and technologies that we
brought folks in last March during our tech expo to introduce
some of the tools and technologies and solutions that private
industry has been creating to help industry do due diligence in
this space. We've seen that industry has taken a very proactive
stance in bringing on these capabilities to help them get
better visibility into supply chains beyond tier 2, to also
leverage isotopic testing at certain points within the supply
chain. If you look at textiles, we've seen industry leverage
testing capabilities, whether it's at the spinning, where the
raw materials come in, or at certain parts maybe where the
textiles themselves are made, or further where the garments are
made.
So at certain checkpoints, the isotopic testing or
scientific testing capabilities are a tool in the kitbag that
industry can use to help them exercise due diligence in their
supply chains.
Mr. Thanedar. What can we in Congress do? How can we
support CBP in this investment?
Mr. Choy. Well, certainly we're very appreciative of the
investment that Congress has already made with the agency. What
we're looking for as far as prioritizing our resources from now
and forward is being able to use those resources smartly,
right, and take those resources and make our work force more
efficient.
So we appreciate the continued support from Congress in the
sense that we will integrate the capabilities that we brought
on board to look at our--to integrate into our more broad kind-
of enforcement platforms, like our advanced trade analytics
platform, which brings in a significant amount of data,
Government data, public and open-source data, to help us
identify risks within the supply chain.
We're also looking at opportunities to enhance our
advanced--our automated commercial environment, which all trade
transactions occur, which needs to be modernized. We have
efforts under way to modernize that to keep pace with the
advancements that industry has made and in global trade
overall, and to help us to continue to force.
Just last, I just wanted to highlight that with the
investments, I mean, we did invest significantly in additional
staffing, both officers and nonuniform staff within CBP.
Certainly we continue to focus on that professional development
for our nonuniform staff, especially for basic entry and
advanced training for them, focusing in on things like learning
supply chain, doing supply chain reviews, gathering
intelligence, those types of capabilities that we really need
to cultivate within our nonuniform capability within the
agency.
Mr. Thanedar. Well, I certainly thank the hard-working
women and men of the CBP, and thank you for your testimony
today.
Mr. Chair, I am out of time.
Chairman Bishop. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize Mr. Strong for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Bishop, Ranking Member
Ivey.
It is a lot more pleasant today in this hearing room than
it was yesterday----
Mr. Ivey. Yes, it is.
Mr. Strong [continuing]. But I can promise you we have got
a commonality here that both sides of the aisle understands
what is at risk.
Ms. Brzozowski and Mr. Choy, at a previous hearing, our
witnesses discussed the impact of de minimis shipments, Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act enforcement. According to these
witnesses, the rapid increase in de minimis packages,
particularly from China, undermines the ability of CBP to
detect forced labor products or contraband.
How concerned are you that the Chinese companies could take
advantage of de minimis to ship goods potentially made with
forced labor to the United States?
Ms. Brzozowski. Maybe I'll start briefly, but can say that
I share your concern with this challenge. As my colleague from
CBP had mentioned, there is a difference in data that we get
for these types of shipments, and that can complicate
enforcement. Also, given the volume of these shipments, it's a
complex environment what we're doing to it. But I do want to
make clear that the targeting and the laws do apply in this
environment, and we do our best with the information that we do
have.
We have a--in the short term, we are looking to enhance
that targeting to do better, using software and other different
technical capabilities. In the medium term, we are looking to
enhance the data that we do get through regulatory action. Over
the longer term, we would be open to a conversation with
Congress.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. How much visibility do we have
regarding the scale of potential UFLPA violations related to
the diminishment shipments?
Mr. Choy. So, Congressman, I appreciate that question, and
certainly I echo Assistant Secretary Brzozowski's comments in
the sense that we recognize the challenge and issues in a de
minimis environment. Certainly, when we look at the challenges
within a de minimis environment, a lot of it goes back to the
lack of information that we gather as compared to traditional
shipments that come in through our ports of entry.
So with that, I mean, we have, since 2019, initiated two
programs. One is we created a new entry type, which we call the
entry type 86. It was kind of a pilot program for folks to
enter de minimis shipments in through a formal process. We also
had a section 321 data pilot, which we were looking to look
into the environment to see what additional information
elements that would be helpful for us to understand who are the
parties within the shipment, what's inside the box, and who the
customers are.
So we've come to the culmination of both of those data
pilots. That's where we're working together with the Department
in a regulatory effort to introduce different ways to file
entries for de minimis shipments and then also what data
elements that we would require for de minimis shipments. We
feel that with that kind of expanded information and data for
each of the shipments that comes in would give us greater
flexibility and greater access for our targeting systems to be
able to identify risk factors and be able to stop specific
shipments coming in at our ports of entry.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. A significant percentage of the U.S.
textiles and apparel imports come from Central and South
America, countries with whom we have free trade agreements. I
can think back just a matter of years ago, Alabama was home to
Russell Athletics, Champion Apparel, and we were known in one
area of Alabama as the sock capital of the world. But that has
gone away.
These agreements require firms to show that the goods they
are shipping to the United States were produced in the region
to qualify for duty-free status. What actions has DHS and CBP
taken to determine whether this system is being abused to allow
goods made with Uyghur forced labor to enter the United States?
Mr. Choy. Thank you again for that question, Congressman
Strong.
So we do definitely see that as a focus area for us. I
mean, textiles is a priority trade initiative which was
codified in the Trade Facilitation Trade Enforcement Act, which
also means that as a priority trade initiative, it also
prioritizes where we focus our resources in.
So with that, we've had consistent and continued focus
within the textile area and we focus our resources means that
we identify, you know, targeting candidates. We do audits. We
do foreign verification visits, verification visits here. We
also identify--do cargo inspections, both at entry and also at
post release, to identify where misdescriptions of the actual
shipments may be.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Choy. I want to try to get one
more real quick here. What actions does CDP take if it detects
specific products made with forced labor being diverted to
third-party countries? What actions do you take?
Mr. Choy. So if there's illegal transshipment that's
occurring through third countries, that is something that we
would stop. We would detain those shipments. We would--then we
would issue duty requirements to make the Government whole.
Then we would issue--or we could potentially, if there's
recidivism or it continues, repeat offenders, we would issue
penalties against those.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. I thank each of you for being here
today.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Bishop. The gentleman yields back.
At the Chair's discretion, we will proceed to a second
round of questions.
Let me go back to, so, Mr. Choy, some of that was very
interesting because you addressed a number of things. You know,
the robustness of your answer was very helpful, I thought.
Ms. Brzozowski, let me go back to you and maybe Ms. Lee,
also, if I can work it in about the UFLPA Entity List or--yes,
I think that is the right way to refer to it. So if what I
understood is about 85 percent of China's, you know, cotton
produce or cotton products produce is sourced from Xinjiang,
which is the region where the forced labor issue is most
pronounced, and just thinking about the size of the Chinese
economy and general knowledge or general perception about the
amount of commerce in those goods to the United States, I am
always--you know, we don't have the expertise maybe to gauge
everything that you guys are doing, but we can certainly hear
when what you are saying sounds like it is really--you know,
you are getting after it, and we want to hear that, obviously.
When I hear the size of the list in contrast to those facts, it
just seems striking.
Ms. Lee, before I ask, Ms. Brzozowski, you mentioned the
TVPRA list, so I guess that is--you have got some sort of a
list. Sort-of like, you know, I hear about these lists of
Treasury designating lists of foreign bad actors and so forth.
So I understand all these things exist in law. How many
entities or people on the TVPRA list? Any idea?
Ms. Lee. Sure. They're not entities. There aren't specific
companies on the TVPRA list.
Chairman Bishop. I see.
Ms. Lee. What we identify is a product and a country. So,
for example, cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Chairman Bishop. I see.
Ms. Lee. It's really what our list is meant to be is sort-
of a starting point, and I think it is a resource that CBP and
DHS would use to say, oh, there might be a problem with, for
example, cobalt.
Chairman Bishop. So maybe--and that is helpful. My question
is probably not that very apt, though, because I don't know
there is any comparison to be drawn here or anything.
But, Ms. Brzozowski, just back to you. You talked about
your team. You got a bunch of things in the works. When you
guys come back, maybe I won't still be here, but at the end of
this year or shortly thereafter, we will hear about a lot of
additional entities added to the list. But I would like you
speak to that a little bit more.
What is flawed about my perception of what I just
suggested? China is a massive economic actor, big market, 85
percent was the figure that I heard of their products are
sourced to Xinjiang. So why so few people even on the initial
list? Why wasn't it hundreds or thousands of entities?
Ms. Brzozowski. Thank you for your question.
Again, I find myself in the good position of being able to
agree with you on the ultimate goal of wanting to get this list
up and expanded. I think that the team has done very impressive
work since the relatively short time of the enactment of the
law, setting up not only frameworks, but a robust methodology
that is going to stand not only the test of time, but legal
scrutiny.
So we were pulling together from a broad array of expertise
across agencies of administrative processes and managing and
running and creating other types of Entity Lists. So that is
where we were able to leverage the expertise and the resources
and the know-how of the broad array of the task force members.
But you're right that the numbers themselves might not
reflect the totality of that work.
Chairman Bishop. You talk about legally sound. Is this
something that, like, companies that are listed litigate
against the United States Government?
Ms. Brzozowski. Yes, sir.
Chairman Bishop. OK. So, Mr. Choy, Mr. Ivey made reference
to this issue. What happens when CBP stops its shipment and
determines it shouldn't be admitted into the United States? Is
it released back to the shipper, or is it seized?
Mr. Choy. Thank you for that question, Chairman Bishop.
So when the shipment is stopped or when it comes in, and
we've identified this as potentially something that could be
stopped pursuant to the UFLPA, there's two somewhat scenarios
in this. The one that, where we have clear, say, direct
shipments, say, from the XUAR, where we know specifically that
this shipment is attributed back to a Xinjiang manufacturer or
producer or an entity that's identified on the Entity List,
those shipments are excluded, meaning that they are denied
entry into the U.S. commerce. So the importer does have the
ability to reexport that shipment.
But then also where we have shipments, where we feel that
we know that there's ties within the supply chain not
necessarily produced in the Xinjiang region of China, where
it's, say, manufactured further downstream with inputs from the
Xinjiang region of China, those shipments are detained. Then we
work together with the importer where they have the ability to
submit matters on behalf of those entries to demonstrate
whether the UFLPA does or doesn't apply to those specific
shipments. In that case, we request a full supply chain
documentation from the raw materials to all inputs to the
actual importation of the goods.
Chairman Bishop. My time has expired, so I yield to Mr.--or
recognize Mr. Ivey for his 5 minutes in the second round.
Mr. Ivey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up on that question and, actually, a
question earlier with respect to perishables, in that instance,
seafood. So you identify a shipment that is in violation, I
guess. By the way, the description of the process you just
outlined, is that only for textiles or would that apply for
minerals or seafood as well?
Mr. Choy. That applies across the board.
Mr. Ivey. All right. OK. So you detain it, you mentioned.
How fast is that process? Because if you got perishables, I
would assume it would have to move very, very quickly for you
to run your traps and make a determination about whether there
is a violation there or not. How would that work?
Mr. Choy. So, according to the regulations, the importer
has 30 days to submit matters on behalf of the specific entry
to the responding center of excellence and expertise. So it's
really up to the importer to have their documentation ready. So
if they don't have that documentation ready, they can go up to
30 days. They can request an extension, but if the importer has
their documentation ready, the centers have been able to clear
through shipments relatively quickly within 7 to 14 days.
Mr. Ivey. OK. So, how does that work for seafood? I mean,
because that is a very long--especially 30 days. That is just
too long. So, I mean, what do you do in that instance?
Mr. Choy. Well, in that instance, I mean, it would be
incumbent upon the importer to make a decision of whether they
would either reexport those shipments or figure out ways to
store and maintain those shipments.
Mr. Ivey. When you say reexport, you mean send it to
someplace other than the United States?
Mr. Choy. That's correct. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ivey. All right. So then the importer, whether it is
seafood or minerals or textiles, still would have the
opportunity to profit from the child labor or forced labor that
we had identified?
Mr. Choy. So, and if the importer reimports those goods,
yes.
Mr. Ivey. All right. Let me--have we--has Congress given
you the legal authority to seize these imported materials, not
just detain, but to seize them?
Mr. Choy. So we do have the regulatory authority to seize
those goods. It would depend based upon the case and the
scenario by which those entries are. But also, statutorily,
there are challenges with regards to the seizure process that
is lengthy and with regards to the burden on the agency as
well.
Mr. Ivey. OK. We will set perishables to the side for the
moment just because of the time sensitivity, obviously, with
those. But let's say minerals with respect to the batteries or
with respect to textiles, how is there a determination made?
Because from my--I will just say this. My perspective is if
we really want to put sanctions in place that punish these
companies that are involved in the supply chain that we have
effectively traced back to forced labor or child labor,
allowing them to just send it to Plan B and get the same amount
of money doesn't seem to really get the message across in the
same way.
I know the United States is a gigantic market and everybody
wants to continue with that, but, you know, if they--and I
think this is what we got from the textiles association
testimony. If they just keep pushing the mass over and hoping
that the vast majority of it will get through, but every now
and then something will get caught, but it still just gets
redirected, they just sell it somewhere else, it seems to me
that we are not, you know, using our tools sufficiently to send
the message back.
This isn't a criticism of you all. I am just--you know,
this is a question, but this is my sense of it from what I
think I am hearing.
So what is your take, out to the whole panel, what is your
take on that issue?
Ms. Brzozowski. From a--maybe not from the operational
perspective at the border, but I could also say that this is
why it's so absolutely imperative that we have partnerships
with foreign governments, so that as these--if seizures are not
able to be accommodated on each and every instance, that these
goods are not finding their way into other countries, and that
as a collective, we're working against the reimport of these
violative goods.
I'll give one more note, that as the task force, this is
one of our primary responsibilities. So in addition to creating
the Entities List, one of the key responsibilities is to
actually conduct that engagement to go out to not only the
private-sector companies for education, which is largely
being----
Mr. Ivey. Well, just to reclaim quickly.
Ms. Brzozowski. Yes, please.
Mr. Ivey. I have expired on time to reclaim, but just to
follow up, do we have the legal authority? So you are working
to make sure there are other countries that aren't taking it,
but, apparently, that means that there are other countries that
do. No offense to any, no criticism, but do we have the legal
authority, do you have the legal authority to just say, you
know what, forget all of that? This is an illegal shipment. We
are using forced labor. We are going to seize it. I don't know,
the Government, like, the Government seizes, certainly in the
criminal world, seizes materials all the time and, you know,
deals with it in that way.
Do you have the authority to do that or is that something
that Congress would have to give you?
Mr. Choy. Thank you. The agency has the authority to seize.
So, in the context of the UFLPA, where we have specific
shipments, where we have the specific confidence or the exact
confidence that we know that these are prohibited goods, we do
have that authority to seize.
The challenge that we have is where--and those are things
that, as we implement things like a withhold release order or
have entities on the Entity List or we have specific shipments,
and we do provide notification to the importers when shipments
are entered into the system that are going to be subject to the
UFLPA that come directly from the Xinjiang region, so we see a
decline in those specific shipments coming into the United
States.
So where the challenge being is where the inputs then are
taken, either through third countries or those inputs are used
in downstream manufacturing processes, and also the importer
then has the ability to demonstrate their entire supply chain.
So during that time, you know, we don't necessarily have the
specific standing to seize the shipment at that point in time.
So during any time during that process, you know, the importer
does have the right to be able to reexport those shipments.
Mr. Ivey. Well, I thank the Chair for--well, thank you for
your candor with the panel, and I thank the Chair for letting
me run over time.
Chairman Bishop. The gentlemen yields back.
I think it has been very helpful, and I think we will
proceed to a discretionary third round for just a minute, you
and I. I think Mr. Ezell doesn't care to ask, doesn't have more
questions, so he waives.
So let me just, again, sort-of pursue the line that you
were on.
No, let me take it different because there a couple of
thoughts conflicting in my mind.
Mr. Choy, I think you said earlier that the de minimis
exemption or exception, whatever it is called, does not apply
to the UFLPA. Did I get that straight?
Mr. Choy. Chairman Bishop, the de minimis exemption does
apply to the----
Chairman Bishop. Does?
Mr. Choy. Doesn't apply to the----
Chairman Bishop. Doesn't?
Mr. Choy. I mean----
Chairman Bishop. It does not apply?
Mr. Choy. There is no UFLPA exception in de minimis.
Chairman Bishop. OK.
Mr. Choy. For de minimis.
Chairman Bishop. I am sorry, say that part again. There is
no UFLPA exception?
Mr. Choy. So there is no de minimis exception within the
UFLPA. So the de minimis doesn't--or does apply. Or doesn't
apply, sorry.
Chairman Bishop. Take another shot and just explain to me
what that means. How does that--what is the implications of
that?
Mr. Choy. So, meaning that in all environments where cargo
or shipments or entries are filed, that if something is coming
through de minimis, it's still going through all our screening
systems.
Chairman Bishop. OK. So like, otherwise, I mean, the basic
notion of the de minimis exemptions, I understand it is like if
you are getting--purchasing a certain amount, and I don't
remember, somebody told me $800 or something like that----
Mr. Choy. No, $800 per one--per day per person.
Chairman Bishop. Yes. So if somebody gets some goods from
abroad, they can kind-of bring them in and they are not subject
to the same usual scrutiny by CBP, basically. Is that the idea?
Mr. Choy. Well, it's not subject to duties and taxes.
Chairman Bishop. OK. But there is no such de minimis
exemption for anything that is covered by the UFLPA?
Mr. Choy. Right, there isn't. So even if it comes in
through de minimis, the UFLPA still applies.
Chairman Bishop. Still applies.
Mr. Choy. Right.
Chairman Bishop. Got it. So as far as--well, let me ask
this question, though, about the de minimis exemption. Ms.
Brzozowski, maybe I will go to you in this part of it.
You know, I sketched out in my opening statement some of
the massive numbers, the massive increases in goods that come
in with respect to the de minimis exemption. I think some
suspect that that becomes a huge source of evasion of the
interdiction of forced labor produced goods. Is our--and I know
you have some background in large ecommerce platforms. To what
degree or can you comment at all on whether e-commerce
platforms are a driver of that massive expansion of the
exploitation of the de minimis exemption?
Ms. Brzozowski. In my current role what I can comment on is
the challenge that this environment presents for our folks at
the border for targeting, and that we have seen an exponential
rise over the last number of years. I think there's any number
of variety of factors that go into this, key points being we
are working hard in a very, very challenging environment.
These requirements, as maybe to put it in another way, we
are enforcing on forced labor laws in this particular channel.
But it's more challenging because of the limited amount of data
that we get, which, of course, drives our targeting
capabilities and our decision making.
Chairman Bishop. All right. Mr. Choy, thank you very much
for trying to persist through my torturous series of questions
about the de minimis exemption. I am not sure I understand it
fully, but I kind-of get the gist.
Let me ask about this. You talked about three isotope
testing labs or testing labs being stood up. One is already in
operation. That sounds good. What kind of quantity of--can you
quantify the amount of testing in some way that you anticipate
those labs being able to do, the one that has been set up and
the other two that you expect to be coming on-line and the
difference that it will make?
Mr. Choy. Well, I can certainly take back the
quantification. I don't have those----
Chairman Bishop. OK.
Mr. Choy [continuing]. Stats in front of me currently right
now. But I can just generally talk about with regards to how we
leverage the isotopic testing and how we anticipate that it
would be leveraged. I mean, certainly we've used isotopic
testing at this point to investigate supply chains, investigate
where we have perceived--we have received allegations and have
perceived risk of entities and entities that are involved in
the use of using inputs from the Xinjiang region, and that
informs our targeting.
But then, also, you know, we do educate and we do inform
our folks out in the field. So this also--that education and
training also gives the ability to our officers at our port of
entry and our import specialists to identify shipments, pull
samples, and then send them off for testing as well.
Chairman Bishop. How, if at all, are the capacities of CBP
to address this problem, how have they been affected or
impaired by sort-of conditions at the border more generally
that we have heard about? A lot of, you know, agents being
moved from different regions to come to the Southwestern Border
and service. Does that have any impact on this part of CBP's
responsibilities?
Mr. Choy. I would just say that, you know, the agency's,
you know, border security mission is foremost, and then, you
know, our focus with regards to the security within the cargo
environment as well, is also foremost as well. You know, we
continue to, regardless of the conditions, continue to focus on
that and maintain that as a high priority.
Chairman Bishop. So I take that as you keep trying to do
your job, but, yes, there is probably an impact. Unless you are
telling me something dramatically different, that is what I
read in what you just shared.
So I yield back and recognize Mr. Ivey for his final round
of questions.
Mr. Ivey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to follow up on the Chair's question about the
testing, I was kind-of curious about the logistics of that. So
you have got a test facility. I think you said it is in
Georgia?
Mr. Choy. Yes, sir. We have one in Savannah, Georgia,
that's operational currently.
Mr. Ivey. OK. So whatever you want to test gets shipped
from whatever port the material is stopped at, and then you
ship it to Georgia? Is that how it works?
Mr. Choy. That's correct. So there's a chain of custody
that's established, and then it's shipped to the labs to test.
So the samples are pulled and then--but for the isotopic
testing, there is the highlight that it does take--those
samples are pulled, but those samples then are subsequently
destroyed by the testing.
Mr. Ivey. Yes. How long does it take to ship, test, and
then make a decision? While the testing is being done, I am
assuming nothing is being withheld or seized at that point.
These tests are done independently of a seizure determination,
is that right?
Mr. Choy. It depends. So the test could be conducted when
the shipment has already--has been detained, or they could be
conducted when we're conducting our risk assessments and our
surveillance of specific shipment lines.
As far as the time it would take to go from the port to the
lab, it's just kind-of--it would be fairly quick with regards
to the express carriers taking those shipments. So as far as
the time it would take to actually conduct the test, I can
certainly take that back.
Mr. Ivey. OK. I had a question with respect to the seize-
release issue that we were discussing a few minutes ago.
Apparently someone decides at some point where, OK, we have
identified this, it is a problem, but we are going to release
it. Then there is another scenario where it gets seized. Who
makes that determination? Is there a department or agency that
does that, or who makes that decision?
Mr. Choy. Thank you for that question, Ranking Member Ivey.
So the port director has the authorities to make those
decisions.
Mr. Ivey. OK. You also mentioned 19 million in fraud and
penalties, I think, at one point, that had been imposed. What
is that on? Is that on the textiles piece or is that across the
board?
Mr. Choy. Those were for textiles specifically in fiscal
year 2023. So those were for a couple of various issues,
whether it's from valuation, misdeclaring the items, or
declaring that--you know, claiming, you know, free trade
agreement.
Mr. Ivey. Have there been civil penalties imposed with
respect to the minerals issue that we were discussing?
Mr. Choy. I'll have to take that back, Member Ivey. I can
certainly discuss that with your staff.
Mr. Ivey. OK. Then I think you mentioned and I think the
Chair referenced this as well, border security. I think
someone, it might have been your testimony, Mr. Choy, with
respect to fentanyl, and I was kind-of curious about that.
Using a test to inspect supply chains, threat detection,
and my notes have that fentanyl was mentioned in there
somewhere, but I wasn't clear on it, so I want to get a follow-
up explanation.
Mr. Choy. Thank you, Ranking Member Ivey, for that
question.
Certainly, the agency's effort in the fight against
fentanyl has been one of the top priorities for the agency.
Certainly the efforts behind the UFLPA and the capabilities
that we brought on board and the capabilities we created
through our advanced trade analytical platform to provide
modeling of how trade flows based upon kind-of known risks and
threats has given us the ability to look at where potential
risks and where that fentanyl may be entering in through our
ports of entry. So that's where I'd mentioned fentanyl within
my opening statement or my opening remarks.
But certainly I just want to highlight that, you know, that
CBP's--of course, are a combination of interdiction and intel
capabilities. Our border search authorities puts us in a very
unique position with regards to the fight against fentanyl.
So we issued our new strategy to combat fentanyl and
synthetic drugs in October of last year, which really is
addressing kind-of the current environment, the changing
threat. In that focus, and working together with our Department
colleagues, our fellow law enforcement colleagues within the
Department, as well as with the interagency, have really kind-
of focused significantly on that effort and just kind-of the
stats alone that in fiscal year 2023 CBP seized well over
27,000 pounds of fentanyl at our border and, you know.
Mr. Ivey. Let me reclaim my time. I apologize. I am curious
about, you know, which ports are which with respect to
fentanyl, textiles, minerals. I don't know how extensive the
Border Patrol--I guess you are probably at every port of entry,
but, you know, hearing more about how that works and which
testing is done where would be great.
Then if I could get one last question in. One of the issues
that I have heard the challenge is for putting more entities on
the list is bad companies have figured this out and they are
starting to take steps to cover their tracks. I guess that goes
to some extent to the supply chain mapping piece that was
mentioned a moment ago.
But what sorts of things can we do? To the extent--I don't
want you giving tips to the importers about what is there and
what to circumvent, but to the extent you can tell us about it,
what sorts of things are you doing to defeat that effort to
cover their tracks?
Ms. Brzozowski. I'd actually maybe take a first stab at
this, but maybe put it in a slightly different light with
regard to the importers. I think the vast majority of importers
are as repulsed by this abhorrent practice as we are and
actively taking steps to eradicate it from their supply chain.
So I think we've got partners in them and need to leverage not
only their capabilities, but also use them to enhance ours. So
a lot of these tools and a lot of these analytic tools and
anecdotes that we're getting about the impact it's having are
coming from importers and from the private sectors who have
really extensive capabilities to be mapping their own supply
chain.
I think what we're trying to do is send a very strong
demand signal with our enforcement, with our ramping up of the
Entities List that this is serious and that we'll work with
importers to make sure they have the information they need to
be compliant, but that the consequences for noncompliance will
be severe and that they will be held accountable.
In the flip side of that, making sure that there's an
appreciation of the fact that diverse and resilient supply
chain, not only in this case, have a--are the right thing to do
to combat forced labor, but have an economic and resiliency
benefit to companies as well.
Mr. Ivey. I am noting I am running over my time and I
apologize to the Chair, but if we could get comments from the
last two on the panel on the same. I apologize for cutting you
off, but.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Ranking Member Ivey.
Just to add to what Assistant Secretary Brzozowski said, I
think there's no question that companies and the Chinese
government are taking steps to obfuscate the supply chain and
so on. So I think that just speaks to how important it is that
we ramp up all the work that we've talked about today with
respect to supply chain tracing, with respect to enforcement.
I think that the point that Assistant Secretary Brzozowski
made also that there is an enormous burden and an obligation on
the part of the ultimate companies, the companies at the top of
the supply chain, to make sure that they are aware of and
taking steps to remove these entities from their supply chain.
They have the power to do that. I think that the Uyghur Forced
Labor Prevention Act, the rebuttable presumption, the forced
labor import ban in whole or in part, is a tremendously
powerful tool and that we are, I think, doing everything within
our power.
I think the resources that CBP and DHS and DOL and the
other Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force agencies have are
essential to making sure that we can do the research and follow
through, to make sure that we are able to trace the complicated
corporate structures and the complicated supply chains in order
to be able to do our best job to enforce this law.
Mr. Ivey. Let me give Mr. Choy the last word.
Mr. Choy. Well, I echo Deputy Under Secretary Lee's
comments and as well as Assistant Secretary Brzozowski's. I
couldn't say that any better. Thank you.
Mr. Ivey. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.
Chairman Bishop. The gentleman yields back.
It is perfunctory in these hearings to thank the witnesses
for appearing, but I really want to do that earnestly today. I
have had occasion more than once to be critical of the either
forthcomingness or the preparedness of witnesses before
committees. This has been an exceptional panel of witnesses. I
always have particularly high regard for Customs and Border
Patrol, and certainly those of you at serving in the other
departments' agencies represented here. But thank you very
much.
The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses, and we would ask you to respond to
those in writing if they are forthcoming. Pursuant to committee
rule VII(D), the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Question From Honorable Mike Ezell for Eric Choy
Question. Major solar panel manufacturers Hanwha Q-Cells and Maxeon
have been the supplier for utility scale projects in Mississippi.
According to the Sheffield Hallam University report titled ``Over-
Exposed: Uyghur Region Exposure Assessment for Solar Industry
Sourcing,'' Q-Cells and Maxeon have a ``very high'' risk of ties to
forced labor in Xinjiang. With respect to Q-Cells, the Sheffield Report
found Meike Solar Technology, a Chinese company which gets raw material
from Xinjiang, reported Q-Cells as one of its largest customers in the
first half of 2022, even though Q-Cells claims it cut off the
supplier's relationship in 2021. When major solar manufacturers are
allowed to import panels made with Xinjiang polysilicon it hurts
domestic manufacturing, including the Mississippi polysilicon industry.
Without detaining Q-Cells and Maxeon imports, how can you be sure
they're not using Chinese polysilicon tainted with forced labor from
Xinjiang?
Answer. The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) presumes
that all commodities and inputs, from raw material to parts to finished
products, from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) are made
with forced labor. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has
reviewed the Sheffield Hallam University report cited in your question
extensively and has used this, along with CBP analytical tools and
resources, to evaluate risk of solar products subject to enforcement
and we have adjusted our targeting of shipments accordingly.
Unfortunately, CBP cannot comment on specific investigations or provide
details pertaining to specific detentions because this information may
be law enforcement sensitive and/or subject to business
confidentiality.
CBP employs a dynamic, risk-based approach to enforcement that
prioritizes action against the highest-risk goods based on current data
and intelligence to prevent prohibited goods from entering the United
States. CBP enforcement efforts safeguard all industries from unfair
trade practices. However, some industries, such as solar and textiles,
have seen increased scrutiny due to open-source reporting on the use of
forced labor in the production of raw materials used in their supply
chains.
Using the resources provided by Congress, CBP is strengthening our
forced labor enforcement efforts by investing in personnel, training,
outreach, technology, and laboratory science capabilities. The agency
is using technology to map supply chains and research high-risk
commodities to ensure supply chains are free of forced labor and XUAR
inputs.
Additionally, CBP is increasing its analytical and threat detection
capabilities. CBP developed and operationalized analytic models that
identify entities operating in XUAR, their affiliates, entities with
whom they share traits or characteristics, and indicators of evasion
activities (e.g., illegal transshipment) to help further our analysis
and enforcement efforts related to UFLPA. Solar panel shipments are
subject to close UFLPA review and CBP's team of specialists conduct
extensive supply chain reviews to ensure shipments released into the
United States are not made with raw materials from the XUAR. CBP
understands that there are companies actively trying to evade CBP
enforcement of the UFLPA, which is why CBP is continuously revising and
strengthening its enforcement procedures to stop those importers who
are still seeking to import forced-labor tainted products. Since UFLPA
implementation began on June 22, 2022, CBP has conducted over 3,700
reviews of supply chain tracing documentation provided by solar
importers subject to detention under the UFLPA and will continue to
strengthen its processes to maximize enforcement in this sector.
CBP continuously engages with importers and emphasizes that they
have the ultimate responsibility to proactively monitor their supply
chains, which they know better than anyone, to mitigate the risk of
importing goods into the United States that were produced with forced
labor. As stated in the Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory updated
on July 13, 2021, ``businesses that do not exit supply chains,
ventures, and/or investments connected to Xinjiang could run a high
risk of violating U.S. law.'' All entities whose supply chains touch
the XUAR should undertake due diligence to ensure compliance with U.S.
law. Section VI of the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force's UFLPA
Strategy provides due diligence and supply chain guidance for
importers.
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