[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE
GONE WILD: EXAMINING
OPERATION LONG TAIL LIBERATION
=======================================================================
OVERSIGHT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
Tuesday, September 10, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-144
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
or
Committee address: http://naturalresources.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-759 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
BRUCE WESTERMAN, AR, Chairman
DOUG LAMBORN, CO, Vice Chairman
RAUL M. GRIJALVA, AZ, Ranking Member
Doug Lamborn, CO Grace F. Napolitano, CA
Robert J. Wittman, VA Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan,
Tom McClintock, CA CNMI
Paul Gosar, AZ Jared Huffman, CA
Garret Graves, LA Ruben Gallego, AZ
Aumua Amata C. Radewagen, AS Joe Neguse, CO
Doug LaMalfa, CA Mike Levin, CA
Daniel Webster, FL Katie Porter, CA
Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon, PR Teresa Leger Fernandez, NM
Russ Fulcher, ID Melanie A. Stansbury, NM
Pete Stauber, MN Mary Sattler Peltola, AK
John R. Curtis, UT Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, NY
Tom Tiffany, WI Kevin Mullin, CA
Jerry Carl, AL Val T. Hoyle, OR
Matt Rosendale, MT Sydney Kamlager-Dove, CA
Lauren Boebert, CO Seth Magaziner, RI
Cliff Bentz, OR Nydia M. Velazquez, NY
Jen Kiggans, VA Ed Case, HI
Jim Moylan, GU Debbie Dingell, MI
Wesley P. Hunt, TX Susie Lee, NV
Mike Collins, GA
Anna Paulina Luna, FL
John Duarte, CA
Harriet M. Hageman, WY
Vivian Moeglein, Staff Director
Tom Connally, Chief Counsel
Lora Snyder, Democratic Staff Director
http://naturalresources.house.gov
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
PAUL GOSAR, AZ, Chairman
MIKE COLLINS, GA, Vice Chair
MELANIE A. STANSBURY, NM, Ranking Member
Matt Rosendale, MT Ed Case, HI
Wesley P. Hunt, TX Ruben Gallego, AZ
Mike Collins, GA Susie Lee, NV
Anna Paulina Luna, FL Raul M. Grijalva, AZ, ex officio
Bruce Westerman, AR, ex officio
------
CONTENTS
----------
Page
Hearing Memo..................................................... v
Hearing held on Tuesday, September 10, 2024...................... 1
Statement of Members:
Gosar, Hon. Paul, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Arizona................................................. 1
Stansbury, Hon. Melanie A., a Representative in Congress from
the State of New Mexico.................................... 3
Statement of Witnesses:
Panel I:
Williams, Martha, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
Department of the Interior, Washington, DC................. 5
Prepared statement of.................................... 6
Questions submitted for the record....................... 9
Panel II:
Pelletier, Paul, Attorney and Consultant, Pep Talk Advisors,
Fairfax, Virginia.......................................... 17
Prepared statement of.................................... 19
Questions submitted for the record....................... 22
Clemons, Donna (Retired), D.V.M., DACLAM, Retired Research
Veterinarian, Trevor, Wisconsin............................ 23
Prepared statement of.................................... 24
Questions submitted for the record....................... 25
Gillespie, Thomas, Professor & Chair, Department of
Environmental Sciences, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia. 27
Prepared statement of.................................... 28
Questions submitted for the record....................... 30
Abee, Chris, DVM, Professor Emeritus, University of Texas MD
Anderson Cancer Center, Paige, Texas....................... 36
Prepared statement of.................................... 37
Questions submitted for the record....................... 38
Additional Materials Submitted for the Record:
Submissions for the Record by Representative Gosar
Transcript of recorded interview with Mr. Kry............ 16
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
To: Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Republican
Members
From: Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations Staff; Michelle
Lane ([email protected]) and James Lundquist
(James.Lundquist @mail.house.gov), x6-8747
Date: Tuesday, September 10, 2024
Subject: Oversight Hearing on ``The Fish and Wildlife Service Gone
Wild: Examining Operation Long Tail Liberation''
________________________________________________________________________
_______
The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations will hold an
oversight hearing titled ``The Fish and Wildlife Service Gone Wild:
Examining Operation Long Tail Liberation'' on Tuesday, September 10,
2024, at 10:30 a.m. in 1334 Longworth House Office Building.
Member offices are requested to notify Cross Thompson
(Cross.Thompson@ mail.house.gov) by 4:30 p.m. on Monday, September 9,
2024, if their members intend to participate in the hearing.
I. KEY MESSAGES
The Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) conducted an
investigation in the Kingdom of Cambodia (Cambodia), known
as ``Operation Long Tail Liberation,'' to investigate
allegations of exportation to the U.S. of wild-caught long-
tailed macaques falsely labeled as captive-bred. This
investigation spanned at least five years and did not
result in charges or convictions against any U.S.
individual or entity.
In carrying out Operation Long Tail Liberation, the
Service paid a Chinese national, an informant, $225,000 of
government funds to gather information surreptitiously in
Cambodia without the knowledge of the Cambodian Government.
In addition, the Service aided the informant and his family
in finding housing and transportation to the U.S., assisted
in obtaining a visa, and provided job placement services.
When the Service conducted Operation Long Tail Liberation,
they did not notify the local law enforcement agencies. The
Service ran a covert operation on their terms, on foreign
soil, with an improper investigative process.
The U.S. currently leads the world in medical research.
However, without a strong U.S. industry to supply non-human
primates (NHPs) for medical research and testing, China
will dominate the trade of NHPs, lead the world in medical
research and testing, and consequently control the pipeline
for new medicines, vaccines, and treatments.
II. WITNESSES
Panel 1:
Ms. Martha Williams, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, Department of the Interior, Washington, DC
Panel 2:
Mr. Paul Pelletier, Attorney and Consultant, PEP Talk
Advisors, Fairfax, VA
Dr. Chris Abee, DVM, Professor Emeritus, University of
Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, Paige, TX
Dr. Donna Clemons (retired), D.V.M., DACLAM, Retired
Research Veterinarian Trevor, WI
Dr. Thomas Gillespie, Professor & Chair, Department of
Environmental Sciences, Emory University, Atlanta, GA
[Minority Witness]
III. BACKGROUND
On June 5, 2024, the House Committee on Natural Resources
(Committee) sent a letter to the Service to investigate actions taken
during an investigation titled ``Operation Long Tail Liberation.'' \1\
The Service's Office of Law Enforcement conducted this five-year
interagency investigation in Cambodia to investigate allegations of the
acquisition and exportation to the U.S. of wild-caught long-tailed
macaques falsely labeled as captive-bred.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Letter from Rep. Bruce Westerman, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Natural Resources, and Rep. Paul A. Gosar, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations, to Shannon Estenoz, Assistant Secretary for
Fish and Wildlife and Parks, U.S. Department of the Interior, and
Martha Williams, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S.
Department of the Interior (June 5, 2024), https://
naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2024.06.05_hnr_operation_long
_tail_letter.pdf.
\2\ Eight International Wildlife Traffickers Indicted, U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (Nov. 21, 2022), https://www.fws.gov/story/2022-
11/eight-international-wildlife-traffickers-indicted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The long-tailed macaque, a monkey native to Asia, is included in
Appendix II of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES).\3\ Appendix II classifies the
long-tailed macaque as a ``threatened'' species and not ``endangered.''
\4\ This species is in heavy demand by biomedical laboratories,
including in the U.S., for ``combating human infectious disease
outbreaks as they have been widely utilized in the development of human
vaccines including AIDS/HIV, periodontitis and most recently SARS-CoV-
2.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See https://cites.org/eng/taxonomy/term/1132.
\4\ See https://cites.org/eng/node/130903.
\5\ Regina Kate Warne et al., Is biomedical research demand driving
a monkey business?, NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE (Jun. 16, 2023),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10288045/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special permits are required to import long-tailed macaques into
the U.S. due to their listing in the CITES appendices.\6\ While legal
trade primarily involves captive-bred long-tailed macaques, wild-caught
macaques can be legally traded if captured with the local government's
permission.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See https://cites.org/eng/disc/how.php, How CITES Works.
\7\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The long-tailed macaque is the most traded primate in the world for
its uses in medical testing and research.\8\ The U.S. has observed a
significant increase in demand for long-tailed macaques due to the
sudden need for COVID-19 vaccine research, further contributing to a
worldwide shortage of these animals. For example, in 2021 alone, over
30,000 long-tailed macaques were imported to the U.S., with the cost of
a single primate rising to as much as $50,000.\9\ Imports into the U.S.
have recently declined due to import restrictions imposed by the
Service on breeding colonies in Cambodia, and are further exacerbated
by an embargo from the Chinese government.\10\ Medical research in the
U.S. is presently at risk due to a shortage of long-tailed macaque for
medical research purposes, which provides an advantage to the Chinese,
who are looking to develop their medical research pipeline.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Lief Erikson Gamalo, Removal from the wild endangers the once
widespread long-tailed macaque, WILEY ONLINE LIBRARY (Sep. 4, 2023),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ajp.23547?af=R.
\9\ Bringing a Nonhuman Primate into the United States, CENTER FOR
DISEASE CONTROL, https://www.cdc.gov/importation/bringing-an-animal-
into-the-united-states/monkeys.html.
\10\ David Grimm, Supply of monkeys for research is at a crisis
point, U.S. government report concludes, SCIENCE ADVISOR (May 4, 2023),
https://www.science.org/content/article/supply-monkeys-research-crisis-
point-u-s-government-report-concludes.
\11\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Fish and Wildlife Service Paid a Chinese National Informant
In carrying out Operation Long Tail Liberation, the Service relied
on a paid informant to surreptitiously gather information outside of
the U.S., in Cambodia, without the knowledge of the Cambodian
Government. For background purposes, undercover operations undertaken
overseas are typically conducted with the full knowledge and consent of
a government, particularly a friendly government, to avoid diplomatic
issues. The Committee understands that in this case, the Cambodian
Government had no knowledge of this investigation, which would be
highly unusual.
The paid informant, Veng Lim Yeung (Yeung), whom the Service
nicknamed ``Francis,'' was a Chinese national working at a primate
facility in Cambodia.\12\ Sarah Kite, an employee of Cruelty-Free
International, a London environmental organization, introduced the
Service to Yeung,\13\ who had originally contacted Cruelty-Free
International in search of a salary.\14\ The information gathered by
the paid informant would become the basis of indictments for illegally
importing long-tailed macaques into the U.S.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Trial Transcript 3-15-24 PM Manera Direct pp 65 et seq, March
15, 2024.
\13\ Id. at 64-65.
\14\ Trial Transcript 3-14-24 AM Yeung Direct pp 189-190, March 14,
2024.
\15\ See Case 1:22-cr-20340-KMW, United States v. Masphal Kry,
Exhibit A to Defendant's Masphal Kry's Reply in Support of Motion to
Conduct Depositions Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.15 from the lawsuit for
a concise description of these issues, which are also discussed in
court transcripts.
In court records, Yeung admitted to receiving almost $225,000 from
the Service throughout the investigation.\16\ Additionally, as part of
that investigation, Yeung admitted to installing spyware on a computer
at his place of employment,\17\ providing access to a security camera
at the gate of the facility to Service agents,\18\ and stealing a
visitor logbook from his employer,\19\ among other actions. Following
his work for the U.S. in Cambodia, the U.S. government paid Yeung and
his family to relocate to the U.S.,\20\ and provided him with a bank
account and housing assistance,\21\ and aided him in obtaining
authorization to work in the U.S.\22\ All of this came at significant
expense to the taxpayer and the Service's programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Id. at 193.
\17\ Trial Transcript 3-15-24 AM Yeung Cross Examination p. 16,
March 15, 2024.
\18\ Id. at 13.
\19\ Id. at 16-17.
\20\ Trial Transcript 3-15-24 PM Manera Direct p 82, March 15,
2024.
\21\ Id. at 85-87.
\22\ Id. at 87.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Improper Investigation Uncovered in Court
On November 16, 2022, the Department of Justice announced the
conclusion of Operation Long Tail Liberation with an eight-count
indictment charging ``two officials of the Cambodian Forestry
Administration, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; the
owner/founder of a major primate supply organization and its general
manager; and four of its employees with smuggling and conspiracy to
violate the Lacey Act and the Endangered Species Act.'' \23\ Of those,
only Masphal Kry, the Deputy Director of the Department of Wildlife and
Biodiversity for the Cambodian Forestry Administration, stood trial in
the U.S.\24\ However, Mr. Kry was acquitted of all charges after a two-
week trial, where court records revealed potential misconduct by the
Service throughout their investigation.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of Florida,
Cambodian Officials and Six Co-conspirators Indicted for Taking Part in
Primate Smuggling Scheme, U.S., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Nov. 16, 2022),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfl/pr/cambodian-officials-and-six-co-
conspirators-indicted-taking-part-primate-smuggling-0.
\24\ Jay Weaver, Cambodian official acquitted of smuggling rare
wild monkeys into South Florida, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 25, 2024), https://
www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article 287073860.html.
\25\ Daniel Gligich, U.S. wildlife officials paid a Chinese
national $224k to spy on Cambodia. Their top target was just
acquitted., THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY SUN (Apr. 1, 2024), https://
sjvsun.com/u-s/u-s-wildlife-officials-paid-a-chinese-national-224k-to-
spy-on-cambodia-their-top-target-was-just-acquitted/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rather than utilizing standard processes available under CITES and
international laws for their investigation, the Service conducted a
covert operation in Cambodia without notifying the national government.
In addition, it is unclear what policies guide the engagement and
vetting of paid informants in these types of investigations. In this
instance, it is clear from his own words and actions that a possible
motivation for Yeung, the paid informant, was to seek payment from
anyone who would hire him.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Trial Transcript 3-14-24 AM Yeung Direct Examination pp 182-
184, March 14, 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Court records also call into question the adequacy of the Service's
background investigations before hiring Yeung as a paid informant. For
example, during proceedings to acquire U.S. citizenship, Yeung signed
an affidavit that excluded the fact that he had previously been married
to another Chinese National.\27\ Yeung failed to provide this
information to Service law enforcement agents, nor was this revealed in
any background checks or clearances that the Service or other federal
agencies performed during his vetting as a paid informant.\28\ Yeung
also admitted in court to smuggling hundreds of wild-caught monkeys
while working for the Service.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Id. at 166-171.
\28\ Trial Transcript 3-15-24 AM Yeung Cross Examination p. 35,
March 15, 2024.
\29\ Id. at 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are also fundamental questions about whether the Service's
investigation against officials in the Cambodian Government was legal
and whether it followed Service policies and guidance. For example,
during the investigation, Yeung admitted to stealing electronic records
from his employer for the Service, installing a computer program on
office computers to allow the Service to watch surveillance cameras at
the primate facility, and purchasing recording devices and secret
cameras to record meetings and events, all without authorization from
his employer or the Cambodian Government.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Trial Transcript 3-15-24 AM Yeung Cross Examination p. 13 et
seq, March 15, 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Service's compliance with basic recordkeeping and secure
systems requirements has been called into question due to several
actions. It is evident that they did not readily disclose
communications between Service agents and the paid informant during the
trial. Additionally, there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the
disclosure of text messages and other communications between the
Service and Yeung, as well as the destruction of certain communication
records during the investigation.
Furthermore, information that emerged during subsequent court
proceedings has raised concerns about the use of a Google Drive set up
by Yeung for sharing information obtained during the investigation with
Service agents.
C. Impact on Domestic Businesses and Medical Research
At the conclusion of the trial, two U.S. citizens from private U.S.
companies involved in the domestic industry for providing long-tailed
macaques for medical testing remain ``unindicted co-conspirators''
within the indictment.\31\ This has created a serious unresolved legal
situation for these individuals and their companies--as they remain
``unindicted co-conspirators,'' they will not have the opportunity to
defend themselves or their companies in court.\32\ As a result, U.S.
companies have experienced reputational repercussions from Operation
Long Tail Liberation, despite the investigation yielding zero
convictions or charges for U.S. citizens or companies.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Paul Pelletier, Briefing memo--Oversight Subcommittee, PEP
TALK ADVISORS (July 7, 2024), On file with Committee.
\32\ Id.
\33\ Christopher Cann, Small town residents unite to fight a common
enemy: A huge monkey farm, USA Today (Jan. 28, 2024), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2024/01/28/monkey-farm-breeding-
medical-science-research/72339272007/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. has long sought to establish domestic sources for the
long-tailed macaque in order to reduce dependence on imports from
countries such as China.\34\ At the moment, the U.S. and most other
countries must rely on ``China's export to test for new treatments for
cardiovascular diseases, neurological disorder and cancers.'' \35\
However, public campaigns by People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (PETA), Cruelty-Free International, and other left-wing
advocacy groups, coupled with the actions of the Service to restrict
the trade of the long-tailed macaque, are crippling the domestic
industry.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Id.
\35\ Steve Boggan, China's plan for medical domination: If there's
another pandemic, the West could be dependent on Beijing for vaccine
development, UNHERD (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.nabr.org/about-nabr/
news/implications-nhp-shortages-us-biomedical-research.
\36\ Pelletier, supra note 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now, U.S. companies are being penalized through the denial of CITES
permits for the import of captive-bred NHPs, including the long-tailed
macaque, that were born in the U.S., and those related to Cambodia.\37\
This is reportedly due to the Service questioning the ``legal
acquisition'' of the parental stock of NHPs from Cambodia, even if
legally imported into the U.S. and previously authorized by the
Service.\38\ The blanket denial of permits for captive-bred NHPs within
the U.S. that have a connection to Cambodia has seriously affected the
nascent domestic industry for NHPs, and ``business and research has
been substantially impacted.'' \39\ The ability to obtain permits to
export the blood samples and tissue samples of NHPs, a common practice
in the industry, has also been restricted.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Id.
\38\ Id.
\39\ Id.
\40\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. PETA's Close Relationship with the Fish and Wildlife Service
Radical, left-wing advocacy groups, particularly PETA, have
aggressively lobbied the Biden-Harris administration for the total halt
on not only the import of NHPs, particularly the long-tailed macaque,
but also the use of NHPs for medical testing and research.\41\ For
years, PETA has waged a public campaign to pressure the U.S. government
to classify the long-tailed macaque as endangered under the Endangered
Species Act and ultimately eliminate imports of the long-tailed
macaque, despite the vast repercussions for medical research in the
U.S.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Updates: Campaign to Shut Down the Violent Monkey-Importation
Industry, PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, https://
www.peta.org/features/campaign-updates-monkey-importation/.
\42\ Id.
PETA has targeted the Service with their advocacy efforts, and has
strongly supported Operation Long Tail Liberation,\43\ as the
investigation became a popular fundraising tool for PETA over the last
several years.\44\ This effort is ongoing--after the conclusion of the
trial resulting from Operation Long Tail Liberation, PETA initiated a
petition urging the Service to: \45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Id.
\44\ Id.
\45\ Forests Emptied to Fill Laboratories With Endangered Monkeys--
Act Now to Stop This!, PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS,
https://support.peta.org/page/65925/action/1?locale=en-US.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
End all monkey imports from Asia immediately.
Speed up its investigation into U.S. companies that profit
from illegally captured monkeys.
Indict the unnamed U.S. coconspirators in the just-
concluded case.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Id.
Due to the conduct of the Service throughout Operation Long Tail
Liberation, and the intense pressure campaign by radical left-wing
groups to halt all imports of NHPs, the Committee is concerned
regarding the Service's perceived close relationships with PETA and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cruelty-Free International.
As previously stated, Ms. Kite from Cruelty-Free International
first introduced the Service to Yeung for Operation Long Tail
Liberation.\47\ The information Yeung gathered formed the unstable
foundation for the indictments following Operation Long Tail
Liberation.\48\ The Committee has sought information on the discussions
that took place between these organizations and the Service that
resulted in the hiring of Yeung as an informant, and whether any
information relating to this matter was improperly shared with these
organizations.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Trial Transcript 3-15-24 PM Manera Direct pp 64-65 et seq,
March 15, 2024.
\48\ See Case 1:22-cr-20340-KMW, United States v. Masphal Kry,
Exhibit A to Defendant's Masphal Kry's Reply in Support of Motion to
Conduct Depositions Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.15 from the lawsuit for
a concise description of these issues, which are also discussed in
court transcripts.
\49\ See, e.g., Trial Transcript 3-13-24 AM p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee has received information that PETA improperly
obtained a document related to the trial of Mr. Kry.\50\ In the Mr. Kry
removal proceeding, Service Agent Dorothy Manera attached a copy of the
indictment to her affidavit.\51\ However, PETA released a press release
on November 16, 2022, the same day the indictment was unsealed, with an
identical copy of this same indictment.\52\ The Committee finds this
concerning, as that copy of the indictment was not yet available to the
general public at the time of the PETA press release.\53\ It remains
unclear how PETA could have obtained that copy of the indictment before
it was available to the general public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Paul Pelletier, Follow-up-Longtail Discussion (July 4, 2024).
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Indictments. On file with Committee.
\51\ AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF REMOVAL TO THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
FLORIDA in the United States District Court Eastern District of New
York. United States of America v. Masphal Kry, No. 22-mj-01230. On file
with Committee.
\52\ Tasgola Bruner, PETA Statement: Feds Indict International
Monkey Smugglers Who Supply U.S. Labs, PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT
OF ANIMALS (Nov. 16, 2022), https://www.peta.org/media/news-releases/
peta-statement-feds-indict-international-monkey-smugglers-who-supply-u-
s-labs/.
\53\ Longtail Discussion, supra note 50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. CONCLUSION
The conclusion of Operation Long Tail Liberation revealed serious
concerns with how the Service carried out their investigation,
primarily actions related to their Chinese paid informant. The Service
failed to follow standard processes available under CITES and
international laws for their investigation, rather choosing to conduct
a covert operation without informing the Cambodian Government.
Congressional oversight is required to explain the shortcomings of this
investigation, resolve outstanding concerns, and examine the close
relationship of PETA and other left-wing organizations with the
Service.
OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE GONE WILD:
EXAMINING OPERATION LONG
TAIL LIBERATION
----------
Tuesday, September 10, 2024
U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Natural Resources
Washington, DC
----------
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in
Room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Paul Gosar
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Gosar, Collins; and Stansbury.
Also present: Representative Wittman.
Dr. Gosar. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
will come to order.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the Subcommittee at any time.
The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear the testimony on
the Fish and Wildlife Service gone wild, examining Operation
Long Tail Liberation.
Under Committee Rule 4(f), any oral opening statements are
limited to the Chairman and the Ranking Member. I, therefore,
ask unanimous consent that all other Members' statements be
made part of the hearing record if they are submitted in
accordance with Committee Rule 3(o).
Without objection, so ordered.
With non-Subcommittee members participating, I ask
unanimous consent that the following Members be allowed to sit
and participate in today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I think we have Mr. Wittman from Virginia.
I now recognize myself for my opening statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. PAUL GOSAR, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA
Dr. Gosar. Good morning, everyone. I would like to take a
moment to welcome our witnesses.
Thank you for coming before this Committee today to discuss
the Fish and Wildlife Service gone wild, examining Operation
Long Tail Liberation.
First, I would like to acknowledge that the men and women
who serve us as special agents for the Fish and Wildlife
Services generally are and do incredible work for our nation,
and they have my great appreciation. However, I believe that
leadership has failed to support them.
Today, the Committee will examine the Fish and Wildlife
Service's failed covert investigation in the Kingdom of
Cambodia, Operation Long Tail Liberation, which attempted to
expose the alleged illegal exploitation of wild caught long-
tailed macaques, falsely labeled as ``captive bred,'' from
Cambodia to the United States.
The long-tailed macaque is the most traded non-human
primate in the world because they are necessary for medical
research, including the development of drugs, vaccines,
biomedical research, and treatments. The United States is
considered the world leader in medical testing and research. As
demand has grown for the long-tailed macaques, spurred by the
COVID-19 pandemic, the United States sought to establish a
domestic industry for supplying non-human primates for medical
testing and research purposes. In response, radical animal
rights groups such as PETA and the Cruelty Free International
have aggressively lobbied the Fish and Wildlife Service to
classify the long-tailed macaque as endangered, and therefore
halt all imports to the United States.
Meanwhile, China is taking steps to dominate the world
trade of non-human primates. If they accomplish this, China
will lead the world on medical research and testing, and
subsequently control the pipeline for any new medicines,
vaccines, and treatments.
I want to be clear here. We are all talking about potential
cures for cancer, Alzheimer's, things of that nature, not just
the COVID vaccine.
From what the Committee has observed throughout our
investigation, poor leadership at the Fish and Wildlife
Service, a lack of establishment guidance for investigations,
and influence from radical non-profits led to the deeply flawed
Operation Long Tail Liberation. The investigation ended in an
embarrassment. After 5 years, the operation resulted in an
eight-count indictment, but only one person stood trial in the
United States, a Cambodian official, for a brief, 2-week trial
that resulted in an acquittal of all charges.
Additionally, two American citizens from domestic companies
involved in the trade of non-human primates are listed in the
indictment as unindicted co-conspirators. These individuals
were never provided the opportunity to clear their name. The
unresolved legal situation continues to harm their businesses
and the reputation of the domestic industry for non-human
primates.
However, the Committee is most concerned with the
methodology used for this ill-fated operation. To start, the
Fish and Wildlife Service has conducted Operation Long Tail
Liberation without notifying the Cambodian Government. This
violates policy for international investigations and places
undercover agents in compromising positions while operating in
a foreign country. The agency also reportedly failed to operate
in accordance with the Department of Justice for this
investigation, instead choosing to run this covert operation on
their own terms.
Perhaps most alarming, the Fish and Wildlife Service
introduced national security vulnerabilities to their
investigation when they contracted a Chinese national to gather
information on behalf of the United States. The Service paid
this informant approximately $225,000 and generously moved him
and his family to the United States, all at the expense of the
American taxpayer. Cruelty Free International, a radical animal
rights group, first introduced the Services to the Chinese
national, who was employed at a primate facility in Cambodia at
the time.
The American people deserve an explanation for these and
other mistakes made throughout Operation Long Tail Liberation,
and for the Fish and Wildlife Service's close relationship with
PETA and Cruelty Free International.
The Committee has received information that PETA, on two
separate occasions, allegedly obtained documents and images
from the indictment and the trial that had not yet been
released to the public, meaning someone leaked the information
to PETA. PETA and Cruelty Free International have benefited
from the publicity of the Operation Long Tail Liberation
through their substantial fundraising efforts, focused on
declassifying the long-tailed macaque as endangered, and banned
all imports of non-human primates.
Clearly, the Department of the Interior is a mess under
President Biden and Harris' administration. There is no
accountability at any level for their failures. While I
recognize this investigation may have begun under the last
administration, it was allowed to spiral out of control under
this Administration and now there are real consequences. We
cannot risk handing over our medical research and ultimately
our drug and vaccine pipeline to China for the sake of faulty
investigation.
I will now recognize the Ranking Member for her opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. MELANIE A. STANSBURY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Ms. Stansbury. Thank you, Chairman Gosar, and thank you to
our witnesses for being here today.
I just want to start by saying this is an extremely
difficult topic. And I think, obviously, we are going to hear a
lot about the case today. But for me personally, listening to
the treatment and illegal trafficking of primates is a very
difficult topic.
As was said, long-tailed macaques are the most traded
primate in the world. In the United States, they are used to
test medicine and vaccines before they are used for humans. And
in theory, these monkeys are bred in captivity specifically for
that research. They have to be captive bred because wild
macaques often carry diseases that can skew the results of a
study to determine if a drug will cause health problems in
people. And wild populations are increasingly endangered, and
poaching is a huge threat.
But let me be clear about my personal position on this
issue. I believe that we should not be doing human testing on
primates at all, and need further alternatives to address our
medical and other needs.
But sadly, many of these primates are continuing to be
caught in the wild, poached from their natural habitats, and
shipped to the United States under falsified permits. Because
the true source of these primates has been altered, this
process has been called ``monkey laundering.''
In 2017, Fish and Wildlife Service agents began an
investigation into a major monkey laundering ring. They looked
into a Chinese company called Vanny Holdings with these
breeding facilities in Cambodia that were allegedly exporting
large numbers of wild macaques into the United States, these
are not captive bred, under falsified permits required under
the international treaty which regulates these, which is known
as CITES. Vanny was using corrupt officials in high places in
Cambodia to help falsify those permits, and one of those
officials was arrested when he came through the United States.
In the end, this individual was acquitted, not because
there was not a crime, but because they didn't have sufficient
evidence to show the conspiracy. But there is little dispute
that the monkey laundering scheme was happening, thanks to the
meticulous investigations conducted by Fish and Wildlife
agents, which are our Federal law enforcement who conduct these
investigations.
It is apparently a well-known industry secret in recent
years the price of a single macaque has risen to as much as
$60,000 per animal. To maintain the supply of profitable
monkeys, this multi-billion-dollar animal importation and
research industry has invested a lot of time and money into
lobbying, apparently into Congress now, and at least one of the
Majority's witnesses reflects that investment.
There are outstanding indictments for several other
individuals affiliated with this monkey laundering ring, and
the investigation is continuing to be ongoing. And we are still
here, in the Minority, trying to understand why exactly this
hearing was called in the middle of a Federal law enforcement
investigation and trial.
Let's be clear. The agents of the Fish and Wildlife Service
did their jobs, and they did them correctly. They followed
investigative procedures and standards. They received the
appropriate approvals and revealed serious flaws in the supply
chain of these monkeys. And, in fact, the investigation was
initially authorized under the Trump administration, and
continued under the current Administration. Authorization was
given for the informant and compensation was given, and the
Trump administration renewed this investigation four times.
Why? Because it is a very serious issue. In transnational
organized crime, wildlife trafficking are all wrapped up
together, and this is why we do this kind of Federal law
enforcement.
And the proceeds from this organized wildlife trafficking
often funds terrorism abroad. So, the attacks that we are about
to hear in this hearing today are questionable, I have to say,
because we know that our Federal law enforcement did what they
were asked to do, and that this is an ongoing investigation.
But I want to be clear. We need alternatives. We cannot
continue to put our country and our communities at risk, and
also these animals. And I believe it is inhumane.
I also want to close by highlighting an urgent and
unresolved problem related to this case. In New Mexico, we have
more than two dozen chimpanzees who are sitting in limbo in a
primate facility that we have been trying to get released. And
similarly, Charles River Laboratories is holding 1,000
Cambodian macaques of mixed and uncertain origins because of
this case. Those animals could be killed, they could be sent to
another country, or they could be put in an animal sanctuary.
And it is our hope that the importers who made a lot of money
on this monkey laundering scheme will foot the bill to make
sure that those animals are safely transported and put in the
care of a sanctuary.
With that, I yield back.
Dr. Gosar. I thank the gentlewoman for her comments. I will
now introduce the witnesses to our first panel: Ms. Martha
Williams, Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S.
Department of the Interior, Washington, DC.
Let me remind the witness that under Committee Rules, you
must limit your oral statement to 5 minutes, but your whole
testimony will be submitted to the record.
I think you can see the green, red, and yellow lights. You
will have to focus right up here if you are talking. When you
see the green, you are ready to go. When you are yellow, start
closing up. And red, shut it down.
With that, I now recognize Ms. Williams for her 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARTHA WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE
SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Williams. Good morning, Chairman Gosar, Ranking Member
Stansbury, and members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you today to discuss just how
important it is for our nation's well-being and defense that we
work together to combat wildlife crime.
This is a bipartisan issue. Since the early 1900s, Congress
has passed laws to facilitate legal trade in wildlife and
prevent the illegal trade, including the Lacey Act, CITES, and
the Endangered Species Act.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, through our Office of
Law Enforcement, is the lead Federal agency for protecting
natural resources and effective enforcement of these criminal
and civil laws. Wildlife trafficking is a multi-billion dollar
illicit industry carried out by highly organized and dangerous
transnational criminal syndicates that are increasingly
diversifying into wildlife trafficking as an avenue for profit.
Along with other criminal activities, including drugs, weapons,
and human trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism, these
organizations pose a serious threat to our national security,
economic prosperity, global health, wildlife conservation, and
community stability.
The work of our law enforcement office is critically
important to disrupting wildlife trafficking. In 2023, our
special agents were involved in over 9,000 wildlife crime
investigations that resulted in nearly $3 million in fines and
penalties, over 60 years of prison time, and 222 years of
probation. Our work levels the playing field for law-abiding
businesses, brings criminals to justice, and protects the
national security interests of the United States.
Because many of our investigations into wildlife
trafficking involve convergence with other crimes committed by
criminal syndicates, our special agents work closely with the
Department of the Defense, DEA, Homeland Security, and more.
All of our Service's investigations are carefully coordinated
with Interior solicitors and the Department of Justice and
Assistant U.S. Attorneys. We also coordinate with the State
Department on any international investigation.
Combating wildlife trafficking and transnational criminal
syndicates is not a partisan issue. There has been bipartisan
support for this work across parties and across
administrations. President Obama established the Task Force on
Wildlife Trafficking. President Trump issued Executive Order
13773 on countering transnational criminal organizations,
including those involved in wildlife trafficking. President
Biden has continued these efforts, and Congress has supported
this work through passage of the bipartisan End Wildlife
Trafficking Act.
The investigation that is the subject of today's hearing is
also non-partisan. The last administration initiated the
investigation that we have continued under this Administration.
This investigation targeted individuals who allegedly conspired
to poach macaques from the wild, launder them through Chinese-
owned captive breeding facilities in Cambodia, and export them
to the United States with fraudulent CITES permits issued by
corrupt officials within the Cambodian Government.
This is an active, ongoing investigation. While one of the
individuals has been tried, there are seven additional indicted
individuals with outstanding arrest warrants. To avoid
compromising any criminal proceedings, there are law
enforcement and legal matters that I will not be able to
comment on today.
This alleged illegal activity undercut companies operating
legally, led to corruption with a foreign government, and put
imperiled species at further risk, and potentially compromised
the integrity of the biomedical research in this country by
introducing wild macaques with high zoonotic disease risk into
the supply chain, all for money.
I want to emphasize the Service understands the importance
of lifesaving biomedical research. There is not and never has
been a ban on the import of long tailed macaques into the
United States. Legal imports of CITES-listed species are
commonplace.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today to shed
light on our nation's interest in combating illegal wildlife
crime through investigations such as the one that is the
subject of today's hearing. I would be pleased to answer any
questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Williams follows:]
Prepared Statement of Martha Williams, Director, United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior
Good morning, Chairman Gosar, Ranking Member Stansbury, and Members
of the Subcommittee. I am Martha Williams, Director of the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (Service) within the Department of the Interior
(Department). I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today
regarding the Service's efforts to carry out its conservation mission
by enforcing wildlife laws, regulating wildlife trade, and
investigating wildlife crimes through the Service's Office of Law
Enforcement (OLE).
The mission of the Service is working with others to conserve,
protect, and enhance fish, wildlife, and plants and their habitats for
the continuing benefit of the American people. The Service's
responsibilities include conserving migratory birds, preventing
wildlife disease, combating invasive species, protecting and recovering
threatened and endangered species, and promoting global wildlife
conservation--all of which rely upon enforcement of relevant criminal
and civil laws, such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, and Lacey Act. The Service is the lead federal agency
for protecting wildlife and plant resources through the effective
enforcement of federal laws, regulations, and international treaties.
Wildlife trafficking was once predominantly a crime of opportunity
committed by individuals or small groups. Today, wildlife trafficking
is largely carried out by international criminal organizations that are
well-structured, highly organized, and capable of illegally moving
large commercial volumes of wildlife and wildlife products and
laundering its proceeds. These transnational criminal organizations
engage in other illicit activities threatening national security,
including money laundering, narcotics trafficking, weapons trafficking,
and human smuggling. What was once a local or regional problem has
become a global crisis, as increasingly sophisticated and violent
criminal organizations have branched into wildlife trafficking. This
multi-billion-dollar illegal trade is fueled by consumer demand and
enabled by corruption, limited legal authorities and law enforcement
capabilities, a lack of political will to prioritize countermeasures,
and often weak institutions abroad.
Wildlife trafficking is a serious threat to conservation, national
security, economic prosperity, global health, and community stability.
The Administration is committed to continuing efforts to address it
through a whole of government approach coordinated by the Presidential
Task Force on Wildlife Trafficking (Task Force). As part of the Task
Force, which the Department co-chairs along with the Departments of
State and Justice, the Service works alongside 16 other agencies to
strengthen enforcement, reduce demand, and build international
cooperation to end wildlife trafficking.
Wildlife trafficking causes significant injury to wildlife
populations in the United States and abroad. For example, in the Gulf
of California off of Mexico, organized criminal groups have continued
to harvest the large marine fish totoaba despite it being listed under
the ESA and under Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Totoaba is
valuable for its swim bladder, with a single pound of swim bladder
estimated at between $8,000-$12,500. Many of these illegally harvested
swim bladders are trafficked from Mexico through the United States to
the People's Republic of China for use as a delicacy for consumption
and in traditional medicine. Unfortunately, the illegal fishery has
drastic effects beyond this species; nets set to catch totoaba also
take a species of porpoise called the vaquita. One of the world's most
endangered marine mammals, the vaquita has been reduced to an estimated
population of fewer than 15 individuals, with only 6-8 individuals
observed in the recent 2024 survey. Both totoaba and vaquita are
considered to be facing extremely high risk of extinction. There are
numerous other examples of species that have had their populations
drastically impacted as the result of illicit trafficking.
The Service's OLE, working with other federal, state, Tribal, and
international law enforcement partners, plays a key role in disrupting
and shutting down this lucrative and harmful illegal business. OLE's
investigative and enforcement activities are led by roughly 220 special
agents and 103 wildlife inspectors stationed domestically and around
the globe. In the United States, OLE was responsible for inspecting
175,223 declared shipments, valued at over $4.6 billion in legal
commerce, at 17 ports of entry in 2023. In addition, OLE personnel are
stationed as attaches at 10 U.S. embassies and stations in countries
that drive or enable the illegal wildlife trade. In Fiscal Year 2023,
the work of OLE personnel contributed to over 9,600 wildlife crime
investigations and court-ordered restitution of $1.9 million in fines,
$1 million in civil penalties, 64 years in prison, and 222 years of
probation.
The Service's OLE works with partners on cases that not only
protect domestic resources and the economy, but also disrupt
transnational criminal organizations that threaten national security.
Through an OLE-led five-year investigation coordinated with the Drug
Enforcement Administration and Department of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland
Security Investigations (HSI), Operation Apex resulted in the seizure
of six tons of shark fins and $200,000 worth of endangered totoaba fish
bladders, while also uncovering over $4 million in cash, narcotics, and
firearms. All 12 defendants pleaded guilty and are serving a combined
250 months of incarceration and 60 months of probation. In another
example, in 2023, a Malaysian national was convicted of conspiring with
criminal associates in Laos, Vietnam, and China to launder money from
the illicit sale of rhino horns and pangolin scales. This conviction
resulted from a multi-year, international investigation carried out by
OLE and resulted in the first time the U.S. Treasury Department
sanctioned foreign co-conspirators for the illegal poaching of
rhinoceros. During these investigations and many others, the Service,
like many federal law enforcement agencies, used a number of common law
enforcement tools including undercover operations, the use of
informants, controlled purchases of evidence and information, and other
evidence collection methodologies. The Service's use of these tools
comports with all appropriate legal and statutory requirements as well
as Service and Department policies.
The Service's close coordination with DOJ is critical, as DOJ has
responsibility for federal criminal prosecutions. OLE investigations
are a collaborative effort in which our special agents work closely
with Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs). To initiate high-profile or
sensitive investigations, agents must first present allegations of
criminal activity to DOJ, the Department's Office of the Solicitor, and
Service managers, who may either approve or deny the investigation.
Special agents and AUSAs work closely throughout every aspect of
investigations, and investigative methods such as the use of
informants, the issuance of grand jury subpoenas, and applications for
search and arrest warrants are subject to DOJ review and approval. For
any investigative activities that take place in foreign countries, the
Service coordinates with DOJ, including Attorney-Advisors from the DOJ
Environmental Crimes Section, Department of State, and other agencies.
Today's hearing is focused on one of the Service's recent
investigations, titled ``Operation Long-Tailed Liberation.'' This is an
active law enforcement matter. The operation was approved in May 2018
in support of President Trump's Executive Order (EO) 13773, ``Enforcing
Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and
Preventing International Trafficking.'' This EO directed federal
agencies to strengthen enforcement of federal law to thwart
transnational criminal organizations that presented a threat to public
safety and national security through the ``illegal smuggling and
trafficking of humans, drugs or other substances, wildlife, and
weapons.'' EO 13773 also directed federal law enforcement agencies,
such as the Service, to ``give a high priority and devote sufficient
resources'' to these types of investigations while enhancing
cooperation with foreign counterparts through the sharing of
intelligence and law enforcement information.
In 2020, the People's Republic of China instituted policies that
restricted the export of wildlife, including non-human primates, which
are traded for biomedical research. The restrictions were implemented
following the COVID-19 pandemic and have significantly reduced the
nation's supply of non-human primates. As a result, other countries,
including Cambodia, have increased their exports to meet the ongoing
demand for live non-human primates in the United States. From 2018 to
2022, 155,772 live non-human primates were cleared by the Service and
imported into the United States for biomedical research. Of that total,
66,011 live non-human primates were cleared by the Service and imported
into the United States from Cambodia, or 42.4% of the total number
imported.
Long-tailed macaques, also known as crab-eating macaques, are one
of the most common non-human primate species imported from Cambodia for
biomedical research. However, long-tailed macaques are also protected
under CITES and require permits in order to be imported into the United
States. The Service's investigation sought to implement EO 13773 and
CITES by increasing OLE's efforts to address organizations that were
allegedly involved in the illegal smuggling and trafficking of
wildlife, particularly long-tail macaques, from foreign countries to
meet demand in the United States.
In November 2022, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of Florida announced a superseding indictment against eight
individuals charged with smuggling and conspiracy to violate the Lacey
Act and the ESA. The defendants facing these felony charges include the
owner and founder of a major primate supply organization, its general
manager and four employees, and two officials of the Cambodian Forestry
Administration, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
(MAFF). The indictment reflects the Operation Long-Tailed Liberation
investigation and alleges that these individuals conspired to acquire
wild-caught macaques and launder them through Cambodian entities for
export to the United States and elsewhere, falsely labelled as bred in
captivity. As alleged in the indictment, in order to make up for a
shortage of suitable monkeys at breeding facilities in Cambodia, the
co-conspirators enlisted the assistance of the CITES authority in
Cambodia and the MAFF to deliver wild-caught macaques illegally taken
from multiple sources, including national parks and protected areas in
Cambodia. The indictment alleges that these illegally taken wild
macaques were delivered to breeding facilities and in some cases they
were subsequently exported under falsified CITES export permits.
Since the November 2022 indictment, the Service has met with
numerous federal agency partners regarding the alleged trafficking of
long-tailed macaques and falsification of CITES documents. We continue
to discuss shipments and permits with importers on a case-by-case basis
and are assessing ways to improve the government's ability to verify
parentage and captive-bred status of non-human primates. There is not,
and has never been, a national ban on non-human primate imports into
the United States. Any imports of CITES-listed species, including long-
tailed macaques, into the United States must comply with all applicable
federal laws and regulations, including those found at 50 CFR Part 23.
Importers are responsible for proving the validity of their permits,
which includes the source of the species, in order for OLE to clear the
import into the country. The Service will continue to work with other
federal agencies, foreign governments, industry, and others to ensure
the sustainable and legal trade of wildlife, including long-tailed
macaques.
The Service is committed to combatting the illegal wildlife trade.
We appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee. We
welcome the opportunity to provide additional information and answer
questions to the best of our ability given that this remains an active
investigation.
______
Questions Submitted for the Record to Ms. Martha Williams, Director,
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Ms. Williams did not submit responses to the Committee by the
appropriate deadline for inclusion in the printed record.
Questions Submitted by Representative Gosar
Question 1. Are there procedures at the service or internal at DOI
which allow your agency to conduct a foreign operation without the
consent of that nation's government?
Question 2. Did the Service notify the Department of Justice's
Office of International Affairs that it was conducting this unusual and
potentially illegal operation?
Question 3. Who exactly was notified at the Department of the
Interior about Operation Long Tail Liberation in Cambodia?
Question 4. Does the Fish and Wildlife Service have written
training materials for its law enforcement officers related to criminal
procedure, including suspect interrogation?
Question 5. Can you commit to providing the Committee with any
training materials the Fish and Wildlife Service uses to train its law
enforcement officers?
Question 6. What are the departmental policies that allowed the
Service to hire a foreign informant?
Question 7. What policies allow the Service to set the compensation
of paid, covert informants, and who approves these payments?
Question 8. Did the Service authorize the informant to steal
documents and use U.S. spying equipment while carrying out his mission?
Question 9. Does the Service rely on the assistance of animal
rights groups such as PETA, Born Free, and Cruelty Free International
when carrying out international operations?
Question 10. Did the Service actively attempt to arrange employment
for the informant with animal right groups like PETA, Born Free and
Cruelty Free International?
Question 11. Are you aware that China has proclaimed this species
of non-human primate to be of strategic national importance to their
country? And, what does that mean to you?
Question 12. Does China have anything to gain while US medical
research is handcuffed by questionable accusations and investigations
of this sort?
Question 13. It is our understanding that ``operation long tail
macaque'' involves only 8 CITES shipments, however the Service has, in
essence, issued an embargo on all imports and re-exports of not only
live animals but also derivatives that are part of ongoing biomedical
research going back 5 years. How does the Service justify this overly
broad approach? What due process has been offered to permit holders who
(detrimentally, as it turns out) relied on USFWS issued CITES permits
that have now been suspended? Has the Service consulted with the
biomedical community to better understand the impact of these permit
denials on critical time sensitive research and to seek ways to
mitigate the damage when the imports/re-exports are not directly
related to the 8 shipments at issue in the indictment?
Questions Submitted by Representative Stansbury
Question 1. I understand there are over 1,000 macaques from
Cambodia that are now in limbo here in the U.S. because they can't be
used in research and they can't be returned to the wild. What is the
status and fate of those macaques?
Question 2. Would you please explain why the larger investigation,
of which this Kry trial is a part, is important?
Question 3. Please explain why investigating transnational
organized crime is so important and what Fish and Wildlife's role is in
that?
Question 4. As we all know, the use of informants is common in
investigations. Why was it so important in this particular
investigation?
Question 5. Was the amount paid to this informant unusual for an
investigation of this magnitude, importance, and duration?
Question 6. What was the basis for the acquittal in the case? Was
it because there was not a crime committed?
Question 7. Is there any doubt that the origin of wild macaques
from Cambodia were being laundered?
______
Dr. Gosar. Thank you, Ms. Williams. We will now recognize
our Members for their questions. The first one is the Vice
Chair, the Member from Georgia, Mr. Collins.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Williams, as you are aware, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service participated in the arrest of a high-ranking
Cambodian Government official in the JFK Airport as part of
this investigation in November 2022. Mr. Kry was detained in
the airport, arrested, and denied access to an attorney or his
embassy staff before being questioned, despite clearly not
understanding his rights.
So, I want to put aside for a second any crimes that may
have taken place. Mr. Kry is basically your counterpart, but
for Cambodia, which is a friendly nation. Now, if you were
arrested in a friendly nation while traveling on official
government business with a diplomatic passport, at a minimum
would you have expected to have access to an American embassy
before being interrogated, especially if that is a right
guaranteed by that country?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, Congressman Collins, I first want
to answer that we did follow all required procedures.
The answer is I would not, frankly, from this government,
entertain corrupt dealings. So, I would never be at risk of
that.
Mr. Collins. It is just a yes or no question is all I was
trying to get.
Ms. Williams. Could you repeat the question, then, please?
Mr. Collins. At a minimum, would you have expected to have
access to an American embassy before being interrogated, if
that is a right guaranteed by the country?
Ms. Williams. I can't answer that in that I would not be in
that position.
Mr. Collins. That is a basic law question.
Ms. Williams. Well, Congressman Collins----
Mr. Collins. Let's put it aside. I am down to 3 minutes.
Putting aside any crimes that could have taken place here,
again, as Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, do you
expect your law enforcement officers, when interrogating
suspects either domestic or foreign, to uphold the law?
Just yes or no.
Ms. Williams. Absolutely.
Mr. Collins. All right. And what type of training did they
receive to ensure that this happens? Because if it is not
happening, I mean, honestly, the facts of the case don't
matter. And I am sure that we all agree that America deserves
better.
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, Congressman Collins, the facts of
this case have borne out in trial. It is an ongoing criminal
investigation for which there are remaining seven arrest
warrants, were those individuals to come into this country.
But our law enforcement officers are specially trained with
years of experience, and they put their lives on the line day
in and day out to carry out their duties in defense of this
country.
Mr. Collins. Director Williams, the chapter 16, 742(b) of
the United States Code lays out the requirements for the
position that you hold. Specifically, no individual may be
appointed as the director unless he or she is, by reason of
scientific education and experience, knowledgeable in the
principles of fisheries and wildlife management. Did you have a
scientific education and experience prior to your confirmation
to this role that satisfied this requirement?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair and Congressman Collins, I am
knowledgeable in the principles of science and biology. I have
a long record of experience in working with these issues.
Mr. Collins. So, do you believe that this is a frivolous
requirement in the law, given your educational background
coming into the position?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, Congressman Collins, I believe
that my appointment adheres to the law.
Mr. Collins. Has the DOI Solicitor's Office ever weighed in
on this matter to determine whether or not you are holding this
position illegally or legally?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, I believe that there has been
litigation that was dismissed repeatedly on this matter.
Mr. Collins. I am running out of time, that is my problem.
The Committee has learned that the Fish and Wildlife
Service failed to inform or involve the Cambodian Government
during the Operation Long Tail Liberation, as revealed during
the trial of Kry and the Deputy Director of the Department of
Wildlife and Biodiversity there for the Cambodian Forestry
Administration. Why did the Service conduct this operation in
Cambodia without first seeking the consent or involvement of
the Cambodian Government?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, Congressman Collins, the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement did seek and
work with the State Department, with Homeland Security, with a
whole number of other organizations. They did not go through
the Cambodian Government for the very reason that they were
concerned and we had credible evidence of corruption within
those individuals indicted in this case in the Cambodian
Government.
Mr. Collins. All right. Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to
yield back.
Thank you, ma'am.
Dr. Gosar. The gentleman from Virginia is now recognized
for his 5 minutes.
Dr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Williams, thank you so much for joining us today.
Let me begin with this. Were you aware that the informant that
you were working with was a Chinese national?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, Congressman Wittman, first off,
that informant was approved under the previous administration,
as was the investigation. But yes, the CPI was a Chinese
national working for a Chinese company that we were
investigating for their criminal activities. So, yes, sir.
Dr. Wittman. Did the Service do any due diligence to
determine what connections the Chinese national may have with
the CCP or with the Politburo members in their role with this
Chinese company?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, Congressman Wittman, the Service
absolutely followed all protocols for using a CPI of a foreign
national.
Dr. Wittman. So, you did the due diligence to look at any
connections there to any entity connected to the CCP or the
Politburo.
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, Congressman Wittman, I did not
myself, but I know that our Office of Law Enforcement officers
followed all procedures.
Dr. Wittman. And we know, subsequent to his work, that the
Chinese national was offered placement here in the United
States. Security, also job placement. Can you give me some idea
about what efforts were made and where he was placed in a job
here in the United States?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, Congressman Wittman, no, I cannot
answer that question directly because of the ongoing
investigation.
But I can say that we worked with Homeland Security, the
State Department, and the Department of Justice in bringing
this CPI into the country so that we would be able to use his
testimony.
Dr. Wittman. Was there any connection with the attempts to
gain employment for him with organizations that inquired with
the Fish and Wildlife Service concerning their concerns about
the use of these monkeys in research and the illegal trade of
these monkeys from Cambodia?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, Congressman Wittman, I am not
aware of that.
Dr. Wittman. OK. There is always a challenge as we see what
happened with COVID, and we see the associations with medical
research in China and in medical research in the United States,
all the way from things like Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients
to medical research here. Is there anything or any concern
about the efforts that you are undertaking using a Chinese
national in what could have been, in that particular case, an
effort by China to gain an advantage in medical research?
Obviously, these primates, while we all care about these
primates and want to make sure that they are treated properly,
we know too that there is a high degree of importance in
medical research, especially with groundbreaking medical
technologies that are able to save lives. Again, the balance
needs to be struck there. But are there concerns about what
this could do to give China a competitive advantage in that
realm of medical research?
In other words, are there things that potentially could
have happened here with the effort to understand if there is an
illegal trade with these monkeys that could be something that
was to China's interest to be able to interrupt that effort by
the United States in using primates in medical research?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, Congressman Wittman, I mean, of
course, that is something we would always pay attention to.
There was never an intent to support Chinese research or
anything like that.
The interesting piece of this case I think that has been
missed is that this was a Chinese company operating in
Cambodia. And the very fact that if wild macaques were
laundered and brought into the captive bred macaque community,
it could undermine those law abiding, legally operating
biomedical companies in this country and bring in zoonotic
diseases.
So, it is the contrary. By laundering wild macaques into
captive bred facilities, that undermines the procedures that
law abiding biomedical companies adhere to in this country. We,
at the Fish and Wildlife Service, are working with the National
Association of Biomedical Research to make sure there are
protocols in place so that wild macaques, especially those with
diseases, are not illegally laundered and brought into our
country and undermining our competitive advantage.
Dr. Wittman. Yes, got you.
Ms. Williams. Thank you for your question.
Dr. Gosar. I thank the gentleman.
Dr. Wittman. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Dr. Gosar. The gentlewoman, the Ranking Member from New
Mexico, Ms. Stansbury, is recognized for her 5 minutes.
Ms. Stansbury. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director, one of the things that I think is important for
people to understand is that Fish and Wildlife Service actually
has a law enforcement division. These are commissioned officers
that engage with the FBI, the CIA, international law
enforcement, and local police. These folks carry guns. They are
dealing with cartels. They are dealing with international human
traffickers. They are dealing with really bad people. Is that
correct?
Ms. Williams. Yes, Ranking Member Stansbury. They put their
lives on the line every day to protect our country.
Ms. Stansbury. And I think it is important that people
understand that wildlife trafficking is not just about the
wildlife, though. That is very, very important, and let's be
clear about that. We are talking about primates that are
classified not only as endangered here in the United States,
but they are also classified internationally under the UN as
endangered species.
So, we have a Chinese-based company, a Chinese-owned
company that is essentially using a third party in Cambodia to
go capture primates that are endangered in the wild, then
changing the papers so that they can illegally transport them
into the United States and sell them to an American company in
order to do biomedical research. That is essentially the
outline of the case. Is that correct?
Ms. Williams. Ranking Member Stansbury, yes.
Ms. Stansbury. And in many cases, these companies that are
involved in international wildlife trafficking are, and I am
not saying in this case, because I don't have all of the
background on this company, but in many, many cases, and this
is what Fish and Wildlife encounters every day, these folks are
wrapped up in international cartels, crime syndicates. There is
human trafficking. There is gun trafficking going on. Like,
there are serious crimes in addition to the animal crimes that
are occurring.
And the reason why we crack down on these crimes is not
only because of the implications for research and what that
will mean for biomedical research in the United States, not
only because it is illegal here in the United States, not only
because it is bad for the animals themselves and for the
ecosystems that they are a part of, but because it is part of
international crime.
And I want to point out that this very Committee has
already held six Committee hearings about the border and about
international crime, and yet I am hearing my friends across the
aisle trying to bend over backwards to defend international
wildlife traffickers. It is hard to wrap my mind around, I am
just going to put it that way.
So, let's just talk here for a moment about this specific
case. It is my understanding from speaking to folks at Fish and
Wildlife and from the background materials of this case that it
is an ongoing investigation, and that one of the judges who was
involved in trying the first defendant said that absolutely
there was a crime committed. Is that correct?
Ms. Williams. Ranking Member Stansbury, I don't----
Ms. Stansbury. If you don't have it in front of you, I will
read the quote.
Ms. Williams. Thank you.
Ms. Stansbury. The quote from Judge Williams says, ``To say
again, I think this jury and any jury would absolutely convict
Vanny,'' this is the Chinese-based company that is involved in
this international cartel, ``and its personnel because they
have been proved to be criminally culpable.'' So, why are we
trying this case in the House Natural Resources Committee? It
is being tried by law enforcement and the judiciary. I find it
very strange that this Committee is monkeying around, no pun
intended, in a trial involving international crime syndicates,
as it is actively being investigated by Federal law enforcement
with a criminal syndicate that we know a judge and a jury have
already said have criminal culpability.
So, Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate that we are shining a
light on this issue, because I do believe that we should be
finding alternatives. And we do have these 1,000 individual
primates that are stuck in limbo because of this case, and that
is inhumane, and these animals should be transferred to a
sanctuary. But I do not think it is appropriate for Congress to
be using its resources to interfere in a criminal trial right
now.
With that, I yield back.
Dr. Gosar. I thank the gentlewoman, and I will address it
myself.
Ms. Williams, the United States and Cambodia are both
parties to CITES, right?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, that is correct, along with their
184 parties to CITES.
Dr. Gosar. Yes, I understand that. But why did the Service
choose to completely ignore the treaty and try to prosecute
this foreign activity in a U.S. court?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, we actually were not ignoring the
CITES treaty but were enforcing it. In addition to this case,
the CITES Secretariat themselves are investigating this as
well.
Dr. Gosar. But once again, you are on a foreign country's
turf, and you have to go through those treaty obligations. You
have to have the goodwill of that country, don't you?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, absolutely. But the point of CITES
is that you adhere to the requirements of CITES. And in this
instance, the Cambodian Government was issuing fraudulent CITES
permits to fraudulently and dangerously bring wild long-tailed
macaques into this country, and negatively impact our own
biomedical research here.
Dr. Gosar. OK. So, then how do you explain the leaked
information that showed up in the PETA regarding the indictment
and trial for this operation?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, I am not aware of any leak.
Dr. Gosar. OK, you say that PETA never had these documents
and pictures? They had none of this?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, I am not aware of PETA having
anything that wasn't in the public record.
Dr. Gosar. Well, I am really confused here now. PETA has
information that is pertinent to the indictments of these
individuals. How did that happen?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, as I said, I am not aware of PETA
having any information that was not in the public record.
But what I would clarify too, I want to make sure everyone
knows that when the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service gets
information, we deem it credible and we have corroborated it.
We should use that regardless of its source, as long as it is
accurately corroborated.
Dr. Gosar. So, is somebody just automatically guilty and
they have to prove themselves innocent, or are they innocent
until proven guilty?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, certainly the law pertains here,
so they are innocent until proven guilty.
Dr. Gosar. Just checking on that.
Yes, I would like to submit for the record the recorded
interview of Mr. Kry.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
*****
The full document is available for viewing at:
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/II/II15/20240910/117486/HHRG-
118-II15-20240910-SD009.pdf
------
Dr. Gosar. Now, I know you don't have much of a science
background, but I want to still ask this question anyway. What
are our options?
I mean, you heard the Ranking Member talk about all these
primates in limbo. You know, we can do AI. We now have the
ability to make human bladders and all sorts of different
things. When is some of this going to stop with these primates?
What options will we have, and how long do you see us giving
options before inducing dogs, cats, primates?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, I am not sure I understand your
question.
Dr. Gosar. How long do you think it is going to take us to
get past these animal trials and start doing them on human-
formed bladders and stuff like that?
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, I believe that there actually are
some methods that are in place now that don't require research
on non-human primates.
But nonetheless, I want to be clear that there has not been
a ban on non-human primates in this country, and there are
CITES permits and CITES-traded, legal traded, wildlife that
come into this country every day, thanks to our Office of Law
Enforcement investigators who are at the borders securing our
nation's security as these and other illegally-traded goods
come into this country.
Dr. Gosar. I understand that, but my question was, in your
opinion, how long is it going to take us to get away from these
animal trials? Point blank.
Ms. Williams. Mr. Chair, I will have to get back to you.
But I do know there is some research that happens without it.
Dr. Gosar. My last comment is just for the record. In this
trial, the company under discussion, Vanny, which is
headquartered in Hong Kong, was not charged. OK.
With that, I think we are done with our questions, and I
will dismiss the witness and go to Panel 2.
Ms. Williams. Thank you, Mr. Chair. On the last comment,
the seven remaining indictments, six of them were Chinese
nationals that worked for Vanny. So, the company employees were
a part of this.
Dr. Gosar. Well, I guess going back to my first question,
there was a treaty under CITES, and it seems like the United
States did what they wanted to do. And I am just saying that
they didn't follow the treaty obligations and go through
Cambodia first. And I think there are a lot of problems with
this, whether it be in a war, whether it be the transfer of
primates. I think we have serious misgivings about our position
in the world that we can violate any law we want to, whenever
we want to.
So, with that, thank you very much, Ms. Williams, and we
appreciate it. And we will take a 5-minute break until the
second panel can get put into place. Thank you.
Ms. Williams. Thank you.
[Pause.]
Dr. Gosar. Welcome back, everyone. I will now introduce the
second panel.
Mr. Paul Pelletier, Attorney and Consultant, PEP Talk
Advisors, Fairfax, Virginia; second, Donna Clemons, D.V.M.,
DACLAM, Retired Research Veterinarian, Trevor, Wisconsin;
third, Mr. Thomas Gillespie, Professor and Chair, Department of
Environmental Sciences, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia; and
finally, Dr. Chris Abee, Professor Emeritus, MD Anderson Cancer
Center, the University of Texas, Paige, Texas.
Let me remind the witnesses that under the Committee Rules,
you must limit your oral statement to 5 minutes. However, your
entire statement will be placed in the record.
I will now start by recognizing Mr. Pelletier for his first
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF PAUL PELLETIER, ATTORNEY AND CONSULTANT, PEP TALK
ADVISORS, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA
Mr. Pelletier. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, thank you
for your time this morning, and thank you to the Committee for
its time and attention to this most important matter.
Let me start by being blunt. The costly 5-year undercover
investigation and subsequent trial of a Cambodian Government
official by the Fish and Wildlife Service was an abject
failure.
This disastrous investigation and prosecution was the
direct result of a severely flawed and unsupervised plan. The
government's conduct was unlawful, and institutional bias of
the Fish and Wildlife was nothing short of a misguided effort
to obstruct the importation and transportation of non-human
primates, or NHPs, for critical medical, vaccine, and drug
research. This illegal effort has resulted in a negative global
impact to human health, and has damaged medical research in the
United States.
It has been consistently apparent that the Fish and
Wildlife, under the influence of PETA and other so-called
animal advocacy groups, was more focused on a relentless
publicity campaign. This half-decade PR campaign began when the
Fish and Wildlife investigation was transparently dubbed
``Operation Long Tail Liberation.'' It was then carried out
through the recruitment of an unmonitored and uncontrolled
Chinese national as a U.S.-paid illegal undercover informant.
And what did all this effort and expense yield? First, the
dismissal of six of eight charges against the Cambodian
official in response to the government's mismanagement and
withholding of evidence. Then the jury acquitted the Cambodian
official of the remaining two charges, rejecting the
government's allegations completely. It is now clear that the
government never actually possessed evidence to support the
charges against the Cambodian official. Prior to the trial in
Miami, I spent months reviewing Fish and Wildlife's so-called
evidence and then watched every day of the trial in person. I
will lay this out for you plainly.
First, starting in 2017, a Chinese national was recruited
and paid hundreds of thousands of dollars by Fish and Wildlife
to act in an effectively unsupervised and undercover role as
the agency conducted its off-the-books operation at a large NHP
breeding farm in Cambodia, which for many years had reliably
sold NHPs to importers in the United States and other
countries.
Rather than actually liberate any long tail macaques, which
of course is not the mission of Fish and Wildlife's Office of
Law Enforcement, it is apparent that the agency repeatedly
broke international laws by conducting the undercover operation
on foreign soil without the proper consent of either Cambodian
or U.S. State Department officials. In so doing, Fish and
Wildlife endangered American citizens by causing the complete
cessation of imports of any NHPs from Cambodia, which was by
far the largest supplier of NHPs to the United States,
especially since 2020, when a ban on the exportation of
Chinese-bred NHPs due to COVID went into effect.
While Fish and Wildlife was conducting its 5-year illegal
operation, it continued to authorize the entry into the United
States of tens of thousands of NHPs that they now claim,
without any credible evidence, were exported illegally into the
United States.
It doesn't end there. As Fish and Wildlife's illegal
operation continued, the government unconstitutionally labeled
my client, Worldwide Primates, an unindicted co-conspirator
when, according to the Fish and Wildlife's own paid Chinese
operative, the government absolutely knew that my client had no
involvement in any criminal activity.
Despite the acquittal, as we have confirmed with a public
records request and evidence admitted at trial, Fish and
Wildlife's undercover Chinese operatives remained on the
agency's payroll, earning tens of thousands of more taxpayer
dollars in yet another covert international investigation in
Cambodia, this one aptly code-named ``Operation Monkey
Business.'' Incredibly, the government then moved the Chinese
national and his family to the United States at taxpayer
expense.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, Fish and Wildlife's refusal to abide
by the long-held demonstrably effective protocols already set
forth in the international CITES treaty in which Fish and
Wildlife plays a central enforcement role has set back
international cooperation for decades, all because Fish and
Wildlife and the DOJ have lost sight of their established
missions. Instead, they have taken sides with private sector
radical animal rights groups like PETA to prevent U.S.
Government mandated and essential commerce of NHPs for our
vital domestic bioscience and vaccine research program.
The indictment, not CITES, effectively removed Cambodia as
a supplier of captive bred NHPs for export to only the United
States. Fish and Wildlife is now implementing a de facto ban on
importing any NHPs bred in captive breeding centers in
Cambodia, none of which were referenced in the indictment or in
any official records. These disastrous consequences
disadvantaged only United States stakeholders, namely
scientific researchers and their suppliers. Other countries
such as Canada, Japan, and Korea remain free to import from
Cambodia under valid CITES permits.
Meanwhile, China continues its primate bioscience research
unabated. After implementing its 2022 export ban, China can now
advance scientific research to the detriment of the United
States healthcare organizations and the American public's need
for cures and vaccines.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pelletier follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul E. Pelletier
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your introduction this morning. And
thank you to the subcommittee for its time and attention to this most
important matter.
Let me start by being blunt: the costly, five-year, extra-
territorial ``undercover'' investigation and subsequent trial of a
Cambodian government wildlife official that U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (``FWS'') was investigating was an abject failure.
This disastrous investigation and prosecution was the direct result
of a severely flawed and unsupervised plan. The government's conduct
was unlawful, and the institutional bias of the FWS was nothing short
of a misguided effort to obstruct the importation and transportation of
Non-Human Primates (``NHPs'') for critical medical, bioscience, vaccine
and drug research. This illegal effort has resulted in a negative
global impact to human health and has damaged medical research in the
U.S.
It has been consistently apparent that FWS, under the influence of
PETA and other so-called ``animal advocacy'' groups, was more focused
on a relentless publicity campaign. This half-decade PR campaign began
when the FWS investigation was transparently dubbed ``Operation
Longtail Liberation.'' It was then carried out through the recruitment
of an unmonitored and uncontrolled Chinese national as a U.S.-paid
illegal undercover informant.
And what did all this expense and effort net? First, the dismissal
of seven of the nine charges against the Cambodian official in response
to the government's mismanagement and withholding of evidence. Then,
the jury acquitted the Cambodian Wildlife official on the remaining two
charges, rejecting the government's allegations completely.
It is now clear that the U.S. government never actually possessed
evidence to support the charges against the Cambodian official.
All of this has seriously undermined FWS' core mission. Having
personally supervised and prosecuted hundreds of complex international
criminal fraud schemes on the government's behalf, I am experienced in
these areas of law and with government agencies, including FWS.
I was privileged to serve as a federal prosecutor with the
Department of Justice for over 25 years. In Miami, I supervised both
the Narcotics and Economic Sections for more than 10 years. In 2002 I
was called to Main Justice in DC to assist in revitalizing the Criminal
Division's Fraud Section tasked with overseeing the burgeoning
accounting fraud scandals that were affecting confidence in our
economy.
And, for more than 15 years, I trained prosecutors and agents on
how to conduct complex international investigations at DOJ's National
Advocacy Center.
Mr. Chairman, prior to the trial in Miami of this Cambodian
official, I spent months reviewing FWS' so-called evidence and then
watched every day of the trial in person.
I'll lay this out for you, plainly:
First, starting in 2017, a Chinese national was recruited and was
paid hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars by FWS to act in an
unsupervised undercover role as the agency conducted its off-the-books
operation at a large NHP breeding farm in Cambodia which for many years
reliably sold NHPs to importers in the United States and other
countries.
Rather than actually ``liberate'' any longtail macaques, which of
course is not the mission of the FWS Office of Law Enforcement, it is
apparent that the agency repeatedly broke international laws by
conducting the undercover operation on foreign soil without the consent
of either Cambodia or the U.S. State Department.
In so doing, FWS endangered American citizens by causing the
complete cessation of imports of any NHPs from Cambodia, which was by
far the largest supplier of NHPs to the United States, especially since
2020 when a ban on the exportation of Chinese-bred NHPs due to COVID
went into effect.
While FWS was conducting its 5-year illegal operation, it continued
to authorize the entry into the U.S. of tens of thousands of NHPs that
they now claim, without credible evidence, were exported illegally into
the United States.
It doesn't end there.
As FWS' illegal operation continued, the government
unconstitutionally labeled my client, Worldwide Primates (WWP), an
``unindicted coconspirator,'' when, according to FWS' own paid
undercover operative, the government absolutely knew that my client had
no involvement in any such scheme.
After the acquittal at trial, as we have confirmed with a public
records request and evidence admitted at trial, the FWS's undercover
operative remained on the agency's payroll, earning tens of thousands
of more taxpayer dollars in yet another covert international
investigation in Cambodia, this one aptly Code named ``Operation Monkey
Business.'' Incredibly, the government then moved the operative and his
family to the United States at taxpayer expense.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, FWS' refusal to abide by the long-held,
demonstrably effective protocols already set forth in the international
CITES treaty, in which the FWS plays a central enforcement role, has
set back international cooperation in this area for decades. All
because the FWS and the DOJ have lost sight of their established
missions.
Instead, they have taken sides with private sector radical animal
rights groups like PETA to prevent the US-government-mandated and
essential commerce of NHPs for our vital domestic bioscience and
vaccine research programs.
You should know that though the undercover portion of ``Operation
Longtail Liberation'' officially ended in January 2022, the DOJ waited
more than seven months to bring charges; all the while, FWS continued
to authorize the importation of thousands of NHP's into the US--NHP's
which the FWS now refuses to be allowed for bio-science research.
So they delay bringing these charges until July 2022--not
coincidentally, this was one week after the public revelation of a
PETA-driven and questionable report which, of course, concluded that
longtail macaques were now ``endangered.'' This was a complete
falsehood, contrary to the CITES determination that these longtail
macaques are not in fact endangered at all and instead are an Appendix
II ``threatened'' species. Interestingly, DOJ just managed to include
that legally irrelevant and orphaned ``endangered'' finding in its
press release announcing the arrest of the Cambodian Wildlife official.
And soon after the unsealing of the indictment, the United States
Attorney's office in Miami issued a grand jury subpoena to publicly
traded importer of research NHP's, knowing that they would have to be
announced publicly by the company. Despite the fact the there existed
no possible venue in the Southern District of Florida! Nevertheless,
upon the mandatory disclosure of the subpoena, investors in that public
company lost more than $1.25 billion dollars.
Along with collaborating with and embracing PETA, whose stated
mission is to prevent the importation and use of all animals for any
purpose (including bioscience research as required by both vaccine
development and US law), the FWS confidentially shared aspects of its
investigation with PETA, so PETA could promote FWS' actions. The FWS
covertly provided copies of the indictment and undercover video tapes
directly and immediately to PETA--and only PETA--for its use in
generating positive sounding press releases about FWS' actions. We know
this incestuous collaboration continues.
Mr. Chairman, no such similar collaboration occurs between the FWS
and US-based importers of NHPs for bioscience research--and these are
the very organizations that have the greatest breadth of knowledge and
experience in the operations of overseas, purpose-bred NHP farming.
Such private companies regularly ``audit'' the breeding operations of
foreign farms to ensure proper conservation measures are utilized.
Now to add some perspective, according to the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC), the number of NHPs annually imported into the United
States, has remained relatively consistent at around 25K per annum for
the last 15 years. In the wake of the COVID pandemic, a severe export
ban enacted by China in March 2020 removed a large portion of
previously available, captive-bred NHPs from the global marketplace.
This left Cambodia, Mauritius, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia
as the remaining habitats for NHPs that could still be lawfully
imported into the United States.
It is important to note that because longtail macaques are an
Appendix II threatened species, there is no law that prohibits the
import of wild caught NHP's into the United States as long as they are
labeled as such on the required CITES permit (as Source code ``W''),
and that the importation process is accomplished in accordance with all
relevant laws in the country of export. Nevertheless, the biomedical
research community had largely shifted from the use of wild caught NHPs
to ``purpose-bred'' NHPs over the last several decades. In addition to
important conservational benefits, this shift ensured a better quality
NHP for the scientific research sector.
In the U.S., it is the future of the NHP sector.
The Southern District of Florida's (``SDFL'') 2022 Indictment--not
CITES--effectively removed Cambodia as a supplier of captive-bred NHPs
for export only to the United States. The FWS is now refusing entry
even to NHPs bred in other captive breeding centers in Cambodia, none
of which were referenced in the indictment or in any official records.
The disastrous consequences disadvantage only United States
stakeholders, namely scientific researchers and their suppliers. Other
countries, such as Canada, Japan, and Korea, remain free to import from
Cambodia under valid CITES permits. China continues its primate bio-
science research unabated after implementing its 2020 export ban,
allowing China to advance in research to the detriment of the United
States scientific community and the public's need for cures and
vaccines. China also does not actively account for the parental source
of NHP's.
Notwithstanding that CITES directly provides immediate and broad
remedies for the conduct and suspected activity cited by the FWS in the
indictment of Cambodia, the five-year investigation has caused
irreparable damage to the use and availability of lawfully acquired
NHPs by US suppliers and research organizations. CITES' historically
effective programs for wildlife management have been tossed to the
wayside. Contrary to the FWS' mission of wildlife conservation and the
stated purpose of CITES, the net effect of the ill-fated 2022
Indictment has been to increase the number of wild caught NHPs now
being removed worldwide from their natural homes.
The ripple effects of the indictment have undermined conservation
efforts and pushed critical research operations to foreign countries,
some of which are adversaries of the United States. This compromises
the global standing of U.S. scientific research and puts at risk US-
developed intellectual property. This, of course, has been China's plan
all along, as evidenced by their ``Made in China 2025 Initiative.''
While U.S.-based research has been stifled, Canada has now become
the largest importer of animals of Cambodian origin, and demand for
necessary research is migrating out of the U.S., straight over our
Northern border.
Some U.S. companies, including WWP, have been forward-thinking,
establishing their own purpose-bred colonies here in the United States.
These homegrown NHP farms reduce imports and dependance on foreign
sources.
But now, as a continuation of the bludgeon-like intent of
``Operation Longtail Liberation,'' and even after their spectacular
failure at the Miami trial, FWS is preventing export of specimens taken
from Cambodian NHPs that were acquired legally via FWS authorization
years ago.
FWS's permitting denials appear to be applied with an inexplicably
unreasonable broad brush, especially since DOJ prosecutors and FWS
agents were unable to trace as ``wild caught'' NHP's in specific
Cambodian shipments post-2018 as alleged in the 2022 indictment, and at
the trial of the Cambodian Wildlife official.
Scientific researchers who purchased NHPs prior to the 2022
indictment and have used them on vital research are now unable to get
permits to export the blood and tissue samples at the conclusion of
their studies. Other research organizations that purchased Cambodian
NHPs prior to 2023 but have not yet taken delivery of them currently
refuse to do so, as they are concerned with retributive actions by FWS.
Many research organizations have canceled orders for all animals of
Cambodian origin. As a result, some research organizations have shifted
to utilizing imported feral animals.
In addition to all of this, the actions of these agencies have
caused real and significant harm to the United States' relationship
with our ally Cambodia. The Cambodian government has made it known that
it is troubled by the U.S.'s treatment of the Cambodian Wildlife
official, including the Court-suppressed unconstitutional actions of
the FWS agents at his arrest, his false imprisonment pre-trial and
treatment at trial. It has questioned whether the actions of the FWS
violated international or domestic laws or the CITES treaty in carrying
out the illegal undercover operations in Cambodia. The United States
government may have a long way to go address the certain harms that
have been caused by this matter.
Finally, if, as a net result of the ill-advised, deliberately
biased, mismanaged and failed FWS operations, the United States moves
forward to ``uplisting'' longtail macaques to ``Endangered'' status
under the Endangered Species Act, importations of these very specific
NHPs to the United States will end. Longtail macaques are the primate
most commonly used for preclinical studies due to their >90% similarity
to human DNA. Researchers will feel even more supply pressure and may
be forced to send their studies to countries like China, where longtail
macaques are readily available and safeguards for quality control,
efficacy, and animal welfare are effectively nonexistent.
The FWS must understand that US importers of NHPs have a unique
understanding of an industry that could benefit from enforcement and
protection of relevant species. In fact, collaboration with importers
is logical and absolutely necessary to ensure the integrity of FWS'
efforts in this area. So I ask Mr. Chairman, why isn't this cooperation
happening and why isn't the FWS using the global CITES treaty to
address this perceived problem?
Thank you.
______
Questions Submitted for the Record to Mr. Paul Pelletier
Questions Submitted by Representative Stansbury
Question 1. Is it your position that current demand for macaques in
medical research in the US cannot be met with verified captive bred
monkeys?
Answer. As discussed in my testimony, rather than utilize the
historically effective international protocols established by CITES,
the Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) has essentially superseded CITES
protocols by imposing a de-facto import ban on all NHP's from Cambodia
by refusing clearance of any primate shipments. This selective use of
the CITES framework and protocols continues to wreak havoc on the
health science industry. Given that FWS has selectively jettisoned
requisite CITES protocols, NHP suppliers are left without essential
implementing guidance as to what evidence would be sufficient to
confirm acceptable foreign captive breeding. Thus, to the detriment of
expressed conservation efforts, a captive-bred NHP shortage has been
artificially created by FWS for only U.S. vaccine and bio-science
researchers. Import statistics reveal 29,612 primates were imported
into the USA in 2022, followed by a rapid drop to 16,888 in 2023. The
ensuing rise of wild caught imports from countries such as Mauritius
certainly confirms that, with the de facto FWS ban on the importation
of Cambodian sourced NHP's, the worldwide captive-bred population
remains insufficient to meet U.S. research needs.
Question 2. Do you think it is acceptable to use wild macaques for
research purposes?
Answer. All federal regulations allow for the use of legally
procured wild macaques for research purposes. Testimony that wild
macaques would not be suitable for research purposes has simply has
never been validated. Historically, as long as imported wild caught
NHP's go through industry standard screening, importation and
quarantine procedures, they have been suitable for bioscience and
vaccine research.
But you should know that not all imports of wild caught NHP's are
used directly for research. As the testimony further established, there
are currently insufficient domestic purpose bred colonies to support
the U.S. bio-scientific demand. As such, one of the goals of importing
feral animals, is to increase the US captive colonies, which serves to
reduce the demand to import animals from abroad. This long-term
solution was also emphasized by the testimony of Dr. Gillespie.
WWP has been promoting U.S. based captive breeding colonies for the
last 30 plus years and has one of the largest U.S. captive colonies in
the U.S.
______
Dr. Gosar. Thank you, Mr. Pelletier. I now recognize Dr.
Clemons for her 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DONNA CLEMONS (RETIRED), D.V.M., DACLAM, RETIRED
RESEARCH VETERINARIAN, TREVOR, WISCONSIN
Dr. Clemons. Thank you. First, I wish to say thank you to
the Committee for having this hearing and for inviting me to
provide information that I hope will be helpful to the
discussion.
As a career research veterinarian, I have been motivated by
my deep love and respect for animals and by a desire to support
the advancement of science and medicine to improve human and
animal health. Most of my work has been in the private sector,
supporting drug development and research areas where there is
high and immediate applicability to human health.
The pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors in this
country rely on non-human primates for medical research,
particularly for later-stage development and evaluation of
potential medicines. In the earlier stages, efforts are focused
on modeling in vitro non-animal methods, and typically other
animal models such as rats and mice. Once a potential medicine
has reached a key stage of development, it is usually necessary
to evaluate the safety and efficacy of it in a species with
systems more similar to humans.
Drug development is a long and costly process, taking many
years from concept of a drug until a medicine is available for
patient use. Many medicines don't make it to the patient over
safety concerns or a lack of adequate effectiveness. It is just
as important that an under-effective or an unsafe product not
make it to the market as it is to have an effective drug.
And yes, there is a sense of urgency involved. Patients
with serious illnesses for autoimmune disease, cancer,
neurodegenerative diseases, and others are waiting for these
medications.
Non-human primates, the long-tailed macaque being the most
used, have immune, reproductive, neurologic, digestive, and
cardiovascular systems with tremendous similarity to human
system functions, and provide predictability regarding the
human response to medicine. These animals have been
instrumental in the creation of many of today's medicines and
treatments. And as a result, the pharmaceutical industry relies
on a consistent, reliable supply chain from both domestic and
foreign breeders to meet their research needs.
Imported animals are a critical component of the supply
chain and have been for many years. A brief explanation of why
importation and large breeding facilities need to exist. The
long-tailed macaque has only one birth per year of a single
infant. In a well-managed facility, this means we can have 70
to 80 births expected for a colony of about 100 females and 10
to 15 males. This number of offspring, when grown, will support
two late-stage pharmaceutical research projects.
Breeding and rearing healthy research-appropriate animals
has been done in large numbers in countries where the climate
is suitable for this semi-tropical species. As a research
veterinarian, it was part of my job to evaluate the health and
general condition of animals, including the non-human primates,
being purchased for research. My evaluation of the animal
supply included a review of suppliers, auditing their animal
care programs, and in many cases conducting on-site inspections
of the facilities themselves. These audits focused on the
facilities, their sanitation, medical care, nutrition, the
welfare of the animals, the staff training, and the behavior of
the animals.
In general, I found earnest, knowledgeable staff with a
genuine concern for the animals in their care that were being
well treated. I saw breeding facilities with healthy offspring
and family units, adolescent animals housed in group settings,
and adult animals being prepared for transport. Over the course
of my decades-long career, the general health of these animals
has only improved as the breeding facilities have become more
sophisticated in their general management, design, medical
care, and nutrition.
From my perspective, having worked in the above capacity, I
am aware of the view in the research community that it is being
discriminated against by Federal agencies that regulate these
activities, whereby individuals who may personally disapprove
of animal research are potentially abusing the power of their
positions to influence policy, including, for example, treating
research organizations differently from other animal
enterprises by slow-walking import and export applications and
other actions including those discussed today. These behaviors
have had a negative impact on medical research in the United
States.
Thank you, and I am happy to answer any questions the
Subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Clemons follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donna Clemons, DVM, DACLAM, Global Director,
Comparative Medicine (retired)
I wish to say thank you to the committee for having this hearing
and for inviting me to provide information that I hope will be helpful
to the discussion.
As a career research veterinarian, I have been motivated by my deep
love and respect for animals and by a desire to support the advancement
of science and medicine to improve human and animal health. Most of my
work has been in the private sector, supporting drug development in
research areas with high and immediate applicability.
The pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors rely on nonhuman
primate models for medical research, particularly for the later stage
evaluation of potential medicines. In the earlier stages, efforts focus
on computer modeling, in vitro (non-animal) methods, and typically
other animal models such as rats and mice.
Once a potential medicine has reached a key stage of development,
it is usually necessary to evaluate the safety and efficacy of it in a
species with systems similar to humans. Drug development is a long and
costly process, taking many years from concept until a medicine is
available for patient use. Many medicines don't make it to the patient
over safety concerns or lack of adequate effectiveness. It's just as
important that an undereffective or unsafe product be identified and
NOT enter the market as it is to have an effective drug. And yes, there
is a sense of urgency--patients with serious illness are waiting and
hoping for that next treatment for cancer, for autoimmune disease, for
neurodegenerative disease.
Non-human primates, the long tail macaque being the most used, have
immune, reproductive, neurologic, digestive, and cardiovascular systems
with tremendous similarity to human system functions and provide
predictability regarding human response to medications. These animals
have been instrumental in the creation of many of today's medicines and
treatments and as a result the pharmaceutical industry relies on a
consistent, reliable supply chain from both domestic and foreign
breeders to meet research needs. Imported animals are a critical
component of this supply chain and have been for many years.
A brief explanation of why importation and large breeding
facilities exist: the long tail macaque has only one birth per year of
a single infant. In a well-managed facility, one can expect 70-80
births per 100 females/10-15 males. This will cover approximately 2
late-stage pharmaceutical studies.
Breeding and rearing healthy, research-appropriate animals has been
done in large numbers in countries with a climate suitable for these
semi-tropical species. As a research veterinarian, it was part of my
job to evaluate the health and general condition of animals (including
the non-human primates) being purchased. My evaluation of animal supply
included a review of suppliers, auditing their animal care programs,
and in many cases conducting on-site inspections of the facilities
themselves. These audits focused on facilities, sanitation, medical
care, nutrition, welfare, staff training, and animal behavior. In
general, I found earnest, knowledgeable staff with a genuine concern
that the animals in their care were being well treated. I saw breeding
facilities with healthy offspring and family units, adolescent animals
in group settings, and adult animals being prepared for transport. Over
the course of my decades-long career, the general health of these
animals has only improved as the breeding facilities have become more
sophisticated in general management, facility design, medical care,
nutrition, and behavior management (handling).
From my perspective having worked in the above capacity, I am aware
of the view in the research community that it is being discriminated
against by federal agencies that regulate these activities whereby
individuals who may personally disapprove of animal research are
potentially abusing the power of their positions to influence policy,
including for example treating research organizations differently from
other animal enterprises by slow walking importation or exportation
applications and other actions including those discussed here today.
These behaviors have had a negative impact on medical research in the
United States.
Thank you and I am happy to answer any questions that the
Subcommittee may have.
______
Questions Submitted for the Record to Dr. Donna Clemons (retired),
D.V.M., DACLAM, Retired Research Veterinarian
Questions Submitted by Representative Gosar
Question 1. During your career, have you had direct interactions
with the FWS? What were the nature of those interactions?
1a) In your experience, is the FWS neutral to customers in terms of
imports?
1b) Do they follow the rules for permitting, or do they put their
thumb on the scale to get the outcome that they want?
Answer. Throughout my 30+-year research career, I have had numerous
direct interactions with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS),
primarily concerning the acquisition of re-export permits for
biological samples from nonhuman primates. These experiences have often
been frustrating due to erratic permit granting, long and unexplained
delays that can range from six weeks to over six months, and instances
where permits expired without any action from the FWS, necessitating
the resubmission of identical applications to restart the process. A
particularly challenging encounter occurred in February 2019 when two
investigators unexpectedly arrived at my home late in the evening after
my husband, and I had returned from celebrating my birthday. They
aggressively interrogated me regarding NHP importation and foreign
breeders based on work I had conducted seven years prior. When I
requested legal representation, they returned two hours later with a
subpoena, which was ultimately withdrawn in favor of an interview at my
attorney's office.
In my experience, the FWS does not maintain neutrality toward
customers regarding imports. This lack of impartiality also extends to
re-export permits. Conversations with FWS staff and colleagues at other
institutions revealed that certain organizations and purposes for
import/export permitting receive preferential treatment. For instance,
sanctuaries could obtain permits within days, while research
institutions often faced delays of weeks or even months. During a
meeting at the Arlington FWS office, I was discreetly informed that
``not everyone likes what you do,'' suggesting that my permits were
frequently placed at the ``bottom of the stack'' for processing.
Based on these observations, it appears that the FWS does not
strictly adhere to permitting rules. Instead, their actions seem
influenced by biases toward specific types of work or institutions,
leading to inconsistencies in how permits are processed and granted.
I strongly believe that they put their thumb on the scale. There
appear to be individuals within agencies, including the FWS who use
their authority to support a private agenda. Industry insiders have
long concluded that applications related to research are discriminated
against while other activities are favored.
Question 2. Based on your testimony, I understand that there are
now fewer long-tailed macaques imported into the United States for
medical research under the Biden Administration. How has this impacted
medical research in the United States?
Answer. Over the past four years, imports of macaques for medical
use have declined by over 50%. It goes to reason that medical research
relying on these animals has declined as well. At the same time, these
very same animals are being imported by China, Japan, and Canada for
medical research in those countries.
Question 3. Do you believe that medical research has declined in
the United States but increased in foreign countries over the past four
years due to the policies adopted by the Biden Administration?
Answer. Yes. The USA is the only country effectively embargoing
these animals, guaranteeing the offshoring of billions in research to
rival countries such as China, which have access to the resources. For
those companies who choose to continue their research, this means
outsourcing this work to other countries, putting US supremacy in
science and our intellectual property at greater risk.
Questions Submitted by Representative Stansbury
Question 1. Is it your position that current demand for macaques in
medical research in the US cannot be met with verified captive bred
monkeys?
Answer. No. My position is that at this time, the demand cannot be
met with domestic-bred NHPs, meaning those bred in the U.S. Importing
primates from established foreign colonies, where the climate is
suitable for large-scale breeding operations, is a critical component
of the research resources needed.
Question 2. Do you think it is acceptable to use wild macaques for
research purposes?
Answer. Based on the natural history of macaques, all of these
animals are considered wild, as they have never been domesticated. A
more accurate distinction might be between captive-bred and wild-caught
macaques.
Captive-bred animals are generally preferred for medical research
because they are better defined in terms of lifetime health conditions,
genetics, diet, and other factors. Ethical sourcing is a top priority
for research organizations, meaning the origin of the animals must be
reliable.
The IUCN has noted that macaques are invasive in many parts of the
world, posing a threat to local wildlife. As an invasive species, they
have contributed to the endangerment and even extinction of certain
bird and animal species. In efforts to control their population,
macaques are often captured or killed. Therefore, using them to
replenish breeding stocks or for selective research purposes could be
seen as a more acceptable approach.
______
Dr. Gosar. Thank you very much, Dr. Clemons. I will now
turn to Dr. Gillespie for his 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS GILLESPIE, PROFESSOR & CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES, EMORY UNIVERSITY, ATLANTA, GEORGIA
Dr. Gillespie. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member, and
esteemed members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to speak before you today. I am doing so in my
personal capacity. The views I express are my own, and do not
necessarily represent my employer or other bodies on which I
serve.
I am Thomas Gillespie, Professor and Chair of Environmental
Sciences and Professor of Environmental Health at Emory
University and Rollins School of Public Health in Atlanta,
Georgia. Prior to my current position, I was a Professor of
Veterinary Medicine and Anthropology at the University of
Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. I am also a member of the IUCN
Primate Specialist Group and an external expert to PREZODE, a
multi-national effort to prevent zoonotic disease emergence.
For over two decades, my research has examined risk factors
for zoonotic disease transmission at the human primate
interface. I am here to address a critical issue that threatens
both public health and wildlife conservation: the trade in wild
macaques for biomedical research.
Long-tailed macaques, Macaca fascicularis, are used for
biomedical and pharmaceutical research due to their genetic and
physiological similarities to humans. Unfortunately, these same
traits make macaques excellent reservoirs for pathogens that
can infect us and potentially lead to disease outbreaks in
humans. Considering the number of animals traded and the
zoonotic potential of each animal, macaques show the highest
average volume of potential zoonotic disease of all wildlife
traded.
Furthermore, some of these pathogens can alter the immune
system of monkeys, confounding the results of studies examining
the effects of a drug or vaccines being tested on monkey
subjects.
For these reasons, U.S. research facilities have for
decades expected healthy, pathogen-free captive bred macaques
sourced from controlled facilities. The COVID pandemic-related
reduction in the availability of captive bred long-tailed
macaques appears to have resulted in the importation of
substantial numbers of wild macaques labeled as captive bred
and pathogen free. Since this time, multiple cases of
melioidosis have been diagnosed in macaques imported from
Cambodia. Melioidosis is a potentially fatal disease caused by
a tier one select agent, Burkholderia pseudomallei, which is
endemic to much of the geographic range of long-tailed
macaques.
Equally troubling, CDC data indicate the prevalence of
culture confirmed tuberculosis in imported non-human primates
was only 0 from 2013 to 2020, but has increased since the
pandemic.
Both Burkholderia and tuberculosis can present
asymptomatically in macaques, and false negatives to approved
diagnostic tests for both pathogens are not uncommon.
Therefore, it is not surprising that multiple cases of TB among
imported monkeys were reported to CDC up to 2 years post-
quarantine.
Even more concerning were the six cases of melioidosis
detected among long-tailed macaques imported from Cambodia.
Four of these cases were not detected until months after the
monkeys had entered the United States and been transported to
other facilities. Both tuberculosis and Burkholderia are
capable of infecting and causing disease in a broad range of
mammalian hosts, including humans, domesticated animals, and
livestock. And environmental conditions in the Southern United
States could promote establishment of Burkholderia, which can
be shed in the urine, feces, blood, and saliva of infected
animals.
Other than TB, CDC does not currently require screening to
be performed in apparently healthy non-human primates during
the CDC-mandated 31-day quarantine period. If importers choose
to screen apparently healthy animals for zoonotic infections
during the quarantine period, positive results must be reported
to CDC within 24 hours. Consequently, TB and Burkholderia are
just the tip of the iceberg in terms of zoonotic threats to the
American public. Most future emerging infectious diseases
remain to be discovered, and the tropical forest habitat of the
long-tailed macaques is a known hotspot.
I applaud the U.S. Fish and Wildlife for their efforts to
combat illegal wildlife trade, and I encourage Congress to
increase resources available to U.S. Fish and Wildlife to
facilitate their efforts. Further, I encourage research
facilities making use of primate models to commit to ending the
use of wild caught primates, to carefully review the sourcing
of primates, and to actively promote the use of alternative
research strategies that do not involve capture of wild non-
human primates.
I hope these details have clarified the critical importance
of ending the wild macaque trade. Thank you again for the
opportunity, and I welcome questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gillespie follows:]
Prepared Statement of Professor Thomas Gillespie, Emory University
Chairman, Ranking Member, and Esteemed Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today. I'm doing so
in my personal capacity; the views I express are my own and do not
necessarily represent my employer or any board, taskforce, commission
or other body on which I serve.
I am Thomas Gillespie, Professor and Chair of Environmental
Sciences and Professor of Environmental Health at Emory University and
Rollins School of Public Health in Atlanta, Georgia. Prior to my
current position, I was a Professor of Veterinary Medicine and
Anthropology at the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. I am also
a member of the IUCN Primate Specialists Group and an external expert
to PREZODE, a multinational effort to prevent zoonotic disease
emergence.
For over two decades, my research has examined risk factors for
zoonotic disease transmission at the human / primate interface. I am
here to address a critical issue that threatens both public health and
wildlife conservation: the trade in wild macaques for biomedical
research.
Long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) are used for biomedical
and pharmaceutical research due to their genetic and physiological
similarities to humans. Unfortunately, these same traits make macaques
excellent reservoirs for pathogens that can infect us and potentially
lead to disease outbreaks (Gillespie et al., 2008). Considering the
number of animals traded and the zoonotic potential of each animal,
macaques show the highest average volume of potential zoonotic disease
of all wildlife traded (Borsky et al., 2020). Furthermore, some of
these pathogens can alter the immune system of monkeys, confounding the
results of studies examining the effects of a drugs or vaccines being
tested on monkey subjects (Conroy, 2023). For these reasons, US
research facilities have, for decades, expected, healthy, pathogen-
free, captive-bred macaques sourced from controlled facilities (Roberts
and Andrews, 2008; Conroy, 2023).
The COVID pandemic-related reduction in the availability of
captive-bred, long-tailed macaques appears to have resulted in the
importation of substantial numbers of wild macaques labelled as
captive-bred and pathogen-free (Ruppert et al., 2022; Hansen et al.,
2022). Since this time, multiple cases of melioidosis have been
diagnosed in macaques imported from Cambodia (CDC, 2022). Melioidosis
is a potentially fatal disease caused by the Tier 1 Select Agent
Burkholderia pseudomallei, which is endemic to much of the geographical
range of long-tailed macaques. Tier 1 Select Agents present the
greatest risk of deliberate misuse with significant potential for mass
casualties or devastating effect to the economy, critical
infrastructure, or public confidence, and pose a severe threat to
public health and safety. Equally troubling, CDC data indicate the
prevalence of culture-confirmed tuberculosis in imported non-human
primates was zero from 2013-2020 but has increased since the pandemic
(CDC, 2023). Both Burkholderia sp. and Tuberculosis sp. can present
asymptomatically in macaques and false negatives to approved diagnostic
tests for both pathogens are not uncommon (CDC, 2022; 2023). Therefore,
it's not surprising that multiple cases of TB among imported monkeys
were reported to the CDC up to two years post-quarantine. Even more
concerning were the six cases of melioidosis detected among long-tailed
macaques imported from Cambodia. Four of these cases were not detected
until months after the monkeys had entered the US and been transported
to other facilities (Taetzsch et al., 2022). Both tuberculosis and
Burkholderia are capable of infecting and causing disease in a broad
range of mammalian hosts including humans, domesticated animals, and
livestock and environmental conditions in the southern US could promote
establishment of Burkholderia, which can be shed in the urine, feces,
blood and saliva of infected animals (Portacci et al., 2017; Hall et
al., 2015; Taetzsch et al., 2022; CDC, 2023).
Other than TB, CDC does not currently require screening tests to be
performed in apparently healthy nonhuman primates during the CDC-
mandated 31-day quarantine period. If importers choose to screen
apparently healthy animals for zoonotic infections during the
quarantine period, positive results must be reported to CDC within 24
hours (CDC 2022; 2023). Consequently, TB and Burkholderia are just the
tip of the iceberg in terms of zoonotic threats to the American public.
Most future emerging infectious diseases remain to be discovered, and
the tropical forest habitat of the long-tailed macaques is a known
hotspot (Jones et al. 2008; Gillespie et al., 2021).
Beyond these obvious threats to public health, the trade in wild
macaques is a threat to wildlife conservation. Long-tailed macaques are
listed by the IUCN as Endangered and are reported to have experienced
an 80% decrease in their population size over the past 35 years (Koch
Liston et al., 2024). Habitat degradation, coupled with pest control
measures at the human interface (culling and sterilization), pose
severe risks to the species (Valle, 2024). Moreover, trade for
biomedical research, is likely to exacerbate this decline (Hansen et
al., 2022). In some regions, macaque populations have declined by over
50% in just a decade (Koch Liston et al., 2024). This not only disrupts
ecological balance but also threatens the survival of species that are
already vulnerable due to habitat loss and other pressures (Estrada et
al., 2017).
I applaud US Fish and Wildlife for their efforts to combat illegal
wildlife trade and I encourage Congress to increase resources available
to US Fish and Wildlife to facilitate their efforts. Further, I
encourage research facilities making use of primate models: 1) to
commit to end their use of wild-caught primates; 2) to carefully review
the sourcing of primates; and 3) to actively promote and use
alternative research strategies that do not involve capture of wild
non-human primates.
I hope these details have clarified the critical importance of
ending the wild macaque trade. I welcome your questions.
References
Borsky S, Hennighausen H, Leiter A, et al. (2020). CITES and the
zoonotic disease content in international wildlife trade. Environmental
and Resource Economics 76:1001-1017.
CDC (2022). Letter from Division of Global Migration and Quarantine,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to National Association of
State Public Health Veterinarians. Subject: Melioidosis in Imported
Nonhuman Primates. February 22, 2022
CDC (2023). Letter from Division of Global Migration and Quarantine,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to the National Association
of State Public Health Veterinarians. Subject: Tuberculosis in Imported
Nonhuman Primates. July 24, 2023.
Conroy G (2023). How wild monkeys' laundered for science could
undermine research. Nature 623:672-673.
Estrada A, Garber PA, Rylands AB, et al. 2017. Impending extinction
crisis of the world's primates: Why primates matter. Science Advances
3:1 e1600946.
Gillespie, TR, Jones KE, Dobson AP, et al. 2021. COVID-clarity demands
unification of health and environmental policy. Global Change Biology
27:1319-1321.
Gillespie TR, Nunn CL, Leendertz FH. 2008. Integrative approaches to
the study of primate infectious disease: implications for biodiversity
conservation and global health. Yearbook of Physical Anthropology
51:53-69.
Hall CM, Busch JD, Shippy K, et al. (2015) Diverse Burkholderia Species
Isolated from Soils in the Southern United States with No Evidence of
B. pseudomallei. PLoS ONE 10:e0143254.
Hansen MF, Ang A, Trinh TTH, et al. (2022). Macaca fascicularis
(amended version of 2022 assessment). The IUCN Red List of Threatened
Species 2022: e.T12551A221666136.
Jones KE, Patel NG, Levy MA, et al. (2008). Global trends in emerging
infectious diseases. Nature 451:990-993.
Koch Liston AL, Zhu X, Bang TV, et al. (2024). A model for the
noninvasive, habitat-inclusive estimation of upper limit abundance for
synanthropes, exemplified by M. fascicularis. Science Advances
10:eadn5390.
Portacci K, Rooney AP, Dobos R. (2017). Assessing the potential for
Burkholderia pseudomallei in the southeastern United States. Journal of
the American Veterinary Medical Association 250:153-159.
Roberts JA, Andrews K. (2008). Nonhuman Primate Quarantine: Its
Evolution and Practice. Institute for Laboratory Animal Research
Journal 49:145-156.
Ruppert N, Holzner A, Hansen MF, et al. (2022). The IUCN Red List of
Threatened Species 2022. (Gland, Switzerland: International Union for
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources), e.T12555A215350982.
Taetzsch SJ, Swaney EM, Gee JE, et al. (2022). Melioidosis in
Cynomolgus Macaques (Macaca Fascicularis) Imported to the United States
from Cambodia. Comparative Medicine. 72:394-402.
Valle, S. (2024). A Population Viability Analysis (P.V.A.) approach to
the conservation of the Long-tailed Macaque (Macaca fascicularis).
Apple Valley, MN: IUCN SSC Conservation Planning Specialist Group.
______
Questions Submitted for the Record to Professor Thomas Gillespie,
Emory University
Questions Submitted by Representative Stansbury
Question 1. How does illegal poaching and smuggling of monkeys
undermine efforts to control and prevent disease outbreaks?
Answer. Wild mammals are the primary source of emerging viral
pathogens of concern to humans and virus richness scales with wild
mammal richness (Johnson et al. 2020). The highest mammalian diversity
occurs in tropical forested areas, such as the natural range of the
long-tailed macaque (Macaca fascicularis) (Jones et al. 2008; Olival et
al. 2017). Furthermore, the close phylogenetic relationship between
humans and nonhuman primates ensures that many pathogens occurring
naturally in wild primates have minimal biological barriers to clear to
expand their host range to humans (Gillespie et al. 2008; Calvagnic-
Spencer et al. 2012).
Consequently, wild primates have long been monitored for zoonotic
diseases such as yellow fever, malaria, and schistosomiasis; however,
the urgency of this surveillance intensified dramatically following the
global HIV/AIDS pandemic, which was definitively linked to the zoonotic
transmission of SIV-1 from chimpanzees (Gao et al., 1999; Keele et al.,
2006). Additionally, related retroviruses (e.g., simian foamy viruses)
and filoviruses (e.g., Ebola and Marburg viruses) are frequently
transmitted between wild primates and humans, particularly through the
hunting and butchering of these animals (Leroy et al., 2004; Wolfe et
al., 2005). While HIV/AIDS and Ebola are perhaps the most well-known
examples, they represent only a fraction of the diverse array of viral,
bacterial, fungal, and parasitic pathogens that can be transmitted from
nonhuman primates to humans (Gillespie et al. 2008; Strahan et al.
2024).
The capture and smuggling of wild monkeys have the potential to
lead to novel human exposures to pathogens throughout the timeline from
capture in the wild (exposure of primate trappers), through transport
(exposure of local and international traders and transportation and
government employees), to laboratory (exposure of researchers and
caretakers) (Karesh et al. 2005). Further, as many pathogens can be
spread through various bodily fluids, inappropriate disposal of such
biohazardous materials could lead to environmental exposure to the
human population, companion animals, livestock, and wildlife. Further,
stress and poor handling conditions implicit in the illegal capture and
smuggling of wild monkeys can also compromise the health of these
animals, making them more susceptible to disease and exacerbating the
public health risk (Vicente-Santos et al. 2023). Considering these
risks, tremendous effort should be made to ensure that primates
entering the United States are not of wild origin.
References
Calvignac-Spencer S, Leendertz SAJ, Gillespie TR, Leendertz FH (2012).
Wild great apes as sentinels and sources of infectious disease.
Clinical Microbiology and Infection. 18:521-527.
Gao F, Bailes E, Robertson DL, et al. (1999). Origin of HIV-1 in the
chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes troglodytes). Nature. 397:436-441.
Gillespie TR, Nunn CL, Leendertz FH. (2008). Integrative approaches to
the study of primate infectious disease: implications for biodiversity
conservation and global health. Yearbook of Physical Anthropology.
51:53-69.
Johnson CK, Hitchens PL, Pandit PS, et al. (2020). Global shifts in
mammalian population trends reveal key predictors of virus spillover
risk. Proceedings of the Royal Society B. 287:20192736.
Jones KE, Patel NG, Levy MA, et al. (2008). Global trends in emerging
infectious diseases. Nature. 451:990-993.
Karesh WB, Cook RA, Bennett EL, Newcomb J. (2005). Wildlife trade and
global disease emergence. Emerging Infectious Diseases. 11:1000-1002.
Keele BF, Heuverswyn F, Li YY, et al. (2006). Chimpanzee reservoirs of
pandemic and nonpandemic HIV-1. Science. 313:523-526.
Leroy EM, Rouquet P, Formentry P, et al. (2004). Multiple ebola virus
transmission events and rapid decline of Central African wildlife.
Science. 303:387-390.
Olival KJ, Hosseini PR, Zambrana-Torrelio C, et al. 2017 Host and viral
traits predict zoonotic spillover from mammals. Nature. 546:646-650.
Strahan EK, Witherbee J, Bergl R, et al. (2024). Potentially zoonotic
enteric infections in gorillas and chimpanzees, Cameroon and Tanzania.
Emerging Infectious Disease. 30:23-26.
Vicente-Santos A, Willink B, Nowak K, et al. (2023). Host-pathogen
interactions under pressure: A review and meta-analysis of stress-
mediated effects on disease dynamics. Ecology Letters. 26:2003-2020.
Wolfe ND, Switzner WM, Carr JK, et al. (2005). Naturally acquired
simian retro-virus infections in Central African hunters. Lancet.
363:932-937.
Question 2. What are the implications for our research on vaccines
and other medications if wild monkeys are passed off as captive bred
when they are not?
Answer. The expectation of purpose-bred/captive-bred monkeys for
use in sophisticated and expensive experiments is that the animals will
have been raised in controlled environments that guarantee that
veterinary care and pathogen screening have been applied from birth and
the animal's health history, pedigree, and genetic definition are
available to researchers. Recent scientific publications have raised
concerns that critical research and toxicology studies are being
impacted by the presence of unexpected viruses, bacteria, and parasites
in macaques being used to test the safety and efficacy of drugs and
treatments (Johnson et al., 2022; Powell et al., 2024).
The introduction of wild-caught monkeys into US facilities also
increases the risk for zoonotic disease transmission to laboratory
personnel and their families. Purpose-bred monkeys are expected to be
free of dangerous pathogens that can spill over into humans or other
animals. A recent increase in the number of monkeys imported into the
US infected with tuberculosis, simian retrovirus and herpes B--a
zoonotic virus that is prevalent is wild monkeys, but should not be
present in captive-bred monkeys--and the transmission of the deadly
herpes B virus to laboratory workers in Asia is a strong indication
that wild-caught monkeys are circulating in the supply chain (CDC,
2021; Wang et al., 2021).
Further, many of the pathogens that naturally infect wild primates
present asymptomatically (Gillespie et al. 2008; Calvignac-Spencer et
al. 2012). Thus, without extensive pathogen screening, infected wild
monkeys passed off as purpose-bred could easily be enrolled in
biomedical research (Grimm 2022). This is particularly detrimental for
studies evaluating vaccine efficacy and safety, as the immune response
of wild-caught monkeys is not representative of the broader population
of captive-bred monkeys or humans due to previous or ongoing
infections. Even asymptomatic infections in these monkeys would produce
divergent immune response compared to captive bred monkeys,
invalidating study results (Conroy 2023). For example, Simian T-
lymphotropic virus type 1 (STLV-1), a retrovirus commonly found in wild
primates in Africa and Asia (Ishikawa et al. 1987; Sintasath et al.
2009), triggers cells to release high levels of cytokines, proteins
that regulate the immune response (Gardner et al. 2004). Thus, use of
wild STLV-1-infected monkeys would compromise studies examining immune
response and could lead to inaccurate conclusions about the
effectiveness and safety of vaccines and medications.
Simian foamy virus (SFV) is another retrovirus that occurs at high
prevalence in Asian monkeys including long-tailed macaques (Gardner et
al. 2004; Jones-Engel et al. 2007). SFV infection can significantly
alter cell membrane structure and function, leading to cell fusion and
other cytopathic effects, particularly in in vitro cell cultures,
making it difficult to maintain cultures of cell lines from infected
monkeys (Welsch et al. 2007; Couteaudier et al. 2022). Further, as an
enveloped virus, SFV acquires its viral envelope by budding from the
host cell membrane, which can disrupt cell membrane integrity within
the host (Welsch et al. 2007). Consequently, use of wild SFV-infected
monkeys and tissues derived from such monkeys would compromise any
studies examining infectious disease mechanisms involving viruses
replicating inside such impacted cells.
Beyond viruses, parasitic worms and protozoa are abundant in wild
primates (Gillespie 2006; Gillespie et al. 2008) and can suppress
immune response to viral infection due to balanced antagonism between
the components of the immune system that deal with extracellular
parasites (type II helper T lymphocytes) vs. intracellular viral
infections (type I helper T lymphocytes) (Desai et al. 2021).
Consequently, use of wild parasite-infected monkeys would have the
potential to compromise vaccine trials for viral pathogens or any
studies examining infectious disease mechanisms involving viruses (Wait
et al. 2020; Whitehead et al. 2022).
These examples demonstrate the significant public health risks
inherent in using wild primates in biomedical research and the strong
potential of this practice to exacerbate health crises rather than
alleviating them.
References
Calvignac-Spencer S, Leendertz SAJ, Gillespie TR, Leendertz FH (2012).
Wild great apes as sentinels and sources of infectious disease.
Clinical Microbiology and Infection. 18:521-527.
CDC (2021). Nonhuman primate importation and quarantine United States,
fiscal years 2019-2021. Presentation given at the Association of
Primate Veterinarians Annual Workshop Kansas City, MO October 15, 2021.
Conroy G. (2023). How wild monkeys' laundered for science could
undermine research. Nature. 623:672-673.
Couteaudier M, Montange T, Njouom R, et al. (2022). Plasma antibodies
from humans infected with zoonotic simian foamy virus do not inhibit
cell-to-cell transmission of the virus despite binding to the surface
of infected cells. PLoS Pathogens. 18(5):e1010470.
Desai P, Janova H, White JP, et al. (2021). Enteric helminth
coinfection enhances host susceptibility to neurotropic flaviviruses
via a tuft cell-IL-4 receptor signaling axis. Cell. 184(5):1214-
1231.e16.
Gardner MB, Carlos MP, Luciw PA. (2004). Simian Retroviruses. In:
Wormser GP, editor. AIDS and other manifestations of HIV infection. 4th
edition ed. San Diego: Elsevier Academic Press. 195-262.
Gillespie TR. (2006). Non-invasive assessment of gastro-intestinal
parasite infections in free-ranging primates. International Journal of
Primatology. 27:1129-1143.
Gillespie TR, Nunn CL, Leendertz FH. (2008). Integrative approaches to
the study of primate infectious disease: implications for biodiversity
conservation and global health. Yearbook of Physical Anthropology.
51:53-69.
Grimm D. (2022). Indictment of monkey importers could disrupt U.S.
research. Science. 378(6623):934-935.
Ishikawa K, Fukasawa M, Tsujimoto H, et al. (1987). Serological survey
and virus isolation of simian T-cell leukemia/T-lymphotropic virus type
I (STLV-I) in non-human primates in their native countries.
International Journal of Cancer. 40(2):233-9.
Johnson AL, Keesler RI, Lewis AD, et al. (2022). Common and not-so-
common pathologic findings of the gastrointestinal tract of rhesus and
cynomolgus macaques. Toxicologic Pathology. 50(5):638-659.
Jones-Engel L, Steinkraus KA, Murray SM, et al. (2007). Sensitive
assays for simian foamy viruses reveal a high prevalence of infection
in commensal, free-ranging, Asian monkeys. Journal of Virology.
81:7330-7337.
Powell CJ, Kapeghian JC, Bernal JC, Foster JR. (2024). Hepatitis A
virus infection in cynomolgus monkeys confounds the safety evaluation
of a drug candidate. International Journal of Toxicology. 43(4):368-
376.
Sintasath DM, Wolfe ND, Lebreton M, et al. (2009). Simian T-
lymphotropic virus diversity among nonhuman primates, Cameroon.
Emerging Infectious Diseases. 15(2):175-184.
Wait LF, Dobson AP, Graham AL. (2020). Do parasite infections interfere
with immunisation? A review and meta-analysis. Vaccine. 38(35):5582-
5590.
Wang W, Qi W, Liu J, et al. (2021). First human infection case of
monkey B virus identified in China, 2021. China CDC Weekly. 3(29):632-
3.
Welsch S, Muller B, Krausslich HG. (2007). More than one door-Budding
of enveloped viruses through cellular membranes. FEBS Letters.
581(11):2089-2097.
Whitehead B, Christiansen S, Ostergaard L, Nejsum P. (2022). Helminths
and COVID-19 susceptibility, disease progression, and vaccination
efficacy. Trends in Parasitology. 38(4): 277-279.
Question 3. The CDC requires procedures and measures to prevent
diseases from being introduced into the US through imported monkeys.
What are some examples of diseases that could still spill over- or have
already spilled over-into people from imported nonhuman primates and
how would they get past protections currently in place? Has there been
evidence of spillover into people from imported nonhuman primates?
Answer. The requirement for imported non-human primates (NHPs) to
undergo a minimum 31-day quarantine, mandated by the CDC, is based on
the time needed to complete three consecutive tuberculin skin tests
(TSTs) at two-week intervals. This duration also exceeds the incubation
period for filoviruses (i.e., Ebola and Marburg viruses) and many other
high-consequence pathogens that have previously been imported along
with wild primates to biomedical facilities in Europe and the United
States (Petts et al. 2021). However, other than tuberculosis, CDC does
not currently require screening tests to be performed in apparently
healthy non-human primates. If importers choose to screen apparently
healthy animals for zoonotic infections during the quarantine period,
positive results must be reported to CDC within 24 hours (CDC 2022;
2023). Consequently, many asymptomatically carried and / or latent
infections my go undetected. For example, multiple cases of melioidosis
have been diagnosed in macaques imported from Cambodia (CDC, 2022).
Melioidosis is a potentially fatal disease caused by the Tier 1 Select
Agent Burkholderia pseudomallei, which is endemic to much of the
geographical range of long-tailed macaques. Importantly, Taetzsch et
al. 2022, note that, ``the incubation period of melioidosis is highly
variable, not well defined in animals, and can exceed 31 d. One report
described a rhesus macaque that developed melioidosis 10 y after
importation into the US. In an unpublished case from 2015, B.
pseudomallei was isolated from a liver abscess found at necropsy in an
NHP that was euthanized due to persistent lethargy and dehydration
almost a year after importation and release from CDC-mandated
quarantine. After the case reported here, 5 additional macaques
imported in separate shipments from Cambodia developed abscesses from
which B. pseudomallei was isolated several months after importation
and, in 4 of the cases, after release from CDC-mandated quarantine.
These cases illustrate the impracticality of holding imported NHPs in
quarantine beyond the incubation period for melioidosis. In addition,
serology is not a useful screening tool in animals from endemic regions
due to cross-reactivity and poor correlation with active infection or
development of clinical signs.''
Equally troubling, CDC data indicate that culture-confirmed
tuberculosis in imported non-human primates was undetected from 2013-
2020 but has increased since the COVID pandemic and consequent
cessation of monkey imports from China (CDC, 2023). Both Burkholderia
sp. and Tuberculosis sp. can present asymptomatically in macaques and
false negatives to approved diagnostic tests for both pathogens are not
uncommon (CDC, 2022; 2023). Therefore, it is not surprising that
multiple cases of TB were reported to CDC in monkeys up to two years
post-quarantine (Yee et al. 2021). TB species isolated and reported to
CDC from non-human primates, including M. fascicularis, included M.
bovis, M. caprae, M. orygis, and M. tuberculosis (CDC, 2023). Both
tuberculosis and Burkholderia are capable of infecting and causing
disease in a broad range of mammalian hosts including humans,
domesticated animals, and livestock and environmental conditions in the
southern US could promote establishment of Burkholderia (Portacci et
al. 2017; Hall et al. 2015; CDC, 2023).
Further, a recent increase in the number of monkeys imported into
the US infected with tuberculosis, simian retrovirus and herpes B--a
zoonotic virus that is prevalent is wild monkeys, but should not be
present in captive-bred monkeys--and the transmission of the deadly
herpes B virus to laboratory workers in Asia is a strong indication
that wild-caught monkeys are circulating in the supply chain (CDC,
2021; Wang et al., 2021). To date, there have been 50 documented cases
of herpes B virus infection in humans, with 21 deaths (Hu et al. 2022).
Most of these infections were caused by direct contact with macaques
(i.e., bites, scratches, or contact with monkey tissue or fluids) (Hu
et al. 2022). These are just the tip of the iceberg in terms of
zoonotic threats to the American public. Most future emerging
infectious diseases remain to be discovered, and the tropical forest
habitat of the long-tailed macaques is a known hotspot (Jones et al.
2008; Calvignac-Spencer et al., 2012; Gillespie et al. 2021).
Considering these risks, tremendous effort should be made to ensure
that primates entering the United States are not of wild origin. In
addition, CDC should implement broad and rigorous pathogen screening
protocols for non-human primates imported into the United States.
Vigilance, comprehensive screening, and strict adherence to quarantine
and safety measures will be essential for mitigating the risks of
disease spillover. These efforts will help safeguard public health and
ensure that potential pathogens are effectively managed before they can
impact both human populations and local ecosystems.
References
Calvignac-Spencer S, Leendertz SAJ, Gillespie TR, Leendertz FH (2012).
Wild great apes as sentinels and sources of infectious disease.
Clinical Microbiology and Infection. 18:521-527.
CDC (1993). Tuberculosis in imported nonhuman primates--United States,
June 1990-May 1993. MMWR. Morbidity and mortality weekly report.
42(29):572-576.
CDC (2021). Nonhuman primate importation and quarantine United States,
fiscal years 2019-2021. Presentation given at the Association of
Primate Veterinarians Annual Workshop Kansas City, MO October 15, 2021.
CDC (2022). Letter from Division of Global Migration and Quarantine,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to National Association of
State Public Health Veterinarians. Subject: Melioidosis in Imported
Nonhuman Primates. February 22, 2022
CDC (2023). Letter from Division of Global Migration and Quarantine,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to the National Association
of State Public Health Veterinarians. Subject: Tuberculosis in Imported
Nonhuman Primates. July 24, 2023.
Gillespie, TR, Jones KE, Dobson AP, et al. (2021). COVID-clarity
demands unification of health and environmental policy. Global Change
Biology 27:1319-1321.
Hall CM, Busch JD, Shippy K, et al. (2015) Diverse Burkholderia Species
Isolated from Soils in the Southern United States with No Evidence of
B. pseudomallei. PLoS ONE 10:e0143254.
Hu G, Du H, Liu Y, Wu G, Han J. (2022). Herpes B virus: History,
zoonotic potential, and public health implications. Biosafety and
Health. 4(4):213-219.
Petts D, Wren M, Nation BR, et al. (2021). A short history of
occupational disease: 1. Laboratory-acquired infections. The Ulster
Medical Journal. 90(1):28-31.
Portacci K, Rooney AP, Dobos R. (2017). Assessing the potential for
Burkholderia pseudomallei in the southeastern United States. Journal of
the American Veterinary Medical Association. 250:153-159.
Taetzsch SJ, Swaney EM, Gee JE, et al. (2022). Melioidosis in
Cynomolgus Macaques (Macaca Fascicularis) Imported to the United States
from Cambodia. Comparative Medicine. 72:394-402.
Wang W, Qi W, Liu J, et al. (2021). First human infection case of
monkey B virus identified in China, 2021. China CDC Weekly. 3(29):632-
3.
Yee JL, Prongay K, Van Rompay KKA, et al. (2021). Tuberculosis
detection in nonhuman primates is enhanced by use of testing algorithms
that include an interferon-g release assay. American Journal of
Veterinary Research. 83(1):15-22.
Question 4. Many of us have not had to deal with Tuberculosis in
our lifetimes. Can you please remind us what that entails for people
who contract it?
Answer. For the average American today, this question would likely
evoke the image of a pale and fragile figure from a century ago
coughing blood into a handkerchief, but tuberculosis (TB) is not a
disease of the past. This bacterial infection, primarily caused by
Mycobacterium tuberculosis, is deadliest among all infectious diseases
today, killing more people than malaria and HIV/AIDS combined (WHO
2023). Globally, almost 10 million people fall ill each year and 1.5
million succumb to TB (WHO 2023).
TB is an airborne disease that spreads easily as people cough or
talk in proximity to others. Consequently, 25% of people globally are
infected with TB (Houben & Dodd 2016). Although the vast majority have
asymptomatic, latent TB; five to 10% will develop disease at some point
without treatment (Menzies et al. 2018; Vynnycky et al. 2020). Initial
symptoms can resemble a common cold, making TB difficult to detect. As
the illness progresses, the victim develops a persistent cough
producing blood or sputum, chest pain, fever, night sweats, weight
loss, and loss of appetite (WHO 2023). If untreated, TB can cause
severe lung damage and other systemic effects, respiratory failure, and
death (WHO 2023).
Successful treatment of TB is challenging, involving daily use of
five drugs whose side effects include nausea, rashes, and jaundice for
four months (or longer depending on severity and drug sensitivities)
(WHO 2023). To further complicate the process, multi-drug resistance
develops in 20% of previously treated cases of TB and drug-resistant TB
requires extensive treatment (>2 years) with only a 50% survival rate
(Pai and Memish 2016). Treatment of DR-TB is also very expensive
because of the high cost of second-line TB drugs (Pai and Memish 2016).
Laboratory-acquired tuberculosis (TB) is a serious occupational
hazard for laboratory workers, especially those who test for TB. TB is
caused by the bacteria Mycobacterium tuberculosis, which is primarily
spread through the air by inhaling infectious aerosols. Laboratory
workers can be exposed to these aerosols when handling liquids that
contain the bacteria.
References
Houben RM, Dodd PJ. (2016). The global burden of latent tuberculosis
infection: a re-estimation using mathematical modelling. PLoS Medicine.
13(10):e1002152.
Menzies NA, Wolf E, Connors D, et al. (2018). Progression from latent
infection to active disease in dynamic tuberculosis transmission
models: a systematic review of the validity of modelling assumptions.
Lancet Infectious Diseases. 18(8):e228-e38.
Pai M, Memish ZA. (2016). Antimicrobial resistance and the growing
threat of drug-resistant tuberculosis. Journal of Epidemiology and
Global Health. 6(2):45-47.
Vynnycky E, Fine PE. (2000). Lifetime risks, incubation period, and
serial interval of tuberculosis. American Journal of Epidemiology.
152(3):247-63.
World Health Organization (2023). Global tuberculosis report 2023.
Geneva. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.
Question 5. Has the illegal importation of long-tailed macaques
into the US for animal research impacted the conservation status of
wild monkey populations?
Answer. Long-tailed macaques are listed by the IUCN as Endangered
(Ruppert et al. 2022), and have experienced an 80% decrease in their
population size over the past 35 years (Koch Liston et al., 2024).
Habitat degradation, coupled with pest control measures at the human
interface (culling and sterilization), pose severe risks to the species
(Valle 2024). Moreover, extensive trade and use in biomedical research,
has exacerbated these declines (Hansen et al., 2022). Despite being
perceived as overabundant in some areas, data on local populations are
often anecdotal and inconsistent, hindering effective conservation
efforts (Valle 2024). In some regions, macaque populations have
declined by over 50% in just a decade (Hansen et al., 2022). This not
only disrupts ecological balance but also threatens the survival of
species that are already vulnerable due to habitat loss and other
pressures (Estrada et al., 2017).
While more data is needed to determine the extent to which illegal
capture for biomedical research contributes to the sharp decline of
wild long-tailed macaques, it is undoubtedly a significant factor.
Given the regulatory and ethical constraints surrounding research on
endangered species, it is in the best interest of stakeholders within
the US biomedical industry and funding agencies, including the National
Institutes of Health, to invest substantially in effective conservation
programs for this endangered primate species. Such efforts will not
only support the species but also align with ethical research
practices.
References
Estrada A, Garber PA, Rylands AB, et al. (2017). Impending
extinction crisis of the world's primates: why primates matter. Science
Advances. 3:e1600946.
Hansen MF, Ang A, Trinh TTH, et al. (2022). Macaca fascicularis
(amended version of 2022 assessment). The IUCN Red List of Threatened
Species 2022: e.T12551A221666136.
Koch Liston AL, Zhu X, Bang TV, et al. (2024). A model for the
noninvasive, habitat-inclusive estimation of upper limit abundance for
synanthropes, exemplified by M. fascicularis. Science Advances
10:eadn5390.
Ruppert N, Holzner A, Hansen MF, et al. (2022). The IUCN Red List of
Threatened Species 2022. (Gland, Switzerland: International Union for
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources), e.T12555A215350982.
Valle, S. (2024). A Population Viability Analysis (P.V.A.) approach to
the conservation of the Long-tailed Macaque (Macaca fascicularis).
Apple Valley, MN: IUCN SSC Conservation Planning Specialist Group.
______
Dr. Gosar. Thank you, Dr. Gillespie.
Dr. Abee, it is your turn for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS ABEE, DVM, PROFESSOR EMERITUS, UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS MD ANDERSON CANCER CENTER, PAIGE, TEXAS
Dr. Abee. Thank you, Chairman Gosar and the Committee, for
the opportunity to testify today.
My name is Chris Abee. I am a veterinarian and an emeritus
professor at the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center,
retired. For over 40 years, I studied the biology and diseases
of non-human primates and conducted research to find better
ways to treat and prevent both human and animal diseases. My
testimony today aims to highlight the importance of long-tailed
macaques and other non-human primates in biomedical research.
Of the approximately 70,000 primates used in research
annually, almost half are long-tailed macaques imported from
Asia. These animals are crucial for pharmaceutical studies and
for publicly-funded research to advance our understanding of
disease prevention and treatment.
We use the term ``non-human primate'' because humans are
also primates. This phylogenetic proximity between human and
non-human primates makes them invaluable in biomedical
research. Their genomes are approximately 95 percent identical
to the human genome, resulting in many body systems such as the
immune system and the cardiovascular system, renal system,
respiratory system all closely resembling those of humans.
A report published last year by the National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine titled, ``Non-human Primate
Models in Biomedical Research: State of the Science and Future
Needs,'' concluded that research requiring non-human primates
remains essential to our country's biomedical discovery and
translational research pipeline.
In recent years, the COVID-19 pandemic placed enormous
pressure on our country's domestic primate research resources.
During this time, China, our primary source of imported
primates, halted exports to the United States. This action
sharply increased the cost of these animals from $5,000 to as
much as $50,000 each, effectively pricing out scientists with
NIH grants.
Simultaneously, animal rights organizations have attempted
to use the Endangered Species Act and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to reclassify these animals as endangered
species. Such a classification would make them unavailable for
research. Therefore, the decision to reclassify a species as
endangered must be based on very solid scientific data and
taken very seriously.
The United States leads the world in biomedical research.
But our country's leadership is fragile. China has openly
expressed its intention to replace the United States as the
world leader in biomedical research. They have built primate
research facilities with capacity far surpassing the United
States, and have no restrictions on primate use in research.
In conclusion, I hope I have conveyed the importance of
non-human primates to the country's biomedical research
programs. I urge Congress to consider directing the NIH and the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to develop action plans ensuring
both supply and availability of primates for publicly and
privately-funded medical research. These plans should be
developed by outside committees of experts, rather than the NIH
and U.S. Fish and Wildlife staff. In my opinion, this will only
happen with a congressional mandate.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Abee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christian R. Abee, D.V.M., M.S., DACLAM Professor
Emeritus, University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Chris
Abee. I am an Emeritus Professor retired from the University of Texas
MD Anderson Cancer Center. For over 40 years, I studied the biology of
nonhuman primates and conducted research to find better ways to treat
or prevent both human and animal diseases.
My testimony today aims to highlight the importance of Long-Tailed
Macaques and other nonhuman primates in biomedical research. Of the
approximately 70,000 nonhuman primates used in research annually,
almost half are Long-Tailed Macaques (Macaca fascicularis) imported
from Asia. These animals are crucial for pharmaceutical studies and for
publicly funded research to advance our understanding of disease
prevention and treatment.
We use the term ``nonhuman primate'' because humans are also
primates. The phylogenetic proximity between human and nonhuman
primates makes them invaluable in biomedical research. Their genomes
are approximately 95% identical to the human genome, resulting in many
body systems, such as the immune and cardiovascular systems closely
resembling those of humans.
A report published last year by the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) titled ``Nonhuman Primate Models in
Biomedical Research: State of the Science and Future Needs'' (National
Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Keck 360, Washington, DC 20001;
(800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313; http://www.nap.edu), concluded that
research requiring nonhuman primates remains essential to our country's
biomedical discovery and translational research pipeline.
In recent years, the COVID-19 pandemic placed enormous pressure on
our country's domestic primate research resources. During this time,
China, our primary source of imported primates, halted exports to the
U.S. This action sharply increased the cost of these animals from
$5,000 to as much as $50,000 each, effectively pricing out scientists
with NIH grants.
Simultaneously, animal rights organizations have attempted to use
the Endangered Species Act and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to
reclassify these animals as endangered species. Such a classification
would make them unavailable for research. Therefore, the decision to
reclassify a species as endangered must be based on solid scientific
data and taken very seriously.
The U.S. leads the world in biomedical research, but our country's
leadership is fragile. China has openly expressed its intention to
replace the U.S. as the world leader in biomedical research. They have
built primate research centers with capacity surpassing the U.S. and
have no restrictions on primate use in research.
In conclusion, I hope I have conveyed the importance of nonhuman
primates to our country's biomedical research programs. I urge Congress
to consider directing the NIH and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to
develop action plans ensuring both supply and availability of primates
for publicly and privately funded medical research. These plans should
be developed by outside committees of experts rather than NIH and USFWS
staff. In my opinion, this will only happen with a Congressional
mandate.
______
Questions Submitted for the Record to Chris Abee
Questions Submitted by Representative Gosar
Question 1. Is the U.S. currently experiencing a shortage of
nonhuman primates for research?
Answer. Yes, the U.S. is currently experiencing a critical shortage
of nonhuman primates for research. This shortage has worsened over the
past 15 years due to two main factors: inadequate funding from the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) for domestic research resources and
continued reliance on imported Long-Tailed macaques from Asian
countries by pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies.
The expansion of domestic primate breeding research resources could
potentially alleviate or eventually eliminate this shortage. However,
this would require the development of national plans for nonhuman
primate research resources by both the government and the private
sector.
Several reports over the last six years have warned the NIH's
Office of Research Infrastructure Programs (ORIP) about this critical
shortage. Unfortunately, ORIP's response to these warnings has been
inadequate.
These reports include:
https://orip.nih.gov/about-orip/research-highlights/
nonhuman-primate-evaluation-and-analysis-part-1-analysis-
future-demand-and
https://orip.nih.gov/about-orip/research-highlights/
nonhuman-primate-evaluation-and-analysis-part-2-report-
expert-panel-forum
https://orip.nih.gov/sites/default/files/NHP-Evaluation-
and-Analysis-Final-Report-Revised-508.pdf
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK593002/
These reports provide detailed information on the current situation
and potential strategies to address the shortage of nonhuman primates
for research in the United States.
Question 2. You mention China in your testimony--what could be the
consequences of China dominating this sector? How important is it for
the US to counteract that dominance?
Answer. China's potential domination of the nonhuman primate
research sector poses significant risks to the United States. The U.S.
dependence on China for critical medical research resources puts the
country in a vulnerable position, as demonstrated during the COVID-19
pandemic when China halted exports of Long-Tailed macaques essential
for vaccine and medicine development. This sudden elimination of
research resources threatened U.S. public health, highlighting the
dangers of relying on a single foreign source for crucial materials. If
the U.S. relinquishes its leadership role in biomedical research, China
would likely determine global research priorities, significantly
impacting future medical advancements. The National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine's 2023 report concluded that
reliance on China and other Asian countries for nonhuman primates is
unsustainable and threatens U.S. medical research. Maintaining U.S.
leadership in this field is crucial for national security, public
health, and scientific advancement, making it essential to counteract
China's dominance and ensure the continued progress and independence of
U.S. medical research.
Question 3. How prepared is the U.S. for the next pandemic?
Answer. The U.S. is not adequately prepared for the next pandemic
due to two critical weaknesses in national research resources for
nonhuman primates. The first weakness is the inadequate support
provided by the NIH's Office of Research Infrastructure Programs
(ORIP). NIH grant support is crucial for developing new medicines and
vaccines, as demonstrated by COVID-19 treatments. Multiple reports
(2018, 2023, 2024) have highlighted the shortage of nonhuman primates,
limiting research on public health threats. Despite these reports, NIH-
ORIP has failed to develop an action plan to expand nonhuman primate
research resources. In fact, inflation-adjusted NIH support for
national primate research resources has decreased over the past 15
years. This lack of action suggests either insufficient expertise and/
or interest in supporting NIH research grants that require nonhuman
primates.
The second weakness facing the U.S. is pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies' reliance on Asian countries for nonhuman
primates. These companies require nonhuman primates to test the safety
and efficacy of new medicines, and most of these animals are imported
from Asian countries. A 2023 report by the National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine concluded that this reliance is
unsustainable and threatens U.S. biomedical research. This issue could
be addressed through public/private partnerships to develop domestic
breeding resources, eventually eliminating dependence on Asian
countries. These weaknesses significantly hinder the U.S.'s ability to
respond effectively to future pandemics.
Questions Submitted by Representative Stansbury
Question 1. Do you think it is acceptable to use wild macaques for
research purposes?
Answer. I do not think it is acceptable to use illegally obtained
wild macaques for research purposes, nor do I recommend the use of
wild-born macaques. Animals captured from the wild have unknown health
histories, ages, genetic backgrounds, and social histories. This lack
of background information may lead to flawed research results.
Furthermore, research using wild macaques might require more animals
due to variability caused by differences in ages, genetic background,
and disease history. It's worth noting that if the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service continues to deny importation of captive-bred macaques
from countries like Cambodia, it inadvertently forces researchers to
rely more heavily on legally obtained wild macaques, which is not ideal
for the reasons mentioned above. This situation underscores the
importance of developing sustainable and ethical sources of these
animals, preferable through captive breeding programs that can provide
animals with known backgrounds and histories.
______
Dr. Gosar. Thank you very much, Dr. Abee.
It is just you and me, so you are up.
The Ranking Member is recognized for her 5 minutes.
Ms. Stansbury. All right. Thank you very much, and thank
you to our witnesses for being here
Mr. Pelletier, is that the correct pronunciation of your
name?
Mr. Pelletier. Yes, it is.
Ms. Stansbury. I apologize.
Mr. Pelletier. It is good enough.
Ms. Stansbury. I just wanted to clarify your role here
today. You mentioned in your testimony that you are here on
behalf of your client, Worldwide Primates. Is that correct?
Mr. Pelletier. That is correct.
Ms. Stansbury. And you are here in that formal capacity of
representing that person as your client, correct?
Mr. Pelletier. I am, yes.
Ms. Stansbury. Yes. And as a family-owned business owned by
a Mr. Matthew Block. Is that correct?
Mr. Pelletier. No it is not, it is owned by Ira Block.
Ms. Stansbury. Oh, Ira Block.
Mr. Pelletier. Matthew Block's son.
Ms. Stansbury. But Matt Block is a former CEO, manager,
family owner. And just to be clear, Mr. Block was convicted and
spent 13 months in prison for smuggling baby orangutans.
Correct?
Mr. Pelletier. No, he wasn't. He was convicted in 1990. He
pled guilty almost 25 years ago, if not more, for participating
in a scheme to submit false paperwork for baby orangutans
entering Russia, yes.
Ms. Stansbury. So, for the smuggling of primates into
another country using a third party.
Mr. Pelletier. Correct.
Ms. Stansbury. I appreciate that clarification. I want to
turn to our witness who is here with us from Emory.
One of the things that I find so strange about this whole
network of illegal smuggling, and I think our last witness
really highlighted the worldwide shortages of course causing
challenges for research, and we understand that, but it is the
actual implications for research.
So, I know, Dr. Gillespie, you are an expert in zoonotics.
If wild versus laboratory-raised animals are used in research,
could it alter the outcomes of tests and trials of drugs?
Dr. Gillespie. Ranking Member Stansbury, it absolutely can.
The fact that many pathogens can modify the effect of immune
function means that you can have confounding results where it
is almost impossible, if not impossible, to distinguish between
the effect of pre-existing infections versus a vaccine-mounted
response for a test of that nature or if you are purposefully
infecting to look at the impacts of a given pathogen.
Ms. Stansbury. So, you would want to, and again, I think I
made my position clear in the first panel that I support
alternatives to animal testing. But strictly from a scientific
and medical standpoint, you want controls in a study to make
sure that the animals that you are conducting trials and tests
on, that you understand their provenance, where they came from
so that you can control for factors that might affect the
outcome of that drug trial is essentially what we are saying,
right?
And the thing that I guess I find strange about the sort of
cover-up in these international animal trafficking situations
and the complicity of American-based companies and research
institutions is wouldn't you want animals that have a clear
provenance because it could affect the outcome of your medical
trials? Is that correct?
Dr. Gillespie. Ranking Member Stansbury, absolutely. It is
a critical issue for the biosecurity of our medical research,
as well as the biosecurity of our populations and our animal
production for agriculture, as well.
Ms. Stansbury. So, why do you think that American-based
research institutions are not pushing for clear enforcement of
these regulations?
Why are they not being more detailed in their due
diligence?
And why are they purchasing from companies that may be
U.S.-based or foreign-based that are potentially bringing in
smuggled animals?
Dr. Gillespie. Ranking Member Stansbury, the specifics are
beyond my expertise. But as an individual, I would assume that
it is because greater profits can be made, or there is ability
to get around the rules that are in place.
Ms. Stansbury. Well, I think I am asking more about U.S.-
based institutions. And I am a bit of a recovering academic
myself, though certainly not in this field. I guess what I am
trying to drive at is that there is an onus on American
institutions and research institutions, especially those funded
by the U.S. Government, to make sure that we are doing our due
diligence to make sure that any kind of tests that we conduct
are being done with full legality, whether that is
international treaties, using animals that are appropriately
sourced. And that it also falls incumbent on us in the United
States to make sure that we are doing that, as well.
And with that, I will yield back.
Dr. Gosar. Thank you.
Dr. Clemons, can you clarify the provenance issues in your
expertise in working with these institutions? Can you tell us a
little bit about that?
Dr. Clemons. Thank you for the question. I have worked in
the private sector my entire career for a contract research
organization and for a major pharmaceutical company. As part of
my role there, I was tasked with looking into the background of
animals, the suppliers that we were doing business with as
companies, and looking into the welfare of animals.
Specifically, welfare of the animals was the primary charge as
my veterinary role.
So, I looked at much documentation related to these
animals, their history of work, and as I said in my statement
before, I researched these facilities and visited most of them
during the course of my career. I have been to several
countries, looking at animals, and found all of them that I was
able to look at to be operating in good condition, with clarity
in their paperwork and clarity in their interactions with us.
It was clearly in the interests of my organizations to have
ethically-obtained animals.
Dr. Gosar. I mean, it seems to me if the macaques are such
a big deal here, that we would have our own supply. What would
it take for the United States to have their own supply? Or do
you have to breed more different genetics?
Dr. Clemons. Yes, thank you for that question, as well.
I think there is an interest in having more of a domestic
supply in the United States. I have certainly seen that. But
there are several factors involved. One is that it would take a
tremendous number of animals to produce what is needed for
research. Just to take the number 20,000, for instance, as an
example of annual use, which is not, by the way, anywhere close
to what the actual need is in the United States, this would
still require a colony of approximately 130,000 breeders,
adolescents, and young animals being reared in order to produce
20,000 animals per year.
Now, that also requires many years of development for us to
create a facility of that size. It is very expensive. It is
going to take a lot of importation of breeding animals. Over
time, I expect this would take many years, as there would not
be enough breeder animals imported in one go to get that
started.
The last factor I might want to mention here is that there
have been numerous attempts by companies to begin major
breeding colonies, and animal rights organizations have
consistently worked to block the development and building of
those facilities.
Dr. Gosar. I want to ask the question to you and Dr. Abee.
We are talking about diseases like dementia. We are talking
about MS, a lot of different things possible. Can you give me
an idea if there is anything on the horizon that AI or
synthetic human cells can actually bust some of these tests
with? What is on the future?
Dr. Clemons. What is in the future? Well, what we have
right now is some very promising technology. It is in early
stage.
To use one example, for instance, the organ-on-a-chip gets
a lot of attention, and it should. It is a promising
technology. But what it is is one very, very small piece of
tissue from one specific individual person or animal being
tested. It does not look at the complex interaction of multiple
organ systems in a complex living being. So, this is very
promising. It is a good adjunct technology that is being used
right now. It may become much more prominent in the future, but
for now it is not mature science and it does not replace the
need for complex species.
Dr. Gosar. Dr. Abee?
Dr. Abee. I referenced the National Academies report that
was published last year. I had the opportunity to serve on that
consensus committee that wrote that report. And the Committee
included a number of scientists that were expert in developing
new approach methodologies. The committee was composed of
scientists who work with animals and scientists that work to
develop new approach methodologies, and the consensus was that
the new approach methodologies are, as Dr. Clemons said, not
mature enough to meet all of our needs.
In some cases, we are able to use non-animal approaches,
and wherever we can we do. But the need for primates, and this
was a consensus, unanimous, of the entire committee, was that
we absolutely have to have non-human primates for the
foreseeable future.
And one surprise to me in serving on that committee is that
scientists working on new approach methods said we need the
primates in order to validate the new approaches that we are
developing.
Dr. Gosar. I think you can hold those thoughts because I am
going to come back. We will do a second round. I am going to go
to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins, for his 5 minutes.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pelletier, did I pronounce that right?
Mr. Pelletier. Sure. That is good enough, thank you.
Mr. Collins. I am a South Georgia boy, we don't have too
many, once you get past Jones, it gets a little tough.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Collins. Given your expertise in this case and your
experience at the Department of Justice, you have a unique
perspective on this matter. In your testimony, you highlighted
some of the illegal and outrageous activities carried out by
the Service and its paid informant in this matter. Can you
quickly summarize some of the most problematic actions taken by
the Service during this investigation?
Mr. Pelletier. Yes, I can. Congressman, thank you for the
question.
The first thing I would tell you is that they opened the
investigation in 2017, called it ``Operation Long Tail
Liberation.'' They had spoken with the Chinese national and he
told them he had no information with respect to any wildlife
being shipped as wild caught to the United States. Yet, they
opened the investigation called Operation Long Tail Liberation.
And No. 2, he was in it for the money. As a prosecutor, I
know that those witnesses that are in it for the money
specifically have to be supervised very well. In this case, the
whole case was about tracing the monkeys to the United States
and proving they were wild caught. They couldn't do that. As a
matter of fact, the Chinese national didn't even attempt to
trace the animals until he came to the United States in 2022
and was paid $100,000. And then he started tracing the monkeys.
Mr. Collins. So, given that lack of evidence or whatever
you want to call it, what do you think motivated the DOJ and
the Service to go forward with this ill-fated trial?
Mr. Pelletier. It is very clear what motivated them. They
were trying to do a stunt to absolutely stop the trade. It is
not about conservation; it is about eradication of this trade.
PETA and the Department of Justice and Fish and Wildlife
Service are in cahoots, and were in cahoots during this whole
trial. And we know that because the Fish and Wildlife was
sharing secretly information with PETA so they could post it on
their website.
Mr. Collins. And in your testimony, you referenced PETA,
Cruelty Free International, as well as actions taken by the
Service to restrict trade on non-human primates that are really
crippling the domestic industry.
Can you elaborate on the actions the Service has taken that
have and are having such a negative effect on our domestic
industry?
Mr. Pelletier. Yes, I mean, my expertise only goes so far
in that area. But what I can absolutely tell you is they
avoided using CITES here. For 5 years they conducted this
``investigation,'' and continued to allow 20,000 or more NHPs
into the United States that Fish and Wildlife Service tells us
are wild caught. Why would you do that when there is an
international treaty that perfectly addresses any concerns in
that arena? They just let them in.
And then we have the Fish and Wildlife Service asking PETA
if they can find a place for these 1,000 monkeys that we have
talked about before they even unsealed the indictment. So, they
are talking about actually seizing monkeys and stopping the
monkeys after they let them into the United States, No. 1.
But No. 2, they are discussing it before the indictment is
unsealed. And those monkeys did not come from the Vanny farm.
So, it is a level of coordination that is, to me, despicable,
No. 1, because it is not the mission of the Fish and Wildlife
Service to eradicate this trade, but it has basically stopped
the trade from Cambodia of any NHPs, and they were the largest
source for medical research.
Mr. Collins. So, I have just heard you state that they have
taken sides with the private sector, these radical animal
groups, to prevent the U.S. Government mandated and essential
commerce of non-human primates for important domestic
bioscience and vaccine research programs.
As a Federal prosecutor and as well as a private sector
litigator, what are your thoughts on how to really address this
problem?
Mr. Pelletier. Well, I think there are a couple of things
that need to be done here.
One is I think there has to be a recognition by Fish and
Wildlife Service that there is a problem here. I think if you
talk to any of these doctors on the panel, particularly Dr.
Clemons and Dr. Abee, they can tell you that in their business,
the Fish and Wildlife Service has always been hostile to the
trade and to research. Always. So, I think there needs to be a
change in that dynamic.
I also think that the conduct here that I have outlined in
my statement needs to be referred to the IG and/or to OPR. I
think that that is it.
And then finally, what I would love is an ability for an
honest broker at Fish and Wildlife Service, to be able to talk
with the experts in the arena, the people who import the
monkeys. If there is a problem, they know more than anybody,
and they should be talking with us, not talking to PETA about
these issues.
Mr. Collins. Thank you.
Dr. Gosar. We are doing a second round.
Mr. Collins. OK, all right. I am hard of hearing, you know.
Mr. Abee, could you please explain why the long-tailed
macaque is the most needed non-human primate for pharmaceutical
studies?
Dr. Abee. That species of primate has been used for many,
many years, which means that we have carried out many, many
studies on these animals, so they are very highly
characterized. That means that when we use them in a research
project and we see anything unusual in the animals in the
research project, we can determine more precisely why that has
occurred if it is a test article or it is an experimental
manipulation.
So, it is the large amount of background data that we have
on this species that make them very important.
Mr. Collins. Can you think of any medical treatments we
would not have today if primates were not available for
research?
Dr. Abee. Almost every major drug that we use today and
that has been developed over the last 20 to 30 years, at some
stage in the process of developing that drug, non-human
primates were needed.
Very often it is in the later stages, what we call the
translational research stages, where we are attempting to
translate what we have found, and translate it into whether it
would be applicable to humans. Non-human primates are
particularly good at that.
This is very important in large molecule therapeutics,
which are extremely important today. These drugs such as Humira
are monoclonal antibodies that were developed, and primates
helped us develop those. And these drugs are used in all of the
autoimmune diseases which are growing in our country. If you
look at the statistics, autoimmune disease is becoming
epidemic.
Mr. Collins. So, if PETA and other animal rights groups
received their wish and primates were banned from research and
testing, what will happen?
Dr. Abee. Well, in biomedical research what would happen is
that the development of new therapies, new drugs, new ways to
treat disease would either be delayed or would never occur.
In biomedical research, I like to say that time is lives.
When we were developing the COVID-19 vaccine very, very
rapidly, we could do the arithmetic without the vaccine. We
knew how many people were dying, and with the vaccine we knew
we could reduce it. The development of that vaccine quickly,
and non-human primates were involved, saved many, many lives.
Mr. Collins. Thank you. I want to go back to one quick
thing.
Mr. Pelletier, did the government promise the court it
would be able to trace the non-human primates delivered by Mr.
Kry to the United States to support all the charges in the
indictment?
Mr. Pelletier. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, it did. What
was even more unusual, it didn't do it.
And what happened is the government themselves moved to
dismiss five of the charges when they weren't able to prove it.
And as a prosecutor for 25 years, I have never seen anything
like that. They promised and didn't fulfill. That is unusual.
Mr. Collins. I want to say that, too. So, the government
did promise the court, but then they didn't deliver.
Mr. Pelletier. That is correct.
Mr. Collins. All right, thank you.
Mr. Chair, that is all I have. I yield back.
Dr. Gosar. The gentlewoman from New Mexico, Ms. Stansbury,
you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Stansbury. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Abee or Abee?
Dr. Abee. Abee.
Ms. Stansbury. Thank you. Did I hear you say a few moments
ago that you had participated in a National Academies panel?
Dr. Abee. Yes, I served on their consensus committee in
preparing that report.
Ms. Stansbury. Thank you. So, you recognize the importance
of science-based organizations in making sure that we have the
most synthesized, up-to-date science in decision-making,
obviously, because you are participating in one of the most
important bodies that does that.
And are you familiar with the IUCN, which is the
international body that makes recommendations regarding
ecosystems and animals?
Dr. Abee. I know of IUCN. I am certainly not an expert on
the organization.
Ms. Stansbury. Definitely. Well, I will just say that there
is a direct analogy to the National Academies, because the IUCN
is an advisory board that is a science-based organization that
makes recommendations to UN bodies around the state of the
science for the protection of animals and ecosystems. So, it is
science-based.
And the reason why I am bringing this up is that I want to
read to you all the consensus science about the status of long-
tailed macaques. And this comes out of PubMed, which is put out
by the National Institutes of Health: ``In 2022 long-tailed
macaques, a once ubiquitous primate species, was elevated to
endangered on the International Union for Conservation of
Nature Red List of Threatened Species.'' That is the IUCN.
``And in 2023, recognizing that long-tailed macaque is
threatened by multiple factors, including declining native
habitats across Southeast Asia, over-utilization for
scientific, commercial, and recreational purposes, inadequate
regulatory mechanisms, and culling due to human macaque
conflict, a petition for rulemaking was submitted to the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service to add the species to the U.S.
Endangered Species Act.''
The reason why I wanted to read this is that there has been
a lot of conversation in this hearing this morning arguing that
the reason why Fish and Wildlife is trying to regulate primate
trafficking is because of influence from animal rights
organizations. But actually, it is science. The science says
that these animals are declining, and that they have declined
precipitously over the last several years in the wild. And it
is not just the United States, it is international
organizations that have taken action to protect these animals.
And we are often, frankly, trailing the international community
around the protection of wildlife and ecosystems.
And it is illegal to traffic in wild caught animals. We
understand from the conversation this morning that sourcing is
a problem. There are not sufficient animals that are bred in
captivity, as was just shared by one of our panelists, to meet
the demand in the U.S. biomedical community. But it is illegal
to traffic in wild caught animals. And the reason is because
they are precipitously declining because of these four factors,
which the consensus of our scientific community has spoken loud
and clear on this.
So, I just want folks to understand that is what we are
talking about here. This is why Fish and Wildlife is regulating
illegal, illicit trafficking in these animals. And with that, I
yield back.
Dr. Gosar. I thank the gentlewoman.
Dr. Abee, you mentioned China in your testimony. What would
be the consequences to the United States and the world if China
dominated this sector?
Dr. Abee. Well, what has happened is that China has invited
American scientists to come to China to do their research. They
have also offered to carry out what are called regulated
studies, studies that have to be done under the Good Laboratory
Practices Act in order for those studies to be recognized by
the FDA when developing a drug.
But if you do a regulated study at a test facility in
China, you have to provide what is called a ``certificate of
analysis'' to the test facility. You are forfeiting your
intellectual property when you do that. They are supposed to
keep it confidential, but there is great concern that that
intellectual property is in jeopardy when a test facility in
China carries out the research.
So with that, it means that we would be forfeiting the
development of new drugs in the United States in order that it
be carried out in China, where the resources----
Dr. Gosar. We saw it happen with COVID. That came from
China, so it is definitely a problem.
Dr. Abee. Well, it is definitely a problem, yes. And I
think that if our research programs, in order to carry out the
research, is moved to China, that we will be jeopardizing
progress in biomedical research because the United States is
the world leader in that research right now.
Dr. Gosar. I want to get back to these populations. If it
is so important, we ought to be breeding these populations. So,
if you were to design this, it is going to cost money,
regardless. It seems like we are stuck here. What kind of
population would you need, and what kind of inferences from
outside sources would you have so that you had additional
genetic material helping you breed this captive population?
Dr. Abee. Well, we would need to build on the primate
resources that we have in this country right now, both public
and private.
The National Institutes of Health funds seven national
primate research centers and a number of national research
resources of non-human primates. But over the years, all of
these centers have been underfunded. The funding from NIH has
not kept up with inflation.
Dr. Gosar. So, let me ask you a question. I am going to
stop you right there.
Why not the people that utilize these primates for their
benefit, because you have this Big Pharma that is getting huge
revenues, why can't they pay part of this aspect?
Dr. Abee. Well, what has happened up until very recent
years is that China provided these animals at a very low cost,
a lower cost than what we could produce them in the United
States.
Dr. Gosar. But couldn't you incentivize that program?
It seems to me we are living inside a box, and we are not
looking outside the box for alternatives. It seems to me like a
collaboration. We are $35.6 trillion in debt, to be honest now,
and we are looking at expenditures more. It seems like we need
the private sector to step up here, and it would be nice to see
some type of collaboration here so it is not all the government
paying money here. Do you see what I am talking about?
Dr. Abee. Absolutely. I think there should be a public-
private partnership. But the publicly-funded primate resources
are extremely important, as well, because they serve publicly-
funded research programs, NIH grants.
Dr. Gosar. Oh, I see the whole point there. That is my
question about additional genetic material mass coming into
that population.
Mr. Pelletier, do you think it would be very appropriate
for Congress to ask all NGOs, if they take one penny from the
Federal Government, they have to disclose all their resources
and where they come from?
Mr. Pelletier. Yes, I think that it would be very
appropriate, particularly finding out all of their
communications with the Fish and Wildlife Service.
And if I might, I would say, to correct something the
Ranking Member said, as it relates to macaques there is no
government in the world on God's green Earth, including the
United States, which recognizes macaques as endangered in any
way, No. 1.
No. 2, wild-caughts are absolutely permitted to be imported
into the United States if, in fact, they are properly declared
as wild caught on the importation papers.
And No. 3, IUCN has agreed that they are re-evaluating
their finding of endangered. So, what the actions of Fish and
Wildlife Service have done here have actually forced more wild
caught to be shipped to the United States because we can't get
captive bred out of Cambodia. So, I would just like to clarify
that.
Dr. Gosar. Well, the other question I want to answer is how
do you stop this? There has to be consequences for actions.
Somebody has to be accountable for it. So, that is the biggest
key. It starts with justice.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony
and the Members for their questions.
The members of the Committee may have additional questions
for you, and we ask that you respond to these in writing. Under
Committee Rule 3, members of the Committee must submit
questions to the Subcommittee Clerk by 5 p.m. on Friday,
September 13. The hearing record will be held open for 10
business days for these responses.
I want to thank everybody. It was a very energetic and
entertaining conversation. With that, if there is no further
business, the Subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]