[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
A LOOK AT U.S. POLICY IN GEORGIA
AND MOLDOVA AHEAD OF THEIR
2024 ELECTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 23, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-108
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-570PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking
JOE WILSON, South Carolina Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida AMI BERA, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee DINA TITUS, Nevada
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee TED LIEU, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
RONNY JACKSON, Texas DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
YOUNG KIM, California COLIN ALLRED, Texas
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida ANDY KIM, New Jersey
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan SARA JACOBS, California
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
American Samoa SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio GREG STANTON, Arizona
JIM BAIRD, Indiana MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
CORY MILLS, Florida JIM COSTA, California
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia JASON CROW, Colorado
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
JOHN JAMES, Michigan GABE AMO, Rhode Island
KEITH SELF, Texas KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
RYAN ZINKE, Montana
JAMES MOYLAN, Guam
Brendan Shields, Staff Director
Sajit Gandhi, Staff Director
Subcommittee on Europe
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey, Chairman
JOE WILSON, North Carolina WILLIAM KEATING,
DARRELL ISSA, California Massachusetts,Ranking Member
ANN WAGNER, Missouri DINA TITUS, Nevada
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
KEITH SELF, Texas
Michael Callesen, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Huck, Joshua, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs, Department of State.......................... 7
Smith, Christopher, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State............. 12
Sokolowski, Alexander, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Europe and Eurasia, U.S. Agency for International Development.. 19
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 43
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 45
Hearing Attendance............................................... 46
STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY
Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly.. 47
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record.................. 48
A LOOK AT U.S. POLICY IN GEORGIA
AND MOLDOVA AHEAD OF THEIR
2024 ELECTIONS
Tuesday, July 23, 2024
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas Kean, Jr.
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Kean. The Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee will come to order.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine U.S. policy
toward Georgia and Moldova in advance of their upcoming
elections later this year.
I would also like to welcome the gentleman from Virginia,
Mr. Connolly, who is joining us today. He will participate
following all other members in today's you know.
I ask unanimous consent that the gentlelady from North
Carolina, Ms. Ross, be allowed to sit on the dais and
participate following all other members in today's hearing.
Without objection. So ordered. I now recognize myself for
an opening statement.
On Christmas Day nearly 33 years ago the Soviet Union
ceased to exist as a sovereign State. The Iron Curtain had
fallen, and with it millions of people were freed from Soviet
oppression. Within a span of 2 years the 15 new republics of
the Soviet Union were independent, free to decide their own
fate. Old adversaries became new partners responding to the
hand of friendship offered by the United States and by our
allies.
Today we examine two of these former Soviet states: Georgia
and the Republic of Moldova. Both are proceeding down very
different paths. Moldova is on track to be a post-Soviet
success story. With help from the United States and the
European Union Moldova has made significant process rooting out
corruption and malign Russian influence. It has worked to
reform its system of justice, de-monopolize its energy sector,
and curtailed the influence of the oligarchs who held back
Moldova's progress and prosperity for far too long. With the EU
accession talks commencing last month and the World Bank
projecting Moldova's GDP to increase by 2.2 percent this year
Moldova's future is bright.
Moldova holds its next Presidential election in October
alongside a referendum on its integration with the European
Union. This is an important moment for Moldova. Will it
continue down its pro-Western path or will it revert back to
the Kremlin's sphere of influence? In the past Moscow has not
shied away from using covert and overt methods to try to coerce
its former subjects to bend to its will again.
Congress will be watching this election in Moldova closely
and we are eager to hear from the Administration what it is
doing to prepare Moldova for the potential Russian
interference.
Across the Black Sea Georgia has sadly followed a very
different path than Moldova in recent years. Since Georgia
gained its independence from the Soviet Union the Georgian
people have shown a fierce determination to root out
corruption, to throw off the country's Soviet past, and to
pursue a closer relationship with the United States and Europe.
Georgians have fought and spilled blood not just to defend
their own country against Russia's war of aggression in 2008,
but also along U.S.--alongside U.S. service members. Georgia
was the first of the largest non-NATO troop contributors to the
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. That is
why the recent actions of the current Georgian government led
by the Georgian Dream Party are so disappointing.
Over the past several years Georgian Dream has allowed
itself to be infiltrated by malign elements openly attacking
its Western partners and pursued a closer relationship with
Russia and with China. In May the Georgian government passed
the so-called foreign agents law despite multiple warnings from
Georgia's Western partners including a letter led by Chairman
McCaul and Ranking Member Meeks, which I and many of my
colleagues here signed. Make no mistake, Georgia's foreign
agents law has ruptured Georgia's relationship with the West.
These actions threaten to reverse Georgia's decades-long
hard-fought progress and spit in the face of the Georgian
people, and overwhelming majority of which support joining the
European Union. Many Georgian citizens bravely and peacefully
took to the streets in opposition to the malign actions of
their government. Sadly they were met with violent repression
and arrests. In the midst of the debate over the foreign agent
bill Georgian Dreams leader threatened fierce vengeance against
his political opponents in a speech that would be well-suited
to a tin pot dictator, not a close partner of the United
States. I am eager to see how the people of Georgia respond to
these actions by their government during the critical
parliamentary elections in October.
In closing, I would note that there is both room for hope
in Georgia and Moldova this October. I believe that the vast
majority of the citizens in both countries are eager for a
closer partnership with the United States and do not want to
see their countries once again subjugated to the Kremlin's
will.
I am eager to hear from our witnesses today in their
assessment of the political situation in both countries and in
what we can do to protect and promote American interests in
both.
I will now recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for any statement that he may have.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank our witnesses.
And actually thank the Moldovan ambassador to the United
States, Ambassador Ursu, who has joined us in the back of the
room here today, too, as well.
Thank you, Chairman Kean, for holding this hearing.
The Black Sea is a region of critical importance to the
United States' foreign policy and I am glad that today we are
taking an in-depth look at Georgia and Moldova ahead of the
upcoming elections in both countries that will occur this fall.
With both the Georgian and Moldovan people making their Europe-
Atlantic intentions clear for decades I have confidence that
they will continue to make their voices heard at the ballot box
later this year.
Unfortunately, and despite public support and
constitutional obligations to pursue EU and NATO membership,
the ruling Georgian Dream Party has strayed from the country's
Euro-Atlantic path.
Just last month Georgian Dream pushed through a Kremlin-
inspired foreign agent bill to crack down on civil society and
freedom of expression in the country. Today I have two messages
for the Georgian government and the Georgian people.
First, to the Georgian government, your actions have not
and will not go unanswered. In May the State Department
implemented an initial tranche of visa restrictions on
officials, and importantly family members. So long as the
Georgian government continues to trample on democracy and the
rule of law, I have no doubt that this Administration will
continue to impose visa restrictions as well as financial
sanctions as necessary.
Furthermore, while the Georgian Dream touts a trade deal
and visa liberalization regime with China it is important to
remember that Beijing is actively supporting Russia's war of
aggression Ukraine even as the Kremlin continues to occupy 20
percent of Georgian's territory in this illegal war.
Put simply, the Georgian Dream government is making deals
with those supporting Georgia's occupier. There are fewer
examples than that in the ruling party's betrayal of the
Georgian people, people still haunted by the memories of their
own war with Russia not too long ago.
Second, to the Georgian people, your ambitions for a future
in the EU and NATO are well known and this Congress and
Administration will continue as we have for the last three
decades to support you in these efforts. The Georgian Peoples
Act which I introduced last month and the MEGOBARI Act with my
friend Representative Joe Wilson exemplify our determination to
support your democratic future even as your government breaks
its constitutionally obligated promises to pave the way for EU
and NATO accession.
While Georgian Dream's actions run counter to the will of
the Georgian people, President Sandu of Moldova has fortified
Moldova's Euro-Atlantic future with impressive reform efforts
despite the numerous challenges thrown her way. She has
transversed a pandemic, the outbreak of a Russian war on her
border, Ukraine, and gas prices, as well as strengthening
Moldova's relationship with the United States and the European
Union. This includes beginning accession negotiations with the
EU in late June.
I congratulate Moldova on this important step forward for
EU integration and look forward to the day they formally join
the alliance.
At the same time Russia has a long-sought-after effort to
undermine Moldovan politics and democratic reform. In late 2022
I wrote a letter to Secretaries Yellen and Blinken to call
attention to Ilan Shor, a pro-Russian Moldovan business man's
responsibility for stealing more than $1 billion from Moldovan
banks. I am glad to see that the Administration has sanctioned
Shor and his cronies who have worked against the interests of
the Moldovan people. It is also reassuring that the sanctions
on Shor and his cronies were not a one-off and have been
followed up with additional sanctions as appropriate.
As we look to the future, the U.S.-Moldova strategic dialog
has greatly strengthened our bilateral relationship. The most
recent dialog in April of this year reaffirmed our joint
commitment to advance defense and security cooperation,
Moldova's EU integration, and important justice and anti-
corruption reforms. Furthermore, U.S. financial support has
been critical to serving Moldova from complete dependence on
Russian gas as Moldova now meets 100 percent of its gas needs
with non-Russian supplies, an amazing achievement in such a
short period of time.
Georgia and Moldova comprise a fraction of the Black Sea
countries, but are demonstrative of how U.S. engagement can
positively reenforce the security, economic prosperity, and
democratic resilience in the entire Black Sea region. As we
address the existing and future challenges in the Black Sea it
is critical that we are prepared and critical we address
existing and future challenges there.
I worked with Chairman Mike Turner and Senator Shaheen on a
Black Sea Security Act to draft an interagency strategy toward
the Black Sea region. I look forward to receiving this report
from the National Security Council as soon as it is complete
and I hope it will further U.S. leadership and influence in the
region for the years to come.
I again want to thank Chairman Kean for holding this
hearing and for our witnesses being here and I yield back.
Mr. Kean. Thank you.
Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a panel of distinguished witnesses
before us today on this important topic.
From the Department of State Mr. Joshua Huck and Mr.
Christopher Smith are deputy assistant secretaries in the
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. And from the U.S.
Agency for International Development Dr. Alexander Sokolowski
is a deputy assistant administrator in the Bureau for Europe
and Eurasia.
Thank you for being here today. Your full statement will be
made part of the record and I will ask each of you to keep your
verbal remarks to 5 minutes in order to allow time for member
questions.
I now recognize Mr. Huck for his opening statement. Thank
you for being here.
STATEMENT OF JOSHUA HUCK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF
EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Huck. Good afternoon. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member
Keating, distinguished members of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee Subcommittee on Europe. Thank you for your invitation
to speak today about the U.S.-Georgia bilateral relationship in
advance of parliamentary elections this October.
I want to thank the members of this committee for their
continued support of strong U.S.-Georgia relations. That
support has never been more critical than it is today. This
hearing comes at an extremely important time in both our
bilateral relationship and for the future democracy in Georgia.
The Georgian government has been deviating sharply from the
country's past democratic trajectory putting its Euro-Atlantic
aspirations and its relationship with the United States at
risk. It has passed undemocratic legislation, demonized civil
society, and issued disinformation and rhetorical attacks
against the United States and European partners who have
supported Georgia for decades.
The foreign influence law passed by the ruling Georgia
Dream Party on May 28 symbolizes this anti-democratic shift.
This law, which mirrors a law put into force in Russia, is
designed to silence critical voices, smear independent NGO
activists and journalists, and cow Georgia's vibrant civil
society. The Georgian Dream government passed this law despite
mass protests by its citizens, U.S. objections, and a clear
finding from the Council of Europe's Venice Commission that the
law was not compatible with European norms.
Over the past many months the State Department has engaged
at all levels to make clear to the Georgian people that we
continue to support their democratic Euro-Atlantic aspirations
while at the same time making clear to the Georgian government
that it is headed in the wrong direction.
During a visit to Tbilisi, in May, Assistant Secretary Jim
O'Brien and I underscored U.S. objections to the Georgian
government's undemocratic actions warning of consequences if
the ruling party did not change course. Similarly,
Undersecretary of State Uzra Zeya and Undersecretary John Bass
recently reiterated to Georgian officials that the government's
actions are incompatible with the democratic values that
underpin membership in the EU and NATO.
As a result of Georgia's ruling party's decisions, on May
23 Secretary Blinken announced visa--a new visa restriction
policy to promote accountability for those undermining
democracy in Georgia. He also announced a comprehensive review
of our bilateral relationship including our assistance to
Georgia.
On June 6, we took steps to impose visa restrictions on
Georgian ruling party officials, parliamentarians, and law
enforcement personnel responsible for or complicit in
undermining democracy in Georgia. These steps built on our
previous actions such as visa restrictions on corrupt judges
and financial sanctions on FSB-linked Georgian-Russian oligarch
Otar Partskhaladze.
We are also working closely with interagency colleagues on
additional steps including potential redirection or suspension
of assistance programs and the cancellation of policy
engagements. DoD recently announced the indefinite postponement
of a military exercise in Georgia.
It remains our hope that Georgian leaders will reconsider
their actions and return to Georgia's long-stated Euro-Atlantic
aspirations. We have made clear to the government of Georgia
that the best way to do this is to repeal the foreign influence
law, cease spreading disinformation about the United States,
stop progress of other undemocratic legislation, and ensure the
pre-election period and the October parliamentary elections are
conducted freely and fairly.
2024 is a crucial year for Georgia's future and its
democratic progress. We have underscored to the government the
importance of ensuring free and fair elections and noted that
we are watching the conduct of the electoral processes very
closely. We have supported Georgia's request for an election
observation mission from the OSCE and we have called on the
government to ensure unimpeded access for international and
domestic election observers.
We remain steadfast in our support to Georgian civil
society in the face of pressure from the government and even
harassment and physical attacks. We engage with civil society
representatives regularly and are actively supporting their
efforts to ensure the October elections are free and fair.
The Georgian people must decide the future of Georgia so we
must remain mindful of the threats to Georgia from Russia which
still occupies 20 percent of Georgian territory.
In closing, I want to reaffirm that despite these difficult
times the United States' commitment to the Georgian people
remains steadfast and unchanged. Americans and Georgians share
a special friendship grounded on our shared values of the love
of liberty and independence. We will continue to support the
further development of a vibrant, secure, and democratic
Georgia.
Thank you for allowing me to speak here with you today and
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Huck follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Huck.
I now recognize Mr. Smith for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER SMITH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Smith. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating, and
distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to speak
with you today about our policy on the Republic of Moldova.
Under the constant threat of Russian aggression,
interference, and disinformation, and with the prospect of EU
membership hanging in the balance, there is much at stake for
our partners in Moldova and for the United States in a region
that is critical to our national interests. I am happy to
report that thanks to our close cooperation to help Moldova
meet this moment of opportunity and challenge our bilateral
ties with Moldova have never been stronger than they are today.
As we have implemented our strategy for Moldova Congress
has been a powerful partner every step of the way from the
funding appropriated for critical assistance to the high-level
engagement and policy advocacy from members, including members
of this subcommittee, to advance our common objective for a
Moldova that is free, whole, democratic, and secure.
Moldova's October 20th Presidential election and
simultaneous national referendum on EU accession represent a
historic opportunity for the people of Moldova. Amidst the
devastating impact of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine
President Sandu's government and the Moldovan people have taken
bold steps to build a more democratic, secure, prosperous
future firmly anchored in the West.
A core objective of our strategy is to ensure that
Moldova's course toward EU integration is irreversible. It
won't be easy to reach this goal, but with continued strong
support from the United States and our European partners and
allies we are confident Moldova can succeed.
Our strategy rests on three main lines of effort: high-
level engagement with Moldova's leaders and its people to
signal our strong political support; assistance to help Moldova
bolster its security and territorial integrity, achieve energy
independence, and integrate its economy with the West; and
finally, sanctions and other measures to meet and help Moldova
meet and master the challenge of Russian malign influence
designed to knock the country of its rightful European course.
When President Sandu was elected in December, 2020 she ran
on a bold vision of fighting corruption and bringing her
country closer to Europe. During the past 4 years Moldova has
made remarkable progress toward the European Union. It's open
formal accession talks just last month.
U.S. assistance, including approximately $824 million
committed since February 2022 has played a significant role in
advancing Moldova's rule of law, anti-corruption, energy and
economic progress that helped unlock this historic achievement.
There is still work to be done to advance Moldova's
integration with Europe and we must continue to support these
reform efforts. Fortunately, we are not acting alone. European
and G7 partners have also provided billions of dollars to
support Moldova and help them accomplish these goals. For
example, since 2021 the European Union has given approximately
2.4 billion euros to support socioeconomic development,
security assistance, and reforms in Moldova.
The Moldovan people have made a courageous choice to seek
integration with Europe, particularly in the face of the
Kremlin's intensified hybrid threats and ongoing efforts to
keep Moldova in its purported sphere of influence. The Russian
government has invested significant time, energy, and money to
thwart Moldovans' sovereign choice to build closer ties with
the West. They have done this using a variety of tactics
including disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities,
and efforts to funnel illicit funds into the country in an
attempt to undermine democratic processes, especially
elections.
We have taken and will continue to take concrete measures
to help Moldova resist this Russian malign influence. Just this
year we sanctioned Marina Tauber and Evgenia Gutul who engaged
in blatant interference activities in recent elections in
Moldova at the direct behest of Moscow. These sanctions sent a
strong signal that the United States will not tolerate threats
to free and fair elections in Moldova.
We recently cooperated with the governments of Canada, the
United Kingdom, to release downgraded information that showed
Russia's current plans to illicitly sway the upcoming
Presidential elections and foment unrest if a pro-Kremlin
candidate is not elected. And we are working to strengthen
Moldova's security in all spheres from elections to border
protection to energy to cyber.
Finally, the unresolved status of the Transnistria remains
a challenge. We support a results-oriented OSCE process to
resolve the conflict and uphold Moldova's territorial integrity
and its sovereignty.
We thank all of you on this committee for your strong
backing of Moldova during this critical period. The people
of Moldova have shown remarkable resilience in the face of
un-relenting Russian pressure. They now face a critical
decision on EU integration that will determine their future as
a sovereign, independent country. Together with our European
partners we will continue to provide the engagement and support
Moldova needs to achieve our strategic interest in a Europe
free, whole, and at peace.
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you
today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
I now recognize Dr. Sokolowski for his opening statement.
Thank you for joining us.
STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER SOKOLOWSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.
Mr. Sokolowski. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating,
distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Europe, thank you
for your invitation to speak today about USAID's efforts to
support democratic development in Georgia and Moldova. I
welcome the opportunity to share the agency's work to
strengthen the foundations of freedom in the region.
Georgia and Moldova have been important U.S. partners
seeking closer ties with the West for decades. Since
independence and despite being in an increasingly threatened
and turbulent neighborhood they have made remarkable progress
and enacted major reforms. As a result of these efforts, in
partnership with the United States last December, we saw the
opening of European Union accession talks with Moldova and
achievement of EU candidate status for Georgia.
Yet in Georgia we are now facing a moment of profound
concern for the country's future. Tens of thousands of
patriotic Georgians have spoken out on repeated occasions and
protested the foreign influence law in order to protect and
defend Georgia's democracy and its hopes for European
integration.
The recent passage of the foreign agent--foreign influence
law is an unnecessary step in the wrong direction which is
threatening civil society and polarizing Georgia. The action
has frozen progress toward and could derail Georgia's hopes for
EU membership and is causing grave concerns about the
trajectory of Georgia's democracy.
The law causes alarm among so many not just because it was
based on a Russian law, but because the model of governance
that it represents, one of increasing stigmatization and
distrust toward civil society and restriction of its
activities.
U.S. support for Georgian democracy and Georgia's
impressive past accomplishments on this road were built on
shared values of individual and societal freedoms, human
rights, and a common vision of democratic governance, embracing
a strong, active, and vibrant society and dialog with
government. Now as an aside, I have been traveling to Georgia
for two decades and this is the Georgia that we had known until
recently. We want to see Georgia adhere to these values and
realize this vision.
Given the gravity of the current situation we are
conducting a comprehensive review of bilateral cooperation
between the United States and Georgia and we at USAID are
working closely with our State Department colleagues on this
effort.
Since 1992 USAID has provided approximately $1.9 billion in
assistance to Georgia to strengthen democratic institutions,
improve health and education, and promote broad-based economic
development. Today U.S. assistance to those institutions and
organizations that are working toward a democratic Georgia and
a Euro-Atlantic path has become all the more important.
Georgians will head to the polls in October to determine
their country's future and the course of their democracy. USAID
is supporting a robust multifaceted set of programs to foster
free and fair elections. This includes preelection assessment
missions, long-term and short-term international domestic
observation, support for transparent accountable election
Administration, and independent media's coverage of the
elections. More than ever we believe that comprehensive
oversight from multiple sources will be crucial for ensuring
the integrity of the electoral process and instilling public
trust.
Turning to Moldova, that country has suffered greatly as a
result of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine starting
in 2022. And despite this, I recall witnessing the great
generosity and hospitality of the people and the government of
Moldova as they welcomed Ukrainian refugees when I traveled to
the border with USAID's administrator in April of that year.
USAID has stepped up and pivoted programming in the aftermath
of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine to help address the
resulting challenges in Moldova.
USAID is supporting diversification of Moldova's energy
sources that have enabled Moldova to break away from its 30-
year dependence on Russian supply. We also continue to foster
increased trade with the European market.
Moldova has also been a focus of USAID's Democracy Delivers
initiative which works to surge support and resources to
democratic countries to help them take advantage of windows of
opportunity to implement reforms for their citizens. As part of
this we have increased our efforts to combat corruption by
enhancing the capacity of the National Anti-Corruption Center
and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office while also
supporting civil society transparency and accountability
initiatives.
Moldovans have made their intentions clear in seeking
greater integration with Europe. This year's Presidential
election and vote for a referendum on EU accession in Moldova
will be critical tests of those intentions and for the
country's democracy and sovereignty. USAID assistance has
improved access to voting for all Moldovans and continues to
strengthen transparency in the electoral process.
USAID supports civil society to increase awareness about
election processes, to monitor elections, to inform judges on
electoral legislation, and to advocate for improved electoral
code.
We have helped modernize the Central Election Commission's
information technology system and strengthened oversight of
political financing and promoted electoral education and
aligned electoral legislation with international standards.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sokolowski follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Dr. Sokolowski. I appreciate
your opening statement.
And I recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.
In May the Georgian government led by the Georgian Dream
Political Party passed the so-called foreign agents law.
Georgian Dream claims that this law is harmless and is similar
to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, or FARA, here in the
United States.
Mr. Huck, what is your response to this? How are the
Georgian foreign agents law and FARA different?
Mr. Huck. Thank you very much for the question.
And I appreciate it because we've heard this, this
allegation or this statement, from Georgian Dream in the past.
And it is patently not true. The two laws are very different
and I can lay out a few specifics. But, in addition, for a full
rundown on this, I would direct you to the Venice Commission
has written a detailed report analyzing this I would be happy
to share as well.
But, in the nutshell, four quick items:
First, FARA legislation does not differentiate between a
profit entity or a not-for-profit entity. It's all treated the
same.
The Georgian law targets only civil society and media
organizations. That's the first problem.
Second, the U.S. FARA law exempts media organizations so
long as 80 percent or more of the ownership is U.S., right? So,
American. In Georgia, they do not make that distinction. In
fact, media is specifically targeted, which has a serious
impact on independent media there.
In addition, the FARA law is based on your actions. Are
you, in fact, acting at the direct control of a foreign entity?
The Georgian law does not make that distinction. Again, it only
looks at where your foreign funding comes from. So, if you're
an NGO working on early childhood education, or something of
that nature, and you receive a grant from Finland--or pick any
other country--you are irrefutably, irrebuttably labeled an
agent of foreign influence of Finland, regardless of what the
actions of your given civil society organization is.
None of this stands to reason. And so, all of this is why
both we and our European partners have analyzed the bill
closely and assessed it does not align with transatlantic
norms.
Thank you.
Mr. Kean. So, you are, basically, saying--and you agree--
that their law is very similar to the Russia law and actually
much closer to what President Putin is pushing within Russia
and his allies-states?
Mr. Huck. I would agree with that, as a Russian-inspired
law, we often say, and it is quite worrisome that, while
Georgia's long-time partners and allies, like the United States
and Europe, have warned and urged Georgia not to move forward
with this legislation, Russia, the country that occupies 20
percent of Georgia, has praised the law.
And we've made the case to Georgian Dream and to the people
of Georgia that, when your friends are urging you to not do it,
and your occupier is urging you to do it, it really ought to
make you think.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Huck.
Mr. Sokolowski, the clear pretext of Geogia's foreign
agents law is to impose control on the organizations that have
worked for years to bring Georgia closer to the Euro-Atlantic
community. Many of these organizations are implementing
partners of the State Department and USAID. Once the foreign
agents law comes into effect in September, what impacts will it
have on State and USAID's implementing partners in Georgia, and
what guidance are you providing to them about this new
operating environment?
Mr. Sokolowski. Thank you very much for that question,
Chairman Kean.
On one level, we are facing a situation that has some
degree of uncertainty. We are waiting for implementing
guidelines to come out with regard to the legislation, and we
anticipate those coming out in August.
At the same time, we are not sitting and waiting. Our
mission in Tbilisi has been working with our partners on what
we're calling a lean-in strategy with civil society, as we help
them to weather this transition in the environment and to offer
them sets of services that to this point they have not needed.
And these are the kind of services that they may need in a
more challenging and less conducive environment for their work.
And in that, we're talking about legal assistance; assistance
to help them understand how they can comply with the law;
security for their staff, and so forth.
So, there's a number of different things that we're working
on. We have set a goal to make sure that we are focusing and
orienting our assistance to help NGO's as they enter this
difficult period.
Mr. Kean. Thank you.
Mr. Smith, Moldova has been slipping out of Russia's orbit
for several years, and based on consistent public pollings, it
seems like it will continue to do so. Is the State Department
concerned about more overt and direct Russian interference and
intervention in Moldova as we get closer to the October
Presidential election and EU referendum?
Mr. Smith. We see very clear--first of all, thank you so
much for the question, Mr. Chairman--we see very clear action
by the Russians to undermine this upcoming election and the
referendum. They are engaging networks of interference financed
by the Russian State and also by oligarchs and criminal
organizations, designed to deprive the Moldovan people of their
right to choose and their right to make a decision about their
country's future. And we are working through sanctions to
target those organizations and disrupt their operations, but
also to support reforms necessary to ensure this election is
protected from that type of influence.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
I now recognize Ranking Member Keating for any questions
that he may have.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to followup with Mr. Smith because I see great
benefit, even to the United States, in understanding the
disinformation tactics employed by Russia in Moldova.
We have seen their actions in France recently. We have seen
their actions in Slovakia and in the Baltic countries for
years, but it is becoming more and more pronounced. And in
Moldova, you indicated how illicit funds are getting into the
country for this. If you could give us some more detail on
that? And plus, you mentioned that the United States and Canada
have seen a plan, actually, a detailed plan, of what they are
doing. Could you give us more details, if that is possible in
an unsecure setting, about what they are doing? It is really
important for Moldova that they are able to combat this and
have done a great job, I think, to the extent they can.
But this is something that will affect, with our own
elections coming here, Russian disinformation tactics. So, the
more we can learn about what is going on in the rest of the
world, the better it is all the way around.
So, if you could, take a few minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Ranking Member.
I would describe the Russian campaign in Moldova as
consisting of three critical elements.
One is that they use illicit funding in order to try to get
people to come out and protest.
Mr. Keating. Now, where do the funds emanate from?
Mr. Smith. The funds emanate from Russian-backed oligarchs,
including Mr. Shor, who you mentioned in your opening
statement, somebody that the United States has designated----
Mr. Keating. This is the person that stole a billion
dollars from Moldova.
Mr. Smith. Exactly sir, and somebody who is operating a
network of influence and using his financial connections to try
to push illicit money into the country.
Additionally, he is promoting false narratives about the
outcome of the referendum; for example, promoting the idea
that, if Moldovans were to support a referendum on EU
integration, that that would result in Russia suddenly
attacking the country, and that that would bring Moldova closer
to----
Mr. Keating. How is this information being transmitted?
Mr. Smith. They use social media and they also use
programming on Russian-controlled television and Russian-
controlled media that is broadcast from Russia.
Mr. Keating. That is true. Because when I was there not too
long ago, I learned that, in Moldova, because it is one of the
poorer countries in Europe, and some of the production--that
the television, including children's television, family
television, all television, is Russian-originated, and within
that, they have great influence.
So, go ahead.
Mr. Smith. That's correct, sir.
And then, the third method that they use is backing
particular candidates. And they have backed particular
candidates who are running in this election. They have ties to
those candidates. They are encouraging them and they are trying
to drive a consensus among certain candidates to support a pro-
Kremlin position that is counter to the will of the Moldovan--
--
Mr. Keating. And they are trying to really inhibit turnout
in voting as well.
Mr. Smith. They are trying to undermine turnout by, again,
spreading false information that somehow Moldova will be
dragged into the war in Ukraine if Moldovans were to support
the EU referendum.
And they are also trying to drive an agenda that undermines
the accomplishments of President Sandu in meeting the
aspirations of the Moldovan people to fight corruption, to
strengthen their democratic and economic institutions.
Mr. Keating. And when I was there, too--and if you could
tell me if this is still in play or if it has even expanded--
they were using domestic issues. They do not come out with pro-
Russian statements. They come out with disinformation
regarding, for instance, the economic conditions in the country
and others. Could you give us some examples of that?
Mr. Smith. Yes. One of the narratives that they try to
foster is that Moldova is turning away from a reliance on
energy emanating from Russia that gas resources, for example,
has caused a raise in prices for Moldovans. It's actually quite
the opposite. In most cases, now that Moldova is buying gas on
the open market, according to EU norms and rules, most of the
prices are cheaper than what Gazprom was offering them earlier.
Mr. Keating. So, they are able to use that influence even
to distort the truth to their advantage?
Mr. Smith. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Keating. And they are using these domestic issues
because the group behind it, the ultimate goal is to create a
government that is pro-Russian. So, they are not using
propaganda as we might remember from the cold war. They are
much more sophisticated in attacking domestic issues, trying to
make the government look weaker, even when those are lies?
Mr. Smith. The goals that we have seen them articulate, and
that we shared in the declassified information that we
announced publicly together with the governments of Canada and
the U.K., make clear that they are doing this in order to get a
pro-Kremlin candidate in office.
Mr. Keating. And my concerns about Georgia that I addressed
in my opening statement are extremely important, but I wanted
to drill down as we have on this while we have the opportunity.
Because this is important in Moldova. It is important with all
the elections in Europe, but it is also important here in the
United States, because we will see these same tactics here.
I yield back.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
I now recognize Mr. Wilson for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want
to thank Chairman Tom Kean and, also, Ranking Member Bill
Keating in this regard: you can see bipartisan appreciation and
support of the people of Georgia and Moldova. And we want the
best for both of the countries.
And with that in mind, I have had wonderful visits to
Tbilisi, to the Nation of Georgia. What a beautiful city.
Tbilisi is just amazing.
And then, I had the opportunity to go to a joint parachute
jump that was really interesting. It was troops from the Nation
of Georgia with the troops from the State of Georgia, and there
is a State partnership program. And the professionalism of the
Georgian military--two of my sons served in Iraq and, also,
Afghanistan with Georgians. And they knew, if Georgians were
there, they were safe. And so, we want to build on that
relationship.
And I have also seen the negative. I have been to Gori,
incredibly, the birthplace of Joseph Stalin. But I have been
there to see the fence where the encroachment occupation of
South Ossetia, of Caucasus, have taken place, and the violation
of territorial integrity of the people of Georgia.
So, sadly, Putin is just trying to recreate the Soviet
Union. Georgia and Moldova, sadly, have remained in War
Criminal Putin's territorial line of fire since declaring their
independence from the failed Soviet empire. It has really
become clear, sadly, that War Criminal Putin is trying to
recreate the failed Soviet Union empire to benefit the
oligarchs.
And he is, first, oppressing the people of Russia. Then, he
now is threatening every former Soviet republic at risk, as he
seeks to provide for the recreation of the failed empire.
The brave and courageous people of Georgia and Moldova have
inspired the world in pursuit of freedom and democracy. That is
why I was grateful to introduce the bipartisan MEGOBARI Act to
hold the pro-Russian Georgian Dream party accountable for its
assault on the will of the Georgian people, while also offering
a path to restore Georgia's Euro-Atlantic trajectory.
As we proceed, I want to thank all the witnesses. And I
have seen firsthand Mr. Smith and his service overseas and how
fortunate we are to have State Department personnel do so well.
Mr. Huck and Dr. Sokolowski, Secretary Blinken has stated
that a review of all assistance to the Georgian government is
on the table following the decision to proceed with the foreign
agents law. And I appreciate the visa sanctions that have been
applied, at least for those who came up with the law. And
people need to know the foreign agents law means the ability of
a government to arrest people for disagreement.
In 2010, that was the law initiated by the Duma to stamp
out all opposition in the Russian Federation, a country that
should be a great country. It is not.
And also, they followed through in Venezuela with a foreign
agents law. And so, dictators see this as a way to expand.
With this, here is the question that I have: given that
more than a month has passed and the foreign agents law will
come into force in September, can you outline what the
Administration plans to take substantive action in response?
What action or actions are being considered? And then, what is
being done to help the people of the Nation of Georgia to have
free and fair elections?
Mr. Huck. Thank you very much for the question. I will give
a few comments, and then, turn to Dr. Sokolowski for some
additional.
First, I would like to outline U.S. actions across four
lines of effort.
First, clear, high-level, direct messaging to the
government of Georgia they are headed in the wrong direction;
to make clear what they need to do to return to the path of a
Euro-Atlantic trajectory and greater Euro-Atlantic integration,
which is what the people of Georgia have so clearly said for so
long that they want.
But, in addition to clear messaging and discussions with
the Georgian government, we have taken actions as well. On May
23d, Secretary Blinken announced this full review of all of our
bilateral relationship, including assistance. The assistance
review is ongoing as well.
We have taken steps to issue visa restrictions on dozens of
Georgian ruling party officials, parliamentarians, law
enforcement, and family members.
We are continuing to look at all the tools available to us
for additional steps. I'm not able to preview today what
exactly those are because we do not preview sanctions or
punitive actions, but we are reviewing the full set of tools at
our disposal, whether that is for violations of human rights,
corruption, or undermining democracy. Everything is on the
table and being reviewed.
In addition, we are continuing to message loud and clear to
civil society, to the Georgian people, that any actions that we
take are targeted and deliberate and focused on the Georgian
Dream ruling party or the individuals responsible, and not to
the people of Georgia. The United States for decades has been
the clearest, loudest advocate for Georgia's territorial
independence, their sovereignty, and their democracy, and we
will continue to do that.
I would like to pass to my colleague for a couple of
additional thoughts on civil society.
Mr. Sokolowski. Sure. Thank you very much, Josh.
And thank you very much for the question.
We agree that this is a critical moment for Georgia and we
need to really focus on this electoral process to help Georgia
move in the right direction. There are a number of components
to what we are trying to do there. There are some that are
already in place.
So, there has been a pre-election assessment mission by NDI
that was out in February. It was actually right after I was
just there. And then, they are going to do another one this
summer.
I talked about observation of multiple organizations
already in my statement, but, overall, there are going to be
about 100 long-term observers and about 2100 short-term
observers.
Finally, two quick things. Get-out-the-vote efforts. We are
going to try to make sure that a lot of people get out and vote
and take advantage of their democratic rights. And then, also,
support of the Central Election Commission.
Mr. Wilson. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Kean. Thank you.
The chair will now recognize Madeleine Dean from
Pennsylvania, 5 minutes for questions.
Ms. Dean. I thank you, Chairman Kean and Ranking Member
Keating, for having this hearing.
I thank you for your testimony, all of you, and more
importantly, for your work with the State Department, with
USAID. It is extraordinarily important work that you are doing
in part of the world that extraordinarily important.
I wanted to focus on what we talked about with the foreign
agent law. As we have heard from you, our witnesses, the
recently passed foreign influence law, foreign agent law, in
Georgia has raised significant concerns--and with good reason.
The law, which was previously withdrawn from consideration, in
large part due to significant public outcry, as you detailed,
is reported to mirror the Russian law that has been used in
practice to stifle dissent.
In response to the enactment of this law, it has been
swift, including the EU halting Georgia's accession and
freezing 30 million euros in financial support.
Mr. Huck, thank you for your testimony.
How does the foreign influence law compare to the
equivalent legislation in Russia? We talked about what does it
look like in comparison to American law. What does it look like
as compared with the Russian law?
Mr. Huck. Thank you very much for the question.
And unfortunately, we do see strong similarities to the
Russian law, both in the nature of the law, but also on the
intent. What is so worrisome about this law is not just the
actual terms of it that we discussed earlier, but it is the
intent. It is the fact that the Georgian Dream government has
publicly and specifically said it is targeting civil society
and independent media with this law, and that it intends to use
it to punish critics or those that it sees as threatening its
rule--it has said that publicly--which is quite concerning. So,
this is, also, how we have seen that law be used in Russia, and
we have seen, of course, with devastating impact the way that
Moscow has wielded these kinds of tools.
So, these are all the reasons that we are particularly
concerned about this, especially given this moment as we head
into the election. It is precisely at this moment where Georgia
needs a powerful, empowered civil society to perform functions
like election observation or policing and oversight of
government institutions, to ensure that they are meeting the
needs of the Georgian people.
Ms. Dean. What does that punishment look like? How are they
going to use the law and how will they punish folks?
Mr. Huck. Yes. So, as Dr. Sokolowski mentioned, in
October--I'm sorry--in August, the implementing regulations
will come out. So, when that comes out, we will have a little
more information about the nitty-gritty details of what the
registration requirements are and how it will be carried out.
But we already know that the government is threatening
steep penalties for non-compliance. And we also know that,
under the terms of the law, individual members of that
organization--not just the ownership, but the members of any
given organization--could be held responsible and could also
face fines, penalties, or even additional repercussions.
Ms. Dean. And connected to that, Dr. Sokolowski, you stated
in your testimony that, ``USAID is supporting a robust,
multifaceted set of programs to try to foster free and fair
election. This includes pre-election assessment missions; long-
term and short-term international and domestic observation;
support for transparent accountable elections Administration;
independent media coverage of elections, and efforts.'' End
quote.
Again, the implementation of this law, how will the foreign
agent law impact what USAID, what you, will be able to
accomplish in protecting free and fair elections?
Mr. Sokolowski. Thank you for the question.
I will just echo what we said before. This is a moment of
great uncertainty because we do not exactly know the
implementing regulations and what they will look like. So,
there is great concern about how this will affect the elections
themselves, because, also, the time line for implementation of
the law is running up right before the elections themselves.
However, I can say that there is one bit of possibly
encouraging news, which is that the International Republican
Institute, who we support, has recently met with the prime
minister, who at least gave lip service and said that he was
interested in seeing free and fair elections.
Our partners are planning to work to provide this
oversight. However, I do not want to say that with certainty we
know that they will be able to operate in the runup to the
elections. That is the plan and we are going to do everything
we can at USAID to work flexibly to help them to do that.
Ms. Dean. Perfect.
And thank you. I see my time is expiring.
But, Mr. Smith, thank you, also, for your extraordinary
work, too.
I yield back.
Mr. Kean. Thank you.
I now recognize Mrs. Wagner from Missouri for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Wagner. I thank the chairman for organizing this very
important and timely hearing.
And I want to thank our witnesses for their time and
service.
I, too, want to focus on Georgia today, which is,
obviously, heading into--we have alluded to and discussed
here--consequential elections in October. I am gravely
concerned that Russian influence over Georgia's government is
growing by leaps and bounds in a country, by the way, where
nearly 80 percent of the population supports NATO and EU
membership. It is pretty astounding.
The West must not leave the Georgian people to the mercy of
a corrupt pro-Putin elite. And it would be extremely
shortsighted to allow Putin even greater latitude to sow chaos
and violence in Europe amid--you know, we have all seen it--
mass protests attended by literally hundreds of thousands of
Georgians.
The Georgian government kind of rammed through its own
version of Russian legislation that Putin has used to silence
opposition groups and the media and attack organizations with
ties to the West.
Assistant Secretary Huck, the State Department confirmed--
and then, you have mentioned it here in the hearing--that
travel bans have been issued for some Georgian officials for
supporting the Russian law, so to speak, as, frankly, many
Georgians are calling it that, and for violence against
peaceful protestors.
Will the State Department take additional action, including
imposing potentially financial sanctions, to hold these
officials accountable, and if so, when?
Mr. Huck. Thank you very much for the question, and
appreciate the concerns, which we definitely share.
In terms of actions, I have detailed some of what we have
done already. But I will say that we are actively--this is an
active process to look at every tool that we have that we can
make available to hold individuals accountable in Georgia for
either corruption, violation of human rights, or undermining
democracy. We are looking at all of those. We will----
Mrs. Wagner. And what will some of those be, besides the
travel bans? I'm looking at sanctions----
Mr. Huck. Yes, sanctions, economic sanctions, which we have
done in the past, including on Otar Partskhaladze, a Georgian/
Russian oligarch, and visa restrictions on judges as well. We
are not afraid to use those. We are actively looking at those.
I do not have something to preview for you today because we do
not announce them in advance.
But if I could say one other piece that I think is really
important that we need to do right now, which is to recognize
that the Georgia Dream government is trying to have it both
ways. They want to criticize the United States, criticize
European partners, and at the same time tell their own people
that they are still on track for membership in the EU. It is
unconscionable.
And I think it is important for us and the international
community to make clear to the Georgian voters, the Georgian
people, that there is a clear choice. They have their own
decision to make, but that the path that Georgian Dream is
leading them is not toward a transatlantic future that the
Georgian people have said they want.
Mrs. Wagner. Let me switch tracks a bit. In May, the
Georgian government announced that a Chinese consortium had won
a bid for construction of the deep sea port in the city of
Anaklia, I think it is called, on Georgia's Black Sea coast.
Anaklia's strategic location makes this a crucial project for
Xi Jinping.
Assistant Secretary Huck, how concerned are you about this
project? Because I am. And what are the ramifications for
regional security if China were to gain control over this
strategic port?
Mr. Huck. Thank you very much for the question and
completely share your concern.
It is surprising to us that the Georgian Dream government
has decided that China, the country that is bankrolling
Russia's ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine, the same country
that occupies 20 percent of Georgian territory illegally in
violation of international law at this very moment, is an
appropriate strategic partner for Georgia. That is surprising
to us.
That is something that we have raised very clearly with the
Georgian government, something that not only is a strategic
risk, but also, as they look at any perceived economic benefits
from partnering with China, they need to look at the costs of
that as well, the risks--risks of dependence on China, and
thereby, opening themselves up to economic coercion.
Mrs. Wagner. Yes, and I think we have to urge our EU
partners to also weigh on this, especially as they look to
become members of the EU and NATO.
Given China and Russia's no limits partnership, sir, does
Chinese control of Anaklia's deep sea port also entrench
Georgia further with Russia's sphere of influence?
Mr. Huck. Well, it certainly raises concern and questions.
Now, Georgia does not have diplomatic relations with Russia.
The Georgia public has spoken very clearly that they do not
want Russian troops anywhere near the rest of Georgia. They
already are bitterly--they have bitter, deep, painful memories
from the invasion in 2008. And so, they are very clear; the
Georgian people have spoken. So, the question is, will the
Georgian Dream government listen?
Mrs. Wagner. My time has expired. I appreciate the chair's
indulgence and I yield back.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Representative Wagner.
I now recognize Representative Titus from Nevada for 5
minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm very interested in Georgia and Moldova because I'm the
ranking member of the House Democracy Partnership, and both of
those countries are partners in that arrangement. And so, we
are very active working with some of the NGO's, trying to
buildup their legislatures, in hopes that that is kind of the
key to moving toward more democratic institutions,
specifically, and governments, generally. So, I hate to see
that it is moving in the wrong direction.
You know, the passage of that foreign agent act just shows
not only the political influence that Russia is having in
Georgia, but you also see it in economic influence. You see
imports increasing, exports increasing. We heard about the
port. All of these things are happening at the same time, and
it does not bode very well.
You know, there are some attempts that we have heard by
some people about stopping their attempted accession into
Western organizations. Several EU officials have called for
that. I think you said, Mr. Huck, that the State Department
supports freezing those accession talks.
Would you give us a little more information about that? And
if we were to do that, couldn't that have the opposite effect
of what we want and push them more toward Russian influence?
Mr. Huck. Thank you very much for the question, and it is
an important one.
First, of course, we have to say, related to EU accession,
this is ultimately a decision for the EU members. But what the
EU Council has announced is a de facto freeze. The door is not
closed. Georgia remains an EU candidate country, but the
process is de facto frozen, based on the actions and rhetoric
of the Georgian Dream government.
That is a decision that we certainly understand from the
perspective of the EU. Because, as I said earlier, you cannot
have it both ways. You cannot be taking these actions as
Georgian Dream and making these kinds of really wild
accusations, if you listen to some of the speeches by Georgian
Dream leadership, and then, expect no repercussions, or even
tell your people that everything is on track.
But I think, you know, there has been some discussion of if
the EU would take additional steps. I do not want to speculate
on hypotheticals, but I can certainly say that the steps that
the EU has taken already should be enough of a wake-up call for
Georgian Dream to see that they are not moving in the direction
that their people have so clearly and so regularly said they
want. Something like 80 to 90 percent of the Georgian people
support EU membership, and clearly, the Georgian Dream
government is not heading in that direction. So, the Georgian
people will have a real decision to make come October.
Ms. Titus. We have talked about the foreign agents act or
foreign influence act. They have also passed some pretty
repressive LGBT rights acts. Are those playing in the
discussion very much?
Mr. Huck. Yes. So, you are right, there are a number of
different pieces of legislation that the Georgian Dream
government have taken over the past few months that are
concerning. The law you mentioned is not yet into law, but they
have introduced it, which is concerning.
And both we and the European Union have looked at it. The
Council of Europe's Venice Commission also did a full analysis
of that, of that law, and raised very serious concerns; that it
would stigmatize one section of the population; that it could
promote hate speech; that it would prevent equal protections
under Georgian law for human rights of all Georgians.
So, for that reason, it is yet another step that the
Georgian Dream is taking where its partners and friends are
saying this does not align with the transatlantic trajectory
that your people say you want. And so, this is of great concern
to us.
Again, that is not yet law, but we will be continuing to
track it and raise our concerns with the government.
Ms. Titus. Do you see things like that in Moldova?
Mr. Smith. I am happy to report that actually in Moldova
the situation is going in the other direction. And that is
largely due to the fact that they have done so well in
implementing the reforms required for opening accession talks
with the EU.
Now, as they move forward beyond talks, they are going to
be opening chapters and really integrating their system not
only with EU practices, principles, and norms, but functionally
integrating it and addressing issues that apply to human
rights, but also practical issues dealing with the economy.
So, we are quite encouraged by the progress that Moldova
has made in this space, and we will continue to align our
engagement and assistance resources to encourage that progress
further forward.
Ms. Titus. What we often hear when we talk to legislators
there is how much they are doing to have an independent
judiciary and to fight corruption. And that that hopes it will
propel them into these western alliances.
And then you go home and then it is not so much.
Do you see--what do you see on that front?
Mr. Smith. We see tremendous progress when it comes to
their commitment. And really, Maia Sandu, when she was elected
president back in December 2020, she put judicial reform at the
very front and center of her anti-corruption efforts.
We have used our assistance in partnership with the
Europeans to help them put in place vetting processes, to make
sure that they are recruiting the right people into the
judicial branch who are going to approach these types of
questions in a free and fair manner.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Representative Titus.
I now recognize Representative Lawler from New York.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As one of the co-chairs of the Moldova Caucus, along with
Rep. Ross, it has truly been remarkable to see the Moldovan
Government's transformation from a pro-Russian kleptocratic
regime to a pro-democracy, pro-Western government under
President Sandu. And the work that has been done not only to
reform the judiciary but to prosecute and apply sanctions with
the cooperation of the U.S. Government on Russian oligarchs has
been an important step forward.
And currently Moldova is seeking EU membership, which I
think is another important and positive step toward
strengthening not only their democracy but strengthening their
economy moving forward. But it does not come without its own
challenges.
Mr. Smith or Mr. Huck, what is the U.S. doing to prioritize
Moldova through programs such as IMET, FMF, and other accounts
within the International Security Assistance Program at the
State Department?
And how much has Moldova received through these programs in
recent years?
Mr. Smith. Since--thank you very much for the question,
Representative Lawler. Since Russia's full-scale invasion our
FMF budget for Moldova has increased tenfold. We have used that
funding not only to help them improve their combat capability
as a military force but also training and education has been a
cornerstone of our assistance.
We have focused not only on helping them develop their
officer corps, but also the non-commissioned officer corps
which is so essential to a strong and resilient military.
Our assistance has extended even beyond the military and,
of course, focused on our close cooperation with the border
guards to help strengthen their border as they face pressure
emanating from the Russians. And, also, we have worked closely
with law enforcement in a deep partnership to help Moldova meet
the challenge to their security emanating from what the
Russians are trying to sponsor inside the country as well.
Mr. Lawler. Putin and many within his Government have made
it clear that certainly if Ukraine were to fall, Moldova would
be in their sights. How concerned is the Administration about
that?
Mr. Smith. As President Sandu has stated herself, the
defenders of Ukraine are not just defending Ukraine. They are
defending Moldova and they are defending Europe.
We take very seriously the threats emanating from Russia
both in terms of its illegal invasion of Ukraine, but also the
threats it poses for the wider region. And that is why we have
aligned our assistance in support of Ukraine to ensure they
prevail on the battlefield and can deter future Russian
aggression.
Mr. Lawler. And, given that, has the Administration
directed any Europe funding toward Moldova, and are you
planning to in this upcoming fiscal year?
Mr. Smith. We have directed funding from the supplementals
for Ukraine to Moldova. Some of that funding has delivered
instrumental transformations in Moldova, one of which we talked
about a little earlier, which is the energy transformation.
Moldova went from being 100 percent reliant on Russian gas, for
example, now to buying it on the open market according to EU
norms and EU practices.
Our assistance was essential in meeting that objective. And
it has had positive results even at a practical level for the
United States. Just last April, for the first time ever in
history, Moldova bought LNG exported from the United States.
These are the type of achievements we have been able to
reach using those resources.
Mr. Lawler. Given Moldova's plan and focus on EU ascension,
do you see a future where Moldova applies for NATO membership,
especially given their relationship with our NATO ally Romania?
Mr. Smith. It is an interesting question, sir. Thank you.
They are constitutionally, as you know, a neutral country.
But they have been a member of the Partnership for Peace for 30
years. And they have actively participated in NATO training,
and in some peacekeeping operations as well, including
contributing forces to the NATO peacekeeping operation in
Kosovo.
This will be a decision for the Moldovan people. But just
as with EU accession, if the United States is partnering with
Moldova, we will support them on their Euro-Atlantic path
should they choose that course. For now, we are focused on the
EU.
Mr. Lawler. The Administration describes corruption in
Moldova as endemic. But I do not think that is something that
we should accept.
Can you describe why the Administration feels Moldova has
endemic corruption?
And what are we doing to help change this narrative?
Mr. Smith. We assess the situation in terms of corruption
in Moldova has improved significantly since Maia Sandu came
into office in 2020. But we still face legacy corruption that
Russia uses to try to manipulate decisionmaking inside the
Moldovan Government and advance its narrative, particularly
when it looks to target elections and the upcoming EU
referendum.
We see corruption that remains in the rule of law sector
and in the judicial sector. And we are working closely to use
our assistance and engagement to help the Moldovans tackle it.
Mr. Lawler. Well, to that end it would be critical to be
engaged in election monitoring to ensure that the Russians do
not interfere in Moldova's elections.
Mr. Smith. I fully concur, sir.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Lawler.
The chair now recognizes Representative Costa from
California for 5 minutes.
Mr. Costa. I thank the chairman and members of the
subcommittee here.
This is, I think, an important topic as it looks at the
Eastern Europe and the challenges we see, not only in Ukraine
but the ripple effect that is taking place.
I think the conversation, I am told this afternoon, is
reflected in part with the backsliding that is taking place in
Georgia, and how we can do our best to reverse this trend, but,
also, the pattern of that backsliding affecting Moldova and
Armenia.
Armenia is a small country that has been impacted by the
actions of Azerbaijan. And, frankly, you know, that trend with
Russia in the lead. And I begin referring to my colleagues and
to my friends in Europe as Russia today being a syndicate
masquerading as a country with a mob boss called Putin, because
he is a war criminal. That is just the way I see it.
How can we apply what we have learned in the case of the
backsliding in Georgia to deal with democratic resilience and
other efforts in the region that we are involved with?
And I guess one of you are an expert in Georgia. Josh, is
that you? And then----
Mr. Huck. Yes.
Mr. Costa [continuing]. Christopher, you are the Moldova
guy?
Mr. Huck. That is it, yes. Thank you for the question and
happy to address.
Dr. Sokolowski may have something to add from the civil
society----
Mr. Costa. Quickly, because I have another question.
Mr. Huck. OK, sure.
So, so briefly, we remain very concerned about Russia's
broader malign intentions to the whole South Caucasus region.
Clearly it sees this region as an area that it should have
preeminence over. And it would like to see weak, divided,
isolated countries on its border that it can take advantage of.
And so, for that reason----
Mr. Costa. And Russia is the original imperialistic country
going back 400 years. I mean, I think Putin sees himself as a
reincarnation of Peter the Great. I did not think he was so
great.
Mr. Huck. Yes. And so, what, you mentioned Armenia. Two
things that we are doing in the Administration: first, strongly
supporting every, through every way we can the achievement of a
just and durable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Secretary Blinken just met with the foreign ministers of
the two countries earlier this, this month. There is no single
thing we could do to improve the lives of the people in the
South Caucasus region more than achievement of a just and
durable peace. So, we are making that effort.
Mr. Costa. A hundred and 20 thousand Armenians part of
Nagorno-Karabakh now in Armenia. The USAID is helpful but we
need to do more?
Mr. Huck. Thank you. On the specifics for those who have
fled, I think I can also turn to Dr. Sokolowski, who may have
some more.
I just wanted to stress the extensive efforts that the U.S.
Government is now taking on behalf of our support to increase
Armenia's resilience writ large. We just had a strategic dialog
capstone event at which we decided, we announced that we are
upgrading the relationship to a strategic partnership.
Mr. Costa. It is important.
Mr. Huck. And we are also increasing assistance levels.
I will turn to Dr. Sokolowski for perhaps a little bit more
on that.
Mr. Costa. Quickly.
Mr. Sokolowski. Yes, sure.
Just would note that our Administrator Samantha Power was
out in Armenia earlier this month with Assistant Administrator
Erin McKee.
And then, also, over the last 3 years we have effectively
doubled our assistance for Armenia. So, we definitely
understand the importance and are working closely with our
European colleagues to answer the call on Armenia's needs.
Mr. Costa. Christopher, you might comment with relationship
to Moldova and Georgia. What are our partners doing, our
allies, to help us support the effort with bolstering democracy
in civil society both in Georgia and Moldova and Eastern
Europe?
And I think Poland is an important leader in this effort.
And Radek Sikorski is now the foreign minister. He has a keen
view on, frankly, what Poland's focus and response should be.
Mr. Smith. European allies and partners--thank you for the
question, sir--European allies and partners have been
absolutely essential into maintaining the progress that Moldova
has made on its course toward the European Union and the
strengthening of its democratic and economic institutions
through the provision of assistance, through technical and
advisory support, they have helped achieve reforms that have
unlocked doors that were previously closed to Moldova on its
European path.
We are also working closely with them to sanction and take
other measures to disrupt and dismantle the networks of
corruption Russia backs to try to hold Moldova back and
undermine its progress.
Poland has been an absolutely essential partner in this
space. I would also cite the U.K., Canada, France, the European
Union itself. Moldova has a lot of partners and friends and
they are stepping up to the plate to ensure this progress moves
ahead.
Mr. Costa. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has
expired, obviously.
But, I mean, Russia is the modern day version of the
Sopranos. And we just ought to be clear-eyed about that.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Costa.
I now recognize Mr. Huizenga for 5 minutes.
Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it and
appreciate your time, as well, to our witnesses.
To both Assistant Secretary Smith and Sokolowski, since the
war in Ukraine began in February 2022, the U.S. has provided
Moldova with $774 million in financial aid, with $300 million
of that specifically for energy security.
Can you speak to precisely what that $300 million has been
used for and sort of the efficiency, effectiveness of what
those goals and objectives are?
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for the question,
Representative Huizenga.
I will speak quickly to the policy implications and then
turn to Alex for the details on the assistance.
Our goal with that assistance was to help Moldova break its
decades-long dependence on Russia when it comes to the energy
assistance. We achieved that and helped the Moldovans achieve
that. And have now transitioned them from being totally reliant
on Russian gas to buying gas on the open market, including from
the United States. The first LNG shipment in history from the
U.S. was purchased by the Moldovans.
It has also been important to ensure Moldova was able to
meet the tremendous humanitarian impact from Russia's war on
Ukraine. A small country of 2.5 million people, they welcomed a
million refugees in the early months of the war from Ukraine.
And our assistance was essential in helping them meet that
challenge.
Mr. Huizenga. OK. I appreciate that.
Let's go back to the first part, though. Isn't Moldova
currently relying on a Russian-controlled and Russian-fueled
plant in Transnistria?
Mr. Smith. The Transnistria region continues to rely on
Russian gas that is basically coming through Ukraine from
Gazprom. We have been working carefully and closely with both
the Government of President Sandu in Chisinau, and also the
authorities in Transnistria to look, as we approach the
question of a broader political settlement, what will be the
implications for energy resources.
Mr. Huizenga. How about Moldovagaz?
Mr. Smith. Alex, I do not know if there is more you would
like to add on the specifics of our assistance.
Mr. Huizenga. Because I am assuming this is to try to
unbundle and untangle----
Mr. Sokolowski. Right.
Mr. Huizenga [continuing]. The necessity of Russian energy.
Correct?
Mr. Sokolowski. So, thank you for the question, Rep.
Huizenga.
With regard to gas supplies, as my colleague Chris had
mentioned, there is major progress with regard to the supply
not coming from Russia anymore. It is electricity which
continues to be the issue. And depending on the time of the
year, that's between 70 and 90 percent of the needs for
electricity are still coming from the MGRES plant that is in
Transnistria.
USAID is working to try to help Moldova diversify those
sources. And it is funding a high voltage electricity
interconnection line with Romania that would allow Moldova to
import electricity from European market and other markets.
Mr. Huizenga. Is this the nuclear electric?
Mr. Sokolowski. I would have to get back to you to check on
the specific sources of that. But I know that the key thing
that we are looking for is that interconnection with Moldova.
Mr. Huizenga. OK.
Mr. Sokolowski. As opposed to getting the electricity from
Transnistria.
Mr. Huizenga. Can either of you speak to the nuclear
situation in the region, nuclear energy specifically?
Mr. Sokolowski. I would have to get back to you with regard
to nuclear for Moldova. I know a bit more on what is happening
in the Caucasus, but we can get back to you with details.
Mr. Huizenga. This is something I have asked in a number of
hearings and different settings, just, you know, what role does
nuclear play in the pushing of that.
So, I appreciate that if we could continue that
conversation.
I have got about a minute left.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Huck, I want to get back to one
of the points that Ms. Wagner had touched on and I am concerned
about as well. And I am afraid I am probably going to have to
followup in writing.
But basically looking at China and their, their influence
in that area, the Georgian Government announced a Chinese
consortium won the tender for the construction of a deep
seaport in Anaklia, if I am pronouncing that right, on
Georgia's Black Sea coast, granting PRC a 49 percent share in
the port. A strategic location of this port in the middle
corridor of the trade route between China and Europe make this
a crucial project for Xi Jinping, I am assuming.
And, obviously, we all know that a good 20 percent of the
territory of Georgia is controlled by the Russians.
So, talk to me a little bit about that interplay.
Mr. Huck. Yes. Thank you for the question.
And we share your concern. And this is something we have
messaged clearly to the Georgian Government that it is, it
seems like a questionable decision to be engaging China as an
economic partner when they are bankrolling Russia's invasion of
Ukraine, as well as the occupation of 20 percent of Georgia.
Specifically to the port, we also have concerns about the
Chinese, some companies involved in that consortium. One of the
companies involved has been designated by the United States for
ties to China's basically military industrial complex, as well
as another of the companies has past concerns with corruption
and fraud in previous, in previous projects.
Mr. Huizenga. I know my time has expired, but a followup.
Beyond this, I am curious if Georgia feels like it has to
choose between the devil they know and the devil they do not. I
mean, 20 percent of their land mass is held by Russia. They do
not like that, clearly, but what is their other option?
And I would contend, Mr. Chairman, that the U.S. has not
been doing enough to support that and push on that. And do they
feel like they now have no other place to go but into the open
arms of China?
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. But I would
like to continue that conversation offline.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Representative Huizenga.
I now recognize Representative Ross from North Carolina for
5 minutes.
Ms. Ross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the ranking member.
I am the co-chair of the Moldova Caucus with Representative
Lawler. And as some of you may know, North Carolina has a
decades-long relationship with Moldova. Our National Guard has
been working with the Moldovans doing trainings for more than
25 years. And then we, of course, are part of the State
Partnership Program for medical issues, education issues.
I think every time I go back to my district there is
another Moldovan delegation that comes to visit, which I think
is wonderful. And our Secretary of State just received the
highest civilian honor in Moldova.
I think that we have touched on a lot of the energy issues.
And I am thrilled that Moldova is making this transition. I
think it is important to highlight that Moldova is not alone. I
mean, Germany is making these transitions, too. And Germany has
so many fewer resources to call on while they are, you know--so
many more resources to call on than the Moldovans. And the
Moldovans have been mighty in what they have done.
I would like to talk a little bit about additional
assistance to Moldova in two areas:
One, Moldova has absorbed more Ukrainian refugees than
pretty much anybody else. And we hear in Europe, I just got
back from Germany in a delegation, about, oh, all these
refugees, you know, in Germany. Well, I love Germany, but
Germany is very big and has a fair amount of money.
Moldova is absorbing these refugees that, you know, they,
and they barely can take care of some of their own financial
issues.
So, I would like to know about plans for further support
for Moldova as they mightily support Ukraine in this, in this
area.
And then the second is, and I am sorry that Congressman
Lawler isn't here, but we have worked on some legislation
together to help Moldova transition its military equipment away
from Russian and even Soviet equipment, because that is really
what they had. And it may be that they are in a situation where
they need to be ready to go.
And so, I would like to talk, I know we only have a couple
minutes, but any additional assistance in both of those areas?
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for the question,
Representative Ross.
And thank you so much for the support the State of North
Carolina has provided to Moldova. It is known in the State
Department as one of the premier State partnerships. And so, I
would be remiss if I did not highlight that, including the role
of the National Guard.
We are prioritizing both of the areas that you highlighted.
As you said, it was a heroic effort on behalf of the Moldovan
people to take in a million Ukrainian refugees in a country
that is only 2.5 million in its entire population.
About 100,000 of those refugees remain. And the Moldovans
have done a great job, with assistance from the United States
and the European Union, in helping to provide a basic security
and assurances for those people who are dealing with the tragic
outcomes of Putin's invasion.
On the security assistance side, we are focusing together,
in partnership with Moldova, on helping them develop the key
capabilities they need to meet the security environment in
which they are operating. And it is a very challenging
environment indeed.
And part of our effort is to not only focus on training and
tactics that are western model, but also focus on key weapons
systems and equipment. And it will continue to be a priority as
we move forward with the Moldovans.
Maybe, Alex, you would like to offer additional points on
refugees.
Mr. Sokolowski. Sure. Thank you very much for that, Chris.
As I said in my statement, I saw firsthand the generosity
of the Moldovan people as they welcomed in so many people. I
was at the Palanca border crossing.
The one additional point that I wanted to make is that
USAID has been helping the Government of Moldova track and
understand the needs of these 100,000 refugees who remain in
Moldova. Ninety-five percent of them are women and children.
There are a lot of questions at AID. But we have been helping
them to understand. There is a program called Data for Impact
that helps the Government of Moldova, you know, understand what
those needs are.
So, I just was going to mention that. Thank you.
Ms. Ross. And with the 33 seconds I have left, we have
talked about the great job that Moldova has done meeting the
requirements for joining the EU.
Just very briefly, how important is it for Moldova to be
part of the EU for its future democracy and its security?
Mr. Smith. It is the absolute critical node on their path
to sovereignty, security, and sustained democracy. The
accession process with the EU not only charts a course of
reforms and changes that they need to make to strengthen their
democracy and their economy, it provides a rightful place for
Moldova in the European family of nations.
That is why we are aligning our assistance and our
engagement to support it. And we will continue to do so.
Ms. Ross. Thank you.
And I yield back.
Mr. Kean. Thank you.
With no further questions from the members, I want to thank
our witnesses for their valuable testimony, as well as the
members for their questions.
Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
written questions for the witnesses. And we will ask you to
respond to these promptly and in writing.
Pursuant to committee rules, all members have 5 days to
submit statements, questions, and extraneous material for the
record, subject to the length limitations.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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