[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                   WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE HOMELAND

=======================================================================







                                HEARING

                               before the

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                           NOVEMBER 15, 2023
                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-38
                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     





               [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]




                                     

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
                               __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 

56-460 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2024 
















                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas                J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York                Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
                      Stephen Siao, Staff Director
                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                       Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk 














                       
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Mark E. Green, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Tennessee, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland 
  Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     7
  Prepared Statement.............................................     8

                               Witnesses

Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of 
  Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................    10
  Prepared Statement.............................................    12
Mr. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of 
  Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice:
  Oral Statement.................................................    20
  Prepared Statement.............................................    22
Ms. Christine Abizaid, Director, National Counterterrorism 
  Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence:
  Oral Statement.................................................    31
  Prepared Statement.............................................    32

                             For the Record

The Honorable Dale W. Strong, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Alabama:
  Article, CNN, August 30, 2023..................................    86
The Honorable Nick LaLota, a Representative in Congress From the 
  State of New York:
  Social Media Post..............................................    96

                                Appendix

Question From Honorable August Pfluger for Honorable Alejandro N. 
  Mayorkas.......................................................   107
Questions From Honorable Mike Ezell for Honorable Alejandro N. 
  Mayor- kas.....................................................   107
Questions From Honorable August Pfluger for Christopher A. Wray..   108
Questions From Honorable Marjorie Taylor Greene for Christopher 
  A. Wray........................................................   108
Questions From Honorable Mike Ezell for Christopher A. Wray......   108

 
                   WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE HOMELAND

                              ----------                              

                      Wednesday, November 15, 2023

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                                            Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m., in 
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mark Green 
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Green, McCaul, Higgins, Guest, 
Bishop, Gimenez, Pfluger, Garbarino, Greene, Gonzales, LaLota, 
Ezell, D'Esposito, Lee, Luttrell, Strong, Brecheen, Crane, 
Thompson, Payne, Swalwell, Correa, Carter, Thanedar, Magaziner, 
Ivey, Goldman, Garcia, Ramirez, Menendez, Clarke, and Titus.
    Also present: Representative Cammack.
    Chairman Green. The Committee on Homeland Security will 
come to order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the 
committee in recess at any point. Without objection, the 
gentlewoman from Florida, Mrs. Cammack, is permitted to sit on 
the dais and ask questions to the witness. The purpose of this 
hearing is to receive testimony on the full-scale scope and 
pace of threats posed to the homeland. I now recognize myself 
for an opening statement.
    Twenty-two years have passed since September 11. Since 
then, the nature of the threats we face has evolved, and the 
security challenges are becoming more dynamic each day. I don't 
say this lightly. This is one of the most dangerous times in 
the history of the United States. Some of the greatest threats 
include an open and lawless Southwest Border. Ask any border 
sheriff, or for that matter, the mayor of New York City, the 
rising threat of terrorism, rogue nation-state actors and 
criminal elements seeking to do us harm, and efforts by foreign 
adversaries like the Chinese Communist Party to target our 
critical infrastructure. Of course, we also have the wars in 
Israel and Ukraine, and rising Chinese aggression in the Taiwan 
Strait and the South China Sea.
    To overcome these significant challenges, we must take a 
clear-eyed and holistic look at these threats. First, we are 
facing an unprecedented crisis at our Southwest Border. In just 
3 years, the administration has systematically dismantled our 
Nation's border security and created the worst border crisis in 
American history. While my friends on the left defend these 
actions, though now maybe less so than they did at the start, 
it is clear that this crisis is not the result of budget cuts, 
changes in Border Patrol resources, or changes in the 
immigration laws passed by Congress. What has changed was the 
cancellation of effective policies that had secured our 
borders. The Biden administration ended proven policies like 
Remain in Mexico, asylum cooperative agreements, and 
construction of new border wall systems. As a result, people 
tested the system, were released into the country, called home, 
and millions more came. A lot like a college town bar that 
doesn't card, before long, they have a line out the door.
    Worse, as acknowledged by AG Garland, Attorney General 
Garland, the drug cartels have taken advantage of this policy 
shift and executed a strategy pushing mass waves of people to 
tie up Border Patrol and then bypass them with thousands of 
pounds of fentanyl, killing Americans at an unprecedented rate. 
Worse, as acknowledged by AG General, Attorney General Garland, 
the drug cartels have taken advantage of this policy shift and 
executed a strategy that is basically resulting in mass human 
trafficking.
    Under Secretary Mayorkas, we just saw a record-breaking 
year for illegal immigration. CBP reported 2.47 million alien 
encounters along the Southwest Border in fiscal year 2023. 
Since taking office, Secretary Mayorkas has overseen more than 
6.5 million Southwest Border encounters, 7.8 million Nation-
wide encounters, and more than 1.8 million known gotaways. All 
records. To put this into perspective, the number of illegal 
immigrants who have entered our country since President Biden 
took office is greater than the population of 33 of our 
Nation's States. I will repeat that, more than 33 out of our 50 
States. Furthermore, under Secretary Mayorkas, violent Mexican 
cartels are making record profits. In fact, the New York Times 
reported that cartels earned around $500 million a year in 2018 
on human smuggling. Today, they earn an estimated $13 billion.
    The failure of this administration's border policies has 
created a humanitarian and national security crisis, as 
transnational criminal organizations prey on vulnerable 
migrants and sneak across violent felons and individuals on the 
terrorist watch list. Yet, Secretary Mayorkas has continued to 
mislead Congress and the American people, claiming that this is 
what a secure border looks like.
    Second, malicious activity by nation-state actors and 
terrorism poses a direct threat to the United States homeland. 
Without question, the homeland is less safe under this 
President. The catastrophic Afghanistan withdrawal 2 years ago 
signaled weakness and a lack of leadership to the world. Our 
Nation's adversaries have been emboldened to attack our allies 
and our friends and are undermining our security here at home. 
Significant threats to our cities and our local communities are 
only growing.
    As each of you recently testified before the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, foreign 
terrorist organizations, including those supported by Tehran, 
have gained a sense of momentum following Hamas' brutal 
terrorist attack against Israel last month. These terrorist 
organizations continue to call for attacks against the United 
States at home and abroad. This includes al-Qaeda, which, as 
Director Wray has pointed out, has issued its most specific 
call to attack the United States in the last 5 years.
    As our adversaries seek to further destabilize the Middle 
East, we must confront how these threats directly impact our 
own homeland security. According to DHS, 294 aliens whose name 
appear on the terrorist watch list, were stopped trying to 
cross our Southwest Border between ports of entry since fiscal 
year 2021. Compare that with 11 individuals stopped in the 4 
years before fiscal year 2017 through 2020. Think about that 
for a moment. It is intuitive. Why would these individuals who 
under the previous President only had 11 attempts to cross and 
were caught, suddenly feel like they could try and succeed? 
Policy changes.
    In the last 2 years, CBP encountered over 6,000 special-
interest aliens from Afghanistan--1,600 from Pakistan, 659 from 
Iran, and 123 from Iraq between ports of entry. Additionally, 
DHS documents obtained by this committee show that more than 
20,000 Russians, nearly 230 Afghans, and more than 1,800 Uzbeks 
have been released into the country via the misguided CBP One 
app mass parole program with minimal or no vetting. These are 
just the ones we know about. How many other individuals posing 
a national security threat have been among the 1.8 million 
known gotaways? No one knows, and that is terrifying.
    Our committee has been engaged with DHS, the FBI, NCTC to 
ensure resources are appropriately allocated to counter these 
threats from terrorism. That said, more must be done. We are 
still waiting on sufficient information on the Biden 
administration's handling of the heightened national security 
risks posed by a massive number of aliens with terrorist ties 
illegally crossing the Southwest Border. We will not be 
deterred. We demand DHS's full compliance and without delay. 
Compliance that I might add, is dictated by the Constitution.
    Third, antisemitism is rising, and threats against 
communities of faith in the United States are reaching historic 
levels. Antisemitic attacks have risen sharply in the United 
States since October 7. Foreign terrorist organizations like 
ISIS have called on its extremist supporters to target Jewish 
communities in the United States and Europe. The free world 
pledged never again nearly 80 years ago. Now it is time we 
stand firm and united against this evil. We must not let these 
antisemitic attacks and the increasingly hateful rhetoric 
become a harbinger of something worse to come. We must do all 
we can to protect houses of worship and vulnerable communities 
from such targeted violence.
    Fourth, cyber attacks continue to undermine our homeland 
security. The cyber threats we face from malicious nation-
states and cyber criminals are increasingly complex. This 
summer, the Federal Government experienced multiple incidences, 
including right before the Secretary of Commerce's visit to 
China. Our critical infrastructure is also under attack. This 
year's annual threat assessment of the United States 
intelligence community highlighted the threat that adversarial 
cyber actors pose to our critical infrastructure owners and 
operators. DHS, CISA, and the FBI have a crucial role to play 
in supporting these owners and operators to defend against and 
respond to these threats.
    Finally, we must address the challenge posed by the CCP. 
Against the backdrop of all these threats lie the specter of a 
regime that continues to challenge the United States 
economically, technologically, diplomatically, and militarily. 
Through its relentless espionage, the CCP is stealing U.S. 
intellectual property, trade secrets, and other sensitive data 
of Americans and American companies. Over the past year alone, 
the CCP has increased its espionage efforts against the 
homeland in a variety of ways. These include the CCP's 
surveillance balloon, collecting intelligence on sensitive 
sites, and Chinese nationals posing as tourists to access our 
military installations and other sensitive sites, and Chinese 
nationals who have crossed our Southern Border at unprecedented 
levels. Twenty-four thousand apprehensions of Chinese nationals 
at the Southwest Border in fiscal year 2023 alone, a 1,100 
percent increase from last year. It doesn't take a rocket 
scientist to see there is intentionality there.
    If recent reports are correct, the CCP also operates dozens 
of overseas police stations which aid their transnational 
repression effort by intimidating and threatening Chinese 
dissidents abroad. DHS and the FBI must ensure that 
transnational repression tactics and schemes by foreign 
governments cannot continue on American soil. We stand ready to 
help.
    The CCP has also made strides in infiltrating our Nation's 
education system. It should concern every American that 
billions of dollars from the CCP are flowing into our K through 
12 classrooms and institutions of higher education. This is a 
systematic effort by the CCP to expand its influence within 
America's classrooms and promote its authoritarian and anti-
American agenda.
    So, what is the Homeland Security Committee doing about 
these threats? Well, first, in May, we passed H.R. 2, the 
Secure the Border Act, the most comprehensive border security 
legislation in decades. We have addressed cyber threats head-on 
through a whole-of-Nation approach. We have passed legislation 
encountering responsible use--encouraging responsible use of 
open-source software in the Federal Government and building 
DHS's cyber work force. I have convened a group of committees 
across Congress to discuss and develop solutions to this 
problem that implicate multiple committees of jurisdiction. 
Just last week, this committee advanced Congressman Pfluger's 
legislation to prohibit DHS funds from flowing into 
universities that host Confucius institutes and Chinese 
entities of concern. Further, we passed Congressman Guest's 
common-sense legislation to counter the CCP's brazen espionage 
and theft of U.S. innovation by barring DHS from purchasing 
drones from the PRC or other foreign adversaries.
    We have held multiple hearings to examine the evolving 
threat of terrorism more than 2 decades after September 11 and 
their implications on the homeland, including a recent hearing 
where we received confirmation of the immediate and significant 
threat the Iranian regime poses to the United States homeland. 
This committee has also demanded information on individuals 
from Uzbekistan and other countries who used a smuggler with 
ties to ISIS to enter the United States through our Southwest 
Border. We also demanded information on DHS's screening and 
vetting of Afghan evacuees in the wake of our catastrophic 
withdrawal. Most recently, we have requested documents and 
information from both DHS and the FBI on terrorist threats at 
the Southwest Border. The Department and FBI's delays and lack 
of responsiveness have become an unacceptable pattern.
    Make no mistake, we will continue to use every tool at our 
disposal to secure these answers for the American people. I 
look forward to a productive conversation about the current 
threats to our homeland and the actions being taken to prevent 
them. I thank our witnesses for being here, and I look forward 
to your testimony.
    [The statement of Chairman Green follows:]
                    Statement of Chairman Mark Green
    Twenty-two years have passed since September 11. Since then, the 
nature of the threats we face has evolved, and the security challenges 
are becoming more dynamic each day. I do not say this lightly; this is 
one of the most dangerous times in the history of the United States. 
Some of the greatest threats include: an open and lawless Southwest 
Border, ask any Texas Sherriff or for that matter the mayor of NYC; the 
rising threat of terrorism; rogue nation-state actors and criminal 
elements seeking to do us harm; and efforts by foreign adversaries like 
the Chinese Communist Party to target our critical infrastructure. Of 
course, we also have the wars in Israel and Ukraine, and rising Chinese 
aggression in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. To overcome these 
significant challenges, we must take a clear-eyed and holistic look at 
these threats.
    First, we are facing an unprecedented crisis at the Southwest 
Border. In just 3 years, the Biden administration has systematically 
dismantled our Nation's border security and created the worst border 
crisis in American history. While my friends on the left defend these 
actions--though now maybe less so than at the start--it is clear that 
this crisis is not the result of budget cuts, changes in Border Patrol 
resources, or changes to the immigration laws passed by Congress. What 
changed was the cancelation of effective policies that had secured our 
borders--the Biden administration ended proven policies like Remain in 
Mexico, asylum cooperative agreements, and construction of new border 
wall system. As a result, people tested the system, were released into 
the country, called home, and millions more came. A lot like a college 
town bar that doesn't card. Before long, they have a line out the door. 
Worse, as acknowledged by AG Garland, the drug cartels have taken 
advantage of this policy shift, and executed a strategy pushing mass 
waves of people to tie up Border Patrol and then bypassed with 
thousands of pounds of fentanyl killing Americans at an unprecedented 
rate. Under Secretary Mayorkas, we just saw a record-breaking year for 
illegal immigration. CBP reported 2.47 million alien encounters along 
the Southwest Border in fiscal year 2023. Since taking office, 
Secretary Mayorkas has overseen more than 6.5 million Southwest Border 
encounters, 7.8 million Nation-wide encounters, and more than 1.8 
million known gotaways--all records. To put this in perspective: The 
number of illegal immigrants who entered our country since President 
Biden took office is greater than the population of 33 of our States. 
I'll repeat that: more than 33 out of our 50 States. Furthermore, under 
Secretary Mayorkas, violent Mexican cartels are making record profits. 
In fact, the New York Times reported that cartels earned around $500 
million a year in 2018 on human smuggling. Today, they earn an 
estimated $13 billion a year. The failure of this administration's 
border policies has created a humanitarian and national security crisis 
as transnational criminal organizations prey on vulnerable migrants and 
sneak across violent felons and individuals on the terrorist watch 
list. And yet, Secretary Mayorkas has continued to mislead Congress and 
the American people, claiming that this is what a secure border looks 
like.
    Second, malicious activity by nation-state actors and terrorism 
poses a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Without question, the 
homeland is less safe under President Biden. The catastrophic 
Afghanistan withdrawal 2 years ago signaled weakness and a lack of 
leadership to the world. Our Nation's adversaries have been emboldened 
to attack our allies and our friends and are undermining our security 
here at home. Significant threats to our cities and local communities 
are only growing. As each of you recently testified before the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, foreign 
terrorist organizations, including those supported by Tehran, have 
gained a sense of momentum following Hamas's brutal terrorist attack 
against Israel last month. These terrorist organizations continue to 
call for attacks against the United States at home and abroad. This 
includes al-Qaeda, which as Director Wray has pointed out, has issued 
its most specific call to attack the United States in the last 5 years. 
As our adversaries seek to further destabilize the Middle East, we must 
confront how these threats directly impact our own homeland security. 
According to DHS, 294 aliens whose names appear on the terrorist watch 
list were stopped trying to cross our Southwest Border between ports of 
entry since fiscal year 2021. Compare that with the 11 individuals 
stopped in the 4 years between fiscal year 2017-2020. Think about that 
for a moment. Its intuitive. Why would these individuals, who under the 
previous President only 11 attempted to cross and were caught, suddenly 
feel like they could try and succeed? Policy changes.
    In the last 2 years, CBP encountered over 6,000 Special Interest 
Aliens from Afghanistan, 1,600 from Pakistan, 659 from Iran, and 123 
from Iraq between ports of entry. Additionally, DHS documents obtained 
by this committee show that more than 20,000 Russians, nearly 230 
Afghans, and more than 1,800 Uzbeks have been released into the country 
via the misguided CBP One mass-parole program, with minimal or no 
vetting. And these are just the ones we know about. How many other 
individuals posing a national security threat have been among the 1.8 
million known gotaways? No one knows, and that is terrifying. Our 
committee has been engaged with DHS, the FBI, and NCTC to ensure 
resources are appropriately allocated to counter the threats from 
terrorism. That said, more must be done. We are still awaiting 
sufficient information on the Biden administration's handling of the 
heightened national security risks posed by a massive number of aliens 
with terrorist ties illegally crossing the Southwest Border. We will 
not be deterred. We demand DHS's full compliance without delay. 
Compliance I might add that is dictated by the Constitution you took 
and oath to uphold.
    Third, antisemitism is rising and threats against communities of 
faith in the United States are reaching historic levels. Antisemitic 
attacks have risen sharply in the United States since October 7. 
Foreign terrorist organizations like ISIS have called on its extremist 
supporters to target Jewish communities in the United States and 
Europe. The Free World pledged ``Never Again'' nearly 80 years ago. Now 
is the time we stand firm and united against this evil. We must not let 
these antisemitic attacks and the increasingly hateful rhetoric become 
a harbinger of something worse to come. We must do all we can to 
protect houses of worship and vulnerable communities from such targeted 
violence. Fourth, cyber attacks continue to undermine our homeland 
security. The cyber threats we face from malicious nation-states and 
cyber criminals are increasingly complex. This summer, the Federal 
Government experienced multiple incidents, including right before the 
Secretary of Commerce's visit to China. Our critical infrastructure is 
also under attack. This year's Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. 
intelligence community highlighted the threat that adversarial cyber 
actors pose to our critical infrastructure owners and operators. DHS, 
CISA, and the FBI have a crucial role to play in supporting these 
owners and operators to defend against and respond to these threats.
    Finally, we must address the challenge posed by the CCP. Against 
the backdrop of all these threats lie the specter of a regime that 
continues to challenge the United States economically, technologically, 
diplomatically, and militarily. Through its relentless espionage, the 
CCP is stealing U.S. intellectual property, trade secrets, and other 
sensitive data of Americans and American companies. Over the past year 
alone, the CCP has increased its espionage efforts against the homeland 
in a variety of ways. These include the CCP's surveillance balloon 
collecting intelligence on sensitive sites, and Chinese nationals 
posing as tourists to access our military bases and other sensitive 
sites. Border Patrol has recorded more than 24,000 apprehensions of 
Chinese nationals at the Southwest Border in fiscal year 2023, a 1,100 
percent increase from last year. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to 
see there is intentionality here. If recent reports are correct, the 
CCP also operates dozens of overseas police stations which aid their 
transnational repression effort by intimidating and threatening Chinese 
dissidents abroad. DHS and the FBI must ensure that transnational 
repression tactics and schemes by foreign governments cannot continue 
on American soil. We stand ready to help achieve this goal. The CCP has 
also made strides in infiltrating our Nation's education system. It 
should concern every American that billions of dollars from the CCP are 
flowing into our K-12 classrooms and institutions of higher education. 
This is a systemic effort by the CCP to expand its influence within 
America's classrooms and promote its authoritarian, anti-American 
agenda.
    So, what is the Homeland Security Committee doing about these 
threats? For one, in May, we passed H.R. 2, the Secure the Border Act 
of 2023--the most comprehensive border security legislation in decades. 
We have addressed cyber threats head-on through a whole-of-Nation 
approach. We have passed legislation encouraging responsible use of 
open-source software in the Federal Government and building DHS's cyber 
workforce. I have convened a group of committees across Congress to 
discuss and develop solutions to this problem that implicate multiple 
committees' jurisdictions. Just last week, this committee advanced 
Congressman Pfluger's legislation to prohibit DI-IS funds from flowing 
to universities that host Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of 
Concern. Further, we passed Congressman Guest's common-sense 
legislation to counter the CCP's brazen espionage and theft of U.S. 
innovation by barring DHS from purchasing drones from the PRC or other 
foreign adversaries. We have held multiple hearings to examine the 
evolving threat of terrorism more than two decades after September 11 
and their implications on the homeland, including a recent hearing 
where we received confirmation of the immediate and significant threat 
the Iranian regime poses to U.S. homeland security. This committee has 
also demanded information on individuals from Uzbekistan and other 
countries who used a smuggler with ties to ISIS to enter the United 
States through our Southwest Border. We've also demanded information on 
DHS's screening and vetting of Afghan evacuees in the wake our 
catastrophic withdrawal. Most recently, we have requested documents and 
information from DHS and the FBI on terrorist threats at the Southwest 
Border. The Department and FBI's constant delays and lack of 
responsiveness has become an unacceptable pattern. Make no mistake, we 
will continue to use every tool at our disposal to secure these 
answers--for the American people. I look forward to a productive 
conversation about the current threats to our homeland and the actions 
being taken to prevent them. I thank our witnesses for being here and I 
look forward to your testimony.

    Chairman Green. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the 
gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for his opening 
statement.
    Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning and 
welcome to our witnesses. Secretary Mayorkas, Director Wray, 
and Director Abizaid, we welcome you. With one notable 
exception during the prior administration, you and your 
predecessors have regularly come before this committee to 
discuss security threats facing the homeland and how your 
Department and agencies are keeping our country safe. Thank you 
for being here today and for your service. Please convey our 
thanks to the dedicated public servants who work for you and 
for all of us every day.
    This Worldwide Threats hearing takes place with a war going 
on in the Middle East, persistent threats from foreign 
terrorist organizations, and domestic violent extremists, and 
surging antisemitism and Islamophobia. We are seeing more 
sophisticated cyber attacks, unprecedented global migration, 
and have a Presidential election less than a year away. The 
list of issues critical to the homeland goes on. My Democratic 
colleagues and I plan to ask you about these issues, and we 
stand ready and willing, as always, to work with you to address 
these challenges on behalf of the American people.
    Unfortunately, my Republican colleagues have a different 
agenda today, and we need to be clear about what their agenda 
really means from the outset of this hearing. Republicans are 
directing politically-motivated attacks at administration 
witnesses and they are doing so to distract from Republicans' 
own failures at governing, their infighting, and their support 
for a Republican Presidential candidate who is himself a threat 
to democracy.
    That is what some people in Washington do rather than take 
responsibility for their own failures. To be sure, Republicans 
have failed at running the House of Representatives. They 
ousted their own Speaker, paralyzing the House and bringing the 
legislative process to a standstill for weeks as they fought 
among themselves. They can't manage to pass bills to fund the 
Government. Instead, they have abruptly pulled spending bills 
from the House floor and have gone from near-shutdown to near-
shutdown, despite the harm it caused to our government, our 
economy, and our security.
    They appear on TV to rant about border security, and they 
issue bogus so-called reports replete with false statements and 
racist rhetoric about the border. Others complain about 
bookstores refusing to sell their propaganda. But when it comes 
to actually paying for border security personnel and resources 
or passing legitimate border security legislation, they are 
AWOL.
    They talk tough about strengthening our cyber defenses, but 
then vote to slash funding for the agency charged with that 
important mission. They revere their Presidential candidate, 
who admires dictators and despots, calling them capable, 
competent, and smart, who recently referred to his political 
opponents as vermin and threatened to use the Justice 
Department against them, who talks about erecting ``detention 
camps'' on United States soil.
    Republicans don't want to own up to it or deal with any of 
that. So rather than getting their own house in order, they 
direct baseless attacks at the administration and Secretary 
Mayorkas in particular. We know their extreme MAGA members are 
desperate to impeach someone, anyone at all. They are on a 
crusade to impeach the Secretary, although there is zero 
justification for it. Unlike the Trump administration, the 
Biden administration has followed the law on border security 
and immigration, claiming asylum at the border is lawful. If my 
Republican colleagues don't like the law, well, they are in the 
Majority--try to change it.
    The prior administration also refused to provide 
information sought by Congress in more than 100 Congressional 
inquiries. But this administration has been and continues to be 
responsive to Congress. It is my understanding today's hearing 
is Secretary Mayorkas's 27th time testifying before Congress 
since being confirmed as Secretary. Under his leadership, DHS 
has responded to more than 1,400 Congressional letters and 
produced more than 11,000 pages of documents to this committee 
alone.
    Secretary Mayorkas is carrying out his responsibilities as 
Secretary of Homeland Security but Republicans don't like this 
administration's policies. Cabinet secretaries shouldn't be 
impeached over policy differences. That is not what the 
Constitution says. That is not what the founders intended. They 
certainly shouldn't be impeached to distract from Republican 
failures or to appease the extreme MAGA element that has 
overtaken their party. Rather than this impeachment 
distraction, we should be focused on how Congress and the 
administration can work together to secure the homeland. That 
is what this committee has done since its inception. That is 
what we were sent here to do, and that is what the American 
people expect of us. It is a shame my Republican colleagues are 
working their own agenda. Instead, this committee, and this 
Congress, and our homeland suffers because of it. Mr. Chairman, 
I yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                           November 15, 2023
    Good morning and welcome to our witnesses, Secretary Mayorkas, 
Director Wray, and Director Abizaid. With one notable exception during 
the prior administration, you and your predecessors have regularly come 
before this committee to discuss security threats facing the homeland 
and how your Department and agencies are keeping our country safe. 
Thank you for being here today and for your service. And please convey 
our thanks to the dedicated public servants who work for you, and for 
all of us, every day.
    This worldwide threats hearing takes place with a war going on in 
the Middle East, persistent threats from foreign terrorist 
organizations and domestic violent extremists, and surging antisemitism 
and Islamophobia. We are seeing more sophisticated cyber attacks, 
unprecedented global migration, and have a Presidential election less 
than a year away. The list of issues critical to the homeland goes on.
    My Democratic colleagues and I plan to ask you about these issues, 
and we stand ready and willing, as always, to work with you to address 
these challenges on behalf of the American people. Unfortunately, my 
Republican colleagues have a different agenda today, and we need to be 
clear about what their agenda really means from the outset of the 
hearing.
    Republicans are directing politically-motivated attacks at these 
administration witnesses, and they are doing so to distract from 
Republicans' own failures at governing, their infighting, and their 
support for a Republican Presidential candidate who is, himself, a 
threat to democracy.
    That's what some people in Washington do rather than taking 
responsibility for their own failures--and to be sure, Republicans have 
failed at running the House of Representatives. They ousted their own 
Speaker, paralyzing the House and bringing the legislative process to a 
standstill for weeks as they fought amongst themselves.
    They can't manage to pass bills to fund the Government. Instead, 
they have abruptly pulled spending bills from the House floor and have 
gone from near-shutdown to near-shutdown, despite the harm it causes to 
our Government, our economy, and our security.
    They appear on TV to rant about border security, and they issue 
bogus, so-called ``reports'' replete with false statements and racist 
rhetoric about the border. Others complain about bookstores refusing to 
sell their propaganda. But when it comes to actually paying for border 
security personnel and resources or passing legitimate border security 
legislation, they're AWOL.
    They talk tough about strengthening our cyber defenses but then 
vote to slash funding for the agency charged with that important 
mission.
    They revere their Presidential candidate, who admires dictators and 
despots, calling them ``capable'', ``competent'', and ``smart.'' Who 
recently referred to his political opponents as ``vermin'' and 
threatened to use the Justice Department against them. Who talks about 
erecting ``detention camps'' on U.S. soil.
    Republicans don't want to own up to, or deal with, any of that. So, 
rather than getting their own House in order, they direct baseless 
attacks at the administration, and Secretary Mayorkas in particular. We 
know their extreme MAGA members are desperate to impeach someone, 
anyone at all. They are on a crusade to impeach the Secretary although 
there's zero justification for it. Unlike the Trump administration, the 
Biden administration has followed the law on border security and 
immigration. Claiming asylum at the border is lawful. If my Republican 
colleagues don't like the law, well, they're in the Majority--try to 
change it.
    The prior administration also refused to provide information sought 
by Congress in more than 100 Congressional inquiries, but this 
administration has been and continues to be responsive to Congress.
    It is my understanding today's hearing is Secretary Mayorkas' 27th 
time testifying before Congress since being confirmed as Secretary. 
Under his leadership, DHS has responded to more than 1,400 
Congressional letters and produced more than 11,000 pages of documents 
to this committee alone. Secretary Mayorkas is carrying out his 
responsibilities as Secretary of Homeland Security, but Republicans 
don't like this administration's policies.
    Cabinet Secretaries shouldn't be impeached over policy differences. 
That's not what the Constitution says. That's not what the Founders 
intended. They certainly shouldn't be impeached to distract from 
Republican failures or to appease the extreme MAGA element that has 
overtaken their party. Rather than this impeachment distraction, we 
should be focused on how Congress and the administration can work 
together to secure the homeland. That's what this committee has done 
since its inception. That's what we were sent here to do, and that's 
what the American people expect of us.
    It's a shame my Republican colleagues are working their own agenda 
instead because this committee, this Congress, and our homeland 
security suffer for it.

    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. Other Members of the 
committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted 
for the record. I am pleased to have an important panel of 
witnesses before us today. I ask that our witnesses please rise 
and raise their right hand.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Chairman Green. Let the record reflect that the witnesses 
have answered in the affirmative. Thank you. You may be seated. 
I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. The 
Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas was sworn in as Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security by President Biden on February 
2, 2021. Mr. Mayorkas has had a 30-year career as a law 
enforcement official and a lawyer in private sector. From 2013 
to 2016, he served as the deputy secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security and as the director of U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services from 2009 to 2013. The Honorable 
Christopher Wray became the eighth director of the FBI on 
August 2, 2017. Mr. Wray started his law enforcement career in 
1997, serving in the Department of Justice as an assistant U.S. 
attorney for the Northern District of Georgia. The Honorable 
Christine Abizaid was sworn in as the director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center on June 29, 2021. She is the eighth 
Senate-confirmed director and the first woman to lead the 
United States Counterterrorism enterprise. Previously, she 
served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. I thank all the 
witnesses for being here today. I now recognize Secretary 
Mayorkas for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement.

    STATEMENT OF ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY, U.S. 
            DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

    Secretary Mayorkas. Chairman Green, Ranking Member 
Thompson, distinguished Members of this committee, in 
September, the Department of Homeland Security published the 
2024 Homeland Threat Assessment, laying out the most direct, 
pressing threats to our security. Already, in the weeks since 
the assessment was published, the world has changed. Hamas 
terrorists horrifically attacked thousands of innocent men, 
women, and children in Israel on October 7, brutally murdering, 
wounding, and taking hostages of all ages. In the days and 
weeks since, we have responded to an increase in threats 
against Jewish, Muslim, and Arab American communities and 
institutions across our country. Hate directed at Jewish 
students, communities, and institutions add to a preexisting 
increase in the level of antisemitism in the United States and 
around the world.
    As the last month has shown, the threat environment our 
Department is charged with confronting has evolved and expanded 
constantly in the 20 years since our founding after 9/11. 
Today, individuals radicalized to violence can terrorize using 
a vehicle or a firearm. A transnational criminal organization 
needs only to conceal 2.2 pounds of fentanyl in a commercial 
truck or passenger car crossing through our land port of entry 
to kill as many as half a million people. Lone actors in 
nation-states such as Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the 
People's Republic of China can use computer code to steal 
sensitive personal information, shut down critical 
infrastructure, and extort millions in ransom payments. 
Compromising deepfake images can exploit and ruin the life of a 
young person. Extreme heat, wildfires, and devastating 
hurricanes are increasing in frequency and severity, and our 
Department's founding rationale, the threat posed by foreign 
terrorists using weapons of mass destruction remains.
    The 260,000 men and women of the Department of Homeland 
Security work every day to mitigate these threats, and many 
more. I am immensely proud to be here today on their behalf to 
discuss the work they do, the challenges they face, and most 
importantly, the support they require from Congress to do their 
jobs. Thank you for the opportunity to do so.
    I would like to focus today on two such means of critical, 
urgent support. First, Congress must now not allow key DHS 
authorities to lapse. Our Department's authority to implement 
the Chemical Facility Antiterrorism Standards expired on July 
28. That means the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency is barred from inspecting over 3,000 high-risk chemical 
facilities, including one in Shepherd, Texas, where an 
explosion last week forced nearby communities to shelter in 
place for hours. We are also barred from identifying who is 
accessing them and whether they are stockpiling dangerous 
chemicals. Historically, more than a third of inspections 
identify at least one gaffe in a facility's security.
    Our counter-drone authority will expire on Saturday, 
challenging, among other missions, the Secret Service's ability 
to protect the President and Vice President, and Customs and 
Border Protection's ability to patrol the Southwest Border and 
intercept cartel drones faring drugs and other contraband 
through the air.
    Our Department's Office of Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Authority will expire on December 21. That would 
hinder our ability to detect biological and illicit nuclear 
material threats and safeguard against the use of AI in the 
development of biological weapons, as President Biden charged 
us with doing last month in his Executive Order on artificial 
intelligence. Finally, key elements of our Intelligence 
Collection Authority under Section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act will expire on December 31. 
Expiration would leave our country vulnerable to attacks 
supported by American citizens, and it would cripple our 
ability to identify and secure American citizens who are the 
targets of such attacks. Renewing each of these four 
authorities is common sense, bipartisan, and critical to our 
national security. This is not a moment to let our guard down.
    Second, we need Congress to allocate sufficient resources 
to enable our Nation's front-line officers to carry out their 
difficult jobs and keep the American people safe. Last month, 
our administration requested critical supplemental Homeland 
Security funding that would help us do just that. This funding 
package would allow us to more effectively combat the scourge 
of fentanyl, stem the impacts of historic migration, and 
accelerate work authorization for eligible noncitizens. This 
funding will, in short, make a critical difference in our 
Department's operational capacity and in our national security.
    Ensuring the safety of the American people is a national 
imperative and a governmental obligation. I look forward to 
partnering with Congress to deliver for the men and women who 
keep our country safe. I look forward to working with you to 
address the threats and challenges America faces today and in 
the years to come. Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Hon. Mayorkas follows:]
            Prepared Statement of Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
                           November 15, 2023
    Distinguished Members of this committee: I am proud to submit this 
testimony on behalf of the 260,000 people across our Nation and around 
the world who make up the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The 
people of DHS are our most important and vital resource. Serving 
alongside them is the greatest honor of my life and supporting them and 
their critical work has been my top priority since taking office.
    In September, DHS published the 2024 Homeland Threat Assessment, 
which focuses on the most direct, pressing threats to our homeland over 
the next year--public safety, border and immigration, critical 
infrastructure, and economic security. Together, we are enabling our 
workforce and our partners to effectively prevent, prepare for, and 
respond to the increasingly diverse and complex threats and challenges 
facing our country.
    Already, in the weeks since the assessment publication, the world 
has changed after Hamas terrorists viciously attacked thousands of 
innocent men, women, and children in Israel on October 7, 2023, 
brutally murdering, wounding, and taking hostages of all ages. As the 
conflict continues, we have seen an increase in reports of threats 
against Jewish, Muslim, and Arab-American communities and institutions. 
Hate directed at Jewish students, communities, and institutions add to 
a preexisting increase in antisemitism in the United States and around 
the world.
    Lone offenders, motivated by a range of violent ideologies, pose 
the most likely threat. We urge the public to stay vigilant and to 
promptly report suspicious activity to local law enforcement. The 
Department is closely monitoring unfolding events and will continue to 
engage in information sharing with our homeland security partners at 
home and abroad. We, along with our partners at all levels of 
government, will continue to help communities prepare for and respond 
to a range of public safety challenges and are working tirelessly on 
this mission, which has never been more important.
    Again, I welcome this opportunity to discuss the overarching 
threats facing the homeland as well as the tools necessary to address 
those challenges.
               combating terrorism and targeted violence
    Since this Department's inception, the threat landscape our 
Department is charged with confronting continues to evolve. Although 
the terrorism threat in the United States has remained heightened 
throughout 2023, Hamas's attack on Israel, along with other recent 
events, have sharpened the focus of potential attacks on targeted 
individuals and institutions perceived as symbolic of or tied to the 
conflict. These tensions, coupled with the wide-spread sharing of 
graphic and disturbing content related to this conflict, increase the 
prospects for violence in the United States. In 2024, we expect the 
threat of violence from violent extremists radicalized in the United 
States will remain high, marked by lone offenders or small group 
attacks that occur with little to no warning. DHS remains agile and 
vigilant in addressing all terrorism-related threats to the homeland.
Foreign Terrorist Threats
    Foreign terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS are rebuilding 
overseas, and they maintain worldwide networks of supporters that could 
target the homeland. Among state actors, we expect Iran, the principal 
funder of Hezbollah and Hamas, to remain the primary state sponsor of 
terrorism and continue its efforts to advance plots against individuals 
in the United States. Foreign terrorists continue to engage with 
supporters on-line to solicit funds, create and share media, and 
encourage attacks in the United States and Europe while their 
affiliates in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East prioritize local goals. 
In Afghanistan, ISIS's regional branch, ISIS-Khorasan, continues to 
harbor intent to conduct external operations and maintains English-
language media releases that aim to globalize the group's local 
grievances among Western audiences.
    DHS works closely with our law enforcement, national security, and 
intelligence community (IC) partners to continually improve our ability 
to identify individuals who pose a national security or public safety 
threat and who seek to travel to the United States or receive an 
immigration benefit. DHS screens and vets every individual encountered 
at or between ports of entry, and if an individual is determined to 
pose a potential threat to national security or public safety, we 
either deny admission, detain, remove, or refer them to other Federal 
agencies for further vetting and prosecution as appropriate. We 
continue to build partnerships with foreign governments that strengthen 
our vetting capabilities through increased information sharing. Under 
the International Biometric Information Sharing (IBIS) Program, DHS has 
partnered with the Department of State to build the capacity of 
partners in the Western Hemisphere to collect and screen biometric 
information--including against DHS holdings--to more effectively manage 
irregular migration. DHS has also added a new requirement to the Visa 
Waiver Program (VWP) to require participating countries to enter into 
an Enhanced Border Security Partnership (EBSP) by the end of 2026. 
Under EBSP, DHS will be able to send a biometric search to VWP partners 
to authenticate the identity of travelers and to detect whether 
individual travelers represent a possible threat to the security or 
welfare of the United States.
    DHS's mission is to protect the country against all threats to 
homeland security regardless of origin, and the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis (I&A) exists to provide intelligence supporting that 
mission, including through effective, appropriately tailored collection 
capabilities, including with respect to U.S. persons associated with or 
targeted by threats to homeland security. I&A uses these capabilities, 
analyzing and sharing information it receives through its collection 
from a variety of sources, including from voluntary interviews and 
publicly-available sources, to inform intelligence and analysis, 
security decisions, policy development, and law enforcement. 
Specifically, I&A helps to ensure that State, local, Tribal, 
territorial, campus (SLTTC) and private-sector entities can better 
protect themselves against threats by providing timely and accurate 
intelligence to the broadest audience at the lowest possible 
classification level. DHS, the IC, SLTTC, and private-sector partners 
rely on I&A's contributions and unique authorities to share this 
information. DHS will continue to leverage our deployed intelligence 
professionals to ensure the timely sharing of information and 
intelligence with DHS components and SLTTC partners, in accordance with 
applicable law and privacy, civil rights, civil liberties, and 
intelligence oversight policies. These activities, as well as the 
information that I&A collects about the fentanyl trade, human 
smuggling, non-traditional intelligence threat actors, and other 
serious threats to the homeland, yield valuable insights to our DHS and 
IC partners with related missions.
Violent Extremism and Targeted Violence
    Over the past year, domestic violent extremists (DVEs) and home-
grown violent extremists (HVEs) inspired by foreign terrorist 
organizations have engaged in violence in reaction to sociopolitical 
events. These actors will continue to be inspired and motivated by a 
mix of conspiracy theories; personalized grievances; and racial, 
ethnic, religious, and anti-Government ideologies, often shared on-
line. The threat of a ``lone wolf'' actor attempting to exploit the 
conflict between Israel and Hamas and incited to violence by an 
ideology of hate is of particular concern. Foreign terrorist 
organization and lone offender reactions based on perceptions of U.S. 
support to Israel could further escalate the threat to Jewish, Muslim, 
and Arab-American communities in the United States and to U.S. 
Government officials. As the conflict endures, graphic visuals will 
likely continue to circulate on-line and garner significant media 
attention, potentially acting as a catalyst for various violent actors 
who have shared and continue to share this kind of material.
    Over the last year, DVEs and criminal actors with unclear or mixed 
motivations have increasingly called for carrying out physical attacks 
against critical infrastructure, particularly the energy sector. DVEs 
see such attacks as a means to advance their ideologies and achieve 
their sociopolitical goals. DVEs, particularly racially motivated 
violent extremists, have been promoting accelerationism--an ideology 
that seeks to destabilize society and trigger a race war. They have 
encouraged mobilization against critical functions, including attacks 
against the energy, communications, and public health sectors.
    Notably, since 2022, there has been a dramatic spike in bomb 
threats, impacting over 30 percent of Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities (HBCUs), inciting fear and panic and resulting in campus 
evacuations and lockdowns across the Nation. DHS has leveraged subject-
matter expertise and innovation from across the Department to respond 
and support our communities. For example, DHS created and delivered 
trainings, products, and resources specific to the threat. The 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Office for 
Bombing Prevention (OBP) provided in-person on-campus training Nation-
wide and hosted 27 virtual courses, ultimately training over 1,250 
participants, and providing over 1,500 bomb threat planning and 
response products.
    DHS is committed to providing resources to communities to prevent 
and respond to incidents of terrorism and targeted violence. We 
announced $2 billion in preparedness grant funding for this fiscal 
year, including $305 million for the Nonprofit Security Grant Program 
(NSGP) to support nonprofit organizations' preparedness activities and 
enhance broader State and local preparedness efforts. DHS also invested 
$70 million over the past 4 years in communities across the United 
States to help prevent acts of targeted violence and terrorism through 
the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grant Program. 
Managed by the DHS Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships 
(CP3) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), this program 
provides funding for SLTTC governments, nonprofits, and institutions of 
higher education to establish or enhance capabilities to prevent 
targeted violence and terrorism. In September 2023, DHS announced 34 
TVTP grant awards to entities in 22 States, totaling $20 million for 
fiscal year 2023. These awards fulfill the grant program's focus on 
prioritizing the prevention of domestic violent extremist acts, while 
respecting individuals' privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
                          nation-state threats
    The United States faces evolving and increasingly complex threats 
from nation-state adversaries, including the People's Republic of China 
(PRC), Russia, Iran, and North Korea. In addition to traditional 
espionage and intelligence collection, nation-state adversaries likely 
will continue to conduct malign influence campaigns aimed at 
undermining trust in U.S. Government institutions, social cohesion, and 
democratic processes. The proliferation and accessibility of emergent 
cyber and artificial intelligence (AI) tools will likely help these 
actors bolster their malign information campaigns by enabling the 
creation of higher quality low-cost, synthetic text, image, and audio-
based content.
    To augment many of their efforts in the public sphere, the PRC, 
Iran, and Russia likely will continue to pursue transnational 
repression activity in the homeland, undermining U.S. laws, norms, and 
individuals' rights. Adversaries have targeted individuals in the 
United States whom they perceive as threats to their regimes, including 
ethnic and religious minorities, political dissidents, and journalists. 
Agents of these regimes have been known to use in other countries, and 
in some circumstances in the United States, physical assaults, threats, 
harassment, defamation, the manipulation of international law 
enforcement personnel and processes to suppress oppositional voices, 
and in limited circumstances, forced disappearances and even 
assassination. The PRC and Iran likely will remain the most aggressive 
actors within the United States.
                             cyber threats
    Our interconnectedness and the technology that enables it--the 
cyber ecosystem--expose us to dynamic and evolving threats that are not 
contained by borders or limited to centralized actors, and that can 
impact governments, the private sector, civil society, and every 
individual. Hostile regimes like Russia, the PRC, Iran, and North 
Korea, as well as cyber criminals around the world, continually grow 
more sophisticated, steal our data and intellectual property, extort 
ransoms, and threaten our cyber systems. Accordingly, cyber threats 
from foreign governments and transnational criminals remain among the 
most prominent threats facing our Nation. In recent years, ransomware 
incidents have become increasingly prevalent among U.S. State, local, 
Tribal, and territorial governments and critical infrastructure 
entities, disrupting services.
    Malicious cyber activity targeting the United States has increased 
since Russia's full invasion of Ukraine, a trend we expect to continue 
throughout the duration of the conflict. Within the past 3 years, we 
have seen numerous cybersecurity incidents impacting organizations of 
all sizes and disrupting critical services, from the Russian 
government's compromise of the SolarWinds supply chain to the wide-
spread vulnerabilities generated by open-source software like Log4j. We 
believe there is significant under-reporting of ransomware and other 
cybersecurity incidents, and we assess that ransomware attacks 
targeting U.S. networks will increase in the near- and long-terms. 
Cyber criminals have developed effective business models to increase 
their financial gain, likelihood of success, and anonymity.
    To respond to evolving cyber threats and increase our Nation's 
cybersecurity and resilience, DHS has established several vehicles. The 
Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) leads the development and 
supports the execution of joint cyber defense plans with partners at 
all levels of government and the private sector to prevent and reduce 
the impacts of cyber intrusions and to ensure a unified response when 
they occur.
    The Cyber Safety Review Board (CSRB) is a public-private advisory 
board dedicated to after-action reviews of significant cyber incidents. 
The Board released its second report in August 2023 on the activities 
associated with the Lapsus$ group focused on malicious targeting of 
cloud computing environments and approaches to strengthen identity 
management and authentication in the cloud. The Board is now initiating 
its third review of the Microsoft Exchange on-line intrusions.
    Through the Cyber Incident Reporting Council (CIRC), DHS delivered 
several actionable recommendations to harmonize cyber incident 
reporting requirements, including establishing model definitions, time 
lines, and triggers for reportable cyber incidents. It also created a 
model cyber incident reporting form that Federal agencies can adopt and 
streamlined the reporting and sharing of information about cyber 
incidents. The CIRC will work with agencies across the Government to 
implement these recommendations.
    The Department is committed to keeping Americans safe from the 
devastating effects of cyber crimes and protecting the Nation's 
critical infrastructure from attacks is a core departmental mission.
                            border security
    The Department continues to implement a border security strategy 
focused on enforcement, the expansion of lawful pathways, and 
agreements with regional partners. The plan has increased the number of 
law enforcement personnel along the border and expedited removals of 
noncitizens without a legal basis to remain in the United States thanks 
to enhanced enforcement processes and historic international 
agreements. Since May 12, 2023, we have removed or returned over 
336,000 individuals, including more than 50,000 individual family unit 
members. This compares to 225,000 removals and enforcement returns 
during the same period in 2019, which was the comparable pre-pandemic 
and pre-Title 42 period. At the same time, we have implemented the 
largest expansion of lawful pathways in decades. Progress has been 
made, but more funding is required to manage the unprecedented flow of 
hemispheric migration and to increase our efforts to combat the 
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) ruthlessly trafficking 
fentanyl and other deadly illicit drugs.
    Last month, the Department submitted a supplemental funding request 
to Congress for $8.7 billion that would fund: additional personnel and 
investigative capabilities to prevent cartels from moving fentanyl into 
the country; additional resources for Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS) to cover projected shortfalls, enhance 
enforcement and processing efficiencies, and hire additional personnel; 
and additional support for communities and non-profits receiving 
migrants through the Shelter and Services Program (SSP). The Department 
urges Congress to provide this supplemental funding to equip the men 
and women of DHS with the resources and support they need to achieve 
our safety and security mission.
Transnational Criminal Organizations
    TCOs continue to pose a threat to the United States, particularly 
U.S. public health, as well as our economic and national security. Over 
the past 10 years, they have grown in size, scale, sophistication, and 
their deadly impact. The increased supply of fentanyl and changes in 
its production during the last year have increased the lethality of an 
already deadly drug, a trend likely to persist in 2024. Drug 
traffickers in Mexico and the United States are using various additives 
and mixing fentanyl into counterfeit prescription pills, leading to 
overdoses. Given this trend, we expect fentanyl to remain the leading 
cause of narcotics-related deaths in the United States. The illegal 
narcotics trade also harms our communities by supporting violent 
criminal enterprises, money laundering, and corruption that undermines 
the rule of law.
    TCOs that specialize in human smuggling increasingly exploit and 
financially benefit from the continued growth in global migration 
trends. In April 2022, DHS launched a first-of-its-kind effort, 
unprecedented in scale, to disrupt and dismantle human smuggling 
networks. To date, this campaign has resulted in the arrest of over 
18,000 smugglers, more than 10,000 disruption actions, and more than 
$60 million seized. This has led to more than 2,000 indictments and 
more than 1,500 convictions in partnership with U.S. attorneys. U.S. 
Border Patrol (USBP) has also referred close to 10,000 individuals for 
prosecution.
Counternarcotics
    DHS employs a multi-layered approach to mitigating and countering 
narcotics trafficking and threats of all types using our extensive 
liaison networks, domestic and foreign partnerships, personnel, and 
technology deployments such as Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) 
capabilities. The increased production and trafficking of synthetic 
opioids from Mexico have prompted the interagency to implement a whole-
of-Government approach, including a number of DHS components and 
efforts, to combat these threats. These efforts have resulted in the 
seizure of more fentanyl in the past 2 years than in the prior 5 years 
combined: nearly 3.5 million pounds of fentanyl and methamphetamine 
precursor chemicals since fiscal year 2021.
    To further increase our counternarcotics efforts, DHS recently 
launched targeted enforcement campaigns to combat illicit narcotics, 
particularly fentanyl. Based on the success of Operation Blue Lotus 
earlier this year, which seized more than 4,700 pounds of fentanyl and 
yielded over 250 arrests by CBP and Homeland Security Investigations 
(HSI), DHS launched further campaigns focused on border and interior 
facilities to further disrupt and degrade the flow and supply chains 
that feed the production of fentanyl and other synthetic drugs through 
coordinated enforcement, investigative, interdiction, and scientific 
identification efforts. Under Operation Blue Lotus 2.0, CBP and HSI 
made 155 Federal and State arrests, seized 1,680 pounds of fentanyl, 
5,000 pounds of fentanyl precursors, and 10,194 pounds of other 
precursors between June-July 2023. Operation Artemis efforts have led 
to well over 500 seizures, including more than 460 pill press-related 
items; 13,000 pounds of fentanyl precursor chemicals; and more than 
11,200 pounds of other narcotics between June-September 2023. In August 
2023, HSI transitioned to a long-term counter-fentanyl posture, 
Operation Orion, which leverages HSI authorities and tools to target 
dark web vendors and other cyber-enabled actors that engage in fentanyl 
distribution via the internet and increase targeting in strategic field 
locations. HSI is also attacking the illicit supply chain beyond the 
border, launching over 135 investigations, leading to 110 criminal 
arrests and 229 seizures, including the arrests of six high-level TCO 
members, and the disruption of five clandestine synthetic drug labs in 
Mexico.
    The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) leads maritime interdictions of 
narcotics in the Western Hemisphere, partnering with nations in South 
and Central America to combat the flow of narcotics before they reach 
U.S. shores. USCG intelligence personnel and Coast Guard Investigative 
Service Special Agents are fully integrated across the Department and 
at the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, allowing for maximum 
counterdrug coordination across the hemisphere. In fiscal year 2023, 
the USCG seized approximately 126 metric tons of cocaine, 51,000 pounds 
of marijuana, and 20 metric tons of other narcotics, including 
methamphetamines, heroin, and hashish.
            human trafficking and child sexual exploitation
    Combating the abhorrent crimes of human trafficking and child 
sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA) are top priorities for the 
Department. These crimes target the most vulnerable among us, offend 
our most basic values, and threaten our national security and public 
safety. According to the United Nations' International Labor 
Organization, human traffickers victimize an estimated 27.6 million 
people worldwide, with 77 percent subjected to forced labor and 23 
percent in sex trafficking. The United States is no exception.
    Almost every office and agency in the Department plays a role in 
our counter-human trafficking mission. The DHS Center for Countering 
Human Trafficking (CCHT), which was codified by the Countering Human 
Trafficking Act of 2021, integrates the counter-trafficking efforts of 
16 DHS component agencies and offices to advance counter-human 
trafficking law enforcement operations, protect victims, and enhance 
prevention efforts by aligning DHS's capabilities and expertise. DHS 
efforts encompass criminal investigations, victim assistance, 
identifying and reporting human trafficking, external outreach, 
intelligence, and training. By integrating these many functions, the 
CCHT enhances every aspect of DHS's counter-human trafficking work. HSI 
leads criminal investigations into sex trafficking and forced labor, 
making 2,610 human trafficking-related arrests during fiscal year 2023, 
including 1,045 indictments and leading to 518 convictions.
    The Department is also redoubling efforts to combat on-line CSEA, 
which has increased dramatically in scope and severity in recent years. 
New forms of CSEA have also emerged and grown exponentially, including 
the live-streaming of child sexual abuse, child sexual abuse material 
(CSAM) developed by AI, and sophisticated financial sextortion and 
grooming schemes.
    In response, we are strengthening our HSI Cyber Crimes Center (C3), 
including the Child Exploitation Investigations Unit (CEIU), a global 
leader in counter-CSEA law enforcement operations. The CEIU Victim 
Identification Program (VIP) utilizes state-of-the-art technologies 
combined with traditional investigative techniques to identify and 
rescue child victims throughout the world. Since its establishment in 
2011, the VIP has identified and/or rescued more than 11,000 child 
victims of sexual exploitation. CEIU's Operation Predator targets child 
sexual predators on both the open web and dark web, and in fiscal year 
2023 led to the arrest of 4,044 perpetrators for crimes involving child 
sexual abuse. During this same period, the CEIU Angel Watch Center 
issued 4,814 notifications regarding international travel by convicted 
child sex offenders, resulting in more than 1,050 denials of entry by 
foreign nations.
    We also know that we must better educate Americans and work with 
partners around the world to spread awareness to prevent these crimes 
before they happen. In the coming months, DHS will launch Know2Protect, 
which will be the Federal Government's first national public awareness 
campaign to educate and empower children, teens, parents, trusted 
adults, and policy makers to prevent and combat on-line child sexual 
exploitation and abuses. The campaign will highlight the Department's 
existing programs, including HSI's iGuardian program and the U.S. 
Secret Service's Childhood Smart, in which agents work directly with 
communities to provide education sessions and resources to combat these 
crimes and prevent more American children from becoming victims.
          extreme weather events and climate change resilience
    The impacts of climate change pose an acute and systemic threat to 
the safety, security, and prosperity of the United States, and have 
already led to changes in the environment, such as rising ocean 
temperatures, shrinking sea ice, rising sea levels, and ocean 
acidification. Our changing climate acts as a force multiplier, turning 
more storms, floods, and fires into events that threaten the well-being 
of people across our Nation. As our climate continues to warm, the 
United States will experience more climate-related disasters such as 
heat waves, droughts, wildfires, coastal storms, and inland flooding. 
Under the Biden-Harris administration, DHS is engaged in climate change 
adaptation and mitigation efforts to make the Department and the Nation 
more prepared, more secure, and more resilient.
    In February 2023, DHS became a member of the United States Global 
Change Research Program (USGCRP). As the first new member of the 
interagency USGCRP body in nearly two decades, DHS joined as its 14th 
member. USGCRP's membership consists of agencies that conduct global 
change research and use it to carry out their mission, creating 
opportunities for decision makers to communicate information needs 
directly to scientists and for scientists to support informed decision 
making.
    On September 6, 2023, FEMA announced the first 483 Community 
Disaster Resilience Zones in all 50 States and the District of 
Columbia. FEMA used the National Risk Index and other tools to identify 
the census tracts across the country at the highest risk from natural 
hazards and those most in need. A Community Disaster Resilience Zone 
designation offers opportunities for public-private partnerships 
including governments, non-profits, philanthropy, insurance, and 
private businesses to collaborate on innovative resilience investment 
strategies, leveraging the up to 13:1 return on investment for 
mitigation and resilience projects.
    DHS has also made available more than $1.8 billion for the fiscal 
year 2023 Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) and 
Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant programs, which seek to help 
SLTT governments address high-level future risks to natural disasters 
such as extreme heat, wildfires, drought, hurricanes, earthquakes, and 
increased flooding to foster greater community resilience and reduce 
disaster suffering.
       emerging threats and opportunities for mission advancement
    Advances in AI capabilities can offer tremendous benefits to our 
society. However, its misuse can also lead to real security challenges. 
We are committed to DHS leading in this space to both mitigate the 
harms and harness the benefits of AI. In the past year alone, DHS has 
shown the way in the responsible use of AI to secure the homeland and 
in defending against the malicious use of this transformational 
technology, but we have much more to do. As we move forward, we will 
ensure that our use of AI is rigorously tested to avoid bias and 
disparate impact and is clearly explainable to the people we serve.
    Last month, the President issued an Executive Order (EO) to promote 
the safe, secure, and trustworthy development and use of AI. The EO 
directs DHS to take a lead role in ensuring the safe, secure, and 
responsible use and development of AI. DHS will manage AI in critical 
infrastructure and cyber space, promote the adoption of AI safety 
standards globally, reduce the risks that AI can be used to create 
weapons of mass destruction, combat AI-related intellectual property 
theft, and help to attract and retain skilled talent. The EO follows 
DHS's innovative work deploying AI responsibly to advance its missions 
for the benefit of the American people.
    DHS recently established the Department's first AI Task Force to 
drive the responsible use of AI in specific applications to advance our 
critical homeland security missions. The Task Force is working to 
enhance the integrity of our supply chains and the broader trade 
environment by deploying AI to more ably screen cargo, identify the 
importation of goods produced with forced labor, and manage risk. It is 
also charged with using AI to better detect fentanyl shipments, 
identify and interdict the flow of precursor chemicals around the 
world, and target for disruption key nodes in criminal networks.
    I also tasked our Homeland Security Advisory Council to study the 
intersection of AI and homeland security. In September, the Council 
delivered findings that will help guide our use of AI and defense 
against its malicious deployment. The Council also delivered 
recommendations on keeping pace with technological advances while 
incentivizing responsible and impactful use of AI for the Department, 
to enhance and improve our ability to meet our mission in an ethical, 
informed, and responsible manner.
    In September, DHS became the first Department to issue 
comprehensive face recognition guidance to ensure strong guardrails to 
protect American liberties. The guidance ensures that all uses of face 
recognition and face capture technologies will be thoroughly tested to 
ensure there is no bias or disparate impact in accordance with national 
standards. DHS will review all existing uses of this technology and 
conduct periodic testing and evaluation of all systems to meet 
performance goals. Furthermore, the directive requires that U.S. 
citizens be afforded the right to opt-out of face recognition for 
specific, non-law enforcement uses, and it prohibits face recognition 
from being used as the sole basis of any law or civil enforcement-
related action while establishing a process for Department oversight 
offices, including the Privacy Office, the Office for Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties (CRCL), and the Office of the Chief Information 
Officer, to review all new uses of face recognition and face capture 
technologies.
           equipping the department with the necessary tools
Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems
    Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs), or drones, offer tremendous 
benefits to our economy and society, but their misuse poses real 
security challenges. DHS has successfully exercised its current 
counter-UAS (C-UAS) authority in protective operations at mass 
gatherings, Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) events, and National 
Special Security Events (NSSEs), including the 2022 World Series, the 
Indianapolis 500, the United Nations General Assembly, the Democratic 
and Republican National Conventions, the State of the Union address, 
the MLB All Star Game, the New York City Marathon, and the Boston 
Marathon. At all times, DHS engages in these activities consistent with 
applicable law and in a manner that protects individuals' privacy, 
civil rights, and civil liberties.
    DHS's current C-UAS authority is set to expire on November 18, 
2023. Ensuring that existing authorities do not lapse is vital to our 
mission, including protecting the President and Vice President, 
patrolling certain designated areas along the Southwest Border, 
securing certain Federal facilities and assets, and safeguarding the 
public. Any lapse in DHS's current C-UAS authority would entail serious 
risks for our homeland security, as DHS would have to cease or curtail 
existing C-UAS operations. Congressional action is required for a long-
term extension and expansion of C-UAS authority, and to prevent any 
lapse in C-UAS authority on November 18, 2023.
    To ensure the Department can continue its C-UAS activities, 
including protecting the 2026 World Cup events, both the Department and 
the administration remain committed to a multi-year extension as well 
as an expansion of existing authorities. The Department and 
administration appreciate Congress considering and acting on S. 1631 
and H.R. 4333, because both bills would address the need for long-term 
authority, while closing vulnerabilities by expansion of DHS's C-UAS 
authority. Specifically, the Department and the administration look 
forward to working with Congress, including this committee, to expand 
C-UAS authority to address critical gaps in the current law, such as 
insufficient protection for U.S. airports and the inability of DHS to 
partner on C-UAS activities with SLTT enforcement officials or critical 
infrastructure owners or operators. These two bills, S. 1631 and H.R. 
4333, if enacted, would provide the needed extension of C-UAS authority 
and close real gaps in our ability to protect the homeland.
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
    Although terrorist capabilities to conduct large-scale attacks have 
been degraded by U.S. counterterrorism operations and policies, 
terrorists remain interested in acquiring and using weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) in attacks against U.S. interests and the homeland. 
Congress established the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Office (CWMD) in 2018 to elevate, consolidate, and streamline DHS 
efforts to protect the homeland from WMD and chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. CWMD serves as the DHS nexus 
for WMD and CBRN coordination, which includes providing direct support 
to both our Government and industry partners. Of significant concern is 
DHS's ability to continue the mission to counter WMDs after the 
authorization for CWMD terminates on December 21, 2023. DHS's tools to 
accomplish this mission are at risk.
    The CWMD Office has primary authority and responsibility within DHS 
to protect the homeland against CBRN threats by interpreting national 
strategies and developing departmental strategic guidance; monitoring 
and reporting on related threats; generating and distributing related 
risk assessments; and researching, developing, acquiring, and deploying 
operationally effective solutions, such as equipment, training, and 
exercises, in support of SLTT communities and Departmental components. 
CWMD strengthens DHS-wide and Federal interagency coordination and 
provides direct financial and operational support Nation-wide to SLTT 
partners who serve as first responders. Additionally, as part of the 
President's EO on AI, CWMD was tasked with helping to evaluate and 
mitigate the potential for AI to be used to develop WMDs, such as 
through AI-enabled misuse of synthetic nucleic acids to create 
biological weapons. If CWMD authorization is allowed to expire, not 
only will DHS not be able to support these AI efforts, but over $130 
million in annual grants will cease to support State and local first 
responders for full-time biological detection, illicit nuclear material 
detection, training, and exercises. CWMD will also cease important CBRN 
research to improve security standards and equipment for SLTTs and DHS, 
including threat detection and prevention at large events.
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
    Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) is the Nation's 
first regulatory program focused specifically on security at high-risk 
chemical facilities. Managed by CISA, the CFATS program identifies and 
regulates high-risk facilities to ensure security measures are in place 
to reduce the risk that certain dangerous chemicals can be weaponized 
by terrorists. An attack on one of these U.S. sites could be as lethal 
as a nuclear blast. On July 28, 2023, DHS authorities to implement the 
CFATS expired, and the program ceased to operate. With the expiration 
of the program, DHS can no longer reassure the more than 3,200 
communities surrounding chemical facilities at high risk of terrorist 
attack that everything is being done to ensure those chemicals are 
protected.
    As of today, we have no longer been authorized to conduct over 450 
inspections, when historically more than a third of inspections 
identify at least one gap in a facility's security. We have lost 
crucial visibility, with likely more than 100 facilities having newly-
acquired chemicals without reporting them, resulting in the inability 
of CISA to conduct risk assessments of these facilities. Cybersecurity 
and physical security measures at these sites are being allowed to 
lapse, and Government planners and first responders are forced to rely 
on out-of-date information about what civilian industry chemical stores 
exist in their areas of responsibility.
    It is critical to the DHS mission and the safety of the homeland 
that Congress reauthorize the Department's C-UAS authority, the CFATS 
program, and the CWMD Office without delay. These programs are vital to 
protecting our communities against drones, WMDs, and other related CBRN 
threats.
Intelligence and Analysis Authorities
    It is also imperative that Congress protect two important 
intelligence collection authorities that are currently under debate. 
The first is Section 702 under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, which will expire unless Congress reauthorizes it by the end of 
this year. Section 702 allows our intelligence community to conduct the 
overseas electronic surveillance that produces much of our Nation's 
most critical intelligence about our foreign adversaries and their 
plans and intentions. It would significantly diminish our national 
security if that authority were allowed to expire.
    It is similarly important that Congress resist the proposed 
language in the Senate's version of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
that would curtail the authority of our Office of Intelligence & 
Analysis (I&A) to collect intelligence bearing on our homeland 
security. This provision would significantly limit the ability of our 
I&A collection professionals to generate the intelligence they use to 
warn our Federal, State, local, territorial, Tribal and private-sector 
partners about the threats facing them and the homeland.
    Both of these authorities are critical to our homeland security. 
While Congress should certainly consider any reasonable additions to 
the comprehensive regime of privacy and civil liberties safeguards 
under which they operate, it must keep both authorities in place and 
available to the intelligence community. These authorities have 
produced intelligence over the years that has been vital to our 
homeland security, and that intelligence is all the more vital now in 
light of the threat environment we are facing in the aftermath of the 
Hamas attacks in Israel.
                               conclusion
    I am grateful to this committee for your continued support of DHS, 
both from a resource perspective and for the provision of key 
authorities that allow the Department to adapt to an ever-changing 
threat landscape. I look forward to our continued work together and to 
answering your questions.

    Chairman Green. Thank you, Secretary Mayorkas. I now 
recognize Director Wray for 5 minutes to summarize his opening 
statement.

      STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL   
      BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

    Mr. Wray. Thank you and good morning, Chairman Green, 
Ranking Member Thompson, Members of the committee. It's been 
more than 5 weeks since Hamas terrorists carried out their 
brutal attacks against innocent Israelis, dozens of American 
citizens, and others from around the world. Our collective 
efforts remain on supporting our partners overseas and seeking 
the safe return of the hostages. But this hearing, while 
focused on threats to our homeland, is well-timed given the 
dangerous implications the fluid situation in the Middle East 
has for our homeland security.
    In a year where the terrorism threat was already elevated, 
the on-going war in the Middle East has raised the threat of an 
attack against Americans in the United States to a whole other 
level. Since October 7, we've seen a rogue gallery of foreign 
terrorist organizations call for attacks against Americans and 
our allies. Hezbollah expressed its support and praise for 
Hamas and threatened to attack U.S. interests in the Middle 
East. Al-Qaeda issued its most specific call to attack the 
United States in the past 5 years. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula called on jihadists to attack Americans and Jewish 
people everywhere. ISIS urged its followers to target Jewish 
communities in the United States and Europe.
    Given those calls for action, our most immediate concern is 
that individuals or small groups will draw twisted inspiration 
from the events in the Middle East to carry out attacks here at 
home. That includes home-grown violent extremists inspired by a 
foreign terrorist organization and domestic violent extremists 
targeting Jewish Americans or other faith communities like 
Muslim Americans.
    Across the country, the FBI has been aggressively 
countering violence by extremists citing the on-going conflict 
as inspiration. In Houston, we arrested a guy who'd been 
studying bomb making and posted about killing Jewish people. 
Outside Chicago, we've got a Federal hate crime investigation 
into the killing of a 6-year-old Muslim boy. At Cornell 
University, we arrested a man who threatened to kill members of 
that university's Jewish community. In Los Angeles, we arrested 
a man for threatening the CEO and other members of the Anti-
Defamation League. I could go on.
    On top of the so-called lone actor threat, we cannot and do 
not discount the possibility that Hamas or another foreign 
terrorist organization may exploit the current conflict to 
conduct attacks here on our own soil. We have kept our sights 
on Hamas and have multiple investigations into individuals 
affiliated with that foreign terrorist organization. While 
historically our Hamas cases have identified individuals here 
who are facilitating and financing terrorism overseas, we 
continue to scrutinize our intelligence to assess how that 
threat may be evolving.
    But it's not just Hamas. As I highlighted for this 
committee in my testimony last year, Iran, the world's largest 
state sponsor of terrorism, has directly or by hiring 
criminals, mounted assassination attempts against dissidents 
and high-ranking current and former U.S. officials, including 
right here on American soil. Or take Hezbollah, Iran's primary 
strategic partner, which has a history of raising money and 
seeking to obtain weapons here in the United States. FBI 
arrests in recent years also indicate that Hezbollah has tried 
to cede operatives, establish infrastructure, and engage in 
spying here domestically, raising our concern that they may be 
contingency planning for future operations in the United 
States.
    While we are not currently tracking a specific plot, given 
that disturbing history, we are keeping a close eye on what 
impact recent events may have on those terrorist groups' 
intentions here in the United States and how those intentions 
might evolve. Now, I want to be clear. While this is certainly 
a time for heightened vigilance, it is by no means a time for 
panic. Americans should continue to be alert and careful, but 
they shouldn't stop going about their daily lives. All across 
the country, the FBI's men and women are working with urgency 
and purpose to confront the elevated threat. That means working 
closely with our Federal, State, and local partners on our FBI-
led joint terrorism task forces, taking an even closer look at 
existing investigations, and canvassing sources to increase 
awareness across the board, and doing all we can, working with 
our partners to protect houses of worship here in the United 
States. Bottom line, we are going to continue to do everything 
in our power to protect the American people and support our 
partners in Israel.
    Now, protecting Americans from the threat of terrorism is 
and remains our No. 1 priority. But as you all know, the range 
of threats that we battle each and every day is enormous. From 
cyber attacks to economic espionage to violent crime and 
narcotics trafficking and everything in between, the problems 
we tackle aren't getting any easier. But we have continued to 
work to outpace our adversaries. We disrupted over 40 percent 
more cyber operations last year and arrested over 60 percent 
more cyber criminals than the year before. We've got easily 
2,000 active investigations across all 56 field offices into 
China's relentless efforts to steal our innovation and 
intellectual property. Over the past 2 years alone, we've 
seized enough fentanyl to kill 270 million Americans. That's 
more than 80 percent of all Americans.
    Just this month, working with our partners, FBI Boston 
seized nearly 8 million doses of fentanyl and methamphetamine-
laced pills and powder, including nearly 20 pounds of fentanyl-
laced pills that had been pressed to look like heart-shaped 
candy. That's one of the largest single seizures in New England 
history and demonstrates the deadly reach of the cartels 
trafficking dangerous drugs to every corner of our Nation.
    I am incredibly proud of the 38,000 skilled and dedicated 
professionals of the FBI who tackle all these complex 
challenges. I think it is our shared responsibility to make 
sure that they've got the tools they need to keep all of us 
safe. Indispensable in that toolkit against foreign adversaries 
are the FBI's FISA 702 authorities. I am happy to talk about 
all the things the FBI has done over the past couple of years 
to make sure we're good stewards of our 702 authorities. But I 
can tell you it would be absolutely devastating if the next 
time an adversary like Iran or China launches a major cyber 
attack, we don't see it coming because 702 was allowed to 
lapse. Or with the fast-moving situation in the Middle East, 
just imagine if some foreign terrorist organization overseas 
shifts its intentions and directs an operative here who'd been 
contingency planning to carry out an attack in our own 
backyard. Imagine if we're not able to disrupt that threat 
because the FBI 702 authorities have been so watered down.
    I want to close by thanking you for your continued support 
of the FBI's men and women who work tirelessly and selflessly 
to protect all Americans. Thank you for having me here today. I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Wray follows:]
               Prepared Statement of Christopher A. Wray
                           November 15, 2023
    Good morning, Chairman Green, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members 
of the committee. Today, I am honored to be here, representing the 
people of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (``FBI''), who tackle 
some of the most complex and most grave threats we face every day with 
perseverance, professionalism, and integrity--sometimes at the greatest 
of costs. I am extremely proud of their service and commitment to the 
FBI's mission and to ensuring the safety and security of communities 
throughout our Nation. On their behalf, I would like to express my 
appreciation for the support you have given them in the past and ask 
for your continued support in the future.
    Despite the many challenges our FBI workforce has faced, I am 
immensely proud of their dedication to protecting the American people 
and upholding the Constitution. Our country continues to face 
challenges, yet, through it all, the women and men of the FBI stand at 
the ready to tackle those challenges. The list of diverse threats we 
face underscores the complexity and breadth of the FBI's mission: to 
protect the American people and to uphold the Constitution of the 
United States. I am prepared to discuss with you what the FBI is doing 
to address these threats and what the FBI is doing to ensure our people 
adhere to the highest of standards while it conducts its mission.
                       key threats and challenges
    Our Nation continues to face a multitude of serious and evolving 
threats ranging from home-grown violent extremists (``HVEs'') to 
hostile foreign intelligence services and operatives, from 
sophisticated cyber-based attacks to internet facilitated sexual 
exploitation of children, from violent gangs and criminal organizations 
to public corruption and corporate fraud. Keeping pace with these 
threats is a significant challenge for the FBI. As an organization, we 
must be able to stay current with constantly-evolving technologies. Our 
adversaries take advantage of modern technology, including the internet 
and social media, to facilitate illegal activities, recruit followers, 
encourage terrorist attacks and other illicit actions, and disperse 
information on building improvised explosive devices and other means to 
attack the United States. The breadth of these threats and challenges 
are as complex as any time in our history. And the consequences of not 
responding to and countering threats and challenges have never been 
greater.
    The FBI is establishing strong capabilities and capacities to 
assess threats, share intelligence, and leverage key technologies. We 
are hiring some of the best to serve as special agents, intelligence 
analysts, and professional staff. We have built, and are continuously 
enhancing, a workforce that possesses the skills and knowledge to deal 
with the complex threats and challenges we face today and tomorrow. We 
are building a leadership team that views change and transformation as 
a positive tool for keeping the FBI focused on the key threats facing 
our Nation.
    Today's FBI is a national security and law enforcement organization 
that uses, collects, and shares intelligence in everything we do. Each 
FBI employee understands that, to defeat the key threats facing our 
Nation, we must constantly strive to be more efficient and more 
effective. Just as our adversaries continue to evolve, so, too, must 
the FBI. We live in a time of persistent terrorist, nation-state, and 
criminal threats to our national security, our economy, and indeed our 
communities.
                           national security
Terrorism Threats
    As we saw earlier this month with the devastating attack in Israel, 
terrorist actors are still very intent on using violence and brutality 
to spread their ideologies. Protecting the American people from 
terrorism remains the FBI's No. 1 priority. The threat from terrorism 
is as persistent and complex as ever. We are in an environment where 
the threats from international terrorism, domestic terrorism, and 
state-sponsored terrorism are all simultaneously elevated.
    The greatest terrorism threat to our homeland is posed by lone 
actors or small cells of individuals who typically radicalize to 
violence on-line, and who primarily use easily accessible weapons to 
attack soft targets. We see the lone offender threat with both Domestic 
Violent Extremists (``DVEs'') and HVEs, two distinct threats, both of 
which are located primarily in the United States and typically 
radicalize and mobilize to violence on their own. DVEs are individuals 
based and operating primarily within the United States or its 
territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist 
group or other foreign power who seek to further political or social 
goals through unlawful acts of force or violence. In comparison, HVEs 
are individuals of any citizenship who have lived and/or operated 
primarily in the United States or its territories, who advocate, are 
engaged in, or are preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated 
terrorist activities in furtherance of political or social objectives 
promoted by a foreign terrorist organization but are acting 
independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization 
(``FTO'').
    Domestic and Homegrown Violent Extremists are often motivated and 
inspired by a mix of social or political, ideological, and personal 
grievances against their targets, and more recently have focused on 
accessible targets to include civilians, law enforcement and the 
military, symbols or members of the U.S. Government, houses of worship, 
retail locations, and mass public gatherings. Lone actors present a 
particular challenge to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
These actors are difficult to identify, investigate, and disrupt before 
they take violent action, especially because of the insular nature of 
their radicalization and mobilization to violence and limited 
discussions with others regarding their plans.
    The top domestic terrorism threat we face continues to be from DVEs 
we categorize as Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists 
(``RMVEs'') and Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists 
(``AGAAVEs''). The number of FBI domestic terrorism investigations has 
more than doubled since the spring of 2020. As of September 2023, the 
FBI was conducting approximately 2,700 investigations within the 
domestic terrorism program. As of September 2023, the FBI was also 
conducting approximately 4,000 investigations within its international 
terrorism program.
    The FBI uses all tools available at its disposal to combat domestic 
terrorism. These efforts represent a critical part of the National 
Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, which was released in June 
2021. The Strategy sets forth a comprehensive, whole-of-Government 
approach to address the many facets of the domestic terrorism threat.
    The FBI assesses HVEs as the greatest, most immediate international 
terrorism threat to the homeland. HVEs are people located and 
radicalized to violence primarily in the United States, who are not 
receiving individualized direction from FTOs but are inspired by FTOs, 
including the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham 
(``ISIS'') and al-Qaeda and their affiliates, to commit violence. An 
HVE's lack of a direct connection with an FTO, ability to rapidly 
mobilize without detection, and use of encrypted communications pose 
significant challenges to our ability to proactively identify and 
disrupt potential violent attacks.
    While we work to assist our Israeli colleagues and understand the 
global implications of the on-going conflict in Israel, we are paying 
heightened attention to how the events abroad could directly affect and 
inspire people to commit violence here in the homeland. Terrorist 
organizations worldwide, as well as individuals attracted to violence, 
have praised HAMAS's horrific attack on Israeli civilians. We have seen 
violent extremists across ideologies seeking to target Jewish and 
Muslim people and institutions through physical assaults, bomb threats, 
and on-line calls for mass casualty attacks. Our top concern stems from 
lone offenders inspired by--or reacting to--the on-going Israel-HAMAS 
conflict, as they pose the most likely threat to Americans, especially 
Jewish, Muslim, and Arab-American communities in the United States. We 
have seen an increase in reported threats to Jewish and Muslim people, 
institutions, and houses of worship here in the United States and are 
moving quickly to mitigate them.
    As of right now, we have no information to indicate that HAMAS has 
the intent or capability to conduct operations inside the United 
States, though we cannot, and do not, discount that possibility, but we 
are especially concerned about the possibility of HAMAS supporters 
engaging in violence on the group's behalf. As always, we are concerned 
with any foreign terrorist organization who may exploit the attacks in 
Israel as a tool to mobilize their followers around the world. In 
recent years, there have been several events and incidents in the 
United States that were purportedly motivated, at least in part, by the 
conflict between Israel and HAMAS. These have included the targeting of 
individuals, houses of worship, and institutions associated with the 
Jewish and Muslim faiths with acts of physical assault, vandalism, or 
harassment. Anti-Semitism and anti-Islamic sentiment permeate many 
violent extremist ideologies and serves as a primary driver for attacks 
by a diverse set of violent extremists who pose a persistent threat to 
Jewish and Muslim communities and institutions in the United States and 
abroad. Foreign terrorist organizations have exploited previous 
conflicts between Israel and HAMAS via media outlets and on-line 
communications to call on their supporters located in the United States 
to conduct attacks. Some violent extremists have used times of 
heightened tensions to incite violence against religious minorities, 
targeting both Jewish and Muslim Americans.
    The FBI remains concerned about the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan 
and that the intent of FTOs, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda and their 
affiliates, is to carry out or inspire large-scale attacks in the 
United States.
    Despite its loss of physical territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIS 
remains relentless in its campaign of violence against the United 
States and our partners--both here at home and overseas. ISIS and its 
supporters continue to aggressively promote its hate-fueled rhetoric 
and attract like-minded violent extremists with a willingness to 
conduct attacks against the United States and our interests abroad. 
ISIS's successful use of social media and messaging applications to 
attract individuals is of continued concern to us. Like other foreign 
terrorist groups, ISIS advocates for lone offender attacks in the 
United States and Western countries via videos and other English 
language propaganda that have specifically advocated for attacks 
against civilians, the military, law enforcement, and intelligence 
community personnel.
    Al-Qaeda also maintains its desire to conduct and to inspire large-
scale attacks. Because continued pressure has degraded some of the 
group's senior leadership, we assess that, in the near term, al-Qaeda 
is more likely to continue to focus on cultivating its international 
affiliates and supporting small-scale, readily achievable attacks in 
regions such as East and West Africa. Nevertheless, propaganda from al-
Qaeda leaders continues to seek individuals inspired to conduct their 
own attacks in the United States and other Western nations.
    Iran and its global proxies and partners, including Iraqi Shia 
militant groups, attack and plot against the United States and our 
allies throughout the Middle East. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps-Qods Force (``IRGC-QF'') has too provided support to militant 
resistance groups and terrorist organizations. And Iran has supported 
Lebanese Hizballah and other terrorist groups. Hizballah has sent 
operatives to build terrorist infrastructures worldwide. The arrests of 
individuals in the United States allegedly linked to Hizballah's main 
overseas terrorist arm, and their intelligence-collection and 
procurement efforts, demonstrate Hizballah's interest in long-term 
contingency planning activities here in the homeland. Hizballah 
Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah also has threatened retaliation for 
the death of IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani. This willingness to 
seek retaliation against the United States was reflected in charges the 
Department brought in 2022 against a member of the IRGC, working on 
behalf of the Qods Force, who was plotting to murder a former national 
security advisor.
    While the terrorism threat continues to evolve, the FBI's resolve 
to counter that threat remains constant. We continually adapt and rely 
heavily on the strength of our Federal, State, local, Tribal, 
territorial, and international partnerships to combat all terrorist 
threats to the United States and our interests. To that end, we use all 
available lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat these 
threats while continuing to collect, analyze, and share intelligence 
concerning the threats posed by violent extremists who desire to harm 
Americans and U.S. interests. We will continue to share information and 
encourage the sharing of information among our numerous partners via 
our Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country, and our legal 
attache offices around the world.
    In addition to fighting terrorism, countering the proliferation of 
weapons-of-mass-destruction materials, technologies, and expertise, 
preventing their use by any actor, and securing nuclear and radioactive 
materials of concern are also top national security priority missions 
for the FBI. The FBI considers preventing, mitigating, investigating, 
and responding to weapons of mass destruction (``WMD'') terrorism a 
``no-fail'' mission because a WMD attack could result in substantial 
injuries, illness, or loss of lives, while yielding significant social, 
economic, political, and other national security consequences. In 
collaboration with Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and 
other partners, the FBI integrates complementary efforts to counter WMD 
terrorism. An example of this collaboration is the FBI-led Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Strategic Group. This interagency crisis action team 
spans more than 15 departments and agencies to coordinate the Federal 
Government's response to WMD threats and incidents. Alongside the FBI, 
the Department of Homeland Security maintains the largest footprint on 
the Strategic Group.
Cyber
    Cyber criminal syndicates and nation-states continue to innovate, 
using unique techniques to compromise our networks and maximize the 
reach and impact of their operations. Those techniques include selling 
malware as a service or targeting vendors to access scores of victims 
by hacking just one provider.
    These criminals and nation-states believe that they can compromise 
our networks, steal our property, extort us, and hold our critical 
infrastructure at risk without incurring any risk themselves. In the 
last few years, we have seen the People's Republic of China (``PRC''), 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (``DPRK''), and Russia use 
cyber operations to target U.S. research. We have seen the PRC working 
to obtain controlled dual-use technology, while developing an arsenal 
of advanced cyber capabilities that could be used against other 
countries in the event of a real-world conflict. And we have seen the 
disruptive impact a serious supply chain compromise can have through 
the SolarWinds-related intrusions, conducted by the Russian Foreign 
Intelligence Service. As these adversaries become more sophisticated, 
we are increasingly concerned about our ability to detect specific 
cyber operations against U.S. organizations. One of the most worrisome 
facets is their focus on compromising U.S. critical infrastructure, 
especially during a crisis.
    Making things more difficult, there is often no bright line that 
separates where nation-state activity ends and cyber criminal activity 
begins. Some cyber criminals contract or sell services to nation-
states; some nation-state actors moonlight as cyber criminals to fund 
personal activities; and nation-states are increasingly using tools 
typically used by criminal actors, such as ransomware.
    So, as dangerous as nation-states are, we do not have the luxury of 
focusing on them alone. In the past year, we also have seen cyber 
criminals target hospitals, medical centers, educational institutions, 
and other critical infrastructure for theft or ransomware, causing 
massive disruption to our daily lives. Incidents affecting medical 
centers have led to the interruption of computer networks and systems 
that put patients' lives at an increased risk.
    We have also seen the rise of an ecosystem of services dedicated to 
supporting cyber crime in exchange for cryptocurrency. Criminals now 
have new tools to engage in destructive behavior--for example, 
deploying ransomware to paralyze entire hospitals, police departments, 
and businesses--as well as new means to better conceal their tracks. It 
is not that individual malicious cyber actors have necessarily become 
much more sophisticated, but that they can now more easily rent 
sophisticated capabilities.
    We must make it harder and more painful for malicious cyber actors 
and criminals to carry on their malicious activities. Using its role as 
the lead Federal agency for threat response, the FBI works seamlessly 
with domestic and international partners to defend their networks, 
attribute malicious activity, sanction bad behavior, and take the fight 
to our adversaries overseas. We must impose consequences on cyber 
adversaries, and use our collective law enforcement and intelligence 
capabilities to do so through joint and enabled operations sequenced 
for maximum impact. We must continue to work with the Department of 
State and other key agencies to ensure that our foreign partners are 
able and willing to cooperate in our efforts to disrupt perpetrators of 
cyber crime.
    An example of this approach is the coordinated international 
operation announced in April 2023 against Genesis Market, a criminal 
on-line marketplace offering access to data stolen from over 1.5 
million compromised computers around the world containing over 80 
million account access credentials. Genesis Market was also a prolific 
initial access broker in the cyber crime world, providing criminals a 
user-friendly database to search for stolen credentials and more easily 
infiltrate victims' computers and accounts. As part of this operation, 
law enforcement seized 11 domain names used to support Genesis Market's 
infrastructure pursuant to a warrant authorized by the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. A total of 22 
international agencies and 44 FBI field offices worked with the FBI 
Milwaukee Field Office investigating the case. And on April 5, the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury announced sanctions against Genesis Market.
    In total, along with our colleagues at the Department of Justice 
(``DOJ''), we took over 1,000 actions against cyber adversaries in 
2022, including arrests, criminal charges, convictions, dismantlements, 
and disruptions. We enabled many more actions through our dedicated 
partnerships with the private sector, with foreign partners, and with 
Federal, State, and local entities. We also provided thousands of 
individualized threat warnings and disseminated 70 public threat 
advisories by way of Joint Cybersecurity Advisories, FBI Liaison Alert 
System (``FLASH'') reports, Private Industry Notifications (``PINs''), 
and Public Service Announcements (``PSAs'')--many of which were jointly 
authored with other U.S. agencies and international partners.
    Along with our partners in the interagency, the FBI has devoted 
significant energy and resources to partnerships with the private 
sector. We are working hard to push important threat information to 
network defenders, but we have also been making it as easy as possible 
for the private sector to share important information with us. For 
example, we are emphasizing to the private sector how we keep our 
presence unobtrusive in the wake of an incident, as well as how we 
protect identities and other information that the private sector shares 
with us. We are still committed to providing useful feedback and 
improving coordination with our Government partners so that we are 
speaking with one voice. But, we need the private sector to do its 
part, too. We need the private sector to come forward to warn us and 
our partners when they see malicious cyber activity. We also need the 
private sector to work with us when we warn them that they are being 
targeted. Significant cyber incidents--SolarWinds, Cyclops Blink, the 
Colonial pipeline incident--only emphasize what we have been saying for 
a long time: the Government cannot protect against cyber threats on its 
own. We need a whole-of-society approach that matches the scope of the 
danger. There is no other option for defending a country where nearly 
all of our critical infrastructure, personal data, intellectual 
property, and network infrastructure sits in private hands.
    In summary, the FBI is engaged in myriad efforts to combat cyber 
threats, from improving threat identification and information sharing 
inside and outside of the Government to developing and retaining new 
talent, to examining the way we operate to disrupt and defeat these 
threats. We take all potential threats to public and private sector 
systems seriously, and will continue to investigate and hold 
accountable those who pose a threat in cyber space.
Foreign Intelligence Threats
            Top Threats
    Nations such as the PRC, Russia, and Iran are becoming more 
aggressive and more capable than ever before. These nations seek to 
undermine our core democratic, economic, and scientific institutions, 
and they employ a growing range of tactics. Defending American 
institutions and values against these threats is a national security 
imperative and a priority for the FBI.
    With that, the greatest long-term threat to our Nation's ideas, 
innovation, and economic security is the foreign intelligence and 
economic espionage threat from the PRC. By extension, it is also a 
threat to our national security. The PRC government aspires to reshape 
the international rules-based system to its benefit. Often, with little 
regard for international norms and laws.
    When it comes to economic espionage, the PRC uses every means at 
its disposal, blending cyber, human intelligence, diplomacy, corporate 
transactions, and other pressure on U.S. companies operating in the 
PRC, to steal our companies' innovations. These efforts are consistent 
with the PRC government's expressed goals to become an international 
power, modernize its military, and create innovation-driven economic 
growth.
    To pursue this goal, the PRC uses human intelligence officers, co-
optees, and corrupt corporate insiders, as well as sophisticated cyber 
intrusions, pressure on U.S. companies in China, shell-game corporate 
transactions, and joint-venture ``partnerships'' that are anything but 
a true partnership. There is nothing traditional about the scale of 
their theft. It is unprecedented. American workers and companies are 
facing a greater, more complex danger than they have dealt with before. 
Stolen innovation means stolen jobs, stolen opportunities for American 
workers, and stolen national power.
            National Counterintelligence Task Force (``NCITF'')
    As the lead U.S. counterintelligence agency, the FBI is responsible 
for detecting and lawfully countering the actions of foreign 
intelligence services and organizations as they seek to adversely 
affect U.S. national interests. Recognizing the need to coordinate 
similar efforts across agencies, the FBI established the NCITF in 2019 
to create a whole-of-Government approach to counterintelligence. The 
FBI established this national-level task force in the National Capital 
Region to coordinate, facilitate, and focus these multi-agency 
counterintelligence operations, and to programmatically support local 
Counterintelligence Task Force (``CITF'') operations. Combining the 
authorities and operational capabilities of the U.S. intelligence 
community, non-title-50 departments and agencies, law enforcement 
agencies around the country, and local CITFs in each FBI field office, 
the NCITF coordinates and leads whole-of-Government efforts to defeat 
hostile intelligence activities targeting the United States.
    The Department of Defense (``DOD'') has been a key partner in the 
NCITF since its founding. While the FBI has had long-term collaborative 
relationships with DOD entities such as the Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and Army 
Counterintelligence, the NCITF has allowed us to enhance our 
collaboration for greater impact. We plan to emphasize this whole-of-
Government approach as a powerful formula to mitigate the modern 
counterintelligence threat.
            Transnational Repression and Other Counterintelligence 
                    Threats
    In recent years, we have seen a rise in efforts by authoritarian 
regimes to interfere with freedom of expression and punish dissidents 
abroad. These acts of repression cross national borders, often reaching 
into the United States. Governments such as the PRC, the Russian 
Federation, and the government of Iran stalk, intimidate, and harass 
ex-patriots or dissidents who speak against the regime from the United 
States.
    Transnational repression can occur in different forms, including 
assaults and attempted kidnapping. Governments use transnational 
repression tactics to silence the voices of their citizens, U.S. 
residents, or others living abroad who are critical of their regimes. 
This sort of repressive behavior is antithetical to our values. People 
from all over the world are drawn to the United States by the promise 
of living in a free and open society that adheres to the rule of law. 
To ensure that this promise remains a reality, we must continue to use 
all of our tools to block authoritarian regimes that seek to extend 
their tactics of repression beyond their shores.
    In addition, our Nation is confronting multifaceted foreign threats 
seeking both to influence our national policies and public opinion and 
to harm our national dialog and debate. The FBI and our interagency 
partners remain focused on foreign malign influence operations, 
including subversive, undeclared, coercive, and criminal actions used 
by foreign governments in their attempts to sway U.S. citizens' 
preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, increase discord in 
the United States, and undermine the American people's confidence in 
our democratic institutions and processes.
    Foreign malign influence is not a new problem, but the 
interconnectedness of the modern world, combined with the anonymity of 
the internet, have changed the nature of the threat. The FBI is the 
lead Federal agency responsible for investigating foreign malign 
influence threats. Several years ago, we established the Foreign 
Influence Task Force (``FITF'') to identify and counteract foreign 
malign influence operations targeting the United States. The FITF is 
led by our Counterintelligence Division, and comprises agents, 
analysts, and professional staff from the Counterintelligence, Cyber, 
Counterterrorism, and Criminal Investigative divisions. It is 
specifically charged with identifying and combating foreign malign 
influence operations targeting democratic institutions inside the 
United States.
    The domestic counterintelligence environment is more complex than 
ever. We face a persistent and pervasive national security threat from 
foreign adversaries, particularly the governments of China and Russia, 
and Iran, who conduct sophisticated intelligence operations using 
coercion, subversion, malign influence, cyber and economic espionage, 
traditional spying, and non-traditional human intelligence collection. 
Together, they pose a continuous threat to U.S. national security and 
our economy by targeting strategic technologies, industries, sectors, 
and critical infrastructure. Historically, these asymmetric national 
security threats involved foreign intelligence service officers seeking 
U.S. Government and U.S. intelligence community information. Now, 
however, the FBI has observed foreign adversaries employing a wide 
range of nontraditional collection techniques, including the use of 
human collectors not affiliated with intelligence services, foreign 
investment in critical U.S. sectors, and infiltration of U.S. supply 
chains. The FBI continues to adjust our counterintelligence priorities 
to address this evolution.
                            criminal threats
    The United States faces many criminal threats, including financial 
and health care fraud, transnational and regional organized criminal 
enterprises, crimes against children and human trafficking, violent 
threats against election personnel, and public corruption. Criminal 
organizations--domestic and international--and individual criminal 
activity represent a significant threat to security and safety in 
communities across the Nation.
Violent Crime
    Violent crimes and gang activities exact a high toll on individuals 
and communities. Many of today's gangs are sophisticated and well-
organized. They use violence to control neighborhoods and boost their 
illegal money-making activities, which include robbery, human 
trafficking, drug and gun trafficking, fraud, extortion, and 
prostitution rings. These gangs do not limit their illegal activities 
to single jurisdictions or communities. The FBI is vital to this fight 
in big cities and small towns throughout the Nation because we are able 
to cross jurisdictions and investigate wherever the evidence leads.
    Every day, FBI special agents partner with Federal, State, local, 
territorial, and Tribal officers and deputies on joint task forces and 
on individual investigations. FBI joint task forces--Violent Crime Safe 
Streets, Violent Gang Safe Streets, and Safe Trails--focus on 
identifying and targeting major groups operating as criminal 
enterprises. Much of the FBI criminal intelligence is derived from our 
State, local, territorial, and Tribal law enforcement partners, who 
know their communities inside and out. Joint task forces benefit from 
FBI surveillance assets, and our sources track these gangs to identify 
emerging trends. Through these multi-subject and multi-jurisdictional 
investigations, the FBI concentrates its efforts on high-level groups 
engaged in criminal conspiracies and patterns of racketeering. This 
investigative model enables us to target senior gang leadership and 
develop enterprise-based prosecutions.
    By way of example, the FBI has dedicated tremendous resources to 
combat the threat of violence posed by MS-13. The atypical nature of 
this gang has required a multi-pronged approach. We work through our 
task forces here in the United States, while simultaneously gathering 
intelligence and aiding our international law enforcement partners. We 
do this through the FBI's Transnational Anti-Gang Task Forces. 
Established in El Salvador in 2007 through the FBI's National Gang Task 
Force, Legal Attache San Salvador, and the United States Department of 
State, each Anti-Gang Task Force is responsible for the investigation 
of, primarily, MS-13 operations in the northern triangle of Central 
America and the United States. This program combines the expertise, 
resources, and jurisdiction of participating agencies to investigate 
and counter transnational criminal gang activity in Central America and 
the United States. There are now Transnational Anti-Gang Task Forces in 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Through these combined efforts, 
the FBI has achieved substantial success in countering the MS-13 threat 
across Central America and the United States.
Transnational Organized Crime (``TOC'')
    More than a decade ago, organized crime was characterized by 
hierarchical organizations, or families, that exerted influence over 
criminal activities in neighborhoods, cities, or States. But organized 
crime has changed dramatically. Today, international criminal 
enterprises run multinational, multibillion-dollar schemes from start 
to finish. Modern-day criminal enterprises are flat, fluid networks 
with global reach. While still engaged in many of the ``traditional'' 
organized crime activities of loan-sharking, extortion, and murder, 
modern criminal enterprises are also involved in trafficking 
counterfeit prescription drugs containing fentanyl, targeting stock 
market fraud and manipulation, cyber-facilitated bank fraud and 
embezzlement, illicit drug trafficking, identity theft, human 
trafficking, money laundering, alien smuggling, public corruption, 
weapons trafficking, kidnapping, and other illegal activities.
    TOC networks exploit legitimate institutions for critical financial 
and business services that enable the storage or transfer of illicit 
proceeds. Preventing and combating transnational organized crime 
demands a concentrated effort by the FBI and Federal, State, local, 
Tribal, territorial, and international partners.
    As part of our efforts to combat the TOC threat, the FBI is focused 
on the cartels trafficking narcotics across our border. The FBI has 328 
pending investigations linked to cartel leadership and 78 of those 
investigations are along the Southern Border. Additionally, the FBI 
actively participates in 17 Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task 
Forces (``OCDETF'') across the United States, investigating major drug 
trafficking, money laundering, and other high-priority transnational 
organized crime networks. On top of that, we are pursuing health care 
fraud investigations against medical professionals and pill mills 
through our prescription drug initiative, investigating the gangs and 
criminal groups responsible for distributing substances like fentanyl 
through our Safe Streets Task Forces, and disrupting and dismantling 
Darknet marketplaces that facilitate the sale of counterfeit 
prescription opioids and other illicit drugs through our Joint Criminal 
Opioid Darknet Enforcement team.
    While the FBI continues to share intelligence about criminal groups 
with our partners and combines resources and expertise to gain a full 
understanding of each group, the threat of transnational crime remains 
a significant and growing threat to national and international security 
with implications for public safety, public health, democratic 
institutions, and economic stability across the globe. TOC groups 
increasingly exploit jurisdictional boundaries to conduct their 
criminal activities overseas. Furthermore, they are diversifying their 
use of the Darknet and emerging technologies to engage in illegal 
activity, such as trafficking illicit drugs and contraband across 
international borders and into the United States.
             crimes against children and human trafficking
    Every year, thousands of children become victims of crimes, whether 
it is through kidnappings, violent attacks, sexual abuse, human 
trafficking, or on-line predators. The FBI is uniquely positioned to 
provide a rapid, proactive, and comprehensive response. We help 
identify, locate, and recover child victims. Our strong relationships 
with Federal, State, local, territorial, Tribal, and international law 
enforcement partners also help to identify, prioritize, investigate, 
and deter individuals and criminal networks from exploiting children.
    But the FBI's ability to learn about and investigate child sexual 
exploitation is being threatened by the proliferation of sites on the 
Darknet. For example, currently, there are at least 30 child sexual 
abuse material sites operating openly and notoriously on the Darknet. 
Some of these exploitative sites are exclusively dedicated to the 
sexual abuse of infants and toddlers. The sites often expand rapidly, 
with one site obtaining as many as 200,000 new members within its first 
few weeks of operation.
    Another growing area of concern involving the sexual exploitation 
of children is the explosion in incidents of children and teens being 
coerced into sending explicit images on-line and extorted for money. 
Known as financial sextortion, in 2022, law enforcement received over 
13,000 reports of this type of crime, resulting in at least 12,600 
victims here and abroad, and more than 20 suicides. A large percentage 
of these sextortion schemes originate outside the United States, 
primarily in West African countries such as Nigeria and Ivory Coast. 
The FBI continues to collaborate with other law enforcement partners 
and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children to mitigate 
this criminal activity and provide the public with informational alerts 
and victim resources regarding these crimes.
    The FBI has several programs in place to arrest child predators and 
to recover missing and endangered children. To this end, the FBI funds 
or participates in a variety of endeavors, including our Innocence Lost 
National Initiative, Innocent Images National Initiative, Operation 
Cross Country, Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Team, Victim Services, 
over 80 Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Forces, over 74 
International Violent Crimes Against Children Task Force officers, as 
well as numerous community outreach programs to educate parents and 
children about safety measures they can follow. Through improved 
communications, the FBI is able to collaborate with partners throughout 
the world quickly, playing an integral role in crime prevention.
    The Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Team is a rapid-response team 
with experienced investigators strategically located across the country 
to quickly respond to child abductions. Investigators provide a full 
array of investigative and technical resources during the most critical 
time following the abduction of a child, such as the collection and 
analysis of DNA, impression, and trace evidence, the processing of 
digital forensic evidence, and interviewing expertise.
    The FBI also focuses efforts to stop human trafficking of both 
children and adults. The FBI works collaboratively with law enforcement 
partners to disrupt all forms of human trafficking through Human 
Trafficking Task Forces Nation-wide. One way the FBI combats this 
pernicious crime problem is through investigations such as Operation 
Cross Country. Over a 2-week period in 2023, the FBI, along with other 
Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, executed approximately 350 
operations to recover survivors of human trafficking and disrupt 
traffickers. These operations identified and located 59 minor victims 
of child sex trafficking, child sexual exploitation, or related State 
offenses and located 59 actively missing children. Furthermore, the FBI 
and its partners located 141 adults who were identified as potential 
victims of sexual exploitation, human trafficking, or related State 
offenses. In addition to identifying and recovering missing children 
and potential victims, the law enforcement activity conducted during 
Operation Cross Country led to the identification or arrest of 126 
suspects implicated in potential child sexual exploitation, human 
trafficking, or related State or Federal offenses.
    Although many victims of human trafficking recovered by the FBI are 
adult U.S. citizens, the FBI and its partners recognize that foreign 
nationals, children, and other vulnerable populations are 
disproportionately harmed by both sex and labor trafficking. We take a 
victim-centered, trauma-informed approach to investigating these cases 
and strive to ensure the needs of victims are fully addressed at all 
stages. To accomplish this, the FBI works in conjunction with other law 
enforcement agencies and victim specialists on the Federal, State, 
local, and Tribal levels, as well as with a variety of vetted non-
governmental organizations. Even after the arrest and conviction of 
human traffickers, the FBI often continues to work with partner 
agencies and organizations to assist victims and survivors in moving 
beyond their exploitation.
reauthorization of section 702 of the foreign intelligence surveillance 
                                  act
    Before closing, I would be remiss if I did not underscore an urgent 
legislative matter directly relevant to our discussion today. As the 
committee knows, at the end of December, Section 702 and other 
provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) will 
expire unless renewed.
    Loss of this vital provision, or its reauthorization in a narrowed 
form, would raise profound risks. For the FBI in particular, either 
outcome could mean substantially impairing, or in some cases entirely 
eliminating, our ability to find and disrupt many of the most serious 
security threats I described earlier in my statement.
    I am especially concerned about one frequently-discussed proposal, 
which would require the Government to obtain a warrant or court order 
from a judge before personnel could conduct a ``U.S. person query'' of 
information previously obtained through use of Section 702. A warrant 
requirement would amount to a de facto ban, because query applications 
either would not meet the legal standard to win court approval; or 
because, when the standard could be met, it would be so only after the 
expenditure of scarce resources, the submission and review of a lengthy 
legal filing, and the passage of significant time--which, in the world 
of rapidly-evolving threats, the Government often does not have. That 
would be a significant blow to the FBI, which relies on this long-
standing, lawful capability afforded by Section 702 to rapidly uncover 
previously hidden threats and connections, and to take swift steps to 
protect the homeland when needed.
    To be sure, no one more deeply shares Members' concerns regarding 
past FBI compliance violations related to FISA, including the rules for 
querying Section 702 collection using U.S. person identifiers, than I 
do. These violations never should have happened and preventing 
recurrence is a matter of utmost priority. The FBI took these episodes 
seriously and responded rigorously, already yielding significant 
results in dramatically reducing the number of ``U.S. person queries'' 
by the FBI of the Section 702 database and in substantially improving 
its compliance rate. Moreover, as we publicly announced in June, the 
FBI is implementing further measures both to keep improving our 
compliance and to hold our personnel accountable for misuse of Section 
702 and other FISA provisions, including through an escalating scheme 
for employee accountability, including discipline and culminating in 
possible dismissal.
    Together with other leaders of the intelligence community and the 
Department of Justice, I remain committed to working with this 
committee and others in Congress, on potential reforms to Section 702 
that would not diminish its critical intelligence value. There are many 
options for meaningfully enhancing privacy, oversight, and 
accountability, while fully preserving Section 702's efficacy. Doing 
that will be critical to fulfilling the FBI's continuing mission of 
identifying and stopping national security threats within the U.S. 
homeland.
                               conclusion
    The strength of any organization is its people. The threats we face 
as a Nation have never been greater or more diverse, and the 
expectations placed on the FBI have never been higher. Our fellow 
citizens look to the FBI to protect the United States from those 
threats, and, every day, the men and women of the FBI continue to meet 
and exceed those expectations. I want to thank them for their dedicated 
service.
    Chairman Green, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the 
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy 
to answer your questions.

    Chairman Green. Thank you, Director Wray. I now recognize 
Director Abizaid for 5 minutes to summarize her opening 
statement.

      STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE ABIZAID, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
         COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 
         OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

    Ms. Abizaid. Thank you, Chairman Green, Ranking Member 
Thompson, and Members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today.
    This hearing is especially timely as we continue to monitor 
the response of global terrorist actors in the wake of Hamas's 
tragic and brutal 7 October terrorist attack. The attack 
affected Americans directly, including over 32 who were killed 
and those who were taken hostage. While Hamas itself continues 
to focus its operational activity in the immediate region, 
Hamas's attack and the conflict that it has precipitated has 
reverberated across the globe among an ideologically diverse 
array of threat actors. Whether it be members of al-Qaeda or 
ISIS, individuals inspired, including those motivated by a 
racial or ethnic animus, or groups considered to be a part of 
the Iranian aligned axis of resistance, terrorists and violent 
extremists are exploiting multiple core grievances to fuel 
violence.
    Among these grievances are the renewed salience of the 
Israeli Palestinian issue, the already-heightened atmosphere of 
antisemitism globally, and narratives that call for violence as 
a result, and a refocused attention on U.S. military 
involvement in the region and our relationship with Israel. All 
of these are amplified by graphic images and emotive content 
shared over social media in a way intended to drive groups and 
individuals to political violence.
    Here in the United States homeland, our current heightened 
threat posture is driven primarily by our concern that 
individuals may increasingly mobilize for attacks, particularly 
against Jewish, Arab, and Muslim communities. This is 
consistent with our years-long assessment that those inspired 
to terrorism, rather than those directly linked to hierarchical 
organizations, are the most likely to carry out a successful 
attack on U.S. soil. Outside of the United States, we are 
monitoring the activities of foreign-based groups, particularly 
ISIS and al-Qaeda, which view the United States as their 
primary enemy and have publicly called for attacks in the wake 
of October 7. Their ability to orchestrate attacks from their 
core operating arenas has been diminished by years of 
counterterrorism pressure. But while these groups have 
disaggregated and become more focused in their local regions in 
recent years, they have a presence across a wide swath of 
territory from West Africa to South Asia, and we are on the 
lookout for any attempts by their members to leverage this 
crisis to rebuild and refocus against the United States.
    Iran and its proxies, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi 
Shia militants, they are a major concern principally for their 
ability to generate attacks in the Middle East, including those 
that have significant escalatory consequences. While we have no 
intelligence to indicate Iran or its proxies had foreknowledge 
of Hamas's October 7 attack, we remain focused on Iranian and 
Iranian-linked activity in support of Hamas and directed 
against U.S. interests since the outbreak of the conflict. Thus 
far, Iranian-aligned militant groups have conducted over 50 
attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria using rockets and 
unmanned aerial systems. This is in addition to several 
instances of Israel-focused attacks, missiles and UAS, attacks 
by the Yemen-based Houthis, and the daily paramilitary attacks 
on Israel by Hezbollah, which also happens to be a globally-
capable terrorist organization.
    Even as the United States comes under attack, we assess 
Iran and Hezbollah are trying to walk a very fine line in the 
region, avoiding overt actions that risk opening them up to a 
more direct conflict with Israel or the United States while 
still exacting calls by enabling anti-U.S. and anti-Israel 
attacks.
    Iran's current regional activities come on top of an 
already aggressive global posture over the last several years, 
including attempted attacks in the United States aimed at 
Iranian dissidents or in retaliation against former U.S. 
Government officials that it deems responsible for the 2020 
death of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.
    It is clear that even in today's heightened threat 
environment, significant CT pressure brought to bear against 
terrorist groups over the last 2 decades, along with 
investments in effective CT defenses here at home, has resulted 
in an overall diminished directed terrorist threat to the 
United States homeland. However, as evidenced by the events of 
the past 6 weeks, the threat landscape is highly dynamic. Our 
country must preserve its CT fundamentals to ensure constant 
vigilance.
    Among these fundamentals is the intelligence collection 
enabled by Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, which provides key indications and warning on terrorist 
plans and intentions and supports international terrorist 
disruptions. I respectfully urge Congress to reauthorize this 
vital authority, not only for its CT benefits, but for the 
benefits it brings across a range of national security 
challenges.
    At the National Counterterrorism Center, we are part of a 
whole-of-Government CT architecture that is foundational to our 
national security. Though built with 9/11 as its backdrop, this 
architecture has proven adaptive to today's environment and 
capable of addressing an inherently unpredictable range of 
terrorist adversaries. For those who serve as part of this CT 
community, I would like to end with a thank you. Your years of 
dedication to the CT mission has done so much to protect this 
country from terrorism. The United States has relied upon you 
time and again, and today is no exception. With that, I welcome 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Abizaid follows:]
                Prepared Statement of Christine Abizaid
                           November 15, 2023
    Good morning, Chairman Green, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members 
of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the overall 
terrorism landscape, the threat posed to the homeland and U.S. persons 
and interests overseas, and the state of the U.S. counterterrorism (CT) 
enterprise.
    I want to begin by addressing the recent attacks by HAMAS and the 
terrorism implications of the on-going events, especially within the 
context of the threat to the homeland.
    We continue to closely monitor, evaluate, and take appropriate 
actions with respect to potential threats to the United States in the 
wake of the 7 October HAMAS attacks against Israel and the resulting 
regional tensions. We are sharing relevant information with our 
Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement, intelligence, 
defense, and homeland security partners to ensure they are prepared for 
any threats. More broadly, we are monitoring the actions of a range of 
terrorist actors for key signs of terrorist escalation, including from 
Iran-aligned proxies in the region; al-Qaeda and ISIS branches and 
affiliates from West Africa to Southeast Asia; and other terrorist 
organizations or lone actors who may seek to exploit the conflict. We 
are committed to analyzing, tracking, and enabling the disruption of 
threats targeting Americans abroad, and Jewish, Muslim, and Arab 
communities within the United States. Since 7 October, there have been 
increased threats to these communities worldwide, and some attacks and 
violent exploitation of protests, primarily driven by overall 
heightened tensions and individuals engaging in violent extremist 
attacks. My colleagues will address other threats by individuals 
mobilizing to violence driven at least in part by the current conflict.
    The cascading effects of HAMAS's brutal and highly complex attacks 
inside of Israel underscore the need for vigilance against a diverse 
array of terrorist actors who retain the capability and intent to 
conduct operations against the United States and our interests. Today's 
Middle East conflict and the potential implications thereof hits 
center-mass for a national CT effort that otherwise had been tracking 
an overall reduced threat emanating from ISIS and al-Qaeda in the 
region and was adjusting to a more discrete, though geographically 
dispersed, terrorist threat.
    How this conflict unfolds in the coming days, weeks, and months--
and the degree to which it may help renew otherwise declining terrorist 
actors across the globe--will require careful monitoring. In the mean 
time, the United States must be careful to preserve the capabilities to 
address an inherently unpredictable range of terrorist adversaries and 
enable agile responses to emerging threats and crises, even as we 
confront a myriad of other national security challenges that play out 
both overseas and in the United States.
                      terrorist trends of concern
    NCTC's approach to evaluating the terrorist threat to the United 
States factors in the current capability and intent of various 
terrorist actors and the conditions under which they operate. These 
categories of terrorists and threat actors generally align as violent 
Sunni extremist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda; Iran and Iranian-
aligned terrorist groups such as Lebanese Hizballah, some militant 
groups in Iraq and Syria, the Yemen-based Huthis, HAMAS, and 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); and Homegrown Violent Extremists 
(HVEs) and other lone actors such as Racially or Ethnically Motivated 
Violent Extremists (RMVEs) with a foreign nexus.
    CT pressure by the United States and foreign partners during the 
last 15 years has been critical in degrading the capabilities of the 
most concerning threats, particularly by disrupting experienced leaders 
and operatives and exerting sustained pressure against key networks. 
Consistent with the last 2 years of testimony to this committee, we 
assess the most likely threat in the United States is from lone actors, 
whether inspired by violent Sunni extremist narratives, racially- or 
ethnically-motivated drivers to violence, or other politically-
motivated violence. This is not to say that the threat from organized 
foreign terrorist groups is gone. Indeed, despite success at deterring 
sophisticated, hierarchically-directed terrorist attacks in the 
homeland since 2001, as of 2022, terrorism threat reporting remained at 
roughly the same level as in 2010, when al-Qaeda was at its relative 
peak, before the death of Usama bin Ladin and rise of ISIS. Today's 
current conflict will undoubtedly fuel even more threat reporting.
    As we evaluate that reporting beyond the dynamic of the Israel-
HAMAS conflict, three key themes characterize our leading CT 
challenges: regional expansion of global terrorist networks despite 
degradation of their most externally focused elements; the growing 
danger from State involvement with terrorism; and, as mentioned above, 
the reality that lone actors are the most likely to succeed in carrying 
out terrorist attacks.
Regional Shifts by ISIS and al-Qaeda
    The United States is safer today because of the suppression of the 
most dangerous elements of ISIS and al-Qaeda's global networks. Thanks 
in large part to American and regional partner CT operations, both 
organizations have suffered significant losses of key personnel and 
sustained CT pressure is constraining their efforts to rebuild in 
historical operating areas. Al-Qaeda is at a low point in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, where its revival is unlikely because it has lost target 
access, leadership talent, group cohesion, rank-and-file commitment, 
and an accommodating local environment. Meanwhile, since early 2022, 
ISIS has lost three overall leaders and more than a dozen other senior 
leaders in Iraq, Syria, and Somalia--including some who had been 
involved in planning attacks outside the region--as a result of 
pressure from the United States and international allies, regional 
governments, and local opposition forces.
    These terrorist losses have been partially offset by an increased 
external threat from ISIS-Khorasan in Afghanistan and the expansion of 
both ISIS and al-Qaeda networks across Africa, although these remain 
largely regionally focused. Thus far ISIS-Khorasan has relied primarily 
on inexperienced operatives in Europe to try to advance attacks in its 
name and, in Afghanistan, Taliban operations have for now prevented the 
branch from seizing territory that it could use to draw in and train 
foreign recruits for more sophisticated plots. That said, given 
Afghanistan's history and the mix of terrorist and insurgent groups 
that have long operated from its territory, a top CT priority remains 
protecting against threats emerging from that country.
    In North and West Africa, we are concerned that the erosion of 
democratic norms and the withdrawal of some traditional partners could 
further embolden terrorist groups who already pose a threat to U.S. 
interests in the Sahel. Al-Shabaab in East Africa has become al-Qaeda's 
largest, wealthiest, and most lethal affiliate. The Somalia-based group 
has demonstrated the capability to carry out attacks across the region, 
including against U.S. personnel.
    In the Middle East, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
remains al-Qaeda's most dedicated driver of external plotting despite 
its own losses of key personnel and resources. Remaining senior members 
of the Yemen-based group continue to produce media reinforcing the 
cohesion of al-Qaeda's global network as well as calls for attacks 
against our interests globally. How AQAP, ISIS, or other regional 
groups may seek to capitalize on HAMAS' 7 October attack to recruit and 
rebuild anti-West attack capabilities will be critical to assess as 
tensions and violence rise as the conflict continues.
Iran as Quintessential State Sponsor of Terrorism
    Our CT enterprise remains focused on the Iranian government's 
persistent global activity, including in the homeland, targeting 
multiple populations over the past 4 years, such as Israeli or Jewish 
interests; Iranian dissidents; and U.S. officials in retaliation for 
the death of IRGC-QF Commander Qasem Soleimani in 2020. Lebanese 
Hizballah, a number of Iran-aligned militant groups in Iraq and Syria, 
the Huthis, PIJ, and HAMAS all have long-standing relationships with 
Iran and have received materiel, financial support, and training from 
Iran. These groups and surrogates pose an asymmetric threat to the 
United States and Israel, and the prospect of the Iranian government's 
provision of more lethal and sophisticated capabilities to them remains 
a serious concern.
    More relevant to the homeland, we are watching for signs that Iran 
could pursue additional operations here, though we assess they would be 
unlikely to do so given the consequences amidst the current conflict. 
Iran and its proxies do have a history of external operations; Iranian 
state agents have pursued several dozen lethal plots and assassinated 
at least 20 opponents across four continents since 1979, while Lebanese 
Hizballah has conducted international terrorist attacks in Argentina, 
Saudi Arabia, and Bulgaria. Over the last several years, Iran has 
plotted against the United States, other Western interests, and Iranian 
dissidents more aggressively than they have at any time since the 
1980's and become increasingly explicit in threats to carry out 
retaliatory attacks for the death of Iranian officials, especially 
against current and former U.S. officials whom it holds primarily 
responsible for Soleimani's death.
    As of mid-October, Iran is allowing its partners and proxies in the 
region to conduct attacks amidst the Israel-HAMAS conflict. For the 
United States, this has included Shia militant rocket and unmanned 
aircraft system (UAS) attacks against U.S. facilities in Syria and 
Iraq, leveraging a long-standing capability. Both Iran and Lebanese 
Hizballah are conducting or permitting dangerous actions that 
demonstrate their increased risk tolerance within the current crisis. 
So far, they appear to be avoiding dramatic actions that would 
immediately escalate the contours of the current conflict or open up a 
concerted second front with Israel. However, in the present regional 
context, their actions and those of their proxies carry great potential 
for miscalculation.
The Enduring Challenge of Violence by Lone Actors
    Violent extremists who are not members of terrorist groups will 
probably remain the most likely to carry out a successful attack in the 
United States over the next several years. The recent resurgence of 
such attacks in Europe, and the context of the on-going HAMAS-Israel 
conflict reinforces our assessment. By their lack of affiliation, lone 
actors are difficult to detect and disrupt. While these violent 
extremists tend to leverage simple attack methods, they can have 
devastating and outsized consequences, as we have experienced in the 
homeland with attacks in San Bernadino, CA; Orlando, FL; El Paso, TX; 
and in Buffalo, NY, to name a few.
    Since 2010, violent extremists influenced by or in contact with 
ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other foreign terrorist organizations have 
conducted 40 attacks in the United States that have killed nearly 100 
and injured more than 500 people. In 2022, there were two such attacks 
in the United States, which is a decline of about 70 percent compared 
to the 7 attacks in 2015--the height of ISIS's territorial control in 
Iraq and Syria and English-language messaging efforts. This averages 
out to a decline of almost 7 percent year-on-year during this period. 
The last Foreign Terrorist Organization-inspired lethal attack was in 
August 2021. However, we are on high alert for whether the current 
conflict in the Middle East may prove to be a catalyst for individuals 
to mobilize for attacks.
    Similarly concerning is the threat posed by the interconnected, 
transnational RMVE movement, particularly the foreign dimensions of 
this threat and its reach into the homeland. NCTC continues to work 
closely with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and our international partners to 
address this particular global phenomenon.
    The transnational nature of the threat is apparent from past RMVE 
attackers and plotters abroad, particularly the Norwegian attacker in 
2011 and the Australian attacker in New Zealand in 2019. These previous 
foreign RMVEs have been particularly influential for like-minded 
individuals globally, with at least 6 subsequent RMVE attackers 
worldwide claiming inspiration from the writings of the Norwegian 
attacker and at least 4 citing the Australian attacker, including his 
use of social media to livestream his violence. Similarly instructive 
is the range of attacks by or disruptions of RMVEs globally in 2022, 
including in Slovakia, Brazil, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany. These attackers are part of an international 
ecosystem of individuals who share violent extremist messaging, mutual 
grievances, manifestos of successful attackers, and encouragement for 
lone-actor RMVE violence. The transnational RMVE movement is largely 
fluid, fragmented, and lacking hierarchical structures. It is driven by 
individuals and networks that share racially- and ethnically-based 
perceived grievances and messaging to incite violence, frequently 
framing actions around the concept of leaderless resistance.
International Terrorism Landscape Impacts Homeland
    Attacks abroad inspire more than just lone attackers and RMVEs in 
the homeland, and we remain concerned about keeping our borders secure 
should individuals with links to transnational terrorist actors such as 
ISIS, al-Qaeda, or Iranian State agents attempt to enter the United 
States. Our efforts during the last two decades to build and enhance 
the screening and vetting system that guards against potential 
terrorist travel to the United States stands as one of our most 
valuable CT tools. Improving and sustaining our ability to identify, 
prevent, and disrupt such movement--whether by land, sea, or air--
remains a critical priority in an era of increased global travel and 
migration.
    NCTC's support to the U.S. Government's screening and vetting 
enterprise plays a critical role in refugee and immigration processing 
by identifying any connections to international terrorism. We review 
about 30 million new travel and immigration applications annually--in 
addition to over 120 million continuous reviews--to enable DHS and the 
Department of State to prevent terrorist travel to the United States.
    We also work closely with our intelligence community colleagues to 
uncover, assess, and support actions to disrupt intersections between 
international terrorist and travel facilitation networks that could 
become potential threat vulnerabilities. While we have no credible or 
corroborated information to suggest that terrorist groups are currently 
trying to use such travel for operations, we know that terrorist actors 
have in the past considered or attempted different travel routes which 
reinforces our work to safeguard the United States.
 preserving nctc's critical mission and flexibility within an evolving 
                     national security environment
    Over the past 20+ years, the U.S. Government has developed a highly 
integrated, innovative, and effective CT enterprise that continues to 
adapt to the changing threat. CT practitioners work behind the scenes 
every day to ensure that interconnected CT operations and programs are 
effectively used against the highest-priority threats, employing a wide 
range of tools to do so, including identity intelligence, diplomatic 
security, sanctions, law enforcement investigations, direct-action 
operations, and partner capacity-building efforts.
    As a critical part of that integrated community, NCTC fulfills its 
key missions, as directed by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004. NCTC serves as the primary organization in the 
U.S. Government to analyze and integrate international terrorism 
information; conduct strategic operational planning for 
counterterrorism activities and integrate all instruments of national 
power; ensure all agencies have access to and receive needed support to 
execute their counterterrorism plans; and serve as the central and 
shared knowledge bank on known and suspected international terrorists 
and international terrorist groups.
    NCTC sits at the intersection between foreign and domestic 
intelligence demands, and works to track threats across that divide in 
a way that is both effective against the threat and protects Americans' 
privacy and civil liberties. As an example of our critical intelligence 
fusion role, in 2007, NCTC established the Regional Representatives 
program to station analysts in the field charged with sharing timely 
and relevant intelligence, conducting training, providing finished 
intelligence products, and offering by-request support to the FBI, DHS, 
and their partners for CT operations. These Regional Representatives in 
select locations enable front-line support to DHS and FBI, as well as 
other Federal, State, local, and private-sector partners, and use the 
deep expertise, unique accesses, and connectivity of NCTC to serve as 
force multipliers against an array of international terrorist threats.
    NCTC is one part of the incredible confluence of capability housed 
in more than a dozen U.S. agencies that make up the CT enterprise. Our 
whole-of-Government CT architecture must work across the spectrum of 
the threat landscape to quickly identify new threats and overcome 
enduring challenges that might allow space for terrorists to advance 
attacks. Our role in continuously evaluating and assessing the 
worldwide terrorist threat enables the CT community to focus its 
efforts on keeping the United States safe from the myriad terrorist 
threats we face.
    Vital to our CT efforts are intelligence collection tools, 
especially Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
which provides key indications, warnings, and international terrorist 
disruptions to the entire CT enterprise, and has done so since its 
inception in 2008. We regularly leverage the essential authority of 
Section 702 to provide insight on foreign terrorists and their networks 
overseas. NCTC's Section 702 program focuses on reviewing 
communications by known and suspected terrorists, conducting 
international terrorist network development, and garnering insight into 
international terrorist operations. One of the most important questions 
for NCTC to determine is whether international terrorists could gain 
access to and pose a threat to the homeland. Section 702 is essential 
for our ability to do that, and without it, the United States and the 
world will be less safe.
    It is clear that the significant CT pressure brought to bear 
against terrorist groups over the last two decades, along with 
investment in effective CT defenses here at home, has resulted in a 
diminished threat to the United States homeland. As evidenced by the 
events of the past month, however, our country must preserve CT 
fundamentals--such as collection, warning, analysis, disruption, 
information sharing, and key partnerships--to ensure constant 
vigilance.
    I would like to end with thanks to the professionals of the 
intelligence, diplomatic, military, and law enforcement communities, 
whose dedication to the CT mission has done so much to protect this 
country from persistent terrorist adversaries. It is a community the 
United States has relied upon time and again, and today is no 
exception. I am honored to be part of the CT enterprise and to work on 
behalf of the American people.

    Chairman Green. Thank you, Director Abizaid. Members will 
be recognized by order of seniority for their 5 minutes of 
questioning. An additional round of questioning may be called 
after all the Members have been recognized. I want to also 
acknowledge the many Members on this committee, on both sides 
of the aisle, who have been fighting the terrorist attack and 
their service in the United States military. So those who are 
veterans here who have been doing that, and those in the 
Government service doing that before you came to Congress, 
thank you for your service. I now recognize myself for 5 
minutes of questioning.
    Chairman Green. Director Wray, since January 2021, 
approximately 1.8 million illegal alien gotaways have evaded 
Border Patrol and entered our country. This doesn't even 
account for the unknown gotaways which former Border Patrol 
Chief Raul Ortiz testified before this committee could be about 
20 percent of that number, meaning the real number of gotaways 
is well over 2 million. Can the FBI guarantee the American 
people that known or suspected terrorists, including any from 
Hamas or other terror groups, are not amongst those gotaways?
    Mr. Wray. Well, certainly the group of people that you're 
talking about are a source of great concern for us. That's why 
we are aggressively using all 56 of our joint terrorism task 
forces.
    Chairman Green. But there is really no way for you to 
guarantee that Hamas isn't in those.
    Mr. Wray. Well, again, as you say, there's the unknown 
unknown and the known unknown.
    Chairman Green. Right.
    Mr. Wray. But what I can tell you is that our 56 joint 
terrorism task forces are working their tails off to make sure 
that they suss out and identify potential terrorist suspects, 
whether they're on the watch list or not.
    Chairman Green. Do you think that number, that increased 
number increases the threat to the American citizens?
    Mr. Wray. I think any time you have a group of people in 
the United States that we don't know nearly enough about, that 
is a source of concern for us from a perspective in our lane of 
protecting Americans here inside----
    Chairman Green. So, wording it maybe another way, if it 
were lower, if that number were lower and the border wasn't as 
open as it is, and we would be safer?
    Mr. Wray. I think greater fidelity about who's coming in 
this country and how they're getting in is essential----
    Chairman Green. Yes.
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. To making sure we protect Americans 
from all sorts of threats, including a potential terrorist 
attack.
    Chairman Green. Yes, I do, too. Director Wray, since taking 
office, we have had, with the policies that are implemented at 
the border, 6.5 million Southwest Border encounters and a total 
of 7.8 million Nation-wide. Does it concern the FBI that the 
policies of this administration and the Department of Homeland 
Security are allowing this unprecedented number of unknown and 
unvetted people into the country? I know it is a rewording of 
the previous question but go ahead and answer.
    Mr. Wray. Well, again, I want to stay in my lane. When it 
comes to physical security, border security, I want to defer to 
Department of Homeland Security on that.
    Chairman Green. But that----
    Mr. Wray. I----
    Chairman Green [continuing]. That increased number is 
increasing the challenge before you and the FBI, right?
    Mr. Wray. But certainly I can tell you that we have seen an 
increase in the number of so-called KSTs attempting to cross in 
the last 5 years. We are concerned not just about the people 
who are watch-listed----
    Chairman Green. Well, why do you----
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. But about those who could have 
gotten in some other way and about whom you may not have 
sufficient information at the time they came in to identify 
them as a source of concern.
    Chairman Green. Those individuals, that watch list that we 
talk about, why do you think in the 4 years before this, there 
were only 11, and suddenly there are 294 in the past few years? 
Why do you think that is so?
    Mr. Wray. I can't really speak to, you know, to that issue. 
It's not in my lane. I can tell you that the threats that come 
from the other side of the border are very much consuming all 
56 of our field offices, not just in the border States. That's 
why I made the point first there were a couple of other----
    Chairman Green. I agree.
    Mr. Wray. Sure, yes.
    Chairman Green. If I heard you correctly, what you just 
said is every State in the country is a border State now. Is 
that what you just said?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I didn't put it quite that way.
    Chairman Green. I mean the threats to every State.
    Mr. Wray. But the threats that come from the other side of 
the border are affecting every State.
    Chairman Green. Absolutely----
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    Chairman Green [continuing]. One hundred percent. We can 
ask the Governor of Massachusetts. She is screaming at the top 
of her lungs about the situation at the Southwest Border.
    Your boss, the Attorney General, came in and said to us 
that it was very clear the cartel strategy was to take 
advantage of the current policies, overwhelm the crossing 
sites, and then use the, you know, Border Patrol agents being 
overwhelmed by that group to then bypass. Do you have any 
reason to disagree with him that that is the cartel strategy?
    Mr. Wray. I wouldn't have any reason to disagree with the 
Attorney General on that.
    Chairman Green. Do you find it interesting that within 2 
months after that, Secretary Mayorkas came in and said he was 
unaware of that cartel strategy? Do you find that interesting?
    Mr. Wray. I am not familiar with Secretary Mayorkas's 
testimony.
    Chairman Green. That testimony.
    Mr. Wray. No, sir.
    Chairman Green. Yes. He came into us and told us that he 
was totally unaware of that testimony, that that was the cartel 
strategy. Despite your boss and the Senate clearly recognizing 
that it is.
    Let me just say this in the few seconds I have left. I 
would like to ask each of you to take back to the people who 
work for you that despite our political differences on this 
dais, we deeply appreciate the men and women who are manning 
their posts and doing the best they can for this country. As 
someone who went down range and, you know, was in a helicopter 
that had bullet holes ripping through the bottom, you know, 
bullets ripping through the bottom of it, I understand the 
courage that it takes to do the jobs that you and your people 
do. So, I want to make sure I ask each of you, despite our 
political differences, to take this message back. We are deeply 
appreciative of the men and women who man their posts for this 
country's safety. With that, I yield to the Ranking Member.
    Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. Let me paraphrase what 
the Chairman just said. While we praise our men and women, when 
the opportunity comes to put the money where the praises are, 
Democrats on this committee have consistently supported the 
funding of DHS's budget. We have consistently funded the FBI's 
budget and our intelligence-gathering agencies because we 
understand that those men and women who put their lives on the 
line deserve all the resources.
    Now taking from that, we have not, on the Democratic side, 
ever voted against one of your budgets. We understand it. We 
can differ on the policy, but we don't differ on the fact that 
you need the investment. There are some Members of this 
committee who have even advocated defunding the FBI. Now, I 
can't in my wildest dreams imagine if we had an impotent FBI, 
where that would put us. Director Wray, if those advocates who 
wanted to defund the FBI in this country, can you give us a 
snapshot of what that defunding would mean for the security of 
the homeland?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I mean, the FBI, in the last year, for 
example, has arrested over 18,000 violent criminals. That's 
about 50 per day. So, defunding the FBI would mean that many 
more violent criminals out on the streets terrorizing 
neighborhoods. We have, as I said in my opening statement, 
about 2,000 active investigations into Chinese economic 
espionage. Restricting our funding would be a gift to the 
Chinese Communist Party. The FBI has about 380 investigations 
into cartel leadership. Lifting our funding means more power to 
the cartels.
    The FBI has investigations into 100 different ransomware 
variants, and each one of those has scores of victims. Limiting 
our funding means more hacks, more intrusions, more damage to 
critical infrastructure. China alone has the biggest hacking 
program in the world by far. They're not slowing down. They're 
not restricting their funding.
    So, from our perspective, it's not just about the 
hardworking career professionals of the FBI and their families 
and their kids that would be affected. More importantly, it's 
State and local law enforcement who are counting on us more and 
more. More importantly than that, the American people that 
we're trying to protect from gangs, the Chinese Government, 
cyber hackers, cartels, child predators, et cetera.
    Mr. Thompson. Ms. Abizaid, can you say what a resource 
deficit would mean for your agency?
    Ms. Abizaid. Yes. Thank you very much. I mean, the National 
Counterterrorism Center has a couple of important missions. 
We're the primary center for the U.S. Government to analyze and 
assess the foreign terrorist threat. We work on screening and 
vetting of individuals that are trying to enter the country. We 
support DHS and FBI in that mission with the intelligence 
database of known and suspected terrorists. We do a lot of work 
across State, local, Tribal, territorial, and Federal 
authorities to do the kind of information sharing that's 
absolutely essential, especially in a dynamic threat 
environment like we have today, to keep everyone informed and 
armed with the information they need to protect against exactly 
the kinds of threats that we've outlined here for you today.
    So, decreased funding for the National Counterterrorism 
Center, decreased funding for any piece of the overall CT 
architecture that works collaboratively together has an impact 
on our ability to stay ready against the terrorist threat.
    Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Secretary Mayorkas, there is a 
supplemental proposal being put forth by the administration. 
Can you share with us what that means for DHS?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member Thompson, that 
supplemental is dedicated to our critical mission of securing 
our border and also battling the scourge of fentanyl. Those 
funds are needed for personnel, technology, facilities, and 
additional support resources critically needed to advance our 
mission. We are under-resourced and have been perennially.
    Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize the 
gentleman from Texas, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Mr. McCaul.
    Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let me 
say my thanks to all three of you, your employees who work so 
hard to protect this country. Having served at the Department 
of Justice for many years and the chief of counterterrorism and 
national security, I think you don't hear that very often these 
days. Also, I agree with you, director, that 702 FISA is a 
critical element to securing and protecting Americans. I will 
fight very hard to get that reauthorized.
    Moving forward, Director Wray, we have had over, about 7.5 
million encounters at the Southern Border. We have had 7,000 
special interest aliens. We have had nearly 200 on the terror 
watch list. When I chaired this committee, that was the first, 
and when I got the briefings, the first question I ever asked 
was, how many SIAs, how many on the terror watch list? Two 
hundred is alarming to me. Does that give you concern?
    Mr. Wray. Certainly, the numbers give us concern. I think 
it's important, though, in some ways to realize that numbers 
alone don't even really tell the problem. We've all seen how 
much damage just a small number of foreign terrorists could 
cause. I mean, sometimes people, as crazy as it sounds, tend to 
forget that it was 19 people who killed 3,000 people on 9/11.
    Mr. McCaul. That was the next point I was going to make. It 
only took 19 to create 9/11. That is alarming. I just got back 
from Israel. I saw the Hamas videos. It is very disturbing. I 
know you have testified previously that Hamas could either 
inspire attacks or maybe get into the country. The problem is 
we don't know who these 200 people are. To your point, how many 
others got in that we don't even know about. Why won't either 
you or the Secretary provide us with the full, complete, 
accurate information, as I used to get when I was Chair of this 
committee, who are these 200 individuals? Who are they? Is 
Hamas on the list? We know the SIAs include countries like 
Iran, Lebanon, and Iraq. That gives me great pause. Will you 
provide that to this committee?
    Mr. Wray. Well, we will certainly continue to engage with 
the committee in closed session with numbers and information. 
As you know from your past experience with this issue, for one 
thing, the numbers themselves change literally moment to 
moment. So, it's important for us to be careful to be accurate 
and timely with the information we've got, but then I think the 
second----
    Mr. McCaul. You know, and it could be in a Classified 
setting. That is how they used to do it when I was Chair of 
this committee. I don't have that information. My Governor in 
the State of Texas who has to deal with this problem on a daily 
basis, cannot get this information. You know, I understand 
before 9/11, we had walls up, you know, sharing information, 
connecting the dots, but this is, you know, 2023. I mean, it 
seems to me we should be able to share that information.
    Mr. Wray. Well, I'm happy to have my staff follow up. I 
know we've had a lot of engagements with the Hill over 
different numbers and populations of individuals, and so I 
guess I'd have to circle back to figure out exactly what 
happened here and what hasn't.
    Mr. McCaul. I would like, as an American and a Texan, I 
would kind-of like to know personally. Mr. Secretary, you know, 
there was an Austin SWAT officer killed in my home town who was 
on the terror watch list. The SWAT officer murdered by someone 
on the terror watch list, and the family involved was Mohammed 
Nasser. Do you have any information about this?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, we would be pleased to 
provide you with whatever information we have in the 
appropriate setting.
    Mr. McCaul. Please do. Let me just say 18 U.S.C. Section 
2(a) states whoever commits an offense against the United 
States or aids, and abets, counsels, command, induces, or 
procures its commission, is punishable as the principal. Human 
trafficking, a criminal enterprise in this country now, with 
people with no legal status, an entire population 7 times over, 
to be killed by fentanyl, 12 billion total, 300,000 people dead 
due to fentanyl. Sir, I would argue that you have been aiding 
and abetting the deaths and the criminal enterprise that has 
occurred in this Nation. I see my time. Well, I got 15 seconds.
    Chairman Green. No, you don't.
    Mr. McCaul. Oh, I am 15 seconds over.
    Chairman Green. You are over.
    Mr. McCaul. I would still like to go on, but I think I have 
made my point.
    Chairman Green. It is going the other way. The gentleman 
yields. I now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. 
Payne, for his 5 minutes questioning.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, just for 
informational purposes, you know, there are Americans on a 
terror watch list as well. So, you know, I would suggest we 
take in all the information with respect to that. I want to 
thank the witnesses for making themselves available today.
    Director Wray, in 2021, more than 26,000 Americans lost 
their lives by homicide, close to 21,000 of which were 
committed with a firearm. The same year, 61 of 73 law 
enforcement officers who died from felonious assault were 
killed by firearms. While we are seeing more States, 
specifically reliably Republican-voting States adopt more 
permissive gun laws, we are also seeing a rise in anti-
Government violent extremists targeting law enforcement. How 
dangerous is it to be in law enforcement right now under these 
circumstances, and how do we rectify the threat to the men and 
women of law enforcement?
    Mr. Wray. Well, certainly this is a dangerous time for law 
enforcement. As you mentioned, 2021 was the deadliest year for 
law enforcement, I think, since 9/11. This year, the pace is 
awfully close to what 2021 is. I say that with a level of 
personal familiarity with it. In 2021, we had two of our agents 
killed in Florida attempting to execute a search related to a 
child exploitation case, and a task force officer of ours in 
Indiana gunned down right outside of our offices. Every time, 
one of the things I decided I was going to do when I took this 
job now, 6\1/2\ years ago, was every time an officer is shot 
and killed in the line of duty anywhere in the country, I call 
the chief or the sheriff myself and talk to him and express my 
condolences on behalf of the FBI. I have a little write-up on 
the family, a photo of the fallen officer, and I have made 
something like 350 of those calls.
    You know, being in law enforcement is dangerous enough. 
What it shouldn't be is wearing a badge making you a target. We 
are seeing way too much of that in today's America.
    Mr. Payne. OK. Let's see. Can you explain why 60 percent of 
guns used in violent crimes in New Jersey, the State I 
represent and have lived in all my life, come from 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, and Florida? What do those States have in common that 
make them dangerous exporters of criminal firearms?
    Mr. Wray. I'm not sure I could speak to the specific 
circumstances of each of those States. Certainly, straw 
purchases and gun trafficking is an ingredient that drives the 
violent crime problem that we have in this country. It's one of 
many things that drives that problem.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield 
the final minute of my time to Mr. Goldman. I thank the 
gentleman for yielding.
    Mr. Goldman. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I asked to 
yield just to respond to something that my distinguished 
colleague from Texas just said, who I know has served for a 
long time as a Federal prosecutor, as have I, and as has 
Secretary Mayorkas. I think it is incredibly dangerous to 
accuse Secretary Mayorkas of aiding and abetting crimes. As you 
well know, you need to have the intent to do that. It is clear 
that whether you disagree or not with Secretary Mayorkas's 
approach to dealing with the border, that to accuse him of 
aiding and abetting crime is very serious and is, I think, 
unwarranted in this situation.
    Mr. McCaul. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Goldman. Yes.
    Mr. McCaul. Look, I live in a border State, you don't. I 
have dealt with this issue for 25 years. I have never seen it 
this bad. It is his dereliction of duty that has created this 
problem in the United States. Seven million people, how are we 
going to deal with that? No legal status, human trafficking, 
fentanyl. Look, we will disagree on this one, but I have to say 
that the change of policy has created this problem, and he 
knows better. He was U.S. attorney in Los Angeles, like you 
were. He knows better.
    Mr. Goldman. Will you yield for 1 second?
    Mr. McCaul. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. Actually, the time has expired, so if 
someone else wants to yield to these gentlemen, you certainly 
may do that. But the time has expired, and we would like to 
continue on so that everyone gets their opportunity. But I do 
appreciate the dialog.
    I believe now we are with Mr. Higgins, the gentleman from 
Louisiana. Sir, you are recognized for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, 
ultimately as we consider threats to the homeland, in our 
annual hearing on that topic with leading members of the 
Executive branch before us, it is important to reflect upon the 
simple fact that ultimately Americans are quite capable of 
defending our own soil, our own cultures, and communities 
against foreign invasion or against armed oppression from 
within. However, it is far more threatening to our republic if 
our own Government facilitates criminal invasion. It is 
incredibly threatening to our citizenry if our Government's 
highest levels of law enforcement coordinate organized 
campaigns of weaponized oppression, harassment, investigation, 
arrest, and prosecution, and imprisonment of free Americans. 
That, Mr. Chairman, is the primary threat our homeland indeed 
faces today.
    Secretary Mayorkas, I have noted you as a worthy adversary, 
sir, for 2\1/2\ years. But my issue is not with you today. I am 
done with you. I have completed my investigative work. It is 
quite extensive. I have filed my articles of impeachment 
against you. I have provided my investigative work to the 
appropriate committee. So, let me just say that my articles 
have been filed, and my time with you is done.
    Director Wray, last year, you might recall, sir, our 
exchange regarding the FBI's involvement on January 6 and 
prior. I am happy to jog your memory. To quote, according to 
the record, I asked you, ``did you have confidential human 
sources dressed as Trump supporters positioned inside the 
Capitol on January 6, prior to the doors being open?'' You 
responded, and I quote again, ``I have to be very careful of 
what I say.'' To which I said, it should be a no. Can you not 
tell the American people no, we did not have confidential human 
sources dressed as Trump supporters positioned inside the 
Capitol on January 6?
    A year has passed. We sit here again a year later. We, the 
people still do not have a definitive answer from you or anyone 
else in the Biden administration regarding the FBI presence and 
participation in the months leading up to the November 
election, and in the weeks and days prior to January 6, and on 
January 6 here in the District of Columbia. We can't get a 
straight answer, although we have a tremendous amount of 
evidence harvested and reviewed over the course of the last 
year, which you will see.
    In September, Steven D'Antuono, formerly in charge of the 
FBI's field office in Washington, DC, testified to the House 
Judiciary Committee that he was aware that FBI informants would 
attend the Stop the Steal rally thrown on January 6. You 
confirm that the FBI had confidential human sources at the Stop 
the Steal rally on January 6 here in the District of Columbia, 
sir?
    Mr. Wray. Congressman, as we've discussed before, I am not 
going to get into where we have or have not used confidential 
human sources. But what I can tell you----
    Mr. Higgins. OK. We will move on.
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. You asked for a definitive answer--
--
    Mr. Higgins. We will move on. It is my time.
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    Mr. Higgins. You said no, you are not going to answer. That 
is cool, we are watching.
    Mr. Wray. Mr. Chairman, may I----
    Mr. Higgins. Your moment----
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. Answer the question?
    Mr. Higgins. Your moment will come. This is my time. 
Earlier this year, an FBI informant who is reported to have, 
quote, his, quote, under oath, ``marched to the U.S. Capitol 
with fellow Proud Boys members on January 6.'' He said he was 
communicating with his FBI handler while people were entering 
the U.S. Capitol. Can you confirm that the FBI had that sort of 
engagement with your own agents embedded with into the crowd on 
January 6?
    Mr. Wray. If you are asking whether the violence at the 
Capitol on January 6 was part of some operation orchestrated by 
FBI sources and/or agents, the answer is emphatically not----
    Mr. Higgins. You are saying no?
    Mr. Wray. No.
    Mr. Higgins. You are saying no, OK.
    Mr. Wray. Not violence orchestrated by----
    Mr. Higgins. Let's move on.
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. FBI sources or agents.
    Mr. Higgins. Are you familiar with, you know what a ghost 
vehicle is, director? The director of the FBI certainly should. 
You know what a ghost bus is?
    Mr. Wray. A ghost bus?
    Mr. Higgins. Ghost bus.
    Mr. Wray. I am not sure I've used that term before.
    Mr. Higgins. OK. Well, it is pretty common in law 
enforcement. It is a vehicle that is used for secret purposes. 
It is painted over. These two buses in the middle here, they 
were the first to arrive at Union Station on January 6, 0500. I 
have all this evidence. I am showing you the tip of this 
iceberg.
    Mr. Ivey. Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Higgins. These two buses----
    Mr. Ivey. Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Are painted completely white.
    Mr. Ivey. Point of order.
    Chairman Green. Point of order, sure.
    Mr. Ivey. Just run over the time.
    Chairman Green. I understand. But you will recall that Ms. 
Jackson Lee's been allowed to go 2 minutes before. I have been 
very fair in letting people finish their questioning throughout 
my tenure as Chairman, and I will continue to be fair on that 
regard. But I will make a note to the Members, if you could 
stay as close within your time as possible, we have a lot of 
people that want to ask these gentlemen questions. So, with 
that, the gentleman yields.
    But your point, I have been very fair in this, Mr. Ivey, 
with everybody on this side of the aisle, just as much as----
    Mr. Ivey. I don't think I accused you of being unfair, Mr. 
Chairman. Just a point of order.
    Chairman Green. You are making a point. OK. Thank you. I 
now recognize Mr. Correa----
    Mr. Higgins. May I close this statement, Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Green. No, I think your time is expired, Mr. 
Higgins.
    Mr. Higgins. I note that other Members across the aisle 
have been granted time, and I object to my question being 
closed. This is a very significant hearing, Mr. Chairman. These 
buses are nefarious in nature and were filled with FBI 
informants dressed as Trump supporters----
    Chairman Green. You----
    Mr. Higgins [continuing]. And deployed into our Capitol on 
January 6.
    Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman----
    Mr. Higgins. Your day is coming, Mr. Wray.
    Chairman Green. You made your point, Mr. Higgins. I now 
recognize Mr. Correa of California----
    Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman----
    Chairman Green [continuing]. For his 5 minutes questioning.
    Mr. Thompson. You are the Chairman, but----
    Chairman Green. The gentleman could yield to you, Mr. 
Ranking Member, if he wants. You have been recognized, Mr. 
Correa.
    Mr. Correa. I will yield to----
    Chairman Green. OK.
    Mr. Thompson. Just----
    Mr. Correa [continuing]. The Ranking Member.
    Mr. Thompson. The rules of the committee says that once the 
Chair calls the time, it is done. So, I mean, those are the 
rules of the committee.
    Chairman Green. Thanks for pointing that out, Mr. Ranking 
Member. I think he yields to you, Mr. Correa.
    Mr. Correa. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for 
holding this hearing. I especially want to thank the witnesses 
today in front of us. Mr. Mayorkas, Mr. Wray, and Ms. Abizaid, 
you have got a difficult task in this country today. The title 
of this committee is Worldwide Threats of the Homeland 
Security. You know, first of all, you have got the challenge of 
finding a needle in a haystack.
    Domestic terrorism, I have got a chart here from the ADL 
that shows the number of incidences, national level. You have 
got to play defense here in the United States, as well as 
defense overseas. I agree with my colleague, Mr. Mike McCaul, 
that things have never been so bad. We are right, we are coming 
out of COVID right now. We have got countries, essentially 
failed economies, failed democracies around the world, 
worldwide refugee movement.
    On top of that I understand, Mr. Wray, that you essentially 
declared possible heightened state of alert for the country. Is 
that correct? Something of this sort that we just got to watch 
the things that are going on right now?
    Mr. Wray. I've testified and I feel very strongly that we 
are in a heightened threat environment.
    Mr. Correa. I couldn't agree with you more. We have got, 
you know, two wars going on, at least areas of conflict around 
the world. I am here really to ask, how can we help you do your 
job better? I am not going to be here to ask for an impeachment 
or hold you accountable. I am here to make sure that you are 
able to hold the line 100 percent.
    We can't afford to have another Uvalde in our country. We 
can't afford to have another 9/11. So, I am here really to 
listen to what it is, what resources do you need to do your 
job? I am going to start out with Mr. Mayorkas. Do you need 
more or less analysts? You know, this is a big job. How do you 
find a needle in a haystack? Do you need more analysts or less 
at the Homeland Security? Can that help?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we have submitted a 
request for supplemental funding. We need additional personnel, 
resources to include facilities, technology, the men and women 
of the Department----
    Mr. Correa. And we need technology, sir, we need good 
intel. We need to make sure that we are able to work with our 
allies, our law enforcement, State, local, Federal 
coordination. That is why Homeland Security was created, 
because of the silos that existed before 9/11. Coordinate good 
intel to make sure you are able to do your job.
    CBP One, do you get information off of that? Do you let 
people just into the country, or do you take their information? 
What kind of data do you require for CBP to work?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, CBP One is a process that 
we employ that enables us to screen and vet individuals before 
they arrive at the border to enable us to make a determination 
whether or not they should be allowed in.
    Mr. Correa. Do you ask for biometric information? What is 
it exactly that you collect there to make sure that the folks 
that are applying are essentially vetted?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we confirm identity and we 
screen and vet them to make sure that they do not pose either a 
public safety threat or a threat to our national security.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you. Director Wray, what is it that we 
can do as Congress to help you make sure that you do your job 
better? Make sure that you 100 percent, nobody scores on us?
    Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, I appreciate the question. 
Certainly, the budget request that we've submitted, both in the 
2024 budget itself, but also the supplemental, are all things 
we desperately need. Second, reauthorize 702 in a form where we 
can actually use it to protect Americans here from foreign 
threats. Third, Secretary Mayorkas highlighted, which I think 
can't be highlighted enough, the need to reauthorize the 
counter-UAS authority, which is going to expire at the end of 
this week if something isn't done. That is authority that if 
it's gone, no one, not DHS, not FBI, no one here can protect 
Americans from that threat. So, those are a few of the things 
that would be very important from the FBI's perspective.
    Mr. Correa. Let me say that I appreciate the three of you 
being here today, because we need to make sure that the public 
out there on Main Street understands the good work you are 
doing. It may be controversial, but that is part of the 
democratic system, but you are doing a good job protecting our 
families back home. I just want to make sure people understand 
that we need to work as a team to make sure the job gets done. 
Ma'am, any thoughts on what resources you need to do your job?
    Ms. Abizaid. I would associate myself with my colleagues' 
comments here. FISA 702 authority is absolutely essential for 
the counterterrorism mission. To your point about working as a 
team, the counterterrorism architecture that we've built across 
the intelligence community, law enforcement community, defense, 
diplomatic, and homeland security, professional community, 
needs to be sustained and sustaining that at the levels we 
requested. It would be incredibly helpful.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I yield.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize the 
Vice Chair of the committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, 
Mr. Guest, for 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To all our panelists, 
thank you for being here today, particularly in the threat 
environment that we face. Director Wray, you state in your 
report that the threats we face as a Nation have never been 
greater. I agree completely with that.
    Secretary Mayorkas, you also talk about the threats in your 
report, where you say terrorist threats in the United States 
remained heightened. Hamas attacks on Israel, along with other 
events, have sharpened the focus of potential attacks. You go 
on later to say the increased prospects for violence, you talk 
about the increased prospects for violence in the United 
States. So, at a time in which we face increased threats 
domestically, where we see internationally, events continue to 
seem to spiral out of control, I want to talk specifically 
about the events that are transpiring along our Southwest 
Border.
    Mr. Secretary Mayorkas, I have behind me a chart that has 
the encounters of CBP. This was taken off of the CBP website 
and just kind-of want to walk through some of the information 
contained there. Based upon the research that I have done, it 
appears since the President took office, since you became the 
chairman of Homeland Security, that there has been roughly 7.4 
million encounters along our Southwest Border. If you were to 
put all those people in one geographic area, that would 
represent the seventh-largest State in the United States 
between Arizona and Tennessee.
    We see that the last month prior to you taking office that 
there were 95,000 encounters along the Southwest Border. We see 
that the numbers reported here by your Department, September 
2023, the last reporting numbers show that that number has 
spiked now to 341 percent, an increase of almost 250 percent.
    We know that as part of the problem, the President 
appointed the Vice President to be the border czar to help try 
to stop the flow of illegal immigration from Mexico and Central 
America. That appointment was made in March 2021. In March 
2021, the end of the month, there was reported 192 encounters. 
Now we know, again, the number of encounters are over 341,000. 
So, under her watch, as border czar, we see that the increase 
is 75 percent.
    So, the numbers have grown exponentially under your and the 
Vice President's leadership. One of my questions to you is, do 
you look at the daily encounter numbers that are put out by 
your Department? Is that something, a statistic that you look 
at on a regular basis?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Vice Chairman Guest it is, in fact. The 
numbers about which you speak are reflective not only of a 
challenge at our Southwest Border, but rather a challenge of 
migration throughout our entire hemisphere and around the 
world.
    Mr. Guest. I understand that. So, you do look at the 
numbers. You do look at the daily reporting numbers. I want to 
harken back to an interview in 2019 at that time with current--
excuse me--former Secretary of Homeland Security Jay Johnson, 
during the Trump administration, as we were seeing 4,000 
immigrants a day coming across the border at that time. The 
former director of Homeland Security, in an interview with 
MSNBC, said that, and he said, my staff would tell you that if 
the number of daily apprehensions was under 1,000 the day 
before, that was a relative good number, and if it was above 
1,000, it was a relative bad number, and I was going to be in a 
bad mood that day. He also went on to say on Thursday, and 
again, this was in March 2019 when Donald Trump was President, 
there were 4,000 apprehensions. I know that if 1,000 overwhelms 
the system, I can't begin to imagine what 4,000 a day truly 
looks like. We are in a crisis.
    So, my question to you, if Secretary Johnson said 1,000 
immigrants a day when he was in the position that you sit, if 
that was a bad day, and if 4,000 a day was a crisis, what is a 
bad day for you, Secretary Mayorkas? Because we see now that 
the numbers have exploded. There are no longer 1,000 a day. 
They are not even 4,000 a day when this article was written. 
They are over 11,000 a day. So, in the last 20 seconds, what 
number to you represents a bad day when we see the number of 
apprehensions increase dramatically? So, I will give you the 
remainder of my time to answer the question and I will yield 
back.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Vice Chairman Guest we do not minimize 
the significance of the challenge at the Southwest Border, and 
we are intensely focused on it.
    Mr. Guest. Is there a number? Would you like to give a 
number? I asked for a number. That was my question. What number 
to you represents a bad day? Are you refusing to answer the 
question?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Vice Chairman Guest, as I said, we do 
not minimize the significance of the challenge at the Southwest 
Border.
    Mr. Guest. That wasn't my question, Mr. Mayorkas. I asked a 
simple question, give me a number. You are filibustering and 
you are refusing to answer the question. What is that number?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I have answered your question, Vice 
Chairman.
    Mr. Guest. No, you haven't, Mr. Mayorkas. You have not 
answered the question.
    Mr. Ivey. I can do, I can do hand signals, at this point, 
right?
    Mr. Guest. Mr. Ivey, if you let him answer the question, or 
maybe if you would like to answer for him, because clearly, he 
does not intend to answer my question.
    Mr. Ivey. I think it is, you know, you have taken----
    Mr. Guest. Is it not a fair question?
    Mr. Ivey. I am just saying you are over your time, that is 
all.
    Chairman Green. We don't need any more points about over 
the time, OK? As I just said to you, I think it was just last 
week I let Mr. Correa vote after we had gaveled out. I am 
gracious here, and I will be gracious to both sides of the 
aisle.
    Mr. Guest. Mr. Chairman, I would ask you----
    Chairman Green. So, I don't want any more interruptions 
about time being expired, please. Thank you.
    Mr. Guest. Mr. Chairman, I would ask you----
    Chairman Green. You----
    Mr. Guest [continuing]. To direct the witness----
    Chairman Green. The----
    Mr. Guest [continuing]. To answer the question.
    Chairman Green. Do you have a number?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I have answered it to the best of my 
ability, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Green. Clearly. I now recognize----
    Mr. Ivey. Well, Mr. Chairman, if----
    Chairman Green [continuing]. Mr. Carter.
    Mr. Ivey. Mr. Chairman, if I might?
    Chairman Green. Point of order?
    Mr. Ivey. I am just asking, are you basically suspending 
that rule or what is----
    Chairman Green. Look, I have since the beginning, and this 
is the last time I am going to answer this question today, Mr. 
Ivey, allowed people to continue a question train of thought 
that extends outside their time. I have done that on both sides 
of the aisle. I am not going to articulate or waste any more of 
these gentlemen and this gentlelady's time defining the policy 
as I have executed it since the beginning of my chairmanship.
    Mr. Ivey. Well----
    Chairman Green. I think now the next person we will 
recognize----
    Mr. Ivey [continuing]. Let me say this Mr. Chairman----
    Chairman Green [continuing]. You are not recognized, Mr. 
Ivey.
    Mr. Ivey. Well, I am sorry, but if----
    Chairman Green. You are not recognized. You are not 
recognized.
    Mr. Ivey. You are not following the rules that we voted 
on----
    Chairman Green. Point of order.
    Mr. Ivey [continuing]. And accepted at the beginning.
    Chairman Green. The Ranking Member is recognized.
    Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, we adopted a set of rules and 
I----
    Chairman Green. OK.
    Mr. Thompson [continuing]. Try not to get involved.
    Chairman Green. Yes, go ahead.
    Mr. Thompson. I have to explain my point of order.
    Chairman Green. Go ahead.
    Mr. Thompson. The rules clearly specify everything that is 
being raised.
    Chairman Green. I have never, once Mr. Ranking Member----
    Mr. Thompson. I have not----
    Chairman Green [continuing]. Heard----
    Mr. Thompson [continuing]. Not completed----
    Chairman Green. Finish your thought.
    Mr. Thompson. Thank you. So, I am saying that we adopted 
the rules on how we conduct business, and any time a Member 
raises the question is consistent with the rules. Now, if that 
becomes a problem, then I think we have to modify our rules 
because that is how we operate. That is what congresses are 
required to do. That is what committees are required to do. For 
people to ignore the rules is inconsistent with the rule. So, I 
am just saying to you, follow the rules that we adopt.
    Chairman Green. We are going to continue the policy as I 
have been doing it since I have been the Chairman. OK. If you 
are in the midst of a thought, we are going to let you go past 
your time. No. 2, I haven't heard anyone raise an issue on the 
left when I have allowed people on the left to go over time. 
Not once, Mr. Ivey, have you said when one of your Members has 
gone over 5 minutes, the person's time is up. Fascinating to me 
that you are only doing it when it is on this side of the 
aisle.
    Mr. Ivey. If I might have a chance----
    Chairman Green. Please.
    Mr. Ivey [continuing]. To be heard.
    Chairman Green. Yes.
    Mr. Ivey. All I am saying is that under the rules, we have 
a right to raise a point of order when somebody goes over the 
time. You have used your discretion to permit additional 
questioning if you want to, but to say I can never raise a 
point of order that is consistent with the rules, doesn't make 
any sense. I mean, it is just a clear violation of the rules 
that were adopted. By the way, the rules were adopted, I don't 
think they were adopted unanimously. There was a Republican 
decision to adopt these rules. So, these are your rules.
    Chairman Green. No doubt about it. But the point I am 
making is it is intriguing to me that we are consuming this 
time over this issue, while I have never once heard you raise 
the issue when I have allowed Ms. Jackson Lee to go 2 minutes 
over.
    Mr. Ivey. I have never objected----
    Chairman Green. But today it is an issue in the midst of a 
very important hearing.
    Mr. Ivey. Anybody can raise a point of order----
    Chairman Green. You are absolutely correct.
    Mr. Ivey [continuing]. On the time when they want to.
    Chairman Green. You are absolutely correct.
    Mr. Ivey. I am not blocking anyone from doing that. But I 
think I have the right.
    Chairman Green. You do. You do.
    Mr. Ivey. I request the right to preserve that, to raise 
the point of order when there is an obvious violation.
    Chairman Green. It is an excellent point. Now can we move 
on? Thank you.
    Mr. Ivey. As long as you give me the authority to put 
that----
    Chairman Green [continuing]. Mr. Bishop or no, Mr. Carter, 
the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Emergency Management, 
the gentleman from Louisiana is recognized.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the 
witnesses for joining us today. I am heartbroken by the 
innocent lives that have been lost and civilians being targeted 
by hateful terrorist groups like Hamas. This is outrageous and 
inevitably leads to tragic consequences. Condemning these 
atrocities and protecting innocent lives at all costs is 
pivotal. Our discussion on worldwide threats is important for 
the American people so we can further address such issues void 
of partisan brinkmanship. We all must do better.
    Director Wray, our Nation's HBCUs produce some of the 
brightest who enter our ever-growing work force. Repeated 
threats to these institutions have caused wide-spread 
disruption on campuses by shutting down classes and campus 
activity. Mr. Wray, could you please briefly update us on the 
FBI's activity and things that you are actively doing to 
monitor and combat such events in the future?
    Mr. Wray. Well, thank you, Congressman. Certainly, the 
threats that we saw against HBCUs were appalling. There is 
absolutely no excuse for putting campuses, students, faculty, 
staff in a position where they can't go about their lives at 
school in fear. So, we have actively been investigating the 
threats as they have come in. As you know, there was an arrest 
related to some of the threats, involved a juvenile who was 
responsible for a number of the threats.
    I think, more importantly, we've doubled down on our 
engagement with HBCUs. I've personally engaged with a number of 
HBCU law enforcement heads. We have an increased partnership 
with campus law enforcement over the last 2 years. That's, you 
know, including in this recent threat environment, we're very 
careful to include campus law enforcement in all of our law 
enforcement partner calls. We have campus liaison officers, in 
effect, appointed in each one of our field offices to focus 
specifically on engagement with academia. So that's a big part 
of it. It's not just the investigations and the analysis, but 
also the outreach.
    Mr. Carter. How has that been ramped up with the recent 
hate speak for Muslims and Jewish brothers and sisters and 
Palestinians? We see this overboiling because of what is 
happening in the Middle East, spreading and boiling into the 
college campus environment, as well as just our general 
communities. We know that Hamas is the true threat. But because 
of these risks, we are seeing this bleed over into a level of 
hatred for innocent people who have nothing to do with Hamas.
    Mr. Wray. Well, certainly we are in an environment where 
the number of tips and threats that are being reported to us 
have gone up significantly since October 7. We were already, as 
I testified earlier, already in an elevated threat environment 
even before October 7, and it's gone to a whole other level 
since October 7.
    The biggest chunk of the threats that have been reported 
into us by a good margin are threats to the Jewish community, 
synagogues, Jewish prominent officials, things like that. We 
also have a large number of tips and leads related specifically 
to Hamas and radicalization and recruitment. We do also have 
some threats to Muslim Americans that have also been called in. 
So, we are urgently running down every tip and lead we get and 
trying to mitigate them and engaging. I think the thing that 
distinguishes the post-October 7 environment even more than the 
pre-October 7 environment, one of the things that distinguishes 
it is how different----
    Mr. Carter. Director, I don't want to cut you off.
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    Mr. Carter. You have got an important job. We appreciate 
the hard work that you and the men and women of your department 
do. Very quickly, Secretary Mayorkas, the Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, CWMD Office, will sunset. You acknowledged 
this in your opening remarks, if Congress does not act. I 
understand that there are a few vehicles which you are working 
on to ensure that CWMD continues to operate.
    As you know, last night we passed a temporary measure in 
the CR that will extend the sunset through February 2024. If 
this is not made permanent, if we are not able to move forward 
with a permanent measure, how does that impact your ability to 
protect American cities and to protect our country?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thank you very much. It is 
an incredible detriment to our ability to secure the American 
people. Just in the last 2 days, a local law enforcement 
officer, equipped with some of the equipment that we provide to 
detect radiological nuclear material, in fact, was wearing a 
device that detected an abandoned material in a very unsafe 
location that could have caused a tremendous amount of harm to 
people in the surrounding community. This is a vital authority 
that we absolutely need.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. As a point of order 
and informing the committee, votes have been called. We are 
going to do two more Members, Mr. Bishop and then Mr. Swalwell. 
We will recess, and we will reconvene 10 minutes after the 
final vote. I now recognize the Chairman of the Oversight 
Subcommittee, Mr. Bishop from North Carolina, for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I listened to your 
opening statements, I am floored by the fact that I perceive a 
dramatic shift in the positions of each of you from the hearing 
that you--from the testimony that you gave and the way you 
answered questions just last November.
    Director Abizaid, I want to begin with you. Last time I 
asked you this, Director Abizaid, does the National 
Counterterrorism Center assess a significant threat from the 
historic level of uncontrolled crossing at the Southern Border? 
Your answer was, we don't actually. The Judiciary Committee has 
released a document that says there are confirmed 1.7 million 
gotaways. Maybe one of you has a better number than that. 
Millions have been processed and released to the extent that 
the mayor of New York, Eric Adams, says that New York City is 
being destroyed. All you are aware of those things. Director 
Abizaid, do you continue to maintain that there is no material 
risk of organized terrorism from this massive infiltration, 
both of people minimally encountered and almost 2 million 
people neither encountered or vetted whatsoever?
    Ms. Abizaid. I appreciate the question, and we absolutely 
recognize the kind of vulnerabilities that are associated with 
border security across all of our ports of entry, across the 
Southwest Border and otherwise. But I would maintain, and I 
talk to my analysts about this on a regular basis, that as we 
look at the global terrorism environment, as we look at foreign 
terrorist organizations' intentions to try and cede operatives 
into the United States, we don't have indications that are 
credible or corroborated that those terrorist organizations are 
trying to do that at this time.
    Mr. Bishop. You are aware, are you not, ma'am, you remember 
I made this comment the last time, the 9/11 Commission report 
talked about the system blinking red. There were obvious risks. 
Director Wray sat next to you just a few minutes ago, and you 
have changed your tenor, too, Director Wray. You said that you 
observed that it took only 20 to take down the World Trade 
Center. So, among a million-seven coming in not interdicted by 
the Federal Government or any government, why is that not an 
obvious risk to you, that we could have organized terrorism? 
How many cells----
    Ms. Abizaid. Sir----
    Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Could you create of 20 people if--
--
    Ms. Abizaid. Sir, if I may----
    Mr. Bishop [continuing]. They do something like that?
    Ms. Abizaid [continuing]. I'd like to clarify. We 
absolutely recognize the risk. In fact, if you look at the kind 
of counterterrorism enterprise that we've built that's focused 
on collecting overseas, that's focused on border security, 
that's focused on screening, vetting, watch-listing individuals 
and terrorist identities, it's absolutely a risk that we 
understand and a vulnerability that we worked very hard over 
the last 20 years to shore up. So, my comments relate to the 
intelligence about foreign terrorist plans and intentions and--
--
    Mr. Bishop. You have deployed that----
    Ms. Abizaid [continuing]. And it is not----
    Mr. Bishop [continuing]. You have deployed----
    Ms. Abizaid [continuing]. About--it is not a statement 
about what risk we think we have. We recognize----
    Mr. Bishop. That is even more astonishing.
    Ms. Abizaid [continuing]. The potential risks.
    Mr. Bishop. I will stop you and reclaim my time because you 
seem to be going on. That seems to me even more astonishing 
because you have sat in this administration almost since its 
beginning alongside Secretary Mayorkas, while elective policies 
had been pursued to allow that to happen. Uncontrolled 
immigration, processing millions of people through Border 
Patrol posts and the CBP, and Border Patrol, to overwhelm those 
agencies so that this unbelievably, and unprecedented, 
historically unprecedented number of gotaways could come 
through.
    You have all given it, sucker, you have all permitted it to 
happen and said nothing publicly about what you now acknowledge 
to be a material risk. It seems to me we are going to see the 
manifestation of that risk. Secretary Mayorkas, in your 
testimony, both written and oral, today, you said the world has 
changed since Hamas's attack in October. What has changed about 
Hamas?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Hamas has been and continues to be a 
terrorist organization.
    Mr. Bishop. Exactly. So does Hezbollah and so do all the 
others, including al-Qaeda. Nothing has changed. You have 
supervised elective policies that have allowed this level of 
flow into the United States. Isn't that true?
    Secretary Mayorkas. That is not true.
    Mr. Bishop. Oh, you haven't done it electively. You 
couldn't have changed anything to attenuate the flow. Is that 
your testimony?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, our policies are directed 
at securing the border.
    Mr. Bishop. Can you give me a quick answer? Could you have 
changed anything to attenuate the flow?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we are seeking to address 
the flow every single day.
    Mr. Bishop. Boy, that's amazing. You have continued to say 
that sort of thing. I agree with Mr. Higgins, it doesn't 
warrant much asking.
    Let me ask you, Mr. Wray, we have seen now this spectacle 
of hundreds of thousands of people waving Palestinian flags, 
attacking the gates of the White House, vandalizing places. You 
have expended, in fact, so has Mr. Mayorkas, expended 
tremendous resources to stop foreign malign influence. With 
millions of people coming into the country unvetted, is that at 
all a foreign malign influence operation now operating in the 
United States homeland?
    Mr. Wray. We view it as a threat. I don't think we view it 
as a foreign malign influence threat, but that's just 
terminology.
    Mr. Bishop. Do you know whether it is or not? In other 
words, do you know whether those protests are in significant 
part the product of people who have been allowed into the 
country, the millions illegally?
    Mr. Wray. We have not seen intelligence that would indicate 
that. I do want to add, though, Congressman, when it comes to 
my testimony from last year, I specifically said, and I am 
looking at the transcript last year, that we had a concern from 
a National security perspective, that we'd seen an increase in 
the number of KSDs attempting to cross over the past 5 years. I 
in fact specifically brought up the case that we brought 
against an individual who tried to smuggle in foreign nationals 
to assassinate George Bush.
    Mr. Bishop. I would be working hard to cover my posterior--
--
    Chairman Green. OK.
    Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Too. You did say more than----
    Chairman Green. The gentleman's time----
    Mr. Bishop [continuing]. You did, but you didn't come 
forward and say that what she said was completely wrong, and 
you should have. I yield.
    Mr. Wray. I----
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Swalwell, the Ranking Member of the Cyber Subcommittee, the 
gentleman from California, for his 5 minutes questioning. We 
will recess after his questioning.
    Mr. Swalwell. A long-time friend of mine who works in the 
intelligence community once told me, Eric, that the challenge 
with our job is that we are only known for our failures, that 
most Americans have no idea about the successes that we achieve 
on behalf of the American people every day. Whether it is 
fentanyl seizures at the border or a terrorist plot that is 
disrupted, most folks don't know about it and aren't able to 
thank you for it. When they do see the work, they see it in a 
public hearing like today.
    So, I just want to thank you. I also want to thank Director 
Wray and Secretary Mayorkas for sending to my Congressional 
district a couple weeks ago some of your staff from the special 
agent in charge in San Francisco to the CISA office to assist 
us in hosting a cybersecurity summit for our small business 
community. It was very effective and helpful, and I think they 
have a better sense of where they should go.
    Director Wray, I wanted to ask you about the extrajudicial 
killing of a Sikh leader in Canada that occurred outside a 
gurdwara.
    My district has one of the largest Sikh populations in the 
United States. An individual, Dr. Pritpal Singh, who is the 
founder of the American Sikh Caucus, lives in Fremont, which is 
in my district. He has very publicly acknowledged that he was 
warned by the FBI about his own safety. I just want to know 
what the FBI is doing right now to protect individuals in the 
Sikh community from any threats to them because of who they 
worship, what they believe?
    Mr. Wray. So, without talking about any investigative work 
that we're doing, other than to note that part of what you're 
describing involves an increase in violence and threats against 
people for their views, for their beliefs. For example, the 
transnational repression that we talk about so much is 
certainly a variation of that. We've seen that from the Chinese 
and the Iranians, for example.
    But when it comes to the Sikh community here, we do have 
quite a number of efforts to engage in outreach, to raise 
awareness about who to call, what to be on the lookout for, to 
understand what a hate crime is, for example. Because one of 
the things we know about hate crimes is whether they're against 
Sikhs or anybody else, is they're chronically underreported. 
Part of that is for people to understand what a hate crime 
looks like so they know when to reach out to law enforcement.
    So, we've tried to kind-of raise awareness, and it kind-of 
ties into your broader point about the intelligence community 
in terms of prevention, quietly preventing things. You know, 
our vision statement is ahead of the threat. If we are 
successful in being ahead of the threat, of course, the threat 
doesn't end up coming to fruition. It's a little bit like being 
the holder for a place kicker. You can distinguish yourself if 
the kick goes smoothly, but it's hard not to----
    Mr. Swalwell. Right.
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. Be noticed if the kick doesn't go 
well.
    Mr. Swalwell. At the end of the year, Section 702, 
Director, expires. This is a part of the law that allows the 
intelligence community and law enforcement to investigate and 
stop threats, credible threats to the United States, to our 
homeland, to our people from abroad. Could you conceive a 
greater case of self-sabotage to create a vulnerability to the 
United States than letting Section 702 lapse at the end of the 
year?
    Mr. Wray. I think letting 702 lapse would be short-sighted 
at best and dangerous in the extreme, at worst. To be clear, 
702 is what allows us to get eyes on foreign threats overseas 
that pose national security threats to people here in the 
homeland. As somebody who was in FBI headquarters on 9/11 and 
spent an awful lot of my time in the Bush administration and 
the years after that engaging with the victims and the families 
of the 9/11 attacks, we should never be in a position where we 
can't say we did everything constitutionally and legally in our 
power to see the threats when they're coming.
    That's what 702 enables us to do, and especially in this 
heightened threat environment with, as I said in my opening 
statement, a rogue gallery of foreign terrorist organizations 
calling for attacks against us. The idea that we would 
deliberately blind ourselves to information that is lawfully in 
our possession just strikes me as crazy.
    Mr. Swalwell. Do you believe a foreign national terrorist 
suspect should be afforded the right to a warrant requirement?
    Mr. Wray. No, and I don't think there is any court that 
suggests otherwise. There's a lot of people throwing around the 
words unconstitutional in this debate. Yet, I don't think there 
is any court that has found that the way in which 702 is used 
is in any way a violation of the Fourth Amendment or the 
Constitution.
    Mr. Swalwell. Because these are foreign nationals overseas.
    Mr. Wray. Yes, correct.
    Mr. Swalwell. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. We will recess until 
10 minutes after the last vote, and we will text out that exact 
time once we have it. Thank you.
    [Recess.]
    Chairman Green. The committee will come to order. I now 
recognize--we will start back in order. I think Mr. Swalwell 
completed our first session this morning. We will now hear from 
the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation, Mr. Gimenez 
from Florida, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question is 
to Secretary Mayorkas. Secretary Mayorkas, when President Biden 
first came into office, one of the first things he did is he 
changed all the Trump-era policies related to the Southern 
Border. Did you agree with those changes?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, he changed----
    Mr. Gimenez. That is a yes or no answer, sir, please.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman----
    Mr. Gimenez. I don't have much time.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman----
    Mr. Gimenez. Do you agree with them or not?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, he changed some of the 
policies, and I do agree with those changes.
    Mr. Gimenez. OK. Subsequent to that, have you had a number 
of conversations with the President when you are making 
substantive changes or implementing new policies at the border, 
have you relayed that to the President? The President, has he 
said that he is in agreement with your recommendations? Or has 
he made recommendations to you or actually given you an order 
and said, no, I want to do this? Do you agree with everything 
that all the policies that have been implemented since you have 
been the Secretary of Homeland Security?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I am not going to get into 
the specifics of my conversations with the President, but 
please rest assured----
    Mr. Gimenez. That's fair enough. I am going to reclaim my 
time. Thank you very much. So, apparently, I don't know if you 
talked to the President or not. Fair enough. So, either you do 
things on your own or you do things in consultation with the 
President, you are still part of his administration.
    A lot has been said about the funding of DHS. So, in fiscal 
year 2020, there were 458,000 encounters at the border. In 
fiscal year 2021, there was 1,734,686 encounters at the border. 
That is a 400 percent increase. There was no really significant 
change in the funding. So, this whole narrative that somehow 
funding is the issue, funding is not the issue. The issue is 
policy. The policies that have been implemented by this 
administration and your Department in particular, have led to 
this catastrophic failure of our immigration in the United 
States, where you have a 400 percent increase in the number of 
encounters at the border with the same amount of money both in 
fiscal year 2020 and 2021.
    Now, in fiscal year 2022, things got even worse. There were 
2.378 million encounters at the border. We also know there has 
been a significant increase in the number of gotaways to the 
point where almost 2 million people are in this country that we 
haven't the faintest idea who they are. We don't know where 
they came from. We don't know where they are and we don't know 
why they are here. So again, Director Wray, does that pose a 
threat to the security of the United States? The fact that 
there is 2 million people here we don't know who they are or 
why they are here, what they are doing here. Have you got any 
worries about that?
    Mr. Wray. Well, certainly the population that you're 
talking about is a source of concern for us.
    Mr. Gimenez. All right. One other question for you, 
Director Wray. You say that the FBI, you work on detecting 
threats, et cetera, to the United States and the homeland. 
Exactly why are you doing that? What is the purpose of 
detecting threats and mitigating threats to the homeland?
    Mr. Wray. Well, our mission is to protect the American 
people and uphold the Constitution.
    Mr. Gimenez. Very good. Protecting the American people, 
that is exactly right. Do you know how many people--you know, 
the No. 1 terrorist organization that has killed the most 
people in the United States, do you know what that is?
    Mr. Wray. That would be al-Qaeda.
    Mr. Gimenez. How many people have they killed, Americans?
    Mr. Wray. Well, in the neighborhood of 3,000.
    Mr. Gimenez. Three thousand. OK. Across the border, there 
are the Mexican cartels. They are pumping fentanyl into the 
United States. Do you know how many people they have killed?
    Mr. Wray. I don't have that number but it's eye-popping.
    Mr. Gimenez. It is eye-popping. So again, the failure at 
the border, the failure of us taking significant action not 
only to stop the flow of illegal immigrants and a lot of them 
we don't even know who they are, that it poses a threat to the 
United States. The actual threat of the cartels that are not 
7,000 miles away, they are 20 miles away, they are 5 miles 
away, on the other side of the border that are killing tens of 
thousands of Americans every year, and we do nothing about it. 
Nothing. They are right there. We know who they are. We know 
where they are operating. We do nothing about it. That is a 
dereliction of duty, Mr. Chairman.
    With that, I got one more if you give me one more thing. 
You know, real quick, OK? Guns, planes, missiles, personnel, 
ships, boats, assassins, they all have one thing in common, Ms. 
Abizaid. Do you know what that is? It is money. Money. That is 
what they have in common. So, I would like to know why 
Secretary Blinken signed off on a waiver for Iraq to purchase 
electricity from Iran which will give them $10 billion in 
revenue. That is a rhetorical question. Thank you. I yield 
back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Thanedar from Michigan, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee 
on Transportation.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I thank Ranking Member 
Thompson, both of you, for having this hearing today. I also 
want to express profound thanks to the most honorable witnesses 
for your valuable efforts that give the people of this great 
country the safety they need to have prosperous lives. As we 
discuss threats to the homeland here today, it looks like we 
will more likely avert a shutdown this time. But for the second 
time this year, the dysfunctional Republican Majority has 
brought our Government to the brink of a shutdown after weeks 
of infighting.
    Funding our Government 45 days at a time has consequences. 
At the Transportation Security Administration, thanks to 
funding Democrats provided in the last year's omnibus spending 
bill, workers are finally receiving the pay they have long 
deserved. However, pay increases were only funded for the final 
quarter of fiscal year 2023. So, continuing at fiscal 2023 
levels instead of passing a full year spending bill will have 
increasingly dire consequences for the agency.
    Secretary Mayorkas, thank you for working with Congress to 
provide pay raises for TSA workers. What benefits is TSA seeing 
so far from pay raises? What consequences would you expect to 
see if Congress does not provide funding to increase TSA's 
budget for fiscal 2024?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Congressman, for 
your concern for the men and women of TSA. I want to thank 
Ranking Member Thompson for championing fair pay for that work 
force for many years, and I am grateful to Congress for 
achieving fair pay finally. It has made a significant 
difference in the recruitment and retention of personnel who 
are vital to the security of the traveling public. If we lose 
that funding, we will return to recruiting and retention 
challenges precisely when travel is booming once again in a 
post-COVID-19 world.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Secretary. I, as a former business 
owner, I understand the importance of making sure the employees 
get paid fairly and they have the benefits that they need 
because we are competing for these employees with the private 
sector and they can always walk. We have seen a high level of 
turnover in the past and that would continue and that will 
endanger our safety.
    But more broadly, for all the witnesses, how does 
continually funding the Government by short-term continuing 
resolution affect your agencies' ability to execute your 
missions? I mean, I ran businesses and I never planned for a 
45-day budget. Usually it is a year, 2-year long, some also 
have a 5-year plan. That is how most businesses operate. How 
does this short-term funding effects on how you run your 
agencies and how does that affect our national security?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, very difficult to plan in 
the implementation of important security-related and security-
focused initiatives when one does not know with certainty 
whether the funding for those initiatives will actually come 
through. I should also add a different element of this. It 
creates tremendous worry and instability within the work force. 
In fact, for example, our Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office, I had an all-employee town hall with them 
because they were uncertain about their future employment. That 
is not a situation that we can afford at a time when we need to 
advance the security of the American people.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you.
    Mr. Wray. I would add to Secretary Mayorkas's comments that 
the funding approach that you're describing is incredibly 
disruptive to our operations. As you say, planning is an 
essential part of any well-functioning organization, and it's 
very, very hard to do that. I would second, the concerns about 
our work force as you see more and more, you have Federal 
employees who are two-Federal-employee couples, for example, 
and in a lot of places, they're living paycheck to paycheck. 
So, even with the law that was passed that ensures they will 
eventually get paid, which is a welcome development----
    Mr. Thanedar. Yes.
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. In the short run, that's incredibly 
stressful for people who are battling to put food on the table 
and keep a roof over their family's heads.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you.
    Ms. Abizaid. I would only add--I completely associate 
myself with my colleagues' comments--I would only add that, you 
know, what we've described is a pretty unpredictable global 
environment right now. In the national security world, we need 
sort-of a steady baseline from which we can operate and respond 
to crises. So, the added stress on the work force of just being 
able to understand when and where their paycheck is coming 
from, I think, is one that we don't want to really put on their 
shoulders.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you so much. I am over my time. So, I 
yield back, Chairman.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Pfluger, the gentleman from Texas, and the Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Pfluger. Director Abizaid, thank you for your service. 
I am not going to have questions for you today. Mr. Chairman, 
we started this hearing by listening to Secretary Mayorkas talk 
about climate change as a threat to our country and obscure 
policies that need reauthorization, but not yet one mention of 
the Southwest Border and the 169-plus known or suspected 
terrorists that have entered this country. So, I think it just 
shows you where the mindset is, and the American people know 
that.
    Director Wray, you said in front of the Senate committee 
last week, and you said again today, the reality is the 
terrorism threat has been elevated throughout 2023, but the on-
going war in the Middle East has raised the threat of an attack 
against Americans in the United States to a whole other level. 
Do you stand by that statement?
    Mr. Wray. Absolutely.
    Mr. Pfluger. If somebody is listed as a special interest 
alien or a KST, by the way, this is Trump-era KSTs, and this is 
Mayor- kas-, Biden-era KSTs. If somebody's listed as a KST, is 
that a concerning person, somebody who could do harm to the 
United States?
    Mr. Wray. Well, to be on the watch list as a KST means that 
they've met the standard to be of concern.
    Mr. Pfluger. So, they are concerning to the FBI. You are 
looking for these people.
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    Mr. Pfluger. Are there people that are listed in these 
numbers, I think the number was 169, they may have amended that 
from CBP DHS, but are there people that you are still searching 
for that we don't know where they are in the United States? Of 
the known apprehensions, KSTs, known or suspected terror people 
match list to the terror watch list?
    Mr. Wray. Well----
    Mr. Pfluger. Are you still searching----
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. There are----
    Mr. Pfluger [continuing]. For people in the United States 
that we know match the terror watch list?
    Mr. Wray. I am not sure I can answer that here because it's 
a constantly moving target.
    Mr. Pfluger. Directory, aye?
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    Mr. Pfluger. Are there people that match the terror watch 
list that were apprehended by CBP that the FBI and other 
agencies are searching for in the United States?
    Mr. Wray. There are certainly individuals who are the 
subject of terrorism investigations that we are searching for.
    Mr. Pfluger. Are there people----
    Mr. Wray. Whether no not they're people--to me, I guess the 
distinction I'm drawing is while there's obviously a lot of 
focus on the watch list itself, one of the things that, and I 
have tried to be clear in my testimony here this morning, one 
of the areas that we are of concern is individuals who once 
here, information later comes in that identifies----
    Mr. Pfluger. Are there people that you don't----
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. Those people we have----
    Mr. Pfluger [continuing]. Are there people you don't know 
where they are that the FBI is searching for today?
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    Mr. Pfluger. Yes or no? Yes. Secretary Mayorkas, is there a 
policy at DHS that requires CBP or any other agency involved 
with the vetting of individuals who match the terror watch list 
that requires these individuals to be detained, does DHS have a 
policy of detainment for anybody who matches the terror watch 
list?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, on September 30, 2021, I 
promulgated a policy that articulated quite clearly and quite 
expressly that individuals who pose a threat to the public 
safety of the American people----
    Mr. Pfluger. Is there a policy at DHS and CBP that requires 
detainment of people who match the terror watch list? This is 
very simple.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. That individuals who pose 
a threat to public safety or national security are a priority 
for enforcement. If, in fact, they pose such a----
    Mr. Pfluger. Is every person that you have listed on the 
terror watch list detained right now?
    Secretary Mayorkas. If, in fact, they pose such a threat, 
they are to be detained.
    Mr. Pfluger. OK. So, why did you release people in the 
United States that matched the terror watch list?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we do not release 
individuals who's----
    Mr. Pfluger. So, you have detained every single person who 
matched the terror watch list that you apprehended at the 
Southern Border?
    Secretary Mayorkas. If you would----
    Mr. Pfluger. One hundred percent?
    Mr. Wray. If you would allow me to answer the question.
    Mr. Pfluger. Please answer it quickly. I don't need a 
filibuster.
    Secretary Mayorkas. If we believe that the detention of an 
individual is necessary to safeguard the safety of the American 
people, we continue to detain them.
    Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Secretary, I am going to reclaim my time. 
If you and any other agency label somebody as a match to the 
terror watch list, do you immediately detain them?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, if you are referring to 
the terrorist screening dataset, the TSDS, we make a 
determination in the execution of our law enforcement 
responsibilities to detain an individual if that detention is 
necessary.
    Mr. Pfluger. I believe that based on testimony----
    Secretary Mayorkas. If that detention----
    Mr. Pfluger. I believe based on your testimony and based on 
Director Wray's, that there are people that you are still 
searching for that you should have detained, and I want to find 
out more information on it.
    Furthermore, in 2023, your agency, Secretary Mayorkas, 
reported that there were over 24,000 Chinese nationals who have 
entered the United States illegally. That is 1,000 percent 
increase from 2022. Are there people that you are searching 
for, Director Wray, Secretary Mayorkas, that have entered this 
country, and is there intelligence to suggest that the CCP is 
trying to use or directing the flow of CCP or Chinese nationals 
into the United States?
    Mr. Wray. Well, certainly there are individuals who are 
affiliated with the Chinese Government who are the subject of 
investigations that we have here, and some of those are people 
that we are searching for. Now, how they came in, whether they 
came in illegally or not is a different question. I am not sure 
I can speak to that here in the aggregate. But what I can tell 
you is that I have been very consistent in saying that there is 
no country that presents a broader, more comprehensive threat 
to our economic security, our national security, our 
innovation, than the Chinese Government. They use 
nontraditional collectors, not just traditional intelligence 
operatives, to cause that threat.
    Mr. Pfluger. Secretary Mayorkas, based on Director Wray's 
testimony that he believes that this threat is at a whole other 
level and you are not detaining people immediately, I am very 
concerned about the security of this Nation and the fact that 
you have been derelict in your duty in securing and why. I 
yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman's time has expired. I now 
recognize, Mr. Carter. You went already? OK. I now recognize 
Mr. Magaziner, the Ranking Member for Counterterrorism, the 
gentleman from Rhode Island, for his 5 minutes questioning.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, to our 
witnesses for your leadership, and to the men and women who 
work under you to keep our Nation safe every day, you have our 
gratitude. And to Ranking Member Thompson and Chairman Green as 
well, for calling this hearing.
    The director of national intelligence has assessed that 
racially- and ethnically-motivated violent extremists present 
the greatest terror threats to our country. I believe in your 
opening statements, our witnesses verified that assessment 
today. Racially- and ethnically-motivated violent extremists 
present the greatest terror threats to our country. Yet, as I 
have been listening, not one Member from the other side of the 
aisle has focused any of their remarks or questions on what the 
DNI and our witnesses have identified as the greatest terror 
threat to our country.
    So, I am going to spend my time today talking about this 
and asking you about it, because we know that over the last 5 
years, more Americans have been killed on our soil by racially-
motivated extremists than any other type of terror. We saw it 
in El Paso, Texas, where a racially-motivated extremist killed 
23 people in an attack explicitly targeting Latino and 
immigrant communities. In Buffalo, New York, where a racially-
motivated extremist targeted the Black community, killing 10 
people. Allen, Texas, where an extremist espousing antisemitic 
and neo-Nazi ideology shot up a mall, killing 8 people. Over 
the past decade, 145 Americans killed on U.S. soil in domestic 
extremist attacks, primarily racially- and ethnically-
motivated.
    The FBI currently has 2,700 open domestic terrorism cases, 
and anti-Government extremism poses a growing threat as well. 
We just learned the horrifying news that an associate of a 
January 6 defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring and plotting 
to murder 37 FBI employees in Chattanooga for the admitted 
purpose to retaliate against Government conduct. Of course, in 
the wake of the October 7 Hamas terrorist attack in Israel, we 
are seeing a significant rise in antisemitic and Islamophobic 
violence across the country. The Antidefamation League reports 
that antisemitic incidents of harassment, vandalism, and 
assault have increased by 388 percent over the same period last 
year. Just this week, a Michigan man pleaded guilty to 
threatening to commit a mass shooting against the Jewish 
community. The Council on American Islamic Relations has 
similarly reported a 216 percent increase. Of course, we are 
all familiar with the tragic death of a 6-year-old Palestinian 
American who was horrifically killed in a hate crime a few 
weeks ago.
    So, given that this has been identified as the greatest 
terror threat facing our country, I would like to give each of 
you an opportunity, starting with Director Wray to talk about 
specifically racially- and ethnically-motivated extremism. What 
is the nature of this threat, and what does the FBI need from 
Congress in order to meet it?
    Mr. Wray. So, first, a point of clarification. When we talk 
about the greatest threat to the homeland, the greatest threat 
to the homeland is lone actors or small groups typically 
radicalized on-line using easily accessible weapons to attack 
soft targets. That group of lone actors includes both, as you 
rightly say, domestic violent extremists, as well as though and 
that's the clarification, home-grown violent extremists who are 
individuals here who are inspired by foreign terrorist 
organizations. So, that's what we call at the highest threat 
level.
    Second, when it comes specifically on the domestic violent 
extremism side, domestic terrorism side, it is the case that 
over the last several years, the most lethal activity has been 
conducted here in the homeland by racially-motivated violent 
extremists in terms of the most lethality. Then there is a 
second category, which you also noted in your question, which 
is anti-Government, anti-authority violent extremists, which is 
distinct, sometimes overlaps a little bit, but it's distinct 
from the racially-motivated in terms of----
    Mr. Magaziner. Is that, for example, what we saw on January 
6, the anti-Government or, you know, inspired by that acts of 
extremism?
    Mr. Wray. That would be one variation on it.
    Mr. Magaziner. Yes.
    Mr. Wray. But so would the violence that we saw in the 
summer of 2020. Anarchist violent extremists.
    Mr. Magaziner. Yes.
    Mr. Wray. It's all in the category of anti-Government, 
anti-authority violent extremism. We've seen a lot of both. So, 
the volume in that category is probably the greatest. The 
lethality is probably the greatest on the racially-motivated 
violent extremist side.
    Mr. Magaziner. Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, let me share with you some 
of the work we are doing to combat this threat. We are working 
very closely with our Federal partners, notably the FBI. We are 
working with State, local, Tribal, territorial, and campus law 
enforcement, our front-line personnel. We are engaging with 
communities in developing best practices for prevention models 
to be able to intervene when individuals are seeing somebody 
descend down a path of radicalization to violence.
    We are, thanks to the support of Congress, distributing 
grant funds to nonprofit organizations. In fact, we have sought 
a $200 million increase in that critically-needed grant 
program, the nonprofit Security Grant Program, to enable 
nonprofit organizations, including places of worship, religious 
schools, to secure themselves.
    We have protective security advisors in every State 
providing advice as to how facilities, places of gathering, can 
best secure themselves. Those are some of the steps that we are 
taking to combat this threat in an environment of critically-
needed partnership.
    Ms. Abizaid. If I may, Mr. Chairman, if it's OK----
    Chairman Green. Yes, go ahead.
    Ms. Abizaid [continuing]. Just to answer the question. 
Racially- and ethnically-motivated----
    Chairman Green. Just quickly.
    Ms. Abizaid [continuing]. Violent extremism over the last 5 
years, as you noted, has created the most lethality for 
Americans, especially here in the homeland. But it is a global 
threat. At the National Counterterrorism Center, we're focused 
on issues that have a foreign nexus. We would say that 
racially- and ethnically-motivated violent extremism certainly 
has a foreign nexus. When you look at the motivation behind a 
shooter in New York who goes to a supermarket and kills Black 
Americans, that is motivated by manifestos that we see from New 
Zealand and from Norway, and actually inspired later attacks 
that we saw in Slovakia.
    So, understanding the global dynamics around this type of 
terrorism, I think, is a really important piece of what we are 
doing to try and keep up with an evolving threat dynamic that 
is affecting many countries.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you for your work in this area. I 
yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Garbarino, the gentleman from New York and the Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Cyber for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to the 
witnesses, for being here. A couple of weeks ago, we had some 
witnesses come in and testify about Iranian threats. I want to 
ask Director Wray, you said recently that you expect Iranian 
cyber threats to worsen if the conflict in Israel expands. Can 
you expand on that? What should we specifically be watching out 
for?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I think sometimes people overlook the fact 
that Iran is one of only two countries to have committed a 
destructive cyber attack against the United States. It's been a 
few years since that happened. So, they've already shown a 
propensity for that. We saw not that long ago, an attempted 
cyber attack from Iran against a children's hospital in New 
England. So, this is an adversary that is engaged in conduct 
that is brazen and aggressive. It is very comparable, in my 
view, to what we see in terms of the lethal targeting that I 
described in my opening statement and to this committee last 
year, which is a country which has attempted to assassinate an 
American journalist and human rights activist right smack in 
the middle of New York City and tried to assassinate current 
and former U.S. officials here on U.S. soil. So, the cyber 
threat that they pose in some ways shows a similar level of 
aggressiveness and brazenness.
    Mr. Garbarino. So, again, specific targets, not, you know, 
industries as a whole, do you think--like I know other 
countries are focused specifically on possibly industries, 
taking down an entire sector. Would you expect the Iranians to 
focus on, like you said, the hospital-specific targets?
    Mr. Wray. I think critical infrastructure is obviously 
where we're most concerned. I am not sure that I could tell 
you, sitting here right now, which of the 16 sectors but 
critical infrastructure is where we would be most concerned 
about their potential cyber activity.
    Mr. Garbarino. Thank you. Secretary Mayorkas, what is DHS 
doing to prepare for these possible cyber attacks coming up? 
Because I know when Russia invaded Ukraine, we did the Shields 
Up program. So, have you done anything since there has been the 
war in Israel? What is DHS doing?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, so, day-to-day we work 
with our private-sector partners. We have the Joint Cyber 
Defense collaborative that our CISA, Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency operates. We are working with 
our partners in Israel. We are sharing information and best 
practices with them. We work very closely with them because 
they are, in fact, experiencing an increase in cyber attacks. 
It's taking a page out of the playbook that you mentioned, our 
incredible work with Ukraine in the Shields Up campaign. So, we 
have many different lines of effort that we are employing on a 
day-to-day basis to protect critical infrastructure.
    Mr. Garbarino. Thank you. I think one of those things is 
focusing on work force. So, Director Wray, you said earlier 
this year that even if all of the FBI's cyber agents and intel 
analysts focus exclusively on China threats, Chinese hackers 
would still outnumber the FBI's cyber personnel by 50 to 1. Is 
that still the case? What is FBI doing to deal with that?
    Mr. Wray. Well, that is still my assessment of the 
numerical disadvantage that we are at. China has a bigger 
hacking program than that of every other major nation combined 
and has stolen more of Americans' personal and corporate data 
than that of every nation, big or small, combined.
    So, it is a scale that is significant. In terms of what we 
are doing, in addition to trying to focus on recruiting cyber 
talent, both among agents, but also computer scientists, data 
analysts, data scientists, we are also focusing very heavily, 
and some of this is in the budget request that's up before 
Congress, focus on advanced training for our existing work 
force. Because one of the things that I hear consistently from 
our agents who work this area is that while people who know the 
ones and zeros is incredibly important, if you've got a really 
good agent who's got the good agent skills, if you get the 
right training, you can teach them a lot of the cyber stuff 
that they need. So, we're trying to raise the median cyber 
proficiency in the work force, not just recruiting our way out 
of the problem.
    Mr. Garbarino. I appreciate that. We did meet with some of 
your agents on a bipartisan trip overseas, some of the work 
they are doing, and they are doing a really good job overseas. 
I think, especially with the shared information.
    I wanted to focus, last, on antisemitism that we are seeing 
the rise in antisemitism, especially on college campuses. There 
are college campuses around that have student groups that don't 
seem to be getting--that are promoting antisemitism, but don't 
seem to be getting funding from the universities. There is one 
here in the District of Columbia at a school here. Have you 
been focused on where they are getting their funding from? Is 
it coming from outside sources? Is it coming from overseas, 
specifically for these student groups that have caused a lot of 
the rise in antisemitism on campuses?
    Mr. Wray. Well, when we investigate funding issues, it's in 
the context of something where we have a properly predicated 
investigation. So, we're not investigating funding in support 
of First Amendment activity, just to be clear. But certainly, 
we are looking at funding and have for quite some time, looking 
at funding of Hamas going in the other direction, and funding, 
including looking at, you know, Hamas's use of cryptocurrency 
and things like that. When it comes to groups here, if they are 
engaged in activity that is properly predicated as a criminal 
or national security investigation, then funding is, of course, 
part of what we would be looking at.
    Mr. Garbarino. I know I am out of time, but I think the 
focus on how these student groups are so well, you know, they 
are well-prepared, they are well-governed. I mean, the money's 
got to be coming from somewhere. It is not coming from the 
universities. I think it is coming from somewhere, but I am out 
of time. I will yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize a 
gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Ivey, who is the Ranking Member on 
Oversight----
    Mr. Ivey. That is correct.
    Chairman Green [continuing]. For 5 minutes.
    Mr. Ivey. Sir, Mr. Bishop----
    Chairman Green. With Mr. Bishop.
    Mr. Ivey. Mr. Bishop's subcommittee. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman. I wanted to follow up on a couple of questions. One 
was to the director, at the end of Congressman Higgins' 
testimony or questioning, he had a photo with two buses on it. 
We tried to figure out what he was getting at, but it sounded 
like he was suggesting that there were FBI operatives who had 
infiltrated the January, like two busloads of FBI operatives 
who had infiltrated the January 6 raid. I wanted to give you a 
chance to clarify on that.
    Mr. Wray. Well, I can't speak to the photo. I haven't seen 
the photo before, so I can't speak to the specifics of his 
photo and what it does or doesn't show. But what I can say and 
what I tried to say in response to his questions is that if 
somebody is asking or suggesting whether the violence at the 
Capitol on January 6 was part of some operation orchestrated by 
FBI sources, or FBI agents, or both, the answer is emphatically 
not. To suggest to the contrary, I think, is a disservice to 
the hardworking men and women of the FBI who bust their tails 
every day to keep Americans, including everybody up on Capitol 
Hill, safe.
    Mr. Ivey. Yes. I want to add as well, I used to be the 
NAUSA in this office here in Washington and actually was 
handling cases against them while the prosecutions were taking 
place. I do want to commend your office and the Department of 
Justice prosecutors for putting together, I guess, like 700 
cases, I think, at this point, the vast majority of which have 
been successful. So, I commend you for that.
    I did want to ask about FISA as well. I am on Judiciary. 
You testified about FISA 702. As you know, the time is coming 
up for reauthorization on that. There are questions about 
whether the reauthorization should contain some statutory 
changes that put additional restrictions on your office. I know 
you have had some objections to that and said that your office 
has made some internal changes. I wanted to get a sense of 
hearing what those are, though, before I made a final decision 
on what I want to do with respect to that bill. There are two, 
actually.
    Mr. Wray. Well, I will say two things. First on the impact 
of the changes and then what the changes were themselves. The 
most important thing for this committee and for Congress to 
take away on the changes we've made and is the results of those 
changes which have now been found, you don't have to just take 
my word for it, look at the FISA court itself. The same FISA 
judge, by the way, who rightly criticized us earlier, found 
that our reforms that we've put in place have resulted in an 
increase----
    Mr. Ivey. Yes, but if you could tell us what they are, I 
would appreciate it.
    Mr. Wray. So, the changes include all sorts of changes to 
training, oversight, internal oversight, pre-approvals, new 
accountability policies.
    Mr. Ivey. Let me stop you on that one. Pre-approvals, what 
are the pre-approval requirements that have been put in place 
now?
    Mr. Wray. Well, there are a whole slew of them. Some have 
to do with when you have what's called a batch query, when 
there's a large number of query terms, that's one as an 
example. Certain kinds of sensitive query terms have to get run 
all the way up to the level of deputy director. I'd be happy to 
arrange a more detailed briefing because it is quite detailed.
    Mr. Ivey. That would be great. And----
    Mr. Wray. Among the other changes we've put in place is I 
created an entire new Office of Internal Audit at the FBI that 
did not exist before.
    Mr. Wray. Well, let's do this. If you could supplement your 
testimony with the written, you may have done it someplace 
else, but if you could send me whatever it is that lays out the 
details of the changes you have made, I would appreciate it. 
Ms. Abizaid.
    Ms. Abizaid. Abizaid.
    Mr. Ivey. I would hope. OK, I got close. You mentioned 702 
in your testimony, but you didn't have anything in your written 
testimony about it. I was wondering if you could answer the 
same kind of question. What sorts of changes? Or you might 
think the current law is fine, but if you think the reforms 
that have been made are sufficient or what is your position on 
that?
    Ms. Abizaid. So, I know the Department of Justice is 
engaged in a robust conversation about what kinds of reforms 
should be considered. I would only reinforce what I said in my 
oral testimony, which is that 702 is a vital authority for the 
CT community, and agility is key to that authority. So, 
anything we do that reauthorizes it and preserves that agility 
will be incredibly important.
    Mr. Ivey. OK. Well, fair enough. If you have got, you know, 
additional proposed reforms you would like to suggest, please 
send those in writing, too.
    Ms. Abizaid. Will do.
    Mr. Ivey. I have run out of time with respect to a couple 
of things here. But I did want to end with this, Mr. McCaul, 
and I am sorry he is not here, but he had a chance to respond 
to Mr. Goldman. But the aiding and abetting allegation that was 
directed at you, Secretary Mayorkas, I thought was just 
inappropriate and incorrect. I just wanted to register that on 
the record. I know there have been some disagreements about the 
way you have run the office and that sort of thing, but I just 
don't see how that is productive. So, with that, I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize the 
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gonzalez, for his 5 minutes' 
questions.
    Mr. Gonzales. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, 
witnesses, for being here. I represent the largest border 
district in Congress. This border crisis is very real to us, 
not only for all Americans, but we are at the forefront of it. 
I want to start with Secretary Mayorkas. In April, you told 
``60 Minutes'' the migrant surge across our border are 
resulting from disinformation by cartels.
    I would go a step further and say that these cartels are 
terrorizing America, and it is long time that we label these 
cartels as terrorist organizations. I have a few questions for 
you, if you could be either yes or no or brief in your 
response. My first question is this. I am looking for 
solutions. Would raising the credible fear standards improve 
our border?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, the asylum system and the 
immigration system as a whole is in desperate need of reform, 
and I look forward to working with Congress on achieving that 
reform.
    Mr. Gonzales. Do you think that----
    Secretary Mayorkas. It is long overdue.
    Mr. Gonzales. Do you think that would help?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I think, Congressman, it is very 
difficult to take one element of an expansive system and say 
that is----
    Mr. Gonzales. Let's talk about----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. The solution.
    Mr. Gonzales [continuing]. A couple of other elements. I 
think it would work. Everyone I talk to is saying raise the 
credible fear standards is a good start. I hope you would 
consider also being vocal on that. The second part, would 
increasing repatriation flights improve our border?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we work with our 
international partners every day to increase the number of 
repatriation flights. In fact, our supplemental funding request 
seeks additional funds to achieve that outcome.
    Mr. Gonzales. Do these repatriation flights work?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, as----
    Mr. Gonzales. I would agree with that. I have seen it 
first-hand. As soon as we turn on repatriation flights, the 
numbers go down. My third question, would increasing penalties 
to smugglers improve our border?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I would like to analyze 
whether or not the severity of the penalties available are 
sufficient. I can tell you from my experience in the 
courthouse, in the courtroom as a Federal prosecutor that the 
delivery of consequences achieves an important law enforcement 
objective.
    Mr. Gonzales. What I am seeing is the consequences don't 
match the crime and the crime, Americans are dying. It is long 
time for us to match the crime to what is occurring. My last 
question for you, Mr. Secretary, do you agree we have a crisis 
at the Southern Border? Yes, or no?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I have been asked this 
question many times. Let me just assure you that we do not 
minimize the significance of the challenge at the border.
    Mr. Gonzales. I would like to now ask Director Wray, I 
agree with your stance on China, firmly believe China is a 
grave threat to our Nation on all different fronts, and I 
appreciate your stance on that. My question is, how substantial 
are the Chinese state ties to entities sending fentanyl 
ingredients to the Mexican cartels?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I am not sure what I can share in this 
setting on that but let me try it this way. When it comes to 
questions about state ties and China, I think it's important 
for Americans to understand that distinctions that we draw in 
this country between the government and, say, the private 
sector are distinctions that in the Chinese country, in the 
Chinese government, the Chinese state, are distinctions that 
are blurry at best, if non-existent. So, we have certainly seen 
that entities in China, unscrupulous actors in China, are the 
primary source not just of fentanyl precursors, but of pill 
presses which are used to press the fentanyl and by the way, of 
precursors for meth in the labs in Mexico as well. So, whether 
or not that traces back to the CCP directly, that I can't speak 
to here.
    Mr. Gonzales. Going back to my 20 years in the military, 
the Chinese Communist Party is interacted in every aspect of 
their government. Very briefly, if you could respond, do you 
think Chairman Xi can turn it on or off? Is he critical to 
turning these precursors or anything on and off, on or off?
    Mr. Wray. There is not a doubt in my mind that if the 
Chinese government wanted to be more aggressive and serious 
about clamping down on precursors for fentanyl and meth and 
pill presses, there are all sorts of things they could do, and 
we would welcome their contribution to that.
    Mr. Gonzales. I agree with you. I want to move on to the 
terrorist attack that happened in Israel. Following Hamas's 
attack on Israel on October 7, there has been a rise of 
antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States. 
Would you agree?
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    Mr. Gonzales. If someone here is in the United States on a 
visa and they actively support terrorism, what happens to them?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I am not an expert on visa revocation, but 
if they meet the appropriate visa revocation standard, then 
action is taken administratively to revoke their visa.
    Mr. Gonzales. Right now, it is illegal if you are here on a 
visa and you actively are supporting a terrorist organization, 
it is illegal and you need to be deported. The question I have 
is, how many cases has the FBI pursued in this route?
    Mr. Wray. Well, visa revocation is not within our 
authorities.
    Mr. Gonzales. Sure.
    Mr. Wray. We obviously work with our partners and share 
information when we have evidence about somebody's trying to 
support terrorism.
    Mr. Gonzales. Have there been cases?
    Mr. Wray. I don't have a number for you today, but 
certainly visa revocation is an important tool that the whole 
of Government has.
    Mr. Gonzales. Has any occurred this year?
    Mr. Wray. Have any visa revocations occurred?
    Mr. Gonzales. Where you have worked with other partners? I 
will close out here, Chairman. That you have worked with other 
entities in the Government to determine if these visa stays are 
indeed supporting terrorism?
    Mr. Wray. I mean, I know that we've had all sorts of cases 
that have resulted in visa revocation, whether or not they fit 
the exact criteria of what you are saying----
    Mr. Gonzales. But there are active cases that you have been 
working on?
    Chairman Green. The gentle----
    Mr. Wray. We view visa revocation as an important tool in 
the toolbox. The only thing I am clarifying is that it's not 
our tool----
    Mr. Gonzales. Sure.
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. But it's a tool we contribute to by 
sharing as----
    Mr. Gonzales. You do contribute. OK. Thank you, Chairman. I 
yield.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman's time has expired. I now 
recognize Mr. Garcia from California for his 5 minutes 
questioning.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to 
all of our witnesses here today and for your service. I want to 
start, Mr. Secretary, I know that this last Tuesday night, one 
of our colleagues also sits on this committee, really decided 
to waste our time with a very political stunt which made some 
deeply unfair and untrue allegations against you, sir. While I 
am glad that 8 Republicans joined us in defeating that 
resolution, I would like to take a moment to correct the record 
for the public and the American people. So, Mr. Secretary, yes 
or no, is our country currently being invaded?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, that is a term that I find 
to be offensive.
    Mr. Garcia. I do as well. Thank you. Is invasion----
    Ms. Greene. Well----
    Mr. Garcia. Is invasion--excuse me, this is my time, Ms. 
Greene. Is invasion a responsible way to characterize people 
who come to the United States to seek asylum?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I have been asked very 
often in many hearings now, I heard one Congressman actually 
cite that I have attended 27, participated in 27 hearings. I 
didn't realize the number was that large. I am not focused on 
language. I am focused on the challenges that we face and 
making sure that we meet those challenges on behalf of the 
American people.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you, sir. Is your agency working every 
day to stop fentanyl from coming into our country?
    Secretary Mayorkas. It most certainly is.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. Is it true that the overwhelming 
majority of fentanyl is, in fact, carried through ports of 
entry by American citizens into this country?
    Secretary Mayorkas. It is, Congressman.
    Mr. Garcia. Is it fair to say that an orderly border 
actually requires comprehensive immigration reform, which would 
require Congressional action rather than just Executive 
actions?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, immigration reform is 
vitally necessary to advancing the security of our border.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you. 
Those are simple questions, but I think that your record keeps 
being distorted unfairly. So, I wanted to make sure, give you a 
chance to clear that up.
    I think it is also important to hear how we are talking 
about security and our threats to the homeland, how the current 
head of the Republican Party spent Veterans Day just recently. 
So, I want to read you this first sentence, ``in honor of our 
great veterans on Veterans Day, we pledge to you that we will 
root out the Communists, Marxists, fascists, and radical left 
thugs that live like vermin within the confines of our country, 
lie, steal, and cheat on elections, and will do anything 
possible, whether legally or illegally, to destroy America and 
the American dream.''
    Here we see Donald Trump calling his fellow Americans 
vermin and threatening to root out people based on their 
political beliefs. This is the kind of rhetoric that reminds me 
of the worst types of dictators in history, and it is not 
Trump's first time using this kind of rhetoric. He told an 
audience in Iowa that immigrants were poisoning the blood of 
our country. That is a quote. He has promised to violate 
Federal laws in order to build mass deportation camps and 
promised to restore his Muslim ban. He even wants to cancel 
legal status for certain categories of immigrants. Donald 
Trump, of course, has had dinner and hosted open Holocaust 
deniers and white nationalists. We all, of course, remember 
that he praised the white nationalist Charlottesville marchers 
who chanted, Jews will not replace us. Of course, he faces 
Federal felony charges for his role in the January 6 
insurrection.
    Now, Mr. Secretary, Director Wray, I am not going to ask 
you to respond directly to Donald Trump's statements, but I 
think we can all agree that they are not worthy of certainly 
running--anybody running for President. As we move into this 
election year, I am deeply concerned about Donald Trump, 
particularly as he faces more and more pressure from his 
supporters that may try to invoke additional violence that we 
might see from fringe supporters of his.
    Now, Mr. Secretary, I wrote to you ahead of Donald Trump's 
first indictment, expressing concerns about his ability to 
provoke violent attacks. I would like to thank you for your on-
going attention to this matter and more broadly, for taking on 
the challenges we have around white supremacy, around the huge 
actions that are happening across this country that impact a 
lot of people. We also know that Donald Trump isn't the only 
politician that has used a history of--or has a history of 
violent rhetoric in this country. We need to call it out at 
every single turn.
    I want to just finally, Director Wray, I want to raise one 
final issue with you. The Anti-Defamation League found that in 
2022, mass shootings in the United States accounted for most 
extremism-related fatalities last year, with about 80 percent 
of those murders committed by white supremacists. We saw that 
in the Dallas Area Mall case, in the Dollar General store in 
Jacksonville. There have been additional shootings after 
shootings. What would you need from Congress to help you better 
tackle this threat as it relates to mass shootings?
    Mr. Wray. Well, our budget request that went up in the 
fiscal 2024 budget request includes a number of resources for 
counterterrorism, including that would speak to this threat. 
That's important because as you've heard in my testimony here 
today, the foreign terrorist threat is not only not abating, 
but it's intensifying. So, we certainly can't be put in a 
position where we're having to, you know, rob Peter to pay 
Paul, if you will, to protect the American people from all 
forms of terrorist attack.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you very much, sir.
    Mr. Wray. Also, I should say, on the issue of mass acts of 
violence, mass shootings, putting ideology aside or anything, 
or motivation, I think there are also parts of the 
appropriation request that go to our ability at NICS to do 
background checks in a timely way and process, obviously, make 
sure that guns are not purchased by people who are prohibited 
under an existing law from having them.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize the 
gentlelady from Georgia, Ms. Greene, for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    Ms. Greene. Secretary Mayorkas, I want you to look at these 
innocent Americans. Do you see them?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I do, Congresswoman.
    Ms. Greene. They are dead. They are from Dalton, Georgia in 
my district. They are dead because a 17-year-old, likely 
affiliated with the cartels, was smuggling illegal aliens into 
our country in Texas, breaking our laws. This happens every 
single day in our country. Earlier this week, 8 Republicans 
joined the Democrats and protected your job. But I want you to 
know you have a short time coming. You can honorably resign, or 
we are going to impeach you. It is happening very, very soon.
    Mr. Wray, do you remember on October 18, when the Capitol 
complex was illegally occupied, breaking the same laws that you 
have hunted down Americans for from January 6? Are you familiar 
with this?
    Mr. Wray. I don't recognize the picture that you're 
holding.
    Ms. Greene. Well, because maybe your agents haven't been 
doing a good job into investigating the organizers that broke 
the law, illegally occupied this very building that we are 
sitting in right now, and over 300 of them were arrested. Some 
of them attacked police officers. I haven't seen on the news, 
where the FBI is hunting them down with helicopters, tanks in 
the streets, raiding their homes with flashbangs, targeting 
these people, watching these people, throwing them in jail for 
them to stay in pretrial, in solitary confinement for years 
before they ever face trial.
    You want to know what this says? I will tell you. This is 
one of the organizer's phones, and this is a chat. It says at 
the top, global intifada. Now, while we are talking about 
terrorism today, are you familiar with the term intifada?
    Mr. Wray. I've certainly heard the term.
    Ms. Greene. Do you know the definition?
    Mr. Wray. I am not going to try to define it but.
    Ms. Greene. It means Arab uprising or jihad. Are you 
concerned about jihad in this country?
    Mr. Wray. I am, and I have consistently testified to that 
effect.
    Ms. Greene. Yes, but are you interested in using the FBI? 
You are the director of the FBI. Do you hunt down terrorists in 
our country, those that would be responsible for jihad?
    Mr. Wray. Absolutely. That's why we've had jihadist-
inspired terrorism at our highest national threat priority 
level since the day that I started as FBI director.
    Ms. Greene. Do you still use the Southern Poverty Law 
Center as a source? You use them. The FBI used the Southern 
Poverty Law Center as a source when targeting Catholics. Are 
you still using the Southern Poverty Law Center as a source?
    Mr. Wray. Congresswoman, what I think you're referring to 
is the so-called Richmond intelligence product, which as soon 
as I learned about it, I was horrified, withdrew it. We had an 
inspection done. Part of the problem that we found with that 
particular product, that particular office, is precisely what 
you're talking about, the reliance on the Southern Poverty Law 
Center and the way in which they relied on it.
    Ms. Greene. Well, you relied on the Southern Poverty Law 
Center, but I would have you know, Mr. Wray, that this one 
right here, this person involved in the global intifada group 
that illegally, they broke the law, came in and occupied the 
Canon Office House building, interrupted Congress, interrupted 
hearings right here, Katrina Bleakley is the lead attorney for 
the Southern Poverty Law Center. Were you aware of this?
    Mr. Wray. Congresswoman, as I said, I haven't seen the 
photos that you're holding up before.
    Ms. Greene. Well, I posted them on my Twitter account. It 
is public. You know, maybe you guys are----
    Mr. Wray. I don't spend a lot of time on Twitter, ma'am.
    Ms. Greene. Well, you know, you--oh, I am sure you do, 
because the Department of Homeland Security, organized with 
other offices, has censored many Americans, including myself.
    Mr. Wray. I'm not part of the Department of Homeland 
Security.
    Ms. Greene. Right. Mr. Wray, you should be interested in 
investigating terrorism. This right here is proof that we had 
terrorists in our own office building. Global intifada. You 
rely on the Southern Poverty Law Center. Katrina Bleakley is 
one of the organizers. I will send this over to your office so 
maybe perhaps you can stop targeting innocent grandmothers and 
veterans who walked through the Capitol on January 6 and might 
actually go after people tied to Hamas, tied to Hezbollah, and 
likely Iran. Mr. Wray, are you interested in Members of 
Congress that are organized and participating in a Facebook 
group that has ties to Hamas?
    Mr. Wray. We are not investigating people for participating 
in a Facebook group.
    Ms. Greene. A Facebook group that is tied to Hamas?
    Mr. Wray. We have multiple investigations into individuals 
affiliated with Hamas and they're active investigations.
    Ms. Greene. You are going to tell me as FBI director, you 
will not investigate Americans or United States Members of 
Congress that are linked to known terrorists?
    Mr. Wray. That's not what I said.
    Ms. Greene. Are you going to investigate or not?
    Mr. Wray. We are going to investigate individuals who are 
affiliated with Hamas if they meet our standards for 
predication, which are long-standing standards set by this 
department and the prior department and the department before 
that.
    Ms. Greene. I would hope to God that intifada and jihad and 
terrorists in our very country would be something that you 
would prioritize instead of a 3-hour event that happened at the 
Capitol nearly 4 years ago, Mr. Wray. I yield back my time, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Chairman Green. The gentlelady yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Menendez, I think you are up next, sir.
    Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr.----
    Chairman Green. The gentleman from New Jersey, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Wray, 
earlier in your testimony, did you say that defunding the FBI 
would be, ``a gift to the Chinese Communist Party, more power 
to the cartels, and more damage to critical infrastructure?''
    Mr. Wray. I believe I said words to that effect, yes.
    Mr. Menendez. I appreciate that. Not everybody was in the 
room during that part of your testimony. I want to follow up on 
what my colleague, Mr. Higgins, said about, ``armed oppression 
as one of the primary threats to the homeland.'' I agree that 
armed oppression is a massive threat to our homeland, but we 
need to be clear about what actually constitutes armed 
oppression. In this country, minority groups are routinely 
targets of weaponized oppression. Armed oppression is when 
Black men cannot go safely for a run in Georgia. Armed 
oppression is when Black youth cannot wear hoodies in Florida. 
Armed oppression is being LGBTQ in this country and not being 
able to safely go to a nightclub in Florida. Armed oppression 
is living in a Hispanic community and being targeted while 
going to Walmart in El Paso. Armed oppression is being Black in 
this country and not being able to go grocery shopping in 
Buffalo without being targeted because of the color of your 
skin. Armed oppression is not being able to go safely to a 
church, synagogue, mosque, temple, or any place of worship to 
practice your faith.
    Domestic terrorists have targeted each of these locations 
and each of these groups in acts of armed oppression. Yet, when 
we in the House Committee on Homeland Security established our 
committee oversight plan for the 118th Congress, my Republican 
colleagues refused to include capital D, capital D, Domestic 
terrorism in our plan. That, in my opinion, is where this 
committee is failing when we consider our threats to the 
homeland.
    New Jersey's 8th Congressional District is home to what 
homeland security experts call the most dangerous 2 miles in 
America, containing ports, airports, major rail lines, densely 
populated cities, and chemical plants. I am proud of the work 
that President Biden and the New Jersey Congressional 
Delegation have done to improve the safety, reliability, and 
resiliency of critical infrastructure in North Jersey. The 
Biden administration has aggressively protected our critical 
infrastructure from foreign adversaries, with President Biden 
admonishing Russian President Vladimir Putin that certain 
critical infrastructure is off-limits, a stark contrast to 
President Trump, who proposed a joint cyber unit with Russia.
    Secretary Mayorkas, when considering the threat landscape, 
how does the Department take into account the risk posed by 
having multiple critical infrastructure sectors in close 
geographic proximity?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, the proximity of elements 
of our critical infrastructure only increase the challenge that 
we confront, but we work very, very closely with our critical 
infrastructure partners. The great majority of this country's 
critical infrastructure rests in the hands of the private 
sector. We work very closely with the private sector to ensure 
the security of our critical infrastructure. The remarkable men 
and women of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency do a tremendous job.
    Mr. Menendez. On the issue of cybersecurity, I want to 
address the current threat landscape. When we talk about 
cybersecurity, we are talking about threats that don't just 
come up from nation-states like Iran, but often from a network 
of proxies and affiliated groups. Secretary Mayorkas, how is 
the current conflict in Israel giving us additional insight 
about Iranian-backed cyber threat actors?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am sorry, can you repeat the 
question, just the----
    Mr. Menendez. Of course. How is the current conflict in 
Israel giving us additional insight about Iranian-backed cyber 
threat actors?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I think what we are seeing, 
Congressman, and I will defer to my colleagues as well, as the 
use of cyber as a tool in the repertoire of our adversaries. We 
are seeing that play out in the Middle East conflict, just as 
we have seen it in the context of the unprovoked Russian 
aggression against Ukraine.
    Mr. Menendez. I appreciate that. One more question for you. 
In your testimony, you mentioned how critical it is that the 
CFATS program is reauthorized. I am particularly invested in 
the CFATS program because there are four facilities covered by 
the program in New Jersey's 8th Congressional District. How 
does the CFATS program help keep our critical infrastructure 
safe?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, the CFATS program, the 
Chemical Facilities Antiterrorism Standards, allow us to 
inspect facilities to ensure adherence with the security and 
safety precautions that are necessary to protect the 
surrounding communities. That is one aspect of CFATS. We must 
achieve the reauthorization of that program.
    Mr. Menendez. I agree. I just want to quickly address some 
of the ways that my colleagues have attacked Secretary Mayorkas 
here and in other hearings. Mr. Secretary, you and I have had 
our disagreements on policies, including recently on an ICE 
detention center in Elizabeth in my district, and I am looking 
forward to your Department's response to my letter on that.
    But I have two quick questions for you. During your long 
career in public service, including 30 years as a law 
enforcement official and senior positions in the Department of 
Homeland Security under the Obama administration, did you take 
your responsibility to the American public seriously?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I have, and I continue to do so, 
Congressman.
    Mr. Menendez. When President Biden asked you to serve as 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, did you 
accept to help keep the American people safe?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I did, Congressman.
    Mr. Menendez. Is that what you focus on every single day 
when you wake up to take this office?
    Secretary Mayorkas. It indeed is.
    Mr. Menendez. Thank you so much for your service, sir. I 
yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
D'Esposito, the gentleman from great State of New York----
    Mr. D'Esposito. Well, thank you.
    Chairman Green [continuing]. For 5 minutes.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary 
Mayorkas, the crisis at the Southwest Border not only impacts 
border States such as Texas and Arizona, but now every State is 
truly a border State. State and local leaders from sanctuary 
cities such as New York and Chicago are starting to feel the 
strain effects of the border crisis. Over the last months, we 
have seen dozens of arrests at the Roosevelt Hotel, which is 
housing migrants, including crimes against children, assaults, 
traumatic beatings using no parking signs, and assaults against 
my fellow members of the NYPD. There was a migrant that came 
into New York City that in his first 45 days in New York, was 
arrested six times on 14 different charges. But there was no 
charges because the great district attorney, one that my 
colleague from New York, Mr. Goldman, has supported, the 
district attorney, Alvin Bragg, declined prosecution.
    Governor Hochul has said there is no room left at the inn. 
There is, and I have spoken as recently as 25 minutes ago to 
commissioners of police on Long Island who said there is zero 
communication from Homeland Security about the individuals that 
are coming into our communities. Less than 2 years into his 
tenure, Mayor Adams has faced challenges finding housing, and 
feeding millions of migrants that have come from the border. 
Mayor Adams, at one point during a public speech said, and I 
quote, ``the influx of migrants along the Southwest Border will 
destroy New York City.''
    Illinois Governor, another Democrat, recently sent a letter 
to President Biden calling the influx, ``unattainable.'' New 
York City is facing a potential 15 percent cut across the board 
to city agencies over the next 9 months. Why? To deal with 
migrants because of your failed policies. So, my question, and 
these are yes, or no. No time to answer differently. Do you 
agree with Mayor Adams when he said that the influx of migrants 
along the Southwest Border will destroy New York City, yes or 
no?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, let me----
    Mr. D'Esposito. Yes or no, sir?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I am going to answer your 
question that we do not underestimate the challenge at the 
Southwest Border and----
    Mr. D'Esposito. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, it is 
a yes or no question.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I have answered that question. Let me 
also add that the----
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK. Do you agree with the Illinois Governor 
who sent the letter to President Biden calling the influx 
unattainable, yes, or no?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we work very closely with 
the cities to address----
    Mr. D'Esposito. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, it is 
a yes or no question. Yes or not?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am going to answer your question, 
Congressman.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK. Does it concern you that Mayor Adams' 
office asked a judge to stop a decades-old right-to-shelter 
mandate which requires New York to give a place to sleep anyone 
who needs one, yes or no?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I can't speak to the----
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK. Does it concern you that the surge of 
illegal aliens crossing the Southwest Border has overwhelmed 
our big cities like New York, with approximately 60,000 
occupying beds in traditional city shelters and in over 20 
emergency sites, yes or no?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I am incredibly proud of 
the men and women of the Department of----
    Mr. D'Esposito. Does it concern you that Mayor Adams 
stated, and I quote, ``we, the city of New York, are getting no 
support on this national crisis?'' Yes or no?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we are very proud of the 
work we do----
    Mr. D'Esposito. Does it concern you that as of August 2023, 
New York City was paying almost $10 million, $10 million per 
day to provide services for illegal aliens, yes or no?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Do I have a chance to answer your 
question?
    Mr. D'Esposito. Sure, if the answer is yes or no. You have 
had the opportunity to answer every one of my questions.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman----
    Mr. D'Esposito. But you refuse to answer the questions 
whether they are yes or no. These are not trick questions. They 
are not trick questions. The answers should unequivocally be 
yes. Every State is a border State. Every city is a border 
city. Especially when it comes to bearing the cost of you and 
President Biden's failed policies at the border.
    I agree with my colleagues. You should be impeached. That 
is why we are doing the work that this committee is doing, 
because you have failed your oath. As someone who has taken 
oaths, probably the one most important, besides being a Member 
of Congress, as a New York City police detective, I live that 
oath every single day. To answer the question that you were 
asked, do you wake up every morning? You clearly don't. Because 
from every moment, from the time that you wake up to the time 
that you go to sleep, your focus should be securing this 
border. There has never ever been such a disaster at our 
Southern Border as it is now. That is because of your failed 
leadership.
    It is a dereliction of your duty. Quite frankly, the 
questions that I answered should have been unequivocally yes. 
But you sat there and you decided to answer it in another 
fashion. That speaks volumes. That is why this committee will 
continue working to put the facts together to make sure that we 
find a new Secretary of Homeland Security, one that holds this 
country and this Nation as most important. Mr. Chairman, I 
yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Goldman, the gentleman from New York, for his 5 minutes 
questions.
    Mr. Goldman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that my 
colleague from the 4th District of New York, which does not 
include any part of New York City, has spent time as a NYPD 
detective and is now an expert on our border policy and the 
history of it as he leaves this room.
    Secretary Mayorkas, you were not allowed to answer a number 
of the questions that my colleague just asked you. I would like 
to give you some time to respond if you would like.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I would only say this, 
that we do not minimize the significance of the challenge at 
the Southern Border. We also understand the challenge at the 
Southern Border and the fact that it is reflective of a 
challenge that is gripping our entire hemisphere and, in fact, 
the world.
    Yesterday, I spent time with my counterparts from the 
European Union, who spoke of the challenges that they are 
suffering by reason of an historic displacement of people 
around the world. We work day and night, 24 hours a day, 7 days 
a week, to advance the security of our Southwest Border, to 
advance the security of the Northern Border, and to achieve our 
highest and most important mission, the safety and security of 
the American people.
    Mr. Goldman. I appreciate that. I also appreciate very much 
that policy disputes are not impeachable offenses. We can wax 
poetic and make big political pronouncements about whether you 
should be impeached or not. But impeachment is high crimes and 
misdemeanors, bribery, and treason. A policy dispute and a 
disagreement about how we are managing the border is not 
impeachable.
    But I do want to give you just an opportunity, because I 
know the administration under your leadership has actually 
taken numerous measures to address what you rightly point out 
to be a dramatic increase in the influx of immigrants to this 
country, in large part because of the collapsing governments in 
Central and South America, as well as climate disruption. So, 
could you just describe briefly some of the measures that you 
have taken to address this influx in immigration at our 
Southern Border?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, the foundational point is 
the following, and it's a point about which everyone agrees 
that we are working with a broken immigration system that has 
been in desperate need of reform for more than 20 years. I 
believe it's since 1996, No. 1.
    Within the confines of that broken immigration system, we 
are implementing a model that does work, and that is to build 
safe, lawful, and orderly pathways for individuals to obtain 
the relief that the law that Congress has passed provides them, 
and to deliver consequences for those individuals who do not 
avail themselves of those pathways. That is a model that has 
proven effective in the context of a broken immigration system 
and also in the context of a phenomenon, the phenomenon of 
migration of displaced people that is incredibly dynamic and 
changes month to month.
    Mr. Goldman. I appreciate very much your point which my 
Republican colleagues do not seem to accept, which is that our 
immigration system can only be fixed by us. It requires 
legislation passed by Congress that cannot be managed 
separately and individually by the Executive branch.
    Director Wray, in my short time left, I want to focus on 
testimony you gave a couple of weeks ago noting the tremendous 
uptick in antisemitic hate crimes. I believe you testified that 
even though Jews make up only 2.4 percent of the United States 
population, antisemitic hate crimes account for around 60 
percent of all religious-based hate crimes. You indicated that 
this comes from across the spectrum, from the left, from the 
right, foreign terrorist organizations, home-grown violent 
extremists, domestic violent extremists. Can you expand a 
little bit on those heightened threats to the Jewish community 
now, 2 weeks later, and how the increase of antisemitic hate 
speech has impacted or affected or increased the threats of 
violence that the FBI has noticed since October 7?
    Mr. Wray. Well, so, as you said, I have tried to be very 
clear that one of the things that jumps out at me, and which is 
why we work so closely at the FBI, both nationally and locally, 
with the Jewish community, is that the Jewish community is 
uniquely targeted by terrorism and hate, really across the 
spectrum. Not that there should ever be a proportion for hate, 
but the idea that a group that makes up only 2.4 percent of the 
American public should be targeted with something close to 60 
percent of all religiously-based hate crime is abhorrent and 
should be abhorrent to everyone.
    We have seen over the last few years an increase not just 
in hate crimes overall, but an increase, a marked increase, in 
antisemitic hate crimes. That's all with the recognition that 
hate crimes are, as we all know, chronically underreported. We 
have had just in the past few years, we've thwarted plots to 
attack synagogues in Colorado, Ohio, Nevada. We've made arrests 
for threats or attacks against the Jewish community in 
California, to Michigan, to New Jersey. We helped rescue the 
hostages in Colleyville. I could go on and on. That's all 
before October 7.
    Since October 7, as I've testified, we've seen an increase 
in threats and reported threats which cover this across the 
spectrum. But the biggest chunk of those, again, by far, is 
threats to the Jewish community. So, we are aggressively 
investigating those threats. But we are also very purposefully 
and intensely doubling down on our engagement with the Jewish 
community, which needs our help. I think it's incumbent on all 
Americans to stand together on this.
    Mr. Goldman. I appreciate that. I appreciate the Chairman 
for indulging over time. I would just add that I do hope that 
the FBI makes a much more concerted effort to pressure local 
law enforcement agencies to participate in the collection of 
data on hate crimes, which is woefully deficient. So even that 
information that you have only includes about 21 percent of law 
enforcement agencies in the country. I thank you and yield 
back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Ms. 
Lee, the gentlelady from Florida for her 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Earlier this year, I 
sponsored the bill to reauthorize the Chemical Facility 
Antiterrorism Standards program, which passed the House 409 to 
1, but unfortunately has stalled in the Senate and the program 
has since expired. Secretary Mayorkas, I know you share my 
concern about the lapse in this program, and I would like to 
return to your testimony about the potential impact of the 
lapse in the CFATS program. Specifically, would you speak to 
the role DHS has in the inspection of chemical facilities and 
how that changes when the program is allowed to lapse?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much for your support, 
Congresswoman, of the CFATS program. It is vitally necessary to 
the protection of not only the communities that surround the 
particular facility, but America as a whole. Without the CFATS 
authority, we are unable to inspect facilities and ensure 
they're in compliance with standards that protect us against 
very, very dangerous chemicals. We are fortunate that we have 
not had an incident that has been a dramatic example of why 
this authority is so vitally needed.
    Ms. Lee. Do you believe the likelihood or the threat of 
such an incident potentially occurring is greater when the 
program is allowed to lapse?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Absolutely. Because what we are able to 
do is ensure that the standards are being enforced and that 
best security practices are being followed. When we are not 
able to inspect and enforce those standards, we see facilities 
not employing them and creating a significant vulnerability.
    Ms. Lee. Thank you, Secretary Mayorkas. Director Wray, I 
appreciate the testimony that you have given and the 
information that you have shared about your internal efforts at 
the FBI to address FISA reform and to address taking steps to 
address abuses to the 702 program and within the FISC and would 
like to discuss that issue with you. The House Committee on 
Judiciary and Intelligence have worked to come up with FISA 
reform ideas and legislation that would protect American civil 
liberties while still ensuring that law enforcement has the 
ability to conduct lawful and necessary surveillance. With the 
expiration looming at the end of 2023 and the threats that you 
have described ever-increasing to our homeland, I would like to 
touch on how the FISA program itself and the 702 program assist 
in preventing plots to harm Americans and potential threats to 
the homeland. Would you please elaborate on why 702 is an 
important part of your work?
    Mr. Wray. So, 702 is critical to protecting Americans from 
foreign terrorist threats. If you think about why 702 was 
enacted in the first place, even though it's focused on foreign 
adversaries overseas presenting national security threats, the 
whole reason we have it is to protect Americans here in the 
homeland from those threats. That part is the FBI's part in 
running U.S. person queries, among other things. If you have a 
foreign terrorist organization overseas, any one of those ones 
that I listed off in my opening statement, who decides to task 
an operative here or to direct an attack here, it is more 
likely than not that 702 is going to be the thing that would 
allow us to anticipate or detect that.
    If we were to deliberately blind ourselves to that 
information, we are taking a wildly irresponsible risk, in my 
view. To give you an example, something like 100 percent of our 
technically-sourced intelligence about Hamas comes from 702. 
That's just one terrorist organization. So why we would blind 
ourselves to that when it's not Constitutionally required, 
somebody needs to be able to explain to the families of 
terrorist victims of the future why something that we were not 
Constitutionally required to do, we just decided to do that 
made them and their family members less safe.
    Ms. Lee. In your written testimony, you specifically touch 
on the concept of a warrant requirement related to U.S. person 
queries in the 702 database, and your assessment that that 
would hamper law enforcement's ability and the intelligence 
community's ability to do their work and utilize the database. 
Would you explain why it is you believe that a warrant 
requirement for U.S. persons queries would be a challenge or a 
hurdle for you all to continue to do that work?
    Mr. Wray. Well, the first thing I would say is that it's 
quite clear under the case law that a warrant is not required 
Constitutionally to run a U.S. person query. This is 
information that is already lawfully collected, and it's our 
ability to run queries of the information that's already 
lawfully collected.
    The second thing, though, is that the time, the stage in an 
investigation where 702 is really used is at the front end to 
quickly figure out what are we dealing with here. Do we have a 
threat that we have to pursue? So, agility and speed are of the 
essence, and trying to get a warrant requirement at the front 
end in that stage is really a nonstarter. The delay that it 
would cause in allowing us to connect the dots, which is what's 
happening when our people are running U.S. person queries, 
would basically make the tool largely useless.
    The other thing that I think people tend to forget when 
they talk about a warrant requirement is that the vast majority 
of our U.S. person querying is to identify victims, in 
particular of cyber attacks. There's no warrant that anybody 
would be getting to be able to run a query of a victim term. 
So, we would be essentially putting ourselves in a position 
where we wouldn't be able to protect American infrastructure 
from Iranian cyber attacks, Chinese cyber attacks, Russian 
cyber attacks, North Korean cyber attacks.
    So, again, I think there's a--I understand the mindset. We 
take very seriously our role as stewards of these important 
authorities. That's why I am so committed to the reforms that 
we have made. That's why I am so gratified by the findings by 
the FISA court and other outside entities about the 
effectiveness of those reforms. But please, please don't throw 
the baby out with the bathwater.
    Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentlelady yields. I now recognize Ms. 
Clarke for her 5 minutes of testimony.
    Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you, 
Ranking Member. I sincerely thank our panel of witnesses for 
both their service and their testimony here today. I would like 
to extend that gratitude to the women and men in the Federal 
enterprise under your leadership.
    Last Congress, I partnered with my colleagues in the Senate 
and across the aisle to enact the cyber incident reporting for 
a Critical Infrastructure Act, which will give the Federal 
Government the visibility it needs to identify malicious cyber 
campaigns early and better understand the tactics of our 
adversaries to prioritize risk reduction investments. Incident 
reporting is a critical tool in our ability to defend 
ourselves, but it is not the only place we need to invest time 
and resources. Competing incident reporting frameworks will 
undermine security, not enhance it, because it forces a 
disproportionate focus on compliance with various reporting 
regulations over security and incident response.
    The Cybersecurity Incident Reporting Council has 
acknowledged as much. Secretary Mayorkas, the Cyber Incident 
Reporting Council has identified duplicative Federal cyber 
incident reporting requirements. The National Cybersecurity 
Strategy continues to task DHS with harmonizing the Federal 
cyber incident reporting requirements. How willing are DHS's 
Federal partners, including independent agencies, to do the 
work of harmonizing incident reporting requirements? Are you 
concerned that multiple inconsistent reporting requirements 
could frustrate the security value of incident reporting?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, this is a very important 
subject in a domain that is only becoming of increasing 
significance to the security of our critical infrastructure and 
our country writ large. No. 1, we are receiving excellent 
cooperation from our Federal partners with respect to the Cyber 
Incident Reporting Council and its effort to harmonize 
reporting requirements.
    It is a challenge because there are also independent 
agencies that have particular mandates, and they perceive 
sometimes those mandates requiring a different process, a 
different time line than other departments and agencies do. We 
are all driving toward the same outcome of a cyber secure 
America, but there are some tensions with respect to particular 
jurisdictions, and we are working through them, and everyone 
has demonstrated impeccable motive.
    Ms. Clarke. Very well. Director Wray and Director Abizaid. 
Abizaid, I remembered like lemonade. It was stuck in my head. 
What do you make of the fact that the U.S.-based persons who 
are primarily responsible for terrorism threats here in our 
homeland--I am sorry, let me back up here, I kind-of--let me 
start. OK. I am struck by an unclassified NCTC product 
entitled, Foreign Terrorist Inspired, Enabled and Directed 
Attacks in the United States since 9/11, as of February 2023, 
that identified 47 attacks and concludes that of the 47, 41 
involved U.S. persons.
    I hope that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle 
are paying attention and will recognize that their fixation 
solely on threats coming over the Southwestern Border is 
dangerous. We cannot lose sight of the threats right here at 
home, and it is urgent that we work to counter radicalization 
of U.S. persons. So, again, my question is, you know, what do 
you make of the fact that U.S.-based persons are primarily 
responsible for terrorism threats here in our homeland? How 
difficult does this make it for the FBI, NCTC, to detect and 
thwart possible attacks? Are you having to shift your 
counterterrorism approach to accomplish this?
    Ms. Abizaid. Yes. Thank you for the question. It goes right 
in line with my testimony here today, which is that the 
heightened threat environment in the United States is being 
driven by individuals that are inspired to act. I think you've 
rightly outlined the number of foreign terrorist inspired, 
enabled, or directed attacks since 9/11 here on U.S. soil and 
most of those have been inspired attacks. Some have been 
enabled, some have been, only three, I think, have actually 
been directed by foreign terrorist organizations.
    So, that history, I think, is an important sort of context 
for the heightened threat environment we're dealing with here 
today. That said, part of the reason that we've had that level 
of success is because of the very clear priority we've placed 
on screening, vetting, watch listing, terrorist identities, 
known and suspected terrorists, databases on the Classified 
side that really support border security efforts writ large.
    Ms. Clarke. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Again, as we move 
to Thanksgiving next week, I give thanks for you and the work 
that you do and to all of those families that sacrifice on 
behalf of the American people. Happy Thanksgiving to all my 
colleagues, and I yield back.
    Chairman Green. Well said, Ms. Clarke. Thank you for that. 
The gentlelady yields. I now recognize Mr. Lutrell, the 
gentleman from Texas, for his 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Luttrell. Good afternoon. Nineteen terrorists in 
September 2001 killed 3,000 of our citizens. Then last month, 
Hamas fighters invaded Israel. Ms. Abizaid, do we have a number 
on how many fighters, Hamas fighters came into Israel? Do we 
have a round number on that?
    Ms. Abizaid. I don't have a number for you.
    Mr. Luttrell. Mr. Wray, you know?
    Mr. Wray. I don't.
    Mr. Luttrell. Almost a month past now and we don't have a 
good accountability on what those numbers look like?
    Ms. Abizaid. I'm sure we can get those for you. I don't 
have them for you today. But it was a sizable number and to a 
shocking degree.
    Mr. Luttrell. So, how many deaths in Israel last month, 
total civilian?
    Ms. Abizaid. We've seen the Israeli government revise their 
casualty estimates down to around 1,200. Again, a shocking 
number of deaths.
    Mr. Luttrell. How many hostages remain?
    Ms. Abizaid. There are over 200, is my understanding.
    Mr. Luttrell. Mr. Wray, do you believe that in America or 
globally, there is a war on fentanyl?
    Mr. Wray. Do I believe there is a war on fentanyl?
    Mr. Luttrell. Yes.
    Mr. Wray. I think there is a whole-of-Government effort to 
combat the scourge of the epidemic of fentanyl.
    Mr. Luttrell. Just the sheer number of deaths that we see 
daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly, I would, and I have----
    Mr. Wray. I'm sorry, I started my opening----
    Mr. Luttrell. I would just say sheer numbers that we are 
losing to fentanyl. As a military man, I would think that loss 
would calculate a sheer conflict. So, my question is, do you 
consider our challenges against the fentanyl crisis a war? Or 
is that too bold of a statement?
    Mr. Wray. No, I don't, I mean look, bold language is 
appropriate when it comes to fentanyl.
    Mr. Luttrell. Good understanding.
    Mr. Wray. You know, I will tell you that on the FBI end, 
when we are making gang arrests, we have seen over and over 
again, violent gang arrests, more often than not now, include 
fentanyl seizures. That's all over the country. That's just one 
metric. But it shows the degree, along with, for example, the 
case that I mentioned in Boston in my opening statement, just 
shows it is a routine thing now for our people, working with 
our partners, to be making seizures of fentanyl that in one 
seizure would be enough to wipe out an entire State.
    Mr. Luttrell. I would add sex trafficking to the war as 
well given the sheer numbers of individuals that are being held 
across the globe. Ms. Abizaid or Mr. Wray, how many known 
groups or individuals in the United States are we monitoring 
for terroristic activity that we need to be concerned on? Mr. 
Mayorkas, I know Mr. Pfluger asked you these questions with 
that chart, but I am concerned, we are concerned that, is there 
a substantial amount, again, 19 for 9/11? Let's just say 200 
maybe Hamas fighters came into Israel. Those are very small 
numbers compared to the damages that they inflicted. So, are we 
actively engaged on any terroristic watch list inside the 
United States that provide an absolute risk or threat right 
now?
    Mr. Wray. Well, let me try to answer the question this way. 
We have, we FBI have, through our 56 Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces, have active investigations that relate to Hamas, that 
relate to al-Qaeda, that relate to al-Qaeda----
    Mr. Luttrell. You said that very eloquently earlier, sir.
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    Mr. Luttrell. I hate to cut you off.
    Mr. Wray. OK.
    Mr. Luttrell. You don't have to repeat yourself. My concern 
is I want to know, can I go home and tell my people in Texas 
that we are in a safe place? There is no viable risk that we 
need to be concerned about right now. Giving just the numbers 
that have come across the border, Mr. Mayorkas, these numbers, 
you get hit in the face with this every day, so I am sure you 
know them well. But in 2018, we had 6 known registers, then it 
goes down to 3, 2022 it went up to 98. This year it is 172. 
Already in 2024 fiscal year, we are at 13.
    So again, this is a worldwide threat to the homeland. My 
concern is, are we missing something? Where is our blind side? 
Is there one? Are we addressing it? Either one of you.
    Ms. Abizaid. So, as an intelligence professional, we are 
always concerned about the gaps that we have about the global 
terrorism environment. For my part, we are very focused on 
foreign terrorist organizations overseas, what we can learn 
about their plans and intentions, and the degree to which they 
have tried to seed operatives here in the United States. We 
don't have credible----
    Mr. Luttrell. Are you seeing them seeding those or sewing 
those threads here in the United States?
    Ms. Abizaid. We do not have credible or corroborated 
indications that they are trying to seed operatives into the 
United States for terrorist purposes through the Southwest 
Border or other borders. That doesn't mean we're complacent. It 
is a risk that we monitor and we evaluate every day.
    Mr. Luttrell. OK. Mr. Mayorkas, you mentioned in your 
opening statement, and I mimic Ms. Lee's statement, about 4470 
passed the House, passed out of the committee through the 
House. It's sitting in the Senate for CFATS. In your opening 
statement, you mentioned Shepherd, Texas. Do you know where 
Shepherd, Texas is?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Not precisely, Congressman.
    Mr. Luttrell. I was kind-of hoping you would say yes 
because I am sure you wrote your opening statement. Well, 
Shepherd, Texas, that is my district. I didn't intentionally 
think you were going to start throwing, you would throw darts 
at me after our discussion. I want to thank you for coming to 
my office after the first time that we met. You said you would 
do that, and you did. So, thank you very much.
    But that facility in Shepherd, Texas, a class A facility, 
very small. Do you know how the explosion happened?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Not precisely, Congressman. I am aware 
of the fact of the explosion and how it underscores the 
criticality of the CFATS program.
    Mr. Luttrell. It does, and it was a human error, is how 
inevitably the explosion happened. But I don't know if you are 
aware of this now, but that facility is not under CFATS 
regulation. I just wanted to bring that to your attention since 
you put--I thought you were talking directly to me when you 
said that. So, I wanted to make sure that you were aware that 
that particular facility does not, even though we support 
CFATS, that one does not live in that space. But thank you. 
Again, thank you for coming to my office like you said you 
would do.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you, Congressman.
    Mr. Luttrell. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields and I think Ms. Titus 
has asked to defer to Mr. Strong and then come back to her. So, 
we will grant that request. The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. 
Strong, is recognized for his 5 minutes of testimony.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mayorkas, I 
want to follow up on Representative Pfluger's question. In 
August, CNN reported that a human smuggling ring containing at 
least one individual with known ties to ISIS was responsible 
for bringing a number of Uzbek, which is Uzbekistan, migrants, 
to the border who were subsequently, were released into the 
country. I do have that document. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to add 
that to the record. I ask unanimous consent to add this.
    Chairman Green. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information follows:]

  Exclusive: Smuggler With Ties to ISIS Helped Migrants Enter US From 
             Mexico, Raising Alarm Bells Across Government
By Katie Bo Lillis, Evan Perez, Priscilla Alvarez and Natasha Bertrand, 
        CNN
Updated 7:23 AM EDT, Wed August 30, 2023.
    CNN.--The FBI is investigating more than a dozen migrants from 
Uzbekistan and other countries allowed into the US after they sought 
asylum at the southern border with Mexico earlier this year, a scramble 
set off when US intelligence officials found that the migrants traveled 
with the help of a smuggler with ties to ISIS, according to multiple US 
officials.
    While the FBI says no specific ISIS plot has been identified, 
officials are still working to ``identify and assess'' all of the 
individuals who gained entry to the United States, according to a 
statement from National Security Council spokesman Adrienne Watson. And 
they are closely scrutinizing a number of the migrants as possible 
criminal threats, according to two US officials.
    Though there is no evidence at this point to justify detaining 
anyone, the episode was so alarming that an urgent classified 
intelligence report was circulated to President Joe Biden's top Cabinet 
officials in their morning briefing book. For some counterterrorism 
officials, it shows that the US is deeply vulnerable to the possibility 
that terrorists could sneak across the southern border by hiding amid 
the surge of migrants entering the country in search of asylum.
    The incident kicked off a flurry of urgent meetings among top 
national security and administration officials at a time when 
Republicans have hammered Biden on the security of the southern border 
heading into the 2024 campaign. Staff on key congressional committees 
have been informed of the incident, according to two sources familiar 
with the matter.
    Earlier this year, a cohort of migrants from Uzbekistan requested 
asylum and were screened by the Department of Homeland Security, part 
of a rising number of asylum seekers who have traveled to the US from 
Central Asia in recent years. There was no information in any of the 
intelligence community's databases that raised any red flags and the 
people were all released into the US pending a court date.
    It was only later, when the FBI learned about the existence of a 
human smuggling network helping foreign nationals travel to the US--and 
that this network included at least one individual with connections to 
ISIS--that national security officials put the pieces together.
    FBI agents around the country immediately rushed to try to locate 
the migrants and investigate their backgrounds. The bureau also worked 
with Turkish authorities, who arrested the smuggler and other members 
of his network at the behest of the US, and has subsequently obtained 
information from him to aid its investigation, US officials said.
    ``There was no indication--and remains no indication--that any of 
the individuals facilitated by this network have a connection to a 
foreign terrorist organization or are engaged in plotting a terrorist 
attack in the United States,'' Watson said in a statement to CNN.
    Since the intelligence became available, homeland security 
officials also began detaining, vetting and, ultimately, expediting the 
removal of other migrants encountered at the southern border who ``fit 
the profile associated with individuals who were facilitated by this 
network,'' Watson said.
    The ISIS-linked smuggler is not believed to be a member of the 
terror group, but more like an independent contractor who has personal 
sympathies with the organization, according to US officials. The 
intelligence community now believes it is unlikely that he was 
assisting these individuals at the behest of ISIS. Most are believed to 
be seeking a better life in the United States.
    For some Biden administration officials, the episode is an example 
of the system working as it should: intelligence came to light about a 
particular group of migrants and the US responded with an investigation 
determining that they did not pose a threat.
    ``While the FBI has not identified a specific terrorism plot 
associated with foreign nationals who recently entered the United 
States at the southern border, we always work with our field offices 
across the country, as well as our domestic and international partners, 
to identify any potential illegal activity or terrorism threats,'' the 
FBI said in a statement to CNN.
    But the US has not yet located all of the individuals who traveled 
as part of the network, according to Watson's statement. And more than 
15 of the migrants tracked down are still under scrutiny by the FBI as 
possible criminal threats, according to one US official.
    Some law enforcement and intelligence officials privately expressed 
concerns that an unusual increase in the number of migrants from 
Central Asia, a region that isn't known to be a major source of 
refugees, didn't spark more investigation by US border authorities.
    ``We continually assess our security architecture to ensure that we 
are best poised to respond to threats to the homeland,'' Watson said in 
her statement to CNN. ``Moreover, we will continue to constantly 
recalibrate our screening, vetting, and processing of those encountered 
entering the United States to ensure that we are taking into account 
the most up-to-date information at our disposal and with an unyielding 
commitment to protecting Americans and the homeland from the full range 
of potential threats.''
    Watson also said in her statement that the US is working with 
foreign partners to shut down travel routes associated with the 
smuggling network.
    In a statement to CNN, an official from the Turkish Embassy in 
Washington said that Turkey had arrested four members of a smuggling 
ring that, the official said, the US had told Turkey aided the travel 
of Uzbeks, Russians, Chechens and Georgians residing in Turkey to the 
United States.
    The Turkish official denied that there was a connection between any 
of the four arrested individuals and ISIS.
    A senior administration official suggested that Turkey did not have 
access to the same intelligence as the US about the smuggler's links to 
ISIS.
    ``Working with partners, the US can't always share the full scope 
of the information picture. We appreciate Turkey's cooperation,'' the 
official said.
    A DHS spokesperson told CNN that the department along with its 
``counterterrorism, and law enforcement partners screen and vet 
individuals prior to their entry to the United States to prevent anyone 
known to pose a threat from entering the country. DHS continually 
monitors all available sources of intelligence and information related 
to potential threats and if any new information emerges, we work 
closely with the FBI and other partners to take appropriate action.''
            Terrorism and the border
    The episode sits squarely at the nexus of two of the thorniest and 
most politically fraught security challenges facing the Biden 
administration: terrorism and the border. Biden has grappled with how 
to prevent terror attacks on the US homeland at a time when the 
intelligence community and the military have shifted many of their 
resources away from counterterrorism in favor of threats from China and 
Russia.
    Administration officials have also grappled with limited resources 
as they face a growing number of migrants at the US southern border. 
Migration patterns to the United States have changed dramatically in 
recent years, with people arriving to the United States from more than 
150 countries--the result, officials say, of unprecedented mass 
migration around the world.
    In July, border authorities encountered more than 183,000 migrants 
at the US southern border, according to US Customs and Border 
Protection data.
    Both the Biden and Trump administrations have been forced to 
wrestle with similar cases of suspected terrorists trying to enter the 
country at the southern border.
    But the number of individuals encountered at the border with 
records in the terror watchlist in a givenyear is extremely small and 
represents a very small percentage of the total number of known or 
suspected terrorists who try to enter or travel to the US through other 
means.
    When USCBP officers process migrants at the border, they take 
biometrics, like fingerprints and facial scans, and run individuals 
through certain law enforcement databases for any red flags.
    Migrants arriving at the US southern border from central Asia may 
trigger additional screening because of the distance and cost required 
to take the journey, according to a former senior DHS official, which 
raises questions about why an individual from that part of the world 
would choose to cross at the US southern border.
    But if there is no so-called derogatory information about a person 
in US databases, then the migrant is released pending a court date. 
Although some asylum seekers do not appear for their court date, 
officials say that US law enforcement has surveillance tools at its 
disposal to locate those individals in the United States.
    It's not clear whether this particular group of migrants received 
secondary screening at the time, but it's possible--even likely--that 
they did. But because officials believe the Turkish smuggler was acting 
as a run-of-the-mill human smuggler, not an agent of ISIS, it's not 
clear that they would have been detained or in any other way handled 
differently even if the government had known about his role at the time 
they were processed.
    For some intelligence and law enforcement officials who spoke 
privately to CNN, that's part of the problem. The US government has to 
figure out how to define who is and who isn't a threat in a murky world 
where criminal activity like human smuggling is often commingled with 
amorphous connections to terrorism organizations. It is particularly 
difficult to disentangle those threads for desperate migrants fleeing 
countries where terror groups routinely recruit and operate.
    Speaking at a July congressional hearing, FBI Director Christopher 
Wray said, ``From the FBI's perspective, that we are seeing all sorts 
of very serious, very serious, criminal threats that come from across 
the border.''
    Wray said the southern border was becoming ``more of a priority'' 
for the FBI.
    Some intelligence officials who viewed the intelligence report sent 
around earlier this month worry that ISIS may shift its tactics to 
target the southern border, long a bogeyman on the political right but 
one that intelligence officials say has yet to become a reality.
    For other officials, the intelligence reporting to top policymakers 
was better described as an appropriately cautious response by a 
responsible government--a warning describing the theoretical risk to 
the United State so that national security agencies could understand 
the threat and determine how best to harden American defenses.
    ``Whenever we have indicators that criminal actors--such as those 
involved in human smuggling--have connections to terrorism, we work 
diligently with our partners to investigate and understand how foreign 
terrorist organizations may attempt to exploit their capabilities so 
that we can best mitigate any risk to the American public,'' the FBI 
said in its statement.
    This story has been updated with additional reporting.

    Mr. Strong. Thank you. After learning of the ISIS 
connection, the Biden administration has been scrambling to 
determine the whereabouts of these Uzbek individuals. Secretary 
Mayorkas, has the Biden administration determined the 
whereabouts of all of these individuals? Have they all been 
detained? Have they all been vetted?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we vet and screen 
individuals whom we encounter at the Southwest Border, No. 1. 
No. 2, individuals who pose a threat to the safety of the 
American people, who pose a public safety or national security 
threat, and whose release would advance that threat, are, in 
fact, detained. They are in immigration enforcement 
proceedings, and they will be removed if, in fact, they don't 
have a basis to remain in the United States.
    Mr. Strong. Have they been detained?
    Secretary Mayorkas. There are those who have been detained 
because, in fact, we cannot be assured of the safety of the 
public. I would be pleased to provide you with greater details 
in a different setting.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. As you know, the 
nonintrusive inspection system program is critical for 
detecting illegal drugs such as fentanyl and other illicit 
contraband hidden inside cars, trucks, and cargo entering the 
United States legally through ports of entry. Secretary 
Mayorkas, you have stated in recent testimony before the Senate 
Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee that DHS has 
surged resources to our ports of entry as it relates to NII 
systems. However, DHS's own numbers tell us that with the NII 
system, only approximately 2 percent of passenger vehicles and 
17 percent of cargo vehicles are even inspected for the 
detection of fentanyl and other contraband. Do you really 
consider that a surge of resources?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, Congressman, we have surged not 
only the deployment of technology, the nonintrusive inspection 
technology known by its acronym, NII, but we have also surged 
forward-operating labs to be able to analyze controlled 
substances that are interdicted. If, in fact, we identify them 
as fentanyl, then we take the appropriate prosecutorial action 
specific to the attempted importation of this incredibly fatal 
opioid. Also----
    Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I reclaim my time. 
Thank you. Director Wray, I appreciate your candor when you 
testified last year that the border represents significant 
concerns to the FBI. Since then, the number of illegal border 
crossings, gotaways, and those on the terrorist watch list 
attempting to cross into the United States has continued to 
balloon. Would it be safe to say that the situation at our 
border is still of significant concern?
    Mr. Wray. Certainly. The concerns that I articulated last 
year remain very much top of mind for us.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you. Director Wray, I know that it is not 
your border policies that have gotten us here, but I would be 
remiss, not to mention the strain that the open border puts on 
your work force and their ability to carry out the FBI's 
primary mission. But that is not what I want to talk to you 
about today. In your testimony, you mentioned the threat posed 
by criminal syndicates and nation-states as it relates to 
cyber. Specifically, you spoke to the threat posed by the 
Chinese Communist Party in this arena.
    I was glad you briefly mentioned earlier the impact of 
advanced training in cyber. Can you speak to the capabilities 
of the FBI Redstone in Huntsville, Alabama, and specifically 
the role that Huntsville plays in combating the unique and 
evolving cyber threats posed by our adversaries?
    Mr. Wray. Well, thank you, Congressman. I am incredibly 
excited about everything that's going on in Huntsville, 
including in particular, we view that as where we're going to 
have be the center of gravity for our advanced training, 
especially high-tech, especially cyber, especially innovation.
    We've been down there numerous times to check on the 
expansion, and we are now up to, I think, about 1,900 employees 
down there. Nineteen different headquarters divisions have 
people there. So, it's a hub of activity. Especially on the 
cyber side, I think it's going to be a very important part of 
the FBI's future.
    Mr. Strong. Like I say, I appreciate that information. We 
are very proud of how it has worked there at Redstone. Mr. 
Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Bishop [presiding]. The gentleman yields back. The 
Chair now recognizes Ms. Titus for her 5 minutes of questions.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the 
witnesses, especially Secretary Mayorkas, for being here today. 
As I am sure you know, it is exactly 1 year ago today that we 
sat in this hearing with these exact same witnesses, the exact 
same issues, exact same questions, and here we are, and this 
committee's done very little other than talk about the border.
    I want to thank you first, Mr. Secretary, for working with 
me on the Sears decision. You know, this week is the week of 
the big race in Las Vegas, and we worked my office, with your 
office very hard to get the security level raised to a Level 2, 
and that's been done. We appreciate that kind of cooperation.
    Also, I have introduced a bill to codify that program. It 
is called a Special Events Program and Support Act. It is 
bipartisan. So, I hope we can continue to work together on 
that, because I think that will be a good next step.
    We listen to the story of the threats and who is 
threatening us and how they are threatening us and where they 
are and where they came from. You know, right now, we are 
talking about what is happening in the Middle East and how it 
has been translated to threats or violence in this country. 
Before, it was talking about it in the wake of the Supreme 
Court decision on the abortion issue.
    So, it seems like the methods are the same, but the motives 
change by just whatever is politically on the agenda. It must 
be like playing whack-a-mole how you deal with the threats. 
Would you tell us kind-of what you have in place to adapt or 
adjust to what the current news is that is bringing out perhaps 
a new group of these kind of home-grown terrorists?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, is that a question 
directed to me?
    Ms. Titus. Yes, or Mr. Wray, either one.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I would say that the two leaders seated 
with me and their colleagues in the intelligence and law 
enforcement enterprise are the best in the world, and that 
gives us visibility in terms of the threat landscape and allows 
us to operationalize the measures to meet that challenge.
    Mr. Wray. I would say that we rely heavily on partnerships, 
State, local, not just with the Federal agencies here, but in 
particular with State and local law enforcement, with the 
community, with the private sector, in order to be able to try 
to anticipate where the threat's going so that we go to where 
the threat's going to be and not waiting to always be in a 
reactive posture. Our goal is to be ahead of the threat, and 
partnerships are the critical ingredient in that. Again, not 
just within the Federal Government, but with all those other 
very important stakeholders.
    Ms. Titus. I know we have a fusion center in Las Vegas 
where you have a strong presence as these agencies, but also 
the private sector, nobody has more security than gaming does, 
that eye in the sky. So, I think they are valuable partners. 
Excuse me.
    Ms. Abizaid. Yes. I would just add to what my colleagues 
said that we have a work force combined across our different 
agencies that is just full of tenacity. Their job is to not 
sleep on threats. Their job is to understand, be curious, and 
evaluate every single report that comes in and take it 
seriously and understand whether it reflects a real and 
credible threat and whether it reflects a changing trend in the 
kind of dynamic that we're facing here in the country and 
globally. So, we are really proud of that tenacious work force.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, if I can just add, 
because Director Wray used the term that is incredibly 
important, that's the term of partnership, because indeed it's 
correct. It's not just across the Federal enterprise, but with 
our State, local, Tribal, territorial, campus law enforcement, 
with the private sector, and also, very importantly, with our 
international partners. It really does require a community of 
action.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you. I would ask you, Director Wray, about 
something you kind-of expanded on in this report or your 
statement today from a year ago, and that is international 
organized crime, the retail crime that we see, organized retail 
crime. We are going to see more pictures of that as we go into 
the holiday season, the smash-and-grab, the shoplifting that 
then the money is turned into human trafficking or drugs or 
guns or whatever. Can you tell us a little bit about how that 
is a priority for you?
    Mr. Wray. Well, we are in a number of States supporting our 
State and local law enforcement partners who are really the 
first line of defense on that. But to the extent that there are 
national connections, national networks, to the extent that the 
crime that you're describing contributes to some broader 
organized criminal activity, then we are actively engaged. In 
some States, for example, we have dedicated task forces that 
are focused just on that issue. It is something that is heavily 
concentrated in a few geographies in particular, but it's 
starting to become a more national trend.
    Ms. Titus. It is not just big box stores anymore. It is 
small stores. I was in a drugstore, and somebody came in, just 
raked off the eyelashes into a backpack and walked out with 
them. Now, eyelashes aren't power tools, but it is a problem at 
all levels. So, appreciate you kind-of keeping an eye on that.
    Mr. Bishop. The gentlelady's----
    Ms. Titus. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Bishop. The gentlelady having yielded back, the Chair 
now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Brecheen, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Brecheen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Our 
decaying national security is on full display. We know the 
Southern Border is open. I think colleagues across the aisle 
know the Southern Border is open. Illegal aliens definitely 
know the Southern Border is open. The policies are what is 
causing millions to come to the border. Under the Trump 
administration, we saw a 45-year low of illegal aliens coming 
to the border in 2019.
    Things have completely reversed. We are seeing the highest 
numbers in our Nation's history. President Biden, Secretary 
Mayorkas, leadership matters, and there has not been a Federal 
law change that has provoked this. It is the leadership from 
the top. Since February 2021, Custom and Border Protection has 
reported over 6.5 million alien encounters at our Southern 
Border under this administration, an additional 1.7 million 
gotaways. That is 8.2 million total since this administration 
took office. That is 3 times the population of Oklahoma. That 
means in 3 years, almost every year, the population of Oklahoma 
is coming illegally across our Southern Border.
    Custom and Border Protection reports they have apprehended 
294 known or suspected terrorists between ports of entry under 
President Biden's time frame. Only 14 suspected terrorists were 
caught trying to cross the border during the entirety of the 4 
years of the Trump administration. There is a passage in the 
Bible that I find interesting. I think it is appropriate. It's 
Ecclesiastes 811. It says, when a sentence for a crime is not 
quickly carried out, the people's hearts are filled with 
schemes to do wrong.
    It remains and has been lawlessness to cross that border, 
Southern Border, would undermine the rule of law. Lawlessness 
is contagious. Lawlessness of an open border encourages 
lawlessness of the fentanyl drug trade. It encourages human 
smuggling. It encourages illegal aliens to drive without a 
driver's license once they get here or go on for those illegal 
aliens that are here and commit additional crimes because they 
remain hidden. Under your leadership, Secretary Mayorkas, we 
are not deporting them to the levels that we were. We all know 
this.
    Former Ambassador John Richmond was before this committee 
yesterday. He said that criminal convictions by the Department 
of Justice against human trafficking is also down 48 percent 
since 2019. It is amazing.
    I have got a couple of pictures here. It is amazing what 
leadership can do. I want to hold these up. This is a Custom 
and Border Patrol agent cutting barbed wire that the Texas 
Department of Public Safety put in place. This administration 
leadership is bringing this about. I got another picture here. 
This is a loader tractor, and it is lifting up barbed wire also 
put in place by the Texas Department of Public Safety. Those 
images are pointing to the fact that a secure border is 
lacking, and the Border Patrol agents following the leadership, 
the culture of leadership, are doing what they can to undermine 
the rule of law.
    We know that as of last June, an illegal immigrant living 
in Ohio was charged with plotting to kill former President Bush 
by smuggling Iraqi citizens across the Southern Border. He 
applied for asylum the year prior in March 2021. An 
assassination plot against a former President of the United 
States that has ties to what is happening at the Southern 
Border.
    Director Wray, you testified in your opening statement that 
protecting the American people from terrorism remains the FBI's 
No. 1 priority. You also said this morning to our Chairman, and 
I am quoting you, ``greater fidelity regarding who comes into 
the country makes us safer.'' Director Wray, I understand you 
are walking a fine line. I understand that you serve this 
President, and I know that your position is something that you 
think about in what you say. There is a statement in our 
culture that says, blood on our hands, and many people, if you 
are interested where it comes from, it actually comes from the 
Torah.
    I thought it was interesting, Secretary Mayorkas, you 
started this morning talking about what has happened in Israel 
in the last 60 days. In the Torah in Ezekiel 33, Israel is 
faced with an invasion and how they defended themselves from 
that invasion. In the Torah in Ezekiel 33, it says this. It 
says, if you speak to your people and say, if destruction is 
about to come on the land, the people of the land, take a man 
among them and make him their watchman. Gentlemen, think about 
the platform, please, that you have been given by this Nation. 
They make him their watchman, and he sees the sword of danger, 
destruction, coming on the land, and he blows the trumpet and 
warns the people. Then he who hears the sound of the trumpet 
and does not take warning, his blood is on his own head. But if 
the watchman sees the sword coming, the watchman who has been 
put in that position by the people, sees the sword coming, 
destruction coming, does not blow the trumpet, and the people 
are not warned and a sword of destruction comes and takes the 
person from them. Talking about the watchman, his blood will be 
required from the watchman's hand. The individual, the people 
in that country will be from the watchman, he will have blood 
on his hands.
    Director Wray, are you doing all you can to speak to 
Secretary Mayorkas and President Biden and crying out loud the 
destruction that is coming to our Nation and potentially come 
if a terrorism attack hits us within the next years, months? 
Have you done all you can to know that your conscience is clean 
on this front?
    Mr. Wray. Congressman, my conscience is clean that I am 
doing everything in my power to protect the American people 
from the threat of terrorism, from the threat of fentanyl, from 
any number of the other threats that we've talked about here 
today. That includes working closely with the rest of my 
colleagues in Government.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Bishop. In my discretion, I will let Mr. Mayorkas 
respond.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I'll take just a minute. I appreciate 
your exercise of discretion. I believe the Congressman said 
that in 2019, there was a decades-long low in the number of 
encounters at our Southwest Border. That is a remarkably 
stunning mis-statement of facts, since in 2019, it was almost 
100 percent increase in the number of encounters over just the 
year prior.
    But I won't correct all of the mis-statements. The mis-
statements with respect to the concertina wire and the like, I 
just want to address one. Because I am accused of all sorts of 
things in these hearings, and I can take it. What I will not 
accept--I can take it, I don't--I just return to my work, and I 
do the work of the Department of Homeland Security, incredibly 
proud to support the 260,000 men and women of that Department. 
But to say that the Border Patrol agents who risk their lives 
every single day to protect our country, undermine the rule of 
law, is beyond the pale. I just want to make that clear.
    Mr. Bishop. Well, I think since you have impugned the 
Member, I need to allow him to respond to that. I didn't 
understand him. I thought I heard him to be indicting 
leadership. But, Mr. Brecheen, you are recognized for a 
response.
    Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a result of 
leadership. It is a result of a culture that says one thing and 
does something else at the Southern Border. It is lawlessness. 
You take a company, you take a Government entity, you take 
anything, leadership matters. So, this is lawlessness, and 
somebody has to take responsibility for it.
    In regards to 2019, one of the months, you saw one of the 
lowest numbers in 45 years of recorded illegal immigration in 
2019, one of those months. That information, I would stand by 
that. I yield.
    Mr. Bishop. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane, for his 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start with 
Director Wray. Have the border security policy changes made 
under this administration, sir, made it more difficult for the 
FBI to keep Americans safe?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I don't know that I could cite it to 
specific policies. What I would say is that certainly the 
threats that we are contending with that emanate from the other 
side of the border, whether it's fentanyl trafficking, whether 
it's the increase in the number of KSTs that we've seen over 
the last 5 years, all those are things that make the work that 
the FBI has on our side of the border to try to get ahead of 
those threats more challenging.
    Mr. Crane. So, you don't acknowledge that the increase in 
traffic that we are seeing, the increase in individuals on the 
terror watch list, have anything to do with some of the policy 
changes of this administration?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I didn't say that. I think what I'm saying 
is when it comes to border security and questions of how that's 
supposed to be done, I defer to DHS on that. What I would say 
is the threats that we're contending with, which come from the 
other side of the border, are certainly extremely challenging 
over the last several years.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, sir. In your professional opinion, 
what is causing the increase of encounters of individuals on 
the terror watch list and the traffic at our Southern Border?
    Mr. Wray. You know, I'm not sure that I have a professional 
opinion about immigration. We try to stay in our lane and focus 
on the issues that we're contending with.
    Mr. Crane. Well, actually, sir, I know you are a really 
smart guy. I know you do have an opinion. If you are not 
willing to share it in this setting, that is OK. But I know you 
have studied criminology. You have studied deterrence. I mean, 
you are the head of the FBI. We all recognize that. But I 
understand, sir, you are in a tough situation here today.
    On that note, though, Director Wray, is it fair to say that 
the now-President of the United States, while he was 
campaigning to become President back in June 27, 2019, said 
this in multiple statements like it on the campaign trail, he 
said, and those who come seeking asylum, we should immediately 
have the capacity to absorb them, keep them safe until they can 
be heard. On September 12, sir, 2019, we are a Nation who says 
if you want to flee and you are fleeing oppression, you should 
come. Did you hear any of those comments by then-candidate Joe 
Biden?
    Mr. Wray. I'm not sure I can quote people's, you know, 
campaign statements.
    Mr. Crane. Do you think that has anything to do with the 
dangerous situation that we now see at our border and now 
within the United States of America?
    Mr. Wray. Again, I am not sure that I am really the one who 
can speak to immigration dynamics.
    Mr. Crane. I think you could speak to it, sir. I just don't 
think you want to. Sir, about how many American citizens have 
been arrested for entering the Capitol on January 6? If you can 
just give me an estimate, that would be great.
    Mr. Wray. Well, I don't know how many were tied to that 
specific piece of it. I know that we've had upwards of 700 
cases brought related to January 6 in one way or another.
    Mr. Crane. Yes. It has definitely been hundreds. OK. Sir, I 
am interested, has the pipe bomber who planted bombs at the DNC 
and the RNC on January 6, has he been arrested yet?
    Mr. Wray. That is something we are still aggressively 
investigating.
    Mr. Crane. OK. So, you were able to arrest hundreds of 
individuals who are allowed into the Capitol, walked around, 
took selfies, but we can't find the individual who committed 
the most dangerous crime and attempted to cause multiple mass 
casualty events at the Capitol or around the Capitol.
    Mr. Wray. Congressman, we have an entire dedicated team 
focused specifically on this investigation. We've done 
thousands of interviews, visited, again just in the pipe bomb 
investigation----
    Mr. Crane. OK.
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. Thousands of interviews, visited 
thousands of residences and businesses, reviewed millions of 
pieces of data. There's something like 39,000 video files. 
We've assessed like 500 or something tips. We've done extensive 
public publicity. We've increased the reward money. We've got 
our lab working on it. We've got our WMD Directorate working on 
it. We've got our Office of Technology Division, our cellular 
analysis team. So, the folks that we have working on this 
investigation are working very aggressively on it. I, as much 
as anybody, would like to see it solved, but it is certainly 
not for lack of effort and lack of priority, I can assure you 
of that.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, sir. Sir, do you find it interesting 
how many whistleblowers there are right now from your 
organization coming forward and testifying to Congress about 
the conduct of the FBI and how they can no longer--they no 
longer even want to work for the FBI? They are willing to risk 
everything, including their livelihood, to come and talk to 
Congress about what they perceive to be a change in the culture 
at the FBI?
    Mr. Wray. Certainly, I respect the role of whistleblowers 
in our system. It's an important part of the way our system of 
government works. When it comes to the culture of the FBI, I am 
very proud of our 38,000 people. I think you will be relieved 
to know that the number of people applying to be special agents 
from the State of Arizona has gone up over 135 percent over the 
last 5 years.
    The view that you've just described, I don't think matches 
what I hear from the 55-plus chiefs and sheriffs and other 
agency heads in the State of Arizona who have dedicated 
something like 200-plus of their task force officers to serve 
on our task forces. We've got about as many task force officers 
on our task forces----
    Mr. Crane. Real quick, sir. Do you find----
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. As we do agents now.
    Mr. Crane. Do you find their testimonies to be reliable? Or 
do you think that when you hear what they are saying to 
Congress, do you think they are pushing false narratives?
    Mr. Wray. I'm not going to be weighing in on the accuracy 
of individual people who have made allegations against us. We 
take them all seriously. There have been plenty of inaccuracies 
lodged by any number of people about the FBI. We are going to 
stay focused on our work and the people we do the work with and 
the people we do the work for.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, sir. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I now recognize the 
gentleman from New York, Mr. LaLota, for 5 minutes of 
testimony.
    Mr. LaLota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for hosting this 
important hearing. Secretary Mayorkas, during Mr. Garcia's 
questioning today, you claimed that 90 percent of fentanyl is 
carried through ports of entry. Yet this comes a day after the 
chief of the Border Patrol, Jason Owens, announced a seizure of 
over 300 pounds of fentanyl, which was not seized at a port of 
entry. In fact, the Border Patrol seized a record number of 
fentanyl between ports of entry last year, about 2,800 pounds. 
Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record Chief 
Owens' social media post regarding this week's fentanyl 
seizure. I will read for you, Chairman.
    Chairman Green. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information follows:]
    
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
    
    
    Mr. LaLota. According to the CDC, over 150 people die every 
day from overdoses related to synthetic opioids like fentanyl. 
Yesterday, USBP agents in Nogales and Wilcox, Arizona, 
interdicted two smuggling loads consisting of over 304 pounds 
of fentanyl worth over $1.9 million. The leading cause of death 
amongst Americans ages 14--excuse me--18 through 45, is 
fentanyl overdoses. This addictive drug is responsible for 
nearly 70 percent of the United States's 107,000-plus drug 
overdose deaths in the past year. It is 50 times stronger than 
heroin and 100 times stronger than morphine.
    Mr. Secretary, I think one of the biggest threats to 
Americans in every corner of this country is fentanyl. Do you 
agree, Secretary Mayorkas?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I do, Congressman. I will tell you, if 
I may, that we are taking it to the traffickers and----
    Mr. LaLota. We are going to get into that in a second. Mr. 
Secretary, last year, nearly 200 people died every day from 
fentanyl poisoning. That is the equivalent of a commercial 
airliner crashing every day. Nearly 75,000 Americans in just 1 
year. The fact that criminal networks have been able to import 
and distribute an unconscionable amount of fentanyl under your 
watch, Mr. Secretary, is beyond negligent.
    Secretary Mayorkas, you have stated many times in the past 
and with great pride that you are, ``taking it to the 
cartels.'' With 75,000 Americans dead in just 1 year, and 
cartels raking in billions of dollars and armed to the teeth 
with military like weaponry, and with enough fentanyl coming 
across our border to kill nearly every human on the planet, 
would you classify this as successfully, ``taking it to the 
cartels?''
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we have not overcome the 
scourge of fentanyl. Let me say, yes, we are taking it to an 
unprecedented degree, to the traffickers. One death from this 
extraordinarily toxic and fatal opioid, is one----
    Mr. LaLota. Are you pleased with your results, Mr. 
Secretary?
    Secretary Mayorkas. If I may, is one death too many.
    Mr. LaLota. Mr. Secretary, the question was about you 
taking it to the cartels. Are you pleased with your performance 
with respect to----
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am incredibly----
    Mr. LaLota [continuing]. Taking it to the cartels?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am incredibly proud of the work that 
the men and women of the Department of Homeland Security 
perform----
    Mr. LaLota. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. Reclaiming my 
time, sir. You have stated in past hearings that you have 
interdicted more fentanyl than ever before. But the very people 
who work for you say that you are only interdicting anywhere 
from between 5 and 10 percent at our ports of entry. Who is 
right, Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Do you realize, Congressman, that there 
were over 57,000 deaths, overdose deaths, from fentanyl in the 
year 2020?
    Mr. LaLota. I appreciate the question. I am going to ask 
you a question, though. Who is right? You or the folks who work 
for you? They are saying that you are massively understating 
the fentanyl that is being seized between ports of entry and 
that gets past our border between ports of entry and what you 
are saying. Are you right, sir? Or are they?
    Secretary Mayorkas. No, you're actually mistaken with 
respect to your characterization of the statements, 
Congressman. I'd be very happy to clarify for you, if you'd 
give me the opportunity. The fact that we are interdicting an 
unprecedented amount of fentanyl does not mean that the scourge 
of fentanyl is diminished. We are seeing an increase in the 
number----
    Mr. LaLota. I am going to reclaim my time, Mr. Secretary. 
With respect to the fentanyl that is coming across our border, 
not at ports of entry, how much fentanyl is coming across our 
border between ports of entry?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I'd be very happy to provide you with 
data with respect to the different means by which fentanyl 
enters our country. By air, we have an interdiction facility at 
Kennedy----
    Mr. LaLota. I am familiar with the process, Mr. Secretary, 
but specifically with respect to known gotaways, how much are 
they trafficking into our country?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I would be very, very 
pleased to provide you with whatever data you inquire about. We 
certainly are providing this committee with a tremendous amount 
of data with respect to all of the mission sets that we 
perform.
    Mr. LaLota. I wish next time you would come with some more 
specific information, Mr. Secretary. But, Mr. Chairman, with 
the remaining time I have, I want to shift gears and talk just 
for a moment, about antisemitism on college campuses. New York 
State, my home State, is home to more than 2.2 million Jewish 
Americans, the largest population of Jewish Americans in the 
entire country. According to the American Jewish Population 
Project at Brandeis University, over 21 percent of Jewish 
Americans live in New York State. Unfortunately, since the 
terrorist attacks in Israel on October 7, many Jewish students, 
some of whom are my constituents, don't feel safe merely going 
to class due to the rise of antisemitism on college campuses.
    As we are all well aware, a 21-year-old student at Cornell 
University, located in Ithaca in New York State, was arrested 
just 2 weeks ago for threatening to, ``shoot up'' Jewish 
students in a predominantly kosher dining hall on that college 
campus. Thankfully, the Federal law enforcement intercepted 
threats posted on-line and arrested him before it was too late. 
Director Wray, I will ask you some questions in another 
setting, sir. Thanks very much for your time.
    Chairman Green. You can always submit those in writing and 
ask Director Wray to send them to you. The gentleman yields. I 
now recognize Ms. Cammack, who has waived onto the committee 
for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is great to 
be back at Homeland. Secretary Mayorkas, good to see you once 
again. Director Wray, good to see you. Ma'am, thank you for 
appearing before the committee today. I will jump right into 
it, Director Wray. Recently, I have been apprised of 
information that is concerning regarding individuals that are 
encountered at the border who, during the process of 
interviewing in the field, specifically using an I-213 form, 
the match for their ID comes back as inconclusive. That 
information is then subsequently redacted and listed as 
derogatory.
    When Members of this committee, as well as other committees 
have attempted to get access to this information, it has been 
denied. Why is this information in these field interviews with 
these individuals, who have then subsequently been found to be 
suspected on the suspected terror watch list, why is that 
information derogatory, and why has the FBI neglected to share 
that information with Congress?
    Mr. Wray. Congresswoman, I'm not familiar with the 
particular redactions in question. So, I am happy to have my 
staff follow up with you and figure out why there is a 
disconnect. Certainly, I know we've provided all sorts of 
information to this committee in a variety of forms, and I'm 
happy to see what it is that's missing and why.
    Mrs. Cammack. Well, and I think you have demonstrated a 
willingness to work with this committee and others. So, could 
you commit in the next 30 days to providing the committee staff 
on Homeland Security all of the unredacted field interviews?
    Mr. Wray. Well, what I can commit to is that I will follow 
up with my team to find out what the heck is going on. If 
there's information that we can provide that we haven't----
    Mrs. Cammack. No, no, no.
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. We will.
    Mrs. Cammack. Well, no----
    Mr. Wray. Because I'm not----
    Mrs. Cammack [continuing]. No information should be 
redacted, and there can be no good reason. If you can't provide 
me with a reason why the information is listed as derogatory 
right now, then you should commit to full transparency to 
Congress, and that can be in a SCIF. That is fine in a 
Classified setting. But this committee staff should have full 
access to the field interviews, especially as it pertains to 
individuals that have been apprehended or encountered at the 
Southwest Border with ties to terrorist groups, yes or no?
    Mr. Wray. I'm not trying to be obtuse, I promise. Since I 
am not familiar with the specific redactions, I would ask to be 
able to go back with my team and find out why it's redacted and 
if there is a reason for it----
    Mrs. Cammack. Can you provide us----
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. That is valid, we will discuss----
    Mrs. Cammack [continuing]. Within 30 days----
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. That with you. If there is not a 
reason, we will----
    Mrs. Cammack [continuing]. Director Wray----
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. We will provide you the information.
    Mrs. Cammack. Director Wray, within 30 days, if you can 
provide this committee, in writing, a rationale as to why that 
information is redacted and what classifies it as derogatory, 
that would be incredibly helpful.
    Mr. Wray. We'd be happy to get back to you----
    Mrs. Cammack. Perfect.
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. Within 30 days.
    Mrs. Cammack. I am going to follow up because I want to be 
sensitive to the time here. Can you confirm, I know my 
colleague, August Pfluger from Texas, had followed up with 
Alejandro, I am sorry, Secretary Mayorkas, on the issue of 
Uzbek nationals and their ties to the confirmed ISIS smuggling 
ring, can you confirm that you are currently and actively 
investigating the Uzbek nationals that were connected to this 
ISIS smuggling ring? Yes or no?
    Mr. Wray. Yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. Cammack. OK.
    Mr. Wray. We are very focused on this particular threat 
stream. We have a number of active, on-going investigations 
related to it. I will say that we have so far not identified 
any intelligence that the individuals came to conduct terrorist 
attacks. But that's not the same thing as suggesting that we 
don't take it extremely seriously and that we are not working 
it very aggressively. We have lots and lots of agents working 
on this at the----
    Mrs. Cammack. But they did come through a connected 
terrorist network.
    Mr. Wray. The network that is in question has itself has 
some ties to ISIS, which is part of why we were concerned. 
That's why we are taking it so seriously. So, what I want to be 
clear about is not in any way to have my answers suggest to you 
that we are not taking this extremely seriously and that we are 
not working it very aggressively. I am just also trying to 
avoid undue alarm about what we found so far. So far is a key 
set of words there, so far.
    Mrs. Cammack. OK. I am going to have follow-up questions, 
for the record with you, Director Wray. Secretary Mayorkas, I 
don't want you to feel left out at all. So, I want to touch 
really quickly on the Homeland Intelligence Experts Group that 
raises some really questionable concerns about the Department's 
impartiality and objectivity. So, isn't it true that on 
September 19, 2013, the Department announced the establishment 
of the Homeland Intelligence Expert Group to provide advice and 
perspectives on intelligence and National security efforts to 
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, INA, and the 
Department's Office of Counterterrorism and their coordinator? 
Yes or no?
    Secretary Mayorkas. We recently announced the group. I'm 
not sure----
    Mrs. Cammack. Yes, perfect.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. The precise----
    Mrs. Cammack. So, isn't it true that the composition of 
this so-called experts group includes former top-level 
intelligence officers James Clapper, Brennan, and Paul Colby?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I believe so, yes.
    Mrs. Cammack. OK. So, are you aware that Clapper, Brennan, 
and Colby all signed a now-discredited public statement on 
October 19, 2020, that incorrectly implied the New York Post 
reporting about Hunter Biden's laptop and influence peddling 
that was supposedly the product of Russian disinformation?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, these are distinguished 
members, former members of the intelligence community.
    Mrs. Cammack. But this is a simple yes or no. Did they or 
did they not sign the letter?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I don't know the answer to that 
question, but I----
    Mrs. Cammack. I do.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I----
    Mrs. Cammack. They did. Are you aware that on October 19, 
2020, the statement used by various media organizations and 
social media businesses to downplay and censor the Post 
reporting before the 2020 Presidential election?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I'm sorry. With the indulgence of 
additional time, Mr. Chairman, could you ask that question just 
at a bit of a slower pace?
    Mrs. Cammack. Are you aware that on October 19, 2020, the 
statement was used, the statement that was signed by Brennan, 
Clapper, and Colby was used by multiple media organizations, 
social media businesses, to downplay and censor the story about 
the Hunter Biden political influence right before the 2020 
Presidential election?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am not tracking that, Congresswoman.
    Mrs. Cammack. Wow. For as much time and effort as you are 
putting into a Homeland Intelligence Experts Group, that seems 
shocking that you wouldn't be tracking that. Are you aware that 
another member of this newly-created group, then-associate 
deputy attorney general for the Department of Justice, Tashina 
Gauhar--I am sorry, I am messing up her name here--was 
extensively involved in the FBI's probe into baseless 
allegations against President Trump's campaign, colluding with 
Russia?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, let me share with you 
what I can tell you with confidence is that the individuals who 
were selected to the experts group are very distinguished and 
reputable members, former members of the intelligence 
community, and we are incredibly proud to avail ourselves of 
their expertise and judgment.
    Chairman Green. The gentlelady's----
    Mrs. Cammack. And have since been discredited.
    Chairman Green [continuing]. Time has expired.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. I want to now yield to the Ranking Member 
for his closing statement.
    Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We have 
had quite a lengthy hearing about threats to the homeland. I 
thank our witnesses for their indulgence and patience, and it 
is appreciated.
    A couple of things I wanted to add before I do my closing 
comments. You know, our asylum laws are the laws of the land. 
As I said in my opening statement, if you don't like them, you 
are in the right forum to change them. But you can't criticize 
people who are following the law just because you don't like 
it. I guess you can, but it doesn't make a lot of sense.
    I chaired the January 6 committee. I saw a lot of things 
that went on in this country is clearly not who we are as 
Americans. I thank the FBI for doing one heck of a job in 
trying to identify those individuals who attacked this great 
institution of ours and let the courts determine innocence or 
guilt. Mr. Wray, I thank you for that.
    Apart from that, as I said in the start of the hearing, we 
face serious threats to the homeland from many fronts. A war in 
the Middle East that may inspire attacks here in the United 
States, foreign and domestic terrorism, and cyber attacks. 
Rising antisemitism, and Islamophobia, and related violence, 
also. Threats to our democratic institutions, our values, as 
well as our way of life.
    Serious threats demand action from serious people. Not 
politically-motivated attacks, not inflammatory language that 
divides us rather than unite us, not grandstanding. What is 
perhaps most troubling is the way my colleagues have twisted 
facts. Success in interdicting dangerous drugs is suddenly a 
failure. Success in removing people who should not be in the 
country is suddenly an impeachable offense. Mr. Chairman, it is 
upside down.
    Democrats remain committed to working with the Department 
of Homeland Security, the FBI, and the National 
Counterterrorism Center to address all these threats. Democrats 
are also ready to back up that commitment by supporting the 
personnel and resources necessary to carry out this critical 
mission.
    As I said, a lot of us talk tough, but when it comes time 
to putting the resources behind the talk, many of my colleagues 
don't do it. But then we criticize the men and women who are 
tasked with the responsibility of caring for the direction of 
keeping us safe. So, I hope after we close the hearing, the 
President has submitted a supplemental budget that will address 
a lot of the issues that have been discussed and expressed from 
a concern standpoint. I look forward to the new Speaker calling 
it up at some point for us to discuss it.
    But if we don't provide the resources, if you say you are 
concerned about the threat environment, Israel, Ukraine, other 
parts of the world, we have to support it. We have yet to get 
agreement on making that happen.
    We have to continue to be the world leader, and in order to 
do that, we have to take responsible action. So, this committee 
has always historically been bipartisan, one of the more 
bipartisan committees in Congress. I look forward to trying to 
get us back to that bipartisanship. We can disagree, but the 
manner in which we disagree, in my humble opinion, is not who 
we are as Americans, not who we have demonstrated on this 
committee since its inception. So, that is what the dedicated 
public servants also, who work to keep us safe, do every day.
    So, again, let me thank the three individuals here, but all 
the men and women actually, who are positioned all around the 
world, who keep us safe. Thank you so much. On my side, if 
resources is what you need to get the job done, I commit to 
support the resources for the men and women to do the job. I 
yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields. I wanted to thank the 
witnesses for being here. A lot of work goes into preparing for 
these, I know. A lot of work goes into doing the jobs that you 
do. I also want to thank our staff that helps put on these 
committee hearings. Again, a lot of work. I know the Members 
pour themselves into preparing for this, so thank the Members 
as well.
    Director Wray, I want to thank you today for your honest 
admission that the risk is increased secondary to this war. You 
also said in questioning by me or from me, that this known 
gotaway group is a big, huge question mark, that there are no 
guarantees, and so thus there is an increased risk from that. 
The question is, how did we get to those known and unknown 
gotaways so large, well over 300 percent. I mean, you can add 
up the last two Presidencies in this, just 3 years, it exceeds 
the last 12 years.
    Well, as I said earlier, I think policies were working. 
They were removed. People tested the system. They realized you 
could get in and just be released. They called home and 
millions came. This migration crisis is a self-inflicted 
crisis, one we created by the change of our policies, and it 
has put Americans at increased risk, as you have acknowledged.
    I think I used in my opening statement the analogy of the 
college bar that stops carding. That bar will be overwhelmed. I 
think we all get that.
    That is what has happened at our Southern Border with mass 
waves of cartels. With this mass wave of people, the cartels 
have seized the opportunity to overwhelm Customs and Border 
Patrol and bypass them and get the fentanyl into the United 
States. How else could we explain the fact that fentanyl was 
$95 a hit on the street when this Secretary Mayorkas came into 
office, and it is now $25, $26 a hit in Tennessee? It is simple 
supply and demand.
    These catch-and-release policies that Mr. Mayorkas, you 
know, I think, has implemented is the cause of the problem. You 
have to ask yourself, why wouldn't, with the way these catch-
and-release policies are working now, I mean, that is really 
what happens. You can look at the CBP One app. They are only 
getting rid of I think 98 percent of the people who do that get 
to come into the country. So, if you get to come into the 
country, why wouldn't you just turn yourself into Customs and 
Border Patrol? Why would somebody even go around Customs and 
Border Patrol now? Because you are going to come in, get 
paroled, and get into the country. Well, it is because they 
don't want to be caught. That scares us even more, considering 
that it is 2 million people.
    I also want to thank you, Mr. Wray, you admitted that your 
department is looking for people right now on the known 
terrorist watch list. I think your question you answered to Mr. 
Pfluger. Mr. Mayorkas kind-of didn't really answer the question 
on whether or not if they identified somebody, 100 percent of 
the time they kept them. There was some discussion about a 
system that was implemented to determine if the person was a 
risk. We know because we talked to the Customs and Border 
Patrol agents that there is no policy that if they are caught 
on the terrorist watch list, that they are immediately detained 
in 100 percent of the cases.
    So, these policies not to do that, which make no sense to 
us, have put Americans at risk. Interestingly enough, your 
agents, who are now having to find these individuals somewhere 
in our country, those decisions, those policies, not only put 
the American citizens at risk. They put your agents at risk 
because they are out there now having to find these 
individuals. The truth is, the current policy in the Department 
of Homeland Security does not require immediate detention of 
these people, and that is wrong.
    I asked Director Wray if the policies of his colleagues are 
making it worse for the FBI. That was one of my questions, and 
you kind-of--I get it, professionalism, you walked around that 
question. But I think it is clear to every American that these 
policies at our Southern Border that are willful decisions, 
those changed policies, have increased the risk of not only the 
Americans in this country, but also the law enforcement all 
over this country, to include the FBI.
    Now, I want to take issue with several of the comments that 
my colleagues on the Minority side have said, some of their 
accusations today. The Ranking Member said that Republicans 
were AWOL. Now, I am a military guy. That term means something 
to me. AWOL is an acronym that stands for absent without leave, 
meaning you don't show up to your place of duty. In my 
recollection, in all of our committee hearings, the only time 
someone didn't show up to a hearing was when the Democrats 
refused to show up at a border hearing. When we had a hearing 
on the border, all the Republicans were there. Not a single 
Democrat showed up. So, as far as I am concerned, there has 
never been a time when Republicans have been AWOL. But there 
certainly was a time when the Democrats were AWOL.
    The Ranking Member also said that a lot of the discussion 
we have had is a difference in policies and things like that. I 
have to tell you I agree on some of that. But it is pretty 
clear that Americans are at risk by decisions that have been 
made. There is nothing wrong with us investigating that and 
pointing it out to the American people and trying to find the 
cause. If those decisions have put Americans at risk, holding 
people accountable.
    Today, the Ranking Member, very interestingly, didn't 
mention Hamas in his opening statement, didn't mention 
Hezbollah. He didn't mention the cartels. He didn't mention the 
CCP. The only thing he seemed to want to talk about was the 
MAGA Republicans and President Trump. I find that interesting. 
I would like to point that out for the record, that in our 
World Threats hearing, the Ranking Member didn't talk about any 
of that.
    The Ranking Member suggested that we have a Member in our 
party that wants to defund the FBI. We are not defunding the 
FBI. But I will tell you, some of their Members want to defund 
ICE, have said it many times on the record, more than just one. 
We had one Member of our side that said to defund the--many of 
them have wanted to defund ICE. They have talked about 
defunding law enforcement all across this country for years. 
So, I was a little offended by the fact that he brought that 
up, but I wanted to set the record straight on that one.
    The Ranking Member also suggested that we are criticizing 
the men and women of your departments. I would never do that. I 
worked for a lot of great military leaders in the day, my time 
in the army. But occasionally we had a guy, a leader, that was 
not effective. I would never be critical of that unit's 
soldiers. Always the leader. Our criticism's not the men and 
women of DHS, Mr. Secretary. Our criticisms are your policies 
that you have implemented that changed everything when you came 
into office and changed the flood of migration and changed the 
fentanyl flow into this country. Tragically now with a war in 
the Middle East and heightened risk to the United States 
because we are supporting their other great enemy, Israel, at 
much greater risk.
    I also want to correct this notion because it keeps coming 
up that 90 percent of the fentanyl's being caught. Well, that 
is not true. Ninety percent of what comes across the border 
that is caught is caught at the crossing sites. That is an 
accurate statement. But to say that you are catching 90 percent 
of the fentanyl, you don't know the denominator, you can't 
figure the percentage. I wish people would be intellectually 
accurate when they make statements, but they just seem to cling 
to things that aren't true.
    There is also this accusation that just because people want 
border security, that we are somehow racist. We heard that 
again today. You would think that that would just get tired and 
be thrown out. The people coming across the Southern Border, 
when I was there, there was a huge group of Russians. They are 
whiter than I am. This notion that you are somehow racist 
because you want border security, it is really insane.
    I can assure you this. The people who are all over this 
Nation right now yelling from the river to the sea, the 
destruction of Israel, I will eat that Red Bull can if there is 
a Republican in that group.
    I also want to thank you, Ms. Abizaid. You brought up the 
home-grown and the lone wolves and all this stuff, and you gave 
some really compelling testimony. I am from Tennessee. What 
happened in Chattanooga several years ago at that recruiting 
station is just an example of what you are talking about. Keep 
saying that over and over again. America needs to know about 
this. They are actively trying to flip people in our country 
and to convince them to hurt Americans. That incident in 
Chattanooga, we in Tennessee will never forget it. I thank you 
for bringing that point home.
    Now, Mr. Mayorkas has said that we need to add dollars. The 
truth of the matter is, there was no budget change between the 
last administration and this administration. But you can look 
at the graph. It is like this and then like this. It ain't 
about dollars. Although we are not against, if you look in H.R. 
2, we put more dollars into that technology, pay for Border 
Patrol people, despite what some people have said.
    You also mentioned, Mr. Mayorkas, immigration laws. Yes, 
they are broken. They need to get fixed. But the truth of the 
matter is that the Immigration and Nationality Act is being 
subverted right now. Courts have ordered you to do it a 
different way than you are doing it. So, I am not even sure if 
we did change the immigration laws you would even abide by 
them.
    The Ranking Member mentioned that the asylum laws, we need 
to change that. But we are not living according to the 
definition of the asylum laws now and detaining people. We are 
actually sending them to hotels and sending them away while ICE 
detention beds sit empty despite what the law says. More 
resources? No, this is a policy issue. The policies were 
changed by the Secretary, and the results are people came, some 
on the terrorist watch list being chased by the FBI, loose in 
our country, thousands dead to fentanyl, millions disrupted by 
the cartel crime. Thousands of children lost in the system. 
Thousands of people trafficked. Billions of taxpayer dollars. 
The New York mayor, who happens to be a Democrat, says it is 
going to cost his city $12 billion right out of the taxpayer 
dollar. Not at their choice. They didn't vote on this. You just 
moved the policies out of the way, here let me write the check 
because that is what Mr. Mayorkas wants us to do.
    Now, as I said, with the conflict in Israel, we are faced 
with an open border coupled with a heightened threat as we give 
assistance to the, as I said, the only other country or group 
of people that the terrorists hate more than us, Israel. The 
abysmal failure to secure our Southern Border has put every 
American at risk. Even a baby crawling around on the floor of a 
VRBO who encounters fentanyl left by the previous renter, dead. 
To crime, to human trafficking, to billions of money going to 
some of the worst human beings on the planet, cartels. Now, of 
course, international terrorists.
    Before I finish my comments, I want to say a few things, 
because you guys have raised some really good points, and I 
want to just give you some assurances. CFATS, the House passed 
it. We are pushing the Senate. We have a CFATS working group to 
try to get it in a posture where the Senate will actually 
approve it. But that side of the building is controlled by 
another party. We passed it over here. We are waiting on them. 
No, we are actually trying to get it in a posture that they 
will actually support.
    UAS, we are working very diligently to get that done. You 
are right, Director. FISA, there is a special committee that is 
working on this. I promise you that will get done.
    The CWMD, of course, was on the CR that just passed, so it 
is done. It is over on the Senate side, waiting.
    Those are very valiant. I agree with you. Those things need 
to be taken care of. We are working on it.
    Mr. Wray, thank you for being here. Thank you for your 
testimony. Ms. Abizaid, thank you. Mr. Mayorkas, thank you. I 
know you rearranged your schedule to stay a little later, and I 
get that, and I deeply appreciate it.
    It is clear that you believe you are doing a great job, and 
I am not hiding it, we are looking into all this because we on 
our side think that you are not. We are in our last phase of a 
five-phase process that you are following in the press, just 
like the rest of my constituents and people across the country. 
We are going to finish that up, I think, sometime around 
December. I would love to know today if you would commit to 
come back. We will finish that thing out. I think maybe in 
December. Does that sound reasonable to you? Will you be able 
to come back for that?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I will honor the request of this 
committee.
    Chairman Green. Thank you. Again, I want to reiterate my 
point about the people of your departments. It is hard work 
protecting this country, protecting the citizens of this 
country. I know the men and women who do that professionally, 
as a career, deserve the utmost of our respect, and every one 
of them has it from us. Our frustrations are not with them. It 
is not. It is with leadership that we think has made bad 
decisions. With that, I am concluding my closing remarks.
    The Members of this committee may have some additional 
questions for the witnesses, and we would ask that the 
witnesses respond to those in writing, if you get any. Pursuant 
to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will be held open 
for 10 days for those written statements. Without objection, 
the committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 2:59 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]




                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

   Question From Honorable August Pfluger for Honorable Alejandro N. 
                                Mayorkas
    Question. I understand Homeland Security Investigations has many 
important priorities. Recently, HSI has conducted multiple seizure 
operations on Iranian oil tankers that were attempting to evade 
sanctions. Unfortunately, these operations are costly and HSI is 
inadequately equipped to execute more of these operations. I have 
recently introduced legislation with Congressman Panetta and Senators 
Ernst and Blumenthal to give HSI the resources it needs to conduct more 
operations to disrupt Iran's illicit oil trade. Would you commit to 
working with me, Congressman Panetta, and Senators Ernst and Blumenthal 
on this legislation?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Mike Ezell for Honorable Alejandro N. Mayorkas
    Question 1a. According to the Office of the Inspector General's 
report, DHS encountered obstacles to screen, vet, and inspect all 
evacuees during the recent Afghanistan crisis. It is clear from this 
report that CBP did not collaborate with the FBI to thoroughly vet 
evacuees before they entered the United States. Below is an example 
from the report:

``CBP paroled one evacuee into the United States who had been liberated 
from prison in Afghanistan by the Taliban in August 2021. The 
individual cleared lily pad screening and vetting processes and flew to 
the United States. At the U.S. POE, CBP officers identified derogatory 
information during the primary inspection. However, a supervisor 
`unreferred' the individual and paroled the individual into the country 
without a secondary inspection. Although the supervisor acted within 
policy, we could not determine whether the supervisor was aware of the 
evacuee's prior incarceration. Approximately 3 weeks after this 
evacuee's parole, the FBI obtained derogatory information. 
Subsequently, ICE removed this individual from the United States.''

    What specific steps have the FBI and DHS taken to improve 
collaboration?
    Question 1b. If a similar evacuation was to occur today, how will 
CBP assure individuals that are of concern to the FBI will not be 
allowed into the United States?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2a. As of September 14, 2023, 160 migrants whose 
identities match those on the FBI's terrorist watch list have been 
stopped trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border, compared to 100 in 
2022.
    What is the procedure for handling and processing a border crosser 
determined to be on the Terrorist Screening Database?
    Question 2b. How many of these border crossers determined to be on 
that database are referred to the Department of Justice for 
prosecution? What are some reasons an individual would not be referred 
for prosecution?
    Question 2c. Which terrorist organizations were these border 
crossers affiliated with? Can you tell us approximately how many border 
crossers belonged to each of these organizations?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3a. Recently, the Biden administration convened close to 
50 countries together to continue the Counter Ransomware Initiative.
    What is DHS doing to combat the ransomware threat?
    Question 3b. Do these threats stem more from malicious nation-
states or cyber criminals?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Questions From Honorable August Pfluger for Christopher A. Wray
    Question 1a. During your opening statement at the Worldwide Threats 
hearing in front of the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs 
Committee, you highlighted the growing threats from the Iranian regime 
and how the October 7 terrorist attacks in Israel have galvanized the 
jihadist movement. Between these two issues and the continuing cases of 
on-line radicalization within the United States, I feel our Nation is 
in an incredibly vulnerable position. Do you believe our Nation is 
properly equipped to disrupt terror operations overseas and at home?
    Question 1b. If not, what steps are you taking to secure the 
homeland?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. Does Lebanese Hezbollah or any other proxy affiliated 
with the Iranian regime have a desire to attack the United States?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Marjorie Taylor Greene for Christopher A. Wray
    Question 1. Director Christopher Wray testified that he was unaware 
of the riot in the Capitol complex on October 18, 2023. In response, I 
would like to provide information detailing the events that occurred as 
well as request answers to the questions listed below.
    On October 18, Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) and If Not Now, both 
violent, pro-Islamic anti-Semitic groups that seek the destruction of 
the State of Israel, launched an illegal uprising in the Capitol 
complex in support of Hamas. Such actions caused elevators to be shut 
down, staircases and hallways to be blocked, exits to be made 
inaccessible, police officers to be assaulted, and official proceedings 
to be obstructed in both the House of Representatives and Senate, 
including a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. This was a 
direct security threat to Members of Congress, their staff, and Capitol 
visitors. The riot organizers communicated through a chat titled, 
``Global Intifada,'' which means global Arabic uprising and refers to a 
series of protests and violent riots carried out by Palestinians in 
Israel. Furthermore, Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib incited the illegal 
uprising by riling up the rioters during her speech that day and 
encouraging Hezbollah's call for ``a day of unprecedented anger.''
    Over 300 rioters were arrested in violation of D.C. Codes  22-1307 
(Crowding, obstructing, or incommoding) and  22-405 (Assault on member 
of police force). However, 18 U.S. Code  1512(c)(2) specifically 
states, ``Whoever otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any 
official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.'' To remain 
consistent with the DOJ's means of prosecution, this crime of 
obstructing official proceedings should also warrant solitary 
confinement, psychological and physical torture, and restricted access 
to legal counsel, all while awaiting trial.
    Given Director Wray's ignorance of the events occurring on October 
18, I request answers to the following questions.
    Were you or anyone at the FBI or DOJ, to your knowledge, aware of 
the unlawful uprising that occurred in the Cannon House Office 
Building, prior to receiving this information?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. Were you or anyone at the FBI aware that a Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee hearing was obstructed by the rioters, 
prior to receiving this information?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. If the FBI was informed of such riot, what actions has 
the FBI taken in response to the unlawful uprising on October 18, 2023?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4. Are there currently any open investigations into 
individuals who were involved in obstructing official proceedings?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 5. If no action has been taken to investigate and address 
such events that occurred in the Capitol complex on October 18, will 
the FBI commit to investigating and prosecuting these individuals to 
the fullest extent of the law?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
      Questions From Honorable Mike Ezell for Christopher A. Wray
    Question 1a. According to the Office of the Inspector General's 
report, DHS encountered obstacles to screen, vet, and inspect all 
evacuees during the recent Afghanistan crisis. It is clear from this 
report that CBP did not collaborate with the FBI to thoroughly vet 
evacuees before they entered the United States. Below is an example 
from the report:

``CBP paroled one evacuee into the United States who had been liberated 
from prison in Afghanistan by the Taliban in August 2021. The 
individual cleared lily pad screening and vetting processes and flew to 
the United States. At the U.S. POE, CBP officers identified derogatory 
information during the primary inspection. However, a supervisor 
`unreferred' the individual and paroled the individual into the country 
without a secondary inspection. Although the supervisor acted within 
policy, we could not determine whether the supervisor was aware of the 
evacuee's prior incarceration. Approximately 3 weeks after this 
evacuee's parole, the FBI obtained derogatory information. 
Subsequently, ICE removed this individual from the United States.''

    What specific steps have the FBI and DHS taken to improve 
collaboration?
    Question 1b. If a similar evacuation was to occur today, how will 
CBP assure individuals that are of concern to the FBI will not be 
allowed into the United States?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2a. As of September 14, 2023, 160 migrants whose 
identities match those on the FBI's terrorist watchlist have been 
stopped trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border, compared to 100 in 
2022.
    What is the procedure for handling and processing a border crosser 
determined to be on the Terrorist Screening Database?
    Question 2b. How many of these border crossers determined to be on 
that database are referred to the Department of Justice for 
prosecution? What are some reasons an individual would not be referred 
for prosecution?
    Question 2c. Which terrorist organizations were these border 
crossers affiliated with? Can you tell us approximately how many border 
crossers belonged to each of these organizations?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3a. During fiscal year 2023, CBP has seized over 27,000 
pounds of fentanyl coming across the Southwestern Border, which is 
enough to kill 6 billion people and is an 88 percent increase in 
seizures since fiscal year 2022. It is widely believed that only 5-10 
percent of the amount smuggled across the border is seized by law 
enforcement.
    During a U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary hearing earlier this 
year, it was stated that the FBI has between 300 to 400 
``investigations into the leadership of the cartels trafficking that 
fentanyl.''
    Where are those cartel leaders primarily located?
    Question 3b. How are they predominantly trafficking those illicit 
drugs?
    Question 3c. Are they coming through legal points of entry or 
through unsecured sectors of our border?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4a. Recently, the Biden administration convened close to 
50 countries together to continue the Counter Ransomware Initiative.
    What can the FBI do to disrupt the financial infrastructure of 
these actors?
    Question 4b. How many investigations does the FBI currently have 
into ransomware attacks? How has this figure compared to the last 
several years?
    Question 4c. Who has the FBI identified as the main nation-states 
and/or cyber groups responsible for attacks or threats of attacks 
against U.S. businesses and the Government?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

                                 [all]