

OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

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OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, July 24, 2024

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Washington, DC

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Jim Jordan [Chair of the Committee] presiding.

Members present: Representatives Jordan, Issa, Gaetz, Biggs, McClintock, Tiffany, Massie, Roy, Bishop, Spartz, Fitzgerald, Bentz, Cline, Armstrong, Gooden, Van Drew, Nehls, Moore, Kiley, Hageman, Lee, Hunt, Fry, Rulli, Nadler, Lofgren, Cohen, Johnson, Schiff, Swalwell, Jayapal, Correa, Scanlon, Neguse, McBath, Dean, Ross, Ivey, and Balint.

Chair JORDAN. The Committee will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. We welcome everyone to today's hearing on Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin to lead us all in the pledge of allegiance.

ALL. I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

Chair JORDAN. I want to begin today's hearing by recognizing the fact that we no longer have one of the great Members with us, Sheila Jackson Lee, as we all know passed away. She was a dedicated public servant. Her service on this Committee spanned nearly three decades and included shepherding through countless pieces of legislation. I said yesterday at Subcommittee hearing that I don't know that there was any Member of Congress who got more out of five minutes than Sheila did. She was just a pleasant spirit who we all enjoyed and we are thinking about her family. We all certainly will miss Sheila.

I yield to the Ranking Member for comments.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, this room in our hearts feels a little emptier today to mourn the loss of our dear friend colleague, Sheila Jackson Lee. In the nearly 30 years that I served with Sheila on the Judiciary Committee, I witnessed her boundless energy, her courage, and her character as she lent her voice in her legislative talents to nearly every issue that came before this Committee. Whether it was advocating for just and hu-

mane immigration reform, working to protect voting rights and preserve our civil liberties, or delving into the technical details of administrative law and property, intellectual property, Sheila was always at the forefront of our work.

Sheila made perhaps her greatest mark serving as the Chair and later Ranking Member of the Crime Subcommittee. In this role, she worked in a bipartisan fashion to re-authorize the Violence Against Women Act and to protect victims of trafficking among many other successes.

She was also a leader of such issues as sentencing reform, gun safety, police accountability, and racial justice. Sheila engaged in many spirited debates, but she always had the deepest respect for all her colleagues, even though to whom she vehemently disagreed. She deeply loved the institution of Congress and particularly the Judiciary Committee because it gave her platform to make a meaningful impact on the lives of millions of Americans.

If Sheila took up a cause, she could be relentless in her determination to see it through whether that meant making one extra phone call, going to one more meeting, or frame one more amendment, or making one more speech. She would not rest until she thought she had done everything she could to fight for the issues she cared about. Through it all, she stayed true to her values and always had the people of Houston close to her heart.

We are all better for having known her. The American people are better for having had her in their corner all these years. I will deeply miss my friend and colleague. May her memory be a blessing. I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. I want to thank the Ranking Member. Well said. Now, the Chair will recognize himself for an opening statement.

On July 13th it was a terrible day for America. We all agree spirited debate, fighting for what you believe in, is part of what makes this country the greatest nation in the world. The First Amendment and robust political debate are not consistent in any way with violence. What happened in Butler, Pennsylvania, was a tragedy. It took the life of a good man, Corey Comperatore, leaving a wife without a husband, and two daughters without a father. Others were injured and of course, former President Trump, by the grace of God, survived the assassination attempt.

There are a lot of unanswered questions about the security failures that day, questions about decisions made before the rally, questions about actions during the rally, and questions about statements made after the event concluded.

Prior to the rally, why was the President's security detail denied requests for extra resources? Why weren't all the buildings secured? There were a finite number of buildings that needed to be secured. Why wasn't that done? Why was the President allowed to walk out on the stage when there was a suspicious person on the property?

During the rally, what exactly happened between 6:09 and 6:14 p.m., those critical five minutes? We know from briefings from the Director and the Deputy Director of the FBI and other information we have gathered, that at 6:09, the shooter was identified on the roof. At 6:10, the counter sniper was notified. Counter sniper teams were notified about the shooter. At 6:11, the shooter fired several

shots injuring and killing one person, injuring others. At 6:12, the counter sniper took down the shooter, and at 6:14, President Trump was escorted off the stage by Secret Service agents. We need to know what happened play by play, moment by moment, second by second, the communications that took place, again, during that critical five minutes.

Then, finally, after the rally, why did both the Secret Service and Secretary of Homeland Security Mayorkas lie to the American people? July 14th, the day after the attack, Secret Service spokesman Anthony Guglielmi said this,

The assertion that a member of the former President's security team requested additional security resources that the U.S. Secret Service or the Department of Homeland Security rebuffed is absolutely false.

The next day, Secretary Mayorkas said,

That is an unequivocally false assertion. We had not received any requests for additional security measures that were rebuffed.

Five days later, top officials repeatedly rejected requests from Donald Trump's security detail for more personnel, and on the 21st of July, *The New York Times* confirming what *The Washington Post* reported said,

Mr. Guglielmi acknowledged that the Secret Service had turned down requests for additional Federal security assets for Mr. Trump's detail.

A 180° change. Why did they initially lie to us in the days after the attack in Pennsylvania?

Finally, we hope to learn more today from Director Wray about the shooter, his use of the drone, the explosives that were in his car, how he got on the roof, and a host of other questions. It is our hope that Director Wray's testimony can begin to get answers to the American people about all those questions and concerns.

So, Director, we appreciate you being here, and we trust that you are going to be as transparent with the Committee and the country as you possibly can. I am sure you understand that a significant portion of the country has a healthy skepticism regarding the FBI's ability to conduct a fair, honest, open, and transparent investigation. That skepticism is based on what they have witnessed over the past several years. The American people have seen a Biden-Harris Justice Department. They can't tell us who planted the pipe bombs on January 6th. They can't tell us who leaked the *Dobbs* opinion. They can't tell us who put cocaine at the White House.

The Biden-Harris Justice Department who raided President Trump's home, the Biden-Harris Justice Department who worked with social media companies to censor Americans, the Biden-Harris Justice Department who let the country believe that the Hunter Biden laptop was misinformation when they knew at the time it was authentic. Maybe most importantly, a Biden-Harris Justice Department who retaliated against whistleblowers who came to this Committee and spoke to us about these issues.

Last week, we sent you 12 questions about what occurred on July 13th. We expect you to answer those questions and the others that I have just outlined. Again, we thank you for being here today and appreciate your willingness to answer the questions that the Committee is going to have. With that, I would yield to the Ranking Member for an opening statement.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, two weeks ago our country witnessed the shocking assassination attempt on a Presidential candidate. Now, I disagree with Donald Trump on almost every policy area imaginable. I am frequently shocked and outraged at the plans he has for our country and the words that come out of his mouth. I have dedicated much of the last eight years to fighting his agenda. Regardless of my strong feelings about Donald Trump's behavior, I unequivocally and unabashedly condemn with every fiber of my being the attempt against his life. This is not just an attack on a man, but an attack on our democracy.

Political violence erodes the very foundations of our Nation. The concepts of freedom of speech, of peaceful transitions of power, of a democratic government at its core, these cannot exist if political violence is allowed to fester and to go unchecked. If you think that this one assassin's bullet was a bolt out of the blue, and not quite of a wave of violence that has threatened this Nation for years, then you have missed the point of what my Democratic colleagues and I have been imploring you to hear for some time.

Election workers, many of them working for free, face near constant threats of violence. In one recent instance in Indiana, a man pleaded guilty to threatening to kill an election worker who said that there were no irregularities in the recent election. That man said, "Ten million plus patriots will surround you when you least expect it and will, expletive, kill you." That is political violence.

In another instance, Speaker Emerita Nancy Pelosi's husband was bludgeoned over the head with a hammer by an intruder in his home who had been there to capture Ms. Pelosi, interrogate her, and possibly "break her kneecaps" because of her liberal views. That is political violence.

The death threats surging against Vice President Harris, former President Obama, his wife, Michelle, and Governor DeSantis, as well as many others, including videos online of individuals holding guns making assassination threats, that is political violence. The plot to kidnap Governor Gretchen Whitmer and overthrow parts of the State Government, that is political violence. The brutal deadly attack three years ago against this very building with rioters breaking through police barriers, running through these halls chanting kill Nancy and hang Mike Pence and even hanging a noose outside the building, these rioters battering Capitol Police Officers and forcing the Members of Congress and their staffs to go into hiding, squatting in spaces under desks or in closets, that is political violence.

This assassination attempt, as horrific as it is, should surprise no one. You would think a political party that almost lost their Presidential Candidate through an act of political violence would have something to say about the way their leaders keep talking about the next election. Donald Trump has warned there will be a "blood bath" if he loses. The Republican of Ohio State, Senator George Lang said just last week at a rally for J.D. Vance that,

He is afraid that a civil war might be necessary if Republicans lose the November election.

The President of the right-wing think tank and Project 2025 leader of the *Heritage Foundation*, Kevin Roberts, said on Stephen Bannon's podcast,

We are in the process of the second American Revolution which will remain bloodless if the left allows us to be.

Republican former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin said in August of last year of Trump's indictments,

You want us to be in civil war? Because that is what is going to happen. We are not going to keep putting up with this. We do need to rise up and take our country back.

I could go on, but it is more and more of the same and to hear nothing from the other side of the aisle in this room about these statements. You support a blood bath, if you don't get the election outcome you want? You justify violence if the left does not agree with you? What exactly has preoccupied this Republican Majority where their allies threaten violence to their political enemies, real and imagined?

We have chased down baseless conspiracy theories designed solely to influence the 2024 election in favor of Donald Trump. We have spent millions of dollars and thousands of hours of staff time and more than 100 transcribed interviews chasing false accusations against President Biden supporting an impeachment effort that seemed designed to fail and hunting for a smoking gun that simply does not exist.

Instead of admitting that these investigations found no corruption, coercion or unethical behavior for the Biden Administration, Republicans chose to just dig deeper and spend more money. Imagine what could have happened if we had spent these thousands of hours of staff time and those millions of taxpayer dollars addressing even one aspect of the political violence that now threatens our country. Perhaps, had this Republican majority lifted a finger to help a Nation that is awash in guns, the assassin in Butler would not have had such easy access to the weapon he used to fire on that crowd.

Director Wray, your agency is responsible for addressing some of the most serious issues of our time. The Bureau fights gun violence which claims the lives of 40,000 Americans every year. It protects election security from growing threats from malign foreign actors who are working tirelessly to influence our elections. It protects against domestic terrorists and violent extremists who have been a growing threat in recent years and have carried out horrific mass shootings and deadly events around the country and so, so much more.

I apologize to you, Director, that instead of supporting you in these missions in the 118th Congress, some of my colleagues have instead hindered your work, maligned your agents, and called to abolish and defund your agency, all for political gain. It is despicable, especially from the party that claims to "back the blue." I know that you and your many agents and employees have paid the price to these baseless attacks. I know you have faced a barrage of threats, distrust, and vitriol from the public as a result of these wild, politically driven conspiracies. I know it has become even more dangerous and difficult for you to come to work each day. I may not agree with you on everything, but I sincerely thank you and every employee in your agency who continues to protect our country.

The FBI is vital to keeping America safe and I pray that today we can focus on the real, substantive work of the agency. It is the least we owe our country in these times. I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. Without objection, all other opening statements will be included in the record.

We will now introduce today's witness.

The Honorable Christopher Wray has been the Director of the FBI since 2017. He previously served as the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, the Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, and Associate Deputy Attorney General, and as Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia. Again, Director Wray, you have been here many times. We appreciate you being here today. We look forward to your testimony and answering our questions.

We will begin by swearing you in. Would you please rise and raise your right hand? Do you swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that the testimony you are about to give is true and correct to the best of your knowledge, information, and belief so help you God?

Let the record reflect that the witness has answered in the affirmative. Thank you. Please be seated. We have votes coming in about 10 minutes, but we definitely want to get through your opening statement as far as we can and this is going to be an interesting day on Capitol Hill with the Prime Minister of Israel here as well.

So, Director Wray, you are recognized for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY

Mr. WRAY. Good morning, Chair Jordan, Ranking Member Nadler, and the Members of the Committee. I want to begin by offering my condolences on the passing of Representative Jackson Lee who served the people of Texas in this body and on this Committee for so long.

Thank you all, for your support of our efforts to protect the American people and uphold the Constitution. I am proud to be here today representing the 38,000 special agents, intelligence analysts, and professional staff who make up the FBI, men and women who everyday work relentlessly to counter the most complex threat environment I have seen in my tenure as FBI Director and maybe in my entire career in law enforcement.

Before I go any further, I also want to acknowledge and offer my deepest condolences to the victims of the horrific assassination attempt in Butler County. To the friends and family of Corey Comperatore, who by all accounts lost his life protecting others from danger, to the other victims, two of whom were critically wounded, and of course, to President Trump, former President Trump and his family.

As I have said from the beginning, the attempted assassination of the former President was an attack on our democracy and our democratic process and we will not and do not tolerate political violence of any kind, especially a despicable account of this magnitude. I want to assure you and the American people that the men and women of the FBI will continue to work tirelessly to get to the

bottom of what happened. We are bringing all the resources of the FBI to bear, both criminal and national security.

Now, there is a whole lot of work underway and still a lot of work to do. Our understanding of what happened and why will continue to evolve, but we are going to leave no stone unturned. The shooter may be deceased, but the FBI's investigation is very much ongoing to that point.

I also want to acknowledge that I recognize both the congressional and the public interest in this case and the importance of this investigation to the American people. I understand there are a lot of open questions. So, while the investigation is very much ongoing and our assessments of the shooter and his actions continue to evolve, my hope here today is to do my best to provide you with all the information I can give where we are at this point.

I have been saying for some time now that we are living in an elevated threat environment, and tragically, the Butler County assassination attempt is another example, a particularly heinous and very public one of what I have been talking about. It also reinforces our need at the FBI and our ongoing commitment to stay focused on the threats, on the mission, and on the people we do the work with and the people we do the work for. Everyday, all across this country, and indeed around the world, the men and women of the FBI are doing just that, working around the clock to counter the threats we face.

Just in the last year, for example, in California, the FBI and our partners targeted an organized crime syndicate responsible for trafficking fentanyl, meth, and cocaine, all across North America. We charged the Mexican-based suppliers who brought the drugs into the United States, a network of Canada-based truck drivers who delivered the drugs, and the distributors in the United States who spread the poison into our communities. Staying on threats emanating from the border, I have warned for some time now about the threat that foreign terrorists may seek to exploit our Southwest border or some other port of entry to advance a plot against Americans.

Just last month, for instance, the Bureau and our Joint Terrorism Task Force has worked with ICE in multiple cities across the country as several individuals with suspected international terrorist ties were arrested using ICE's immigration authorities. Leading up to those arrests, hundreds of FBI employees dedicated countless hours to understanding the threat and identify additional individuals of concern.

Now, the physical security of the border is, of course, not in the FBI's lane, but as the threat has escalated, we are working with our partners in law enforcement and the intelligence community to find and stop foreign terrorists who would harm Americans and our interests. As concerning as the known or suspected terrorists encountered at the border are, perhaps even more concerning is those we do not yet know about, because they provided fake documents or because we didn't have information connecting them to terrorism at the time they arrived in the United States.

Staying ahead of today's threats demands that we work together and for the FBI that means doubling down on our partnerships, especially with State and local law enforcement. Whether it is work-

ing through our hundreds of Joint Terrorism Task Forces to build outsource networks, to identify those who slipped through the cracks or targeting the worst of the worst responsible for the violence that still plagues far too many communities, to our Safe Streets Task Forces, we are taking the fight to the cartels responsible for trafficking the dangerous drugs like fentanyl pouring into our country and claiming countless American lives.

Staying ahead of the threat also means continuing to disrupt the cyber criminals ravaging businesses, large and small, and confronting Nation States like China targeting our innovation and our critical infrastructure. At the Bureau, we are proud to work side by side with our brothers and sisters in Federal, State, and local law enforcement, our partners in the intelligence community, and others around the world to fulfill our commitment to keep Americans safe.

Now, on Friday, the FBI will celebrate its 116th Anniversary, 116 years of protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution, 116 years of working with our partners to safeguard the communities we serve, 116 years of innovating to stay ahead of the complex, evolving and very real threats out there. I am proud of the legacy the men and women of the FBI have built and all they have accomplished for the American people.

So, if I may, as we approach this week's anniversary, I would just like to say to all those who are part of the FBI family, from our current employees to our formers, and to our partners across law enforcement and the intelligence community, thank you. Thank you for dedicating your lives to this country and to its people. It is both humbling and an honor to serve alongside you and I look forward to the work we are going to continue to do together. With that, thank you again for having me, and I look forward to our discussion.

[The prepared statement of the Hon. Wray follows:]



Department of Justice

STATEMENT OF

CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY
DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE THE
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AT A HEARING ENTITLED
"OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION"

PRESENTED
JULY 24, 2024

STATEMENT OF
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JULY 24, 2024

Good afternoon, Chairman Jordan, Ranking Member Nadler, and Members of the Committee. I want to begin by offering my condolences on the passing of Representative Jackson Lee, who served the people of Texas in this body, and on this Committee, for so long. Thank you all for inviting me to appear before you today. I would like to acknowledge the recent tragic events in Butler, Pennsylvania. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) continues to conduct a full and thorough investigation of the attempted assassination of former President Trump. I recognize the devastating impact on all the victims and families who were there that day to exercise one of our most fundamental Constitutional rights.

I am here today on behalf of the men and women of the FBI, who tackle some of the most complex national security and criminal threats every day with perseverance, professionalism, and integrity – sometimes at the greatest of costs. I am extremely proud of their service and commitment to the FBI’s mission and to ensuring the safety and security of communities throughout our nation.

Despite the many challenges our FBI workforce faces, I am immensely proud of their dedication to protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution. The list of diverse threats we face underscores the complexity and breadth of the FBI’s mission: to protect the American people and uphold the Constitution of the United States. I am prepared to discuss with you what the FBI is doing to address these threats and what the FBI is doing to ensure that our people adhere to the highest of standards while it conducts its mission.

Key Threats and Challenges

Over the past year, the threats facing our nation have escalated. These threats emanate from myriad sources – nation-states, hostile foreign intelligence services, and criminals. They range from foreign terrorist organizations to sophisticated cyber-attacks, from internet-facilitated sexual exploitation of children to human trafficking, from violent gangs and criminal

organizations trafficking dangerous drugs like fentanyl, to public corruption and corporate fraud. Keeping pace with these threats is a significant challenge for the FBI, especially as technology evolves and allows adversaries to use the Internet and social media to facilitate illegal activities, recruit followers, encourage terrorist attacks and other illicit actions, and disperse information on building improvised explosive devices and other means to attack the United States. Cyber actors also exploit technology to infiltrate U.S. networks, steal our intellectual property, sensitive business information, and secrets, carry out transnational repression and foreign malign influence operations, spread malware, hold our critical infrastructure at risk, and create chaos. The breadth of these threats and challenges are as complex as at any time in our history, and the consequences of not responding to and countering threats and challenges have never been greater.

To meet these threats, we have built, and are continuously enhancing, a workforce that possesses the skills and knowledge to deal with the complex threats and challenges we face today — and will face tomorrow. We are building a leadership cadre that views innovation as key to staying ahead of the threats facing our nation.

Today's FBI is a national security and law enforcement organization that uses, collects, and shares intelligence in everything we do. Each FBI employee understands that, to defeat the key threats facing our nation, we must constantly strive to be more efficient and more effective. Just as our adversaries continue to evolve, so, too, must the FBI. We live in a time of acute and persistent terrorist and criminal threats to our national security, our economy, and indeed our communities. These diverse threats underscore the complexity and breadth of the FBI's mission.

National Security

Top Terrorism Threats

Protecting the American people from terrorism—both international and domestic—remains the FBI's number one priority. The threat from terrorism is as persistent and complex as ever. As we saw in October with the devastating attack in Israel, terrorist actors are still very intent on using violence and brutality to spread their ideologies. We are in an environment where the threats from international terrorism ("IT"), domestic terrorism ("DT"), and state-sponsored terrorism are all simultaneously elevated.

In recent years, the greatest terrorism threat to our homeland has been posed by lone actors or small cells of individuals who typically radicalize to violence online and use easily accessible weapons to attack soft targets. In addition to this threat, which has not diminished, we are also increasingly concerned that foreign terrorist organizations will enable or direct attacks on U.S. soil. We see the lone offender threat with both domestic violent extremists ("DVEs") and homegrown violent extremists ("HVEs"), two distinct threats, both primarily located in the United States who typically radicalize and mobilize to violence on their own. DVEs are individuals based and operating primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seek to further political or social goals through unlawful acts of force or violence. In comparison,

HVEs are individuals of any citizenship who have lived or operated primarily in the United States or its territories, who advocate, are engaged in, or are preparing to engage in ideologically motivated terrorist activities in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization but are acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization (“FTO”).

While we assist our Israeli colleagues and we understand the global implications of the ongoing conflict in Israel, we are paying heightened attention to how the events abroad could directly affect and inspire people to commit violence here in the Homeland. Terrorist organizations worldwide, as well as individuals attracted to violence, have praised Hamas horrific attack on Israeli civilians. We have seen violent extremists across ideologies seeking to target Jewish and Muslim people and institutions through physical assaults, bomb threats, and online calls for mass casualty attacks. Our top concern stems from lone offenders inspired by—or reacting to—the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict, as they pose the most likely threat to Americans, especially Jewish, Muslim, and Arab-American communities in the United States. We have seen an increase in reported threats to Jewish and Muslim people, institutions, and houses of worship here in the United States, and we are moving quickly to mitigate them.

Presently, while we have no information to indicate that Hamas has the intent or capability to conduct operations inside the United States, though we cannot, and do not, discount that possibility, we are especially concerned about the possibility of Hamas supporters engaging in violence on the group’s behalf. As always, we are concerned with any FTO that may exploit the attacks in Israel as a tool to mobilize their followers around the world. In recent years, there have been several events and incidents in the United States that were purportedly motivated, at least in part, by the conflict between Israel and Hamas. These have included the targeting of individuals, houses of worship, and institutions associated with the Jewish and Muslim faiths with acts of physical assault, vandalism, or harassment. Anti-Semitism and anti-Islamic sentiment permeate many violent extremist ideologies and serve as a primary driver for attacks by a diverse set of violent extremists who pose a persistent threat to Jewish and Muslim communities and institutions in the United States and abroad. FTOs have exploited previous conflicts between Israel and Hamas via media outlets and online communications to call on their supporters located in the United States to conduct attacks. Some violent extremists have used times of heightened tensions to incite violence against religious minorities, targeting both Jewish and Muslim Americans.

The FBI remains concerned about the intent of FTOs, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (“ISIS”) and al-Qaida and their affiliates, to carry out or inspire large-scale attacks in the United States, as well as the possibility that FTOs may exploit any successful method of entry to advance a terrorist plot.

Despite its loss of physical territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIS remains relentless in its campaign of violence against the United States and its partners—here at home and overseas. ISIS and its supporters continue to aggressively promote its hate-fueled rhetoric and attract like-minded violent extremists with a willingness to conduct attacks against the United States and our interests abroad. ISIS’ successful use of social media and messaging applications to attract individuals is of continued concern to us. Like other foreign terrorist groups, ISIS advocates for lone offender attacks in the United States and Western countries via videos and

other English language propaganda that have specifically advocated for attacks against civilians, the military, law enforcement, and intelligence community personnel.

Al-Qaida also maintains its desire to conduct and to inspire large-scale attacks. Because continued pressure has degraded some of the group's senior leadership, we assess that, in the near term, al-Qaida is more likely to continue to focus on cultivating its international affiliates and supporting small-scale, readily achievable attacks in regions such as East and West Africa. Nevertheless, propaganda from al-Qaida leaders continues to seek individuals inspired to conduct their own attacks in the United States and other Western nations.

Iran and its global proxies and partners, including Iraqi Shia militant groups, attack and plot against the United States and our allies throughout the Middle East. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force ("IRGC-QF") has also provided support to militant resistance groups and terrorist organizations. And Iran has supported Lebanese Hezbollah and other terrorist groups. Hezbollah has sent operatives to build terrorist infrastructure worldwide. The arrests of individuals in the United States allegedly linked to Hezbollah's main overseas terrorist arm, and their intelligence-collection and -procurement efforts, demonstrate Hezbollah's interest in long-term contingency planning activities here in the Homeland. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has also threatened retaliation for the death of IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani.

While the terrorism threat continues to evolve, the FBI's resolve to counter that threat remains constant. We continually adapt and rely heavily on the strength of our Federal, state, local, Tribal, territorial, and international partnerships to combat all terrorist threats to the United States and its interests. To that end, we use all available lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat these threats while continuing to collect, analyze, and share intelligence concerning the threats posed by violent extremists who desire to harm Americans and U.S. interests. We will continue to share information and encourage the sharing of information among our numerous partners via our Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country, and our legal attaché offices around the world.

In addition to fighting terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons-of-mass-destruction materials ("WMD"), technologies, and expertise, preventing their use by any actor, and securing nuclear and radioactive materials of concern are also top national security priorities for the FBI. The FBI considers preventing, mitigating, investigating, and responding to WMD terrorism a "no-fail" mission because a WMD attack could result in substantial injuries, illness, or loss of lives, and yield significant social, economic, political, and other national security consequences.

Cyber

The FBI has seen a wider-than-ever range of cyber actors threaten Americans' safety, security, and confidence in our digitally connected world. Cybercriminal syndicates and nation-states continue to innovate, using unique techniques to compromise our networks and maximize the reach and impact of their operations. Those techniques include selling malware as a service or targeting vendors to access scores of victims by hacking just one provider.

These criminals and nation-states believe that they can compromise our networks, steal our property, extort us, and hold our critical infrastructure at risk without incurring any risk themselves. In the last few years, we have seen the People's Republic of China ("PRC"), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPRK"), and Russia use cyber operations to target U.S. research. We have seen the PRC working to obtain controlled dual-use technology, while developing an arsenal of advanced cyber capabilities that could be used against other countries in the event of a real-world conflict. And we have seen the disruptive impact a serious supply-chain compromise can have through the SolarWinds-related intrusions, conducted by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. As these adversaries become more sophisticated, we are increasingly concerned about our ability to detect specific cyber operations against U.S. organizations. One of the most worrisome facets is their focus on compromising U.S. critical infrastructure, especially during a crisis.

Making things even more difficult, there is often no bright line that separates where nation-state activity ends, and cybercriminal activity begins. Some cybercriminals contract or sell services to nation-states; some nation-state actors moonlight as cybercriminals to fund personal activities; and some nation-states are increasingly using tools, such as ransomware, typically used by criminal actors.

So, as dangerous as nation-states are, we do not have the luxury of focusing only on them. In the past year, we also have seen cybercriminals target hospitals, medical centers, educational institutions, and other critical infrastructure for theft or ransomware, causing massive disruptions to our daily lives. Incidents affecting medical centers have led to the interruption of computer networks and systems that put patients' lives at increased risk.

We have also seen the rise of an ecosystem of services dedicated to supporting cybercrime in exchange for cryptocurrency. Criminals now have new tools to engage in destructive behavior—for example, deploying ransomware to paralyze entire hospitals, police departments, and businesses—as well as new means to better conceal their tracks. It is not that individual malicious cyber actors have necessarily become much more sophisticated, but that they can now more easily rent sophisticated capabilities.

We must make it harder and more painful for malicious cyber actors and criminals to carry on their malicious activities. As the lead federal agency for threat response, the FBI works seamlessly with domestic and international partners to defend their networks, attribute malicious activity, sanction bad behavior, and take the fight to our adversaries overseas. We must impose consequences on cyber adversaries and use our collective law enforcement and intelligence capabilities to do so through joint and enabled operations sequenced for maximum impact. And we must continue to work with the Department of State and other key departments and agencies to ensure that our foreign partners are able and willing to cooperate in our efforts to disrupt perpetrators of cybercrime.

An example of this approach is the coordinated international operation announced in April 2023 against Genesis Market, a criminal online marketplace offering access to data stolen from over 1.5 million compromised computers around the world containing over 80 million account access credentials. Genesis Market was also a prolific initial access broker ("IAB") in the cyber-crime world, providing criminals a user-friendly database to search for stolen

credentials so they could easily infiltrate a victim's computer. As part of this operation, law enforcement seized 11 domain names used to support Genesis Market's infrastructure pursuant to a warrant authorized by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. A total of 22 international agencies and 44 FBI field offices assisted the FBI Milwaukee Field Office in investigating the case. And on April 5, 2023, the U.S. Department of Treasury announced sanctions against Genesis Market.

As another example, in January 2024, the FBI announced an operation where the FBI and its partners identified a network of hundreds of compromised routers used by the PRC-sponsored hacking group known as Volt Typhoon. The botnet enabled China to hide, among other things, pre-operational reconnaissance and network exploitation against critical infrastructure like our communications, energy, transportation, and water sectors. The PRC took these steps to find and prepare to destroy or degrade the civilian critical infrastructure that keeps us safe and prosperous. To be extremely clear, cyber threats to our critical infrastructure represent real-world threats to our physical safety. Working with our partners, the FBI ran a court-authorized, on-network operation that significantly disrupted this Volt Typhoon botnet and the access it enabled.

This operation was an important step. But there's a lot more to do. To quantify what we are up against: the PRC has a bigger hacking program than every other major nation combined. In fact, if each one of the FBI's cyber agents and intelligence analysts focused exclusively on the PRC threat, the PRC's hackers would still outnumber FBI cyber personnel by at least 50 to 1.

The FBI is doing everything in its power to combat these threats. In total, we took over 1,000 actions against cyber adversaries in 2023, to include arrests, criminal charges, convictions, dismantlements, and disruptions, and enabled many more actions through our dedicated partnerships with the private sector, foreign partners, and with Federal, state, and local entities. We also provided thousands of individualized threat warnings and disseminated 78 public threat advisories by way of Joint Cybersecurity Advisories, FBI Liaison Alert System ("FLASH") reports, Private Industry Notifications ("PINs"), and Public Service Announcements ("PSAs")—many of which were jointly authored with other U.S. agencies and international partners.

In summary, the FBI is engaged in myriad efforts to combat cyber threats, from improving threat identification and information sharing inside and outside of the government to developing and retaining new talent, to examining the way we operate to disrupt and defeat these threats. We take all potential threats to public and private sector systems seriously and will continue to investigate and hold accountable those who pose a threat in cyberspace.

Foreign Intelligence Threats

Nations such as the PRC, Russia, and Iran are becoming more aggressive and more capable than ever before. These nations seek to undermine our core democratic, economic, and scientific institutions, and they employ a growing range of tactics. Defending American institutions and values against these threats is a national security imperative and a priority for the FBI.

With that, the greatest long-term threat to our Nation's ideas, innovation, and economic security is from PRC foreign intelligence and economic espionage. By extension, it is also a threat to our national security. The PRC aspires to reshape the international rules-based system to its benefit, often with little regard for international norms and laws.

When it comes to economic espionage, the PRC uses every means at its disposal, blending cyber, human intelligence, diplomacy, corporate transactions, and other pressure on U.S. companies operating in the PRC, to steal our companies' innovations. These efforts are consistent with the PRC's expressed goals of becoming the preeminent power on the world stage through technology-enabled economic and military development.

To pursue this goal, the PRC uses human intelligence officers, co-optees, and corrupt corporate insiders, as well as sophisticated cyber intrusions, pressure on U.S. companies in China, shell-game corporate transactions, and joint-venture "partnerships" that are anything but true partnerships. There is nothing traditional about the scale of their theft. It is unprecedented. American workers and companies are facing a greater, more complex danger than they have dealt with before. Stolen innovation means stolen jobs, stolen opportunities for American workers, and stolen national power.

As the lead U.S. counterintelligence agency, the FBI is responsible for detecting and lawfully countering the actions of foreign intelligence services and organizations as they seek to adversely affect U.S. national interests. The FBI recognized the need to coordinate similar efforts across all agencies, and therefore established the National Counterintelligence Task Force ("NCITF") in 2019 to create a whole-of-government approach to counterintelligence. The FBI established the national-level NCITF in the National Capital Region to coordinate, facilitate, and focus multi-agency counterintelligence operations, and to programmatically support local Counterintelligence Task Force ("CITF") operations in each FBI field office. Combining the authorities and operational capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Federal, state, and local law enforcement, and local CITFs, the NCITF coordinates and leads whole-of-government efforts to defeat hostile intelligence activities targeting the United States.

The Department of Defense ("DoD") has been a key partner in the NCITF since its founding. While the FBI has had long-term collaborative relationships with DoD entities such as the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and Army Counterintelligence, the NCITF has allowed us to enhance our collaboration with each other for greater impact. We plan to emphasize this whole-of-government approach moving forward as a powerful formula to mitigate modern counterintelligence threats.

In recent years, we have seen a rise in efforts by authoritarian regimes to interfere with freedom of expression and punish dissidents, political opponents, and others abroad. These acts of repression cross national borders, often reaching into the United States. The governments of China, Russia, and Iran, and their proxies stalk, intimidate, and harass expatriates or dissidents who speak against the regimes from within the United States and elsewhere, as well as other individuals these governments view as threats to their regime.

Transnational repression can occur in different forms, including assault, kidnapping,

and murder. Governments use transnational repression tactics to silence the voices of their own or former citizens, U.S. residents, and family members living abroad who are critical of their regimes. This sort of repressive behavior is antithetical to our values. People from all over the world are drawn to the United States by the promise of living in a free and open society that adheres to the rule of law. To ensure that this promise remains a reality, we must continue to use all of our tools to block authoritarian regimes that seek to extend their tactics of repression beyond their own shores.

In addition, our Nation is confronting multifaceted foreign threats seeking both to influence our national policies and public opinion, and to harm our national dialogue and debate. The FBI and our interagency partners remain focused on foreign malign influence operations, including subversive, undeclared, coercive, and criminal actions used by foreign governments in their attempts to sway U.S. citizens' preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, increase discord in the United States, and undermine the American people's confidence in our democratic institutions and processes.

The domestic counterintelligence environment is more complex than ever. We face a persistent and pervasive national security threat from foreign adversaries, particularly the governments of China, Russia, and Iran, who conduct sophisticated intelligence operations using coercion, subversion, malign influence, cyber and economic espionage, traditional spying, and non-traditional human intelligence collection. Together, they pose a continuous threat to U.S. national security and our economy by targeting strategic technologies, industries, sectors, and critical infrastructure. Historically, these asymmetric national security threats involved foreign intelligence service officers seeking U.S. government and U.S. Intelligence Community information. Now, however, the FBI has observed foreign adversaries employing a wider range of nontraditional collection techniques, including the use of human collectors not affiliated with intelligence services, foreign investment in critical U.S. sectors, and infiltration of U.S. supply chains. The FBI continues to adjust its counterintelligence priorities to address this evolution.

Criminal Threats

The United States faces many criminal threats, including financial and health care fraud, transnational and regional organized criminal enterprises, crimes against children, human trafficking, and public corruption. Criminal organizations—domestic and international—and individual criminal activity represent a significant threat to security and safety in communities across the Nation.

A critical tool in protecting the Nation from those who wish to do harm is the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, or NICS. The goal of NICS is to ensure the timely transfer of firearms to eligible gun buyers while striving to keep guns out of the wrong hands. Mandated by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 and launched by the FBI on November 30, 1998, NICS is used by Federal Firearms Licensees ("FFLs") to determine whether a prospective buyer is eligible to buy firearms. NICS receives firearm background checks from tens of thousands of FFLs and performs research and analysis to determine if available information demonstrates that the subject of the NICS check is ineligible to receive a firearm as described under 18 U.S.C. 922(t). In the first complete month of operation in 1998, a total of

892,840 firearm background checks were processed. By contrast, in 2023, approximately 2.4 million checks were processed per month, for a total of 29.9 million processed last year.

The Bipartisan Safer Communities Act (“BSCA”), signed into law in June 2022, requires enhanced NICS background checks for any person under the age of 21 (“U21”). These enhanced background checks are more labor-intensive but have prevented ineligible persons from acquiring firearms. As of July 1, 2024, the NICS Section had completed over 273,400 U21 transactions since the additional checks began on October 4, 2022. A total of 254,514 transactions received “proceed” notifications from NICS; 2,709 received “denied” notifications; 812 of which were a direct result of the expanded background checks required under the provisions of the BSCA. As provisions from the BSCA continue to be implemented, the FBI expects the volume of NICS transactions to continue to grow. Ensuring the timely processing of these inquiries is important to ensure law abiding citizens can exercise their right to purchase a firearm and to protect communities from prohibited, and therefore ineligible, individuals attempting to acquire a firearm.

Violent Crime

Violent crimes and gang activities exact a high toll on individuals and communities. Many of today’s gangs are sophisticated and are well organized. They use violence to control neighborhoods and boost their illegal money-making activities, which include robbery, drug and gun trafficking, fraud, extortion, and prostitution rings. These gangs do not limit their illegal activities to single jurisdictions or communities. The FBI works across such lines, which is vital to the fight against violent crime in big cities and small towns across the Nation. Every day, FBI special agents work in partnership with Federal, state, local, territorial, and Tribal officers and deputies on joint task forces and individual investigations.

FBI joint task forces—Violent Crime Safe Streets, Violent Gang Safe Streets, and Safe Trails—identify and target major groups operating as criminal enterprises. Much of the FBI’s criminal intelligence is derived from our state, local, territorial, and Tribal law enforcement partners, who know their communities inside and out. Joint task forces benefit from FBI surveillance assets, and our sources track these gangs to identify emerging trends. Through these multi-subject and multi-jurisdictional investigations, the FBI concentrates its efforts on high-level groups engaged in patterns of racketeering. This investigative model enables us to target senior gang leadership and to develop enterprise-based prosecutions.

By way of example, the FBI has dedicated tremendous resources to combat the threat of violence posed by MS-13. The atypical nature of this gang has required a multi-pronged approach—we work through our task forces here in the United States, while simultaneously gathering intelligence from and aiding our international law enforcement partners. We do this through the FBI’s Transnational Anti-Gang Task Forces (“TAGs”). Established in El Salvador in 2007 through the FBI’s National Gang Task Force, Legal Attaché San Salvador, and the Department of State, each TAG is a fully operational unit responsible for the investigation of MS-13 operating in the northern triangle of Central America and threatening the United States. This program combines the expertise, resources, and jurisdiction of participating agencies involved in investigating and countering transnational criminal gang activity in the United States and Central America. There are now TAGs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Through

these collaborating efforts, the FBI has achieved substantial success in countering the MS-13 threat.

We are committed to working with our Federal, state, local, and Tribal partners in a coordinated effort to reduce violent crime in the United States and to hold violent criminals accountable.

Transnational Organized Crime (“TOC”)

More than a decade ago, organized crime was characterized by hierarchical organizations, or families that exerted influence over criminal activities in neighborhoods, cities, or states. But organized crime has changed dramatically. Today, international criminal enterprises run multi-national, multi-billion-dollar schemes from start to finish. Modern-day criminal enterprises are flat, fluid networks with global reach. While still engaged in many of the “traditional” organized crime activities such as loan-sharking, extortion, and murder, modern criminal enterprises are now also involved in trafficking counterfeit prescription drugs containing deadly fentanyl, conducting stock market fraud and manipulation, committing cyber-facilitated bank fraud and embezzlement, illicit drug and wildlife trafficking, identity theft, human trafficking, money laundering, alien smuggling, public corruption, weapons trafficking, kidnapping, and other illegal activities. TOC networks exploit legitimate institutions for critical financial and business services that enable the storage or transfer of illicit proceeds. Preventing and combating transnational organized crime demands a concentrated effort by the FBI and Federal, state, local, territorial, Tribal, and international partners.

As part of our efforts to combat the TOC threat, the FBI is focused on the cartels trafficking dangerous narcotics, like illicit fentanyl, across our borders. The FBI has over 350 cases linked to cartel leadership, and 91 of those are along the southern border. Additionally, the FBI actively participates in 18 Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (“OCDETF”) Strike Forces across the United States, investigating major drug trafficking, money laundering, and other high-priority TOC networks. On top of that, through our prescription drug initiative we are pursuing healthcare fraud investigations against medical professionals and pill mills, through our Safe Streets Task Forces, investigating the gangs and criminal groups responsible for distributing dangerous substances like illicit fentanyl, and through our Joint Criminal Opioid Darknet Enforcement team disrupting and dismantling Darknet marketplaces for prescription opioids and drugs like illicit fentanyl.

While the FBI continues to share intelligence about criminal groups with our partners and combines resources and expertise to gain a full understanding of each group, the threat of transnational crime remains a significant and growing threat to national and international security with implications for public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and economic stability across the globe. TOC groups increasingly exploit jurisdictional boundaries to conduct their criminal activities overseas. Furthermore, they are expanding their use of the Darknet to engage in illegal activity while exploiting emerging technology to traffic illicit drugs and contraband across international borders and into the United States.

The FBI continues its efforts to combat organized retail theft and other threats to the United States supply chain. The FBI has eight Major Theft Task Forces located throughout the

United States. These Major Theft Task Forces are staffed by FBI Special Agents and Task Force officers who are subject matter experts in investigating interstate transportation of stolen property matters. The FBI continues to develop and establish additional Major Theft Task Forces to address emerging threats to industry and the United States supply chain.

Crimes Against Children and Human Trafficking

Every year, thousands of children become victims of crimes, whether it results from kidnappings, violent attacks, sexual abuse, human trafficking, or online predators. The FBI is uniquely positioned to provide a rapid, proactive, and comprehensive response. We help identify, locate, and recover child victims. Our strong relationships with Federal, state, local, territorial, Tribal, and international law enforcement partners also help to identify, prioritize, investigate, and deter individuals and criminal networks from exploiting children.

But the FBI's ability to learn about and investigate child sexual exploitation is being threatened by the proliferation of sites on the Darknet and end-to-end encryption. For example, currently, there are at least 30 child sexual abuse material ("CSAM") sites operating openly and notoriously on the Darknet. Some of these exploitative sites are exclusively dedicated to the sexual abuse of infants and toddlers. The sites often expand rapidly, with one site obtaining as many as 200,000 new members within its first few weeks of operation. End-to-end encrypted apps allow offenders to form groups of like-minded individuals to trade files of CSAM and trade tips for how to exploit children—all with no fear of detection.

Another growing area of concern involving the sexual exploitation of children and adults alike is the explosion in incidents of children, teens, and adults being coerced into sending explicit images online and being extorted for money, known as financially motivated "sextortion." A large percentage of these sextortion schemes originate outside the United States, primarily in West African countries such as Nigeria and Ivory Coast. The continued development of Artificial Intelligence ("AI") has made this crime even easier to commit. Perhaps the most difficult part of a successful sextortion is convincing the child to initially share a sexually explicit depiction. Now, with AI, offenders can create the sexually explicit depictions from innocent images available on social media – and then use those created images to extort the child into creating actual depictions or making a financial payment. The FBI continues to collaborate with other law enforcement partners and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children to mitigate this criminal activity and provide the public with informational alerts and victim resources regarding these crimes.

The FBI has several programs in place to arrest child predators and to recover missing and endangered children. To this end, the FBI funds or participates in a variety of endeavors and constructs, including the Innocence Lost National Initiative, the Innocent Images National Initiative, Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Team, Victim Services, over 80 Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Forces, over 90 international Violent Crimes Against Children Task Force officers, and numerous community outreach programs to educate parents and children about safety measures they can follow. Through improved communications, the FBI collaborates with partners throughout the world quickly, playing an integral role in preventing crimes against children.

The Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Team is a rapid-response team with experienced investigators strategically located across the country to quickly respond to child abductions. Investigators provide a full array of investigative and technical resources during the most critical time following the abduction of a child, such as the collection and analysis of DNA, impression, and trace evidence; the processing of digital forensic evidence; and interviewing expertise.

The FBI also focuses efforts to stop human trafficking of both children and adults, including both sex trafficking and forced labor. The FBI works collaboratively with law enforcement partners to disrupt all forms of human trafficking through Human Trafficking Task Forces nationwide. Over a two-week period in 2023, the FBI and its Federal, state, local, and tribal partners executed approximately 350 operations to recover potential victims of human trafficking and other forms of exploitation, and to disrupt potential trafficking and exploitation crimes. These operations identified and located 59 minors who were potential victims of child sex trafficking, child sexual exploitation, or related state or federal offenses and located 59 actively missing children. Furthermore, the FBI and its partners located 141 adults who were identified as potential victims of sexual exploitation, human trafficking, or related state or federal offenses. In addition to identifying and recovering missing children and potential victims, these law enforcement actions led to the identification or arrest of 126 suspects implicated in potential child sexual exploitation, human trafficking, or related state or federal offenses.

While many potential victims of human trafficking encountered or recovered by the FBI are adult U.S. citizens, foreign nationals, children, and other vulnerable populations are disproportionately harmed by both sex and labor trafficking. In 2023, the FBI initiated efforts to develop specialized strategies for identifying and investigating crimes involving forced labor and transnational trafficking of foreign-national victims into the United States. The FBI and its partners take a victim-centered, trauma-informed approach to investigating these cases and strive to ensure the needs of victims are fully addressed at all stages. To accomplish this, the FBI works in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies and victim specialists on the Federal, state, local, territorial, and Tribal levels, as well as with a variety of vetted nongovernmental organizations. Even after the arrest and conviction of human traffickers, the FBI often continues to work with partner agencies and organizations to assist victims and survivors in moving beyond their exploitation.

Key Cross-Cutting Capabilities and Capacities

Operational Technologies

As criminal and terrorist threats become more diverse and dangerous, the role of technology becomes increasingly important to our efforts. We are using technology to improve the way we collect, analyze, and share information. We have seen significant improvement in capabilities and capacities over the past decade; but keeping pace with technology remains a key concern for the future.

The FBI Laboratory is one of the largest and most comprehensive forensic laboratories in the world. Operating out of a state-of-the-art facility in Quantico, Virginia, laboratory

personnel travel the world on assignment, using science and technology to protect our Nation and support law enforcement, intelligence, military, and forensic science partners. The Lab's many services include providing expert testimony, mapping crime scenes, and conducting forensic exams of physical and hazardous evidence. Lab personnel possess expertise in many areas of forensics supporting law enforcement and intelligence purposes, including explosives, trace evidence, documents, chemistry, cryptography, DNA, facial reconstruction, fingerprints, firearms, digital forensics, and WMDs.

One example of the Lab's key services and programs is the Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS"), which allows over 200 law enforcement laboratories throughout the United States to compare DNA samples against over 24 million DNA profiles. Since its inception, CODIS has aided over 680,000 investigations, while maintaining its sterling reputation and the confidence of the American public.

Statutory requirements and recent regulatory changes have significantly expanded the DNA processing requirements of the FBI. For instance, enacted in 2005, the DNA Fingerprint Act (in 34 U.S.C. § 40702(a)(1)(A) and (B)) authorized the Attorney General to collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted, and from non-U.S. persons detained under U.S. authority. The law mandates that Federal DNA collection agencies submit their arrestee collections to the FBI Laboratory for analysis and entry into CODIS. In April 2020, the Department of Justice amended the DNA Fingerprint Act's implementing rule that now precludes the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") from waiving DNA collections. As a result, during the past twelve months, the FBI received an average of 146,000 DNA samples per month, which is more than quadruple the average monthly submission rate for FY 2021 of 36,300 samples. This substantial increase has created massive budget and personnel shortfalls for the FBI. While the FBI has worked with DHS components to automate and streamline workflows, a backlog of over 1.7 million samples (as of July 2024) has developed, increasing the likelihood of arrestees and non-U.S. detainees being released before identification through investigative leads.

Investment in additional expanded DNA capabilities and technology is critical to maintaining and enhancing the FBI's ability to address emerging threats and help mission critical information reach partners and investigators in an expeditious manner.

Conclusion

The strength of any organization is its people. The threats we face as a Nation have never been greater or more diverse and the expectations placed on the FBI have never been higher. Our fellow citizens look to the FBI to protect the United States from all of those threats, and the men and women of the FBI continue to meet and exceed those expectations, every day. I thank them for their dedicated service.

Chairman Jordan, Ranking Member Nadler, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer your questions.

Chair JORDAN. Thank you, Director Wray. We will now proceed under the five-minute rule. The gentleman from North Carolina is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Director Wray, I am way down here, and I appreciate the Chair giving me this because I have got to leave but let me ask this question. Why doesn't the FBI disclose to the American people all the investigative detail and evidence that you are gathering as it is gathered?

Mr. WRAY. Well, we have tried to be transparent with both Congress and the American people as we are going along in the investigation, frankly, unusually so for an ongoing investigation given the sheer nature of it. We have provided a lot of information. I expect to continue to provide information. I expect to be able to provide some additional information here today in response to your questions and your colleagues, but part of the issue is that as like in any investigation, as we proceed, facts evolve. Our understanding of what somebody said turns out to have more context than we didn't have before. We have additional leads out there. So, part of our goal is not just to respect the ongoing investigation process, but also to make sure that we don't prematurely provide information that then two days later turns out to be different than what told people because that is very much kind of a natural part of any investigation.

Mr. BISHOP. So, did Crooks fire eight shots?

Mr. WRAY. We have recovered eight cartridges on the roof.

Mr. BISHOP. Why was Crooks allowed to get off eight shots?

Mr. WRAY. Well, that, is something we are still digging into. Again, maybe this is a good place for me to make clear the different investigations that are going on. So, certainly, I understand—

Mr. BISHOP. Well, given that I have only got three minutes left, I am really interested because I appreciate your invitation. You said you are prepared to disclose things as questions are asked. So, I don't want to waste time. I just want to get to the questions that might—and as many Members that can ask questions that you will answer. I actually think you—I would be glad for you to go on soliloquy, frankly, and tell us what you know. I think the American people want to know.

Why was President Trump not kept off the stage?

Mr. WRAY. We don't know the answer to that, but I want to be clear, and this is important because I think it goes to the questions that I can and cannot answer. Our investigation, the FBI's mandate, is focused on the shooter and all things related to his attack. Now, obviously, I understand very much the intense interest and focus on the Secret Service's performance, actions, decisionmaking, et cetera. There are two separate after-action reviews that the DHS Inspector General and the outside independent panel that's been convened to focus on this. Now, our investigation—

Mr. BISHOP. Here is the problem. We are out 13 days, and you say we have been disclosing. We had the colonel from the Pennsylvania State Police in front of Homeland yesterday. He was quite candid. He disclosed to us that Butler Emergency Services Unit personnel were posted into the windows on the second floor of the AGR Building, that they left there to go pursue the person that

they spotted, Crooks; that they texted a photo of Crooks to the PSP representative in the Command Center. That information was relayed to the United States Secret Service. They asked that it be texted to someone else. That was many minutes before President Trump took the stand.

What we don't know is why they were not keeping him off the stand? To the extent—I know we always hear when there is a criminal investigation, you have to wait for that to develop, but do you have any reason—do you have any other target in your criminal investigation other than Crooks who is dead?

Mr. WRAY. We are investigating the shooter both to determine his motive and his preparations and activities before the shooting, but also to make sure whether or not there are any coconspirators, accomplices—

Mr. BISHOP. At this point, have you developed any evidence to suggest that there are any accomplices or cooperators or assisters?

Mr. WRAY. Not at this time, but again, the investigation is ongoing.

Mr. BISHOP. Here is the thing. Why we wait, maybe for months, and I hate to say this because I am not trying to take a pot shot, the country went for years with the understanding that the Hunter Biden laptop was Russian disinformation as offered by respected former Intel Officials and the whole time the FBI had the laptop and then let that happen in public until finally offering testimony in the case. To the degree we wait to hear as a country and as a Congress, what has happened in this event, because the FBI's conducting an investigation it provides quarter for the U.S. Secret Service not perhaps to reckon with the problems that are obvious to everyone.

So, let me get a couple in, well, I have 13 more seconds, one more question perhaps. Senator Grassley says the records of the day show that there was a counter unmanned aerial surveillance operator onsite. Was there? Why did that person not prevent Crooks from being able to use a drone?

Mr. WRAY. So, again, questions about the Secret Service's performance are better directed to those other reviews. What I can tell you when it comes to drones, is that Crooks himself had a drone and I am prepared to answer questions here today about the shooter and his use of the drone, for example.

Mr. BISHOP. My time has expired.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. The Ranking Member is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. As I said in my opening statement, political violence is a scourge and entirely unacceptable no matter the source or the target. Last October, the far-right conspiracy theorists broke into Nancy Pelosi's home and bludgeoned her husband. Prominent Republicans mocked the attack and promoted conspiracy theories about it.

Last August, an armed Utah man who threatened to kill President Biden was killed as FBI agents attempted to serve a warrant on him hours before President Biden landed in this State. Some on the right claim that the man was simply a "Second Amendment enthusiast." In recent weeks and months, those on the right have repeatedly quoted the civil war with an Ohio State Senator saying

that if Republicans lose the election “it is going to take a civil war to save the country and it will be saved.” The president of *The Heritage Foundation* likewise said that,

We are in the process of the second American Revolution which will remain bloodless if the left allows it to be.

Director, it is obviously important that we respect First Amendment protection, but there is clearly a point that with some violent rhetoric crosses over into threats of violence or leads to actual violence. Could you describe how the FBI looks at this relationship between rhetoric and action and what you have seen around the country?

Mr. WRAY. So, I appreciate the question, and this is an issue that I’ve been talking about for some time. In our view there is a right way and a wrong way under the First Amendment to express your views no matter how passionate or even angry you are. Violence and threats of violence is not the right way. We don’t care what you’re upset about or who you’re upset with, from the FBI’s perspective when it turns to violence and threats of violence, that’s when we have to draw the line. That’s when we get engaged.

There is an alarming phenomenon that we’ve seen over the last several years of that kind of passion and heated rhetoric turning into actual violence and threats of violence. We’ve seen it against public officials of all sorts, we’ve seen it against law enforcement. The number of officers shot and killed in the line of duty in this country is frankly outrageous and alarming. I know that because every time an officer is shot and killed anywhere in this country since the day I started as the FBI Director, I personally call the Chief or the Sheriff to express my condolences and to talk to them about the victim’s family.

The number of those shootings that are ambush-related, meaning somebody is targeting law enforcement because they’re law enforcement, is particularly alarming. I have made around 400 of those phone calls. It’s almost every five days that a law enforcement officer is killed in the line of duty. That is an example of the kind of ways in which passions and heated rhetoric can bubble over into violence.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Members of Congress, their families, and their staff have witnessed an alarming rise in threats against them. I appreciate the work your agency has done to investigate and address these threats, but I am concerned that we do not seem to be stemming the tide. What is the FBI doing to ensure that the Members of Congress, their families, and their staffs are safe?

Mr. WRAY. So, we have a very close relationship with the Capitol Police, and we have members of the Capitol Police, for example, who are on some of our task forces. We share intelligence information about things that we’re seeing, trends that we’re seeing with Capitol Police and others in law enforcement. Obviously, if we have specific information about an effort to target a Member of Congress, then we’re getting with Capitol Police in a much more specific way. Those are some of the things that we’re doing.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Now, Director, your office is leading the investigation into the attempted assassination of Donald Trump. Republicans in Congress including Members of this Committee have repeatedly called for defunding the FBI. What impact would

the defunding, or even just limiting your funding have on the FBI's ability to conduct this and other investigations?

Mr. WRAY. So, I understand that there are heated views, opinions about us, just like there are about every institution in today's America, but cutting our funding is incredibly shortsighted. The people it really hurts are State and local law enforcement and the American people we're all sworn to protect.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. During my remaining time I want to turn to a different matter. In recent days Republican Members of Congress have attacked Presumptive Democratic Presidential Nominee Kamala Harris as a, quote, "DEI candidate," which presumably is code for woman and person of color. It is not a new theme for them. In May, Chair Jordan wrote to you claiming that because of DEI initiatives the FBI is no longer hiring, quote, "the best and brightest candidates to fill the position of special agent."

With the remaining time—with my remaining time, Director Wray, can you please answer the following questions? Is it true that hiring women and people of color means that FBI is no longer hiring the best and the brightest to serve as law enforcement officers? Is there any evidence that women and people of color are less effective in law enforcement roles? What message does it send to perspective applicants when their leaders demean them and make judgments about them based solely on their race or gender?

Chair JORDAN. The witness may respond.

Mr. WRAY. So, any notion that we have lowered our standards, our hiring standards is just not accurate. In fact, our standards are as competitive and selective as ever. We have tens of thousands of people applying. Our selection rate is about 3.1 percent, which is more selective than just about any university in the country. Most of our applicants—I think something like 50 percent of them are coming from military or law enforcement backgrounds. About 50 percent of them also have advanced degrees. The average age is around 31, which means they're bringing a wealth of personal and professional experience when they arrive.

To suggest that those people because of efforts related to diversity or anything like that are less qualified, frankly is not at all consistent with what I see having visited all our field offices and seen these young people in action, I think is an insult to those hardworking men and women who've signed up to dedicate their lives for this country.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, director. I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back.

Director, let me go back to where Mr. Bishop was. Tell me about the drone. You acted like you wanted to fill us in on that. Fill us in.

Mr. WRAY. So, we have recovered a drone that the shooter appears to have used. It's being exploited and analyzed by the FBI lab. The drone was recovered in his vehicle. So, at the time of the shooting the drone was in his vehicle with the controller.

In addition, our investigation has uncovered—

Chair JORDAN. Do you know what time of day he flew it and if he flew it on the day of—

Mr. WRAY. So, in addition, it appears that around 3:50–4:00 p.m., in that window on the day of the shooting that the shooter was flying the drone around the area—

Chair JORDAN. Two hours—

Mr. WRAY. I want to be clear, when I say the area, not over the stage and that part of the area itself, but I would say about 200 yards, give or take, away from that.

Chair JORDAN. OK.

Mr. WRAY. We think, but we do not know—so again, this is one of those things that's qualified because of our ongoing review—that he was live streaming, viewing the footage from again about 11 minutes in around the 3:50–4:00 p.m. range.

Chair JORDAN. Two hours before he is flying a drone in the vicinity of the rally?

Mr. WRAY. Yes, about 200 yards away. Yes.

Chair JORDAN. OK. Two hundred yards? That is important information. What about the bombs that we have heard about in the shooter's car?

Mr. WRAY. So, again, the FBI lab is exploiting those explosive devices. We've recovered three devices: Two in his vehicle and one back in his residence.

Chair JORDAN. Are these what you would call—your experts would call sophisticated operations or—

Mr. WRAY. I think—

Chair JORDAN. I don't know. That is what I have been told by people who have some understanding of this area.

Mr. WRAY. Yes, I think it's—we've seen more sophisticated and less. I would say these are relatively—again, key word relatively—crude devices themselves, but they did have the ability to be detonated remotely. So, to that point, in addition to the two devices that we recovered out of his vehicle there were receivers for those two explosive devices with the devices. Then on the shooter himself when he was killed by law enforcement he had a transmitter with him.

Now, I do want to add one important point here is at the moment it looks to us—again, ongoing review, and I can't say that too many times—

Chair JORDAN. Right, right.

Mr. WRAY. —at the moment it looks because of the on/off position on the receivers, that if he had tried to detonate those devices from the roof, it would not have worked.

Chair JORDAN. OK.

Mr. WRAY. That doesn't mean the explosives weren't dangerous.

Chair JORDAN. I am sure we are going to get into all these subjects a little bit later as well. Tell us what you can about the encrypted platforms we have heard about.

Mr. WRAY. So, one of the things that we're drilling into hard with the shooter in an effort to try to learn more about his state of mind, his motive, his ideology, his contacts, and everything else is to look at all his devices, any social media accounts he had, et cetera.

Chair JORDAN. Right, right.

Mr. WRAY. One of the things we've learned in finally getting into his phone, which was also a significant technical challenge from an

encryption perspective—but in addition, once we got on the phone it turned out he was using some encrypted messaging application.

Chair JORDAN. Again, the same question relative to the bombs, was this pretty sophisticated or this is kind of the norm you see with folks in similar situations, or how would you describe it?

Mr. WRAY. Yes, on this subject I would say this is unfortunately now become very commonplace and it's a real challenge for not just the FBI, but State and local law enforcement all over this country.

Chair JORDAN. Tell me exactly the scope of—does the scope of your investigation include what I call that critical five minutes from when the—6:09 when—this is based I think on information you have given to Congress—6:09 when the shooter is identified on the roof, and 6:14 when President Trump is ultimately escorted off, and all that happens, the shots that take place in between there? Do you have access to the communications that were going on at the time in that critical five minutes?

Mr. WRAY. So, our investigation—when you say scope, our investigation includes that timeframe, although focused again on the shooter himself and as part of that—

Chair JORDAN. Understand. The shooter is involved in that—he is obviously involved in that timeframe.

Mr. WRAY. Correct. As part of that, as part of our focus, our investigation of the shooter and the attack, of course, we are interviewing law enforcement from the scene, because those are some of the most significant witnesses. We're obviously getting access to their materials and that kind of things. The Secret Service has been fully cooperative.

Chair JORDAN. You are getting access to any—you have access to the communications that exist there?

Mr. WRAY. That exact question I don't—as I sit here at the moment, I don't know the exact answer to that question, but I know the Secret Service has been cooperative with us.

Chair JORDAN. Congress would like access to those communications as well. Not just that five minutes, although I think that is the critical timeframe. There are lots of communications we would love to have access to as well.

I see my time is up and they have called votes on the floor. I think there are about six minutes left in votes. So, the Committee will stand in recess until approximately 10 minutes after votes conclude on the House floor.

[Recess.]

Chair JORDAN. The Committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California for five minutes.

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Director Wray, for being here with us today. Before I ask anything let me just echo the comments made by others and especially the Ranking Member decrying the State of political violence in this country. It is completely unacceptable. We have a democratic system that allows us to disagree, but not to take those disagreements to violence. That is what we have elections for.

I want to also thank you and all the FBI for the work that you do and frankly the abuse, unwarranted abuse and criticism that have been directed to you by conspiracy theorists and others. It

doesn't make your hard job any easier and I want you to know that many of us notice that and appreciate the work that you and your team are doing.

Let me just ask a couple of quick questions: First, many of us are interested in the motives of the shooter here. When it is an assault on a political figure you immediately assume there is a political motive. That may be the case here; we don't know yet.

I was interested in what you are seeing on his phone. The press has reported that he had pictures not only of Mr. Trump, but of Mr. Biden, and various other Members and political figures. Can you discern was there an element of mainly Republicans, mainly Democrats? Was it all over the board? Can you enlighten us about that?

Mr. WRAY. Well, this is a place where it's particularly important for me to reiterate the caveat that I've included before because in this instance in particular we have a lot of legal process out for additional accounts, and things like that the shooter is associated with. So, we're hoping to learn more. We're still exploiting a number of the digital devices.

Ms. LOFGREN. Right.

Mr. WRAY. I think it's fair to say that we do not yet have a clear picture of his motive. I think it's important for me to explain because I understand of course why everybody wants to know the answers to those questions.

Often in an investigation from interviewing people that the subject was in close contact with, looking at the individual's social media accounts, messages, often things—physical evidence in the person's residence. You might see a manifesto, things like that. We're not seeing that yet, but we are digging hard because this is one of the central questions for us.

What I can say is that the shooter appears to have done a lot of searches of public figures in general. So far, we're seeing news articles and things like that, and so the images that have been reported about. Really what we're talking about there are when you do a news search of an article—

Ms. LOFGREN. I see.

Mr. WRAY. —the image appears in the cache as opposed to like a search for that specific individual.

Ms. LOFGREN. For that specific person.

Mr. WRAY. Again, I really want to be clear that's a place that we're doing a lot of work right now. So, more to come on that.

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, I thank you for that clarification. We are interested also in the role of access to weapons when it comes to this terrible crime. The shooter used a semiautomatic rifle, really a weapon of war that sadly has also been used in mass shootings around the country including in my own district. It seems to me that the assault weapons ban that was once in place has to be a part of the national answer to curbing the epidemic of gun violence in America.

I wonder if you could, with your help, Director Wray, understand a few aspects of the investigation. It is my understanding that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, ATF, was quickly able to trace the gun, the gun's purchaser, using records from an out-of-business gun store, records that the government is

required to collect. Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have suggested that collection should stop. There have been efforts to digitize it which have been resisted.

Can you tell us about how the origin of this gun purchase was discovered, and the technology used?

Mr. WRAY. Well, I guess what I can say is we located a number of firearms associated with the shooter and his family. I think it was a total of 14 in the house. The weapon that he used for the attempted assassination was an AR-style rifle that was purchased legally, that he—it's my understanding acquired—I think bought actually from his father who was the one who originally bought it, again legally.

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you.

Mr. Chair, my time is expired so I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentlelady yields back.

The gentleman from California is recognized.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

Director, I will try to ask questions that are answerable, too. I think that has been done pretty well on both sides.

You do the advanced threat assessment and deliver that information as to the general threat, and then specifics as to protected people to the Secret Service. Is that correct?

Mr. WRAY. Well, sort of. The Secret Service does a threat assessment, but they're doing that based on intelligence that they receive from a number of sources, including of course the FBI. So, whenever we have threat information related to a particular individual or protectee, then we share it with the Secret Service at a number of levels.

Mr. ISSA. So, you are a participant but ultimately the responsibility for threat assessment as to these individuals belong to the Secret Service?

Mr. WRAY. Well again, the threat assessment for the individual belongs to the Secret Service, but we are an important part of that because we share threat information if we have any. They get threat information from a variety of sources.

Mr. ISSA. OK. You get them from the same variety of sources? They have got no sources that are excluded from the FBI, do they?

Mr. WRAY. I'm not aware of any that are excluded from the FBI, but they may receive information that comes directly to them that didn't come to us.

Mr. ISSA. Sure. OK. Director, do you believe that the former President Trump was a high-risk threat under your assessment?

Mr. WRAY. Well, I believe that former President Trump, really frankly like any President or former President, is a very high-profile figure and attracts a lot of unfortunately the kind of threats that we've been talking about.

Mr. ISSA. So, it is fair to say—not on a scale of one to a million with little nuances, but on a scale of 1–10, President Trump's risk was very similar to a current President, very similar to—because he was the presumptive nominee and leading in the polls, and so on that he was a high risk by any standard. Is that correct?

Mr. WRAY. Certainly, there's a reason why he had some much protection around him.

Mr. ISSA. OK. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., the son of an assassinated Senator and the nephew of an assassinated President—would you say he was also as a Presidential candidate at significant risk?

Mr. WRAY. Again, I think any Presidential candidate raises some level of risk.

Mr. ISSA. OK.

Mr. WRAY. It might vary from candidate to candidate.

Mr. ISSA. No, but it is clearly a risk. OK.

So, in a nutshell the day before this attack President Trump was documented not to have gotten on multiple occasions from the Secret Service what they asked for. The day after it looks like they are getting more. The day before RFK had been denied by the President multiple times Secret Service protection. The day after he now has it.

So, now my question is; is the actions of a 20-year-old with—a lone gunman on a roof sufficient to change the risk assessment in your mind for President Trump and RFK, or are we just realizing the threat that was always there and being more appropriate in matching it?

I know that is a little vague, but you have been at this for a long time. Hindsight is 20/20. Now that we have hindsight, is it fair to say that giving Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., security, upping the security including drones overhead support for the President—former President, these are things that in hindsight should have done the day before?

Mr. WRAY. Well, let me try to answer your question this way: Of course, as I said, the assessments of the level of security to be provided to individual protectees—

Mr. ISSA. No, I understand it is the Secret Service's decision.

Mr. WRAY. What I would say to you is that—and I've been saying for quite some time, including in front of the Committees of this Congress, that we are in an elevated threat environment, and we have been for some time. That comes from a variety of quarters. It is quite frankly a dangerous time to be a prominent public official.

Mr. ISSA. Well, in regard to that, the other side has spent a lot of time talking about what people in the right have said, but there was an attempted assassination on a Supreme Court Justice. We have had the highest-ranking Senator on the other side of this body saying that there were actions, that they were accountable.

We have had multiple Members of Congress in both the House and the Senate berating the character of members of the Supreme Court as a result of their decisions made, sometimes 6–3, sometimes unanimous, whatever. Are those comments, not any one of them, but are those comments and the generation of that sort of, oh, this guy is bad for democracy, this Supreme Court Justice is a threat to democracy—is that the kind of thing that raises the threat level and would you caution against that?

Mr. WRAY. Well, I do believe that we've seen an increase in threats of violence, which again, that's the FBI's lane, not rhetoric, no matter how despicable or heated it is. Violence and threats of violence, we have seen an uptick in threats toward judges, among other prominent public officials, including as you say a case that

we helped investigate involving a threat to a sitting Supreme Court Justice.

Mr. ISSA. An attempt.

Mr. WRAY. An attempt. Correct. Right.

Mr. ISSA. Yes, thank you.

Mr. WRAY. It's a reflection of a broader phenomenon that we are seeing in this country where people—again, very passionate. I respect that. Very angry. I respect that. There's a right way and wrong way to express yourself when you're angry. Violence and threats of violence just can't be it. That's where we fit in. It's not my role as FBI Director to call out particular people's rhetoric. There's a place for that, but that's not my role as FBI Director. When it turns to violence and threats of violence, that has to be treated as unacceptable and that's the way we look at it.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. Director, when did the FBI learn that Iran was threatening President Trump's life?

Mr. WRAY. So, I want to be a little bit careful here, not talk about specific classified information. We have been for quite some time—and I'll stick with what's in the open record. We for some time, and I, in particular, for some time have been calling out the efforts by the Iranian government to attempt to retaliate for the killing of Soleimani by going after current or former prominent U.S. officials. We've had an indictment against it.

That we need to recognize the brazenness of the Iranian regime including right here in the United States. I expect that we're going to see more of it, and I expect there will be more coming on that. I'm not aware of any threat information related to protectees that wasn't passed in a timely way, but I can't really get into specifics here.

Chair JORDAN. It is the minority's time here, but I just felt that was a question the Committee needed to understand. It sounds like you have known that for a long time. That information was conveyed to the Secret Service?

Mr. WRAY. Any information related to threats against the former President, which again as we've talked about happens all too often. It's something that we have a whole process of. We routinely share with the Secret Service on a number of levels in a timely way. To my knowledge that has consistently been followed.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman from Georgia is recognized.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here, Director Wray. Director Wray, the FBI is the independent law enforcement agency under the Department of Justice, is that correct?

Mr. WRAY. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Does the FBI Director currently report to anyone?

Mr. WRAY. Well, you mean in a chain of command reporting structure kind of thing?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. WRAY. Yes, so the FBI is part of the Justice Department. On the org chart you would see that the FBI Director, and it's been true for decades, reports to the Deputy Attorney General, who reports to the Attorney General. Obviously, reports in a communication sense. I report to any number of people.

Mr. JOHNSON. As opposed to a micromanagement reporting system?

Mr. WRAY. Correct.

Mr. JOHNSON. You would take issue, would you not, with any proposal that would change or alter that chain of command and place you, or place a FBI Director in the position of reporting directly to the President, would you not? You would oppose that?

Mr. WRAY. I don't think that would be a wise reporting structure. I think the structure that we've had for decades now makes sense. I think there's a difference between independence in a sort of organizational structure perspective and independence in terms of the way you do the work. Obviously, the FBI is part of the Justice Department.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well reporting directly to the President would eliminate your independence, would it not?

Mr. WRAY. I don't think it would help.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. You are familiar with Project 2025, are you not?

Mr. WRAY. I've seen news reports about it. I'm not particularly familiar with it.

Mr. JOHNSON. You are aware that it is a game plan for President Trump's first 120 days in office, correct?

Mr. WRAY. I'm not really familiar with the details. Again, I've seen reporting about it.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, it is. It is. What he proposes to do is to force the FBI Director to report directly to him. That is what he wants to do within the first 120 days. He also wants to eliminate the position of FBI General Counsel. That is also set forth in Project 2025. Would you recommend that?

Mr. WRAY. I think the FBI's Office of General Counsel serves an incredibly important role, including in terms of advising our workforce. We have 38,000 people. The idea of having an organization like ours, an independent law enforcement agency like ours that doesn't have its own General Counsel's office doesn't make sense to me.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, it would seem like any proposal that would force the Director to report to the President and then there would be no legal counsel for the Director of the FBI—that seems like it is an attempt to neuter the FBI, and render it accountable only to the President. Isn't that correct?

Mr. WRAY. Well, let me put it this way: I recognize that the FBI Director, this FBI Director and every FBI Director before me, serves at the pleasure of the President. That's part of our system. I was appointed by President Trump. I respect that. I think that's a part of our structure. Independence in terms of how we do our work is what matters to me. We need to be able to do our work in a way that is free from political interference.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, you wouldn't be able to do that by reporting everything you do to the President and getting his authority and approval before you take action, correct?

Mr. WRAY. I don't think that would be a wise approach.

Mr. JOHNSON. Then there is even a proposal to replace many of those 38,000 dedicated civil servants who work for the FBI, replace them with a MAGA group that has pledged its allegiance to Donald

Trump. What danger would that bring to the FBI if that were to happen?

Mr. WRAY. Well again, I haven't read or reviewed this thing that you're referring to, but—

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, assuming what I say is true—

Mr. WRAY. —the FBI is made up of 38,000 dedicated career law enforcement professionals. It has no political appointees of any kind unless you count me as a nominee of the former President.

Mr. JOHNSON. You don't want that to change either, do you?

Mr. WRAY. I don't think that should change. I think that is—

Mr. JOHNSON. You don't want a bunch of MAGA loyalist being the employees of the FBI?

Mr. WRAY. That is part of how we do our work. Right.

We're coming up 116 years of the FBI and that's the way it has been for 116 years.

Mr. JOHNSON. It would be crazy to take 38,000 MAGA loyalists and put them at the FBI. That is frightening. That is what Project 2025 proposes. I am glad to know that you are not with that program. With that I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back.

The gentleman from Florida is recognized.

Mr. GAETZ. Was the shooter on the FBI's radar in any way prior to the assassination attempt?

Mr. WRAY. We did not have any information about the shooter. He was not in our holdings before the shooting.

Mr. GAETZ. No communication in any chat rooms? No CIs or confidential human sources have had any interaction with—

Mr. WRAY. No. We've run a thorough search for the subject through all our holdings and he was not in them anywhere.

Mr. GAETZ. Were there any FBI agents or informants present at the Trump rally in Butler?

Mr. WRAY. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Jordan was talking to you about Iran. Were law enforcement resources diverted from the protection of President Trump to John Bolton, as a consequence of concern that Mr. Bolton might have been the target of Iranian malign efforts?

Mr. WRAY. That's really a Secret Service decision. I don't know the answer to that. That's really something they would know better.

What I can tell you is that there are a number of individuals—you mentioned one—who we have brought a case, a specific criminal case, for the Iranians targeting for assassination, but how the Secret Service allocates—

Mr. GAETZ. Are you going to get that answer to us, whether or not resources were diverted from Trump to Bolton? Is that just going to be part of your review?

Mr. WRAY. I think that's going to be part of the reviews by the Inspector, the Inspector General, and the after—

Mr. GAETZ. The Inspector General for DHS, right?

Mr. WRAY. The DHS and the outside panel after action—

Mr. GAETZ. Right. Got it. That's an important point because the Inspector General for DHS has really fallen out of favor with the Administration because he's been pointing out all the problems on the border with Mayorkas and Biden. We're always worried that

they're about to fire him, which would be a really bad idea now that this role that you've identified is so critical. It would be a bad idea to fire the IG for DHS during the pendency of this, right, Mr. Director?

Mr. WRAY. I don't think that would be a good idea.

Mr. GAETZ. I'm with you on that.

So, I want to zoom out a little bit. How often do you brief President Biden?

Mr. WRAY. You mean on this specific case?

Mr. GAETZ. No, just generally. No, in your role as FBI Director.

Mr. WRAY. I don't know that I could give you a number.

Mr. GAETZ. Is it weekly, monthly, or daily?

Mr. WRAY. It's not at a regular cadence. There have been times when there have been months at a time when I haven't, and then, there have been times when several days apart I have. It's always with other people.

Mr. GAETZ. The Vice President, is she typically there?

Mr. WRAY. Often has been.

Mr. GAETZ. OK. So, when did you notice his decline?

Mr. WRAY. In my interactions in my role, all my interactions with the current President have been completely professional.

Mr. GAETZ. Right, but his cognitive decline. I'm not saying he treated you unprofessionally, just maybe not picking things up as quickly as he used to.

Mr. WRAY. Again, I don't meet with him very often, but what you're describing is not something that I've observed during my interactions with him.

Mr. GAETZ. We've had it observed so often that the Ranking Member and Mr. Schiff on this Committee have said that he could no longer continue as a candidate. So, since you're the FBI Director, I was just sort of wondering who's running the country?

Mr. WRAY. My—

Mr. GAETZ. If something bad happened, you'd have to go brief President Biden about it right now, God forbid.

Mr. WRAY. On any number of occasions, I have briefed the President, and as I said, those briefings have all been uneventful and unremarkable.

Mr. GAETZ. Oh, I can imagine them being uneventful.

In the work where the Vice President is also present, like you say there's more than half the time there's these briefings she's there, too?

Mr. WRAY. I don't know if I said more than half the time. Certainly, there have been times where she's been present; there have been other times where she hasn't.

Mr. GAETZ. I take you at your word when you say this is the most complicated threat environment you've ever observed over a long career in law enforcement. I'm just kind of wondering, with this assassination attempt, with the invasion at our border, with all the Hamas that have been let in, that you've talked about and briefed about, is Biden up to it?

If he's not up to it, and you're a guy who's been regularly briefing him, who's been in on this conspiracy to hide the real Joe Biden from all of us for years? It never occurred to you that this guy wasn't up to it in all these briefings you did?

Mr. WRAY. As I said, my briefings with the President have all been completely fine. I briefed.

Mr. GAETZ. Were they between 10 a.m.—4 p.m.?

Mr. WRAY. He's asked questions. There hasn't been anything of note in the area that you're talking about.

Mr. GAETZ. Yes. Did you ever have to brief him before 10 a.m. or after 4 p.m.? We hear those are his good hours.

Mr. WRAY. Certainly, the times that I have briefed have included outside those hours.

Mr. GAETZ. All right. OK. I just think the American people want to know how we got to this point with someone who's so diminished, his own party has, basically, put him out to pasture. Since you had close proximity and the Vice President had close proximity, I'm just wondering if you are being straight with all us about how things were going with him. I guess we'll have to figure that out.

Mr. WRAY. You can count on me to be straight with you, sir.

Mr. GAETZ. We'll see.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back.

The gentleman from Tennessee is recognized.

Mr. COHEN. Thank you.

First, I'd like to recognize the unfortunate fact that our colleague and my colleague side-by-side with me for many, many years in this Committee, Sheila Jackson Lee is no longer with us. She was a great Member and a force for America, and her loss is felt greatly.

Second, I'd like to say to the FBI Director that there were some remarks made when you were introduced, peremptory remarks, saying that people don't have great faith in the FBI now, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. I have great faith in the FBI, and I think most of us on this side of the aisle do. We appreciate your work and appreciate your being here.

Some on the other side of the aisle have cast aspersions on the FBI and on law enforcement. If they don't want to support law enforcement, that's their business, but I support law enforcement, and the FBI is the top rank of law enforcement in our country. So, I thank you and all your people that work with you.

Third, there's been some questions about the FBI maybe being weaponized. Did President Biden ever ask you to get involved in the case in Orlando, Florida, where Kevin McCarthy says that Mr. Gaetz was investigated for some sexual involvement with a 17-year-old girl? Did the President or anybody in the Democratic Party, as Mr. McCarthy has suggested, weaponize you and tried to get you involved in that case?

Mr. WRAY. No, sir.

Mr. COHEN. Good. Thank you. I just wanted to make sure of that.

In Butler, Pennsylvania, I read something about a ladder, that he used a ladder to get up on that roof, and that the ladder was found somewhere a distance away. Is that true?

Mr. WRAY. So, we do know that he purchased a ladder. I think, if I recall correctly, it was about a five-foot-tall type of ladder. Importantly, we did not find the ladder at the scene. So, it's not clear that he used the ladder to get on top of the roof.

Mr. COHEN. So, you don't think the ladder—

Mr. WRAY. We're still digging into all that, things related to the ladder and his access to the roof. He did buy a ladder, but the ladder was not found at the scene.

Mr. COHEN. The ladder didn't have any feet on it?

Mr. WRAY. Any feet?

Mr. COHEN. It didn't walk off?

Mr. WRAY. Oh, yes, right.

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir.

There have been a lot of threats against public officials. We've seen Mr. Scalise terribly shot and we saw Gabby Giffords shot and other Congress people. Many of us have had death threats, and the FBI is made aware of those to help protect us, and I appreciate that greatly.

We've also had election officials and poll workers threatened. What is the FBI doing in consultation with other law enforcement to ensure every eligible voter can safely and confidently cast a ballot this year?

Mr. WRAY. So, when it comes to threats to election workers, in particular, we participate in the Election Threats Task Force that DOJ set up. There have been a number, quite a number already of arrests in convictions under that Task Force.

We have got a number of investigations underway that involve all kinds of threats to election workers, ranging from online threats to—there were even some mailings that included fentanyl. So, there's been a number of types of threats to election workers. These are, after all, people who are putting in their own time for the good of the country to try to help us have a functioning democracy. So, the idea that they would be targeted with violence is just outrageous.

We are sharing information with election officials about things to be on the lookout for. We have election crime coordinators in all 50—

Mr. COHEN. You'll be prepared for Election Day with additional—the FBI will be looking out for the election—

Mr. WRAY. Yes.

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. Thank you.

Jeffrey Epstein has been in the news a lot lately about involvement with certain people high in politics involved. Did the FBI conduct a raid on his townhouse in New York when he was incarcerated in New York? There was a raid on his East side townhouse.

Mr. WRAY. Well, I don't know about a raid. I know we executed a number of searches in the course of our fairly extensive investigation related to Mr. Epstein.

Mr. COHEN. Can you tell me if during that search if you came across and have within your possession of the FBI tapes of him with other individuals that he might have taken in, people and compromising people—

Mr. WRAY. I don't know that there's anything I can share related to that. I can see if there's information we could provide and maybe get back to you with it.

Mr. COHEN. If there were tapes of people in prominent positions, friends of his he posed for pictures with, possibly in compromising positions, it would be—the public I think has a right to see those.

Mr. WRAY. Well, how we handle evidence recovered in a criminal investigation has all kinds of rules that apply to it. I recognize the intense public interest in the subject, but we'd have to follow our rules. I'm happy, like I said, I'm happy to followup with my team on it.

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir.

I appreciate your service and thank you for being here today.

Chair JORDAN. Will the gentleman yield the last five?

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. BIGGS. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Director Wray, for being here.

How many shots did the shooter fire?

Mr. WRAY. Well, we know that he fired at least eight, because we recovered eight cartridges on the roof.

Mr. BIGGS. OK. Are all the cartridges and the unspent bullets, have they been—do you know how many there are? You've accounted for all those? I assume—yes?

Mr. WRAY. We believe we have. We believe we have. Again, there is lots of work still ongoing, but, yes, we believe we have accounted.

Mr. BIGGS. Did the recovered shells, the cartridges, match the shooter's rifle?

Mr. WRAY. My recollection is yes.

Mr. BIGGS. You conducted analysis that confirms that?

Mr. WRAY. Well, we work with ATF, but, yes. So, some of the work has been divided up, but—

Mr. BIGGS. How many shells, casings were recovered from the location of the counter-snipers?

Mr. WRAY. I'm sorry? I couldn't hear the last part.

Mr. BIGGS. From the counter-snipers' location?

Mr. WRAY. That, I don't have the answer, at least here at my fingertips.

Mr. BIGGS. OK. Did the blood and tissue pattern of the shooter, did it match the stories with the witness testimony that you've heard so far?

Mr. WRAY. Can you—well, I'm not sure I'm following the question.

Mr. BIGGS. Well, I assume you've interviewed the counter-snipers, or you have that evidence, and other witnesses describing the kill of the shooter. I'm wondering if the blood, tissue, and brain matter is consistent with the testimony that you're receiving. In other words, does the physical—

Mr. WRAY. In terms of the manner of death—

Mr. BIGGS. Exactly. Is the physical evidence consistent with where the shot from the counter-snipers took place—

Mr. WRAY. Yes. So, the autopsy is being handled by, as is not unusual, the State authorities. My understanding is, thus far, I don't think it's fully complete, which is, again, not totally unusual. So far, nothing remarkable on that front.

Mr. BIGGS. That's from the body itself, but from actually the scene where the shooter was found, is everything consistent with the testimony? The physical evidence at the scene, is that consistent with the testimony you've seen, that you've heard so far?

Mr. WRAY. So, far, yes. Again, ongoing investigation.

Mr. BIGGS. Were you able to determine whether the shooter took the gun up with him when he climbed up to the top of the roof? Was it already placed there somewhere?

Mr. WRAY. So, that is something that we're drilling into right now that we don't know the answer to yet. I can tell you, which may be relevant, though, to your question, and I don't think this has been reported yet, that the weapon had a collapsible stock, which could explain why it might have been less easy for people to observe, you know.

Because one of the things that we're finding is people have observed him—the first people to observe him with the weapon were when he was already on the roof. We haven't yet found anybody with firsthand observation of him with the weapon walking around beforehand. So, that doesn't mean he wasn't, obviously, but the collapsible stock is potentially a very significant feature that might be relevant to that.

Mr. BIGGS. Did he have a scope?

Mr. WRAY. I believe so, but I just, as I sit here right now, I don't remember.

Mr. BIGGS. OK. You mentioned about two hours before the incident that he had a drone, and he was using a drone. Instead of me putting words in your mouth, just tell me what, how you discovered the drone; how you discovered the time, and how you discovered—if you can describe what he would have been observing with a drone and how you determined that?

Mr. WRAY. So, this is something that is very much ongoing right now. We're going back and forth with our lab as they continue to do work on it.

What I would say is, the drone was in his car. As I said, we've been able to, by exploiting the drone, determine its use and flight paths. There were no pictures or videos on the drone of the day of the rally, for example.

We have been able to reverse-engineer the flight path of the drone from the day of the rally, and that's how we know that, for about 11 minutes from—I think it's around 3:50–4:00 p.m., somewhere in that range, he was flying the drone, and we have the flight path. It's about 200 yards away from where former President Trump would ultimately be speaking.

So, that would have primarily given him a vantage point. I'm trying to think of how to describe this. If the former President's podium is that way the drone would be over here—

Mr. BIGGS. Yes.

Mr. WRAY. —looking say 200 yards again off this way, looking back. So, it would have shown the shooter, we think—again, we're still doing more work on this. I really want to qualify what I'm saying, but I'm trying to be transparent and lean in here.

Mr. BIGGS. Right.

We think it would have shown him kind of what would have been behind him—

Mr. BIGGS. When you say, "behind him"—

Mr. WRAY. Behind the shooter.

Mr. BIGGS. Oh, behind the shooter?

Mr. WRAY. Correct. Like, in other words, almost like giving him a rearview mirror of the scene behind him, except, again, he wasn't flying it overhead while he was later back for the assassination—

Mr. BIGGS. Sure. He would have had, with the drone, he would have been able to also assess kind of what—because the stage, I assume, was already set. He would have been able to assess that angle with the rooftop as well, forward and backward, I assume?

Mr. WRAY. Well, certainly, going toward the podium.

Mr. BIGGS. Right. Again, we're still trying to figure out exactly what he saw. Because we're having to, in effect, because there's no recording of what he saw during those 11 minutes our hypothesis at this point, the experts think he would have been livestreaming it.

So, we're trying to, in effect, say, OK, well, if this was the flight pattern, given these capabilities of the drone, what would you have seen, what could you have seen for those 11 minutes? Again, it wasn't over the stage or the kind of hub of the rally. It was about 200 yards away, but it looks like it would have been looking at, let's say the length of a football field or so, more kind of toward the podium.

Mr. BIGGS. Right. Great. Thank you, Mr.—

Chair JORDAN. How many separate times was the shooter on the premises?

Mr. WRAY. So, again, with the caveat that we're continuing to work on it, we believe that the first time he traveled to the grounds was a week before. He spent roughly, 20 minutes there.

Then, he went to the grounds again on the morning of the event, it appears, for about 70 minutes but, again, I qualify that. I'd have to go back and look to be sure of that part.

Then, he came back in the afternoon. So, that would be, I guess, a third time, for good. That included things like this drone activity we just talked about.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman from California is recognized.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Director, thank you for appearing. Thank you for the extraordinary job that you're doing. Please convey our thanks to the men and women at the Bureau for their incredible work. I worked with them since I was an Assistant U.S. Attorney more than 30 years ago.

Let me start with a threshold question that I'm curious about. When I applied to be an Assistant U.S. Attorney, I had to go through a background check. Do candidates for the FBI have to go through background checks?

Mr. WRAY. Yes.

Mr. SCHIFF. Would someone with dozens of felony convictions survive a background check for the Bureau?

Mr. WRAY. No.

Mr. SCHIFF. So, they would never be hired by the Bureau?

Mr. WRAY. No.

Mr. SCHIFF. Well, clearly, the Bureau has—you don't have to comment on this; I know you won't but, clearly, the Bureau has higher standards for their hiring than one of America's great political parties.

Let me turn to the events of the, the tragic shooting. Have you been able to gain access to the shooter's electronic communications, social media? With the caveats that you mentioned that the investigation is still early, have you been able to make any deductions or are there any indications of the shooter's motivation from those electronic holdings?

Mr. WRAY. So, in terms of our ability to access it, we have been able to get into and exploit a number of electronic devices, digital devices, but not all them yet. Then, within his various accounts, we've been able to get access to some of them, but some of them we're still waiting on.

Some of them, we may never get access to because of the encryption issue, that presents an increasingly vexing barrier for law enforcement, not just the FBI, but for law enforcement all over the country.

We're still drilling into that. We have some information. Some places we've been able to look. Some places we will be able to look. Some places we may never be able to see, no matter how good our legal process is. That's what we're looking at right now.

In terms of what we've been able to find so far, a lot of the usual repositories of information have not yielded anything notable in terms of motive or ideology. Having said that, it does appear fairly clear that he was interested in public figures kind of more broadly and this is important—that, starting somewhere around July 6th or so, he became very focused on former President Trump and this rally.

So, one of the things that I can share here today that has not been shared yet is that we've just, in the last couple of days, found that from our review—to your point about devices—analysis of a laptop that the investigation ties to the shooter reveals that, on July 6th, he did a Google search for, quote, "How far away was Oswald from Kennedy?" So, that search, obviously, is significant in terms of his state of mind.

That is the same day that it appears that he registered for the Butler rally.

Mr. SCHIFF. When you say that his electronic holdings indicated an interest in different public figures, without revealing anything you're not comfortable revealing about those public figures, can you tell us anything, generally, about them, either the offices they hold, their political party, or was it simply people of a high profile?

Mr. WRAY. Well, a couple of things. First, the images that we've recovered so far—I can't remember which of his various devices—appeared to be what we call cached images from searches of news articles. So, if you do a news article search, of course, images, if there are photos on it, those photos get stored automatically in your cache, as opposed to me searching or him searching for a specific person and getting up images of that person.

As far as the pictures that are like that, it doesn't seem to be a whole lot of rhyme or reason to it so far, other than these are, you know, all prominent public people. They cover both parties. They cover both U.S. people and even some foreign public officials.

So, that part doesn't appear to—that one repository of information doesn't appear to be overly indicative of motive, other than in-

terest in public figures. That could be just because he was reading news stories.

So, we're still trying to drill into that. That's why all these outstanding legal process returns that we're waiting on for various accounts, platforms, et cetera, any one of them could be one that would have very indicative, very important information.

Mr. SCHIFF. If I could be permitted one very short additional question, Chair?

From that, any indication of any other particular target? That is, someone who was not just sort of generically the subject of the searches you described, but for which there was more of an interest than others?

Mr. WRAY. The information I just described at the moment does not appear particularly indicative of targeting in its own right. Again, that dot, once we get other information, could connect in a way that might be more meaningful.

I really—I'm sharing that piece of information with this Committee and with the American public, but I think it's important that we put down a qualification. This does not appear to be some kind of target list, or something like that. This is cached images from running searches of news stories. Again, there's nothing at the moment that—there's no pattern from that particular piece of information that is overly remarkable so far.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you.

Thank you, Chair.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back.

The gentleman from California is recognized.

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Mr. Director, you previously told us that you consider the situation on the Southern border to be a massive security threat to our country. Is that still your assessment?

Mr. WRAY. I stand by my prior testimony. In fact, just in the last month or so, we've conducted a significant series of arrests—I say, "we," our Joint Terrorism Task Forcing is working with ICE—of a number of individuals with suspected international terrorism ties.

I have also been very vocal about the fact that, since—and this is really since the last time I appeared before you—that we are increasingly concerned about the possibility, not just of a foreign terrorist-inspired attack, which is very much, very much a concern, but even the potential for a coordinated foreign terrorist attack, perhaps like what we've seen against the concert hall in Russia, for example, but just here in the United States.

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Well, the 19 suicide bombers who overstayed visas were responsible for 3,000 American deaths on 9/11. What is your best estimate of the number of foreign terrorists who are now in our country?

Mr. WRAY. I don't know if I could give you that number. What I can tell you is we have lots of foreign terrorism-related investigations. That doesn't mean that all of them came in illegally or anything like that.

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. It seems to me that the simplest act of terrorism would be for dozens of guerillas to attack low security, high density venues, for example, Friday night high school football games all across the country at the same hour with bombs and

automatic weapons. That would produce thousands of casualties from coast to coast in a matter of minutes.

How likely is such a scenario?

Mr. WRAY. Well, what you are describing would require of course a lot of coordination. What I will tell you, and I think you are onto a particularly important point from my perspective, which is that unlike the 9/11 attacks, which, again, I was in FBI headquarters on the day of 9/11, and so I remember it vividly, and I spent plenty of time in the period after that in my prior positions engaged with the families and the victims.

What we are seeing more and more with the foreign terrorist threat, and frankly, also the domestic terrorism threat, is a focus on what you are talking about, what I would call soft targets. Which is really, for the American people's benefit, just intelligence community speak for where everyday people live their everyday lives.

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. What terrorist groups have now infiltrated our country that you are tracking?

Mr. WRAY. Well, I don't know that I would say infiltrated. We have investigations, as we speak, that relate to ISIS and its affiliates. We have investigations, as we speak, that relate to Al Qaeda. We have investigations, as we speak, that relate to Al Shabaab. We have investigations as we speak that relate to the Iranian proxies, Hezbollah, and frankly even the IRGC Quds Force itself.

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. What foreign criminal gangs are now in our country that you are most concerned with?

Mr. WRAY. Well, foreign criminal gangs, we obviously have investigations, a lot of investigations into gangs like MS-13, for example, and some of its counterparts. Although, I think if you were to talk to most chiefs and sheriffs like I am doing every week, we shouldn't underestimate how prevalent neighborhood gangs are really. It is a lot of the gang violence that—

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Well, I am concerned about those that we have allowed in through the Southern border and what threat they are now posing. Do you believe that the vetting performed at the Southwest border is adequate to ensure that aliens with terrorist or criminal gang ties are not being released into the United States?

Mr. WRAY. Well, it is not really for me to speak to the vetting. What I would tell you is that—

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. You have to deal with it once they are released into the United States.

Mr. WRAY. One of the concerns that I have, which I touched on briefly in my opening, is there has been a lot of focus on the number of known or suspected terrorists encountered at the border. That number has increased over the last five or six years, and that should be of concern.

Frankly, to me, the bigger concern is individuals who either weren't on the watch list at the time they came in because there wasn't information known yet that ties them to terrorism, and it is only after they get in that some new piece of information develops somewhere overseas and now we know. That is a bigger concern.

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. We have been warned that they basically vet against a blank sheet of paper. If they don't have a record in this

country, Border Patrol probably doesn't have any record. They are released into the country, and you find out later about the dangers.

Mr. WRAY. If they use fake documents and there aren't biometrics to connect them. I think sometimes there are people who come in who, because of the nature of the threat information that puts somebody on the watch list, there weren't fingerprints from the person at the time. Because not every piece of intelligence comes with fingerprints.

So, then the guy comes in using a fake ID—

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Of course—

Mr. WRAY. There is no reason to connect them.

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Of course, the two million got-aways you know absolutely nothing about.

Mr. WRAY. Exactly. Well, I don't know about absolutely nothing, because we may come across them in other things. One of the key parts of our collective defense here is that we work with 800,000 sworn law enforcement across the country, and we train them on the right questions to ask and things like that so that we can build in additional eyes and ears.

If they do a traffic stop or whatever it happens to be, we run a greater chance of leveraging all that to pick up people who may have slipped through the cracks.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from California is recognized.

Mr. SWALWELL. Director, we are about 100 days until the election. Russia has attacked our democracy in past elections. Are they seeking to do it in this one?

Mr. WRAY. We assess that the Russian Government continues to want to influence and in various ways interfere with our democracy, with our electoral process.

In fact, just in the last few weeks, we announced a significant disruption of a generative AI-enhanced social media bot farm essentially of the Russians that was designed to be an influence operation and some of the fake, fictitious profiles of those bots purported to be U.S. persons.

So, they are still at it. We have seen that in election cycle after election cycle.

Mr. SWALWELL. Do the Russians have a preferred candidate?

Mr. WRAY. I am not sure that I could speak to that here. Certainly, what I would tell you is it is not just the Russians. I think that is important for people to know too.

There is a lot of attention to the Russians, as there should be. We also know, you may recall, that in 2020, Director Ratcliffe and I announced an effort by the Iranians to try to interfere.

More recently, we have had indictments related to China. Thirty-four Chinese MPS officers creating fictitious personas, posting false information online, full of narratives designed to sow device and discord, undermine us. I am talking about narratives that they were pushing.

Again, purporting to be Americans but actually Chinese MPS officers. For example, trashing any suggestion that COVID came from a lab leak or trashing U.S. law enforcement on the occasion of the anniversary of George Floyd's death.

Mr. SWALWELL. Shifting to the attempted assassination on the former President, I want to make it clear, in America, violence has never been the answer. Not on a certain in January or a recent day in July.

I just want to go through the shooting just briefly with you. How many armed officers were within the perimeter, just ballpark figure?

Mr. WRAY. That really goes to the security posture, which is the subject of the DHS Inspector General's review and the outside panel, independent panel that is—

Mr. SWALWELL. Would you say probably more than 100, though?

Mr. WRAY. I have to believe that number, but I don't, again, I don't have that number at my fingertips. Our focus is on the shooter and his attack.

Mr. SWALWELL. The shooter was able to get eight shots off before he was killed.

Mr. WRAY. That is what it would appear, yes.

Mr. SWALWELL. Type of weapon used by the shooter was an assault rifle?

Mr. WRAY. Was an AR-style rifle.

Mr. SWALWELL. So, that means one trigger pull, one round, is that right?

Mr. WRAY. Essentially.

Mr. SWALWELL. Do you like to shoot?

Mr. WRAY. Do I?

Mr. SWALWELL. Yes.

Mr. WRAY. Yes.

Mr. SWALWELL. Do you know the difference between an AR and bolt action rifle?

Mr. WRAY. I am not going to try to sit here and engage on firearms expertise, but I have fired a variety of weapons.

Mr. SWALWELL. Had the shooter used a bolt-action rifle, would that have been one trigger pull, one round?

Mr. WRAY. That is my understanding.

Mr. SWALWELL. Would there have been more—well, on an assault rifle, trigger pull, round, trigger pull, and round. Bolt action, nonassault rifle, what is the difference? Is it faster, slower?

Mr. WRAY. He was able to get more rounds off more quickly than he would have with other kinds of weapons.

Mr. SWALWELL. That is my point, is that we can add additional resources to protect both candidates, and we should. The people who went to that rally deserved to be protected from gun violence, just like the students at Parkland deserved to be protected from gun violence. Just the like the babies at Sandy Hook deserved to be protected from gun violence.

So, we will devote more resources. We have added a Presidential Candidate who is also now protected. If we are being honest with ourselves, we have armed this country to the teeth. We have allowed the most dangerous people to have access to the most dangerous weapons.

I say that as a parent of a seven-, five-, and a two-year-old, the two oldest who have done multiple mass shooter drills in their classrooms. I say that as a brother to two police officers who walk a very violent beat. I say that as an elected official who believes

that my colleagues deserve to be as safe as I deserve to be when we are at political rallies.

So, we really need to step back and think if we allow these weapons to be in our country, can we truly protect our elected officials? Can we truly protect, most importantly, our children and the next generation?

I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. It is good to have Mr. Massie back with us today. Some of us had a chance to go to Kentucky over the last few weeks and visit Thomas and his family and hear all kinds of wonderful stories about Rhonda. Amazing, amazing lady, a gentle spirit. We are glad to have Mr. Massie back with us.

The next five minutes belong to you, Congressman.

Mr. MASSIE. Thank you, Chair.

Director Wray, how many counter-snipers were present at the rally that day, and which of the counter-snipers took the shot that took out the would-be assassin?

Mr. WRAY. I don't have the number of counter-snipers. I know it was a Secret Service counter-sniper who took the shot that eliminated the shooter. We have conducted a number of interviews, including with him.

Mr. MASSIE. So, was it one of the two that we see in the videos on top of the roof, or was it a different location that was faster?

Mr. WRAY. I am afraid I don't have that at my fingertips here.

Mr. MASSIE. OK. You mentioned that the would-be assassin bought a five-foot ladder. You have a credit card evidence of that. It looks like on the scene there was a larger ladder that he might have used.

Do you know which ladder he used to get to the roof, and do you have possession of that five-foot ladder and the other ladder? Do you know how the taller ladder got to the scene?

Mr. WRAY. So, this whole business about the ladder is something we are drilling into more. We do have possession of the five-foot ladder that he purchased close in time to his attempted assassination, that we traced the purchase of that ladder from a receipt, a bloodied receipt that he had on him at the time that his body was recovered on the roof.

We do not yet know for sure how exactly he got up on the roof. We are looking at various forensic pieces to try to kind of piece that together. So, more to come on that.

Mr. MASSIE. Do you know where the five-foot ladder was found or retrieved? Was it near the roof or was it still in his vehicle?

Mr. WRAY. Neither. I don't have it in front of me, but I know that it was not on scene, and I know that it was not in his vehicle. We can circle back to you and give you that.

Mr. MASSIE. OK. Is there any evidence at all that he may have been in contact with somebody else before this occurred that may have had any prior knowledge or may have helped him plan this event?

Mr. WRAY. Well, needless to say that is the question that we are intensely focused on, because that would obviously be incredibly meaningful. So far, underlined, so far, we have not found any evidence of any accomplices or co-conspirators, foreign or domestic.

Mr. MASSIE. You are using geolocation data to see if his cellphone was near another cellphone, I presume?

Mr. WRAY. Right. We are doing lots of different kinds of cellular analysis, geolocation stuff, looking at his accounts. He, from everything we have seen, which is consistent with what we have learned in interviews, a lot of people describe him as a loner.

That does fit with what we are seeing in his devices. His list of contacts, for example, is very short compared to what you would normally see for most people. So, it doesn't appear to be a whole lot of interaction between him face to face or digital, with a lot of people.

Mr. MASSIE. OK, thank you.

Mr. WRAY. That doesn't mean there is not any, and that is why we are drilling into—we are trying to talk to anybody who has had any engagement with him whatsoever, digital, in-person, classmates, coworkers, etc.

Mr. MASSIE. Right, appreciate that. Now, I want to talk about another possible assassination attempt. I will start by sharing a video of President Biden, and this is from recently. This is in the last month. So, if we can play that.

[Video shown.]

Mr. MASSIE. OK, and he is referring to January 6th. Were there gallows erected to hang Mike Pence, as the President says here?

Mr. WRAY. I am not aware of any physical gallows. I can't remember whether from a demonstration perspective there may not have been some kind of replica or—

Mr. MASSIE. Yes.

Mr. WRAY. Symbol of something like that.

Mr. MASSIE. That is my impression.

Can you raise that up so he can see it?

It looks like there was some kind of prop that was built. The construction doesn't look like it lends itself to actually hanging somebody. It is more of a prop, as you suggested, that was erected on January 6th.

If the President were correct that these gallows were erected to hang Mike Pence, that would be a very serious allegation, wouldn't it?

Mr. WRAY. I would take it very seriously, yes.

Mr. MASSIE. Has anybody been arrested, or do you have any leads in conjunction with the erection of these gallows? We had a picture here on the screen, if you can show it again. It was just up there, there is an individual here who is seen on, near these gallows. Has he been arrested? Have you identified this person?

Mr. WRAY. I don't know that I can speak to this specific person or the gallows that are pictured on the image. We have had I think 850 people who have pled guilty to Federal crimes related to January 6th, and another 180 I think is convicted at trials. So, I just can't be sure.

Mr. MASSIE. Some of them merely for going into the capitol. Here, the President suggests that individual intended to hang Vice President Pence, which seems like kind of a wild claim, myself, given the construction of those gallows.

If we are to take him seriously, or even if we aren't, let me just finish by saying this: If you have no leads or you are not sure if

anybody who erected those gallows was arrested or is being investigated, were there any confidential human sources involved from the FBI or any other agency in the erection of that prop, those gallows?

Mr. WRAY. I am not aware of anything like that.

Mr. MASSIE. All right. Thank you, I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. The gentlelady from Washington is recognized.

Ms. JAYAPAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome, Director Wray.

Political violence of any kind is dangerous, unlawful, and totally unacceptable. Just as we all watched and then unequivocally condemned the attempted assassination attempt on our former President, I wish that we could all come together to unequivocally condemn the act of political violence on January 6th, instead of defending props that were used that were harmful, dangerous props of gallows attempting to show what people wanted to do to Vice President Pence.

Extremists attempted to subvert our democracy in the worst assault on the U.S. Capitol since the War of 1812. Many of us were trapped in the gallery that day. We feared we would not make it out. Insurrectionists were chasing down former Speaker Nancy Pelosi and then-Vice President Mike Pence.

I, myself, have been the direct target of political violence when an armed man with a gun showed up at my door, threatened me and my family. We actually ended up having to move our home.

So, I understand the increased tenor of political violence that is wracking our country. It has been on the rise, fomented by violent and dehumanizing rhetoric from top public officials, including the former President and Members of Congress, sadly. Bolstered by the proliferation of easily accessible guns, including assault-style weapons.

All this violence is unacceptable, and I wholeheartedly condemn it. I just hope we condemn all the violence, not just one or two incidents.

Mr. Wray, today I want to focus on the role of the FBI and the need for the Bureau to remain politically neutral and independent. The FBI cannot and should not be subject to the whims of any President. The majority apparently doesn't think that the FBI needs to be politically neutral and independent.

They want an FBI subordinate to the President, not accountable to the American people. That is one part of a larger plan to undermine our democracy, to remove the checks and balances that have protected us, and ultimately to subvert our freedoms.

That agenda, promulgated by the former President, his loyalists, and their MAGA allies, is called Project 2025. It is publicly available online. I encourage everyone who is watching this to Google it. It includes plans to undermine every part of our government, including the FBI.

Trump's Project 2025 agenda says that the Director of the FBI must not be independent of politics, but instead must do whatever the President orders. Under Trump's Project 2025, Trump loyalists would undermine the nonpolitical and independent structure of the FBI.

Project 2025 openly calls on the next conservative administration to support, “a vast expansion of the number of political appointees in every office across the DOJ, especially the FBI.”

So, Mr. Wray, given your extensive experience as a law enforcement professional at DOJ across multiple Republican and Democratic Administrations, why do you think it is important that the FBI maintain political independence from the President?

Mr. WRAY. I think the FBI is and needs to stay independent. That means protecting the American people without fear or favor, upholding the Constitution and the rule of law. It means following the facts wherever they lead, no matter who likes it.

I add that last part because the essence of independence and objectivity is not that an investigation is going to always yield the result you want. Our independence and objectivity can’t only be respected when you like the outcome. That is the very essence of objectivity. Sometimes you are going to like the result, sometimes you are not going to like the result.

That applies to everyone, including us. A number of times, we are disappointed and frustrated by the results of our investigations. The alternative is an erosion of the rule of law, where the only thing that distinguishes one investigation from another is power.

That is what you see in some authoritarian countries around the world. So, I am not familiar with this particular—

Ms. JAYAPAL. No, I didn’t ask you to comment on that.

Mr. WRAY. Project 2025 thing—

Ms. JAYAPAL. No, I just wanted to know—

Mr. WRAY. I don’t know anything about it. What I can tell you is, from my perspective, the FBI needs to be functioning as independent.

Ms. JAYAPAL. Thank you.

Mr. WRAY. It doesn’t mean it is not part of the executive branch, it doesn’t mean the FBI Director doesn’t serve at the pleasure of the President. It does mean that the way we do our work—

Ms. JAYAPAL. Has to be objective.

Mr. WRAY. Has to be independent.

Ms. JAYAPAL. Yes, thank you. I have another question about the role of attorneys at the FBI Office of General Counsel. How do we protect that work?

Mr. WRAY. I am sorry, could you repeat the question?

Ms. JAYAPAL. The role, what role do the attorneys at the FBI Office of General Counsel play in ensuring that the Bureau respects the Constitutional rights of American citizens? How do we protect that work?

Mr. WRAY. So, in my experience, the lawyers in the Office of the General Counsel play an incredibly important role in ensuring that our agents have their questions about how to comply with the law and conducting their work answered and ensuring that we conduct our work in the right way, which means scrupulously adhering to the laws and the rules that apply to us.

Ms. JAYAPAL. I just wanted to say, before I yield, Mr. Chair, that the Project 2025 also eliminates the FBI’s Office of General Counsel in-house lawyers, who are responsible for that role. I appreciate your indulgence, and I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman from Wisconsin is recognized.

Mr. TIFFANY. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair.

I think it was when you were here in December of last year, Mr. Wray, that you said blinking lights were going off in regard to the Southern border and what is happening down there. Has the border situation improved in terms of your assessment with the security of Americans since you were last here in December?

Mr. WRAY. Well, I guess a couple things. I appreciate the question. So, first, the blinking lights comment that I made refers more broadly to the threat environment that I am seeing as FBI Director across a wide range of threats. Contributing to that in a variety of ways are the threats that emanate from the border.

So, it is not a comment just on the border issues, it is the threat environment that we face more broadly and my experience in law enforcement.

I am increasingly concerned that foreign terrorists could seek to exploit vulnerabilities at our Southwest border or at other ports of entry, or in other aspects of our immigration system, to facilitate an attack here in the United States. I think that is something we have to be concerned about.

There has been a lot of focus on numbers, numbers of this, numbers of that. I understand that. As I think was referenced in an earlier question, it doesn't take very many foreign terrorists to be a real problem.

We had 19 hijackers responsible for the 9/11 attacks. We just not that long ago had a case, as some of the Members of the Committee will remember, where we charged an individual for trying to smuggle individuals in to assassinate former President Bush.

Mr. TIFFANY. Are you concerned that the Border Patrol Chief, former Border Control Chief Rodney Scott said that concerned about very, very minuscule data that they are receiving.

So, there is all this—we are told that illegal aliens are vetted against databases. Oftentimes, they are doing biometrics as they come into this country but not looking behind it in their home countries. Does that concern you when there is not a review done in the home country?

Mr. WRAY. Well, we certainly need as much help as we can get from the countries of origin. These people, when I say origin, not just where they come from originally, but countries they have come through. The biometric enrollment piece is of course an important one. We have situations where even if—

Mr. TIFFANY. Are we doing a thorough enough job of reviewing them, their actions and their lives in their home countries before they came here?

Mr. WRAY. Well, we need more help from our foreign partners. There is no question about that. I think that is an important part—

Mr. TIFFANY. How about our domestic partners like the CIA and others that are supposed to protect us?

Mr. WRAY. So, there has been a lot of discussion, of course, over the last several years about the pivot to what is called the hard targets, right, the understandable focus, which I support, of focusing on the threat posed by China, Russia, and Iran.

With that comes, if you look at, for example, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, we start to lose sources of information about foreign terrorist threats from overseas. That is a concern to me.

Mr. TIFFANY. My time is running out. Has Vice-President Harris met with you in regard to the border?

Mr. WRAY. Well, I have been in meetings with, that have included the Vice President that in different ways touched on border issues.

Mr. TIFFANY. Has she specifically asked you for a meeting in regard to the threat that is at the border?

Mr. WRAY. I am not going to get into sort of specific meetings, but I can tell you that I have been in meetings that have included, among other people, the Vice President, that touch on border security issues.

Mr. TIFFANY. Did she ask questions about what you thought needed to be done in regard to reducing this threat to the American people?

Mr. WRAY. I really can't get into specific conversations.

Mr. TIFFANY. Is support for President Trump a security concern within the FBI?

Mr. WRAY. I am sorry, I couldn't hear.

Mr. TIFFANY. Is support for President Trump a security concern among your employees?

Mr. WRAY. No.

Mr. TIFFANY. Is objection to the COVID-19 vaccine a security threat?

Mr. WRAY. Not from my perspective.

Mr. TIFFANY. Who approved what is termed the "Trump questionnaire" within the FBI that done by SIIS? Dena Perkins and Jeffrey Veltri were behind it. Who was responsible for that, and did you know that there was a Trump questionnaire out there?

Mr. WRAY. So, the document you are asking about is an interview outline that we only recently learned about, and in my view is completely inappropriate. I asked my team to get to the bottom of what happened and to ensure that it doesn't happen again.

I have learned that it is not an FBI form. That its use was isolated. That it was created not by an FBI employee, but by an outside contractor, and that individual is no longer affiliated with the FBI. We are sending what we have found to the Office of Inspector General to, and we will cooperate, of course, with anything they—

Mr. TIFFANY. Mr. Chair, I will just close with this: We keep hearing about these isolated examples, whether it is Richmond Catholics, this instance. When isn't it a pattern? I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. Mr. Correa.

Mr. CORREA. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Director Wray, welcome again to this Committee, and I want to thank you and your agents for the good job you are doing to protect Americans.

Earlier this week, I was part of the group that went out to visit Butler, Pennsylvania, Homeland Security members. I agree with my colleagues that have said violence has no part in our democracy. I trust you will investigate the events surrounding July 13th thoroughly.

I am going to ask you a question, I hope you will keep it in mind as your investigation proceeds, which is who is in charge? Who is in charge of a campaign rally, setting it up? Secret Service or a campaign?

I ask this question because when I was there, I had a couple of law enforcement individuals alluding to that question as well. They gave me an example.

They said if a Secret Service says you need to set up a line of dump trucks behind the stage to serve to protect the candidate, and the campaign says that is bad optics, who ends up winning the debate? So, my question is who is in charge?

As you investigate this crime scene, I hope you ask the locally elected officials. I spoke to a county supervisor, local police and sheriff. They all had information they wanted us to know, to relay. We just didn't have the opportunity to sit down and talk to them.

There was a lot of concern that they weren't given enough time to prepare for this rally. They thought there were things that could have been done better. Ultimately, what I keep thinking, what I keep coming back to is the question who is in charge at these rallies.

I think it is an important one because we have an election right around the corner. Pennsylvania, Butler, these areas, battleground States around the country will continue to be areas where our candidates, both sides, will show up, and the threats will continue to be there.

So, I hope, Director Wray, that you will keep that statement in mind as you continue to investigate this crime scene.

Mr. WRAY. Well, I appreciate the question. I will tell you that we have conducted well over 400 interviews, but we have many more still to conduct. As is not unusual in an investigation, I am sure there will be situations where we have to go back to people we have already interviewed with followup questions, and our interviews cover a wide range of people.

I do think it is important to make sure that the Committee and the American people understand the scope of our investigation versus the scope of others. Our investigation is focused on the shooter and his attack.

There is, of course, and I understand completely why there are two separate reviews, one by the DHS Inspector General, and the other by this outside independent panel that has been announced that are focused on the security posture, the adequacy of the security posture at the rally, Secret Service decisionmaking and actions, and things like that.

So, I certainly understand why there are all those questions. Those are in scope of those two other reviews and of course whatever Congress chooses to do. Our investigation, though, because of our interviews with people who were on the scene, will relate to that in some ways. We are going to share whatever we learn that is relevant with those other reviews.

Mr. CORREA. Director Wray, in my last minute that I have I am going to flip quickly to your good job resources. Earlier this year in the Appropriations Committee, you testified that you were, for 2024, your budget was 500 million below what you needed to sustain your 2023 efforts.

A few minutes ago, you talked about foreign terrorists. The last few weeks I know information has emerged. That information came from FISA information that was able to be collected overseas on these possible terrorist threats.

What we have here, today, is a domestic terrorist. What looks to be a lone wolf. Your statements, there is nothing really there that would have tipped anybody off to this individual. Is that what I am hearing from you?

Mr. WRAY. Well, I don't know that I would go quite that far because we are still investigating a lot related to the shooter. It does appear so far that we are seeing less in his—

Mr. CORREA. In my six seconds I would just say, I would ask that you let us know what resources you need to protect the American public and our candidates and our democratic system.

Mr. WRAY. I appreciate the question. I would just say this: We are in, as I have said consistently today and for quite some time now, we are in an elevated threat environment covering a wide range of threats. The FBI is central to protecting the American people from those threats.

State and local law enforcement, who depend on us everyday, rely on us for all sorts of services, databases, forensic support, and training. I could go on and on and on. A lot of those departments, unlike the FBI, have had a hard time recruiting.

So, this is not a time to pull back on our funding, because we are going to leave our brothers and sisters in State and local law enforcement twisting in the wind, and then by extension, the American people we are all collectively sworn to protect.

Mr. CORREA. Thank you, and Mr. Chair, I yield.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Texas is recognized.

Mr. ROY. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Director Wray, for being here. When did you last speak with President Biden?

Mr. WRAY. I don't have the exact date, but it has been certainly since the shooting.

Mr. ROY. So, you have spoken to the President since the assassination attempt on President Trump's life?

Mr. WRAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROY. What was the mental State of the President?

Mr. WRAY. We had a perfectly professional conversation.

Mr. ROY. Are you—do you have any scheduled briefings with the President upcoming?

Mr. WRAY. Not at the moment specifically scheduled, no.

Mr. ROY. In 2016 and 2015, top FBI officials infamously texted about "their insurance policy to make sure Trump was never elected or inaugurated as President." Have any FBI agents texted, emailed, or expressed disappointment that Trump survived the assassination attempt or otherwise editorialized about the assassination attempt?

Mr. WRAY. I don't know about any agents. There have been at least two instances I think, or one instance, of an individual who posted something that I consider outrageous, totally inappropriate, and unacceptable.

That individual has been referred to our Inspection Division, which is the arm, our sort of Internal Affairs investigatory arm that does the disciplinary process.

Mr. ROY. OK. Will you report back to this Committee any other incidents?

Mr. WRAY. I will do my best to share information with the Committee.

Mr. ROY. You testified earlier that the FBI maintains high standards irrespective of so-called diversity efforts. Is it true that in December 2016, former Director Comey lowered the passing standards for Phase 1, allowing an influx of previously unqualified applicants to continue in the hiring process who normally would have been stopped back in December 2016?

Mr. WRAY. Yes, I can't speak to Director Comey's—

Mr. ROY. What were the standards?

Mr. WRAY. I can tell you that at least since I have been Director, changes that we have made to—

Mr. ROY. Specific question, were standards changed, Phase 1, this specific part of the process, were they changed in 2016?

Mr. WRAY. Well, I don't recall if they were changed in 2016. Obviously, I started, as your question presupposes, after that. What I can tell you is since that time, we have made changes to various phases of the process, but none of them, this is important, none of them lowered the standards. In fact, if anything, they actually increased—

Mr. ROY. Are you familiar with the reporting that we have, and we have asked questions to you about this, I am not sure the result of the questions, that to more "easily accommodate a large pool of available applicants the FBI's special agent hiring standards have been relaxed and requirements measurably lowered," this according to a group of former agents who have testified about this and written a report and submitted it to Congress.

In addition, specifically, minority, people with 20-year careers, one in particular, a minority who served for more than 20 years, wrote in this report and submitted it to Congress, saying these standards were, in fact, lowered. That, in fact, if you were hiring, you were moved off of hiring if you put quality above these kinds of DEI requirements.

Do you reject this report, and do you have comments on this report?

Mr. WRAY. I haven't read—

Mr. ROY. You are aware of the report.

Mr. WRAY. I am aware of the report. I don't know that I have read every detail of it, but I can tell you that the claim that we have lowered our standards to be less selective and less competitive is not accurate.

Mr. ROY. So, do you believe these former agents are lying to Congress when they submit a report to Congress stipulating and suggesting otherwise? Are you saying that they are lying?

Mr. WRAY. I am saying they are mistaken.

Mr. ROY. OK, but they are affirmatively on the record, they are telling us and submitting a report to Congress saying that those facts are directly contradicting what you are testifying here today. So, I just want to be clear, so we know. We are saying that they

are submitting evidence to our record to the contrary that you say is untruthful.

Mr. WRAY. I encounter all the time when I travel around the country and have conversations with our agents, and one of the things I try to do is have meetings with some of the longer serving agents, without executive—

Mr. ROY. That is OK, my only question is—

Mr. WRAY. My point, here is—

Mr. ROY. The implication is it is untruthful. So, I mean we have only got one minute left. Are you familiar with the case of Paulette Harlow? She is a 75-year-old elderly woman from Massachusetts with a debilitating medical condition.

She was prosecuted for violating the FACE Act and sentenced to two years in prison. She has to go to Texas in two weeks. She was praying at an abortion clinic in Washington, DC. The FBI interrogated and investigated her.

Do you think it is appropriate for a 75-year-old woman who was praying at a clinic in D.C., to be put in prison for two years for that activity? Just a simple question, do you think that is appropriate?

Mr. WRAY. I am not familiar with the specific case.

Mr. ROY. You are not familiar with that case? It has been significantly in the headlines. So, you don't know how to comment on that case. It is appropriate for a 75-year-old woman to be put in prison for two years for praying at a clinic.

Mr. WRAY. Again, I am not—since I am not familiar with the case, I don't want to start weighing in, because I don't know all the facts.

What I can tell you is that when it comes to FACE Act enforcement and abortion-related violent extremism, I think one of the things that gets lost, and I appreciate the opportunity to clarify it, is that really since the *Dobbs* decision, actually more of our abortion-related violent extremism investigations have focused on violence against pro-life facilities as opposed to the other way around.

We have had a number of investigations. We are using FACE Act resources and our JTTFs—

Mr. ROY. We are still waiting for responses on letters that we have sent indicating the data to the contrary, that there has been significant amount of efforts and targeting of people who are pro-lifers who go to clinics and that they have been prosecuted. Like this case, a 75-year-old woman who is now going to jail in Texas for two years because she was praying at a clinic in Washington, DC.

We have submitted questions on that, and I would appreciate a response on it. I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. The gentlelady from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Ms. SCANLON. Thank you so much.

Thank you, Director Wray, for being here and for the work that your team does, as well as for sharing the information that you have been able to today.

You just got a couple questions about, that seemed to imply that there was some problem with the FBI's diversity efforts. Certainly, the 1950's version of the FBI was singularly Caucasian male

agents, etc. Is the FBI a better force for having a diverse range of employees and agents?

Mr. WRAY. I think diversity makes us better, but like everything else, it has to be done the right way. I think we can have a more diverse workforce and do it without lowering our standards. That is, in my view, what we have done.

Ms. SCANLON. You haven't lowered standards at the FBI.

Mr. WRAY. We have not. I repeatedly come across people who are confused about different parts of that, and I appreciate the opportunity to set that straight.

Ms. SCANLON. Thank you. Yes, I think we are all concerned here as we have seen the rollout of this Project 2025 that purports to try to eliminate any reference to diversity efforts across the entire Federal Government. So, it is sort of a top-of-mind concern as it is threatening to become reality.

So, what I did want to talk about today is something some of my colleagues have mentioned, which is the normalization of threats and violence against public servants at all levels, whether it is election workers or school officials, elected officials and their families, judges, Federal law enforcement agents, others.

To be clear, I think it is very clear that the majority of Americans wholeheartedly condemn any sort of political violence and understand that it is not legitimate discourse and that it has no place in our civic life.

Words do matter, and they have consequences, particularly when uttered by people in positions of leadership. So, that is why I remain very concerned by the willingness of some Members of Congress to repeat disinformation and conspiracy theories that undermine trust in our public institutions, which serve all Americans.

When elected officials embrace overheated or fact-free rhetoric, it becomes dangerous. I have been heartened as many national leaders have unequivocally condemned calls to violence, and I would urge all Members of this body to do so and continue to do so, regardless of the party affiliation of the perpetrators or the targets of such threats.

You and our other national security officials have repeatedly warned us that foreign actors are actively working to spread disinformation to influence our elections and discredit our public institutions, and we shouldn't be aiding and abetting them.

So, to live in a country that we aspire to where our most valued democratic processes, like free and fair elections, can be carried out unimpeded and people can run for office, serve their communities, and exercise their right to vote without fear of violence, we have had some concern about violence around our elections.

In 2020, the endorsement and promulgation of falsehoods about the election results by the former President and his campaign led to threats and attacks against election officials and poll workers in Pennsylvania. Those falsehoods also wasted millions of taxpayer dollars on frivolous lawsuits and extraordinary security costs.

So, as we are again approaching November, we want to ensure that those who implement and defend our elections, our neighbors and our nonpartisan civil servants, can do that important work free from conspiracy theories and threats.

So, we know our local law enforcement across Pennsylvania are preparing for some disruptions and threats. Because while Pennsylvania may be a battleground State in the upcoming election, that battle should obviously be a war of words over policy and the vision we are charting for our country's future, not an actual civil war.

So, how is the FBI working with State and local law enforcement to prevent and respond to election-related violence, particularly against election workers?

Mr. WRAY. So, in a variety of ways we are partnering with State and local law enforcement. Obviously, physical security in the first instance, in most of the respects you are talking about is in the ordinary course the responsibility of State and local law enforcement. We play an important role in a number of ways.

So, we share threat bulletins, information like that about things to be on the lookout for, things we are seeing. If we ever have specific threat information, then we work to get it to the right people.

We have election crime coordinators, which we have had for decades, in all 56 field offices who have existing relationships with not just State and local law enforcement, but election officials, especially focused on security and threat-related issues.

Then of course we are participating in the election threats task force that DOJ set up, which is focused on threats of violence or actual violence against election workers specifically. We have had a number of arrests and even some convictions already on that.

Ms. SCANLON. Thank you for your input.

I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentlelady yields back.

Director, it is my intention to go approximately another half an hour, then we will break for the Prime Minister of Israel's address to the Congress on the floor, give you a chance for lunch, then resume after that. We will keep pushing through for the next half hour if we can.

The gentlelady from Indiana is recognized.

Ms. SPARTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Director Wray. Think you have a little bit better tone in conversation, so I appreciate it in answer some questions. So, I appreciate it.

Hopefully you will answer also two letters that I sent you over a year ago, one related to Durham Report and the other one related to Russian-infiltrated SBU that collaborated with FBI. So, hopefully we will get these answers and hopefully we'll do an authorization.

Don't you think doing an authorization would help us to get better answers? Congress should probably work on authorizing your agency, don't you agree with that?

Mr. WRAY. We work very hard to try to get information to this Committee and to other Committees.

Ms. SPARTZ. To authorize and spend probably would be a good thing for us to do, don't you agree?

Mr. WRAY. Oh, I'm sorry, authorized and what?

Ms. SPARTZ. Oh, spending, not just doing appropriating, but actually doing authorization of spendings for this Committee.

Mr. WRAY. Yes.

Ms. SPARTZ. OK, thank you, we might start doing that. We can talk about, and a lot of my colleagues on the other side, AR-15 gets a lot of bad rap. Like bring it up this issue.

Really there are a lot of hunting rifles that probably may be even more accurate than a lot of ARs. Don't you—we have like millions, right. Don't you agree, we have millions of rifles owned by law-abiding Americans.

So, do you think we should be taking them, millions of rifles from law-abiding Americans? What do you think about that? Would that be something feasible and really, we should be doing that?

Mr. WRAY. Well, again, I am not going to be addressing anybody's specific legislative proposal. From our perspective, from the FBI's perspective, the concern is any dangerous weapon in the hands—in the wrong hands.

Ms. SPARTZ. All weapons are—

Mr. WRAY. In the hands of the wrong person.

Ms. SPARTZ. All weapons are dangerous, right?

Mr. WRAY. I am sorry?

Ms. SPARTZ. All weapons are dangerous.

Mr. WRAY. Sure.

Ms. SPARTZ. Knives are dangerous and explosives are dangerous.

Mr. WRAY. Weapons are by their very definition dangerous.

Ms. SPARTZ. Yes, but are we going to be confiscating hunting rifles and rifles for millions of Americans? Do you think it is even feasible to do something like that for law-abiding citizens?

Mr. WRAY. It is not something I am advocating.

Ms. SPARTZ. OK, well, thank you, I appreciate that. So, we have to go back. That was a catastrophic failure of security that happened recently with attempted assassination, don't you agree with that?

Mr. WRAY. Well, I think former Director Cheatle has already publicly acknowledged that it was, I think her words were “a significant operational failure.”

Ms. SPARTZ. Yes. Then we had similar situation and different talking about bad optics, Speaker Pelosi at the time didn't want to have bad optics on January 6th. We didn't have proper security here on January 6th. That was a catastrophic failure too.

Are we looking at that, any one conclusion was made from that? Have we—making any adjustments? Because not a lot of people got hurt, now, just being here it was a lot of cases brought up with Department of Justice. There were, a lot of them were really just law-abiding Americans that really just upset with the government and they have a reason to do it.

So, I think we need to think about it before we prosecute instead of actually looking at how we can deal with real criminals and how we can have a proper security when we have events with so many people there.

So, did you have confidential human sources? I think you never answered that question on January 6th in the Capitol. Did you have some?

Mr. WRAY. I am sorry, what's the question?

Ms. SPARTZ. Confidential human sources, did you have them on January 6th in the Capitol?

Mr. WRAY. Well, again, I am never going to be getting into when and where we have or have not used confidential human sources, but—

Ms. SPARTZ. Are you willing to say on the record that you had no confidential human sources that went into Capitol on January 6th?

Mr. WRAY. As I have said consistently, I am not going to get into where we have or have not used confidential human sources. I can tell you that if you are asking if the violence at the Capitol on January 6th was part of some operation orchestrated by FBI sources or agents, the answer is no.

Ms. SPARTZ. I didn't ask you that—

Mr. WRAY. It is a disservice to our people.

Ms. SPARTZ. I ask did you investigate if any confidential human sources, did you do any investigation in looking at that? You are not answering if you had any or not. So, if you had potentially—did you do anything you needed to make sure to investigate that none of your sources did anything wrong, if they were prosecuted the same way as you are trying to prosecute a lot of people that really, even Supreme Court ruled recently that some unconstitutional charges?

Mr. WRAY. Let me just add that there have now been 180 individuals who have gone to trial, in addition to the 850 who pled guilty—

Ms. SPARTZ. Right, but I think the problem is you put these charges—

Mr. WRAY. Let me—may I—

Ms. SPARTZ. A lot of people would plead guilty. Let me say just quickly because I only have 10 seconds really, so I hope you will take seriously what you are doing.

Related to the border security is also a crisis. Have the Vice President was leading on that. Has she, actually—she initiated meetings with you to lead, like weekly or monthly meeting where she actually get briefings from you as a leading border czar that had that function? Have you had that, has she initiated any meetings on a regular basis with you?

Mr. WRAY. Again—

Chair JORDAN. The gentlelady's time has expired. The gentleman can respond.

Mr. WRAY. Right. On this issue of confidential human sources, first, I will say there is a DOJ OIG review that is underway that addresses some of these kinds of topics, I believe, but I won't speak for the Inspector General.

Second, as to this suggestion, which I have heard all too many times, that somehow January was orchestrated by FBI agents or sources, I will note that, in addition, to my prior comments, that there have now been 850-ish individuals who have pled guilty, another 180 who have gone to trial.

They have all had access to defense counsel, discovery, all the things the Constitution and the rules provide them. It has been in front of something like 15 different judges, I think dozens of juries. Not one has given credence to this notion. In fact, I don't think any of them have even really seriously to raise it.

So, it is not just my word for it, look what has happened in the cases. Thank you.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman from Colorado is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. NEGUSE. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Director Wray, for being here, for your testimony today, for the work that you do each and every day and that your front-line agents across the country do each and every day to protect Americans. They keep our country safe.

I am also grateful for the work that you are doing in investigating the horrific events of July 13th, and the attempted assassination of former President Trump, which everyone must and has condemned.

I would first just ask; do you believe that the FBI has the adequate resources to ultimately ensure that your agency gets to the bottom of it and fully investigates this terrible crime?

Mr. WRAY. Well, we are devoting massive amounts of resources to this specific investigation. We have easily several hundred FBI agents, analysts, and professional staff working on it. It is, involves over half of the FBI's 56 field offices, almost every headquarters division.

We even have some of our overseas offices working on it. You might say, well, why is that. Well, because some of the companies that involve accounts or purchases or communications or what have you that the shooter used are foreign companies. So, we have to get evidence from overseas from those companies.

I talked about our lab a little bit earlier today. We have got our Office of Technology Division working on the digital devices. We have our Behavioral Analysis Unit, our BAU, working on helping us build out a profile of the shooter. I could go on and on and on. So, it is all hands-on deck on this case, as I think is appropriate.

Now, when you ask about our resources, I have been public about the fact that the Fiscal Year 2024 budget put us \$500 million below where we needed to be to sustain current operations.

On Fiscal Year 2025, current House mark would put us significantly further back behind that and would result in significant risks across every program and our support to State and local law enforcement.

We arrested something like 50 violent criminals per day, every day, last year. The current mark would mean more violent criminals on the street, more neighborhoods at risk. We have about a 1,300 percent increase in our investigations related to China and its targeting of us. I can assure you China is not cutting its budget. This would mean more threats from China.

We have something like 300–400 investigations just into cartel leadership. About hardly a week goes by when some FBI field office isn't seizing enough fentanyl to wipe out an entire State. That mark, those cuts mean more fentanyl on the street, more people dying.

So, the people who suffer the most are State and local law enforcement and the American people we are sworn to protect.

Mr. NEGUSE. Let me just—

Mr. WRAY. So, look forward to working with Congress, but we really need to be smart about what we are doing. I think that

would be a step in the wrong direction, given the threat of the environment that we face.

Mr. NEGUSE. I couldn't agree with you more, Director Wray. Of course, we have talked about this in a very previous hearings at which you have testified.

To be clear, I think the budget that House Republicans have proposed, which is about a \$325 million cut to the FBI, would precisely what you have described and have deleterious impacts for public safety across our country. The House Democrats are certainly working to prevent those cuts from taking place.

You have talked at great length about the events of July 13th. There is justifiably a lot of public interest in the investigation, which we understand is ongoing. Wonder if there is anything that you would like to disclose or provide to the Committee or to the public that perhaps has not yet been gleaned during the course of this hearing and just give you an opportunity. Because there are a lot of folks—related to the investigation.

Mr. WRAY. One thing I can give an update on, which if pretty fresh here, we had some conversations with some of the Members about the access to the roof and the ladder and so forth.

Our evidence response teams and their forensic collection, we now believe that the subject climbed onto the roof using some mechanical equipment on the ground and vertical piping on the side of the AGR building. In other words, we do not believe he used a ladder to get up there.

Mr. NEGUSE. One question, if the Chair might indulge me with just a few extra seconds, there is an article recently regarding several former Trump Administration national security officials who had received a duty-to-warn briefing from the FBI regarding the potential threat from Iran.

I think there is this article made clear deep concern these individuals have, justifiably so, about the threat level, and particularly given the events of the last several months and the need for there to be an increased security posture and security personnel for former officials who may very well still be at risk.

I don't know if you are familiar with that article. I am trying not to use names here, but I think would perhaps followup with your agency and with the Department of Justice more broadly to ensure that any individuals who are potentially facing a threat from Iran or another hostile actor, foreign nation, have the resources they need to have the security available to them.

Mr. WRAY. So, again, without reference to any specific individual, I want to be very clear about this, because I have tried to be vocal on this, but it sometimes doesn't get noticed as much, which is that in my view, the Iranian Government has been extremely aggressive and brazen.

We have seen in the last few years an attempt, I am speaking just from public information now, an attempt to assassinate a former U.S. National Security Advisor on U.S. soil. We have seen an attempt first to kidnap, and then to try to murder, an American dissident/journalist who is a critic of the Iranian regime, right smack in the middle of New York City.

We have a cyber-attack against a children's hospital in New England that ties back Iran. We have seen, as I have testified before,

as Director Ratcliffe and I announced, an effort by the Iranians to target the 2020 Presidential Election.

That is all before you even get to the fact that the Iranian Government is the leading State sponsor of terrorism. So, if that is not enough to convince people that Iran is a threat, I don't know what is.

Chair JORDAN. Director, was there a distinction between what the gentleman from Colorado raised and what you just said, these general concerns and these specific incidents you talk about, and a direct, specific threat on President Trump that is distinct from what you have been describing as this general concern with Iran?

Mr. WRAY. Well, again, I can't get into specific pieces of classified—

Chair JORDAN. If so, when, if it was a distinct threat on President Trump when did that take place?

Mr. WRAY. Yes, all I can tell you, certainly in this kind of setting, is targeting of U.S. officials for the Soleimani strike is something that is a reality that the Iranian Government has at times called for very publicly.

Whenever there is reporting—let me try to answer your question this way: Whenever there is reporting about any of those protectees, we share the information in a variety of ways, working with the intelligence community, working with whoever is the protective service with responsibility for that individual. We do it in a timely way using the duty-to-warn process that was just referred to.

To my knowledge, everything along those lines that is relevant was shared in a timely way with the relevant people.

Chair JORDAN. Thank you. The gentleman from Wisconsin is recognized.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Director Wray, thanks for being here. Where were you when you heard that President Trump was shot, and then what were your immediate actions/response to that as Director?

Mr. WRAY. I was about to have dinner with my family. I was horrified and angry.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I am just thinking—the reason I asked the question is because I am thinking. I am still trying to figure out the lanes, what the FBI would respond to and what the Secret Service has the responsibility to respond to. Can you just kind of cover that again?

Mr. WRAY. Sure. So, the FBI is not responsible for—it's never really been part of our mandate or mission for the physical security of venues, of specific protectees or anything like that. That's if it's somebody within Secret Service's scope, that's their mandate and mission.

We are a law enforcement and intelligence agency. So, if you think about it this way, we're the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We're not the Federal Bureau of Security. You might say, "Well, what's the difference?" Well, there is a difference.

We investigate crimes. We investigate threats to national security, but we don't—questions about security posture, the adequacy of resources and assets that were deployed to protect a specific individual, whether there's enough security and certainly the staffing

of that security, is not something the FBI—again, we’re 116 years old—has historically done.

Mr. FITZGERALD. So, at this point, have you been able to go through the shooter’s home and document what you found as far as evidence goes?

Mr. WRAY. So, we were able to search the shooter’s home. So, again, just sort of tying your first question to your second question now, our role is to conduct an investigation of the shooter and the attack. So, we’re going to conduct a painstaking, intense investigation of that.

We have, among other scenes that we’ve processed using evidence response teams—in addition to the rally scene itself, of course, we have been through the individual’s, the shooter’s home, his bedroom, other parts of the house, et cetera.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Have you been able to establish that he did go to a range and either zero that weapon in or at least target shoot that weapon prior to the assassination attempt?

Mr. WRAY. So, we do assess that he went to a shooting range the day—not the only time he went to a shooting range; he was a fairly—avid might be a little strong, but a fairly avid shooting hobbyist. So, he went to—belonged to different sort of clubs and went to certain ranges and that kind of thing.

We do believe based on what we’ve seen so far that he went to a shooting range the day before and that he shot an AR-style rifle at that range the day before. I’m not sure we know for sure that it’s the weapon that he used, but I think we assessed that it probably is.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Have you been able to interview his parents?

Mr. WRAY. Yes, we have.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Was there anything that was gained from that interview that would lead you to believe that they certainly were aware of what was going on?

Mr. WRAY. I guess I want to be careful talking about specific people’s interviews, but I would say that his parents were cooperative with us. As I’ve said before—and hopefully this gets to your question—we have not identified any accomplices, co-conspirators, or anything along those lines.

Mr. FITZGERALD. So, is it the FBI’s position right now that he still acted independently?

Mr. WRAY. Again, we’re still—I know it seems like a lifetime since—

Mr. FITZGERALD. Right. Right.

Mr. WRAY. —July 13th, but we’re still early stages. We have not seen anything so far that would suggest to us that he acted with others.

Mr. FITZGERALD. How does the FBI view not just a Trump rally but political rallies versus other types of events from a security perspective compared to a college football game or any mass large crowd-type gathering? Because I can’t—I think one of the things that is most difficult to really swallow at this point is that the idea that these Trump rallies have been happening for years and that there could be such a lax approach to the physical security of those fairgrounds that day.

I am wondering, where does this fall? Then, on top of that there were other Presidential Candidates out there that didn't have full Secret Service protection. RFK, Jr., has been the most vocal about it. I was wondering if you could comment on the facilities as well as providing security for Presidential Candidates.

Mr. WRAY. Well, again, I want to be a little bit careful to stay in my lane because, again, security posture and the adequacy of the security posture is really the core expertise and responsibility of agencies like the Secret Service. Certainly, it is fair to say that outdoor events, whether they're political rallies or, as you say a college football game in an open stadium, a concert, these are places that are often particularly challenging to secure adequately because the range of threats that can face them are higher.

In addition to that, as has been discussed a little bit here already in today's hearing, just threats to public officials, including politicians, is an increasingly pervasive part of today's landscape. So, that adds to the challenge. So, you're talking about the combination of individuals who are increasingly targeted for violence combined with venues that are softer and harder-to-secure targets, I guess, is the way I would answer.

Again, those kinds of questions—the adequacy of the security posture, all the resources that were or were not devoted—all that stuff, it is my understanding, would be very much in scope for the DHS Inspector General investigation and this outside independent panel that's been appointed.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back.

Director, I think we are going to be able to get two more Members time to question; then we have to get to the floor for the Prime Minister.

The gentlelady from Georgia is recognized.

Ms. MCBATH. Thank you, Chair Johnson.

Thank you so much, Director Wray, for your transparency and your testimony today.

First, I want to say my friend, my mentor, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, was known by many as the voice of reason here in Congress. She was my friend before I even came to Congress. In my freshman year, she kind of took me under her wing, and she showed me the ropes. She was a force to be reckoned with. I can say that she will never, ever be replaced. She was a trailblazer, and I know that she will sorely be missed here in Congress.

Director Wray, I only have one question for you today. Before we get to that point; I would just like to reiterate today that political violence is never acceptable. Regardless of how different our political values and views are, attempted assassinations are a stain to the very democratic ideals of this Nation.

We have endured riots on Capitol Hill on January 6th, where a literal noose was erected on Capitol grounds, intended for then Vice President Pence and Speaker Emeritus Nancy Pelosi; political violence against election workers—that has been expressed today; an attack on Paul Pelosi, Nancy Pelosi's husband; threats against the FBI agents, as you have expressed, and prosecutors; and threats to the staff who serve the public every single day. Congressman Connolly's staff was targeted and attacked last year.

Now, we have the attempted assassination of a former President of the United States—all this within just the last three years. This violence simply needs to end. The assassination attempt on Donald Trump was, by the grace of God, a failure.

The weapon the 20-year-old man was able to obtain, an AR-15, generally has a shooting range up to 600 yards and shot Mr. Trump from almost 150 yards away. This weapon has the ability to kill multiple people in seconds. Sadly, Corey Comperatore lost his life because of this man and because of this gun. Mr. Comperatore's family will never be the same. Trust me. I understand that more than anyone else in this room.

Is the near loss of a former President enough for this Congress to finally take action? Because there are 206 of us that are already standing in the wings ready to take immediate action to ban assault weapons today. We need only 12 more of our colleagues to join us in courage and move the legislation to save the lives of so many of the people that we are elected to serve by removing assault weapons from the hands of people who simply should not have them in their possession.

We are crippling our democracy, and we are ripping apart our fellow Americans until we do. I ask today because, clearly it wasn't enough to take action when the lethality of assault weapons—we lost 26 seven-year-olds and six teachers in 2012, when I also lost my son to gun violence, or 14 teenagers and three more teachers in 2018. It wasn't enough when we lost 19 more children and two more teachers in 2022.

Well, is it enough now, now that a former President, the very President that many of you in this room are hoping will be re-elected, almost lost his life because this Congress has failed to reinstate an assault weapons ban, a ban that, by the way, Republicans joined with Democrats to pass 30 years ago?

Well, fine. You all don't like assault weapons ban; we can bring another bill that I have introduced to a vote, the GOSAFE Act. This bill focuses on the components of semiautomatic firearms and regulates their infrastructure, sale, and transfer. This, again, is not the time for thoughts and prayers. This is a time for action.

Director Wray, just one question I have for you. Would you rather have your officers protected or protect someone against an assault weapon being shot from 147 yards away or a standard pistol with no accessories attached?

Mr. WRAY. Well, again, I'm going to refrain from appearing to comment on specific legislative proposals. I can tell you that we are certainly concerned about the danger to law enforcement from any kind of high-powered weapon in the wrong hands. It hits close to home for us because just not that long ago, two great agents, Laura Schwartzenberger and Dan Alfin, down in Miami executing a search in a crimes-against-children case, were shot and killed by a subject with an automatic weapon.

So, again, dangerous weapons in the wrong hands are something that of course, from a law enforcement perspective, concerns us. I'm not going to wade into the legislative process.

Ms. MCBATH. Well, thank you for that answer. I would rather give our agents a fighting chance.

I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentlelady yields back.
The gentleman from Oregon is recognized.

Mr. BENTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Director Wray, for being here today. So, we spend \$3 billion a year on the Secret Service. Three billion. It would seem that we could and should have had a better job done a few weeks ago on the 13th than what we saw. Will you have anything to say about correcting what are the obvious deficiencies in what the Secret Service did?

Mr. WRAY. Well, for the most part, the deficiencies or adequacy or inadequacy of the Secret Service's performance, decisionmaking, resources—all that stuff is in the purview of those two other investigations. That is the DHS Inspector General and the outside independent panel that's been announced.

Having said that, our investigation, which, as I've testified now, involves several hundred FBI employees and every asset we can bring to bear of the shooter—again, our investigation is of the shooter and his attack—of course involving interviewing law enforcement, including lots and lots and lots of Secret Service people. So, we'll share all that with those reviews so that they can answer those questions.

Mr. BENTZ. The reason I am asking this is because this isn't the first time the Secret Service has been before Congress. There was a 435-page report issued in 2015 by Congress saying, "Fix yourself." They didn't. In fact, there was a followup in 2019 where they had only done a few of the—I think it was 18 or 19 different specific things they were supposed to do. They had done some, but certainly not all.

There was another followup in 2022. Again, the Secret Service had not done what Congress had asked. I guess my question to you, Mr. Director, is what should Congress do? You have a 435-page report nine years ago, and still, the Secret Service didn't do what it was told to do then.

Can you help, Director Wray? Because this type of performance is not acceptable.

Mr. WRAY. Well, as I think even former Director Cheatle has acknowledged, this was a significant operational failure. If there are ways for the FBI to be helpful beyond what we're already doing in terms of our investigation, we stand ready to try to be helpful.

I do want to say, as somebody who's been in law enforcement for most of my career, I've worked with some phenomenal Secret Service agents going all the way back to my time as a line prosecutor. They have an incredibly hard job, and I have a lot of affection and respect for the men and women in the Secret Service.

Mr. BENTZ. I am sure you do, and I am sure you are right. The trouble is, when Congress says, "You need to do these 19 things," and you don't, something needs to change. Now, the Director has resigned. You are going to be in a position, because your Agency is doing such a careful review, to say a lot about what should have been done.

I guess the real issue is much more of what the higher-ups in that Agency are or are not doing. Perhaps that is on us.

Mr. BENTZ. We will share. We will share, with those reviews, anything that we come across that could be helpful or relevant to them for those questions.

Mr. BENTZ. Yes. Let me quickly go to some details about the actual events. It appeared to a lot of us, as the Secret Service was taking former President Trump from the stage, that he was clearly still in view of everybody. Had there been another shooter, I didn't see him being protected. Are you going to raise that issue?

Mr. WRAY. I think that's really more in scope of these two other reviews, probably both of them.

Mr. BENTZ. Let me go to—OK. That's fine. Let me go to the shooter. As he was on top of the roof, apparently, another officer from another police division saw him and quickly ducked down because the shooter aimed a gun at him. Then the shooter apparently—was he prone at the time he took the shot toward the President?

Mr. WRAY. So, my understanding is that the local officer who they were talking about, with the assistance of another local officer, was able to kind of get up and see onto the roof, where he observed the shooter, I believe in a prone shooting position. The shooter then turned and faced him, the local officer, with the weapon.

Mr. BENTZ. From the prone position?

Mr. WRAY. That's my understanding.

Mr. BENTZ. Then he went back to the prone position.

Mr. WRAY. This was all seconds before the shooter took his—

Mr. BENTZ. That entire time, the shooter was in the scope sight of the counter-sniper, correct?

Mr. WRAY. That one I'd have to double-check on. I know we've interviewed the counter-sniper, but I'm not sure I know the answer—

Mr. BENTZ. The counter-sniper didn't take a shot until after the assassin attempted to shoot the former President and others. He got off eight shots before the counter-sniper shot the shooter. What is with that protocol? Can you get that fixed?

Mr. WRAY. Well, again, I really want to be careful not to be giving the scope of our investigation, somehow second-guessing the very difficult act and decision it takes for a counter-sniper to kill another human being in that situation. It's all happening in seconds, so—

Mr. BENTZ. Eight shots.

Mr. WRAY. Yes.

Mr. BENTZ. That was after he'd been seen for 20 minutes.

I yield back. Thank you.

Chair JORDAN. Director, that is an important question, though, because you have talked to the counter-sniper. That—I mentioned this in our opening statement. That critical five minutes from 6:09–6:14 p.m. and what takes place there is critical. I think that is what the gentleman was getting at. We are hopeful that you could tell us something about your interview with the counter-sniper.

Mr. WRAY. Yes. I guess I want to distinguish a couple things. There is some individual, not law enforcement, I believe, who spotted the shooter on the roof a few minutes before. I think law en-

forcement spotted him with the weapon on the roof is seconds before the shot.

Chair JORDAN. OK. That is important because—

Mr. WRAY. Yes. There are two different things going on.

Chair JORDAN. If what you're saying is it wasn't—maybe that is—if the bad guy shoots at 6:11 p.m., then you are saying this encounter with local law enforcement that Mr. Bentz was just getting into happened just seconds before that and maybe not two minutes before that?

Mr. WRAY. That's my understanding, in other words, that there's different things here. There's individual—at least one individual I can think of, not law enforcement, a member of the public, who observed him on the roof. Not clear whether or not the individual saw a weapon or not but saw him in a way that was concerning.

That is some number of—not many, but like just a handful of minutes. I think separate from that, as far as law enforcement goes in terms of a weapon, this local officer that we just talked about observed the individual, again, literally just seconds before the individual, the shooter, took his shots.

Separate and apart from all that roughly, maybe a little less— or around an hour before the shooting, there were local law enforcement officers who observed the shooter, not up on the roof, not with a weapon, but with, I believe, a range finder like you would use if you were playing golf or something, in a way that was odd and suspicious.

So, that started happening with local law enforcement beforehand. In terms of shooter, meaning with the weapon, law enforcement—my understanding is that the first time that happened was this local officer climbing up on the roof seconds before the shooter—

Chair JORDAN. Again, we want that timeline. I think the Committee wants that timeline and communications that were taking place in that short period of time.

Mr. WRAY. Again, as I've said with everything else, I really want to be careful. I'm leaning in—trying to share as much as I can here. Facts are evolving. Things may change. We are working on a timeline, among other things.

Chair JORDAN. The Committee will stand in recess until after the Prime Minister's remarks conclude.

[Recess.]

Chair JORDAN. The Committee will come to order. The gentlelady from North Carolina is recognized for five minutes.

Ms. ROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you so much Director Wray for being with us yet again.

As you know, we've seen a disturbing rise in domestic terrorism and far right extremism across the United States. We've heard from you several times about this.

White supremacists and far-right extremist groups continue to outpace all types of terrorism and domestic violent extremism according to the National Institute of Justice report from this past January.

Part of this dramatic rise in extremist violence and threats stems from a line of foreign actors who are actively working to sow division in American democracy. They're desperately trying to inflame

extremists and deepen divides all to support far right agendas and candidates that will erode our democracy.

The DHS threat assessment has warned, we expect the 2024 election cycle will be a key event for possible violence and foreign influence, targeting our election infrastructure, processes, and personnel. Microsoft has warned that the 2024 election may be the first Presidential election during which multiple authoritarian actors simultaneously attempt to interfere with and influence election outcomes.

National security officials and experts have warned that foreign governments, mainly Russia, China, and Iran, seek to destabilize the United States via its elections, by sowing further division in the American electorate. This is happening and happening in the current context of increased political violence in our country against a former President, election workers, judges, Members of Congress and their families, and other public servants.

I cannot emphasize enough that this is a national security threat. Director Wray, reports have found that these propaganda campaigns will sometimes target racial groups.

Why would countries like Russia, China, Iran, seek to inflame racial tensions via social media?

Mr. WRAY. Well, of course, it may vary from adversary to adversary. The playbook for authoritarian regimes in today's world is to try to sow divisiveness and discord to turn us against each other, to capitalize on existing social tensions that they perceive.

To try to, in effect, pour gasoline on the fire and intensify those conflicts that may already exist in our domestic political scene.

So, rather than if you're a foreign adversary that means us no good, rather than try to come up with some completely brand new issue or theory or narrative to turn us against each other, you look for things where we're already, at the very least, quarreling with each other, if not fighting with each other.

Then, they try to capitalize on that and amp it up. Of course, that can then sometimes, as we've seen all too tragically, boil over or bubble over into outright violence.

Ms. ROSS. So, how has the FBI worked to combat this propaganda and infiltration on our social media network?

Mr. WRAY. So, our focus is on the foreign actor, China, Russia, Iran, and on their efforts. So, we work with the intelligence community. We work with our foreign partners, our friendly foreign partners to try to uncover what those countries, Russia, China, and Iran, are up to.

We try to share information about the hidden hand of the foreign actor where it's appropriate. We also engage in efforts to disrupt those foreign actors.

The most recent example with the Russians for example, is a Russian government-linked generative AI social media bot farm, where they were posing as, among others, U.S. persons, and not, in fact, U.S. persons, and trying too again, sow various narratives.

That case very heavily focused on the issue they picked there was the war in Ukraine. Again, trying to kind of get everybody turned against each other.

We've also seen that through from China and Iran. I mentioned China before, we've had a case where we charged, it was 34 Chi-

nese Ministry of Public Security, MPS Officers for much the same kind of behavior, creating false personas, pretending to be Americans, and then trying to kind of sow narratives.

In that case, in the Chinese case, their narratives were trying to, for example, undermine any suggestion that Covid was the product of a lab leak or attacking U.S. law enforcement at the anniversary of George Floyd's death, for example.

Then, Iran, in 2020, we saw them undertake similar kinds of efforts that were disrupted in October 2020.

Ms. ROSS. Thank you. I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. CLINE. Director Wray, thank you for being here. Thank you for the information that you've provided today. I greatly appreciate it.

This event that occurred, the attempted assassination of President Trump on July 13th in Butler, Pennsylvania, was a level five alarm alert to this country that our elected officials, our leaders, the President, and the former President, are not safe.

We need to reevaluate from the ground up, exactly how we are to go about providing that protection. The information you've provided, dealing with eight cartridges from the roof, the drone, the fact that two explosive devices were found in the car, one at home that was a remote detonation device that he had on him, the fact that his phone was using encrypted platforms, he only had one phone, correct?

Mr. WRAY. I'm sorry. Yes, he had one phone. Although we've identified other phones that he may have used that may not have been his phone.

So, for example, we think, in certain instances he might have used his dad's phone. Again, not necessarily related to the attack.

We're trying to, we are trying to make sure that we process and exploit every device he could have used. We keep, which is part of why I keep making this point, which I know you all are probably tired of me making, about this being an ongoing investigation. Because we keep identifying new pieces of equipment, new accounts, what have you.

Mr. CLINE. The fact that you are, in real time, informing us about what you're finding as you're performing this investigation, is very helpful.

Clarifying the fact that he went to the range the day before and shot an AR. Now, my understanding is that the AR he used on the 13th, was his father's. Is that correct?

Mr. WRAY. Well, yes and no. It was originally; his father bought it legally.

Mr. CLINE. OK.

Mr. WRAY. Then, our understanding so far is that his father then conveyed it to him, sold it, in fact, to his son. So, originally his father's, at the time of the shooting, the shooter's.

Mr. CLINE. OK. So, that's new information. Was that provided to you by the father?

Mr. WRAY. I think it was partly from that. I think we also saw some documentation to support it.

Mr. CLINE. OK. Investigators also have said that the shooter posted, quote, “July 13th will be my premier, watch as it unfolds,” on an online gaming platform sometime before he tried to assassinate President Trump.

Can you confirm that? How much time elapsed between this posting and the attempt on July 13th?

Mr. WRAY. So, I’m really glad you asked about that. Because that is a situation where, again, in our effort to give real time information, since we’ve provided that information, we have since learned that this July 13th premier profile page on the gaming platform, it turns out it was not the shooter.

Mr. CLINE. OK.

Mr. WRAY. That it was some other individual as part of some sick joke, who, after the shooting, created a profile page pretending to be the shooter.

Mr. CLINE. Wow.

Mr. WRAY. So, of course, we’ve now, that person has now admitted to it. Even my point being, among the other challenges that we as investigators have, you have people who create accounts, in today’s world create accounts pretending to be somebody that they’re, and it’s not the actual person.

Mr. CLINE. The shooter—

Mr. WRAY. That’s troubling, obviously. It makes our jobs even harder as investigators.

Mr. CLINE. Thank you for clarifying that. Did he have an online gaming account?

Mr. WRAY. We do believe he was a gamer and that he had different kinds of gaming accounts. So, that’s part of why we, yes.

Mr. CLINE. Any the information gleaned from those?

Mr. WRAY. Not yet. Again, some of those are some of those legal process returns I’m still waiting on.

Mr. CLINE. Now, during the attempted assassination, Crooks was wearing a tee shirt from a popular YouTube Channel. Have you been able to access his selection of YouTube videos that he’s watched?

Mr. WRAY. I believe we have seen some of his search history. We’ve got a ways to go on that.

I know there’s some manual work that we’re doing on that. The most notable thing that we’ve found recently, which I don’t think has been shared until today, is that on a laptop that the investigation ties to him, that on July 6th, it revealed a Google search.

His search, if it was him, again, it’s a laptop tied to him.

Mr. CLINE. Right.

Mr. WRAY. We obviously believe it’s him. We’ll continue to investigate it. His Google search was, “how far away was Oswald from Kennedy?”

Mr. CLINE. Right. Horrifying.

Mr. WRAY. Yes. Absolutely.

Mr. CLINE. Can you clarify that you have in your possession all the video that was taken on that day at the scene?

Mr. WRAY. We’ve collected mountains of video. Part of the reason that I—

Mr. CLINE. Can you commit to providing us with that video?

Mr. WRAY. Well, we're going to work with the Committee and share information as best we can. Part of the reason I hedged on whether we have it all, is as you can appreciate in today's world, everybody with a phone—

Mr. CLINE. Sure.

Mr. WRAY. Has the ability to take footage. So, we're finding things kind of left and right.

Mr. CLINE. You have all the law enforcement videos?

Mr. WRAY. I believe we have all the law enforcement video. We're still collecting evidence.

Mr. CLINE. OK. I hope you would provide that to us and to the American people. Thank you. I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. Director, just to be clear, the photo and the message on the online gaming account, your testimony was to Mr. Cline that that was somebody else posing as the shooter. Is that right?

Mr. WRAY. Correct. Somebody after—

Chair JORDAN. After the shooting.

Mr. WRAY. July 13th—

Chair JORDAN. OK. That's all.

Mr. WRAY. Created this profile, pretending to be the shooter, and sent us down the rabbit trail, which we've now tied off.

Chair JORDAN. That's important information. The gentlelady from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Ms. DEAN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Director Wray, for being here. I want to add my voice to the chorus of folks who are just devastated by the illness and passing of Sheila Jackson Lee.

What a champion. What a role model. I always called her the hardest working Member of Congress. She was everywhere on every issue. She'll be greatly missed.

Director Wray, I thank you for what you said earlier, which is leaning in. This is such an extraordinary set of events, the attempted assassination of Donald Trump.

The stealing of the life of a father, a firefighter, somebody who protected lives, Corey Comperatore, serious injuries to two others. So, I thank you, because you are trying to give us what you can without jeopardizing the investigation. I think that's very helpful.

Did the shooter also investigate other high-profile folks? We had heard some reporting around that early on.

Mr. WRAY. Well, you say investigate other folks. This is a place where we still have a lot more work to do. Part of what we did find was a bunch of cached images of a variety of public figures.

Again, cached images are those images that you get when you pull up a news story from any number of news sites, if there are photographs in the article, those images are automatically put into your cache on your computer. So, it doesn't necessarily mean that you were searching for that person's image.

We do have the fact that starting around, at least around the period of early July, so this search that I just mentioned related to Oswald and Kennedy, that's about July 6th, which is the same day, we believe, that he registered for the rally. The day before, we traveled to the grounds for the first time.

So, I think there is a certain amount of searches related to former President Trump that during that period we're seeing, con-

sistent with some kind of planning or reconnaissance, if you want to call it that, in advance of the rally.

That's sort of confined to that, or concentrated maybe is a better word, in that July period after the announcement of the rally and before the shooting.

Ms. DEAN. Can you speak to the conveyance of the gun? This is a 20-year-old young man. The father owned the gun originally. An AR-15, am I correct?

Mr. WRAY. An AR-styled. Yes, an AR-styled.

Ms. DEAN. AR-styled. A 20-year-old man. When did the father sell the gun to him? What documents do you have? How much money transpired and what date was it?

Mr. WRAY. Yes. I do know that, I like to say we believe, based on what we've seen, that his father, after purchasing the gun legally, sold the gun to his son.

I don't have the date of that transfer or the amount of the transfer. Although, we may be able to get that to you so far, I just don't have it in front of me.

Ms. DEAN. Do you know when the father bought it?

Mr. WRAY. We know. I don't, as I'm sitting here testifying in front of you, I don't have that in front of me.

Ms. DEAN. OK.

Mr. WRAY. So, I don't have it in my period reports.

Ms. DEAN. I'm just wondering if it's proximate to this event.

Mr. WRAY. I do not believe that the gun was purchased, that is the gun that was used, I do not believe it was purchased particularly close in time to the shooting. How far in advance, it may have been a year before, give or take.

Again, we'll go back and double check that on you. I do know that on the day of the shooting, at about 1:30 p.m., he bought 50 rounds of ammunition.

So, if you think about the day of, or if you back up a little bit, so the day before, he goes to the shooting range. The day of, he goes to the grounds the morning of the event for around an hour.

He buys the ammunition at around 1:30 p.m.. At around 3:50 p.m. is when he's back on the grounds of the rally. That's when he used the drone that I've talked about already today.

Then, of course, fast forward, until just after 6:00 p.m., when the worst happened.

Ms. DEAN. We had thought, maybe over the weekend, there was a conversation around a classified briefing for Members. I hope that will happen as soon as it's feasible for you and for the other agencies involved.

He got off eight shots. The reporting is that this was under six seconds, he got off eight shots, fatal to one.

My question that I'll leave you with—and I know I'm over time, Mr. Chair—is, we all decry political violence. We decry any violence. We decry the rise in political violence.

What can you tell us that we could do better? What do you need for you to be able to help this country reduce the political violence tendencies?

Mr. WRAY. This is a moment wherein the most stark way possible, all of us as Americans can see how out of control political violence is in this country. It's an opportunity for everybody to come

together and to try to show that this is not the kind of thing we're going to tolerate in this country.

The FBI's role is to focus on violence and threats of violence. There is a role for others in the public square to address how people communicate in this country.

Every day in our jobs, we see in social media in terms of threats that people are, we get thousands and thousands and thousands and thousands and thousands of tips reported to us.

The language that's out there is just mind-bogglingly hateful and violent sounding. People, sometimes as figures of speech, use expressions that are very violent expressions.

So, that is a part of it. We could all do better in being a little more thoughtful and measured in our language.

Again, the FBI, we've got to stay in our lane. Our lane is the violence and the threat to violence. There's a role for everybody as Americans to try to see if we can take the temperature down.

Ms. DEAN. Agree. Thank you. Thank you for the extra time.

Mr. WRAY. OK.

Ms. DEAN. I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman from North Dakota is recognized.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I really appreciate you correcting the gaming thing and about "this is my coming out party," because we're asking you to do something and we've had acrimonious, you and I have actually had acrimonious issues.

We're not here for a gotcha moment. We're just not. Not on this. We're asking you to give us information before the investigation is complete.

My only recommendation or suggestion would be when that happens, don't necessarily wait until you ask, because don't wait for us to ask. Because there's a—and I'll go through why in a second.

I appreciate you coming in and I appreciate you telling us things. I appreciate you guys going against essentially your normal policy of waiting until an investigation is done, because the American people need to know it.

Here's why. A guy with a range finder walking around that everybody noticed and then couldn't find. You know he scaled to the top of a roof within 150 yards, line of sight to the President or a Republican former Presidential Candidate, by climbing a drainpipe and then, you said, some equipment.

He was being pointed out by rally goers everywhere they could. Nobody could figure it out. There's maybe supposed to be local law enforcement in the building, either upstairs or downstairs. All of this is going on.

I was talking to a colleague of mine yesterday on the floor and it's, I hate the conspiracy theories that come out. This is not the FBI's purview. This is the Secret Service's purview.

This is so comically like, inept to the average, to have the average North Dakota citizen is just hey, look at this. They're like, how could this possibly happen?

So, by you giving us information in a really meaningful way, even though we know the investigation is ongoing and things can change, that at least helps us to deal with that and figure out where we're at.

So, you're doing all this. This guy had no combat training. No counter-surveillance training that you're aware of, right?

Mr. WRAY. I'm sorry. I couldn't quite hear that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. He had no combat training.

Mr. WRAY. Oh, no, I don't think any, and certainly no, what we would call, what you and I would call combat training. Obviously, he was a fairly active recreational shooter.

So, he did plenty of shooting.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes. A lot of guys in Western North Dakota, right?

Mr. WRAY. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. All of those different things. Somehow we came within under an inch of a Presidential Candidate being shot and killed within 100 days out from an election.

When you look at it, so just, I just want to be really clear, because there is a lot of this. There is no evidence of another shooter, right?

Mr. WRAY. Another shooter,—

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes.

Mr. WRAY. There's the counter-sniper who took out the shooter. Right, right. You're talking about, like, another?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Anybody else. You're looking at his online and seeing all that. There's no evidence he had any other accomplices on the scene that day, correct?

Mr. WRAY. Correct. Not that we've seen yet, certainly.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You said, and Oversight has had a hearing, DHS had a hearing, and we're having a hearing now. The Inspector General is going to investigate. We're probably announcing a bipartisan outside panel.

There's another investigation, too, right? Because somebody has to clear this shooter. Like, even though it is a Secret Service officer deploying his, when an FBI agent kills somebody in the line of duty, what's the process?

Mr. WRAY. So, we have what we call an agent involved shooting, is what you're getting at.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Maybe I'm have—

Mr. WRAY. We have a whole process. Our inspection—

Mr. ARMSTRONG. They get put on leave, paid leave. Get a lawyer, depending on how it is, right?

Mr. WRAY. Well, those, some of those things depend. We have—our inspection division does a shoot review of each time there's one of these situations.

They sometimes have to coordinate with local prosecutors who are also doing some kind of review. So yes, Secret Service would have a similar kind of process for the counter-shooter.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Because you have to actually establish one of the defenses to homicide. Just like you don't do it in a court system the same way everybody else does.

You have to justify that this shooting was justified. So, when the FBI does that, do they conduct that all internally?

Mr. WRAY. Most of the time, yes. Every once in a while, there's a situation where the Inspector General gets involved.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you know how the Secret Service does it?

Mr. WRAY. I don't.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. OK. I just think that's important, because when we're talking about how this works, and I don't think anybody's arguing it wasn't, anybody who's seen it and knows what happened. It's just, knowing it and making sure that the process is handled correctly.

I just wanted to shift gears with my last 30 seconds really quickly, because we had a hearing on the Northern border in Grand Forks. You were talking about specific threats from Iran, but also generally.

We have diverted an exceptional amount of resources to the Southern border. Our interactions, 114 percent increase in apprehension.

The one specific thing, with all due respect to my friends and my neighbors from Canada, it's a lot easier to get into Canada from some of these countries where we have these real issues with terrorist threats then it is to the United States, particularly Iran.

Are you guys monitoring that and making sure whatever coordination you have with Canada, that we're paying attention to that as well?

Mr. WRAY. We have an excellent relationship, we the FBI, with our Canadian counterparts, both RCMP the Mounties as some people with euphemistically call them, and CSIS, they're my intelligence service counterparts.

We have great relations with them. Terrorism is, I find, probably the No. 1 thing we talk about.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes. They're understaffed and overworked on the Northern border. They can use all the help you get.

With that, I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Maryland is recognized.

Mr. IVEY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Director, thank you for today. I greatly appreciate your candor. I know it's highly unusual to go into this level of detail during an active investigation.

It's a special and unique circumstance given the nature of what happened that day. I'll ask my colleagues that we are not try and take advantage of this and other circumstances.

We need to be careful about pressuring our investigators to disclose information in the middle of an investigation in a casual or a routine way. Thank you for what you've done here today.

I do want to mention this too, like Congressman Correa, I went up to Butler with Homeland Security Committee and had a chance to meet with a number of the people there, including people who were there at the rally.

Several of them were elected officials. In fact, one of them that spoke with me a lot, was sitting directly behind Mr. Trump when he was shot. She had videos that she had taken, and she would love to share it with you all.

She mentioned a couple of things too, that I hope you all will have a chance to have conversations about. I know some of it is going to be in the Secret Service lane and some is going to be in the FBI lane.

One of the things she talked about was the fact that the day before the shooting, she and other officials in the town, and people

who just wanted to prepare the stage, showed up and started working on putting the bunting up and decorating it.

The point she noted was that none of them had been vetted. There was nobody there to keep an eye on them and make sure that everything that was being done was appropriate.

She actually thought this in the context of hearing that a gun was found, or a gun was perhaps hidden at the site before the shooter was able to get it and use it. I don't know those details.

Those were some of the things that came up that day. She also mentioned that there was sort of the outer parameter.

So, you had a parameter around the stage that the Secret Service had set up. Beyond that, you had a field. Then, you had the building where the company was, and the shooter got on the roof.

Apparently, there was sort of a second level of a parameter there that wasn't particularly restricted from an access standpoint, as with the street, it was just beyond that.

So, she raised, and another elected official raised as well, issues about security that may actually kind of get into what you're talking about. Where the ladder was there. How the guy got on the roof. There were all sorts of issues with respect to that.

There were a lot of people, as you said, that had video tapes. I talked to three that were showing me videos while I was standing out there in the grounds.

I have a couple of questions to ask of you briefly. Apparently, there was no Secret Service recordation of communications during that day. There's no radio runs, we call them. There's no tapes.

Do you know if there are any recorded conversations among law enforcement from that day?

Mr. WRAY. I don't know the details of that. I believe, there may be some. I don't have it in front of me exactly what we've seen or heard.

Mr. IVEY. OK. Then, with respect to email communications. There were a lot of issues about—because my personal, if you have not gone to the site, was that they shouldn't, they just shouldn't have had the rally there. It should not have been permitted.

I thought there were, there's too many roofs. He picked one, but there was like a half dozen others that he could have picked on the other side of the field.

As Eli Crane, a Congressman who was a sniper for the U.S. military, said, "there was a water tower that actually would have been a better site." Probably that Secret Service should have used but could have been used as well.

The lead up to that decision, and Congressman Correa raised this, "who made this decision about how to pick the site?"

Apparently, there was some back and forth between local law enforcement, Secret Service, and the campaign. I was kind of curious as to whether that's something that your investigation is going into or not?

Mr. WRAY. So, that primarily falls within the scope of the other, the two other reviews. That is the inspectors, the DHS Inspector General review, and the outside panel, independent panel that's been announced.

Certainly, we are interviewing law enforcement personnel. The security preparations, the adequacy of the security preparations—

Mr. IVEY. That's the other lane.

Mr. WRAY. That's the other lane.

Mr. IVEY. All right. I've only got 15 seconds left. Quick question for you with probably not a quick answer. This scenario is kind of the worst-case scenario from a couple of standpoints.

You've got a lone wolf shooter with no red flags that we've heard of so far. Nobody should have known that this was coming. He didn't have a criminal record or that sort of thing. Easy access to an assault weapon.

I had a discussion like this with Congressman Roy and Congressman Bishop several months ago. What is it we can do to try and preempt those kinds of scenarios?

We've got gun violence all over the country, including in my district. This is one example, but this scenario is the worst possible that I can think of from the standpoint of no intervention prevention efforts that can be put in place to try and address it.

I'm kind of curious if you have any thoughts to the contrary on that?

Mr. WRAY. I don't know if I have any magic solution to the problem. I certainly don't want to be proposing legislative ideas. That's not really my role.

Certainly, dangerous weapons, especially high-powered weapons in the hands of the wrong person, represent a real concern for law enforcement. Including to law enforcement sometimes as the victims, as we saw very tragically down near Miami, with two of our agents killed.

That's probably all I can say about that. I do, while we're on the subject of firearms, Mr. Chair, I have an answer to Congresswoman Dean's question.

Chair JORDAN. Go ahead.

Mr. WRAY. I might as well do it now.

Chair JORDAN. Go right ahead.

Mr. WRAY. Which is probably the purchase of the firearm. I'm told that the father purchased the firearm in 2013. So, quite a while ago. Then, he sold it to his son in October 2023. Thank you.

Mr. IVEY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Director, for your great work.

Chair JORDAN. I'd ask unanimous consent that we enter into the record, a statement from Representative Kelly and some questions for the Bureau.

Representative Kelly represents Butler, actually, that's his hometown. Without objection, those will be entered into the record and we'll make sure you get those Director.

The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized.

Mr. VAN DREW. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Before I begin, and this is not directly with you, actually. I just wanted to straighten something out.

I know my colleagues, the gentlemen and the gentleladies from Georgia, Washington, California, and Pennsylvania, you all mentioned Project 2025. Well, I don't know how they expect you to know about that, No. 1. I'm pretty damn involved. I don't really know a whole lot about it.

President Trump has made it clear, and we're going to say it again, we'll say it over and over again, that there are some of the

things he disagreed with, some of the things he agreed with that he wasn't that familiar with. It was from *The Heritage Foundation*.

That was just raw politics to be honest with you. It was just because 2025 has some things in it, that they believe, that are really going to offend American people, and it very well may. So, they want to pin it on the Presidential Candidate.

He didn't author it. He didn't condone it. He didn't put his seal of approval on it. It's getting old. It really is. We do this sort of thing.

Just like in this Committee, when everything goes wrong, anything, somehow Donald Trump's name has to be brought into it. It gets tiring. It's politics over reality.

The second thing about picking the site, I was intimately involved in the Wildwood rally, the biggest rally President Trump's ever had. The biggest political rally in the State of New Jersey.

I had spoken to the President about it. He wanted to do it on the beach, because we had over 100 thousand people. Let me tell you, we had everybody out there, because they were concerned, the Secret Service, the local police, the country police, and just about every entity could be.

So, they had behind it was that iconic setting. They had the ferris wheel on the pier, and all the stuff. They had agents up in there.

They had agents in the ocean, in the water, and in boats. They had people coordinating, working with each other and talking with each other, because they knew it was a risk.

So, we chose a site that was difficult. The President did, and I thought it was a great site. Nevertheless, the law enforcement responded properly.

Something went wrong here. You can't blame this on Donald Trump as well. The site was chosen. It's the responsibility of those who serve in law enforcement to make sure that he was safe, period. I'm sure you'll find out why.

On another tangent here, I've got to wonder how many qualified people were passed for Director Cheatle to get her 30 percent quota. That's a lousy way to run an agency, especially when it's dealing with law enforcement, to say, we've got to have 30 percent of anything.

I worry about these practices, because it's policy over protection. Director Wray, I know that some things were left to you. I understand that. One of your early acts on the Biden Presidency was hiring the FBI's very first Chief Diversity Officer.

Since that time and even before your time, but—and you're going to disagree with me. Respectfully, I'm going to disagree with you. Recruitment standards under your lead have resulted in deterioration in many areas including physical fitness, illicit drug use, financial irregularities, mental health issues, full time work experience, and integrity.

I know you dismissed them, but, in October 2023, they are a prestigious group of retired FBI Special Agents and Analysts, both, expressed concern regarding the FBI's willingness to recruit agents that quote, I'm not saying this, they said it, not me,

Can't even pass the new relaxed standards for fitness, who are illiterate in some cases, and need lessons, educational lessons, don't want to work weekends or after hours ...

Their words,

... and have serious disabilities or mental health issues, which is not the place for them.

Most of your agents are great people. I love them. I love them for what they do. I'm not criticizing most. These new standards, don't you think this is a hindrance and reduces the morale of the vast majority of good people that you have in the FBI?

I ask you for a quick answer because I have a few other things.

Mr. WRAY. So, I respect our retired agents. Many of them come to our graduations now. I can tell you emphatically that they are mistake—those who think that we have lowered our standards, whether it's on physical fitness or anything else, are mistaken.

Mr. VAN DREW. You can prove that?

Mr. WRAY. The facts back me up on that.

Mr. VAN DREW. That the standards are the same today as they were a decade ago?

Mr. WRAY. Again—

Mr. VAN DREW. They've changed in some ways that are appropriate.

Mr. WRAY. Well, in fact, the physical fitness standards, it depends on how far back you go, but the physical fitness standards that our current graduates have to have to graduate from Quantico, actually exceed some of the physical fitness standards that were in place, if you go back far enough, with some of our retirees.

What I would tell you, part of the reason there's confusion, and again, I accept that these folks are raising their concerns in good faith, but we have actually access to the facts.

Part of the reason there's confusion, just take the physical fitness thing as an example, is that before, you had to pass the physical fitness test before you showed up to Quantico.

Now, you have to pass it to get a badge at Quantico. The standard hasn't changed. You still have to pass the same test, the same 12-point standard, et cetera, all that stuff applies.

The only difference is you can pass it while you're at Quantico. If you don't pass that same test that's been in place for a long time now, you don't get a badge.

We will dismiss people from Quantico, and we do, who don't pass that test.

Mr. VAN DREW. Director, I have to wrap this up and I appreciate that. If you could get us information that substantiates what you say, that should be easy enough to do, for the whole Committee, I would appreciate it.

Feelings in this Administration are more important than functionality. It's resulted in a border crisis. We don't have time to talk about that. You've spoken out about it. I appreciate that you've spoken out about it.

It's also resulted in shortages in our Nation's law enforcement and our military. It makes us less safe.

So, I look forward to seeing those statistics and that proof, because I have people talking in my ear that tell me otherwise. I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Alabama is recognized.

Mr. MOORE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Director Wray, I appreciate you being here today. I certainly appreciate your forthcomingness and giving us information that the American people want.

To me it's—you have a very difficult job right now. In the past, and under Comey, certainly, the Russian collusion narrative got out pretty heavily.

That came out of the FBI with the FISA warrants and that sort of stuff, spying on General Flynn. Then, the laptop issue, the Hunter Biden laptop issue, which the FBI actually had in their possession.

So, I have 800 thousand people thereabouts that I represent. Our job is to restore trust. So, in a lot of the hearings we've had this week they've said, well, the FBI is investigating that.

Every answer was, the FBI is investigating this. So, in some ways it kind of landed in your lap. I appreciate you being here.

It's just, for me, the question of how does a 20 year old, acting alone, get a long gun, a range finder, we know he bought a ladder. I guess he reconned the area and realized he didn't need the ladder to get on top of the building, so he left it at the house, get on a roof within 150 yards of one of the most famous people in the world, I guess, now, and a former President, how does that happen?

How do we restore trust in the American people if the FBI and the DHS, who is under Mayorkas' directorate now, how do we verify and get trust back to the American people that these agencies are really working to protect the President?

I'm not trying to place blame specifically. I never thought that we'd raid his house. I never dreamed that they'd raid a former President's house.

I certainly never imagined that they would actually indict him. I felt, well, they'll never find him guilty. Now, he's had a threat on his life.

So, how do we restore trust in the government of this country and the agencies that are here, that we pay and provide \$3 billion a year to the Secret Service to protect some of the leading political candidates in America?

That's a lot. I'm sorry. That's a lot of questions. I'm going to give you a little room to talk.

Mr. WRAY. Right. No, no, listen, obviously you included a lot, as you said, in your question. As you might imagine, I disagree fairly strongly with a number of parts of it.

Sensitive to the time, I guess what I would say this, I can speak to my approach to running the FBI. Again, the FBI was not involved in the physical security of the rally. We come in as the investigators afterwards. As I've said before, our investigation is an investigation of the shooter and his attack.

There are separate investigations, the Inspector General at DHS, and this outside independent panel that's been announced, they

will be looking at the Secret Services' performance. Those will be important to trust and confidence, if you will, in Secret Service.

From the FBI perspective, we can't promise that everybody is going to like the results of what we do. Right? What we can promise is that we're going to do our best to do the work in the right way. That's all we can do.

So, I keep telling our folks every day, on this and on everything else, our focus has to be, we've got to do the work in the right way. We've got to make sure we do the work in the right way.

Then, no matter who likes it, because everything we do, somebody doesn't like it.

Mr. MOORE. It's a credibility issue at this point. Do the American people trust what the FBI and the DOJ is going to tell them?

That's the thing with this, when I was early on, and I've only been here about 3½–4 years now, but the American people fear the weaponization of government. So, now, we have this issue.

Tucker Carlson asked the President, he said, "Are you afraid they'll kill you?" I remember that interview and I thought, wow, I can't believe he went there, but here we are.

So, as we work through this process, I think, it's so important. The Chair hit on this, is the audio of the shooter, you've interviewed the sniper, the Secret Service sniper that took out the target. Was he waiting for a green light? What was going on? Why did Mr. Crooks have a chance to get off eight rounds? We knew he was on the rooftop, I don't know for how long.

We know he was a marked target. So, was he trying to get the green light? Was somebody not giving it to him?

Mr. WRAY. So, again, the performance, the adequacy of the performance of Secret Service will be the subject of the Inspector General investigation and this outside independent panel.

What I can tell you, and I'm glad you asked the question, because this goes to something that was part of an earlier exchange, the first time that anybody from law enforcement saw the subject on the roof, was a few minutes before the shooting.

Not with a gun. They didn't, at that point they didn't know—

Mr. MOORE. Right. Right.

Mr. WRAY. Local law enforcement, a few minutes before, saw him on the roof and started radioing it in.

Mr. MOORE. Did he have a backpack going up the roof? Did they—

Mr. WRAY. Nobody has, we haven't found anybody yet who saw him climbing up the roof.

Mr. MOORE. OK.

Mr. WRAY. The reason we, the reason why I've talked about how we think he got on the roof, is that's based on forensic, our evidence response to and forensic analysis that we're without getting into all the details, footprints and things like that we can fingerprints, et cetera, that we can see how he got on.

We don't have an eyewitness at the moment who saw him climbing up. So, a few minutes before the shooting, local law enforcement saw him on the roof. Again, no weapon identified at that point.

A few seconds before the shooting, is when the law enforcement officer that I've talked about already, is the one that was assisted

by another officer, who saw on the roof, saw the shooter in a prone shooting position with the gun turn—

Mr. MOORE. How long did that happen before?

Mr. WRAY. That sighting is the first time to my knowledge, the first time anybody from law enforcement saw him with a weapon, that is seconds before he shot at President Trump.

Mr. MOORE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. So, did the counter-sniper not see the bad guy, the shooter until after he fired a shot?

Mr. WRAY. Until after the subject fired a shot?

Chair JORDAN. Until after the shooter.

Mr. WRAY. Yes, I don't know the answer to that. It's possible we've already determined that. I just, as I sit here right now, I don't have that. I can, yes.

Chair JORDAN. That's the logical next question with where the gentleman from Alabama's question was going.

The gentleman from California is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. KILEY. Director Wray, to the best of your understanding, how close did the assassin's bullet come to killing President Trump?

Mr. WRAY. My understanding is that either it or some shrapnel is what grazed his ear. So, I don't know that I have the actual distance.

Mr. KILEY. Very, very close though?

Mr. WRAY. What's that?

Mr. KILEY. Very, very close you would agree?

Mr. WRAY. Yes.

Mr. KILEY. Is this the biggest security failure that you've seen in your career?

Mr. WRAY. Well, certainly, Director, former Director Cheatle has already acknowledged that this was a significant, at the very least a significant operational failure. I forgot her exact words.

I will defer on that. It speaks for itself.

Mr. KILEY. Well, we really haven't seen anything like this in at least decades in this country, right?

Mr. WRAY. The attempted assassination of a President, current or former, is an historic event.

Mr. KILEY. Was this a sophisticated plot that Thomas Crooks carried out?

Mr. WRAY. Well, it probably depends on your definition of sophisticated, right? So, on the one hand he's a 20-year-old, it seems, from what we've seen so far, a loner without a lot of elaborate criminal—without any criminal history or anything like that.

On the other hand, he did clearly do some level of planning and recon.

Mr. KILEY. When did the planning start to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. WRAY. What's that?

Mr. KILEY. When did the planning start?

Mr. WRAY. Well, we're still drilling into that. We know, we assess that on July 6th—

Mr. KILEY. So, a week in advance.

Mr. WRAY. For example, it seems to be that, he seems to become very focused on it. Because that's when, as I've testified here today,

that's when it, as the laptop that we've tied to him has the Google search, "how far away was Oswald from Kennedy?"

Mr. KILEY. That seems like an indication of a total amateur, right? Someone who's searching for that and he's doing it a week in advance?

Mr. WRAY. Again, I don't want to characterize him. I, frankly, don't want to give him the credit of characterizing him as amateur or a professional.

What I will say is that there are some things he did that involve a certain amount of planning and preparation. On the other hand, if you're telling me, do I think this is the most sophisticated ever, of course not.

We deal with much more sophisticated adversaries all the time.

Mr. KILEY. You probably prepare for much more sophisticated plans to target high-level officials.

Mr. WRAY. I'm sorry, could you repeat?

Mr. KILEY. You probably prepare for more sophisticated plans to target high-level officials, correct?

Mr. WRAY. Well, we don't do physical security, but, yes. Obviously, we're investigating much more sophisticated attacks all the time.

Mr. KILEY. How about the encrypted applications on his phone? Were those there for a while?

Did he download them in the days or weeks leading up to the assassination attempt?

Mr. WRAY. I don't have the answer to that sitting here right now. It may vary from platform to platform, because he had a number of encrypted messaging apps on it.

Again, as I've said, we're trying to get access to that content. That's important. It's important for everybody on this Committee to understand that this is a real problem for law enforcement.

That these companies, let's be clear here, these companies are designing their platforms in a way to, no matter how heinous the crime, no matter how rock solid the legal process to have access—

Mr. KILEY. I'm sorry to interrupt. I'm running out of time, but I want to get—

Mr. WRAY. Yes.

Mr. KILEY. To the next question. At this moment, are you confident that high-level protectees, Presidents, former Presidents, are well protected?

Mr. WRAY. That's not really for me to say. I have a lot of respect for the men and women of the Secret Service who provide protection, just as I do for their counterparts at other agencies.

Mr. KILEY. You can't say one way or the other, your assessment as Director of the FBI, whether the President is safe?

Mr. WRAY. I'm not an expert on protective details and physical security. What I would tell you is that we have a very robust system for sharing threat information with those agencies. In my experience, the men and women of the Secret Service are professionals who are hard-working, who are literally willing to take a bullet for their protectee.

Mr. KILEY. You mentioned a thwarted assassination attempt against former President Bush. Are there any other thwarted as-

sassination attempts against current or former Presidents that you could discuss?

Mr. WRAY. Not that immediately comes to mind. I'd have to go back and think about that. Obviously, we've been around for a while. Current and former Presidents are high-profile targets who are attractive to all kinds of bad guys.

Mr. KILEY. There's also been reports that the shooter's parents called local law enforcement to say he was missing on the day of the shooting. Is that correct?

If so, is that something that you would see as sort of a natural thing for them to do? It seems like a 20-year-old who's been missing for three hours, maybe his parents don't, first thing they do, call the police.

What was going on with that situation?

Mr. WRAY. So, my recollection, I don't have this in front of me. My recollection is that they did call, concerned that he was missing.

My recollection though, is that they didn't call until, this was after the event.

Mr. KILEY. I see.

Mr. WRAY. I'm not certain of that. So, I want to hedge on that slightly, because I have to get back to you to confirm that.

I believe that part of the issue was that when he last saw his father, he indicated to his father that he was going to shoot at the range. Then, of course, he didn't go to the range. He didn't come back from that. So, that may have added to the level of concern.

Mr. KILEY. Thank you. I yield back.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. The gentlelady from Wyoming is recognized.

Ms. HAGEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Director Wray, I am going to go a little bit different route with my questioning.

In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in December of last year, you stated that the FBI is "especially concerned about the possibility of Hamas supporters engaging in violence on the group's behalf" and that the threat from a "terrorist organization who may exploit the attacks on Israel as a tool to mobilize their followers around the world."

We have seen a lot of conduct today that I think is concerning to many people in terms of Hamas terrorists and their sympathizers. Reports have surfaced alleging that many of the groups intimidating and violating the civil rights of Jewish American students, like the Students for Justice for Palestine, received guidance and financial support from American Muslims for Palestine and that AMP's directors allegedly have links to groups which fund-raised for Hamas.

Director Wray, is the Bureau aware of or investigating whether these groups violating the civil liberties of Jewish Americans are connected to or affiliated with Hamas or other terrorist organizations?

Mr. WRAY. So, we are investigating a lot of attacks and threats against the Jewish community. I have been very vocal on how big of a concern that is. Certainly, that was already heightened even before October 7th. Since October 7th, it went to a whole other

level. We are actively engaged with the Jewish community both locally and nationally.

When it comes to foreign terrorist organizations and their role or foreign adversaries and their role, we are looking hard to see if we can find linkage, for example, funding or things like that. Nothing that I can report at this time. It is something that—

Ms. HAGEMAN. You are investigating it?

Mr. WRAY. —it is the kind of thing that we are looking for, absolutely, because we know that there is an interest in their part to foment—

Ms. HAGEMAN. We are watching it in real time today.

Mr. WRAY. Right, yes.

Ms. HAGEMAN. There are other reports that Mayor Bitar, National Security Council Coordinator for Intelligence and Defense Policy and Deputy Assistant to the President, was an active member in Students for Justice in Palestine at Georgetown University, which is one of the groups alleged to have ties to Hamas.

Is the Bureau investigating whether the Biden-Harris Administration is compromised by pro-Hamas groups and organizations?

Mr. WRAY. Well, again, we are having quite a number of Hamas-related investigations. I can't—

Ms. HAGEMAN. I am asking specifically—

Mr. WRAY. Yes, I can't—

Ms. HAGEMAN. —about whether you are investigating whether the Biden-Harris Administration has been compromised by pro-Hamas groups.

Mr. WRAY. There is nothing along those lines that I can think of to report.

Ms. HAGEMAN. I also want to talk to you a bit about the FBI's investigation and involvement with the Russia collusion hoax. The FBI was involved with that because of its potential relationship to election interference. Is that correct? The FBI's involvement in investigating the Russia collusion hoax that was because there was concern about election interference, is that correct?

Mr. WRAY. Well, the FBI was involved and staffed as investigators in the Special Counsel Mueller investigation into efforts by the Russian Government to influence and interfere.

Ms. HAGEMAN. With the election, correct?

Mr. WRAY. Yes.

Ms. HAGEMAN. All right. So, is the FBI investigating what just happened with Joe Biden being forced out of the race after winning the Democrat primary as election interference? Is the FBI investigating that right now?

Mr. WRAY. I am not aware of any investigation along those lines.

Ms. HAGEMAN. It has happened just in the last couple of weeks.

OK. Director Wray, it was reported in March that the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force resumed communication with social media companies. An FBI spokesman has stated that,

In coordination with the Department of Justice, the FBI recently implemented procedures to facilitate sharing information about foreign malign influences with social media companies in a way that reinforces that private companies are free to decide on their own whether and how to take action on the information.

Director Wray, what specifically is the FBI doing to reinforce that such decisions are in fact for the private companies to make and not the Administration?

Mr. WRAY. So, I think the best way to summarize it is that the guidance takes all kinds of additional steps to underscore that the FBI has no interest in participating in any way whatsoever in the companies' decisionmaking and that companies are completely free to take any actions on their own.

That we are simply passing information on to them for them to do whatever it is they want to do independently, consistent with, I should say, I very much appreciate the Supreme Court's finding that no evidence that the FBI coerced platforms to take content down.

Ms. HAGEMAN. Well, I don't believe that is what the Supreme Court found. What the Supreme Court found was that the parties involved didn't have standing. I think there is a whole body of evidence and legal analysis demonstrating that in fact this Administration was violating the First Amendment rights of folks through social media companies.

I am just going to ask one final very quick question. If the FBI was involved in the removal or restriction of speech of Americans, do you agree that this would be a violation of the First Amendment?

Mr. WRAY. Well, again, I am not going to engage in hypotheticals. My understanding and my strong view from everything I have seen is that we did not violate the First Amendment.

Ms. HAGEMAN. OK.

Chair JORDAN. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman from Texas is recognized.

Mr. GOODEN. Thank you, Director. I have just got two easy questions for you. In February, Donald Trump, Jr., received a letter containing a white suspicious powder that read, "Lee Harvey Oswald's grandson must complete his contract."

The United States Secret Service and the FBI said they would investigate the matter, and five months later no more information has been released. I have also visited with Mr. Trump, and he has not received any information either. Why is that?

Mr. WRAY. So, as I sit here right now, I am not familiar with the specific investigation, but I do know that we have had unfortunately quite a few investigations of threatening mailings and white powder letters and things like that.

So, I am happy to drill into it and have us circle back to you and see if there is more information we can share about it.

Mr. GOODEN. Thank you. Would you maybe circle back to Mr. Trump and Donald, Jr. I think they would like an update as well.

Mr. WRAY. All right. Sure. Let me—again, like I said, I am not familiar with the specifics, but I am happy to have us look into it and get back to whoever we need to get back to.

Mr. GOODEN. Thank you. The next question, the Pittsburgh Field Office is now handling the assassination attempt investigation, is that right?

Mr. WRAY. Well, there are several—the Pittsburgh Field Office is the lead office. We obviously have lots of—I think it is about half, maybe over half, of the FBI's field offices are working on this, in-

cluding almost every headquarters division. So, we have lots and lots and lots, several hundreds of employees working on it, but yes.

Mr. GOODEN. All right. Pittsburgh is the lead. OK. This is the same office that botched the Hunter Biden laptop case. They, in my view, my constituents, and many Americans displayed a clear reluctance, quote, “reluctance to really do any tasking” and “effectively failing to investigate,” according to the U.S. Attorney on the case.

My question is how can we trust this office and why does it keep reappearing in critical election related investigations or is that just dumb luck?

Mr. WRAY. So, I want to be a little bit careful in what I can say here because some of what you are talking about relates to an ongoing investigation being led by the Special Counsel, Mr. Weiss, but what I can tell you is that the Pittsburgh Field Office’s involvement in the matter you are talking about was the choice by the Attorney General, Attorney General Barr, to have the U.S. Attorney and the FBI Field Office in Pittsburgh handle that particular matter.

As to your summary or characterization of what U.S. Attorney, now former U.S. Attorney Brady actually said, I would have to see the whole context. I am not quite sure that’s what he said. As to your overall question about confidence, what I would tell is we have—that is the point I am trying to make about the sheer breadth of our investigation.

Yes, the Pittsburgh Field Office is the office on the ground. That is where the attempted assassination happened. We are using the full might of the FBI, criminal and national security. That is why I am pointing out that multiple field offices, over half of our field offices, almost every headquarters division, several hundreds of employees. These are people who are working around the clock to deal with this historic attack.

I have the utmost confidence in those hundreds of employees, agents, analysts, professional staff, and the American people should, too.

Mr. GOODEN. I yield to Mr. Jordan.

Chair JORDAN. I appreciate the gentleman yielding. Director, I guess I am not clear exactly where you said there were eight-shell casings on the roof so eight bullets were fired. We obviously know that Mr. Comperatore lost his life, two other rally goers were injured, seriously injured, and then the one that hit President Trump.

Does that account for—were some of these individuals hit multiple times? Where did all eight bullets go, I guess, is my question?

Mr. WRAY. I don’t have that in front of me. I am happy to circle back and get that to you. That is assuming we have that information. As I said, I think with respect to former President Trump, there is some question about whether or not it is a bullet or shrapnel that hit his ear. So, it is conceivable.

As I sit here right now, I don’t know whether that bullet, in addition to causing the grazing, could have also landed somewhere else. I believe we have accounted for all of the shots and the cartridges. So, let us get—

Chair JORDAN. It is my understanding that the very first one was the one that hit the President. Is that the very first shot or is that not accurate?

Mr. WRAY. As I sit here right now, I don't know the answer to that. I believe we know the answer to that. I just don't have it in front of me.

Chair JORDAN. OK. Is there any chance this—it seems to me that this bad guy, this shooter, was focused on President Trump. You indicated that he purchased 50 rounds of ammunition, I believe, earlier that day.

Do you have any indication thus far in your investigation that in addition to going after and trying to assassinate the former President, he was also looking to do a lot more damage to other individuals?

Mr. WRAY. That's a hard question to answer. What I would say is I agree with you that his preparatory activity, what we have seen so far, the limited information that has been relevant and interesting about his preparatory activity, does seem to be that he had settled on former President Trump as a target, and this rally as his moment to try to take a shot.

In addition to the 50 rounds, of course, you have the issue of these explosive devices.

Chair JORDAN. Right.

Mr. WRAY. So, what else he may have had in mind is something that I think is very much of an open question.

On the one hand, you have these explosive devices, including the one still back at his home that wasn't in quite the same stage as the one in the vehicle—the ones in the vehicle. He clearly had those explosive devices for some reason. So, we are trying to figure that out.

As I have said before, sometimes in these kinds of situations you find like a manifesto or something like that.

Chair JORDAN. Right.

Mr. WRAY. It is frustrating to us, and I am sure frustrating to you and the American people, that we haven't found anything quite like that.

We would love to have a road map that tells us exactly what he was thinking. We haven't found that yet. It doesn't mean we won't. We are looking all over the place. We are going to leave no stone unturned.

Chair JORDAN. Thank you. The gentleman from Texas is recognized.

Mr. HUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Director, for being here today. I know it has been a very long day, a busy day on Capitol Hill. Also, I want to apologize in advance if there is any repetitive questions from me.

I have to ask, given that our sitting President resigned from the campaign on Sunday and the Secret Service Director resigned yesterday, you don't plan on resigning any time soon, do you, sir?

Mr. WRAY. No, sir.

Mr. HUNT. Good to go. Earlier today, you told this Committee that you recovered eight bullet cartridges from the roof next to the shooter.

Given that testimony, I have two questions for you. How many shots were fired at President Trump, and how many shots were fired in total of the entire day? I know I keep hearing eight, but were there anymore that were unaccounted for?

Mr. WRAY. The best information I have right now is eight shots. As to the sequence, I am not sure I have that sitting here right now. As I said to the Chair, I am going to go back to my team and see if we have got that nailed down yet. If we have, I am happy to share it with you and the rest of the Committee.

Mr. HUNT. Please do, sir. Thank you very much for that.

You also mentioned that the shooter used encrypted messages to communicate. Specifically, do you know what apps that he was using to communicate? Can you confirm if he was communicating with any foreign nationals through the encrypted messages?

Mr. WRAY. So, as to the names of the apps, I don't have that right here in front of me. As far as communicating with any foreign actors, I will say two things:

- (1) We haven't, as I have testified before, we have not, at the moment at least, identified any accomplices or co-conspirators, foreign or domestic.
- (2) As to foreign contacts, of course, that is part of why we want to get access to the encrypted messages, because that might tell us whether he had been in contact with somebody.

Mr. HUNT. Thank you. Let's talk about motive. I know the FBI has taken a lead role in investigating the assassination of President Trump. Your team has searched the shooter's phone, conducted countless interviews, done extensive research into his motives. As of today, July 24, 2024, do you and your team know the motive of the shooter or have any idea what could have driven it?

Mr. WRAY. Well, "know" and "have any idea" are two very different things.

Mr. HUNT. OK.

Mr. WRAY. We do not know the motive. That is obviously one of the central questions in our investigation. It has been very frustrating to us that a lot of the usual kind of low-hanging fruit places that we would find that have not yielded significant clues about his motive.

Having said that, we have seen indications that he was interested in public figures. In the period around July 6th leading up to July 13th, he does seem to become very focused on this particular rally and former President Trump. Exactly what his thought process was in doing that is something still very much under investigation.

Mr. HUNT. I want to make something clear to the American people to try to help out with motive. Could they—again, it is not my job to steer it, but here are some of my thoughts.

I am not sure about motives either specifically. I can tell you that after the assassination attempt, people on both sides, both parties, need to tone down the rhetoric.

Recently, just on Monday in fact, President Biden called into the Harris campaign event and said that President Trump was a threat to democracy.

Just take a look behind me at these photos. This is a magazine cover of *The New Republic* from June 2024, published just one month before the assassination attempt on President Trump. In a Tweet explaining the cover, *The New Republic* said this:

Today, we, at *The New Republic* think we can spend this election year in one of two ways: We could spend it debating whether Trump meets the 9 or 17 points that define fascism. Or we could spend it saying he is damn close enough, and we better fight. We unreservedly choose the latter course.

Now, sir, I know you said that the FBI doesn't have a clear motive yet, and you have explained that. In your professional experience as an investigator, do you think that language like this could radicalize someone to engage in political violence?

Mr. WRAY. I certainly understand the point of the question. What I would tell you is that respectfully, I don't think it is appropriate for me, as the FBI Director, to be characterizing or engaging in public commentary on specific people's rhetoric.

That's because it is not that I don't understand why you are raising the question, but I am saying that in my role, I have to be very careful to make sure that we speak through our work and we speak through our cases and our intelligence products, not the FBI Director chiming in on the public square on different people's public political commentary.

Mr. HUNT. I understand. For the record, there was an assassination attempt on an American President. I will be asking these same questions even if it were President Biden.

My message to the American people is that we need to do better. I yield back the rest of my time. I thank you for being here, sir. I know it has been a very long day.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. FRY. Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Director, for being here. Actually, it is refreshing. I was in the Oversight hearing earlier this week, and although we don't have an idea on everything, your ability to come in here and actually give way more than Director Cheatle ever did is somewhat refreshing. You saw some pretty bipartisan frustrations exhibited in that particular hearing. I am sure you have seen part of it.

I want to followup on a couple lines of questions that I had with Director Cheatle that she actually answered, which was remarkable.

One she had indicated that Secret Service at the Trump rally did not have any radio recordings. In your investigation, is that accurate?

Mr. WRAY. I am not sure I know the answer to that. I believe we have—there may be some recordings on the local law enforcement side. As to whether or not we have recordings on the Secret Service side, I would have to drill back into that.

The reason I am—you might say, well, how the heck can you not know, well, we certainly have interviewed lots of Secret Service employees.

Mr. FRY. Correct.

Mr. WRAY. So, what we know from the interviews versus some other source, as I sit here right now, I don't know.

Mr. FRY. So, on this particular case, but in your experience, and again, it is a different agency, but she had indicated, Director Cheatle had indicated, that recordings sometimes are done from radio recordings, I guess, what happens at a Trump rally or any other thing that they are engaged in.

Is that your experience as well that sometimes there are audio recordings of communications between law enforcement officials?

Mr. WRAY. Just speaking very broadly—

Mr. FRY. Broadly.

Mr. WRAY. —certainly, there are times when there are recordings. It would be hard for me to be more precise than that.

Mr. FRY. I know you can't answer whether they were here in this instance or not, but what would cause recordings to not exist for the Trump rally if, as a hypothetical, what would be the reason that this would happen?

Mr. WRAY. I am afraid I don't know the answer to that. If they didn't record, there may be situations where they just don't record in the first place. Why that would be though, I am not sure I can answer that.

Mr. FRY. Thank you. Let me ask you this, and this is another line of questioning. Director Cheatle had indicated that seconds before the would-be assassin fired the shot, is roughly seconds, is when he became a person of suspicion to an actual threat. Would you agree with that assessment from Director Cheatle?

Mr. WRAY. Well, let me try it this way. I think there are sort of three—in my mind, there are sort of three, let's say three significant moments on this continuum that you are kind of getting at.

There is roughly an hour before the shooting when local law enforcement observes the individual, the shooter, at that point as somebody that was a person of concern. I forgot the exact phrasing. That was based on seeing him with this range finder. No observation of a weapon, but there was something odd and off about him that caught local law enforcement's attention. So, that is the first moment.

Then, there is a second moment which is just minutes before the shooting where local law enforcement observed him on the roof, but didn't see a weapon is my understanding at that point. At that point, their level of concern, obviously, was even higher.

The third moment, which is that moment when local law enforcement saw him, the officer who climbed up with the assistance of his colleague, and saw the shooter in the prone position with the weapon. That is seconds before the event.

So, the terminology I'm not sure.

Mr. FRY. Right.

Mr. WRAY. It seems to me there is an evolution of concern over that time period.

Mr. FRY. Correct, an escalating concern. At what point—and this again, I just don't know so I'm curious. At what point is say the sniper who killed Mr. Crooks, at what point is he able to fire a shot and does he have to have authorization in which to do that?

Mr. WRAY. I don't know that I know Secret Service's rules of engagement in that situation. It is possible that our interview of the counter-sniper has uncovered that.

Again, our focus has been—I certainly understand why you are asking the question. Our focus has been on the shooter himself and his actions in the attack. These two other reviews, the DHS Inspector General and the outside independent panel are both looking at the performance of the Secret Service, which would, I am confident, include the question that you are talking about.

Mr. FRY. Thank you, Director. I actually think from a legislative purpose and what this body will probably ultimately do, it's of great importance that we break down barriers of communication and that we allow officers to do their job without so this doesn't happen again.

I appreciate you being here. Thank you, Director.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized.

Mr. RULLI. Well once again, as Congressman Fry said, we want to thank you for your time and a lot more information today than Monday. So, thank you for that.

I just have a handful of questions. I would love to have just a simple yes or no so we can get done with this.

So, on day one, President Biden issued an Executive Order mandating DEI programs in the Executive Branch.

You responded by hiring FBI's first ever Chief Diversity Officer. You are even on the Bureau's website quoting, saying,

That diversity and inclusion of the workforce is something I care deeply about because the success of our efforts impacts our operations, our culture, and our future.

So, Director, just a simple yes or no. Do you still find DEI hiring practices to be central to the FBI's operations, cultures, and future?

Mr. WRAY. I believe that diversity is an important part—is a core value of a high-performing organization.

Mr. RULLI. Do you have any concerns that our homeland security efforts will be hampered if the FBI continues to use DEI as a primary hiring measure?

Mr. WRAY. I don't believe that we use DEI as a primary hiring metric. I would say that we have not lowered our standards.

Mr. RULLI. Yes or no, please.

Mr. WRAY. Let me—if I could finish. It is not a yes or no question. We have not lowered our standards, and the facts back that up.

Mr. RULLI. Are you aware of a 112-page report compiled by senior agents and analysts which stated,

If the current trajectory of the FBI special agent recruitment and selection continues using DEI as the primary and sole measure, our homeland security efforts will be significantly hampered.

Do you know about that 112-page report?

Mr. WRAY. I am aware of a report from a number of anonymous former employees.

Mr. RULLI. Thank you. Do you agree that protecting the former President falls under the umbrella of Homeland Security?

Mr. WRAY. Well, protecting the former President, the physical security, the protective detail on the former President, is the province of the Secret Service, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. RULLI. It is my understanding that historically the FBI had 100,000 applications for special agents on file at any given time of the year.

So, talking about supplementing recruitment, are you aware that in February 2024, a letter from the FBI's Assistant Director for Training Division, which reported that FBI only received an estimated 48,000 applications over a two-year period?

Mr. WRAY. I don't know if we are comparing apples to apples. What I can tell you is that in the time that I have been FBI Director, the number of Americans applying to be special agents has gone up dramatically to the tune of in some cases double or triple the pace of—

Mr. RULLI. So, the 48,000 is wrong?

Mr. WRAY. —if I could finish, sir, if I could finish, please—to a rate that is higher—you would have to go back about a decade or so to find the number of Americans applying to be special agents that are currently applying.

Mr. RULLI. OK. So, for the record, that 48,000 is probably wrong then in your eyes?

Mr. WRAY. I don't know. I don't have the letter in front of me. What I am not sure of is that we are comparing apple to apple in terms of time periods and everything else.

Mr. RULLI. In advance of the Trump shooting, United States Secret Service Special Agent in Charge Tim Burke reportedly told law enforcement partners that the NATO Summit in Washington, DC, limited his resources available to the Trump rally.

The Service has similar DEI hiring aims and failed their zero-fail mission to protect President Trump. Director Cheatle has since stepped down. Could the hyper fixation on hitting Biden Administration's imposed DEI rules be causing the FBI and the Federal law enforcement agencies to not only miss their candidates, but also potential threats?

Mr. WRAY. Well, I can't speak to Secret Service's hiring practice. What I can tell you is that in my view, diversity, like everything else, is something that has to be done in the right way. Just like everything, there is a right way and a wrong way to achieve it.

I think we can and have achieved improvements in diversity and at the same time not lowering our standards. I think part of the reason we have been able to do that is because of the encouraging increase in the number of Americans applying to be special agents.

Mr. RULLI. Thank you. The investigation into the planting of pipe bombs at the RNC and DNC headquarters has been going on for over 3½ years and will soon have lasted longer than the Biden Presidency.

I look forward to you proving yourselves because we haven't received any update, right now, on the Trump shooting since July 15th and the people really need that.

Can the public expect a more transparent and timely investigation into the attempted assassination of former President Trump?

Mr. WRAY. I have been testifying here all day about the investigation into the attempted assassination of former President Trump. We have done multiple briefings, and I have answered multiple questions.

Mr. RULLI. We appreciate that because like I said—

Mr. WRAY. OK. If that's what you were asking.

Mr. RULLI. —well, it just seems like there hasn't been a press conference to the people to go through all the different details that were already presented today.

I will just leave you with one final question. The government is not doing their job. Do you feel as the Director that perhaps not only the FBI, but the Secret Service needs to have a complete reconstruction? Do you think it is still put together the way that it could be do its job?

Mr. WRAY. The FBI that I see every single day, having visited all 56 of our field offices at least twice, many of them three times, the FBI that I see engaging with State and local law enforcement from all 50 States that I hear about from prosecutors, judges, business leaders, community leaders, and foreign partners, is an FBI that is respected, trusted, appreciated, and it is there for people when they need them the most. That is the FBI that I see. I am very proud to be a part of them.

Mr. RULLI. Any comment on the other agencies?

Mr. WRAY. I am not going to comment on another agencies.

Mr. RULLI. I appreciate your time, sir. I yield back to the Chair.

Chair JORDAN. The gentleman yields back. Director, I have just a couple quick questions, but I want to give the Ranking Member a chance to say some remarks or questions, and then we will be done.

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. First, I would like to say as somebody when I grew up watching the Untouchables. I think Eliot Ness would be proud of you. I don't know about J. Edgar Hoover, but Eliot Ness for sure.

Let me ask you this. In Memphis, you put Memphis and Nashville's FBI together, and consolidated in one office. We have—I know you have worked with our U.S. Attorney and others to work on the crime situation there, and it has gotten better. Is this change in the FBI relationship there, we are not going to have an office necessarily. Tell me how that is going to affect Memphis.

Mr. WRAY. So, I want to be very clear. We are not leaving. We are not leaving Memphis. What we are doing is—

Mr. COHEN. Nobody should leave Memphis.

Mr. WRAY. Right.

Mr. COHEN. Most of the songs are about people going to Memphis. They leave Nashville. They go to Memphis.

Mr. WRAY. We are recognizing population growth and the threat to the environment. We have instead taken, if you look across the State, instead of having two field offices in Knoxville and Memphis, we are creating a Tennessee division headquartered in the middle in Nashville. We are keeping the offices in Knoxville and Memphis.

In fact, when it comes to Memphis specifically, not only will it not result in any decrease in the number of agents there to work, actually, strange as it might sound, it is going to allow us to increase the number of agents who will be assigned to the Memphis office, including to tackle things like violent crime, which I know is of huge concern.

The reason for that is really, the effect of this reorganization is, to be able to reduce administrative roles that will be more consoli-

dated in the middle of Nashville. It will allow us to increase the operational roles, the agent roles, the number of them in Memphis.

So, not only are we not leaving Memphis, we are actually increasing our investigative presence in Memphis as part of this. We are going to be able to continue to collaborate closely with our great partners there without skipping a beat.

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. That is reassuring. One of the questions that was asked over here was about previous assassination attempts on the Presidents. Obviously, I know you are a lot younger than me, did you ever watch the Untouchables?

Mr. WRAY. I have watched them, yes.

Mr. COHEN. One of the programs was on Mayor Cermak. Do you know Mayor Cermak?

Mr. WRAY. I am sorry. I couldn't hear you.

Mr. COHEN. Mayor Cermak, do you know who he was?

Mr. WRAY. I do not.

Mr. COHEN. He was the mayor of Chicago. In February 1933, there was an assassination attempt on Franklin Roosevelt in Miami, Florida. Mayor Cermak, C-E-R-M-A-K, was killed and said, "I am glad it was me and not you." Allegedly, he said that. Anyway, that was an attempt and it failed. The Untouchables brought it into my consciousness.

Thank you for your work. I appreciate it very much. I appreciate you are not looking into changing our Democratic nominee. That is something we normally do. Thank you.

Chair JORDAN. Director, I am still not clear in my mind. When did the counter-snipers, the good guys, when did they first get eyes on the bad guy, the would-be assassin, on the roof of the AGR building?

Mr. WRAY. I am not certain, but I will make my best effort here.

Chair JORDAN. I guess, I am sorry to interrupt.

Mr. WRAY. Yes?

Chair JORDAN. Did they have eyes on him before the local enforcement was looking up on the roof and engaged with the bad guy shooter?

Mr. WRAY. I don't know the answer to that. I will look into that and get to you. I believe we have the answer. I just don't know that I have it. I want to make sure I answer accurately.

Chair JORDAN. Because we thought from the briefings that Mr. Abbate gave us.

Mr. WRAY. Abbate.

Chair JORDAN. Excuse me, Abbate gave us, and the briefings you gave to Congress that they did. It wasn't clear from your testimony. So, if you can get that answer to us that would be helpful.

I want to circle back just a third time, if I could, to the Iranian threat to President Trump and some others, former members of our government. The reason I want to go back there because we now know that the Secret Service and Homeland Security denied resources to President Trump's detail that they had asked for.

It seems to me if that all happened after you guys knew about the Iran threat and had briefed the Secret Service on that real threat that is an even bigger problem. That is why I was trying to get that timeline down, when you knew about it and when you

briefed the Secret Service on the Iranian's threat to kill President Trump.

Mr. WRAY. So, again, I really want to be careful to both be accurate, but also not to kind of stray into any kind of classified information or confirm the existence of classified information. So, let me see if there is a way for us to get back to you on that question.

Chair JORDAN. OK.

Mr. WRAY. I understand why you are asking. It may be easier to answer than I think. At the moment in an open hearing, I am not sure if I can see the right way to do that.

Chair JORDAN. Fair enough. We will expect answers to both those questions. If you can get back to us, that would be great.

Finally, is there anything else you want to tell us that we didn't ask? You came today and you told us some things that weren't even prompted by questions. I just want to make sure if there is anything else you want to tell us regarding July 13th, and what you discovered, now is the time.

Mr. WRAY. Well, again, we are going to continue to engage with the Congress. I think we have covered a lot of the points that I really wanted to make sure that I got across—and just as I am looking at my list—in one way or another through the course of today's questioning. I think we have gotten through most of it.

Chair JORDAN. That concludes today's hearing. We thank our witness for appearing before the Committee today.

Without objection, all Members will have five legislative days to submit additional written questions for the witness or additional materials for the record. Without objection, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:53 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

All materials submitted for the record by Members of the Committee on the Judiciary can be found at: <https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=117545>.

