[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL SECURITY: ASSESSING SECURITY
FAILURES ON JANUARY 6, 2021
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 19, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
www.govinfo.gov
www.cha.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-409 WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin, Chairman
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia JOSEPH MORELLE, New York,
MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia Ranking Member
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
STEPHANIE BICE, Oklahoma NORMA TORRES, California
MIKE CAREY, Ohio DEREK KILMER, Washington
ANTHONY D'ESPOSITO, New York
LAUREL LEE, Florida
Mike Platt, Staff Director
Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia, Chair
MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia NORMA TORRES, California
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina Ranking Member
ANTHONY D'ESPOSITO, New York DEREK KILMER, Washington
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Opening Statements
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight Barry Loudermilk,
Representative from the State of Georgia....................... 1
Prepared statement of Chairman Barry Loudermilk.............. 2
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight Norma Torres,
Representative from the State of California.................... 3
Prepared statement of Ranking Member Norma Torres............ 116
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on House Administration Joseph
Morelle, Representative from the State of New York............. 117
Prepared statement of Ranking Member Joseph Morelle.......... 118
Witnesses
Steven Sund, former Chief of U.S. Capitol Police................. 120
Prepared statement of Steven Sund............................ 123
Submissions for the Record
Congressional Record excerpt..................................... 6
Executive summaries of flash reports............................. 8
Congressional hearings testimonies............................... 36
Lieutenant Honore's Task Force 1/6 Capitol Security Review
summary........................................................ 99
Washington Post article.......................................... 114
Capitol Police Board letter...................................... 131
Washington Post article.......................................... 148
CNN article...................................................... 152
Secretary of Defense memorandum.................................. 157
Secretary of the Army letter..................................... 158
Select Committee interview excerpt............................... 161
H. Con. Res. 40.................................................. 169
H. Con. Res. 40 amendment........................................ 174
Amendment vote tally............................................. 175
Matt Gaetz tweets................................................ 177
Chief Manger letter.............................................. 179
Questions for the Record
Steven Sund answers to submitted questions....................... 188
OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL SECURITY: ASSESSING SECURITY
FAILURES ON JANUARY 6, 2021
----------
September 19, 2023
Subcommittee on Oversight,
Committee on House Administration,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:44 p.m., in
room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Barry
Loudermilk [chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Loudermilk, Steil, Griffith,
Murphy, D'Esposito, Torres, and Morelle.
Staff present: Caleb Hays, Deputy Staff Director and
General Counsel; Elliott Tomlinson, Deputy General Counsel and
Deputy Parliamentarian; Hillary Lassiter, Chief Clerk; Will
Neitzel, Deputy Director of Member Services; Khalil Abboud,
Minority Deputy Staff Director, Chief Counsel; Matthew
Schlesinger, Minority Oversight Counsel; and Sean Wright,
Minority Senior Elections Counsel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY LOUDERMILK, CHAIRMAN OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE
OF GEORGIA
Chairman Loudermilk. The Subcommittee on Oversight and come
to order. Also, without objection, the meeting record will
remain open for five legislative days so Members may submit any
materials they wish to be included therein.
Thank you, Ranking Member Torres, Members of the
Subcommittee, and Chief Sund for joining us in today's
oversight hearing.
Today, we are focused on identifying the numerous security
failures that preceded and continued to persist following the
breach of the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.
Although, it has been more than 2 years, there is still many
unanswered questions. Former Speaker Pelosi and House Democrats
spent millions of dollars on their Select Committee to
Investigate January 6th, yet the Committee failed to
investigate the real security failures.
Today, we are joined by Chief Sund, who was Chief of the
United States Capitol Police on that day. The Democrat Select
Committee never invited Chief Sund to testify during one of
their prime-time hearings, despite him being the chief of
police on January 6th. Perhaps that is because his testimony
did not fit with their preconceived narrative.
For months leading to January 6th, the House Democrats
championed the anti-police, ``defund the police'' narrative.
House Democrats continued pushing this dangerous narrative
through the appropriations process where they threatened to cut
Capitol Police's budget. This politicization of the Capitol
Police directly contributed to many of the structural and
procedural failures we witnessed that day. Let me be clear.
I stand with law enforcement, specifically our Capitol
Police Officers, and appreciate their dedication, bravery, and
service. I hope my Democratic colleagues do the same.
We now know that serious structural failures within the
Capitol Police intelligence department contributed to the
terrible events of that day. This includes misplaced and
misguided goals, as well as key intelligence failures that
resulted in timely warnings not reaching the Capitol Police
leadership.
Instead of doing the comprehensive assessment of these
intelligence failures, Chief Sund was pushed out, and the new
leadership silenced individuals who spoke about these failures.
Retaliation against whistleblowers is unacceptable. This is one
of the reasons why House Republicans are conducting this
investigation.
I look forward to hearing Chief Sund's view regarding the
multiple accusations of retaliation that are now public. I also
look forward to hearing directly from Chief Sund about the
general operation of Capitol Police, including day-to-day
relations with the Capitol Police Board, as well as the Speaker
of the House. Chief Sund's testimony will provide transparency,
accountability, and most importantly help to prevent anything
like this from happening again.
Finally, we will focus on the aftermath of January 6th and
the ensuing witch hunt conducted by the Select Committee on
January 6th of which I was, unfortunately, a target. Throughout
their nearly 2 years of work, the Select Committee clearly
operated on hearsay and cherry-picked so-called evidence to fit
their desired narrative.
When the Select Committee published their final report in
December 2022, it was clear that their multimillion dollar
committee effort was a political weapon focused at attacking
former President Trump and his supporters instead of how to
prevent another incident. We must ask ourselves why the Capitol
was ill-prepared, and what security changes are needed to
ensure adequate Capitol security, a question the January 6th
Select Committee failed to scrutinize. This was preventable,
and we must ensure nothing like this ever happens again.
I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mrs. Torres, for 5
minutes for the purpose of providing an opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Loudermilk follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
BARRY LOUDERMILK
Today, we are focused on identifying the numerous security
failures that preceded and continued to persist following the
breach of the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.
Although, it has been more than 2 years, there is still many
unanswered questions. Former Speaker Pelosi and House Democrats
spent millions of dollars on their Select Committee to
Investigate January 6th, yet the Committee failed to
investigate the real security failures.
Today, we are joined by Chief Sund, who was Chief of the
United States Capitol Police on that day. The Democrat Select
Committee never invited Chief Sund to testify during one of
their prime-time hearings, despite him being the chief of
police on January 6th. Perhaps that is because his testimony
did not fit with their preconceived narrative.
For months leading to January 6th, the House Democrats
championed the anti-police, ``defund the police'' narrative.
House Democrats continued pushing this dangerous narrative
through the appropriations process where they threatened to cut
Capitol Police's budget. This politicization of the Capitol
Police directly contributed to many of the structural and
procedural failures we witnessed that day. Let me be clear.
I stand with law enforcement, specifically our Capitol
Police Officers, and appreciate their dedication, bravery, and
service. I hope my Democratic colleagues do the same.
We now know that serious structural failures within the
Capitol Police intelligence department contributed to the
terrible events of that day. This includes misplaced and
misguided goals, as well as key intelligence failures that
resulted in timely warnings not reaching the Capitol Police
leadership.
Instead of doing the comprehensive assessment of these
intelligence failures, Chief Sund was pushed out, and the new
leadership silenced individuals who spoke about these failures.
Retaliation against whistleblowers is unacceptable. This is one
of the reasons why House Republicans are conducting this
investigation.
I look forward to hearing Chief Sund's view regarding the
multiple accusations of retaliation that are now public. I also
look forward to hearing directly from Chief Sund about the
general operation of Capitol Police, including day-to-day
relations with the Capitol Police Board, as well as the Speaker
of the House. Chief Sund's testimony will provide transparency,
accountability, and most importantly help to prevent anything
like this from happening again.
Finally, we will focus on the aftermath of January 6th and
the ensuing witch hunt conducted by the Select Committee on
January 6th of which I was, unfortunately, a target. Throughout
their nearly 2 years of work, the Select Committee clearly
operated on hearsay and cherry-picked so-called evidence to fit
their desired narrative.
When the Select Committee published their final report in
December 2022, it was clear that their multimillion dollar
committee effort was a political weapon focused at attacking
former President Trump and his supporters instead of how to
prevent another incident. We must ask ourselves why the Capitol
was ill-prepared, and what security changes are needed to
ensure adequate Capitol security, a question the January 6th
Select Committee failed to scrutinize. This was preventable,
and we must ensure nothing like this ever happens again.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NORMA TORRES, RANKING MEMBER OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA
Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Chairman. Big protests in D.C. on
January 6th. Be there, Be wild.
On December 19th, 2022, former President Donald Trump, the
leader of the Republican Party, said those fateful words to his
supporters, and they complied. Following that directive, the
National Intelligence Threat Consortium noticed a 1,000-percent
increase in violent rhetoric against Members of Congress and
law enforcement officers.
In the weeks and months leading up to January 6th, Trump
continued to incite unrest, accusing Democrats of rigging the
election and referring to it as the biggest scam in our
Nation's history. On New Year's Day, he tweeted: January 6th,
see you in D.C.
On the morning of the attack, at the ``stop the steal''
rally on the Ellipse, a Member, a Republican Member of Congress
told the crowd: Today is the day American patriots start taking
down names and kicking ass. Our ancestors sacrificed their
blood, their sweat, their tears, and sometimes their lives. Are
you willing to do the same?
Rudy Giuliani continued the violence to incite the armed
crowd by asking for a trial by combat, while Donald Trump told
his supporters: We are going to walk down, and I will be there
with you. We are going to walk down to the Capitol.
The former President orchestrated a corrupt scheme to
overturn the results of a free and fair election. When that did
not work, he incited, he incited his supporters to violence.
Updated via social media and directed by the former President,
the crowd marched to the Capitol armed with guns, handcuffs,
and pepper spray. If think did not bring a weapon, they found
one, viciously, viciously beating our officers with poles
bearing the American flag and erecting gallows to hang Vice
President Pence. The former President bears full responsibility
for bringing violence to the Capitol.
I spoke with some of the heroic Capitol Police Officers who
were injured and beaten that day by the violent mob and still
face the enduring pain of that traumatic day. If not for the
heroic actions of law enforcement officers, some of whom
literally gave their lives to protect us, the former President
and his supporters would have succeeded.
Immediately, Speaker Pelosi engaged with retired United
States Army General Russel Honore to conduct a complete
security assessment of the Capitol to identify nine
vulnerabilities. In addition to the work of the Honore Task
Force, former Chair Zoe Lofgren of this Committee, instructed
the U.S. Capitol Police Inspector General to halt all ongoing
investigations and devote all resources investigating the
attack. House Democrats then directed the Government
Accountability Office to perform a governmentwide examination
of the attack, including a comprehensive review of agency
preparation and response.
Still, after Republicans refused to support legislation to
create an independent national commission, the bipartisan
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack took up
this work. In addition to the many investigations, we passed a
funding bill to equip the institution with adequate resources
to address our security needs.
The law also established the Howard C. Liebengood Center
for Wellness named in honor of a U.S. Capitol Police Officer
who tragically took his life following the attack, to ensure
that his partners on the force have access to care as they
continue to heal from the traumatic events of a violent
insurrection.
We are still reckoning with the fallout from January 6th
collectively as a country and as individuals. The American
democratic experience came dangerously close to ending if not
for the courageous actions of the Capitol and D.C. police. The
person, the person responsible for directing the violence to
the Capitol that day in order to undermine, to undermine a
peaceful transfer of power is the favorite to secure the
Republican nomination for President.
Mr. Chairman, I ask for unanimous consent to enter into the
record the following: an excerpt from the Congressional Record,
dated January 13th, 2021, containing then minority leader Kevin
McCarthy's remarks during the debate on President Trump
impeachment for incitement of insurrection, executive summaries
of the eight flash reports examining the preparation for it,
and response to the January 6th attack, prepared by the Capitol
Police Inspector General, the Capitol Police Inspector
General's testimony from each hearing and a series of hearings
convened by this Committee examining his flash reports,
testimony from a hearing convened by this Committee in 2021,
entitled ``Reforming the Capitol Police and Improving
Accountability for the Capitol Police Board,'' a summary of
Lieutenant Honore's Task Force 1/6 Capitol Security Review, and
Washington Post article dated September 6, 2023, entitled
``Trump's 2020 crusade had led to 700 years in prison
sentences.''
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Torres. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Torres follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT NORMA TORRES
On December 19th, 2022, former President Donald Trump, the
leader of the Republican Party, said those fateful words to his
supporters, and they complied. Following that directive, the
National Intelligence Threat Consortium noticed a 1,000-percent
increase in violent rhetoric against Members of Congress and
law enforcement officers.
In the weeks and months leading up to January 6th, Trump
continued to incite unrest, accusing Democrats of rigging the
election and referring to it as the biggest scam in our
Nation's history. On New Year's Day, he tweeted: January 6th,
see you in D.C.
On the morning of the attack, at the ``stop the steal''
rally on the Ellipse, a Member, a Republican Member of Congress
told the crowd: Today is the day American patriots start taking
down names and kicking ass. Our ancestors sacrificed their
blood, their sweat, their tears, and sometimes their lives. Are
you willing to do the same?
Rudy Giuliani continued the violence to incite the armed
crowd by asking for a trial by combat, while Donald Trump told
his supporters: We are going to walk down, and I will be there
with you. We are going to walk down to the Capitol.
The former President orchestrated a corrupt scheme to
overturn the results of a free and fair election. When that did
not work, he incited, he incited his supporters to violence.
Updated via social media and directed by the former President,
the crowd marched to the Capitol armed with guns, handcuffs,
and pepper spray. If think did not bring a weapon, they found
one, viciously, viciously beating our officers with poles
bearing the American flag and erecting gallows to hang Vice
President Pence. The former President bears full responsibility
for bringing violence to the Capitol.
I spoke with some of the heroic Capitol Police Officers who
were injured and beaten that day by the violent mob and still
face the enduring pain of that traumatic day. If not for the
heroic actions of law enforcement officers, some of whom
literally gave their lives to protect us, the former President
and his supporters would have succeeded.
Immediately, Speaker Pelosi engaged with retired United
States Army General Russel Honore to conduct a complete
security assessment of the Capitol to identify nine
vulnerabilities. In addition to the work of the Honore Task
Force, former Chair Zoe Lofgren of this Committee, instructed
the U.S. Capitol Police Inspector General to halt all ongoing
investigations and devote all resources investigating the
attack. House Democrats then directed the Government
Accountability Office to perform a governmentwide examination
of the attack, including a comprehensive review of agency
preparation and response.
Still, after Republicans refused to support legislation to
create an independent national commission, the bipartisan
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack took up
this work. In addition to the many investigations, we passed a
funding bill to equip the institution with adequate resources
to address our security needs.
The law also established the Howard C. Liebengood Center
for Wellness named in honor of a U.S. Capitol Police Officer
who tragically took his life following the attack, to ensure
that his partners on the force have access to care as they
continue to heal from the traumatic events of a violent
insurrection.
We are still reckoning with the fallout from January 6th
collectively as a country and as individuals. The American
democratic experience came dangerously close to ending if not
for the courageous actions of the Capitol and D.C. police. The
person, the person responsible for directing the violence to
the Capitol that day in order to undermine, to undermine a
peaceful transfer of power is the favorite to secure the
Republican nomination for President.
Mr. Chairman, I ask for unanimous consent to enter into the
record the following: an excerpt from the Congressional Record,
dated January 13th, 2021, containing then minority leader Kevin
McCarthy's remarks during the debate on President Trump
impeachment for incitement of insurrection, executive summaries
of the eight flash reports examining the preparation for it,
and response to the January 6th attack, prepared by the Capitol
Police Inspector General, the Capitol Police Inspector
General's testimony from each hearing and a series of hearings
convened by this Committee examining his flash reports,
testimony from a hearing convened by this Committee in 2021,
entitled ``Reforming the Capitol Police and Improving
Accountability for the Capitol Police Board,'' a summary of
Lieutenant Honore's Task Force 1/6 Capitol Security Review, and
Washington Post article dated September 6, 2023, entitled
``Trump's 2020 crusade had led to 700 years in prison
sentences.''
Chairman Loudermilk. Without objection, the gentlelady's
time has expired. I now recognize full Committee Ranking Member
Mr. Morelle for 5 minutes for the purpose of providing an
opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH MORELLE, RANKING MEMBER OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
NEW YORK
Mr. Morelle. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling
this hearing. I also want to thank my colleague and the Ranking
Member of the Subcommittee, Mrs. Torres, for her work.
I want to thank Chief Sund not only for being here today to
offer testimony, sir, but also for your service to the Capitol
Police and to our country. I appreciate that.
I think, whenever we are talked about January 6th, I think
it is important we have a fuller picture of what the House
majority did in the aftermath of the attack, particularly for
those who seem to have developed a case of collective amnesia.
I do want to set the record straight. In the days and weeks
following the violent mob's attack and ransacking of the United
States Capitol, House Democrats immediately got to work. The
work started with the Speaker immediately ordering a
nonpartisan forward-looking and comprehensive security view of
the Capitol and its support agencies, and that was spearheaded
by General Russel Honore.
This Committee--I was not a Member of the Committee at the
time--but the Committee then directed the United States Capitol
Police Inspector General to temporarily set aside the office's
ongoing work and prioritize a comprehensive nonpartisan view of
the USCP's preparation for and response to the attack.
Concurrently, the Architect of the Capitol Inspector General
conducted similar assessments of the Capitol complex's physical
security.
Upon issuance of each IG's report, this Committee, excuse
me, held a series of public hearings, six in total, to review
findings and to question the inspectors general. A series of
reports culminated in more than 100 recommendations to improve
the operation of the Capitol Police, harden the security of the
Capitol complex, and protect the people within, which is, of
course, our large responsibility here.
The work did not stop there. While the Committee on House
Administration conducted its important work, it was evident a
broader inquiry was necessary to fully investigate and
understand the attack, not just to hold those involved
accountable but to provide the American public with answers to
basic questions. Toward that end, legislation was introduced to
establish an outside independent commission to investigate and
report on the facts and the causes of the attack. The bill was
developed with input from both parties, and that bipartisan
framework was reflect in the final text considered by the
House. I just recall, because he was a friend and a colleague
of mine, John Katko, a Member of the House Republican Caucus,
who was asked to help negotiate the deal, did so. Then,
inexplicably at the time, minority leader McCarthy declared his
opposition to the bill, the bill which was characterized by his
own handpicked negotiator Representative--John Katko, as a
solid fair agreement. Regardless, we pressed on and got the
bill through the House on a bipartisan basis only for it to
ultimately fail through the Republican filibuster.
With the prospects of an independent commission growing
bleaker, despite good-faith efforts by the Speaker to work
collaboratively with the minority leader, the House then voted
to impanel a bipartisan Select Committee to investigate the
attack. It was constituted by appointments for both the Speaker
and the minority leader. Again, at the last minute, the
minority leader withdrew his appointments to the Select
Committee.
Although, impossible to exhaustively list the entirety of
its work in the brief 5 minutes I am afforded here, the Select
Committee interviewed hundreds of subjects, including riot
participants and Government officials, combed through thousands
of hours of video footage and hundreds of thousands of pages of
documents, held 10 public televised hearings, and issued a
report which devoted two appendices to examining the
preparation and response of Government agencies and the D.C.
National Guard. We did not just end the investigation there,
nor did we just investigate the attack itself. We passed laws
that provided increased security funding for the Capitol
complex to make sure officers struggling from the physical and
emotional trauma of that day had access to the care they need
and deserve. We brought transparency to the Capitol Police
Board and made it easier to mobilize outside assistance in the
event of an emergency. The Capitol Police were there for us, so
we wanted to be there for them.
January 6th is among the darkest stains on this country's
historic fabric. An armed and violent mob attempted to
forcefully disrupt the peaceful transfer of power and subvert
the will of the American people at the behest of an
increasingly desperate former President. We also witnessed
incredible bravery on that day by the Capitol Police, acts of
genuine heroism that kept us safe and kept our beloved
democratic experiment alive, and I am forever grateful to the
Capitol Police for that.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ranking Member Morelle follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE
ADMINISTRATION JOSEPH MORELLE
I want to thank Chief Sund not only for being here today to
offer testimony, sir, but also for your service to the Capitol
Police and to our country. I appreciate that.
I think, whenever we are talked about January 6th, I think
it is important we have a fuller picture of what the House
majority did in the aftermath of the attack, particularly for
those who seem to have developed a case of collective amnesia.
I do want to set the record straight. In the days and weeks
following the violent mob's attack and ransacking of the United
States Capitol, House Democrats immediately got to work. The
work started with the Speaker immediately ordering a
nonpartisan forward-looking and comprehensive security view of
the Capitol and its support agencies, and that was spearheaded
by General Russel Honore.
This Committee--I was not a Member of the Committee at the
time--but the Committee then directed the United States Capitol
Police Inspector General to temporarily set aside the office's
ongoing work and prioritize a comprehensive nonpartisan view of
the USCP's preparation for and response to the attack.
Concurrently, the Architect of the Capitol Inspector General
conducted similar assessments of the Capitol complex's physical
security.
Upon issuance of each IG's report, this Committee, excuse
me, held a series of public hearings, six in total, to review
findings and to question the inspectors general. A series of
reports culminated in more than 100 recommendations to improve
the operation of the Capitol Police, harden the security of the
Capitol complex, and protect the people within, which is, of
course, our large responsibility here.
The work did not stop there. While the Committee on House
Administration conducted its important work, it was evident a
broader inquiry was necessary to fully investigate and
understand the attack, not just to hold those involved
accountable but to provide the American public with answers to
basic questions. Toward that end, legislation was introduced to
establish an outside independent commission to investigate and
report on the facts and the causes of the attack. The bill was
developed with input from both parties, and that bipartisan
framework was reflect in the final text considered by the
House. I just recall, because he was a friend and a colleague
of mine, John Katko, a Member of the House Republican Caucus,
who was asked to help negotiate the deal, did so. Then,
inexplicably at the time, minority leader McCarthy declared his
opposition to the bill, the bill which was characterized by his
own handpicked negotiator Representative--John Katko, as a
solid fair agreement. Regardless, we pressed on and got the
bill through the House on a bipartisan basis only for it to
ultimately fail through the Republican filibuster.
With the prospects of an independent commission growing
bleaker, despite good-faith efforts by the Speaker to work
collaboratively with the minority leader, the House then voted
to impanel a bipartisan Select Committee to investigate the
attack. It was constituted by appointments for both the Speaker
and the minority leader. Again, at the last minute, the
minority leader withdrew his appointments to the Select
Committee.
Although, impossible to exhaustively list the entirety of
its work in the brief 5 minutes I am afforded here, the Select
Committee interviewed hundreds of subjects, including riot
participants and Government officials, combed through thousands
of hours of video footage and hundreds of thousands of pages of
documents, held 10 public televised hearings, and issued a
report which devoted two appendices to examining the
preparation and response of Government agencies and the D.C.
National Guard. We did not just end the investigation there,
nor did we just investigate the attack itself. We passed laws
that provided increased security funding for the Capitol
complex to make sure officers struggling from the physical and
emotional trauma of that day had access to the care they need
and deserve. We brought transparency to the Capitol Police
Board and made it easier to mobilize outside assistance in the
event of an emergency. The Capitol Police were there for us, so
we wanted to be there for them.
January 6th is among the darkest stains on this country's
historic fabric. An armed and violent mob attempted to
forcefully disrupt the peaceful transfer of power and subvert
the will of the American people at the behest of an
increasingly desperate former President. We also witnessed
incredible bravery on that day by the Capitol Police, acts of
genuine heroism that kept us safe and kept our beloved
democratic experiment alive, and I am forever grateful to the
Capitol Police for that.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
I note that a quorum is present. Without objection, the
chair may declare a recess at any time.
Without objection, all other Members' opening statements
will be made part of the hearing record if they are submitted
to the Committee by 5 p.m. today.
Pursuant to paragraph B of Committee rule 6, the witness
will please stand and raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Chairman Loudermilk. Let the record show that the witness
has answered in the affirmative.
You may be seated, Chief.
I would like to now introduce our witness. Chief Steven
Sund served for over 25 years with the Metropolitan Police
Department where he rose through the ranks to become the
commander of the special--the Elite Special Operations
Division, overseeing some of the most critical units within the
department. In 2017, he was selected as the Assistant Chief of
Police. On June 13th, 2019, Sund was named the 10th Chief of
the United States Capitol Police, where he served for 18
months. In January 2023, Chief Sund published a book about the
institutional failings entitled ``Courage Under Fire: Under
Siege and Outnumbered 58 to 1 on January 6th.''
Chief Sund, we appreciate you being here today and look
forward to your testimony. As a reminder, we have read your
written statement, and it will appear in the full Committee
record. Under Committee rule 9, you are to limit your oral
presentation to a brief summary of your written statement,
unless I extend this time period in consultation with Ranking
Member Torres. Please remember to turn on your microphone using
the button in front of you so that Members can hear you. When
you begin to speak, the light on the timer in front of you will
turn green. After 4 minutes, the light will turn yellow. When
the red light comes on, I ask that you please wrap as that
indicates your 5 minutes has expired. I now recognize Chief
Sund for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEVEN SUND, FORMER CHIEF OF U.S. CAPITOL
POLICE
Mr. Sund. Good afternoon, Chairman Loudermilk, Ranking
Member Torres, and Members of the Subcommittee. It is hard to
believe that it is been almost 3 years since January 6th, and
we are still having congressional hearings to identify what
contributed to that tragic day. To date, there have been four
congressional reports, along with several inspector general and
Government Accountability Office reports, and they continue to
support what many of us have suspected from the very beginning:
January 6th was an intelligence failure.
We rely on accurate intelligence to help us develop
effective security and operational plans. Accurate intelligence
is essential--is an essential factor in the decision-making
process of the Capitol Police, the Capitol Police Board, and
the Oversight Committees.
We now know that significant intelligence existed that
individuals were plotting to storm the Capitol Building, target
lawmakers, and discussing shooting my officers. Yet no intel
agencies or units sounded the alarm. We were blindsided.
Intelligence failed the operations.
The January 6th attack at the Capitol was preventable. If
the intelligence had been accurately reported, and the FBI and
DHS had followed their policies and established practices, I
would not be sitting here today.
There was a failure to connect the dots on 9/11 and again
on January 6th. I am concerned if we do not identify and
correct these issues, we may fail again in the future. I did
everything I could to protect and defend the U.S. Capitol and
the Members of the Congress prior to and on January 3d. I am
sorry, prior to January 6th and prior to and on January 6th. On
January 3d, I requested the assistance of the National Guard to
support perimeter and was denied by the two Sergeant at Arms
over the concern for politics and optics. Still concerned for
the number of personnel I had on my perimeter, I called the MPD
early on morning of January 6th and asked if they could stage
additional personnel closer to the Capitol on Constitution
Avenue. Less than 2 hours later, we were violently attacked on
the West Front of the Capitol at 12:53 p.m. I immediately
followed up on that morning call and contacted MPD Chief Carrol
at 12:55 p.m. and requested those resources. The MPD was on the
scene within minutes and were assisting my officers in holding
the line and delaying the breach of the building. It took 81
agonizing minutes for that mob to fight their way through
numerous police lines before they were able to breach Capitol.
The decision to reach out to MPD proved critical in
safeguarding the Members of Congress.
Minutes after the attack began, I made my first call to
House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving 12:58 p.m. to request
approval to bring in the National Guard. ``Let me run it up the
chain, and I will get back to you'' was his response. It would
be 71 minutes before that approval would finally come. Between
12:58 and when I finally received approval for the National
Guard at 2:09 p.m., I made 32 calls to coordinate support for
my officers, including at least 11 frustrating calls to the
Sergeant at Arms regarding my request for the National Guard.
My calls to my partner law enforcement agencies resulted in
hundreds of police officers from around the national capital
region and as far away as New Jersey responding to assist.
After I received approval to call in the National Guard, I
then had to beg the Pentagon officials to send us help. I was
repeatedly denied assistance by Army Lieutenant General Piatt
citing concerns of optics of the National Guard on Capitol
Hill. The D.C. National Guard, many of whom were standing
within eyesight of the Capitol and whose motto is ``Capital
Guardians,'' would not arrive until almost 6 p.m., after the
fighting was over and the Capitol Grounds secured. The New
Jersey State Police arrived before they did. To add insult to
injury, the Inspector General for the Department of Defense
considered the response, quote, appropriate.
Besides the MPD, the National Guard was of the next largest
cadre of personnel that could be deployed to assist my officers
who desperately needed those boots on the ground. The fact that
the Chief of Police responsible for the entire legislative
branch of Government was repeated denied assistance by the
Pentagon is indefensible. The fact that an experienced law
enforcement official was constrained by Federal law from
bringing in lifesaving resources for his officers is
unfathomable. This type of politicized control over an
oversight was and continues to be detrimental to the mission.
Why bring in an experienced police chief if you are not going
to allow him to do his job?
In December 2021, Congress amended 2 U.S.C. 1970, the law
that restricted my ability to bring in Federal resources. While
the amendment now grants the Chief authority to call in Federal
resources only during an emergency, it does not grant the Chief
authority to request Federal resources in advance of an event,
which means the request can still be denied. In other words,
the law still requires the Chief to seek advanced approval from
the Capitol Police Board and congressional leadership. This is
exactly what I faced on January 3d. It should also be noted
that the new amendment makes the Chief Emergency Authorization
revocable.
I am extremely proud and appreciative of the Capitol Police
Officers and the Metropolitan Police Department, and the other
law enforcement agencies that came to our assistance. Despite
your bureaucratic issues on the Hill and a no-show by the
military, it was law enforcement that saved the day, and not a
single Member of Congress was injured.
Thanks to the assisting law enforcement, the men and women
of the Capitol Police did not fail in their mission. In
conclusion, I ask that this Committee address the institutional
failures that contributed to January 6. I also implore the
Committee to have an independent entity investigate the
complaints and allegations of retaliation of intel
whistleblowers following January 6 and review any of the
personnel actions, to include disciplinary actions that
occurred following January 6th, to ensure they are properly
investigated and not subject to any inappropriate actions,
coercion, influences, or predetermined outcomes.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Chief Sund follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN SUND
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, Chief Sund.
I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Griffith. Chief Sund, some have characterized January
6th as an intelligence failure. Is it true that, when you were
Chief of Police, Ms. Yogananda Pittman was the Assistant Chief
of Police in charge of the Intelligence Division. Yes or no?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
Mr. Griffith. In your book, I believe you wrote that the
information regarding potential threats prior to January 6th
was received by the United States Capitol Police Intelligence
Division, but you were not made aware of it until after January
6th. Is that correct? Yes or no?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Griffith. Had you seen the United States Capitol
Intelligence Assessment Report in full issued on January 4th
before January 6th? Yes or no?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
Mr. Griffith. You had seen the January 4th report.
Mr. Sund. When you say ``January 4th,'' it is dated--I
mean, I just want to make sure there is a January 4th report, a
daily intelligence report. That one?
Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sund. Yes.
Mr. Griffith. Would this intelligence assessment report
have changed your actions had you received it and fully
understood all of the ramifications of it?
Mr. Sund. When you say ``fully understood the ramifications
of it,'' there was nothing supporting----
Mr. Griffith. Well, what I am getting to is that apparently
what I understood was, as Chief of Police, you received the
report, but there was a comment about some intelligence or
about some concerns, but it was put on the last page of the
report instead of on the first page. Is that accurate?
Mr. Sund. OK. Just to make sure we are clear, you are
referring to the January 3rd----
Mr. Griffith. January 3d. All right.
Mr. Sund. Yes, January 3d. It is actually January 3d. It is
dated 2020. It is supposed to be 2021. That is the final
intelligence assessment, but not the final intelligence report
that is put out.
Mr. Griffith. All right.
Mr. Sund. That is correct.
Mr. Griffith. All right. I got my lingo mixed up.
Mr. Sund. No problem. It is a 15-page report with the
intelligence assessment at the end behind two and a half pages
of street closures. Correct, sir.
Mr. Griffith. Wouldn't you expect there to be some kind of
warning on the front page or an alert or highlighting of the
fact that there might be a concern by your intelligence
department?
Mr. Sund. When you see the amount of intelligence that they
had in advance, and you go and get some of the testimony for
the people that put it together, there is a failure to include
specific intelligence that would have been critical for my men
and women to be better prepared for that day, yes.
Mr. Griffith. All right. Just so I am clear because I am
not sure I understood the answer. Was there something
highlighted in the report, or was it that there was not
information that you needed to get to your officers?
Mr. Sund. Yes, there was not information. When you talk
about the assessment, the intelligence assessment, the very
last paragraph, the very last paragraph does not tell you
anything other than pretty much what we were expecting from any
of the previous MAGA rallies. There could be, you know, there
could be some danger. There could be some----
Mr. Griffith. It is a very standard response and not
something that would have highlighted that there was a real
threat or a real concern?
Mr. Sund. Correct. Not what you are seeing now about
storming the Capitol, killing the palace guards, which is
referring to my officers. None of that was included in the
intelligence, correct.
Mr. Griffith. That information was available to Ms.
Pittman?
Mr. Sund. It was available to IICD, which is a unit she
runs, yes, sir.
Mr. Griffith. All right. Ms. Pittman approved that report
but did not pass that information on to you. Is that correct?
Mr. Sund. It came out of her units, sir.
Mr. Griffith. Subsequent to January 6th, when Ms. Pittman
was retiring, she was given what I call a sweetheart deal from
the United States Capitol Police. That was earlier this year.
She was placed on leave without pay while working a new job for
several months, about five, before she reached the eligible age
to retire. It is clear she had no intent to return to the
United States Capitol Police, which is what the handbook says
you are supposed to be doing. If you get leave without pay,
there has to be an expectation of return.
During your time in management at the United States Capitol
Police, have you ever heard of such a sweetheart deal before?
Mr. Sund. No, sir.
Mr. Griffith. When you were in management, did counsel
Thomas Ted Bias ever indicate that you had the power to give
somebody leave out pay so they can get to retirement without an
expectation that they would at least attempt to return to the
United States Capitol Police Service?
Mr. Sund. No, sir, not that I recall.
Mr. Griffith. Nobody has ever told you you could do that?
Mr. Sund. No, sir.
Mr. Griffith. Did you think you had that power?
Mr. Sund. It is written in the policy that you cannot
offer----
Mr. Griffith. You cannot offer, but there is a requirement
there be an expectation to return. In this case, there was not.
Mr. Sund. That is correct.
Mr. Griffith. You never had the expectation that you could
give somebody leave without pay unless they were planning on
coming back; somebody that might have a health problem or
something like that. That is what it is for, is not it?
Mr. Sund. Correct. That is the policy then.
Mr. Griffith. Since January 6th, 2021, have you learned of
other intelligence reports, and I think you mentioned in your
opening, in the possession of the United States Capitol Police
or other Federal agencies, other Federal agencies, which could
have been of assistance to you and your decision making on
January 6th?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir, I have.
Mr. Griffith. All right. I see that my time is up, and so I
will now yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
I now recognize the gentlewoman from California, Mrs.
Torres, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you. I join the Chairman in welcoming
the witness before this Committee. Since the insurrection, more
than 1,100 individuals have been arrested and charged with
crimes associated with the January 6th insurrection. This
includes 404 defendants who have been charged with assaulting
more than 140 law enforcement officers.
One hundred and 15 of those defendants have been charged
with using a deadly or dangerous weapon or causing a serious
physical injury to an officer. So far, 770 defendants have been
convicted, including 65 defendants who have been convicted of
assaulting law enforcement officers.
I have had the opportunity to meet with some of the Capitol
Police Officers who were severely injured and still struggle
to--with the events of that horrible day. Yet, they still show
great strength and courage and still serve the force in order
to continue to protect us.
Mr. Sund, I have a series of easy questions and kindly ask
you to answer yes or no. There has been a direct effort here in
this Committee and by many Republicans to rewrite the violent
events that took place here at the Capitol on January 6th. For
example, President Trump called the defendants, and I quote,
great patriots.
Mr. Sund, do you agree with former President Trump that
those convicted of January 6th related offenses are, quote,
great patriots? Yes or no, sir?
Mr. Sund. You know, I am here to try and identify potential
failures.
Mrs. Torres. It is just a simple yes or do. Do you believe
that the people that assaulted your officers are great
patriots, yes or no?
Mr. Sund. I think the people that assaulted my officers
with weapons and violated law assaulting them and injuring them
is----
Mrs. Torres. The former President also said that the
rioters that day, and I quote, had love in their heart, and
that it was, I quote, a beautiful day. Do you agree, Mr. Sund,
with the former President that it was a beautiful day on
January 6th, and that those people that attacked your officers
had love in their heart?
Mr. Sund. It was not a beautiful day, ma'am.
Mrs. Torres. Did they have love in their heart while they
were attacking your officers, sir.
Mr. Sund. I do not know what they had in their heart.
Mrs. Torres. OK. On January 13th, 2021, Speaker Kevin
McCarthy, when he was minority leader said, and I quote: Last
week's violent attack on the Capitol was undemocratic, un-
American, and criminal.
Mr. Sund, do you agree with Speaker McCarthy that the
attack on the Capitol was undemocratic, yes or no?
Mr. Sund. I agree that those that committed violations of
laws deserve to be held accountable.
Mrs. Torres. Do you believe that it was un-American, sir.
Mr. Sund. Again, I think those that violated the law should
be held accountable.
Mrs. Torres. Do you agree that it was criminal?
Mr. Sund. Yes.
Mrs. Torres. Speaker McCarthy also said, and I quote: Some
say riots were caused by antifa.
There is absolutely no evidence of that. Do you agree, Mr.
Sund, that the January 6th, 2021, riot was not caused by
antifa, yes or no?
Mr. Sund. I do not have information on hand to answer that
one.
Mrs. Torres. In fact, the minority leader McCarthy went on
to say that former President Trump, quote, bears
responsibilities for Wednesday's attack on Congress by mob
rioters. He should have immediately denounced the mob when he
saw what was unfolding.
Mr. Sund, do you believe that former President Trump, and I
quote, ``bears responsibility for the attack,'' yes or no, sir?
Mr. Sund. Again, ma'am, I am here to identity the
institutional failures.
Mrs. Torres. It is a simple question, sir. Do you agree
that the incidents that led the President to push people here--
--
Mr. Sund. This is--I think this is--I just--if you give----
Mrs. Torres. Let me ask you one other question. Do you
agree that former President Trump should have immediately
denounced the mob when he saw what was unfolding at the
Capitol, yes or no?
Mr. Sund. I would have liked some assistance with getting
the military to the Capitol, yes. That is correct, ma'am.
Mrs. Torres. Minority leader McCarthy continued, and I
quote, these facts require immediate action by President Trump,
accept his share of responsibility, quell the brewing unrest,
and ensure President-elect Biden is able to successfully begin
his term.
My question to you, Mr. Sund, to this day, has former
President Trump accepted his share of responsibility or done
anything to, quote, quell the brewing unrest he cultivated?
Mr. Sund. I think there is a lot of people that need to
accept some responsibility associated with this.
Mrs. Torres. Finally leader McCarthy said, and I quote, and
the President's immediate action also deserves congressional
action, which is why I think a fact-finding commission and a
censure resolution would be prudent. Unfortunately, Leader
McCarthy's courage did not last thing. He chose to vote against
the bipartisan bill establishing a commission negotiated by the
Ranking Republican Member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee
and containing all of his priorities. This is unacceptable, and
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentlelady yields. I now recognize
the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Murphy, for 5 minutes.
Dr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just would like to
refresh your memory that we were not really allowed to pick our
own individuals on that Committee, and they were just picked
essentially because they did not like Trump. That is a
secondary issue.
I wish Mr. Irving and Mr. Stenger were here today to defend
themselves because, from what I am reading, there is absolutely
no defense of themselves. I am just going through this.
Let me go through a little bit. There is a lot of
conjecture as to the presence of law enforcement on January
6th, questions about law enforcement being embedded,
plainclothes officers. My questions to the current Capitol
Police major, he was unable to speak about how many
plainclothes individuals were there.
Chief Sund, while you were Chief of Police, was there a
process in place if a Federal agency were there in plain
clothes or undercover agents.
Mr. Sund. For coming up on the Hill, sir, or just a----
Dr. Murphy. On Capitol Grounds.
Mr. Sund. Oh, yes, sir.
Dr. Murphy. OK. Thinking back, do you know if there were
any Federal officers authorized by the Capitol Police to be
operating on the Capitol Grounds?
Mr. Sund. Other than Capitol Police, not that I am aware
of, no.
Dr. Murphy. OK.
Mr. Sund. Now real quick, we did have Secret Service up
there with Vice President Pence, and they are also not in
uniform.
Dr. Murphy. Absolutely. Do you know if the FBI or
Department of Homeland Security had any plainclothes employees
in the crowd on January 6th?
Mr. Sund. Only from what I am learning, you know, from GAO
reports that came out----
Dr. Murphy. Are you aware of any individuals in the Federal
Government that were wearing bracelets so they could be
identified?
Mr. Sund. Not that I am personally aware of, no.
Dr. Murphy. OK. Prior to January 6th, do you recall in
which plainclothes or undercover agents came onto the Capitol
Grounds without the Chief of Police approval?
Mr. Sund. No, sir, that I recall.
Dr. Murphy. All right. Thank you. You know, it is very,
very disheartening to read this narrative of when you asked for
help, and the 2 days before they did not care about doing
something because it may have looked bad. Therefore, none of us
in this room, none of us in this room are saying what happened
on January 6th was correct. I absolutely the conditions for
that to occur rests at the former Speaker's lap and those--the
two Sergeant at Arms and complicit with other individuals. You
know, it is one thing for something to occur, but it is another
thing to create the conditions for that to occur.
Let me ask you this. I am reading here, Mr. Irving only
provided security information to Republicans after receiving
distinct instructions from Democratic leadership. On January
4th, he sent a text to Fleet, asking him to, quote, act
surprised when Irving emailed him and his Republican
counterpart information about the joint session. Is there
anything wrong with that?
Mr. Sund. I just want to make sure I understand.
Dr. Murphy. He basically--Irving basically asked Fleet to
act surprised about the information when he was sending it to
the Republican. In other words, he knew the information before,
but he was withholding it from the minority party.
Mr. Sund. That is one of the big problems you have with the
Capitol Police Board and the Sergeant at Arms; they are too
politicized.
Dr. Murphy. Well, did you resign because you wanted to?
Mr. Sund. No, I did not. I love the Capitol Police. I love
the men and woman----
Dr. Murphy. I personally believe you were a scapegoat. You
are a scapegoat of conditions that were set forth that you
could not succeed. What happened on January 6th was
unforgivable. The conditions were set forth by the former
Speaker and two House Sergeant at Arms for the conditions for
that to occur. Absolutely. I do not care if the National Guard
were out there. I do not care about optics. I care about
safety. Absolutely. It is a dereliction of duty of the former
Speaker, her staff, and the two Sergeant at Arms.
Let me ask one more line of questioning. Pipe bombs. The
day before January 6th, live pipe bombs were planted outside
Republican and Democrat Party Headquarters. The U.S. Capitol
Police has not received any insight into the FBI investigation,
which is astonishing because Members of Congress from both
sides may very well have been targeted by these bombs. During a
hearing this summer of the U.S. Capitol Police Board, I called
on the board to request a briefing from the FBI to the status
of this investigation. The board committed to do so.
Mr. Chairman, I submit this letter to the record verifying
the request.
[The letter referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Dr. Murphy. Chief Sund, before you resigned, can you recall
anything about the pipe bomb incident.
Mr. Sund. Other than the time they were called out, us
sending resources over to them, and hearing both the RNC and
the DNC. The first one at the RNC, and I was worried that that
could be distracting for us. Then the second one came, and that
raised a lot of concerns.
Dr. Murphy. To your initial comments originally, here we
are several years out; do you think it is acceptable that the
FBI still cannot identify the individual placing the pipe
bombs?
Mr. Sund. I find it very surprising knowing the security
level that we have down here, the amount of resources that can
be available for an investigation, I am surprised that we have
not found----
Dr. Murphy. I find it absolutely surprising. The same thing
with the bag of cocaine in the White House that probably had
fingerprints and every camera known to God in that building.
Again, I will say, what happened on January 6th was absolutely
wrong. The conditions set forth by the Speaker, her
administration, and the two Sergeant at Arms and whoever was
complicit with that absolutely allowed you to fail and then
Members of Congress to be at risk of being injured.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would yield back.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
I will now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Morelle, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Morelle. Thank you very much.
Again, thank you, Chief, for being here. I am disturbed by
both the sense that you do not blame the rioters or the
President, but you blame the Capitol Police and the Capitol
Police Board--not you, sir. My colleagues. It is like blaming
the homeowner when he or she is robbed, instead of blaming the
intruder. I do want to note one thing, too, because it sounds
awfully partisan and awfully political--not that I am blaming
anyone, but I just note that Mr. Irving is the Sergeant at Arms
appointed by John Boehner and reappointed by Speaker Ryan. Mr.
Stenger, whose passed away and could not testify if he wanted
to, sadly, but was appointed by Senator McConnell. The third
member of the board, which you were not a member of when you
were a Capitol Police Chief. By the way, the board is three
other people. I acknowledge that. The third one is the
Architect of the Capitol, which at the time was Mr. Blanton
appointed President Trump. To inject partisanship here I think
is very troubling. If we are going to do that, we should at
least note the obvious that each of the members of three-person
board were appointed by Republicans, not by Democrats.
I do want to go back to a couple of the things that I think
are really important. I do want to talk a little bit about the
delay, which I consider unconscionable, between your call with
the Pentagon leadership and the ultimate deployment of the
National Guard, which as I understood took over 3 hours to be
able to do. That was requested of the Secretary of Defense.
I want to note, Chief, do you know now or did you know at
the time about a memo on January 4th from the Secretary of
Defense to the Secretary of the Army, and a January 5th letter
from the Secretary of the Army to the commanding general of the
D.C. National Guard? Are you familiar with those memos?
Mr. Sund. I have become familiar with them after January
6th, yes, sir.
Mr. Morelle. Yes, as I read the material, among others,
they were told that the Guard could not be issued weapons,
helmets, body armor; they could not interact physically with
protestors; they could not employ any riot-control agents; and
they could not make arrests and could not use a quick reaction
force. Is that your understanding now of the correspondence
that went on between the Secretary of the Army and the
Secretary of Defense?
Mr. Sund. Yes, that is correct. The Secretary of Defense
wrote the first memo on January 4th, and the Secretary of the
Army put the additional restrictions on what is called the QRF,
the Quick Reactionary Force, to William Walker after the fact.
Mr. Morelle. By the way, you said you did not know that
leading up to January 6th that those restrictions were in
place, sir?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Morelle. I assume at the time you would have been led
to believe that the National Guard was essentially a phone call
away to be able, if necessary. No, were you not under that
belief?
Mr. Sund. I was definitely under that belief. After I
requested the National Guard Sunday morning, the two Sergeant
at Arms had me reach out to William Walker instead of
authorizing them. Just say: Hey, if we need assistance, could
you kind of be ready, be on standby.
I talked to him 6:14 p.m. that evening, on Sunday evening,
the 3d, and took that information back. He said, yes, he would
be leaning forward, but he needs authorization from the--he did
not say anything about the memo because it had not come out
yet, I guess, nor----
Mr. Morelle. Nor did he say anything about the restrictions
that the memo had placed on the deployment of the National
Guard should they be requested.
Mr. Sund. That is correct. Also, just to add an additional
to that, January 5th, I held a meeting with many of the top law
enforcement officials from around the city, including the FBI,
and the commanding general for the D.C. National Guard, and
nothing was said to me again on that conference call. That was
also with the Capitol Police Board.
Mr. Morelle. You know, you and I unfortunately did not have
a chance to work professionally together, but I do reach out to
Chief Manger from time to time when there are concerns or there
are seemingly threats, and we have conversations. I assume you
did that to predecessors on both sides of the aisle, that there
would be conversations leading up to events like January 6th
when you knew people would be at least on alert. Is that true?
Mr. Sund. A lot of the times, those conversations would go
directly to the two Sergeant at Arms.
Mr. Morelle. Yes.
Mr. Sund. Now the Sergeant at Arms would oftentimes would
have recommendations to me or advise me to limit my direct
communications with Members because once I open that door, they
cannot protect--so they would----
Mr. Morelle. If this subject came up, you would not--so
what I am getting at, I guess, is neither the Sergeant at Arms
nor the Architect of the Capitol nor you were aware that the
National Guard had restrictions placed on it. Even while you
are waiting for the call for hours, you still did not know if
those restrictions were in place. That seems to me is a big
part of this story line.
Mr. Sund. That is correct. Knowing those restrictions are
in place--because I am a stakeholder. When the police
department becomes overwhelmed and we dial 9-1-1 because we
need assistance, that goes to the National Guard.
Mr. Morelle. Yes.
Mr. Sund. It sure as hell would have been great to know
that they put up this memo restricting the National Guard from
assisting my men and women in advance of January 6th, knowing
now that they were so damned concerned about the violence that
day that they were expecting on January 6th, and no one ever
told me about it?
Mr. Morelle. Yes, I mean----
Mr. Sund. So----
Mr. Morelle. I hate to state the obvious, but that is the
Pentagon's, the Department of Defense, the Department of the
Army--no one at that time told you that the National Guard,
even if they were called up, would have severe restrictions. I
just want to make sure I get that in.
Before I yield back, if I might, unless you would like to
call me another time, just to enter items into the record,
without objection, if I could do that now, Mr. Chairman, or
would you----
Chairman Loudermilk. Well, I will entertain that now, but I
think you have got a good line of questioning here. If it is OK
with the minority, and we have so few here, I would be open to
doing another round of questions. We will do that then.
Mr. Morelle. OK. That is fine. I yield back.
Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Morelle.
I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. D'Esposito
for 5 minutes.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chief, thank you for being here this afternoon. Thank you
for your 30 years of commitment to the law enforcement. I know
that you are well prepared in incident management, special
events, active shooters, investigations. I myself spent a
career in the NYPD and know that any time politics gets
involved in law enforcement, it could be or lead to something
very discuss. It is one of the reasons just as to why, when I
first got here, I still question if the Capitol Police Board is
the correct oversight and management of the Capitol Police.
In your book, you noted how security issues were usually,
quote, approached from a political perspective and not based
purely on security. What did you mean by that?
Mr. Sund. Oftentimes, if we are having a major event that
was coming up here, whether it was a demonstration, whether it
was a healthcare or immigration or even one of the Supreme
Court nominations, we put together a security plan. The
Sergeant at Arms, after they reviewed the security plan, would
have me go out and brief it to some of the Committees. One
would often be the Committee on House Administration. When I go
out and brief what we are going to do, if we are going to put
in like fence off the East Front of the Capitol, I had often
get pushback about, you know: Why you got to be--block off the
East Front of the Capitol? Why do you have your people in hard
gear? Things that a commander or a Chief of Police should be
able to make those decisions.
Mr. D'Esposito. You were able to make decisions as a law
enforcement professional. Your decisions were based on
political interference.
Mr. Sund. Oftentimes, there would be interference from
staffers and Members themselves asking the question about why
you got on helmets.
Mr. D'Esposito. Individuals that had zero experience in law
enforcement were influencing you on the decisions that you had
to make for the best interest of this Capitol?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
Mr. D'Esposito. You also noted in your book that, as part
of your role as Chief of Police, you had to, quote, cater to a
multitude of bosses. In the lead-up on January 6th, who would
you have been referring to in this statement?
Mr. Sund. That would have been mainly the two Sergeant at
Arms, trying to work things between the two of them.
Mr. D'Esposito. Moving forward, how do we ensure that
security decisions are made solely based on law enforcement
expertise and not on politics?
Mr. Sund. My No. 1 recommendation is we need to de-
politicize the Capitol Police Board. You have got two laws out
there. People always bring up, you know, why does leadership
get called into things. It is Congress that has leadership on
laws. You have got 2 U.S. Code 1970, 2 U.S. Code 1974 that both
list either a review or approval process needed before the
Capitol Police can implement those parts of the code. One is
special police officers. When we brought in outside resources,
we had to swear in the special police officers. There is a
requirement that that be approved by leadership. It
specifically says the Speaker, the Speaker pro tem, stuff like
that. I would take that out. Let the Capitol Police Board give
the--the Capitol Police Department, let them be the final
authority of what constitutes--law enforcement action is going
to take. Do not let--there is no reason that Members of
Congress should be involved or listed on laws as approving it.
All that does is politicize things. Take them out. Get a police
board that is going to make the appropriate decisions and allow
the chief to make decisions to protect the men and women that
are our legislators.
Mr. D'Esposito. I know it is rare on Capitol Hill, but it
seems to make perfect sense.
Going to January 6th the actual day, is it true that the
National Guard was stationed nearby and could have responded
quickly had they been authorized to help by the Capitol Police
Board?
Mr. Sund. That is correct. They were in eyesight of the
Capitol. One thing I had say real quick again with the last
series of questions, I had have you enter in Joint Publication
3-28 from the Department of Defense, specifically the emergency
authority of the National Guard to respond--they can
immediately respond. They do not need to wait for anybody else.
There should be no authorization for higher headquarters
instructions. That should be looked at closely.
Mr. D'Esposito. You just said that the National Guard was
in earshot from----
Mr. Sund. Many were in eyesight.
Mr. D'Esposito. Within eyesight of the Capitol.
Mr. Sund. With their riot gear, even though they were told
not to have it.
Mr. D'Esposito. Is it also true that the New Jersey State
Police made it to the Capitol before the National Guard did?
Mr. Sund. That is correct, sir.
Mr. D'Esposito. Any reason?
Mr. Sund. The National Guard is only 2 miles from our
headquarters; you know, sat and waited for the evening crew to
come in. While the Pentagon was still sending a resource to
protect generals' homes, they sent me nobody to help my men and
women.
Mr. D'Esposito. I only have 30 seconds left. When were you
finally given the green light to bring the National Guard to
the Capitol?
Mr. Sund. At 2:08 p.m.
Mr. D'Esposito. That was over an hour after you originally
asked?
Mr. Sund. That is correct. I am sorry, 2:09 p.m., at 2:09
p.m., Irving finally gave me approval. Because I still
remember, where I was sitting, because I screamed to the watch
commander, ``Mark the time,'' because I finally got approval to
bring in the National Guard.
Mr. D'Esposito. Again, thank you for your service.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
I now recognize myself for the purpose of asking questions.
Chief Sund, since January 6th, 2021, have you testified or been
asked to testify publicly before a Committee of the House of
Representatives?
Mr. Sund. No, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. Did the January 6th Select Committee
ask you to publicly testify before their Committee.
Mr. Sund. No, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. You did testify in the Senate,
correct.
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir. The Senate combined hearing, I think,
was February 23d.
Chairman Loudermilk. Can you briefly tell us about that.
Mr. Sund. It was a combined hearing. I think it was a
really good approach of, you know, of having to come in and
address it. Initially, they did not want anybody that was no
longer in the position to testify, which would have excluded
myself. Senate Sergeant at Arms Stenger and House Sergeant at
Arms Irving and I went and asked, specifically asked the Senate
Rules Committee: Please let me come and testify. I will testify
in person to show up.
They changed the rules and allowed me to show up.
Chairman Loudermilk. You had to basically force yourself in
to even be able to testify before the Senate?
Mr. Sund. Right. I had to call in somebody I knew there and
tell them: I promise you I will show up in person.
I was the only one to be there in person, not on video.
Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you for your vigilance there.
Chief Sund, you previously testified on January 3d, 2020--that,
on January 3, 2021, 3 days before January 6th, that you met
separately with House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving and Senate
Sergeant at Arms Michael Stenger. You asked them to approve a
request for National Guard assistance on the 6th. Now this was
on January the 3d. I believe this was in your book that you met
with both Stenger and Irving and requested National Guard
assistance to be ready on the 6th. Can you explain what
happened in those two meetings with Irving and Stenger?
Mr. Sund. Absolutely. On the morning of the 3d, at 9:24
a.m., I specifically went to see him because I know what a big
deal it is to have National Guard come and assist us on the
Hill. I went into his office again at 9:24 in the morning, went
up, and immediately went up and said: Hey, I would like to
bring in the National Guard to support me, to assist me on the
perimeter. Because when we have a joint session of Congress, it
takes a lot of our personnel inside. Immediately, as soon as I
asked him, his first response was: I do not know. I do not like
the optics of that.
His second response was: Besides the intelligence does not
support it.
He immediately--then we began talking. He said: Have you
reached out to Mike Stenger on this?
I said: No, I have not talked to him about it yet.
He said: Why do not you talk to Stenger and see what he has
to say.
Then I left and went over to Mike Stenger's office at 9:35
in the morning. Walked into his office, and he was not there. I
came back. He showed up at 11:13. I showed back up at 11:53 and
went in to immediately ask him: You know, I would like to
request the National Guard.
He said: You know, let us come up with another idea. Why do
not you call--do you know somebody at the National Guard?
I said: Yes, sir, I know General William Walker.
He said: Why do not you call Walker and see, if we need
them, how quickly they could get here, and how many people
could they send us.
I called William Walker at 6:14 p.m. that night. He told me
they have 125 people assisting with COVID response. He could
reallocate those fairly quickly one he got Secretary of Defense
approval and send them over.
Chairman Loudermilk. When you met with Stenger, had Irving
given him heads-up that you were coming to ask for National
Guard?
Mr. Sund. Yes, later on, after January 6th, specifically on
April 8, I went and had lunch with Mike Stenger. I asked him
because it was kind of unusual. He came up with that idea so
quickly when I was walking in. I asked him, I said: Mr.
Stenger, you came up with that response fairly quickly for me
to call General Walker. He told me that Paul Irving had called
him ahead of time and said Sund came here looking for the
National--asking for the National Guard. We have got to come up
with another plan. Pelosi will never go for it.
I was floored by him saying that.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. You do not know--I know this word
``optics'' has come up several times in the past or in
different context. Do you know if Irving had discussed that
with Stenger of what her possible response would be?
Mr. Sund. I have no idea, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. All right. Around 2 p.m., on January
6th, you joined a call with Metropolitan Police Department
Chief Contee and National Guard representatives. According to
Chief Contee's transcribed testimony given to the Select
Committee, you asked National Guard to send assistance on that
call, and he did not hear the military people respond to your
plea. Is that what you remember?
Mr. Sund. No, he heard clearly the military respond to my
plea and say they recommended against my request for the
National Guard. Robert Contee immediately butted in and said:
Let me get this right, you are denying the Chief of the Capitol
Police?
Again, he just--you know, I can go farther into that if you
want.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you. Are you familiar with
the term ``data miner''?
Mr. Sund. I have become familiar with it, yes.
Chairman Loudermilk. According to a book by Carol Leonnig,
General Milley was using this tool and reached out to Senator
Angus' team, warning him about violent rhetoric before January
6th. Some of the intelligence included references to smuggling
guns and other weapons into D.C. One message said: Let us burn
Senator McConnell's house down while he is in it.
Another one seemingly addressed to Members who supported
certifying the election said: We are coming to kill you. Just
wait a few days.
Did General Milley ever reach out to you and share these
concerns with you of any of this intelligence?
Mr. Sund. No, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. Do you know if he reached out to
either of the Sergeant at Arms?
Mr. Sund. I have no idea, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. Would this intelligence have helped
the Capitol Police prepare for January 6th?
Mr. Sund. Absolutely.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. With that, I do have several other
questions, but it seems we have a second round. At this time, I
will recognize the Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Steil,
for 5 minutes.
Chairman Steil. Thank you very much, Chairman Loudermilk
and for hosting today's hearing.
Thank you, Chief Sund, for being here today. Members of the
Committee and Congress are thankful for your prior service at
the U.S. Capitol Police and your commitment to protecting
Members, staff, and visitors. My priority as Chairman of the
Committee on House Administration is to de-politicize Capitol
Police. I am committed to ensuring the U.S. Capitol Police has
the tools, resources, and leadership it needs to keep our
community safe. I also remain committed to supporting our law
enforcement officers and the work they do each day.
Today we are here to discuss the security failures that
occurred on January 6th, 2021, and how we can prevent these
failures from occurring again.
I want to dive into the questions, Chief Sund. In your
transcribed interview, you mentioned that you met with the
House Sergeant at Arms regarding the National Guard prior to
January 6th. Is that correct?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
Chairman Steil. Who was the House Sergeant at Arms leading
up to and on January 6th.
Mr. Sund. That would be Paul Irving.
Chairman Steil. House Sergeant at Arms is appointed by who?
Mr. Sund. He was appointed at that time by Speaker Pelosi.
Chairman Steil. In your transcribed interview, you
mentioned that when you first brought up the National Guard to
the House Sergeant at Arms in the days leading up to January
6th, that Mr. Irving said he, quote, did not like the optics,
end quote. Is that correct.
Mr. Sund. That is correct. He referenced being concerned
for optics.
Chairman Steil. On January 6th, when he went to Mr. Irving
to get his approval to call in the Guard, Mr. Irving said he
would, quote, run it up the chain. Is that correct.
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir. That was a telephone call. I did not
see him in person when I first made that request.
Chairman Steil. The House Sergeant at Arms is considered
probably the most senior security official in the House side.
When Mr. Irving says yes to, quote, run it up the chain, end
quote, what did that mean?
Mr. Sund. I took that to mean his leadership chain.
Chairman Steil. Who would be his leadership chain? He is
essentially the most senior security official in the House
side, correct.
Mr. Sund. That is his title. That is part of the title of
the senior law enforcement official of the House of
Representatives. He would have been referring to the leadership
team that goes up to Speaker Pelosi.
Chairman Steil. The political leadership team, meaning
elected officials, not another security official. Is that
correct.
Mr. Sund. That is correct, sir. He is the top security
official for the House.
Chairman Steil. Running up the chain would most likely, in
your opinion, is through the Speaker's Office and possibly to
Speaker Pelosi.
Mr. Sund. That would be where it ends, yes.
Chairman Steil. Let us park that there, and let us jump to
a second set here. In a press conference on January 7th,
Speaker Pelosi called for your resignation on national
television. Speaker Pelosi also stated that she had not talked
to you since the initial breach of the Capitol. According to
your transcribed interview, you were on the phone with Speaker
Pelosi a few times. Can you explain that discrepancy?
Mr. Sund. Yes, that is--that is correct. I spoke to Speaker
Pelosi three times that evening. She went on national TV and
said I had never spoken to her, but I spoke to her three times.
The three times were--the first time when I went over to
brief President--Vice President Pence at the secure location. I
had called House Sergeant at Arms Irving, told him I was going
over to brief the Vice President. I was also going over to do a
personal assessment of the Capitol.
At that point, things were getting under control. Went over
there, briefed him on when we can get them back into Chambers,
with, you know, Mr. Irving being fully aware.
He said he wanted to get Speaker Pelosi on the phone. He
made a phone call from his cell phone at approximately 5:34,
where I first briefed Speaker Pelosi.
The second call was when I left that location. As I was
walking away, I met up with Mr. Stenger, and we started walking
over to the Senate to go brief the Senate when Jennifer
Hemingway--I believe it was Jennifer Hemingway--handed me a
cell phone. It was Emily Barrett's cell phone calling her.
It was Speaker Pelosi on the other line--this is my second
call with Speaker Pelosi--questioning the information I had
given to Vice President Pence about when we can get back into
Chambers. I assured her that information was correct, I could
get them back into Chambers by 7 p.m. and the call ended. That
was call number 2.
Call number 3 was 6:25 p.m. I was over at the Senate, from
the secure location--I mean, from where the Senate had been
sequestered and on a cell phone, using Robert Karem's cell
phone.
They dialed leadership, who was over offsite at a secure
location, and I briefed all of leadership of the plans to get
them back into Chambers. That would have been call number 3
with Speaker Pelosi.
Chairman Steil. You did not have one call, you did not have
two calls, you had three calls. Speaker Pelosi's comments that
she did not speak to you are inaccurate?
Mr. Sund. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Steil. Let me shift gears and go back as it
relates to the optics of bringing people up to Capitol Hill. In
running things up the chain of command, ultimately the
Speaker's Office, do think Speaker Pelosi's Office, or Speaker
Pelosi, herself, politicized Capitol security?
Mr. Sund. I have--I have no idea on that, sir.
Chairman Steil. OK. Any other clarifications you would like
to make as it relates to Speaker Pelosi's comments that you did
not speak to her?
Mr. Sund. I just, you know, wish she had considered that,
wish she had considered some of the stuff that I faced and the
efforts I went through to bring in the outside resources on
that day before she called for my resignation.
Chairman Steil. Thank you very much for being here.
I yield back.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
I will now begin our second round of questioning. I yield 5
minutes to the gentlelady from California, Mrs. Torres.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Sund, I have here a statement from--it is testimony
from Paul Irving, the former Sergeant at Arms, and this is
testimony he gave to the Senate at a hearing. He states, on
January 5th, Chief Sund and I participated in a web-based
interagency conference call with multiple law enforcement
partners--the FBI, the MPD, the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S.
Park Police, and the military district of Washington, among
other law enforcement agencies from the national capital
region.
Based on the intelligence and threat assessment, everyone
on the call believed that we were prepared and the plan met the
threat. You were prepared for what you thought would be a
typical demonstration, a First Amendment demonstration on
Capitol Hill, such as the Women's March, when we all wore our
pink hats and came out and marched against some of the efforts
of the President.
What you did not anticipate, none of you anticipated, that
a Republican Member of Congress would tell the crowd on stage,
Today is the day. American Patriots, start taking down names
and kicking ass, and, Our ancestors sacrificed their blood,
their sweat, their tears, their fortunes, and sometimes their
lives. Are you willing to do the same.
You did not anticipate that, did you?
Mr. Sund. We anticipated some minor skirmishes. We did not
anticipate a full-fledged----
Mrs. Torres. You did not anticipate a Member--a Republican
Member of Congress to go on stage and incite the crowd like
this.
You also did not anticipate the President's lawyer, Rudy
Guiliani, to tell this, you know, mob that was armed, trial by
combat.
You also did not anticipate the President of the United
States telling an armed mob to march to the Capitol and that--
to start walking to the Capitol. I mean, you did not--you could
not have anticipated any of that, did you?
Mr. Sund. Well, knowing now that there is intelligence----
Mrs. Torres. Of course not. I believe when you say that,
sir, because I do not believe that anyone in charge of the men
and women that serve us here in the U.S. Congress, if they had
known any of that intelligence, would have acted very
differently than we did that day.
I still want you to know that I am grateful for my life,
that I am grateful that the officers used their own bodies to
protect us, that they bravely fought against these very angry
rioters who came here to do violence, to hang the Vice
President.
This past weekend, the former President has said he would
pardon those convicted--the ones convicted--of crimes
associated with January 6th, including individuals like Enrique
Tarrio, the leader of the Proud Boys, who was convicted of
seditious conspiracy and sentenced to 22 years in prison.
Mr. Sund, how does that make you feel, to hear that the
former President talks about pardoning defendants who assaulted
your officers during that violent attack and assault on our
democracy?
Mr. Sund. Again, I feel if they assaulted the officers,
they need to have--pay the consequences.
Mrs. Torres. I feel really badly for everything that has
happened since the officers, the suicides. No one deserved
that.
I have here, I wanted to really stay focused on who to
blame--you know, who is to blame for everything that happened
on January 6th. You know, I attended this peaceful transfer of
power on this inauguration, when this President took the oath
to serve this country and to protect, you know, the rule of law
and democracy.
I also attended--by the way, I was not wearing a vest at
this ceremony because Democrats did not insight a crowd and
say, Those Russians that interfere in our election, you know,
were at fault for us losing.
We took the loss, and we did the right thing by ensuring
that we had a peaceful power of transfer.
Unfortunately, when I attended Mr. Biden's inauguration, I
had to wear a vest, because I no longer felt safe.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentlelady yields.
I now yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Griffith. Mr. Sund, you also did not anticipate that
you would not get significant intelligence about the threat. Is
not that true?
Mr. Sund. That is--that is correct. With the intelligence--
--
Mr. Griffith. You would have anticipated that either your
own department or other Federal agencies would have alerted you
to the risk. Is not that true?
Mr. Sund. Like I said, this could have been preventable if
we had gotten the intelligence they had.
Mr. Griffith. Is not it also true that you would not have
anticipated, and did not anticipate, that you would not get
support from up the chain when you requested the National Guard
before and on January 6th? Is not that true?
Mr. Sund. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Griffith. During a February 2021 joint Senate hearing,
former House Sergeant of Arms, Paul Irving, testified that on
January 6th, 2021, he did not receive a request from you for
National Guard assistance until around 2 p.m. Is that accurate?
Mr. Sund. That is not accurate, sir.
Mr. Griffith. When did you ask for it?
Mr. Sund. 1:58--I am sorry--12:58 p.m. was my first call to
Paul Irving. I was--I had a number of people that were
surrounding me that were aware I was calling. He was fully
aware of just how bad it was outside because he had his
representative to the command center right behind me, sending
him all the information of what was happening.
I did not get the approval at 12:58 p.m.
Mr. Griffith. He still said he was going to--he would run
it up the chain?
Mr. Sund. He was going to run it up the chain. It took 71
minutes to get an approval.
Mr. Griffith. To get it run up the chain?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
Mr. Griffith. Your assumption, although you testified that
you do not know for sure, that it went to Nancy Pelosi, your
assumption is, is that because the Sergeant at Arms, while
elected by the Members of the House, is generally put on the
ballot by the Speaker and serves at the direction of the
Speaker, so you assumed, as most people would, that it was the
Speaker that was the top of the chain?
Mr. Sund. Yes, that was--that was my assumption.
Mr. Griffith. I mean, based on the flow chart that I am
aware of, there is nobody between the Sergeant at Arms and the
Speaker. Do you know of somebody in between of two of them?
Mr. Sund. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Griffith. I do not either.
All right. Now, you had some phone calls with Mr. Irving.
Do you have the record of what times you had those phone calls?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. Griffith. Would you please tell them to the Committee?
Mr. Sund. Let us see if I--if I do not have them, I had be
happy to submit my phone records. My phone records have all
been submitted. They were submitted to the Senate--the Senate
hearing, a full accounting of my phone records.
Yes, I do not have them--hold on just a second. I do not
have the exact times, but----
Mr. Griffith. You made--my recollection is, and I have read
your book, but my recollection is, you made several calls
within a relatively short period of time. If it took 71 minutes
to run it up the chain, is my information correct that you
called three times--the first one that you just told us about,
and then two more during that 71 minutes?
Mr. Sund. No, no, no. Those are calls with Speaker Pelosi.
Those that I just went over, those times, those were calls with
Speaker Pelosi.
Mr. Griffith. Oh, those were calls with Speaker Pelosi.
Mr. Sund. Correct. Between 12:58 and 2:09, when I finally
got approval 71 minutes later, I made 11 calls to the Sergeant
at Arms asking, What is going on--first asking for the request,
and then 10 follow up calls saying, What is going on with the
request?
Mr. Griffith. Eleven calls during the----
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
Mr. Griffith [continuing]. roughly an hour and 10 minutes?
Mr. Sund. During that time, I was calling every--the leader
of every agency, Gary Settle with Virginia State Police, Secret
Service, anybody I could get to come to my aid.
I activated mutual aid around Maryland, Virginia, and that
is what brought in the New Jersey State Police at 1:51 p.m.,
still while calling every couple of minutes to find out where
the hell my approval was for the National Guard.
Mr. Griffith. Now, being from Virginia, did the Virginia
State Troopers come in to help?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir, they did.
Mr. Griffith. Did they get here before the National Guard,
too?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir, they did.
Mr. Griffith. Wow. All right.
USCP hired Julie Farnam as the assistant director of
intelligence and interagency coordination division in November
2020 when the former director retired. Is that correct?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
Mr. Griffith. She testified previously that you wanted to
overhaul the Department. Is that correct?
Mr. Sund. I wanted----
Mr. Griffith. That she wanted to overhaul the Department?
Mr. Sund. She might have. I am not--I am not aware.
Mr. Griffith. OK. All right. You--but did you think at the
time, on January 6th, did you think your intelligence
department was effective?
Mr. Sund. That is correct. I thought the intelligence they
were providing us----
Mr. Griffith. Prior--prior to January 6th?
Mr. Sund. Oh, prior to January 6th, absolutely. They had
gotten--been effective on any previous demonstration. I mean,
we handled a Supreme Court nomination where we made hundreds of
arrests, and that was effective intelligence, absolutely.
Mr. Griffith. That was effect---so they were effective
prior to January 6th. You did not see the cracks in the system
until after that. Is that accurate?
Mr. Sund. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Griffith. All right. I appreciate your testimony here
today, and I am glad you have been able to correct some of the
misstatements that have been made by others, and I yield back.
Mr. Sund. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
Chief Sund, before I recognize the Ranking Member of the
full Committee, would you be willing to submit those phone
records to this Subcommittee for our records?
Mr. Sund. Absolutely, sir. I will have them to you by the
end of the day.
Chairman Loudermilk. All right. Thank you, sir.
I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Morelle,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do note, since there seems to be a fair amount of
conversation and speculation about what happened in the
conversations between Mr. Irving and Speaker Pelosi, why Mr.
Irving was not asked to testify in front of this panel.
You could have asked him to come. I assume that you chose
not to because it is easier to speculate on the conversation
rather than ask him to testify. I assume he would have been
here to testify about it.
In any case, since there seems to be a real focus on the 1
hour that there is a dispute over whether or not authorization
was given, I am a little surprised that there is no frustration
or concern about the 3-1/2 hours between the time you did place
the call--and I do understand, sir, you placed the call at
2:30, according to your testimony here--requesting National
Guard support?
Mr. Sund. No. To correct it, I--I could not wait any
longer. I had waited so long for Mr.--the approval from the
Capitol Police Board, both Mr. Irving and Mr. Stenger.
At 1:51 p.m., I called William Walker, without even having
authority, and said, Please, get ready--send me anything you
got. This is life or death. I told him, I do not have approval
from the Capitol Police Board yet, but it is coming any minute,
but please start sending me resources.
Mr. Morelle. Got you.
Mr. Sund. It was 1:51 when I made the call.
Mr. Morelle. That was before 2, and yet--so--and when do
the National Guard show up?
Mr. Sund. 5:40 p.m., the first National Guard showed up,
approximately 150, and they were sworn in as special police
officers and deployed. They got on post about 6 p.m. when the
Capitol Grounds were secure at that point.
Mr. Morelle. OK. That is over 3-1/2 hours after your
request was put in?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morelle. Earlier, I was asking about this, and I would
like to just get a little more definition. You did not know it
at the time. When you made the request at 1:50 or so, did you
know--when were you made aware that there were restrictions on
what the National Guard could do as a result of the memo that
had been issued on the 4th and 5th?
Mr. Sund. I do not know the exact date, but it was
definitely after--after January 6th. When I started doing
research into what happened, that is when I found it.
Mr. Morelle. When they showed up at 5:40--so do you have
any sense of the 3-1/2 hours that went on? You said--I just
want to make sure--you said in interview that there was a
concern in the administration about the President invoking the
Insurrection Act, and concern at the Pentagon about him
declaring martial law or activating the military in support of
his claims.
Do you suspect that played a role in the Pentagon's
unwillingness to allow the National Guard to respond to the
Capitol, that those hours, that was being debated?
Mr. Sund. When I went back and started doing research for
the book I wrote, that is--I started finding out there was a
lot of concerns within the President's Cabinet about him
invoking the Insurrection Act, and that was one of the
hypothesis that had come up, that maybe they were concerned
about him invoking it, and that is why they would want to
delay.
Think about it. I think the--it was the Secretary of
Defense has come out and stated in testimony, he was not
putting National Guard anywhere east of 9th Street Northwest,
which means, toward the Capitol. Why would that be?
Mr. Morelle. I do not know. What do you--why do you
speculate?
Mr. Sund. Like I am saying, for some reason, they wanted to
do everything they could to keep National Guard away from the
Capitol.
Mr. Morelle. Yes. I would wonder why my colleagues are not
more concerned about that. I mean, that is 3-1/2 hours while we
are under siege. A request has been made.
Can you describe the scene during the period between your
call and the arrival of the National Guard here at the Capitol?
Mr. Sund. Between my--my first call at 12:58?
Mr. Morelle. Your call at 1--at 2, until 5:40.
Mr. Sund. It was--I mean, I was seeing my officers go
through some intensive battling on the west front. It was
terrible what they were going through, and no police officer
deserves to be subjected to that. It was some of the--some of
the worst violence I have seen against law enforcement.
Mr. Morelle. Let me ask this then. How would the situation
have differed had the National Guard's Quick Reaction Force
been able to deploy soon after your call, which I assume would
have been just minutes away?
Mr. Sund. If they had followed their emergency authority,
and they had deployed the quick QRF, we could have had close to
200 National Guardsmen--men and women here fairly quickly. That
could have been a game-changer.
You know, Metropolitan Police Department sent me almost
1,000 officers. That would have been the next largest cadre of
officers. We could have absolutely used their assistance.
Mr. Morelle. Yes. You know, I--on a sort of tragic
circumstance, you obviously know about then Police Lieutenant
Michael Byrd and the interaction which had ultimately led to
the death of Ashli Babbitt, who was a rioter when she broke--
tried to break into the Speaker's Lobby.
Because of his actions, now Captain Byrd and his family
have had to face an onslaught of threats and had been the
target of vile attacks, some of them racist. Just a few weeks
ago a family member of Ms. Babbitt said publicly that Michael
Byrd needs to swing from the end of a rope. Do you have any
reaction to that comment?
Mr. Sund. No. No comment on that.
Mr. Morelle. No comment.
Before I yield back, may I ask unanimous consent to enter
into the record the following; an article from The Washington
Post fact-checker dated December 15th, 2021, entitled, ``No,
Trump did not order 10,000 troops to secure the Capitol on
January 6th''; an article from CNN, entitled, ``Fact-Checking
Representative Jordan's claim that Speaker Pelosi was
responsible for U.S. Capitol security on January 6th''; a
memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of
the Army, dated January 4th, 2021, Restricting the activities
of the D.C. National Guard; a letter from the Secretary of the
Army to the commanding general of the D.C. National Guard,
dated January 5th, relaying those National Guard restrictions;
an excerpt from the Select Committee's transcribed interview
with former House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving; a copy of H.
Con. Res. 40, a concurrent resolution, expressing support for
law enforcement officers that explicitly excluded the United
States Capitol Police; a copy of an amendment to H. Con. Res.
40 offered in the Rules Committee by Ranking Member McGovern,
expressing gratitude to the Capitol Police who protected the
Capitol on January 6th; a copy of the vote tally and the
amendment, which was defeated on a party line 8-3 vote, all
Republicans voting against; a tweet by Representative Matt
Gaetz, dated September 14th, 2023, in which he pledges to hold
Speaker McCarthy to his promise to release the full January 6th
tapes; a tweet by Representative Matt Gaetz, dated September
18th, 2023, in which he demands full release of January 6th
tapes in exchange for funding the Government; and finally, a
letter from Capitol Police Chief Tom Manger to Chairman Steil
and myself, dated September 18th, 2023, in which he renews his
request to review all video footage requests received by the
Committee and address security concerns prior to release.
Without objection?
Chairman Loudermilk. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Chairman Loudermilk. I now recognize the gentleman from New
York, Mr. D'Esposito, for 5 minutes.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to make it very clear that I think all of our
colleagues, the Republicans, have been very concerned about the
response of the National Guard, which is why most of us have
asked questions about the timing, about the authority, about
you getting permission, and the fact that you had to get
answers from two individuals who clearly were taking--taking
their orders from Speaker Pelosi. I just want to make that very
clear.
Just touching quickly on the Chamber evacuations, the
Capitol was breached at 2:12 p.m. The House Chamber did not
start evacuating until 2:28. What was the reason for the delay?
Mr. Sund. I am not really sure what the reason for the
delay is.
Mr. D'Esposito. OK.
Mr. Sund. They should have been called--the evacuation
should have definitely been called earlier.
Mr. D'Esposito. Who would have made that decision?
Mr. Sund. When I was up in the Command Center, I had two
assistant chiefs with me. They were in charge of operations. I
had one assistant chief that was in charge of Member
protection--intelligence and protection, and one in charge of
uniformed operations. Either of those could have called it, but
it should have been called earlier.
Mr. D'Esposito. OK. Do you know what time the Senate
Chamber was evacuated?
Mr. Sund. I will see if I have it in my--give me 1 second.
Sorry about that.
I am sorry.
I do not have that right in front of me right now, sir.
Sorry.
Mr. D'Esposito. OK. No worries. I will move on to something
else.
Yesterday Chairman Steil hosted a security briefing here in
this room, brought all the stakeholders, the law enforcement
agencies that oversee the Washington, D.C. area, into one room
to talk about the spiking violent crime and what we can do
better.
I think something that has been a common theme, and
probably not one that we are really proud of, but a common
theme that we have all heard is staffing issues when it comes
to the Capitol Police.
Obviously, I think any law enforcement agency around the
country right now would agree that the more people in uniform,
the better.
In your book, you wrote that on January 6th, United States
Capitol Police would be subjected to the greatest staffing
demands on the Department's limited resources, and that, quote,
``This would make pulling together the staffing for a large CDU
detail even more difficult.''
What was it specifically about January 6th and the joint
session that placed such significant demands on the staffing of
your department?
Mr. Sund. Any time you have a joint session of Congress,
where you have both the House and the Senate in session, as
well as the Vice President there holding a joint--joint
hearing, it is going to take a lot of--a lot of work.
The problem that we have is with the electoral college,
when you are in there doing the certification, it can likely
run into the early morning hours. You have to prepare for 24-
hour staffing for that. That is what takes a lot of the
resources.
You know, we had prepared for, I think it was 223 hard CDU
officers, as well as some officers on the perimeter, and that
is about--about the most we can get on the outside. It takes a
lot of our staffing on the inside, sir.
Mr. D'Esposito. You spent over three decades in the law
enforcement arena. Public safety, emergency management, it is
all kind of tied in there. As someone who has spent most of his
adult life in the emergency management world, one of the
questions that we always ask ourselves is, are we better off
today than we were when we saw the last event unfold.
My question to you is, are we better off today than, God
forbid, if we saw an event like January 6th unfold again?
Mr. Sund. I continue to be concerned. I know, like you had
mentioned, and I think there was an influx of money coming in.
That was key for getting some of the equipment and helping out
with the training.
The officers are still very, very short. They are getting
overworked. They are getting held over, and it is still making
training difficult. I would say, as far as some of the
equipment coming in, yes.
As far as the politicization, which is, the No. 1 thing I
had recommend, you know, there is no reason you should be going
and having Members of Congress in an approval or review
category for laws overseeing the Capitol Police. That needs to
be restricted.
You know, let the Capitol Police chief do his job.
Mr. D'Esposito. I agree.
Mr. Sund. That is the No. 1 thing I can say.
Mr. D'Esposito. Leave policing to the law enforcement
professionals.
Mr. Sund. That is correct. If they mess up, hold them
accountable.
Mr. D'Esposito. Exactly. Well, thank you for your service.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
I also want to clarify something Mr. Morelle brought up,
regarding bringing Mr. Irving before this Committee. It is the
intention of this Committee to bring Mr. Irving before our
Committee, whether in a hearing or in a transcribed interview
which, if either takes place, we will notify the minority and
invite them to participate.
With that, I would now recognize the Chairman of the full
Committee, Mr. Steil, for 5 minutes.
Chairman Steil. Thank you very much.
I want to go back to your recollections in the transcribed
interview of Mr. Irving. He said that on January 6th, the
initial statement about the Guard occurred on a phone call. You
noted it is in his office. Which is correct?
Mr. Sund. Can you repeat the question, sir, just so I----
Chairman Steil. Yes, no, absolutely. Mr. Irving said that
on January 6th, the initial statement about the Guard occurred
on a phone call. You contend that you went into his office to
discuss the Guard.
Mr. Sund. On January 6th?
Chairman Steil. Yes.
Mr. Sund. No, sir. I was in the--I was in the Command
Center on January 6th when we became under attack at 12:53.
Chairman Steil. OK.
Mr. Sund. I was there for several hours until I left at 5,
approximately 5 p.m. to go see the Vice President and go check
on the Capitol.
Chairman Steil. Thank you.
On January 6th, Mr. Irving said that when you called and
asked his permission to ask for the Guard, he gave you
permission. Is that correct?
Mr. Sund. That is false. I think if you look at his
testimony, he says, When I first call him--I want to, just for
clarification--at 2, because I think his testimony is, before I
was saying, I might be needing the National Guard, that is
absolutely not true.
When I first called at 12:58, I absolutely said, We need
the Guard now. I think my response was, I think we are getting
our asses handed to us. No, it was not correct that he gave me
approval on the first call.
Chairman Steil. When comparing your transcribed interview
with the January 6th Committee, and the transcribed interview
of Mr. Irving, there seems to be some pretty big discrepancies
in the timeline of events and how they happened. Can you
explain the discrepancies?
Mr. Sund. Maybe there is problems with recollection. The
one thing I would say is, when you think there is
discrepancies, realize that Congress did try and change the law
to correct those discrepancies in the sense of, they changed
the law giving the chief the authority now. Obviously they
agree with my position.
Chairman Steil. Well, I thank you for being here, Mr. Sund,
and, you know, we really are working, as chair of the full
Committee, to de-politicize Capitol Police. I remain concerned
that under the previous Congress and the previous Speaker,
Capitol Police was politicized, and we are working to de-
politicize the security apparatus on Capitol Hill.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Sund. Thank you.
Chairman Loudermilk. I thank the Committee Chairman for his
questions and being here today.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Just to finish up on the previous question--line of
questioning, regarding General Milley and his notification to
the Senate of this particular intelligence. You had stated that
he did not notify you. Do you know if General Milley notified
the intelligence division at all of this intelligence?
Mr. Sund. I have no idea, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. From what I recall, and I believe
it was in your book, you had issued an all-hands-on-deck, for
officers to be present, and on duty on January 6th. Is that
correct?
Mr. Sund. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. Do you know, was that order put in
place with the intelligence division?
Mr. Sund. The intelligence division actually--it is funny
you say that--the intelligence division had two-thirds of their
personnel working from home that day. No, it was not put in
place. It only had one intelligence analyst assigned to monitor
the January 6th events.
Chairman Loudermilk. Even though you issued an all-hands-
on-deck--this would have been Yogananda Pittman's call--she had
nearly 70 percent of her workforce at home?
Mr. Sund. At least of that one unit. When you talk about
the intelligence----
Chairman Loudermilk. Intelligence.
Mr. Sund. Yes, the larger----
Chairman Loudermilk. That is right. She was over a larger,
but, yes--so the intelligence, do you know why they chose to
not order their people to come to work.
Mr. Sund. No, sir. I have not been able to follow up on
that.
Chairman Loudermilk. Very interesting.
Are there any preexisting--or when you were chief, was
there any preexisting agreements between the Metropolitan
Police Department and Capitol Police that would allow MPD to
come onto Capitol Grounds without the approval from the chief
or the Police board?
Mr. Sund. Well, you got to understand, there is a number of
thoroughfares through the Capitol Grounds that Metropolitan
Police will patrol regularly--Constitution Avenue, Independence
Avenue, so they have to traverse the Capitol, when you call the
Capitol Grounds regularly.
For them to be coming up and coming into one of our
buildings, it usually requires approval and notification for
them to be able to come in and be invited in.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. From our research, the only
directive that we have seen with the Metropolitan Police
Department, which dates back about 10 years, is that no officer
can come onto Capitol Grounds, patrol Capitol Grounds, or enter
any Capitol building without the explicit approval or request
by the Capitol Police Board. You do not know that there is
anything that has superseded that?
Mr. Sund. No, I do not. I had have to say that there is a
Metropolitan Washington Council of Government's Mutual Aid
Agreement that I believe--that I believe exists, but I do not
know how that interacts with that.
Chairman Loudermilk. The mutual aid agreement that you
enacted, is that that same mutual aid agreement?
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. What time did you enact that?
Mr. Sund. I enacted that at 1--approximately 1:51, I called
Scott Boggs over at the Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments.
Also realize that I did call Metropolitan Police Department
right at 12:55. We were attacked at 12:53. At 12:55, I called
MPD and asked them to send in the resources. I called--I had
called earlier that morning at 10:55 and asked Chief Carroll if
he could put additional resources on Constitution Avenue in
case we needed them.
Chairman Loudermilk. No, that would have been off Capitol
Grounds at that point.
Mr. Sund. I believe it would have been right on the--right
on the edge of Capitol Grounds.
Chairman Loudermilk. Yes. OK.
Mr. Sund. I think it actually technically would have been
on Capitol Grounds, correct.
Chairman Loudermilk. Were you made aware that MPD would be
sending their emergency services unit in plain clothes to be in
the crowd?
Mr. Sund. Their----
Chairman Loudermilk. I mean--I am sorry--their electronic
services unit, ESU.
Mr. Sund. Oh, I am sorry. No. No, sir, I was not aware of
that.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. We actually have evidence and
records indicating plain clothes MPD officers were on Capitol
Grounds on January 6th, and you are saying you were not aware
that they would have embedded those officers within the crowd.
They did not make you aware of that.
Mr. Sund. No, sir, they did not make me aware of it. It is
not unusual for agencies to have plain clothes units deployed
around major events, but no, I was not made aware that they
would be on Capitol Grounds.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Some of what actually Metropolitan
Police provided to us, the camera footage, body cam footage,
shows that there were undercover agents in the crowd with one
apparently encouraging some of the protestors to enter the
Capitol. That would--I assume you would think that that was
uncalled for, or unprofessional?
Mr. Sund. I have not seen that. If it turned out to be a
police officer involved in that, that would be inappropriate.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. When did you come on as acting
chief? I know it was 2017. What month?
Mr. Sund. January. It was beginning of January, the first
week of January.
Chairman Loudermilk. You were acting chief at the time that
a--someone crazed by political rhetoric came on the baseball
field, which I was on, and began shooting at Members of
Congress, Republican Members.
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. That after-action report, do you
remember that after-action report?
Mr. Sund. I do, yes.
Chairman Loudermilk. You had two Capitol Police officers
involved in that, and from what I remember, it was a pretty
significantly large after-action report. Is that right?
Mr. Sund. Yes. I had have to remember exactly, but yes,
that was Crystal Griner and David Bailey that were heroic in
that event. Yes, substantial. I was involved in that, as well
as, you know, other infractions.
Chairman Loudermilk. Have you seen the Capitol Police
after-action report on January 6th.
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir. The 27-page after-action, yes, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. Does it surprise you that it is only
27 pages long when--how many officers were here that day?
Mr. Sund. I called in 1,700 officers, as well as there was
a total of 18--let us see--I am sorry--our total of 1,457. You
figure a little over 3,000--3,200 officers. No, I would have
expected a much larger after-action.
I was involved in Navy Yard as the incident commander
there. The after-action there was at least three times that
length.
Chairman Loudermilk. That is what amazes me is that this
after-action report of the Capitol--or the baseball shooting
with two officers involved, 15 or 16 Members of Congress,
received this comprehensive after-action report, but the
January 6th after-action report literally is just a handful of
pages, and it is very sketchy.
Who was responsible for that after-action report?
Mr. Sund. I do not remember the exact date that it was
published. I do not know if that would have been the acting
chief, Pittman, or the new chief, Manger.
Chairman Loudermilk. Yes. I think it was Acting Chief
Pittman.
Finally, this will be my last question. I appreciate you
being here with us and being so vigilant.
You have mentioned earlier in response to a question by the
minority, that there should be others that are held accountable
to this. Who else do you believe that should be held
accountable?
Mr. Sund. When I talk about holding people accountable, I
think, you know, you are dealing with a morale issue, I think,
right now on the--on the police department. That is one of the
big issues that you face when you talk to the officers.
I agree with Representative Torres, these were heroic
officers. They are working really hard all the time, and I
appreciate that. There is a morale issue, and I think part of
that morale issue goes to the fact that people have not been
held accountable. You know, failures have not been identified,
and people that have been left in certain positions that--that
should be identified as contributing to some of the issues we
had that day.
Chairman Loudermilk. In contrasting that, there are
individuals who--I believe you even mentioned this in your
book--that acted above and beyond the call of duty, or above
and beyond their position, who were actually terminated from
the Capitol Police, and there were many whistleblowers that
were retaliated against. That is exactly what we are trying to
get at here.
We thank you for spending time with us today, thank you for
your service. It is been exemplary. Look, you had the ability
to just step away and go in obscurity like some that were here
that day have, but you chose to stand up and see that justice
is done and that, more importantly, that we do correct the
wrongs and we secure this Capitol.
It is not the intention, as has been mentioned several
times, for this Committee to rewrite history. History is there.
Violence was done. We want to get to the truth of how there was
a security failure at this Capitol so that we can ensure that
it never happens again.
Members of the Subcommittee may have some additional
questions for you, and we ask you please respond to those in
writing.
Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. Without objection, each Member will
have 5 legislative days to insert additional material into the
record, or to revise and extend their remarks.
If there is no further business, I thank the Members for
their participation. Without objection, the Subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:19 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
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