[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


  OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL SECURITY: ASSESSING SECURITY 
                      FAILURES ON JANUARY 6, 2021

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

                                 OF THE

                   COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 19, 2023
                               __________

      Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration


                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                            www.govinfo.gov
                           www.cha.house.gov
                           
                                __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
56-409                      WASHINGTON : 2024  


                   COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION

                    BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin, Chairman

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia            JOSEPH MORELLE, New York,
MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia                 Ranking Member
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina          TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
STEPHANIE BICE, Oklahoma             NORMA TORRES, California
MIKE CAREY, Ohio                     DEREK KILMER, Washington
ANTHONY D'ESPOSITO, New York
LAUREL LEE, Florida

                       Mike Platt, Staff Director
                  Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director

                                 ------                                

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

                    BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia, Chair

MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia            NORMA TORRES, California
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina               Ranking Member
ANTHONY D'ESPOSITO, New York         DEREK KILMER, Washington

                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                           Opening Statements

Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight Barry Loudermilk, 
  Representative from the State of Georgia.......................     1
    Prepared statement of Chairman Barry Loudermilk..............     2
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight Norma Torres, 
  Representative from the State of California....................     3
    Prepared statement of Ranking Member Norma Torres............   116
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on House Administration Joseph 
  Morelle, Representative from the State of New York.............   117
    Prepared statement of Ranking Member Joseph Morelle..........   118

                               Witnesses

Steven Sund, former Chief of U.S. Capitol Police.................   120
    Prepared statement of Steven Sund............................   123

                       Submissions for the Record

Congressional Record excerpt.....................................     6
Executive summaries of flash reports.............................     8
Congressional hearings testimonies...............................    36
Lieutenant Honore's Task Force 1/6 Capitol Security Review 
  summary........................................................    99
Washington Post article..........................................   114
Capitol Police Board letter......................................   131
Washington Post article..........................................   148
CNN article......................................................   152
Secretary of Defense memorandum..................................   157
Secretary of the Army letter.....................................   158
Select Committee interview excerpt...............................   161
H. Con. Res. 40..................................................   169
H. Con. Res. 40 amendment........................................   174
Amendment vote tally.............................................   175
Matt Gaetz tweets................................................   177
Chief Manger letter..............................................   179

                        Questions for the Record

Steven Sund answers to submitted questions.......................   188

 
  OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL SECURITY: ASSESSING SECURITY 
                      FAILURES ON JANUARY 6, 2021

                              ----------                              


                           September 19, 2023

                 Subcommittee on Oversight,
                 Committee on House Administration,
                                  House of Representatives,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:44 p.m., in 
room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Barry 
Loudermilk [chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Loudermilk, Steil, Griffith, 
Murphy, D'Esposito, Torres, and Morelle.
    Staff present: Caleb Hays, Deputy Staff Director and 
General Counsel; Elliott Tomlinson, Deputy General Counsel and 
Deputy Parliamentarian; Hillary Lassiter, Chief Clerk; Will 
Neitzel, Deputy Director of Member Services; Khalil Abboud, 
Minority Deputy Staff Director, Chief Counsel; Matthew 
Schlesinger, Minority Oversight Counsel; and Sean Wright, 
Minority Senior Elections Counsel.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY LOUDERMILK, CHAIRMAN OF THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE 
                           OF GEORGIA

    Chairman Loudermilk. The Subcommittee on Oversight and come 
to order. Also, without objection, the meeting record will 
remain open for five legislative days so Members may submit any 
materials they wish to be included therein.
    Thank you, Ranking Member Torres, Members of the 
Subcommittee, and Chief Sund for joining us in today's 
oversight hearing.
    Today, we are focused on identifying the numerous security 
failures that preceded and continued to persist following the 
breach of the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021. 
Although, it has been more than 2 years, there is still many 
unanswered questions. Former Speaker Pelosi and House Democrats 
spent millions of dollars on their Select Committee to 
Investigate January 6th, yet the Committee failed to 
investigate the real security failures.
    Today, we are joined by Chief Sund, who was Chief of the 
United States Capitol Police on that day. The Democrat Select 
Committee never invited Chief Sund to testify during one of 
their prime-time hearings, despite him being the chief of 
police on January 6th. Perhaps that is because his testimony 
did not fit with their preconceived narrative.
    For months leading to January 6th, the House Democrats 
championed the anti-police, ``defund the police'' narrative. 
House Democrats continued pushing this dangerous narrative 
through the appropriations process where they threatened to cut 
Capitol Police's budget. This politicization of the Capitol 
Police directly contributed to many of the structural and 
procedural failures we witnessed that day. Let me be clear.
    I stand with law enforcement, specifically our Capitol 
Police Officers, and appreciate their dedication, bravery, and 
service. I hope my Democratic colleagues do the same.
    We now know that serious structural failures within the 
Capitol Police intelligence department contributed to the 
terrible events of that day. This includes misplaced and 
misguided goals, as well as key intelligence failures that 
resulted in timely warnings not reaching the Capitol Police 
leadership.
    Instead of doing the comprehensive assessment of these 
intelligence failures, Chief Sund was pushed out, and the new 
leadership silenced individuals who spoke about these failures. 
Retaliation against whistleblowers is unacceptable. This is one 
of the reasons why House Republicans are conducting this 
investigation.
    I look forward to hearing Chief Sund's view regarding the 
multiple accusations of retaliation that are now public. I also 
look forward to hearing directly from Chief Sund about the 
general operation of Capitol Police, including day-to-day 
relations with the Capitol Police Board, as well as the Speaker 
of the House. Chief Sund's testimony will provide transparency, 
accountability, and most importantly help to prevent anything 
like this from happening again.
    Finally, we will focus on the aftermath of January 6th and 
the ensuing witch hunt conducted by the Select Committee on 
January 6th of which I was, unfortunately, a target. Throughout 
their nearly 2 years of work, the Select Committee clearly 
operated on hearsay and cherry-picked so-called evidence to fit 
their desired narrative.
    When the Select Committee published their final report in 
December 2022, it was clear that their multimillion dollar 
committee effort was a political weapon focused at attacking 
former President Trump and his supporters instead of how to 
prevent another incident. We must ask ourselves why the Capitol 
was ill-prepared, and what security changes are needed to 
ensure adequate Capitol security, a question the January 6th 
Select Committee failed to scrutinize. This was preventable, 
and we must ensure nothing like this ever happens again.
    I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mrs. Torres, for 5 
minutes for the purpose of providing an opening statement.
    [The prepared statement of Chairman Loudermilk follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 
                        BARRY LOUDERMILK

    Today, we are focused on identifying the numerous security 
failures that preceded and continued to persist following the 
breach of the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021. 
Although, it has been more than 2 years, there is still many 
unanswered questions. Former Speaker Pelosi and House Democrats 
spent millions of dollars on their Select Committee to 
Investigate January 6th, yet the Committee failed to 
investigate the real security failures.
    Today, we are joined by Chief Sund, who was Chief of the 
United States Capitol Police on that day. The Democrat Select 
Committee never invited Chief Sund to testify during one of 
their prime-time hearings, despite him being the chief of 
police on January 6th. Perhaps that is because his testimony 
did not fit with their preconceived narrative.
    For months leading to January 6th, the House Democrats 
championed the anti-police, ``defund the police'' narrative. 
House Democrats continued pushing this dangerous narrative 
through the appropriations process where they threatened to cut 
Capitol Police's budget. This politicization of the Capitol 
Police directly contributed to many of the structural and 
procedural failures we witnessed that day. Let me be clear.
    I stand with law enforcement, specifically our Capitol 
Police Officers, and appreciate their dedication, bravery, and 
service. I hope my Democratic colleagues do the same.
    We now know that serious structural failures within the 
Capitol Police intelligence department contributed to the 
terrible events of that day. This includes misplaced and 
misguided goals, as well as key intelligence failures that 
resulted in timely warnings not reaching the Capitol Police 
leadership.
    Instead of doing the comprehensive assessment of these 
intelligence failures, Chief Sund was pushed out, and the new 
leadership silenced individuals who spoke about these failures. 
Retaliation against whistleblowers is unacceptable. This is one 
of the reasons why House Republicans are conducting this 
investigation.
    I look forward to hearing Chief Sund's view regarding the 
multiple accusations of retaliation that are now public. I also 
look forward to hearing directly from Chief Sund about the 
general operation of Capitol Police, including day-to-day 
relations with the Capitol Police Board, as well as the Speaker 
of the House. Chief Sund's testimony will provide transparency, 
accountability, and most importantly help to prevent anything 
like this from happening again.
    Finally, we will focus on the aftermath of January 6th and 
the ensuing witch hunt conducted by the Select Committee on 
January 6th of which I was, unfortunately, a target. Throughout 
their nearly 2 years of work, the Select Committee clearly 
operated on hearsay and cherry-picked so-called evidence to fit 
their desired narrative.
    When the Select Committee published their final report in 
December 2022, it was clear that their multimillion dollar 
committee effort was a political weapon focused at attacking 
former President Trump and his supporters instead of how to 
prevent another incident. We must ask ourselves why the Capitol 
was ill-prepared, and what security changes are needed to 
ensure adequate Capitol security, a question the January 6th 
Select Committee failed to scrutinize. This was preventable, 
and we must ensure nothing like this ever happens again.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NORMA TORRES, RANKING MEMBER OF THE 
     SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
                           CALIFORNIA

    Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Chairman. Big protests in D.C. on 
January 6th. Be there, Be wild.
    On December 19th, 2022, former President Donald Trump, the 
leader of the Republican Party, said those fateful words to his 
supporters, and they complied. Following that directive, the 
National Intelligence Threat Consortium noticed a 1,000-percent 
increase in violent rhetoric against Members of Congress and 
law enforcement officers.
    In the weeks and months leading up to January 6th, Trump 
continued to incite unrest, accusing Democrats of rigging the 
election and referring to it as the biggest scam in our 
Nation's history. On New Year's Day, he tweeted: January 6th, 
see you in D.C.
    On the morning of the attack, at the ``stop the steal'' 
rally on the Ellipse, a Member, a Republican Member of Congress 
told the crowd: Today is the day American patriots start taking 
down names and kicking ass. Our ancestors sacrificed their 
blood, their sweat, their tears, and sometimes their lives. Are 
you willing to do the same?
    Rudy Giuliani continued the violence to incite the armed 
crowd by asking for a trial by combat, while Donald Trump told 
his supporters: We are going to walk down, and I will be there 
with you. We are going to walk down to the Capitol.
    The former President orchestrated a corrupt scheme to 
overturn the results of a free and fair election. When that did 
not work, he incited, he incited his supporters to violence. 
Updated via social media and directed by the former President, 
the crowd marched to the Capitol armed with guns, handcuffs, 
and pepper spray. If think did not bring a weapon, they found 
one, viciously, viciously beating our officers with poles 
bearing the American flag and erecting gallows to hang Vice 
President Pence. The former President bears full responsibility 
for bringing violence to the Capitol.
    I spoke with some of the heroic Capitol Police Officers who 
were injured and beaten that day by the violent mob and still 
face the enduring pain of that traumatic day. If not for the 
heroic actions of law enforcement officers, some of whom 
literally gave their lives to protect us, the former President 
and his supporters would have succeeded.
    Immediately, Speaker Pelosi engaged with retired United 
States Army General Russel Honore to conduct a complete 
security assessment of the Capitol to identify nine 
vulnerabilities. In addition to the work of the Honore Task 
Force, former Chair Zoe Lofgren of this Committee, instructed 
the U.S. Capitol Police Inspector General to halt all ongoing 
investigations and devote all resources investigating the 
attack. House Democrats then directed the Government 
Accountability Office to perform a governmentwide examination 
of the attack, including a comprehensive review of agency 
preparation and response.
    Still, after Republicans refused to support legislation to 
create an independent national commission, the bipartisan 
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack took up 
this work. In addition to the many investigations, we passed a 
funding bill to equip the institution with adequate resources 
to address our security needs.
    The law also established the Howard C. Liebengood Center 
for Wellness named in honor of a U.S. Capitol Police Officer 
who tragically took his life following the attack, to ensure 
that his partners on the force have access to care as they 
continue to heal from the traumatic events of a violent 
insurrection.
    We are still reckoning with the fallout from January 6th 
collectively as a country and as individuals. The American 
democratic experience came dangerously close to ending if not 
for the courageous actions of the Capitol and D.C. police. The 
person, the person responsible for directing the violence to 
the Capitol that day in order to undermine, to undermine a 
peaceful transfer of power is the favorite to secure the 
Republican nomination for President.
    Mr. Chairman, I ask for unanimous consent to enter into the 
record the following: an excerpt from the Congressional Record, 
dated January 13th, 2021, containing then minority leader Kevin 
McCarthy's remarks during the debate on President Trump 
impeachment for incitement of insurrection, executive summaries 
of the eight flash reports examining the preparation for it, 
and response to the January 6th attack, prepared by the Capitol 
Police Inspector General, the Capitol Police Inspector 
General's testimony from each hearing and a series of hearings 
convened by this Committee examining his flash reports, 
testimony from a hearing convened by this Committee in 2021, 
entitled ``Reforming the Capitol Police and Improving 
Accountability for the Capitol Police Board,'' a summary of 
Lieutenant Honore's Task Force 1/6 Capitol Security Review, and 
Washington Post article dated September 6, 2023, entitled 
``Trump's 2020 crusade had led to 700 years in prison 
sentences.''
    [The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mrs. Torres. I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mrs. Torres follows:]

  PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
                     OVERSIGHT NORMA TORRES

    On December 19th, 2022, former President Donald Trump, the 
leader of the Republican Party, said those fateful words to his 
supporters, and they complied. Following that directive, the 
National Intelligence Threat Consortium noticed a 1,000-percent 
increase in violent rhetoric against Members of Congress and 
law enforcement officers.
    In the weeks and months leading up to January 6th, Trump 
continued to incite unrest, accusing Democrats of rigging the 
election and referring to it as the biggest scam in our 
Nation's history. On New Year's Day, he tweeted: January 6th, 
see you in D.C.
    On the morning of the attack, at the ``stop the steal'' 
rally on the Ellipse, a Member, a Republican Member of Congress 
told the crowd: Today is the day American patriots start taking 
down names and kicking ass. Our ancestors sacrificed their 
blood, their sweat, their tears, and sometimes their lives. Are 
you willing to do the same?
    Rudy Giuliani continued the violence to incite the armed 
crowd by asking for a trial by combat, while Donald Trump told 
his supporters: We are going to walk down, and I will be there 
with you. We are going to walk down to the Capitol.
    The former President orchestrated a corrupt scheme to 
overturn the results of a free and fair election. When that did 
not work, he incited, he incited his supporters to violence. 
Updated via social media and directed by the former President, 
the crowd marched to the Capitol armed with guns, handcuffs, 
and pepper spray. If think did not bring a weapon, they found 
one, viciously, viciously beating our officers with poles 
bearing the American flag and erecting gallows to hang Vice 
President Pence. The former President bears full responsibility 
for bringing violence to the Capitol.
    I spoke with some of the heroic Capitol Police Officers who 
were injured and beaten that day by the violent mob and still 
face the enduring pain of that traumatic day. If not for the 
heroic actions of law enforcement officers, some of whom 
literally gave their lives to protect us, the former President 
and his supporters would have succeeded.
    Immediately, Speaker Pelosi engaged with retired United 
States Army General Russel Honore to conduct a complete 
security assessment of the Capitol to identify nine 
vulnerabilities. In addition to the work of the Honore Task 
Force, former Chair Zoe Lofgren of this Committee, instructed 
the U.S. Capitol Police Inspector General to halt all ongoing 
investigations and devote all resources investigating the 
attack. House Democrats then directed the Government 
Accountability Office to perform a governmentwide examination 
of the attack, including a comprehensive review of agency 
preparation and response.
    Still, after Republicans refused to support legislation to 
create an independent national commission, the bipartisan 
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack took up 
this work. In addition to the many investigations, we passed a 
funding bill to equip the institution with adequate resources 
to address our security needs.
    The law also established the Howard C. Liebengood Center 
for Wellness named in honor of a U.S. Capitol Police Officer 
who tragically took his life following the attack, to ensure 
that his partners on the force have access to care as they 
continue to heal from the traumatic events of a violent 
insurrection.
    We are still reckoning with the fallout from January 6th 
collectively as a country and as individuals. The American 
democratic experience came dangerously close to ending if not 
for the courageous actions of the Capitol and D.C. police. The 
person, the person responsible for directing the violence to 
the Capitol that day in order to undermine, to undermine a 
peaceful transfer of power is the favorite to secure the 
Republican nomination for President.
    Mr. Chairman, I ask for unanimous consent to enter into the 
record the following: an excerpt from the Congressional Record, 
dated January 13th, 2021, containing then minority leader Kevin 
McCarthy's remarks during the debate on President Trump 
impeachment for incitement of insurrection, executive summaries 
of the eight flash reports examining the preparation for it, 
and response to the January 6th attack, prepared by the Capitol 
Police Inspector General, the Capitol Police Inspector 
General's testimony from each hearing and a series of hearings 
convened by this Committee examining his flash reports, 
testimony from a hearing convened by this Committee in 2021, 
entitled ``Reforming the Capitol Police and Improving 
Accountability for the Capitol Police Board,'' a summary of 
Lieutenant Honore's Task Force 1/6 Capitol Security Review, and 
Washington Post article dated September 6, 2023, entitled 
``Trump's 2020 crusade had led to 700 years in prison 
sentences.''

    Chairman Loudermilk. Without objection, the gentlelady's 
time has expired. I now recognize full Committee Ranking Member 
Mr. Morelle for 5 minutes for the purpose of providing an 
opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH MORELLE, RANKING MEMBER OF THE 
 COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
                            NEW YORK

    Mr. Morelle. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling 
this hearing. I also want to thank my colleague and the Ranking 
Member of the Subcommittee, Mrs. Torres, for her work.
    I want to thank Chief Sund not only for being here today to 
offer testimony, sir, but also for your service to the Capitol 
Police and to our country. I appreciate that.
    I think, whenever we are talked about January 6th, I think 
it is important we have a fuller picture of what the House 
majority did in the aftermath of the attack, particularly for 
those who seem to have developed a case of collective amnesia.
    I do want to set the record straight. In the days and weeks 
following the violent mob's attack and ransacking of the United 
States Capitol, House Democrats immediately got to work. The 
work started with the Speaker immediately ordering a 
nonpartisan forward-looking and comprehensive security view of 
the Capitol and its support agencies, and that was spearheaded 
by General Russel Honore.
    This Committee--I was not a Member of the Committee at the 
time--but the Committee then directed the United States Capitol 
Police Inspector General to temporarily set aside the office's 
ongoing work and prioritize a comprehensive nonpartisan view of 
the USCP's preparation for and response to the attack. 
Concurrently, the Architect of the Capitol Inspector General 
conducted similar assessments of the Capitol complex's physical 
security.
    Upon issuance of each IG's report, this Committee, excuse 
me, held a series of public hearings, six in total, to review 
findings and to question the inspectors general. A series of 
reports culminated in more than 100 recommendations to improve 
the operation of the Capitol Police, harden the security of the 
Capitol complex, and protect the people within, which is, of 
course, our large responsibility here.
    The work did not stop there. While the Committee on House 
Administration conducted its important work, it was evident a 
broader inquiry was necessary to fully investigate and 
understand the attack, not just to hold those involved 
accountable but to provide the American public with answers to 
basic questions. Toward that end, legislation was introduced to 
establish an outside independent commission to investigate and 
report on the facts and the causes of the attack. The bill was 
developed with input from both parties, and that bipartisan 
framework was reflect in the final text considered by the 
House. I just recall, because he was a friend and a colleague 
of mine, John Katko, a Member of the House Republican Caucus, 
who was asked to help negotiate the deal, did so. Then, 
inexplicably at the time, minority leader McCarthy declared his 
opposition to the bill, the bill which was characterized by his 
own handpicked negotiator Representative--John Katko, as a 
solid fair agreement. Regardless, we pressed on and got the 
bill through the House on a bipartisan basis only for it to 
ultimately fail through the Republican filibuster.
    With the prospects of an independent commission growing 
bleaker, despite good-faith efforts by the Speaker to work 
collaboratively with the minority leader, the House then voted 
to impanel a bipartisan Select Committee to investigate the 
attack. It was constituted by appointments for both the Speaker 
and the minority leader. Again, at the last minute, the 
minority leader withdrew his appointments to the Select 
Committee.
    Although, impossible to exhaustively list the entirety of 
its work in the brief 5 minutes I am afforded here, the Select 
Committee interviewed hundreds of subjects, including riot 
participants and Government officials, combed through thousands 
of hours of video footage and hundreds of thousands of pages of 
documents, held 10 public televised hearings, and issued a 
report which devoted two appendices to examining the 
preparation and response of Government agencies and the D.C. 
National Guard. We did not just end the investigation there, 
nor did we just investigate the attack itself. We passed laws 
that provided increased security funding for the Capitol 
complex to make sure officers struggling from the physical and 
emotional trauma of that day had access to the care they need 
and deserve. We brought transparency to the Capitol Police 
Board and made it easier to mobilize outside assistance in the 
event of an emergency. The Capitol Police were there for us, so 
we wanted to be there for them.
    January 6th is among the darkest stains on this country's 
historic fabric. An armed and violent mob attempted to 
forcefully disrupt the peaceful transfer of power and subvert 
the will of the American people at the behest of an 
increasingly desperate former President. We also witnessed 
incredible bravery on that day by the Capitol Police, acts of 
genuine heroism that kept us safe and kept our beloved 
democratic experiment alive, and I am forever grateful to the 
Capitol Police for that.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Ranking Member Morelle follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE 
                 ADMINISTRATION JOSEPH MORELLE

    I want to thank Chief Sund not only for being here today to 
offer testimony, sir, but also for your service to the Capitol 
Police and to our country. I appreciate that.
    I think, whenever we are talked about January 6th, I think 
it is important we have a fuller picture of what the House 
majority did in the aftermath of the attack, particularly for 
those who seem to have developed a case of collective amnesia.
    I do want to set the record straight. In the days and weeks 
following the violent mob's attack and ransacking of the United 
States Capitol, House Democrats immediately got to work. The 
work started with the Speaker immediately ordering a 
nonpartisan forward-looking and comprehensive security view of 
the Capitol and its support agencies, and that was spearheaded 
by General Russel Honore.
    This Committee--I was not a Member of the Committee at the 
time--but the Committee then directed the United States Capitol 
Police Inspector General to temporarily set aside the office's 
ongoing work and prioritize a comprehensive nonpartisan view of 
the USCP's preparation for and response to the attack. 
Concurrently, the Architect of the Capitol Inspector General 
conducted similar assessments of the Capitol complex's physical 
security.
    Upon issuance of each IG's report, this Committee, excuse 
me, held a series of public hearings, six in total, to review 
findings and to question the inspectors general. A series of 
reports culminated in more than 100 recommendations to improve 
the operation of the Capitol Police, harden the security of the 
Capitol complex, and protect the people within, which is, of 
course, our large responsibility here.
    The work did not stop there. While the Committee on House 
Administration conducted its important work, it was evident a 
broader inquiry was necessary to fully investigate and 
understand the attack, not just to hold those involved 
accountable but to provide the American public with answers to 
basic questions. Toward that end, legislation was introduced to 
establish an outside independent commission to investigate and 
report on the facts and the causes of the attack. The bill was 
developed with input from both parties, and that bipartisan 
framework was reflect in the final text considered by the 
House. I just recall, because he was a friend and a colleague 
of mine, John Katko, a Member of the House Republican Caucus, 
who was asked to help negotiate the deal, did so. Then, 
inexplicably at the time, minority leader McCarthy declared his 
opposition to the bill, the bill which was characterized by his 
own handpicked negotiator Representative--John Katko, as a 
solid fair agreement. Regardless, we pressed on and got the 
bill through the House on a bipartisan basis only for it to 
ultimately fail through the Republican filibuster.
    With the prospects of an independent commission growing 
bleaker, despite good-faith efforts by the Speaker to work 
collaboratively with the minority leader, the House then voted 
to impanel a bipartisan Select Committee to investigate the 
attack. It was constituted by appointments for both the Speaker 
and the minority leader. Again, at the last minute, the 
minority leader withdrew his appointments to the Select 
Committee.
    Although, impossible to exhaustively list the entirety of 
its work in the brief 5 minutes I am afforded here, the Select 
Committee interviewed hundreds of subjects, including riot 
participants and Government officials, combed through thousands 
of hours of video footage and hundreds of thousands of pages of 
documents, held 10 public televised hearings, and issued a 
report which devoted two appendices to examining the 
preparation and response of Government agencies and the D.C. 
National Guard. We did not just end the investigation there, 
nor did we just investigate the attack itself. We passed laws 
that provided increased security funding for the Capitol 
complex to make sure officers struggling from the physical and 
emotional trauma of that day had access to the care they need 
and deserve. We brought transparency to the Capitol Police 
Board and made it easier to mobilize outside assistance in the 
event of an emergency. The Capitol Police were there for us, so 
we wanted to be there for them.
    January 6th is among the darkest stains on this country's 
historic fabric. An armed and violent mob attempted to 
forcefully disrupt the peaceful transfer of power and subvert 
the will of the American people at the behest of an 
increasingly desperate former President. We also witnessed 
incredible bravery on that day by the Capitol Police, acts of 
genuine heroism that kept us safe and kept our beloved 
democratic experiment alive, and I am forever grateful to the 
Capitol Police for that.

    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    I note that a quorum is present. Without objection, the 
chair may declare a recess at any time.
    Without objection, all other Members' opening statements 
will be made part of the hearing record if they are submitted 
to the Committee by 5 p.m. today.
    Pursuant to paragraph B of Committee rule 6, the witness 
will please stand and raise your right hand.
    [Witness sworn.]
    Chairman Loudermilk. Let the record show that the witness 
has answered in the affirmative.
    You may be seated, Chief.
    I would like to now introduce our witness. Chief Steven 
Sund served for over 25 years with the Metropolitan Police 
Department where he rose through the ranks to become the 
commander of the special--the Elite Special Operations 
Division, overseeing some of the most critical units within the 
department. In 2017, he was selected as the Assistant Chief of 
Police. On June 13th, 2019, Sund was named the 10th Chief of 
the United States Capitol Police, where he served for 18 
months. In January 2023, Chief Sund published a book about the 
institutional failings entitled ``Courage Under Fire: Under 
Siege and Outnumbered 58 to 1 on January 6th.''
    Chief Sund, we appreciate you being here today and look 
forward to your testimony. As a reminder, we have read your 
written statement, and it will appear in the full Committee 
record. Under Committee rule 9, you are to limit your oral 
presentation to a brief summary of your written statement, 
unless I extend this time period in consultation with Ranking 
Member Torres. Please remember to turn on your microphone using 
the button in front of you so that Members can hear you. When 
you begin to speak, the light on the timer in front of you will 
turn green. After 4 minutes, the light will turn yellow. When 
the red light comes on, I ask that you please wrap as that 
indicates your 5 minutes has expired. I now recognize Chief 
Sund for 5 minutes.

  STATEMENT OF HON. STEVEN SUND, FORMER CHIEF OF U.S. CAPITOL 
                             POLICE

    Mr. Sund. Good afternoon, Chairman Loudermilk, Ranking 
Member Torres, and Members of the Subcommittee. It is hard to 
believe that it is been almost 3 years since January 6th, and 
we are still having congressional hearings to identify what 
contributed to that tragic day. To date, there have been four 
congressional reports, along with several inspector general and 
Government Accountability Office reports, and they continue to 
support what many of us have suspected from the very beginning: 
January 6th was an intelligence failure.
    We rely on accurate intelligence to help us develop 
effective security and operational plans. Accurate intelligence 
is essential--is an essential factor in the decision-making 
process of the Capitol Police, the Capitol Police Board, and 
the Oversight Committees.
    We now know that significant intelligence existed that 
individuals were plotting to storm the Capitol Building, target 
lawmakers, and discussing shooting my officers. Yet no intel 
agencies or units sounded the alarm. We were blindsided. 
Intelligence failed the operations.
    The January 6th attack at the Capitol was preventable. If 
the intelligence had been accurately reported, and the FBI and 
DHS had followed their policies and established practices, I 
would not be sitting here today.
    There was a failure to connect the dots on 9/11 and again 
on January 6th. I am concerned if we do not identify and 
correct these issues, we may fail again in the future. I did 
everything I could to protect and defend the U.S. Capitol and 
the Members of the Congress prior to and on January 3d. I am 
sorry, prior to January 6th and prior to and on January 6th. On 
January 3d, I requested the assistance of the National Guard to 
support perimeter and was denied by the two Sergeant at Arms 
over the concern for politics and optics. Still concerned for 
the number of personnel I had on my perimeter, I called the MPD 
early on morning of January 6th and asked if they could stage 
additional personnel closer to the Capitol on Constitution 
Avenue. Less than 2 hours later, we were violently attacked on 
the West Front of the Capitol at 12:53 p.m. I immediately 
followed up on that morning call and contacted MPD Chief Carrol 
at 12:55 p.m. and requested those resources. The MPD was on the 
scene within minutes and were assisting my officers in holding 
the line and delaying the breach of the building. It took 81 
agonizing minutes for that mob to fight their way through 
numerous police lines before they were able to breach Capitol. 
The decision to reach out to MPD proved critical in 
safeguarding the Members of Congress.
    Minutes after the attack began, I made my first call to 
House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving 12:58 p.m. to request 
approval to bring in the National Guard. ``Let me run it up the 
chain, and I will get back to you'' was his response. It would 
be 71 minutes before that approval would finally come. Between 
12:58 and when I finally received approval for the National 
Guard at 2:09 p.m., I made 32 calls to coordinate support for 
my officers, including at least 11 frustrating calls to the 
Sergeant at Arms regarding my request for the National Guard.
    My calls to my partner law enforcement agencies resulted in 
hundreds of police officers from around the national capital 
region and as far away as New Jersey responding to assist.
    After I received approval to call in the National Guard, I 
then had to beg the Pentagon officials to send us help. I was 
repeatedly denied assistance by Army Lieutenant General Piatt 
citing concerns of optics of the National Guard on Capitol 
Hill. The D.C. National Guard, many of whom were standing 
within eyesight of the Capitol and whose motto is ``Capital 
Guardians,'' would not arrive until almost 6 p.m., after the 
fighting was over and the Capitol Grounds secured. The New 
Jersey State Police arrived before they did. To add insult to 
injury, the Inspector General for the Department of Defense 
considered the response, quote, appropriate.
    Besides the MPD, the National Guard was of the next largest 
cadre of personnel that could be deployed to assist my officers 
who desperately needed those boots on the ground. The fact that 
the Chief of Police responsible for the entire legislative 
branch of Government was repeated denied assistance by the 
Pentagon is indefensible. The fact that an experienced law 
enforcement official was constrained by Federal law from 
bringing in lifesaving resources for his officers is 
unfathomable. This type of politicized control over an 
oversight was and continues to be detrimental to the mission. 
Why bring in an experienced police chief if you are not going 
to allow him to do his job?
    In December 2021, Congress amended 2 U.S.C. 1970, the law 
that restricted my ability to bring in Federal resources. While 
the amendment now grants the Chief authority to call in Federal 
resources only during an emergency, it does not grant the Chief 
authority to request Federal resources in advance of an event, 
which means the request can still be denied. In other words, 
the law still requires the Chief to seek advanced approval from 
the Capitol Police Board and congressional leadership. This is 
exactly what I faced on January 3d. It should also be noted 
that the new amendment makes the Chief Emergency Authorization 
revocable.
    I am extremely proud and appreciative of the Capitol Police 
Officers and the Metropolitan Police Department, and the other 
law enforcement agencies that came to our assistance. Despite 
your bureaucratic issues on the Hill and a no-show by the 
military, it was law enforcement that saved the day, and not a 
single Member of Congress was injured.
    Thanks to the assisting law enforcement, the men and women 
of the Capitol Police did not fail in their mission. In 
conclusion, I ask that this Committee address the institutional 
failures that contributed to January 6. I also implore the 
Committee to have an independent entity investigate the 
complaints and allegations of retaliation of intel 
whistleblowers following January 6 and review any of the 
personnel actions, to include disciplinary actions that 
occurred following January 6th, to ensure they are properly 
investigated and not subject to any inappropriate actions, 
coercion, influences, or predetermined outcomes.
    Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Chief Sund follows:]

               PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN SUND

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, Chief Sund.
    I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Griffith. Chief Sund, some have characterized January 
6th as an intelligence failure. Is it true that, when you were 
Chief of Police, Ms. Yogananda Pittman was the Assistant Chief 
of Police in charge of the Intelligence Division. Yes or no?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. In your book, I believe you wrote that the 
information regarding potential threats prior to January 6th 
was received by the United States Capitol Police Intelligence 
Division, but you were not made aware of it until after January 
6th. Is that correct? Yes or no?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir, that is correct.
    Mr. Griffith. Had you seen the United States Capitol 
Intelligence Assessment Report in full issued on January 4th 
before January 6th? Yes or no?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. You had seen the January 4th report.
    Mr. Sund. When you say ``January 4th,'' it is dated--I 
mean, I just want to make sure there is a January 4th report, a 
daily intelligence report. That one?
    Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Sund. Yes.
    Mr. Griffith. Would this intelligence assessment report 
have changed your actions had you received it and fully 
understood all of the ramifications of it?
    Mr. Sund. When you say ``fully understood the ramifications 
of it,'' there was nothing supporting----
    Mr. Griffith. Well, what I am getting to is that apparently 
what I understood was, as Chief of Police, you received the 
report, but there was a comment about some intelligence or 
about some concerns, but it was put on the last page of the 
report instead of on the first page. Is that accurate?
    Mr. Sund. OK. Just to make sure we are clear, you are 
referring to the January 3rd----
    Mr. Griffith. January 3d. All right.
    Mr. Sund. Yes, January 3d. It is actually January 3d. It is 
dated 2020. It is supposed to be 2021. That is the final 
intelligence assessment, but not the final intelligence report 
that is put out.
    Mr. Griffith. All right.
    Mr. Sund. That is correct.
    Mr. Griffith. All right. I got my lingo mixed up.
    Mr. Sund. No problem. It is a 15-page report with the 
intelligence assessment at the end behind two and a half pages 
of street closures. Correct, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. Wouldn't you expect there to be some kind of 
warning on the front page or an alert or highlighting of the 
fact that there might be a concern by your intelligence 
department?
    Mr. Sund. When you see the amount of intelligence that they 
had in advance, and you go and get some of the testimony for 
the people that put it together, there is a failure to include 
specific intelligence that would have been critical for my men 
and women to be better prepared for that day, yes.
    Mr. Griffith. All right. Just so I am clear because I am 
not sure I understood the answer. Was there something 
highlighted in the report, or was it that there was not 
information that you needed to get to your officers?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, there was not information. When you talk 
about the assessment, the intelligence assessment, the very 
last paragraph, the very last paragraph does not tell you 
anything other than pretty much what we were expecting from any 
of the previous MAGA rallies. There could be, you know, there 
could be some danger. There could be some----
    Mr. Griffith. It is a very standard response and not 
something that would have highlighted that there was a real 
threat or a real concern?
    Mr. Sund. Correct. Not what you are seeing now about 
storming the Capitol, killing the palace guards, which is 
referring to my officers. None of that was included in the 
intelligence, correct.
    Mr. Griffith. That information was available to Ms. 
Pittman?
    Mr. Sund. It was available to IICD, which is a unit she 
runs, yes, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. All right. Ms. Pittman approved that report 
but did not pass that information on to you. Is that correct?
    Mr. Sund. It came out of her units, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. Subsequent to January 6th, when Ms. Pittman 
was retiring, she was given what I call a sweetheart deal from 
the United States Capitol Police. That was earlier this year. 
She was placed on leave without pay while working a new job for 
several months, about five, before she reached the eligible age 
to retire. It is clear she had no intent to return to the 
United States Capitol Police, which is what the handbook says 
you are supposed to be doing. If you get leave without pay, 
there has to be an expectation of return.
    During your time in management at the United States Capitol 
Police, have you ever heard of such a sweetheart deal before?
    Mr. Sund. No, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. When you were in management, did counsel 
Thomas Ted Bias ever indicate that you had the power to give 
somebody leave out pay so they can get to retirement without an 
expectation that they would at least attempt to return to the 
United States Capitol Police Service?
    Mr. Sund. No, sir, not that I recall.
    Mr. Griffith. Nobody has ever told you you could do that?
    Mr. Sund. No, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. Did you think you had that power?
    Mr. Sund. It is written in the policy that you cannot 
offer----
    Mr. Griffith. You cannot offer, but there is a requirement 
there be an expectation to return. In this case, there was not.
    Mr. Sund. That is correct.
    Mr. Griffith. You never had the expectation that you could 
give somebody leave without pay unless they were planning on 
coming back; somebody that might have a health problem or 
something like that. That is what it is for, is not it?
    Mr. Sund. Correct. That is the policy then.
    Mr. Griffith. Since January 6th, 2021, have you learned of 
other intelligence reports, and I think you mentioned in your 
opening, in the possession of the United States Capitol Police 
or other Federal agencies, other Federal agencies, which could 
have been of assistance to you and your decision making on 
January 6th?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir, I have.
    Mr. Griffith. All right. I see that my time is up, and so I 
will now yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    I now recognize the gentlewoman from California, Mrs. 
Torres, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Torres. Thank you. I join the Chairman in welcoming 
the witness before this Committee. Since the insurrection, more 
than 1,100 individuals have been arrested and charged with 
crimes associated with the January 6th insurrection. This 
includes 404 defendants who have been charged with assaulting 
more than 140 law enforcement officers.
    One hundred and 15 of those defendants have been charged 
with using a deadly or dangerous weapon or causing a serious 
physical injury to an officer. So far, 770 defendants have been 
convicted, including 65 defendants who have been convicted of 
assaulting law enforcement officers.
    I have had the opportunity to meet with some of the Capitol 
Police Officers who were severely injured and still struggle 
to--with the events of that horrible day. Yet, they still show 
great strength and courage and still serve the force in order 
to continue to protect us.
    Mr. Sund, I have a series of easy questions and kindly ask 
you to answer yes or no. There has been a direct effort here in 
this Committee and by many Republicans to rewrite the violent 
events that took place here at the Capitol on January 6th. For 
example, President Trump called the defendants, and I quote, 
great patriots.
    Mr. Sund, do you agree with former President Trump that 
those convicted of January 6th related offenses are, quote, 
great patriots? Yes or no, sir?
    Mr. Sund. You know, I am here to try and identify potential 
failures.
    Mrs. Torres. It is just a simple yes or do. Do you believe 
that the people that assaulted your officers are great 
patriots, yes or no?
    Mr. Sund. I think the people that assaulted my officers 
with weapons and violated law assaulting them and injuring them 
is----
    Mrs. Torres. The former President also said that the 
rioters that day, and I quote, had love in their heart, and 
that it was, I quote, a beautiful day. Do you agree, Mr. Sund, 
with the former President that it was a beautiful day on 
January 6th, and that those people that attacked your officers 
had love in their heart?
    Mr. Sund. It was not a beautiful day, ma'am.
    Mrs. Torres. Did they have love in their heart while they 
were attacking your officers, sir.
    Mr. Sund. I do not know what they had in their heart.
    Mrs. Torres. OK. On January 13th, 2021, Speaker Kevin 
McCarthy, when he was minority leader said, and I quote: Last 
week's violent attack on the Capitol was undemocratic, un-
American, and criminal.
    Mr. Sund, do you agree with Speaker McCarthy that the 
attack on the Capitol was undemocratic, yes or no?
    Mr. Sund. I agree that those that committed violations of 
laws deserve to be held accountable.
    Mrs. Torres. Do you believe that it was un-American, sir.
    Mr. Sund. Again, I think those that violated the law should 
be held accountable.
    Mrs. Torres. Do you agree that it was criminal?
    Mr. Sund. Yes.
    Mrs. Torres. Speaker McCarthy also said, and I quote: Some 
say riots were caused by antifa.
    There is absolutely no evidence of that. Do you agree, Mr. 
Sund, that the January 6th, 2021, riot was not caused by 
antifa, yes or no?
    Mr. Sund. I do not have information on hand to answer that 
one.
    Mrs. Torres. In fact, the minority leader McCarthy went on 
to say that former President Trump, quote, bears 
responsibilities for Wednesday's attack on Congress by mob 
rioters. He should have immediately denounced the mob when he 
saw what was unfolding.
    Mr. Sund, do you believe that former President Trump, and I 
quote, ``bears responsibility for the attack,'' yes or no, sir?
    Mr. Sund. Again, ma'am, I am here to identity the 
institutional failures.
    Mrs. Torres. It is a simple question, sir. Do you agree 
that the incidents that led the President to push people here--
--
    Mr. Sund. This is--I think this is--I just--if you give----
    Mrs. Torres. Let me ask you one other question. Do you 
agree that former President Trump should have immediately 
denounced the mob when he saw what was unfolding at the 
Capitol, yes or no?
    Mr. Sund. I would have liked some assistance with getting 
the military to the Capitol, yes. That is correct, ma'am.
    Mrs. Torres. Minority leader McCarthy continued, and I 
quote, these facts require immediate action by President Trump, 
accept his share of responsibility, quell the brewing unrest, 
and ensure President-elect Biden is able to successfully begin 
his term.
    My question to you, Mr. Sund, to this day, has former 
President Trump accepted his share of responsibility or done 
anything to, quote, quell the brewing unrest he cultivated?
    Mr. Sund. I think there is a lot of people that need to 
accept some responsibility associated with this.
    Mrs. Torres. Finally leader McCarthy said, and I quote, and 
the President's immediate action also deserves congressional 
action, which is why I think a fact-finding commission and a 
censure resolution would be prudent. Unfortunately, Leader 
McCarthy's courage did not last thing. He chose to vote against 
the bipartisan bill establishing a commission negotiated by the 
Ranking Republican Member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee 
and containing all of his priorities. This is unacceptable, and 
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentlelady yields. I now recognize 
the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Murphy, for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just would like to 
refresh your memory that we were not really allowed to pick our 
own individuals on that Committee, and they were just picked 
essentially because they did not like Trump. That is a 
secondary issue.
    I wish Mr. Irving and Mr. Stenger were here today to defend 
themselves because, from what I am reading, there is absolutely 
no defense of themselves. I am just going through this.
    Let me go through a little bit. There is a lot of 
conjecture as to the presence of law enforcement on January 
6th, questions about law enforcement being embedded, 
plainclothes officers. My questions to the current Capitol 
Police major, he was unable to speak about how many 
plainclothes individuals were there.
    Chief Sund, while you were Chief of Police, was there a 
process in place if a Federal agency were there in plain 
clothes or undercover agents.
    Mr. Sund. For coming up on the Hill, sir, or just a----
    Dr. Murphy. On Capitol Grounds.
    Mr. Sund. Oh, yes, sir.
    Dr. Murphy. OK. Thinking back, do you know if there were 
any Federal officers authorized by the Capitol Police to be 
operating on the Capitol Grounds?
    Mr. Sund. Other than Capitol Police, not that I am aware 
of, no.
    Dr. Murphy. OK.
    Mr. Sund. Now real quick, we did have Secret Service up 
there with Vice President Pence, and they are also not in 
uniform.
    Dr. Murphy. Absolutely. Do you know if the FBI or 
Department of Homeland Security had any plainclothes employees 
in the crowd on January 6th?
    Mr. Sund. Only from what I am learning, you know, from GAO 
reports that came out----
    Dr. Murphy. Are you aware of any individuals in the Federal 
Government that were wearing bracelets so they could be 
identified?
    Mr. Sund. Not that I am personally aware of, no.
    Dr. Murphy. OK. Prior to January 6th, do you recall in 
which plainclothes or undercover agents came onto the Capitol 
Grounds without the Chief of Police approval?
    Mr. Sund. No, sir, that I recall.
    Dr. Murphy. All right. Thank you. You know, it is very, 
very disheartening to read this narrative of when you asked for 
help, and the 2 days before they did not care about doing 
something because it may have looked bad. Therefore, none of us 
in this room, none of us in this room are saying what happened 
on January 6th was correct. I absolutely the conditions for 
that to occur rests at the former Speaker's lap and those--the 
two Sergeant at Arms and complicit with other individuals. You 
know, it is one thing for something to occur, but it is another 
thing to create the conditions for that to occur.
    Let me ask you this. I am reading here, Mr. Irving only 
provided security information to Republicans after receiving 
distinct instructions from Democratic leadership. On January 
4th, he sent a text to Fleet, asking him to, quote, act 
surprised when Irving emailed him and his Republican 
counterpart information about the joint session. Is there 
anything wrong with that?
    Mr. Sund. I just want to make sure I understand.
    Dr. Murphy. He basically--Irving basically asked Fleet to 
act surprised about the information when he was sending it to 
the Republican. In other words, he knew the information before, 
but he was withholding it from the minority party.
    Mr. Sund. That is one of the big problems you have with the 
Capitol Police Board and the Sergeant at Arms; they are too 
politicized.
    Dr. Murphy. Well, did you resign because you wanted to?
    Mr. Sund. No, I did not. I love the Capitol Police. I love 
the men and woman----
    Dr. Murphy. I personally believe you were a scapegoat. You 
are a scapegoat of conditions that were set forth that you 
could not succeed. What happened on January 6th was 
unforgivable. The conditions were set forth by the former 
Speaker and two House Sergeant at Arms for the conditions for 
that to occur. Absolutely. I do not care if the National Guard 
were out there. I do not care about optics. I care about 
safety. Absolutely. It is a dereliction of duty of the former 
Speaker, her staff, and the two Sergeant at Arms.
    Let me ask one more line of questioning. Pipe bombs. The 
day before January 6th, live pipe bombs were planted outside 
Republican and Democrat Party Headquarters. The U.S. Capitol 
Police has not received any insight into the FBI investigation, 
which is astonishing because Members of Congress from both 
sides may very well have been targeted by these bombs. During a 
hearing this summer of the U.S. Capitol Police Board, I called 
on the board to request a briefing from the FBI to the status 
of this investigation. The board committed to do so.
    Mr. Chairman, I submit this letter to the record verifying 
the request.
    [The letter referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Dr. Murphy. Chief Sund, before you resigned, can you recall 
anything about the pipe bomb incident.
    Mr. Sund. Other than the time they were called out, us 
sending resources over to them, and hearing both the RNC and 
the DNC. The first one at the RNC, and I was worried that that 
could be distracting for us. Then the second one came, and that 
raised a lot of concerns.
    Dr. Murphy. To your initial comments originally, here we 
are several years out; do you think it is acceptable that the 
FBI still cannot identify the individual placing the pipe 
bombs?
    Mr. Sund. I find it very surprising knowing the security 
level that we have down here, the amount of resources that can 
be available for an investigation, I am surprised that we have 
not found----
    Dr. Murphy. I find it absolutely surprising. The same thing 
with the bag of cocaine in the White House that probably had 
fingerprints and every camera known to God in that building. 
Again, I will say, what happened on January 6th was absolutely 
wrong. The conditions set forth by the Speaker, her 
administration, and the two Sergeant at Arms and whoever was 
complicit with that absolutely allowed you to fail and then 
Members of Congress to be at risk of being injured.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    I will now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Morelle, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you very much.
    Again, thank you, Chief, for being here. I am disturbed by 
both the sense that you do not blame the rioters or the 
President, but you blame the Capitol Police and the Capitol 
Police Board--not you, sir. My colleagues. It is like blaming 
the homeowner when he or she is robbed, instead of blaming the 
intruder. I do want to note one thing, too, because it sounds 
awfully partisan and awfully political--not that I am blaming 
anyone, but I just note that Mr. Irving is the Sergeant at Arms 
appointed by John Boehner and reappointed by Speaker Ryan. Mr. 
Stenger, whose passed away and could not testify if he wanted 
to, sadly, but was appointed by Senator McConnell. The third 
member of the board, which you were not a member of when you 
were a Capitol Police Chief. By the way, the board is three 
other people. I acknowledge that. The third one is the 
Architect of the Capitol, which at the time was Mr. Blanton 
appointed President Trump. To inject partisanship here I think 
is very troubling. If we are going to do that, we should at 
least note the obvious that each of the members of three-person 
board were appointed by Republicans, not by Democrats.
    I do want to go back to a couple of the things that I think 
are really important. I do want to talk a little bit about the 
delay, which I consider unconscionable, between your call with 
the Pentagon leadership and the ultimate deployment of the 
National Guard, which as I understood took over 3 hours to be 
able to do. That was requested of the Secretary of Defense.
    I want to note, Chief, do you know now or did you know at 
the time about a memo on January 4th from the Secretary of 
Defense to the Secretary of the Army, and a January 5th letter 
from the Secretary of the Army to the commanding general of the 
D.C. National Guard? Are you familiar with those memos?
    Mr. Sund. I have become familiar with them after January 
6th, yes, sir.
    Mr. Morelle. Yes, as I read the material, among others, 
they were told that the Guard could not be issued weapons, 
helmets, body armor; they could not interact physically with 
protestors; they could not employ any riot-control agents; and 
they could not make arrests and could not use a quick reaction 
force. Is that your understanding now of the correspondence 
that went on between the Secretary of the Army and the 
Secretary of Defense?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, that is correct. The Secretary of Defense 
wrote the first memo on January 4th, and the Secretary of the 
Army put the additional restrictions on what is called the QRF, 
the Quick Reactionary Force, to William Walker after the fact.
    Mr. Morelle. By the way, you said you did not know that 
leading up to January 6th that those restrictions were in 
place, sir?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir, that is correct.
    Mr. Morelle. I assume at the time you would have been led 
to believe that the National Guard was essentially a phone call 
away to be able, if necessary. No, were you not under that 
belief?
    Mr. Sund. I was definitely under that belief. After I 
requested the National Guard Sunday morning, the two Sergeant 
at Arms had me reach out to William Walker instead of 
authorizing them. Just say: Hey, if we need assistance, could 
you kind of be ready, be on standby.
    I talked to him 6:14 p.m. that evening, on Sunday evening, 
the 3d, and took that information back. He said, yes, he would 
be leaning forward, but he needs authorization from the--he did 
not say anything about the memo because it had not come out 
yet, I guess, nor----
    Mr. Morelle. Nor did he say anything about the restrictions 
that the memo had placed on the deployment of the National 
Guard should they be requested.
    Mr. Sund. That is correct. Also, just to add an additional 
to that, January 5th, I held a meeting with many of the top law 
enforcement officials from around the city, including the FBI, 
and the commanding general for the D.C. National Guard, and 
nothing was said to me again on that conference call. That was 
also with the Capitol Police Board.
    Mr. Morelle. You know, you and I unfortunately did not have 
a chance to work professionally together, but I do reach out to 
Chief Manger from time to time when there are concerns or there 
are seemingly threats, and we have conversations. I assume you 
did that to predecessors on both sides of the aisle, that there 
would be conversations leading up to events like January 6th 
when you knew people would be at least on alert. Is that true?
    Mr. Sund. A lot of the times, those conversations would go 
directly to the two Sergeant at Arms.
    Mr. Morelle. Yes.
    Mr. Sund. Now the Sergeant at Arms would oftentimes would 
have recommendations to me or advise me to limit my direct 
communications with Members because once I open that door, they 
cannot protect--so they would----
    Mr. Morelle. If this subject came up, you would not--so 
what I am getting at, I guess, is neither the Sergeant at Arms 
nor the Architect of the Capitol nor you were aware that the 
National Guard had restrictions placed on it. Even while you 
are waiting for the call for hours, you still did not know if 
those restrictions were in place. That seems to me is a big 
part of this story line.
    Mr. Sund. That is correct. Knowing those restrictions are 
in place--because I am a stakeholder. When the police 
department becomes overwhelmed and we dial 9-1-1 because we 
need assistance, that goes to the National Guard.
    Mr. Morelle. Yes.
    Mr. Sund. It sure as hell would have been great to know 
that they put up this memo restricting the National Guard from 
assisting my men and women in advance of January 6th, knowing 
now that they were so damned concerned about the violence that 
day that they were expecting on January 6th, and no one ever 
told me about it?
    Mr. Morelle. Yes, I mean----
    Mr. Sund. So----
    Mr. Morelle. I hate to state the obvious, but that is the 
Pentagon's, the Department of Defense, the Department of the 
Army--no one at that time told you that the National Guard, 
even if they were called up, would have severe restrictions. I 
just want to make sure I get that in.
    Before I yield back, if I might, unless you would like to 
call me another time, just to enter items into the record, 
without objection, if I could do that now, Mr. Chairman, or 
would you----
    Chairman Loudermilk. Well, I will entertain that now, but I 
think you have got a good line of questioning here. If it is OK 
with the minority, and we have so few here, I would be open to 
doing another round of questions. We will do that then.
    Mr. Morelle. OK. That is fine. I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Morelle.
    I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. D'Esposito 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chief, thank you for being here this afternoon. Thank you 
for your 30 years of commitment to the law enforcement. I know 
that you are well prepared in incident management, special 
events, active shooters, investigations. I myself spent a 
career in the NYPD and know that any time politics gets 
involved in law enforcement, it could be or lead to something 
very discuss. It is one of the reasons just as to why, when I 
first got here, I still question if the Capitol Police Board is 
the correct oversight and management of the Capitol Police.
    In your book, you noted how security issues were usually, 
quote, approached from a political perspective and not based 
purely on security. What did you mean by that?
    Mr. Sund. Oftentimes, if we are having a major event that 
was coming up here, whether it was a demonstration, whether it 
was a healthcare or immigration or even one of the Supreme 
Court nominations, we put together a security plan. The 
Sergeant at Arms, after they reviewed the security plan, would 
have me go out and brief it to some of the Committees. One 
would often be the Committee on House Administration. When I go 
out and brief what we are going to do, if we are going to put 
in like fence off the East Front of the Capitol, I had often 
get pushback about, you know: Why you got to be--block off the 
East Front of the Capitol? Why do you have your people in hard 
gear? Things that a commander or a Chief of Police should be 
able to make those decisions.
    Mr. D'Esposito. You were able to make decisions as a law 
enforcement professional. Your decisions were based on 
political interference.
    Mr. Sund. Oftentimes, there would be interference from 
staffers and Members themselves asking the question about why 
you got on helmets.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Individuals that had zero experience in law 
enforcement were influencing you on the decisions that you had 
to make for the best interest of this Capitol?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
    Mr. D'Esposito. You also noted in your book that, as part 
of your role as Chief of Police, you had to, quote, cater to a 
multitude of bosses. In the lead-up on January 6th, who would 
you have been referring to in this statement?
    Mr. Sund. That would have been mainly the two Sergeant at 
Arms, trying to work things between the two of them.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Moving forward, how do we ensure that 
security decisions are made solely based on law enforcement 
expertise and not on politics?
    Mr. Sund. My No. 1 recommendation is we need to de-
politicize the Capitol Police Board. You have got two laws out 
there. People always bring up, you know, why does leadership 
get called into things. It is Congress that has leadership on 
laws. You have got 2 U.S. Code 1970, 2 U.S. Code 1974 that both 
list either a review or approval process needed before the 
Capitol Police can implement those parts of the code. One is 
special police officers. When we brought in outside resources, 
we had to swear in the special police officers. There is a 
requirement that that be approved by leadership. It 
specifically says the Speaker, the Speaker pro tem, stuff like 
that. I would take that out. Let the Capitol Police Board give 
the--the Capitol Police Department, let them be the final 
authority of what constitutes--law enforcement action is going 
to take. Do not let--there is no reason that Members of 
Congress should be involved or listed on laws as approving it. 
All that does is politicize things. Take them out. Get a police 
board that is going to make the appropriate decisions and allow 
the chief to make decisions to protect the men and women that 
are our legislators.
    Mr. D'Esposito. I know it is rare on Capitol Hill, but it 
seems to make perfect sense.
    Going to January 6th the actual day, is it true that the 
National Guard was stationed nearby and could have responded 
quickly had they been authorized to help by the Capitol Police 
Board?
    Mr. Sund. That is correct. They were in eyesight of the 
Capitol. One thing I had say real quick again with the last 
series of questions, I had have you enter in Joint Publication 
3-28 from the Department of Defense, specifically the emergency 
authority of the National Guard to respond--they can 
immediately respond. They do not need to wait for anybody else. 
There should be no authorization for higher headquarters 
instructions. That should be looked at closely.
    Mr. D'Esposito. You just said that the National Guard was 
in earshot from----
    Mr. Sund. Many were in eyesight.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Within eyesight of the Capitol.
    Mr. Sund. With their riot gear, even though they were told 
not to have it.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Is it also true that the New Jersey State 
Police made it to the Capitol before the National Guard did?
    Mr. Sund. That is correct, sir.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Any reason?
    Mr. Sund. The National Guard is only 2 miles from our 
headquarters; you know, sat and waited for the evening crew to 
come in. While the Pentagon was still sending a resource to 
protect generals' homes, they sent me nobody to help my men and 
women.
    Mr. D'Esposito. I only have 30 seconds left. When were you 
finally given the green light to bring the National Guard to 
the Capitol?
    Mr. Sund. At 2:08 p.m.
    Mr. D'Esposito. That was over an hour after you originally 
asked?
    Mr. Sund. That is correct. I am sorry, 2:09 p.m., at 2:09 
p.m., Irving finally gave me approval. Because I still 
remember, where I was sitting, because I screamed to the watch 
commander, ``Mark the time,'' because I finally got approval to 
bring in the National Guard.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Again, thank you for your service.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    I now recognize myself for the purpose of asking questions. 
Chief Sund, since January 6th, 2021, have you testified or been 
asked to testify publicly before a Committee of the House of 
Representatives?
    Mr. Sund. No, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Did the January 6th Select Committee 
ask you to publicly testify before their Committee.
    Mr. Sund. No, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. You did testify in the Senate, 
correct.
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir. The Senate combined hearing, I think, 
was February 23d.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Can you briefly tell us about that.
    Mr. Sund. It was a combined hearing. I think it was a 
really good approach of, you know, of having to come in and 
address it. Initially, they did not want anybody that was no 
longer in the position to testify, which would have excluded 
myself. Senate Sergeant at Arms Stenger and House Sergeant at 
Arms Irving and I went and asked, specifically asked the Senate 
Rules Committee: Please let me come and testify. I will testify 
in person to show up.
    They changed the rules and allowed me to show up.
    Chairman Loudermilk. You had to basically force yourself in 
to even be able to testify before the Senate?
    Mr. Sund. Right. I had to call in somebody I knew there and 
tell them: I promise you I will show up in person.
    I was the only one to be there in person, not on video.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you for your vigilance there. 
Chief Sund, you previously testified on January 3d, 2020--that, 
on January 3, 2021, 3 days before January 6th, that you met 
separately with House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving and Senate 
Sergeant at Arms Michael Stenger. You asked them to approve a 
request for National Guard assistance on the 6th. Now this was 
on January the 3d. I believe this was in your book that you met 
with both Stenger and Irving and requested National Guard 
assistance to be ready on the 6th. Can you explain what 
happened in those two meetings with Irving and Stenger?
    Mr. Sund. Absolutely. On the morning of the 3d, at 9:24 
a.m., I specifically went to see him because I know what a big 
deal it is to have National Guard come and assist us on the 
Hill. I went into his office again at 9:24 in the morning, went 
up, and immediately went up and said: Hey, I would like to 
bring in the National Guard to support me, to assist me on the 
perimeter. Because when we have a joint session of Congress, it 
takes a lot of our personnel inside. Immediately, as soon as I 
asked him, his first response was: I do not know. I do not like 
the optics of that.
    His second response was: Besides the intelligence does not 
support it.
    He immediately--then we began talking. He said: Have you 
reached out to Mike Stenger on this?
    I said: No, I have not talked to him about it yet.
    He said: Why do not you talk to Stenger and see what he has 
to say.
    Then I left and went over to Mike Stenger's office at 9:35 
in the morning. Walked into his office, and he was not there. I 
came back. He showed up at 11:13. I showed back up at 11:53 and 
went in to immediately ask him: You know, I would like to 
request the National Guard.
    He said: You know, let us come up with another idea. Why do 
not you call--do you know somebody at the National Guard?
    I said: Yes, sir, I know General William Walker.
    He said: Why do not you call Walker and see, if we need 
them, how quickly they could get here, and how many people 
could they send us.
    I called William Walker at 6:14 p.m. that night. He told me 
they have 125 people assisting with COVID response. He could 
reallocate those fairly quickly one he got Secretary of Defense 
approval and send them over.
    Chairman Loudermilk. When you met with Stenger, had Irving 
given him heads-up that you were coming to ask for National 
Guard?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, later on, after January 6th, specifically on 
April 8, I went and had lunch with Mike Stenger. I asked him 
because it was kind of unusual. He came up with that idea so 
quickly when I was walking in. I asked him, I said: Mr. 
Stenger, you came up with that response fairly quickly for me 
to call General Walker. He told me that Paul Irving had called 
him ahead of time and said Sund came here looking for the 
National--asking for the National Guard. We have got to come up 
with another plan. Pelosi will never go for it.
    I was floored by him saying that.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. You do not know--I know this word 
``optics'' has come up several times in the past or in 
different context. Do you know if Irving had discussed that 
with Stenger of what her possible response would be?
    Mr. Sund. I have no idea, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. All right. Around 2 p.m., on January 
6th, you joined a call with Metropolitan Police Department 
Chief Contee and National Guard representatives. According to 
Chief Contee's transcribed testimony given to the Select 
Committee, you asked National Guard to send assistance on that 
call, and he did not hear the military people respond to your 
plea. Is that what you remember?
    Mr. Sund. No, he heard clearly the military respond to my 
plea and say they recommended against my request for the 
National Guard. Robert Contee immediately butted in and said: 
Let me get this right, you are denying the Chief of the Capitol 
Police?
    Again, he just--you know, I can go farther into that if you 
want.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you. Are you familiar with 
the term ``data miner''?
    Mr. Sund. I have become familiar with it, yes.
    Chairman Loudermilk. According to a book by Carol Leonnig, 
General Milley was using this tool and reached out to Senator 
Angus' team, warning him about violent rhetoric before January 
6th. Some of the intelligence included references to smuggling 
guns and other weapons into D.C. One message said: Let us burn 
Senator McConnell's house down while he is in it.
    Another one seemingly addressed to Members who supported 
certifying the election said: We are coming to kill you. Just 
wait a few days.
    Did General Milley ever reach out to you and share these 
concerns with you of any of this intelligence?
    Mr. Sund. No, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Do you know if he reached out to 
either of the Sergeant at Arms?
    Mr. Sund. I have no idea, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Would this intelligence have helped 
the Capitol Police prepare for January 6th?
    Mr. Sund. Absolutely.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. With that, I do have several other 
questions, but it seems we have a second round. At this time, I 
will recognize the Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Steil, 
for 5 minutes.
    Chairman Steil. Thank you very much, Chairman Loudermilk 
and for hosting today's hearing.
    Thank you, Chief Sund, for being here today. Members of the 
Committee and Congress are thankful for your prior service at 
the U.S. Capitol Police and your commitment to protecting 
Members, staff, and visitors. My priority as Chairman of the 
Committee on House Administration is to de-politicize Capitol 
Police. I am committed to ensuring the U.S. Capitol Police has 
the tools, resources, and leadership it needs to keep our 
community safe. I also remain committed to supporting our law 
enforcement officers and the work they do each day.
    Today we are here to discuss the security failures that 
occurred on January 6th, 2021, and how we can prevent these 
failures from occurring again.
    I want to dive into the questions, Chief Sund. In your 
transcribed interview, you mentioned that you met with the 
House Sergeant at Arms regarding the National Guard prior to 
January 6th. Is that correct?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Steil. Who was the House Sergeant at Arms leading 
up to and on January 6th.
    Mr. Sund. That would be Paul Irving.
    Chairman Steil. House Sergeant at Arms is appointed by who?
    Mr. Sund. He was appointed at that time by Speaker Pelosi.
    Chairman Steil. In your transcribed interview, you 
mentioned that when you first brought up the National Guard to 
the House Sergeant at Arms in the days leading up to January 
6th, that Mr. Irving said he, quote, did not like the optics, 
end quote. Is that correct.
    Mr. Sund. That is correct. He referenced being concerned 
for optics.
    Chairman Steil. On January 6th, when he went to Mr. Irving 
to get his approval to call in the Guard, Mr. Irving said he 
would, quote, run it up the chain. Is that correct.
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir. That was a telephone call. I did not 
see him in person when I first made that request.
    Chairman Steil. The House Sergeant at Arms is considered 
probably the most senior security official in the House side. 
When Mr. Irving says yes to, quote, run it up the chain, end 
quote, what did that mean?
    Mr. Sund. I took that to mean his leadership chain.
    Chairman Steil. Who would be his leadership chain? He is 
essentially the most senior security official in the House 
side, correct.
    Mr. Sund. That is his title. That is part of the title of 
the senior law enforcement official of the House of 
Representatives. He would have been referring to the leadership 
team that goes up to Speaker Pelosi.
    Chairman Steil. The political leadership team, meaning 
elected officials, not another security official. Is that 
correct.
    Mr. Sund. That is correct, sir. He is the top security 
official for the House.
    Chairman Steil. Running up the chain would most likely, in 
your opinion, is through the Speaker's Office and possibly to 
Speaker Pelosi.
    Mr. Sund. That would be where it ends, yes.
    Chairman Steil. Let us park that there, and let us jump to 
a second set here. In a press conference on January 7th, 
Speaker Pelosi called for your resignation on national 
television. Speaker Pelosi also stated that she had not talked 
to you since the initial breach of the Capitol. According to 
your transcribed interview, you were on the phone with Speaker 
Pelosi a few times. Can you explain that discrepancy?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, that is--that is correct. I spoke to Speaker 
Pelosi three times that evening. She went on national TV and 
said I had never spoken to her, but I spoke to her three times.
    The three times were--the first time when I went over to 
brief President--Vice President Pence at the secure location. I 
had called House Sergeant at Arms Irving, told him I was going 
over to brief the Vice President. I was also going over to do a 
personal assessment of the Capitol.
    At that point, things were getting under control. Went over 
there, briefed him on when we can get them back into Chambers, 
with, you know, Mr. Irving being fully aware.
    He said he wanted to get Speaker Pelosi on the phone. He 
made a phone call from his cell phone at approximately 5:34, 
where I first briefed Speaker Pelosi.
    The second call was when I left that location. As I was 
walking away, I met up with Mr. Stenger, and we started walking 
over to the Senate to go brief the Senate when Jennifer 
Hemingway--I believe it was Jennifer Hemingway--handed me a 
cell phone. It was Emily Barrett's cell phone calling her.
    It was Speaker Pelosi on the other line--this is my second 
call with Speaker Pelosi--questioning the information I had 
given to Vice President Pence about when we can get back into 
Chambers. I assured her that information was correct, I could 
get them back into Chambers by 7 p.m. and the call ended. That 
was call number 2.
    Call number 3 was 6:25 p.m. I was over at the Senate, from 
the secure location--I mean, from where the Senate had been 
sequestered and on a cell phone, using Robert Karem's cell 
phone.
    They dialed leadership, who was over offsite at a secure 
location, and I briefed all of leadership of the plans to get 
them back into Chambers. That would have been call number 3 
with Speaker Pelosi.
    Chairman Steil. You did not have one call, you did not have 
two calls, you had three calls. Speaker Pelosi's comments that 
she did not speak to you are inaccurate?
    Mr. Sund. That is correct, sir.
    Chairman Steil. Let me shift gears and go back as it 
relates to the optics of bringing people up to Capitol Hill. In 
running things up the chain of command, ultimately the 
Speaker's Office, do think Speaker Pelosi's Office, or Speaker 
Pelosi, herself, politicized Capitol security?
    Mr. Sund. I have--I have no idea on that, sir.
    Chairman Steil. OK. Any other clarifications you would like 
to make as it relates to Speaker Pelosi's comments that you did 
not speak to her?
    Mr. Sund. I just, you know, wish she had considered that, 
wish she had considered some of the stuff that I faced and the 
efforts I went through to bring in the outside resources on 
that day before she called for my resignation.
    Chairman Steil. Thank you very much for being here.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    I will now begin our second round of questioning. I yield 5 
minutes to the gentlelady from California, Mrs. Torres.
    Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Chairman.
    Mr. Sund, I have here a statement from--it is testimony 
from Paul Irving, the former Sergeant at Arms, and this is 
testimony he gave to the Senate at a hearing. He states, on 
January 5th, Chief Sund and I participated in a web-based 
interagency conference call with multiple law enforcement 
partners--the FBI, the MPD, the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. 
Park Police, and the military district of Washington, among 
other law enforcement agencies from the national capital 
region.
    Based on the intelligence and threat assessment, everyone 
on the call believed that we were prepared and the plan met the 
threat. You were prepared for what you thought would be a 
typical demonstration, a First Amendment demonstration on 
Capitol Hill, such as the Women's March, when we all wore our 
pink hats and came out and marched against some of the efforts 
of the President.
    What you did not anticipate, none of you anticipated, that 
a Republican Member of Congress would tell the crowd on stage, 
Today is the day. American Patriots, start taking down names 
and kicking ass, and, Our ancestors sacrificed their blood, 
their sweat, their tears, their fortunes, and sometimes their 
lives. Are you willing to do the same.
    You did not anticipate that, did you?
    Mr. Sund. We anticipated some minor skirmishes. We did not 
anticipate a full-fledged----
    Mrs. Torres. You did not anticipate a Member--a Republican 
Member of Congress to go on stage and incite the crowd like 
this.
    You also did not anticipate the President's lawyer, Rudy 
Guiliani, to tell this, you know, mob that was armed, trial by 
combat.
    You also did not anticipate the President of the United 
States telling an armed mob to march to the Capitol and that--
to start walking to the Capitol. I mean, you did not--you could 
not have anticipated any of that, did you?
    Mr. Sund. Well, knowing now that there is intelligence----
    Mrs. Torres. Of course not. I believe when you say that, 
sir, because I do not believe that anyone in charge of the men 
and women that serve us here in the U.S. Congress, if they had 
known any of that intelligence, would have acted very 
differently than we did that day.
    I still want you to know that I am grateful for my life, 
that I am grateful that the officers used their own bodies to 
protect us, that they bravely fought against these very angry 
rioters who came here to do violence, to hang the Vice 
President.
    This past weekend, the former President has said he would 
pardon those convicted--the ones convicted--of crimes 
associated with January 6th, including individuals like Enrique 
Tarrio, the leader of the Proud Boys, who was convicted of 
seditious conspiracy and sentenced to 22 years in prison.
    Mr. Sund, how does that make you feel, to hear that the 
former President talks about pardoning defendants who assaulted 
your officers during that violent attack and assault on our 
democracy?
    Mr. Sund. Again, I feel if they assaulted the officers, 
they need to have--pay the consequences.
    Mrs. Torres. I feel really badly for everything that has 
happened since the officers, the suicides. No one deserved 
that.
    I have here, I wanted to really stay focused on who to 
blame--you know, who is to blame for everything that happened 
on January 6th. You know, I attended this peaceful transfer of 
power on this inauguration, when this President took the oath 
to serve this country and to protect, you know, the rule of law 
and democracy.
    I also attended--by the way, I was not wearing a vest at 
this ceremony because Democrats did not insight a crowd and 
say, Those Russians that interfere in our election, you know, 
were at fault for us losing.
    We took the loss, and we did the right thing by ensuring 
that we had a peaceful power of transfer.
    Unfortunately, when I attended Mr. Biden's inauguration, I 
had to wear a vest, because I no longer felt safe.
    With that, I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentlelady yields.
    I now yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Griffith. Mr. Sund, you also did not anticipate that 
you would not get significant intelligence about the threat. Is 
not that true?
    Mr. Sund. That is--that is correct. With the intelligence--
--
    Mr. Griffith. You would have anticipated that either your 
own department or other Federal agencies would have alerted you 
to the risk. Is not that true?
    Mr. Sund. Like I said, this could have been preventable if 
we had gotten the intelligence they had.
    Mr. Griffith. Is not it also true that you would not have 
anticipated, and did not anticipate, that you would not get 
support from up the chain when you requested the National Guard 
before and on January 6th? Is not that true?
    Mr. Sund. That is correct, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. During a February 2021 joint Senate hearing, 
former House Sergeant of Arms, Paul Irving, testified that on 
January 6th, 2021, he did not receive a request from you for 
National Guard assistance until around 2 p.m. Is that accurate?
    Mr. Sund. That is not accurate, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. When did you ask for it?
    Mr. Sund. 1:58--I am sorry--12:58 p.m. was my first call to 
Paul Irving. I was--I had a number of people that were 
surrounding me that were aware I was calling. He was fully 
aware of just how bad it was outside because he had his 
representative to the command center right behind me, sending 
him all the information of what was happening.
    I did not get the approval at 12:58 p.m.
    Mr. Griffith. He still said he was going to--he would run 
it up the chain?
    Mr. Sund. He was going to run it up the chain. It took 71 
minutes to get an approval.
    Mr. Griffith. To get it run up the chain?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. Your assumption, although you testified that 
you do not know for sure, that it went to Nancy Pelosi, your 
assumption is, is that because the Sergeant at Arms, while 
elected by the Members of the House, is generally put on the 
ballot by the Speaker and serves at the direction of the 
Speaker, so you assumed, as most people would, that it was the 
Speaker that was the top of the chain?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, that was--that was my assumption.
    Mr. Griffith. I mean, based on the flow chart that I am 
aware of, there is nobody between the Sergeant at Arms and the 
Speaker. Do you know of somebody in between of two of them?
    Mr. Sund. No, sir, I do not.
    Mr. Griffith. I do not either.
    All right. Now, you had some phone calls with Mr. Irving. 
Do you have the record of what times you had those phone calls?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir, I do.
    Mr. Griffith. Would you please tell them to the Committee?
    Mr. Sund. Let us see if I--if I do not have them, I had be 
happy to submit my phone records. My phone records have all 
been submitted. They were submitted to the Senate--the Senate 
hearing, a full accounting of my phone records.
    Yes, I do not have them--hold on just a second. I do not 
have the exact times, but----
    Mr. Griffith. You made--my recollection is, and I have read 
your book, but my recollection is, you made several calls 
within a relatively short period of time. If it took 71 minutes 
to run it up the chain, is my information correct that you 
called three times--the first one that you just told us about, 
and then two more during that 71 minutes?
    Mr. Sund. No, no, no. Those are calls with Speaker Pelosi. 
Those that I just went over, those times, those were calls with 
Speaker Pelosi.
    Mr. Griffith. Oh, those were calls with Speaker Pelosi.
    Mr. Sund. Correct. Between 12:58 and 2:09, when I finally 
got approval 71 minutes later, I made 11 calls to the Sergeant 
at Arms asking, What is going on--first asking for the request, 
and then 10 follow up calls saying, What is going on with the 
request?
    Mr. Griffith. Eleven calls during the----
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Griffith [continuing]. roughly an hour and 10 minutes?
    Mr. Sund. During that time, I was calling every--the leader 
of every agency, Gary Settle with Virginia State Police, Secret 
Service, anybody I could get to come to my aid.
    I activated mutual aid around Maryland, Virginia, and that 
is what brought in the New Jersey State Police at 1:51 p.m., 
still while calling every couple of minutes to find out where 
the hell my approval was for the National Guard.
    Mr. Griffith. Now, being from Virginia, did the Virginia 
State Troopers come in to help?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir, they did.
    Mr. Griffith. Did they get here before the National Guard, 
too?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir, they did.
    Mr. Griffith. Wow. All right.
    USCP hired Julie Farnam as the assistant director of 
intelligence and interagency coordination division in November 
2020 when the former director retired. Is that correct?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. She testified previously that you wanted to 
overhaul the Department. Is that correct?
    Mr. Sund. I wanted----
    Mr. Griffith. That she wanted to overhaul the Department?
    Mr. Sund. She might have. I am not--I am not aware.
    Mr. Griffith. OK. All right. You--but did you think at the 
time, on January 6th, did you think your intelligence 
department was effective?
    Mr. Sund. That is correct. I thought the intelligence they 
were providing us----
    Mr. Griffith. Prior--prior to January 6th?
    Mr. Sund. Oh, prior to January 6th, absolutely. They had 
gotten--been effective on any previous demonstration. I mean, 
we handled a Supreme Court nomination where we made hundreds of 
arrests, and that was effective intelligence, absolutely.
    Mr. Griffith. That was effect---so they were effective 
prior to January 6th. You did not see the cracks in the system 
until after that. Is that accurate?
    Mr. Sund. That is correct, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. All right. I appreciate your testimony here 
today, and I am glad you have been able to correct some of the 
misstatements that have been made by others, and I yield back.
    Mr. Sund. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    Chief Sund, before I recognize the Ranking Member of the 
full Committee, would you be willing to submit those phone 
records to this Subcommittee for our records?
    Mr. Sund. Absolutely, sir. I will have them to you by the 
end of the day.
    Chairman Loudermilk. All right. Thank you, sir.
    I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Morelle, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I do note, since there seems to be a fair amount of 
conversation and speculation about what happened in the 
conversations between Mr. Irving and Speaker Pelosi, why Mr. 
Irving was not asked to testify in front of this panel.
    You could have asked him to come. I assume that you chose 
not to because it is easier to speculate on the conversation 
rather than ask him to testify. I assume he would have been 
here to testify about it.
    In any case, since there seems to be a real focus on the 1 
hour that there is a dispute over whether or not authorization 
was given, I am a little surprised that there is no frustration 
or concern about the 3-1/2 hours between the time you did place 
the call--and I do understand, sir, you placed the call at 
2:30, according to your testimony here--requesting National 
Guard support?
    Mr. Sund. No. To correct it, I--I could not wait any 
longer. I had waited so long for Mr.--the approval from the 
Capitol Police Board, both Mr. Irving and Mr. Stenger.
    At 1:51 p.m., I called William Walker, without even having 
authority, and said, Please, get ready--send me anything you 
got. This is life or death. I told him, I do not have approval 
from the Capitol Police Board yet, but it is coming any minute, 
but please start sending me resources.
    Mr. Morelle. Got you.
    Mr. Sund. It was 1:51 when I made the call.
    Mr. Morelle. That was before 2, and yet--so--and when do 
the National Guard show up?
    Mr. Sund. 5:40 p.m., the first National Guard showed up, 
approximately 150, and they were sworn in as special police 
officers and deployed. They got on post about 6 p.m. when the 
Capitol Grounds were secure at that point.
    Mr. Morelle. OK. That is over 3-1/2 hours after your 
request was put in?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Morelle. Earlier, I was asking about this, and I would 
like to just get a little more definition. You did not know it 
at the time. When you made the request at 1:50 or so, did you 
know--when were you made aware that there were restrictions on 
what the National Guard could do as a result of the memo that 
had been issued on the 4th and 5th?
    Mr. Sund. I do not know the exact date, but it was 
definitely after--after January 6th. When I started doing 
research into what happened, that is when I found it.
    Mr. Morelle. When they showed up at 5:40--so do you have 
any sense of the 3-1/2 hours that went on? You said--I just 
want to make sure--you said in interview that there was a 
concern in the administration about the President invoking the 
Insurrection Act, and concern at the Pentagon about him 
declaring martial law or activating the military in support of 
his claims.
    Do you suspect that played a role in the Pentagon's 
unwillingness to allow the National Guard to respond to the 
Capitol, that those hours, that was being debated?
    Mr. Sund. When I went back and started doing research for 
the book I wrote, that is--I started finding out there was a 
lot of concerns within the President's Cabinet about him 
invoking the Insurrection Act, and that was one of the 
hypothesis that had come up, that maybe they were concerned 
about him invoking it, and that is why they would want to 
delay.
    Think about it. I think the--it was the Secretary of 
Defense has come out and stated in testimony, he was not 
putting National Guard anywhere east of 9th Street Northwest, 
which means, toward the Capitol. Why would that be?
    Mr. Morelle. I do not know. What do you--why do you 
speculate?
    Mr. Sund. Like I am saying, for some reason, they wanted to 
do everything they could to keep National Guard away from the 
Capitol.
    Mr. Morelle. Yes. I would wonder why my colleagues are not 
more concerned about that. I mean, that is 3-1/2 hours while we 
are under siege. A request has been made.
    Can you describe the scene during the period between your 
call and the arrival of the National Guard here at the Capitol?
    Mr. Sund. Between my--my first call at 12:58?
    Mr. Morelle. Your call at 1--at 2, until 5:40.
    Mr. Sund. It was--I mean, I was seeing my officers go 
through some intensive battling on the west front. It was 
terrible what they were going through, and no police officer 
deserves to be subjected to that. It was some of the--some of 
the worst violence I have seen against law enforcement.
    Mr. Morelle. Let me ask this then. How would the situation 
have differed had the National Guard's Quick Reaction Force 
been able to deploy soon after your call, which I assume would 
have been just minutes away?
    Mr. Sund. If they had followed their emergency authority, 
and they had deployed the quick QRF, we could have had close to 
200 National Guardsmen--men and women here fairly quickly. That 
could have been a game-changer.
    You know, Metropolitan Police Department sent me almost 
1,000 officers. That would have been the next largest cadre of 
officers. We could have absolutely used their assistance.
    Mr. Morelle. Yes. You know, I--on a sort of tragic 
circumstance, you obviously know about then Police Lieutenant 
Michael Byrd and the interaction which had ultimately led to 
the death of Ashli Babbitt, who was a rioter when she broke--
tried to break into the Speaker's Lobby.
    Because of his actions, now Captain Byrd and his family 
have had to face an onslaught of threats and had been the 
target of vile attacks, some of them racist. Just a few weeks 
ago a family member of Ms. Babbitt said publicly that Michael 
Byrd needs to swing from the end of a rope. Do you have any 
reaction to that comment?
    Mr. Sund. No. No comment on that.
    Mr. Morelle. No comment.
    Before I yield back, may I ask unanimous consent to enter 
into the record the following; an article from The Washington 
Post fact-checker dated December 15th, 2021, entitled, ``No, 
Trump did not order 10,000 troops to secure the Capitol on 
January 6th''; an article from CNN, entitled, ``Fact-Checking 
Representative Jordan's claim that Speaker Pelosi was 
responsible for U.S. Capitol security on January 6th''; a 
memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of 
the Army, dated January 4th, 2021, Restricting the activities 
of the D.C. National Guard; a letter from the Secretary of the 
Army to the commanding general of the D.C. National Guard, 
dated January 5th, relaying those National Guard restrictions; 
an excerpt from the Select Committee's transcribed interview 
with former House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving; a copy of H. 
Con. Res. 40, a concurrent resolution, expressing support for 
law enforcement officers that explicitly excluded the United 
States Capitol Police; a copy of an amendment to H. Con. Res. 
40 offered in the Rules Committee by Ranking Member McGovern, 
expressing gratitude to the Capitol Police who protected the 
Capitol on January 6th; a copy of the vote tally and the 
amendment, which was defeated on a party line 8-3 vote, all 
Republicans voting against; a tweet by Representative Matt 
Gaetz, dated September 14th, 2023, in which he pledges to hold 
Speaker McCarthy to his promise to release the full January 6th 
tapes; a tweet by Representative Matt Gaetz, dated September 
18th, 2023, in which he demands full release of January 6th 
tapes in exchange for funding the Government; and finally, a 
letter from Capitol Police Chief Tom Manger to Chairman Steil 
and myself, dated September 18th, 2023, in which he renews his 
request to review all video footage requests received by the 
Committee and address security concerns prior to release.
    Without objection?
    Chairman Loudermilk. Without objection.
    [The information referred to follows:]

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    Chairman Loudermilk. I now recognize the gentleman from New 
York, Mr. D'Esposito, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I just want to make it very clear that I think all of our 
colleagues, the Republicans, have been very concerned about the 
response of the National Guard, which is why most of us have 
asked questions about the timing, about the authority, about 
you getting permission, and the fact that you had to get 
answers from two individuals who clearly were taking--taking 
their orders from Speaker Pelosi. I just want to make that very 
clear.
    Just touching quickly on the Chamber evacuations, the 
Capitol was breached at 2:12 p.m. The House Chamber did not 
start evacuating until 2:28. What was the reason for the delay?
    Mr. Sund. I am not really sure what the reason for the 
delay is.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK.
    Mr. Sund. They should have been called--the evacuation 
should have definitely been called earlier.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Who would have made that decision?
    Mr. Sund. When I was up in the Command Center, I had two 
assistant chiefs with me. They were in charge of operations. I 
had one assistant chief that was in charge of Member 
protection--intelligence and protection, and one in charge of 
uniformed operations. Either of those could have called it, but 
it should have been called earlier.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK. Do you know what time the Senate 
Chamber was evacuated?
    Mr. Sund. I will see if I have it in my--give me 1 second. 
Sorry about that.
    I am sorry.
    I do not have that right in front of me right now, sir. 
Sorry.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK. No worries. I will move on to something 
else.
    Yesterday Chairman Steil hosted a security briefing here in 
this room, brought all the stakeholders, the law enforcement 
agencies that oversee the Washington, D.C. area, into one room 
to talk about the spiking violent crime and what we can do 
better.
    I think something that has been a common theme, and 
probably not one that we are really proud of, but a common 
theme that we have all heard is staffing issues when it comes 
to the Capitol Police.
    Obviously, I think any law enforcement agency around the 
country right now would agree that the more people in uniform, 
the better.
    In your book, you wrote that on January 6th, United States 
Capitol Police would be subjected to the greatest staffing 
demands on the Department's limited resources, and that, quote, 
``This would make pulling together the staffing for a large CDU 
detail even more difficult.''
    What was it specifically about January 6th and the joint 
session that placed such significant demands on the staffing of 
your department?
    Mr. Sund. Any time you have a joint session of Congress, 
where you have both the House and the Senate in session, as 
well as the Vice President there holding a joint--joint 
hearing, it is going to take a lot of--a lot of work.
    The problem that we have is with the electoral college, 
when you are in there doing the certification, it can likely 
run into the early morning hours. You have to prepare for 24-
hour staffing for that. That is what takes a lot of the 
resources.
    You know, we had prepared for, I think it was 223 hard CDU 
officers, as well as some officers on the perimeter, and that 
is about--about the most we can get on the outside. It takes a 
lot of our staffing on the inside, sir.
    Mr. D'Esposito. You spent over three decades in the law 
enforcement arena. Public safety, emergency management, it is 
all kind of tied in there. As someone who has spent most of his 
adult life in the emergency management world, one of the 
questions that we always ask ourselves is, are we better off 
today than we were when we saw the last event unfold.
    My question to you is, are we better off today than, God 
forbid, if we saw an event like January 6th unfold again?
    Mr. Sund. I continue to be concerned. I know, like you had 
mentioned, and I think there was an influx of money coming in. 
That was key for getting some of the equipment and helping out 
with the training.
    The officers are still very, very short. They are getting 
overworked. They are getting held over, and it is still making 
training difficult. I would say, as far as some of the 
equipment coming in, yes.
    As far as the politicization, which is, the No. 1 thing I 
had recommend, you know, there is no reason you should be going 
and having Members of Congress in an approval or review 
category for laws overseeing the Capitol Police. That needs to 
be restricted.
    You know, let the Capitol Police chief do his job.
    Mr. D'Esposito. I agree.
    Mr. Sund. That is the No. 1 thing I can say.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Leave policing to the law enforcement 
professionals.
    Mr. Sund. That is correct. If they mess up, hold them 
accountable.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Exactly. Well, thank you for your service.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    I also want to clarify something Mr. Morelle brought up, 
regarding bringing Mr. Irving before this Committee. It is the 
intention of this Committee to bring Mr. Irving before our 
Committee, whether in a hearing or in a transcribed interview 
which, if either takes place, we will notify the minority and 
invite them to participate.
    With that, I would now recognize the Chairman of the full 
Committee, Mr. Steil, for 5 minutes.
    Chairman Steil. Thank you very much.
    I want to go back to your recollections in the transcribed 
interview of Mr. Irving. He said that on January 6th, the 
initial statement about the Guard occurred on a phone call. You 
noted it is in his office. Which is correct?
    Mr. Sund. Can you repeat the question, sir, just so I----
    Chairman Steil. Yes, no, absolutely. Mr. Irving said that 
on January 6th, the initial statement about the Guard occurred 
on a phone call. You contend that you went into his office to 
discuss the Guard.
    Mr. Sund. On January 6th?
    Chairman Steil. Yes.
    Mr. Sund. No, sir. I was in the--I was in the Command 
Center on January 6th when we became under attack at 12:53.
    Chairman Steil. OK.
    Mr. Sund. I was there for several hours until I left at 5, 
approximately 5 p.m. to go see the Vice President and go check 
on the Capitol.
    Chairman Steil. Thank you.
    On January 6th, Mr. Irving said that when you called and 
asked his permission to ask for the Guard, he gave you 
permission. Is that correct?
    Mr. Sund. That is false. I think if you look at his 
testimony, he says, When I first call him--I want to, just for 
clarification--at 2, because I think his testimony is, before I 
was saying, I might be needing the National Guard, that is 
absolutely not true.
    When I first called at 12:58, I absolutely said, We need 
the Guard now. I think my response was, I think we are getting 
our asses handed to us. No, it was not correct that he gave me 
approval on the first call.
    Chairman Steil. When comparing your transcribed interview 
with the January 6th Committee, and the transcribed interview 
of Mr. Irving, there seems to be some pretty big discrepancies 
in the timeline of events and how they happened. Can you 
explain the discrepancies?
    Mr. Sund. Maybe there is problems with recollection. The 
one thing I would say is, when you think there is 
discrepancies, realize that Congress did try and change the law 
to correct those discrepancies in the sense of, they changed 
the law giving the chief the authority now. Obviously they 
agree with my position.
    Chairman Steil. Well, I thank you for being here, Mr. Sund, 
and, you know, we really are working, as chair of the full 
Committee, to de-politicize Capitol Police. I remain concerned 
that under the previous Congress and the previous Speaker, 
Capitol Police was politicized, and we are working to de-
politicize the security apparatus on Capitol Hill.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Sund. Thank you.
    Chairman Loudermilk. I thank the Committee Chairman for his 
questions and being here today.
    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    Just to finish up on the previous question--line of 
questioning, regarding General Milley and his notification to 
the Senate of this particular intelligence. You had stated that 
he did not notify you. Do you know if General Milley notified 
the intelligence division at all of this intelligence?
    Mr. Sund. I have no idea, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. From what I recall, and I believe 
it was in your book, you had issued an all-hands-on-deck, for 
officers to be present, and on duty on January 6th. Is that 
correct?
    Mr. Sund. That is correct, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Do you know, was that order put in 
place with the intelligence division?
    Mr. Sund. The intelligence division actually--it is funny 
you say that--the intelligence division had two-thirds of their 
personnel working from home that day. No, it was not put in 
place. It only had one intelligence analyst assigned to monitor 
the January 6th events.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Even though you issued an all-hands-
on-deck--this would have been Yogananda Pittman's call--she had 
nearly 70 percent of her workforce at home?
    Mr. Sund. At least of that one unit. When you talk about 
the intelligence----
    Chairman Loudermilk. Intelligence.
    Mr. Sund. Yes, the larger----
    Chairman Loudermilk. That is right. She was over a larger, 
but, yes--so the intelligence, do you know why they chose to 
not order their people to come to work.
    Mr. Sund. No, sir. I have not been able to follow up on 
that.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Very interesting.
    Are there any preexisting--or when you were chief, was 
there any preexisting agreements between the Metropolitan 
Police Department and Capitol Police that would allow MPD to 
come onto Capitol Grounds without the approval from the chief 
or the Police board?
    Mr. Sund. Well, you got to understand, there is a number of 
thoroughfares through the Capitol Grounds that Metropolitan 
Police will patrol regularly--Constitution Avenue, Independence 
Avenue, so they have to traverse the Capitol, when you call the 
Capitol Grounds regularly.
    For them to be coming up and coming into one of our 
buildings, it usually requires approval and notification for 
them to be able to come in and be invited in.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. From our research, the only 
directive that we have seen with the Metropolitan Police 
Department, which dates back about 10 years, is that no officer 
can come onto Capitol Grounds, patrol Capitol Grounds, or enter 
any Capitol building without the explicit approval or request 
by the Capitol Police Board. You do not know that there is 
anything that has superseded that?
    Mr. Sund. No, I do not. I had have to say that there is a 
Metropolitan Washington Council of Government's Mutual Aid 
Agreement that I believe--that I believe exists, but I do not 
know how that interacts with that.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The mutual aid agreement that you 
enacted, is that that same mutual aid agreement?
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. What time did you enact that?
    Mr. Sund. I enacted that at 1--approximately 1:51, I called 
Scott Boggs over at the Metropolitan Washington Council of 
Governments.
    Also realize that I did call Metropolitan Police Department 
right at 12:55. We were attacked at 12:53. At 12:55, I called 
MPD and asked them to send in the resources. I called--I had 
called earlier that morning at 10:55 and asked Chief Carroll if 
he could put additional resources on Constitution Avenue in 
case we needed them.
    Chairman Loudermilk. No, that would have been off Capitol 
Grounds at that point.
    Mr. Sund. I believe it would have been right on the--right 
on the edge of Capitol Grounds.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Yes. OK.
    Mr. Sund. I think it actually technically would have been 
on Capitol Grounds, correct.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Were you made aware that MPD would be 
sending their emergency services unit in plain clothes to be in 
the crowd?
    Mr. Sund. Their----
    Chairman Loudermilk. I mean--I am sorry--their electronic 
services unit, ESU.
    Mr. Sund. Oh, I am sorry. No. No, sir, I was not aware of 
that.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. We actually have evidence and 
records indicating plain clothes MPD officers were on Capitol 
Grounds on January 6th, and you are saying you were not aware 
that they would have embedded those officers within the crowd. 
They did not make you aware of that.
    Mr. Sund. No, sir, they did not make me aware of it. It is 
not unusual for agencies to have plain clothes units deployed 
around major events, but no, I was not made aware that they 
would be on Capitol Grounds.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Some of what actually Metropolitan 
Police provided to us, the camera footage, body cam footage, 
shows that there were undercover agents in the crowd with one 
apparently encouraging some of the protestors to enter the 
Capitol. That would--I assume you would think that that was 
uncalled for, or unprofessional?
    Mr. Sund. I have not seen that. If it turned out to be a 
police officer involved in that, that would be inappropriate.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. When did you come on as acting 
chief? I know it was 2017. What month?
    Mr. Sund. January. It was beginning of January, the first 
week of January.
    Chairman Loudermilk. You were acting chief at the time that 
a--someone crazed by political rhetoric came on the baseball 
field, which I was on, and began shooting at Members of 
Congress, Republican Members.
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. That after-action report, do you 
remember that after-action report?
    Mr. Sund. I do, yes.
    Chairman Loudermilk. You had two Capitol Police officers 
involved in that, and from what I remember, it was a pretty 
significantly large after-action report. Is that right?
    Mr. Sund. Yes. I had have to remember exactly, but yes, 
that was Crystal Griner and David Bailey that were heroic in 
that event. Yes, substantial. I was involved in that, as well 
as, you know, other infractions.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Have you seen the Capitol Police 
after-action report on January 6th.
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir. The 27-page after-action, yes, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Does it surprise you that it is only 
27 pages long when--how many officers were here that day?
    Mr. Sund. I called in 1,700 officers, as well as there was 
a total of 18--let us see--I am sorry--our total of 1,457. You 
figure a little over 3,000--3,200 officers. No, I would have 
expected a much larger after-action.
    I was involved in Navy Yard as the incident commander 
there. The after-action there was at least three times that 
length.
    Chairman Loudermilk. That is what amazes me is that this 
after-action report of the Capitol--or the baseball shooting 
with two officers involved, 15 or 16 Members of Congress, 
received this comprehensive after-action report, but the 
January 6th after-action report literally is just a handful of 
pages, and it is very sketchy.
    Who was responsible for that after-action report?
    Mr. Sund. I do not remember the exact date that it was 
published. I do not know if that would have been the acting 
chief, Pittman, or the new chief, Manger.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Yes. I think it was Acting Chief 
Pittman.
    Finally, this will be my last question. I appreciate you 
being here with us and being so vigilant.
    You have mentioned earlier in response to a question by the 
minority, that there should be others that are held accountable 
to this. Who else do you believe that should be held 
accountable?
    Mr. Sund. When I talk about holding people accountable, I 
think, you know, you are dealing with a morale issue, I think, 
right now on the--on the police department. That is one of the 
big issues that you face when you talk to the officers.
    I agree with Representative Torres, these were heroic 
officers. They are working really hard all the time, and I 
appreciate that. There is a morale issue, and I think part of 
that morale issue goes to the fact that people have not been 
held accountable. You know, failures have not been identified, 
and people that have been left in certain positions that--that 
should be identified as contributing to some of the issues we 
had that day.
    Chairman Loudermilk. In contrasting that, there are 
individuals who--I believe you even mentioned this in your 
book--that acted above and beyond the call of duty, or above 
and beyond their position, who were actually terminated from 
the Capitol Police, and there were many whistleblowers that 
were retaliated against. That is exactly what we are trying to 
get at here.
    We thank you for spending time with us today, thank you for 
your service. It is been exemplary. Look, you had the ability 
to just step away and go in obscurity like some that were here 
that day have, but you chose to stand up and see that justice 
is done and that, more importantly, that we do correct the 
wrongs and we secure this Capitol.
    It is not the intention, as has been mentioned several 
times, for this Committee to rewrite history. History is there. 
Violence was done. We want to get to the truth of how there was 
a security failure at this Capitol so that we can ensure that 
it never happens again.
    Members of the Subcommittee may have some additional 
questions for you, and we ask you please respond to those in 
writing.
    Mr. Sund. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Without objection, each Member will 
have 5 legislative days to insert additional material into the 
record, or to revise and extend their remarks.
    If there is no further business, I thank the Members for 
their participation. Without objection, the Subcommittee stands 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 5:19 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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