[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-67]
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 10, 2024
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-331 WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eighteenth Congress
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
Chair RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi ANDY KIM, New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MATT GAETZ, Florida ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
DON BACON, Nebraska MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
JIM BANKS, Indiana VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida SARA JACOBS, California
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
RONNY JACKSON, Texas PATRICK RYAN, New York
PAT FALLON, Texas JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
NANCY MACE, South Carolina CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO,
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota Pennsylvania
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
NICK LaLOTA, New York TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
MARK ALFORD, Missouri JIMMY PANETTA, California
CORY MILLS, Florida MARC VEASEY, Texas
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia
LANCE GOODEN, Texas
Chris Vieson, Staff Director
Katherine Earle, Professional Staff Member
Rob Ikoku, Professional Staff Member
Logan Whelchel, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 3
WITNESSES
Wallander, Dr. Celeste, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Department of Defense.......... 4
Cavoli, GEN Christopher G., USA, Commander, U.S. European Command 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Wallander, Dr. Celeste....................................... 55
Cavoli, GEN Christopher G.................................... 64
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Ukraine Rejects 10 German Leopard tanks...................... 93
US Urges Ukraine to stop attacking Russian oil refineries.... 99
F-16 Fighter Jets `No Longer Relevant': Ukrainian Official... 102
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Scott.................................................... 115
Ms. McClellan................................................ 115
Mr. Davis.................................................... 115
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Scott.................................................... 119
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 124
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 126
Mr. Bergman.................................................. 128
Mr. Golden................................................... 129
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 129
Mr. Gimenez.................................................. 135
Mr. LaLota................................................... 136
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 10, 2024.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [chairman
of the committee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.
Today we will continue our posture hearings with European
Command (EUCOM). I remind members, when we adjourn the hearing,
we will immediately move upstairs for the closed briefing. I
want to thank our witnesses for being here and for their
service to our Nation.
The United States is moving into an era of unprecedented
danger. We have heard from the commanders of Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM), Africa Command (AFRICOM), Central Command
(CENTCOM), and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). They each
raise grave concerns about how China, Russia, Iran, and North
Korea are working together to reduce America's global
influence, harm our alliances, and undermine our national
security.
Nowhere is that more apparent than in Ukraine. Iran and
North Korea are arming Russia with deadly effect. In return,
they are receiving advanced technologies and other illegal aid
from Putin. And while China has yet--has not yet provided
weapons to Russia, Xi is providing Putin critical economic and
security assistance. This includes dual-use materials and
components for weapons.
Kim, Xi, and the Ayatollah are eagerly aiding and abetting
Putin's brutal invasion of Ukraine because they know a Russian
victory there will seriously undercut the credibility of
American deterrence and leave our security partners exposed. It
is the green light these despots have been craving for decades.
A Russian victory will embolden Kim, Xi, and the Ayatollah
to confront South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, and ultimately the
United States in a new and--in new and fatal ways. And I fear
Putin will use a victory in Ukraine as a springboard to invade
Eastern Europe. We can't let that happen. We must restore
American deterrence. It starts with this Administration finally
articulating a winning strategy.
Since the start of the war, President Biden's Ukraine
policy has been plagued by hesitation. Every major weapons
system the United States has provided, from Stingers to Abrams
to Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), only came after
serious congressional pressure, and it usually arrived months
late and in insufficient numbers.
The President's hand-wringing has only prolonged the war
and driven up cost in terms of dollars and lives. Meanwhile,
the U.S. sanctions have failed to make much of a dent in
Putin's war machine. The President's use--the President should
use the billions frozen in Russian assets to support Ukraine,
and he should arm Ukraine at the speed of relevance.
But in order for that to happen, Congress needs to pass the
national security supplemental. If the United States is unable
to send additional weapons to Ukraine, Putin will win. And I
would remind my colleagues that nearly all of the money we are
spending to arm Ukraine doesn't leave this country. It goes
directly to U.S. companies and American workers to produce more
weapons at a faster pace. This funding is revitalizing our
defense industrial base after decades of atrophy.
It is exactly what we need to do to prepare for a potential
conflict with China. But we can't do it all. The President
needs to force our European allies to do more. While the UK,
Poland, and the Baltic states, and the Czech Republic are
punching well above their weight. There are some European
countries that can and must do more.
We all want this war to end, but that can't happen if the
West hedges. If Putin thinks he can win, he won't come to the
bargaining table. The quickest way to end this conflict is to
strengthen Ukraine's negotiating position by ensuring they are
well armed and well supplied. I look forward to working with my
colleagues to do just that.
Finally, last week marked the 75th anniversary of the
founding of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO has
been enormously successful at keeping America and our allies
secure and providing the deterrence necessary to avoid another
world war. But as we enter this new era where China, Russia,
Iran, and North Korea are working together to flaunt
international laws and destabilize whole regions, NATO needs to
broaden its focus.
It needs to secure its supply chains and reduce its
dependency on China and Russia for goods and energy. And all
NATO nations must meet their requirement to spend at least 2
percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense. With
a war raging in Eastern Europe, it is entirely unacceptable
that a dozen nations are still falling short.
When NATO meets in Washington this summer, the President
should insist--should demand--these nations present a clear
plan on how they will meet the 2 percent benchmark as soon as
possible. Every member state needs to fulfill its commitment
because now more than ever we need a strong NATO.
I look forward to our discussion today and hearing from our
witnesses about their security posture in Europe. And, with
that, I yield to my friend and colleague, the Ranking Member.
STATEMENT OF HON. RANKING MEMBER, ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM WASHINGTON, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with almost all
of what the Chairman said, particularly about the importance of
NATO and the importance of the fight in Ukraine. I definitely
look forward to hearing from our witnesses who are very well
positioned to update us on the specifics of that fight and on
the Alliance that is pushing back against Russia's invasion of
Ukraine.
And I will just right off the top foot stomp the point, you
know, the House has waited months now to approve the security
package to help protect Ukraine. You know, weeks ago, we were
too late, and now every day is at an extreme cost to our
ability to deter Russia--to deter Russia in Ukraine, but as the
Chairman correctly pointed out, to deter the whole broad
alliance that is trying to basically, you know, tear down the
international rules-based system. All of that pushes them
forward.
So we have the bill, the Senate bill, that we can pass. I
would urge every member of this body to ask the Speaker and
implore the Speaker to bring that up for a vote. It would pass
the House and be signed by the President in short order. All we
need is a little democracy. Give us the chance to vote on that
bill, so that we can give Ukraine the help that they so
desperately need.
I would love to get an update today from our witnesses
about the fight in Ukraine. You know, my personal opinion is
that Ukraine is in a strong position to stop Russia where they
are if we give them the help. And this is where I have a tiny
little bit of disagreement with the Chairman's remarks.
I think the Biden Administration has been very clear on
their policy from day one, which is defend Ukraine, make sure
that we maintain a sovereign democratic Ukraine while not
stumbling into World War III with Russia. And that second goal
is not irrelevant. Okay? Making sure that that didn't happen is
an important part of the policy because that would make
everything vastly worse. It is not simply a matter of we are
going to war with Russia, no matter what. There are very
complicated calculations to make sure that we don't stumble
into that broader war, which would definitely jeopardize our
interests and the world's interests, which means that taking
some care in how we do that was actually a very smart policy.
But even with that, if we go back to February of 2022 when
the war started, the assumption was it was over. There was
nothing Ukraine could do. Russia would take them out in a
matter of weeks. The coalition that was pulled together, in
large part by this President and by this Administration, that
built a 50-nation-strong coalition to support Ukraine, is the
reason--part of the reason, the other part being Ukraine's
incredible courage and ability to fight--that that was stopped.
I think we need to recognize that.
We also need to recognize the other point, and I will get
back to agreement with the Chairman at this point, that if we
walk away from that mission, that will undermine our ability to
build the alliances that we need to confront all elements of
this, not just Putin but China and Iran and North Korea and
Hamas and Hezbollah and all the groups that threaten us.
So you can't say, well, we need to walk away from Ukraine
because China is more important. If China is more important,
that just emphasizes the fact that we should not walk away from
Ukraine as we go forward.
The other piece that I am interested in both of our
witnesses' thoughts is on the sanctions piece. You know, part
of the reason that sanctions have not been as effective as we
would have liked is because China in particular has been there
as an economic backstop, but not just China. Other nations like
India, South Africa, Brazil, have continued to do business.
There is a fundamental shift in U.S. economic power
globally in that there are other nations now that are stepping
into that void. We don't have the ability to simply choke off
another nation that we once had because of that alliance that
is being built, and I think that means that we should start
thinking about, well, how do we deal with that? What is a new
strategy to recognize that we are definitely in a competition
now for economic primacy in the world? And how do we best
confront that competition?
I am worried that we overly rely on sanctions, certainly
not in this case, not where Russia is concerned, but a number
of other cases that push nations across the globe away from us
and into the arms of China and Russia, which only further
weakens our ability to hold Russia to account for this war.
Now, but let me close where I started, and that is the
importance of Ukraine. Ukraine can in fact win. They can
maintain a sovereign democratic Ukraine and stop Russia, but
only if we help them. And the implications of that, certainly
for NATO more broadly, are profound. So I urge the speaker
again, give us that vote, so that we can help Ukraine defend
the interests that are important to us as well as to Ukraine
and the rest of the world.
And, with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the Ranking Member.
I now introduce the witnesses. We have the Honorable
Celeste Wallander, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, and also General Christopher
Cavoli is the Commander of U.S. European Command.
I welcome the witnesses. Ms. Wallander, we will start with
you.
STATEMENT OF DR. CELESTE WALLANDER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Dr. Wallander. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Rogers,
Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the
committee. This is a great opportunity to testify, and I want
to also thank you for the support of Congress and the committee
to enable the Department of Defense's operations and posture in
Europe. It is an honor to appear alongside General Cavoli.
With its unprovoked invasion in 2022, Russia revealed its
determination to revert to an international system that rewards
aggression. In response to Putin's challenge and to ensure
continued deterrence and defense of our collective security,
the Department has enhanced its posture in Europe over the last
2 years. But we are not alone.
I can report that our allies in Europe are sharing the
responsibility for collective defense. Together with our
allies, the Department is committed to reinforcing the lesson
that aggression will result in very costly failure. American
security and prosperity rely on that fact.
In Ukraine, our strategic goal is to see a sovereign,
independent, economically viable, and democratic Ukraine emerge
from Russia's failure, a Ukraine with a means to deter and
defend itself against further aggression. Russian forces
continue their assault in Ukraine's east and south and target
civilians and critical infrastructure across Ukraine.
Ukraine's defenses and its population will face devastation
without additional U.S. security assistance to join with
Europe's. With congressional support, we will strengthen
Ukraine in forging a strong defense industrial base that
provides Ukraine with its required capabilities and resilience.
Meanwhile, we have organized our allies and partners into
coalitions focused on key capability areas, for Ukraine's air
force, ground-based air defense, artillery, maritime security,
armor, information security, information technology, demining,
and drones. Through U.S. leadership of the Ukraine Defense
Contact Group, we have provided more than $88 billion in
security assistance to Ukraine.
U.S. leadership is ensuring that Russia is bearing enormous
costs as a result of its war against Ukraine. Russia has
expended $211 billion to equip, deploy, maintain, and sustain
operations in Ukraine, resources that Russia's limited economy
ill affords.
Russia's armed forces have suffered at least 315,000
casualties in the fight, yet because of Putin's obsessions,
Putin's Russia will be a threat to European and U.S. security
for years. DoD has focused on our defense and on deterring
Russia from attacks on the United States and our NATO allies.
NATO is stronger today than ever. Finland and Sweden are
allies, and more allies than ever are devoting at minimum 2
percent of GDP to defense. Today, 18 allies meet the 2 percent
requirement compared to only 9 in 2020. Several more will meet
2 percent by the July Washington Summit.
In 2024, NATO allies will invest a total of $470 billion in
defense, which amounts to 2 percent of the aggregate GDP of all
of the members of the Alliance. NATO allies together are
answering the call to meet this historic threat. The Department
will continue working with allies to defend our countries and
our freedoms throughout Europe, including on its eastern flank,
those facing Russia, where American soldiers serve on the front
line from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia,
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.
America will welcome our allies this summer for the
Washington NATO Summit to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the
signing of the Washington Treaty that established the NATO
alliance founded on freedom and democracy.
There are also states beyond NATO's Article 5 umbrella
threatened by Russia. Moldova recognizes the threat posed by
Russia and is undertaking significant defense reforms. Moscow
continues its occupation of 20 percent of Georgia's territory
and maintains an unwelcome military presence in both Armenia
and Azerbaijan. DoD works with all four to strengthen ties,
build resilience, and advance Euro-Atlantic integration.
I want to emphasize how important Congress is to achieving
our strategic objectives in Europe and beyond. Your reliable,
stable, and consistent support in funding are critical.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wallander can be found in
the Appendix on page 55.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Wallander.
General Cavoli, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI, USA, COMMANDER,
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
General Cavoli. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Rogers,
Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee,
it is an honor to testify before you today on behalf of the
men, women, and families of U.S.-European Command.
I would like to publicly recognize our service members'
shared sacrifice, and I would like to praise their devotion to
the mission, and thank you for your support of them. I am lucky
to be accompanied by Command Sergeant Major Rob Abernethy here
today, who represents those men, women, and families, and I am
honored to testify next to Dr. Wallander.
We are facing challenging times, to say the least, in the
European Theater. Russia's brutal, unprovoked war has ravaged
Ukraine for over 2 years. Their forces are demolishing cities
and are destroying innocent lives on a scale we have not seen
since the Second World War.
Moreover, Russia is turning to the People's Republic of
China, Iran, and North Korea to sustain its campaign in
Ukraine. These countries are forming interlocking strategic
partnerships in an attempt to challenge the existing order.
This is profoundly inimical to U.S. national interests. And
Russia shows no signs of stopping, nor does Russia intend to
stop with Ukraine. Russia presents a chronic threat.
USEUCOM has responded to this Russian threat by enhancing
our deterrence posture across Europe. We have strengthened our
eastern flank with rotational force deployments. We have
expanded prepositioned stocks, and we have modernized our
infrastructure to enable rapid reception of reinforcing forces.
We have demonstrated this capability to reinforce in all
domains through dozens of multinational training exercises. So
we are ready to defend, and this allows us to deter. And we
have deterred Russia from attacking our Alliance.
USEUCOM is also very proud to lead the international effort
in support of Ukraine. We do this through the Security
Assistance Group-Ukraine, SAG-U, which is led by Lieutenant
General Tony Aguto. In the past 26 months of this war, the U.S.
and our partners have delivered vast amounts of critical
munitions and equipment to our Ukrainian colleagues.
The SAG-U has facilitated a full range of training to
promote unit readiness. We have ensured that Ukraine knows how
to use their new equipment and knows how to maintain it.
Nevertheless, Russia persists in its vicious campaign, and
meanwhile Ukraine remains almost entirely dependent on external
support to stay in this fight.
The severity of this moment cannot be overstated. If we do
not continue to support Ukraine, Ukraine could lose. So our
efforts are great, but in all of this USEUCOM is not alone. War
in Europe has given our allies and partners clear purpose and
unity, and they seized the opportunity presented by this
catastrophe. Over the past year, there have been profound
changes in NATO. We have new war plans for the first time in 35
years.
We have a new force model and a new readiness model. It
makes more than 700 percent more European troops available to
the Supreme Allied Commander--me--than just a couple of years
ago. We have a streamlined and focused command structure. We
have new authorities that give me the ability to respond to
crises in a timely manner.
And European governments are backing these organizational
changes with a concrete uptick in investment. In 2024, at least
20 nations are expected to meet the 2 percent of GDP defense
spending mark. This compares to only three that did so in 2014.
Continued U.S. leadership is essential, however. Our allies
are stepping up, but they require--and they hope for--our
continued leadership and example. By upholding our commitment
to Ukraine, and by demonstrating steadfast cohesion with the
NATO Alliance, we provide a clear deterrent to our adversaries.
Should that deterrence fail, USEUCOM, alongside our allies, is
ready to fight and win.
I thank Congress for your unwavering support to our
servicemen and women, to our mission, to their safety, and to
their well-being.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, on behalf of the
entire European Command, thank you again for this opportunity
today. I very much look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Cavoli can be found in
the Appendix on page 64.]
The Chairman. I thank the witnesses. I recognize myself for
questions.
General Cavoli, what would be the consequences for Ukraine,
the United States, and NATO if Congress fails to in a timely
manner pass the supplemental funding bill?
General Cavoli. Chairman Rogers, you know, I can't predict
the future, but I can--I can do simple math. And when I look at
the supply rates, I look at the supply sources, when I look at
the consumption rates, if we do not continue to support
Ukraine, Ukraine will run out of artillery shells and will run
out of air defense interceptors in fairly short order, Mr.
Chairman.
Based on my experience in 37-plus years in the U.S.
military, if one side can shoot and the other side can't shoot
back, the side that can't shoot back loses. So the stakes are
very high. We are the main supplier of ground-based air defense
and artillery shells for Ukraine right now.
It is important to note that our allies are increasing
their production rates. They are just not able to take it all
under their control yet. They just don't have the supplies.
They are increasing rapidly. Both NATO and the European Union
are working to increase European production. That will be the
first part of a bridge to the future, and then meanwhile we are
all working with Ukraine to increase their organic production
rates. They are also producing about 11,000 artillery shells a
year, and some other things, so we are bringing that up.
But, in the meantime, they are really dependent this year
on us, Mr. Chairman. And without our support, they will not be
able to prevail.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Wallander, some of our members are frustrated. They
feel like the Administration doesn't have a clear plan or
objective in Ukraine. Could you articulate that for us?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The objective is
Russia's strategic failure. Putin's goal is to subjugate
Ukraine, to strip it of its sovereignty and independence, but
also to weaken and subvert Europe, America, and especially, of
course, the NATO Alliance.
So our objectives and what has guided our policies for the
last 2 years is that Ukraine remain a sovereign, independent,
European country that is able to defend and deter, and to
deliver that failure to Putin. And Ukraine is doing that with
our support every day. And it is to strengthen the NATO
Alliance to defend America's European security, which is the
core of our global security.
Our alliance in Europe enables American military presence
more broadly globally, as well as to defend and deter against
Russia. And China is watching how we perform in Europe because
they are drawing lessons for how we will live up to our
commitments to allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. So we
need to ensure that Putin also fail in his goal to undermine
European security. We are doing this out of self-interest, out
of American national security interest, as well as, of course,
the admiration that we Americans feel for Ukraine. But, in the
end, we are doing this so that Americans can be secure at home
and abroad.
The Chairman. Okay. General Cavoli, if funding is not
provided by the U.S. and NATO for Ukraine and the government
falls, do you believe that Russia will take the entirety of the
country or just a portion thereof?
General Cavoli. Mr. Chairman, I believe that Russia will
take as much of that country as they can get. And if the
Ukrainian armed forces are not able to hold, they will take as
much as they can. This could, in the worst case, put Russian
soldiers throughout Ukraine, which would put them on many more
NATO country borders than they are currently. And that would--
that would cost an awful lot for us to deal with.
The Chairman. And do you all have an expectation of what
would happen next after--assuming that Ukraine falls and Russia
takes the entirety of the nation, at some point, do you believe
there will be further aggression or not? And, if so, what would
that be?
General Cavoli. I believe Russia would be emboldened, Mr.
Chairman, and I believe at some point they would commit further
aggression. And if I--if I may, I would like to ask Celeste if
she has that as well.
Dr. Wallander. I fully agree with General Cavoli. Putin is
not going to stop at Ukraine. Ukraine is a step towards
undermining European security and the Transatlantic Alliance
and, therefore, American security.
The Chairman. I thank the witnesses.
The chair recognizes the Ranking Member for any questions
he may have.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Cavoli, taking the flip side of that question, if
we get assistance to Ukraine as is currently outlined, what do
you assess their chances of stopping Russia where they are at,
at least right now?
General Cavoli. Sir, I think those chances would be very
good. I think--I think they would be able to do it. We work
very closely with them on their general plans, and the way to
accomplish them, and they have solid plans. They have a solid
approach to their defense. It does need to be resourced,
however.
Mr. Smith. Right. Because, I mean, at the moment Russia is
trying to press the advantage they have, because Ukraine is
rationing what they used because of the lack of support. But
even then, you know, Russia seems to be struggling to break
through. Can you give us your assessment as to why that is,
what are the weaknesses or strengths of the Russian force and
why they are still in the situation they are in?
General Cavoli. Absolutely. The first and primary reason
the Russians are unable to break through is due to the tenacity
of the Ukrainian defenders. They are defending very, very hard.
They fight very hard. They fight every day.
On the Russian side, the Russians are struggling to put
together combined arms operations or operations at the
battalion level above the company level. It is very hard to
aggregate very small unit actions into a larger offensive. They
are trying. They are spending enormous quantities of materiel
and enormous amounts of life to try to break through just by
piling small attack after small attack.
It has not worked so far, but in the end, numbers matter in
warfare, of course, as you know, Ranking Member Smith, and
those numbers, if we don't support Ukraine, will favor the
Russians over time.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
And, Dr. Wallander, on a more difficult policy question,
the other aspect of the Biden Administration's policy here is
to make sure that there was a sovereign, democratic Ukraine.
Yes, Russia focused, as you emphasized in your answer to the
Chairman's question is there, but we wanted to make sure that
Ukraine was there. If we are able to get them support and we
stop Russia where they are at, that of course is not the
ultimate objective of Ukraine. Ukraine would like to take back
all of the territory back to the, you know, pre-2014 borders.
At the moment, that seems unrealistic. What would you say
is the scenario and the Administration's position on
negotiation? So we get them the aid, we stop Russia, so that
Russia cannot achieve their maximalist goals. I see risk if at
that point we continue--nope, we have got to keep fighting,
because we have got to get it all back.
How do you have that very difficult discussion with Ukraine
and also, crucially, with other Eastern European allies, who
are quite right? I mean, Ukraine should have, you know, pre-
2014 borders. But should and what--you know, what should happen
isn't the same as what can happen. How do you handle that
discussion to get to a peace in Ukraine?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman Smith. First, and
most important, is we--our policy is to fight to preserve to
support Ukraine, so that it is sovereign and make its own
choices. So we have to understand that in the end it is the
Ukraine people and their leadership, who will decide how,
whether, and on what terms they might be willing to negotiate
with Russia. And it is very important to remember that.
And we are supporting them in security assistance, but also
economic assistance and other parts of the U.S. Government, so
that Ukraine can be that sovereign country and have that
decision and live to see that day.
I do think there is a misconception that what Putin is
after is territory. He is not after territory. He is not after
Bakhmut or Avdivka or even Odesa. He is after Ukraine.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Dr. Wallander. And so we have to understand that while
there may be a negotiation over territory, at some point some
territorial resolution, we have to be ready for the fact that
that probably doesn't mean that Putin gives up on the goal to
subvert Ukraine and, through Ukraine, Europe.
So we have to do both things. We have to support Ukraine in
negotiations, if it chooses to negotiate, but we must not be
fooled into thinking that brings an era of peace and
cooperation back to Europe.
Mr. Smith. Well, any negotiation would have to make sure
that there were clear security protections for Ukraine going
forward. We could not simply rely on Putin's word that he would
not go further. I completely agree with that.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Georgia, Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wallander, I have a tremendous amount of respect for
you. I have--I would tell you, I disagree on the Odesa
statement. I do think Putin wants Odesa. I think it gives him
control of the economy of Ukraine. And that port is extremely
important to him, and I think that he would like to charge a
tax on everything leaving that port and give it to one of his
oligarchs or keep a portion of it for himself.
But my question gets to your statement about Russia's
strategic failure being the Biden Administration's goal.
Certainly, that is my goal. I want Russia to fail. I want Putin
to fail. I want Ukraine to win. And you also talk about
Russia's limited economy, but most numbers show that Russia's
economy grew at a rate of 3.6 percent for 2023. Is that your
understanding?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, and its inflation rate is 13 percent.
Mr. Scott. Okay. So it is 13 percent.
Dr. Wallander. The inflation rate is 13 percent.
Mr. Scott. Okay. But their economy is growing, and the
Biden Administration has looked the other way while India,
whose economy is also growing at a pace that is actually about
7 percent, has bought billions of dollars' worth of oil from
Russia, in violation of the sanctions.
Is it correct--I won't ask you about the opinion on the
Biden Administration. I will ask you, though, is it correct
that India has purchased billions of dollars' worth of oil, in
violation of the sanctions from Russia?
Dr. Wallander. India has purchased oil from Russia, yes.
Mr. Scott. In violation of the sanctions.
Dr. Wallander. That would be a technical issue on whether
they are paying more than the price cap, and I am afraid I
would have to get back to you on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 115.]
Mr. Scott. Okay. Fair enough. As I said, I respect you. I
am not trying to play ``gotcha'' here. But my concern is that
there are things the Biden Administration could do that would
hurt Russia's economy, and then--and they have not done it. I
am also concerned with the fact that Russia, when the
Ukrainians hit Russia's oil and gas infrastructure, the Biden
Administration came out and condemned the Ukrainians for
hitting Russia's oil and gas infrastructure and suggested that
they should not do that again.
Can you tell me why, while Russia is attacking Ukrainians'
oil and gas and energy sector, why shouldn't the Ukrainians
attack the Russian oil and gas and energy sector?
Dr. Wallander. The issue on attacking critical
infrastructure is when those are civilian targets, we have
concerns because Ukraine holds itself to the highest standards
of observing the laws of armed conflict, and that is one of the
elements of being a European democracy.
Mr. Scott. But the Russians are attacking the oil and gas
infrastructure in Ukraine, correct?
Dr. Wallander. Absolutely.
Mr. Scott. And if you are going to win a war, you can't sit
back and take punches and not deliver punches, so why shouldn't
the Ukrainians attack the oil and gas infrastructure in Russia?
Dr. Wallander. Congressman, we have concerns about striking
at civilian targets when we support countries. Again, this is
Ukraine's sovereign decision, but we expressed those concerns.
Mr. Scott. But those oil and gas infrastructures in Russia
are owned by the Kremlin, correct? It is not like they are
owned by a private corporation that had shareholders and
private assets that are being destroyed.
Dr. Wallander. They are owned by private Russian citizens
who are part of the Putin regime. That is correct.
Mr. Scott. I mean, it makes sense to me that we should
destroy them.
General Cavoli, you talked a lot about our NATO partners
and their ascension to the 2 percent. Russia is currently
spending, as I understand it, 6 percent of their GDP on their
military. My question is, is the 2 percent enough? If your
enemy is spending 6 percent, if your greatest threat is coming
from a country that is spending 6 percent of GDP, should that 2
percent threshold--should we work to raise that 2 percent
threshold for the NATO partnerships?
General Cavoli. Thanks, Congressman. So, first of all,
there is a lively discussion among the nations in NATO right
now about whether 2 percent is even any longer the relevant
figure. Should it be higher? As you know, a number of our
allies are spending significantly above 2 percent. I would call
attention to Poland here especially, which is closing in on 4
percent of GDP.
I personally believe, in the absence of any North Atlantic
Council decision or agreement, I do think we are going to find
that 3--that 2 percent is too low a figure. We have plans that
have driven force structure requirements that nations are now
going to be asked to build towards, so there is a--there is a
blueprint, there is a shopping list for that 2 percent, and I
think we are going to find that 2 percent goes pretty quickly,
Congressman.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, I just want to join the Chairman and the
Ranking Member in terms of the urgency of getting this
supplemental assistance package voted on. Again, I think it is
important to remember that the vote in the Senate was 70 to 28,
which, you know, in this polarized environment that sends a
very strong, confident message that the votes will be there in
the House if we take this measure up, and hopefully we could do
it tonight.
There is a discharge petition that has actually been filed
to force a vote, and it is just shy of 200. 218 is the magic
number and, again, something hopefully members will think about
as the clock keeps ticking in terms of the urgency of this
issue.
General, your testimony pretty powerfully described the
fact that, in pages 2 to 5 about the fact that, you know,
Russia, despite the, like, horrific losses that they are
experiencing, that is not slowing down investment in their
military and their defense sector.
And you and I just had a brief conversation to talk about,
you know, one of the areas where they have been continuing to
invest is in the undersea domain. Particularly, again, because
of their presence and activities in the North Atlantic, they
have been steadily increasing over the years with construction
of more sophisticated submarines, such as the Severodvinsk
class and the upgraded Kilo platforms.
Again, I know a lot of this sort of topic has to happen or
be discussed in a classified setting, but I guess the question
is that, in terms of your command, I mean, and your
predecessors have testified to this in the past, the Russian
submarine activity in the North Atlantic is steadily, surely,
in 2022, 2023, 2024, growing. Is that correct?
General Cavoli. Absolutely. Correct.
Mr. Courtney. And can you talk about the need for, you
know, our Navy to, again, have adequate attack submarine fleet
to be out there to, again, safely and effectively conduct anti-
submarine warfare?
General Cavoli. Yes, Congressman. Thank you for the
opportunity, in fact, because I think it is an extremely
important topic. We absolutely have a need for a strong
undersea warfare capability. As you pointed out, the Russian
losses in Ukraine have been primarily in the land domain. We do
not see significant losses in the air domain, especially their
long-range and strategic aviation fleets.
Other than the Black Sea Fleet losses, we see no losses in
the rest of the Russian Navy fleet. And in the modernizing,
rapidly modernizing nuclear forces, we see continued investment
and heightened level of activities underwater especially.
So our ability to handle that depends on a number of
different things, but one of the primary things it depends on
is our attack submarine fleet. And we have requirements that I
share with US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to defend the
United States against the threat posed by Russian submarines,
and we can always use more submarines to pursue that threat,
sir. Absolutely.
Mr. Courtney. So to just put it more, you know, bluntly, I
mean, your requests in terms of requirements are not met in
terms of what is available in terms of the missions.
General Cavoli. My requirements exceed what I am provided
on a regular basis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you. Again, you mentioned the
Black Sea, you know, activities that are out there. I mean, in
terms of people who are--sort of have doubts about, you know,
Ukraine's commitment to stay in the fight here, I mean, it
actually has been just, in my opinion, an underplayed success
in terms of how they have, with no navy, really been able to
inflict incredible losses. Twenty percent of the Black Sea
Fleet was the latest number I saw.
Can you just sort of comment in terms of, you know, that
sort of signal that, you know, they are in the fight, and there
is a plan.
General Cavoli. Absolutely. It is easy sometimes I think,
Congressman, for us to stare at the fight on the land and think
that it represents the totality of the situation. It does not.
The fight on the Black Sea and the fight for the Black Sea is
an important part of this. It is especially important because
of what it does for the Ukrainian economy. Without the rollback
of the Black Sea Fleet, we wouldn't be able to get as much of
Ukraine's grain out and on to market. That would cause food
security problems across the globe and severe and acute
problems for the economy of Ukraine, which is obviously under
great stress as it is.
I think the Ukrainians have done a fantastic and
groundbreaking job using largely unmanned systems to push the
Russian fleet back east of Crimea. It is very rare that a
Russian warship ventures past the western--ventures west of the
southern tip of Crimea right now.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
General Cavoli. It is a big success story, and it is
theirs.
Mr. Courtney. I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. Dr. Wallander, first, I want to
say thank you. I was pleased to see that the Pentagon's Office
of Inspector General (OIG) launch of the new website last month
that will allow the American people to directly see where our
tax dollars are being spent to support Ukraine--something we
have been talking about I think for about 6 months in our
briefings--it is still a pretty hard sell back home because
people don't see a pathway to victory.
Basically, you know, what they are seeing is a stalemate
that has drug on for 2 years now. And with the continued
problems in our own country with the border, et cetera, it is
hard to justify this spending, even though most of us in this
room understand the importance of it.
You know, one message it does seem to sell back home is
when you talk about the evolving alliance between Russia,
China, Iran, and North Korea, it is almost an axis similar to
World War II, Germany, and Italy, and Japan. So that seems to
get people's attention.
What do you both see as a successful end of the conflict in
Ukraine? And what more can the Administration and the DoD do to
message the reasoning for spending this money to the folks back
home?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. In addition to the
strategic objectives that I already identified on--as Ukraine
remaining a sovereign, independent European democracy, let me
clarify that we are also supporting Ukraine to put it in the
best possible position should Russia want to negotiate an end
to the conflict on Ukraine's terms.
In order for Ukraine to be in the driver's seat in any
negotiation, they have to have the advantage. And the military
and security assistance support that we have been providing to
Ukraine has given them significant advantages, including
controlling most of their Black Sea coast, as General Cavoli
pointed out. So those are the stakes, and the answer also has
to be that constituents need to understand that of the $60
billion in the supplemental that was requested, 48 billion of
that goes to American industry to either replenish U.S. stocks
or to procure for the longer term and to support General
Cavoli's forces in Europe, who are working to defend and deter.
So that is money going actually to American companies and
to American citizens to support the work that they are doing
for European security.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And I think that is the message the
President should deliver directly to the country. I have said
that before, and I still think that, you know, they are not
getting that message. I hear and understand what you are
saying, and I think it would help to hear that.
I wanted to get both of your opinion on Secretary Blinken's
announcement last week that Ukraine will become a member of
NATO sooner or later. It seems like a pretty provocative
remark, and I wanted to see if you had any response to it.
Dr. Wallander. U.S. policy since I believe it was 2008 has
been that Ukraine will be a member of NATO someday, and we have
focused our bilateral relationship, as well as the work we do
with NATO allies, to bring Ukraine up to the standards of not
just NATO membership, but EU membership, because that is the
aspiration of the Ukraine people. They have elected leaders
again and again who have promised to keep Ukraine on that path.
So that--Secretary Blinken was reiterating a longstanding,
bipartisan policy.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Well, if memory serves, 2 years ago
that was a major red line for Putin, if Ukraine entered NATO,
the escalation could go way beyond Ukraine, at least that was
his threat and one of the reasons that I think even Zelensky
said Ukraine does not want to be a member of NATO, or at least
at that time.
So it just seems antithetical in a way to throw that out
there right now while we are trying to secure peace and/or
victory in Ukraine. You know, maybe that is something that
should have happened 2 years ago in hindsight, but who knows?
But it just seemed pretty bold.
General, did you have any opinion on that?
General Cavoli. No, not with regard to U.S. policy,
Congressman. I would just add, from a NATO perspective, NATO's
agreed policy among the 32 nations is that when the time is
right, and all allies agree, Ukraine will become a member of
the Alliance. But those two conditions are an important part of
NATO's position, and they have not been met yet.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And a personal
thank-you to you for your strong statement about the necessity
of passing the supplemental bill. Your leadership and the
colleagues--all of us on this committee--play a critical role
in getting that done.
And my question really goes to General Cavoli. In your
written statement, you continue to use, quote, ``Despite its
military's evident deficiencies, dysfunction, Russia continues
to pose an existential threat to Ukraine. Ukraine cannot
sustain the fight alone. The United States, our allies and
partners, must continue to provide Ukraine with munitions,
weapons, and materiel.''
How dire is the situation in Ukraine? And what is the role
of the United States not providing support to that dire
situation, if in fact it is dire?
General Cavoli. Thank you, Congressman. The situation is
extremely serious. The best way to think about this is in terms
of what are the specific things that Ukraine needs. Our allies
provide for some of those things, right? For instance, tanks.
Ninety percent--more than 90 percent of the tanks that have
been given have not been given by the United States. They have
been given by allies. They are sustained by allies.
One hundred percent of the fuel, the petroleum products,
that Ukraine needs have been provided by allies, not by--not by
the United States. But there are two places where the American
contribution is critical. They are in the provision of
artillery munitions and interceptors for air defense. Those two
things also happen to be the most critical things on the
battlefield.
The biggest killer on the battlefield is artillery in most
conflicts, but in this one definitely. And should Ukraine run
out, they would run out because we stopped supplying because we
supply the lion's share of that 155.
Likewise, the air defense interceptors, sir. Russia
launches very large-scale attacks every few days, keeping with
their production rate, what we believe their production rate to
be. They produce, they save up, they launch a big attack. Those
attacks would absolutely cripple the economy and the civil
society as well as the military of Ukraine if they were not
defended against. Without U.S. provision of interceptors, that
will happen.
And, in closed session, Congressman, I would be delighted
to talk to you about the exact consumption rates and exactly
how long I would predict things could go on without a
supplemental.
Mr. Garamendi. I think it is extremely important that in an
open session we fully understand the critical situation and the
timeframes associated with it. To the extent that you can
describe it, you have already described it as an existential,
dire threat without United States' munitions, 155s, and air
defense. Plow that field another time. If you want to restate
it, restate it. It is absolutely critical that this Congress
and the American public understand the situation. So say it
again if you need to.
And, Ms. Wallander, if you would also chime in here from
your perspective.
Dr. Wallander. Just two points to reinforce this. We are
already seeing the effects of the failure to pass the
supplemental. The Ukrainians are having to use less artillery.
They are having--the Russians have made some advances, and they
are having to decide what to defend, and that is why the
Russian attacks are getting through and really harming the
Ukrainian electricity grid. So we don't need to imagine. We are
already seeing it.
Mr. Garamendi. General?
General Cavoli. So the Ukrainians have been husbanding
their shells in anticipation of, you know, the supply running
out, Congressman. They have been rationing them. They are now
being out-shot by the Russian side 5 to 1. So Russians fire 5
times as many artillery shells at the Ukrainians than the
Ukrainians are able to fire back.
That will immediately go to 10 to 1 in a matter of weeks.
We are not talking about months. We are not talking
hypothetically. Again, I would like to be detailed in closed
session, but we are talking about weeks, Congressman. Thank you
for the opportunity to underline that. I do not see----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Garamendi. --how they would win.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Nebraska, Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, both, for being here. I appreciate
your testimony. I was just meeting with Israeli families of
hostages, so I may duplicate some of the questions. But the
first thing I would like to know, if Russians prevailed in
Ukraine, what is the likely outcome for Moldova?
Dr. Wallander. Well, Russia already occupies Moldovan
territory. It uses that military occupation to subvert
Moldova's democracy and its economy, corruption is rampant
because of that Russian influence. And Moldova is very much, in
Russian policy, unfinished business. They have been limited by
being able to control more territory because Moldova--because
Ukraine stands between Moldova and Russia. But Moldova ranks
high as part of Putin's unfinished business.
Mr. Bacon. It stands to reason if Ukraine falls, Moldova
will be next. Also Russian leaders have been threatening the
Estonian Prime Minister, the Latvian Prime Minister, in fact a
leader in the Kremlin called them fake states. How much threats
will the Baltics be under if Ukraine falls?
Dr. Wallander. Again, Russian nationalists and Putin
themselves are very public, and clear that they believe that
the status of the Baltic States as former elements of the
Russian Empire remains unresolved, and that is business that
they intend to get to. I do believe that NATO's Article Five
commitment is strong and credible, and we need to keep it so.
But we also need to make sure that Russia's operations in
Ukraine are a failure.
Mr. Bacon. Well, what we are saying here is this is that--
this war with Ukraine by the way, just on its own merits, is
barbaric. Russia's invading a country that was independent,
wanted to go towards the west, wanted to go to free markets, it
was an unprovoked invasion by Russia. So, it is bad in its own
right, but this war with Ukraine is not just about Ukraine,
would you agree?
Dr. Wallander. I absolutely agree with you, sir.
Mr. Bacon. Well, thank you. I am the Baltic Security Chair,
I'd like to maybe ask General Cavoli if you could talk a little
bit about what we're doing there. I know we're trying to get
better air defenses, we're trying to get more--a division
equivalent there. But could you give us an update how we're
doing? Because I think it's very much in our national security
interest to have a deterrence in the Baltics.
General Cavoli. First of all, Congressman, I agree with you
on that last point, absolutely. I think our ability to help
deter conflict in the Baltics is extremely important, it is a
vulnerable part geographically speaking, military geography of
the alliance. I would also point out that Dr. Wallander's
comments about Russia's intentions, which reflected yours,
those are shared by the leaders of those countries.
And they feel them acutely, and talk to me about them
frequently, and I agree with their concerns. So, Congress has
been very generous, and provided for a Baltic Security
Initiative, and----
Mr. Bacon. I also point out our initiative, which not to
brag on it.
General Cavoli. Okay, we're about one point four billion
into that right now. We have started with air and missile
defense improvements, we have completed the sensor networks,
and now we're moving into effectors, or the shooters. I think
it's having a big effect there. In parallel, we've got the
plans in place for the other five components, which include
land forces, medical forces, and the other things you're aware
of, sir.
It's going very well, I mean we have eager, eager partners
there, right? The three Baltic countries in and of themselves,
just individually, are very serious about their defense, and
have done extraordinary things to prepare. Different things in
some cases, but extraordinary. In the case of Latvia they've
reintroduced conscription for example, which is not something
we would have been thinking about some years ago.
In addition to the Baltic Security Initiative, we're doing
a few other things. As the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe
I'm responsible to put together a plan for rotational air and
missile defense. One of the primary locations for those
rotations is going to be in the Baltic countries.
Mr. Bacon. That's great.
General Cavoli. And then we have bilateral agreements that
have been made between our secretary and the ministers of all
three countries. So, as the U.S. European Commander, I maintain
forces in each of those countries, they work to improve our
interoperability, and stiffen the defense capabilities.
Mr. Bacon. I don't have, really time for another question,
but I have to make a comment, something for you to chew on. I
support having armored units in Poland and Eastern Europe, but
being at the rotational, it is putting a huge strain on the
families, and we saw a report that suicide rates for folks in
these armored units are significantly higher than the rest of
the Army.
I think they need some kind of stability, maybe a
permanency there. We don't have time for you to answer, but
this is a huge concern for many of us. Thank you.
I yield.
The Chairman. And I would echo that, I would like to have
more discussion with you, General, about exactly that point.
But anyway, we will recognize the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cavoli, you
termed this as extremely serious. You said that the severity of
this moment, this moment can't be overstated. And I have heard
political deflection here in this committee today, and I hear
it outside of this committee room on the floor, I hear it in
all kinds of news reports, deflection.
Deflection mentioning President Biden, that two or three
years ago maybe he should have done more. Deflection that there
is no policy in spite of the fact that Dr. Wallander just
concisely laid out our policy very clearly. Deflection that
Europe's not doing enough, and why should we do anything if
they're not doing enough, when we know that the GDP of European
countries is greater than ours committed to this.
We know that a new NATO country like Finland is committed
to ten years of their fight against Ukraine. We know even that
historically Germany, for the first time since World War II is
deploying troops right in Lithuania, something that you
wouldn't believe was possible even a year ago, to put a line of
defense up against Russia's aggression. And we've heard the
name Biden again, and Biden again, yet we're here right now in
this Congress with our responsibility, and one person is
holding this up.
One person is holding up a huge bipartisan supported
package in the Senate. Supported by the President and the
Administration, supported by the majority of people on this
committee across the aisle, and I think close to three hundred
members on the floor. One person. But I have never heard the
name Speaker Johnson invoked once, not once. The person that's
holding this up, not once.
And I hope during the committee that we will hear that
name, because he is holding this up, and we need action right
now, which you have made very clearly. One thing I want to
extend is the idea that China is looking. China's doing more
than looking right now. Chinese have entered agreement with
Hungary, led by President Orban, who the former president
praises and emulates.
Entered an agreement allowing Chinese police to patrol the
streets of Hungary, a NATO country. China has helped rebuild
Russia's defense industrially, and economically, militarily has
helped them in this war, providing non-lethal assistance in
drones, and computer chips, and increased imports in Russian
goods by twelve percent last year. China's no limit partnership
is parroting Russian disinformation about Ukraine.
And several European ports have entered into agreements
with China's National Transportation & Logistics Public
Information Platform where they present a risk, I believe to
U.S. and NATO allies that use these European ports to ship
military equipment throughout the region. So, all these things
are real, and we do nothing here in Congress, when we can do
the one thing that would be the most important thing at this
moment that's so serious.
I just want to comment for those too that don't recognize
the threat to the rest of Europe in terms of the Russian
aggression in Ukraine. And that is the fact that just a few
weeks ago Belarus began military exercises on its border.
Belarus, the ally of Russia in this, the proxy of Russia in
this. They began military exercise on the border not just with
Ukraine, but with Lithuania and Poland.
So, I would ask about the significance of this, and to
emphasize once again what the threat is to the rest of Europe
here, including with this recent military exercise, two NATO
countries where we have an Article Five commitment, a
commitment that Europe and the rest of our allies came to our
call after 9/11 to do everything we can, including deploying
troops on the ground, U.S. troops on the ground, if you could?
General Cavoli. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, so if Belarus
is an extension of Russia, and its military is an extension of
the Russian military, that closes the gap between the Russian
armed forces and NATO, and that presents additional problems in
terms of time, space, in strictly military terms. Our allies
there realize that.
Our allies, when faced with the weaponization of
immigration last couple of years, both state sponsored pushes
of migrants across the border into Poland and Lithuania, both
responded by fortifying the border, and closing the border with
Belarus. So, relations with Belarus are going in the wrong
direction, and it is because of Russia, and it does have
military complications. Beyond that, perhaps Dr. Wallander has
something to say.
Mr. Keating. Thank you very much, I yield back.
Mr. Scott. [Presiding.] Mr. Moylan, you're recognized for
five minutes.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General, for your leadership in working with our NATO allies.
It is a lot of coordination to do, but obviously you're asking
us to continue to support, and which I absolutely do. Our
allies, of course, are important, there are future battles as
well, and General, my first question regards just that, and
NATO's responsibility, and what they are able to do for future
battles.
Specifically, as we look at Guam, Hawaii, and other U.S.
Pacific island territories who are not covered under Article
Five of the NATO chapter. Meaning if these jurisdictions were
attacked, NATO allies would not be obligated to defend the
United States. Now, while many countries have vowed, they vowed
to defend the U.S. in the Pacific, what assurance can EUCOM
give to my constituents in Guam regarding the relationship to
NATO?
General Cavoli. Thanks, Congressman. First, a little bit
about the coverage of the North Atlantic Treaty, or the
Washington Treaty, as it were. Article Six lays out what the
boundaries are that were agreed at the time, and have been
routinely updated over the years. It is north of the Tropic of
Cancer is the first thing. That excludes French possessions in
Polynesia like French Polynesia, it excludes British
possessions such as the Pitcairn Islands, and it technically
excludes Guam.
However, that is changeable, it is amendable. All nations,
to include the United States, have elected not to amend that
over the years, and opportunities have come up. So, as a highly
technical matter, that's correct. However, any nation--under
Article Four, any nation that is attacked any place can always
invoke consultations under Article Four. Say I have been
attacked, and I expect the rest of you to do something about
it.
And they may or may not choose to apply Article Five no
matter what the treaty says. So, it is a technicality, is it a
technicality that's within our hands to amend? But I also think
it is an extremely unlikely scenario, and I know that our
allies are committed to our defense, just as we are to theirs,
sir.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, General, it's very assuring, and
appreciate that. My final question is the future battlefields
will present some unique challengers in the form of great
distance in air and sea. On 2021 Rear Admiral Duke Heinz, Chief
Logistic for EUCOM, stated the contest environment demands
swift adaptability and flexibility to roll out new ways to
address challenges.
One of those challenges will be the medical evacuation of
our service members. General, given the different environments,
and climates, and geographic combatant commands, has there been
talks of best practices for the most effective medical
evaluation plans that will result in the continued tactical,
operational, and strategic advantages for our various commands
and combatant commanders?
General Cavoli. Yeah, absolutely, Congressman, it is
something we work on quite a bit. We work on it even harder now
because of what we are observing in Ukraine, the casualty rates
are just enormous. And if you contemplate a large-scale war
across the European continent, we can expect them to be
greater. So, medical evacuation, a casualty evacuation inside
the European theater would necessarily and inevitably include
civilian infrastructure.
And we have coordination cells in NATO that helps us do
that, and Duke Heinz also was responsible for making sure that
as U.S. European Command, we were plugged into that system. It
is complicated because each country has its own national health
system, some don't have national health systems, so there is
quite a patchwork to be put together. At the tactical level, I
think getting a casualty off the battlefield is something we're
entirely capable of doing.
The further processing of casualties beyond that is where
it would become complicated. The second point I would make on
this has to do with the Defense Health Agency, and the
transition to a new healthcare system. The healthcare system,
the military healthcare system in the European theater, and I
believe ``Lung'' Aquilino feels this way in the Pacific as
well, is actually an inherent part of our combat capability.
And so, we've been lucky to be able to be sort of last in
line for some of the transition there. The final thing I would
say is I am concerned about this. One of the only things I
offered as an unfunded priority back to the Congress this year,
sir, was the construction of an air medical evacuation facility
at Ramstein. Thank you for the opportunity, sir.
Mr. Moylan. I appreciate that, thank you for your
leadership, and protecting our nation.
The Chairman. [Presiding.] The chair now recognizes the
gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. Slotkin.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you, Chairman. And I want to appreciate
our Chairman and Ranking Member for their bipartisan support
for aid. We do need to get it over the finish line, and
supporting it here in committee, and supporting it out in the
world is great. But we need to get it on the floor, we have
heard this repeatedly. Speaker Johnson has a choice to make, I
accept that it is a complicated choice.
I accept that he is at risk of losing his job over that
choice, but that is what leadership is, it is the big boy
pants, and making tough choices. I also want to note that there
is a discharge petition right now on the floor of the House. It
is the exact bipartisan bill that the Senate passed that
includes Ukraine aid. We have one Republican who signed it on
his way out the door.
We need, I think, two more in order to have a vote that
will pass on the House floor. So, we are not without action
here, without actions that we can take to move this forward,
even members of this committee. You have spoken eloquently
about the consequences of not providing aid, about what Putin
will do, or what he is proven to do, I mean what he has
demonstrated he will do.
You have talked about how China is watching, and the
demonstration this is setting. To my knowledge, unless someone
corrects me, the United States of America has never allowed a
sitting democracy to be taken over by a sitting autocracy since
World War II, correct me if I am wrong. So, this would be
precedent setting, and Ronald Reagan is right now spinning in
his grave that we are giving up, or threatening to give up on
peace through strength.
And I am super confused by the messages coming out of some
of the members of the other side of the aisle both here and in
the Senate about how Vladimir Putin should get a choice on who
gets in NATO. That somehow he has a veto over our alliances.
And maybe that logic would make sense if we thought that it
would prevent him from invading other countries, if a deal with
him would prevent--but he has gone into Moldova, and Georgia,
and Ukraine, and Ukraine again.
So, he has done it, people. There is no deterring him
unless we take a strong stand, and that includes U.S. aid. I
saw a report in the Washington Post yesterday that made my
breath vacate my body, that while we are complaining about how
the rise of Iranian weapons are being used by the Russians in
Ukraine, that out of desperation the United States of America
is now sending seized Iranian weapons from the Houthis from
Yemen area to Ukraine.
Please give me the details on that, and help us understand
just the depths of our desperation, I guess, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ASD) Wallander.
Dr. Wallander. Well, I can talk more about the details of
provisions and specific capabilities to Ukraine, but we have
used every opportunity to find ways since December to find
extra stocks to work with allies and partners, and we have had
to get quite creative, and the Ukrainians have made good use of
that while we wait for a decision on the supplemental.
Ms. Slotkin. I just, I think again, if Ronald Reagan was
spinning at our hesitance in providing arms to Ukraine, he is,
I don't know what, exploding if he would see that seized
Iranian weapons are now helping a partner stave off further
invasion of their country. Can you outline for us what you
think additional air defenses could do? Or basically can you
outline what you think would be sort of the next things that we
would want to provide in terms of not quantity but quality to
the Ukrainians that might have a decisive impact?
We have lots of questions about air defenses, but can you
walk me through certain systems in this next tranche that would
be decisive?
Dr. Wallander. So, thank you for the question because I
want to highlight something that often gets missed. Which is
the supplemental would include not just Presidential drawdown
authority (PDA), urgent--the capability we can deliver next
week, as fast as EUCOM can move it. But putting on contract
things like Patriot systems, replenishment missiles for
National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMs),
replenishment missiles for Patriots.
And those are long lead times, but the sooner we can put
them on contract the sooner we can get them to Ukraine so
Russia knows that they can't wait us out, that Ukraine will
continue to be able to defend itself. I will turn to General
Cavoli to speak about priorities, but I think that those are
the stakes as well.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
General Cavoli. In addition to that, it is the monies that
provide the demand signal that creates investment in the
defense industrial base, and that is one of our big challenges,
getting our war time production up, Congressman. Yes----
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.
Banks.
Mr. Banks. Dr. Wallander, DOD admitted last month that it
underestimated the cost of replacing American weapons we have
sent to Ukraine, leaving a ten billion dollar hole in our own
stockpiles. The day after announcing that it was overdrawn, the
DOD took three hundred million dollars that it found and
immediately sent it to Ukraine. Why didn't that money go to
filling the ten billion dollar hole in our own stocks?
Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I apologize, I believe what we
did was we assessed that we had overvalued the value of the
stocks that were given to Ukraine, and that was what created--
we hadn't used as much PDA authority as we had originally
estimated. So, the reference you made to that particular
package was that there had been an overvaluation of what the
material and stocks were. So, it gave us more headroom to be
able to provide capabilities to Ukraine.
Mr. Banks. What does that mean? Mysteriously finding the
three hundred million dollars? You say overestimating, unpack
that more, what does that mean, how does that happen?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, sir. The procedures for PDA is you are
supposed to value it at the value of the existing stock, not
the replacement value. The replenishment value is absolutely
key, as you note, and the replenishment money in the
supplemental is calculated at the cost of replenishing. But in
terms of the value under the PDA authority, I know it's very
technical and mind blowing.
But the value of what we have authority from Congress to
give Ukraine is supposed to be set at what the value of the
stocks themselves were.
Mr. Banks. Is this unusual? I mean mind blowing, three
hundred million dollars, it seems like that would be very
unusual.
Dr. Wallander. That was over a period of two years of PDAs,
so I can't give you the exact percentage of what that was of
the value of the PDA, but I can follow up with you on that
part.
Mr. Banks. It seems to me like funny math. So, we overvalue
three hundred million dollars, so we sent more money to
Ukraine. I'm trying to wrap my head around it, and I can't.
Dr. Wallander. We sent more--not money, sir, we sent more
capability, more equipment.
Mr. Banks. Why the emphasis on sending more money to
Ukraine over replenishing our own stockpiles?
Dr. Wallander. There is not, those go hand in glove. In
replenishing our stockpiles, we need the authority and the
appropriation from Congress for the replenishment funds, as
well as the authority for the PDA draw down.
Mr. Banks. But you seem to be more interested in sending
our stockpiles to Ukraine instead of replenishing them here.
I'm not trying to make a point, I am just really confused by
it. We find an extra three hundred million, we shovel it to
Ukraine.
Dr. Wallander. Again, that was the authority, and it is
matched by the replenishment money that Congress has provided
us, and that we need in order to be able to do more under the
supplemental.
Mr. Banks. So, after you found this three hundred million
dollar, as you said, mind blowing is a great word for it, did
you do something to address that moving forward, that we are
not going to find another--that the Pentagon is not going to
mysteriously find another three hundred million dollars in
extra money next year? How do you account for that moving
forward?
Dr. Wallander. We do believe that that was a one time
opportunity that we were able to advance because of the waiting
for the decision on the supplemental. We do not expect that
there will be similar findings, and savings.
Mr. Banks. So, the public is hopefully paying attention to
this hearing today, and they hear about the Pentagon, I mean
the media covered this as well, headlines about three hundred
million dollars found at the Pentagon, I mean is that
embarrassing to you?
Dr. Wallander. I was relieved that we were able to provide
capabilities to Ukraine----
Mr. Banks. You are coming here asking us for more money to
do more for Ukraine, but the Pentagon mysteriously finds three
hundred million dollars in extra money that we can give to
Ukraine. I mean, it is really, is that embarrassing?
Dr. Wallander. I was relieved that we were able to find
authority to be able to provide Ukraine with some artillery
ammunition so that Ukrainian forces don't get overwhelmed on
the front lines.
Mr. Banks. Your colleague said last year that it would be
bad to send six hundred and fifty million dollars of U.S.
weapons to Taiwan without cash to replace them. Do you think it
is dangerous to send Ukraine four billion dollars in weaponry
without the funding?
Dr. Wallander. We would not send capabilities to Ukraine
were it not for Congress passing appropriations for
replenishment.
Mr. Banks. I have got to say, I lose trust in you and the
Pentagon when incredibly, a mind blowing three hundred million
dollars is found and sent to Ukraine rather than replenishing
our own stockpiles, it is really bizarre.
I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Moulton, for five minutes.
Mr. Moulton. Dr. Wallander, I have a question about
disinformation. You warn in your written statement that
Russia's cyber and disinformation campaigns continue to
threaten Euro Atlantic security. We know that Russia has
interfered in U.S. elections since at least 2016, and it is
likely that Putin will ramp up disinformation campaigns as we
move towards November's presidential election. Is Russia's
disinformation machine trying to undermine U.S. support for
Ukraine?
Dr. Wallander. Russia's disinformation machine is working
not just in the United States to undermine support, but
throughout Europe, and indeed globally. And it is being
magnified, and picked up by disinformation operations in places
advanced by China as well.
Mr. Moulton. Is Russia's disinformation machine trying to
undermine U.S. support for NATO?
Dr. Wallander. Russia's disinformation machine has been
ramped up to undermine support for NATO, to try to raise doubts
in Europe and in the United States about the value of the
alliance to American security.
Mr. Moulton. So, would you say that when Republicans echo
these sentiments trying to undermine support for Ukraine,
trying to undermine support for NATO, they are essentially
echoing Russian propaganda?
Dr. Wallander. I think it is extremely important to make
sure that the American people know when they are being
influenced by Russian disinformation, and exposing that
disinformation is something that we work on in the interagency,
not just DOD, but we work with State, and with other agencies
of the U.S. government so Americans understand very clearly
where that disinformation is coming from.
Mr. Moulton. Well, the Kremlin has made it very clear in a
recently released trove of documents that they know exactly
what they are doing in trying to get Republicans to support
their cause. I am also concerned about China's increasing
willingness to conduct disinformation and electoral
interference campaigns against the U.S. General Cavoli, how is
China coordinating with Russia to spread disinformation
throughout the U.S. and Europe?
General Cavoli. Congressman, China coordinates both in
general terms, that is sort of echoing, and sort of
spontaneously echoing, they echo each other's messages in that
regard, and we also believe that there is some specific
coordination, in closed session I think we could discuss the
specifics of that. But your general point, I think is
absolutely correct. This is a concerted effort, and it is not a
single nation doing it.
Mr. Moulton. Well, I mean just, I want to be clear so
everyone understands. Russia has a clear policy of trying to
get conservative elements of the United States to trumpet their
propaganda, and they are coordinating with China on this
propaganda. So, some members of Congress are becoming
mouthpieces for Russian and essentially Chinese propaganda in
the United States. I want to turn to a few lessons learned from
Ukraine.
The conflict is providing an important insight into ways
that electronic warfare and drones are used on the battlefield,
and obviously we have to learn from these examples. I mean we
have seen five thousand dollar drones take out five million
dollar tanks with ease. So, General Cavoli, what are some of
the lessons that DOD is learning from the use and counter use
of drones and electronic warfare in Ukraine, and how are we
quickly adopting those lessons for our own troops?
General Cavoli. The Department of Defense and the services
individually are very closely studying what is going on in
Ukraine through a variety of overt and not overt means,
Congressman. We are studying it very closely on a technical
level, as well as at a tactical level. Drones do seem to be a
feature of this war that is unexpectedly significant. I
personally think that we have to be a little bit careful
overdrawing conclusions about it.
Many of the drones involved are not very destructive,
especially the small commercially available ones, or home-made
types. And we don't yet see them, drones being able to replace
concentrated artillery fire for example, but it is a great
supplement to what is going on. With regard to electronic
warfare, a lot of it we are familiar with, we have waged
electronic warfare in the past and we know how to defend
against it.
But the quantity of it and the ubiquity of it across the
battlefield is important, and we are working on a lot of
technical solutions, Congressman.
Mr. Moulton. So, General, if I go and visit some of your
troops training in the field, are they going to be training in
an environment with a lot of drones, and a lot of electronic
warfare, or are they going to have a few token drones flying
around?
General Cavoli. Yes, I think throughout the Army right now,
especially in the Marine Corps, the ground forces, you would
find a great deal of experimentation, as well as rapid fielding
of small drones across the force. Both electronic warfare and
drones are difficult to train with because of civil
restrictions in airspace, and things like that, and spectrum
management. But we manage to, and we are very enthusiastic
about it.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk today
about NATO contributions to its own defense. And you have both
stated in your opening statements, kind of patting ourselves on
the back that we are going from the pathetic number of eleven
out of thirty, thirty-one member nations contributing its bare
minimum of two percent to its national defense that--wow, we
are going to twenty now, and we are on the right path.
I think, frankly, that is the tyranny of low expectations,
and it has infected our national security apparatus for many,
many decades. Including the many years that our European, look,
we can be friends, and allies, and have tough conversations.
But if we don't start imposing real consequences, if we don't
start using the leverage we have, we literally cannot afford to
subsidize European defense any longer.
And what we often talk about, I mean we are talking about
the front-line European nations, they are contributing, the
Baltics, Poland. But when we are talking about France, when we
are talking about Germany, when we are talking about Spain,
when we are talking about Italy, they are not. And all of those
heads of state will be here in Washington for the Washington
Summit this summer. Dr. Wallander, how are we as a matter of
policy going to go from eleven to thirty-one contributing the
minimum, the bare minimum?
Not half, not a third, because we are continuously, and you
are asking us to go to the American people again, and again,
and we will be having the same conversation at this posture
hearing, Mr. Chairman, next year. American people dig deeper in
your pockets because European politicians can't and won't get
their people to dig deeper in their pockets. It is a good deal
for them, it is a bad deal for the American people.
This is pathetic. Half, half is what we are congratulating
ourselves for? Do you think that is a good deal for the
American people, Dr. Wallander?
Dr. Wallander. No, I fully agree with you, it should be
thirty-two, and we press----
Mr. Waltz. What is the administration's plan, aside from
asking, to get them to do it?
Dr. Wallander. So, the plan has already yielded
improvement, and we can share with you the updated numbers.
There are, as of today, eighteen NATO allies who meet two
percent, which is fourteen too few. We expect around several
more by the time of the summit to announce publicly that they
have met two percent. And we expect several other allies to
have----
Mr. Waltz. No, no, no, that two percent of that, they are
on some kind of future pathway.
Dr. Wallander. That they have reached two percent, we
expect the number to be larger by the summit.
Mr. Waltz. We have Chancellor Scholz in his famous speech
in 2022 just after the invasion, promised to enshrine the two
percent in law, the German Chancellor, he did not. In fact they
voted it down in their Parliament. Italian Prime Minister
Meloni promised in 2023 Italian defense spending would
increase, saying quote ``freedom has a price'' Italian defense
spending is actually declining.
Spanish prime minister promises by 2029 two percent, it
would have to double its defense budget. You know who is
doubling their defense budget in relation to the threat? Japan
is, their prime minister is here, they are living up to their
shared burden commitment, the European nations are not. Mr.
Chairman, it is not only the defense spending, what they are
giving is in horrible condition. I'd like to enter into the
record Ukraine rejects German leopard tanks due to their poor
condition.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 93.]
Mr. Waltz. In this article by Reuters, the tanks currently
stranded in Poland constitute the second part of a large-scale
supply of German Leopard tanks. By the way, these are the ones
that they leveraged to get us to contribute ours. The tanks
were retired from active service more than a decade ago. So,
our European allies are under giving, what they are giving is
often late.
What you see in the charts are often commitments and
promises, we saw that in Afghanistan for years. And then what
they are giving late and too few is often in poor condition.
Dr. Wallander, how are we going to get to thirty-two? Will you
commit to get us to thirty-two within the next three years? Is
that possible?
Dr. Wallander. We will commit to work with those allies who
have not met their commitment, their required commitment that
they agreed to at Vilnius, and get to thirty-two one by one.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired, although he
makes an outstanding point.
The gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. Sherrill, is
recognized.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And it is really, I
think as we have heard today, necessary that we get a vote on
the floor of the bipartisan supplemental. We have been waiting
now for far too long, and every day that we wait Ukraine
suffers, and those fighting for Ukraine suffer. And it is
estimated that since Putin's illegal invasion of Ukraine, our
allies and partners have actually committed around forty-four
point three billion dollars to direct security assistance to
Ukraine.
In fact as a percentage of GDP, the United States only
ranks at sixteen among all of the countries in NATO. So, our
NATO allies have also made significant plans and commitments to
improve the alliance's collective defense and deterrents
through defense spending, improved capabilities, and nested
strategies. So, we see many are in fact doing their part for
the collective security of NATO, and ensuring Ukraine maintains
their right of self-determination.
But Ukraine is running low on ammunition for essential
artillery, air defense systems, and all while Russia's
receiving shells from North Korea and Iran. So, the Speaker has
got to bring this vote to the floor. Time is of the essence,
has been of the essence, and we must pass the supplemental. It
is time for him to show true leadership despite his own
political concerns.
And to really stop playing politics with this, and start
ensuring that Ukraine can effectively fight. Because our allies
and partners have stepped up in the absence of U.S. support,
but the United States is failing as a leader of the free world,
and a vanguard of democracies worldwide, and our adversaries
around the world are taking note.
So, Dr. Wallander, can you share your assessment of what
the inaction of this legislative body will mean not only for
the survival of Ukraine, but also the dangerous precedent that
this would set for the status of the United States as a leader
for democracy to our allies, partners, potential partners, and
importantly to our adversaries?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman. We are viewed
with, and greatly positively by Europeans for our leadership in
the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. But unfortunately, the fact
that we have been unable to provide capabilities to Ukraine
since December, when the previous supplemental funds were used
up, has created a challenge in our leadership of that group.
Fortunately, Europe has stepped up in the four months since
we have been unable to provide capabilities, and have announced
billions of dollars of additional security assistance. That is
not enough, as General Cavoli has made clear, but we have
worked with Europeans, and they have stop gapped us.
However, they have stop gapped us in the anticipation that
we will get that supplemental, and we will get that capability
for all the reasons that General Cavoli pointed out, they are
unable to provide, especially the artillery ammunition, and the
air defense interceptors that Ukraine requires. So, we need to
be able to do our part, because we haven't been doing our part
in this collective support of European security through
supporting Ukraine.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And General Cavoli, can you share
your assessment of Ukraine's ability to defend their territory
and air space without this vital U.S. security assistance?
General Cavoli. Sure, Congresswoman. Their ability to
defend their terrain that they currently hold, and their
airspace would fade rapidly, will fade rapidly without the
supplemental, without continued U.S. support. And it will
continue to fade until such time as somebody else is able to
provide those munitions to the Ukrainians. As Dr. Wallander
just pointed out, that production level is not in sight right
now.
We think it is at least months away, and that is why this
is such an important time right now. That is why this is such
an important time.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And I have to say personally, to
see members of the Ukrainian military in my district seeking
medical help who have lost their legs, who have lost their
eyesight, who have been on the battlefield for hours and lost a
leg because they simply didn't have an armored vehicle to come
pick them up is devastating.
And to think that as a foreign adversary to the United
States of America attacks a democracy that we might stand in
the wings and not fully support this is offensive, offensive to
this nation's traditional support for democracy around the
world.
Thank you, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs.
McClain.
Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would agree
with my colleague, that we need to stop playing politics, and I
would agree with you, Dr. Wallander, but maybe not in the same
perspective as you say we haven't been doing our part. I take a
little bit of offense to that. I want to talk about this
article, U.S. urges Ukraine to stop attacking Russian oil
refineries, the report says.
In this piece, the U.S. government sources are said to be
concerned with Ukraine targeting of Russian oil production
facilities. Listen to this, because it could drive up gas
prices. I quote, ``ahead of a knife edge presidential election
where prices at the gas pump are bound to be a contentious
topic, this report seems to show that while the White House has
incessantly demanded Congress pass additional Ukrainian
funding, they are tying the hands of the Ukrainians for
political purposes.''
And I agree, we need to stop playing politics. If the
president truly cared about defeating Russia, he would be
acting as a leader, and not as a political hack worried about
his next election. Mr. Chairman, this president has shown time
and time again that politics are more important than our own
national security. He is now giving Russia the green light to
continue to destroy Ukraine.
Six months ago this President said October tenth, in his
October tenth speech, he said we stand with Israel, and we will
make sure Israel has what it needs to take care of its
citizens, and defend itself. Now the President has been
threatening Israel if they don't stop defending themselves. On
Iran, the President has chosen to side with the Iranian regime
over all of our allies in the region.
This decision has made the Middle East less safe, put
American service members at risk, and given the regime room to
provide deadly drones, ammunitions to Russia for their war in
Ukraine. Again, the same war this President is demanding
Congress provide more American tax dollars to, right? I take
offense that we haven't done our part.
Our southern border, the President chooses to play politics
with our nation's security by opening the floodgates to illegal
immigrants simply because President Trump had the border
secured. I want to remind my colleagues what President Obama's
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said about the then Vice
President Biden in 2014. I quote ``I think he has been wrong on
nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue
over the past four decades.''
A well respected Secretary of Defense, a man who was held
in high regards by members on both sides of the aisle has said
our President is always wrong when it comes to our national
security. Mr. Chairman, I think it is imperative that this
committee investigate whether President Biden is playing
politics with the lives of Ukrainians, and our NATO allies, and
the rest of the western world. I ask unanimous consent to
include the article in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 99.]
Mrs. McClain. And with that, I yield the balance of my time
to Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Dr. Wallander, we have statistics here that our
allies have contributed forty-four billion in direct security
assistance to Ukraine, and we have talked about the accounting
differences in the Pentagon that have yielded six billion,
three hundred billion. What is the common accounting standard?
Does NATO have a common accounting standard for how it is
valuing its assistance?
Dr. Wallander. NATO does not have--NATO doesn't organize or
advance that security assistance.
Mr. Waltz. So, it is conceivable that it could be
overvalued, as our equipment contributions were overvalued?
Dr. Wallander. Assessment of the value is provided by the
countries providing the value of the equipment.
Mr. Waltz. So, they could be using, I mean we have got
what, thirty different countries, they could be using thirty
different standards?
Dr. Wallander. I cannot speak to their national standards,
these are democracies, they are accountable as well----
Mr. Waltz. But you just stated on the record in front of
the American people, they are doing their fair share, we have
figures saying they've contributed forty-four billion, but you
don't know how they're coming up to that forty-four billion?
Dr. Wallander. Those are the figures that they report to
their parliaments, and----
Mr. Waltz. So, they are grading their own homework, fair?
Dr. Wallander. Yes. Those are our allies, and when they
report numbers, we take them seriously.
Mr. Waltz. We just take it at face value?
Dr. Wallander. We take them seriously.
Mr. Waltz. Mr. Chairman, I think we should look at
legislation to understand what our allies are actually
contributing. Is it replacement value, is it new value, is it
some value that they valued? Because they think it is valuable,
maybe they want to appear to be doing more than they are. I
think this is a serious issue, and I find it concerning, Dr.
Wallander, that we don't have a common standard for a number
that we are putting out to the American people.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Escobar.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and I'd like
to thank our witnesses, thank you for your service to our
country. We are definitely living through very precarious
times, and it is disheartening to see politics coming from this
dais, and this committee at a time when we really need to be
united around our common goals, and united for our common
vision for the globe.
One of the areas of great concern that I keep hearing about
on cable TV, and coming from members of Congress, and I heard
it today from the dais, from one of our colleagues, that we are
in effect sending bags of cash to Ukraine. That it is Congress
that is being asked to approve money for Ukraine, when in fact
the truth is we are approving funding to replenish stocks and
munitions.
I think it is really important for the American people to
understand what supplemental funding goes to specifically. Not
specifically enumerating everything that it is funding, but can
you please explain to the American people what the supplemental
funding request from the President would fund for Ukraine, Dr.
Wallander?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman. So, there are
three buckets to understand. First is presidential draw down
authority, and the associated replenishment appropriation to
replenish U.S. stocks. The authority allows for pulling
capabilities from U.S. stocks based on an assessment that
readiness requirements are maintained.
And then the contracts are made to replenish those stocks
for the American military forces to be able therefore to move
on to new production, new capabilities, in many cases more
modern, new, advanced versions of the existing stocks. The
second is Ukrainian security----
Ms. Escobar. And who is building--I'm sorry, I don't mean
to interrupt, but I think this is an important point, who is
building the replenishment of the stocks?
Dr. Wallander. That money goes to American defense
contractors to supply the American military with the most up to
date, capable requirements that the combatant commanders have
identified, and need in their stocks.
Ms. Escobar. So, that funding is being invested in American
jobs, American companies?
Dr. Wallander. Across forty states of the United States all
put together.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you, I didn't mean to interrupt.
Dr. Wallander. And then the second bucket, the Ukrainian
Security Assistance Initiative is direct procurement from
American defense industrial companies in those forty states.
So, going for paying for contracts and capabilities that then
on a longer term are delivered to Ukraine for building that
future force for defense and deterrence. But again, that is not
money that goes to Ukraine, that is money that goes to American
defense contractors, to American workers in those companies.
All that money stays in the American economy. And the third
bucket goes to support EUCOM, its operations, its presence, its
activities in support of Ukraine so they learn how to use that
equipment, so they are trained, so they know how to repair it,
so that they are able to field it, and also to support all the
work that General Cavoli's team is doing in support of Ukraine.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much. I think it is so important
every time a member of Congress talks about sending money to
Ukraine, and uses that term, I think it is so important that we
remind the American public where that money is actually going
to. The jobs it creates in our own country, in our own states.
Otherwise this is part of, I'm concerned it is part of the
Russian disinformation effort to mislead the American public
about that funding.
Very, very quickly, the House has been frozen for months on
this request. It is up to one man, the Speaker of the House, or
colleagues on the Republican side who will sign a discharge
petition. Only thirty seconds left, if we were to approve that
supplemental request in the next week or two, how quickly would
help get to Ukraine?
Dr. Wallander. We would be able to, with EUCOM's support,
and Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)'s support, begin
immediately within a week or two to provide the ammunition, the
artillery ammunition, to provide interceptors to Ukraine.
Ms. Escobar. And I think it is important to underscore
today, the Ukrainian defense is being out shot five to one,
that will change pretty quickly if the House remains frozen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Mills, for five minutes.
Mr. Mills. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, my colleagues
have said a lot, and I just want to kind of make sure that we
are referencing those comments. A few of them said that all we
need is a little democracy. Well, I wish that there was
significantly important, a vote by the Senate, and Chuck
Schumer to bring House Resolution (H.R.) 2, Secure the Border
Act, when we have got hundreds of thousands of Americans who
are dying.
Fentanyl overdoses, child and human sex trafficking, not to
mention one hundred and seventy-eight plus countries that are
crossing our border, and over four hundred plus known
individuals on terrorist watch lists that are coming across,
but oh wait, that is not the priority, let's secure Ukraine's
borders. You know, it is just politics as usual. I want to also
go back to something one of my colleagues had talked about.
Which is in 1947 NATO was created for the ideas of stopping
Soviet Union expansionism. And the idea is that we were so in
fear of the idea that the Soviet Union would continue its
encroachment, and yet the countries that are most at risk of
this, Germany, France, Italy, others, for how many years
wouldn't even pay two percent of their actual dues?
And America is left holding the bag at three point four
seven percent, in addition to the one hundred and fourteen plus
billion dollars that has already been allocated with Ukraine,
who on multiple occasions, hasn't presented a military
strategic plan that would show how they win this war, or even
what is the definition of what winning the war means.
And so, I have a big, difficult problem with this. Not to
mention that the E.U. member states under David O'Sullivan, the
E.U. Sanctions Chief, has admitted that they have frozen assets
from Russia exceeding two hundred and six billion dollars U.S.,
one hundred and ninety billion euro that they now are netting
profits on at three and a half billion dollars that should be
utilized if they are so concerned with a lack of ammunition.
This premise that we are going to go ahead and spend this
sixty billion dollars in America, and that is somehow going to
be great for the industrial base, you are still looking at the
idea is that you are adding money in that we don't have which
increases our inflation. And one of the things that we just
talked about, Dr. Wallander, you said that Russia's inflation
is thirteen percent, is that correct?
Dr. Wallander. That is, yes.
Mr. Mills. Can you tell me what America's is?
Dr. Wallander. No, I cannot.
Mr. Mills. Would you want to take just a shot in the dark
at what you think America's inflation is at?
Dr. Wallander. I'd prefer not to guess.
Mr. Mills. Yeah, try about twenty plus percent. And try
thirty-four trillion dollars. It's eighteen percent plus two
percent reduction in minimum wage, so we can go ahead and put
those figures together. Not to mention roughly twenty-seven
percent increase in fuel cost, cost of good allowances, yeah,
inflation is one of those things that we admit is bad for
Russia, and also bad for America.
You also made a comment recently when you said that we have
concerns on hitting civilian targets with oil terminals. Was
that the same concerns that we had in the 2003 Iraq War when we
were bombing oil terminals, and we were hitting areas that?
Dr. Wallander. That is the concern in our discussions with
Ukraine.
Mr. Mills. Was that our concern when we were at war in
Iraq?
Dr. Wallander. I do not know, sir, I was not in the U.S.
government at that time.
Mr. Mills. I was, because I was actually deployed to that
war, as well as for the additional seven years in Iraq, three
years in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Pakistan, North Somalia, blown up
twice in 2006, all to do what? To play interventionism, to play
neo-con, neo-lib ideas that we don't understand the evolution
of warfare is beyond kinetics.
And now into the ideas of resource economics, supply chain,
and non-kinetic influence operations that have been not only
vastly more successful, but also safer, and not costly to the
American people? You know, next year at thirty-four plus
trillion dollars we are going to spend more in interest
payments than the entire budget for our national defense
annually.
We need to start thinking about three priorities for a
change, America, Americans, and American interests. And if we
are talking about building coalitions for allies, then we need
to be putting the pressure that President Trump put on our NATO
allies to say you need to be paying two percent of your GDP,
which we agreed, now needs to be even more than that when you
are looking at Russia's increase to six percent.
But instead we are continuing to play politics. Let's bring
this vote to the floor, even though it is not a bill which has
all the necessary things, and hasn't addressed the corruption,
hasn't addressed the failure for a one hundred percent audit on
Ukraine funding, hasn't addressed what does success look like
for Ukraine. And this idea that whatever happens in Ukraine is
somehow going to happen in Taiwan is a false premise.
That's the same idea as the George W. Bush model of we can
fight them over here, or we can fight them here. Well guess
what? Our borders are open, and we are allowing them to come
in, not to mention this great, successful airlift operation of
the 2021 botched withdrawal in Afghanistan that actually
brought over seventy three percent of the people on that
aircraft that wasn't vetted, didn't have biometrics, wasn't
Special Immigrant Visas (SIV)s.
It's funny how we cherry pick what is beneficial, but we
don't address the facts. I put America first, and I'm going to
continue to put America first.
With that, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Virginia, Ms.
McClellan.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr.
Wallander, and General Cavoli, for being here. Russia has
sought to use irregular warfare and cyber weapons to bolster
its aggressions in Ukraine, and sow division, and undermine
democracy among our European allies, and some would argue here.
How is EUCOM working to address this particular threat, and
what do you need from Congress to support those efforts?
General Cavoli. Thank you, Congresswoman. EUCOM has a very
active strategic messaging apparatus. We have teams that
analyze news and spot disinformation, and then we get the truth
to usually a country's public affairs apparatus, and they
promulgate the real story. A very simple example would be if we
were having an exercise and somebody falsely posted a picture
of a bicycle accident and said that an American truck ran over
that.
We spot that, we get the truth to the country very quickly,
they turn it around and put it out. I think more to your point
though, we work very closely with nations at both an overt and
a secret level to help them analyze the information
environment, and then to help them combat disinformation and
misinformation. And we do that country by country under the
supervision of the chief of mission in that country, the U.S.
chief of mission in that country.
And we also do that regionally under my authorities and
supervision. It is a well-funded program, we could always do
more, but nevertheless, I think it is well funded by the
Congress right now, and it is very effective, Congresswoman,
thank you.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you. With Russia's illegal invasion of
Ukraine, Finland and Sweden have now officially joined NATO and
drastically increased both the fighting force and defense
manufacturing capability of the alliance. How is the United
States working to swiftly integrate our new allies into the
alliance, and how can we here in Congress better facilitate
those efforts?
General Cavoli. Thank you. First of all, NATO is primarily
responsible for that integration. NATO has already pulled both
of those countries into our regional plans, and we had been
working with them for some months to prepare to do that. So,
that is going very quickly. As you are well aware,
Congresswoman, both of those countries have very advanced, and
sophisticated militaries that have a long operational history
with the forces in NATO.
So, their interoperability is already sky high, so it is a
very easy pull in that regard. The U.S. proper, U.S. EUCOM has
conducted exercises with them to make sure that our
interoperability is high. We have worked with them to gain
access to their airspace, to conduct intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance flights, those have proven very successful,
it is real estate that we didn't have too much access to
previously.
And in addition to that, we have made agreements with both
countries for the prepositioning of material in those
countries. So, not only are we helping NATO to integrate them,
but they are helping us to integrate into places that we were
previously unable to. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you.
Dr. Wallander. Our part of this at DOD is to support the
policies required to enable General Cavoli to advance the
exercises, the capabilities, the diplomatic relationships. And
I would just say that Finland and Sweden will, the heads of
state and government at the summit, be fully part of all the
decisions on NATO's future, and the obligations and
responsibilities of all the allies going forward.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you. And I don't know if you will
fully have time to answer the next one, so if not, maybe if you
could submit it for the record? But with Russia pulling out of
the New START Treaty, which is an incredible blow to the system
of nuclear arms non-proliferation that has been a guiding light
of the post-Cold War era, what does that decision mean for
prospects for future nuclear non-proliferation efforts? And how
concerned should we be about what this signals concerning
Russia's strategic weapons goals?
Dr. Wallander. I will submit a full answer. The top lines
would be we are very concerned about the signal it sends to the
international community, that Russia does not respect or live
up to its international obligations in the case of nuclear arms
treaties, as well as the invasion, and other instances. So, but
I will submit a full answer.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 115.]
Ms. McClellan. And as part of that, if you could discuss
the risk of returning to a nuclear arms race, I would
appreciate it.
With that, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Fallon.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it. In
2014, NATO countries, as we all know, agreed to invest two
percent of their GDP on defense, and that was a commitment that
wasn't unfortunately followed through with expediency. There
was a lot of words, and not actions, and particularly I feel
what is egregious, and I think what is touched on by Mr. Waltz,
were some of the larger European nation states.
Spain, Canada, Italy, France hovered around two percent,
but the greatest, I think, egregious violator was Germany.
Fourth largest economy in the world, and they weren't stepping
up. So, I have a two-part question for General Cavoli. Let's
look at a different world, 2014, that that commitment was met
with expediency and our larger nation states in NATO followed
through, the ones I had just mentioned.
With some timely decisiveness could the Ukrainian war have
been deterred all together, do you think, if that happened,
General?
General Cavoli. I'm sorry, Congressman, are you asking had
nations, especially the larger allies been spending at or above
the goal would that have deterred----
Mr. Fallon. Yeah, if they had made their commitment with
expediency, say in 2015 and 2016, and said you know what,
particularly after Crimea, we are going to spend two and a
half, whatever percent, and they follow through with it. And
Germany said we are in a different world now, we are going to
take the lead, and France followed as well, Italy, Spain,
Canada, do you think that Vladimir Putin would have invaded
anyway in 2022?
General Cavoli. Yes, I do. I do not think we were extending
mutual or collective defense guarantees to Ukraine at that
time.
Mr. Fallon. Do you think it would have given him some
increased pause?
General Cavoli. Sure, it would have.
Mr. Fallon. Okay, so it would have been a good thing, but
the lack of action certainly encouraged it? If you say you are
going to do something, and then you don't do it, I think it is
worse if you hadn't--you would have been better off not saying
anything at all. And in NATO in 2014 a lot of our allies said
they were going to do something, they didn't do it.
And I think that was a breeding ground for an authoritarian
land grab, quite frankly. One other question, General. I notice
that when you look at the closer you get to the threat, which
is Russia, the more the defense spending tends to go up. In
fact, I don't think there is a NATO country that borders
Ukraine or Russia that has not met that two percent commitment.
And the further you go away it seems the less spending you get.
Having said that, do you think it makes sense for us to
move United States troops closer to the threat? So, my question
is should we, in your opinion, make the Eastern European bases
permanent?
General Cavoli. First of all, Congressman, the United
States has and is moving forces closer to the eastern flank. As
you are aware, we have got an agreement signed a couple of
years ago with Poland before this conflict began in Ukraine,
signed with Poland to Poland provides significant
infrastructure, and we will rotate forces through there.
The additional forces that we surged to Europe during the
immediate aftermath of Russia's invasion, those have all gone
to the eastern flank, principally the Baltic countries, again,
Poland, and Southeastern Europe, and Romania, and Bulgaria, so
there is an effort. There is also an effort on the part of
nations in the alliance to go farther east.
So, in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, NATO,
before I became the Allied Command Operations Commander, took
the decision to establish new battle groups on a standing
basis. They rotate, but they are permanently there, four
additional ones, so there is a total of eight. But to design so
they can allgo up to brigade size at time of need. And a number
of nations have elected to go up to brigade size early in that.
So, there is a definite shift eastward in the alliance, sir.
Mr. Fallon. All right, thank you. Dr. Wallander,
unfortunately, would you agree that the western sanctions on
Russia haven't worked, economic sanctions?
Dr. Wallander. Western sanctions have imposed costs, but
they have not stopped Putin.
Mr. Fallon. I think they have unfortunately--I mean,
unfortunately they have been a dismal failure. I would have
loved to have them work. But when you have got nations like the
communist Chinese, you have got Iran, North Korea, in some ways
even India dealing with Russia, they circumvented us. So, we
talked a lot about Western European reliance, some call it an
addiction to Russian energy.
You would be in favor of the United States doing all we can
to wean their dependence, our Western European allies in
particular, off of Russian energy?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, they have taken steps, and they can do
more, and we fully support that, and actively work with them.
Mr. Fallon. Because we have a lot of natural gas in this
country, for instance. The number one customer for liquid
natural gas (LNG) that we export is Europe. So, I was
perplexed, confused, and otherwise befuddled when this
administration, and President Biden put a, whatever you want to
call it, suspension, stopping, pause on our LNG exports. Did
you advise him to do that?
Dr. Wallander. That is not my area of responsibility.
Mr. Fallon. Okay, so would you agree that that was not wise
considering that it was really, essentially a gift to Putin?
Dr. Wallander. I cannot speak to that policy, it is outside
the scope of DOD.
Mr. Fallon. But you are a very intelligent young woman, I
think that you have a DR in front your name, I do not----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired, and she is
very intelligent, I agree with you.
The gentleman from Nevada is recognized, Mr. Horsford.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, and to the
Ranking Member, for holding this important hearing. It has been
over two years since we saw Russia launch a brutal invasion of
Ukraine, but for many Ukrainians, this conflict began a decade
ago, with Russia's continued occupation of Crimea. It has also
been six months since President Biden released a national
security supplemental that would reinvigorate the United States
defense industrial base, while also providing much needed
support for our closest allies and partners.
President Biden's supplemental request would provide
billions in direct industrial investments in the United States,
including over four million in my home State of Nevada alone.
However, instead of putting this critical bill to a vote, the
House majority has stalled, and even worse, repeated Russian
propaganda on the House floor.
It was reported this week that U.S. Central Command has
sent a stash of Iranian munitions it captured from Houthi
militants to Ukraine. General Cavoli, I understand that
desperate times call for desperate measures, can you provide
examples on how Ukrainians are continuing to stay in the fight,
even as support from the United States has lagged, and can you
expand on how crucial it is that Congress pass the national
security supplemental?
General Cavoli. Absolutely, Congressman. The first, and
most clearest, and present example is the self-rationing of
artillery rounds that the Ukrainians are using right now. So,
they know that they have a limited supply until we are able to
begin supporting them again. And in the meantime, they have
self-restricted the amount of artillery they use, this has
significant consequences on the battlefield, of course.
They are already at a five to one deficit in artillery fire
as compared to the Russians, and that will obviously increase
dramatically in the absence of a supplemental, sir.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you. Assistant Secretary Wallander,
several of our European allies continue to rely on Chinese made
logistics networks, ports, and 5G capabilities. I am concerned
that this leaves these countries vulnerable to economic
pressure coming from the People's Republic of China (PRC). How
are you assessing the threat of over reliance on Chinese
infrastructure in Europe, especially in the telecommunication
space? And how can we work with our allies and partners to give
them an alternative?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, absolutely,
reliance on Chinese provided technology or capabilities and
logistics, as you note, creates a vulnerability among NATO
allies, European countries. It undermines their resilience, it
creates challenges for them to be able to advance strong
policies. Countries like Lithuania, who have taken a very
principled stand on China, have fortunately already divested
themselves of those dependencies.
And we use that as an example when we talk to European
countries to show how reducing or even eliminating those kinds
of dependencies actually is a security step. Often it is framed
as an economic benefit, and what we work with them is to
understand the security risk that they undertake when they
follow that path.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you.
General Cavoli. Congressman, it might be useful to note
also that U.S. EUCOM designs exercises, or aspects of its
exercise program specifically to test infrastructure, and to
flush out problems with its ownership. That gives us the
opportunity to do everything from work on the networks, the
communications networks and infrastructure, as well as the
physical infrastructure, and the manpower of a port for
instance.
And then we work very closely with the Department of State
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, specifically Dr.
Wallander, to address our concerns with countries. It is
actually a very successful program, I think, so far. But it is
a big task that we are trying to push back on.
Mr. Horsford. Great. And in my final time, General, what
are the lessons that EUCOM has learned about the use of these
autonomous capabilities in large scale combat operations, and
has it changed the way we think about the use of unmanned
capabilities specifically?
General Cavoli. Not completely, not yet it hasn't changed
everything, Congressman. We are watching it very closely,
because there is clearly something there, but I would note that
the principal decisions on the battlefield for both sides are
made by legacy systems, it is tanks, and it is artillery. All
the drones and stuff have not yet produced that.
The one area, two areas where I would say are the most
promising, long-range penetration from the air to substitute
for ballistic missiles, and what the Ukrainians have done in
the Black Sea with unmanned systems is ----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Gimenez.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Wallander, let's
go back to energy. It takes money to perpetuate, promulgate a
war. What is the leading money maker for Russia right now?
Dr. Wallander. It is oil exports, and natural gas exports,
primarily to China.
Mr. Gimenez. Okay. So, if the United States were to produce
more oil and gas, and drive down the cost on a worldwide basis,
would that affect Russia's ability to perpetuate this war?
Dr. Wallander. On the margin it would, but China is an
energy hungry, greedy country, and it is willing to pay. It has
long term contracts with Russia, and Xi does not want Putin to
fail.
Mr. Gimenez. All right, fair enough. Now, Russia has been
targeting Ukrainian's energy, and sources of energy, et cetera,
is that true?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, that is true.
Mr. Gimenez. Has Ukraine been targeting Russia's energy
production?
Dr. Wallander. There are public reports that Ukraine has
done so.
Mr. Gimenez. Have we tried to stop them from doing that?
Dr. Wallander. The U.S. has raised concerns with Ukraine,
which is a sovereign country, and can choose its own targets,
but raised concerns about targeting civilian critical
infrastructure.
Mr. Gimenez. Well, yeah, but the Russians have no problem
in targeting Ukrainian energy production. Now, if the
Ukrainians were able to disrupt Russian energy production,
would that significantly alter their ability to perpetuate this
war?
Dr. Wallander. So far the strikes that we have seen against
Russian energy sources have not significantly altered Russia's
ability to prosecute the war.
Mr. Gimenez. That is so far, but if they are actually able
to do it successfully, would that alter the economics of this
war?
Dr. Wallander. I am not an expert on energy infrastructure,
but the evidence we have seen is that the Russians have been
able to rapidly repair the facilities that were struck.
Mr. Gimenez. General, what would happen if we don't support
Ukraine, and they actually run out of bullets?
General Cavoli. In my military experience, Congressman, if
somebody is shooting at you, and you can't shoot back, you
lose, or you die.
Mr. Gimenez. Where is Ukraine now in terms of its arms
supplies, and ability to fight back?
General Cavoli. Sir, could I tell you about that in closed
session, please?
Mr. Gimenez. Absolutely, thank you very much. A lot of
folks, even on my side of the aisle somehow equate the lack of
the Biden Administration securing our border being a reason why
we can't help Ukraine secure their border. The facts are that
Ukrainians are spilling their blood to secure their border. And
the fact that our administration does not secure our border
shouldn't be the reason why we don't help people that are
trying to fight for their freedom.
As somebody who came over from a communist country some
sixty years ago, somebody who is not a fan of Russia, I think
that we need to support the Ukrainians. All they are asking for
is our aid, all they are asking for is bullets and armaments,
and for the life of me I just don't understand why we don't
support them, and we should. Some analysts believe that the F-
16 could help Ukraine, do you share that, General?
General Cavoli. The F-16 will help, any aircraft will help,
Congressman. It is a particularly difficult jump to go from the
older Soviet era stuff, aircraft that the Ukrainians have been
flying, especially had been maintaining and supporting, it is
tough to go from that to a modern fourth gen aircraft like the
F-16. As you know, we are working on it with them, there is an
entire coalition of countries working on it with them. But
ultimately it will be a valuable thing for them to have.
Mr. Gimenez. I understand that we are actually training
them, training them to fly the F-16s, and that there are some
countries that will be actually supplying F-16s to Ukraine, is
that true?
General Cavoli. Both are correct, yes.
Mr. Gimenez. Okay, why isn't the United States giving them
F-16s?
Dr. Wallander. We are supporting the provision of F-16s by
European countries, and the numbers that they are going to
provide meet the requirements for the Ukrainians at this time.
Mr. Gimenez. All right, thank you, I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and first, I would like
to thank the Chair and Ranking Member for their bipartisan
support of the security supplemental. I think it is incredibly
important that we get Ukraine the assistance that it needs, and
also that we make sure that humanitarian assistance in that
supplemental package is past. I was just on the border of Chad
and Sudan, and saw the Sudanese refugees whose food is running
out because we haven't yet passed that humanitarian assistance.
General Cavoli, I want to ask you, in the Operation
Atlantic Resolve quarterly report to Congress, it stated that
the Security Assistance Group Ukraine reported that it had no
information to suggest that the Ukrainian armed forces were
using U.S. provided weapons and equipment in any way other than
intended. Can you provide more details about the reporting
mechanism utilized to monitor the usage of U.S. provided
weapons and equipment?
And are there mechanisms in place for independent
verification or assessment of these findings regarding the
usage of U.S. assistance?
Ms. Jacobs. Yeah, Congresswoman, thank you very much for
the opportunity to talk about this important topic. First of
all, it continues to be the case since the publication of that
report, or since the authorship of that report, that we just
don't have evidence that this is--that there is widespread
diversion or anything like that. Now, I have to admit that that
is different from whether or not things get efficiently from
the stockpiles to the soldiers' hands in the squad on the front
line.
But we do work on logistical distribution with our partners
in Ukraine quite a bit. So, things leave the United States
accounted for by the service that provided it. In the case of
something from a PDA, where we are giving something from our
stockpile according to the amount of money provided under the
authority, and then receiving money to replenish that, right?
So, that comes out, that is accounted for by the services,
and I think we have a very, very good control over that. When
things hit the ground in Poland, either by truck, plane, or
train, they come into the hands of our soldiers in Southeastern
Poland, they get accounted for there, and I'm very confident,
we had some missteps early on when we were rushing to get
things done.
But we have got systems in place, I know we know what we
have got on our hands, and that it is faithful to what was
sent. Then we consign it to the Ukrainians, and they sign for
it item by item. So, I know as it goes onto trucks, that we
have accounted for it. After it crosses the border, it gets
harder for us. So, we bar code things, and we have issued the
Ukrainians scanners.
We have automated the process of tracking things as it goes
forward, we share our databases with them, and they share
theirs with us, so we can track. It is really when you get down
to the tactical edge that it starts getting a little bit
harder, ma'am. And it is complicated by the fact that we can't
go to a lot of those places simply because of the level of
danger, and we have restricted ourselves from doing that.
So, in those cases we do ask the Ukrainians to self-report.
And incredibly important part of this system though, is
contractors that we hire to provide for us an outside view on
front line units accountability. Those contractors are paid for
with supplemental money. And when the supplemental, if it is
not renewed, I won't be able to perform that level of fidelity
outside third party verification of what the Ukrainians are
claiming as their accountability. I hope that answers your
question, ma'am.
Dr. Wallander. That is my understanding of the system, and
that we also then have a duty at DOD to report those findings,
and that tracking to Congress.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. I also wanted to ask about the Joint
Rapid Acquisition Cell. Could you just talk about how we are
working with Ukrainian defense manufacturers to most
effectively use the assistance we are giving?
Dr. Wallander. We are working with the Ukrainians, and a
number of European countries to create reassurance about the
size of contracts, because what we need is for potential
investors in Ukrainian defense industries to see not just the
immediate need, but a multi-year requirement. So, we are
working with Ukraine on locations, on what is required.
Our embassy works with potential investors to support those
capabilities in Ukraine, and we are also sharing with them the
lessons we have learned on rapid acquisition, on multi-year
contracts, to inform them from the lessons of our success with
congressional support that we have experienced over the last
two years.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
McCormick.
Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. It is good to see you
both here today. I have some specific questions that actually
arose from some of your statements earlier. First, I will
address the Supreme Allied Commander, which I think is the
coolest title ever.
General Cavoli. The title does not help me at home,
Congressman.
Dr. McCormick. This is an important question. When it comes
to Ukraine, which I think is an incredibly strategically
important country in the world, is this war, for the allies,
winnable?
General Cavoli. Yes, it is, in a couple of ways. The first,
if we go back to what Secretary Wallander was talking about
earlier, denying the Russians a strategic victory, or imposing
a strategic defeat on them. That in itself is a victory, even
if a temporary victory, for the alliance. So, in that sense it
is winnable, we can do that with our Ukrainian colleagues.
Dr. McCormick. So, I would agree, and here is my point on
this, because I think this is really important. You mentioned
the F-16s, and what is being supplied is adequate. I don't like
that word, adequate, because that doesn't go back to what we
learned in command and staff in the war college, which is
overwhelming force, Clauswitzian warfare.
We have a GDP of around twenty-five to twenty-seven
trillion dollars. Combine that with Europe, around forty-five
trillion dollars. Russia has one point seven seven trillion
dollars for a GDP. This shouldn't be a contest, it shouldn't
be. But we are slow rolling our support. Not just what we have
already committed, which has been slow rolling.
Getting our tanks over there, getting our airplanes over
there, getting our munitions over there, the things we have
already committed to. But also we continue to hold this up in
Congress, which drives me crazy, because this is a winnable
war. This idea that is being propagated on both sides of the
house that we can't win this war is insane. We outnumber them
dramatically.
But quite frankly, Ukraine, with a GDP of only two hundred
billion dollars, has been able to hold out against a First
World country army, and sustain fifty percent casualties to
their armor, and three hundred and fifty casualties over all
with a third-rate Army that is very ill trained. That is
success by my measures.
And if we give them surge capabilities, which by the way in
Iraq and Afghanistan, I don't know if you would agree with me
general, but we didn't do very well until we had surge
capabilities, and we are the big boy on the block. But we
didn't succeed until we had surge ops, and we are the First
World country when it comes to military capabilities. How do we
expect a Third World country to succeed against a First World
army if we don't give them surge ops in real time?
We are not giving--we can't give them adequate, we have to
give them superiority, that is my point, and nobody is talking
about that right now. We have to give them what it takes to get
this done. This is a winnable war, would you agree?
General Cavoli. Yes, I agree, I agree, Congressman. And
much of the conversation, much of my testimony today has been
about the minimum, about avoiding defeat for Ukraine, which
does not necessarily immediately lead to the accomplishment of
a strategic interest, yeah.
Dr. McCormick. And when you talk about strategic interest,
Ms. Secretary, would you agree that Ukraine is probably a top
five country when it comes to resources? You are talking about
seventy percent of European grain, you have titanium, you have
steel, you have cobalt, you have rare minerals, including some
of the radioactive stuff that actually powers the world.
All in this country that could be taken by Russia, and then
that stuff could be moved over to China, North Korea, and Iran
instead of our allies. It will have consequences for
generations to come that people aren't really taking into
account when they talk about the economic impact of this.
Dr. Wallander. I think you laid out the stakes extremely
well, Congressman, I agree.
Dr. McCormick. Great. So, I think if we are going to
fulfill our word, by the way that is the third part of this, we
actually gave our word, not just one time, but actually real
time, NATO as a unanimous vote said we are going to support you
during this. I think it is unwise to turn your back on the rest
of the world. Reagan, forty years ago at the fortieth
anniversary of D-Day from Normandy talked about the
consequences of isolationism.
How it is a failed policy, especially against an
expansionist, Marxist government, which is exactly what NATO
was made for. This is the time to stand, now I agree with both
of you. This is a winnable war, and strategically important to
the future of the world. We have a fifty percent increase
necessary in food stores by 2050, we have to secure our
resources, this is strategically important, and it is important
to us to fulfill our word to our allies overseas.
And with that, I yield.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from the great
State of Alabama, Ms. Sewell.
Ms. Sewell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to add my
voice to the chorus thanking you, Mr. Chair, and our Ranking
Member, for your bipartisan support of the Ukraine supplemental
package. As we have heard today, Congress must act. We must act
to get Ukrainians the tools they need to defend their
countries, it is a strategic ally of ours, and to allow the
necessary tools not to be given is just unacceptable, frankly.
You know, I had an opportunity last year, General, to visit
Poland on a bipartisan delegation to see firsthand the tracking
and accountability systems that you all have put in place in
order to make sure that we, the American people, know that the
resources that they are sending to Ukraine are being utilized.
I get that you can't see once it is past the border, but
overall have you been pleased with that system, and what can we
do to strengthen it?
General Cavoli. Thank you, ma'am. To be clear, we don't go
blind when it goes across the border. We have folks in Kyiv who
inspect depots, we have folks in Kyiv who venture out farther,
like to Odesa, and places like that to inspect depots. It is
really when it gets down to front lines that it gets a little
bit tougher for us, and I explained how we are doing that.
Am I satisfied? No, I am not satisfied. I mean, you know,
in the U.S. Army when you change over command of a unit you
have to sign for every single screwdriver, for every single
screw in that unit, you have to account for it, or you have to
pay for it, that is where I would like to be. We are just
finding that it is difficult to be there right now.
I am satisfied under the conditions that we are doing a
good job. I am not satisfied under the conditions that we are
doing a perfect job, or even the best job we can, and we strive
to improve it every single day.
Ms. Sewell. Of course we strive to improve it. I just want
my constituents in Alabama to know that we are doing everything
we can to track it, and to be accountable. One of those NATO
allies, and anchor of stability in the region is Romania. And
last year, the Alabama National Guard and Romania celebrated
thirty years as partners through the State Partnership Program,
which has enhanced both of our country's armed forces.
As part of this program, the Red Tails, at the 187th
Fighter Wing in Montgomery, which I am so honored to represent,
partnered with the Romanian Air Force to share best practices
related to the F-16 and the F-35 now, as Romania modernizes its
fleet. So, General, can you speak to the benefit that the
Alabama National Guard's partnership has on Romania's military
readiness, and how does this partnership bolster our position
in the region?
General Cavoli. Ma'am, first of all, just for all members
from all states, the State Partnership Program is just an
incredibly valuable part of our strategy to be able to support
the alliance, and to create strategic bonds between the United
States and given countries. In many cases it pays off tenfold
in terms of access, in terms of basing, in terms of influence,
and things like that.
It is extremely practical, but it is also just
strategically valuable. I work very hard with Dan Hokanson on
making sure we do it. We have got exciting new developments in
the State Partnership Program, it is helping us consolidate the
position of formerly neutral, or neutral and wondering about it
countries right now.
My Sergeant Major Rob Abernathy here, routinely engages
with the soldiers from the various states, and he routinely
attends the State Partnership conferences, and everything like
that, it is extremely important. With regard to Alabama and
Romania, particularly a huge success story, right? So, the
Romanians are having a moment, their economy is doing well, and
it is going into their military.
They have beaten back a lot of corruption problems they
had. Their military is surging right now, it is going to become
really an anchor of our alliance in the southeast. They are
spending well on defense, they are buying all U.S. equipment,
very high-end stuff, but to use that equipment you have got to
have a mentor, it is not just a member going and learning how
to fly the F-35, or learning how to use this piece of
equipment.
You have really got to understand how to employ it in an
organization, and how to take care of it, and the Alabama
National Guard has been fantastic in that regard, in all
domains by the way, on the ground as well, working with
Multinational Corps Southeast to put that together. So, I can't
thank Alabama enough, or the National Guard in general enough
for what they do. It has a material impact on the combat
readiness of our alliance.
Ms. Sewell. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make
sure that we were supporting the State Partnerships, really the
Alabama Romanian partnership is a model to be followed, thanks.
The Chairman. It is.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Gaetz.
Mr. Gaetz. Dr. Wallander, you have testified that the goal
in the war is Russia's strategic failure, right? So, I want to
drill down into what that specifically means. Does Russia's
strategic failure require repatriating Crimea back to Ukraine?
Dr. Wallander. That is for Ukraine to decide whether that
is their absolute required achievement to define this war.
Mr. Gaetz. You are a senior administration official in the
Biden Administration, I just want to know to you does Russia's
strategic failure require the repatriation of Crimea?
Dr. Wallander. To me, reinforcing the international law
that borders cannot be changed by force is absolutely vital to
teaching Putin a lesson, so ultimately, yes.
Mr. Gaetz. Yes, so the objective of the United States
through your eyes, and granted Ukraine can have their own
objectives, totally concede that, but in your eyes, as you
testify to us, until Crimea has been repatriated, we have not
achieved what you say is the goal in the war, which is Russia's
strategic failure?
Dr. Wallander. That Russia does not gain territory through
the use of force is a strategic success for Ukraine and for the
United States----
Mr. Gaetz. But I just want--I know, but that is very
amorphous, I am talking about a specific piece of geography,
Crimea. You are testifying that Russia's strategic failure has
not been achieved until Crimea is back under Ukrainian control.
I think that is what you have said, I just want to draw the
finest possible point on it.
Dr. Wallander. I appreciate that. I said that Russia will
not succeed in seizing territory and having that recognized
through the use of force.
Mr. Gaetz. All right, so now let's do the Donbas. Is your
testimony the same, that Russia's strategic failure can only be
accomplished through a repatriation of the Donbas region back
to Ukraine?
Dr. Wallander. Russia's strategic failure requires that
Russia not gain territory in Ukraine through the use of force.
Mr. Gaetz. And they have done that in the Donbas, right?
Dr. Wallander. We do not recognize that, and Ukraine does
not recognize that, so no. They occupy the territory----
Mr. Gaetz. I am really interested in how Ukraine has
historically recognized the Donbas. Have you ever heard the
Donbas described as the ungoverned region by Ukrainian
officials prior to the invasion?
Dr. Wallander. The Donbas?
Mr. Gaetz. Yes.
Dr. Wallander. You mean Donetsk and Luhansk?
Mr. Gaetz. Yeah.
Dr. Wallander. I personally have never heard that.
Mr. Gaetz. Really, I have. I heard the Ukrainian Ambassador
describe it as the ungoverned region before, and now we are
acting as though its repatriation is necessary to achieve
Russia's strategic failure. Do you think setting such a high
bar, like the repatriation of Crimea, that has been under
Russian control for some years now, and the repatriation of the
Donbas region, do you think that is a really high bar for us to
achieve?
Dr. Wallander. I think that Russia is going to fail. I
think the international community at large does not support
this, and they see a stake in an aggressor being able to invade
a neighbor, and slice off territory, and reclaim it as its own.
Mr. Gaetz. Here is what I think. I think that we are never
repatriating Crimea back to Ukraine. And I think that if you
set that as the objective, then we perpetuate this new forever
war that is going to have a lot of death, and a lot of
destruction, and it is for an unachievable goal. And I worry
that is driving our thinking. General, you said any aircraft
will help.
I take some exception with that, I want to quibble with
that. Like aircraft that can't fly don't help, do they? Right?
General Cavoli. There are aircraft that can't fly, and they
are not helping----
Mr. Gaetz. Okay, yeah, so they wouldn't help. And then if
you weren't able to properly an aircraft, and it were to create
some sort of escalatory accident, that would be problematic
too, right? Okay, so just for the record, Mr. Chairman, I seek
unanimous consent to enter an April 5th publication from the
TheDefensePost.com, F-16 Fighter Jets No Longer Relevant
According to Ukrainian Official.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 102.]
Mr. Gaetz. Do you have any reaction to that reporting,
general?
General Cavoli. That is not what the Ukrainian officials I
talk to think, that is not what they tell me.
Mr. Gaetz. Well, I guess then we shouldn't represent that
there is unanimity on that position. There are some who think
they will be helpful, some think they won't. Just real quick--
--
General Cavoli. I'm not----
[Simultaneous speaking.]
Mr. Gaetz. You guys are going to have folks leaving
Cypress, and going to these operations in the Eastern Med, and
Gaza, and I think the Biden Administration wants us to become
the port authority in Gaza, presumably forever. But do we know
yet where we are going to build this pier in Gaza?
General Cavoli. So, that is not in my area of
responsibility, sir.
Mr. Gaetz. Okay, so you are not supporting that out of
Cypress? Just because on page fifteen of your testimony----
General Cavoli. No, no, I'm supporting it, yes I do know
where----
Mr. Gaetz. But do you know where it is going to be since
you are supporting it?
General Cavoli. I do know where the pier is going to go,
but it is not my area of responsibility, and I would refer you
to General Kurilla, sir.
Mr. Gaetz. Okay, I'll check with him. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Smith. It is a fascinating world we live in, because I
actually agree with Mr. Gaetz on something around Ukrainian
policy, which I would not have thought of. And this is a really
important point, right now what we need to do is get money to
Ukraine so they can defend themselves, I am one hundred percent
with you on that. I think all the arguments that we have heard
today dance around that fundamental reality.
That giving Putin Ukraine is an enormous mistake, and not
giving Ukraine the money right now to defend it, that is giving
Putin Ukraine. But we have got to get off of this Crimea trap
that we walk right into like you just did. Realistically,
Crimea is not coming back to Ukraine. And we can absolutely win
this war, and absolutely make a difference even in that
reality.
We do not have to have Crimea to make it one thousand
percent worth it to give Ukraine the money, okay? We need a
sovereign, democratic Ukraine that can survive. We have a
sovereign, democratic Ukraine that can survive right now, we
do. All right, but if we are telling the world you must support
us, Ukraine taking it all back, that is an entirely different
proposition.
And I have never liked, I have heard this phrase over,
nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. Forgive me, that is a
ridiculous thing for any U.S. diplomat or person in U.S. policy
to say, okay? We have partners all over the world, and yes, we
listen to them. But when we are footing the bill, when we are
spending so much money over there, we have a say.
And to act like we don't, I get it, I know why you don't
want to act like you are bullying Ukraine into something, but
let us walk down that road, as Mr. Gaetz just walked you down
that road, and see that that initial instinct that saying well,
we are not--we are going to just make sure that Ukraine has a
say is a problem. So, I don't really want an answer to this, I
just want everybody listening within the Biden Administration
to walk down that road a little bit more effectively from this
point forward.
So that we don't wind up abandoning Ukraine because we are
defending something that is largely theoretical basically, and
we get ourselves in that trap. And I just wanted to get that on
the record at this particular moment.
And I yield back to the Chairman.
The Chairman. I completely agree with the Ranking Member.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Panetta.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Ranking
Member, for your comments, Doctor, General, thank you for being
here, appreciate your testimony today. I also want to harken
back to the gentleman from Georgia's testimony. I appreciate
how he did sort of sum it up, in that last summer we sort of
had high hopes about potentially, using the vernacular, of
winning.
But unfortunately now, we are sort of in a situation where
we definitely are not as optimistic, and we are getting to the
point where we are going to be very, very pessimistic. I had a
conversation with a couple of my colleagues who had just
traveled to Ukraine last week, and their attitude was that the
situation was tense, stable, but they are very, very worried
about what is going to happen.
Like I said, last summer, we had high hopes that Ukrainian
troops could punch through Russian lines. But unfortunately,
the counter offensive failed, and we got to a point where we
started to accept that Ukraine was settling into a stalemate.
Now, we are starting to worry it is going beyond that,
especially with the potential for a big Russian push this
summer that could punch through Ukrainian defenses, and deep
into the country.
And what we are seeing is that Ukraine is suffering from
quote unquote shell hunger, where Russia is firing five shells
for every one Ukrainian shell that Ukraine can fire. In
addition, Ukraine is low on air defenses, they are low on air
defense interceptors, they are low on cruise missiles, they are
low on tanks, they are low on fighting vehicles, it is not just
leading to a stalemate, it could be leading to a loss.
Straight forward question, what can Congress be doing that
we change not just the vernacular, but we change the outcome?
Dr. Wallander. What we need right now to prevent Russian
success and Ukrainian defeat is passage of the supplemental. It
is critical for the reasons General Cavoli has made clear. We
are able to get to a longer-term solution by working with
Europe, that is well underway. But none of that work that we
have done for two years in investing in Ukraine's future will
pay off unless we get them through the next few months.
Mr. Panetta. General?
General Cavoli. Congressman, I really don't have anything
to add to what Dr. Wallander just said, I thought it was very
well put. We have spoken at length today about what the
critical steps are, and why it is the U.S. So, a very valid
question that I have heard from members both in the hearing
today, and previously, sir, is why can't somebody else fill in
this requirement?
And on those two items, the artillery shells, and ground-
based interceptors, we are really leading the world in the
production of those, for one five five, especially for the NATO
standard. Nobody else is producing it in the quantity
necessary. They are trying to get there, but they are not there
yet.
So, this supplemental at this time, to get us to that day
when others are going to be able to be producing, to include
Ukrainians producing their own, which is their and our goal
together, I think that is really why this is a critical moment
for this supplemental, sir.
Mr. Panetta. Thanks to both of you. General, obviously what
we have seen, and I think you talked about this earlier in one
of your answers, the war in Ukraine has been one of both
advanced technology and conventional warfare. The Russians have
been relying on the age-old tactics, including mines, tanks,
and layered defenses. But Ukrainians have actually been merging
both advanced technology and conventional warfare.
In some cases Ukraine has been losing some of these
technologies in high volumes to combat Russia's sheer number of
firepower. What is your assessment of Ukraine's use of emerging
technology to reduce some of the asymmetric advantages against
Russia's military, and war economy, and how do you anticipate
that this can be sustained?
General Cavoli. It is quite innovative, Congressman. They
successfully brought into their military in the very early
stages a large, large number of engineers and scientists from
what was a very highly developed, technical education base. So,
their tertiary education system was very long on engineers and
scientists, and those folks have made a big, big help inside
the military adapting technologies.
Both new military technologies and grafting it onto old
systems, or civilian technologies, and finding a military use
for them. Very innovative, very useful, difficult to scale.
Mr. Panetta. Great, thanks again to both of you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. I would advise
members and their staff that are watching, that after Mr.
Davis, we are going to recess and go to 2212 for the classified
portion of this hearing.
But right now we will recognize the gentleman from North
Carolina, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thanks so much, Mr. Chair, and to the witnesses
here today, Doctor, General. Seymour Johnson Air Force Base is
the crown jewel in Eastern North Carolina, plays a key role in
our national security and defense. General Cavoli, can you
explain the role that Strike Eagles particularly are playing in
the European theater, and in particular, how divesting a
fighter squadron at the base would impact operations in
Ukraine?
General Cavoli. So, the Strike Eagle is a very capable
aircraft. It is at the very top end of the fourth generation of
aircraft, it carries a very large payload, and can deliver it
in very, very difficult places. So, it has proven its worth
over the years, sir. It is one of the aircraft that figures
heavily in my plans, in the plans at U.S. EUCOM. It is an
aircraft that will continue to be valuable for some time.
I do recognize that the Air Force is trying to replace them
with more capable aircraft, and it will be very important for
us not to have a gap between the retirement of one and the
arrival of the next. With regard to the particular squadron at
Seymour Johnson, I don't know off the top of my head, and I
would refer that question to the Department of the Air Force,
and I will get that to them if you would like, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 115.]
Mr. Davis. Absolutely. And just a follow up here, how do
the F-15Es stationed in particular at Lakenheath directly
support or indirectly support Ukraine right now?
General Cavoli. They form an invaluable part of our air
policing, and our air defense system. And that has proven very
important in a couple of locations, where it has been necessary
to have an active missile and air defense. And I would like to
be more detailed about that in closed session if you can.
And if you are not going to be at the closed session, sir,
I would be happy to answer you in a classified setting
elsewhere. There are other very important uses for it.
Mr. Davis. Okay, thank you. I visited Ukraine a few weeks
ago, and one of the take-aways for me, and I am sticking along
this aircraft theme so to speak, and that is not just the
aircraft they are receiving, but going through the training,
getting pilots trained through the pipeline, could you speak
towards your knowledge of all--are we able to help the
Ukrainians get through this process that is meaningful in a way
that is still going to help us meet all the demands in terms of
the national security demands here?
General Cavoli. Sure, Congressman. First, it is worth
pointing out, I think, that we are not the only ones training
Ukrainian pilots, and working on fourth generation aircraft.
The co-lead of the coalition that Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) has put together with our allies are Denmark and
The Netherlands, and they are doing the preponderance of it
right now. We are training some pilots in the U.S., and we are
working on some of their maintenance programs and everything in
the U.S. also.
Just a couple of notes, an important feature of this,
believe it or not, has been English language capability, and
English language training. If all the manuals, and all the
instructions, and all the buttons are written in English, you
at least got to know that much English. By the way, it is also
the international language of flight, and so it is just
necessary to have some level of language skill.
That is the first step. The second step is to determine
whether or not the pilot has sufficient basic pilot training.
If the person is an accomplished pilot already, go straight to
an F-16 transition, and that brings some challenges, because
these are very different aircraft from what they have been
flying in the Ukrainian Air Force. Otherwise, you go to basic
flight training.
And we do have some aviators in basic flight training as
well in a couple of different countries, and then they will
graduate to an F-16 transition. I hope that answered your
question.
Mr. Davis. And just one follow up here in the few seconds
left. Do we have the capability, the capacity to train more
Ukrainian pilots in your opinion?
General Cavoli. Yeah, the limiting factor on how many we
are training right now, sir, is Ukrainian pilot availability.
The Ukrainians have carefully calculated how many pilots they
can spare and still maintain an adequate level of combat
activity inside Ukraine, and that is what is driving the actual
size of the pipeline, or how many are in the pipeline.
Mr. Davis. Thank you, I yield back, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back. The committee will
now stand in recess for five minutes as we move to room 2212
for the closed portion of this hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 10, 2024
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 10, 2024
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 10, 2024
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 10, 2024
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Dr. Wallander. We coordinate with allies and partners to mitigate
the impact of Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine on energy
markets. The price cap policy and import bans of the Price Cap
Coalition partners maintain oil market stability, while lowering the
value of Russian crude relative to competing crude oil and shifting
more of Russian exports from higher-value refined products to lower
value crude oil. We are aware that India continues to leverage the
price cap to negotiate heavy discounts on purchases of Russian oil.
?The United States, along with Price Cap Coalition partners, is working
to prevent Russia from earning a wartime premium on oil while
supporting stability of global oil markets. We will continue price cap
enforcement actions with a view to raising costs for Russia and
reducing Kremlin revenue. [See page 11.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. DAVIS
General Cavoli. The two USEUCOM Strike Eagle squadrons are integral
to the USEUCOM mission and the support USEUCOM provides to the overall
NATO mission. The aircraft actively support the NATO Response Force,
NATO Operations, SECDEF directed EXORD, and one USEUCOM directed
mission in support of material transfer to Ukraine. Divesting the
USEUCOM Strike Eagle squadrons would result in the COCOM losing over
25% of its fighter capacity, increasing the strain on the aircraft,
pilots, maintainers, and support functions due to no corresponding
reduction in tasking. As a USEUCOM directed mission, the operations
supporting the transfer of material to Ukraine may be the first to be
suspended as capacity dwindles. This would result in a lack of
defensive coverage for these logistics operations. USEUCOM defers to
the Air Force concerning fighter modernization timelines and basing
decisions. [See page 49.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. MCCLELLAN
Dr. Wallander. Deterrence and arms control play complementary and
indispensable roles in reducing nuclear dangers. The 2022 Nuclear
Posture Review underscores the importance of U.S. leadership in arms
control but also emphasizes that we need a willing partner operating in
good faith. Russian actions make mutual and verifiable arms control
challenging, but preparing for engagement and realistic outcomes with
Russia remains in our national security interest. The most effective
actions the Department of Defense can take now are to complete the
current modernization of U.S. nuclear forces, continually assess
whether changes in U.S. strategy and force posture are required as a
result of the evolving security environment and continue to message to
Russia that it will not be safer in an unconstrained environment.
[See page 35.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 10, 2024
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. Terrorist groups obtain financing through many
different methods. What actions are your COCOM taking to combat
the financing of terrorists? Are there areas in which increased
collaboration with interagency partners, Allies, or Strategic
partners would lead to cutting terrorist financing to prevent
them from buying weapons and conducting attacks?
General Cavoli. U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) Joint
Interagency Counter Trafficking Center (JICTC), which hosts the
Command's counternarcotics (CN) funded counter threat finance
team, leverages Congressional authorities that allow DoD, under
certain circumstances, to utilize CN resources and personnel to
support U.S. law enforcement investigations targeting terrorist
finances originating or transiting Europe. Notably, the JICTC's
strong relationships with the Command's Drug Enforcement
Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Homeland Security
Investigations representatives allow for a whole-of-government
approach to terrorist finance disruption. Additionally, the
JICTC provides USEUCOM-funded commercially available tool
suites to Intelligence Directorate analysts based at Joint
Analytic Center--Molesworth, the Command's analytic lead for
countering violent extremism. This information ultimately
provides investigative leads for U.S. and partner nation
investigations. We also partner with National CounterTerrorism
Center (NCTC) Pursuit Group and Special Operations Command's
Operation Gallant Phoenix to collaborate on terrorist threats
and terrorist finances related to Europe.
Opportunities to increase collaboration with allies and
strategic partners relies on U.S. access to European financial
data. Currently, U.S. investigations are largely limited to
U.S. correspondent banking, a limitation that becomes more
pronounced as financial flows move farther from the Homeland.
Therefore, enhancing our access to European financial data is
not just a strategic advantage, but a necessity for effective
counterterrorism efforts.
Mr. Scott. How should NATO's and US force presence evolve
in the Baltic region to effectively counter the threat posed by
a reconstituted Russian military? Is the current posture of a
NATO brigade per nation sufficient?
General Cavoli. NATO's current posture, including the NATO
Forward Land Force Battalions that can expand to Brigade size
during crisis, represents a significant step toward bolstering
NATO's defense capabilities. However, even this new posture may
be insufficient on its own to effectively deter potential
Russian aggression. Other necessary considerations to bolster
the effectiveness of NATO's force presence include:
Enhanced Interoperability: Improving interoperability among
NATO Allies is crucial for effective collective defense. This
includes conducting joint exercises, training programs, and
military exchanges to ensure seamless coordination and
cooperation among Allied forces.
Investment in Defense Capabilities: The United States must
continue to encourage all Allies to invest in and prioritize
rebuilding their defense capabilities, particularly in the land
domain. This includes increasing defense spending, modernizing
equipment, and investing in critical infrastructure to better
withstand potential threats.
Mr. Scott. What air defense capabilities are still needed
to protect Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania?
General Cavoli. The Baltics currently possess a mixture of
Soviet-era and Western style short range air defense systems
and sensors with no medium-to-long range active air defense
assets, including sensors. The Baltics' sensor network is being
actively improved through a security cooperation initiative
sponsored by the United States. To efficiently defend Baltic
airspace and critical assets against both air and ballistic
missile threats, a layered defensive network consisting of
medium-to-long range capabilities and interoperable sensors is
recommended. These assets should consist of systems such as
PATRIOT, IRIS-T (German), SAMP/T (French/Italian), and Sky
Sabre (UK) in order to improve the network and mitigate risk.
Mr. Scott. Now that Sweden and Finland has joined NATO, how
do you ensure seamless planning and operations in the Baltic
Sea area in the air, land, and maritime domains?
General Cavoli. Sweden and Finland have exercised with NATO
nations for many years and possess advanced and highly capable
military forces. The accession of Sweden and Finland as NATO
members, and their inclusion in the Deterrence and Defense of
the Euro-Atlantic family of plans, significantly enhances
integrated planning and coordinated operations. It alleviates
the need for bilateral, trilateral, or multi-lateral planning
between the United States, NATO, and those countries, and
allows me, in my capacity as CDRUSEUCOM, to ensure integration
between U.S. plans and NATO plans. Additionally, Sweden and
Finland have also disclosed their national defense plans to the
Alliance through the Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and SHAPE,
which will serve to better synchronize both Allied Command
Operations and national efforts.
Mr. Scott. What is the right balance of ``in place''
permanent US/western allied forces in Central Eastern Europe
versus rotational and ``response'' forces?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM sees the existing in-theater
presence, including the rotational and ``response'' forces and
pre-positioned equipment brought to Europe following the 2014
and 2022 invasions, as an enduring requirement post-Ukraine.
Furthermore, additional forces may be required depending on the
specific outcomes of the war in Ukraine. USEUCOM prefers
assigned forces over allocated forces due to operational
flexibility, familiarity with the theater, efficiency, and
continuity in building relationships to increase operational
effectiveness. USEUCOM, the Services, and the Department of
Defense (DoD) use the following criteria to determine the
method of sourcing combatant command requirements: Operational
(basis for requirement and associated risk); Political-Military
(including host nation and/or NATO concerns); Force Management
(available capacity and deployment models); and Cost
(affordability of options associated with implementing a
change). The balance considers risk across multiple combatant
commands. The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs evaluate all COCOM requests against the services'
abilities to source the forces requested.
Mr. Scott. What are your top 5 priorities for Moldova in FY
25?
General Cavoli. DoD's priorities for Moldova are to
strengthen Moldova's deterrent against Russian aggression,
support Moldova develop its strategic vision and requirements,
ensure sustainable change as part of Moldova's defense capacity
building, divest of Soviet legacy equipment, and enhance
resilience against Russian hybrid threats. USEUCOM's priorities
will serve these larger objectives.
The USEUCOM priorities for Moldova in FY25 are: 1. Advocate
for Foreign Military Sales (FMF), Humanitarian Assistance (HA),
1251, and 321 funding for Moldova to remain the same or
increase so that my other priorities for Moldova continue to be
funded. 2. Air Defense and Air Domain Awareness 3. Anti-tank/
armor training and equipping 4. Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO)
development 5. Conduct surveys of Marculesti Airfield and all
military training areas for Exercise Related Construction (ERC)
and exercise planning.
Mr. Scott. Do we need a robust multi-category weapons/
ammunition enactment of the Defense Production Act (DPA)?
General Cavoli. I welcome any proposed amendment or
legislation aimed at leveraging the Defense Production Act to
its fullest extent across various weapon categories and
munition types. An expansion like this, coupled with DPA
appropriations needed to execute, will help us improve the
defense industrial base, enhancing our ability to respond to
increased and surge procurement demands as we counter emerging
threats and evolving security challenges. This approach would
also need to be supported by funding the Services to procure
munitions in sufficient quantities as requested in the budget.
It will enable our military, Allies, and partners to remain
prepared to defend those nations' interests, while
simultaneously strengthening our commitment to regional
stability and international security cooperation.
Mr. Scott. What actions are still needed to strengthen
Moldova's immunity to hybrid threats by Russia?
General Cavoli. Moldova must first elevate public messaging
to clearly articulate its national achievements and highlight
its trajectory towards EU integration. Second, it must persist
in exposing instances of Russian interference through various
media channels to heighten awareness among the populace. Third,
inter-ministerial coordination must be seamless, including
through identification of a clear focal point for cybersecurity
and resilience planning.
From a DoD perspective, we need to continue investing in
activities and programs aimed at increasing Moldova's cyber
security and resilience to Russian mis/disinformation. We must
also increase the national army's capability and capacity by
promoting the importance of increased defense spending, and
identify a clear strategy for procurement. Finally, we must
help Moldova strengthen the image of the Ministry of Defence
(MoD) and national army as institutions that are favorably
viewed by the public, including through support to the civilian
population in emergencies and natural disasters.
Mr. Scott. Does NATO intend to increase the frequency of
military exercises conducted with Moldova?
General Cavoli. Moldova continues to advance opportunities
to realize its West-leaning ambitions through targeted
participation in NATO's exercise program. While NATO, as an
alliance, does not conduct exercises with specific Partner
Nations like Moldova, NATO does prepare a set of exercises
under the Military Training and Exercise Program (MTEP) that
are open to Partners and Non-NATO Entities. Partner Nations can
choose from over 125 events based on national goals. NATO is
specifically looking at developing relationships with non-NATO
partners, with an eye towards Moldova. 2022 represented the
first year for Moldovan participation in a NATO exercise when
Moldova participated in STEADFAST JACKAL and NATO-GEORGIA.
Moldova also participated in Coalition Warrior Interoperability
Exercise (CWIX) and STEADFAST JACKAL in 2023. Moldova will
tentatively participate in two exercises in both 2024 and 2025.
Exercising with NATO, or with other international partners,
will support Moldova's interoperability with current and future
international peacekeeping missions, such as KFOR, to which
Moldova's contributes troops.
Mr. Scott. How has Moldova done in updating their policy
documents, relevant legal acts, the structure of the national
defense system, and the training system, based on the lessons
learned from the Russian Federation's military aggression
against Ukraine? What more needs to be done?
General Cavoli. Moldova has made significant strides in
updating policy documents, relevant legal acts, and the
structure of the national defense system. Moldova published a
new National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2023, with
plans for National Defense and Military Strategies as early as
this calendar year. Additionally, Moldova has adopted Western
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) pre-deployment requirements prior
to integrating with Kosovo Forces (KFOR). Continued support
from Romania, the United States, the EU, and other partners
will be instrumental as Moldova works toward advancing these
efforts.
Mr. Scott. How important is it for the strategic
credibility of Moldova to ensure a gradual growth of their
defense budget with the objective to reach 1% of the GDP during
the current decade?
General Cavoli. Growing the defense budget to 1% of the GDP
is paramount for Moldova's strategic credibility; it allows for
implementation of needed reforms, modernization of defense
capabilities, and strengthened bilateral relations. A
consistent increase in the defense budget would signal a
significant shift in priorities and bolster the MoD's standing
in the international community, while opening new doors for
defense procurement of critical defense equipment.
Mr. Scott. What recommendations do you have for Moldova on
how they can deepen their special relationship with Romania?
General Cavoli. Moldova stands at a similar juncture to
where Romania stood more than 30 years ago. This presents an
opportunity to learn from Romania's experiences in NATO
integration, Foreign Military Sales, and long-term project
management. Additionally, Moldova can train on equipment that
it has in common with Romania, such as tactical radars,
AntiTank Guided Missiles (ATGM), K-Loaders, airfield
operations, and maintenance capabilities. Moldova can also
similarly adapt its operational and defense model to a more
Western style, as Romania has sought to do, with Romania's
support. Romania has demonstrated willingness to support
Moldova in these areas.
Mr. Scott. How many GLSDB are on contract for Ukraine? When
will they receive all of them? What feedback have the
Ukrainians provided on them? Will more be ordered if additional
USAI funds are appropriated?
General Cavoli. There are 12 launchers and 606 GLSDB rounds
on contract for Ukraine, and the deliveries are projected to be
completed in FY25. Given operational feedback from Ukraine, the
systems will undergo additional refinement and operational
testing throughout the latter half of FY24. Additional
procurement decisions will be driven by Ukraine's security
assistance priorities and available resources.
Mr. Scott. What is the status of NASAMS deliveries to
Ukraine? What is the main production rate limiting factor:
radars, launchers, control vehicles? When can they expect to
receive all of the ones that have been committed via USAI?
General Cavoli. Two U.S. donated systems have been
delivered to date, two additional systems will be delivered in
FY24, and the remaining eight systems are expected to be
delivered in FY25. The primary limiting factor for NASAMS is
not the number of systems fielded in Ukraine, but the low
availability of the compatible air defense interceptors.
Mr. Scott. Between FMF funds from the 4 Supplementals,
annual S&FO Appropriations, and any other sources, how much FMF
has actually been obligated for Ukraine since Feb 2022? After
the recent obligation for HAWK sustainment, how much is
available for them?
General Cavoli. Prior to passing the 2024 supplemental
bill, Congress has appropriated $1,642,580,000 in FMF to the
Department of State for Ukraine since 2022. Including the 9
April 2024 announcement of HAWK sustainment, a total of
$623,953,181 in FMF has been obligated with $1,018,626,819
remaining available. I recommend contacting the Department of
State for further details.
Mr. Scott. What is the status of HIMARS deliveries to
Ukraine? When can they expect to receive all of the 18
committed via USAI? Have these been given priority in the queue
ahead of the Army's own orders?
General Cavoli. The 18 HIMARS systems funded via USAI are
projected to be delivered to Ukraine in FY26. I recommend
contacting Headquarters Department of the Army, Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)
(HQDA ASA(ALT)) and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
regarding the prioritization of customers on the HIMARS
production line.
Mr. Scott. In July 2022, DOD reprogrammed $50 million in
Ukraine replacement funds to LTAMDS RDT&E to increase it's
interoperability with ``friendly foreign countries.'' Has
LTAMDS been provided to Ukraine to support their Patriot
batteries?
General Cavoli. The United States has not provided Lower
Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) to Ukraine. Since
July 2022, the United States and our Allies and partners have
provided Patriot, NASAMS, HAWK, and other air defense systems
to Ukraine. I recommend contacting Headquarters Department of
the Army, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology) (HQDA ASA(ALT)) for further details
on the specific status of the LTAMDS RDT&E program.
Mr. Scott. What issues still need to be addressed in order
for the Danube to be fully utilized as a strategic route for
long-term European security?
General Cavoli. The Danube River is a strategic route for
European commerce. However, it does not traverse through
contiguous NATO territory, which limits its military utility.
Additionally, the Cargo Preference Act of 1904 limits our
options by requiring DoD cargo to be transported on U.S.-
flagged vessels, restricting the use of foreign-flagged ships
to maximize this route's potential.
The 21st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) successfully
utilized the Danube River for transporting military equipment
to Romania in 2021 and 2022, demonstrating its viability as a
congestion-reducing route. However, the full capabilities for
offloading and utilizing river Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPODs)
have yet to be fully tested, with the Bratislava River port
under consideration for future loading and unloading
operations.
Mr. Scott. What are the best resources to counter the
nearly 400-600 drifting mines in the Black Sea?
General Cavoli. Freedom of navigation in the Baltic and
Black Seas depend heavily on mine countermeasure capabilities.
Although many NATO Allies maintain robust mine countermeasure
capabilities organized and deployed as part of two Standing
NATO Mine Countermeasure Groups, Romania and Bulgaria have very
limited organic mine countermeasure capacity. At such time that
Russia's war of aggression permits warships to transit the
Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, NATO intends to re-
establish mine countermeasure presence in the Black Sea, and
the Ukraine Armed Forces intends to homeport mine
countermeasure ships they have received from the United Kingdom
from Royal Navy Bases in the UK.
------
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Mr. Carbajal. How does a strong NATO alliance bolster the
United States' defense capabilities within the European Command
AOR?
General Cavoli. A strong NATO Alliance significantly
enhances the United States' defense capabilities in the USEUCOM
AOR by promoting collective defense, interoperability,
intelligence sharing, strategic partnerships, forward presence,
deterrence, and burden sharing. NATO's cohesive and unified
approach to security in Europe reinforces U.S. security
interests and contributes to regional stability and peace.
NATO's principle of collective defense under Article 5
ensures that an attack on one member is considered an attack on
all members. This mutual defense commitment greatly enhances
the U.S. military's deterrence posture in Europe.
NATO facilitates interoperability and integration among
Allied armed forces through Allied Command Operations (ACO)
exercises, training programs, staff coordination and
standardization efforts. This enables U.S. forces deployed
within the USEUCOM AOR to operate alongside Allies, enhancing
the overall effectiveness of Allied military operations, and
ensuring a unified response to potential threats.
NATO serves as a platform for the increased sharing of
intelligence, information, and assessments among Allies. This
collective intelligence-sharing network enhances situational
awareness, facilitates early warning capabilities, and enables
more informed decision-making for U.S. forces.
Mr. Carbajal. Can you speak to the role space-based
capabilities have played throughout this conflict for both
sides? Drawing on lessons from this war do you feel you have
access to the space capabilities you need for your AOR?
General Cavoli. Space-based capabilities remain a critical
enabler in the current war. We have observed that uninterrupted
access to resilient satellite-based communications is integral
to command, control, and communications networks and that
space-enabled technologies are crucial for achieving
information dominance and unfettered access to battlespace
awareness as well as intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR). Additionally, we have observed from both
UAF and RUSMIL that space-based technologies are necessary for
command of the electromagnetic spectrum. Consequently, from a
defensive perspective, Russia has integrated counterspace
activities as a part of its order of battle, and Russia will
likely continue to challenge its adversaries across the
entirety of the space domain.
Based on these observations, we believe that space-based
capabilities--both military and commercial, fielded and in
development--will continue to play an essential role in future
conflicts for USEUCOM, NATO, and partners within our AOR.
NATO's reliance on space-enabled capabilities is increasing;
however, this has increased the strain on our appropriated
systems, frequencies, and resources as a result. To best
prepare ourselves for competition and future crises, USEUCOM
requires additional resources and expertise across the command
at all levels, to include a significant increase in authorized
manpower at the Space Force Component Command.
Mr. Carbajal. How does a strong NATO alliance bolster the
United States' defense capabilities within the European Command
AOR?
Dr. Wallander. Our alliances and partnerships around the
world are our most important strategic asset. A strong and
unified NATO not only deters aggression, it provides a platform
for mutually beneficial cooperation. NATO's collective defense
obligations, which are enshrined in Article 5, ensure every
inch of NATO territory on both sides of the Atlantic will be
defended if attacked. Without this credible deterrent, Europe
and North America would face tremendous instability with
massive human and economic consequences that would be felt
globally. At this moment, for example, Russia is deterred from
attacking European Allies because of our ironclad commitment to
collective defense.
Furthermore, U.S. posture in Europe, distributed across
various nations of the Alliance, strengthens the security of
the United States, and enables us to rapidly respond to crises
in Europe as well as in Africa and the Middle East. Our
membership in NATO and our rights under the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement enable this posture.
Mr. Carbajal. Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine poses a grave risk to the security of all Europe, as
well as U.S. interest in the region.
What are your biggest concerns for what Russia may do next
to threaten the security and stability of Europe and U.S.
interests?
Dr. Wallander. The Euro-Atlantic region is currently
confronted with a unique set of challenges and dangers not
witnessed since World War II. Russia's full-scale war in
Ukraine shows no signs of abating, raising concerns about the
potential for a broader conflict.
We remain concerned about Russia's threat to bordering
states and its willingness to use force in pursuit of
territorial expansion. By collaborating with Allies and
partners in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, we
seek to enhance their resilience against Russian malign
influence and bolster their defensive capabilities, ensuring a
robust and effective response if deterrence fails.
For northern European nations, the Arctic's strategic
significance has led to heightened Russian interest and
increased risk for confrontation. Russia has been actively
bolstering its regional presence, establishing new Arctic
units, upgrading existing airfields and infrastructure, and
setting up additional military bases along its Arctic coast.
Russia aims to become the leading Arctic power, viewing the
region as crucial for its national security and economic
development.
Russia's unlawful invasions of Ukraine and Georgia,
alongside its swift military buildup, deepening alliances with
China, Iran, and North Korea, and its disruptive activities in
sensitive regions like the Balkans, reveal a significant and
escalating chronic threat to not only our NATO Allies but to
American interests.
The threat posed by Russia is not bound by geographic
borders. Russia continues to conduct malign cyber operations,
pursue capabilities in space, and interfere in election
processes--all of which pose a threat to U.S. interests in
Europe. The Department remains focused on deterring any and all
attacks--including aggression--from Russia on the United
States, its Allies, and partners.
------
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Mr. Bacon. I understand the Ukrainian Air Force may receive
its first F-16s and trained pilots later this year. However I'm
aware of concerns that by the end of next year the Ukrainian
Air Force will have more F-16s from our allies than they have
trained pilots and maintainers. A) Does the Ukrainian Air Force
have enough trained pilots and maintenance personnel to begin
combat operations this year and to support planned F-16s
deliveries through the end of 2025? B) Does the US have a plan
to train additional pilots and maintainers and what factors are
limiting our ability to train more Ukrainian personnel to
operate the F-16? C) Does the DoD currently plan on providing
US F-16s or related munitions and support equipment to Ukraine?
Why or why not? D) What organization in the Department of
Defense has the overall lead for developing and coordinating
the plan to train and equip the Ukrainian Air Force to operate
the F-16?
General Cavoli. As a co-lead of the multinational Air Force
Capability Coalition, the United States is committed to
supporting Ukraine's fourth-generation fighter capability
through our ongoing work to train and equip the Ukrainian Air
Force to operate, service, and maintain F-16 fighter aircraft
and integrate the F-16 into Ukraine's Armed Forces. Currently,
there are several dozen pilots and maintainers training in
Denmark, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
With current plans, we anticipate training enough pilots and
maintainers to meet Ukraine's initial operational requirement
in 2025. Alongside co-leads Denmark and the Netherlands, and in
close consultation with our Ukrainian counterparts, my team
will continue to develop and refine a future training plan,
particularly as Allies refine their delivery timelines. We will
maximize our ability to enable an operationally relevant F-16
capability for Ukraine. Considering additional training in the
United States over the next calendar year and beyond will be an
important element of any future training plan. Ukrainian pilot
English proficiency, U.S. training capacity, and funding will
be critical components to ensure we are able to meet aircraft
sourcing requirements.
The United States does not plan to provide Ukraine with F-
16 jets from U.S. stocks at this time. However, we are
supporting Ukraine's future F-16 capability by providing
training, key support equipment, spare parts, and munitions.
Many of these munitions are also utilized on Ukraine's current
legacy aircraft thanks to Western integration efforts.
The U.S. Air Force, with oversight from OSD Policy, is
taking a lead role in the Air Force Capability Coalition to
develop and coordinate the plan to train Ukraine on and equip
Ukraine with the F-16. As Ukraine begins to receive its initial
jets, the Department will continue to fine tune efforts to
enable a sustainable and effective capability for Ukraine.
Mr. Bacon. I understand the Ukrainian Air Force may receive
it's first F-16s and trained pilots later this year. However
I'm aware of concerns that by the end of next year the
Ukrainian Air Force will have more F-16s from our allies than
they have trained pilots and maintainers. A) Does the Ukrainian
Air Force have enough trained pilots and maintenance personnel
to begin combat operations this year and to support planned F-
16s deliveries through the end of 2025? B) Does the US have a
plan to train additional pilots and maintainers and what
factors are limiting our ability to train more Ukrainian
personnel to operate the F-16? C) Does the DoD currently plan
on providing US F-16s or related munitions and support
equipment to Ukraine? Why or why not? D) What organization in
the Department of Defense has the overall lead for developing
and coordinating the plan to train and equip the Ukrainian Air
Force to operate the F-16?
Dr. Wallander. As a co-lead of the multinational Air Force
Capability Coalition, the United States is committed to
supporting Ukraine's fourth-generation fighter capability
through our ongoing work to train and equip the Ukrainian Air
Force to operate, service, and maintain F-16 fighter aircraft
and integrate the F-16 into Ukraine's Armed Forces. Currently,
there are several dozen pilots and maintainers training in
Denmark, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
With current plans, we anticipate training enough pilots and
maintainers to meet Ukraine's initial operational requirement
in 2025. Alongside co-leads Denmark and the Netherlands, and in
close consultation with our Ukrainian counterparts, my team
will continue to develop and refine a future training plan,
particularly as Allies refine their delivery timelines. We will
maximize our ability to enable an operationally relevant F-16
capability for Ukraine. Considering additional training in the
United States over the next calendar year and beyond will be an
important element of any future training plan. Ukrainian pilot
English proficiency, U.S. training capacity, and funding will
be critical components to ensure we are able to meet aircraft
sourcing requirements. The United States does not plan to
provide Ukraine with F-16 jets from U.S. stocks at this time.
However, we are supporting Ukraine's future F-16 capability by
providing training, key support equipment, spare parts, and
munitions. Many of these munitions are also utilized on
Ukraine's current legacy aircraft thanks to Western integration
efforts. The U.S. Air Force, with oversight from OSD Policy, is
taking a lead role in the Air Force Capability Coalition to
develop and coordinate the plan to train Ukraine on and equip
Ukraine with the F-16. As Ukraine begins to receive its initial
jets, the Department will continue to fine tune efforts to
enable a sustainable and effective capability for Ukraine.
------
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
Mr. Bergman. General Cavoli, it's my understanding that
commercial cellular networks are being used to target Ukrainian
troops, and that this problem is exacerbated by the fact that
Russia weaponizes its state-owned telecom networks. How has
EUCOM sought to make most efficient use of innovative solutions
in the US tech industry to utilize pre-existing commercial
cellular infrastructure for improved telecom security and
resilience in places like Poland and the Baltic states?
General Cavoli. There is no concern of commercial cellular
networks being used to target US troops in theater by Russian
forces. USEUCOM purchases pre-existing commercial cellular
phones and cards from vetted and trusted third party German
vendors, which are then deployed within the theater (to include
when travels to Poland and Baltic States) as members execute
operations in the area. Similarly, units stationed and
operating outside of Germany purchase commercial cellular
phones and cards from approved local vendors (to the region
they are operating in). Purchasers of telecommunications
equipment take steps during acquisitions process to protect US
government employees' identity and aim to make their cellular
network use appear the same as any standard commercial user.
------
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN
Mr. Golden. The debate is not if F-16s will be of aid to
Ukraine, but when. As we have seen over the course of this
brutal war of Russian aggression, the longer we wait, the more
Ukraine loses. With that being said, would you agree that F-16s
are a key asset that would help the win Ukrainians now and
defend themselves in the future?
General Cavoli. Yes, F-16s are an asset that will provide
Ukraine with additional capability, including the ability to
conduct operations using a broad variety of munitions. However,
this capability is not a silver bullet in Ukraine's war against
Russian aggression. Longer term, the F-16 offers the potential
of future integration and interoperability with NATO, improves
the effectiveness, survivability, and sustainability of the
Ukrainian Air Force, and strengthens the capabilities of the
Ukrainian Air Force to deter and, if necessary, defeat future
Russian aggression.
Mr. Golden. What is the current status of the F-16
assistance to Ukraine? When will the first aircraft, pilots,
and maintainers arrive? How many more aircraft and crews are
needed, and how soon should they be available to Ukraine?
General Cavoli. The multinational Air Force Capability
Coalition, co-led by Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United
States, is committed to supporting Ukraine's F-16 program. The
initial aircraft, pilots, maintainers, and support personnel
should arrive this summer, with a plan for additional aircraft,
pilots, and maintainers to arrive later in 2024 and beyond.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. I'd like to discuss the proposed EU find to send
a million 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine per year, announced
last March. This fund would allegedly be capitalized at $2
billion and include some joint procurement. The artillery shell
piecer, however, would include PDA-style reimbursement for
existing member stocks.
Have you received any information from the Europeans about
how those valuations are made?
The funded joint procurement efforts would be limited to EU
products, rather than what will help Ukrainians most. Have you
raised this in your discussions with the allies? It seems like
an EU jobs program.
General Cavoli. Yes, I am aware of the EU's Act in Support
of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which is intended to support
ammunition projects and boost production among EU member states
through 2025. ASAP is one of three tracks targeting the overall
EU goal to deliver one million artillery rounds (not
specifically 155mm) to Ukraine within one year. The other two
tracks agreed by the Council were focused on:
1. Funding reimbursements from member state stocks (Track
1/€1 billion) 2. Funding for member states to contract for
new supplies of ammunition (Track 2/€1 billion).
The EU did not meet its target due to lack of concrete
industry orders and delays in Europe's defense industrial
mobilization. Earlier this year, High Representative of the
European Union for Foreign Affairs and security Policy/Vice
President of European Commission Joseph Borrell stated that 52%
of the promised rounds would be delivered by the deadline, with
the original target to be reached by the end of 2024. He also
noted that the production capacity for artillery shells in
Europe has gone up 40% since the start of the war and is
expected to reach 1.4 million rounds a year by the end of 2024.
ASAP is intended to focus Europe on enhancing its defense
industrial base capacity and promoting EU production, which
will help a variety of nations to collectively meet the
immediate demand for artillery ammunition.
Mr. Waltz. The recent ISIS-K attack on a Moscow concert
hall reminded the world of the enduring danger of Islamist
terrorism and the ambitions of ISIS-K outside of Afghanistan.
The growing focus in Europe, coupled with GEN Kurilla's
statement in our recent posture hearing that ISIS-K ``retains
the capability and the will to attack US and Western interests
abroad in as little as six months with little to no warning.''
How are we combating the increased terrorist threat in
Europe from ISIS-K? Are we getting appropriate support from our
European allies to defeat this threat? How is this threat
perceived against the U.S. homeland?
General Cavoli. Our European partner security services have
the lead in disrupting terrorist threats in Europe, to include
those from ISIS-K. USEUCOM, in coordination with Department of
State, DoD, and U.S. interagency partners, assists our European
partners by sharing intelligence on potential terrorist
threats. In addition, USCENTCOM's efforts against ISIS-K within
their AOR help to stem the spread of ISIS-K into Europe.
In regards to our European allies, they maintain robust
counterterrorism and information sharing capabilities to detect
and disrupt these threats. They are not taking the ISIS-K
threat lightly, as evidenced by several nations raising their
threat levels and increasing their security postures. Our
European allies are diligent in deterring and pre-emptively
halting terrorist actions. For example, France and Turkey
investigate and where appropriate detain persons believed to be
``known or suspected terrorists.'' Germany is persistent in
their investigative processes and will, after months of
surveillance, ensure they have the evidence to detain
individuals as appropriate. Countries in the southern part of
Europe are working with North African intelligence agencies to
stop plots before they cross the Mediterranean Sea. These
collaborative international efforts play a key role in
interdicting transnational threats and bolster our ability to
protect the U.S. homeland forward.
Mr. Waltz. Russian influence has extended into the next
frontier for maritime trade- the arctic. The Arctic waterways
open an extremely strategic water way cutting down on seafaring
trade while also providing a strategic outpost for a potential
military conflict.
How are we closely aligning with Sweden and Finland as new
NATO allies to strictly enforce sanctions to prevent Russian
encroachment and land seizure as they are proactively doing in
Ukraine? How are we projecting increased maritime power in the
Northern Atlantic to prevent and curb the expansion of Russian
influence on the former Soviet states and the surrounding
European nations?
General Cavoli. Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and amphibious
forces deliver credible combat power to deter Russia and
reassure U.S. Allies and partners. Persistent indications and
warnings capabilities and uncrewed systems across the
Greenland, Iceland, and UK (GIUK) gap are critical for high-end
subsurface threat detection and defense of the homeland. The
two additional destroyers planned for the European theater will
enhance Allied sea power projection and deterrence in the North
Atlantic and Arctic. Finland and Sweden bring highly capable
forces that add a world-class submarine fleet, operational
icebreaking capabilities, and underwater EOD operations to the
Alliance in the Arctic. In December 2023, U.S. Secretary of
Defense Lloyd Austin signed three bilateral Defense Cooperation
Agreements with Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. DoD will focus on
implementing its bilateral defense cooperation agreements to
enable calibrated presence using existing Allied
infrastructure. Large-scale, joint, and combined exercises,
such as Nordic Response and Arctic Shock, prepare ground,
naval, and air forces to operate in extreme cold weather.
USEUCOM also collaborates with other Combatant Commands and
Arctic Allies to deliver a 360-degree approach against Russia.
Allies and partners are the center of gravity for our National
Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR). The NSAR is heavily
focused on work with partners--by, with, and through. The NSAR
highlights the necessity of working together to enhance our
domain awareness, improve our information sharing, and develop
a shared threat picture.
Mr. Waltz. As part of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement in recent years, the U.S. has shifted eastward while
moving more U.S. troops and assets to Poland from Germany to
enhance deterrence against Russia, strengthen NATO, reassure
our Allies, and our forward presence in Poland on NATO's
eastern flank will improve our strategic and operational
flexibility.
Have you seen a positive impact of this Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement with Poland? Has this increased our
ability to project eastward in our Russia deterrence? What
resources (i.e. Patriot batteries, F-15s, etc.) or personnel
increases do you need to better project this power?
General Cavoli. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
has created a positive impact with Poland and supports our
bilateral objectives. Through this agreement, Poland has
increased support to the U.S., providing the facilities and
life support required to support forward deployed U.S.
personnel. This enhances force projection, improves operational
readiness, and enables deterrence.
Our forward presence on NATO's eastern flank improves our
strategic and operational flexibility. The United States serves
as the framework nation for the NATO enhanced Forward Presence
(eFP) Battle Group in Poland. Additionally, the permanent
stationing of V Corps forward HQ in Poland expands U.S. command
and control capabilities. This summer, USEUCOM will move an
armored brigade combat team's equipment from Germany to Poland.
This army prepositioned stock, maintained by a permanent army
field support battalion, will increase our power projection
capabilities in Eastern Europe.
USEUCOM recommends maintaining a robust force posture in
Poland and across Eastern Europe for continued strong U.S.
support to Poland and the Polish NATO Battlegroup. USEUCOM also
requires additional Patriot systems to defend against the
totality of the Russian air threat and to ensure that the
Patriot batteries in place can rotate out and meet deployment-
to-dwell timelines without a lapse of coverage for our deployed
forces.
Mr. Waltz. I think our allies are vastly overestimating the
dollar value of the military assistance they are giving
Ukraine, and I'm worried DOD is going along with that to make a
better case that our diplomacy is working. For example, it was
reported in the March 31st edition of France's La Tribune
newspaper, in an interview with the French armed forces
minister, that Paris would send ``hundreds'' of its Renault VAB
armored personnel carriers to Ukraine this year. The defense
minister called the equipment ``old,'' and France is currently
phasing it out.
Would DOD count this type of aid as military assistance?
How would it value such equipment?
Dr. Wallander. Although I cannot comment on the specifics
of a media report, the Military Departments value equipment for
presidential drawdown authority purposes consistent with the
Foreign Assistance Act and implementing policy. This involves
starting with the equipment's original acquisition cost and
making reasonable adjustments for condition and market value.
I can say that Ukraine's battlefield needs are vast. Some
of the critical battlefield requirements, such as the ability
to safely transport personnel to and from the front lines, can
be readily met through the provision of available on-hand
equipment, including older variants. In situations like this,
availability and quantity can make an important difference.
Mr. Waltz. Last June DOD stated that it overestimated the
value of the weapons it has sent to Ukraine by $6.2 billion
over the past two years, resulting in a surplus that will be
used for future security packages. It was reported that this
error was caused when DoD officials overvalued some of the
systems sent to Ukraine, using the value of money it would cost
to replace an item completely rather than the current value of
the weapon. This accounting error thereby has been allowing DoD
to send more weapons now without asking Congress for more
money.
We are entrusted with the American taxpayer money and
painstakingly review where each dollar and cent go. How does
this enormous error happen? What have we done to correct this
error and prevent a repeat in the future?
What is the standardized NATO valuation for equipment? How
is DoD arriving at its valuations for weapons sent to Ukraine?
Are you (as DoD) partnering with our European allies to
inflate the contributions to put pressure on Congress to act on
the supplemental bill?
Dr. Wallander. The issue of re-valuing equipment provided
to Ukraine is one centered on authority to provide up to a
certain monetary value of goods. It is not one involving
funding or the misuse of taxpayer dollars. No funds were ever
lost or found.
During the Department's regular oversight of our execution
of presidential drawdown authority (PDA) for Ukraine, last year
we discovered inconsistencies in equipment valuation for
Ukraine. In a significant number of cases, Services used
replacement costs rather than net book value, thereby
overestimating the value of the equipment drawn down from U.S.
stocks and provided to Ukraine. Once we discovered the mis-
valuation, the Comptroller reissued guidance clarifying how to
value equipment in line with financial management regulation
and other Department policy to ensure we use a common
accounting method for PDA purposes. The Military Services now
certify to the Department's Comptroller that their estimated
valuations of U.S. stocks and services drawn down for Ukraine
are in line with DoD guidelines.
Our Allies and partners report their own commitments
through various announcements and in bilateral and multilateral
conversations. When totaling security assistance provided by
Allies and partners, the Department captures what was actually
transferred by Allies and partners. It does not include the
long-term support funds that may have been committed or
identified as necessary, but not yet provided. We will continue
to work with our Allies and partners to meet Ukraine's most
urgent security requirements. In addition to committing over
$44 billion in security assistance, our Allies and partners
can, at times, provide capabilities not readily available in
U.S. inventories, meeting a key battlefield need.
We have found that our Allies and partners robustly track
and report the values of the equipment they have donated to
Ukraine. OSD Policy has tasked our U.S. Defense Attaches
serving in Allied capitals to report back on the monetary
values of security assistance to Ukraine to ensure our Ally/
partner donation estimates are as accurate as possible.
Mr. Waltz. I'd like to discuss the proposed EU find to send
a million 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine per year, announced
last March. This fund would allegedly be capitalized at $2
billion and include some joint procurement. The artillery shell
piecer, however, would include PDA-style reimbursement for
existing member stocks.
Have you received any information from the Europeans about
how those valuations are made?
The funded joint procurement efforts would be limited to EU
products, rather than what will help Ukrainians most. Have you
raised this in your discussions with the allies? It seems like
an EU jobs program.
Dr. Wallander. The European Peace Facility (EPF) is the
vehicle that the European Union (EU) uses to provide security
assistance to Ukraine. In March 2023, the EU approved €2
billion in funds from the EFP to support its ammunition
initiative and specifically reimburse member states for
deliveries of ammunition to Ukraine from existing stocks and to
support joint procurement efforts. Since then, in March 2024,
the EU increased the ceiling of the EPF from €12 billion
to €17 billion, with the additional €5 billion
intended exclusively for Ukraine. Initially, the use of EPF
funds for joint procurement for Ukraine was limited to
purchases from European Union and Norwegian defense industry.
However, in March 2024, the EU relaxed the restrictions,
allowing EU member-states to receive reimbursements from the
EPF for procurements of munitions and weapons from non-European
sources over the near-term, if European industry cannot source
the items in time to meet Ukraine's urgent requirements.
In our consultations, including at the Ukraine Defense
Contact Group (UDCG) chaired by Secretary Austin, we have
consistently urged the EU and bilateral European donors to
surge assistance to meet Ukraine's immediate battlefield needs.
The EU continues to emphasize its unwavering support for
Ukraine and underscore its willingness to leverage the EPF to
address Ukraine's urgent requirements.
To date, the EFP has disbursed €5.6 billion to
reimburse member states for donations to Ukraine. I do not,
however, have visibility on how the EU assess individual
valuations, and would refer you to the EU for more information.
Mr. Waltz. Russian influence has extended into the next
frontier for maritime trade- the arctic. The Arctic waterways
open an extremely strategic water way cutting down on seafaring
trade while also providing a strategic outpost for a potential
military conflict.
How are we closely aligning with Sweden and Finland as new
NATO allies to strictly enforce sanctions to prevent Russian
encroachment and land seizure as they are proactively doing in
Ukraine? How are we projecting increased maritime power in the
Northern Atlantic to prevent and curb the expansion of Russian
influence on the former Soviet states and the surrounding
European nations?
Dr. Wallander. Allies and partners are the center of
gravity for our National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR).
The NSAR is heavily focused on work by, with, and through
partners. The NSAR highlights the necessity of working together
to enhance our domain awareness, improve our information
sharing, and develop a shared threat picture.
As you likely know, Russia is making excessive maritime
claims in the Arctic region, refurbishing infrastructure in the
Arctic along their so-called Northern Sea Route (NSR) and
threatening military action to enforce these claims.
The infrastructure in the Arctic impacts missions outside
the Arctic, including nuclear deterrence and power projection
into the Indo-Pacific and European theaters. DoD's posture
includes not only our own infrastructure, but also ``access,
basing, and overflight'' of our Allies' infrastructure.
The United States benefits from its close relationships
with European Arctic nations (both bilaterally and through
NATO) as well as with Canada (through coordination between
North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD] and U.S.
Northern Command [USNORTHCOM]). These relationships build
shared threat perceptions and create opportunities to sustain
the ability to project power into and through the Arctic
region.
By training alongside our Allies at exercises like NORDIC
RESPONSE and ARCTIC FORGE we will improve our interoperability
and understanding of Arctic operations. In December 2023, U.S.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin signed three bilateral
Defense Cooperation Agreements with Denmark, Sweden, and
Finland, respectively. DoD will focus on implementing its
bilateral defense cooperation agreements to enable calibrated
presence using existing Allied infrastructure.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIMENEZ
Mr. Gimenez. This week, Chinese President Xi Jinping met
with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavron in Beijing. As the
world is focused on Russia/Ukraine, what have the Chinese been
doing in EUCOM? What developments or investments have they made
in the region? How many European sea ports have they invested
in?
General Cavoli. China attempts to sow division and exert
influence across Europe through malicious means like trade
coercion, boycotts of European goods, and export controls in
order to shape policymakers in European states. Notably, in
2023 the European Union maintained a trade deficit with China
of over 291 billion euros, down from a record 390 billion euros
in 2022. Additionally, China invests in European ports,
airports, utility companies, and telecommunications, putting at
risk our collective sustainment and communication systems.
Chinese state-owned enterprises have investment stakes in
commercial seaports that handle more than 10 percent of
Europe's shipping capacity; this includes at least 14 ports in
close proximity to or collocated with hubs that provide
logistical support to NATO. European nations are awakening to
the massive extent and potentially damaging effect that Chinese
influence is having in the region.
Mr. Gimenez. This week, Chinese President Xi Jinping met
with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavron in Beijing. As the
world is focused on Russia/Ukraine, what have the Chinese been
doing in EUCOM? What developments or investments have they made
in the region? How many European sea ports have they invested
in?
Dr. Wallander. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the
Department's pacing challenge and presents a challenge to
European security. In the USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR),
we see the PRC attempting to weaken and fracture NATO's
cohesion and unity--which represent the bedrock of the
Alliance's deterrence and defense capabilities. In addition,
the PRC's investments in and access to European critical
infrastructure have the potential to directly impact
capabilities that are critical to SACEUR. For example, PRC
companies growing worldwide ownership and operation of
important infrastructure, such as port and rail projects across
the European continent, could affect NATO's logistics, military
mobility, and communications. Moreover, the presence of PRC
technology and services in Europe's telecommunication
infrastructure could increase the risk of potential
intelligence collection by the PRC. We're also seeing the rapid
advance of the PRC's space, cyber, and nuclear capabilities,
which are particularly concerning as domains without borders.
We know the only path to counter Beijing's malign behavior is
in close coordination with our Allies and partners and in all
our engagements we continue to encourage our European Allies
and partners to continue their focus on the PRC to collectively
address these issues.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LALOTA
Mr. LaLota. Dr. Wallander, recognizing the significant
contributions of Long Island's defense industrial base to our
national security, and in light of the recent unveiling of the
European Defense Industrial Strategy aimed at bolstering the
EU's defense base, could you share your perspective on how the
American defense industry and suppliers can contribute to
fostering a robust transatlantic defense base, ensuring a
steady supply of critical defense products, and supporting the
modernization efforts of the European defense sector?
Dr. Wallander. The United States is engaging with NATO
Allies and European Union (EU) member states to advocate for
keeping the EU defense industry market open, competitive, and
free of non-tariff barriers for entry of U.S. defense industry.
The 2022 EU Strategic Compass described the United States
as ``the EU's staunchest and most important strategic partner
and a global power contributing to peace, security, stability
and democracy on our continent.'' We hope the EU will maintain
the Strategic Compass as a guiding document as the EU moves
forward to bolster the European defense sector.
Prohibition of U.S. entity involvement could drastically
weaken shared security by limiting procurement options during a
time of severe defense article shortages, wasting resources
though duplication of efforts, and hindering U.S.-EU and NATO-
EU interoperability in defense industry production and
development.
Aspects of the EU Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) which
support Ukraine and promote its defense industrial base growth
are positive, as is the intention for greater cooperation with
NATO. The United States continues to support development of EU
defense initiatives and the defense industrial and
technological base that are coordinated and complementary to
NATO.
Partnership with non-EU industry, in particular American
defense industry, will help grow and expand European defense
industrial capacity. The best way for the EU to expedite
efficient production in the short-term is to reduce barriers
and allow transatlantic cooperation.
Since the signature of the DoD--European Defense Agency
(EDA) Administrative Arrangement (AA) in April 2023, DoD has
facilitated several conversations with the EDA and EU member
states writ large on efficient production and increased
interoperability between our defense industrial bases. DoD
hopes to continue these dialogues throughout the EU's
development of defense initiatives mapped out in the EDIS.
The DoD's first National Defense Industrial Strategy
(NDIS), released earlier this year, emphasizes the importance
of enduring cooperation with our NATO Allies and EU member
states, alongside other partners.
The NDIS recognizes that fortifying the defense industrial
base of the 21st century requires a collaborative effort
involving the U.S. government, private industry, and
international partners.
The NDIS calls for an expansion of our network of allies,
and for closer working relationships to achieve integrated
deterrence against our pacing threat. Specifically, it calls
for developing interoperability standards and other
infrastructure to ensure that allies and partners can produce
products for use by the Military Departments, and that products
made by the domestic DIB can be used by foreign militaries.
The NDIS also calls for the development of markets in which
materiel and knowledge produced by the domestic Defense
Industrial Base (DIB), or the DIB of our allies and partners
can be shared without fear of knowledge theft or other anti-
competitive market practices. This sharing of materiel and
knowledge can strengthen the relationship between the United
States and our partners and allies and enable closer
cooperation to rapidly address adversarial actions.
In support of the key actions laid out in the NDIS, DoD has
and will continue to engage the EU and its member states in
dialogue as we move forward to face the common security
challenges of the 21st century.