[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OVERSIGHT OF THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE
AND THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 22, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-122
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available on: govinfo.gov,
oversight.house.gov or
docs.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-323 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman
Jim Jordan, Ohio Jamie Raskin, Maryland, Ranking
Mike Turner, Ohio Minority Member
Paul Gosar, Arizona Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Columbia
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Michael Cloud, Texas Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Gary Palmer, Alabama Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Ro Khanna, California
Pete Sessions, Texas Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
Andy Biggs, Arizona Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York
Nancy Mace, South Carolina Katie Porter, California
Jake LaTurner, Kansas Cori Bush, Missouri
Pat Fallon, Texas Shontel Brown, Ohio
Byron Donalds, Florida Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Robert Garcia, California
William Timmons, South Carolina Maxwell Frost, Florida
Tim Burchett, Tennessee Summer Lee, Pennsylvania
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Greg Casar, Texas
Lisa McClain, Michigan Jasmine Crockett, Texas
Lauren Boebert, Colorado Dan Goldman, New York
Russell Fry, South Carolina Jared Moskowitz, Florida
Anna Paulina Luna, Florida Rashida Tlaib, Michigan
Nick Langworthy, New York Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts
Eric Burlison, Missouri
Mike Waltz, Florida
------
Mark Marin, Staff Director
Jessica Donlon, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
James Mandolfo, General Counsel
Jake Greenberg, Chief Counsel for Investigations
Clark Abourisk, Senior Counsel
Ellie McGowan, Staff Assistant and Administrative Clerk
Contact Number: 202-225-5074
Julie Tagen, Minority Staff Director
Contact Number: 202-225-5051
------
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 22, 2024.................................... 1
WITNESSES
----------
Kimberly Cheatle, Director, United States Secret Service Oral
Statement
Oral Statement............................................... 6
Opening statements and the prepared statements for the witnesses
are available in the U.S. House of Representatives Repository
at: docs.house.gov.
INDEX OF DOCUMENTS
----------
* Article, Western Journal, ``Six Camera Split Screen of
Assassination Attempt''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Daily Caller, ``Andrew McCabe Says Assassination
Attempt is `Even More Glaring' after Iran `Threat'''; submitted
by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Just the News, ``At least six major security
failures''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``Biden: I Haven't Engaged in Inciting
Rhetoric, Trump Has''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, The Gateway Pundit, ``Butler Township Town Manager
Speaks Out on Broadcasting Warning''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``Charlemagne the God Says Trump `Solely
Responsible for Violent Rhetoric''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Western Journal, ``Cheatle Calls the 30 Minutes a
Short Period of Time''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, The Gateway Pundit, ``Computer Model Shows Just How
Close Bullet Was to Trump's Skull''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Western Journal, ``Crooks Family Neighbor Reveals
Big Change in Home Before Shooting''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, The Gateway Pundit, ``Crooks' Parents Called Police
About their Son Hours Before''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Blaze Media, ``Exactly how did the would-be assassin
get so close''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``Exclusive-GOP Rep. Cloud''; submitted
by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``Failed Assassination Fallout'';
submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Daily Caller, ``Former Biden Official Corrects
Herself''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, The Federalist, ``Grassley Launches Probe Into
`Monumental Security Failure' by Secret Service''; submitted by
Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Redstate, ``Here's What Thomas Matthew Crooks Did
Days Leading Up''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``House Oversight Committee Subpoenas
Kimberly Cheatle''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
INDEX OF DOCUMENTS
----------
* Article, The Daily Caller, ``If You're Looking for Evidence
of Jill Biden Screwing Over America''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Daily Wire, ``It's All About The Rhetoric and The
Rhetoric Is All About Trump''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Just the News, ``Jack Black Cancels Tenacious D
Tour''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Just the News, ``Kash Patel on security failures at
rally decades in the making''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Yahoo! News, ``Local Police and Gunman Were in Same
Warehouse''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``Mark Hamill Cracks Jokes About Trump's
Ear Bandage''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Townhall, ``Mayorkas Is Blocking Secret Service
Director From Testifying''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Western Journal, ``Murillo: 5 Reasons You Should Be
Angry''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Daily Caller, ``Notice Anything Different about
Trump's Secret Service Detail''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Just the News, ``Oversight Committee requests
information, records''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Just the News, ``Pennsylvania fire chief resigns
over inappropriate post''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, The Gateway Pundit, ``Police Find Remote Bomb
Detonator Next to Shooter's Body''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Western Journal, ``Questions swirl over security
lapse revives old concerns''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, The Gateway Pundit, ``Reenactment Video Shows
Possible POV''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``Report Secret Service Identified
Rooftop as a Potential Vulnerability''; submitted by Rep.
Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``Report Sniper in Building Used by
Shooter Saw Him with Range Finder''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``Report U.S. Officials Received Intel of
Iranian Plot Before Crooks' Attempt''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``Reports Police Were Stationed Below
Trump Shooter''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, The Gateway Pundit, ``Secret Service `Aware of
Threat' 10 Minutes Before Shooting, Yet Allowed to Take
Stage''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Just the News, ``Secret Service and FBI finish
briefing Congress, lay out timeline''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, The Western Journal, ``Secret Service Director
Allegedly Told to Keep Quiet''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, The Blaze, ``Secret Service director interview
explains A Lot''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``Secret Service Director Says Buck Stops
with Her''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Just the News, ``Secret Service Director Says 'Buck
Stops With Me' but Won't Resign''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Just the News, ``Secret Service Director under
scrutiny for diversity initiatives''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Western Journal, ``Secret Service Scrambles to Shift
Blame''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
INDEX OF DOCUMENTS
----------
* Article, Daily Caller, ``Secret Service's Explanations for
Security Failures Aren't Adding Up''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, The Western Journal, ``Shooter Spotted Up to 30 Min
Before Firing''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Daily Wire, ``Snipers Were Inside Building Where
Gunman Shot''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, The Gateway Pundit, ``The Company Building Sniped
From Sold Four Months Ago''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Daily Wire, ``The Official Story on Trump's Shooting
Makes No Sense at All''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Just the News, ``Top Police Group Blasts Secret
Service for Blaming Local Cops''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Just the News, ``Trump Calls for National Unity'';
submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, The Federalist, ``Trump Security Scandal Follows
Yearslong String of Failures''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, RedState, ``Tucker Carlson, Asked If SS Allowed
Would-Be Assassin to Fire First''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Daily Caller, ``U.S. Reportedly Received Intel of
Iranian Plot''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``Video Actress Amanda Seales Pushes
Conspiracy Theory'' submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``BlackRock Removes Ad'' submitted by
Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Breitbart, ``Who Is Secret Service Chief Kimberly
Cheatle''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Daily Wire, ``Why the Trump Assassination Attempt
Was Inevitable''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Town Hall, ``Why Trump's Raised Fist Is Triggering
the Liberal Media''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, Global Pundit, ``WTH? Secret Service Now Saying They
Didn't Put Any Agents on the Roof; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Photo, Trump Poster; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Podcast, Bauer and Rose, ``There, but for the Grace of God'';
submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Letter, July 22, 2024, Mike Kelly to House Oversight
Committee; submitted Chairman Comer.
* Report, USSS An Agency in Crisis-Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform 114th Congress; submitted by Chairman Comer.
* Subpoena of Kimberly Cheatle; submitted by Chairman Comer.
* Article, CBSNews.com, ``Alexandria shooting heroes credited
with preventing massacre''; submitted by Rep. Crockett.
* Article, Texas Tribune, ``Deaths from firearms keep climbing
in Texas''; submitted by Rep. Crockett.
* Article, U.S. Department of Justice, ``Special Agents David
Bailey and Crystal Griner, USCP, VA''; submitted by Rep.
Crockett.
* Press Release, U.S. Capitol Police, ``Maryland Congressional
Delegation Presents Badge of Bravery''; submitted by Rep.
Crockett.
* Transcript, July 16, 2024, ``MSNBC Interview with Eric
Trump''; submitted by Rep. Crockett.
* Article, Politico, ``Politico Playbook July 22, 2024'';
submitted by Rep. Mace.
* Article, Punchbowl News, ``Secret Service Director in Hot
Seat as House GOP Readies Task Force''; submitted by Rep. Mace.
* Article, Government Executive, ```Long been the case' that
we're stretched too thin''; submitted by Rep. Mfume.
INDEX OF DOCUMENTS
----------
* Report, U.S. Secret Service Workplace Ranking for 2023;
submitted by Rep. Mfume.
* Article, CNN.com, ``Right-wing media figures blame women in
Secret Service and DEI; submitted by Rep. Pressley.
* Article, FoxNews.com, ``FBI director has been sounding alarm
on `heightened threat environment'''; submitted by Rep. Turner.
* Article, U.S. Department of Justice, ``Member of Iran's IRGC
Charged with Plot to Murder the Former National Security
Advisor''; submitted by Rep. Turner.
* Article, CNN.com, ``Secret Service ramped up security after
receiving intel of Iranian plot to assassinate Trump'';
submitted by Rep. Turner.
* Article, CBSNews.com, ``Secret Service paid over $12 million
for a year's protection of 2 Trump advisers from potential
Iranian threats; submitted by Rep. Turner.
* Questions for the Record: to Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., Acting
Director, United States Secret Service; submitted by Rep.
Gosar.
* Questions for the Record: to Mr. Rowe; submitted by Rep.
Higgins.
The documents listed are available at: docs.house.gov.
OVERSIGHT OF THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE
AND THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
----------
Monday, July 22, 2024
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Accountability
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James Comer
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Comer, Jordan, Turner, Foxx,
Grothman, Cloud, Palmer, Sessions, Biggs, Mace, LaTurner,
Fallon, Donalds, Perry, Timmons, Burchett, Greene, McClain,
Boebert, Fry, Luna, Langworthy, Burlison, Waltz, Raskin,
Norton, Lynch, Connolly, Krishnamoorthi, Khanna, Mfume, Ocasio-
Cortez, Brown, Stansbury, Frost, Lee, Crockett, Goldman,
Moskowitz, Tlaib, and Pressley.
Chairman Comer. This hearing of the Committee on Oversight
and Accountability will come to order.
I want to welcome everyone here today.
And I know we also want to welcome Speaker Johnson, who is
also in attendance today.
Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at any
time.
I now recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening
statement, but, first, without objection, Representative Mills
of Florida and Representative Miller of Ohio are waived on to
the Committee for the purpose of questioning the witness at
today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
Good morning. Today's hearing is for the American people,
who are seeking answers about the attempted assassination of
President Trump.
A little over a week ago, Americans watched in horror as a
shooter attempted to assassinate President Donald J. Trump at a
campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. The gunman nearly
succeeded. The bullet that struck President Trump's head was
less than an inch from taking his life.
President Trump survived, but one rally goer, Corey
Comperatore, tragically did not. Two others were seriously
injured. It was a horrifying moment in American history.
The horror was exceeded only by the bravery of the law
enforcement agents who threw themselves in harm's way when
shots were fired, the bravery of a crowd unwavering in its
refusal to panic, and the bravery of a bloody President Trump
refusing to run.
While we give overwhelming thanks to the individual Secret
Service agents who did their jobs under immense pressure, this
tragedy was preventable.
The Secret Service's protective mission is to protect U.S.
and visiting world leaders and safeguard U.S. elections through
protection of candidates and nominees.
The Secret Service has a zero-fail mission, but it failed
on July 13 and in the days leading up to the rally. The Secret
Service has thousands of employees and a significant budget,
but it has now become the face of incompetence.
The Committee has a long track record of providing
oversight of the Secret Service. Our predecessors, both Jason
Chaffetz and Elijah Cummings, among others, worked together to
issue warnings and recommendations to address obvious
shortcomings in the agency's makeup and operations.
Unfortunately, those warnings and recommendations have gone
unheeded.
A former President and current candidate for President was
shot in the head by a sniper within 500 feet of the podium.
This is unacceptable. And we are concerned the Secret Service
lacks the proper management to keep protectees safe from bad
actors.
Americans demand answers, but they have not been getting
them from the Secret Service. We are instead learning about new
facts about the events surrounding the attempted assassination
every day from whistleblowers and leaks.
Americans demand accountability, but no one is yet to be
fired for this historic failure.
Today's witness, Secret Service Director Kimberly Cheatle,
is here under subpoena to answer questions about how the agency
failed President Trump and the victims who attended the rally
in Butler, Pennsylvania.
It is my firm belief, Director Cheatle, that you should
resign.
However, in complete defiance, Director Cheatle has
maintained she will not tender her resignation. Therefore, she
will answer questions today from members of this Committee
seeking to provide clarity to the American people about how
these events were allowed to transpire.
We will ask these questions because the Secret Service and
its parent agency, the Department of Homeland Security, have
been unwilling to provide answers to the American people. DHS
has sought to push this hearing to a different time, Secret
Service has suggested the hearing occur without media presence,
and both agencies have provided only shallow explanations to
Congress about what happened on July 13.
Indeed, DHS and Secret Service's lack of communication with
the Oversight Committee required me to issue a subpoena
compelling Director Cheatle to attend today. And, still, DHS
requested more time to prepare.
It should not take this much time or preparation, Director
Cheatle, to tell the truth and to be transparent with the
American people.
I am thankful to the Ranking Member, Mr. Raskin, for
joining me in insisting that Director Cheatle appear today. God
knows the Ranking Member and I disagree on many things, but
that does not matter today.
The safety of Secret Service protectees is not based on
their political affiliation. And the bottom line is that, under
Director Cheatle's leadership, we question whether anyone is
safe--not President Biden, not the First Lady, not the White
House, and certainly not the Presidential candidates.
The July 13 assassination attempt is one of the darkest
days in American political history. It represents the ugliest
parts of what American politics has become--hatred of each
other and a dangerous turn to extremism.
Before we are Republicans or Democrats, we are Americans.
If we place our political affiliations above our duty and love
of country, we cannot maintain a country. We must ensure our
Republic is strong. And our Republic cannot be strong when our
leadership, our elections, our institutions, and our candidates
are threatened by extremism and violence.
Today, Director Cheatle will answer questions about why she
deserves to continue to play a critical role in preserving this
country's safety and, at the very least, what led to the
catastrophic deadly events on July 13 in Butler, Pennsylvania.
Again, I do not believe Director Cheatle deserves to
maintain her position as head of the Secret Service, but
members and the American people will make their own decisions
based on her answers today.
I urge Director Cheatle to be transparent and forthcoming
in her testimony today. Americans deserve no less. We have a
duty to find out how this happened and to ensure it never
happens again.
I now yield to Ranking Member Raskin for his opening
statement.
Mr. Raskin. Thank you kindly, Chairman Comer.
Elijah Cummings, whose beautiful visage looks down upon us,
taught us that the way to find common ground in a crisis is to
look for the higher ground. And, last week, Chairman Comer and
I came together to reach for that higher ground. We made a
joint statement condemning the mass shooting and assassination
attempt against former President Trump as a grave assault our
on democracy. As we wrote, we are united in condemning all
political violence.
I join the good Chairman in expressing condolences to the
family of Corey Comperatore and in sending healing wishes to
the wounded victims also of this atrocious act of violence.
Some are calling it a miracle that former President Trump
escaped this AR-15 attack unlike so many thousands of our
fellow citizens who have been killed or seriously wounded in
other AR-15 shootings.
Whether this miracle is of divine providence or of an
adventitious nature will be up to each of us to ponder, but our
job in Congress is not simply to marvel at miracles or count on
good luck but to act as public policy legislators to do
whatever we can to prevent future political violence, attempted
assassinations, and mass shootings.
The Chairman and I are thus determined to get to the bottom
of the stunning security failures that enabled this 20-year-old
lone gunman who borrowed his father's AR-15 to perpetrate a
mass shooting and assassination attempt at an event protected
by the Secret Service as well as state and local police.
We will ask hard questions of Director Cheatle today in
order to identify and understand the shocking security failures
that occurred and to help transform the operations of the
Secret Service to prevent anything like this from happening
again.
But we cannot let ourselves off the hook either, dear
colleagues. What happened in Butler, Pennsylvania, was a double
failure--the failure by the Secret Service to properly protect
former President Trump and the failure of Congress to properly
protect our people from criminal gun violence. We must
therefore also ask hard questions about whether our laws are
making it too easy for potential assassins to obtain firearms
generally and the AR-15 specifically.
Mr. Comperatore, former President Trump, and the other
rally attendees wounded in Butler are now members of a club no
one wants to belong to--the thousands of people who have fallen
victim to mass shootings.
Last year, we had 655 mass shootings in America, defined as
4 or more people being shot or killed in a single event, not
including the shooter. Seven hundred and 12 people died and
nearly 2,700 people were wounded in these attacks in 2023.
Mass shootings are commonplace. They happen at political
rallies and constituent meetings; in our elementary schools,
middle schools, and high schools; in churches, synagogues, and
mosques; in movie theaters and parades; in nightclubs and
grocery stores; in concerts and on street corners.
Here are the worst mass shootings in the last 11 or 12
years. The list is a grim reminder of the horrific damage and
death wrought by assault weapons, and the AR-15 in particular,
that have taken the lives of our children, parents, colleagues,
and neighbors. This is a very partial list.
Mass shootings have become so frequent that we do not even
hear about them anymore. Since the mass shooting in Butler,
there have already been at least 10 additional mass shootings
in America, 2 of which took place the same day that former
President Trump was targeted.
One of the mass shootings on that violent Saturday, July
13, happened at 11 p.m. at a nightclub in Birmingham, Alabama,
where 4 people were shot dead and 10 others wounded. This
means, amazingly, that the Butler attack was not even the
deadliest mass shooting to happen in America on that day.
A weapon that can be used to commit a mass shooting at an
event under the full protection of the Secret Service, together
with dozens of state and local police, is obviously an
intolerable threat to the rest of us who do not receive such
protection and obviously does not belong in our communities.
It is time to pass universal background checks and build on
this Administration's work to ensure that we permanently close
the loopholes in the Brady Law for gun show purchases, online
purchases, and private sales to prevent those weapons from
getting into the hands of people we know to be a threat to
others.
What happened in Butler shows why even closing these
loopholes, however, will not keep assault weapons out of the
hands of potential assassins and mass murderers. Under Federal
law and in the vast majority of states, even young people not
old enough to buy a beer legally can legally purchase and own
the AR-15 and carry it in public. The shooter in Butler used
his father's AR-15.
We have to find the courage and resolve to pass a ban on
the AR-15 and other assault weapons. A ban has broad support.
Even the New York Post loudly endorsed such a ban in 2019.
We have passed an assault-weapons ban before. Republicans
and Democrats, together, passed it in 1994. Alas, in 2004, we
allowed the ban to expire.
We know this weapons ban worked. One study found that in
the decade that followed the ban's lapse mass shootings went
back up 183 percent and deaths from mass shootings went up 239
percent.
But even as we change the Secret Service and act to ban
weapons of war like the AR-15, we still will have fallen short
of our duty if we fail to denounce every instance of
politically motivated violence in whatever form it takes.
Republicans and Democrats again have come together to
denounce this assassination attempt, just as we did the violent
attempts on the lives of our colleagues Representative Steven
Scalise and Representative Gabby Giffords and on Paul Pelosi,
the husband of Speaker Nancy Pelosi who was attacked and
brutalized in his home.
And in the immediate aftermath of the January 6 mass
violence waged against Congress and the Vice President and the
constitutional transfer of power, Democrats and Republicans
alike, including Senator McConnell, Chairman Comer, and other
colleagues, all denounced this violent assault on our democracy
that wounded approximately 140 officers from the U.S. Capitol
Police and the Metropolitan Police Department. And I commend
them for acting to denounce that attack, just as Democrats
moved swiftly to denounce the attack on Congressman Scalise.
Political scientists tell us that authoritarian attacks on
democratic institutions begin with political parties refusing
to disavow or openly embracing political violence. We have to
reject that on a strong bipartisan basis, as Chairman Comer and
I have done, even as we ensure our Secret Service is up to its
vital task of protecting Presidents and candidates and as we
work to ensure that America, the streets of our country are
free from the violence of weapons of war.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back to you.
Chairman Comer. Thank you.
The gentleman yields back.
Today we are joined by Kimberly Cheatle, who was sworn into
office on September 17, 2022, as the Director of the United
States Secret Service.
Prior to her appointment, Director Cheatle was Senior
Director of Global Security at PepsiCo. Before her role at
Pepsi, she served 27 years in the Secret Service.
Pursuant to Committee rule 9(g), the witness will please
stand and raise her right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you
are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Ms. Cheatle. I do.
Chairman Comer. Let the record show that the witness
answered in the affirmative.
Thank you.
We certainly appreciate you being here today and look
forward to your testimony.
We normally limit testimony to--opening statement to 5
minutes, but take all the time that you need.
Obviously, the rules that we will abide by, when you are
finished with your statement, we will then turn to questions.
Each member will have 5 minutes.
And just a note to the members: I am going to strictly
adhere to the 5 minutes. Once 5 minutes is up, I will hit the
gavel. If the Director is in the process of answering a
question, we will certainly let her finish her answers, and
then we will move on.
We are going to have about 100 percent attendance here
today, plus a few additional add-ons, so this will be a very
lengthy hearing, and we want to make sure every member gets
their 5 minutes, uninterrupted, to be able to ask these
important questions in this very bipartisan hearing today.
I now recognize Director Cheatle for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF KIMBERLY CHEATLE
DIRECTOR
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
Ms. Cheatle. Thank you.
Good morning Chairman Comer, Ranking Member Raskin, and
distinguished members of the Committee. My name is Kimberly
Cheatle, and I am the Director of the United States Secret
Service. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today.
The assassination attempt of former President Donald Trump
on July 13 is the most significant operational failure of the
Secret Service in decades. And I am keeping him and his family
in my thoughts.
I would like to offer my sincerest condolences to the
family of Corey Comperatore, a former fire chief and a hero,
who was killed in this senseless shooting.
I would also like to acknowledge those who were injured in
Butler--David Dutch and James Copenhaver--and I wish them a
speedy recovery.
I would be remiss if I did not also extend my condolences
on the passing of your colleague, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson
Lee. Ms. Jackson Lee was always engaged in the oversight of the
Secret Service, and her passing is a great loss to this body.
The Secret Service's solemn mission is to protect our
Nation's leaders. On July 13, we failed.
As the Director of the United States Secret Service, I take
full responsibility for any security lapse of our agency.
We are fully cooperating with ongoing investigations. We
must learn what happened, and I will move heaven and earth to
ensure that an incident like July 13 does not happen again.
Let me state, unequivocally, nothing I have said should be
interpreted to place blame for this failure on our Federal,
state, or local law enforcement partners who supported the
Secret Service in Butler. We could not do our job without them.
We rely on the relationships built over years of working
together to secure events and conduct investigations.
Our agents, officers, and support personnel understand that
every day, we are expected to sacrifice our lives to execute a
no-fail mission. As witnessed on July 13, our special agents
shielded former President Trump with their own bodies on stage
while shots were being fired, selflessly willing to make the
ultimate sacrifice without hesitation.
I am proud beyond words of the actions taken by the former
President's detail, the counter-sniper team who neutralized the
gunman, and the tactical team who was prepared to act.
I will be transparent as possible when I speak with you,
understanding, though, at times that I may be limited in
providing a thorough response in this open setting due to
associated risks with sharing highly sensitive protective
methodologies. I do not want to inadvertently provide you today
with inaccurate information.
Since January 1, 2024, the Secret Service has successfully
secured over 7,500 sites. Every protective advance comes with
its own set of challenges and requires a customized mitigation
strategy, including specific assets. Security plans are
multilayered, providing 360 degrees of protection. These layers
include personnel, technical and tactical assets, which are a
force multiplier for our protective posture.
During every advance, we attempt to strike a balance
between enabling the protectee to be visible and our protective
requirements to be secure. I know this because I have spent 29
years in this agency.
I came up through the ranks. I have secured events for
every President since President Clinton, supervised on Vice
President Cheney's detail, led our Training Center, oversaw all
of the investigations and protective visits in the state of
Georgia, supervised on Vice President Biden's detail and the
agency's entire protective mission during the Trump
Administration.
The comprehensive advance process involves collaborative
planning between our Secret Service, the protectee's staff,
local law enforcement partners, and the level of security
provided for the former President increased well before the
campaign and has been steadily increasing as threats evolve.
The security plan included a full assessment of the Butler
Farm Show grounds to identify security vulnerabilities and
craft a security plan for the protectee, attendees, and the
public.
Immediately following the assassination attempt, I directed
the activation of my Crisis Center, I assembled my executive
team to begin surging more protective resources to the former
President and to ensure the wellness of our people post-
incident, all while securing an active crime scene.
I immediately ordered a reevaluation of the Republican
National Convention security plan, and I increased the security
posture in the National Capital Region for all permanent
protectees and sites.
At the same time, I initiated a mission assurance
investigation within our agency. I have instructed my team that
all necessary resources will be dedicated to investigating
these manners. We will not rest until we have explored every
option, and we will leave no stone unturned.
But I want to be clear: I am not waiting for these
investigations to be completed prior to making changes.
Over the past 2 weeks, we successfully led the planning and
execution of the 75th NATO summit and the Republican National
Convention. Over the next few months, we will implement
security plans for the Democratic National Convention, the
United Nations General Assembly, and have already begun
planning and coordinating the 2025 inauguration.
It is now more important than ever for the men and women of
the Secret Service to remain resilient and to focus on what is
necessary to carry out our critical mission.
Our agency needs to be adequately resourced in order to
serve our current mission requirements and anticipate future
requirements. The Secret Service currently protects 36
individuals on a daily basis, as well as world leaders who
visit the United States, like Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, who arrived in Washington, DC, today. The coming
years will bring an unprecedented heavy protection tempo.
I have no doubt that the processes that I have implemented
during my tenure as Director, in addition to my nearly 30 years
of experience in this agency, have positioned the Secret
Service to be stronger.
Our mission is not political; it is literally a matter of
life and death. And the tragic events on July 13 remind us of
that.
I have full confidence in the men and women of the Secret
Service. They are worthy of our support in executing our
protective mission.
I will now answer any questions that the Committee may
have.
Chairman Comer. Thank you very much, Director Cheatle.
We will now begin our 5 minutes of questions, and I will
begin.
Just for the record, the Secret Service has an annual
budget of around $3.1 billion and, I believe, around 8,000
employees. Is that correct?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, sir.
Chairman Comer. Obviously, there were many security
failures on the day of the attempted assassination and leading
up to that day. Let us start with the building that the shooter
used to shoot President Trump from.
At any point Saturday, did the Secret Service have an agent
on top of that roof?
Ms. Cheatle. Sir, I am sure as you can imagine, we are just
9 days out from this incident and there is still an ongoing
investigation. And so, I want to make sure that any information
that we are providing----
Chairman Comer. So--so--so----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Providing to you is factual.
Chairman Comer [continuing]. You cannot--OK.
Why did the Secret Service not--can you answer why the
Secret Service did not place a single agent on the roof?
Ms. Cheatle. We are still looking into the advance process
and the----
Chairman Comer. All right. All right.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Decisions that were made----
Chairman Comer. OK. OK.
Was that building not within the perimeter that should be
secured? Do we agree with that?
Ms. Cheatle. The building was outside of the perimeter on
the day of the visit. But, again, that is one of the things
that, during the investigation, we want to take a look at and
determine whether or not other decisions should have been made.
Chairman Comer. One of the things that you said, I believe
in an interview, that there was not an agent on the roof
because it was a sloped roof, is that normal? And do you fear
that that immediately creates an opportunity for future would-
be assassins to look for a slanted roof?
I mean, this is a huge question that every American has:
Why was a Secret Service agent not on the roof? And there have
been reports that agents were supposed to be on the roof, but
it was hot that day and they did not want to be on the roof.
Can you answer any of those questions, Director?
Ms. Cheatle. So, I appreciate you asking me that question,
Chairman. I should have been more clear in my answer when I
spoke about where we place personnel in that interview.
What I can tell you is that there was a plan in place to
provide overwatch, and we are still looking into
responsibilities and who was going to provide overwatch.
But the Secret Service, in general, not speaking
specifically to this incident, when we are providing overwatch,
whether that be through counter-snipers or other technology----
Chairman Comer. OK.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Prefer to have sterile rooftops.
Chairman Comer. Did the Secret Service use any drones for
surveillance that day?
Ms. Cheatle. Sir, again, I am not going to get into
specifics of that day in itself, but there are times during a
security plan that the Secret Service does deploy an asset like
a drone.
Chairman Comer. There were reports that the shooter used a
drone just a few hours before the rally start time. Is that
accurate?
Ms. Cheatle. I have heard those same reports and, again, am
waiting for the final report.
Chairman Comer. Do you know--if you cannot answer the
question, that is your answer, but can you answer this? Do you
know--do you know--I am not asking ``yes'' or ``no,'' but do
you know if the shooter used a drone before the shooting?
Ms. Cheatle. That information has been passed to us from
the FBI.
Chairman Comer. How many Secret Service agents were
assigned to President Trump on the day of the rally?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I am not going to get into the
specifics of the numbers of personnel that we had there, but we
feel that there was a sufficient number of agents assigned.
Chairman Comer. There are reports that several agents
assigned to the rally on July 13 were temporary agents, agents
not normally assigned to President Trump. Is that accurate?
Ms. Cheatle. What I can tell you is that the agents that
were assigned to former President Trump are Secret Service
agents that provide close protection to him, and that was what
was actual on that day.
Chairman Comer. How many temporary agents were there that
day?
Ms. Cheatle. Quite frequently, sir, during campaign events,
the Secret Service utilizes agents from HSI or the Department
of Homeland Security----
Chairman Comer. But you do not know how many?
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. To supplement----
Chairman Comer. Or you cannot answer it?
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Our plan.
Chairman Comer. Have the investigators reconstructed the
shooter's precise movements over the past days, weeks, and
months?
Ms. Cheatle. So, again----
Chairman Comer. We need to have confidence that, if the FBI
is leading this investigation, that they are leading a credible
investigation. Because there is some of us sitting up here
today that do not have a lot of confidence in the FBI.
So, I will repeat the question. Have the investigators
reconstructed the shooter's precise movements over the past
days, weeks, and months?
Ms. Cheatle. I understand your question, Chairman, and I
share your concerns about wanting to make sure that we have
factual information.
The FBI is conducting a criminal investigation. The Secret
Service is conducting an internal investigation. There are a
number of OIG investigations. And there is the external
investigation----
Chairman Comer. OK.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. The President has initiated----
Chairman Comer. Last question for me: before July 13, had
the Trump detail requested additional resources?
Ms. Cheatle. What I can tell you is that, for the event on
July 13, the details that were--the assets that were requested
for that day were given.
Chairman Comer. OK.
My time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes Ranking Member Raskin for 5
minutes.
Mr. Raskin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It has been reported that, before former President Trump
got up on the stage at around 6 p.m. on Saturday, July 13, that
the local police had identified and even photographed a man who
was acting suspiciously, and this man, who turned out to be the
gunman, had been flagged as a potential threat.
Is that accurate?
Ms. Cheatle. What I can say is that the individual was
identified as suspicious.
Mr. Raskin. So, he was known to be suspicious before former
President Trump took the stage.
Ms. Cheatle. That is the information I have received.
Mr. Raskin. Why was he allowed to take the stage with a
suspicious person having been identified in the crowd?
Ms. Cheatle. Sir, I appreciate the question, and I would
like to make two points.
If the detail had been passed information that there was a
threat, the detail would never have brought the former
President out onto stage. That is what we do, and that is who
we are. We are charged with protecting all of our protectees.
Mr. Raskin. So, you distinguish between someone who is
suspicious and someone who is threatening? Is that----
Ms. Cheatle. I do.
Mr. Raskin [continuing]. Right?
Ms. Cheatle. There are a number of times at protective
events where suspicious people are identified, and those
individuals have to be investigated and determined what is it
that identifies that person as suspicious.
Mr. Raskin. So, did you deny a request for additional
resources that had been made by the Trump campaign?
Ms. Cheatle. There were no assets denied for that event in
Butler on the 13th.
Mr. Raskin. I see. So, you are saying there were requests
made for additional assistance for other specific events rather
than for the campaign as a whole. Is that right?
Ms. Cheatle. I am sorry. I am not understanding----
Mr. Raskin. Well, you seemed to say that there were not
additional resources requested for that event. And forgive me
for being unfamiliar with this. Is it requested event by event,
or is it requested just in general for the campaign?
Ms. Cheatle. So, if I can explain the advance process, when
an event or a venue is identified by, in this case, campaign
staff, then the campaign staff works together with Secret
Service agents who go out and conduct an advance.
Generally, that is a 5-day time period where those
discussions are had about what the perimeter is going to look
like, what the size of the event is, what the venue is.
And then, from there, there is a request made to mitigate
potential risk and threat. And I am saying that, on that day,
the requests that were pushed forward were granted.
Mr. Raskin. So, the Secret Service did not know that the
gunman actually had a weapon before President Trump was allowed
to get up on the stage?
Ms. Cheatle. To the best of our knowledge and the facts
that we have at this point, that is correct.
Mr. Raskin. So, can you answer this question, which I think
is on the mind of most Americans thinking about this? How can a
20-year-old with his father's AR-15 assault weapon climb onto a
roof with a direct 150-yard line of sight to the speaker's
podium without the Secret Service or local police stopping him?
Ms. Cheatle. So, again, sir, I will say, we are 9 days out
from this event, and I would like to know those answers as
well, which is why we are going through these investigations to
be able to determine that fully.
Mr. Raskin. OK.
It has been reported that the shooter was not carrying a
driver's license or any form of identification. They had no
idea who he was. But then he was quickly identified, I think
within 30 minutes, by using the serial number on the AR-15
under a tracing system that is now controversial. Some people
say we should get rid of it; some people want to keep it.
But is that right, that the serial number was the key
information which led to the identification of the shooter?
Ms. Cheatle. That is my understanding, sir, yes.
Mr. Raskin. OK.
If an American citizen were just to stop you and say,
``Director Cheatle, we support your work, to the tune of
billions of dollars and thousands and thousands of employees;
what went wrong?'' what would you say?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, knowing that we are 9 days out, I would
say, as I have said from the very outset: I accept
responsibility for this tragedy. We are going to look into how
this happened, and we are going to take corrective action to
ensure that it never happens again.
Mr. Raskin. Well, I appreciate that, and I hope you will
act with vigor and focus and intensity. And it seems you
understand the gravity and solemnity of this to the American
people.
Millions and millions of Americans do not feel safe with
all the AR-15s out there. We thought at least the President of
the United States or a former President of the United States
would be safe, but now that is not even clear.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, Mr. Jordan from Ohio.
Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director, were you guessing or lying?
The day after President Trump is shot, Secret Service
spokesman Anthony Guglielmi said, quote, ``The assertion that a
member of the former President's security team requested
additional security resources that the U.S. Secret Service or
the Department of Homeland Security rebuffed is absolutely
false.''
The next day, Secretary Mayorkas said, ``That is an
unequivocally false assertion. We had not received any requests
for additional security measures that were rebuffed.''
But 5 days later, the Washington Post said this: ``Top
officials repeatedly rejected requests from Donald Trump's
security detail for more personnel.''
The next day, The New York Times said this: ``Mr. Guglielmi
acknowledged that the Secret Service had turned down some
requests for additional Federal security assets for Mr. Trump's
detail.''
So, which is it? Because both statements cannot be true.
Were you guessing or lying when you said you did not turn down
requests from President Trump's detail?
Ms. Cheatle. Neither, sir. And I appreciate the question--
--
Mr. Jordan. Well, what were you doing? Because those
statements do not jibe.
Ms. Cheatle. So, what I can tell you is that, for the event
in Butler, there were no requests that were denied. As far as
requests----
Mr. Jordan. Well, maybe they got tired of asking. Maybe you
turned them down so darn much they said, not worth asking.
How many times did you turn them down ahead of that?
Ms. Cheatle. I think that it is important to distinguish
between what some people may view as a denial of an asset or a
request and not----
Mr. Jordan. Well, is Mr. Guglielmi your spokesperson? He
said--he acknowledged the Secret Service had turned down some
requests. I am asking how many?
Ms. Cheatle. A denial of a request does not equal a
vulnerability.
Mr. Jordan. Well, tell me what it is.
Ms. Cheatle. There are a number of ways that threats and
risks can be mitigated with a number of different assets,
whether that be through personnel, whether that be through
technology or other resources.
Mr. Jordan. Well, tell the Committee which it was. They
asked for additional help in some form or another. You told
them no. How many times did you tell them no, and what did you
tell them no to?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I cannot speak to specific incidents,
but I can tell you, in general terms, the Secret Service is
judicious with their resources based on----
Mr. Jordan. What does ``some requests'' mean? How many
times? ``Some'' indicates--``requests'' is plural, so more than
once they asked for additional help, and you turned them down.
What did they ask for, and how many times did you turn them
down? Pretty basic questions.
Ms. Cheatle. So, again, without having all of the details
in front of me, sir, what I can tell you is that there are
times----
Mr. Jordan. You did not get briefed on how many times you
turned down the Trump detail when they asked for additional
help?
Ms. Cheatle. I am sorry----
Mr. Jordan. You did not get briefed on that before you came
to this hearing, knowing you were going to get asked that
question?
Ms. Cheatle. What I can tell you is that, in generic terms,
when people--when details make a request, there are times that
there are alternate ways to cover off on that threat or that
risk.
Mr. Jordan. But that is not what he said. He said they were
denied certain requests--some requests.
Ms. Cheatle. I--I----
Mr. Jordan. This is your spokesperson, not me, talking.
This is the Secret Service talking.
Ms. Cheatle. I----
Mr. Jordan. And what a change, from ``absolutely false,''
``unequivocally false,'' to, ``oh, by the way, there were some
times where we did not give them what they wanted.'' That is a
huge change in 5 days.
And the fact that you cannot answer how many times you did
that, that is pretty darn frustrating, not just for me but for
the country.
Ms. Cheatle. I hear your frustration----
Mr. Jordan. Let me ask you this: were any of those requests
denied to President Trump's detail after you knew about the
Iranian threat?
Ms. Cheatle. What I can tell you--again, I do not know the
specifics--is that there are times when we can fill a request--
it does not necessarily have to be with a Secret Service asset
or resource; we can fill that request with locally available
assets and resources.
Mr. Jordan. Have you spoken to anyone at the White House
since July 13?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, I have.
Mr. Jordan. Who did you talk to?
Ms. Cheatle. I have briefed the President and the Vice
President.
Mr. Jordan. Did you talk to the First Lady?
Ms. Cheatle. No, I have not.
Mr. Jordan. Did you talk to the White House staff, anyone
in White House communications?
Ms. Cheatle. No, I have not.
Mr. Jordan. Have you talked to the counter-sniper who took
the shot that took out the bad guy?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, I have.
Mr. Jordan. And can you tell us about that conversation?
Ms. Cheatle. I would not want to reveal conversations that
I have had with my employees.
Mr. Jordan. But that is exactly the kind of information the
American people want to know, the American people who pay your
salary.
Ms. Cheatle. I understand. This is an ongoing
investigation, and I want to----
Mr. Jordan. Who is all doing the investigating at Secret
Service? I know the Inspector General, but is there also an
internal investigation in addition to the Inspector General?
Ms. Cheatle. We are conducting a mission assurance
investigation internally, yes.
Mr. Jordan. You know what it looks like, Director? It looks
like you will not answer some pretty basic questions. It looks
like you got a 9-percent raise and you cut corners when it came
to protecting one of the most important individuals, the most
well-known individuals on the planet, a former President,
likely the guy who is going to be the next President. It looks
like you guys were cutting corners. That is what it looks like
to me.
Is that true?
Ms. Cheatle. I am here today because I want to answer
questions, but I also want to be----
Mr. Jordan. You might want to, but you have not answered--I
do not think you have answered one question from the Chairman,
the Ranking Member, or me. We have got a lot of other people to
ask them; we will see if your record improves. But right now,
you have not answered, I do not think, any questions.
I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Norton from Washington, DC.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In the summer of 1963, as a law student, I traveled to the
South to work in the civil rights movement. When I arrived in
Jackson, Mississippi, I was met by a civil rights activist who
showed me around town and tried to convince me to work in
Jackson that summer. I recall talking with him and his wife
about the raw atmosphere in Jackson.
Later that day, he took me to the bus station for my trip
to my assignment. That night, he was assassinated outside his
home. His name was Medgar Evers.
I condemn the political violence. It is a threat to
democracy.
I want to discuss one of the roots of political violence:
guns.
For years, Republicans, including a member of this
Committee, have introduced legislation and amendments to repeal
or block the District of Columbia gun violence protection laws,
including its bans on assault weapons and large-capacity
magazines.
The shooter at the Trump rally used the mass shooter's gun
of choice, an assault weapon, specifically an AR-15-style
rifle, and presumably a large-capacity magazine, which is
defined in D.C. as a magazine that can hold more than 10
bullets.
Under current D.C. law, D.C. does not recognize concealed-
carry permits issued by other jurisdictions, but it does issue
concealed-carry permits to both residents and nonresidents.
However, D.C. imposes a number of requirements on
concealed-carry applicants, including suitability, such as not
having exhibited a propensity for violence or instability.
Moreover, D.C. residents--restricts where the guns can be
carried, such as a political demonstration near the White House
and Naval Observatory or near people under Secret Service
protection, provided the permit holder has been given notice.
This week, the House is expected to consider the Fiscal
Year 2025 Financial Services and General Government
Appropriations bill. This Republican-drafted bill would allow
an individual with a permit to carry a concealed handgun issued
by a state or territory--to carry a concealed handgun in D.C.,
regardless of that jurisdiction's permit requirements.
A Republican has filed an amendment to that provision to
allow such an individual to carry a magazine of any size with
that handgun.
In short, the pending bill and amendment would allow any
person with a carry permit issued by another jurisdiction to
carry a concealed handgun with a magazine of any size in any
location in the District of Columbia.
The Secret Service is responsible for protecting a large
number of people and facilities in D.C.
Director Cheatle, would Secret Service protectees in D.C.
be safer or less safe if people who have exhibited a propensity
for violence or instability could carry a concealed--concealed
handguns in D.C.?
Ms. Cheatle. I think being a Secret Service agent and an
officer or a law enforcement officer in any state is difficult.
They are required to make decisions and snap judgments in the
blink of an eye. And I think that the officers and the agents
that work here in the D.C. area do a great job of monitoring
the public and reacting to threats as appropriate when they
arise.
Ms. Norton. Well, would Secret Service protectees in D.C.
be safer or less safe if people in D.C. could carry concealed
handguns with large-capacity magazines?
Ms. Cheatle. I think, ma'am, that we work in parameters
where we travel around North America, and the rules on open
carry and concealed carry are different from state to state,
and that is part of what the Secret Service takes into account
when we develop a security plan.
Obviously, anyone that comes into one of our protective
sites, we would establish magnetometer support, metal detectors
that personnel would have to process through, eliminating that
potential.
Ms. Norton. Would Secret Service protectees in D.C. be
safer or less safe if more people could carry handguns in D.C.?
Ms. Cheatle. I think, again, as I stated, ma'am, we want to
make sure that we provide a safe environment for all of our
protectees, and whatever measures we would need to put in place
for a secure site, we would do so.
Ms. Norton. I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee, Mr. Turner from Ohio.
Mr. Turner. Director Cheatle, your opening statement
indicates that the Secret Service constructed a security plan
for the site in Pennsylvania.
I am assuming that security plan would also include the
security footprint for the site, but it also would be based
upon a threat assessment for the risk threats associated with
Donald Trump and the crowd in attendance.
Would it not include a threat assessment?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, it would.
Mr. Turner. So, that threat assessment, as we know,
basically would have started with, there is a generalized
threat against Donald Trump because he is a Presidential
candidate. Then it would have gone to, he is a former
President, and he gets the security coverage just as Bush,
Clinton, Carter, and Obama do. And then you also have the
heightened political environment.
Even for those, it is clear that the security footprint,
that the threat assessment was insufficient, which permitted a
20-year-old to actually enter with a weapon and shoot Donald
Trump.
But I want to ask you about two other aspects of the threat
assessment.
It is known and public that Iran is a threat risk for
Donald Trump. They are a threat risk for John Bolton, former
Secretary of State Pompeo, and Donald Trump because they have
indicated they want to assassinate them as a result of
retaliation for the killing of Soleimani.
That is both, for Iran, a generalized threat--they are
targeting these individuals--but also, most recently, a
specific threat to Donald Trump himself.
Now, I want to enter into the record by UC a Department of
Justice public affairs release, a CNN article, an article from
FOX News, and an article from CBS, all of which acknowledge----
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. That this threat exists for Donald
Trump from Iran and that there are specific threats, most
recently, that have been acknowledged.
Mr. Turner. Director Cheatle, have you read the
intelligence of the generalized threat to Donald Trump by Iran
as a result of their desire to retaliate for the killing of
Soleimani?
Ms. Cheatle. I have.
Mr. Turner. Have you read or been briefed about the
intelligence of this specific recent threat to Donald Trump
from Iran?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, I have.
Mr. Turner. Director Wray, when we were getting our
briefing, indicated that he thought the threat assessment
should have included this threat from Iran.
Is it your testimony today that the threat assessment,
since you have read this intelligence, was sufficient to
protect him from this threat from Iran?
Ms. Cheatle. My testimony today is that the information
that we had at the time was known--that is----
Mr. Turner. Was it sufficient? Director Cheatle, was it
sufficient for the Iranian threat that you said you have read
the intelligence briefings for?
Ms. Cheatle. That information was passed to----
Mr. Turner. Well, I am not asking the bureaucratic issue of
who did it get passed around to.
Director Cheatle, was it sufficient for the specific and
generalized threat to Donald Trump's life from Iran?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, I do believe it was.
Mr. Turner. Director Cheatle, is an Iranian assassin more
capable than a 20-year-old?
Ms. Cheatle. Sir, I think we have acknowledged that there
was gaps and a failure that day. We are----
Mr. Turner. When I raised this issue with Director Wray, he
was incensed. He was shocked that the threat assessment of Iran
did not seem to be, as he and I discussed, baked in to your
security footprint and your threat assessment.
And he went on to say that the generalized threat that he
has told the whole country that we are under from a terrorist--
a potential terrorist threat--he has said, we are under the
highest threat level since 9/11, that the lights are flashing
red.
And he has specifically indicated that people have crossed
the southern border as a result of the Biden Administration's
policy and that there are in our country today terrorists and
individuals who are affiliated with terrorist groups and
organizations.
That would be a heightened threat environment, Director
Cheatle, would it not?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Turner. In his public statements, he has said he is
making these statements because he wants people to take them
into consideration in threat assessments specifically.
Ms. Cheatle. Uh-huh.
Mr. Turner. Now, that would be a threat not just to Donald
Trump, but it would also be a threat to the crowd there, would
it not?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Turner. Are ISIS terrorists and al-Qaida terrorists and
international groups and terrorists more capable than a 20-
year-old in pulling off either a mass shooting or an
assassination of Donald Trump?
Ms. Cheatle. Sir, again, there was clearly a breakdown----
Mr. Turner. Right.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. And a failure that day.
Mr. Turner. Have you read the intelligence of the
terrorists that are currently in the United States that
Director Wray speaks--and those individuals that are here that
are affiliated with terrorist groups and organizations that are
in the process, as Director Wray said, of representing a
significant threat of a terrorist attack occurring in the
United States?
Ms. Cheatle. I have read reports that apply specifically to
the Secret Service's mission.
Mr. Turner. Director Cheatle, because Donald Trump is
alive--and thank God he is--you look incompetent. If Donald
Trump had been killed, you would have looked culpable.
There is no aspect of this that indicates that there has
been any protection to Donald Trump. The threat was identified
before he took the stage, and the shooter was only killed after
Donald Trump himself was killed [sic].
Not only should you resign, if you refuse to do so,
President Biden needs to fire you. Because his life, Donald
Trump's life, and all the other people which you protect are at
risk because you have no concept of the aspect that the
security footprint needs to be correlated to the threat.
I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lynch from
Massachusetts.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Cheatle, there were multiple security failures at
the former President's rally in Butler, Pennsylvania.
First of all, there was a failure to isolate the podium
from exposure to direct fire. Do we know who made that
decision, to allow that rooftop to remain as an unprotected
area? Do we know who came up with that security plan that
omitted that?
Ms. Cheatle. Sir, I do not have a specific person to
identify for you----
Mr. Lynch. OK. Well, that is what I am looking for, so let
us move on.
There was also a breakdown in security in failure to
confront the shooter over an hour before the former President
began his remarks when the shooter was identified as a person
of interest.
What, particularly, allowed agents or law enforcement to
identify him as a person of interest?
Ms. Cheatle. Sir, I appreciate the question. And, again, I
will say that we are 9 days out, and there are a multitude of
interviews that are still taking place----
Mr. Lynch. OK.
So, did he have a rangefinder? There were some reports that
the individual had a rangefinder. That would certainly raise my
suspicion. Did he have a rangefinder?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, he did. But----
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. May I explain that, at a number
of our sites, especially when you are at outdoor venues, a
rangefinder is not a prohibited item. It is sometimes an item
that is brought in by individuals that----
Mr. Lynch. But did anybody----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Are going to be in the back----
Mr. Lynch [continuing]. Confront him on that? Anybody ask
him questions, what are you doing with a rangefinder? Anybody
confront him on his presence where he was in proximity to the
President?
Ms. Cheatle. So, again, to my knowledge, I believe that
that was the process that was taking place, was to locate the
individual----
Mr. Lynch. Did they--did they confront him? Did they go up
to him? Did they talk to him?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have those details at this time.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Those are important details.
There was also a failure to communicate between law
enforcement to act quickly upon information, provided by either
local law enforcement or rally attendees, that the suspect was
positioned on the roof. There were minutes of delay before any
meaningful action was taken even though he was several hundred
feet from the podium, and this was obviously minutes before the
shooting.
Let me ask you--there was considerable delay in removing
the President from the podium after the shooting began. He was
shot in the ear; it was still over a minute before he was
removed from the stage.
Meanwhile, this shooter had multiple clips, several clips.
He got off eight shots, and he had the capacity and the
ability, if he was not neutralized, to basically mow down that
whole Secret Service detachment as well as the President.
What, from your own investigation, caused that delay under
the circumstances?
Ms. Cheatle. What I can tell you is that, when the agents
identified that the shooting was taking place, in under 3
seconds they threw themselves on top of the President----
Mr. Lynch. Oh, I understand that. There was heroism there,
no question about it, no question about it.
But protocol would indicate--and these are--you know, these
are the opinions of various former Secret Service agents,
people who have done this work in the past--that over a minute
of exposure on that podium, with a shooter with a high-capacity
weapon who had already wounded the President and could have got
off we do not know how many more rounds, and yet the President
remained exposed, even though he was joined in that exposure by
the Secret Service in their heroic acts.
It just--it--I do not know if there is a good explanation
for that.
Ms. Cheatle. Our personnel created a body bunker on top of
the President----
Mr. Lynch. I get that. I get that.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Shielding him----
Mr. Lynch. Yes. This was--this was an AR-15-style weapon
that would have made pretty quick work if he was determined and
able to do so.
This is not the first investigation that we have had of the
Secret Service during my time here on this Committee. And the
last one we had; our previous investigation determined that the
Secret Service was experiencing a staffing crisis ``that poses
perhaps the greatest threat'' to the agency. And that is a
quote.
Is that staffing crisis still in place? Is that still
something that you deal with on a daily basis?
Ms. Cheatle. As of today, the Secret Service has just over
8,000 employees. We continue to hire, knowing that we need to
ensure that we keep pace with a----
Mr. Lynch. What would be the full complement of----
Chairman Comer. And the gentleman's time has expired, but
please answer the question.
Mr. Lynch. Yes.
Ms. Cheatle. I am sorry?
Mr. Lynch. What would be the full complement that you are
looking for? You have got 8,000, and how many would be a full
complement for the Service?
Ms. Cheatle. So, we are still striving toward a number of
9,500 employees, approximately, in order to be able to meet
future and emerging needs.
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy. I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes Dr. Foxx from North
Carolina.
Ms. Foxx. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Cheatle, what grade would you give the Secret
Service's performance in Butler, Pennsylvania, on July 13?
Ms. Cheatle. As I have stated, ma'am, this was clearly a
failure.
I would grade the agents and officers who selflessly threw
themselves in front of the President and neutralized the threat
an ``A.''
I think that we need to examine the events that led up to
and prior to that day.
Ms. Foxx. You stated in 2021 that the Secret Service has a
zero-fail mission.
It is clear that the events of July 13 show a cascade of
failures that cost Corey Comperatore his life, nearly cost the
former President his life, and injured David Dutch and James
Copenhaver.
When an agency fails spectacularly in its mission, those
responsible must be held accountable and the problems must be
fixed so they cannot happen again.
Why should the American people or the officials you are
responsible for protecting have confidence in your ability to
lead the Secret Service after such a spectacular failure?
Ms. Cheatle. I appreciate the question, and I am committed
to finding answers so that we can make the agency stronger
after this.
Ms. Foxx. You said on July 15 that ``the buck stops with
me.'' How are you taking accountability for the Secret
Service's failures during the July 13 assassination attempt on
President Trump?
Ms. Cheatle. I have taken accountability, and I will
continue to take accountability. I am responsible for leading
the agency, and I am responsible for finding the answers to how
this event occurred and making sure that it does not happen
again.
Ms. Foxx. So, I would like to explore how you got the job
as Director of the United States Secret Service.
Is it typical for the Director of the Secret Service to be
recommended for the role at the behest of a President's family
and senior staff, perhaps at the request of Jill Biden or
Anthony Bernal?
Ms. Cheatle. I got the job as the Director of the Secret
Service because I spent 27 years in an agency with a mission
that I absolutely love. I started my career in Detroit. I
worked my way up through investigations and protection----
Ms. Foxx. Were you--was there competition for the position?
Ms. Cheatle. You would have to ask those who were involved
in the interview process.
Ms. Foxx. But you think you are the best person in the
country to head the Secret Service?
Ms. Cheatle. I think that I am the best person to lead the
Secret Service at this time.
Ms. Foxx. The Secret Service receives billions in funding
each year, as has been explained by my colleagues here. In
fact, you have had an increase in real terms of 55 percent.
As you are no doubt aware, staffing levels for those
assigned to protect the President, former Presidents, and other
senior officials has decreased by about 350 between 2014 and
today.
Clearly, a lack of financial resources is not to blame for
the staffing shortage.
In 2022, the Secret Service saw nearly half its work force
leave in 1 year. And, during the same year, it was ranked dead-
last among law enforcement agencies in the Best Places to Work
in the Federal Government.
Can you explain why your agency was so poorly rated and why
so many staff left in just 1 year?
Ms. Cheatle. So, with all due respect, I dispute the
statistic of half of the employees leaving in 2022. I think
that that has been inaccurate data that has been reported out
there.
But what I can tell you is, as I have returned as the
Director of the agency, we have had an increase in hiring and
staffing and an increase in resources, and we are committed to
continue to hire so that we can be staffed appropriately to
meet the dynamic mission that we have.
Ms. Foxx. Well, you may want to dispute it, but it is out
there.
My understanding---given the high-profile failures and
rotten culture at the Secret Service during your nearly 2-year
tenure, why should the American people have any confidence in
your ability to lead the Secret Service to perform its zero-
fail mission to protect our senior leaders?
Ms. Cheatle. The Secret Service has an incredible culture.
Our men and women place service over self. They come in every
day willing to risk their lives for our protective mission, and
they work investigations that thwart people who would do harm
to children, child exploiters. We have an incredible mission,
and our culture is we will get the job done no matter what.
Ms. Foxx. Well, those on the front lines certainly have a
great culture, and they were willing to risk their lives for
President Trump, but I am not sure the leadership at the agency
has the right kind of culture.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Connolly from
Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, I hope the American people do appreciate the
incredible daily risks Secret Service agents take on our
behalf.
You mentioned there are 36 regular clients you have got
that you protect constantly, but I was participating in the
NATO summit just 2 weeks ago. We had 32 heads of government and
heads of state plus visiting heads of state and heads of
government. Presumably, you provided protection for all of
them.
Ms. Cheatle. That is correct.
Mr. Connolly. Just saying.
Help us understand, however--I will stipulate that there is
an ongoing investigation and you do not want to go into too
much detail on that until you have been able to ascertain all
the facts and analyze what they mean.
You can understand, however, the anxiety we and the
American public have about how could this happen and how can we
ensure it cannot recur.
Now, there are some things my friends on one particular
side of the aisle do not really want to talk about, like AR-15s
and access to them by a 20-year-old, or anybody for that
matter.
Presumably, Director Cheatle, the ubiquity of weapons, guns
in America, especially assault weapons or semiautomatic
weapons, that has helped your job and the mission of your
agencies, right? It has made it less complicated. Is that not
true?
Ms. Cheatle. I am sorry. I am not understanding your
question.
Mr. Connolly. Real simple. More guns, especially dangerous
ones, have made your job protecting people easier. Is that not
right?
Ms. Cheatle. I think from every----
Mr. Connolly. Director Cheatle, this is simple English.
More guns, do they make your job more complicated or less
complicated in protecting these 36 clients and visiting heads
of state and heads of government that come to Washington?
Ms. Cheatle. I think the Secret Service needs to take into
account----
Mr. Connolly. I did not ask that. I am sorry. I asked a
simple question which deserves a simple answer.
The ubiquity of guns, dangerous weapons in America, like
AR-15s, has that made your job--that is to say the mission of
the Secret Service--easier or more difficult?
Ms. Cheatle. I think the threat environment for protecting
our Secret Service protectees is always difficult, and that is
dynamic, and it is always evolving.
Mr. Connolly. We stipulate it is always difficult. Again,
this is a simple one.
Does the ubiquity of guns make your job easier or more
difficult today?
Ms. Cheatle. I understand the Second Amendment rights of
individuals.
Mr. Connolly. I did not ask that question. I am not
questioning the Second Amendment. I am asking a simple
analysis, Director Cheatle.
And I can tell you, you are not making my job easier in
terms of assessing your qualification for continuing on as
Director.
Please answer the question. You are the head of the Secret
Service. You are speaking on behalf of 8,000 members who put
their lives on the line. We just had a failure by your own
admission.
Do guns make your job easier or harder?
Ms. Cheatle. I think the job of the Secret Service is
difficult on every day, and we need to make sure that we are
mitigating all threats, whether that be weapons----
Mr. Connolly. That is not my question. That is not my
question. And now I think you are evading the answer, which is
not a hard one.
Ms. Cheatle. I am sorry that you feel that way, sir.
Mr. Connolly. How else could I feel, Director Cheatle, when
you are clearly avoiding a direct answer to a very simple
declarative question?
We almost lost a Presidential candidate the other day. A
20-year-old had access to his father's AR-15 and got on top of
a roof within 500 yards or feet of the podium.
And I am asking you, did the availability of that AR-15--
which is replicated all across America--make your job harder or
easier, and you are not willing to answer that question? And
you think--and you wonder why we might have a lack of
confidence in your continued ability to direct this agency?
Ms. Cheatle. I understand your question, and that is the
environment----
Mr. Connolly. Well, if you understand my question, why not
answer it?
Ms. Cheatle. Because it is the environment that the Secret
Service works in every day.
Mr. Connolly. That does not tell me anything. That is the
environment we work in.
I had an attack on my office a year ago. I know a little
bit about violence, too. He came to kill me. When he could not,
he beat one of my staffers eight times with a baseball bat on
the head. We live with the threat of violence.
But a simple answer from the Director of the Secret Service
would be helpful, and I am sorry you have chosen to evade it.
I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Grothman from
Wisconsin.
Mr. Grothman. Thank you.
When this guy took the shots, he climbed a ladder to get on
the roof, correct?
Ms. Cheatle. I am unable to answer details of exactly how
the individual accessed the roof at this time.
Mr. Grothman. Do you know when the--if he did use the
ladder, do you know when the ladder was placed there? Was the
ladder there 2 days before? Just the night before? Do you have
any information at all as to when the ladder got there?
Ms. Cheatle. I would like to be able to answer those
questions. The FBI is still conducting an investigation.
Mr. Grothman. How did the rifle get to the roof?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, sir, at this time, I am unable to
answer questions to provide clarity.
Mr. Grothman. Have they cleaned the roof since the
assassination attempt?
Ms. Cheatle. Have they cleaned the roof?
Mr. Grothman. Right. Has anything been done to the roof? Is
it just like it was, you know, whatever, 10 days ago or not?
Has anything been done to the roof?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have an answer for that.
Mr. Grothman. OK.
Were President Trump's normal agents, normally assigned to
him, there that day?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Grothman. There was no--these were the same agents that
were always there?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, sir. The people that are assigned to his
detail were working on that day.
Mr. Grothman. OK. There is stuff on the internet that says
they were not there that day, but these are the same agents who
are routinely there?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Do we know which agents fired the shots
that finally took down the potential assassin?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. Grothman. Could you give us those names or the
background of those agents?
Ms. Cheatle. I would not offer their name up in this
setting, but it was one of our technical officers, our counter-
snipers.
Mr. Grothman. OK. So, can we privately get those names to
the Committee?
Ms. Cheatle. I am certain that we can make names available
privately.
Mr. Grothman. OK.
Do we know where all the shots landed?
First of all, how many shots did the potential assassin--
how many shots came out of the rifle?
Ms. Cheatle. So, again, I would hesitate to offer that
information as the FBI is conducting an investigation.
Mr. Grothman. Have we got the bullets from all the shots?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, that would be the responsibility of the
FBI to collect that evidence.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Do we have any--do we have the
correspondence from the shooter? Has that been recovered from
his phone, whatever?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I would have to defer you to the FBI
for details on that investigation.
Mr. Grothman. OK.
You have spent some time trying to change the makeup of the
Secret Service, OK? You feel there are, whatever, too high a
percentage are men.
Does this affect at all who you are hiring for the Secret
Service?
Ms. Cheatle. I have spent my time as the Director trying to
increase the number of people that we hire in the Secret
Service so that we have the best and the brightest, and that
has been my concentration as the Director.
Mr. Grothman. OK. You ever hiring--hiring--not hiring men
because of your desire to hit certain targets?
Ms. Cheatle. I am hiring the best-qualified candidates that
put in an application that want to work for our great
organization.
Mr. Grothman. OK.
Next question. The shooter obtained a direct sight of
President Trump from the position on the rooftop. I assume that
is not something that should ever happen. It should never
happen.
Do you want to elaborate a little on how that happened or
what you wish you had done differently or would do differently
next time there is a Trump rally?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, sir, the facts of this particular event
are still unfolding. Nine days, there have been a number of
reports that have been out there. So, I do not want to provide
information that perhaps would contradict something that has
been erroneously reported or is not factual. But there clearly
was a mistake, and we will take every effort to make sure that
this never happens again.
Mr. Grothman. Could you elaborate why you want one-third of
the Secret Service to be women?
Ms. Cheatle. I have never stated that I want one-third of
the Secret Service to be women.
Mr. Grothman. Thirty percent or something. You had some
target, no? OK.
Mr. Jordan. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Grothman. Sure. I will yield.
Mr. Jordan. What was, Director, what was erroneously
reported? You said, to Mr. Grothman's question, you said
something was erroneously reported. What are you referring to?
Ms. Cheatle. I am referring to----
Mr. Jordan. His question was in the context of the shooter
using a ladder to get on the building. What was erroneously
reported? Because you will not tell us anything, but you will
tell us something that was not reported accurately?
Ms. Cheatle. I am saying, sir, that there have been a
number of reports that are out there that have been
speculation, and until we have the actual facts, I do not want
to report anything that would contradict speculation that has
been out there.
Mr. Jordan. I yield. Thank the gentleman for yielding.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes Mr. Krishnamoorthi
from Illinois.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you, Mr. Chair, thank you, Mr.
Ranking Member, for bringing us together this morning.
One question I get asked a lot from my constituents is,
what can Congress actually do to stop this from happening
again?
And I would like to share a graphic from a very recent
study conducted by Professor Robert Pape, a world-renowned
expert in combating political violence. The graphic shows that
74 percent of Americans want this Congress to come together to
denounce political violence of all stripes. I mean, you can
tell it is across party lines.
I commend the Chair and Ranking Member for putting out the
statement the other day condemning political violence, and to
further this effort, I would like to ask all my colleagues to
join Dr. Brad Wenstrup and me in introducing a resolution that
we think can secure unanimous House passage in deploring and
condemning political violence. And we will be circulating that
resolution shortly.
Director Cheatle, as you know, the shooter began shooting
at 6:11 p.m. eastern on July 13. NBC reported that at 5:51
p.m., 20 minutes before the shooting began, the state police
informed the Secret Service of their concern.
Now, the rally was not paused at that point, correct?
Ms. Cheatle. No.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And according to NBC, just 2 minutes
later, at 5:53 p.m., the Secret Service notified its snipers
about the gunman.
The rally was not paused at that point either, correct?
Ms. Cheatle. No.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Let me show you some video footage by
rally goers.
If you could play the video on the screen up here.
This was taken 2 minutes before the shooting started.
If you could turn up the volume.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Ma'am, that does not look like
suspicious behavior. That looks like threatening behavior to
me. And the rally was not paused at that point either, correct?
Ms. Cheatle. I can tell you, as I stated earlier, sir, that
the moment that the shift surrounding the President were aware
of an actual threat----
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. That is a threat right there. The guy
is on the roof, and everybody is yelling at him----
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi [continuing]. And directing the
officers' attention to him. The rally was not paused at that
point, correct?
Ms. Cheatle. We are currently still combing through
communications and when communications were passed.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Well, I can point you to this
communication. It is 2 minutes before the shots started ringing
out.
Director Cheatle, yes or no, was there ever a moment where
the Secret Service actually considered pausing the rally?
Ms. Cheatle. The Secret Service would have paused the rally
had they known or been told----
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. So, the answer is no?
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. That there was an actual threat.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. The answer is no, correct?
Ms. Cheatle. I can speak to you in generalities.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. No, no. I do not want generalities. I
want specifics.
Ms. Cheatle. I do not know all of the communications----
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. The answer is no, you did not consider
pausing the rally, correct?
Ms. Cheatle. The people that are in charge of protecting
the President on that day would never bring the former
President out if there was a threat that had been identified to
them.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Well, they did, because we have now
identified three points in the 20 minutes before the shooting
that the threat emerged.
Let me point you to something else, which is the building
that the shooter was perched on seen here. This building is
called the AGR building. I am sure that you are familiar with
it. It is no more than 150 yards from the stage where Donald
Trump stood, yet the security perimeter was drawn such that the
AGR building was placed outside of it.
Director Cheatle, according to the Washington Post, the AR-
15-styled rifle used in the shooting had a range of 400 to 600
yards, and therefore the AGR building is--was clearly within
rifle range of the stage, correct?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. NBC News has reported that, in the days
before the rally, the Secret Service had identified the
building as a vulnerability that required special attention,
correct?
Ms. Cheatle. That is reporting from NBC?
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Yes.
Ms. Cheatle. So, I am still looking into an active
investigation.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. I know, but it has been 9 days. I mean,
you should know that, right?
And yet, despite the fact that the AGR building was in
rifle range of the stage and it was flagged as a vulnerability,
this building was put outside of the Secret Service's security
perimeter.
And I respectfully submit the Secret Service must expand
its security perimeter to account for the kinds of weapons that
can be used outside the perimeter to endanger the protectees
inside the perimeter, ma'am.
Let me turn your attention to some conspiracy theories that
have been circulating and ask you to comment on them.
First, you have not found evidence that the incident was a
staged shooting, right?
Ms. Cheatle. Correct.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And you have not found evidence that
this was a result of a conspiracy of high-ranking government
officials, correct?
Ms. Cheatle. Correct.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And you have not found evidence that
this incident was, in fact, directed or perpetrated by a
foreign state or entity, right?
Chairman Comer. And that is the last question, but I will
let the Director answer that, please.
Ms. Cheatle. Not at this time.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Cloud from Texas.
Mr. Cloud. Thank you.
I just wanted to confirm, there was only one counter-sniper
who took one shot? Is that correct?
Ms. Cheatle. We had multiple counter-sniper teams available
that day.
Mr. Cloud. Yes, on the premises, but only one took one
shot? Is that correct? Or only one----
Ms. Cheatle. Correct.
Mr. Cloud. OK.
How many spent shell casings were found on the roof?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I would have to defer you to the FBI's
criminal investigation.
Mr. Cloud. OK. Word is, is that the car was rigged with
explosives?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, sir, I would have to defer you to the
FBI's investigation.
Mr. Cloud. OK. You are not curious about--you do not
communicate with them? No? OK.
CNN reported that the Secret Service did not sweep the
building the shooter was used to shoot President Trump and
other attendees. Is that true or false?
Ms. Cheatle. So, we are conducting a mission insurance
investigation, and it will depend on the information that we
obtain from our investigations.
Mr. Cloud. OK. The Secret Service knew there was a
suspicious person anywhere from 8 minutes before the President
walked on stage to 30 to 60 minutes. We have different reports.
Was President Trump or his team notified of the threat?
Ms. Cheatle. I think there is a difference and a
distinction between suspicious----
Mr. Cloud. Suspicious person.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. And threat.
Mr. Cloud. Yes.
Ms. Cheatle. So, we are going back and looking at
communications to know when the information about a suspicious
person was passed to Secret Service personnel.
Mr. Cloud. OK. But was President Trump or his team
notified?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, we are going back and looking to make
sure that we have the exact information of when those
notifications were made and who those notifications were made
to.
Mr. Cloud. OK.
I think it is troubling for a lot of us that the No. 1
question everyone in America is wondering is why was the roof
left open, and after 9 days, we should at least maybe have a
little bit of that information. And when you come to this
Committee hearing and you do not have anything to say about
that, it is very, very troubling.
Did you review the security plan for this event?
Ms. Cheatle. I personally do not review security plans for
events that take place across the country.
Mr. Cloud. Any of them?
Ms. Cheatle. We have a number of events that take place----
Mr. Cloud. Who is the top-level official who reviews the
security plan?
Ms. Cheatle. There is a number of people that review
security plans as they unfold.
Mr. Cloud. Who is ultimately responsible for signing off on
a security plan?
Ms. Cheatle. It is a conjunction of personnel. There are
people on the ground. There are supervisors on the detail.
There are people at headquarters.
Mr. Cloud. So, there is not one person who says, ``OK, this
is good, it is copacetic, we are going for it''?
Ms. Cheatle. I think much in the way that we build our
security plans where they are multilayered----
Mr. Cloud. No doubt there are teams working different
aspects of it, but ultimately, is there not an individual who
signs off on the plan?
Ms. Cheatle. Much like how we design our security plans,
they are multilayered. There are multiple layers of people.
Mr. Cloud. So, there is no accountability?
Ms. Cheatle. There is accountability, sir.
Mr. Cloud. This is, whether it is the FBI or Fauci or
anything, it is time after time after time these multiple
layers of accountability turn into layers of plausible
deniability in agency after agency after agency.
That has got to be fixed, because you keep coming here and
expecting--yes, you are saying, ``I am responsible,'' but--and
you are accountable for it--but then there is nothing. What do
you mean by that? I mean, you are saying you are going to keep
your job, right?
Ms. Cheatle. I assure you, sir, that if we determine
through the course of our investigation that someone or people
need to be held accountable, we will do so.
Mr. Cloud. What level of--if President Biden, God forbid,
had been shot and killed, would you think that was worthy of
resignation?
Ms. Cheatle. I would do the same thing that I am doing here
where I would want to make sure that we are conducting an
investigation, that there is continuity in that investigation,
and that we could find the answers for what happened.
Mr. Cloud. You do not think the assassination of somebody
under your detail is worthy of resignation?
Ms. Cheatle. I think that this event was tragic and
deserves answers.
Mr. Cloud. The thing that you have said so far is that you
want to make sure that this never happens again. The thing is,
everyone in America knows that is not the job description that
you are tasked with. The job description you are tasked with is
to make sure it never happens, period.
One of your goals in the strategic plan is to champion
diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility. You have
accomplished the accessibility part.
What standards--do you keep the same standards for all
applicants and all--does every Secret Service agent meet the
same qualifications, or do you have different standards for
different people?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, sir. Everyone who moves through the
application process has to meet the same standards to become a
special agent.
Mr. Cloud. OK.
The trouble I think we are having with right now--so far,
you gave a lame excuse for sloped roof. You said that local law
enforcement's job was to cover up the building before
backtracking on that. We were told that President Trump's team
did not ask for security before you backtracked on that. You
have not provided the audio recording that this Committee--the
Chairman requested that was due Thursday. You did not give us
an advanced copy of your opening statement, but yet there was
reporting on it somewhere else. There seems to be more
information from YouTube videos than you are able to provide
for us.
And it begs the question to anyone, you are in charge of
the investigation of your own failure, so how is anybody in
America supposed to be able to trust the results of that
investigation as being anything transparent and genuine?
Chairman Comer. That is the last question, but please feel
free to answer the question, Director.
Ms. Cheatle. Sir, I have been a Secret Service agent for
nearly 30 years. I have led with integrity, and I follow our
core values of duty, justice, honor, loyalty, and courage, and
I am doing that in this case. And I assure this Committee that
I will provide answers when we have a full and complete report
in addition to cooperating with all of the other investigations
that are ongoing.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Khanna from
California.
Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank the Chair and the Ranking Member for
convening this hearing on a bipartisan basis. I join them in
condemning the horrific assassination attempt on the former
President. I am relieved for the sake of the country that he
was not seriously hurt and that he survived, and my thoughts
are with him and his family during such a traumatic event.
I also want to express condolences to Corey Comperatore's
family and recognize his heroism in saving his daughters' lives
and to the victims of that awful event.
Now, Director Cheatle, would you agree that this is the
most serious security lapse since President Reagan was shot in
1981 of the Secret Service?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, sir, I would.
Mr. Khanna. And, you know, do you know what Stuart Knight
did when--he was in charge at the time of the Secret Service.
Do you know what he did afterwards?
Ms. Cheatle. He remained on duty.
Mr. Khanna. He resigned. He resigned. And Stuart Knight was
not a Democratic appointee or a Republican appointee.
Look, I am not questioning your judgment. I just do not
think this is partisan. If you have an assassination attempt on
a President, a former President, or a candidate, you need to
resign. That is what Stuart Knight did. He was a Republican
appointee, and he took responsibility.
And I think you need to reflect. This is not a question of
you. It is a question of the American people. You cannot go
leading a Secret Service agency when there is an assassination
attempt on a Presidential candidate. I would say that about
anyone who is running.
And so, I guess my question to you is, what is the
difference between your position and what Stuart Knight did?
Ms. Cheatle. What I will tell you, sir, is that I am
dedicated to finding the answers to what happens. And like
every Secret Service agent, we do not shirk our
responsibilities. I will remain on and be responsible to the
agency, to this Committee, to the former President, and to the
American public.
Mr. Khanna. But is there a reason you would not just do
what Stuart Knight did after the Reagan assassination attempt?
Ms. Cheatle. I believe that I provided an answer.
Mr. Khanna. There is nothing more that you have to say? I
mean, do you really believe at this moment, given how divided
the country is and the questions asked, that your service in
this role is the best for the Nation? I mean, I am not saying
you cannot do public service again, you cannot do something
else again.
Do you really genuinely in your heart believe that you
being in this role is what is right for America at this moment?
I mean, do you think there are people who are Trump supporters
who have confidence in you?
The one thing that the--we have got to have agencies in
this country that transcend politics, that have the confidence
of independents, Democrats, Republicans, progressives,
conservatives.
Do you really believe that the majority of this country has
confidence in you right now?
Ms. Cheatle. I believe that the country deserves answers,
and I am committed to finding those answers and providing those
answers.
Mr. Khanna. Well, I believe, Director Cheatle, that you
should resign. I think there are colleagues on both sides of
the aisle who believe that. And I hope you will consider it.
I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Palmer from
Alabama for 5 minutes.
Mr. Palmer. Director Cheatle, did local law enforcement ESU
teams have compromise authority to engage a perceived threat?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Palmer. Why do you think they did not use it?
Ms. Cheatle. I believe that they follow the same use of
force that our agents----
Mr. Palmer. You do not--when you have compromise authority,
you do not have to get permission if you perceive a threat. And
there were not just the ESU units, but there were local law
enforcement that had line of sight on the shooter before the
shots were taken.
So, one of my questions is, there was supposed to be a
briefing with the Secret Service sniper units, your
counterassault team members, with the contract team, with the
local ESU teams. That did not take place. Why was that?
Ms. Cheatle. So, I have been told that there has been a
briefing. There was a briefing that took place.
Mr. Palmer. I have been told that there was not one.
Ms. Cheatle. And, again, we are still looking into the
facts of the investigation, so----
Mr. Palmer. Let me ask you this. When were you informed
that there was a credible threat against President Trump--
former President Trump? When did you learn of that?
Ms. Cheatle. Sir, the former President has a number of
threats.
Mr. Palmer. I did not ask you that. There was a credible
threat from Iran. When were you informed of that? Answer the
question.
Ms. Cheatle. We have been monitoring the threats for the
former President----
Mr. Palmer. You knew before the rally. OK? All right?
The site security plan is generally drafted by the site
supervisor and the site agent, probably out of the Pittsburgh
district office. Did they take into account the credible threat
against President Trump?
Ms. Cheatle. Our personnel take into account the threats
that are out there.
Mr. Palmer. Then why would they leave a building--and I
will correct the distance that has been quoted, it was about
140 yards with clear line of sight to the President. Why was
that building not occupied on the roof? I mean, you could have
put Barney Fife on the roof and kept somebody from getting up
there. So, why was that not done?
Ms. Cheatle. The plan that was developed that day
encompassed a number of security mitigations.
Mr. Palmer. No, ma'am. The issue is the site supervisor,
the site agent, and the special agent in charge--who I think
signed off on the plan--did not include that in the inner
perimeter, and they did not have a plan to secure the building.
As I understand it, the Butler County ESU unit was situated
on the second floor of a building next to that, but they did
not have a clear line of sight of the roof. The angle was too
severe.
The photograph that was taken of the young man--of the
shooter--when he had the range finder was taken at 5:15. It was
not until 5:38 that that photograph was transmitted to the
Secret Service sniper unit.
I do not understand the lack of interoperability here in
the communication process. I do not understand why people did
not perceive that as a credible threat. The video that Mr.
Krishnamoorthi had shown there was clearly a credible threat.
So, how is it that all of these mistakes could be made?
How many explosive devices were found on or near the site?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I would have to defer you to the FBI--
--
Mr. Palmer. Madam, I believe they were in his car, and I
think there might have been one near a main gas line.
It was not just the fact that he had a rifle. It was the
fact that he had the ability to inflict enormous harm, enormous
numbers of casualties had those devices exploded.
I want to know also, when your agents conduct a site
review, are they fully informed of all of the threats that are
being made against the principal that they are protecting?
Ms. Cheatle. What I can tell you is that when our agents go
out to conduct an advance their whole goal is to ensure the
safety and security----
Mr. Palmer. I understand what the goal is. The failure to
secure that building not only put the former President's life
in danger, it put the lives of individuals in the crowd in
danger as well. I mean, the Reagan shooting, there were other
people shot at that time as well, and the Secret Service
members' lives were in danger.
So, I do not understand how you can continue to stay in the
position you are in when this was a failure of historic
magnitude. Forty-three years without anything like this
happening, and you failed, in this case, in a spectacular way.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Mfume from Maryland.
Mr. Mfume. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to commend you and
the Ranking Member on your joint statement and for holding this
hearing that we might all at least attempt to try to get some
answers.
Some of us, Ms. Cheatle, grew up in an era not too unlike
what we see today in terms of political violence. And some of
us remember the November 22, 1963, assassination of President
Kennedy. Some of us, like myself, remember 2 days later when
Jack Ruby, on live TV, shot and killed Lee Harvey Oswald.
We have seen over and over and over since that time these
kind of attempts, whether it was the assassination of Martin
Luther King or Bobby Kennedy, or the attempted attack on George
Wallace in Laurel, Maryland, the shooting in 1981 of Ronald
Reagan, our friend and colleague Steve Scalise shooting here in
D.C., and the unfortunate attack on Paul Pelosi, and now this
matter regarding former President Trump.
Let me try, if I might, to take another walk at this.
People just assume that whoever is in charge takes full
responsibility when there has never been, at least on this
magnitude and scale, this sort of failure. So, when Members ask
you are you going to resign and you say you have no intention
to, they are perplexed, like many people who watch what is
going on.
And there are some things I just do not understand.
Why was the building, the ARG building, placed outside of
the perimeter when, clearly, it was close enough for someone to
launch an attack?
Ms. Cheatle. So, again, sir, we are looking into all of the
details of how the advance was comprised, but I can tell you
that there was overwatch on that building provided that day.
Mr. Mfume. By a drone?
Ms. Cheatle. I am not going to get into the specifics of
technology or assets that were used in this forum.
Mr. Mfume. OK. OK. Well, I think it is fair to say the
overwatch failed because the shooter got up on the roof and
stayed there for a while, and people had pointed him out.
So, do you think that your overwatch was a failure in that
case?
Ms. Cheatle. I think that we need to know the full details
to understand how this occurred.
Mr. Mfume. And why was the rooftop left naked to begin
with, can you tell us that, considering it was within the line
of sight and so very close?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I cannot speak to the specifics of this
particular event site. But what I can tell you is that, when
the Secret Service develops an advance plan, they take into
account a number of factors when they are building their
advance. If there are buildings or areas of concern and
overwatch is one of those mitigations that they want to put in
place, then they will cover off areas of responsibility.
Mr. Mfume. I understand that, but the shooter came to the
attention of your agency 52 minutes before the former President
got to the stage.
Did anybody get assigned to watch or cover that individual
who had already been seen with an advanced finder on him and
other suspicious matters? Was anybody assigned to track him?
Ms. Cheatle. So, what I would like to clarify is that a
suspicious individual----
Mr. Mfume. I got that part, is not a threat. I know. I
know.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Was brought to the attention of
our personnel. And, again, having a range finder at an outdoor
event----
Mr. Mfume. Well, let me ask you this. When the suspicious
person was brought to the attention of the Secret Service, was
anybody in the detail ordered to follow and stay with that
suspicious person just because they might become a threat?
Ms. Cheatle. So, we have a number of teams that are on the
ground. And, again, we are trying to verify the timelines of
when those notifications were made to our personnel so that
they could assume the responsibility of trying to track that
individual.
Mr. Mfume. Ms. Cheatle, there has been a lot of
discussion--some of which raised itself earlier in this
hearing--about poor staff morale within your agency. And I have
the July 17 report of Government Executive, which is a credible
reporting service for the Federal Government for employees, and
the 2023 ranking of places to work within the Federal
Government showed--and this is through the Office of Personnel
Management--that the Secret Service came in 413th out of 459
subagencies and agencies.
Can you explain that?
Ms. Cheatle. Certainly. What I can tell you is the Secret
Service is a difficult job. It challenges our employees daily.
It is holidays. It is weekends. It is no-leave periods.
Mr. Mfume. But, madam, people come to work knowing that.
You do explain that when you hire somebody. They know that. It
is the same with other agencies. They miss holidays. They come
to work at odd hours.
But to be worst, one of the worst places to work within the
Federal Government, 413 out of 459, I just need an explanation.
What do you think as the Director there?
Ms. Cheatle. I think----
Chairman Comer. And that is the last question, but please
answer Mr. Mfume's question.
Ms. Cheatle. I think that this is a challenging job. I
think that it is a challenging environment to be in law
enforcement. And we do have a no-fail mission, and our folks
are tasked with that every day, 365 days of the year.
But I can tell you I have also taken a number of measures
since I have been the Director to recruit and retain and stem
the tide of attrition in our agency, which will hopefully
alleviate some of that.
Mr. Mfume. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Sessions from
Texas.
Mr. Sessions. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I join in
the calls of all of our Members to say thank you for doing this
hearing on a bipartisan basis.
Director, I am not going to sit here and say you ought to
resign, but I am going to say that you have not given us
confidence that you have the ability to understand what
happened, to take the responsibility in terms of understanding.
You have spent a number of years--how many years do you say
you have been with the agency?
Ms. Cheatle. Twenty-nine.
Mr. Sessions. Well, I spent 16 years with AT&T, moved seven
times with them, and had a really good feel about their
operations, how they worked, what was acceptable, who was
responsible. And I have heard you say today numbers of times:
Well, you have got to wait. Well, you have got to wait. Wait
for the final report.
When is the ``final'' final going to happen?
Ms. Cheatle. I am----
Mr. Sessions. I mean, how long do we have to wait before
you can give us credible answers? You have been there 28 years.
You have had a few days to be able to draw your own analysis of
this. You should understand the entire process.
You talked about being on the team perhaps in Georgia. You
have talked about your experience in this. You have talked
about the professional nature of the agency. That, I do not
doubt.
But the Director, just like it was when I ran my operations
at AT&T, was responsible for making sure they worked. And in
business, it either works or it does not work. There is no in
between. It either works or it does not work.
And your job as the, in essence, administrator, the
Director, is to make sure it looks right and works. And I have
not heard you say one thing about, ``my analysis is. I have
asked these questions.'' It is always, ``I have got to sit back
and wait for someone else to decide that.''
So, I am going to ask you a question that maybe you can
answer.
Have any employees been disciplined for their role in the
Butler, PA, incident?
Ms. Cheatle. No, sir, not at this time. I am asking those
questions.
Mr. Sessions. So, no employee has been disciplined and no
employee has been placed in any position that would place their
job in jeopardy nor their standing in the agency?
Ms. Cheatle. We are still in the process of interviewing
people.
Mr. Sessions. That is not what I asked. You are the person
that runs the place. You are the person that knows right from
wrong, good from bad. You have had a number of days. And now
you come before this Committee, knowing you are going to be
before us, and you have got to slough it off to someone else.
Do you see where there was something that went wrong, as a
professional at an agency for 28 years, or do you have to count
on someone else to give you the final report?
Ms. Cheatle. I see that something went wrong, and I have
acknowledged that something went wrong.
Mr. Sessions. Then what went wrong?
Ms. Cheatle. I need to----
Mr. Sessions. Was the special agent in charge not doing
their job? Was the shooter not--was the shooter given extra
time? Was the sniper doing their job?
I mean, these are things that people who have been around
for 28 years can analyze quickly.
I watched it live on TV and then within minutes saw a
number of facts and factors that would have and should have
been known by people who were there. You have got 28 years. You
are showing up here telling us and the American public, ``Well,
I have got to wait for the final answer.''
What is your evaluation?
Ms. Cheatle. I am asking those same questions.
Mr. Sessions. Well, no, you are before the Committee.
Ms. Cheatle. And I----
Mr. Sessions. Tell us what went wrong. A special agent in
charge? The person who was there? Tell us and do not try and
play a shell game with us.
Do you have the ability to effectively, as the Director of
this agency, to understand what went wrong and at least tell
us, ``I do or do not know what I am doing''?
And we come away with--and I am not asking for you to
resign. I am asking for you, if you have got this experience,
then you should be able to say to us, ``We know what we did
wrong. It was a failure in our system. And we are immediately
making these corrections.''
That is why you are having a difficult time with this group
of Members of Congress, because we saw it, too. We have seen
the things.
But you are the 28-year expert. You are the person that--
and only you--that can make the changes. And I hear you say,
``Well, I have got to wait for a final report before I, at 28
years experience.''
That is why we think what you are doing, the answers you
are giving us, are not correct and you are not using your
professional expertise.
Mr. Chairman, I will allow her to respond.
Ms. Cheatle. I am asking those same questions, sir. And I
assure you, when I have a full and complete report of exactly
what happened, there will be accountability, and we will make
changes.
Chairman Comer. Before I recognize--just out of curiosity,
Director, it has been 9 days. Every American wants these
questions answered.
Do you have a ballpark estimate of when what Mr. Sessions
asked you would be able to answer----
Ms. Cheatle. So, I can tell you----
Chairman Comer [continuing]. Time-wise?
Ms. Cheatle. I can tell you on our mission assurance
internal investigation, we are targeting to have that completed
within 60 days.
There is also an external investigation that is going to be
taking place. There are a number of Office of Inspector General
investigations as well, and we are working in concert. And
then, of course, there is the Department of Justice/FBI
criminal investigation.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes Ms. Ocasio-Cortez from
New York.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Cheatle, respectfully, what you had just laid out
about 60 days--we are currently in the midst of an especially
concentrated Presidential campaign in the moment. That is also
paired with, of course, elections happening across the country
that are happening in about 100 days.
So, the notion of a report coming out in 60 days when the
threat environment is so high in the United States--
irrespective of party--is not acceptable, and I think it is
very important to understand that.
This is not theater. This is not about jockeying. This is
about the safety of some of the most highly targeted and valued
targets, internationally and domestically, in the United States
of America.
So, the idea that a report will be finalized in 60 days,
let alone prior to any actionable decisions that would be made,
is simply not acceptable. It has been 10 days since an
assassination attempt on a former President of the United
States. Regardless of party, there need to be answers.
Again, this party--this Committee--this is not a moment of
theater. We have to make policy decisions, and we have to make
them now. We do.
And that may be a--and that may require legislation. That
may require policy that we must pass in the immediate term. And
without that, we are flying blind.
So, the lack of answers and the lack of a report is just
simply not something that we can accept here.
Director Cheatle, is there a standard perimeter that the
Secret Service establishes around an event, or are those
perimeters independently determined per event and scenario?
Ms. Cheatle. There is no standard. Every event and every
venue is different and treated as such.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. So, each event has a different perimeter
that is established depending on the logistics of that event.
Now, you established earlier that the building upon which
the shooter operated from was outside of that established
perimeter, correct, for the Butler, Pennsylvania, event?
Ms. Cheatle. It was outside of our secure perimeter, yes.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Now, that building was, I believe, 500--
how far away was that building from the President?
Ms. Cheatle. It was approximately 200 yards.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Two hundred yards.
Now, the individual used an AR-15 in order to act out his
assassination attempt. An AR-15 has a range of about 4-to 600
yards.
My question is, why does the Secret Service perimeter--why
is the Secret Service protective perimeter shorter than one of
the most popular semiautomatic weapons in the United States?
Ms. Cheatle. There are a number of weapons out there with a
number of ranges. Again, an advance was completed. The
determination of the perimeter--I am not going to speak to
specifics--but there are a number of factors that are taken
into account when we determine our perimeter. Some of it has to
do with terrain. Some of it has to do with buildings. Some of
it has to do with assets and resources that are available.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. And so, what I am hearing is that a
perimeter was not established outdoors, in an outdoor venue,
that would prevent an AR-15--which is one of the most common
weapons used in mass shootings--from being able to be within
the range of Secret Service protection?
Ms. Cheatle. A perimeter was established, and even though
there were buildings that were outside of that perimeter, it
was not just that building, there were a number of buildings in
the area, and there was overwatch that was created to help
mitigate some of those buildings.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Respectfully, Dr. Cheatle, as well, as a
person who has experienced an enormous amount of threat
incidents, including incidents that have never been reported
publicly, what--there is a common pattern that happens here,
whether it is Secret Service, FBI, Capitol Police, local
departments.
After a critical security failure, we often hear there will
be an independent investigation. That independent investigation
gets set up. Usually, the expectation is between 2 to 3 months
after the incident. And then nothing really occurs from there.
The report is usually not satisfactory to the questions that
are usually being raised here, and most importantly, corrective
action is rarely taken.
If I were to state anything that I think is profoundly
important, it is that we need to have answers to the public.
Ideally, I would encourage you and the agency to be more
forthright with the Members that still have yet to have their
questioning because the public deserves to have full
confidence, and the stakes are too high.
The violence that could break out in this political moment,
regardless of party, in the event of someone getting hurt
constitutes a national security threat to the entire country.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Ms. Cheatle. Can I go back to something you said?
Chairman Comer. Yes, please. Feel free, Director.
Ms. Cheatle. Ma'am, if I could just speak to something you
said at the outset when you started your questioning.
I want to assure you and everyone on this Committee that I
am not waiting for a report to take action. We have been
conducting analysis all along, and we have been adding
additional features to our security details since this incident
occurred.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. And I would hope you can highlight and
illuminate what some of those are in the event of other
Members' questioning as well.
Chairman Comer. Very good.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Biggs.
Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I request unanimous consent for that photo to go into the
official record.
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Biggs. Thank you.
Director, your agency has a no-fail mission, and on
Saturday, July 13, your agency spectacularly failed. The
failure resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore and serious
injury to two other rally attendees, David Dutch and James
Copenhaver, besides the injuries to President Trump.
It is unfathomable that a 20-year-old on the radar of
Secret Service and local law enforcement before President Trump
went on stage was able to climb onto the roof of a building
with a rifle and fire off multiple rounds before he was
neutralized.
Was Mr. Crooks acting alone?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I would have to refer you to the FBI's
investigation.
Mr. Biggs. Was he just a lone gunman?
Ms. Cheatle. I would have to refer you to the FBI's
investigation for motive.
Mr. Biggs. What did the Technical Services Division
determine was going to be the event perimeter?
Ms. Cheatle. Those are questions that we are asking, and we
are----
Mr. Biggs. I mean, you are sitting here today. Come on,
Director. Everybody said this. You knew you were going to be
asked that question because it has been asked multiple times.
So, this is an easy one. What did they determine was going
to be the event perimeter? So, you should know that. I mean,
this is not, ``Gee, I got to wait till someone else tells me.''
What was it?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I do not want to speak to specifics of
the event that took place.
Mr. Biggs. OK. This is a specific.
Ms. Cheatle. I understand.
Mr. Biggs. This is a specific that you ought to know. As
someone who said, ``The buck stops with me, I am going to stay
in my job, I am going to give the answers to the American
people, and I know what happened''--except you are not going to
tell us and you are not going to tell the American people.
And you, yourself, said in an interview that that foments
this notion of conspiracy theories. Guess what? When you sit
here and repeatedly tell people, ``Hey, I have to wait,'' as it
frustrated everybody on this Committee, guess what? It
undermines your credibility and whether you are really going to
get to it.
So, I am going to ask you again. What did the Technical
Service Division determine was going to be the event perimeter?
Ms. Cheatle. We are still gathering reports. We are
interviewing individuals.
Mr. Biggs. You know what it is, though, now. You are just
not going to tell us, right?
Ms. Cheatle. When I have those details, I will most
certainly share those.
Mr. Biggs. Was the gun already on the roof, or did the
shooter carry the gun up with him?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have that information at this time.
Mr. Biggs. Well, when was the last sweep of that roof done
prior to the rally?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have that information at this time.
Mr. Biggs. So, how many holds--I mean, so most of us here
have been in events and Secret Service has been there, there
has been security. And I cannot tell you how many times we have
said there is going to be a security hold right here, so we are
going to wait. And we wait to 1 or 2 or 3 minutes. And yet we
are hearing from you, apparently, that there were no holds in
place ever instituted here with President Trump's going on
stage.
And you said--and this is, I think, connected with this--
you said they had not adjudicated the shooter to be a threat.
He was adjudicated to be a suspicious person, even though we
got some dynamic video that Mr. Krishnamoorthi put on the video
for us.
So, I guess my question for you is--and I think you
answered this, I just want to see if you are consistent with
what you said about an hour and a half ago--what do you do if a
suspicious person is identified by the agency?
Ms. Cheatle. So, at a number of our events, it is not
unusual for----
Mr. Biggs. I know it is not unusual. What do you do?
Ms. Cheatle. Those individuals that are identified as
suspicious, we will send teams out to----
Mr. Biggs. Was a team sent out here then?
Ms. Cheatle. There were teams that were sent to identify
and interview that individual.
Mr. Biggs. They were sent to interview the individual who
scampered up in camo on top of a roof within 130 yards of his
target. And did they--did your team get there? When did your
team get there to conduct that interview?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have the details on a timeline. It is
my----
Mr. Biggs. So, if you did send--if your team--if they did
send a team and they are going to interview him, you said--you
described that earlier as an investigation--why did they not
put a security hold on President Trump going on stage at that
rally?
Ms. Cheatle. At a number of our protective sites there are
suspicious individuals that are identified all the time. That
does not necessarily mean that they constitute a threat.
Mr. Biggs. Of course not. But here you have got a guy
scampering up the side of a building on top of a roof, it is
identified to you, and you said you sent a team there. And you
cannot answer that.
And this gets to my--one of my finer points, Mr. Chairman,
if I can make it, and that is, we can have these kind of
interview sessions. Five minutes, you know, everybody gets a
kiss at the pig. Five minutes, and she gets to stonewall us,
not deliver answers.
So, we say, OK, we are going to put together a
congressional committee, a blue-ribbon committee. Same crap
will happen.
I am calling--and I will support that--but I will tell you
this. I am calling on the Speaker to give us and put together a
truly independent commission of qualified former Secret Service
agents, Presidential and VIP protective services people who can
actually conduct this kind of investigation and give us real
answers, because I do not think you are going to give us those
answers. You should have come today ready to give us answers. I
call upon you to resign today--today.
And I also would say I have got a bunch of UC requests, if
I can go ahead, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Comer. Proceed with the requests.
Mr. Biggs. Thank you. I apologize. It might take----
Chairman Comer. That is all right. Go ahead.
Mr. Biggs. It might take a moment.
Chairman Comer. Very important.
So, Anthony Guglielmi, the Secret Service spokesman, one
from him.
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Biggs. Article: ``U.S. Secret Service says it
previously denied Trump requests for additional resources, New
York Times reports.''
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Biggs. ``Secret Service says it denied earlier Trump
requests for more Federal resources.''
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Biggs. ``Secret Service acknowledges denying some past
requests by Trump's campaign for tighter security.''
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Biggs. Preliminary findings by Senator Ron Johnson and
his Committee.
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Biggs. Article is entitled, ``Notice anything different
about Trump's Secret Service detail?''
Next. ``Former Biden official corrects herself after saying
Dems must turn their fire on Donald Trump to beat him.''
``Secret Service Director says buck stops with her, but she
will not resign.''
``Disney's 'Star Wars' Mark Hamill cracks joke about
Trump's ear bandage following assassination attempt.''
``Biden: I have not engaged in inciting rhetoric, Trump
has, I am just talking about 'threat to democracy.'"
A piece called, ``Who is Secret Service Chief Kimberly
Cheatle?''
``Charlamagne tha God says Trump is solely responsible for
violent rhetoric that led to attempt on his life.''
``Video Actress Amanda Seales pushes conspiracy theory
Donald Trump assassination trip was staged.''
``Report: Secret Service identified rooftop as a potential
vulnerability days before the rally.''
``Watch: BlackRock removes ad showing former President
Donald Trump's would-be assassin.''
``Why does the Biden administration have 100 percent
confidence in Secret Service after assassination attempt?''
``Secret Service Director: We did not put snipers on the
roof because it was kind of sloped.''
``Here is what Thomas Matthew Crooks did in the days
leading up to Trump assassination attempt.''
``Secret Service Director under scrutiny for diversity
initiatives after Trump assassination attempt.''
``The official story on Trump shooting makes no sense at
all.''
``Andrew McCabe says Trump assassination''----
Mr. Raskin. Mr. Chairman, a point of order. I am happy to
assent to all of them just to facilitate----
Mr. Biggs. You do not want me to read--is it too tedious?
Mr. Raskin. Well, we are not even really hearing them
anyway, so if we could--it is up to you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Biggs. Would you like me to slow--I will slow down. I
was probably going too fast.
``Secret Service's explanations for security failures ahead
of Trump assassination attempt are not adding up.''
``U.S. reportedly received intel of Iranian plot to
assassinate President Trump.''
``WTH? Secret Service now saying that they did not put any
agents on the roof because slight slope was too dangerous.''
``Report: U.S. officials received intel of Iranian plot to
assassinate Donald Trump before Crooks' attempt.''
``Exclusive--GOP Rep Cloud: Homeland Security agency is
interfering in House's assassination investigation.''
``Why Trump's raised fist after surviving assassination
attempt is triggering to liberal media.''
``Questions swirl over the security lapse at Trump rally,
reviving old concerns about Secret Service.''
``Secret Service scrambles to shift blame after Trump
shooting as backlash hits hard--'Nobody contacted me.'"
``Must see: Six-camera split screen of assassination
attempt captures everything. Shooter was in open 2-plus
minutes.''
Mario: ``Five reasons you should be angry.''
``Breaking: Shooter spotted up to 30 minutes before firing.
Reported multiple times. Pictures taken. No one stopped him.''
``Cheatle calls the 30 minutes between noticing and
neutralizing shooter a very short period of time.''
``Secret Service Director says, 'Buck stops with me' on
Trump's assassination attempt but will not resign.''
Chairman Comer. Mr. Biggs, we will stop right there. We can
retake them on the next one. I know there are more.
Mr. Biggs. OK.
Chairman Comer. But, without objection, we will enter into
the record all of those, and we will take up the others after
the next speaker.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Brown from Ohio for 5 minutes.
Ms. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I first want to highlight certain comments from Ranking
Member Raskin, my colleagues on both sides of the aisle,
President Biden, and Vice President Harris, and that is,
political violence is completely unacceptable in this country,
full stop. It is an assault on our democracy itself and I am
devastated by this attack on a candidate for the President, for
the office of the highest office in the land and continue to
pray for the victims of this shooting and their families.
As someone who has known gun violence firsthand, no one
should have to experience the pain of losing a loved one to
weapons of war.
It is deeply unfortunate political violence has become far
too common. Whether it is the deadly attack on the Capitol on
January 6, the assault on Speaker Pelosi's husband, or the
threats of violence against election workers, we all must work
to condemn political violence and tone down the rhetoric.
So, Director Cheatle, on behalf of the hardworking men and
women of the Secret Service, can you give us some perspective
into what goes into securing an event like the rally, like how
much time do you have to prepare?
Ms. Cheatle. Thank you for the question.
Generally, when we receive notification that there is going
to be an event taking place at a venue, the advance team
assignments are made, and there is a 5-day process to conduct
walkthroughs, coordinate with staff, local staff, whether it be
campaign staff or the protectee's staff, and then with local
law enforcement on where the perimeter is going to be, the size
and the scope of the event, how many attendees there are going
to be, if it is an indoor rally/outdoor rally, what sort of
assets are available locally, what sort of assets the Secret
Service can bring to bear, and what the scope of the event that
the staff is trying to accomplish.
Ms. Brown. So, to that point, how many agents were
recommended or requested, as opposed to how many were assigned?
Ms. Cheatle. So, I am not going to get into specifics of
how many were assigned, but those numbers that were requested
were provided.
Ms. Brown. And how many local agents were involved in the
preparation, if you will, that you talked about, that 5-day
preparation?
Ms. Cheatle. So, there were a number of local agents from
the local office, as well as agents from the former Trump
detail, that were involved in that advance process.
Ms. Brown. Do we have a number?
Ms. Cheatle. I do have a number. I am not going to release
that number in this setting.
Ms. Brown. You are not making this easy for us.
This is a shocking incident on the former President's life
and an appalling instance of political violence and a threat to
our democratic values.
I am thankful that the former President is on the mend.
And, again, I am grieving for the family and friends of Corey
Comperatore who lost a loved one in this shooting and now know
the unbearable pain of gun violence.
I really hope this serves as a reminder about our
responsibility to attack policies, not personalities; to be
honest and truthful; and to treat one another with dignity,
respect, and thoughtfulness.
And, with that, I yield my remaining time to Ranking Member
Raskin.
Mr. Raskin. Thank you, Ms. Brown, for those very powerful
and moving remarks.
Director Cheatle, we do not want to lose a Presidential
candidate to an AR-15 attack. We cannot lose a Presidential
candidate to an AR-15 attack. And we cannot lose any more
citizens to AR-15 mass violence, mass shootings. And we
certainly do not want an attempted AR-15 assassination or
assassination attempt to set off political violence or riots in
America. So, this is deadly serious business.
The Vice Ranking Member pointed out that a report in 60
days will not do it for us, because we have a responsibility,
Members of Congress have a responsibility, to take action now
if there is anything we can do to prevent this.
So, my question for you is, what is informing your
operational decisions right now that you have invoked? Without
a report, can you tell us what are the preliminary judgments?
Or--if you do not want to foreshadow the report, fine--what are
your personal, professional judgments informing the operational
decisions you are making right now?
Ms. Cheatle. Certainly. And I appreciate that question.
I do not want to make any preliminary judgments on what
happened on this particular day, but I can tell you that we
have looked at, as we did immediately in the aftermath, what
the security plan for the Republican National Convention was
going to be, and we made adjustments to the interior of the
perimeter there.
We looked at the protectees that we have here in the
Washington, DC, area and our protective sites, and we did make
some adjustments to their security posture.
And as we continue to move through the next several weeks--
even yesterday, with the announcement of the President no
longer running, we have made adjustments to the Vice
President's detail. We are already prepared for an eventual VP
nominee, and we continue to make those assessments.
I think it just shows how dynamic the environment is that
this agency works in every day.
Mr. Raskin. So, you have made the same kinds of commonsense
judgments and intuitive recommendations that members of the
public and Members of Congress are asking about right----
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Raskin [continuing]. Now?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Raskin. OK.
Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to the gentlelady.
Chairman Comer. And before I recognize Ms. Mace, I have to
say, Director, we are pretty close to the halfway point during
this. You answered more questions with an ABC reporter than you
have with Members of Congress. We have a lot more questions.
The American people are demanding that we get answers to those
questions. And that is what the purpose of this hearing is
today.
So, I am sure a lot of the questions that have already been
asked are going to be asked again, and hopefully we can get
some answers to those questions. I strongly implore you to
answer those questions. You are here with a subpoena, and we
expect you to answer the questions.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Mace from South Carolina.
Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Cheatle, the American people are watching, and
they are wondering if there are any questions you can answer
honestly today.
So, Director Cheatle, I have a series of questions, very
specific questions. I want very specific answers. Most of my
questions are going to demand a ``yes'' or ``no'' answer. Do
you understand?
Ms. Cheatle. I do.
Ms. Mace. OK.
My first question: both sides of the aisle today have asked
for your resignation. Would you like to use my 5 minutes to
draft your resignation letter, yes or no?
Ms. Cheatle. No, thank you.
Ms. Mace. Was this a colossal failure?
Ms. Cheatle. It was a failure.
Ms. Mace. Yes or no, was it a colossal failure, is the
question. Yes or no?
Ms. Cheatle. I have admitted this is a terrible tragedy----
Ms. Mace. This is a ``yes'' or ``no'' series of questions.
Was this a colossal failure, yes or no?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Ms. Mace. Was this tragedy preventable, yes or no?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Ms. Mace. Has the Secret Service been transparent with this
Committee?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Ms. Mace. Would you say the fact that we had to issue a
subpoena to get you to show up today as being transparent, yes
or no?
Ms. Cheatle. I have always been----
Ms. Mace. Yes or no?
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Eager to come in----
Ms. Mace. You did not want to answer the question.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. And talk to the Committee.
Ms. Mace. We had to issue a subpoena to get you to show up
today. That is not transparent, by the way.
You stated earlier, Secret Service is not political. Is
that correct?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Ms. Mace. OK. Would you say leaking your opening statement
to Punchbowl News, Politico's Playbook, and the Washington Post
several hours before you sent it to this Committee as being
political, yes or no?
Ms. Cheatle. I have no idea how my statement got out.
Ms. Mace. Well, that is bullshit.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to
enter into the record articles by Punchbowl News, Politico
Playbook, Washington Post, all done at 5:24 a.m., 6:12 a.m.,
6:34 a.m., a solid 3 to 4 hours before this Committee got your
statement.
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Mace. OK.
Is the Secret Service fully cooperating with our Committee?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Ms. Mace. OK. You say you are fully cooperating with this
Committee.
On July 15, this Committee sent you a list of demands of
information that we wanted. Has the Secret Service provided
this Committee a complete list of all law enforcement personnel
that were there that day? Have you done that? Have you provided
a list to the Oversight Committee, yes or no?
Ms. Cheatle. I will have to get back to you on that.
Ms. Mace. That is a ``no.''
Have you provided all audio and video recordings in your
possession to this Committee, as we asked on July 15, yes or
no?
Ms. Cheatle. I would have to get back to you on that.
Ms. Mace. That is a ``no.''
You are full of shit today. You are just being completely
dishonest----
Mr. Mfume. Mr. Chairman----
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Mfume [continuing]. A point of privilege.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Come on.
Ms. Mace. Mr. Chairman, I am going to continue.
Mr. Mfume. We have to maintain decorum in this Committee--
--
Ms. Mace. Any----
Mr. Mfume [continuing]. No matter how----
Ms. Mace. Have you provided----
Mr. Mfume [continuing]. Upset we get.
Ms. Mace [continuing]. Any and all memos to this Committee
that we have asked you on July 15? Have you provided all
memorandums within the Secret Service?
Ms. Cheatle. I would have to get back to you on that.
Ms. Mace. That is a ``no.''
You are being dishonest or lying. Like, I just--you are
being dishonest here with this Committee. These are important
questions that the American people want answers to. And you are
just--you are just dodging and talking around it in
generalities.
And we had to subpoena you to be here, and you will not
even answer the questions. We have asked you repeatedly to
answer our questions. This is not hard. These are not hard
questions.
Have you provided us all communications from the Secret
Service related to that day or that rally? Have you provided
this Committee--we have asked for this information on July 15.
Have you provided any of this information that this Committee
has asked of the Secret Service, any of it?
Ms. Cheatle. I will have to get back to you on that.
Ms. Mace. Have you even read this letter that we sent you?
Did you even read this?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Ms. Mace. OK. And you have said you do not know, you have
no idea. Well, the answer is ``no.'' We have not gotten a
single document or piece of information or data from you or
your agency related to the rally that we have asked you for.
So, is this--was this attempted assassination of Donald
Trump a failure of training or execution or both?
Ms. Cheatle. I think that those are answers that we need to
examine----
Ms. Mace. Training, execution, or both? Which one?
Ms. Cheatle. I think those are answers----
Ms. Mace. All right. How many----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. We have to determine.
Ms. Mace. How many Secret Service personnel have lost their
jobs due to this colossal failure?
Ms. Cheatle. At this time, none.
Ms. Mace. How many Secret Service personnel have been
required to take a refresher course on how not to let people
shoot Donald Trump?
Ms. Cheatle. Our personnel are currently operational. We
are examining the facts of this investigation, and we will make
the changes necessary----
Ms. Mace. What time did law enforcement become aware that
there was an individual on the roof with a clear line of sight
to President Trump?
Ms. Cheatle. I am still verifying timelines.
Ms. Mace. Of course. Nine days in, you have no answers.
How many minutes went by between the time law enforcement
saw and took photos of Crooks and the shooting? How many
minutes?
Ms. Cheatle. I am still verifying----
Ms. Mace. Fifty-----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Timelines.
Ms. Mace [continuing]. Seven minutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentlelady yields back.
Before I recognize Ms. Stansbury, I believe I want to
recognize Mr. Mfume for a unanimous consent.
Mr. Mfume. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I beg your
indulgence. I meant to do this earlier.
I would like to have unanimous consent that it be submitted
for the record the ``2023 Ranking of Best and Worst Workplaces
in the Federal Government'', compiled by the Office of
Personnel Management, which shows the United States Secret
Service coming in, again, as I said earlier, 413th out of 459
sub-agencies. And this appears in the July 17 edition of
Government Executive.
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Stansbury from
New Mexico.
Ms. Stansbury. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, I want to start by just saying that part of why
you have bipartisan agreement here on the dais about the
severity and importance of this hearing is because this is not
just a single shooting, this is about national security and the
security of our democracy. It is not just one operational
failure; this is about, are our public officials safe, and what
does that signal to our country and to the world about American
security and the ability of our officials to do their job
safely?
So, I want to start by saying thank you to all of our brave
men and women who are in the uniform, whether it is the Secret
Service or local law enforcement, who put their lives on the
line. I think, obviously, we honor their service, but this is
really about operational failures and what it means for our
country at large.
And I also want to reaffirm that we must condemn
unequivocally political violence of any kind--violence of any
kind, not just political violence, and that it cannot be
tolerated in this democracy, and also to offer my prayers for
the slain fire chief, Corey Comperatore, and also prayers for
those who have been injured.
Now, I think, you know, the tone of this hearing is, how is
it that a 20-year-old young man with a gun that was legally
purchased by his father could, on the day of a rally, go to a
gun shop, legally purchase ammunition, show up to a secured
site, and then not only attempt an assassination of a political
figure but kill and injure two others? How could this happen? I
am not asking yet. I think we have had a lot of testimony here
today.
I want to talk a little bit about the timeline. Now, here
is what we know.
And I know, Director, you were also on the call that we had
a few days ago with the FBI and other law enforcement. So, I
respect that you are not able to share, based on your
testimony, some of the details that are currently being
investigated, but I know you were on the call, because I heard
you on the call, and you heard them too.
So, I am going to lay out the timeline a little bit.
On July 3, the rally was announced, that it was going to be
in Butler.
On July 6, 3 days later, we know that the shooter searched
for dates for Trump and DNC events.
On July 7--so this is 4 days after the announcement--the
shooter went to the site. He actually, physically went to the
site.
On July 12, the shooter went to a gun range where he and
his dad regularly go and practiced shooting.
And the next day, on July 13, he went to the site again
before the rally began.
We know that he then went and searched online for a gun
store, where he went and he purchased 50 rounds of ammunition,
went home, got his father's AR, which was legally purchased,
and returned to the venue.
At 5 p.m. that evening--so this is more than an hour before
Donald Trump actually took the stage that evening--local law
enforcement made aware--were made aware that there was a
suspicious man.
In fact, at 5:20, local law enforcement flagged that he had
a rangefinder. And they radioed their concerns and sent around
pictures of the individual at 5:40, 20 minutes before local law
enforcement actually identified the shooter.
And, at 5:51, Secret Service notified--was notified of the
suspicious person by the state police, and 1 minute later they
distributed that information. That was before Donald Trump even
took the stage. That was 11 minutes before he took the stage.
So, the Secret Service was aware that there was a suspicious
person.
At 6:03, he took the stage.
At 6:09, rally goers, as was shown in the video, identified
this gentleman climbing on the roof.
At 6:11, three shots were heard, three rounds of shots and,
of course, the President and the other victims were shot.
This shooter was a 20-year-old young man--no criminal
record, legally purchased gun and ammunition--who for days in
the lead-up to this shooting was searching mass shooters. He
even had a picture of a mass shooter on his cell phone the day
of the shooting. He searched for explosives; he searched high-
level officials.
So, the American people want to know, how did a 20-year-old
young man with access to a military-style weapon actually bring
it onto an unsecured perimeter, who for days had been planning
a mass-shooting event?
And I think that, Madam Director, with all due respect, the
answers that we have received here in this hearing today are
completely unsatisfactory.
How could this happen? We need answers.
We need answers not just for the family members of the
gentleman who was killed and those who were injured, but we
need answers for our democracy. Because, as others have stated
here today, we are in a highly politically charged environment
right now. We are only weeks away from one of the most
significant Presidential elections in American history, and it
is clear that our public officials' safety has not been
secured. And it is not just a matter of one shooting; it is a
matter of national security.
So, I hope that you will take our comments to heart. I hope
that there will be accountability. And we need answers.
Ms. Cheatle. Absolutely.
Ms. Stansbury. And, with that, I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. LaTurner from
Kansas.
Mr. LaTurner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Cheatle, I have a question just right off the bat.
Something that you have bragged about repeatedly is that you
have increased protection for the 36 individuals that the
Secret Service is also entrusted with. Is that correct?
Ms. Cheatle. I think I stated that we currently have 36
protectees and that we have--we continue to make evaluations on
where those levels of protection are provided.
Mr. LaTurner. You have mentioned specific increases in
protection that you have provided for some of those
individuals, correct?
Ms. Cheatle. Correct.
Mr. LaTurner. Based on what?
Ms. Cheatle. Well, some of it has been as a result of the
tragic incident that occurred on the 13th. We went back and
reassessed where we were at in providing protection and wanted
to make sure that we were not, you know, overlooking anything,
considering this most recent incident.
Mr. LaTurner. So, the Secret Service needed to learn that
allowing a rooftop 150 yards away from a protectee--not putting
that in a perimeter, not having someone guarding that roof--
that information is new to you, and it has caused you to
increase protection to other folks that are under your care?
Ms. Cheatle. I think it is prudent after any incident that
occurs to go back and take a look at your current practices and
see if there is anything that needs to be done differently.
Mr. LaTurner. But it is inconsistent, because what you said
earlier to Mr. Turner was that the protection that you were
offering to President Trump was in line with the current
threats--him being a former President, him being a nominee of a
major political party, the threats from Iran--the protection
that you are providing him was adequate.
Do you stand by that statement?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. LaTurner. OK.
Do you think it is a problem that the Americans' trust in
the Federal Government is at an all-time low? Do you think that
is a problem?
Ms. Cheatle. I think that it is unfortunate.
Mr. LaTurner. I do not know why you are quibbling with my
word. Is it a problem, or is it not?
Ms. Cheatle. I think the American public deserves to have
trust in their Federal Government.
Mr. LaTurner. OK. I do not know why you are being
difficult. I am just--it is a simple question.
Are you concerned about the increasing prevalence of
conspiracy theories going on out there right now?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. LaTurner. I am too.
You have been incredibly inconsistent with your answers
before this Committee today and what you are willing to reveal.
You have acknowledged that the shooter was identified with
a rangefinder; that President Trump's detail was sufficient for
the threats he faced from Iran; that certain details were
erroneously reported, in your words. But you have not been
willing to provide any information about the decision to place
the building in question outside the perimeter; the explosives
placed in the shooter's vehicle; the use of a drone by the
shooter; or when exactly the Secret Service identified the
shooter as a threat rather than merely suspicious.
What is your standard today for what you are willing to
answer and what you are not? Because you have been
inconsistent.
Ms. Cheatle. I am certain that you can understand that some
of the information that has been provided to you thus far has
come from the FBI's investigation and has come from information
that we have released. I want to make sure that information
that is being provided to this Committee is consistent and is
factual.
Mr. LaTurner. But the question about the drone that the
Chairman asked at the beginning of the hearing, he said, do you
know this information? And you acknowledged that, yes, you do
know the information, you just do not want to tell us.
I guess my question is that, if you wanted to wait until
the end of the investigation to draw conclusions--which you
have acknowledged you are not; you are drawing conclusions
right now and making changes. But if that was your standard,
that you want to wait until the end of the investigation to
draw conclusions, OK, at least you would be consistent in that.
But what we are wanting to know today and what would dispel
some of the conspiracy theories out there, what would increase
trust with the American people, is for you to let facts out,
for you to tell us what you know.
And I want to understand from you, why is that a problem?
Why is it inconsistent with a quality investigation to release
to the American people today at least the information that you
know for sure? Because you certainly know for sure more
information than you are willing to give us today.
Ms. Cheatle. I have released that there was a failure and
that there are gaps that we need to make sure that they do not
happen again. I----
Mr. LaTurner. That is not acceptable. That is not enough.
That does not quell any conspiracy theories out there.
In your 27 years of experience, would you have been
concerned about an elevated location within 150 yards of a
protectee that did not have a Secret Service presence? Just
based on your experience.
Ms. Cheatle. What I can tell you is that every site and
every venue----
Mr. LaTurner. No, no, no, no, no.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Is advanced differently----
Mr. LaTurner. I am asking for your experience. Looking at
this situation, would that have been of concern to you? Or
would you have agreed that it is fine, it does not need to be
covered?
Ms. Cheatle. What I have explained today----
Mr. LaTurner. You are not going to answer.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Is that there was----
Mr. LaTurner. Is it true that at 5:45 p.m., approximately
18 minutes before President Trump took the stage, the Beaver
County Emergency Services Unit noticed the shooter on the roof
and photographed him? Is that a fact or not?
Ms. Cheatle. That is the information that I have from the
FBI's report, yes.
Mr. LaTurner. You have not been willing to share whether or
when this was communicated to the Secret Service, so I would
like to get into the difference between suspicious activity and
threatening activity.
Is it suspicious or threatening if an individual is seen
around the perimeter with a rangefinder? Is that just
suspicious?
Ms. Cheatle. That could be termed as suspicious.
Mr. LaTurner. If that same individual with the rangefinder
is found on a rooftop, is that still just suspicious, or is
that considered threatening?
Ms. Cheatle. That could be termed still as suspicious.
Mr. LaTurner. All right. My time is over.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Comer. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Frost from Florida.
Mr. Frost. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
I obviously want to start by stressing that political
violence is always unacceptable and acknowledging that this is
still an ongoing investigation. But oversight hearings like
this are essential components of an investigation, and I want
to thank the Chair for pulling this together.
Madam Director, I appreciate you for being here.
The events of July 13 raise serious questions about the
efficacy and thoroughness of the security protocols in place.
The gravity of the fact that an unsophisticated gunman was
able to secure his perch and take a shot at a former President
despite multiple layers of security and intelligence are not
lost on me. Before I came to Congress, I used to work advance
for a major political candidate and have interacted with many
different law enforcement agencies on large political events
like the one that just happened.
How many times was the Secret Service alerted about a
suspicious person at the July 13 campaign event prior to the
first shot being shot?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have an exact number to share with
you today, but from what I have been able to discern, somewhere
between two and five times there was some sort of communication
about a suspicious individual.
Mr. Frost. To the Secret Service specifically?
Ms. Cheatle. Uh-huh.
Mr. Frost. According to reports, the shooter was
photographed twice by security officers prior to the shooting.
A police officer saw the shooter on the ground and reported
him, with a photograph, as a suspicious person.
Multiple local law enforcement officers identified the
shooter, radioed that he was acting suspiciously near the
event's magnetometers.
A local law enforcement tactical team saw the shooter on a
roof and notified other security services and also photographed
him.
One police officer who was photographed--who photographed
the shooter saw him scoping out the roof and carrying a
rangefinder.
My question is--and you have answered this, but--why--or,
you have not answered this--why was the event not paused right
then?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I am not clear on the timeline of when
the Secret Service shift and the counter-sniper were notified--
--
Mr. Frost. But, earlier, Madam Director, earlier, you said
that the Secret Service would have paused the rally if they
identified a threat.
Ms. Cheatle. Correct.
Mr. Frost. So, why was it not paused?
Ms. Cheatle. Because I have to assume that they did not
know that there was a threat when they brought the President
out on the stage.
Mr. Frost. I feel like this is a breakdown in communication
between local law enforcement, you all, and other actors at the
rally. And, again, as someone who has worked on these, I
understand that there is multiple people with multiple
decision--with the ability to make different decisions on the
ground.
I have taken the--over the last week, I have spoken with a
lot of folks in local law enforcement in my district and across
the country that I have worked with before, and other people
have brought up concerns around being able to communicate with
law enfor---or, with Secret Service during these big events and
having their flags taken seriously.
I do believe that if Secret Service believed that there was
a legitimate threat that they would have paused the rally. My
concern is before that, that something was flagged and it was
not taken as seriously as it should have been taken.
So, I think this shows an issue with communication. And I
want to know, Madam Director, what you intend to do to fix
that, not in 60 days, but now.
We are in the middle of a Presidential election. Obviously,
a former President who had an attempt--assassination attempt;
another rally goer who was killed due to this gun violence. We
now have a presumptive nominee of the Democratic Party who is
also historic--first Black woman to be running for President.
And so, I am worried about everybody's life.
What do you all intend to do to fix this communication
breakdown and making sure that you actually take what local law
enforcement or local folks are saying more seriously?
Ms. Cheatle. We take what local law enforcement relays to
us seriously. Let me just be clear on that.
As far as the communication----
Mr. Frost. But not this--not this time.
Ms. Cheatle. We always trust our law enforcement partners
and have a great relationship with them.
We are looking at whether or not there was a communication
breakdown. If that was the case, we will take steps to ensure
that we correct that, because, to your point, we cannot have a
communication breakdown.
Mr. Frost. Madam Director, does the--you have mentioned
that the perimeter of the event did not include the rooftop
where the shooter was.
Does your responsibility and the Secret Service's
responsibility to protect a principal stop at the perimeter of
an event?
Ms. Cheatle. Our responsibility is to ensure the safety and
security of the event itself and the protectee who is attending
that event and the personnel who are protecting that event.
Mr. Frost. So, you would say the fact that the rooftop was
outside the perimeter is not an excuse for what happened,
saying that it was outside the perimeter of the event?
Ms. Cheatle. I am not offering that as an excuse.
Mr. Frost. OK. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Fallon from Texas.
Mr. Fallon. How did a 20-year-old loner with a week's
notice pick the absolute best location to assassinate President
Trump when the entire Secret Service missed it?
Director Cheatle, under your leadership, your agency got
outsmarted and outmaneuvered by a 20-year-old. How can we have
any confidence that you could stop trained professionals from a
nefarious nation-state?
Ms. Cheatle. Those are absolutely questions that we need
to----
Mr. Fallon. I know they are questions----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Have answers to.
Mr. Fallon [continuing]. But, you know, the fact of the
matter is, we cannot have that confidence.
Director, do you have the ability, personally--do you have
the authority to beef up security of any of your protectees?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, I do.
Mr. Fallon. OK.
So, were you also aware there was a credible threat
President Trump was facing--he was facing a heightened security
threat due to a foreign adversary?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Fallon. OK.
So, given that there was an increased threat to President
Trump's life, was he provided a full security complement akin
to what a sitting U.S. President would receive?
Ms. Cheatle. He was provided a full complement of security
based on the threat assessment that we had----
Mr. Fallon. That is not my question.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. And the venue.
Mr. Fallon. My question is, if he had been the sitting
President, would he have had the same security he had on July
13, or would it have been beefed up?
Ms. Cheatle. There is a difference between the sitting
President----
Mr. Fallon. So, he did not. So, your answer is he did not.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. And continuity of government----
Mr. Fallon. OK.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. And the responsibility that we
have.
Mr. Fallon. So, he did not. OK. There was not a CAT team, a
full CAT team onsite. There were not counter-surveillance teams
onsite.
But this is the thing: you just said you have the ability
to beef up the security, you knew about the threat, and you did
not. And that is as telling as it is chilling.
We have satellite images from the Butler fairgrounds. Have
you visited the site?
Ms. Cheatle. No, I have not.
Mr. Fallon. Nine days and you have not visited the site.
You should have been there that night.
Did you talk to that--that evening, did you talk to the
team, the heroes that surrounded the President? Did you call
them that night?
Ms. Cheatle. They were still operational, working the
protection----
Mr. Fallon. So, that is a--the answer is ``no.''
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Of the President.
Mr. Fallon. Did you call them the next day?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, I spoke with them.
Mr. Fallon. You called them the very next day, not the day
of? Or was it 72 hours after?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not know the timeline, but I spoke with
them----
Mr. Fallon. OK, because you are under oath.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Immediately following.
Mr. Fallon. I think it was 72 hours after. You waited 3
days.
What is immediately clear is that there were a number of
structures that needed to be secured. Of these, Director, other
than the first, you know, immediate four, what is the most
dangerous site that should have been secured? Because, you
know, security 101, you have got to mitigate the high ground.
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Fallon. OK.
Do you know what the next-most-dangerous site--what was the
closest structure to the President other than the four
immediate ones that you had your counter-sniper teams on?
Ms. Cheatle. There are a number of structures around that
event site.
Mr. Fallon. You know who--the shooter knew. The shooter has
visited the site two more times than you have, and he had a
drone, and he picked the AGR building.
So, you said, do you remember, in an ABC interview you did,
that you did not have people on the roof of the AGR building
because you were worried about safety because of the slope?
Ms. Cheatle. I recall that statement.
Mr. Fallon. OK. Does the Secret Service have a written
policy you could share with us about sloped roofs?
Ms. Cheatle. No.
Mr. Fallon. OK. So, why did you act like there was one?
Because is it your practice to comment on enormous--events of
enormous national implications when you are ignorant of the
facts?
That is rhetorical.
So, here is this thing with the slopes. You can go all the
way up to, like, 18/12. You can go to a 1/12, which is about as
flat as you can get without it being completely flat. And you
are saying that there was a danger--a safety concern there, but
the problem is, Director, you put your counter-snipers on a 3/
12 roof, which is steeper than the 1/12. And, by the way, the
1/12 is ADA-compliant. You can build a ramp for a wheelchair on
a 1/12 roof.
So, these are nothing but pathetic excuses, and they make
no sense, and they are a bunch of cow dung.
All the law enforcement I have spoken with over the last 9
days are amazed that the AGR rooftop was not secure. And do you
want to know why? Because it is dangerous.
I have never had any long-gun training in my life. I own an
AR-15, and last time I shot it--I shot it one time in my whole
life--it was 6 years ago. That is until Saturday, where we
recreated the events in Savoy, Texas; we recreated what
happened in Butler.
I was lying prone on a sloped roof at 130 yards at 6:30 at
night. And I knew that he had a scope; I did not know what
kind, red dot or magnified, so I shot 8 rounds from both.
You know what the result was? Fifteen out of 16 kill shots.
And the one I missed would have hit the President's ear. That
is a 94-percent success rate. And that shooter was a better
shot than me. It is a miracle President Trump was not killed.
Corey Comperatore's life is over because that damn shooter
made it on the roof. And it was not the roof that was
dangerous; it was the nutjob on top of the roof.
You know what else is dangerous? I believe your horrifying
ineptitude and your lack of skilled leadership is a disgrace.
Your obfuscating today is shameful. And you should be fired
immediately and go back to guarding Doritos.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes Ms. Lee from
Pennsylvania.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I would like to thank the Chair and the Ranking Member for
coming together and holding this hearing. But I have to say, I
do not think any of our concerns have been addressed today, and
what little we have learned has not inspired much confidence.
I will just say that we obviously cannot allow the violence
we are seeing in this country to become the norm or
commonplace, but that seems to be where we are heading.
On this occasion, it was, you know, very shockingly, a
former President and current political candidate at a rally
that we all assume is one of the most secured places we can be.
But the violence we saw last Saturday is the same culture of
violence that makes too many of our kids and our community
members feel unsafe to play outside or to go to class or to
simply live their lives each day.
But, again, this was a political rally, and it is supposed
to be one of the most secured places. So, we do have very
specific questions about that.
Director Cheatle, I would like to start by following up on
some of my colleagues' questions. My colleagues Mr.
Krishnamoorthi and Mr. Frost highlighted a number of points
that showed the shooter presenting an active threat.
So, I would like to ask you, Director Cheatle, to clarify
the protocol--what the protocol is for postponing or canceling
an event based on a threat and how the events on July 13 did
not meet those standards.
Ms. Cheatle. So, again, I think we are talking about the
distinction between suspicious behavior and a threat. And at
the time that this individual was identified, they were
displaying suspicious behavior.
I am still waiting for interviews from the FBI to determine
what it was that identified that individual as suspicious and
what those behaviors were.
Ms. Lee. To that question, is suspicious behavior--does
suspicious behavior vary between different events? For
instance, if we have an event with a President, would there not
be a heightened standard for suspicious behavior?
Ms. Cheatle. I think that there are a number of ways that
someone could be identified as suspicious, and it does not
matter whether it is at a rally or an indoor event or who the
protectee is. I think it is up to law enforcement or citizens
to identify someone as suspicious.
Ms. Lee. OK. Thank you.
According to the Associated Press, at least six different
agencies, including two sheriff's offices, local police, state
police, as well as fire and emergency rescue officials, were
involved in securing the rally in Butler.
When there are so many teams that are collaborating, who
takes the lead, and how is that determined?
Ms. Cheatle. The Secret Service is responsible for the
security of the site and the----
Ms. Lee. And----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Coordination.
Ms. Lee. And that was the case on July 13?
Ms. Cheatle. Correct.
Ms. Lee. OK.
Changing gears, in 2024's appropriations budget, the Secret
Service was given a little over $3 billion, which was about $78
million above what was requested. For 2025's budget, you have
requested yet another increase.
How much of these funds goes toward training and improving
protection procedures?
Ms. Cheatle. I would have to get back to you on the
training aspect of it, but about 30 percent of our budget is
for protection and facilities and training.
Ms. Lee. But, clearly, the problem cannot be a lack of
funding. So, what exactly do you see as the core problem that
led to this failure, that led to your agency being outgunned by
a 20-year-old using his father's gun and acting on his own
without a particularly sophisticated plan or technology?
Ms. Cheatle. I think that we are waiting to determine
exactly what those failures or failure was so that we can make
sure that the Secret Service is stronger after this.
Ms. Lee. So, we have heard a lot today that you cannot
answer because it is an ongoing investigation, that you are
still figuring out the details, and that you will not answer
basic questions.
You have said 60 days for the investigation, but I simply
do not think that is acceptable. Do you really plan to keep
avoiding questions and the American people's questions--ours
and the American people's questions for the next 60 days?
Ms. Cheatle. I am not avoiding questions. I want to make
sure that I am providing factual and accurate information.
Ms. Lee. Certainly. But is there no in between, right,
between what is obviously a fact and what you can surmise from
the details that you already have?
Ms. Cheatle. I assure you, when I have a full and complete
report of what took place on that day, I will certainly come
back and make that available.
Ms. Lee. Certainly.
Studies indicate that the United States is experiencing
increasing levels of political violence and tension.
Does the Secret Service see increasing political violence
as a threat to its work? And, if so, how is the Secret Service
adapting its strategies and protocols to account for increasing
political violence?
Ms. Cheatle. We are constantly evaluating the threats that
we receive and monitoring that, and we make adjustments on a
daily basis to our protectees based on what those threats are
and what actions we need to take.
Ms. Lee. Yes or no, do you believe that stricter controls
on the availability of assault weapons would make it easier for
the Secret Service to fulfill its mission of protecting public
officials?
Ms. Cheatle. I think the Secret Service is tasked with
providing a safe environment, which is why we put into place a
number of mitigation factors.
Ms. Lee. Certainly. But do assault weapons make it easier
or harder for you to do your job?
Ms. Cheatle. I think that any weapon makes it difficult for
us to do our job.
Ms. Lee. OK.
I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Donalds from
Florida.
Mr. Donalds. Thank you, Chairman.
Director, real quick, at what time was Secret Service aware
of the active threat against President Trump?
Director, what time?
Ms. Cheatle. So, the Secret Service was aware that there
was an individual who had been identified as suspicious and
that that individual was attempting to be tracked down----
Mr. Donalds. At what time?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have a specific timeline other than
to tell you----
Mr. Donalds. Director, it has been 9 days.
Ms. Cheatle. I understand.
Mr. Donalds. At what time?
Ms. Cheatle. I want to make sure that I give you factual
information, sir.
Mr. Donalds. Director, have you talked to the agents on the
ground that day?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, I have.
Mr. Donalds. You have talked to all of them?
Ms. Cheatle. Uh-huh.
Mr. Donalds. Your senior team has talked to every agent
that was on the ground that day?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, we have.
Mr. Donalds. Have they all corroborated the same time they
identified the shooter or they were made aware of the shooter
either by attendees in the crowd or local police department?
Ms. Cheatle. There are a number of reports of when those
times were made, those notifications.
Mr. Donalds. Was it 5 minutes before the first shot rang
out?
Ms. Cheatle. No.
Mr. Donalds. Generally speaking, was it 10 minutes before
the first shot rang out?
Ms. Cheatle. No. It was less----
Mr. Donalds. Was it 15 minutes before the first shot rang
out?
Ms. Cheatle. It was less than that timeframe when it was
identified as a threat.
Mr. Donalds. How many days before the shooting took place
did Secret Service actually do their advance work to secure the
facility that the rally was going to be held at?
Ms. Cheatle. Five days.
Mr. Donalds. In the 5 days prior, when the security advance
team did their work, did they identify the rooftop as a
potential threat?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I am pulling those reports and that
information to----
Mr. Donalds. It has been 9 days, Madam Director.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Conduct those interviews.
Mr. Donalds. Did they notice a rooftop 150 yards away that
was a potential threat, yes or no?
Ms. Cheatle. I am certain that the rooftop was noticed. I
am pulling the reports----
Mr. Donalds. What was the security parameters around
securing that rooftop?
Ms. Cheatle. There was----
Mr. Donalds. What did they do?
Ms. Cheatle. There was overwatch provided for that rooftop.
Mr. Donalds. Did overwatch fail?
Ms. Cheatle. I am waiting to hear what the results of the
investigation were so that I can identify where the failure
was.
Mr. Donalds. Who did you talk to that was on the ground
that day that was responsible for overwatch? What are their
names?
Ms. Cheatle. I am not going to provide their names in this
setting.
Mr. Donalds. Did you talk to the people that were providing
overwatch that day?
Ms. Cheatle. I have talked to the people that conducted the
advance on that day and that were working the shift and were
the counter-snipers on that day.
Ms. Cheatle. So, you talked to the counter-sniper team, you
talked to the people who were providing overwatch that day, and
you talked to the advance team, correct?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Donalds. What did they tell you?
Ms. Cheatle. We are putting together a comprehensive report
so that I can identify exactly where the gaps and the
failures----
Mr. Donalds. When the counter-sniper team was on the roof
and they identified that there was suspicious activity on the
roof in question, what was the chain of command's orders around
the person on said roof?
Because I am quite sure somebody saw--under your
organization, the Secret Service, I am quite sure somebody saw
the shooter on the roof. So, what was the communication through
the chain of command to deal with said person?
Ms. Cheatle. What I can tell you is that when the
individual was identified by the counter-sniper, they took one
shot and neutralized that individual.
Mr. Donalds. But that was after the shooter already took a
shot. Is that correct?
Ms. Cheatle. That is correct.
Mr. Donalds. So, what you are saying now is that the Secret
Service did not see the shooter on the roof until after the
shooter took a shot?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have all of those details at this
time.
Mr. Donalds. If you do not have those details after 9 days,
Director, then what you are telling me is that you guys did not
see it. Is that correct?
Ms. Cheatle. I am telling you I do not have all the details
of the sequence at this time.
Mr. Donalds. Director, it has been 9 days. Either you have
the information, or you do not. Is that correct?
Ms. Cheatle. We are still in the process of conducting
interviews and an investigation.
Mr. Donalds. Some of my colleagues have texted me over the
last couple days, bipartisan, about whether you should lose
your job, and I have been quiet on that question because I
wanted to see what you were going to do today.
In my opinion, you do need to be fired, immediately. And it
is because this is gross incompetence.
And the fact that it has been 9 days, and these are simple
questions to answer. I am quite sure if I asked any one of my
kids, if they got in trouble and I told them to give me the
details, I would get more answers from them than I am getting
from you right now. And that is what is frustrating, on a
bipartisan basis--on a nonpartisan basis.
This is a joke. And, Director, you are in charge. And that
is why you need to go.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Goldman from
New York.
Mr. Goldman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director, I want to followup and just understand a little
bit why there is so much information about this out in the
public, including some from you and your communications team,
and yet you are here, pursuant to a subpoena, under oath in
front of Congress and you are unable or unwilling to answer
some of those same questions.
Can you just explain why you are answering so many fewer
questions here than you have to the media?
Ms. Cheatle. I am answering the questions that I am able to
answer based on the fact that there are multiple ongoing
investigations.
Mr. Goldman. But you have answered some of these questions
previously, correct, to the public, to the media?
Ms. Cheatle. Which questions?
Mr. Goldman. Well, for--did you have an interview with ABC
News?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, I did.
Mr. Goldman. OK. And did you explain the interaction
between local law enforcement and the Secret Service and that
local law enforcement was responsible for securing the
perimeter of the building where the shooter was?
Ms. Cheatle. I said that the Secret Service is responsible
for designing and implementing and executing the security plan
and that we rely on the assistance of our local law enforcement
partners to assist us with that plan.
Mr. Goldman. Let me ask you something. Were you given any
instructions about what you can and cannot answer here today?
Ms. Cheatle. My ability to answer questions is solely
reflective of the fact that there are multiple ongoing
investigations, and I want to make sure that I provide accurate
information that does not conflict with any of those
investigations that are going on.
Mr. Goldman. So, is it your view that you cannot talk about
anything that happened that day until those investigations are
completed?
Ms. Cheatle. My view is that I want to make sure that this
Committee and the American public gets correct and actual
information.
Mr. Goldman. And so, is it your view that that has to--that
can only happen after the completion of the investigation?
Ms. Cheatle. It is my view that when the investigations are
complete that we will be able to share that information.
Mr. Goldman. And how about before that?
Ms. Cheatle. If I have factual information that I can share
before that, I absolutely will.
Mr. Goldman. I am guessing you have factual information as
to when the suspicious photograph--the photograph of the
suspicious person was relayed to the Secret Service. There is a
timestamp on that text message or whatever it was, correct?
Ms. Cheatle. Sir, I am sure you can understand that, when
you are dealing with text messages, emails, and other
communications, the timelines do not always match up.
Mr. Goldman. Not really, if they are timestamped.
But let me move on. Because you have acknowledged that this
was a major security failure. Is that right?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Goldman. Do you acknowledge that it was a major
security failure not to secure the rooftop of the building that
the shooter shot from?
Ms. Cheatle. I believe at this time that the rooftop was
provided overwatch. I acknowledge that we are unaware at this
time how the individual was able to access the roof.
Mr. Goldman. Overwatch meaning from other counter-sniper or
other higher points?
Ms. Cheatle. Correct.
Mr. Goldman. And so, was it a failure, then, that when that
shooter was on the rooftop, that overwatch did not identify him
before he fired his shots?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have the timeline of how the
individual accessed the roof, where they accessed the roof, or
how long they were on the roof.
Mr. Goldman. Let me ask a couple things quickly.
You have testified here about all the resources that the
Secret Service needed to deploy to protect the NATO summit and
all of the leaders here. Is that right?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Goldman. Does--did you have to rely more on local law
enforcement because of the NATO summit for this event?
Ms. Cheatle. The Secret Service routinely works with local
law enforcement at every event. It does not matter whether it
is a NATO summit, NSSE, the DN---I am sorry--the RNC in
Milwaukee----
Mr. Goldman. No, but that is not my question.
Obviously, there is a natural give-and-take as to, I am
sure, how many agents you deploy and how much you rely on local
law enforcement.
Did you have to rely more on local law enforcement because
there were fewer Secret Service assets available because of the
NATO summit?
Ms. Cheatle. No.
Mr. Goldman. OK.
I hope we get answers before the completion. I do not like
the fact that the media has received far more answers than
Congress has. If this is a function of getting your ducks in a
row, I assume you have access to a lot of these reports and a
lot of this information and you should have come prepared here
today.
And I would just want to flag, Mr. Chairman, before I yield
back, that--I want to just point out one thing that my
colleague from Texas was talking about, when he said he
recreated the shooting twice with an AR-15 and he had a 94-
percent success rate, 15 out of 16 shots.
I do not know why that does not convince him that we should
get rid of AR-15s. But, clearly, we need to do something about
the prevalence of AR-15s and weapons of war on our streets.
And I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Perry from
Pennsylvania.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Chairman.
Director, I guess 60 days is the time of the investigation.
Is that the information that you have put out, or where did
that come from, 60 days? Or is that just information that the
Committee members are talking about?
Ms. Cheatle. I stated that earlier today. I have asked my
team----
Mr. Perry. OK, 60 days.
So, are you receiving regular updates--you are in charge of
the Secret Service. This is about your organization, what
happened 9 days ago. Are you receiving regular updates from the
FBI on their investigation?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, I am.
Mr. Perry. So, you know some things are true, some things
are probably not true. We want to talk to you about the things
that we are hearing about and find out if they are true.
Have you--you have been in contact with the FBI then. You
are getting updates on a daily basis, right----
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. Based on what you said? OK.
So--and are you confident that the person in question, Mr.
Crooks, was the only person firing that day against the
President or the crowd? Is he the only one? I am not asking you
yet if he acted alone, but is he the only one? Can you say that
with certainty to the American people?
Ms. Cheatle. That is the information I have at this time,
yes.
Mr. Perry. OK. Did he--does it appear he acted alone?
Ms. Cheatle. That is the information we have at this time.
Mr. Perry. OK.
Now, let us talk about the fact that he was noticed as a
person of interest, of concern, suspicion, as you say.
Your PI team, how do they stay--there is a sea of people.
How does the PI team get to that individual that is in question
in the sea of people? How is that individual tracked?
Ms. Cheatle. Our protective intelligence teams that work at
our sites are paired up with a local police counterpart, and so
they work in conjunction together----
Mr. Perry. So, do they just follow them around? Or----
Let me ask you this. Looking at the site, you have multiple
perimeters, right? You have the secure--the inside perimeter.
You have multiple secure--or multiple perimeters. Was the AGR,
so-called, building the highest location affecting the site of
the rally? Was it the highest location?
Ms. Cheatle. I believe the highest location at the site was
where our counter-snipers were----
Mr. Perry. What about the water----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Positioned.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. Tower adjacent? What about the--how
high is the water tower?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have the height on the water tower.
Mr. Perry. OK. Seems like water towers are pretty high. At
least in the photo, it looks like it.
But there might actually be a building right behind the AGR
building that is even higher than the building that Crooks
fired from.
You are familiar with cover, concealment, and defilade,
right? You are familiar with those terms?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Perry. So, how would your sniper team or your PI team
track the individual and give vectors to Secret Service on the
PI team to get to that individual to question him?
And how would you cover the defilade, the cover and
concealment of low areas that you cannot see from where your
sniper team immediately adjacent to the President were--was
sited? How would you do that if you are not up on the high
ground?
Ms. Cheatle. So, when our counter-sniper teams go out and
conduct an advance, they have a methodology and provide a grid
system that our response teams are able to vector in if they
see something that is troubling.
Mr. Perry. So, when Mr. Jordan asked about the assets that
were requested--let me just ask you about assets requested.
Were aerial assets requested for this event from either the
Secret Service or state police or anybody else--a drone,
manned, otherwise? Aerial assets, were they requested?
Ms. Cheatle. I cannot speak to what the local police----
Mr. Perry. I am just asking if they were requested.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. May have--conversations with the
local police. But I can tell you that the assets that were
requested from the Secret Service for the site that day were
all granted.
Mr. Perry. But were aerial assets--I am just--I did not ask
if you used them or what you used. Were they requested?
Ms. Cheatle. Overwatch was requested, and----
Mr. Perry. Aerial.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. That was provided.
Mr. Perry. Is that aerial? Because overwatch could mean on
the water tower or not on the water tower. Can you be specific,
ma'am? I am running out of daylight here.
Ms. Cheatle. I understand. If you are asking me about
specifics, whether or not there was----
Mr. Perry. Is it not clear what I am asking you? Were
aerial assets requested, by the President, by Secret Service,
by anybody? Were they requested?
Ms. Cheatle. The Secret Service, we felt that we had a good
plan in place----
Mr. Perry. OK. OK. Fair enough.
How about K-9 assets with bomb-sniffing or explosive-
sniffing capabilities? Requested? I did not say they were
present; were they requested?
Ms. Cheatle. Those requests were fulfilled.
Mr. Perry. They were requested and fulfilled.
Ms. Cheatle. Uh-huh.
Mr. Perry. So, was the Crooks vehicle inside any of your
perimeters?
Ms. Cheatle. No, it was not.
Mr. Perry. It was not. How did you--so--OK. So, it was not
within the--so what--was there a device located on Mr. Crooks'
body to detonate the vehicle?
Ms. Cheatle. That is the information that I have.
Mr. Perry. So, what would be the point of detonating the
vehicle if it was not inside the perimeter?
Ms. Cheatle. I have no idea what Mr. Crooks' motivation
was.
Mr. Perry. Ma'am, the fact that you--and I will close with
this, Mr. Chairman--have not even visited the site--I
understand there are other things going on, but the culture of
your organization, the culture, that does not--do you know how
tall the President is? How tall is the President? President
Trump, how tall is he?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not--he is over 6 feet tall. I do not
have the exact----
Mr. Perry. OK. So, do you assign agents based on their
ability to cover physically and carry--and carry, if necessary,
the President of the United States? When you assign them to
this mission, is that a parameter that is considered?
Ms. Cheatle. I assign agents to work our protectees that
are capable and have been trained by Secret Service----
Mr. Perry. I understand they are trained, but if you are
not tall enough--this has nothing to do with--we are not mad at
you, but if somebody is 7 feet tall and you are 5 feet tall,
there is going to be a delta there that is problematic in
protecting the protectee.
And I am asking, is that a consideration when you--when
these agents--not saying you--but when they are assigned to the
protectee?
Ms. Cheatle. The agents that are assigned to our protectees
are perfectly capable----
Mr. Perry. OK, ma'am.
So, the culture----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Of providing protection.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. Is what I am concerned about,
because the primary objective here seems to be something other
than securing the site, securing the principal, and securing
the people at the site. And that is the concern, based on the
answers that you have given today so far.
With that, I yield, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Moskowitz from
Florida.
Mr. Moskowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this
hearing. I want to thank your--the subpoena that you sent.
I want to thank Ranking Member Raskin and your work, the
letter you sent to the Committee. And I also support the
creation of a commission to get to the bottom of what happened.
Director, I just want to give you an honest assessment of
how this is going for you today.
Did you happen to catch the hearing many months ago in
Education where there were a bunch of university professors--of
university presidents and Elise Stefanik asked a very easy
question and could not get an answer? Did you see that hearing?
Ms. Cheatle. No, I do not think I did.
Mr. Moskowitz. OK. Well, let me tell you, it did not go
well. And the short end of that story was, those university
professors all resigned. They are gone.
That is how this is going for you. This is where this is
headed. OK?
This is--I do not know who prepared you for this. I do not
know how many times you have testified in front of Congress.
But a President was almost assassinated live on television not
just for Americans but for the world to see. And this being
your first opportunity--I understand there is an ongoing
investigation, I understand there is things that you cannot
talk about. But the idea that we are getting less than you did
on television is something that Democrats, independents, and
Republicans are going to find unacceptable.
My high school, Marjory Stoneman Douglas, was on the list
of mass shootings that Representative Raskin held up. That very
day, the school resource officer, a police officer, did not run
into the building. He hid in the stairwell while the shooter
was in the building. He stayed outside, never helped. OK?
Mr. Moskowitz. He also directed other officers who showed
up on the scene not to go into the building.
When it was determined that the failures in response and
training and that the sheriff fired nobody in his agency,
Governor DeSantis then removed that sheriff. I supported the
removal.
So, here is my question. You said there is going to be
accountability. I understand you do not want to give us names.
When you say that, are you telling the Committee that once it
is concluded you are prepared to fire the people on the ground
who made poor decisions that day?
Ms. Cheatle. I am prepared to take the actions necessary.
Mr. Moskowitz. No, that is nonsense, OK?
Accountability. The failure was human. That does not mean
they are bad people. It means they failed that day and a
President was almost--a former President was almost
assassinated, OK?
Are you prepared to fire the human failure on the ground,
yes or no? When you have the names of where those failures
were--they are people. It is not like a piece of technology
failed. It was people who failed that day. Are you prepared to
fire them?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have an answer as to whether people--
--
Mr. Moskowitz. Well, then how can there be accountability
if you are not prepared to fire someone?
And the reason why your name is going to be the person who
is held accountable, the reason why Members on this Committee
are calling for resignation--and I join in that--or for the
President to fire you, is because you are saying there is going
to be accountability, but you cannot commit that people are
going to get fired.
Let me ask this question a different way.
If Trump had been assassinated that day, if the gunman had
succeeded, OK, would you have come and tendered your
resignation?
Ms. Cheatle. I would still be sitting here, because I would
want to ensure the integrity of the investigation moving
forward.
Mr. Moskowitz. Totally understand. That is a fair answer,
that you would have set up that process. But would you have had
the honor to come in front of the Committee and say, ``A
President was assassinated''--``A former President was
assassinated on my watch, there should be new leadership''?
Ms. Cheatle. I think that I have admitted that there were
grave failures----
Mr. Moskowitz. No, that is not what I am asking. Would you
have tendered your resignation if he had been killed?
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. That occurred on my watch, and I
am accountable for that.
Mr. Moskowitz. OK. But would you have tendered your
resignation if he had been killed?
Ms. Cheatle. I think that I have admitted that I have taken
accountability and will take responsibility.
Mr. Moskowitz. OK. Well, let me ask a--I want to followup
on Representative Connolly's question in which he asked about
guns, and you were not willing to commit that that makes your
job harder.
This is not about the Second Amendment. There are over 400
million guns on the streets. If all of those guns were machine
guns, would that make your job harder to protect people?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I think weapons that are out there----
Mr. Moskowitz. If all of those guns were rocket-propelled
grenades, would that make your job harder?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moskowitz. Yes. OK. Thank you. Perfect. This is not a
trick question. Thank you. OK. I will not ask the other 15
things I was going to do. I was going to do drone strikes, but
it is OK.
So, that is all we were asking. It creates a challenging
environment. It has nothing to do with the Second Amendment or
people's rights. But it does make your job harder. So, credit
to Representative Connolly for asking that question.
One last thing, Mr. Chairman, and I will conclude.
You know, there was a question asked, is an Iranian
assassin more capable than a 20-year-old? And I have been tough
on Iran. I probably have more resolutions on Iran than almost
anyone in Congress.
But I can tell you it is not Iranians walking into schools
and grocery stores and movie theaters and churches. It is 20-
year-olds, right? And some of them are mentally unstable, and
they have access to guns. And they are domestic terrorists.
Someone talked about Christopher Wray. Christopher Wray has
talked about domestic terrorism.
And so, yes, we collectively come together on foreign
threats. And I am not at all debasing the fact that there are
foreign threats here and abroad.
But there are domestic threats. And we have to get to the
bottom of how we stop domestic terrorism, because it was a 20-
year-old who walked into my high school and killed 17 people.
He was plenty capable and he was not Iranian.
Thank you.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Timmons from
South Carolina.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Cheatle, we have asked you a lot of questions and
have not really got a lot of straight answers. I have
intentionally created a line of questioning that I think that
you can answer.
So, the first question is, do you agree that the allocation
of Secret Service resources should correspond with the risk
profile of any given event? A higher degree of risk at one
event should get more resources. Is that fair?
Ms. Cheatle. That is fair.
Mr. Timmons. OK. And when two events occur at the same time
in the same geographic vicinity, that the risk profile of each
event should be taken into account and whichever event is
greater risk should receive greater resources?
Ms. Cheatle. That is correct.
Mr. Timmons. OK.
So, I am going to go over the Trump event. So, this was
publicly announced July 3, Butler, Pennsylvania. The venue is
an outdoor fairground, open air, no existing security. The
crowd size was expected to be tens of thousands. It ended up
being over 20,000.
There were general and specific threats from foreign
adversaries. As the Chairman of Intelligence remarked, Iran has
said they want revenge, as well as when President Trump was in
office he made a lot of people mad, terrorists to be included,
all over the world.
And, you know, President Trump is the former President and
the future President.
So, I would say that that is a fairly high-risk event.
Would you agree?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Timmons. OK.
Let us conversely, the First Lady had an event at a casino
in Pittsburgh just a few dozen miles away. It was a dinner for
the Italian Sons and Daughters of America. It was publicly
announced on July 10.
What is interesting is that the casino is actually
extremely secure. They already have magnetometers existing
prior to this event even being announced. It was in a ballroom
and the size of the crowd a mere 400. There were no specific
threats. There may have been general threats. And the asset is
the First Lady.
Those seem like there is a huge disparity relative to risk.
Would you agree?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Timmons. OK. Thank you.
Multiple whistleblowers and various media outlets have
reported that the Pittsburgh field office of the Secret Service
allocated 12 additional post-standers to the First Lady's event
and 3 additional post-standers to the Trump rally. Is that
correct?
Ms. Cheatle. There were no assets that were diverted from
the First Lady's visit.
Mr. Timmons. No, no, no. This is a very simple question. I
am not asking if anyone was diverted.
Did the First Lady's event, that was relatively secure,
especially compared to Trump's rally, get 12 assets and the
First--did the First Lady's event get 12 assets and Trump's get
3 from the Pittsburgh field office? That is a yes or no.
Ms. Cheatle. The number----
Mr. Timmons. If you do not know, do not answer it. I mean,
if you do not know, do not answer.
Ms. Cheatle. The number of personnel that were allocated to
both of those events were comparable to the risk at both of
those events.
Mr. Timmons. Wow. Really? So, you think that the Pittsburgh
casino 400-person ballroom with ingress/egress through probably
a very well-guarded parking garage was four times more
dangerous than a 20,000-person rally in an open field with the
former President and future President? You think that that is
four times more dangerous the casino event?
Ms. Cheatle. I did not say that at all.
Mr. Timmons. Well, they got four times the resources from
the Pittsburgh field office, who was likely in charge of the
final walk-through for both events.
I mean, we have continually highlighted the failures of the
Secret Service at the Trump rally. And, you know, you have the
former and future President getting shot. You have multiple
injuries, one fatality.
And I would have to think that if we had nine more post-
standers, nine more individuals that have the training and the
integration into the Secret Service defense of Trump at that
rally, that I have a feeling that Crooks would have had
somebody come say hello to him before he fired a bunch of
shots. Do you think that is possibly true?
Ms. Cheatle. There were significantly more assets and
resources available at the former President's event than there
were at the First Lady's event.
Mr. Timmons. Who made the decision to deploy 12 post-
standers to the casino where the First Lady was having a 400-
person dinner and only 3 people from the Pittsburgh field
office to the 20,000-person-plus Trump rally? Who made that
decision?
Ms. Cheatle. There were additional Secret Service resources
available at the former President Trump's event that day.
Mr. Timmons. Who made the decision to deploy 12 to the
First Lady's event and 3 to the Trump event?
Ms. Cheatle. The allocation of resources is decided based
on the availability of personnel and their location and where
they are, but there were sufficient resources----
Mr. Timmons. What did you just say?
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. That were given to the former
President's event that day.
Mr. Timmons. Did you just say there were sufficient
resources? President Trump got shot. Someone got killed. There
were not sufficient resources, clearly.
Ms. Cheatle. There was a gap.
Mr. Timmons. It does not take 27 years of experience to
know that. And whoever made that decision--it probably was not
you--needs to be fired, and then you need to resign, because
this is absolutely unacceptable. You have lost the trust of the
American people.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Tlaib from Michigan.
Ms. Tlaib. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Director, for being here.
You know, when we hear the headline of 20-year-old young
man with access to an assault weapon commits a mass, you know,
act of mass violence, I mean, we have heard this before over
and over again.
But the unfortunate thing is that my residents do not get a
Committee hearing. We have not had one Committee hearing about
the over 260 mass shootings that we have had, killing hundreds
of people, injuring hundreds, changing their lives forever.
And do not get me wrong, too many of my colleagues, I mean,
I watched. And even the pool of blood, the screams, it was
horrific. But it made me think about the images I saw after
mass shootings at schools, grocery stores.
I mean, I think of Buffalo, New York, at a supermarket
where a racist gunman killed ten shoppers with an AR. In El
Paso, AK-47 style assault rifle killed 22. In Florida, in
Parkland, Florida, 17 students and teachers murdered, again,
with an AR. In Pittsburgh, at a place of faith, Tree of Life
Synagogue, 11 murdered. And do not get me about Newtown,
Connecticut, which still breaks my heart, 26 murdered,
including 20 elementary school children.
This year in Michigan we have had, Mr. Chair, two mass
shootings, 21 shot in Detroit, one of the most horrific
shootings we have seen, two killed at a splash pad in Rochester
Hills, Michigan, eight shot there, again, an assault weapon
used.
But the difference here is the former President gets a
hearing in his attempted assassination, but our residents do
not get a hearing about mass shootings, about gun violence in
our country.
You know, Mr. Chair, I ask this wholeheartedly. You know,
they do not have Secret Service to protect them. They do not. I
do not have these mass agencies protecting our kids in the
schools or the supermarket, movie theaters. They are going to a
block party in Detroit. I do not have that. We do not have
that.
But I cannot believe we are just going to focus on that and
not the fact that we are hearing yet again in the headlines a
20-year-old young man having access to an assault weapon, a
weapon of war many of my veterans say they have to be trained
to use. But he can get it, was not safely stored by the parent,
grabbing that gun, and innocent lives are lost.
Director, I know you got asked about this and I think it is
important, though, you know, for us to hear this. But how
difficult is your job when there is such easy access to assault
weapons in the streets?
Ms. Cheatle. I think the job of a Secret Service agent, an
officer, is incredibly difficult. I think the environment we
deal with every day and the dynamics of the threat environment
is incredibly difficult.
These are brave men and women who put their lives on the
line. And a day like we had on July 13 is a day that no one in
my agency ever wants to have as their responsibility. It is an
incredibly difficult job.
Ms. Tlaib. Yes, I immediately thought of the children in
the audience. I mean, when you think about going to a rally
with your family. Again, their lives are forever changed.
The incident was not--are never isolated. I really believe
these incidents are never isolated. And I know Detroit Free
Press had reported that the 20-year-old Pennsylvania shooter
looked up the 2021 Oxford High School shooting in Michigan.
Can you comment on what information the shooter was looking
up regarding the tragedy of Oxford High School where it took
four of our high school youth there?
Ms. Cheatle. I am sorry, I am not able to. The FBI has
those details.
Ms. Tlaib. So, you cannot even tell us, I mean, was he
looking at the type of weapon, how many----
Ms. Cheatle. Yes. Unfortunately, I do not have those
details.
Ms. Tlaib. Do you have--I mean, did they share that with
you, though?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have the full content of what his
searches were. I think that they are still in the process of
examining all of his devices.
Ms. Tlaib. OK. Again--you know, again, the impact--I want
to be really serious about this--the impact on our families is
more than just this political rally, Mr. Chair.
We have to talk about this. Even if we are in disagreement,
let us talk about it. Because I have seen statistics that show
that we could be saving lives now if we ban these weapons of
war from our--from being able to buy it at the local store down
the street. I mean, we just cannot continue to allow this to
happen.
And, unfortunately, my colleague--my residents are not
former Presidents of the United States. They do not get a
hearing, they do not get Secret Service protection, any of
that. And even among those that are expressing that failed in
the system, they just deserve better, they truly do.
Thank you, and I yield.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Burchett from
Tennessee.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Cheatle, the shooter was set up on the roof of the AGR
International building, as we know. Was the roof identified as
a potential vulnerability days before the rally?
Ms. Cheatle. To my knowledge, yes, it was.
Mr. Burchett. Were agents or officers inside the building?
If so, what floor were they on?
Ms. Cheatle. We had local police officers inside the
building.
Mr. Burchett. The roof looks like it is a tin roof. How did
no one inside that building hear someone moving on the top of a
metal roof?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have the details of all of the
interviews that have been conducted yet.
Mr. Burchett. When will you have those?
Ms. Cheatle. I have been asking, and I want to have that
information as soon as you do as well.
Mr. Burchett. OK.
Why did Secret Service fail to block the line of sight from
that roof?
Ms. Cheatle. I think that the Secret Service put together a
plan where they were counting that roof in as part of their
overwatch, and that was the plan that they had put in place
that day.
Mr. Burchett. If you were not going to put a security
personnel on the roof, why not at least use drone technology or
aerial surveillance to monitor the rally?
Ms. Cheatle. There are a number of times that we do use
drone technology. I am not speaking specifically to this event
and what was utilized or not. There are times when drone
technology is available and helpful at events, and there are
times when it is not appropriate.
Mr. Burchett. OK. Do you all use Signal--do you use--
personally use Signal to communicate with any official from the
White House? Signal on your phone?
Ms. Cheatle. Oh. On occasion I am sure that there are
people that use Signal, yes.
Mr. Burchett. OK. Do you use it to speak with the White
House, use Signal?
Ms. Cheatle. No, I do not.
Mr. Burchett. OK.
When was Thomas Crooks first identified as a person of
interest?
Let me help you. At 5:10. He was spotted with a range
finder at 5:51. And when did Secret Service notice him?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I do not have those specific timelines,
but it was a relatively short period of time.
Mr. Burchett. Let me help you. 5:52.
Ms. Cheatle, why was President Trump allowed on stage 10
minutes after the Secret Service spotted a suspicious
individual?
That seems to me to be the worst thing of all. Of all the
breakdown in all this communication, all the BS you have been
feeding us here today or not feeding us, that seems to be the
question.
Ms. Cheatle. So, as I have stated before, there are a
number of events where suspicious people may be identified.
That does not necessarily----
Mr. Burchett. Ma'am, I submit to you, you got a guy who is
going to be the next President of the United States. He is on
the stage. I have been to these events. We have all been to
these events. A car backfires and there is a 15-minute dadgum
wait. That is not acceptable.
Did the Secret Service tell President Trump they had
spotted a suspicious individual before he was shot?
Ms. Cheatle. I am unclear as to what the communication was
with the former President at that time.
Mr. Burchett. OK. I will take that as a no.
Did you all deny President Trump's request for more
security, yes or no? And when was the most recent request for
additional security?
Ms. Cheatle. The rally request for security, all of those
requests were fulfilled.
Mr. Burchett. And were there any personnel redirected to
Jill Biden's rally?
Ms. Cheatle. No.
Mr. Burchett. Who made the decision on the direction of
agents at either one of those rallies?
Ms. Cheatle. I am unclear as to your question on the
direction of the agents.
Mr. Burchett. I said, who directed those agents to be at
Ms. Biden's rally or President Trump's rally, those specific
agents?
Ms. Cheatle. So, there is a methodology in which agents are
available for assignments, and they are assigned based on
either geographic location or logistics or flight----
Mr. Burchett. Ma'am, I appreciate all that, but that
methodology about got President Trump killed.
Was the security detail guarding President Trump a
temporary detail?
Ms. Cheatle. The personnel who are assigned to the former
President's detail are assigned to him.
Mr. Burchett. Why was there a different detail on the
opening night of the convention than the detail that was
guarding him in Pennsylvania?
Ms. Cheatle. The President has a very large permanent
protective detail assigned to him. They work shift work. And so
it could be that the people you saw at the rally were not
working the same shift the day that he was----
Mr. Burchett. I can assure you, ma'am, somebody that is a
lot shorter than the President was not at the convention, and
the people that were cowering down behind the mass of agents
that were on top of the President were not in the convention
hall, at least I did not see them.
You cannot answer--seem to answer--a single question about
an ongoing investigation, ma'am, and you do not know when the
information will be released publicly.
Are you waiting for the Administration to sign off?
Ms. Cheatle. No. I am waiting for the results of the
investigation, at which time I will----
Mr. Burchett. OK. Let me ask you one more question.
You found explosives in the shooter's possession. Is that
correct?
Ms. Cheatle. The FBI found explosives.
Mr. Burchett. Do we know how--who directed this young man
how to make those explosives?
Ms. Cheatle. I believe that the FBI is still looking into
that on their investigation.
Mr. Burchett. Ms. Cheatle, you said that ``The buck stops
with me,'' and I agree. I do not think you should resign. I
think you should have been fired. Ma'am, you are a DEI horror
story.
I have told my daughter multiple times, my wife and my
daughter, we talk with her all the time about how she is going
to succeed in life. She will succeed in life by achieving.
Ma'am, you have not achieved today. You have let the
American public down. If it was up to me, you would be gone.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Crockett from
Texas.
Ms. Crockett. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
And let me just pick up where my colleague from Tennessee
left off.
Director Cheatle, was the incident on July 13 due to DEI or
rather systemic failures in communication and potentially
safety protocols?
Ms. Cheatle. The incident on the 13th has nothing to do
with DEI. The incident on the 13th has to do with a failure or
a gap either in planning or communication.
Ms. Crockett. Thank you so much.
In fact, I have a few articles that I will enter into the
record once I wrap up that actually acknowledge a number of
women specifically for their valor and their service, whether
it has been in various levels of law enforcement.
But, you know, I want to stay here for just a second,
because earlier you had a conversation in which there was a
discussion about training.
And I want to talk about training and I want to talk about
the fact that there has been a little bit of dancing around as
it relates to this being a suspicious person and this being a
situation that was perceived to be a threat, and it seems as if
there is a different analysis that takes place.
One of my questions has to do with if you have any bias
training that your officers undergo. And the reason I ask that,
because, as a civil rights lawyer, I have learned so many times
in having to deal with law enforcement that there usually is
not a perception of a threat when it is a young White male,
even if they are carrying a long gun. Yet, a lot of times, at
least in this country, when it comes to law enforcement, there
is a perceived threat just by somebody having a little bit more
melanin in their skin.
So, I am curious to know, because a lot of times one of the
things that we have consistently pushed for on my side of
things--and when I say my side is once we are looking at a
tragedy in which law enforcement made an error--is the bias
training and whether or not our officers are getting it.
So, I am curious to know, in some of the training that you
talk about that is part of your budget, has bias training been
part of that?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, it is.
Ms. Crockett. OK. Thank you.
I know that today is a rough day and on that day in
Pennsylvania it was a rough day. And the reality is that I
understand it, and you may or may not know the answer to this
question.
In the space in which this event took place, it was an open
carry space. Is that correct?
Ms. Cheatle. That is correct.
Ms. Crockett. OK.
So, I hale from the state of Texas, and interestingly
enough, I was serving in the state house right after there was
a mass shooting in El Paso. We had an opportunity to do right
by our citizens in Texas, but we did not. Instead, they passed
permitless carry.
And what my colleagues kept trying to get you to answer,
because we want to come up with solutions, we do not want to
keep pointing the finger, and right now you have got a bunch of
fingers that are pointed at you. But our job is to solve
problems for the American people.
And to be perfectly honest, the numbers are clear. I had I
think almost every major law enforcement agency come forward
and say that they were against permitless carry, because they
said that their jobs would be made more difficult.
Unfortunately, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle
in the state of Texas decided that they would ignore those
warnings, and they passed the law instead.
And right after they passed that law, we ended up with
Uvalde. And we heard the stories of those officers that were
scared to go in and save those babies because of the firearm in
which that in that case 18-year-old had in his hands.
They also were given an opportunity to say, ``Hey, raise
the age and make it to where at least you have to be 21 before
you can possess this type of weapon,'' and they chose not to.
And we have the facts. It shows--and I will enter this into
the record as well if there is no objection--``Deaths from
Firearms Keep Climbing in Texas Decades After Lawmakers Began
Weakening Gun Regulations.'' That is from the Texas Tribune.
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Crockett. Thank you so much.
The last thing that I am just going to make a point of
saying is that we all care about this issue because we know
that there has been a spike in violence, political violence, in
this country.
Are you aware of the fact that the numbers are higher right
now?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Ms. Crockett. OK.
In addition to that--and I am going to point a little blame
at ourselves, because right now you got all the fingers pointed
at you. But the reality is that we have a number of
congressional Members that are consistently engaging in violent
rhetoric, and it needs to be toned down.
The reality is that people are listening and they are
paying attention. But, unfortunately, another thing that is
happening, because we are not getting answers from you today,
is the conspiracy theories. They have already began.
Have you heard of any of the conspiracies?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Ms. Crockett. OK.
The problem with these conspiracies is that when people
believe that, say, the President of the United States ordered a
hit, or they believe it was an inside job, or whatever
conspiracies they believe because they do not have any facts in
front of them, that potentially incites the next level of
violence at the next event in retaliation for this.
So, we are only begging for your job as it relates to being
the Director as well as the men and women that you are
protecting as their Director that you keep them safe by making
sure that the American people have the information that they
need so that they can feel as if Secret Service is on the side
of the American people.
And, ma'am, I do not doubt that Secret Service is on the
side of the American people. But right now, so long as these
conspiracy theories continue to fester, it is going to make
your job that much harder.
Thank you so much. And I yield.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Marjorie
Taylor Greene from Georgia.
Ms. Greene. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Cheatle, I would like to remind you that you are under
oath.
The site team has a senior supervisor, an advance team, a
protective intelligence team, a counter-sniper element and
detail.
Who was the agent in charge? How long has she been the
agent in charge? And what is her Secret Service background?
Ms. Cheatle. So, I am not going to provide a name of----
Ms. Greene. Why not? You are here to answer our questions.
Ms. Cheatle. In this forum, I am not going to provide names
of----
Ms. Greene. You stated in your testimony, you said, ``I am
here today to answer your questions.''
Ms. Cheatle. That is correct.
Ms. Greene. Answer the question.
Ms. Cheatle. I am not going to provide names of our
personnel to the Committee today.
Ms. Greene. Why not? The American people are demanding
these answers from you today, Ms. Cheatle.
Ms. Cheatle. I will do the best to provide you accurate
information based on the facts that I have at this time.
Ms. Greene. You are not answering our questions.
The advance element coordinates with other intel or law
enforcement partners, identifies threats and weaknesses at the
sites and movements.
We would like a copy of the advance report. Have you
brought it here with you today?
Ms. Cheatle. We will comply with the request for the
documentation that has been requested.
Ms. Greene. When will that be, Ms. Cheatle, because you
should have brought it today?
Ms. Cheatle. I am certain that our personnel are working on
obtaining all of that documentation.
Ms. Greene. I do not believe you, and neither do the people
watching this hearing. You are not doing well, as Mr. Moskowitz
informed you. You have been sitting here for over 3 hours, and
I will have you know the entire country is demanding you resign
and demanding that you be fired if you do not resign. Things
are not going well for you. You need to answer the questions.
Was there a protective intelligence team and what technical
resources were utilized for that event, specifically drone or
helicopter assets?
Ms. Cheatle. There were a number of technical assets that
were deployed for that event, and there was a protective
intelligence team that was assigned to that event.
Ms. Greene. Why was Crooks able to fly a drone over the
entire area the day of the rally and the day of his
assassination attempt?
Ms. Cheatle. To my knowledge, he did not fly the drone over
the entire area.
Ms. Greene. How did he fly a drone over the area, period,
any part of the area?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I would have to go back and check the
timeline of when that took place and when the event----
Ms. Greene. Why did you not bring the timeline with you
today to answer our questions?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have all of the answers on the
timelines, based on the criminal investigation.
Ms. Greene. Were you not prepared today to answer our
questions?
Ms. Cheatle. I am prepared to answer the questions, based
on the information, and wanted to be able to provide----
Ms. Greene. Do you have a timeline that you--do you have a
timeline at all from any of the day?
Ms. Cheatle. I have a timeline that does not have
specifics.
Ms. Greene. That is shocking. That is absolutely
unacceptable. That means you are a failure at your job.
Let us talk about things that are prohibited in Trump
rallies. And I have been to a lot of Trump rallies. Backpacks
and bags, bicycles, firearms, any type of weapon, or any other
item determined to be a potential safety hazard, like a range
finder would be one.
At 5:10, Crooks is first observed by one of the snipers,
AGR sniper 1, at the building. 5:10. 5:10. President shot,
President Trump was shot in the face at 6:11 p.m.; 5:28, AGR
Sniper 1 takes a picture of a bicycle and two bags. Those
belonged to Crooks; 5:32, AGR Sniper 1 spots Crooks looking at
his phone and using a range finder; 5:55, Butler ESU Command
confirms receipt of photos and states they have been relayed
on; 6:05 p.m., AGR Sniper 1 later communicates that Crooks is
seen moving northeast in direction of Sheetz and that Crooks
has a backpack.
Two minutes before the shooting, while President Trump has
been allowed to take the stage, people see Crooks laying on his
stomach in a sniper position on the roof and they are yelling,
``He has a gun,'' and they are trying to alert law enforcement
and Secret Service.
Why was Crooks not shot by the snipers? Why was he allowed
to be there?
Ms. Cheatle. As soon as the individual was identified as a
threat, they were----
Ms. Greene. No, no, no, no, no, no. What do you consider to
be a threat? A man with a gun laying in a sniper position, a
man that had a backpack, a man that had a bicycle, a man that
had a range finder, at what point is he determined a threat?
Ms. Cheatle. An individual with a backpack is not a threat.
An individual with a range finder is not a threat.
Ms. Greene. What about a man laying on a building that has
direct line of sight of President Trump with a gun that people
are screaming and pointing out, is that a threat, Ms. Cheatle?
Ms. Cheatle. Once that individual was identified, they were
neutralized.
Ms. Greene. No. They were neutralized, Crooks was
neutralized after he shot President Trump in the face, Ms.
Cheatle. Is he only a threat once he fires the weapon?
Ms. Cheatle. As soon as the counter-sniper identified that
individual, they were able to neutralize them.
Ms. Greene. How were people in the crowd--OK. Then let us
just take it this way.
People under your command did not consider him to be a
threat, yet people in the crowd knew he had a gun and
considered him to be a threat.
That means that you are a complete failure as the Director
of the Secret Service, that people under your command do not
perceive a man laying on a roof with direct line to the
President with a gun, they do not perceive that to be a threat,
yet the people in the crowd do. How is that possible?
Chairman Comer. That is the last question, but please
answer the question, Director.
Ms. Cheatle. I am not certain at this time how the
information from the people in the crowd was relayed to any law
enforcement personnel.
Ms. Greene. No. You knew. Everyone knew. The people there
knew that there was a danger. They knew there was a threat to
President Trump and it was allowed to happen.
Was there a stand-down order, Ms. Cheatle?
Ms. Cheatle. No.
Ms. Greene. Was there a conspiracy to kill President Trump?
Ms. Cheatle. Absolutely not.
Ms. Greene. Then how did this happen, and why are you still
sitting here not turning in your letter of resignation?
Chairman Comer. Last question, but please answer, and then
I will recognize Ms. Pressley. Please answer the question,
Director.
Ms. Cheatle. That is what we are investigating to
determine.
Ms. Greene. We are waiting for your letter. We are waiting
for your letter of resignation. And you really need to consider
doing that before you leave today.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Pressley from
Massachusetts.
Ms. Pressley. Thank you.
No one, absolutely no one should fear for their life at a
political rally, in a classroom, in a faith house, or in their
home. We must do something about political violence in all its
forms and gun violence in all of its forms.
Now, Director Cheatle, you have noted that numerous
investigations are ongoing related to the Secret Service
response and that we can expect a report in the next 60 days.
With the election nearly 100 days away, that is an unacceptable
timeline, and it makes people less safe.
It also allows my colleagues across the aisle, Republicans,
additional time to spread dangerous misinformation, which also
puts people in harm's way.
Some Republicans have exploited this moment to continue to
attack progress toward racial justice and gender equity in
America, disappointing but not surprising.
I hesitate to repeat their racist and sexist tropes, but,
in summary, Republicans have wrongfully and shamefully stated
that hiring women and people of color hindered the response to
the shooting.
Now, this is part and parcel of the Republican strategy to
constantly attack necessary diversity, equity, and inclusion
efforts, to undermine the contributions that women, people of
color, the disability community, and others make to this
country each and every day, and it is disgraceful.
In the wake of gun violence and tragic loss of life,
Republicans are ignoring solutions like gun safety reform and
instead trotting out sexist tropes. Cannot say I am surprised.
I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record reporting
from CNN titled ``Right-wing media figures blame women in
Secret Service and DEI for security failure in Trump
shooting.''
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Pressley. This article quotes Members of Congress and
others that plainly accuse DEI and the hiring of women as a
liability for the Secret Service.
Women have been an integral part of the agency since 1971
and are held to the same standards as their male counterparts.
To use them as a scapegoat during a time of crisis is shameful,
and it is dangerously divisive. In fact, based on recent
publicly available demographic data of the agency, the largest
demographic groups among special agents are White and male.
But to right-wing extremists the truth does not matter. The
lies they tell to advance their anti-diversity agenda, which is
a key theme throughout Project 2025, will only make the
American public less safe and more divided.
And every day, Director Cheatle, that you fail to give us
answers they are given more oxygen to make their baseless
claims that women and people of color are responsible for
tragic events, and that is dangerous too.
Thank you. And I yield my remaining time to Ranking Member
Raskin.
Mr. Raskin. Thank you to the distinguished gentlelady from
Massachusetts and thank you for those trenchant insights.
I wanted to make the point that you are making and several
other Members were making to bring it into sharp relief here.
The very same day that Donald Trump narrowly escaped an
assassination attempt, but an honored firefighter was gunned
down and killed and other people were injured, there was
another mass shooting that day just several hours later in
Birmingham, Alabama, four people killed and ten wounded in a
nightclub shooting.
And you might think, ``Oh, that is some kind of freakish
coincidence.'' Not at all. We have more than one mass shooting
a day in America. They are so commonplace now that they are
barely reported in the national news. It is, of course, local
news in Birmingham, Alabama, that four people were killed and
ten other people were shot and seriously wounded, being treated
at the hospital.
These things are a nightmare for the families of the
victims who have been killed, for the families who have to take
care of people who have been seriously injured and wounded.
They are a major financial drain publicly and privately. And
yet we allow AR-15s to be purchased with abandon promiscuously
all over the country. People can just go out and get an assault
weapon.
And the distinguished gentlelady from Michigan was right.
We have a hearing when it affects the President of the United
States, but on all the other days of the year we do not have a
hearing about it.
And I think it is because in an honest disagreement we have
about the Second Amendment there are some people who think the
Second Amendment means you have got the right to arm yourself
with whatever weaponry you need to overthrow the Government of
the United States, and we reject that as a false interpretation
of the Second Amendment and a false interpretation of the
Constitution.
We can ban assault weapons. We did it back in 1994. It
dramatically reduced these mass shootings. And when that ban
was lifted, the mass shootings went up through the roof again,
and we have shown it.
And so just like we are demanding real answers and real
action from the Secret Service, let us demand real action and
real answers from ourselves about the nightmare of mass gun
violence which puts America into a category all its own when
you compare us to the countries in the European Union or Canada
or other similarly situated countries. There is nothing like
what we are going through.
So, we have got to act on the Secret Service to protect
ourselves against political violence, and we have got to act as
a Congress to protect ourselves against AR-15 violence in
America.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes Mrs. McClain from
Michigan.
Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And first of all, I want to thank the Secret Service
agents, those who work tirelessly to protect our Presidents,
and specifically those agents who did not hesitate to jump in
front of President Trump.
And my heart goes out to the family, the Comperatore
family, and the people at the rally who are still recovering.
On the other hand, the Secret Service has a leadership
problem, and it falls on you. And although I appreciate your
hollow words that the buck stops here, I was actually hoping
for some answers.
Director Cheatle, you must answer to the American people if
you want to stay in charge. It is really, really simple.
You want to keep your job, right?
Ms. Cheatle. Absolutely.
Mrs. McClain. OK.
The best way to keep your job is to answer the questions,
not play this shell game, not sing the Slim Shady song ``It
Wasn't Me.'' I mean, come on.
How long did you prepare for this hearing?
Ms. Cheatle. I have been preparing for this hearing over
the weekend and into last week.
Mrs. McClain. OK. Five days? Six days?
Ms. Cheatle. As soon as I was notified----
Mrs. McClain. And how long was that?
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. About this hearing----
Mrs. McClain. OK. Four days?
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. I began preparing.
Mrs. McClain. Four days? Three days?
Ms. Cheatle. I am not sure the date that I got the letter
asking me to be here.
Mrs. McClain. What are you sure of? Are you sure of the
color of your hair? Are you sure of the color of your suit?
Like, tell the American people, what are you sure of?
You do not even know when you started preparing for the
hearing? I mean, the biggest hearing of your life and you have
no clue, you cannot remember when you started preparing for
this hearing?
Can you understand why those words seem hollow to the
American people who are supposed to entrust their faith in you?
Ms. Cheatle. I assure you, the moment I received
notification of this hearing.
Mrs. McClain. But you cannot remember it. You got a little
Alzheimer's, dementia going? I mean, you cannot remember?
Ms. Cheatle. I have several active investigations going on
and an operational agency to run.
Mrs. McClain. OK. All right. But you want to take
accountability, right? The buck stops with you, right?
Ms. Cheatle. I am taking accountability.
Mrs. McClain. Super. Then let us start with trying to
answer some questions.
You keep referring to the FBI. When asked how many shell
casings were on the roof, you referred to the FBI. When asked
if there were explosives in the car, you referred to the FBI.
When asked if Crooks was acting alone, you referred to the FBI.
See a common theme here? I can go on and on.
My question is, who at the FBI should I speak with? Wait
for it. Wait for it.
Ms. Cheatle. The FBI is responsible for the criminal
investigation.
Mrs. McClain. Is there a name?
Ms. Cheatle. I am not certain who at the FBI is running the
investigation.
Mrs. McClain. ``I am not certain.'' All right, here we go.
``I am not certain. I do not know.''
Let me ask a different question. Have you been in
communication with the FBI?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, I have.
Mrs. McClain. With whom?
Ms. Cheatle. I speak with the Director and the Deputy
Director.
Mrs. McClain. OK. And what have they shared with you about
this investigation? So, I will give you an opportunity to
answer again.
Did they share with you how many shell casings were on the
roof?
Ms. Cheatle. They have shared with me the evidence that
they have collected.
Mrs. McClain. Did they share with you how many shell
casings were on the roof?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mrs. McClain. OK. How many were there?
Ms. Cheatle. I would refer to the FBI for their
investigation----
Mrs. McClain. How many were there?
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. And their information that they
need to share in their investigation.
Mrs. McClain. So, they have shared the information with
you. You just do not want to share the information with us,
correct?
Ms. Cheatle. We have concurrent investigations that are
going on.
Mrs. McClain. So, they have shared this information with
you. You know the answer to the question. You just refer--
refuse to answer the question from the Member of Congress who
has subpoenaed you to be here.
Is there a different answer to that question?
Ms. Cheatle. I was always willing to come here and testify
before this oversight hearing. A subpoena was not necessary.
Mrs. McClain. Beautiful. Then let us do that. Let us for
once have your actions match your words.
So, you have been in communication with the FBI. You know
the answers and you refuse to tell us the answers.
So, I will ask you again. You know how many shell casings
were on that roof. What is the answer to that question?
Ms. Cheatle. I think it is pertinent to talk----
Mrs. McClain. What is the answer to that question?
Ms. Cheatle. I think it is pertinent to talk to you about
the information that the Secret Service has and that the Secret
Service knows related to the events on that day.
Mrs. McClain. I am asking you an answer to the question. If
you are supposed to be in charge, if the buck stops with you,
how come you cannot share the answers? What are you covering
up? What are you hiding, my friend?
Ms. Cheatle. I am not covering anything up.
Mrs. McClain. Then why can you not answer a simple
question?
Ms. Cheatle. I would leave it to the criminal investigation
to answer questions related to that.
Mrs. McClain. When you talk to the FBI and you ask them how
many explosives--well, let me ask you. Did you ask them how
many explosives were on the roof? Did they answer that
question? Or in the car, excuse me. Did they answer that
question for you?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mrs. McClain. Yes. So, you know the answer to that question
that my colleagues have asked you, but, again, you refuse to
give us the answers. You are playing, ``This was not me.''
Well, I submit to you, if you cannot--and it is not a
``cannot.'' It is a ``will not.'' It is not a ``cannot.'' It is
not an ``I do not know.'' It is an ``I choose not to answer the
question.''
Well, let me tell you, Ms. Cheatle, if you are going to
lead, you need to lead. If you want to be in charge, then
answer the question or step aside and have someone with the
courage and the guts to answer to the American people the
questions that they deserve answers to.
And with that, I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Boebert from
Colorado.
Ms. Boebert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to continue down that vein.
You have been here sitting today, Director Cheatle,
definitively able to dismiss erroneous information and
speculation. However, you are refusing to answer questions that
we now know that you have the information for.
You are saying that you are wanting to answer questions
that the Secret Service has information to. Well, ma'am, you
are the Secret Service. You are the Director. You have said
that you are the best for the job.
So, I am going to ask you some questions now, now knowing
that you do have answers from the FBI whom you have been
passing the buck to this entire day.
And I will start with something that, you know, maybe the
FBI does not know, because it has to deal with you personally.
You said you spoke with President Trump after the
assassination attempt, and I want to know, did you apologize to
him directly for nearly having President Trump killed?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, I did.
Ms. Boebert. I appreciate that. I appreciate that you
recognize that this was your failure.
Now, since the assassination attempt--you are under oath,
reminding you--have you communicated with anyone at the White
House on an encrypted messaging app like Signal, yes or no?
Ms. Cheatle. No, I have not.
Ms. Boebert. Are you willing to surrender your personal
phone for analysis?
Ms. Cheatle. If I am required to do so.
Ms. Boebert. OK. I will look into making that request,
because I would like to see your personal phone to see if you
are communicating over encrypted messaging apps.
Have you ever turned down enhanced security requests from
Donald Trump's detail, his special agent in charge, Sean
Curran? Have you ever turned that down?
Ms. Cheatle. No, I have not.
Ms. Boebert. Have there been--has your team? Has the Secret
Service? Maybe not you personally.
Ms. Cheatle. I believe, as I mentioned earlier, there are
times when requests are made for assets----
Ms. Boebert. And you have denied them. They have been
denied.
Ms. Cheatle. And a denial does not necessarily mean----
Ms. Boebert. Has the Trump campaign made requests for
additional assets that have been denied?
Ms. Cheatle. Denial does not mean vulnerability.
Ms. Boebert. Have there been additional requests for
enhanced security at Mar-a-Lago?
Ms. Cheatle. We have made a number of enhancements to
security.
Ms. Boebert. You confirmed that there were bomb-sniffing
dogs that were provided. You failed to confirm if there were
aerial security surveillance assets that were provided. So, yes
or no, was that provided?
Ms. Cheatle. At the rally?
Ms. Boebert. At the rally, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Cheatle. We had overwatch provided at the rally.
Ms. Boebert. You have confirmed that the assassin was
identified as suspicious 57 minutes prior to the shooting. Was
the suspicious individual ever approached by an agent? Was any
contact ever made with him?
Ms. Cheatle. Not to my knowledge.
Ms. Boebert. Is that the standard protocol for someone who
is identified as suspicious?
Ms. Cheatle. The protocol would be to locate the individual
and conduct an interview.
Ms. Boebert. And you said that he was located two to five
times, approximately?
Ms. Cheatle. No. I said that the information was passed
potentially somewhere between 2 to 5 minutes----
Ms. Boebert. And he was never located by an agent?
Ms. Cheatle. To my knowledge, that individual was not
located by an agent.
Ms. Boebert. We have dozens of rally goers who have
identified him, and not one agent on the ground. There are
many, many, many agents on the ground, local law enforcement,
Secret Service. No one was able to identify him and have sight
on--and see him.
Ms. Cheatle. What I am saying is that the agents that were
on the ground at the time, I have no knowledge that they were
able to interview him or----
Ms. Boebert. Was----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Locate him.
Ms. Boebert. Thank you.
Was there a local law enforcement officer who approached
the roof and saw the shooter and saw that he was present on the
roof?
Ms. Cheatle. That is the information that has been shared
with me.
Ms. Boebert. Have you spoke to that local law enforcement
officer?
Ms. Cheatle. No, I have not.
Ms. Boebert. Are you going to?
Ms. Cheatle. It is part of a criminal investigation that
the FBI----
Ms. Boebert. Are you going----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Is interviewing those
individuals.
Ms. Boebert. Were agents stationed on the water tower?
Ms. Cheatle. No.
Ms. Boebert. Why?
Ms. Cheatle. That would not be something that would be
included in a security plan.
Ms. Boebert. Has the man who is reported to have been
present wearing a gray suit who allegedly requested a photo of
the dead body of the assassin on top of the AGR roof been
identified?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have that information.
Ms. Boebert. Is that something that you have heard of?
Ms. Cheatle. No.
Ms. Boebert. Were ATF agents present at the rally?
Ms. Cheatle. To attend or to work?
Ms. Boebert. To work.
Ms. Cheatle. Not to my knowledge.
Ms. Boebert. How long did the counter-sniper have Crooks in
his sights before the shooter opened fire on President Trump?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have that specific timeline.
Ms. Boebert. Will you be able to tell us if he communicated
with other agents on what he was seeing through his sights?
Ms. Cheatle. Once I have that information, absolutely.
Ms. Boebert. Because we need to know why he waited for
multiple rounds to be fired at President Trump before the
threat was neutralized. We need to know if he was given an
order to hold fire.
Now, it is--you have excused the roof of being unmanned
because of the slope of the roof. Do you continue to assert the
slope of the roof as a credible reason for leaving this
position undefended?
Ms. Cheatle. First, I will go back and correct that there
was no order to hold fire. Our agents and officers have the
ability to neutralize a threat at the time----
Ms. Boebert. So, you do not know----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. They see it.
Ms. Boebert. I am sorry. You do not know the communication
that was taking place or how long he had him in his sights
because you have not spoke to him, but you do know that there
was no order to hold fire.
Ms. Cheatle. I can tell you the way that our personnel are
trained, they are trained on the use-of-force scale that when
they see a threat they are authorized to neutralize that
threat. There is no--they do not have to ask for permission.
Ms. Boebert. You excused the roof being unmanned because of
a slope. Do you stand by that assertion?
Ms. Cheatle. The roof was not covered with an individual on
it because there was overwatch provided.
Ms. Boebert. Apparently not. No, there was no overwatch
provided. This is very evident. President Trump was shot. A man
died. There was no oversight provided.
I find this rather maddening, especially now knowing that
you do have answers from the FBI, who you have been passing the
buck to this entire hearing, not answering a congressional
hearing, Members of Congress, while you are under oath and
under a subpoena.
I find it maddening that the Director, that our country has
come centimeters away from oblivion under your watch, you have
answers, you are refusing to give those to us, directing us to
the FBI. And this entire thing is a waste of time.
You are responsible for the loss of a life and the shooting
that took place on President Trump. You do need to resign. This
is bipartisan. You need to be fired. You do not need to hold
this position. You are not the best for this job.
I am over my time. But I cannot tolerate your watch any
longer and I am going to continue to call daily for you to be
removed from your position, ma'am.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes Mr. Fry from South
Carolina.
Mr. Fry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Cheatle, how long have you been with the Secret
Service? Twenty-nine years, right?
Ms. Cheatle. That is correct.
Mr. Fry. And how long have you been Director of the Secret
Service?
Ms. Cheatle. Just under 2 years.
Mr. Fry. During your tenure as Director under the Secret
Service, I know we are here today to talk about the
assassination attempt on President Trump, but how many other
security lapses have occurred with protectees under your watch?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have a specific number, but there
have been some lapses.
Mr. Fry. There have been other lapses. Was one of them Jake
Sullivan?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fry. What happened there?
Ms. Cheatle. There was an individual who was able to access
Mr. Sullivan's residence.
Mr. Fry. His residence? A protectee, somebody was able to
break into his house. And what happened? Did anyone get fired
because of that?
Ms. Cheatle. There were individuals who have been
reassigned.
Mr. Fry. Reassigned.
What other steps have taken--what I am seeing--what other--
excuse me.
What other incidents have occurred other than Jake
Sullivan? Was there an issue with a Secret Service agent and
Vice President Harris?
Ms. Cheatle. I would not call that a security incident.
Mr. Fry. Well, it seems to me--I mean, you have security
lapses with President Trump. You have security lapses with Jake
Sullivan. You have issues with your personnel related to Vice
President Kamala Harris.
There seems to be a repeated theme here. Would you not
agree with that?
Ms. Cheatle. I think that we are talking about separate
categories of incidents.
Mr. Fry. Well, I would disagree with that. I mean, I think
there is a repeated theme when you have got protectees and you
are not upholding your core mission.
Let me ask you something else. Does the Secret Service
routinely record communications between and amongst detail?
Ms. Cheatle. Radio communication?
Mr. Fry. Any communication.
Ms. Cheatle. Email communications are captured as well as
text messages. And then, depending on the detail, radio
communications are recorded.
Mr. Fry. Does the Secret Service have recorded
communications from the July 13 event?
Ms. Cheatle. We do not have radio communications from that
day.
Mr. Fry. But you have text messages?
Ms. Cheatle. We do have emails and text messages.
Mr. Fry. Emails. OK, great.
Does the head of the Trump detail or someone else embedded
in this detail have command decisionmaking authority, or do
they need to seek authorization from someone outside that
detail?
Ms. Cheatle. The head of the detail has the decisionmaking
authority for things that are necessary for that detail.
Mr. Fry. Is that standard for protection details?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, it is.
Mr. Fry. OK.
Let me ask you something. During campaign events, is it
common for the Secret Service to utilize other agencies?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, it is.
Mr. Fry. What other agencies would be providing assistance
to the Secret Service?
Ms. Cheatle. There are a number of other agencies that
provide assistance to the Secret Service during campaigns. We
utilize personnel from the Department of Homeland Security, we
utilize personnel from the Department of Defense, and we
utilize local law enforcement partners.
Mr. Fry. Are you on the same radios? Do you provide the
radios to all the assets that are taking part in protection of
an event?
Ms. Cheatle. We provide radios to the personnel from the
Department of Homeland Security that are assisting us.
Mr. Fry. But not local law enforcement?
Ms. Cheatle. Local law enforcement is working on their own
radios.
Mr. Fry. Are you on the same frequency?
Ms. Cheatle. We ensure that we have counterparts in the
security room. And so, the local law enforcement will place one
of their personnel in the security room with our personnel so
that we have interoperability communications.
Mr. Fry. Let me ask you something just about the timeline,
because I think this is really interesting that we cannot nail
that down. I mean, I think there are laypeople out there with
more knowledge about the timeline than you seem to come before
a subpoena in front of Congress.
Was Mr. Crooks observed at the AGR building prior to the
shooting?
Ms. Cheatle. He was observed on the grounds outside of our
perimeter prior to the shooting.
Mr. Fry. And approximately what time was that? You do not
have to give me the specific minute, but at approximately what
time was that?
Ms. Cheatle. I believe it was about 45 minutes or so prior
to.
Mr. Fry. Did the sniper--the sniper team--take a photo of
Mr. Crooks?
Ms. Cheatle. The local team did, yes.
Mr. Fry. So, it was a local team and not a Secret Service
sniper?
Ms. Cheatle. That took the photo.
Mr. Fry. OK. And did he relay that photo to Central
Command?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, it is an active ongoing investigation,
so we--I want to make sure that I am factual with the route
that that photo took and who that was disseminated to and when.
Mr. Fry. What time did the--did Mr.--when did Mr. Crooks'
status go from a suspicion, a person that was under suspicion,
to a threat? When did that happen?
Ms. Cheatle. For----
Mr. Fry. And maybe not even a specific time, Director
Cheatle, maybe a certain event that happened that transformed
him from a person of suspicion to a threat. When did that
happen?
Ms. Cheatle. To the best of my knowledge, based on what I
have been told thus far, it is approximately 5 minutes to where
individuals relayed that there was an incident being--or an
issue, I am sorry--being worked at the 3 o'clock of the
President--former President.
Mr. Fry. So, that was--but it was before the shots were
fired?
Ms. Cheatle. That is correct. But, again, it was not
phrased as a threat. It was just that something was being
worked.
Mr. Fry. Yes, but my question is, when did he become--when
did he transform from suspicion to threat? Because they are
treated very differently. People can be suspicious, but they
are not a threat until a certain point in time. So, when did
that happen?
Ms. Cheatle. I believe that it was seconds before the
gunfire started.
Mr. Fry. Seconds. My gosh, we actually have a few questions
that we got answered today.
Listen, I am going to wrap up here, Mr. Chairman.
But here is the frustration that people have. The buck
stops with you. You have said that yourself. But the problem in
Washington, DC, it is the only town in America that you can be
so bad at your job that you actually get a promotion or do not
get fired.
You have not been able to answer the number of agents,
whether or not requests were denied on additional security,
whether or not law enforcements were able to engage before the
shooting with the assassin, how he got on the roof, how the
rifle got on the roof.
You cannot tell us how many shots he fired, whether the
casings were recovered. You cannot tell us anything about his
cell phone. You cannot tell us whether the rally was supposed
to be postponed, given the intelligence that you were
receiving. You cannot tell us whether the car had a bomb. You
cannot even tell us his motive.
And the American people are incredibly distrustful, because
it has taken 9 days to even get a scintilla of evidence out of
you. Maybe if I was CNN or ABC or NBC, I would have gotten much
more thorough and accurate information, but we have not
received that in a subpoenaed hearing in front of this
Congress.
That is why the American people are frustrated. And I echo
the bipartisan calls on this Committee and all across this
country that you should resign, or maybe when the President
wakes up from his nap he can fire you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Luna from
Florida.
Mrs. Luna. Director Cheatle, can you please give me the
names of the individuals who were in charge of your CONOP for
the rally?
Ms. Cheatle. I am not going to release names----
Mrs. Luna. Can you give me the titles----
Ms. Cheatle. No.
Mrs. Luna [continuing]. And how many individuals?
Ms. Cheatle. No.
Mrs. Luna. Nothing?
Ms. Cheatle. We had a full advance team that was
responsible----
Mrs. Luna. Who were the----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. For advancing the site.
Mrs. Luna. How many people had the final approval
authority?
Ms. Cheatle. There are a number of people that are----
Mrs. Luna. Can you give me a number?
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Engaged in approving the plan.
Mrs. Luna. Can you give me a number?
Ms. Cheatle. No, I do not----
Mrs. Luna. OK.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Have a firm number.
Mrs. Luna. Can you just confirm whether or not--I
understand this is an open investigation, but in order to
dispel conspiracy theorists, have you guys been able to
subpoena the shooter's Discord records, or has the FBI, to your
knowledge?
Ms. Cheatle. I believe that the FBI is working on those.
Mrs. Luna. OK.
Is it factual to say that you have not ruled out that the
shooter was working with other people or persons?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, the FBI is conducting the criminal
investigation into the shooter.
Mrs. Luna. Can you--at least in an effort to dispel
conspiracy theories, can you confirm or deny that?
Ms. Cheatle. At this time, we do not have that there were
any other people engaged.
Mrs. Luna. So, you believe he was acting alone?
Ms. Cheatle. I do.
Mrs. Luna. OK.
Have you been made aware of multiple eyewitness reporting
that there was a second shooter on a water tower?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have any information related to any
second shooter.
Mrs. Luna. OK. The reason I ask that is because, according
to testimony from multiple witnesses, they did report that.
And, again, to my understanding, there were over 40 sniper
teams that were briefed by the Butler ESU. And I want to make
sure that people are aware, if you are saying that there was
not another shooter, that we are able to clear that
information. Because, from this whole entire briefing, it does
not seem like much information has been able to get out to the
American people, so I am trying to dispel rumors, as I am sure
you understand.
Was it true that Secret Service was present at the Butler
ESU briefing?
Ms. Cheatle. There was a briefing between the counter-
sniper teams that were working on the ground.
Mrs. Luna. Was Secret Service present?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, to my knowledge.
Mrs. Luna. OK.
I want to read you a report from people that seemed to be
throwing you under the bus and stated that they were in
attendance and that Secret Service was not in attendance at the
security briefing, according to individuals with knowledge; to
also include that the AGR building where the shooter, Thomas
Matthew Crooks, was located was actually not a part of their
security perimeter for that.
So, there was not Secret Service present.
It seems as though that when you were asked earlier from
Rep. Krishnamoorthi about whether or not Secret Service was
aware of a threat, you had said, no, they were unaware of a
threat, and yet, according to communications, again, from law
enforcement that were in some of these group chats, they
actually had reported that Secret Service was made aware of a
threat at around 5:59 p.m. as a part of the command, including
Secret Service--aware of messages and requests about
information about the suspect's location.
Can you please tell me if you have knowledge of that at
all?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I think we are conflating the
difference between the term ``threat'' and ``suspicious.''
Mrs. Luna. But you guys did have knowledge at 5:59 p.m.,
according to those group chats, did you not?
Ms. Cheatle. Of a suspicious individual.
Mrs. Luna. OK.
Chairman--in my opinion, according to some of the testimony
today, I feel that you have perjured yourself in some
instances. And so, I am going to ask for a full review of the
transcripts by staff, and if you find that to be the case, I do
ask that you bring perjury charges against the Director.
I will say this. It is very frustrating--and I have talked
to my colleagues, and we have said it to your face--that you
have been up here basically stonewalling our ability to get the
answers to the American people.
And what I will also say is that every single Member of
Congress does not feel safe with you in charge. You have heard
that. And I think that we are all sitting ducks, with you
directing the Secret Service currently.
But, more importantly, it sends a message to our
adversaries that we are not protected. And we are one of the
strongest countries in the world, so you have essentially made
us a less safe country because of it.
As a result of that, I am asking you to formally step down.
I share my same opinions as my Democrat colleagues.
And I also think that your efforts to bring forward a full
investigation and report in 60 days is unacceptable. And, as a
result of that, I am going to do everything in my legislative
toolkit to ensure that that happens sooner rather than later.
And I am sure that you know that we brought a vote on
inherent contempt against Garland for essentially blocking a
congressional investigation, and I do not think that you should
be any different.
So, I will say that I am just completely disgusted by your
performance today. And I understand that you are probably in a
position where you are being told not to testify, which is why
we had to subpoena you. I think that goes back to Garland. But,
again, that is part of the flushing that we need to get out of
Washington, and I would be happy to assist in that process.
Chairman, I yield the rest of my time.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Langworthy
from New York.
Mr. Langworthy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
appreciate you bringing this hearing forward with the subpoena.
Director, yesterday, I made the decision to get in my car
and drive to Butler, Pennsylvania, in preparation for this
moment and asking you questions about the events of the
assassination attempt on President Trump's life.
I have done several Presidential advance events prior in my
career, and I wanted to see this site with my own two eyes,
because I do not believe the video footage tells the whole
story or looking at things on a diagram.
And I was absolutely appalled when I went to the site when
I saw the fact that I could have stood on the roof of that
building, the AGR building, and hit that podium with a 9 iron,
and I am a lousy golfer. And the fact that that was not
included in the perimeter is a complete dereliction of the duty
of the U.S. Secret Service.
I mean, there are very few rooftops that needed to be
secured, and the fact that the Secret Service, as they were
putting a site plan in place, did not think it was necessary to
man those rooftops, you have completely walked away from your
duties.
You had one job, and that was to protect the future
President of the United States or to protect all of the other
protectees. And President Trump is only here today by God's
grace, because he had just something in him that made him turn
his head just slightly, or we would be in a national period of
mourning right now.
And you have done nothing here today--I have rewritten
these questions, like, four times during your hearing, and you
have not answered a damn one of them. You have not given any
information. You have hidden behind this FBI investigation.
And I think you should be ashamed of yourself, because you
have brought more shame to your agency than I think the
assassination attempt has at this point. This is literally the
worst performance I have ever seen in front of a congressional
hearing. You have offered no reason for this Committee, this
body, or the American people to trust you or the Secret Service
today. And you should resign.
You have said that you have put new security measures in
place after the assassination attempt. Can you tell us what
those are?
Because the American people want to know that you are
taking real, corrective measures, but today you pointed to an
investigation. An investigation or not, you still have a job to
do with a zero-fail mission. But so far there has been
absolutely no accountability, and you have admitted that here
today. Not one person has been suspended. Not one person has
been put on a desk.
Meanwhile, we have got the most contentious of elections in
our Nation's history, and protectees are in danger because of
incompetent leadership--not the agents. The agents piled on
President Trump to protect his life. Those are heroes. But the
administrators running your agency, they are not right now.
They are not doing their jobs, and you certainly are not doing.
The most appalling part of Saturday's events is the
countless opportunities that Secret Service had to stop Crooks
before he even got on the roof. At 3 o'clock, Crooks raised
suspicion by entering the rally with a rangefinder. At 5:45, a
cop with a Beaver County Emergency Services Unit saw Crooks
eyeballing the roof at the AGR International building. And then
at 5:55, Secret Service was warned of a suspicious person and
identifies Crooks as a threat. This was all before shots were
fired 15 minutes later.
Director, yes or no, did local law enforcement alert the
Secret Service about Crooks' presence at the rally?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, they did.
Mr. Langworthy. The shooter came to attention of law
enforcement almost an hour before President Trump went on
stage. Law enforcement alerted the Secret Service to the
shooter.
Over and over, you have said there is a difference between
a suspicious individual and a threatening individual. Can you
explain what the shooter needed to exemplify to be called a
threat?
Ms. Cheatle. So, I am not clear as to what identified him
as suspicious to the individuals who originally clarified him
that way.
For the Secret Service, for an individual to be determined
to be a threat, that individual would have to be seen with a
weapon or capable of doing some sort of harm to our protectees.
Mr. Langworthy. I mean, Director, an individual walking
into a rally with a rangefinder, scoping out an unprotected
rooftop--and he reportedly flew a drone over hours before--it
sounds like a lot more than suspicious, especially at a
Presidential rally.
Your operational lapses, your resource management, and poor
judgment nearly resulted in the assassination of President
Trump. I mean, the dereliction of duty here is just appalling.
The fact that you have not visited Butler is just maddening to
me, that you are not taking this job seriously.
You know, many people here have called for your
resignation. I have introduced a resolution here into this body
that hopefully will get a vote this week calling on the
President to fire you, ma'am.
You have not done your job, you have put a--two black eyes
on your agency, and you need to go.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Burlison from Missouri.
Mr. Burlison. Director Cheatle, I just want to kind of get
an idea of what you can answer. Because, outside of what the
FBI is responsible for, you have full responsibility for the
Department of Secret Service.
So, the question is, what is the mission? What is your--and
who defines the mission?
Ms. Cheatle. Our mission of the Secret Service is to
protect the President, the Vice President, their immediate
families, Presidential candidates, the former Presidents, and
those by executive order. And we also have an investigative
mission.
Mr. Burlison. And those are well-defined?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Burlison. Everyone within the agency understands the
mission?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, they do.
Mr. Burlison. What about protocols and standards? Who
defines the protocols and standards?
Ms. Cheatle. We have a number of protocols and policies in
place for the various missions that we have.
Mr. Burlison. So, would it be safe to say that you failed
the mission, the ultimate mission?
Ms. Cheatle. I have stated repeatedly here today that there
was a failure.
Mr. Burlison. What about specific failures within protocols
and guidelines within the agency?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, I am certain that the investigation
that is being conducted internally as well as the external
investigation----
Mr. Burlison. You said earlier in the hearing that there
was either a communication--there was a--there was errors in
communication or in operations. Could it be both, both errors
in operational decisions and errors in communications?
Ms. Cheatle. I think the investigation potentially could
identify both.
Mr. Burlison. So, I want to talk about communications.
Representative Boebert asked earlier about using encrypted apps
that you said you have not used, I guess Signal. Have you used
any encrypted app to communicate from your personal device?
Ms. Cheatle. I do, on occasion, use encrypted apps to
communicate.
Mr. Burlison. So, you use some form of an encrypted app to
communicate with people--within the Federal Government? With
local law enforcement? Whom are you communicating with using
encrypted apps?
Ms. Cheatle. Many times it is with colleagues and
associates.
Mr. Burlison. So, you are communicating with colleagues on
a personal device?
Ms. Cheatle. There are times that the Secret Service, when
we work internationally with some of our partners, that they do
not have the same texting capability.
Mr. Burlison. And you are not able to do that with your
government-issued device?
Ms. Cheatle. Recently, we have been able to install some of
those apps on government devices.
Mr. Burlison. OK.
Let us talk about some of the things that we can get access
to.
I am actually shocked that you are using your personal
device and encrypted communication tools. I think that that
might be the most shocking thing that I have heard today. I did
not expect for you to say that.
We have requested--this Committee has requested multiple
documents. And this is not, you know, under the purview of the
FBI; this is under your purview. We requested a complete list
of all law enforcement personnel, including Secret Service,
Department of Homeland Security, local law enforcement with the
roles in protecting the President, and we requested that to
be--for us to receive that by July 18.
Did you provide that?
Ms. Cheatle. I believe that our agency is in the process of
collecting all documents----
Mr. Burlison. So, you did not--you have not provided it.
How long does it take to determine who the personnel were that
were onsite?
Ms. Cheatle. We are collecting a comprehensive list of all
the documents that have been requested.
Mr. Burlison. We also requested all the audio and video
recordings that your agency--not the FBI, but your agency--has
in possession related to the event.
Did we receive those? Have you provided those at all?
Ms. Cheatle. We are in the process of collecting all
documentation requested.
Mr. Burlison. You are in the process, but you have not.
Any memorandums or any internal communications related to
the event? We requested that you provide that. Have you
provided any of that?
Ms. Cheatle. We are in the process of collecting the
information that has been requested.
Mr. Burlison. OK.
So, when can we expect to receive these documents? How long
does it take to determine who was onsite, who was being
employed to be there to protect the former President? When can
we expect that? How many days does it take to provide that
information?
Ms. Cheatle. We want to make sure that we have a
comprehensive accounting of all of the documents that were
engaged in that day, and we will make them available as soon as
possible.
Mr. Burlison. I think transparency is the key here. It is
shocking to me that we are communicating in an encrypted app to
colleagues. I am almost certain that violates some Federal
laws.
Ms. Cheatle. I would like to clarify. You did not ask me
whether my communications were government/work-related or
whether they were personally related. I do not----
Mr. Burlison. You are communicating with colleagues.
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Communicate government business
with colleagues on a personal device. I communicate on my work
device.
Mr. Burlison. Are you using an encrypted device on your
work device?
Ms. Cheatle. I am not.
Mr. Burlison. No encrypted apps?
Ms. Cheatle. No, I do not.
Mr. Burlison. OK.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Waltz from
Florida.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Director, please, I would like to direct your
attention to this video.
Can you turn up the volume, staff?
[Video played.]
Mr. Waltz. Director Cheatle, did you speak with your boss,
Secretary Mayorkas? You fall under DHS. Did you speak with him
on the 14th, the day after?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes, I did.
Mr. Waltz. So, you spoke with him before he made that
statement?
Ms. Cheatle. I spoke with him immediately following----
Mr. Waltz. Did you----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. The incident.
Mr. Waltz. Did you inform him that all requests for
additional resources for President Trump had been fulfilled----
Ms. Cheatle. I----
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Or--or that it was false to say
they had been denied?
Ms. Cheatle. I informed him that the request for that rally
that day had been fulfilled.
Mr. Waltz. OK. You continue to answer that very carefully.
Because I made a broader statement, the agents that came to me
made a broader statement, that his permanent protective detail
for years now have been asking for more. Is that correct?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not have specific incidents of those
requests.
Mr. Waltz. Is it correct that they have been asking for
more?
Ms. Cheatle. I have heard the same reports that you have.
Without having them in front of me, I am unable----
Mr. Waltz. Those requests were made in writing. I mean, the
agents were telling me they make them in writing. This is not a
verbal agency; things are made in writing.
Ms. Cheatle. I understand what you are saying. I do not
have those requests in front of me here to----
Mr. Waltz. I am not asking if you have them in front of
you. Are you aware that they were made?
Ms. Cheatle. As I said earlier, there are times when
requests are made, and depending on the availability of assets
or if there is a way that that----
Mr. Waltz. So, there were times when they were denied?
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. If there is a way that that
vulnerability can be mitigated in a different way, then that is
why Secret Service----
Mr. Waltz. So, there are times when they were denied----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Has----
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. For a variety of reasons?
Ms. Cheatle. That is why the Secret Service has a
multilayered and multifaceted security plan, so that we can
pivot if we need to.
Mr. Waltz. So, in the wake--I mean, in the immediate 48
hours of an assassination attempt on a former President, could
be the next leader of the free world--almost had his head blown
off--your boss says, that is irresponsible and false to say
things or deny. And you had talked to him.
So, did he just make that on his own--make that up on his
own, or did you tell him that?
Ms. Cheatle. We were speaking about the requests made at
the rally.
Mr. Waltz. Staff, can we show the next slide, please?
Then we have your spokesman. Did you sign off on this
statement, that there is an assertion that a member of the
former President's team requested additional security resources
and those were rebuffed? ``This is absolutely false. In fact,
we added protective resources and technology and capability as
part of the increased campaign travel tempo.''
But--next slide, please. Next slide, please, staff--we have
the Washington Post article that then says, we now have senior
Secret Service officials saying there were in times--at times
when it was denied.
So, which is it?
Ms. Cheatle. Again, there have been a number of
conversations going on here----
Mr. Waltz. Did you sign off on that spokesman's statement?
Ms. Cheatle. The spokesman's statement, I believe, was
related to requests that were made for the rally.
Mr. Waltz. Did you sign off on it?
Ms. Cheatle. For the requests that were made at the rally--
--
Mr. Waltz. Did you----
Ms. Cheatle [continuing]. Yes.
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Sign off on the statement before it
went out? I sign off on my press spokesman's statements before
they go out. I would hope you would in the wake of an
assassination attempt.
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Waltz. You did?
Ms. Cheatle. Uh-huh.
Mr. Waltz. Categorically false that any requests were made.
You signed off on it. Thank you for that--thank you for that
clarity.
Madam Director, how many press conferences have you held
since the assassination attempt?
Ms. Cheatle. We have put out press releases----
Mr. Waltz. How many press conferences have you held? Gone
to the mic, taken questions from the public, from the media.
How many?
Ms. Cheatle. I have not held any.
Mr. Waltz. How many has your--how many has Secretary
Mayorkas held?
Ms. Cheatle. I do not----
Mr. Waltz. Zero.
How many has the FBI held? Zero.
How many has the Department of Justice held? I know you
know the answer.
Ms. Cheatle. I believe there was a press conference in
Butler after the incident occurred.
Mr. Waltz. By local law enforcement, not by you and not by
the Department of Homeland Security.
So, this is how misinformation flies, I mean, in the
darkness, in the absence of information. Now we have, 9 days
later, before a congressional Committee--we all represent
almost a million people, and you still do not have answers.
Are you aware that national news anchors are saying this
was a hoax? On national television, they are saying, no, the
President was not shot, it was flying glass. Are you aware of
that?
Ms. Cheatle. I have not heard those reports.
Mr. Waltz. Are you aware that, I mean, there are rumors
rampant online that there were multiple shooters?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Waltz. Are you aware that because the shooter had
overseas encrypted platforms in Belgium and New Zealand and
Germany that a lot of people are speculating there could have
been foreign involvement, logically? Are you aware of that?
Ms. Cheatle. Yes.
Mr. Waltz. And have you done anything to disabuse any of
these notions today? No, you have not.
Madam Director, I would fire you--regardless of the
failure, I would fire you, just how you have handled it since.
You should have been the first to the mics to say,
``America, world, I want to assure you, we are going to get to
the bottom of this. I want to assure you, full transparency.
Our agency clearly had major gaps here, and I want to
personally take responsibility and accountability.'' You should
have been the first, standing alongside Secretary Mayorkas, and
I would even go so far as to say, have daily press conferences
updating everyone on what we know.
But you have not had any of that. What are you hiding
behind?
Ms. Cheatle. I am not hiding----
Mr. Waltz. Because you are making the situation worse. I
think you have heard that on a bipartisan basis here. You are
making this situation far worse in the absence of information.
Let us move on. This is truly astounding.
I want to be clear, because you keep dodging the issue. Has
President Trump's permanent protective detail requested
additional assets over the last few years?
He is clearly not your average former President. He is not
Jimmy Carter in an old folks' home. He is not President Bush
painting out in his barn. He has multiple residences, a lot of
rallies. He is very publicly engaged. And he has a foreign
threat in addition to domestic threats.
Have they requested additional resources?
Chairman Comer. That is the last question, but please feel
free to answer, Director.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
Ms. Cheatle. Thank you.
We have continued, as I stated earlier, to increase over
the past year the assets that are at the former President's
residence and supplied to his detail.
Mr. Waltz. Mr. Chairman, if I could just ask for one more
indulgence.
It is clear you have not been to Butler, Pennsylvania.
Leaders lead and should be on the ground. You have not been
there.
Instead, you went to the RNC. But you were not originally
even going to go there. Where were you originally scheduled to
go besides the RNC, a national special security event?
Ms. Cheatle. I was always scheduled to go to the RNC----
Mr. Waltz. Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the
record that the Director was scheduled to go to Aspen,
hobnobbing around with--I do not know who--what liberal elites
go to Aspen.
That was where you were originally scheduled----
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. To go to speak at a forum.
Ms. Cheatle. I was scheduled to go to the RNC. I was going
to leave the RNC for 24 hours and return back to the RNC.
Mr. Waltz. I hope, as your predecessor Julia Pierson, with
a security incident on the White House under the Obama
Administration, and Reagan's Secret Service detail lead, I will
hope you would have the dignity for the sake of the agents in
the Service to resign.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
Chairman Comer. I would like to enter a few things into the
record.
First of all, the remaining articles that Mr. Biggs was
wanting to enter into the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
Chairman Comer. Next, I have a written statement from
Representative Mike Kelly of Pennsylvania. His district
includes Butler. And he has a written statement that we would
like to enter into the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
Chairman Comer. A bipartisan 114th congressional report
titled, ``United States Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis.''
This was prepared by former Oversight Committee Chairman Jason
Chaffetz and former Ranking Member Elijah Cummings.
Chairman Comer. And, last, the issued subpoena compelling
Director Cheatle's appearance at today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
Chairman Comer. That concludes our question segment.
I want to thank the Director for your testimony today.
I now yield to the Ranking Member for closing remarks.
Mr. Raskin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, Director Cheatle, I also want to thank you for your
patience over the course of what must have been a very long and
trying hearing for you.
It has been an unusually encouraging hearing and an
unusually depressing hearing.
And what is encouraging, Mr. Chairman, is that we came
together to issue a strong statement deploring and
categorically denouncing political violence in America. And I
also did not see any daylight between the members of the two
parties today at the hearing in terms of our bafflement and
outrage about the shocking operational failures that led to
disaster and near catastrophe on July 13, 2024.
What is depressing is the extraordinary communications gap
between the Director of the Secret Service and Congress.
And I do not want to add to the Director's terrible,
horrible, no good, very bad day, but I will be joining the
Chairman in calling for the resignation of the Director just
because I think that this relationship is irretrievable at this
point, and I think that the Director has lost the confidence of
Congress at a very urgent and tender moment in the history of
the country, and we need to very quickly move beyond this.
But what I will say, Mr. Chairman, is that I took this
hearing to be about two major policy failures. And one policy
failure is the one that got the vast majority of the attention,
which was the failure of the Secret Service to effectively
respond to a gunman on a roof within 150 yards of a
Presidential visit and speech.
But the other failure is on the part of Congress. Because
the mass shooting that took place in Butler, Pennsylvania, is
replicated all over the country every day. And, in fact, as I
said, Mr. Chairman, it happened that evening in Alabama, in
Birmingham, Alabama, where there was a mass shooting where more
people even were killed and wounded than were killed and
wounded in Butler, Pennsylvania.
So, it is true, the President, the former President, and a
handful of people who get the Secret Service protection are the
only people in America we thought were safe from an AR-15
attack. It is clear that they are not safe either, and we have
got to get to the bottom of that.
But we also have to get to the bottom of the larger
problem, which is that the whole country is living like this,
in fear and in terror of assault-weapon attacks in movie
theaters, churches, synagogues, mosques, supermarkets,
Walmarts, you know, anyplace where an audience or a public
gathers. And the worst was in Las Vegas, where a gunman got up
on a roof and then just mowed down 60 people below him and
wounded hundreds and hundreds of other people.
So, we have got to deal with that problem. Yes, we have got
to move as swiftly as we can to deal with the problems at the
Secret Service, but the broader problem is still there.
And I just wish to the heavens that our colleagues that
could get together on the question of Presidential security
against an AR-15 attack could get together on the question of
public security against an AR-15 attack. Because all of us are
vulnerable. All of our families are in danger by this.
And the rest of the world does not live this way. And we
have to look to see how uniquely strange it is that we allow
20-year-olds to access AR-15s, weapons of mass destruction, and
show up in public places to endanger other people.
And I hope, Mr. Chairman, we can work together on that with
the same spirit of bipartisan commitment to the public safety
that was exemplified here today.
And I yield back to you.
Chairman Comer. The Ranking Member yields back.
I will deliver my closing remarks.
Director Cheatle, I subpoenaed you to appear today to get
answers for the American people about the failures that led to
the assassination attempt to President Donald J. Trump.
Unfortunately, you refused to answer today.
And this Committee is not known for its bipartisan--its
model of bipartisanship, but I think today we came together
unanimously in our disappointment for your lack of answers.
You have stated that the FBI will investigate and give a
report in, you estimate, 60 days. We have been waiting for
months and months for lots of different bits of information
from the FBI. We have no confidence in the FBI. The majority of
this Committee has no confidence in the FBI.
I sincerely hoped that the hearing today would give not
just Congress confidence in the Secret Service, but the
American people would have confidence in the Secret Service. We
do not have confidence, not just in Congress, but I do not
believe the American people tonight when they go to bed are
going to have confidence that the Secret Service is the best it
can be at protecting President Biden, at protecting the First
Lady, at protecting President Trump, at protecting their
families. That is what the primary role for the Secret Service
should be.
And some people have said and speculated, well, there needs
to be more money and more employees. As I stated early on, a
$3.1 billion--I believe next year it is going to be a $3.2
billion budget; over 8,000 employees.
If the Secret Service is spread too thin in doing things
like inspecting counterfeit--which is what the Secret Service
was created to do, was to inspect counterfeit money and things
like that with the Treasury. If it is spread too thin, then we
need to come together in Congress--and I think we can do that
in a bipartisan way--to narrow the focus of the Secret Service
to protect the leaders of our country, to protect our elections
by protecting our candidates. And I do not believe we have any
confidence that you can do that, as the leader of the FBI
[sic].
I sincerely hoped that we would adjourn this Committee
hearing and have confidence not just in the Secret Service but
in you as Director of the Secret Service. But we do not.
Taking responsibility requires a lot of things. It means
providing transparency. It means answering simple questions. It
means providing a specific timeline of July 13 to this
Committee and the American people.
I mean, it has been 9 days. There were people that were
demanding that we have a hearing the next day or 2 days
following the shooting, and I said, no, we need to give the
Secret Service ample time to be able to answer those questions.
Nine days. Nine days. And I do not think we answered very many
questions that the American people have.
I do not think there was a--I have never said this before,
and I have presided over a lot of hearings. I do not think
there was one question asked by anyone that the average
American has not already asked at a diner or at church or at a
ball game.
The American people have questions. They deserve answers.
Congress deserves answers. You were subpoenaed today to provide
answers, and, ma'am, you did not do that.
So, as Ranking Member Raskin stated, he and I will be
sending a letter requesting that you submit your resignation as
a step toward accountability in what happened.
And one of the biggest frustrations that many of us have,
especially on this side of the aisle, is that there is never
accountability in this Administration. And when you look at the
debacles prior to July 13, I mean, it would be hard to beat the
withdrawal in Afghanistan, the debacle there. And no one was
held accountable. To this day, no one has been held accountable
for that.
But here we have, clearly, video showing people notifying
the police. And the police are blaming the Secret Service. The
Secret Service are blaming the police. Homeland Security is
blaming everybody.
But at the end of the day, after this hearing, and after
our requests for information, we do not have any answers for
the American people, and we do not have that confidence that
you can lead the Secret Service to restore the confidence. And,
again, I commend the ranking member for joining with me in the
letter asking your resignation. And we certainly hope that you
will take that to heart.
With that and without objection, all members have 5
legislative days within which to submit materials and
additional written questions for the witness, which will be
forwarded to the witness.
Chairman Comer. If there is no further business, without
objection, the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:38 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
[all]