[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE DESPOTIC DUO: RUSSO-IRANIAN
COOPERATION
AND THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH
AFRICA, AND CENTRAL ASIA
joint with
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 17, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-98
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-236PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey GREGORY MEEKS, New Yok, Ranking
JOE WILSON, South Carolina Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
KEN BUCK, Colorado AMI BERA, California
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee DINA TITUS, Nevada
ANDY BARR, Kentucky TED LIEU, California
RONNY JACKSON, Texas SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
YOUNG KIM, California DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida COLIN ALLRED, Texas
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan ANDY KIM, New Jersey
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN-RADEWAGEN, SARA JACOBS, California
American Samoa KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK,
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio Florida
JIM BAIRD, Indiana GREG STANTON, Arizona
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York JONATHAN JACOBS, Illinois
CORY MILLS, Florida SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
RICH MCCORMICK, Georgia JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas JASON CROW, Colorado
JOHN JAMES, Michigan BRAD SCHNEIDER. Illinois
KEITH SELF, Texas
Brendan Shields, Staff Director
Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
------
The Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia
JOE WILSON, Chair
BRIAN MAST, Florida DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota,
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee Ranking Member
RONNY JACKSON, Texas BRAD SHERMAN, California
JIM BAIRD, Indiana GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia
Gabriella Zach, Staff Director
The Subcommittee on Europe
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey, Chairman
JOE WILSON, North Carolina WILLIAM KEATING,
DARRELL ISSA, California Massachusetts,Ranking Member
ANN WAGNER, Missouri DINA TITUS, Nevada
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
KEITH SELF, Texas
Katie Earle, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Taleblu, Behnam Ben, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies.................................................... 10
Noronha, Gabriel, Fellow, Jewish Institute for National Security
of America..................................................... 33
Stroul, Dana L., Research Director, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy............................................... 52
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Additional information submitted for the record.................. 21
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 87
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 89
Hearing Attendance............................................... 90
THE DESPOTIC DUO: RUSSO-IRANIAN COOPERATION
AND THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS
Wednesday, April 17, 2024
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Middle East, North
Africa, and Central Asia,
joint with
Subcommittee on Europe,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson
[chairman of the Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and
Central Asia] presiding.
Mr. Wilson [presiding]. Ladies and Gentlemen, the
Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia and
the Subcommittee on Europe will come to order.
The purpose of this hearing is to discuss Iran's and
Russia's cooperation to enhance their shared malign intent,
including Iran's sale of drones and other weapons to War
Criminal Putin; Russia's use of its U.N. Security Council veto
to benefit Iran; sanctions evasion schemes to benefit both
countries, and nuclear collaboration--a danger to the whole
world.
I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from North
Carolina, Mr. Murphy, be allowed to sit at the dais and
participate following all other members in today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
And as I do, I would like to remind the audience members
that disruption of committee proceedings is against the law.
Holding up of signs or making verbal outbursts during the
proceedings is disruptive and will not be tolerated, in the
interest of free speech for everyone. Any disruptions will
result in a suspension of the proceedings until the Capitol
Police can restore order.
I am grateful to co-chair this joint committee hearing with
the chairman of the Europe Subcommittee, the very capable Tom
Kean of New Jersey.
Thank you for being here for what is, sadly, a critical and
timely hearing to examine the partnership of evil opportunity
between War Criminal Putin and the regime in Tehran.
This weekend, the world watched in horror as the Iranian
regime, directly and with puppets, attacked Israel with over
300 drones and missiles, including ballistic missiles. The same
long-range Shahed drones launched by the Iranian regime to
attack Israel are used every day by War Criminal Putin to
murder innocent civilians. And we saw another attack today,
which was inconceivable, on an apartment complex--clearly, a
civilian target in Ukraine.
And then, we will see, too, sadly--Dr. McCormick notices--
we will see a later attack on the EMS personnel and the first
responders, police, fire. And so, the Putin strategy is clear--
to kill civilians, to intimidate civilians, and then,
intimidate first responders.
Russia and Iran will soon be jointly producing deadly
suicide drones in Moscow. Iranian regime officials are on the
ground in Belarus and occupied Ukraine, at the request of War
Criminal Putin.
This murderous partnership of opportunity was cemented
following Russian and Iranian intervention murderously in
Syria, supporting the campaign of mass murderer Bashir al-Assad
against the Syrian people's revolution against the criminal
Assad regime.
The unholy alliance between War Criminal Putin and the
terrorist regime in Tehran has flourished in Syria with War
Criminal Putin establishing a footprint on the Mediterranean
through his puppet, Bashir al-Assad. Iranian terrorist puppets
and Putin's thugs in Syria are free to use Syria as a weapons
depot and staging area to launch missiles and drones, including
against our own servicemembers.
The dictators in Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing have conducted
joint maritime exercises for years. Our adversaries are playing
a long game. War Criminal Putin has already signed an agreement
to purchase Iranian ballistic missiles--in violation of the
sanctions, including those in the Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
Disturbingly and sadly, the Biden Administration renewed
waivers to allow for Russia-Iranian collaboration to facilitate
the expansion of Iranian regime nuclear aspirations with
technical support for Putin through the Russian-owned Rosatom--
potentially, yielding a $10 billion windfall for Putin as he
carries out war crimes in Syria and Ukraine with the backing
from the Iranian regime.
I'm grateful to support the strong efforts and effective
efforts of Chairman Tom Kean to stop this insanity. As we know,
sanctions are only as strong as their enforcement, and
diplomacy is only possible where leverage exists. Sadly, this
Administration seems intent on ceding our leverage, as
adversaries strengthen cooperation to undermine American
interests.
Collaboration between the two regimes extends far beyond
weapons. They work together to evade sanctions and are actively
building supply routes to facilitate transfer of weapons and
solidify their commitment to integrate energy projects to
undermine democracies.
Both carry water for each other at the United Nations,
where the dictators run the show and Russia weaponizes its veto
at the United Nations Security Council to provide cover for
other dictators. Both Iran and Russia abuse financial systems
to evade our sanctions.
The No. 1 goal of the Iranian regime is, ultimately, a
nuclear weapon to fulfill its stated goal. In English, they are
very clear to tell the world: ``Death to America. Death to
Israel.''
War Criminal Putin is more than happy to help the mullahs
reach this goal. Russian has launched Iranian satellites into
orbit and actively provides technical support to the Iranian
regime, quote, ``Space Program,'' and it extends its reach into
Ukraine.
The partnership between War Criminal Putin and the regime
in Tehran extends to, and is aided by, support from the Chinese
Communist Party, Kim Jong Un in North Korea, and mass murderer
Bashir al-Assad.
The defense of American interests against our adversaries
is not a partisan issue. Sadly, the Biden Administration
repeatedly fails to enforce sanctions and makes concessions,
replacing real deterrence with diplomacy, out of fear of
escalation.
History has consistently shown that escalation occurs when
America operates from a position of weakness. Following the
full-scale invasion of Ukraine by War Criminal Putin, Ukraine,
effectively, mobilized and has done what many said could not be
done. They have resisted. They have imposed massive costs on
the Putin regime. They have liberated thousands of square miles
of their country.
War Criminal Putin's ability to murder innocent Ukrainians
and threaten our allies with invasion is directly supported and
aided by the Iranian regime. War Criminal Putin's first trip
abroad following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine was to
Tehran. In March 2023, prior to the horrific murderous attack
of October 7th in Israel, War Criminal Putin welcomed Hamas
leaders to Moscow and has since welcomed them back. It would
not be a stretch to say that the Iranian regime is now a full
participant in War Criminal Putin's delusional attempt to
recreate the Soviet Empire, as they, too, have an expansionist
goal.
Both Putin and the Ayatollah, like Xi, seek a new
multipolar world order at the expense of freedom and democracy.
Iranian regime officials are on the ground to temporarily
occupy regions of Ukraine, and there is full information-
sharing with Moscow.
Those who support Israel and its right to self-defense
should all support the right of Ukraine to do the same thing.
The adversary is the same. We should be consistent supporting
the borders of Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, and America. We are in
a conflict we did not choose of dictators with rule of gun
invading democracies with rule of law.
I appreciate our esteemed witnesses, including Behnam Ben
Taleblu, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies. And we also have Gabriel Noronha, a fellow at the
Jewish Institute for National Security of America. And finally,
we have Dana Stroul, the research director of the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy.
I now gladly yield to the ranking member, Bill Keating, for
his opening statement.
Again, I would like to state it is substantially, almost
universally, bipartisan, particularly as I look at and I see
our members of the other party from North Carolina and a remote
area called Rhode Island.
Thank you.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Chairman Wilson, Chairman
Kean, and our witnesses, for being here today to discuss the
deepening Russian-Iranian relationship and how the United
States and our allies can work together to counter this
authoritarian alliance.
While we face many threats and much instability around the
world today, Russian and Iran sit at the heart of resistance
against the United States, the West, and the tenets of
democracy and the rule of law.
Just this weekend, Iran launched an unprecedented drone and
missile attack against the State of Israel. Israel is America's
closest ally in the Middle East and the only democracy in the
region. The devastating October 7th terrorist attack against
Israel perpetrated by Hamas, an Iranian-backed terrorist group,
and the most recent Iranian attack seek to undermine Israel's
very existence. This must not stand, and I commend the Biden
Administration, the United Kingdom, France, Jordan, and our
allies and partners for coming together to Israel's defense.
Threats from Iran are not just limited to Israel. On
January 28th, Iranian-backed Iraq Shia militia groups attacked
Tower 22, a U.S. base in Jordan, one of the 170 such attacks,
killing three U.S. servicemembers.
At the same time, Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen have
launched over 70 attacks on U.S. and commercial vessels in the
Red Sea, threatening global shipping and freedom of navigation.
While Iran undermines U.S. interests and regional
stability, Russia continues its brutal war of aggression
against Ukraine. Vladimir Putin has further tightened their
authoritarian grip on power by imprisoning opposition figures,
targeting innocent Americans in Russia, among them Paul Whelan
and Evan Gershkovich, and expanding their economic and military
relationship with other U.S. adversaries, like China and North
Korea.
In the Middle East, Russia has historically aimed to have a
multifaceted foreign policy, carefully seeking to balance a
relationship with Iran, the Gulf, and Israel. However, to
support its war in Ukraine, Russia has turned resolutely toward
Tehran, purchasing thousands of Iranian drones to be used
against Ukrainian targets and working with Iran to evade
sanctions in response to its invasion. Iranian drones used by
Russia in Ukraine provide Tehran with important battlefield
testing for its weapons, likely informing Iran's own usage of
these drones.
To counter Iran's malign influence, Russia's authoritarian
ambitions in Ukraine, and the expanding Russian-Iranian
relationship, the Biden Administration has taken action
marshaling the support of 51 allies and partners for our ally
Ukraine, creating a coalition of partners to ensure freedom of
navigation in the Red Sea, striking Houthi rebels who attack
U.S. interests, and imposing comprehensive sanctions in
response to Russian-Iranian military cooperation in Ukraine, as
well as new sanctions announced yesterday in response to Iran's
attack against Israel.
In Congress, I have introduced legislation on this very
issue with Chairman Wilson, the Block the Use of Transatlantic
Technology in Iranian Made Drones Act, which has been reported
out of this committee favorably. It still requires the
Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense to develop
strategies to counter the use of Western and U.S. technology in
Iranian drones. I am hopeful this legislation will be voted on
on the floor as soon as possible.
The most urgent measure we, as Congress, can take is to
vote on the Senate-passed national security supplemental bill,
which passed by a vote of 70-to-29, a strong, bipartisan vote.
This legislation will ensure Ukraine has the necessary
military, financial, and humanitarian support to defeat Russia
on the battlefield and ensure its economy remains solvent.
The bill provides urgent military assistance to Israel, as
well as humanitarian support for Palestinian civilians, many of
whom are on the brink of famine.
Put simply, this bill addresses threats to the United
States national security across the world, bolsters our allies'
defenses, hurts our adversaries' ability to spread malign
influence, and even creates jobs and investments right here at
home.
Finally, the supplemental package sends an unmistakable
message to allies and partners around the world that an
investment in America is an investment in global stability. It
is a signal to Russia and Iran, as well as China and North
Korea, that their malfeasance and aggression on the world
stage, as well as their burgeoning partnerships, will not be
left unaddressed.
If Russia sees its attacks on Ukraine go unanswered, and if
Iran believes its proxies can act unchallenged in the Middle
East without a U.S. response, the Russian-Iranian partnership
will grow and it will strengthen.
In closing, as many of my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle have said, we must pass the supplemental package
immediately. Breaking up this package from what has been passed
by the Senate creates unnecessary delay and uncertainty over
whether the United States will answer the call for a
Churchillian response for the defense of democracy or a
Chamberlain response of appeasement.
While we should work for any successful resolution, if this
legislation stalls or is ineffective, we should sign the
discharge petition and bring forth the Senate bipartisan bill
to the floor as soon as possible. This is a moment; this is a
historical moment, and it is a moment of urgency. And I hope
that we can act on this bipartisan package coming from the
Senate.
I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Bill
Keating. And I particularly want to thank you for referencing
January 28th. The three young Americans who were reservists,
Army Reservists from Georgia, were killed by Hezbollah as
puppets of Iran. And this should never be forgotten. And I just
appreciate so much your referencing that.
And with this, I would like to now proceed to the chairman
of the Subcommittee on Europe, Congressman Tom Kean, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you for your extraordinary leadership and
longstanding leadership on this issue and the importance of
pulling both committees together on this important day on this
important topic.
I also want to thank Ranking Member Keating for his strong
partnership over the last year and a half on issues of strong
importance on European growth and making sure we defend Ukraine
against Russian aggression.
Unlike any other time in recent memory, our world is on
fire. With multiple conflicts in different regions, the enemies
of freedom are emboldened like never before. At the helm of
this chaos are two fierce enemies of freedom and democracy, the
Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
But this vile alliance did not happen overnight. Building
upon years of coordination in Syria, Russia has leveraged the
military and political exchanges with Tehran during the Syrian
Civil War to its benefit, which has now emerged in a full-
fledged, mutually beneficial defense partnership, made more
complete by Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.
Since the first year of the war, Iranian Shahed drones have
been procured and used by the Russian Federation to kill
civilians and to target critical infrastructure. Last month,
our subcommittee's hearing on Rosatom highlighted the role that
Russia's nuclear energy sector plays in building Iran's nuclear
program.
David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science
and International Security, testified that Rosatom, Russia's
nuclear energy monopoly, is involved in providing carbon fiber
used for making these heat drones and that manufacturing is
occurring in Russia.
In Belarus and occupied Crimea, Tehran was more than
willing to send military advisors to help train Russian forces
on how to operate the Shahed drone. They have also been more
than willing to lend expertise and to develop clandestine
financial systems to help Russia evade sanctions--something
that Iran, unfortunately, has much experience in.
In return, Russia has committed to sell Iran advanced
weapon systems, such as the Su-35 fighter jet and the S-400 air
defense system. Through Rosatom, Russia is actively supporting
the expansion of Iran's nuclear program, including its
secretive underground enrichment facility, the Fordow Fuel
Enrichment Plant.
Of course, Rosatom's activities in Iran would not be
possible without the Biden Administration's use of sanctions
waivers under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act.
It is this foolish approach over the last 3 years that has
enabled and emboldened closer cooperation between both
countries.
Iran is openly threatening to sell advanced ballistic
missiles to Russia. In fact, Iran has already reportedly
provided Russia with approximately 400 ballistic missiles. The
same ballistic missiles used to rain hellfire on the people of
Israel over the weekend can and will be used to threaten NATO
and to kill Ukrainian civilians.
Last week's attacks also highlight Iran's willingness to
use strike packages modeled on those the Russians repeatedly
use against Ukraine. They are sharing battlefield lessons with
each other to better threaten America and our allies.
Emboldened like never before, Iran and its proxies,
clearly, want to wipe Israel from the face of the Earth, while
Russian forces try to do this on a daily basis in Ukraine. The
threats posed by Russia and Iran are interconnected. They are
working toward the same goal--the destruction of American
allies and the demise of transatlantic leadership and
deterrence.
Let me be clear, deterrence failed because the Biden
Administration failed to project strength. President Biden will
fail to effectively counter this threat if he tries to dictate
to Ukraine how they are to fight Russia and if he continues
down the path of undermining the U.S.-Israel alliance.
The Biden Administration must lead by example and coalesce
our Transatlantic allies to meaningfully address this
interconnected threat. The sooner that this Administration and
our friends in Europe see the Russia-Iran threat as one and the
same, the closer we will be to finally turning the tide against
this vile alliance.
I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman Tom Kean, and
thank you for your insight and your success on raising these
issues.
We are pleased to have with us the distinguished witnesses.
Mr. Behnam Ben Taleblu, the senior fellow of the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies; Mr. Gabriel Noronha, the fellow with
the Jewish Institute for the National Security of America, and
Dana L. Stroul, the research director with The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy.
We thank all of you for being here today. Your full
statement will be made part of the record, and I will ask you
to keep spoken remarks to 5 minutes, so that we can allow time
for member questions. And Alexis is going to be the monitor of
the 5 minutes. So, watch her hand signals.
And I now recognize Ben Taleblu for an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF BEHNAM BEN TALEBLU, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR
DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Taleblu. Chairmen, Ranking Members, distinguished
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Middle East,
North Africa, and Central Asia Subcommittee and Europe
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
It is a privilege to present my analysis alongside Gabriel
Noronha and Dana Stroul, both of whom have served in the U.S.
Government and have since contributed to bettering our public
national security debate.
Ladies and Gentlemen, it's high time to connect the dots.
America's authoritarian adversaries like Russia and Iran are
drawing closer together, constituting the new revisionist axis
capable of supporting one another's foreign and security
policies while undermining ours and those of our allies.
There may be no cruder example of this than the praise
Russian President Putin just offered Iranian President Raisi
for Iran's missile and drone attack on Israel, calling it,
quote, ``the best way to punish the aggressor and a
manifestation of the tact and rationality of Iran's leaders.''
End quote.
But Iran and Russia are not natural allies. In fact, they
have centuries of historic enmity. In my written testimony, I
trace in-depth the turbulence, then transactional and now
transformational phases of their relationship, the latter of
which we are now in.
This has been evidenced by Iran's provision of one-way
attack drones, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, artillery
shells, and even body army to Russia since 2022 to support
Putin's war in Ukraine. In return, the Islamic Republic has
received gold, cash, Russian diplomatic cover, captured Western
weapons, and contracts for advanced Russian platforms, like the
Su-35.
Washington has warned that Tehran may also provide Moscow
with short-range ballistic missiles. Last year, in a historic
first, Iran participated in Russia's Army 2023 Military
Expedition in August, showcasing a mockup of the Ababil close-
range ballistic missile. Please see image 1.
One month later in September, Russia's Defense Minister
visited an IRGC Aerospace Force exhibition in Tehran, where he
inspected, among other things, the full Ababil missile. Please
see image 2.
Iranian ballistic missiles would significantly alter the
threat landscape in Ukraine by helping Russia conserve its own
ballistic missiles and offer more opportunities for layered
attacks. Ukraine also has, comparatively, less in the way of
expensive ballistic missile defenses than it does air defenses.
Looking ahead, Iran and Russia could easily deepen their
relationships, be it in nuclear matters, sanctions busting, the
cyber domain, or evicting the United States from Syria. In my
testimony, I outline several such areas, but here today I am
choosing to ring the alarm bell over space and satellite
cooperation. There is significant concern that Russia may be
helping Iran launch spy satellites for military purposes that
could make Iranian ballistic missiles more accurate.
Late last year, in fact, a video emerged from summer 2019
showing a IRGC Aerospace Force commander and his Russian
counterpart in Tehran shaking hands after Iran proposed to
Russia to create a drone command if Russia helped Iran create a
space command. Please see image 3.
Congress can help offset this deepening cooperation by
weakening each party.
For example, one, through legislation, Congress has already
set the stage for a better Iran policy that provides more
options to deal with Iran's domestic suppression and foreign
aggression. The MAHSA Act, the SHIP Act, and the Fight CRIME
Act are good examples.
Two, through oversight, Congress should inquire about the
status and implementation of the DEFEND Act, which calls for
establishing the Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Architecture in the Middle East. It should also inquire about
the status of the task force the Biden Administration claimed
to create last year to combat Iran's acquisition of Western
components for Iranian drones which have ended up in Ukraine.
Three, through creativity, by considering the applicability
of Iran sanctions and even terrorism sanctions to Russian
targets, as well as the exposure of Iranian entities to
existing Russian sanctions. A priority for Washington will be
how best to target Russia's and Iran's Caspian-Sea-based
sanctions-busting.
Four, through the bully pulpit, Congress should ring the
alarm bell on both Russia's and Iran's deepening ties with
another party, China, as well as their repression of dissidents
and protestors at home.
Five, through pressure, Congress should press the
Administration to work with the E3 to snap back and restore
U.N. sanctions on Iran before this option expires in 2025,
October. Should this lapse, the West will not be able to use
the U.N. Security Council to bring diplomatic pressure against
Iran again, as Russia is poised to play the role of Iran's
lawyer for the foreseeable future at international
organizations.
And six, through financing. By passing the supplemental,
Congress can make sure that all partners which have been
subject to attacks and predation by Putin's Russia and
Khamenei's Iran have the means to defend themselves.
In my written testimony, I have offered additional policy
recommendations aimed at tackling this rising relationship.
Thank you for your time, attention, and the opportunity to
testify. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Taleblu follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ben Taleblu.
And we now recognize Mr. Noronha for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF GABRIEL NORONHA, FELLOW, JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY OF AMERICA
Mr. Noronha. Thank you, Chairmen, Ranking Members, and
distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for having me
testify today.
The West is under a joint assault from Iranian and Russian
drones, missiles, and nuclear threats. And I think it is
important to note that the same weapons fired at Israel this
past weekend have been hurled at Ukraine for over 2 years now.
We cannot hope to counter one threat and ignore the other.
And I want to compliment this committee, in particular, for
already working on some of those solutions. I will offer a few
new ones right here that haven't been legislated on yet.
One of the most immediate developments that we must disrupt
is increased Russian and Iranian weapons and munitions
production that today will help Russia overwhelm Ukraine, but
tomorrow could help Iran overwhelm Israel.
Iran has built a joint drone production facility east of
Moscow. Ninety percent of those electrical and computer
components are planned to be sourced from the United States,
according to their own documents--90 percent. A few solutions.
First, Congress should require the manufacturers, the U.S.
manufacturers of those components to verify their end
destination if they are going to be exporting from the United
States. We should outright prohibit all sales of these
components to Turkey, the UAE, China, and Hong Kong, since they
are major proliferation hubs to Russia and Iran.
Second, we need all our allies to match our counter-
proliferation sanctions. It is an inconvenience to be blocked
from just the United States, but if you and your family are
going to be banned from entering Europe or any of our Asian
allied countries, you are going to think twice about getting
involved in this kind of trade.
Third, we should punish the companies moving weapons from
Iran to Russia. Iranian State airlines ferry many of the
suicide drones, the military personnel, and other weapons to
Russia. These terror airlines are already on the brink of
bankruptcy, and we can push them over the edge.
According to my research, these airlines are still today
landing in over a dozen airports in NATO countries, even though
they are sanctioned by the United States for terrorism and WMD
proliferation. The airlines get hundreds of millions of dollars
for these commercial flights to Europe. European governments
are aware of this and they have chosen not to crack down. I
would like to submit my report on this issue for the record, if
I may.
We must be willing to enforce our sanctions----
Mr. Wilson. It shall be admitted.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Noronha. We must be willing to enforce our sanctions on
any airport that hosts these terror airlines or the sanctions
we have on the books already do not mean anything at all.
Europe also hosts 15 Iranian state-owned banks sanctioned
by the United States for terrorism and WMD proliferation. Those
could be shut down tomorrow and their assets sent to Ukraine
for war reparations. Europe has refused to do this as well.
If I may be frank, Congress needs to deal with the painful
truth, which is that our European allies have thwarted nearly
every effort to hold the Iranian regime accountable for their
deadly work in Ukraine. In fact, senior European leaders often
even embolden Iranian actions. This behavior is untenable,
especially as Europe keeps asking Americans to help thwart an
invasion powered by Iranian weapons.
What is good for Russia is good for Iran. What is good for
Iran is good for Russia. Europe likes to ignore that latter
point. Europe and the Biden Administration must also snap back
the U.N. sanctions that, until they let expire last October,
blocked under international law Iranian shipments of
ammunition, drones, and ballistic missiles to Russia.
As my colleague Behnam mentioned, we can restore these
sanctions in under 30 days without the approval of Russia or
China. And especially in light of Iran's brazen attack on
Israel, this should be our minimum response. And we have to use
this snapback soon. The tool will expire exactly 18 months from
this evening. At that point, realistically, we are never
getting U.N. sanctions back on Iran.
On the nuclear file, Iranian and Russian nuclear
cooperation is deeper than most people realize. My written
testimony documents that there are now around 5,000 Russian
nuclear personnel working inside Iran. The regime has also been
asking Russia for help acquiring additional nuclear materials
that could shorten its nuclear breakout time.
Yet, the State Department has been rewarding this
cooperation with sanctions waivers. And I want to agree fully
with the letter signed by Chairmen Kean and Wilson today. Those
waivers helped Russia through its state-owned nuclear company,
Rosatom, on their ongoing construction of two new nuclear
reactors for Iran. Without those waivers, Rosatom could not
receive payment for their work in Iran. And Rosatom's future
work in Iran could earn them upwards of $50 billion this
decade.
Rosatom is instrumental to Russia's assault on Ukraine. As
this committee has heard recently, we need to bankrupt Rosatom.
I offer my thoughts on how to do this, how to bankrupt some of
their oil sales, and several more specific ideas of how to
weaken the two regimes, in my full written testimony.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Noronha follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Noronha, thank you so much.
And I want to give you some good news, and that is that
everyone here voted yesterday for legislation called No
Technology for Terror, right in line with the concerns you
expressed. And it was presciently offered by Congressman
Nathaniel Moran of Texas. And so, with good suggestions and I'm
really grateful that we have Members of Congress who the vast
majority will be very happy to work with the three of you.
And, Ms. Stroul, for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DANA L. STROUL, RESEARCH DIRECTOR, THE WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Ms. Stroul. Chairmen Wilson and Kean, Ranking Member
Keating, and honorable members of the subcommittees, thank you
for the opportunity to testify today on this critical issue.
Two observations upfront.
Policymakers and analysts have long insisted that the
relationship between Moscow and Tehran would never rise beyond
the tactical, due to longstanding historical animosity and
ideological differences. Today, that view no longer holds
water. The geopolitical landscape incentivizes both governments
to strengthen a strategic alliance.
Second, there has long been an assumption that Russia is
the dominant player in this bilateral relationship and can be
relied upon to moderate Iran's actions. Today, the balance of
leverage has shifted. Russia's reliance on Iranian weapons to
sustain its war in Ukraine means that Iran has the upper hand.
This cooperation has implications in the following areas:
Military coordination. Citizens in Ukraine and citizens in
the Middle East are suffering from the same Iranian weapons.
Russia's willingness to provide Iran advanced fighter aircraft,
upgraded air defense capabilities, and other military
technology poses a serious risk to the balance of power in the
Middle East.
Russia and Iran are using Ukraine and the Middle East as a
battlefield lab to improve their weapons and develop techniques
to overcome U.S. and allied capabilities. This has implications
for the security of U.S.-origin defense equipment, and as they
learn lessons about U.S. and NATO air defenses, those
vulnerabilities will be transferred to other adversaries
developing their own plans for future wars. It means our
military planners need to update war plans and that we need to
reassess our own defense sales and arms sales, so that the
balance of power remains in our favor.
Nuclear nonproliferation. We should expect that Russia will
block U.S. and European efforts to constrain and walk back
Iran's steps toward its own nuclear threshold status.
Sanctions. As the two most sanctioned countries in the
world, Tehran and Moscow are actively engaged in activities to
circumvent, evade, and weaken the potency of our sanctions.
Diplomacy. Russia is using its seat at the U.N. Security
Council and other international bodies like the IAEA to shield
Iran from accountability for its actions.
And domestic suppression. Iran and Russia are exchanging
best practices to crush protests, undermine citizen
organization efforts, and maintain mass surveillance programs
against their own people. This cooperation challenges values
that we have long held as critical for global stability, human
rights, representative governance, and transparency. Moreover,
they are working to undermine democratic processes through
election interference and disinformation, including here in the
United States.
Iran's complex state-on-State attack against Israel on
April 13th bears the hallmarks of Russian attacks on Ukraine.
Iran enables Russia to continue its war, including the
deliberate targeting of Ukrainian civilians.
Iran is extracting from Russia lessons and combined strike
packages; how to improve the lethality of their weapons, and
how to overcome Western air defenses. While there is debate
here about security assistance to Ukraine, there is no
hesitation by Tehran to continue supporting Russia.
Though Iran's attack against Israel failed this weekend, we
should expect that Moscow and Tehran will improve military
operations against Ukraine, Israel, and others in the Middle
East going forward. Future attacks will be more lethal.
To counter this cooperation, we can take the following
steps:
Continue sanctions enforcement and expand sanctions. Russia
will not be able to maintain payment schedules and provide
Tehran and other owners of Russian-origin military equipment
with spare parts. Now, we need to expand it and coordinate with
European partners.
Engage the private sector. U.S. and Western parts are
ending up in Iranian-manufactured attack drones. We need more
education and outreach to help ensure compliance with sanctions
and raise awareness of customers seeking to acquire off-the-
shelf, commercial, dual-use products for lethal purposes.
Continue downgrading intelligence to expose this malign
Iranian-Russian cooperation. It underscores America's value as
a reliable actor committed to defending the sovereignty and
security of our partners.
Increase public diplomacy to counter Iranian and Russian
misinformation, and maintain programs that seek to reach civil
society in Iran and Russia, drawing a distinction between the
regimes and the leadership and the people of these countries.
And emphasize the benefits of U.S. partnership and
coalitions. The performance of European and Arab partners
working together to disrupt Iran's attack this weekend is the
clearest proof of concept that we should be the partner of
choice for countries who benefit from the current international
order. We are the only military capable of operationally
integrating our partners, informed by unparalleled intelligence
and unmatched technology.
One final remark. The most immediate action we can take is
to pass the national security supplemental. This will allow
critical security funding and defense equipment to flow to
Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan--the partners most at risk from
adversary actions. But it also supports our military,
diplomats, and assistance specialists working 24/7.
We cannot underestimate the strategic significance of
passing the supplemental. It will immediately be understood in
the hallways of Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing, and will provide
reassurance not only to our partners in the most need, but to
other skeptical partners questioning U.S. staying power.
The funding for defense industry expansion in the
supplemental will make the United States a more reliable
partner. This is not only about Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan; it
is about the ecosystem of allies and partners that we want to
work with and are looking to us for leadership, as well as to
our defense industry and our cutting-edge technology and
innovation. This is about our reliability as a guarantor of the
current international order and that we are ready to walk, and
not only talk, in standing up for the defense of our partners.
Thank you so much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stroul follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Ms. Stroul.
And I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. And Alexis is
going to be very firm in raising that issue on the 5 minutes.
And as we begin, I would like to reiterate the
bipartisanship. Last night, I was grateful to be with Ranking
Member Keating meeting with the Prime Minister of the Czech
Republic, a great member of NATO, a former member of the Warsaw
Pact. How times can change. But we were with Petr Fiala, the
Prime Minister. And to see their assistance to Ukraine, per
GDP, they provide more assistance to Ukraine than the United
States.
And so, it is just reassuring to see bipartisanship and see
our allies and see NATO more unified than ever with--hey, who
would have ever imagined Sweden, 200 years of neutrality given
up? And now, Putin has what he said he did not want to have--an
830-mile border with NATO and Finland.
With that in mind, I want to thank Mr. Taleblu so much for
connecting the dots. An organization, the AEI, has provided
connecting the dots, and I hope people see the interconnection,
which is so clear, between the American Enterprise Institute--
so clear between the axis of evil of War Criminal Putin, the
Chinese Communist Party, and the regime in Tehran. And it just
cannot be missed.
And then, the pictures you showed of the delegations with
the weaponry, we have seen that over and over again. Our
enemies are very happy to show how well they work together. I
still remember the pictures of the Iranians with the Houthis
showing off their phenomenal capability of UAVs and drones. And
so, we need to understand that.
Mr. Taleblu, in your monograph, which everyone should read,
you detail the expansion of Iran's ballistic missile program.
And earlier this year, the CIA Director warned about Russian
assistance to the regime in Tehran with the space and missile
program and, also, now we see the nuclear program, of course.
And so, what might this look like and how can we address
this?
Mr. Taleblu. Thank you, sir, and also, thank you for your
leadership in connecting the dots legislatively on another
partner in that axis, which is the Syrian regime. So, thank you
for your leadership on countering that threat was well. That
was really the laboratory for Iran and Russia pre-Ukraine.
To your question about the cooperation on Iran and Russia
in the missile and space world, I think there are three we have
to be aware of: satellites, space launch vehicles, and
potentially, GPS.
Satellites. Russia actually helped Iran launch its first
satellite ever in 2005. They put it into a Russian carrier
rocket and the Russians launched it, allegedly, into low earth
orbit.
Since then, the Russians have been actively involved in
helping the Iranians actively place smaller satellites--
telecommunication, imagery, messaging--back and forth into low
earth orbit, allegedly. The fear here is that, the more you
have a series of Iranian satellites operating there, the better
the targeting can be for Iranian weapons, which, even at least
prior to the strike on Israel, had been improving.
The second is space launch vehicles. In this sense, Iran is
walking and chewing gum at the same time. It is developing
active solid and liquid propellant, two-stage and three-stage
carrier rockets that could potentially become the bedrock for a
future ICBM program. This also allows Iran to claim to adhere
to a self-imposed 2,000-kilometer cap, while working on
developing something that can threaten Europe, and then,
threaten us.
Iran has not perfected this. And the fear here is, out of
the CIA Director, that the Russians could help them with
staging thrust, and perhaps most importantly, going from SLV to
ICBM, their reentry vehicle technology.
Last is the satellites--sorry--is the GPS, essentially.
Russia has its own version of GPS called GLONASS. Iran, since
2014, has been trying to create a more localized version, not
global, but local positioning system called Huda. It is unclear
how successful this is, but this is a sign that both of our
adversaries are trying to hedge away from technologies that we
can control, to be in full charge of their own precision strike
capability.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for raising that. Because they have
already got the ballistic missile capability to strike Greece,
Bulgaria, India. And so, this is so serious; it must be
addressed.
And, Mr. Noronha, the illegal aggression of Putin in
Ukraine, how has that affected their ability to help Bashir al-
Assad?
Mr. Noronha. Massively, because it has taken so much of the
allied effort off the Bashir al-Assad regime. Our Middle East
partners are also lifting their prohibitions against dealing
with Assad for a number of reasons, but, partly, again, the
West has taken its eye off of Syria. We aren't putting pressure
on.
And one thing that I have noticed, particularly recently,
is there is this focus on saying, you know, the deaths of
Palestinians, oh, which are tragic, in complete ignorance of
the fact that Assad was brutally massacring 5-10 thousand
Palestinians, even more, in Syria, and has gotten really no
approbation for that.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for raising that to our attention.
Now, Ranking Member Bill Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
While in the period where this hearing started and the
present, I received news that President Biden has announced his
official support for the House bills and called for their
passage.
In this extraordinary effort of bipartisanship by the
President, I hope that, if we do have delays here in the House,
and as the terrain hardens and the mud season ends in Ukraine,
and the threat of greater attack on the ground by Russia
becomes graver, I hope that, if there is a delay in this, that
my Republican colleagues will move on a discharge and sign the
discharge petition, if, indeed, there are dilatory attempts to
stop this type of funding--funding that we now have the House
leadership and the President and the Senate all in accord with.
So, I hope there are efforts to do that because this moment
is a perilous moment for Ukraine right now and soldiers are
dying unnecessarily because they do not have the basic
munitions to go forward and defend themselves.
With that being said, I just want to ask a question in that
regard. Some supplemental funding package requests strengthen
our alliances, not just in Europe and not just with European
countries, but also strengthens our posture in the Middle East
as well.
So, if, indeed, you know, this Congress does not act, this
House does not act, or delays in acting during this period of
this week, what vital and lifesaving assistance, you know,
being denied by Ukraine--what message does that send to the
Middle East and what is going on there, let alone China? Anyone
can jump forward, if they want.
Mr. Noronha. If I may, one lesson that we learned is
Russian involved itself in Syria and got massive bases, 105
bases in Syria as a result. Iran has now supplied massive
weapons to Russia. It is not inconceivable that, should Ukraine
be forced into surrender, that we will see Iranian military
bases on the European continent. Those bases would be 2,000
kilometers closer to New York City and Washington, DC, if they
ever choose to launch nuclear armed missiles at us. That is
something that the House should take into serious
consideration.
Mr. Keating. Yes. I just want to shift quickly to another
important issue that Ms. Stroul brought forward. It has not
been given enough attention, although the Senate Intelligence
Committee is about to move forward with further hearings, I
believe, on this issue. And that is something they worked with
in 2020 in terms of election interference and disinformation.
Ms. Stroul, how important and what a great threat that
presents going forward to this period of time during an
election year. Can you expand on your comments and your
concerns on that kind of election interference as well?
Ms. Stroul. Thank you for the question.
Russia and Iran are, clearly, working together on a
playbook to undermine democracies and representative
governments. They learned valuable lessons about how to stoke
political discourse and spread lies and information in 2020. We
know that they have continued to do it here in the United
States and that they are gearing up to do more of it.
Two, Iran has been successful in undermining electoral
processes in other countries. A good example is Iraq, where
Iranian influence, meddling, payment to political parties,
pressuring of politicians absolutely shifted the political
discourse and parties during the government formation period
that resulted in the longest government formation period in the
history of Iraq.
There is no question that they are exchanging information
about these tactics and techniques and preparing to foment
discord and division, because they see a weak and divided
America as better for their alliance and to be deflecting from
what they are doing in both Europe and the Middle East.
Mr. Keating. Yes, it is an important point that you brought
forward. Because, you know, you look at so many factors. You
look at the Wagner Group, for instance, reports that they were
giving weapons to Hezbollah as well. So, you see this kind of
military coordination that is occurring.
But I think your point in terms of the hybrid warfare that
Russia uses is also being used by Iran during this period. And
as we gather for this hearing and look at that kind of
coordination between Moscow and Tehran, we cannot forget all
the aspects of hybrid warfare that they are doing. I really
appreciate you bringing that point.
And I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Bill
Keating.
We now proceed to Chairman Tom Kean of New Jersey.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In the coming days, the EU will propose new sanctions
against Iran after the regime launched over 200 drones and
ballistic missiles toward Israel. The EU is looking to expand
sanctions imposed on Iran for supplying Russia with drones and
missiles, to possibly include components. Would you consider--
this is for Mr. Noronha--would you consider this a significant
consequence, given Iran's actions before and after October 7,
2023?
Mr. Noronha. It entirely depends on the nature of these
sanctions. My guess is that, no, they will not be very serious.
The regime in Iran will not take this as a significant
escalation--unless they do the U.N. snapback of sanctions. That
is significant. That would impose real costs. Anything short of
that is a little window dressing, in my view.
Mr. Kean. So, do you agree with that, Mr. Taleblu?
Mr. Taleblu. Partially. Here's why: on October 18, 2023,
the EU and the U.K., basically, committed their first-ever
JCPOA violation in plain sight. We have to build on this to
bridge the transatlantic gap.
The EU retained over 200 missile, military, and nuclear
entities that it had promised to give away. And as you know,
during the Trump period, the Europeans had no problem drawing a
sharp contrast with us and rewarding Iran and chastising us.
What we have to do now to work up to the snapback and both
Gabe and I want, and both Gabe and I have called for, is an
incremental approach. The problem is I would love the snapback,
but I know the Europeans; they are probably not going to go for
it.
So, what we have to do is build on what they have retained
and share the targeting information of every single missile,
military, and nuclear entity that we have sanctioned since
leaving the deal in 2018 to bridge that gap and serve as an
architecture to get the snapback.
Mr. Kean. If I may, what glaring gaps exist in the current
EU sanctions regime against Iran, and how do these gaps allow
Russian aggression and assist their geopolitical goals? Either
one of you two.
Mr. Noronha. The big three to me are oil. Europe does not
have sanctions on Iran's oil export or their gas exports.
The second one, a very easy one to do, is banks. That is
hard, if they are still in the JCPOA, to sanction all of Iran's
banks. They need to get out of the JCPOA to do so.
And then, what I would say is airlines, which I mentioned
in my testimony, and then, finally, financial networks.
Currently, you can conduct financial transactions within the EU
to Iran. Again, that is protected by the JCPOA currently.
Mr. Kean. So, to followup on that point, how has the
continuation of the Administration's JCPOA sanction grant
strategy toward Iran benefited Russia? And in your opinion,
does it provide cover for some EU member-states to impose
effective sanctions on Iran?
Mr. Noronha. So, what I have seen from Europeans over
several years, over 5 years really, is this posture, which I
always hear is, if we take certain action, that will imperil
the deal, and therefore, we cannot impose punitive measures on
Iran for fear of escalation.
To me, this is the classic evidence of deterrence. Iran has
deterred Europe from taking these actions. Again, if you can
get Europe to leave the JCPOA--the JCPOA is a figment of
everyone's imagination at this point. No one is abiding by it
except the Europeans. They are now giving unilateral sanctions
relief to Iran. Iran is not giving them any nuclear concessions
or anything back in return.
And I think my colleague Dana might have some comments
there.
Mr. Kean. Yes?
Ms. Stroul. So, I would simply observe, No. 1, we have a
diplomatic moment right now. Not only are Europeans, if you go
talk to members of European governments, extremely concerned
about Iran's creep toward nuclear threshold status, and its
very alarming steps, and are actually thinking through the
steps to get to snapback, but you do not wake up 1 day and do
it. There is a lot of preparatory steps. There is an openness
to having that conversation with our E3 counterparts at this
point in time.
No. 2 is, after this weekend's attack, all of the focus is
on Iranian aggression. We have an opportunity to work with
Europe, and I would agree with my fellow witnesses earlier that
U.S. unilateral sanctions are not nearly as potent or effective
as multilateral sanctions coordinated with our European and
Asian colleagues.
Mr. Kean. And what----
Ms. Stroul. So, we should take U.S. interests at this point
in time, work with them incrementally to continue to ratchet up
those sanctions.
Mr. Kean. And what is the role of the Lukashenko regime in
Belarus in facilitating military cooperation between Iran,
Russia, and China? Mr. Noronha?
Mr. Noronha. Iran has used the IRGC trainers in Belarus to
launch drones at Ukraine. Iran and Belarus signed a military
cooperation agreement back in 2023. They are hoping that Iran
will help them supply ammunition as well.
So, I think of Belarus as sort of the little vassal State
of Russia. All the problems that we are seeing with the
Russian-Iranian relationship, to a minor degree, are the same
ones that we are seeing in Belarus at this time.
Mr. Kean. Thank you. I yield back my time.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Tom Kean.
And golly, how clear is this? An agreement between Iran and
Belarus--even Dr. McCormick is surprised.
We now proceed to Congressman Gabe Amo of Rhode Island.
Mr. Amo. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon to our witnesses.
I just want to start out by stating the outrage that I
have, and that we collectively have, by Iran's attacks against
Israel this weekend. I'm heartened that President Biden
directed our military to help stop Iranian drones before they
reached their targets in Israel. And we must de-escalate
violence in the region and prevent any future attacks from
Iran.
This attack is the latest reminder why the House must pass
the Senate's bipartisan national security package as soon as
possible. We cannot continue to delay passing a comprehensive
package that supports Israel and Ukraine, as well as
humanitarian aid for civilians in Gaza, and resources for the
Indo-Pacific.
Some colleagues, mistakenly, believe we should abandon our
ally Ukraine and only provide aid to Israel. This could not be
more misguided. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Iran's attacks
on Israel do not occur in isolation. The strong and growing
ties between Putin and Ayatollah Khamenei demand that we
support our democratic allies.
Russia has been purchasing drones from Iran in its illegal
invasion in Ukraine. These are the same types of drones that
Iran used in its recent attack on Israel. In exchange, Russia
provides Israel (sic) with digital surveillance technology and
anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems captured in Ukraine. These
are advanced systems that Iran would not otherwise have because
of U.S. sanctions.
Recently, leadership at the U.S. Central Command expressed
worry that Russia may soon provide Iran with Russian Su-35
fighter aircraft in exchange for more drones and military
weapons. Iran's recent drone attack remains a dangerous and
serious escalation of violence in the region. But just imagine
what an attack using advanced fighters would have looked like.
There is no doubt that Iran is gaining access to
sophisticated defense technology from Russia. This threatens
our safety and security and our allies in the region. I can
really only wonder why those who are willing to let Russia
continue their war with Ukraine with so much at stake.
So, you know, I wanted to ask here now Ms. Stroul if you
could describe how Russia's assault on Ukraine impacts the
likelihood that Russia will provide Iran with additional
advanced technology, like the Su-35 fighter aircraft.
Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question, Congressman.
Russia cannot continue its war in Ukraine without a steady
supply of Iranian military equipment, and it is not getting it
for nothing. It has purportedly offered to upgrade Iran's air
defenses to sell the Su-35, as my colleagues here and you have
mentioned, as well as other surveillance capabilities, et
cetera.
So, the challenge here is that the United States has
pursued foreign military sales and defense equipment across the
region to maintain a certain balance of power. No U.S. partner
in the region except Israel has fifth-generation fighter
aircraft, and our war plans have been developed based on
certain assessments of air defenses and the capabilities of our
partners.
So, the more sophisticated defense technology Russia sells
to Iran, it is not only a problem for the United States and how
we think of our own war plans and contingency scenarios in the
Middle East, nor is it only a problem for Israel. It is
actually a partner for all Arab--it is a problem for all of our
Arab partners who have certain assumptions and certain plans
and certain investments and capabilities.
And the question for them is, are they going to look to us
for leadership and our own defense industry to make sure they
have what they need to defend themselves? Are they going to
look to us for commitment that we are going to show up for
them, like we just did for Israel over the weekend? Or are they
going to hedge and say, ``Well, if Russia is giving Iran all of
the sophisticated equipment, I'd better make sure I'm really
good with Tehran and Beijing.''?
Mr. Amo. So, you know, by extension there--and I think you
have answered this, but I want to ask it to punctuate here--
would supporting Ukraine in their fight against Russia's
unlawful invasion reduce the chance that Russia provides
advance technology to Iran?
Ms. Stroul. Yes. Adversaries in Europe and the Middle East
are looking at each other and looking at our actions and
whether or not we can pull together a coalition to support
Ukraine and Europe, and to support our partners, both Arab and
Israel, in the Middle East. And Beijing is watching what we are
doing in both of these theaters.
If the war in Ukraine ends, Russia no longer needs that
Iranian supply of weapons and we would have opportunities to
shift that mutual defense exchange.
Mr. Amo. Well, thank you for that.
And I hope that my colleagues in the House know that these
efforts are linked and it is imperative that we take up our
responsibility to act in the coming days to pass meaningful
legislation for our national security and global stability.
With that, I yield back my time.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman, and we
appreciate the freshman from Rhode Island.
We will now proceed to Ambassador Ann Wagner of Missouri.
Mrs. Wagner. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank both
our Europe and Middle Eastern subcommittees for organizing this
incredibly timely and important hearing.
In every corner of the globe, America's adversaries are
lined up to attack our interests and our allies. Iran's
unprecedented direct attack on Israel is a clear warning;
Russia, China, and Iran are dangerously emboldened. This crisis
demands strong American leadership to disrupt the new axis of
evil.
Mr. Taleblu, The Washington Post published extensive
reporting on Monday on the deepening Russian-Iranian security
partnership, including its ramifications for Iran's drone and
fighter jet and air defense programs. How will these concerning
new partnerships improve Iranian capabilities and embolden Iran
to further destabilize the region? And how should the United
States be working with Israel and other regional partners to
better counter this rapidly changing threat?
Mr. Taleblu. It actually stands to significantly deepen the
cooperation that we have already seen well underway. The test
run in Syria, the growing use in Ukraine, and the potential to
translate that into a third theater, if there is, again,
Russian-Iranian strategic convergence that is based on opposing
us and our partners.
It has been very interesting to hear over the past decade,
decade and a half, in nearly every jurisdiction where U.S.
policymakers, and even U.S. lawmakers, say there is no military
solution, the likes of Russia, Iran, and the rest of the axis
have actually found a military solution. So, this is the
imperative of countering their deepening mil-to-mil ties. We
have to actually think creatively, and even sometimes on the
military side, about how to offset this.
A couple of concerning areas. Iran learned from Russia,
actually, in the Ukrainian theater, how to shadow drones.
Russians have lots of manned aircraft, jets, fighters. Just
like jets go behind one another--this was reported by
Bloomberg--and hide behind the other jet, drones can go behind
one another and hide behind each other.
And that is precisely how, in January of this year, using a
Shahed 101 drone, Iran killed three U.S. service persons in
Jordan by mirroring, allegedly, another American drone that was
coming in, going up right behind it, and then, exploding. So,
this is lethal.
Mrs. Wagner. Well, and they have it.
And according to a Reuters article in February, Iran
transferred approximately 400 missiles to Moscow, including
short-range ballistic missiles. The Administration has yet to
confirm the transfer of ballistic missile systems, yes, even
with Tehran threatening further transfers.
And so, Mr. Taleblu, why won't the Administration
acknowledge the transfer of these weapon systems? And what
added capabilities does this give the Russian Federation in
Ukraine?
Mr. Taleblu. To date, to be honest, we haven't seen the
appearance of Iranian ballistic missiles on the battlefield of
Ukraine, but it is more a question of when, not if, these
systems will come.
Mrs. Wagner. When? If they transferred 400 missiles--so,
it's when, not if.
Mr. Taleblu. Exactly.
Mrs. Wagner. And what added capability do they have?
Mr. Taleblu. The added capability is it allows Russia to
conserve more of its own stockpile, use up these foreign
weapons. By the way, the North Koreans have even ballistic
missiles. And when you marry up, just like we saw in the strike
over the weekend, ballistic missiles which fly high and fast,
cruise missiles which fly low and slow, and drones which fly
even lower and slower, you have a robust strike package that
can overwhelm even the most advanced and integrated air and
missile defenses. So, that is exactly what Russia is trying to
do to Ukraine, and they are doing it on the cheap by using the
weapons of the other members of the axis.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you. It is very, very disturbing. Very
disturbing.
Mr. Noronha, what role is Western technology playing in
sustaining Iran's ability to produce lethal weapons like the
Shahed-136 drone? And what more can be done to cutoff Iran's
procurement of the parts and the technologies they use for
drone production?
Mr. Noronha. Well, thank you.
As I noted in my testimony, 90 percent right now is the
estimate of how many--90 percent of their most advanced
components are all coming from Western, and mostly American,
companies--companies in Massachusetts, Texas, Virginia.
So, the issue is some of these you can go buy on Amazon,
but some of these are more specialized. And we need to--it is
going to be a tough regulatory issue, but we need to crack down
and say, in the same way that we have ITAR regulations, apply
those things to any of the components which are being used in
those drones. It is going to be cumbersome, but it is,
unfortunately, necessary.
Mrs. Wagner. Well, it absolutely is. The world is on fire
and we can bury our heads in the sand, and we cannot allow U.S.
technology to be used in this kind of nefarious fashion, nor
can we allow this axis of evil to move forward.
So, my time has expired. I thank you for the work that you
are doing. We have to triple down on it, as a Congress and as
those that are working in the Administration.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman, and former
Ambassador Ann Wagner of Missouri.
We now proceed to Congressman Dina Titus of Nevada.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
hearing.
We have been hearing how Moscow and Tehran have
historically been close partners. It has mostly been driven by
shared hostility toward the U.S., but nonetheless despite after
the fall of the Soviet Union we had better relations with
Russia, but they still kept cordial relations with Iran.
Now, we have heard a lot about Iran supplying the drones,
or unmanned vehicles, to Russia. Even they have built a factory
on the outskirts of Moscow, I understand. But I would like to
talk more about how Russia is aiding Iran.
You mentioned, Ms. Stroul, about the M16 35s and I think
the Su-35s. Could you talk a little bit more about that
relationship and how it is upsetting the balance in the Middle
East as opposed to the other direction that it is going?
Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question. Russia in the
Middle East has been the second most significant arms supplier
to countries, second to the United States up until now, but
what we are seeing is a decision by Russia to transfer
increasingly sophisticated defense technology to Iran. It has
the potential to have--to enable Iran to have more advanced
fighter aircraft than some of our long-standing air partners in
the region.
There is potential for Iran to have more upgraded and
advanced air defense radars which will require updating our own
war plans should there be a need to go to war with Iran, should
they take certain steps. President Biden has always said
military options are on the table.
There are a range of other capabilities. And I also heard
from my colleagues about space launch vehicles, et cetera. All
of this changes the balance of power.
And the question for us is what actions can we take to
undermine and degrade that transfer to change the geopolitical
and strategic environment around this so that this is not such
a potent and mutually reliant partnership and at the same time
to reassure our allies and partners, in particular our Arab
partners and Israel and the Middle East. And part of how we
would do that is through refreshing how we look at foreign
military sales, how we look at security assistance funding, how
we look at military exercises, and also the diplomacy and
public messaging we can do to make it clear that we are
committed to the Middle East and a partner of choice.
Ms. Titus. So you do not see this as just a temporary
matter of convenience because of certain circumstances in
Ukraine? You see this as part of the big picture long term?
Ms. Stroul. I think at this point in time the regimes in
Moscow and Tehran are ideologically oriented to undermine the
United States, western interests, and our unmatched network of
allies and partners. And they are doing this not only the--in
the defense and military sector, but across a range of civilian
areas as well. And Beijing is looking at it, Pyongyang is
looking at it, Venezuela, Damascus, et cetera. And we have to
think about what the convergence of all of these adversary,
disruptive, revisionist leaders working to undermine the
international order from which we benefit today. And that is
going to require doubling down on shoring up our own alliances
and partnerships as well as maintaining a variety of coercive
measures to degrade this emerging alliance.
Ms. Titus. You see any of this going on in Turkey?
Ms. Stroul. Which specific thing in Turkey?
Ms. Titus. Well, just this undermining of relationships and
strengthening of coziness with Russia.
Oh, maybe you want to address that?
Mr. Taleblu. There is one that immediately comes to mind,
which is Turkey, as you know, is a member of NATO but also has
the S-400. That is the most advanced Russian surface-to-air
missile system and it is a historic first for Russia to be able
to puncture the NATO alliance system with more--with Russian
weapons.
Now, let's actually contrast that with Iran. Iran is not in
NATO. And Iran has the S-300, so Iran has an even lesser
advanced version of the Russian air defense system that the
Russians are willing to sell a NATO country. So in this sense
to a NATO country Russia can sell exceptionally advanced
technology hoping to create a spoiler.
If you know, during the cold war Turkey's western alliance
was essential for a lot of our intelligence and military
successes in that area. Now with a country outside of NATO,
like the Islamic Republic, you can give significantly more
advanced but not all the way up advanced surface-to-air missile
technology to make any potential American or Israeli strike on
Iranian territory even harder. So it is a layered approach.
They know how to take advantage of the existing alliance
structures while keeping themselves at a distance.
Ms. Stroul. Turkey is a good example of where we took
action where we warned. So recalling the CAATSA legislation
there was a very significant piece of that legislation: if you
make a significant defense purchase from Russia, there will be
consequences. And despite the fact that Washington twisted
itself in knots for a very long time about this issue Turkey
was written out of the F-35 Program and led to a lot of
challenges between Ankara and Washington and had a lot of
challenges for the NATO alliance. We are at an interesting
moment in time with Turkey. This is a prime example of how
skilled patient diplomacy can both address very de-stabilizing
actions and the same time shore up an important member of NATO.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Titus.
And we now proceed to Congressman Dr. Rich McCormick of
Georgia.
Mr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It is my opinion that the Iranian government is perhaps the
most notorious government we have to deal with foreign affairs,
sponsoring terror all over world right now, not just in the
Middle East, but all over the world, literally supplying our
enemies with weapons than can hurt both United States citizens
abroad as well as our allies all over the world.
And yet our sanctions--pastor, you mentioned I think
recently just during your testimony today the JCPOA and its
ineffectiveness. The United Nations sanctions that--or sorry,
the United States sanctions that we had through Obama giving
billions of dollars to basically get rid of a nuclear program I
believe is--is it expired already?
Mr. Noronha. Large parts of the JCPOA have all expired and
90 percent of the U.N. sanctions have expired.
Mr. McCormick. Yes, I saw that, too. 2020 and 2025 the rest
will expire. And ironically through all this holding them
back--I think they still have procured enough uranium to
basically make three nuclear weapons within a couple day to a
couple weeks essentially. So it really did not do what it was
supposed to do even though we paid them to do that.
They continue to have the money to fund terrorist
organizations and weaponize them all. And meanwhile they have
built all this technology for cyber weapons, obviously drones,
other weaponry that they are producing all the--and they have
killed Americans essentially. Producing weapons that have been
used against us directly. We lost three Georgians recently. And
you mentioned that also in your testimony.
So how does it make any sense that new sanctions are going
to help us when the old sanctions did not help us to begin
with? In other words, cheaters cheat. I am concerned that we
are not doing enough and that we are not using our
cybersecurity or even our cyber weapons, our ability to
undercut their energy production and their funding of this and
as well as literally destroy the weapon producing facilities
that are killing Americans and our allies. We are at war as far
as I am concerned.
Why would we rely on sanctions? I will let both of you
answer this in a second because I think this is really
important. This is the bottom line: Why not do something
effective while we have the ability? We need to talk about a
commensurate response. We keep in waiting for somebody to get
hurt or killed before we respond with like kindness. We are the
biggest, baddest players on the planet and, yes, we want to
wait until they are strong enough to harm us before we have a
commensurate response.
Anybody who has been to war fighting college, anybody who
has been to command staff, anybody who has anything in the
military, who has marched up the ladder understands you do not
respond with like kinded-ness. You respond with overwhelming
force and people get that. Reagan did it in Libya. They
understood. You can even say that Bill Clinton did it in
Somalia and they understood. When you respond with strength
people understand. Why are we wasting our time with sanctions
when we can actually do something about it?
I will let both of you respond.
Mr. Taleblu. Thank you, Congressman. I think at this point
in time sanctions are a necessary but not sufficient element of
the equation, particularly when you look at the growing Russia-
Iran partnership.
One example: the drones, right? We need sanctions to go
after the defense industrial base of Russia, the defense
industrial base of Iran. You need good regulatory measures and
tough export controls to go after the technology that goes into
those weapons that feed into the foreign and domestic supply
chains.
Then on the back end you need good local intelligence in
places that the Iranians and Russians are using the drones to
figure out the battle tactics, to figure out how they are used.
You need to make sure that your partners in those local
jurisdictions have good air and missile defenses to shoot them
down. And talk about punishment, you want to make sure that
your partners who are forward-deployed in that area have the
capability to respond in kind.
So if it is a place like Ukraine, for example, you know,
the Russians get Iranian drones. The Ukrainians should get
ATACMS. And they have. And there is the U.K. Storm Shadow as
well. So you want to be able to go tit for tat. This is like a
cocktail-kind of approach. And not any one of these will be
enough to deter the Iranian or Russian use.
What will be enough to deter the Russian or Iranian use is
throwing this cocktail at them and ratchetting it up over time.
It is not punishment. It is punishment over time that gets an
adversary to back down.
Mr. Noronha. Well, I associate myself with his remarks.
What I would say is we have escalation dominance, but we need
to be able to maintain escalation dominance. We cannot take
that for granted.
To me, when I was imposing sanctions on Iran it was about
how do you bankrupt their war machine? How do you make them
have to do their defense sequestration so they have to cut
their own procurement lines?
We were doing that. They had to shutter some of their
centrifuges because they couldn't even buy new centrifuges.
They couldn't produce certain munition rounds in tanks. We need
to get back to doing that. We can get back to a posture where
they are down to maybe half a million barrels of oil per day.
We can do that. We just have to have the political will to
sanction certain things. It is quality, not quantity when it
comes to sanctions as something we should consider.
Mr. McCormick. I agree with both of you. I think we do more
both through sanctions and other strong forced willed policy,
but the main thing is that we just pay attention to which
Administrations are doing what. And when you want to see who is
soft on crime, so to speak, it is evident. We need to come
hard. Thank you. With that, I yield.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much Congressman Dr. Rich
McCormick.
And we now proceed to Congresswoman Kathy Manning, who--of
North Carolina, who is going to be very sorely missed in that
she has announced as a statesperson not to run for reelection.
Congresswoman Manning?
Ms. Manning. Thank you to my friend, Chairman Wilson, my
friend Chairman Kean, and of course Ranking Member Keating for
this--holding this hearing.
And thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
So Russia's illegal invasion and ongoing aggression in
Ukraine is the most significant threat to our rules-based
international order in decades and Iran is the world's leading
sponsor of terrorism. It poses a direct threat to our ally
Israel. And we saw on Saturday, it attacked Israel with an
unprecedented drone and missile attack on civilian populations.
And let's be clear, had it not been for the extraordinary
defensive measures by the U.S., the U.K., Israel, and others,
the Iranian attack last Saturday could have resulted in
devastating loss of life in Israel.
And you mentioned in your remarks, Ms. Stroul, Iran's next
attack on Israel could be much more lethal. So we should be
doing everything possible to disrupt this growing diabolical
relationship between Iran and Russia to protect our own
interests and to protect the interests of the free world.
I want to followup, Ms. Stroul, on Representative Amo's
questions about the SU fighter aircraft. As you mentioned in
your testimony if Iran were to provide ballistic missiles to
Russia and Russia were to provide the Su-35 fighter aircraft to
Iran, what should our response be and should there be
consequences?
Ms. Stroul. I think there should absolutely be
consequences. The question is how do we do these, the cocktail
approach to steadily ratchet up pressure?
So first of all, we will face a policy question here. And
your committee will have a serious role in discussing whether
or not it changes the kinds of weapons and platforms we are
willing to sell to our partners in the region, No. 1.
No. 2, the Administration did downgrade intelligence to
highlight the consideration in Tehran of ballistic missiles to
Russia. Referring to earlier questions, there is no evidence
that that transfer has happened yet, but we should be planning
as if it is going to happen because Russia is reliant on Iran.
Ms. Manning. Is there anything we could do to stop that
transfer?
Ms. Stroul. Well, there are ways that we could continue to
make it very difficult for that transfer to happen. The
airlines that are transporting it, the Caspian Sea trade that
is happening. There are a range of other options as well.
Generally, if Iran decides to make that decision to
transfer ballistic missiles to Russia, it is not only about the
security and safety of Ukraine. It is about Europe, it is about
the Middle East, it is about Israel, and of course it is also
about our allies in other theaters. So what we are seeing
especially after this weekend is a significant effort to
coordinate, galvanize, and energize allies and partners. The
sanctions being contemplated this week I think are a step and
an important first step, but it cannot stop there. And we are
going to have to continue this coordination.
Ms. Manning. And let me just followup on that question
because Russia and Iran are two of the most sanctioned
countries in the world. So given that reality we can talk about
more sanctions, but what is the single most significant thing
the U.S. or our partners and allies could do to force a change
of behavior in these regimes?
Ms. Stroul. I am not sure there is one most significant
single thing. I do think we have to be smart about sanctions.
One of the reasons that both of them have not felt the
pressure as hydrocarbon economies is because they are trading
lessons on how to do illicit ship-to-ship oil transfer at sea,
turning off the GPS corresponders of the ships. We have for a
long time though through how to deny Iran access to Swift, the
international financial mechanism. They are developing and
alternative to Swiss--to Swift. They are working on de-
dollarizing their trade.
If they continue with these very significant economic
moves, and then you have a Beijing, a Pyongyang, a Caracas join
in, then we have a serious challenge with the efficacy of our
sanctions regimes which means we are--we cannot do this alone
and unilaterally. We have to be working with our allies and
partners.
Ms. Manning. Thank you.
Mr. Noronha, you wanted to jump in.
Mr. Noronha. To build off of my colleague's comments, I
think Europe might actually have more leverage than we do on
this because we have done so many of these things. So Europe
presents something to Iran and says if you conduct this
transfer of ballistic missiles, then we snap back or then we
shut off the airlines. Deterrence is the question and I think
there should be----
Ms. Manning. So what if they were to actually designate the
IRGC as a terrorist organization? Would that be a good place to
start?
Mr. Noronha. I think that would. That is something that
would irritate them immensely.
Ms. Manning. Thank you. Unfortunately, my time is expired.
I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Kathy
Manning of North Carolina.
We now proceed to Congressman Darrell Issa of California.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Chairman.
Ms. Stroul, I am going to continue on where you left off.
Is it fair to say that in the case of Iran if you do not cutoff
the oil, you cutoff nothing?
Ms. Stroul. In the past we have sought to cutoff oil sales
and dampen that. Their behavior and investment in terrorism did
not change, so I think it is important but cannot stand on its
own.
Mr. Issa. So if what others have said already here today
that at the end of the last Administration Iran was broke, they
were having to shut down their investments even in their
nuclear program, and they were begging for opportunities to
feed their people, quite frankly, so they could divert some--
what money they had to other things--that is not the case now--
is there any substantial difference between 3 years ago and
today other than the quantity of oil they are making available
for profit?
Ms. Stroul. I think it is also important to recognize that
they did react to the maximum pressure campaign in the previous
Administration by using force, first by seeking to mine and
target tankers in the Arabian Gulf, and second by launching an
attack on Abqaiq in 2019 against Saudi Arabia. In both cases
our partners asked for military support and they did not
receive it from the United States, which shook the confidence
of our partners. So I think looking at it only in the binary
way that that argument was presented misses some of the
context.
Mr. Issa. I am not saying we shouldn't do more. I just want
to make sure I understand that if we fail--in my--in this
member's opinion, if we fail to cutoff the oil which would
require interdicting at sea ships that are taking on Iranian
oil directly and indirectly--if we do not do that then we miss
the opportunity to stop the funding, notwithstanding direct
funding the United States has provided. I agree with you that
we also have to defend our neighbors.
And when I met with the crowned prince in Saudi Arabia, he
made it very clear he did not choose to go to Iran to cut a
deal. He was forced to go to Iran to cut a deal because of our
inaction.
Let me change course a little bit on this. Mr. Taleblu, do
you know the current status of the $6 billion that was agreed
to be released from South Korea?
Mr. Taleblu. Are you referring to the one that was passed
through in Qatar and----
Mr. Issa. Yes.
Mr. Taleblu [continuing]. Accordingly to the latest reports
was allegedly designed to be--or was allegedly supposed to be
frozen after October 7? So based on press reports/what was
leaked from the Administration to reporters, it is supposed to
be frozen in Qatar. I seriously think that that should be
checked in terms of oversight capabilities of the U.S. Congress
to make sure that that is actually being frozen.
In a post-October 7 and a post-April 13-14 world we cannot
be affording to give a dime to the world's foremost State
sponsor of terrorism particularly when this Administration's
own Treasury personnel that comes before the U.S. Congress, Mr.
Adeyemo, and talks about how even in the past when it comes to
humanitarian sanctions waivers the government of the Islamic
Republic prioritized funding the IRGC, not feeding the Iranian
people.
Mr. Issa. Following up on that, the late Senator McCain
once called Russia a gas station impersonating a country. Is it
fair to say Iran is effectively a gas station in that they have
very few internal resources of true development other than
the--that which they glean through their export of oil?
Mr. Taleblu. I would slightly qualify it as a proud Iranian
American that Iran is indeed a--is home to a glorious
civilization. The Islamic Republic of Iran does not do justice
to that civilization. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a poor
guardian of the Iranian national interest and functions akin to
a mafia that generates revenue from oil and gas that we have to
sanction them.
Mr. Issa. Notwithstanding the Iranian people, I was
referring to the GDP of the country in this era. And I say so
for a reason: If not for the weapons production capability,
which almost exclusively depends on Chinese cooperation,
technology, and parts, would Iran be in a position effectively
to export or even to fire the drones they fired over the
weekend?
Mr. Taleblu. Partially yes. Not entirely, but partially
yes. The Islamic Republic has been developing a robust defense
industrial base which requires us to keep pace with the growth
of this base, not just based on illicit foreign procurement
that comes through Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, and
other jurisdictions of weak central authority, potentially with
technology in Turkey and the UAE and Oman as well, but success
for us is----
Mr. Issa. So with the remaining time is it fair to say that
if we do not cutoff those illicit imports of technology and
parts, they will eventually have greater and greater internal
capability to produce weapons of destruction?
Mr. Taleblu. Absolutely, but the money you want to go after
is oil and petrochemical. Those are the two big financial
lifelines: oil and petrochemical.
Mr. Issa. Good closing. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Darrell Issa
for your incisive questions.
And we now proceed to Congresswoman Madeleine Dean of
Pennsylvania.
Ms. Dean. I thank you, Chairman Wilson, Chairman Kean,
Ranking Member Keating, for holding this timely hearing. And
thank you to our witnesses today for your expertise and
perspective.
As broadly discussed in all of our testimony to our
committee, Iran and Russia are moving toward greater and
greater cooperation, largely focused on their mutual desire to
combat the United States and western influences. The growth in
relations has only accelerated I think we believe and have seen
since the start of the war in Ukraine.
The reported expansion of military cooperation is
particularly disturbing especially considering Russia's
continuing aggression in Ukraine and Iran's stark unprecedented
attack on Israel over the weekend with more than 300 missiles
and drones, just a devastating attack. Fortunately the defense
was extraordinary and multinational, as you pointed out.
Ms. Stroul and Mr. Taleblu, you both ended your testimony
with the point No. 6 and point final, the importance of passing
the National Security Supplemental. I agree with you. It was 6
months ago that the Administration--it was late October,
October 20, the Administration called for the National Security
Supplemental, notably after the horrific attack in Israel by
Hamas.
You both call on that as the very important last item.
And, Mr. Taleblu, you said in your written statement,
quote, ``There couldn't be a starker contrast between Russia's
recent uptick in the use of Iranian drones and stalled debates
in Washington over supplemental funding to support Ukraine.
Beside the moral reasons there are strategic ones why the
Russo-Iranian model of the war must be defeated in Ukraine.''
What is going on? What are we risking through this long
stall?
Mr. Taleblu. While I understand that you have multiple
other financial, domestic, legal, other prerogatives, the
longer we do stall the greater this cooperation solidifies in
trend line. Remember, Syria was the start; Ukraine is the
present. There could be an even more dangerous future. Again, I
respect and understand the need to debate over funding and
priorities, but at this present moment the ability of our
adversaries to put aside their differences, in fact to be able
to compartmentalize their differences--Russia and Iran are
actually competing to sell China discounted sanctioned oil, but
they are still able to do that and tighten military ties.
So if our authoritarian adversaries can do it, there is
absolutely no reason why us and our democratic partners and
allies should not be doing this. This should be the price floor
to ramp up our cooperation with Ukraine against Putin in
Russia.
Mr. Dean. And your quite courteous to say that there is
important debate going on. There is sad stalling going on. We
should have supported our ally Ukraine much earlier. Obviously,
we were very important in the beginning and continue--we will
continue to be important to Ukraine.
There is no reason for this long stall. And of course
Israel needs us as its friend and ally as it faces its security
issues.
Ms. Stroul, I wanted to ask you what you think about this
pause, this stall. If we fail to pass the National Security
Supplemental, if we continue to stumble and stall as a result
of politics, what is at risk? And if you can, layer in the risk
of election interference.
Ms. Stroul. Thank you for the question. Since my colleague
Behnam talked about the implications in Ukraine, I think the
implications for how the world views United States leadership
and partnership is at risk. So if they see us after 2 years of
working to provide Ukraine security assistance, not for us to
fight Russian aggression, but to enable Ukraine to fight
Russian aggression and defend their territory, then adversaries
in other theaters will feel very emboldened. So it is not just
about Ukraine.
If the world sees us picking partners, picking Israel and
not Ukraine, then they will think that they can play off
differences, sow divisions. And maybe we pick one partner
another day and somebody else the next day and again our
partners will question our staying power and commitment to
their security.
And of course while we spend a lot of time focusing right
now on Ukraine and on Israel, there is just no question that
Beijing is watching this with glee and delight and making sure
and preparing for how to sow division here so that we have our
own debates about when and where to support Taiwan or other
smaller states in the INDOPACOM theater that are under
intimidation and coercive behavior by Beijing and are preparing
for that day.
Ms. Dean. Yes, I couldn't agree with you more.
I know you signaled you wanted to add one more thing?
Mr. Taleblu. One very quick thing. Perhaps this might help
the debate in Congress. Iran's chief terrorist Qasem Soleimani,
who the Trump Administration killed in January 2020, used to
have a saying when he travel the Middle East. He used to say
we're not like the Americans. We do not abandon our friends.
Let that sink in.
Ms. Dean. And may all of our colleagues hear that, both
here and on the Senate side. You do not pick and choose
friends. You are a friend this week; you are not a friend that
week. We stand strong with our allies. We must pass the
National Security Supplemental for the security of Israel, for
the humanitarian aid that needs to get into Gaza and other
regions of the world, to the Palestinians and the West Bank as
well, and of course to continue to support Ukraine. If we fail
to support Ukraine, we fail ourselves. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Dean.
We now proceed to Congressman Jim Baird of Indiana.
Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
My question deals with the assessment of the expiration of
the United Nations' missile and long-range drone embargo on
Iran and how that has impacted Russia's willingness to procure
missiles. And while you are on that, if Iran follows through on
the deal to transfer hundreds of missiles to Russia, how would
it impact Russia's operations in Ukraine? And I would like to
start in reverse order so that, Ms. Stroul, you get to go
first.
Ms. Stroul. First of all, I think public reporting has
suggested that Iran--that the majority of Iran's ballistic
missiles in the attack on April 13 that Israel failed in
flight. So that should cause us to think through how we think
about coercion and use of force against Iran in our own plans.
And I think our partners should be thinking twice about the way
in which they might be intimidated by Iranian threats of
aggression.
No. 2, however, the transfer of ballistic missiles to
Russia for use in Ukraine is incredibly serious. We would need
to think through the kinds of air defenses that we are
supplying Ukraine. We would have to get more, faster, and
coordination with our allies in Europe. We should think through
again this cocktail of additional coercive measures at Russia
and Iran for that supply. I would hope to see more downgraded
intelligence to shine a light on the risks of what this is,
more training and offers of support to Ukrainian forces. And we
should think through ways to sabotage and undermine the actual
physical transfer of those capabilities.
Mr. Noronha. Representative, I recently read quotes from an
anonymous Russian official saying explicitly there's no
international prohibition against buying Iranian missiles
anymore, so what's your concern? The arms embargo has expired
so we're fully within our right to purchase this, slight
paraphrase.
The other things that we should be watching is other
countries also taking advantage of this. Sudan, the Sudanese
armed forces is reportedly looking to buy Iranian drones. China
is looking to supply both Iran and Russia with ammonium
perchlorate, which is used in missile fuel. So this is not
hypothetical. There are a lot of countries saying, hey, the
international embargo has expired. We have full legal rights to
now executive on these things. So that is why I am harping
quite a bit on this snapback.
Mr. Taleblu. The quote that Gabe just mentioned, sir, about
the Russians saying that they will not adhere to any
international legal restrictions because there are no
international legal restrictions the Russians literally said I
think a day after those U.N. sanctions expired on October 18,
2023. So it just goes to you show you the cost of inaction.
I think a price floor, again a la what Gabe was saying, was
snapback. Snapback does not just restore these older penalties
on Iran. It restores a permanent international arms transfer
prohibition to and from Iran and it restores a permanent
ballistic missile testing and transfer prohibition on the
Islamic Republic of Iran. These are permanent and they would be
diplomatic wins you enshrine in the U.N. Security Council.
Three other quick things: Totally agree with Dana in terms
of public diplomacy. More intel sharing about Russo-Iranian
cooperation can get more people to be concerned about it and
potentially help to deter that.
No. 2 is USG messaging. We have significant Persian
language and Russian language media through the Broadcasting
Board of Governors. Every single day these media outlets, in my
view, should be talking about the historic enmity that used to
exist between Russia and Iran.
My testimony details the turbulent Russo-Iranian past that
every Iranian nationalist knows from taking away territory to
causing famine to trying to sponsor separatist insurrection to
support for communist parties in Iran. This was a turbulent
relationship and the less political space the leadership in
Iran has to maneuver the better it will be for us.
In 2016, for example, Russia used to stage bombers from
Iranian bases to go hit Syria. They couldn't do that anymore
once this story became public. So do not be afraid to put the
spotlight on the cooperation.
Mr. Baird. Thank you. I appreciate all your answers and I
yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Jim Baird.
We now proceed to Congressman Brad Sherman of California.
Mr. Sherman. Ms. Stroul, did I hear you right that you say
that half of the 300 missiles and drones aimed at Israel just
fell from flight without being shot down?
Ms. Stroul. A good percentage of the ballistic missiles
fell.
Mr. Sherman. Oh, well, mostly it was drones though in terms
of numbers?
Ms. Stroul. The ballistic missiles.
Mr. Sherman. Not in terms of the impact, but in terms of
the numbers? I would point out that I look forward to us
hopefully developing laser weapons that would be the answers to
these cheap and fragile drones.
We start with the idea that both Russia and Iran are evil
and then we jump to the conclusion that they are infinitely
evil. And I am not sure that is the case, at least with regard
to Russia. What has Russia not done that they could have gotten
away with as far as providing fissile material to Iran? Iran
does not have enough fissile material for 20 or 30 nuclear
weapons. Could Russia have easily provided that and could they
have gotten away with it? I will ask the--yes.
Mr. Taleblu. There was a period in time, particularly in
the post-cold war period from the 1990's to about the early
2000's where the Clinton Administration was able to
successfully leverage a western-looking Russia to not provide
Iran with this stuff. So for example, the Russians----
Mr. Sherman. Yes, I am talking about now. I mean, Putin
obviously has staked his career on success in Ukraine. He finds
the drones from Iran useful. But as far as been reported to
this committee he has not provided nuclear know-know, fissile
material, or worse yet sold an assembled nuclear weapon to
Iran. Do we have evidence that he has and what is the risk that
he will?
Mr. Taleblu. We do not have evidence that he has, but we
also have a lot of outstanding questions. For example, Russia
is still slated to produce a new reactor for Iran in Bushehr.
Russia's activities per the JCPOA require them to help verify
things at Fordow. And Russia per the JCPOA was home to Iran's
excess enriched uranium, which we do not know the status of
those.
Mr. Sherman. Well, that was part of the deal.
Mr. Taleblu. Yes.
Mr. Sherman. They were supposed to be. I will go to the----
Mr. Noronha. There was declassified information in 2022
that Iran sought certain nuclear materials from Russia. We do
not have declassified information that Russia obliged that. I
would note----
Mr. Sherman. I want to go onto another topic, and that is
we are talking about limiting these drone parts. And obviously
we should, but just because the majority are made in the United
States does not mean that other countries do not have the
capacity. Does China have the capacity to make the very drone
parts that are our panel has asked us not to export?
Mr. Noronha. Some of them, but not all of them.
Mr. Sherman. And how long would it take for them to be able
to do all of them?
Mr. Noronha. If they were intent on it, a year or two.
These are not terribly advanced.
Mr. Sherman. Got you. Yes.
Mr. Noronha. They are moderately advanced.
Mr. Sherman. Drones are for sale at hobby stores. They are
not the most advanced of military equipment.
I would point out that many of us on this committee urged
that we arm Ukraine before February 2022. Had we done that,
there might not have been a February 24, 2022. And now it is
critical that we provide weapons to Taiwan because an invasion
of Taiwan would be an even worse outcome for our national
security.
Let's see. If we had snapback and Russia was prohibited
from buying drones from Iran, would they adhere to that?
Mr. Noronha. No, they would not, but what does--what
snapback does do is it grants all U.N. member states both the
right and obliges to inspect and seize and cargo in their
airspace or sea territory that may be containing prohibited
items. So anything from the Black Sea----
Mr. Sherman. So this prohibits weapons from going from Iran
to Russia, albeit that does not go through anybody's airspace
except--well, it goes over Azeri airspace. I do not know if we
could count on Azerbaijan to force down a Russian plane or an
Iranian plane. Would it entitle those countries to interrupt
parts shipments going into Iran?
Mr. Noronha. Yes.
Mr. Sherman. So that might be helpful. And it is possible
that China would adhere to the sanctions.
Mr. Noronha. And China tends to be pretty--they are not
perfect by any means, but they do not want to get too far
afield. And then countries like Sudan might not purchase
Iranian drones if it is prohibited.
Mr. Sherman. Don't count on Sudan.
Mr. Noronha. Might. Might.
Mr. Sherman. Sudan is more likely to violate the U.N. than
Russia. And I yield back. I know there at least two governments
in Sudan right now. I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Sherman.
And I want to point out the sophistication of drones. At
truck stops they cost $29.95. And then at Ollie's Outlet you
can get a very advanced one for 39.95. But a person who does
not need to buy one, but the most persistent person here paying
attention the whole time, and he is not the last one, but
Congressman Brian Mast of Florida.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have thoroughly enjoyed this panel. I thought you have
been analytical and specific and have enjoyed it from beginning
to end. I want to get into some specific economic questions and
I hope that is OK that you all--if you do not know, just say
you do not know because we are talking about specific numbers.
I am not trying to nail you down. I am just trying to really
understand some things.
What do we understand the GDP of Russia to be? My estimate,
2 billion? Somebody else in here have something to say----
Mr. Noronha. Two trillion.
Mr. Mast. Two trillion? I am sorry. I did not mean to say
billion. Trillion? Two trillion?
Mr. Noronha. Two trillion is roughly----
Mr. Mast. Two trillion, roughly? Right. We have an estimate
for EU GDP?
Mr. Noronha. Twenty.
Mr. Mast. Twenty? That is what I was thinking, 20, 25
trillion, maybe--or 15 to 20 trillion. I would say 25 trillion
for the United States, right? We have an estimate for Ukraine
GDP? In the billions?
Mr. Noronha. Billions I think. I do not know, but----
Mr. Mast. Maybe 200 billion? Maybe less?
Mr. Noronha. Higher than that, I think.
Mr. Mast. Higher? Five hundred?
Mr. Noronha. Somewhere around there. I apologize. I do not
have the----
Mr. Mast. No, it is OK.
Mr. Noronha [continuing]. On that.
Mr. Mast. You were not given these specific questions in
advance or anything, so you are not expected to actually know
exactly what they are. But it is important to realize--what to
your knowledge is Russia having a capability to--or who to your
knowledge is Russia having a capability to export to right now?
Mr. Noronha. They export large volumes of oil to--India is
their primary exporter; China is their secondary exporter. They
are still doing decently large volumes to European Union
countries, particularly in gas condensate. And then a
hodgepodge all over the world. Nickel, aluminum, potash,
lumber, lots of other exports besides petrochemicals that they
are still doing across the world including to the United
States.
Mr. Mast. And what is your worry as you look at the oil and
gas exports specifically about those coming back around in a
circle to European nations, from India, China, Iran, anybody?
Mr. Noronha. We know that Russia and Iran use each other to
disguise their own oil shipments. Russia uses Iran as a
sanctions evasion hub. They do ship-to-ship transfers. They do
fake invoices. So a very sophisticated system to use and abuse
any and all financial systems.
Mr. Mast. No doubt about it. And some of the conversation
we have had already about snapback sanctions as it relates to
Iran would specifically help European Union members and others
from not being able to have Russian energy or something else
come back and essentially be funding the entity that we are at
war with. So it is important to look at that as well.
Do you see the currently in Russia would you assess
economic growth or economic decline?
Mr. Noronha. They were slated to grow at 3.5 percent last
quarter, and over 3 percent this year, much higher than the EU
or the United--or and about/on par with the United States.
Mr. Mast. What do you attribute the economic growth to in
Russia as they are at war committing more to war resource and
there are sanctions on them? How are they growing?
Mr. Noronha. It is mostly their petro--their oil and
petrochemical sales which are higher today than they were
before the war.
Mr. Mast. And again, go specifically to where those--where
do you put the most profit coming in for them from?
Mr. Noronha. India, and China being second to that. They
are not under----
Mr. Mast. Any numbers you could put on that to specifically
gauge what the numbers on their economic growth?
Mr. Noronha. They imported--they exported $120 billion in
oil in 2021. In petrochemicals they exported 180 billion 2022.
So roughly a quarter of that India, roughly a quarter of that
China, and then the rest of the world.
Mr. Mast. OK. Let's go to some specific war numbers. What
do you assess Russia will be spending on the Ukraine war in
2024, or what do you assess that they spent in 2023?
Mr. Noronha. They are spending 6 percent of their defense--
other GDP on defense. They have managed to raise their defense
spending. They have not increased their debt. Their debt to GDP
is 18 percent. It has stayed at 18 percent the last 3 years
while ours has ballooned to 130 percent.
Mr. Mast. Why do you assess, if you do, that the EU cannot
foot the bill--given the GDP of the EU versus the GDP of
Russia, it being substantially more, that the EU cannot foot
the bill for the war against Ukraine?
Mr. Noronha. In my view, in my assessment it is a political
choice. They have chosen to fund social programs and domestic
priorities, climate initiatives, and they have chosen not to
defend--to spend certain defense numbers. That is Europe as a
whole. That is not true for Eastern Europe or Northern Europe.
Mr. Mast. Quickly, in your estimation you would say that EU
could foot the bill for Russian deterrence, deterring this
Russian aggression, helping Ukraine fight the war if they had a
reappropriation of their resources?
Mr. Noronha. They certainly have the fiscal space. They do
not have--they have the fiscal space, they have the debt space,
they have the ability to raise debt in a way that they can do
it if they so wished.
Mr. Mast. That is very important. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Brian Mast of
Florida.
We now proceed to Congressman Brad Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for your time. As was said,
this has been a very insightful and informative conversation.
I want to pick up on some things you were saying. It was
noted that the growing relationship between Iran and Russia is
a threat to the United States, our interests and our allies,
and the rules-based international order. Let me ask--go down
the line, do you agree?
Mr. Ben Taleblu, do you agree with that?
Mr. Taleblu. Yes, indeed it is a threat.
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Noronha?
Mr. Noronha. Yes, it is a threat.
Mr. Schneider. Ms. Stroul?
Ms. Stroul. Yes.
Mr. Schneider. OK. Mr. Noronha, I am going to quote you,
and you said with respect to Iran and Russia, quote, ``It is
unwise and deeply myopic for leaders in the West to believe
they can ignore one country's threats and still hope to counter
the threats of the other, that these two things are linked.''
So I won't ask you if you agree.
But, Mr. Ben Taleblu, do you agree with that statement?
Mr. Taleblu. Yes, there is that linkage.
Mr. Schneider. Ms. Stroul?
Ms. Stroul. Yes.
Mr. Schneider. OK. And all of you, and thank you for this,
and we will hopefully put this to good use, you brought to us a
number of what I will call wise and good recommendations for
what we can do, what we can and should do to address the
growing Russia-Iran partnership. But let me ask the group
again, is there anything more important or more urgent than
passing the essential national security-related funding bills
for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan.
I will go the other way. Ms. Stroul?
Ms. Stroul. There is nothing more important.
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Noronha?
Mr. Noronha. There is nothing more important.
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Ben Taleblu?
Mr. Taleblu. There are a lot of close seconds, but there is
nothing more important.
Mr. Schneider. All right. So I think we have consensus, and
I agree with you 100 percent, this is the most important thing
we need to do. We should have done it last year when President
Biden made the request. We certainly should have passed it in
the House more than 2 months ago when the Senate passed their
bill. And I am going to argue we are wasting time now putting a
different bill that will then have--or set of three bills that
will have to go through the machinations of Congress back to
the Senate and then hopefully to the President, with no
guarantees.
So let me ask a final question on this line of thought:
What are the consequences if Speaker Johnson's plans fail and
the House does not act? I will open that up to anyone who wants
to jump in. Mr. Noronha?
Mr. Noronha. Thinking about the consequences if Ukraine
loses and we have Russian forces on the border, truly on the
borders of NATO, it is going to complicate the problem of
deterring an Iranian nuclear breakout. If U.S. forces have to
go flood into EUCOM again, if CENTCOM is getting de-
prioritized, it is much harder, and I think my colleague can
speak to this, to prevent all the issues that we would have to
deal with to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
The follow-on effects of losing Ukraine are enormously
catastrophic for Israel, for our Middle East security goals. It
is not just limited to this one theater.
Mr. Schneider. And before I come to you, Ms. Stroul, I want
to emphasize something. You said so basically if Russia wins in
Ukraine, it is more likely that Iran breaks out with a nuclear
weapon. You also said earlier that if Russia wins, it is also
more likely Iran has bases in Europe armed with nuclear
weapons.
Mr. Noronha. That is my assessment. I think that latter one
is hopefully a low probability, but it is not zero.
Mr. Schneider. But it is a real risk.
Ms. Stroul?
Ms. Stroul. When we talk about the rules-based
international order, what we mean is that Putin is seeking to
change internationally recognized boundaries by force. If he
succeeds in do that and the world does not hold the line at
Ukraine, what Iran wants in the Middle East is to be the
regional hegemon. Iran does not want to stay in its borders. It
wants to challenge that. Why is it fomenting all of these
proxies and non-State actors across the Middle East to
challenge the borders of Israel? And China. What does China
want? Taiwan.
So every adversary in every theater will think that there
is a chance that they will be able to get out of jail free by
changing internationally recognized borders by force and that
the United States will not stand with its allies and partners
in defending those borders.
Mr. Schneider. I couldn't agree with you more. And at the
risk of--maybe if the chair would give me another 90 minutes we
could have a whole history lecture. But Russia is aspiring in
my view to restore a bygone empire. Iran is struggling to
restore its bygone empire. China, the same.
The modern world order, as we talk about it, the rules-
based order is, as you said, where nations respect each other's
boundaries, where alliances are built, where working together
in the world countries establish relationships diplomatically,
trade, economies grow, people live in peace, security, and
prosperity. That is the world the United States helped create
after World War II. It is the world that we want to preserve
and it is the world that is under dire threat both in Ukraine
because of Russia's attack, and the Middle East because of
Iran's actions. And in the Pacific--Indo-Pacific, which is why
it is so important that we pass this supplemental funding bill.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Brad Schneider
of Illinois.
We now proceed to Congressman Keith Self of Texas.
Mr. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me help you with the
GDPs. The United States is roughly 29 trillion. The EU is
roughly 20 trillion. Russia is 2.5 trillion. Texas, my State
Texas, Texas alone 1.8 trillion.
I want to move to something very mundane: logistics. There
are multiple Iranian airliners that fly through NATO countries
to Russia. There are sanctions on these airlines. The first
question is what has the Biden Administration done to enforce
sanctions on several of the Iranian airlines?
Mr. Noronha. These sanctions have been on these airlines,
some since the Obama Administration, others imposed in the
Trump Administration. There has been no secondary sanctions
enforcement on those airlines really, period, meaning if
airports refuel these airliners, no consequences, no
consequences for the air crew, any of these things. There has
simply been zero secondary sanctions enforcement.
Mr. Self. So if I can followup on that, if--and the
sanctions I believe talk about material support. Is it not true
that if an airliner lands on an airport, that in and of itself
is materials support?
Mr. Noronha. It is.
Mr. Self. How much on these Iranian airliners--what do they
transport into Russia? How much? What do you estimate?
Mr. Noronha. There were 72 flights in the first 2 months of
the war of Russia's Ukraine--war into Ukraine that according to
some reports were military flights, again containing--likely
containing ammunition, suicide drones, personnel. That is an
intel question. I am not exactly sure, but quite a bit I think
is the answer. Again, some of this is an intel question.
Mr. Self. OK. What can you tell us about their activities
to support the IRGC since October 7?
Mr. Noronha. Mahan Air and Iran Air were both sanctioned
for providing support for the IRGC sending even in some cases
ballistic missile parts into Syria disguised as alternate
cargo. One of the big issues with these airlines is they lie
about their cargo manifests to smuggle in weapons and other
dangerous WMD proliferation materials. That is again another
reason Europe shouldn't allow them into their airspace at all
because they lie about their crew. In Latin America they lied
and had IRGC officers disguised as crew members. They lie about
everything of their activities.
Mr. Self. And how would you recommend Congress taking
action to try to disrupt their supply lines in these airliners,
because I obviously sanctions are not working?
Mr. Noronha. I think--I believe you may have let a letter
to the U.K. asking them to take this seriously.
Mr. Self. To several countries.
Mr. Noronha. There is an issue. Those ministries of foreign
affairs do not necessarily tell the airports they have even
gotten that letter. If those airports realized that they were
liable to U.S. sanctions and could get sanctioned or if they
could realize that, hey, you might not get U.S. airliners to
your airport for a few months over this issue, they would very
rapidly in my view and assessment shut off these flights.
Again, there aren't that many flights from Iran Air and
Mahan Air into Europe. They are more important for Iran than
they are for these airports. They can do without them.
Mr. Self. So what you are saying is we ought to target the
airports, not the foreign ministers?
Mr. Noronha. Correct. Is the bankers and executive boards
and lawyers who are the ones making the call here, not
politicians.
Mr. Self. Very good. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Self.
And I want to point out how modest Congressman Self is.
There is no question the GDP of Texas is larger than the
Russian Federation. And any country that lies about cargo
manifests, those numbers are not correct. OK? And so I cannot
believe a Texan being modest, but it has occurred.
Now we go to Congressman Mike Lawler of New York.
Mr. Lawler. Another bastion of modesty.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. After this past
weekend's attack on Israel, which marked the first direct
attack on Israeli territory launched from Iranian territory,
the Biden Administration cannot ignore that their policies of
appeasement have emboldened the Iranian regime. The President
has failed to enforce sanction on Iran's illicit oil trade
allowing the regime to rack up tens of billions of dollars in
new revenue, over $88 billion.
This money funds its proxy wars against Israel and our
troops, no question about it. And the President also continues
to exercise waiver authority to free up billions of dollars for
Iran. Further, the Administration has been engaging in informal
negotiations with Iran on a nuclear deal during its tenure
giving credibility to Iran's development of these capabilities
and purposefully withholding any information about it from
Congress.
The erratic behavior on the part of the President and his
continued attempts at bowing down to the Iranian regime must
stop. And it begins with passing important legislation like the
SHIP Act and the Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act, two bills
that I introduced that would put in place stronger sanctions on
the illicit Iranian oil trade.
Mr. Taleblu, do you agree that the Biden Administration's
apologetic Iran policies have emboldened their terrorist
regime?
Mr. Taleblu. Unfortunately, very much yes, sir. I think the
first example of even a slight attempt at oil sanctions
enforcement came 16 months into the Biden Administration's
term. I think it was May 2022. So that is far too long.
Mr. Lawler. Do you have other instances to support this
viewpoint?
Mr. Taleblu. Broadly there is a whole series of pulled
punches. The fact that the Administration's even stated aim for
diplomacy with Iran changed so much over time gave Iran the
impression that it could get away with a lot more. You may
remember during the campaign period they talked about longer
and stronger. Once they started negotiating with the Iranians
via the Europeans they talked about JCPOA resurrection. Then
there was talk of all these smaller deals, side deals, and
particularly a lot of the hostage deals, the waivers that came
to the Islamic Republic. Basically creating room for the regime
to breathe under sanctions actually undermined the
Administration's own stated aim of a diplomatic resolution.
Mr. Lawler. Just yesterday the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee marked up and passed the SHIP Act. And we passed this
through the House last fall. Seemingly it only took 130
ballistic missiles for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
and Senate Democrats to realize that there was a problem with
the illicit Iranian oil trade. Do you believe that Senator
Schumer should immediately put this bill on the floor?
Mr. Taleblu. Absolutely, sir, and I thank you for your
leadership on pointing out the Iran-China energy nexus. China
has been the biggest in the past decade, licit and illicit,
importer of Iranian crude oil. This fact cannot go understated.
I think your legislation goes a far way toward targeting it.
Mr. Lawler. I mean, roughly 80 percent of Iranian petroleum
is purchased by China, $88 billion in increased revenue. Iran
is the greatest State sponsor or terror funding Hamas,
Hezbollah, the Houthis. Ninety-three percent of Hamas' budget
comes from Iran. This is a crisis. We must cutoff the funding
stream at its source, this illicit oil trade. And that is why
we have put this legislation forward to not only enact
secondary sanctions on the purchaser, but also on the financial
institutions which are facilitating the trade.
Yes, sir?
Mr. Noronha. When I was at the State Department 5 years ago
working on this particular problem one of the things that
really worried me was that China was creating what I called
sanctions-proof entities. So that you sanction them and they
say who cares, we are not going connected to the U.S. financial
system?
Mr. Lawler. Right.
Mr. Noronha. The way in my----
Mr. Lawler. These little teapots.
Mr. Noronha. The way in my view that the U.S. should solve
this is we can create leverage in other funds. They care a
whole lot about semiconductors, about trade, about aluminum,
things that have nothing to do with the Iran file. We need to--
in my view need to establish leverage on a series of things and
then lever that on rejections in Iranian oil imports.
Mr. Lawler. Agree with that. That is an important point to
make.
As I am sure you know, in the days before Iran's attack on
Israel the President and Senate Majority Leader Schumer made
some troubling statements about Israel's leadership and their
domestic affairs. No one in our country should be interfering
in Israeli elections, especially our elected officials. You
agree with that?
Mr. Taleblu. Absolutely, Congressman. I will go one step
further. Any daylight between the U.S. and Israel benefits
directly these Islamic Republic of Iran.
Mr. Lawler. Agree. I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Lawler. And
thank you for raising the issue about sale of oil. It is
heartbreaking to me that the world's largest democracy, India,
is buying oil from war criminal Putin to help finance the
invasion and--murderous invasion. I just cannot fathom such a
country so important as India doing this.
We are very fortunate--as we conclude we have the
Congressman Mayor Tim Burchett of Tennessee.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you. I prefer to be called the 435th
most powerful Member of Congress.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Burchett. Thank you. This is to all you all. As
documented by the non-profit United Against Nuclear Iran, since
the imposition of the price cap 86 tankers in the ghost fleet
that ships illicit Iranian oil has switched to carrying Russian
oil instead. Half of these vessels were flagged by Panama.
Should the U.S. increase pressure on Panama to de-flag these
vessels? A simple yes or now would be----
Ms. Stroul. Yes.
Mr. Burchett. OK.
Mr. Noronha. Yes, they should.
Mr. Taleblu. Yes.
Mr. Burchett. That is sort of a leading question, but I
appreciate the emphasis on it.
How important is the ghost fleet to financing Russia and
Iran's war machines?
Ma'am, we will start with you. Ladies first.
Ms. Stroul. I do not have information on the importance of
the ghost fleet to direct war efforts.
Mr. Burchett. OK.
Mr. Noronha. It is indispensable. Iran has a small and very
rickety fleet of tankers. Russia has very few tankers. Without
those ghost fleet tankers they cannot export their oil. If you
take out the ghost fleet tankers, they are out of business.
Mr. Burchett. OK. Do you agree, sir?
Mr. Taleblu. Yes, and also in general any macroeconomic
lifeline.
Mr. Burchett. Say that again? I am sorry.
Mr. Taleblu. Yes, and in general any macroeconomic lifeline
because the revenues generated will go toward funding the war
effort.
Mr. Burchett. All right. Iran sold a million more barrels
of oil per day in March 2024 than in March 2020. Do you feel
like this Administration, the Biden Administration is doing
everything it can to stop the sale of U.S.-sanctioned oil?
Ms. Stroul. I think it is important to recognize that while
there is what we can do to stop the sale of oil, there is also
the fact that Iranians--the Iranian regime is selling the oil
very cheap and China is willing to buy. So it is not just how
we think about punishing or targeting Iranian sales, but what
we can do about the purchasers. And here because of this
emerging and deepening strategic alliance between Moscow,
Tehran, and Beijing it is not just about targeting the Iranian
oil sales.
And I also think it is important to mention here as we talk
about oil sales and how it funds Iran or Russia's war machine
that Iranian terror is extremely cheap. They were able to
continue to foment chaos, fund, train, and direct their proxies
throughout the JCPOA and the maximum pressure campaign. So it
is not simply about cutting off the funding. I think it is very
important both for executive Branch and legislative branch to
think about what we can do other than just targeting the
economic incentives here given how cheap Iranian terror is.
Mr. Burchett. You all agree with that?
Mr. Taleblu. Yes, partially. Again, to go back to the
cocktail, and forgive me for this analogy, if it is a martini,
the macroeconomic pressure is----
Mr. Burchett. I am Southern Baptist, so I have no idea what
you are talking about. Please feel free to explain.
Ms. Stroul. Behnam, is Iranian terror cheap?
Mr. Taleblu. Iranian terror is cheap. And I will go one
further----
Ms. Stroul. No. Thank you.
Mr. Taleblu. Yes, but ballistic missiles and drone are
weapons of the weak, but that does not mean they do not kill.
So we should be in the business of macroeconomic pressure and
everything else Dana just said. It is not one or the other. And
here is the quiet part out loud: Iran seldom changes its
foreign and security policy. Iran has been on this collision
course for 45 years under the leadership of the Islamic
Republic. And so long as we treat the symptoms and not the
cause we are not going to get to the root problem here.
Mr. Burchett. Iran's putting about what, 2.5 million
barrels a day? Is that roughly----
Mr. Taleblu. 2.2 to 2.4, depending in estimates. And then--
--
Mr. Burchett. Right. And China is buying 80 percent of
their oil from them? Did I read that statistic right somewhere?
Roughly. We are good. Yes, I was just trying to get a ballpark.
These Iranian drones that are mentioned have been used to
directly attack Israel. Is there a way that the U.S. can
interrupt the production?
Ms. Stroul. Absolutely, and a lot of those actions are
already in place and they should be tightened up. First of all,
we need to shore up the air defenses of our partners. Israel
has an exceptional layered air defense.
Mr. Burchett. I understand.
Ms. Stroul. We just our partners together operate those air
defenses.
No. 2, we have to go after the dual-use components that are
ending up in Iran's drones.
No. 3, we have to stop and figure out how to degrade the
illicit transfer of Iranian drones to the Russian theater.
No. 4, we need to shore up Ukraine's air defenses and their
capabilities to down those drones.
And five, we need to increase information and intelligence
sharing between Ukraine and others who are at risk from Iranian
attack drones.
Mr. Burchett. Didn't we just have something that was
blocking those drones, the sale of those drones and now that
they are opening that pipeline back up so to speak? Have I read
something correctly about that recently?
Mr. Noronha. There was an U.N. embargo on sales and
purchases of Iranian drones and ballistic missiles that expired
on October 2023.
Mr. Burchett. Right.
Mr. Noronha. But that is one that can be returned.
Mr. Burchett. OK. Great. And I am sorry I have gone over,
Mr. Chairman. I yield nothing back to you.
Mr. Wilson. And I would like to point out actually with the
leadership of the 435th member legislation has passed on that
issue. And so he does not even know how successful he is.
And with that, pursuant to committee rules, all members
have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous
materials for the record. Subject to the length of limitation--
Congressman Burchett, at this time I would like for the
witnesses to stay in place--and thank goodness Congressman--the
ranking member has returned. Isn't this amazing? But anyway, I
wanted to get a picture with the witnesses in place. And I was
trying to have people from both parties here and he magically
appeared. So here we are.
And without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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