[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-75]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR
AND LAND FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2025 BUDGET REQUEST
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR
FIXED-WING TACTICAL AND TRAINING
AIRCRAFT PROGRAM
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 16, 2024
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-232 WASHINGTON : 2025
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
SAM GRAVES, Missouri RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
DON BACON, Nebraska SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
PAT FALLON, Texas PATRICK RYAN, New York
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
LANCE GOODEN, Texas
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
Jay Vallario, Professional Staff Member
Brooke Alred, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Norcross, Hon. Donald, a Representative from New Jersey, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 1
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
WITNESSES
Donnelly, RADM Michael, USN, Director, Air Warfare Division,
Department of the Navy......................................... 5
Gering, LtGen Bradford J., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation,
Department of the Marine Corps................................. 6
Guertin, Nickolas H., USN, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition, Department of the Navy. 4
Hunter, Andrew P., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Department of the Air
Force.......................................................... 2
Moore Jr., Lt Gen Richard G., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Plans and Programs, Department of the Air Force................ 3
Schmidt, Doctor Douglas C., Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation Office of the Secretary of Defense.................. 8
Schmidt, Lt Gen Michael J., USAF, Program Executive Officer and
Director for the F-35 Lightning II Program, Department of the
Air Force...................................................... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 35
Mr. Norcross................................................. 41
Mr. Hunter and Lt Gen Moore.................................. 43
Mr. Guertin, RADM Donnelly, and LtGen Gering................. 66
Lt Gen Schmidt............................................... 93
Dr. Schmidt.................................................. 120
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mrs. McClain................................................. 00
Mr. Gimenez.................................................. 00
FISCAL YEAR 2025 BUDGET REQUEST OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE FOR FIXED-WING TACTICAL AND TRAINING AIRCRAFT
PROGRAM
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 16, 2024.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:29 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert Wittman
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Wittman. I want to welcome everybody to the Tactical
Air and Land Subcommittee hearing today. This is convened to
hear about fiscal year 2025 budget request from the Department
of Defense's Fixed-Wing Tactical and Training Aircraft
Programs. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
I am going to focus on the national defense strategy and
the things that we need to do to accomplish that. Our effort
today is to be able to make sure that we get to your questions.
I know everybody here has an opening statement. We ask that you
stay strictly to the three minutes.
We have votes coming up, which means right around four
o'clock we are going to be called out, maybe a little bit
later.
So what I want to do is I am going to put my comments in
the record, and I am now going to recognize the ranking member,
Mr. Norcross.[The opening statement of Chairman Wittman is
available in the appendix on page 35.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD NORCROSS, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW JERSEY, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR
AND LAND FORCES
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman, and for all the
witnesses that have shown up today, I again will echo the
statements of the chairman. I will put my formal remarks in. I
just want to touch base on a number of issues that are coming
up, and hopefully we can squeeze those in in the appropriate
amount of time.
But the one thing I do want to mention when it comes to
capacity is important, but capabilities is the driver for what
we deal with each and every day. And that statement will become
more relevant as we get into the question and answer.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Norcross. I ask
unanimous consent that the chairman and the ranking member be
allowed to enter their opening remarks in the record. Hearing
no objections, so ordered.[The opening statement of Ranking
Member Norcross is available in the appendix on page 41.]
We will now to go to our witnesses, and we will allow the
witness panel to begin in whatever order you all have
preselected. The first one up, please give your comments. We
ask that you stick to the three-minute clock, and we will keep
time. It should be there in front of you as we start the clock.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW P. HUNTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF
THE AIR FORCE
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Chairman Wittman and Ranking Member
Norcross. Thanks for having us here today to provide testimony
on the Department of the Air Force's fiscal year 2025
President's budget request for Fixed-Wing Tactical and Training
Aircraft Programs.
As we testified last year, our operational imperatives work
highlighted the challenges of integration and the importance of
tight partnerships between the operational and acquisition
communities in developing the necessary capabilities to deter
and win future conflicts.
We look forward to working with Congress as we organize
into a more agile and integrated acquisition system that
delivers capabilities quickly and at scale for great power
competition and ask your support for our budget request,
including funding included for operational imperative
initiatives.
We remain steadfast in resourcing these priorities, as well
as others such as nuclear modernization. But our resources have
been limited by the 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act.
The impacts of the FRA [Fiscal Responsibility Act],
combined with the delays of funding through continuing
resolutions and restrictions on the retirements in weapon
systems that do not meet our needs on a national defense
strategy, divert the focus from our military's ability to
deliver decisive combat at risk. Nothing could be more
imperative than our need to receive timely authorization and
appropriation of our fiscal year 2025 budget request.
This budget request continues our modernization efforts,
such as the development of collaborative combat aircraft next
generation air dominance platform, the advanced battle
management system, our T-7 training aircraft, the E-7, and
munitions. It also allows us to continue fielding platforms,
like the F-15EX, the F-15 EPAWSS [Eagle Passive Active warning
Survivability System], F-22 upgrades, and F-35 Block 4, as well
as sustaining our current fleet.
I particularly want to highlight the CCA [collaborative
combat aircraft] program as the exemplar of our efforts to
develop and field new capabilities rapidly, affordability, and
at scale. The CCA program is working to complete CCA Increment
1 concept refinement efforts, and we will notify Congress as we
move forward with the vendors who will complete detailed
designs, build prototypes, and test production representative
test articles.
In fiscal year 2025, we will begin concept refinement for
the next CCA increment as we also continue to explore
international partnership participation.
Since time is of the essence in capability development, we
are thankful to Congress for providing quick start authority
through Section 229 of the fiscal year NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act]. Secretary Kendall highlighted a program
just approved through quick start which will initiate work on
providing C-3 battle management for moving target indication at
scale.
This effort is an element of the operational imperatives
funding request in fiscal year 2025, and the quick start
authority allows us to begin some of that work now.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. We look
forward to working with you and Congress, the committee,
industry, and the communities that support us to defend the
nation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter and Lt Gen Moore can
be found in the Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.
And now go to Lieutenant General Moore.
STATEMENT LT GEN RICHARD G. MOORE JR., USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF, PLANS AND PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
General Moore. Thank you, Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member
Norcross, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee
for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the
Department of the Air Force, and thank you for your continued
leadership and your unwavering support of the U.S. military.
Today we are, as you know, in the midst of a difficult
transition from a legacy force to one built to deter Chinese
aggression and win against any peer competitor. Fiscal year
2025 represents another opportunity for the Department of the
Air Force and the Congress to work together to remain the
world's preeminent power projection force.
We cannot afford to stop short of achieving the force our
nation needs. Our most valuable resources -- manpower, money,
and time -- remain limited. We must be disciplined in our
decisions and focus our investments on what we need most.
We do not want to get rid of aging airplanes, but in order
to invest in modernized capabilities while maintaining the
ability to keep our airmen ready, we must pivot both our
resources and our airmen to the future. We have to stop funding
things that do not measurably bring us closer to that goal.
Continuing to maintain our current force structure while
simultaneously pursuing modernization is creating a drain on
our resources. And those resources include our airmen and their
readiness.
The Air Force's strategy is not to divest but rather to
modernize. We must get past what is holding us back from being
able to compete. In our FY [fiscal year] 2025 request, the Air
Force remains focused on achieving a fight force mix that
provides a capable, sustainable, survivable, and affordable
force that can operate across a range of mission sets.
Most notably, our FY 2025 request seeks to preserve our
advances in modernization while shaping future investments
around long-range kill chains and the elements that support
them. This contribution to the joint force is central to our
ability to deter, and if necessary, defeat aggression.
We continue to make significant progress towards closing
key capability gaps, but the hard choices are not behind us. We
must consolidate the things that we need that are relevant to
the future fight and make them the most relevant we can. We
must remain united as a department and as a nation to
successfully overcome barriers to change.
Time is our most valuable asset on the path to
modernization, but it is not on our side. Our adversaries are
watching, and we must act now to make the difficult choices
that it takes to modernize. American lives and those of our
allies and partners rely on our ability to deliver air
superiority. We cannot fail in this endeavor.
We look forward to once again working with the Congress to
shape a lethal force that efficiently and affordably provides
the most capable air power for our nation. I am honored to sit
here today with Mr. Hunter and my joint teammates, and look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter and Lt. Gen. Moore
can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Wittman. Lt. Gen. Moore, thank you.
Mr. Guertin, you are now recognized.
STATEMENT OF NICKOLAS H. GUERTIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF
THE NAVY
Mr. Guertin. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Norcross, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today and for Congress's
support as we discuss the Department of Navy's tactical
aviation and munitions programs.
The FY 2025 budget request supports national security by
providing for the procurement of 53 fixed-wing aircraft for the
Department of Navy, which includes 13 F-35Bs, 13 F-35Cs, and 27
multi-engine training aircraft. This budget also supports the
start of the MQ-25 low rate initial production and procures
three MQ-25 Sting Rays.
The budget request continues to support the modernization
and sustainment of legacy and fourth generation multi-mission
aircraft. In March 17, F/A-18 E/F Block 3 production aircraft
were placed on contract with Boeing. This contract also
acquired technical data necessary for operational readiness and
post-production sustainment.
In addition, this budget supports life cycle modernization
initiatives and capability upgrades that enhance our inventory
while maintaining tactical relevance. We continue to focus on
stabilizing and strengthening the industrial base and managing
supply chains. We seek to invest $227 million to increase
production capacity and strengthen suppliers.
The Navy continues to take full advantage of authorities
granted by Congress in the FY 2023 NDAA that provides
streamlined, multi-year procurement processes for tactical
munitions.
Not only has this authority allowed the Department to
replenish munition stockpiles, which have been used in support
of conflicts in Ukraine, Israel, and the Red Sea, it stabilizes
the demand signal to industrial base, resulting in an increased
capacity to develop, upgrade, produce, and field munitions at
scale.
The FY 2025 budget continues to strategically shift the
focus of the fifth generation fighter production with the
acquisition of 175 F-35s across the FYDP [Future Years Defense
Program].
As the service acquisition executive for joint strike
fighter program, I will work closely with U.S. services, OSD
[Office of the Secretary of Defense], and the Joint Program
Office and industry partners to continue reducing program costs
and ensure the sustainment strategies is implemented that meets
the needs of the fleet and the entire F-35 enterprise.
The FY 2025 budget submission continues to invest in our
airwing of the future, to include next generation air dominance
and collaborative combat aircraft, which allow the Navy and
Marine Corps to achieve service goals for investment in a
future force and to maintain a competitive edge.
Overall, this budget represents the deliberate and informed
development of a modernized, integrated, all-domain naval force
for the fight today, tomorrow, and in the future, a fight that
requires us to be agile, think differently, and prioritize
wisely to meet an ever-changing and complex security
environment.
Thank you once again for the opportunity to be here before
your subcommittee today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Guertin, Admiral Donnelly,
and LtGen Gering can be found in the Appendix on page 66.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Guertin.
Rear Admiral Donnelly.
STATEMENT OF RADM MICHAEL DONNELLY, DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE
DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Admiral Donnelly. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member
Norcross, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear here today.
Naval aviation appreciates the committee's support with
recent procurement of new strike fighters and weapons and NDAA
language that improves the ability and more effectively get at
the capabilities and the capacities that we need for these
systems and programs.
The criticality of our work is on display in the Red Sea
with operations of Carrier Airwing 3 in Eisenhower Strike Group
to maintain global sea control and access in support of our
national interest and open access to vital sea routes.
Concurrently, the western Pacific deployment of Theodore
Roosevelt and permanently forward-deployed posture of Ronald
Reagan strike groups demonstrates the deterrence value of
unambiguous credible forward presence and underscore our
requirement to maintain an even more intense focus on
sharpening naval aviation's role and the critical capabilities
of our carrier strike groups in joint warfighting integration
as fundamental to providing combatant commanders options and
what we will be required to fight and win decisively in any
high-end fight.
Navy maintains our focused vision on airwing of the future,
while higher donned budgetary priorities, deferred procurement
of F-35C, Navy is continuing and committed to the F-35C carrier
airwing transition plan.
Success F-35 carrier strike group deployments with VFA-147,
VFA-94, and the Marine Corps' VMFA-314 inform Navy's process of
learning in order to better qualify costs, mission-capable
rates, and operations of the F-35.
Future platforms of airwing of the future will further
improve persistence and increase operational reach and capacity
through the combination of its 6th Generation platform F/A-XX,
advanced long-range weapons, and unmanned tactical platforms
that support carrier wing ability to pace the most stressing
threats through the 2030s and beyond, keeping nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers as the most viable option for deterrence in
crisis response around the globe.
We continue to develop methods of achieving high-end
training through live virtual constructive training and via
joint simulation environment and our integrated training
facilities that enable air crews to conduct joint, enable
integrated end-to-end enhanced mission training in simulated
environments, mitigating the requirement to continually expand
our live training ranges.
In addition to aviation platforms, PB-25 [President's
Budget 2025] weapons procurement plan is focused on inventory
objectives of priority and critical munitions through multi-
year procurement and large-lot production contract awards for
maximized rate and reduced all up around costs.
Navy thanks Congress and this subcommittee for your
continued support of important aviation priorities, including
our flight hour program, critical aircraft upgrades, and
investment in future capabilities, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Guertin, Admiral Donnelly,
and LtGen Gering can be found in the Appendix on page 66.]
Mr. Wittman. Rear Admiral Donnelly, thank you.
We will now go to Lt. Gen. Gering.
STATEMENT OF LTGEN BRADFORD J. GERING, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR
AVIATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE MARINES
General Gering. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Norcross,
distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you to report the state of marine aviation. Your support
has been critical in our ability to maintain a warfighting edge
in the face of a rapidly changing global landscape and emerging
challenges.
As directed by the commandant, we are balancing the
sustainment and upgrades of current capabilities to meet our
enduring crisis response requirements while executing
deliberate force modernization across all functions of marine
aviation.
I want to thank Congress and this subcommittee for your
continued support in funding our critical sustainment accounts,
which enable marine aviation to generate the capabilities and
warfighting readiness required to meet our global crisis
response mandate.
This support enabled our newest F-35B squadron, Marine
Fighter Attack Squadron 542, to deploy to the high north as
part of Exercise Nordic Response, where they executed sustained
operations with allies and partners and achieved 100% sortie
completion rate.
The Marine Corps F-35 program of record remains 420
aircraft, and we are continuing to transition to an all 5th
Generation tac [tactical] Air Force. Your corps currently eight
operational F-35 squadrons ready to respond to crisis
worldwide, and we will hit the halfway point in our transition
to 18 active component squadrons by the end of this calendar
year.
We are working closely with the Joint Program Office and
other services to ensure vital weapons capabilities are
delivered to the fleet on an acceptable timeline and without
unacceptable cost growth. We appreciate the continued
congressional oversight and support on TR-3 and Block 4
modernization.
We are aligned with the Air Force and the Navy in
prioritizing the engine corps upgrade and power and thermal
management systems upgrade to meet future capability
enhancements and reduce future sustainment costs.
As we look for continued opportunities to enhance our
current 5th Generation capabilities, Marine Aviation will
execute a deliberate modernization effort we call Project
Eagle. Project Eagle is Marine Aviation's fully informed
modernization strategy spanning three future year defense
program cycles out to the year 2040.
One such effort includes accelerating the prototype in an
experimentation of tac air collaborative combat aircraft and
building a common interoperable control architecture for
integrating with joint assets. The Marine Corps has taken the
lead on integrating and testing the XQ-58 as a pathway toward a
broader series of CCA capabilities in the future.
To date, the Marine Corps has completed two successful XQ-
58 flights, and we are planning three additional flights this
fiscal year.
In closing, central to Marine Aviation are your Marines,
the men and women of Marine Aviation, the driving force behind
our continued excellence. Their unwavering commitment, coupled
with a penchant for innovation, ensures Marine Aviation remains
agile, lethal, naval at its core, and contributed directly to
deterring our adversaries.
Thank you once again, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Guertin, Admiral Donnelly,
and LtGen Gering can be found in the Appendix on page 66.]
Mr. Wittman. Lt. Gen. Gering, thank you.
Lt. Gen. Schmidt, you are now recognized.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN MICHAEL J. SCHMIDT, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE
OFFICER AND DIRECTOR FOR THE F-35 LIGHTNING II PROGRAM,
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
General Michael Schmidt. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member
Norcross, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to provide an F-35 program update.
In December, I testified before this subcommittee on top
expanding F-35 development, production, and sustainment. The
subcommittee highlighted priorities, including engine
modernization, test infrastructure enhancements, digital
engineering initiatives, supply chain maturity, future
sustainment strategy, Tech Refresh 3 resolution, and Block 4
delivery.
As you know, development and production concurrency is
Block 4's most critical challenge, and we are dealing with its
consequences today. Since my last testimony, the F-35 Joint
Program Office has maintained an unequivocal focus on these
efforts as we work to make congressional and warfighter
expectations a reality.
I look forward to offering updates regarding progress
across these fronts and to sharing details on the work that
remains.
Amid these efforts, the Department of Defense's official
declaration of Milestone C and formal full rate production
decision in March 2024 gives credence to the acquisition
maturity taking place within the F-35 enterprise. For over 20
years, F-35 stakeholders have laid the groundwork for a 5th
Generation air system that is operating around the world today
and planned for employment by U.S. and international users for
decades to come.
With this milestone behind us, we enter a new chapter as we
make an unrelenting push to modernize this platform for the
future and drive sustainment excellence throughout the fleet.
TR-3 [technology refresh 3], a reimagined Block 4,
propulsion modernization, and upgrades that will follow depend
on the work we must execute today. The F-35 program represents
professional acquisition at its highest level, and I am
tremendously proud of the team working to bring these
objectives to life.
As this subcommittee knows, the efforts that got us here
will not be sufficient to get us where we are going. Success
will continue to require the best personnel, software
practices, facilities, supply chains, and industrial
partnerships our U.S. and international teammates can offer.
I have no doubt we will continue to face and overcome
complex challenges, and I assure you the F-35 Joint Program
Office team remains up to the challenge. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Lt Gen Schmidt can be found in
the Appendix on page 93.]
Mr. Wittman. Lt. Gen. Schmidt, thank you so much.
Dr. Schmidt, you are next.
STATEMENT OF DR. DOUGLAS SCHMIDT, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST
AND EVALUATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Dr. Douglas Schmidt. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member
Norcross, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an
honor to be here today to provide a summary of the results and
recommendations on tactical fighter aircraft and related
programs that are under my oversight.
I would like to focus my opening comments on three areas:
the combined report on the F-35 integrated operational test and
evaluation, or IOT&E, and live-fire test and evaluation, LFT&E;
key findings across other programs; and the operational test
infrastructure needed to support testing of current and
emerging tactical weapon systems.
DOT&E [Director Operational Testing and Evaluation]
released its combined F-35 IOT&E and LFT&E report in February
of 2024, and in March, DOT&E staff briefed these results to
this subcommittee. My staff is available to provide follow-on
briefings at your convenience.
Next, I will move on to key findings of other tactical
fighter aircraft and tactical fighter aircraft-related
programs. The first is the F-15 Eagle passive-active warning
and survivability system, or EPAWSS. The current electronic
warfare test infrastructure significantly limited the breadth
of DOT&E's assessment of EPAWSS effectiveness during its recent
IOT&E.
This limitation affects all spectrum warfare systems,
especially electromagnetic attack systems like EPAWSS and the
EA-18 Growler next gen jammer. DoD's open and closed hardened
loop laboratories and military test ranges need upgrades to
address these and other limitations.
The next key finding comes from the F-22 and F-35 programs.
These programs have ongoing test instrumentation challenges
that center around the integration of the open-air battle
shaping, or OABS. OABS was utilized in F-22, F-35, and F-15 EX
operational testing.
It enables high fidelity live testing with real-time kill
removal and data collection. It is already installed in several
CONUS [Continental United States] ranges and continues to
expand.
Multiple Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft are
already equipped with OABS, which requires frequent upgrades to
keep up with the platform and weapon program upgrade processes.
High-fidelity data collected by the OABS system is
essential to the verification, validation, and accreditation of
modeling simulation on different platforms and integrated --
that they are integrated into, and continually see upgraded in
the joint simulation environment, or JSE.
As findings from these tests show, the operational test
infrastructure needed to support modern testing continues to be
a challenge. The JSE is a high fidelity battle space
environment, and it is currently integrated with the F-35-in-a-
Box software, blue and red cockpits, and advanced surface and
air threats that were required to support F-35 IOT&E.
The JSE is rapidly expanding to support the multiple
platform test and evaluation tactics development and high-end
training for aircraft, such as the F-22 and F-18.
In addition to the JSE, there is also other needs we have
for stakeholders, which include support for digital class-of-
threat emulators that are also integrated with the OABS for
realistic real-time integration with threats.
It is important that we get these systems and other systems
into critical platforms like the F-22 and F-35, and we would be
partnering with the Test Resource Management Center in order to
do this.
Thank you for your attention, and for your continuous
support of our service men and women, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Douglas Schmidt can be found
in the Appendix on page 120.]
Mr. Wittman. Dr. Schmidt, thank you.
We are going to go to our committee members now to begin
the questioning.
Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
We appreciate your leadership.
I submit to you that we don't have a large enough top line
for this year. It is a one percent growth in spending,
underneath inflation, and because of that, you are forced to
make some, I would say some bad choices.
So just look at some of the numbers. In 2024, we are going
to bring in -- and this is really more to Gen. Moore for the
Air Force, but I think it is true for all the services to some
degree, we are going to put in 60 new aircraft, but we are
going to get rid of 190. So that is 130 subtractions there of
fighter aircraft.
And over the next five years, you will bring in 351
fighters and get rid of 594. And that is going to be a loss of
243 fighters. So that is almost like ten fighter squadrons'
equivalent. I know in 2019 we said we needed seven more fighter
squadrons, and now we are budgeting a loss of about ten more.
We are going backwards.
So my question may be to Gen. Moore, and the backdrop is we
are spending about 3.1% of our GDP [gross domestic product] on
defense, it used to be around 4. So I think we are at historic,
not the historical low, but near the historical low for
spending.
So, would it be true, Gen. Moore, to say that the top line
is forcing us to make some bad decisions? If we had a higher
top line, would we produce some more fighters or get rid of
less?
General Moore. Sir, I would say that in order to comply
with the Fiscal Responsibility Act, we did make choices that
you can see very clearly in our budget.
Mr. Bacon. Are we going the right way to address a near-
peer competitor fight?
General Moore. Sir, I think the capabilities that a near-
competitor brings require aggressive modernization. And the
questions is how do you get there.
Do you aggressively modernize by shedding old capability?
Do you aggressively modernize by a higher top line? Or do you
aggressively modernize by taking money out of readiness? There
aren't really many other choices.
Mr. Bacon. Well, with a higher top line, we could produce
more F-35s?
General Moore. We intended to buy six F-35s this year, as
well as six F-15 EXs. You can see those in last year's FYDP.
But they are not still in the budget year.
Mr. Bacon. I am just concerned that we are going to be 17
fighter squadrons short for what we need, and we are not going
the right direction. I am not blaming this team, because I
think it is a result of decisions made by Congress and the
President. But I think we are not going the right way to meet
China.
And with that, I will yield.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Bacon. I think those are all
very salient points as far as where we are going with scale.
Listen, we understand the need to modernize. The key is, is
you know, we always go through these transitions where we get
rid of existing platforms regardless of their limitations and
capabilities and things that they can and cannot do for the
promise of new capabilities somewhere out in the future.
And I tell folks, all of our dreams come true outside the
FYDP. So you have this giant gap, and all of a sudden, you
figure well, we are going to save money to get there. The
problem is, is your leaders that follow on say well, wait a
minute, we are going to use this money for other purposes.
So it always is a disconnect there. We have got to find a
way to get those curves to intersect as far as retiring older
capability, bringing online new capability. It always seems
like there is a bathtub there we have to swim in for years, so.
All right, and with that, Mr. Courtney, you are recognized.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all the
witnesses for your conciseness and efficiency in your remarks,
which were also very full of content.
Lt. Gen. Schmidt, last December you mentioned, you know,
you testified here, and at that time you discussed that 80
kilowatts of cooling capacity is the objective requirement for
the Joint Program Office as part of the engine and power
thermal management modernization program, you know, was the
requirement.
Is that objective requirement of 80 kilowatts still the
margin that you need for future requirements?
General Michael Schmidt. Yes, sir, the requirement is
actually -- the window is 62-80, but the threshold is 62 and 80
is the objective.
Mr. Courtney. And what is the acquisition strategy for a
new power thermal management system, and what do you estimate
is the timeline to deliver to the fleet?
General Michael Schmidt. So, sir, we are just getting
started on the power and thermal management piece of that,
because it was an FY 2024 new start. So we will -- I will be
able to fully answer I think that question next year.
With that initial 2024 new start and getting Lockheed to
fully characterize the airplane and what all of the boundary
conditions are for a power and thermal management system will
be better defined.
As far as the engine core upgrade program, which we really
embarked on to get the life back into the engine, that is
proceeding nominally. And I am looking forward to this year to
really inform the 62-80 requirement.
Another important requirement is the retrofitability of
this. So that is a requirement from all of our customers that
we can affordably retrofit the airplanes that we have out
there. And that will -- that is all playing into the design
considerations.
Mr. Courtney. So the budget request regarding engine core
upgrade was $527 million. I mean, is that, you are confident
that is the right number in terms of just how the process is
moving at this point?
General Michael Schmidt. Sir, I am confident in that number
today. So we have a requirement from Congress, and I actually
appreciate it, to come back and make the engine modernization
program a separate subprogram, managed separately.
We will, again, the engine core upgrade program is kind of
going through its risk reduction phase. Power and thermal
management work is just getting going.
We are going back to the department, and we will lay all
this out for Dr. LaPlante that the DAE [Defense Acquisition
Executives] as well as the service acquisition executives as we
create that subprogram. And we will have to do an independent
cost estimate on that. But for right now, sir, I am confident
in the funding that is in the budget, yes, sir.
Mr. Courtney. Great, thank you.
General Gering, the Marine Corps' FY 2025 unfunded priority
list contains a request of $97 million for additional F-35C
engine spares and power modules. Can you discuss how important
the spares are to the F-35 program and how prioritizing depot
outputs sustains flight operations for the aircraft?
General Gering. Sir, thanks for that question. Yeah, what
we have experienced since purchasing sovereign spares is really
what it does for our readiness, not only our home-based
readiness, but also when we deploy.
It gives us the ability to put spares on ships as we
deploy, and it is just more timely. So we have really
benefitted quite a bit from that, sir, and we continue
supporting that in the future.
Mr. Courtney. Right. And as you are sort of ramping up in
the Indo-Pacific region, I would imagine that that tyranny of
distance makes that even more useful.
General Gering. Yes, sir, tyranny of time, distance,
logistics only gets harder in INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command], sir.
Mr. Courtney. Right, thank you. I yield back.
General Gering. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. We will now go to Dr.
McCormick.
Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I will get right to the point, because I know we have
limited time and we have votes coming up. Real Admiral
Donnelly, I recently was on a plane trip and I was watching a
documentary for about the fifth time, you have probably heard
of it, called Top Gun: Maverick.
I had some concerns, because I am from the 1986 graduation
class, so I am the Top Gun class, and I don't understand why a
guy named Tom Cruise gets a cat & trap ride and I don't. I have
significant concerns. Is that because of the discrimination
because my wings move when I fly, or some other reason?
Admiral Donnelly. I appreciate your question, sir, and I
look forward to rectifying that issue as quickly as possible.
Dr. McCormick. Outstanding answer, you have my full support
in whatever you want.
With that said, shifting gears a little bit, Lt. Gen.
Schmidt, I know recently there was testimony in Congress that
there was lab testing that has greatly benefitted our models
looking into the future. And I know we have done this with the
Osprey where we have avoided a lot of problems. But of course
now we are having some hard problems facing us.
But as we look forward, is the software test capability a
limiting factor in the delivery weapons systems capabilities as
far as that bottleneck of what we are seeing kind of slow down
the process? How do we widen that bottleneck to progress to
where we need to be to continue to force through our
innovations and our advancements?
General Michael Schmidt. Sir, thank you for the question.
So, absolutely that bottleneck is restricting our ability to
deliver everything we want in this program. In fact, we are
considering truncating the current 40 -- the current software
for the TR-3 deliveries so that we can get after the next
version of software to deliver the full combat capability.
And they are competing with each other in the labs. And
there's many other reasons that we are trying to do that as
well. But that is a challenge for us, the lab capacity.
At the same time, we had a great software architecture
independent review team come in, and they laid out a number of
long-term priorities as well as short-term priorities in terms
of our digital infrastructure model-sharing and things like
that. I am excited, we are rallying with our industry teams to
prioritize those things. In fact, they did that just last week.
And we will be pushing forward some of those I think we can
vest within the program. Others we will have to discuss whether
industry pays for them or the government outside the program.
But thank you for the question. Yes, that is a challenge, sir.
Dr. McCormick. Absolutely. And in a related question, I
don't know if this would be for the Honorable Mr. Hunter or
not, but do we feel like we had the right competition, this
kind of relates what you were taking, these models that are
competing with each other for the next advancements?
Obviously we are always short on money. We want to have a
competition that drives down the price range, and at the same
time increases the quality. Do you think that is a working,
functional model right now, or do you think that there is
something that is hamstringing us in our advancements in that
category?
Mr. Hunter. I think we have proven that we can do it and
that it can work. And we have also proven that we can do it
affordably. But that obviously ties in a bit to the nature of
the capability that you are trying to acquire.
So with a collaborative combat aircraft I would point to
where we have a number of vendors currently working, early
stage design work, which we are able to afford having multiple
doing that work.
Then as we progress to more concrete, you know, build and
the expensive activities, that does neck down. But we get very
robust competition early on, which allows us to choose our
vendors based on their actual demonstrated capability, not just
a paper product or advertisement.
And that is core to our strategy of beginning CCA Increment
2, is for those who do not get selected to continue on
Increment 1. They can continue to work bettering the
capabilities for future program offerings.
Dr. McCormick. Good, I hope that continues to be a
competitive process. I know there's always these legacy
programs, and sometimes we get stuck in these funnels of money
which kind of give us less opportunities, less competition,
which of course costs us more money and more problems in the
future as we progress.
Specifically I don't know if this would be for Gen. Schmidt
or somebody else, but what lessons learned are you documenting
from the power thermal management system, the PTMS, and the
engine issues on the F-35 that will inform our future in
development?
General Michael Schmidt. That is a great question, sir. I
think the biggest lesson learned is develop whatever products
you have that meets the spec in the first place. And in this
case, we had an engine that didn't meet the specs.
Now, at the same time, the engine had already been designed
as the aircraft was being built, so I am not trying to point
fingers here. It is just, that is a challenge. As the
requirements grew on the airplane, the engine was already
designed.
And so yeah, eat into the life of the engine and all that
kind of stuff. I am, you know, I think there are some really
innovative things going on in terms of the engine core upgrade,
which will allow us to get the life back into this engine
without changing our complete supply support infrastructure and
make it as common as possible.
But ultimately if the specs aren't matching in the first
place, the integrated design documents don't match each other,
then you are probably going to have a problem.
Dr. McCormick. Excellent point for future planning for our
future development in R&D [research and development]. And I
will say, gentlemen, again, I want to reinforce that Admiral
Donnelly gave the best answer for the day. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Dr. McCormick, appreciate it.
Mr. Carbajal, you are now recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think we have a
record number of witnesses today, more than some subcommittee
members, so thank you for being here.
Gen. Schmidt, it is well known that the F-35 program has
had significant overrun costs in its schedule. This has been a
big bill for the taxpayers to pick up. Certainly we have gained
great capabilities with the F-35, but quite frankly it has been
an embarrassment when it comes to the price tag that has crept
up significantly.
I hope throughout the life of this program the department
has learned lessons to lower costs for future programs like
next generation air dominance. Do you think the department has
learned lessons to apply to future programs? What is the
department actively doing to drive down costs for future
programs?
General Michael Schmidt. Sir, that is to me specifically on
F-35. So as far as development goes, I would say we --
concurrency is our biggest challenge, and we bought into a
rapid, agile acquisition process to deliver software. And
really, we are delivering a lot of very hard-to-develop
hardware as we integrate this, and integrating that hardware
has been our biggest challenge.
And I think the failure of our teams to recognize the
complexity of some of the things that we bought into in that
schedule is part of that. And undoing that concurrency is a
really important part of that, and I could talk to you a lot
about reimagining Block 4, but I don't want to take up all the
time. But I am sure we will get to that eventually here.
In terms of costs, I do want to -- so development costs, we
certainly have gone in the wrong direction here in terms of
delivering Block 4. In sustainment and in our operating costs,
I am very proud of the team.
We have significantly reduced our cost per tail per year,
significantly reduced our cost per flying hour. We have an
active war on costs going on in the program. Just in the last
year, in sustainment costs, again, through the life of the
program, we have taken out $13 billion in costs in the program.
Our last cost estimate, in current year dollars, so
factoring out inflation, is $45 billion less over the life of
the program than the year before. So I am totally with you,
sir, on development costs, and we got to get better at cost
estimating and laying out our schedules. But I think we are
making some progress on the sustainment side.
Mr. Carbajal. Great, thank you very much. I do hope that is
codified so that in the future we do have those learned lessons
to apply in the development side of this.
The Air Force goal is to have a tactical fighter fleet that
provides the capability, capacity, and affordability to meet
air superiority and the global strike needs by 2035/2040
timeframe.
Gen. Gering, Gen. Donnelly, and Gen. Moore, do you think
this timeline is adequate for our national security? And do you
think we will have capability gaps between now and then? Don't
all jump in at once, please.
General Moore. Sir, I think that if we want to ensure that
we are able to confront a peer adversary, we are seeing
capability gaps developing long before the timeframe that you
mentioned. And so I think if we want to make sure that doesn't
happen, we have to aggressively modernize.
I mentioned before there are basically three ways to do
that. You can modernize at the expense of readiness, you can
modernize with a higher top line, or you can modernize at the
expense of the other foundational things that need to occur.
So I think we can look into the future and see that if we
want to remain relevant into the early to mid 30s, we have a
challenge now, and it requires aggressive action.
Mr. Carbajal. Gen. Donnelly or Gen. Moore?
Admiral Donnelly. Thank you, sir, I think CNO [Chief of
Naval Operations] Franchetti has been very clear in the decade
of concern, it has come upon us. And Navy is very focused on
current capability and program wholeness.
And we see that in our service life modifications of our
current F-18 fleet, bringing them to a Block 3 capability, as
well as the procurement of those new aircraft that are arriving
to our flight lines. And also as we have our airwing transition
ongoing.
So we recognize in the role that we have to play in global
presence today, we have to be ready for the fight tonight in
any circumstances, whether it is what we have ongoing right now
in the Red Sea and the role that we are playing over there, or
against a high-end adversary.
So we recognize the point that you made, yes, sir.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I am pretty much out of time, Mr.
Chair. I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Carbajal. We are now going to
go to Mr. Norcross.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman. And thank all the
witnesses, which you officially do outnumber us up here.
Obviously we are dealing with a number of issues. And when
we talk about some of the priorities, F-35, largest program
ever in history of DoD [Department of Defense].
So when we talk about delivering the TR-3 aircraft, let me
start by asking, there is a pause on delivery, Gen. Schmidt.
How many aircraft are parked on the tarmac somewhere in this
world, waiting delivery to us?
General Michael Schmidt. Sir, can I just say a significant
number? I would rather not advertise that to all of our
adversaries. But a significant number, sir.
Mr. Norcross. And I think that is agreed upon, both
Lockheed Martin and all the people sitting here today. And when
we look at those, we have been in this meeting, going back year
after year talking about this, and each time we are kicking the
can down the road. It is always something new.
You need to understand the frustration. I know Chairman
feels this strongly, and he will speak about it, but the date
for delivery of TR-3, how confident are you that it actually
will meet that modified date that we have now?
General Michael Schmidt. Sir, as I said in my last
testimony, I am as frustrated as you that I can't nail down a
specific date and be extremely clear about exactly when we will
deliver. That said, the best chance we have to get to a
truncated, so a couple of combat capabilities will be in there,
the first realistic chance is July of this summer.
And that would basically be the current version of software
or maybe with a little tweaks, because it takes a while to get
through airworthiness and all that, July. The software
architecture independent review team that just finished, they
estimated more like August or September of this year.
So and I, there are some awfully smart guys on that team,
and we could talk a lot about all the things that they found.
But the frustration that you have, that I have with our lack of
ability to say exactly where we are is driven by hardware
immaturity that we are doing a lot of software work-arounds to,
you know, to deliver as efficiently as possible.
And that is not a long-term winning solution. And I think
this all goes back to the concurrency of us saying, you know
what, no matter what, this hardware needs to be in this slot.
And yes, I understand why we make those decisions.
At the same time, putting our national asset production
lines at risk for a development program, there are other
options to deal with concurrency, and we need to do a better
job of that. And when we reimagine Block 4, we are going to
change that model for sure.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. You talked about Block 4 and
lessons that we have learned. What else can we do to, I will
use the term enforce, cajole, plea, to get this in a time that
is relevant to us? There are a number of target dates that we
have heard, that potentially could be an issue in the South
Pacific.
But regardless of those, 27, 28, 29. Now more than ever,
what can we do differently? Authorities, a piece of legislation
in the NDAA, what can we do to collectively push our foot down
a little harder to make sure we hit these in a time that is
relevant to us?
General Michael Schmidt. Sir, last year you invested in
additional flight sciences jets for this program. That was
very, very important. We all should have done that years ago,
but, and that is not going to help us out next year. It will
help us out in a few years from now.
Similarly, in the situation we are in, as our discussion
about lab investments, I also, my frustration over our lack of
digital infrastructure and whether that is our industry,
because it is our industry not making the investments they need
to make. And of course the government has a role in that to
some degree.
But if we are going to be the most advanced, out front,
biggest airplane fighter program in the world, we should have a
digital infrastructure that looks like we are the biggest
fighter program in the world. And we don't have that now, sir.
And whether you want to hold me to that or industry, we both
are accountable for that, and we need to have that
infrastructure out there.
Mr. Norcross. So I will just wrap up. Pointing fingers, we
do, doing that. And this isn't to beat up on the contractor per
se. Obviously we all have skin in the game. But the idea of the
F-35 is a remarkable aircraft by any measurement. But who we
are going to be fighting against potentially have even more
remarkable.
So we can say hey, we got a great one. But if we can't beat
it, it become irrelevant. I know I will have more questions,
but let me toss it back over to Chairman.
I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Norcross.
Gentleman, we have seven votes on the House floor right
now. The first vote has come to time, and we still have time to
get down and vote. So I would ask, if you would, to stay here
with us. We are probably going to be 45 minutes to 55 minutes
in votes.
So if you could stay with us, we would like to come back
and continue the line of questioning, if that suffices with
your schedule. Unfortunately, these vote series are somewhat
unpredictable for us. So we would be very honored if you would
stay with us while we have a chance to go vote.
With that, we will recess until after votes. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Wittman. We are back and we appreciate your indulgence
and being patient with us. And we will get back underway.
So Don, I will let pick up your questioning, and we will go
from there.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman. Certainly, again, for
sticking in there with us, we really appreciate it.
When we start talking about capabilities, capacities, and
the statement that I alluded to during my opening remarks,
capacity is important but capabilities. Mr. Bacon talked about
the retirement issue across the board. And when we look at
those, the numbers are significant, the replacement numbers.
So as a first question, when we start looking at what a CCA
is going to be, how are we going to compare when CCAs enter
operation when we start talking airframes? Gen. Moore, can you
give us some light on where we might be going? The CCA versus a
manned platform.
General Moore. So I think we would probably be ill-advised
to compare CCAs to manned platforms. CCAs are intended to be
something different. They are intended to be able to augment
what manned platforms are able to do but not to replace them.
So I don't know that we would want to draw necessarily a
direct correlation between the tail, the number of tails or the
number of nosewheels or whatever it is that you would like to
count. I think there is an issue of capability. There is also
an issue of capacity.
And I think what we would like to look at is what capacity
are CCAs able to add to a package that we would send forward
and how does it impact the average cost per tail of that
package in order to deliver effects.
So I am not trying to duck the question, I am not trying to
use a bunch of words to get out from under it, but the fact of
the matter is I don't know that there is a direct correlation
and I don't think we should draw one. I think we should look at
combat power. And I think that is how we ought to make that
comparison.
Mr. Hunter. If I could, Congressman, one of the insights
from our operational imperative work that I referenced in my
opening is the complexity of the mission threads that we have
to execute in a high intensity peer conflict. And they are
complex enough that no individual platform can succeed without
the contributions of the other platforms and the networks that
support them all.
And therefore, again, in addition to what Gen. Moore said
about its being hard to compare a CCA to a manned fighter
platform, in terms of delivering the capability that you care
about, success in our missions, the individual platforms aren't
the best measure of how -- of our ability to do that.
Mr. Norcross. I couldn't agree more. But that is how we are
being measured in comments that we have around here. And
somehow that they are the same, and they are not. It is the
capabilities, but by the same token, if you lose one that has
high capabilities, then you are losing a lot more than that
one.
But I think it is incredibly important to have that deeper
conversation rather than just tails. But tails do count. And
that is where I want to go to.
When we start looking at some of the retirement plans, and
I have been supportive generally of the plans that have come
before us over the past, quite frankly, ten years. But when I
see some of the retirements this year, given some of the
reports of what happened on Saturday, the F-15E and what they
were able, yet they are on the list to some degree.
Gen. Moore, can you talk to us a little bit that? As
relevant as it was on Saturday, how do they become irrelevant
and retire in short order?
General Moore. Yes, sir, so it is a fair question. First of
all, we don't seek to retire all of these, only the oldest of
them. The ones that we are talking about average 33 years old.
They are older, in fact, than our average fleet age, which
is about 29 and a half, and 29 and a half in our opinion is far
too old a fleet for us to consider perpetuating that cycle.
The other thing is F-15Es don't operate by themselves, they
operate as part of a network. It is the air crew, it is the
munitions, it is the command and control. The other thing is
this weekend, I don't want to take one single thing away from
what happened this weekend, but there was neither a surface-to-
air nor an air-to-air threat.
They did not penetrate the highly contested environment,
they didn't penetrate into an A2/AD [anti-access/area denial]
environment. I don't mean to take a single thing away from the
great work that they did. Take that same set of -- that same
set of things that surround the platform and transition that to
China, and I think you find a very different result.
And so what we are trying to do is build the capability
that it takes to confront a peer adversary. Iran is not a peer
adversary.
Mr. Norcross. Right. If we are going. But it is the truck
that is behind you that is carrying all the luggage that can --
General Moore. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norcross. Be fired from elsewhere.
General Moore. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norcross. So very much still in there, so appreciate.
I want to switch over to the Marines a little bit. Last
year the Marine Corps talked about the outfit of the squadrons
as ten aircraft, and we went into great detail why and so on.
Yet this year, it appears to reverse that decision, going back
to 12.
General, can you share with us what analysis? Was last year
wrong, or what came in that you were able to see this year that
made you change that number?
General Gering. Sir, thanks for that question. Yeah, there
are really two things that informed our decision to go from 10
to 12 aircraft across all 18 active component squadrons and two
reserve component squadrons. And it really came down to, first
of all, informed by the operating environment and the
anticipated threat.
And then when we look at unitive employment or formation
required to either counter that threat or prevail on that
threat, and then couple that with sortie generation rate, how
many times do you want to be able to do that each day, the
number 12 makes a lot more sense when you look at the way that
we employ the aircraft.
So that was really informed by two things. The first was
extensive exercising out in the fleet. I had the privilege to
command 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing for two years. We had five
fleet F-35 squadrons, 10 aircraft per squadron. And for two
years, we exercised them extensively.
And that was one of the real big lessons learned, where if
you really want to have the sortie generation rate and get the
formations airborne that you need, that 10 did not necessarily
work well. Or you would have to have a higher readiness rate
than what we are planning for. Twelve works out really well for
that.
The second piece was a third-party look by Johns Hopkins.
They did a study and their findings basically supported what
our findings were, sir. So the plan going forward is to go from
10 to 12 aircraft across the board.
Mr. Norcross. Well, I can appreciate the study, and quite
frankly, at times it takes courage to say hey, we made a
mistake, we change it. Mistake is probably not the right word,
but a reassessment of what you did. And the idea of looking at
it is something that we appreciate that conversation with.
I was going to have a conversation regarding the IOT&E, but
for reasons that we were informed, we are not going to be able
to go there, at least in this public session. But we will have
to get with your staffs, later on, Dr. Schmidt, to address
those questions, given --
Dr. Douglas Schmidt. Absolutely, Ranking Member.
Mr. Norcross. What happened. I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Norcross. We will now go to Mr.
Fallon.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, when I was junior officer in the Air Force, I
remember them always teaching us about not only air
superiority, but air supremacy. Like, we own the skies. And
then I went off to live my life after I left and served in the
state legislature for eight years. We don't talk a lot about
air superiority in the Texas Legislature.
So when I got here three years ago, I was a bit surprised
that that is something that we don't -- we can't guarantee any
longer because of technology, because of drones and things of
that nature. Then when we see what happened in Ukraine and that
use, what I wanted to talk about is in the future, how do we
combat that problem?
We just saw roughly 300 drones not reach their targets.
Yay, that was wonderful that no civilians were killed, but at
what cost? And I don't think Iran's 300 drones cost nearly as
much as, and you can see where I am getting at, the attrition.
If there is some non-state actor that were to do that where we
couldn't hit back.
I mean, one of the things that we will see about Iran not
doing it again is then they are going to get hit by Israel
hard. But if it is a non-state actor, I am worried about the
attrition factor.
And when I met with -- when we met, Chairman, with like
Palmer Lucky and what is it, Anduril, and they are doing things
differently and cost effectively. So I wanted to just kick,
there are some very smart people on this panel, and ask how are
we going to address that moving forward.
Mr. Hunter. Well, affordable mass is definitely a core
principle of our collaborative combat aircraft program. Anduril
happens to be one of the vendors competing on that program,
along with others. And that competition I think is vital to the
whole concept of affordability, getting the price where we need
it to be to be able to purchase in the volume.
CCAs are going after a higher end threat than the, you
know, than the drone threat that was recently made evident. So
we have to have a range of capabilities, from things that can
combat $10,000 drones to $300,000 drones to million-dollar
drones and up to sophisticated fighter aircraft.
And it is finding that way to balance all the priorities
within, I know for us in the Air Force, within the Air Force
POM [Program Objective Memorandum], that is the major challenge
of going through these budget exercises. And then we get to the
end and we look and we see hey, we ended up with fewer fighter
aircraft this year than had previously planned.
And a lot of it is driven by those requirements that
continue to manifest as we go through our POM process, and we
have to adjust our plans in response.
But affordable mass is definitely core part of the concept
and something that we are changing the way we do acquisition to
allow us to generate affordable mass capabilities in a way that
our system has not been optimized for in the past.
Mr. Fallon. Anyone else care to comment? Okay. Also with
the, you know, in previous hearings we talked about autonomous
aircraft. And I think that would be invaluable if we were to
have a hot war with China. And considering what is the result
of the war games and the tremendous losses that we take in a
very short period of time, not only in materiel but of course
in human lives as well.
And the other advantage is you are not constrained by the
limits of the human body in that you are just constrained by
the laws of aerodynamics. And so what I wanted to ask Gen.
Moore is can you elaborate more on the program and discuss the
way ahead for autonomous air platforms?
General Moore. Yes, sir. So we submitted as a part of our
2024 budget request Project Venom. It was approved. It is a way
of taking an F-16 and using it to explore various autonomy
algorithms to find out what it is that we are able to do with
autonomy. How far has it come so far and where is it able to go
from here.
So we are excited about what may be able to come out of
that, and we share your sentiment on the strong addition to our
presence that could be made autonomous aircraft. And we are
looking at that and we just getting ready to put our secretary
in an F-16 that has an autonomy algorithm in it so that he can
see it firsthand.
And this I think will be a great enhancement to manned/
unmanned teaming. The next step past that is the no requirement
to team at all to be truly autonomous.
Mr. Hunter. One thing I would just add to that is our
autonomy government reference architecture, which is the
technical underpinning for not just delivering an autonomous
aircraft as a one-off, but continuously over time with
competition from a whole range of autonomy providers, including
in a lot of non-traditional defense companies who have
significant capabilities and autonomy that we have been
challenged to access in the past because of clearances and a
whole variety of other issues.
So that autonomy government reference architecture allows
us to unlock access to a much wider range of tech providers.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you. Just hope --
Mr. Hunter. Our secretary chose to fly, we didn't inflict
that on him.
Mr. Fallon. Just that we all need to have the courage to
embrace innovation. We just have to considering the changing
landscape.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you all.
Mr. Wittman. Mr. Fallon, thank you, thank you.
Gen. Schmidt, I wanted to begin with you. I know we have
had a lot of conversations about F-35, TR-3. It was bitterly
disappointing to myself and other committee members that we had
to learn of another shift to the right to Q3, not directly from
the contractor, but from an earnings call that we had to read
in the newspaper, which was pretty disconcerting.
I know that you have had to deal with, through your tenure
there, challenges in communication and back and forth about
production capability, performance of the aircraft. All those
things I think have led us to the point where we are today.
Can you give us your perspective on how you see the path
forward? Because F-35 is it, we are all in on this aircraft. It
has to perform the capabilities that TR-3 brings to the table
are necessary, and it has to occur at the speed of relevance.
Delays there create risks for this country, create risks for
the brave pilots that fly those aircraft.
So can you give us your perspective on where things are
today in light of delays, in light of what I think is lots of
shortcomings in how TR-3 has been tested and developed? And
listen, I am not looking to place blame.
I think everybody is part of this. And listen, Congress has
to be part of this as far as not just understanding what
happened, but what the solution is going forward.
So I want to get your perspective on how do you see things
going forward to make sure we get back to where we need to be.
And how do we, I hate to use a Navy term, but I am going to use
it, how we do have a all-hands-on-deck mentality?
General Michael Schmidt. Yes, sir, thank you for the
opportunity. So let me just quickly talk about production and
sustainment.
So production. We have national asset production actually
lines. So in Fort Worth, in Italy, and in Japan. And we cannot
interrupt those production lines because they have to keep
going to make use of what we have built, which is a treasure.
In sustainment, we got a lot of work to do. I got a lot of
team working through on readiness, could talk about it for two
hours if you want to. I am proud of what we have done. I see a
light in the sustainment end of the tunnel.
So when I get frustrated, like you do, sir, it is most of
the time in development. And I, you know, we have signed
ourself up to pipe dreams in concurrent, with concurrent
programs and a long set of capabilities for a lot of reasons
that we decided, well, I have to have it so it will be done in
this timeframe without the engineering rigor required to get
those capabilities actually into the airplane. And all the
things that go with that.
So as we reimagine Block 4, we have already implemented
last year capability decision points for specific capabilities
before we agree to put them into a lot. We have already made
poor choices in some other parts of the program that I can't
undo. But at the same time going forward, we are going through
the capability decision point process.
We are taking what we have learned from the tech baseline
review team, the software IRT [Innovative Readiness Team] team,
and we are going to re-lay out Block 4 in a combat-relevant
timeframe with, yes, a subset of capabilities of the Block 4
program, but those which give us the most bang for the buck.
And honestly, sir, I am getting tired of over-promising and
under-delivering, and I need to change that narrative.
All that said, just saying it is going to take longer and
is not going to be satisfying, and all the things we talked
about earlier with a true digital infrastructure being a state-
of-the-art program for literally the biggest fighter program in
the world, it would be unacceptable to be anything else. But I
don't feel like that is where we are today.
The discussions, honestly, from industry are all we can do
in the future on future programs. There is no future program
that is bigger than this program.
And so getting after the development side is the thing that
bothers me the most every single day, and those the things that
we are trying to do about it. But I need some help from
industry, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Well, Lt. Gen. Schmidt, I appreciate that. And
I think things are finally starting to move in the right
direction. I appreciate your assertion that we have to have the
best on your team there at the Joint Program Office.
I appreciate the conversation we had a few days ago to give
Lockheed credit that they are saying we are going to make sure
we bring subject matter experts across the enterprise.
Because there are other aspects of what Lockheed does that
use digital twin technology, that use digital design, that use
advanced methods to make sure that we develop systems at the
speed of relevance to make sure you get information quickly
into comparison computer models to make sure we make those
software upgrades.
Those are things that have to happen. Lockheed has made the
commitment to do that. So as much as we will criticize knowing
about it in an earnings call, they have said hey, there is
going to be a marshaling of resources there to make sure that
it happens.
The key now is execution, make sure that those things get
done. I think the desire is there, the key is is to be able to
do that.
And Lockheed is committed to staying in touch with members
of this committee on a twice a month basis. We want to make
sure that happens so we stay up to date. The same too with your
office to make sure we understand the things that are
happening.
We have an obligation in this too to make sure we are part
of the partnership on what the path is forward. I tell folks,
you know, we can talk all about the ground that we have already
plowed and talk about how we got here, but the key is is what
are we going to do on the path forward.
So I appreciate your perspective to say hey, we have got a
long ways to go and a short time to get there, and to steal the
words of the immortal Jerry Reed, but I want to make sure that
we are getting things done. And I appreciate your perspective
to do that.
I do want to ask, too, the next step forward. So as begin
to deliver these TR-3 configured aircraft, are you confident as
to when they are delivered as to where they will be
operationally? And will there be additional things that need to
be done in the interim to actually get them to be in combat-
coded?
Because the thought is is when they first come in, they may
not be at a combat-coded status. It looks like to me it may
take 12, 16 months to get them from the early stages of TR-3 to
actually being able to fly within that combat configuration?
Admiral Donnelly. Yes, sir. There are certain capabilities
that will not be available in the truncated version of the TR-3
software. And you are probably right about the 12-16 month. We
are looking at everything we can to try to figure out what can
we move left in that.
But that is an accurate assessment, sir, that for a couple
of the capabilities that our warfighters feel are required to
be fully combat-capable, they will not be there at the
truncation, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. So we still have even a ways to go
once the TR-3 software upgrade gets delivered.
Dr. Schmidt, I want to go to you because the DOT&E report
that we received here had quite a few aspects that had members
asking a lot of questions. One of the aspects of the testing
regime are the test beds.
As was pointed out, they are old, they lack certain
capabilities in order to be able to get information quickly
from the test bed to the ground. Sometimes they are failures,
too, and what happens there and you have to repeat a test over
again. Again, not investing in that has shown itself here at
this particular point.
So I didn't know if you had any notable concerns or
recommendations for the F-35 program to ensure that we have the
requisite number of modernized test beds, test beds that can
function, as Lt. Gen. Schmidt talked about, in the digital
realm in ways that digital twin technology can be utilized and
where we learn at the speed of relevance.
And I do want to make sure I put out there a precursor,
because I know in your confirmation hearing that Senator Warren
had mentioned your connection there. I just want to make sure
for the full sake of transparency to kind of reflect on that.
Because we are asking you questions now that F-35 program
and Lockheed, so I just want to make sure so people understand
where your limitations are. So if you can't go someplace, that
you let us know and that we are transparent about it.
Dr. Douglas Schmidt. Sure, thanks, Chairman Wittman. I
think I can speak to this because it is a broader issue than F-
35, the need for a joint simulation environment-like capability
or improving that capability is crucial.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
Dr. Douglas Schmidt. But it is more than just having the
digital assets. We also have to make sure that those assets are
calibrated appropriately based on open-air exercises and being
able to feed that back in a synergistic loop where the digital
environments get more representative and higher fidelity, and
we are able to then go back out into the open air ranges.
Because it is, unless we are going to fight all of our
future wars in video games, we need to be able to do something
that goes back out to the actual operational systems. So there
is continued need for investment in that, and it is not just F-
35.
There is also other platforms, like F-22, where need to
make sure we have the appropriate capabilities for the things
like the open-air battle shaping capability there so that they
can be part of those exercises to get the accurate date for the
live-fire environments.
Mr. Wittman. Yeah. Well, the JSE [Joint Simulation
Environment] I think is critically important, and you mentioned
that. Give us your perspective, too, on how we have seen other
models of JSE happen. And that is you have the aircraft in the
air, you fly it through certain rigorous exercises, you gather
the data off of that aircraft.
But you also want to be able to compare it to a static
model to look at what is happening there to kind of run the
data through that. So the whole idea that you have a comparable
system on the ground that exactly replicates what you are
flying in the air so you are able to learn at the speed of
relevance.
And those things I think are going to be incredibly
important for the APG-85 radar, for the electrical optical
multi-dimensional sensor kits that are going to be put on those
aircraft.
If you are going to integrate those and make sure that
those are being put into the software of the aircraft at the
speed of relevance and you understand what the limitations are
and the things you have to make and changes to the software, it
seems like to me that it is not just new test beds in the air,
but it is also having a comparison component that is hardware
on the ground that exactly replicates it.
Give us your perspective on how you see that realm.
Dr. Douglas Schmidt. Sure, Chairman. A couple things come
to mind first. We have to be able to model the hardware
dimensions accurately. Sometimes we can do that statically,
sometimes it has to be dynamic. But there is also the software
dimensions.
Mr. Wittman. Yeah.
Dr. Douglas Schmidt. And perhaps most importantly in a lot
of these newer systems, the network capabilities, because a lot
of these systems have to work together in concert with other
assets in the air.
And being able to model that with sufficient fidelity is
challenging and the investment in our infrastructure is crucial
and getting the right people who know how to build the models,
who know how to analyze the models, who know how to interpret
the results and then feed them back into the operational part
of the system is crucial.
Mr. Wittman. Got you, very good. Thank you.
Lt. Gen. Schmidt, I wanted to talk a little bit now in a
different part of the airplane. And that is in the engine
itself. As we know, we are faced with making sure we get life
out of the future engine. So the F-135 has its limitations.
A part of that is really looking at the entire system of
the aircraft. So it is looking at how do we manage the wear on
the engine by the amount of heat that is in the engine. The
whole concept of bleed air. But more specifically, the power
thermal management system.
Give us your perspective, too, on where you are in looking
at that as we go down the road in making the evaluation of all
those elements.
Because you can't discuss an engine upgrade without
discussing PTMS and the other aspects of operations of the
aircraft. So give us an idea about where you are in that whole
discussion and your thought process with how we look at all
those aspects.
General Michael Schmidt. So, sir, where we are is, so
again, the engine core upgrade program started under a
congressional ad funding a couple years ago. So, definitely got
a head start there, which is good.
Relative to the power and thermal management system,
thinking about when we did the business case analysis, we went
out to determine how to get the life back in this engine. But
we clearly identified during that timeframe that we got a big
problem in the future of power and thermal management, which is
where got today.
So as we developed the engine core upgrade, yes, I first
need, when I talk about power and thermal management, what are
the boundary conditions that we want to preserve in the engine
core upgrade to give us any amount of margin that can help in a
future power and thermal management solution.
I am very much reliant on the OEM [Office of Enterprise
Management], Lockheed, to evaluate their airplane. And
honestly, they have just been able to use study money to do
that. And we do, you know, doing some honestly really good work
that I expect our first real input to us to be this fall. But
that really needs to get done.
And then there are definitely power and thermal management
companies out there that have been working really hard on
solutions. And sir, I am anxious to get all of them and get
their solutions on the table, and we can truly evaluate those.
I think we need to figure out exactly what the airplane can
handle first, but I am anxious for that, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Lt. Gen. Schmidt.
Mr. Hunter, Mr. Guertin, I wanted to get your perspective.
And we have talked a lot about F-35, but we have to look at how
the threat is continuing to develop. We know that NGAD [Air
Force Next Generation Air Dominance] and NJAD [Navy Next
Generation Air Dominance] are what we are looking at down the
road.
Obviously cutting edge technology, looking at where that
takes us, both in cost and schedule. We look at where the
threat is and what the proposed schedule is for that. But I
wanted to get your perspective about where we are with that
particular enterprise, Mr. Hunter, and get your perspective,
and Mr. Guertin, get the Navy's perspective on that.
Because what I see is somewhat of a divergence there, was
for a while Navy saying hey, listen, we want to learn at the
same rate as the Air Force does in this next generation air
defense platform. But then what we are seeing this year is the
Navy going whoa, whoa, wait a minute, we are going to pull back
and take some money out of that.
So I wanted to get your perspectives on where we are with
that, the importance for the future capability, and how do we,
with that capability, learn in the technology developments,
too, that our adversaries are putting forward. Because what we
don't want is to say, well, we are doing this, and that is in
the static realm.
And then all of a sudden by the time we get that aircraft
ready to go, we look at it and the counter measures there have
already made that aircraft at a much higher risk point than it
would be otherwise because the pace at which our adversaries
are going.
So give me a perspective there about where we are and then
how we are keeping in perspective what the future threat is
going to be in relation to where that aircraft ends up when it
goes to production.
Mr. Hunter. Yes, Congressman. Thanks for that question. You
know, as the name next generation air dominance and family
systems implies, most of the technology work that we believe is
necessary to ensure the ability to compete over multiple
decades in future air fights is really centralized in the NGAD
program.
And it leverages some of these things I have talked about,
these government reference architectures that are foundational
to that. And foundational to our ability to share technology
with the Navy and to leverage their technology, because they
have many good and very advanced programs that we look to
leverage in our program as well.
And my understanding is that at that level, we are working
very well together. And in fact, the Navy is proceeding on the
key technologies that we believe we would like to leverage in
our approach to the NGAD family of systems.
And we are obviously at a point with our FY 2025 budget
request of looking to move NGAD to the next stage and to take
some of that technology development we are working on and
looking at how do we now move that into fielded systems. And so
I would definitely ask for your support for that 2025 budget
request.
Mr. Wittman. Absolutely, next generation air dominance is
going to be key.
Secretary Guertin, if you can reflect, too, on where the
Navy is with NJAD and the FY 2025 budget request coming over
with a significant reduction, about $1.8 billion. So give us
the idea about why the slowing of the steps forward with that
and where the Navy sees this.
And Rear Admiral Donnelly, I would love to get your
perspective on that too.
Mr. Guertin. So thank you, Chairman, for the question, is
actually my first question.
Mr. Wittman. Good, yeah.
Mr. Guertin. So I am very excited for the opportunity. But
there is actually isn't a lot of daylight between the Navy and
the Air Force in terms of the cooperative development we are
seeing across the services. You know, just mark this date,
right, this -- we are pathfinding for a level of cooperation
between the departments that I think, to be honest, is quite
refreshing.
And just like Honorable Hunter said, we have a lot of co-
development. Not necessarily co-development, but we are
leveraging off of each other. We are working different parts of
the problem and working together in a way that is, it is, well,
honestly just a little bit surprising.
Mr. Wittman. Yeah.
Mr. Guertin. Now, they are going to be different jets,
right. We are going to do something, we are going to do this
trick, right. We are going to take off from an aircraft carrier
and we are going to land on it again. So there is some
structural elements of what it takes to do that. It is just
going to be different. But a lot of the stuff on the inside is
going to be highly leveraged.
And another thing that they have started doing that we are
teaming on I am particularly passionate about is that to have
the government in a better position to manage our business.
Having a reference architecture, we can understand how to bring
different capabilities into this jet over its life cycle is
something I am particularly interested in, looking forward to
partner with the Air Force in going forward.
Is there anything else you want to add on that, Gen.
Donnelly?
Admiral Donnelly. Thank you, Chairman Wittman. As Ranking
Member Norcross brought up, it is about the capability. And so
Navy firmly sees that the 6th Generation capability that AFX
[Adversary Force Exercise] will bring is extremely important to
our future port structure and the capability required in the
next decade.
I think Mr. Hunter laid it out very well how we establish
our understanding of the capability required based on threat
assessments, the environment that we are going to operate in
and the architecture that will allow us to continue to develop
towards that.
It has been well-stated here the cooperation between the
Navy and the Air Force, but what I would also bring up is our
close cooperation with industry as we develop these
possibilities here for the both services' solutions.
With regards to where the Navy is in the budget, there were
some obviously very hard decisions to make in 2025, and Navy is
prioritizing current readiness, wholeness of capabilities. But
we wholly understand that we have to continue to develop this
future capability because of the importance it has for our
force.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. I think one of the aspects of this
also with NGAD/NJAD is not just understanding what the future
threat scenario would be and what the future countermeasures
will be by our adversaries to try to overcome whatever
technology we bring to the table. But also to look at our
neighbors like CCA.
I think CCA holds a lot of promise for the current aircraft
and F-35. As we know, it is meant to be ancillary, not in place
of.
But give us your perspective, both Mr. Hunter Mr. Guertin
and Rear Admiral Donnelly, about how you see CCA playing a role
with NGAD and NJAD. Because not a whole lot has been mentioned
about that. We talk about the current scenario now and moving
it to the left, getting it out there quickly.
But as we advance that particular platform, give me your
perspective on what it does to the capability of NGAD/NJAD.
Mr. Hunter. Well, sir, our collaborative combat aircraft
program is part of the NGAD family system, so it is very much
envisioned to be a complementary capability that helps NGAD
perform its mission.
Having said that, we anticipate or we project and we are
budgeting towards fielding of collaborative combat aircraft on
a faster timeframe. So it is not just NGAD that they would be
teaming with. Also other systems, other Air Force systems, and
also joint systems like the F-35.
Mr. Wittman. Do you think what we learn by fielding CCA
faster will provide more capability and capacity for NGAD?
Mr. Hunter. Absolutely. It is leveraging that same
architecture, that same industry-based partner. It allows us to
exercise fielding of technology in a way that will definitely
be supportive of us doing the same thing with NGAD.
Mr. Wittman. Sure. Secretary Guertin, I know that Navy has
gone down that road too, making looking at CCA a little bit
differently, but still in the realm of additional capabilities.
Mr. Guertin. Certainly. I would like to answer the question
slightly differently --
Mr. Wittman. Sure.
Mr. Guertin. And show how we are leaning into that
aggressively in MQ-25. You know, this is a refueling jet. Maybe
we could do some other things later, but my message to industry
right now is we need a refueling jet. And so staying clear and
consistent on the requirements for that capability.
But as we mature out that technology and get to the point
where we can reliably take off and land on an aircraft carrier
with an unmanned vehicle to do a, first of all, simple task and
then grow it over time and figure out how do we take advantage
of CCA. And then build other kinds of capabilities that the
airwing of the future can leverage into.
And Admiral Donnelly, I would like you to pick it up from
there.
Mr. Wittman. Admiral Donnelly?
Admiral Donnelly. Yes, sir. The only thing I would add is
that airwing of the future, and as has been pointed out here by
both General Moore and Mr. Hunter, the future fight is about
the system, not just about an individual platform. The CCAs we
see as a significant part about that. It provides great
flexibility and opportunities to the tactical commander because
of the risk that can be tolerated with the unmanned autonomous
platform.
One of the things I would emphasize is that we are
potentially on different journeys between the services because
of where these will be based from. But this starts with a tri-
service agreement. So there is significant cooperations between
each of the services as we develop our approach to this.
There is a shared approach to the tactics that we will
employ with these. And beyond interoperability, we are looking
interchangeability for the employment of these platforms. So I
think we all recognize the value these bring to the future
fight.
Mr. Wittman. That is great. Yeah, it is I think pretty
exciting to see potentially what they can bring to the table.
Lt. Gen. Gering, I want to get your perspective. Because
from the Marine Corps' perspective, there are actually two
dimensions to CCAs. There is a CCA as an asset in the stand-in
force to be an independent asset that can be launched and
retrieved there across the Indo-Pacific.
There is also using it as an enabler for the ARG/MEU
[Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit] and the
F-35 bravos that are based on ARG/MEU. So give us your
perspective about how the Marine Corps sees the CCA, which is
probably a little bit different perspective than the Air Force
and the Navy.
General Gering. Chairman, thanks for that question. Yeah, I
mean, I think at the wave top, first of all, we are completely
aligned with the Air Force and Navy with CCA, and we also have
signed the tri-service vision.
Mr. Wittman. Yeah.
General Gering. So we think no matter what it looks like or
what it ends up being, it has got to be complementary and
interoperable, not only with our own force, principally our F-
35 fleet, but certainly with the joint force. And that includes
beyond 5th Gen. So that is the approach we are taking.
Right now, we are experimenting with the XQ-58. We have
conducted two flights to date. We have three more planned this
year. The first two were focused more on electronic-type
warfare technologies.
And then as we get into the remaining flights, now we are
starting about putting it into the link, data link. And then
from there for the capstone event, the fifth flight is actually
paired up with an F-35.
So we are still on the voyage of discovery there. But to
your point, sir, as part of the ARG/MEU, you know, the crown
jewel of what we do in campaigning, there is certainly a new
aspect that we want to explore and see what is in the art of
possible there. But also to your point on being part of the
stand-in force, we want to make sure that it is effective in
what we need there.
But we are fully committed to this. We think it is an
absolute must to pair up with our F-35 fleet going forward,
sir. So we are still learning.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Well, folks, thank you, thank so
much. You all have I think exhausted all the aspects of
tactical aircraft, both manned and unmanned. We appreciate your
patience with us in giving us your perspective on what I
believe is probably one of the most important paths forward for
this nation in countering the threats that we see around the
world.
So I appreciate what you do. Anything that you need from
us, please know that we are standing by. Again, our effort is
to chart the path forward to make sure that we are successful
in where we need to be. Congress has to be a partner with you
in that.
It has to be a partner with the industry, as much as
sometimes we are kind of back and forth about, you know, what
has happened to this point. You know, our charge is to make
sure that we have that clear path forward to make sure we
achieve what we have to achieve to counter the threats that we
see before us.
And we cannot underestimate what that is or where they are
going. So I am confident that we can surpass them. But it will
be a tough job, and it is going to be a 24/7 commitment.
And gentleman, I know that you all have all of that in your
hearts and minds going forward. And again, whatever you need
from us, know that we are standing by.
So with that, I don't think there are any other questions.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 16, 2024
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 16, 2024
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 16, 2024
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCCLAIN
Mrs. McClain. 1. As the Government Accountability Office has
previously noted, the recurrence of issues with the F-35 engine and
Power and Thermal Management System (PTMS) is largely due to
insufficient visibility into the engine's performance characteristics
and requirements and a lack of coordination among the companies
responsible for the aircraft's systems. a. As the Department of Defense
and the Joint Program Office begin the Engine Core Upgrade, has the
appropriate technical data been shared with the current PTMS provider
to ensure interoperability between engine performance and the PTMS
functionality? b. If the appropriate technical data has not been
shared, why has the necessary information to ensure interoperability
between the PTMS modernization and engine core upgrade? This is
critical to avoiding past mistakes.
2. Section 226 of the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act
directed a complete and comprehensive cost-benefit and technical risk
analysis that evaluates and determines the PTMS modernization for the
F-35. a. Given that the PTMS was uniquely designed to integrate closely
with the aircraft and perform 14 mission-critical functions on the F-
35, beyond air and liquid cooling, how is the Joint Program Office
evaluating the technical risk to the overall f-35 program associated
with integrating and subsequently requalify every PTMS function -
including extensive on-aircraft integration and flight tests?
3. The Joint Program Office released in December 2023 stated that
the PTMS upgrade must be "economically retrofittable, affordable,
common across all three variants of the F-35, and partner releasable.
Additionally, the integration of the [Thermal Management Upgrade] TMU
should not violate any air system specifications, and no changes to the
air vehicle design will be considered. b. How does the government weigh
each element when selecting the PTMS upgrade solution? c. As part of
the "affordability" criteria, is the government considering the
switching cost and the necessity to upend decades of investment in
global sustainment architecture?
General Michael Schmidt. 1. Yes, as part of the Preliminary Design
effort and subsequent follow-on contracts, both Prime contractors have
been sharing the appropriate technical data required to ensure
interoperability between the engine performance and the current PTMS
functionality. The ECU is being designed to accommodate a modernization
PTMS solution. At this time in development, the appropriate level of
technical data with regards to PTMS does not include data related to a
modernized PTMS solution. It's a separate effort under the Engine Power
and Modernization (EPM) program.
2. The PTMS modernization (or PTMU) team is currently operating in
a competitive environment and has had little, to no communication with
vendors concerning the upcoming PTMU program. Once a Lead Systems
Integrator is selected and the team is able to get under contract, the
first contracting effort will be a System of Systems Analysis to
evaluate modernizations solutions ranging from a derivative solution to
the current system to a "clean-sheet" solution, which could involve a
complete overhaul of the current system. All functions of the overall
PTMS system will be considered and evaluated as part of that initial
contracting action, which will help inform the follow-on contract
actions involving the on-aircraft integration and flight test.
3. Once the PTMU team is out of the competitive environment and
able to get under contract with a Lead Systems Integrator, the first
contracting effort will include evaluation of the Declared Statement of
Requirements (DSOR) FD-652 language for a PTMU solution needing to be
"economically retrofittable, affordable, common across all three
variants of the F-35, and partner releasable." The exact method of
determining the evaluation criteria will be developed as part of the
System of Systems Analysis effort, but will take into consideration all
the design, development, testing, and production aspects of an upgraded
PTMU solution, to include both a derivative solution and a "clean-
sheet" solution. This evaluation will absolutely take into account the
ability to leverage the existing supply chains, depot level
infrastructure, and global sustainment architecture that is supporting
the current PTMS system on the F-35.
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIMENEZ
Mr. Gimenez. Homestead Air Force Base sits proudly in my district.
The 482d Fighter Wing is a fully combat-ready unit capable of providing
F-16C multi-purpose fighter aircraft, along with mission ready pilots
and support personnel, for short-notice worldwide deployments. This
base is a national security asset with power projection into the
Western Hemisphere, used both for responses to national security
threats and natural disasters. But Homestead has an aging F-16/C Fleet.
And between FY25 and FY27, is it correct that you plan on divesting 137
F-16s? What is the plan to replace those F-16s? How will the Air
Force's numerous divestment plans support Homestead Air Reserve Base
fighter mission, and how will you comply with statutory requirement of
the National Military Strategy?
General Moore. The FY25 President's Budget does not include any
force structure changes for Homestead Air Reserve Base (ARB) through at
least FY27 and the Air Force has no plans to close Homestead ARB. The
Air Force's fighter strategy outlined in the FY25 President's Budget
reflects the Department's imperative to continue modernizing to meet
the National Defense Strategy. The Air Force must build a capable,
sustainable, and affordable force that can operate across the entire
range of mission sets. The Air Force's divestment plans for F-16s
center on simplifying the most diverse and complex fighter fleet in the
inventory. Between block types, flight control configurations, and
engine types, there are 9 different F-16 variants in use today in the
Air Force. Pre-block (block 25/30/32) are the oldest variants, have
mechanical flight control systems, and unique Operational Flight
Program development. Consolidating to a post-block only fleet allows
modernization and sustainment efforts to be focused on the 610 post-
block (block 40/42/50/52) aircraft that have digital flight controls
and more modern components. Delaying transformation of the fighter
force produces risk. Extensive war-gaming and analysis suggests that
legacy fighters, regardless of how many, are not sufficient to deter or
defeat a peer adversary, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Continuing to
retain legacy aircraft comes at the cost of today's readiness and
tomorrow's modernization and detracts from the ability to meet the
needs of the National Defense Strategy. This drives the necessity to
retire some legacy aircraft to free up funding and personnel for higher
priority systems.
Mr. Gimenez. As you embrace the fielding of Collaborative Combat
Aircraft (CCA), it is reasonable to assume today's most numerous 5th
generation fighter, the F-35, will be the primary manned leader of the
coming CCA forces? Are there any investments we need to make now to
ensure the F-35 is ready when the CCA's come online?
General Moore. Investment analysis is ongoing for specific use
cases of CCA, including possible integration with the F-35. The Air
Force is committed to rapidly fielding an incremental capability to the
warfighter within the current five-year plan. The first aircraft will
be used by an Experimental Operations Unit, organized to quickly
develop and mature tactics, techniques, and procedures; identify
integration requirements and policy shortfalls; and, chart the path for
future increment capabilities.
Mr. Gimenez. Does the FY25 Budget Request provide enough fighter
aircraft to meet the Services' recapitalization needs? I am concerned
that year after year we see the numbers requested going down; for
example, last year's budget projected 83 F-35s in FY25, but the request
came over for 68.
General Moore. The DAF fighter strategy remains consistent with our
imperative to modernize to meet the National Defense Strategy.
Retaining today's legacy force structure comes at the cost of today's
readiness and tomorrow's modernization. The fiscally constrained
environment driven by the 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act and reduced
buying power necessitated difficult decisions, and you're seeing the
impacts of that in the 2025 President's Budget. The DAF believes the
2025 budget represents the best option for spreading that risk over
time.
Mr. Gimenez. As you embrace the fielding of Collaborative Combat
Aircraft (CCA), it is reasonable to assume today's most numerous 5th
generation fighter, the F-35, will be the primary manned leader of the
coming CCA forces? Are there any investments we need to make now to
ensure the F-35 is ready when the CCA's come online?
Admiral Donnelly. No additional investments are needed at this
time. The Navy continues to work with the Joint Program Office (JPO),
the Marine Corps and the Air Force on F-35C/Collaborative Combat
Aircraft (CCA) integration. Efforts are underway to develop a beyond
line of sight (BLOS) communication pathway and an advanced tactical
data link (ATDL) to pave the way for F-35C/CCA integration.
Mr. Gimenez. Does the FY25 Budget Request provide enough fighter
aircraft to meet the Services' recapitalization needs? I am concerned
that year after year we see the numbers requested going down; for
example, last year's budget projected 83 F-35s in FY25, but the request
came over for 68.
Admiral Donnelly. The Navy plans to optimize strike fighter
recapitalization capacity given available resources, and concurrent F-
35 development and production challenges. Fiscal realities and higher
service priorities required the Navy to defer F-35C procurement in
FY25. The FY25 budget balances these realities, and reflects a
reduction in four F-35C aircraft across the FYDP. While this reduction
allows the Navy to meet recapitalization needs, continued reductions
will increase the risk of not meeting required strike fighter inventory
levels.
Mr. Gimenez. As you embrace the fielding of Collaborative Combat
Aircraft (CCA), it is reasonable to assume today's most numerous 5th
generation fighter, the F-35, will be the primary manned leader of the
coming CCA forces? Are there any investments we need to make now to
ensure the F-35 is ready when the CCA's come online?
General Gering. The F-35 is, and will be for decades, the Joint
Force's premier fighter platform. Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA)
represent a critical technology that address key capability and
capacity gaps to win in the future fight. As a Joint Force, we must
ensure that these complimentary, yet separate, roadmaps are able to
merge seamlessly in the very near future. Marine Unmanned Expeditionary
(MUX) TACAIR is the USMC effort to field a fleet of CCAs that increase
the lethality, survivability, and interoperability of all Aviation
Combat Element (ACE) platforms. The F- 35 will be the primary leader
for MUX TACAIR. Existing experimentation seeks to utilize XQ-58A
Valkyrie aircraft in support of F-35 strike against an enemy target.
Follow-on experimentation and prototyping are necessary to ensure that
F-35 is ready when CCAs come online. Those efforts are specifically
intended to build upon FY24 investments which are enabling a
communications architecture with F-35 while requiring minimal
configuration changes in parallel to the Program of Record (POR).
Investments will include integration of Line of Sight (LOS)
communications, Beyond LOS (BLOS) data links while enhancing command
and control for the F-35. If funded, additional investments in this
capability will support the development effort needed to fully enable a
federated F-35 communication system, an off-board F-35 BLOS, while
building out TACAIR (F-35 and MUX) ground system capabilities. The USMC
needs to maintain the momentum for MUX TACAIR transition to POR.
Funding levels in FY25 will pause F-35/CCA efforts and push POR
achievement beyond USMC operational needs in the INDOPACOM AOR. The
Service is ready to close this gap and position the Joint Force to
close kill chains in any future fight or global crisis.
Mr. Gimenez. Does the FY25 Budget Request provide enough fighter
aircraft to meet the Services' recapitalization needs? I am concerned
that year after year we see the numbers requested going down; for
example, last year's budget projected 83 F-35s in FY25, but the request
came over for 68.
General Gering. The USMC remains fully committed to a POR of 420
aircraft. As the service looked to balance a multitude of service
priorities, as well as right-size funding in above- and below-the-line
F-35 funding, fiscal constraints led to a deferral of seven tails
across the FY25 FYDP. While this reduction does not put the USMC TACAIR
transition plan at risk, it pushes aircraft deliveries later than
planned and reduces decision space for TACAIR planners. Any additional
deferrals will put the USMC TACAIR transition plan and associated
Global Force Management (GFM) requirements at risk. We appreciate the
continued Congressional oversight and assistance on this issue.
Mr. Gimenez. The recent conflict with Israel and Hamas has been a
true test of the F-35. How have the F-35s performed, and has the F-35
sustainment enterprise been able to efficiently and effectively rise to
the occasion to keep these jets mission capable? What feedback are you
getting from the IAF?
General Michael Schmidt. Maximizing mission capability rates for
all Partners and Foreign Military Sales customers remains a top F-35
Program priority. We are executing a War on Readiness as we work with
industry teammates and our user community to tackle top degraders.
Meanwhile, we are maturing sustainment capability and standing up
robust depot capacity throughout the enterprise to ensure users have
timely access to parts, equipment, and repair capability. Throughout
its history, the F-35 Program has laid the groundwork for surge
sustainment to ensure preparation for wartime activities. As we've seen
in recent months, the F-35's global sustainment infrastructure, and the
platform itself, are being tested. From operational and technical
perspectives, our aircraft and global supply system are proving
resilient. The JPO is applying lessons learned to maximize sustainment
survivability, responsiveness, and flexibility throughout the fleet.
While information associated with operational data and outcomes for
specific user nations is sensitive in nature, the F-35 JPO welcomes the
opportunity to provide additional details to Members and Professional
Staff in appropriate forums.
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