[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]








              THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN AVIATION SECURITY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                  TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY

                                 of the

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 19, 2023

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-33

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]








                                     

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________
                                  
                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
                 
56-142 PDF                   WASHINGTON : 2024 























                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                  Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas                J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York                Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
                      Stephen Siao, Staff Director
                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                       Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
                                 ------                                

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY

                  Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Shri Thanedar, Michigan, Ranking 
Nick LaLota, New York                    Member
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Robert Garcia, California
    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
                                         (ex officio)
                  Vacancy, Subcommittee Staff Director
           Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director   
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Transportation and Maritime Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     3
The Honorable Shri Thanedar, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Transportation and Maritime Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     4
  Prepared Statement.............................................     6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     6
The Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, a Representative in 
  Congress From the State of Maryland:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     1

                               Witnesses

Mr. Austin Gould, Assistant Administrator, Requirements and 
  Capabilities Analysis, Transportation Security Administration:
  Oral Statement.................................................     8
  Joint Prepared Statement.......................................    10
Ms. Tina Won Sherman, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 
  U.S. Government Accountability Office:
  Oral Statement.................................................    14
  Prepared Statement.............................................    15
Mr. Mario Wilson, Assistant Administrator, Acquisition Program 
  Management, Transportation Security Administration:
  Oral Statement.................................................    25
  Joint Prepared Statement.......................................    10

                                Appendix

Question From Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger for the 
  Transportation Security Administration.........................    37
Questions From Honorable Robert Garcia for the Transportation 
  Security Administration........................................    37
Question From Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger for Tina Won 
  Sherman........................................................    37

 
              THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN AVIATION SECURITY

                              ----------                              


                       Thursday, October 19, 2023

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                        Subcommittee on Transportation and 
                                         Maritime Security,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in 
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez 
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Gimenez, LaLota, Thanedar, and 
Garcia.
    Also present: Representative Menendez.
    Mr. Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security will come 
to order.
    Without objection, the Chair may declare the subcommittee 
in recess at any point.
    Today's hearing will examine the role of technology in 
aviation security.
    I recognize Ranking Member Thanedar for the purposes of 
seeking unanimous consent.
    Mr. Thanedar. Good morning, everybody.
    Mr. Chair, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Menendez be 
permitted to sit with the subcommittee and question today's 
witnesses; and further, that Mr. Ruppersberger be permitted to 
submit a statement and questions for the record, please.
    Mr. Gimenez. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The statement of Mr. Ruppersberger follows:]
            Statement of Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger
    Thank you, Chairman Gimenez and Ranking Member Thanedar, for 
holding this hearing on a topic of paramount importance to our National 
security and for allowing me to participate.
    Earlier this year, the TSA made history by screening the most 
passengers ever in a single day in the agency's history--nearly 2.9 
million travelers. On any given day, this year, TSA screened an average 
of 2.3 million passengers.
    As demand for commercial flights in the United States continues to 
increase, so do the ever-evolving threats that TSA screeners must 
anticipate, detect, and stop before lives are jeopardized. Ensuring 
that TSA possesses the latest technology is foundational to this 
mission.
    The good news is that Congress created a mechanism in the wake of 
9/11 to fund TSA's security efforts by establishing the Passenger 
Security Fee. The bad news is that, since 2014, a large portion of the 
funds collected have been diverted to the General Treasury rather than 
spent on new technologies, system maintenance, and checkpoint 
reinforcement. By 2027, $19 billion will have been diverted. Let's not 
mince words: This is opening the door for terrorists to attack our 
democracy.
    Continued diversion of the Passenger Security Fee is short-sighted 
and dangerous. I am eager to hear from our esteemed witnesses on the 
importance of following through on our commitment to airline passengers 
by creating a devoted Aviation Security Checkpoint Technology Fund.

    Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize myself for an opening 
statement. Today, our subcommittee is discussing the role of 
technology in TSA's mission to secure the American 
transportation and aviation industry.
    One of our chief concerns is the slow time line of TSA's 
rollout of the new technology in the passenger screening 
process, and what this subcommittee can do to expedite the long 
time lines outlined by the agency.
    After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress 
tasked TSA to protect the Nation's commercial and aviation 
sector. TSA cannot carry out this mission without the 
technological systems it deploys at airports around the 
country. These systems allow transportation security officers 
and other TSA personnel to screen for weapons, explosives, and 
other dangerous items that threaten passenger safety.
    Additionally, TSA's technological systems facilitate 
passenger identification verification and ensure that known or 
suspected terrorists and other dangerous criminals do not board 
commercial flights.
    These functions are essential for TSA to carry out its 
statutory mission. The new systems that TSA are bringing on-
line make the agency more effective in carrying out its 
missions by reducing the possibility of human error and 
allowing TSOs to focus more attention on interfacing with 
passengers to resolve pressing issues.
    However, I am concerned that TSA has not appropriately 
prioritized the development and deployment of new technological 
systems within its passenger screening process. Earlier this 
year, Administrator David Pekoske informed the subcommittee 
that the agency projects it will fully integrate the new 
computed tomography, or CT machines, used to screen carry-on 
luggage and second-generation Credential Authentication 
Technology, or CAT-2 systems, used for passenger identification 
verification by fiscal year 2042 and 2049, respectively. These 
time lines mean that the agency will take over 20 years to 
adopt the technologies it needs today--frankly, obviously, way 
too slow.
    I'm concerned that TSA has not adequately prioritized 
accelerating this time line. TSA budget request for fiscal year 
2024 included only around $70 million to procure additional 
systems within the CPSS program, an amount significantly lower 
than what was appropriated in the previous fiscal year.
    TSA's request of $11 million for CAT-2 machines also does 
not make a serious dent in the lengthy time lines for the 
replacement of the current CAT-1 machines, which currently is 
projected to take 26 years.
    TSA is also forgoing opportunities to invest in other 
technologies, like detection-at-range, that would further 
increase TSA's capabilities at passenger checkpoints and 
decrease the need for screening procedures, like physical pat-
downs, that some consider to be invasive. There are two ways in 
which we can address this issue: Funding and focus.
    Regarding funding, I was pleased that the House-passed 
Homeland Security appropriations bill included a $35 million 
increase from TSA's original budget request to fund the 
acquisition of new CT machines. In our previous hearing with 
Administrator Pekoske, we discussed the possibility of 
redirecting the September 11 security fee back to TSA. That 
fee, which is $5.60 for every air passenger per trip is 
intended to fund TSA's operations at airports. However, over $1 
billion in collected fees are currently diverted to the 
Treasury to pay for unrelated Federal debt.
    I believe it is time that we revisit the fee diversion and 
discuss ways in which ending it would help the agency develop 
and deploy technologies faster. Actually, it's passengers that 
are paying this fee. Passengers are expecting the best security 
system. Frankly, I find it quite objectionable that $1 billion 
that the passengers are paying for are going somewhere else. 
They're not really being used for what they're paying for.
    With regard to focus, I believe the TSA ought to be 
prioritizing its new technological systems more. Anyone can do 
anything with an unlimited budget, but even with an unlimited 
budget, I still believe TSA can be doing more to bring these 
new technologies on-line more quickly. In addressing this 
critical issue, we can ultimately ensure that American air 
passengers are safer and American citizens are getting good 
return on their security fee.
    For our panel of witnesses, I thank each of you for 
testifying before our subcommittee today, and I look forward to 
hearing your testimony.
    [The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
                Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
    Today, our subcommittee is discussing the role of technology in 
TSA's mission to secure the American transportation and aviation 
industry.
    One of our chief concerns is the slow time line of TSA's rollout of 
the new technology in the passenger screening process and what this 
subcommittee can do to expedite the long time lines outlined by the 
agency.
    After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress tasked 
TSA to protect the Nation's commercial aviation sector.
    TSA cannot carry out this mission without the technological systems 
it deploys at airports around the country.
    These systems allow Transportation Security Officers and other TSA 
personnel to screen for weapons, explosives, and other dangerous items 
that threaten passenger safety.
    Additionally, TSA's technological systems facilitate passenger 
identify verification and ensure that Known or Suspected Terrorists and 
other dangerous criminals do not board commercial flights.
    These functions are essential for TSA to carry out its statutory 
mission.
    The new systems that TSA are bringing on-line make the agency more 
effective in carrying out its mission by reducing the possibility of 
human error and allowing TSOs to focus more attention on interfacing 
with passengers to resolve pressing issues.
    However, I am concerned that TSA has not appropriately prioritized 
the development and deployment of new technological systems within its 
passenger screening process.
    Earlier this year, Administrator David Pekoske informed this 
subcommittee that the agency projects it will fully integrate the new 
computed tomography, or CT, machines used to screen carry-on luggage 
and the second-generation Credential Authentication Technology, or CAT-
2, systems used for passenger identity verification by fiscal years 
2042 and 2049 respectively.
    These time lines mean that the agency will take over 20 years to 
adopt the technologies it needs today.
    Frankly, this is too slow.
    I am concerned that TSA has not adequately prioritized accelerating 
this time line.
    TSA's budget request for fiscal year 2024 included only around $70 
million to procure additional systems within the CPSS program, an 
amount significantly lower than what was appropriated in the prior 
fiscal year.
    TSA's request of $11 million for CAT-2 machines also does not make 
a serious dent in the lengthy time line for the replacement of the 
current CAT-1 machines, which currently is projected to take 26 years.
    TSA is also forgoing opportunities to invest in other technologies 
like ``detection at range'' that would further increase TSA's 
capabilities at passenger checkpoints and decrease the need for 
screening procedures like physical pat-downs that some consider to be 
invasive.
    There are two ways in which we can address this issue: funding and 
focus.
    Regarding funding, I was pleased that the House-passed Homeland 
Security appropriations bill included a $35 million increase from TSA's 
original budget request to fund the acquisition of new CT machines.
    In our previous hearing with Administrator Pekoske, we discussed 
the possibility of redirecting the September 11 Security Fee back to 
TSA.
    The fee, which is $5.60 for each air passenger per trip, is 
intended to fund TSA's operations at airports.
    However, over $1 billion in collected fees are currently diverted 
to the Treasury to pay for unrelated Federal debt.
    I believe it is time that we revisit the Fee Diversion and discuss 
ways in which ending it would help the agency develop and deploy new 
technologies faster.
    With regard to focus, I believe that TSA ought to be prioritizing 
its new technological systems more.
    Anyone can do anything with an unlimited budget, but even within a 
limited budget, I still believe TSA can be doing more to bring these 
new technologies on-line more quickly.
    In addressing this critical issue, we can ultimately ensure that 
American air passengers are safer and American citizens are getting a 
good return on their security fee.
    To our panel of witnesses, I thank each of you for testifying 
before our subcommittee today, and I look forward to hearing your 
testimonies.

    Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the 
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Thanedar, for his opening 
statement.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, and thank you 
for holding this hearing today on this important topic, and 
thank you to our witnesses to be here.
    My job, you know, calls for me to be traveling on an 
airline very often, and invariably, I get a chance to observe 
TSA workers in action. I get to see the technology, and I've 
seen over the years how the technology has changed.
    I've seen how hard these TSA officers work every day, long 
hours. You know, sometimes it's a thankless job, you know. 
People are in a hurry and they always look at a TSA officer as 
a, you know, intrusion as opposed to someone who is doing their 
job to keep America safe.
    You know, the more I see their hard work the more I 
appreciate. I'm bothered by the huge turnover in these 
hardworking people, because we've got to compete for their 
services not only with other Federal agencies, but we got to 
compete for their services. They have options. They have 
choices. They could go to private sector. They could do a whole 
lot of other things.
    I'm a businessman. I ran businesses. I took care of my 
employees. It's good business to be good and take care of your 
staff, your employees. We got to take care of these hardworking 
men and women of TSA. What does that mean? We've got to--we've 
got to, you know, make sure they're happy, that they're paid 
fairly, that they have benefits, they have rights, and we help 
them enjoy and feel productive at their work and feel 
appreciated for what they do. You know, I have more of that 
appreciation every time I'm going through and passing, you 
know, an airport.
    So the Transportation Security Administration carries out a 
critical mission to secure transportation systems. To do so, 
TSA relies on a well-trained work force and the sophisticated 
technologies capable of detecting the latest threats.
    Thanks to funding Democrats provided in last year's omnibus 
spending bill, a few months ago TSA workers finally began to 
receive long-overdue pay raises to put them on par with other 
Federal workers.
    To build on this progress, we must provide additional 
funding to not only preserve those pay raises for this fiscal 
year, but to empower TSA workers with next-generation 
technology that will maximize TSA's detection capabilities, 
technologies such as Computed Tomography machines and 
Credential Authentication Technology machines provide 
significant enhancements to security while also improving the 
passenger experience.
    I would like to see Congress provide sustained funding for 
checkpoint security technologies, which is why I am a cosponsor 
of Ranking Member Thompson's bill, the Fund the TSA Act, which 
would direct a modest increase to passenger security fees to 
provide consistent funding for checkpoint technologies, TSA 
work force initiatives, and other transportation security 
programs.
    As TSA deploys technologies to airports, it must also make 
sure to provide equitable treatment to all passengers. Last 
year, the Government Accountability Office issued a report 
finding that TSA has not assessed the extent to which its 
policies and technology result in certain passengers being 
referred for additional screening more often than others.
    For too long, some passenger populations have been 
disproportionately subjected to invasive pat-downs due to 
alarms from screening technology. This population includes 
transgender passengers, passengers with religious headwear, 
passengers with disability, and passengers with coarse hair, 
including African-American women.
    Under the Biden administration, TSA has made impressive 
progress in addressing these issues by deploying an updated 
algorithm that reduces false alarms by 50 percent. TSA must 
build on this progress and protect against discriminatory 
outcomes in emerging technologies.
    Finally, we must ensure TSA fosters innovation in its 
technology programs by encouraging the participation of a wide 
range of vendors, including small and minority-owned 
businesses. Many small businesses have trouble to compete for 
TSA technology awards, given the long time lines necessary for 
technology development, testing, and evaluation. We must 
support small businesses, since they are some of the biggest 
drivers of innovation and progress.
    Chairman Gimenez, I thank you and I thank our witnesses and 
look forward to listening to you. I yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thanedar follows:]
               Statement of Ranking Member Shri Thanedar
                            October 19, 2023
    The Transportation Security Administration carries out a critical 
mission to secure transportation systems. To do so, TSA relies on a 
well-trained workforce and sophisticated technologies capable of 
detecting the latest threats. Thanks to funding Democrats provided in 
last year's Omnibus spending bill, a few months ago TSA workers finally 
began to receive long-overdue pay raises to put them on par with other 
Federal workers.
    To build on this progress, we must provide additional funding to 
not only preserve those pay raises for this fiscal year, but to empower 
TSA workers with next-generation technologies that will maximize TSA's 
detection capabilities. Technologies such as Computed Tomography 
machines and Credential Authentication Technology machines provide 
significant enhancements to security while also improving the passenger 
experience.
    I would like to see Congress provide sustained funding for 
checkpoint security technologies--which is why I am a cosponsor of 
Ranking Member Thompson's bill, the Fund the TSA Act, which would 
direct a modest increase to passenger security fees to provide 
consistent funding for checkpoint technologies, TSA workforce 
initiatives, and other transportation security programs. As TSA deploys 
technologies to airports, it must also make sure to provide equitable 
treatment to all passengers.
    Last year, the Government Accountability Office issued a report 
finding that TSA has not assessed the extent to which its policies and 
technology result in certain passengers being referred for additional 
screening more often than others. For too long, some passenger 
populations have been disproportionately subjected to invasive pat-
downs due to alarms from screening technology. These populations 
include transgender passengers, passengers with religious headwear, 
passengers with disabilities, and passengers with coarse hair, 
including African American women.
    Under the Biden administration, TSA has made impressive progress in 
addressing these issues by deploying an upgraded algorithm that reduces 
false alarms by 50 percent. TSA must build on this progress and protect 
against discriminatory outcomes in emerging technologies.
    Finally, we must ensure TSA fosters innovation in its technology 
programs by encouraging the participation of a wide range of vendors, 
including small and minority-owned businesses. Many small businesses 
have struggled to compete for TSA technology awards given the long time 
lines necessary for technology development, testing, and evaluation. We 
must support small businesses since they are some of the biggest 
drivers of innovation and progress.

    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ranking Member Thanedar.
    Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                            October 19, 2023
    Thank you to Chairman Gimenez and Ranking Member Thanedar for 
convening today's hearing to examine the Transportation Security 
Administration's aviation security technology programs. Thank you to 
our witnesses as well for sharing their expertise.
    We meet today under a cloud of chaos and dysfunction, as the 
Republican Majority has failed to elect a Speaker for more than 2 weeks 
and counting.
    Each day that passes without a Speaker brings us 1 day closer to 
the deadline to fund the Government, which is now less than a month 
away.
    A Government shutdown would be detrimental to the TSA workforce, 
along with other workforces across the Government, and it would place 
our transportation systems at risk.
    I hope my Republican colleagues will figure out a way to bring the 
House back to regular order as quickly as possible.
    Now, turning to the topic of today's hearing. Throughout the past 
two decades, TSA has worked to field technologies capable of detecting 
threats to aviation and processing a large and diverse population of 
travelers and their baggage.
    TSA has succeeded in developing some impressive technologies--and 
has also made its fair share of missteps.
    Many of us remember the expensive yet ineffective ``puffer'' 
machines TSA purchased, as well as the whole-body imaging machines that 
could not be outfitted with appropriate privacy filters.
    In both cases, TSA ultimately had to pull machines from the field, 
at great expense to the taxpayer.
    Too often, TSA has relied on a handful of large technology 
manufacturers to provide screening equipment, resulting in limited 
competition.
    In recent years, at my urging, TSA has worked to create additional 
opportunities for small and minority-owned businesses to compete for 
technology contracts.
    These businesses provide innovative approaches and help spur 
improvements to TSA's capabilities, but they sometimes need support to 
be able to withstand the long time lines TSA requires for testing and 
evaluating new technologies.
    TSA must continue to foster increased competition and innovation 
within the screening technology marketplace by expanding opportunities 
for small and minority-owned businesses.
    TSA must also continue to improve its technologies to ensure they 
do not impact certain passenger populations in a discriminatory manner.
    We have long seen some groups of passengers alarm TSA's screening 
technologies at much higher rates than others.
    Transgender passengers have been forced to undergo invasive pat-
downs because their bodies do not conform to an arbitrary standard.
    Black women have been subjected to pat-downs of their hair because 
many of their hairstyles do not conform to TSA's standard.
    Passengers wearing religious headwear or using assistive devices 
have caused alarm after alarm because, again, they do not conform to a 
standard.
    TSA must do a better job of considering the needs of all passengers 
when developing the requirements for technologies.
    Thankfully, under this administration, TSA is moving in the right 
direction.
    In June, TSA finished deploying a new software algorithm to 
Advanced Imaging Technology machines across the country. The algorithm 
allows for gender-neutral screening and reduces false alarms for all 
passengers by 50 percent.
    TSA must build on this success to further reduce invasive pat-
downs, and the agency must refine its processes to ensure new 
technologies are thoroughly vetted to prevent discrimination.
    TSA must also continue its efforts to procure and deploy Computed 
Tomography machines, which provide important improvements to TSA's 
screening of carry-on luggage.
    Deploying these machines to all screening lanes across the country 
will require sustained and dedicated funding.
    My bill, the Fund the TSA Act, would establish a fund dedicated to 
checkpoint security technologies paid for by a modest increase to 
passenger security fees.
    I look forward to continuing to work with TSA, GAO, and 
stakeholders to ensure TSA's security technologies meet the needs of 
the traveling public.
    Thank you again to our witnesses.

    Mr. Gimenez. Again, I am pleased to have a distinguished 
panel of witnesses before us today on this critical topic.
    I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right 
hand.
    Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give 
before the Committee on Homeland Security of the U.S. House of 
Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God?
    Mr. Gould. I do.
    Mr. Wilson. I do.
    Ms. Sherman. I do.
    Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have 
answered in the affirmative. Thank you, and please be seated.
    I would like to now formally introduce our witnesses.
    Austin Gould serves as the assistant administrator for 
requirement and capability analysis; and Mario Wilson serves as 
the assistant administrator for acquisition program management 
for TSA; Tina Won Sherman serves as director for the Government 
Accountability Office's homeland security and justice team.
    I thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here 
today.
    I now recognize Assistant Administrator Austin Gould for 5 
minutes to summarize his opening statements.

      STATEMENT OF AUSTIN GOULD, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, 
REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
                         ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Gould. Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member 
Thanedar, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am 
Austin Gould, the assistant administrator for requirements and 
capabilities analysis at the Transportation Security 
Administration. I am joined today by my colleague, Mr. Mario 
Wilson, the assistant administrator for acquisition program 
management. We'd like to thank you for the opportunity to 
appear today to discuss the role of technology in aviation 
security.
    I would like to begin by thanking the committee for your 
strong support of the new TSA pay plan, which ensures that TSA 
employees are paid similarly to their Federal counterparts. 
This significant change will enable TSA to recruit and retain a 
highly-skilled work force to operate the technologies that we 
will discuss today. Early indicators show that attrition is 
down nearly 30 percent, thanks to this effort.
    Although today's hearing is focused on technology, it is 
important to note that sustaining this increase in pay for our 
entire work force ensures that those who we need to operate 
TSA's technology are appropriately paid.
    The TSA uses robust risk analytics to assess risk and 
vulnerabilities in the aviation domain. These risks are 
incorporated into research and development priorities for the 
agency, where we collaborate closely with the DHS Science and 
Technology Directorate and National Labs to ensure that R&D 
funding is focused on the most pressing needs.
    The risk outlook in R&D is then used to develop the 
operational requirements for security technology. These 
requirements are validated through the DHS Joint Requirements 
Council, shared with other components for potential 
applicability, and form the basis for TSA technology 
acquisitions.
    There are many on-going acquisition efforts at TSA. The 
Credential Authentication Technology, or CAT, is a device which 
scans a passenger's ID and assesses the security features for 
validity. The CAT displays the result of the security scan, the 
passenger's biographics and image from the ID to the officer, 
and returns the passenger's secure flight vetting status in 
near-real time so they can be directed to the appropriate level 
of screening.
    The newest version of CAT includes biometric and digital 
identity functionality. The biometric capability allows for 
consenting passengers to be photographed at the checkpoint and 
have their image compared to the ID. This process is fast, 
highly accurate, and does not require any biometric information 
to leave the checkpoint. Digital identity functionality is 
being tested in States that have issued mobile driver's 
licenses. With current funding levels, the TSA will complete 
CAT deployment in 2049.
    The TSA is also updating X-rays at the checkpoint with 
advanced computed tomography, or CT machines. The CTs are a 
significant improvement in security effectiveness as they can 
more accurately identify threats, enable the officers to slice 
and rotate images, and provide the ability to virtually remove 
laptop computers to assess them for tampering. These systems 
can be networked to allow officers to review images from other 
lanes, and can be connected to remote screening rooms where 
officers can view images in a quiet environment.
    The TSA is further exploring the development of prohibited 
item algorithms for CTs, which will automatically recognize 
knives, guns, and other weapons. The deployment of CT will 
reduce the need for passengers to remove items from their bags, 
and with current funding levels, the TSA will complete CT 
deployment in 2042.
    Advancements in on-person screening are also being 
developed and implemented. The TSA recently deployed a low 
false alarm algorithm for the Advanced Imaging Technology, or 
AIT machines, which lowers the false alarm rate for on-person 
screening, resulting in fewer pat-downs and improves threat 
detection. The TSA is researching advanced panel systems which, 
if successful, may allow a passenger to pause only briefly 
while being screened.
    These technologies and the others I mentioned will be field 
tested at the TSA innovation checkpoint at Harry Reid 
International Airport in Las Vegas, Nevada.
    When potential threat items are detected in primary 
screening, TSA officers need the ability to quickly ascertain 
if the item is actually a threat. This process is known as 
alarm resolution, and the TSA is researching advanced 
technologies to improve this capability.
    Many of the technologies I just described incorporate open 
architecture principles. Open architecture is an engineering 
philosophy where equipment is designed to standards so that 
third parties, such as algorithm providers, can provide best-
of-breed technology solutions to the TSA. This ensures not only 
the best security capability, but also increases opportunities 
for small businesses to engage with TSA.
    It is clear that the TSA is actively leveraging advanced 
technology to both enhance security and improve the passenger 
experience. In order to execute this, the TSA needs dedicated, 
predictable resources for technology investment. Dedicated 
resources will both enable the TSA to deploy security-
enhancing, game-changing technologies years ahead of the 
current schedule and also encourage industry to invest in new 
technologies.
    The TSA would welcome any legislation providing this 
funding, including ending the diversion of the 9/11 passenger 
security fee to deficit reduction.
    On behalf of Mr. Wilson and myself, I would like to thank 
you for the opportunity to appear today, and we look forward to 
your questions. Thank you.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Gould and Mr. Wilson 
follows:]
       Joint Prepared Statement of Austin Gould and Mario Wilson
                            October 19, 2023
                              introduction
    Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and 
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me 
and my Transportation Security Administration (TSA) colleague, Mr. 
Mario Wilson, to testify on the role of technology in aviation 
security. Our testimony will highlight the development of requirements 
for new checkpoint technologies, acquisition time lines with the 
associated funding requirements, and how the technology is used in the 
field to both enhance security effectiveness and improve the passenger 
experience.
    First and foremost, I would like to thank the committee and 
Congress for your continued support of our workforce, most notably 
through approving funding for TSA's pay plan which was included in the 
fiscal year 2023 Omnibus Appropriations Act. Although today's hearing 
is focused on technology, it is important to note that sustaining this 
increase in pay for our entire workforce ensures that those who we need 
to operate TSA's Government-funded technology are properly and 
comparably paid. This is especially important as we have seen record-
breaking passenger volume in recent months. This necessary and 
significant increase in pay that occurred in July upon conversion to 
the new pay plan brought the salaries of TSA personnel to a level equal 
to our Federal counterparts, and will enable the TSA to recruit, and 
most importantly retain, top candidates for Federal employment. 
Positive impacts are already being seen. The TSA is committed to 
providing the very best tools, training, and procedures to our 
personnel to enable them to efficiently and effectively secure the 
aviation system.
    Second, TSA has seen the benefits of dedicated annual funding for 
our checked bag systems and are supportive of any legislation that 
would establish a similar concept for our checkpoint security screening 
technology. Dedicated funding would enable TSA to complete the 
deployment of new technologies years, if not decades, ahead of its 
current deployment time lines of 2042 and 2049. Ending the diversion of 
the Security Service Fee is critical to TSA's mission. In the aftermath 
of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress authorized the collection of 
a fee from commercial flight passengers to offset the costs for civil 
aviation security services: the Security Service Fee. In 2014, Congress 
passed legislation to increase the fee to $5.60 per one-way trip with a 
maximum of $11.20 per round trip. However, the legislation also 
diverted a large portion of the fees collected away from TSA and to the 
Treasury General Fund--not for aviation security. If the diversion of 
the fee away from TSA is terminated and the fees collected are directed 
back toward TSA as originally intended, it will provide TSA 
approximately $1.6 billion annually to offset the agency's appropriated 
funding. This funding is essential as TSA has seen an unprecedented 
increase in passenger volume in recent months, which is projected to 
increase even further in the future.
    Passenger volumes have recovered and are exceeding pre-pandemic 
levels. TSA is screening an average of 2.3 million passengers per day. 
In fiscal year 2023, TSA screened a total of 838.1 million passengers, 
a 13.8 percent increase from the prior year; 99.1 percent of passengers 
waited 30 minutes or less in standard lanes and 98.7 percent of 
passengers waited 10 minutes or less in TSA PreCheck lanes. This 
summer, TSA screened 150 million checked bags. In fiscal year 2023, TSA 
experienced 6 of the busiest travel days on record, the highest being 
June 30, 2023 with 2.88 million passengers screened.
                checkpoint security screening technology
    Given this staggering volume, it is imperative that TSA develop and 
deploy the most effective technologies available to promote safe air 
travel of passengers, checked baggage, and cargo, while ensuring that 
the system supports a positive and streamlined customer service 
experience. To do this, TSA uses robust risk analytics to inform the 
operational requirements for screening equipment, ensuring that 
investments are made in technologies that provide the most security 
benefit. These risk analytics are then used to inform research 
priorities for the agency to ensure research and development (R&D) 
funding is applied to the most pressing needs.
    Recent research efforts include biometric identification 
technologies, advanced algorithms for explosives and prohibited items 
(guns, knives, grenades, etc.), detection in carry-on baggage, and 
advanced on-person screening equipment. Additional critical research is 
being conducted into what is called Alarm Resolution. Alarm Resolution 
is the process Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) use to resolve 
alarms that occur during on-person or luggage screening to quickly 
determine if the alarm is the result of an actual prohibited item.
    TSA coordinates all of these R&D activities with the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, 
ensuring no redundancies. TSA also actively participates in S&T's 
research portfolio development process to ensure that the 
administration's basic research needs are addressed.
    What follows is a summary of TSA's major procurement efforts and 
plans for future technology development and fielding.
                  credential authentication technology
    Credential Authentication Technology (CAT) is one example of the 
agency's major procurement efforts. From a security perspective, 
positive identification of passengers is critical to aviation security. 
In fiscal year 2023, TSA discovered a total of 452 fraudulent IDs at a 
checkpoint. The CAT is a technology that scans a passenger's identity 
credential (driver's license, passport, etc.) for security features, 
displays it on a screen for the TSO to compare it to the passenger's 
face, and connects to TSA's Secure Flight passenger prescreening 
system, returning the passenger's screening status (i.e., Standard, TSA 
PreCheck, or Selectee) in near-real time. This enables the officer to 
more accurately identify the passenger and direct them to the 
appropriate level of screening, and it negates the need to produce a 
boarding pass. Currently, a total of 2,054 CAT machines are deployed at 
227 locations.
    Building on the success of the CAT, TSA is integrating digital 
identity capabilities, namely the interoperability of state-issued 
mobile Driver's Licenses, into the second generation CAT system known 
as the CAT-2. The CAT-2 incorporates biometric matching and digital 
identity functionality into the CAT unit. The biometric capability on 
the CAT-2 is a 1:1 facial match where the system compares a live photo 
of the individual's face with the image on the physical credential. The 
passenger allows permission for their smart device to transmit their 
credential information to TSA using the CAT-2 unit, where the CAT-2 
performs biometric matching against the digitally-provided credential. 
In September 2023, TSA began retrofitting the existing CAT units with 
upgrade kits providing CAT-2 functionality, including the ability to 
interact with digital identities. The TSA will continue to deploy these 
upgrade kits to existing CAT units throughout fiscal year 2024.
    Given the wide diversity of the millions of passengers moving 
through airport checkpoints daily, accuracy in biometric solutions is a 
key issue for TSA. Therefore, TSA is grounding its exploration of 
biometric solutions in rigorous scientific study and analysis to ensure 
the full benefits of biometrics technology are realized. We are aware 
of a variety of public concerns related to performance errors and take 
this issue seriously. Along with its Federal partners, TSA is carefully 
studying matching performance differences across biometric systems and 
operational environments to identify the existence of disparities on 
these and other grounds. TSA works closely with Department of Homeland 
Security's Science and Technology Directorate and National Institute of 
Standards and Technology to independently assess the performance of 
biometrics solutions and found no statistically significant differences 
in biometric performance across gender, race, and skin tone under 
varied test conditions for the CAT-2 system. Accuracy in biometric 
solutions is a priority for TSA, and one that is being carefully 
studied to ensure TSA realizes the full benefits of this technology and 
makes informed decisions to mitigate risks.
    TSA is also conducting a ``1:n'' facial identification touchless 
proof of concept for passengers with a Known Traveler Number (KTN) who 
are eligible to participate in TSA PreCheck. 1:n is a process that uses 
the Customs and Border Protection's Traveler Verification Service 
(TVS); galleries of day-of travelers are built of passengers who have 
met the requirements and have opted-in to the touchless experience. TSA 
PreCheck passengers in these locations can step up to the system, have 
their face photographed, and have their image matched against the day-
of gallery in TVS. If there is an identity match, they are allowed to 
enter the security checkpoint without having to produce any physical or 
digital forms of ID. Through this innovation, TSA PreCheck passengers 
now can process through the security checkpoint significantly faster 
than through the standard CAT-2 protocol. Passengers must take several 
steps to participate and already have a photo on file for the purpose 
of travel. Privacy is protected through opt-in consent and deletion of 
the photo collected at the checkpoint within 24 hours after flight.
    If a passenger decides not to opt-in to using biometrics 
identification, then a normal manual verification process is used. This 
is addressed in the Privacy Impact Assessment for this touchless proof 
of concept, and signage is prominently displayed near the 1:n prototype 
devices.
    All of TSA's identity management, facial recognition, and biometric 
programs are reviewed internally by TSA Privacy and TSA Civil Rights & 
and Liberties offices, as well as by the DHS Privacy and DHS Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties offices to ensure the protection of privacy, 
civil rights, and civil liberties of the traveling public.
    Last, the careful development and deployment of biometric and 
digital identification capabilities will significantly streamline the 
passenger identification process while ensuring privacy is enhanced.
      checkpoint property screening system and computed tomography
    Another major technology advancement that TSA is currently 
procuring is the Checkpoint Property Screening System, or CPSS. At the 
current rate, TSA will surpass last year's record of 6,542 firearms 
prevented from getting on-board an aircraft. The CPSS consists of a 
computed tomography (CT) three-dimensional X-ray scanner. A three-
dimensional CT image enables the TSO to rotate the image, scan through 
items in order to better identify potential threat contents, and 
virtually remove laptops in the image to assess for signs of tampering. 
The system is capable of using advanced detection algorithms to detect 
explosive materials. TSA, in conjunction with the CPSS manufacturers, 
are currently developing Prohibited Item algorithms to detect weapons 
such as knives and firearms. There are currently 781 CPSSs installed in 
the field, and TSA currently has contracts in place with three vendors 
to deliver additional CT capability. These new CPSSs come in one of 
three configurations: base, mid-size, and full-size, depending on the 
size of, and space at, the airport checkpoint.
                   cat and cpss deployment time lines
    Due to funding constraints, TSA does not have the resources needed 
to purchase and deploy all of the necessary equipment to airports 
Nation-wide. Based on the current funding levels, TSA will not be able 
to deploy all of the 3,585 CAT machines needed to airports until 
approximately 2049. Similarly, it will take until approximately 2042 
for TSA to be able to deploy all of the 2,263 CPSS machines to 
airports.
                     on-person screening technology
    TSA is currently in the development phase of the next generation of 
on-person screening technology. On-person screening technology 
currently consists of the Walk-Through Metal Detector (WTMD) and the 
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT). The WTMD is currently used 
predominantly for TSA PreCheck passengers to screen for metallic 
objects. The AIT is used to screen standard, non-PreCheck passengers 
for metallic and non-metallic objects. The WTMD is unable to detect 
non-metallic items, to include explosives, but it provides for expanded 
passenger throughput for the vetted TSA Trusted Traveler and TSA 
PreCheck populations. The AIT screens standard, non-PreCheck passengers 
without physical contact for both metallic and non-metallic threats, 
including weapons and explosives that may be concealed under a 
passenger's clothing. Utilization of AIT decreases the need for pat-
downs for both metallic and non-metallic threats, including weapons and 
explosives.
    In June 2023, TSA concluded deployment of the low probability of 
false alarm algorithm on AIT units to increase detection capability, 
decrease false alarm rates, and reduce the need for a pat-down by 50 
percent. Additionally, High-Definition AIT is currently being tested in 
the DHS S&T Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, NJ. If 
successful, this new technology will both significantly increase 
security through enhanced threat detection and decrease the false alarm 
rate even further, which would also help accelerate passenger 
throughput.
    TSA is also evaluating screening technologies to replace the WTMD. 
These technologies show promise in detection of both metallic and non-
metallic items when passengers pause, or walk through, the equipment at 
a slow speed.
                 advanced alarm resolution capabilities
    The TSA is also currently conducting extensive research into 
advanced Alarm Resolution (AR) capabilities. The AR program will 
replace older and limited resolution systems (e.g., the current Bottle 
Liquid Scanners) with next-generation solutions such as Bulk Resolution 
Technology that will positively identify a significantly increased 
number of threat materials concealed in containers.
                      checked baggage capabilities
    The TSA is also investigating the next generation of checked 
baggage (CB) screening systems. TSA has developed a CB road map 
outlining the needed capability enhancements and technology upgrades 
over the next several years. The road map defines the TSA's current 
state and future vision for CB capability and is designed to guide 
investments into the long-term research, innovation development, and 
acquisition strategy. The TSA must seek technology aimed at closing the 
capability gaps in today's CB screening systems. Through dedicated 
research and innovation, the agency will introduce new technologies 
with the ability to detect an expanded set of threat materials, lower 
false-alarm rates, and lower life-cycle costs. Ideally, all future 
capabilities will reduce the cognitive burden on the TSOs and improve 
their operator experience and detection ability, which will ultimately 
improve the passenger experience. Historically, some airports lacked 
the infrastructure to accommodate the large and heavy Explosive 
Detection System (EDS) machines. Those airports were required to rely 
solely on the use of Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) to screen 
passengers and their luggage. To improve CB security effectiveness, the 
TSA is transitioning from ETD-only to EDS at locations that are now 
capable of supporting EDS. Additionally, TSA recently tested Dual Use 
Computed Tomography (DUCT) in some airports, which utilizes one piece 
of screening equipment to screen both carry-on and checked baggage. 
Early results show that the use of DUCT systems would significantly 
increase security effectiveness. DUCT systems could be deployed at low-
volume airports that currently rely on ETD physical search.
                           cargo capabilities
    TSA is also responsible for the oversight of the screening of 
cargo. TSA established the Certified Cargo Screening Program in 2009 
under which it certifies cargo screening facilities in the United 
States in order to meet the mandates of the 9/11 Act to screen 100 
percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft. The TSA requires 
Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSF) or their authorized 
representatives to use TSA-approved methods which include diverse 
methods of screening such as X-ray systems, EDS, ETD, explosives 
detection canine teams certified by TSA, or a physical search together 
with manifest verification. The range of air cargo commodity types is 
extraordinarily wide, and this poses challenges to developing 
appropriate screening systems. TSA is aggressively pursuing next 
generation solutions including systems that combine X-ray, ETD, or EDS 
enabling technologies to not only rely on images but leverage the 
ability to detect trace components; large aperture systems that enable 
screening an entire pallet at one time; fast parcel systems to increase 
throughput; and automated alarm software that is currently being 
developed in partnership with DHS S&T to mitigate complete reliance on 
screeners.
                           open architecture
    The technologies discussed above, and any future acquisitions, will 
be grounded in Open Architecture (OA). OA is a design approach where 
components such as software and hardware are standards-based and 
interoperable to allow any vendor to create improved subcomponents such 
as new detection algorithms, enhancements to user interfaces, and 
reporting systems to support improved business intelligence. 
Ultimately, these components come together to create a superior 
combined system.
    Leveraging OA will improve TSA's ability to rapidly respond to 
emerging threats and work with all of industry to address capability 
needs. OA strengthens TSA's ability to stay ahead of ever-evolving 
threats through greater agility and flexibility in the acquisition of 
innovative, interconnected, and advanced transportation security 
technologies. It will define an improved approach to delivering 
enhanced capabilities to the field in a timely manner, providing the 
workforce access to the most effective security technology while 
simplifying the processes and procedures used to help keep the Nation 
secure. TSA published the Open Architecture Roadmap in July 2023 and is 
actively working to operationalize key OA concepts in fiscal year 2024.
                          passenger experience
    As TSA develops and deploys new checkpoint security screening 
technology and procedures, the agency's primary focus is on 
strengthening aviation security while enhancing the passenger 
experience. CAT enables TSOs to validate a traveler's reservation 
without having to request a boarding pass thus reducing documentation 
requirements for the traveling public to access our security 
checkpoints. The deployment of CT three-dimensional X-ray machines will 
reduce the need for passengers to remove items from their bags, greatly 
improving throughput at the checkpoint. The development of advanced 
detection algorithms will enable TSOs to focus on potential threats 
that are automatically identified, both improving security and 
increasing efficiencies. New on-person screening capabilities will 
further reduce the need for pat-downs, significantly improving the 
passenger experience.
    Any investments in technology to improve security enhancements must 
be placed in the hands of a talented and well-trained workforce. The 
TSA is committed to providing the very best tools, training, and 
procedures to our personnel to enable them to efficiently and 
effectively secure the aviation system.
                               conclusion
    To carry out its aviation security mission, TSA needs dedicated, 
predictable, and robust funding to continue to develop and deploy next-
generation checkpoint security screening technology and procedures. TSA 
is actively pursuing these technologies in partnership with multiple 
vendors, including small businesses. The single biggest limiting factor 
is that TSA is inadequately funded to fully implement checkpoint 
technology acceleration plans to address known and evolving threats. As 
passenger throughput continues to increase, TSA must have the tools and 
technology necessary to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of 
people and commerce.
    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 
on the role technology plays in aviation security. My colleague and I 
look forward to your questions.

    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Gould.
    I now recognize Director Tina Won Sherman for 5 minutes to 
summarize her opening statement.

STATEMENT OF TINA WON SHERMAN, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
         JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Ms. Sherman. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to 
testify this morning on behalf of the agency I represent, the 
Government Accountability Office.
    As threats to domestic aviation are wide-ranging and can 
lead to devastating results if unaddressed, the Transportation 
Security Administration has the difficult mission of ensuring 
the security of our Nation's transportation system.
    The agency's almost 50,000 Transportation Security Officers 
verify the identity of, and screen over 2 million passengers 
each day at more than 400 airports across the country, and it 
does so in a fast-moving and high-pressure situation where 
there is little margin for error.
    At the same time, it is critical for TSA to uphold the 
public's confidence in its efforts to counter these threats. 
Only in this way can the agency conduct its security activities 
in the most effective and efficient manner.
    However, upholding the public's confidence can be 
incredibly challenging, as a traveler's perception of their 
screening experience is uniquely their own and is as real and 
as valid as that of the Transportation Security Officer who is 
carrying out the screening.
    Thus, TSA also has a responsibility to ensure that it 
considers the potential impact of its technologies and 
practices on passengers as they move through security 
checkpoints. For well over a decade, GAO has reviewed numerous 
aspects of TSA's layered security approach, and testified on 
that work before this committee. My comments today center on 
two GAO reports really focused on TSA technologies and its 
implications.
    In 2019, GAO reviewed TSA's detection standards for 
screening technologies, and found that the agency did not 
ensure those technologies, such as explosive detection systems 
and advanced technology X-rays, continued to meet the 
requirements it set forth for detection standards over time. 
This means that TSA's technologies may not always identify 
potential threat items such as weapons or explosives after 
deployed to an airport.
    Two years ago, the Department of Homeland Security's Office 
of Inspector General also found that TSA did not adequately 
oversee its acquisition as well as the testing and evaluation 
of 300 computed tomography systems to ensure they met key 
performance parameters prior to their acquisition.
    More recently, in 2022, GAO studied TSA's screening 
practices to determine if they could result in potential 
discrimination of passengers. We found that the agency's 
screening practices can refer certain passengers for additional 
screening more often than others. This includes, for example, 
transgender passengers, passengers with religious headwear, 
with natural or braided hair or with disabilities.
    This is because TSA's advanced imaging technology cannot 
adequately screen some of those passengers, resulting in alarm 
followed by a referral for additional screening, such as a pat-
down by a Transportation Security Officer, which can be viewed 
by some passengers as invasive and sometimes traumatic.
    We recommend that TSA take several actions to address the 
issues identified in these reviews, including to develop and 
implement a way to ensure its screening systems continue to 
meet detection standards and requirements post-deployment, and 
to collect and assess data on passenger referrals for 
additional screening to determine whether its practices align 
with the agency's nondiscrimination policies.
    TSA has provided us with updates on their progress in 
implementing our recommendations, which we are actively 
reviewing.
    In closing, I want to thank my GAO colleagues for their 
support in advance of this hearing and to the subcommittee for 
bringing attention once again to these issues.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Sherman follows:]
                     Statement of Tina Won Sherman
                            October 19, 2023
                             gao highlights
    Highlights of GAO-24-107094, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Transportation and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, 
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
    TSA employs passenger and baggage screening technologies to 
mitigate the threat of terrorism. TSA has faced challenges ensuring 
these technologies consistently meet detection requirements. The agency 
has also faced allegations that some of its screening practices, such 
as the use of advanced imaging technology, may refer certain passengers 
more frequently to additional screening.
    This statement discusses TSA's efforts to: (1) Ensure passenger and 
baggage screening technologies continue to meet detection requirements 
after deployment, and (2) assess the extent to which its use of 
advanced imaging technology refers certain passengers to additional 
screening more often than others.
    This statement is based primarily on reports GAO issued in December 
2019 and November 2022 on detection requirements for TSA screening 
technologies (GAO-20-56) and TSA's efforts to ensure its passenger 
screening practices do not result in discrimination (GAO-23-105201). To 
report on actions taken to address recommendations, GAO assessed 
implementation reports and reviewed agency documents and responses.
What GAO Recommends
    GAO made a total of 9 recommendations in the December 2019 and 
November 2022 reports. DHS concurred with all 9 recommendations. Seven 
remain open. However, TSA has taken steps to implement them, including 
the 4 recommendations to address the issues discussed in detail in this 
statement.
 aviation security.--tsa could better ensure detection and assess the 
       potential for discrimination in its screening technologies
What GAO Found
    In December 2019, GAO reported that the performance of technologies 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses to screen 
passengers and baggage at airports can degrade over time. However, TSA 
does not ensure that such technologies continue to meet detection 
requirements after deployment to airports.


    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    TSA certifies technologies to ensure they meet requirements before 
deployment, and its officers are to regularly calibrate deployed 
technologies to demonstrate they are minimally operational. However, 
neither of these actions ensures that technologies continue to meet 
requirements after deployment. In 2015 and 2016, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) tested a sample of deployed explosives trace 
detection and bottled liquid scanner units and found that some no 
longer met detection requirements. GAO recommended that TSA develop and 
implement a process to ensure technologies continue to meet detection 
requirements after deployment. TSA began requiring reviews of 
technologies after deployment in 2020 and is working to update its 
policy. TSA has also begun to conduct reviews and report on the 
results.
    In November 2022, GAO reported that TSA officials at 4 selected 
airports and representatives from 7 selected stakeholder organizations, 
such as the National Center for Transgender Equality and the Sikh 
Coalition, stated that the use of advanced imaging technology can 
result in certain passengers being referred for additional screening 
more frequently than others. These include transgender passengers and 
those who wear religious headwear or have disabilities. GAO recommended 
that TSA: (1) Collect data on referrals for additional screening, and 
(2) assess the extent to which its screening practices comply with 
agency non-discrimination policies. According to TSA officials, the 
agency has taken steps to collect data on such referrals, including the 
cause of additional screening, and plans to assess the data to inform 
the development and use of advance imaging technology.
    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the 
subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to today's 
discussion on aviation screening technologies. The Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) is charged with the mission of protecting 
the Nation's transportation systems, including preventing acts of 
terrorism on these systems and responding to ever-evolving threats. To 
mitigate these threats, TSA employs technologies to screen passengers 
and their carry-on and checked baggage for explosive materials and 
other prohibited items. The on-going threat of terrorism and the 
projected growth in air travel highlight the importance of TSA 
continually assessing the effectiveness of its screening operations. 
However, the agency has faced challenges ensuring these technologies 
consistently meet detection requirements.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ International Air Transport Association, Global Outlook for Air 
Transport: Highly Resilient, Less Robust (Montreal, Quebec, Canada: 
June 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TSA's 2020 Biennial National Strategy for Transportation Security 
states that while striving to enhance transportation security, the 
Government must preserve and protect the fundamental civil rights and 
civil liberties of the public it serves.\2\ As such, it is important 
for TSA to carry out its security mission while ensuring its screening 
practices do not result in discrimination against passengers.\3\ Yet 
the agency has received allegations that some of its screening 
practices, such as the use of advanced imaging technology, may refer 
certain passengers more frequently to additional screening.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ TSA, 2020 Biennial National Strategy for Transportation 
Security, Report to Congress (May 29, 2020).
    \3\ TSA guidance states that prohibited discrimination occurs when 
TSA provides members of the public lesser, segregated, or different 
treatment (e.g., profiling, harassment, denial of services) based on 
protected class characteristics (e.g., hair style, clothing, skin 
color, manner of speaking, country of origin, name, religious articles 
or jewelry). See Transportation Security Administration, Unlawful 
Profiling: What It Is and How To Avoid It (Nov. 13, 2017).
    \4\ Advanced imaging technology machines use automated recognition 
software to screen passengers without physical contact and locate 
potential metallic and non-metallic threats, such as weapons or 
explosives, which may be concealed under clothing. Passengers who 
trigger an alarm on the machines may be required to undergo additional 
screening, which could include a targeted pat-down and, in some cases, 
explosive trace detection screening.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    My remarks today will focus on TSA's efforts to: (1) Ensure that 
passenger and baggage screening technologies meet the requirements for 
detection standards after deployment, and (2) assess the extent to 
which its use of advanced imaging technology refers certain passengers 
to additional screening more often than others. This statement is 
primarily based on two reports--our December 2019 report about TSA's 
efforts to ensure passenger and baggage screening technologies continue 
to meet detection requirements after deployment and our November 2022 
report about TSA's efforts to help ensure its airline passenger 
screening practices do not result in discrimination against 
passengers.\5\ This statement also includes selected updates on actions 
TSA has taken to implement the recommendations from these two reports. 
In doing so, we assessed technology implementation reports and reviewed 
agency documents and responses.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Should Ensure Screening 
Technologies Continue to Meet Detection Requirements after Deployment, 
GAO-20-56 (Washington, DC: Dec. 5, 2019); and GAO, Aviation Security: 
TSA Should Assess Potential for Discrimination and Better Inform 
Passengers of the Complaint Process, GAO-23-105201 (Washington, DC: 
Nov. 7, 2022).
    \6\ For the recommendations in our 2022 report, TSA provided its 
last response to our follow-up questions on the actions taken to 
implement them in July 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Our work examining TSA's passenger and baggage screening included 
analyzing documents on TSA's screening procedures, technology, and 
detection requirements, and interviewing TSA officials. For our work on 
screening technologies, we assessed operational requirements for 
technologies that were subject to TSA detection standards and 
calibration procedures. We compared TSA processes for ensuring deployed 
technologies meet requirements against DHS acquisition regulations and 
policies. Additionally, we observed screening operations and 
technologies at 7 airports, which we selected based on airport category 
and geographic location.
    For our work on TSA efforts to prevent discrimination, we visited 4 
airports, selected based on size, complaints filed, and other factors. 
At these airports, we observed screening operations, interviewed TSA 
officials, and conducted 12 discussion groups with Transportation 
Security Officers who perform checkpoint screening. We also interviewed 
7 stakeholder organizations, including those representing religious 
groups and persons with disabilities, selected based on their work on 
airline security screening. Detailed information about the scope and 
methodology for our prior work can be found in the products cited 
throughout this statement.
                               background
    We conducted the work on which this statement is based in 
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
    Terrorist organizations have a long history of targeting passenger 
aircraft using conventional and homemade explosives and other 
prohibited items, such as guns and knives. To mitigate this threat, TSA 
procedures generally provide that all passengers pass through security 
checkpoints where their person, identification documents, and carry-on 
bags are screened to detect and deter the smuggling of prohibited items 
into restricted airport areas and onto aircraft.\7\ TSA uses a variety 
of screening technologies--a combination of hardware and software 
designed to detect threats--to protect the Nation's civil aviation 
system. Figure 1 depicts the various screening technologies TSA may use 
in primary and secondary passenger and checked baggage screening.
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    \7\ Passengers' checked baggage are screened separately.


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    For each screening technology, TSA develops detection standards 
that identify and describe the prohibited items that the technology is 
required to detect during the screening process.\8\ These standards, 
which are classified, also identify how often the technology should 
detect prohibited items and the maximum allowable rate at which the 
technology incorrectly identifies prohibited items. For explosive 
materials, the standards also identify what the screening technology is 
required to detect in terms of: (1) The minimum amount or weight of the 
material and (2) the chemical and physical makeup of the material.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ As of December 2019, the screening technologies for which 
explosives detection standards were developed were advanced imaging 
technology, advanced technology X-ray, bottled liquid scanner, computed 
tomography, explosives detection system, and explosives trace 
detection. According to DHS officials, the agency also screens for 
``explosives precursors,'' which are chemical substances that, when 
combined with another substance, could be used to create a homemade 
explosive on board an aircraft. Explosives precursors can be used for 
legitimate purposes.
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  tsa should ensure screening technologies continue to meet detection 
                     requirements after deployment
TSA's Practices Do Not Ensure Screening Technologies Continue to Meet 
        Detection Requirements After Deployment
    In December 2019, we reported that TSA's practices do not ensure 
that screening technologies continue to meet detection requirements 
after those technologies have been deployed to airports.\9\ According 
to TSA officials, the agency uses two processes--certification and 
calibration--to ensure screening technologies are operating as 
intended. The certification process is designed to ensure that new 
technologies meet detection requirements before they are procured and 
deployed to airports.\10\ TSA officials also stated that daily 
calibration helps ensure that the technologies are at least minimally 
operational while in use at airports.\11\ However, while certification 
and calibration serve important purposes in the acquisition and 
operation of screening technologies, these processes do not ensure that 
TSA screening technologies continue to meet detection requirements 
after they have been deployed.
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    \9\ GAO-20-56.
    \10\ During the certification process, DHS's Science and Technology 
Directorate tests the technology under controlled conditions at its 
Transportation Security Laboratory to determine whether it meets TSA's 
detection requirements. After TSA certifies that a technology meets 
detection requirements (and it undergoes additional testing for other 
requirements), TSA may deploy the technology to selected airports for 
operational testing and evaluation to determine how it performs in an 
airport setting.
    \11\ Calibration procedures vary in terms of frequency and type for 
each screening technology.
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    The certification process, for instance, does not account for the 
possibility that technology performance can degrade over time, 
throughout the technology's life cycle. For example, in 2015 and 2016, 
DHS tested a sample of deployed explosives trace detection and bottled 
liquid scanner units and concluded that some deployed units for each 
technology no longer met detection requirements.\12\
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    \12\ According to TSA officials, the units did not meet detection 
requirements because they were not adequately maintained. Officials 
stated that the agency has since introduced better controls to ensure 
that routine preventative maintenance is performed as required.
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    Calibration, likewise, can demonstrate that the screening 
technology is at least minimally operational, but it is not designed to 
test whether the screening technology meets detection requirements. For 
example, to calibrate explosives detection systems, TSA officers are to 
run the manufacturer's operational test kit--which includes items of 
various densities--through the unit and verify that the item is 
correctly displayed on the system's monitor (see figure 2 below).\13\ 
This process demonstrates a level of base functionality of the system, 
but it does not ensure that the system meets detection requirements. As 
a result, a system can pass calibration even when its detection 
capabilities have degraded.
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    \13\ For the purposes of this statement, references to TSA 
Transportation Security Officers may include both TSA-employed 
screening personnel and personnel employed by a qualified private-
sector company contracted with TSA to perform screening services at 
airports participating in TSA's Screening Partnership Program. See 49 
U.S.C.  44920.

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    TSA officials stated that there are challenges in designing a 
process to ensure that screening technologies continue to meet 
detection requirements after deployment. For example, TSA officials 
stated that it is not feasible to conduct live explosives testing in 
airports. Further, while it is relatively easy to temporarily transfer 
smaller screening technologies, such as explosives trace detection 
units, to a controlled setting for live explosives testing, it would 
not be feasible to transfer larger installed units, such as advanced 
imaging technology. However, as we have previously reported, 
independent test measures exist to test these technologies such as a 
national standard for measuring image quality in explosives detection 
systems.\14\
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    \14\ GAO, Air Cargo Security: TSA Field Testing Should Ensure 
Screening Systems Meet Detection Standards, GAO-21-105192 (Washington, 
DC: July 29, 2021).
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TSA Is Developing and Implementing a Process to Better Ensure Screening 
        Technologies Continue to Meet Detection Requirements after 
        Deployment
    We made two recommendations regarding these issues in our December 
2019 report.\15\ The TSA administrator should: (1) Develop a process to 
ensure that screening technologies continue to meet detection 
requirements after deployment to commercial airports and (2) implement 
that process. DHS concurred with both recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ GAO-20-56. We also made recommendations for TSA to: (1) Update 
its guidance for developing and approving screening technology 
explosives detection standards; (2) require and ensure that it 
documents key decisions, including testing and analysis decisions, used 
to support the development of new screening technology explosives 
detection standards; and (3) require and ensure that it documents its 
assessments of risk and the rationale behind decisions to deploy 
screening technologies. DHS concurred with the recommendations, has 
fully implemented two recommendations, and is taking steps to implement 
the third.
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    As of October 2023, TSA has partially addressed the first 
recommendation. In April 2020, TSA issued the TSA Post Implementation 
Review (PIR) and Periodic Review Policy (APM-20-031), which calls for 
TSA to develop and conduct a Post-Implementation Review--or roadmap for 
how TSA will assess technology performance--for each screening 
technology after initial deployment.\16\ The policy identifies a 
specific time frame for conducting this review and requires that TSA 
determine system performance relative to effectiveness and suitability 
as part of the review.
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    \16\ Transportation Security Administration, TSA Post 
Implementation Review (PIR) and Periodic Review Policy, APM-20-031 
(Springfield, VA: April 28, 2020). The Post-Implementation Review is 
the first assessment of performance after the technology has been 
deployed to airports; it is used to determine user satisfaction, system 
performance relative to effectiveness and suitability, financial 
compliance, and to identify lessons learned. The Post-Implementation 
Review is to be conducted within 6 to 12 months after the technology 
attains Initial Operating Capability or as directed by an acquisition 
decision memorandum. Initial Operating Capability for software occurs 
when the minimum capability necessary to field (deploy) the technology 
is achieved. In its November 2019 concurrence with our recommendation, 
DHS stated that TSA decided to examine the component performance of 
technologies' detection chain rather than perform a direct measure of 
detection requirements, due to the limitations of using live explosives 
and simulants. A separate Post-Implementation Review is required for 
each screening technology because each technology has unique logistics 
data and a unique detection chain.
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    Additionally, the policy calls for TSA to conduct periodic reviews 
of each technology after the Post-Implementation Review, to assess 
system performance over time and examine whether functionality changes 
need to be made.\17\ However, time frames and other requirements for 
conducting periodic reviews are less clear. For example, the policy 
does not specify system performance requirements relative to 
effectiveness and suitability for periodic reviews.
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    \17\ According to TSA's policy, periodic reviews can be completed 
through a variety of technical and non-technical means, such as a 
program manager review, dedicated operational analysis, contractual 
reviews, or a review of acquisition documentation.
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    To fully address our recommendation to develop a process for 
ensuring screening technologies continue to meet detection requirements 
after deployment, TSA policy and guidelines should call for the same 
requirements for periodic reviews as for post-implementation 
reviews.\18\ In May 2023, TSA stated that it intends to adjust its 
policy on periodic reviews to include the same type of requirements as 
post-implementation reviews. According to TSA, such adjustments will 
include a general time frame for conducting periodic reviews that 
allows for management team judgment based on specific needs and the 
assessment of system performance requirements relative to effectiveness 
and suitability. TSA estimated this update would be completed by 
December 31, 2023.
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    \18\ For example, general time frames for conducting reviews that 
allow for the individual judgment of the management team, and system 
performance requirements relative to technology effectiveness and 
suitability.
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    With respect to the second recommendation, TSA has begun to conduct 
and report on the results of post-implementation and periodic reviews 
for selected technologies. We assessed TSA's finalized and draft 
reports of the post-implementation and periodic reviews and found that 
TSA has made notable progress in implementing these policies.\19\ In 
particular, TSA leveraged the national standard for image quality 
testing of computed tomography systems to assess detection performance 
of the checked baggage screening systems without the use of explosives 
testing. As we previously reported, this standard can be used to verify 
detection performance if properly employed.\20\
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    \19\ As of May 2023, TSA had conducted and provided reports for two 
Post-Implementation Reviews and one periodic review, and was in the 
process of conducting a third Post-Implementation Review and scoping a 
plan for a fourth Post-Implementation Review.
    \20\ GAO-21-105192. Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers Standards Association, American National Standard for 
Evaluating the Image Quality of X-ray Computed Tomography (CT) 
Security-Screening Systems. (New York, NY: May 23, 2011). To properly 
employ image quality tests in lieu of live explosive testing, TSA must 
establish clear linkage back to the laboratory tests conducted with 
live explosives. The agency also must use quantitative metrics of image 
quality to establish when detection performance would begin to degrade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to TSA officials, the agency is also working to develop a 
similar image quality test for advanced imaging technology that would 
evaluate degradation of detection performance without the use of live 
explosives.
    TSA officials reported in May 2023 that they have developed and 
tested a kit to measure the parameters for this image quality test.\21\ 
We have not previously reported on an image quality standard for 
advanced imaging technology and plan to continue to work with TSA 
officials and independent experts to understand whether this test will 
adequately identify degradation in detection performance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ According to TSA officials, they have scoped a Post-
Implementation Review for advanced imaging technology that is to be 
implemented once the standards and pass/fail criteria have been 
approved by a joint industry and Government committee. The image 
quality test proposed by TSA is based on a draft National standard for 
image quality testing of millimeter wave screening devices--the core 
technology underlying advanced imaging technology systems.
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    However, we continue to have concerns regarding the sufficiency of 
the test data collected and reported during the periodic reviews, and 
the absence of specific test plans to measure the detection performance 
of the advanced imaging and computed tomography systems.\22\ According 
to TSA officials, while the agency remains committed to implementing 
its periodic review process of screening technologies, officials also 
said that enduring resource constraints mean TSA will likely require 
additional time to implement a periodic review process for all 
screening technologies. To fully address our recommendation, TSA should 
address the concerns discussed above, such as the absence of specific 
test plans to measure the detection performance of specific 
technologies. We will continue to work with TSA to evaluate the 
agency's progress.
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    \22\ Because TSA deems these reports to contain sensitive 
information, we are not discussing the details of our assessments in 
this statement.
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tsa should collect data on and assess the potential for discrimination 
                       in its screening practices
TSA's Advanced Imaging Technology Can Refer Certain Passengers for 
        Additional Screening More Frequently than Others
    As discussed earlier in this statement, TSA may use advanced 
imaging technology as part of its primary passenger screening at 
airport security checkpoints (see figure 3). Passengers who trigger an 
alarm on the advanced imaging technology machine may be required to 
undergo secondary screening, which could include a targeted pat-down 
and, in some cases, explosive trace detection screening.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    In November 2022, we reported that supervisory officers in all 4 
airports we visited and Transportation Security Officers in all 12 
discussion groups we conducted said that they have observed advanced 
imaging technology machines alarming frequently on certain 
passengers.\23\ These include transgender passengers, passengers who 
wear religious headwear, or passengers with certain hair types and 
styles. For example,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ GAO-23-105201.
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   The officers stated that they push a blue or pink button on 
        the advanced imaging technology machine to specify the gender 
        passengers are scanned as, based on their visual assessment of 
        the passengers' gender presentation. The officers stated that 
        passengers may undergo additional screening if the gender 
        button selected on the machine does not match the gender of the 
        passenger. In addition, officers noted that transgender 
        passengers may trigger alarms depending on the nature of their 
        transition, because the technology may register potential 
        threats in the groin and chest areas.
   The officers also stated that the advanced imaging 
        technology cannot adequately screen certain hair types and 
        styles (e.g., heavy braids), which can result in some 
        passengers, including Black women, triggering alarms on the 
        machines.
   Furthermore, officers stated that passengers who have 
        medical conditions, prostheses, or disabilities that prevent 
        them from holding the required position for advanced imaging 
        technology screening (i.e., stand with their arms positioned 
        over their heads) may be required to undergo additional 
        screening.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ According to TSA officials, individuals who cannot hold the 
stance for advanced imaging technology screening are considered 
ineligible, and the walk-through metal detector becomes the primary 
method of screening.
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    Some of the Transportation Security Officers we interviewed stated 
that these referrals for additional screening are not due to 
discrimination or profiling. Rather, they said that the alarms are a 
result of the detection of potential threats that cannot be cleared by 
the advanced imaging technology and need additional screening to 
resolve based on TSA's operating procedures. According to lead officers 
in one of the airports we visited, anything that differs from the 
technology's standard algorithm will register as a potential threat and 
trigger an alarm, regardless of race, religion, or other 
characteristics. Officers in another airport noted that passengers who 
are wearing baggy clothing or clothing with sequins can also trigger 
alarms. According to the officers, they are required to perform 
targeted pat-downs as a means of resolving alarms to help ensure that 
passengers are not carrying potential threat items, such as weapons, 
past the screening checkpoint.
    Similar to the observations of the TSA officials at the airports we 
visited, representatives from the 7 selected stakeholder organizations 
we interviewed said that TSA's use of advanced imaging technology 
affects certain passenger groups more often than others. Some of these 
organizations have also raised concerns about the technology in 
Congressional hearings. Representatives from some organizations stated 
that the use of the technology has contributed to negative passenger 
experiences with the security screening process that can be perceived 
as discrimination or profiling. For example,
   Representatives from the National Center for Transgender 
        Equality and American Civil Liberties Union stated that because 
        advanced imaging technology is based on a binary (i.e., male or 
        female) selection by the officer, transgender passengers 
        consistently trigger alarms and are subject to pat-downs of 
        sensitive areas that they consider to be invasive and 
        traumatic. These representatives noted that the prosthetic 
        devices transgender passengers may wear could also trigger 
        alarms on advanced imaging technology machines.
   In addition, representatives from the National Disabilities 
        Rights Network and the Paralyzed Veterans of America stated 
        that passengers who use wheelchairs and are not able to be 
        screened by advanced imaging technology machines, are required 
        to undergo a pat-down, and at times may have to wait for 
        extended periods for an officer of the same gender to conduct 
        the pat-down.
   Further, in testimony before this committee in June 2019, a 
        representative from the Sikh Coalition stated that Sikhs are 
        virtually guaranteed to receive additional screening because of 
        their turbans, which trigger alarms on advanced imaging 
        technology machines. According to the representative, this 
        perpetuates stereotypes that certain passengers, including 
        Sikhs, Muslims, Arabs, and Hindus, are security threats because 
        other passengers consistently see them trigger alarms on 
        purportedly neutral technology. Moreover, a representative from 
        the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
        Legal Defense and Educational Fund stated in the same hearing 
        that Black women wearing natural or braided hair have 
        frequently had to undergo pat-downs of their hair by TSA 
        officers because the advanced imaging technology is unable to 
        distinguish contraband from natural Black hair. Representatives 
        from both of these organizations alleged that the technology 
        singles out and imposes burdens on specific passenger groups, 
        which they said could be experienced as discrimination by these 
        groups.
    TSA officials stated that the agency has a Disability and 
Multicultural Coalition and holds annual conferences and quarterly 
meetings with its members. This coalition includes over 400 
organizations such as the Sikh Coalition, the National Center for 
Transgender Equality, and the Paralyzed Veterans of America. According 
to 3 of the 7 stakeholder organizations we interviewed, TSA's 
Multicultural and Disabilities Branches, which collaborate with the 
coalition, are aware of and receptive to hearing organizations' 
concerns.\25\ However, representatives from 4 stakeholder organizations 
stated that while TSA has taken some positive steps that may help 
prevent discrimination, it has not made meaningful changes to address 
the long-standing concerns they have raised. For example, a 
representative from one of these organizations stated that when 
advanced imaging technology machines were implemented, TSA told them 
the technology would reduce the need for pat-downs. However, this 
representative believes that this has not occurred. Representatives 
from another organization stated that TSA's main focus is on security 
and reducing wait times for the general public, and not enough emphasis 
is placed on the civil rights and dignity of passengers with special 
circumstances.
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    \25\ The Multicultural and Disabilities Branches are responsible 
for: (1) Promoting respect for civil rights and civil liberties in 
policy and training creation and implementation; (2) educating TSA 
personnel at headquarters and in the field on TSA's civil rights and 
liberties responsibilities to the public; (3) collaborating with 
organizations and advocacy groups to identify promising practices for 
TSA's nondiscriminatory delivery of security, custody, and customer-
service programs and activities; and (4) investigating and resolving 
civil rights and civil liberties complaints filed by the public 
alleging discrimination in TSA's security screening activities at 
airports.
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    We reported in November 2022 that TSA had taken some actions that 
agency officials said may help better facilitate screening of 
transgender and gender-nonconforming passengers.\26\ For example, at 
the time of our review, TSA was in the process of developing an 
algorithm update for its advanced imaging technology machines which, 
according to officials, would increase detection rates and reduce false 
alarm rates for the traveling public. The update was also expected to 
remove the need for gender-identifying buttons on the machine. 
Specifically, officers would only be required to press a gender-neutral 
``scan'' button which, according to TSA, is expected to facilitate 
screening of transgender passengers because officers will no longer 
need to discern a passenger's gender prior to screening.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ GAO-23-105201.
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TSA Has Not Collected Data on Referrals for Additional Screening or 
        Assessed the Potential for Its Practices to Result in 
        Discrimination
    In November 2022, we reported that TSA was aware of many of the 
concerns that stakeholder organizations had raised regarding its 
screening practices, but had not collected data on the extent to which 
its practices refer certain passengers for additional screening more 
than others.\27\ The agency also had not conducted assessments to 
determine whether its screening practices comply with agency non-
discrimination policies. We recommended that TSA: (1) Collect 
additional data on passenger referrals for additional screening, and 
(2) conduct assessments to determine the extent to which TSA's 
passenger screening practices comply with agency non-discrimination 
policies to identify any needed actions to improve compliance.\28\
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    \27\ GAO-23-105201.
    \28\ In our November 2022 report, we also made recommendations for 
TSA to: (1) Take additional actions to better inform passengers about 
its discrimination complaint process, and (2) strengthen its ability to 
analyze passenger discrimination complaints. DHS concurred with the 
recommendations, and TSA has taken steps to implement them.
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    DHS concurred with both recommendations. In July 2023, TSA 
officials told us that, in June 2023, the agency completed deployment 
of the algorithm update to its advanced imaging technology machines at 
about 340 airports.\29\ TSA officials stated that they collected data 
at 20 selected airports from May 2023 through June 2023 during its 
annual resource planning assessment to verify that the update was 
working as intended. TSA reported that preliminary results show that 
approximately 25 to 27 percent of passengers received a pat-down when 
using the updated machines at the selected airports. Officials stated 
that the 2022 assessment found that about 52 percent of passengers 
received a pat-down.
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    \29\ TSA reported that it is responsible for the security of nearly 
440 Federalized airports, as of July 2022.
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    TSA officials stated that the agency also plans to collect data at 
selected airports where the advanced imaging technology update has been 
deployed using a new form that captures information on the passenger's 
experience during checkpoint screening. According to officials, the new 
form captures: (1) The total screening time from travel document 
verification through checkpoint exit; (2) the cause of any additional 
screening; (3) the duration of any additional screening; and (4) any 
qualifiers including risk status, use of wheelchair, and number of 
traveling companions. TSA estimated that its data collection efforts 
would be complete by September 29, 2023. As of October 16, 2023, we 
have not received documentation of the data collected.
    Officials stated that TSA plans to analyze the data collected to 
identify the: (1) Rate at which passengers trigger advanced imaging 
technology alarms, (2) percentage of false alarms, and (3) causes of 
false alarms. They said that the results of this study will be cross-
referenced with complaint data and used to support further development 
of advanced imaging technology algorithms. In addition, officials noted 
that further research may be needed to identify root causes related to 
any outcomes found and to expand upon the number of data points.
    In addition to its data collection and analysis efforts, TSA 
reviewed literature on passenger experiences and potential bias in on-
person screening and issued a briefing on its findings in March 2023. 
The briefing summarizes common factors associated with additional 
screening and potential strategies for using technology and procedures 
to help mitigate or prevent unintended bias. Furthermore, TSA has 
conducted focus groups to assess the pat-down process, and according to 
officials, planned to issue a report summarizing the topics discussed 
in July 2023. As of October 16, 2023, we have not received the report.
    To fully implement our recommendations, TSA will need to provide 
evidence that it has collected data on passenger referrals and used 
these data to assess the extent to which its screening practices align 
with its anti-discrimination policies to identify any needed actions to 
improve compliance. We will continue to monitor TSA's data collection, 
analysis, and other efforts to address these recommendations.
    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the 
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ms. Sherman.
    Mr. Wilson, do you have anything you want to say? You have 
5 minutes if you want.

STATEMENT OF MARIO WILSON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, ACQUISITION 
   PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Wilson. Good morning, Chairman, Ranking Member 
Thanedar, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
    As my distinguished colleague to my right said, I am 
Assistant Administrator Mario Wilson. I am in charge of leading 
the professional team responsible for the testing, procurement, 
deployment, and sustainment or maintenance of all 16,000 pieces 
of screening equipment that we have at TSA at this time.
    In my office, we take the requirements and the innovative 
solutions that Mr. Gould and his team identify, and we run them 
through the gamut of the testing procurement process that I 
just mentioned.
    I look forward to answering any questions that you all have 
today with regards to our practices, our procurement 
strategies, the time lines and a lot of the great achievements 
that we've made recently. We have plans for the future to, in 
essence, continue to improve our technologies, our 
capabilities, and ensure that the customer experience is much 
better. Thank you.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
    Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their 
5 minutes of questioning.
    I recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Ms. Sherman, you talked about some people being screened 
more than others. Is that due to profiling or is that due to 
technology?
    Ms. Sherman. As part of our 2020 review--2022 review, we 
actually visited several airports across the country and spoke 
with Transportation Security Officers to get their perspectives 
in addition to reviewing procedures and other screening 
practices.
    I think it's probably helpful just to give a little bit of 
context about the AIT machines themselves. The AIT machines are 
scanning individuals for metallic or nonmetallic items that 
potentially could be concealed on their person.
    What we had observed is that not only are certain items 
such as baggy clothing or sequins or jewelry are those which 
the AIT software cannot adequately scan, but we also observed, 
in talking with Transportation Security Officers, and as part 
of other observations, that the AIT machines were not able to 
adequately scan other items as well that are frequently, 
certain passengers who are moving through the screening process 
may have on.
    Mr. Gimenez. Ms. Sherman, I only have 5 minutes, OK? So it 
was a pretty simple question. Is it profiling or is it 
technology?
    Ms. Sherman. So in those conversations that we had with 
Transportation Security Officers, the conversations really 
centered around that it's not so much profiling or 
discrimination that results in the AIT machines alarming but, 
in fact, it is the practices of not being able to clear the 
alarm on the AIT machine and asking for the passenger then to 
be referred to secondary screening as a result. So it's the 
technology's inability to scan.
    Mr. Gimenez. So, again, it's a pretty simple question. Is 
it technology or is it profiling? A pretty simple question. 
What is it?
    Ms. Sherman. We did not identify profiling.
    Mr. Gimenez. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate it, 
Ms. Sherman. I really do. OK. Thank you. So we need to do 
something about technology. All right. Thank you.
    Because I didn't want to disparage our TSA officers by 
somehow feeling that we are somehow profiling somebody because 
of their religion or transgender or whatever. So a very simple 
answer: Yes, it's probably a technological problem. So I'm very 
happy about that.
    I don't know if this is a question for you, Mr. Wilson, or 
Mr. Gould. I'm very concerned about the diversion of $1 billion 
from our passenger fee to pay the national debt. As a 
passenger, I pay that fee, and I expect that fee to go to what 
I am paying it for, which is, enhance my security, enhance my 
passenger experience.
    I've also calculated that by the year 2049, I'm going to be 
95 years old. Maybe they'll have a, you know, get-young pill by 
then and I'll be OK, but, you know, 95 years old. Yes, OK, I'm 
almost 70, got it. But still, it's 25 years from now, OK? So we 
need to accelerate that.
    By the way, do you think that by 2049 you'll have different 
technology?
    Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir. Based on what our experience is, we 
will have different technology.
    Mr. Gimenez. Yes, I would think so. So I think what we need 
to do, and I think I've asked you, you all, is to what kind of 
increase in the passenger fee do we need in order to stay 
abreast of technology and in order to have an orderly 
transition from one technology to another, a passenger fee that 
will keep the industry occupied, the industry that you need, to 
keep the production lines going and also to foster innovation? 
So, if you could do that, I would appreciate it.
    But also when you do that and when you come up with a fee, 
you tell me how you're going to spend it, what your revenues 
are going to be and also exactly how, line by line, that is 
going to be spent. Because I understand bureaucracies, I used 
to be a bureaucrat myself. All right? I know you're going to 
pad it, OK? So I want to make sure you don't pad it.
    So I'm going to see what you guys are going to say. OK, I'm 
going to use this for the technology, this is for personnel, 
this is for R&D, et cetera, et cetera, so that if we do--and I 
sincerely think that we need to, because security is the 
priority of--security is what--we have to make sure that our, 
you know, traveling public is safe, but also safe, they're not 
profiled, that you take into account, you know, differences in 
people, but that it's also a better customer experience.
    As we get newer and newer technologies, it's a better 
customer experience, it's a safer experience, but it's also 
better. We should be at the pinnacle of this around the world. 
We are the United States of America. We also need to make sure 
that the companies that provide this for us are also companies 
that can compete with other companies around the world that may 
be subsidized by adversarial powers.
    So, I see that my time is up. Oh, my God. All right.
    So I now recognize the Member--so I yield and I now 
recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 
Thanedar, for his 5 minutes and maybe 20 seconds of 
questioning.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez. You're always 
fair. I appreciate that.
    Thank you all for your testimony. This is so important. I 
remain concerned about disproportionately impact on certain 
passengers. Help me understand how some of the technology 
continues to disproportionately impact certain groups or 
certain passengers and what can be done to improve that.
    Mr. Gould. Sir, we take that very, very seriously at TSA, 
and I appreciate the opportunity to address it. It is true that 
certain demographics of people, certain people with different 
kinds of clothing receive secondary screening more frequently 
than others.
    To answer, Mr. Chairman, your question, it is not profiling 
at all. It's a technology issue. We've made a lot of progress 
in this area recently. We rolled out a low false alarm 
algorithm last year, which not only provides better security 
detection on a--for on-person screening, but it lowers the 
false alarm rate by 50 percent. That means fewer pat-downs. 
That means fewer people are getting touched.
    It helps us with keeping passengers happy as they go 
through the screening experience and it helps us with keeping 
things moving at the checkpoint. But that's only our first step 
in that area.
    We recently demonstrated at the Department of Science and 
Homeland--Science and Technology's Transportation Security Lab 
in New Jersey a high-definition, or HD, advanced imaging 
technology machine. This HD AIT will further improve detection, 
will allow us to rule out nuisance false alarms associated with 
clothing and body styles and, you know, we'll be prototyping 
that in the field next year.
    So, we really do focus on best-of-breed equipment, best-of-
breed algorithms. As the technology gets better, our screening 
capability will get better, and there will be reduced impact on 
certain, you know, populations of passengers.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you.
    Mr. Gould and Mr. Wilson, it seems that 4 years after the 
issuance of this report, GAO's report, there are still 
improvements that need to be made. What is TSA's time frame for 
updating its policy on conducting periodic reviews of screening 
technology performance to better ensure the technologies 
continue to meet detection requirements or time?
    Also, what additional resources, if any, will TSA need to 
conduct these reviews for every passenger and baggage screening 
technology?
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you for the question, sir. As you pointed 
out, the GAO report did identify the importance of those 
periodic reviews, post-implementation reviews.
    I'm pleased to say that, based on the wonderful feedback 
that we did get from GAO, we have made those policy changes. 
The new policy is in place today for post-implementation 
reviews as well as periodic reviews. In fact, we have completed 
two post-implementation reviews on specific technologies to 
date, and we've also started conducting our periodic reviews.
    Post-implementation reviews are a standard practice in 
acquisition programs. Those are conducted typically 6--on 
average, about 12 months after the initial deployment of 
technology.
    The periodic reviews, per our policy, is something that we 
will be and have initiated that will occur on an annual basis. 
The scope of those periodic reviews will differ technology by 
technology, but we are very pleased to say that we have taken 
the feedback and done something with it, changed the policy and 
implemented that, and now it is a part of our standard program 
practice.
    With regards to the additional resources needed, the 
continued--I would say the continued support of investment in 
security technology is what we really need to continue down the 
path to be able to consistently do post-implementation reviews 
and periodic reviews.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you. Do any of the witnesses know what 
is an average time it takes for a passenger to go through the 
screening process, and how has that changed over time? Because 
our ultimate goal is not only to keep the passengers safe, but 
also expedite the screening so we minimize, you know, 
discomfort to the passenger.
    Mr. Gould. Sir, passenger volume goes up by about 4 percent 
a year. We screen around 2\1/2\ million passengers a day.
    I can't give you the average time, you know, across the 
whole enterprise for how long it takes a passenger to get 
through screening, but I will tell you this: We look at every 
opportunity we can to shorten our screening processes. If we 
save a second here and a second there, if we cut down on pat-
downs, if we cut down on body searches, we save time.
    Mr. Thanedar. My time is up so I give it back to you.
    Mr. Gimenez. Twenty seconds over, very good. OK.
    I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. LaLota.
    Mr. LaLota. Thank you, Chairman, for your leadership on 
many issues, including this one.
    I'd like to use my 5 minutes today to talk about $1 billion 
bait-and-switch scam that is the passenger security fee, also 
known as the September 11 security fee.
    For my constituents and for Americans listening from home, 
this is a scam. In the name of aviation security and post-9/11 
airport security, you get charged an extra $11.20 every time 
you fly round trip. Despite the name of that collection 
program, many of the funds, $1 billion, have nothing to do with 
aviation security. In fact, it's diverted to the Treasury for 
things having nothing to do with keeping our skies safe. It's a 
bait-and-switch scam perpetrated by our Federal Government, and 
hardworking and unknowing Americans are being charged every day 
and they're the victims.
    To use September 11 to perpetrate this scam is especially 
offensive to Americans and New Yorkers especially. Our skies 
should be safe, and the fees collected to do so should go to 
that purpose and 9/11 should not be used to that end.
    Chairman, I appreciate you calling this meeting and drawing 
attention to this important issue and for our witnesses to help 
Congress help fix this issue and to right this wrong.
    Mr. Gould, thanks for being here, sir. I understand you 
served several decades in the Coast Guard. I appreciate your 
service to our--continued service to our country.
    I just want to confirm some of the things that I think I 
know. The passenger security fee is revenue that stems from 
passengers purchasing tickets originating in the United States. 
Is that correct, sir?
    Mr. Gould. Yes, sir.
    Mr. LaLota. So it's not taxpayer dollars?
    Mr. Gould. No, sir.
    Mr. LaLota. The passenger security fee is roughly $5.60 per 
one way and $11.20 per round trip?
    Mr. Gould. Yes, sir.
    Mr. LaLota. How much revenue, approximately, if you know 
it, was collected from the passenger security fee or also the 
9/11 security fee last year?
    Mr. Gould. I believe it's well over $1 billion a year. I 
think it's 1.6.
    Mr. LaLota. When was the passenger security fee first 
implemented?
    Mr. Gould. Mario?
    Mr. Wilson. I believe it went in place, I want to say, 
2004. I'd have to confirm. It's been many years, sir. It's been 
in place for many years. Most recently, I think it was 2013, 
that was when the fee was increased from $2.50 one way to $5.60 
one way.
    Mr. LaLota. To the best that you understand it, anybody on 
the panel, what is the proffered reason for collecting the fee?
    Mr. Gould. To fund TSA security activities and technology.
    Mr. LaLota. Does it do that?
    Mr. Wilson. Only a portion of it does at this point in 
time, unfortunately. I think it's as high as Mr. Gould pointed 
out, $1.5 billion. It's something that the President has 
identified and we've also identified would be ideal if it was 
not diverted, as it is today. But out of $4.5 billion on an 
annual basis of those fees that are collected, only roughly 29 
percent to 30 percent, I think it is, is actually provided to 
offset TSA's security activities.
    Mr. LaLota. Would you agree that you need more resources, 
more dollars to actually perform your key function of keeping 
our skies safe and moving our passengers efficiently through 
airports?
    Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir. I believe that all of the $4.5 
billion--and it's continuing to grow--should be dedicated to 
its original purpose, which was security of the aviation.
    Mr. LaLota. Thank you. I just want to reiterate some of the 
facts as we've identified them. The passenger security fee is 
not taxpayer dollars. The passenger security fee stems from 
revenue raised from passengers paying into those funds, 
specifically for the proffered reason of security.
    I want to make it clear, as a fiscal conservative, we must 
do more to address our Nation's debt. We're $33 trillion in 
debt and Congress and both parties need to figure out a plan 
for that, but this is not the right way to do it.
    To tell our constituents, to tell air travelers they're 
being charged an amount that helps protect their safety and 
helps them move through the airport in a more efficient manner, 
because all of my constituents don't want to wait in long 
lines. You do--I'm in your airports all the time. You're doing 
a good job moving me through, and I appreciate that.
    But the stated purpose does not actually fit where the 
dollars are going. I have legislation that maybe in a future 
round I may talk a little bit more about, but I appreciate you, 
the witnesses, being here today and the Chairman for leading 
and shining a spotlight on this issue.
    Americans need to know that its Federal Government will not 
perpetrate this scam on them, and we need to put a stop to 
this.
    I yield, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman from New York yields.
    I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Garcia.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here as 
well. TSA, of course, is absolutely critical to securing our 
air travel ports, highways, railroads, transit, and pipelines. 
I'm grateful to the more than 60,000 TSA workers that I know 
work really, really hard, especially grateful for all the TSA 
folks that I see out of my home airports, out of Long Beach, 
the Long Beach Airport as well as LAX, which are the two that I 
use almost exclusively back home.
    We know that our workers should be treated fairly. They 
should be paid appropriately, like the professionals they are, 
and have all the same rights as other Federal workers, which I 
know has been a challenge in the past.
    I am proud that President Biden and the Democratic Congress 
are taking steps to support TSA workers, especially granting 
them full collective bargaining rights, which is really 
important.
    Now more than 2 million people pass through a TSA 
checkpoint at more than 430 airports across our Nation each day 
with, of course, air traffic improving up to prepandemic 
levels. I'm glad that TSA officers are doing what's necessary, 
they are really tough jobs to keep us safe. But I also know 
that there's reforms that either have been implemented or are 
on the way to make the experience even better.
    I have actually--and I've said this to folks at TSA. I 
think that there have been obvious improvements made in the 
last few years, particularly through the screening process. But 
I still think we have a little ways to go, but I do want to 
recognize the improvements.
    We know that no one enjoys waiting in lines and certainly 
taking off their shoes or dumping out their water bottles or 
getting a pat-down. We know that pat-downs are sometimes 
necessary, but they're also intrusive. They slow down lines. 
Delays cost us time and money, having real economic costs.
    For some passengers, as has been noted, especially if you 
have a disability, for instance, secondary screening and pat-
downs can be intrusive; for some, humiliating, and really 
ruining their travel experience. But we also know that it's 
necessary for security and that you're working toward the best 
possible solutions.
    To help that, I'm working on introducing the Better 
Screening Act to improve the security checkpoint passenger 
experience without reducing security effectiveness--it's 
something that you will hear about soon--by encouraging 
deployment of technology and other solutions.
    Specifically, the bill would require TSA to develop a 
strategy to reduce pat-downs without reducing security, with 
consideration for those groups of passengers who receive pat-
downs at a disproportionately higher rate. We want TSA to think 
really hard about how to speed up lines and reduce intrusive 
and uncomfortable pat-downs, but not compromising security.
    The bill would also require TSA to develop a strategy to 
reduce the need for passengers to take items out of their bags 
when going through security, which can make travel smoother and 
more convenient.
    Simply put, I think we all want screening to be as quick 
and easy as possible while still keeping us safe and secure. 
That makes common sense, I know to all of you, and certainly to 
me.
    Thankfully, with advances in screening technology, 
algorithm procedures, equipment, we can vastly improve the 
screening experience, and it's something that we're all very 
interested in. The new technology, like advanced imaging 
technology, algorithms for body--the algorithms for body scans 
can lower false alarms by half. We know this. The new computed 
tomography, or CT, carry-on bag scanners, all of these 
technology implementations are making a difference and can 
actually advance our security even more.
    Mr. Gould, I understand that new advanced imaging 
technology algorithms have been deployed to many airports 
Nation-wide and that we're making progress on deploying the CT 
machines as well.
    How do these technologies affect the passenger experience 
to you?
    Mr. Gould. So I firmly believe that through technology, we 
can screen people more effectively and give you a better 
passenger experience. It does not have to be mutually 
exclusive.
    Mr. Garcia. TSA is also evaluating additional technology 
that's coming on-line as well to reduce the need for pat-downs 
and taking items out of your bag. Is that right?
    Mr. Gould. Absolutely. Yes, sir. So our on-person 
screening, I talked about high-definition AIT before. That will 
cut down the need for pat-downs significantly.
    Something else to discuss, sir, is right now, our 
legislation requires us to use what we call an avatar, which is 
almost like a stick figure that the officer looks at. It's the 
same for every passenger, and it indicates where there might be 
a threat item on the passenger.
    If we could get permission to use a visual image of the 
person as they're presented in their clothing, preserving all 
privacy associated with that, we'd get a much more accurate 
location of where that threat object might be, providing for a 
much more targeted pat-down, which I think would also provide a 
better passenger experience.
    With respect to CT, the technology is fantastic. It 
provides great material discrimination. It's going to 
significantly reduce the amount of items that you have to 
divest from your bag, which will speed things up, increase 
passenger--improve the passenger experience, and again, enhance 
security.
    Mr. Garcia. Just really briefly, I know--Ms. Sherman, I 
know GAO did a report on these discrimination concerns that I 
mentioned earlier.
    Just to conclude, we have a lot of concerns with certain 
passengers, folks that wear religious headwear, which you 
reference, have disabilities, folks that are transgender, that 
obviously usually get additional screening. There's real 
concerns there for discrimination from a lot of organizations.
    Can you share, to conclude, your findings of your report 
just very briefly and any other recommendations you might have?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes. That it is the--the screening practices 
we identified that contribute to certain passengers being more 
frequently referred for additional screening. As a result, we 
recommended that TSA, which it has not done in the past, 
collect data on these referrals and evaluate that data to 
determine whether or not those referrals for additional 
screening and the practices that are in place, whether they 
align with the agency's nondiscrimination policies.
    Mr. Garcia. Great. Well, thank you all very much.
    Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the time.
    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman from California yields.
    I now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. 
Menendez.
    Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Ranking 
Member, for the opportunity to waive onto this hearing.
    Thank you to the witnesses for appearing here today.
    This hearing is of importance to my work both here on the 
Homeland Security Committee and also through my position on the 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
    This summer, the Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee passed a Federal Aviation Administration 
reauthorization bill, which included many key provisions that 
will improve the flying experience for all Americans and invest 
in the growing--sorry, invest in growing the aviation work 
force.
    I'm proud that pieces of my bill, the Airline Employees 
Assault Prevention Act, were included in the House-passed FAA 
reauthorization. These provisions would protect thousands of 
additional airline employees from unruly passengers by 
correcting a jurisdictional issue between TSA and the FAA.
    Today, I'd like to take some time to discuss TSA's work to 
protect airport employees and passengers. Over several years, 
we've seen an increase in unruly passengers both on the plane 
and in the airport before boarding.
    Mr. Gould and Mr. Wilson, how does TSA ensure the safety of 
both passengers and airport employees through technology, 
particularly as it relates to unruly passengers? We'll start 
with Mr. Gould.
    Mr. Gould. Well, sir, at our checkpoint, you know, we 
screen passengers and aviation workers and also staff, you 
know, as well for any kind of prohibited items. You know, if 
there's any sort of behavior at the checkpoint that would 
indicate that there's some sort of a security risk, we 
immediately identify that to local law enforcement and local 
law enforcement will address the issue for us.
    You know, from a technology standpoint, you can't really 
tell necessarily who's going to be unruly when they get in the 
aircraft. There's a lot of contributing factors that 
associate--that associate--that contribute to it, and it's 
difficult to identify that through the screening process. What 
we do, if there's any sort of indication that a passenger is 
going to be unruly on the plane and they manifest that at the 
checkpoint, we hand that over to local law enforcement.
    Mr. Menendez. Appreciate that. Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. I'll just add to what Mr. Gould said. We do 
take very seriously our mission of security, which is why we do 
screen all the people that he pointed out.
    I will say that we do have the authority to deny boarding 
in instances where an individual has presented themselves to be 
crossing a line in an unruly manner. We also have a lot of 
other authorities as well to include levying fines, referring 
those individuals to the Department of Justice for prosecution 
if they have violated any laws.
    We also have the authority to revoke any of their trusted 
traveler privileges, which can be Global Entry or TSA PreCheck. 
So the authority, in essence, is there and we, again, do take 
that very seriously to make sure that we prevent any unruly 
passenger, if we can identify that person, from either entering 
the stairway or boarding an aircraft.
    Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. I want to expand on 
your answer, because you mentioned the authorities you 
currently possess.
    Does TSA have the authorities needed to address unruly 
passengers who could pose a danger to airport workers and 
others?
    Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir, we do. In the checkpoint area, we 
have the authority to address those passengers in the 
checkpoint area. As I stated, if, in fact, we need to prevent 
them from boarding an aircraft, then we do have that authority 
as well.
    Mr. Menendez. I appreciate that.
    How can Congress help ensure that TSA has the technology 
and resources it needs to respond to incidents on unruly 
passengers, again, for both Mr. Gould and Mr. Wilson?
    Mr. Wilson. I would say the TSA would appreciate the 
continued investment in our technologies. As Mr. Gould pointed 
out, technology is one of the many facets that we use for 
identifying passengers and what maybe their intentions may be, 
whether something that they're trying to bring in is a 
prohibited item or potentially a weapon.
    The investment in the technology that can help us identify 
that is key, and also the continued investment, making sure 
that all of the TSA employees are compensated fairly across the 
board, because they are all a part of the entire solution when 
it comes to screening.
    Mr. Menendez. Absolutely.
    Mr. Gould. Sir, I would just add one thing. We've talked a 
lot today about the technologies that we're investing in today. 
This space moves so quickly from an industry perspective. 
Providing adequate resources to TSA to do research and 
development. Let us work with S&T. Let us work with National 
Labs. We can really advance the technology to the betterment of 
the aviation ecosystem from a security perspective.
    Mr. Menendez. I appreciate that. I appreciate that's a 
quickly evolving technology space and look forward to 
partnering with you on that. Thank you.
    I now look forward to working with TSA on this issue and 
collaborating with my colleagues on this committee to protect 
airport employees and passengers.
    Thank you, and I yield back.
    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman from New Jersey yields back.
    We have time for a second round, so I got a couple 
questions.
    The passenger fee for security, was that $1.5 billion or 
$4.5 billion?
    Mr. Wilson. Sir, it's my recollection that it's a total of 
$4.5 billion. Of that $4.5 billion, roughly $250 million go 
toward our Checked Baggage Program and $1.5 billion is what's 
being deferred and sent for deficit reduction, as I understand 
it.
    Mr. Gimenez. One-point-five billion dollars, not $1 
billion?
    Mr. Wilson. I believe it's $1.5 billion. I can confirm that 
to make sure that we have that correct, but I believe it's $1.5 
billion that may be going to deficit reduction instead of 
coming to aviation security.
    Mr. Gimenez. What percentage of your budget for TSA--what 
is the budget for TSA, total budget?
    Mr. Wilson. Sir, I'd want to give you--make sure I give you 
the correct number. It's in the billions, but I want to give 
you the correct number for exactly what that is. I don't have 
that at the top of my head, sir.
    Mr. Gimenez. I'd like to know what that number is. Still, 
diverting $1.5 billion for a purpose other than what the 
passengers pay for, it is a classic bait-and-switch.
    Frankly, you know, I served as mayor of Miami-Dade County. 
I know, Mr. Garcia, you were a mayor too, right? If we did that 
in our own municipalities or in our county, in my case the 
county, I'd probably get sued and I probably would lose, 
because the fees that you pay for as a citizen for a service 
are supposed to go to that service. It's not supposed to be 
diverted. About the only thing you can divert maybe would be 
some kind of administrative cost that you can justify as 
servicing that particular area that you're doing.
    So if you had this $1.5 billion additional, then how fast 
would that time line be accelerated?
    Mr. Wilson. Sir, I appreciate that question. Right now, we 
have contracts already in place for the new CT machines that 
you mentioned earlier as well as the new CAT machines that we 
talked about and some of the AIT enhancements that Mr. Gould 
mentioned. Some of the contracts in place for CAT and CT today 
are only being funded roughly about 30 percent of what we could 
actually do with--right now, if we had the funding, we could 
reduce the time frame for those deployments to roughly 5 years, 
meaning in 5 years, we'd be done deploying the CT machines and 
the CAT machines that currently is going to take us up to two 
decades to deploy.
    Again, that's with the contracts that we do have in place 
today. We are able to deploy as many as 300, 350 of those 
machines on an annual basis. Right now, that's not able to be 
done.
    Mr. Gimenez. I asked you for, you know, if we had to 
increase the per-passenger fee in order to deploy this quicker 
and also to keep the industry running so that as new 
technologies come, we can go ahead and start replacing, you 
know, this at a reasonable pace so that we're always there. 
We're at the forefront of technology. Our systems are being 
replaced on a periodic basis at all airports so that we stay on 
top of that.
    So I asked you to give me a new per-passenger, you know, 
rate, and also kind-of skew it a little bit toward 
international, and have international passengers maybe pay a 
little bit more. But if you can do that, you know, I would 
certainly appreciate it.
    Probably have not a--first have a meeting and then maybe 
have a hearing on it to see if that's something that we would 
do. But it's certainly something that I'm interested in, 
especially not diverting the money that we're paying for. This 
could be a way for us to start thinking about user fees instead 
of taxes so that the people who are actually using the service 
are the ones paying for the service and not burden the 
taxpayer.
    I know that the taxpayer doesn't pay any of this 
whatsoever, but I'm sure there's taxpayer money that goes into 
your agency. So eventually, I also want to see the budget of 
the agency.
    Also, I'm interested in your TO, which I've asked for, you 
know, when we had our meeting. So I want to see the TO, how 
you're organized, et cetera. Maybe I'll pass that--I will pass 
that on to the Members of the subcommittee. Some of us have 
some executive experience and we will look at it and then, you 
know, make recommendations or not. Maybe you guys are just 
great. I don't know. I've got to see it first.
    So I will now yield to the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Garcia, for a second round.
    Mr. Garcia. We'll yield back. We don't have any additional 
questions. Thank you. We'll yield back. We don't have any 
additional questions.
    Mr. Gimenez. OK. Thank you very much.
    I yield to the gentleman from New York, Mr. LaLota.
    Mr. LaLota. Thanks, Chairman.
    We've talked a lot in this hearing about the bait-and-
switch passenger security fee. It's not enough that a Member of 
this committee merely points out a problem. I think it's 
appropriate that we come to the table with solutions.
    With respect to the bait-and-switch passenger security fee, 
I actually have legislation that I've introduced that would 
ensure that at least the second $250 million that is raised 
through the fee goes toward technology and checkpoint security. 
That is H.R. 3061, the Aviation Security Checkpoint Technology 
Fund Act of 2023.
    Just a few months ago when the TSA administrator himself 
was before us, I asked him point-blank if he supported this 
concept in this legislation that would start to correct the 
problem that we've identified. Without any hesitation, he said 
that this legislation would significantly improve TSA's ability 
to secure our airports and keep our passengers safe.
    I am hopeful, Chairman, that this committee will be able to 
take concrete steps to right this wrong, to make a commitment 
to Americans to keep everybody safe and to ensure agencies like 
TSA have the resources they need to do their jobs effectively.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman from New York yields back.
    I wholeheartedly agree with you, Mr. LaLota.
    All right. So I thank the witnesses for their valuable 
testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members of 
the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the 
witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these 
in writing.
    Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will 
be held open for 10 days.
    Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:01 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

Question From Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger for the Transportation 
                        Security Administration
    Question. Mr. Gould, thank you for your testimony today. I think we 
agree that ending fee diversions would help TSA fulfill its mission of 
securing airports and protecting air travelers. My question is to what 
extent. If legislation guaranteed that at least $250 million collected 
by the 9/11 Security Fee must remain with TSA and TSA only, would this 
enable TSA to consistently meet weapons and explosives detection 
standards?
    Answer. Current statute requires the first $250 million collected 
in Passenger Fees remain with TSA and be deposited into the Aviation 
Security Capital Fund (ASCF) in support of checked baggage that enable 
risk reduction, security effectiveness, and screening efficiency. This 
level of funding has remained constant since the establishment of the 
ASCF in 2004. With the funding that TSA receives from the ASCF, which 
TSA can only apply to checked baggage related projects, TSA will be 
unable to purchase and deploy all of the required checkpoint CT and 
Credential Authentication Technology (CAT) systems until 2042 and 2049, 
respectively.
Questions From Honorable Robert Garcia for the Transportation Security 
                             Administration
    Question 1. Now as we know, in 2006, the United Kingdom thwarted a 
terrorist plot to detonate bombs on flights with liquid explosives that 
could be used to cause an explosion, and these liquids were based on 
what couldn't be screened at the time.
    Ever since, we've had the 3-1-1 liquids rule for carryon bags where 
you can only have small travel-sized liquids below 3.4 oz that have to 
fit in a 1-quart bag.
    This is a huge inconvenience to travelers who either have to bring 
their liquids in a checked bag, be stuck with travel-size liquids, and 
for those of us who forget dumping out shampoos, drinks, and makeup 
into the trash.
    With the new CT scanners, the TSA will now allow you to leave your 
liquids inside your carry-on suitcase for scanning but are still 
subject to the 3-1-1 size limit. I understand that other countries--
including the United Kingdom and Spain--which have deployed these new 
CT scanners are moving soon to lift their liquid size requirements and 
be allowed to take up to 2 liters--almost half a gallon--of liquids to 
be scanned safely in their carry-on bags.
    Mr. Gould, is the TSA looking at the new European security 
guidance, and considering similar adjustments to the 3-1-1 rule?
    Answer. TSA is aware of the shift in liquids policy by some 
international partners. While TSA is not in a position to make any 
changes at this time, increased deployment of CTs to the checkpoints 
could enable screening larger amounts of liquids using advanced 
algorithms and next-generation alarm resolution technology. Once these 
advanced technologies are widely deployed, TSA will be better 
positioned to evaluate potential policy changes.
    Question 2. Do CT scanners give us the ability to continue the same 
level of safety while bringing in a water bottle or a bottle of shampoo 
in your bag?
    Answer. CT technology provides superior 3D imaging capabilities, 
which allows TSA to detect liquids and eliminate the need to remove 
electronics and liquids, aerosols, and gels from carry-on bags in 
checkpoint lanes that have CT systems. Although CT scanners provide TSA 
the ability to screen water or shampoo in a bag, they need to be more 
widely deployed and TSA needs better alarm resolution technology prior 
to evaluating policy changes to ensure consistent passenger experience.
 Question From Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger for Tina Won Sherman
    Question. Ms. Sherman, thank you, as well, for your time and 
willingness to testify. GAO's reporting on TSA technology and process 
effectiveness is of great use to Congress. Thank you for your 
contributions to that work. Do you believe that, as technology evolves, 
and TSA continues to implement nuanced processes involving facial 
recognition and potentially artificial intelligence, that it would 
behoove TSA to have access to expanded financial resources dedicated to 
modernizing and maintaining checkpoint security technology?
    Answer. We believe TSA is best positioned to determine the 
resources needed to modernize and maintain its checkpoint security 
technologies, including fully implementing the recommendations we 
discussed in our October 2023 testimony statement.\1\ We recommended 
that TSA: (1) Develop and implement a process to ensure technologies 
continue to meet detection requirements after deployment and (2) 
collect data on passenger referrals for additional screening and assess 
the extent to which its screening practices comply with agency non-
discrimination policies to identify any needed actions to improve 
compliance.
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    \1\ GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Could Better Ensure Detection and 
Assess the Potential for Discrimination in Its Screening Technologies, 
GAO-24-107094 (Washington, DC: Oct. 19, 2023).
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    We stated in our October 2023 statement that TSA has taken steps to 
implement these recommendations. With respect to our recommendation 
that TSA better ensure technologies meet detection requirements, we 
continue to have concerns regarding TSA's periodic reviews of deployed 
screening technologies. According to TSA officials, the agency remains 
committed to implementing its periodic review process of screening 
technologies. However, officials stated that because funding of 
periodic reviews for existing technologies were not included in the 
agency's estimated program life-cycle costs, such reviews will be 
planned and executed as limited resources, mission priorities, risk, 
and acquisition decisions dictate. In addition, TSA has stated that 
enduring resource constraints means the agency will likely require 
additional time to implement a periodic review process for all types of 
screening technologies currently deployed to commercial airports. With 
respect to our recommendation for TSA to assess compliance with its 
non-discrimination policies, TSA officials stated that the agency plans 
to use the analysis it conducts on referrals for additional screening 
to inform the development of advance imaging technology algorithms, 
which may require additional resources.
    With regard to new technologies, in our April 2023 annual 
assessment of DHS's major acquisition programs, we reported that in 
June 2022, TSA revised its baseline of the Credential Authentication 
Technology program to add new capabilities, including facial-matching 
biometrics, to address operational gaps and improve performance.\2\ We 
reported that TSA plans to deploy 3,585 units by September 2049 with an 
approved cost baseline of about $1.3 billion.\3\ We also reported that 
the agency plans to deploy 2,263 Checkpoint Property Screening Systems 
with an approved cost baseline of about $1.4 billion. As of April 2023, 
the overall program schedule for deploying these systems was not yet 
determined. We will provide an update on these TSA programs as part of 
our next annual assessment in spring 2024.
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    \2\ GAO, DHS Annual Assessment: Major Acquisition Programs Are 
Generally Meeting Goals, but Cybersecurity Policy Needs Clarification, 
GAO-23-106701 (Washington, DC: Apr. 20, 2023).
    \3\ Costs include: (1) Procurement, construction, and improvements, 
and (2) operations and support.
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