[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ADDRESSING OVERSIGHT AND SAFETY
CONCERNS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE'S V-22 OSPREY PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
THE BORDER, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 12, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-115
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available on: govinfo.gov
oversight.house.gov or
docs.house.gov
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-063 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman
Jim Jordan, Ohio Jamie Raskin, Maryland, Ranking
Mike Turner, Ohio Minority Member
Paul Gosar, Arizona Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Columbia
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Michael Cloud, Texas Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Gary Palmer, Alabama Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Ro Khanna, California
Pete Sessions, Texas Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
Andy Biggs, Arizona Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York
Nancy Mace, South Carolina Katie Porter, California
Jake LaTurner, Kansas Cori Bush, Missouri
Pat Fallon, Texas Shontel Brown, Ohio
Byron Donalds, Florida Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Robert Garcia, California
William Timmons, South Carolina Maxwell Frost, Florida
Tim Burchett, Tennessee Summer Lee, Pennsylvania
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Greg Casar, Texas
Lisa McClain, Michigan Jasmine Crockett, Texas
Lauren Boebert, Colorado Dan Goldman, New York
Russell Fry, South Carolina Jared Moskowitz, Florida
Anna Paulina Luna, Florida Rashida Tlaib, Michigan
Nick Langworthy, New York Ayanna Pressley, Massachesetts
Eric Burlison, Missouri
Mike Waltz, Florida
------
Mark Marin, Staff Director
Jessica Donlon, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Kaity Wolfe, Senior Professional Staff Member
Grayson Westmoreland, Senior Professional Staff Member
Ellie McGowan, Staff Assistant and Administrative Clerk
Contact Number: 202-225-5074
Julie Tagen, Minority Staff Director
Contact Number: 202-225-5051
------
Subcommittee on National Security, the Border, and Foreign Affairs
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin, Chairman
Paul Gosar, Arizona Robert Garcia, California, Ranking
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Minority Member
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Pete Sessions, Texas Dan Goldman, New York
Andy Biggs, Arizona Jared Moskowitz, Florida
Nancy Mace, South Carolina Katie Porter, California
Jake LaTurner, Kansas Cori Bush, Missouri
Pat Fallon, Texas Maxwell Frost, Florida
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Vacancy
Vacancy Vacancy
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on June 12, 2024.................................... 1
Witnesses
----------
Mr. Peter Belk, Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Readiness, U.S. Department of Defense
Oral Statement................................................... 5
Vice Admiral Carl Chebi, Commander, U.S. Naval Air Systems
Command, U.S. Department of Defense
Oral Statement................................................... 6
Mr. Gary Kurtz, Program Executive Officer, Air Anti-Submarine
Warfare and Special Missions Programs, U.S. Department of
Defense
Oral Statement................................................... 9
Written opening statements and the written statements of the
witnesses are available on the U.S. House of Representatives
Document Repository at: docs.house.gov.
Index of Documents
----------
* List, Fallen Marines, National Security V-22 Osprey Program;
submitted by Rep. Garcia.
* Email, Class A Mishap Investigation Email Redacted; submitted
by Rep. Grothman.
* Testimony, SWIFT 11 MV-22B Testimony; submitted by Rep.
Grothman.
* Questions for the Record: to Mr. Belk; submitted by Rep.
Grothman.
* Questions for the Record: to Mr. Chebi; submitted by Rep.
Grothman.
Documents are available at: docs.house.gov.
ADDRESSING OVERSIGHT AND SAFETY
CONCERNS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE'S V-22 OSPREY PROGRAM
----------
Wednesday, June 12, 2024
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Accountability
Subcommittee on National Security, the Border, and Foreign Affairs
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:39 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Glenn Grothman
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Grothman, Sessions, Biggs, Fallon,
Perry, Garcia, Lynch, Porter, and Frost.
Mr. Grothman. This hearing of the Subcommittee on National
Security, the Border, and Foreign Affairs will come to order.
Welcome, everyone.
Without objection, I may declare a recess at any time, and
I will recognize myself now for the purpose of making an
opening statement. Thank you. You can sit down.
Good morning and welcome. The goal of today's hearing is to
examine the Department of Defense V-22 Osprey Program. We are
all familiar because it seems to pop up in the news
intermittently for the last 20 years. As an American deeply
committed to the safety of our service members and the
responsible stewardship of U.S. taxpayer funds, I believe it is
imperative that we examine the challenges associated with this
program.
The V-22 Osprey, a revolutionary tiltrotor aircraft, was
designed to combine the vertical takeoff and landing
capabilities of a helicopter with the long-range, fuel-
efficient performance of a turboprop plane. Its promise was
significant, enhancing the operational reach and flexibility of
our armed services. However, as with any ambitious defense
program, it has encountered substantial hurdles and tragically
has been linked to dozens of fatalities. Since the V-22 became
operational, it has been involved in multiple crashes during
training exercises, resulting in the loss of over 50 service
members' lives. These incidences have earned the Osprey the
troubled nickname, ``Widow Maker,'' highlighting the grave
concerns revolving its safety and reliability. Most recently,
last November, its failure led to the deaths of eight Air Force
crew members, prompting the Department of Defense to ground the
entire fleet for several months.
There have been several known issues throughout its
history. The hard clutch engagement issue is a major mechanical
flaw that has plagued the V-22. This program has been known
since at least 2010, and has caused catastrophic losses of
control, contributing to several fatal crashes. The Department
of Defense has publicly claimed that the risk of a hard clutch
engagement issue has been reduced 99 percent. However, the
recent fatal crash and ongoing investigation suggest that more
transparency and rigorous testing is needed to verify these
claims, first, to understand whether all mechanical and
operational issues are thoroughly investigated, and second, to
demand transparency and accountability from the Department of
Defense.
We have had hearings about the Department of Defense before
on this Subcommittee, and it always seems to me like, you know,
transparency, they view it as an enemy. Since the Committee's
initial request last year, the Department has produced a very
few responsive documents. The Department needs to produce the
outstanding documents and information as soon as possible.
Finally, I want to ensure that taxpayer dollars are being
spent wisely and efficiently in ways that do not subject the
lives of our service members to unnecessary risk over and above
what they already face. Every year the Department of Defense's
budget continues to climb with no proper assessment of
priorities, so we are not only losing people maybe by
continuing this program, there are other more important
programs that are being squashed. I have concerns that despite
the monumental investment the taxpayers made in the Osprey
Program, the Department has not prioritized long-term
sustainability and operability of the program and has even cut
operations and maintenance budgets.
This is not the first time the House Oversight Committee
examined the Osprey. The Committee held a hearing in 2009. It
is a shame that here we are over a decade later, and I am sure
some of the questions will be the same questions that were
asked 15 years ago, trying to understand these issues in light
of even more crashes and loss of life. As we proceed with this
hearing, let us remember our responsibility to the brave men
and women who serve our Nation. Their safety and well-being
must be at the forefront of our discussions and decisions.
To that end, I would like to enter into the official
hearing record a written statement, which is really an
incredible document, from surviving families, most of which are
here today, of an MV-22B Osprey crash that occurred on June 8,
2022, during routine flight operations.
Mr. Grothman. I would like to read one quote from Ms. Amber
Sax of California, wife of Captain John Sax, who lost his life
in that crash. ``We seek accountability, answers, and change.
Our goal is not to see this platform removed. It is to know
that someday we will be able to save their lives, enable others
to live, knowing what happened to them will not ever be
repeated.'' I look forward to hearing from our witnesses from
the Department of Defense today as we continue to work together
to address these critical issues. I thank you for being here.
I now recognize Ranking Member Garcia for the purpose of
his opening statement.
Mr. Garcia. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank all of our witnesses, and thank you for your service. And
to all the family members that are here also, we share your
obviously incredible grief, and thank you all for being here
and for your advocacy work on this important topic. Like the
chairman, I think this is an important bipartisan hearing, and
I think it is important that our Nation is always secure and
that we have the best military readiness and capabilities
possible.
Now, we know that the V-22 Osprey has been very important
for the Air Force, Navy, and our Marine Corps, and has allowed
our military to complete important missions in the past. With
this unique capability to hover and land vertically without
needing a runway, like a helicopter, we know the fast speed and
long distance range that it carries. We really have a unique
aircraft that has also had some challenges that we are going to
talk about today. Now, the V-22 gives our troops important
flexibility. This has been pretty made clear by our military.
And if you look at the Osprey's major accident rate, which is
the actual data that the military uses to judge safety, we know
that per-flight hour over the past 10 years has been comparable
to similar aircrafts. We know that the aircraft has some unique
capabilities that it provides to our military. We also know
that the Osprey has some really unique challenges.
It is not surprising, given how actually remarkable the
tiltrotor technology is, which has been obviously the
centerpiece of the capabilities of this aircraft, we know that
when something goes wrong, the Osprey actually requires even
greater pilot skill and experience to land safely. We also know
that it has incredible speed, lift, and range, and when you
think about delivering supplies to an aircraft carrier, we know
how critical that work is and the important situation that can
arise in all of our theaters.
We know that the Osprey's complicated technology creates
unique procurement and development challenges as well. The
Osprey requires tens of thousands of parts for completion made
by many contractors and subcontractors. The Osprey has been
delivered late and over budget. This is an all too familiar
story, of course, when we talk oftentimes about the defense
appropriation and acquisitions process, and we know that the
concerns about the Osprey are real and they are not new. In its
lifetime, we know that 16 Ospreys have actually been damaged
beyond repair in accidents and 62 service members have
tragically lost their lives.
Now, it is our responsibility to protect every person that
serves our country. Congress has to hold both the Pentagon and
our defense industry accountable, and so we look forward to the
critical challenges that we can discuss. And I know that our
witnesses are also very much interested in solutions and having
honest and important conversations.
Investigations into a June 2022 crash showed a so-called
``hard clutch engagement'' that caused a catastrophic failure
and crash, which killed all five marines aboard the aircraft.
In 2023, two more Ospreys crashed last August in Australia,
killing three marines, and most recently, last November, a
crash killed eight airmen off the coast of Japan. These
crashes, we know, are still under investigation and each one,
of course, is incredibly tragic. And we know that following the
November crash, the Air Force, Marines, and Navy actually
grounded their entire Osprey fleets. This was an appropriate
decision to protect our service members, and by March that
order, of course, has been lifted and the Osprey is, of course,
flying again, but it is required to stay close to a landing
zone.
Now, I understand the military has put in place maintenance
and design upgrades to address some of the issues. We know that
more are needed, and that is part of what the hearing is about.
Given this aircraft's history and ongoing safety issues, I do
believe we need to hear more about why the DOD concluded that
the Osprey can return to service and how we will keep our
people safe in the future. I appreciate Chairman Grothman
calling this hearing and hope we can work in a bipartisan way
to ensure the highest degree of protection for our armed
forces. Only through continued congressional oversight, can we
protect the men and women who have chosen to serve our country.
Finally, I just want to remind everyone why we are here
today, to honor the service and sacrifice of the men and women
in uniform who put themselves in harm's way to protect our
Nation, and specifically, the three marines lost in the
Australia crash, the eight airmen lost in the Japan crash, and
the many other service members that we have lost over the
course of the last few years.
Now, Chairman Grothman, I ask for unanimous consent to
enter each of those names into the record today. I have
provided a list.
Mr. Grothman. Yes, so ordered.
Mr. Garcia. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
yield back.
Mr. Grothman. OK. I am pleased to introduce our witnesses
here today from left to right. Mr. Peter Belk, performing the
duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, come
over from the Pentagon. In this capacity, he is the principal
advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Next, we have Vice Admiral
Carl Chebi, the Commander of Naval Air Systems Command. He is a
skilled fighter pilot and has served in several operational
capacities. He has also had an array of program management
experience on various air platforms. And finally, Mr. Gary
Kurtz is the Program Executive Director for Air Anti-Submarine
Warfare, Assault, and Special Mission Programs. He oversees the
acquisition and the total lifecycle support for a diverse range
of programs, including the V-22 Joint Program Office. Thank you
for all participating in today's hearing.
Pursuant to Committee Rule 9(g), the witnesses will please
stand and raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you
are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
[A chorus of ayes.]
Mr. Grothman. Let the record show that all the witnesses
answered in the affirmative. Thank you, and you may sit down.
We appreciate you being here today and look forward to your
testimony.
I will remind the witnesses we have read your testimony and
will appear in full in the hearing record, but please limit
your testimony to 5 or 6 minutes. As a reminder, please press
the button on the microphone in front of you, so that it is on
and the members can hear you. When you begin to speak, the
light in front of you will turn green. After 4 minutes, the
light will turn yellow. When the red light comes on, the 5
minutes is up. I would like you to wrap up as soon as
convenient.
I now recognize Mr. Belk for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF PETER BELK
PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR READINESS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Belk. Chairman Grothman, Ranking Member Garcia, and
distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify today about the Department of Defense's
safety oversight and our ongoing work to ensure the safety of
the V-22 Osprey Aircraft.
I am proud to be here today to discuss how we are
inculcating a culture of safety across the Department and
specifically how our actions are driving the safe return of the
V-22 Osprey to flight. Our partnerships across the Department
are key to maintaining that culture of safety, and I am pleased
to be here today with Vice Admiral Carl Chebi and Mr. Gary
Kurtz to describe the Department's efforts to ensure the safety
of the V-22 Osprey and our service members.
I also want to thank personally the family members of those
who have suffered losses and tell them directly, you have my
commitment on behalf of the Department to continue to drive the
safest outcomes possible so we never have to and try to work to
reduce any mishaps in the future. Thank you.
As a Department, it is our solemn duty to protect our
greatest resource: our people. We continuously underscore the
importance of safety at every level in the Department, from our
newest recruit to our most senior commander, to ensure an
environment where safety and risk management remain a core
value ingrained as an essential and integrated part of our
operations. The Department continues to proactively promote a
culture of safety where there is a shared commitment, emphasis,
and urgency placed on deliberate communications, consistent
resourcing, and elevated ownership of risk decisions.
I am in the position of performing the duties of Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Readiness in the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. One of my
office's primary responsibilities is in establishing and
overseeing safety policies, plans, and programs to support all
the Department's components in managing risk and preventing
accidents and injuries to our military and civilian personnel.
We execute our safety mission through the Defense Safety
Oversight Council, which is the Department's senior safety
forum that provides governance on Department-wide safety
efforts and addresses the most significant challenges facing
the safety and health of our people. The Defense Safety
Oversight Council brings together senior leaders from across
the Department to elevate safety decisions and guide our
comprehensive and crosscutting efforts to drive behavioral
change, review safety trends, improve awareness, share lessons
learned, and confirm priorities, ensuring we are taking
deliberate actions to reduce safety risk, enhance readiness,
and protect our most valuable resource: our people.
The Defense Safety Oversight Council reports to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, who receives regular updates on safety
and occupational health through the Deputy's Workforce Council.
The Joint Safety Council is a key component of our departmental
safety governance structure and it serves an essential
institutional role in developing a common understanding of
operational mishaps involving joint programs. It is also a key
venue for collaborating to synchronize communications and share
mishap lessons learned and best practices for mitigating risk.
From the moment the most recent Osprey mishap occurred, the
Department's senior safety leaders, in partnership with the
Defense Safety Oversight Council, the Joint Safety Council, and
the military departments, were actively collaborating on all
aspects of the V-22's return to flight. The Department will
continue to collectively leverage our robust safety governance
processes to maximize our collaborative approach for improving
safety-focused outcomes. As a Department, we are working
relentlessly and prioritizing solutions that minimize risks and
other hazards to the well-being of our service members by
understanding causal mishap factors, identifying mitigations,
addressing exposures, strengthening policy, and incorporating
actions to prevent both on and off-duty accidents.
The Department is committed to instituting an effective and
enduring Department-wide culture of safety that yields safer
workplaces, fewer mishaps, enhanced readiness, and that
supports one of Secretary Austin's keen priorities, taking care
of people. The Defense Safety Oversight Council and the Joint
Safety Council are essential to our collaborative mishap
reduction efforts to proactively identify trends and
indicators, share best practice and lessons learned, and
mitigate risks to ensure the safest possible operational
training environments for our service members. We will continue
to advocate for enhanced synergy, emphasis, and urgency on
delivered communications, consistent resourcing, and elevated
ownership of the risk decisions to preserve operational
capabilities and protect our most vital assets, the service
members, who defend our Nation and the civilian employees who
support them.
We appreciate the opportunity to share with you how
seriously we take our safety oversight responsibilities and how
we are consistently and proactively striving to detect and
mitigate risks before mishaps occur. Thank you for your
continued support, and we look forward to your questions.
Mr. Grothman. Admiral Chebi?
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL CARL CHEBI
COMMANDER
U.S. NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Chebi. Chairman Grothman, Ranking Member Garcia, and
distinguished members of the House Committee on Oversight and
Accountability, Subcommittee on National Security, the Border,
and Foreign Affairs, thank you for the opportunity to address
the status of the V-22 Osprey Program with you today. I am Vice
Admiral Carl Chebi, and I currently serve as the commander of
Naval Air Systems Command, a position I have held since
September 2021. With me today to my left is Mr. Gary Kurtz, the
Program Executive Officer for Air Anti-Submarine Warfare,
Assault, and Special Mission Programs. The V-22 Program is part
of his portfolio, and he, along with the V-22 Program Manager,
are responsible for the overall acquisition lifecycle and risk
management of the V-22 Program.
I, along with my team, am responsible for the development,
integration, testing, fielding, and sustaining of naval
aviation capabilities. Our focus is ensuring we deliver the
warfighting capability that the fleet, that our sons and
daughters need to execute their missions successfully and
return home safely. This has been and continues to be our North
Star for myself as the NAVAIR Commander, along with my
teammates, Vice Admiral Dan Cheever, the Commander of Naval Air
Forces; Lieutenant General Bradford Gering, the Deputy
Commandant for Marine Aviation; and Lieutenant General Tony
Bauernfeind, the Air Force Special Operations Commander.
Currently at NAVAIR, I have oversight of just over 4,000
aircraft across 40 different types. This includes the V-22
Program, which today operates as a joint program of 434
aircraft across the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air
Force, and Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force. I am committed
to ensuring the safety of the V-22 to perform its mission, just
like the 40 other aircraft types that I am responsible for. As
the Commander of NAVAIR, I serve as the airworthiness authority
for naval aviation, somewhat akin to the role of FAA in a
commercial parallel. I am responsible for implementing and
maintaining the technical standards required to establish and
maintain safe flight operations. If cases arise in which we can
no longer maintain that standard, I will take the appropriate
action, including grounding of aircraft until deemed safe for
flight.
Since I arrived at NAVAIR in September 2021, we have
grounded the F-18, the F-35, the T-45, the V-22, the P-3, and
the H-53 aircraft due to safety concerns. The decision to
ground these aircraft were not made lightly due to operational
impacts. Our ability and responsibility to ensure continued
safe flight operations is at the forefront of every decision we
make.
Naval aviation is an inherently dangerous profession. Our
objective is to provide aircraft that are safe to execute their
mission while proactively managing every platform so as to
prevent mishaps from ever occurring. Throughout the life of a
program, we continuously assess program risks based on
engineering and test data, quality reports, manufacturing data,
fleet feedback, and mishap investigations. This process of
reviewing our risks is continuous and considers manning,
training, and equipment aspects of safety across the spectrum
of how our platforms are designed, built, operated, and
maintained.
In the event that a mishap does occur, which can range from
a relatively minor ground incident to a catastrophic loss of
life or aircraft, a safety investigation board is established
to investigate the mishap, determine the root cause, and make
recommendations to prevent future incidents. The safety board
is comprised of experts across all required technical
competencies so that we reach a full understanding of what
happened, how it happened, and what we can do to prevent the
event from ever occurring again.
In the past 2 1/2 years, we have experienced four mishaps
with the V-22 Program that have resulted in a loss of 20 of our
service members and four aircraft. This has the full attention
and support of USN, USMC, and U.S. Air Force leadership. I
would like to take a couple minutes to walk you through what we
have done to address this issue with a clear understanding
there is still much work to be done. While I will address the
most recent mishap, this same process is used for every mishap
for all of our platforms.
On 29 November 2023, a CV-22 was involved in a crash that
resulted in a loss of eight airmen and the aircraft. As a
result, the AFSOC Commander immediately established a safety
investigation board to investigate the mishap that included
experts from the Navy, the Air Force, and industry. On 6
December 2023, data was presented to myself that indicated that
the platform had experienced a catastrophic material failure
that we have never seen before in the V-22 Program. Based on
that data, I made the decision to ground all V-22s until we
understood the failure mode and we could safely return the
aircraft to flight.
Over the next couple months, service aviation leadership
engaged with the Safety Board presidents to review the mishap
investigation findings. The Safety Board was able to determine
the sequence of events that occurred and we are confident we
know the material root cause of the November mishap. Based on
the Safety Board's findings, service aviation leadership
developed a path to allow for a return to restricted flight
operations through implementation of specific controls.
On March 8, 2024, the V-22 was returned to a flying status
and has safely flown over 7,000 hours since then. Today, we are
methodically looking at material and nonmaterial changes that
we can make to allow for a full mission set without controls in
place. I will not certify the V-22 to return to unrestricted
flight operations until I am satisfied that we have
sufficiently addressed the issues that may affect the safety of
the aircraft. Based on the data that I have today, I am
expecting that this will not occur before mid-2025.
In parallel, I have launched a comprehensive review of the
V-22 Program. This effort is ongoing and will ensure we are
holistically looking at all aspects of the program across
manning, training and equipment, and proactively identifying
additional actions outside of mishap reviews that enable safe,
reliable, and affordable flight operations. As we have findings
from the comprehensive review, I will take the necessary
actions to ensure continued safe flight operations. This is an
ongoing process, and my expectation is the full comprehensive
review will take another 6 to 9 months.
The NAVAIR and V-22 joint program teams are committed to
ensuring the safety, reliability, and operational effectiveness
of these critical platforms. By the ongoing comprehensive
review of the V-22 Program, we will continue to pursue safety
improvements where needed. As a NAVAIR commander, I have a
vested interest in the safety of this platform and all aircraft
for which I am responsible, and I will not certify an aircraft
to perform a mission unless confident in the ability of that
aircraft to do so safely. Thank you. Both Mr. Kurtz and myself
look forward to answering any of your questions.
Mr. Grothman. Thank you. Mr. Kurtz, it is my understanding
you do not have an opening statement, but I would like to give
you the opportunity to make any opening remarks you want to.
STATEMENT OF GARY KURTZ
PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER
AIR ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND
SPECIAL MISSIONS PROGRAMS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Kurtz. Yes, sir. Thank you, and good morning, Mr.
Chairman, and as well, Ranking Member Garcia. It is truly my
honor to be here today to testify. I associate my comments with
Vice Admiral Chebi as a joint statement, and I look forward to
your comments today.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Mr. Fallon, we will go a little bit out
of order today.
Mr. Fallon. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, very
gracious of you to do so.
In this room today, it looks like we have some Gold Star
families and your presence here is recognized, and I am deeply
sorry for your loss. I am a member of the Armed Services
Committee and also a veteran myself, and I think it is
incumbent upon us as Members of Congress to do everything we
can to ensure that the military maintains the highest degrees
and focus and prioritizes safety. Everybody says they do, but
sometimes it is words, and we need actions to back that up.
I have had a fight with one of the branches on rollovers
with Humvees and we are losing military members. And we have
authorized the money, we have appropriated the money, and then
we have to take them kicking and screaming to actually spend
the money on safety, so I am very acutely sensitive to what we
are talking about here. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding
this hearing.
Equipment sometimes fails, and it is oftentimes when
equipment fails, tragedy is the result. As an Air Force
veteran, I recall the T-37, which was a trainer they used to
use, and it had an incredible safety record. I think when I was
in the service, it was like 30 years plus where there had been
no fatalities because of it, and that is a standard that needs
to be followed so it is possible to operate equipment that goes
very fast and do it in a safe manner.
Admiral, has the DOD been actively using information from
the safety investigations in the Osprey crashes to determine
modifications to improve the system?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, thank you for that question. As I mentioned
in my statement, we use data continuously through the life of a
program to identify the risks that are for that platform, more
importantly, to make sure we identify the controls and the
mitigations that we can put in place to minimize or to
eliminate that risk from ever occurring with the aircraft. So,
yes, we use all sources of information, including the safety
investigations, to determine the root cause and to address the
root cause through mitigations and controls.
Mr. Fallon. Two questions, Admiral. The first one is, have
you collected data on whether or not these failures have
increased or decreased since these modifications have been
made, and second question is, will you commit to providing this
data to the committee if it exists?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, can you clarify your first question? I just
want to make sure I answer it correctly.
Mr. Fallon. Sure. Have you collected data on whether the
Osprey failures have increased or decreased since the
modifications have been made, and if there is data that you
have collected, will you share it with the committee?
Mr. Chebi. OK. Since the modifications have been made, I
just want to make sure I am addressing yours.
Mr. Fallon. OK.
Mr. Chebi. So, we take all the information on. If there are
repeat issues that are causing risk to our platform or to our
aircrew, we take the appropriate actions to put the controls in
place to minimize or to remove that risk from the platform.
Mr. Fallon. But there is no data? I am talking about just
simply measures. You take actions, but we want to make sure
those actions are effective, and I apologize because I only
have a limited amount of time here. Admiral, how many deaths
have occurred from accidents on the Osprey?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, I will answer it in two different ways.
Since I have been in the seat in the last 2 1/2 years, we have
lost four aircraft and 20 of our service members. Many of the
service members' families are right behind me right now.
Mr. Fallon. Do you know the total number?
Mr. Chebi. The total number of the platform before it was
IOC and after IOC, the total number that I am tracking is 64
service members.
Mr. Fallon. OK. And then I am guessing injuries as well.
Have people survived these crashes?
Mr. Chebi. The total number of fatalities that I am
tracking is 64 fatalities total and 93 injuries.
Mr. Fallon. OK. I have one more question. The hard clutch
engagement, which apparently is a fleetwide program that we
have known about for years, the pilot shifts the gears and the
clutch engages. And sometimes when this happens in this HCE, it
causes complete loss of control in the aircraft, and apparently
there is nothing the pilot can do about it. And on June 8th of
2022, Gold Star families were told that this was modified and
this risk was limited, 99 percent chance that this would not
happen. Where does that number come from, Admiral?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, thank you for the question. For hard
clutches, you know, through the life of the program, we have
had 19 hard clutch events. In 2022, we had a sharp increase in
the number of hard clutches. Based on the data that I had at
that time, the first control that we put in place was we
modified our air crew procedures, so that they would be in a
safe environment should a hard clutch event did occur.
Subsequent to that, there was additional hard clutch events,
and we received data back from the Glamis mishap that indicated
that the controls that we had in place were insufficient.
The team executed a statistical analysis on all the mishaps
that did occur with hard clutches and determined that the
failure mode that we have seen, even though we have never been
able to repeat the failure in test, the failure mode that we
are seeing is called a wear-out mode. Over time, the clutch
wears out and has a higher susceptibility to slipping, which
will cause a hard clutch event. Based on that data, in March
2023, I grounded the fleet and mandated that all aircraft will
remove clutches that have over 800 hours. That has been
completed, and we have flown numerous hours since then without
a hard clutch event.
I want to make this point clear though. That has not
eliminated the risk, and I will let the PEO kind of talk about
this. We are currently in testing of a follow-on design for the
clutch not only to minimize the exposure, but to eliminate this
risk from occurring again. I will let Mr. Kurtz kind of take
over from there.
Mr. Fallon. So, there has never been an HCE prior to the
800 hours?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, there have been no hard clutch events since
we implemented the 800-hour time limit on the input cool
assemblies.
Mr. Fallon. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you to
our witnesses. Admiral, just to make sure that we are on the
same page, what is a Class A accident, and what is the current
Marines' Class A accident rate per 100,000 flight hours?
Mr. Chebi. A Class A mishap is determined loss of aircraft,
loss of life, or a certain dollar amount to repair the aircraft
is how it is defined. I do not have the dollar amount in front
of me, but I can get that back to you.
Mr. Garcia. And what is the accident rate per 100,000
flight hours?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, I just want to make sure that I am
answering your specific question. For the V-22 for Marine
Corps? For the overall aviation for Marine Corps? Which one
would you like?
Mr. Garcia. For the V-22.
Mr. Chebi. The V-22 overall mishap rate across all three
services is 4.1 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. For the U.S.
Marine Corps, it is 3.29 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours.
Mr. Garcia. And if you separate the current Marines' Class
A accident rate and the current Air Force Class A accident rate
per 100,000 flight hours, including the November 2023 crash,
there is a difference. Is that correct?
Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir. There is a difference between the
Class A mishap rate between the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S.
Air Force.
Mr. Garcia. And do you get a sense of why there is a
discrepancy there or why that exists?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, when we do mishap investigations, we look
at all aspects across manning, training, and equipment to
identify the root cause and put the corrective actions in place
to minimize or to eliminate that risk from ever occurring
again. With the specifics on why the U.S. Air Force V-22 mishap
rate is higher than the U.S. Marine Corps, I think that is a
question the U.S. Air Force needs to take on.
Mr. Garcia. Well, I just want to note, I think this is an
important discrepancy, and I think it is one that should be
investigated and discussed more openly. And there is clearly a
difference in discrepancy between both the Air Force and the
Marines, and so I understand. I appreciate your answer. But
just for the record, Mr. Chairman, I think that that is
something that needs to be addressed, and certainly I think I
look forward to more answers on. Thank you for that.
Admiral, is there any reason to believe tiltrotor
technology is any less safe than traditional fixed-wing or
rotor aircraft?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, thank you for that question. I will answer
it from my capacity as airworthiness. More safe or less safe,
my objective is to do an analysis of the data throughout the
entire lifecycle of a program to make it as safe as you
possibly can. So, whether or not one is more or less safe, it
is interesting, but what I am focused on is increasing the
safety posture across all of our platforms and eliminate
mishaps to the max extent possible by proactively managing each
one of our aircraft.
Mr. Garcia. I appreciate that, and obviously, I am not an
expert on the aircraft safety, but certainly I slightly maybe
have a different perspective. I think that if there is a
difference and something is more safe or less, if I actually
think that matters, it should be taken into consideration as we
are making these assessments.
Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garcia. Admiral, are you confident that the current
restrictions on aircraft operations are adequate?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, thank you for that question. Yes. It was a
very deliberate, methodical, data-driven process that we went
through. We fully vetted. We understood exactly what occurred
on the most recent mishap. We fully vetted the controls that we
put in place. I went and personally briefed all the Air Force,
the Navy, as well as the Japanese crews so they had a full
understanding of what happened in this mishap. We need to build
trust with the air crews, and the Marine Corps did that on
their side as well. I am confident that the controls that are
put in place, based on the data I have today, allow for return
to flight in a restricted flight envelope only.
Mr. Garcia. OK, and I am just going back. Are you, like
myself, concerned about the difference between the Air Force
and the Marine discrepancy that exists? Is that a concern?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, I have had direct conversations with the
AFSOC commander, Lieutenant General Bauernfeind. He is
addressing the issue and the discrepancy between the mishap
rates between his V-22 fleet and the other V-22 fleets. From my
perspective, I am trying to lower the overall V-22 mishap rate
holistically.
Mr. Garcia. OK. Thank you. Do you think that as it relates
to the timeline for redesigning, testing, and deploying the new
gearboxes, and to replace the current clutch system, how would
you describe that process and where are we at?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, I will start and I will hand it over to Mr.
Kurtz to kind of followup. I mentioned the hard clutch. I
mentioned the controls that we put in place to remove them at a
certain time limit to minimize the exposure of that risk. We
modified procedures as well from the air crew perspective to
give them good procedures to execute should that incident occur
again, but we have not eliminated that risk. We will not
eliminate that risk until we have a redesigned clutch. That is
in testing right now, and I am pushing, from my seat as the
airworthiness, the safety advocate, to get that out to the
fleet as soon as we possibly can. I will hand it over to Mr.
Kurtz.
Mr. Kurtz. Yes, sir. Just to followup on Vice Admiral
Chebi's comments, we have understood through cause analysis
that has allowed us to move forward very aggressively with a
new design to that clutch. That clutch testing is expected to
start in the next couple of months, and we anticipate that we
will have a new design clutch fielding in the mid-2025
timeframe.
Mr. Garcia. OK. And then I have other questions, but just
to conclude, I know my time has run out. Admiral, I know that
sometimes certain upgrades to craft and to mechanical concerns,
oftentimes decisions are made about when to make an upgrade to
a certain craft depending on when we are using certain aircraft
in certain missions, and obviously safety is always, I know, a
priority. But frequency of use, pace of use, I think, also
obviously sometimes has an impact on certain types of
equipment, vehicles that we may use. And I know that we try to
be as selective as possible in prioritizing safety and what is
used.
But do you have any reason to believe that mechanical, when
we have tried to upgrade the V-22, or frequency of use has had
or could possibly be any of the factors that have led to some
of the concerns that we share about the V-22 and some of the
accidents that we have seen?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, I want to make sure I clearly understand
your question. Can you just state that one more time? I just
want to make sure.
Mr. Garcia. Sure. Let me be more clear. Oftentimes we make
decisions when we are going to actually make mechanical
improvements to vehicle or to aircraft dependent on frequency
of use. Do you think that that issue or those issues could have
anything to do with any of the accidents or the concerns that
we share about the V-22?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, thank you for that question. Based on the
data I have today, I would say, no, that has not been a causal
factor. A key point of the comprehensive review that we are
executing today is to holistically look across manning,
training, equipment across all aspects of the program to ensure
continued safe outcomes for the V-22 platform. That is going to
take another 6 to 9 months to finish up. That will be very
thorough, holistic, and it is a proactive measure we are going
after to implement the necessary controls across manning,
training, equipment to ensure continued safe flight operations
of the V-22 Program.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, sir, and I appreciate the chairman
for the extra time.
Mr. Grothman. Sure. OK. I am going to call on myself.
To ensure we are getting fair, accurate, and transparent
answers from each of you, I am starting off with a simple
``yes'' or ``no'' question. Has anyone within the Federal
Government or outside the Federal Government told you not to
discuss any topic related to the Osprey Program that may come
up today?
Mr. Belk. Mr. Chairman, no.
Mr. Chebi. No.
Mr. Kurtz. No, sir.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Good. Now we are looking forward to
having this hearing being open and honest discussion.
Admiral Chebi, can you please explain why Class A aircraft
mishaps are or what Class A aircraft mishaps are and what
criteria is involved in determining if an aircraft crash
qualifies as a Class A mishap?
Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir. At a high level, a Class A mishap is
loss of aircraft, loss of life, and there is a certain dollar
threshold from a damage perspective. I do not have that number.
I can take that one for the record.
Mr. Grothman. OK.
Mr. Grothman. You have testified that there are many more
mishaps in the Marines, in the Navy, in the Air Force, correct?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, I have testified? I am sorry. I just want
to make sure.
Mr. Grothman. There have been many more mishaps, you know,
per whatever, per hours flown in the Marines, in the Navy, or
in the Air Force, correct?
Mr. Chebi. Sorry. I just want to clarify I am answering
your question. Are you asking if we had mishaps across the
Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force in the V-22?
Mr. Grothman. You have. You have, correct?
Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We have had Class A's
through D's across the different services with the V-22
Program.
Mr. Grothman. Right, and many more in the Marines
expectation than in the Navy, correct?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, I would not characterize as many more. The
reason we establish a mishap rate, it is per 100,000 flying
hours.
Mr. Grothman. Right.
Mr. Chebi. Marines have many more aircraft, have flown many
more hours than the Navy has so far. So, I would caution us all
to make sure we are having apples to apples comparison, and
that is why we try to normalize it per 100,000 flight hours.
Mr. Grothman. OK. I would like to enter into record an
email committee staff received from DOD personnel.
Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Grothman. The email says, ``As for the command
investigations, not all Class A mishaps have command
investigations. Over the past 5 years, there have been two
command investigations related to a V-22 Class A mishap.''
Admiral Chebi, can you explain what a command investigation is?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, if you will allow, I would like to get Mr.
Belk to kind of answer this question.
Mr. Grothman. OK.
Mr. Belk. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your question. So, a
command investigation is unduly undertaken in different ways by
the different military departments, largely to get after a set
of facts and potentially determine what, if any, additional
actions need to be taken at that point, whether that has to do
with matters of accountability or matters of remedy, given a
particular set of circumstances.
Mr. Grothman. I am going to jump in here. I am trying to
understand how the Department can accurately determine issues
with the Osprey aircraft maintenance or personnel that may have
caused a mishap if there is not an investigation done with
every single Class A mishap. Why is an investigation not done
every time?
Mr. Chebi. Let me jump in there. So, with that question,
for every Class A mishap, there is a safety investigation board
that is conducted where we have full, unfettered access to all
the data so we can holistically look at the program, what
caused this issue, and, more importantly, what controls can we
put in place to minimize or eliminate this risk from ever
occurring again in the future here. Every Class A has a mishap
investigation.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Now, you have command investigations and
safety investigations. Can you give us an example of something
that would be included in a safety investigation, not included
in a command investigation?
Mr. Chebi. Can I give an example of something that would be
included in a safety investigation or not?
Mr. Grothman. Right.
Mr. Chebi. It would be privileged data, so it would be an
analysis. It would be potentially some statements from
witnesses. Those would be a couple of examples of things that
would not be in a command investigation----
Mr. Grothman. OK.
Mr. Chebi [continuing]. But that we want access to during
the safety investigation because we need to understand.
Mr. Grothman. Right.
Mr. Chebi. OK.
Mr. Grothman. There is more stuff available in a safety
investigation, right?
Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir.
Mr. Grothman. And they are not publicly made available,
correct?
Mr. Chebi. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Grothman. OK. This is for Mr. Belk. As you know, the
Committee sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense, Lloyd
Austin, in December asking for documents and information
related to all mishap investigations. To date, the Department
has refused to share the safety investigations with this
Committee despite numerous offers to review the safety
investigations in a sanitized manner or in camera as an
accommodation. Why has the Department refused to provide access
to these reports?
Mr. Belk. Congressman, thank you for your question. So, the
Department remains committed to being transparent in sharing
information related to any of these mishaps, and we do so
largely at the conclusion of our command investigations, which
we do provide to the Congress upon request and on
circumstances.
With respect to safety investigations, safety
investigations are designed to maximize the fullest
transparency possible with those who are participating in the
investigation so we can maximize our opportunity to understand
what went right and what went wrong, and how to take remedial
access to and understanding of those actions by providing those
participants safety privilege. The content of those safety
investigations relevant to how to get after the solution to a
particular mishap event are then informed or provided to
command investigations and then be able to be acted upon, which
we then would be in a position to be shared with this
committee.
Mr. Grothman. We will come back to that later. I am just
going to ask one more question. Mr. Chebi, I am curious about
the rate of Osprey mishaps compared to other aircraft, and I am
saying just mishaps non-combat related. Are the mishaps of the
Osprey higher or lower than other military air platforms,
noncombat?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, we had this discussion yesterday about
combat versus noncombat. Most of our mishaps occur in noncombat
mission sets. We train like we fight, and so we train in very
realistic environments. We want our air crew to train in that
environment, and so, there is a higher likelihood that we are
going to have a mishap in a training accident than we are in a
combat mission.
With regards to your specific question, the overall mishap
rate across all the systems, all the platforms of the V-22 is
4.1. The Marine Corps is slightly higher than their overall
mishap rate, the Air Force is higher than their mishap rate,
and the U.S. Navy right now is slightly lower than their mishap
rate across the other platforms. Again, I just want to
reiterate----
Mr. Grothman. I am not getting the answer I want, but we
are well over my time.
Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir.
Mr. Grothman. I will go to Mr. Frost.
Mr. Frost. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The V-22 Osprey, like
all military aircraft, is only as good as it is safe. If
maintenance issues or, even worse, significant mechanical
failures endanger the life of our service members, then the
United States military cannot rely on the Osprey's unique
capabilities, no matter how unique those capabilities may be.
In the last 2 years, the V-22s have been involved in four major
fatal accidents, which have resulted in the deaths of 20
service members just in the last year. These are catastrophes
where American service members lost their lives, and it is not
just a problem with the Osprey. In military aircraft across the
board, safety and readiness metrics are dropping.
So far this year, Army aircraft have experienced twice the
rate of major incidents than any year in the last decade. Air
Force major incidents hit a 5-year high in the Fiscal Year
2023, despite us continuing to raise our defense budget almost
nearing a trillion dollars than the one we are currently
debating. Mr. Belk, can you explain the reasons underlying this
troubling trend?
Mr. Belk. Congressman, thank you for your question. With
respect to some of the specific data you have shared, what I
would like to do is come back with some additional context and
response that we can get after some of the more specifics.
Mr. Belk. Generally speaking, what I would say is that as
the force continues to transform and shift in the types of
training and operations that it is doing to mitigate and
address new and emerging threat contexts, this is placing
additional stress on the force. Whether or not this translates
into additional mishaps or not, we are still looking at very
closely, but we are monitoring that very closely to ensure that
as we continue to transform as a force, we understand how we do
so as we operate and train in the safest manner possible.
Mr. Frost. Recent data suggests that the military is
relying on aircraft that are not meeting readiness goals. In
2022, the GAO released a report that studied readiness among 49
different aircrafts over the span of a decade. GAO found that
only one of those aircrafts--one--met their mission readiness
goals every year, and only four met their readiness goals a
majority of the years studied, and 26 of those aircraft did not
meet readiness goals in a single year between 2011 and 2001.
This trend is both alarming and unacceptable. I understand that
the V-22 has now been approved to return to limited operation,
despite there being no clear conclusion of the investigation of
the most recent crash.
So, Mr. Belk, what did the DOD learn about the accident and
its return to flight assessment, and how exactly does that
differ from the initial crash investigation?
Mr. Belk. So, Congressman, if I understand the question
correctly, we learned, and I would say when I say ``we,'' we in
OSD, we with the military departments, learned rather
contemporaneously about the incident that we are talking about
in November. In terms of the approach, we take a, and I will
defer to Admiral Chebi to speak to some of the specifics on how
we conduct upon notification of a mishap at a military
department or service level.
What I would say is that, from my perspective, we approach
this particular incident with the same level of rigor and care
and consideration in terms of how to get after the fundamental
understanding of the events that transpired and led to the
incident; and then the mitigation steps that need to be taken
as we learn information to ensure the continued safest
environment, operating environment and training environment,
for our service members; and then what, if any, steps to
include the stand-down that Admiral Chebi alluded to, to
continue the safest environment possible.
Mr. Frost. Lieutenant Colonel Eric Cranford, the squadron
commander where the most recent crash occurred, stated, ``We
are looking at 750,000 flight hours of history making data-
driven decisions,'' and so, what we are looking for is more
transparency in terms of this data. We want to know what you
all are finding out from it because transparency equals
heightened scrutiny, and we need the heightened scrutiny right
now as we have lost 20 service members in 1 year. So, Mr. Belk,
your job is to ensure the readiness of the total force. So,
where does the fault lie for the mission readiness failures
that GAO identified, and will you take responsibility for
addressing them?
Mr. Belk. So, Congressman, I can assure you that the
Department, at every echelon and every level, takes very
seriously matters of accountability upon understanding the
facts and circumstances around a particular event and then
what, if any, steps need to be taken to either hold
organizations or individuals accountable for errors or actions
that need to be held accountable for. So, upon understanding
those circumstances and learning those events, you have my
commitment that we will continue to do those things that need
to ensure that accountability is meted out and addressed upon
learning about the specifics in these instances.
I think also, as Admiral Chebi alluded to, some of these
investigations remain open. But what I can assure you is, as
those close out, we will be in a position to maximize the
amount of transparency about the information that we learn from
those investigations to this committee and elsewhere within the
Congress. Thank you.
Mr. Frost. Thank you, because the GAO report that found
that 26 different military aircraft did not meet the readiness
goals in any of the years that they were studied is of cause of
great concern. We do not want to be in the same place a few
years from now with a different aircraft with 20 new service
members who lost their lives during a training mission. Thank
you so much, and I yield back.
Mr. Grothman. Mr. Biggs?
Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding this
committee, and I acknowledge Gold Star families who are here
today. Thank you for being here. I appreciate you, and I am
sorry that this is what brings us together. With witnesses,
this is just a little thing. You do not need to thank me for
every question. I do not think you mean it, and I think it is
obsequious, so let us not play that game. So, let us just get
right to it.
Mr. Belk, GAO, and I am going to dovetail what Mr. Frost
said just a second ago, reported in 2022 that only 52 percent
of Marine V-22s are ready to fly. Fifty-two percent. Why were
only half of Marine Ospreys mission capable?
Mr. Belk. Congressman, I would defer that question to
Admiral Chebi, who I believe will have more specific details to
share.
Mr. Biggs. Admiral?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, for the readiness of all the platforms
under NAVAIR, a couple of years ago we started a journey, and
we started it with the F-18.
Mr. Biggs. So, we are talking about the Osprey. We are
talking about 2022. I do not need a long, drawn-out history. We
only have 5 minutes. Please make your answer brief, concise,
but accurate.
Mr. Chebi. There are manning and training aspects and
readiness aspects with the V-22 that keep the readiness levels
where it is at the 50 percent that you quoted. There are
actions in place today, and we are leveraging the learning we
have had from all of our other platforms to increase the
readiness levels across all of the type model service across
naval aviation. We are on a good path. We will get there with
V-22.
Mr. Biggs. Mr. Belk, how often has the V-22 been grounded?
Mr. Belk. Congressman, I would defer again to Admiral
Chebi.
Mr. Biggs. Admiral?
Mr. Chebi. Sure. In the last 2 1/2 years I have been here,
I have grounded the V-22, from my recollection, at least 2
times. I am sorry, 3 times.
Mr. Biggs. Three times. For how long? What is the extent to
the period of being grounded?
Mr. Chebi. Groundings can go from a day to what happened
after the November 2023 incident where it was 3 to 4 months
that they were grounded.
Mr. Biggs. So, what is the total of the last 2 1/2 years, 3
times grounded, how long? Four months? Five months?
Mr. Chebi. Four to five months, yes, sir.
Mr. Biggs. And you were talking about the safety
investigation, Mr. Belk and Admiral, that the Chairman was
asking about. And I did not hear a commitment that you would
give us access to the safety investigation results, Mr. Belk,
and I would like to know if you will commit to give that access
to members of this committee.
Mr. Belk. Congressman, it remains important to protect the
safety privilege for those who participate in those safety
investigations, to protect those investigations and ensure that
the members who participate in them have the maximum amount of
opportunity to know that the information that they provide in
those safety investigations will remain confidential and not
for further disclosure.
Mr. Biggs. So, you are telling us you are not going to
allow members of this committee to have access to the results?
Mr. Belk. Congressman, we will continue to maximize the
fullest transparency possible on the information contained in
those investigations.
Mr. Biggs. So, here is the deal. You do not want to give us
full transparency. You are going to give us whatever you
managed transparency, but you want the money from the taxpayer
to pay for this. You understand that that is ironic, and I do
not mean to be disrespectful, but that is disrespectful to this
body. It is our obligation to oversee. That is why you are
here, and you do not want to give us full access.
I get it. You think somebody up here is going to leak, but
the bottom line is you need to be held accountable. We need to
see because we need to know what is going to happen next with
the program because we are concerned about mission capability.
We are concerned about the men and women, the personnel who
operate, maintain, work on these aircraft. And so, when you
tell us within range we will let you see some of it, it is
disrespectful, and it makes me wonder how we are going to get
the information, how will we make the policies that we need to
make.
Admiral, when is the last time a comprehensive review was
done across this platform?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, I am not aware of a previous comprehensive
review on the V-22 Program.
Mr. Biggs. And is that normal not to do a comprehensive
review?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, this is the first comprehensive review that
I have initiated since my 2 years at NAVAIR. Again, the purpose
and intent is to improve our outcomes across safety,
affordability, and availability of this platform by
holistically looking and proactively looking at all aspects of
the program across manning, training, and equipment, so we can
improve the outcomes there.
Mr. Biggs. So, it has never been done before and you are
doing it now. We understand why you are doing it now because
there is some apparent real problems. Mr. Belk, can you provide
us with a breakdown of the $134.5--billion lifecycle cost of
the V-22 Program?
Mr. Belk. Congressman, I cannot, but I would be more than
happy to take that back and get you the answer.
Mr. Biggs. I would appreciate it.
Mr. Biggs. I actually have additional questions. My time
has long expired, but I would, again, Mr. Belk, urge you all to
give us access to the safety investigations. I think it is
important for us to be able to make policy that way, and with
that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield.
Mr. Grothman. Thank you. Mr. Lynch?
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
witnesses for being here to help the committee with its work. I
especially want to thank the Gold Star families who are in the
audience here today. It is really, really important that you
are here. I hope you realize that it is not only a
demonstration of loyalty and love for your loved ones, but it
is also important to others who serve and who may be put in an
equally risky situation as your loved ones. So, I thank you
doubly for you being here today.
Just to make sure we all understand, in March 2022, a
Marine Corps V-22 Osprey assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor
Squadron 261 crashed during a training flight in Norway,
killing four Marines. In June 2022, five U.S. Marines from Camp
Pendleton were killed during a routine flight operation in
California. In August 2023, three marines from Marine
Rotational Force Darwin, a force that I traveled to Darwin,
Australia, and met with them, they were killed in an Osprey
crash in Australia. And in November 2023, a U.S. Air Force
Osprey carrying eight airmen assigned to Yokota Air Base in
Kadena Air Base crashed off the southern coast of Japan during
a routine training mission, killing all eight service members
on board.
Look, I understand the value of this aircraft. I understand
especially the many CODELs I have done to Africa, the ability
to what the few landing areas where we have there, few
airfields that we have here, the ability for a rotor landing, I
understand that, and the need to move personnel quickly, but
this repeated drumbeat of fatalities is totally unacceptable.
And look, the lives of our young men and women that are
perishing on this aircraft have long passed the level of which
a comprehensive review should have been instituted. I am
embarrassed. I am embarrassed as a member of this committee
that this is the first comprehensive review we have done, given
the fact that since the year 2000, we have had 54 U.S. service
members killed and many, many more injured because of the
structural deficiencies in this aircraft.
Mr. Kurtz, you mentioned earlier that we have a rework
being done on the clutch--I think it is the sprag clutch on
this aircraft--and that it might be ready for deployment by
mid-2025. Is that correct?
Mr. Kurtz. Yes, sir. I said mid-2025, somewhere between the
mid period of 2025 and the third quarter of that fiscal year.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Lynch. Admiral Chebi, let us think about this entire
program. What do you think the consequences are going to be if
we have a V-22 go down and we lose more brave Marines or our
airmen between now and the time when Mr. Kurtz indicates that
we might have this clutch situation figured out and deployed?
Your whole program is done. It is done. If another Osprey goes
down, we are done. This program is done. So, why do we not
ground this now, do not allow any other brave marine or airmen
to go down in one of these aircraft? Ground them now. We will
bite the bullet for the next year or so until we get this
clutch figured out, but we have already had too much carnage.
We have already lost too many good men and women that they have
joined for all the right reasons to serve their country and
then we have failed them by not providing them with safe
aircraft. I do not believe this aircraft is safe.
Nothing you have told me today leads me to believe that. I
think it is still very iffy situation. I think you have
conceded that fact, so it is crazy to put more of our young men
and women at risk. And I am asking you to ground this aircraft
until we get the clutch figured out, and we will find
alternative measures to service the needs that we have that
this aircraft was serving.
So, I know my time has expired. I will yield back. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Mr. Sessions?
Mr. Sessions. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman,
I want to thank you for having not only this hearing, but our
colleagues that are engaging, I think, properly and
professionally in this manner.
Some conversation today has found itself where we are
talking about this aircraft, presumptuously one could draw a
conclusion it is dangerous. I think it is a 10-year average
because we went back to 1992 a few minutes ago. If we just go
back 10 years now, the 10-year average for mishaps is fewer
than F-18s, F-35s, and Stallion CH-53E. Is that correct,
Admiral?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, I do not have that data in front of me.
Mr. Sessions. OK. That is fair. That is fair. Do you
believe that it is higher than other averages in aircraft that
are flown by the United States Military?
Mr. Chebi. So, the data that I have in front of me, the
overall mishap rate for the V-22 across the three services in
Japan is at 4.1 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours, which is
above the average rate of our other platforms across the
military services on average.
Mr. Sessions. Is that a 10-year or what figure is that? I
am sorry, I am referring to a 10-year. Mine shows 3.28 per
100,000 hours, but----
Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sessions [continuing]. I am going to take your average,
not mine.
Mr. Chebi. For the Marine Corps, for the 10-year, the
mishap rate is 3.29.
Mr. Sessions. OK.
Mr. Chebi. Again, from my position and my authorities, my
objective is to look across all of our platforms and to
proactively manage those to reduce the risk of all of our
platforms. So, I understand the characterization or the
comparison to other platforms. I want all of them to go lower.
Mr. Sessions. Yes, sir, and my point is there might be
other aircraft we need to look at also.
Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir. So, we are----
Mr. Sessions. That would be my point, and so we tend to,
whether it is right, wrong, or indifferent, to talk about
averages. The families that are sitting here are not averages.
They are reality, and we all do agree with your assessment of
what your job is and what you are attempting to do. I also look
at how important the Osprey is. I have been on one downrange in
Kuwait. I know that it probably is way preferred than other
types of aircraft that do not have the same ability that it
does, including in Afghanistan, some other places with quicker
retrieval of people who might be injured, that it saves lives
also.
My point is this, that as we look at this, I think a
reality check needs to be done, and I am not sure. Have we
decided it is a clutch problem? Have we decided it is a
training problem? Something has happened in the last year as
Congressman Perry has talked about. Something is happening. We
did not know about the F-35. You remember they were grounded
because there was some reassessment made. I do not know whether
it was a light or whether it was a fixture or whether it was
training, but someone was missing that technical advantage.
The question that I would ask you now, in your opinion,
just your opinion, is it the machine or is it training? And I
am not asking you to out anybody. I am just saying you have the
facts of the case ahead of you, and I believe that it has been,
in the past, the training, and that is why I think the numbers
point to what they do. It is not the Navy's fault. It is not
the people's fault. It is we are dealing with newer people who
are operating in our aircraft with the lack of time in the
aircraft, lack of hours, or is it that, and that fits under the
training. No, maybe it fits under operational need.
We need to go, and we have to go, and we got to go with the
people that we have got, just like what Mr. Perry brought up
about the aircraft that are available for service today. I
cannot imagine some crew chief or some commander saying, well,
we know that is not ready to go, but go anyway. But maybe that
happens. So, I hope that all of these are some conclusion that
you are able to draw and at least come back to our young
Chairman and offer an explanation because, I think it is
terribly important that we have this hearing today. I think it
is terribly important that the families that are involved in
this and who have taken their time for their loved one, but
also for others that are in the family, and I do not mean their
family. I mean the Navy family, the military families that are
here. And I would like to see that you would zero in on and at
least give this Subcommittee an opportunity to know we have
zeroed in, we think that here are the contributing factors, if
not the answer.
So, I want to thank all three of you for your service
today. I would like to followup with you and to find out in
writing, yes, Congressman Sessions, Chairman, here is really
the answer, we are zeroing in on the following factors that we
think are important because you have already heard, if there is
one more crash, someone believes we will quit using this. I
think it is a workhorse that we need. I would like for us not
to give up on the Osprey, but we do need to and you have that
responsibility to give us insight into what you are zeroing in
on as the conditions by which each are going down.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
Mr. Grothman. Thank you. Ms. Porter?
Ms. Porter. The DOD plans to buy 2,456 F-35s, and the F-35
is one of the most egregious boondoggles in the history of the
Pentagon, but if we are going to buy more of those planes, we
should at least make sure that they work. Mr. Belk, if an F-35
engine were to break down at sea on an aircraft carrier, what
aircraft would the Navy use to transport that F-35 engine
ashore to be fixed?
Mr. Belk. So, I genuinely mean thank you for the question
because I do believe in this Committee's oversight
responsibilities, and I appreciate the opportunity to thank you
for that.
Ms. Porter. Mr. Belk, come on. What plane would the Navy
use to transport the broken F-35 engine?
Mr. Belk. Congresswoman, I do not know the answer. I am
happy to take it back and get----
Ms. Porter. Thank you. Vice Admiral Chebi, do you know the
answer?
Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, the question of what aircraft the V-22
was designed is one of the requirements for the CMV-22 to----
Ms. Porter. OK. So, the CMV-22 would be used. It is
essentially one of the Navy's two kind of tow trucks. Can the
C-2, the other kind of tow truck that the Navy flies, can it
transport an F-35 engine?
Mr. Chebi. To my knowledge, a C-2 cannot transport F-35
engine. In that case, we would put additional spares on the
aircraft carrier, if we have to have it supported with a C-2.
So, that is the----
Ms. Porter. OK. You would put additional spares. OK. I am
going to followup on that. So, the C-2 cannot pick up the F-35
engine because the engine is too large, so we would use the
CMV-22. So, the military did not have the common sense to make
F-35 engines transportable by all of the tow trucks it owns, so
we are going to use only one of them, the CMV-22. So, Admiral
Chebi, why did you not see this coming? Why did you buy F-35s
that your infrastructure cannot handle?
Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, I am here as the NAVAIR commander from an
airworthiness perspective to talk about the safety of the V-22.
I am going to have to direct that question back to the
appropriate personnel to address the question.
Ms. Porter. Mr. Belk?
Mr. Belk. Congresswoman, I will have to take that back to
the Department.
Ms. Porter. So, you do not know why you bought F-35s for
billions of dollars, and you do not have any airplanes as we
are about to see, that can actually pick up the broken engine
and fix it. So, on the CMV-22, which is the one plane that we
can use to go get this broken engine, let us say that the F-35
engine broke down in the South China Sea while F-35s are
engaged in securing our national interests from an increasingly
assertive China. Do you know how far it would be to a fully
capable maintenance depot, Mr. Belk?
Mr. Belk. Congresswoman, I do not.
Ms. Porter. Vice Admiral Chebi?
Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, can you clarify your question, please?
Ms. Porter. An F-35 engine is broken down on an aircraft
carrier in the South China Sea. How far is it to get that F-35
engine to a place where we can fix it?
Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, I am going to have to direct you to the
F-35 Joint Program Office to kind of answer that question.
Ms. Porter. OK. It is 7,200 miles to a small facility in
Australia and 14,500 miles to a full-scale U.S. facility. And I
am sure the CMV-22 would not fly all that distance, but it
needs to be able to pick up the engine and get it to the next
airport where it can then be flown for repair. Admiral Chebi,
how often is the CMV-22 mission capable?
Mr. Chebi. The overall mission capable rate, I do not have
that in front of me. I am not sure. Gary, if you have----
Ms. Porter. Mr. Kurtz?
Mr. Kurtz. I do not have that information in front of me.
Ms. Porter. Mr. Belk?
Mr. Belk. Ma'am, I do not have that information.
Ms. Porter. Guys, you are here for a hearing on this very
aircraft. Now, you have been deferring on the F-35, but the
CMV-22 is what we are talking about here today. It is the
Navy's version of the Osprey. So, the data I have seen suggests
that it can only fly 44 percent of the time. It costs $85
million per aircraft, and it can fly 44 percent of the time.
That is absolutely absurd. So, if the military has made fixing
an F-35 engine that hard for itself surely you have, as you
mentioned, Admiral Chebi, spare engines that you can swap in
when something goes wrong. Mr. Belk, has the DOD purchased
spare F-35 engines?
Mr. Belk. Ma'am, I do not know the answer.
Ms. Porter. No, they have not, so it is going to be tough
to put those on the aircraft carrier, Admiral Chebi, when you
do not have any. So, the only plan we have when an F-35 engine
breaks down is to fly it thousands of miles, but to do that,
the plane only works part of the time. Mr. Belk, how long is
the CMV-22 allowed to fly from the nearest airport?
Mr. Belk. Ma'am, I defer that to Admiral Chebi.
Ms. Porter. Admiral Chebi?
Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, the return to flight criteria was based
on the data----
Ms. Porter. All right, Admiral Chebi, 30 minutes. So often
the CMV-22 does not work more than half the time. If it works,
it is only allowed to fly 30 minutes from an airport, but these
failures both leave the F-35 with broken engines stranded on
aircraft carriers, and get this. We are still buying more of
these incredibly expensive F-35 jets, and we are doing that
knowing that we cannot fix those engines because the CMV-22 is
a disaster. And by the way, you all want to buy more of those,
too.
Admiral Chebi, do you stand by this state of affairs? Would
you like to blame Mr. Belk or Mr. Kurtz?
Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, the F-35 Charlie readiness levels aboard
aircraft carriers is above 90 percent.
Ms. Porter. OK. Ten percent of the time it is not ready,
and the engine might be part of it. I am asking you, should we
spend billions of dollars on F-35s that you cannot repair?
Mr. Chebi. Ma'am, my objective as the NAVAIR commander is
to make sure I deliver the warfighting capability the fleet
needs to win at a cost we can afford. The service----
Ms. Porter. OK. Admiral Chebi, my objective as a U.S.
Congress person is to make sure that our tax dollars are being
spent to actually keep us safe, not line the pockets of defense
contractors for boondoggles. I yield back.
Mr. Grothman. Thank you. Mr. Perry?
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, it is good
to see you here. Thank you very much.
Got some questions for you. I guess I will start with you,
Admiral Chebi, and I think I understand the limitations of what
you can answer. However, I am concerned that you do not know
the OR rate. I would think that anybody in your position would
know the OR rate of every single aircraft within your command
purview, but the V-22, as I understand, was added to the Marine
Helicopter Squadron, HMX-1, to support the Presidential
operations, heliborne operations, but the aircraft does not
carry the President. Is there some reason that we do not know
about or is there something obvious that we should know about
that we will carry the President's support staff, but not the
President?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, from my position as airworthiness, the
aircraft has been return-to-flight with controls in place. The
decision of who flies on what airplanes is beyond my control.
Mr. Perry. So, I understand maybe you did not make the
decision, but do you know why it is? Like, we will fly the
Presidential support staff, reporters, staff members, equipment
in a V-22, but we will not fly the President in one, which
would limit because V-22 is pretty fast compared to what the
President is in. Who makes that decision, and I am just asking,
do you know why it is that? Maybe Mr. Belk knows. Does anybody
know on the panel?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, I do not know.
Mr. Perry. Anybody else? OK.
Mr. Belk. Congressman, I do not know.
Mr. Perry. All right. I would love that answer if you can
get back to us with that.
Mr. Perry. Now, the gentlelady from California asked a lot
of questions about the F-35s engines and the V-22. It seems to
me, I look at the sling load capability, the 22, 15,000,
internal 20,000, and the F-35, I am going to be generous, I
think, because it says 3,750 is the weight of the engine, so
let us say 4,000 pounds. Does it cube out before it grows? OK.
So, the Admiral said it. What about sling? Do we not sling load
F-35 engines? Is there some policy not to sling load them?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, I am not aware. It does cube out, so that
is----
Mr. Perry. OK. So, I have got another question for you. You
know, all of us that flew various aircraft, we all know the CH-
53 is the only heavy lift helicopter in the inventory. Even
those who flew, like me, the 47, the 53 is it. I get it.
Admiral, I will give you that, but the sling capacity is
30,000. The 36,000-pound payload, does it cube out in a 53
also?
Mr. Chebi. Sir, I am going to hand that over to the PEO. I
am unaware.
Mr. Kurtz. Sir, I am unaware of the specific cube out, but
to your point, it does have that lift capacity as you have
described.
Mr. Perry. So, why are we not using 53s? You guys own them,
right? The Army does not have them while the Air Force has some
payloads, right? So, what is the problem? Is it interservice
rivalry that we cannot use a 53 in the Navy to move a jet
engine? What is happening? I am just asking. I do not know.
Mr. Chebi. Sir, I will just answer. You are asking the
equivalent of the FAA authority----
Mr. Perry. Yes.
Mr. Chebi [continuing]. What the operational commanders are
doing with their assets. That is beyond the scope of our
responsibility.
Mr. Perry. OK. Fair enough. It is beyond your scope. And I
understand, sir, you take orders. Yours is not to question why.
I get it. But for the sake of those who have died, and their
families are sitting here behind you, that signed up, wanted to
go support and defend their country and everything we believe
in, and probably looked at the Osprey and said this thing is
awesome, man, I cannot wait to get in it, but there was a lot
of us that looked at and said, Holy mother of God, how is this
thing going to stay together in flight?
And when those nacelles start rotating after the whole wing
has been put back to center and all the parts that have to come
back together, and what Mr. Lynch was talking about, sprag
clutches that have to let go when one engine quits, so that you
can get the thing on the ground and stay alive. There are a lot
of concerns. And for the sake of we got to retire the 46, we
cannot bring the 22 online before it is ready to go because,
well, we got to get rid of the 46 and we got a lot of money
invested in this thing and the train is rolling. People's lives
are at stake and have been lost.
I wonder why the Navy just will not buy 47s. Forty-seven
was a big 46, right? Forty-six is, we call it, a baby Chinook.
I know you would probably reverse to that, and I understand
why, but that is what we called it, but the 47 is highly
capable. It is not as fast as an Osprey, but nothing is as fast
as an Osprey in the vertical arena because of the mechanics of
it. But, when you got to get engines on the deck and keep
people alive, use the damn thing that works, and the V-22 has
got obvious problems, evidenced by the people sitting behind
you, which leads me to my next and final question.
The Army is preparing to launch the V-280 Valor Program,
and you know, I am talking about the Army program here, to
replace the Black Hawk fleet. Now, we have learned a lot with
the V-22, but apparently we have not learned enough. Whether it
is like my good friend from Texas says, training or whether it
is the mechanics; service members are dying, which is
unacceptable. It is bad enough they die in combat, but it is
unacceptable that they die either due to the lack of training,
complexity of the aircraft, or the aircraft itself. What
lessons can any one of you tell us that we have learned on the
22 that we are not going to replicate on the 280?
Mr. Kurtz. Sir, certainly, as you referenced, it is an Army
program. It is not a program that I have insight into with
regards to my portfolio, so I cannot speak to where we are with
regards to the V-280 and what the Army is currently doing at
this time.
Mr. Perry. What is the 22 going to be replaced with?
Mr. Kurtz. Sir, I am not aware of at this point----
Mr. Perry. Admiral?
Mr. Kurtz [continuing]. At this time the service and plans
for replacement of the V-22.
Mr. Chebi. Yes, sir. The CMV-22 is halfway through the
production run, so it is a brand new aircraft. I am not sure
any plans right now are in place to replace the CMV-22.
Mr. Perry. Well, I will say this, Mr. Chairman, and then I
will yield back, and it is expensive halfway through the
lifecycle, but if we cannot get it right, at some point, we
have to acknowledge we just cannot get it right. This thing
should not fly because it is too dangerous. We got the concept,
we would love to do it, it is awesome to look at. When it is
working right, it is awesome, but it is not working right
enough to accept.
And there are other acceptable alternatives, and oh my god,
even though we are in the Navy, we will put a different coat of
paint on this damn thing and call it some kind of Navy term and
fly this 47 instead, or maybe even better, 53 highly capable in
the Navy's program. Let us use that and just say, look, we are
not going to get there quite as fast because we do not have an
Osprey, but we are going to get there alive, which is really
damn important to the mission. And it is really important to
the people that want to serve in the United States uniform
services do their service, protect their country, but then come
home safely to their families.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield.
Mr. Grothman. Thank you. It looks like we have gone through
everyone here, so I will now yield to Ranking Member Garcia for
your closing remarks.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, again. Thank you to our witnesses
for being here and for your service.
I think just a couple of things. First, I mean, I think it
is clear that our witnesses, and again, I think you believe
that there is use and an important mission for the V-22, and
obviously, you are working trying to rectify the concerns and
certainly assess opportunities to make the V-22, the safest
possible vehicle, is clear from your testimony. And so, I do
appreciate and I thank you for that.
It is also obviously a decision that had been made in
keeping the Osprey in use even during this period of time where
we are still looking at trying to make it even safer. It is a
decision that you stand behind and that you have been vocal
about here today, so I do want to thank you for that.
But I just want to also just reiterate some of the concern
that has been shared by my colleagues. I think clearly, those
of us here on this Subcommittee, I think many of us spoke to
our concerns about the V-22, about its safety, certainly about
its use during this time where we are trying to make it even
safer and certainly, about not being having complete access to
all the safety information that members of the Subcommittee
would like to have. And so, I just want to highlight those real
concerns.
This is an important function of this body to do this
oversight and to work with all of you to have the absolute
safest possible of vehicles and aircraft that we can have. And
so, I want to urge the DOD and all of our partners to really
work with us on ensuring that we have all the information that
we need to make the decision and the oversight that we are
required to do. I also just want to add as well that I think
the difference of the rate of discrepancy that exist between
the Air Force and the Marines, I think is a real problem, and I
think that is something that we deserve answers on, and I think
that it would be important to have some followup as to why that
difference exists in the rate of accidents. And I think that is
something we discussed earlier and I would like to get more
answers on that.
Finally, to the families, I really appreciate you all being
here. I know how probably hard this is also for all of you to
sit through. But I also know that not only do you want to honor
your loved ones, but you also want a strong military that keeps
every single person that serves safe, and I really appreciate
that, so thank you all for being here. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Grothman. OK. I would like to thank the families for
being here again today. You being here is very important
because I do not even want to drop this thing today. There were
a surprising number of questions that I felt you guys did not
have answers to. Mr. Garcia brings up the difference between
accidents rates in the Marines, in the Air Force, and I do not
see how we can really adequately address this unless we have a
look at those safety investigations. So, we are going to do a
followup in some fashion because I think we have to see that.
You are not the first military group that has been before us.
We have had the military before us in the past, and I always
feel it should be a little more transparent. The Department of
Defense has not done an audit, which is not your fault, in
something like 30 years, which is kind of an insult to
Congress. But in any event, I think we have established that we
could get some more information.
I mean, whenever I hear about one of these things going
down, as have been intermittently over the last 30 years now, I
guess, it always bothers me because it is one thing to lose
somebody in combat. But to lose somebody in a non-combat
situation should be almost inexcusable, and it is something
that you would never see in the private sector. I realized what
your guys are doing is a lot more technical, a lot more
difficult than that, but nevertheless, it always bothers me,
and I think there is something wrong with it. And it would
bother me a lot more if I was one of the folks sitting there
behind you.
So, I will assure you folks that we are not going to let
this matter drop. For whatever reason, they are not giving us
the results of the safety investigations, and staff has
contacted them before and they always turn them down on things
that I think we should get. So, the ranking member and I are
not going to let that drop.
And with that, I will have to say for this, without
objection, all members have 5 legislative days within which to
submit materials and additional written questions for the
witnesses, which will be forwarded to the witnesses.
Mr. Grothman. If there is no further business, without
objection, the Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]