[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


 
               GUARDIANS  OF  THE  SEA:  EXAMINING  COAST  
                 GUARD EFFORTS IN DRUG ENFORCEMENT, ILLE- 
                 GAL MIGRATION, AND IUU FISHING

=======================================================================

                                (118-33)

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                           TRANSPORTATION AND  
                             INFRASTRUCTURE 
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                              __________

                           NOVEMBER 14, 2023
                               _________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
             
             
             
             
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    Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
    transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation 
                                 -------

                  U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 

55-982 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2024 













             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                    Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
                Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking Member
                
   Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford,         Eleanor Holmes Norton,              
     Arkansas			        District of Columbia            
   Daniel Webster, Florida	      Grace F. Napolitano, California   
   Thomas Massie, Kentucky	      Steve Cohen, Tennessee            
   Scott Perry, Pennsylvania	      John Garamendi, California        
   Georgiaian Babin, Texas	      Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr.,   
   Garret Graves, Louisiana	      Andre Carson, Indiana             
   David Rouzer, North Carolina	      Dina Titus, Nevada                
   Mike Bost, Illinois		      Jared Huffman, California         
   Doug LaMalfa, California	      Julia Brownley, California        
   Bruce Westerman, Arkansas	      Frederica S. Wilson, Florida      
   Brian J. Mast, Florida	      Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey  
   Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,	      Mark DeSaulnier, California       
     Puerto Rico		      Salud O. Carbajal, California     
   Pete Stauber, Minnesota	      Greg Stanton, Arizona,            
   Tim Burchett, Tennessee		Vice Ranking Member             
   Dusty Johnson, South Dakota	      Colin Z. Allred, Texas            
   Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,    Sharice Davids, Kansas            
     Vice Chairman		      Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois
   Troy E. Nehls, Texas		      Chris Pappas, New Hampshire       
   Lance Gooden, Texas                Seth Moulton, Massachusetts       
   Tracey Mann, Kansas	              Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts   
   Burgess Owens, Utah	              Marilyn Strickland, Washington    
   Rudy Yakym III, Indiana	      Troy A. Carter, Louisiana         
   Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon	      Patrick Ryan, New York            
   Chuck Edwards, North Carolina      Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska      
   Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey    Robert Menendez, New Jersey       
   Anthony D'Esposito, New York	      Val T. Hoyle, Oregon              
   Eric Burlison, Missouri	      Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio  
   John James, Michigan               Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan       
   Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin	      Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina  
   Brandon Williams, New York	      
   Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
   Mike Collins, Georgia
   Mike Ezell, Mississippi
   John S. Duarte, California
   Aaron Bean, Florida
                                        
                                ------                                 

        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

                   Daniel Webster, Florida, Chairman
             Salud O. Carbajal, California, Ranking Member 
             
Brian Babin, Texas                   John Garamendi, California
Brian J. Mast, Florida               Chris Pappas, New Hampshire
Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,            Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts
  Puerto Rico                        Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska
Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey       Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan,
Mike Ezell, Mississippi, Vice          Vice Ranking Member
  Chairman                           Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio)
Aaron Bean, Florida                    
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)














                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
  Maritime Transportation, opening statement.....................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................     4
Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast 
  Guard and Maritime Transportation, opening statement...........     5
    Prepared statement...........................................     6

                               WITNESSES

Rear Admiral Jo-Ann F. Burdian, Assistant Commandant for Response 
  Policy (CG-5R), U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement...............     8
    Prepared statement...........................................     9
Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. 
  Government Accountability Office, oral statement...............    13
    Prepared statement...........................................    15
Aaron C. Davenport, Associate Director, Infrastructure, 
  Immigration, and Security Operations Program, RAND Corporation, 
  oral statement.................................................    25
    Prepared statement...........................................    27
Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, Ph.D., Natural Resources Policy Analyst, 
  Congressional Research Service, oral statement.................    31
    Prepared statement...........................................    32

                                APPENDIX

Questions to Rear Admiral Jo-Ann F. Burdian, Assistant Commandant 
  for Response Policy (CG-5R), U.S. Coast Guard, from:
    Hon. Mike Ezell..............................................    53
    Hon. Jared Huffman...........................................    55

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                            November 9, 2023

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Guardians of the Sea: 
Examining Coast Guard Efforts in Drug Enforcement, Illegal 
Migration, and IUU Fishing''
_______________________________________________________________________


                               I. PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 
will meet on November 14, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. ET in 2167 of the 
Rayburn House Office Building to receive testimony at a hearing 
entitled ``Guardians of the Sea: Examining Coast Guard Efforts 
in Drug Enforcement, Illegal Migration, and IUU Fishing.'' 
Members will examine the United States Coast Guard's (Coast 
Guard) law enforcement missions. The hearing will focus on the 
Coast Guard's efforts to interdict the illegal entry of drugs 
and migrants along the maritime border and deter illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. At the hearing, 
Members will receive testimony from the Coast Guard, the 
Government Accountability Office, the RAND Corporation, and the 
Congressional Research Service.

                             II. BACKGROUND

    The Coast Guard is uniquely positioned as the only military 
service capable of performing maritime law enforcement 
operations. Under its authorities, the Coast Guard is actively 
engaged in missions pertaining to drug interdiction, migrant 
interdiction, and the protection of natural resources from 
malign activity, like IUU fishing.\1\ It performs these mission 
sets within the territorial waters and exclusive economic zone 
of the United States, on the high seas, and in foreign 
territorial waters when operating under agreements with allies 
and partner nations.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See 14 U.S.C. Sec. 522.
    \2\ See United States Coast Guard, Force Laydown, available at 
https://www.uscg.mil/
About/Force-Laydown/
#::text=The%20Coast%20Guard%20also%20has,assets%2C%20and%20
deployable%20specialized%20forces.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    From 2018 to 2022, the Coast Guard intercepted and seized 
888 metric tons of cocaine, worth approximately $25.76 
billion.\3\ The Service also detained 2,776 drug smugglers for 
prosecution.\4\ More recently, the Coast Guard seized 11,600 
pounds of cocaine valued at $158 million in July 2023 and 
12,100 pounds of cocaine valued at $160 million in September 
2023.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ See Securing America's Maritime Border--Challenges and 
Solutions: Hearing before the Transp. and Maritime Security Subcomm. of 
the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 118th Cong. (March 23, 2023) 
(statement of Rear Admiral Jo-Ann F. Burdian, United States Coast 
Guard).
    \4\ Id.
    \5\ See USCG District 11 Public Affairs, Coast Guard crew offloads 
more than $158 million worth of narcotics in San Diego (July 17, 2023), 
available at https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/3460718/
photos-available-coast-guard-crew-offloads-more-than-158-million-worth-
of-narco/; see also Coast Guard Seventh District, Coast Guard offloads 
more than $160 million in illegal narcotics (September 20, 2023), 
available at https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/3532372/
coast-guard-offloads-more-than-160-million-in-illegal-narcotics/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to drug seizures, one of the Coast Guard's most 
important roles in defending the homeland is countering illegal 
maritime migrations. A significant problem area for illegal 
maritime migration is the Caribbean. During fiscal year (FY) 
2022, the Coast Guard interdicted 12,000 Haitian and Cuban 
migrants alone.\6\ This number is expected to grow in FY 2023 
as the Coast Guard continues to surge assets to the Caribbean 
in response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ See Commander Michael Feltovic and Lieutenant Commander Robert 
O'Donnell, Coast Guard Migrant Interdiction Operations Are in a State 
of Emergency (February 2023), available at https://www.usni.org/
magazines/proceedings/2023/february/coast-guard-migrant-interdiction-
operations-are-state-emergency [hereinafter Feltovic].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, the Coast Guard's ability to interdict bad actors 
and enforce local and international laws has made it an 
important tool in countering Chinese malign and grey-zone 
activity in the Indo-Pacific, such as IUU fishing. The Coast 
Guard is the only agency explicitly referenced by name in the 
2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, cementing the importance of Coast 
Guard abilities and authorities in supporting United States 
National security interests.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy, (Feb. 2022), 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/
U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     III. DRUG/MIGRANT INTERDICTION

    The Coast Guard is the lead and only Federal maritime law 
enforcement agency with the authority and capability to enforce 
National and international law on the high seas, including for 
both drug and migrant interdiction operations.\8\ The Coast 
Guard is constrained in conducting these missions by limited 
assets.\9\ Drug and migrant source countries are often hundreds 
of miles away from United States coastlines, requiring 
detection, monitoring, and efforts to occur across vast 
expanses of time and distance. While the Coast Guard attempts 
to use historic trends, intelligence, and advanced monitoring 
technologies to maximize the deployment of its assets, it is 
constantly forced to prioritize certain vectors and lapse 
coverage for others.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ See Congressional Research Service, International Drug Control 
Policy: Background and U.S. Response, 24 (2015), available at https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34543/24.
    \9\ See U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-23-106695, Maritime 
Security: Coast Guard and CBP Efforts To Address Prior GAO 
Recommendations on Asset and Workforce Needs (Mar. 23, 2023), available 
at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106695.pdf [hereinafter GAO 
Maritime Security].
    \10\ Id.; Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies 
for the Maritime Border: Testimony before the Senate Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Committee, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of 
Rear Admiral Peter J. Brown, USCG Assistant Commandant for Response 
Policy), available at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/07/15/written-
testimony-uscg-senate-committee-homeland-security-and-governmental-
affairs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

DRUG INTERDICTION

    Illicit maritime drug shipments are carried by 
noncommercial means, such as small ``go-fast'' vessels with 
multiple outboard engines, semisubmersible vessels, fishing 
vessels, and sailing vessels, as well as by commercial vessels, 
such as container ships.\11\ The majority of known maritime 
drug flow is conveyed via noncommercial means through the 
Western Hemisphere Transit Zone--the waters off the coasts of 
Central and South America and the Caribbean Sea.\12\ The Coast 
Guard uses cutters, boats, aircraft, and unmanned monitoring 
systems in a layered approach to combat drug cartels as they 
transport illicit drugs in the maritime domain.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ See United States Coast Guard Report to Congress: Counter-Drug 
Operations, (2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/uscg_-_counter-drug_operations.pdf [hereinafter Counter-
Drug Operations].
    \12\ Id.
    \13\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The objectives of Coast Guard drug interdiction efforts are 
to: (1) maintain a strong interdiction presence to deny 
smugglers access to maritime routes and deter trafficking 
activity; (2) strengthen ties with source and Transit Zone 
(Eastern Pacific and Caribbean) Nations to increase their 
willingness and ability to reduce the production and 
trafficking of illicit drugs within their sovereign boundaries, 
including territorial seas; and (3) support interagency and 
international efforts to combat drug smuggling through 
increased cooperation and coordination.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ See United States Coast Guard Report to Congress: Coast Guard 
Interdiction of Illicit Drugs in Transit Zones, (2022), (on file with 
Comm.) [hereinafter Transit Zones].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Coast Guard facilitates international maritime 
counternarcotics operations with partner nations that permit 
Coast Guard officers to stop, board, and search suspicious 
vessels.\15\ The United States government is party to 41 
maritime counterdrug bilateral agreements or operational 
procedures to coordinate detection, monitoring, interdiction, 
and apprehension activities.\16\ The Coast Guard's law 
enforcement, legal, and regulatory expertise are in high demand 
from Central American partners, whose navies more closely 
resemble the Coast Guard, focusing primarily on maritime law 
enforcement.\17\ Coast Guard personnel act as attaches, 
liaisons, maritime advisors, and drug interdiction specialists 
at embassies around the world.\18\ International training teams 
and deployed units provide training, engage in joint 
operations, and may even embark ship riders to facilitate 
enforcement.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Id.; United States Coast Guard, Partnerships and Stakeholders, 
available at https://www.uscg.mil/About/Partnerships/.
    \16\ See Counter-Drug Operations, supra note 11.
    \17\ Id.
    \18\ Id.
    \19\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Annually, the Coast Guard removes approximately ten percent 
of the cocaine flowing through maritime transit routes while 
indications show the majority of the remaining 90 percent is 
typically not intercepted before reaching the shore.\20\ Drug 
interdictions are prosecuted through multi-agency and multi-
national coordination. United States Southern Command, through 
the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), is 
responsible for cueing and detections, while the Coast Guard is 
the primary force provider of surface assets used as law 
enforcement platforms and presence.\21\ The Maritime Drug Law 
Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 70501-70507, and the Drug 
Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec.  2285, are 
the primary criminal statutes utilized in the counter-drug 
mission.\22\ These laws apply extraterritorially so that 
persons who are interdicted aboard suspected drug smuggling 
vessels in international waters may be prosecuted in the United 
States.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ See Transit Zones, supra note 14.
    \21\ Id.
    \22\ See Counter-Drug Operations, supra note 11.
    \23\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By leveraging its unique authorities and collaborating 
across United States agencies and with international partners, 
the Coast Guard prevents more cocaine from entering the United 
States than all other Federal agencies combined.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ See Transit Zones, supra note 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ILLEGAL MIGRATION

    In 2022, the Coast Guard saw one of the deadliest years for 
illegal migration in recent history when approximately 65 
people perished while trying to reach the United States.\25\ In 
2023, illegal maritime migration, and consequently Coast Guard 
interdictions, continue to reach increasingly high levels due 
to major economic and social turmoil unfolding in the Caribbean 
and South American countries.\26\ Overall, most maritime 
migration is illegal and can occur along hundreds of miles of 
coastline, which is impossible to continuously patrol. While 
there are several prevailing vectors of unauthorized maritime 
migration into the United States, maritime routes from Cuba, 
Haiti, and the Dominican Republic on the east coast and Mexico 
on the west coast have historically accounted for the highest 
annual interdiction attempts.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ See Nicole J. Groll, Operation Vigilant Sentry: Stopping 
Illegal Migration at Sea, (Jan. 27, 2023), available at https://
www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/3280774/operation-vigilant-
sentry-stopping-illegal-migration-at-sea/ [hereinafter Groll].
    \26\ Feltovic, supra note 6.
    \27\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Illegal maritime migration takes place over long expanses 
of water and is slow and hazardous.\28\ Maritime migration 
efforts are typically unorganized, utilizing homemade 
``rustic'' vessels like makeshift rafts constructed with debris 
and tarps, locally made sail freighters, or other modified 
modes of transportation engineered to float.\29\ These vessels 
are almost always severely overloaded with people. For example, 
a 50-foot sail freighter may have more than 200 migrants 
crammed onboard.\30\ The makeshift vessels are neither 
seaworthy nor safe, often incapable of withstanding heavy seas 
and sinking even in benign weather.\31\ For example, in 2004, a 
group of Cuban Nationals tried to sail to the United States in 
a 1959 Buick car fashioned into a boat when they were 
intercepted at sea by the Coast Guard.\32\ They have little to 
no navigation or lifesaving equipment.\33\ Accordingly, illegal 
maritime migration has both law enforcement and humanitarian 
assistance implications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Id.
    \29\ Id.
    \30\ Id.
    \31\ Id.
    \32\ Cubans sailing vintage car caught off Florida, Reuters, 
available at https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna4163593.
    \33\ Id.
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Figure 1. Cubans sailing vintage car caught off Florida.

    Individuals interdicted at sea are either repatriated to 
their country of origin or departure or brought to the United 
States to face prosecution.\34\ Many Coast Guard cutters 
operating off the Florida coast and in the Caribbean end up 
packed with migrants beyond their maximum capacity, because the 
continual stream of migration offers little opportunity for a 
Coast Guard cutter to leave the scene.\35\ Furthermore, Coast 
Guard cutters are not equipped with spaces to house hundreds of 
migrants for extended periods of time and have limited 
personnel available to monitor them while onboard.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Groll, supra note 24.
    \35\ Feltovic, supra note 6.
    \36\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

DRUG/MIGRANT INTERDICTION

    Undoubtedly, maritime drug trafficking and illegal 
migration are on the rise.\37\ The challenges associated with 
these Coast Guard missions are only increasing, due to limited 
Coast Guard assets and capacity.\38\ Despite this, the Coast 
Guard continues to be the Nation's primary maritime force to 
combat transnational criminal organizations engaging in illicit 
drug and migrant operations, secure maritime borders, and 
safeguard commerce throughout the Western Hemisphere.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ GAO Maritime Security, supra note 9.
    \38\ Id.
    \39\ Transit Zones, supra note 14.
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                            IV. IUU FISHING

    Illegal fishing encompasses fishing activities that 
contradict state, Federal, and international laws and 
regulations.\40\ Unreported fishing includes fishing activities 
that are not reported or misrepresented in contravention of 
relevant laws.\41\ Unregulated fishing refers to fishing 
activity undertaken by flagless vessels, or that occurs in 
areas outside of regulated fish stocks and outside of 
applicable laws and regulations to conserve living marine 
resources.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Nat'l Oceanic Atmospheric Admin., Understanding Illegal, 
Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, available at https://
www.fisheries.noaa.gov/insight/understanding-illegal-unreported-and-
unregulated-fishing
    \41\ Id.
    \42\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Twenty percent of fish caught around the world originate 
from IUU fishing, resulting in tens of billions of dollars in 
lost revenue to legal fishers, and harming the management of 
marine fish stocks.\43\ By virtue of its size, scale, and 
range, China is the largest IUU offender.\44\ China accounts 
for more than a third of the world's seafood production, and 
Chinese vessels make up nearly 40 percent of the world's 
distant-water fishing fleet.\45\ China's distant-water fishing 
fleet is subsidized by the Chinese Government, with an 
estimated $7.2 billion in subsidies going to the sector in 
2018.\46\ Chinese vessels are responsible for numerous IUU 
fishing violations, including fishing in other Nations' 
exclusive economic zones and incorrectly reporting fishing 
activity. Chinese vessels often operate in disputed territorial 
waters with competition over fishery resources driving some of 
the disputes.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Coast Guard, IUU Fishing, available at https://www.uscg.mil/
iuufishing/.
    \44\ Bruce Vaugh & Ben Dolven, Cong. Rsch Serv. (R47065) China's 
Role in the Exploitation of Global Fisheries: Issues for Congress, 
(Apr. 12, 2022) available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/R/R47065.
    \45\ Id.
    \46\ Id.
    \47\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Coast Guard monitors and works to mitigate illegal 
fishing through domestic efforts like the United States 
Interagency Working Group where the Coast Guard is one of 21 
member agencies and international efforts working with partner 
nations in the Indo-Pacific through coordination groups, 
multinational enforcement operations, and bilateral 
agreements.\48\ The United States Interagency Working Group was 
established in the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92), which directed additional 
efforts to combat IUU fishing, including coordination with 
international organizations, diplomatic engagement, and support 
to improve law enforcement capabilities in priority 
regions.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ See Feltovic, supra note 6.
    \49\ See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, 
Pub. L. No. 116-92, 133 Stat. 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Earlier this year, the National Academy of Sciences 
released an assessment on emerging issues that require Coast 
Guard action. The report notes that as illegal fishing 
increases, the Coast Guard will need to improve its data 
collection, work with non-governmental organizations and deploy 
assets to areas where they will be most effective.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ See Nat'l Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 
Coast Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging Challenges and 
Statutory Needs 186 (2023), available at https://
nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/27059/the-coast-guards-next-decade-
an-assessment-of-emerging-challenges-and-statutory-needs [hereinafter 
NAS Report].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Over the next decade, the Coast Guard intends to focus its 
IUU efforts in three areas. These include expanding and 
strengthening bilateral and multilateral partnerships to 
maximize IUU enforcement efforts, countering predatory and 
irresponsible state behavior, including that of China, and 
expanding targeted intelligence to drive enforcement 
options.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ See Coast Guard, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
Strategic Outlook, (September 2020), available at https://www.uscg.mil/
Portals/0/Images/iuu/IUU_Strategic_Outlook_2020_FINAL.pdf#page=39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              V. WITNESSES

     LRear Admiral Jo-Ann Burdian, Assistant Commandant 
for Response Policy (CG-5R), United States Coast Guard
     LHeather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and 
Justice, United States Government Accountability Office
     LAaron Davenport, Associate Director, 
Infrastructure, Immigration, and Security Operations Program, 
RAND Corporation
     LCaitlin Keating-Bitonti, PhD, Natural Resources 
Policy Analyst, Congressional Research Service

.  
                GUARDIANS OF THE SEA: EXAMINING COAST 
                 GUARD EFFORTS IN DRUG ENFORCEMENT, 
                 ILLEGAL MIGRATION, AND IUU FISHING

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2023

                  House of Representatives,
                    Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
                           Maritime Transportation,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:17 a.m. in 
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Daniel Webster 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation will come to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time in today's hearing.
    Without objection, show that ordered; that could come at 
any time now.
    I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the 
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 
today's hearing and ask questions.
    Without objection, show that ordered.
    As a reminder, if you wish to insert a document, please 
notify the T&I Committee through [email protected].
    I now recognize myself for the purpose of opening remarks.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL WEBSTER OF FLORIDA, CHAIRMAN, 
    SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

    Mr. Webster of Florida. We meet today to examine the Coast 
Guard's law enforcement missions, focusing on the Service's 
counterdrug and migrant efforts and its work to limit illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated, or IUU, fishing.
    I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses today.
    Rear Admiral Jo-Ann Burdian--is that correct?
    Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. She is the Assistant Commandant 
for Response Policy at the Coast Guard.
    Heather MacLeod, Director of Homeland Security and Justice 
at the Government Accountability Office.
    Aaron Davenport, associate director of the Infrastructure, 
Immigration, and Security Operations Program at the RAND 
Corporation.
    And Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, natural resources policy 
analyst at the Congressional Research Service.
    The Coast Guard is our Nation's premier maritime law 
enforcement agency and is actively engaged in countering 
illicit marine activity. This includes stopping the flow of 
illegal drugs to our shores, interdicting illegal maritime 
migration, and protecting the environment through efforts to 
curb illegal fishing. Illicit maritime activity threatens our 
Nation's health, security, and industries.
    As drug traffickers seek to poison our communities, the 
Coast Guard's accomplishment in stemming the tide of illegal 
drugs has been impressive. Over the past 4 fiscal years, the 
Coast Guard intercepted and seized 888 metric tons of cocaine 
worth approximately $25 billion--that's well more than the 
Service's annual budget.
    At the same time, the Coast Guard is addressing increased 
levels of maritime migration to our shores, often in the form 
of makeshift vessels that are not seaworthy and threaten the 
lives of the occupants. The year 2023 was one of the deadliest 
years for illegal maritime migration.
    In 2020, the Coast Guard declared that IUU fishing replaced 
piracy as the leading global maritime security threat. It harms 
the management of fish stocks and costs legal fishing 
operations tens of billions of dollars a year in revenue. This 
harm is exacerbated by the world's biggest IUU offender: China. 
The China Communist Party provides billions of dollars in 
subsidies to their distant-water fishing fleet to plunder the 
fishing stocks of other nations.
    To combat illicit maritime activity, the Coast Guard works 
with partner nations and expands targeted intelligence to 
maximize enforcement actions. At the same time, these efforts 
often pit our Nation's Coast Guard against foreign forces, 
including China, which has the largest coast guard fleet.
    Despite its best efforts at these missions, the Coast Guard 
can only act on a fraction of the intelligence it receives. The 
Service's drug and migration interdiction efforts are hindered 
first and foremost by a lack of resources, both due to a 
longstanding failure to make long-term sustained financial 
investments and heightened more recently by manpower shortages 
broadly affecting the Armed Forces. In the coming year, this 
problem will only increase as the Service is forced to lay up 
cutters that would otherwise be engaged in patrols because of a 
lack of Coast Guard guardians to man them.
    An important part of this subcommittee's work is to conduct 
oversight to better understand the Coast Guard's capabilities 
and to identify the causes for any mission gaps. As we explore 
the Service's law enforcement missions today, I look forward to 
hearing what the Coast Guard will do to strengthen its 
capabilities.
    To Rear Admiral Burdian, I want to emphasize that this 
hearing is an opportunity for you to tell us what resources the 
Coast Guard needs to accomplish its critical law enforcement 
missions. Advocating for its needs has not been one of the 
Coast Guard's strengths, so, today, I ask you to be candid.
    I would like to thank all of our witnesses for joining us 
here today and look forward to a great discussion.
    [Mr. Webster of Florida's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
    Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster of Florida, Chairman, 
        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    We meet today to examine the Coast Guard's law enforcement 
missions, focusing on the Service's counter drug and migrant efforts, 
and its work to limit illegal, unreported, and unregulated, or IUU, 
fishing.
    I'd like to welcome our distinguished witnesses joining us today--
Rear Admiral Jo-Ann Burdian, Assistant Commandant for Response Policy 
at the U.S. Coast Guard; Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security 
and Justice at the Government Accountability Office; Aaron Davenport, 
Associate Director, Infrastructure, Immigration, and Security 
Operations Program, at the RAND Corporation; and Caitlin Keating-
Bitonti, Natural Resources Policy Analyst at the Congressional Research 
Service.
    The Coast Guard is our nation's premier maritime law enforcement 
agency and is actively engaged in countering illicit maritime activity. 
This includes stopping the flow of illegal drugs to our shores, 
interdicting illegal maritime migration, and protecting the environment 
through efforts to curb illegal fishing.
    Illicit maritime activity threatens our nation's health, security, 
and industries.
    As drug traffickers seek to poison our communities, the Coast 
Guard's accomplishments in stemming the tide of illegal drugs have been 
impressive. Over the last four fiscal years the Coast Guard intercepted 
and seized 888 metric tons of cocaine, worth approximately 25 billion 
dollars--that's well more than the Service's annual budget.
    At the same time, the Coast Guard is addressing increasing levels 
of maritime migration to our shores--often in the form of makeshift 
vessels that are not seaworthy and threaten the lives of the occupants. 
2023 was one of the deadliest years for illegal maritime migration.
    In 2020, the Coast Guard declared that IUU fishing replaced piracy 
as the leading global maritime security threat. It harms the management 
of fish stocks and costs legal fishing operators tens of billions of 
dollars a year in revenue. This harm is exacerbated by the world's 
biggest IUU offender--China. The Chinese Communist Party provides 
billions of dollars in subsidies to their distant-water fishing fleet 
to plunder the fishing stocks of other nations.
    To combat illicit maritime activity, the Coast Guard works with 
partner nations and expands targeted intelligence to maximize 
enforcement actions. At the same time, these efforts often pit our 
nation's Coast Guard against foreign forces, including China, which has 
the world's largest coast guard fleet.
    Despite its best efforts at these missions, the Coast Guard can 
only act on a fraction of the intelligence it receives.
    The Service's drug and migrant interdiction efforts are hindered 
first and foremost by a lack of resources--both due to a longstanding 
failure to make long-term sustained financial investments, and 
heightened more recently by manpower shortages broadly affecting the 
armed forces.
    In the coming year, this problem will only increase as the Service 
is forced to lay up cutters that would otherwise be engaged in patrols 
because of a lack of Coast Guard guardians to man them.
    An important part of this subcommittee's work is to conduct 
oversight to better understand the Coast Guard's capabilities, and to 
identify the causes for any mission gaps.
    As we explore the Service's law enforcement missions today, I look 
forward to learning what the Coast Guard will do to strengthen its 
capabilities.
    To Rear Admiral Burdian, I want to emphasize that this hearing is 
an opportunity for you to tell us what resources the Coast Guard needs 
to accomplish its critical law enforcement missions. Advocating for its 
needs has not been one of the Coast Guard's strengths, so today, I ask 
you to be candid.
    I'd like to thank all our witnesses for joining us here today and 
look forward to a great discussion.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. I now recognize the ranking member 
of the committee. You are recognized.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING 
     MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And I am going to be brief, and I ask my full statement to 
be admitted into the record. We are going to be called to vote 
in a little bit.
    But I want to make four basic points as we get started. 
First, the Coast Guard is facing a 3,000-person shortage, which 
has degraded the mission readiness of the Coast Guard. And, 
while its mitigation plans will prioritize search-and-rescue 
operations, national security, and the Marine Transportation 
System, operational status across the Coast Guard will suffer.
    The second point is what that means for the three items we 
have before us today. On drug interdiction, of the Coast 
Guard's 11 missions, the Service dedicates the most resources 
to maritime drug interdiction. Despite this, over the past 3 
years, the Coast Guard has failed to reach its 10 percent 
interdiction goal of known cocaine flow. And so, I think it is 
important we understand why that is and how we can rectify 
that.
    Migration enforcement, the U.S. is witnessing a significant 
increase in maritime migration from the Caribbean that is 
expected to continue and will further strain limited Coast 
Guard resources and personnel. The Coast Guard's role in 
immigration enforcement is to ensure safety and engage in 
search-and-rescue missions. So, understanding what the role of 
the Coast Guard is and how it might be impacted is important to 
us as well.
    And, finally, on illegal fishing, the consequences of 
illegal fishing include international disputes over resources, 
overfishing of fish stocks in international and domestic 
waters, and humanitarian repercussions such as human 
trafficking and exploitation of vulnerable communities through 
forced labor. I know it is an issue that a lot of us are 
interested in, especially those of us in the Pacific Northwest, 
where much of our fishing fleet ends up all over the world.
    So, with that, I will close my statement and look forward 
to the testimony and yield back.
    [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member, 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chair Webster and Ranking Member Carbajal, for holding 
this important hearing where we'll focus on the Coast Guard's essential 
law enforcement missions: drug interdiction, IUU fishing, and migration 
enforcement.
    At a time when the Coast Guard is facing a personnel shortage and 
impacted operations, it is important for the Committee to take a closer 
look into how we can best help the Coast Guard succeed.
    In fiscal year 2022, the Coast Guard interdicted nearly 335,710 
pounds of cocaine at sea--preventing it from reaching the U.S. 
Unfortunately, that number, while significant, only reflects 5.4 
percent of the known maritime drug flow.
    This 5.4 percent rate is a substantial decrease from the annual 
target of 10 percent interdiction.
    While this shortfall is partially due to better intelligence giving 
us a more accurate understanding of the maritime drug flow, it is also 
the result of personnel constraints and decreased asset availability 
due to diversion to other missions.
    Improved intelligence combined with emerging technologies, like 
artificial intelligence and unmanned systems, are promising tools the 
Coast Guard can leverage to improve these interdiction rates--but 
ultimately, the Service needs more resources.
    Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, also known as IUU 
fishing, is a serious threat that has vast security, economic, 
environmental and humanitarian impacts.
    In 2020, the Coast Guard called IUU fishing the ``leading global 
maritime security threat.''
    IUU fishing includes foreign vessels fishing in another country's 
territorial waters, violation of international conservation laws or 
tracking requirements and failure to report catches to proper 
authorities; often taking advantage of developing countries.
    Annually, IUU fishing costs the global seafood industry between $26 
billion and $50 billion.
    Not only does it lead to overfishing of vulnerable fish populations 
and destroy essential habitats but it also threatens global food 
security.
    Further, forced labor and human trafficking often occur on IUU 
fishing vessels, only raising the importance of enforcement.
    China's distant water fishing fleet is the largest perpetrator of 
IUU fishing, using predatory fishing practices around the world, 
violating the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and 
failing to regulate vessels that repeatedly violate the law. China also 
uses its influence and subsidies to influence poorer countries to turn 
a blind eye to IUU practices taking place in their territorial waters.
    The Coast Guard plays a vital role in preventing IUU fishing within 
U.S. waters and the waters of partner nations. International 
partnerships are key in enabling the Coast Guard to assist other 
nations that lack enforcement capabilities.
    Congress and international bodies like the United Nations and the 
International Maritime Organization can do more to combat IUU fishing.
    Without adequate resources and funding for the Coast Guard, these 
missions will suffer.
    The Coast Guard is facing one of the worst personnel shortages in 
their history. As the personnel shortage approaches 3,000 enlisted 
members, every Coast Guard mission will be impacted. The personnel most 
lacking--servicemembers that work on cutters, boat crew, engineers--are 
necessary to ensure that Coast Guard law enforcement missions do not 
falter.
    For too long, the Coast Guard has done more with less, but this is 
not sustainable. This cannot continue. To have the Coast Guard this 
country needs, we must invest in Coasties by providing the Coast Guard 
with resources for effective recruiting and to repair crumbling 
infrastructure affecting recruits, cadets, Coasties and their families.
    Today I'd like to hear from the Coast Guard about what Congress can 
do to help dig the Service out of its personnel deficit. Impacts to 
search and rescue, drug and migrant interdiction and IUU fishing should 
come as a wakeup call--more funding is needed.
    Thank you to our witnesses for their contribution to today's 
hearing and working with us to make the Coast Guard the best it can be.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. I now recognize the ranking member, 
Mr. Carbajal, for an opening statement for 5 minutes. You are 
recognized.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SALUD O. CARBAJAL OF CALIFORNIA, 
   RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME 
                         TRANSPORTATION

    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to take this opportunity to discuss what has been 
and continues to be my top priority for the Coast Guard: its 
people.
    We were recently alerted to major operational changes 
underway at the Coast Guard due to a personnel shortfall. While 
the Coast Guard's mitigation plans will prioritize search-and-
rescue operations, national security, and the Marine 
Transportation System, operational status across the Coast 
Guard will be adversely affected. Over 50 stations across the 
country will be affected through station downgrades, asset 
layups, or station closures.
    While the underlying recruiting and retention problems have 
been exacerbated by larger workforce trends and a declining 
interest in military service, chronic underfunding is a major 
factor. The Coast Guard Academy and Training Center Cape May, 
the two main points of entry into the Service, are in desperate 
need of infrastructure improvements. The first experience with 
the Coast Guard must reflect an organization that cares about 
and for its people. Congress must do better to support 
Coasties, and I hope my colleagues will join me in my demand 
for significant increases to the Coast Guard's budget.
    This August, I traveled with the Coast Guard to Panama, 
where I had the opportunity to see firsthand how the Service 
conducts drug and migrant interdiction and its illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing missions. I left the visit 
with several takeaways.
    First, the Coast Guard alone is uniquely situated to 
execute these missions. Neither part of the State Department or 
the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard is able to form 
relationships and enter into agreements that would otherwise be 
impossible.
    Second, the strong relationship with Panama and the 
associated benefits to the United States should be replicated 
in many other places across the world. With the current budget, 
that is simply not viable.
    Lastly, members of the Coast Guard are truly the backbone 
of the Service. One day a Coastie may be training Panamanians 
to conduct fishing vessel inspections, while the next day they 
are interdicting drugs on the high seas. They break ice on the 
Great Lakes and issue credentials for merchant mariners. They 
are truly our country's best kept secret and value multiplier.
    The Coast Guard's footprint, both domestically and 
internationally, continues to grow, and the distinct but 
related missions we are covering today demonstrate the unique 
and important role of the Service.
    Combating international illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing ensures equitable access to food, 
safeguards our oceans, and prevents forced labor and human 
trafficking. Drug interdiction stops the flow of drugs before 
they reach American shores and combats transnational criminal 
organizations.
    The Coast Guard's role in migrant interdiction ensures that 
the least fortunate among us who choose to board a vessel to 
come to the United States do not perish at sea.
    I look forward to hearing more about these missions and how 
Congress can support Coasties to ensure that the Coast Guard 
remains semper paratus.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    [Mr. Carbajal's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal of California, Ranking 
    Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    Thank you, Chairman Webster.
    I want to take this opportunity to discuss what has been and 
continues to be my top priority for the Coast Guard--its people.
    We were recently alerted to major operational changes underway at 
the Coast Guard due to a personnel shortfall.
    While the Coast Guard's mitigation plans will prioritize search and 
rescue operations, national security, and the marine transportation 
system, operational status across the Coast Guard will be adversely 
affected. Over 50 stations across the country will be affected through 
station downgrades, asset layups, or station closures.
    While the underlying recruiting and retention problem has been 
exacerbated by larger workforce trends and a declining interest in 
military service, chronic underfunding is a major factor.
    The Coast Guard Academy and Training Center Cape May, the two main 
points of entry into the service, are in desperate need of 
infrastructure improvements. The first experience with the Coast Guard 
must reflect an organization that cares about and for its people.
    Congress must do better to support Coasties and I hope my 
colleagues will join in my demand for significant increases to the 
Coast Guard's budget.
    This August, I traveled with the Coast Guard to Panama where I had 
the opportunity to see firsthand how the Service conducts drug and 
migrant interdiction and its IUU fishing missions. I left the visit 
with several takeaways.
    First, the Coast Guard alone is uniquely situated to execute these 
missions. Neither part of the State Department or the Department of 
Defense, the Coast Guard is able to form relationships and enter into 
agreements that would otherwise be impossible.
    Second, the strong relationship with Panama and the associated 
benefits to the United States should be replicated in other places 
across world. With the current budget, that's simply not viable.
    Lastly, members of the Coast Guard are truly the backbone of the 
Service. One day a Coastie may be training Panamanians to conduct 
fishing vessel inspections while the next day they're interdicting 
drugs on the high seas. They break ice on the Great Lakes and issue 
credentials for merchant mariners. They are truly our country's best 
kept secret and value multiplier.
    The Coast Guard's footprint, both domestically and internationally, 
continues to grow and the distinct but related missions we're covering 
today demonstrate the unique and important role of the service.
    Combating international Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing ensures equitable access to food, safeguards our oceans, and 
prevents forced labor and human trafficking.
    Drug interdiction stops the flow of drugs before they reach 
American shores and combats transnational criminal organizations.
    The Coast Guard's role in migrant interdiction ensures that the 
least fortunate among us, who choose to board a vessel to come to the 
U.S., do not perish at sea.
    I look forward to hearing more about these missions and how 
Congress can support Coasties to ensure that the Coast Guard remains 
Semper Paratus.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
    I now would like to begin with our witnesses.
    First of all, let me make a brief statement about our 
lighting system. G means go; yellow means slow up; and red 
means end your remarks.
    So, with that said and a few other little things here we 
will do, I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full 
statements be included in the record.
    Without objection, show that done.
    I ask for unanimous consent that the record today of this 
hearing remain open until such time as the witnesses have 
provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to them 
in writing.
    Without objection, show that done.
    I also ask unanimous consent that the record be open for 15 
days for any additional comments or information submitted by 
Members or witnesses to be included in the record today.
    Without objection, show that done.
    All of your written testimony has been made a part of the 
record. The committee asks that you limit your oral remarks to 
5 minutes.
    With that, Rear Admiral Burdian, you are recognized for 5 
minutes for your testimony.

    TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL JO-ANN F. BURDIAN, ASSISTANT 
   COMMANDANT FOR RESPONSE POLICY (cg-5r), U.S. COAST GUARD; 
HEATHER MacLEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AARON C. DAVENPORT, ASSOCIATE 
DIRECTOR, INFRASTRUCTURE, IMMIGRATION, AND SECURITY OPERATIONS 
PROGRAM, RAND CORPORATION; AND CAITLIN KEATING-BITONTI, Ph.D., 
   NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY ANALYST, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
                            SERVICE

    TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL JO-ANN F. BURDIAN, ASSISTANT 
    COMMANDANT FOR RESPONSE POLICY (CG-5R), U.S. COAST GUARD

    Admiral Burdian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Good morning, Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, 
members of this subcommittee. It really is my honor to be here 
this morning.
    And, while the topic of this hearing really focuses on 
matters of enforcement, I did just want to take a moment as an 
operator, as a leader, to acknowledge the mishap involving a 
Coast Guard helicopter this morning in Congresswoman Peltola's 
district. All four crewmembers are being airlifted to 
Harborview in Seattle, and we hope for the very best. And the 
team here on the Hill will provide updated information as we 
continue to get it.
    So, I am honored to be here to share the important work 
that your Coast Guard is doing in 3 of our 11 statutory 
missions this morning: drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, 
and other law enforcement, which really is counter illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing around the world.
    I want to thank you for your continued strong support. 
Without the work that we do together and with your support, we 
simply would not be able to do the work to save lives, defend 
American prosperity in the homeland, and preserve the 
sustainability of our world's oceans.
    America's Coast Guard is in greater demand today than it 
ever has been. Our crews and the work we do inspires trust and 
confidence among the American public and with like-minded 
partners who join us in our commitment to promote maritime 
governance.
    The Coast Guard is one of six armed services, and at the 
same time, we are a maritime law enforcement agency. Our unique 
blend of authorities and capabilities enable action and promote 
joint operations in the interagency and with international 
partners.
    This is a Coast Guard discussion, so, I hope you will let 
me tell a sea story or two to really frame the discussion here 
this morning about how we combat complex global threats and 
project governance in the maritime domain.
    Transnational criminal organizations continue to exploit 
the maritime domain to traffic narcotics into the United 
States, and this revenue enables TCOs to expand their networks 
to other illegal activity. It drives violence, and it drives 
instability in our neighbors in our backyard.
    Last week, Coast Guard cutter Waesche, which is a National 
Security Cutter, interdicted just over 1,500 kilos of cocaine 
and detained four criminals from a vessel off the west coast of 
Panama in the Eastern Pacific. And, for context, 1,500 kilos of 
cocaine is about the weight of a Ford Escape. So, as the 
chairman mentioned, the Coast Guard, over the last 5 years, has 
interdicted over 800 metric tons of cocaine. I don't know what 
weighs 800 metric tons, but it is a lot of cocaine. And, just 
last year, we interdicted over 130 metric tons of cocaine. On 
average annually over the last 5 years, we have transferred 
about 475 criminals to the Department of Justice for 
prosecution.
    Just this weekend, the Coast Guard and partner agency crews 
in the Straits of Florida rescued 35 people from the sea 10 
miles south of Key West. Those individuals had clung to their 
vessel, which had overturned 2 days prior. And what is truly 
noteworthy about this case is that they had lifejackets. In my 
experience--and I have done this work for over a decade in that 
operational space--the fact that the vessel overturned is not 
unusual. Coast Guard crews often see overloaded, unseaworthy, 
manifestly unsafe vessels attempting the treacherous journey 
via maritime routes to the United States. But what is 
noteworthy is that they had lifejackets.
    I really want to express my gratitude to the Coast Guard 
crews who conduct the migrant interdiction mission with courage 
and compassion. This is difficult work in sometimes hazardous 
and treacherous conditions, and our crews really set the 
standard for compassion and a humanitarian approach of this 
lifesaving mission.
    Globally, we have seen an increase in illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated fishing. IUU fishing undermines the global rule 
space order and threatens food security for the over 3 billion 
people globally who rely on the sea for their primary source of 
protein. Today, as we speak, the Coast Guard cutter Frederick 
Hatch is on patrol in Oceania working with Papua New Guinea for 
just the second time in history exercising a bilateral 
fisheries agreement to help that partner exert sovereignty and 
protect resources in their exclusive economic zone.
    I also have the pleasure of being one of three tri-chairs 
of the Maritime SAFE Interagency Working Group that, under the 
Maritime SAFE Act, synchronizes efforts around the world in the 
interagency with nongovernmental organizations that work with 
our international partners.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear here this morning. 
I look forward to our discussion.
    [Admiral Burdian's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
    Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Jo-Ann F. Burdian, Assistant 
        Commandant for Response Policy (CG-5R), U.S. Coast Guard
                              Introduction
    Good afternoon, Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and 
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I am honored to be here 
today to discuss the United States Coast Guard's role in securing 
America's maritime border.
    The United States is a maritime nation with 95,000 miles of 
shoreline and 361 commercial ports connecting 25,000 miles of navigable 
channels facilitating the flow of $5.4 trillion of maritime economic 
commerce. The Coast Guard is a unique, complementary organization 
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) enterprise. We are at 
all times an Armed Force, a Federal law enforcement agency, 
humanitarian first responders, environmental stewards, a regulatory 
agency, and a member of the Intelligence Community. The Coast Guard is 
a nimble instrument of national power. We protect the homeland, save 
lives, and preserve the world's ocean. I am pleased to share with you 
how we leverage our unique authorities, capabilities, and relationships 
with international, federal, state, local, and Tribal partners to 
operationalize a layered approach to maritime border security to 
protect our communities from transnational threats.
                       Maritime Drug Interdiction
    Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) harm the American way 
of life. They traffic drugs, weapons, wildlife, and humans, which 
causes instability and violence in Central America, the Caribbean, and 
elsewhere , driving irregular migration to the United States. Illicit 
drugs destined for the United States devastate American families, 
leading to record-setting drug-related deaths in recent years. Drug 
trafficking also destabilizes nations in the region undermines the rule 
of law, threatens citizens, and drives individuals, families, and 
unaccompanied children to migrate to the United States. To be clear, 
the flow of illicit drugs toward the United States funds TCOs, which 
pose a significant and growing threat to our national security, the 
security of nations in Central and South America, the rule of law 
throughout the Western Hemisphere, and governance within the maritime 
commons.
    Today, TCOs and the illicit drugs they traffic inflict great harm 
here, in the United States, as well as in countries where drugs are 
grown and produced, and those through which the TCOs transport the 
drugs. The nature of the threat to America has changed over the course 
of this decades-long fight. Plant-based drugs such as cocaine, 
primarily trafficked via non-commercial maritime vessels, are still a 
grave threat, but illicit fentanyl, precursors, analogues, and other 
synthetic opioids are responsible for 70 percent of overdose deaths in 
the U.S. and now the greatest concern. However, almost all the illegal 
drugs coming from Central and South America are produced and shipped by 
the same TCOs. Notably, cocaine and other plant-based narcotics 
continue to form the foundation of TCO revenue streams, even with the 
increase of fentanyl and synthetic opioid trafficking operations.
Combating TCOs--Drug Interdiction in the Maritime Domain
    The Coast Guard is the only Federal maritime law enforcement agency 
with both the authority and capability to conduct drug interdiction 
operations and enforce national and international law on the high seas. 
The Coast Guard shares the lead for U.S. territorial seas interdiction 
and enforcement responsibilities with U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP). Employing our fleet of sea-going cutters, maritime 
patrol aircraft, helicopters, and boats, the Coast Guard takes action 
against drug smuggling threats far from U.S. shores where the TCOs are 
most vulnerable by interdicting bulk quantities of drugs at sea.
    The importance of Coast Guard interdictions transcends the direct 
removal of drugs from the high seas. When the Coast Guard apprehends 
suspects from drug smuggling cases, the suspects disclose information 
during prosecution and sentencing that is used to help indict, 
extradite, and convict key criminal leaders and further disrupt and 
dismantle TCOs. Interdictions also take profits out of the pockets of 
criminal networks thereby denying them financial resources.
    While more than 75 percent of the Coast Guard's interdictions in 
2023 were cued by intelligence, the unexpected unavailability of the 
Coast Guard's aging major cutters and other assets used to detect all 
the cued drug events limited our ability to interdict more smuggling 
operations. Critical acquisitions like the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) 
are vital to the long-term success of the Coast Guard's fight against 
TCOs. Medium endurance cutters, some that were commissioned in the 
1960s, are the critical ``patrol cars'' in maritime interdiction 
efforts and are in need of replacement. Additionally, whole-of-
government commitment of detection capability, particularly long-range 
patrol aircraft, remains critical to increasing the number of 
identified targets that can be interdicted.
Combating TCOs--Interagency and International Cooperation
    Continued cocaine interdictions at sea are critical to the fight 
against illicit fentanyl because the information and evidence collected 
with these seizures offer law enforcement agencies and task forces the 
opportunity to illuminate and map the TCO networks. These interdictions 
represent the point at which TCOs are most vulnerable and have 
supported the development of law enforcement cases against major TCO 
leaders.
    The Coast Guard continues to be a supporting component in the U.S. 
government's approach to identify and disrupt illicit fentanyl supply 
chains. In the United States, through Regional Coordinating Mechanisms, 
the Coast Guard routinely shares intelligence; coordinates assets for 
operational coverage, patrols, as well as responds; leverages resources 
to identify the flow of suspected fentanyl and precursors through ports 
across the United States; and conducts Multi-Agency Strike Force 
Operations with our port partners that help to further disrupt the flow 
of drugs.
    The Coast Guard has for decades developed and maintained an 
extensive array of bilateral and multilateral agreements with nearly 
every coastal state in the Western Hemisphere. These agreements provide 
the framework through which the Coast Guard effectively and efficiently 
pursues maritime interdiction efforts in the region through a 
collaborative approach in the mutually beneficial fight against TCO 
networks. In addition to directly enhancing Coast Guard effectiveness, 
this international cooperation also helps build partner nation capacity 
to interdict drugs far from U.S. shores. In fiscal year 2023, partner 
nations contributed to more than 75 percent of the drug interdictions 
recorded by Joint Interagency Task Force South.
                          Migrant Interdiction
    Coast Guard migrant interdiction operations are, first and 
foremost, ensuring safety of life at sea and upholding humanitarian 
principles. Every year, thousands of people attempt to migrate via 
maritime routes, many utilizing services of organized smuggling 
operations and often in dangerously overloaded, unseaworthy, or 
otherwise unsafe vessels. Migrants who take to the sea put their lives 
at incredible risk. Many of the migrant interdiction cases handled by 
the Coast Guard begin as search and rescue missions.
    Migrant interdiction at sea is also a critical U.S. law enforcement 
mission. The Coast Guard, pursuant to Executive Order 12807, is charged 
with interdicting migrants as far from U.S. shores as possible and 
returning them to their countries of origin. Swift repatriation deters 
many individuals intending to undertake unsafe maritime migration. 
Upholding the principal of non-refoulement under international human 
rights law, during the course of migrant interdictions, when Coast 
Guard crews encounter migrants who manifest fear of return to their 
country of origin, these migrants are referred to U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services in accordance with U.S. policy for a protection 
screening to ensure they are offered protection, if appropriate. 
Protection from persecution or torture is an important concern during 
migrant interdiction operations.
Interagency Effort via Operation Vigilant Sentry (OVS)
    OVS is the DHS Homeland Security Task Force-Southeast's (HSTF-SE) 
comprehensive, integrated, national operational plan for a rapid, 
effective, and unified response to maritime migration in the Caribbean 
utilizing combined Federal, state, and local capabilities. The primary 
objectives of OVS are to protect the safety of life at sea and to deter 
and dissuade mass migration. OVS, led by the Coast Guard Seventh 
District Commander, maintains interagency coordination and has remained 
in an elevated posture since August 2022. Although there was a downturn 
in irregular maritime migration in February 2023, the Coast Guard 
continues to make risk-informed decisions to allocate resources to key 
irregular maritime migration routes.
    The OVS Unified Command staff continues to advocate, through 
strategic messaging, lawful pathways to migrate to the United States. 
Additionally, the Coast Guard continues to collaborate with CBP to best 
utilize resources to deter irregular maritime migration, increase 
maritime domain awareness, and work with partner nations to safely and 
swiftly repatriate noncitizens to their country of last departure, when 
appropriate.
    The Coast Guard employs cutters, boats, fixed-wing aircraft, and 
helicopters to identify and interdict migrant vessels as far from U.S. 
shores as possible. After appropriate protection screening, migrants 
interdicted at sea are returned to their country of origin or departure 
via Coast Guard cutters. Key to the ability of the Coast Guard to 
repatriate migrants interdicted at sea are the Coast Guard's 
relationships and international agreements with partner nations, 
especially the Bahamas, Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic, who 
agree to accept maritime repatriation of migrants from their countries 
(or who departed from their countries). Loss of the ability to conduct 
regular maritime repatriations would be detrimental to Coast Guard 
interdiction operations and present significant risk to migrants and 
Coast Guard personnel at sea.
       Countering Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing
    IUU fishing is a pervasive security, economic, and environmental 
threat with damaging effects for oceans and coastal states around the 
world. By some estimates, up to a third of annual global seafood 
catch--approximately 56 billion pounds--is associated with IUU fishing 
practices. IUU fishing endangers long-term ocean and ecosystem health 
and is a significant contributor to overfishing. It threatens global 
food security for over 3 billion people who rely on fish for protein 
and jeopardizes economic stability for 800 million people around the 
world who rely on fisheries for their livelihood. From an economic 
perspective, global IUU fishing catch--valued in the tens of billions 
of dollars each year, are a lucrative revenue stream for TCOs and other 
malign actors.
    At its core, IUU fishing is a symptom of ineffective maritime 
governance. It is powered by economic drivers that make it profitable. 
These drivers are often associated with forced labor, human 
trafficking, and other human rights abuses. IUU fishing actors hide in 
areas where maritime domain awareness is lacking and seek out spaces 
where flag state, coastal state, and regional enforcement is either 
challenging or altogether non-existent. In these ways, IUU fishing 
vessels often operate with impunity, with little respect for a state's 
laws, and without regard for conservation or management measures put in 
place by the international community. IUU fishing practices also 
contribute to eroding port and maritime security, as criminal elements 
may use similar trade routes, landing sites, and vessels for 
trafficking arms, migrants, drugs, and other contraband.
    The Coast Guard has been the lead U.S. agency for at-sea 
enforcement of fisheries laws for more than 150 years. For decades, the 
Coast Guard has worked to leverage its authorities and capabilities to 
improve both domestic and international fisheries enforcement, holding 
bad actors accountable, and adapting operations as fish stocks migrate 
and technology improves the ability to find and harvest catch.
    As criminal operations become increasingly sophisticated, the Coast 
Guard is uniquely positioned to combat IUU fishing and uphold the rule 
of law through specialized capabilities, law enforcement authority, 
robust bilateral maritime agreements, and its role as a member of the 
intelligence community. However, the Coast Guard recognizes that IUU 
fishing is a complex global challenge, and not one that any single 
nation can solve alone.
Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement Act (M-SAFE)
    In 2019, the U.S. Congress directed the creation of a working group 
under the M-SAFE Act specifically to address IUU fishing and related 
threats to maritime security, such as transnational organized crime, 
trafficking, and forced labor. The Coast Guard, along with the 
Department of State and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), is a co-chair of the working group, which is 
composed of 21 federal agencies.
    In October 2022, the M-SAFE Interagency Working Group released its 
National Five-year Strategy. This National Strategy established three 
strategic objectives to combat IUU fishing:
    1.  Promote Sustainable Fisheries Management and Governance
    2.  Enhance the Monitoring, Control and Surveillance of Marine 
Fishing Operations
    3.  Ensure Only Legal, Sustainable, and Responsibly Harvested 
Seafood Enters Trade

    These goals are driven by national policy, laws (such as the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act), and 
international ocean governance structures (such as U.S. membership 
within international Regional Fishery Management Organizations 
(RFMOs)). RFMOs are shining examples of multilateral, consent-based 
partnerships that develop legally binding conservation and management 
measures based on scientific evidence. For example, the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), one of the first RFMOs in 
the world to employ a fully developed boarding and inspection protocol 
for high seas enforcement based on the United Nations (UN) Fish Stocks 
Agreement, has produced a level of governance and cooperation for long-
term resource management that was previously unfeasible. The Coast 
Guard is proud to have been involved in the development and negotiation 
of the protocol, and to participate in its continuing implementation.
    The more we strengthen the sovereignty of other nations, the 
greater their ability to resist foreign activity that negatively 
targets their economic resources. Alongside NOAA and the State 
Department, we will continue to work with priority flag states to 
identify gaps in fisheries management schemes, monitoring and 
surveillance platforms, and enforcement capabilities. The Coast Guard 
continues to strive to add fisheries enforcement language into pre-
existing bilateral maritime law enforcement agreements with shiprider 
provisions and initiating new shiprider agreements. The United States 
currently has bilateral agreements with 12 Pacific Island and 6 African 
nations. These agreements are critical to assisting partner nations to 
maintain control and maritime domain awareness over activities in their 
sovereign waters and ensure compliance with national and international 
laws by local and distant-water fishing fleets. Additionally, these 
agreements promote effective counter-IUU fishing enforcement 
cooperation, as well as critical transfer of knowledge and expertise 
which increase overall capability to confront and combat IUU fishing.
    The world's oceans contain shared resources, and therefore require 
an internationally cooperative approach toward their conservation and 
management. In the face of increasing challenges to global food 
security and growing demand for marine resources, the Coast Guard 
stands ready to confront IUU fishing to ensure the long-term strategic 
and economic viability of fish stocks. Doing so increases Maritime 
Domain Awareness on the high seas, enhances the Service's ability to 
effectively respond to a range of transnational threats, and upholds 
the international rules-based order in the maritime domain.
                               Conclusion
    The Coast Guard's layered approach to maritime border security 
relies on our unique authorities, capabilities, and partnerships to 
address threats as far away from U.S. shores as possible. To do this, 
we must continue to invest in our workforce, re-capitalize aging assets 
and infrastructure, and explore and integrate new technologies that 
enhance interoperability with partner agencies across all levels of 
government, including our international partners. The Coast Guard 
recognizes the importance and value of working by, with, and through 
our partners, because we cannot do this alone.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and for your 
continued support of the Coast Guard. I would be pleased to answer your 
questions.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
    Ms. MacLeod, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

 TESTIMONY OF HEATHER MacLEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
         JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Ms. MacLeod. Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 
be here today to discuss GAO's recent work related to Coast 
Guard missions and resource challenges.
    My testimony focuses on Coast Guard asset, workforce, and 
technology issues that are affecting the Service's ability to 
carry out its 11 statutory missions.
    As you know, the Coast Guard is the Nation's lead Federal 
maritime law enforcement agency, and its missions, including 
drug and migrant interdiction and efforts to prevent illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing, are supported by its 
people and assets. Coast Guard's personnel stationed around the 
Nation operate aircraft, cutters, and boats to protect the 
country's maritime borders. In recent years, almost one-quarter 
of Coast Guard's operating expenses have gone to drug and 
migrant interdiction and illegal fishing missions.
    The Coast Guard is constantly trying to balance its 
multiple efforts and adjust to a wide variety of tasks and 
circumstances to carry out these and its other missions. 
Although the Coast Guard has taken some steps to address these 
challenges, it should take additional steps to maintain future 
readiness.
    Our work has noted that declining asset capabilities and 
acquisition program delays continue to affect the availability 
of Coast Guard assets. For example, the Coast Guard's newest 
cutters, the Offshore Patrol Cutter and Polar Security Cutter, 
are intended to support law enforcement missions and deliver 
greater capability. However, we found that combined, these two 
programs are billions of dollars over their initial estimates 
and more than 2 years behind schedule. Declining availability 
of legacy assets and delays in acquisitions of their 
replacements can affect the Coast Guard's ability to conduct 
its drug and migrant interdiction and illegal fishing missions.
    We made several recommendations in those reports to address 
immature technologies and unstable designs, including that the 
Coast Guard update its acquisition policies.
    Another challenge I would like to highlight is the 
uncertainty around the Coast Guard's workforce needs. In recent 
years, the Coast Guard has raised concerns that its mission 
workload has outpaced its workforce levels. Despite these 
concerns, the Coast Guard has conducted limited assessments of 
its workforce needs. Specifically, as of March 2023, the 
Service reported that it has assessed needs for just 15 percent 
of its workforce, a process it began 20 years ago. The Coast 
Guard estimates that it is short thousands of servicemembers.
    Without workforce assessments, it does not know the true 
magnitude of the shortfall and which units or missions are most 
affected. Having this information could also help the Coast 
Guard target its recruiting efforts.
    One of the recommendations from our review is that the 
Coast Guard update its workforce planning document with 
timeframes and milestones for completing these assessments.
    Another area that we have highlighted is the Coast Guard's 
longstanding issues with managing its technology resources. For 
example, in multiple reviews, we have raised concerns about 
challenges related to MISLE, a critical but antiquated data 
system that tracks and reports results for nearly every Coast 
Guard mission.
    However, because of system limitations, it is difficult for 
the Coast Guard to compile and analyze even some of the most 
basic performance information. For example, the Coast Guard 
cannot easily track migrant interdiction data, and officials 
told us that they may spend an hour a day compiling it 
manually. We have recommended that the Coast Guard identify and 
analyze alternatives to MISLE. The Coast Guard agreed, and, as 
of June 2023, MISLE replacement efforts were ongoing.
    In closing, Coast Guard maritime law enforcement missions 
are increasingly vital to U.S. interests. Operations are 
becoming more complicated as the Coast Guard acquires upgraded 
data systems, aircraft, and vessels. Workforce growth and 
enhanced skills will be required to operate and maintain these 
updated assets.
    Addressing our recommendations will help ensure that the 
Service is effectively and efficiently using its limited 
resources to carry out these critical missions.
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and members of 
the subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement, and I 
would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
    [Ms. MacLeod's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and 
             Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office
 Coast Guard: Asset, Workforce, and Technology Challenges Continue to 
                    Affect Law Enforcement Missions
                               Highlights
Why GAO Did This Study
    The Coast Guard--a multi-mission, maritime military service within 
the Department of Homeland Security is the nation's lead federal 
maritime law enforcement agency. Composed of more than 55,000 
personnel, the Coast Guard is responsible for, among other things, 
protecting the country's maritime borders from encroachment, defending 
against illicit activity, and suppressing violations of federal law on, 
under, and over the seas.
    This statement discusses: (1) Coast Guard law enforcement missions 
related to homeland security, and (2) challenges we have identified and 
recommendations we have made to Coast Guard related to managing its 
assets, workforce, and technology.
    This statement is based on prior GAO reports published from April 
2010 through July 2023, along with selected updates on Coast Guard 
efforts to address previous GAO recommendations. For these reports, GAO 
reviewed Coast Guard documentation, analyzed data, and interviewed 
agency officials. For selected recommendation updates, GAO reviewed 
Coast Guard documentation and met with Coast Guard officials.
What GAO Recommends
    GAO made 31 recommendations to the Coast Guard in the reports 
covered by this statement. The Coast Guard generally agreed with the 
recommendations. As of November 2023, four of the recommendations have 
been implemented, two have been partially implemented, and 25 remain 
open. GAO continues to monitor the agency's progress in implementing 
them.
What GAO Found
    The Coast Guard is responsible for conducting 11 statutory 
missions, including three maritime law enforcement missions--drug 
interdiction, migrant interdiction, and other law enforcement (which 
includes preventing illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing). IUU fishing encompasses many illicit activities, including 
under-reporting the number of fish caught and using prohibited fishing 
gear. In September 2021, we reported that almost one quarter of the 
Coast Guard's total estimated operating expenses for fiscal years 2011 
through 2020 were for these three missions (annually averaging more 
than $1.5 billion).
    GAO has previously identified challenges with the Coast Guard's 
management of its assets, workforce, and technology that have affected 
the service's ability to carry out missions. For example,
      In multiple reports, we found challenges with the 
acquisition of the Coast Guard's newest cutters--the Offshore Patrol 
Cutter and Polar Security Cutter--that are intended to support law 
enforcement missions. For example, in 2023 GAO found that these 
acquisitions are billions of dollars over initial cost estimates and 
over 2 years behind schedule, increasing the risk of capability gaps. 
We made seven recommendations, including that the Coast Guard update 
its acquisition policy. DHS and the Coast Guard agreed with five of our 
recommendations and has taken some steps to implement them.

      GAO has found that the Coast Guard has not adequately 
determined its workforce needs. The Coast Guard has reported to 
Congress that it faces challenges meeting its daily mission demands 
because of workforce shortfalls. For example, in February 2020, GAO 
found that the Coast Guard had assessed a small portion of its 
workforce needs. GAO recommended that Coast Guard update its workforce 
plan with timeframes and milestones to meet its workforce assessment 
goals. As of May 2023, Coast Guard officials said they had not yet 
taken these steps but indicated it could be feasible to develop a rough 
estimate of how many positions it plans to assess in the next five 
years.
                               __________
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal and Members of the 
Subcommittee:
    I am pleased to be here to today to discuss our work on the U.S. 
Coast Guard's law enforcement missions and resources. The Coast Guard--
a multi-mission, maritime military service within the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)--is the nation's lead federal maritime law 
enforcement agency. Composed of more than 55,000 personnel, the Coast 
Guard is responsible for, among other things, protecting the country's 
maritime borders from encroachment, defending the nation's maritime 
sovereignty against illicit activity, and suppressing violations of 
federal law on, under, and over the seas. Coast Guard personnel operate 
aviation and vessel assets that include a fleet of about 200 fixed- and 
rotary-wing aircraft, more than 1,600 boats, and about 250 cutters, as 
of September 2020.\1\ To carry out its missions, the Coast Guard must 
maintain these assets while making necessary investments for the future 
and operating within its existing resources.
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    \1\ As of April 2022, Coast Guard officials stated that the agency 
had a total workforce of 55,236--including 46,235 military and 9,001 
civilian personnel. The Coast Guard classifies vessels under 65 feet in 
length as boats, which usually operate near shore, on inland waterways, 
or attached to cutters. Coast Guard also operates cutters, defined as a 
vessel 65 feet in length or greater with accommodations for a crew to 
live aboard.
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    My statement today discusses (1) Coast Guard law enforcement 
missions related to homeland security and (2) challenges we have 
identified and recommendations we have made to the Coast Guard related 
to managing its assets, workforce, and technology. This statement is 
based primarily on 17 GAO reports published from April 2010 to July 
2023 related to the Coast Guard as well as selected updates regarding 
Coast Guard efforts to address our previous recommendations through 
June 2023.\2\ For these reports, we analyzed Coast Guard documents and 
data and interviewed agency officials. In addition, for our selected 
updates through June 2023, we reviewed Coast Guard documentation and 
met with Coast Guard officials.
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    \2\ See, for example, GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore 
Patrol Cutter Program Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-
105805 (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2023); GAO, Coast Guard: Increasing 
Mission Demands Highlight Importance of Assessing Its Workforce Needs, 
GAO-22-106135 (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2022); and See GAO, Coast 
Guard: Actions Needed to Ensure Investments in Key Data System Meet 
Mission and User Needs, GAO-20-562 (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2020.
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    We made 31 recommendations to the Coast Guard in the reports 
covered by this statement. As of November 2023, four recommendations 
have been implemented, two recommendations have been partially 
implemented, and 25 remain open. We will continue to monitor the Coast 
Guard's progress in implementing them.
    More detailed information on the objectives, scope, and 
methodologies of our prior work can be found in each of the reports 
listed at the end of this statement. We conducted the work on which 
this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
       Coast Guard Conducts Several Key Law Enforcement Missions
    The Coast Guard is responsible for conducting 11 statutory 
missions, three of which are maritime law enforcement missions codified 
as homeland security missions--drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, 
and other law enforcement (which includes preventing illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing).\3\ These missions involve 
about a quarter of Coast Guard resources. In some cases, the Coast 
Guard coordinates its law enforcement missions with interagency 
partners.
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    \3\ 6 U.S.C. Sec.  468(a). Appendix I provides information on the 
Coast Guard's missions programs and statutory missions.
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Drug Interdiction
    The purpose of this mission is to stem the flow of illicit drugs 
into the U.S., which the U.S. government has identified as a 
significant threat to the public, law enforcement, and the national 
security of the U.S. The Coast Guard deploys its vessels and aircraft 
to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs smuggled from South America to the 
U.S. through the Western Hemisphere transit zone--a 6 million square 
mile area of smuggling routes that includes the eastern Pacific Ocean, 
the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea. In fiscal year 2022, the 
Coast Guard interdicted over 335,000 pounds of cocaine, according to 
the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2024 budget overview. Figure 1 shows 
Coast Guard personnel conducting a drug interdiction operation, which 
resulted in seizing 17,000 pounds of cocaine.

 Figure 1: Coast Guard Personnel Conducting Drug Interdiction Operation

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

                Source: U.S. Coast Guard. GAO-24-107144

    Given challenges the federal government faces in responding to the 
drug misuse crisis, in March 2021, we updated our High Risk List to 
include national efforts to prevent, respond to, and recover from drug 
misuse. Ongoing efforts seek to address drug misuse, including through 
law enforcement and drug interdiction. We identified several challenges 
in the federal government's response to drug misuse, such as the need 
for more effective implementation of a coordinated, strategic 
approach.\4\
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    \4\ See GAO, High-Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to 
Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk Areas, GAO-21-119SP 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2021); We issue an update to the High-Risk 
List every 2 years at the start of each new session of Congress. The 
most recent update was issued in April 2023. See GAO, High-Risk Series: 
Efforts Made to Achieve Progress Need to Be Maintained and Expanded to 
Fully Address All Areas, GAO-23-106203 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 
2023).
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Migrant Interdiction
    The purpose of this mission is to stem the flow of unlawful 
migration and human smuggling activities via maritime routes. It has 
three main objectives: deter migrants attempting to enter the U.S. 
through irregular routes and transnational smugglers from using 
maritime routes to enter the U.S.; detect and interdict migrants and 
smugglers far from the U.S. border; and expand Coast Guard 
participation in multi-agency and bi-national border security 
initiatives. The Coast Guard interdicted more than 12,000 migrants in 
both fiscal year 2022 and 2023--more than double the fiscal year 2021 
total, according to Coast Guard data.\5\ The U.S. is currently 
experiencing an increase in migrants entering the country by sea. 
Global international migration is likely to continue and potentially 
accelerate over the next decade, according to the National Academy of 
Sciences.\6\ Figure 2 shows Coast Guard personnel conducting a migrant 
interdiction operation.
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    \5\ According to Coast Guard documentation, the Coast Guard 
interdicted 5,028 migrants in fiscal year 2021.
    \6\ National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. The 
Coast Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging Challenges and 
Statutory Needs. (Washington, D.C., 2023).
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   Figure 2: Coast Guard Personnel Conducting a Migrant Interdiction 
                               Operation

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

                Source: U.S. Coast Guard. GAO-24-107144

Other Law Enforcement
    The purpose of this mission is to enforce international treaties, 
including the prevention of IUU fishing in international waters and the 
dumping of plastics and other marine debris. IUU fishing encompasses 
many illicit activities, including under-reporting the number of fish 
caught and using prohibited fishing gear. In fiscal year 2022, the 
Coast Guard boarded 81 foreign vessels to suppress IUU fishing, 
according to the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2024 posture statement. 
Figure 3 below shows a Coast Guard vessel interdicting a vessel using 
an illegal high seas driftnet, and Coast Guard officials preparing to 
conduct a law enforcement boarding. According to the Coast Guard IUU 
Strategic Outlook, IUU fishing has replaced piracy as the leading 
global maritime security threat that if unchecked could threaten geo-
political stability around the world.\7\
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    \7\ Coast Guard, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing 
Strategic Outlook (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2020).
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Figure 3: Coast Guard Vessel Interdicting Illegal Fishing and Officials 
            Preparing to Conduct a Law Enforcement Boarding

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

      Source: State Department and U.S. Coast Guard. GAO-24-107144

Law Enforcement Missions Resources
    In September 2021, we reported that Coast Guard data showed almost 
a quarter of its total estimated operating expenses were for law 
enforcement missions related to homeland security.\8\ From fiscal years 
2011 through 2020, drug interdiction accounted for 13 percent of its 
estimated operating expenses, migrant interdiction 8 percent, and other 
law enforcement 2 percent, which includes preventing IUU fishing. The 
operating expenses of these three missions annually averaged more than 
$1.5 billion over this time period. Vessel and aircraft deployments for 
these missions accounted for 30 percent of the average annual 
operational hours during that period, as shown in figure 4.
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    \8\ GAO, Coast Guard: Information on Defense Readiness Mission 
Deployments, Expenses, and Funding, GAO-21-104741 (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 15, 2021). The Mission Cost Model is the Coast Guard's official 
methodology for estimating annual operating expenses for its 11 
statutory missions. The Model estimates the proportion of operating 
expenses by mission by (1) multiplying operations and maintenance costs 
for supporting a vessel or aircraft by the operational hours and (2) 
using survey data to estimate additional personnel costs for nonvessel 
or aircraft-based operations. It produces estimates of operating 
expenses by mission rather than actual operating expenditures.
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 Figure 4: Coast Guard Average Annual Vessel and Aircraft Operational 
 Hours and Estimated Operating Expenses, by Statutory Mission, Fiscal 
                        Years 2011 through 2020

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

      Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data. GAO-24-107144

   Note: Operational hours include the use of aircraft, cutters, and 
boats for the Coast Guard's 11 statutory missions. They do not include 
   the time personnel may spend on missions without using vessels or 
aircraft. We do not include hours spent on support activities, such as 
  training and technology tests. Operating expenses are estimated by 
    mission by (1) multiplying operations and maintenance costs for 
supporting a vessel or aircraft by the operational hours and (2) using 
  survey data to estimate additional personnel costs for nonvessel or 
                       aircraft-based operations.

Interagency Collaboration
    The Coast Guard collaborates with other agencies on certain law 
enforcement missions.
      The Coast Guard coordinates with other DHS components and 
the Department of Defense on counterdrug missions through various 
interagency task forces, including Joint Interagency Task Force-South. 
In July 2019, we reported on the contribution and allocation of assets, 
such as ships and surveillance aircraft, through these task forces.\9\ 
For example, the task force is allocated assets, such as ships and 
surveillance aircraft, from Department of Defense and DHS components, 
such as Coast Guard, as well as from foreign partners. The task force 
uses these assets, in conjunction with available intelligence, to 
detect and monitor the trafficking of illicit drugs, such as cocaine, 
being smuggled north on noncommercial maritime vessels across its area 
of responsibility.\10\
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    \9\ GAO, Drug Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces Should 
Enhance Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug 
Activities, GAO-19-441 (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2019).
    \10\ Joint Interagency Task Force-South's area of responsibility 
includes the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific 
Ocean.
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          Coast Guard units also deploy aboard Department of Defense 
vessels in support of certain law enforcement missions. In November 
2019, we reported that the Coast Guard employs specialized units to 
serve as force multipliers, including for specialized capabilities 
needed to carry out the drug interdiction mission.\11\ Among these 
units, the Coast Guard has two Tactical Law Enforcement Teams which 
provide specialized capabilities for offshore drug interdiction and 
vessel interception operations, primarily in the Caribbean Sea and 
Eastern Pacific Ocean. These specialized teams do not maintain their 
own vessels but deploy aboard Coast Guard cutters or U.S. Navy or 
Allied vessels.
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    \11\ GAO, Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' 
Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap 
or Gaps in Capabilities, GAO-20-33 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2019).

      The Coast Guard coordinates with other federal agencies 
to address IUU fishing.\12\ For example, in November 2021 we reported 
that the Coast Guard and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration analyze data to identify vessel movements and actions 
that may indicate IUU fishing.\13\ We also reported that the Coast 
Guard had used aircraft to capture images confirming a suspicion that a 
vessel was engaging in IUU fishing.
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    \12\ The Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration within the Department of Commerce, the Department of 
Defense, and the State Department coordinate with one another, as well 
as internationally, to address IUU fishing.
    \13\ GAO, Combating Illegal Fishing: Clear Authority Could Enhance 
U.S. Efforts to Partner with Other Nations at Sea, GAO-22-104234 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2021).
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          Coast Guard officials told us they use data analysis to 
develop lists of vessels suspected of IUU fishing, which contribute to 
successful identification of IUU fishing at sea and help guide at-sea 
patrol operations to target these vessels. For example, the Coast Guard 
identified and interdicted a vessel in 2018 that, according to 
officials, was included on a list of suspected vessels after analysis 
of location data indicated the vessel was moving in ways characteristic 
of using prohibited high seas driftnets. Coast Guard officials told us 
they intercepted the vessel, confirmed illegal use of driftnets, and 
escorted the vessel to authorities of its flag state. According to 
Coast Guard officials, authorities of the flag state prosecuted the 
case, imprisoned several people, and destroyed the vessel.
   Coast Guard Has Faced Asset, Workforce, and Technology Challenges
    Our previous reports have identified various challenges the Coast 
Guard has faced in managing its assets, workforce, and technology, as 
well as some steps it has taken to address them. These challenges have 
affected the Coast Guard's ability to conduct its law enforcement 
missions.
Delayed Asset Acquisitions, Declining Legacy Asset Capabilities, and 
        Cost Increases
    In multiple reports, we found challenges with the acquisition of 
the Coast Guard's newest cutters--the Offshore Patrol Cutter and Polar 
Security Cutter--that are intended to support law enforcement missions 
and deliver greater capabilities (e.g., the length of time a ship can 
spend at sea) than the legacy assets they will replace (see fig. 
4).\14\
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    \14\ Coast Guard plans to acquire 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters and 
three Polar Security Cutters. The Offshore Patrol Cutters will replace 
the aging fleet of 28 Medium Endurance Cutters, which have exceeded 
their design service lives. They will enable the Coast Guard to 
continue conducting patrols for homeland security, law enforcement, and 
search and rescue operations. Polar Security Cutters will replace the 
aging Polar Star icebreaker and enable the U.S. to maintain defense 
readiness in the Arctic and Antarctic regions; enforce treaties and 
other laws needed to safeguard both industry and the environment; and 
help support other missions.
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Figure 5: Rendering of the Coast Guard's Offshore Patrol Cutter (left) 
                   and Polar Security Cutter (right)

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

  Source: 2016 Eastern Shipbuilding Group, Panama City, Florida (left 
                                image),
    Bollinger Mississippi Shipbuilding (right image). GAO-24-107144

    We found in our summer 2023 reports that, combined, these two 
programs are billions of dollars over their initial cost estimates and 
are more than 2 years behind schedule, increasing the risk of potential 
capability gaps and putting cost pressure on the overall acquisition 
portfolio.\15\ For example, in June 2023, we reported that the Coast 
Guard projects to have a reduced number of cutters available for 
operation starting in 2024 and through 2039 due to the Offshore Patrol 
Cutters' delivery delays.
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    \15\ GAO-23-105805; Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Security Cutter 
Needs to Stabilize Design Before Starting Construction and Improve 
Schedule Oversight, GAO-23-105949 (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2023); 
Coast Guard Recapitalization: Actions Needed to Better Manage 
Acquisition Programs and Address Affordability Concerns, GAO-23-106948 
(Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2023).
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    We have reported for decades that the operational capacity of the 
legacy vessel fleet has been declining. For example, we reported in 
July 2012 that Medium Endurance Cutters--a key asset for law 
enforcement missions that the Offshore Patrol Cutter is to replace--did 
not meet operational hours targets from fiscal years 2005 through 2011 
and that declining operational capacity hindered mission 
performance.\16\ Further, since 2013, the Coast Guard has acknowledged 
that its two operational icebreakers--the Polar Star and Healy--are 
insufficient to meet its multifaceted mission needs in the polar 
regions, which include preventing IUU fishing.
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    \16\ GAO, Coast Guard: Legacy Vessels' Declining Conditions 
Reinforce Need for More Realistic Operational Targets, GAO-12-741 
(Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since 2010, the Coast Guard has invested at least $850 million to 
maintain the aging Medium Endurance Cutters and the Polar Star 
icebreaker. The Coast Guard is investing an additional $250 million to 
extend the service life for six cutters and $75 million to extend the 
service life of the almost 50-year-old Polar Star until the delayed 
Offshore Patrol Cutters and Polar Security Cutters, respectively, are 
operational.
    We made seven recommendations in our 2023 reports on the Offshore 
Patrol and Polar Security Cutters to better align the Coast Guard's 
acquisition policy and the programs' practices with shipbuilding 
leading practices. DHS and the Coast Guard agreed with five of our 
recommendations and have taken some steps to implement them. For 
example, the Coast Guard stated that it plans to update its acquisition 
policy to require that all shipbuilding programs complete the 
functional design of major portions of systems that affect multiple 
zones of the ship--such as electricity and water--prior to the start of 
lead ship construction.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ The two recommendations that DHS did not agree with were 
related to the Offshore Patrol Cutter stage 2 program, which 
encompasses Offshore Patrol Cutters 5 through 15. These recommendations 
stated that the Coast Guard should ensure the stage 2 program 1) 
successfully demonstrates integrated prototypes of all critical 
technologies in a realistic environment no later than preliminary 
design review, and 2) achieves a sufficiently stable design--which 
according to leading practices is completion of basic and functional 
design, including the routing of major distributive systems--prior to 
the start of lead ship construction. We stand by our recommendations 
because they align with leading practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Uncertain Workforce Needs
    Coast Guard challenges with determining its workforce needs 
generally as well as for specific key mission needs have affected its 
ability to meet mission demands. In recent years, the Coast Guard has 
raised concerns that its workload had outpaced its workforce levels. 
Notably, in April 2018, the Coast Guard reported to Congress that it 
faced challenges meeting its daily mission demands because it was 
operating below the workforce level necessary to meet all its mission 
requirements.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Coast Guard, Manpower Requirements Plan Report to Congress, 
(Apr.13, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More recently, in 2022, the Coast Guard reported that operating in 
increasingly complex and dynamic security and maritime domains will 
become more complicated with technology-driven changes. The Coast Guard 
reported that these changes require workforce growth and enhanced 
skills to operate and maintain updated assets.\19\ Further the Coast 
Guard has a workforce shortfall of approximately 3,500 enlisted 
members, according to remarks made by the Commandant in October 2023, 
and the service has missed its recruiting targets in recent years.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Coast Guard, Ready Workforce 2030, (Apr. 2022).
    \20\ Admiral Linda L. Fagan, ``The U.S. Coast Guard in an Era of 
Great Power Competition with ADM Linda L. Fagan'' Transcript of event 
held at Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 17, 
2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-coast-guard-era-great-power-
competition-adm-linda-l-fagan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the Coast Guard has expressed workforce concerns, it has 
conducted limited assessments of its workforce needs. In 2022, 2020, 
and 2010, we reported that the Coast Guard had not adequately 
determined its workforce needs.\21\ Specifically, the Coast Guard had 
assessed only a small portion of its workforce needs through the 
requirements determination process it began using in 2003.\22\ In 
February 2020, for example, we found that the Coast Guard had completed 
workforce requirements analyses from calendar years 2003 through 2019 
for 28 percent of its workforce and requirements determinations over 
the same period for 6 percent of its workforce.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ GAO-22-106135; Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Evaluate the 
Effectiveness of Organizational Changes and Determine Workforce Needs, 
GAO-20-223 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2020); Coast Guard: Deployable 
Operations Group Achieving Organizational Benefits, but Challenges 
Remain, GAO-10-433R (Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2010).
    \22\ U.S. Coast Guard, Manpower Requirements Plan, Report to 
Congress (Apr. 13, 2018). The requirements determination process 
includes a requirements analysis, which is a comprehensive review of 
workforce needs, and concludes with a requirements determination, which 
identifies the number and type of positions a unit type requires to 
meet mission-based capability requirements.
    \23\ GAO-20-223. Further, we reported in September 2022 that the 
service has faced persistent challenges filling certain cyberspace 
positions it considers as critical or understaffed. See GAO, Coast 
Guard: Workforce Planning Actions Needed to Address Growing Cyberspace 
Mission Demands, GAO-22-105208 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We found several limitations affecting the Coast Guard's ability to 
effectively implement its workforce requirements determination process. 
Specifically, it lacks time frames for how it will achieve its 
workforce assessment goals--notably, to assess the workforce 
requirements for all its positions and units. Among other things, we 
recommended that the Coast Guard update its Manpower Requirements Plan 
with time frames and milestones for doing so.\24\ DHS concurred with 
our recommendations and described actions planned to address them. As 
of November 2023, the Coast Guard reported that it had completed 
workforce requirements determinations for 15 percent of its workforce.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ We made a total of six recommendations, four of which 
addressed limitations with Coast Guard's workforce requirements 
determination process. As of November 2023, the Coast Guard implemented 
three of these recommendations by updating its guidance, determining 
necessary personnel to conduct the workforce determination process, and 
tracking the extent to which it completed this process for its units.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As of May 2023, Coast Guard officials said they had not determined 
time frames and milestones to fully implement its workforce 
requirements plan but indicated it could be feasible to develop a rough 
estimate of how many positions it plans to assess in the next five 
years. By updating its plan to complete requirements determinations and 
obtaining information on the resources needed to achieve its workforce 
assessment goal, the Coast Guard will be better positioned to ensure 
that it has the right number of people with requisite skills in the 
right units to meet its mission demands.
    We have also previously reported on Coast Guard's workforce 
challenges related to identifying capability gaps in specific mission 
needs, including specialized forces. In November 2019, we reported that 
the Coast Guard could benefit from assessing workforce needs for its 
Deployable Specialized Forces workforce--multiple units with a range of 
specialized capabilities needed to handle drug and migrant 
interdiction, IUU fishing, terrorism, and other threats in the U.S. 
maritime environment.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ GAO-20-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Specifically, we found that the Coast Guard had not used data and 
evidence to fully assess its Deployable Specialized Forces workforce 
needs.\26\ We reported that conducting this analysis would better 
position the Coast Guard to identify capability gaps between mission 
requirements and mission performance caused by deficiencies in the 
numbers of personnel available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ As of November 2019, the Coast Guard had 25 specialized forces 
teams and 2 units.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As a result, we recommended that the Coast Guard conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of its Deployable Specialized Forces' workforce 
needs. DHS concurred with this recommendation, and, in February 2023, 
the Coast Guard reported that drafts of the mission analysis reports on 
two Specialized Forces unit types were being reviewed, with an 
estimated completion of Spring 2023. However, the Coast Guard informed 
us that analysis of the three remaining Specialized Force unit types is 
subject to available funding and is not yet complete. By 
comprehensively assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' workforce 
needs the Coast Guard may be able to more efficiently allocate 
resources for its Deployable Specialized Forces and the missions they 
conduct.
Technology Challenges
    The Coast Guard has had longstanding issues managing its technology 
resources. The Coast Guard relies extensively on IT systems and 
services to carry out its missions. It also relies on operational 
technology, which encompasses a broad range of programmable systems or 
devices that interact with the physical environment, such as sensors 
and radar.
    In July 2020, we reported on longstanding challenges the Coast 
Guard has had with its IT systems MISLE, which is a data system that 
tracks and reports results data for nearly all Coast Guard missions. We 
found that the system had some capability gaps, and MISLE users we 
spoke to described numerous challenges with the system. For example, 
MISLE did not capture migrant interdiction data used to meet 
departmental reporting requirements. According to Coast Guard maritime 
law enforcement officials, the Coast Guard is responsible for tracking 
20 discrete migrant interdiction data elements for departmental 
reporting. However, according to these officials, they were only able 
to easily aggregate two of the 20 required data elements from MISLE--
date and location of interdiction event--because MISLE captured the 
other data elements in user-created narrative entries that were not 
easily searched. Coast Guard officials at the time of our review 
estimated that they spent 1 hour per day compiling data manually but 
could compile the information in seconds if the data were readily 
available in MISLE.
    MISLE system managers stated they were aware of these challenges, 
had begun to address some of them, and agreed that MISLE requires 
further investments to meet user needs. However, we found that the 
Coast Guard did not follow key systems development processes. As a 
result, we recommended that the Coast Guard follow its key systems 
development processes to identify and analyze alternatives to select 
solutions to meet mission needs. The Coast Guard concurred and said it 
plans to replace MISLE. As of June 2023, replacement efforts were 
ongoing.
    In addition, in July 2022, we reported on various aspects of the 
Coast Guard's IT program.\27\ For example, we reported that the Coast 
Guard implemented two processes intended to ensure that its IT 
infrastructure resources meet the service's mission needs.\28\ However, 
the service did not have a comprehensive process that included common 
practices for network capacity planning--a key process in IT 
infrastructure planning that involves assessing and determining the 
network resource needs required to effectively support an entity's 
mission. As a result, we recommended that the Coast Guard develop 
network capacity planning policies and procedures and implement leading 
practices for network capacity planning, among other things. Coast 
Guard agreed with each of our eight recommendations and as of January 
2023 was taking actions to address them, such as implementing leading 
practices for network capacity planning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Enhance IT Program 
Implementation, GAO-22-105092 (Washington, D.C. July 28, 2022).
    \28\ GAO-22-105092.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In conclusion, the Coast Guard's law enforcement missions are vital 
to U.S. interests. The Coast Guard has acknowledged that operating in 
the dynamic security and maritime domains will become more complicated 
as it acquires upgraded information systems as well as technologically 
advanced aircraft and vessels. In addition, workforce growth and 
enhanced skills will be required to operate and maintain updated 
assets. Addressing our recommendations on managing its assets, 
workforce, and technology will help ensure that the service efficiently 
uses its available resources to carry out its law enforcement and other 
missions.
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Appendix I: Information on the U.S. Coast Guard's Missions Programs and 
                           Statutory Missions
    As shown in table 1, the Coast Guard is responsible for 11 
statutory missions identified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as 
amended.\1\ The Coast Guard manages these missions through six mission 
programs, also listed in table 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 6 U.S.C. Sec.  468(a).

    Table 1: Information on the Coast Guard's Mission Programs and 11
                           Statutory Missions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Mission program           Statutory Mission      Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maritime security operations....  8Ports, waterways,  Ensure the
                                   and coastal         security of the
                                   security            waters subject to
                                   (response           the jurisdiction
                                   activities).        of the U.S. and
                                                       the waterways,
                                                       ports, and
                                                       intermodal
                                                       landside
                                                       connections that
                                                       comprise the
                                                       marine
                                                       transportation
                                                       system and
                                                       protect those who
                                                       live or work on
                                                       the water or who
                                                       use the maritime
                                                       environment for
                                                       recreation.0
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
Maritime law enforcement........  8Migrant            Stem the flow of
                                   interdiction.       undocumented
                                                       alien migration
                                                       and human
                                                       smuggling
                                                       activities via
                                                       maritime routes.
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                  Drug interdiction.  Stem the flow of
                                                       illegal drugs
                                                       into the U.S.0
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                  Living marine       Enforce laws
                                   resources.          governing the
                                                       conservation,
                                                       management, and
                                                       recovery of
                                                       living marine
                                                       resources, marine
                                                       protected
                                                       species, and
                                                       national marine
                                                       sanctuaries and
                                                       monuments.
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                  8Other law          Enforce
                                   enforcement.        international
                                                       treaties,
                                                       including the
                                                       prevention of
                                                       illegal fishing
                                                       in international
                                                       waters and the
                                                       dumping of
                                                       plastics and
                                                       other marine
                                                       debris.0
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
Maritime prevention.............  8Ports, waterways,  Ensure the
                                   and coastal         security of the
                                   security            waters subject to
                                   (prevention         the jurisdiction
                                   activities).        of the U.S. and
                                                       the waterways,
                                                       ports, and
                                                       intermodal
                                                       landside
                                                       connections that
                                                       comprise the
                                                       marine
                                                       transportation
                                                       system and
                                                       protect those who
                                                       live or work on
                                                       the water or who
                                                       use the maritime
                                                       environment for
                                                       recreation.0
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                  Marine safety.....  Enforce laws which
                                                       prevent death,
                                                       injury, and
                                                       property loss in
                                                       the marine
                                                       environment.
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                  Marine              Enforce laws which
                                   environmental       deter the
                                   protection          introduction of
                                   (prevention         invasive species
                                   activities).        into the maritime
                                                       environment, stop
                                                       unauthorized
                                                       ocean dumping,
                                                       and prevent oil
                                                       and chemical
                                                       spills.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
Maritime response...............  Search and rescue.  Search for, and
                                                       provide aid to,
                                                       people who are in
                                                       distress or
                                                       imminent danger.
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                  Marine              Respond to oil and
                                   environmental       chemical spills.
                                   protection
                                   (response
                                   activities).
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
Defense operations..............  8Defense readiness  Maintain the
                                                       training and
                                                       capability
                                                       necessary to
                                                       immediately
                                                       integrate with
                                                       Department of
                                                       Defense forces in
                                                       both peacetime
                                                       operations and
                                                       during times of
                                                       war.0
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
Marine transportation system      Aids to navigation  Mitigate the risk
 management.                                           to safe
                                                       navigation by
                                                       providing and
                                                       maintaining more
                                                       than 51,000
                                                       buoys, beacons,
                                                       lights, and other
                                                       aids to mark
                                                       channels and
                                                       denote hazards.
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                  Ice operations....  Establish and
                                                       maintain tracks
                                                       for critical
                                                       waterways, assist
                                                       and escort
                                                       vessels beset or
                                                       stranded in ice,
                                                       and remove
                                                       navigational
                                                       hazards created
                                                       by ice in
                                                       navigable
                                                       waterways.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Source: 6 U.S.C. Sec.  468(a); GAO summary of Coast Guard information.
  GAO-24-107144
 Note: Shading denotes Coast Guard statutory homeland security missions.


    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
    As I promised at the first, we are going to recess here for 
the time of the committee votes. And about 5 minutes 
afterwards, we will recall at the call of the chair, which will 
be probably 5 minutes after we quit the votes.
    [Recess.] [11:20 a.m.]
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The committee is called to order.
    And, Mr. Davenport, we left off with you. You are 
recognized.

     TESTIMONY OF AARON C. DAVENPORT, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, 
 INFRASTRUCTURE, IMMIGRATION, AND SECURITY OPERATIONS PROGRAM, 
                        RAND CORPORATION

    Mr. Davenport. Thank you.
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and members of 
the subcommittee, good morning and thank you for the honor of 
testifying before you today.
    I am a senior policy researcher and associate program 
director at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit and nonpartisan 
research organization. Prior to joining RAND, I served in the 
U.S. Coast Guard for 30 years in multiple roles, including as 
commanding officer of two major cutters performing interdiction 
missions in the Atlantic, Pacific, Caribbean, and Bering Seas.
    My testimony today is focused on potential ways Coast Guard 
interdiction missions could be enhanced. I will specifically 
discuss opportunities for better information sharing, 
technology implementation, and interagency and international 
cooperation and collaboration.
    Regarding information sharing, a strong consensus exists 
across the interagency that intelligence-driven operations are 
key to improving interdiction outcomes. Information sharing 
among intelligence and law enforcement agencies and partner 
nations often yields the best outcomes when investments are 
focused on increasing intelligence gathering analysis and 
queuing capability.
    Improved data sharing will facilitate more optimal 
placement of the limited assets dedicated to interdiction and 
help target where diplomatic and economic incentives would be 
the most efficient. However, consistency in interdiction data 
remains an issue. Both flow and seizure data differ depending 
on the source and, therefore, may lead to conflicting or 
erroneous conclusions. Having a common understanding of 
interdiction data is essential because it contributes to 
informed policy development, resource allocation, and 
operational decisions pertaining to interdiction programs.
    Concerning technology, increasing the use of existing 
unmanned systems technology continues to be an important 
investment to improve the effectiveness of interdiction forces. 
In expansive geographic areas, small unmanned aircraft could be 
launched from unmanned vessels that can remain at sea for 
extended periods of time. These unmanned vessels could further 
be used to monitor illegal activities while remaining 
undetected, thanks to their small size.
    Additionally, other unmanned vessels and the aircrafts that 
would be easily visible to those engaging in illicit activity 
could further deter migration, drug trafficking, and illegal 
fishing activities.
    A RAND Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center study 
for Coast Guard aviation found that incorporating unmanned 
aircraft is particularly cost effective for detection and 
monitoring activities and further recommended unmanned aircraft 
as a major element of the future aircraft fleet.
    With respect to cooperation collaboration, the U.S. has 
achieved the largest increases in interdiction and security 
when enabling and working with regional partners. Training 
provided by the Coast Guard has been a key enabler of improving 
international coordination and maritime interdiction success.
    In addition, greater utilization of Coast Guard law 
enforcement detachments has been demonstrated to be a highly 
successful force multiplier. Establishing and exercising 
bilateral agreements also remains crucial. The Coast Guard 
could further bolster regional partnerships by providing more 
training from law enforcement experts, combined operations, and 
logistics support. In doing so, the United States will expand 
the jurisdictional reach of its maritime interdiction 
operations.
    Finally, the Coast Guard could explore other options for 
operating to increase its effectiveness in areas discussed 
today. For example, U.S. interdictions generally focus on 
international waters and noncommercial conveyances, but there 
remain challenges associated with coordinating interagency and 
international forces, partner nation legal hurdles, forward 
basing, and logistics support. An alternative is greater 
emphasis on improving intelligence and interdiction measures 
through international port state control, which would allow for 
additional scrutiny before a suspect ship leaves the source 
nation. Efforts to counter commercial maritime trafficking 
should recognize the utility of port state control as a choke 
point to monitor and control poorly regulated flag-of-
convenience ships suspected of engaging in illegal transport.
    In summary, I believe there are multiple options available 
to enhance the Coast Guard's interdictions and operations, and 
improve outcomes.
    Thank you.
    [Mr. Davenport's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Aaron C. Davenport,\1\ Associate Director, 
  Infrastructure, Immigration, and Security Operations Program, RAND 
                            Corporation \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are 
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those 
of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research.
    \2\ The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops 
solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities 
throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more 
prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public 
interest. RAND's mission is enabled through its core values of quality 
and objectivity and its commitment to integrity and ethical behavior. 
RAND subjects its research publications to a robust and exacting 
quality-assurance process; avoids financial and other conflicts of 
interest through staff training, project screening, and a policy of 
mandatory disclosure; and pursues transparency through the open 
publication of research findings and recommendations, disclosure of the 
source of funding of published research, and policies to ensure 
intellectual independence. This testimony is not a research 
publication, but witnesses affiliated with RAND routinely draw on 
relevant research conducted in the organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Enhancing U.S. Coast Guard Interdiction: Information-Sharing, 
     Technology, and Interagency and International Cooperation and 
                             Collaboration
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and members of the 
subcommittee, good morning and thank you for the honor of testifying 
before you today. I am a senior defense and international policy 
researcher and associate program director within the Homeland Security 
Research Division of the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit and nonpartisan 
research organization. Prior to joining RAND, I served in the U.S. 
Coast Guard (USCG) for 30 years in multiple roles, including as 
Homeland Security Advisor to the Office of the Vice President of the 
United States; Executive Officer, Counterdrug Operations, U.S. Southern 
Command, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD); Chief, Office of Cutter 
Forces, USCG, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and as a 
commanding, executive, and operations officer aboard multiple major 
cutters performing drug and migrant interdiction missions and 
international fisheries enforcement in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans 
and in the Caribbean and Bering Seas, as well as security cooperation 
and joint operations with several partner nations. As a senior RAND 
researcher, I have been a lead or contributing author on more than 20 
reports and publications associated with USCG operations, strategy, 
policy, and acquisition programs and have served as a maritime security 
policy and strategy subject-matter expert to the Defense Security 
Cooperation University's Institute for Security Governance and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Science for Peace and Security 
Programme.
    My testimony today is focused on potential ways the USCG's drug and 
migrant interdiction missions and international fisheries law 
enforcement mission could be enhanced. My comments apply to all three 
interdiction missions, focusing on opportunities to enhance 
information-sharing, leverage existing technology, improve interagency 
and international cooperation and collaboration, and other options for 
operations.
                          Information-Sharing
    Opportunities to improve information-sharing is a persistent 
challenge. A strong consensus exists across the interagency that 
intelligence-driven operations are key to improving interdiction 
operations outcomes. To that end, information-sharing among 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies and partner or cooperating 
nations often yields the best outcomes while improving resource 
allocation. Investments that are focused on increasing intelligence 
gathering, analysis, and cueing capability and capacity may have a 
greater return on investment than spending limited government resources 
on interdiction platforms and other equipment.
    My experience and analysis while at RAND strongly suggest that the 
international law enforcement community could also derive further 
benefits from enhanced information-sharing programs with partner 
nations and U.S. interagency partners. It is an imperative that the 
U.S. government expand and facilitate the appropriate and timely 
sharing of operationally relevant and perishable information between 
the United States and foreign partners.
    The sharing of data that inform smuggling patterns and interdiction 
successes also needs to improve. There is a constant demand for higher-
quality datasets that challenge what is known or perceived regarding 
drug and migrant smuggling and regarding illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing activities. This demand includes better 
sharing of unclassified government data that may reveal better ways to 
successfully interdict vessels conducting illegal activities. Robust 
data that support a wider variety of analyses and allow for thoughtful 
discourse among subject-matter experts are an imperative to improving 
processes. Continued and enhanced efforts to leverage quality 
performance metrics, datasets, and information-sharing programs among 
international interdiction regional partners remain an important factor 
in reducing the flow of illegal drugs, migrants, and IUU fishing. 
Improved data will facilitate more optimal placement of the limited 
assets dedicated to interdiction and help target where diplomatic and 
economic incentives would be the most efficient. Consistent and routine 
capture and analysis of operational performance data could aid in the 
optimization of asset placement in resource-constrained environments as 
well. Robust information-sharing, operations research, and analysis of 
interdiction data can reveal patterns and maximize the effectiveness of 
available assets.
    U.S. support in the form of information-sharing has been critical 
to interdiction operations. This is particularly true with respect to 
maritime forces that conduct interdictions within their territory. 
However, consistency in interdiction data remains problematic. 
Interdiction data differ depending on the source. There are myriad 
potential explanations, but the central point is that both flow and 
seizure data differ depending on the source and, therefore, may lead to 
conflicting or erroneous conclusions and inferences. Having a common 
understanding of interdiction data is essential because it contributes 
to policy development, resource allocation, and operational decisions 
pertaining to interdiction programs and overall counterdrug program 
policy.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Daniel M. Gerstein, Bryce Pardo, Aaron C. Davenport, and Irina 
A. Chindea, An Overview of the Effectiveness of U.S. Counternarcotics 
Efforts in Colombia, 2000-2020, and Recommendations for the Future, 
RAND Corporation, RR-A1389-3, 2022, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RRA1389-3.html; Aaron C. Davenport, ``Lessons from 
Maritime Narcotics Interdiction: Interdiction in the Maritime Source, 
Transit, and Arrival Zones of the Western Hemisphere,'' in Edward R. 
Lucas, Samuel Rivera-Paez, Thomas Crosbie, and Felix Falck Jensen, 
eds., Maritime Security: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from Maritime Piracy 
and Narcotics Interdiction, Vol. 150, IOS Press, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         Leveraging Technology
    Increasing the use of existing unmanned systems technology has been 
and continues to be identified as an important investment for 
interdiction forces to improve their effectiveness and reduce manned 
assets. Recent RAND reports and researcher commentary highlight the 
importance of incorporating unmanned systems technology. Unmanned 
aerial systems (UASs) provide situational awareness less expensively 
than manned platforms. In expansive geographic areas, UASs could be 
launched from and recovered by unmanned surface vehicles (USVs). USVs 
that linger in the environment could also be used to monitor drug 
vessels and remain undetected thanks to their small size. With the 
right sensors, USVs could help detect semisubmersible or submersible 
threats. Visible UASs and USVs near shorelines could deter illegal 
migration. These systems could also aid in tracking IUU fishing 
activities.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Eric Cooper and Scott Savitz, ``Coast Guard Leans Forward in 
New UxS Strategy but Faces Significant Challenges,'' The RAND Blog, May 
3, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/05/coast-guard-
leans-forward-in-new-uxs-strategy-but-faces.html; Scott Savitz, Aaron 
C. Davenport, and Michelle D. Ziegler, The Marine Transportation 
System, Autonomous Technology, and Implications for the U.S. Coast 
Guard, Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center operated by the 
RAND Corporation, PE-359-DHS, May 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
perspectives/PE359.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A RAND Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center fleet mix 
study for USCG aviation completed in 2020 found that incorporating UASs 
is particularly cost-effective for scenarios requiring detection and 
monitoring activities. Researchers recommended that the USCG consider 
UASs as a potential major element of the future aircraft fleet. 
Modeling revealed that fleets with UASs performed well across all 
mission sets. Using a measured and deliberate approach will ensure that 
these aircraft can suitably perform the surveillance mission and that 
appropriate numbers are procured to enable an effective and robust 
fleet.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Jeremy M. Eckhause, David T. Orletsky, Aaron C. Davenport, Mel 
Eisman, Raza Khan, Jonathan Theel, Marc Thibault, Dulani Woods, and 
Michelle D. Ziegler, Meeting U.S. Coast Guard Airpower Needs: Assessing 
the Options, Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center operated by 
the RAND Corporation, RR-3179-DHS, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR3179.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Improving Interagency and International Cooperation and Collaboration
    The United States has achieved the largest increases in 
interdiction and security when enabling and working with regional 
partners and organizations.\6\ The United Nations Counter-Terrorism 
Centre and the Global Counterterrorism Forum have cooperated to produce 
a set of ``good practices'' for border security and management. These 
practices include enhancing interagency and international cooperation. 
A key enabler of improving international coordination and maritime 
interdiction success is through international training. Major 
objectives of training are designed to enhance the expertise of law 
enforcement activities in countries significant to U.S. efforts, 
improve the technical capability of law enforcement personnel in these 
countries, and, ultimately, increase the cooperation between U.S. and 
foreign law enforcement officials.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Matthew R. Conners, Caribbean and Eastern Pacific Maritime 
Security: Regional Cooperation in Bridge and Insular States, thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, March 2018.
    \7\ Davenport, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Bilateral agreements have become even more critical for 
interdiction operations. The exploitation of Central American nations 
by transnational criminal organizations has created a strategically 
difficult and destabilizing situation, as movements of illicit cargo 
(and people) from source countries often make landfall in countries 
incapable of stopping them. The USCG's bilateral agreements with 
partner nations, including foreign militaries and law enforcement 
agencies, expand the jurisdictional reach of maritime interdiction 
operations. Maintaining and advancing bilateral agreements has been a 
successful strategy. Thanks to the years of persistent engagement with 
international partners to develop these agreements, the USCG has become 
dramatically more effective. The USCG could further bolster these 
partnerships by providing equipment and training funded through U.S. 
Department of State and DoD security assistance programs. Some partner 
nations benefit greatly from training provided by USCG law enforcement 
experts, while other nations lack standardized boats and communications 
packages and are unable to adequately communicate with each other, and 
most nations also benefit from combined operations and logistics 
support.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Davenport, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An example of a successful program was the Caribbean Support 
Tender. Under the auspices of the U.S. Department of State and U.S. 
Southern Command, the USCG operated an internationally crewed ship 
composed of partner nation mariners and USCG trainers and operators. 
The tender's mission was focused on law enforcement training and 
maintaining partner nation interdiction competencies. This effort 
resulted in directly improving partner nation capability and expertise. 
Additionally, the progressive training engagements advanced trust and 
cooperative relationships critical to future mission success and 
resulted in a stronger coalition of counterdrug forces than what had 
existed in the Pacific area of operations, which did not have a similar 
asset.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Davenport, 2020.
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    In a study conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School, researchers 
concluded that the United States must strengthen its partnerships with 
transit zone countries, enhance partner nation abilities, and 
concentrate its efforts in high-payoff areas of interest; that 
strengthening such partnerships builds trust among the United States 
and its partners and provides access to geographic areas of interest; 
and that enhancing the abilities of partner nations serves to fill 
existing capacity gaps borne of declining resources. The United States 
cannot effectively provide an interdiction force across a majority of 
its 42-million-square-mile operating area and must concentrate its 
forces exclusively in high-payoff trafficking areas--specifically, 
coastal areas nearest the source zones and at transit zone arrival 
points. It is understood that this approach will eventually be 
countered, but the gains achieved by this strategy will likely have 
lasting impacts on the smuggling enterprise.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Davenport, 2020.
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    Greater utilization of USCG Deployable Specialized Forces (DSF), 
specifically law enforcement detachments, has been demonstrated to be a 
highly successful force multiplier. Providing USCG DSF personnel while 
exercising bilateral agreements with partner nations, including foreign 
militaries and law enforcement agencies, expands the jurisdictional 
reach of U.S. maritime interdiction operations. Specifically, ship-
boarding and ship-rider authorities and international maritime 
interdiction support could be enhanced.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Ship-boarding refers to the standing authority or procedures 
for the USCG to stop, board, and search suspect foreign vessels located 
seaward of the territorial sea of any nation. Ship-rider refers to the 
standing authority for partners to embark law enforcement officials on 
each other's platforms, and the officials may then authorize certain 
law enforcement actions. International maritime interdiction support 
refers to the standing authority or procedures for U.S. law enforcement 
assets to moor or stay at national ports and for U.S. law enforcement 
officials to board suspect vessels not flying a U.S. or host nation 
flag, to escort persons from suspect vessels through and out of the 
host nation, and to land and temporarily remain at international 
airports for logistics (Davenport, 2020).
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                             Other Options
    Despite robust bilateral agreements, U.S. government interdictions 
generally focus on international waters and noncommercial conveyances; 
there might not be the same level of effort and success (measured in 
quantity seized) in the United States targeting flows within other 
domains and along threat vectors because of significant challenges 
associated with coordinating interagency and international forces, 
partner nation legal hurdles, forward basing, and logistics 
support.\12\ Placing a greater emphasis on improving intelligence and 
interdiction measures through international port state control (PSC) 
may assist in better outcomes before contraband leaves the source 
nation. One reason why maritime transport offers the greatest success 
rate for the trafficking of destabilizing commodities is that it is 
more difficult for states to monitor and control maritime avenues than 
any other means of international bulk transport. The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea generally provides flag states with 
exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction over their vessels in 
international waters. For example, in most cases, ships suspected of 
carrying illicit cargo cannot be boarded, and their commodities cannot 
be seized without the prior agreement of the flag state. Therefore, 
many ships involved in the transport of illicit cargo sail under so-
called flags of convenience and are registered in flag states with 
limited regulation and control of their merchant fleets. Many of the 
flags of convenience under which these vessels sail have been 
consistently targeted for inspection in other countries by PSC regimes 
based on poor performance in previous inspections, but these 
inspections are focused more on safety measures than on smuggling or 
contraband seizure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Gerstein et al., 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In most cases, PSC inspections are the only occasions when state 
authorities have the right to board a ship without consulting the flag 
state. PSC inspections allow the inspection of the ship, including the 
cargo hold and crew's quarters. They also provide a mechanism to 
control the movement of targeted ships through detention in port and 
even to ban the suspect ships from all ports operating under the same 
cooperative PSC regime. Efforts to counter maritime trafficking should 
recognize the utility of PSC as a ``choke point'' to monitor and 
control poorly regulated flag-of-convenience ships suspected of 
engaging in illegal transport.\13\
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    \13\ Adriana Avila-Zuniga Nordfjeld, Building a National Maritime 
Security Policy, dissertation, World Maritime University, WMU Research 
Report Series No. 11, September 2018; Davenport, 2020; Edward R. Lucas, 
Samuel Rivera-Paez, Thomas Crosbie, and Felix Falck Jensen, eds., 
Maritime Security: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from Maritime Piracy and 
Narcotics, Vol. 150, IOS Press, 2020.
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    Foreign seaports represent one potential trafficking vulnerability 
because many of the Pacific and Atlantic ports in Central and South 
America have poor PSC measures. This results in the exploitation of 
maritime shipping containers and other commercial shipping avenues. 
This also makes commercial maritime smuggling a more popular smuggling 
mode, which is ostensibly underestimated in the flow estimates. PSC 
measures is an area where the source and transit zone partner nations 
could improve their interdiction efforts. Domestically, the U.S. 
government has relied on focused intelligence when performing 
interdictions aboard commercial vessels because of the complexity of 
both targeting and interdicting containers, as well as the diplomatic 
and legal hurdles with flag states, owners, and operators within the 
container-shipping global enterprise, which make widespread inspection 
difficult.\14\
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    \14\ Nordfjeld, 2018; Davenport, 2020; Lucas et al., 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In summation, there are options available to enhance USCG 
interdiction missions to include continuing to improve information-
sharing at all levels, better leverage existing unmanned systems 
technology, further advance cooperation and collaboration through 
international training opportunities, improve interdiction data and 
data sharing, and consider expanding the use of international port 
state control strategies as an interdiction tool.
    I thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify and look 
forward to answering your questions.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
    Dr. Keating-Bitonti, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

TESTIMONY OF CAITLIN KEATING-BITONTI, Ph.D., NATURAL RESOURCES 
         POLICY ANALYST, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

    Ms. Keating-Bitonti. Chairman Webster, Ranking Member 
Carbajal, and members of the subcommittee, good morning. My 
name is Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, and I am an analyst in natural 
resources policy at the Congressional Research Service.
    As requested by the subcommittee, my testimony will focus 
on the United States Coast Guard's role in the at-sea 
enforcement of living marine resource laws and international 
agreements as it pertains to illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing, or IUU fishing. CRS takes no position and 
makes no recommendations on policy matters.
    Today, I am going to discuss IUU fishing and some of the 
negative consequences associated with it, as well as discuss 
some efforts by the U.S. Coast Guard to combat IUU fishing. IUU 
fishing is an ongoing, multifaceted global issue that affects 
the ocean ecosystem and the sustainable management of living 
marine resources both within areas of national jurisdiction and 
on the high seas. IUU fishing can impact the accuracy of the 
data needed to inform fisheries conservation and management 
decisions, thereby exacerbating overfishing while threatening 
the livelihoods of vulnerable fishing communities and food 
security in certain regions.
    Experts estimate that one in five fish caught is derived 
from IUU fishing, costing the global economy between $15 
billion and $36 billion annually.
    Over the past two decades, successive U.S. administrations 
and Congress have recognized that IUU fishing poses a threat to 
national and regional security and have taken a number of 
actions to combat IUU fishing broadly. In particular, the 
Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement Act, commonly known 
as the Maritime SAFE Act, was enacted in 2019, establishing a 
whole-of-Government approach to counter IUU fishing and to 
prevent IUU fish species from entering the marketplace.
    The U.S. Coast Guard is a leading agency for U.S. 
enforcement of domestic and international living marine 
resources laws in the U.S. exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, and 
in key areas of the high seas, such as those managed by 
regional fisheries management organizations, or RFMOs. RFMOs 
are treaty-based international bodies composed of nations that 
share an interest in the management and conservation of 
fisheries in specific geographic areas of the high seas.
    The U.S. Coast Guard works with the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, the Department of Defense, and the 
Department of State, among other agencies, to provide a whole-
of-Government approach to addressing IUU fishing.
    In 2021, the U.S. Coast Guard outlined actions it would 
take to combat illegal exploitation of marine fish stocks. Some 
of these actions were also identified as priorities for the 
U.S. Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing, which was 
established under the Maritime SAFE Act.
    To combat IUU fishing, the U.S. Coast Guard proposes 
enhancing its at-sea operations, applying innovative 
technologies to detect vessels engaging in suspicious fishing 
behavior, and assisting partner nations with fishery law 
enforcement in their territorial waters, among other actions.
    The U.S. Coast Guard identifies instances of IUU fishing 
through its at-sea operations. On the high seas, under the 
authority of some RFMOs, U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement 
officials may conduct boardings and investigations of vessels 
suspected of IUU fishing.
    The U.S. Coast Guard reports instances of identified or 
suspected IUU fishing activity to other Federal agencies and to 
the relevant RFMO to inform IUU fishing vessel lists and other 
actions.
    According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
between 2016 and 2020, U.S. Coast Guard boarded and inspected 
227 fishing vessels on the high seas. Because of the size of 
the ocean environment, the U.S. Coast Guard may analyze vessel 
tracking data, such as vessel position information broadcasts 
via automated identification systems, to identify vessel 
movement patterns indicative of IUU fishing. These analyses 
help target suspect vessels.
    The U.S. Coast Guard also works with partner nations to 
help build their own counter IUU capacity through training 
exercises and bilateral shiprider agreements. Shiprider 
agreements are cooperative enforcement arrangements that allow 
law enforcement officials from one party to embark on another 
nation's law enforcement vessel or aircraft. The Maritime SAFE 
Act directs Federal agencies to enter into new shiprider 
agreements or add counter IUU fishing provisions to existing 
shiprider agreements in priority regions.
    This concludes my opening remarks. Thank you, and I look 
forward to responding to any questions.
    [Ms. Keating-Bitonti's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, Ph.D., Natural Resources 
             Policy Analyst, Congressional Research Service
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, on behalf on the Congressional Research Service (CRS), 
thank you for this opportunity to appear before you. I am Caitlin 
Keating-Bitonti, an Analyst in Natural Resources Policy. The 
Subcommittee requested that CRS testify about the United States Coast 
Guard's role in the at-sea enforcement of living marine resource laws 
and international agreements as it pertains to illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing. In accordance with our enabling statutes, 
CRS takes no position and makes no recommendations on legislative or 
policy matters. My testimony draws on my own area of specialization at 
CRS--federal ocean science policy and relevant international 
agreements--and on the input of other CRS colleagues who cover other 
issues often associated with ocean policy, including IUU fishing.
           Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing
    IUU fishing is an ongoing, multi-faceted global issue that affects 
the ocean ecosystem and the sustainable management of living marine 
resources, both within areas of national jurisdiction and on the high 
seas.\1\ IUU fishing can impact the accuracy of the data needed to 
inform fisheries conservation and management decisions, thereby adding 
to overfishing and threatening food security in certain regions. 
Furthermore, the difficulty in regulating fishing vessels on the high 
seas may allow some of the vessels involved in IIU fishing to engage in 
other transnational crimes, such as labor abuses, drug smuggling, and 
human trafficking.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), Report to Congress: Improving 
International Fisheries Management, August 2023, p. 10.
    \2\ U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
Fishing Strategic Outlook, September 2020, p. 2.
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    According to the U.S. Coast Guard, IUU fishing has replaced piracy 
as the leading global maritime security threat.\3\ IUU fishing 
generally refers to fishing activities that violate national laws or 
international fisheries conservation and management measures. The 
international definition of IUU fishing is provided in the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations International Plan 
of Action for IUU fishing.\4\ The International Plan of Action for IUU 
fishing was developed as a voluntary instrument within the framework of 
the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, which has the 
general objective of promoting sustainable fisheries.\5\ In general,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Ibid.
    \4\ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Rome, Italy, 2001, http://
www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.HTM. The Agreement on Port State 
Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing uses the International Plan of Action for Illegal, 
Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing's definition (FAO, Agreement 
on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Rome, Italy, June 20, 2012, ftp://
ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/PSM/circular_lett_2012.pdf.).
    \5\ FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Rome, Italy, 
1995, http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM.
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      Illegal fishing refers to fishing activities conducted in 
contravention of applicable laws and regulations, including those laws 
and rules adopted at the regional and international level.
      Unreported fishing refers to those fishing activities 
that are not reported or are misreported to relevant authorities in 
contravention of national laws and regulations or reporting procedures 
of a relevant regional fisheries management organization (RFMO). RFMOs 
are treaty-based international bodies composed of nations that share an 
interest in the management and conservation of fisheries in specific 
geographic areas of the high seas.
      Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities 
occurring in areas, or fishing for fish stocks,\6\ for which there are 
no applicable conservation and management measures and where such 
fishing activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with a 
nation's or entity's responsibility under international law. 
Unregulated fishing also includes fishing activities conducted by 
vessels without nationality within the geographic boundaries of an 
RFMO, or by vessels flying a flag of a nation not a party to the RFMO 
with authority in that area.\7\
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    \6\ NOAA Fisheries defines a stock as ``a part of a fish population 
usually with a particular migration pattern, specific spawning grounds, 
and subject to a distinct fishery. A fish stock may be treated as a 
total or a spawning stock. Total stock refers to both juveniles and 
adults, either in numbers or by weight, while spawning stock refers to 
the numbers or weight of individuals that are old enough to 
reproduce.'' NOAA, NOAA Fisheries Glossary, p. 49.
    \7\ NOAA, NMFS, Report to Congress: Improving International 
Fisheries Management, August 2023, p. 10.

    IUU fishing undermines national and regional efforts to conserve 
and manage fish stocks.\8\ FAO estimates that one in five (or 20%) fish 
caught around the world comes from IUU fishing and, in some regions, 
such as in West Africa, it can be as high as 40%.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ FAO, ``The Toll of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing,'' at https://www.un.org/en/observances/end-illegal-fishing-
day.
    \9\ FAO, ``Four Reasons Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) 
Fishing Affects Us and What We Can Do About It,'' at https://
www.fao.org/fao-stories/article/en/c/1403336/ and NOAA, NMFS, 
``Understanding Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing,'' at 
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/insight/understanding-illegal-
unreported-and-unregulated-fishing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Illegal fishing can entail fishing for nonpermitted species, 
fishing above management quotas, and fishing out of season. These 
illegal fishing behaviors can contribute to stocks being fished at 
biologically unsustainable levels (i.e., at rates greater than species 
can replenish themselves). FAO estimates that the percentage of stocks 
fished at biologically unsustainable levels has been increasing since 
1970s, from about 10% in 1974 to about 35% in 2019.\10\ In particular, 
in 2019, approximately 77% of catch off the Pacific coast of South 
America occurred at biologically unsustainable levels.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ FAO, 2022 State of World Fisheries and Agriculture, p. 46.
    \11\ FAO, 2022 State of World Fisheries and Agriculture, p. 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By its very nature, IUU fishing is difficult to quantify, but there 
is general global consensus that the impacts of IUU fishing have far-
reaching negative consequences.\12\ First, IUU fishing undermines the 
sustainable management of fishery resources--resources that provide 
both food security and socioeconomic stability in many parts of the 
world. Developing countries that depend on fisheries for food security 
and export income are most at risk from IUU fishing.\13\ For example, 
according to a 2022 report by the FAO, aquatic foods provide at least 
20% of the average intake of animal protein for 3.3 billion people.\14\ 
IUU fishing can inhibit lawful access to this protein source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ California Environmental Associates, ``Distant Water Fishing: 
Overview of Research Efforts and Current Knowledge,'' October 2018, p. 
7.
    \13\ NOAA, NMFS, ``Understanding Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing,'' at https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/insight/
understanding-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing.
    \14\ FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2022: 
Towards Blue Transformation, Rome, FAO, 2022, pp. 12-13, at https://
doi.org/10.4060/cc0461en (hereinafter referred to as FAO, 2022 State of 
World Fisheries and Agriculture).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A second negative consequence of IUU fishing is that it provides an 
unfair advantage to entities that engage in these activities.\15\ For 
example, vessels conducting IUU fishing avoid operational costs by not 
complying with regulatory requirements and may earn more revenue by 
exceeding harvest limits. Conversely, those fishing legally may be 
harmed by lower catch rates and higher associated fishing costs. IUU 
fish in the marketplace can put legal fishers at an economic 
disadvantage and cause them to lose revenue. According to FAO, IUU 
fishing catches millions of tons of fish every year,\16\ and experts 
have calculated that IUU costs the global economy up to tens of 
billions of dollars every year.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ NOAA, NMFS, ``Understanding Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing,'' at https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/insight/
understanding-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing.
    \16\ FAO, ``The Toll of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing,'' at https://www.un.org/en/observances/end-illegal-fishing-
day.
    \17\ Enric Sala et al., ``The Economics of Fishing the High Seas,'' 
Science Advances, vol. 4, no. 6 (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Experts note that international cooperation is necessary to manage 
many fish stocks because some species move among different national 
zones of jurisdiction and the high seas. However, actions to combat IUU 
fishing activities are often hindered by the large areas in which 
fishing takes place, the lack of resources for adequate enforcement, 
weak governance institutions, and inadequate international cooperation. 
On the high seas, vessels are subject to the laws of their flag state--
the flag state of a vessel is the nation of jurisdiction under whose 
laws the vessel is registered or licensed and is deemed the nationality 
of the vessel.\18\ Vessels are also subject to the applicable rules 
established by international agreements and conventions to which their 
flag state is a party. The expectation is that all fishing nations 
exercise responsible flag state control over their vessels, including 
their distant water fleets operating on the high seas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Article 94 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982, Overview and Full Text, at https://www.un.org/depts/
los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm 
[hereinafter referred to as UNCLOS]). Although the United States is not 
a party to UNCLOS, some members of the executive branch have stated 
that some (but not all) portions of UNCLOS reflect customary 
international law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's Role in the Exploitation of Global Fisheries
    IUU fishing occurs throughout the world, and according to the U.S. 
International Trade Commission a portion of the seafood entering the 
United States reportedly is obtained from IUU fishing activities. The 
U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that in 2019 about $2.4 
billion (or 11%) worth of U.S. seafood imports were products of IUU 
fishing, of which about $204.3 million were obtained from Chinese IUU 
fishing.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ U.S. International Trade Commission, ``Illegal, Unreported, 
and Unregulated Fishing Accounts for More Than $2 Billion of U.S. 
Seafood Imports, Reports USITC,'' press release, March 18, 2021, at 
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2021/er0318ll1740.htm.
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    China is one of the world's largest seafood importers, having 
imported approximately 4.1 million metric tons of seafood in 2022.\20\ 
Unlike other large importers such as the United States and Japan, the 
majority of seafood that China imports is not consumed in country.\21\ 
Recent estimates have found that nearly 75% of all fish imported by 
China never makes it to the Chinese market, but instead is re-exported 
into the global market.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture Service, 
``2022 China Fishery Products Annual,'' February 22, 2023.
    \21\ Beatrice Crona et al., ``China At a Crossroads: An Analysis of 
China's Changing Seafood Production and Consumption,'' One Earth, vol. 
3, no. 1 (2020), pp. 32-44.
    \22\ Fangzhou Hu et al., ``Development of Fisheries in China,'' 
Reproduction and Breeding, vol. 1, no. 1 (2021), pp. 64-79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In recent years, the IUU Fishing Index--a collaboration between 
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, a non-
governmental organization, and Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management 
Ltd., a private fisheries and aquaculture consultancy--has consistently 
identified China as the worst-performing nation overall in combating 
IUU fishing.\23\ (The IUU Fishing Index analyzes the performances of 
152 nations.) \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ In 2021, China received a 3.86 score out of 5.00 on the IUU 
Fishing Index (high scores indicate worse performance). The IUU Index 
also generally finds that countries with DWF fleets, such as China, 
have poor scores. IUU Fishing Index, ``2021 Country Profile: China,'' 
at https://iuufishingindex.net/reports/iuu-fishing-index-country-
profile-2021-china.pdf
    \24\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China has the world's largest fishing fleet, with an estimated 
564,000 vessels, and in 2020 was the top combined producer of marine 
and inland water catches, making up nearly 15% of global catches.\25\ 
China also has the largest distant water fishing fleet in the 
world,\26\ with an estimated 2,900 to 3,400 vessels according to the 
U.S. International Trade Commission.\27\ Distant-water fishing is the 
practice of operating fishing fleets outside of your own nation's 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the zone that extends 200 nautical miles 
seaward of a coastal nation's shoreline.\28\ Distant water fishing 
fleets operate either on the high seas or foreign EEZs. Overfishing and 
depleted coastal fish stocks in its national waters have led China's 
fishing industry to develop a distant-water fishing fleet.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ FAO, 2022 State of World Fisheries and Agriculture, p. 59.
    \26\ Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, ``China's IUU Fishing Fleet: Pariah of 
the World's Oceans,'' International Law Studies, vol. 99 (2022), p. 329 
(hereinafter referred to as Pedrozo, 2022).
    \27\ United States International Trade Commission, Seafood Obtained 
via Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: U.S. Imports and 
Economic Impact on U.S. Commercial Fisheries, February 2021, p. 142. 
Another report estimates that China's DWF fleet is made up of nearly 
17,000 vessels, of which about 12,500 were identified as operating 
outside internationally recognized China waters between 2017-2018. 
However, the report cautioned that all of these vessels are not 
operating currently, simultaneously, or consistently in other 
countries' or international waters (Overseas Development Institute, 
``China's Distant-Water Fishing Fleet: Scale, Impact and Governance,'' 
June 2020).
    \28\ Article 56 of UNCLOS gives coastal nations sovereign rights 
for the purpose of conserving and managing natural resources, including 
fisheries, among other purposes, in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
    \29\ Pedrozo, 2022, p. 330.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China's distant water fishing fleets are alleged to be increasingly 
engaging in IUU fishing. A 2022 report by the Environmental Justice 
Foundation estimates that 95% of Chinese distant water fishing crews 
have witnessed some form of illegal fishing, including the removal of 
shark fins and the targeting of endangered and protected marine 
life.\30\ In 2021, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration's (NOAA's) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
issued China a negative certification for IUU fishing, under the 
authorities of the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act 
(16 U.S.C. Sec. 1826j(d)).\31\ China denied all allegations made by 
NMFS.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Environmental Justice Foundation, ``Global Impact of Illegal 
Fishing and Human Rights Abuse in China's Vast Distant Water Fleet 
Revealed,'' April 5, 2022.
    \31\ NOAA, NMFS, Improving International Fisheries Management, 
Report to Congress, August 2023, pp. 18-19.
    \32\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Like many governments with industrial-scale fishing operations, the 
Chinese government provides financial and policy support to its fishing 
industry, including its distant water fishing fleet.\33\ This support 
takes a variety of forms, including fuel subsidies, vessel upgrading/
replacement subsidies, and tax incentives. Some analysts argue that 
some types of distant water fishing would be unprofitable for Chinese 
vessel operators without government subsidies.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Pedrozo, 2022, p. 328.
    \34\ Ian Urbina, ``How China's Expanding Fishing Fleet is Depleting 
the World's Oceans,'' August 17, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China has adopted some policies to address IUU fishing. However, a 
2021 report estimated that at least 183 Chinese distant water fishing 
vessels, some of which are government-owned or -operated, are involved 
in IUU fishing, suggesting that the China is not holding its vessels 
accountable for engaging in IUU activities.\35\ Under the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which China ratified in 1996, the 
flag state has exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag on 
the high seas.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ IUU Fishing Index, 2021 Report, p. 60.
    \36\ UNCLOS Article 92.
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       U.S. Government Initiatives Aimed at Combating IUU Fishing
    Over the past two decades, successive U.S. administrations and 
Congresses have recognized that IUU fishing poses a threat to national 
and regional security and have taken a number of actions to combat IUU 
fishing broadly. These actions attempt to influence the behavior of 
foreign fishing fleets through international agreements, organizations, 
and trade, because most IUU activities occur outside of U.S. 
jurisdiction.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Actions to combat IUU fishing have included enforcement 
agreements with partner countries, trade monitoring, implementation and 
enforcement of international treaties, and broad efforts to promote 
resource sustainability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States works with other fishing nations through RFMOs 
and other multilateral international agreements to sustainably manage 
high seas fisheries and address IUU fishing globally. Several federal 
agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard, NOAA, the Department of 
Defense, and the Department of State, engage in various efforts to 
combat IUU fishing on the high seas and in the EEZs of partner nations. 
The efforts of these federal agencies include establishing strategic 
partnerships; improving enforcement tools, such as high seas boarding 
and inspection; identifying and sharing information about countries 
that have fishing vessels engaged in IUU fishing activities; and 
assisting partner nations develop and maintain their own counter IUU 
fishing capacity, among other lines of effort.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ NOAA, NMFS, Improving International Fisheries Management, 
Report to Congress, August 2023, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2019, the Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement Act 
(Division C, Title XXXV, Subtitle C of P.L. 116-92, 16 U.S.C. 
Sec. Sec. 8001 et seq.), commonly known as the Maritime SAFE Act, 
passed in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. 
The Maritime SAFE Act seeks to support a whole-of-government approach 
to counter IUU fishing, improve data sharing, support efforts to 
counter IUU fishing in priority regions around the world, increase 
global transparency and traceability across the seafood chain, improve 
global enforcement operations against IUU fishing, and prevent the use 
of IUU fishing as a financing source for transnational crime.\39\ The 
Maritime SAFE Act also established the Interagency Working Group on IUU 
Fishing to support and coordinate a government-wide effort to address 
IUU fishing globally. The IWG on IUU Fishing is made up of 
representatives from 21 federal agencies and is currently chaired by a 
representative from the Department of State, with representatives from 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and U.S. Coast 
Guard serving as Deputy Chairs.\40\
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    \39\ 16 U.S.C. Sec. 8002.
    \40\ 16 U.S.C. Sec. 8031(b). The chair of the Interagency Working 
Group on IUU Fishing rotates every three years among the Secretary of 
the Department in which the U.S. Coast Guard is operating (i.e., the 
Department of Homeland Security), Secretary of State, and NOAA 
Administrator.
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           U.S. Coast Guard's Role in Addressing IUU Fishing
    The U.S. Coast Guard is a multi-mission maritime service with the 
authority to conduct maritime law enforcement operations, including 
operations aimed at combating IUU fishing activity.\41\ The U.S. Coast 
Guard enforces U.S. and international living marine resources laws in 
the U.S. EEZ and in key areas of the high seas, and works with NOAA, 
Department of Defense, and Department of State to provide whole-of-
government approach to addressing IUU fishing.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ 14 U.S.C. Sec. 102.
    \42\ USCG, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Strategic 
Outlook, September 2020, p. 4.
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    The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead U.S. agency for at-sea enforcement 
of fishery conservation on the high seas.\43\ On the high seas, RFMOs 
manage and conserve fish stocks of a particular species or group of 
species within a particular geographic area. The 1995 U.N. Fish Stocks 
Agreement provides an enhanced framework for RFMOs' conservation and 
management of transboundary fish stocks.\44\ Under the 1995 U.N. Fish 
Stocks Agreement, party nations are obligated to regulate ``the 
activities of vessels flying their flag which fish for such stocks on 
the high seas.'' \45\ In addition, the agreement gives party nations 
the right to monitor and inspect vessels of other nation parties to 
ensure compliance with internationally agreed fishing regulations, 
including regulations established by RFMOs. Violations of RFMO 
conservation measures are generally considered IUU fishing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ USCG, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Strategic 
Outlook, September 2020, p. 19.
    \44\ United Nations, Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, at https://www.un.org/
depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/fish_stocks_agreement/
CONF164_37.htm (hereinafter referred to as the 1995 U.N. Fish Stock 
Agreement).
    \45\ Article 7 of the 1995 U.N. Fish Stock Agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Both the Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing's National 5-Year 
Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and 
the U.S. Coast Guard's IUU Fishing Strategic Outlook Implementation 
Plan identify strategies used by the U.S. Coast Guard to counter IUU 
fishing on the high seas, such as at-sea operations, use of vessel 
tracking data to identify vessels suspected of IUU fishing, and 
cooperation in partner nation capacity-building exercises.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ U.S. Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing, National 5-Year 
Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: 
2022-2026, Report to Congress, October 2022, pp. 1-A3-1, and USCG, 
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Strategic Outlook 
Implementation Plan, July 2021, pp. 1-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Coast Guard At-Sea Operations
    The U.S. Coast Guard identifies instances of IUU fishing through 
its at-sea operations. On the high seas, under the authority of some 
RFMOs, U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement officials may conduct law 
enforcement boardings and investigations of fishing vessels suspected 
of IUU fishing.\47\ U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement officials may also 
randomly board other vessels as a means to deter IUU fishing activity. 
If a U.S. Coast Guard patrol not directly related to IUU fishing 
suspects a vessel of IUU fishing, the U.S. Coast Guard may provide 
relevant information to other U.S. federal agencies (e.g., NMFS) for 
further investigation. The U.S. Coast Guard patrol may also report the 
suspect vessel to the relevant RFMO to share information about the 
vessel with other member states of the RFMO to aid in the tracking of 
the vessel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ According to NOAA, the United States is a member of nine 
multilateral RFMOs. NOAA, NMFS, ``International and Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations,'' at https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/
international-affairs/international-and-regional-fisheries-management-
organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. Coast Guard reports IUU fishing violations identified 
through at-sea patrol to RFMOs, which alert the vessels flag state. On 
the high seas, vessels are subject to the laws of their flag state. The 
U.S. Coast Guard shares information about the vessels it identifies as 
having participated in IUU fishing to relevant U.S. federal agencies to 
inform IUU fishing vessel lists,\48\ which may trigger port control 
measures, among other actions.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Pursuant to its statutory requirements under the High Seas 
Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act, NMFS prepares a biennial 
report to Congress that includes a list of nations whose flagged 
vessels were identified for IUU fishing (16 U.S.C. Sec. 1826h).
    \49\ NOAA, ``Frequent Questions: Implementing the Port State 
Measures Agreement,'' at https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/enforcement/
frequent-questions-implementing-port-state-measures-agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Experts consider high seas boarding and inspection of vessels to be 
effective approaches for fisheries law enforcement and for identifying 
vessels engaged in IUU fishing.\50\ According to the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), from 2016 through 2020, the U.S. Coast 
Guard boarded and inspected 227 fishing vessels on the high seas within 
the boundaries of RFMOs to which the United States is a party.\51\ 
During these inspections, the U.S. Coast Guard found 90 potential 
violations of RFMO fishery conservation and management measures.\52\ 
The information obtained by the U.S. Coast Guard through vessel 
boardings and inspections can inform U.S. diplomatic engagements with 
foreign nations. However, only a subset of RFMOs have high seas 
boarding and inspection measures. The Interagency Working Group on IUU 
Fishing identified the need for more RFMOs to adopt high seas boarding 
and inspection measures.\53\ According to GAO, the U.S. Coast Guard, 
Department of State, and NOAA are working to promote the adoption of 
high seas boarding and inspection measures in all RFMOs to which the 
U.S. is a member.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ For example, FAO, High Seas Boarding and Inspection of Fishing 
Vessels: Discussion of Goals, Comparison of Existing Schemes and Draft 
Language, September 2003, pp. 1-41.
    \51\ U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Combating Illegal 
Fishing: Clear Authority Could Enhance U.S. Efforts to Partner with 
Other Nations at Sea, GAO-22-104234, November 2021, p. 19.
    \52\ Ibid.
    \53\ U.S. Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing, National 5-Year 
Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: 
2022-2026, Report to Congress, October 2022, p. 12.
    \54\ GAO, Combating Illegal Fishing: Clear Authority Could Enhance 
U.S. Efforts to Partner with Other Nations at Sea, GAO-22-104234, 
November 2021, p. 19.
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U.S. Coast Guard Use of Vessel Tracking Data
    The scale of the ocean environment enables some fishing fleets to 
conduct IUU fishing activity unnoticed and presents law enforcement 
challenges. The International Maritime Organization and other 
management bodies require large ships, including many commercial 
fishing vessels, to broadcast their position with an automatic 
identification system (AIS).\55\ In addition to broadcasting the 
location of the vessel, AIS devices also broadcast information about 
the identity, course and speed of the vessel. Radio stations and 
satellites pick up this information, making vessels trackable even in 
the most remote areas of the ocean.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ Global Fishing Watch, ``What Is AIS?,'' at https://
globalfishingwatch.org/faqs/what-is-ais/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. Coast Guard analyzes vessel tracking data to identify 
movement patterns that may be indicative of IUU fishing activity.\56\ 
Fishing vessels that ``go dark'' by ceasing to broadcast position 
information may suggest that these vessels are engaging in IUU fishing 
activities. Research conducted by NOAA, the University of Santa Cruz, 
and Global Fishing Watch found that vessels most often go dark while 
fishing next to EEZs with contested boundaries, fishing in EEZ with 
limited management oversight, and during the transfer of fish between 
fishing vessels and refrigerated cargo vessels.\57\ The U.S. Coast 
Guard analyzes vessel tracking data to help guide at-sea patrol 
operations to target suspect vessels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ GAO, Combating Illegal Fishing: Clear Authority Could Enhance 
U.S. Efforts to Partner with Other Nations at Sea, GAO-22-104234, 
November 2021, p. 17.
    \57\ NOAA, NMFS, ``Learning More about ``Dark'' Fishing Vessels' 
Activities at Sea,'' November, 2, 2022, at https://
www.fisheries.noaa.gov/feature-story/learning-more-about-dark-fishing-
vessels-activities-sea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In its IUU Fishing Strategic Outlook Implementation Plan, the U.S. 
Coast Guard acknowledged that it will continue to advance and implement 
innovative technology to counter IUU fishing and to expand multilateral 
fisheries enforcement cooperation with partner nations.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ USCG, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Strategic 
Outlook Implementation Plan, July 2021, pp. 26-27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Coast Guard Efforts to Build Capacity for Partner Nations
    The U.S. Coast Guard works with partner nations to develop and 
maintain their own counter IUU fishing capacity, including the 
enforcement of their own fisheries conservation measures and the 
investigation and prosecution of their own fishing fleets suspected of 
IUU fishing. According to its IUU Fishing Strategic Outlook 
Implementation Plan, the U.S. Coast Guard aims to create regionally 
based international fisheries law enforcement symposiums for foreign 
partners, support expanded unclassified information sharing about 
illicit operations, and add counter-IUU fishing measures to existing 
bilateral agreements, among other initiatives to combat IUU 
fishing.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ USCG, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Strategic 
Outlook Implementation Plan, July 2021, pp. 26-27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One strategy used by the U.S. Coast Guard to help foreign partners 
build capacity for counting IUU fishing is through shiprider 
agreements.\60\ Shiprider agreements authorize a law enforcement 
official of one party to embark on a law enforcement vessel, or 
aircraft, of the other party and exercise certain authorities. U.S. 
shiprider agreements are designed to allow U.S. law enforcement 
officials, typically U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement officials, to 
assist partner nations in combating various illicit maritime activity, 
such as IUU fishing. In general, U.S. bilateral shiprider agreements 
allow maritime law enforcement officers of a partner nation to embark 
on vessels (and/or aircraft) of the U.S. government. The presence of a 
shiprider on board a U.S. government vessel allows the vessel to 
enforce the laws and regulations of the partner nation, including the 
boarding and inspection of suspect vessels, within the partner nation's 
designated territorial sea or exclusive economic zone. Certain 
shiprider agreements also allow U.S. government vessels with embarked 
shipriders to pursue flag ships of the party on the high seas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ U.S. Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing, National 5-Year 
Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: 
2022-2026, Report to Congress, October 2022, p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Not all U.S. bilateral shiprider agreements include counter-IUU 
fishing provisions. According to GAO, the United States has entered 
into 15 shiprider agreements that address IUU fishing.\61\ One priority 
of the Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing is for the U.S. 
government to establish new bilateral shiprider agreements that have 
counter-IUU fishing provisions with countries located within priority 
regions and to add counter-IUU fishing provisions to existing shiprider 
agreements.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ GAO, Combating Illegal Fishing: Clear Authority Could Enhance 
U.S. Efforts to Partner with Other Nations at Sea, GAO-22-104234, 
November 2021, p. 13.
    \62\ The Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement Act (P.L. 116-
92) directs select federal officials to ``exercise existing shiprider 
agreements and to enter into and implement new shiprider agreements'' 
(16 U.S.C. Sec. 8013(b)(2)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. Coast Guard also coordinates with the Department of 
Defense in their at-sea exercises. Some of these exercises may be 
designed to help partner nations build maritime security capacity, 
including their capacity to address IUU fishing in their territorial 
waters and IUU fishing committed by their flagged vessels. For example, 
the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Africa Command collaborated to enhance 
partner nation maritime enforcement capabilities to counter IUU fishing 
and other issues.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ For example, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of 
Defense collaborated with partner African nations to help them build 
maritime security capacity through the U.S. Africa Commands Africa 
Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership program. See, GAO, Combating 
Illegal Fishing: Clear Authority Could Enhance U.S. Efforts to Partner 
with Other Nations at Sea, GAO-22-104234, November 2021, p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In its FY2024 budget overview, the U.S. Coast Guard also identified 
it has operational priorities, including capacity-building 
partnerships, aimed at combating IUU fishing off the east and west 
coasts of South America, off the west coast of Africa, and in the 
Pacific.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ USCG, Posture Statement: 2024 Budget Overview, pp. 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               Conclusion
    This concludes my prepared remarks. Thank you for the opportunity 
to testify, and I welcome your questions. If additional research and 
analysis related to this issue would be helpful, my CRS colleagues and 
I stand ready to assist the committee.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
    So, I now recognize myself, but I would like to say we just 
appreciate all of you coming back. I appreciate it. So, I will 
turn to questions of the panel, and I am going to be first. I 
will recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.
    So, Rear Admiral Burdian, in the last 2 fiscal years, the 
Coast Guard interdicted more than 12,000 migrants attempting to 
cross our maritime border, more than double the figure that 
crossed in 2021.
    Can you explain the impact the increase in migrants has on 
overall law enforcement missions? For example, have other 
missions like drug interdiction had to scale back because of 
the increase in migrant interdictions?
    Admiral Burdian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As you mentioned, since February of 2021, the Coast Guard 
has seen historic levels of irregular maritime migration in the 
maritime approaches to the southeastern United States, as well 
as in the Mona Passage, which really connects the maritime 
routes to the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.
    There has been an impact to other missions, from maritime 
patrol, aircraft coverage to the International Ice Patrol, to 
our ability to provide surface and air assets in support of the 
counterdrug mission in the Joint Interagency Task Force South 
area of responsibility. We remain at Operation Vigilant Sentry, 
phase 1 Bravo, which is the phase at which we operate to 
prevent a mass maritime migration, and that demands greater 
coordination among DHS partners. The Homeland Security Task 
Force Southeast is a DHS construct under Joint Task Force East 
and is how we share intelligence, coordinate operations, and 
create a force laydown to deter and prevent that mass 
migration, sir.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, in your estimation, are there 
particular policies that are driving the increase in migration?
    Admiral Burdian. So, I think having been on the water and 
seeing face-to-face some of these individuals who have made 
what I imagine is a near impossible choice to take to the sea 
with one's family, I think the drivers of that kind of 
decisionmaking are complicated, sir.
    What I can tell you is coastguardsmen every single day 
approach these missions as lifesaving operations, and they do 
so with humility and compassion. And there certainly are 
complex policy decisions to be made, but those remain outside 
of the Coast Guard, sir.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Ms. MacLeod, to what extent does 
the Coast Guard's lack of sufficient assets hinder the ability 
to carry out the law enforcement missions?
    Ms. MacLeod. So, collectively, our work has shown that the 
Coast Guard has struggled with foresight in this area, managing 
towards a future that might look different than the past. They 
often have assets and people working on missions 
simultaneously, but the Coast Guard has not accurately 
distinguished the priority of its missions or resources or 
successfully identified how to assess tradeoffs among its many 
priorities. We think that data improvements could assist the 
Coast Guard in this area.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, is that why you can--I mean, 
the mitigations, those challenges have been so difficult is 
because it is so spread out, or what would you say?
    Ms. MacLeod. I think, without having the most foundational 
basic data information systems that support analysis of looking 
towards the various missions and resources that are being 
expended towards those missions, enabling the Coast Guard to 
prioritize among them is a major challenge, yes.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Rear Admiral, would you like to 
respond to that question?
    Admiral Burdian. Yes. Thank you.
    I think the Coast Guard did establish an Office of Data and 
Analytics in 2022 so that we can get into the big data 
business, so that we can use past performance to be an 
indicator of future priority.
    Likewise, I will say, you, sir, in your opening, mentioned 
resources. And I think to be the Coast Guard of the future by 
2033, we would offer that we need to be a $20 billion Coast 
Guard, to have 3 to 5 percent of sustained growth in our 
operating budget so that we can't just maintain the Coast Guard 
we have. Right? You all have been very generous, and we have 
been grateful for your support. But, as we look to the future, 
we really do need that 3 to 5 percent of sustained growth in 
our operating budget to build a Coast Guard of the future.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
    Mr. Davenport, in your testimony, you noted the importance 
of leveraging technology. Can you discuss some of the ways that 
the Coast Guard can leverage their unmanned systems and other 
similar technologies to improve its execution of law 
enforcement missions?
    Mr. Davenport. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
    I strongly believe that the Coast Guard could better 
leverage what unmanned systems could provide. The Coast Guard's 
manned assets spend arguably a large portion of their time 
searching and locating. With UAS, unmanned system technology, 
this could be relieved, and it would be more efficient. You may 
locate them quicker, but also, it would save all the time and 
effort in the search.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. Thank you very much. I am out 
of time.
    Mr. Carbajal, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. You are the chairman. 
You are never out of time.
    Thank you.
    First, let me say to Admiral Burdian how I think the 
chairman and myself and everybody, we share our concern for the 
families and the Coast Guard personnel that were involved in 
the accident, the MH-60 accident that transpired when they were 
doing search and rescue in Alaska. And we wish them a speedy 
recovery, and our thoughts are with their families.
    Secondly, I had the privilege of being with you at the 
JIATF South in the Florida Keys, along with the previous 
Commandant, and it is great to see you have risen even further 
in your career, and it is great for the Coast Guard, great for 
our country, that you are where you're at. So, I just wanted to 
recognize you for your leadership.
    Ms. MacLeod, issuing over 17 reports between 2010 and now, 
GAO has been raising red flags about Coast Guard planning and 
resources for a while. Now that we are amid a serious workforce 
shortage, what should the Coast Guard be doing?
    Ms. MacLeod. Correct, we have issued numerous 
recommendations in these areas of strategic planning for the 
Coast Guard. And specifically in its workforce planning, I 
think that one area the Coast Guard could do better is a risk-
based approach. For example, in our work on the marine 
inspection workforce and gas carrier examinations, we found 
that a risk-based approach to these examinations could better 
utilize the marine inspection workforce and provide some 
benefit in terms of resources for personnel going forward. So, 
that is just one suggestion we have.
    And I will just say, in response to the numerous 
recommendations we have outstanding to the Coast Guard in these 
areas, we are consistently following up with the Coast Guard 
and working on these. Many of these recommendations we have 
made to them in the last 3 years, and we are seeing some 
progress, but as the Coast Guard faces workforce shortages like 
the other military services, addressing our recommendations 
will become even more important.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Admiral Burdian, the Coast Guard is nothing without its 
people. When stations and cutters are short-staffed, what does 
that mean for the Coasties? If the Coast Guard could 
appropriate $500 million for infrastructure needs at the Coast 
Guard Academy and Cape May as well as for recruiting, how would 
that affect the shortfall?
    Admiral Burdian. Thank you, Mr. Carbajal.
    I will say to your first question, when units are short, 
what we do is drive risk down to the operational commander. 
What we say to our crews is, ``Go ahead and do more with less, 
but be careful.'' The efforts we are undertaking now to 
temporarily realign our workforce really are in response to 
that known risk so that we can take an enterprisewide view with 
regard to how these existing personnel shortfalls impact our 
ability to execute the mission. And you have read and have been 
briefed by the teams that we really are prioritizing 
lifesaving, Homeland Security, and preservation of the MTS.
    With the addition of funds, as you know, in the 2024 
President's budget and the unfunded priorities list, there are 
projects for both the Coast Guard Academy and Training Center 
Cape May, at Cape May to create the new training complex for 
recruits and at the Coast Guard Academy to make improvements to 
Chase Hall.
    I think it is important just to acknowledge that all--like, 
100 percent of our Active and Reserve Component, officer and 
enlisted, flow through those two accession points. And so, if 
we say we are going to invest in our people and we were 
provided those additional resources, that is where they would 
go.
    I would also say, we would take the opportunity to expand 
our recruiting workforce. Coast Guard recruiters are excellent 
at what they do. And you know us well as our committee of 
primary jurisdiction, the Coast Guard sort of sells itself once 
we are in the room.
    On average, Coast Guard recruiters recruit 12 people per 
year, and that is compared to our DoD counterparts that recruit 
about 9 folks per year. So, when we are in the space, when we 
have the recruiting team in place, I think we can be 
successful.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    And, going to the right places to recruit is also very 
important if I should say.
    Dr. Keating-Bitonti, I recently had the opportunity to see 
the Coast Guard's presence and partnership in Panama firsthand. 
There the Coast Guard is capacity building and conducting law 
enforcement.
    What should Congress and the administration be doing to 
better leverage the Coast Guard's international status?
    Ms. Keating-Bitonti. I think to address IUU fishing broadly 
and especially building partner nations' capacity, it involves 
a whole-of-Government approach. There are resources that the 
Coast Guard could be using to encourage other countries to 
review the assets and technologies that they have available to 
address IUU fishing within their waters.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    And, lastly, just to conclude real quick, Mr. Davenport, 
your testimony focuses on ways to enhance the Coast Guard's IUU 
and drug and migrant interdiction missions.
    What can you say about the Coast Guard's resources, given 
the current workforce shortages combined with the increased 
migrant flow? What will happen to the percent of drugs 
interdicted if Congress does not increase appropriations?
    Mr. Davenport. I can only assume, if they do not have 
enough assets, that that would increase the flow. However, I 
think there are ways that they could increase interdiction by 
driving it down and working more with the partner nations and 
enabling them through the use of a very successful tool, which 
is law enforcement detachments combined with bilateral 
agreements.
    And the other big one that I have seen over the years is 
the effect that international training has on the capability 
and capacity of partner nations and cooperative operations.
    And the last point I would make is that what was most 
successful is approaching these problems from a regional 
standpoint and not just one nation to one nation. The most 
successful ones have been when you do a regional effort.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    I am out of time, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Babin, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Dr. Babin. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here, you witnesses.
    As one of the cochairs of the House Border Security Caucus, 
I believe this hearing is vital. Thank you for being here.
    Enforcing our maritime border security, disrupting 
international drug and human smuggling activities, and 
protecting American waters from illegal foreign fishing is all 
vital for our Nation, and I appreciate all of the work that the 
Coast Guard is doing in this space.
    Admiral Burdian, the first question I would like to ask is, 
I represent part of the gulf coast in southeast Texas. Many 
folks in the shrimping industry have been feeling a lot of pain 
lately. In fact, they are having a problem keeping the lights 
on on their boats. Foreign shrimpers, however, are apparently 
having a heyday. They have been dumping shrimp into the 
American economy, driving prices down, and harming the 
livelihood of individuals in my district and several other 
districts that are surrounding me.
    I understand that you are not responsible for trade 
policies, but I would like to know if you've seen an uptick in 
illegally harvested shrimp and if you are aware of the impact 
that it is having on American shrimpers.
    Admiral Burdian. Thanks for the question, Mr. Babin.
    We routinely patrol the maritime boundary line in the Gulf 
of Mexico to counter illegal fishing in the U.S. EEZ. I will 
say the majority of our work thus far has been with regard to 
snapper, primarily Mexican launches crossing the maritime 
boundary line. Though in advance of the hearing, I was made 
aware of this particular issue and will coordinate with our 
partners in NOAA who primarily oversee the imports to discuss 
with them, and we can get back to you on that, sir.
    Dr. Babin. Sure. That would be fine.
    Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir.
    Dr. Babin. I have several other questions I would like to 
ask you. But that is an acute problem for our American 
shrimpers, and I would hope that the Coast Guard would at least 
be aware of that.
    The entire country and, likely, the entire world, is paying 
attention to what is happening in our southwest border, and our 
open border policies have been received as an open invitation 
for millions, almost 10 million illegal immigrants, to simply 
show up, sign a few documents, download an app, and then be 
released into the interior of our country.
    It is my belief that the White House and the administration 
is directly responsible for this situation at our southern 
border. The Secretary of Homeland Security has been complacent 
at best throughout the last few years, in my opinion, and 
completely failed in his duty to protect the Nation's interior, 
even saying our borders are secure, he has operational control, 
when nothing could be further from the truth.
    I am just curious whether the White House or anyone else in 
this administration, Homeland Security, DOT, Department of 
Defense, anyone else has ever pressured the Coast Guard on its 
migrant interdiction mission. What sort of conversations have 
you had with the administration officials on your migrant 
interdiction mission? And has the mission or the associated 
policies changed since January of 2021? Just quickly.
    Admiral Burdian. Sir, we routinely have discussions with 
partners in interagency and policy discussions up the chain 
through DHS and with the White House with regard to maritime 
migration. Those discussions surround how best to support the 
Coast Guard in these lifesaving missions and what resources we 
need to continue to coordinate with our partners in the 
Department of Homeland Security and with international and 
interagency partners sort of in a vertically integrated 
Government.
    Dr. Babin. OK. All right. How much of an increase in 
trafficked fentanyl and fentanyl precursors have you seen? 
There are three precursors to fentanyl. I serve on the House 
Task Force to Combat Mexican Drug Cartels where we have been 
studying the cartel business plan and how they operate in the 
United States, how they make money, et cetera. The cartels' 
fentanyl is made up of a number of precursors that largely come 
from China.
    Does your drug interdiction mission consider precursors as 
a priority either directly from Chinese sources or possibly 
smuggled through other foreign-flag vessels?
    Admiral Burdian. Sir, those precursors are primarily 
moving, as I understand it, in containerized cargo into ports 
in other countries such as Mexico. We have worked with our 
partners in SEMAR and SEDATU to really build some capacity to 
understand governance in ports and get after that issue. We are 
not seeing finished fentanyl move in the maritime, with very, 
very minor exceptions, sir, but I will say that the cartels, 
whether it's Mexican cartels or cartels in Colombia, are 
operating agnostic to product.
    And so, every kilo of cocaine the Coast Guard interdicts 
serves to undermine the profit motivation and undermine the 
financial resource of these transnational criminal actors and 
the violence and instability they sow in the region.
    Dr. Babin. And that is exactly what needs to happen. We 
have to bust up their profit motive and their business model.
    Thank you very much.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Garamendi, you are recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    A couple of quick questions, mundane perhaps, but all 
politics are local.
    So, when the Coast Guard decides to move the Military Ocean 
Terminal Concord, MOTCO, the escort and patrol for the ships 
that are coming and going, carrying the munitions, why did you 
move from Vallejo, in my district, directly across the river of 
MOTCO, to San Francisco? And the impact that that has on the 
salary structures: interesting. I will let it just hang out 
there. I would like to hear from you about the salary 
structures as a result of that move from my district to San 
Francisco, and she is no longer Speaker.
    And you also discussed the issue of tracking, monitoring, 
finding out what is going on out there. And, Mr. Davenport, you 
raised the issue of unmanned vessels observation. Have you gone 
beyond just those that are at sea to those that are in the air 
and those that might be available through various commercial 
satellite operations and organizations?
    Mr. Davenport. Thank you.
    Actually, there has not been much exploration in space, but 
I will say that I lead a project for the Coast Guard. It is 
called Evergreen. It is looking into the future. And space is 
one of the focal areas that we will be focusing on in the next 
3 years.
    Mr. Garamendi. I would highly suggest you do. There are 
commercial operations that are ever increasing with various 
satellite technologies that can provide almost daily a view of 
the entire world and might be available to deal with this issue 
of identifying where the problem might be, illegal fishing, 
contraband of all kinds.
    So, I would like to hear from you about that. And, Admiral, 
if you will pay attention to that also. You are welcome to 
comment, Admiral, if you would like to about--you might want to 
pick up the issue of the University of California San Diego and 
the laboratory that exists out there with Scripps working with 
the Coast Guard on these unmanned vessels.
    Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir. We are in the midst of a 
contract using unmanned surface vessels right now and trying to 
understand how they can help us with domain awareness in 
multiple mission sets, but primarily in maritime migrant 
interdiction. And I will say that the Deputy Commandant for 
Operations just last year released a strategy on unmanned 
systems, and my partners in the Acquisition and Capabilities 
Directorate at headquarters are actively working to accelerate 
how we get into that space in earnest.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
    It may very well be that we will have to move very rapidly 
on these unmanned systems because our new manned systems seem 
to be way behind schedule. I suppose if we would beat this drum 
enough, we might actually be able to bend some steel and get 
some ships out to sea. So, that is an ongoing issue I am sure 
this committee will be dealing with and having to do with the 
Offshore Patrol Cutters and, of course, some day, maybe--oh, 
no. We are never going to have an Arctic icebreaker. Hopeful.
    Finally, about your budget, about recruiting and all that 
goes with it, it comes back to the Congress, and that is, do 
you have an adequate budget to hire the people that you need 
for the ships? Apparently the indication from Ms. MacLeod is 
that you don't. Would you care to opine on this for 1 minute or 
less, Admiral?
    Admiral Burdian. Sir, I know that Congress is in the 
position of making tough choices about where to apply 
appropriated dollars. And we, likewise, as the executive, are 
in the tough--in the business of making tough choices about 
sometimes having to find economy. So, certainly with additional 
resources, we absolutely would invest in the accession points 
where all of our recruits and officer candidates enroll into 
the Coast Guard, embrace our core values, and create the values 
and activities as leaders that are the key component of our 
efforts to retain the best workforce.
    Mr. Garamendi. If I might interrupt in my last 20 seconds, 
we are going to spend a lot of time here, this week and perhaps 
later, dealing with the Secretary of Homeland Security. I would 
suggest our time might be better spent providing an adequate 
appropriation for that Department as well as for the Coast 
Guard.
    And, with that, I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Graves is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, I want to thank you very much. I think you were 
awakened months ago at 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning to help 
out with a search-and-rescue mission for one of our 
constituents, and I just want to thank you very much for going 
above and beyond in all of your help in helping out with one 
our constituent families. I know you know the awful outcome of 
that situation. But your assistance--we are very grateful for 
that, as is the family of Cameron Robbins. So, I just want to 
say thank you.
    Secondly, I want to congratulate you, a little bit late, 
but on the promotion. Certainly, I have watched your career 
blossom over the years, and congratulations.
    Admiral, one of the largest obstacles we have in IUU is 
being able to identify the illegal fisheries that ends up being 
commingled in with other perhaps legal fish and then put onto 
global markets and ultimately to consumers' plates. What has 
the Coast Guard learned from its participation in the Maritime 
SAFE Interagency Working Group to help inform us what else we 
could be doing, what other tools or authorizations we could be 
giving the Coast Guard to help to decipher or to weed out some 
of the illegally caught fisheries that we know China and other 
countries are currently fishing?
    I believe one in every five fish right now is IUU 
fisheries. I need to give a shout out to my friend Jared 
Huffman, which I rarely do, but I want to take this opportunity 
because he and I did work--[to Rep. Huffman] well, it's only 
when you do good things, which has been fewer and further 
between lately.
    But, seriously, I want to thank my friend, Jared Huffman, 
for the work that we did on a bipartisan basis in the NDAA to 
help improve IUU enforcement actions. But if you could respond 
to the question on additional tools and authorizations.
    Admiral Burdian. Thank you, Mr. Graves. It is good to be 
here in this capacity. I feel proud to sit before the committee 
given my history in the room here. I think the M-SAFE's 
Interagency Working Group, the power is in our ability to layer 
authorities and really drive outcomes and to build capacity in 
particular in the five priority flag states. There was an 
interagency team in Senegal just last week, working with that 
country to really understand what they need to create a legal 
framework to elevate their ability to conduct enforcement in 
the Gulf of Guinea and really drive towards solutions for those 
artisanal fishers who rely so much on successful fisheries for 
their livelihood. So, not at a national level but really at a 
local level there.
    And what we have been able to do in the work group, as I 
mention, is layer our authorities. So, in the case of vessels 
that refused Coast Guard boarding in the Eastern Pacific in 
August of 2022, working with partners in Treasury, in State, 
and throughout the interagency, those were Chinese--the 
beneficial ownership was to accompany PRC; they were Panamanian 
flagged. And, after those incidents occurred, Panama actually 
deflagged 31 vessels belonging to that same company. Those are 
real, tangible, articulable outcomes that are only achieved 
when we do work together in an interagency and take the issue 
from detection to outcome.
    We are not going to interdict or inspect our way out of the 
IUU fishing challenge globally. So, it really does take a 
focused effort synchronized in the interagency, alongside 
international partners with the support of nongovernmental 
organizations, which is what M-SAFE is doing.
    And, to your question, sir, we are in year 3 of 5 of M-
SAFE. So, as you consider whether to reauthorize that 
particular work group and whether to fund it so that this isn't 
a collateral duty; we work hard to push other issues aside and 
focus in this space so that we can assign individuals to focus 
primarily on this challenge globally.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. In regard to the 
specific provision we worked on with Congressman Huffman, it 
was about capacity building within DoD. Is that a tool that the 
Coast Guard needs as well? Or I know you mentioned doing some 
work with Senegal, for example. Is that an authorization or 
capacity that the Coast Guard needs?
    Admiral Burdian. Sir, I think we feel like we have the 
authority, in particular, using State's authority to build 
capacity, where we get those requests. Coast Guard crews have 
been in [inaudible], Senegal, Vietnam, Panama, Ecuador, Costa 
Rica. We really have deployed globally to understand the needs 
of our partners and apply resources to help elevate the 
capacity so that we are operating with our international 
partners on that level playing field.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. I yield back.
    Dr. Babin [presiding]. The gentleman yields back.
    I would like to recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, 
Mr. Auchincloss.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
    Good afternoon, Admiral Burdian, thank for being here. The 
Coast Guard is facing a 3,000-person workforce shortage, which 
will impact stations in Massachusetts, including Scituate, 
Boston, and Cape Cod. How will the shortage impact the Coast 
Guard's ability to conduct its missions? In Massachusetts, in 
particular, I know you spoke previously broadly about how you 
devolve operational risk to the commanders. Can you speak to 
the Northeast, and Massachusetts, in particular?
    Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir. Good afternoon. Those targeted 
temporary reductions were made given the geographical layout of 
those particular boat stations and our standards for search and 
rescue, which is our priority during this time.
    I will say I sort of owned the performance side of that as 
my primary duty and have directed the offices of search and 
rescue to continue to monitor the performance of search and 
rescue in locations where there has been an impact due to the 
personnel shortage to make sure that we are achieving the level 
of service the American public expects.
    Mr. Auchincloss. We don't have enough personnel. There are 
effects happening to the stations. There is going to be a 
diminution in service. So, what are the tradeoffs that you are 
making? What are the tradeoffs that are you issuing to the 
commanders at those stations that they are not going to do?
    Admiral Burdian. Well, I think you've been briefed on what 
the reductions are. Whether it is a forward operating location 
or there will be a unit with scheduled missions only or 
seasonal stations, we're ceasing to operate on the western 
rivers----
    Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. Yes, I mean, they are 
activities, but I am talking about outcomes. What is the 
diminution in outcomes and performance that the American public 
can expect because of this personnel shortfall?
    Admiral Burdian. So, the reductions were targeted given our 
existing policy toward performance, toward outcomes. And I can 
provide you more details on that----
    Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. I----
    Admiral Burdian [interposing]. OK.
    Mr. Auchincloss. That is not what I am asking. You clearly 
have a personnel target because you need that number of 
personnel to execute your 11-part mission. If you don't have 
enough personnel, unless you are overstaffed--I don't think 
anyone here is claiming that you are--then there is going to be 
a reduction in that inability to execute that mission. So, just 
clearly state what are the tradeoffs that you are making across 
that 11-part mission as it affects Massachusetts.
    Admiral Burdian. Sure. Absolutely. Right, like we will 
conduct fewer law enforcement boardings per se if there is--
right, like, we have limits on the amount of time an individual 
boat driver can spend operating. Once those limits are reached, 
because that individual crew is conducting a search and rescue 
case, it will be unavailable for other missions.
    Mr. Auchincloss. So, you are prioritizing search and 
rescue, search and recovery, but there is going to be a 
degradation in law enforcement in the three maritime law 
enforcement missions.
    Admiral Burdian. There could be. Sir, it is difficult 
without knowing what that search and rescue load will be. This 
is a demand-driven operation.
    Mr. Auchincloss. I understand, you can't predict it. But, 
overall, you know the trend lines for search and rescue demand 
in the greater Boston area. So, of those three maritime 
missions, fisheries, migrant interdiction, and drug 
interdiction, which of those three are likely to be the biggest 
challenge for the Northeast because of the reduction in law 
enforcement?
    Admiral Burdian. Well, certainly, in the law enforcement 
space, it will be fisheries that are important. We don't do an 
awful lot of the drug or migrant interdiction in the Northeast, 
as you know, sir.
    But I can tell you that our operational commanders are 
empowered to make those tradeoffs at given----
    Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. I know you are going to do 
your best with the resources that you have. It is not a 
question of your response. It's just the reality is that you 
don't have enough people. And so, it is important just to 
articulate the tradeoffs so that we here on the panel, but also 
my constituents, can understand the imperative of the Coast 
Guard mission and why it is important that we support you as 
you recruit.
    Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Ms. MacLeod, how would you evaluate the 
Coast Guard's recruitment? What might they do to improve it?
    Ms. MacLeod. We have seen in our various studies of the 
Coast Guard workforce that the Coast Guard has a culture of 
making do. They also have a process to assess their workforce 
and manpower determinations. And this is an area where we do 
have outstanding recommendations to the Coast Guard that they 
do these assessments.
    Mr. Auchincloss. You have 40 seconds. What is the one big 
thing they can do better on recruitment?
    Ms. MacLeod. Know the positions that they are trying to 
fill.
    Mr. Auchincloss. I don't understand. I am a former marine. 
When we got recruited, we didn't know our MOS. What do you mean 
by that? Say more.
    Ms. MacLeod. Without having a strategy or a plan of how 
many people and what missions they should be doing, I don't 
know how you can make a recruitment pitch.
    Mr. Auchincloss. OK. So, better planning around MOS 
shortfalls and how to back plan.
    Ms. MacLeod. Indeed.
    Mr. Auchincloss. All right. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Babin. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
    I would like to recognize the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. 
Scholten.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you so much 
to our witnesses for taking the time to be here today and your 
informative testimony.
    As the vice ranking member on the Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation Subcommittee, I was fortunate enough in August 
to join a congressional delegation to Panama with the Coast 
Guard to learn more about the Coast Guard's key law enforcement 
missions. As you know, the Coast Guard is uniquely positioned 
to perform drug, migrant, and IUU interdictions. Intercepting 
illicit drug shipments is an essential part of combating 
addiction and maintaining public health and national security. 
As your testimony here today has shown, we know you share my 
concern over a potential Government shutdown in just 3 days and 
what that would mean to our enforcement efforts.
    Rear Admiral Burdian, we have previously heard how a 
shutdown will harm our servicemembers, the heart of the Coast 
Guard. But how would a Government shutdown impact the Coast 
Guard's key operations, particularly drug, migrant, and IUU 
interdictions?
    Admiral Burdian. Congresswoman, first, thank you for taking 
time to visit with the Coast Guard and understand our mission 
space. We would continue to conduct lifesaving missions. We 
would continue to keep assets on patrol. There would be certain 
operations that we would not conduct during a shutdown.
    But I will say the most profound impact is to our people, 
to the individuals conducting that critical work. I was chief 
of response in Seattle during the last Government shutdown, and 
my spouse at the time was in command of a ship that was 
deployed to the South Pacific. And so, kind of keeping your 
head in the game is a real challenge when you have young people 
who don't know how they are going to put food on their table 
and make ends meet. So, if we look at the range of missions the 
Coast Guard conducts and the relative risk in those mission 
spaces, we often operate very close to the edge of the 
operating envelope of the assets that we crew.
    What I want as a leader and an operator is for our crews to 
be able to focus on risk and the mission at hand.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you. And you may well be aware, in 
April, Representative Gonzalez-Colon and I reintroduced H.R. 
2693, the bipartisan Pay Our Coast Guard Parity Act of 2023. 
This bill would ensure that, if servicemembers in other 
branches of the military are paid, even in a Government 
shutdown, so will our Coast Guard members. They deserve nothing 
less. This bill is essential to ensure that Coasties may 
continue to perform these critical law enforcement missions 
without fear of losing their homes, feeding their families, or 
risking their livelihoods.
    Can you talk a little bit more indepth just specifically 
about the impact of a shutdown, fearing where the income may be 
coming from, has on retention and recruitment and the overall 
morale of our Coasties.
    Admiral Burdian. Yes, ma'am. I think what we don't want is 
to be at our crewmembers' dinner tables, when crewmembers are 
arguing at dinner tables about finances because they are not 
receiving their paycheck as coastguardsmen and then are going 
out to conduct dangerous missions. We say that service is a 
sacrifice. And it's true, but it's not just a servicemember who 
sacrifices. I can tell you that you my children have missed, 
with either parent, multiple holidays, birthdays, significant 
events. It really--it's a worthwhile tradeoff. But the more 
junior the person, the more challenging it is, given the fact 
that--most Coast Guard personnel are not--they don't live in a 
place that is co-located with a large military base. So, we are 
on the economy for housing. And it is having to have 
discussions with landlords and creditors. It is demoralizing. 
It is difficult, again, to keep your head in the game.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you for that. Thank you for your 
service, and thank you for your sacrifice.
    With that, I yield back.
    Dr. Babin. The gentlelady yields back.
    I would like to recognize the gentleman from California, 
Mr. Huffman.
    Mr. Huffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I want to thank my colleague from Louisiana who earlier 
brought up our collaborative efforts on this subject, very 
troubling subject of IUU fishing.
    Thanks to those on the panel who testified about this, and 
we could spend an entire hearing, of course, on this subject. I 
hope we actually will. I hope a few other committees will do 
the same because we now know a lot more about this because of 
the recent bombshell report the Outlaw Ocean Project detailed 
in The New Yorker, and it reveals a profoundly troubling 
reality. We have seafood processed by Uyghur forced labor in 
China, a lot of it, that has infiltrated U.S. supply chains. It 
is a distressing revelation. We know that IUU fishing is a 
sobering environmental problem. It is a fishing industry 
problem. My colleague from Texas talked about how unfair it is 
to the gulf shrimp fleet in his district. And it is the same 
effect on U.S. fishers all over the country who hold themselves 
to a high standard and have to compete with this terrible 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated black market.
    But it is also a huge human rights crisis that is seeping 
through our borders. And this Outlaw Ocean Project links 47,000 
metric tons of imported seafood, including cod, pollock, 
shrimp, and more, to Uyghur forced labor facilities, and that's 
coming into our market. Major U.S. retailers and food service 
companies are implicated, and that includes Costco, Kroger, 
Sysco, and others. The scale of this issue just paints a dire 
picture of how complicit we are in these systemic failures to 
ensure an ethical supply chain.
    Our Government unknowingly spent over $200 million over the 
last 5 years on seafood that has been tied to Uyghur forced 
labor for public food programs here in this country. This is 
staggering. It should be a wakeup call. This problem is huge. 
We are deeply complicit as consumers and, frankly, as the 
United States Federal Government. And we are allowing this to 
happen because of the failures of oversight, the lack of 
enforcement, and the unwitting participation even of our own 
Government programs. So, all of this, I think, demands our 
immediate attention and a much stronger collective commitment 
to seriously confronting this scourge. Given what we have known 
for years, we should have been doing this all along. But 
certainly what we know now should be an outrage to everyone.
    Now, some of us have been sounding the alarm for several 
years. And, just in the last few weeks since the new report 
dropped, Ranking Member Grijalva and I have sent two letters, 
one to Customs and Border Protection and the other to the 
Department of Commerce and NOAA. We are calling on the 
administration to address this with a whole-of-Government 
approach.
    And, Rear Admiral Burdian, thank you for referencing your 
belief that we need a whole-of-Government approach. Certainly, 
any step back by any part of our Government on this issue right 
now would be deeply troubling, such as what NOAA unfortunately 
is doing today. They are announcing that they are delaying a 
rulemaking that would strengthen the SIMP program and implement 
IUU provisions that Congressman Graves and I helped to get into 
the NDAA. This is a huge mistake. We are going in the wrong 
direction at the worst possible time. This is not just a 
fishing industry problem. Forced labor and illegal fishing are 
inseparable. They go together. And it is not just about land 
versus water, ship decks versus processing plants. Every part 
of our supply chain is touched by this problem.
    So, Rear Admiral Burdian, I just want to ask you about some 
of the limitations of authority that you are probably grappling 
with. Is it correct that the Coast Guard's authority to enforce 
illegalities tied to IUU fishing only extends to activities 
that happen at sea?
    Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir, it is.
    Mr. Huffman. And is it also true that the Coast Guard is 
limited in its ability to enforce forced labor policies like 
those identified in the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and 
the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act?
    Admiral Burdian. Sir, our crews are trained to identify 
signs of human trafficking and forced labor. But, as you 
stated, that is not within our enforcement authority.
    Mr. Huffman. Yes, and thank you also for--I just want to 
agree with you when you say that you feel like we need more 
interagency coordination to tackle this.
    In the few seconds I have left, I will just ask our witness 
from the GAO. This seems like a problem that we need some GAO 
guidance on. Would you agree that a study that looks at 
agencies pointing at each other, jurisdictional confusion, and 
limitations would be of great value if the GAO would be willing 
to undertake it?
    Ms. MacLeod. I would agree with that. And I would point you 
also to our May 2023 report, if you are not familiar with it, 
where we emphasize that better information sharing between CBP 
and the National Marine Fisheries Service could lead to better 
targeting and investigation.
    Mr. Huffman. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair, I 
yield back.
    Dr. Babin. Yes, sir, thank you, and I appreciate the line 
of questioning about the fishing. I think this concludes all 
the questions that we have. Is there anyone else that--I don't 
think there has been anyone coming into the room that hasn't 
had an opportunity to ask questions.
    Seeing none, this concludes our hearing for today. I would 
like to thank each and every one of you witnesses for being 
here today.
    And, with that, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]


 
                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


 Questions to Rear Admiral Jo-Ann F. Burdian, Assistant Commandant for 
    Response Policy (CG-5R), U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Mike Ezell

    Question 1. The Coast Guard published an Unmanned Systems Strategic 
Plan in March, including a strategic goal of identifying capability 
gaps that could be closed using unmanned systems.
    What progress is the Coast Guard making toward this goal? Can you 
discuss specific examples?
    Answer. The Coast Guard continuously evaluates its mission needs 
and the capabilities needed to fulfill them. This strategic goal has 
triggered the assessment of unmanned systems across multiple domains 
(e.g., aviation, surface, subsurface) to evaluate their ability to fill 
capability gaps.
    Several ongoing mission and capability development efforts are 
currently including the use of Unmanned Systems to fill gaps. First, as 
existing platforms reach the end of their service life, the Coast Guard 
is evaluating options to employ unmanned systems to maintain those 
operational capabilities. Options include extending and expanding the 
use of cutter-based unmanned aircraft systems and employing long-range 
unmanned aircraft systems in place of manned fixed wing assets in the 
future.
    The Joint Persistent Wide Area Maritime Surveillance Capability 
Analysis Report developed in collaboration between the Coast Guard, 
Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
identified new gaps in surveillance and detection within the US EEZ. 
All three components are collaborating to develop concepts of operation 
and asset operational requirements to close those gaps using a mix of 
manned and unmanned systems for coastal surveillance and detection.

    Question 2. Another goal is to spur innovation through testing 
small, learning, and scaling smart. When it comes to integrating new 
technologies, the challenge is not just in identifying and testing 
them. There is also a need to either incorporate those capabilities 
directly into the budget process or ensure that enough funding is 
available with enough flexibility to quickly deploy them at scale.
    Question 2.a. From a funding standpoint, how will the Coast Guard 
be able to quickly scale the deployment of proven unmanned systems?
    Answer. The Coast Guard has already awarded small-scale, limited 
duration contracts to deploy unmanned systems and enabling technologies 
in support of ongoing operations. These deployments often leverage 
innovative contractor-owned/contractor-operated (COCO) unmanned systems 
which can provide operational data-as-a-service quickly without the 
time and investments needed for more traditional material acquisitions.
    These small-scale COCO contracts have been and can continue to be 
funded with existing operations and support funding to quickly fill 
operational gaps within the current budget process. Further, these COCO 
deployments avoid the timely and costly acquisition and ownership costs 
of hardware systems, lifecycle maintenance, and logistics. These 
deployments have already yielded lessons learned through real-world use 
for current missions.
    One example is Coast Guard contracts to deploy unmanned surface 
vehicles (USVs) to directly support operations. Saildrone was awarded a 
contract to provide surveillance and detection data directly to Coast 
Guard operators while maintaining ownership and operating the USVs 
throughout a four-month deployment in the Caribbean Sea. This contract 
allowed rapid capability deployment, evaluation of these USVs for Coast 
Guard missions, and development of potential operational concepts for 
their deployment in conjunction with manned boats, ships, and aircraft 
on a broader scale in the future.
    Meanwhile the Coast Guard has leveraged Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) contracts and is developing guidance on how best to 
employ the other transactional authorities (OTAs) granted in the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2023. Employment of 
these vehicles allow more rapid procurement and acquisition of 
innovative technologies including unmanned systems and other 
technologies that support the use of unmanned systems (e.g., sensors, 
communications networks, and data systems).
    The Coast Guard will continue to pursue COCO contracts and 
innovative contracting vehicles in the near term to enable 
experimentation and learning about these systems and technologies and 
determine which may be appropriate for future acquisition and 
ownership. When those capabilities that are most effective and 
affordable are determined, future funding sources will be evaluated 
during the annual budget process.

    Question 2.b. Additionally, another important strategic goal is to 
``build and sustain partnerships across DHS, DoD, and other 
stakeholders to leverage parallel efforts.'' How is the Coast Guard 
pursuing that goal? Are there specific examples you can reference?
    Answer. The Coast Guard is working closely with U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and Other 
Government Agencies (OGA) to deploy, test, evaluate, and share lessons 
learned on new unmanned capabilities and supporting systems.
    The Coast Guard leverages DHS initiatives for purchase and 
coordination of unmanned systems advancements. First, the Coast Guard 
leverages the DHS-wide Blanket Purchase Agreement for procurement of 
small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) that are NDAA approved (BLUE 
UAS). Second, the Coast Guard's current program for sUAS collaborates 
with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and shares information on 
training best practices, cooperative curriculum development, training 
facility site visits, and information sharing regarding security 
control mechanisms. Similar cyber discussions are held with other DHS 
components as part of a bimonthly department-wide sUAS Cyber 
roundtable. Finally, the Coast Guard is also part of a Joint Program 
Office (JPO) with CBP Air and Marine Operations (CBP AMO). The JPO has 
responsibility for the development of joint capabilities and 
coordination of policies and operations to maximize the utility of 
individual agency assets across present and future DHS UASs. The JPO is 
responsible for management and employment of common UAS for CBP AMO and 
the Coast Guard and provides synergies between the two organizations.
    The Coast Guard has engaged heavily with DoD units including the 
U.S. Navy (NAVAIR), U.S. Air Force (AFSOC), and the Defense Innovation 
Unit (DIU) on sUAS to include obtaining cybersecurity ``Authorization 
to Operate'' (ATO) and collaborating on creation of a new policy manual 
for BLUE UAS specific-cybersecurity protocols. The Coast Guard also 
collaborates with DoD in receiving airspace authorization from the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and use of UAS in the National 
Airspace System for Coast Guard missions involving the use of long 
range UAS like the MQ-9. Specifically, the Coast Guard has successfully 
worked with NORTHCOM and the North Dakota and Michigan Air National 
Guards to support search and rescue operations with DoD UAS and 
continues to expand joint operations with more DoD units and in 
additional geographical locations, including the Indo-Pacific. Further, 
the Coast Guard coordinated with US Navy Task Force 59 (TF-59) in 
Bahrain to learn from their deployment of unmanned systems and testing 
of UAS operations from Coast Guard cutters supporting US Navy Fifth 
Fleet. Similar collaboration and interservice UAS operations are 
ongoing with the US Navy's Fourth Fleet in the SOUTHCOM area of 
responsibility.
    Finally, the Coast Guard is engaged with other government agencies. 
For example, the Service is collaborating with NOAA to support mission-
based testing of UAS platforms for oil spill response, train NOAA 
members for interagency knowledge sharing/awareness, and use NOAA 
facilities for Coast Guard UAS qualification courses. Additionally, the 
Coast Guard has implemented protocols created by the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, collaborated with the Environmental 
Protection Agency regarding UAS program management best practices, and 
worked extensively with the FAA to implement training on emergency 
Special Government Interest approvals for safely and legally operating 
UAS within controlled airspace for emergency response.

    Question 3. While most of the focus on the Coast Guard's IUU 
enforcement has been on high-seas--there is a very serious problem of 
IUU fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. There have been countless illegal 
incursions into our EEZ by small Mexican fishing boats targeting shrimp 
and red snapper.
    These illegally caught fish are then finding their way into the 
U.S. market where they are competing unfairly and illegally with 
product from our domestic fisherman. On top of this, they are severely 
undermining the fishery management regime for which US shrimp and red 
snapper fisheries will be held accountable.
    Given the Coast Guard's presence in the Gulf of Mexico, why has 
there not been a significant decline in these incursions?
    Answer. While the Coast Guard routinely interdicts Mexican vessels 
illegally fishing in the U.S. EEZ, the fishermen are repatriated to 
Mexico. Akin to U.S. law, Mexican law only allows the issuance of civil 
penalties for these offenses, which have not significantly deterred the 
illegal activity.

    Question 4. Recent reports have shown some Mexican Nationals have 
been interdicted up to 40 times in our EEZ. Currently there are no laws 
in place to deter this behavior.
    What are the consequences once a Mexican fishing vessel is caught 
illegally fishing in our EEZ?
    Answer. The U.S. government seizes the catch, gear, and vessel, and 
CBP repatriates the violator to Mexico. After developing case packages 
documenting the incursion, those case packages are transmitted through 
the State Department to the Mexican government to afford Mexico the 
opportunity to hold their citizens accountable under their own laws. 
According to Article 73 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, which the U.S. has not ratified but accepts as international 
law, a foreign national's punishment for illegal fishing cannot include 
imprisonment, despite significant recidivist behavior. U.S. law and 
Mexican law only allow for civil penalties. The United States is 
actively working with Mexico to see if there are other operational or 
legal mechanisms that could be used to prevent multiple instances of 
recidivism or incursions.

 Questions to Rear Admiral Jo-Ann F. Burdian, Assistant Commandant for 
   Response Policy (CG-5R), U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Jared Huffman

Coast Guard inspections and forced labor
Rear Admiral Burdian, thank you for co-chairing the US Interagency 
Working Group on IUU Fishing. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing is depleting our oceans of fish, damaging marine 
ecosystems, and enabling widespread human rights abuses and forced 
labor on fishing vessels around the world. As stated in the Coast 
Guard's IUU strategy, your agency is ``Leveraging existing resources, 
enforcement tools, and legal authorities to coordinate efforts 
alongside partner nations to combat IUU fishing and associated illegal 
trade, including weapons, drugs, and human trafficking . . .''. I have 
several questions regarding human trafficking and forced labor:
    Question 1. When Coast Guard officers board vessels to inspect 
them, and fishers on the vessels give notes to the officers requesting 
assistance, what are Coast Guard officers instructed to do in response 
to these requests for assistance?
    Answer. Coast Guard boarding officers are instructed to pass the 
information via their chain of command and facilitate a conversation 
through the Global Maritime Operational Threat Response Coordination 
Center to inform the interagency and coordinate further action among 
interagency partners.

    Question 2. When the Coast Guard conducts inspections for safety 
and seaworthiness, is the Coast Guard also assessing the vessel 
conditions for red flags for forced labor?
    Answer. If Coast Guard boarding officers observe indications of 
forced labor, they are instructed to pass the information via their 
chain of command and facilitate a conversation through the Global 
Maritime Operational Threat Response Coordination Center to inform the 
interagency and coordinate further action.

    Question 3. Has the Coast Guard ever found forced labor on a vessel 
under inspection? What was the result? Has the Coast Guard ever 
reported a forced labor case to another agency for prosecution/
investigation?
    Answer. The Coast Guard has not encountered a case of forced labor 
while conducting high seas boardings and inspections. Structurally, 
there is not a protocol in place to report cases of forced labor, but 
the Coast Guard is currently working with the Department of Labor's 
Bureau of International Labor Affairs to include such a mechanism in 
the Global Maritime Operational Threat Response system.

    Question 4. Are Coast Guard officers trained on identifying forced 
labor aboard vessels that they inspect? Is this part of the curriculum 
at the Coast Guard Academy?
    Answer. Prior to a counter IUU fishing patrol, Coast Guard units 
will conduct specific training, which includes training on indicators 
of forced labor. Forced labor identification is not a standard part of 
the curriculum taught to Officers at the Coast Guard Academy. However, 
we are collaborating with the Department of Labor's Bureau of 
International Labor Affairs on a forced labor training, and have 
received the International Labor Organization Handbook on Identifying 
Forced Labor in Fishing. The Maritime Safe Act calls for strong 
interagency collaboration drawing on respective agencies' expertise 
including that of the U.S. Department of Labor.

    Question 5. Advocates have suggested that one method to keep 
fishers safe on vessels would be to mandate access to WiFi, allowing 
the fishers to communicate with shore. What is your view of this 
proposal to prevent forced labor? And, as a policy matter, how could 
this be added to the requirements for vessels entering U.S. waters?
    Answer. The Coast Guard has not taken a position regarding mandated 
access to WiFi onboard fishing vessels. Such a requirement would 
require further study and necessitate new regulations.
Importance of Automatic Information Systems (AIS) for transparency at 
        sea
    Question 1. Rear Admiral Burdian, as you know, Automatic 
Information System (AIS) is a vessel tracking system that transmits a 
vessel's location, behavior, and identity. This technology was 
developed to reduce vessel collisions, increase maritime safety, and 
provide greater awareness of vessel locations at sea, improving domain 
awareness. AIS transponders are relatively inexpensive for vessel 
owners to purchase. Vessel operators can turn off their AIS 
transponders, but that in itself is a suspicious act that can draw 
attention to the vessel's activities.
    Would greater use of AIS by fishing vessels around the world assist 
the Coast Guard with effective law enforcement regarding IUU fishing in 
your partnerships in the Pacific and around the world?
    Answer. Automatic Information System (AIS) is a valuable Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA) tool in combating IUU fishing; data from the 
system is monitored and analyzed by Coast Guard intelligence units to 
inform operational planning. Increased AIS usage and the legal 
requirement of compliance with the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea, Chapter V, Regulation 19.2 across the 
international community would provide intelligence units with more 
information to better identify potential IUU fishing. However, as a 
tool designed primarily to aid in safe navigation, the susceptibility 
of AIS information to spoofing or other forms of manipulation limit its 
reliability as a stand-alone MDA tool for enforcement operations.
IUU in the Gulf of Guinea
    Question 1. The Maritime SAFE Act required a National 5-Year 
Strategy to Combat IUU fishing. The new strategy identifies three 
strategic objectives: 1) Promote sustainable fisheries governance; 2) 
Enhance monitoring, control, and surveillance of marine fishing 
operations; and 3) Ensure only legal, sustainable, and responsibly 
harvested seafood enters trade. It also identifies ``Priority Regions'' 
for counter-IUU fishing programming, including the Gulf of Guinea.
    The Gulf of Guinea was identified because it has a high risk for 
IUU fishing activity; there is entry of illegally caught seafood into 
its markets; and the countries lack the capacity to fully address the 
illegal activity. There has also been a significant increase of PRC 
fishing, and PRC investment in fish meal plants and fish bases in the 
Gulf of Guinea. All of these operations are depleting fish stocks, 
undermining the local fishing economies and harming sustainable 
fisheries management, leading to incidents of civil unrest due to food, 
environmental and economic insecurity. Further there is an uptick of 
young men and families getting on small boats to migrate to Europe.
    Question 1.a. Is the Coast Guard undertaking activities to expand 
and support capacity building activities with Gulf of Guinea partner 
nations?
    Answer. The Coast Guard employs the full scope of available 
security cooperation activities within its own resource limitations and 
authorities so that nations within this critical region may exercise 
their sovereignty over their own exclusive economic zones (EEZ), with a 
particular emphasis on support for countering IUU fishing. Current 
capacity building efforts include: formal resident and mobile training; 
capability and capacity assessments; joint exercises; subject matter 
expert exchanges; and senior level key leader engagements. In 
collaboration with the U. S. Navy, the Coast Guard established the 
African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership program in 2008, to build 
the maritime response capacity of African partner nations through 
training, exercises, and combined maritime law enforcement operations. 
The Gulf of Guinea will see the second greatest number of Coast Guard 
Mobile Training Team visits in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, after only the 
Indo-Pacific region. One specific engagement example is a joint Coast 
Guard/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) led five-
day seminar on combatting IUU fishing, the next of which will occur in 
Sierra Leone in July of 2024. The Coast Guard also actively partners 
with interested Gulf of Guinea countries in providing Excess Defense 
Article (EDA) vessels via the interagency allocation process. Recent 
examples of Coast Guard EDA vessel transfers included two 87-foot 
Marine Protector Class Coastal Patrol Boats to the Ghanaian Navy in 
2023, which enabled them to patrol to the limit of their EEZ.

    Question 1.b. What are you doing to counter IUU fishing by the PRC?
    Answer. The Coast Guard seeks law enforcement action against the 
beneficial owners and actors in IUU fishing, rather than targeting one 
vessel, one fleet, or one flag state. The Coast Guard works with our 
partners to increase collective international ocean governance through 
the Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) for the 
adoption of High Seas Boarding and Inspection Schemes. These schemes 
allow party nations to ensure adherence to established Conservation 
Management Measures of the RFMOs. Additionally, the Coast Guard works 
with partner nations during law enforcement operations to encourage 
adherence to international norms and rules-based order. This occurs 
through deployments of Coast Guard cutters and law enforcement teams 
around the world. Last fiscal year, the Coast Guard allocated 
approximately 146 days of Deployable Specialized Force Units to AFRICOM 
to serve as force multiplier in the region.

    Question 1.c. Are you engaging in shiprider agreements, port 
security and fisheries management trainings?
    Answer. The Coast Guard leverages four bilateral maritime law 
enforcement agreements with shiprider provisions in the West Africa/
Gulf of Guinea region: Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Senegal, and Cabo 
Verde. Additionally, a bilateral maritime law enforcement agreement is 
in effect with the Seychelles. It is anticipated the United States and 
Cote d'Ivoire will enter into a bilateral maritime law enforcement 
agreement in 2024.
    In FY 2024, the Coast Guard International Port Security Program 
(IPSP) is scheduled to provide port security capacity building in Cabo 
Verde (two sessions), Cameroon (three sessions), Cote D'Ivoire (three 
sessions), Guinea (three sessions), and Gabon. This training will focus 
on improving our partners' implementation of the International Ship and 
Port Facility Security Code at the national and facility level.
    Through its IPSP, the Coast Guard conducts a variety of port 
security engagements with Gulf of Guinea partner nations. In 
collaboration with the U.S. Department of State and local government 
authorities, IPSP conducts annual informal port security evaluations 
and triennial formal assessments in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, and Angola. IPSP also conducts port security-
related capacity building in Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, and 
Gabon, and enhanced assistance programs in Benin, Nigeria, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Capacity building and enhanced 
assistance programs allow IPSP to provide targeted seminars and 
technical assistance to host nation government officials and port 
facility security officers to elevate port security standards and build 
more effective port security governance and implementation systems. 


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