[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BEHIND THE SCENES: HOW THE
BIDEN ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO
ENFORCE THE DOHA AGREEMENT
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
February 15, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-86
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
55-924PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS #4
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking
JOE WILSON, South Carolina Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida AMI BERA, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee DINA TITUS, Nevada
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee TED LIEU, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
RONNY JACKSON, Texas DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
YOUNG KIM, California COLIN ALLRED, Texas
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida ANDY KIM, New Jersey
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan SARA JACOBS, California
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
American Samoa SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio GREG STANTON, Arizona
JIM BAIRD, Indiana MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
CORY MILLS, Florida JIM COSTA, California
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia JASON CROW, Colorado
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
JOHN JAMES, Michigan GABE AMO, Rhode Island
KEITH SELF, Texas
Brendan Shields, Majority Staff Director
Sophia Lafargue, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Information submitted for the record from Ambassador Smith....... 4
WITNESSES
Khalilzad, Zalmay, Former U.S. Special Representative for
Afghanistan Reconciliation, U.S. Department of State........... 11
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Information submitted for the record from Representative Davidson 35
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 60
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 61
Hearing Attendance............................................... 62
STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY
Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly.. 63
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record.................. 65
BEHIND THE SCENES: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO ENFORCE THE
DOHA AGREEMENT
Thursday, February 15, 2024
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael McCaul
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come
to order. The purpose of this hearing is to discuss how the
Biden Administration unconditionally handed over Afghanistan to
the Taliban terrorist organization with its refusal to enforce
the DOHA agreement.
Today's hearing comes at a crucial moment in this
committee's investigation into the Biden Administration's
catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan.
For months after President Biden announced the withdrawal,
his senior military advisors and his own intelligence community
repeatedly issued dire warnings about the damage this would
create. At the same time, I, along with other Republican and
Democrat Members of Congress, urged President Biden to uphold
the conditions of the DOHA agreement, and most importantly, we
urged him to prepare for the eventual fallout of our
withdrawal.
He ignored us and all, including his own State Department
personnel, who issued a dissent cable in July warning of the
dire situation on the ground. Instead, as the Taliban takeover
became imminent, the White House and State Department
leadership stuck their heads in the sand.
It was so bad the State Department waited until the day
after the Taliban captured Kabul to actually request an
emergency evacuation, also known as a NEO. As a result of the
Biden Administration's failure to plan, the U.S. military was
forced to conduct this emergency evacuation surrounded by tens
of thousands of Taliban terrorists. Put simply, President Biden
and Secretary Blinken put thousands of American lives at risk
through their incompetence and willful blindness.
And then, the worst possible outcome: a terrorist attack at
Abbey Gate on August the 26th, 2021, that killed 13 U.S.
service members, wounded 45 more, and killed more than 170
Afghan civilians. It was the deadliest day for the United
States in Afghanistan in over a decade.
And today, we have some of the family members of the
service members killed at Abbey Gate in the audience. They are
here because they want accountability for their children's
deaths. I'm going to get them answers--the answers they
deserve.
I anticipate my colleagues on the other side of the aisle
will attempt to spin this disaster as all being President
Trump's fault. They will claim the DOHA agreement forced
President Biden to withdraw and that he had no choice, but this
is false.
To that end, I want to remind everyone of two critical
facts.
First, the DOHA agreement was conditions-based--conditions
our witness here today negotiated. And as he can tell you,
those conditions were not being met by the Taliban, and they
are still not being met today.
The Taliban is allowing terrorists like Al Qaeda to
flourish in Afghanistan. And the truth is that President Biden
wanted to withdraw from the DOHA agreement, and if he wanted
to, he could have. He did just that with many of President
Trump's other agreements, like Remain in Mexico.
Second, President Biden himself said that, even if the DOHA
agreement had never been signed, he would still have withdrawn
all U.S. troops from Afghanistan exactly the way that he did.
When asked by George Stephanopoulos, quote, he said,
``Would you have withdrawn troops like this, even if President
Trump had not made that deal with the Taliban?'' President
Biden replied, quote, ``I would have tried to figure out how to
withdraw those troops, yes.''
Our witness today, Ambassador Khalilzad, someone I have
known for quite many years, served as the U.S. Special
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation under President
Trump, where he negotiated the DOHA agreement and was asked to
remain on by President Biden.
In November 2023, Ambassador Khalilzad appeared before the
committee for a nearly 12-hour, closed-door, transcribed
interview--and voluntarily, I might add, and we thank you for
that.
And in that interview, one thing was made clear: the core
problem was not the DOHA agreement. It was a President who
refused to enforce it.
I want to thank our witness for being here today.
Ambassador Khalilzad, I believe you have valuable information
to share with this committee. And I know you have chosen to do
so voluntarily, and I hope you do so with the same candor you
showed in November.
And I really admire you, sir. You are not forced to appear
here. We could have done that. You are doing this as a patriot
and an American, and someone who was in the middle of all this
from the very beginning with so many facts to share with this
committee. We thank you, sir, for being here today.
With that, I recognize the ranking member, Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me begin by also thanking you for hearing my call
for transparency at our November 23rd--November 2023
Afghanistan hearing. Yesterday, your staff sent us written
notice of your personal commitment to publicly release all
transcripts from interviews held during this Congress and in
the committee's investigation into the United States withdrawal
from Afghanistan after they are finalized on February 29th.
This, indeed, is the right thing to do. The American people
have funded our bipartisan oversight work and we owe them full
transparency, not just misleading, cherry-picked snippets. Such
transparency is critical for any investigation.
So, I strongly hope that your commitment to make
transcripts public will extend to the other oversight
investigations you have initiated in this Congress in which
witnesses have been questioned behind closed doors. We must not
let this committee's activities become another typical move in
a partisan game.
And with that, let me thank Ambassador Khalilzad for
appearing before our committee. Ambassador, you served under
three different Presidents in a variety of capacities during
America's 20 years of war effort in Afghanistan. And your
insights on the August 2021 withdrawal, and the many decision
points that led to the events of August 2021, are important to
this committee's understanding. A 20-year war deserved
comprehensive and bipartisan oversight.
But the title of this hearing, ``How the Biden
Administration failed to enforce the DOHA agreement,'' is
telling. It is not titled, ``The Biden Administration's failed
DOHA agreement with the Taliban.'' That is because it was not
Joe Biden who crafted the February 2020 deal. It was, in fact,
his Republican predecessor that made the agreement with the
Taliban that committed the United States to withdraw all of our
troops from Afghanistan.
Nor is the hearing titled, ``How the Trump Administration
failed to press the Taliban to live up to its commitments in
the DOHA agreement, but withdrew troops anyway.'' That would
require scrutiny of the DOHA deal since its inception under the
Trump Administration.
I must say this because, for some of my Republican
colleagues, the challenges of Afghanistan began the day of Joe
Biden's inauguration. That is not to say that the Biden
Administration is beyond congressional review or that there is
nothing to learn from those 8 months, but that is an 8-month
snapshot out of 20 years. At best, this fixation is oversight
malpractice. At worst, it is historical revisionism,
politically motivated to place a withdrawal which President
Biden inherited solely at his feet.
Let's be clear. Both President Biden and President Trump
sought to end our forever war in Afghanistan, and President
Biden, ultimately, achieved that goal. Our presence in
Afghanistan has changed, but our core interests have not. And
the United States continues to pursue those interests, as it
has demonstrated with the killing of the Emir of Al Qaeda and a
key 9/11 mastermind, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in 2022 in Kabul.
This is not about pointing blame. This is about grappling
with reality, with the facts we like, as well as the ones we do
not. And with the sacred responsibility, we have to oversee the
State Department and the U.S. foreign policy.
To that end, I want to acknowledge Ambassador Dan Smith's
statement which is submitted for today's record.
[The information referred to:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Meeks. Ambassador Smith served for almost four decades
at the State Department and returned at Secretary Blinken's
request to lead its after-action review, an independent review
of the Department's actions over the course of January 2020 to
August 2021 related to the United States withdrawal.
The result of his review, drawn from more than 150
interviews, are not just invaluable, but actionable and provide
a roadmap we all should consult regularly to support the
Department's crises management capacity and its single greatest
assets--its people.
Now, Ambassador Khalilzad, I know you have previously sat
for a transcript interview on today's subject that lasted over
10 hours, and we thank you for that. That's a testimony to both
your vast knowledge to share and your deep commitment to
America and to our national security.
So, I look forward to your testimony and I hope that the
American people can hear today what we have already heard
behind closed doors.
With that, I yield.
Chairman McCaul. Other members of the committee are
reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
Chairman McCaul. We are pleased to have here today Hon.
Zalmay Khalilzad before us today. He served as a Special
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation at the State
Department from September 2018 to October 2021.
Your full statement will be made part of the record.
And I now recognize Ambassador Khalilzad for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD, FORMER U.S. SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONCILIATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member, and distinguished members of the committee, I welcome
the opportunity to talk with you today about America's strategy
in Afghanistan during my service as the Special Representative
for Afghanistan Reconciliation between 2018 and 2021.
In September 2018, the Trump Administration asked me to
help negotiate a framework agreement for the safe withdrawal of
U.S. forces, obtain commitments from both the Taliban and the
Afghan government on U.S. counterterrorism concerns, and set
the stage for Afghans to start negotiating an end to the war in
their country.
By the end of 2018, the President's decision was to bring
the American forces home. Several factors that contributed to
this decision:
The conclusion that this war had gone on for too long with
no end in sight.
The opportunity cost was too high. The United States needed
to focus on great power competition--that is, China, Russia,
and the threat from Iran.
Afghanistan no longer was central to the war on terror.
The goal of transforming Afghanistan into a modern and
democratic State had been unrealistic. Despite best efforts,
the country had huge governance problems and rampant levels of
corruption.
That decision recognized the potential risks involved in
this policy. The greatest risk was the potential threat to U.S.
forces during withdrawal. The British withdrawal in 1842 and
the Soviet withdrawal in 1988 and 1989 had been very bloody.
A second risk was Afghanistan once again becoming the big
platform for a terrorist threat against the United States
homeland, U.S. interests, and our allies.
A third risk was the loss of gains made by the Afghan
people.
There was opposition to this policy, both inside the
government and outside, but the President determined that the
withdrawal was in the U.S. national interest.
After more than a year of negotiations, on February 29,
2020, we reached two agreements--one with the Taliban and the
other with the Afghan government. These provided a framework
for U.S. withdrawal, dealing with terrorism, intra-Afghan
negotiations within the Taliban and the Afghan Republic, a
permanent cease-fire, and future relations between the United
States and Afghanistan.
Key features of the agreement were:
Phased withdrawal of U.S. forces over a 14-month period.
Afghanistan was not to be used by any group or individual
to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.
Intra-Afghan negotiations.
Importantly, the Taliban committed not to attack U.S.
forces once the agreement was signed. This was critical, and
the Taliban adhered to it, killing no coalition fighter or U.S.
soldier during the entire withdrawal period.
The first phase of withdrawal lasted 135 days, in which the
U.S. forces were reduced to 8600. By the time President Trump
left office, U.S. forces in Afghanistan had been reduced to
2,500.
The United States retained the right to come to the defense
of the Afghan forces if the Taliban attacked them. We exercised
this right as needed.
During the negotiations between the Afghanistan Republic
and the Taliban, which started on September 12, 2020, they did
not make any significant progress.
After the November 2020 elections, President-Elect Biden's
team asked me to stay on.
The Administration had three options:
One, withdraw from the DOHA agreement.
Two, implement the agreement, but with changes, such as the
extension of the agreed timeline--linking the withdrawal of
remaining forces to the conclusion of a political agreement
between the Taliban and the Afghan government, or insisting on
leaving behind in Afghanistan a counterterror force, or
withdraw the remaining forces without such linkages.
The President announced in April 2021 that we would add 4
months to the timetable for withdrawal, for a total of 18
months.
The withdrawal was not conditioned on a political agreement
between the two Afghan sides because it was believed that such
conditionality would risk a return to war without end and
entrap the United States into reversing course and sending more
forces again.
It was also decided that our over-the-horizon capabilities
would allow us to monitor and respond to terror threats to the
United States from Afghan territory.
On protecting social and political gains, the approach was
to advocate for key values in the course of intra-Afghan
negotiations by pressing the Taliban on respecting women's
rights and human rights.
The withdrawal proceeded based on the new extended
timeline. The assessment was that the Afghan government would
remain in power and its forces would defend it and fight the
Taliban during the withdrawal and for some time afterwards.
This assumption informed our plans.
Although reasonable, the assumption turned out to be wrong.
The situation on the ground began to shift significantly and
rapidly in favor of the Taliban. They took over one province
after another, and by mid-August 2021, were at the gates of
Kabul.
We had the last-minute success in persuading the Taliban to
refrain from entering Kabul and, instead, to hold talks with
government to reach a political deal for a shared government, a
step to which both sides agreed.
But this fell apart when President Ghani surprisingly fled
the country, which caused the now leaderless Afghan military
and police to instantly disintegrate.
These developments led to the Taliban entry into Kabul, and
this abrupt series of events obliged the United States to
react, adapt, and improvise, as none of this had been foreseen
in our plans to withdraw by the end of August.
As we all remember, the final 2 weeks of chaos at the
airport and the tragic loss of 13 brave Americans in an ISIS-K
terrorist attack were difficult, and ``what-ifs'' remain hotly
debated.
The events of those final days should not diminish the
achievements made. We must all remember that, after 9/11, we
sent our forces to Afghanistan to decimate Al Qaeda there. This
was accomplished and represents a major win for the security of
the United States. We all are grateful to those whose sacrifice
made this possible and to their families.
The struggle for Afghanistan is not over and Afghanistan's
final chapter is certainly not written. The seed of the values
we planted may well bear fruit over time. It would be a mistake
to turn our back on the country.
The American approach going forward must take current
realities in Afghanistan, the region, and the world into
account while remaining guided, as elsewhere, by our interests
and enduring values.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Khalilzad follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Ambassador.
And I want to echo your comments to our veterans that their
service was not in vain. They protected this Nation for 20
years from a major terrorist attack like 9/11, and we thank
them for that.
We also want to thank the parents of Marine Corps Corporal
Hunter Lopez and Marine Corps Sergeant Nicole Gee, who are here
today, and to the Lopez family, Ms. Shamblin, and the rest of
the Gold Star families. We honor your sacrifice and your
children.
In November, you testified before this committee in a
transcribed interview and you just restated that you presented
to the Biden Administration and to the President, basically,
three options on the DOHA agreement.
One, to, basically, ignore it and unconditionally withdraw.
Two, to tear it up.
And three, to enforce it, its conditions against the
Taliban.
You also testified that you and Secretary Blinken both
recommended to President Biden that he enforce DOHA's
conditions. But, instead, the President ignored your advice or
disagreed and chose to ignore the DOHA conditions and
unconditionally withdraw. Is that correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. I think there was the opportunity for me to
brief the President, as you said, correct, and the options that
he had. And it was clear that it would be desirable that the
final withdrawal happens after there is an agreement between
the government and the Taliban.
And that was broadly supported, that idea, but upon
discussion and deliberation, and consultations with allies and
others--and the allies, too, favored withdrawal after there was
an agreement between the government and the Taliban--but there
was a judgment that, if we did that, since that was not part of
the DOHA agreement, that it could result in a protracted delay
in the withdrawal of forces, as we couldn't be certain when and
if the Afghans would reach an agreement. And if there was a
risk of going back to war, and perhaps sending more troops, the
decision was not to pursue that, and there was broad support
for that decision.
Chairman McCaul. But your recommendation to the President
was to enforce DOHA's conditions, correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. That was part of the agreement, yes, and we
restated that, that this was a condition-based agreement. It
was a package deal and there were linkages. What we did
depended on the Taliban delivering on their commitments.
Chairman McCaul. Right. And the President disagreed with
you and chose not to enforce the conditions?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I described the discussion that
occurred and the judgment that was made.
Chairman McCaul. And the conditions were not enforced, and
as a result, the Taliban is in control of Afghanistan today,
correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I would say it's clear that the
Taliban are in control, but I would put the responsibility for
what happened largely on the shoulders of the Afghan government
leadership for not standing for their government, for their
system, and for the values that they said they believed in.
Chairman McCaul. Yes, and I agree. I think President
Ghani's actions were cowardice in fleeing his country as a
coward--not a good example.
Let me turn to the meeting you had in DOHA between
yourself, General McKenzie, and the Taliban leader Mullah
Baradar. You said that the Taliban offered to give the United
States control of Kabul for the purposes of evacuation, but
that offer was turned down. When asked by my committee at your
interview whether the Taliban viewed that as a, quote, ``green
light'' to take over Kabul, you said, quote, ``I think that's
clear.'' Do you agree with that statement?
Mr. Khalilzad. I agree that we had made an agreement for
the Taliban not to enter Kabul and for a delegation to come
from Kabul--and President Ghani had agreed to it as well--to
negotiate the power-sharing government to take over on
September 1 in a meeting of 200 Afghan notables present.
Chairman McCaul. Right, but McKenzie says, ``That's not my
mission'' because his orders are not to secure Kabul----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, indeed.
Chairman McCaul [continuing]. For evacuation. His orders
are to evacuate----
Mr. Khalilzad. Indeed. Indeed.
Chairman McCaul [continuing]. By July 4th, and he did not
have the troops----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Chairman McCaul [continuing]. Allocated for that.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Chairman McCaul. Now, he could have raised that to the
President. Was this meeting, to your knowledge, ever reported
to the White House?
Mr. Khalilzad. It was reported clearly to the entire
government, but it was reported after General McKenzie said on
the spot there that that wasn't, as you said, Chairman, his
mission to secure Kabul. And the initial goal was for the
Taliban not to be in Kabul. In fact, it presented them with a
map of some 20 to 25 miles away from the center, within that
area, that there should be no Talibs present.
But the departure of President Ghani and increased
widespread concern by Afghans in Kabul about law and order with
the disintegration of the Security Forces, the options were
either that the Talibs offer that we take responsibility, and
General McKenzie, as you said correctly, Chairman--I was
present in the meeting--that that was not part of his mission,
and then, the discussion shifted to where the Talibs could go
for----
Chairman McCaul. Because of his understanding, McKenzie's
understanding, that the President wouldn't authorize more
troops to take over Kabul for purposes of the evacuation?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I cannot comment on that because----
Chairman McCaul. Yes.
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. I wasn't presented in any
discussion he may have had----
Chairman McCaul. Now, if that had happened, imagine,
wouldn't that have been a little different, right? We take over
Kabul for purposes of the evacuation. The Taliban agrees to
stay out of this 20-mile radius and they do not take over HKIA.
They are not part of this chaos at the very end, and the
suicide bomber coming from this prison out of Bagram--you know,
I'm not asking you to speculate, but it is very foreseeable
that may never have happened. And this report does go to the
White House, and yet, nothing is done to change the course of
events. Correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, your account is correct, but we do not
know what else could have happened if that decision was made.
So, we are entering speculation now.
Chairman McCaul. No, the bottom line is you really cannot
trust the Taliban.
And I see my time is expired, and I now recognize the
ranking member, Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
I'm not going to speculate because I do not think we should
be speculating or just giving our own opinions, or paraphrasing
of what you are saying. I want to take it for what you are
saying and not going to guess on what my thoughts are, because
we want to do an investigation to determine what we should
learn from it.
Mr. Khalilzad. Correct.
Mr. Meeks. Let me join the chairman, though, in, first,
saying to our Gold Star families how much we appreciate you and
the heroes that lost their lives. And I know that there is
nothing that we can do to bring them back, but they are,
indeed, heroes for our country. And I thank you for your
sacrifices. And I will tell you that, no matter whether it is a
Democrat or a Republican, I truly believe that we will always
hold them dear and acknowledge the heroes that they are. Thank
you for being here.
Ambassador, you have worked tirelessly over the years to
negotiate and implement the DOHA deal, as did many others in
our government. And I have some questions I want to ask based
upon your experience. They are mostly yes or no. So, we do not
have to get into speculation and any things of that nature.
Now, Secretary Pompeo himself--I think I have a picture
here--had gone to DOHA to sign the agreement in a photo op with
the Taliban leader, Mullah Baradar, after nearly two decades of
being at war with them. And despite any criticisms of it, it is
fair to say that concluding the DOHA deal was a big deal; it
was a significant event, is that correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, signing it was a significant event.
Mr. Meeks. And with the conclusion of the DOHA deal, the
Taliban, then, stopped attacking U.S. forces inside
Afghanistan, fulfilling the top condition placed on it in the
deal. Is that also correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. Correct.
Mr. Meeks. And the United States committed in the DOHA deal
to, quote, ``withdraw from Afghanistan all military forces of
the United States, its allies, and coalition partners,
including all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private
security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting
services personnel.'' Is that not correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. Correct.
Mr. Meeks. And arguably, that withdrawal was well underway
in January 2021 after President Trump, according to Ambassador
Smith's statement for the record, quote, ``steadily withdrew
U.S. forces, notwithstanding concerns about the Taliban's
behavior.'' Is that correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. Correct. We were down to 2500, as I said,
yes.
Mr. Meeks. Right. And so, in your expert opinion, what did
you think the Taliban would have done if President Biden, just
a few months before the original May deadline that his
predecessor had set for a full withdrawal, had just walked away
entirely from the DOHA agreement, in your expert opinion?
Mr. Khalilzad. If we had walked away from the DOHA
agreement, we would have been back, in my opinion--now I am
offering an opinion----
Mr. Meeks. Yes, your expert opinion.
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. We would have been back and
fighting the Taliban. So, we would have been back to where we
were before the agreement. That is my opinion.
Mr. Meeks. Right. So, you spoke in your opening statement
of the belief that imposing further conditions on the Taliban
at that time, as you just stated, would risk a return to war.
And you hold to that belief today, is that correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. I do.
Mr. Meeks. And had President Biden sought to revise the
deal to maintain a small number of troops in Afghanistan
indefinitely, did the risk remain that the Taliban would resume
attacks against them?
Mr. Khalilzad. Very likely.
Mr. Meeks. So, I'm sure, Mr. Ambassador, you agree that the
highest priority of the United States President should be to
protect American lives, correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. Correct.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
And even over other development or national security
objectives, or even the welfare of our allies and partners?
Mr. Khalilzad. Of course, this gets into a complicated
discussion. We do put lives at risk in defense of our interests
and our values, as we did in Afghanistan for many years.
Mr. Meeks. Let me ask my last question----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Meeks [continuing]. Because I see I'm out of time.
So, Mr. Ambassador, in your own belief, do you believe that
President Biden's completion of the U.S. withdrawal from
Afghanistan in 2021 was necessary to protect American lives?
Mr. Khalilzad. Certainly American lives in Afghanistan in
terms of American military forces, yes.
Mr. Meeks. I thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
Mr. Meeks. I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Ambassador, thank you for your service, and it is just
so inspiring to be with you. So, we are grateful for what you
have done for our country.
And it is particularly a time for us to appreciate the
success of the American military.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Wilson. For 20 years, they stopped terrorist attacks in
our country. And so, as people look back, we should appreciate
the success of the American military.
It is very personal to me. My former National Guard unit,
the 218th Mechanized Infantry of the South Carolina National
Guard, led by General Bob Livingston, served for a year across
Afghanistan, and they developed a great affection for their
Afghan brothers. I was there four times seeing firsthand the
success of what they were doing.
And then, I am grateful my youngest son, First Lieutenant
Hunter Wilson, was an engineer serving with the Army Guard for
a year in Afghanistan.
So, it is very personal to me, the absolute disgust I have
with President Joe Biden. His shameful appeasement, surrender,
and abandonment of the people of Afghanistan has led
immediately to the death of 13 young Americans at Kabul
airport, even though the sniper had the mass-murdering
individual bomber in his sights, which could have saved the 13
lives and could have saved, indeed, hundreds of poor Afghan
citizens who were murdered. But yet, the Biden rules of
engagement came into play and 13 young Americans died.
And with that, too, it has also given encouragement to what
we are into now which we did not choose. And that is a war,
dictators with rule of gun invading democracies with rule of
law. We saw that on February 24th, 2022, when War Criminal
Putin invaded Ukraine. We saw it October 7th, when Hamas, the
puppets of Iran, invaded Israel. We see it today with the
threats being made against the 24 million people of Taiwan by
the Chinese Communist Party.
All of this to me goes back to the shameless, shameful
decision which I think is the most catastrophic in the history
of the United States in terms of national defense, security,
and foreign police, and there is no excuse, however they
rewrite history, God bless their hearts.
But, then, additionally, we should always remember that
America was in Afghanistan and liberated Afghanistan from
Taliban terrorists because of the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
Again, history should not be rewritten. What happened is Osama
bin Laden was operating out of a cave in Afghanistan.
And so, for 20 years, indeed, our military was successful
to protect, but, sadly, we now, by abandoning Afghanistan, the
global war on terrorism is not over. It is coming to America.
The FBI has identified that we are great risk of attack
imminently today in America that could occur. And so, it is
just shameful what occurred.
Additionally, a question I have is that, on August 26th,
2021, when President Biden excused his appeasement, and right
in the middle of his speech, he was explaining his advisors had
said to just abandon; leave now, and then, he threw in--it was
not on the teleprompter--``I have letters.''
OK. I sent him, and asked that night, I asked for copies of
the letters of the advice that he received to abandon the
people of Afghanistan. And it should not surprise you, about
every 2 months, I send a letter to the White House asking for
the letters. There are no letters; they have not been revealed.
But what advice was given by his advisors on leaving the people
of Afghanistan to fall off jets as the abandonment took place?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I believe that our military, under the
leadership of the President and the chain of command, did an
admirable job in a very difficult set of circumstances to get
as many people out, as some 125,000 people were brought out.
So, I associate myself with your praise of our military. I
had the honor of serving with them in Afghanistan and in Iraq.
And they have done an outstanding job for the people of the
United States and our security.
With regard to what you mentioned, sir, about the letters
and advice, I do not have a direct knowledge of what it is that
was involved there. But the advice was to bring out as many
people as possible, to reach out to as many Americans and those
who had worked for us or for organizations that worked for us,
to bring them out. And a huge number was brought out.
Mr. Wilson. Again, thank you for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
The chair recognizes Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Throughout the relevant period, we had two
choices: keep a force there, particularly with air power, and
be prepared to incur modest casualties, or pull out. The
foreign policy establishment wanted to stay.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Sherman. The dissent cables said, ``Stay.'' The
politicians promised the American people we would pull out--not
because our casualties were particularly large, but because
they were on top of 20 years of war.
We were defeated militarily in achieving our full goals in
Afghanistan not by the Taliban, but by the phrase ``Forever
War.'' Once that phrase was coined, the American people
demanded we withdraw.
Now, I know there is pressure on the chairman to politicize
this committee and achieve the political objectives of his
party, but this hearing is going to give politicization a bad
name because it is the worst issue for the Republicans to bring
up.
Because, Ambassador, this agreement, this DOHA agreement,
is the worst agreement I could imagine. I do not blame you.
Because President Trump--well, you had testified in your
testimony, by the end of 2018, it was well known that President
Trump's decision was to bring all American forces home from
Afghanistan. In 2019, on the anniversary of 9/11, he invited
them to Camp David, and just before the November 2020 election,
President Trump stated, ``We will have the small remaining
number of our brave men and women serving in Afghanistan home
by Christmas.''
So, the only leverage you had over the Taliban is maybe we
will take that foreign policy approach and keep our Air Force
capacity there. And you have got the President saying,
President Trump saying, they're all home by Christmas, every
single one of them.
So, this is the worst agreement I could imagine.
Ambassador, is there anything in the agreement where the
Taliban commit themselves to allowing 13-year-old girls to go
to school? I did not find anything like that. Is there in
there?
Mr. Khalilzad. The Taliban--there is nothing in the
agreement. The issues dealing with the future of Afghanistan
was to be negotiated----
Mr. Sherman. But the agreement itself----
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. Among the Afghans, between the
two sides.
Mr. Sherman. The purpose of this hearing is to say, why did
not we enforce the agreement?
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Sherman. But when the Taliban treats 12-year-old girls
like sex slaves, when they kill members of the LGBT community,
when they kill anyone who converts from Islam to Christianity,
they are not in violation of this agreement that we are having
a hearing to say, why aren't we enforcing? They are not in
violation. You cannot enforce it. We entered into an agreement
in which they agreed to do nothing more than talk to the Afghan
government.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Sherman. They talked. They decided they wanted to kill
the LGBTQ community; they wanted to kill what they call
apostates. They wanted to, basically, enslave half the human
race, the female half.
So, this agreement was so bad that the chairman attacks
President Biden for not withdrawing from it. This is an
agreement entered into by the man who claims he is the best
negotiator in the world, President Trump.
I will say that we did achieve one objective, and that is
Afghanistan is not uniquely situated to serve as a base for
terrorism against America, and, in fact, there has been more
terrorism coming out of Afghanistan killing Iranians in Iran
than killing Americans.
There is no such thing as an easy withdrawal. As the
Ambassador pointed out, Russia and Britain had very messy
withdrawals from Afghanistan, and our withdrawal from Vietnam
was messy as well.
That was particularly true when every English-speaking
Afghan I had any acquaintance with was trying to leave, the
idea that the average grunt in Afghanistan would stay in fight
is absurd.
But I do have one more question. And that is, the
Republicans have said that somehow we should have gone over
Afghanistan and collected our $85 billion worth of weapons,
presumably from people who knew that they could keep them for
their own self-defense or sell them to the Taliban. Could we
have, by force, taken back our weapons everywhere in
Afghanistan on our way out without casualties?
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you, sir.
As you know, the weapons that were left behind were weapons
that we thought was safe to leave behind for the government of
Afghanistan since----
Mr. Sherman. Even if we had realized the government was
useless, could we have seized them without casualties?
Mr. Khalilzad. Now we are speculating. Because the
government, we assumed, would not fall apart before our
withdrawal.
Mr. Sherman. Ambassador, it was more of a rhetorical
question. If people have weapons they want to hold onto, you
cannot take them away if you are not willing to incur some
casualties.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
The chair recognizes Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, I'm over here.
In September 2020, you appeared before the House Oversight
Committee and testified that the U.S. troop withdrawal would be
determined based--and I'm going to quote you--``based on
conditions on the ground and delivery by the Taliban on their
commitment.''
Did you or Secretary Blinken advocate for an extension on
the withdrawal date, considering the poor planning behind the
final evacuation as it occurred?
Mr. Khalilzad. As I said, sir, 4 months were added to the
timetable, moving from 14 to 18. But, as I said again, the
decision was made to withdraw at the end of August and not to
link it to any conditions that you might have in mind.
Mr. Perry. Well, that was your quote, ``conditions.'' So, I
think Americans have in mind that it would be a condition-based
withdrawal, which makes sense. You provide some kind of--when I
say, ``you,'' our adversary, so to speak--you provide some
level of compliance with the agreement that we can see, and
then, we will give you a little. But that is not what occurred.
I'm just wondering if you can name a single concession made
by the Taliban during the time period between the April 14th
announcement by the President, by President Biden, of total
withdrawal and the fall of Afghanistan. What concessions?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, one concession was that they acquiesce
to the addition of 4 months that we demanded.
Mr. Perry. Of foreign what?
Mr. Khalilzad. Four months----
Mr. Perry. Four months.
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. Was demanded of additional
time. They could have rejected it and gone back to fighting.
They did not; they acquiesced.
Too, they agreed not to enter Kabul, when we asked. They
agreed to sit and agreed to a government that would include
members of the republican side, the government side.
Mr. Perry. But those agreements, as you know, were hallow
because they took more and more and more of the government
under their control, which was not in the DOHA agreement, which
was not what was considered, which was not what was agreed to.
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, they----
Mr. Perry. And they did invade Kabul.
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, they did because--they agreed not to,
and then, there was to be negotiations----
Mr. Perry. And so, they lied to us. So, it wasn't based,
the withdrawal was not based on conditions on the ground. And
I'm wondering, did you convey these concerns to President Biden
during the continuing negotiations about the blatant
violations--blatant. They were blatant. The whole world saw
them as they were occurring.
Mr. Khalilzad. Certainly, I'm not here to defend the
behavior of the Talibs or the Taliban.
Mr. Perry. None of us are; I get that.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. But I believe that----
Mr. Perry. I'm trying to----
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. Insisting on additional
conditions----
Mr. Perry. We are not asking for additional conditions,
just the conditions that they agreed to. And I'm trying to
determine, knowing that--you knew that.
Mr. Khalilzad. Sure.
Mr. Perry. The world saw that.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Perry. The President saw that. I'm assuming--maybe I
shouldn't be--but I'm assuming you advised him of that. The
Secretary advised him of that. But he proceeded anyway.
That's----
Mr. Khalilzad. He proceeded to withdraw forces because he
believed, if he persisted, we would be back to a fight, and he
did not want to do that.
Mr. Perry. So, just out of curiosity, in the remaining
time, who chose the 20th anniversary of 9/11 as the final
evacuation day?
Mr. Khalilzad. I actually do not know that.
Mr. Perry. Did you ever question that? I mean, maybe it is
not as important, impactful to you as it is for the rest of
Americans, but that's pretty significant.
Mr. Khalilzad. I agree with that, but I think, therefore,
an adjustment was made to the end of August as the final date
of withdrawal.
Mr. Perry. But it was September 11th.
Mr. Khalilzad. The initial announcement was, you know as
well as I do, but I think----
Mr. Perry. You do not know who made the decision?
Mr. Khalilzad. I do not--well, the President, obviously,
made the decision, but I do not know who advised him on
choosing that date.
Mr. Perry. Well, the President is the Commander-in-Chief,
regardless----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. Of who advised him.
Now, it was said that the President wanted to withdraw, and
you even kind of just reminded us, because it was to protect
American lives and to lessen the loss of American lives. But
you would also concede that the time coming into that during
the previous Administration there had been no loss of American
lives. And once the decision was made and the plan executed,
there was a horrific loss of American lives.
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the loss of life that did not occur
under President Trump's Administration----
Mr. Perry. We will never know what did not occur, sir. What
we know did occur, and that the previous Administration's plan
coming into it during that period of time, a long period of
time, there was no loss of American service members' lives.
Mr. Khalilzad. Because of the agreement.
Mr. Perry. No, no, it wasn't because of the agreement. The
Taliban wasn't following the agreement or abiding by the
agreement.
Mr. Khalilzad. Well----
Mr. Perry. It was because the President let the Taliban
know that, if they killed any American lives, it was going to
be over for them.
Mr. Khalilzad. You know, I----
Mr. Perry. I yield the balance.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
The chair recognizes Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First off, as a Gold Star family myself--my uncle was
killed in action--I just want to recognize and thank the
families that are here. I want to be sure we thank, first and
foremost, and give our eternal gratitude to their service and
their sacrifice.
The purpose of undertaking the overall investigation of
Afghanistan was to look to 20-plus years and to try to find out
lessons learned, things that we could do differently. And the
goal is--and I think I share it, and I'm sure the families here
share it--to prevent future lives from being lost. Can we learn
something over this period of time that will save other
families and save other brave Americans from that sacrifice?
So, that is my goal, over 20 years, looking at this.
And I cannot really sit here at this moment in time talking
about saving future American lives without just indicating
something else that is happening right here in this House right
now, and that is not acting on aid to Ukraine.
Why is that relevant to this? Because when we can fund
Ukrainians defending themselves against an illegal war from
Russia that is a direct and present danger to the United States
and our allies, and we can confront this threat with funding
Ukraine, and by doing that, confront Russia, deter other
threats--threats that could be in China and Taiwan--in the
process, and keep young American men and women from being
deployed under Article 5. If Ukraine falls, Putin has made it
clear he is going into the Baltic states, which are NATO
states.
So, in the theme of trying to save future American lives, I
hope that the Speaker has the courage to even allow democracy
that so many people fought for a chance to have a vote on this.
Now, when it comes to Ukraine, Mr. Ambassador, you know, I
did not get to choose who is here. I did not get to choose the
title that says ``the Biden Administration failed.'' Again, I
prefer to look at this over 20-plus years.
But I would quote, given the comments of some of my
colleague, a quote from former U.S. Ambassador John Bass, who
said our main policy efforts--and he was the Ambassador, as you
are aware----
Mr. Khalilzad. He was.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. Under President Trump--our main
policy efforts not only did not reinforce each other; they
contradicted each other. These contrary signals were amplified
by President Trump's periodic statements supporting rapid force
reductions. Taken together, they undermined Afghan's confidence
in a U.S. security commitment and in their own armed service
and government--something that you alluded to, Mr. Ambassador,
the lack of confidence that spelled itself out with the Afghan
government and their military.
I guess I would just leave with this, and hope that we can
undertake, as a committee, really our emphasis on what went
wrong; what we can learn; learn from our military; learn from
our diplomats. There was plenty that went wrong and it had dire
consequences in many instances.
But, in terms of limiting this hearing to how the Biden
Administration failed, I will just end with one quote, and that
quote occurred on June 26th, 2021. It was at a political
campaign rally afterwards by the former President. And quote,
``I started this process. All the troops are coming home. They
couldn't stop this process.'' Unquote.
So, let's not have this hearing center on who is the last
person holding the ball when the music ended, but, rather,
sincerely looking at what we can do to prevent other tragedies;
what we can learn from this, and how we can save young American
men and women from being in harm's way when they do not have to
be. They have the courage to be there when they have to be. The
decisions that are made are not there.
I will never forget, when I first became a Congressman, I
went to one of our members serving in a war zone and I asked
him what he thought about the war. And he said, ``Well, sir, my
job is to serve.''
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Keating. ``That question is yours to answer,
respectfully.'' That is why we are here. That is why we are
trying to learn. That is why we are trying to save more
American lives in the future.
And I yield back.
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
The chair recognizes Mrs. Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. I thank the chairman.
And I thank the Ambassador for being here and for his
service.
Today, more than 2 years after the Biden Administration's
shameful, tragic, and utterly misguided flight from
Afghanistan, it has become clear that the President was
determined to abandon the country at any cost and with no
conditions. The cost in lost military assets and our
credibility as a friend and ally, and global leader, and most
of all, in precious American lives, was incalculable.
Again and again, the Administration proved that it was
willing to simply cede Afghanistan to the Taliban, irrespective
of the Taliban's clear intent to ignore all commitments and
agreements. The responsibility, the absolute debacle in
Afghanistan, rests on this Administration's shoulders, period.
And there must be accountability. There has been no
accountability for the Administration's total failure to
protect U.S. troops and citizens.
Ambassador Khalilzad, did countries in NATO argue against a
full U.S. troop withdrawal?
Mr. Khalilzad. They did----
Mrs. Wagner. They did.
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. As subject to a political
agreement that I mentioned to the chairman.
Mrs. Wagner. How did Russia and China respond to the
Taliban takeover?
Mr. Khalilzad. I do not know for sure, but it seems to me
that they would have preferred a political settlement. They
stated at least that they would have a preferred a political
settlement. I was always suspicious of their motivations.
Mrs. Wagner. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Khalilzad. Sometimes they would want a political
settlement, but they knew that there is no easy path to a
political settlement. They also would have liked to have kept
us in Afghanistan in a difficult situation, doing what they
wanted us to do, in part, which is to get the terrorists that
were focused on them eliminated by us, and paying a price
without winning.
So, we had to be careful in terms of the Russian and Talib
activities, yes.
Mrs. Wagner. Ambassador, I know that this was touched on
before, but Afghanistan----
Mr. Khalilzad. I could talk some more, if we were in a
different setting, about their policies, but this is what I can
say in this setting.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you. Thank you. I appreciate that.
And it is more concerning to me that NATO was against----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. A full troop withdrawal.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mrs. Wagner. Afghanistan--and this was touched on--is now
ranked worst of 177 countries in terms of the status of women,
according to the Peace Research Institute of Oslo. Did you
believe the Taliban would respect women's rights and allow
girls to go to school?
Mr. Khalilzad. I did not trust them. They did make
statements on the record, video statements, that they would
allow girls to go to school, all the way through not only
college, but to a PhD. This is on the record that they have
made, but----
Mrs. Wagner. But they did not do it.
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. They have not lived up to it.
Mrs. Wagner. They did not do it. They did not do it----
Mr. Khalilzad. They did not do it.
Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. And you did not trust them?
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mrs. Wagner. Why did not U.S. negotiators press the Taliban
to extend the withdrawal date beyond August 31 to facilitate
the evacuation?
Mr. Khalilzad. That was according to the President's
decision not to. He had asked for 4 months, as I mentioned
before, but that was his decision not to ask for an additional
extension.
Mrs. Wagner. President Biden's?
Mr. Khalilzad. President Biden, yes.
Mrs. Wagner. The Taliban issued threats to attack U.S.
troops if they stayed longer than the August 31 deadline.
Ambassador, did you consider this to be the actions of a
responsible partner of peace?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, that consideration, that if an
additional extension was asked for, it wasn't asked. But if an
additional extension was asked for, perhaps it could lead to
this restart of the fight, and that is why perhaps the decision
was made not to ask for more time.
Mrs. Wagner. Well, they threatened our U.S. troops----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. If they stayed on day longer----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. Than August 31.
What was your assessment throughout 2021 of whether the
Taliban was meeting the conditions of the DOHA agreement? And
how about in April 2021?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, it always was my personal judgment
that, to get the Taliban to do what they have agreed to do, we
have to respond with our commitment in a way that incentivizes
them to do what they have committed to do--meaning that we
wouldn't do what we have committed to unless they do what they
have committed to doing. That was my point of view and that was
my advice.
Mrs. Wagner. My time has ended here, and I yield back.
Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
The chair recognizes Mr. Castro.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you, Ambassador, for your testimony today.
In your prepared testimony, you said, quote, ``By the end
of 2018, as is well known, the President's decision was to
bring home American forces from Afghanistan.'' We have also
heard testimony in multiple closed-door transcribed interviews
with senior State Department officials to this effect.
In other words, that the withdrawal of all U.S. troops--the
withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Afghanistan began in
February 2020, as part of the agreement you negotiated between
the United States and the Taliban. Can you provide examples of
how President Trump's decision to withdraw all U.S. troops was
apparent and, quote, ``well known'' beginning in 2018?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, and the President tweeted to that
effect multiple times. I would give a reference to Secretary
Pompeo's book in which he documents the President's
determination. And, of course, when I had my meetings with the
President, he always made that clear, that that was the
objective.
Mr. Castro. So, let me ask you: so, it is fair to say the
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan began as a result of the
February 2020 DOHA agreement under President Trump?
Mr. Khalilzad. Indeed.
Mr. Castro. And do you believe that sentiment to withdraw
all troops was known or suspected by the Taliban when you were
negotiating with them? And what informs this belief?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the public statements. Sometimes the
Taliban would say that I was not following in my negotiations
the letter or the spirit of what was being said publicly by
saying we would only withdraw if certain conditions are met,
while sometimes statements would be made that provided, that
created the impression as if we would withdraw regardless. And
so----
Mr. Castro. So, you feel like that was undermining at the
time of your negotiating?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, but that is for others to judge, but
the challenge is as I described. The challenge was as I
described.
Mr. Castro. And so, how did that fact, how did that
situation--the conflicting statements, and so forth; the fact
that the Taliban had a sense at least or suspected that there
would be a total withdrawal--how did that affect your ability
to negotiate the DOHA deal with them?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, it was not helpful, but, also,
however, I tried to educate them not to take public statements
made for a variety of reasons as the definitive final word,
because circumstances could change; that we needed a good
agreement, as good as possible, given the statements that were
being made. Because without having such an agreement, they
might hear a statement very different than the statement that I
heard.
Mr. Castro. From the President or the Secretary of State,
or some high-ranking U.S. official?
Mr. Khalilzad. Indeed.
Mr. Castro. Yes.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Castro. And you negotiated this deal. Was there ever
any doubt that it what it committed the United States to do was
to draw down its military fully from the country? Basically, to
go to zero?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, that was, clearly, in the agreement,
but the idea of perhaps leaving some forces behind was there,
not in the agreement. We had raised it with the Talibs. It
became an understanding--I have to be careful how I articulate
this--that if there is an agreement between the government of
Afghanistan and the Taliban, and there is a new unity
government, the issue of a residual U.S. presence would be
decided by that government. But, as well, they could never
agree to----
Mr. Castro. Sure.
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. Themselves----
Mr. Castro. Well, let me ask you, in light of these facts
to which you have testified, would it be reasonable to say that
the withdrawal began in 2020?
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Castro. And that it wasn't--that it wasn't the sole
decision of one U.S. President in 2021?
Mr. Khalilzad. Agreed.
Mr. Castro. The Trump Administration initiated the U.S.
withdrawal from Afghanistan by negotiating and, ultimately,
concluding the DOHA deal in February 2020 with an explicit aim
to withdraw all American troops in the country in 14 months.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Castro. The Trump Administration's implementation of
this deal set in motion the formal U.S. withdrawal from
Afghanistan?
Mr. Khalilzad. Agree. I would advise that, if we could
think about withdrawal, and then, the way the final phase
withdrawal happened, that is, I think, a distinction that we
should keep in mind.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes Mr. Mast.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
I would start by touching on the last statement that you
just said. There is the withdrawal, and then, there is,
essentially, the way that it is conducted. You could say that
about any sporting event, any athletic event, anything that you
are planning on doing in the future. You know, you might plan
to have a Super Bowl, but there is the way that the game is
played. And that is what ultimately counts, is what do you do
when you get onto the ground, as they say, where the metal
meets the meat.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Mast. So, I want to ask a few questions about that, and
I want to ask a few questions about the conditions for the
Biden Administration.
Did the Biden Administration execute or operate on a plan
that there are no conditions; there is no line, no threshold,
no red line, anything that was going to prevent them from being
out of Afghanistan on the day they wanted?
Mr. Khalilzad. Let me understand what you are asking.
Certainly, the desire to complete the withdrawal by the end of
August was that any stay beyond that risks the restart of the
war, which was a driving factor, as I understood it.
Mr. Mast. So, to say it again--I'm not going to try to put
words in your mouth--was there anything that was going to stop
them from leaving on the day that they wanted to leave?
Mr. Khalilzad. That would be speculating, of course, but I
would reState that avoiding the restart of the war was the most
important factor shaping decisions.
Mr. Mast. I wonder if, in fact, it would be speculating or
not be speculating. Because, as you have spoken about, as you
have been questioned about, and as you offered up in interviews
previously, you made your recommendations to the
Administration.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Mast. And you said, you know, listen, there is
continuation of expecting full adherence with the provisions,
the conditions, of the DOHA agreement. That is a
recommendation, and I believe that was your recommendation:
make the Taliban uphold to those provisions.
There is scrap the DOHA agreement as though it never
existed and create your own conditions, President Biden, and
tell the Taliban this is what you want.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Mast. Or there is forget about the conditions of the
DOHA agreement and, one way or another, you are leaving when
you want to leave.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Mast. He chose, my understanding is, forget the
conditions of the agreement; we are leaving when we want to
leave. We are leaving on the date that we demand to leave. We
are not leaving on any other date, is that correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, the additional 4 months was the only
factor that changed from the timetable. Otherwise, you are
right.
Mr. Mast. And we know he chose September 11 to begin with.
I'm just going to ask one more question. Do you know who
pays the price ultimately for bad foreign policy?
Mr. Khalilzad. All of us.
Mr. Mast. Who----
Mr. Khalilzad. Especially the Armed Forces, of course.
Mr. Mast. That is exactly right.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. And I want to associate myself with----
Mr. Mast. How many people----
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. All the comments----
Mr. Mast. How many people paid the price for his bad
foreign policy?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, of course, ISIS attacked. We knew that
they were out to attack and we demanded steps by the Taliban to
preclude or prevent the attack. And General McKenzie on the
record has said that, despite the fact that he is very hostile
toward the Taliban, that they did everything we asked for. So,
it was an ISIS attack that killed 13 brave Americans. And the
Taliban-U.S. cooperation to prevent that did not succeed.
Mr. Mast. Thank you for the time today.
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
The chair recognizes Ms. Titus.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, on June 26th, 2021, a person at a rally
said this. Tell me who said this: ``I started the process. All
the troops are coming back home. They couldn't stop the
process. Twenty-one years is enough, do not you think? Twenty-
one years, they couldn't stop the process.''
Mr. Khalilzad. I suspect that is President Trump.
Ms. Titus. That is correct.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Ms. Titus. So, does not that suggest that he was
acknowledging that the process he started could not be stopped
without some consequences?
Mr. Khalilzad. I cannot speculate, but it was about whether
others could stop it, although it is my judgment that President
Biden, if he wanted to, he could have. That is my personal----
Ms. Titus. Well, let me ask you this: you just said a few
minutes ago to Mrs. Wagner, when she was asking you about the
Taliban's commitment to education of women----
Mr. Khalilzad. Mm-hmm.
Ms. Titus [continuing]. Virtually, that we have to live up
to our obligation in order to make them live up to theirs.
Mr. Khalilzad. You are right.
Ms. Titus. Now, what if we had not withdrawn those troops?
What if we had not lived up to our obligation? Wouldn't that
have had consequences that were not what were desirable? Hadn't
they already stopped attacking U.S. troops before this, and if
we had left troops there, we had not met our obligation, who
knows what they would have done?
Mr. Khalilzad. You are absolutely right.
Ms. Titus. OK. So, we can speculate that whatever they
would have done probably wouldn't have been good, because the
chairman said, ``I cannot trust the Taliban''--or ``We cannot
trust the Taliban.'' And you said, ``I do not trust the
Taliban.''
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Ms. Titus. So, why did we enter into an agreement with the
Taliban with no accountability measures, no way to hold them to
their commitments, if we cannot trust them?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, we enter agreements--we are talking
about international politics with people that we do not trust.
We did it during arms control with the Soviets. Remember
President Reagan said, ``Trust, but verify.''
Ms. Titus. Right.
Mr. Khalilzad. And the way to incentivize the other side
when you have an agreement to adhere is that you won't do what
they want from you unless they do what they have agreed to
doing. So, that is the way it works. And then, you have your
information system to monitor are they living up to the
agreement or not. And then, you bring that information into the
negotiation and the implementation of the agreement.
Ms. Titus. Well, did you have any way to monitor what they
were doing?
Mr. Khalilzad. Absolutely, we had a way, maybe not
perfectly. We did have, we did have information. We, in fact,
did reports, my office did with the Department of Defense
together on, for example, what were they doing in terms of
terrorism; what they had agreed with us to do or not to do, and
then, what they were doing. And we were sending those reports
out----
Ms. Titus. Let me ask you about that, since you mentioned
terrorism.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Ms. Titus. We made the deal that they were no longer going
to be a base or a support for terrorism. And yet, did not we
find that Al Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri there----
Mr. Khalilzad. Sure.
Ms. Titus [continuing]. And take him out with a drone? So,
obviously, they weren't living up to that obligation.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right. But that was a--violations happen in
agreements. That was a flagrant violation.
Ms. Titus. Yes, it was.
Mr. Khalilzad. And then, we took action and that we did.
Ms. Titus. Well, how did you miss that, if you were
monitoring, and then, we wouldn't----
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, we, obviously--this happened after the
withdrawal had been completed. So, the monitoring system
worked. We found him, and then, we took action that the Taliban
said we shouldn't have. But we had made it clear that we would
do what is necessary to protect the American people, and we
took the action that the President did, and I applauded that
action.
Ms. Titus. Well, what else have they done that we caught
through any kind of monitoring that was perhaps was not
desirable?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, we are watching their counterterrorism
commitments, the implementation of it. And I'm not in the
government now, and you can, I'm sure, see reports that they
do. From what I see on the outside now--and this is my
opinion--it appears that we believe they are largely adhering
to those, to those commitments.
Ms. Titus. But not to the education of women, apparently?
If we had left some troops there, like some people have
suggested we should have done, do you not think that would have
had consequences for what they would have done, aside from the
DOHA agreement? If we had violated our half, our part, and left
some troops there, do you think they would have just said,
``Oh, well, OK.''?
Mr. Khalilzad. The judgment was--and you, obviously, rely
on a lot of people, intelligence, on coming to a judgment--was
that we would be back to fighting if we did that. If we
unilaterally said, ``We are not withdrawing all our forces,''
although we agreed that we would, and that we may be back and
fighting. And as I said, President Biden decided to withdraw
all the forces.
Ms. Titus. But did you, do you agree with that? Or you
thought we should leave them there and risk fighting?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I supported the idea, that not going
back to war and--but one would have reopened some negotiations.
That is something different on the----
Ms. Titus. I think the American people did not want us to
go back to war.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Titus. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Chairman McCaul. The chair now recognizes Mr. Davidson.
Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I appreciate you
being here today. Thank you for your service to our country,
and I appreciate your testimony today.
Hopefully, it helps us learn what we can from Afghanistan
and apply it, not just to provide accountability and truth for
the record, but for action in the future.
I spent my life from 18 to 30 in the Army. I was fortunate
to get to serve in the 75th Ranger Regiment. And one of the
core missions that we trained on was non-combatant evacuation
operations. In none of those training scenarios--and I never
did it live; we trained for it--but in Afghanistan that was the
mission. It was a non-combatant evacuation operation. In no
training scenario that I'm aware of did we have a plan to ever
take the military out first, and then, hope that somehow the
civilians would get out. Have you ever heard of such a doctrine
anywhere?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, of course, I applaud you for your
service. I have had the great honor of serving with our brave
men and women in Iraq and Afghanistan and they have inspired
me, and I very much associate myself with what you said.
I think the problem was, in my judgment--and I said it
before--is that we planned for a single scenario, and that
scenario was that the government and its troops would survive
our withdrawal and for some time thereafter. And that is what
informed, I think, the sequencing, it is my judgment, the
sequencing----
Mr. Davidson. So, you believe that the State Department
actually believed that they would trust the lives of American
citizens to the Taliban? Because they weren't there themselves,
frankly. They were ready to get out of town. And they thought
that we could get ourselves out; we can get the military out,
and we'll just trust the Taliban to finish the job. That was
the plan?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, it was to work with the government of
Afghanistan, with the troops of the Afghan government that we
had trained and equipped to deal with the withdrawal period,
and then, for a period after the withdrawal. The plan was to
maintain some forces after the withdrawal was completed at
Kabul airport and to protect the embassy.
Mr. Davidson. Yes.
Mr. Khalilzad. And I believe that assumption--and I keep
repeating that because several of your colleagues are
mentioning lessons learned--is that we do not plan, as one
lesson that I have learned from the outside, for a single
scenario. We have to plan for alternative scenarios and how we
would digress from one to the other.
Mr. Davidson. Well, regardless of how many alternatives we
had, that seemed like a particularly bad plan.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Davidson. And now, with the benefit of hindsight, I
think everyone can agree that it was, in fact, a bad plan.
Mr. Khalilzad. In this respect, it does, it is--it was
problematic, but I explained to you what the assumption was.
Mr. Davidson. I understand. I understand. But, in 2004, you
wrote an op-ed in The Washington Post titled, quote,
``Afghanistan's Milestone,'' which I would like to submit for
the record, Mr. Chairman. This op-ed covered the country's
approval of a new constitution.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Davidson. However, I want to read aloud some sentences
that you wrote.
Quote: ``Afghanistan has sent a compelling message to the
rest of the world that, by investing in that country's
development, the United States is investing in success.
Americans can take pride in the role that we played in leading
the multilateral effort to support Afghan democratization.
President Bush's decision to increase aid to Afghanistan, which
will likely total more than $2 billion in fiscal 2004, will
accelerate reconstruction of the country's national army,
police force, economic infrastructures, schools, and medical
system.''
You finished this op-ed by writing, quote, ``Our work in
Afghanistan is not yet done. It will take several years and
sustained commitment of significant resources by the United
States and the international community before the country can
stand on its own feet. Given the stakes involved, we must
remain committed for as long as it takes''--I have heard that
phrase before--``to succeed.''
Do you think we were successful----
Chairman McCaul. And without objection, it is entered into
the record.
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Davidson. What can we learn about nation-building? It
seems pretty foolish to me. I will admit it seemed foolish at
the time.
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, yes, I supported President Bush's
vision for transforming not only Afghanistan, but the broader
Middle East. His vision was that problems of that region was--
--
Mr. Davidson. The goals are always nice.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Davidson. And if we judge things by what people say
they aspire to, it always sounds so good.
Mr. Khalilzad. It was aspirational. That was aspirational.
Mr. Davidson. But the execution is problematic. And I will
say that, frankly, that same phrase, ``as long as it takes,''
``as much as it takes''----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Davidson [continuing]. Is the only public plan the
Biden Administration has laid out for Ukraine. And other than
that----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Davidson [continuing]. I do not see any tie to Ukraine
here.
Mr. Khalilzad. I associate----
Mr. Davidson. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
Ms. Wild is recognized.
Ms. Wild. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Ambassador, thank you so much for your testimony----
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
Ms. Wild [continuing]. Here today.
Before I begin my question, I just want us all to take a
moment to remember the 13 U.S. service members who lost their
lives on August 26th of 2021 while conducting the evacuation. I
know that every member of this committee joins me in paying
tribute to their families, as well as to the families of all
service members who put their lives on the line over the course
of our country's longest war. We will continue to honor them
and we will never forget their sacrifices
On August 26th of 2021, I spent much of the day on the
phone with a constituent, a mother whose son had very abruptly
been sent to Afghanistan to assist in the evacuation. He was
stationed at the airport, and she did not hear from him the
entire day. And you can imagine the stress and anxiety that she
had as we got the news that service members had been lost. So,
I will never forget that.
And, you know, it is our obligation, when we send men and
women in uniform into harm's way, that we continually ensure
that they have the support that they need and that the mission
they are being asked to conduct is in our national interest and
is achievable; and that their partners on the ground are
willing to make the same kind of sacrifices that our troops are
making every day.
So, my question I think is simple, but it is probably a
complicated answer. It deals with the fundamental underlying
reality here. Why over the course of 20 years in Afghanistan
did Administrations of both parties fail to correctly assess
the level of dedication and cohesion of the Afghan forces and
its political leadership?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, that's, obviously, an excellent
question, and there are lessons to be learned--that we have to
focus sharply on that. We spent a lot of resources, a lot of
effort. The forces were of varying qualities. They sacrificed a
lot. Some 70,000 perhaps, 60,000 to 70,000 Afghan soldiers and
policemen died during the period----
Ms. Wild. No question.
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. We were there. But what
happened to them, our assessment was that they would do a lot
better after our withdrawal.
Ms. Wild. Understood, but my real question is, how did we
fail so badly at that----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, that----
Ms. Wild [continuing]. Over the 20 years?
Mr. Khalilzad. We did.
Ms. Wild. I mean, we know that there was a division in the
intelligence community----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Ms. Wild [continuing]. With the CIA on one side----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Ms. Wild [continuing]. And the Pentagon on the other side--
--
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Ms. Wild [continuing]. On the effectiveness of training the
Afghan forces.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Ms. Wild. And I'm not asking you to go into classified
information in a public setting.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Ms. Wild. But can you speak broadly to these----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Ms. Wild [continuing]. Divergent perspectives and what
interests they may have been driven by?
Mr. Khalilzad. One is perhaps the way we build the armed
forces needs to be a question. Many people would argue that the
Afghans, teaching them how to fight shouldn't have been a
difficult task. The way we organized them perhaps to fight,
their recruitment, sustainment, organization maybe were not
appropriate for the circumstances. Perhaps that would be one.
And second would be to what extent politics and the
divisions in the country affected the force. I was very
concerned. I spent a lot of time in 2020 because two candidates
announced themselves as presidents, two presidents. And here
was a possible scenario in which some forces were going to go
with one candidate, the forces we invested so much in, and some
would have gone with the other. And you would have had--already
you are at war with the Talibs, and then, you will have another
war inside the republic side.
So, there are lessons to be learned and----
Ms. Wild. Well, I'm just going to stop you there because I
only have another 30 seconds.
Mr. Khalilzad. Sure.
Ms. Wild. But I have a very deep concern that from Vietnam
to Afghanistan to Iraq----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Ms. Wild [continuing]. And who knows in the current
situation in the world?--we keep seeing politicization of
intelligence----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Ms. Wild [continuing]. To sort of fit a pre-designed agenda
and what seems to be a cherry-picking of intelligence and data
that Administrations may use to tell the story that they want
to tell, not necessarily the reality. And that is what I want
to see us get away from.
With that, I thank you very much.
Mr. Khalilzad. Sure.
Ms. Wild. I'm sorry we do not have more time, and I yield
back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
The chair recognizes Mrs. Kim.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman, for holding
today's hearing.
And I want to thank you, Ambassador, for making yourself
available----
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
Mrs. Kim of California [continuing]. And coming before our
committee today.
Since the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, under the
Biden Administration, all hard-fought progress and basic
freedoms and rights for Afghan women have vanished. Women made
incredible gains in the classroom; played an active role in the
Afghan government and free press, and participated in the
workforce side by side with their male coworkers.
When the Taliban seized power, one of their first actions
was to ban girls from attending secondary school. They
eliminated the Afghan Commission to Eliminate Violence Against
Women; banned women from working at NGO's, and started
restricting women's access to public areas. Decades of work on
women and girls went down the drain in a matter of weeks. As a
woman, this is deeply personal to me.
It has been raised several times today that you presented
the Administration with several power-sharing proposals that we
give the Taliban partial or majority control of the Afghan
government. So, what did these peace plans say about women's
rights and participation in the Afghan government?
Mr. Khalilzad. We did give one plan to accelerate the
negotiations. Since we wanted to see the optimal outcome, the
better options would have been an agreement before withdrawal
was completed. And in those draft proposals, Afghanistan's
adherence to international standards on human rights, respect
for the rights of all Afghan citizens--men, women, minorities,
children--were all specified in the draft that we shared with
them to assist with accelerating the negotiations, yes.
Mrs. Kim of California. Ambassador, did you think that the
Taliban would be willing to share power of the Afghan
government with women?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, we had them say to us--and they say it
publicly and on videos--that women could be ministers; women
could be active in all parts of life. What has happened since
has been a violation of those statements that are on the
record, not to me alone, but----
Mrs. Kim of California. Say what they--yes, they actually
did not follow them.
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. To the whole world they said
that.
Mrs. Kim of California. Yes. Their words and actions did
not match.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mrs. Kim of California. You know, the Taliban was often
cited as stating to the United States, ``You might have the
watches, but we have the time.''
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mrs. Kim of California. Was the Taliban waiting the U.S.
Government out, so it could overthrow the Afghan government
after our departure?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I would be speculating, but,
certainly, they waited us out in the sense that, based on what
happened, based on changes in the world, based on successes
that we had on counterterrorism, as I have described, we
decided that it is time to come home.
And there are things we could have done differently in
retrospect. Those studies will be done that would have perhaps
had a different outcome in terms of the Taliban. One issue as
Ambassador----
Mrs. Kim of California. Ambassador, did you----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes?
Mrs. Kim of California. Ambassador, did you consider that
as a possibility, if a power-sharing agreement was implemented?
Mr. Khalilzad. I did, certainly, consider it as a
possibility because both sides were saying they want that. And
the question was the terms. The President of Afghanistan,
President Ghani, did not want to leave office. He wanted the
Talibs to join them. They said, no, they wouldn't join; there
has to be a new government that would be formed with a head
that is acceptable to both sides.
So, the negotiations were difficult. We knew it was going
to take time, you know. The war had been going on there for 40
years.
Mrs. Kim of California. Do you think that President Biden's
unconditional withdrawal legitimized the Taliban's plan of
action?
Mr. Khalilzad. Now, our withdrawal, of course, changed the
balance in favor of the Taliban. But I believe that the bigger
mistake or the bigger factor that shaped the outcome was the
poor performance of the government, of the Afghan government.
Running away while saying that they will never do that; the
disintegration of the armed forces, those were the bigger
factors, in my judgment, in terms of what ultimately happened.
Mrs. Kim of California. Well, there was no doubt we saw----
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
The chair recognizes Ms. Manning.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Ms. Manning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witness for being here with us today.
Mr. Ambassador, I have to be honest with you. Like many
Americans, I was shocked when I read the February 2020 Trump
DOHA agreement by how few conditions there were for the Taliban
to meet. There were no protections for women and girls in
Afghanistan or for the Afghan people who had helped us and
worked side by side with our forces.
Basically, the former President agreed to a precipitous
withdrawal of all troops, all coalition partners, and all
civilian personnel by May 1st; to release 5,000 prisoners; to
work with the U.N. to lift sanctions against the Taliban; to
seek economic cooperation for the reconstruction of
Afghanistan, and to refrain from the threat or use of force
against Afghanistan or intervene in its domestic affairs.
In exchange, the Taliban agreed to release up to a thousand
prisoners. For our 5,000, they agreed to release a thousand.
They vaguely committed to enter intra-Afghan negotiations and
agreed not to allow its members to attack our personnel on the
way out.
I did not see any agreement to stop attacks against
Afghans. I did not see any agreement to prevent them from
taking Afghan territory, and I certainly did not see any
protection of Afghan women and girls. I did not see any
guarantees that Afghanistan would prosecute anyone who commits
atrocities against women or girls. I did not see any
requirement that the Taliban take steps to keep women and girls
in schools. I did not see any requirement that the Taliban take
steps to uphold any rights of the Afghan people. Apparently,
the protection of women and girls was not important to
President Trump.
Given the terrible reality that we see today in
Afghanistan, including for Afghan women and girls, in
retrospect, what should have been done differently to secure
protections for vulnerable minority populations and, in
particular, women and girls in Afghanistan?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the key issue for you and for our
other leaders is whether achieving the goals that you outlined
on women should have been a pre-condition for withdrawal, which
means that the U.S. forces would have been given the
responsibility to achieve those rights; that we should have
stayed in Afghanistan until the Taliban agreed to those----
Ms. Manning. To protect women and girls.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Ms. Manning. And was that--were you ever instructed on
behalf of President Trump to secure those agreements?
Mr. Khalilzad. And the judgment was that to pursue those
objectives with other means other than the use of armed forces.
Because there's lots of violations of human rights around the
world, and it is not the responsibility of the U.S. forces to
go to war----
Ms. Manning. Of human rights. We are talking about--we are
talking about half the population of the country.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Ms. Manning. Was it ever articulated that one of the goals
of withdrawal was to make sure that Afghan women and girls were
going----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Ms. Manning [continuing]. To be protected? Was that ever
articulated as a goal of the Trump Administration?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. Yes, it was articulated that that would
be pursued in the intra-Afghan negotiations, during which--and
we have a written agreement in which it states that we would
work with the government which supported the human rights, the
legitimate government of Afghanistan, to pursue those
objectives in the intra-Afghan negotiations using diplomacy,
using the future relations----
Ms. Manning. So, you weren't going to negotiate that with
the Taliban? You were going to help behind the scenes the
Afghan government----
Mr. Khalilzad. The Afghan government----
Ms. Manning [continuing]. That collapsed? You were going to
encourage them to work to support women and girls?
Mr. Khalilzad. OK. The assumption was--it turns out to be
wrong, ma'am--that the government would not collapse; that it
had big, more forces in numbers, more weapons, more
international standing, more money. So that it would----
Ms. Manning. Did you ever----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes?
Ms. Manning. Did you ever believe that the Taliban was
truly interested in negotiating with the Afghan government?
Mr. Khalilzad. I saw them negotiate with the Afghan
government because the negotiations started in September up to
the----
Ms. Manning. But was that before you gave up all the
leverage by signing the agreement, and frankly, by Donald Trump
tweeting in advance what he was going to do in withdrawing our
troops?
Mr. Khalilzad. As I said before, I mean, and there was this
agreement, obviously, inside the Administration and outside
where the way the President decided to go was the right way.
But the decision was made. In our system, as you know, the
President makes the decisions. Others will express their
opinions, the advisors. The decision was made not to link
withdrawal on these other matters----
Ms. Manning. On the protection of Afghan people and Afghan
women and girls.
My time has expired. I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
The chair recognizes Mr. Baird.
Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here today. I
appreciate all the work that you have done.
You know, the question I have deals with the many reports
of sidebar agreements between the United States and the Taliban
during the DOHA. For instance, after signing the deal,
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claimed that the Taliban would
destroy Al Qaeda. Other reports indicated that the Taliban
would enter negotiations with the Afghan government.
So, neither of these things really happened. So, did you
believe the Taliban would destroy the Al Qaeda? Or what is your
position----
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the agreement says, specifically--and
you talked about the side agreements. They are classified.
There are two, and one deals with terrorism. I cannot go into
that in this setting. Hopefully, you have read it.
It was not to allow Al Qaeda, specifically, but terrorists,
any terrorists that would threaten the security of the United
States and our allies. That was the agreement.
Now, the al-Zawahiri case was a grave violation of that
agreement. But, as I said before, I am not in government. You
should ask the intelligence community what our judgment is on
their adherence to that. I believe, based on what I read, that
we believe that they are largely in compliance on the
counterterrorism.
With regard to government negotiations, negotiations did
stop. The agreement necessitated the start of intra-Afghan
negotiations. We assume it will take time. We desired if it
could be concluded before we left, but we did not want to make
it conditional on the withdrawal on an agreement, because one
side or the other in the negotiations would have not wanted to
conclude something and keep us there.
The government, for example, could have been interested in
keeping us there because the government did not want us to
withdraw, the Afghan government. They liked the situation with
a big American presence and support.
So, as to the assessment of who was more serious about
negotiations, I could speculate or I could give you my opinion,
but the key point is that we did not want the withdrawal of
forces--a decision was made to leave, conditioned on a decision
by Afghans toward each other, because we did not know quite
what their calculations would be, and whether those
calculations would assist with the timetable or withdrawal that
the President had in mind.
Mr. Baird. Thank you.
One more question, since you were involved in this so
deeply. Was the Biden Administration made aware of these side
agreements with the Taliban?
Mr. Khalilzad. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Mr. Baird. Absolutely?
Mr. Khalilzad. Absolutely.
Mr. Baird. So, my last question deals with giving you the
opportunity to refresh us about your involvement in
communications, and so on, in those final days before the fall
of Kabul.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. I was very much at the center of the
storm, if you like. I was in DOHA, basically, during the final
days. I would participate, obviously, with the President and
others in meetings. I was, essentially, the channel to get the
Taliban to do what we wanted during those 2 weeks.
We wanted a road closed because we thought ISIS-K was going
to use that road, or from that hill nearby, they might shoot a
rocket at the airport. At this mosque, there might be a
terrorist. To direct them to block the road; go up the hill; go
to the mosque.
And then, I would deal with people's movement. I would get
calls. One thing I learned, sir, is how our society had gotten
intermixed with the Afghan society. I would get calls from all
over the United States saying, ``This X person used to drive my
car and he wants to get to the airport. He is stuck in this
place in Kabul. Please arrange for him to get to the airport.''
And then, I would be in almost multiple contacts daily with
our military at the airport. I had put my deputy at the airport
also with our military. And then, the military would call me.
``We want to see X Talib. They are not reacting, responding to
our messages. Can you talk to the big Talib leader, to Mullah
Baradar, to allow this to happen.''
So, it was a lot going on, and then, not to mention Members
of Congress calling, asking for movement of people.
Mr. Baird. I thank you. I have run out of time.
Mr. Khalilzad. So, I gave you too much information, I
think.
Mr. Baird. I appreciate it.
And, Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me for just a
second or so?
Chairman McCaul. Sure.
Mr. Baird. I cannot help but share my experience about
soldiers, men and women who put the uniform on. And we had one
of those young 13 right from my district. And so, I cannot help
but recognize the contribution that our people in uniform make
around this world.
Mr. Khalilzad. Absolutely.
Mr. Baird. And so, thank you.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, sir. We appreciate your
contribution as well in Vietnam.
So, the chair now recognizes Mr. Stanton.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Congressman Baird, for those good comments about
our women and men serving our country.
Thank you, Ranking Member Meeks, for holding this hearing
today.
I would like to focus on our allies, those who risked
everything, their safety, their families' safety, to support
the United States mission in Afghanistan. For two and a half
years, our Afghan allies have been trapped in a frightening
legal limbo--trapped because Congress has, again and again,
failed to pass the Afghan Adjustment Act and make good on our
promises. We even had an opportunity to pass parts of it in the
Senate border deal just last week, a deal that extreme
Republicans killed.
Now, I have been fortunate to get to members of an
especially vulnerable group, the Female Tactical Platoon, part
of the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command. These
brave women went through rigorous screening and training by the
United States military. They have participated in hundreds of
direct-action combat missions against the Taliban, alongside
U.S. Special Forces, including Green Berets, Navy SEALs, and
Army Rangers.
Forty-two FTPs, many of whom are part of the persecuted
Hazara ethnic minority, were evacuated after Kabul fell. But
the Taliban knows who they are. They know who the families are
that they were forced to leave behind.
And a constituent of mine, an Army captain who served in
Afghanistan from 2016 to 2020, spent part of her deployment
serving alongside the FTPs. She told me that, quote,
``Threatening letters from the Taliban were sent to these women
warning that they will be dealt with, so that they will serve
as an example.'' Unquote. She also said, quote, ``There is no
doubt that these women would have been raped and tortured
before death if they hadn't been evacuated by U.S.
counterparts.'' Unquote.
Another active duty service member wrote to me, quote,
``The Female Tactical Platoon holds some of the bravest women I
have ever met. I am an American soldier and these women fought
by my side for nearly 10 years, targeting the enemies of the
United States in Afghanistan. I trusted them with my life daily
and they entrusted me with theirs.
When Afghanistan fell in August 21, they did not
want to lay down their arms and flee. They were forced to. As
the Taliban encircled Kabul, they began to target the members
of the Female Tactical Platoon and their families. Their loved
ones remained in danger. Their mothers, fathers, sisters, and
brothers were forced to stay behind since they are not
considered''--quote--`` `immediate family.' To this day, I
receive messages from family members desperately seeking help.
Many have been beaten, tortured, and killed. They need our
help.'' Unquote. That is from that active duty service member.
In the words of an FTP herself residing in my home State of
Arizona, who was kind enough to share her story with my office,
quote, ``I cannot give you my name for fear of reprisals
against my family in Afghanistan. I served in the Afghan
National Army Special Forces Female Tactical Platoon for 5
years. I speak five languages, spent a year and a half training
with U.S. and British forces before being assigned to the
platoon. I would love to serve in the U.S. Army. I left behind
my father, mother, three sisters, three brothers. They are now
subject of harassment, intimidation, and kidnapping at the
hands of the Taliban because of my service with U.S. forces.''
Unquote.
``My sisters are hiding for fear the Taliban will''--
quote--`` `disappear' them, as has happened to other FTP family
members. Even though they are only my sisters, the Taliban will
exact revenge on anyone they can find who is related to me by
blood. I fear for my family's lives every day.'' Unquote.
I share their words today to underscore the deadly
consequences if this Congress continues to stall on the Afghan
Adjustment Act. Every day that this Congress fails to act is a
betrayal of our allies and of our American values.
Ambassador, your thoughts on the Afghan Adjustment Act?
Mr. Khalilzad. I appreciate what you said, Congressman. I
am not familiar with this Act. So, therefore, I am not in a
position to offer an opinion on it.
Mr. Stanton. I appreciate your diplomatic answer to that.
For your information, yes, as you would expect, this would
allow the Female Tactical Platoon and others that served
alongside the U.S. military who temporarily have immigration
status in the United States to be given permanent status here
in the United States.
Mr. Khalilzad. I know that many Afghans served with
distinction alongside our forces. They sacrificed a great deal.
But with regard to the specifics, I haven't looked at the
legislation.
Mr. Stanton. Ambassador, you are an outstanding diplomat.
Thank you.
Mr. Khalilzad. You are kind.
Mr. Stanton. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
The chair recognizes Mr. Self.
Mr. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is one of the more concerning hearings I have ever
been in.
A little bit of background. I do not have your experience
in the region, but over a 20-year period I had five assignments
when I dealt directly with the region, starting in 1984 dealing
with Iran--most of my assignments as a military planner. I was
in Bagram early in 2002, stationed in the headquarters in
Bagram. I was in Al Udeid later for the Iraqi Freedom
Operation.
With that background, our enduring values are not shared in
this region. I have heard nothing and I have read nothing in
the preparation for this hearing that--it is filled with
naivete.
Now, you are given the position of having done much of this
under both President Trump and President Biden. I am not
questioning your motive, sir, but we have to focus on the fact
that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was a strategic blunder of
monumental proportions--monumental proportions.
Putin started moving troops within 2 months after that
strategic blunder. And as for the 20-year forever wars, our
Nation, our military, this Nation's military is not meant for
nation-building. It is meant to go and break things and impose
our national will, our national interests on our adversaries.
That is the use of the United States military.
So, I want to focus on that one strategic blunder, but I
also want to read for people--we talked about the DOHA
agreement. The actual title of the DOHA agreement I think is
instructive. ``The Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan
between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan''--which is not
recognized by the United States as a State and is known as the
Taliban--``and the United States of America.'' That is the
formal title of what we call the DOHA agreement.
The Taliban, it is naive to think the Taliban was ever
going to live up to anything. My 20 years, over a span of 20
years dealing with the region, this entire process that we have
heard today is extremely naive. And, sir, I find you at the
middle of it.
I will tell you, I firmly disagree with your statement that
the restart of the war being the most important factor in the
withdrawal. I absolutely disagree with your characterization of
that.
But my question to you, sir, is you said earlier the
Taliban was largely in compliance with their counterterrorism
agreement. Can you justify that statement for us?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. First, on the last statement, I said
I'm not in the government. I do not read the intelligence now.
But, based on what I read of what the intelligence community
puts out in unclassified product, it appears to me that they
are largely in compliance, based on what I read of their
report.
But you shouldn't take my word for it. You should call
experts who are monitoring the situation very closely in our
government. We have a significant body of expertise that
monitors this, and I relied on them when I was in government.
Mr. Self. Yes, but let me just help you there.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Self. The U.N. Sanctions Monitoring Team released a
report last month----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Self [continuing]. In January----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Self [continuing]. That says about it, ``The
relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda remains close.''
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Self. ``And the latter maintains a holding pattern in
Afghan under Taliban patronage.''
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Self. We need to understand that the Taliban--and let
me ask you a yes-or-no question.
Mr. Khalilzad. Let me, let me----
Mr. Self. What is the status of the Taliban?
Mr. Khalilzad. But may I comment on----
Mr. Self. No, sir.
Mr. Khalilzad. Well----
Mr. Self. What is the status of the Taliban today? We do
not recognize them as a government.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Self. We understand that they are in physical control
of Afghanistan.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Self. What is the official U.S. position on the Taliban
today?
Mr. Khalilzad. Again, you should ask the U.S. Government
officials, but my understanding is that we transact with them.
We meet with them when we have concerns we raise with them on
particular issues. We interact with them. We do not have a
presence, as you know, in Afghanistan. We do not recognize the
Taliban government. We haven't implemented parts of the DOHA
agreement because of our unhappiness with what they are doing
and not doing.
But those are questions and issues for the current
officials. The nuances of what they are doing or are not--I am
telling you what I read.
Mr. Self. Yes. If I may, if I may quickly, Chairman----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Self [continuing]. Germany just became the third
largest economy in the world. If we are talking Ukraine
funding, the EU needs to step forward. Our GDP is $27 trillion;
EU together is $20 trillion. Russia's is $2.5 trillion. We need
to push Europe as a whole to be funding the Ukraine war.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
Mr. Self. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
The chair recognizes Ms. Dean.
Ms. Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking
Member Meeks.
Thank you, Ambassador, for being here, for your years of
service and expertise.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. Thank you.
Ms. Dean. It is very valuable to us on this committee and
to American citizens.
I do want to recognize the families in the room, some of
whom I have had the opportunity to meet, Gold Star families.
I want to recognize the service of our military members
over the course of 20 years, the sacrifice and service, and the
brave gains that were made, and the horrific losses that were
suffered. And so, with heartbreak, I recognize you, and with
humility, I recognize you and your service and your loved ones.
I also, of course, remember the 13 service members killed
at Abbey Gate, that tragic, tragic set of events and the scores
of others who were injured that day.
I wanted to try to examine three areas as quickly as I can.
The impact of President Ghani's actions. When you were
asked earlier, you said that you put the responsibility of what
happened in the Afghan withdrawal on the Afghan government. And
I would like you to tell us more about that.
For example, going back to the final days of the
withdrawal, you said in your testimony that the agreement you
negotiated between the Taliban and the Afghan government,
quote, ``fell apart when President Ghani surprisingly fled the
country, which caused the now leaderless Afghan military and
police to instantly disintegrate.''
What did the impact of that disintegration have on the
situation outside the gates at Kabul airport and on the non-
combatant evacuation?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, thank you for what you said.
The impact was instantaneous. The rush to the airport, the
airport crisis, if you like, was created because of what
happened. The security leaders, rather than standing in place
carrying out their duties, defending their city, defending the
government, they rushed to the airport to be evacuated. And
then, there was, obviously, challenges created about securing
the perimeters of the airport.
Ms. Dean. And it was surprising, apparently, across the
board, whether to you, to the Administrations, both
Administrations.
Mr. Khalilzad. To our various communities that watch these
things. And if he was afraid, the president, for his life,
although there was an agreement and a lot of his immediate
subordinates said, with the announcement that Talibs will not
come into Kabul, there was a sense of calm in the palace; that
he did not reach out to us to say, ``Look, can you do one, two,
three to secure the palace?'' if he was afraid of that. I do
not know what we would have done. We had no indication from him
that he was going to leave the field and go to the UAE.
Ms. Dean. A stunning abandonment.
A second area, the troop drawdown. We saw that the Trump
Administration first drew down to 8600 in the first 135 days,
then down to 4500 by September 2020.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Ms. Dean. Can you explain to me what happened that created
the final drawdown in the last minutes, the last days, of the
Trump Administration down to 2500?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Ms. Dean. What were your thoughts there?
Mr. Khalilzad. There was a discussion and the President had
said that the troops will be home by Christmas. And so, so
there was--whether total withdrawal would happen----
Ms. Dean. What did you think of President Trump in his
final days in office setting it up with the new Administration,
having 2500 members on the ground?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, ultimately, the back-and-forth that
took place resulted in a decision not to completely withdraw by
Christmas, but to leave that final decision to the new
Administration.
Ms. Dean. I want to end on something you ended on in your
testimony--that you saw perhaps the seeds and values being
planted. Can you give us some possibility of all of the work of
so many folks on the ground, Afghanistan, as well as our
military? What are some of those seeds that you think could
possibly spring a better future for Afghanistan?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, most young Afghans in their 20's,
30's, experienced the America, the encounter we had with
Afghanistan--the schools, universities with----
Ms. Dean. Women being educated.
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. Women being educated, with cell
phones, with the internet. And I think they are struggling for
their rights in their own ways. Now some have left the field,
but others are standing for their values.
The future remains uncertain. The struggle goes on. The
values, the objectives that President Bush and others had for a
democratic, modern Afghanistan, I think those objectives remain
valid, but it is going to come not with American bayonets, if
you like, but with American engagement and interaction, perhaps
in their own way and over a longer, much longer period of time.
Ms. Dean. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing that
answer.
And thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The chair recognizes Mr. Kean.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witness----
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
Mr. Kean [continuing]. Being here today.
Ambassador Khalilzad, you have a very long and very
distinguished career in the U.S. Government and have often
appeared before this committee. And I want to thank you for
your extraordinary service to the people of this country and
people around the world.
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Kean. Unfortunately, the Taliban is, once again, the
ruling power in Afghanistan. From President Biden's go-to-zero
order in April 2021 that was meant to coincide with the 20th
anniversary of September 11th, 2021, despite leaders in the
U.S. military previously urging the retention of some troops to
support Afghans, what conversations did the Administration have
on retention of U.S. contractors in Afghanistan?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, if I understood the question, what
impact did it have on the contractors, right? Did I understand?
Mr. Kean. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, they became uncertain, and then,
ultimately, mostly decided to leave because they were concerned
about the security environment, insurance-related issues. And
although the plan based on the assumption that the government
would survive, the systems that they had, the military system
would continue to be serviced, but when the contractor
departures--we had to rush around, try to find outside the
country potential places where those systems could be serviced.
Mr. Kean. Well, clearly----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Kean [continuing]. Much of the Afghan Security Forces
relied on U.S. contractors to maintain equipment, vehicles, and
aircraft.
Mr. Khalilzad. Absolutely.
Mr. Kean. And it must have been pointed out that, without
this support, the Afghan Security Forces wouldn't be able to
successfully combat the Taliban.
Ambassador, can you also speak the Peace Government Plan
that was advanced by the Biden State Department in early 2021?
Whose idea was the plan? Can you talk us through the
formation----
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, there was a discussion when the new
Administration came to accelerate negotiations. Because, as I
said, even in the previous Administration, the desire was to
get a political agreement as soon as possible, although,
realistically, it was assumed that it would be complicated; it
will take time.
And the two features of the proposals by the Biden team
was, one, to internationalize the effort, to get the U.N. to
appoint someone to help with the negotiations.
And second was to advance a power-sharing plan for
Afghanistan--not that that be the one, but to get a discussion
going. And the government of Afghanistan dismissed it, more or
less.
I would say there were many ideas and plans, but, yes,
there was a--there was a proposal put forward and given to the
Taliban and to the Afghan government.
Mr. Kean. How did the Russian government respond to the
Taliban takeover, Ambassador?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the Russians, clearly, had a two-track
policy. One was they wanted us to leave, and they said that
they wanted us to leave. On the other hand, they wanted us to,
also, stay and to do the dirty work, if you like, of dealing--
going after groups that they would target them, and to see us
stuck there, pay a price without succeeding.
But their public statements, at least as I recall now--it
was a long time ago--the immediate aftermath was they would
have preferred an agreement first, a political agreement first.
But I'm sure they were happy to see us leave, no doubt, to
depart.
Mr. Kean. And can you explain your assessment in deeper
regard, please?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, for the longer term, they did not want
U.S. forces on the border of the former Soviet territory, and
that they thought our presence with regards to Central Asia
offered those opportunities and advantages. But, on the other
hand, like Iran, they wanted to make it as difficult for us, to
tie us down, to have leverage, if you like, over us by
remaining vulnerable and stuck there--not to win, but not to
kind of leave. So, I said before, wanting us to, ultimately,
not have permanent bases there; to, also, while we were there,
to make us suffer.
Mr. Kean. Thank you.
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
Mr. Kean. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
The chair recognizes Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good to see you, Ambassador.
Mr. Khalilzad. Great to see you.
Mr. Waltz. Many years of this painful episode in our
history, but I would say to our Gold Star families that are
here, and every veteran who sacrificed, we kept America safe
for over two decades, and we cannot lose--we cannot lose sight
of that. We did not have another 9/11. We did not have
additional attacks on our homeland, despite many issues in this
war that we absolutely should learn from.
So, we have heard continuously, both in the media, from
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, and from the
President, from President Biden, that he was stuck with the
DOHA agreement; that this was his hands were tied; the Trump
Administration tied his hands. He had no choice.
Mr. Khalilzad. No.
Mr. Waltz. And I just want to put out, Mr. Chairman, one
thing for the record here. This is a short list of the policies
that the Biden Administration walked away from on day one--
everything from the construction of the border wall; our
membership in the World Health Organization. The Biden
Administration completely walked away from Trump's maximum
pressure campaign; tried to get us back into the disastrous
Iran nuclear deal; rejoin the Paris Climate Accord; ended
Remain in Mexico; canceled the Keystone Pipeline, $16 billion
in investment. And I could go on. All of these things were
reversed in the first month. But yet, we are supposed to
believe that somehow he was handcuffed to this deal.
Mr. Ambassador, let's go back to January 2021. President
Trump is still in office. His advisors go in, tell him, ``Mr.
President, the Taliban haven't lived up to the half dozen
conditions that were in the deal minus one--partially not
attacking troops--but in terms of entering negotiations with
the Afghan government and other conditions, the Taliban did not
live up to the deal.'' What did President Trump do, Mr.
Ambassador, as a result of that advice?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well----
Mr. Waltz. He had a stated goal of getting all U.S. troops
out.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Waltz. Right?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Waltz. But now, he is told they did not live up to the
deal. What did President Trump do?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, it would be speculation, of course----
Mr. Waltz. But it is not speculation that, by January 19th,
2021----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. We still had Bagram Air Base.
Mr. Khalilzad. We did.
Mr. Waltz. Did we?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, we did.
Mr. Waltz. Is that the only air base in the world that is
sandwiched between China, Russia, Iran----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. And is a key platform for
counterterrorism?
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Waltz. Did we still have Bagram Air Base?
Mr. Khalilzad. We did.
Mr. Waltz. Did we still have 2500 U.S. special operators
and intelligence professionals?
Mr. Khalilzad. We did.
Mr. Waltz. Did we still have five to seven thousand NATO
troops?
Mr. Khalilzad. We did.
Mr. Waltz. Did we still have over 10,000 contractors that
were keeping the Afghan air force flying?
Mr. Khalilzad. We did.
Mr. Waltz. And all of our intelligence assets, and plus,
the most important thing, the message to the Afghan people and
government that we stand with you, right?
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Waltz. So, let's fast forward. Just a few months
later----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Did President Biden reject your
advice for conditionality moving forward on the DOHA agreement?
Mr. Khalilzad. He decided not to make a withdrawal of the
final 2,500 conditional on a political agreement or leaving a
force, a counterterrorism force behind.
Mr. Waltz. He, essentially, said--well, he did not
essentially--he said to the world, ``We're pulling out.'' He
was asked, ``Are there conditions?'' He said, unconditionally,
we're out, regardless of the consequences.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Waltz. Correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. Because I am going to have to say that he
thought, if he stayed, he might have to go back to war, likely
to go back to war with the Taliban.
Mr. Waltz. But this is the misnomer. This is the false
choice.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Waltz. We could take an approach like we did in, say,
Colombia for 40 years, where we had trainers; we had assets; we
had support, but we did not put American troops in harm's way.
There was a lot of middle ground----
Mr. Khalilzad. Ranges of choices.
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Between unconditional full
withdrawal and going back to any type of surge or war?
Mr. Khalilzad. True.
Mr. Waltz. Correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. True. Correct.
Mr. Waltz. But those options weren't considered. And I will
just ask you this: we have had the senior leader of Al Qaeda,
Zawahiri, as a guest of the Taliban. We now have reports of
eight Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. We have reports
from the U.N. of tens of thousands of fighters, foreign
fighters, flowing into Afghanistan; plus, the ongoing threat of
ISIS.
Is the American homeland today safer than it was 3 years
ago?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I would, respectfully, ask you to ask
the intelligence community, ours, to look at the data that the
U.N. reports. I wouldn't rely, in other words, on the U.N.
report.
Mr. Waltz. OK. Let me ask you--Chairman, if I could indulge
you----
Mr. Khalilzad. Please, please.
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. I think we are at the end here.
Mr. Khalilzad. Please.
Mr. Waltz. Does Al Qaeda and ISIS still have the intent to
attack the United States and the West, if given the opportunity
to do so?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, no doubt, but I also want to point
that----
Mr. Waltz. So, that is a yes? I mean, just for the record,
that is a, yes, they fully intend to----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, but they--but they have the intent. But
I also want to say, Congressman, that our intelligence
community, from what I read in the unclassified versions, as we
cannot discuss classified material here, believe that in the
next year or two Al Qaeda does not have the ability to attack
the United States--I'm paraphrasing--from Afghanistan. The
likelihood would be----
Mr. Waltz. The Commander of Central Command a year ago
testified that ISIS will have reconstituted their capability to
attack the West within 6 months--and that was a year ago--from
Afghanistan----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Khalilzad. He did say, but I noticed, again, the
intelligence community since then, in the last few months, has
highlighted successes by the Taliban against Daesh, against
ISIS-K.
I would, respectfully, suggest that, for coming to a
judgment on those, that you, and maybe you are----
Mr. Waltz. I would. I would. I'm on the Intelligence
Committee and I will just State for the record--Mr. Chairman,
thank you for your indulgence----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Relying on terrorists like the
Taliban and Al Qaeda to take out terrorists----
Mr. Khalilzad. Well----
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Is a fool's errand and danger, and
very dangerous for the----
Mr. Khalilzad. We shouldn't rely----
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The chair recognizes Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Khalilzad, thank you for coming back before our
committee.
And in 2021, the last time you were before this committee--
--
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Barr [continuing]. Before the withdrawal, I asked you
if President Ghani and Chairman Abdullah had any predictions
about the outcome of a planned U.S. withdrawal in Afghanistan,
having met both gentlemen when I visited Afghanistan in 2015.
And your response was, quote, ``They have no choice but to
prepare to defend themselves, and we have made a commitment to
help them defend themselves if the Talibs go the route of a
military solution.''
Ambassador Khalilzad, did the United States stick to our
commitment to help the Afghan government when the Taliban took
a military solution in Afghanistan?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, we did, I believe in the following
way, if I understand you, sir, which is that we continued to
provide them with military support, including attacks against
the Talibs when the Talibs attacked them. But once the
government had disintegrated with the departure of President
Ghani, then, of course, we could not help them. I think the----
Mr. Barr. Well, just reclaiming my time----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Barr [continuing]. As I think Mr. Waltz demonstrated so
ably, we did not stick to our commitments and there was not a
fulfillment of the DOHA conditions-based withdrawal. It was an
unconditional withdrawal. And so, from that standpoint, I do
not think that the United States stuck to our commitment to
help the Afghan government when the Taliban was clearly making
progress throughout the country.
Do I interpret your testimony in response to Mr. Waltz
correctly that public defender did not adhere to a conditions-
based withdrawal, as contemplated by the DOHA agreement?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I--no. The DOHA agreement, the
conditions were: one, that there will be no attacks on the U.S.
withdrawing forces; that we could come to the assistance of the
Afghan government; that there would be intra-Afghan
negotiations, and that there would be no allowing of
terrorists.
But whether to make withdrawal conditional on a cease-fire,
that the two Afghan sides do not fight each other, and, too,
that there be a political agreement, those were not explicit
conditions.
Mr. Barr. Yes. Well, this was, clearly, an abandonment of
the conditions-based approach of DOHA.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, but the agreement was condition-based,
but which conditions, that's what I mean.
Mr. Barr. I hear you.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Barr. It was an unconditional retreat, the way I see
it.
In 2021, also, before the withdrawal, I asked you whether
it would be a strategic mistake to abandon Bagram. And I'm
paraphrasing you, but you, basically, referred me to the
Defense Department----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Barr [continuing]. On that, on that question.
Mr. Khalilzad. Sure.
Mr. Barr. Ambassador, the withdrawal from Afghanistan gave
up U.S. control of the only U.S. Air Base in the country that
shares a land border with China.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Barr. Can you give us a readout on what the status is
of Bagram? Who is in control of it now, and have you seen any
Chinese interest in that base?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, now, of course, you are right that we
gave up, obviously, Bagram, and that was as part of the
agreement to withdraw our forces. But, as far as what is
happening there now, I'm not in a good position. You should ask
the intel community to brief you. But I wouldn't be surprised
if the Chinese were interested in it, but I have no--I have no
data or a fact to give you on that.
Mr. Barr. Have you seen any increase in Chinese investment
in Afghanistan since the United States left?
Mr. Khalilzad. There are indications, clearly, from what I
read in the media of Chinese interest in Afghanistan and
activities, yes.
Mr. Barr. In my remaining time, Ambassador, it is often
portrayed that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was a security
decision for the long-term safety of American soldiers. While I
do not believe the United States should have had a forever
presence in Afghanistan, save for maybe Bagram, the way in
which we withdrew was an unmitigated disaster. Do you believe
the United States is more or less safe with the Taliban in
charge?
Mr. Khalilzad. I believe that the withdrawal was because of
the costs and a perception that we weren't succeeding; that it
was costing too much; the world had changed, and we needed to
adjust.
But, certainly, in terms of terrorism, it was that being
there gave us certain advantages, being in Afghanistan, rather
than not being in Afghanistan, but----
Mr. Barr. My time has expired. But with ISIS-K fighters, Al
Qaeda allowed to thrive in Afghanistan, the Taliban in charge,
clearly, the United States is not in a safer posture.
With that, my time has expired. Mr. Chairman, thanks for
the hearing. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
The chair recognizes Mr. Amo.
Mr. Amo. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
And, Ambassador, a pleasure to see you.
I wanted to understand a portion of your opening testimony.
You said that, quote, ``The first phase of the withdrawal
lasted 135 days, in which U.S. forces were reduced to 8600.''
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Amo. ``By the time President Trump left office, U.S.
forces in Afghanistan had been reduced to 2500.''
So, let's fill in the gaps a little bit on what happened
between the levels of 8600 to 2500.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Amo. So, that reduction to 8600 which you said occurred
initially that was ordered by President Trump--is that the
case?
Mr. Khalilzad. That is the case.
Mr. Amo. And it was an explicit condition of the DOHA deal
that the United States was on the hook to do that level of
withdrawal after the signing of the agreement in 2020?
Mr. Khalilzad. The only one that was specified in terms of
a phase was phase one----
Mr. Amo. OK.
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. To come to 8600. It did not get
into subsequent phases, except that the final withdrawal of the
remaining forces would be by May 1st or so--in 14 months, in
other words. But there was no other phases, like to go to 4500,
to 2500; that was not specified in the agreement.
Mr. Amo. OK. And it had occurred per the terms of the deal
within 135 days----
Mr. Khalilzad. Phase one.
Mr. Amo. Phase one?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Amo. OK.
Mr. Khalilzad. And we had felt the military advice was--I
actually asked them--that we could do the mission with 8600, so
the risk was not going to be higher in any significant degree
in terms of our ability to carry out the mission still at the
8600.
Mr. Amo. Got it. Understood.
So, you said that was in phase one. So, there were no
stipulations of further troop----
Mr. Khalilzad. Subsequent phases, yes.
Mr. Amo. None of them? OK. And do you recall any troop
reduction directed by President Trump in September to 4500?
Mr. Khalilzad. There was a phase of coming, I believe--I
will need to check--but my recollection is it went to another
phase of 4500, and then, to 2500.
Mr. Amo. And was that at the discretion of President Trump?
Mr. Khalilzad. The military offering options and the
President deciding.
Mr. Amo. OK. And did you understand that the drawdown in
2020, was that to be tied to any Taliban progress on meeting
its own commitments in the DOHA deal?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. Well, in that regard, yes, I would say.
And that was their commitments, especially on the
counterterrorism part. The tie, the relationship between the
counterterrorism commitment and withdrawal was very tight.
Mr. Amo. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm.
Mr. Khalilzad. The commitment on the Afghan reconciliation
was not as tight. It was linked, but not as tight. It
definitely was tight on the start of intra-Afghan negotiations,
but not on success and agreement being in place before
departure, complete departure.
Mr. Amo. OK. And do you recall a tweet by President Trump
in October 2020 pledging to have the small remaining number of
our brave men and women serving in Afghanistan home by
Christmas? Do you remember that tweet?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, that, yes, there was the idea that was
floated. I do not remember the specific tweet----
Mr. Amo. OK.
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. To get everybody home by
Christmas. Yes, I remember speeches and statements----
Mr. Amo. But if you saw that, that would be something that
would--it surprised you?
Mr. Khalilzad. That would not surprise me, no.
Mr. Amo. OK. OK. And according to the terms of the DOHA
agreement, the United States would not fully withdraw all
troops until May 2021.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Amo. So, did that seem realistic, given the actions of
the Taliban?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I mean, that was not called for in the
agreement, and the agreement had until May, and then, it had,
also, conditionality, which is that our commitments, delivering
on them, dependent on them delivering on their commitments.
Mr. Amo. Would removing all those troops have impacted your
leverage to secure Afghan peace talks?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, yes, removing troops was the biggest
leverage. So, therefore, if we did not have the troops and the
leverage during that period, during which we would have had
troops, it would not have been there.
Mr. Amo. Mm-hmm. And then, do you recall another
discretionary troop reduction by President Trump down to 2500
in January 2021, just before the Administration took office?
Mr. Khalilzad. I am not aware of that, that there was any
other decision in January to, to get the 2500 troops out.
Before the change in Administration? I am not aware of that.
Mr. Amo. OK. Well, I see my time has expired. So, I yield.
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, getting the troops home for Christmas makes this
particularly appropriate. In the back there, there's two Gold
Star families----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Issa [continuing]. Christie Shamblin and Alicia and
Herman Lopez. Their loved ones did not get home for Christmas.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Issa. They did not get home for Christmas because of a
hasty withdrawal, because of a decision to withdraw from the
military base and keep, as it turned out, a completely non-
defendable, or at least not defended, embassy.
So, I want to go through a little bit of a timeline,
because you have two Administrations and to a great extent you
were there for all of them.
When Mike Pompeo left office, one of the agreements was a
50/50 sharing coming out of that negotiation between the
Taliban and the lawfully elected government, isn't that true?
Mr. Khalilzad. The percentages were not mentioned, but it
was to be negotiations for a new government between the
Taliban----
Mr. Issa. With shared authority?
Mr. Khalilzad. Shared government, yes.
Mr. Issa. OK. So, the shared authority, it is fair to say,
started off, at least tangentially, as 50/50, and then, as the
Taliban continued to aggressively take bigger parts of the
country--because we had withdrawn and, to be honest, the Afghan
government was not able to hold them back in that summer
offensive--as I understand it, it went to 60/40 in favor of the
Taliban; 70/30, and then, ultimately, 100/0, as they headed
toward Kabul. Is that correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. I do not know about the percentages. There
was nothing formally----
Mr. Issa. Well, was the Taliban demanding more authority as
they took more land?
Mr. Khalilzad. Oh, no doubt that, as the balance shifted
and the requirement--what one heard is the increase. But I have
to say again that, on the 15th of August, they made a proposal
for a shared government.
Mr. Issa. OK. But, I mean, you previously testified to the
50/50, 60/40, and 70/30, and these are your own prior
statements. So, I just want to----
Mr. Khalilzad. I, I----
Mr. Issa. We will give it to you from the transcribed
interview.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, please. I know that they have actually
changed their position, but I do not recall a specific number.
Mr. Issa. OK. Well, let's just try to be--let's try to be
fair with the facts as they occurred.
Mr. Khalilzad. Sure. Absolutely.
Mr. Issa. There was a negotiation for an end to hostilities
and a shared government power, in many ways similar to other
ends of that.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right, yes.
Mr. Issa. We agreed to leave because they agreed not to
fight. During perhaps the Trump Administration, but certainly
during the Biden Administration, the Taliban was aggressively
fighting. They were, in fact, taking territory. They were
violating the spirit of the cease-fire, the spirit of the
agreement. And yet, we continued our withdrawal as though they
were not, in fact, taking by force control of the country.
Isn't that correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. The agreement was, Congressman, for them to
attack withdrawing forces. The agreement was for us, if they
attacked the Afghans, to come to the defense of the Afghan
forces, and we did that.
Mr. Issa. But we did not come to--no, but let's be clear.
What you are saying is we agreed that we wouldn't get killed as
we withdraw, withdrew----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Issa [continuing]. But we left the caveat that we would
not allow the Taliban to defeat the Afghan military, and we had
the right to come to their defense.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right, and we did.
Mr. Issa. But we did not do it sufficient to stop them, did
we?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, at the end, you are right, but what
surprised us was the poor performance of the Afghans,
particularly post-President Biden's announcement and in the
summer----
Mr. Issa. OK.
Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. The April announcement and in
the summer that the balance began to shift significantly.
Mr. Issa. So, I just want to ask a simple question.
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, sir.
Mr. Issa. And it is a final question, I believe. When
conditions changed and our ability to stop the Taliban by
taking the country by force and putting children, particularly
girls, back into, essentially, slavery, when that began to
change, President Biden did not react by sending troops back
in----
Mr. Khalilzad. Correct.
Mr. Issa [continuing]. Or anything else. And it is your
testimony he did so because sending troops back in--in other
words, enforcing their keeping their agreement--would have
potentially cost American lives, and he wasn't willing to do
so.
So, 13 Americans died and countless Americans and people
who helped Americans became trapped in Afghanistan because he
wouldn't send troops back in, when, in fact, the Taliban was
violating, not just the spirit, but the facts of what they had
agreed to, which was not taking the country by force. Isn't
that true?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the government disintegrated. The
president ran away.
Mr. Issa. But wait a minute. Wait a second. Wait a second.
The government disintegrated when all they had left was an
encircled Kabul. The president flew out at a time----
Mr. Khalilzad. If you go further in time----
Mr. Issa. Well, I would like to go back to around January
20th of 2021.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Issa. On January 20, 2020--or January 20th, 2021----
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
Mr. Issa [continuing]. Was, in fact, the government already
disintegrated or did, over the next 8 months, as they were
finding themselves unable to hold the territories and
negotiate, they began to disintegrate--disintegrating finally
when they were entrapped and all that was left was an airport
to leave by?
Mr. Khalilzad. You are absolutely right that during the 8
months the disintegration increased and, finally, in Kabul,
what happened happened. But I think that the balance shifted,
surprisingly--our assessment was different than what happened.
Mr. Issa. Well, you know, I appreciate the surprise, but,
Mr. Chairman, I think the testimony speaks for itself. It was
during the 8 months----
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Issa [continuing]. In which the Taliban aggressively
took land that they began to deteriorate a government because
we did not re-engage with troops sufficient, and maybe that was
a good decision.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Issa. But I do not think it was. I think it was the
decision that made inevitable the people of Afghanistan living
in slavery and 13 Americans losing their lives.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
We are still waiting for Mr. Mills, is that correct?
Staff. He's not coming.
Chairman McCaul. OK. Well, let me just say I want to thank
you, sir, for being here today, again, voluntarily. I
appreciate your honestly, transparency.
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. You were in a very difficult assignment,
as I always told you----
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul [continuing]. Even back in the day. And it
is very helpful to this committee to get all the facts before
us.
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. And I want to thank you for your service
to the Nation as well.
There may be additional questions that we would ask you to
submit in writing.
Mr. Khalilzad. Sure.
Chairman McCaul. And pursuant to committee rules, all
members have 5 days to submit questions and extraneous
materials for the record.
And without objection, this committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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