[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AUKUS IMPLEMENTATION AND CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS
CONTROL IN THE 21ST CENTURY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 14, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-83
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
55-921PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking
JOE WILSON, South Carolina Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida AMI BERA, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee DINA TITUS, Nevada
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee TED LIEU, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
RONNY JACKSON, Texas DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
YOUNG KIM, California COLIN ALLRED, Texas
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida ANDY KIM, New Jersey
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan SARA JACOBS, California
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
American Samoa SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK,
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio GREG STANTON, Arizona
JIM BAIRD, Indiana MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
CORY MILLS, Florida JIM COSTA, California
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia JASON CROW, Colorado
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
JOHN JAMES, Michigan GABRIEL AMO, Rhode Island
KEITH SELF, Texas
Brendan Shields, Staff Director
Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Jenkins, Hon. Bonnie D., Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, U.S. Department of State............... 7
MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Newsweek article, "Israel Implemented More Measures to Prevent
Civiliam Casualties Than Any Other Nation in History."......... 34
CNN article, ``Option: I'm an expert in urban warfare, Israel is
upholding the laws of war.".................................... 46
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 74
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 75
Hearing Attendance............................................... 76
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record.................. 77
AUKUS IMPLEMENTATION AND CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS
CONTROL IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Wednesday, February 14, 2024
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael McCaul
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come
to order.
I want to welcome everybody to our restored hearing room
and I--a point of personal privilege. I took the opportunity to
put our first chairman's portrait up underneath the Great Seal
of the United States in front of us.
In fact, in the Continental Congress on April 19th, 1775,
the Committee on Correspondence was formed, which eventually
became the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and so I just put that
as a historical reference as to why this committee is, in fact,
so important and I want to thank the Secretary for being here
this morning.
Now, the purpose of this hearing is to discuss
implementation of the AUKUS trilateral partnership and broader
challenges facing international security and arms control. I
now recognize myself for an opening statement.
One of America's most effective tools has been deterrence,
leveraging our arsenal of democracy for global stability.
However, since the deadly and chaotic withdrawal from
Afghanistan this Administration has failed to project strength
on the world stage and we're witnessing the development of a
deadly and unholy alliance among our adversaries.
They are working together to undermine Western values,
attempting to change the global balance of power. The world has
seen Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, an emboldened
Chairman Xi threatening Taiwan, and the Iranian regime
continuing to fund its terror proxies.
Iran is at the center of destabilization in the Middle East
greenlighting unrelenting attacks on Israel as I speak, on
commercial shipping, and our own troops in the region including
several deaths recently, including our troops and dozens more
injured.
Russia is now getting component parts from China, ballistic
missiles from North Korea, manufactures Iranian drones in
country.
China is expanding its nuclear arsenal while its military-
civil fusion strategy uses our technology and investments
against us to advance and strengthen the CCP, and North Korea
continues to buildup its nuclear and ballistic missile program
despite U.N. sanctions.
As the world burns America is being tested. We must
modernize our approach to security to advance our strategic
goals and that includes working with our allies in new and
innovative ways. AUKUS is a prime example of how we should be
partnering with our closest allies.
I agree with the Administration that to counter CCP
aggression we must work with our closest allies and,
importantly, here are the U.K. and Australia and that's why I
led the bipartisan AUKUS implementation legislation which
passed into law this past December on the National Defense
Authorization bill.
This legislation grants the Administration the authority to
issue ITAR exemptions so we can deploy cutting-edge technology
with our closest partners.
This April a Presidential determination to finally grant
these exemptions will allow the AUKUS pact to move forward and
it will show the world that we will not be intimidated by
Chairman Xi.
Alongside AUKUS we need to rebuild our Defense Industrial
Base. The Defense Industrial Base is strained to maintain our
own military readiness while meeting the critical needs of our
partners.
We must make investments to support the Defense Industrial
Base and include innovative companies that are producing
cutting-edge technology but struggle to secure a government
contract.
We must cut through the red tape and streamline the process
to make Federal contracts obtainable and trust the private
sector to do what it does best and that's innovate. These
innovative companies are eager to collaborate on research and
development of advanced capabilities like artificial
intelligence, autonomous vehicles, quantum computing, and
hypersonic systems, and as we grow the AUKUS collaboration we
can expand to space systems and other cutting-edge technology.
Bureaucracy should not get in the way of American
innovation. Additionally, to successfully move forward we must
reform our foreign military sales process. When I travel
overseas I hear the same thing over and over from our allies.
They want our equipment and our weapon systems but they cannot
afford the delays.
Since 2019 I have approved 19 sales totaling over $22
billion to Taiwan that have yet to be delivered and when I was
in country last April President Tsai asked me, ``Where are my
weapons? I paid for them.'' I did not really have a good
answer.
Seeing these challenges firsthand I convened a task force
led by Representative Waltz which last week published its
report highlighting desperately needed improvements to our FMS
process and it's called the Foreign Military Sales Tiger Task
Force report recently released.
It'll be the first time we have had FMS reform--the first
time in a generation--and we're not done. We're going to look
at outdated arms control and nonproliferation policies like the
missile technology control regime and whether the department's
structural organization needs updating to combat the challenges
we face today.
Xi is not slowing down his malign agenda and neither should
we slow down in the face of that. However, with AUKUS we have
an opportunity to build on American innovation and partner with
our closest allies to deter and defend against the CCP.
At the same time we need to protect the U.S. and our allies
with a credible nuclear deterrent. Outdated cold war nuclear
systems are no longer adequate to face the dual nuclear threat
we face from Putin and Xi.
Only from a position of strength can we negotiate. We are
at risk of losing that strength as we let our deterrent age--
deterrence age and desperately grasp at negotiations with the
Russians and Chinese.
The United States does not seek conflict but only through
strength can we provide the deterrence necessary to secure
peace in the region and around the globe.
And with that the chair now recognizes the ranking member
Mr. Meeks for an opening statement.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it's good to be in
our renovated home. You know, it's been a while, you know, but
it's beautiful and I'm glad to be back home. We do not have to
make that long trek anymore.
But it's good to be home, and I want to thank you, Mr.
McCaul, for calling this hearing and let me also start by
thanking Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, the Under Secretary of
State for arms control and international security for being
here today for helping us understand the critical work that the
Biden Administration has been engaged in with our allies and
partners to strengthen our collective security.
You know, in a little over a week we will mark 2 years--two
years--since Russia's renewed full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The human cost of Russia's war has been devastating and the
consequences for global security and stability will reverberate
for decades to come.
The Administration's commitment to supporting the people of
Ukraine in this fight is ironclad and proven. In addition to
providing billions of dollars in security assistance, as a
direct result of President Biden's leadership the United States
of America forged a coalition of allies and partners around the
world that stands together against Moscow's unprovoked war of
aggression.
And as we look forward I want to commend our colleagues on
the other side of the building, the U.S. Senate--I'm surprised
I'm doing that. But they did its job earlier this week to pass
an overwhelmingly bipartisan bill--critical assistance for
Ukraine, critical assistance for Israel, critical for the Indo-
Pacific.
And the question that now presents itself is what will this
body do. Will this body show similar leadership? Will this body
see it, put this bill on the floor so that we can get Ukraine
what it needs? It is time for this body to stand up.
So I hope our colleagues on the other side of the aisle
find their way to meet this moment. We need the United States
of America in a bipartisan way to meet this moment.
In addition to the war in Europe the United States and our
allies in the Indo-Pacific are facing an unprecedented military
buildup and aggression from the People's Republic of China in
the East and South China Seas as well as in the Taiwan Strait.
Under Xi Jinping Beijing has become a more repressive--has
become more repressive at home and more coercive and ambitious
abroad. America's military presence in the region, our
alliances, our diplomatic engagement, are all key to keeping
the region peaceful, free, and open and the United States
commitment to the defense of our allies and to maintaining open
seas and skies has never been greater.
The Administration's record approval of arms cases for
Taiwan, a modernized alliance with Japan, and a historic AUKUS
trilateral security framework are just some of the examples of
how the Biden Administration has used strength to keep the
peace in the Indo-Pacific.
President Biden's historic AUKUS initiative with the U.K.
and Australia will strengthen defense cooperation and
interoperability in the region and allow us to enhance regional
security.
I am a strong supporter of this vital agreement and was
proud to advance critical legislation to implement AUKUS. Even
with our looming competition with China and efforts to counter
Russian aggression in Europe, we must always remember that a
nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. That is why
arms control, despite what its opponents may say, is so
critical to our national security.
It not only reduces the prevalence of nuclear weapons and
reduces the risk of miscalculation between the United States,
our adversaries, our competitors, but it helps us to keep them
in check.
Simply put, reducing the number of deployed Russian nuclear
weapons keeps Americans safer. Preventing Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapon keeps America safer.
Working together to denuclearize North Korea keeps America
safer. Stemming China's rapid conventional and nuclear military
buildup keeps America safer, and sound and effective arms
control policies like those this Administration has advanced
are the one--is one of the best tools to help achieve those
goals.
And, yet, the State of arms control is more perilous now
than it has been in decades. So I hope our witness can help us
understand today what the Administration is doing to change
this picture and put all of these issues into a broader
strategic context.
And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman McCaul. The ranking member yields back.
I just want to thank the ranking member for his hard work
in a bipartisan fashion with myself and our teams working
together on the AUKUS legislation and, obviously, with the
Senate as well with the four corners of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It
was one of the finer moments in Congress. We have had a few but
few and far between lately, I'd say.
Also other members of the committee are reminded that
opening statements may be submitted for the record.
We're pleased today to have Hon. Bonnie Jenkins.
Mr. Meeks. Mr. Chairman? One thing I left out.
Chairman McCaul. The ranking member is recognized.
Mr. Meeks. I just want to ask--he's not here yet but I want
to ask unanimous consent that Rep. Courtney who worked very
hard on the AUKUS agreement participate at today's hearing
after all committee members have had their opportunity to
participate and question the witness.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
We're pleased to have Hon. Bonnie Jenkins, the under
secretary for arms control and international security at the
State Department, before us today. Her bio is very lengthy and
impressive and I told her her academic record--you must have
spent, you know, a long part of your lifetime in school and it
was extremely impressive and so long that I do not have time to
read all the credentials.
But let me just say thank you for being here. Your full
statement will be made part of the record. And with that, I now
recognize Under Secretary Jenkins for her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. BONNIE D. JENKINS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS
CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Jenkins. Good morning.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the
committee, and congratulations to being back here in this hall.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak to all of you today
about the work that I oversee at the Department of State as
under secretary for arms control and international security.
Let me give you a broad overview of the challenges and
opportunities we face and the tools we employ to ensure that
United States is leading from a position of innovation during
this inflection point in history.
I oversee the Arms Control Deterrence and Stability Bureau,
ADS; the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau,
ISN; and the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, PM. I also lead
the coordination for the trilateral partnership between
Australia, United Kingdom, and United States known as AUKUS.
We find ourselves at a time where we are certainly
challenged. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine is about to
begin its third year. The People's Republic of China continues
to pressure Taiwan across a spectrum of diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic measures.
The Middle East is on a knife's edge as Israel defends
itself from Hamas terrorism amid a deepening humanitarian
crisis, and Houthi extremists engage in illegal and reckless
attacks on commercial vessels exercising their navigational
rights and freedom.
The deepening cooperation among Russia, the DPRK, and Iran
is a cause of concern. However, it is precisely during these
moments where we must be innovative to maintain international
norms and institutions, providing foundations for global
security.
This includes our work to advance the full scope of arms
control measures on weapons of mass destruction and
conventional arms to strengthen deterrence and strategic
stability.
This Administration has secured allied unity to suspend the
treaty on armed conventional forces in Europe in response to
Russian withdrawal. We have proposed and passed United Nations
resolutions calling on countries to not conduct destructive
direct ascent anti-satellite missile tests and to not use
radiological weapons.
We led states to endorse responsible practices regarding
artificial intelligence for military applications and we
completed the destruction of U.S. chemical weapons stockpile,
eliminating an entire category of declared weapons of mass
destruction.
We are strengthening nuclear safeguards, safety and
security, especially as we assist nations partnering in nuclear
energy and peaceful nuclear cooperation, building capacity to
mitigate proliferation threats, sanctioning actors engaged in
illicit activities, enhancing interdiction measures, and
protective sensitive U.S. technologies from exploitation.
Thanks to the strong bipartisan support of the CHIPS and
Science Act of 2022 and the International Technical Security
Innovation fund this Administration has made profound
contributions to protect semiconductor and other emerging
technologies.
We continue to advance deeper security cooperation with our
allies and partners around the world. We have provided over $44
billion in security assistance to strengthen the international
coalition helping Ukraine to defend itself and assist our
allies and partners to transition off Russian-origin equipment.
We are working to strengthen Taiwan's self-defense
capabilities, implementing new security assistance authorities
and improving the highest single year number of foreign
military sale notifications to Taiwan to maintain peace and
stability across the Taiwan Strait.
We are helping Israel defend itself while continuing to
press for a two-State solution that puts Palestinian voices at
the center of a post-crisis governance in Gaza.
Standing shoulder to shoulder with our closest allies is
one of the hallmarks of American diplomacy. A prime model is
AUKUS, a generational opportunity that deepens cooperation with
our closest allies, strengthens our long-term defense and
security partnerships, provides us a clear pathway to continue
advancing our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific,
and sends a very strong signal of deterrence and commitment to
the highest nonproliferation standards in the region and around
the world.
With your passage of the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense
Authorization Act we are making great strides within AUKUS on
export controls, fostering an Indo-Pacific ecosystem and
supporting operational readiness and interoperability of U.S.
allies for generations to come.
We have a historic responsibility to get this right and
with everyone in this room working together we are on the right
path.
So let us continue to work together. This new security
landscape requires innovation and creativity. It requires
resilience and modernization.
This Administration has been making the tough choices and
laying the groundwork for long-term prosperity both at home and
abroad. We are clear eyed about where our adversaries or our
competitors are making inroads and how our actions will
determine the safety and security of future generations.
I thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jenkins follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Under Secretary Jenkins, and I
agree with you. We have a historic opportunity before us.
Pursuant to the legislation--AUKUS legislation--the
President has until mid-April to decide whether the British and
Australians have a, quote/unquote, ``comparable defense export
control system with the U.S.'' and whether to exempt them from
the international traffic in arms regulations, otherwise known
as ITAR.
In essence, ITAR-free zones will allow us to develop and
build the most cutting-edge military technologies like
hypersonics together. In my view, these are our closest allies.
They are members of Five Eyes.
They bled with us on the battlefield over the last hundred
years and we shared our crown jewel, the nuclear propulsion
technology, with the British for generations and just
authorized sharing our most advanced conventionally armed
nuclear-powered submarines with the Australians.
I believe it would be a diplomatic concern if the President
does not exempt them from ITAR, and I do not want to put you on
the spot but since I have you here and we have to make this
decision--the President does--by April my question is very
simple.
Does the Administration believe that we should give this
exemption to our two closest allies in April?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Thank you for that question and I totally
agree with you. The U.S.--the U.K. and Australia are our
closest allies. We have a long history of working with them and
I can tell you that we are working around the clock to do what
we need to make sure that we can get the ITAR exemption that
all of you have voted with the NDAA to help put forward.
I can tell you that I've made several trips myself to the
U.K., going to Australia. My experts are working with our
colleagues on a regular basis. We're having trilateral meetings
and it's going--actually it's going very well.
The U.K. has passed the National Security Act. Australia
has two bills which are going forward. So they are doing what
they need and we're doing what we need to put in place all the
steps that have to happen so that we can certify.
I feel very confident that we will certify. We're just
actually in the process of making this happen. Something that
normally takes about six to 12 months we are doing it in a
much, much faster period.
Chairman McCaul. I appreciate that, your candor and
honesty, and I really hope the Administration does certify. If
you need anything from us in the committee please let us know.
You know, we're working as Americans here with our allies
against a very, very strong threat coming from China.
Shifting to that, Taiwan arms sales--I know you're aware of
this issue. When I saw President Tsai she asked me, ``Where are
my weapons?'' There are 19 weapon systems, $22 billion, that
have not reached the island.
What I'm concerned about is if we cannot get these weapons
into Taiwan what deterrence does the island have as the clock
is ticking, and I think after the Presidential elections in
Taiwan it's even more foreseeable.
They know they cannot take it by election so maybe they're
going to look at other ways to unify, in their words, Taiwan
through a blockade of some sort.
Do you know why this has taken so long and when do you
anticipate that the weapons that Mr. Meeks and I signed off on
and the chair and ranking member in the Senate--do you
anticipate when they will be delivered?
Ms. Jenkins. First of all, I totally agree with you in
terms of our--the important work that we're doing with Taiwan.
I want to thank everyone for all the effort that's gone in for
work we have been doing to allow us to do things like have
foreign military financing with them that we hadn't had before,
to have our international military education training with them
now.
We have been able to use your--use the Taiwan Enhanced
Resilience Act to authorize up to $10 billion in security
assistance.
So first of all, I just want to say that we recognize very,
very much how important this is. Also, I want to note that many
times there are problems or delays. We are able within the
State Department to go through these processes in 48 hours or
so.
But the problem really is getting it through the industrial
base, getting the equipment on time. A lot of times after in
these cases after the signature is done that's when things
start to happen in terms of getting the equipment.
So the delay is not related to anything in terms of our
commitment. Our commitment is certainly there. It's really the
industrial base and this is something that we know is in the
supplemental and something that we know is an issue and we're
working very closely with our partners and industry to try to
move that faster.
I do not have a specific timeframe that I can give you
right now but I just want you to understand a little of the
background.
Chairman McCaul. I want to thank you. As we examine the
supplemental--we just received it--with respect to Taiwan and
countering China we obviously--any input--it's not a final
draft by any stretch and any input you may have to help this
situation would be very much appreciated.
In fact, I know there's $3.3 billion for AUKUS itself which
I think is a very strong argument to defending the Pacific. So
thanks for your candor.
I now recognize Ranking Member Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
Ambassador Jenkins, I've got some serious concerns right
now dealing with Ukraine assistance. For more than a year the
U.S. Congress demonstrated its steadfast support for Ukraine.
We called out Russia's brutal invasion and many of us, Mr.
McCaul and myself, visited Ukraine to show our support. Went to
Poland to show our support.
In this Congress this committee held hearings on the
comprehensive oversight and mechanisms linked to our support
and we heard from returned kidnapped children and women and the
terror that Russia represents in Ukraine.
We passed legislation standing with the people of Ukraine
and fielded calls from our constituents who generously offered
to open up their homes to Ukrainian children and other
civilians fleeing this horrific war.
To this day we still receive those calls. But we also
receive calls from constituents. Quite frankly, I've received a
few just a couple days ago who are now angry, angry that after
standing shoulder to shoulder with the people of Ukraine for so
long that this Congress is now failing to act. Angry that--and
I'm sorry to say that it seems as though those in the House
majority is buckling under the pressure of MAGA Republicans who
are acting on the whims of the former president to help his
election campaign.
I hope my Republican colleagues in this body are not
putting politics over our national security--our national
security. And early yesterday morning the Senate did do its
part and I applaud Senator Schumer and Senator McConnell for
putting politics aside and passing one of the most
consequential national security packages in years.
I know the Democrats in the House are ready to act and act
now and I would hope that Speaker Johnson will put the bill on
the floor so that we have an opportunity in this House to vote
on it because I truly believe if he puts it on the floor we
will pass it in a bipartisan way. But we need the bill on the
floor so that we can pass it.
So let me just ask you first, Madam Ambassador, just want a
yes or no for--in the beginning. Do you believe Ukraine is a
regional conflict that will not have impacts beyond Russia and
Ukraine?
Ms. Jenkins. No. The impact will be much more than beyond
Russia and Ukraine.
Mr. Meeks. And would it be beyond Europe?
Ms. Jenkins. It will be beyond Europe.
Mr. Meeks. And do you believe that what happens in Ukraine
matters for the national security of the United States of
America?
Ms. Jenkins. It very much matters to our national security.
Mr. Meeks. Can you tell us why?
Ms. Jenkins. It matters to the United States because, one,
we are a leader and we have to be continued to be seen as a
leader around the world. We have made a commitment to Ukraine
and we need to show that we could--we stick to our commitments.
Other countries are watching what we're doing and taking
lessons, and we also have to promote democracy and help
countries defend themselves.
Mr. Meeks. And do you believe that President Xi is watching
closely what we do to support Ukraine?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I do.
Mr. Meeks. And do you believe whether or not we continue
supporting Ukraine will have an impact on his calculus or
future plans against Taiwan?
Ms. Jenkins. It certainly will.
Mr. Meeks. And will passing this critical national security
package help our readiness?
Ms. Jenkins. It will certainly help our readiness.
Mr. Meeks. And how would it do that?
Ms. Jenkins. It will help our readiness because, first of
all, we're providing--we're able to provide more equipment to
Ukraine. But once again, as I was saying in the last question,
it also helps us strengthen our industrial base.
Mr. Meeks. And let me turn to AUKUS for a second because as
you have testified China is also watching very closely how we
choose to act or not act, and at this pivotal moment in history
we know the State Department has been closely engaged with both
Australia and the United Kingdom to make sure important reforms
to protect sensitive defense technology are completed in order
to meet requirements in place to allow sensitive defense
cooperation.
So what is the status of the changes we requested of
Australia and the U.K. in the NDAA?
Ms. Jenkins. Thanks for the question.
As I mentioned earlier, the status is we are moving
forward. As I had mentioned, we have already--the U.K. has
already a new act. Australia has a couple of bills that they're
getting through their processes.
We are having regular meetings with them both in the U.S.
and outside the U.S. in Australia and U.K. We have several
groups that are meeting--several working groups that are
meeting. There's a lot of activity that's taking place to make
sure that we can in fact certify.
Mr. Meeks. And why does the department believe defense and
regulatory reforms in our partners' regimes are so important?
Ms. Jenkins. It's important because we have to make sure
that, you know, we protect our intellectual property. We know
that there's countries like China who want to steal information
and AUKUS, because it's going to be a very strong interoperable
process not only just in submarines but emerging technologies
and it is going to be a very interesting place for countries
like China to try to steal our technology.
Mr. Meeks. My time has expired. I wanted to get into arms
control with Russia and China but I do not have that time. So
thank you for your testimony. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize Mr. Wilson for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for being here
today and we appreciate your service, and congratulations to
Chairman Mike McCaul and Ranking Member Greg Meeks for the
renovation of Room 2172 Rayburn Building to be back with
adequate lighting, too. And so this is--this is very
impressive. Thank you.
And, hey, sadly--and this should be bipartisan--all of us
should be facing--we're in a war we did not choose between
dictators with rule of gun invading democracies with rule of
law, and America, I believe, sadly, today with the open borders
too--you add that in--is at greater risk of attack--of imminent
attack than ever before, as the FBI has indicated.
With that in mind, with the axis of evil war criminal Putin
and North Korea have just had unprecedented ballistic missile
cooperation with war criminal Putin firing indiscriminately
North Korean missiles against civilians of Ukraine.
What's being done to try to address this? Because it also--
it's a direct threat to our great allies of South Korea and
Japan.
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, thank you for that question and I totally
agree. Any relationship that we're seeing, you know, between
Russia and North Korea is very concerning and one of the things
that we started doing already is last month we have already
started doing sanctions as a result of this, and we are being
very, very vocal.
We are working with partners in multilateral settings to
also see how we all can work together to address this issue
because so much of this is multilateral, working together with
sanctions, and that's what we're doing to this date and we're
going to continue to focus on this issue.
Mr. Wilson. And additionally bipartisan--I'm really
grateful to see our leadership here so concerned, correctly,
about the providing of equipment to deter the People's
Republic--the Chinese Communist Party from attacking Taiwan.
That needs to be done immediately and so please look into that.
Additionally, there's been a request and provision has been
signed off by our leadership in the House and Senate for rifles
to be provided to Israel.
What's the status to providing--this has been held up and
to me it's just inconceivable at a time of war that we would
delay and the rifle should be provided. And when can we expect
that to be approved?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for your question.
Once again I want to reiterate how important we see the
situation in Taiwan and our efforts to really move as fast as
we can on that.
On the rifles we are still deliberating that within the
Administration so we there's nothing that I can report on that
to date. But that's an issue we're still working on.
Mr. Wilson. And, indeed, they lost rifle capability when we
had the Hamas puppets of Iran invade and there's just no reason
for delay of something as basic as rifles and so I hope that's
advanced.
And then also bipartisan should be interested in small
modular reactors and that is that how critical they can be with
technology to promote work with our partners.
I know that Romania has taken a real lead on trying to
develop small modular reactors. What is your department doing
and working with our allies to promote small modular reactors
and, hey, for immediate manufacture? I even have a location,
Savannah River Nuclear Laboratory.
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, we're doing quite a bit and thanks for
recognizing the work that we're doing in Romania. We are
pressing forward very hard on small modular reactors around the
world and we are working very closely with our allies. We're
working with the G-7.
Recently at the COP-28 we had 22 countries agree to triple
nuclear technology by 2050. We have a number of countries who
are working to promote more funding in this issue.
So, yes, we take it very seriously. We'll work with allies,
G-7 partners as well, to promote small modular reactors around
the world.
Mr. Wilson. And the benefit of that would be the security
for a territory such as Guam which is so critical--three hours
from Shanghai, 3 hours from Tokyo, 3 hours from Manila. Again,
a floating aircraft carrier that needs energy independence.
And so it's just so clear, and then you also have examples
of, hey, resort areas like Hilton Head Island, South Carolina.
We would like to have in the event of a hurricane, again, small
modular reactors and, hey, we have had small modular reactors
on aircraft carriers and submarines. This just need to be
advanced and the production should be approved and should be
accelerated.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
The chair recognizes Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam
Secretary, for being here and thank you for your efforts
strengthening the values of freedom and democracy we have
around the world and strengthening particularly with our allies
that share these beliefs and particularly those allies that are
in very difficult threatened regions around the world.
I believe in many senses, and many experts agree, that
we're in the greatest threat globally that we have been in
since World War II in this regard. I had an uncle who was
killed in action defending us in Europe.
So many other Americans lost loved ones, family members.
Many individuals had lifetime injuries, hidden wounds, families
that were under strain, all for that sacrifice to bring us to
the foundation we have right now where post World War II we
have the greatest chance of peace and prosperity that modern
times have ever shed upon any generation.
And I'm worried. I'm worried that this will be whittled
away with indifference and I cannot fail to comment on the
bigger picture when you're here in front of us that we are at a
critical place right now with this package for Ukraine, Israel,
Indo-Pacific, Taiwan--that package that passed the Senate.
Time is passing very quickly. Those of us that have been
briefed know that there's an exigency of time here and an
urgency to move, and I must say the place where this will be
met is not in your office, with all due respect.
The place where this will be met is not in the Secretary's
office. The place where this will be met is not even in the
White House. Right now at this time that place is right here in
this U.S. House.
Just 5 months ago we passed the support package for Ukraine
and it was 311-217. Pretty tough to get numbers like that in
this Congress at all. But we must be able to put it on the
floor right now for a democratic vote.
If we do not have democracy in the U.S. House right now we
cannot expect to be the leader of democracy worldwide globally
when we cannot even do that.
Anything we say, anything we utter, will be nothing but
hollow words. So in this context too I want to ask you
something else that concerns me that surrounds particularly
what's going on in Ukraine, what's going on in China, what's
going on in Iran, and that's the importance of recognizing I
think that there's--we have NATO that brings, you know, post
World War II allies together that gives leadership to so many
others.
We have 50 countries participating in our effort to help
Ukraine. Fifty--no small task. But I'm very concerned if you
have any remarks on this on how it might affect
nonproliferation, how it might affect arms use, how it might
affect U.S. influence.
We're seeing, I think, and it's really at stake now a new
axis, if you will, an axis with Russia and North Korea who is
supplying them with missiles, with Iran who is supplying them
with drones, some of them with U.S. and Western parts, by the
way, and China who's bolstering up domestically and we're
watching very closely what they're doing in any dual purpose
products they're having.
But this axis of North Korea, of Iran, of Russia, of China
is very dangerous and it's coming together, and I think it's
going to be one of the byproducts of us not acting to support
Ukraine right now. Can you comment on that burgeoning threat?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, thank you. I cannot agree with you more.
First of all, the importance of getting the supplemental passed
because of the funding that it will allow to help us combat
these threats but also the concern that we have in terms of
these countries working together and it really--as you said
this is a changing moment in terms of international security.
And so we have to think about things that we have done in
the past that have been successful that we have to adjust to
deal with this new not just the individual challenges but the
challenges that are being faced by having, you know, three very
challenging countries working together.
So the judicial tools that we have in sanctions and export
controls and working multilaterally with countries, working in
different forums, you know, exchanging information, best
practices, these have to be adjusted and strengthened because
we have to deal with a different type of challenge that's
growing. So I totally agree with everything you say.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, and I think it's going to affect
generations to come. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
The chair recognizes Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thanks for being here. You're the under
secretary for arms control and international security. To that
end, has Iran's uranium enrichment well beyond what is needed
for nuclear energy production continued during the last 3
years?
Ms. Jenkins. Iran has--most recently they have been
increasing their production to about 60 percent.
Mr. Perry. Is that what's needed for peaceful nuclear power
production, 60 percent enrichment?
Ms. Jenkins. What I can say is their activities are not
ones that make us understand that what they're doing is
peaceful.
Mr. Perry. I'm sorry. So that last part?
Ms. Jenkins. Our assessment is that what they're doing is
not considered peaceful.
Mr. Perry. Right. Obviously, 60 percent has nothing to do
with peaceful power production. It has to do with weapons
production. Are you personally involved in any active
discussions with Iran on nonproliferation?
Ms. Jenkins. We are not involved in these activities right
now on nonproliferation.
Mr. Perry. So what is the plan? If you can, generally
speaking--not asking for any classified information--but how
can we assure the American people of some plan, any plan, to
stop Iran from having a nuclear weapon that they will deliver
via ballistic capability?
Ms. Jenkins. Right. Well, first, I want to--thanks for the
question--just to highlight, first of all, that, you know, we
are always looking for a diplomatic solution and that's always
the first thing.
Of course, we're having a problem with that right now
because there really is no good solution on the table. We
continue to work with the IAEA--International Atomic Energy
Agency--in their efforts to try to assess what's happening in
Iran and we know that their challenge----
Mr. Perry. We know what's happening. I'm asking what the
plan is because they're moving forward. They're doing it as we
speak.
Ms. Jenkins. The plan--yes, the plan is to continue to seek
diplomatic resolution on it.
Mr. Perry. OK. All right. So they're going to continue and
we're going to keep talking and they're going to continue. I
got it. I just wanted to see if there was something new here
that I wasn't aware of.
I want to switch subjects here a little bit. New reporting
from Michael Shellenberger, Matt Taibbi, and Alex Gutentag cite
sources in the intelligence community that say that the IC
asked Five Eyes' intelligence agencies including the U.K. and
Australia to spy on 26 of the previous Administration's
associates.
Did you know if a warrant existed to authorize the spying
on these American citizens at the behest of our intelligence
community?
Ms. Jenkins. I do not have any information on that.
Mr. Perry. You do not have any information? Well, OK. Do
you and the President support the requirement of a warrant to
have Five Eyes intelligence agencies spy on American citizens
on America's behalf? Do you and the President agree that a
warrant would be required?
Ms. Jenkins. I'm hesitant to respond to that because I do
not feel like I have enough of the background information that
you're----
Mr. Perry. OK. Well, if I do not include the President, if
I just include you, do you believe in warrantless spying at the
behest of the intelligence community on American citizens?
Ms. Jenkins. I'm not quite sure how to respond to that. I
mean, we do want warrants if there's going to be spying done,
but I'm not sure I can answer that question. I want to be
honest with you, I do not feel I can----
Mr. Perry. OK. Would you--would you like the intelligence
community to be authorized to spy on you without a warrant?
Ms. Jenkins. No, I would not.
Mr. Perry. So then would you be able to transpose that
desire of yours for yourself to other American citizens who
would like the same constitutional protections that you
apparently want for yourself?
Ms. Jenkins. I can--I assume that others would want that.
But I'm not sure that I can really say what the U.S. position
is because I'm not sure----
Mr. Perry. I'm not asking for the U.S. position. I just
asked for yours and if you know what the President's is.
So yours for yourself is you want the protection of the
warrant----
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I do. Yes.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. But you cannot say for other
American citizens?
Ms. Jenkins. I would imagine yes. Yes.
Mr. Perry. OK. I'll take yes as an answer.
Let me--let me just posit one other thought to you. I look
at your testimony here and we proposed, as you said, and passed
the United Nations resolutions calling on countries to not
conduct destructive direct sent satellite/anti-satellite
missile tests. Did China agree with that?
Ms. Jenkins. China--we have approached China with that.
Mr. Perry. I know.
Ms. Jenkins. We have not had a real in-depth discussion
with them on that.
Mr. Perry. You haven't had what?
Ms. Jenkins. We haven't had an in-depth discussion with
them on that but we have approached them about that and we're
open to them being a part of that.
Mr. Perry. Oh, I'm sure we're open to it. I'm sure they're
not open to it, which concerns me because further in your
testimony you talk about the United States destroying the
stockpile of the entire category of declared weapons of mass
destruction.
So we're leading just by destroying our defensive
capabilities and offensive capabilities while hoping that China
will come along and discontinue their offensive capabilities.
I will tell you, ma'am, what we're doing is unilaterally
disarming hoping that China is going to play along. They're not
going to play along.
I yield the balance.
Mr. Wilson [presiding]. Thank you very much, Congressman
Perry, I think it's very appropriate, your questioning, as
we're looking at the portrait of Benjamin Franklin of
Pennsylvania and Congressman Perry continues the tradition of
the--being outspoken as part of the delegation from
Pennsylvania. So congratulations, Congressman Perry.
We now proceed all the way to Texas with Congressman
Castro.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
Under Secretary Jenkins, it's great to see you. Thank you
so much for your service in the Biden Administration and also
for your testimony today.
I'm glad the Biden Administration has recently revised the
conventional arms transfer policy to ensure defense sales and
weapons transfers are consistent with our values and our
strategic goals.
I have a few questions regarding these policies. The
conventional arms transfer policy states that the United States
will not transfer arms to a country if the United States
assesses that, quote, ``it is more likely than not that the
arms to be transferred will be used by the recipient,''
unquote, to violate international, humanitarian, or human
rights law.
Prior to an arms sale does the U.S. Government make an
affirmative assessment on whether those arms would meet the
standard and who in the Administration is responsible for
making these assessments?
Ms. Jenkins. That is an assessment that's made--we start
within the State Department to look at that and we have
discussions within the State Department. But, you know, these
are looked at within the interagency. So----
Mr. Castro. But the assessment is made before the transfer
of these arms?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Castro. OK. And last week the White House released
National Security Memorandum 20 which aims to ensure that U.S.
security assistance is used in line with U.S. law and
international humanitarian law.
Specifically, the memo creates an enforcement mechanism to
hold countries accountable if they're found to have violated
provisions such as Section 6201 of the Foreign Assistance Act,
which states that the U.S. shall assess if a country is denied
or restricted the delivery of U.S. humanitarian aid to a
country.
So I wanted to ask you are there any countries that are
provided exceptions to the transparency requirements under last
week's National Security Memorandum or will it be applied to
all countries equally?
Ms. Jenkins. It's going to be applied to all countries----
Mr. Castro. And has----
Ms. Jenkins [continuing]. That fit within the definitions
of the act, yes.
Mr. Castro. And has the State Department received credible
and reliable written assurances from Israel that they will not
impede the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance?
Ms. Jenkins. We have talked to Israel about the NSM and
they are aware of it and agree to it.
Mr. Castro. Have they provided us any kind of assurances?
Ms. Jenkins. We are in the process of--as I said, if you
look at the NSM it provides a timeframe if a country is at war
to provide those assurances.
Mr. Castro. Will we demand assurances from them?
Ms. Jenkins. It's part--yes, it's part of the NSM.
Mr. Castro. OK. And just this morning the Wall Street
Journal reported that the Department of State is investigating
whether the bombs used in an Israeli attack on the Jabalia
refugee camp were provided by the United States.
How does the State Department plan to conclude if the bombs
used in this air strike were provided by the United States, and
if the State Department concludes that the U.S. provided the
bombs what steps will the State Department take in response?
Ms. Jenkins. Well, one of the things that I think that the
NSM was trying to do is try to help us--help the public
understand the way in which we address these issues.
So if it turns out that that is the case we will take it
back and we will deliberate and consider what the next steps
will be and we will incorporate that into our considerations
for next steps.
I cannot say specifically what we're going to do but I can
certainly say that we are very focused on the issue. We
understand the importance of the issue to the American people
and we will take that back and assess what we should do next
steps.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
And switching subjects but also within your purview--and
you may have to take this one for the record--Ambassador
Jenkins, the family of bureaus you lead has a responsibility
over U.S. engagement with the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annex.
There's a proposal in front of this Congress to add
fentanyl and fentanyl--related substances to Schedule II and
III of the Chemical Weapons Convention Annex and I have serious
concerns about this proposal and I understand that the State
Department does as well.
In response to a previous inquiry of mine the State
Department stated that, quote, ``The department assesses that
adding fentanyl to the Chemical Weapons Convention schedules
would not enhance our ability to identify fentanyl traffickers
or address chemical weapons risks related to fentanyl.''
I also understand that adding fentanyl to the Chemical
Weapons Convention Annex would imperil the DOD's access to
fentanyl for pain management of battlefield injuries and
prevent legitimate shipments of fentanyl to Taiwan and Israel,
who are not parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention,
devastating their health care systems.
So I wanted to ask you do you believe that adding fentanyl
and fentanyl-related substances to the Chemical Weapons
Convention's Annex is appropriate and what do you see as the
impacts of doing so?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. First of all, I just want to acknowledge
stat I recognize the impact of fentanyl and so I definitely
understand the importance of these issues.
But as you said, we do not see that as a--we do not see the
CWC and the OPCW as the way in which to do this. As you
mentioned, fentanyl also has a medical--other medical purposes
and by putting this on the CWC/OPCW schedules it will impact
and disrupt individuals who need some of that for medical
purposes from using it and it's also not going to really, as
you said, focus and really do what it needs. What we are
looking for interdiction issues.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Secretary. I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Castro.
We now recognize Congresswoman and Ambassador Ann Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. I thank the chairman and the under secretary
for her time and service.
China represents an urgent threat to the United States and
its partners. We have an important advantage, however--a range
of partnerships and alliances that are unshakable and battle
tested including AUKUS, a critical security partnership between
the U.S., Australia, and the U.K.
The fact that the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP, finds
AUKUS so terrifying is a clear sign that the partnership is the
right path forward for the United States as we seek to defend
Indo-Pacific partners from China's predatory and bullying
influence.
But we need to devote real time and energy to address
remaining pitfalls and ensure AUKUS' success, whether by
cutting red tape for our trusted allies or correcting China's
attempts to sow anti-AUKUS propaganda while it massively
expands its own nuclear stockpile.
Under Secretary Jenkins, the 2024 NDAA instructed the
Secretary of State to create streamlined procedures and
anticipatory release policy for the transfer of advanced
weapons technologies like submarines and hypersonics, cyber
capabilities, artificial intelligence, and undersea
capabilities to Australia, the U.K., and Canada.
When do you anticipate the release of that policy and what
concrete steps are you and your bureaus taking to prepare those
policies?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, and once again it's an opportunity
for me to talk about AUKUS which I agree with everyone here
about the importance of that, and as I had mentioned earlier we
are working around the clock with both the U.K. and Australia
to make sure that we have what we need and all three countries
have what they need so that we can move and certify as required
under the NDAA.
Our experts are meeting on a regular basis. We just met
last week. All three countries have met on experts. I'm meeting
with my colleagues on a regular basis. We have questions that
are being answered----
Mrs. Wagner. Excuse me. Time line wise are you on track
here? When do you anticipate the release?
Ms. Jenkins. It's hard to anticipate the release right now
because we are actually working to get these things. There's
certain things that have to happen but they're happening at a
rapid pace.
Mrs. Wagner. OK. Well, I hope so.
Ms. Jenkins. I can say, for example, as I said earlier the
U.K. just passed legislation. The same thing with Australia.
They have to go through processes within their own countries
for this to happen. So I can say we're working as fast as we
can but there are steps that have to happen in all three of our
countries.
Mrs. Wagner. China has disseminated propaganda across the
Indo-Pacific falsely claiming that AUKUS undermines
nonproliferation goals and I'd like to note the astounding
hypocrisy of these claims as China itself embarks on an
unprecedented nuclear buildup.
Under Secretary Jenkins, is the department effectively
countering Chinese misinformation surrounding AUKUS like the
misinformation surrounding the transfer of conventionally armed
nuclear capable submarines?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Thank you for the question. We are
regularly countering disinformation. We see it on a regular
basis. As was mentioned, China often raises AUKUS at the IAEA
in a general--in the Board of Governors.
We have been very successful constantly pushing back to the
point that they've actually started looking at some other
issues in addition.
So we have been working on this. We understand the Chinese
buildup of nuclear weapons and we continue to----
Mrs. Wagner. Where do you think that China's misinformation
campaign against AUKUS gained the most traction and
specifically are we are working with regional partners to
correct the record?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. I think originally it was starting for
some countries to gain traction. I think that that has been
reversed because a lot of what was being claimed countries are
understanding is not true, particularly what they were saying
about submarines--that they were saying that submarines were
nuclear weapons.
They're not. They're conventional weapon submarines and
people are seeing that. We're working very closely with the
IAEA. DG Grossi is making reports talking about the great
relationship we have with them. So I think it's that active
work that we're doing is helping.
Mrs. Wagner. In my limited time--and you may have to answer
for the record--China is expected to increase its nuclear
arsenal many times over by 2030.
Under Secretary Jenkins, do you think China's unprecedented
buildup of nuclear weapons requires a new approach to how we
control the trade of nuclear material, considering the civil-
military fusion that China relies on for their military
modernization?
And if so do you also believe that we need to ensure that
the West is not supplying Russia and China with nuclear
technology and material that can contribute to the expansion of
our adversaries' nuclear arsenals?
I would ask you to reply for the record on this question. I
have--my time has expired, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Ann Wagner
of Missouri.
And now we proceed to Congresswoman Dina Titus of Nevada.
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, and thank you, Ambassador.
Your impressive reputation and resume precedes you. We're
delighted to have you here.
We have heard a lot this morning about the bill that just
came out in the Senate and how it's far reaching and how it
impacts our national security and how our colleagues definitely
want to do that but just cannot bring themselves to vote for
that bill for some reason. That may have more to do with
politics than policy.
You've said yourself that it impacts our national security
or would if it passed in a number of ways but would you
describe a little more specifically how that bill has broader
implications for the T family, how it impacts arms control,
arms verification, and nonproliferation?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Thank you.
You know, the bill, as I said, is going to provide us with
things we talked about in terms of Ukraine, in terms of Taiwan,
in terms of foreign military. But we also have funding in there
for our nonproliferation fund and the work that we do in
nonproliferation.
Some of the capacity building work that we do is going to
be supporting domestic uranium enrichment. We have been talking
a lot about that today about civil nuke issues, which allow us
to be independent in terms of our nuclear fuel and that--and
continuing to help us work with other countries as well and
that has nonproliferation aspects to it as well.
And so it's going to be--as I look at all the things that's
in the bill it's going to be helping quite a number of
activities within the T family, particularly as we talked a lot
about today in the PM Bureau.
Ms. Titus. Could you also talk a little bit more about how
the programs that you oversee and that we have been discussing
kind of play out and the relationship that's growing between
Russia and Iran?
Ms. Jenkins. Most of the work that we're doing in that
respect--I mean, there's a lot of things we're doing but I'll
focus on the Russia-Iran issues.
You know, we have a number of sanctions, obviously, on
Iran. We have also started some new sanctions on their UAV
issues--related issues connected, obviously, with the UAVs that
they have given Russia.
We have a lot of sanctions, obviously, on Russia following
the invasion in 2022. So but we're also seeing them act
together in many different forums that we are engaged with and
I will not really have time to go into all the arms control
forums that we work with and we're seeing them working together
more often.
So it's not just in--obviously, we talk about, you know,
the security assistance side and the sanctions issues but we're
seeing them work together in other ways. And so we're trying--
as I said, we talk about innovation in this new security
environment.
We're looking at new ways we can try to work together with
our partners and like-minded countries who see the same thing
and are also very concerned about the growing relationship
between Russia and Iran and the DPRK.
Ms. Titus. So when we talk about the Senate bill impacting
Israel and impacting Ukraine and impacting Taiwan it, indeed,
also impacts that relationship with Iran, right?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. One way to look at it is as we provide
funding for us to provide funding for defense for countries, to
provide funding to support democracy, to provide funding for
the U.S. being a leader to help our partners, these are all
areas where we are strengthening our role in the world,
strengthening national security.
So as the point that you're making even though it seems--it
may seem very focused on particular countries it's really about
strengthening the United States, particularly at a time when
everyone has been saying here that we have enormous
international security challenges. So we have to be very
thoughtful.
Ms. Titus. Yes. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congresswoman Dina Titus.
And we now proceed to Congressman Andy Barr of Kentucky.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Ambassador Jenkins, welcome to the committee, and
before I get to my questions I do want to address the issue of
the supplemental that the Senate is sending over to us. I know
that's a priority for the Administration.
There's a lot of members on my side of the aisle who,
obviously, demonstrably support the assistance to Israel, the
assistance to the Indo-Pacific, and I'll direct most of my
questions to you regarding Taiwan.
But I want to address just as a comment the issue of
Ukrainian. In the Financial Services Committee just down the
hall Under Secretary Nelson from Treasury is over there. I'm
going to ask him or make this point to him as well.
Many Republicans are fully supportive of the effort to
assist the Ukrainian resistance. That is not the issue. That
concern is the mind boggling and perplexing lack of a strategy
from this Administration in supporting the Ukrainian
resistance.
When the Administration is asking Congress to approve over
$60 billion in additional assistance, which I personally
support, but at the same time is banning LNG exports to our
European and NATO allies, when they eight times provide a
general license to the sanctions on Russian banks in processing
energy transactions, when the oil price cap strategy is
failing, our strategy is literally funding Putin.
And my point to the State Department here with this
commentary is that the Administration's obsession with climate
is compromising our national security and our strategy to
counter Putin.
If we want to stop Putin, if we want to prevail in the
fight against Moscow then for goodness sakes stop limiting
energy exports, stop aiding Putin's energy exports, and stop
financing Moscow's war machine.
With that, let me get to my question about Taiwan.
Regarding Presidential drawdown authority for Taiwan, Section
5505 of the Fiscal Year 1923 NDAA states that the President may
direct the drawdown of defense articles from stocks of the
Department of Defense--defense services of the Department of
Defense and military education and training of an aggregate
value of not to exceed $1 billion per Fiscal Year to be
provided to Taiwan.
This bill became law in December 2022. What was--Madam
Ambassador, what was the total amount of Presidential drawdown
authority used by the Administration in Fiscal Year 2023?
Ms. Jenkins. I'm not sure I have the specific number in
these--with me at the moment. But I can--I can certainly get
that to you.
Mr. Barr. Well, if you could get that to us, and also we
want to know what has been used thus far in current Fiscal Year
2024.
And the reason why we say that is that the Administration
is rightly asking for Indo-Pacific assistance in the
supplemental.
But the Administration has existing authorities that we
provided through the NDAA in successive years to assist in that
effort and we would urge the Administration to use that
Presidential drawdown authority.
India, real quick, Madam Ambassador. In 2016 Congress
designated India as a major defense partner and last year
President Biden and Prime Minister Modi reaffirmed this
partnership twice, here in D.C. and in Delhi.
Not only are we cooperating more but we're seeing a shift
in India's defense supply chain away from Russia and toward the
United States and our orbit.
However, last week the Biden Administration issued the
National Security Memorandum on safeguards and accountability
with respect to transfer of defense articles and defense
services.
This memorandum sets up new hurdles and reporting
requirements for prospective arms sales to partners. Do you see
this memorandum having any impact on future sales of defense
articles from India?
India is over dependent on Russia for defense. We need to
reduce those barriers.
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Thank you.
First, I know we do not have a lot of time. On the first
one I just want to just highlight--on the PDA I just want to
mention that we are--we do want to use that PDA but it has
taken time, some of it because of industrial industry backlog
and things like that. So I just want to let you know we are
very focused on that.
And on the question, yes, we see India trying to diversify.
We like India diversifying, particularly diversifying from
Russia. We want that. We have encouraged that.
So we are happy to work with them to encourage them to do
that even more because as you know we want to get countries off
of relying on equipment from Russia.
Mr. Barr. And I met with the deputy chief of mission from
the Indian embassy. They want more defense cooperation with the
United States so that they can decrease their dependence on
Russia at this moment. We just need to make sure we do not set
up any barriers.
Ms. Jenkins. Right.
Mr. Barr. Thank you for your service and thanks for hearing
me out on the strategy on Ukraine. Energy has geopolitical
consequences and when the Administration asks Congress for
assistance but is working at cross purposes with energy policy
it makes it harder for us to support the Administration's
request.
With that, I yield.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Andy Harris--
Barr--for your good work--from Kentucky.
Hey, and we're really grateful. We have a new Member of
Congress, Congressman Gabe Amo of South Carolina heritage from
Rhode Island.
Mr. Amo. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and
greetings, Ambassador. It's a pleasure to see you. Certainly, I
want to begin by acknowledging the remarks of several of my
colleagues on the urgency of getting the Senate legislation to
provide critical security assistance on the floor so that we
can vote.
We need to recommit to these critical, critical obligations
around the world and I'm hopeful that we will see progress
there and we'll continue to make that case.
But turning to home, Rhode Island's First congressional
District is front and center in supporting AUKUS to support
security in the Indo-Pacific and is providing an enduring
foundation for its success.
This agreement is an opportunity for us to share our Rhode
Island-based expertise by establishing long lasting research
collaborations that empowers an expert workforce. The naval
undersea warfare center division in Newport recently signed a
cooperative research and development agreement with Australia's
Flinders University to foster collaborative research on
undersea technology.
This partnership is an exciting opportunity to advance
research coordination between the U.S. and Australia in the
field of undersea technology.
These agreements deepen the connection between our two
nations, the U.S. and Australia, and it builds upon the
University of Rhode Island's research and education partnership
that was formalized last year.
And, of course, you know, Electric Boat along with other
suppliers are supporting AUKUS Pillar One by manufacturing the
first rate Virginia-class submarine.
So AUKUS is a great example of how we can leverage our
economic relationships to support good-paying jobs at home and
our diplomatic and security mission abroad. But I understand in
my short tenure that this process can be cumbersome at times.
Generally speaking, American companies cannot interface
directly with their foreign counterparts. So I'm hopeful that
the Administration is open to considering methods to operate
more efficiently, to expeditiously advance AUKUS.
Under secretary Jenkins, what sort of conversations have
there been with Australia regarding the regulatory reforms that
they need to take up to obtain the licensing exemptions so that
we can expand our defense, trade, and cooperation and if so,
you know, what sort of conversations have yielded progress?
Where do they stand, et cetera?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Thank you for that and, first, I want to
also highlight the point you made about, you know, universities
and there's a part of the--of AUKUS which does not often get
enough attention is the buildup of resources and human capital
and, you know, our training with the Australians, Australians
coming here to the U.S. visiting our bases, the main part of
our schools.
So I just wanted to take a moment to highlight that aspect
that was highlighted by all three leaders on AUKUS. As I had
mentioned earlier, we are having numerous conversations with
both the U.K. and Australia.
We have actually looked at the legislation that they have--
that they are working on and trying to get passed and we're
basing a lot of the questions that we have to allow for
certification based on the really significant steps that they
have already taken in terms of developing a new regulatory
body, you know, as I said, you know, the bills that they're
going--that they're putting through, the time that it's going
to take for those bills to get to completion.
So we are learning from them and they're learning from us.
We're getting--and a lot of this is--some of it's new for them
in some respects and so we are having really good conversations
really getting--going back and forth on real detailed technical
questions so that we can get there.
Mr. Amo. Is there anything that we in Congress can do to
help improve this cooperation in the near term?
Ms. Jenkins. Just continue--I mean, the bipartisan support
for AUKUS has been amazing, you know, and I think our partners
in Australia and the U.K. hear that and they see that.
Very appreciative of the passing of the NDAA which allowed
for us to expedite the processes for exchange and extension
through the ITAR. So I think you're doing what you're doing and
showing that our partners and the world, quite frankly, your
support for this is very important and it shows our adversaries
as well that we are all united on this. So just continue to do
that as well.
Mr. Amo. Well, Ambassador, I'm grateful for your insights
and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Gabe Amo.
We now proceed to Congresswoman Young Kim of California.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman, and I want to
thank Under Secretary Jenkins for making herself available
today.
You know, earlier this year, as you know I led the Keeping
Our Allies Leading in Advancement--the AUKUS Act--and I am
really happy that that legislation provided international
trafficking in arms regulations exemptions for Australia for
the purpose of AUKUS implementation and I'm proud that we were
able to help secure determinations for exemptions in the final
Fiscal Year 1924 NDAA.
We also know U.K. and Australia we share our common
interest in securing the Indo-Pacific and promoting economic
resilience and they are also Five Eyes partners so we can work
with them on deterring CCP's aggression.
As such I know you work very closely and you are engaged
regularly in dialog with Australians on AUKUS implementation so
can you tell us during your time as under secretary has there
been any evidence of Australia violating the U.S. arms export
laws?
Ms. Jenkins. I do not want to say that I know everything
but I am not aware of any personally.
Mrs. Kim of California. You know, since the legislation was
enacted ITAR--has State Department revised--if there is any
parts of ITAR--if the State Department revised to reflect the
AUKUS and what is the impact such revisions has had on
Australian and U.S. companies to work together on Pillar Two?
Ms. Jenkins. We are still in the process of talking with
our industries about Pillar Two. We have yet to provide them.
Of course, before we can certify we have to get their
perspectives on everything.
And so we have had some meetings with industry both here,
also in the U.K. and Australia, to start getting them aware and
understanding what's happening. We take industry very, very
seriously in this. So we are going to continue to do that in
Asia.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
And also since I chair the Indo-Pacific Subcommittee I'm
deeply concerned with the recent developments in the North
Korea and Russia relationship, and the Russians and North
Koreans have entered into unprecedented ballistic missile
cooperation. That was exemplified by Russia firing North Korean
ballistic missiles in the war against Ukraine.
So what is your department doing to ensure that this
cooperation ends and is your department concerned with Russia
sharing the advanced ballistic missile and cruise missile
technology with North Koreans?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, we are very concerned. I mean, it's very
concerning to have North Korea and Russia working together on
almost anything but particularly on these issues.
So we are working with regional partners on this. We are
working with our G-7 partners. We are working in a multilateral
environment in all--in every way we can to signal our concern
about this and so that other countries can do so as well and
that we're also doing the sanctions----
Mrs. Kim of California. Would you be able to tell us if
Russian technology or technical know-how contribute to any of
the recent North Korean missile tests?
Ms. Jenkins. I cannot say that I'm aware of that.
Mrs. Kim of California. Has North Korea expanded its
nuclear and missile programs in the past 3 years and why have
we seen an increase in missile tests?
Ms. Jenkins. It's hard to speculate why they're doing
more--why they're doing more tests. I mean, we do not know. We
do not have, unfortunately, no real access to understanding
that. So we can only speculate as to why they're doing it. I
mean, you can----
Mrs. Kim of California. Let's then also ask you if DPRK has
ever used U.S. humanitarian or development aid to fund human
rights atrocities or their missile or nuclear regime.
Ms. Jenkins. I am not aware of----
Mrs. Kim of California. To the best of your knowledge.
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. To the best of my knowledge I'm not
aware.
Mrs. Kim of California. OK. Well, thank you. I want to
thank you so much for everything that you're doing and I'm
really looking forward to full implementation of AUKUS.
Mr. Connolly. Would my colleague yield just for a quick----
Mrs. Kim of California. Sure.
Mr. Connolly. So to your line of questioning about North
Korea and Russia, Mr. Wilson and I have a bill that would
expand sanctions for anyone facilitating those weapons
transfers and you might want to take a look at that bill. Would
love to have you as a co-sponsor.
Mrs. Kim of California. Happy to review. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Ms. Jenkins. And we also have sanctioned already for that
so as well.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. With that, Chairman, I
yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Young Kim,
for your leadership.
We now proceed to Congressman Brad Schneider of Illinois
who next week will be serving on the Helsinki delegation to
Vienna. Congressman Schneider?
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And just to correct the record, I just will happen to be in
Vienna on vacation and will visit you. But I'm not a part of
the delegation. Thank you.
Ambassador, thank you for your testimony today and for the
work that you do. You have a long track record in this area,
you know, just pulling out two things from your biography--an
emphasis on peace and security and an emphasis on arms control
and nonproliferation.
And I wish I had all day to talk to you about these things
because we're at a moment. But broadly--a broad question.
I look at the world and see great dangers. You touched on
your testimony some of the challenges we face from Ukraine to
the conflict in the Middle East to Iran to Indo-Pacific to
North Korea. These are major threats.
From your experience where would you rank the current
moment as far as the national security risks the United States
faces?
Ms. Jenkins. Rank it in terms of other----
Mr. Schneider. Just other periods in time. Are we at a
perilous moment like anything we have seen certainly in my
lifetime?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, this is--you know, people have said this
is, you know, the most challenging since World War II. You
know, we have had the Soviet Union fall apart and we have had
9/11, for example, and we obviously got through those periods
and I know we'll get through this one as well.
But for me looking at all the challenges, and we're talking
not just Ukraine and the challenges in the Middle East and the
relationship between the DPRK and Russia and Iran.
But we have new challenges coming--you know, emerging
technologies. We do not know how that's going to--what's going
to happen with that. In many ways we're trying to figure that
out.
So the challenges are just also different. They're
different.
Mr. Schneider. Different and growing and expanding, and I
want to ask a leading question. I mean, to me--I say this all
the time--we are safer, the world is safer, when the United
States is leading, when we lean in and take the role that so
many other countries around the world, maybe all the world,
looks to us.
I put three stars as I was reviewing your testimony last
night. Standing shoulder to shoulder with our closest allies is
one of the hallmarks of American diplomacy--your words--and I
thought that was really important.
And you go on to describe, I think, the alliances we have
as a game changer. Could you touch just very briefly on how
important our alliances are and the risk, and very specifically
the one I think there's so much concern about?
We're here talking about AUKUS which is a game changer,
looking forward, but we have others talking about exiting NATO
which, as you noted, the most perilous moment since World War
II. NATO has kept us safe and the world stronger or us stronger
and the world safer since World War II.
If you could touch on that.
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. So, I mean, with the challenges we have
today we--multilateralism is key to so much of what we need to
do.
When we think about when Russia invaded Ukraine we had--we
worked with a number of countries on important export controls
that really deprived Russia, you know, funding and a lot of
other things that they would like to--they would need for their
war and that was done, you know, with a lot of collaboration.
When we talk about North Korea, when we talk about DPRK, I
mean, Russia and Iran the ways in which we can combat is by
working with countries--you know, what can we do together in
terms of sanctions, what can we do together to deter, to deny,
to interdict.
We cannot do these by ourself. We have to work with other
countries. When we talk about NATO--I mean, NATO has been
amazing in these last few years dealing with so many issues and
even that, you know, new countries who are part of NATO.
You know, there's so much we need to do and we need to do
it to different forums whether it's NATO, whether it's the
United Nations, particularly the U.N. First Committee, which is
what I'm more familiar with.
You know, whether it's the OSCE, whether it's, you know,
the OPCW that implements the CWC, all of these are multilateral
forums and we need to work this way to combat these issues.
Same with emergent technologies as we figure out how we
deal with that. So these are all--we are in a time where we
need to work with partners.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. And one of the joys of being on
this committee is Ambassadors from around the world come to
visit us and talk, and a question I'm consistently getting is
can we count on the United States to stay--are they going to be
there? Are they going to do what they promised to do and are
they going to see it to the end?
And so my last question for you in the few seconds we have,
when there is rhetoric talking about pulling out of NATO or
there is a debate in Congress or unwillingness to stand by
Ukraine as the heroic fighters in Ukraine are fighting for
their independence but also for what is dear to us what is the
impact of that?
Ms. Jenkins. We have to remain a leader and, as you said,
you know, we--you know, we can travel around the world and do
diplomatic engagements.
You know, they're always looking for--you know, our
partners and allies look to the U.S. to be a leader and as you
said they want to know that we're there and we're not going to
leave and we're not going to abandon.
And we hear that all the time and all of the supplemental,
the funding, will help us to continue to do that and be the
leader at this very challenging time.
Mr. Schneider. And I know it's supplemental by terms of our
appropriations process but this is essential funding that our
allies need and our security relies upon.
I yield back.
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Brad Schneider.
We now proceed to Congressman Bill Huizenga of Michigan.
Mr. Huizenga. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Under Secretary Jenkins, I appreciate you being here today.
Last year under Chairman Mr. McCaul's leadership I was one
of the proud authors of the AUKUS Submarine Transfer
Authorization Act which ultimately signed was signed into law
via the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA.
This legislation authorized the sale and transfer of
conventionally armed--important part, as we'll get into it
later--nuclear-powered Virginia-class submarines to Australia
with conditions to ensure that national security considerations
are made to protect our undersea warfare advantage.
How are you ensuring--there's kind of two sides to this--
one, what kind of vetting is being done of our allies, both
British and Australian personnel, required to make this program
work and what are you doing to ensure then on the other side of
that that these folks have the proper access needed to and
around U.S. submarine yards and are you taking advantage of the
ITAR exemption language for shipyards in my bill as it was
enacted into law? How are you actually doing that?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. We are actually in the process now of
developing for both of these in terms of access, in terms of
vetting.
We are in the process now of putting together these lists
of personnel and we are working this with--within the
interagency and then we want to, you know, work with our
partners as well.
But we need to have a list of personnel so that--we're
actually working on it now.
Mr. Huizenga. OK. We'd love to have an update on how that
is going and whether there's issues on either the vetting side
or the access side.
One provision of the bill discussed at length during the
markup process was the imperative that submarine production
targets for the U.S. must be met to ensure that then the
Australians are able to buy their submarines on time and our
national security interests are accounted for.
With that comes necessary signals from industry that
they're able to bolster production in addition to purchases
from the U.S. Navy. Do you anticipate the Administration will
ramp up purchasing in the Fiscal Year 1925 budget request to
allow this transfer to move forward?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. I mean, we are--we have in the budget in
the supplemental funding to allow for enhancements of submarine
bases in support of AUKUS. So we are hoping that this will help
and we will look in the future to see if we need to ramp up
these----
Mr. Huizenga. OK. I'll just note, you know, we have--we
have put significant resources into this Fiscal Year 1918 to
1922.
Congress invested nearly a billion in developing suppliers,
training workforce, and shoring up critical supply chains.
Fiscal year 1923 the Administration initiated a 5-year
investment in submarine industrial base totaling $2.4 billion,
and I'm glad to see--actually on a personal note I'm glad to
see the Navy and others getting back to those I think what are
inspiring commercials to young people about getting back in and
literally welding these behemoths together because they are
roaming the seas, making sure that not just our country but
free trade and freedom are being protected.
So notably----
Ms. Jenkins. And I just want to--on that I had an
opportunity to go to the shipyards in Norfolk and so it was
really--it was really, really good to be there and see that
happening.
Mr. Huizenga. OK. And I'm anticipating both Norfolk as well
as Connecticut and some other places that we need to be paying
attention to.
Notably, China is not a huge fan--shocker--about us
bolstering Indo-Pacific partners to deter their unmatched
regional expansion and aggression.
They've gone so far as to push misinformation on AUKUS in
order to further its means. For example, in 2021 at an
International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meeting,
the Chinese Ambassador, Ambassador Qian, declared that AUKUS
was, quote, ``an explicit violation of the object and purpose
of the nonproliferation treaty--the NPT--and to the detriment
of the international nonproliferation regime,'' close quote.
Obviously, that's false. That is not what the NPT regime
allows. It very clearly distinguishes between propulsion
systems and weapon systems. What is your department doing,
though, to counter that misinformation about the transfer?
You know it. I know it. People in your agency might know
it. But not only here domestically but internationally what are
you doing to make sure that these--this misinformation being
spewed by China is being countermanded?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Thanks for the question.
Actually, we're very active in that. You mentioned the
IAEA. Our mission in Vienna has done an excellent job of
combating China every time that they've come to the IAEA with
that--with those statements and misinformation and they've been
getting pretty successful in that and more and more countries--
as I said earlier, more and more countries are falling away
from that and showing any signs of believing that.
We mention this in all of our international engagements,
whether it's at the Nuclear NonProliferation Review
Conference--I mean PrepCom--whether we--you know, we do side
events during meetings to educate people about what's really
going on.
Our colleagues in U.K. and Australia are very much engaged.
In fact, Australia was a leader in promoting the correct
information in Southeast Asia and was very helpful in reducing
a lot of the comments there.
So we have actually noticed--we had conversation about this
yesterday that the rhetoric is certainly not winning in the
IAEA.
It's not winning because it's falling on--people are
hearing it but they're not starting to believe it because
they're seeing the IAEA, the Director General, the reports, and
he talks about the conversations he's having with Australia and
the transparency that we're doing.
So we are combating in all the different forms that we
have.
Mr. Huizenga. My time is long gone. Keep it up. Intensify
that and let us know how we can help. I yield back.
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Bill Huizenga.
We now proceed to Congressman Brad Sherman of California.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
I'd like to comment on some of the comments that have been
made so far. Our colleague Mr. Castro questions whether Israel
is following the rules of law, the law of war and the law of
armed conflict.
Without objection I'd like to put in the record two
articles by John Spencer, the chair of the Modern War Institute
at West Point's Urban Warfare Studies program. He concludes
that Israel has done the best job in history of complying with
those--with the laws of war.
Mr. Wilson. Without objection it shall be happily included.
[The information referred to follows:]
newsweek israel implemented
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cnn option iam an expert in urban warfare
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Mr. Sherman. Thank you. The big foreign policy issue that
we face is the Senate bill so in a way my question is for my
Republican colleagues rather than--I know where you stand on
the Senate bill, and this is just a rhetorical question but
will Republicans be willing to sign a discharge petition so we
can get a vote on the Senate bill or so that we can at least
demonstrate to the Speaker that he should bring a version of
that bill to the floor of the House, perhaps with the border
provisions, perhaps without the border provisions.
But if we cannot aid Ukraine and Israel and Taiwan at this
critical time then we are no longer a world power. The chair, I
believe, has commented about our industrial base and I've been
very disappointed in our industrial base.
Ukraine is carrying on a small war compared to one that
America would carry out. We have fought wars against Iraq and
Afghanistan but we maintain a military capable of fighting
Russia and China simultaneously.
How many artillery shells is that compared to what we can
actually produce? How long before we'd run out of ordnance if
we fought the war for which we built our military?
And I'll address our witness for just a second. You have
tough decisions to make--allow an export, not allow an export--
and it's--and I just want you to point out that the worst
possible answer you could give is wait because that means they
go somewhere else, perhaps with a contract that would have been
good for you to approve and that, second, saying no may protect
our national security. You do not want to export what we should
not export.
But it may also hurt our national security because that's
less money going into the American industrial base and more
money going in to the industrial base of Russia, China, France,
or wherever.
So my question will focus on Taiwan. Taiwan's chief
representative in Australia said that Taiwan is open to deeper
collaboration with the U.S., U.K., and Australia under the
AUKUS framework and in particular joining Pillar Two.
This would address key issues for Taiwan such as cyber
capacities, information sharing. Given the existential threats
to Taiwan do you see potential collaboration of Taiwan in the
AUKUS framework?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for the question.
Just very briefly I want to remark on NSM-20. One thing I
did not make clear is that this is based on things that we were
already expecting countries to do in terms of laws of war and
in terms of humanitarian. So I just want to----
Mr. Sherman. And I might add people say that there should
be conditions on our aid to Israel. We already have them. We
have statutes that require everyone that receives our arms to
comply with the law of armed conflict.
I'll turn it back to our witness.
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. And on AUKUS, yes, Pillar Two we have
already made it clear that that's--unlike Pillar One, Pillar
Two is when we will be looking for partners. We are in the
process now internally looking at the--what we're going to--you
know, what the criteria is going to be, which areas of emerging
technology they may be involved in.
So these are things that we are looking at right now to see
which countries will be a part of it, which ones we want to
invite.
But, yes, we will be asking more countries to join us on
that.
Mr. Sherman. And our hearing here is on AUKUS. There's $8
billion in this Senate bill for Taiwan. If we fail to provide
that money does that degrade our national security in the South
Pacific?
Ms. Jenkins. What it does is it makes--we have been very
clear about our support for Taiwan. We're very happy that we
have this--we have gotten--what we have been able to do with
the funding.
We want to get more funding. And it's a signal. It
certainly will be a signal that we're not as committed as we
have said we are. So it's very important that we get the
supplemental.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Brad Sherman.
I now proceed to Congressman Brian Mast of Florida.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
Ma'am, up here. Per your opening comments you're here
representing the idea that you support a Palestinian State,
correct?
Ms. Jenkins. We support a two-State solution.
Mr. Mast. OK. Have you looked at that objectively?
Ms. Jenkins. What do you mean have I looked at it
objectively?
Mr. Mast. Have you analyzed that objectively?
Ms. Jenkins. This is--this is something that we do support,
yes.
Mr. Mast. That's not an answer. Have you analyzed a second
Palestinian State objectively? Have you--have you analyzed it
objectively?
Ms. Jenkins. I'm not sure exactly what you're asking. Have
I personally analyzed it?
Mr. Mast. You do not know what it means to objectively
analyze something?
Ms. Jenkins. I know what it means subjectively. I do not--
--
Mr. Mast. OK. So have you done that?
Ms. Jenkins. No, I have not.
Mr. Mast. You----
Ms. Jenkins. If I understand your question.
Mr. Mast. You might not be because I cannot believe that
you would answer it in that way. So let me just start over.
You're here representing support for a Palestinian State,
correct?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Mast. Have you analyzed that support objectively?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. Mast. Well, you just said no. So----
Ms. Jenkins. I'm trying to understand what you're saying.
Mr. Mast. I thought I made it pretty simple. But you said
no but I'll grant you that now you said yes, you have looked at
it objectively.
So having looked at it objectively, which I would assume
somebody in your position does, who would you assess would lead
that Palestinian state?
Pick a group. You could name a group but I'm saying Hamas,
Palestinian Authority, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah, some
other group--who would lead it?
Ms. Jenkins. I think that has to be something that's
considered. I do not think I'm in a position to say----
Mr. Mast. Who did you objectively assess would lead it in
determining you have support for a Palestinian state?
Ms. Jenkins. I do not--I do not want to--I do not think
that I can answer that question. I think this has--this is part
of a larger discussion.
Mr. Mast. But you objectively assessed that you support a
Palestinian State.
Ms. Jenkins. I do support a----
Mr. Mast. In objectively assessing that who do you assess
would lead that state? What group that does not receive
military support from, say, Iran do you assess would lead that
state?
Ms. Jenkins. I understand your question but I think I would
have to have a little--I would--I do not feel comfortable
saying that without having more understanding.
Mr. Mast. Have you not assessed what group would lead it?
Have you or have you not assessed who would become the leader
of that Palestinian state?
Ms. Jenkins. This is part--this is part of a larger
discussion.
Mr. Mast. But have you or have you not assessed that?
Ms. Jenkins. I have--this is a part of a larger discussion.
I do not think----
Mr. Mast. Yes.
Ms. Jenkins. I cannot answer that question.
Mr. Mast. You cannot answer whether you have or have not
assessed who would be the state?
Ms. Jenkins. I cannot--I cannot answer a question about me,
particularly what I think what it should be. I mean, I think
that's part of----
Mr. Mast. You came here and said there should be a
Palestinian State. Have you or have you not assessed who would
lead that? Just yes or no, have you looked at who would lead it
or have you not?
Ms. Jenkins. I support a two-State solution.
Mr. Mast. I know. You said that numerous times. Have you or
have you not assessed who would become the leader of that
state? Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian
Authority? Somewhere else? Who have you assessed who it would
be?
Ms. Jenkins. I do not feel comfortable. I'm sorry. I do not
feel comfortable answering that question and I feel----
Mr. Mast. You do not feel comfortable saying if you have
assessed something?
Ms. Jenkins. No. What I do not feel comfortable with is
making a statement when I think it's part of a larger
discussion.
Mr. Mast. Don't even say who it is. Just answer have you
assessed it? Have you assessed who would lead it?
Ms. Jenkins. There--put it this way. There will be an
assessment of this question within the U.S. Government in terms
of who we think should be----
Mr. Mast. So you came here supporting something you have
not assessed?
Ms. Jenkins. I'm not in a--I'm not in a position right now
to say what that is because I think this is part of a larger
discussion.
Mr. Mast. This--honestly, it's amazing. I think it goes
back to your original statement, which was probably the correct
one, that you have not objectively looked at this and you got
it right when you said that.
Ms. Jenkins. It's not a--it's not a personal----
Mr. Mast. I'm going to move on to another question.
Ms. Jenkins. It's part of what the U.S. Government wants to
do. I cannot--I feel like----
Mr. Mast. You're supposed to be the part of the U.S.
Government that does that.
Mr. Sherman. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Mast. So I will not. I have more time.
Ms. Jenkins. I am part of the U.S. Government but I'm not
going to say what the government should do.
Mr. Mast. Sorry. I have more questions. So I apologize. So
do you assess that a Palestinian State would be more likely to
be designated as a major non-NATO ally like Israel or Egypt or
would you assess that they would have to be labeled a State
sponsor of terror?
Ms. Jenkins. I cannot answer that question.
Mr. Mast. Have you assessed that?
Ms. Jenkins. These are questions that I'm not in a position
to answer.
Mr. Mast. I'm asking if--you are in the position to answer
if you have assessed whether that would be the case. You came
here sitting before Congress saying you are here representing
the idea that there should be a Palestinian State.
You said you looked at it objectively, which you probably
did not, and I'm asking if you have--if you assessed that. So
you can answer whether you assessed something or not.
Ms. Jenkins. What I can answer is this is part of a
discussion that I do not think that I should be making those
decisions or answering these questions right now.
Mr. Mast. Answering what--you do not think you should
answer whether you assessed something is amazing.
Let me ask one more question. Why do you think that we
should make a country out of a people that just conducted a
Jewish genocide 4 months ago?
Ms. Jenkins. I'm not sure what you're--what you're asking
now.
Mr. Mast. Can I have time to repeat the question for her,
Mr. Chair----
Mr. Wilson. Yes.
Mr. Mast [continuing]. Since she does not understand?
Mr. Connolly. I object. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Mast. She's asking for a clarification.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman--Mr. Chairman, the time limit
has occurred.
Mr. Mast. So the question, to repeat it since you said you
do not understand it was----
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, I continue to object.
Mr. Mast. Why do you want to make a country of a people----
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Mast [continuing]. That just conducted a Jewish
genocide? I said it very clearly.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Mast. Please answer.
Ms. Jenkins. I'm not going to respond to questions about
that. Sorry. I do not--I do not feel like I--I want to answer
your question. I really do.
But I just do not feel like I'm in a position right now
that I can answer those type of questions. When I--this is a
question that's going to be just--this is a question for the
U.S. Government and----
Mr. Mast. You're the U.S. Government.
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I know.
Mr. Mast. But, undoubtedly, you cannot answer.
Ms. Jenkins. But we haven't--we're still--we're still
making----
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me to
repeat the question that apparently was not clear.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you very much, Congressman Brian
Mast.
We now proceed to Congressman--former president of the
NATO-PA Gerry Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm sorry for that berating. You know, the chairman began
this hearing bemoaning the fact that the Biden Administration
has, you know, been slow in coming to the aid of Taiwan. Is
there aid to Taiwan in the bipartisan security package----
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, there is.
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. That passed the Senate?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, there is.
Mr. Connolly. And is that being blocked by Republican
leadership here in the House?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, it is.
Mr. Connolly. Now, Mr. Perry complained about his concern
that Iran is marching toward nuclear capability. Could we,
should we, have had some kind of arms control agreement to
prevent that from happening?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. And what was that called?
Ms. Jenkins. JCPOA. JCPOA.
Mr. Connolly. And what happened to that?
Ms. Jenkins. We withdrew from JCPOA.
Mr. Connolly. Who did that?
Ms. Jenkins. The prior Administration.
Mr. Connolly. Is that a Republican or a Democratic
Administration?
Ms. Jenkins. Republican.
Mr. Connolly. Trump?
Ms. Jenkins. Trump.
Mr. Connolly. Oh. Well, what about the intermediate range
nuclear forces treaty, you know, that had been between us and
the former Soviet Union, now Russia? What happened to that one?
Ms. Jenkins. We withdrew from that one.
Mr. Connolly. We withdrew from that. And who withdrew from
that?
Ms. Jenkins. The prior Administration. President Trump.
Mr. Connolly. President Trump. And do you think the world
is more or less secure since 2019 with that decision?
Ms. Jenkins. The world is more secure if we have valid arms
control treaties.
Mr. Connolly. I'm sorry?
Ms. Jenkins. The world is more secure with valid arms
control treaties.
Mr. Connolly. So it's the opposite. We're less secure----
Ms. Jenkins. Less secure.
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. Because we withdrew from that.
Ms. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Otherwise, that sounds like yes, we have no
bananas.
OK. What are the Open Skies treaty and New START? What
about those? What happened to those?
Ms. Jenkins. Open Skies we are no longer party to that and
New START treaty right now Russia has suspended.
Mr. Connolly. But did we withdraw from that treaty?
Ms. Jenkins. We did not withdraw from New START.
Mr. Connolly. The Open Skies treaty----
Ms. Jenkins. Open Skies treaty we did.
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. We did and who did that?
Ms. Jenkins. The prior Administration.
Mr. Connolly. I'm sorry.
Ms. Jenkins. The prior Administration.
Mr. Connolly. You do not want to name it.
Ms. Jenkins. President Trump.
Mr. Connolly. President Trump. And that was a 34-nation
treaty that contributed to security, from your point of view?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, it did.
Mr. Connolly. So we're by definition less secure. OK. What
about the Law of the Seas treaty? Now, that one--surely we
could agree to that one, right?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Well, we--yes, it would be good if we did
because it hasn't----
Mr. Connolly. Did we is my question.
Ms. Jenkins. Oh. We haven't, no.
Mr. Connolly. We are not a party to the treaty.
Now, when we're looking at security in the Indo-Pacific who
benefits from American nonparticipation in the Law of the Sea
treaty?
Ms. Jenkins. China.
Mr. Connolly. China. And is China a member of the treaty?
Did they sign the treaty?
Ms. Jenkins. I do not recall, honestly.
Mr. Connolly. Yes. The answer is yes.
Ms. Jenkins. OK. Good.
Mr. Connolly. And they participate in every committee and
subcommittee created by the Law of the Seas authority and we're
not there. What could go wrong with that, Madam Under
Secretary?
Ms. Jenkins. Mm-hmm. Yes, we need to be present.
Mr. Connolly. Does that contribute to our security in the
region?
Ms. Jenkins. No. Us not being present does not contribute
to our security.
Mr. Connolly. And with respect finally to President Biden's
big security package supplemental and the big bipartisan vote
in the Senate this week do you think that our security would be
enhanced or damaged with House consideration and passage of
that bipartisan agreement?
Ms. Jenkins. It's be strongly enhanced if we had that.
Strongly enhanced if we have it.
Mr. Connolly. And do you think we're diminished if we do
not act on it?
Ms. Jenkins. We are diminished if we do not.
Mr. Connolly. In terms of, for example, NATO alliance,
credibility, reliability?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. I mean, Ukraine--I mean, there's so many
things in this--in the supplemental that really strengthens our
security and being able to provide and be a leader in these
issues.
Mr. Connolly. Well, that's interesting that we're having a
hearing on security and it's fascinating to actually delve into
various treaties and agreements, all of which have been damaged
by the previous Administration.
Thank you very much. I yield back.
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Connolly.
Now we proceed to Congressman Tom Kean of New Jersey.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This committee held a hearing in May 2023 that focused on
AUKUS and ways to improve U.S. arms exports. Since that hearing
we successfully negotiated language in the Fiscal Year 1924
National Defense Authorization Act to a clear pathway forward
to realize the potential of AUKUS which the President then
signed into law.
Under Secretary Jenkins, thank you for being with us here
today. I look forward to your answers to my questions. The U.K.
has worked closely with the U.S. in some of the most sensitive
military technologies including naval nuclear propulsion for
the British through our mutual defense agreement and the
Polaris sales agreement. We have fought side by side with them
in every major conflicts in the 20th and 21st centuries.
Recently we worked with the Australians to combat threats
posed by Chinese recruiters to ex-military pilots and have
altered their laws with the National Security Act of 2023 to
reflect that threat.
This is precisely the type of cooperation that we would
expect from our closest allies. Allies as close as this deserve
an ITAR exemption.
Under Secretary Jenkins, do you agree with that statement?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I do.
Mr. Kean. Can you provide examples of recent ITAR
violations that preclude giving the ITAR exemption to the
British?
Ms. Jenkins. I do not know of any.
Mr. Kean. Neither do I. Can you commit that you will
provide the British the whole nation ITAR exemption that will
work and not fail as the defense trade control treaties?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, and we are working to make that happen.
Mr. Kean. Thank you. Russia--this is on a different area--
Russia's Rosatom has long been a Kremlin tool to influence and
coerce around the world and evade Western sanctions. Do you
agree with this?
Ms. Jenkins. Sorry, I missed the first point. Could you say
that again?
Mr. Kean. Russia's Rosatom has long been a Kremlin tool to
influence and coerce around the world and to evade Western
sanctions. Do you agree with this sentiment?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. Kean. OK. What is the department doing to meaningfully
develop alternative supply chains in the U.S. and allied
countries that are not dependent on Rosatom for nuclear fuel?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, we are very interested in making sure
that we can help countries move away from relying on Russia and
Rosatom. We have--there's--once again in the supplemental
there's funding there to find alternative sources for the
supply chain.
We have come to agreements with countries to help countries
find--we have agreement with a number of NATO countries as
well. We have--with the G-7 actions. We have statements that
were made at COP.
These are multilateral efforts and, in addition, you know,
of course, a lot of Europe has been trying to move away from
Russia. So we--this is something we're very serious about it
and we're working multilaterally with countries and we want to
get the funding to actually do some more of that.
Mr. Kean. The few sanctions on Rosatom executives and its
subsidiaries to date are insufficient.
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, we have sanctions.
Mr. Kean. The U.K. as one example has sanctioned more of
Rosatom executives. Why is the U.S. not moving faster in
coordination with allies to sanction Rosatom and its
subsidiaries?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, we have sanctioned Rosatom. We, of
course, can continue to work with our partners to continue to
sanction them. It's not something that's done. We can continue
to do that and we will.
Mr. Kean. Well, I think that it needs to be deeper and more
truly impactful to people who want to--who are benefiting from
Rosatom relationships.
Which European countries work most closely with Rosatom
right now?
Ms. Jenkins. I do not know offhand but I can get back to
you.
Mr. Kean. Can you please?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I would.
Mr. Kean. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Jenkins. Thanks.
Mr. McCormick [presiding]. With that, the gentleman yields.
And with that, Hon. Mr. Costa from California is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Chairman, and thank you,
Madam Secretary.
Obviously, the topic this morning is to try to focus on
American security and with our allies and AUKUS in particular.
But as you observed I think this committee is interested in a
wide range of security issues affecting our country and our
alliances.
Could you give me a brief update on where you think AUKUS
stands in terms of our matrix and our goals to deal with that
modernization and any clear challenges? Because I want to segue
as well to some of our other security issues.
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. I mean, just as--there's a couple of
things. There's--I mentioned earlier some of the work that
we're already doing with the U.K. and Australia so that we can
certify them----
Mr. Costa. Are you saying we're on schedule?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, we are actually ahead of----
Mr. Costa. Time lines--we're ahead of schedule?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Yes. We are working hard to do the time
lines and we're actually way before the normal timeframe for
something like this, which is usually six to 12 months.
Mr. Costa. OK. Part of our other modernization in terms of
strengthening our alliances is the effort that the
Administration has done with regards to the discussions that is
really, I think, somewhat historical between South Korea and
Japan.
I do not know if you've been engaged in that particular
area. But where do you think the progress is there with Japan
modernizing their constitution and getting more focused? I
think this is very important.
Ms. Jenkins. Well, what I can say on this issue is that we
have been obviously focusing a lot on both Japan and South
Korea a lot because of the North Korean threat but also because
we want to strengthen our relationship with them.
So, you know, we have had the Washington statement, the
extended deterrence talks, a lot of engagement that we're
doing.
Mr. Costa. And I think the North Korea threat is clearly--I
mean, we're focused in Ukraine and in the Middle East as we
should be. But I think that and now with the situation with
China and Taiwan we do not want to lose sight of the challenges
we're facing there.
Ms. Jenkins. No, I agree. Right. I totally agree with you
and, you know, the whole strategy, whether we're talking about
Taiwan, whether we're talking about more engagements with Indo-
Pacific overall, all the work we're doing with the Philippines
and then there's, as I said, the Washington statement that we
had with the Republic of Korea, all the extended deterrence
talks that we have had, the visit of the submarine to Korea to
show strength, there's a lot that we're doing in that region in
addition to what we're doing in Ukraine.
Mr. Costa. Right. Which brings me to the question, and you
noted it and others have mentioned it. And by the way, I want
to associate myself with the comments with Representative
Connolly.
I think our--you know, and the previous Trump
Administration backing away with various agreements that we had
has weakened our security, not strengthened our security, and
to ignore that, I think, is really not to understand the big
picture in terms of whether we're dealing with security in
Asia, Southeast Asia with our allies or whether we're dealing
with it in the Middle East or Europe.
So that brings me to my frustration. The funding that's in
the supplemental not only provides our support in terms of
Ukraine, and Ukraine has really done an incredible job given
their resources--regaining over half the land that Russia took.
This unprovoked attack by a war criminal, a war criminal
named Putin, and anyone who associates with Putin or takes his
side simply, I think, as the President said is ignoring our
democratic responsibilities as the leader of the free world.
But the funding does not just stop there. It provides
assistance for Israel, one of our most valuable allies, and
humanitarian assistance and, frankly, that humanitarian
assistance as the world is watching is critical, do not you
believe?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, it certainly is.
Mr. Costa. And the humanitarian assistance goes beyond to
120,000 Armenians that have lost their native homeland in
Nagorno-Karabakh who are now faced with Azerbaijan and they
just attacked and killed five soldiers in Armenia yesterday and
destroying our----
I mean, the world's watching and our responsibility is
there. And by the way, does not the supplemental provide $30
billion to replenish America's own defense capability?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, and I just want to make sure before the
time runs out that--to highlight what I do not think has been
said enough is about the humanitarian side and the funding does
go to these issues that we talked about, Taiwan and Ukraine and
Israel and obviously things related to AUKUS. But we are
looking at----
Mr. Costa. And the world's watching. The European Union has
just in the last week provided $52 billion euro and we're
sitting here abdicating our own responsibilities and
undermining our own very security. Our own very security is
being undermined because of our inability to come together on
what seems to me common sense.
And certainly the border security is an issue. We had an
opportunity to resolve the border security. But I guess we
found out that the border security by some of our folks is no
longer important and we can wait to the end of the year.
My time is expired. But I think that, frankly, we got to
come together here and we got to come together soon. Our
security depends on it.
Thank you very much.
Mr. McCormick. With that, the gentleman yields and I
recognize myself for 5 minutes.
You cited in a discussion with Mr. Connolly just recently
that we are now less safe by withdrawing from certain treaties
that we had. Specifically, Russia has a clear history of
violations of the INF, Open Skies and New START.
The question I have for you do these arms agreements
benefit us if one side is not complying to the agreement and
the other side is? How does that benefit us and make us safer
or less safe?
Ms. Jenkins. Well, I think we have to understand that arms
control treaties benefit the global community and it benefits
us.
For example, let's talk about New START. New START is still
very much in our national security interests. Currently, while
the Russians have suspended the treaty they still remain within
the numerical limits of the treaty and we have done lawful
countermeasures as a result of this suspension.
But it's still within our national security interest. We do
not want a situation where there's no treaty, which means
Russia can still start developing even more weapons. You know,
it's the other side of deterrence. It's in our interests to try
to find ways through arms control to limit arms races.
Mr. McCormick. So I would make the counterpoint that
whether it be these agreements or World Trade Organization or
the Paris Accords or anything, if the United States is the only
one following the rules, the only one decreasing carbon
imprint, the only one who's paying the bills, the only one
who's following the rules and everybody else is cheating that's
not really putting us at an advantage at all.
That's not the purpose of a treaty to begin with. And
before you respond I just want to say that did the Trump
Administration cite the treaty violations as a reason to
withdraw from the treaties?
Ms. Jenkins. Oh, there were conversations, yes, about that
part of the treaty, yes.
Mr. McCormick. Of course they did. OK. Thank you. So I just
want to point out the point, look, whether it be China
violating the World Trade Organization when we take them to
court they're wrong every time. They just find other ways to
cheat.
China is paying attention to these treaties and if we're
allowing people to cheat in these treaties it sets us up for
bigger failures on grander scales where we have a global
strategic issue at hand and that's why I disagree with your
point.
I mean, we're just going to have to have an impasse at that
because I think if one person is cheating and the other person
is following the rules it does not put you in an advantage.
It does not give you whether--and certainly when you're
talking about a global agreement the rest of the world is
paying attention to this, too.
Ms. Jenkins. Could I respond?
Mr. McCormick. Quickly, please.
Ms. Jenkins. Just very briefly, just put it in context, I
understand we're talking about the New START treaty but there
are other treaties that have over 180 countries that are
parties to them and these treaties develop norms and help to
provide some kind of strategic stability within the
international system.
So they do have a value and even though I understand that
in this case with Russia with their suspending the treaty right
now the treaty still exists and it's in our interest to try to
keep it going.
Mr. McCormick. With all due respect, I'm not worried about
other countries besides Russia, Iran, China, North Korea. I do
not think the other countries are nefarious. It's unfair to
judge the other countries based on those countries that are
cheating and I will not agree with you on that point.
With that said, when we talk about Pillar Two allies what
do you think the nations--what nations do you think are most
important to us including those Pillar Two talks about sharing
of technologies?
Obviously, New Zealand wants to be one of those. We have
Australia right now that we're sharing information with and
we're going to help them with submarine programs. Who do you
think the most important Pillar Two future allies are?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, and actually that's something we're
actually looking at. We're looking at this at this very moment.
As we're speaking we're looking at which countries will be the
ones that we think will be most beneficial both ways to bring--
--
Mr. McCormick. And what are they?
Ms. Jenkins. I cannot say because we haven't made that
decision yet.
Mr. McCormick. OK.
Ms. Jenkins. But we'll--I mean, we'll----
Mr. McCormick. I hope we're considering New Zealand. I hope
we're considering India, for that matter. When it comes to
submarine production and technologies that we're sharing one of
the problems we have we have a limited number of ports that can
build these enormous ships and submarines. China has about 50.
We have about two.
How are we even going to keep up with our own production
needs let alone anybody that's agreed in this AUKUS production
abroad because we are woefully behind right now. What's your
strategic plan?
Ms. Jenkins. Well, I know--right. Well, I notice that the
supplemental has some funding to do that and this is something
that we'll just have keep doing. I mean, we'll have to keep
refining----
Mr. McCormick. With all due respect, once again, 2027 is
what China said is our drop dead time to take over Taiwan. We
do not have time. We should not have vague, opaque ideas of
what we're going to do. We have to have a plan to move forward
now.
The time is now. We're running out of time to protect two
of the most strategically important things to our future, which
is AI and a sea lane that controls 70 percent of the world's
wealth. The time is now.
Ms. Jenkins. And part of--and part of AUKUS is to start
developing these--for example, these AI and emerging
technologies in an interoperable way so we can defend
ourselves.
Mr. McCormick. OK. Like I said, I need a specific plan,
please.
A final point, if I may take a little liberty with myself
since I'm in the chair right now, one of the things that just
recently happened we gave Israel 700 rifles that were promised
to them from Daniel Defense.
The other 4,500 were approved by Congress but then have
been held up by the Biden Administration to be given to Israel
as part of their defense.
My question is if we're not going to give low technology
weaponry to Israel, a fairly defined ally for a long time now,
in a time of war how can we trust the Biden Administration to
release even more technologically advanced weapons to allies
and friends in even more strategically important future
conflicts including Taiwan and other places? How can we trust
you to release that if we cannot even give it to a known friend
during a time of war?
Ms. Jenkins. Well, two things. We are still in the process
right now of deliberating on that.
But I would also like to say that, you know, different
situations have different processes and so I would not
necessarily say that what we do here in this case is exactly
the same as Ukraine or exactly the same as any other situation.
We are----
Mr. McCormick. You're absolutely right. It's not the exact
same thing.
Ms. Jenkins. We're deliberating now on that particular case
to see where we're going to go.
Mr. McCormick. So you're deliberating on it during a time
of war with a close ally on low tech weaponry. We're
deliberating on giving them the assets they need to defend
themselves. I just want to point that out.
Ms. Jenkins. And we're also hoping that we'll get a
supplemental that will also give them more funding that will
also help----
Mr. McCormick. So if we give you the supplemental you're
going to go ahead and give them the weapons? Is that it? Are we
being held hostage for that?
Ms. Jenkins. Oh, we need to continue our deliberations but
we should also give them funding----
Mr. McCormick. So I will just note that the deliberations
are delaying weapons for a known ally during a time of war and
even if we approve whatever bill you want to put in front of us
you may do the same thing anyways.
With that, I yield myself.
I now recognize Representative Jackson from Illinois for 5
minutes.
Mr. Jackson of Illinois. Thank you, Acting Chairman
McCormick. Thank you, Honorable Bonnie Jenkins, for your
service and your hard work and dedication and your candor and
the time you've given us today.
Regarding the AUKUS I'd like to know how will the AUKUS
agreement secure U.S. interest and promote peace in the Indo-
Pacific? I've had the opportunity with Member Kim to travel
most recently to many of the countries in the Indo-Pacific
area. Please answer that for me.
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, thank you.
Actually, the whole--one of the major focus of AUKUS is in
fact to make the Indo-Pacific open and free and to provide
security in the Indo-Pacific region and that's one of the major
points of it.
So, you know, whereas Two Pillars, as you know--I mean, by
building the submarines and helping Australia with this
nuclear-powered submarine we see that as a way to have all
three countries to work together to strengthen the Indo-Pacific
region and its security.
Mr. Jackson of Illinois. In this trilateral agreement what
new opportunities has this created for us to strengthen our
defense and security in the region?
Ms. Jenkins. It's going to allow us to work with all--with
both countries in developing a very strong interoperable
process in terms of our technology, not just with the
submarines but in terms of our technology.
It's going to promote integrated deterrence and will help
develop our industrial base. It will help to develop and
promote our science and technology--our STEM individuals.
So there's a huge side of it that's about people and
developing that aspect of it and it really is going to expand
our relationship with two countries who are long partners with
us where we have a history of working with them but also
eventually to include other countries as well in terms of the
work that we do in emerging technologies.
Mr. Jackson of Illinois. Beyond the intelligence efforts
are there legal reforms or changes under consideration in
Australia and the U.K. to support investigations and
prosecutions of crimes?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, that--yes, those are the--those are
examples of things. We're actually having conversations with
them right now. I mean, I talked a little bit today about, you
know, questions we're having based on new bills and legislation
that they're actually doing in the U.K. and Australia so that
we can certify them.
So they are actually stepping up and taking a leading role
in their countries and making sure that we can do all of this
and we are working with them in that process to make sure
everything is in place so that we can certify them.
Mr. Jackson of Illinois. I would like to thank you for your
candor, your spirit of cooperation, and your openness and
transparency. Was there anything else you'd like to add to the
record?
Ms. Jenkins. No. It's just basically what I said earlier. I
mean, one of the things that's most important to us in addition
to passing the supplemental is the bipartisan support that we
have seen on AUKUS and as I said earlier Australia sees it. The
U.K. sees it.
So it's a message that we are--that we remain very serious
about this initiative, this very exciting initiative. So we
hope that that can continue.
Mr. Jackson of Illinois. Again, I thank you very much. I
yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you.
Mr. McCormick. The gentleman yields.
And with that we recognize Mr. Baird from Indiana for 5
minutes.
Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Under Secretary
Jenkins, we appreciate you taking the time to be with us.
So Madam Secretary, I've heard that ITAR, which is the
International Trafficking in Arms Regulations, compliance can
be burdensome for many of those involved. Can you explain what
the process looks like for an ITAR license?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. When the license comes in, you know, we
always--we look at the cap policy and we measure everything by
our commission on transfer policy and we base everything on
that.
And then there's a process where we go through it with
about 24 hours. We do not hold on--24 to 48 hours--we do not
hold on to requests for very long. I know there's been a lot of
questions about the delays in providing equipment to countries
and ITAR.
But we do our deliberations within State very--pretty
rapidly. And then, you know, we have to get--in some cases it
goes to Congress for them to look at and review.
And if everything goes through that's when--unfortunately,
that's when a lot of the delay occurs because we have delays in
our industrial base and that's one of the reasons why we are
not as quick as we could be in terms of providing equipment
that's being requested.
But that's something that we want to fix. It's something
that's in the supplemental and we need to fix that because--not
only for all countries who are concerned about the delay but
because we have to continue to support Israel and Ukraine.
Mr. Baird. Thank you. And continuing on in that vein, in
that process where's your department seeing the most time spent
on the license and compliance?
Is it registration? Is it application for temporary
license? Is it implementing internal compliance programs? Or is
it something else?
Ms. Jenkins. The process is pretty--obviously, it's very
standard and, you know, as I had said earlier we do not run
into a lot of problems with the process within State
Department.
It really is--and the Congress notifications and the cases
where we have them is not usually cumbersome either. The outcry
is really after that. That's where the real issue is.
Mr. Baird. So my last question then deals with--does the
Administration and your department believe that an exemption to
either the U.K. or Australia--is that a threat to our national
security?
Ms. Jenkins. It's not a threat to our national security and
that's why we are making sure that we have everything in place.
First, I want to say these are two countries who have been
partners for very--obviously, for very many years.
We have worked together on so many things. So we're
building on existing relationships and we have a lot of
experience in some of these issues.
So we are fine tuning everything and getting the
legislation that needs to be passed in Australia and the U.K.
so that we can actually certify and ensure that our information
is protected.
Mr. Baird. Thank you. I appreciate your response to those
questions and that's all the questions I have.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you.
Mr. McCormick. The gentleman yields.
And with that, we recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Davidson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for being here
today. I appreciate the work that you're doing to make sure we
get this really sensitive job right on who do we release
weapons to, what weapons are released, do we expect people to
pay us for them.
We used to sell these things and we have had an unfortunate
circumstance of giving them away in lots of cases and
occasionally to people that probably should not have gotten
them.
So one of the things that we have debated recently is what
kind of oversight should Congress have with that and, of
course, we get some level of notification on this and, you
know, I just wonder in your experience doing the role do the
notification requirements to Congress really affect the front
end of whether you transfer weapons or sell the weapons?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, it does, and I--you know, we very much
value the notification period, very much value the opportunity
for Congress to weigh in.
What I would also say is not only is there the notification
period biannual, my political-military affairs experts and
colleagues are very often up here on the Hill briefing
staffers. I think they come up every other week to do briefings
about what's happening.
So it's an opportunity for us to hear from you, not just
with the notifications in between.
Mr. Davidson. So I think the notifications are really
important. We do not always have to give approval but we at
least have awareness of what's going on.
But I think one of the things I've found common ground with
a lot of my colleagues across the aisle is the idea of
structuring. So when you structure payments in the financial
services world you can run into legal problems if you, say,
make lots of cash deposits just under $10,000 because then it's
treated as no, no, no, you deposited $25,000--we see what you
did there.
But when it comes to arms transactions we have reporting
thresholds that some people want to raise. Some want to raise a
lot. Some want to raise a little. But, you know, can you have
an endless series of transactions that come in just below the
threshold?
And this isn't for approval. This is just for notification.
Where do you land on this discussion?
Ms. Jenkins. Well, I would just say that we--at the State
Department we are at this point, you know, leaving out the
industrial base process we're pretty satisfied with our
engagement.
But we think--we think, as I said, we have a pretty well-
worn machine particularly after recently with Ukraine and
Israel where we really had to sharpen up and really get fast at
these things and it works very well.
But you know, and we--as I said, we are always on the Hill
and, you know, letting you know what's going on and then having
an opportunity to talk.
But having said that, you know, we always open to having
conversations about--you know, about the process.
Mr. Davidson. Thank you for that. Just so you know, we are
working on how to properly address structuring. We want the
right people to get the weapons, our allies in particular, and
the legislation we recently considered certainly treats NATO
differently than non-NATO members, and so close allies probably
qualify for a different program than others.
One of the concerns we have had, and I think everyone
shares a concern about the Iranian approach in the Middle East.
They are the destabilizing force in the Middle East and,
clearly, Republicans have looked at Iran differently.
But, you know, there have been recent claims by senior
Iranian leaders that the country now possesses all the
components and nuclear fuel required to produce atomic weapons.
These claims appear to have increased since the 10/7
attacks by Hamas, which is armed and financed by the regime in
Iran, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has been in a
standoff with Tehran over its refusal to allow inspectors to
visit multiple sites inside Iran where they believe that there
are undeclared nuclear materials and equipment.
In addition, in late December IAEA warned that Iran had
tripled its monthly production of weapons grade uranium. So as
I'm sure you know the Biden Administration recently did a
sanctions waiver that allows Iran to access--that did allow
Iran to access $10 billion in revenue generated from Iraqi
electricity sales that were previously held in escrow.
Do you think that the money could help Iran?
Ms. Jenkins. That money is not going to Iran. That's being
used for humanitarian purposes. It's not going to Iran.
Mr. Davidson. Humanitarian purposes to Hamas then?
Ms. Jenkins. No. No, it's not going to those purposes at
all.
Mr. Davidson. So but in a way how does money--money is
fungible. So I can tell you if you give my company--I'm back in
the private sector now. Let's say I'm not in Congress anymore
and I go back to running my company, and you give me $10
billion I promise I will not use any of it on executive
compensation. Do you think it would help my company?
Ms. Jenkins. Well, what I would say on that is I would like
to offer an opportunity to brief you more on that because----
Mr. Davidson. I would love to. But of course it would.
Everyone knows it would. I yield.
Ms. Jenkins. That's why I think--I do want to give you an
opportunity to have more information on that. But, I mean,
that----
Mr. McCormick. With that, the gentleman yields.
With that I recognize the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr.
Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And at the outset of
my remarks I just want to thank Chairman McCaul and Ranking
Member Meeks, the committee staff, for the opportunity to join
here today but also for their amazing hard work in the fall to
get the AUKUS authorities package out of this committee over to
the House Armed Services Committee so that we were able in
conference to really get it done in time and President Biden
signed it into law on December 23d. Again, a historic bill.
You know, the foreign military sales aspect for the sale of
nuclear-powered submarines, which has never happened before,
was included in it, and also the ITAR reforms which, again,
there has been good colloquy here today about that as well.
One other aspect which hasn't been mentioned is that the
government of Australia as part of the Optimal Pathway plan,
which was released in March 2023, agreed to invest $3 billion
into the U.S. submarine industrial base.
That has never happened before and I can say that because
that's why we had to pass a law to set up a system where,
again, another country--in this case, obviously, a great ally--
would be able to follow through on that commitment.
And I mention that because as you have said, Madam
Secretary, is just--you know, on Tuesday night the Senate
passed the national security package. Again, Israel, Ukraine,
you know, obviously the biggest focus of all.
But one other aspect was $3.3 billion into the submarine
industrial base of the United States, which is to expand
capacity so that we can actually meet our own Navy needs as
well as also making sure that we can be ready to sell that
first sub by 2032.
And, you know, again, the ink is barely dry on the AUKUS
legislation that we just passed but, obviously, we have more
work to do, and I will just tell my friends here as someone who
co-chairs the Friends of Australia Caucus in the AUKUS Working
Group this investment that's in the supplemental is something
that is being watched like a hawk in terms of, you know,
whether or not we're really serious about following through,
you know, on what I think is one of the smartest moves we have
made in terms of, you know, a deteriorating security
environment and the Indo-Pacific.
And, again, I wonder if you could just talk about that. I
mean, this is really a linchpin to making sure that AUKUS
succeeds.
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, thank you for that. Totally agree with
you, I mean, and I like that you phrase it as they're watching
us because, you know, I have interactions with my U.K. and
Australian colleagues on a regular basis and they are, as you
said, extremely committed to this.
They've done new legislation. They've committed a lot of
money to this. They have, you know, gone through their
processes to, you know, start sending, you know, people over
here to learn about our processes in terms of our bases.
So they are all in. They are all in and we are all in. But
we have to keep showing that we're all in and, as you said
people are watching what's happening with the supplemental and
they know that there is money in the supplemental that's
related to AUKUS.
And, you know, this is not just--this is not just money.
This is policy. This is priorities. This is what the U.S. cares
about and everyone understands that. So we need to pass the
supplemental because of all the things in here including AUKUS
that shows the U.S. wants to continue to be a leader.
Mr. Courtney. And among those who are watching is China
because, you know, they, again, will pounce on the failure to
follow through on this as an example that it's really never
going to happen or, you know, it's all talk.
You know, as someone who represents the General Dynamics
shipyard where--which the general contractor for the Virginia-
class program, first of all, we have just had our first three
Australian naval officers show up in town as part of a 2023
authorization that, again, is going to start training them up
to get that proficiency to operate a nuclear-powered submarine.
But we also are looking forward to getting shipyard
workers, to skill them up to make sure that they can take this
on and that, again, is back in your portfolio. We want to make
sure that we really do not keep the shipyard sort of carved out
into places where they can and cannot go. We want to make sure
they as quickly and comprehensively as possible learn how to--
these skills.
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, I totally agree, and as I mentioned
earlier this is an important part of AUKUS that does not get as
much attention is the training and the exchange of individuals
at different shipyards and learning about what's happening.
I mentioned earlier that I visited a shipyard a few months
ago and all because of AUKUS to really move this forward.
So, yes, we're not going to forget that.
Mr. McCormick. With that, the gentleman yields.
And with that the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Burgess, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
ma'am, for being here.
Do you feel like Iran is closer today to having a nuclear
bomb than ever before?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, Iran is reaching up to 60 percent and--
yes.
Mr. Burgess. Why aren't the Biden Administration's policies
working, in your opinion?
Ms. Jenkins. Well, obviously, as I said earlier, you know,
one of the things we do want to focus on is diplomacy but you
also have to have a willing partner on the other side.
We are supporting the IAEA and its efforts and we're trying
with the efforts that we can. But nothing's taken traction
right now with Iran and they're not putting anything on the
table that's really something that we can negotiate.
Mr. Burgess. Apparently North Korea has been doing some
missile tests. How are they funding these tests?
Ms. Jenkins. I am not particularly sure exactly how they're
funding this test. I mean, obviously, they're taking things
from their own domestic sources but they're also, you know,
violating U.N. Security Council resolutions and countries are--
other countries are doing the same by providing them things.
Mr. Burgess. All right. Has North Korea ever used any of
our foreign aid--United States foreign aid to fund their
nuclear missile program?
Ms. Jenkins. I am not aware of that.
Mr. Burgess. OK. What countries in that region do you think
are helping North Korea?
Ms. Jenkins. Well, now we know that--we know that Russia
has a relationship with them. I mean, there might be more that
we could say in a classified----
Mr. Burgess. Are they funding it or are they just----
Ms. Jenkins. Well, there is--put it this way. We do not
know exactly what the relationship is with Iran and Russia. We
do not know what--I'm sorry, with North Korea aggression----
Mr. Burgess. North Korea.
Ms. Jenkins [continuing]. We do not know all the things
that they're doing. There's more that we could probably go into
in a classified setting where we can get more in depth. But,
yes, we do know that there are violations.
Mr. Burgess. OK. Let me switch gears a little bit. Are you
aware of the purposes that are not a prohibited section of the
Chemical Weapons Convention and does that section specifically
mention that the use of chemicals on the annex can be used for
legitimate pharmaceutical and medical needs?
Ms. Jenkins. Well, I think the issue with chemical weapons
is--well, the precursors there's so many of them. There's so
many dual use items when you're talking about it.
Mr. Burgess. OK. Are the Biden Administration's efforts to
require a license to export fentanyl to Russia and Belarus, is
that because of its potential for application as a chemical
weapon?
Ms. Jenkins. Sorry. Are you saying--can you repeat that
again?
Mr. Burgess. Yes, ma'am. And I'm asking if you're aware
that the--that this Administration's efforts through the
Commerce to require a license to export fentanyl to Russia and
Belarus is that because of the potential for application as a
chemical weapon?
Ms. Jenkins. That would not be for that reason.
Mr. Burgess. It would not?
Ms. Jenkins. That--no. My understanding is--yes.
Mr. Burgess. OK. OK.
Given the purposes of not prohibited sections of the treaty
and this Administration's actions why do you think that a
chemical that Russia used in 2002 to kill over a hundred
civilians and the State attorney generals and bipartisan
members endorsed calling it chemical weapon?
Ms. Jenkins. Why is it called a chemical weapon?
Mr. Burgess. Well, that--I'm sorry. I did not get the rest
of it. I paused. I apologize. Of that--that was called a
chemical weapon. It's killed thousands of Americans.
Should it not be declared a chemical weapon and controlled
by the Chemical Weapons Convention given its deadly dual use
nature?
Ms. Jenkins. If you're talking about novichoks we have
included that in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Mr. Burgess. OK. Let's see. I believe that's the end of my
questions, ma'am. Thank you.
Ms. Jenkins. OK. Thank you.
Mr. McCormick. With that, the gentleman yields. So I
believe we're to the conclusion remarks right now.
First of all, thank you, Ms. Under Secretary, for your
time. I know this has been a long day for you so we will allow
you to escape at this point.
I just wanted to kind of conclude as chair today or acting
chair that I hope we're not naive or idealistic in the way we
approach these challenges, especially when it comes to our
friends and allies.
I think we need to make sure we do not compromise when it
comes to our mission accomplishment, which is getting the
technologies and weaponry to our allies to defend themselves to
accomplish what we know is essential to our world strategy when
we ally with our friends.
The concern I have is truly are we doing things to hamper
that and I think in my case and in many cases what we talk
about, what allies we choose, what agreements we make, that
we're not believing that bad actors are going to follow that,
naively, and that we do not enter these agreements thinking
that those people just because they misbehave that everybody
else is going to behave after looking at that happening.
And I hope that the Biden Administration takes very
seriously the fact that we need to deliver on time and right
now I'm not seeing a really good plan for delivering those
technologies and those weapons that we have promised our allies
and friends and I hope we do a better job of stepping up to
that challenge and especially in the regulatory and
decisionmaking when all we have to do is snap a finger and it
happens. We should never hold those decisions up.
With that said, I think maybe the one thing that always
comes to mind I'll quote Admiral Mullen from over a decade ago
when we talk about the greatest threat to national security is
our national debt and that's something we have to take very
seriously, too, no matter what we're talking about, whether it
be defense, technologies, or anything else like that. If it
overcomes us we will not have enough money to help anybody
anywhere including ourselves.
I thank you once again for your valuable testimony and
their members for their questions. The members of the committee
may have some additional questions for the under secretary and
we will ask you to respond to those in writing.
Pursuant to the committee rules all members may have 5 days
to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for
the record subject to the length limitations.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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