

FROM 1979 TO 2024: EVALUATING THE TAIWAN
RELATIONS ACT AND ASSESSING THE FUTURE
OF U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS

HEARING
OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ON INDO-PACIFIC
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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FROM 1979 TO 2024: EVALUATING THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT AND ASSESSING THE FUTURE OF U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS

Wednesday, May 1, 2024

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INDO-PACIFIC,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Young Kim (chair of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. The Subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific of the Foreign Affairs Committee will now come to order.

The purpose of this hearing is to commemorate the 45th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act and assess the current U.S.-Taiwan relationship.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN YOUNG KIM

I will now recognize myself for an opening statement. This year we celebrate 45 years of the Taiwan Relations Act, known as TRA. This is a monumental and unique piece of legislation that has guided our U.S. bilateral relations with Taiwan. There is no other legislation that guides our bilateral relations with another country quite this way.

The legislation is one of the reasons why the U.S. is uniquely positioned to lead. Since the TRA became law, Taiwan has demonstrated to the world time and time again its importance as a vital contributor to global peace and prosperity. From manufacturing the most advanced semiconductors to providing health and humanitarian assistance to providing a model of democracy, Taiwan is a critically important democratic partner of the United States and like-minded allies.

Yet today Taiwan is possibly the biggest geopolitical flash point in the world. In his meeting with President Biden in December, Chairman Xi Jinping told President Biden that Beijing will reunite—reunify Taiwan, and the U.S. intelligence suggests that he has directly the People's Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan by force in 2027.

As the PLA steps up aggression in the Taiwan Strait, it is important that Congress carefully examines the TRA and ensure that the U.S. is diplomatically, economically, and militarily prepared for the

Taiwan contingency. The fate of Taiwan affects not only the 23 million people living on the island but every American.

In February 1954, the U.S. Senate ratified a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. That treaty obligated the United States to act if Taiwan suffers an armed attack. U.S. military presence on the island reached nearly 100,000 troops at its peak.

In 1978, President Carter announced that the United States would formally recognize Communist China and several diplomatic and military relations with Taiwan, a move Congress strongly disapproved at the time. In fact, Senator Goldwater sued the Carter administration for ending the treaty without the consent of Congress. It was Congress that stepped in to ensure basic relations with the people of Taiwan.

On an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis, the House and Senate passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, 14 days from introduction to passing both chambers and just within months of President Carter cutting diplomatic and military ties to Taiwan. Through the TRA, Congress ensured normal relations with Taiwan would continue and, importantly, put several requirements on the executive branch.

I want to emphasize three of them. One, to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character. Two, to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social or economic system of the people of the Taiwan. And, third, to make clear that the United States' decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.

Congress doubled down on the U.S. position that in establishing diplomatic relations with China any issue between China and Taiwan would have to be resolved peacefully and free from coercion. Congress pushed in the defense components of the TRA to ensure the backing of the U.S. military and capabilities would ensure peace across the Taiwan Strait.

After more than 20 years of guaranteeing Taiwan's defense, it seems that the Congress was forced to use the TRA to seek peace over Taiwan through deterrence. It is now clear that Xi Jinping has no intention of resolving the issue peacefully and is prepared for armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait and the situation is very dangerous.

Earlier this year, now-retired Admiral John Aquilino told Congress that, quote, "We are in the most dangerous time that I have seen in 20 years or in my 40 years of doing business."

Today we are holding this hearing to assess the executive branch's implementation of this law to help determine if the fate of Taiwan will be peaceful and if it has the support to deter Chairman Xi. As previously noted, one of our responsibilities of the TRA is to arm Taiwan.

After we found out that there was a \$19 billion backlog of weapons sales to Taiwan in 2022, we engaged with the State and Defense Departments to address the delays. While I appreciate these engagements, we have yet to receive satisfactory responses to our inquiries about why the delays persist.

I am also concerned that the Administration has been slow to fully execute the tenet of maintaining the capacity to resist PRC coercion against Taiwan. The CCP has run a successful coercion effort to cut Taiwan out of international organization. We are moving too slowly on initiatives promoting Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations.

For example, my legislation, the Taiwan WHO Act, was signed into law 2 years ago. The World Health Assembly is now a month away, and I am hearing that progress on this has been slow at best. Delays on our commitments to Taiwan send the wrong signal to the CCP at the worst possible time. The ability to execute our responsibilities under the TRA may very well determine whether we maintain peace in the Indo-Pacific or if the United States policy of strategic ambiguity is put to the test.

This may well be one of the most important hearings our subcommittee has held in this Congress, so I look forward to your testimony.

The chair now recognizes the ranking member, the gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, for any statement that you may have.

OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER AMI BERA

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.

And thank you, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, for testifying this afternoon.

Today we reflect on the significance of the Taiwan Relations Act, the TRA, and its enduring impact on peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. On April 10 of this year, I introduced a bipartisan resolution with my fellow Taiwan Caucus co-chairs, Representatives Connolly, Barr, and Diaz-Balart, marking the 45th anniversary of enactment of the TRA and reaffirming the United States' commitment to Taiwan.

Our resolution had 66 bipartisan original co-sponsors, including Chairwoman Kim. I believe that resolution and this hearing today demonstrate what has been made clear since the passage of the TRA in 1979, that the U.S. Congress in a bipartisan way has enduring support for Taiwan and we are unwavering in that support.

In January of this year, I was honored to join my fellow Taiwan Caucus co-chair, Mario Diaz-Balart, as the first congressional delegation to visit Taiwan after the successful democratic election of President-elect William Lai. During our trip, we were able to spread the message of steadfast support on behalf of the bipartisan congressional Taiwan Caucus, one of the largest caucuses in the House of Representatives with over 200 members.

I also applaud the Biden Administration's commitment to strengthening our partnership with Taiwan under the guidance of the TRA. Over the past 4 decades, the TRA has served as the cornerstone of our relationship with Taiwan, providing a framework for robust engagement through the American Institute in Taiwan and a commitment to ensuring Taiwan's self-defense capabilities.

Thanks to new authorizations provided by Congress through the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, the Biden Administration has directed the drawdown of defense articles for Taiwan valued at \$345 million, notified Congress of the first-ever provision of foreign mili-

tary financing assistance to Taiwan, and provided the first-ever international military education and training funding to Taiwan.

By providing for Taiwan's defense needs, the United States not only upholds its commitment to the island security but also reinforces deterrence against any potential aggression. This is more important than ever in light of Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine. How the United States responds to Russia's invasion of Ukraine sends a strong message to authoritarian leaders around the world who feel emboldened by Putin's actions.

Earlier this year, Taiwan's foreign minister, Joseph Wu, stated that a halt in U.S. security assistance to Ukraine would embolden the PRC in its aggression against Taiwan and fuel propaganda from Beijing that the United States is an unreliable partner.

That is why it was imperative that Congress pass the supplementary security assistance for Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific last month, which included 2 billion in foreign military financing for our Indo-Pacific partners, including Taiwan.

Although I was disappointed to see 112 of my Republican colleagues vote against Ukraine's supplemental funding, and 34 oppose Indo-Pacific security assistance, both packages passed with over 300 members, including all House Democrats, confirming that the overwhelming majority of Congress stands with our Democratic partners against authoritarian aggression.

Also, in an attempt to isolate Taiwan, we are seeing the PRC advance false narratives about U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758 to thwart Taiwan's participation in international organizations and, in turn, its diplomatic partners.

When Nauru switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC 2 days after Taiwan's Presidential election in January, their government concerningly cited moving to the One China principle that is in line with U.N. Resolution 2758. That is why, in addition to countering false narratives about U.N. GA Resolution 2758, USAID and the DFC are partnering with Taiwan on development assistance to support countries that maintain diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, in light of economic and diplomatic coercion from Beijing.

In the face of growing challenges and uncertainties, the United States remains resolute in its support for Taiwan, and our commitment to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Throughout the past 45 years, the TRA has served as the foundation of an unshakeable U.S.-Taiwan friendship.

I look forward to working with my colleagues and partners in Taiwan to continue to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the United States and Taiwan and ensuring the future of a free and open Indo-Pacific and world.

And, with that, I yield back.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Ranking Member Bera.

Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record.

But right now we are very pleased with the—you know, to have with us—distinguished witness before us on this very important topic. The Honorable Daniel Kritenbrink is Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.

Thank you for joining us today. Your full statement will be made part of the record, and I will ask that you try to keep it within 5 minutes, so we will have more opportunity for members to ask you questions.

So let me now recognize you for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to speak with you today about the Administration's commitment to the United States' longstanding One China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint communiques, and the six assurances, and which has promoted peace and prosperity in the region for 45 years across multiple Administrations from both parties.

I would also like to thank Congress for its bipartisan support for the Administration's national security supplemental, which will provide critical security assistance for the Indo-Pacific region, including Taiwan. Today I will deliver the below statement, which is a summarized version of my written testimony which has been submitted for the record.

The U.S.'s unofficial relationship with Taiwan is stronger than ever. With credit to Congress for passing the Taiwan Relations Act, or the TRA, in 1979, which President Biden himself voted for as a senator, the TRA has given us the tools we need to pursue our overall objective of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Far from being outdated or obsolete, the TRA provides an enduring framework under which we continue to adapt to face the challenges of today. The TRA is a remarkably prescient document. Nearly a half century ago, it laid down a marker that the United States would consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other-than-peaceful means as a matter of grave concern.

The TRA laid the foundation for the United States to provide Taiwan with the defense articles and services necessary to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, as well as to maintain our own capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan.

The TRA also astutely anticipated the need to strengthen support for Taiwan commensurate with the threat it faces. Indeed, in the 45 years since the passage of the TRA, the PRC threat to Taiwan has increased, and the PRC has never renounced the use of force to unify with Taiwan.

In response to this threat, and consistent with our One China policy, this Administration is bolstering cross-strait deterrence using the full range of tools at our disposal. We are grateful to Congress for providing additional authorities and resources through the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act and subsequent appropriations, which has allowed us to provide several security assistance measures to Taiwan for the first time which I have detailed further in my written testimony.

The Administration also notified Congress of more than \$6.2 billion in foreign military sales to Taiwan, including 20 sales between 2022 and 2023, which is the largest 2-year number of notifications for Taiwan in at least 30 years.

Now, the defense aspects of deterrence, while crucial, they are only one element of our approach. As the TRA declared, peace and stability in the Strait is not only a U.S. interest, but it is also a matter of international concern. We are working daily toward increasing the diplomatic costs of precipitous action against Taiwan by strengthening the international coalition of allies and partners who recognize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and are willing to contribute to its maintenance.

We also continue to advocate for Taiwan's international space, including Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations and pushing back against the PRC's attempts to mischaracterize U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758.

Finally, our partnership with Taiwan has grown dramatically and stands on its own, enabled by the tools and authorities provided by the TRA. Taiwan is the United States' eighth largest trading partner, with bilateral trade in goods and services totaling nearly \$128 billion in 2023, up from just \$9 billion in 1979.

In addition, through the American Institute in Taiwan, this Administration launched the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade; the Technology, Trade, and Investment Collaboration framework; and the inaugural Science and Technology Cooperation Dialogue, among other milestones. As another example, TSMC's historic \$65 billion investment in Arizona is the largest greenfield foreign direct investment project in U.S. history, supported with up to \$6.6 billion in direct funding through the CHIPS Act.

In conclusion, with the Taiwan Relations Act as a foundational element of our One China policy, we have deepened and expanded our ties with Taiwan over decades to reflect not only the threat that Taiwan faces from the PRC, but also the vibrant partnership between the United States and Taiwan.

We have been able to engage in extensive cooperation with Taiwan because the TRA provides the authorities we need to carry out our unofficial relationship. We have the framework we need. We do not need to change it. What we need to do is respond to the present moment using all the tools at our disposal. I hope today I have demonstrated how this Administration is doing just that, in close partnership with Congress and this committee.

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Kritenbrink follows:]

Testimony of Daniel J. Kritenbrink
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific
“From 1979 to 2024: Evaluating the Taiwan Relations Act and Assessing the
Future of U.S.-Taiwan Relations”
May 1, 2024

Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the Administration’s continuing commitment to the United States’ longstanding one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, and which has promoted peace and prosperity in the region for 45 years across multiple administrations from both parties.

I would also like to thank Congress for its bipartisan support for the Administration’s national security supplemental, which will provide critical security assistance for the Indo-Pacific region, including Taiwan.

The United States’ unofficial relationship with Taiwan is stronger than ever. With credit to Congress for passing the TRA in 1979 — which President Biden himself voted for as a Senator — my aim today is to illustrate how the TRA has given us the tools we need to pursue our overall objective of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Far from being outdated or obsolete, the TRA provides an enduring framework under which we continue to adapt to face the challenges of today.

Defense and Security Ties

The TRA is a remarkably prescient document. Nearly a half century ago, it laid down a marker that the United States would “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means” as a matter of “grave concern to the United States.”

The TRA laid the foundation for the United States to continue providing Taiwan with the defense articles and services necessary for Taiwan to “maintain a sufficient self-defense capability,” as well as to maintain our own capacity to “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” against Taiwan.

The TRA also astutely anticipated that the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) threat to Taiwan and to cross-Strait peace and stability would continue, and provided us the ability to strengthen our support for Taiwan commensurate with the threat it faces.

Indeed, in the 45 years since the passage of the TRA, the PRC threat to Taiwan has not only continued, but increased. The PRC has become the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.

The PRC has never renounced the use of force to unify with Taiwan, and has increased its campaign of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic pressure designed to isolate and intimidate Taiwan. Beijing’s increasingly provocative actions are deeply destabilizing, risk miscalculation, and threaten peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

In response to this threat, and consistent with our one China policy, this Administration is intensely focused on bolstering cross-Strait deterrence using the range of tools at our disposal. On top of the TRA, we are grateful to Congress for providing additional authorities and resources through the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act and subsequent appropriations. To date, we have:

- Directed the drawdown of defense articles and services from DoD stocks and resources for Taiwan, valued at \$345 million;
- Notified Congress of the first-ever provision of Foreign Military Financing grant assistance to Taiwan;
- Notified Congress that Taiwan is eligible for Excess Defense Articles (EDA) grant assistance in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024;
- Provided Taiwan with International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding, which will unlock millions of dollars in savings for

Taiwan to participate in courses across the DoD educational enterprise;

- More than doubled DoD's Building Partner Capacity assistance for Taiwan from FY 2022 to 2023.

This Administration has also notified Congress of more than \$6.2 billion in Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan, including 20 sales between 2022 and 2023, the largest number of notifications over a two-year period in at least 30 years.

Allies and Partners and Taiwan's International Space

The defense aspect of deterrence, while crucial, is only one element of our approach. As the TRA declared, "peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern."

We are working daily toward our goal of increasing the diplomatic costs of precipitous action against Taiwan by strengthening the international coalition of allies and partners who recognize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and are willing to contribute to its maintenance.

In the wake of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and increasing PRC pressure on Taiwan, this Administration has driven unprecedented alignment among allies and partners on cross-Strait issues, which has manifested in numerous high-level public statements—including by the G7, EU, and Indo-Pacific partners—as well as private discussions with friends across the globe.

Amid increasing PRC pressure on Taiwan's diplomatic partners, we have concluded Memoranda of Understanding through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) under which USAID and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) are working with Taiwan's International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) to leverage our collective resources toward development projects and trainings in the Pacific Islands and Western Hemisphere, where most of Taiwan's remaining diplomatic partners are located.

We also continue to advocate for maintaining and increasing Taiwan's "international space," including Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations and multilateral fora such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Health Assembly, and at the Organization for Economic Cooperation for Development (OECD).

We are pushing back against the PRC's efforts to mischaracterize UN General Assembly resolution 2758, which did not constitute a UN institutional position on the ultimate political status of Taiwan, has no bearing on countries' sovereign decisions regarding their relationships with Taiwan, and does not preclude Taiwan's meaningful participation in the UN system or in any other multilateral forum. Moreover, resolution 2758 did not endorse, is not equivalent to, and does not reflect a consensus for the PRC's "One China Principle," a concept that refers to the PRC's own position with respect to Taiwan and that is distinct from the U.S. one China policy.

Thanks to Congress' generosity, the United States, Taiwan, Japan, and Australia have jointly organized dozens of workshops through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) to share Taiwan's expertise with the world on topics ranging from public health to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Economic and People-to-People Ties

Finally, despite the challenges we face, I want to emphasize that our partnership with Taiwan stands on its own. Enabled by the tools and authorities provided in the TRA, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has grown by leaps and bounds since 1979.

The TRA explicitly called for the preservation and promotion of "extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations" between the United States and Taiwan. In 1979, U.S.-Taiwan trade was approximately \$9 billion, not adjusted for inflation. Today, Taiwan is the United States' eighth-largest trading partner, with bilateral trade in goods totaling nearly \$128 billion in 2023.

In addition, in the last 45 years, through great effort, Taiwan has become a vibrant and flourishing democracy, a technological powerhouse, and a global

force for good. It is a critical U.S. partner in semiconductors and other critical supply chains, public health, and education. As one example, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company's historic \$65 billion investment in Arizona is the largest greenfield Foreign Direct Investment project in U.S. history, supported with up to \$6.6 billion in proposed direct funding through the CHIPS Act. The TSMC facilities in Arizona will create approximately 6,000 direct manufacturing jobs, and tens of thousands more in construction and indirect jobs, as well as bring the most advanced semiconductor manufacturing back to American soil.

In recognition of the significance of our economic and people-to-people relationship with Taiwan, we have expanded our engagements on these topics in a manner consistent with our one China policy and the Taiwan Relations Act. Under the auspices of AIT, this Administration:

- Launched the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade in 2022;
- Initiated the Department of Commerce-led Technology, Trade, and Investment Collaboration in December 2021;
- Institutionalized the Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue to discuss cooperation in areas such as supply chains, energy security, and responding to economic coercion;
- Helped Taiwan embark on a collaboration with NASA through the ASIA-AQ regional air quality monitoring project;
- Solidified partnerships between the U.S. DFC, USAID, and Taiwan's ICDF to assist Taiwan's international development assistance strategies;
- Commemorated the 30th anniversary of the relationship between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Taiwan's Ministry of Environment (formerly the Taiwan EPA) in 2023;
- Convened the inaugural Science and Technology Cooperation Dialogue in 2023;
- Welcomed over 150 Taiwan delegates to participate in the U.S. hosting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in 2023; and

- Facilitated a record number of American students studying Mandarin in Taiwan through Department of State language exchange programs and the U.S.-Taiwan Education Initiative.

Conclusion

With the TRA as a foundational element of our one China policy, we have deepened and expanded our ties with Taiwan over decades to reflect not only the threat Taiwan faces from the PRC, but the vibrant and dynamic partnership between the United States and Taiwan.

We have been able to engage in multiple initiatives and extensive cooperation with Taiwan *because* the TRA provides the authorities to carry out our unofficial relationship.

We have the framework we need. We do not need to change it. What we need is to respond to the present moment, using all the tools at our disposal. I hope today I have demonstrated how this Administration is doing just that, in close partnership with Congress.

Looking ahead, the dynamism that has defined our unofficial relationship with Taiwan—even as our foundational policy has not changed—will continue. The TRA endures as a critical element of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which not only benefits the United States, but is also in the global interest.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you for your testimony. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask you some questions.

The CCP has been abusing U.N. Resolution 2758 that we have been talking about to delegitimize and determine Taiwan's legal status in international organizations and exclude Taiwan's membership and meaningful participation in international organizations, as I mentioned in my opening statement, like the World Health Organization.

Last Congress my legislation, the Taiwan WHO Act, was signed into law. It codified that it is the policy of the United States to support Taiwan's meaningful participation in World Health Assembly as an observer. The World Health Assembly will be assembling later this month.

So can you talk about how the State Department is pushing back against the PRC's misrepresentation of U.N. Resolution 2758? And can you commit to us right here in public to the efforts to secure Taiwan's meaningful participation in WHA?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Madam Chairwoman, yes, I can. Let me start with the first part of your question. We have called that repeatedly the PRC's mischaracterization and misuse of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758. I mentioned that briefly in my testimony. Let me say a little bit about that.

Contrary to the false narratives that the PRC is pushing about Resolution 2758, 2758 did not constitute a U.N. institutional position on the ultimate political status of Taiwan. It has no bearing on countries' sovereign decisions regarding their relationship with Taiwan, and it does not preclude Taiwan's meaningful participation in the U.N. system or in any other multilateral forum.

Moreover, Resolution 2758 did not endorse, is not equivalent to, and does not reflect a consensus for the PRC's own so-called One China principle, a term that refers to the PRC's own position on Taiwan. So, beyond that, ma'am, in addition to pushing back against the misuse and mischaracterization of 2758, we have aggressively tried to support and expand Taiwan's international space. We support strongly Taiwan's—

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. In the international body, like at the U.N. and others, so when—

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA [continuing]. The opportunity comes, I hope that our voice and position will be very strong and make sure that Taiwan is not excluded in any way.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Yes, ma'am. I think you will see—

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. Imminently, perhaps as early as—

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. In the interest of time—

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. Today, a statement—

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA [continuing]. Can I move on?

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. To that effect.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Talk about—

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Please.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA [continuing]. Some other issues? Our policy is that any issue across the Taiwan Strait must be resolved peacefully, and that U.S. efforts and capabilities are maintained to

deter CCP aggression, yet our military cooperation with Taiwan continues to be low or no profile, while the CCP broadcasts and escalates its military exercises, air and neighbor incursions, around Taiwan.

And despite our many lines of effort with engaging Taiwan, CCP coercion is growing at a rapid pace. So can you talk about—well, let me pose this question very directly. Are we deterring CCP from aggression against Taiwan, or are they deterring us?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Madam Chairwoman, our entire policy when it comes to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait—and, again, that is our fundamental U.S. national interest. It is predicated precisely on building Taiwan's deterrence, building their deterrence capacity.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. So do weapons in Taiwan enhance or detract from deterrence?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Well, ma'am, our policy is predicated on the fact that we must, in accordance with our obligations under the TRA, continue to provide Taiwan with the defense articles and services necessary to help Taiwan maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Are weapons delivery more useful before or after an invasion?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Ma'am, the entire idea is to prevent an invasion through deterrence.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Sure. Does the weapons backlog and extended delivery times improve or degrade deterrence?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. I would like to respond to that, ma'am. I know you mentioned that in your opening statement as well. I would say two things. The figure that you have quoted about a backlog, I think there is one element of that that is somewhat misleading.

There is always a lag time between the announcement and the notification to Congress of a sale and the delivery timeline. And some of those announced sales are in fact on track. They are not yet delivered yet because that is natural. There are others, we fully admit, that have been delayed.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. And we will be able to deliver those in time, hopefully—

Secretary KRITENBRINK. I would say we are doing—

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA [continuing]. Before—

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. Everything possible to speed up that delivery. We have done everything, together with my colleagues in the Political Military Bureau at State, and with DOD, to speed up our own internal processes. But, ma'am, I think one other additional challenge is some of the constraints in the U.S. Defense Industrial Base. That is something we are talking about with industry. I know that is something that Congress has supported as well. I think that is part of it.

I would also say deterrence, more broadly, is involved with assisting Taiwan, both civilian and military authorities, in building out Taiwan's whole of society, a defense and resilience that contributes to deterrence, as does the international space—

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. OK. Thank you.

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. Question you raised earlier.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. I know my time is up, so let me now recognize Ranking Member Bera for 5 minutes for questions.

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

And, again, thank you, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, for being here. You know, Congress' support for Taiwan has been steadfast in a bipartisan way. And, again, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I am privileged to be one of the co-chairs of the Taiwan Caucus, along with Mr. Barr and Mr. Connolly and Mr. Diaz-Balart. And it has over 200 caucus members in a bipartisan way. So, you know, our support is steadfast.

That said, as of 2024, Taiwan maintains formal diplomatic relations with 11 countries and the Holy See, primarily in Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. What we have seen over the past years, is that many countries have shifted their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan due to the PRC placing significant political and economic pressure on those smaller countries.

This past week I had the privilege of leading a delegation to the Pacific Islands, and we specifically and very intentionally visited the island of Tuvalu, a diplomatic ally of Taiwan. And in so doing, I think we were the first congressional delegation ever to visit that island. But, again, it was important for us to be there to reiterate the decision that they made to continue to be a diplomatic ally of Taiwan, but also to express and recognize that, you know, they are facing significant pressure from Beijing.

I was just visiting with some members of the Japanese Diet as well, and they have expressed, their support for Tuvalu as well. But for smaller countries like that, we have seen China use economic coercion and pressure. What are some of the tools in terms of how State Department is partnering with countries like Tuvalu that continue to maintain their recognition of Taiwan, while also working with partners like Japan, Australia, and others? And what are some of the tools that you are using?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Mr. Ranking Member, thank you very much for those important questions. Maybe I will take them in order. Yes, there is no doubt that much of PRC policy is predicated on intimidating and pressuring and coercing Taiwan through a variety of means, including one means that you have highlighted here, which is picking off some of Taiwan's formal diplomatic allies, presumably in an attempt to isolate and further pressure Taiwan.

So what we have tried to signal to Taiwan's remaining partners, we tried to signal affirmatively the benefits of partnering with Taiwan. We have also tried to candidly address some of the concerns about partnering with the PRC and encourage some caution about always listening to some of the promises that the PRC makes in the midst of this struggle, which oftentimes remain unfilled.

But in a more practical way, and maybe highlighting Tuvalu just as one example, we have tried to partner with Taiwan and other close partners like Japan to work to make sure we can address their needs and give them options, so they are not subject to economic coercion, either from the PRC or from anyone else, and so they see the benefits of partnering with us as well.

In the context of Japanese Prime Minister Kishida's State visit here, I think you may have seen there was an announcement about

funding for subsea cables to Tuvalu. And I think this is one example to, again, show them the benefits of partnering with us.

I would also say, too, sir, that as important as Taiwan's remaining formal diplomatic allies are, I think it is at least as important to highlight the benefits of Taiwan's many unofficial partners, including the United States. And I would say many of Taiwan's friends happen to be their unofficial partners or some of their most capable and most strongly supported partners as well.

Mr. BERA. Thank you. You know, the House passed the Tax Relief for American Families and Workers Act. And included in that bill that we passed in a bipartisan way were provisions to authorize a negotiated solution to eliminate the double taxation issue on cross-border investments between the United States and Taiwan.

Unfortunately, this legislation is sitting over in the Senate. From your perspective, why is it important that the Senate take up this measure and pass the Tax Relief for American Families and Workers Act, particularly to address the issue of double taxation?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Well, Mr. Ranking Member, I fully support your comments. We are grateful and thankful to the House for passing the tax bill to eliminate this double-taxation burden for both American and Taiwan companies, and we do look forward and hope to see its passage in the Senate.

I think what we have seen, sir, is that when both American and Taiwan companies face a double taxation burden, that is an obvious hindrance to the further development and growth of our vitally important economic and trade relationship.

As I think I outlined at the top, Taiwan is our eighth largest trade partner, now more than \$128 billion in annual trade. I think that trade would increase if we were able to reduce that burden, and I think that would further contribute to another source of Taiwan resilience and another element of deterrence; namely, investing in Taiwan's economic development.

Mr. BERA. Thank you. I yield back.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

I recognize Mrs. Wagner from Missouri for 5 minutes.

Mrs. WAGNER. I thank the chair, and I thank the assistant secretary for your time and your service. Confronting China is a once-in-a-generation challenge. And if we are to defeat China's plan—their plan, stated plan—to replace the United States as the world's preeminent power, we must boldly stand by our friends and partners, particularly Taiwan.

And I will say this, sir. As a former United States Ambassador, I believe in diplomacy. But when we are dealing with dictators, authoritarian governments, bullies, and a country that is part of what I consider the axis of evil, which is Russia, Iran, and China, deterrence through military weapons and force is key and necessary. Hiding behind opacity and red tape invites bullies like Xi Jinping to push the envelope.

Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, with Taiwan—and I am going to take another stab at this. They are still facing a backlog of \$19 billion of U.S. arms sales that they have purchased. OK? And I hope the emergency funding that Congress just provided will help us get back on track. What remaining bottlenecks and red tape at State are continuing to delay these deliveries?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Congresswoman, thank you very much for your questions. I would State that we are absolutely committed to doing everything possible to build Taiwan's deterrent capacity in every area that I have outlined here today, including continuing to provide them the defense articles necessary to maintain——

Mrs. WAGNER. What is standing in the way?

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. Sufficient self-defense. I would say, ma'am, the biggest hurdles we face, like right now, are challenges in the U.S. Defense Industrial Base. We have worked very hard internally at State and DOD to hasten our processes, remove red tape. We—I am told that we approve 95 percent of FMS cases now within 2 weeks. So I think the main challenge that we face, ma'am, are production challenges that——

Mrs. WAGNER. They have been waiting for years for some of this—let me just say, years—and I want to know what you are doing to eliminate these barriers.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Actually, my colleague tells me it is 95 percent of cases in 2 days, not 2 weeks. My apologies. But I think the main point, ma'am, as I said, too——

Mrs. WAGNER. They still don't have the weaponry. I don't care how many days for process. Sorry.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Yes.

Mrs. WAGNER. All due respect.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Yes, ma'am. I will underscore what I said. That \$19 billion, some of that—those are legitimate delays. Some of those are simply cases that haven't been delayed yet, because there is a natural delay from announcement to——

Mrs. WAGNER. OK. Let me ask you this. The fact that the \$19 billion in weapons backlog is degrading our deterrence against China, has China's behavior changed as a result? And how is State addressing China's increasingly aggressive and coercive activities in the region?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Ma'am, I would say that we believe, one, that the threat from the PRC is growing. Two, we believe that we are meeting that threat together——

Mrs. WAGNER. How?

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. Together with our Taiwan partners, through the provision of the arms that we are talking about, through working with Taiwan authorities, both civilian and military, on building their whole of society defense and resilience——

Mrs. WAGNER. Well——

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. On ensuring——

Mrs. WAGNER [continuing]. There won't be a whole of society if China overruns and takes over Taiwan. So the weapons backlog also I think makes the United States appear to be a less reliable partner to other countries in the Indo-Pacific. Your thoughts?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. I completely disagree, ma'am. I would say that our partnership with Taiwan is stronger than it has ever been. We do not believe that conflict is either imminent or inevitable. And everything we do, both through the demonstration of our own capabilities and our assistance to Taiwan, is designed to demonstrate that deterrence, as well as the fact I think a larger num-

ber of countries than ever before has stood up to say they recognize the importance of Taiwan to——

Mrs. WAGNER. Let me ask, just in my limited time——

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. This a possibility.

Mrs. WAGNER [continuing]. Assistant Secretary, if China succeeds in taking control over swaths of the South China Sea, as they are actively doing right now, how would U.S. and allied countries' ability to operate in the first island China—in the first island chain, pardon me, during the Indo-Pacific conflict be impacted?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Ma'am, we have stood up to say that in the South China Sea international law must be respected, claims must be based in international law, and they must be—disputes must be resolved peacefully in accordance with that law.

We have also made clear in the case of the Philippines no one should doubt the commitment of the United States of America to the mutual defense treaty or——

Mrs. WAGNER. The foundational Taiwan Relations Act, or TRA, we have all been discussing states that the United States' decision to establish diplomatic relations with China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. How would you define "peaceful means"? Because, you know, I don't defend "peaceful means" to include live fire drills and economic embargoes and election interference.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. With all due respect, since the gentleman's time is up, may I ask Assistant Secretary to respond to her question?

Mrs. WAGNER. I can't wait, and I have more to ask.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Mrs. WAGNER. So I thank you, Madam Chair.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. I would like to recognize the gentleman from California, Representative Sherman, for 5 minutes.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Would you like me to respond, or should I come back later?

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. In writing.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Oh. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. If you can. Yes.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Thank you.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Or I—you know, Mr. Sherman can——

Mr. SHERMAN. Madam Chair, I would ask unanimous consent that the gentleman, the witness, be allowed to answer that last question.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. If that is OK with Mr. Sherman, then I—OK.

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. All right.

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank my colleagues.

Mrs. WAGNER. I am only 13 seconds over.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. WAGNER. All right.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Congresswoman, I would say the United States of American has been—has been crystal clear from day one that we have a fundamental national interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and ensuring that cross-strait disputes are resolved peacefully. That is the entire founda-

tion of our policy. We are committed to that, and there is no ambiguity on that point I think in either Beijing, Taiwan, or——

Mrs. WAGNER. Well, as I said, peaceful means.

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. Anywhere else.

Mrs. WAGNER. I question peaceful means. Fire drills, economic embargoes, election interference, tons of warships surrounding the Strait, not very peaceful means to me. But I thank you for answering the question, and I thank the gentleman for allowing the response.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Thank you, ma'am.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Now, Mr. Sherman, you are recognized.

Mr. SHERMAN. Our objective is to deter an invasion or blockade of Taiwan. There are three things or four things that will go into Beijing's decisionmaking. The first is whether Taiwan takes unwarranted—well, surprising action declaring its own independence, forcing the issue. And I think we have done an effective job of convincing our friends in Taiwan to preserve the legal status quo. That would be easier if it was clear that Taiwan could participate as a practical matter in the WHO, Interpol, and a number of the organizations.

So the first is avoiding any precipitous action in Taipei that upsets the status quo.

The second issue is, can and will Taiwanese fight?

The third is, can and will the United States fight?

And the fourth is, can and will the United States take enormous economic action?

So we just passed a \$90 billion-plus defense bill or foreign policy bill, but it has got only 2 billion for all Indo-Pacific allies in terms of armaments. Mr. Assistant Secretary, how much of that 2 billion will go to bolster Taiwan's defense?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Congressman, thank you. I can't say at this point exactly how much of that \$2 billion——

Mr. SHERMAN. The bulk?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. I would say a significant amount. We are having——

Mr. SHERMAN. That is not saying——

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. Those discussions right now. And we——

Mr. SHERMAN. And I would point out, some of us were pushing to get—send weapons to Ukraine before 2014. More of us were pushing for weapons to go to Ukraine before 2022. And the world would be much better if those weapons had gotten there in a way that had deterred the invasion that is now the most difficult event in Europe since World War II.

The issue of how the U.S.—well, let me ask. The Ukrainians surprised the world and proved that they were willing to fight. Are the Taiwanese willing to fight?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Congressman, what I would say is that we have been impressed by the willingness of our Taiwan counterparts to address this threat head on——

Mr. SHERMAN. Good.

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. To plan accordingly.

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to move on to two other things.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. I think most opinion polls would say the answer to your question—

Mr. SHERMAN. The next—

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. Is yes.

Mr. SHERMAN. The next issue is, will the United States fight? And the answer is, we have a policy of strategic ambiguity, and nothing Congress can do can absolutely assure the result in that it would take a president to actually order our forces to take any action. We don't know who is going to be president. We don't know when. And the Chinese cannot be certain what we will do militarily.

But the one area where we can lock something in is economically, and that is to establish by law that if it—that if China invades or blockades Taiwan, that they immediately, automatically, without further action, lose MFN with the United States. Would that be an effective deterrent? And would the Administration support it?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Congressman, I am reluctant to comment on any specific measure regarding an event that has not yet happened. What I would say is that—

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, an event has happened. The Congressman from California has proposed the idea that we adopt a statute now, long before China takes any action, that makes it plain to Beijing that if they invade or blockade they immediately lose MFN.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Congressman—

Mr. SHERMAN. So that has happened. So can you comment on it?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. What I would say is that, obviously, it would be a serious mistake for China to take such precipitous action.

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. But here is what—

Secretary KRITENBRINK. They should assume—

Mr. SHERMAN. Here is what Beijing may be thinking. There will be a flood of lobbyists from every corporation in America saying, "Oh my god, we can't cutoff MFN for China. It is going to hurt our economy. We haven't de-risked." And our companies are not de-risking the way they should.

That is why I hope—I guess Ann Wagner has left—but I am hoping that in financial services we require companies to report to their shareholders what they are doing to de-risk. Is it the policy of the U.S. Government to encourage our corporations to de-risk? Or do we just wait for the day when they send all their lobbyists here saying, "Oh, we haven't done anything, so you can't possibly take economic action against China?"

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Congressman, we leave to companies, just as we do other countries, to them to make their own decisions. But what we do—

Mr. SHERMAN. We encourage companies to reduce their carbon footprint. Do we encourage companies to reduce their China risk?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Yes. We encourage countries and companies to consider carefully the risk, and we do encourage resilient supply chains and investments, so none of us are overly dependent on any one country or supply chain.

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield back.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Let me now recognize the gentleman from Kentucky, Representative Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, the Biden Administration says it maintains strategic ambiguity regarding whether the United States would defend Taiwan militarily if it suffered an armed attack by China. President Biden, however, has stated on the record four times that he would commit U.S. military forces to defend Taiwan.

For context, then-Senator Biden criticized President George W. Bush for explicitly committing a U.S. response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Let's see if we can clarify what exactly the policy of the Administration is here. Can you tell us for the record, what is the policy of the Administration on protecting Taiwan in the event of an attack?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Sir, I think what we have said all along, and I can walk you through the entire policy, is we State that our policy is we oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side. We do not support Taiwan independence. We support cross-strait dialog. We expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means.

Mr. BARR. Yes.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Free from coercion, in a manner that is acceptable to—

Mr. BARR. Is that strategic ambiguity?

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. Of the Strait?

Mr. BARR. What you just described, is that a policy of strategic ambiguity?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. We don't normally use that term, sir, but others have used that term to describe how—

Mr. BARR. OK. Well, the President has clearly said the opposite. He said—he has said definitively that we would commit military force in the event of an armed conflict. Do you disagree with the President, or does the President not speak for the Administration?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Congressman, the U.S. One China policy has not changed. The President himself has said repeatedly that the One China policy has not changed, and he said it to my understanding most recently after the Woodside Summit.

I know that as well when some of these questions were previously asked in September 2022, the National Security Advisor spoke to this from the White House podium as well, and he said that there has been no change to our policy, and the President was not announcing any change to U.S. policy.

Mr. BARR. Well, clearly, the Administration is speaking out of both sides of its mouth, and maybe that is ambiguity. Maybe that is why we call it strategic ambiguity. Former late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said the United States should end its strategic ambiguity with respect to Taiwan. Do you agree with the former prime minister?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. I do. Changing our longstanding One China policy for—that has stood the test of time for the last 45 years has helped ensure peace and stability across the—

Mr. BARR. Do you believe that clarity—

Secretary KRITENBRINK. It would be——

Mr. BARR [continuing]. About red lines and intentions is useful or harmful to deterrence?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Well, Congressman, I think we have been absolutely clear about America's national interest in maintaining peace and——

Mr. BARR. That is my point. No, you are not being clear. It is exactly the opposite of clarity. This exchange we are having is a perfect example of how it is strategic ambiguity. It is ambiguity. If you took the position that ambiguity is deterrence, I would understand that. But it is clearly not clear. It is unclear, and that is why Asian leaders like the late prime minister has encouraged the United States to abandon this dithering or this dissembling, this lack of clarity.

And so President Biden deserves credit. At least he is trying to clear up the matter. I wish the State Department would follow the Commander in Chief's lead here.

Let me move to another question, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink. In the readout of President Biden's meeting with General Secretary Xi in November, President Biden apparently called for restraint in the PRC's use of military activity in and around the Taiwan Strait.

Since that meeting, the number of PLA air force incursions crossing Taiwan's air defense identification zone have been steadily increasing—72 in January, 86 in February, 139 in March, 157 in April. Do you feel General Secretary Xi is abiding by President Biden's call for restraint?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. What I believe, Congressman, is that China has stepped up its pressure directed at Taiwan. I also believe that our deterrence and our contributions to deterrence, those are real. They are effective.

Mr. BARR. Doesn't look like it.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. We believe that conflict is not——

Mr. BARR. Doesn't look like it. It looks like—looks like the incursions are going up. Looks like Beijing is not at all deterred by tough words from President Biden at APEC. Doesn't seem to be making a difference. In fact, it looks like it is going in the opposite direction.

So I appreciate the attempts by the President to remove the ambiguity, and I appreciate the calling for restraint, but it doesn't look like the PRC is heeding those words.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Congressman, we have been clear what our interests are, what is at stake. The TRA and our One China policy has helped maintain peace and stability for the last 45 years, and we are proud—what we have to do is step up to the challenge that you have outlined, Congressman. And with the support of Congress, and the leadership of this Administration, we have done that and we will continue to do so.

Mr. BARR. My time has expired. I yield back.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Let me now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Representative Connolly.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And can I ask you, Mr. Assistant Secretary, pull the mic closer. A little hard to hear. You are soft spoken.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. My apologies.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let me just begin by saying I agree with Mr. Barr. President Biden made it very clear in his personal view that were there an unprovoked attack by the mainland against Taiwan we would respond militarily. Now you could—maybe that was, you know, off script. Maybe that was not part of the State Department talking points. From my point of view, and I think Mr. Barr was getting at that, I think that was actually very useful. It gives Beijing something more to think about. In case you thought our strategic ambiguity always errs on the side of we are not going to do anything, listen to the President of the United States. And I would hope our State Department will listen to the President of the United States.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. I can assure you we follow the orders of the Commander in Chief.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Good. Because he served on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee where I serve for 36 years. He chaired the committee. He knows what he is talking about. And what he said was deliberate, and I applaud him for it.

I think it adds to the cost factor Beijing has to calculate, and I would hope it would be seen as of strategic value in what Mr. Barr was getting at in terms of the overall policy of what has been called strategic ambiguity. That is fine. But let's not always mean, you know, wishy-washy-ness and probably we are not going to do anything.

Xi Jinping is watching what we are doing in Ukraine, and I think he now has a different calculation because of the solidarity of NATO and the resilience here in the United States about the U.S. Congress and an overwhelming vote we are going to stand with Ukraine. We are going to continue to resupply Ukraine. We are going to resist militarily, unprovoked military action against a sovereign nation. In the case of Taiwan, not a sovereign nation, but a territory that we have circumscribed by law.

I was on the committee when the Taiwan Relations Act was written by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee primarily. President Carter signed it into law in 1979 after recognizing Beijing. What is your understanding of that law? Does that guide you? Does that compel you, in terms of consistency with policies that circumscribe the relationship with Taiwan and, for that matter, with mainland China?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Well, Congressman, first, I will just reiterate on the comments that the President made, he himself has said he has not announced a change to our policy on—

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, I know. That is called strategic ambiguity. Oh, yes.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. On the point on Ukraine, I—

Mr. CONNOLLY. When I say that we are going to respond militarily, that is not a change.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Congressman, on Ukraine, I fully agree the world is watching and what we have done is step up to support Ukraine. It sends a powerful message around the world, including in Asia, including in Beijing. The Taiwan Relations Act, as I hope

I have outlined here today, is a fundamental element of our One China policy, gives us the tools and the framework that we need to respond to the increasing threat from China.

Mr. CONNOLLY. It is also the law of—

Secretary KRITENBRINK. It has allowed us—

Mr. CONNOLLY. It is also the law of the land, Mr.—

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. Assistant Secretary. It is not just guidance. It is the law, and it was signed into law by the President of the United States, head of the executive branch. So—

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. I would just hope that when my colleagues reiterate parts of the Taiwan Relations Act that we expect, in terms of Chinese behavior, that is the law, and that should guide everything we do as we try to meet Chinese aggression in the South China Sea especially.

Real quickly, does the Administration support the language contained in the Tax Relief for American Families and Workers Act on double taxation with respect to Taiwan? The Senate hasn't acted yet. What is the Administration's position? As quickly as you can say it.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Congressman, as I indicated earlier, we are very grateful for the House's passage of that legislation, and we hope the Senate will act on it as well.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Great.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. We think it is important for our—

Mr. CONNOLLY. Great to hear.

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. Relationship with Taiwan.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I wrote a lot of that text, so I am glad to hear that. Thank you, sir.

UN GA Resolution 2758. Beijing is spreading a lot of disinformation about the consequences of that and what it means, and all that good stuff. What is the State Department doing to counter Chinese disinformation and to help Taipei participate in things like the WHA, which is coming up?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir. As I indicated earlier, we have spoken out against China's misuse and mischaracterization of 2758. We have spoken out in support of Taiwan's participation in all international organizations that do not require statehood, and meaningful participation by Taiwan in all international organizations that do. And that includes the WHA.

I think you will see a statement to that effect from U.S. Government imminently. We will campaign for their observership in the WHA, in ICAO, in Interpol, and elsewhere. Taiwan has a lot to offer the international—

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. Finally, 92 percent of the world's most advanced logic semiconductors smaller than 10 nanometers are made in one place, Taiwan. Is that of strategic concern to us? And should it be of concern, strategic concern, to industrialized countries that rely on those chips?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. The way that I would look at it, Congressman, is it shows what is at stake in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Any type of crisis, let alone a conflict across the Taiwan Strait, would be devastating to the glob-

al economy. We should all be concerned about maintaining peace and stability.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Thank you.

And thank you, Madam Chair.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

I would like to recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Davidson.

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thanks, Chairwoman.

Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, could you please clarify the distinction between the Taiwan Relations Act and an actual security guarantee for Taiwan?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Sir, the Taiwan Relations Act has a number of provisions that we have discussed here today. It talks about how it will be the policy of the United States to provide defense articles and services to Taiwan to assist Taiwan in maintaining a credible self-defense. It talks about how the United States will maintain the capacity to resist any use of force or coercion to undermine peace and stability in the Western Pacific. And I think that hopefully clarifies what the distinction between the provisions of the TRA and what a formal security pact or security treaty would look like.

Mr. DAVIDSON. Does the State Department currently assess that Xi Jinping intends to peacefully resolve the situation, the disagreements they have with Taiwan, or does he consider the use of force?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. We think that if you take Chinese statements at face value, they State explicitly that China would prefer to resolve that issue peacefully, but they do not rule out the use of force and they never have. But I would also reiterate we have seen no indication that conflict is either imminent or inevitable.

Mr. DAVIDSON. The Taiwan Relations Act states that, quote, "The United States' decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means." Would the Administration consider ending diplomatic relations with China if it no longer expected the future of Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Congressman, I can't speak to a hypothetical scenario. What I can say is we have made clear from day one, including with Beijing, that America has a fundamental national interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The TRA also outlines that any threat or use of coercion to resolve those issues by other than peaceful means would be viewed as a matter of grave concern on the part of the United States. I think that is crystal clear, sir.

Mr. DAVIDSON. How do you feel that the TRA coordinates with the One China policy to maintain stability in the region?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. As I indicated, the pillars of our One China policy are the Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-China joint communiques, and the six assurances to Taiwan. In totality, we believe that that policy and that policy approach has stood the test of time. It has maintained peace and stability for the last 45 years. And, again, I am confident that together with the cooperation and support of Congress we will continue to meet the challenge to maintain peace and stability.

Mr. DAVIDSON. Do you see threats to the shipping lanes involved with escalatory actions by China?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Absolutely do. Fifty percent of global container traffic goes to the Taiwan Strait. In addition to the comments made by Congressman Connolly earlier, when you look at the centrality of Taiwan to the global economy, peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait has to be a matter of international concern.

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thanks for acknowledging that. And when you think about, you know, the stakes here, you mentioned, you know, our One China policy.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIDSON. And, of course, that drew some attention when President Trump announced, quote, "our One China policy." Do you see any differentiation in the evolution of the United States' One China policy Administration to Administration?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. I would say that in my mind the terms are interchangeable. Whether it is our policy, it is the U.S. One China policy, it is absolutely not the PRC One China principle. And our policy has remained essentially unchanged and enduring for the last 45 years, and I am confident, again, together with Congress, we will continue to meet the challenge.

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you. Can you commit that all the money appropriated to the Biden Administration for use in the Indo-Pacific as part of the national security emergency supplemental that just passed and was signed into law will be used in the Indo-Pacific and not used to service loans in other regions?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Well, Congressman, I am the EAP Assistant Secretary. Our intention is to plan to invest and spend those moneys where it was intended. I am not specifically in charge of our budget, but I think the intent of Congress was clear and that is what we are planning toward.

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you for clarifying that. Does China believe the U.S. position on protecting Taiwan in the event of armed conflict is ambiguous?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. I am sorry. Can you repeat the question? Does China believe that our policy is ambiguous?

Mr. DAVIDSON. Do ever colleagues feel that the position is ambiguous? I mean, our policy formally has the word "ambiguity" in it. Does China believe our position is ambiguous?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. I would say formally, again, we don't use that term. Here is what I am confident of. I am confident that all across the region, including in the PRC, know how fundamental peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is.

Mr. DAVIDSON. Is China preparing for the United States to become involved militarily should they use force?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. I can't say that definitively, but I know in prior testimony with my colleagues from the Department of Defense their assessment is yes.

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you. I yield back.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. In other words, their assessment of PRC assessment is yes. Thank you.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. I would like to recognize the gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Houlahan. And welcome to our subcommittee hearing.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I really appreciate you and the ranking member allowing me to be here, and it is good to be back in this room. I can tell you it is a lot classier than it was when I last left it. I don't know what you all have been doing, but it is pretty fancy.

My name is Chrissy Houlahan, and I serve on the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees. I am grateful to be here to ask some questions about Taiwan.

Sir, my first question has to do with our collective concern. Many of us certainly in this room and in this Congress are deeply concerned about election security, not only in our own country but of course in how the United States can help other countries to protect not only the physical and digital infrastructure that is necessary for free and fair elections, but also in countering the disinformation that comes as well.

So we know that Taiwan has historically, and particularly recently, borne the brunt of Chinese disinformation campaigns. There was a 2022 Freedom House report that said about Beijing's global media influence that their efforts in Taiwan were very, very high. But it also did note that Taiwan was resilient in repelling that disinformation and in countering the CCP's efforts.

So my question, sir, is, can you share any details that are available and allowed to share of what involvement the State Department, you specifically, have had in supporting Taiwan's recent elections and how you might be planning on coordinating in the future to counter CCP disinformation campaigns as well?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Congresswoman, thank you for your very important question. I would say we agree that the threat posed by misinformation and disinformation campaigns around the world is a significant challenge to elections around the world, including in Taiwan. I would say I have been part of a number of conversations with friends in Taiwan to try to share both our experience in countering such threats and lessons learned, right, that we—that we have garnered over the years.

I will say that we have been generally impressed by Taiwan's resilience, and I think that Taiwan's democracy really is a shining example for many countries around the world and in the region, and I think this most recent election bears that out. But I think they recognize the threat. We have discussed it multiple times and tried to share experiences.

Ms. HOULAHAN. And I will go back to that if I have a little bit of time.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. HOULAHAN. But my second question has to do with the TRA and the fact that it has created a strategic partnership, as you have mentioned, for the U.S. and the Indo-Pacific through which the U.S. can counter Chinese influence. And my specific question is, I have been very focused on how we can help Taiwan with cybersecurity.

As of last December, Taiwan was facing, in some cases in open source, hundreds of thousands of attacks, cyber attacks, from the

CCP each day. And so we recently passed a bill now with my former colleague, Representative Gallagher and myself, that was the Taiwan Cybersecurity Resiliency Act, and it was signed into law in the NDAA of last year requiring the DOD to expand military cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan.

My question to you is, is there any sort of analog to that? What kind of efforts are existing, if at all, within the State Department to share best practices on cybersecurity with Taiwan?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. I would say, ma'am, for details of whether there are colleagues outside of my bureau working on this right now with Taiwan, I would have to come back to you. But I would say we have an ongoing and regular dialog with counterparts in Taiwan about building societal resilience and supporting their efforts to build so-called whole of society resilience, including their all-out defense mobilization area and plans. And a key part of that is cybersecurity.

And so it is a key part, we believe, of our contribution to Taiwan's resilience, and building their deterrent capacity. And I would also say, ma'am, that I have been gratified that other partners, international partners, have expressed a willingness to engage on these resilience issues as well.

Ms. HOULAHAN. And with what remains of my time, in both cases, election security, kind of malign influence and malign messaging, cybersecurity and resilience to cyber attacks, all of those things, if there are things that we can do to be helpful to enable the State Department to be as effective as possible, as I know the DOD and the intel community are also trying to be, we would welcome that, I am certain.

And, with that, I will yield back. Once again, thank you so much for allowing me to be part of this hearing, and I yield.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Thank you, ma'am. And we will take you up on that offer. Thank you very much.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Ms. Houlahan, for joining us.

I was informed that we have another member on his way, literally, hopefully walking in in the next 30 seconds or so.

In the meantime, I would like to ask a question. In your statement, you said China's decision to act peacefully would be of grave concern. So based on China's behavior that we have seen lately, do you have grave concerns?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Yes, ma'am. I believe you are referring to my statement in which I quoted from the TRA, in which it says that, of course, any means other than of a peaceful nature to resolve these issues would be resolved—or would be viewed with grave concern on the part of the United States.

So I would say that if there were steps to use force, and other precipitous action, we would absolutely view that with grave concern. I hope I have made clear today we do recognize China has used a number of coercive and pressure tactics, gray zone tactics, to try to increase pressure on Taiwan and isolate Taiwan.

We are certainly concerned about that, and I hope I have made clear here today what we are doing to respond to that. And we believe that with the support of the Congress and the many tools that we have talked about here today, both under the Taiwan Relations

Act and the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, that we have the tools we need—

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Secretary KRITENBRINK [continuing]. To respond to that challenge.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Yesterday you appeared before the Senate Committee and testified that the U.S. toolkit to push back against Chinese coercion toward Taiwan is by arms sales, helping Taiwan's defense reform, building out Taiwan's international space, expanding economic resilience, and enhancing Taiwan's whole of society resilience.

The last 4 years we have seen Taiwan lost its partnership with Nauru, Honduras, Nicaragua, the diplomatic ally status. And China has blocked several agricultural imports from Taiwan at will.

During the last Administration, PLA violations of Taiwan's air defense identification zone totaled 400 sorties. Over the course of the Biden Administration, they have hit almost 500, or 5,000 I should say. The Chinese military conducted military exercises to the north and east of Taiwan. That had never been done previously.

So given our policy is to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, free of coercion, tell us, by what measure is this Administration's strategy effective in deterring or dissuading Chinese coercion against Taiwan?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Ma'am, I would say through my testimony and responses to questions today I hope I have laid out the same strategy today as I did yesterday. We are committed to that strategy. We recognize that the threat from the PRC is growing. Use of gray zone tactics and coercion by the PRC, they are growing, and we recognize that and we are stepping up to meet that challenge in a range of ways, and I would argue a range of unprecedented ways, both through efforts to build Taiwan's military deterrent capacity, the work we are doing to build out their international space to strengthen their economic resilience, including being through our own economic relationship, but also encouraging them to diversify their supply chains and markets, and the like.

We are confident in our approach. We recognize that the challenge is growing. But as I hope I have indicated here today, we believe we have the framework and the tools necessary. What we need to do is stand up and meet the moment. We believe we are doing that, and we are doing that with the support of this body, and we are grateful for that.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. I would like to yield some time to ranking member for a question or two.

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Assistant Secretary, when I was in Taiwan 2 weeks after the election to—wanted to help them celebrate a successful democratic election, but also to congratulate President-elect Lai. One of the things that we were apprised of was to kind of watch the time between the election and the inauguration, May 20. Have we noticed, in terms of the PRC posture, what they have been doing or not doing? It does seem like President Lai has been measured in his

comments, and I think appropriately, you know, continuing the policy of One China.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. I would say that we have been very clear, including through Secretary Blinken's recent visit to Beijing, our expectation that all sides will conduct themselves with restraint and prudence in the period ahead. We have made clear to our friends in Beijing that they should not take advantage of this period in the run-up to the May 20 inauguration, to take steps that would escalate tensions and undermine peace and stability.

And of course we have made clear that there shouldn't be such steps after the inauguration as well. I would say we are watching this very carefully, and we will continue to do so.

I also agree with you that I thought that President-elect Lai's comments after the election were very responsible and make clear our shared commitment to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Mr. BERA. And I think that is important to emphasize. From our perspective, I think from the Administration's perspective, from the Taiwanese perspective, our goal is to maintain the status quo, peace, stability, prosperity, you know, across the Strait but throughout the region. It is Beijing, Xi Jinping, that is in their aggressive manner changing that status quo. And I think it is important for us to continue to counter that narrative.

Again, our goal is to maintain the status quo, which really has been peaceful and prosperous for all the countries in the region, probably no more so than the PRC. So, you know, it is Beijing and Xi Jinping that are changing that calculus. And, unfortunately, we have to respond and, you know—

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Well, Mr. Ranking Member, I agree with all of that. It is very clear our commitment to the status quo and peace and stability. I would argue the same is true for the authorities in Taiwan. Our concern is that China is taking measures that are undermining that status quo and long-held peace and stability and that is why we have responded the way that we have.

And I would also say I appreciate your comments, Mr. Ranking Member, because I think it is important to underscore here, too, that our consistent commitment to our One China policy, as we define it, and our commitment to maintaining the status quo, it has been important not just to maintaining peace and stability across the Strait these 45 years, it is also a really important feature in encouraging other like-minded allies, partners, and friends, to stand up and speak out in support of that peace and stability and support of Taiwan as well.

It would be unwise to change the framework and the approach that has held us in such good stead for the last 45 years, and I think it would also undermine the ability and the willingness of other countries to stand in partnership with us. I think it is very much in our collective interest to shine a light on the fact that it is the PRC that is working to undermine the status quo.

Mr. BERA. Right.

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Not us. Not Taiwan.

Mr. BERA. And knowing that the PRC, for Taiwan's diplomatic partners, is obviously putting pressure on it. From the State De-

partment perspective, can you give us some examples of how we are helping support some of those folks that continue to maintain relations with Taiwan, you know, particularly in South America and elsewhere?

Secretary KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir. When it comes to Taiwan's formal diplomatic partners, again, we have tried to reach out directly to just help demonstrate the benefits of partnering with a counterpart as capable as Taiwan. We have tried to as well caution them about some of the inducements that the PRC will sometimes offer and to be cautious about going down that path.

And then, as I indicated earlier, we have also tried to assist where we can in making sure that partners are resilient and not subject to coercion. And, in the case of Tuvalu, I talked about the work to connect them to subsea cables. We have also worked with some partners in Latin America as well to make sure that if they have certain needs that we can help address them, particularly in those needs would represent a vulnerability that might make them subject to coercion and pressure from the PRC.

As I also indicated, Mr. Ranking Member, I think we have been gratified as well. A number of Taiwan's unofficial partners have stood up in pretty unprecedented ways over the last several years to speak out in support of cross-strait peace and stability, and I think that is an important development as well.

Mr. BERA. All right. Thank you.

And I will yield back.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Since we see no other members in queue to ask questions, I would like to offer some closing comments, and I would also ask, Ranking Member Bera, if you have some closing comments as well.

So, first of all, I want to thank you, Assistant Secretary, for joining us today, and all the members that were here to ask questions. This hearing crystallizes, at least in my mind, the longstanding, decisive role Congress has played, and continues to play, regarding Taiwan. And it was Congress that fought hard to maintain relations with Taiwan in peace across the Taiwan Strait.

Today Chairman Xi's own words and actions are trying to upset this peace. He is aggressively attempting to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and upend the rules-based international order. The United States chose to diplomatically recognize Communist China severed ties with Taiwan and withdraw our military on the expectation that any issues between China and Taiwan would be resolved peacefully.

So we provide arms to Taiwan, build our own capabilities to keep that peace. If our expectations of peace are lowering, how do we ramp up our support to create the deterrence needed to maintain peace? The next decade may determine the trajectory of security in the Indo-Pacific for the next 100 years.

If our deterrence fails, then we plunge our children and grandchildren into a more dangerous and unpredictable world. We cannot let that happen.

So we have got a lot of work to do. As you can see, this—when it comes to Taiwan, this is clearly a bipartisan issue and we will continue to work, you know, in that fashion.

So, with that, I would like to ask if, Mr. Bera, you have some closing comments.

Mr. BERA. Yes. I would just echo what the chairwoman said. I think we, as a Nation, can be proud of what we did in the 75 years post World War II in terms of creating a framework of peace, stability, prosperity, throughout the world, lifting millions out of poverty and, again, really creating that context of peace and stability.

We have seen, though, over the last decade, decade and a half, with the Great Recession, with the pandemic, and now, really, for the first time big country war with the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine, and, you know, it does behoove us at this moment in time to work with our allies, friends in the region, not to do anything other than to make sure our children and grandchildren have that same peace, stability, and prosperity.

That said, in Asia, we have seen aggressive actions in the South China Sea. We have seen, as you have alluded to, the gray zone tactics that the PRC is using in various parts of the world, but that diplomacy and debt trap, that Belt and Road, often will get small countries.

And, obviously, the aggression that we are seeing across the South China Sea, not to mention the disregard of previous agreements with regards to Hong Kong. So it does behoove us with our partners and allies to step up to preserve that peace, stability, and prosperity, so our children can—and grandchildren can enjoy the world that we have enjoyed.

So, again, I thank you for your service. I appreciate the hard work that the Biden Administration has been doing, and, again, in a bipartisan way. I think to the people of Taiwan and to Asia, you know, Democrats and Republicans stand together in preserving the peace, prosperity, freedom, and democracy.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. I know on our overseas travels we have run into each other at some, you know, like, of all places, at the airport. And so I know you are working really hard, your Administration is working really hard, to work with our key partners, especially like in the case of Taiwan, as we are talking about that today.

It is as important on the congressional level as we travel out and meet with our counterparts that U.S. is showing our leadership and giving them the assurance that we will be there, which is one of the reasons why, in all of my engagements, I make it a point to ask our friends and partners to stand with the United States.

We don't want our friends and allies to turn to China. We want them to turn to us. But we also need to show up and engage and give the alternatives. So as you travel, as we travel as Members of Congress, we hope we can continue this dialog, share our best practices, and maybe share some notes and comments, and so that we can do this in a very close working relationship way.

And I—so for that, I want to thank you so much for your work, and I want to thank you for your valuable testimony and answering all of our questions. So I want to also thank my colleagues, who showed up to our hearing today.

The members of the committee may have some additional questions for you, so we will ask you to respond to those in writing.

Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitations.

So, without objection, the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD



**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE**
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific
Young Kim (R-CA), Chairwoman

April 24, 2024

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held by the Subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific at 2:00 p.m. in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building. The hearing is available by live webcast on the Committee website at <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/>.

DATE: Wednesday, May 1, 2024

TIME: 2:00 PM

LOCATION: 2172 RHOB

SUBJECT: From 1979 to 2024: Evaluating the Taiwan Relations Act and Assessing the Future of U.S.-Taiwan Relations

WITNESSES: The Honorable Daniel J. Kritenbrink
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of State

*NOTE: Witnesses may be added.

By Direction of the Chair

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-226-8467 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day Wednesday Date May 01 Room 2172 RHOB

Starting Time 1402 Ending Time 1520

Recesses ☐ (to) (to) (to) (to) (to) (to)

Presiding Member(s)

Chairwoman Kim

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session ☒

Executive (closed) Session ☐

Televised ☒

Electronically Recorded (taped) ☒

Stenographic Record ☒

TITLE OF HEARING:

Standing United Against the People's Republic of China's Economic Agression and Predatory Practices

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Attached

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Rep. Houlahan

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes ☒ No ☐

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

Attached

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED 1520

Meg Wagner
Full Committee Hearing Coordinator

ATTENDANCE

Date: May 1, 2024

[illegible]