[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FROM 1979 TO 2024: EVALUATING THE TAIWAN
RELATIONS ACT AND ASSESSING THE FUTURE OF
U.S. TAIWAN RELATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ON INDO-PACIFIC
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
May 1, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-96
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
55-809PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking
JOE WILSON, South Carolina Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida AMI BERA, California
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee DINA TITUS, Nevada
ANDY BARR, Kentucky TED LIEU, California
RONNY JACKSON, Texas SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
YOUNG KIM, California DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida COLIN ALLRED, Texas
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan ANDY KIM, New Jersey
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, SARA JACOBS, California
American Samoa KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio Florida
JIM BAIRD, Indiana GREG STANTON, Arizona
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
CORY MILLS, Florida SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas JASON CROW, Colorado
JOHN JAMES, Michigan BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
KEITH SELF, Texas
Brendan Shields, Majority Staff Director
Sophia Lafargue, Minority Staff Director
------
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INDO-PACIFIC
YOUNG KIM, California, Chairwoman
ANN WAGNER, Missouri AMI BERA, California, Ranking
MARK GREEN, Tennessee Member
ANDY BARR, Kentucky ANDY KIM, New Jersey
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, BRAD SHERMAN, California
American Samoa GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MIKE WALTZ, Florida WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
JAMES MOYLAN, Guam
C O N T E N T S
----------
REPRESENTATIVES
Page
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairwoman Young Kim........... 1
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member Ami Bera........ 3
WITNESSES
Statement of Hon. Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of East Asian And Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of
State.......................................................... 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 36
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 37
Hearing Attendance............................................... 38
FROM 1979 TO 2024: EVALUATING THE TAIWAN
RELATIONS ACT AND ASSESSING THE FUTURE OF
U.S. TAIWAN RELATIONS
----------
Wednesday, May 1, 2024
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Indo-Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Young Kim (chair
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mrs. Kim of California. The Subcommittee on the Indo-
Pacific of the Foreign Affairs Committee will now come to
order.
The purpose of this hearing is to commemorate the 45th
anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act and assess the current
U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN YOUNG KIM
I will now recognize myself for an opening statement. This
year we celebrate 45 years of the Taiwan Relations Act, known
as TRA. This is a monumental and unique piece of legislation
that has guided our U.S. bilateral relations with Taiwan. There
is no other legislation that guides our bilateral relations
with another country quite this way.
The legislation is one of the reasons why the U.S. is
uniquely positioned to lead. Since the TRA became law, Taiwan
has demonstrated to the world time and time again its
importance as a vital contributor to global peace and
prosperity. From manufacturing the most advanced semiconductors
to providing health and humanitarian assistance to providing a
model of democracy, Taiwan is a critically important democratic
partner of the United States and like-minded allies.
Yet today Taiwan is possibly the biggest geopolitical flash
point in the world. In his meeting with President Biden in
December, Chairman Xi Jinping told President Biden that Beijing
will reunite--reunify Taiwan, and the U.S. intelligence
suggests that he has directly the People's Liberation Army to
be ready to take Taiwan by force in 2027.
As the PLA steps up aggression in the Taiwan Strait, it is
important that Congress carefully examines the TRA and ensure
that the U.S. is diplomatically, economically, and militarily
prepared for the Taiwan contingency. The fate of Taiwan affects
not only the 23 million people living on the island but every
American.
In February 1954, the U.S. Senate ratified a mutual defense
treaty with Taiwan. That treaty obligated the United States to
act if Taiwan suffers an armed attack. U.S. military presence
on the island reached nearly 100,000 troops at its peak.
In 1978, President Carter announced that the United States
would formally recognize Communist China and several diplomatic
and military relations with Taiwan, a move Congress strongly
disapproved at the time. In fact, Senator Goldwater sued the
Carter administration for ending the treaty without the consent
of Congress. It was Congress that stepped in to ensure basic
relations with the people of Taiwan.
On an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis, the House and Senate
passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, 14 days from
introduction to passing both chambers and just within months of
President Carter cutting diplomatic and military ties to
Taiwan. Through the TRA, Congress ensured normal relations with
Taiwan would continue and, importantly, put several
requirements on the executive branch.
I want to emphasize three of them. One, to provide Taiwan
with arms of a defensive character. Two, to maintain the
capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or
the social or economic system of the people of the Taiwan. And,
third, to make clear that the United States' decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of
China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will
be determined by peaceful means.
Congress doubled down on the U.S. position that in
establishing diplomatic relations with China any issue between
China and Taiwan would have to be resolved peacefully and free
from coercion. Congress pushed in the defense components of the
TRA to ensure the backing of the U.S. military and capabilities
would ensure peace across the Taiwan Strait.
After more than 20 years of guaranteeing Taiwan's defense,
it seems that the Congress was forced to use the TRA to seek
peace over Taiwan through deterrence. It is now clear that Xi
Jinping has no intention of resolving the issue peacefully and
is prepared for armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait and the
situation is very dangerous.
Earlier this year, now-retired Admiral John Aquilino told
Congress that, quote, ``We are in the most dangerous time that
I have seen in 20 years or in my 40 years of doing business.''
Today we are holding this hearing to assess the executive
branch's implementation of this law to help determine if the
fate of Taiwan will be peaceful and if it has the support to
deter Chairman Xi. As previously noted, one of our
responsibilities of the TRA is to arm Taiwan.
After we found out that there was a $19 billion backlog of
weapons sales to Taiwan in 2022, we engaged with the State and
Defense Departments to address the delays. While I appreciate
these engagements, we have yet to receive satisfactory
responses to our inquiries about why the delays persist.
I am also concerned that the Administration has been slow
to fully execute the tenet of maintaining the capacity to
resist PRC coercion against Taiwan. The CCP has run a
successful coercion effort to cut Taiwan out of international
organization. We are moving too slowly on initiatives promoting
Taiwan's meaningful participation in international
organizations.
For example, my legislation, the Taiwan WHO Act, was signed
into law 2 years ago. The World Health Assembly is now a month
away, and I am hearing that progress on this has been slow at
best. Delays on our commitments to Taiwan send the wrong signal
to the CCP at the worst possible time. The ability to execute
our responsibilities under the TRA may very well determine
whether we maintain peace in the Indo-Pacific or if the United
States policy of strategic ambiguity is put to the test.
This may well be one of the most important hearings our
subcommittee has held in this Congress, so I look forward to
your testimony.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member, the gentleman
from California, Mr. Bera, for any statement that you may have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER AMI BERA
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.
And thank you, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, for
testifying this afternoon.
Today we reflect on the significance of the Taiwan
Relations Act, the TRA, and its enduring impact on peace and
stability across the Taiwan Strait. On April 10 of this year, I
introduced a bipartisan resolution with my fellow Taiwan Caucus
co-chairs, Representatives Connolly, Barr, and Diaz-Balart,
marking the 45th anniversary of enactment of the TRA and
reaffirming the United States' commitment to Taiwan.
Our resolution had 66 bipartisan original co-sponsors,
including Chairwoman Kim. I believe that resolution and this
hearing today demonstrate what has been made clear since the
passage of the TRA in 1979, that the U.S. Congress in a
bipartisan way has enduring support for Taiwan and we are
unwavering in that support.
In January of this year, I was honored to join my fellow
Taiwan Caucus co-chair, Mario Diaz-Balart, as the first
congressional delegation to visit Taiwan after the successful
democratic election of President-elect William Lai. During our
trip, we were able to spread the message of steadfast support
on behalf of the bipartisan congressional Taiwan Caucus, one of
the largest caucuses in the House of Representatives with over
200 members.
I also applaud the Biden Administration's commitment to
strengthening our partnership with Taiwan under the guidance of
the TRA. Over the past 4 decades, the TRA has served as the
cornerstone of our relationship with Taiwan, providing a
framework for robust engagement through the American Institute
in Taiwan and a commitment to ensuring Taiwan's self-defense
capabilities.
Thanks to new authorizations provided by Congress through
the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, the Biden Administration
has directed the drawdown of defense articles for Taiwan valued
at $345 million, notified Congress of the first-ever provision
of foreign military financing assistance to Taiwan, and
provided the first-ever international military education and
training funding to Taiwan.
By providing for Taiwan's defense needs, the United States
not only upholds its commitment to the island security but also
reinforces deterrence against any potential aggression. This is
more important than ever in light of Russia's illegal invasion
of Ukraine. How the United States responds to Russia's invasion
of Ukraine sends a strong message to authoritarian leaders
around the world who feel emboldened by Putin's actions.
Earlier this year, Taiwan's foreign minister, Joseph Wu,
stated that a halt in U.S. security assistance to Ukraine would
embolden the PRC in its aggression against Taiwan and fuel
propaganda from Beijing that the United States is an unreliable
partner.
That is why it was imperative that Congress pass the
supplementary security assistance for Ukraine and the Indo-
Pacific last month, which included 2 billion in foreign
military financing for our Indo-Pacific partners, including
Taiwan.
Although I was disappointed to see 112 of my Republican
colleagues vote against Ukraine's supplemental funding, and 34
oppose Indo-Pacific security assistance, both packages passed
with over 300 members, including all House Democrats,
confirming that the overwhelming majority of Congress stands
with our Democratic partners against authoritarian aggression.
Also, in an attempt to isolate Taiwan, we are seeing the
PRC advance false narratives about U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 2758 to thwart Taiwan's participation in
international organizations and, in turn, its diplomatic
partners.
When Nauru switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to
the PRC 2 days after Taiwan's Presidential election in January,
their government concerningly cited moving to the One China
principle that is in line with U.N. Resolution 2758. That is
why, in addition to countering false narratives about U.N. GA
Resolution 2758, USAID and the DFC are partnering with Taiwan
on development assistance to support countries that maintain
diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, in light of economic and
diplomatic coercion from Beijing.
In the face of growing challenges and uncertainties, the
United States remains resolute in its support for Taiwan, and
our commitment to maintaining peace and stability across the
Taiwan Strait.
Throughout the past 45 years, the TRA has served as the
foundation of an unshakeable U.S.-Taiwan friendship.
I look forward to working with my colleagues and partners
in Taiwan to continue to strengthen the bonds of friendship
between the United States and Taiwan and ensuring the future of
a free and open Indo-Pacific and world.
And, with that, I yield back.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Ranking Member Bera.
Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
But right now we are very pleased with the--you know, to
have with us--distinguished witness before us on this very
important topic. The Honorable Daniel Kritenbrink is Assistant
Secretary of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at
the U.S. Department of State.
Thank you for joining us today. Your full statement will be
made part of the record, and I will ask that you try to keep it
within 5 minutes, so we will have more opportunity for members
to ask you questions.
So let me now recognize you for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Kritenbrink. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to
speak with you today about the Administration's commitment to
the United States' longstanding One China policy, which is
guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint
communiques, and the six assurances, and which has promoted
peace and prosperity in the region for 45 years across multiple
Administrations from both parties.
I would also like to thank Congress for its bipartisan
support for the Administration's national security
supplemental, which will provide critical security assistance
for the Indo-Pacific region, including Taiwan. Today I will
deliver the below statement, which is a summarized version of
my written testimony which has been submitted for the record.
The U.S.'s unofficial relationship with Taiwan is stronger
than ever. With credit to Congress for passing the Taiwan
Relations Act, or the TRA, in 1979, which President Biden
himself voted for as a senator, the TRA has given us the tools
we need to pursue our overall objective of maintaining peace
and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
Far from being outdated or obsolete, the TRA provides an
enduring framework under which we continue to adapt to face the
challenges of today. The TRA is a remarkably prescient
document. Nearly a half century ago, it laid down a marker that
the United States would consider any effort to determine the
future of Taiwan by other-than-peaceful means as a matter of
grave concern.
The TRA laid the foundation for the United States to
provide Taiwan with the defense articles and services necessary
to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, as well as to
maintain our own capacity to resist any resort to force or
other forms of coercion against Taiwan.
The TRA also astutely anticipated the need to strengthen
support for Taiwan commensurate with the threat it faces.
Indeed, in the 45 years since the passage of the TRA, the PRC
threat to Taiwan has increased, and the PRC has never renounced
the use of force to unify with Taiwan.
In response to this threat, and consistent with our One
China policy, this Administration is bolstering cross-strait
deterrence using the full range of tools at our disposal. We
are grateful to Congress for providing additional authorities
and resources through the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act and
subsequent appropriations, which has allowed us to provide
several security assistance measures to Taiwan for the first
time which I have detailed further in my written testimony.
The Administration also notified Congress of more than $6.2
billion in foreign military sales to Taiwan, including 20 sales
between 2022 and 2023, which is the largest 2-year number of
notifications for Taiwan in at least 30 years.
Now, the defense aspects of deterrence, while crucial, they
are only one element of our approach. As the TRA declared,
peace and stability in the Strait is not only a U.S. interest,
but it is also a matter of international concern. We are
working daily toward increasing the diplomatic costs of
precipitous action against Taiwan by strengthening the
international coalition of allies and partners who recognize
the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait
and are willing to contribute to its maintenance.
We also continue to advocate for Taiwan's international
space, including Taiwan's meaningful participation in
international organizations and pushing back against the PRC's
attempts to mischaracterize U.N. General Assembly Resolution
2758.
Finally, our partnership with Taiwan has grown dramatically
and stands on its own, enabled by the tools and authorities
provided by the TRA. Taiwan is the United States' eighth
largest trading partner, with bilateral trade in goods and
services totaling nearly $128 billion in 2023, up from just $9
billion in 1979.
In addition, through the American Institute in Taiwan, this
Administration launched the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st
Century Trade; the Technology, Trade, and Investment
Collaboration framework; and the inaugural Science and
Technology Cooperation Dialogue, among other milestones. As
another example, TSMC's historic $65 billion investment in
Arizona is the largest greenfield foreign direct investment
project in U.S. history, supported with up to $6.6 billion in
direct funding through the CHIPS Act.
In conclusion, with the Taiwan Relations Act as a
foundational element of our One China policy, we have deepened
and expanded our ties with Taiwan over decades to reflect not
only the threat that Taiwan faces from the PRC, but also the
vibrant partnership between the United States and Taiwan.
We have been able to engage in extensive cooperation with
Taiwan because the TRA provides the authorities we need to
carry out our unofficial relationship. We have the framework we
need. We do not need to change it. What we need to do is
respond to the present moment using all the tools at our
disposal. I hope today I have demonstrated how this
Administration is doing just that, in close partnership with
Congress and this committee.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Kritenbrink follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you for your testimony. I now
recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask you some questions.
The CCP has been abusing U.N. Resolution 2758 that we have
been talking about to delegitimize and determine Taiwan's legal
status in international organizations and exclude Taiwan's
membership and meaningful participation in international
organizations, as I mentioned in my opening statement, like the
World Health Organization.
Last Congress my legislation, the Taiwan WHO Act, was
signed into law. It codified that it is the policy of the
United States to support Taiwan's meaningful participation in
World Health Assembly as an observer. The World Health Assembly
will be assembling later this month.
So can you talk about how the State Department is pushing
back against the PRC's misrepresentation of U.N. Resolution
2758? And can you commit to us right here in public to the
efforts to secure Taiwan's meaningful participation in WHA?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Madam Chairwoman, yes, I can. Let me
start with the first part of your question. We have called that
repeatedly the PRC's mischaracterization and misuse of U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 2758. I mentioned that briefly in
my testimony. Let me say a little bit about that.
Contrary to the false narratives that the PRC is pushing
about Resolution 2758, 2758 did not constitute a U.N.
institutional position on the ultimate political status of
Taiwan. It has no bearing on countries' sovereign decisions
regarding their relationship with Taiwan, and it does not
preclude Taiwan's meaningful participation in the U.N. system
or in any other multilateral forum.
Moreover, Resolution 2758 did not endorse, is not
equivalent to, and does not reflect a consensus for the PRC's
own so-called One China principle, a term that refers to the
PRC's own position on Taiwan. So, beyond that, ma'am, in
addition to pushing back against the misuse and
mischaracterization of 2758, we have aggressively tried to
support and expand Taiwan's international space. We support
strongly Taiwan's----
Mrs. Kim of California. In the international body, like at
the U.N. and others, so when----
Secretary Kritenbrink. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Kim of California [continuing]. The opportunity comes,
I hope that our voice and position will be very strong and make
sure that Taiwan is not excluded in any way.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Yes, ma'am. I think you will see----
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. Imminently, perhaps as
early as----
Mrs. Kim of California. In the interest of time----
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. Today, a statement----
Mrs. Kim of California [continuing]. Can I move on?
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. To that effect.
Mrs. Kim of California. Talk about----
Secretary Kritenbrink. Please.
Mrs. Kim of California [continuing]. Some other issues? Our
policy is that any issue across the Taiwan Strait must be
resolved peacefully, and that U.S. efforts and capabilities are
maintained to deter CCP aggression, yet our military
cooperation with Taiwan continues to be low or no profile,
while the CCP broadcasts and escalates its military exercises,
air and neighbor incursions, around Taiwan.
And despite our many lines of effort with engaging Taiwan,
CCP coercion is growing at a rapid pace. So can you talk
about--well, let me pose this question very directly. Are we
deterring CCP from aggression against Taiwan, or are they
deterring us?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Madam Chairwoman, our entire policy
when it comes to maintaining peace and stability across the
Taiwan Strait--and, again, that is our fundamental U.S.
national interest. It is predicated precisely on building
Taiwan's deterrence, building their deterrence capacity.
Mrs. Kim of California. So do weapons in Taiwan enhance or
detract from deterrence?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Well, ma'am, our policy is
predicated on the fact that we must, in accordance with our
obligations under the TRA, continue to provide Taiwan with the
defense articles and services necessary to help Taiwan maintain
a sufficient self-defense capability.
Mrs. Kim of California. Are weapons delivery more useful
before or after an invasion?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Ma'am, the entire idea is to prevent
an invasion through deterrence.
Mrs. Kim of California. Sure. Does the weapons backlog and
extended delivery times improve or degrade deterrence?
Secretary Kritenbrink. I would like to respond to that,
ma'am. I know you mentioned that in your opening statement as
well. I would say two things. The figure that you have quoted
about a backlog, I think there is one element of that that is
somewhat misleading.
There is always a lag time between the announcement and the
notification to Congress of a sale and the delivery timeline.
And some of those announced sales are in fact on track. They
are not yet delivered yet because that is natural. There are
others, we fully admit, that have been delayed.
Mrs. Kim of California. And we will be able to deliver
those in time, hopefully----
Secretary Kritenbrink. I would say we are doing----
Mrs. Kim of California [continuing]. Before----
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. Everything possible to
speed up that delivery. We have done everything, together with
my colleagues in the Political Military Bureau at State, and
with DOD, to speed up our own internal processes. But, ma'am, I
think one other additional challenge is some of the constraints
in the U.S. Defense Industrial Base. That is something we are
talking about with industry. I know that is something that
Congress has supported as well. I think that is part of it.
I would also say deterrence, more broadly, is involved with
assisting Taiwan, both civilian and military authorities, in
building out Taiwan's whole of society, a defense and
resilience that contributes to deterrence, as does the
international space----
Mrs. Kim of California. OK. Thank you.
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. Question you raised
earlier.
Mrs. Kim of California. I know my time is up, so let me now
recognize Ranking Member Bera for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
And, again, thank you, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, for
being here. You know, Congress' support for Taiwan has been
steadfast in a bipartisan way. And, again, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, I am privileged to be one of the co-chairs
of the Taiwan Caucus, along with Mr. Barr and Mr. Connolly and
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And it has over 200 caucus members in a
bipartisan way. So, you know, our support is steadfast.
That said, as of 2024, Taiwan maintains formal diplomatic
relations with 11 countries and the Holy See, primarily in
Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. What we have
seen over the past years, is that many countries have shifted
their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan due to the PRC placing
significant political and economic pressure on those smaller
countries.
This past week I had the privilege of leading a delegation
to the Pacific Islands, and we specifically and very
intentionally visited the island of Tuvalu, a diplomatic ally
of Taiwan. And in so doing, I think we were the first
congressional delegation ever to visit that island. But, again,
it was important for us to be there to reiterate the decision
that they made to continue to be a diplomatic ally of Taiwan,
but also to express and recognize that, you know, they are
facing significant pressure from Beijing.
I was just visiting with some members of the Japanese Diet
as well, and they have expressed, their support for Tuvalu as
well. But for smaller countries like that, we have seen China
use economic coercion and pressure. What are some of the tools
in terms of how State Department is partnering with countries
like Tuvalu that continue to maintain their recognition of
Taiwan, while also working with partners like Japan, Australia,
and others? And what are some of the tools that you are using?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Mr. Ranking Member, thank you very
much for those important questions. Maybe I will take them in
order. Yes, there is no doubt that much of PRC policy is
predicated on intimidating and pressuring and coercing Taiwan
through a variety of means, including one means that you have
highlighted here, which is picking off some of Taiwan's formal
diplomatic allies, presumably in an attempt to isolate and
further pressure Taiwan.
So what we have tried to signal to Taiwan's remaining
partners, we tried to signal affirmatively the benefits of
partnering with Taiwan. We have also tried to candidly address
some of the concerns about partnering with the PRC and
encourage some caution about always listening to some of the
promises that the PRC makes in the midst of this struggle,
which oftentimes remain unfilled.
But in a more practical way, and maybe highlighting Tuvalu
just as one example, we have tried to partner with Taiwan and
other close partners like Japan to work to make sure we can
address their needs and give them options, so they are not
subject to economic coercion, either from the PRC or from
anyone else, and so they see the benefits of partnering with us
as well.
In the context of Japanese Prime Minister Kishida's State
visit here, I think you may have seen there was an announcement
about funding for subsea cables to Tuvalu. And I think this is
one example to, again, show them the benefits of partnering
with us.
I would also say, too, sir, that as important as Taiwan's
remaining formal diplomatic allies are, I think it is at least
as important to highlight the benefits of Taiwan's many
unofficial partners, including the United States. And I would
say many of Taiwan's friends happen to be their unofficial
partners or some of their most capable and most strongly
supported partners as well.
Mr. Bera. Thank you. You know, the House passed the Tax
Relief for American Families and Workers Act. And included in
that bill that we passed in a bipartisan way were provisions to
authorize a negotiated solution to eliminate the double
taxation issue on cross-border investments between the United
States and Taiwan.
Unfortunately, this legislation is sitting over in the
Senate. From your perspective, why is it important that the
Senate take up this measure and pass the Tax Relief for
American Families and Workers Act, particularly to address the
issue of double taxation?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Well, Mr. Ranking Member, I fully
support your comments. We are grateful and thankful to the
House for passing the tax bill to eliminate this double-
taxation burden for both American and Taiwan companies, and we
do look forward and hope to see its passage in the Senate.
I think what we have seen, sir, is that when both American
and Taiwan companies face a double taxation burden, that is an
obvious hindrance to the further development and growth of our
vitally important economic and trade relationship.
As I think I outlined at the top, Taiwan is our eighth
largest trade partner, now more than $128 billion in annual
trade. I think that trade would increase if we were able to
reduce that burden, and I think that would further contribute
to another source of Taiwan resilience and another element of
deterrence; namely, investing in Taiwan's economic development.
Mr. Bera. Thank you. I yield back.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
I recognize Mrs. Wagner from Missouri for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Wagner. I thank the chair, and I thank the assistant
secretary for your time and your service. Confronting China is
a once-in-a-generation challenge. And if we are to defeat
China's plan--their plan, stated plan--to replace the United
States as the world's preeminent power, we must boldly stand by
our friends and partners, particularly Taiwan.
And I will say this, sir. As a former United States
Ambassador, I believe in diplomacy. But when we are dealing
with dictators, authoritarian governments, bullies, and a
country that is part of what I consider the axis of evil, which
is Russia, Iran, and China, deterrence through military weapons
and force is key and necessary. Hiding behind opacity and red
tape invites bullies like Xi Jinping to push the envelope.
Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, with Taiwan--and I am
going to take another stab at this. They are still facing a
backlog of $19 billion of U.S. arms sales that they have
purchased. OK? And I hope the emergency funding that Congress
just provided will help us get back on track. What remaining
bottlenecks and red tape at State are continuing to delay these
deliveries?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Congresswoman, thank you very much
for your questions. I would State that we are absolutely
committed to doing everything possible to build Taiwan's
deterrent capacity in every area that I have outlined here
today, including continuing to provide them the defense
articles necessary to maintain----
Mrs. Wagner. What is standing in the way?
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. Sufficient self-
defense. I would say, ma'am, the biggest hurdles we face, like
right now, are challenges in the U.S. Defense Industrial Base.
We have worked very hard internally at State and DOD to hasten
our processes, remove red tape. We--I am told that we approve
95 percent of FMS cases now within 2 weeks. So I think the main
challenge that we face, ma'am, are production challenges that--
--
Mrs. Wagner. They have been waiting for years for some of
this--let me just say, years--and I want to know what you are
doing to eliminate these barriers.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Actually, my colleague tells me it
is 95 percent of cases in 2 days, not 2 weeks. My apologies.
But I think the main point, ma'am, as I said, too----
Mrs. Wagner. They still don't have the weaponry. I don't
care how many days for process. Sorry.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Yes.
Mrs. Wagner. All due respect.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Yes, ma'am. I will underscore what I
said. That $19 billion, some of that--those are legitimate
delays. Some of those are simply cases that haven't been
delayed yet, because there is a natural delay from announcement
to----
Mrs. Wagner. OK. Let me ask you this. The fact that the $19
billion in weapons backlog is degrading our deterrence against
China, has China's behavior changed as a result? And how is
State addressing China's increasingly aggressive and coercive
activities in the region?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Ma'am, I would say that we believe,
one, that the threat from the PRC is growing. Two, we believe
that we are meeting that threat together----
Mrs. Wagner. How?
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. Together with our
Taiwan partners, through the provision of the arms that we are
talking about, through working with Taiwan authorities, both
civilian and military, on building their whole of society
defense and resilience----
Mrs. Wagner. Well----
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. On ensuring----
Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. There won't be a whole of society
if China overruns and takes over Taiwan. So the weapons backlog
also I think makes the United States appear to be a less
reliable partner to other countries in the Indo-Pacific. Your
thoughts?
Secretary Kritenbrink. I completely disagree, ma'am. I
would say that our partnership with Taiwan is stronger than it
has ever been. We do not believe that conflict is either
imminent or inevitable. And everything we do, both through the
demonstration of our own capabilities and our assistance to
Taiwan, is designed to demonstrate that deterrence, as well as
the fact I think a larger number of countries than ever before
has stood up to say they recognize the importance of Taiwan
to----
Mrs. Wagner. Let me ask, just in my limited time----
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. This a possibility.
Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. Assistant Secretary, if China
succeeds in taking control over swaths of the South China Sea,
as they are actively doing right now, how would U.S. and allied
countries' ability to operate in the first island China--in the
first island chain, pardon me, during the Indo-Pacific conflict
be impacted?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Ma'am, we have stood up to say that
in the South China Sea international law must be respected,
claims must be based in international law, and they must be--
disputes must be resolved peacefully in accordance with that
law.
We have also made clear in the case of the Philippines no
one should doubt the commitment of the United States of America
to the mutual defense treaty or----
Mrs. Wagner. The foundational Taiwan Relations Act, or TRA,
we have all been discussing states that the United States'
decision to establish diplomatic relations with China rests
upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be
determined by peaceful means. How would you define ``peaceful
means''? Because, you know, I don't defend ``peaceful means''
to include live fire drills and economic embargoes and election
interference.
Mrs. Kim of California. With all due respect, since the
gentlewoman's time is up, may I ask Assistant Secretary to
respond to her question?
Mrs. Wagner. I can't wait, and I have more to ask.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
Mrs. Wagner. So I thank you, Madam Chair.
Mrs. Kim of California. I would like to recognize the
gentleman from California, Representative Sherman, for 5
minutes.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Would you like me to respond, or
should I come back later?
Mrs. Kim of California. In writing.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Oh. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Kim of California. If you can. Yes.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Thank you.
Mrs. Kim of California. Or I--you know, Mr. Sherman can----
Mr. Sherman. Madam Chair, I would ask unanimous consent
that the gentleman, the witness, be allowed to answer that last
question.
Mrs. Kim of California. If that is OK with Mr. Sherman,
then I--OK.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you. All right.
Mr. Sherman. I thank my colleagues.
Mrs. Wagner. I am only 13 seconds over.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Wagner. All right.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Congresswoman, I would say the
United States of American has been--has been crystal clear from
day one that we have a fundamental national interest in
maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and
ensuring that cross-strait disputes are resolved peacefully.
That is the entire foundation of our policy. We are committed
to that, and there is no ambiguity on that point I think in
either Beijing, Taiwan, or----
Mrs. Wagner. Well, as I said, peaceful means.
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. Anywhere else.
Mrs. Wagner. I question peaceful means. Fire drills,
economic embargoes, election interference, tons of warships
surrounding the Strait, not very peaceful means to me. But I
thank you for answering the question, and I thank the gentleman
for allowing the response.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Thank you, ma'am.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. Now, Mr. Sherman, you
are recognized.
Mr. Sherman. Our objective is to deter an invasion or
blockade of Taiwan. There are three things or four things that
will go into Beijing's decisionmaking. The first is whether
Taiwan takes unwarranted--well, surprising action declaring its
own independence, forcing the issue. And I think we have done
an effective job of convincing our friends in Taiwan to
preserve the legal status quo. That would be easier if it was
clear that Taiwan could participate as a practical matter in
the WHO, Interpol, and a number of the organizations.
So the first is avoiding any precipitous action in Taipei
that upsets the status quo.
The second issue is, can and will Taiwanese fight?
The third is, can and will the United States fight?
And the fourth is, can and will the United States take
enormous economic action?
So we just passed a $90 billion-plus defense bill or
foreign policy bill, but it has got only 2 billion for all
Indo-Pacific allies in terms of armaments. Mr. Assistant
Secretary, how much of that 2 billion will go to bolster
Taiwan's defense?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Congressman, thank you. I can't say
at this point exactly how much of that $2 billion----
Mr. Sherman. The bulk?
Secretary Kritenbrink. I would say a significant amount. We
are having----
Mr. Sherman. That is not saying----
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. Those discussions right
now. And we----
Mr. Sherman. And I would point out, some of us were pushing
to get--send weapons to Ukraine before 2014. More of us were
pushing for weapons to go to Ukraine before 2022. And the world
would be much better if those weapons had gotten there in a way
that had deterred the invasion that is now the most difficult
event in Europe since World War II.
The issue of how the U.S.--well, let me ask. The Ukrainians
surprised the world and proved that they were willing to fight.
Are the Taiwanese willing to fight?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Congressman, what I would say is
that we have been impressed by the willingness of our Taiwan
counterparts to address this threat head on----
Mr. Sherman. Good.
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. To plan accordingly.
Mr. Sherman. I want to move on to two other things.
Secretary Kritenbrink. I think most opinion polls would say
the answer to your question----
Mr. Sherman. The next----
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. Is yes.
Mr. Sherman. The next issue is, will the United States
fight? And the answer is, we have a policy of strategic
ambiguity, and nothing Congress can do can absolutely assure
the result in that it would take a president to actually order
our forces to take any action. We don't know who is going to be
president. We don't know when. And the Chinese cannot be
certain what we will do militarily.
But the one area where we can lock something in is
economically, and that is to establish by law that if it--that
if China invades or blockades Taiwan, that they immediately,
automatically, without further action, lose MFN with the United
States. Would that be an effective deterrent? And would the
Administration support it?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Congressman, I am reluctant to
comment on any specific measure regarding an event that has not
yet happened. What I would say is that----
Mr. Sherman. Well, an event has happened. The Congressman
from California has proposed the idea that we adopt a statute
now, long before China takes any action, that makes it plain to
Beijing that if they invade or blockade they immediately lose
MFN.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Congressman----
Mr. Sherman. So that has happened. So can you comment on
it?
Secretary Kritenbrink. What I would say is that, obviously,
it would be a serious mistake for China to take such
precipitous action.
Mr. Sherman. Yes. But here is what----
Secretary Kritenbrink. They should assume----
Mr. Sherman. Here is what Beijing may be thinking. There
will be a flood of lobbyists from every corporation in America
saying, ``Oh my god, we can't cutoff MFN for China. It is going
to hurt our economy. We haven't de-risked.'' And our companies
are not de-risking the way they should.
That is why I hope--I guess Ann Wagner has left--but I am
hoping that in financial services we require companies to
report to their shareholders what they are doing to de-risk. Is
it the policy of the U.S. Government to encourage our
corporations to de-risk? Or do we just wait for the day when
they send all their lobbyists here saying, ``Oh, we haven't
done anything, so you can't possibly take economic action
against China''?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Congressman, we leave to companies,
just as we do other countries, to them to make their own
decisions. But what we do----
Mr. Sherman. We encourage companies to reduce their carbon
footprint. Do we encourage companies to reduce their China
risk?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Yes. We encourage countries and
companies to consider carefully the risk, and we do encourage
resilient supply chains and investments, so none of us are
overly dependent on any one country or supply chain.
Mr. Sherman. I yield back.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
Let me now recognize the gentleman from Kentucky,
Representative Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, the Biden Administration
says it maintains strategic ambiguity regarding whether the
United States would defend Taiwan militarily if it suffered an
armed attack by China. President Biden, however, has stated on
the record four times that he would commit U.S. military forces
to defend Taiwan.
For context, then-Senator Biden criticized President George
W. Bush for explicitly committing a U.S. response to a Chinese
invasion of Taiwan. Let's see if we can clarify what exactly
the policy of the Administration is here. Can you tell us for
the record, what is the policy of the Administration on
protecting Taiwan in the event of an attack?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Sir, I think what we have said all
along, and I can walk you through the entire policy, is we
State that our policy is we oppose any unilateral changes to
the status quo from either side. We do not support Taiwan
independence. We support cross-strait dialog. We expect cross-
strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means.
Mr. Barr. Yes.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Free from coercion, in a manner that
is acceptable to----
Mr. Barr. Is that strategic ambiguity?
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. Of the Strait?
Mr. Barr. What you just described, is that a policy of
strategic ambiguity?
Secretary Kritenbrink. We don't normally use that term,
sir, but others have used that term to describe how----
Mr. Barr. OK. Well, the President has clearly said the
opposite. He said--he has said definitively that we would
commit military force in the event of an armed conflict. Do you
disagree with the President, or does the President not speak
for the Administration?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Congressman, the U.S. One China
policy has not changed. The President himself has said
repeatedly that the One China policy has not changed, and he
said it to my understanding most recently after the Woodside
Summit.
I know that as well when some of these questions were
previously asked in September 2022, the National Security
Advisor spoke to this from the White House podium as well, and
he said that there has been no change to our policy, and the
President was not announcing any change to U.S. policy.
Mr. Barr. Well, clearly, the Administration is speaking out
of both sides of its mouth, and maybe that is ambiguity. Maybe
that is why we call it strategic ambiguity. Former late Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe said the United States should end its
strategic ambiguity with respect to Taiwan. Do you agree with
the former prime minister?
Secretary Kritenbrink. I do. Changing our longstanding One
China policy for--that has stood the test of time for the last
45 years has helped ensure peace and stability across the----
Mr. Barr. Do you believe that clarity----
Secretary Kritenbrink. It would be----
Mr. Barr [continuing]. About red lines and intentions is
useful or harmful to deterrence?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Well, Congressman, I think we have
been absolutely clear about America's national interest in
maintaining peace and----
Mr. Barr. That is my point. No, you are not being clear. It
is exactly the opposite of clarity. This exchange we are having
is a perfect example of how it is strategic ambiguity. It is
ambiguity. If you took the position that ambiguity is
deterrence, I would understand that. But it is clearly not
clear. It is unclear, and that is why Asian leaders like the
late prime minister has encouraged the United States to abandon
this dithering or this dissembling, this lack of clarity.
And so President Biden deserves credit. At least he is
trying to clear up the matter. I wish the State Department
would follow the Commander in Chief's lead here.
Let me move to another question, Assistant Secretary
Kritenbrink. In the readout of President Biden's meeting with
General Secretary Xi in November, President Biden apparently
called for restraint in the PRC's use of military activity in
and around the Taiwan Strait.
Since that meeting, the number of PLA air force incursions
crossing Taiwan's air defense identification zone have been
steadily increasing--72 in January, 86 in February, 139 in
March, 157 in April. Do you feel General Secretary Xi is
abiding by President Biden's call for restraint?
Secretary Kritenbrink. What I believe, Congressman, is that
China has stepped up its pressure directed at Taiwan. I also
believe that our deterrence and our contributions to
deterrence, those are real. They are effective.
Mr. Barr. Doesn't look like it.
Secretary Kritenbrink. We believe that conflict is not----
Mr. Barr. Doesn't look like it. It looks like--looks like
the incursions are going up. Looks like Beijing is not at all
deterred by tough words from President Biden at APEC. Doesn't
seem to be making a difference. In fact, it looks like it is
going in the opposite direction.
So I appreciate the attempts by the President to remove the
ambiguity, and I appreciate the calling for restraint, but it
doesn't look like the PRC is heeding those words.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Congressman, we have been clear what
our interests are, what is at stake. The TRA and our One China
policy has helped maintain peace and stability for the last 45
years, and we are proud--what we have to do is step up to the
challenge that you have outlined, Congressman. And with the
support of Congress, and the leadership of this Administration,
we have done that and we will continue to do so.
Mr. Barr. My time has expired. I yield back.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
Let me now recognize the gentleman from Virginia,
Representative Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And can I ask you, Mr. Assistant Secretary, pull the mic
closer. A little hard to hear. You are soft spoken.
Secretary Kritenbrink. My apologies.
Mr. Connolly. Let me just begin by saying I agree with Mr.
Barr. President Biden made it very clear in his personal view
that were there an unprovoked attack by the mainland against
Taiwan we would respond militarily. Now you could--maybe that
was, you know, off script. Maybe that was not part of the State
Department talking points. From my point of view, and I think
Mr. Barr was getting at that, I think that was actually very
useful. It gives Beijing something more to think about. In case
you thought our strategic ambiguity always errs on the side of
we are not going to do anything, listen to the President of the
United States. And I would hope our State Department will
listen to the President of the United States.
Secretary Kritenbrink. I can assure you we follow the
orders of the Commander in Chief.
Mr. Connolly. Good. Because he served on the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee where I serve for 36 years. He
chaired the committee. He knows what he is talking about. And
what he said was deliberate, and I applaud him for it.
I think it adds to the cost factor Beijing has to
calculate, and I would hope it would be seen as of strategic
value in what Mr. Barr was getting at in terms of the overall
policy of what has been called strategic ambiguity. That is
fine. But let's not always mean, you know, wishy-washy-ness and
probably we are not going to do anything.
Xi Jinping is watching what we are doing in Ukraine, and I
think he now has a different calculation because of the
solidarity of NATO and the resilience here in the United States
about the U.S. Congress and an overwhelming vote we are going
to stand with Ukraine. We are going to continue to resupply
Ukraine. We are going to resist militarily, unprovoked military
action against a sovereign nation. In the case of Taiwan, not a
sovereign nation, but a territory that we have circumscribed by
law.
I was on the committee when the Taiwan Relations Act was
written by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee primarily.
President Carter signed it into law in 1979 after recognizing
Beijing. What is your understanding of that law? Does that
guide you? Does that compel you, in terms of consistency with
policies that circumscribe the relationship with Taiwan and,
for that matter, with mainland China?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Well, Congressman, first, I will
just reiterate on the comments that the President made, he
himself has said he has not announced a change to our policy
on----
Mr. Connolly. Yes, I know. That is called strategic
ambiguity. Oh, yes.
Secretary Kritenbrink. On the point on Ukraine, I----
Mr. Connolly. When I say that we are going to respond
militarily, that is not a change.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Congressman, on Ukraine, I fully
agree the world is watching and what we have done is step up to
support Ukraine. It sends a powerful message around the world,
including in Asia, including in Beijing. The Taiwan Relations
Act, as I hope I have outlined here today, is a fundamental
element of our One China policy, gives us the tools and the
framework that we need to respond to the increasing threat from
China.
Mr. Connolly. It is also the law of----
Secretary Kritenbrink. It has allowed us----
Mr. Connolly. It is also the law of the land, Mr.----
Secretary Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. Assistant Secretary. It is not
just guidance. It is the law, and it was signed into law by the
President of the United States, head of the executive branch.
So----
Secretary Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. I would just hope that when my
colleagues reiterate parts of the Taiwan Relations Act that we
expect, in terms of Chinese behavior, that is the law, and that
should guide everything we do as we try to meet Chinese
aggression in the South China Sea especially.
Real quickly, does the Administration support the language
contained in the Tax Relief for American Families and Workers
Act on double taxation with respect to Taiwan? The Senate
hasn't acted yet. What is the Administration's position? As
quickly as you can say it.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Congressman, as I indicated earlier,
we are very grateful for the House's passage of that
legislation, and we hope the Senate will act on it as well.
Mr. Connolly. Great.
Secretary Kritenbrink. We think it is important for our----
Mr. Connolly. Great to hear.
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. Relationship with
Taiwan.
Mr. Connolly. I wrote a lot of that text, so I am glad to
hear that. Thank you, sir.
UN GA Resolution 2758. Beijing is spreading a lot of
disinformation about the consequences of that and what it
means, and all that good stuff. What is the State Department
doing to counter Chinese disinformation and to help Taipei
participate in things like the WHA, which is coming up?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Yes, sir. As I indicated earlier, we
have spoken out against China's misuse and mischaracterization
of 2758. We have spoken out in support of Taiwan's
participation in all international organizations that do not
require statehood, and meaningful participation by Taiwan in
all international organizations that do. And that includes the
WHA.
I think you will see a statement to that effect from U.S.
Government imminently. We will campaign for their observership
in the WHA, in ICAO, in Interpol, and elsewhere. Taiwan has a
lot to offer the international----
Mr. Connolly. All right. Finally, 92 percent of the world's
most advanced logic semiconductors smaller than 10 nanometers
are made in one place, Taiwan. Is that of strategic concern to
us? And should it be of concern, strategic concern, to
industrialized countries that rely on those chips?
Secretary Kritenbrink. The way that I would look at it,
Congressman, is it shows what is at stake in maintaining peace
and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Any type of crisis, let
alone a conflict across the Taiwan Strait, would be devastating
to the global economy. We should all be concerned about
maintaining peace and stability.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Thank you.
And thank you, Madam Chair.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
I would like to recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Davidson.
Mr. Davidson. Thanks, Chairwoman.
Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, could you please clarify
the distinction between the Taiwan Relations Act and an actual
security guarantee for Taiwan?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Sir, the Taiwan Relations Act has a
number of provisions that we have discussed here today. It
talks about how it will be the policy of the United States to
provide defense articles and services to Taiwan to assist
Taiwan in maintaining a credible self-defense. It talks about
how the United States will maintain the capacity to resist any
use of force or coercion to undermine peace and stability in
the Western Pacific. And I think that hopefully clarifies what
the distinction between the provisions of the TRA and what a
formal security pact or security treaty would look like.
Mr. Davidson. Does the State Department currently assess
that Xi Jinping intends to peacefully resolve the situation,
the disagreements they have with Taiwan, or does he consider
the use of force?
Secretary Kritenbrink. We think that if you take Chinese
statements at face value, they State explicitly that China
would prefer to resolve that issue peacefully, but they do not
rule out the use of force and they never have. But I would also
reiterate we have seen no indication that conflict is either
imminent or inevitable.
Mr. Davidson. The Taiwan Relations Act states that, quote,
``The United States' decision to establish diplomatic relations
with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation
that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful
means.'' Would the Administration consider ending diplomatic
relations with China if it no longer expected the future of
Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Congressman, I can't speak to a
hypothetical scenario. What I can say is we have made clear
from day one, including with Beijing, that America has a
fundamental national interest in peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait. The TRA also outlines that any threat or use of
coercion to resolve those issues by other than peaceful means
would be viewed as a matter of grave concern on the part of the
United States. I think that is crystal clear, sir.
Mr. Davidson. How do you feel that the TRA coordinates with
the One China policy to maintain stability in the region?
Secretary Kritenbrink. As I indicated, the pillars of our
One China policy are the Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-
China joint communiques, and the six assurances to Taiwan. In
totality, we believe that that policy and that policy approach
has stood the test of time. It has maintained peace and
stability for the last 45 years. And, again, I am confident
that together with the cooperation and support of Congress we
will continue to meet the challenge to maintain peace and
stability.
Mr. Davidson. Do you see threats to the shipping lanes
involved with escalatory actions by China?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Absolutely do. Fifty percent of
global container traffic goes to the Taiwan Strait. In addition
to the comments made by Congressman Connolly earlier, when you
look at the centrality of Taiwan to the global economy, peace
and stability across the Taiwan Strait has to be a matter of
international concern.
Mr. Davidson. Thanks for acknowledging that. And when you
think about, you know, the stakes here, you mentioned, you
know, our One China policy.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
Mr. Davidson. And, of course, that drew some attention when
President Trump announced, quote, ``our One China policy.'' Do
you see any differentiation in the evolution of the United
States' One China policy Administration to Administration?
Secretary Kritenbrink. I would say that in my mind the
terms are interchangeable. Whether it is our policy, it is the
U.S. One China policy, it is absolutely not the PRC One China
principle. And our policy has remained essentially unchanged
and enduring for the last 45 years, and I am confident, again,
together with Congress, we will continue to meet the challenge.
Mr. Davidson. Thank you. Can you commit that all the money
appropriated to the Biden Administration for use in the Indo-
Pacific as part of the national security emergency supplemental
that just passed and was signed into law will be used in the
Indo-Pacific and not used to service loans in other regions?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Well, Congressman, I am the EAP
Assistant Secretary. Our intention is to plan to invest and
spend those moneys where it was intended. I am not specifically
in charge of our budget, but I think the intent of Congress was
clear and that is what we are planning toward.
Mr. Davidson. Thank you for clarifying that. Does China
believe the U.S. position on protecting Taiwan in the event of
armed conflict is ambiguous?
Secretary Kritenbrink. I am sorry. Can you repeat the
question? Does China believe that our policy is ambiguous?
Mr. Davidson. Do ever colleagues feel that the position is
ambiguous? I mean, our policy formally has the word
``ambiguity'' in it. Does China believe our position is
ambiguous?
Secretary Kritenbrink. I would say formally, again, we
don't use that term. Here is what I am confident of. I am
confident that all across the region, including in the PRC,
know how fundamental peace and stability across the Taiwan
Strait is.
Mr. Davidson. Is China preparing for the United States to
become involved militarily should they use force?
Secretary Kritenbrink. I can't say that definitively, but I
know in prior testimony with my colleagues from the Department
of Defense their assessment is yes.
Mr. Davidson. Thank you. I yield back.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
Secretary Kritenbrink. In other words, their assessment of
PRC assessment is yes. Thank you.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I would like to
recognize the gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Houlahan. And
welcome to our subcommittee hearing.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I really
appreciate you and the ranking member allowing me to be here,
and it is good to be back in this room. I can tell you it is a
lot classier than it was when I last left it. I don't know what
you all have been doing, but it is pretty fancy.
My name is Chrissy Houlahan, and I serve on the Armed
Services and Intelligence Committees. I am grateful to be here
to ask some questions about Taiwan.
Sir, my first question has to do with our collective
concern. Many of us certainly in this room and in this Congress
are deeply concerned about election security, not only in our
own country but of course in how the United States can help
other countries to protect not only the physical and digital
infrastructure that is necessary for free and fair elections,
but also in countering the disinformation that comes as well.
So we know that Taiwan has historically, and particularly
recently, borne the brunt of Chinese disinformation campaigns.
There was a 2022 Freedom House report that said about Beijing's
global media influence that their efforts in Taiwan were very,
very high. But it also did note that Taiwan was resilient in
repelling that disinformation and in countering the CCP's
efforts.
So my question, sir, is, can you share any details that are
available and allowed to share of what involvement the State
Department, you specifically, have had in supporting Taiwan's
recent elections and how you might be planning on coordinating
in the future to counter CCP disinformation campaigns as well?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Congresswoman, thank you for your
very important question. I would say we agree that the threat
posed by misinformation and disinformation campaigns around the
world is a significant challenge to elections around the world,
including in Taiwan. I would say I have been part of a number
of conversations with friends in Taiwan to try to share both
our experience in countering such threats and lessons learned,
right, that we--that we have garnered over the years.
I will say that we have been generally impressed by
Taiwan's resilience, and I think that Taiwan's democracy really
is a shining example for many countries around the world and in
the region, and I think this most recent election bears that
out. But I think they recognize the threat. We have discussed
it multiple times and tried to share experiences.
Ms. Houlahan. And I will go back to that if I have a little
bit of time.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Houlahan. But my second question has to do with the TRA
and the fact that it has created a strategic partnership, as
you have mentioned, for the U.S. and the Indo-Pacific through
which the U.S. can counter Chinese influence. And my specific
question is, I have been very focused on how we can help Taiwan
with cybersecurity.
As of last December, Taiwan was facing, in some cases in
open source, hundreds of thousands of attacks, cyber attacks,
from the CCP each day. And so we recently passed a bill now
with my former colleague, Representative Gallagher and myself,
that was the Taiwan Cybersecurity Resiliency Act, and it was
signed into law in the NDAA of last year requiring the DOD to
expand military cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan.
My question to you is, is there any sort of analog to that?
What kind of efforts are existing, if at all, within the State
Department to share best practices on cybersecurity with
Taiwan?
Secretary Kritenbrink. I would say, ma'am, for details of
whether there are colleagues outside of my bureau working on
this right now with Taiwan, I would have to come back to you.
But I would say we have an ongoing and regular dialog with
counterparts in Taiwan about building societal resilience and
supporting their efforts to build so-called whole of society
resilience, including their all-out defense mobilization area
and plans. And a key part of that is cybersecurity.
And so it is a key part, we believe, of our contribution to
Taiwan's resilience, and building their deterrent capacity. And
I would also say, ma'am, that I have been gratified that other
partners, international partners, have expressed a willingness
to engage on these resilience issues as well.
Ms. Houlahan. And with what remains of my time, in both
cases, election security, kind of malign influence and malign
messaging, cybersecurity and resilience to cyber attacks, all
of those things, if there are things that we can do to be
helpful to enable the State Department to be as effective as
possible, as I know the DOD and the intel community are also
trying to be, we would welcome that, I am certain.
And, with that, I will yield back. Once again, thank you so
much for allowing me to be part of this hearing, and I yield.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Thank you, ma'am. And we will take
you up on that offer. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Ms. Houlahan, for
joining us.
I was informed that we have another member on his way,
literally, hopefully walking in in the next 30 seconds or so.
In the meantime, I would like to ask a question. In your
statement, you said China's decision to act peacefully would be
of grave concern. So based on China's behavior that we have
seen lately, do you have grave concerns?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Yes, ma'am. I believe you are
referring to my statement in which I quoted from the TRA, in
which it says that, of course, any means other than of a
peaceful nature to resolve these issues would be resolved--or
would be viewed with grave concern on the part of the United
States.
So I would say that if there were steps to use force, and
other precipitous action, we would absolutely view that with
grave concern. I hope I have made clear today we do recognize
China has used a number of coercive and pressure tactics, gray
zone tactics, to try to increase pressure on Taiwan and isolate
Taiwan.
We are certainly concerned about that, and I hope I have
made clear here today what we are doing to respond to that. And
we believe that with the support of the Congress and the many
tools that we have talked about here today, both under the
Taiwan Relations Act and the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act,
that we have the tools we need----
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
Secretary Kritenbrink [continuing]. To respond to that
challenge.
Mrs. Kim of California. Yesterday you appeared before the
Senate Committee and testified that the U.S. toolkit to push
back against Chinese coercion toward Taiwan is by arms sales,
helping Taiwan's defense reform, building out Taiwan's
international space, expanding economic resilience, and
enhancing Taiwan's whole of society resilience.
The last 4 years we have seen Taiwan lost its partnership
with Nauru, Honduras, Nicaragua, the diplomatic ally status.
And China has blocked several agricultural imports from Taiwan
at will.
During the last Administration, PLA violations of Taiwan's
air defense identification zone totaled 400 sorties. Over the
course of the Biden Administration, they have hit almost 500,
or 5,000 I should say. The Chinese military conducted military
exercises to the north and east of Taiwan. That had never been
done previously.
So given our policy is to maintain peace and stability
across the Taiwan Strait, free of coercion, tell us, by what
measure is this Administration's strategy effective in
deterring or dissuading Chinese coercion against Taiwan?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Ma'am, I would say through my
testimony and responses to questions today I hope I have laid
out the same strategy today as I did yesterday. We are
committed to that strategy. We recognize that the threat from
the PRC is growing. Use of gray zone tactics and coercion by
the PRC, they are growing, and we recognize that and we are
stepping up to meet that challenge in a range of ways, and I
would argue a range of unprecedented ways, both through efforts
to build Taiwan's military deterrent capacity, the work we are
doing to build out their international space to strengthen
their economic resilience, including being through our own
economic relationship, but also encouraging them to diversify
their supply chains and markets, and the like.
We are confident in our approach. We recognize that the
challenge is growing. But as I hope I have indicated here
today, we believe we have the framework and the tools
necessary. What we need to do is stand up and meet the moment.
We believe we are doing that, and we are doing that with the
support of this body, and we are grateful for that.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I would like to yield
some time to ranking member for a question or two.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Assistant Secretary, when I was in Taiwan 2 weeks after the
election to--wanted to help them celebrate a successful
democratic election, but also to congratulate President-elect
Lai. One of the things that we were apprised of was to kind of
watch the time between the election and the inauguration, May
20. Have we noticed, in terms of the PRC posture, what they
have been doing or not doing? It does seem like President Lai
has been measured in his comments, and I think appropriately,
you know, continuing the policy of One China.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. I
would say that we have been very clear, including through
Secretary Blinken's recent visit to Beijing, our expectation
that all sides will conduct themselves with restraint and
prudence in the period ahead. We have made clear to our friends
in Beijing that they should not take advantage of this period
in the run-up to the May 20 inauguration, to take steps that
would escalate tensions and undermine peace and stability.
And of course we have made clear that there shouldn't be
such steps after the inauguration as well. I would say we are
watching this very carefully, and we will continue to do so.
I also agree with you that I thought that President-elect
Lai's comments after the election were very responsible and
make clear our shared commitment to peace and stability across
the Taiwan Strait.
Mr. Bera. And I think that is important to emphasize. From
our perspective, I think from the Administration's perspective,
from the Taiwanese perspective, our goal is to maintain the
status quo, peace, stability, prosperity, you know, across the
Strait but throughout the region. It is Beijing, Xi Jinping,
that is in their aggressive manner changing that status quo.
And I think it is important for us to continue to counter that
narrative.
Again, our goal is to maintain the status quo, which really
has been peaceful and prosperous for all the countries in the
region, probably no more so than the PRC. So, you know, it is
Beijing and Xi Jinping that are changing that calculus. And,
unfortunately, we have to respond and, you know----
Secretary Kritenbrink. Well, Mr. Ranking Member, I agree
with all of that. It is very clear our commitment to the status
quo and peace and stability. I would argue the same is true for
the authorities in Taiwan. Our concern is that China is taking
measures that are undermining that status quo and long-held
peace and stability and that is why we have responded the way
that we have.
And I would also say I appreciate your comments, Mr.
Ranking Member, because I think it is important to underscore
here, too, that our consistent commitment to our One China
policy, as we define it, and our commitment to maintaining the
status quo, it has been important not just to maintaining peace
and stability across the Strait these 45 years, it is also a
really important feature in encouraging other like-minded
allies, partners, and friends, to stand up and speak out in
support of that peace and stability and support of Taiwan as
well.
It would be unwise to change the framework and the approach
that has held us in such good stead for the last 45 years, and
I think it would also undermine the ability and the willingness
of other countries to stand in partnership with us. I think it
is very much in our collective interest to shine a light on the
fact that it is the PRC that is working to undermine the status
quo.
Mr. Bera. Right.
Secretary Kritenbrink. Not us. Not Taiwan.
Mr. Bera. And knowing that the PRC, for Taiwan's diplomatic
partners, is obviously putting pressure on it. From the State
Department perspective, can you give us some examples of how we
are helping support some of those folks that continue to
maintain relations with Taiwan, you know, particularly in South
America and elsewhere?
Secretary Kritenbrink. Yes, sir. When it comes to Taiwan's
formal diplomatic partners, again, we have tried to reach out
directly to just help demonstrate the benefits of partnering
with a counterpart as capable as Taiwan. We have tried to as
well caution them about some of the inducements that the PRC
will sometimes offer and to be cautious about going down that
path.
And then, as I indicated earlier, we have also tried to
assist where we can in making sure that partners are resilient
and not subject to coercion. And, in the case of Tuvalu, I
talked about the work to connect them to subsea cables. We have
also worked with some partners in Latin America as well to make
sure that if they have certain needs that we can help address
them, particularly in those needs would represent a
vulnerability that might make them subject to coercion and
pressure from the PRC.
As I also indicated, Mr. Ranking Member, I think we have
been gratified as well. A number of Taiwan's unofficial
partners have stood up in pretty unprecedented ways over the
last several years to speak out in support of cross-strait
peace and stability, and I think that is an important
development as well.
Mr. Bera. All right. Thank you.
And I will yield back.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. Since we see no other
members in queue to ask questions, I would like to offer some
closing comments, and I would also ask, Ranking Member Bera, if
you have some closing comments as well.
So, first of all, I want to thank you, Assistant Secretary,
for joining us today, and all the members that were here to ask
questions. This hearing crystallizes, at least in my mind, the
longstanding, decisive role Congress has played, and continues
to play, regarding Taiwan. And it was Congress that fought hard
to maintain relations with Taiwan in peace across the Taiwan
Strait.
Today Chairman Xi's own words and actions are trying to
upset this peace. He is aggressively attempting to change the
status quo in the Taiwan Strait and upend the rules-based
international order. The United States chose to diplomatically
recognize Communist China severed ties with Taiwan and withdraw
our military on the expectation that any issues between China
and Taiwan would be resolved peacefully.
So we provide arms to Taiwan, build our own capabilities to
keep that peace. If our expectations of peace are lowering, how
do we ramp up our support to create the deterrence needed to
maintain peace? The next decade may determine the trajectory of
security in the Indo-Pacific for the next 100 years.
If our deterrence fails, then we plunge our children and
grandchildren into a more dangerous and unpredictable world. We
cannot let that happen.
So we have got a lot of work to do. As you can see, this--
when it comes to Taiwan, this is clearly a bipartisan issue and
we will continue to work, you know, in that fashion.
So, with that, I would like to ask if, Mr. Bera, you have
some closing comments.
Mr. Bera. Yes. I would just echo what the chairwoman said.
I think we, as a Nation, can be proud of what we did in the 75
years post World War II in terms of creating a framework of
peace, stability, prosperity, throughout the world, lifting
millions out of poverty and, again, really creating that
context of peace and stability.
We have seen, though, over the last decade, decade and a
half, with the Great Recession, with the pandemic, and now,
really, for the first time big country war with the unprovoked
Russian invasion of Ukraine, and, you know, it does behoove us
at this moment in time to work with our allies, friends in the
region, not to do anything other than to make sure our children
and grandchildren have that same peace, stability, and
prosperity.
That said, in Asia, we have seen aggressive actions in the
South China Sea. We have seen, as you have alluded to, the gray
zone tactics that the PRC is using in various parts of the
world, but that diplomacy and debt trap, that Belt and Road,
often will get small countries.
And, obviously, the aggression that we are seeing across
the South China Sea, not to mention the disregard of previous
agreements with regards to Hong Kong. So it does behoove us
with our partners and allies to step up to preserve that peace,
stability, and prosperity, so our children can--and
grandchildren can enjoy the world that we have enjoyed.
So, again, I thank you for your service. I appreciate the
hard work that the Biden Administration has been doing, and,
again, in a bipartisan way. I think to the people of Taiwan and
to Asia, you know, Democrats and Republicans stand together in
preserving the peace, prosperity, freedom, and democracy.
Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I know on our overseas
travels we have run into each other at some, you know, like, of
all places, at the airport. And so I know you are working
really hard, your Administration is working really hard, to
work with our key partners, especially like in the case of
Taiwan, as we are talking about that today.
It is as important on the congressional level as we travel
out and meet with our counterparts that U.S. is showing our
leadership and giving them the assurance that we will be there,
which is one of the reasons why, in all of my engagements, I
make it a point to ask our friends and partners to stand with
the United States.
We don't want our friends and allies to turn to China. We
want them to turn to us. But we also need to show up and engage
and give the alternatives. So as you travel, as we travel as
Members of Congress, we hope we can continue this dialog, share
our best practices, and maybe share some notes and comments,
and so that we can do this in a very close working relationship
way.
And I--so for that, I want to thank you so much for your
work, and I want to thank you for your valuable testimony and
answering all of our questions. So I want to also thank my
colleagues, who showed up to our hearing today.
The members of the committee may have some additional
questions for you, so we will ask you to respond to those in
writing.
Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to
submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the
record, subject to the length limitations.
So, without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
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