[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                      THREE YEARS LATER: D.C. NATIONAL GUARD 
                       WHISTLEBLOWERS SPEAK OUT ON JANUARY 
                       6 DELAY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE
                               
                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

                                 OF THE

                   COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             APRIL 17, 2024

                               __________

      Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration
      
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]      


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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
                         
                   COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION

                    BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin, Chairman

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia            JOSEPH MORELLE, New York,
MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia                 Ranking Member
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina          TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
STEPHANIE BICE, Oklahoma             NORMA TORRES, California
MIKE CAREY, Ohio                     DEREK KILMER, Washington
ANTHONY D'ESPOSITO, New York
LAUREL LEE, Florida

                       Mike Platt, Staff Director
                  Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director

                                 ------                                

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

                    BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia, Chair

MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia            NORMA TORRES, California
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina               Ranking Member
ANTHONY D'ESPOSITO, New York         DEREK KILMER, Washington

             Elliott Tomlinson, Subcommittee Staff Director
                         
                         
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                           Opening Statements

Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight Barry Loudermilk, 
  Representative from the State of Georgia.......................     1
    Prepared statement of the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
      Oversight Barry Loudermilk.................................     4
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight Norma Torres, 
  Representative from the State of California....................     5
    Prepared statement of Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on 
      Oversight Norma Torres.....................................     7
Ranking Member of the Committee on House Administration Joseph 
  Morelle, Representative from the State of New York.............     8
    Prepared statement of Ranking Member of the Committee on 
      House Administration Joseph Morelle........................     9

                               Statement

Hon. Morgan Griffith, Representative from the State of Virginia..    13
    Prepared statement of Hon. Morgan Griffith...................    20

                           Witness Statements

Command Sergeant Major Michael Brooks............................    22
    Prepared statement of Command Sergeant Major Michael Brooks..    24
Colonel Earl Matthews............................................    26
    Prepared statement of Colonel Earl Matthews..................    27
Brigadier General Aaron Dean.....................................    53
    Prepared statement of Brigadier General Aaron Dean...........    54
Captain Timothy Nick.............................................    54
    Prepared statement of Captain Timothy Nick...................    56

                       Submissions for the Record

Transcribed interview of Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher 
  Miller.........................................................    11
Army timeline of events..........................................    13
New York Times article...........................................    65
Memorandum from the Secretary of the Army........................    93
Letter from the Secretary of the Army............................    94
Politico article.................................................    97
Letter from the Select Committee to the General Counsel of the 
  Department of Homeland Security................................   101
Pages 99 to 101 of Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher 
  Miller's interview with the Select Committee...................   104
PolitiFact article...............................................   108
CNN article......................................................   114
Washington Post article..........................................   116
Email from Mark Meadows to John Aycoth...........................   121
Appendix 2 of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6 
  Attack final report............................................   123
Summaries of the Capitol Police Inspector General reports 
  requested......................................................   178

 
  THREE YEARS LATER: D.C. NATIONAL GUARD WHISTLEBLOWERS SPEAK OUT ON 
                            JANUARY 6 DELAY

                              ----------                              


                             April 17, 2024

                 Subcommittee on Oversight,
                 Committee on House Administration,
                                  House of Representatives,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in 
room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Barry 
Loudermilk
    [chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Loudermilk, Griffith, Murphy, 
D'Esposito, Morelle, and Torres.
    Staff present: March Bell, General Counsel; Annemarie Cake, 
Staff Assistant; Hillary Lassiter, Deputy Staff Director, 
Subcommittee on Oversight; Janet Schwalb, Deputy Staff Director 
for Advice and Guidance; Elliott Tomlinson, Staff Director, 
Subcommittee on Oversight; Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff 
Director; Owen Reilly, Minority Professional Staff; and Matt 
Schlesinger, Minority Senior Counsel.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY LOUDERMILK, CHAIRMAN OF THE 
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM GEORGIA

    Chairman Loudermilk. The Subcommittee on Oversight will 
come to order.
    Without objection, the chair may declare a recess at any 
time.
    Also, without objection, the meeting record will remain 
open for 5 legislative days so Members may submit any materials 
they wish to be included therein.
    Thank you, Ranking Member Torres, Members of the 
Subcommittee, and our courageous whistleblowers, for joining us 
for today's oversight hearing.
    These whistleblowers are coming forward today to share for 
the first time under oath their firsthand account related to 
National Guard deployment on January 6. None of today's 
whistleblowers were interviewed under oath by the Department of 
Defense Inspector General or the Select Committee.
    January 6, 2021, highlighted a culmination of failures at 
many levels. For today's hearing, we are examining the 
Department of Defense and the D.C. National Guard's response to 
the violent breach of the Capitol. We will get into it.
    I would like to play a brief video about the timeframe of 
the delay.
    Mrs. Torres. Is this the video we received just this 
morning? Last night? OK.
    [Video shown.]
    Chairman Loudermilk. I want to thank the minority for their 
indulgence in playing the video. I think it is important to 
kind of set the stage of just how important 3 hours and 19 
minutes can be on a day like that.
    At a previous hearing, we heard testimony from former U.S. 
Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund about the former Speaker and 
the congressional leadership delay of the U.S. Capitol Police's 
request for assistance.
    On January 6, 2021, at 1:49 p.m., the D.C. National Guard 
received the first request for immediate assistance from the 
U.S. Capitol Police as protestors started to gather and force 
their way into the Capitol complex. However, at this time the 
Capitol Police Board had not officially approved the request.
    At roughly 2:12 p.m., protestors breached the Capitol and 
began assaulting police officers. Staffers and Members of 
Congress were ordered to evacuate, including myself and others 
that are here today. Capitol Police attempted to secure Members 
and clear the Capitol but were quickly outnumbered.
    There have been many testimonies of that day, but one thing 
is clear: The U.S. Capitol Police requested and needed urgent 
assistance from anyone who would answer the call, including the 
Metropolitan Police Department and various Federal law 
enforcement entities and the D.C. National Guard. However, 
there was a delay deploying the National Guard for over 3 
hours.
    Almost an hour after the Capitol was breached, at 3:04 
p.m., the Acting Secretary of Defense, Christopher Miller, 
approved the D.C. National Guard to deploy to the Capitol.
    Just a brief history lesson for those who do not know. 
Executive Order 11485 delegates oversight of the D.C. National 
Guard to the Department of Defense. A 1969 memo further 
designates this authority specifically to the Secretary of the 
Army.
    On January 6, 2021, the Commanding General of the D.C. 
National Guard, William Walker, reported directly to the 
Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy.
    The D.C. National Guard was at the Armory, 1.2 miles away 
from the Capitol, waiting for authorization to deploy to assist 
civil authorities and quell the riot. However, the D.C. 
National Guard did not arrive at the Capitol until almost 6 
p.m. That is 3 hours and 19 minutes of delay.
    During those hours, chaos engulfed Members of Congress, law 
enforcement officers, reporters, staffers, and citizens. During 
those hours, necessary help from the D.C. National Guard was 
not on the way.
    Our goal today is to get to the bottom as to why.
    It took too long for the D.C. National Guard to arrive at 
the Capitol. The 113th Wing--Capital Guardians--have a proud 
history of protecting our Nation's capital and serving our 
Nation's leadership. Nevertheless, the New Jersey State Police 
from nearly 150 miles away responded to the Capitol before the 
D.C. National Guard.
    Additionally, the Pentagon knew that there was a threat to 
governmental operations because, by 3:37 p.m. the Pentagon sent 
its own security forces to guard the homes of defense leaders.
    At 3:37 p.m., no D.C. National Guard forces were on the way 
to the Capitol.
    Throughout my Subcommittee's extensive investigation into 
the events of January 6 and the Select Committee on January 6, 
we have uncovered concerning inconsistencies regarding the 
mobilization of the D.C. National Guard.
    Through phone records, firsthand accounts, sworn 
testimonies, and after-action reports we have gathered, there 
appears to have been a significant delay at the Department of 
Defense in either deploying the National Guard or communicating 
the order of deployment.
    Either way, the purpose of this hearing is to hear the D.C. 
National Guard's story for the first time ever about the 3 hour 
and 19 minute delay.
    On November 16, 2021, the Department of Defense Inspector 
General released a report reviewing their role in the response 
to January 6 which claimed that the D.C. National Guard was 
deployed to the Capitol as quickly as possible.
    However, the report also credited significant delays in 
deployment to D.C. National Guard Commanding General Major 
General William Walker neglecting to mobilize after receiving 
orders.
    Specifically, the DOD IG (Department of Defense Inspector 
General) report concludes that the leader of the National Guard 
response, Major General Walker, received direction from the 
Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy, to deploy the D.C. 
National Guard to the Capitol twice, once at 4:35 p.m. and 
again at 5 p.m.
    Major General Walker denies that either of these calls took 
place.
    Despite the many inconsistencies and contradictions of the 
Department of Defense's responsibility that day, the Select 
Committee on January 6 ignored these discrepancies, despite 
them being shared privately by their own staff, and barreled 
forward with the DOD's side of the story.
    Following the release of the DOD IG report, multiple 
whistleblowers from the D.C. National Guard who were present 
with Major General Walker have come forward to share their 
experiences.
    According to their testimony, hours of vital response time 
were missed because senior Army officials had personal concerns 
regarding military presence at the U.S. Capitol.
    Today we have the responsibility of recognizing these D.C. 
National Guardsmen, listening to their testimony, and honoring 
their patriotism, these brave men who showed up to defend the 
Capitol and were discarded and ignored when they tried to come 
forward.
    I reached out to the DOD IG regarding concerns with their 
report and contradictory narratives. For nearly 2 months I have 
not received any answers.
    Today we will learn more about what happened that day 
regarding the delay. We will hear a side of the story that has 
been ignored for too long.
    Most importantly, today we will look into the future and 
make sure that our Capitol, our Capital Guardians, and our law 
enforcement partners are more prepared today than they were 3 
years ago.
    We are only able to conduct this oversight because 
whistleblowers have come forward to share their stories. I 
encourage anyone to reach out to the Subcommittee as our 
investigation continues.
    [The prepared statement of Chairman Loudermilk follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 
                        BARRY LOUDERMILK

    These whistleblowers are coming forward today to share for 
the first time under oath their firsthand account related to 
National Guard deployment on January 6. None of today's 
whistleblowers were interviewed under oath by the Department of 
Defense Inspector General or the Select Committee.
    January 6, 2021, highlighted a culmination of failures at 
many levels. For today's hearing, we are examining the 
Department of Defense and the D.C. National Guard's response to 
the violent breach of the Capitol. We will get into it.
    I would like to play a brief video about the timeframe of 
the delay.
    [Video shown.]
    I want to thank the minority for their indulgence in 
playing the video. I think it is important to kind of set the 
stage of just how important 3 hours and 19 minutes can be on a 
day like that.
    At a previous hearing, we heard testimony from former U.S. 
Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund about the former Speaker and 
the congressional leadership delay of the U.S. Capitol Police's 
request for assistance.
    On January 6, 2021, at 1:49 p.m., the D.C. National Guard 
received the first request for immediate assistance from the 
U.S. Capitol Police as protestors started to gather and force 
their way into the Capitol complex. However, at this time the 
Capitol Police Board had not officially approved the request.
    At roughly 2:12 p.m., protestors breached the Capitol and 
began assaulting police officers. Staffers and Members of 
Congress were ordered to evacuate, including myself and others 
that are here today. Capitol Police attempted to secure Members 
and clear the Capitol but were quickly outnumbered.
    There have been many testimonies of that day, but one thing 
is clear: The U.S. Capitol Police requested and needed urgent 
assistance from anyone who would answer the call, including the 
Metropolitan Police Department and various Federal law 
enforcement entities and the D.C. National Guard. However, 
there was a delay deploying the National Guard for over 3 
hours.
    Almost an hour after the Capitol was breached, at 3:04 
p.m., the Acting Secretary of Defense, Christopher Miller, 
approved the D.C. National Guard to deploy to the Capitol.
    Just a brief history lesson for those who do not know. 
Executive Order 11485 delegates oversight of the D.C. National 
Guard to the Department of Defense. A 1969 memo further 
designates this authority specifically to the Secretary of the 
Army.
    On January 6, 2021, the Commanding General of the D.C. 
National Guard, William Walker, reported directly to the 
Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy.
    The D.C. National Guard was at the Armory, 1.2 miles away 
from the Capitol, waiting for authorization to deploy to assist 
civil authorities and quell the riot. However, the D.C. 
National Guard did not arrive at the Capitol until almost 6 
p.m. That is 3 hours and 19 minutes of delay.
    During those hours, chaos engulfed Members of Congress, law 
enforcement officers, reporters, staffers, and citizens. During 
those hours, necessary help from the D.C. National Guard was 
not on the way.
    Our goal today is to get to the bottom as to why.
    It took too long for the D.C. National Guard to arrive at 
the Capitol. The 113th Wing Capital Guardians have a proud 
history of protecting our Nation's capital and serving our 
Nation's leadership. Nevertheless, the New Jersey State Police 
from nearly 150 miles away responded to the Capitol before the 
D.C. National Guard.
    Additionally, the Pentagon knew that there was a threat to 
governmental operations because, by 3:37 p.m. the Pentagon sent 
its own security forces to guard the homes of defense leaders.
    At 3:37 p.m., no D.C. National Guard forces were on the way 
to the Capitol.
    Throughout my Subcommittee's extensive investigation into 
the events of January 6 and the Select Committee on January 6, 
we have uncovered concerning inconsistencies regarding the 
mobilization of the D.C. National Guard.
    Through phone records, firsthand accounts, sworn 
testimonies, and after action reports we have gathered, there 
appears to have been a significant delay at the Department of 
Defense in either deploying the National Guard or communicating 
the order of deployment.
    Either way, the purpose of this hearing is to hear the D.C. 
National Guard's story for the first time ever about the 3 hour 
and 19 minute delay.
    On November 16, 2021, the Department of Defense Inspector 
General released a report reviewing their role in the response 
to January 6 which claimed that the D.C. National Guard was 
deployed to the Capitol as quickly as possible.
    However, the report also credited significant delays in 
deployment to D.C. National Guard Commanding General Major 
General William Walker neglecting to mobilize after receiving 
orders.
    Specifically, the DOD IG report concludes that the leader 
of the National Guard response, Major General Walker, received 
direction from the Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy, to 
deploy the D.C. National Guard to the Capitol twice, once at 
4:35 p.m. and again at 5 p.m.
    Major General Walker denies that either of these calls took 
place.
    Despite the many inconsistencies and contradictions of the 
Department of Defense's responsibility that day, the Select 
Committee on January 6 ignored these discrepancies, despite 
them being shared privately by their own staff, and barreled 
forward with the DOD's side of the story.
    Following the release of the DOD IG report, multiple 
whistleblowers from the D.C. National Guard who were present 
with Major General Walker have come forward to share their 
experiences.
    According to their testimony, hours of vital response time 
were missed because senior Army officials had personal concerns 
regarding military presence at the U.S. Capitol.
    Today we have the responsibility of recognizing these D.C. 
National Guardsmen, listening to their testimony, and honoring 
their patriotism, these brave men who showed up to defend the 
Capitol and were discarded and ignored when they tried to come 
forward.
    I reached out to the DOD IG regarding concerns with their 
report and contradictory narratives. For nearly 2 months I have 
not received any answers.
    Today we will learn more about what happened that day 
regarding the delay. We will hear a side of the story that has 
been ignored for too long.
    Most importantly, today we will look into the future and 
make sure that our Capitol, our Capital Guardians, and our law 
enforcement partners are more prepared today than they were 3 
years ago.
    We are only able to conduct this oversight because 
whistleblowers have come forward to share their stories. I 
encourage anyone to reach out to the Subcommittee as our 
investigation continues.

    I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mrs. Torres, for 5 
minutes for the purpose of providing an opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NORMA TORRES, RANKING MEMBER OF THE 
     SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
                           CALIFORNIA

    Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Chairman.
    Thank you to our witnesses for being here today and for 
your service to our Nation, particularly on January 6. You have 
sacrificed your time to protect us, and we owe you a debt of 
gratitude.
    We are here today discussing the delayed National Guard 
response to the Capitol for one reason and one reason only: 
Donald Trump dispatched an armed mob to try to overturn the 
election he knew he lost.
    For 3 hours and 19 minutes, as that violent mob assaulted 
law enforcement and hunted for Members of Congress and the Vice 
President, who they were trying to hang, the National Guard was 
forced to wait and wait and wait, all because of the chaos at 
the Pentagon caused by the Commander in Chief and the fear that 
he would involve the military in domestic political affairs, a 
big no-no we teach worldwide to emerging countries.
    This was a Commander in Chief who, as the riot unfolded, 
did not call his Acting Secretary of Defense or Secretary of 
the Army to ask why the National Guard was missing, where were 
they?
    A Commander in Chief who, after he learned someone was 
shot, did not care. He did not call the National Guard 
directly.
    A Commander in Chief whose aides and family partied and 
danced as the mob prepared to overturn the Capitol.
    A Commander in Chief who sat in his dining room watching it 
all unfold on TV like it was an action movie with an ending 
favorable to him.
    How did we get here? Let me tell you.
    In response to the June 2020 demonstrations responding to 
the murder of George Floyd, President Trump said he would, 
quote, ``deploy the United States military,'' end quote, to put 
down the protests and even asked Secretary of Defense Mark 
Esper why the military could not just, quote, ``shoot the 
protesters in the legs or something,'' end quote.
    Secretary Esper found the President's comments so 
disturbing he held a press conference, saying he opposed 
invoking the Insurrection Act.
    Then, in December, as Trump continued to spread conspiracy 
theories supported by Members of this Congress sitting here 
today about the election being stolen, talk of invoking the 
Insurrection Act reached a boiling point.
    It got so bad that his own Secretary of the Army and the 
Army Chief of Staff, a four-star general, issued a joint 
statement saying, quote, ``There is no role for the U.S. 
military in determining the outcome of an American election,'' 
end quote.
    As our top military leaders worried the President would 
declare martial law, the rest of the national security 
apparatus was in total disarray. People were getting fired or 
resigning left and right. Everyone remembers that, right? With 
only 71 days left in his term, Trump terminated the Secretary 
of Defense and replaced him with an Acting Secretary of Defense 
who was completely, completely over his head.
    Contrary to attempts to rewrite history, the January 6 
Select Committee conducted more than two dozen interviews and 
reviewed over 37,000 pages of documents related to the National 
Guard and dedicated 46 pages of its final report to this issue.
    The Select Committee found that the chaos led to an ill-
equipped Acting Secretary of Defense issuing an unclear order 
to the Secretary of the Army, an order so unclear that it was 
interpreted differently by the Acting Secretary of Defense, the 
Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of the Army--three 
people, three different interpretations.
    It is all there in the Select Committee's final report and 
the dozens of relevant transcripts available online.
    Adding to the chaos, these top Army officials exercised 
extreme caution and imposed unprecedented restrictions on when 
and how to deploy the Guard on January 6. This was the direct 
result of the President's decision to involve the military in 
domestic affairs.
    To our witnesses, I am so sorry. I am so sorry that Trump's 
Defense Department and Army leadership failed you and they 
failed us on January 6. You should never have been forced to 
sit on your hands while we were lying on our stomachs, planning 
to use a pen in our purses as a weapon to defend ourselves 
against the mob that was sent here to kill us by the President 
of the United States of America. We were preparing to die.
    I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mrs. Torres follows:]

  PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
                     OVERSIGHT NORMA TORRES

    We are here today discussing the delayed National Guard 
response to the Capitol for one reason and one reason only: 
Donald Trump dispatched an armed mob to try to overturn the 
election he knew he lost.
    For 3 hours and 19 minutes, as that violent mob assaulted 
law enforcement and hunted for Members of Congress and the Vice 
President, who they were trying to hang, the National Guard was 
forced to wait and wait and wait, all because of the chaos at 
the Pentagon caused by the Commander in Chief and the fear that 
he would involve the military in domestic political affairs, a 
big no no we teach worldwide to emerging countries.
    This was a Commander in Chief who, as the riot unfolded, 
did not call his Acting Secretary of Defense or Secretary of 
the Army to ask why the National Guard was missing, where were 
they?
    A Commander in Chief who, after he learned someone was 
shot, did not care. He did not call the National Guard 
directly.
    A Commander in Chief whose aides and family partied and 
danced as the mob prepared to overturn the Capitol.
    A Commander in Chief who sat in his dining room watching it 
all unfold on TV like it was an action movie with an ending 
favorable to him.
    How did we get here? Let me tell you.
    In response to the June 2020 demonstrations responding to 
the murder of George Floyd, President Trump said he would, 
quote, ``deploy the United States military,'' end quote, to put 
down the protests and even asked Secretary of Defense Mark 
Esper why the military could not just, quote, ``shoot the 
protesters in the legs or something,'' end quote.
    Secretary Esper found the President's comments so 
disturbing he held a press conference, saying he opposed 
invoking the Insurrection Act.
    Then, in December, as Trump continued to spread conspiracy 
theories supported by Members of this Congress sitting here 
today about the election being stolen, talk of invoking the 
Insurrection Act reached a boiling point.
    It got so bad that his own Secretary of the Army and the 
Army Chief of Staff, a four star general, issued a joint 
statement saying, quote, ``There is no role for the U.S. 
military in determining the outcome of an American election,'' 
end quote.
    As our top military leaders worried the President would 
declare martial law, the rest of the national security 
apparatus was in total disarray. People were getting fired or 
resigning left and right. Everyone remembers that, right? With 
only 71 days left in his term, Trump terminated the Secretary 
of Defense and replaced him with an Acting Secretary of Defense 
who was completely, completely over his head.
    Contrary to attempts to rewrite history, the January 6 
Select Committee conducted more than two dozen interviews and 
reviewed over 37,000 pages of documents related to the National 
Guard and dedicated 46 pages of its final report to this issue.
    The Select Committee found that the chaos led to an ill 
equipped Acting Secretary of Defense issuing an unclear order 
to the Secretary of the Army, an order so unclear that it was 
interpreted differently by the Acting Secretary of Defense, the 
Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of the Army three 
people, three different interpretations.
    It is all there in the Select Committee's final report and 
the dozens of relevant transcripts available online.
    Adding to the chaos, these top Army officials exercised 
extreme caution and imposed unprecedented restrictions on when 
and how to deploy the Guard on January 6. This was the direct 
result of the President's decision to involve the military in 
domestic affairs.
    To our witnesses, I am so sorry. I am so sorry that Trump's 
Defense Department and Army leadership failed you and they 
failed us on January 6. You should never have been forced to 
sit on your hands while we were lying on our stomachs, planning 
to use a pen in our purses as a weapon to defend ourselves 
against the mob that was sent here to kill us by the President 
of the United States of America. We were preparing to die.

    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentlelady yields.
    The chair now recognizes the full Committee Ranking Member, 
Mr. Morelle, for 5 minutes for the purpose of making an opening 
statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH MORELLE, RANKING MEMBER OF THE 
 COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
                            NEW YORK

    Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you to our witnesses for your careers of 
distinguished service.
    The D.C. National Guardsmen are known as the Capital 
Guardians, and we as Members are only able to do our jobs in 
the days and months that followed January 6 because you stood 
guard over us as you did. For that and for all of your long 
service, we owe you an enormous debt of gratitude. Thank you.
    I want to be clear: We are here today for a single reason. 
An unpatriotic, cynical, power-hungry man incited a deadly 
insurrection as part of his months-long effort to overturn a 
free and fair American election. We are here because of his 
lies about the 2020 election.
    It is hard to believe, it is, frankly, even hard to say, 
but it does not make it any less true. Yet many cannot bring 
themselves to acknowledge it, many in this room.
    As a result, we are here because of the majority's 15-month 
quixotic mission to find malfeasance from the January 6 Select 
Committee who investigated the insurrection where no 
malfeasance exists.
    Frankly, just as a question of jurisdiction should be 
raised. If this hearing is about the chain of command and/or 
communication between the various elements of the defense 
apparatus of the United States, then it falls to the House 
Armed Services Committee to do that investigation. They should 
be doing it. I do agree. This is clearly not the venue for this 
to happen.
    I do want to address something at the outset. There is a 
notion that persists that President Trump ordered or pushed for 
10,000 National Guard troops ahead of January 6. It has been 
debunked repeatedly, and it is also a red herring, and here is 
why.
    As the chair has stated, a 1969 executive order delegated 
authority of the D.C. National Guard to the Secretary of 
Defense who, in turn, delegated that authority to the Secretary 
of the Army.
    The President of the United States ultimately sits atop the 
chain of command. What he did with the National Guard before 
January 6 does not matter compared to his actions--or, I should 
say, inactions--on the 6th of January itself.
    What he never did on the 6th was call the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of the Army, or the D.C. National Guard 
itself to find out why they were not on the scene or to order 
them to the Capitol for that 3 hour and 19 minute delay.
    I want to quickly dispense with the claim once and for all 
that he ordered 10,000 troops, as he has said. Acting Secretary 
of Defense Christopher Miller was asked the following questions 
and provided the following answers under penalty of perjury.
    First question: ``The 10,000 troops, did you take that as a 
request for you or an order for you to deploy 10,000 troops?''
    His answer, and I quote: ``No, absolutely not. I 
interpreted it as a bit of Presidential banter or President 
Trump banter that you're all familiar with, and in no way, 
shape, or form did I interpret that as an order or direction.''
    He was also asked: ``In February 2021, Mark Meadows said on 
FOX News that, quote, `Even in January, that it was a given as 
many as 10,000 National Guard troops were told to be on the 
ready by the Secretary of Defense.' Is there any accuracy to 
that statement?''
    Mr. Meadows' (sic) answer: ``Not from my perspective. I was 
not given any direction or order or knew of any plans of that 
nature . . . No, there was--obviously we had plans for 
activating more folks, but that was not anything more than 
contingency planning.''
    Then a few questions later, ``To be crystal clear,'' the 
question was, ``there was no direct order from President Trump 
to put 10,000 troops to be on the ready for January 6. Is that 
correct?''
    His answer, quote: ``That's correct. There was no direct 
order. There was no order from the President.''
    I think that is all you need to know. Under oath, the 
Secretary of Defense said it never happened.
    Here is the bottom line. The President of the United States 
manipulated his followers into believing the election was 
stolen from him, summoned an armed mob to Washington, and then 
unleashed them on the United States Capitol, and then did 
absolutely nothing to stop what unfolded.
    People died. We almost lost our democracy. We could have a 
hundred hearings to deflect blame, but the facts are not going 
to change.
    President Truman famously had a sign on his desk that said, 
``The buck stops here.'' President Trump's sign, on the other 
hand, would read, ``The buck stops anywhere but here.''
    He lit the fire. He fanned the flames. The Defense 
Department delayed the troops. He wants everyone else to take 
the blame. Frankly, I find it pathetic.
    I agree with Senator Mitch McConnell who said, ``Former 
President Trump's actions preceding the riot were a 
disgraceful, disgraceful dereliction of duty.''
    Former Speaker Kevin McCarthy said Trump bears 
responsibility for his actions, no ifs, ands, or buts.
    I agree with Senator Lindsey Graham who said, ``All I can 
say is count me out. Enough is enough.''
    I only wish that they and the rest of the Republican Party 
agreed with their prior versions of themselves.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Morelle follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE 
                 ADMINISTRATION JOSEPH MORELLE

    The D.C. National Guardsmen are known as the Capital 
Guardians, and we as Members are only able to do our jobs in 
the days and months that followed January 6 because you stood 
guard over us as you did. For that and for all of your long 
service, we owe you an enormous debt of gratitude. Thank you.
    I want to be clear: We are here today for a single reason. 
An unpatriotic, cynical, power hungry man incited a deadly 
insurrection as part of his months long effort to overturn a 
free and fair American election. We are here because of his 
lies about the 2020 election.
    It is hard to believe, it is, frankly, even hard to say, 
but it does not make it any less true. Yet many cannot bring 
themselves to acknowledge it, many in this room.
    As a result, we are here because of the majority's 15-month 
quixotic mission to find malfeasance from the January 6 Select 
Committee who investigated the insurrection where no 
malfeasance exists.
    Frankly, just as a question of jurisdiction should be 
raised. If this hearing is about the chain of command and/or 
communication between the various elements of the defense 
apparatus of the United States, then it falls to the House 
Armed Services Committee to do that investigation. They should 
be doing it. I do agree. This is clearly not the venue for this 
to happen.
    I do want to address something at the outset. There is a 
notion that persists that President Trump ordered or pushed for 
10,000 National Guard troops ahead of January 6. It has been 
debunked repeatedly, and it is also a red herring, and here is 
why.
    As the chair has stated, a 1969 executive order delegated 
authority of the D.C. National Guard to the Secretary of 
Defense who, in turn, delegated that authority to the Secretary 
of the Army.
    The President of the United States ultimately sits atop the 
chain of command. What he did with the National Guard before 
January 6 does not matter compared to his actions or, I should 
say, inactions on the 6th of January itself.
    What he never did on the 6th was call the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of the Army, or the D.C. National Guard 
itself to find out why they were not on the scene or to order 
them to the Capitol for that 3 hour and 19 minute delay.
    I want to quickly dispense with the claim once and for all 
that he ordered 10,000 troops, as he has said. Acting Secretary 
of Defense Christopher Miller was asked the following questions 
and provided the following answers under penalty of perjury.
    First question: ``The 10,000 troops, did you take that as a 
request for you or an order for you to deploy 10,000 troops?''
    His answer, and I quote: ``No, absolutely not. I 
interpreted it as a bit of Presidential banter or President 
Trump banter that you're all familiar with, and in no way, 
shape, or form did I interpret that as an order or direction.''
    He was also asked: ``In February 2021, Mark Meadows said on 
FOX News that, quote, `Even in January, that it was a given as 
many as 10,000 National Guard troops were told to be on the 
ready by the Secretary of Defense.' Is there any accuracy to 
that statement?''
    Mr. Meadows' (sic) answer: ``Not from my perspective. I was 
not given any direction or order or knew of any plans of that 
nature . . . No, there was obviously we had plans for 
activating more folks, but that was not anything more than 
contingency planning.''
    Then a few questions later, ``To be crystal clear,'' the 
question was, ``there was no direct order from President Trump 
to put 10,000 troops to be on the ready for January 6. Is that 
correct?''
    His answer, quote: ``That's correct. There was no direct 
order. There was no order from the President.''
    I think that is all you need to know. Under oath, the 
Secretary of Defense said it never happened.
    Here is the bottom line. The President of the United States 
manipulated his followers into believing the election was 
stolen from him, summoned an armed mob to Washington, and then 
unleashed them on the United States Capitol, and then did 
absolutely nothing to stop what unfolded.
    People died. We almost lost our democracy. We could have a 
hundred hearings to deflect blame, but the facts are not going 
to change.
    President Truman famously had a sign on his desk that said, 
``The buck stops here.'' President Trump's sign, on the other 
hand, would read, ``The buck stops anywhere but here.''
    He lit the fire. He fanned the flames. The Defense 
Department delayed the troops. He wants everyone else to take 
the blame. Frankly, I find it pathetic.
    I agree with Senator Mitch McConnell who said, ``Former 
President Trump's actions preceding the riot were a 
disgraceful, disgraceful dereliction of duty.''
    Former Speaker Kevin McCarthy said Trump bears 
responsibility for his actions, no ifs, ands, or buts.
    I agree with Senator Lindsey Graham who said, ``All I can 
say is count me out. Enough is enough.''
    I only wish that they and the rest of the Republican Party 
agreed with their prior versions of themselves.

    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    Just for the record, this hearing is not being done in 
isolation. It has been carefully coordinated with the House 
Armed Services Committee and not only has their blessing but a 
bipartisan blessing to hold this hearing.
    Also, without objection, I would like to submit for the 
record Secretary Miller's transcribed interview under oath to 
the Select Committee on January 6.
    [The transcribed interview referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Chairman Loudermilk. Two excerpts.
    ``So, Mr. Miller, did you try to reach''--let me back up.
    ``On January 3d, did you have or even prior did you have 
all the authorities needed in terms of activating, deploying 
the D.C. National Guard?''
    He said, ``Yes. I felt I did.''
    ``Did you need any additional authorities, or was there a 
discussion about your authorities in any way at the January 3d 
meeting?''
    ``No, I didn't. I felt like I had all the authorities I 
needed and did not need to discuss anything with the President 
regarding authorities.''
    Another question: ``So, Mr. Miller, did you try to reach 
President Trump that day?''
    ``I did not.''
    ``Why not?''
    ``I had all the authorities I needed to perform my duties, 
responsibilities that day and didn't need any other guidance 
from the President.''
    I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith, 
for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MORGAN GRIFFITH, A U.S. 
           REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

    Mr. Griffith. Let me start, Mr. Chairman, by submitting for 
the record the Army timeline of events from December 31, 2020, 
through January 7, 2021, that report dated January 7, 2021.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Without objection.
    [The report referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Griffith. I find some of the comments this morning 
interesting because I, too, was on the floor that day. I find 
it interesting because there is an allegation that the 
Commander in Chief has to call everybody who is in the chain of 
command to make sure his orders are followed.
    It is my understanding, and I believe that the evidence 
today will show from these gentlemen who have given their time 
and are whistleblowers, meaning they are coming forward with 
something that other people may not want to have heard, that we 
will discover through their testimony that, in fact, the 
President had given the instruction, perhaps misunderstood on 
January 3 but certainly on January 6, prior to that instruction 
being relayed by his officers in accordance with general 
military procedure to the D.C. National Guard.
    That is a big part of what this hearing will be about 
today, and I think it is important that we keep that in mind.
    Further, we have heard a lot about the attempts to rewrite 
history because the January 6 Committee is allegedly supposed 
to have already done all of this. We will hear, I believe, from 
these gentlemen today that they were not talked to by the 
January 6 commission.
    Further, that commission will forever in history be tainted 
because it was the first time in history, in an attempt to 
write the history after the fact, that both sides, both major 
parties in this political situation, that we find--have found 
ourselves in for the last 175, 200 years, both were not invited 
to participate in an equal manner, that the Republican 
Representatives who were supposed to be on that, who as it was 
originally set up were supposed to be a part of the January 6 
Committee, were not allowed to be present. They were not 
allowed to cross-examine witnesses. They were not allowed to 
ask for witnesses like these four brave gentlemen who are here 
with us today. They were not allowed to call those witnesses to 
appear in front of the January 6 Committee.
    While the January 6 Committee may have found some very 
interesting information, they intentionally chose not to tell 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. At the 
very best, it can be described as a partial attempt to put 
forward facts that favored their side of the narrative and not 
to get to all the facts.
    As Jack Webb in his famous character from ``Dragnet'' used 
to say, ``The facts. We just want the facts, ma'am.''
    That is what we are here to do here today, is to try to 
make sure that we are getting to the facts, not the political 
rhetoric, not the emotions, per se, but the facts from four 
brave gentlemen who serve our Nation and have served our 
Nation, who have come forward.
    I do not know any of these gentlemen. I do not believe any 
of them has a political axe to grind. They are here just to 
deliver the facts.
    I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Griffith follows:]

           PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MORGAN GRIFFITH

    I find some of the comments this morning interesting 
because I, too, was on the floor that day. I find it 
interesting because there is an allegation that the Commander 
in Chief has to call everybody who is in the chain of command 
to make sure his orders are followed.
    It is my understanding, and I believe that the evidence 
today will show from these gentlemen who have given their time 
and are whistleblowers, meaning they are coming forward with 
something that other people may not want to have heard, that we 
will discover through their testimony that, in fact, the 
President had given the instruction, perhaps misunderstood on 
January 3 but certainly on January 6, prior to that instruction 
being relayed by his officers in accordance with general 
military procedure to the D.C. National Guard.
    That is a big part of what this hearing will be about 
today, and I think it is important that we keep that in mind.
    Further, we have heard a lot about the attempts to rewrite 
history because the January 6 Committee is allegedly supposed 
to have already done all of this. We will hear, I believe, from 
these gentlemen today that they were not talked to by the 
January 6 commission.
    Further, that commission will forever in history be tainted 
because it was the first time in history, in an attempt to 
write the history after the fact, that both sides, both major 
parties in this political situation, that we find have found 
ourselves in for the last 175, 200 years, both were not invited 
to participate in an equal manner, that the Republican 
Representatives who were supposed to be on that, who as it was 
originally set up were supposed to be a part of the January 6 
Committee, were not allowed to be present. They were not 
allowed to cross examine witnesses. They were not allowed to 
ask for witnesses like these four brave gentlemen who are here 
with us today. They were not allowed to call those witnesses to 
appear in front of the January 6 Committee.
    While the January 6 Committee may have found some very 
interesting information, they intentionally chose not to tell 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. At the 
very best, it can be described as a partial attempt to put 
forward facts that favored their side of the narrative and not 
to get to all the facts.
    As Jack Webb in his famous character from ``Dragnet'' used 
to say, ``The facts. We just want the facts, ma'am.''
    That is what we are here to do here today, is to try to 
make sure that we are getting to the facts, not the political 
rhetoric, not the emotions, per se, but the facts from four 
brave gentlemen who serve our Nation and have served our 
Nation, who have come forward.
    I do not know any of these gentlemen. I do not believe any 
of them has a political axe to grind. They are here just to 
deliver the facts.

    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    Without objection, all other Members' opening statements 
will be made part of the hearing record if they are submitted 
to the Committee clerk by 5 p.m. today.
    Pursuant to paragraph (b) of Committee Rule 6, the 
witnesses will please stand and raise your right hand.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Chairman Loudermilk. Let the record show the witnesses have 
answered in the affirmative.
    You may be seated.
    I will now introduce each of our witnesses.
    Our first witness is Command Sergeant Major Michael Brooks. 
Command Sergeant Major Brooks' military career spanned 29 
years, with combat tours in Iraq. Command Master Sergeant 
Brooks spent the end of his career in the D.C. National Guard, 
including at the Joint Task Force D.C. Mr. Brooks now works at 
a company that seeks to protect national and economic security 
from undue foreign influence.
    On January 6, 2021, Mr. Brooks was the senior enlisted 
advisor to Major General William Walker and advised on all 
enlisted matters.
    Our next witness is Colonel Earl Matthews, a decorated 
military veteran with a long and accomplished career in 
government and the private sector. Colonel Matthews served as 
Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for 
Defense Policy and Strategy on the National Security Council 
staff. He also served as the Army's Acting General Counsel and 
Principal Deputy General Counsel, as well as the Deputy Legal 
Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    On January 6, 2021, Colonel Matthews was the Chief Legal 
Advisor to Major General William Walker and was with him all 
day.
    Our next witness is Brigadier General Aaron Dean, with a 
similarly accomplished career in military service.
    Brigadier General Dean served in Operation Desert Storm and 
a combat tour in Iraq. He also served in the D.C. National 
Guard for over 35 years, exemplifying what it means to be a 
Capital Guardsman.
    On January 6, 2021, Brigadier General Dean served as Major 
General Walker's Adjutant General and Principal Advisor.
    Our final witness is Captain Timothy Nick, an Active-Duty 
servicemember in the Florida National Guard. Captain Nick has 
experience in law enforcement, including as a current officer 
in the U.S. Secret Service. Captain Nick previously served in 
the D.C. National Guard's Public Affairs Department.
    On January 6, 2021, Captain Nick was the aide-de-camp to 
Major General William Walker and took detailed notes of actions 
of Major General Walker on that day.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country and 
your strength and courage to come forward and share your 
accounting of events on January 6, 2021. We all look forward to 
your testimony.
    As a reminder, we have read your written statements, and 
they will appear in full in the hearing record.
    Under Committee Rule 9, you are to limit your oral 
presentation to a brief summary of your written statement 
unless I extend the time period in consultation with Ranking 
Member Torres.
    Please remember to turn on your microphone using the button 
in front of you so that Members can hear you. When you begin to 
speak, the light on the timer in front of you will turn green. 
After 4 minutes, the light will turn yellow. When the red light 
comes on, your 5 minutes has expired, and we just ask that you 
please wrap up your comments at that moment.
    I now recognize Command Sergeant Major Michael Brooks for 5 
minutes.

  STATEMENTS OF COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR MICHAEL BROOKS, SENIOR 
   ENLISTED OFFICER, D.C. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD; COLONEL EARL 
   MATTHEWS, CHIEF LEGAL ADVISOR, D.C. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD; 
   BRIGADIER GENERAL AARON DEAN, ADJUTANT GENERAL, D.C. ARMY 
 NATIONAL GUARD; AND CAPTAIN TIMOTHY NICK, AIDE-DE-CAMP, D.C. 
                      ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

       STATEMENT OF COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR MICHAEL BROOKS

    Sergeant Major Brooks. Good morning, Chairman Loudermilk, 
Ranking Member Torres, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank 
you for the opportunity to testify today.
    I am Command Sergeant Major, Retired, Michael F. Brooks. I 
am the former command senior enlisted----
    Chairman Loudermilk. Mr. Brooks, I am sorry to interrupt. 
Could you pull the microphone a little closer to you? People in 
the audience are having a hard time hearing. I apologize for 
that. You can start over, and we will reset your time.
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Thank you.
    Is that better?
    Chairman Loudermilk. Much better. Thank you.
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Good morning, Chairman Loudermilk, 
Ranking Member Torres, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank 
you for the opportunity to testify today.
    I am Command Sergeant Major, Retired, Michael F. Brooks. I 
am the former Command Senior Enlisted Leader of the District of 
Columbia National Guard--the Capital Guardians. I retired on 
March 1 of 2023 with 29 years of active Federal service in the 
Army and the Army National Guard.
    While I am no longer in service, I continue defense of our 
great Nation as a Compliance and Investigation Specialist with 
the Compliance and Adjudication Division of the Office of 
Information and Communications Technology and Services of the 
Bureau of Industry and Security.
    I served as the Command Senior Enlisted Leader of the D.C. 
National Guard from December 2017 to December 2022. As the most 
senior noncommissioned officer in the organization, I reported 
directly to the Commanding General. From 2017 until his 
retirement and selection as the 38th Sergeant at Arms for the 
House of Representatives, my commander was Major General 
William J. Walker.
    As his Senior Enlisted Advisor, I reported only to him, and 
I was with him throughout the days before, the day of, and the 
subsequent weeks and months that followed the events of January 
6, 2021.
    Imagine my surprise when the DOD IG released their report 
without once interviewing myself or other critically 
significant D.C. National Guard members with firsthand 
knowledge of what occurred that fateful day--not anonymous 
witnesses or anonymous officials but senior ranking military 
members that were in the room, on the calls, and on the secure 
video teleconference.
    I am not here to disparage the Army that I love and served 
for nearly three decades, but to correct the record and speak 
for the hundreds of enlisted soldiers and airmen of the D.C. 
National Guard who have always answered the call to serve 
without political bias or prejudice, who have always faithfully 
fulfilled their oath to support and defend the Constitution of 
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, 
those Capital Guardians who continue to do so even today, after 
being degraded by senior officials of the Army and the Army 
staff in their inaccurate and biased report.
    I believe those who steered the narrative of the DOD IG 
report did so not for historical documentation or to enhance 
future military capability, but to protect and advance 
individuals who sought to shield themselves from 
responsibility, to overly enhance their role and perceived 
significance in a critical moment in the history of our 
Nation's democracy.
    In truth, their actions, no matter how innocent they 
believe them to be, have led to an awful mark on our military 
and shown an incredible lack of respect for the service of the 
men and women who served in the D.C. National Guard before, 
during, and after January 6, 2021.
    Trust in our Army's most senior leadership was lost. Their 
actions and comments have highlighted the Army Staff and the 
Secretary of the Army's lack of knowledge and understanding of 
the D.C. National Guard, its authorities, and capabilities.
    Prior to the protests following the murder of George Floyd 
in May 2020, I do not believe any of them understood just how 
unique the D.C. National Guard is and the responsibility that 
is delegated from the President to the Secretary of Defense and 
further delegated to the Secretary of the Army. I believe it is 
this lack of understanding that led to the significant delays 
in the military response on January 6.
    I will not sit here today and say if we had been given 
authority to immediately respond when Chief Sund, the Chief of 
the Capitol Police, made that first frantic call for support at 
1:49 p.m. that we would have prevented the breach of the 
Capitol.
    What I can tell you with absolute certainty is that we had 
a force equipped and ready to respond and that, despite the 
inaccuracies of the DOD IG report, we had a plan and would have 
liked the opportunity to try.
    Instead, we waited for hours, less than 2 miles east of the 
Capitol Building, absolutely frustrated, knowing our Capitol 
had been breached and not understanding why we had not received 
the authorization to respond.
    I cannot tell you the number of times someone has asked me: 
Where were you? Where was the National Guard? Or how can you 
call yourselves Capital Guardians?
    There is no easy response to those questions, and the truth 
is we were there and we were ready. We just were not authorized 
to respond, and that is difficult to explain.
    The soldiers and airmen of the D.C. National Guard deserve 
better. They deserve to be recognized for their sacrifices over 
a prolonged period of civil unrest from May 2020 to May 2021.
    I look forward to your questions you may have. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Command Sergeant Major Michael 
Brooks follows:]

  PREPARED STATEMENT OF COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR MICHAEL BROOKS
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, Sergeant Major.
    I now recognize Colonel Earl Matthews for 5 minutes.

               STATEMENT OF COLONEL EARL MATTHEWS

    Colonel Matthews. Chairman Loudermilk, Ranking Member 
Torres, Members of the Subcommittee, good morning and thank you 
for the opportunity to appear before you today.
    My name is Earl Matthews, and I am a colonel in the United 
States Army Reserve. I am in the 25th year of my military 
service. I love our Army, and I am committed to our Army 
values.
    I am here today because two senior general officers of the 
United States Army, General Charles A. Flynn and Lieutenant 
General Walter E. Piatt, have acted contrary to those values.
    Generals Piatt and Flynn have lied to Congress, to Federal 
investigators, and to the American people about why it took so 
long for the District of Columbia National Guard to deploy to 
the U.S. Capitol on January the 6th, 2021.
    Their distortions contributed to a deeply and fundamentally 
flawed Department of Defense Inspector General investigation 
and to deficiencies in other official inquiries.
    On January the 6th, 2021, I was on duty and present during 
numerous conversations, video conferences, and phone calls 
leading up to, during, and after the riot which was engulfing 
the Capitol.
    [Disturbance in hearing room.]
    Chairman Loudermilk. Order.
    Colonel Matthews. When I say these general officers lied, I 
do not do so lightly or cavalierly. I speak from personal 
knowledge, having interacted with them on January the 6th in my 
official military capacity.
    Unfortunately, some senior officials within the Department 
of the Army and the Department of Defense have sought to 
protect or to promote Generals Flynn and Piatt. These senior 
civilian officials have excused, condoned, or overlooked the 
misconduct of these officers.
    As a former Acting General Counsel of the Department of the 
Army and its Chief Legal Officer, I take these matters 
seriously, even if others do not. I am glad this Subcommittee 
has an open mind and is committed to the dogged search for the 
truth.
    In my formal statement, which I provided to the Committee 
in advance of today's hearing, I detailed General Piatt's and 
General Flynn's intentional misrepresentations to the Congress 
and to Federal investigators. During today's hearing, I hope to 
discuss with you how they lied, where they lied, and, in my 
opinion, why they lied.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Colonel Earl Matthews follows:]

          PREPARED STATEMENT OF COLONEL EARL MATTHEWS
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                            ADDENDUM
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, Colonel Matthews.
    I now recognize Brigadier General Aaron Dean for 5 minutes.

           STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL AARON DEAN

    General Dean. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, 
Members of the Subcommittee.
    Good morning. I am Brigadier General, Retired, Aaron Dean.
    Let history record this moment as I, in my capacity as the 
second in command of the District of Columbia National Guard, 
entrusted with the sacred duty to advise and assist the 
Commanding General on matters of operational significance 
concerning the deployment of the District of Columbia National 
Guard on January 6, 2021, addressed the grave assertions and 
inaccuracies contained in the Inspector General's report DODIG-
2022-039.
    I believe it is my duty and moral obligation to stand 
before you today and illuminate the truth. I stand resolute, 
bearing witness to the unwavering readiness and unparalleled 
dedication of the servicemembers of the District of Columbia 
National Guard.
    I will answer questions honestly, as witnessed through the 
lens of my 34-year career in the District of Columbia National 
Guard.
    I rebuff in the strongest terms the insidious insinuation 
that the District of Columbia National Guard faltered in its 
duty, that it languished in apathy or incompetence when called 
upon to safeguard the sanctum of democracy.
    Today I will tell the truth to the best of my recollection, 
unblemished by falsehoods, and in doing so exonerate the honor 
of the brave soldiers and airmen who stood unwavering in the 
defense of our Nation.
    May my testimony serve as a testament to the indomitable 
spirit of those who answered the call of duty on that historic 
day.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Brigadier General Aaron Dean 
follows:]

       PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL AARON DEAN
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, General Dean.
    I now recognize Captain Timothy Nick for 5 minutes.

               STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN TIMOTHY NICK

    Captain Nick. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 
my name is Timothy Nick, and I am a captain in the Army 
National Guard.
    I am here today to aid the Subcommittee in resolving 
factual errors in the official record of what happened on 
January 6, 2021, specifically regarding the alleged District of 
Columbia National Guard's delayed response caused by critical, 
Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed Pentagon senior 
officials.
    I was concerned by the events that unfolded that day on the 
United States Capitol. As a Federal officer with the United 
States Secret Service and a former State trooper with the 
Florida Highway Patrol, my heart goes out to all law 
enforcement officers, sisters and brothers, that held the line 
that day to restore public order to the chaos.
    I am here today with my counsels, Lachlan McKinion and Dan 
Meyer of law firm Tully Rinckey. The firm has advised me, 
beginning with my role as a confidential source to the Select 
Committee to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the United 
States Capitol. When my confidentiality was breached, it was 
Dan who intervened to ensure I was protected as a military 
whistleblower.
    First, I want to explain my role on January 6. I was 
assigned as aide-de-camp, the personal assistant to Major 
General William Walker, the Commanding General of the D.C. 
National Guard. It was my only second day on the job.
    Please focus on alleged facts about--found in the November 
16, 2021, Department of Defense Inspector General's 
multidisciplinary review into the D.C. National Guard response 
and Department of Defense's role that day.
    I can say unequivocally that the Inspector General's review 
is riddled with inaccuracies, misstatements, and perhaps false 
flags and narratives regarding how critical Pentagon senior 
officials responded when our Republic was under great stress.
    For instance, during a conference call at 2:31 p.m. with 
members of the United States Army, U.S. Capitol Police, 
Metropolitan Police Department, District of Columbia 
government, and U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division, the 
U.S. Army's Lieutenant General Walter Piatt, Director of the 
Army Staff, and the Army's Lieutenant General Charles Flynn, 
Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations, were on the call. Also on 
was Colonel John Lubas, Executive Officer to the Secretary of 
the Army.
    The Army falsely denied that General Flynn was ever on the 
call. This is false and material on its face. Lieutenant Flynn 
was on the call and even participated in discussions.
    The Defense Inspector's review also rounds language, 
papering over the fact that Lieutenant General Piatt and 
Lieutenant General Flynn, while on the call, discussed how they 
``did not like the optics.'' That is a direct quote.
    They stated it would be in their best military advice to 
recommend to the Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy, to deny 
the request from Command General William Walker to deploy the 
D.C. National Guard and aid U.S. Capitol Police in restoring 
restoration of ordered liberty on Capitol Hill.
    In addition, former Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy 
claims he was on a 2:31 p.m. call and spoke on that call. This 
is false. Unless he was in the room, shadowing the call, and he 
did not speak nor identify himself, he was not on the call. He 
was en route to the Washington, D.C., regional office at the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation to support that agency's 
concept of operation plans for January 6.
    He went on to claim that he called and spoke to Major 
General Walker at least twice, ordering deployment of the D.C. 
National Guard. This is also false. At no time did General 
Walker take any calls, nor did we ever hear from the Secretary 
on any of the ongoing conference calls or the secure video 
teleconferencing throughout the day.
    This I know because I was with the Command General the 
entire time, recording events.
    Throughout the day, Major General Walker was told by staff 
officers ``to stand by'' with respect to deploying to Capitol 
Hill. Only at 5:09 p.m. in the early evening, which I wrote 
down in my wheel book, was the D.C. Guard given orders to 
deploy and to move to the Capitol to assist Capitol Police.
    We arrived too late. One American lay dead, with other 
sisters and brothers injured, including Federal and local law 
enforcement officers.
    We were ready and standing by. I know if we were able to 
deploy immediately when General Walker made the request the 
National Guard could have helped end the civil disturbance and 
restored public order quickly.
    The Army National Guard motto is, ``Always ready, Always 
there.'' The D.C. National Guard was ready to help and assist 
Capitol Police, but we were not allowed to do our job due to 
paralyzed decisionmaking by Acting Secretary of Defense Chris 
Miller and Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy.
    This led to a crisis in Federal leadership at the Pentagon 
and delayed the D.C. response by 3 hours and 19 minutes.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 
and articulate the facts as they happened. I look forward to 
answering any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Captain Timothy Nick follows:]

           PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN TIMOTHY NICK
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, Captain.
    As we begin our question session, I want to reemphasize how 
much we appreciate all of you coming forward. I know as a 
veteran of the Armed Forces myself, this takes an incredible 
amount of courage to come forward and tell the truth.
    We will now move into the question session. Just a reminder 
to make sure the microphones are very close to you during this 
time.
    I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Griffith. We have a sergeant major, a colonel, a 
brigadier general, and a captain. Your testimony is compelling. 
Thank you.
    Now to the questions.
    On January 6, 2021, were each of you gentlemen with Major 
General William Walker from 1:49 p.m. through 5:55 p.m., yes or 
no?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes.
    Colonel Matthews. I was.
    General Dean. Yes.
    Captain Nick. Yes.
    Mr. Griffith. The Department of Defense Inspector General 
report, DOD IG report, alleges that the Secretary of the Army 
contacted Major General Walker multiple times on January 6 
during that timeframe. Some allegations are two calls, some are 
three, but the allegations would be or the assertions would be 
3:04 p.m., 4:35 p.m., and finally at 5 p.m.
    Do any of you recall any one of those calls taking place?
    Colonel Matthews. Negative, sir.
    Can I amplify that, though?
    Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir.
    Colonel Matthews. By way of background, so I was a 
political appointee in the Trump administration. I was a senior 
political appointee. I was also in the Army Reserve and 
National Guard.
    Now, in June 2017, I was appointed to be Acting General 
Counsel in the Department of the Army. The next month, Ryan 
McCarthy was appointed Acting Secretary of the Army. He had 
been confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army.
    Ryan McCarthy is my colleague. He is my friend. I told the 
Committee he was a good Secretary of the Army. I had a great 
deal of affection for Ryan McCarthy. I know he does for me. I 
am not here to badmouth Ryan McCarthy, but I have got to set 
the record straight.
    Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir.
    Colonel Matthews. In my memo I did not call--I never 
called--I call Piatt and Flynn liars. I never called McCarthy a 
liar, for two reasons.
    One, it was not clear to me that he was saying some of the 
things they said he said. I mean, it is clear to me that some 
of the things they said he said were said by others who were 
trying to really protect themselves.
    The other thing is he was my friend. You just do not turn 
it off. You do not call your friend a liar.
    At 2:30--at 2:31--at 2:30, they said that he was on a call 
with General Walker and he told him to move the QRF (Quick 
Response Force) to the Armory. I mean, that did not happen.
    Ryan McCarthy did not speak on that call, and we know this 
because that call was on a conference bridge. It was a D.C. 
Government conference bridge.
    Now, the DOD IG incorrectly states that McCarthy requested 
the call. I helped facilitate that call. General Walker was on 
the call with Dr. Rodriguez, who was the Homeland Security 
Advisor for Mayor Bowser. Mayor Bowser was on the call. Chief 
Sund was on the call. Chief Contee was on the call. All of us 
at this dais were all on the call.
    Ryan McCarthy never spoke on that call. I am a person who 
was his friend, who knew his voice quite well. If he had said 
anything, I would say that. We were told he was unavailable. I 
called his executive officer to ask to speak to him, and we 
were told he was unavailable. General Walker, Piatt, and 
General Charles Flynn were on the call.
    Subsequently, Flynn denies he was even involved in the 
call. For what reason, I really do not know. He did so under 
oath.
    Command Sergeant Major Brooks, myself, and Lieutenant Nick 
were all interviewed by the Select Committee. We told them 
that. To me, this is material because Flynn denied under oath 
twice to the House Oversight Committee and to the Select 
Committee that he even participated in the call. That goes to 
his integrity, to his credibility.
    Mr. Griffith. All right, let me----
    Colonel Matthews. I am sorry, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. Let me underline this.
    Colonel, you are also an attorney.
    Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir. With a law license.
    Mr. Griffith. You got your degree from Harvard Law School.
    Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir. I got a mortgage in Great 
Falls, Virginia. I have no reason to be up here lying, because 
I do not want to go to Federal prison.
    Mr. Griffith. You understand that you are--if you lie to 
Congress, 18--Title 18, 1001 makes that a crime. Is that 
correct?
    Colonel Matthews. Unquestionably, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. You also understand that as a member of the 
legal establishment that if you were to lie under oath, your 
license to practice law, no matter the fact that you have a JD 
from Harvard, could be in jeopardy. Is that correct?
    Colonel Matthews. No question, sir. Sir, I want to point 
out----
    Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir.
    Colonel Matthews.--I spoke to the Select Committee. I was 
not under oath, but it does not matter because you do not have 
to be under oath. If you lie to Congress, it is still a Federal 
crime.
    Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir.
    Colonel Matthews. I am fully aware of that. I submitted a 
document stating that these men were liars, and I stand by it 
100 percent. It is a stain on my Army that they got away with 
it and no one said anything about it.
    They even sent Piatt's name to the President of the United 
States to have him promoted. He was a liar. All of us can 
attest to that.
    Mr. Griffith. You want the truth to come out.
    Colonel Matthews. No question about it, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. Good, bad, or ugly, correct?
    Colonel Matthews. Exactly.
    Mr. Griffith. Anybody here want anything but the truth--any 
of the four witnesses want anything but the truth to come out?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. No, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. Good, bad, or ugly, it does not matter. No 
matter what side you are on. Is that correct? I heard a yes--I 
heard a ``no, sir'' and a ``yes, sir.''
    Sergeant Major Brooks. You want the truth, sir, nothing but 
the truth, yes, sir.
    Colonel Matthews. Right.
    Mr. Griffith. Colonel Matthews.
    Brigadier General.
    General Dean. That is correct.
    Captain Nick. That is correct.
    Mr. Griffith. All right.
    Wow, I do not know. I got lots of other questions to ask. I 
appreciate you jumping in and clearly with your heartfelt 
emotions telling us that things were not exactly true and that, 
in fairness, the January 6 Committee was not told the truth.
    Is that correct, Colonel?
    Colonel Matthews. They were not told the truth, but I think 
they knew that, though, and they disregarded that. This is what 
I mean.
    General Flynn testified before the House Oversight 
Committee on June the 15th, 2021. During his opening statement 
and during his questioning he stated explicitly that he was not 
on that phone call, he made no statements on that call.
    Subsequently, he was interviewed by the January 6 Committee 
and he also stated--he was directly asked by the senior 
investigative counsel: Did you make any statements on that 
call? He says he did not. He was not on the call, he says.
    Now, that is perjury in my opinion. I mean, I am a lawyer 
but it is for a court to decide. To me that is perjury.
    The important point is later I raised that. I was 
interviewed by the Select Committee in----
    Mr. Griffith. Unfortunately, my time is up, but hopefully 
you will get another opportunity to talk about it. I apologize.
    My time is up. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    I now recognize the Subcommittee's Ranking Member, Mrs. 
Torres, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Chairman.
    Colonel Matthews.
    Colonel Matthews. Yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. Torres [continuing]. I spent more than 17 years as a 
911 dispatcher. I worked with some very difficult times in the 
city of L.A., Rodney King riots, the verdict. On 9/11, I was 
tasked with putting together Mobile Field Force units to 
dispatch to critical locations to ensure that those would not 
be attacked.
    I know what an EOC (Emergency Operations Center) is 
supposed to look like. I know what orders to follow during 
certain types of emergency. I was prepared with a manual that 
was provided to me, things that we have practiced time and time 
and time again.
    During an emergency, you agree that it is vital that we 
have a quick response and a unified coordination that has clear 
communications, correct?
    Colonel Matthews. No question.
    Mrs. Torres. I was struck by the written--your written 
testimony when you said the D.C. National Guard was delayed 
because Milley, McCarthy, and McConville believed that the 
President of the United States might deploy the National Guard 
improperly on that day and had taken measures to prevent this.
    This must have been incredibly frustrating for you and for 
your colleagues in the Guard.
    Why do you think senior military leaders believed the 
President of the United States might employ the National Guard 
improperly on January 6? Was it based on their words, actions, 
or both?
    Colonel Matthews. I think that belief was irrational 
because I do not believe the President ever gave any of them an 
unlawful order.
    Mrs. Torres. OK.
    Colonel Matthews. He gave none of them an unlawful order.
    Mrs. Torres. Secretary----
    Colonel Matthews. He appointed----
    Mrs. Torres. Secretary of the Army----
    Colonel Matthews. He appointed all of them to high office.
    Mrs. Torres [continuing]. Ryan McCarthy----
    Colonel Matthews. He appointed all of them to high office.
    Mrs. Torres [continuing].--testified that on January 6 
Select Committee that at one point he was walking down the 
Pentagon hallways and one of the most seasoned reporters asked 
him whether the Army was planning to seize ballot boxes.
    Do you know if ideas like the President seizing ballot 
boxes was something Secretary McCarthy was considering when 
making decisions about deploying the Guard on January 6?
    Colonel Matthews. I think it was, but I think it was not a 
rational belief. I think----
    Mrs. Torres. OK.
    Colonel Matthews. Secretary McCarthy----
    Mrs. Torres. Was there widespread fear within the 
Department of Defense about the President using the military or 
other levers of the State to impact the election around the 
time of the 2020 election?
    Colonel Matthews. No. It was not a widespread fear. It was 
a fear among a clique of officers led by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff who talked about a so-called Reichstag 
moment and----
    Mrs. Torres. OK. Well, let me tell you, The New York Times 
reported in January 2022 that President Trump actually directed 
his attorney, Rudy Giuliani, to ask the Department of Homeland 
Security to see if it could take control of voting machines in 
key swing States.
    I would like to ask for unanimous consent to enter this New 
York Times article entitled, ``Trump Had Role in Weighing 
Proposals to Seize Voting Machines,'' into the record.
    Mr. Griffith.
    [Presiding.] Without objection, so order.
    [The article referred to follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    

    Mrs. Torres. Command Sergeant Major Brooks, you served in 
the Army and Army National Guard for 29 years. You spent the 
months after January 6 right here on this Capitol Hill 
protecting the citadel of democracy. I understand that for the 
entire time that you were deployed, you slept in your office, 
with the exception of maybe 1 week over the course of months. 
You clearly are a patriot who loves our country.
    How did you feel watching the Capitol get overrun, knowing 
that you were almost walking distance away but not permitted to 
come assist law enforcement in defending it?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. It was very disheartening to see. I 
believe it was something that, you know, I think any of us who 
serve in the military, it was something that we did not think 
we would see in our lifetime. It was very frustrating to know 
that we had the capability and the personnel and unable to 
respond.
    Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
    Sergeant Major Brooks. It is hard to describe.
    Mrs. Torres. Brigadier General Aaron Dean, what is the 
basis and rationale on which the Department of Defense and D.C. 
National Guard rely in determining the equipment, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures that the Guard could use to respond 
to escalations in the protests on January 6? Was this atypical?
    General Dean. I do not think--I do not think--it was not 
atypical.
    Mrs. Torres. We were just months--we right now are just 
months away from the 2024 election and the man who incited the 
2020 insurrection is on the ballot again.
    What corrective actions has the National Guard Bureau or 
Department of Defense taken to ensure the National Guard can 
plan, coordinate, and execute command and control in response 
to threats in the national capital region?
    General Dean. I can only really talk about the District of 
Columbia National Guard and its preparation, especially around 
January 6.
    We match capability with request. If there is a request, we 
match the capability that we have. We had riot control 
capability on that day to provide services for the Capitol.
    Mrs. Torres. You would say that over the last 4 years the 
smoke has been cleared and everyone is clear on how to respond 
and politics will not take priority over necessity.
    General Dean. I can say that the District of Columbia 
National Guard is always ready to respond.
    Mrs. Torres. Thank you, sir.
    General Dean. Was ready even before that date.
    Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Griffith. The gentlelady yields back.
    I now recognize Congressman D'Esposito of New York, 5 
minutes.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First question for everyone. We can start and just go down 
the line.
    Did you testify in front of the January 6 Select Committee?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. No, I received a phone call.
    Colonel Matthews. When you say testify, I had an informal 
interview with the Committee.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Right. It was--it was not----
    Mr. Griffith. If you could move the mike closer.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Correct?
    Colonel Matthews. I am sorry. Say again?
    Mr. Griffith. If you could move the mike closer, please, we 
will give you a couple extra seconds.
    Mr. D'Esposito. The answer, Command Sergeant, was no?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. No.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Colonel, you were interviewed but never in 
front of the Committee.
    Colonel Matthews. Correct.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Brigadier General?
    General Dean. No.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Captain?
    Captain Nick. Informally interviewed but never in front of 
the Committee.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Got it.
    As the Chairman mentioned in his opening remarks, we are 
here today to not only correct the record but also make sure 
that we are better prepared today than we were, right? We want 
to be better prepared as a Nation, as an agency. We want to be 
better prepared for the next, God forbid, incident than we were 
that day, not really to focus on President Trump. That is not 
really what we are here for today.
    Captain Nick, in your opening testimony, or the one 
submitted to the Committee, you said of that 2:30 conference 
call, and I quote, ``Lieutenant General Piatt and Lieutenant 
General Flynn, while on the call, discussed how they did not 
like the optics. They stated it would be in their best military 
advice to recommend to the Secretary of the Army, Ryan 
McCarthy, to deny the request from Command General William 
Walker to deploy the D.C. National Guard and aid the United 
States Capitol Police in the restoration of ordered liberty''--
or, as some have called on this Committee, democracy--``on 
Capitol Hill.''
    Major Brooks, during the bipartisan transcribed interview 
the Subcommittee conducted in March 2024, you were asked if you 
recall hearing the word ``optics'' on your 2:30 p.m. phone 
call. You responded, ``Yes.''
    I quote, ``General Flynn and General Piatt both made 
numerous comments about the optics of having the Guard on the 
Capitol and how they would much prefer that the Guard relieve 
MPD officers elsewhere in the city so that they could respond 
to the Capitol,'' close quote.
    For everyone, and we will start with Command Sergeant Major 
Brooks, why would these military experts want to send the 
National Guard to relieve MPD officers elsewhere after the 
Capitol was breached at 2:12 p.m.?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. In my opinion, it was a senseless 
recommendation. The logistics and the amount of time it would 
have taken to replace individual MPD officers across the city 
would have taken way too much time and would have been further 
delayed.
    Mr. D'Esposito. I think the key term there is 
``senseless.''
    Colonel?
    Colonel Matthews. Their whole attitude was that this 
mission was for law enforcement. They never wanted the D.C. 
Guard to be on the streets in the first place. They never 
wanted to approve the 350. They thought this was a law 
enforcement mission. They believed it would have required 
100,000 demonstrators before the D.C. Guard was necessary, and 
that was the Army's thinking.
    They wanted--and they also said they wanted no involvement 
in the politicization of the--or no involvement in the 
electoral certification process. They wanted no DOD role there. 
That was their attitude.
    We were not allowed to be east of 9th Street, which is 
where the Capitol is. We had to have the Secretary of the 
Army's approval to move three unarmed guardsmen one block.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Right. Sounds like baseless decisions.
    Brigadier General?
    General Dean. I did hear the word ``optics,'' and they did 
use it, especially specifically General Piatt I know said 
``optics.'' His concern was he did not want soldiers or airmen 
on the Capitol Grounds with the Capitol in the background.
    They were giving every other reason why we should be around 
the Capitol, away from the Capitol, and not responding to the 
Capitol.
    Part of what I believe is I believe that they are 
unfamiliar with our true capabilities and what we are really 
designed to do as the National Guard.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Can you say that again for everyone to 
hear?
    General Dean. I think they are unfamiliar with our true 
capabilities and what we are designed to do as the National 
Guard under Title 32.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Precisely.
    Captain?
    Captain Nick. I did hear the word ``optics'' also, and 
General Piatt and General Flynn did say it was not in their 
best military advice to recommend to the Secretary at this time 
to approve that request.
    Mr. D'Esposito. I only have 30 seconds, but I would just 
like to go down the line once again and answer this question.
    Was it clear at the time that the No. 1 priority was to 
restore order or to protect the safety of Members of Congress, 
staff, or visitors here at the Capitol complex?
    Captain?
    Captain Nick. Absolutely.
    Colonel Matthews. No, that was not----
    Captain Nick. It was clear that we needed to be at the 
Capitol at that time.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Right, you needed to be. Was that their No. 
1 priority?
    Captain Nick. No, it was not.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Brigadier General?
    General Dean. Their No. 1 priority was to make the police 
respond and not the National Guard.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Colonel?
    Colonel Matthews. Absolutely not, Congressman.
    Sergeant Major Brooks. It was not their priority, sir.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you. I think it is clear.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Griffith. The gentleman yields back.
    I now recognize Mr. Morelle for his 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to start my questioning--and I apologize, I only 
have 5 minutes, so I will try to get through some of this 
quickly.
    First of all, appreciate very much your frustration. This 
is your job, to defend the Capitol, and for the reasons both of 
this hearing and a lot of conversation, you were not called on 
to do that.
    I can--obviously, it is palpable how strongly you feel 
about this missed opportunity to defend this, and I appreciate 
that. I do not think there is any disagreement here. You should 
have been here much sooner. I do not--certainly do not know 
that anyone argues that it was your fault that that happened.
    I am a little shocked. Mr. D'Esposito said we are not here 
to talk about President Trump. To me, that is a little like 
asking Mrs. Lincoln, ``Other than the incident, how did you 
like the play?''
    The truth is, the Commander in Chief could have ordered the 
National Guard. As I said earlier--and, frankly, I think Mr. 
Griffith said, and I, you know, I will have to go back and look 
at the record--that the President ordered the troops out on 
January 6.
    There is no evidence anywhere that I have heard of--other 
than him saying it--there is literally no evidence of logs from 
the White House, there is no evidence anywhere that the 
President did that.
    Frankly, look, I do not know much about this. I am a 
civilian. If I were the President of the United States, as soon 
as the breach happened, as soon as there was any measure of 
violence at the Capitol, I would have assembled people in the 
Situation Room, and I do not care about if the Secretary of 
Defense was there, if the Secretary of the Army was there, I am 
the Commander in Chief of the United States.
    I guess I would begin at General Dean.
    If an order came from the White House, from the President, 
that deployed the National Guard, would that order have been 
questioned by anyone?
    General Dean. I would answer it this way. I would say that 
that order was delegated. The responsibility of the response 
from the Commanding General was written in a written document 
to him that basically gave him parameters on what he could do 
and what he couldn't do.
    Now, if the President----
    Mr. Morelle. I appreciate that. I appreciate that. I do not 
believe the delegation of authority exempts the higher 
authority.
    If a call came from the President or the White House that 
the President wants this deployed, if the Secretary of Defense 
were somewhere and the Secretary of the Army were somewhere 
else, would you have ignored that order?
    General Dean. No, we would not have.
    Mr. Morelle. No.
    General Dean. Not at all.
    Mr. Morelle. I do not want to draw you into it. I am just 
saying, those who want to absolve the higher levels of command.
    Likewise, if the Secretary of the Army had not acted, but 
the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Miller, had called and his 
office had called General Walker and said, ``Deploy the 
National Guard immediately,'' would anyone have questioned that 
order?
    General Dean. No. No, we would not--I will speak from my 
perspective--we would not have questioned--we would not have 
questioned it, but we would have wanted it coordinated based on 
the document that was sent by the Secretary of the Army.
    Mr. Morelle. Not to interrupt you. You would have sought a 
manner to verify and to make sure that that was legally the 
appropriate process, but you would have acted on it 
immediately, no?
    General Dean. I think the whole thing was, there would have 
been a conversation, right?
    Mr. Morelle. Yes.
    General Dean. There was this--there was this--there was 
this talk about they needed a CONOP, right, a concept of 
operations.
    Mr. Morelle. Yes.
    General Dean. Well, that is a discussion. In a crisis, that 
is a discussion.
    Mr. Morelle. I agree.
    General Dean. With that, there would have been a discussion 
about the deployment of the National Guard with any order given 
by any senior official.
    Mr. Morelle. Yes. I guess--you know, and I will--this is 
not necessarily a question. What I hear is a lot of confusion 
between the White House, the Department of Defense, the 
Secretary of the Army and his office. I do not know what 
happened. I guess there are varying accounts.
    What I think each of you is here to testify is that the 
order did not come down.
    Colonel Matthews. Congressman, may I speak to that, please, 
sir?
    Mr. Morelle. Yes. Go ahead.
    Colonel Matthews. Chain of command runs from the President 
to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Army to 
General Walker.
    Now, the Secretary of Defense authorized the D.C. National 
Guard to deploy at 3 o'clock. The D.C. Guard was able to deploy 
at 3 o'clock.
    Mr. Morelle. Yes.
    Colonel Matthews. It had the capability and readiness to go 
on the street at 3 o'clock.
    The order did not come from Secretary of the Army. That was 
the--that was the----
    Mr. Morelle. No, I understand.
    Colonel Matthews.--bottleneck there. The President----
    Mr. Morelle. Yes.
    Colonel Matthews. The President followed the chain of 
command.
    Typically, the President----
    Mr. Morelle. I would say this--excuse me. I am going to 
reclaim my time. I apologize.
    Is that if I were the President of the United States and 
had ordered it--if that were true, there is no evidence that 
happened, but let us say it had been ordered--and then 20 
minutes goes by and nothing is happening, I would be on the 
phone again to my Secretaries, and I would be on the phone to 
General Walker and say, ``What's going on? I have ordered you 
out. Move out.''
    With all due respect, the conversation should have 
happened. I do not know if it did or did not.
    Colonel Matthews. Congressman, I think that, you know, if 
the President would have called the Secretary of the Army, the 
Secretary of the Army would have said, ``We're moving as fast 
as we can. We need to be deliberate. We need to know more 
information.''
    That is what the Secretary of the Army said in sworn 
testimony, Congressman. So----
    Mr. Morelle. That is not what happened. He did not say that 
in his testimony.
    Colonel Matthews. He did say that in his testimony, sir.
    Mr. Morelle. No, he did not. He did not say the President 
of the United States ordered him to do anything.
    Colonel Matthews. No. He said if the President were to 
call, he said it would not have made a difference. The 
President's call would not have made a difference.
    Secretary McCarthy----
    Mr. Morelle. I disagree. Well, let me----
    Colonel Matthews. Secretary McCarthy--I think you are right 
also.
    Mr. Morelle. Respectfully, sir, let me reclaim my time. In 
fact, my time is over.
    The point that I am trying to make is that I do not 
disagree. This is an important conversation. I do not think it 
is one for our Committee. I think the Armed Services Committee 
ought to be holding this. There is a question to make sure that 
come January 2025, we better be damn sure we have communication 
that is clear, compelling, and chain of command.
    I do think this. There is no way to absolve responsibility 
of the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of 
the Army. You may dispute what happened, and I think that is 
fair. Something should have happened that triggered the 
deployment of the National Guard sooner so that you could have 
done your jobs and we would not be having this hearing this 
morning.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Griffith. The gentleman yields back. I agree with him 
on his last statement that we need to be prepared for the next 
time that we have January 6 come up, which is in the law.
    I would also correct the record. I did say the President. 
The gentleman is correct, that is not in the evidence. The 
President had previously given Christopher Miller the authority 
to act, as he stated in his testimony which was previously 
submitted into the record, and Christopher Miller is the one 
who gave the order that did not get followed, apparently, by 
the Secretary of the Army.
    That being said, I now recognize Dr. Murphy for his 5 
minutes of questions.
    Dr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize if I am a 
little out of breath. It is just being old.
    Thank you all for coming forward. It takes absolute 
courage, absolute courage. Every damn meeting we have now has 
Trump derangement syndrome talking to it.
    This was a dereliction of duty by the Secretary of the 
Army--who refused, by the way, to come before this Committee 
because he knew his culpability. He knew that he has lied, and 
he was derelict in the duty.
    I appreciate from the bottom of my heart you guys standing 
up for the United States of America. You took an oath to it, as 
did the Secretary, and you are keeping your oath, so I deeply 
appreciate it--at your own personal cost, because we know the 
weaponization of this Government is occurring at an exponential 
rate. It is just privy--it is just proof in the pudding that 
this is what we are dealing with.
    I swear, why do we not have bipartisan support in getting 
to the bottom of this is beyond me. It is everything about 
Trump.
    Captain Nick, you know, the summer before, in 2020, when 
there was an absolute disaster in this country where riots and 
burning of Federal buildings occurred, we saw billions of 
dollars, multiple deaths occur.
    Speaker Pelosi, I believe, is a culpable part of this in 
allowing this, paving the way for the terrible thing to happen 
on January 6, to just dismiss America's memory of what happened 
the summer before.
    In contrast, the protests at the Capitol on January 6, 
which we know were all wrong, there was no hesitation in 
creating a politicized community. We had a former Republican 
who saw it as a personal grind to go after President Trump, 
basically not allowing evidence to come before the Committee.
    It has been more than 3 years, and members of the D.C. 
National Guard are coming forward with your oath to provide 
clarity.
    I will just ask, Captain Nick, in your testimony you 
mentioned you were a confidential source for the Select 
Committee. In addition, you go on to State, ``My 
confidentiality was breached to the national media.''
    Would you mind expanding upon that?
    Captain Nick. Yes, sir. First, I would like to correct the 
record from a previous statement from your colleague when he 
asked a question about Pentagon officials and their desire to 
send troops. I said, ``Absolutely.'' I meant they did not at 
that time want to send troops to the Capitol, just for 
clarification.
    I was informally--after January 6, at some time after, I 
was informally interviewed by the Select Committee on January 
6. I gave informal testimony, and I hired counsel from Tully 
Rinckey, Dan Meyer, who is also behind me.
    After giving my written notes and informal testimony, a 
couple weeks later I was contacted by Politico, from a news 
outlet, from a writer requesting comment on my handwritten 
notes they got a copy of. I then contacted Dan, who then 
contacted the Select Committee to resolve that.
    It had to be leaked at some point from probably the Select 
Committee because that is the only people I talked to and gave 
my notes to.
    Dr. Murphy. It is, obviously, evident with anybody with an 
objective eye that the Committee was put forth to tell one 
thing. If that Committee had gone in front of anything in a 
legal department, you would have cross-examination, other 
witnesses, et cetera. We never saw any of that to get to the 
actual truth, which is what all Americans, whether you are 
which party or not, should believe in doing, period. Period.
    I just want to reiterate something. This is, actually, I 
guess to Colonel Matthews and General Dean.
    Turning to the matter of security, Secretary of the Army 
McCarthy has said the D.C. National Guard was not--was not 
prepared for immediate deployment.
    Do you agree with that statement?
    General Dean. That statement is false. We were prepared in 
many ways. We even had backup plans. We call them branches and 
sequels, right?
    Not only did we have a force that was at Andrews Air Force 
Base that was training and doing civil disturbance that 
weekend, prepared to deploy on that day, that was ready to 
deploy on that day, we also had traffic control points that 
were at MPD.
    Those members had riot control gear in the trunk, not 
visible to the public, but for their self-protection in case 
MPD had to respond. They had the appropriate gear to provide 
the civil disturbance, riot control efforts, if needed.
    We had the capability, we had the planning, we had the 
know-how.
    The question that I have is, so out of all the events, out 
of all the inaugurations the District of Columbia National 
Guard supported, out of all the NATO summits, out of all the 
IMF protests that we have had, the summer of 2020, COVID, we 
were not able to respond to this? We are incapable? That is 
categorically false.
    Dr. Murphy. I find it just--my time is short--but I just 
find it a slap in the face to all the good men and women who 
serve in our Armed Forces to say you are not prepared. A slap 
in the face.
    Because this guy wanted to save his butt with the hope of 
getting in the Biden administration, that is point blank what 
happened.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Griffith. The gentleman yields back.
    After consultation with Mrs. Torres, we have agreed to do a 
second round of questioning. I would recognize Mrs. Torres for 
her additional 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
    The claim that somehow the Select Committee did not 
investigate the National Guard response to the security 
failures at the Capitol on January 6 is inconsistent with the 
facts.
    As I mentioned, the Select Committee interviewed 24 
individuals and reviewed 37,000 pages of documents related to 
the National Guard on January 6, their response, and 46 of 
those pages are in the final report that was issued.
    If you search the transcripts of those interviews held with 
these witnesses ahead of this hearing, you will see the 
significant number of questions used for testimony from the 
Select Committee as their foundation. Just because there was 
not a court reporter does not mean that it did not happen.
    As I told you in the back room, I was in the balcony while 
all of this was unfolding. I was also witness to an assault on 
an officer where the door swung open on the balcony that I was 
sitting. Just because they did not interview me for that 
incident does not mean that any of those investigations did not 
happen.
    Let me just remind everyone about what the President was 
putting out on social media during that time.
    At 2:24 p.m., the President tweeted out regarding Vice 
President Pence not having the courage to do the wrong thing 
that he wanted him to do.
    At 3:13, the President had issued another statement saying, 
``I'm asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain 
peaceful, no violence. Remember, we are the party of law and 
order. Respect the law and our great men and women in blue. 
Thank you.'' He did not tell people to go home. He did not tell 
them to go home.
    It took many of his own closest allies to get him to this 
point. The President did not want the violence against the 
police or against Members of Congress or against his own Vice 
President to stop. The truth is he wanted the violence to 
continue until he could take custody and continue to keep 
custody of his position.
    At 4:17, he finally posts a video that contained many lies 
about the election, but finally encourages people to go home. 
That is when they finally started home.
    Those are the real facts of what happened on that day.
    In addition to under Democratic leadership--and I know that 
you want to continue to blame Democrats for what happened on 
that day--but Democrats did not tell the mob--the angry mob, 
that was armed--to go to the Capitol. Democrats are not 
responsible for that.
    The request, you know, about this January 6 attack to--we 
have gone back and forth as to who was ordered to do what. That 
information is very clear. There were no clear directions, 
because if there were clear directions everyone would have 
moved in unison. Everybody would have been together, putting 
together those plans that you said already exist.
    Colonel Matthews, you seem to want to respond. Please, go 
ahead.
    Colonel Matthews. Well, ma'am, I just--the Committee--so 
the Committee interviewed, again, Sergeant--Command Sergeant 
Major Brooks, myself, and Lieutenant Nick. We all told them 
that there are issues with the credibility of several 
witnesses, that people were not responding honestly and 
accurately as part of the investigation, and that was 
disregarded.
    That goes to the credibility of what they were telling the 
Committee. Like, for instance, the Committee says--I am sorry, 
the Select Committee stated in its findings that our QRF, that 
it was debatable what its purpose was. There is no debate about 
that. It was a civil--it was a civil disturbance response 
force. It was designed to respond to a riot. General Walker----
    Mrs. Torres. I think you are missing the point. There would 
have been no riot--there would have been no riot--had the 
President of the United States not set up a stage and order 
people and told them that he would join them at the U.S. 
Capitol. There would have been no galley that was erected to 
hang the Vice President if the President had not want them to 
stop us from certifying the election.
    You are missing the point of all of what happened 6 months 
prior to January 6.
    Colonel Matthews. Congresswoman----
    Mrs. Torres. The chaos that was happening within the 
branches of the military that are sworn to never get involved 
in domestic affairs.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk.
    [Presiding.] The gentlelady yields.
    I apologize for a brief absence. I have another Committee 
that a bill got called up right at the worst time that I had to 
go present.
    I think a couple points of clarification.
    The Capitol breach began well before the people at the 
White House made it down to the Capitol.
    The gallows were actually erected at 6 o'clock in the 
morning, and no one knew exactly what Mike Pence was going to 
do until about 1:30 in the afternoon.
    These are just some of the questions of the narrative that 
came out from the January 6 report, which is this, this much.
    This is how much is discussed about the D.C. National 
Guard.
    The primary objective of the Select Committee was to 
investigate the security failure at the U.S. Capitol because we 
have to identify the failures before we can fix things.
    There was an entire team, the blue team, who was 
commissioned with doing that. I challenge anyone to look in 
here and find anything of substance from the blue team 
whatsoever.
    This is why it is important that we do the oversight that 
is the job of Congress, and specifically the Subcommittee, to 
look into what happened. This is clearly within the security 
failure of the Capitol. This should not be political. This 
should not be biased in one way or the other.
    Regardless of who was coming to the Capitol, regardless of 
who broke into the Capitol, that should have never happened. 
There should have been no breach of this Capitol. The resources 
are here.
    The idea that the New Jersey National Guard would get here 
before our own National Guardsmen, whose job is, as Colonel 
Matthews said, riot control, traffic control, this is their 
job, to come in and help defend this Capitol.
    With that, I do have a few questions here.
    The DOD IG report alleges that DOD officials did not delay 
or obstruct a response to the Capitol.
    Sergeant Major Brooks, I will start with you.
    Do you believe that the deployment of the D.C. National 
Guard was delayed?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Who do you believe delayed it?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Secretary McCarthy and senior 
officials in the Army Staff.
    The Chairman. OK. Why do you believe that they delayed it?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. I believe their misunderstanding of 
the capabilities of the D.C. National Guard and the seriousness 
of the situation, to be honestly--I have no idea why we never 
received that order. All I know is that they were more 
concerned with what it would look like with soldiers with the 
Capitol in the background than protecting the Capitol of the 
United States.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Colonel Matthews, same question for 
you. Do you believe that the deployment of the D.C. National 
Guard was delayed?
    Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir. I believe that it was a result 
of an overcautious, reluctant, hesitant, facilitating 
leadership. I think they were concerned about the optics, the 
political optics of a military presence here. I do not think 
they trusted the Commander in Chief. I think that was because 
of our senior ranking military officer who was making 
disparaging remarks about the President to them.
    You have got to remember, the people who ran the Army are 
very close associates of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. They owe this position--they owe their positions to him. 
He was not--I mean, there are books about how Chairman Milley 
was impeding the ability of the President.
    I think that that was an issue there, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Just to clarify, you think that there 
was a delay that was calculated for one reason or the other, 
but you are not indicating that there was a nefarious purpose 
in that. Just so we do not walk out of here with conspiracy 
theories that the DOD wanted the Capitol to fail. I just want 
to make sure that that is not where you are going with that.
    Colonel Matthews. I am not going with that, sir. I am 
saying that----
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
    Colonel Matthews. I am saying that the conditions were set 
by this talk of a coup, of a Reichstag moment.
    I mean, the idea that--I mean, to be--let me be frank about 
it. A bunch of Black kids in the D.C. Guard are going to take--
going to usurp the election for Trump is crazy, but that is 
what they were talking about, I mean, and it is crazy talk. It 
was out there. It is in books. I mean, Milley's talked about 
it.
    Chairman Loudermilk. While I have got you, Colonel 
Matthews, do you believe the DOD IG report accurately reflects 
the events of January 6, 2021?
    Colonel Matthews. That DOD IG report is replete with 
incorrect information, false information. Even the Select 
Committee's report has shown that.
    Can I give you a couple of examples, please?
    Chairman Loudermilk. Sure.
    Colonel Matthews. It says at 1635 Ryan McCarthy called 
General Walker and directed him to go to the Capitol.
    Now, McCarthy, if you read his transcript from the Select 
Committee, he said he never did that. He was getting ready for 
a news conference. He was taking notes and writing in a--so 
preparing for a televised news conference.
    He overheard Brigadier General LaNeve direct General Walker 
to go. General LaNeve says he never told General Walker to go, 
he never gave the go order. They do like this. They point in 
each other's directions.
    The DOD IG puts it in. Then they claim that they had to 
call Walker again at 1700, like 25 minutes later, and direct 
him to go. That is an absolute falsehood. McCarthy was in a 
televised press conference.
    Mr. Storch, the DOD Inspector General, has an obligation to 
correct the record. I mean, where does he go--where does 
General Walker go to get his reputation back? I mean, you 
smeared this man by anonymous sources.
    We are talking about general officers in the Army who were 
bitter because of Walker's testimony in March before the 
Senate. They did not like that, and they wanted to get General 
Piatt promoted to general. They wanted to take down Walker.
    Even General Milley engages in that. General Milley engages 
in that. If you read his transcript, sir, from the Select 
Committee, he implies Walker was lying or exaggerating. 
Everything General Milley says in his transcribed interview 
from the Committee is incorrect, and the Committee staff had to 
know it.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Let me just clarify something here.
    General Walker----
    Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk [continuing].--did testify under oath 
to the Select Committee. Is that correct?
    Colonel Matthews. Correct. Yes, he did.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The implication of the DOD IG report 
is that General Walker falsely testified. Is that fair?
    Colonel Matthews. To the Senate Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs Committee and to the Senate Rules Committee.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
    Colonel Matthews. He testified in March, March 2021. The 
DOD IG report came out in November 2021. The implication was 
that he was not truthful in his testimony.
    Chairman Loudermilk. So----
    Colonel Matthews. This is a sitting officer of the Congress 
of the United States appointed by Speaker Pelosi, a sworn 
career Federal law enforcement executive and a major general in 
the United States Army. They were implying that he committed 
outright perjury on live television.
    Chairman Loudermilk. So----
    Colonel Matthews. I had--I took exception to that. I wrote 
my memo, sir. I was not working for General Walker. I mean, I 
had nothing to gain from that. It was the right thing to do.
    This man was responsible for all of your personal safety. 
He was smeared by--and I just--I feel an obligation----
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Let me reclaim my time. There are 
other questions I need to get to. I just wanted to make sure 
they understand that the implications of the DOD IG report is 
that General Walker falsified testimony or was not truthful.
    Would you believe that he would be selected to be the head 
security officer of the House of Representatives by Nancy 
Pelosi if it was known that he had lied under oath?
    Colonel Matthews. Oh, no, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. I just want to make sure we are----
    Colonel Matthews. No, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. We are talking about someone who was 
selected by my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to be 
the Sergeant at Arms here. Getting the point, this is a 
bipartisan issue that we are talking about here.
    Let me move on real quickly.
    Captain Nick, the DOD IG states they received a copy of 
contemporaneous notes from Secretary McCarthy's aide-de-camp 
from January 6, 2021.
    Did the DOD IG request a copy of your notes that day?
    Captain Nick. No.
    Chairman Loudermilk. They did not ask for your notes?
    Captain Nick. I never spoke to anybody at the Department of 
Defense IG's Office, and they never requested my notes, and 
they never contacted me.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Interesting.
    I will do a couple more questions, and we will continue 
down the aisle.
    The DOD IG report alleges that on June--in June 2020--that 
June 2020 taught Secretary McCarthy that he could not simply 
rely on the D.C. National Guard to figure out the details.
    General Dean, what do you make of that statement?
    General Dean. I think that he is unfamiliar with what the 
D.C. National Guard can actually do and its true capability.
    I think he is probably being advised by our senior Active 
Component officers that have never spent a day in their life in 
the National Guard, and they are advising him on what the 
National Guard should or should not do. It is like a surface 
warfare officer in the Navy talking about a submariner. You are 
in the same service, but you do different things.
    I think part of the issue is, is taking military advice 
from a senior Active Component officer about National Guard 
issues pertaining to civil disturbance or domestic response. I 
think it is out of their wheelhouse, and I think sometimes they 
can provide inaccurate information. In doing so, it creates 
this lack of trust, because now you do not know who to believe. 
You do not whether to believe the people that are actually 
supposed to advise you on military matters or the National 
Guard.
    I would propose to you that you need somebody to advise you 
on Army and Air Force National Guard matters, not just military 
matters, if you want to get to the truth.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you.
    Sergeant Major Brooks, same question, but let me precede 
that with, there were a lot of acts of violence, riots 
throughout the country during 2020. We had that in Georgia.
    As a response to the riots in Atlanta, the Governor of 
Georgia called out the State Patrol and the Georgia National 
Guard. No one raised an issue with that because that is a job 
of the National Guard, to respond to the Governor and provide 
for civil disturbance and support riot control.
    Really, the same question I did to General Dean. Is that 
not understood by certain DOD officials, that ultimately that 
is the same role as the D.C. National Guard, it is just the 
chain of command is differently since D.C. is not a State?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes, sir. The D.C. National Guard is 
unique in that aspect. In fact, there are actual D.C. code that 
gives special authorities to the D.C. National Guard that no 
other National Guard in the country have to conduct business 
within the District and conduct law enforcement operations in 
support of Federal or District agencies.
    I believe that General Dean is absolutely accurate. I asked 
the question: Where was the chief of the National Guard Bureau 
in this when you were discussing Guard capabilities? You were 
only acting--asking Active-Duty military who had never served 
in the Guard, did not truly understand capabilities and 
authorities, and at no time you reached out to the four-star 
general in charge of the National Guard to get information, 
although you had all the information necessary if you just 
understood the role that had been delegated to you many months 
or even years prior to.
    I think it is incredibly important going forward that the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of 
Staff of the Army, to include the Sergeant Major of the Army, 
are thoroughly briefed on the authorities, capabilities, and 
their responsibility that has been delegated to them over the 
D.C. National Guard and its ability to respond to the Nation's 
capital.
    We thoroughly train on our ability to be a Reserve force 
for the Active Component. Why does the Active Component not 
thoroughly train on us?
    Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you. I appreciate the thorough 
answers there. Very important issue.
    I now recognize the full Committee Ranking Member, Mr. 
Morelle, for 5 minutes for questions.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I will admit, I am a simple guy, and I do want to do some 
follow ups to Mr. Loudermilk's questions, which were important. 
Also recognize that General Walker was held in such high esteem 
by Members of our side of the aisle, we made him the Sergeant 
at Arms after January 6. I think we have as much faith in him 
and had as much faith in him as all of you did during that 
time.
    The way I see this--and maybe I am wrong--if I am the 
President of the United States, the Commander in Chief, even 
though I have delegated authority, I think at some period after 
3 o'clock when I see that there does not seem to be much 
movement, I am going to pick up the phone and call the 
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army and say, 
``Exactly what's going on?'' while I have issued orders or I 
have not or there is confusion.
    At some point I would have had my chief of staff call 
General Walker and say, ``Exactly what's happening on the 
ground?''
    My only point is, it would not have taken me--and I am, 
again, I am not sophisticated--but it would not have taken me 
three and a half hours while I am sitting in the White House 
watching this unfold, confident in my view that while I have 
signed the necessary papers, so I am not sure what is 
happening, but it is all good because I signed the papers.
    This is an attack on the United States Capitol, the citadel 
of democracy here in this country and around the world. I 
just--for all the other misdirection here--and I am not 
suggesting that we are trying to bring the President into this 
unnecessarily. It is that the President is necessarily part of 
the chain of command.
    By the way, so is the Secretary of Defense, and so is the 
Secretary of the Army. I am not absolving them. They clearly 
had direct line responsibility to make sure this happened.
    At some point, when this is going on, in the midst of the 
chaos, if only a few minutes goes by and something is not 
happening, I am picking up the damn phone, I am going to find 
out exactly what is going on.
    To this point--so, look, we have high respect, the greatest 
respect for General Walker. We would have continued him as 
Secretary--or Sergeant at Arms. It was my friends over there 
who made the decision to remove him. That is fine. They have 
that responsibility.
    Let me ask this, and maybe--I am not sure anyone can answer 
this, but let me direct it first to Sergeant Major Brooks.
    Tell me what the protocols should be going forward. Since 
we are all focused on what is supposed to happen, tell us in 
the future, whether it is January 6, 2025, or any other day 
that involves a breach of the Capitol or issues here, what is 
the protocol? What should we know needs to be in place that 
people fear was not? How do we make sure this does not happen 
again? What is the protocol like?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. One positive step that I believe has 
already been taken is I believe they have given the authority 
to the Chief of the Capitol Police to call on the Guard without 
further approval. That is a huge step.
    Second, I believe that the D.C. National Guard has been 
neglected for many years for what I believe to be the lack of 
knowledge or understanding. It was put on a shelf. Those who 
were delegated authority over the Secretary of the Army, the 
Secretary of Defense, did not thoroughly understand their 
responsibility.
    You know, they are ultimately one of the commanders, one of 
the senior leaders of the D.C. National Guard. Over the 17 
years that I served in the D.C. National Guard, repeatedly the 
National Guard Bureau came down and removed units, military 
police units, that would respond to the Capitol, had removed 
them from the D.C. National Guard without objection.
    If the Governor of your State was told they were going to 
move one of their Guard units, your Governor would be upset, 
and there would be a significant challenge to that, correct?
    The Secretary of the Army is supposed to be our Governor, 
is supposed to defend the D.C. National Guard from losing its 
capability to support and defend the capital of the United 
States. That has been neglected for decades, and it needs to 
change.
    The D.C. National Guard should be the elite unit that it 
was designed to be under President Thomas Jefferson. It is 
responsible for the seat of democracy. It is not responsible 
for a State, a territory. It is responsible for a city. It is 
the only Guard that is responsible for a city. It just happens 
to be the capital of the most powerful Nation in the world, and 
I think that is significant.
    If that change does not come, if this happens again--and, 
unfortunately, in our political environment, I think there is a 
chance.
    Mr. Morelle. Well, and I appreciate that response, and I am 
almost out of time. I would simply say this: that I also think 
leading up to January 6, recognizing the tumult, recognizing 
the challenges, from the President to the Secretary of Defense 
to the Secretary of the Army, there should have been a lot of 
work in preparation for, not on that day, but in the weeks, 
months leading up, to make sure the lines of communications 
were set and that there was a series of protocols that would be 
followed if and when things happened. That clearly did not 
happen as well.
    Again, gentlemen, appreciate all of your not only testimony 
for being here today, but your long service in support of the 
United States. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    I will now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Griffith, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Griffith. I submit to you, gentlemen, that if the 
President of the United States had gone outside the chain of 
command and called General Walker directly, bypassing his 
Acting Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army, we 
might very well be in a hearing trying to find out why the 
President was interfering with the National Guard.
    Would you agree with that, Command Sergeant Major?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. I think that would have been highly 
irregular.
    Mr. Griffith. It would have been highly irregular.
    Colonel?
    Colonel Matthews. Sir----
    Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir.
    Colonel Matthews.--keep in mind, we are--during that time 
they were talking about the President improperly using the 
military. They wanted to take precautions against that use.
    They wanted to have it both ways, to say he did not call. 
If he would have called, they would have said he was trying to 
interfere with the chain of command. So----
    Mr. Griffith. You are exactly--that is exactly what I was 
hearing. I just wanted to put it--make sure we had it on the 
record.
    I put on the record previously, in my previous line of 
questions, that all of you were there with Major General 
William Walker from 1:49 p.m. through 5:55 p.m.
    During that time period, we have already established that 
he did not receive any calls from Secretary McCarthy. Did he 
try to reach out to Secretary McCarthy during that timeframe? 
Did any--gentlemen, did you all witness any attempts by him to 
reach out? Not that I am saying it is his duty. I am just 
asking for facts.
    Colonel Matthews. You want to go?
    Mr. Griffith. Captain?
    Captain Nick. Yes, sir. I witnessed General Walker 
attempting to reach out to the Secretary's office multiple 
times.
    Mr. Griffith. Multiple times?
    Captain Nick. Yes, sir.
    Colonel Matthews. Sir?
    Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir. Colonel?
    Colonel Matthews. In fairness to Secretary McCarthy, I 
wrote a memo and I said he was incommunicado. I was not taking 
a shot at him there. I was saying the Pentagon is a big 
building, cell phones do not work. If you are in a SCIF 
(Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility) in the Pentagon, 
you are not going to be reachable by cell phone. If he is in a 
SCIF with the Chairman or with the Secretary of Defense, it is 
reasonable he would not be able to be reached except through 
his front office and an aide goes back and relays information.
    I gave Secretary McCarthy the benefit of the doubt there.
    Mr. Griffith. I appreciate that and appreciate you bringing 
it. Look, we are just trying to get the facts.
    Colonel Matthews. Yes.
    Mr. Griffith. Brigadier General, my understanding is that 
you would have been second in command behind Major General 
Walker. Is that correct?
    General Dean. That is correct.
    Mr. Griffith. If for some reason--because we heard earlier 
that as a part of the DOD IG report that there were attempts to 
reach General Walker, which you all said did not happen.
    Let us assume for the sake of argument that they could not 
reach him for some unknown reason. Wouldn't the proper move 
then have been to call you in this case of an emergency where 
orders have been given to activate the National Guard?
    General Dean. That is correct.
    Mr. Griffith. It is interesting because the report says--
and I am not a military man, so you all bear with me. I may be 
asking something that you all know and I do not. That is that 
Major General Walker indicated that he had called to initiate 
movement. Now, I understand there was not a call.
    What does initiate movement mean? Does that mean to get 
into the--to go lend assistance? What exactly does that mean, 
Brigadier General Dean?
    General Dean. Initiate movement means that you actually 
give the order for a force to move.
    In this case, it would have been our QRF or any force that 
was qualified to do civil disturbance, you give them the order 
to move forward.
    Mr. Griffith. That would have been the order to head to the 
Capitol and lend assistance?
    General Dean. That would have been the order to move, yes.
    Mr. Griffith. OK. I mean, that is why I asked. I wanted to 
know.
    Captain Nick, I think this is in the record, but let us 
just get it out there again.
    What time did the D.C. National Guard learn that they were 
authorized to deploy to the Capitol?
    Captain Nick. I wrote down in my notes 5:09 p.m., which was 
relayed from General McConville on a secure video 
teleconferencing line in our office.
    Mr. Griffith. 5:09 p.m.
    Now, they have asked if the President--the questions from 
the other side indicated the President, if there was not any 
action, should have jumped the chain of command and called 
General Walker.
    If you are Piatt or Flynn and you knew that there was 
supposed to be a deployment or initiate the move, would not you 
have reached out to somebody if you could not get ahold of 
Walker? I understand they were on the call the whole time. 
Wouldn't they have been able to properly call Brigadier General 
Dean? I will let anybody answer.
    Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir.
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. Sergeant Major?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. I think we miss a key point in all 
of this conversation when we are talking about who and what 
when we go back to the significant fact that the only reason 
why we are here today is because Secretary McCarthy, in his 
approval letter, removed Major General's ability to execute his 
immediate response authority.
    Secretary McCarthy changed the memo from Secretary of 
Defense to the Secretary of the Army. The one that we got from 
Secretary McCarthy stated that Major General Walker could not 
deploy the QRF without the Secretary of the Army's explicit 
order.
    Colonel Matthews. I will just clarify. The term ``immediate 
response'' there is used incorrectly in this instance.
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Immediate--emergency response.
    Colonel Matthews. Yes. So--but--correct. I just wanted to 
clarify.
    Mr. Griffith. When was that memo or order given, to not do 
anything without the direct call from the Secretary of the 
Army?
    Colonel Matthews. January 5th or 4th--I think--I think the 
memo----
    Mr. Griffith. Several days before January 6?
    Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. All right. I appreciate your questions. I 
appreciate you all. Thank you very much for your courage to be 
here today. I know it has got to put you all under a lot of 
stress.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    Now I will recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. 
D'Esposito, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Sergeant Major Brooks, at the time you were the most senior 
noncommissioned officer in the organization. Can you share 
briefly what was happening at the D.C. Armory between 3 p.m. 
and 5 p.m. on January 6?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Immediately upon receiving the 1:49 
call from Chief Sund, we, the D.C. National Guard, on our own 
accord, initiated from the QRF from the Air Force--Andrews Air 
Force Base to the Armory. They were there.
    We were then taking the soldiers that were coming in for 
the second shift that were already at the Armory. We had geared 
them--fully kitted them with riot control gear. We had moved 
our transportation onto the Armory drill floor so that not to 
arouse any public awareness of what was actually going on. They 
were loaded and standing by ready to go.
    They had been divided up into civil disturbance platoons, 
roughly 40 to 45 people per platoon, with appropriate 
leadership--which, coincidentally, matches the MPD for 
structure for civil disturbance as well, because, as we have 
stated previously, we train with them. We wanted to be as close 
to their force package as possible.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Right. You train with them to do the work 
that you are prepared to do, which is exactly the opposite of 
what so-called leadership was telling you your mission was.
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes. I think they would like to say 
this is untrained and they point to us conducting and training, 
and some soldiers may or airmen may have had their first 
experience of training.
    The Army and Air Force get new--brand-new privates and 
airmen every day. They are assimilated into the formation and 
trained and trust that their leaderships have their best 
interest and would not put them in a situation that they were 
not prepared for.
    I believe that our leadership all the way down the chain 
prepared our soldiers and airmen as best as possible to perform 
the mission that they were given.
    Mr. D'Esposito. On January 6, between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m., 
they were trained, they were prepared, and they were ready to 
respond?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Absolutely.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK. Thank you.
    Brigadier General Dean, according to his testimony to the 
DOD, Secretary McCarthy told to General Walker to, quote, 
``Posture his troops,'' and, quote, ``Get ready to go'' on the 
2:30 call. Is that accurate?
    General Dean. That is not accurate. There was no mention--
first of all, Secretary McCarthy was not even on the call.
    I will say this. He was not identified on the call, nor did 
he speak on the call.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Understood.
    Colonel Matthews?
    Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir.
    Mr. D'Esposito. If I leave anything out here, please 
correct me.
    You were Acting General Counsel to the Army.
    Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir.
    Mr. D'Esposito. You were Principal Deputy General Counsel.
    Colonel Matthews. Correct.
    Mr. D'Esposito. You were Deputy Leg Counsel to the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs.
    Colonel Matthews. Deputy Legal Counsel, yes, sir.
    Mr. D'Esposito. You were Special Counsel to the Director of 
National Intelligence.
    Colonel Matthews. I was.
    Mr. D'Esposito. You served this country faithfully in 
combat in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
    Colonel Matthews. I did, sir.
    Mr. D'Esposito. You are a Nova grad.
    Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir.
    Mr. D'Esposito. All right. You are a Harvard Law grad.
    Colonel Matthews. Do not hold it against me.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Pretty well-accomplished.
    Let me ask you a question. You have a minute and 40 
seconds, sir.
    Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir.
    Mr. D'Esposito. You were in charge on January 6. Tell me 
your plan and what you would have done differently.
    Colonel Matthews. In charge of the D.C. Guard, the Army, 
the what--or what?
    Mr. D'Esposito. You could have made any decision necessary 
in order to keep this place safe.
    Colonel Matthews. I would have picked up the phone and told 
the D.C. Guard to deploy to the Capitol immediately, and I 
would have told General Walker to have everyone in the building 
kitted up in riot gear and get down to support the Capitol 
Police.
    I will say this, sir. At 3:04 Secretary Miller did give the 
Army authorization to go to the Hill. That was not conveyed to 
General Walker. That authorization had been given.
    Secretary Miller had all the authority he needed. He did 
not need to hear from the President. The President had given 
him the authority he needed to act. I would argue he had that 
authority even without talking to the President based on the 
executive order.
    I mean, I think that there was a bottleneck, and it was not 
at the D.C. Guard level and it was not at the OSD (Office of 
the Secretary of Defense) level, in my opinion.
    Mr. D'Esposito. I guess, again, the goal here today was to 
make sure that we are better prepared next time.
    Brigadier--I am sorry--Brigadier General, you have more?
    General Dean. Yes, can I answer that just real quick?
    To me, what I would have done if I was in the position over 
at the Pentagon, I would have--or if I was the Secretary--I 
would have given--one, I would have given General Walker more 
latitude. I would not have written the memo so constraining 
that it would take one person to mobilize the D.C. National 
Guard.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Well, that was clearly done by design.
    General Dean. Right.
    Second, what I would have done, I would have given him the 
authorization to deploy if there was a threat to life or limb. 
Then I would have said, ``When you get there, then give me a 
call, and we will discuss how the D.C. National Guard is 
actually going to be deployed.'' That is the CONOP.
    Mr. D'Esposito. My time has expired. I want to thank you 
all for your service to this great country. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    I have just got some closing questions, and then we will 
adjourn after that.
    I just want to do a quick review before I ask these last 
couple questions.
    From the information that we obtained from the Select 
Committee on January 6, transcribed interviews, logs from DOD 
officials, we have a timeline of the authorization process of 
the National Guard.
    We know on January 3 that President Trump ordered that the 
Guard be readied for potential deployment based on intelligence 
that had been received.
    As I mentioned earlier, Secretary Miller did testify to the 
Select Committee he had full authorization to deploy the 
National Guard on January 6, did not need any additional 
authority from the President of the United States.
    There was a breakdown in an order. Secretary Miller 
testified that he gave an order to deploy the National Guard to 
the Capitol. Somewhere there was a breakdown in that order, 
whether it was communication or a delay.
    Sergeant Major Brooks, if General Walker were to give you a 
direct order, you lawfully, and according to your oath, same 
oath I took when I joined the military, you are obligated to 
carry out that lawful order. Is that correct?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes, sir. Any moral, legal authority 
order given is my responsibility to carry out, yes, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. If you did not carry out that order, 
would that be considered dereliction of duty?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Absolutely. General Walker could 
take action against me, yes, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Do you feel that there was dereliction 
of duty in the chain of command on January 6?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Not within the D.C. National Guard, 
sir. From higher levels, yes, sir. I do believe that senior 
officials within the Secretary of the Army and senior officials 
in the Army Staff were derelict in relaying the authorization 
from Secretary Miller down to the appropriate level of 
execution, which would have been Major General Walker, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you. I know that is hard, it 
is a difficult question, and I apologize for that. To get to 
the truth, we need to know what really happened.
    Another--while we are here--and this is open to anyone that 
can answer this appropriately. Maybe I will direct it to 
General Dean to start with.
    Secretary McCarthy claims that he was making a tactical-
level CONOP plan at the MPD headquarters.
    Did you ever see this plan?
    General Dean. Not only did I not see the plan, he was at 
the wrong agency. The lead Federal agency for this particular 
event was the Capitol Police.
    My question is, why are you at the MPD headquarters and not 
at Capitol Police? Because the Capitol Police have the 
responsibility for the security of the Capitol.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. That was my follow up question 
because the deployment was to the Capitol.
    Did General Walker ever discuss a plan with anyone?
    Colonel Matthews. Yes.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Sergeant Brooks? I am sorry. 
Whoever--was that you? OK. I am sorry, Colonel.
    Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir. The plan was get your riot gear 
on and get on a bus and go support Chief Steven Sund at the 
Capitol. Take orders from any white shirt or senior officer in 
the Capitol Police Department. That was the plan. That is what 
we did--that is what we eventually did.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. We have Chief Sund here.
    Thank you for attending today, Chief, and for your service.
    Once the National Guard deploys, you become under the 
authority of the U.S. Capitol Police. You are sworn in then, 
right? You are officers of the U.S. Capitol Police.
    Your operation plan, in reality, I guess, is get from here 
to there, get sworn in, and do whatever Chief Sund tells you. 
Is that a good summary of it?
    Colonel Matthews. Follow lawful orders, sir.
    The D.C. Guard never acts independently. We always take 
direction from civil authority. We work for somebody in the 
civilian side.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Right.
    Colonel Matthews. We would have taken direction from--that 
is what we did during the summer of 2020. We worked for the MPD 
all over the city, responding to riots in the city, or for the 
Secret Service police or Park Police.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Just to make sure I understand, 
there was a discussion of an op plan, very simple op plan. Get 
on the bus, get to the Capitol, get sworn in, and get to work. 
That is the extent of, really, an op plan that you need. Is 
that what you are saying?
    Sergeant Brooks?
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes. Due to our normal planning 
operations, we already had a rally point identified for the 
soldiers who were on traffic control points within the city. 
All we had to do was communicate to those servicemembers to 
rally at that point, don your riot gear. Everyone else at the 
Armory would have been donning their riot gear and moving 
toward their direction.
    Exactly as Colonel Matthews mentioned, once we arrive, we 
fall under--it is called defense support to civil authorities. 
Once we arrive, we fall under the--we are supporting the civil 
authority. In this case the Capitol Police would have given us 
direction on where to be and what to do.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you.
    This is my last question. Again, General Dean, I will start 
with you since you were the senior member that would have been 
there at the time.
    The order that finally came at 5--what time was it again, 
Captain Nick?
    Captain Nick. 5:09.
    Chairman Loudermilk. 5:09?
    Captain Nick. I wrote 5:09 down in my wheel book.
    Chairman Loudermilk. General Dean, at 5:09 did Secretary 
McCarthy give you--give General Walker the order at that time? 
If not, can you explain how you got the order?
    General Dean. My understanding is that General McConville 
actually gave the order, but he said he received it from 
Secretary McCarthy. General Walker, in turn, told me, and I, in 
turn, told the Quick Response Force it is time to move.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
    Anybody else?
    Colonel Matthews. Sir, I was sitting right next to General 
Walker in the conference room in the VTC when General 
McConville--General McConville was not in the chain of command, 
so it was not his order.
    He was conveying an order that we were authorized to go, 
and I was told that it came not from Secretary McCarthy but 
from Secretary Miller, that we had the authorization to go. 
That is what I was told at the time.
    This claim that Secretary McCarthy called General Walker, 
obviously, was not true. As Secretary McCarthy has stated, it 
was not true. He did not call General Walker. The way we got it 
was it was relayed via VTC, video teleconference.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Somebody called you up on video 
teleconference to give you that order?
    Colonel Matthews. Oh, no, no. The conference was ongoing, 
it was running. General McConville, Chief of Staff of the Army, 
happened to be on the conference talking to us, and he 
mentioned that we had the authorization to go.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. He just was, like, ``What are you 
all doing still here? You are supposed to go.'' Or----
    Colonel Matthews. No. He claims that, but that is not what 
happened, sir.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
    Colonel Matthews. Someone in the back of the room said, 
``Oh, these guys are good to go now? You are good to go?'' He 
said we are good to go.
    He claimed later that he asked General Walker, ``Why are 
you still here? You already have the authority.'' That was not 
the case.
    General Walker did not--he implied that Walker had the 
authority at 1635 from McCarthy. He was just hanging out on the 
VTC twiddling his thumbs while the city was being--was in a 
riot condition.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you.
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Mr. Chairman, can I----
    Chairman Loudermilk. Yes. Absolutely.
    Sergeant Major Brooks. Can I add that it all does not make 
sense if you follow this through the chain, because if Major 
General Walker had been told numerous times, had been given a 
lawful order to do something, why was there never an action 
taken against Major General Walker for dereliction of duty or 
refusing a lawful order? There never was. There was never even 
an inkling of charging him with anything.
    That whole narrative that we were just sitting around 
waiting is false, and it is disrespectful to the men and women 
that did that job to think that we just sat and waited while 
the Capitol was under attack.
    Colonel Matthews. Sir, I might point out, Walker told me 
that he wanted to send them anyway and resign. I asked him not 
to do that. I said, ``Sir, don't do that. Wait for the order.''
    General Dean. He actually told me the same thing.
    Colonel Matthews. Absolutely.
    General Dean. He asked me, he said, ``Should I send them? 
Should I send them? Should I send them? I am going to send 
them.'' I said, ``Don't send them. You did not get the order. 
It is in writing that you can't send them. Don't send them.''
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. I want to thank you all.
    Mrs. Torres. I have something for the record.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. I will do these, and I will 
recognize you for that.
    I do want to enter for the record a memorandum from the 
Secretary of the Army dated January 4, 2021, and it is the 
employment guidance for the District of Columbia National 
Guard. Also, a letter from the Secretary of the Army to Major 
General William Walker dated January 1, 2021, recommending 
approval of the request of Mr. Christopher Rodriguez, Director 
of District of Columbia Homeland Security Emergency Management, 
on behalf of--this is support of the civil authorities of the 
District of Columbia.
    Without objection, so entered.
    [The memorandum and letter referred to follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Chairman Loudermilk. I will recognize the Ranking Member.
    Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Chairman. I have a few items I 
would like to enter to the record. Thank you.
    I want to also acknowledge and say thank you to everyone 
that is here today. We know that the chaos at the Pentagon was 
caused by the Commander in Chief and the fear that he would 
involve the military in domestic political affairs.
    I want to enter into the record the following articles.
    A Politico article entitled, ``Trump could have helped 
respond to the January 6 riot--but didn't--per new testimony.''
    Chairman Loudermilk. Without objection.
    [The article referred to follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Mrs. Torres. A letter dated December 30, 2022, and posted 
on the Select Committee website from the Select Committee to 
the General Counsel of the Department of Homeland Security 
related to the disposition of interview transcripts.
    Pages 99 to 101 of Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher 
Miller's interview with the Select Committee.
    An article from PolitiFact in which it declares false the 
claim that the January 6 Committee suppressed testimony from 
Anthony Ornato that proves former President Donald Trump pushed 
for 10,000 National Guard troops at the Capitol.
    A CNN article entitled, ``Trump's Defense Secretary denies 
that there were orders to have 10,000 troops ready to deploy on 
January 6.''
    A Washington Post article entitled, ``The false GOP claim 
that Pelosi turned down National Guard before January 6 
attack.''
    An email from Mark Meadows to John Aycoth dated January 5, 
2021, in which he says that the National Guard will be 
activated so they can protect pro-Trump people.
    Appendix 2 of the Select Committee to Investigate the 
January 6 Attack final report.
    Summaries of the many Capitol Police Inspector General 
reports requested by Democratic leadership of this Committee 
last Congress.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Without objection.
    [The information referred to follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Again, I would like to thank each of 
our witnesses, the whistleblowers, for coming forward to share 
their story.
    Again, for anyone who is watching who wishes to share their 
story with my Subcommittee, please do not hesitate to reach out 
at CHA.house.gov/whistleblower-support.
    To our whistleblowers, Members of our Committee may have 
additional questions for you, and we ask that you respond to 
those questions in writing.
    Without objection, each Member will have 5 legislative days 
to insert additional material into the record or to revise and 
extend their remarks.
    If there is no further business, I thank the Members for 
their participation.
    Without objection, the Subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
  

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