[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THREE YEARS LATER: D.C. NATIONAL GUARD
WHISTLEBLOWERS SPEAK OUT ON JANUARY
6 DELAY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 17, 2024
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
www.govinfo.gov
www.cha.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
55-798 WASHINGTON : 2024
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin, Chairman
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia JOSEPH MORELLE, New York,
MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia Ranking Member
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
STEPHANIE BICE, Oklahoma NORMA TORRES, California
MIKE CAREY, Ohio DEREK KILMER, Washington
ANTHONY D'ESPOSITO, New York
LAUREL LEE, Florida
Mike Platt, Staff Director
Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia, Chair
MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia NORMA TORRES, California
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina Ranking Member
ANTHONY D'ESPOSITO, New York DEREK KILMER, Washington
Elliott Tomlinson, Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Opening Statements
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight Barry Loudermilk,
Representative from the State of Georgia....................... 1
Prepared statement of the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Oversight Barry Loudermilk................................. 4
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight Norma Torres,
Representative from the State of California.................... 5
Prepared statement of Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on
Oversight Norma Torres..................................... 7
Ranking Member of the Committee on House Administration Joseph
Morelle, Representative from the State of New York............. 8
Prepared statement of Ranking Member of the Committee on
House Administration Joseph Morelle........................ 9
Statement
Hon. Morgan Griffith, Representative from the State of Virginia.. 13
Prepared statement of Hon. Morgan Griffith................... 20
Witness Statements
Command Sergeant Major Michael Brooks............................ 22
Prepared statement of Command Sergeant Major Michael Brooks.. 24
Colonel Earl Matthews............................................ 26
Prepared statement of Colonel Earl Matthews.................. 27
Brigadier General Aaron Dean..................................... 53
Prepared statement of Brigadier General Aaron Dean........... 54
Captain Timothy Nick............................................. 54
Prepared statement of Captain Timothy Nick................... 56
Submissions for the Record
Transcribed interview of Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher
Miller......................................................... 11
Army timeline of events.......................................... 13
New York Times article........................................... 65
Memorandum from the Secretary of the Army........................ 93
Letter from the Secretary of the Army............................ 94
Politico article................................................. 97
Letter from the Select Committee to the General Counsel of the
Department of Homeland Security................................ 101
Pages 99 to 101 of Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher
Miller's interview with the Select Committee................... 104
PolitiFact article............................................... 108
CNN article...................................................... 114
Washington Post article.......................................... 116
Email from Mark Meadows to John Aycoth........................... 121
Appendix 2 of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6
Attack final report............................................ 123
Summaries of the Capitol Police Inspector General reports
requested...................................................... 178
THREE YEARS LATER: D.C. NATIONAL GUARD WHISTLEBLOWERS SPEAK OUT ON
JANUARY 6 DELAY
----------
April 17, 2024
Subcommittee on Oversight,
Committee on House Administration,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Barry
Loudermilk
[chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Loudermilk, Griffith, Murphy,
D'Esposito, Morelle, and Torres.
Staff present: March Bell, General Counsel; Annemarie Cake,
Staff Assistant; Hillary Lassiter, Deputy Staff Director,
Subcommittee on Oversight; Janet Schwalb, Deputy Staff Director
for Advice and Guidance; Elliott Tomlinson, Staff Director,
Subcommittee on Oversight; Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff
Director; Owen Reilly, Minority Professional Staff; and Matt
Schlesinger, Minority Senior Counsel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY LOUDERMILK, CHAIRMAN OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM GEORGIA
Chairman Loudermilk. The Subcommittee on Oversight will
come to order.
Without objection, the chair may declare a recess at any
time.
Also, without objection, the meeting record will remain
open for 5 legislative days so Members may submit any materials
they wish to be included therein.
Thank you, Ranking Member Torres, Members of the
Subcommittee, and our courageous whistleblowers, for joining us
for today's oversight hearing.
These whistleblowers are coming forward today to share for
the first time under oath their firsthand account related to
National Guard deployment on January 6. None of today's
whistleblowers were interviewed under oath by the Department of
Defense Inspector General or the Select Committee.
January 6, 2021, highlighted a culmination of failures at
many levels. For today's hearing, we are examining the
Department of Defense and the D.C. National Guard's response to
the violent breach of the Capitol. We will get into it.
I would like to play a brief video about the timeframe of
the delay.
Mrs. Torres. Is this the video we received just this
morning? Last night? OK.
[Video shown.]
Chairman Loudermilk. I want to thank the minority for their
indulgence in playing the video. I think it is important to
kind of set the stage of just how important 3 hours and 19
minutes can be on a day like that.
At a previous hearing, we heard testimony from former U.S.
Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund about the former Speaker and
the congressional leadership delay of the U.S. Capitol Police's
request for assistance.
On January 6, 2021, at 1:49 p.m., the D.C. National Guard
received the first request for immediate assistance from the
U.S. Capitol Police as protestors started to gather and force
their way into the Capitol complex. However, at this time the
Capitol Police Board had not officially approved the request.
At roughly 2:12 p.m., protestors breached the Capitol and
began assaulting police officers. Staffers and Members of
Congress were ordered to evacuate, including myself and others
that are here today. Capitol Police attempted to secure Members
and clear the Capitol but were quickly outnumbered.
There have been many testimonies of that day, but one thing
is clear: The U.S. Capitol Police requested and needed urgent
assistance from anyone who would answer the call, including the
Metropolitan Police Department and various Federal law
enforcement entities and the D.C. National Guard. However,
there was a delay deploying the National Guard for over 3
hours.
Almost an hour after the Capitol was breached, at 3:04
p.m., the Acting Secretary of Defense, Christopher Miller,
approved the D.C. National Guard to deploy to the Capitol.
Just a brief history lesson for those who do not know.
Executive Order 11485 delegates oversight of the D.C. National
Guard to the Department of Defense. A 1969 memo further
designates this authority specifically to the Secretary of the
Army.
On January 6, 2021, the Commanding General of the D.C.
National Guard, William Walker, reported directly to the
Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy.
The D.C. National Guard was at the Armory, 1.2 miles away
from the Capitol, waiting for authorization to deploy to assist
civil authorities and quell the riot. However, the D.C.
National Guard did not arrive at the Capitol until almost 6
p.m. That is 3 hours and 19 minutes of delay.
During those hours, chaos engulfed Members of Congress, law
enforcement officers, reporters, staffers, and citizens. During
those hours, necessary help from the D.C. National Guard was
not on the way.
Our goal today is to get to the bottom as to why.
It took too long for the D.C. National Guard to arrive at
the Capitol. The 113th Wing--Capital Guardians--have a proud
history of protecting our Nation's capital and serving our
Nation's leadership. Nevertheless, the New Jersey State Police
from nearly 150 miles away responded to the Capitol before the
D.C. National Guard.
Additionally, the Pentagon knew that there was a threat to
governmental operations because, by 3:37 p.m. the Pentagon sent
its own security forces to guard the homes of defense leaders.
At 3:37 p.m., no D.C. National Guard forces were on the way
to the Capitol.
Throughout my Subcommittee's extensive investigation into
the events of January 6 and the Select Committee on January 6,
we have uncovered concerning inconsistencies regarding the
mobilization of the D.C. National Guard.
Through phone records, firsthand accounts, sworn
testimonies, and after-action reports we have gathered, there
appears to have been a significant delay at the Department of
Defense in either deploying the National Guard or communicating
the order of deployment.
Either way, the purpose of this hearing is to hear the D.C.
National Guard's story for the first time ever about the 3 hour
and 19 minute delay.
On November 16, 2021, the Department of Defense Inspector
General released a report reviewing their role in the response
to January 6 which claimed that the D.C. National Guard was
deployed to the Capitol as quickly as possible.
However, the report also credited significant delays in
deployment to D.C. National Guard Commanding General Major
General William Walker neglecting to mobilize after receiving
orders.
Specifically, the DOD IG (Department of Defense Inspector
General) report concludes that the leader of the National Guard
response, Major General Walker, received direction from the
Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy, to deploy the D.C.
National Guard to the Capitol twice, once at 4:35 p.m. and
again at 5 p.m.
Major General Walker denies that either of these calls took
place.
Despite the many inconsistencies and contradictions of the
Department of Defense's responsibility that day, the Select
Committee on January 6 ignored these discrepancies, despite
them being shared privately by their own staff, and barreled
forward with the DOD's side of the story.
Following the release of the DOD IG report, multiple
whistleblowers from the D.C. National Guard who were present
with Major General Walker have come forward to share their
experiences.
According to their testimony, hours of vital response time
were missed because senior Army officials had personal concerns
regarding military presence at the U.S. Capitol.
Today we have the responsibility of recognizing these D.C.
National Guardsmen, listening to their testimony, and honoring
their patriotism, these brave men who showed up to defend the
Capitol and were discarded and ignored when they tried to come
forward.
I reached out to the DOD IG regarding concerns with their
report and contradictory narratives. For nearly 2 months I have
not received any answers.
Today we will learn more about what happened that day
regarding the delay. We will hear a side of the story that has
been ignored for too long.
Most importantly, today we will look into the future and
make sure that our Capitol, our Capital Guardians, and our law
enforcement partners are more prepared today than they were 3
years ago.
We are only able to conduct this oversight because
whistleblowers have come forward to share their stories. I
encourage anyone to reach out to the Subcommittee as our
investigation continues.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Loudermilk follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
BARRY LOUDERMILK
These whistleblowers are coming forward today to share for
the first time under oath their firsthand account related to
National Guard deployment on January 6. None of today's
whistleblowers were interviewed under oath by the Department of
Defense Inspector General or the Select Committee.
January 6, 2021, highlighted a culmination of failures at
many levels. For today's hearing, we are examining the
Department of Defense and the D.C. National Guard's response to
the violent breach of the Capitol. We will get into it.
I would like to play a brief video about the timeframe of
the delay.
[Video shown.]
I want to thank the minority for their indulgence in
playing the video. I think it is important to kind of set the
stage of just how important 3 hours and 19 minutes can be on a
day like that.
At a previous hearing, we heard testimony from former U.S.
Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund about the former Speaker and
the congressional leadership delay of the U.S. Capitol Police's
request for assistance.
On January 6, 2021, at 1:49 p.m., the D.C. National Guard
received the first request for immediate assistance from the
U.S. Capitol Police as protestors started to gather and force
their way into the Capitol complex. However, at this time the
Capitol Police Board had not officially approved the request.
At roughly 2:12 p.m., protestors breached the Capitol and
began assaulting police officers. Staffers and Members of
Congress were ordered to evacuate, including myself and others
that are here today. Capitol Police attempted to secure Members
and clear the Capitol but were quickly outnumbered.
There have been many testimonies of that day, but one thing
is clear: The U.S. Capitol Police requested and needed urgent
assistance from anyone who would answer the call, including the
Metropolitan Police Department and various Federal law
enforcement entities and the D.C. National Guard. However,
there was a delay deploying the National Guard for over 3
hours.
Almost an hour after the Capitol was breached, at 3:04
p.m., the Acting Secretary of Defense, Christopher Miller,
approved the D.C. National Guard to deploy to the Capitol.
Just a brief history lesson for those who do not know.
Executive Order 11485 delegates oversight of the D.C. National
Guard to the Department of Defense. A 1969 memo further
designates this authority specifically to the Secretary of the
Army.
On January 6, 2021, the Commanding General of the D.C.
National Guard, William Walker, reported directly to the
Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy.
The D.C. National Guard was at the Armory, 1.2 miles away
from the Capitol, waiting for authorization to deploy to assist
civil authorities and quell the riot. However, the D.C.
National Guard did not arrive at the Capitol until almost 6
p.m. That is 3 hours and 19 minutes of delay.
During those hours, chaos engulfed Members of Congress, law
enforcement officers, reporters, staffers, and citizens. During
those hours, necessary help from the D.C. National Guard was
not on the way.
Our goal today is to get to the bottom as to why.
It took too long for the D.C. National Guard to arrive at
the Capitol. The 113th Wing Capital Guardians have a proud
history of protecting our Nation's capital and serving our
Nation's leadership. Nevertheless, the New Jersey State Police
from nearly 150 miles away responded to the Capitol before the
D.C. National Guard.
Additionally, the Pentagon knew that there was a threat to
governmental operations because, by 3:37 p.m. the Pentagon sent
its own security forces to guard the homes of defense leaders.
At 3:37 p.m., no D.C. National Guard forces were on the way
to the Capitol.
Throughout my Subcommittee's extensive investigation into
the events of January 6 and the Select Committee on January 6,
we have uncovered concerning inconsistencies regarding the
mobilization of the D.C. National Guard.
Through phone records, firsthand accounts, sworn
testimonies, and after action reports we have gathered, there
appears to have been a significant delay at the Department of
Defense in either deploying the National Guard or communicating
the order of deployment.
Either way, the purpose of this hearing is to hear the D.C.
National Guard's story for the first time ever about the 3 hour
and 19 minute delay.
On November 16, 2021, the Department of Defense Inspector
General released a report reviewing their role in the response
to January 6 which claimed that the D.C. National Guard was
deployed to the Capitol as quickly as possible.
However, the report also credited significant delays in
deployment to D.C. National Guard Commanding General Major
General William Walker neglecting to mobilize after receiving
orders.
Specifically, the DOD IG report concludes that the leader
of the National Guard response, Major General Walker, received
direction from the Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy, to
deploy the D.C. National Guard to the Capitol twice, once at
4:35 p.m. and again at 5 p.m.
Major General Walker denies that either of these calls took
place.
Despite the many inconsistencies and contradictions of the
Department of Defense's responsibility that day, the Select
Committee on January 6 ignored these discrepancies, despite
them being shared privately by their own staff, and barreled
forward with the DOD's side of the story.
Following the release of the DOD IG report, multiple
whistleblowers from the D.C. National Guard who were present
with Major General Walker have come forward to share their
experiences.
According to their testimony, hours of vital response time
were missed because senior Army officials had personal concerns
regarding military presence at the U.S. Capitol.
Today we have the responsibility of recognizing these D.C.
National Guardsmen, listening to their testimony, and honoring
their patriotism, these brave men who showed up to defend the
Capitol and were discarded and ignored when they tried to come
forward.
I reached out to the DOD IG regarding concerns with their
report and contradictory narratives. For nearly 2 months I have
not received any answers.
Today we will learn more about what happened that day
regarding the delay. We will hear a side of the story that has
been ignored for too long.
Most importantly, today we will look into the future and
make sure that our Capitol, our Capital Guardians, and our law
enforcement partners are more prepared today than they were 3
years ago.
We are only able to conduct this oversight because
whistleblowers have come forward to share their stories. I
encourage anyone to reach out to the Subcommittee as our
investigation continues.
I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mrs. Torres, for 5
minutes for the purpose of providing an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NORMA TORRES, RANKING MEMBER OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA
Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today and for
your service to our Nation, particularly on January 6. You have
sacrificed your time to protect us, and we owe you a debt of
gratitude.
We are here today discussing the delayed National Guard
response to the Capitol for one reason and one reason only:
Donald Trump dispatched an armed mob to try to overturn the
election he knew he lost.
For 3 hours and 19 minutes, as that violent mob assaulted
law enforcement and hunted for Members of Congress and the Vice
President, who they were trying to hang, the National Guard was
forced to wait and wait and wait, all because of the chaos at
the Pentagon caused by the Commander in Chief and the fear that
he would involve the military in domestic political affairs, a
big no-no we teach worldwide to emerging countries.
This was a Commander in Chief who, as the riot unfolded,
did not call his Acting Secretary of Defense or Secretary of
the Army to ask why the National Guard was missing, where were
they?
A Commander in Chief who, after he learned someone was
shot, did not care. He did not call the National Guard
directly.
A Commander in Chief whose aides and family partied and
danced as the mob prepared to overturn the Capitol.
A Commander in Chief who sat in his dining room watching it
all unfold on TV like it was an action movie with an ending
favorable to him.
How did we get here? Let me tell you.
In response to the June 2020 demonstrations responding to
the murder of George Floyd, President Trump said he would,
quote, ``deploy the United States military,'' end quote, to put
down the protests and even asked Secretary of Defense Mark
Esper why the military could not just, quote, ``shoot the
protesters in the legs or something,'' end quote.
Secretary Esper found the President's comments so
disturbing he held a press conference, saying he opposed
invoking the Insurrection Act.
Then, in December, as Trump continued to spread conspiracy
theories supported by Members of this Congress sitting here
today about the election being stolen, talk of invoking the
Insurrection Act reached a boiling point.
It got so bad that his own Secretary of the Army and the
Army Chief of Staff, a four-star general, issued a joint
statement saying, quote, ``There is no role for the U.S.
military in determining the outcome of an American election,''
end quote.
As our top military leaders worried the President would
declare martial law, the rest of the national security
apparatus was in total disarray. People were getting fired or
resigning left and right. Everyone remembers that, right? With
only 71 days left in his term, Trump terminated the Secretary
of Defense and replaced him with an Acting Secretary of Defense
who was completely, completely over his head.
Contrary to attempts to rewrite history, the January 6
Select Committee conducted more than two dozen interviews and
reviewed over 37,000 pages of documents related to the National
Guard and dedicated 46 pages of its final report to this issue.
The Select Committee found that the chaos led to an ill-
equipped Acting Secretary of Defense issuing an unclear order
to the Secretary of the Army, an order so unclear that it was
interpreted differently by the Acting Secretary of Defense, the
Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of the Army--three
people, three different interpretations.
It is all there in the Select Committee's final report and
the dozens of relevant transcripts available online.
Adding to the chaos, these top Army officials exercised
extreme caution and imposed unprecedented restrictions on when
and how to deploy the Guard on January 6. This was the direct
result of the President's decision to involve the military in
domestic affairs.
To our witnesses, I am so sorry. I am so sorry that Trump's
Defense Department and Army leadership failed you and they
failed us on January 6. You should never have been forced to
sit on your hands while we were lying on our stomachs, planning
to use a pen in our purses as a weapon to defend ourselves
against the mob that was sent here to kill us by the President
of the United States of America. We were preparing to die.
I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Torres follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT NORMA TORRES
We are here today discussing the delayed National Guard
response to the Capitol for one reason and one reason only:
Donald Trump dispatched an armed mob to try to overturn the
election he knew he lost.
For 3 hours and 19 minutes, as that violent mob assaulted
law enforcement and hunted for Members of Congress and the Vice
President, who they were trying to hang, the National Guard was
forced to wait and wait and wait, all because of the chaos at
the Pentagon caused by the Commander in Chief and the fear that
he would involve the military in domestic political affairs, a
big no no we teach worldwide to emerging countries.
This was a Commander in Chief who, as the riot unfolded,
did not call his Acting Secretary of Defense or Secretary of
the Army to ask why the National Guard was missing, where were
they?
A Commander in Chief who, after he learned someone was
shot, did not care. He did not call the National Guard
directly.
A Commander in Chief whose aides and family partied and
danced as the mob prepared to overturn the Capitol.
A Commander in Chief who sat in his dining room watching it
all unfold on TV like it was an action movie with an ending
favorable to him.
How did we get here? Let me tell you.
In response to the June 2020 demonstrations responding to
the murder of George Floyd, President Trump said he would,
quote, ``deploy the United States military,'' end quote, to put
down the protests and even asked Secretary of Defense Mark
Esper why the military could not just, quote, ``shoot the
protesters in the legs or something,'' end quote.
Secretary Esper found the President's comments so
disturbing he held a press conference, saying he opposed
invoking the Insurrection Act.
Then, in December, as Trump continued to spread conspiracy
theories supported by Members of this Congress sitting here
today about the election being stolen, talk of invoking the
Insurrection Act reached a boiling point.
It got so bad that his own Secretary of the Army and the
Army Chief of Staff, a four star general, issued a joint
statement saying, quote, ``There is no role for the U.S.
military in determining the outcome of an American election,''
end quote.
As our top military leaders worried the President would
declare martial law, the rest of the national security
apparatus was in total disarray. People were getting fired or
resigning left and right. Everyone remembers that, right? With
only 71 days left in his term, Trump terminated the Secretary
of Defense and replaced him with an Acting Secretary of Defense
who was completely, completely over his head.
Contrary to attempts to rewrite history, the January 6
Select Committee conducted more than two dozen interviews and
reviewed over 37,000 pages of documents related to the National
Guard and dedicated 46 pages of its final report to this issue.
The Select Committee found that the chaos led to an ill
equipped Acting Secretary of Defense issuing an unclear order
to the Secretary of the Army, an order so unclear that it was
interpreted differently by the Acting Secretary of Defense, the
Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of the Army three
people, three different interpretations.
It is all there in the Select Committee's final report and
the dozens of relevant transcripts available online.
Adding to the chaos, these top Army officials exercised
extreme caution and imposed unprecedented restrictions on when
and how to deploy the Guard on January 6. This was the direct
result of the President's decision to involve the military in
domestic affairs.
To our witnesses, I am so sorry. I am so sorry that Trump's
Defense Department and Army leadership failed you and they
failed us on January 6. You should never have been forced to
sit on your hands while we were lying on our stomachs, planning
to use a pen in our purses as a weapon to defend ourselves
against the mob that was sent here to kill us by the President
of the United States of America. We were preparing to die.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentlelady yields.
The chair now recognizes the full Committee Ranking Member,
Mr. Morelle, for 5 minutes for the purpose of making an opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH MORELLE, RANKING MEMBER OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
NEW YORK
Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses for your careers of
distinguished service.
The D.C. National Guardsmen are known as the Capital
Guardians, and we as Members are only able to do our jobs in
the days and months that followed January 6 because you stood
guard over us as you did. For that and for all of your long
service, we owe you an enormous debt of gratitude. Thank you.
I want to be clear: We are here today for a single reason.
An unpatriotic, cynical, power-hungry man incited a deadly
insurrection as part of his months-long effort to overturn a
free and fair American election. We are here because of his
lies about the 2020 election.
It is hard to believe, it is, frankly, even hard to say,
but it does not make it any less true. Yet many cannot bring
themselves to acknowledge it, many in this room.
As a result, we are here because of the majority's 15-month
quixotic mission to find malfeasance from the January 6 Select
Committee who investigated the insurrection where no
malfeasance exists.
Frankly, just as a question of jurisdiction should be
raised. If this hearing is about the chain of command and/or
communication between the various elements of the defense
apparatus of the United States, then it falls to the House
Armed Services Committee to do that investigation. They should
be doing it. I do agree. This is clearly not the venue for this
to happen.
I do want to address something at the outset. There is a
notion that persists that President Trump ordered or pushed for
10,000 National Guard troops ahead of January 6. It has been
debunked repeatedly, and it is also a red herring, and here is
why.
As the chair has stated, a 1969 executive order delegated
authority of the D.C. National Guard to the Secretary of
Defense who, in turn, delegated that authority to the Secretary
of the Army.
The President of the United States ultimately sits atop the
chain of command. What he did with the National Guard before
January 6 does not matter compared to his actions--or, I should
say, inactions--on the 6th of January itself.
What he never did on the 6th was call the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of the Army, or the D.C. National Guard
itself to find out why they were not on the scene or to order
them to the Capitol for that 3 hour and 19 minute delay.
I want to quickly dispense with the claim once and for all
that he ordered 10,000 troops, as he has said. Acting Secretary
of Defense Christopher Miller was asked the following questions
and provided the following answers under penalty of perjury.
First question: ``The 10,000 troops, did you take that as a
request for you or an order for you to deploy 10,000 troops?''
His answer, and I quote: ``No, absolutely not. I
interpreted it as a bit of Presidential banter or President
Trump banter that you're all familiar with, and in no way,
shape, or form did I interpret that as an order or direction.''
He was also asked: ``In February 2021, Mark Meadows said on
FOX News that, quote, `Even in January, that it was a given as
many as 10,000 National Guard troops were told to be on the
ready by the Secretary of Defense.' Is there any accuracy to
that statement?''
Mr. Meadows' (sic) answer: ``Not from my perspective. I was
not given any direction or order or knew of any plans of that
nature . . . No, there was--obviously we had plans for
activating more folks, but that was not anything more than
contingency planning.''
Then a few questions later, ``To be crystal clear,'' the
question was, ``there was no direct order from President Trump
to put 10,000 troops to be on the ready for January 6. Is that
correct?''
His answer, quote: ``That's correct. There was no direct
order. There was no order from the President.''
I think that is all you need to know. Under oath, the
Secretary of Defense said it never happened.
Here is the bottom line. The President of the United States
manipulated his followers into believing the election was
stolen from him, summoned an armed mob to Washington, and then
unleashed them on the United States Capitol, and then did
absolutely nothing to stop what unfolded.
People died. We almost lost our democracy. We could have a
hundred hearings to deflect blame, but the facts are not going
to change.
President Truman famously had a sign on his desk that said,
``The buck stops here.'' President Trump's sign, on the other
hand, would read, ``The buck stops anywhere but here.''
He lit the fire. He fanned the flames. The Defense
Department delayed the troops. He wants everyone else to take
the blame. Frankly, I find it pathetic.
I agree with Senator Mitch McConnell who said, ``Former
President Trump's actions preceding the riot were a
disgraceful, disgraceful dereliction of duty.''
Former Speaker Kevin McCarthy said Trump bears
responsibility for his actions, no ifs, ands, or buts.
I agree with Senator Lindsey Graham who said, ``All I can
say is count me out. Enough is enough.''
I only wish that they and the rest of the Republican Party
agreed with their prior versions of themselves.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Morelle follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE
ADMINISTRATION JOSEPH MORELLE
The D.C. National Guardsmen are known as the Capital
Guardians, and we as Members are only able to do our jobs in
the days and months that followed January 6 because you stood
guard over us as you did. For that and for all of your long
service, we owe you an enormous debt of gratitude. Thank you.
I want to be clear: We are here today for a single reason.
An unpatriotic, cynical, power hungry man incited a deadly
insurrection as part of his months long effort to overturn a
free and fair American election. We are here because of his
lies about the 2020 election.
It is hard to believe, it is, frankly, even hard to say,
but it does not make it any less true. Yet many cannot bring
themselves to acknowledge it, many in this room.
As a result, we are here because of the majority's 15-month
quixotic mission to find malfeasance from the January 6 Select
Committee who investigated the insurrection where no
malfeasance exists.
Frankly, just as a question of jurisdiction should be
raised. If this hearing is about the chain of command and/or
communication between the various elements of the defense
apparatus of the United States, then it falls to the House
Armed Services Committee to do that investigation. They should
be doing it. I do agree. This is clearly not the venue for this
to happen.
I do want to address something at the outset. There is a
notion that persists that President Trump ordered or pushed for
10,000 National Guard troops ahead of January 6. It has been
debunked repeatedly, and it is also a red herring, and here is
why.
As the chair has stated, a 1969 executive order delegated
authority of the D.C. National Guard to the Secretary of
Defense who, in turn, delegated that authority to the Secretary
of the Army.
The President of the United States ultimately sits atop the
chain of command. What he did with the National Guard before
January 6 does not matter compared to his actions or, I should
say, inactions on the 6th of January itself.
What he never did on the 6th was call the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of the Army, or the D.C. National Guard
itself to find out why they were not on the scene or to order
them to the Capitol for that 3 hour and 19 minute delay.
I want to quickly dispense with the claim once and for all
that he ordered 10,000 troops, as he has said. Acting Secretary
of Defense Christopher Miller was asked the following questions
and provided the following answers under penalty of perjury.
First question: ``The 10,000 troops, did you take that as a
request for you or an order for you to deploy 10,000 troops?''
His answer, and I quote: ``No, absolutely not. I
interpreted it as a bit of Presidential banter or President
Trump banter that you're all familiar with, and in no way,
shape, or form did I interpret that as an order or direction.''
He was also asked: ``In February 2021, Mark Meadows said on
FOX News that, quote, `Even in January, that it was a given as
many as 10,000 National Guard troops were told to be on the
ready by the Secretary of Defense.' Is there any accuracy to
that statement?''
Mr. Meadows' (sic) answer: ``Not from my perspective. I was
not given any direction or order or knew of any plans of that
nature . . . No, there was obviously we had plans for
activating more folks, but that was not anything more than
contingency planning.''
Then a few questions later, ``To be crystal clear,'' the
question was, ``there was no direct order from President Trump
to put 10,000 troops to be on the ready for January 6. Is that
correct?''
His answer, quote: ``That's correct. There was no direct
order. There was no order from the President.''
I think that is all you need to know. Under oath, the
Secretary of Defense said it never happened.
Here is the bottom line. The President of the United States
manipulated his followers into believing the election was
stolen from him, summoned an armed mob to Washington, and then
unleashed them on the United States Capitol, and then did
absolutely nothing to stop what unfolded.
People died. We almost lost our democracy. We could have a
hundred hearings to deflect blame, but the facts are not going
to change.
President Truman famously had a sign on his desk that said,
``The buck stops here.'' President Trump's sign, on the other
hand, would read, ``The buck stops anywhere but here.''
He lit the fire. He fanned the flames. The Defense
Department delayed the troops. He wants everyone else to take
the blame. Frankly, I find it pathetic.
I agree with Senator Mitch McConnell who said, ``Former
President Trump's actions preceding the riot were a
disgraceful, disgraceful dereliction of duty.''
Former Speaker Kevin McCarthy said Trump bears
responsibility for his actions, no ifs, ands, or buts.
I agree with Senator Lindsey Graham who said, ``All I can
say is count me out. Enough is enough.''
I only wish that they and the rest of the Republican Party
agreed with their prior versions of themselves.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
Just for the record, this hearing is not being done in
isolation. It has been carefully coordinated with the House
Armed Services Committee and not only has their blessing but a
bipartisan blessing to hold this hearing.
Also, without objection, I would like to submit for the
record Secretary Miller's transcribed interview under oath to
the Select Committee on January 6.
[The transcribed interview referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Loudermilk. Two excerpts.
``So, Mr. Miller, did you try to reach''--let me back up.
``On January 3d, did you have or even prior did you have
all the authorities needed in terms of activating, deploying
the D.C. National Guard?''
He said, ``Yes. I felt I did.''
``Did you need any additional authorities, or was there a
discussion about your authorities in any way at the January 3d
meeting?''
``No, I didn't. I felt like I had all the authorities I
needed and did not need to discuss anything with the President
regarding authorities.''
Another question: ``So, Mr. Miller, did you try to reach
President Trump that day?''
``I did not.''
``Why not?''
``I had all the authorities I needed to perform my duties,
responsibilities that day and didn't need any other guidance
from the President.''
I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith,
for 5 minutes for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MORGAN GRIFFITH, A U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
Mr. Griffith. Let me start, Mr. Chairman, by submitting for
the record the Army timeline of events from December 31, 2020,
through January 7, 2021, that report dated January 7, 2021.
Chairman Loudermilk. Without objection.
[The report referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Griffith. I find some of the comments this morning
interesting because I, too, was on the floor that day. I find
it interesting because there is an allegation that the
Commander in Chief has to call everybody who is in the chain of
command to make sure his orders are followed.
It is my understanding, and I believe that the evidence
today will show from these gentlemen who have given their time
and are whistleblowers, meaning they are coming forward with
something that other people may not want to have heard, that we
will discover through their testimony that, in fact, the
President had given the instruction, perhaps misunderstood on
January 3 but certainly on January 6, prior to that instruction
being relayed by his officers in accordance with general
military procedure to the D.C. National Guard.
That is a big part of what this hearing will be about
today, and I think it is important that we keep that in mind.
Further, we have heard a lot about the attempts to rewrite
history because the January 6 Committee is allegedly supposed
to have already done all of this. We will hear, I believe, from
these gentlemen today that they were not talked to by the
January 6 commission.
Further, that commission will forever in history be tainted
because it was the first time in history, in an attempt to
write the history after the fact, that both sides, both major
parties in this political situation, that we find--have found
ourselves in for the last 175, 200 years, both were not invited
to participate in an equal manner, that the Republican
Representatives who were supposed to be on that, who as it was
originally set up were supposed to be a part of the January 6
Committee, were not allowed to be present. They were not
allowed to cross-examine witnesses. They were not allowed to
ask for witnesses like these four brave gentlemen who are here
with us today. They were not allowed to call those witnesses to
appear in front of the January 6 Committee.
While the January 6 Committee may have found some very
interesting information, they intentionally chose not to tell
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. At the
very best, it can be described as a partial attempt to put
forward facts that favored their side of the narrative and not
to get to all the facts.
As Jack Webb in his famous character from ``Dragnet'' used
to say, ``The facts. We just want the facts, ma'am.''
That is what we are here to do here today, is to try to
make sure that we are getting to the facts, not the political
rhetoric, not the emotions, per se, but the facts from four
brave gentlemen who serve our Nation and have served our
Nation, who have come forward.
I do not know any of these gentlemen. I do not believe any
of them has a political axe to grind. They are here just to
deliver the facts.
I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Griffith follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MORGAN GRIFFITH
I find some of the comments this morning interesting
because I, too, was on the floor that day. I find it
interesting because there is an allegation that the Commander
in Chief has to call everybody who is in the chain of command
to make sure his orders are followed.
It is my understanding, and I believe that the evidence
today will show from these gentlemen who have given their time
and are whistleblowers, meaning they are coming forward with
something that other people may not want to have heard, that we
will discover through their testimony that, in fact, the
President had given the instruction, perhaps misunderstood on
January 3 but certainly on January 6, prior to that instruction
being relayed by his officers in accordance with general
military procedure to the D.C. National Guard.
That is a big part of what this hearing will be about
today, and I think it is important that we keep that in mind.
Further, we have heard a lot about the attempts to rewrite
history because the January 6 Committee is allegedly supposed
to have already done all of this. We will hear, I believe, from
these gentlemen today that they were not talked to by the
January 6 commission.
Further, that commission will forever in history be tainted
because it was the first time in history, in an attempt to
write the history after the fact, that both sides, both major
parties in this political situation, that we find have found
ourselves in for the last 175, 200 years, both were not invited
to participate in an equal manner, that the Republican
Representatives who were supposed to be on that, who as it was
originally set up were supposed to be a part of the January 6
Committee, were not allowed to be present. They were not
allowed to cross examine witnesses. They were not allowed to
ask for witnesses like these four brave gentlemen who are here
with us today. They were not allowed to call those witnesses to
appear in front of the January 6 Committee.
While the January 6 Committee may have found some very
interesting information, they intentionally chose not to tell
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. At the
very best, it can be described as a partial attempt to put
forward facts that favored their side of the narrative and not
to get to all the facts.
As Jack Webb in his famous character from ``Dragnet'' used
to say, ``The facts. We just want the facts, ma'am.''
That is what we are here to do here today, is to try to
make sure that we are getting to the facts, not the political
rhetoric, not the emotions, per se, but the facts from four
brave gentlemen who serve our Nation and have served our
Nation, who have come forward.
I do not know any of these gentlemen. I do not believe any
of them has a political axe to grind. They are here just to
deliver the facts.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
Without objection, all other Members' opening statements
will be made part of the hearing record if they are submitted
to the Committee clerk by 5 p.m. today.
Pursuant to paragraph (b) of Committee Rule 6, the
witnesses will please stand and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Loudermilk. Let the record show the witnesses have
answered in the affirmative.
You may be seated.
I will now introduce each of our witnesses.
Our first witness is Command Sergeant Major Michael Brooks.
Command Sergeant Major Brooks' military career spanned 29
years, with combat tours in Iraq. Command Master Sergeant
Brooks spent the end of his career in the D.C. National Guard,
including at the Joint Task Force D.C. Mr. Brooks now works at
a company that seeks to protect national and economic security
from undue foreign influence.
On January 6, 2021, Mr. Brooks was the senior enlisted
advisor to Major General William Walker and advised on all
enlisted matters.
Our next witness is Colonel Earl Matthews, a decorated
military veteran with a long and accomplished career in
government and the private sector. Colonel Matthews served as
Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for
Defense Policy and Strategy on the National Security Council
staff. He also served as the Army's Acting General Counsel and
Principal Deputy General Counsel, as well as the Deputy Legal
Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
On January 6, 2021, Colonel Matthews was the Chief Legal
Advisor to Major General William Walker and was with him all
day.
Our next witness is Brigadier General Aaron Dean, with a
similarly accomplished career in military service.
Brigadier General Dean served in Operation Desert Storm and
a combat tour in Iraq. He also served in the D.C. National
Guard for over 35 years, exemplifying what it means to be a
Capital Guardsman.
On January 6, 2021, Brigadier General Dean served as Major
General Walker's Adjutant General and Principal Advisor.
Our final witness is Captain Timothy Nick, an Active-Duty
servicemember in the Florida National Guard. Captain Nick has
experience in law enforcement, including as a current officer
in the U.S. Secret Service. Captain Nick previously served in
the D.C. National Guard's Public Affairs Department.
On January 6, 2021, Captain Nick was the aide-de-camp to
Major General William Walker and took detailed notes of actions
of Major General Walker on that day.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country and
your strength and courage to come forward and share your
accounting of events on January 6, 2021. We all look forward to
your testimony.
As a reminder, we have read your written statements, and
they will appear in full in the hearing record.
Under Committee Rule 9, you are to limit your oral
presentation to a brief summary of your written statement
unless I extend the time period in consultation with Ranking
Member Torres.
Please remember to turn on your microphone using the button
in front of you so that Members can hear you. When you begin to
speak, the light on the timer in front of you will turn green.
After 4 minutes, the light will turn yellow. When the red light
comes on, your 5 minutes has expired, and we just ask that you
please wrap up your comments at that moment.
I now recognize Command Sergeant Major Michael Brooks for 5
minutes.
STATEMENTS OF COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR MICHAEL BROOKS, SENIOR
ENLISTED OFFICER, D.C. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD; COLONEL EARL
MATTHEWS, CHIEF LEGAL ADVISOR, D.C. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD;
BRIGADIER GENERAL AARON DEAN, ADJUTANT GENERAL, D.C. ARMY
NATIONAL GUARD; AND CAPTAIN TIMOTHY NICK, AIDE-DE-CAMP, D.C.
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
STATEMENT OF COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR MICHAEL BROOKS
Sergeant Major Brooks. Good morning, Chairman Loudermilk,
Ranking Member Torres, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify today.
I am Command Sergeant Major, Retired, Michael F. Brooks. I
am the former command senior enlisted----
Chairman Loudermilk. Mr. Brooks, I am sorry to interrupt.
Could you pull the microphone a little closer to you? People in
the audience are having a hard time hearing. I apologize for
that. You can start over, and we will reset your time.
Sergeant Major Brooks. Thank you.
Is that better?
Chairman Loudermilk. Much better. Thank you.
Sergeant Major Brooks. Good morning, Chairman Loudermilk,
Ranking Member Torres, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify today.
I am Command Sergeant Major, Retired, Michael F. Brooks. I
am the former Command Senior Enlisted Leader of the District of
Columbia National Guard--the Capital Guardians. I retired on
March 1 of 2023 with 29 years of active Federal service in the
Army and the Army National Guard.
While I am no longer in service, I continue defense of our
great Nation as a Compliance and Investigation Specialist with
the Compliance and Adjudication Division of the Office of
Information and Communications Technology and Services of the
Bureau of Industry and Security.
I served as the Command Senior Enlisted Leader of the D.C.
National Guard from December 2017 to December 2022. As the most
senior noncommissioned officer in the organization, I reported
directly to the Commanding General. From 2017 until his
retirement and selection as the 38th Sergeant at Arms for the
House of Representatives, my commander was Major General
William J. Walker.
As his Senior Enlisted Advisor, I reported only to him, and
I was with him throughout the days before, the day of, and the
subsequent weeks and months that followed the events of January
6, 2021.
Imagine my surprise when the DOD IG released their report
without once interviewing myself or other critically
significant D.C. National Guard members with firsthand
knowledge of what occurred that fateful day--not anonymous
witnesses or anonymous officials but senior ranking military
members that were in the room, on the calls, and on the secure
video teleconference.
I am not here to disparage the Army that I love and served
for nearly three decades, but to correct the record and speak
for the hundreds of enlisted soldiers and airmen of the D.C.
National Guard who have always answered the call to serve
without political bias or prejudice, who have always faithfully
fulfilled their oath to support and defend the Constitution of
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic,
those Capital Guardians who continue to do so even today, after
being degraded by senior officials of the Army and the Army
staff in their inaccurate and biased report.
I believe those who steered the narrative of the DOD IG
report did so not for historical documentation or to enhance
future military capability, but to protect and advance
individuals who sought to shield themselves from
responsibility, to overly enhance their role and perceived
significance in a critical moment in the history of our
Nation's democracy.
In truth, their actions, no matter how innocent they
believe them to be, have led to an awful mark on our military
and shown an incredible lack of respect for the service of the
men and women who served in the D.C. National Guard before,
during, and after January 6, 2021.
Trust in our Army's most senior leadership was lost. Their
actions and comments have highlighted the Army Staff and the
Secretary of the Army's lack of knowledge and understanding of
the D.C. National Guard, its authorities, and capabilities.
Prior to the protests following the murder of George Floyd
in May 2020, I do not believe any of them understood just how
unique the D.C. National Guard is and the responsibility that
is delegated from the President to the Secretary of Defense and
further delegated to the Secretary of the Army. I believe it is
this lack of understanding that led to the significant delays
in the military response on January 6.
I will not sit here today and say if we had been given
authority to immediately respond when Chief Sund, the Chief of
the Capitol Police, made that first frantic call for support at
1:49 p.m. that we would have prevented the breach of the
Capitol.
What I can tell you with absolute certainty is that we had
a force equipped and ready to respond and that, despite the
inaccuracies of the DOD IG report, we had a plan and would have
liked the opportunity to try.
Instead, we waited for hours, less than 2 miles east of the
Capitol Building, absolutely frustrated, knowing our Capitol
had been breached and not understanding why we had not received
the authorization to respond.
I cannot tell you the number of times someone has asked me:
Where were you? Where was the National Guard? Or how can you
call yourselves Capital Guardians?
There is no easy response to those questions, and the truth
is we were there and we were ready. We just were not authorized
to respond, and that is difficult to explain.
The soldiers and airmen of the D.C. National Guard deserve
better. They deserve to be recognized for their sacrifices over
a prolonged period of civil unrest from May 2020 to May 2021.
I look forward to your questions you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Command Sergeant Major Michael
Brooks follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR MICHAEL BROOKS
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, Sergeant Major.
I now recognize Colonel Earl Matthews for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL EARL MATTHEWS
Colonel Matthews. Chairman Loudermilk, Ranking Member
Torres, Members of the Subcommittee, good morning and thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today.
My name is Earl Matthews, and I am a colonel in the United
States Army Reserve. I am in the 25th year of my military
service. I love our Army, and I am committed to our Army
values.
I am here today because two senior general officers of the
United States Army, General Charles A. Flynn and Lieutenant
General Walter E. Piatt, have acted contrary to those values.
Generals Piatt and Flynn have lied to Congress, to Federal
investigators, and to the American people about why it took so
long for the District of Columbia National Guard to deploy to
the U.S. Capitol on January the 6th, 2021.
Their distortions contributed to a deeply and fundamentally
flawed Department of Defense Inspector General investigation
and to deficiencies in other official inquiries.
On January the 6th, 2021, I was on duty and present during
numerous conversations, video conferences, and phone calls
leading up to, during, and after the riot which was engulfing
the Capitol.
[Disturbance in hearing room.]
Chairman Loudermilk. Order.
Colonel Matthews. When I say these general officers lied, I
do not do so lightly or cavalierly. I speak from personal
knowledge, having interacted with them on January the 6th in my
official military capacity.
Unfortunately, some senior officials within the Department
of the Army and the Department of Defense have sought to
protect or to promote Generals Flynn and Piatt. These senior
civilian officials have excused, condoned, or overlooked the
misconduct of these officers.
As a former Acting General Counsel of the Department of the
Army and its Chief Legal Officer, I take these matters
seriously, even if others do not. I am glad this Subcommittee
has an open mind and is committed to the dogged search for the
truth.
In my formal statement, which I provided to the Committee
in advance of today's hearing, I detailed General Piatt's and
General Flynn's intentional misrepresentations to the Congress
and to Federal investigators. During today's hearing, I hope to
discuss with you how they lied, where they lied, and, in my
opinion, why they lied.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Earl Matthews follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF COLONEL EARL MATTHEWS
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
ADDENDUM
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, Colonel Matthews.
I now recognize Brigadier General Aaron Dean for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL AARON DEAN
General Dean. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
Members of the Subcommittee.
Good morning. I am Brigadier General, Retired, Aaron Dean.
Let history record this moment as I, in my capacity as the
second in command of the District of Columbia National Guard,
entrusted with the sacred duty to advise and assist the
Commanding General on matters of operational significance
concerning the deployment of the District of Columbia National
Guard on January 6, 2021, addressed the grave assertions and
inaccuracies contained in the Inspector General's report DODIG-
2022-039.
I believe it is my duty and moral obligation to stand
before you today and illuminate the truth. I stand resolute,
bearing witness to the unwavering readiness and unparalleled
dedication of the servicemembers of the District of Columbia
National Guard.
I will answer questions honestly, as witnessed through the
lens of my 34-year career in the District of Columbia National
Guard.
I rebuff in the strongest terms the insidious insinuation
that the District of Columbia National Guard faltered in its
duty, that it languished in apathy or incompetence when called
upon to safeguard the sanctum of democracy.
Today I will tell the truth to the best of my recollection,
unblemished by falsehoods, and in doing so exonerate the honor
of the brave soldiers and airmen who stood unwavering in the
defense of our Nation.
May my testimony serve as a testament to the indomitable
spirit of those who answered the call of duty on that historic
day.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Brigadier General Aaron Dean
follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL AARON DEAN
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, General Dean.
I now recognize Captain Timothy Nick for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN TIMOTHY NICK
Captain Nick. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
my name is Timothy Nick, and I am a captain in the Army
National Guard.
I am here today to aid the Subcommittee in resolving
factual errors in the official record of what happened on
January 6, 2021, specifically regarding the alleged District of
Columbia National Guard's delayed response caused by critical,
Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed Pentagon senior
officials.
I was concerned by the events that unfolded that day on the
United States Capitol. As a Federal officer with the United
States Secret Service and a former State trooper with the
Florida Highway Patrol, my heart goes out to all law
enforcement officers, sisters and brothers, that held the line
that day to restore public order to the chaos.
I am here today with my counsels, Lachlan McKinion and Dan
Meyer of law firm Tully Rinckey. The firm has advised me,
beginning with my role as a confidential source to the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the United
States Capitol. When my confidentiality was breached, it was
Dan who intervened to ensure I was protected as a military
whistleblower.
First, I want to explain my role on January 6. I was
assigned as aide-de-camp, the personal assistant to Major
General William Walker, the Commanding General of the D.C.
National Guard. It was my only second day on the job.
Please focus on alleged facts about--found in the November
16, 2021, Department of Defense Inspector General's
multidisciplinary review into the D.C. National Guard response
and Department of Defense's role that day.
I can say unequivocally that the Inspector General's review
is riddled with inaccuracies, misstatements, and perhaps false
flags and narratives regarding how critical Pentagon senior
officials responded when our Republic was under great stress.
For instance, during a conference call at 2:31 p.m. with
members of the United States Army, U.S. Capitol Police,
Metropolitan Police Department, District of Columbia
government, and U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division, the
U.S. Army's Lieutenant General Walter Piatt, Director of the
Army Staff, and the Army's Lieutenant General Charles Flynn,
Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations, were on the call. Also on
was Colonel John Lubas, Executive Officer to the Secretary of
the Army.
The Army falsely denied that General Flynn was ever on the
call. This is false and material on its face. Lieutenant Flynn
was on the call and even participated in discussions.
The Defense Inspector's review also rounds language,
papering over the fact that Lieutenant General Piatt and
Lieutenant General Flynn, while on the call, discussed how they
``did not like the optics.'' That is a direct quote.
They stated it would be in their best military advice to
recommend to the Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy, to deny
the request from Command General William Walker to deploy the
D.C. National Guard and aid U.S. Capitol Police in restoring
restoration of ordered liberty on Capitol Hill.
In addition, former Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy
claims he was on a 2:31 p.m. call and spoke on that call. This
is false. Unless he was in the room, shadowing the call, and he
did not speak nor identify himself, he was not on the call. He
was en route to the Washington, D.C., regional office at the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to support that agency's
concept of operation plans for January 6.
He went on to claim that he called and spoke to Major
General Walker at least twice, ordering deployment of the D.C.
National Guard. This is also false. At no time did General
Walker take any calls, nor did we ever hear from the Secretary
on any of the ongoing conference calls or the secure video
teleconferencing throughout the day.
This I know because I was with the Command General the
entire time, recording events.
Throughout the day, Major General Walker was told by staff
officers ``to stand by'' with respect to deploying to Capitol
Hill. Only at 5:09 p.m. in the early evening, which I wrote
down in my wheel book, was the D.C. Guard given orders to
deploy and to move to the Capitol to assist Capitol Police.
We arrived too late. One American lay dead, with other
sisters and brothers injured, including Federal and local law
enforcement officers.
We were ready and standing by. I know if we were able to
deploy immediately when General Walker made the request the
National Guard could have helped end the civil disturbance and
restored public order quickly.
The Army National Guard motto is, ``Always ready, Always
there.'' The D.C. National Guard was ready to help and assist
Capitol Police, but we were not allowed to do our job due to
paralyzed decisionmaking by Acting Secretary of Defense Chris
Miller and Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy.
This led to a crisis in Federal leadership at the Pentagon
and delayed the D.C. response by 3 hours and 19 minutes.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
and articulate the facts as they happened. I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Captain Timothy Nick follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN TIMOTHY NICK
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, Captain.
As we begin our question session, I want to reemphasize how
much we appreciate all of you coming forward. I know as a
veteran of the Armed Forces myself, this takes an incredible
amount of courage to come forward and tell the truth.
We will now move into the question session. Just a reminder
to make sure the microphones are very close to you during this
time.
I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Griffith. We have a sergeant major, a colonel, a
brigadier general, and a captain. Your testimony is compelling.
Thank you.
Now to the questions.
On January 6, 2021, were each of you gentlemen with Major
General William Walker from 1:49 p.m. through 5:55 p.m., yes or
no?
Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes.
Colonel Matthews. I was.
General Dean. Yes.
Captain Nick. Yes.
Mr. Griffith. The Department of Defense Inspector General
report, DOD IG report, alleges that the Secretary of the Army
contacted Major General Walker multiple times on January 6
during that timeframe. Some allegations are two calls, some are
three, but the allegations would be or the assertions would be
3:04 p.m., 4:35 p.m., and finally at 5 p.m.
Do any of you recall any one of those calls taking place?
Colonel Matthews. Negative, sir.
Can I amplify that, though?
Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir.
Colonel Matthews. By way of background, so I was a
political appointee in the Trump administration. I was a senior
political appointee. I was also in the Army Reserve and
National Guard.
Now, in June 2017, I was appointed to be Acting General
Counsel in the Department of the Army. The next month, Ryan
McCarthy was appointed Acting Secretary of the Army. He had
been confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army.
Ryan McCarthy is my colleague. He is my friend. I told the
Committee he was a good Secretary of the Army. I had a great
deal of affection for Ryan McCarthy. I know he does for me. I
am not here to badmouth Ryan McCarthy, but I have got to set
the record straight.
Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir.
Colonel Matthews. In my memo I did not call--I never
called--I call Piatt and Flynn liars. I never called McCarthy a
liar, for two reasons.
One, it was not clear to me that he was saying some of the
things they said he said. I mean, it is clear to me that some
of the things they said he said were said by others who were
trying to really protect themselves.
The other thing is he was my friend. You just do not turn
it off. You do not call your friend a liar.
At 2:30--at 2:31--at 2:30, they said that he was on a call
with General Walker and he told him to move the QRF (Quick
Response Force) to the Armory. I mean, that did not happen.
Ryan McCarthy did not speak on that call, and we know this
because that call was on a conference bridge. It was a D.C.
Government conference bridge.
Now, the DOD IG incorrectly states that McCarthy requested
the call. I helped facilitate that call. General Walker was on
the call with Dr. Rodriguez, who was the Homeland Security
Advisor for Mayor Bowser. Mayor Bowser was on the call. Chief
Sund was on the call. Chief Contee was on the call. All of us
at this dais were all on the call.
Ryan McCarthy never spoke on that call. I am a person who
was his friend, who knew his voice quite well. If he had said
anything, I would say that. We were told he was unavailable. I
called his executive officer to ask to speak to him, and we
were told he was unavailable. General Walker, Piatt, and
General Charles Flynn were on the call.
Subsequently, Flynn denies he was even involved in the
call. For what reason, I really do not know. He did so under
oath.
Command Sergeant Major Brooks, myself, and Lieutenant Nick
were all interviewed by the Select Committee. We told them
that. To me, this is material because Flynn denied under oath
twice to the House Oversight Committee and to the Select
Committee that he even participated in the call. That goes to
his integrity, to his credibility.
Mr. Griffith. All right, let me----
Colonel Matthews. I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Griffith. Let me underline this.
Colonel, you are also an attorney.
Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir. With a law license.
Mr. Griffith. You got your degree from Harvard Law School.
Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir. I got a mortgage in Great
Falls, Virginia. I have no reason to be up here lying, because
I do not want to go to Federal prison.
Mr. Griffith. You understand that you are--if you lie to
Congress, 18--Title 18, 1001 makes that a crime. Is that
correct?
Colonel Matthews. Unquestionably, sir.
Mr. Griffith. You also understand that as a member of the
legal establishment that if you were to lie under oath, your
license to practice law, no matter the fact that you have a JD
from Harvard, could be in jeopardy. Is that correct?
Colonel Matthews. No question, sir. Sir, I want to point
out----
Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir.
Colonel Matthews.--I spoke to the Select Committee. I was
not under oath, but it does not matter because you do not have
to be under oath. If you lie to Congress, it is still a Federal
crime.
Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir.
Colonel Matthews. I am fully aware of that. I submitted a
document stating that these men were liars, and I stand by it
100 percent. It is a stain on my Army that they got away with
it and no one said anything about it.
They even sent Piatt's name to the President of the United
States to have him promoted. He was a liar. All of us can
attest to that.
Mr. Griffith. You want the truth to come out.
Colonel Matthews. No question about it, sir.
Mr. Griffith. Good, bad, or ugly, correct?
Colonel Matthews. Exactly.
Mr. Griffith. Anybody here want anything but the truth--any
of the four witnesses want anything but the truth to come out?
Sergeant Major Brooks. No, sir.
Mr. Griffith. Good, bad, or ugly, it does not matter. No
matter what side you are on. Is that correct? I heard a yes--I
heard a ``no, sir'' and a ``yes, sir.''
Sergeant Major Brooks. You want the truth, sir, nothing but
the truth, yes, sir.
Colonel Matthews. Right.
Mr. Griffith. Colonel Matthews.
Brigadier General.
General Dean. That is correct.
Captain Nick. That is correct.
Mr. Griffith. All right.
Wow, I do not know. I got lots of other questions to ask. I
appreciate you jumping in and clearly with your heartfelt
emotions telling us that things were not exactly true and that,
in fairness, the January 6 Committee was not told the truth.
Is that correct, Colonel?
Colonel Matthews. They were not told the truth, but I think
they knew that, though, and they disregarded that. This is what
I mean.
General Flynn testified before the House Oversight
Committee on June the 15th, 2021. During his opening statement
and during his questioning he stated explicitly that he was not
on that phone call, he made no statements on that call.
Subsequently, he was interviewed by the January 6 Committee
and he also stated--he was directly asked by the senior
investigative counsel: Did you make any statements on that
call? He says he did not. He was not on the call, he says.
Now, that is perjury in my opinion. I mean, I am a lawyer
but it is for a court to decide. To me that is perjury.
The important point is later I raised that. I was
interviewed by the Select Committee in----
Mr. Griffith. Unfortunately, my time is up, but hopefully
you will get another opportunity to talk about it. I apologize.
My time is up. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
I now recognize the Subcommittee's Ranking Member, Mrs.
Torres, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Chairman.
Colonel Matthews.
Colonel Matthews. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Torres [continuing]. I spent more than 17 years as a
911 dispatcher. I worked with some very difficult times in the
city of L.A., Rodney King riots, the verdict. On 9/11, I was
tasked with putting together Mobile Field Force units to
dispatch to critical locations to ensure that those would not
be attacked.
I know what an EOC (Emergency Operations Center) is
supposed to look like. I know what orders to follow during
certain types of emergency. I was prepared with a manual that
was provided to me, things that we have practiced time and time
and time again.
During an emergency, you agree that it is vital that we
have a quick response and a unified coordination that has clear
communications, correct?
Colonel Matthews. No question.
Mrs. Torres. I was struck by the written--your written
testimony when you said the D.C. National Guard was delayed
because Milley, McCarthy, and McConville believed that the
President of the United States might deploy the National Guard
improperly on that day and had taken measures to prevent this.
This must have been incredibly frustrating for you and for
your colleagues in the Guard.
Why do you think senior military leaders believed the
President of the United States might employ the National Guard
improperly on January 6? Was it based on their words, actions,
or both?
Colonel Matthews. I think that belief was irrational
because I do not believe the President ever gave any of them an
unlawful order.
Mrs. Torres. OK.
Colonel Matthews. He gave none of them an unlawful order.
Mrs. Torres. Secretary----
Colonel Matthews. He appointed----
Mrs. Torres. Secretary of the Army----
Colonel Matthews. He appointed all of them to high office.
Mrs. Torres [continuing]. Ryan McCarthy----
Colonel Matthews. He appointed all of them to high office.
Mrs. Torres [continuing].--testified that on January 6
Select Committee that at one point he was walking down the
Pentagon hallways and one of the most seasoned reporters asked
him whether the Army was planning to seize ballot boxes.
Do you know if ideas like the President seizing ballot
boxes was something Secretary McCarthy was considering when
making decisions about deploying the Guard on January 6?
Colonel Matthews. I think it was, but I think it was not a
rational belief. I think----
Mrs. Torres. OK.
Colonel Matthews. Secretary McCarthy----
Mrs. Torres. Was there widespread fear within the
Department of Defense about the President using the military or
other levers of the State to impact the election around the
time of the 2020 election?
Colonel Matthews. No. It was not a widespread fear. It was
a fear among a clique of officers led by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff who talked about a so-called Reichstag
moment and----
Mrs. Torres. OK. Well, let me tell you, The New York Times
reported in January 2022 that President Trump actually directed
his attorney, Rudy Giuliani, to ask the Department of Homeland
Security to see if it could take control of voting machines in
key swing States.
I would like to ask for unanimous consent to enter this New
York Times article entitled, ``Trump Had Role in Weighing
Proposals to Seize Voting Machines,'' into the record.
Mr. Griffith.
[Presiding.] Without objection, so order.
[The article referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Torres. Command Sergeant Major Brooks, you served in
the Army and Army National Guard for 29 years. You spent the
months after January 6 right here on this Capitol Hill
protecting the citadel of democracy. I understand that for the
entire time that you were deployed, you slept in your office,
with the exception of maybe 1 week over the course of months.
You clearly are a patriot who loves our country.
How did you feel watching the Capitol get overrun, knowing
that you were almost walking distance away but not permitted to
come assist law enforcement in defending it?
Sergeant Major Brooks. It was very disheartening to see. I
believe it was something that, you know, I think any of us who
serve in the military, it was something that we did not think
we would see in our lifetime. It was very frustrating to know
that we had the capability and the personnel and unable to
respond.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
Sergeant Major Brooks. It is hard to describe.
Mrs. Torres. Brigadier General Aaron Dean, what is the
basis and rationale on which the Department of Defense and D.C.
National Guard rely in determining the equipment, tactics,
techniques, and procedures that the Guard could use to respond
to escalations in the protests on January 6? Was this atypical?
General Dean. I do not think--I do not think--it was not
atypical.
Mrs. Torres. We were just months--we right now are just
months away from the 2024 election and the man who incited the
2020 insurrection is on the ballot again.
What corrective actions has the National Guard Bureau or
Department of Defense taken to ensure the National Guard can
plan, coordinate, and execute command and control in response
to threats in the national capital region?
General Dean. I can only really talk about the District of
Columbia National Guard and its preparation, especially around
January 6.
We match capability with request. If there is a request, we
match the capability that we have. We had riot control
capability on that day to provide services for the Capitol.
Mrs. Torres. You would say that over the last 4 years the
smoke has been cleared and everyone is clear on how to respond
and politics will not take priority over necessity.
General Dean. I can say that the District of Columbia
National Guard is always ready to respond.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you, sir.
General Dean. Was ready even before that date.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Griffith. The gentlelady yields back.
I now recognize Congressman D'Esposito of New York, 5
minutes.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First question for everyone. We can start and just go down
the line.
Did you testify in front of the January 6 Select Committee?
Sergeant Major Brooks. No, I received a phone call.
Colonel Matthews. When you say testify, I had an informal
interview with the Committee.
Mr. D'Esposito. Right. It was--it was not----
Mr. Griffith. If you could move the mike closer.
Mr. D'Esposito. Correct?
Colonel Matthews. I am sorry. Say again?
Mr. Griffith. If you could move the mike closer, please, we
will give you a couple extra seconds.
Mr. D'Esposito. The answer, Command Sergeant, was no?
Sergeant Major Brooks. No.
Mr. D'Esposito. Colonel, you were interviewed but never in
front of the Committee.
Colonel Matthews. Correct.
Mr. D'Esposito. Brigadier General?
General Dean. No.
Mr. D'Esposito. Captain?
Captain Nick. Informally interviewed but never in front of
the Committee.
Mr. D'Esposito. Got it.
As the Chairman mentioned in his opening remarks, we are
here today to not only correct the record but also make sure
that we are better prepared today than we were, right? We want
to be better prepared as a Nation, as an agency. We want to be
better prepared for the next, God forbid, incident than we were
that day, not really to focus on President Trump. That is not
really what we are here for today.
Captain Nick, in your opening testimony, or the one
submitted to the Committee, you said of that 2:30 conference
call, and I quote, ``Lieutenant General Piatt and Lieutenant
General Flynn, while on the call, discussed how they did not
like the optics. They stated it would be in their best military
advice to recommend to the Secretary of the Army, Ryan
McCarthy, to deny the request from Command General William
Walker to deploy the D.C. National Guard and aid the United
States Capitol Police in the restoration of ordered liberty''--
or, as some have called on this Committee, democracy--``on
Capitol Hill.''
Major Brooks, during the bipartisan transcribed interview
the Subcommittee conducted in March 2024, you were asked if you
recall hearing the word ``optics'' on your 2:30 p.m. phone
call. You responded, ``Yes.''
I quote, ``General Flynn and General Piatt both made
numerous comments about the optics of having the Guard on the
Capitol and how they would much prefer that the Guard relieve
MPD officers elsewhere in the city so that they could respond
to the Capitol,'' close quote.
For everyone, and we will start with Command Sergeant Major
Brooks, why would these military experts want to send the
National Guard to relieve MPD officers elsewhere after the
Capitol was breached at 2:12 p.m.?
Sergeant Major Brooks. In my opinion, it was a senseless
recommendation. The logistics and the amount of time it would
have taken to replace individual MPD officers across the city
would have taken way too much time and would have been further
delayed.
Mr. D'Esposito. I think the key term there is
``senseless.''
Colonel?
Colonel Matthews. Their whole attitude was that this
mission was for law enforcement. They never wanted the D.C.
Guard to be on the streets in the first place. They never
wanted to approve the 350. They thought this was a law
enforcement mission. They believed it would have required
100,000 demonstrators before the D.C. Guard was necessary, and
that was the Army's thinking.
They wanted--and they also said they wanted no involvement
in the politicization of the--or no involvement in the
electoral certification process. They wanted no DOD role there.
That was their attitude.
We were not allowed to be east of 9th Street, which is
where the Capitol is. We had to have the Secretary of the
Army's approval to move three unarmed guardsmen one block.
Mr. D'Esposito. Right. Sounds like baseless decisions.
Brigadier General?
General Dean. I did hear the word ``optics,'' and they did
use it, especially specifically General Piatt I know said
``optics.'' His concern was he did not want soldiers or airmen
on the Capitol Grounds with the Capitol in the background.
They were giving every other reason why we should be around
the Capitol, away from the Capitol, and not responding to the
Capitol.
Part of what I believe is I believe that they are
unfamiliar with our true capabilities and what we are really
designed to do as the National Guard.
Mr. D'Esposito. Can you say that again for everyone to
hear?
General Dean. I think they are unfamiliar with our true
capabilities and what we are designed to do as the National
Guard under Title 32.
Mr. D'Esposito. Precisely.
Captain?
Captain Nick. I did hear the word ``optics'' also, and
General Piatt and General Flynn did say it was not in their
best military advice to recommend to the Secretary at this time
to approve that request.
Mr. D'Esposito. I only have 30 seconds, but I would just
like to go down the line once again and answer this question.
Was it clear at the time that the No. 1 priority was to
restore order or to protect the safety of Members of Congress,
staff, or visitors here at the Capitol complex?
Captain?
Captain Nick. Absolutely.
Colonel Matthews. No, that was not----
Captain Nick. It was clear that we needed to be at the
Capitol at that time.
Mr. D'Esposito. Right, you needed to be. Was that their No.
1 priority?
Captain Nick. No, it was not.
Mr. D'Esposito. Brigadier General?
General Dean. Their No. 1 priority was to make the police
respond and not the National Guard.
Mr. D'Esposito. Colonel?
Colonel Matthews. Absolutely not, Congressman.
Sergeant Major Brooks. It was not their priority, sir.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you. I think it is clear.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Griffith. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize Mr. Morelle for his 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to start my questioning--and I apologize, I only
have 5 minutes, so I will try to get through some of this
quickly.
First of all, appreciate very much your frustration. This
is your job, to defend the Capitol, and for the reasons both of
this hearing and a lot of conversation, you were not called on
to do that.
I can--obviously, it is palpable how strongly you feel
about this missed opportunity to defend this, and I appreciate
that. I do not think there is any disagreement here. You should
have been here much sooner. I do not--certainly do not know
that anyone argues that it was your fault that that happened.
I am a little shocked. Mr. D'Esposito said we are not here
to talk about President Trump. To me, that is a little like
asking Mrs. Lincoln, ``Other than the incident, how did you
like the play?''
The truth is, the Commander in Chief could have ordered the
National Guard. As I said earlier--and, frankly, I think Mr.
Griffith said, and I, you know, I will have to go back and look
at the record--that the President ordered the troops out on
January 6.
There is no evidence anywhere that I have heard of--other
than him saying it--there is literally no evidence of logs from
the White House, there is no evidence anywhere that the
President did that.
Frankly, look, I do not know much about this. I am a
civilian. If I were the President of the United States, as soon
as the breach happened, as soon as there was any measure of
violence at the Capitol, I would have assembled people in the
Situation Room, and I do not care about if the Secretary of
Defense was there, if the Secretary of the Army was there, I am
the Commander in Chief of the United States.
I guess I would begin at General Dean.
If an order came from the White House, from the President,
that deployed the National Guard, would that order have been
questioned by anyone?
General Dean. I would answer it this way. I would say that
that order was delegated. The responsibility of the response
from the Commanding General was written in a written document
to him that basically gave him parameters on what he could do
and what he couldn't do.
Now, if the President----
Mr. Morelle. I appreciate that. I appreciate that. I do not
believe the delegation of authority exempts the higher
authority.
If a call came from the President or the White House that
the President wants this deployed, if the Secretary of Defense
were somewhere and the Secretary of the Army were somewhere
else, would you have ignored that order?
General Dean. No, we would not have.
Mr. Morelle. No.
General Dean. Not at all.
Mr. Morelle. I do not want to draw you into it. I am just
saying, those who want to absolve the higher levels of command.
Likewise, if the Secretary of the Army had not acted, but
the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Miller, had called and his
office had called General Walker and said, ``Deploy the
National Guard immediately,'' would anyone have questioned that
order?
General Dean. No. No, we would not--I will speak from my
perspective--we would not have questioned--we would not have
questioned it, but we would have wanted it coordinated based on
the document that was sent by the Secretary of the Army.
Mr. Morelle. Not to interrupt you. You would have sought a
manner to verify and to make sure that that was legally the
appropriate process, but you would have acted on it
immediately, no?
General Dean. I think the whole thing was, there would have
been a conversation, right?
Mr. Morelle. Yes.
General Dean. There was this--there was this--there was
this talk about they needed a CONOP, right, a concept of
operations.
Mr. Morelle. Yes.
General Dean. Well, that is a discussion. In a crisis, that
is a discussion.
Mr. Morelle. I agree.
General Dean. With that, there would have been a discussion
about the deployment of the National Guard with any order given
by any senior official.
Mr. Morelle. Yes. I guess--you know, and I will--this is
not necessarily a question. What I hear is a lot of confusion
between the White House, the Department of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army and his office. I do not know what
happened. I guess there are varying accounts.
What I think each of you is here to testify is that the
order did not come down.
Colonel Matthews. Congressman, may I speak to that, please,
sir?
Mr. Morelle. Yes. Go ahead.
Colonel Matthews. Chain of command runs from the President
to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Army to
General Walker.
Now, the Secretary of Defense authorized the D.C. National
Guard to deploy at 3 o'clock. The D.C. Guard was able to deploy
at 3 o'clock.
Mr. Morelle. Yes.
Colonel Matthews. It had the capability and readiness to go
on the street at 3 o'clock.
The order did not come from Secretary of the Army. That was
the--that was the----
Mr. Morelle. No, I understand.
Colonel Matthews.--bottleneck there. The President----
Mr. Morelle. Yes.
Colonel Matthews. The President followed the chain of
command.
Typically, the President----
Mr. Morelle. I would say this--excuse me. I am going to
reclaim my time. I apologize.
Is that if I were the President of the United States and
had ordered it--if that were true, there is no evidence that
happened, but let us say it had been ordered--and then 20
minutes goes by and nothing is happening, I would be on the
phone again to my Secretaries, and I would be on the phone to
General Walker and say, ``What's going on? I have ordered you
out. Move out.''
With all due respect, the conversation should have
happened. I do not know if it did or did not.
Colonel Matthews. Congressman, I think that, you know, if
the President would have called the Secretary of the Army, the
Secretary of the Army would have said, ``We're moving as fast
as we can. We need to be deliberate. We need to know more
information.''
That is what the Secretary of the Army said in sworn
testimony, Congressman. So----
Mr. Morelle. That is not what happened. He did not say that
in his testimony.
Colonel Matthews. He did say that in his testimony, sir.
Mr. Morelle. No, he did not. He did not say the President
of the United States ordered him to do anything.
Colonel Matthews. No. He said if the President were to
call, he said it would not have made a difference. The
President's call would not have made a difference.
Secretary McCarthy----
Mr. Morelle. I disagree. Well, let me----
Colonel Matthews. Secretary McCarthy--I think you are right
also.
Mr. Morelle. Respectfully, sir, let me reclaim my time. In
fact, my time is over.
The point that I am trying to make is that I do not
disagree. This is an important conversation. I do not think it
is one for our Committee. I think the Armed Services Committee
ought to be holding this. There is a question to make sure that
come January 2025, we better be damn sure we have communication
that is clear, compelling, and chain of command.
I do think this. There is no way to absolve responsibility
of the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of
the Army. You may dispute what happened, and I think that is
fair. Something should have happened that triggered the
deployment of the National Guard sooner so that you could have
done your jobs and we would not be having this hearing this
morning.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Griffith. The gentleman yields back. I agree with him
on his last statement that we need to be prepared for the next
time that we have January 6 come up, which is in the law.
I would also correct the record. I did say the President.
The gentleman is correct, that is not in the evidence. The
President had previously given Christopher Miller the authority
to act, as he stated in his testimony which was previously
submitted into the record, and Christopher Miller is the one
who gave the order that did not get followed, apparently, by
the Secretary of the Army.
That being said, I now recognize Dr. Murphy for his 5
minutes of questions.
Dr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize if I am a
little out of breath. It is just being old.
Thank you all for coming forward. It takes absolute
courage, absolute courage. Every damn meeting we have now has
Trump derangement syndrome talking to it.
This was a dereliction of duty by the Secretary of the
Army--who refused, by the way, to come before this Committee
because he knew his culpability. He knew that he has lied, and
he was derelict in the duty.
I appreciate from the bottom of my heart you guys standing
up for the United States of America. You took an oath to it, as
did the Secretary, and you are keeping your oath, so I deeply
appreciate it--at your own personal cost, because we know the
weaponization of this Government is occurring at an exponential
rate. It is just privy--it is just proof in the pudding that
this is what we are dealing with.
I swear, why do we not have bipartisan support in getting
to the bottom of this is beyond me. It is everything about
Trump.
Captain Nick, you know, the summer before, in 2020, when
there was an absolute disaster in this country where riots and
burning of Federal buildings occurred, we saw billions of
dollars, multiple deaths occur.
Speaker Pelosi, I believe, is a culpable part of this in
allowing this, paving the way for the terrible thing to happen
on January 6, to just dismiss America's memory of what happened
the summer before.
In contrast, the protests at the Capitol on January 6,
which we know were all wrong, there was no hesitation in
creating a politicized community. We had a former Republican
who saw it as a personal grind to go after President Trump,
basically not allowing evidence to come before the Committee.
It has been more than 3 years, and members of the D.C.
National Guard are coming forward with your oath to provide
clarity.
I will just ask, Captain Nick, in your testimony you
mentioned you were a confidential source for the Select
Committee. In addition, you go on to State, ``My
confidentiality was breached to the national media.''
Would you mind expanding upon that?
Captain Nick. Yes, sir. First, I would like to correct the
record from a previous statement from your colleague when he
asked a question about Pentagon officials and their desire to
send troops. I said, ``Absolutely.'' I meant they did not at
that time want to send troops to the Capitol, just for
clarification.
I was informally--after January 6, at some time after, I
was informally interviewed by the Select Committee on January
6. I gave informal testimony, and I hired counsel from Tully
Rinckey, Dan Meyer, who is also behind me.
After giving my written notes and informal testimony, a
couple weeks later I was contacted by Politico, from a news
outlet, from a writer requesting comment on my handwritten
notes they got a copy of. I then contacted Dan, who then
contacted the Select Committee to resolve that.
It had to be leaked at some point from probably the Select
Committee because that is the only people I talked to and gave
my notes to.
Dr. Murphy. It is, obviously, evident with anybody with an
objective eye that the Committee was put forth to tell one
thing. If that Committee had gone in front of anything in a
legal department, you would have cross-examination, other
witnesses, et cetera. We never saw any of that to get to the
actual truth, which is what all Americans, whether you are
which party or not, should believe in doing, period. Period.
I just want to reiterate something. This is, actually, I
guess to Colonel Matthews and General Dean.
Turning to the matter of security, Secretary of the Army
McCarthy has said the D.C. National Guard was not--was not
prepared for immediate deployment.
Do you agree with that statement?
General Dean. That statement is false. We were prepared in
many ways. We even had backup plans. We call them branches and
sequels, right?
Not only did we have a force that was at Andrews Air Force
Base that was training and doing civil disturbance that
weekend, prepared to deploy on that day, that was ready to
deploy on that day, we also had traffic control points that
were at MPD.
Those members had riot control gear in the trunk, not
visible to the public, but for their self-protection in case
MPD had to respond. They had the appropriate gear to provide
the civil disturbance, riot control efforts, if needed.
We had the capability, we had the planning, we had the
know-how.
The question that I have is, so out of all the events, out
of all the inaugurations the District of Columbia National
Guard supported, out of all the NATO summits, out of all the
IMF protests that we have had, the summer of 2020, COVID, we
were not able to respond to this? We are incapable? That is
categorically false.
Dr. Murphy. I find it just--my time is short--but I just
find it a slap in the face to all the good men and women who
serve in our Armed Forces to say you are not prepared. A slap
in the face.
Because this guy wanted to save his butt with the hope of
getting in the Biden administration, that is point blank what
happened.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Griffith. The gentleman yields back.
After consultation with Mrs. Torres, we have agreed to do a
second round of questioning. I would recognize Mrs. Torres for
her additional 5 minutes of questioning.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
The claim that somehow the Select Committee did not
investigate the National Guard response to the security
failures at the Capitol on January 6 is inconsistent with the
facts.
As I mentioned, the Select Committee interviewed 24
individuals and reviewed 37,000 pages of documents related to
the National Guard on January 6, their response, and 46 of
those pages are in the final report that was issued.
If you search the transcripts of those interviews held with
these witnesses ahead of this hearing, you will see the
significant number of questions used for testimony from the
Select Committee as their foundation. Just because there was
not a court reporter does not mean that it did not happen.
As I told you in the back room, I was in the balcony while
all of this was unfolding. I was also witness to an assault on
an officer where the door swung open on the balcony that I was
sitting. Just because they did not interview me for that
incident does not mean that any of those investigations did not
happen.
Let me just remind everyone about what the President was
putting out on social media during that time.
At 2:24 p.m., the President tweeted out regarding Vice
President Pence not having the courage to do the wrong thing
that he wanted him to do.
At 3:13, the President had issued another statement saying,
``I'm asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain
peaceful, no violence. Remember, we are the party of law and
order. Respect the law and our great men and women in blue.
Thank you.'' He did not tell people to go home. He did not tell
them to go home.
It took many of his own closest allies to get him to this
point. The President did not want the violence against the
police or against Members of Congress or against his own Vice
President to stop. The truth is he wanted the violence to
continue until he could take custody and continue to keep
custody of his position.
At 4:17, he finally posts a video that contained many lies
about the election, but finally encourages people to go home.
That is when they finally started home.
Those are the real facts of what happened on that day.
In addition to under Democratic leadership--and I know that
you want to continue to blame Democrats for what happened on
that day--but Democrats did not tell the mob--the angry mob,
that was armed--to go to the Capitol. Democrats are not
responsible for that.
The request, you know, about this January 6 attack to--we
have gone back and forth as to who was ordered to do what. That
information is very clear. There were no clear directions,
because if there were clear directions everyone would have
moved in unison. Everybody would have been together, putting
together those plans that you said already exist.
Colonel Matthews, you seem to want to respond. Please, go
ahead.
Colonel Matthews. Well, ma'am, I just--the Committee--so
the Committee interviewed, again, Sergeant--Command Sergeant
Major Brooks, myself, and Lieutenant Nick. We all told them
that there are issues with the credibility of several
witnesses, that people were not responding honestly and
accurately as part of the investigation, and that was
disregarded.
That goes to the credibility of what they were telling the
Committee. Like, for instance, the Committee says--I am sorry,
the Select Committee stated in its findings that our QRF, that
it was debatable what its purpose was. There is no debate about
that. It was a civil--it was a civil disturbance response
force. It was designed to respond to a riot. General Walker----
Mrs. Torres. I think you are missing the point. There would
have been no riot--there would have been no riot--had the
President of the United States not set up a stage and order
people and told them that he would join them at the U.S.
Capitol. There would have been no galley that was erected to
hang the Vice President if the President had not want them to
stop us from certifying the election.
You are missing the point of all of what happened 6 months
prior to January 6.
Colonel Matthews. Congresswoman----
Mrs. Torres. The chaos that was happening within the
branches of the military that are sworn to never get involved
in domestic affairs.
I yield back.
Chairman Loudermilk.
[Presiding.] The gentlelady yields.
I apologize for a brief absence. I have another Committee
that a bill got called up right at the worst time that I had to
go present.
I think a couple points of clarification.
The Capitol breach began well before the people at the
White House made it down to the Capitol.
The gallows were actually erected at 6 o'clock in the
morning, and no one knew exactly what Mike Pence was going to
do until about 1:30 in the afternoon.
These are just some of the questions of the narrative that
came out from the January 6 report, which is this, this much.
This is how much is discussed about the D.C. National
Guard.
The primary objective of the Select Committee was to
investigate the security failure at the U.S. Capitol because we
have to identify the failures before we can fix things.
There was an entire team, the blue team, who was
commissioned with doing that. I challenge anyone to look in
here and find anything of substance from the blue team
whatsoever.
This is why it is important that we do the oversight that
is the job of Congress, and specifically the Subcommittee, to
look into what happened. This is clearly within the security
failure of the Capitol. This should not be political. This
should not be biased in one way or the other.
Regardless of who was coming to the Capitol, regardless of
who broke into the Capitol, that should have never happened.
There should have been no breach of this Capitol. The resources
are here.
The idea that the New Jersey National Guard would get here
before our own National Guardsmen, whose job is, as Colonel
Matthews said, riot control, traffic control, this is their
job, to come in and help defend this Capitol.
With that, I do have a few questions here.
The DOD IG report alleges that DOD officials did not delay
or obstruct a response to the Capitol.
Sergeant Major Brooks, I will start with you.
Do you believe that the deployment of the D.C. National
Guard was delayed?
Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes.
Chairman Loudermilk. Who do you believe delayed it?
Sergeant Major Brooks. Secretary McCarthy and senior
officials in the Army Staff.
The Chairman. OK. Why do you believe that they delayed it?
Sergeant Major Brooks. I believe their misunderstanding of
the capabilities of the D.C. National Guard and the seriousness
of the situation, to be honestly--I have no idea why we never
received that order. All I know is that they were more
concerned with what it would look like with soldiers with the
Capitol in the background than protecting the Capitol of the
United States.
Chairman Loudermilk. Colonel Matthews, same question for
you. Do you believe that the deployment of the D.C. National
Guard was delayed?
Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir. I believe that it was a result
of an overcautious, reluctant, hesitant, facilitating
leadership. I think they were concerned about the optics, the
political optics of a military presence here. I do not think
they trusted the Commander in Chief. I think that was because
of our senior ranking military officer who was making
disparaging remarks about the President to them.
You have got to remember, the people who ran the Army are
very close associates of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. They owe this position--they owe their positions to him.
He was not--I mean, there are books about how Chairman Milley
was impeding the ability of the President.
I think that that was an issue there, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. Just to clarify, you think that there
was a delay that was calculated for one reason or the other,
but you are not indicating that there was a nefarious purpose
in that. Just so we do not walk out of here with conspiracy
theories that the DOD wanted the Capitol to fail. I just want
to make sure that that is not where you are going with that.
Colonel Matthews. I am not going with that, sir. I am
saying that----
Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
Colonel Matthews. I am saying that the conditions were set
by this talk of a coup, of a Reichstag moment.
I mean, the idea that--I mean, to be--let me be frank about
it. A bunch of Black kids in the D.C. Guard are going to take--
going to usurp the election for Trump is crazy, but that is
what they were talking about, I mean, and it is crazy talk. It
was out there. It is in books. I mean, Milley's talked about
it.
Chairman Loudermilk. While I have got you, Colonel
Matthews, do you believe the DOD IG report accurately reflects
the events of January 6, 2021?
Colonel Matthews. That DOD IG report is replete with
incorrect information, false information. Even the Select
Committee's report has shown that.
Can I give you a couple of examples, please?
Chairman Loudermilk. Sure.
Colonel Matthews. It says at 1635 Ryan McCarthy called
General Walker and directed him to go to the Capitol.
Now, McCarthy, if you read his transcript from the Select
Committee, he said he never did that. He was getting ready for
a news conference. He was taking notes and writing in a--so
preparing for a televised news conference.
He overheard Brigadier General LaNeve direct General Walker
to go. General LaNeve says he never told General Walker to go,
he never gave the go order. They do like this. They point in
each other's directions.
The DOD IG puts it in. Then they claim that they had to
call Walker again at 1700, like 25 minutes later, and direct
him to go. That is an absolute falsehood. McCarthy was in a
televised press conference.
Mr. Storch, the DOD Inspector General, has an obligation to
correct the record. I mean, where does he go--where does
General Walker go to get his reputation back? I mean, you
smeared this man by anonymous sources.
We are talking about general officers in the Army who were
bitter because of Walker's testimony in March before the
Senate. They did not like that, and they wanted to get General
Piatt promoted to general. They wanted to take down Walker.
Even General Milley engages in that. General Milley engages
in that. If you read his transcript, sir, from the Select
Committee, he implies Walker was lying or exaggerating.
Everything General Milley says in his transcribed interview
from the Committee is incorrect, and the Committee staff had to
know it.
Chairman Loudermilk. Let me just clarify something here.
General Walker----
Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk [continuing].--did testify under oath
to the Select Committee. Is that correct?
Colonel Matthews. Correct. Yes, he did.
Chairman Loudermilk. The implication of the DOD IG report
is that General Walker falsely testified. Is that fair?
Colonel Matthews. To the Senate Homeland Security and
Government Affairs Committee and to the Senate Rules Committee.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
Colonel Matthews. He testified in March, March 2021. The
DOD IG report came out in November 2021. The implication was
that he was not truthful in his testimony.
Chairman Loudermilk. So----
Colonel Matthews. This is a sitting officer of the Congress
of the United States appointed by Speaker Pelosi, a sworn
career Federal law enforcement executive and a major general in
the United States Army. They were implying that he committed
outright perjury on live television.
Chairman Loudermilk. So----
Colonel Matthews. I had--I took exception to that. I wrote
my memo, sir. I was not working for General Walker. I mean, I
had nothing to gain from that. It was the right thing to do.
This man was responsible for all of your personal safety.
He was smeared by--and I just--I feel an obligation----
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Let me reclaim my time. There are
other questions I need to get to. I just wanted to make sure
they understand that the implications of the DOD IG report is
that General Walker falsified testimony or was not truthful.
Would you believe that he would be selected to be the head
security officer of the House of Representatives by Nancy
Pelosi if it was known that he had lied under oath?
Colonel Matthews. Oh, no, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. I just want to make sure we are----
Colonel Matthews. No, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. We are talking about someone who was
selected by my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to be
the Sergeant at Arms here. Getting the point, this is a
bipartisan issue that we are talking about here.
Let me move on real quickly.
Captain Nick, the DOD IG states they received a copy of
contemporaneous notes from Secretary McCarthy's aide-de-camp
from January 6, 2021.
Did the DOD IG request a copy of your notes that day?
Captain Nick. No.
Chairman Loudermilk. They did not ask for your notes?
Captain Nick. I never spoke to anybody at the Department of
Defense IG's Office, and they never requested my notes, and
they never contacted me.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Interesting.
I will do a couple more questions, and we will continue
down the aisle.
The DOD IG report alleges that on June--in June 2020--that
June 2020 taught Secretary McCarthy that he could not simply
rely on the D.C. National Guard to figure out the details.
General Dean, what do you make of that statement?
General Dean. I think that he is unfamiliar with what the
D.C. National Guard can actually do and its true capability.
I think he is probably being advised by our senior Active
Component officers that have never spent a day in their life in
the National Guard, and they are advising him on what the
National Guard should or should not do. It is like a surface
warfare officer in the Navy talking about a submariner. You are
in the same service, but you do different things.
I think part of the issue is, is taking military advice
from a senior Active Component officer about National Guard
issues pertaining to civil disturbance or domestic response. I
think it is out of their wheelhouse, and I think sometimes they
can provide inaccurate information. In doing so, it creates
this lack of trust, because now you do not know who to believe.
You do not whether to believe the people that are actually
supposed to advise you on military matters or the National
Guard.
I would propose to you that you need somebody to advise you
on Army and Air Force National Guard matters, not just military
matters, if you want to get to the truth.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you.
Sergeant Major Brooks, same question, but let me precede
that with, there were a lot of acts of violence, riots
throughout the country during 2020. We had that in Georgia.
As a response to the riots in Atlanta, the Governor of
Georgia called out the State Patrol and the Georgia National
Guard. No one raised an issue with that because that is a job
of the National Guard, to respond to the Governor and provide
for civil disturbance and support riot control.
Really, the same question I did to General Dean. Is that
not understood by certain DOD officials, that ultimately that
is the same role as the D.C. National Guard, it is just the
chain of command is differently since D.C. is not a State?
Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes, sir. The D.C. National Guard is
unique in that aspect. In fact, there are actual D.C. code that
gives special authorities to the D.C. National Guard that no
other National Guard in the country have to conduct business
within the District and conduct law enforcement operations in
support of Federal or District agencies.
I believe that General Dean is absolutely accurate. I asked
the question: Where was the chief of the National Guard Bureau
in this when you were discussing Guard capabilities? You were
only acting--asking Active-Duty military who had never served
in the Guard, did not truly understand capabilities and
authorities, and at no time you reached out to the four-star
general in charge of the National Guard to get information,
although you had all the information necessary if you just
understood the role that had been delegated to you many months
or even years prior to.
I think it is incredibly important going forward that the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of
Staff of the Army, to include the Sergeant Major of the Army,
are thoroughly briefed on the authorities, capabilities, and
their responsibility that has been delegated to them over the
D.C. National Guard and its ability to respond to the Nation's
capital.
We thoroughly train on our ability to be a Reserve force
for the Active Component. Why does the Active Component not
thoroughly train on us?
Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you. I appreciate the thorough
answers there. Very important issue.
I now recognize the full Committee Ranking Member, Mr.
Morelle, for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will admit, I am a simple guy, and I do want to do some
follow ups to Mr. Loudermilk's questions, which were important.
Also recognize that General Walker was held in such high esteem
by Members of our side of the aisle, we made him the Sergeant
at Arms after January 6. I think we have as much faith in him
and had as much faith in him as all of you did during that
time.
The way I see this--and maybe I am wrong--if I am the
President of the United States, the Commander in Chief, even
though I have delegated authority, I think at some period after
3 o'clock when I see that there does not seem to be much
movement, I am going to pick up the phone and call the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army and say,
``Exactly what's going on?'' while I have issued orders or I
have not or there is confusion.
At some point I would have had my chief of staff call
General Walker and say, ``Exactly what's happening on the
ground?''
My only point is, it would not have taken me--and I am,
again, I am not sophisticated--but it would not have taken me
three and a half hours while I am sitting in the White House
watching this unfold, confident in my view that while I have
signed the necessary papers, so I am not sure what is
happening, but it is all good because I signed the papers.
This is an attack on the United States Capitol, the citadel
of democracy here in this country and around the world. I
just--for all the other misdirection here--and I am not
suggesting that we are trying to bring the President into this
unnecessarily. It is that the President is necessarily part of
the chain of command.
By the way, so is the Secretary of Defense, and so is the
Secretary of the Army. I am not absolving them. They clearly
had direct line responsibility to make sure this happened.
At some point, when this is going on, in the midst of the
chaos, if only a few minutes goes by and something is not
happening, I am picking up the damn phone, I am going to find
out exactly what is going on.
To this point--so, look, we have high respect, the greatest
respect for General Walker. We would have continued him as
Secretary--or Sergeant at Arms. It was my friends over there
who made the decision to remove him. That is fine. They have
that responsibility.
Let me ask this, and maybe--I am not sure anyone can answer
this, but let me direct it first to Sergeant Major Brooks.
Tell me what the protocols should be going forward. Since
we are all focused on what is supposed to happen, tell us in
the future, whether it is January 6, 2025, or any other day
that involves a breach of the Capitol or issues here, what is
the protocol? What should we know needs to be in place that
people fear was not? How do we make sure this does not happen
again? What is the protocol like?
Sergeant Major Brooks. One positive step that I believe has
already been taken is I believe they have given the authority
to the Chief of the Capitol Police to call on the Guard without
further approval. That is a huge step.
Second, I believe that the D.C. National Guard has been
neglected for many years for what I believe to be the lack of
knowledge or understanding. It was put on a shelf. Those who
were delegated authority over the Secretary of the Army, the
Secretary of Defense, did not thoroughly understand their
responsibility.
You know, they are ultimately one of the commanders, one of
the senior leaders of the D.C. National Guard. Over the 17
years that I served in the D.C. National Guard, repeatedly the
National Guard Bureau came down and removed units, military
police units, that would respond to the Capitol, had removed
them from the D.C. National Guard without objection.
If the Governor of your State was told they were going to
move one of their Guard units, your Governor would be upset,
and there would be a significant challenge to that, correct?
The Secretary of the Army is supposed to be our Governor,
is supposed to defend the D.C. National Guard from losing its
capability to support and defend the capital of the United
States. That has been neglected for decades, and it needs to
change.
The D.C. National Guard should be the elite unit that it
was designed to be under President Thomas Jefferson. It is
responsible for the seat of democracy. It is not responsible
for a State, a territory. It is responsible for a city. It is
the only Guard that is responsible for a city. It just happens
to be the capital of the most powerful Nation in the world, and
I think that is significant.
If that change does not come, if this happens again--and,
unfortunately, in our political environment, I think there is a
chance.
Mr. Morelle. Well, and I appreciate that response, and I am
almost out of time. I would simply say this: that I also think
leading up to January 6, recognizing the tumult, recognizing
the challenges, from the President to the Secretary of Defense
to the Secretary of the Army, there should have been a lot of
work in preparation for, not on that day, but in the weeks,
months leading up, to make sure the lines of communications
were set and that there was a series of protocols that would be
followed if and when things happened. That clearly did not
happen as well.
Again, gentlemen, appreciate all of your not only testimony
for being here today, but your long service in support of the
United States. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
I will now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Griffith, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Griffith. I submit to you, gentlemen, that if the
President of the United States had gone outside the chain of
command and called General Walker directly, bypassing his
Acting Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army, we
might very well be in a hearing trying to find out why the
President was interfering with the National Guard.
Would you agree with that, Command Sergeant Major?
Sergeant Major Brooks. I think that would have been highly
irregular.
Mr. Griffith. It would have been highly irregular.
Colonel?
Colonel Matthews. Sir----
Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir.
Colonel Matthews.--keep in mind, we are--during that time
they were talking about the President improperly using the
military. They wanted to take precautions against that use.
They wanted to have it both ways, to say he did not call.
If he would have called, they would have said he was trying to
interfere with the chain of command. So----
Mr. Griffith. You are exactly--that is exactly what I was
hearing. I just wanted to put it--make sure we had it on the
record.
I put on the record previously, in my previous line of
questions, that all of you were there with Major General
William Walker from 1:49 p.m. through 5:55 p.m.
During that time period, we have already established that
he did not receive any calls from Secretary McCarthy. Did he
try to reach out to Secretary McCarthy during that timeframe?
Did any--gentlemen, did you all witness any attempts by him to
reach out? Not that I am saying it is his duty. I am just
asking for facts.
Colonel Matthews. You want to go?
Mr. Griffith. Captain?
Captain Nick. Yes, sir. I witnessed General Walker
attempting to reach out to the Secretary's office multiple
times.
Mr. Griffith. Multiple times?
Captain Nick. Yes, sir.
Colonel Matthews. Sir?
Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir. Colonel?
Colonel Matthews. In fairness to Secretary McCarthy, I
wrote a memo and I said he was incommunicado. I was not taking
a shot at him there. I was saying the Pentagon is a big
building, cell phones do not work. If you are in a SCIF
(Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility) in the Pentagon,
you are not going to be reachable by cell phone. If he is in a
SCIF with the Chairman or with the Secretary of Defense, it is
reasonable he would not be able to be reached except through
his front office and an aide goes back and relays information.
I gave Secretary McCarthy the benefit of the doubt there.
Mr. Griffith. I appreciate that and appreciate you bringing
it. Look, we are just trying to get the facts.
Colonel Matthews. Yes.
Mr. Griffith. Brigadier General, my understanding is that
you would have been second in command behind Major General
Walker. Is that correct?
General Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Griffith. If for some reason--because we heard earlier
that as a part of the DOD IG report that there were attempts to
reach General Walker, which you all said did not happen.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that they could not
reach him for some unknown reason. Wouldn't the proper move
then have been to call you in this case of an emergency where
orders have been given to activate the National Guard?
General Dean. That is correct.
Mr. Griffith. It is interesting because the report says--
and I am not a military man, so you all bear with me. I may be
asking something that you all know and I do not. That is that
Major General Walker indicated that he had called to initiate
movement. Now, I understand there was not a call.
What does initiate movement mean? Does that mean to get
into the--to go lend assistance? What exactly does that mean,
Brigadier General Dean?
General Dean. Initiate movement means that you actually
give the order for a force to move.
In this case, it would have been our QRF or any force that
was qualified to do civil disturbance, you give them the order
to move forward.
Mr. Griffith. That would have been the order to head to the
Capitol and lend assistance?
General Dean. That would have been the order to move, yes.
Mr. Griffith. OK. I mean, that is why I asked. I wanted to
know.
Captain Nick, I think this is in the record, but let us
just get it out there again.
What time did the D.C. National Guard learn that they were
authorized to deploy to the Capitol?
Captain Nick. I wrote down in my notes 5:09 p.m., which was
relayed from General McConville on a secure video
teleconferencing line in our office.
Mr. Griffith. 5:09 p.m.
Now, they have asked if the President--the questions from
the other side indicated the President, if there was not any
action, should have jumped the chain of command and called
General Walker.
If you are Piatt or Flynn and you knew that there was
supposed to be a deployment or initiate the move, would not you
have reached out to somebody if you could not get ahold of
Walker? I understand they were on the call the whole time.
Wouldn't they have been able to properly call Brigadier General
Dean? I will let anybody answer.
Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir.
Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Griffith. Sergeant Major?
Sergeant Major Brooks. I think we miss a key point in all
of this conversation when we are talking about who and what
when we go back to the significant fact that the only reason
why we are here today is because Secretary McCarthy, in his
approval letter, removed Major General's ability to execute his
immediate response authority.
Secretary McCarthy changed the memo from Secretary of
Defense to the Secretary of the Army. The one that we got from
Secretary McCarthy stated that Major General Walker could not
deploy the QRF without the Secretary of the Army's explicit
order.
Colonel Matthews. I will just clarify. The term ``immediate
response'' there is used incorrectly in this instance.
Sergeant Major Brooks. Immediate--emergency response.
Colonel Matthews. Yes. So--but--correct. I just wanted to
clarify.
Mr. Griffith. When was that memo or order given, to not do
anything without the direct call from the Secretary of the
Army?
Colonel Matthews. January 5th or 4th--I think--I think the
memo----
Mr. Griffith. Several days before January 6?
Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Griffith. All right. I appreciate your questions. I
appreciate you all. Thank you very much for your courage to be
here today. I know it has got to put you all under a lot of
stress.
I yield back.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
Now I will recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr.
D'Esposito, for 5 minutes.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sergeant Major Brooks, at the time you were the most senior
noncommissioned officer in the organization. Can you share
briefly what was happening at the D.C. Armory between 3 p.m.
and 5 p.m. on January 6?
Sergeant Major Brooks. Immediately upon receiving the 1:49
call from Chief Sund, we, the D.C. National Guard, on our own
accord, initiated from the QRF from the Air Force--Andrews Air
Force Base to the Armory. They were there.
We were then taking the soldiers that were coming in for
the second shift that were already at the Armory. We had geared
them--fully kitted them with riot control gear. We had moved
our transportation onto the Armory drill floor so that not to
arouse any public awareness of what was actually going on. They
were loaded and standing by ready to go.
They had been divided up into civil disturbance platoons,
roughly 40 to 45 people per platoon, with appropriate
leadership--which, coincidentally, matches the MPD for
structure for civil disturbance as well, because, as we have
stated previously, we train with them. We wanted to be as close
to their force package as possible.
Mr. D'Esposito. Right. You train with them to do the work
that you are prepared to do, which is exactly the opposite of
what so-called leadership was telling you your mission was.
Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes. I think they would like to say
this is untrained and they point to us conducting and training,
and some soldiers may or airmen may have had their first
experience of training.
The Army and Air Force get new--brand-new privates and
airmen every day. They are assimilated into the formation and
trained and trust that their leaderships have their best
interest and would not put them in a situation that they were
not prepared for.
I believe that our leadership all the way down the chain
prepared our soldiers and airmen as best as possible to perform
the mission that they were given.
Mr. D'Esposito. On January 6, between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m.,
they were trained, they were prepared, and they were ready to
respond?
Sergeant Major Brooks. Absolutely.
Mr. D'Esposito. OK. Thank you.
Brigadier General Dean, according to his testimony to the
DOD, Secretary McCarthy told to General Walker to, quote,
``Posture his troops,'' and, quote, ``Get ready to go'' on the
2:30 call. Is that accurate?
General Dean. That is not accurate. There was no mention--
first of all, Secretary McCarthy was not even on the call.
I will say this. He was not identified on the call, nor did
he speak on the call.
Mr. D'Esposito. Understood.
Colonel Matthews?
Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir.
Mr. D'Esposito. If I leave anything out here, please
correct me.
You were Acting General Counsel to the Army.
Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir.
Mr. D'Esposito. You were Principal Deputy General Counsel.
Colonel Matthews. Correct.
Mr. D'Esposito. You were Deputy Leg Counsel to the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs.
Colonel Matthews. Deputy Legal Counsel, yes, sir.
Mr. D'Esposito. You were Special Counsel to the Director of
National Intelligence.
Colonel Matthews. I was.
Mr. D'Esposito. You served this country faithfully in
combat in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Colonel Matthews. I did, sir.
Mr. D'Esposito. You are a Nova grad.
Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir.
Mr. D'Esposito. All right. You are a Harvard Law grad.
Colonel Matthews. Do not hold it against me.
Mr. D'Esposito. Pretty well-accomplished.
Let me ask you a question. You have a minute and 40
seconds, sir.
Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir.
Mr. D'Esposito. You were in charge on January 6. Tell me
your plan and what you would have done differently.
Colonel Matthews. In charge of the D.C. Guard, the Army,
the what--or what?
Mr. D'Esposito. You could have made any decision necessary
in order to keep this place safe.
Colonel Matthews. I would have picked up the phone and told
the D.C. Guard to deploy to the Capitol immediately, and I
would have told General Walker to have everyone in the building
kitted up in riot gear and get down to support the Capitol
Police.
I will say this, sir. At 3:04 Secretary Miller did give the
Army authorization to go to the Hill. That was not conveyed to
General Walker. That authorization had been given.
Secretary Miller had all the authority he needed. He did
not need to hear from the President. The President had given
him the authority he needed to act. I would argue he had that
authority even without talking to the President based on the
executive order.
I mean, I think that there was a bottleneck, and it was not
at the D.C. Guard level and it was not at the OSD (Office of
the Secretary of Defense) level, in my opinion.
Mr. D'Esposito. I guess, again, the goal here today was to
make sure that we are better prepared next time.
Brigadier--I am sorry--Brigadier General, you have more?
General Dean. Yes, can I answer that just real quick?
To me, what I would have done if I was in the position over
at the Pentagon, I would have--or if I was the Secretary--I
would have given--one, I would have given General Walker more
latitude. I would not have written the memo so constraining
that it would take one person to mobilize the D.C. National
Guard.
Mr. D'Esposito. Well, that was clearly done by design.
General Dean. Right.
Second, what I would have done, I would have given him the
authorization to deploy if there was a threat to life or limb.
Then I would have said, ``When you get there, then give me a
call, and we will discuss how the D.C. National Guard is
actually going to be deployed.'' That is the CONOP.
Mr. D'Esposito. My time has expired. I want to thank you
all for your service to this great country. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
I have just got some closing questions, and then we will
adjourn after that.
I just want to do a quick review before I ask these last
couple questions.
From the information that we obtained from the Select
Committee on January 6, transcribed interviews, logs from DOD
officials, we have a timeline of the authorization process of
the National Guard.
We know on January 3 that President Trump ordered that the
Guard be readied for potential deployment based on intelligence
that had been received.
As I mentioned earlier, Secretary Miller did testify to the
Select Committee he had full authorization to deploy the
National Guard on January 6, did not need any additional
authority from the President of the United States.
There was a breakdown in an order. Secretary Miller
testified that he gave an order to deploy the National Guard to
the Capitol. Somewhere there was a breakdown in that order,
whether it was communication or a delay.
Sergeant Major Brooks, if General Walker were to give you a
direct order, you lawfully, and according to your oath, same
oath I took when I joined the military, you are obligated to
carry out that lawful order. Is that correct?
Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes, sir. Any moral, legal authority
order given is my responsibility to carry out, yes, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. If you did not carry out that order,
would that be considered dereliction of duty?
Sergeant Major Brooks. Absolutely. General Walker could
take action against me, yes, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. Do you feel that there was dereliction
of duty in the chain of command on January 6?
Sergeant Major Brooks. Not within the D.C. National Guard,
sir. From higher levels, yes, sir. I do believe that senior
officials within the Secretary of the Army and senior officials
in the Army Staff were derelict in relaying the authorization
from Secretary Miller down to the appropriate level of
execution, which would have been Major General Walker, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you. I know that is hard, it
is a difficult question, and I apologize for that. To get to
the truth, we need to know what really happened.
Another--while we are here--and this is open to anyone that
can answer this appropriately. Maybe I will direct it to
General Dean to start with.
Secretary McCarthy claims that he was making a tactical-
level CONOP plan at the MPD headquarters.
Did you ever see this plan?
General Dean. Not only did I not see the plan, he was at
the wrong agency. The lead Federal agency for this particular
event was the Capitol Police.
My question is, why are you at the MPD headquarters and not
at Capitol Police? Because the Capitol Police have the
responsibility for the security of the Capitol.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. That was my follow up question
because the deployment was to the Capitol.
Did General Walker ever discuss a plan with anyone?
Colonel Matthews. Yes.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Sergeant Brooks? I am sorry.
Whoever--was that you? OK. I am sorry, Colonel.
Colonel Matthews. Yes, sir. The plan was get your riot gear
on and get on a bus and go support Chief Steven Sund at the
Capitol. Take orders from any white shirt or senior officer in
the Capitol Police Department. That was the plan. That is what
we did--that is what we eventually did.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. We have Chief Sund here.
Thank you for attending today, Chief, and for your service.
Once the National Guard deploys, you become under the
authority of the U.S. Capitol Police. You are sworn in then,
right? You are officers of the U.S. Capitol Police.
Your operation plan, in reality, I guess, is get from here
to there, get sworn in, and do whatever Chief Sund tells you.
Is that a good summary of it?
Colonel Matthews. Follow lawful orders, sir.
The D.C. Guard never acts independently. We always take
direction from civil authority. We work for somebody in the
civilian side.
Chairman Loudermilk. Right.
Colonel Matthews. We would have taken direction from--that
is what we did during the summer of 2020. We worked for the MPD
all over the city, responding to riots in the city, or for the
Secret Service police or Park Police.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Just to make sure I understand,
there was a discussion of an op plan, very simple op plan. Get
on the bus, get to the Capitol, get sworn in, and get to work.
That is the extent of, really, an op plan that you need. Is
that what you are saying?
Sergeant Brooks?
Sergeant Major Brooks. Yes. Due to our normal planning
operations, we already had a rally point identified for the
soldiers who were on traffic control points within the city.
All we had to do was communicate to those servicemembers to
rally at that point, don your riot gear. Everyone else at the
Armory would have been donning their riot gear and moving
toward their direction.
Exactly as Colonel Matthews mentioned, once we arrive, we
fall under--it is called defense support to civil authorities.
Once we arrive, we fall under the--we are supporting the civil
authority. In this case the Capitol Police would have given us
direction on where to be and what to do.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you.
This is my last question. Again, General Dean, I will start
with you since you were the senior member that would have been
there at the time.
The order that finally came at 5--what time was it again,
Captain Nick?
Captain Nick. 5:09.
Chairman Loudermilk. 5:09?
Captain Nick. I wrote 5:09 down in my wheel book.
Chairman Loudermilk. General Dean, at 5:09 did Secretary
McCarthy give you--give General Walker the order at that time?
If not, can you explain how you got the order?
General Dean. My understanding is that General McConville
actually gave the order, but he said he received it from
Secretary McCarthy. General Walker, in turn, told me, and I, in
turn, told the Quick Response Force it is time to move.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
Anybody else?
Colonel Matthews. Sir, I was sitting right next to General
Walker in the conference room in the VTC when General
McConville--General McConville was not in the chain of command,
so it was not his order.
He was conveying an order that we were authorized to go,
and I was told that it came not from Secretary McCarthy but
from Secretary Miller, that we had the authorization to go.
That is what I was told at the time.
This claim that Secretary McCarthy called General Walker,
obviously, was not true. As Secretary McCarthy has stated, it
was not true. He did not call General Walker. The way we got it
was it was relayed via VTC, video teleconference.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Somebody called you up on video
teleconference to give you that order?
Colonel Matthews. Oh, no, no. The conference was ongoing,
it was running. General McConville, Chief of Staff of the Army,
happened to be on the conference talking to us, and he
mentioned that we had the authorization to go.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. He just was, like, ``What are you
all doing still here? You are supposed to go.'' Or----
Colonel Matthews. No. He claims that, but that is not what
happened, sir.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
Colonel Matthews. Someone in the back of the room said,
``Oh, these guys are good to go now? You are good to go?'' He
said we are good to go.
He claimed later that he asked General Walker, ``Why are
you still here? You already have the authority.'' That was not
the case.
General Walker did not--he implied that Walker had the
authority at 1635 from McCarthy. He was just hanging out on the
VTC twiddling his thumbs while the city was being--was in a
riot condition.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you.
Sergeant Major Brooks. Mr. Chairman, can I----
Chairman Loudermilk. Yes. Absolutely.
Sergeant Major Brooks. Can I add that it all does not make
sense if you follow this through the chain, because if Major
General Walker had been told numerous times, had been given a
lawful order to do something, why was there never an action
taken against Major General Walker for dereliction of duty or
refusing a lawful order? There never was. There was never even
an inkling of charging him with anything.
That whole narrative that we were just sitting around
waiting is false, and it is disrespectful to the men and women
that did that job to think that we just sat and waited while
the Capitol was under attack.
Colonel Matthews. Sir, I might point out, Walker told me
that he wanted to send them anyway and resign. I asked him not
to do that. I said, ``Sir, don't do that. Wait for the order.''
General Dean. He actually told me the same thing.
Colonel Matthews. Absolutely.
General Dean. He asked me, he said, ``Should I send them?
Should I send them? Should I send them? I am going to send
them.'' I said, ``Don't send them. You did not get the order.
It is in writing that you can't send them. Don't send them.''
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. I want to thank you all.
Mrs. Torres. I have something for the record.
Chairman Loudermilk. OK. I will do these, and I will
recognize you for that.
I do want to enter for the record a memorandum from the
Secretary of the Army dated January 4, 2021, and it is the
employment guidance for the District of Columbia National
Guard. Also, a letter from the Secretary of the Army to Major
General William Walker dated January 1, 2021, recommending
approval of the request of Mr. Christopher Rodriguez, Director
of District of Columbia Homeland Security Emergency Management,
on behalf of--this is support of the civil authorities of the
District of Columbia.
Without objection, so entered.
[The memorandum and letter referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Loudermilk. I will recognize the Ranking Member.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Chairman. I have a few items I
would like to enter to the record. Thank you.
I want to also acknowledge and say thank you to everyone
that is here today. We know that the chaos at the Pentagon was
caused by the Commander in Chief and the fear that he would
involve the military in domestic political affairs.
I want to enter into the record the following articles.
A Politico article entitled, ``Trump could have helped
respond to the January 6 riot--but didn't--per new testimony.''
Chairman Loudermilk. Without objection.
[The article referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Torres. A letter dated December 30, 2022, and posted
on the Select Committee website from the Select Committee to
the General Counsel of the Department of Homeland Security
related to the disposition of interview transcripts.
Pages 99 to 101 of Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher
Miller's interview with the Select Committee.
An article from PolitiFact in which it declares false the
claim that the January 6 Committee suppressed testimony from
Anthony Ornato that proves former President Donald Trump pushed
for 10,000 National Guard troops at the Capitol.
A CNN article entitled, ``Trump's Defense Secretary denies
that there were orders to have 10,000 troops ready to deploy on
January 6.''
A Washington Post article entitled, ``The false GOP claim
that Pelosi turned down National Guard before January 6
attack.''
An email from Mark Meadows to John Aycoth dated January 5,
2021, in which he says that the National Guard will be
activated so they can protect pro-Trump people.
Appendix 2 of the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6 Attack final report.
Summaries of the many Capitol Police Inspector General
reports requested by Democratic leadership of this Committee
last Congress.
Chairman Loudermilk. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
Chairman Loudermilk. Again, I would like to thank each of
our witnesses, the whistleblowers, for coming forward to share
their story.
Again, for anyone who is watching who wishes to share their
story with my Subcommittee, please do not hesitate to reach out
at CHA.house.gov/whistleblower-support.
To our whistleblowers, Members of our Committee may have
additional questions for you, and we ask that you respond to
those questions in writing.
Without objection, each Member will have 5 legislative days
to insert additional material into the record or to revise and
extend their remarks.
If there is no further business, I thank the Members for
their participation.
Without objection, the Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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