[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


.                       OVERSEEING THE OVERSEERS:
                   A HEARING WITH NIH DEPUTY DIRECTOR
                             LAWRENCE TABAK

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

            SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC

                                 OF THE

               COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                              MAY 16, 2024
                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-110
                               __________

  Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability
  
  
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]  


                       Available on: govinfo.gov,
                         oversight.house.gov or
                             docs.house.gov
                             
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
55-710 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2024                                
                             

               COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

                    JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman

Jim Jordan, Ohio                     Jamie Raskin, Maryland, Ranking 
Mike Turner, Ohio                        Minority Member
Paul Gosar, Arizona                  Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of 
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina            Columbia
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin            Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Michael Cloud, Texas                 Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Gary Palmer, Alabama                 Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Ro Khanna, California
Pete Sessions, Texas                 Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
Andy Biggs, Arizona                  Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York
Nancy Mace, South Carolina           Katie Porter, California
Jake LaTurner, Kansas                Cori Bush, Missouri
Pat Fallon, Texas                    Shontel Brown, Ohio
Byron Donalds, Florida               Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania            Robert Garcia, California
William Timmons, South Carolina      Maxwell Frost, Florida
Tim Burchett, Tennessee              Summer Lee, Pennsylvania
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Greg Casar, Texas
Lisa McClain, Michigan               Jasmine Crockett, Texas
Lauren Boebert, Colorado             Dan Goldman, New York
Russell Fry, South Carolina          Jared Moskowitz, Florida
Anna Paulina Luna, Florida           Rashida Tlaib, Michigan
Nick Langworthy, New York            Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts
Eric Burlison, Missouri
Mike Waltz, Florida

                                 ------                                
                       Mark Marin, Staff Director
             Mitchell Benzine, Subcommittee Staff Director
                        Marie Policastro, Clerk

                      Contact Number: 202-225-5074

                Miles Lichtman, Minority Staff Director
                      Contact Number: 202-225-5051
                                 ------                                

            Select Subcommittee On The Coronavirus Pandemic

                     Brad Wenstrup, Ohio, Chairman
Nicole Malliotakis, New York         Raul Ruiz, California, Ranking 
Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa           Minority Member
Debbie Lesko, Arizona                Debbie Dingell, Michigan
Michael Cloud, Texas                 Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
John Joyce, Pennsylvania             Deborah Ross, North Carolina
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Robert Garcia, California
Ronny Jackson, Texas                 Ami Bera, California
Rich Mccormick, Georgia              Jill Tokuda, Hawaii

                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              

                                                                   Page

Hearing held on May 16, 2024.....................................     1

                               Witnesses

                              ----------                              


Dr. Lawrence Tabak, D.D.S., Ph.D., Principal Deputy Director, 
  National Institutes of Health
Oral Statement...................................................     6

Written opening statements and the written statements of the 
  witnesses are available on the U.S. House of Representatives 
  Document Repository at: docs.house.gov.

                           Index of Documents

                              ----------                              

  *  No additional documents were submitted for this hearing.

 
                       OVERSEEING THE OVERSEERS:
                   A HEARING WITH NIH DEPUTY DIRECTOR
                             LAWRENCE TABAK

                              ----------                              


                         Thursday, May 16, 2024

                        House of Representatives

               Committee on Oversight and Accountability

            Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic

                                           Washington, D.C.

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:01 a.m., in 
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Wenstrup 
[Chairman of the Select Subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Wenstrup, Comer, Malliotakis, 
Miller-Meeks, Lesko, Joyce, Jackson, McCormick, Ruiz, Dingell, 
Ross, and Tokuda.
    Also present: Representatives Griffith and Castor.
    Dr. Wenstrup. The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus 
Pandemic will come to order. I want to welcome everyone.
    At the discretion of the Chair and pursuant to an agreement 
with the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Chairman and 
Ranking Member of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Mr. Morgan 
Griffith and Ms. Kathy Castor, are permitted to participate in 
today's hearing for the purposes of questions and give 3-minute 
opening statements.
    Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at any 
time.
    I now recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening 
statement.
    Good morning. I would first like to highlight the action 
taken by NIH and HHS yesterday to immediately suspend and 
propose debarment of EcoHealth Alliance.
    The Select Subcommittee while investigating the origins of 
COVID-19 uncovered multiple instances of wrongdoing by both 
EcoHealth and its President, Dr. Peter Daszak. EcoHealth faces 
an immediate governmentwide suspension and hold on all taxpayer 
funds pending a formal debarment investigation. I have said it 
before, but our investigation into EcoHealth and Dr. Daszak's 
actions is not over. Dr. Daszak owes us documents and 
explanations for what appears to be truths or lies before this 
Subcommittee.
    Today we will hear from Dr. Lawrence Tabak, principal 
deputy director and former acting director of the National 
Institutes of Health. The Select Subcommittee has serious 
concerns regarding the processes in which NIH awards Federal 
grants and conducts oversight of these grants. EcoHealth and 
its subgrantee, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, highlighted 
numerous inadequacies in the NIH grant management and oversight 
process. This is especially true regarding oversight of gain-
of-function work on potential pathogens, pandemic capable or 
otherwise.
    Oversight of grant management is crucial regardless of 
anyone's operative definition of ``gain of function.'' When the 
U.S. Government is actively funding research in these areas, as 
we saw with EcoHealth and the Wuhan Institute of Virology, we 
need to have the highest possible standards in place. 
Unfortunately, there does not appear to have been adequate 
oversight of EcoHealth and its experiments. This issue has 
highlighted broader concerns with the NIH, especially that it 
is up to the grantee to oversee themselves. This is a recipe 
for waste, fraud, abuse, and deception.
    We have heard conflicting testimony regarding late grant 
reporting, the dates experiments were conducted, the 
interactions with the Wuhan Institute, whether grant terms 
actually applied or not. We have uncovered outrageous conduct, 
like intentionally using personal email to avoid FOIA or 
deleting Federal records from a senior NIAID official, Dr. 
David Morens. Put simply, Dr. Tabak, the Select Subcommittee 
has serious concerns regarding the NIH's ability to conduct 
necessary and proper oversight of its grant processes by what 
seems to be its current grant process construct. So, the 
American people pay for this scientific research, and the 
research needs to be for the benefit of the American people, 
first and foremost. We hope we can put forth some solutions to 
help going forward. Unfortunately, as EcoHealth President, Dr. 
Peter Daszak, made the Select Committee fully aware during a 
hearing earlier this month, such oversight and responsibility 
is not always taking place.
    In securing your testimony today, Dr. Tabak, NIH assured 
the Select Subcommittee that you would be able to speak to 
these issues on behalf of the Agency, and we appreciate that. 
NIH insisted we do not need to have a hearing with Dr. Lauer, 
the NIH official in charge of compliance, because you would be 
knowledgeable on these matters. In anticipation of this 
hearing, the Select Subcommittee provided you with a list of 
specific issues that require answers. The Select Subcommittee 
has been entirely open and transparent in what it requires of 
the NIH, we expect the same courtesy today.
    Forward-looking policy recommendations require us to review 
what happened in the past and what went wrong in the first 
place. Without our extensive report on EcoHealth, I don't 
believe that HHS would have been able to propose debarment, and 
we are very happy the Department accepted our recommendation. 
While we acknowledge HHS's actions with respect to EcoHealth, 
more work needs to be done. How do we prevent this from 
happening again? While I understand the temptation to simply 
look forward, we can't learn how to prevent and respond to the 
next pandemic if we do not learn any lessons from the last one. 
So, I appreciate my colleagues' assistance in demanding answers 
from EcoHealth. Our actions have led to real change and a 
benefit to the American people. I hope you all would join me 
today in examining what we can do better going forward, and I 
look forward to a robust and on-topic discussion, so thank you 
very much.
    I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Ruiz for the 
purpose of making an opening statement.
    Dr. Ruiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Fifteen months ago, the 
Select Subcommittee declared a mission of getting to the bottom 
of the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. As Ranking Member, I 
made a promise to keep an open mind about how the pandemic 
started because understanding whether the novel coronavirus 
emerged from a lab or from nature is essential to better 
preventing and preparing for future public health threats and 
to better protecting the American people. And as the origins of 
the novel coronavirus remain inconclusive, I stand by this 
commitment. But as we approach the three-quarter mark of the 
Select Subcommittee's work, this Congress must acknowledge the 
fact that the majority's probing into our public health 
agencies and federally funded research has left us with no 
better understanding of how the novel coronavirus came to be.
    We have pored over nearly 450,000 pages of documents 
provided to us by Federal agencies, universities, and private 
citizens. We have conducted more than 100 hours of closed-door 
interviews with 20 current former Federal officials and 
scientists, and we have held multiple hearings, all in what has 
at times appeared to be an effort to weaponize concerns about a 
lab-related origin to fuel sentiment against our Nation's 
scientists and public health officials for partisan gain. And 
while this Select Subcommittee's probe has uncovered efforts by 
Dr. Peter Daszak to mislead his funders at the National 
Institutes of Health and the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases, it has not substantiated any allegations 
that Federal grant funding for EcoHealth Alliance created the 
COVID-19 pandemic. This is a critically important distinction.
    As Dr. Tabak explained in the letter to the Committee on 
Oversight and Reform in October 2021, research performed under 
EcoHealth Alliance has grant, including at the Wuhan Institute 
of Virology, involved viruses that are too genetically distant 
from SARS-CoV-2 to be its progenitor virus. The Select 
Subcommittee has obtained no evidence this Congress to suggest 
otherwise, nor has it nearly spent equivalent time and energy 
meaningfully examining the still very real possibility that the 
novel coronavirus could have emerged through zoonosis in 
nature. And so, at the end of the day, nearly a year and a half 
into House Republicans' majority, we are right where we started 
when it comes to understanding COVID's origins.
    Now, as the Ranking Member of the Select Subcommittee, I 
also promised to follow the facts wherever they lead. And as we 
examined earlier this month, the facts indicate that Dr. Daszak 
and EcoHealth Alliance may have deliberately misled Federal 
regulators and investigators, including at NIH, regarding their 
compliance with reporting requirements and the nature of their 
scientific work. And we can all agree that demonstrating a 
reckless disregard for transparency and accountability to the 
American taxpayers who fund your research is unacceptable, and 
this misconduct should be taken seriously. But we should also 
bear in mind that as EcoHealth misconduct has been identified, 
NIH has taken decisive actions to rectify the issue at hand, 
including by recommending the debarment of the Wuhan Institute 
of Virology, and instituting unprecedented conditions on 
EchoHealth's use of funds. And just yesterday, the Department 
of Health and Human Services announced that it had immediately 
suspended funding to EcoHealth and initiated debarment 
proceedings for the organization.
    While the discussion of how we can continue to strengthen 
oversight of the use of taxpayers funding is always an 
important one, it is my hope that we can use this conversation 
to generate constructive, forward-looking solutions to fortify 
the work of our Nation's public health agencies and work force 
as opposed to denigrating them for partisan gain. As Members of 
the Select Subcommittee, we have an obligation to confront the 
challenges of declining confidence in science and public health 
to advance pandemic preparedness, not further weaken it by 
sowing extreme conspiratorial accusations that our public 
health leaders caused and sought to cover up the origins of the 
novel coronavirus for the sake of scoring political points.
    So, as we look toward the future, it is my hope that we can 
work together to build on the progress Congress made to fortify 
our shores for future public health threats. Democrats passed 
the Consolidated Appropriations Act reforms that strengthened 
protections against undue influence in our biomedical research, 
improve training and transparency for the handling of select 
agents, pave the way for the interagency collaboration to 
fortify zoonotic disease prevention, and invested in our 
infectious disease work force, and it is my hope that we can 
work with the Biden administration to continue to fortify 
biosafety, including by collaborating on the implementation of 
new guidelines.
    The Office of Science and Technology Policy announced 
earlier this month to strengthen oversight of dual research of 
concern and research involving pathogens with enhanced pandemic 
potential, and I look forward to a hearing of the constructive 
work that is ongoing right now that will actually prevent and 
help us better prepare for the next pandemic by the 
administration. And it is my hope that we can make objectively 
examining the origins of the novel coronavirus a part of this 
forward-looking work. And I stand by my commitment to take a 
serious, balanced look at all possibilities for the origins of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, and I stand ready to work on this 
critically important mission so that we can save future lives. 
Thank you, and I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Ms. Castor to make an opening 
statement.
    Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the 
ability to participate in today's hearing, and I want to thank 
Dr. Tabak for your years of service to America and the National 
Institutes of Health, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
one of the darkest periods in our lifetimes. Approximately 1.2 
million Americans died due to COVID-19, they estimate over 7 
million worldwide, and even today, the mortality rate for 
COVID-19 is higher than the flu as is the risk for 
hospitalization. In early 2020, when there were tens of 
thousands of new cases of COVID-19 in America each day, Dr. 
Tabak was one of many public servants who ensured that NIH's 
best-in-class scientific research was focused on preventing and 
treating this terrible new disease.
    Overall, this Congress' effort to examine the cause of the 
pandemic has brought more heat than light. Plus, so many, 
including me are frustrated that instead of taking time to 
learn critical lessons from our Nation's response to the 
pandemic, Republicans in Congress have focused on eroding trust 
in public health and science. In the Energy and Commerce 
Committee, we had a tremendous opportunity to build on the very 
difficult lessons learned throughout COVID by passing the 
bipartisan Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, the 
PAHPA, which has historically been bipartisan. We wanted to 
give the necessary resources and authorities to agencies 
working to address and prevent pandemics, but Republicans in my 
committee refused to move consensus legislation forward. 
Instead, they doubled down on ideological partisanship and 
refused to work together on bipartisan solutions. After a 
closed-door transcribed interview, public health officials have 
been hauled in and asked numerous questions, but it doesn't 
seem like the Republican majority is actually interested in the 
answers. We have not learned anything more about the origins of 
COVID-19, but we have learned a lot about NIH's diligent work 
to tackle the pandemic as well as the decades of scientific 
work preceding 2019 that dramatically accelerated America's 
ability to develop and manufacture vaccines in record time, 
saving countless lives.
    I hope that we can use today's hearing to learn how 
Congress can be a better partner to NIH as it continues to 
prepare us for pandemic threats rather than lob speculative 
conjecture at our hardworking public health officials. I also 
hope the remaining transcribed interviews will be released 
quickly so that the public can read for themselves the complete 
answers that we have heard from top scientists like Dr. Fauci, 
instead of having to rely on misleading tweets about their 
testimony.
    I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. Thank you, 
Dr. Tabak, and I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Our witness today is Dr. Lawrence Tabak. Dr. 
Tabak is the principal deputy director of the National 
Institutes of Health and served as acting director of the NIH 
from December from 2021 to November 2023. Thank you, Dr. Tabak, 
for your many years of service.
    Pursuant to Committee on Oversight and Accountability, Rule 
10(g), the witness will please stand and raise his right hand.
    Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you 
are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God?
    Dr. Tabak. I do.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Let the record show that the 
witness answered in the affirmative. The Select Subcommittee 
certainly appreciates you for being here today, and we look 
forward to your testimony.
    Let me remind the witness that we have read your written 
statement, and it will appear in full in the hearing record. 
Please limit your oral statement to 5 minutes. As a reminder, 
please press the button on the microphone in front of you so 
that it is on, and the Members can hear you. When you begin to 
speak, the light in front of you will turn green. After 4 
minutes, the light will turn yellow. When the red light comes 
on, your 5 minutes has expired, and we would ask that you 
please wrap up.
    I now recognize Dr. Tabak to give an opening statement.

             STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE TABAK, D.D.S, Ph.D.

                       PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR

                     NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH

    Dr. Tabak. Thank you, Chairman Wenstrup, Ranking Member 
Ruiz, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I 
appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss your 
investigation into the origins of COVID-19. It has been an 
honor to serve the NIH in various roles over the past 24 years, 
and I am pleased to continue my service as the NIH principal 
deputy director under the leadership of NIH director, Dr. 
Monica Bertagnolli. I have deep respect for the role of 
congressional oversight. Since the beginning of the 118th 
Congress, NIH has worked diligently with HHS to respond to 
letters and inquiries from this Subcommittee, providing written 
responses, document productions, and providing NIH employees 
for full days of interviews. I am here today to answer 
questions related to your investigation.
    Like all the Subcommittee Members here today, I strongly 
support efforts to identify the origins of SARS-CoV-2, the 
virus that causes COVID-19. NIH strongly believes that a 
thorough, expert-driven investigation into the origins of SARS-
CoV-2 is critical to prepare for the next potential pandemic. 
While it is frustrating, it is not a surprise that we still do 
not know with certainty how this virus came to be. It took 14 
years to find a single bat population containing the necessary 
genetic components of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that caused the 
2003 SARS epidemic. Determining the origin of a virus is rarely 
fast or easy and sometimes not possible. While NIH is not an 
investigative Agency, we do support scientific research into 
the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and will continue to make this a 
priority. We are open to all possibilities, and we will follow 
where the science leads us.
    The body of publicly available scientific evidence thus far 
suggests a natural evolution and points to the theory that 
SARS-CoV-2 may have come from a wild animal market in Wuhan. 
Importantly, agencies in the U.S. intelligence community agreed 
that the virus was not developed as a biological weapon, and 
most agencies assess that SARS-CoV-2 most likely was not 
genetically engineered. A full understanding of the origins of 
SARS-CoV-2 will require cooperation from other countries, 
including China, and an independent investigation with 
coordination from the intelligence community.
    We may not know the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic yet, 
but we have learned a great deal to improve the Nation's 
preparedness for future pandemics. Decades of investment in 
fundamental biomedical research were essential to the NIH's 
rapid development of safe and effective vaccines, diagnostics, 
and treatments. It took 10 years for a measles vaccine to be 
approved. We had a COVID vaccine with emergency use 
authorization in just 11 months. Countless lives have been 
saved because of this work. The pandemic also demonstrated the 
need to build, leverage, and sustain partnerships across the 
U.S. Government, academia, industry, and not-for-profit 
organizations to rapidly integrate clinical trial networks 
across sectors streamlining and expediting research efforts 
during the emergency. Data-sharing efforts supported by NIH 
accelerated the field tremendously by allowing for immediate 
public access to COVID-19 publications and open scrutiny of 
research outcomes.
    The world looks to science for definitive answers. However, 
the complexities of nature take time to unravel. Scientific 
discovery is iterative, and we continually try to improve 
scientific approaches to drive toward more rapid, efficient, 
and accurate assessments of the world around us. With your 
continued partnership and support, NIH will continue to make 
good on these efforts. Thank you for your time, and I welcome 
your questions.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Doctor. I now recognize myself for 
questions.
    Dr. Tabak, we understand that the HHS has suspended 
EcoHealth Federal grants and is proposing debarment, and we 
appreciate that, while I understand that HHS will have to 
conduct their own review before debarring EcoHealth. I 
understand that. Do you think HHS would have been able to issue 
this suspension without the Select Subcommittee's 
investigation? And will it be helpful, the investigation today, 
will it be helpful toward creating new policies going forward, 
either through NIH or Congress itself?
    Dr. Tabak. As you point out, Mr. Chair, the suspension and 
proposal to debar is what is conducted by HHS. And so, I really 
can't comment on what input they considered in preparing that 
documentation.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Well, I look forward to working with NIH on 
proposals for better processes going forward based on what we 
learned. And we have several proposals already, but we will 
follow-up with you further on that. First, does this suspension 
apply to Dr. Daszak personally or just EcoHealth?
    Dr. Tabak. My understanding is this suspension relates only 
to the organization.
    Dr. Wenstrup. OK. I would ask that NIH evaluate the option 
of Dr. Daszak himself. I think that we looked through some of 
the findings that we have obtained to date. There may be cause 
to consider a suspension on Dr. Daszak himself. Next, the ARM, 
the Action Referral Memorandum, only mentions three active NIH 
grants, but it doesn't mention the R01 that was used to involve 
the Wuhan Institute of Virology and not the grant in 
conjunction with Colorado state to start a bat colony. Does the 
suspension include those grants as well? Did we miss that?
    Dr. Tabak. The suspension includes all grant activities for 
that organization.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Dr. Tabak, EcoHealth, like every 
other NIAID grantee, was required to submit a 5-year progress 
report, as you know. This report was submitted nearly 2 years 
late. Dr. Daszak testified that EcoHealth had tried to submit 
the report on time but was locked out of the NIH system. Dr. 
Lauer testified that a forensic audit was conducted, and no 
such system error was detected. Is NIH willing to share the 
findings of this forensic audit with the Select Subcommittee?
    Dr. Tabak. We certainly will work together with you to 
obtain things that you require, sir.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Does the audit indicate that 
EcoHealth could have submitted their report on time?
    Dr. Tabak. That is what our audit indicates, yes.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. When EcoHealth eventually 
submitted its year-5 report, Dr. Daszak testified it took 11 
days to unlock the NIH system. Is this true?
    Dr. Tabak. We have no evidence of that.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Does NIH allow grantees to update 
progress reports with information gathered outside the scope of 
the applicable budget period?
    Dr. Tabak. It has happened in the past. Occasionally 
investigators will for context add in additional information, 
so that is possible.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Despite what Dr. Daszak testified, the Select 
Subcommittee recently uncovered an email that he wrote on 
October 1, 2021, to the personal email of Dr. David Morens. He 
said, ``Here's the truth behind this mystery. We got our report 
ready to file for the Year 5 grant, but when it was funded, we 
assumed we didn't need to. It was the first time we had a 
renewal. We then had our grant terminated by Trump and assumed 
we definitely wouldn't need to at that point.'' Does this sound 
like a more accurate description of events as opposed to a 
system lockout?
    Dr. Tabak. I can't comment on his email. All I can say to 
you is that our system did not lock them out, and there was no 
impediment for them to provide that report on time.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Are grantees still required to 
submit progress reports, even if they receive that year's 
funding?
    Dr. Tabak. They are indeed.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. One of the reasons for the 
debarment was a dispute regarding whether an experiment that 
showed unexpected viral growth was conducted in Year 4 or 5 of 
that grant, unexpected viral growth, basically increased 
pathogenicity. Would you agree with that?
    Dr. Tabak. No. Again, just to put a finer point on it, 
increased viral growth does not necessarily mean increased 
pathogenicity. It just simply means that the virus is growing 
more rapidly.
    Dr. Wenstrup. OK. I appreciate that clarification. So, 
going back to that, whether it was conducted in Year 4 or 5 of 
the grant, what is NIH's determination? Did it occur in Year 4 
or 5?
    Dr. Tabak. It was our evaluation that it occurred in Year 
5, but because of the uncertainty, we asked for the original 
metadata, that is the electronic records, and the actual lab 
notebooks that would have memorialized the actual events. And 
as you know, we never received those.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Dr. Daszak wrote in an email that 
he ``verified'' this experiment by calling Dr. Shi at the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology and asking her. Is that alone sufficient 
to meet his requirements to oversee subgrantees?
    Dr. Tabak. It is not, sir, which is why we asked to see the 
metadata, electronic records, and the laboratory notebook.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Were the lab notebooks that Dr. Daszak failed 
to produce, provide information that may potentially validate 
this experiment?
    Dr. Tabak. I certainly hoped they would, yes.
    Dr. Wenstrup. And he never produced those to you?
    Dr. Tabak. That is correct.
    Dr. Wenstrup. OK. Thank you. I would now like to recognize 
the Ranking Member for questions.
    Dr. Ruiz. Thank you. As I have said from the outset of the 
Select Subcommittee's work last year, better understanding the 
origins of the COVID-19 pandemic is essential for preventing 
and preparing for future pandemics. Dr. Tabak, regardless of 
whether the novel coronavirus came from a lab or from nature, 
do you agree that we can better protect the American people if 
we understand the risk factors leading to either potential 
pathway?
    Dr. Tabak. Yes, absolutely.
    Dr. Ruiz. So, for the past 15 months, my Republican 
colleagues have demonstrated that they are more concerned with 
proving their extreme narrative about Dr. Fauci orchestrating a 
coverup of Federal funding causing the COVID-19 pandemic than 
they are with conducting an objective, balanced analysis of the 
pathways by which the novel coronavirus could have emerged. But 
three-quarters of the way through this Congress, Select 
Subcommittee Republicans still have not succeeded in 
substantiating their allegations that NIH and NIAID through a 
grant to EcoHealth Alliance created SARS-CoV-2 and conspire to 
cover it up.
    And while we can agree that EchoHealth Alliance has defied 
its obligations to be a transparent steward of taxpayer 
dollars, let me be clear about this. No evidence provided to 
the Select Subcommittee demonstrates that Dr. Fauci lied about 
gain-of-function research in Wuhan. No evidence demonstrates 
that Dr. Fauci and NIH lead a coverup of any kind, and no 
evidence demonstrates that work performed under the EchoHealth 
grant, including at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, led to the 
creation of SARS-CoV-2. To date, my colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle have been unable to demonstrate that any of 
the viruses studied under the grant could even possibly have 
been SARS-CoV-2's progenitor virus.
    Dr. Tabak, in October 2021, you sent a letter and analysis 
to then Oversight Committee Ranking Member, James Comer, 
regarding the EchoHealth Alliance grant. That letter and 
accompanying analysis in your words ``demonstrated that the 
naturally occurring bat coronaviruses used in experiments under 
the NIH grant from 2014 to 2018 are decades removed from SARS-
CoV-2 evolutionarily.'' In the letter, you also confirmed that 
those viruses ``could not have been the source of SARS-CoV-2 
and the COVID-19 pandemic.'' That was more than 2 years ago, 
and the majority still has not identified a single virus 
related to the grant, whether in Wuhan or elsewhere that could 
be the progenitor virus. Dr. Tabak, could you remind us why 
none of the virus as studied under the EchoHealth grant could 
have been the progenitor virus to the SARS-CoV-2?
    Dr. Tabak. The viruses that were approved for study under 
the EchoHealth grant are very removed, evolutionarily speaking, 
from SARS-CoV-2. It would take many, many years for a virus of 
the type that they use to evolve into SARS-CoV-2.
    Dr. Ruiz. OK. And is it correct that the closest known 
viruses to SARS-CoV-2 are the RaTG13 and the BANAL-52 viruses, 
neither of which were discovered or created with NIH funds?
    Dr. Tabak. That is correct. Those two viruses are 96 and 97 
percent identical, and although that may seem close, in fact, 
that is very far apart.
    Dr. Ruiz. OK. And you already made all of this known to 
Oversight Committee Republicans almost 3 years ago in October 
2021, correct?
    Dr. Tabak. That is what the letter outlined, yes.
    Dr. Ruiz. Yes. So, it is unfortunate that for the past year 
and a half, the Select Subcommittee has fallen short of its 
obligation to objectively promote the Americans public's 
understanding of the viruses origins. And Dr. Tabak, in your 
view, what actions should Congress take to better understand 
the origins of the novel coronavirus and to prevent and prepare 
for future pandemics?
    Dr. Tabak. Well, again, we need to continue the studies 
about the evolution of these viruses. We have to somehow 
encourage foreign partners to engage because it is only through 
engagement of foreign nations that we are going to truly get to 
the bottom of this. As you know, these viruses do not originate 
in this country. They originate in Southeast Asia.
    Dr. Ruiz. OK. Well, let me just be clear once again that it 
could have been lab leak, and it could have been zoonotic, 
although what we haven't proven because so far there is no 
evidence, is that it was created from grant money from NIH or 
NIAID to EchoHealth, and that there was a coverup, which is 
what my colleagues on the other side have been repeatedly 
mentioning throughout these investigations. So, I do think that 
we need to continue to do the research to investigate if it was 
a lab leak, where and how, and how to create better biosafety, 
which is what the administration is currently undertaking. I 
think it would be helpful to hear from them their efforts and 
what we can do to bolster the administration's efforts to keep 
lab safety a priority in our country and in our efforts in 
other countries. And I think we should also have more hearings 
on zoonotic high-risk detection in other countries so that we 
can set up better systems to build capacity to identify 
emerging novel viruses immediately and contain them at the 
source site. So, with that, I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Ms. Malliotakis from New York 
for 5 minutes for questions.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Thank you. Dr. Tabak, Dr. Daszak came 
before us and said he was not sure of all the work, or all the 
research being conducted at the WIV. Are you aware of all the 
work that was being done at the WIV?
    Dr. Tabak. Certainly not. We just have a window into what 
we support.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. Are you aware or were you aware that 
the CCP, the military wing, was doing work at the WIV?
    Dr. Tabak. I am not personally aware of that.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. And just for the record, Dr. Collins 
came before us and said that the hypothesis that the COVID-19 
pandemic was a result of a lab leak or lab-related accident is 
not a conspiracy theory. Would you agree with that?
    Dr. Tabak. I think it is just an alternate theory that 
needs to be considered.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. And we also had the former head of the 
CDC come before us and say that it was American tax dollars 
that went to the WIV, and it wasn't just NIH funding. It was 
funding from Department of State, Department of Defense, USAID. 
Are you aware of that?
    Dr. Tabak. I am aware that they received funding from other 
organizations, but I don't know the specifics.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. So, there is still the possibility 
that American tax dollars didn't make their way to the WIV and 
that this was a lab leak, and we can put together the dots 
here, but aside from that, I want to actually focus on NIH. 
When NIH certified EcoHealth's compliance and we negotiated the 
grant, was NIH aware of the EcoHealth would still be 
communicating with the debarred Wuhan Institute of Technology? 
Last year was when they were debarred, and they were still 
obtaining data and conducting experiments with that 
information.
    Dr. Tabak. Once they were debarred, I do not believe that 
there is any requirement that they can no longer have 
conversations with WIV. Is that the timeframe----
    Ms. Malliotakis. Well, no. Well, WIV was debarred----
    Dr. Tabak. Right.
    Ms. Malliotakis [continuing]. And EcoHealth was still 
talking to them. Are we certain that no Federal funds have gone 
to the WIV since the debarment?
    Dr. Tabak. No NIH funds have gone to the WIV since the 
debarment.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. And is that possible that it has gone 
through the EcoHealth to WIV as a subgrant? I'm saying----
    Dr. Tabak. We checked USAID spending, and to my knowledge, 
no funds, once they were debarred, went to WIV from NIH.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. Well, that is why Ways and Means 
yesterday passed a bill to make sure that all this information 
is made public, these subgrants, so we know exactly where this 
money is going once they are given because we don't believe 
EcoHealth should have received this money, No. 1. No. 2, the 
fact that they were working with this lab in Communist China 
that had subpar conditions is very disturbing. But we also know 
that at least 20 more EcoHealth research projects received 
funding since March 2020. And they are conducting research, 
NEPA, zoonotic viruses, bat coronaviruses, MERS. They are doing 
a lot of this research, mostly actually in Third World 
countries, subpar safety conditions.
    How do you ensure that our Federal dollars are not going to 
do risky experiments in countries where there are subpar safety 
regulations, and do you believe that that should be a criteria 
that is put forth to ensure that the money doesn't?
    Dr. Tabak. Well, again, once we established special 
conditions for award on EcoHealth Alliance, we have monitored 
them very carefully with regard to expenditure and with regard 
to their various administrative processes. There was never a 
concern with the danger, if you will, of the experiments that 
NIH approved for EcoHealth Alliance to work under sub-award 
with WIV. As I just indicated, the viruses that they were 
working with are nonhuman pathogens that presented no threat.
    Ms. Malliotakis. But you said that you don't know all the 
work that was being conducted at WIV.
    Dr. Tabak. I can only speak to the funds that NIH approved 
and the work that we approved. I cannot speak to the other 
side.
    Ms. Malliotakis. How are you sure about the work that we 
approved? Did you go there? I mean, did you talk to WIV 
officials? How did you confirm that the money was not used?
    Dr. Tabak. We monitor reports. We monitor their publication 
record.
    Ms. Malliotakis. The WIV's reports?
    Dr. Tabak. The EcoHealth Alliance----
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK.
    Dr. Tabak [continuing]. Reports because as a sub-awardee, 
we do not directly connect to WIV.
    Ms. Malliotakis. I just have one last question. In October 
2021, NIH changed the website for the definition of a ``gain-
of-function.'' Who authorized that change?
    Dr. Tabak. I don't know if anybody specifically authorized 
it.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Who made the change?
    Dr. Tabak. The change was made by our communications 
department because of the confusion that people have about the 
generic term of gain-of-function and the specific term gain-of-
function.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. So, you don't know who specifically 
made the change?
    Dr. Tabak. It was done by our communications office that 
wrote----
    Ms. Malliotakis. The communications office is 
communications and not scientists, so somebody must have gave 
him the----
    Dr. Tabak. The content was vetted.
    Ms. Malliotakis. By who?
    Dr. Tabak. By individuals who are subject matter experts.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. Well, we would like to find out who 
that person is, who is the subject matter expert, if you could 
let the committee----
    Dr. Wenstrup. OK. Now I recognize Ms. Castor from Florida 
for 5 minutes for questions.
    Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Tabak, in your 
transcribed interview of January 5th, 2024, you shared that 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, we happened to know a lot about 
coronaviruses because of a lot of antecedent work. How did 
Congress' years of investment in basic research accelerate 
NIH's ability to respond to the pandemic, and what would have 
been different had those investments not happened?
    Dr. Tabak. In many ways, the congressional investment 
allowed NIH to understand the biology of the SARS family 
viruses. It allowed us to understand how they are able to 
attach the host, how they are able to infect and then induce 
pathogenesis. It enabled us to understand better how the host 
would respond to the virus. So, it gave us insight as to what 
potential targets there might be in order to develop 
therapeutics, as well as vaccines. The spike protein, which 
many people have heard about, represented such a target for a 
vaccine, and indeed that turned out to be the case. It also 
laid the groundwork for rapid testing for the virus, which was 
important as well as we sought to control the pandemic.
    Ms. Castor. I also think it demonstrated how vital it is 
that American scientists and our agencies are able to monitor 
new potential public health threats because right now, we are 
faced with an avian flu, and we are monitoring of course, new 
COVID-19 and flu variants and measles outbreaks. Just in my 
time in Congress, we have had to deal with outbreaks of Zika 
and monitor Ebola in other countries. So confronting public 
health threats requires a strong, resilient NIH, which is why I 
was so disappointed when my Republican colleagues proposed in 
the last Fiscal Year to slash the budget of NIH by almost $4 
billion because as you stated, this reliable support has helped 
accelerate our response to COVID-19, and it will continue to 
lay the foundation for response to future pandemics.
    Dr. Tabak, what would be the effect of slashing $4 billion 
from NIH? What would be the effect on our preparedness for the 
next pandemic?
    Dr. Tabak. Obviously, with fewer resources, our progress 
would be slowed.
    Ms. Castor. In your transcribed interview, you also shared 
examples of what productive cross-departmental coordination to 
tackle disease threats look like. In some parts of the country, 
including my home state of Florida, we learned the hard way 
what a failure to collaborate and coordinate looks like when 
Governor DeSantis deliberately hid death and infection 
information from the public. More people died in Florida from 
COVID-19 after a safe and effective vaccine was available, and, 
I believe, largely due to the state's disinformation campaign.
    Democrats in the Energy and Commerce Committee tried to 
implement the lessons learned through the reauthorization of 
the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act. A lot of the 
things that Dr. Ruiz mentioned, we tried to develop plans for 
public-private partnerships and also focus on data sharing 
across local, state, and Federal Government. Unfortunately, 
Energy and Commerce Republicans refused to work with us on this 
critical legislation.
    In your transcribed interview, you shared that we as a 
country have had a mixed response when it comes to applying the 
lessons learned from COVID-19 and that we can't become 
complacent as the pandemic wanes. Aside from maintaining 
critical funding, what does NIH need to see from Congress in 
order to help the Agency best implement the lessons learned 
from COVID-19?
    Dr. Tabak. Well, I think the forward thinking of making the 
fundamental investments so that we can investigate the 
remaining viral families of concern. Sometimes it is difficult 
to understand why such basic research is critical when at the 
end of the day where is the vaccine, where is the therapeutic. 
But until you have that fundamental knowledge, you can't get to 
that final step, which is so crucial. I think also in 
facilitating in whatever way the Congress has at its disposal, 
to cross departmental integration of things which is very 
helpful. We did that. We came together to do that, and 
hopefully we are able to stay in that in the future and do it 
in even better ways.
    Ms. Castor. We still have time in this Congress to 
implement a bipartisan bill and to establish new policy on 
lessons learned from COVID-19. We have learned a lot, and I 
want to thank you again for your service and urge my colleagues 
to work in a bipartisan way on the real solutions. Thank you, 
and I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Mrs. Lesko from Arizona for 5 
minutes of questions.
    Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Dr. Tabak, did the NIH 
fund the gain-of-function research at the Wuhan Institute of 
Virology through EcoHealth?
    Dr. Tabak. It depends on your definition of gain-of-
function research. If you are speaking about the generic term, 
yes, we did, but the generic term is research that goes on in 
many, many labs around the country. It is not regulated, and 
the reason it is not regulated is it poses no threat or harm to 
anybody.
    Mrs. Lesko. Thank you. Dr. Tabak, since COVID-19, we have 
seen many problems with the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the 
Chinese Communist Party hiding information and refusing to 
provide data to the United States. Do you believe this lack of 
transparency cost Americans their lives?
    Dr. Tabak. I can't speak to that directly. I can tell you 
that the failure of the Wuhan Institute of Virology to provide 
us with the data that we requested and the lab notebooks that 
we requested certainly impeded our ability to understand what 
was really going on with the experiments that we have been 
discussing this morning.
    Mrs. Lesko. And because of that, do you think NIH should 
continue to provide grants where lab work will be done in 
China?
    Dr. Tabak. Well, as you know, the Wuhan Institute of 
Virology has been disbarred, so we will not do----
    Mrs. Lesko. How about any other labs? Should we fund any 
work in labs in China?
    Dr. Tabak. I think if you look at the new policy that has 
just been released, there is mention of consideration for 
funding in countries of concern, and China is one of those 
countries.
    Mrs. Lesko. So, I don't understand your answer. Does that 
mean you don't want to fund labs in China anymore?
    Dr. Tabak. That would have to come under very, very high 
scrutiny before it was done.
    Mrs. Lesko. Dr. Tabak, at the time of funding to EcoHealth, 
did the NIH have a concrete, understandable definition of risk 
of concern, gain-of-function research throughout NIH?
    Dr. Tabak. I can't talk for the whole of NIH, but certainly 
the organizations that support this type of research, I don't 
understand.
    Mrs. Lesko. All right. In the United States, what level of 
biosecurity would be used for the type of research that was 
being done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology under this 
subgrant from EcoHealth?
    Dr. Tabak. There were two types of experiments they did. 
The experiments involving cell culture would likely be done at 
a BSL-2 level, and the experiments involved with mice would 
likely be done at a BSL-3 level.
    Mrs. Lesko. Thank you. And how much time do I have? Oh, I 
got some time, good.
    NIH boasts a rigorous grant review process. Dr. Morens, a 
senior advisor to Dr. Fauci, stated the following about Peter 
Daszak, the President of EcoHealth: ``Peter Daszak is one of my 
oldest and best friends, and I talk to him all the time.'' 
Indeed, after one of Dr. Daszak EcoHealth grants from NIH was 
suspended in response to EcoHealth's violation of grant 
policies, Dr. Morens wrote to Dr. Daszak from his private Gmail 
instead of his official email. It appears from what our 
committee has learned that Dr. Morens and Dr. Daszak regularly 
conspired to reinstate Dr. Daszak's grant, all while avoiding 
Federal records laws and the transparency of FOIA. My question 
is, do you believe these statements that were made and actions 
between Dr. Morens and Dr. Daszak undercut NIH's claim of a 
rigorous grant review process?
    Dr. Tabak. I can't speak to the specifics because I am not 
privy to any of this, but certainly, one would not have a 
Federal official having discussions of that type with a 
potential grantee.
    Mrs. Lesko. And does Dr. Morens still work for NIH?
    Dr. Tabak. Dr. Morens is an employee of NIH, yes.
    Mrs. Lesko. And was there any repercussions for him using 
private emails and avoiding FOIA?
    Dr. Tabak. We do not discuss personnel issues, as you know.
    Mrs. Lesko. Well, I certainly hope that when somebody 
violates Federal law, that there should be some type of 
repercussions, so it seems very convenient that you can't tell 
us anything, but I thank you, and I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Mrs. Dingell from Michigan 
for 5 minutes of questions.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Internal documents 
and testimony provided by EcoHealth Alliance, and the NIH, and 
the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases--
NIAID--officials demonstrate potential efforts on EcoHealth's 
part to mislead the Federal Government. As Democrats stated in 
our recently released staff report, these efforts raise serious 
questions about EcoHealth's credibility as a continued 
recipient of taxpayer funding. For example, EcoHealth has 
argued to this committee NIH that they are not at fault for 
submitting their Year 5 progress report nearly 2 years late. 
One of EcoHealth's defenses is that NIH Report Submission 
System locked them out from submitting the report. NIH 
investigated EcoHealth's claims.
    Dr. Tabak, we spoke to Dr. Michael Lauer, the NIH official 
responsible for overseeing EcoHealth's compliance with NIH 
grant policy. He testified that NIH performed an electronic 
forensic investigation and found no evidence that the system 
had locked out EcoHealth. Do you have any reason to dispute Dr. 
Lauer's testimony about the electronic forensic investigation 
that NIH conducted?
    Dr. Tabak. None at all.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you. When it was finally submitted, the 
Year 5 report ended up becoming a point of disagreement between 
NIH and EcoHealth. EcoHealth makes certain representations 
about the results in that report, and for good reason, it 
appears that NIH is not entirely convinced. For example, 
EcoHealth has argued that its viruses did not grow in excess of 
permitted thresholds, and, therefore, EcoHealth had no 
obligation to immediately notify NIAID. Dr. Tabak, in October 
2021, you wrote to then Oversight Ranking Member, James Comer, 
that EcoHealth had failed to immediately report the Year 5 
results as was required by the terms of the grant. EcoHealth 
submitted its Year 5 report nearly 2 years late. Do you 
consider that immediate notification?
    Dr. Tabak. Certainly not.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you. So EcoHealth has argued they did 
immediately notify NIAID of the experiments in the Year 5 
report because those were the same experiments in the Year 4 
report. Now, if you are watching the C-SPAN, I want to tell you 
something. EcoHealth's argument is as convoluted as it sounds. 
Dr. Tabak, at your transcribed interview, you testified that 
NIH disagrees with EcoHealth and thinks that Years 4 and 5 
reports probably show two different sets of experiments. Is 
that still NIH's view today?
    Dr. Tabak. That is our view, and that is why we requested 
the electronic records, metadata, and lab notebooks so that we 
could reconcile this issue.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you. When misconduct in EcoHealth's 
part has been identified, NIH worked in good faith to ensure 
improved transparency and compliance. For instance, NIH 
required EcoHealth to submit all of its sub-award agreements, 
to submit invoices for work performed as NIH determined 
appropriate reimbursement, and to submit two progress reports 
per year. Dr. Tabak, do you agree that those special 
conditions, like the general conditions on all grants, helped 
to ensure the grantee was a responsible steward for American 
taxpayer dollars?
    Dr. Tabak. They certainly are designed to do that, yes.
    Mrs. Dingell. We have some issues, and we are all talking 
to him about them. Prior to his hearing, just a couple of weeks 
ago, EcoHealth president, Dr. Peter Daszak, submitted written 
testimony to the Select Subcommittee stating that because of 
the additional conditions NIH instituted to monitor EcoHealth 
grants, no other research organization in the United States has 
more oversight than EcoHealth. Yesterday, HHS announced that it 
would proceed with disbarment proceedings against EcoHealth and 
bar the organization from receiving Federal funding. Pursuant 
to that announcement, HHS has suspended Federal funding 
immediately and noted the many decisive actions NIH took to 
investigate EcoHealth's contact and use of taxpayer dollars.
    I believe we have worked constructively on a bipartisan 
basis. I know we all here are deeply concerned on a bipartisan 
basis to examine EcoHealth's potential misconduct, and I 
commend the administration for taking the action that you now 
have to ensure that all Federal grantees use Federal taxpayers' 
dollars responsibly and transparently. And that is what we all 
must guarantee going forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am out 
of time, and I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize the Chairman of the Full 
Committee, Mr. Comer from Kentucky, for 5 minutes of questions.
    Chairman Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Dr. Tabak, I 
want to thank you for being here today representing NIH. I want 
to ask both about the situation regarding EcoHealth and a few 
questions regarding the Institute's record retention policies. 
Starting with EcoHealth, yesterday HHS proposed debarring them 
from receiving Federal funds. Does NIH agree with this 
decision?
    Dr. Tabak. Yes, we do.
    Chairman Comer. Back in 2020 when NIH originally terminated 
and then suspended the EcoHealth grant, many scientists were 
outraged. We have emails where Dr. Daszak called NIH actions 
Stalinesque. He called you ``NIH Acting Dentist Director 
Tabak'' and your oversight actions as ``an anti-science 
shitshow''. And that is a quote. It is not my word. Dr. Tabak, 
do you agree with the request NIH made of EcoHealth?
    Dr. Tabak. Oh, absolutely.
    Chairman Comer. Dr. Tabak, do you agree with the actions 
NIH has taken against EcoHealth?
    Dr. Tabak. Completely.
    Chairman Comer. Is anyone entitled to receive Federal 
funds?
    Dr. Tabak. Of course not. You have to demonstrate your 
ability to oversee them correctly.
    Chairman Comer. And did EcoHealth fail to satisfactorily 
answer NHI's request?
    Dr. Tabak. They have.
    Chairman Comer. So, NIH reinstated EcoHealth's grant on the 
condition that there would be no work in China and the Wuhan 
lab had already been debarred. Dr. Daszak testified that since 
then and during the course of the grant, he spoke routinely 
with the Wuhan Institute of Virology to get data and publish 
papers. Did Dr. Daszak ever inform the NIH that he would keep 
working with the Wuhan lab even though they were debarred?
    Dr. Tabak. Not to my knowledge.
    Chairman Comer. Shifting to some questions regarding NIH's 
document retention policies. Dr. David Morens, a senior advisor 
to Dr. Fauci for decades, wrote in an email to Dr. Daszak, ``I 
learned from our FOIA lady here how to make emails disappear 
after FOIA but before the search starts, so I think we are all 
safe. Plus, I deleted most of those earlier emails after 
sending them to Gmail.'' Is that consistent with NIH document 
retention policies?
    Dr. Tabak. It is not.
    Chairman Comer. Does the NIH FOIA Office teach employees 
how to avoid transparency?
    Dr. Tabak. I certainly hope not.
    Chairman Comer. He also later wrote Dr. Daszak, ``We are 
all smart enough to know to never have smoking guns, and if we 
did, we wouldn't put them in emails. And if we found them, we 
would delete them.'' Is that consistent with NIH document 
retention policies?
    Dr. Tabak. It is not.
    Chairman Comer. Finally, emails show that Dr. Morens would 
share internal discussions regarding upcoming FOIA releases 
with Dr. Daszak. He would then help Dr. Daszak craft responses 
to documents being released in these FOIAs. Are those actions 
consistent with NIH policies?
    Dr. Tabak. If those actions occurred, they would not be 
consistent.
    Chairman Comer. So, do these actions concern you, Dr. 
Tabak?
    Dr. Tabak. It does indeed.
    Chairman Comer. What is Dr. Morens' current employment 
status?
    Dr. Tabak. He is an employee of NIH.
    Chairman Comer. Well, I think you see where my lines of 
questioning were leading. We have some serious concerns. We 
have fought in this Select Subcommittee, the Oversight 
Committee on obtaining information. And here you have admission 
of deleting information, going to great lengths to not be 
transparent in an apparent coverup of something that, I think, 
we would agree in a bipartisan manner, is one of the most 
serious issues that our country has ever faced, the COVID-19 
pandemic. So, I appreciate the work of the Chairman Wenstrup 
and the full committee here to try to get to the truth, give 
the American people the truth because that is what they want 
and that is what this committee's role is, but we also want to 
hold people accountable for wrongdoing. So, we look forward to 
working with you to help us achieve what the American people 
want us to achieve in this Select Committee. With that, Mr. 
Chair, I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Ms. Ross from North Carolina 
for 5 minutes of questions.
    Ms. Ross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr. 
Tabak, for being with us today.
    As we have heard earlier and really ever since COVID came 
to light, there has been a lot of controversy and confusion 
about gain-of-function research. And I think some of that has 
been caused by the fact that we have heard different people use 
the same term to mean completely different things with 
completely different definitions. But as an institution, it 
seems like you and your colleagues at NIH and NIAID have been 
fairly consistent in that your North Star with respect to 
proposed research has consistently been the context of the 
Federal regulation. Is that correct?
    Dr. Tabak. It is.
    Ms. Ross. And I would like to turn to the definition of 
gain-of-function research that Republicans raised at your 
transcribed interview. Republican questioning referred to it as 
a broad definition, and it defined gain-of-function research as 
a type of research that modifies a biological agent, so it 
confers new or enhanced activity to the agent. I believe that 
the definition existed at some point in a digital media kit on 
NIH's news and events webpage. And I understand that you are 
several levels removed from where the assessments like this are 
made, but for the purpose of the NIAID staff assessing whether 
the proposed research is or is not gain-of-function research, 
did that very broad definition have any regulatory 
significance?
    Dr. Tabak. It does not. The broad definition is unregulated 
because those types of experiments are conducted in virtually 
every lab across the country with no consequence of safety to 
anybody.
    Ms. Ross. And in your experience as deputy director of NIH, 
if you are interested in getting government guidance or 
regulations relevant to an issue, would that news and events 
webpage maybe be your first stop?
    Dr. Tabak. It likely would be one of the stops, yes.
    Ms. Ross. And with respect to EcoHealth Alliance's grant, 
program staff had to assess at different points in time whether 
the proposed research was or was not gain-of-function research. 
At those different points of time, did staff refer to 
government guidance and regulation, such as the P3CO framework 
when making their assessments?
    Dr. Tabak. Yes, once it was instituted, that is correct.
    Ms. Ross. And the definitions for gain-of-function research 
provided in government guidance and regulations were very much 
different than that broad definition we discussed earlier. Is 
that correct?
    Dr. Tabak. That is correct.
    Ms. Ross. And did NIAID staff ever use the broad definition 
when assessing proposed research as far as you know?
    Dr. Tabak. No, it wouldn't be applicable.
    Ms. Ross. So, I think there is a natural logic to that 
process. NIAID as the regulator refers to regulation when 
determining whether proposed research is within the scope of 
the regulatory term of art. And just to be clear, each time 
NIAID program staff was asked to answer whether the proposed 
research on the EcoHealth grant met the regulatory definition 
of gain-of-function research, the answer was no. Is that 
correct?
    Dr. Tabak. That is correct.
    Ms. Ross. So, I am just going to end by saying that I 
believe it is a disservice to our Nation's scientific 
enterprise when there are attempts to make regulators judge 
research outside of the regulatory context. And if we want to 
have a serious conversation about regulation, we can do that, 
and the Democrats support those conversations. That is why the 
Biden administration recently announced a new policy for 
overseeing high-risk research that could otherwise cause the 
next pandemic. Dr. Tabak, I want to thank you for your many 
years of service and for appearing before the committee today, 
and I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Dr. Joyce from Pennsylvania 
for 5 minutes of questions.
    Dr. Joyce. Thank you, Chairman Wenstrup, for convening this 
hearing. Thank you, Dr. Tabak, for taking time to speak with us 
this morning. I think it is time to really reset the table of 
what the core agenda of this Select Subcommittee is. We want to 
evaluate how the effects of the COVID virus affected America. 
We want to come up with best practices, and we want to see what 
investing in a Chinese Communist Party-guided Wuhan Institute 
of Virology, what those effects were, and how our taxpayer 
dollars were spent.
    Earlier this month, we heard from Dr. Peter Daszak before 
this committee and examined how he misled the NIH to secure 
taxpayer funds which were used to perform gain-of-function 
research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. The important work 
of this committee has led to HHS suspending all active grants 
to EcoHealth and commencing formal debarment proceedings. We 
must now scrutinize the system that allowed the reinstatement 
of Federal funds to EcoHealth. During questioning about the 
term of EcoHealth's renegotiated grant with NIAID, Dr. Daszak 
revealed that EcoHealth continues to communicate with the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology and relies on them for the data required 
to carry out the reinstated grant. This level of communication 
and reliance on Wuhan Institute of Virology to meet grant terms 
is alarming. And based on this information, I questioned how 
EcoHealth could have fulfilled grant requirements without 
violating the terms of the Wuhan Institute of Virology's 
debarment.
    Dr. Tabak, at the time NIH certified EcoHealth's compliance 
and NIAID renegotiate the grant, was NIH aware that EcoHealth 
would still be in communication with the Wuhan Institute of 
Virology?
    Dr. Tabak. Not to my knowledge.
    Dr. Joyce. At the time that the NIH certified EcoHealth's 
compliance and NIAID renegotiated the grant, was NIH aware that 
EcoHealth would rely on data from the Wuhan Institute of 
Virology to meet the aims of the grant?
    Dr. Tabak. To put a point on it, data that they already had 
in their possession or data that they had yet to gain?
    Dr. Joyce. Both.
    Dr. Tabak. We assume that they would use data that was 
already in their possession, but we did not assume that they 
were still interacting about data that they did not yet have 
and----
    Dr. Joyce. So, there was no awareness of continued 
interaction?
    Dr. Tabak. I had no awareness of that, no.
    Dr. Joyce. Does the NIH consider that ongoing relationship 
and reliance on the WIV as a violation the WIV's debarment?
    Dr. Tabak. I would have to consult with attorneys, but it 
would seem to me that that would be inappropriate.
    Dr. Joyce. It certainly seems to this Subcommittee Member 
that it is. Is the NIH certain that no Federal funds have been 
obligated to the WIV or in furtherance of the WIV's research 
activities since it was debarred?
    Dr. Tabak. I have been told that there have been no funds 
issued to the WIV since their debarment by NIH.
    Dr. Joyce. I think one of the key components of what we 
have learned from the Select Subcommittee hearing is that no 
taxpayer dollars should go toward research by the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology or EcoHealth. The NIH must improve their 
grant processes to ensure that information relied on for 
funding is truthful and that information is complete. While it 
is apparent that Dr. Daszak and EcoHealth did make false 
statements during the grant negotiations, NIH must ensure that 
the grants that they provide are responsible use of the 
taxpayer dollars. This Select Subcommittee, I will reiterate, 
looks to learn the lessons and be prepared for best practices 
in the face of any future attack by a virus from within these 
borders or from outside these borders. I thank you again for 
being here to present to us this morning, and, Mr. Chairman, I 
yield.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Dr. Jackson from Texas for 5 
minutes of questions.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, sir, for 
being here today. I just wanted to start off just to make a 
point that Federal money doesn't grow on trees around here in 
D.C., despite what people around here sometimes think. It is 
provided by hardworking Americans, and the Constitution 
entrusts Congress with the responsibility to utilize public 
dollars to provide for the national defense and to create 
programs that benefit those who are paying for them in the 
first place, in the case of NIH and critical research that is 
beneficial to the citizens of this country.
    Dr. Daszak and EcoHealth Alliance were dishonest in their 
stewardship of taxpayer dollars, and, ultimately, they were 
caught and tried to find ways to cover this up, and that is 
pretty obvious from what we have heard today. Dr. Daszak's 
testimony in front of this committee contradicted statements of 
the National Institute of Health and the National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious Disease, and we appreciate you, Dr. 
Tabak, for taking time to clarify the record today.
    However, we are having this hearing today because of the 
NIH's failed policies and procedures and lack of oversight that 
granted EcoHealth Alliance dollars to conduct dangerous gain-
of-function research in the first place. And despite what you 
hear from colleagues on the other side of the aisle, often 
hear, I am astonished that they continue to bury their head in 
the sand on this issue. The evidence is overwhelming, from what 
we have heard on this committee, that the virus did not evolve 
naturally but was a result of some sort of gain-of-function 
manipulation.
    It is not logical to assume at this point that this is a 
total coincidence and that it just happened to emerge in Wuhan, 
China, and it just happened that Dr. Fauci, Peter Daszak, and 
NIH, and EcoHealth Alliance just happened to be funding gain-
of-function research on a coronavirus with U.S. taxpayer 
dollars, and that is becoming more and more obvious every day. 
We saw that the funding was suspended by HHS just yesterday.
    I have an article here that I was reading online just 
before coming in here that was published last night. It says, 
``For years now, EcoHealth has generated immense controversy 
for its use of Federal grant money to support gain-of-function 
research on bat coronaviruses in the Wuhan lab.'' It goes on to 
say, ``In a memo justifying its funding suspension, HHS said 
that EcoHealth had failed to properly monitor the work it was 
supporting at Wuhan. It also failed to properly report the 
results of experiments showing that the hybrid viruses it was 
creating there had improved the ability to infect human 
cells.'' That is from HHS. And then it goes on to describe some 
of the research and what it was intended to do, and then it 
says, ``Soon enough EcoHealth used some of the viruses that 
they collected to create chimeric or hybrid viruses that might 
be better able to infect human lung cells in genetically 
engineered humanized mice.''
    I think that in my particular opinion, it has become 
obvious that NIH has become too independent, too rogue, and too 
unregulated at this particular point. There needs to be a 
complete audit of the policies and procedures and proper 
oversight from outside entities at this point. It has become 
obvious that NIH is just another government bureaucracy, to 
some extent, that is too large and refuses to hold those who do 
wrong accountable. This is evidence, in my opinion, by what we 
have heard today from you, unfortunately, with the continued 
employment of Dr. Morano, and your insistence that you have no 
obligation to discuss ``personnel matters'' with Members of 
Congress that provide millions and millions of dollars to 
perform research and pay for the salaries of employees such as 
Dr. Moran.
    I want to ask you, in August 2021, the NIH finally received 
EcoHealth Alliance's 5-year annual progress report, nearly 2 
years after the September 2019 deadline. In September 2023, the 
Wuhan Institute of Virology, which was funded by EcoHealth 
Alliance, was disbarred from receiving Federal funds because of 
the implications in the development of the COVID-19. Then on 
November 14, Dr. Daszak testified that samples from experiments 
funded by the United States are in possession of the Chinese 
Communist Party in the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Today some 
of the samples remain under the custodianship of the CCP.
    Dr. Tabak, in your opinion and with this information, was 
Dr. Daszak a good steward of taxpayer dollars?
    Dr. Tabak. He was not.
    Dr. Jackson. OK. I am running out of time here, so I am not 
going to ask the following questions. I will just submit those 
for the record.
    Dr. Jackson. But I just want to reiterate that one of the 
things that drives me crazy on all the committees I am on, this 
one included, is the complete lack of accountability when 
things go wrong. I think there has to be accountability. I 
think that when we come up with stuff here that is a danger to 
our country, when we find out that we are on the wrong path on 
something like this research that was happening in NIH, that we 
were funding what was going on in Wuhan Institute of Virology, 
that we have to make corrections, that it has to be bipartisan 
efforts to do that. And that entities like NIH and people like 
you that are in leadership roles have to have the level of 
responsibility, there has to be some accountability, and you 
have to be accountable, not only to yourself and to your 
Institution, but to Members of Congress. Thank you. With that, 
I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Ms. Tokuda from Hawaii for 5 
minutes of questions.
    Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Dr. Tabak, I want to 
quickly clarify for the record a crucial distinction regarding 
the relevance of different definitions of gain-of-function 
research. To make it abundantly clear, under the regulatory 
definition of gain-of-function, which is the applicable 
definition for the purposes of evaluating and funding 
proposals, NIH and NIAID at no point funded gain-of-function 
research through the EcoHealth Alliance grant. Is that correct?
    Dr. Tabak. That is correct.
    Ms. Tokuda. And the website's broad definition, the non-
regulatory definition, is not relevant for these purposes. Is 
that correct?
    Dr. Tabak. That is correct.
    Ms. Tokuda. OK. Thank you. I want to move on now to some of 
the comments we received last week. During the Select 
Subcommittee's last hearing with EcoHealth's president, Dr. 
Daszak, it became abundantly clear that he and EcoHealth had 
fallen markedly short of their obligation to use taxpayer 
dollars transparently and with care and so truly appreciate the 
initiated debarment proceedings that are currently underway. 
With my time today, I would like to make sure the record is 
clear about an issue that I discussed with the doctor. That 
issue involves representations he made to NIAID officials 
regarding EcoHealth's access to key samples when their grant 
was being considered for reactivation.
    In transcribed interviews, NIAID officials told us that 
part of the logic in reactivating the EcoHealth grant was 
preserving access to the grant's bat samples previously 
collected by the Wuhan Institute of Virology. However, it 
appears that Dr. Daszak may have misrepresented his access to 
the samples. The truth is Dr. Daszak did not have access to the 
samples as they are currently sitting in freezers in Wuhan. 
That truth notwithstanding, it seems that Dr. Daszak told NIAID 
division director that he had access to the samples. We spoke 
to the NIAID division director, and she explained that Dr. 
Daszak had directly informed her he had access. She further 
explained that had she known that the samples were in Wuhan and 
inaccessible to EcoHealth, NIAID would have reconsidered 
reactivating EcoHealth's grant. When Dr. Daszak appeared before 
this committee 2 weeks ago, he suggested that the NIAID 
division director may have mistaken sequences for samples 
during their conversation.
    Dr. Tabak, do you think it is likely that the director of 
NIAID's Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases does 
not understand the difference between sequences and samples?
    Dr. Tabak. I am sure she does.
    Ms. Tokuda. And that would make sense to all of us here and 
given the work and expertise she has. In our conversation with 
the division director, she demonstrated no lack of 
understanding that we saw for the difference between bat virus 
sequences and bat samples. We are concerned about the apparent 
gap in understanding between NIAID and EcoHealth regarding the 
location of previously collected bat samples and EcoHealth's 
access to them, particularly when we step back and consider all 
the other instances mentioned today and during our last hearing 
that draw into question EcoHealth's integrity and professional 
conduct as a grantee. Dr. Tabak, do you share our concerns?
    Dr. Tabak. I do.
    Ms. Tokuda. Thank you very much. Chair, I yield back the 
balance of my time.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Dr. Miller-Meeks from Iowa 
for 5 minutes of questions.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Dr. Tabak, for testifying before the Select Subcommittee this 
morning. As you have heard and as you know, Dr. Daszak 
testified in front of the Select Subcommittee on May 1st and 
clearly highlighted the need for more effective oversight of 
Federal grants, as has been elucidated by my colleagues.
    In 2024, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases, NIAID, awarded EcoHealth Alliance almost $4 million 
for understanding the risk of bat coronavirus emergence, which 
included the collection of coronaviruses at the Wuhan Institute 
of Virology. While Dr. Daszak denied using American taxpayer 
dollars for gain-of-function research, the evidence indicates 
otherwise, and it has been incredibly challenging obtaining 
information from both EcoHealth and the NIH. Members of this 
committee on both sides of the aisle were right to question Dr. 
Daszak's integrity and handling of funds, which also 
highlighted NIH's sloppy oversight process. Dr. Tabak, are you 
aware of the different definitions various Federal agencies use 
to define gain-of-function research?
    Dr. Tabak. I am aware of two different definitions, one 
very broad and generic, which is unregulated, and one more 
precise and certainly regulated.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. So, it seems to me that this is sort of 
like what the definition of ``is'' is. Do you believe having 
one definition that is universally employed would be more 
effective?
    Dr. Tabak. The broad definition is lab jargon. It is just 
the way scientists speak. The precise definition which is 
regulated, of course that is the important one because that is 
the one that regulates the experiments that people are 
concerned about.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. Well, it seems that there was gain-of-
function research occurring but denied that it was occurring 
because it didn't meet that precise definition. Do you believe 
that having multiple definitions of gain-of-function research 
has led to gaps in oversight?
    Dr. Tabak. I believe it leads to confusion. I think those 
who are regulating things understand that they need to use the 
regulatory framework.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. Have grant recipients like EcoHealth 
exploited these inconsistencies?
    Dr. Tabak. I can't speak to that. I don't know.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. As I mentioned, the understanding the 
risk of bat coronavirus emerging grant was almost $4 million 
grant that partially went to the Wuhan Institute of Virology 
and the Wuhan University of Public Health. Do you believe this 
grant was an effective use of taxpayer dollars and would you 
support issuing the same grant today?
    Dr. Tabak. Well, with the benefit of what we know today, 
no, of course not.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. There is great concern with Dr. Daszak's 
interaction with NIH and NIAID pertaining to the one long 
growth term of the award. The NIH relied on Dr. Daszak to 
monitor and report virus growth after being a month late on his 
annual reporting requirements, which were outlined in the 
grant. Dr. Tabak, looking back, did the NIH rely too much on 
Dr. Daszak's self-reporting information?
    Dr. Tabak. Again, with the benefit of hindsight, we did 
because we never received the information, unfortunately.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. Well, as an ophthalmologist, hindsight is 
always 20/20.
    Dr. Tabak. Indeed.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. Was the information NIH received 
accurate?
    Dr. Tabak. From Dr. Daszak, we don't think so, and that is 
why we asked for the additional materials, the metadata, the 
electronic records, the laboratory notebooks, which hopefully 
would have been able to clarify all of these issues.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. And I think it is one of the reasons why 
HHS yesterday took the extraordinary step, after the great work 
of this Select Subcommittee under Dr. Wenstrup's leadership, 
took the extraordinary step of defunding EcoHealth, which was 
appropriate given the inconsistencies, inaccurate information, 
and denial of research. With that, I yield. Thank you.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Dr. McCormick from Georgia 
for 5 minutes of questions.
    Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I love that statement 
about the ophthalmologist and hindsight being 20/20. In the ER, 
we just say I have no idea what is just about to happen. I am 
happy to have you here today. Thank you for your testimony. We 
have a lot of things to sort out here, and I just want to make 
sure we are getting things in order. I am hoping you can 
provide some clarity on some previous statements that were made 
by both Dr. Daszak and other folks that are coming together 
right now, some things you have already testified on.
    Dr. Tabak, when the National Institute of Health requested 
the notebooks from EcoHealth, was EcoHealth required to produce 
them under its grant's terms?
    Dr. Tabak. Yes, they were.
    Dr. McCormick. OK. Thank you. When NIH requested notebooks 
from EcoHealth, should EcoHealth have been able to access them 
or already have access to them?
    Dr. Tabak. That is correct.
    Dr. McCormick. OK. Thank you. Did EcoHealth ever produce 
the requested notebooks?
    Dr. Tabak. They have not.
    Dr. McCormick. Never did. Thank you. Dr. Daszak testified 2 
weeks ago that he was not required to produce the lab 
notebooks. Would NIH disagree with that testimony?
    Dr. Tabak. Yes, we disagree with that testimony.
    Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Dr. Tabak, for clarifying that. 
The testifying here today clarifies the inconsistency between 
Dr. Daszak's testimony and the testimony of numerous NIH 
officials and NIAID officials, also including yourself. Dr. 
Daszak continues to talk congressional oversight through 
semantics and outright dishonesty, quite frankly. He has 
routinely failed to produce pertinent documents and made 
countless misleading statements to the Select Subcommittee 
right here. I think he needs to be held accountable, Mr. Chair. 
I am looking forward to that, and with that, I yield.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Thank you for coming before the 
Select Subcommittee this morning, Mr. Tabak. We appreciate your 
testimony. We are pleased that the American people had a chance 
to hear from you directly today. The purpose of today's hearing 
was to have a transparent examination of the process in which 
NIH awards Federal grants and conducts oversight on these 
grants. If we find things that we can do better, then that is 
where we want to go, and we are all subject to that.
    It was important to hear from the deputy director directly 
on this matter, especially as it pertains to EcoHealth 
Alliance. While investigating the origins of COVID-19, we 
uncovered very concerning behavior and wrongdoing by EcoHealth 
Alliance and its President Dr. Peter Daszak. It was made all 
the more troublesome as EcoHealth had been awarded Federal 
funding taxpayer dollars and were conducting research at the 
Wuhan Institute of Virology. Our investigation was essential, I 
should say, for uncovering this behavior and for laying out the 
facts for all to see because just 2 weeks after publishing a 
report on EcoHealth wrongdoing, they now face an immediate 
governmentwide suspension and hold on all taxpayer funds 
pending a formal debarment investigation. That is appropriate 
and a good result in my opinion. I want to reiterate my 
proposal that NIH consider personally suspending EcoHealth 
president, Dr. Peter Daszak, in addition to EcoHealth, from 
receiving Federal funds and also be immediately suspended from 
the current Federal funding.
    We understand based on past history, the possibilities of 
natural origins of COVID and pandemic type of viruses. We 
recognize the need for surveillance, the benefits of enhanced 
predictability. We applaud those efforts. What is new and in 
need of greater study is the culpability and the capability of 
creating a pandemic or creating a pathogen that is capable of 
being more infectious. Even in 2012 in an interview when Dr. 
Fauci was questioned about gain-of-function research and the 
question was, aren't you concerned about something getting out 
of the lab and creating a pandemic, he felt at that time that 
the benefits outweighed the risk and that the risk was small. I 
think we have greater concerns today when it comes to biosafety 
standards. And so there is a concern about biosafety standards 
throughout the world being inadequate. We need to address that 
as best we can as a Nation, not having control over other 
nations. That is a concern on who we engage with, so that is a 
concern throughout the world.
    So I appreciate, Dr. Tabak, you testifying today, that not 
only is a lab leak theory not a conspiracy, but it is a 
hypothesis, and I will use your words, that should be 
considered. I agree with you 100 percent, and I have felt that 
way from the beginning. And I have said in this committee from 
the very beginning that we need to consider nature, and we need 
to consider a lab because the capabilities of creating 
something in lab didn't exist 100 years ago when we had a 
pandemic, they didn't exist 50 years ago, but they do exist 
today.
    Look, I believe the origins of COVID will likely only be 
potentially resolved through intelligence, as testified by 
former CDC Directors Redfield and Walensky. That is where we 
are going to figure it out. Why? Because China is not 
cooperative. And I agree with that because China has not been 
transparent, they have not been accountable, so it makes it 
very difficult. The threats of existing gain-of-function 
technology in the hands of bad actors is and should be a huge 
concern to every American and freedom loving people everywhere. 
This is not to be taken lightly.
    And when we had Dr. Fauci in transcribed interview he said 
that the conspiracy theory is possible, but I asked him if he 
reviewed studies or scientific evidence related to that 
possibility of creating this in the lab, and he said no. I 
asked him, I said, are you familiar with the published research 
onsite-directed mutagenesis. He said, no, I am not. Well, if 
you are open to that, we should be researching it. We should be 
looking at it, and many of us have been. I have since 2020, 
when I discovered that Ralph Baric with Zhengli Shi in China 
created a chimera. That concern has been there for me since 
that time.
    We don't know all the viruses that EcoHealth and/or the WIV 
either with EcoHealth Alliance or independently or possibly 
with the PLA, or with their Academy of Military Medical 
Science, we don't know all the viruses that they created. So, 
for some here to say that it is impossible for COVID-19 to have 
originated from this work, it is possible it didn't come from 
their work directly. But that is inconsistent with unknown 
unknowns, including testimony from numerous public health 
officials and from Dr. Peter Daszak himself. So, I appreciate 
Dr. Tabak testifying that we do not know everything that was 
occurring at the WIV and that we just had a window of insight. 
It is important that we recognize our vulnerabilities, so that 
we can improve upon them in the future.
    I appreciate you, Dr. Tabak, and I appreciate you 
clarifying that the NIH found that their reporting system did 
not, in fact, lock Dr. Daszak and EcoHealth out of their 
account which impeded them from submitting their report on 
time. That honesty is tremendously welcomed here. The more we 
look into Dr. Daszak and EcoHealth, the more concerned I get 
and the more untruths it seems to uncover, and we will continue 
our work.
    Today's hearing was important as we continue our 
investigation into the origins of COVID and the effects of the 
pandemic on the United States in the world, and work to uncover 
any impropriety by public health officials or grantees in a 
government of we, the people, truth, justice, transparency, and 
accountability matter. And on that note, I thank you for being 
here today, Dr. Tabak.
    With that and without objection, all Members will have 5 
legislative days within which to submit materials and to submit 
additional written questions for the witnesses, which will be 
forwarded to the witnesses for their response.
    Dr. Wenstrup. If there is no further business, without 
objection, the Select Subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 10:31 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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