[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER: HELPING OR HURTING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 25, 2023
__________
Serial No. 118-56
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
55-694 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking
JOE WILSON, South Carolina Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
DARRELL ISSA, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN MAST, Florida
KEN BUCK, Colorado
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ANDY BARR, Kentucky
RONNY JACKSON, Texas
YOUNG KIM, California
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,
American Samoa
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio
JIM BAIRD, Indiana
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York
CORY MILLS, Florida
RICH MCCORMICK, Georgia
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas
JOHN JAMES, Michigan
KEITH SELF, Texas
BRAD SHERMAN, California
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
AMI BERA, California
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
DINA TITUS, Nevada
TED LIEU, California
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
COLIN ALLRED, Texas
ANDY KIM, New Jersey
SARA JACOBS, California
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
Florida
GREG STANTON, Arizona
MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
JIM COSTA, California
JASON CROW, Colorado
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
Brendan Shields, Staff Director
Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Oversight and Accountability
BRIAN MAST, Florida, Chair
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JASON CROW, Colorado, Ranking
DARRELL ISSA, California Member
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
CORY MILLS, Florida
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas
DINA TITUS, Nevada
COLIN ALLRED, Texas
ANDY KIM, New Jersey
SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
Florida
MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
Parker Chapman, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
KIMMAGE, DANIEL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY COORDINATOR, GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT
CENTER......................................................... 8
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 32
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 33
Hearing Attendance............................................... 34
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questoions submitted for the record................. 35
THE GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER: HELPING OR HURTING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Wednesday, October 25, 2023
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and
Accountability,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:06 p.m., in
room 210, House Visitor Center, Hon. Brian Mast (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Mast. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Accountability
will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to examine
the purpose and the priorities of the GEC's operations as well
as provide an opportunity to evaluate whether the work the GEC
and its partners do today align with its mission and the U.S.
foreign policy. I now recognize myself for an opening
statement.
Let's see here. We will get there eventually. There is a
lot of procedure in this book. I always hate sitting up here so
far away from you all. It seems very elitist. I think I have
said that before. We are going to work to sit down there closer
to everybody else.
So as I mentioned, today the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Accountability will examine the Global Engagement Center, or
GEC, and its successes, its failures, and questions about
weaponization.
GEC's mission statement reads in part that it seeks to
counter foreign, State, and non-State propaganda and
disinformation efforts aimed at undermining the stability of
the United States, its allies and partner nations. And we are
here today to determine whether or not that mission is being
fulfilled. And we look forward to you answering questions about
that.
On October 7, Hamas terrorists stormed into Israel with a
single goal, inflict as much pain and incite as much horror
onto the civilian population as possible. Entire families were
burned alive. An unborn baby was cut from its mother's womb. A
Holocaust survivor, in her wheelchair, was dragged out of her
home as a hostage.
On October 7, Israel was thrust into a war for its very
existence with rockets launched from Gaza Strip and Hezbollah
fighters trading fire on the northern border. Israel is locked
in battles on a number of fronts, but the Israeli people are
facing another battle worldwide, and that is anti-Semitism and
fake news from international institutions and major news
outlets, including some in the United States of America.
Look no further than October 17 when a rocket hit the Al-
Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza. Almost immediately, the Hamas run
Ministry of Health claimed that it was a gross act of war
crimes by Israel that cost 500 civilians their lives. Rather
than fact checking the story, news outlets, including the New
York Times and the Associated Press, were entirely willing to
take the terrorists' talking points and amplify them to the
hundreds of millions of people.
Headlines blared that Israel strikes hundreds in hospital.
That's what Palestinians said. Here is the problem. Hamas was
lying. And according to preliminary conclusions by our own
Pentagon, the explosion was caused by a Palestinian Islamic
Jihad rocket misfire. In fact, mounting evidence even shows
that not only was there little to no structural damage done to
the hospital, that it was in a parking lot that was hit by
debris from the rocket.
Outlets like the New York Times did eventually post
retractions, but the reputational and political damage was
done. Violent protests and riots broke out at our embassies
across the region. More protests with liberal hot spots here at
home erupted overnight. Hamas leadership called for a global
day of rage. Even the President's peacekeeping efforts were
halted as a result.
Jordanian leadership refused to meet with him because of
what was going on with global media and propaganda. Those on
the left consistently claim that words can cause violence,
well, here's a very prime example of that prediction coming
true.
This single example of disinformation led to the
condemnation of the United States of America and Israel and the
heightened likelihood of multinational conflict, very real
consequences. In my opinion, this story is exactly the type of
disinformation the State Department anti-propaganda body should
be focused on countering, but I have questions about whether it
saw this coming.
Even if we give it the benefit of the doubt and assume that
GEC was involved behind the scenes offering support to the
Pentagon and other agencies, the State Department's anti-
disinformation apparatus has failed to quickly and publicly
counter blatant disinformation. In many cases, this case
highlights the problem that I have with GEC, Mr. Kimmage. We
know very little about the day-to-day operations.
According to an OIG report, GEC's leadership was ``unable
to determine whether it was meeting its strategic goals and
objective to counter State sponsored disinformation.'' We will
want answers on that.
If GEC isn't countering real-time disinformation that is
damaging one of our greatest allies, what is it focused on? A
few examples that we can point to seem to form a problematic
pattern.
GEC has issued grants to organizations that labeled
Alexander Hamilton's New York Post one of the riskiest outlets
and another that had a hand in content moderation practices
that targeted conservatives online. It has backed ``independent
fact checking organizations'' that are actually supported by
left wing billionaires.
In the next year, this committee will decide whether or not
GEC should be reauthorized. At this moment, we will determine
what the problems are, if there are solutions to fixing any of
those problems, and whether they should be reauthorized.
The first problem that I see is actually fulfilling your
mission to counter disinformation from foreign sources. I do
not believe that you've adequately in your statement quantified
your success in doing so.
The second problem that I want addressed, areas where you
should be involved and may be perceived not to be involved in
at this time, as I gave the example of Hamas and Israel.
The third place that I have concern, there seem to be some
operating in your office that are not as interested in
fulfilling the mission statement, but are interested in
weaponizing taxpayer resources in order to undercut media
outlets and individuals who have a particular point of view.
Mr. Kimmage, we have spoken, and I have read your opening
statement. And I appreciate you taking the time to speak with
me.
I do not feel that the answers to all of those questions
were in the opening statement that you wrote, your letter to
us.
I need you to convince us that GEC should be reauthorized.
I need to hear about how GEC tangibly measures success, how it
oversees its partners to ensure that it isn't perpetuating
disinformation in other places, and what it does to prevent
disastrous foreign propaganda on a daily basis.
The onus is on you to change my mind. So I would encourage
you to take a moment, think about your opening remarks, as my
colleague will be giving his opening remarks. And do not just
read us what you wrote to us, but please give us answers to the
questions that we have for you so that we can have a very real
and true understanding of the work that is being done, whether
it is to counter our adversaries like China, Russia, Iran,
Hamas, or any other. And with that, I thank you for bearing
with me.
Let's go back to the script here. I am now going to
recognize my colleague here for an opening statement of however
long you choose to make your opening statement.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman. And I will spare you all and
make this a short one so we can get into the important work of
having a discussion that the chairman outlined.
I want to thank you, Mr. Kimmage, for coming here today and
offering insights into the very important work of the Global
Engagement Center that is doing its part in the counter
propaganda and disinformation from Iran, China, Russia, and
many other adversaries.
Your involvement with the Global Engagement Center spans
most of its existence, and as such you have seen the
organization evolve as congressional mandates have changed.
And I know your testimony will help us understand how the
Engagement Center's work strengthens our national security,
counters these adversaries' false narratives, and shines light
on their malign behaviors.
Now I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the unique
context in which we hold this hearing. Iran's proxy, Hamas, has
conducted the deadliest terror attack in Israel's history and
engaged in extreme brutality against innocent civilians.
One of our challenges now is preventing the spread of this
terror and this conflict into a broader Middle East war. And a
large part of that effort is around countering disinformation
and misinformation.
At the same time, China continues to undermine peace and
stability in the Indo-Pacific and around the world by spreading
its malign influence and engaging in provocative behavior
against our partners.
In Russia's illegal war against the people of Ukraine, it
is now entering its 21st month. In each of these contexts, our
adversary's propaganda machine play a key part in keeping the
world divided and obfuscating their true actions and intentions
and straining our partnerships and alliances, undermining our
policy, our security, and our stability. For those our partners
are our allies, and it is an undeniable goal of our
adversaries' efforts.
The Global Engagement Center, a State Department unit,
founded by Congress on a bipartisan basis, is one of the tools
we use to stem the tide of this disinformation wave. Support
for the Global Engagement Center has, and continues to be,
bipartisan. Although its current mandate expires at the end of
2024, House and Senate Democrats and Senate Republicans have
supported repeated attempts to extend this mandate over the
last few years.
Any glimpse at news headlines today makes it clear that it
is not the time to take an important bipartisan tool to counter
authoritarian and terrorist disinformation off the table.
There are a handful of critical national security concerns
that should be the focus of today's hearing, including Iranian
propaganda, undermining our security and that of our most
important ally in the Middle East, sophisticated information
operations by China, which is the pacing threat of our time
across the Indo-Pacific, Europe, Africa, and our own backyard,
Russia's disinformation campaign propping up its war in Ukraine
and aiming to divide the United States from our allies and
partners in support of Ukraine.
Bipartisan oversight of ways to address foreign malign
efforts like these are both possible and necessary. What we
should not do at this time is chase conspiracy theories or
pursue unsubstantiated allegations that will be
counterproductive and undermine our efforts to do this
important work.
Now Mr. Kimmage, many of my colleagues will have good
substantive questions about how the Global Engagement Center's
work serves U.S. interests, making sure we do our duty, our
mutual duty of oversight, to be good stewards of the American
taxpayer dollar.
So I look forward to your answers on these questions
because the American people do need to know what it is you do
and why it's important, how we are succeeding, but also ways in
which we are falling short because there are never instances in
which any unit, any agency or department fulfills all of its
missions. There are always challenges.
So let's have a real discussion about what those are and
what we can do as Members of Congress to help support that
mission, which is essential to our mutual interest.
So thank you again for your time and for being here today
and with that, I yield back.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Crow. Other members of the
committee are reminded that opening statements made be
submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a
distinguished witness before us today on this important topic.
Mr. Daniel Kimmage is the principal deputy coordinator of
the Global Engagement Center. While serving in this role, he
had led efforts designed to counterterrorist recruitment and
State sponsored propaganda and disinformation. Your public
service career includes a number of State Department positions,
including uncovering counterterrorism issues for the Office of
Policy Planning and as a principal deputy coordinator of the
Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications.
I want to thank you for being here today. I got to learn a
little bit about you in a conversation this morning. A fluid
Arabic speaker so please do not speak to us in Arabic because
we probably will not understand much of what you're saying. But
I want to thank you for being here today.
Your full statement will be made a part of the record, and
I will ask you to keep your spoken remarks to 5 minutes. But if
you are saying really important stuff that we need to hear, I
can tell you that I'm not going to cut you off. And after that,
we will allow time for member questions. I now recognize you
for an opening statement, sir.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL KIMMAGE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY COORDINATOR,
GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER
Mr. Kimmage. Chairman Mast, Ranking Member Crow, members of
the subcommittee, I would like to thank you for this
opportunity to testify on the work of the Global Engagement
Center.
The malign influence of foreign adversaries is a growing
threat. It must be an integral part of our national security
policy to confront the Nation's nefarious actors that seek to
undermine our interests and values with information
manipulation.
The GEC's mission is to lead our government's response to
the threat posed by foreign malign influence actors overseas.
It starts with coordination.
We work closely with our colleagues at the State
Department, the White House, the intelligence community, and
Department of Defense to make sure that we use the full
spectrum of our capabilities.
We engage with allies and like-minded partners to push back
effectively against State and non-State actors that want to
undermine the way of life that democratic nations have fought
to protect and preserve.
Recent events have reminded us that terrorism continues to
threaten our security. We must remain vigilant to the spread of
toxic propaganda by violent extremist groups like Hamas,
Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and ISIS.
I would like to share with you an example of our work on
counterterrorism. In 2020, we learned that ISIS Amir al-Mawla
had been in U.S. detention. While detained, he provided
actionable information about his fellow terrorists. We worked
with interagency colleagues to declassify the tactical
interrogation reports.
We developed a plan to publicize them. We executed the
plan. And we tracked the results. We recorded a measurable
shift in perceptions as the leader of ISIS lost credibility
with some supporters.
The State Department's Rewards for Justice Program
generated a fourfold increase in priority tips when it
referenced the declassified reports.
To sum-up, the GEC lead a successful campaign to discredit
the leader of ISIS.
Of course, our primary focus is on strategic competition
with Russia and the People's Republic of China. Last month, the
GEC released the first public U.S. Government report detailing
the PRC's efforts to reshape the global information
environment.
Our report starts with a simple premise. Every country has
the right to tell its story to the world, but that story must
stand or fall on its own merits.
The PRC uses deception and coercion to promote its national
narrative. Beijing is gaining overt and covert influence over
content and platforms. It is constraining global freedom of
expression, and it is building a community of digital
authoritarians. Our report documents this comprehensively and
convincingly. It has garnered worldwide attention since we
released it last month.
We have every reason to believe that it will inform and
embolden our partners and allies as they, too, confront the
PRC's aggressive push into the information domain. This
tangibly advances America's effort to compete with the PRC.
Malign influence is at the core of Russia's national
security strategy. President Putin has created a virtual
Potemkin village to hoodwink his own people and deceive the
rest of the world. We call out this disinformation. We give our
partners and allies the tools they need to do the same. And we
actively support Ukraine against Russian aggression.
In 2020, we publicly exposed a network of proxy media
operations, some supported by the Kremlin security services.
Public scrutiny made their lives harder. The editor of one
proxy website later described the impact as devastating.
Technology is central to the issue of information
manipulation. It is part of how our adversaries try to attack
us, how we defend ourselves, and how we retake the initiative.
GEC-IQ is an information sharing and analytics platform
with collaborative tools, a centralized data source, and a
research library. It links the U.S. Government and key
international partners so that we can be more effective
together.
We follow the latest vulnerabilities and opportunities
associated with artificial intelligence. We hold tech
challenges to find and support innovators. Most recently, we
did this last month in Cote d'Ivoire. The GEC is the only part
of the U.S. Government with a congressional mandate to lead
U.S. efforts to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation
abroad.
It has had its current mission for a little more than 5
years. It has had some growing pains, but it has also had real
successes as I've noted here and looked forward to explaining
in greater detail in this hearing.
We must ensure that the United States does not fall behind
our adversaries and competitors as they seek to manipulate the
global information environment for corrupt and coercive
purposes.
There is no substitute for Congress' continued support for
the GEC and its mission. We are eager to build on what we've
achieved as we safeguard our Nation's security and advance its
interests.
Thank you again for this opportunity. I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kimmage follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Mast. Thank you, sir. I now recognize myself for 5
minutes of questioning. One of the GEC's focus areas, as you
spoke about, I think all of us have spoken about so far, is
extremist terrorist groups. And let's continue to use the
Israel, Hamas, Palestinian conflict as the example.
In advance of this, was GEC working to produce products to
counter, to perceive that Hamas might conduct such
disinformation campaigns, like what we saw with the hospital,
or to counter such disinformation campaigns, like what we've
seen with the hospital under any attack that might take place
or propaganda campaign that might take place?
Mr. Kimmage. So the Global Engagement Center for years has
tracked extremist organizations like Hamas in how they seek to
distort events to promote their narrative----
Mr. Mast. Can I pause you a second?
Mr. Kimmage. Sure.
Mr. Mast. When you say like Hamas, do you mean terrorist-
like organizations or are you literally saying Hamas?
Mr. Kimmage. I mean, designated violent extremist
organizations, including Hamas. Our primary focus----
Mr. Mast. Thank you, including Hamas.
Mr. Kimmage [continuing]. Including Hamas, our primary
focus has been on ISIS and Al Qaeda We have looked at these
groups how they try to manipulate the information around to
advance their narrative. What are the tools and techniques they
use? What are the platforms they use? What are the specific
campaigns that they use?
Now we are not an intelligence organization so we are not
part of the intelligence community looking at what groups are
going to plan. But we do have a broad familiarity with the
types of techniques that they use.
We have worked with partners for years to give them the
tools to push back against those narratives. We have, in the
broader context of Iranian proxy organizations and of Iran's
disinformation and propaganda, we have worked to dispose the
divisive and destructive influence of Iran in the region and
particularly for Arabic speaking target audiences.
Mr. Mast. So is that a yes you do have a Hamas product that
we could read?
Mr. Kimmage. I do not know that we have a specific Hamas
product that you can read. I will ask our analytics and
research folks to go back through their reports to see if there
is anything.
We have been, since the beginning of this crisis, doing
daily monitoring. We have been producing both contributions to
the State Department's situation reports. We have produced a
spot report. We are working closely with our colleagues in the
inter-agency, including the Department of Defense and the
intelligence community. And we have shifted resources so that
we can use cutting edge technology to identify the best
approaches to undermining Hamas' specific narratives in the
region.
Mr. Mast. And from my understanding previously and from our
conversation earlier, which thankfully I appreciate you
educating me on some things I didn't know, helping clear things
up, in part you worked through a number of third-party
organizations. It is fair to call those grant recipients? Would
that be a fair characterization of them?
Mr. Kimmage. Sure. Some of them receive grants. We work
with third-parties because the U.S. Government is almost never
the most credible or effective communicator with the target
audiences we need to reach.
So, yes, we use grants, but we can also provide technical
training. We can provide sort of networking experience to link
different partners. Grants are only one of the tools in the
toolbox. But we work very broadly with partners because that
is, in the end, the most effective way for us to get to the
countering part of our mission.
Mr. Mast. What's your budget for third-party organization
funding?
Mr. Kimmage. Our budget for third-party organization
funding has been roughly 30 percent or so of our $60 million
budget. It is more in Fiscal Year 1923 because of money we
receive through the Ukraine supplemental. And so it's in the I
would say low tens of millions across the board, and I would be
happy to get you specific figures.
Mr. Mast. Have you given us a list of the third-party
organizations that you've worked through?
Mr. Kimmage. I do not know that we've provided a full list,
but we've be more than happy to provide more information in a
closed setting.
Let me just be clear that we're dealing with adversaries
like Russia, like Iran, that have very aggressively targeted
critics of those regimes. We need to be mindful of the security
of our partners that are operating in dangerous conditions in
some cases. So we would be very happy to sit down and go into
more significant detail on our partnerships in a closed
setting.
Mr. Mast. Very good. I am going to yield to my colleague,
Mr. Crow, here for 5 minutes.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Kimmage. Can
you tell me in the time that you've been with the Global
Engagement Center--well, let's actually narrow the time down.
Let's not say the whole time. Let's just say in the last 2
years, how has the information environment changed?
Mr. Kimmage. Thank you. The information environment is
always becoming more dynamic. The information environment most
recently has been, I would say, rocked by advances in
artificial intelligence. That's something that we track very
closely. It's the reason we have a very active technology
engagement program.
But what I would really flag in the last 2 years is an
increasing alignment among the main adversaries, what I would
call sort of the axis of blame America first.
So if we look at Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of
China, they all share an objective of undermining and weakening
the United States, of reducing our global prestige of broadly
speaking, blaming America first in every crisis.
They often have similar narratives. We initially saw this
in the global pandemic. We have seen this in Russia's
aggression on Ukraine and more recently in the last 2 weeks, we
have seen this in the crisis in the Middle East wherein----
Mr. Crow. So increasing coordination between Russia, China,
and Iran on these messages?
Mr. Kimmage. I would be careful with the word coordination
because it is not entirely clear what is happening behind the
scenes, but we certainly are seeing alignment of messages and
messaging.
We are seeing alignment of some of their platforms. The PRC
has invested billions of dollars in global media properties.
Russia has a very extensive network not just of state-funded
media, but also proxies, troll farms, various mechanisms for
influencing the information environment. Iran has its own
smaller, but very active ecosystem. We have seen----
Mr. Crow. Can you tell me--I'm just going to move along
here.
Mr. Kimmage. Yes.
Mr. Crow. Can you tell me on the AI front, whether the
Engagement Center is structured and resourced? That it has the
technology to address that in the way that you would like to.
And if not, what do you need to address that effectively?
Mr. Kimmage. So we have a very active analytics and
research team that is deeply engaged on questions of artificial
intelligence. We are looking both at the vulnerabilities that
it creates. We are looking at some of the opportunities it may
create. We have, I would say, two or three people who are
focused exclusively on this issue. We are bringing on more
people to do this. I think that we are well positioned right
now on the issue of AI. We are very plugged in.
Mr. Crow. What does that mean?
Mr. Kimmage. What I mean by that is that we have people
with the right expertise to be looking at the vulnerabilities
and opportunities. We are talking to people in the Office of
Science and Technology Policy for example in the Office of
Cyber and Digital Policy in the State Department.
So I think we have the right connections and some of the
right expertise to be involved in this issue, yes.
Mr. Crow. OK. So there's the qualitative element to the
information space, but there is the quantitative element. And I
travel a lot on these congressional delegations when we visit
embassies, when we visit foreign partners.
Across the board, they all tell us that they are just
getting overwhelmed in the information space. Just
quantitatively, it is 20 to 1 in terms of the messaging. Can
you just briefly describe the quantitative overwhelming
challenge that we face and how we address that?
Mr. Kimmage. So here, if I said we are relatively well-
positioned in terms of expertise on artificial intelligence, we
also are dealing with a deluge of information. We are coping
with the enormous amounts of output from the propaganda
mechanisms of Russia, the PRC, and others.
So there is the output. There is the data piece of this to
understand how the environment is being shaped by others. I
would say that we are also coping with this. It is an enormous
challenge because you have both the dynamism of the environment
and the volume of the information. So, yes, you have identified
one of the primary challenges we face.
Mr. Crow. So I have this test that I call the bar stool
test. And when we are talking about complicated issues, I
pretend that I am sitting on a bar stool with a beer telling
one of my friends who has no idea what's happening in
Washington, DC. and government and explaining to him or her
what is going on.
So imagine yourself sitting at a bar stool now with your
beverage of choice and that person says, what would happen if
the Global Engagement Center does not become reauthorized?
Mr. Kimmage. Sure. So you have got People's Republic of
China, Russia, Iran, all of these countries trying to
misrepresent us, distort our values, present America as the
villain in every circumstance. They are out there working every
day. There are thousands of people, billions of dollars going
to blame America first and make us seem like the villain.
We are leading the charge on our side to make them less
effective, to tell the truth about our story, to increase our
global prestige and standing so that we can advance all of our
interest in the ways that maintain our standard of life that
will allow us to sit here and have this beer in freedom and
relative security.
So if we go away, all of those enemies are going to have
that much easier of a time presenting us as the villain and
making our job harder in our foreign policy, making it harder
to advance America's interest.
Mr. Crow. Thank you. And thank you for the additional time,
Chairman.
Mr. Mast. Like me, many of your friends are Rangers, so I
have no doubt you have a lot of bar stool conversations so.
Mr. Crow. That we do.
Mr. Mast. That's right. I yield to my friend from Florida,
Mr. Mills.
Mr. Mills. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to pick up on
what my colleague was asking and your response. You said that
you wanted to ensure that you were re-engaged and refunded so
that you could stop presenting our foreign policy in a failed
way.
Just that on the surface sounds so funny to me because when
you have things like botched Afghan withdrawals, when you have
every other nation who has been able to get their citizens and
when we were one of the last, actually the last, to be able to
even get a plane on the ground to try and help them. When you
look at unfreezing $6 billion that helped to--even if they want
to claim that it was being held by a mediator, it was still
fungible income that could be moved from bucket to bucket, that
allows, not just--again, I agree with one of the key things,
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, that geopolitical
alignment in itself is focused primarily on the west. And their
overarching goal is to stop developing nations from being able
to trust that we will actually be there when the time is
needed.
But we are doing that on our own. We are giving them all of
the messaging and ammunition that they need. And the only way
we are going to counter that is by actually getting good
foreign policy and getting a President in the oval office who
understands that our foreign and domestic policies are
intrinsically linked in an effort to try and go ahead and stop
the expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative, which its entire
intent is the Eurasian expansion, the domination of Africa, and
to cutoff Western hemisphere's supply chain from the Horn of
Africa, Mediterranean, Red Sea, Black Sea, Persian Gulf, to
control those elements, utilize the WHO, and the WF, and OPEC
to attack the petrodollar and the U.S. dollar as the global
currency while simultaneously utilizing their propaganda
misinformation campaigns in our own hemisphere to go after
economic coercion in Panama and Honduras to control the Canal,
to utilize their marriage of convenience with Russia, for
Chavez of Venezuela or Petro in Colombia, or now as they look
into Argentina with what my colleague Maria Salazar has pointed
out a 400 football length satellite that many of the
Argentinians do not even know about, and we are not doing
anything about, not to mention the spy and military training
base in Cuba, 92 miles off of both myself and Chairman Mast's
great State of Florida.
So tell me, how is your department going to prevent the
President and others from making these failed foreign policy
decisions?
Mr. Kimmage. So let me draw a distinction between the
legitimate debates that we have about foreign policy and the
illegitimate misrepresentation of America as a country by our
adversaries, adversaries that seek to paint us as the villain
in every situation, that seek to entirely misrepresent
everything we stand for and everything they are doing.
So for example, on the Belt and Road Initiative, which the
PRC presents as an economic boon to partners, Global Engagement
Center has supported work that shows definitively that the
projects that they are funding are not what they are cracked up
to be. We have translated that work into local languages. We
have done it to make the case with the decisionmaking elites to
try to shape the environment in a direction that is accurate,
that is true, and that is less conducive to the PRC promoting
its interest.
So we are not going to solve all of the debates about U.S.
foreign policy. But we will continue to try to make progress
against these illegitimate, untrue misrepresentations of the
United States of what other countries are doing, including in
South and Central America as the PRC tries to make inroads. We
are actively engaged in exposing that, and once, again, trying
to influence decisionmaking elites with a truthful picture so
they can make the right decision on these issues.
Mr. Mills. But when you talk about the economic strongholds
where they try to come in and they promise things, for example,
that they are going to develop infrastructure and
transportation and communication platforms that they know that
they are going to control and actually utilize financing that,
we do not have to do anything to try and counter them because
usually they fail to complete their packages to begin with or
it is poor quality. And in most cases, like the country of Iraq
as an example, who initially started to go toward that Chinese
influence as a result of their relationships of the 2005
Constitution that gave sectarian democracy for Iran's
stronghold, they are failing to meet every one of the
requirements and now looking at the quality of American
products and goods again.
So, again, I am just trying to talk about one of my
colleague's comments, how does giving more funding to your
organization truly in any way help us?
Mr. Kimmage. So on the PRC, we have supported work that
tracks water levels in the Mekong River Valley showing that PRC
dam projects are harming local agriculture. We supported a
dynamic monitor----
Mr. Mills. But this is an economic resource warfare that we
are involved in with China.
Mr. Kimmage. Yes.
Mr. Mills. It is not about just an environmental factor
that is being----
Mr. Kimmage. I understand.
Mr. Mills [continuing]. And they are complicit in that. I
see my time has expired, and I appreciate your time. And with
that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Mast. Thank you. I now recognize Ms. Titus for 5
minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back to
that bar stool conversation to be sure I understand all of
this. The way I see it, you are both on the offense and one the
defense. On the defense, you are there to discredit other
stories about the U.S. or other facts that are--non-facts that
are put out. And--let me start over.
On the offense, you are there to discredit what they are
saying. On the defense, you are there to counter the blame
America first. Is that accurate?
Mr. Kimmage. It is accurate. I would only add that on the
defense, we are working with our partners to make them more
resilient. So we are doing more than just the communications
piece, and I am happy to detail how we are doing that.
Ms. Titus. OK. And also you give targeted information,
perhaps like in a country where China or Russia or Iran are
trying to influence an election. So you can target that
population with a certain set of information about that
circumstance. But at the same time you do that target
information, aren't you trying to influence public opinion at
large around the world in some instances?
Mr. Kimmage. So we do not seek to influence any outcomes of
elections.
Ms. Titus. Oh, I know you do not. I am saying countering
someone's attempt perhaps to influence an election.
Mr. Kimmage. We want to present truthful information or
give people the tools so that they have access to that
information to safeguard the integrity of a process that
depends on it so that people can make an informed choice.
Ms. Titus. So that's kind of a narrow case, but also do not
you do broader information to influence world opinions, for
example, like the Belt and Road Initiative?
Mr. Kimmage. Yes. So we have supported in-depth research on
the Belt and Road Initiative to expose the falsehoods and
misrepresentations that the PRC promotes.
But bear in mind also that the Global Engagement Center is
part of a larger public diplomacy enterprise at the Department
of State that includes exchanges, that includes public affairs.
And we also work with our colleagues at International
Broadcasting who bring objective news and analysis to many
environments where that's not otherwise available.
We work closely with them because we understand we cannot
do all the work ourselves. We are focused on this specific
issue of propaganda and disinformation, but we are lucky to be
part of this broader enterprise to work with our talented
colleagues in helping to ensure information, and to give people
that broader picture you were talking about.
Ms. Titus. And would that be like NGO's or Radio Free
Europe, those kind of partners? Is that who you work with?
Mr. Kimmage. Yes. So International Broadcasting includes
Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, where I was
honored to work for several years before I came to the State
Department. We also work with NGO's, with non-governmental
organizations, with civil society. Yes, we have a very broad
range of partners because as I said earlier, partnerships are
absolutely essential to our work.
There is a small subset of things that we can do on our own
with the coordination with other parts of U.S. Government,
hearings like this, but to really reach people out in the world
so that we can counter the propaganda and disinformation from
our adversaries, we need the partners with the right
credibility to do that.
Ms. Titus. You just issued a report on China. You mentioned
it briefly. It surprises me that some members of this committee
want to kind of kneecap your organization when they are so
adamantly anti-China. Would you talk a little bit about the
findings of that report and how it's been valuable to us in
shaping our diplomacy?
Mr. Kimmage. Sure. The China report that we released last
month--and it's on the State Department's website, it's
available in multiple languages--it details how the PRC is
trying to reshape the global engagement environment by using
propaganda and censorship by bringing digital authoritarians
together, by gaining control or trying to gain control of
international organizations, by trying to co-opt other
communicators, and by trying to control the Chinese language
media all over the globe.
They are doing this to work along kind of three major lines
of effort. One is to control content in here. I am not trying
to be cute here, but it is the three C's. It is content,
constraints, and community. They are trying to insert as much
pro-PRC content into the environment as possible. They are
trying to constrain freedom of speech not just inside China,
but globally. And they are building a community of
authoritarians worldwide.
So this report for the first time details all of this from
the U.S. Government. It is from the Global Engagement Center.
It is available on the State Department's website. And I would
urge everyone to take a look.
Ms. Titus. I would wager that China is putting a lot more
investment into their effort than we are here into your agency
to try to counter that.
Mr. Kimmage. We and others have assessed that they are
spending billions to do all of these things to re-shape the
global narrative, billions of dollars.
Ms. Titus. So I do not think we should be short-changing
you in that effort.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Ms. Titus. I yield to Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, the work that
you are tasked to do is certainly important and needs to be
done, but I have a number of questions that do concern me in
your reauthorization. And I guess I will start off, would you
say that the New York Post is a source of disinformation?
Mr. Kimmage. The Global Engagement Center does not do any
work domestically, and we do not have any position on any U.S.
media outlets.
Mr. Issa. The same with RealClearPolitics?
Mr. Kimmage. We simply do not do any work in the United
States media.
Mr. Issa. Same with Daily Wire?
Mr. Kimmage. We do not do any work in the U.S. media
environment.
Mr. Issa. OK. But you did give London-based Global
Disinformation Index hundreds of thousands of dollars,
right?
Mr. Kimmage. Let me be clear about the context here. We had
an arrangement with the Global Disinformation Index to do work
in six languages other than English for a limited period of
time to look for Russian and PRC propaganda narratives. It was
very specific work. It only went for a few months. It ended at
the end of 2021. And that was the beginning and end of all of
our work there.
Mr. Issa. OK. You do not have to get too animated about it.
I can tell that there is some concern there. And I just want to
dot the I. Would you say that in retrospect that it was a
mistake to work with them? That they were not, in fact, an
index that you would want to use on a go forward basis?
Mr. Kimmage. The work that we did with them was entirely in
keeping with the GEC's mission to work against foreign
propaganda and disinformation in overseas environments. So six
languages other than English, completely outside the United
States, no relation to anything else.
Mr. Issa. But when you have a disinformation source, one
that named those entities as sources of Russian propaganda,
then the question is when you are asking them to give you
this--you know, to help you, are you--who is vetting them when
you choose to give them money, and in fact, they are a source
of disinformation?
Mr. Kimmage. Let me be clear about the timeline. The work
that we did with the GDI ended in late 2021. I believe the work
that you are referring to, with which we had no involvement,
was later. It was after in 2022.
Mr. Issa. A little more topical than a few days ago, it was
falsely reported that Israeli assets had bombed and killed 500
people at a Gaza Hospital. Why is it when you are combating
disinformation, your organization is silent as to that false
information?
Mr. Kimmage. So first of all, the Global Engagement Center
is generally not a front line communicator. We are not the
Public Affairs folks. We have a different mission. We look to
make strategic interventions.
Mr. Issa. What was strategic?
Mr. Kimmage. Yes.
Mr. Issa. This has echoed around the world. It has both
falsely continued to be repeated, even in the halls of Congress
by some members. It is currently affecting, because the U.S. is
the supplier of choice and of almost exclusivity to the Israeli
government, it has affected how the United States is viewed
throughout the world. And this disinformation is still wide.
If there was a strategic requirement, wouldn't this fall as
one? In other words, are you only able to work with long-term
contracts or if we re-authorize you, are you prepared to deal
in real-time with information that once spread cannot--you
know, the genie cannot be put back in the bottle once people
have this view.
Mr. Kimmage. I cannot rule out that the Global Engagement
Center could take a more active posture. You are right. It
would be very resource intensive.
In general, we are not engaged in back and forth in the
online environment in real-time. That has never been the
operational posture of the Global Engagement Center. When I say
strategic, I am talking about things like our Russia report or
the exposure of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Mr. Issa. And I appreciate that. And I certainly would
appreciate if every time we can show that Belt and Road was
gotten by bribes and ultimately delivered inferior product,
that is helpful.
But in 2020 and 2021, you spent hundreds of thousands of
dollars producing a video game related to disinformation. Would
it surprise you that they didn't--that video game that you paid
for did not go after Xi or Putin or Iran, but in fact after
citizens of the U.S., maybe not intended, but after citizens of
the U.S. that spoke of waste, fraud, and abuse within our own
country.
Mr. Kimmage. So the video game that we supported is a
neutral teaching tool. It is not directed at any environment.
It simply shows people how campaigns can be constructed. It is
intended to raise awareness. It does not have any political
significance. That is not the way----
Mr. Issa. But I thought we weren't paying for neutral. I
thought we were paying for results that drove down
disinformation. Did it do that?
Mr. Kimmage. So we did have a peer-reviewed study of the
video game, one of the games in Harmony Square. And it reported
a 23 percent increase in people's ability to spot
disinformation after using the game. So that part was not
neutral and that is why we funded it.
Mr. Issa. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Issa. I would be curious to know
would that change 23 percent of how many people played the
game, maybe they would change their minds, about how many
people did it actually reach? I am going to yield to Ms. Dean
now for 5 minutes.
Ms. Dean. I thank the chairman and the ranking member. And
I thank you, Mr. Kimmage, for your work, the work of your
department, and for your testimony today in clearing up certain
things.
I will go back to Hamas, if I may. We watched in horror and
sadness at the brutal attack, barbaric attack of October the
7th and the hours and days after that as they unfolded in
Israel and, of course from Gaza.
Relevant to today's hearing, we also watched confusion.
Some of it was just disgust among my colleagues. As you note in
your testimony, and I quote, ``control over the narrative is of
key importance between Israel and Hamas.''
So I would like to try to examine what you mean by that
because I think you are right, the story, the narrative, and
the facts and truth about that matter. And you know better than
I, but disinformation appears to be everywhere.
In the lead-up to October the 7th, what was your office,
your Department, seeing in terms of disinformation around what
would be this brutal attack, disinformation by Hamas in Gaza,
West Bank, wherever disinformation was taking place? What do
you know about the lead-up?
And I understand you are not of the moment reporters, but
how about disinformation of the moment reporters, but how about
disinformation around evacuation orders? We talked about
disinformation around the hospital attack and maybe
disinformation going on. Can you give us any sense of what your
office saw?
Mr. Kimmage. Sure. Our focus here is in keeping with our
main lines of effort, and those are to analyze, to coordinate
and then to work with our partners. And we have tracked broadly
the efforts by extremist groups to promote their narrative, to
turn every situation to their advantage.
In this conflict, we have leveraged that in the following
ways. We have conducted daily analysis. And on the narrative
front, we are particularly vigilant for attempts by the major
malign actors to pile on to the conflict and turn it to their
advantage.
So we are looking at not just the narratives that Hamas is
promoting, but how Iran is then amplifying those further. How
Russia is in many cases then amplifying those even more, and
then how the PRC is integrating this into their global efforts.
So we are very focused on that aspect of the narrative.
Bear in mind our model is an adversary based model. It is a
threat actor model. So we do not look at the totality of
information flow. We really start with the threat actors. And
that's because we have limited bandwidth and resources.
Ms. Dean. And if I could ask you to paint the picture a
little bit. I do love the bar stool analogy. I'm stealing that,
ranking member. How do you make it plain? What was it that the
GEC was hearing, seeing, being proliferated in terms of
disinformation?
Mr. Kimmage. So in terms of disinformation, what we have
seen is Iran amplifying Hamas' narrative more or less lock,
stop and barrel.
What we have seen is Russia making limited opportunistic
attempts to advance particular disinformation narratives about
weapons, et cetera. They have tried to draw a link between
weapons we have provided to Ukraine and the conflict in the
Middle East. That's a very classic, so far limited, but Russian
approach.
Ms. Dean. If I could just take you back. I can appreciate
what amplification took place by other malign actors, larger
ones, what did Hamas put out?
Mr. Kimmage. Hamas has put out an avalanche of propaganda
claiming falsely to be the legitimate representatives of the
Palestinian people. They are not. And, we have, of course,
tracked that, and we tracked the amplification of that,
primarily by Iran, but also by others.
Ms. Dean. And what did they say about Israel in their
propaganda?
Mr. Kimmage. Which?
Ms. Dean. Hamas.
Mr. Kimmage. Hamas denies the legitimacy of Israel's right
to exist.
Ms. Dean. Yes. And the disinformation that continues, of
course, now during this conflict? Is there anything kind of
granular that you can say in this setting that is going on?
Mr. Kimmage. What I would say in this setting is that we
must be vigilant to attempts by our adversaries to link this
into a global narrative. And we must be aware of the enormous
resources that they bring to bear.
This is everything from television stations like the Arabic
language Al-Alam that Iran has to Russia Today in Arabic to the
global media properties of the PRC, all the way down through
troll farms and cyber tools.
This is an enormous global propaganda apparatus. It is one
that seeks to turn every event into a blame America first
incident where they can turn it to their advantage. And so we
are tracking that, and we are leveraging everything we can to
push back against it.
Ms. Dean. Well, it seems like the folks in your office in
GEC must feel like they are in a blizzard of disinformation,
and we have to do everything we can to support you and your
work. Thank you. I yield back
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Ms. Dean. I appreciate the line of
questioning. I would caution perhaps not to necessarily make
policy, exactly, whether Hamas does or does not represent the
Palestinian people. I know we had Erdogan just say that he
called them a liberation group. So I think that's a pretty good
representation of a lot of the sentiment of the Arabic world
unfortunately. And his characterization of them does not make
them seem so strictly as an enemy of the Palestinian people. So
I would caution you in your policymaking. I am now going to
yield to Mr. Kim for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kim. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Kim. Thank you, Mr. Kimmage,
for joining us. Actually, I want to pick up where you kind of
left off. I thought you made a very strong and compelling vivid
picture about this enormous propaganda machine that we are
facing here.
I guess I would just kind of start with you, like, are we
scaled to the magnitude that we need to be to counter that? I
mean, that certainly sounded very formidable.
Mr. Kimmage. So we also bring formidable capabilities to
the table. They are not resourced to the extent that our
adversaries are investing in this.
We do have International Broadcasting. We have our
colleagues in the public diplomacy enterprise who are working
hard. We have the Department of Defense. We have our
intelligence community. And we have our partners and allies.
So we do have all those things. I am clear-eyed about the
enormous investment that our adversaries have made. But I would
like to draw attention to recent efforts that we have made to
make our allies and partners more resilient. We talked about
the offensive part of our mission, the exposures, the reports.
I would like to talk a little bit about the defensive part
because this is what will eventually undermine our adversaries'
investment.
We have recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
North Macedonia, with Bulgaria, with Moldova on principles that
we believe will make all countries more resilient. These are
having a national strategy to deal with information
manipulation, having specific structures and institutions like
the Global Engagement Center, having the capability to see
what's happening in the information environment to see what our
adversaries are doing, to have vibrant civil society in media,
to expose and shine light on information manipulation, and then
to have multilateral engagement on this.
And this is maybe less eye-catching and glamorous than some
things. But it is the necessary work of diplomacy that the
State Department does every day to make us and others more
resilient. And that will help to counter some of this enormous
investment that our adversaries are making in lies and
falsehoods.
Mr. Kim. And I appreciate you raising that because that was
something that I wanted to get to is just that the idea of
coalition goals. So it sounds like in your mind here--again, we
are up against this very large propaganda machine. But it is
not just on us, you know, that we are able to leverage and have
coalition partners that can be a force multiplier. Is that kind
of along the lines of what you are saying?
Mr. Kimmage. Absolutely. I would take from the
counterterrorism world the Global Engagement Center has co-led
one of the lines of effort, the communications line of effort,
in the counter-ISIS coalition for several years.
That coalition, which I have been privileged to be involved
with has made significant strides, countering ISIS, in
particular ISIS propaganda. And we are trying to leverage some
of that experience in the different but related tasks of
countering the information manipulation by nation states.
Mr. Kim. Now I wanted to get in, you talked about this
increasing alignment, not necessarily direct coordination, but
a kind of alignment between some of these actors, Russia, Iran,
China in particular. You talk about how their efforts to try to
shade disinformation and promote that here in the United
States, you know, to try to sow doubt and challenges here
amongst Americans.
What is our capability? How would you assess our capability
of getting information to the people in those nations? You
know, there are countries that have very strong control over
their own media. You know, when we think about the fight going
on in the Ukraine, I always kind of wonder, like, how much are
the Russian people understanding about, you know, some of this
or are they understanding that there are a lot of different
sides to it that they are not getting fed?
Mr. Kimmage. You cite probably our greatest challenge,
which is reaching audiences in the PRC and Russia. The
propaganda disinformation efforts of these nations are
primarily directed against their own populations.
They have reinstituted types of control that we haven't
seen since the Soviet Union. It is a huge challenge. We have,
what would I describe, as modest efforts to reach Russian
speaking audiences. We do work to support independent media
that are doing tremendous work to show the truth of Russia's
war of aggression against Ukraine, to show the true cost it is
inflicting on the Russian people.
So it is an enormous challenge. We are working. And we be
trying to do more.
Mr. Kim. No, thank you. And, look, I just sort of say that
to my colleagues here on this committee. I think that we should
be very thoughtful about. You know, when we think about this
disinformation, certainly the defense part of it is important,
but on the offensive side, we are not able to have that kind of
penetration.
If we are not able to, but they are having tremendous
penetration within our own country, there is something there
that we need to be thinking about. And I hope that that is
something that we can work on in a bipartisan way. Thank you.
And I yield back.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Kim. We are going to do another
round of questioning here for anybody that wants to, Ms. Dean
or Mr. Kim. And I am going to touch off on something that my
colleague, Mr. Issa, was talking about anecdotally. He was
bringing up one of the third-parties that we used.
And to paint the picture, they labeled risky and non-risky
entities, whatever the timeframe was. And they said risky, top
ten risky, New York Post, RealClearPolitics, The Blaze, One
America News, NewsMax, The Federalist, The Daily Wire, those
are the most risky.
And the most trustworthy, or the not risky, were NPR,
Associated Press, New York Times, Huffington Post, other ones,
Wall Street Journal, and the list goes on. But some of that
list of not risky, I consider to be highly risky.
And so my question goes to third-parties in general. I want
to know if there is an institutional bias for third-parties
that are hired to do this work. Because that, as one example,
seems like an institution that has a bias.
And it is almost like being double-crossed because they did
get our money and then it was saying this is risky. This is not
risky. But the ones they said were not risky were the ones in
real-time perpetuating the hospital lie as an example. And I'm
not going to go through other examples, but as an example, they
were the ones perpetuating the hospital lie.
And so a couple of questions there, and that's where I go
back to, one, I want a list of the third-parties that you have
been out there hiring because I want to know if institutionally
hired third-parties are being hired by you all.
And No. 2, and I know this is soon after, but do you know
for a fact at this point that any of your other third-parties
that we do not have a list of yet were a part of spreading the
hospital lie or having anti-Israel bias?
Mr. Kimmage. So on our partners, we will never have control
over what they do in the future just to be absolutely clear.
The work that you are referring to----
Mr. Mast. I will acknowledge that. You do not have control
over your third-party partners. They are a third-party. I
understand why you are using them. Not to be mean, people
aren't following your Twitter. You are looking for people of
influence to do this.
Mr. Kimmage. Right.
Mr. Mast. But do you know if any of the third-parties to
date that you've hired were part of the hospital lie, we will
call it that?
Mr. Kimmage. So let me just answer your preceding question
on bias. We have a process to select partners. We have an open
announcement asking for the type of work. We have a panel that
reviews the partners. And in every statement of work, in every
agreement that we make with them, and let me read this for the
record, we have the following, which says, GEC does not address
United States domestic audiences nor engage in domestic
discussions of United States policy. No activities supported
under the scope of work shall be directed toward U.S. persons.
Any such engagement, if determined by GEC to have been
intentional, may constitute grounds for termination for cause
of this award.
That is in every agreement that we make with a third-party.
So that is as set in stone as it can be. And I just wanted to
make sure that you and other members of the committee hear that
to allay any concerns that you might have.
Mr. Mast. I will just say this, you know, the mission
statement is to counter foreign State, non-State propaganda
disinformation efforts that threaten the stability of the
United States, its allies, and partner nations. So that is a
tough mix there because you are not supposed to address
Americans. You are addressing across the globe and obviously
one of our allies being Israel, a partner nation, being Israel.
So just again, to that very pointed question, do you know
yet at this point if any of your current third-parties under
contract were part of spreading the Al-Ahli Hospital lie with
the rest of the Palestinians?
Mr. Kimmage. I'm not aware of any of our partners.
Mr. Mast. Do you plan on investigating whether they were a
part of spreading that lie about our ally?
Mr. Kimmage. We will look into this and get back to you.
Mr. Mast. I hope you do, and I will look forward to you
getting back. And I yield to my friend, Mr. Crow.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can we talk just for a
moment about the nature of risk when you are doing innovative
things and in a very dynamic space where you are trying to stay
up to speed with an evolving environment.
Because it seems like you could be risk averse to the point
of being irrelevant. But if you take no risk, if you are not
innovating, if you are not experimenting with things, then you
are actually not staying ahead of a rapidly evolving
environment.
So how do you address that, right? There is no situation in
which a relevant entity that exists within a dynamic
environment is accomplishing its purpose without taking some
risk in trying things. And some of those things will work and
some of them will not. So just talk to me about your approach
on that.
Mr. Kimmage. Sure. Thank you for the question. This is a
persistent and unavoidable aspect of operating in the
communications space. When we work with partners, we gain
credibility. We gain flexibility. Sometimes we gain rapidity,
but there is a tradeoff in terms of control. A partner is not
going to vet their messaging through the rigorous clearance
process at the State Department to ensure that it is fully in
line with all of those requirements. So there is a tradeoff
there.
There is always risk in the space. There is always a risk
in inaction that is not perfectly safe. The risk in inaction is
that our adversaries are going to be doing everything they can
to undermine us in the communications space.
To answer your specific question, we weigh this on a case-
by-case basis. We do this when we review partners. We do this
when we make decisions about what we will, and we will not do.
It is a huge challenge where we are always keenly aware
that we cannot do nothing. Our mandate compels us to take on
this mission. And we are keenly aware that there are many eyes
on us, that there are risks in the space, and I do not know
what more I can say beyond the fact that it is one of the more
onerous and challenging parts of our job.
Mr. Crow. And is it your opinion, as somebody who has
operated in the space for a very long time and seeing how it
has changed, that the risk of inaction is much higher than the
risk of action, even if sometimes that action misses the mark
or isn't exactly the way it works and you have to adapt?
Mr. Kimmage. Broadly speaking, I would agree. We are seeing
an increasing not just tempo of operations by our adversaries,
but this alignment that I have referred to several times. And
so we cannot afford to look the other way. We cannot afford to
be mired in internal rumination. We do have to act, and we do
have to execute the mission that you and your colleagues have
given us.
Mr. Crow. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Mills [presiding]. Thank you to the ranking member. So
I wanted to ask a couple of additional questions. You know,
prior to 2017 when the GEC was created, what was actually the
mechanism that was used? And if that was sufficient, what types
of duplications of effort would GEC actually have or what makes
GEC so special?
Mr. Kimmage. Sure. You know, with the caveat that I was
working on specific counterterrorism issues before----
Mr. Mills. And where was that--my apologies, for the
counterterrorism operations?
Mr. Kimmage. Sure. I was the principal deputy of the Center
for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, and in 2016, I
was in the Office of Policy Planning. So I was not as directly
involved.
To my knowledge, there was no entity in the executive
branch that had the ability to convene the interagency that was
specifically tasked with doing the work that the Global
Engagement Center does. And I can only point you to the
relative absence of reports like the reports that we have done
on Russia, the PRC in particular, and other topics before 2017
when the GEC was created.
Mr. Mills. So one of the things that you guys do is that
you look and assess third-party violations of these types of
propaganda and misinformation campaigns that are going on. And
some of those that can be listed are social media organizations
like VK as an example and things like this. Why wouldn't we
list TikTok, a foreign created social media platform that is
being utilized for these types of propaganda and misinformation
campaigns as a violator assessed by GEC?
Mr. Kimmage. Sure. So just to clarify, the Global
Engagement Center does not have any regulatory role. We do not
assess social media.
Mr. Mills. But you do actually go and review those who are
actually kind of misrepresenting things so that we know exactly
how to identify an encounter, correct?
Mr. Kimmage. What we do is we identify the tools in the
toolbox that our adversaries use for information manipulation.
And in fact, we have sponsored work that shows how TikTok is
being used by the PRC.
What we do not do is anything in the regulatory space. We
do not either regulate----
Mr. Mills. But you do see that TikTok is in fact being
utilized in this manner to be pushed by the PRC as a mechanism
to have a cultural impact by utilizing misinformation and
propaganda?
Mr. Kimmage. We have, I believe, supported a report that
highlights the role that TikTok plays in the PRC's effort to
reshape the global media environment, yes.
Mr. Mills. And, you know, it's interesting, going along
that thread, knowing this, would you advise, or would you,
coming from a policy background, obviously, there are bills
that Republicans are putting forward where they would want to
ban TikTok.
Now I am not asking you to say that this is a policy that
you thereby would create, but do you think that that should be
something which is effective in trying to tamp down some of the
utilization of TikTok as this mechanism?
Mr. Kimmage. The GEC and I do not take any position on
regulatory matters. I can only reiterate that TikTok is one of
the tools in the toolbox in the PRC's broader effort to reshape
the global----
Mr. Mills. I will take that as a yes. That if we were to
get rid of that that limits the toolbox and what they are
actually able to utilize.
Your office mission is to direct, lead, synchronize,
integrate and coordinate U.S. Federal Government efforts to
recognize, understand, expose and counter foreign State, non-
State propaganda. Are there other offices that you are aware of
within any other U.S. agency that you can identify that
monitors, exposes, or counters misinformation?
Mr. Kimmage. So we work with many partners that do parts of
this, but we are the ones who do this sort of exclusively
because that's our congressional mandate. We work with partners
in the intelligence community who look at adversarial
information manipulation. We work with partners who look at the
broader information environment.
Mr. Mills. So there are others that do this. So there is
potentially then--and I apologize for interrupting, but there
is then potentially redundancies. Because I know that--I sit on
the Armed Services Committee as well, and I sit on the
Intelligence Special Operations Subcommittee, and I will not
talk about anything which is classified in this unclassified
setting, but we know that there are other areas that do exactly
the same thing in a very similar manner. Does that not create a
redundancy in some ways?
Mr. Kimmage. I do not believe that there are redundancies.
We work with partners that--you know, the information
environment is dynamic, and it touches on almost every aspect
of our existence.
So we do not duplicate the work that our colleagues in the
intelligence community do. We do not duplicate the work that
our colleagues in International Broadcasting do. They
complement our work, and we try to complement theirs. But I
would argue that there are no, it's not a redundancy, and we do
not duplicate each other's work.
Mr. Mills. Well, I certainly look at working with your
office and making sure that we can continue these discussions
to look at exactly what it is that we're funding and what the
benefits of this is in a way that would stop the PRC and other
adversarial nations from utilizing platforms as we have
discussed to help to be weaponized in their misinformation
campaigns.
But, again, I go back to my original thing is that it all
starts within the U.S. Government and the messaging and the
actual foreign policy that we are promoting that is being
utilized against us because we are making the mistakes of not
considering Iran to be the largest State sponsor of terror and
not calling them out for that.
We are making mistakes when we do not immediately identify
that Iran plays a role with Hamas. And we are making a mistake
when we do not look at China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as
adversarial nations as opposed to competitors and then we
started abandoning our Americans behind.
So it is our own foreign policy, in my opinion, our own
actions, that give credence and actually support exactly what
is being spun around and used against us. And I think that
starts a good strong foreign policy and that will help us to
control the narratives that we put forward. And with that, I
yield back. Mr. Crow, anything for you?
Mr. Crow. I do not think you want to yield to me. You are
the chairman.
Mr. Mills. I was going to let you ask more questions. Do
you want to go a second or third round?
Mr. Crow. I am good. I am ready to go to closing if you
are, Chairman.
Mr. Mills. All right. Sounds good. I want to give you the
opportunity. I mean, come on. I got to make sure my 325th 82d
buddy has something.
I thank the witness for the viable testimony and the
members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee
may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we
will ask you to respond to those in writing.
Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to
submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the
record subject to the length of limitations. Without
objection--Mr. Crow?
Mr. Cross. Yes, I just want to make sure you are not going
to adjourn. Yes, OK.
Mr. Mills. The committee will refer to you, Mr. Crow, as
the ranking member.
Mr. Crow. OK. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Kimmage,
for your testimony here today and your insights into the Global
Engagement Center and for your many years of service to the
country.
Your testimony has put into sharp focus the critical work
of the Global Engagement Center and how you and your team work
tirelessly every day to counter misinformation and
disinformation by our adversaries that goes to the core of our
national security as well as our proactive efforts to develop
alliances and partnerships to spread democracy and freedom
throughout the world.
You talked about the risks of inaction, which in my view
are unacceptable risks. And that is why we have to continue to
innovate, to create, to engage, and that is obviously what you
do as the name of your center implies.
You also operate in the open, and you are transparent
because I have always thought that if we lead with our values,
if we lead by being open and transparent and with our
partnerships that ultimately people will see that as difficult
and challenging as that might be in this environment. There is
really no other way.
Your work is critical. And in my view Congress should work
with you to reauthorize the important work of the Global
Engagement Center to give you the resources, to work with you
to give you the resources that you need to counter
disinformation and misinformation by our adversaries.
And I look forward to working with my colleagues to make
sure that we do reauthorize this, that we conduct our
oversight. We will always do that, make sure that we are asking
tough questions and that we are being good stewards of the
taxpayer dollar, and we are accomplishing the congressionally
mandated mission.
And I do look forward to working with you, and I think it
is extremely important that we support your work. And with
that, I yield back.
Mr. Mast [presiding]. I want to thank the ranking member
once again and our witness. Again, we will be in touch to make
sure that we can look at how your office will truly serve its
purpose and whether or not the reauthorization is necessary
with regard to overarching redundancies across the various
agencies. With that, I will consider this to be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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