[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                      A HEARING WITH THE PRESIDENT
                          OF ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
                             DR. PETER DASZAK

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

            SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC

                                 OF THE

               COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                              MAY 1, 2024
                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-107
                               __________

  Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability
  
  
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]  


                       Available on: govinfo.gov,
                         oversight.house.gov or
                             docs.house.gov
                               __________


                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
55-548 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2024                                
                             
               COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

                    JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman

Jim Jordan, Ohio                     Jamie Raskin, Maryland, Ranking 
Mike Turner, Ohio                        Minority Member
Paul Gosar, Arizona                  Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of 
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina            Columbia
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin            Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Michael Cloud, Texas                 Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Gary Palmer, Alabama                 Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Ro Khanna, California
Pete Sessions, Texas                 Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
Andy Biggs, Arizona                  Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York
Nancy Mace, South Carolina           Katie Porter, California
Jake LaTurner, Kansas                Cori Bush, Missouri
Pat Fallon, Texas                    Shontel Brown, Ohio
Byron Donalds, Florida               Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania            Robert Garcia, California
William Timmons, South Carolina      Maxwell Frost, Florida
Tim Burchett, Tennessee              Summer Lee, Pennsylvania
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Greg Casar, Texas
Lisa McClain, Michigan               Jasmine Crockett, Texas
Lauren Boebert, Colorado             Dan Goldman, New York
Russell Fry, South Carolina          Jared Moskowitz, Florida
Anna Paulina Luna, Florida           Rashida Tlaib, Michigan
Nick Langworthy, New York            Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts
Eric Burlison, Missouri
Mike Waltz, Florida

                                 ------                                
                       Mark Marin, Staff Director
             Mitchell Benzine, Subcommittee Staff Director
                        Marie Policastro, Clerk

                      Contact Number: 202-225-5074

                Miles Lichtman, Minority Staff Director
                      Contact Number: 202-225-5051
                                 ------                                

            Select Subcommittee On The Coronavirus Pandemic

                     Brad Wenstrup, Ohio, Chairman
Nicole Malliotakis, New York         Raul Ruiz, California, Ranking 
Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa           Minority Member
Debbie Lesko, Arizona                Debbie Dingell, Michigan
Michael Cloud, Texas                 Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
John Joyce, Pennsylvania             Deborah Ross, North Carolina
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Robert Garcia, California
Ronny Jackson, Texas                 Ami Bera, California
Rich Mccormick, Georgia              Jill Tokuda, Hawaii

                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              

                                                                   Page

Hearing held on May 1, 2024......................................     1

                               Witnesses

                              ----------                              


Dr. Peter Daszak, Ph.D., President, EcoHealth Alliance
Oral Statement...................................................     8

Written opening statements and the written statements of the 
  witnesses are available on the U.S. House of Representatives 
  Document Repository at: docs.house.gov.

                           Index of Documents

                              ----------                              




Interim Report, Majority staff; submitted by Rep. Wenstrup.

Documents are available at: docs.house.gov.

 
                      A HEARING WITH THE PRESIDENT
                          OF ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE
                            DR. PETER DASZAK

                              ----------                              


                         Wednesday, May 1, 2024

                        House of Representatives

               Committee on Oversight and Accountability

            Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic

                                           Washington, D.C.

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in 
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad R. Wenstrup 
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Representatives Wenstrup, Malliotakis, Miller-
Meeks, Lesko, Cloud, Joyce, McCormick, Comer (ex officio), 
Ruiz, Dingell, Ross, Robert Garcia, Tokuda, and Raskin (ex 
officio).
    Also present: Representatives Griffith and Castor.
    Dr. Wenstrup. The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus 
Pandemic will come to order.
    Welcome, everyone.
    At the discretion of the Chair and pursuant to an agreement 
with the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Chairman and 
Ranking Member of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Mr. Morgan 
Griffith and Ms. Kathy Castor, are permitted to participate in 
today's hearing for the purposes of questions and give 3-minute 
opening statements.
    Without objection, pursuant to clause 4(a)(3)(A) of House 
Resolution 5 and clause 2(j)(2)(C) of House Rule XI, the Chair 
may recognize staff of the Select Subcommittee for questions 
for equal periods of time, not to exceed 30 minutes per side.
    Finally, without objection, the Chair may declare a recess 
at any time.
    I now recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening 
statement.
    Good morning.
    The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the debate regarding the 
risks and benefits of a type of high-risk research, 
specifically what is known as gain-of-function research.
    Prior to the pandemic, the public was largely unaware of 
the existence of this area of research, let alone the fact that 
they were funding it. I know I first heard of it during our 
COVID lockdown while researching how we might treat patients 
suffering from this unique and deadly virus.
    In 2014, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases, NIAID, awarded EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., a grant 
entitled ``Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus 
Emergence.''
    This grant included the collecting of novel coronaviruses 
from bats and conducting research on those novel viruses using 
laboratory mice.
    The laboratory work where this research was actually 
occurring was outsourced by EcoHealth Alliance to the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology in China.
    Dr. Daszak, who is here before us, is the president of 
EcoHealth.
    Today, the Select Subcommittee released a report regarding 
EcoHealth and the evidence surrounding its research activities. 
This report highlights the Select Subcommittee's concerns with 
EcoHealth as an organization and Dr. Daszak's interactions with 
Federal agencies and foreign entities, such as the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology.
    We have found that EcoHealth was nearly 2 years late in 
submitting a routine progress report to NIH; that EcoHealth 
failed to report--as required--a potentially dangerous 
experiment conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology; that 
EcoHealth used taxpayer dollars to facilitate risky gain-of-
function research; and that Dr. Daszak omitted a material fact 
regarding his access to unanalyzed virus samples and sequences 
at the WIV, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, in his successful 
effort to have his grant reinstated by NIH.
    These are only a few of our findings, which are detailed in 
our interim report issued today and will be further explored in 
the Select Subcommittee's final report.
    Dr. Daszak has been less than cooperative with the Select 
Subcommittee, and he has been slow to produce requested 
documents and has used semantics with the definition of gain-
of-function research, even in his previous testimony.
    Dr. Daszak maintains that EcoHealth never conducted gain-
of-function research by shifting definitions of this area of 
research put forth by regulatory agencies.
    I believe Dr. Daszak either cannot or will not distinguish 
between the common understanding of gain-of-function research 
and the more technical definitions provided under various and 
narrowly defined regulatory frameworks.
    But facts are facts. Research can be gain of function 
without meeting these somewhat convoluted and often hard to 
understand frameworks that only regulate a very minute subset 
of research, so minute that HHS has only ever reviewed three 
proposals out of thousands it receives every year.
    Using highly technical definitions in order to assert that 
a certain project really isn't ``gain-of-function'' research, 
when most others would suggest, as well as confirm in their 
testimonies before the Select Subcommittee, that it absolutely 
is gain of function, comes across disingenuous, comes across as 
a disingenuous attempt of avoiding questions and 
accountability.
    The fact is that, as most people understand it, EcoHealth 
was absolutely conducting gain-of-function research, 
specifically in Wuhan, China.
    Unfortunately, Dr. Daszak's problematic behavior is not 
limited to his less than fulsome cooperation or the risky 
research that he conducted.
    Recently released documents display Dr. Daszak 
communicating with Dr. David Morens, who was Senior Advisor to 
then-NIAID Director Dr. Fauci, and doing this through private 
channels to avoid FOIA, Freedom of Information Act.
    Dr. Daszak and Dr. Morens shared information, ideas, and 
strategies about how to best proceed to re-obtain funding for 
this risky research after Dr. Michael Lauer had terminated Dr. 
Daszak's grant.
    Dr. Morens provided Dr. Daszak with internal NIH 
deliberations and discussions concerning the suspension of 
EcoHealth's grant, along with assurances that Dr. Fauci and 
NIAID would seek to mitigate the damage done to EcoHealth.
    On April 16, 2024, I announced a subpoena to Dr. Morens for 
documents in his email relating to the origins of COVID-19.
    Yesterday, Dr. Morens produced 30,000 pages of emails, 
emails from his Gmail account which he said he had used to 
avoid FOIA.
    So, this investigation does not end today.
    Dr. Daszak told Dr. Morens in these private communications 
that he still had 15,000 samples, quote, ``in freezers in 
Wuhan,'' end quote, and had not yet analyzed more than ``700'' 
coronaviruses he had identified in those samples.
    EcoHealth has lamented, quote, ``the negative impact on . . 
. U.S. national security,'' end quote, posed by their inability 
to sequence all the samples at the WIV.
    But EcoHealth's actions themselves are a threat to national 
security. Dr. Daszak has displayed a disregard for the risks 
associated with gain-of-function research, the congressional 
oversight process, and the Federal grant process.
    Dr. Daszak has proven that he's not a responsible steward 
of the American people's tax dollars. We see no reason that the 
American people should be paying for EcoHealth's research, or 
any other work Dr. Daszak conducts.
    Dr. Ruiz, I believe we agree on this, and there may be a 
path forward.
    Let me be clear. I support global health research. I 
support work that will make the world safer. That's why we are 
investigating all of this.
    Our concern is that this research and research similar does 
the opposite--it puts the world at the risk of a pandemic, 
something even Dr. Fauci addressed as far back as 2012 in an 
interview.
    Dr. Daszak, before I close, and as someone who has been 
shot at and someone who has received threats, I want to tell 
you that we unequivocally condemn all threats to you--to you, 
any public health official, scientists, anyone else. That is 
wrong and intolerable.
    I look forward at this point to an engaging and on-topic 
discussion.
    Thank you.
    And I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Ruiz for 
the purpose of making an opening statement.
    Dr. Ruiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    When I was named Ranking Member of the Select Subcommittee 
last February, I made a commitment to follow the facts in 
objectively analyzing the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.
    I made a promise to keep an open mind about how the 
pandemic started, because understanding whether the novel 
coronavirus emerged from a lab or from nature is essential to 
better preventing and preparing for future public health 
threats and to better protecting the American people.
    And as the origins of the novel coronavirus still remain 
inconclusive, I stand by these commitments to this day. But as 
we approach the year-and-a-half mark of the House Republican 
majority, it's important that we take stock of what the Select 
Subcommittee has accomplished so far, and the extent to which 
we have fulfilled our obligations to the American people.
    For more than 14 months, under the guise of investigating 
COVID's origins, the Select Subcommittee has relentlessly 
probed the relationship between the Federal Government and our 
Nation's scientific community to prove--without evidence--
Republican accusations that Dr. Daszak and EcoHealth Alliance 
created the COVID-19 pandemic.
    We have pored over more than 425,000 pages of documents 
provided to us by HHS, the State Department, the Department of 
Energy, the Government Accountability Office, universities, and 
private citizens; we have conducted more than 100 hours of 
closed-door interviews with more than a dozen current and 
former Federal officials and scientists; and we have held 
multiple hearings--all in what has appeared to be an effort to 
weaponize concerns about a lab-related origin to fuel sentiment 
against our Nation's scientists and public health officials for 
partisan gain.
    And while the Select Subcommittee's probe has uncovered 
questionable conduct about Dr. Daszak's commitment to 
transparency and professional integrity, I want to be clear 
that it has not substantiated allegations that EcoHealth 
Alliance used taxpayer dollars to fund research that created 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
    No evidence provided to the Select Subcommittee has 
indicated that the work performed under EcoHealth Alliance's 
grant, including at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, led to the 
creation of SARS-CoV-2.
    These viruses are too genetically distant from SARS-CoV-2 
to be its progenitor virus, and the majority has uncovered no 
tangible proof of other viruses included in work pursuant to 
the EcoHealth Alliance grant leading to the creation of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and this distinction is critically 
important.
    Today we will hear from both sides that there are serious 
concerns regarding EcoHealth Alliance's failure to comply with 
reporting requirements for Federal grantees, concerns that draw 
into question whether you, Dr. Daszak, sought to deliberately 
mislead regulators at NIH and NIAID.
    And while the majority's probe has not meaningfully 
advanced our understanding of the pandemic's origins, internal 
documents and testimony do suggest that Dr. Daszak potentially 
misled the Federal Government on multiple occasions in both 
their transparency obligations and reporting requirements as 
recipients of Federal grant funding.
    Transparent and forthcoming communication with Federal 
Government agencies is expected at all times, and this 
potential misconduct raises serious questions about EcoHealth 
Alliance's commitment to the responsible stewardship of 
taxpayer dollars.
    We will also examine whether Dr. Daszak, beyond his 
obligations as an employee of a federally funded grantee, acted 
with integrity in his engagement with the possibility that 
COVID-19 resulted from a research-related incident.
    But at the end of the day, this is not the same as 
uncovering COVID-19's origin, nor is it evidence that our 
scientific community caused and has sought to cover up the 
origins of the pandemic, and to cast it as such would be 
misleading to the American public, damaging to already 
declining confidence in science and public health, and 
ultimately harmful to our Nation's pandemic preparedness.
    So, as we look to the future of fortifying our Nation for a 
future public health crisis, it is my hope that we can broaden 
our focus to the forward-looking policies that will better 
protect our constituents.
    Strengthening oversight of potentially risky research 
domestically and abroad is an essential part of this 
conversation, but so is closing pathways for zoonotic transfers 
of viruses in nature and investing in our public health 
infrastructure to ensure that when future viruses hit our 
shores we are ready.
    When Democrats were in the majority, we made important 
strides in these objectives by passing the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2023, which strengthened protections 
against undue influence in our biomedical research, improved 
training and transparency for the handling of select agents, 
paved the way for the interagency collaboration to fortify 
zoonotic disease prevention, invested in our infectious disease 
work force, and enhanced our supply chain preparedness and 
ability to rapidly develop and deploy medical countermeasures.
    It is my hope that in the remaining months of the Select 
Subcommittee we can work together to build on this legacy and 
make objectively examining the origins of the novel coronavirus 
a part of this forward-looking work.
    I stand by the commitments I mentioned earlier, Mr. 
Chairman, to take a serious, balanced look at all possibilities 
for the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, and I stand ready to 
work with you on this critically important mission so that we 
can save future lives.
    Thank you. And I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Dr. Ruiz.
    I would now like to recognize Mr. Griffith for the purpose 
of making an opening statement.
    Mr. Griffith. Good morning.
    I want to thank Chairmans Comer and Wenstrup, Ranking 
Members Raskin and Ruiz, for having this hearing today and 
inviting relevant Energy and Commerce chairs and ranking 
members to it.
    For over a year now we've been working together to 
investigate the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and the role 
that the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 
NIAID, headed by Dr. Fauci, and EcoHealth, headed by Dr. 
Daszak, may have played in it by funding research and 
facilitating the transfer of technologies to the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology, which I will refer to henceforth as 
Wuhan.
    It is critical that we understand what went wrong at NIAID 
and EcoHealth's relationship with Wuhan. Frankly, it's been 
alarming to discover that NIAID's approval and oversight of 
risky experiments involving potential pandemic pathogens is 
lax.
    My hope is that when we are finished we have a package of 
legislative proposals and other recommendations on biosafety 
and biosecurity. I increasingly think that means taking final 
approval authority for these experiments away from NIAID and 
other funding in favor of an independent entity.
    With many lives lost and disrupted by what I believe was a 
research-related accident, we need transparent, effective 
oversight and tight regulation of gain-of-function research of 
concern. We certainly do not have that now.
    I participated in Dr. Daszak's transcribed interview. It's 
clear to me that neither NIAID nor EcoHealth have a complete 
picture of what Wuhan was up to with it's coronavirus 
collection or with their gain-of-function research trajectory.
    But what we do know from EcoHealth's NIAID grant and 
EcoHealth's DEFUSE proposal, and the private musings of 
virologists who collaborated with Wuhan, is not comforting.
    We don't have this critical information in large part 
because NIAID's review and oversight was a farce. NIAID and 
EcoHealth were asleep at the switch. In my opinion, they were 
grossly negligent.
    I find it incomprehensible that NIAID continues to fund 
EcoHealth's collaboration with Wuhan to this very day. 
EcoHealth's grant was reinstated so they could process virus 
samples and sequences that had been previously collected.
    It turns out many of these viruses and sequences are held 
by Wuhan. NIAID didn't even think to ask them where the samples 
were stored before restarting their funding.
    Even after COVID-19, at NIAID it's just business as usual. 
It's absurd, and it's got to change, or we risk having perhaps 
yet another high-consequence accident.
    We have to put some adults in place to independently review 
proposed gain-of-function research of concern that NIAID and 
other agencies want to fund.
    Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to continuing 
working together. And I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I would now like to recognize Mrs. Dingell 
for the purpose of making an opening statement.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 
Ruiz and Chairman Griffith, who I sit on Energy and Commerce 
with as well.
    I want to echo the thoughts of my colleague, Ranking Member 
Ruiz, in that we must focus our attention on the future and how 
we can best protect all Americans from and against future 
pandemics. Sowing distrust in the scientific and medical 
communities is not a way to accomplish this goal.
    While I agree--and I think most of us on this dais, both 
sides, today do--that EcoHealth Alliance has proven to be 
careless and imprecise with their Federal funding, contrary to 
what we expect and demand of any Federal grantee, this does not 
mean we should throw out the baby with the bathwater, as my 
Republican colleagues seem to be suggesting.
    The National Institutes of Health and the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases serve important 
functions in medical and scientific research--to advance the 
health of all Americans in the world--and they have done good 
work in the past, and we want that good work to continue in the 
future.
    The EcoHealth Alliance grant did reveal some weaknesses in 
the reporting systems that were in place at NIAID, but it's 
important to note that, in conjunction with their Office of 
Inspector General, NIAID has already taken steps to rectify 
these issues.
    The investigation detailed how EcoHealth was not able to 
secure underlying documents from its subgrantees about 
important coronavirus research happening in China and that this 
limited NIAID's ability to determine if EcoHealth was compliant 
with its grant terms.
    NIH and NIAID have already implemented recommendations from 
the OIG, including ensuring subaward agreements contain all 
required terms and guaranteeing that prime awardees can access 
all research records conducted at the subrecipient locations. 
These changes apply to all grantees.
    This investigation has not looked into these policy changes 
and how they will improve the information sharing between 
grantees and the NIH and NIAID going forward. It's only focused 
on the past.
    Throughout this investigation, my Republican colleagues 
have been trying to cast blame for the COVID-19 pandemic on 
Drs. Collins and Fauci, and as we have seen time and time 
again, it's contrary to the evidence. So, now they're shifting 
to blame a wider swath of dedicated public servants at NIH and 
NIAID based on the bad actions of a single grantee.
    We should be holding today's witness accountable, of which 
we have bipartisan agreement, but this should not distract us 
from our ultimate goal: future pandemic preparedness. 
Strengthening our scientific community to prepare for any 
future pandemic is our best course of action.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
    Our witness today is Dr. Peter Daszak. Dr. Daszak is the 
president of EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.
    Pursuant to Committee on Oversight and Accountability Rule 
9(g), the witness will please stand and raise his right hand.
    Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you 
are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God?
    Dr. Daszak. I do.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
    Let the record show that the witness answered in the 
affirmative.
    The Select Subcommittee certainly appreciates you for being 
here today, Dr. Daszak, and we look forward to your testimony.
    Let me remind the witness that we have read your written 
statement and it will appear in full in the hearing record. 
Please limit your oral statement to 5 minutes.
    As a reminder, please press the button on the microphone in 
front of you, so that it is on and the Members can hear you.
    When you begin to speak, the light in front of you will 
turn green. After 4 minutes, the light will turn yellow. When 
the red light comes on, your 5 minutes has expired, and we 
would ask that you please wrap up.
    I now recognize Dr. Daszak to give an opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF DR. PETER DASZAK, PRESIDENT, ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE 
                              INC.

    Dr. Daszak. Chairman Wenstrup, Ranking Member Ruiz, 
distinguished Members of the Select Subcommittee on the 
Coronavirus Pandemic, it is a privilege to come before you 
today to discuss the vital research that EcoHealth Alliance 
conducts globally and to answer your questions about our work.
    I respect and appreciate the critical mission of your 
Select Subcommittee, which is why I volunteered to testify 
before you today and similarly volunteered to participate in a 
full-day transcribed interview with the Subcommittee last 
November.
    I am Peter Daszak, president of EcoHealth Alliance, a 
501(c)(3) nonprofit based in New York, founded in 1971, with a 
mission to conduct research on emerging disease threats to the 
U.S., to identify the underlying causes of pandemics and 
develop solutions to prevent them, and to benefit conservation.
    EcoHealth Alliance scientists have worked in partnership 
with U.S. Federal agencies since the early 2000's with 
significant funding support from dozens of leading government 
and philanthropic donors.
    With funding from the National Institutes of Health, we 
mapped the global spread of high path avian flu and showed its 
potential to enter the U.S. via trading partners in Canada, 
information that the Government Accountability Office used to 
recommend better targeted strategic surveillance by the USDA.
    With support from the Department of Homeland Security, we 
mapped the likely introduction of emerging diseases via air 
travel and trade and the threat they represent to U.S. public 
health and agriculture.
    With funding from the National Institutes of Health, we 
identified the origins of the highly lethal Nipah virus and 
discovered bats are the wildlife reservoirs of MERS, SARS, and 
a new viral disease that threatens global swine production.
    In all of our federally funded projects, we have maintained 
an open, transparent communication with agency staff, rapidly 
provided information critical to public health and agriculture, 
uploaded data and genetic sequences into the U.S.-based NIH 
GenBank data base, and published our analyses in scientific 
journals, so that scientists everywhere can use this 
information.
    EcoHealth Alliance's mission has taken us to places around 
the world where viruses originate, in countries that represent 
our first line of defense against novel diseases.
    Our work in foreign countries can only happen with the 
approval of the U.S. funding agency and of the host country 
government.
    In China, with approval from NIH and the State Department, 
we partnered with the country's leading virology lab in Wuhan 
to do this work, just as many other U.S. government-funded 
institutions have done.
    Our 15 years' work in China provided direct public health 
benefits to the American people, with Chinese scientists 
publishing their papers in U.S.-based journals and uploading 
critical China viral genetic sequences into NIH's GenBank data 
base.
    The viruses that we identified in bats in China were used 
by U.S. labs throughout the COVID pandemic--and continue to 
be--to test drugs, vaccines, and therapies that saved countless 
lives.
    EcoHealth Alliance's work is a matter of the public record, 
via dozens of scientific publications, media interviews, and 
public lectures given before, during, and after the emergence 
of COVID-19.
    For years, we repeatedly briefed the U.S. Government and 
international agencies and spoke to the press and public about 
the risk of a coronavirus outbreak emerging in China from bats.
    Unfortunately, in 2019, just as we predicted, a bat-origin 
SARS-related coronavirus emerged and spread in the city of 
Wuhan, leading to the global COVID-19 pandemic.
    The public nature of our work and our longstanding 
collaborations with Chinese scientists have made us a target 
for misinformation about the origins of COVID, beginning in 
early 2020 and continuing to this day. We have repeatedly and 
publicly refuted the many myths and false allegations about 
EcoHealth Alliance's research.
    However, at a time when the COVID-19 pandemic seemed out of 
control and emotions were running high, our organization, our 
staff, and even my own family were targeted with false 
allegations, death threats, break-ins, media harassment, and 
other damaging acts.
    Our organization has gone to great lengths to address any 
allegations head-on, checking our records and stating the facts 
publicly.
    We estimate over 15 million pages of EcoHealth Alliance 
documents have been shared with Federal agencies, House and 
Senate committees, and with the public via FOIA requests, and 
via audits with the Department of HHS OIG and inquiries by the 
Government Accountability Office.
    And we have spent substantial staff time voluntarily 
helping with every and all realistic and bipartisan 
investigations on the origin of COVID.
    Like other public figures, I have been personally targeted 
with a white powder letter sent to my home address, devastating 
online threats and media harassment, and my children and wife's 
names appearing on a 4chan kill list, among with other 
incidents now under investigation by the FBI and other 
authorities.
    Indeed, between the public announcement of my voluntary 
appearance before this Committee and the Subcommittee's tweets 
over the past 2 weeks, we have seen a noticeable increase in 
death threats and other harassment, including a swatting attack 
in my home when the local police received a notice that someone 
had killed a scientist and had his wife tied up in my basement.
    Of course, it was a fake call, but we ended up with six 
police cars and detectives searching the house and staying for 
the afternoon.
    This is not what a scientist should be put through to do 
their work.
    Our funding has also been targeted even though our research 
programs continue to be identified as high priority by NIH and 
other Federal agencies.
    Despite these challenges, we remain committed to our 
pandemic prevention mission and to protecting the health of the 
people in the U.S. and globally. We continue to conduct our 
research and to publish scientific papers, so that the data are 
available for everybody and to upload viral genetic sequences 
into NIH's GenBank data base.
    In 2005, EcoHealth scientists developed the first-ever 
emerging infectious disease ``hotspot'' map to chart threats, 
so we can better target resources to prevent them.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Dr. Daszak----
    Dr. Daszak. Our work and that of many other scientists show 
that most----
    Dr. Wenstrup. Dr. Daszak, you were given 5 minutes. Are you 
ready to wrap up?
    Dr. Daszak. Sir, the light says I've got 30 seconds left or 
so. I've just got a short period here.
    Dr. Wenstrup. You've gone over. Go ahead.
    Dr. Daszak. Our work and that of many other scientists show 
that most pandemics originate from animals, mainly wildlife, in 
rapidly developing countries where people and animals come into 
direct contact.
    But as we saw with COVID-19, once a virus begins to spread, 
it exploits travel and trade networks, which means a virus 
emerging anywhere on the planet is a direct threat to all of us 
here in the USA.
    Thus, our research has direct benefits for the public 
health of the American people, strengthens national security, 
and enhances sustainable economic growth in our allies around 
the world.
    Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your 
questions.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
    I now recognize myself for as much time as I may consume 
for questions, with equal time being afforded to the Ranking 
Member.
    Dr. Daszak, my time is limited, so as much as you could 
limit your answers to ``yes'' or ``no'' for now it would be 
greatly appreciated.
    In 2018, did you submit an application for funding to DARPA 
for a project entitled ``DEFUSE''?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes, EcoHealth submitted----
    Dr. Wenstrup. On this proposal, did you collaborate with 
Ralph Baric from the University of North Carolina?
    Dr. Daszak. UNC was one of the co-investigators on the 
proposal, yes.
    Dr. Wenstrup. With Dr. Ralph Baric?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes, he was on the proposal.
    Dr. Wenstrup. On this proposal, did you collaborate with 
Zhengli Shi from the Wuhan Institute of Virology?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes, they were involved in the proposal.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Were there any other Chinese collaborators on 
this proposal?
    Dr. Daszak. I don't know. I'd have to check the proposal. 
But I think it was just that organization. I'm not sure.
    Dr. Wenstrup. The organization being?
    Dr. Daszak. The Wuhan Institute of Virology.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
    So others may be from the Wuhan Institute of Virology?
    Dr. Daszak. It would be in the proposal. I've got a copy if 
you want to see.
    Dr. Wenstrup. We'll take a look at that.
    A draft of the DEFUSE proposal was released via FOIA and 
had some comments in it regarding where the work would take 
place and the biosafety level for it.
    The first comment is up on the screen. It has the initials 
``PD.''
    Did you write this comment?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Can we get it on the screen? OK.
    It says, ``Ralph. Zhengli. If we win this contract, I do 
not propose that all of this work will necessarily be conducted 
by Ralph, but I do want to stress the U.S. side of this 
proposal, so that DARPA are comfortable with our team. Once we 
get funds, we can then allocate who does what exact work, and I 
believe that a lot of those assays can be done in Wuhan as 
well.''
    The proposal says that Dr. Baric would reverse engineer 
spike proteins to test their capacity to cause disease.
    Were you also intending that the WIV conduct some of the 
work?
    Dr. Daszak. If you look at the language in my comment----
    Dr. Wenstrup. Yes or no, please. I'm just----
    Dr. Daszak. No. The language says assays, not experiments. 
Already the WIV is clearly listed in the proposal to conduct 
some assays.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Why did you want to stress the U.S. side of 
the proposal?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I checked with DARPA if it was OK to 
include a Chinese collaborator on the proposal. They said yes. 
They checked with their higher-ups and said yes. So, we went 
ahead with that.
    But I still was concerned that we didn't want to have too 
much American taxpayer dollars going to China. So, that's the 
meaning of that.
    Dr. Wenstrup. The second comment is up on the screen, and, 
again, it has the initials ``PD.''
    Did you write this comment?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Dr. Wenstrup. It says, ``I'm planning to use my resume and 
Ralph's. Linfa/Zhengli, I realize your resumes are also very 
impressive, but I'm trying to downplay the non-U.S. focus of 
this proposal, so that DARPA doesn't see this as a negative''--
again, your language of attempting to downplay how much work 
would occur in China.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, there's nothing----
    Dr. Wenstrup. Why?
    Dr. Daszak. Sorry.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Why?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, there's nothing unusual about this at 
all.
    If you're writing a grant to a Federal agency, it gets 
reviewed by a committee of outside scientists.
    It's not necessarily--DARPA telling me it's OK to include 
Chinese and foreign collaborators doesn't necessarily mean the 
reviewers know that or are going to see it in the same way.
    So, I simply wanted to stress the U.S. side of the 
proposal. I was trying to explain to our colleagues why their 
CVs weren't going to be in.
    We were limited in the number of CVs we could add. That's 
all. It's quite simple.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
    So, you were downplaying how much work they would do.
    Dr. Daszak. I say it right there in that comment.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Did Dr. Shi contribute to the drafting of the 
proposal at all.
    Dr. Daszak. Of course, yes, all collaborators did.
    Dr. Wenstrup. OK. The third comment is up on the screen, 
and this time it was written by Dr. Baric and says, ``In the 
U.S., these recombinant SARS coronaviruses are studied under 
BSL-3, not BSL-2. In China, might be growing these viruses 
under BSL-2. U.S. researchers will likely freak out.''
    Were you proposing to do the work in DEFUSE at BSL-2?
    Dr. Daszak. No.
    Dr. Wenstrup. In fact, you write in the proposal that the 
choice of BSL-2 is more cost effective. Dr. Baric testified 
that he does this work at BSL-3 and, in fact, encouraged you to 
do the same.
    What's more important to you, biosafety or cost?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, look, EcoHealth Alliance maintains the 
appropriate biosafety levels for our research. The proposal 
includes research which, according to both U.S. and Chinese 
biosafety rules, which I have right in front of me, BSL-2. It 
also has research which, according to both U.S. and Chinese 
rules, are BSL-3.
    The final proposal is the proposal of record, and it is 
absolutely correct in the definition of biosafety levels that 
go into this. This is simply a draft proposal where one group 
is suggesting one thing, another is suggesting another. The 
final proposal is what matters.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Well----
    Dr. Daszak. And I want to remind the Committee that this 
proposal was not funded. The work was never done. It is utterly 
irrelevant to the origins of COVID.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Well, it's not irrelevant, Dr. Daszak. It's 
very relevant. And, you know, you just stated that China--those 
are China standards. So, you're OK with China standards as 
opposed to the U.S. standards, and it does matter whether it's 
at a BSL-2 or BSL-3, as Dr. Baric pointed out.
    And it also is important to understand that you 
intentionally downplayed the role of China.
    Between your actions to DARPA and those within NIH, you 
have failed to be a good steward of taxpayer dollars, and so 
our recommendation is that you do not receive any more.
    Understanding the lethality of COVID-19--to certain 
vulnerable populations for sure--do you believe that a lethal 
virus could be used as a bioweapon? And should we be concerned 
about such weapons?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, with respect, you made two allegations in 
there that I want to address.
    First, you mischaracterized my statement. What I said about 
biosafety levels is that they are the same in both China and 
the U.S. and that we follow them implicitly to the letter. I 
have them in front of me. I'm happy to share them with the 
Committee.
    Second, you suggested that we downplayed the role of China. 
That's not true. Before the proposal was submitted, I contacted 
DARPA and asked them if it was appropriate to conduct a project 
in China and to include Chinese scientists. They checked with 
their authorities, and they said yes. So, we included that.
    And in response to your question--sorry.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Do you have a record of that check?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes, I do.
    Dr. Wenstrup. OK. We would----
    Dr. Daszak. And I'm happy to share it with the Committee.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Please do.
    Dr. Daszak. And I remember the name of the person. It was a 
Dr. Gimlett, and I have an email record of it. I've seen it 
recently, yes.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Excellent.
    Dr. Daszak. Of course.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Excellent.
    And we also have on record what you had said in your email.
    But, again, to my question, do you believe that a lethal 
virus could be used as a bioweapon, and should we be concerned 
about such weapons?
    Dr. Daszak. Of course. And there's a long history of 
pathogens being used as bioweapons.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
    Dr. Daszak. But that is the not the research that we do.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
    But maybe that's why DARPA turned you down.
    I now recognize the Ranking Member, Dr. Ruiz from 
California, for 5 minutes of questions.
    Dr. Daszak. I will address that later, of course.
    Dr. Ruiz. I'll go ahead and let you address that for a few 
seconds.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Ruiz.
    DARPA turned us down for whatever reasons DARPA had. The 
only information we received from DARPA about the reasons for 
turning us down was an exit interview, which I have 
contemporaneous notes from, which I'm happy to share with the 
Committee.
    In no instance did they suggest that the reason for turning 
down was because of safety issues. In fact, they said it was an 
excellent proposal. They didn't have enough money to fund it. 
They came back to us later to try and fund portions of it.
    Dr. Ruiz. For that it was a bioweapon research?
    Dr. Daszak. Sorry?
    Dr. Ruiz. Dr. Daszak, did they turn you down because they 
thought somehow there was going to be bioweapon research in the 
lab?
    Dr. Daszak. Absolutely not. That was never mentioned.
    Dr. Ruiz. I think one of the things that we know--there's 
two things. One is that there're so many agencies that have 
shown or reported with low, mostly low, and one with moderate 
confidence, that it could either be a zoonotic transmission or 
a lab leak. So, the data is still out there that it's 
inconclusive.
    But one of the things that they clearly state is that it 
was not bioweapon research.
    I believe that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle 
would agree that transparency and disclosures regarding 
competing interests are necessary for individuals addressing 
scientific questions open to reasonable debate.
    In February 2020, The Lancet published a statement signed 
by an international group of scientists who stood together to, 
quote, ``condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 
does not have a natural origin.''
    The statement purports to express solidarity with 
scientists and frontline workers in China, many of whom, we 
learned, were sharing early information about the virus at 
great personal cost.
    Dr. Daszak, evidence reviewed by the Select Subcommittee 
demonstrates that you authored and organized the statement. Is 
it still your view that all theories suggesting that COVID-19 
has a research-related origin are conspiracy theories?
    Dr. Daszak. No. We take all theories seriously. We looked 
at every single theory that was submitted.
    Dr. Ruiz. OK. Well, I'm glad there's been a shift in your 
thoughts and that you agree, because whether the virus came 
from a lab or from nature is still unknown.
    Two Federal agencies still assess with low and moderate 
confidence that the virus originated in a lab, and four 
government agencies still assess with low confidence that the 
virus emerged from nature.
    But the Lancet Statement that you authored summarily 
attempted to close that question, understanding that your 
funding and ability to partner with the Wuhan Institute of 
Virology relied on relaxed scrutiny of research-related origin 
theories.
    So, let me ask you, why did you decide not to declare a 
competing interest?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, first of all, Dr. Ruiz, the conspiracies 
that we were talking about in the Lancet letter at the time, in 
February 2020, were things like there are HIV inserts into the 
virus, that the virus contains snake DNA, that it's a 
bioengineered virus.
    And those are pure conspiracy theories. There's no evidence 
at all for them. And they're based on myth and legend. So, 
that's what we were talking about at the time.
    Dr. Ruiz. So, why did you decide not to declare a competing 
interest.
    Dr. Daszak. I did declare a competing interest. The full 
statement----
    Dr. Ruiz. So, The Lancet later requested that you expand on 
your initial disclosures. In turn, you elaborated on your 
coronavirus work in China. However, your updated disclosures do 
not explicitly acknowledge that you had partnered with the 
Wuhan Institute of Virology.
    That is a glaring omission, particularly when, as you 
stated at your transcribed interview, your updated disclosures 
are otherwise extremely detailed.
    Dr. Daszak, why did you decide not to name the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology in disclosures of your coronavirus work 
in China?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I want to point out that the competing 
interest statement that we published in Lancet is longer than 
the original letter. It contains the most detail----
    Dr. Ruiz. It could have a thousand words, two thousand 
words. The fact of the matter is that you didn't disclose the 
competing interest. And at one point you agreed with your 
colleagues that you should not sign the statement and offered 
that--you should not sign the statement and offered that you 
would release it, quote, ``in a way that doesn't leak it back 
to our collaboration.''
    So, I'm going to list a series of actions you took before 
and shortly after the statement publication.
    Dr. Daszak. So----
    Dr. Ruiz. So, 1 second. Let me just finish this list.
    Dr. Daszak. Of course.
    Dr. Ruiz. You requested The Lancet not designate you as a 
corresponding author. You arranged for The Lancet to feature 
the 27 signatories as coauthors in alphabetical order. You 
created a COVID-19 Statement Google Mail address for reader 
correspondence. You directed one of the Statement's signatories 
to take a press inquiry you had personally received.
    Dr. Daszak, did you take those actions, so that the Lancet 
Statement would not, in your own words, link back to your 
collaboration?
    Dr. Daszak. No. Those actions were taken because, as we 
state in, I think, the final sentence of the statement, this is 
a 300-word statement to show support for scientists fighting a 
pandemic.
    In the final phrase, we say: We speak in one voice. All of 
us, all 26 people, are leaders in public health.
    There are people in--authors of that letter that are far 
more high ranked in the system than I am. It was inappropriate 
for me to be first or corresponding author because we speak as 
one voice. We state that clearly in the letter. We all felt 
very strongly about it.
    And I want to remind the Committee that almost all of those 
authors followed up with a renewed letter to Lancet to continue 
support for that original letter about a year later.
    Dr. Ruiz. So, you know, let me be clear here. I 
categorically condemn the threats you and other scientists or 
public health officials have received due to extreme 
accusations like we've heard from some of my colleagues. Words 
have consequences, and repeated attacks can rile up people's 
negative sentiments and result in threats.
    But it seems like you were aware of your involvement, and 
the Lancet Statement had at minimum the appearance of a 
competing interest.
    Dr. Daszak, you may disagree that you had a competing 
interest as a technical matter. So, I'd like to know, where did 
you draw the line between the appearance of a competing 
interest and an actual competing interest?
    Dr. Daszak. At the time we wrote the letter, none of us, 
all 26 authors, could ever imagine the political maelstrom 
that's happened since. None of us thought that the work we did 
would be considered----
    Dr. Ruiz. So, where do you draw the line between the 
appearance of a competing interest and an actual competing 
interest?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, in the case of the Lancet letter, we 
filed our submission----
    Dr. Ruiz. In the case of all of your disclosures and all 
the debate where you didn't say that Wuhan was a subsidiary of 
your grant, like, where do you--you know, you were doing 
subsidiary work at Wuhan.
    Where do you draw the line between telling folks that, yes, 
you, in fact, were subgranting research at Wuhan and yet you're 
debating whether or not this came from Wuhan?
    Dr. Daszak. And I think you'll find in my competing 
interests I stated we've done extensive work with multiple 
organizations in China.
    Dr. Ruiz. Multiple organization in China is a way to skirt 
around the fact that it was Wuhan.
    Dr. Daszak. We had years of research----
    Dr. Ruiz. It was Wuhan.
    Dr. Daszak. Dozens of----
    Dr. Ruiz. I mean, the one lab that we're interested in here 
is Wuhan.
    Dr. Daszak. Right.
    Dr. Ruiz. And yet you say multiple labs.
    So, Dr. Daszak, you know, my heart goes out to you and your 
family. I really feel for you and your family for the attacks 
that you guys have endured.
    But, you know, I can appreciate the importance of 
solidarity with scientists fighting COVID-19, sharing 
information about the virus, yet facing resistance from the 
government. We saw the same during the Trump administration.
    But your failure to declare a competing interest, coupled 
with your efforts to disperse apparent authorship among the 
signatories, deprived the public of important context when 
reading the statement.
    So with that, you know, I want to thank you for being here.
    And I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
    I now recognize the Chairman of the Full Committee, Mr. 
Comer from Kentucky, for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Daszak, how long have you been a collaborator with the 
Wuhan Institute of Virology?
    Dr. Daszak. I think since about 2003.
    Mr. Comer. So, during that time before the pandemic, were 
you aware of all the types of research occurring at the Wuhan 
lab?
    Dr. Daszak. We were aware of all the published information 
coming out of the lab and the people we met from the lab.
    Mr. Comer. Were you aware that there was a Chinese military 
lab associated with the Wuhan lab?
    Dr. Daszak. No, and I still am not aware of that.
    Mr. Comer. In the fall of 2019, the Wuhan lab virus data 
base was taken offline.
    Have you ever seen its full virus data base?
    Dr. Daszak. No. No.
    Mr. Comer. To your knowledge, did the Wuhan Institute 
conduct coronavirus research that did not involve EcoHealth?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Mr. Comer. In kind of standard procedure, do you--do 
research--do researchers publish every virus they find or every 
experiment they conduct?
    Dr. Daszak. They try to publish most eventually.
    Mr. Comer. So, is it possible the Wuhan Institute has 
viruses or conducted experiments that they never published?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Mr. Comer. So, you testified to your lack of knowledge 
regarding activities at the Wuhan lab. Is it possible COVID-19 
was the result of a lab leak?
    Dr. Daszak. I've publicly stated that many times, including 
as a member of the WHO mission to investigate the COVID 
origins. All of us in the group unanimously voted----
    Mr. Comer. So, yes, it's possible, correct?
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. That it was possible but extremely 
unlikely, based on the evidence we have.
    Mr. Comer. Dr. Daszak, the U.S. intelligence community has 
been investigating the origins of COVID-19. During that 
investigation were you ever contacted by any intelligence 
agencies?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Mr. Comer. Which ones?
    Dr. Daszak. The CIA, the FBI, and the Defense Intelligence 
Agency.
    Mr. Comer. OK. Dr. Daszak, before I ask you this next 
question, I want to remind you that you are under oath.
    Other than the interactions that you just testified to, 
have you or do you have a standing relationship, either 
officially or unofficially, with any agency in the intelligence 
community?
    Dr. Daszak. No.
    Mr. Comer. So, you've never been an informant for the U.S. 
Government?
    Dr. Daszak. You asked me if I have a standing relationship 
with any agencies in the intelligence community. The answer is 
no.
    Mr. Comer. So, you're stating publicly you've never been an 
informant for any U.S. intelligence agency?
    Dr. Daszak. I'm stating publicly that I do not have a 
standing relationship with the intelligence community. That was 
your question.
    Mr. Comer. Have you ever been an informant for any U.S. 
intelligence agency?
    Dr. Daszak. Not to my knowledge. I've certainly when 
they've asked me questions, I've provided answers, as any 
citizens of the U.S. would.
    Mr. Comer. What types of questions? Did they ask you 
questions before the COVID outbreak?
    Dr. Daszak. I've spoken with FBI before the COVID outbreak, 
of course.
    Mr. Comer. So, you had communications with the intelligence 
community before the outbreak of COVID.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, the FBI was a member of the Forum on 
Microbial Threats, which I'm the Chair of. So, yes, only in 
that context.
    Mr. Comer. Like what types of conversations did you talk 
about prior to the outbreak of COVID?
    Dr. Daszak. Talked about emerging disease threats and what 
information we have about where on the planet the next virus is 
likely to emerge.
    Mr. Comer. Did the U.S.----
    Dr. Daszak. And then we talked about China and the threats 
of coronaviruses.
    Mr. Comer. So, did the U.S. intelligence community know 
what was going on in the Wuhan lab.
    Dr. Daszak. That's a question for the U.S. intelligence 
agency. I mean, we've supplied any information to any 
government agency that----
    Mr. Comer. So, the U.S. intelligence agency was interested, 
because you had conversations with them prior to COVID, in what 
type of activity was taking place in the Wuhan lab?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes. And I believe they've asked many other 
scientists too.
    Mr. Comer. How familiar would you state that the 
intelligence community was with what was going on in the Wuhan 
lab? Did the intelligence community believe that the Wuhan lab 
was being used by China to manufacture bioweapons?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, that's really for the intelligence 
community to answer.
    But in the public statements that they've made, two 
agencies, I think, have low to moderate confidence that there 
was some activity, and the other agencies were unable to 
comment. So, I'm not sure they do have much information.
    Mr. Comer. Do you find it troubling that, by all accounts 
from your testimony, the intelligence community suspected 
something fishy was going on at the Wuhan lab, despite that 
they still funded research with American taxpayer dollars at 
the Wuhan lab?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I don't know that the intelligence 
community funded research there, but----
    Mr. Comer. But the government did.
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Mr. Comer. And the intelligence community is part of the 
government.
    Dr. Daszak. Sure. Sorry, I misunderstood your question.
    And I don't find it troubling at all, I don't think it's 
unusual, because only two intelligence agencies, from my 
recollection, have any belief that that may have been involved 
in a lab origin of COVID and they have low to moderate 
confidence.
    I just don't think the data are there to support that. And 
I think the evidence that this came from a natural spillover is 
huge and growing every week.
    Mr. Comer. My time has expired.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Mrs. Dingell from Michigan 
for 5 minutes of questions.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    In 2018, EcoHealth submitted a grant application titled 
``Project DEFUSE'' to DARPA. And although DARPA ultimately 
rejected the application, it proposed experiments to introduce 
furin cleavage sites into coronaviruses. That has, as we all 
know, since met controversy.
    For context, furin cleavage sites are an attribute found in 
some viruses, including SARS-CoV-2, that can help make these 
viruses more infectious.
    Dr. Daszak, did Project DEFUSE propose that the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology perform the furin cleavage site 
experiments?
    Dr. Daszak. No.
    Mrs. Dingell. Do you have any knowledge of the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology or UNC ever performing the furin cleavage 
site experiments?
    Dr. Daszak. No.
    Mrs. Dingell. You have none?
    Dr. Daszak. No.
    Mrs. Dingell. Your answers appear to be consistent with 
your transcribed interview testimony about Project DEFUSE's 
proposed furin cleavage site experiments.
    However, Republicans have suggested that your testimony 
today and previously is materially inconsistent with a comment 
you made on a recently released draft of the Project DEFUSE 
application.
    You wrote that you, quote, ``want to stress the U.S. side 
of this proposal, so that DARPA are uncomfortable with our 
team. Once we get the funds, we can then allocate who does what 
exact work, and I believe that a lot of these assays can be 
done in Wuhan as well.''
    Republicans have suggested that this comment is 
inconsistent with your testimony about where particular Project 
DEFUSE experiments would be conducted.
    However, it's not entirely clear that the furin cleavage 
site experiments you've testified about today and previously 
are the same work being referenced in your comment.
    And I would like to note that the final Project DEFUSE 
proposal does, in fact, reference certain lab work to be 
conducted in Wuhan.
    Dr. Daszak, is your testimony about the proposed furin 
cleavage site experiments at UNC inconsistent with your comment 
about lab work in Wuhan?
    Dr. Daszak. Absolutely not. And as you can see from the 
sidebar comment in the draft proposal that you're referring to, 
I was talking about assays.
    Assays are things like PCR tests, like the COVID tests we 
all take. They use noninfectious particles. They're not 
infectious agents.
    The infectious work involving recombinant viruses is 
clearly laid out in the proposal to be done at UNC.
    And I want to remind the Committee again that this proposal 
was never funded and the work was never done.
    Mrs. Dingell. Well, thank you for clearing that up.
    But I do want to note, however, that it appears that you 
intended to mislead DARPA about the extent of Wuhan's 
involvement at the time you made this comment. You told the 
Chairman that you saw nothing unusual about this.
    It kind of raises some questions for me. It's not so easy. 
So, I guess I'd like you to talk about that a little more.
    Dr. Daszak, why did you even entertain the thought of 
minimizing and apparently omitting the extent of Wuhan's 
involvement?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I did talk to the DARPA staff right at 
the beginning when we started planning this proposal and asked 
them straight up in an email chain: Is it OK to propose this, 
to work with the colleagues in China on coronaviruses from 
China? They said yes.
    So there was no intent to hide any China involvement. 
They're in the proposal. And what matters is the record of the 
proposal, not what's written in a draft months earlier that was 
then rejected by our internal deliberations.
    The record of the proposal that was submitted clearly lays 
out the work plan and indicates each lab and what work it's 
going to do. DARPA reviewed that. They saw it. They had 
oversight of that.
    If then when they said, ``Yes, you've got the go-ahead to 
be funded,'' we would then have submitted work plans. If I 
wanted to change where one or two of the assays were done, I 
would then propose that to DARPA. They would have complete 
authority and oversight over whether that happened or not.
    So, there was no attempt to deceive at all.
    Mrs. Dingell. There are appearance issues here. So, that's 
why I want to say my Democratic colleagues and I want to----
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Mrs. Dingell [continuing]. Emphasize the importance of 
transparency.
    We believe in a full accounting of facts, and I believe we 
have been very fair with you. We won't accuse you of creating 
COVID-19 because that's simply not what we can do with the 
available evidence. It doesn't demonstrate it. And we will give 
you the opportunity to respond to allegations--Republican 
allegations--that may not hold water.
    But to the extent that you have considered misrepresenting 
facts or done so, we will consider that a very serious mistake.
    And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
    I now recognize Mr. Griffith from Virginia for 5 minutes of 
questions.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you.
    Dr. Daszak, I'd like to walk through an inconsistency we 
have identified in your--in this investigation and your 
testimony.
    I would request unanimous consent to move three documents 
into the record. The first is the draft progress report dated 
May 2020, the second the year 5 progress report submitted to 
NIH in August 2021, and the last is an excerpt from Dr. 
Daszak's transcribed interview of November.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Without objection.
    Mr. Griffith. The first document is an earlier draft of the 
year 5 progress report that was originally due in September 
2019 that was sent to the Committee by an anonymous 
whistleblower.
    You should have that now, and it's this document here.
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Mr. Griffith. It appears that this version was updated on--
or last updated on May 26, 2020, which was about 7 months after 
it was due and about 16 months before you had submitted--or 
submit a document--to the NIH--to NIAID in August 2021.
    I'll also note that we have repeatedly requested the drafts 
of these progress reports from EcoHealth, but the drafts, 
including this one, have not been produced.
    In the version you submitted to NIAID in August 2021, in 
talking about transference from bats to humans, you stated--or 
the report stated--``There may be as many as the low hundreds 
of thousands to over a million people infected each year in 
south China and Southeast Asia.''
    This statement has since been repeated in multiple news 
articles for the proposition that direct bat-to-human spillover 
of viruses is a common occurrence. It has been used to bolster 
the case for natural origin, and may even be responsible, as 
you said, for the intelligence community having low to moderate 
assurance that it started in the lab.
    But the May 2020 draft of the year 5 progress report 
reached a different conclusion with the same data. This is 
still your people. And you stated in that one, quote, ``The low 
rate of seropositivity observed in this study indicates that 
the bat coronavirus spillover is a rare event.''
    Rare or up to a million?
    So as of May 2020, EcoHealth was in the opinion that a 
spillover of bat viruses into people was a rare event. But when 
you finally sent this report to NIH, the report stated that 
spillovers infected potentially a million people each year in 
south China and Southeast Asia.
    Now, in addition to the draft being materially different, 
this May 2020 draft also contradicts your transcribed interview 
testimony.
    During the interview, I specifically asked you, and I asked 
you directly, whether the 2021 version of the year 5 progress 
report was, quote, ``in all respects the same as,'' end quote, 
the one that was supposed to be submitted in September 2019.
    Mr. Griffith. You testified from the point of view of the 
work that this Committee's concerned about in SARS-related 
coronavirus, yes. Then we had a discussion about the fact that 
there's a couple of committees involved. And you repeated, yes, 
that there was nothing significant that wasn't in the draft 
that would have then been put in the final version. That's your 
testimony under oath.
    In light of this May 2020 draft of the progress report, I 
don't know how to interpret your answer to me in the 
transcribed interview as anything other than untruthful.
    You changed perhaps one of the most important findings, the 
likelihood of bat coronavirus spillover into humans, from very 
rare in early 2020, on a report that was due in September 2019, 
to possibly over a million spillovers annually in Southeast 
Asia and Southeast China alone by late 2021.
    There's no new data. There's no new paper cited--just a 
complete 180 reversal on the conclusion.
    And, Dr. Daszak, this is uncomfortable, but we must know, 
and my assumption is that you either had communications with 
Dr. Fauci or others at NIAID; you had outside pressure; or you 
realized that your company could be liable, and so, changes 
were made either to satisfy NIAID or others in the scientific 
community, or to cover up potential liability. Which one is it?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, there's a fourth possibility, isn't 
there, that we conducted scientific research in the period 
between the initial drafting of that report and updating it----
    Mr. Griffith. And, if that were true--hang on--if that were 
true, Dr. Daszak, why didn't you tell me that in November of 
last year? It's been less than 6 months. I gave you the 
opportunity to say that there was a change in your initial 
draft and later drafts. You didn't bring up this fourth 
possibility then. You didn't say, ``Well, we did some 
additional research, and we made a change on the number of 
times that a bat virus might spill over into the population in 
Southeast Asia or South China.'' You didn't give me that.
    I gave you the chance. I didn't ask it as--I was looking 
for facts. I wasn't trying to cross-examine you at that time, 
and yet you didn't tell me the truth. And today you come up 
with a new theory as to why that might've happened, but that's 
not what you gave me in November. Isn't that true? You didn't 
give me that in November, isn't that true, yes or no?
    Dr. Daszak. My theory----
    Mr. Griffith. Is it yes or no that you told me something 
wrong and false in November?
    Dr. Daszak. My theory has a substantial advantage over 
yours in that it's----
    Mr. Griffith. No, my theory is you didn't tell me the 
truth. You're now coming up with a theory as to why your 
reports in the leaked 2020 report and your later 2021 report 
are different. I'm asserting, and I'm asking you, you told me 
something wrong in November if your----
    Dr. Daszak. I believe----
    Mr. Griffith [continuing]. Is correct. Is that true?
    Dr. Daszak. I believe I'm seeing this for the first time. 
You never showed this to me on the record.
    Mr. Griffith. I didn't have it in November, but I asked you 
if there was a substantial change----
    Dr. Daszak. If you would've shown me this, I would've 
explained it then. If you let me speak, I'll explain it now.
    Mr. Griffith. Well, let me----
    Dr. Daszak. I can give you the answer to your question.
    Mr. Griffith. I'm going to answer it for you because here's 
the problem.
    Dr. Daszak. OK.
    Mr. Griffith. I asked you specifically if there would be 
any substantial or significant changes from what you would've 
had--you said you tried to send the report in earlier, and 
there was something wrong with the site and so forth, and I 
said, but that report that was due in September, when you tried 
to send it in September 2019, were there any substantial 
differences. You said that there weren't, that they would be 
substantially the same.
    Dr. Daszak. And that is still correct.
    Mr. Griffith. And you don't think this is a significant 
change?
    Dr. Daszak. No.
    Mr. Griffith. Wow.
    Dr. Daszak. I will explain--I will explain----
    Mr. Griffith. You know what, I practiced in the criminal 
courts for many, many years, and I will just tell you, if you 
were my client, I would tell you that that dog won't hunt and 
the judge ain't going to believe that.
    And I yield back.
    Dr. Daszak. Thanks.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Ms. Ross from North Carolina 
for 5 minutes of questions.
    Ms. Ross. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 
Member.
    Dr. Daszak, I'm going to return to the report but talk 
about a discrete issue examined in the minority staff report 
that the Democrats released this morning, concerning your 
compliance with NIH's reporting requirements. So, we're just 
going to stay on reporting requirements.
    And, as you know, as a grant recipient and a scientist, 
accurate and timely reporting is crucial for the stewards of 
taxpayer funds, and missteps in this process can reflect poorly 
on the broader scientific enterprise.
    So, consistent with NIH's grants policy statement and 
NIAID--NIAID required you to submit annual progress reports for 
your grants--annual, every year.
    Your grant had an initial 5-year term, meaning you were 
required to submit five reports. But I'm going to go back to 
the report that my colleague was talking about.
    So your year 5 report, so the fifth report--you'd already 
reported, done fine, before then--that was due on September 19. 
Is that correct?
    Dr. Daszak. That's not correct. It was due on September the 
28th, 2019.
    Ms. Ross. Right. I'm sorry. September 28, 2019?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Ms. Ross. Perfect. Thank you.
    But it is also true that you did not submit this report 
until August 2021, nearly 2 years later, as my colleague just 
represented.
    Dr. Daszak. Well----
    Ms. Ross. You did not submit the report at the end of 
September 2019?
    Dr. Daszak. We uploaded the report into the system. The 
system locked us out. We tried to contact NIH. We received no 
response----
    Ms. Ross [continuing]. Excuse me. Reclaiming my time.
    You did email, on July 30 of 2019, your grants manager, 
saying you expected to have everything uploaded by the end of 
July. But then the report was not uploaded by the end of July. 
I'm quoting an email from Dr. Chmura, dated July 30, 2019, 
which is on file.
    Then HHS IG examined why you submitted the year 5 report 
nearly 2 years late, and, again, you told us about this lockout 
for the deadline.
    However, NIH performed an electronic, forensic 
investigation of its report-submission system and found no 
evidence of a lockout. They also found no evidence to 
corroborate your claims.
    Additionally, in a transcribed interview with Select 
Committee staff, the NIH official tasked with your grants 
compliance believed that you could have submitted the report on 
time.
    You have provided us with no documented evidence of 
EcoHealth's outreach to NIAID about the lockout, and then you 
stated it didn't exist because you only contacted by phone.
    That assertion is pretty difficult to square with your 
staff's previous patterns of communication over the previous 4 
years.
    For example, your staff had emailed twice in July 2019, 
once on July 30, as I previously explained, and then earlier on 
July 24. So, there was no email on September 29 that said we 
tried to call you.
    And, in the previous year, you previously emailed a copy of 
your year 4 annual report to multiple NIAID officers. So, there 
was no email of the fifth year report, the same one that my 
colleague was talking about.
    So your staff knows how to communicate--they had--for the 
life of the grant. And then later you claimed that that year 5 
report was of little significance because the grant renewal 
application contained experimental results from year 5 of the 
grant.
    But that's just not true because we've heard this whole 
colloquy about differences that would've been made between 2019 
and 2021.
    Yes or no, if you had looked back and knew that you would 
be here today, would you have done something differently to 
ensure that that report was received in September 2019?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I have a timeline of submission efforts, 
and there are attempts to submit which are not yet on the 
record with you, which we'll supply.
    Ms. Ross. We'd appreciate that.
    Dr. Daszak. There are also--it's also both things can be 
true, that a forensic analysis of efforts to submit aren't 
going to pick up a phone call to the grants management staff 
that our admin people made. They did. They received no 
response. I believe that person then left.
    And, look, the issue over what we would do differently, 
well, one thing I would do differently was I'd certainly send a 
copy of the report to our program officer. I did that in year 4 
not because that's a routine process--that's not----
    Ms. Ross. But you knew----
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. But I was trying to set up a 
meeting with the program officer----
    Ms. Ross [continuing]. You knew that there were 
difficulties. You had a previous----
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Ms. Ross [continuing]. Experience of doing this and making 
sure people got things. And what I am saying is, when the 
taxpayers' money is used for scientific research, it is 
imperative that people comply with the rules, particularly when 
their behavior had been exemplary in the past.
    And that is what raises the concerns that you have heard 
from our colleagues----
    Dr. Daszak. Well, let me explain----
    Ms. Ross [continuing]. And with that, I yield back.
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. But let me explain, please, if I 
can. NIH told us 2 years later to submit that report. It took 
NIH 11 days to unlock the system--so any assertion that the 
system was not locked are demonstrably false--11 days. And that 
time we got the email receipts which I'll share with you, of 
course.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Ms. Malliotakis from New York 
for 5 minutes of questions.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Daszak, ``gain of function'' is broadly understood as a 
type of research that modifies a biological agent, so that it 
confers new and enhanced activity to that agent.
    Does that describe any of the work that Wuhan conducted as 
far as you are knowledgeable?
    Dr. Daszak. That is not the definition of ``gain of 
function.''
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. Then what is your definition?
    Dr. Daszak. I don't have a personal definition.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. But did you--then let me ask this 
question. Did any of the research that you funded through your 
organization at Wuhan Lab modify a virus to make it more 
infectious among humans, yes or no?
    Dr. Daszak. No. That was not the goal of our work, and 
that's why it was not considered gain of function.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. But in 2016----
    Dr. Wenstrup. Will the gentlelady suspend?
    Under the rules of the House, the Chairman is responsible 
for maintaining order and preserving decorum in the Committee 
room. I expect the audience members to be respectful of the 
witnesses, Members, and public, and there should be no filming.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Malliotakis. In 2016, in an email to NIH, you said, 
``We are happy to hear that our gain-of-function research 
funding ban, or prohibition, or pause rather, has been 
lifted.'' So, what were you--what gain of function therefore 
followed?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, they paused our research because of the 
gain-of-function pause. They lifted the pause on our research. 
That was the response I was----
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. So, after that period of time, you did 
not fund any research that modified a virus to make it more 
infectious among humans?
    Dr. Daszak. EcoHealth Alliance never has and did not do 
gain-of-function research, by definition.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Are you aware of Wuhan Lab conducting that 
type of research?
    Dr. Daszak. No.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. The State Department has indicated 
ties between Chinese military and WIV since 26--17. You 
testified earlier that you were not aware of any type of 
military activity at the WIV?
    Dr. Daszak. I've never seen any. I've never seen any 
reliable reporting of any.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. EcoHealth received tens of millions of 
dollars from the Defense Department. Did any of this money make 
its way to the WIV?
    Dr. Daszak. Not a single cent.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. Did any scientific information derived 
with those funds make its way to the WIV?
    Dr. Daszak. The scientific information derived from the 
DITRA--the work that we do, goes to DITRA and the American 
people.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. And so, no technology or anything 
obtained with the funds from the Department of Defense made its 
way to the WIV?
    Dr. Daszak. There is no connection between the WIV and the 
work we do with DITRA at all whatsoever.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. Thank you.
    Why did you choose to partner with the Wuhan Lab?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, if you want to work in a foreign country 
to find the next potential risk of a pandemic, you have to work 
with labs in those countries. We looked at labs across China. 
The WIV is the premier viral research in China.
    Ms. Malliotakis. And at no time were you concerned about 
sub-par safety conditions at this particular lab?
    Dr. Daszak. No. In fact, it's got very good biosafety 
level.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Well, I mean, I think that could be 
disputed at this point.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I've never seen any verifiable evidence 
or data that suggests otherwise.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Like, I think our intelligence 
department--intelligence community has shown that they've been 
operating----
    Dr. Daszak. No, I've never seen any verifiable or real data 
to suggest otherwise. Intelligence community reports behind 
the, you know, the security code----
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. I'd like to turn to----
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. And I can't see those.
    Ms. Malliotakis [continuing]. How much has the EcoHealth 
Alliance received since the outbreak of the COVID pandemic 
from--in American tax dollars, from 2020 to today?
    Dr. Daszak. Our annual operating budget this year is about 
$16 million. So, it's been about 4 years since the pandemic, 
so, given the fluctuation in funding, approximately four times 
$15-or $16 million.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. And our colleagues on both sides of 
the aisle say that we want to prevent the next pandemic. Yet 
EcoHealth is still receiving tens of millions of dollars to do 
risky----
    Dr. Daszak. To prevent the next pandemic.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Well, but----
    Dr. Daszak. That's our goal. That's our mission. It's 
written into our mission.
    Ms. Malliotakis [continuing]. I mean, it's one thing to 
prevent the next pandemic. You could actually produce one and--
--
    Dr. Daszak. No.
    Ms. Malliotakis [continuing]. What I want to--yes, 
absolutely, yes.
    Dr. Daszak. No, absolutely not. That's not----
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. So, although funding was stopped at 
EcoHealth Alliance work on bat coronaviruses in Wuhan, your 
researchers are still doing research on bat coronaviruses in 
Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam. Is that correct?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes. Not Myanmar. We're not allowed to work 
there yet because of political instability.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. And are you doing experiments with 
bats and hamsters on the deadly, brain-swelling Nipah virus in 
Bangladesh?
    Dr. Daszak. I would have to check if we're doing 
experiments on that. We certainly have funding to work on Nipah 
virus. It's a very real threat globally and to the American 
people.
    Ms. Malliotakis. And are you infecting humanized mice with 
zoonotic viruses in Southeast Asia?
    Dr. Daszak. Not to my knowledge, but I would have to check.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. And are you--did you obtain $14 
million in taxpayer funds to import bats from Asia to create a 
breeding colony here in the United States at the State 
University of Colorado?
    Dr. Daszak. We have a collaboration with CSU to conduct 
work on a really significant public health threat called Nipah 
virus.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. And now you'll be infecting those bats 
with deadly viruses including the Nipah and the Ebola. Are you 
aware that Colorado State University has had lab accidents in 
the past?
    Dr. Daszak. There will be no infection experiments, to my 
knowledge, with Nipah or ebola at CSU. That will be done at a 
BSL-4 facility elsewhere.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. I've run out of time. I yield back. 
Thank you.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Dr. Daszak, we are going to take some of the 
questions that you said you'd get back to us on, we'll submit 
them for the record and get a response.
    I now recognize Ms. Tokuda from Hawaii for 5 minutes of 
questions.
    Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Doctor, a key issue at today's hearing is your transparency 
as a Federal grantee. There's an apparent gap in understanding 
between you and NIAID about the status of key bat samples 
related to your grant.
    There's an open question about the extent to which this gap 
may be attributable to omissions or misrepresentations on your 
part. I'd appreciate your help in understanding this a little 
bit more.
    In April 2023, NIAID allowed work to resume on the 
EcoHealth grant, while barring EcoHealth from providing any 
grant funds to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. The Select 
Subcommittee interviewed two senior NIAID officials involved in 
that decision.
    We were told that part of the logic in allowing the grant 
to move forward was preserving access to biological bat samples 
from your prior work.
    So, for context, under the former iteration of the 
EcoHealth grant, the Wuhan Institute of Virology collected and 
tested bat samples for the presence of coronavirus.
    Doctor, it appears that when NIAID renewed your grant, that 
they were of the understanding that you would have access to 
those bat samples. In fact, in a transcribed interview, a NIAID 
official testified that you had directly informed her EcoHealth 
had access to those samples.
    But, in your transcribed interview, you testified that all 
of the bat samples that WIV had collected under your grant 
remained in the custody of the WIV.
    Doctor, do you have physical access to the bat samples the 
Wuhan Institute of Virology previously collected under your 
grant? A simple yes or no will suffice.
    Dr. Daszak. Sadly we do not.
    Ms. Tokuda. Do you have access to the genetic sequences of 
viruses found in those bat samples?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes, we do.
    Ms. Tokuda. At any point did you as the CEO of EHA demand 
that your team physically verify and cross-check the sequencing 
at the Wuhan Institute of Virology? Yes or no will suffice.
    Dr. Daszak. We cross-check all the information that comes 
out from all of our collaborators.
    Ms. Tokuda. So, you cross-check it, but did you actually 
see the conduct yourself? Did you go there to the lab, actually 
have access to the samples, and do the work yourself? Or were 
you taking the information, the sequencing you got from Wuhan, 
and just assuming that it was correct?
    Dr. Daszak. For us to go to China and do the sequencing and 
the extraction of RNA and all that work ourselves----
    Ms. Tokuda. So much of this is based upon----
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. Would defeat the objective of 
having a subcontract. The whole point is that the work is done 
in China by the Chinese researchers because that's what is the 
most efficient way to do that work.
    We then get the data from them. We cross-check it, validate 
it, submit it for publication. It's reviewed, revised----
    Ms. Tokuda. So, we're working off of the----
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. Uploaded into the NIH data base.
    Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, sir. I'm taking back my time.
    So clearly we are taking the word of these Chinese 
scientists, and to state the obvious, having the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology send you electronic sequences through 
emails, as I recall through your testimony, is not the same 
thing as physically having the samples.
    There's nothing stopping the Wuhan Institute of Virology 
from withholding certain sequences of particular interest or 
for manipulating sequence data for unknown purposes.
    In addition, the gap in understanding between you and NIAID 
regarding the status of these samplings is highly concerning to 
me.
    Doctor, did you intentionally misrepresent your access to 
the samples to get your grants renewed by NIAID, yes or no?
    Dr. Daszak. No. And let me explain why there may be a 
discrepancy in the understanding from NIAID. We were very clear 
that the samples collected with U.S. taxpayers' money, because 
of the geopolitical issues and our grant being terminated, are 
now unable to be taken out of that lab. We were told that by 
the Chinese authorities.
    However, we had gotten access to genomic information, new 
information, sequence data, and that is what we proposed to 
work with, with NIH.
    In fact, it was EcoHealth Alliance, me, who proposed to 
NIAID in our renegotiation that we would not do any on-the-
ground work in China, and we don't need to because we already 
have full genome----
    Ms. Tokuda. You seem to have a lot more information than 
what we were provided in the days of testimony that you sat 
down and gave our team, as well as that that we got from NIAID, 
so clearly someone is either lying or somebody is clearly 
misrepresenting themselves.
    So if you, in fact, said all of these things to NIAID 
officials, are you saying that they are misrepresenting you?
    Dr. Daszak. No. And I categorically refute the suggestion 
that someone's lying. This is a simple case of people are 
mistaken between what a sample is and what a sequence is.
    The critical piece of information that the Committee could 
see----
    Ms. Tokuda. I think it's very hard for you to mistaken 
between a sample and a sequence in your profession and within--
--
    Dr. Daszak. People make that mistake all the time. 
Scientists usually don't.
    Ms. Tokuda. But the series of mistakes that had to be made 
in order for NIAID to have the understanding that you had 
access to the samples yourself versus having it in WIV as 
you're stating. You clearly stated that to them, that you had 
no access to the physical samples?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes, repeatedly, and there's a key document 
that the Committee's missing, which is the----
    Ms. Tokuda. So, the NIAID official misrepresented herself 
in her testimony to this Committee? Is that what you're 
claiming?
    Dr. Daszak. I'm not claiming anything about the NIAID 
official. I've not seen the testimony. I've not seen what 
evidence they've got.
    However, I will state, the Committee should look at a 
document, which is with NIAID--and we have a copy of it--it's 
the renegotiated specific aims which clearly say, no on-the-
ground work will be done in China----
    Ms. Tokuda. I think--OK.
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. No samples will come from China. 
The genomes are already in possession----
    Ms. Tokuda. Doctor, my time is up. I appreciate the----
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. To do this research.
    Ms. Tokuda [continuing]. Time of the Chair here. I think 
it's important that grantees represent themselves honestly and 
transparently.
    Dr. Daszak. Which we do.
    Ms. Tokuda. Our taxpayers deserve better, and this 
Committee demands nothing less.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    Dr. Daszak. Thank you.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Dr. Miller-Meeks from Iowa 
for 5 minutes of questions.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 
thank you, Dr. Daszak, for testifying before the Select 
Subcommittee today. I've not been in your place before, and I 
would say that it's certainly very challenging.
    You know, some people would say where I represent in 
southeast Iowa is kind of redneck or kind of hickville. So, I 
think a lot of medical terminology and scientific terminology 
is very confusing and very confusing to the average person and 
even the average Congressperson.
    So, as I recall, there was, under the Obama Administration, 
a pause on gain-of-function research, and that was a 2-year 
pause that Dr. Fauci helped to communicate, and then also was 
communicating whether or not that prohibition should be lifted.
    And, as I recall, weren't you in favor of lifting the 
prohibition on gain-of-function research?
    Dr. Daszak. I don't think I've ever publicly stated whether 
the prohibition should be lifted or not. I think we published 
an editorial in our journal, EcoHealth, that discussed the pros 
and cons of gain-of-function research, back in 2015, something 
like that.
    And we came out with a conclusion, me and some other 
authors, that this is a controversial piece of work, that if it 
goes ahead, must be done in a very controlled and biosafe way.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. Thank you for that. And for your grant 
which funded the Wuhan Institute of Virology, you proposed a 
one log growth award term, and this term was in place in case 
any of the viruses that were being modified grew, so--but 
that's not considered gain of function, so--or is it? That's 
the confusing part.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, yes, it's quite important distinction. 
The gain-of-function rules come into play when you propose an 
experiment, and the experiment is reviewed then as to whether 
it is likely to, with a reasonable assurance of likelihood, 
cause an increase in transmission or pathogenicity of a virus 
already known to infect people.
    Because the work we were doing was on bat coronaviruses, it 
was not covered by those rules. It was not considered of any 
risk to human health because they've never been shown to infect 
people. Now, that's one of the reasons why it wasn't 
considered----
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. I mean, what about SARS? Did SARS not 
infect people? Is that not a bat coronavirus?
    Dr. Daszak. The work we were doing was to work with bat 
coronaviruses----
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. I may be confused, but I think SARS was a 
bat coronavirus. So----
    Dr. Daszak. No, SARS was not a bat coronavirus. It's a----
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. [continuing] Any of the viruses in your 
experiments, did any of them grow in, as you said, 
transmissibility, or pathogenicity?
    Dr. Daszak. Not in any way that would cause any reason for 
concern----
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. So, they may have grown in 
transmissibility or pathogenicity, but that's not gain-of-
function research?
    Dr. Daszak. Because if you look at the definition of gain-
of-function research, it's to assess whether a human pathogen 
is likely to be increased by some experiment on it. The viruses 
we were working on were bat coronas.
    But, listen, please don't take my word for it. The NIH 
wrote to us--and I have the letter here--and said, ``Your work 
is not gain of function and can move ahead.''
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. I think it's contested whether the 
experiments violated the one log growth term occurred during 
the fourth or fifth year of your grant, and then, therefore, as 
we know, there was questions about oversight and oversight on 
your grant.
    Let me just change a little bit. In your written 
testimony----
    Dr. Daszak. Well, can I just respond very briefly?
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. Sir?
    Dr. Daszak. Of course.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. Thank you.
    You state that EcoHealth has maintained open, transparent 
communication with agency staff, rapidly provided information 
critical to public health and published analysis in scientific 
journals, so that scientists everywhere can use this 
information. Very important.
    You continued by describing how Federal funding has allowed 
you to build capacity in China which led to you being able to 
obtain actual public health information from the scientists 
which aided your research of SARS virus, originating from bats.
    Based off your remarks and your testimony, would you say 
that you have responsibly used Federal grant dollars?
    Dr. Daszak. We have responsibly used Federal grant 
dollars----
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. So, the HHS Office of the Inspector 
General----
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. And complied with every oversight 
issue.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. So, the HHS Office of the Inspector 
General released a report, in January 2023, stating that the 
National Institutes of Health and EcoHealth Alliance did not 
effectively monitor awards and sub awards, which resulted in 
missed opportunities for oversight and effective accounting of 
taxpayer dollars.
    Amongst the many recommendations of the OIG report 
included, it stated that EcoHealth should comply with reporting 
requirements for grants and sub awards as well as implementing 
enhanced monitoring of how funds are used.
    I think the point has already been made that transparency 
is absolutely necessary. The type of research being done in a 
lab, whether it is overseas or in the United States, it is 
critical that it's done in the proper safety environment and 
that the ethics of the research we're doing should be valid.
    And we are stewards of taxpayer dollars that should not be 
used in an irresponsible, nontransparent manner.
    With that, I yield. Thank you.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Garcia from 
California for 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Dr. Daszak. I appreciate you being here, and I 
want to thank everyone for some good questions that have 
happened so far.
    We all know that this Subcommittee has a critical mission 
to prevent future pandemics--I think that's why we're all 
here--and of course keep Americans safe from threats like 
COVID. And, to the extent we're able to do that here today, I 
obviously welcome that opportunity.
    You probably are aware that we have had multiple hearings 
now investigating the origins of COVID-19. And I want to just 
remind us, the scientific consensus on this point is very 
clear, which is that we do not have any conclusive evidence to 
determine whether COVID sprung from an accidental lab leak or 
some animal spillover.
    Dr. Daszak, is a fair assessment in your mind as well?
    Dr. Daszak. I would say the scientific consensus right now 
is that--by far more likely that COVID-19 emerged from the 
wildlife trade and wildlife markets of China, which employed 14 
million people prior to the outbreak. There is zero evidence 
that it emerged from a lab.
    Mr. Garcia. Now, I want to remind you and as well as the 
public that our own Federal agencies, of course, share this 
exact lack of confidence, what one determining origin actually 
is, and we actually have multiple different perspectives from 
our agencies.
    So, our press reports, as we all know--we have five 
intelligence agencies that believe in animal spillover with low 
confidence. The FBI thinks with moderate confidence, and the 
Department of Energy with low confidence, in a lab leak, and 
the CIA just doesn't know.
    So, from a Federal agency perspective, there is no 
conclusive evidence that we have actually made.
    Now, what we do know, which is a lot of attacks, there's a 
lot of thoughts about where certain folks in the Congress 
believe these labs--or these leaks actually came from.
    Now, Dr. Daszak, I'm going to be honest with you as well. I 
share a lot of my colleagues' concerns about EcoHealth 
Alliance's practices. A lot of them are deeply concerning, 
particularly when it comes to the monitoring and reporting 
requirements you had to the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases.
    I think these lapses make a strong case for us, as Members 
of Congress, to strengthen our country's ability to monitor and 
enforce effective bio security measures and encourage the same, 
of course, of our international community.
    But I also want to just address what I think is the big 
elephant in the room today, and oftentimes of what you and your 
organization are accused of. Did your organization cause the 
COVID-19 pandemic?
    Dr. Daszak. Absolutely not.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. And I say that because we've 
actually heard that being--have heard that throughout the 
course of the last few months. And I ask this because we have 
yet, of course, to focus on real solutions, for example, like 
increasing funding to actually have better efforts to monitor 
research grant recipients or improve biosecurity.
    This Subcommittee also hasn't really talked about tangible 
ways to increase international cooperation to achieve these 
goals.
    But we have heard a lot of implicit and explicit 
suggestions that EcoHealth Alliance was part of some broader 
conspiracy to spark a global pandemic.
    Now, Doctor, were you ever directed by a government 
official, let's say Dr. Fauci, to intentionally manufacture a 
viral pandemic?
    Dr. Daszak. Of course not.
    Mr. Garcia. And I wanted to just ask you that, as 
ridiculous as that question sounds, because we know folks have 
actually suggested this. There was actually--we've had a Member 
of even this--our own Subcommittee mention that Dr. Fauci was 
trying to, and I quote, create a vaccine pandemic experiment, 
mandate a vaccine be developed from it, and have the American 
taxpayers foot the bill.
    So, proponents of this conspiracy generally seem to think 
your organization was somehow involved. So, I'm sure you've 
heard this before. Do you want to, for the record, again, clear 
this up?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, it's patently false. There's no evidence 
for that whatsoever, and there is incredibly substantial 
evidence that this virus emerged through so-called natural 
zoonotic origins.
    And I might add that we're, right now as we speak, seeing a 
global pan zootic, an outbreak in wildlife, of high pathogen 
avian flu. It's now in our cattle. It's in our people, and here 
we are debating lab biosafety which has nothing to do with 
the----
    Mr. Garcia. I appreciate that, and I think, you know, we've 
heard also, not just that somehow Dr. Fauci or you or, you 
know, your organization was involved, but that maybe it was a 
Chinese-made bioweapon, which we've heard--actually the same 
somebody of the Subcommittee has said in the past.
    I think what's clear is that this Subcommittee needs to 
actually focus on good-faith investigations, supporting 
additional research, ensuring that grantees are actually given 
the support that they need.
    And I think what's also really clear is that we have 
opportunities in this appropriations cycle, and in others in 
the future, to actually collaborate, support HHS, support the 
work the scientists are doing across this country, and that we 
stop making these conspiracy theorist arguments and attacks 
that aren't really helping us solve any future pandemics that 
we may and, we know, will experience in the future.
    Dr. Daszak. Agreed.
    Mr. Garcia. And so, I want to thank you for being here. 
Again, I think there are real concerns that we've had, and 
certainly they've been shared today, but I think we should 
focus on what we actually know to be true and move in that 
direction.
    And, with that, I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Mrs. Lesko from Arizona for 5 
minutes of questions.
    Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you for being here. I think I heard you say earlier 
today that the safety measures in the Chinese labs are the same 
as in the U.S. Did you say that or something similar to that?
    Dr. Daszak. I said they follow the same biosafety levels 
for coronavirus research as we do here in the U.S., yes.
    Mrs. Lesko. And so, you said that WIV followed the same 
U.S. standards--or U.S. standards?
    Dr. Daszak. The mandated rules in China are the same as in 
the U.S. I have the paperwork here.
    Mrs. Lesko. So, help me understand, because I've been told 
that WIV is a biological safety level 2 and U.S. labs are 
required to be biological safety level 3 for the type of 
research that was done. So, how is it that you say they're the 
same?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, because that's--with all due respect, 
that's not correct. There are--the biosafety levels are in the 
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratory Manual, 
Sixth Edition, for the U.S., and they mandate that, for bats, 
SARS-related coronaviruses--on page 452--it states that they're 
for BSL-2 in culture, BSL-2 or 3 for in vivo work in mice.
    So, those are the same standards that are used in China. 
They're the same standards that are published. They're the same 
standards that I'm being repeatedly asked questions about and 
being attacked over. Yet here they are in black and white in 
the manuals that describe the work that should be done in the 
U.S.
    Mrs. Lesko. Good. I'll look at it closer. The other thing I 
think you said earlier is that you still don't know that there 
is a Chinese military presence or collaboration with the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology. Is that what you said?
    Dr. Daszak. No. What I said was that I know of--I have no 
knowledge of any military activity in the Wuhan Lab, and that 
is correct.
    Mrs. Lesko. And how do you know that? Because the State 
Department--this is what the State Department said--the U.S. 
State Department said in 2021, a fact sheet. It says, ``Secrecy 
and nondisclosure are standard practice for Beijing. For many 
years the United States has publicly raised concerns about 
Chinese past biological weapons work which Beijing has neither 
documented nor demonstrably eliminated despite its clear 
obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention. Despite 
the WIV presenting itself as a civilian institution, the United 
States has determined that the WIV has collaborated on 
publications and secret projects with the Chinese military.''
    And this was in 2021, so you just deny what the State 
Department says, that this is not happening?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, something doesn't add up, I completely 
agree, because it's the same State Department that reviews our 
proposals to NIH and allows us to work with that lab.
    If the State Department considers that to be a military 
lab, surely they would've said, ``No, the WIV is not 
appropriate for doing this research.'' However, they reviewed 
it and said, ``Yes, it's appropriate and allowed.''
    Now, I don't know--I don't have access to what the State 
Department reviews and knows, but something doesn't add up 
there because it's them that gave us the go-ahead to work with 
WIV. If they'd have said, ``No, this is not appropriate,'' we 
would've not done so, obviously.
    Mrs. Lesko. I'm going to ask you a question similar to what 
the Congresswoman from Hawaii asked, and, you know, you got a 
lot of money, EcoHealth Alliance got a lot of money from grants 
from the U.S. Government, from the taxpayers.
    And I'm trying to understand if you went there, if anybody 
from your company went to the Wuhan Institute of Virology to 
actually inspect what was going on, because you keep saying no, 
there was no gain-of-function research.
    I think my colleague right here, Ms. Malliotakis, asked 
that and you said, no, didn't happen. How do you know that if 
you didn't go there?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, what I said is, the research we did is 
not gain of function, that is correct. Our staff visited Wuhan 
repeatedly during the period we were working with them--we're 
not working with them anymore--I visited them repeatedly. We 
had online meetings, calls, Zoom calls, exchanged megabytes of 
information on a weekly, monthly basis, of raw data and reports 
and sequences. It's a very active collaboration.
    And, after 15-plus years, 20 years of doing that, you get 
to know how reliable and accurate their data are and the 
working standards that they use. So, you do get a good 
knowledge of whether that lab is adequately protected or not, 
and it is, and it was, and I don't have access to any 
information from the----
    Mrs. Lesko. You know, I'm hoping someday that we are going 
to get to the bottom of the truth of this. I don't know that we 
ever are because I'm hearing totally opposite information from 
reliable sources, than possibly you have said.
    And so, we have two competing theories, and we can't get to 
the bottom of it. It's very frustrating. I hope you understand 
that.
    Dr. Daszak. I hope you trust the scientists.
    Mrs. Lesko. For me--the thing is, we've had scientists on 
both sides----
    Dr. Daszak. Oh, OK.
    Mrs. Lesko [continuing]. That say totally opposite of what 
you're saying, and so, we've had testimony over and over. My 
time is up, but I hope you understand that the American people 
just want to get to the bottom of this, and so do I, because I 
don't want this to happen again.
    Dr. Daszak. And so do we----
    Mrs. Lesko. Thank you.
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. And that is why we do our work 
every day in some very difficult places.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Mr. Cloud from Texas for 5 
minutes of questions.
    Mr. Cloud. Thank you, Chairman. So, you acknowledge you've 
received a grant in 2014--NIAID awarded an EHA grant, entitled, 
Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence, to your 
organization, correct?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Mr. Cloud. And, once COVID outbreak happened, you labeled 
the lab leak theory as conspiracy theory with your knowledge at 
the time?
    Dr. Daszak. That's not what I said, actually. I said that 
there were conspiracy theories at the time that we wrote about 
in our letter in Lancet, including HIV sequences----
    Mr. Cloud. Right.
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. In the virus and snake DNA, some 
very bizarre things.
    Mr. Cloud. Your opinion was used to help--you said, ``Trust 
the scientists.''
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Mr. Cloud. Not necessarily because of you. I don't know 
that you had any contact with social media companies.
    Did you have contact with social media companies during 
that time?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I've posted things----
    Mr. Cloud. Yes. As far as having, you know, a number of the 
scientists, their opinions----
    Dr. Daszak. Oh, no, no.
    Mr. Cloud [continuing]. Were banned. Our government even 
worked to help ban some of those scientific opinions of----
    Dr. Daszak. No, that's not what we do.
    Mr. Cloud [continuing]. That differed than yours.
    Do you--would you acknowledge that that was bad practice at 
least, that our government helped work with social media 
companies to help ban certain scientific opinions?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I mean, if a social media----
    Mr. Cloud. Do you think that benefited science? Do you 
think what that was----
    Dr. Daszak. I think there's been a lot of misinformation, 
there still is, on social media. I think it's good that social 
media companies are going to scientists to get information 
about whether the data they're putting out is true or false.
    Mr. Cloud. There were virologists who had, you know, years 
of experience, who had differing opinions, who were silenced.
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Mr. Cloud. License threatened to be revoked, all those 
different kind of things----
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Mr. Cloud [continuing]. In the name of science. You know, 
we had Fauci almost declare himself to be science and that--you 
know, those kind of things, I think, put a deep distrust in the 
American people for some of the institutions we're now having 
them to rely upon.
    Looking back, do you think there was any error in that? Are 
you concerned about that, or do you think----
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I think, you know, as I said in my 
opening statement, that the emotions during a pandemic are very 
high. We have loved ones--we've all had that, we've all had our 
children infected by COVID and worrying that they're going to 
get really sick. And we know people who've died, and it's very 
upsetting, very tragic.
    I think the emotions lead to a sort of hyper reaction to 
some of these things, and I think that we should trust our 
scientists. I think that the head of a government institute 
that's set up to work on infectious----
    Mr. Cloud. Knowing what you know now, do you regret working 
with the lab in Wuhan?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, our mission is to prevent pandemics. 
Pandemics emerge in----
    Mr. Cloud. Knowing what you know now, do you regret working 
with them?
    Dr. Daszak. Pandemics----
    Mr. Cloud. Not debating that you knew then, but knowing 
what you know now----
    Dr. Daszak. It's our mission to do this. We don't do this 
because we want to go and work in foreign countries and risk 
our lives. Pandemics emerge there. If we can stop them there, 
we stop them getting here. That's what we do. It's written into 
our mission. It's----
    Mr. Cloud. Now, you said there's no evidence to a lab leak 
theory. That's what you've said today a couple times.
    Dr. Daszak. What I said, there's zero verifiable scientific 
evidence--zero.
    Mr. Cloud. OK. But we have evidence that the Wuhan Lab 
destroyed data. Does that concern you at all?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes. Any lab that destroys data concerns me.
    Mr. Cloud. OK. Knowing what you know now, do you regret 
working with the Wuhan Lab?
    Dr. Daszak. As I've said----
    Mr. Cloud. Do you think working with labs that destroy data 
are--is sound?
    Dr. Daszak. I have no choice. We work in countries where 
diseases emerge, whether they're our allies or our competitors, 
because our goal is to stop those diseases from emerging.
    Mr. Cloud. One of the troubling things for us when we go 
home, because we're representing the taxpayers----
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Mr. Cloud [continuing]. Who, no doubt, are, you know, most 
of them are not virologists or scientists or--but they're 
going, we're paying money to fund research in a country that's 
in unrestricted warfare against us, that destroys evidence, and 
then you still are like----
    Dr. Daszak. No, no, I----
    Mr. Cloud [continuing]. ``Well, maybe we should continue 
working with them.''
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. I recognize those concerns, 
absolutely, but if we want to prevent the next pandemic coming 
out of China, how do we know when it's going to happen? We need 
scientists on the ground to get that information, so we're 
better prepared.
    Mr. Cloud. Do you maintain that the lab leak theory is a 
plausible theory today?
    Dr. Daszak. As I've said all the way through this, it's 
possible but extremely unlikely.
    Mr. Cloud. And, having done it over, you would continue to 
work with the Wuhan Lab?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I--they're a lab in China that does 
virology research----
    Mr. Cloud. This weighs into like your----
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. That----
    Mr. Cloud [continuing]. Your organization is still 
receiving taxpayer funds----
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Mr. Cloud [continuing]. And you're still making decisions 
on which labs across the world that you go into.
    Dr. Daszak. We don't work in China. We don't work with the 
Wuhan Lab. They're debarred from funding.
    Mr. Cloud. OK. Right. Right. But the taxpayer right now is 
trusting you in some essence, through the various recommended 
channels, to make decisions on who we're working with. And if 
you're picking labs and you don't think it's an issue that a 
lab destroyed data and that's not a disqualifying factor, 
that's a concern.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, let me remind you, we didn't pick a lab. 
We proposed to do research with that lab. The State Department 
and NIH reviewed it and said that lab was on the list of labs 
that it preferred to work with.
    Mr. Cloud. Well, I'm out of time, and I know Dr. Fauci will 
be here, but there's--the, quote, layers of accountability have 
become layers of plausible deniability in different 
institutions----
    Dr. Daszak. Well, that's a fact what I just said. It really 
is a fact.
    Mr. Cloud [continuing]. And so, we'll have to dig into that 
because my time is up.
    Dr. Daszak. No, no, I'll send you----
    Mr. Cloud. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. The information about it.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Dr. Joyce from Pennsylvania 
for 5 minutes of questions.
    Dr. Joyce. Thank you, Chairman Wenstrup, for convening what 
I feel is a critical meeting.
    It is imperative that we are an oversight body who conduct 
an adequate investigation and ensure that the American taxpayer 
dollars are being spent judiciously and within the law.
    Dr. Daszak, why did you try to downplay the fact that Shi 
Zhengli and other Chinese scientists would be working on your 
proposed grant to DARPA?
    Dr. Daszak. I did not. I told DARPA who----
    Dr. Joyce. Did you make any edits to your proposal in order 
to obscure Chinese involvement in this work?
    Dr. Daszak. No. It's clearly----
    Dr. Joyce. Specifically, did you alter the number of 
Chinese investigators in initial application and follow-up 
application? Were the numbers the same?
    Dr. Daszak. There was only one application.
    Dr. Joyce. And so, that number has always been the number 
of Chinese investigators that you worked with?
    Dr. Daszak. The application that was submitted to the 
agency is the only matter of record. Anything else is a draft. 
They're ideas that can be revised and changed.
    Dr. Joyce. Following up on some of my colleagues' 
questions--and I appreciate the candidness that we continue to 
pepper you with, because I think we have conflicting answers--
where are the sequences stored, and who has that data base?
    Dr. Daszak. Those are two different questions.
    Dr. Joyce. I know that.
    Dr. Daszak. The sequences that we acquired from our work 
with the Wuhan Institute of Virology are stored at EcoHealth 
Alliance and have been shared publicly through GenBank, the NIH 
data base, published and shared with this Committee and other 
committees.
    We have other sequences that we acquired before our grant 
was renegotiated, which we're currently analyzing and will 
publish----
    Dr. Joyce. Do you feel you have all the sequences from the 
Wuhan Institute of Virology?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I believe we have all the sequences of 
any relevance to COVID.
    Dr. Joyce. Having said that you're recognizing that data 
was destroyed, you feel that you have all the sequences----
    Dr. Daszak. Yes, I do.
    Dr. Joyce [continuing]. That were not destroyed?
    Dr. Daszak. There's a reason for----
    Dr. Joyce. You have all the sequences that were not 
destroyed?
    Dr. Daszak. No, I think--I think we have--we had all 
available SARS coronavirus-related, bat coronavirus sequences. 
Prior to the outbreak, I had requested from WIV that they send 
us all their data, so we publish a paper together, summarizing 
the whole of the work that they do and we do. They included, in 
the data they sent us, sequences that weren't collected with 
our U.S. funding.
    So we had access to all their information of any relevance 
to COVID. That was before the outbreak. So, of course, it 
didn't matter back then. After the outbreak----
    Dr. Joyce. That's a great point----
    Dr. Daszak. And we published it.
    Dr. Joyce [continuing]. It didn't matter back then.
    Dr. Daszak. And we published it.
    Dr. Joyce. But subsequent to that, we recognize that there 
has been data that has been destroyed. So, giving us data that 
doesn't matter is irrelevant to the----
    Dr. Daszak. The dates, it matters a lot. It didn't matter 
to them whether they sent it to us or not. Now we have the 
COVID pandemic and this huge geopolitical concern. There wasn't 
a single request for any of those sequences to be moved or 
changed. We published them in the summer of 2020 in a U.S. 
journal with--uploaded, sorry, into U.S. NIH GenBank data base.
    Dr. Joyce. So, you have to count on the goodwill of the 
Wuhan Institute of Virology in order to meet your grant 
requirements. How does that not violate the terms of the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology's debarment?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, we don't work with them. They're 
debarred.
    Dr. Joyce. So, you have no further contact with them?
    Dr. Daszak. What I said is we don't work with them. We do--
--
    Dr. Joyce. Do you have further contact with them?
    Dr. Daszak. Of course, we have contact. Under the terms of 
my renegotiated RO with NIH, we have to publish data from that 
work. Of course we have to send copies of drafts of papers, get 
them to check and make sure that they've included everything, 
that we've got everything correct. So, of course we have 
contact with them.
    Dr. Joyce. Do you feel, given all the concerns that have 
been raised during this hearing, that EcoHealth should continue 
to receive taxpayer funds?
    Dr. Daszak. EcoHealth's work is critical, as I said in my 
opening statement, to preventing the next pandemic. Of course 
we should receive Federal work. We've worked very carefully and 
precisely with all of the Federal funding we've had. We've 
reported on time in every other instance. The one instance we 
were unable to, the NIH system locked us out, and you can see 
from----
    Dr. Joyce. We haven't been provided with data. There was an 
employee who made a phone call, but you're not sure they still 
work for EcoHealth, so that's still suspect for us.
    Dr. Daszak. No, no, the NIH employee doesn't work for NIH--
--
    Dr. Joyce. So, you have documentation that your employees 
reached out? You have that employee that you could produce for 
us that made the----
    Dr. Daszak. Every bit of documentation I've got, we've 
supplied. I think I have a few more other pieces that I can 
supply.
    Dr. Joyce. I think that's important that you supply that 
because----
    Dr. Daszak. Yes, absolutely, yes.
    Dr. Joyce [continuing]. We, sitting on this side, are 
responsible stewards of the taxpayer dollars, but I feel that 
you at EcoHealth are not responsible stewards of the taxpayer 
dollars that have been shared for you.
    And I feel that, based on the information and based on the 
actions that we have seen, I believe that you should never 
receive taxpayer dollars again.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, what's the----
    Dr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Dr. McCormick from Georgia 
for 5 minutes of questions.
    Dr. McCormick. Dr. Daszak, how much was the grant that you 
were reinstated--given for?
    Dr. Daszak. I think it was $2.2 million.
    Dr. McCormick. OK.
    Dr. Daszak. Some of the money was never reinstated.
    Dr. McCormick. OK. Your understanding, the risk of bat 
coronavirus emergency grant was eventually reinstated by the 
National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases, 
despite the fact that Wuhan Institute of Virology was barred 
from receiving Federal funds. I think that was just discussed 
ad nauseam----
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Dr. McCormick [continuing]. So, I won't kind of go into too 
much detail on that.
    But your grant was reinstated based on probably advice that 
you got from some people, and I just want to kind of go into 
that a little bit.
    Did you have any conversations about your grant 
reinstatement with Dr. David Morens, the senior adviser to Dr. 
Fauci?
    Dr. Daszak. I don't know.
    Dr. McCormick. You don't know if you had a discussion?
    Dr. Daszak. I don't know. Probably. I don't know. I'd have 
to check my records.
    Dr. McCormick. Did Dr. Morens ever give you any advice on 
how to reinstate your Federal funding?
    Dr. Daszak. Oh, yes. I mean, I asked everybody who had any 
knowledge about the way NIH works on any possible strategy to--
--
    Dr. McCormick. So, you did have discussions?
    Dr. Daszak. With many, many scientists----
    Dr. McCormick. OK.
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. Both those at NIH and elsewhere, 
yes.
    Dr. McCormick. So, were you aware that Dr. David Morens was 
communicating with you on his personal Gmail account to avoid 
FOIA and public accountability?
    Dr. Daszak. I was aware that he was communicating with me 
on his personal Gmail account sometimes, yes, for personal 
matters.
    Dr. McCormick. So, a personal matter about reinstating a 
public grant?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, it's not his job to reinstate it.
    Dr. McCormick. Got it.
    Dr. Daszak. This was me asking his advice as a friend and 
colleague----
    Dr. McCormick. About reinstating a Federal grant. Got it.
    Dr. Daszak. Yes. I mean, we----
    Dr. McCormick. Do you even find it problematic that a 
senior adviser of Dr. Fauci, the head of NIAID, was 
communicating with you on Gmail rather than an official 
capacity about an official grant?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, when I'm talking to him by email about 
personal and security issues and political attacks----
    Dr. McCormick. Security issues? So, you talked with him 
security on his Gmail account?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes, I talked to him about the attacks on my 
house.
    Dr. McCormick. OK. Officially--when your grant was 
officially terminated in April 2020, do you think that Dr. 
Morens undermined NIAID's decision by advising on how to get it 
reinstated?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, if that were true, then everybody else at 
NIH who advised me on how to get it reinstated, including the 
official reinstatement procedure, would also have undermined--
--
    Dr. McCormick. Fair enough.
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. Stop it getting reinstated.
    Dr. McCormick. Did you make any assertions that you would 
be able to obtain information from the Wuhan Lab in regards to 
your research when you were trying to get your reinstatement of 
the grant?
    Dr. Daszak. The assertion was that the U.S. taxpayer, who 
funded the work we did in Wuhan, would get a fair shot at then 
getting that information and making it public to protect the 
U.S. taxpayer from future coronavirus threats. That's a very 
valid and noble----
    Dr. McCormick. So, you assume that you would have access to 
that information. Is that correct?
    Dr. Daszak. We already had access to----
    Dr. McCormick. Do you have access to it now?
    Dr. Daszak. After a certain day, we had access to genomic 
sequences from Wuhan, yes. Yes, we do.
    Dr. McCormick. OK. Where are those samples today?
    Dr. Daszak. I'm talking about sequences, not samples. This 
is exactly as I was saying earlier. People commonly make that 
mistake. And the samples are in the freezers in Wuhan. The 
sequences, the genetic information----
    Dr. McCormick. So, you have access to the sequences, not 
the samples?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes, I do.
    Dr. McCormick. OK. Very good.
    Dr. Daszak. And I stated that clearly to NIAID all the way 
through the negotiations. I also stated clearly we did not have 
access to the sample----
    Dr. McCormick. OK.
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. They were in the freezer. They 
will probably remain there.
    Dr. McCormick. And Wuhan is no longer receiving any tax 
dollars, correct?
    Dr. Daszak. Correct.
    Dr. McCormick. OK. When it comes to your research--and I 
know that we're talking some semantics, but I understand the 
sequencing--by the way, have you ever found any consequential 
sequence of this virus in the bats that you've studied?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes, we found a lot of consequential sequences, 
yes.
    Dr. McCormick. So, in other words, are you finding that 
coronavirus that's infected human beings in the bat population 
in general that's continued to survive?
    Dr. Daszak. Oh, no. No, that's a different question.
    Dr. McCormick. OK. Yes. So, I would make the case that 
maybe from the very beginning--and we've talked about this ad 
nauseam, I think--we haven't found it in any animal samples 
despite massive research to begin with.
    And yet we continue to pour millions of dollars into 
something that should exist--as a physician, as a physician 
that just talked to you before, we spent millions and millions 
of dollars and hundreds of samples for different species all 
over China and have no evidence that it's in a--in an animal 
origin, but yet we continue to send millions of dollars to try 
to find evidence that now we can't get to essentially. And 
that's really what you're here for, is, that's why we're upset, 
that we feel like that this grant was misrepresented, it was 
seeking information from the wrong source to begin with, and 
that the grant--principle of the way we get our grants was 
misrepresented too, and that's what we're all kind of angry 
about right now.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, the grant was scored in the top 3 percent 
of grants in that review period. It was considered high impact 
and----
    Dr. McCormick. And that's exactly the problem, sir. That's 
exactly the problem.
    Dr. Daszak. No, it was scored that well because it is high 
impact----
    Dr. McCormick. I don't know why it was scored that well, 
but I would disagree with you vehemently, and that's why I 
think we're here to make a statement on it.
    Dr. Daszak. But I think I pointed out in my opening 
statements that we had, from the work we've done in China, we 
now have lab assays that can be tested against vaccines, drugs, 
and therapeutics to fight COVID to save people's lives. That's 
how science works.
    Dr. McCormick. I yield.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize majority staff for not more 
than 30 minutes of questions.
    Majority Counsel. Thank you, sir.
    Dr. Daszak, my name is Mitch Benzine. I'm the staff 
director for the majority staff. I have a number of questions 
but want to follow-up on some of the questions that the Members 
asked over the last couple of hours.
    In response to Mr. Griffith pointing out that you were 
still making edits to the year 5 progress report 7 months past 
its due date, the year 5 progress report is only supposed to 
contain information from year 5. Is that correct?
    Dr. Daszak. The NIH requested the year 5 progress report 2 
years late----
    Majority Counsel. No, no, no. It was due September 30, and 
it covered----
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Majority Counsel. [continuing] The grant period of 2018 to 
2019, correct?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes. Yes, yes.
    Majority Counsel. So, the report is not supposed to cover 
information outside of that grant period?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I think NIH is always happy to receive 
any information they can on research you're doing that has 
relevance to the goals. There are no strict rules on that.
    Majority Counsel. You testified that you were editing it 
because you gathered more information, but that information 
should have gone into the year 6 report.
    Dr. Daszak. No, what I said--and I wasn't allowed to 
finish--what we did was, we analyzed the data, and we came up 
with an estimate of how many people likely infected per year.
    We eventually published that information. It's about 
60,000--the estimate in the year 5 report was then revised 
again--it's about 60,000 people a year, across an area that 
includes 300-plus million people.
    So, both things are correct, that this is a rare event, and 
it infects a lot of people every year.
    Majority Counsel. I appreciate that. I have some more 
questions about it, but we'll get to it. You've testified here 
today that, on the year 5 report being delayed, that an 
employee of EcoHealth made a phone call to NIAID. Who is that 
employee?
    Dr. Daszak. I don't know. It was one of our admin staff. It 
might've been Aleksei Chmura, Dr. Chmura. It might've been 
other people who were working there at the time. It would've 
been from one of their phones.
    We've looked at the records, we can't find it, but we 
believe there were repeated phone calls to Saddayah Girma , 
to--who was the grant management officer at the time. There 
were repeated emails--I've got the list of them here--and she 
never responded.
    Majority Counsel. And then one question that wasn't touched 
on by the Members, is EcoHealth currently drafting a laboratory 
standard or biosafety manual?
    Dr. Daszak. For field biosafety, yes.
    Majority Counsel. And you're pitching it to the CDC?
    Dr. Daszak. We're not pitching it. We're going to make it 
public for everybody in the world to see.
    Majority Counsel. You're asking the Federal Government to 
adopt it, though, correct?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, we're simply putting it out there, and if 
people want to use some of those rules, that's great because 
it's the very highest standard of field biosafety there is.
    Majority Counsel. Have you met with the CDC regarding the 
manual?
    Dr. Daszak. I think that the person writing it has spoken 
with CDC and talked to them about it, yes, and WHO and others.
    Majority Counsel. You also referenced that the biosafety 
standards in the U.S. and China were similar for the work that 
you were doing. What document were you referencing?
    Dr. Daszak. It's the BMBL, Sixth Edition, Biosafety in 
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, Sixth Edition. 
Page 452.
    Majority Counsel. Has the Chinese Government memorialized 
the BMBL?
    Dr. Daszak. They have their own--in fact, every country has 
its own national standards. There's no one global standard. But 
we looked at those national standards, translated them from 
Mandarin. They are the same.
    Majority Counsel. In U.S. grants, are sub grantees required 
to follow U.S. standards or foreign country standards?
    Dr. Daszak. I believe U.S. grantees working in labs in the 
U.S., would follow biosafety standards for the U.S. I believe 
that labs that are funded through the U.S. Government in 
foreign countries would probably follow their national 
standards. And, if there were discrepancies between those and 
the U.S. standards, some arrangement would have to be made, 
some negotiation or debate with the funding agency.
    That was not the case in our work.
    Majority Counsel. I appreciate that.
    Dr. Daszak. They're the same. The standards are the same. 
They're right there.
    Majority Counsel. I would also appreciate it if you can 
produce the----
    Dr. Daszak. Of course.
    Majority Counsel. [continuing] The original Mandarin 
version of the Chinese document.
    Dr. Daszak. We'll dig it up.
    Majority Counsel. You testified to, I forget which Member 
it was, but you testified every bit of documentation I have, I 
have supplied. That's patently----
    Dr. Daszak. For what aspect?
    Majority Counsel. That's all you said. I----
    Dr. Daszak. OK. But what was it in relation to? And then I 
can understand what----
    Majority Counsel. I believe it was in relation to the year 
5 report.
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Majority Counsel. Have you supplied drafts of the year 5 
report to the Committee.
    Dr. Daszak. I'll have to check. I think so, yes. I'll 
check.
    Majority Counsel. The answer is no. Instead of supplying 
the drafts, you supplied a link to the FOIA library.
    Dr. Daszak. Which has drafts in it.
    Majority Counsel. No. But we asked----
    Dr. Daszak. We will check.
    Majority Counsel. [continuing] For the documents. It is 
your responsibility to----
    Dr. Daszak. We will absolutely provide those pretty 
quickly. Not a problem.
    Majority Counsel. All right. I'm going to go through some 
of the questions for documents that we have previously asked 
that we have not received yet.
    In EcoHealth's custody do you have communications with HHS 
regarding the reinstatement of your R01?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Majority Counsel. In EcoHealth's custody, do you have 
communications with HHS regarding the suspension or debarment 
of the Wuhan Institute.
    Dr. Daszak. Not to my knowledge.
    Majority Counsel. In EcoHealth's custody, do you have 
communications with the Wuhan Institute regarding its 
suspension or debarment?
    Dr. Daszak. With the Wuhan Institute.
    Majority Counsel. Yes.
    Dr. Daszak. Not to my knowledge.
    Majority Counsel. To the committees, you produced one email 
between yourself and the Wuhan Institute regarding requesting 
the laboratory notebooks in response to NIH compliance efforts. 
Is that the entirety of the communications you have regarding 
that issue?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Majority Counsel. You never followed up.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, we never received a response. We were 
told by NIH not to communicate with him, not to work with them. 
And I believe HHS wrote to them but by UPS, and it was sent 
back with return to sender.
    Majority Counsel. That was with the debarment memo. That 
wasn't a request for laboratory notes.
    Dr. Daszak. But I believe----
    Majority Counsel. I'll get back to the laboratory notes.
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Majority Counsel. We touched on the progress reports.
    Do you have any communications in EcoHealth's custody 
regarding the renewal of the R01?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Majority Counsel. With the WIV.
    Dr. Daszak. I'll check. Probably. I don't know.
    Majority Counsel. Did you notify the WIV that they were no 
longer on your grant?
    Dr. Daszak. Oh, you mean did we get--I'll check. Probably, 
yes.
    Majority Counsel. Have you ever communicated regarding the 
issues we've discussed today on an email other than your 
EcoHealth email.
    Dr. Daszak. No.
    Majority Counsel. On April 12, 2024, in response to a 
letter from Chairman Wenstrup to Boston University, you 
released some emails on your website. I want to discuss one of 
them. It's between you and Dr. Morens, who we've talked about, 
and the date of the email is April 26, 2020. It was 2 days 
after your grant was terminated.
    And in this email, you wrote, ``David, we will communicate 
with you via Gmail from now on.''
    Was it he that suggested using his Gmail, or was that you 
telling him to only use his Gmail?
    Dr. Daszak. I'm not sure, but I believe he--he's repeated 
said to me by phone and emails and elsewhere that for stuff 
that's not his official business, he prefers to receive it to 
his Gmail. So, I'm going to comply with that.
    Majority Counsel. And that's consistent with what you 
testified previously. You said, And when I would write to Dr. 
Morens about official NIH-related issues, I would use his NIH 
address. When I wrote to him about personal matters that 
weren't part of his job, to my understanding, I would use his 
Gmail.
    That email that you released discussed setting up a call 
with NIH officials about your grant, how to respond to your 
grant termination, why your grant work was important, the 
official NIAID strategic plan, and how you spent your money 
pursuant to a federally funded grant. Those are all NIH-
related.
    Dr. Daszak. But I wasn't requesting David Morens to set up 
a call for me. That would have been official----
    Majority Counsel. You have a misunderstanding of Federal 
record retention laws. He is discussing his official business. 
He needs to----
    Dr. Daszak. Again, that's David Morens' business. I don't 
know why he does that. He explained to me for personal stuff 
use Gmail, for official business, use NIH.
    His official business is to advise the director of NIAID, 
and there are many, many emails that I've sent him that gives 
him information to pass on to the director of NIAID to inform 
them on emerging diseases. This wasn't that. This was about a 
grant that had been terminated by the President of the United 
States. We had no idea----
    Majority Counsel. Sir, that's also not true. It was 
terminated by Dr. Lauer.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I heard the President of the United 
States say, I will end it quickly. Within a week it was gone.
    Majority Counsel. And Dr. Collins testified under penalty 
of perjury that he agreed with every action that was taken 
against you. This was not ended by the President of the United 
States.
    When was the last time that you spoke with or otherwise 
corresponded with Dr. Morens?
    Dr. Daszak. Probably yesterday.
    Majority Counsel. Did you discuss how you would testify 
today?
    Dr. Daszak. No.
    Majority Counsel. OK. Shifting to the outbreak of COVID-19, 
China first reported an unrecognized pneumonia December 31, 
2019, and China did not mention that it was a coronavirus in 
that report, just undiagnosed pneumonia. They didn't identify 
it as a coronavirus until January 7 and then did not share the 
sequence until January 11.
    When did you first hear about the virus?
    Dr. Daszak. I first heard rumors about a virus on December 
30, 2019.
    Majority Counsel. Who told you?
    Dr. Daszak. Someone in China told me.
    Majority Counsel. What do they do?
    Dr. Daszak. Oh, they work in public health.
    Majority Counsel. For who?
    Dr. Daszak. I think they're a free agent. They run their 
own company or their own business.
    Majority Counsel. What company?
    Dr. Daszak. I don't know, sir. I would have to check in my 
records.
    Majority Counsel. And you----
    Dr. Daszak. I mean, bear in mind, the people in China 
creating rumors about this were later on arrested and put under 
severe penalty.
    Majority Counsel. No, I understand.
    Dr. Daszak. I mean, we didn't know how verifiable that 
information was. I didn't publish it. So, we just were trying 
to find out what we could.
    Majority Counsel. And you testified previously that this 
person--I told you that they had identified a coronavirus that 
was not SARS, but was 20 percent different. Is that correct?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Majority Counsel. And COVID-19 is almost 20 percent or a 
little bit more?
    Dr. Daszak. Oh, yes, it was incredibly accurate data in the 
end. When we looked back on it, they were right.
    Majority Counsel. When you were told this, did you inform 
the U.S. Government?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, at the time I was told it, it was a rumor 
and a myth. So no, that would have been a mistake. What I did 
do was publish it the next day, make a statement publicly on 
Twitter. And I also informed ProMED, ProMED-mail, which is a 
widely used system for getting rapid information about 
outbreaks out to the world. They'd already heard the same 
rumors. They published it the next day as well.
    Majority Counsel. But they were still publishing 
undiagnosed pneumonia, not coronavirus?
    Dr. Daszak. No, but they--well, I'm not sure what they said 
on the next day, but I think we both put out important 
communications that something is going on, we need to know more 
about it.
    And then I think I talked about our coronavirus research, 
kind of hinting heavily this may be coronavirus, but we 
couldn't verify it. So, to tell the public that it's a 
coronavirus would have been a huge mistake. What if it turned 
out not to be?
    Majority Counsel. Dr. Eddie Holmes and Dr. Jeremy Farrar 
said they have information that the virus was sequenced prior 
to Christmas by a U.S. genomics company.
    Does that track with your understanding--or by a Chinese 
genomics company. Excuse me.
    Dr. Daszak. From what I know now, I believe that's where 
the information I got came from is from the sequence data from 
a private sector company that was doing the work for the Wuhan 
investigation.
    Majority Counsel. If they had sequenced it prior to 
Christmas, they would know that it was a coronavirus, correct?
    Dr. Daszak. Someone would. Well, they would be highly 
suspicious that it was. You'd need to verify it. I mean, don't 
forget, whenever there is a new outbreak of something, we have 
to verify and verify it before you go public.
    The same thing is happening now with, for instance, avian 
flu, fragments of RNA in milk. It would be reckless and a 
problem for public health to say there's virus in the milk 
until you verify whether there is or isn't. It's the same story 
with this.
    Majority Counsel. I'm going to shift gears back to the 
Wuhan Institute. Prior to the pandemic, was the Wuhan Institute 
attempting to start a live bat colony?
    Dr. Daszak. Apparently so.
    Majority Counsel. Did you have any firsthand knowledge of 
that?
    Dr. Daszak. Not at the time I publicly stated that it 
wasn't, no.
    Majority Counsel. In addition to bat samples, to your 
knowledge, was the Wuhan Institute also analyzing pangolin 
samples?
    Dr. Daszak. I'm not sure, but I do know that there was 
someone in China we met, a Dr. Tong, who seems to have heard of 
a pangolin-positive coronavirus earlier and was working on it 
and getting it ready for publication, yes.
    Majority Counsel. Does----
    Dr. Daszak. I'm not sure if he works with the WIV or not.
    Majority Counsel. Does the Wuhan Institute have the ability 
to genetically engineer viruses without leaving a trace?
    Dr. Daszak. I don't know.
    Majority Counsel. You touched on this a little bit in your 
testimony, and mentioned the 2020 paper where the primary 
author was Alice Latinne.
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Majority Counsel. And testified previously to us, To the 
best of my knowledge, I'm fairly confident this is the case, 
that every genetic sequence of SARS-related coronaviruses that 
the WIV had, both from our work that we funded and from any 
work they'd done separately, was in a paper that we submitted 
to a U.S. journal and we'd submit into the U.S. NIH data base, 
Genbank. There were a few after the fact that we got from the 
WIV, and I put into Genbank, and we notified NIH later on, only 
a handful.
    And sitting here today, you're still fairly confident that 
every genetic sequence of SARS-related coronaviruses the WIV 
had was published in the Latinne paper?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Majority Counsel. What was the time scope and the 
methodology of the Latinne paper?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, it was the methodology we had used in 
China for over the last 15 years.
    Majority Counsel. No. What was the time scope of the 
samples?
    Dr. Daszak. I'm not sure. I think it's 2010 to 2015 or 
something. I'm not sure. I would have to check.
    Majority Counsel. Did the Wuhan Institute collect samples 
after 2015?
    Dr. Daszak. I don't know.
    Majority Counsel. Is it possible that the Wuhan Institute 
collected samples after 2015?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Majority Counsel. Is it possible that the Wuhan Institute 
hasn't analyzed these samples?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Majority Counsel. Is it possible that they haven't 
published these samples?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Majority Counsel. So, is it possible that you didn't 
actually publish every virus the Wuhan Institute has?
    Dr. Daszak. What I said to you is that we published every 
virus of relevance to SARS coronaviruses from our work in 
China----
    Majority Counsel. No. You said from your work and the Wuhan 
Institute provided you the samples that they collected.
    Dr. Daszak. OK. So, it's possible that they have hidden 
some viruses from us that we don't know about yet, of course.
    Majority Counsel. All right.
    Dr. Daszak. Of course.
    Majority Counsel. I appreciate that.
    Dr. Daszak. That's to the best of my knowledge. I'm trying 
to help in any way I can.
    Majority Counsel. Do you know if the Chinese government 
deleted any sequences or samples?
    Dr. Daszak. I don't know.
    Majority Counsel. We've discussed your grant work a lot, 
and you've stated unequivocally many times today in private 
testimony publicly that EcoHealth did not fund the WIV to 
conduct gain-of-function research.
    This has been directly contradicted by witness testimony. 
Dr. Tabak testified that while your research did not meet the 
definition to be regulated by the P3CO, it did fall under the 
function of gain-of-function.
    And Dr. Baric, who is a world renowned coronavirologist and 
expert in gain-of-function, testified that the work described 
in your year 5 progress report was, quote, ``absolutely a gain-
of-function phenotype.'' And he went to far as to say as, 
quote, ``You can't argue with that.''
    You disagree with them?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I have a letter from NIH that says our 
work is not gain-of-function. You have testimony from Dr. Baric 
who says absolutely it was. Both are there. I mean, I tend to 
go with the regulatory authority on this, which is NIH.
    Majority Counsel. All right. During its compliance efforts 
with your grant, NIH requested you provide the underlying lab 
notebooks from the WIV. You responded that you did not have 
access to them, but that you would ask the WIV.
    Did you know that you had to have access to them under your 
grant terms?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, we checked on that, and at the time that 
we requested the lab notebooks, it is not true that we had to 
have access to lab notebooks in a foreign subrecipient. That 
rule then came into play from NIH later and----
    Majority Counsel. Dr. Tabak testified that it was part of 
the standard grant terms and policies at the time of your 
grant.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, as I said, we checked----
    Majority Counsel. So, you disagree with him?
    Dr. Daszak. We checked the CFRs. We've received dozens of 
letters from NIH with listing CFR, Codes of Federal 
Regulations. We check them all. They do not state that. It's a 
fact.
    Majority Counsel. You said here--and we have the email----
    Dr. Daszak. And we did try to get them, by the way.
    Majority Counsel. Well, ``try'' might be a strong word.
    We previously discussed the one email that you sent to the 
WIV where you forwarded the letter to Dr. Shi and said that you 
could answer question No. 1, but you can't answer question No. 
2.
    You never actually requested the lab notebooks. You just 
forwarded the letter. You testified a few minutes ago that the 
WIV never responded to that email?
    Dr. Daszak. Correct.
    Majority Counsel. And you never e-mailed again?
    Dr. Daszak. Correct.
    Majority Counsel. Why not?
    Dr. Daszak. Because, clearly, the WIV is not going to 
respond further. I'm happy to email them again if you want me 
to.
    Look, we were instructed by NIH to terminate our work with 
the WIV. In 2020, we then had our grant terminated. We then had 
huge geopolitical issues between the U.S. and China, very 
specifically around the origins of COVID. And we were then 
requested by NIH to do something that isn't in the Code of 
Regulations, and that's to request lab notebooks. We did that. 
The WIV did not respond. We will do it again, and I predict 
they will not respond again, if you wish me to.
    But look, every time we act as an agent for the U.S. 
Government in seeking things that are not required by Codes of 
Federal Regulations, we put our own staff at risk around the 
world. But we're happy to do it again if you so wish.
    Majority Counsel. There's a dispute whether or not an 
experiment was conducted in year 4 or year 5. It's the 
experiment that Dr. Tabak reported to Congress that's been----
    Dr. Daszak. There's no dispute. It was conducted in year 4.
    Majority Counsel. Do you have the dates?
    Dr. Daszak. We submitted the results from the experiment 
back in 2018, I think, so it was just prior to that submission.
    Majority Counsel. You submitted it in the year 4 report?
    Dr. Daszak. Correct, yes.
    Majority Counsel. NIH disputes whether or not those are the 
same experiments.
    Do you have the date that the experiment was conducted?
    Dr. Daszak. No. And, again, this is another issue of--this 
is something that I could ask WIV, and it's highly unlikely 
we're going to get a response.
    Majority Counsel. When Dr.----
    Dr. Daszak. They're debarred from the Federal Government. I 
mean, you put me in a very unusual position to go back 10 years 
to a debarred agency asking them questions which we know the 
Chinese Government are not interested in answering.
    Majority Counsel. When Dr. Lauer started compliance 
efforts, did you reach out to Dr. Shi and ask her if it 
occurred in year 4 or year 5?
    Dr. Daszak. Did I ask Dr. Shi what?
    Majority Counsel. If the experiment in question occurred in 
year 4 or year 5?
    Dr. Daszak. Oh, yes, yes.
    Majority Counsel. What did she say?
    Dr. Daszak. She said that--I asked her--let me just respond 
by saying every single request, every single theory, no matter 
how bizarre a conspiracy theory or a real hypothesis, something 
unusual that had gone on in China, we check on those. We check 
everything.
    And at the time when NIH suggested that the year 5 
experiment was different to year 4, I checked, and we were told 
by WIV that it was the same experiment dealing with the 
pathological findings from the same----
    Majority Counsel. Did you verify it with the underlying 
experiment notebooks?
    Dr. Daszak. It's impossible for us to do that. We don't 
have those.
    Majority Counsel. But at that point you could have?
    Dr. Daszak. No. It was the same situation. This is at a 
time when our grant was suspended with onerous conditions that 
included identifying where an allegedly missing person was from 
WIV, going to China and seeking a vial of virus to return to 
the U.S. These things are illegal.
    Look, it was a very difficult position to put a grantee in 
and to be requesting that.
    Majority Counsel. So, you took Dr. Shi's word for it that 
they were--you didn't have any proof at the time of the year 4 
experiment that----
    Dr. Daszak. I have no other way to verify.
    Majority Counsel. You were asked by Ms. Tokuda about access 
to samples previously paid for by the U.S. Government. And I 
want to read the exact testimony from Dr. Erbelding, so that 
you can understand what we're working off of.
    The question: Did EcoHealth--was it EcoHealth that told you 
they had the samples?
    Answer: They did. They did give me an approximate number. I 
don't recall what it was.
    Question: Did they tell you that the samples were in their 
possession?
    Answer: I believe I asked, You have access to these 
samples? Do you have access to these samples? I think that, to 
the best of my recollection, that's how I phrased the question, 
and I got an affirmative answer.
    Question: You asked, Do you have access? And they 
responded, Yes?
    Answer: This was Peter Daszak, yes.
    Question: There wasn't an elaboration on the yes?
    Answer: I did not ask further questions. I took his 
representation as truthful.
    You testified a couple of minutes ago that you were very 
forthright with NIH and NIAID that you actually didn't have 
access to the samples.
    Dr. Daszak. Correct.
    Majority Counsel. Is Dr. Erbelding lying?
    Dr. Daszak. Dr. Erbelding is--it's the same procedures for 
them. She says she doesn't recall, I believe, I think that. 
Clearly, Dr. Erbelding either wasn't in the conversation where 
I clearly stipulated we do not have access to those samples; we 
do have access to the sequences, or perhaps she has mistaken 
sequences for samples. But whatever one might tease apart from 
her memory, what matters is the record, which is the emails 
sent to NIH proposing the work to be done and the revised 
specific names, which clearly state no further samples will be 
brought out of China and that sequences are already in 
EcoHealth's possession.
    Majority Counsel. And we don't have those emails, so----
    Dr. Daszak. We will happily share them with you, of course.
    Majority Counsel. And the samples are still in the custody 
of the Wuhan Institute?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, unless they're not. But to the last of my 
knowledge, they were in the freezers in Wuhan, over 15,000 of 
them.
    Majority Counsel. Is there a benefit to having the samples 
versus just the sequences? You can, in essence, redo an 
experiment to prove the results, correct?
    Dr. Daszak. And you might find out more information from a 
deep secret, but at this point we do have an incredible amount 
of information from those samples.
    Majority Counsel. And you testified previously that if the 
Wuhan Institute does more work on those samples that you, 
quote, ``have an understanding to be able to request and gain 
access to the new data.''
    Is that memorialized in a memo or contract?
    Dr. Daszak. I don't know. I'll have to check. But, yes, 
that is the understanding with the sort of--you know, no matter 
what the politics around the world, scientists from different 
countries try to maintain open channels of communication. It 
happened in the cold war. It happens with our rivals and 
competitors. I think it's very important for the American 
people that we keep those communication channels open.
    Majority Counsel. Have you had----
    Dr. Daszak. So, yes, I will try to do that.
    Majority Counsel. Have you had to request access to any new 
data?
    Dr. Daszak. No. But we've been able to get new data, yes.
    Majority Counsel. From them?
    Dr. Daszak. From China, yes.
    Majority Counsel. With using--from the Wuhan Institute?
    Dr. Daszak. From the Wuhan Institute of Virology, of 
course.
    Majority Counsel. And you testified a little bit earlier 
that you've had communication with----
    Dr. Daszak. I might add that we've got 17 years of research 
we've done there. Some of it is not yet published. The new data 
comes in the form of, here's a publication to be made public, 
and that's a very valuable and important resource.
    Majority Counsel. And you testified earlier that you have 
had communication with the Wuhan Institute in furtherance of 
the reinstated R01 grant?
    Dr. Daszak. I'm not sure that it was in furtherance of the 
restatement.
    Majority Counsel. Or if you're requesting data that you 
were paid for by the United States to analyze, then that would 
be in furtherance?
    Dr. Daszak. The communications I've had with Wuhan are 
typical scientific collaborative----
    Majority Counsel. No. Have you had any communications with 
the Wuhan Institute that would impact your R01 grant?
    Dr. Daszak. I'm not sure. I'd have to check.
    Majority Counsel. OK.
    Mr. Daszak. I mean, I'm just not sure.
    Majority Counsel. Are you aware that the Wuhan Institute is 
not just procurement debarred; they are nonprocurement debarred 
as well?
    Dr. Daszak. I don't know what that means, but I'll--you'll 
have to----
    Majority Counsel. It means that the Wuhan Institute is not 
allowed to have a substantial impact over any federally funded 
government activity.
    If the Wuhan Institute today canceled your access to 
samples, would that impact your research?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, we don't have access to samples, so 
that's a moot point.
    Majority Counsel. You have access to the data generated 
from the samples?
    Dr. Daszak. Correct, yes.
    Majority Counsel. If the Wuhan Institute cutoff your access 
to the data, would that substantially impact your research 
efforts?
    Dr. Daszak. Not for the purposes of that R01 because we 
already have the data in our--at EcoHealth Alliance.
    Majority Counsel. All right. Yesterday there was an article 
in the National Review regarding a recently made grant from 
USAID to EcoHealth Alliance, and a spokesman for EcoHealth gave 
a long statement, but also said, quote, ``EcoHealth is no 
longer partnering with any Chinese research entities.''
    Is that true?
    Dr. Daszak. That's certainly for Federal funding, yes, 
correct.
    Majority Counsel. That's not what he said. He said, 
EcoHealth is no longer partnering with any Chinese research 
entities.
    Do you have any partnerships with any Chinese----
    Dr. Daszak. I don't believe right now we have any 
contractual relationships with any organization in China.
    Majority Counsel. But you're going to----
    Dr. Daszak. So, I think that's correct, from the way he's 
speaking, yes.
    Majority Counsel. You're going to check on if there's a 
contractual arrangement regarding the data from the unanalyzed 
samples?
    Dr. Daszak. There's no contractual relationship.
    Majority Counsel. So, it's just a gentleman's agreement 
that the Chinese Communist Party will give the U.S. what we 
request?
    Dr. Daszak. I'm not speaking with the Chinese Communist 
Party. I'm speaking with scientists.
    Majority Counsel. Well, that might be disputed.
    On April 16, 2020, you tweeted, ``The WIV did not have a 
culture of a virus related to SARS-CoV-2, so it is impossible 
for accidental release being the source.''
    You've testified a lot today that you don't know what was 
going on at the WIV, you don't know all the viruses they have, 
you don't know all the samples they have, that you don't know 
all the research. So, you don't know that it is impossible for 
accidental release being the source?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, what we do know is prior to the outbreak, 
we asked the WIV for every single SARS-related bat coronavirus 
sequence. Not only did they share the ones from what we were 
doing together, they also shared----
    Majority Counsel. Sir, this is the Latinne paper that only 
goes to 2015.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, let me finish my point.
    They also shared data from work they had done themselves 
without our involvement. So, I think that was very important. 
If they had any of the sequences at the time, surely they would 
have been in that data dump and----
    Majority Counsel. And that data dump is what was published 
in the Latinne paper, correct?
    Dr. Daszak. Correct, yes.
    Majority Counsel. So, that only went to 2015.
    Did you ever request all of their SARS-related sequences 
and samples from 2016 to 2019?
    Dr. Daszak. I requested those data prior to the outbreak in 
something like November-ish or fall of 2018. We then went back 
and repeated throughout the process backward and forwards. Any 
other data that came would have been requested in 2020. So, 
yes, we did that.
    Majority Counsel. So, the Latinne methodology is wrong? 
Latinne actually published samples--sequences that were post 
2015?
    Dr. Daszak. No. The data from the samples, that's what I'm 
talking about. The samples were collected prior to, from my 
understanding.
    Majority Counsel. OK. On February 10, 2021, you sent a 
letter to congressional leadership that stated, Zoonotic 
spillover is the origin of most infectious--emerging infectious 
diseases, including COVID-19.
    This is again unequivocal, but you didn't actually know?
    Dr. Daszak. Sorry, to congressional leadership?
    Majority Counsel. Yes. You sent a letter to congressional 
leadership. It was Speaker Pelosi, Leader Schumer, Leader 
McConnell, and Leader McCarthy.
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Majority Counsel. And stated, Zoonotic spillover, the 
transmission of novel pathogens from animals to humans, is the 
origin of most infectious--emerging infectious diseases, 
including COVID-19.
    But the origin is in dispute. That sentence is incorrect?
    Dr. Daszak. But it's pretty crystal clear and undisputed 
that this is a zoonotic virus. And the most close relatives are 
from animals, so therefore, it's a zoonotic virus.
    Majority Counsel. All right. March 8, 2023, in response to 
a hearing this Subcommittee had and multiple times since, 
including today, you've said regarding the DEFUSE proposal, 
quote, ``The proposal was not funded and the work was not 
done.''
    Did you ever solicit private funding for anything regarding 
DEFUSE?
    Dr. Daszak. No.
    Majority Counsel. Do you know if the work--WIV started this 
work?
    Dr. Daszak. No.
    Majority Counsel. Then you can't say that the work was not 
done?
    Dr. Daszak. There's no evidence of the work being done. 
There's no evidence that WIV started it. There's no evidence 
that any of the other contractors on the ground started it.
    Majority Counsel. Did you ask?
    Dr. Daszak. I think everyone has been asked at this point 
repeatedly by----
    Majority Counsel. Did you ask Dr. Shi if she had started 
any of the proposed work?
    Dr. Daszak. No. But again, I'm happy to send an email to 
Dr. Shi and say, Did you begin the work that was proposed in 
the DEFUSE proposal? She might not even remember the DEFUSE 
proposal at this point. I doubt that I would receive a 
response.
    Majority Counsel. One of the things that the Select 
Subcommittee has been investigating is that it matters what 
public health officials write down and what they say. When you 
make unequivocal statements that can't possibly be supported by 
the evidence, it matters.
    Dr. Daszak. So, what was your unequivocal statement again, 
please?
    Majority Counsel. The proposal was not funded and the work 
was not done.
    Dr. Daszak. The work in the proposal has not been done, 
but----
    Majority Counsel. But you just said you didn't know if the 
WIV did it.
    Dr. Daszak. We--the work in the proposal designates which 
groups do the work. That work has not been done. We have 
delayed the work. Ralph Baric's group hasn't done any of the 
work. The organization that was going to spray some residue 
hasn't done the work, to my knowledge. All of this is to my 
knowledge. I mean, you know, obviously, one can't know 
everything.
    Majority Counsel. Then I would suggest clarifying that 
going forward.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, then I'm clarifying it right here and 
now. To the very best of my knowledge, with strong evidence, 
the work hasn't been done.
    Majority Counsel. And my last question, on March 6, 2024, 
you tweeted, The lab leak theory for COVID origins is evidence-
free.
    But when testifying regarding submitting your year 5 
progress report late and the fact that Dr. Lauer couldn't find 
evidence to support your claims, you testified ``just because 
he can't find evidence of that doesn't mean it's not true.''
    Do you stand by that testimony?
    Dr. Daszak. The lab leak is evidence-free. I----
    Majority Counsel. No. That just because someone can't find 
evidence of something does not mean it's not true. That's what 
you said regarding the grant.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I have a very particular knowledge about 
Dr. Lauer's inquiry. We did contact those authorities at NIH, 
and his forensic analysis did not go to checking phone calls. 
He said it in his testimony. So, that's why I stated that, and 
I think that stands.
    Majority Counsel. The last things I'll say, I apologize, 
but you've been asked by a number of Members, including the 
Ranking Member, about the letter that you authored in the 
Lancet, and you said that you were discussing primarily HIV 
inserts and snake DNA.
    I want to read for the record what you actually wrote. 
It's, We stand together to strongly condemn conspiracy theories 
suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin.
    Thank you, sir.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize minority staff for not more 
than 30 minutes of questions, maybe 31, since we went over 
here.
    Minority Counsel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Daszak, thank you for coming in today. I think maybe 
I'll just pick up right where the majority left off.
    That Lancet letter, we've talked about it a few times 
today. I'll read just one more time that very same sentence. 
``Standing together to condemn conspiracy theories suggesting 
that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin.''
    So you talked about snakes, and you talked about HIV. I 
don't see either of those words in that sentence or in the 
letter. Why is that?
    Dr. Daszak. Because there's a word limit on letters to 
Lancet. They're not going to allow you to just bang on for a 
long period of time. Look----
    Minority Counsel. I'm sorry. If I could follow-up on that.
    Dr. Daszak. Let me follow-up first. At the time we 
submitted that letter, the prevailing theories, other than this 
came from a bat through a zoonotic spillover, were HIV inserts 
bioengineered, I think snake DNA, and a bioengineered bioweapon 
virus. All of those are conspiracy theories.
    The intelligence agency stated that clearly at the 
beginning of that report that there is no evidence to support 
that, there never was, and there still isn't.
    Minority Counsel. That's helpful. Thank you.
    So I just kind of want to hone in on the exact nature of 
what you're saying. I think it's that the word limit wouldn't 
allow you to fit in the word ``snake''?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, the word ``snake'' wouldn't be enough to 
make any difference. So, it would have to say--for instance, 
for example, the origin--theories about the virus having snake 
DNA, or that it's got HIV inserts, or that it's a bioengineered 
virus, perhaps they were in earlier drafts of the statement, 
but they're not in that one.
    Minority Counsel. All right. Well, your----
    Dr. Daszak. And they were the only prevailing theories, 
other than that it came from a zoonotic spillover----
    Minority Counsel. Sure.
    Dr. Daszak [continuing]. Which is still the prevailing 
theory.
    Minority Counsel. Well, let me finish. As a reader and 
writer of the English language, how do you think the sentence 
``COVID-19 does not have a natural origin'' reads?
    Dr. Daszak. COVID-19 does not----
    Minority Counsel. Does not have a natural origin. Do you 
read that sentence as being limited to snakes and HIV?
    Dr. Daszak. Is that what we said?
    Minority Counsel. Yes.
    Dr. Daszak. Can you read out of the context of that, 
please? I'm not sure what you mean.
    Minority Counsel. Sure. That's not a problem.
    We stand together to strongly condemn conspiracy theories 
suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin.
    Dr. Daszak. Yes. That's what we said then, and we stand by 
it. At the time that was the right thing to say.
    Minority Counsel. Do you read that sentence as being 
limited to snakes and HIV?
    Dr. Daszak. I read that sentence in February 2020 as 
focusing on those conspiracies that were out there, and they 
were the ones that were out there.
    Minority Counsel. That's not quite the question. As the 
reader of the sentence, how do you read it?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, first of all, you would have to go back 
in time to 2020, put yourself in the mindset of what was going 
on back then, which were those prevailing theories, 
bioengineered virus, snake DNA, and HIV inserts, preposterous, 
conspiratorial, and without any evidence whatsoever.
    Minority Counsel. Yes, I just don't think any reasonable 
reader of that sentence is going to read it that way.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, but the editor of Lancet read it and 
approved it. 26 of the leading public health authorities in the 
world read it and agreed with it. 20,000-plus people signed 
onto that letter on a public statement. Everybody seemed to 
read it and understand exactly what it meant, and it was 
correct at the time, and we stand by it.
    Minority Counsel. You talked a little bit about the DEFUSE 
application and BMBL.
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Minority Counsel. And you've talked several times about how 
the BMBL, you know, either says BSL-2 is appropriate or we've 
heard elsewhere maybe it doesn't actually have a specific 
requirement at all.
    I think the thing I want to focus on is your testimony to 
us in November wasn't just about BMBL. You told us that you 
ensured that WIV adhered to the same biosafety levels that were 
used in the U.S., and that were required by the BMBL, and those 
are two different things. Ralph Baric clearly told you that 
what is used in the U.S. is BSL-3, and you knew that was not 
the case in Wuhan.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, Ralph Baric is entitled to his opinion 
about best practices, which is what he was trying to say in 
that statement. But I have here the language from BMBL, it says 
right there----
    Minority Counsel. Sorry. Yes, we've heard it three or four 
times.
    Dr. Daszak. OK.
    Minority Counsel. As I said, that's not quite the same 
thing as what do scientists actually do in the United States.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, it is actually, because they're the rules 
that government scientists actually do.
    Minority Counsel. So, if I follow it, it is that you 
disagree with Dr. Baric and you don't actually think that it's 
common in the United States to use BSL-3 for this type of work?
    Dr. Daszak. Ralph Baric may use it for some types of work. 
He may go above and beyond the BMBL levels. Good for him, and 
that's good for us, too.
    Minority Counsel. Do you understand him to be an outlier in 
that respect?
    Dr. Daszak. There is no outlier. If the rule states 
something differently--and will just add in the DEFUSE 
proposal, we did not propose to use BSL-2 for infection 
experiments with recombinant viruses. We proposed BSL-3s right 
there in black and white at Ralph Baric's lab, using his high 
standards, higher than the BMBL requires.
    Minority Counsel. Yes, I think the concern is more that you 
point to the BMBL, and I understand that. I think----
    Dr. Daszak. But I thought your job was to oversee this line 
of research, and these are the rules that oversee them.
    Minority Counsel. If your collaborator comes to you and 
says, What we do here in the United States is use a certain 
level of biosafety, and that's not what they do in China, and 
people in the United States will freak out, I think that 
distinction is probably important for somebody in your 
position.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I agreed with Dr. Baric, which is why the 
BSL-3 is in the proposal, not BSL-2.
    Minority Counsel. The year 5 report has been talked about a 
few times as well. You said something that I just wanted to 
follow-up on. You said something to the effect of, Look, 
there's a record that I tried to submit that report, and that 
we as a Subcommittee have that record.
    I think what you're referring to, which we do have, and 
which is not quite what you say it is, is a screenshot that 
your folks initiated the year 5 report on July 24 of that year, 
and we agree, we have that. We're all----
    Dr. Daszak. From the NIH system.
    Minority Counsel. Yes. We're all on the same page there. 
The problem is routing the report, submitting the report is 2 
years later. There's no evidence that you submitted the report 
in 2019.
    Dr. Daszak. Correct, there's no evidence.
    Minority Counsel. Well, that's not quite what you said 
about an hour and a half ago, and I think it's those types of 
little representations----
    Dr. Daszak. What did I say an hour and a half ago?
    Minority Counsel. You told us that there was documentary 
evidence that you had submitted the report in 2019.
    Dr. Daszak. What I have here is a timeline with documentary 
evidence of attempts to submit the report, to open up the 
system--we had a draft of the report back in June. We tried to 
get it in the system, and it locked us out. I have the record 
here.
    We will send any of the evidence that you don't yet have, 
we will send to the Committee.
    Minority Counsel. Well, I'll distinguish for a starting 
point, I think we have what you're talking about, and we went 
over it in November----
    Dr. Daszak. Well, we'll find out. I'll check. It might be 
something that you don't have yet.
    Minority Counsel. I think it's safe to speak for both sides 
here to say that if we don't have what you're talking about, 
then at this point, that's a pretty big problem as well.
    Dr. Daszak. What do you mean?
    Minority Counsel. If you have extra documents on the year 5 
issue that you have not handed over----
    Dr. Daszak. I'm talking about we've reviewed all of our 
systems to try and find information to see if we've got any 
evidence at all if that report was uploaded, which we know it 
was. We know we had had an inability to get through to the 
system. It locked us out. And I'm looking for evidence we may 
have somewhere that you don't yet have. We will find it and 
send it to you.
    Minority Counsel. OK. I just want to be really clear that 
the documentary evidence we do have that I think you might be 
talking about shows that you all opened up this system----
    Dr. Daszak. I know that, yes. Yes, I have that written----
    Minority Counsel. It does not show that you submitted or 
attempted to submit the report.
    Dr. Daszak. Right. Well, I'm telling you here, under oath, 
that we did.
    Minority Counsel. OK. I would like to pivot to some of the 
more science-heavy aspects of really what we've already talked 
about back in November, probably starting with, you had this 
detailed back and forth with NIAID in the summer of 2016 on the 
question of whether or not the work you were proposing was 
affected by the 2014 Federal pause on gain-of-function work.
    So NIAID ultimately decided that your work was not affected 
by that pause. You've said that several times here today. I 
don't think we have a problem with that decision. I've not 
heard the majority have a problem with that decision.
    So it's not the decision that is in dispute, but I do think 
we're interested in and would like to focus on some of the 
arguments you made to NIAID, because their reasoning I think 
was slightly different from what you were suggesting, so I just 
kind of want to walk through how you----
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I just want to correct one thing. This 
wasn't a----
    Minority Counsel. Wait, wait, wait, wait. Dr. Daszak, I let 
you finish, and I was happy to. I ask that you do the same.
    So those arguments sort of ran in order, and I'd like to 
touch on them and talk about them.
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Minority Counsel. The first one I think was pretty easy. It 
was making the point that the 2014 policy should be viewed as 
applying to SARS because that's what it says, SARS, but not to 
the SARS-like viruses that you were planning on working with.
    I think we understand that argument and acknowledge that 
the pause was a little bit unclear from a textual point of view 
there, so I really don't have too many questions about that.
    You then pivoted, though, to talk about WIV1, which I think 
is that virus that you all were planning to use as a backbone 
in your experiments. And you said to NIAID that WIV1, quote, 
``has never been demonstrated to infect humans or cause human 
disease.''
    Later in the letter, for other reasons, you included a 
parenthetical to an article that's called ``WIV1 is Poised for 
Human Emergence,'' and that article concludes that, quote, 
``the results indicate that WIV1 has the ability to directly 
infect humans.''
    I think it's really hard for us as readers to understand 
how that context was not addressed in your letter.
    Dr. Daszak. Both can be correct. It is correct that it has 
never infected people, to our knowledge, but it's also correct 
that it infects human cells in the lab, not people. There's no 
evidence of that.
    Now, we cite that paper in the response to NIH. NIH is the 
body that oversees this. If NIH had said, Wait a minute, this 
paper that you cite yourselves suggests that we need to 
rethink, we would have not gone ahead with the experiment. 
Don't forget we proposed alternatives to this work. We send 
them a paragraph of modeling we could do, pseudovirus work we 
could do if they decided the work should not go ahead. NIH had 
every possibility, every reason to go through that and say no 
if they wanted to, and we would have not done that work.
    This is something to ask NIH, not EcoHealth Alliance. We 
did our best, our best shot at trying to explain why we believe 
the work was not covered by the gain-of-function, as they asked 
us, what alternatives we could do, and then it's NIH that makes 
the decision on that.
    Minority Counsel. Yes. So, you cited the article for a 
different reason. You would have had to open the article and 
read it to appreciate what I just quoted from it. And I 
understand that I think you're drawing a distinction between 
human cells in the lab and a human receptor in a lab.
    Dr. Daszak. A big distinction.
    Minority Counsel. So, I think the eventual conclusion of 
that is it does not count until a live human walks in and drops 
to the ground sick?
    Dr. Daszak. No, until it infects a person.
    Minority Counsel. Uh-huh.
    Dr. Daszak. There's a big difference between infecting a 
cell in a lab.
    And also you point out that you would have to read--open 
the paper and read it. Surely, the NIH system that deliberates 
on these issues actually opens up the papers and reads them, as 
do scientists. I mean, we assume that this group is doing it. 
They know the literature. They are going to make a 
knowledgeable decision based on their knowledge of the 
literature which we cited in our letter to them.
    Minority Counsel. Yes. So, the concern is less on the back 
end of the reader of your letter, because we do assume that 
those folks are knowledgeable and they'll open the article. The 
concern is more on the front end as a grantee that that article 
is out there and you didn't say anything about----
    Dr. Daszak. We cited it.
    Minority Counsel. You cited it for a different reason.
    Dr. Daszak. We listed the paper in our list that went to 
NIH.
    Minority Counsel. Yes, you did. You managed not to include 
the title of that paper in your email I noticed.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, if the citation is there, the title will 
be there. If not, they can look it up on the web, but it's a 
well-known paper at the time from the group that were already 
doing similar work. They knew about it. Surely, they--they 
funded it actually. Surely, they know about that work.
    Minority Counsel. If the paper's results were true that 
WIV1, quote, ``had the ability to directly infect humans,'' 
would that be a problem for your argument that WIV1 has never 
been demonstrated to infect humans?
    Dr. Daszak. If WIV1 has been demonstrated to infect people, 
then that argument that I made would not be true, so that would 
be a problem. It has not, therefore, it was not.
    Minority Counsel. Don't worry about the human cells.
    Dr. Daszak. Human cells are not humans. They're cells in a 
lab. It's a very different thing. Any biologist will tell you 
that. Same as mice are different to humans. You know, you step 
up from the cell line work, to the mouse work, to--then we know 
from other work that people do in primates and the rest of it. 
It's a big gap between a virus that can infect a cell in the 
lab and one that can actually infect people in the wild.
    Minority Counsel. So, the progression from there went to, 
well, because WIV1 is about 10 percent distant from SARS, and 
the spikes that we want to insert are getting progressively 
more distant from there, it seems progressively less likely 
that any of these chimeric viruses would be more pathogenic, 
more transmissible.
    We talked about this in November. You hopefully explained 
to us that the theory was, OK, we know that SARS-1 is a human 
pathogen. We know of 95 or 97 percent SARS-like viruses that 
simply are not able to infect humans; and so it seems 
reasonable to hypothesize that as you move away from SARS, you 
have reduced human pathogenicity.
    I think what we struggle with a little bit is at the time, 
if you know that SARS-1 is a human pathogen, and you know that 
a 95 percent SARS-like cannot infect humans, and we know that 
WIV1 at 90 percent similarity seems as if it can, at the very 
least, infect human cells, it seems as if it would be 
reasonable to think that there might just not be a linear 
relationship in this family of viruses.
    Dr. Daszak. If that were the case, why didn't NIH come back 
to us and say, Well, actually we refute your suggestion. This 
was the standard thought at the time scientifically, that the 
further you go away from that evolutionarily, it's the less 
chance that it's going to be a significant pathogen.
    NIH had every opportunity to review that and say, Actually, 
we disagree. You're not going to do that experiment.
    We would have said, OK. Can we do the alternative that's 
noninfectious? I'm sure that we would have gone ahead with that 
and got interesting results. Maybe not quite as useful.
    Minority Counsel. Yes. So, as I said, it's not so much 
about NIAID because their eventual reasoning I think was not 
related to what I've talked about----
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I think this----
    Minority Counsel. Dr. Daszak, my point is there are three 
or four different reasons in your letter. Not all of them 
factored ultimately into NIAID's reasoning. But as a reader, 
when we think about grantee transparency and integrity, there's 
a concern that you're leaving out an awful lot of context from 
the letter.
    Dr. Daszak. I don't know how many reams of paper you wanted 
us to respond to. We cited references in our response. I sought 
the best advice in the world from Dr. Baric, who's an author on 
that paper. He could have told us, Wait, that's not a good 
paper to cite. He suggested we cite it. I mean, we did 
everything we could to lay out the case. NIH then had every 
opportunity to refuse it and say, No. Do the alternative.
    Minority Counsel. That's helpful. And so, that sort of last 
argument was that Dr. Ralph Baric's group took a WIV1 spike, 
put it on a SARS backbone, and showed a loss-of-function, not a 
gain-of-function.
    And I think for us, the question is, your work was going to 
be with a WIV1 backbone and other spikes, and so the WIV1 spike 
would be the only part of WIV1 that was not relevant at all for 
your work. And so, I'm confused about that.
    Dr. Daszak. I think if you look at the results from that 
experiment--because I think we did the experiment and the 
results showed that there was no difference in any aspect of 
that.
    Minority Counsel. My point----
    Dr. Daszak. So, I think our predictions were absolutely 
spot on, so I don't know why this should be an issue now almost 
10 years later.
    Minority Counsel. Well, I think it's that you haven't quite 
answered what I was asking about. In other words, you pointed 
to experiments testing the WIV1 spike, right?
    Dr. Daszak. In the letter to NIH.
    Minority Counsel. Yes. You were going to use the WIV1 
backbone. The only part of WIV1 that you were not going to use 
at all is the WIV1 spike.
    So I think as a reader, I'm a little bit uncertain about 
why----
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I'm sorry. But at this point I'm confused 
over WIV1, WIV1 spike, WIV16, SHCO4----
    Minority Counsel. Well, I think it's fair to say----
    Dr. Daszak. There are multiple experiments we did.
    Minority Counsel. Yes. It's a little bit concerning that 
you're confused, I think, is my point.
    Dr. Daszak. No, because I don't have the documents in front 
of me. You've got a question there. But look, we were asked by 
NIH to explain why we believed this experiment would not lead 
to any aberrant reactions. We explained why we felt that. We 
were then asked to produce an alternative. We did. NIH reviewed 
it. And as you said, they spent some time reviewing this 
detailed proposal, and then came back, I think, in July 2016 
and said, This is not covered by the gain-of-function policy. 
Experiment can move ahead.
    I think this is a system where the oversight was there. It 
was brought into play, because we proposed that work, and they 
saw it and said, Hold on. Let's check. They checked and allowed 
it to move forward. And for that particular experiment there 
was no issue at all. And for all of the experiments we did, we 
submitted the results to NIH, and they had no concerns 
whatsoever with those results.
    So I think this shows the system was working. Maybe there 
were ways we could tighten it up, and I fully support that. And 
EcoHealth Alliance will do everything we can to comply with any 
new rules you think are inadequate, and I think that's a good 
thing.
    Minority Counsel. So, I think it's hopeful to transition to 
the oversight. We've talked a little bit about the one log rule 
that NIAID put on your grant.
    Dr. Daszak. Yes.
    Minority Counsel. That rule, I'll just read it out. It's 
just one sentence. ``Should any of the SARS-like chimeras show 
evidence of enhanced growth greater than one log over the 
backbone, you've got to stop all the experiments and notify 
your program officer.''
    You told us that you'd received data from WIV and that you 
and your team at EcoHealth had reviewed that to make sure 
everybody is in compliance with the one log rule, which makes 
sense. I think we just have a couple of questions about how 
that unfolded.
    In the year 3 report, you gave the experiment results from 
that year showing what the chimeric viruses did. WIV1, the 
backbone, wasn't in the report. We talked about this in 
November. I don't think it should be new to you. The full 
length WIV1 wasn't included in the----
    Dr. Daszak. Oh, this is the report, but then it was in the 
publication.
    Minority Counsel. Yes. That almost makes it worse. In other 
words----
    Dr. Daszak. Well, there's no significant difference between 
the two graphs, actually. I mean, I don't see why that's of any 
relevance really, other than the timing. I mean, clearly the 
results they had for WIV1 weren't ready to submit for the 
report but were available when they submitted the paper. And 
we're all on the paper together, I believe, so that's a 
standard, normal thing in doing science.
    What you do with NIH oversight, when you submit a report, 
you send them everything you've got. That is stuff from 
unpublished data, it might be wrong, it might need to be 
analyzed further. There may be missing parts of it. So, I think 
what you're finding is something that was missing, that then 
was done, and then put into the paper.
    Minority Counsel. So, without the backbone, you can't 
possibly know if you are or are not in compliance with the one 
log rule. Is that right?
    Dr. Daszak. No, that's not right. I mean, we----
    Minority Counsel. That's not right?
    Dr. Daszak. We--well, no one can know in advance for sure.
    Minority Counsel. One log is called what?
    Dr. Daszak. With reasonable hypothesis based on the 
evolutionary distance, based on everything we know about these 
viruses, we put forward the rationale for the thinking that 
this would not lead to a striking significant difference. NIH 
approved it because they also believed that. We did the 
experiment, reported it back. Nobody came back to us and said, 
This is highly concerning, because it wasn't. The results were 
unremarkable.
    Minority Counsel. I'm sorry, because that's not even close 
to what I asked.
    Dr. Daszak. Oh.
    Minority Counsel. So, the question is, without the backbone 
strain, it is not possible to know whether you are or are not 
in compliance with the one log rule. Is that right?
    Dr. Daszak. I don't think that's correct.
    Minority Counsel. Why not?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I just don't--I'd have to look at the 
data, but I don't think that's correct.
    Minority Counsel. Well, it's pretty easy. So, the one log--
we'll go back over it. The one log rule is you can't go one log 
above the backbone. And so, if you don't know what the backbone 
is, how can you measure compliance?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, you'd have to look at the actual filing 
of what the backbone--proposed backbone was.
    Minority Counsel. I agree. And you don't have it in your 
report.
    Dr. Daszak. So, let me ask you, did that go over one log 
higher than the WIV backbone.
    Minority Counsel. No, it didn't end up doing that.
    Dr. Daszak. No. So, why is this an issue at all for 
anybody.
    Minority Counsel. Well, that's easy, I think. It's because 
in year 4, the subsequent year, it went way over one log.
    Dr. Daszak. But that was a different virus.
    Minority Counsel. Sure. It indicates, however----
    Dr. Daszak. It's a different issue.
    Minority Counsel. It indicates, however, that the 
subsequent year when you did start measuring the backbone 
strain's performance, it went over a log. And you talked to us 
about why you think----
    Dr. Daszak. You're not comparing apples to apples. That's a 
completely different experiment.
    And, by the way, you say whatever, one log viral growth. 
Those are genome copies per gram. They're widely known to be 
inaccurate and not a very ideal measure of true viral growth. 
That should be a viral titer. So, I think that's an unfair 
comparison and not relevant.
    Minority Counsel. I can appreciate that.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, thanks.
    Minority Counsel. What did the viral titers say?
    Dr. Daszak. I think you know the answer to that.
    Minority Counsel. It would help, I think, folks to hear it.
    Dr. Daszak. We never received viral titers in the end.
    Minority Counsel. Did you ever ask for them?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, if you look at the results, you'll see 
that there's no significant difference in the final day of the 
experiment. By day 6, the number of genome copies per gram had 
returned to normal. There would have been no need to go back 
and do extra work in an experiment that was only remarkable 
with no significant problems.
    Minority Counsel. Just because, again, we are focused on 
the details, which I know can be tedious, but it was day 8 that 
they evened out, so it was----
    Dr. Daszak. I think day 6 they were pretty much evened out 
statistically.
    Minority Counsel. I don't think they were.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, let's check.
    Minority Counsel. That's fine. We can do that.
    Dr. Daszak. OK.
    Minority Counsel. So, I think the situation you were in 
there is the other accompanying figure shows that those mice 
are losing more weight than the mice that are infected with 
that backbone strain. And you've got one log of growth on days 
2, 4, and 6, and you're telling me, Well, it evened out on day 
8, so it doesn't----
    Dr. Daszak. Sure. You know, you seem somehow concerned 
about that. We submitted that report to NIH. The program 
officer clearly read it, and NIH never once got back to us and 
said, Look, we have concerns over that issue. If they had have, 
then we would have said, OK, let's discuss. Let's get the data. 
Let's conduct our own titers. Let's check all the raw data.
    Nobody reported anything because it wasn't remarkable. 
Those were normal variations within a small group of mice. We 
didn't even get to publish it because it probably wouldn't have 
been publishable. It just wasn't that significant. If you look 
at my conclusions in the report, in the report, I don't say, 
Wow, we have this striking response from a group of mice that 
suggests this virus is highly dangerous. We certainly didn't 
say, Well--you read out from a paper by Dr. Baric--evidence on 
the cusp of a pandemic. No. We said this experiment shows that 
there is sometimes different responses to different viruses in 
different conditions. That's it. It wasn't remarkable. It isn't 
a cause for concern.
    I also want to remind the Committee these are SARS-CoV-
related bat viruses. They're not known to be infectious to 
people. They have nothing to do with COVID-19. They're not 
related to SARS-CoV-2.
    So again, going back to reports, and even an experiment 
almost 10 years ago, and sort of saying, Well, we need to go 
back and get more information, that won't be possible. No one 
asked for it at the time. We showed the results, all the 
results we had to NIH, and they were unremarkable, and NIH 
clearly agreed. They then awarded the next year's funding, and 
we continued our work.
    Minority Counsel. Yes. And I think you've hopefully said 
that even if that year 4 is viewed as going over one log, it's 
the same experiment as year 5. It's one single experiment. I 
think that's your testimony, right?
    Dr. Daszak. Yes, that's right.
    Minority Counsel. All right.
    Dr. Daszak. That's my understanding.
    Minority Counsel. And I think, as the majority alluded to, 
we're a little bit unsure about that, but just some data points 
on it. The year 5 report says, ``In year 5, we continued with 
in vivo experiments.''
    Just as a starting point, does that not sound to you like 
in year 5 they continued with experiments?
    Dr. Daszak. Well, this is the language received from 
Chinese Nationals writing in English. And our understanding of 
that was they continued analyzing from the in vivo experiments, 
which is what's in the reports. It's the pathology from the 
experiment.
    Minority Counsel. So, it's some English proficiency 
problem?
    Dr. Daszak. It's a ``your misinterpretation of what they 
meant'' problem. My interpretation is that, which I think is 
shown by the data, that they were doing the pathology on an 
experiment that was concluded a year ago, which is normal.
    Minority Counsel. Yes. So, those two experiments----
    Dr. Daszak. Absolutely normal.
    Minority Counsel. Those two experiments are also measured 
over different time spans. The figure in year 4 is 6 days. The 
figure in year 5 is 14 days. That sounds like a different 
experiment.
    Dr. Daszak. Well, we were told it isn't a different 
experiment. It's the same experiment. And unfortunately, it's 
going to be very difficult to get any information on that now. 
I did try, but we were told it's the same experiment. Now, the 
time difference may be easily explained by the way they set up 
the experiment. Maybe some of those mice were allowed to live 
longer before they were terminated, killed.
    Minority Counsel. Maybe. And so, at that----
    Dr. Daszak. Yes. I mean, it's totally reasonable.
    Minority Counsel. Well, I don't quite agree there, but I 
suppose you can say maybe. We asked what your source was for it 
being a single experiment. Am I right that the source of for 
that is the Wuhan Institute of Virology told you so?
    Dr. Daszak. The source is the lab that did the experiment.
    Minority Counsel. That's what they told you?
    Dr. Daszak. That's the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
    Minority Counsel. And that was after the pandemic when they 
told you that?
    Dr. Daszak. It was when I asked, when I was asked to ask by 
NIH.
    Minority Counsel. And was that during the pandemic?
    Dr. Daszak. Oh, yes, yes.
    Minority Counsel. OK.
    Dr. Daszak. After it had begun, yes.
    Minority Counsel. Do you think there's any possibility that 
they might have been incentivized to be less than truthful with 
you in that situation?
    Dr. Daszak. I'm not going to comment on people's motives 
that I don't know. I've had a long relationship with the 
scientists in that lab. I've told you about that. You get to 
understand people, and you get to know them. And, you know, you 
hear the same stories over 20 years. You hear if there are any 
discrepancies in their stories.
    They've always been honest with us. They've always been 
truthful. There's never been any untoward, underhand things 
going on. And I have no reason to think that they were under 
pressure to lie. There was no indication of that. They've not 
lied about other things, to my knowledge. You know, these are 
good scientists that are trying to do their job, and some of 
the best scientists in the world.
    Minority Counsel. OK. I'll yield some time back, but I 
think the broader theme throughout that is a little bit of a 
concern that when you discuss your work, either here at the 
Select Subcommittee, or with regulators or in public-facing 
situations, it's possible perhaps that you're framing issues in 
a way that is most favorable to you, and less so in a way 
that's confronting the science at any given moment. And that is 
just concerning.
    Dr. Daszak. I've only told you the truth.
    Minority Counsel. OK.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I would now like to yield to the Ranking 
Member Ruiz for a closing statement, if you would like one.
    Dr. Ruiz. As we conclude today's hearing, I remain 
seriously concerned that you, Dr. Daszak, appear to be eluding 
questions from this Committee in an attempt to avoid 
consequences. It was quite evident after this last questioning, 
and so, it is important that you and your organization be held 
accountable for all of your actions as Federal grantees, 
including the failure to comply with transparency obligations. 
You can say, Well, everybody knows. That's basically what 
your--everybody just assumes. Everybody knows. But when you're 
obliged to report them and you don't, that's concerning.
    We need to ensure that American taxpayer dollars are being 
spent responsibly, and I'm pleased by the strong bipartisan 
agreement demonstrated on this point today. At the same time, 
we owe it to the American people to be transparent about what 
exactly we are seeing. And I want to be clear that nothing 
produced to the Select Subcommittee over the past 14 months, 
nothing in more than 425,000 pages of internal documents and 
100 hours of closed-door testimony substantiates claims that 
Federal funding to EcoHealth Alliance and its work in Wuhan 
caused the COVID-19 pandemic.
    I have always maintained that my role as Ranking Member of 
this Committee is to keep an open mind about how the pandemic 
started, because understanding whether the novel coronavirus 
emerged from a lab or from nature is essential to better 
preventing and preparing for future public health threats and 
to better protecting the American people.
    That doesn't negate not being transparent or, you know, not 
giving full context of your remarks at the time or, you know, 
saying that you submitted the report, but yet, it wasn't 
submitted, and then being locked out and not submitting it 
until years later is not concerning, and your administrative 
responsibilities and lack of reporting in a timely manner is 
not concerning.
    So as we press for appropriate accountability for 
EcoHealth's concerning conduct, it is my hope that we can also 
dedicate our remaining time to an objective analysis of the 
various pathways by which SARS-CoV-2 could have emerged, be 
they zoonotic or stemming from a research-related incident. 
Because the truth of the matter is that the results will remain 
inconclusive, and our time in this Congress is running short.
    As I said in my opening statement, I stand ready to work 
with an objective evaluation of all of these possibilities, Mr. 
Chairman, and I hope that we can do so in order to protect the 
health and safety of our constituents, our community, and our 
country.
    This origin could still very well be zoonotic, and it could 
have been a lab leak, but we need to, in my opinion, spend 
equal amount of time trying to figure out how we can prevent 
zoonotic transmissions in the right locations around our globe 
and what we can do to collaborate better with foreign 
countries, some friendly, some not, in order to better contain 
the next emerging virus in the host country.
    But I do think, and at the end of the day, Dr. Daszak, your 
responses here are unsatisfactory. Some are understandable, but 
some are unsatisfactory in that, Well, that's not how I 
interpreted the Chinese--that's not how I interpreted it when 
it was quoted. And you say you can interpret it this way and I 
can interpret it that way. And as my colleague here, my 
friend----
    Dr. Daszak. Well, I'm----
    Dr. Ruiz. You're not asked to speak right now, but as you 
said, you know, you're explaining things to your convenience to 
avoid the consequences.
    So, you know, that's concerning, and it's very concerning. 
And, you know, there's been plenty of opportunity for you to 
submit all of your data and evidence, and now you're telling us 
that you could potentially have more evidence that you will 
give us, it's also concerning.
    So, with that, you know, I look forward to have forward-
facing solutions because, at the end of the day, the end point 
here is, was this a lab leak. And then if it was, let's improve 
biosafety standards and ensure that these misinterpretations 
don't happen. And then--but if it was zoonotic, then let's 
develop a system to prevent animal transmission.
    And since we don't know, and we probably won't know because 
of the Chinese Communist Party withholding all of their 
information, then let's work on forward-facing solutions on 
both scenarios.
    With that, I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I thank the Ranking Member for his remarks. I 
could not agree more that we have a path forward. We've been 
conducting investigation. We today have found out a lot of 
things that have given us guidance on things that we may need 
to correct.
    And I have the same concern--whether something is zoonotic 
or whether it's manufactured within a lab--how are we going to 
be prepared, how can we predict it, how can we prevent it, how 
can we keep the American people safe, and for that matter, 
people around the globe.
    But the purpose of today's hearing was to have a 
transparent examination of EcoHealth Alliance's president, Dr. 
Peter Daszak, given the extensive evidence of their role in 
gain-of-function research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, 
as well as getting a better understanding of the grant process 
and the oversight, or lack thereof.
    Because Congress has a responsibility to ensure American 
taxpayer dollars are spent in accordance with the law, and that 
rigorous oversight is applied to the entities that receive 
these funds, and as the Chairman of this Select Subcommittee, 
I'm committed to doing just that.
    We have identified serious issues with EcoHealth for the 
public to witness here today, such as failing to disclose 
competing interests, efforts to conceal where information 
originated from, and other significant reporting failures.
    I want to stress, this investigation is not over, and Dr. 
Daszak, we are not throwing the baby out with the bath water 
when it comes to advances in scientific research. That is not 
the purpose.
    Everyone on here, on this Subcommittee, supports good 
research. This, however, has not been good research.
    This Subcommittee has gone, spent time with the World 
Organization of Animal Health. You talk about infections 
through the zoonotic community, and possibly jumping to the 
human community. We have concerns with that. We went and 
visited with Dr. Tedros in the WHO.
    We are concerned about global health. We're not trying to 
throw the baby out with the bath water. And I agree that it's 
nice if you can do work in the country where the greatest risk 
is, and we can do the surveillance there.
    But the problem is, if you're in a country that is not 
trustable and not accountable and noncooperative with the WHO, 
in this case, we have a problem. And that's not where you 
should be.
    You can be near there. There may be some countries near 
there, where we can do the same research with trustable and 
accountable scientists. That is, I think, an important lesson 
that we have learned here.
    And you talk about, Oh, this is research that's really 
important. I'm not saying it's not, but I'll tell you, there's 
a difference between this type of research, and research that I 
see in my journals about bone growth or orthopedic repairs or--
this is not research on a cure for cancer that benefits all 
people. This is dangerous, risky research, and everyone 
involved with that, that I know of, has stated that at one 
point in their life or other.
    So we cannot just blindly trust the scientists just because 
they're scientists. They're scientists in China, a country that 
is an adversary to the United States of America, and especially 
when they're not forthcoming and honest when working to go 
forward. And when doing this to secure a Federal grant and fail 
to do the important work to satisfy the terms of the grant, 
that's a problem.
    As we pointed out in our report and heard today, hiding 
behind different definitions of ``gain of function'' to deny 
your role in conducting dangerous gain-of-function research at 
the WIV will not prevent us from conducting oversight and 
holding people accountable.
    You know, semantics doesn't change the risks involved. The 
semantics that we're hearing about today, the different 
definitions of gain-of-function research just seems to define 
the different levels of the risk and the severity of the 
results.
    We know that EcoHealth and Dr. Daszak violated the terms of 
the NIH grant by failing to report the gain-of-function 
experiment it was conducting. Let's be clear. We know this 
wasn't a small oversight or a clerical error. This was a 
dangerous experiment that was conducted and not reported.
    And this was not the only occurrence of EcoHealth failing 
to properly report. Didn't submit the annual research report. 
We talked about that a lot today.
    This is not an organization that shows leadership committed 
to protecting taxpayer funds or conducting research in an 
appropriate manner as set in the terms of the grant. This is 
troubling pattern of behavior that we are seeing, and conduct 
as well.
    EcoHealth made misleading statements in an effort to 
benefit yourself and your organization's financial interests 
and reputation. Misleading grant application to DARPA, you 
downplayed the Chinese involvement in the project.
    Even though we did learn from the emails produced that your 
proposal--your proposal did what you said you wanted to do in 
private, which is downplay the role of China and the WIV, 
specifically Dr. Zhengli Shi.
    You know, you didn't disclose your relationship with the 
WIV when you published the Lancet letter. And you said that 
Lancet approved this correspondence. Well, I'll tell you what, 
we asked Lancet to come in and sit before us. They didn't. 
Neither did Nature Magazine. Science did. They came in. They 
admitted to some of the things they could maybe do better. So, 
claiming that Lancet approved of it doesn't bear much water in 
front of this Committee right now.
    I could go on, but I think we've covered just about 
everything, and I'm glad we have. And I think we've done it in 
a very thorough fashion, but we're waiting for more, because 
while we're trying to be thorough, we don't feel that we have 
gotten a thorough response.
    If everything was innocent mistakes, we wouldn't need to 
send a letter asking for more information and documents by 
April 4--on April 4. Too many mistakes. Accountability taking 
far too long.
    But here we are, and we'll continue to conduct oversight 
and evaluate the evidence surrounding EcoHealth Alliance's 
research activities.
    Before I close, I ask unanimous consent to place the report 
on evaluation of the evidence surrounding EcoHealth Alliance, 
Inc's, research activities into the record.
    Dr. Wenstrup. With that, and without objection, all Members 
will have 5 legislative days within which to submit materials 
and to submit additional written questions for the witnesses, 
which will be forwarded to the witnesses for their response.
    With that, and without--and if there's no further business, 
without objection, the Select Subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:09 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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