[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





                               


 
 THREE YEARS LATER: ASSESSING THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO MULTIPLE 
                     PIPE BOMBS ON JANUARY 6, 2021

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

                                 OF THE

                   COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 12, 2024

                               __________

      Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration
      
      
      
      
 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
 
 
 
 
     


                             www.govinfo.gov
                             www.cha.house.gov                           
                           
                           
                           ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 55-095                WASHINGTON : 2024                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                   COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION

                    BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin, Chairman

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia            JOSEPH MORELLE, New York,
MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia                 Ranking Member
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina          TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
STEPHANIE BICE, Oklahoma             NORMA TORRES, California
MIKE CAREY, Ohio                     DEREK KILMER, Washington
ANTHONY D'ESPOSITO, New York
LAUREL LEE, Florida

                       Mike Platt, Staff Director
                  Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director

                                 ------                                

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

                    BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia, Chair

MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia            NORMA TORRES, California
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina               Ranking Member
ANTHONY D'ESPOSITO, New York         DEREK KILMER, Washington

             Elliott Tomlinson, Subcommittee Staff Director
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                           Opening Statements

Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight Barry Loudermilk, 
  Representative from the State of Georgia.......................     1
    Prepared statement of the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
      Oversight Barry Loudermilk.................................     3
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight Norma Torres, 
  Representative from the State of California....................     4
    Prepared statement of the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee 
      on Oversight Norma Torres..................................     5
Ranking Member of the Committee on House Administration Joseph 
  Morelle, Representative from the State of New York.............     6
    Prepared statement of the Ranking Member of the Committee on 
      House Administration, Joseph Morelle.......................     7

                               Witnesses

Sean Gallagher, Assistant Chief of Police for Uniformed 
  Operations, U.S. Capitol Police................................    10
    Prepared statement of Sean Gallagher.........................    13
Sean Dennis, President and CEO, United States Bomb Technician 
  Association....................................................    17
    Prepared statement of Sean Dennis............................    19
Michael Keim, former Head K-9 Detection Trainer, Washington 
  Metropolitan Area Transit Authority............................    22
    Prepared statement of Michael Keim...........................    22
Barry Black, former Master Bomb Technician, FBI..................    23
    Prepared statement of Barry Black............................    25

                        Questions for the Record

Sean Gallagher answers to submitted questions....................    46
Sean Dennis answers to submitted questions.......................    64
Michael Keim answers to submitted questions......................    73
Barry Black answers to submitted questions.......................    78


 THREE YEARS LATER: ASSESSING THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO MULTIPLE 
                     PIPE BOMBS ON JANUARY 6, 2021

                              ----------                              


                             March 12, 2024

                 Subcommittee on Oversight,
                 Committee on House Administration,
                                  House of Representatives,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:32 a.m., in 
room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Barry 
Loudermilk [chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Loudermilk, Griffith, Murphy, 
D'Esposito, and Torres.
    Also present: Representative Morelle.
    Staff present: Annemarie Cake, Deputy Clerk; Hillary 
Lassiter, Deputy Subcommittee Staff Director; Kristen 
Monterroso, Legislative Clerk; Michael Platt, Staff Director; 
Elliott Tomlinson, Subcommittee Staff Director; Jordan Wilson, 
Director of Member Services; Khalil Abboud, Minority Deputy 
Staff Director, Chief Counsel; Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff 
Director; and Matt Schlesinger, Minority Oversight Counsel.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY LOUDERMILK, CHAIRMAN OF THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE 
                           OF GEORGIA

    Chairman Loudermilk. The Subcommittee on Oversight will 
come to order. I know that a quorum is present.
    Without objection, the chair may declare a recess at any 
time.
    Also without objection, the meeting record will remain open 
for 5 legislative days so Members may submit any materials they 
wish to be included therein.
    Today we have Congressman Brian Mast joining us, and he is 
waived on to the Subcommittee to participate in today's 
hearing. He will arrive a little later. As a former Army 
explosive ordnance disposal technician, Congressman Mast is 
well-positioned to expose any failures of the January 6th 
device responses that we will analyze today. I appreciate 
having him here, and we look forward to his discussion.
    Thank you, Ranking Member Torres, Members of the 
Subcommittee, and our witnesses, for joining us at today's 
oversight hearing.
    January 6, 2021, was an incredibly dark day for our 
country. Our Capitol was overrun, and some individuals 
assaulted the U.S. Capitol Police officers, and they breached 
our halls. Additionally, explosive devices were placed at the 
DNC and the RNC, threatening our security.
    Today, we will focus on identifying the numerous security 
failures that preceded and continue to persist following the 
discovery of two explosive devices near the U.S. Capitol 
complex on January 6, 2021.
    Although it has been more than 3 years, we still have many 
unanswered questions. According to the FBI, there are still no 
suspects as to who planted the devices found near the RNC and 
the DNC. I know I share many people's concerns that there has 
been no update in their investigation.
    Additionally, the January 6th Select Committee, which was 
meant to dive into the failures and investigations of January 
6th, completely neglected to investigate the devices. Despite 
former Speaker Nancy Pelosi and House Democrats spending 
millions of dollars in their 2 years of the Select Committee, 
their investigation into the pipe bomb was basically 
nonexistent.
    Their 845-page final report only referred to the pipe bomb 
five times. These references are situational, and, as far as I 
can tell, no investigation was conducted. In contrast, the term 
``President Trump'' is mentioned in the report 1,901 times. I 
refuse to follow in the Select Committee's footsteps and 
conduct a partisan, biased investigation.
    There were genuine and regrettable security failures on 
January 6th. The response to the devices was one of the most 
alarming.
    Here are the facts:
    At approximately 12:42 p.m., the United States Capitol 
Police received reports of an explosive device found next to 
the RNC.
    At roughly 1:05 p.m., a second device was discovered at the 
DNC while Vice President-elect Kamala Harris was inside the 
building. The Vice President-elect came within feet of the 
device, which, if detonated, could have caused serious bodily 
harm.
    CCTV footage indicates the devices were planted the night 
before by an individual carrying a backpack and wearing a gray, 
hooded sweatshirt, a mask, gloves, glasses, and a pair of Nike 
Air Max Speed Turf sneakers.
    Despite the suspect's appearance on numerous U.S. Capitol 
Police CCTV cameras and the FBI's efforts interviewing over 800 
individuals and assessing more than 300 tips, the suspect still 
remains at large.
    Unfortunately, the FBI has failed to provide substantive 
updates on the investigation, despite numerous requests from 
congressional Committees. Today, they have declined to 
participate in our hearing.
    We are joined by several experts today who will help shed 
light on the devices response, including U.S. Capitol Police 
Assistant Chief Sean Gallagher. On January 6, 2021, Assistant 
Chief Gallagher directed a countersurveillance team to the DNC 
following the discovery of the device at the RNC.
    While today we will spend time analyzing the discrepancies 
of the devices response, ultimately this hearing is meant to 
help us all move forward.
    I look forward to your testimony, Assistant Chief 
Gallagher, and to working together so we can ensure 
shortcomings of this nature do not happen again.
    I salute and applaud the U.S. Capitol Police officers, who 
day-in and day-out devote their lives to protecting the Members 
and the Halls of Congress and the thousands of visitors who are 
here every day.
    We have a lot to dive into this morning.
    [The prepared statement of Chairman Loudermilk follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 
                        BARRY LOUDERMILK

    January 6, 2021, was an incredibly dark day for our 
country. Our Capitol was overrun, and some individuals 
assaulted the U.S. Capitol Police officers, and they breached 
our halls. Additionally, explosive devices were placed at the 
DNC and the RNC, threatening our security.
    Today, we will focus on identifying the numerous security 
failures that preceded and continue to persist following the 
discovery of two explosive devices near the U.S. Capitol 
complex on January 6, 2021.
    Although it has been more than 3 years, we still have many 
unanswered questions. According to the FBI, there are still no 
suspects as to who planted the devices found near the RNC and 
the DNC. I know I share many people's concerns that there has 
been no update in their investigation.
    Additionally, the January 6th Select Committee, which was 
meant to dive into the failures and investigations of January 
6th, completely neglected to investigate the devices. Despite 
former Speaker Nancy Pelosi and House Democrats spending 
millions of dollars in their 2 years of the Select Committee, 
their investigation into the pipe bomb was basically 
nonexistent.
    Their 845-page final report only referred to the pipe bomb 
five times. These references are situational, and, as far as I 
can tell, no investigation was conducted. In contrast, the term 
``President Trump'' is mentioned in the report 1,901 times. I 
refuse to follow in the Select Committee's footsteps and 
conduct a partisan, biased investigation.
    There were genuine and regrettable security failures on 
January 6th. The response to the devices was one of the most 
alarming.
    Here are the facts:
    At approximately 12:42 p.m., the United States Capitol 
Police received reports of an explosive device found next to 
the RNC.
    At roughly 1:05 p.m., a second device was discovered at the 
DNC while Vice President-elect Kamala Harris was inside the 
building. The Vice President-elect came within feet of the 
device, which, if detonated, could have caused serious bodily 
harm.
    CCTV footage indicates the devices were planted the night 
before by an individual carrying a backpack and wearing a gray, 
hooded sweatshirt, a mask, gloves, glasses, and a pair of Nike 
Air Max Speed Turf sneakers.
    Despite the suspect's appearance on numerous U.S. Capitol 
Police CCTV cameras and the FBI's efforts interviewing over 800 
individuals and assessing more than 300 tips, the suspect still 
remains at large.
    Unfortunately, the FBI has failed to provide substantive 
updates on the investigation, despite numerous requests from 
congressional Committees. Today, they have declined to 
participate in our hearing.
    We are joined by several experts today who will help shed 
light on the devices response, including U.S. Capitol Police 
Assistant Chief Sean Gallagher. On January 6, 2021, Assistant 
Chief Gallagher directed a countersurveillance team to the DNC 
following the discovery of the device at the RNC.
    While today we will spend time analyzing the discrepancies 
of the devices response, ultimately this hearing is meant to 
help us all move forward.
    I look forward to your testimony, Assistant Chief 
Gallagher, and to working together so we can ensure 
shortcomings of this nature do not happen again.
    I salute and applaud the U.S. Capitol Police officers, who 
day-in and day-out devote their lives to protecting the Members 
and the Halls of Congress and the thousands of visitors who are 
here every day.
    We have a lot to dive into this morning.

    I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mrs. Torres, for 5 
minutes for the purpose of providing an opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NORMA TORRES, RANKING MEMBER OF THE 
     SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
                           CALIFORNIA

    Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, join you in 
welcoming our witnesses to our hearing.
    Thank you for your many years of service to our 
communities.
    I understand how important and dangerous your jobs truly 
are, especially when forced to protect us from those who choose 
to use bombs instead of the ballots to achieve their ends.
    I also know, from many years working as a 911 dispatcher, 
that it is usually premature to assess the law enforcement 
response to a criminal act while a Federal investigation is 
still active and ongoing.
    I am sure that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle 
know this, which leads me to wonder, what exactly is it that we 
are doing here this morning?
    Maybe it is to peddle crazy, right-wing conspiracy theories 
about the January 6th pipe bombs spreading in the dark corners 
of the internet. Or maybe we are here so this Subcommittee can 
once again try to muddle our history, villainize law 
enforcement, and undo the efforts of the bipartisan January 6th 
Select Committee, all to distract from the simple fact that the 
former President--and Republican nominee for President--
orchestrated a corrupt scheme to overturn the results of a free 
and fair election.
    When that did not work, he summoned an armed mob, riled 
them up, and dispatched them to the Capitol, endangering the 
lives of everyone working here that day, including Members of 
Congress, not to mention putting at risk the lives of the 
outgoing and the incoming Vice Presidents.
    I was in the House Gallery when the Capitol was breached. 
It is imperative that all who committed criminal acts that day 
be held accountable for their actions, including, especially, 
whoever placed pipe bombs at the DNC and RNC.
    Yet we must remember that this is not an episode of ``CSI'' 
or ``Law & Order.'' We do not get to write our own ending 
according to what may or may not be convenient for our 
politics. It is frustrating, and I agree a hundred percent, but 
all critical and sensitive investigations take time.
    Experts are tasked with not only solving a crime but also 
identifying potential characteristics to prevent future 
threats. From the church bombings that terrorized Black 
communities throughout the civil rights movement to the bombing 
in Oklahoma City, Federal law enforcement agencies have always 
had to work tirelessly, sometimes for years and decades, to put 
together the pieces needed to fully investigate, identify, and 
prosecute domestic violent terrorists like whomever placed 
these bombs.
    FBI Director Christopher Wray testified before the January 
Committee--the Judiciary Committee last year that his agents 
reviewed 40,000 video files and assessed more than 500 tips. 
Law enforcement have spent thousands of man-hours investigating 
this crime, and I have faith that they will continue to do so 
until the perpetrator is brought to justice.
    While my colleagues on other side of the aisle and I 
disagree on some things, I hope that we can acknowledge and 
respect the vital work that law enforcement, including Federal 
law enforcement, does on our behalf.
    Just last week, House Republicans included cuts to DOJ, the 
FBI, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives, ATF, programs in their appropriations billings for 
Fiscal Year 2024.
    If they were serious about this investigation and supported 
law enforcement efforts, then they would not have cut critical 
funding for Federal law enforcement needed to solve these 
crimes and others.
    This Committee should not be used as a platform to feed 
into internet conspiracy theorists. Rather, I look forward 
discussing and learning more about the responsibilities and 
complexities of the important work that the FBI and its 
partners are engaged in from our witnesses.
    Thank you once again for taking the time to testify at this 
hearing.
    I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Ranking Member Torres follows:]

  PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
                     OVERSIGHT NORMA TORRES

    Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, join you in 
welcoming our witnesses to our hearing.
    Thank you for your many years of service to our 
communities.
    I understand how important and dangerous your jobs truly 
are, especially when forced to protect us from those who choose 
to use bombs instead of the ballots to achieve their ends.
    I also know, from many years working as a 911 dispatcher, 
that it is usually premature to assess the law enforcement 
response to a criminal act while a Federal investigation is 
still active and ongoing.
    I am sure that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle 
know this, which leads me to wonder, what exactly is it that we 
are doing here this morning?
    Maybe it is to peddle crazy, right-wing conspiracy theories 
about the January 6th pipe bombs spreading in the dark corners 
of the internet. Or maybe we are here so this Subcommittee can 
once again try to muddle our history, villainize law 
enforcement, and undo the efforts of the bipartisan January 6th 
Select Committee, all to distract from the simple fact that the 
former President--and Republican nominee for President--
orchestrated a corrupt scheme to overturn the results of a free 
and fair election.
    When that did not work, he summoned an armed mob, riled 
them up, and dispatched them to the Capitol, endangering the 
lives of everyone working here that day, including Members of 
Congress, not to mention putting at risk the lives of the 
outgoing and the incoming Vice Presidents.
    I was in the House Gallery when the Capitol was breached. 
It is imperative that all who committed criminal acts that day 
be held accountable for their actions, including, especially, 
whoever placed pipe bombs at the DNC and RNC.
    Yet we must remember that this is not an episode of ``CSI'' 
or ``Law & Order.'' We do not get to write our own ending 
according to what may or may not be convenient for our 
politics. It is frustrating, and I agree a hundred percent, but 
all critical and sensitive investigations take time.
    Experts are tasked with not only solving a crime but also 
identifying potential characteristics to prevent future 
threats. From the church bombings that terrorized Black 
communities throughout the civil rights movement to the bombing 
in Oklahoma City, Federal law enforcement agencies have always 
had to work tirelessly, sometimes for years and decades, to put 
together the pieces needed to fully investigate, identify, and 
prosecute domestic violent terrorists like whomever placed 
these bombs.
    FBI Director Christopher Wray testified before the January 
Committee--the Judiciary Committee last year that his agents 
reviewed 40,000 video files and assessed more than 500 tips. 
Law enforcement have spent thousands of man-hours investigating 
this crime, and I have faith that they will continue to do so 
until the perpetrator is brought to justice.
    While my colleagues on other side of the aisle and I 
disagree on some things, I hope that we can acknowledge and 
respect the vital work that law enforcement, including Federal 
law enforcement, does on our behalf.
    Just last week, House Republicans included cuts to DOJ, the 
FBI, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives, ATF, programs in their appropriations billings for 
Fiscal Year 2024.
    If they were serious about this investigation and supported 
law enforcement efforts, then they would not have cut critical 
funding for Federal law enforcement needed to solve these 
crimes and others.
    This Committee should not be used as a platform to feed 
into internet conspiracy theorists. Rather, I look forward 
discussing and learning more about the responsibilities and 
complexities of the important work that the FBI and its 
partners are engaged in from our witnesses.
    Thank you once again for taking the time to testify at this 
hearing.

    Chairman Loudermilk. I now recognize the full Committee 
Ranking Member, Mr. Morelle, for 5 minutes for the purpose of 
providing an opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH MORELLE, RANKING MEMBER OF THE 
 COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
                            NEW YORK

    Mr. Morelle. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thanks to our witnesses for joining us this morning, and 
thank you for your long service.
    Thanks to all the brave men and women of the Capitol 
Police, the FBI, and other law enforcement for the work they do 
each and every day to keep the American people safe, which is 
no easy task, but we are very grateful nonetheless.
    I must admit, I am perplexed as to why we are here for a 
public hearing on an active and ongoing Federal criminal 
investigation, especially one in which the FBI has repeatedly 
told Congress, including Members of this Subcommittee, that 
discussing an ongoing investigation would undermine its 
integrity and make it more difficult to catch the perpetrator.
    I have to wonder aloud whether that is the goal--to 
undermine the integrity of an ongoing investigation. I 
certainly hope not.
    Here we are. So, while I am not quite sure what the precise 
goal of this hearing is, I sincerely hope it is treated with 
the seriousness it deserves and it is not used as a platform to 
spread conspiracy theories about the FBI and the United States 
Capitol Police.
    Throughout this Congress, prominent House Republicans have 
called to defund agencies like the FBI and the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. In fact, at least 
one House Republican sells T-shirts on their website that say, 
``Defund the FBI.''
    I must point out the irony of my friends on the other side 
of the aisle repeatedly criticizing the pace of this FBI 
investigation while at the same time proudly attempting to 
defund the FBI, ATF, and other agencies leading the inquiry. 
How does it make any sense to criticize the pace of an 
investigation or the resources allocated to it while 
simultaneously taking those resources away?
    I am not the only one confused. The executive director of 
the National Fraternal Order of Police summed it up well: ``To 
say you support law enforcement and then withhold funding for 
law enforcement is at variance with common sense,'' end quote.
    It is not just the funding. This entire Congress, House 
Republicans have echoed the former President's bizarre 
accusations that the FBI has been weaponized against the 
American people and that it cannot be trusted.
    In fact, before technical difficulties prevented the 
majority on this Subcommittee from doing so, the current 
Speaker admitted that his allies on the Subcommittee were 
blurring faces of rioters in the January 6th footage they 
released over Capitol Police objections because, quote, ``We do 
not want them to be retaliated against and to be charged by the 
Department of Justice.''
    Imagine that. People who might have broken the law, we do 
not want to have them retaliated against or to be charged for 
crimes they may have committed.
    As I am sure our witnesses can attest, law enforcement 
relies heavily on the cooperation of members of the public to 
perform effective investigations. All leveling these baseless 
accusations against the FBI does is discourage witnesses and 
members of the public who may be helpful and have information 
from cooperating.
    Do not get me wrong; it is key that the individual who 
placed--or individuals--who placed the pipe bombs at the DNC 
and RNC ahead of the January 6th attack be caught and 
prosecuted. While I appreciate the majority's interest, I am 
not sure how this hearing will help advance that goal or what 
the Committee on House Administration could possibly do 
legislatively to speed up an active FBI investigation.
    Again, I thank the witnesses for being here, for your 
service, for your willingness to answer questions. I am 
actually looking forward to your testimony.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Ranking Member Morelle follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE 
                 ADMINISTRATION JOSEPH MORELLE

    I must admit, I am perplexed as to why we are here for a 
public hearing on an active and ongoing Federal criminal 
investigation, especially one in which the FBI has repeatedly 
told Congress, including Members of this Subcommittee, that 
discussing an ongoing investigation would undermine its 
integrity and make it more difficult to catch the perpetrator.
    I have to wonder aloud whether that is the goal--to 
undermine the integrity of an ongoing investigation. I 
certainly hope not.
    Here we are. So, while I am not quite sure what the precise 
goal of this hearing is, I sincerely hope it is treated with 
the seriousness it deserves and it is not used as a platform to 
spread conspiracy theories about the FBI and the United States 
Capitol Police.
    Throughout this Congress, prominent House Republicans have 
called to defund agencies like the FBI and the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. In fact, at least 
one House Republican sells T-shirts on their website that say, 
``Defund the FBI.''
    I must point out the irony of my friends on the other side 
of the aisle repeatedly criticizing the pace of this FBI 
investigation while at the same time proudly attempting to 
defund the FBI, ATF, and other agencies leading the inquiry. 
How does it make any sense to criticize the pace of an 
investigation or the resources allocated to it while 
simultaneously taking those resources away?
    I am not the only one confused. The executive director of 
the National Fraternal Order of Police summed it up well: ``To 
say you support law enforcement and then withhold funding for 
law enforcement is at variance with common sense,'' end quote.
    It is not just the funding. This entire Congress, House 
Republicans have echoed the former President's bizarre 
accusations that the FBI has been weaponized against the 
American people and that it cannot be trusted.
    In fact, before technical difficulties prevented the 
majority on this Subcommittee from doing so, the current 
Speaker admitted that his allies on the Subcommittee were 
blurring faces of rioters in the January 6th footage they 
released over Capitol Police objections because, quote, ``We do 
not want them to be retaliated against and to be charged by the 
Department of Justice.''
    Imagine that. People who might have broken the law, we do 
not want to have them retaliated against or to be charged for 
crimes they may have committed.
    As I am sure our witnesses can attest, law enforcement 
relies heavily on the cooperation of members of the public to 
perform effective investigations. All leveling these baseless 
accusations against the FBI does is discourage witnesses and 
members of the public who may be helpful and have information 
from cooperating.
    Do not get me wrong; it is key that the individual who 
placed--or individuals--who placed the pipe bombs at the DNC 
and RNC ahead of the January 6th attack be caught and 
prosecuted. While I appreciate the majority's interest, I am 
not sure how this hearing will help advance that goal or what 
the Committee on House Administration could possibly do 
legislatively to speed up an active FBI investigation.
    Again, I thank the witnesses for being here, for your 
service, for your willingness to answer questions. I am 
actually looking forward to your testimony.

    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    This hearing is to review the handling of two serious 
incidents that affects the safety and security of Republicans 
and Democrats and visitors to this city. I was sure that this 
could and really should be a bipartisan hearing, and I hope 
that it will be.
    The FBI has been investigating this for 3 years. This 
hearing is not about the FBI, nor its investigation. It is 
about the response and the process of responding to three very 
dangerous devices that provide an imminent risk to people here 
at the Capitol.
    The FBI was invited to be here today, but they declined. I 
believe we have assembled an impressive panel of experts that 
can help us break down the response.
    This hearing, this is not about the FBI investigation, but 
this is about something that this Committee does have oversight 
of, which is the U.S. Capitol Police and law enforcement that 
do respond and how they respond to incidents like this.
    Without objection, all other Members' opening statements 
will be made part of the hearing if they are submitted to the 
Committee clerk by 5 p.m. today.
    Pursuant to paragraph (b), Committee rule 6, the witnesses 
will please stand and raise your right hand.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Chairman Loudermilk. Let the record show that the witnesses 
answered in the affirmative.
    You may be seated. Thank you all.
    I will now introduce our witnesses.
    Our first witness is U.S. Capitol Police Assistant Chief 
for Uniformed Operations, Mr. Sean Gallagher.
    Thank you for your long-term service to the U.S. Capitol 
Police and the Members here.
    Assistant Chief Gallagher joined the Capitol Police in 2001 
and on January 6, 2021, was Deputy Chief for the Protective 
Services Bureau.
    We are grateful you are here today, Assistant Chief 
Gallagher, and we look forward to hearing your perspective 
regarding the law enforcement response and how we can improve 
in the future.
    Our next witness is Mr. Sean Dennis, the co-founder, 
president, and CEO of the U.S. Bomb Technician Association. Mr. 
Dennis formerly served as the bomb squad commander and special 
operations sergeant for the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office in 
Centennial, Colorado.
    I hope I got that name pronounced correctly.
    Mr. Dennis has been involved in the bomb technician and 
explosives community for a quarter-century, over 25 years.
    Our next witness is Mr. Michael Keim, a former Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority head K-9 detection trainer.
    Did I get that right?
    Mr. Keim. Yes.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Close enough, huh?
    Mr. Keim has spent over 12 years as an explosive and K-9 
trainer and handler and has supervised thousands of sweeps for 
explosive devices.
    Since the U.S. Secret Service, who supervised the security 
sweep at the DNC, was not available to testify before the 
Subcommittee today, we are looking forward to hearing Mr. 
Keim's perspective on the K-9 security sweep of the DNC, what 
went right, and what possibly may have gone wrong.
    Our final witness is Mr. Barry Black.
    A big fan of your first name, by the way. I just want to 
share.
    He is a former FBI special agent and master bomb 
technician. Mr. Black was a first responder to the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing, 1996 Atlanta Olympic bombing, and the 9/
11 World Trade Center attacks, among others. In 2022, Mr. Black 
was awarded as an honorary U.S. Air Force commander for his 
work with security forces and military working dogs.
    As I said, we have a very impressive panel of experts that 
I think can help navigate us here today.
    We appreciate the witnesses' being here today and look 
forward to your testimony.
    As a reminder, we have read your written statements, and it 
will appear in the full hearing record. Under Committee rule 9, 
you are to limit your oral presentation to a brief summary of 
your written statement, unless I extend the time period in 
consultation with Ranking Member Torres.
    Please remember to turn on your microphones using the 
button in front of you so that Members can hear. If you do not, 
I will very politely remind you to turn your microphone on.
    When you begin to speak, the light on the timer in front of 
you will turn green. After 4 minutes, it will turn yellow. When 
the red light comes on, your 5 minutes has expired. You do not 
have to stop mid-sentence, but we would ask that you please 
wrap up your statements once that red light has illuminated.
    I now recognize Assistant Chief Gallagher for 5 minutes.

  STATEMENTS OF SEAN GALLAGHER, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF POLICE FOR 
    UNIFORMED OPERATIONS, U.S. CAPITOL POLICE; SEAN DENNIS, 
 PRESIDENT AND CEO, UNITED STATES BOMB TECHNICIAN ASSOCIATION; 
  MICHAEL KEIM, FORMER HEAD K-9 DETECTION TRAINER, WASHINGTON 
 METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY; AND BARRY BLACK, FORMER 
                  MASTER BOMB TECHNICIAN, FBI

                  STATEMENT OF SEAN GALLAGHER

    Chief Gallagher. Good morning, Chairman Loudermilk, Ranking 
Member Torres, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the 
invitation to testify today about the January 6th pipe bombs.
    The department greatly appreciates the Committee's 
continued support of the men and women of the U.S. Capitol 
Police, who courageously carry out their duties of protecting 
the Members of Congress, staff, visitors, and the entire 
Capitol Complex and legislative process each and every day.
    Congress's support has been invaluable as we continue to 
work on building on the lessons learned from January 6th while 
also meeting the dramatic workload increases and increasing 
volatile threat environment.
    As you know, the United States Capitol Police is a unique 
Federal law enforcement agency. We patrol a campus that is 
completely open. The public has a constitutional right to 
visit, protest, and petition their Representatives on Capitol 
Grounds. Our officers and civilians work 24/7 to keep you safe 
whether you are here on Capitol Hill or when you travel to your 
home districts.
    Our mission is vast, and our responsibilities have expanded 
immensely over the years. The threat picture has morphed from 
securing our buildings to the threat of a 9/11 scenario, to the 
lone offender, and now to an unprecedented increase in threats 
to Members and their families.
    On January 6, 2021, however, that safety was threatened in 
a number of ways, including the placement of two pipe bombs--
one in an alley behind the Capitol Hill Club on Capitol 
Grounds, which is adjacent to the Republican National 
Committee, and one at the Democratic National Committee, which 
is just off the Capitol Grounds.
    I would like to walk through the events of that day with 
regards to the pipe bombs, and then I would be happy to answer 
any questions the Committee may have.
    On January 6, 2021, I was in charge of our Protective 
Services Bureau as the Deputy Chief. Our Protective Services 
Bureau is our Dignitary Protection Division, our IICD, and our 
Investigation Division.
    On January 6th, at approximately 12:44, one of our 
uniformed officers was notified by Republican National 
Committee security that there appeared to be a pipe bomb 
located at the rear of the Capitol Hill Club in an alley. A 
command post was established by 12:49, and the device was 
located during a search of the area.
    Around the same time, one of our K-9 technicians identified 
a pickup truck parked directly across the street from the RNC 
with a weapon in plain view and the truck appearing to be 
weighed down. This pickup truck was parked directly across the 
street from the RNC.
    Assets from our department's Hazardous Device Section, more 
commonly known as our bomb squad, responded and began to assess 
the device at approximately 12:52. The pipe bomb was eventually 
disrupted by our bomb squad and cleared at approximately 3 p.m.
    The earlier pickup truck that I mentioned that our K-9 
technician located was declared suspicious, and members of our 
bomb squad then began to assess that vehicle at approximately 
3:25.
    This vehicle was found to contain 11 Molotov cocktails, 
smokeless powder canisters, OC spray, canisters full of 
ammunition, a rifle, a shotgun, a handgun, multiple machetes, 
and a crossbow.
    The owner of that vehicle was later identified, arrested, 
and is ultimately serving 47 months in Federal prison.
    The overall scene at the RNC was cleared at approximately 
6:30 p.m.
    As a result of the discovery of the pipe bomb at the RNC, 
members of our department's countersurveillance unit, as they 
have been trained to do, began to push out and search for other 
locations for either suspicious packages, suspicious people, or 
similar devices.
    At approximately 1 p.m., the department requested Metro 
Transit to have trains bypass the Capitol South Metro due to 
the presence of the pipe bomb.
    At 1:07 p.m., approximately 23 minutes after the Capitol 
Police was alerted of the pipe bomb at the RNC, two of our 
countersurveillance agents located what appeared to be a 
similar pipe bomb underneath a bench in front of the DNC.
    The Cannon House Office Building was evacuated at about 
1:11 p.m., and officers immediately began to clear residences 
and businesses in the area.
    The scene at the DNC was cleared at approximately 4:36 
after our bomb squad disrupted and cleared the pipe bombs. The 
FBI then took possession of both devices and all evidence and 
is the lead agency on the entire investigation.
    It is my understanding that both of these devices were 
fully functional and viable pipe bombs. However, it is unclear 
whether they would have gone off on their own had they not been 
rendered safe by our bomb squad.
    As I noted earlier, our bomb squad successfully handled an 
extremely dangerous situation on January 6th, but since that 
date we have determined additional improvements are necessary. 
Thus, the department has continued to seek ways to improve our 
operations, overhauling many of our policies, processes, and 
implementing numerous changes related to: Civil Disturbance 
Unit, intelligence gathering, operational planning, training 
and equipment, incident command, and internal communications, 
as well as a host of other areas.
    Since January 6th, our bomb squad technicians have begun 
receiving specialized advanced training from the ATF's 
Certified Explosives Specialist Program, and the department has 
a bomb technician training with an elite FBI team which is one 
of only 14 such teams in the country now.
    Our bomb squad is also participating in the Raven's 
Challenge, which includes numerous public safety squads and 
military EOD teams performing realistic operational scenarios.
    Our bomb squad remains one of the largest and one of the 
most capable squads in the entire country. The changes noted 
above will ensure that the department is even better prepared 
to respond to any similar incidents.
    Finally, I want to make sure that I note--and this is 
important--I am extremely proud that none of these two pipe 
bombs nor any of the Molotov cocktails found that day exploded 
or harmed anybody. This is without a doubt directly due to the 
outstanding efforts of not only our bomb squad but other 
members of the U.S. Capitol Police.
    We now know based on video surveillance that both of these 
devices were placed the night before, on January 5, 2021.
    While there is vague footage of the suspect, to date nobody 
has been arrested for the offense, despite a $500,000 reward by 
the FBI and many hours of hard work by the FBI and other law 
enforcement agencies. I do hope one day that the person or 
persons responsible for planting these two explosive devices on 
Capitol Grounds will be brought to justice by the FBI.
    The department thanks the Committee for its support, and we 
greatly appreciate our continued partnership with Congress. I 
welcome any questions.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Gallagher follows:]

              PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEAN GALLAGHER
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

    Chairman Loudermilk. Mr. Dennis, you are now recognized for 
5 minutes.

                    STATEMENT OF SEAN DENNIS

    Mr. Dennis. Good morning, Chairman Loudermilk, Ranking 
Member Torres, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for 
the opportunity today to provide some background on the 
response to improvised explosive devices in the United States.
    My name is Sean Dennis, and I am a retired sheriff's 
sergeant and bomb squad commander from the Arapahoe County 
Sheriff's Office, outside of Denver, Colorado. After 
retirement, I worked for the Transportation Security 
Administration as an explosives specialist at the Denver 
International Airport.
    It was during this time that I, along with a small group of 
military and public safety bomb technicians with similar 
backgrounds, recognized the need for an organization to support 
the bomb technician community. We felt under-represented, 
despite the critical role we were playing to keep our homeland 
safe.
    In 2016, we formed the United States Bomb Technician 
Association, known as the USBTA. Today we represent over 5,000 
active military and public safety bomb technicians by educating 
those in positions of leadership on the desperate needs of this 
community.
    USBTA also conducts technology training exercises to 
identify technology and training gaps that exist within the 
bomb technician community. In addition, USBTA conducts research 
involving counter-IED tools and equipment, along with research 
of characterizing hazardous homemade explosives.
    The lessons learned from our training and research are used 
to give the EOD warfighter and public safety bomb technician 
the capabilities to render safe IEDs in a safe, efficient, and 
effective manner.
    Some of the critical areas in the bomb technician community 
that we would like to highlight today include:
    One, training and certifications. Public safety bomb 
technicians receive basic training and certification at the FBI 
Hazardous Devices School in Huntsville, Alabama, consisting of 
a 6-week curriculum. Bomb technicians then receive a variety of 
continuing education and training from various U.S. Government 
entities, such at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives; the FBI; and the DHS Office for Bombing Prevention.
    The National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board provides 
national guidelines for bomb technicians to conduct 24 hours of 
monthly training in addition to the required recertification 
with the FBI every 3 years to ensure competency. Furthermore, 
bomb squads and their technicians seek out professional 
organizations and industry events to increase their knowledge 
and strengthen their skill sets.
    Two, incident response. Bomb technicians face several 
challenges when called to an incident in which a suspect 
package or hazardous material has been identified. First and 
foremost, they are facing the unknown. Only the person 
responsible for construction and placement knows how these 
devices function and who the target is and what the motive is 
behind their malicious intentions or malicious actions. Bomb 
squads may only have minutes to determine those factors for the 
preservation of life.
    Last, challenges upon arrival. Some of the life-threatening 
challenges faced by the bomb technicians may include the 
following: the initial intelligence--first responders' 
assessment provided to the responding bomb technicians may only 
provide a portion of the information required--determination of 
the environment, permissive or hostile; identification of 
single or multiple devices; potential of secondary devices; on-
scene targeting of first responders; location of device 
replacement by bomb maker; standoff area densely populated with 
bystanders and civilians; inability to evacuate civilians in a 
timely manner; having the appropriate equipment available to 
handle the call; poor weather conditions; adequate personnel to 
perform appropriate render-safe operations; possibly a remote 
detonation by the bomb maker; limited render-safe options based 
on surrounding critical infrastructure; the inability to remain 
remote--remember, if you can see the device, the device can see 
you--communications amongst team members and command staff.
    Although not present during the events that took place on 
January 6, 2021, I am aware of some of the challenges the bomb 
technicians might have faced, as I have experienced similar 
challenges during my time as the bomb squad commander at the 
sheriff's office.
    The job of a bomb technician is inherently dangerous and 
stressful. When we are called upon, the situation has already 
risen to a level that most do not have to face in their normal 
lives. The decisions you make in a very short period of time 
have consequences that can cost your life and the lives of the 
innocent around you.
    There is no opportunity for do-overs or time for tabling 
the options for further discussions. There is a term in our 
community that is posted outside our doors of our training 
classroom to remind us: ``Initial success or total failure.''
    The challenges faced by the Capitol Police bomb squad on 
that January 6th event were extraordinary, as they were 
required to navigate the render-safe of multiple devices in and 
around critical infrastructure, buildings, and general 
population, in addition to thousands actively protesting within 
their scene.
    By all accounts, it is my opinion that the bomb squad dealt 
with these challenges professionally and rendered safe the 
device, avoiding harm or injury to themselves or others, and 
were able to collect forensic evidence to assist in determining 
who was responsible.
    I am proud of the bomb squad community that we represent, 
and we will continue to advocate for their needs to ensure they 
have the appropriate resources, personnel, training, and 
technology when they are faced with these extraordinary 
challenges in keeping our communities safe.
    Thank you.
    I yield back to the Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Dennis follows:]

               PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEAN DENNIS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

    Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Dennis.
    Mr. Keim, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

                   STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KEIM

    Mr. Keim. Good morning. My name is Mike Keim. I am a 
retired 25-year veteran of the K-9 unit, Metro Transit Police 
Department, Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority.
    I began my career in 1992. I spent the last approximately 
12 years of my career training explosive detections K-9 teams, 
the handlers and the dogs. In this role, I had the 
responsibility of training the Washington Metropolitan Transit 
Authority Police Department explosive detection dogs from the 
time they were acquired through their certification and 
utilization, maintaining training records for both handlers and 
dogs.
    During my career, I have conducted over--conducted or 
supervised in excess of 35,000 explosive sweeps, real-life and 
training scenarios, utilizing explosive detection dogs 
throughout the Washington, D.C., Metrorail system and stations.
    Many of my friends and colleagues from my 25-year career 
responded on January 6, 2021. I am here today to answer any 
questions you may have or provide any information that this 
Committee deems useful.
    I would like to thank Chairman Loudermilk as well as all 
the other Committee Members for your help in law enforcement.
    I yield back my time.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Keim follows:]

               PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KEIM
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5095.008

    Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Keim. We appreciate the 
time management there. With that length of testimony, you could 
become a very popular witness for a lot of Committees here.
    Mr. Black, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

                    STATEMENT OF BARRY BLACK

    Mr. Black. Good morning, Chairman Loudermilk, Ranking 
Member Torres, and Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure 
to be with you this morning.
    Last week, I was asked to consider the status of the 
investigation regarding the subject that left two devices 
before the RNC and DNC back in January 2021.
    I retired in 2019, so I was not present that day, but as a 
master bomb technician, a master police instructor, a founding 
member of the FBI's Evidence Response Team, Worldwide Rapid 
Deployment Team, and having been a first responder at numerous 
high-profile events, I am familiar with the way bombing 
investigations are conducted.
    After I retired, I took a position as an instructor at a 
leading forensic science institute, where I teach classes on 
crime scene processing and the forensic investigation of mass 
disasters.
    One thing I tell my students, as Mrs. Torres alluded to: 
The ``CSI'' effect just does not exist. That is a product of 
television shows that depict trace evidence and forensic 
science as a silver bullet that is omnipresent and can almost 
immediately point to a specific subject out of the universe of 
possible subjects.
    Oftentimes, forensic evidence is just unavailable, and 
investigators have to rely on other types of investigative 
techniques. Many times, that is directly related to the 
identity of the suspect.
    By way of example, Eric Rudolph, the Olympic bomber, placed 
four devices over a 2-year period. Despite forensic 
examinations during that time, his identity remained elusive. 
It took eyewitnesses to come forward that said they saw a 
suspicious man in a specific type of truck just prior to the 
blast in Birmingham that killed a police officer. It was those 
tips that focused the investigation on Eric Rudolph.
    Similarly, Ted Kaczynski was active for 17 years. Despite 
thorough forensic examinations of over a dozen devices during 
that period, his identity remained elusive, primarily because 
Mr. Kaczynski went to great lengths to obscure forensic 
evidence. It was not until his manifesto was published that his 
brother provided a tip. That tip is what brought focus to Mr. 
Kaczynski, not the years of forensic examinations.
    I once responded to the bombing of an Air Force recruiting 
station. As we were processing that crime scene, we recovered 
pieces of a pipe bomb and a specialized, customized timing 
device. As we collected that evidence and we are preparing it 
for submission to the laboratory, again, a witness came forward 
that indicated they saw a suspicious man driving a unique red 
racing motorcycle before and after the blast.
    Using Air Force personnel records cross-matched with DMV 
records, we developed a suspect and within 24 hours were able 
to execute a search warrant at that individual's home and 
recovered two fully viable time bombs. Forensics were used to 
tie those two time bombs to the evidence recovered from the 
scene, but it was the witness testimony that expeditiously 
pointed to that suspect.
    As for the January 6th suspect, it appears that there was a 
conscious efforts to disguise that person's identity, making 
personal identification difficult.
    From what I have seen in the public record, it appears that 
the IEDs themselves were comprised of very simple, very common 
components that are available most anywhere. That makes it 
difficult to trace the source of those components and, thereby, 
makes it difficult to determine who purchased those components.
    I understand hundreds, if not thousands, of interviews have 
been conducted. Tens of thousands of video images have been 
reviewed, hundreds of tips. Sadly, sometimes cases go cold. 
Once the forensic evidence has been exhausted, once all viable 
leads have been covered, new information is required.
    Requests for public information and a half-million-dollar 
reward may one day provide the key that will unlock this case, 
and at that time I am certain the dedicated men and women of 
the FBI and our law enforcement partners will thoroughly 
exhaust those leads to their logical conclusion.
    Thank you for your time, and I will be happy to try to 
answer any questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Black follows:]

               PREPARED STATEMENT OF BARRY BLACK
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 


    Chairman Loudermilk. Well, thank you all.
    We are going to enter into the question portion now. Some 
of you, maybe all of our witnesses, may not have participated 
in a hearing like this. At this point, we will--Members will be 
allowed to ask questions. They will alternate between 
Republican and Democrat, back and forth.
    Each Member will have 5 minutes, and so--many have multiple 
questions, so ask that you be--I am going to ask you to be 
thorough but concise in your answers. Again, we are looking for 
facts. We are just looking to review what happened and see how 
we can go forward.
    With that, one of the things that, as Mr. Black alluded to, 
a lot of times we are just going off of evidence after the 
fact. Fortunately, we do have video of the placing of the pipe 
bombs as well as the response. So, today, we will be utilizing 
some U.S. Capitol Police CCTV footage that we will play to help 
us break these things down.
    Now, as most of you know, there is not any audio associated 
with these videos. We did not hire a Hollywood producer to put 
sound effects in. What we did do is overlay radio 
communications, Capitol Police radio communications, over the 
top of the video to save time. Whatever audio that you are 
hearing is actually where we have put the radio communications 
commensurate with the video.
    According to the FBI, both devices were planted the night 
before but were discovered more than 16 hours later, in the 
early afternoon of January 6, 2021.
    One of the questions the Subcommittee is interested in, as 
part of our oversight responsibilities, is the law enforcement 
response after the devices were discovered--specifically, 
setting and maintaining a secure perimeter around those 
devices.
    At roughly 12:42 p.m., the first device was discovered near 
the RNC.
    At approximately 1:21 p.m., two civilians walked south on 
1st Street, past the RNC, and entered the Capitol South Metro 
station directly across from the alley where the first device 
was discovered.
    U.S. Capitol Police security footage shows no police 
presence at 1st and C Street to prevent pedestrian traffic from 
walking directly into the safe perimeter.
    Approximately 1 minute later, a U.S. Capitol Police officer 
makes the following broadcast over the radio.
    Can we please play that tape?
    [Videotape played.]
    Chairman Loudermilk. Assistant Chief Gallagher, you can 
clearly see in the video a roll of yellow police tape on top of 
the sidewalk post at 1st and C Street, which indicates that 
there has already been the response and at least a presence 
there.
    Should a safe perimeter have been established at 1st and C 
Street by 1:21 p.m.?
    Chief Gallagher. Thank you, Chairman.
    So, for incidents of this nature, the first officer on the 
scene will be setting up incident command and a command post. 
Part of that procedure is to identify a perimeter and set a 
perimeter for a safe distance away from a potential hazard. So, 
yes, there should have been a perimeter officer at that 
location.
    Now, I would like to clarify, as these incidents are 
ongoing, we are--at 1:21, we are dealing with breaches on the 
east front and the west front of the Capitol as well. Our 
manpower was very succinct in where these officers were 
assigned and stuff. Any officers that come to help set up a 
perimeter are coming from another area. We do not have just 
response teams, you know, waiting around to help set up 
perimeters. There could have been a delay with getting there.
    Chairman Loudermilk. All right. Thank you.
    Mr. Dennis, in your opinion, from watching that video, was 
there a safe perimeter at the RNC?
    Mr. Dennis. Well, looking at the video, it is hard to tell 
exactly the perimeter, not being too familiar with the area. 
Back to what the assistant chief just said, is they set up a 
good perimeter like that for the safe distances for the bomb 
squad to act. It is hard to tell if it was actually done or 
not.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. You know, in your opinion, there 
should have been something----
    Mr. Dennis. Should have been, yes. Correct.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Is that a priority, from your 
experience of working----
    Mr. Dennis. When a bomb respond is responding to an 
incident such as this, it is extremely important for the 
perimeter to be set up in a timely manner so the bomb squad 
could act appropriately.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you.
    Mr. Keim, in your opinion, was there a safe perimeter at 
the RNC at this time?
    Mr. Keim. From the video, it is tough to tell, but that 
would be the----
    [Turns on microphone.]
    Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you.
    Mr. Keim. From the video, it is tough to tell, but that 
is--as a K-9 officer, when we show up, if we see a suspicious 
package or if there is one there, the first thing we are going 
to do is establish the command post and set up a perimeter a 
safe distance away.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
    Mr. Black, same question.
    Mr. Black. Yes, sir. Again, from the video, it is difficult 
to tell, not being familiar with the area, but these are 
phases. When the suspect device is first noticed, then the 
first responding officer should set up a safe perimeter, hold 
that perimeter until EOD assets can arrive on the scene.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you.
    Mr. Dennis, why is it important to establish a secure 
perimeter early on and maintain that perimeter throughout the 
day? Why is that a priority, to quarantine off that area?
    Mr. Dennis. So, for when the bomb squad's responding and 
setting up their own internal command post, if you will, 
regarding dealing with the incident or the potential IED 
suspect packages, it is extremely important for the safe 
distances that are established with the perimeter to make sure 
that everybody, both civilian as well as even other law 
enforcement personnel, are far enough away in a safe manner so 
the bomb squad could act appropriately.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you.
    Now, to complicate things even further, as Assistant Chief 
Gallagher said, there were multiple instances going on. There 
were actually another instance going on over at the Democrat 
National Committee. Similarly, law enforcement at the DNC 
appeared to fail to secure the perimeter at a much larger 
scale.
    The device at the DNC was discovered at 1:05 p.m. After its 
discovery, law enforcement should have established a secure 
perimeter at the DNC as well. Over the span of the afternoon, 
more than 30 different vehicles and numerous civilians breached 
what should have been a secure perimeter.
    The following video shows examples of the perimeter being 
breached at various points in the afternoon, both before and 
after the disruption of the device. This is once the bomb squad 
did their job, disrupted the device, we had instances before 
and after.
    Let us go ahead and play this tape.
    Again, this is a montage of----
    [Videotape played.]
    Chairman Loudermilk. That was where the package was, by the 
park bench there.
    For example, at 2:01 p.m., a U.S. Capitol Police officer 
incorrectly announced ``fire in the hole at the RNC'' when they 
meant to say ``DNC.'' At 2:05, the officer corrects their 
mistake and says ``fire in the hole at the DNC.''
    Mr. Black, what does the term ``fire in the hole'' mean?
    Mr. Black. Generally, the term ``fire in the hole'' would 
be indicative of an explosion is about to happen. It is a range 
term when we are about to detonate a charge on an explosives 
range. That term, ``fire in the hole,'' would mean the 
explosion is going to occur.
    Chairman Loudermilk. In other words, look out, clear the 
area.
    Mr. Black. Yes.
    Chairman Loudermilk. All right.
    Mr. Dennis, what could this mistake lead to when dealing 
with multiple scenes? In other words, identifying--there are 
two going on--RNC, DNC--very similar names, but--and, again, it 
was corrected at some point. What could a mistake like that 
lead to, declaring ``fire in the hole'' at the wrong location?
    Mr. Black. For me, sir?
    Chairman Loudermilk. Yes. Sorry.
    Mr. Black. Obviously, information's critical. Knowing what 
is going on at a particular event is absolutely critical for 
incident command. Multiple devices, multiple locations, other 
problems in other areas complicate communications for any 
incident commander.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Sorry I called you ``Mr. Dennis.'' My 
fault.
    Mr. Dennis, do you have anything to add to that?
    Mr. Dennis. No. I concur with what Mr. Black said.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
    At nearly the same time, at the DNC, an unmarked police car 
drives next to the robot as it prepares to disrupt the bomb.
    Mr. Dennis, is it safe for a vehicle to drive within feet 
of a device, whether it is viable or not, after ``fire in the 
hole'' has been called?
    Mr. Dennis. That would be negative.
    Chairman Loudermilk. I am sorry?
    Mr. Dennis. It would not be appropriate for that to----
    Chairman Loudermilk. It would not be appropriate.
    Mr. Dennis. No.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Mr. Dennis, should any civilian or law 
enforcement officer be allowed within close proximity of the 
device, viable or not, once ``fire in the hole'' has been 
called?
    Mr. Dennis. No.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you.
    As you can see from the montage, there were several both 
law enforcement and civilians in the area, even one where there 
is a plainclothes police officer or a civilian walking by and 
looking at the robot while it was there.
    It seems to be that, based on what you are telling us, that 
is highly inappropriate and potentially deadly. Is that 
correct?
    Mr. Dennis. That is correct.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
    Next, I would like to discuss law enforcement's failure to 
discover the devices.
    On the morning of January 6th, Vice President-elect Kamala 
Harris arrived at the DNC through the garage entrance. Prior to 
her arrival, the Secret Service conducted a security sweep of 
the building and its exterior. Based on records obtained by the 
Subcommittee, the Secret Service used two Uniformed Division K-
9 units and more than 10 Secret Service agents to conduct this 
sweep.
    Let me just say, before we roll this tape, we are showing 
all of these videos during my time in the beginning to save 
time later so others may have questions based off of these 
videos. This is just not for this line of questioning.
    Let us go ahead and roll this tape of the security sweep.
    [Video shown.]
    Chairman Loudermilk. It is a still picture of the building 
on the right, just for clarity of where the device is.
    [Video shown.]
    Chairman Loudermilk. At 9:28 a.m., a Secret Service handler 
and the bomb dog conducted a sweep of the garage outside the 
DNC.
    At one point in the video, the handler allows the dog to 
inspect an area directly behind the device. As the handler 
begins to pull away, his leash tightens, causing him to lose 
balance.
    Let us just look at that portion again for clarity.
    [Video shown.]
    Chairman Loudermilk. So, at this point, when he goes down 
and turns to the right, you can see his leg kick out a little 
bit.
    Voice. Whose leg was that?
    Chairman Loudermilk. Right there.
    Voice. The officer?
    Chairman Loudermilk. Right there. Of the actual officer. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Keim, what is your assessment of the effectiveness of--
--
    Mr. Morelle. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask a question? I 
think we are probably about 10 minutes into your 5 minutes. I--
--
    Chairman Loudermilk. We are about to wrap it up. We are 
taking the additional time so we can save time later so we do 
not have to replay the video. It is going to take a little 
additional time.
    Mr. Morelle. OK.
    Chairman Loudermilk. We will be moving on very quickly.
    Mr. Keim, what is your assessment of these sweeps in the 
video?
    Mr. Keim. It appears to me that the K-9 handler, the K-9 
team, is doing an open sweep, where the dog's out in front of 
him and he is letting the dog dictate where he wants to go.
    Unfortunately, the dog is out of our--out of the screen 
whenever the handler has his left leg and left arm goes up. It 
could be one of two things: the dog had some K-9 of change of 
behavior out of our view, or the handler had a change of 
behavior and the handler's trying to allow that dog by giving 
him that extra lead. That is usually what happens, is your foot 
goes up, your hand goes up, and you are trying to leave--you do 
not want to put any unneeded pressure on the dog----
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
    Mr. Keim [continuing]. from him pulling on the lead and 
causing the dog to move.
    Depending on how well-trained the dog is and the handler 
is, to me it appears he is trying to give him a little more 
lead because he has had some type of change of behavior. 
Unfortunately, we cannot see what that change of behavior is.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Right.
    Mr. Keim. It looks like the dog decides that he is going to 
leave that area.
    Could he be an odor (ph)? He could have had some kind of 
change of behavior, but----
    Chairman Loudermilk. Which could have been an alert.
    Mr. Keim. It could have been. It----
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
    Mr. Keim. Alert would a final response, like a sit would 
be----
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
    Mr. Keim [continuing]. an alert on a package. That would be 
a change of behavior. The handler wanted to give him the time 
to make a decision, is he going to go.
    From what I understand, there is a wall there. And----
    Chairman Loudermilk. Yes.
    Mr. Keim [continuing]. you know, it is hard to tell whether 
the dog gets an alert or how that air's moving, but the dog 
decided to leave it and walk away from it. So----
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
    Just real quickly, your assessment of the sweep of the 
vehicle?
    Mr. Keim. The sweep of the vehicle--well, when we start 
training, depending on the experience of the dog, we tend to 
put a dog on a pattern.
    That was a free-flowing sweep, where the dog's just out in 
front. It looks like the dog has some kind of experience, 
because it is hitting, sort of, the spots you need it to hit: 
the wheel wells, the door seams, the windows.
    The handler actually pops the trunk, which causes the 
vehicle to breathe, the air inside, and the dog turns away from 
it like it had no interest. So----
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK.
    Mr. Keim. Then it goes and finishes. You start at one 
corner, you go all the way around, you finish at the same 
corner you started at. Sometimes you overlap by a little bit.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you.
    This will be the last video after we--because this is also 
a video being used for questions by the rest of the Committee. 
This is the video of the U.S. Capitol Police controlled 
disruption of the device.
    The robot arm is in the bottom left of the screen, if you 
watch it there.
    [Video shown.]
    Chairman Loudermilk. With this, one quick question.
    Mr. Dennis, if the device is successfully disrupted, what 
do you expect to see?
    Mr. Dennis. Once a device is disrupted--in this case, it 
looks to be a galvanized-type pipe bomb in there--you would 
have the end cap, if that is what the target was, the end cap, 
you would take the end cap off, which is usually what bomb 
technicians will do. You will see the end cap somewhere within 
the location of the shot that they placed.
    Potentially, any of the residue or anything that is inside 
the actual pipe itself may have came out at that time. Anything 
else that is exterior that was maybe attached to the pipe could 
also be laying there in the immediate area.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Nothing unusual that you see in 
that?
    Mr. Dennis. No, nothing.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you.
    Now I will recognize Mrs. Torres for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Torres. Before the clock begins, I have a question for 
you.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. Torres. Given that you have taken close to 15 minutes 
and between all of you, you have, 25, 30 minutes in addition to 
the 15 minutes--there are two of us; we have 10 minutes--are 
you going to allow for us to extend our time?
    Chairman Loudermilk. Well, as you know, under the rules, 
the Chairman has full discretion over the management of time. 
As I had explained, we wanted to make sure to get the videos 
upfront. If we would have done the videos or any other audio, 
it would have been taken out of the other Members' time.
    What I would ask--and I will be flexible--is to try to, you 
know, stay within a reasonable time with asking your questions, 
and if needed to be, then we can do an additional round of 
questioning as well. We have so many people and other 
Committees going on, we do want to be timely going forward.
    Mrs. Torres. OK.
    Well, this information that you--these videos that you have 
played are news to the minority, this information, as it has 
been the common discourtesy of this Subcommittee to not provide 
the minority with information other than the time and the 
meeting place.
    It is really unfortunate that--Chairman, I am going to put 
this on you, because you are the Chairman of this Committee--
that you are refusing to be honest and upfront with the 
minority as to what exactly are we going to hear, what is the 
purpose of the meeting.
    Second-guessing our law enforcement officers, you know, 3 
years after the incident seems to me like a very, very cheap 
shot. It is like spitting in their face after they gave up so 
much. Many of them had major injuries that were suffered under 
the violence of this angry mob that was unleashed on the U.S. 
Capitol.
    While the first video was played, you said the time was 
around 1:30 when these pipe bombs were discovered and when--or 
at least one of them--when the perimeter was set.
    At 1:30--and I had to look back at my own personal records 
of where I was and what I was doing at 1:30 that night--or, 
that afternoon, and I can tell you that at 1:30 several 
buildings of the Capitol had already been entered, forcibly 
entered, breached by this angry mob.
    To say, you know, to the law enforcement community, ``You 
should have been here instead of over there,'' ``You should 
have been over there instead of over there''--we did not have 
enough officers. We did not have--the officers that were 
present were here with their own--armed with their own bravery 
to defend themselves. They had barely the equipment that it 
takes in order for them to handle the mob that was unleashed on 
them by the former President.
    Mr. Black, thank you for your presence here.
    I am going to ask you: Our colleagues in the minority have 
repeatedly asked Director Wray and the FBI to testify publicly 
as to the status of the investigation into the pipe bombs and 
why it continues after 3 years.
    Is this policy, is this a policy you had to observe over 
the years in your career as a law enforcement professional?
    Mr. Black. As far as the investigation taking 3 years or 
more?
    Mrs. Torres. No, no. As far as giving public testimony as 
to an update of how the investigation is going.
    Mr. Black. Generally, ongoing investigations are not 
discussed. It can----
    Mrs. Torres. Why is that?
    Mr. Black. It can be counterproductive not only to that 
investigation but to future investigations as well.
    Mrs. Torres. What do you mean, ``counterproductive''?
    Mr. Black. If certain investigative techniques are being 
undertaken to identify a suspect, for instance, if those types 
of techniques are divulged, that suspect can change their 
behavior, destroy evidence. Then, again, that information's 
available for future crimes.
    Mrs. Torres. Not only could it hurt the current 
investigation, but it could compromise any future investigation 
if you were having to deal with that same person, correct?
    Mr. Black. That same person or type of crime.
    Mrs. Torres. The same suspect.
    Mr. Black. Yes.
    Mrs. Torres. Because they would change their MO, and it 
would make it that much more difficult for you.
    Mr. Black. They could, yes.
    Mrs. Torres. Would take any action to cover their crime.
    Mr. Black. Correct.
    Mrs. Torres. As far as we know, the perpetrator could be 
sitting here in the room with us, correct?
    Mr. Black. Their identity is currently unknown.
    Mrs. Torres. It could be, the perpetrator who planted these 
bombs could be watching us on TV, right?
    Mr. Black. Perhaps.
    Mrs. Torres. How could revealing this information put this 
U.S. Capitol in danger in the future?
    Mr. Black. Investigative techniques----
    Mrs. Torres. Specific information.
    Mr. Black. Investigative tactics and techniques are usually 
not publicized, as I mentioned earlier, so that the suspects, 
if one has been developed, would not destroy evidence or change 
their behavior that would render those investigative techniques 
less viable.
    Mrs. Torres. Some individuals, including Members of this 
institution, have questioned the authenticity of the pipe bombs 
found at the DNC and the RNC. However, FBI statements firmly 
State that both devices were viable and could have been 
detonated, resulting in serious injury or death.
    Based on your years of service, individuals in Government 
making unfounded allegations that the FBI lying about a 
particular investigation, does that pose any challenges to the 
FBI?
    Mr. Black. Public perception is important. The men and 
women that are doing the work every day----
    Mrs. Torres. Why is that? Why is that perception so 
important?
    Mr. Black. Law enforcement relies on information and a good 
relationship with the public and communities they serve. Any 
kind of negative publicity is to be expected sometimes, but you 
work through that to get to the logical conclusion and justice.
    Mrs. Torres. So, by breaking that trust, we compromise any 
potential witness that could come forward and give us 
information?
    Mr. Black. The public should be certain that any viable 
information will be accepted and followed through to its 
logical conclusion.
    Mrs. Torres. OK. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentlelady yields.
    Just for clarification, based on the Ranking Member's 
comments, we are not here to discuss the investigation of the 
FBI. I totally agree with Mr. Black and what he is stating.
    In fact, this hearing was noticed to the minority and the 
public over a week ago with a description of what we would be 
discussing here today, which is not a partisan finger-pointing 
but trying to get to the bottom of what may have gone right, 
what may have gone wrong, and how we can improve the security 
of Members of both parties here.
    As a courtesy to the minority, the videos that we played 
here today were sent to the minority yesterday for review, so 
it should not have been a surprise.
    I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I would agree with the gentlelady that we did not have 
enough officers that were on duty that day, and it did create a 
number of different issues. Plus, we were unprepared as a--
Capitol Police were just unprepared for those numbers.
    That being said, Assistant Chief Gallagher, you said in 
your testimony, and I quote, ``It is my understanding that both 
of these devices were fully functional and viable pipe bombs. 
However, it is unclear whether they would have gone off on 
their own had they not been rendered safe by our bomb squad.''
    How did you form that opinion that it is unclear they would 
not have gone off on their own?
    Chief Gallagher. Yes, sir. The viability and functionality 
of the bombs--of the pipe bombs that were placed at the 
Republican National Committee and the Democratic National 
Committee--those statements come from our trained bomb techs, 
highly trained, highly capable bomb techs, that, when they were 
presented with a picture of the device on scene--they did not 
have all the context of when the devices were planted, how long 
they had already been sitting there. They were looking at a 
picture of a pipe bomb, to them, which comprised of all the 
components. They did not know, obviously, what was inside it--
--
    Mr. Griffith. What made you think it would not go off?
    Chief Gallagher. Based on the bomb techs' experience and--
--
    Mr. Griffith. OK.
    Chief Gallagher [continuing]. training.
    Mr. Griffith. That is all I need to know. I appreciate 
that.
    I have great concerns, and I understand that there was a 
dilemma with manpower, but lots of vehicles were passing by 
here. The one at the DNC headquarters was found at 
approximately 1:05, but if I understood your testimony correct, 
Assistant Chief--and tell me if I have got it wrong--people 
were not told to shelter in place until 1:30.
    Is not that what your testimony says? I am looking at page 
3. In both your oral and your written testimony, you said, at 
1:30 p.m., DNC and Fairchild Building personnel were told to 
shelter in place.
    Is that correct?
    Chief Gallagher. That is correct----
    Mr. Griffith. OK.
    Chief Gallagher [continuing]. at 1:30. Earlier----
    Mr. Griffith. Here is my question. There were people. Now, 
we have already gone over that the perimeter was not secured. 
The Vice President-elect to the United States is inside one of 
the buildings, and there is a 25-minute delay before anybody 
goes over and says, ``You all might want to shelter in place.''
    That is not acceptable, is it?
    Chief Gallagher. That is not accurate.
    Mr. Griffith. All right. Tell me why it is not accurate.
    Chief Gallagher. Yes. When the initial call came out, our 
countersurveillance agents found the pipe bomb. They 
immediately went up and alerted the two law enforcement 
agencies that were at the DNC, which was the U.S. Secret 
Service and Metropolitan Police Department.
    Then those countersurveillance agents moved over to do 
exactly what they were trained to do, which was go establish an 
incident command post----
    Mr. Griffith. Then why does your testimony say that they 
were told to shelter in place at 1:30?
    Because, in the meantime, instead of sheltering in place, 
the Vice President-elect of the United States leaves, driving 
past the pipe bomb that was viable, according to evidence.
    Chief Gallagher. That is correct. In the timeframe between 
when we set up our incident command post and when the shelter 
in place was, there was also teams, not U.S. Capitol Police, 
that were telling the DNC to evacuate as well. That is why you 
had the evacuation of the protectee and others.
    Mr. Griffith. All right. There was cross-communications.
    Mr. Black, you said that you hoped someday we would 
identify this individual. Would not you agree with me that, in 
light of the fact that the perimeter was not secured--because 
there are two reasons to secure the perimeter: first and 
foremost, to protect the lives of people, correct?
    Mr. Black. Yes.
    Mr. Griffith. Second, to preserve evidence. Is not that 
also correct?
    Mr. Black. Yes.
    Mr. Griffith. Without having secured that perimeter, we 
will never know if there was any incriminating evidence that 
might have been found in that perimeter zone, because you have 
got all kinds of--you have got pedestrians walking past the 
robots; you have got numerous vehicles, including law 
enforcement vehicles, driving by where they are about to 
detonate and in the vicinity.
    Is not that crime scene just a mess, as far as trying to 
find any evidence that you can later use to link a suspect to 
the site?
    Mr. Black. The device itself was intact at the time. It was 
placed in the evening hours of the 5th and located on the 6th, 
so there was a lot of activity----
    Mr. Griffith. Are you sure?
    Mr. Black [continuing]. between those two times.
    Mr. Griffith. Because here is what a good criminal defense 
attorney is going to say. You tell me if you do not think this 
sounds reasonable from a defense-attorney standpoint: You saw 
my--they identify the individual that placed what is believed 
to be the bomb, hours go by, and you had a search by the Secret 
Service at DNC and the dog did not light on an explosive. So, 
clearly, the device that my client might have left there was 
not the device that was later determined to be the pipe bomb, 
because it was not picked up by the bomb-sniffing dog.
    Does not that sound like what is going to happen if they 
ever do identify the guy in the video?
    Mr. Black. Well, that may be a good question, but I believe 
it is flawed in its logic.
    Mr. Griffith. Yes. I do not think so. I think I win that 
case.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
    I now recognize the full Committee Ranking Member, Mr. 
Morelle, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I will admit I am now more confused than when we began just 
a short time ago.
    Mr. Chair, you had indicated you had invited the FBI to 
testify, but I have no idea how they would have contributed to 
the conversation about what happened moments after the bombs 
were discovered. I am not sure I understand that.
    If I understand now the line of questioning and the videos, 
it is to suggest failures by the United States Capitol Police 
regarding the establishment of the perimeters, securing 
evidence, and some questions now about the handling of the K-9 
sweep.
    I am also curious, just--I will ask this rhetorically. I am 
not sure what the poster behind you, Mr. Chair, is. What does 
``Donald Trump,'' ``fraud,'' ``Hutchinson,'' ``conspiracy,'' 
``stolen,'' ``Meadows''--I have no idea what any of this has to 
do with the hearing in question, which is----
    Chairman Loudermilk. If the gentleman would yield?
    Mr. Morelle [continuing]. about the pipe bomb. Yes, if you 
stop my clock.
    Chairman Loudermilk. This was part of the opening statement 
as illustrative that the Select Committee, who was tasked with 
investigating this 2 years ago, only mentioned the pipe bomb 
five times.
    They mentioned--the size and the font of these words are 
how many times those particular words were used in that 
investigation, as to show the point that no one has taken a 
real look at this until this Committee, which has pure 
oversight over this.
    Regarding the FBI, the FBI was invited because they 
conducted the post-incident investigation of the device itself.
    Mr. Morelle. OK.
    Chairman Loudermilk. I yield back.
    Mr. Morelle. All right. The fact that the poster is there I 
think signifies other things, but I will leave you to your 
answer.
    I do want to give--I mean, this has been interesting. I am 
not sure--and I am no expert--Mr. D'Esposito and others are, on 
the panel--about law enforcement.
    I do not want to leave without giving you, Assistant Chief 
Gallagher, who I have had the privilege of knowing now the last 
couple of years, some opportunity to describe--first of all, 
clearly, a number of things were going on at the same time. I 
mean, these pipe bomb incidents were not in isolation.
    Maybe you could respond both to the questions--I do not 
know if they are allegations, but certainly suggestions--that 
both sites were mishandled, No. 1, and talk about what was 
going on in the context of the things that were happening that 
day, if you could.
    Chief Gallagher. Sure. Thank you.
    So, as far as an allegation of failures by the U.S. Capitol 
Police officers, I want to be upfront and honest. The U.S. 
Capitol Police have not shied away from the failures of that 
day. Those failures result in the leadership of Capitol Police, 
not with the police officers that were outnumbered.
    We suffered 80 officers who had injuries. We lost two of 
our heroes, one on the day after January 6th and one on January 
9th.
    We have well over 2,000 pages of after-action reviews 
resulting in all the--from the OIG reports, the GAO, General 
Honore's study--that go into detail on every aspect of the 
department, of what needs to be improved. All aspects of the 
department needed improvement.
    For context of that day, while we were dealing with the 
DNC--which, I want to preface, is off Capitol Grounds, so the 
primary jurisdiction for the DNC is Metropolitan Police 
Department. When our bomb techs showed up at the scene for the 
DNC, Metropolitan Police Department had an EOD technician there 
who asked our bomb techs to take the lead on the scene, because 
our bomb techs show up with our equipment. We had our robot; 
MPD did not have their robot. It would have taken a lot more 
time to get the resources there.
    The perimeter that was set up around the DNC, it looked 
chaotic because it was chaotic. We were dealing with a pipe 
bomb a couple blocks away at the RNC. We were dealing with a 
pickup truck that had 11 Molotov cocktails, machetes, rifles, 
handguns, ammunition in it. At the same time, our officers were 
suffering the injuries on the west front of the Capitol and the 
east front of the Capitol. We had multiple calls for 10-33, 
which is an officer in trouble.
    So, as you can--for context, you can--I would gladly give 
up a perimeter not being perfect to be able to get officers 
responding to help their brothers and sisters who were calling 
for help at the U.S. Capitol.
    It was a chaotic day. It was mentioned that we did not have 
enough Capitol Police officers. We did not. We did not have any 
mutual aid that was onsite already.
    Even for a 10-100, which is what we call a suspicious 
package--and I am certain my colleagues seated to the left of 
me would agree--all of them have some issues with the initial 
perimeter, with getting resources there, with getting agencies 
there.
    Now, when you are looking at the DNC, where you have 
multiple jurisdictions, Capitol Police are already stretched 
beyond their limits--we are fighting on the west front, the 
east front, officers getting injured, we have 10-33 calls--we 
did not have enough people to get down there immediately to set 
up this perfect perimeter where not one car and not one 
pedestrian could enter into that perimeter. The officers did 
the best that they could. We just did not have enough resources 
there.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you.
    Of course, not to mention that, for 3 hours, the occupant 
of the White House at the time failed to call out the National 
Guard, which could have clearly aided in support of the 
personnel at the Capitol. I only raise that because the name 
behind it is on the poster.
    I did want to ask a quick question, in my remaining 
seconds, of Mr. Keim.
    The question from the gentleman earlier was about the 
failure of the K-9 unit to discover the bomb. Are the dogs 
infallible? Do they ever miss something? I mean, is it likely 
that they would have missed, or is there something--would you 
necessarily conclude that the bomb was not there during the 
sweep, as the gentleman did, and that it was placed somehow 
afterward?
    Mr. Keim. No. Dogs are dogs. Sometimes they are really 
good; sometimes they are having a bad day. There are several 
reasons a dog could miss an explosive. Usually----
    Mr. Morelle. Is it--I am sorry. I do not mean to cut you 
off. Is it possible, then, in your judgment, that the dog 
simply missed it, that it could have been there during the time 
of the sweep and the dog just did not pick it up? Is that 
possible?
    Mr. Keim. Yes. Anything is possible.
    We do not have a video of the actual sweep around the 
explosive device. I would say, as a team, you know, you follow 
a pattern when you are doing a sweep. Once you have completed 
your sweep, you know, it is done, it is no longer secure.
    From what I have seen from the stills of the pipe bomb, if 
I am doing a sweep with my K-9, and I come across a park bench 
with that sitting underneath it, I am not putting my dog on it. 
Right? I might not even try to get him into the cone, which is, 
you know, the odor----
    Mr. Morelle. Yes.
    Mr. Keim [continuing]. depending on which way the wind is 
blowing. Because, once I see that, that becomes a very 
suspicious package. If you really want to upset an EOD unit, go 
ahead and tell them you cleared that using your K-9. Right? 
That is just not a--you are literally stepping away from that 
as far as you can, securing the perimeter----
    Mr. Morelle. Yes.
    Mr. Keim [continuing]. making that perimeter incredibly 
large, and let EOD decide how much they are going to shrink it 
from that point on.
    Mr. Morelle. Yes. I do not know--I am sure there is a 
reason for it--why there is a still on the right-hand side of 
the sweep, but the dog--I mean, it is like a split screen. I do 
not know what happened to the video on the other side. I 
guess----
    Mr. Keim. Yes. There are many reasons a dog--I mean, the 
dog might have had to go to the bathroom. It could be a ton of 
different reasons if----
    Mr. Morelle. Yes.
    Mr. Keim. Or the dog has been searching--already been 
searching for 30 minutes----
    Mr. Morelle. Yes.
    Mr. Keim [continuing]. right, and now he is getting 
exhausted. Even if the weather is not hot, they only have a 
certain amount of time that they can actually be successful.
    Mr. Morelle. Gotcha.
    Necessarily reaching the conclusion that the dog--it was 
not that the device was not there and the dog would have 
caught--that is not necessarily a conclusion you would really--
--
    Mr. Keim. No. It could also depend on the actual maker of 
the device----
    Mr. Morelle. Gotcha.
    Mr. Keim [continuing]. and how well he concealed the--
whatever the explosive was inside the pipe.
    Mr. Morelle. Very good.
    Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. Thank you.
    Just for clarification, the still on the right was just for 
reference as to where the device was, since the edge of the 
camera did not cover that. We had a still that would match up 
just so you could see where the device was in relationship to 
the dog.
    Another point of clarification: That sweep was done by the 
U.S. Secret Service. It was not the U.S. Capitol Police.
    Just for a third point of clarification, I think it is kind 
of--it may be just hard to understand that--and maybe we are 
not used to actually having a nonpartisan, unbiased hearing 
actually try to get to the bottom--that we are not finger-
pointing. We are just trying to figure out what happened, what 
went wrong, what went right, and how we can make sure it does 
not happen again.
    So, with that, I recognize the gentleman from North 
Carolina, Mr. Murphy.
    Dr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would just reiterate your point. This is not here to 
point fingers. This is a learning exercise. This is our job, to 
provide a supervisory role and to review information and to 
help us all prevent something--the missed cues that happened 
during this event.
    You know, there was a lot going on, to your point, but, 
also, lives were at risk here, and there were some very, very 
important cues missed. The basic line is, how do we prevent 
that from happening in the future? Not pointing a finger at 
anybody. We do the same thing in the operating room. If you 
screw up, there is a redone--redo, see where it went wrong, to 
try to prevent a problem again.
    Thank you all for coming.
    Mr. Gallagher, I just want to continue a little bit a line 
of questioning. Who was responsible for the command and control 
of the DNC pipe scene?
    Chief Gallagher. The U.S. Capitol Police had the incident 
command, and our bomb squad was the lead bomb squad for the DNC 
scene.
    Dr. Murphy. OK. That bomb squad would have--that dog would 
be a bomb-sniffing dog?
    Chief Gallagher. The dog that was at the scene was a U.S. 
Secret Service K-9.
    Dr. Murphy. What does that mean?
    Chief Gallagher. It is one of their bomb-sniffing dogs----
    Dr. Murphy. OK.
    Chief Gallagher [continuing]. yes.
    Dr. Murphy. All right. All right.
    There were over 30 vehicles and a pedestrian allowed to 
enter the active crime scene. I thought that has been gone 
before. I am not a, you know, police officer or anything, but I 
would just--I would assume that would be anathema to what a 
crime scene should have. Is that fair?
    Chief Gallagher. That is fair.
    Dr. Murphy. OK.
    What types of additional training or equipment would be 
beneficial moving in the future? Because, again, we are trying 
to learn from this episode. What would happen in the future to 
prevent such a problem with the command and control problems 
that we would have in the future?
    Chief Gallagher. So, in the future, for events like this--
and we have this in place now. Any large-scale events on 
Capitol Grounds, we have funding to bring in mutual aid so that 
we are not understaffed, so that we have the contingency plans 
in place to be able to handle multiple incidents, multiple 
areas of Capitol Grounds, with mutual aid onsite.
    In addition to that, we have not implemented training post-
January 6th, for a whole host of reasons, with incident 
command--which deals with area command, incident command, scene 
perimeters--for all sworn employees of the U.S. Capitol Police.
    Dr. Murphy. OK. Thank you.
    All right. At 1:09 p.m., the operator for the USCP camera 
facing--and I really want to get into this camera issue--facing 
the DNC garage began to zoom in on the position of that pipe 
bomb.
    At approximately 1:40 p.m., the same camera was turned away 
and faced south on South Capitol Street. A second camera, on 
the west side of the DNC, was also turned away at 2:20 p.m. 
Both times, neither of the cameras were turned back.
    Do you have any idea why the cameras were moved, who did 
it?
    Chief Gallagher. That would be speculation on my part, as 
to who was working the cameras there. We have trained command 
center specialists who are the ones that operate our USCP 
cameras.
    The cameras----
    Dr. Murphy. Would there not be a time log of who would be 
working those at the specific time?
    Chief Gallagher. There would. I do not have that with me.
    Dr. Murphy. OK.
    Chief Gallagher. With regards to our cameras at the DNC, I 
am aware of the speculation of moving some of the cameras.
    There were three cameras that capture various aspects of 
the DNC. The two that you mention, one does move--and I do not 
have the camera number off the top of my head----
    Dr. Murphy. Sure.
    Chief Gallagher [continuing]. but one does move away from 
the DNC, and it goes up by the U.S. Capitol Power Plant, where 
the incident command post was. So, when you start to see it 
zoom in, it is zooming in on our U.S. Capitol Police command 
post location, which is typical, for a command center operator 
to zoom in on the command post.
    The second camera that you mention that starts to move, it 
captures certain areas of the DNC, and then it looks like it 
starts to move to check on street closures and various other 
aspects of the response.
    There is one camera that captures the entirety of the scene 
at the DNC, that captures where the pipe bomb was located, the 
evacuation of the protectee that was there, the K-9, our 
countersurveillance agent that finds the pipe bomb, and 
continues unmoved and catches the robot coming down, as well as 
the disruption. We do have, you know, a camera that takes the 
whole complexity of that scene.
    I think it is important to note, too, we have 1,800 cameras 
on the Capitol complex. On that day, we probably had----
    Dr. Murphy. These are manually moved, correct?
    Chief Gallagher. Yes. Yes, sir.
    Dr. Murphy. OK. Somebody had to move it away from that, 
correct?
    Chief Gallagher. Yes, sir.
    Dr. Murphy. OK.
    Chief Gallagher. As to why--speculation as to why those 
cameras would not have been moved back: Because we probably had 
two or three camera operators in our command center, and they 
are also dealing with the scene at the RNC and all of the 
breaches at the U.S. Capitol as well.
    Dr. Murphy. Absolutely understand. Absolutely understand. I 
think, you know, to the Chairman's point, we are just trying to 
gather some information here. This is not a partisan issue. 
This is protection of the executive branch, it is protection of 
the legislative branch, everybody else.
    So, with that, Mr. Chairman--actually, just a real quick 
question, Mr. Black. Was that a--those were both functional 
pipe bombs, correct?
    Mr. Black. Yes.
    Dr. Murphy. Both functional. OK.
    Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. The gentleman yields back.
    I now recognize Mr. D'Esposito, law enforcement officer, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am going to try to move through this quick, because I do 
have a lot of questions and I want to get to a point.
    Chief Gallagher, during the course of the events on January 
6, 2021, Capitol Police radio dispatchers were clearly 
overwhelmed--which they should have been--with the amount of 
information being transmitted, the number of events occurring 
at the same time, ensuring transmissions were on appropriate 
channels, and providing accurate info.
    Dispatch, for example, provided inaccurate information 
regarding the evacuation routes of civilians from the DNC, 
wrong address for incident command post locations, wrong 
callback numbers, and in many cases the dispatchers expressed 
audible panic and confusion.
    I have been on the other side of that radio. I have been on 
the other side of the radio when, you know, the stuff is 
hitting the fan, and you need people on the other side of that 
radio that are able to calm everyone down and get them the 
correct information.
    Can you briefly describe the responsibilities of 
dispatchers for the Capitol Police?
    Chief Gallagher. Sure.
    Our dispatchers are responsible for--they are basically the 
lifeline for the officers out in the field. Anything that they 
need, they go through the radio.
    The dispatchers are trained. They are highly competent 
dispatchers that are set up to handle multiple incidents. They 
got overwhelmed that day, just like the officers got 
overwhelmed as well.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Absolutely.
    This is sort of not on the same topic, but just for my 
knowledge: Are civilian members of the Capitol Police part of 
the FOP?
    Chief Gallagher. No, they are not.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK.
    Their training, the dispatcher training, do you believe 
that they receive adequate training?
    Chief Gallagher. I do believe they receive adequate 
training, yes.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Continuous training?
    Chief Gallagher. Yes.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK.
    Moving to something different, at approximately 1313 hours, 
a United States Capitol Police officer asked dispatch to 
identify an incident commander for the DNC pipe bomb. After it 
took multiple attempts to secure an incident commander, 
dispatch finally identified and established an incident 
commander and then proceeded to provide an incorrect location 
for that incident commander.
    A second officer answered over the radio and attempted to 
correct the mistake by providing two additional locations, 
which were also incorrect. This led dispatch to erroneously 
call out another incorrect location for the DNC pipe bomb.
    I know the answers to these questions, and I am just trying 
to get to a point. Is this kind of confusion common?
    Chief Gallagher. This kind of confusion is not common with 
a regular incident. These type of incidents, where you had 
explosive devices--multiple explosive devices, breaches at the 
west front and east front, it is a chaotic scene, as you----
    Mr. D'Esposito. Right. In a perfect world, which is one we 
never operate in, obviously what we would want to happen is all 
the information be crystal-clear and precise and what we need.
    Did the failure to establish an incident command lead to 
subsequent breaches of the perimeter?
    Chief Gallagher. I would say, the lack of resources and 
officers between not only U.S. Capitol Police, Metropolitan 
Police--it was their primary jurisdiction as well--to be able 
to secure that perimeter is what caused people and vehicles to 
traverse it.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK.
    So, last, I just want to comment on Mrs. Torres's remarks 
in the beginning that we are here to point a finger.
    We serve a purpose here in House Administration, and that 
is to provide oversight to the Capitol Police. It is also our 
job to provide the resources, the training, and everything 
necessary so that you can do the job that you are supposed to 
do.
    You made a comment, Chief, and your quote: that you and the 
department has--or specifically you--not shied away from the 
failures of that day.
    If that does not mark the remarks of a true leader, I am 
not sure what does. I would serve under your command any day.
    I think it is our job to make sure that those failures--and 
that is what we are here--that is what we are here to do. We 
are not here to point fingers. We are not here to talk about 
defunding the police. We are not here to, as Mrs. Torres say, 
Monday-morning-quarterback. There is no time to Monday-morning-
quarterback any incidents that police officers have. Until they 
wear the gun belt, until they pin that shield on their chest, 
they have no idea what law enforcement officers do every day.
    It is our job, as part of this Committee, again, to provide 
you everything that you need. When we have incidents like this 
or any other incidents, if we are not going to take the time to 
critique it, if we are not going to take the time to see what 
happened, what went well, and what failed, well, then we are 
not doing our job and neither are you. Right?
    The purpose of this is to find ways that we can improve. If 
protocols failed, we need to change them. If training failed, 
we need to do it better. If there are opportunities for more 
resources, if we need to work better with other law enforcement 
agencies so that we can keep people safe, well, then we need to 
foster those relationships.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Loudermilk. I thank the gentleman.
    I think that was a good way to wrap up this hearing here 
today.
    I appreciate everyone being here. We have Chief Manger here 
with us today, as well as other Members of the leadership; the 
chairman of the Capitol Police union, Gus Papa--I am not even 
going to try to pronounce the last name, but I think everybody 
knows who he is. I appreciate all the witnesses being here.
    I would like to just offer one piece of clarification to 
make sure I understand this right. I think it was Mr. Keim. We 
were talking about the U.S. Secret Service and the dogs. I want 
to make sure I understand what your response was, that--is it--
it is not the dog's responsibility to identify the device, but 
the handler's.
    The fact that the device was seen and close by, would it 
not be the actual handler who should have noticed it, not just 
relying on the dog?
    Mr. Keim. Yes.
    When you have a K-9 team, it is a team for a reason; you 
have got the dog and the handler.
    The handler is looking for areas--anything to put the dog 
on to use the advantage of the dog, right? Dogs have a 40-
percent stronger smell--sense of smell than we do. The dog's 
purpose is to find that that we cannot see.
    The handler's position is to locate the areas--as you are 
doing a pattern search, and if you see that, you would not even 
put your dog on that--on an explosive pipe or any suspicious 
package. You would back off.
    Chairman Loudermilk. OK. Thank you. I just felt that was 
important for clarification, as we are not trying to point 
fingers at the dog for not doing his job, but to get a better 
understanding of how this works.
    I commend the Capitol Police for all that they went through 
and stood the line that day. It was a very bad day. We want to 
continue to do our oversight, as Mr. D'Esposito said, not to 
point fingers, but to make sure that we do correct what was 
done wrongly, we do de-politicize the Capitol Police, make you 
able to do your job according to the way you need to without 
the politicization aspect of it, and make sure that you have 
the training and the resources you need to do a very difficult 
job.
    Again, thank you all for being here. Members of the 
Subcommittee may have some additional questions for you--and I 
can pretty much assure you that we do--and we ask that you 
please respond to these in writing. We will submit these 
questions, so if you will respond in writing.
    [The questions for the record referred to follow:]

                    QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 






    Chairman Loudermilk. Without objection, each Member will 
have 5 legislative days to insert additional material into the 
record or revise and extend their remarks.
    If there is no further business, I thank the Members for 
their participation. Without objection, this Subcommittee 
stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]