[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FUTURE OF HOMELAND SECURITY:
ADDRESSING THE RISE OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM,
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 27, 2023
__________
Serial No. 118-31
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-955 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
Stephen Siao, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE
August Pfluger, Texas, Chairman
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island,
Tony Gonzales, Texas Ranking Member
Anthony D'Esposito, New York J. Luis Correa, California
Elijah Crane, Arizona Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Dina Titus, Nevada
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Michael Koren, Subcommittee Staff Director
Brittany Carr, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Seth Magaziner, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Witnesses
Mr. J. Peter Pham, Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. Joshua Meservey, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Aaron Y. Zelin, Richard Borow Fellow, Washington Institute
for Near East Policy:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Ms. Donna O. Charles, Director of West Africa and the Sahel,
United States Institute of Peace:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
Appendix
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for J. Peter Pham......... 51
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Joshua Meservey....... 52
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Aaron Y. Zelin........ 53
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Donna O. Charles...... 54
THE FUTURE OF HOMELAND SECURITY: ADDRESSING THE RISE OF TERRORISM IN
AFRICA
----------
Wednesday, September 27, 2023
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism,
Law Enforcement, and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. August Pfluger
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Pfluger, Bishop, D'Esposito,
Magaziner, Correa, and Titus.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Chairman Pfluger. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and
Intelligence will come to order.
Without objection, the Chair may declare the subcommittee
in recess at any point.
The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from a
non-governmental panel of expert witnesses to examine the
terrorism threats posed by jihadist groups in Africa and their
implications on U.S. homeland security and our interest.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good morning and welcome to the Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Intelligence. We are holding
this important hearing to examine and discuss the rising
threats posed by terrorist groups in Africa and its impact on
the security of our homeland and Americans abroad. This is a
topic of critical importance not only to this committee and
this subcommittee, but also, I think, to our entire country. In
fact, it was this subcommittee that held the very first
Congressional hearing about Boko Haram, who refers to itself as
the Nigerian Taliban and has been designated a foreign
terrorist organization for its terrorist attacks.
Why are we here? Over 30 years ago terrorists who were
trained at an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan carried out
a car bombing at the World Trade Center. The bombing resulted
in the deaths of 6 people and injured thousands of Americans.
Eight years later, 19 terrorists that were motivated by the
same radical ideological beliefs, hijacked 4 commercial
airliners and carried out the largest terrorist attacks on
American soil on September 11. Just a short while ago, Homeland
Security Committee Members, led by Subcommittee Chairman
Anthony D'Esposito, commemorated the 22nd anniversary of those
attacks on 9/11 at the 9/11 Memorial and Museum in Lower
Manhattan. Members honored the memory of the victims and thank
the first responders for their dedicated services.
During the period between the first attack on the World
Trade Center and 9/11, our Nation did not fully comprehend the
threats posed by the Salafi-jihadist movement or identify the
warning signs or threat indicators that could have helped
degrade al-Qaeda's operational capacities and capabilities. We
must learn from these past gaps--some would call them
failures--and have proactive conversations to not only identify
these threats, but appropriately confront them before they
metastasize.
Political instability, dire economic conditions, sectarian
violence, mass migration, and an anti-Western sentiment are
just some of the main factors that contribute to individuals
radicalizing and joining jihadist movements to commit violence.
The unfortunate reality is that many African nations share
these underlying factors that contribute to the rise of
extremism. These conditions are not new and have been present
on the continent for decades.
Two notable events have especially defined today's
terrorism threat landscape throughout Africa. First, on October
3, 1993, American forces helping with U.S. peacekeeping
operations in Mogadishu were attacked by Somali National
Alliance, whose fighters were trained and equipped by al-Qaeda.
Eighteen Americans died and 73 others were injured. To this
day, the Battle of Mogadishu is still one of the deadliest days
in the history of the U.S. Special Force Operations. American
forces were again attacked by jihadists on October 4, 2017 in
Niger, now known as the Tongo Tongo ambush. U.S. Army Special
Operators and Nigerian troops were ambushed by Islamic State
militants while out conducting an operation to capture Islamic
State in the Greater Sahel, Commander Doundou Chefou. Four
Americans and 4 Nigerians were killed that day and 8 Nigerians
and 2 Americans were wounded. Both the Battle of Mogadishu and
the Tongo Tongo ambush were galvanizing inflection points for
the jihadist movements in Africa and helped contribute to the
rise of the terror networks across the continent.
Regional instability has also fueled the terror threat
landscape across Africa. After the collapse of ISIS Caliphate
in Syria and Iraq, many of the jihadists escaped to various
countries throughout Africa. These insurgents have wreaked
havoc across the continent, forcing governments to develop and
enhance their counterterrorism capabilities. Our Nation has
helped lead these efforts. In fact, we have kept 2 bases in
Nigeria with about 1,000 men and women of our military deployed
there with counterterrorism and intelligence mission across the
broader region. However, near-peer competitors, both China and
Russia have also rushed to help fill this power vacuum. Russia
has exploited corrupt African governments with checkered human
rights records into allowing their Nation's
``counterterrorism'' efforts to be supported by Russian
paramilitary groups. Most notably Russia's Wagner Group, a
private military company, have not only provided
counterterrorism capabilities, but have also been used to prop
up ruthless authoritarian figures. In return, Russian PMCs gain
access to gold, to diamonds, critical mineral mines, and many
other resources and these resources have helped keep the
Russian economy afloat and has helped fuel their unjust and
provocative war in Ukraine.
The nefarious actions and human rights abuses by foreign
maligned nation-states have turned local populations toward
jihadist groups for protection. The United States cannot
continue to allow Russian PMCs or CCP groups to fill this power
vacuum. We must provide viable alternatives to these
arrangements and encourage our African partners to work with us
and embrace our shared democratic values to stop the spread of
the jihadi movement.
This hearing today is an important subject that I am
personally familiar with, having served myself in the Middle
East, having served in operations against ISIS throughout Iraq
and Syria. I know first-hand just how deadly these periods of
time can be when you have the ability for these groups to grow
unchecked and to not have the appropriate partnerships abroad.
Our African partners must not fall victim to the sheer
brutality of these jihadist groups or allow anywhere on the
continent to become a new breeding ground for extremism.
I hope today that we can have an open and honest dialog on
this issue. This is not a partisan issue. This has nothing to
do with Republican versus Democrat politics, this is all about
the security of the United States, it is all about the security
of our partners who value freedom, who value the Western
mentality of pushing back on groups that would harm not only
our partners, but the innocent lives of so many people
throughout the world.
We are absolutely delighted to have a distinguished panel
with plenty of experience to give us your thoughts and your
recommendations as to where we should go.
Last, I will say, when thinking about these hearings and
what they mean to our country, and even though some of these
don't get the press or the publicity, they are vitally
important for my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to hear
the facts. We cannot allow these interim periods of time in
between conflicts like what 9/11 brought to this country, to
have a breeding ground where extremism wins out. We must remain
vigilant. That is why we are holding this hearing.
What keeps me up at night is the thought that these groups
who do have a track record and have the absolute motivation to
harm Americans, to harm the American way of life, to harm our
partners, that is what keeps me up at night is thinking about
those places on Earth that we are not thinking about, that we
don't have visibility into. What can we be doing alongside our
partners, and especially in Africa to help prevent those things
from metastasizing.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here this morning,
and I look forward to a good, robust discussion.
[The statement of Chairman Pfluger follows:]
Statement of Chairman August Pfluger
September 27, 2023
Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism,
Law Enforcement, and Intelligence.
We are holding this important hearing to examine and discuss the
rising threats posed by terrorist groups in Africa and its impact on
the security of our homeland and Americans abroad.
This is a topic of critical importance to the committee and this
subcommittee, in particular.
In fact, it was this subcommittee that held the FIRST Congressional
hearing about Boko Haram, who refers to itself as the ``Nigerian
Taliban'' and has been designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization for
its terrorist attacks.
Why are we here?
Over 30 years ago, terrorists trained at an al-Qaeda training camp
in Afghanistan carried out a car bombing on the World Trade Center. The
bombing resulted in the deaths of 6 people and injured thousands of
Americans.
Eight years later, 19 terrorists that were motivated by the same
radical ideological beliefs, highjacked 4 commercial airliners and
carried out the largest terrorist attacks in our Nation's history on
September 11.
Just a short while ago, Homeland Security Committee Members led by
Subcommittee Chairman Anthony D'Esposito commemorated the 22nd
anniversary of the 9/11 attacks at the 9/11 Memorial & Museum in lower
Manhattan. Members honored the memory of the victims and thanked first
responders for their dedicated services.
During the period between the first attack on the World Trade
Center and 9/11, our Nation did not fully comprehend the threats posed
by the Salafi-jihadist movement or identify the warning signs or threat
indicators that could have helped degrade al-Qaeda's operational
capacities and capabilities.
We must learn from these past failures and have proactive
conversations to not only identify these threats, but appropriately
confront them before they metastasize.
Political instability, dire economic conditions, sectarian
violence, mass migration, and anti-Western sentiment are some of the
main factors that contribute to individuals radicalizing and joining
jihadist movements to commit violence.
The unfortunate reality is that many African nations share these
underlying factors that contribute to the rise of extremism.
These conditions are not new and have been present on the continent
for decades.
Two notable events have especially defined today's terrorism threat
landscape throughout Africa.
On October 3, 1993, American forces helping with U.S. peace-keeping
operations in Mogadishu were attacked by the Somali National Alliance,
whose fighters were trained and equipped by al-Qaeda.
Eighteen Americans died and 73 others were injured. To this day,
the Battle of Mogadishu is still one of the deadliest days in the
history of the U.S. Special Operations Forces.
American forces were again attacked by jihadists on October 4, 2017
in Niger. Now known as the Tongo Tongo ambush, U.S. Army special
operators and Nigerian troops were ambushed by Islamic State militants,
while out conducting an operation to capture Islamic State in the
Greater Sahel commander Doundou Chefou.
Four Americans and 4 Nigerians were killed that day and 8
Nigerians, and 2 Americans were wounded.
Both, the Battle of Mogadishu and the Tongo Tongo ambush, were
galvanizing inflection points for the jihadist movements in Africa and
helped contribute to the rise of the terror networks across the
continent.
Regional instability has also fueled the terror threat landscape
across Africa.
After the collapse of ISIS's caliphate in Syria and Iraq, many of
the jihadist escaped to various countries throughout Africa.
These insurgents have wreaked havoc across the continent forcing
governments to develop and enhance their counterterrorism capabilities.
Our Nation has helped lead these efforts. In fact, we have kept two
bases in Niger, with about 1,000 men and women of our military deployed
there with a counterterrorism and intelligence mission across the
broader region.
However, near-peer competitors, China and Russia, have also rushed
to help fill the power vacuum.
Russia has exploited corrupt African governments with checkered
human rights records into allowing their nation's counterterrorism
operations to be supported by Russian paramilitary groups.
Most notably Russia's Wagner Group, a private military company
(PMC), have not only provided counter-terrorism capabilities, but have
also been used to prop up ruthless authoritarian figures.
In return, Russian PMCs gain access to gold, diamond, and critical
mineral mines. These resources have helped keep the Russian economy
afloat and has helped fuel their unjust and provocative war in Ukraine.
The nefarious actions and human rights abuses by foreign malign
nation-states have turned local populations toward jihadist groups for
protection.
The United States cannot continue to allow Russian PMCs or China to
fill this power vacuum. We must provide viable alternatives to these
arrangements and encourage our African partners to work with us and
embrace our shared-democratic values to stop the spread of the jihadi
movement.
This hearing is an important subject that I am personally familiar
with, having served abroad in numerous theaters of operations,
including the Middle East fighting against ISIS.
Our African partners must not fall victim to the sheer brutality of
these jihadist groups or allow anywhere on the continent to become a
new breeding ground for extremism.
I hope we can have an honest and open dialog today on this issue.
This shouldn't be a Republican or Democrat issue; it transcends party
lines.
I am delighted to have a distinguished panel of expert witnesses to
discuss this important topic.
I thank all our witnesses for being with us this morning and I look
forward to our discussion.
Chairman Pfluger. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Magaziner, for his opening
statement.
Mr. Magaziner. Good morning. I want to thank Chairman
Pfluger for calling this important hearing and thank our
witnesses for coming today.
Terrorism is increasing across the continent of Africa,
making this a critical and timely oversight topic for this
committee. Last month marked the 25th anniversary of the
bombing of U.S embassies in East Africa, where 224 people were
killed, including 12 Americans, and more than 4,500 people were
wounded. The embassy bombings were orchestrated by Osama bin
Laden, who would later direct the most heinous, most deadly
terrorist attack on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001.
While the United States was reeling from the 9/11 attacks
and focusing our counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East
and Central Asia, bin Laden and al-Qaeda were looking toward
Somalia and Yemen. Today, terrorist groups have established
themselves in those countries and are focused on further
expanding their reach through brutal violence in the Sahel in
West Africa.
The reality is that 22 years after the 9/11 attacks, al-
Qaeda and ISIS affiliates are still active, especially in
Africa, and newer terrorist organizations have emerged to
spread to the African continent as well. Al-Qaeda's richest and
most successful affiliate, al-Shabaab, today controls large
territories in Somalia, despite more than 15 years of military
operations and air strikes, and has also killed U.S. citizens,
soldiers and contractors in Kenya. Ten years ago last week
marked the anniversary of the Westgate shopping mall attack,
where 64 people died at the hands of al-Shabaab terrorists. Al-
Shabaab has launched an incursion of as many as 2,000 terrorist
fighters deep into Ethiopia, and it has killed thousands of
people in attacks across Somalia.
Another al-Qaeda affiliate, JNIM, operates in West Africa
and particularly in the nations of Mali and Burkina Faso. JNIM
has attacked French, United Nations, and local security force
personnel, has brutally murdered civilians accused of
collaborating with the state, and has encircled the capital of
Mali while spreading deeper into the Sahel and southward into
coastal West Africa.
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not the only terrorist
organizations in Africa that conspire to attack Americans. Over
the past 7 years, ISIS has spread its influence throughout the
Sahel region. ISIS Sahel has predominantly focused on local
targets in the border areas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger,
but the group has claimed credit for killing four U.S. soldiers
and kidnapping at least one U.S. citizen. In Nigeria, the most
populous country in Africa, Islamic State, West Africa has
established itself as a leading extremist group in the region.
Now, these threats may seem far away from the U.S.
homeland, but we must be clear-eyed that what is happening in
Africa affects our security here at home. Though the
intelligence community assesses that Africa-based violent
extremist groups are primarily threats to the regions in which
they operate, these terrorist organizations seek to target
Americans and no doubt would take advantage of any opportunity
to bring their reign of terror to our homeland as well.
In addition to working with friendly governments in Africa
to crack down on terrorism, we must redouble our efforts to
combat terrorist groups' ability to radicalize individuals in
the United States and through the internet as well. We know
that al-Shabaab and ISIS have recruited American citizens and
citizens of other Western countries to engage in terrorism
domestically, using social media to encourage sympathetic or
troubled individuals to attack targets here in the United
States. Furthermore, we know that these terrorist groups often
rely on Americans and other Westerners to help fund their
operations.
I hope that we take the opportunity during today's hearing
to discuss this, how we can counter foreign terrorist groups'
unprecedented virtual access to people in the United States in
furtherance of inspiring and enabling attacks on the homeland.
I am thankful that the Biden administration is taking the
threat from the rise in terrorism across Africa seriously.
Today, we have around 450 military personnel on the ground,
advising Somali forces and African Union troops to beat back
al-Shabaab and bring stability to the Horn of Africa. We also
have approximately 1,100 military personnel in Niger conducting
drone operations to combat terrorism.
The United States continues to launch airstrikes against
al-Shabaab when necessary, and we are advising, assisting,
accompanying, training, and equipping regional forces to carry
out counterterrorism operations that protect the security of
African nations and prevent the spread of terrorism to the
United States and our allies.
While military options are necessary to counter terrorism
in Africa, the United States must also help African nations
build their democratic institutions and improve the lives of
their citizens in order to foster stability. If we do not
continue to engage with robust foreign aid, adversaries like
Russia and China will continue to fill that void, and terrorist
organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS will continue to gain
strength. It is in America's national security interest to be a
good partner to those nations in Africa who are aligned with
our values.
Today's hearing is an important opportunity for Members of
this subcommittee to demonstrate that we are united in a
bipartisan effort to defend the American people, protect the
homeland, and ensure the security of African nations from
terrorist threats.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses, and I
yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Magaziner follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Seth Magaziner
Good morning. I want to thank Chairman Pfluger for calling this
important hearing and thank our witnesses for coming today. Terrorist
attacks are increasing across the continent of Africa, making this a
critical and timely oversight topic for this committee.
Last month marked the 25th anniversary of the bombing of U.S.
embassies in East Africa where 224 people were killed--including 12
Americans--and more than 4,500 people were wounded.
The embassy bombings were orchestrated by Osama bin Laden, who
would later direct the most heinous, most deadly terrorist attack on
U.S. soil on September 11, 2001.
While the United States was reeling from the 9/11 attacks and
focusing our counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East and Central
Asia, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were looking toward Somalia and
Yemen. Today, terrorist groups have established themselves in those
countries and are focused on further expanding their reach through
brutal violence in the Sahel and West Africa.
The reality is that 22 years after the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda and
ISIS affiliates are still active--especially in Africa--and newer
terrorist organizations have emerged and spread to the African
continent.
Al-Qaeda's richest and most successful affiliate, al-Shabaab, today
controls large territories in Somalia, despite more than 15 years of
military operations and airstrikes, and has also killed U.S. citizens,
U.S. soldiers, and U.S. contractors in Kenya.
Ten years ago, last week, marked the anniversary of the Westgate
Shopping mall attack where 64 people died at the hands of al-Shabaab
terrorists. Al-Shabaab has launched an incursion of as many as 2,000
terrorist fighters deep into Ethiopia. It has killed thousands of
people in attacks across Somalia.
Another al-Qaeda affiliate, JNIM, operates in West Africa, and
particularly the nations of Mali and Burkina Faso. JNIM has attacked
French, United Nations, and local security force personnel. It has
brutally murdered civilians accused of collaborating with the State or
foreign forces. And JNIM now has encircled the capital of Mali while
spreading deeper into the Sahel and southward into coastal West Africa.
And, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not the only terrorist
organizations in Africa that aspire to attack Americans abroad.
Over the past 7 years, ISIS has spread its influence throughout the
Sahel region. ISIS-Sahel has predominantly focused on local targets in
the border areas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, but the group has
also claimed credit for killing 4 U.S. soldiers and kidnapping at least
1 U.S. citizen. And in Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa,
Islamic State-West Africa has established itself as a leading extremist
group in the region.
These threats may seem far away from the U.S. homeland, but we must
be clear-eyed that what is happening in Africa affects our security
here at home.
Though the intelligence community assesses that Africa-based
violent extremist groups are primarily threats to the regions in which
they operate, these terrorist organizations seek to target Americans
and no doubt would take advantage of any opportunity to bring their
reign of terror to our homeland as well.
In addition to working with friendly governments in Africa to crack
down on terrorism, we must redouble our efforts to combat terrorist
groups' ability to radicalize individuals here in the United States
through the internet.
As we know, al-Shabaab and ISIS have recruited American citizens
and citizens of other Western countries to engage in terrorism, using
social media to encourage sympathetic or troubled individuals to attack
targets here in the United States.
Furthermore, we know these terrorist groups often rely on Americans
and other Westerners to help fund terrorist operations.
I hope that we take the opportunity during today's hearing to
discuss this--how we counter foreign terrorist groups' unprecedented,
virtual access to people living in the United States in furtherance of
inspiring and enabling attacks in the Homeland.
I am thankful that the Biden administration is taking the threat
from the rise in terrorism across Africa seriously.
Today, we have around 450 military personnel on the ground advising
Somali forces and African Union troops to beat back al-Shabaab and
bring stability to the Horn of Africa. We also have approximately 1,100
military personnel in Niger conducting drone operations to combat
terrorism.
The United States continues to launch airstrikes against al-
Shabaab, when necessary. And, under President Biden, we are advising,
assisting, accompanying, training, and equipping regional forces to
carry out counterterrorism operations that protect the security of
African nations and prevent the spread of terrorism to the United
States and our allies.
While military options are necessary to counter terrorism in
Africa, the United States must also help African nations build their
democratic institutions and improve the lives of their citizens--in
order to foster stability and safety.
If we do not continue to engage with robust foreign aid,
adversaries like Russia and China will fill that void, and terrorist
organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS will continue to gain strength.
It is in America's national security interest to be a good partner
to those nations in Africa who are aligned with our values.
Today's hearing is an important opportunity for Members of this
subcommittee to demonstrate that we are united in a bipartisan effort
to defend the American people, protect the homeland, and ensure the
security of African nations from terrorist--and all security--threats.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses, and I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you. Ranking Member Magaziner.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
September 27, 2023
Terrorism in Africa has increased markedly, with violence in at
least 22 countries on the continent, including several that had no
history of extremism prior to 2001, such as Mozambique and Burkina
Faso. While terrorist activity fell during the early 2000's, over the
past decade, fatalities caused by terrorist groups in Africa have
increased almost three-fold.
The U.S. Defense Department's Africa Center for Strategic Studies
assesses that total fatalities in Africa linked to terrorist groups
surged by nearly 50 percent from 2021 to 2022, with over 19,000 deaths
reported. Africa has also seen the greatest growth in the number of
ISIS affiliates. National security experts have called the continent
``the new epicenter for international terrorism.'' My hope is that in
today's hearing, we explore why.
After decades of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures,
it is troubling that groups like al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates
continue to pop up in African countries. I also hope we begin to re-
examine our approach to combatting international terrorist groups in
Africa and across the globe, since it is clear that the perverse
ideology espoused by ISIS and al-Qaeda and their commitment to violence
and murder persists.
Although the groups operating in Africa threaten mostly local or
regional targets--no matter where these terrorist groups are focused,
we must remain vigilant in guarding against their ability to cause
devastation to our allies and our interests both at home and abroad.
And while currently there is no credible, imminent threat to the U.S.
homeland from Africa--we all know ISIS, al-Qaeda, and their offshoots
desire to attack the United States.
In the 22 years since 9/11, our homeland security, intelligence,
law enforcement, and military personnel have worked tirelessly to
degrade these groups and destroy their networks. The fact that
September 11, 2001, was the last complex foreign terrorist attack on
U.S. soil is a testament to this work--and it is essential that we
resource and empower our national security personnel to keep the
pressure on, especially in Africa. To that point, I would be remiss if
I did not address the elephant in the room--the impending Government
shutdown.
Today, we will be receiving testimony urging Congress to support
Federal agencies' critical work to track evolving threats in Africa and
collaborate with partner nations to build layered defenses. That cannot
happen if the Government goes unfunded. Today's hearing is important,
but words must be backed up with action--and necessary funding.
I hope that after we receive this testimony, extreme MAGA
Republicans will end their destructive attempt to shut down the
Government. Only then can we assure the American people that Congress
is dedicated to countering terrorism threats wherever they arise and
keeping such threats far away from our shores.
Chairman Pfluger. I am pleased to have a distinguished
panel of witnesses before us today on this very important
topic, and I ask that at this time, the witnesses please rise
and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn]
Chairman Pfluger. Let the record reflect that the witnesses
have answered in the affirmative.
I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Dr.
John Peter Pham previously served as the United States Special
Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa and as the Special
Envoy of the Sahel Region of Africa from 2018 to 2020. During
this time, Ambassador Pham was responsible for coordinating and
executing the United States strategy in the region to advance
peace, stability, and our Nation's interest in the region.
Prior to being confirmed as Ambassador, Ambassador Pham served
as vice president for Research and Regional Initiatives at the
Atlantic Council, where he currently serves as a distinguished
fellow. He has also served as vice president for the National
Committee on American Foreign Policy Interest and is a senior
advisor to U.S. AFRICOM. Last, he is a tenured professor at
James Madison University where he taught courses related to
Justice Studies, Political Science, Africana Studies, and led
the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs.
Welcome.
Mr. Joshua Meservey is a senior fellow at the Hudson
Institute where he focuses his research on great power
competition in Africa, African geopolitics, and
counterterrorism. He has also served as a research fellow for
Africa at the Heritage Foundation and has worked at the
Atlantic Council's Africa Center and U.S. Army Special
Operations Command. He has also served in the Peace Corps,
where he was stationed in Zambia.
Welcome.
Dr. Aaron Zelin serves as the Richard Borrow Fellow at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy where he also directs
the Islamic State Worldwide Activity Map Project. He is a
visiting research scholar at Brandeis University. Dr. Zelin is
a published author and has written extensively on the jihadist
threat landscape. He earned his Ph.D. in war studies from the
King's College in London in December 2017, and his dissertation
on the history of the Tunisian jihadi movement was nominated
for King's College London Graduate School Prize for the
outstanding Ph.D. thesis. I may also mention that we were
colleagues at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
while I was a visiting fellow there. I would like to thank
Robert Satloff and Michael Singh for their efforts as well.
Welcome.
Our fourth witness today is Ms. Donna Charles, who serves
as the director of the West Africa and Sahel programs for the
United States Institute of Peace. Prior to joining the United
States Institute of Peace, Ms. Charles served as a professional
staff member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee where she
handled issues pertaining to Africa and U.N. peacekeeping
efforts. In addition, she has spent nearly a decade with the
State Department in various roles pertaining to African
affairs, counterterrorism policy, and sanctions. Ms. Charles is
also a veteran, and we appreciate your service through the
United States Air Force. Thank you for being here.
I would like to thank all of our witnesses for being here.
You have submitted great written testimonies, however, I would
ask you to please summarize those in a 5-minute period, which I
know is very difficult at times.
But I would like to now recognize Dr. Pham for your 5
minutes opening statement.
STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL
Mr. Pham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, permit me to begin
by thanking you not only for the opportunity to testify before
you today on the subject of the rise of terrorism in Africa and
its impact on the security of our American homeland, but also
for the sustained attention which the U.S. House of
Representatives has given to this challenge over the years.
As the title of this hearing correctly suggests, there is
indeed a rise in terrorist activity in Africa, and it does
impact the future security of our homeland. Let me address both
of these in turn.
First, while thankfully, the number of deaths caused by
terrorism around the globe has been on the decline the last
several years, although, of course, even one death is too many,
the progress is uneven. In Africa, the trend has been, sadly,
of increased violence, with the Sahel region in particular
witnessing a significant deterioration last year according to
the data set of the Global Terrorism Index. In fact, just two
Sahelian countries, Burkina Faso and Mali, alone accounted for
one-third of all deaths from terrorism around the world. It's
not just the sheer number of deaths has increased from the year
before, but the terrorist attacks themselves have become more
lethal. There is one counterterrorism good news story from
Africa in 2022, and that was Niger, which saw a 79 percent
decrease in deaths from terrorism. Alas, the coup in that
country exactly 2 months ago risked undoing that progress.
Second, while the Sahel appears remotely remote
superficially to America, it's worth remembering that the
centuries-old trade routes leading across the Sahara Desert to
the Mediterranean and beyond to Europe run across this region.
Today, those ancient paths are used both for human trafficking
and the smuggling of drugs and other contraband to Europe, and
thus represent a vulnerability to a number of U.S. allies. In
addition, in the wake of the pivot from their dependence on
Russian oil and gas, many of our European allies have come to
rely on energy exported from West African producers via
pipelines that traverse the Sahel region.
For these and other strategic reasons, the United States
has maintained two bases in Niger, with approximately a
thousand men and women of our armed forces deployed there, with
a mission of both intelligence gathering and counterterrorism
across the wider region that has become invaluable, and will
prove even more so in the weeks and months ahead, given French
President Macron's announcement this past weekend of a pullout
of his country's military forces in Niger by the end of the
year.
While the regional affiliates of al-Qaeda and the Islamic
State constitute much of the infrastructure for terrorism and
violent extremism in the Sahel and across Africa do not
presently appear to have the capability to attack our American
homeland, that doesn't mean they would not if somehow, God
forbid, they come into those means. Moreover, there are U.S.
citizens well within their reach, as the long ordeal of aid
worker Jeff Woodke held captive for over 6 years after he is
kidnapped from Niamey, Niger underscored, as well as
significant American economic and other interests across the
African continent, including in countries where terrorist
groups have been stepping up attacks in recent years.
If you may, let me pivot to offering several considerations
about the U.S. response to terrorism in Africa and the possible
threat this phenomena poses to American citizens and interests,
as well as to our homeland.
First, time and again, the mistake has been made to
underestimate, if not entirely discount, the threat face. Part
of this is attributable to an analytical bias to limit future
possibilities to extrapolations from the past, a hermeneutical
choice that ignores the dynamic potential of many of these
terrorist organizations. Another part of the explanation is
much more basic the sheer lack of resources for Africa-related
intelligence and analysis across the whole of the U.S.
Government. Given the geopolitical, economic, and security
stakes, the failure to invest more in institutions and
personnel and training and strategic focus is incredibly short-
sighted.
Second, with the exception of the Department of Defense,
across the U.S. Government, there's an artificial division of
the continent that, frankly, is rejected by not only Africans,
but it's also unhelpful. In reality, there are few compelling
geopolitical, economic, or strategic reasons to separate the
North African countries from the rest of the African continent.
Third, bureaucratic structures are only of value insofar as
the positions therein are filled by qualified individuals.
Without getting polemics about decision making in the current
administration or political dynamics in the Senate, permit me
to simply observe that it doesn't serve America's interest to
leave key positions unfilled.
Fourth, closely related to terrorism is the danger posed by
the lack of effective sovereignty that bedevils many African
governments. Often the challenge manifests itself in
criminality. Other times, it's the lack of capacity to provide
citizens with basic goods and services.
Fifth, as America's relationships, diplomatic, security,
economic, and cultural with Africa as a whole and with
individual countries expands and deepens, a positive
development to be sure, an unfortunate downside is the
potential risks to U.S. persons and interests, as well as the
homeland, necessarily increase. Quite simply, the threats
exist, and more engagement, by its very nature, increases
exposure and vulnerability.
Just two more points.
No. 6, with supply chains for critical minerals needed both
for energy transition and new technologies running across
Africa, I'd invite this distinguished panel to consider a
broader vision of security, not just protecting American people
and homeland from attacks, but protecting our access to the
strategic materials which are essential for our defense systems
and our civilian economy.
Finally, the challenge of terrorism in Africa and any
derivative threat to the United States cannot be addressed
except, as the Ranking Member rightly pointed out, in an
integrated fashion, with solutions that embrace a broader
notion of human security writ large, encompassing social,
economic, and political development, which often enough must
transcend national and other boundaries. I repeatedly
emphasized during my service as envoy to the Sahel, the crisis
in the Sahel is one of state legitimacy, a perception by
citizens that their governments are valid, equitable, and able
and willing to meet their needs. Absent states' commitment to
meeting their citizens' needs, no degree of international
engagement is likely to succeed. This obviously is not a task
for the United States alone. Nonetheless, it's one which
America has a strategic interest in embracing----
Chairman Pfluger. Ambassador, I am sorry to interrupt. We
are going to have to keep moving, OK?
Mr. Pham [continuing]. And leading. That was my final.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pham follows:]
Prepared Statement of J. Peter Pham
Wednesday, September 27, 2023
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, Distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and
Intelligence, permit me to begin by thanking you, not only for the
opportunity to testify before you today on the subject of the rise of
terrorism in Africa and its impact on the security of our American
homeland, but also for the sustained attention which the U.S. House of
Representatives has given to this challenge. In its oversight capacity,
the people's House--and, especially, the Committee on Homeland
Security--has been very much ahead of the curve over the course of the
last 2 decades and it has been my singular privilege to have
contributed, however modestly, to that effort over that time.
In fact, if I may cite just one example, it was this esteemed
panel's predecessor, the Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism, that 12 years ago convened the very first
Congressional hearing on Boko Haram, at which I also had the privilege
of testifying. At that time, Boko Haram was considered so obscure that
the all the participants at the event, held in conjunction with the
release of a bipartisan report on the threat posed by the militant
group, might have been able to convene in the proverbial broom closet.
Sadly, our analysis proved prescient and, rather than fading away as
some dismissively suggested at the time that it would, Boko Haram went
on to pose an even greater menace, not only to Nigeria and its people,
but to their neighbors in West Africa as well as to international
security writ large as it metastasized into the West Africa Province of
the so-called Islamic State.
the current reality
As the title of this hearing correctly suggests, there is indeed a
rise in terrorist activity in Africa and it does impact the future
security of our homeland. Let me address both of these aspects in turn.
First, while thankfully the number of deaths caused by terrorism
around the globe has been on the decline the last several years--
although, of course, even one death is one too many--the progress has
been uneven. In Africa, the trend has been, sadly, that of increased
violence, with the Sahel region in particular witnessing a significant
deterioration with Burkina Faso and Mali recording 1,135 and 944
deaths, respectively, last year according to the data set of the Global
Terrorism Index. In fact, just these two Sahelian countries alone
accounted for one-third of all deaths from terrorism around the world
in 2022. Burkina Faso even edged out Afghanistan for the dubious
distinction of being the deadliest country in the world for terrorism.
It is not just that the sheer number of deaths has increased from the
year before, but the terrorist attacks themselves have become more
lethal: the latter has ticked up 38 percent, but the former has gone up
50 percent. Overall, the Sahel region represented 43 percent of global
terrorism deaths in 2022, an increase of 7 percent over 2021. If
current trends continue, the Sahel region may well account for slightly
more than half of the fatalities this year. Africa as a whole
represented just under 50 percent of all deaths from terrorism in 2022
and so, barring an attack elsewhere in the world that might result in
mass casualties skewing the data, will easily account for a majority of
global deaths from terrorism in 2023, with attacks increasingly
impacting West African littoral states which had previously experienced
few, if any, attacks.
One counterterrorism good news story from Africa in 2022 was Niger,
which saw a 79 percent decrease in deaths from terrorism. Alas, the
coup in that country exactly 2 months ago risks undoing that progress.
Second, while the Sahel appears superficially remote to America, it
is worth remembering that centuries-old trade routes leading across the
Sahara Desert to the Mediterranean and beyond to Europe run across the
region. Today those ancient paths are used for both human trafficking
and the smuggling of drugs and other contraband to Europe and thus
represent a vulnerability to a number of U.S. allies. In addition, in
the wake of the pivot from their dependence on Russian oil and gas,
many of our European allies have come to rely on energy exported from
West African producers via pipelines that traverse the Sahel region.
For these and other strategic reasons, the United States has maintained
two bases in Niger, with approximately 1,000 men and women of our Armed
Forces deployed there, with a mission of both intelligence gathering
and counterterrorism across the wider region that has been invaluable--
and will prove even more so in the weeks and months ahead given French
President Emmanuel Macron's announcement this past weekend of a pullout
of his country's military forces in Niger by the end of this year.
While the regional affiliates of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
that constitute much of the infrastructure for terrorism and violent
extremism in the Sahel and across Africa do not presently appear to
have the capability to attack the American homeland, that does not mean
that they would not if they were somehow, God forbid, to come into
those means. Moreover, there are U.S. citizens well within their reach
as the long ordeal of aid worker Jeff Woodke, held captive for over 6
years after he was kidnapped from Niamey, Niger, underscored, as well
as significant American economic and other interests across the African
continent, including in countries where terrorist groups have been
stepping up attacks in recent years, including to Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Mozambique, and the West African countries along the Gulf
of Guinea.
To cite just one example, the administration has rightly won
plaudits for its investment, alongside G7 partners and, more recently,
the European Union, in strategic corridors like the one stretching from
the Angolan port of Lobito to the DRC and on to Zambia (with the
possibility of a future extension to the Indian Ocean). These are not
just transportation infrastructures that will bring critical minerals
to market, but corridors for energy and communications to flow. But one
also has to recognize as an al-Qaeda strategist opined nearly two
decades ago that, ``This is a continent with many potential advantages
and exploiting this potential will greatly advance the jihad.''
the u.s. response
Let me now pivot to offer several considerations about the U.S.
response to the rise of terrorism in Africa and the possible threat
this phenomenon poses to American citizens and interests abroad as well
as to the American homeland.
First, time and again, the mistake has been made to underestimate--
if not to discount entirely--the threat faced. Part of this is
attributable to an analytical bias to limit future possibilities to
extrapolations from the past, a hermeneutical choice which ignores the
dynamic potential which many terrorist organizations have exhibited.
Another part of the explanation is even more basic: The sheer lack of
resources for Africa-related intelligence and analysis across the whole
of the U.S. Government. Given the geopolitical, economic, and security
stakes, the failure to invest more in institutions, personnel,
training, and strategic focus is incredibly shortsighted.
Second, with the exception of the Department of Defense with the
U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), across the U.S. Government there is an
artificial division of the continent that, quite frankly, is rejected
not only by Africans, but is also unhelpful--witness the criticism of
the Biden administration by many African leaders for the decision to
label its Africa strategy document as one for Sub-Saharan Africa only.
In reality, there are few compelling geopolitical, economic, or
strategic reasons to do so except possibly for Egypt. In point of fact,
the overwhelming majority of the regional political, security, and
commercial links extending to and from the other four North African
countries go north-south across the Sahara, not east-west toward the
Levant. While I was able to bridge the divide during my tenure as
Special Envoy for the Sahel Region with explicit authority from
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to work with both the Bureau of
African Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, I have had no
successor and, in any event, a longer-term, rather than ad hoc,
solution is needed.
Third, bureaucratic structures are only of value insofar as the
positions therein are filled by qualified individuals. Without getting
polemics about decision making in the current administration or
political dynamics in the Senate, permit me simply to observe that it
does not serve America's interests that key positions go unfilled for
months, if not years, including that of U.S. Ambassador to the African
Union. Or in the Sahel where, in Niger, the administration waited 8
months after the retirement of Ambassador Eric Whitaker in December
2021 before nominating his successor, Kathleen FitzGibbon. Ambassador
FitzGibbon waited a full year before receiving unanimous confirmation
by the Senate, ironically, the day after a coup overthrew the
government she was to have been accredited to, her nomination being
held up all that time for reasons having little or nothing to do with
her qualifications.
Fourth, closely related to terrorism is the danger posed by lack of
effective sovereignty that bedevils many African governments. Often the
challenge first manifests itself in criminality, whether in the form of
piracy and other brigandage or in that of trafficking, human or
material. For the United States, all this means that increasing
vigilance against terrorism in Africa also requires greater investments
in law enforcement capabilities focused on the continent, including
enhanced analytical resources at home, more liaison personnel posted
abroad, and stepping up efforts to build the capacity of our partners
on the continent. Abroad, this requires a more pragmatic attitude that
prioritizes maintaining the progress that has been achieved in regions
like the Sahel and realistic perspective that privileges effective
partners who have proven their value over those that have failed time
and again--a good candidate for review is our failure to more
strategically engage in the Horn of Africa with the Republic of
Somaliland, a functional state, while pouring billions into the
perennial failed state of rump Somalia, which has as a government
minister a terrorist who just a few years ago had a $5 million bounty
on his head from our own Rewards for Justice program.
Fifth, as America's relationships--diplomatic, security, economic,
and cultural--with Africa as a whole and with the individual countries
on the continent expands and deepens (a positive development to be
sure!), an unfortunate downside is that the potential risk to U.S.
persons and interests as well as to the homeland necessarily increases.
Quite simply, threats exist and more engagement, by its very nature,
increases exposure and vulnerability to them. The answer is not to
curtail engagement since there are clear strategic imperatives for
seeking to build these links, but to ensure that adequate resources are
mustered to cope with the meet the rising demand across a whole range
of sectors from civil aviation to ports to customs and immigration,
etc., for more intelligence on and security against threats originating
in Africa.
Sixth, with many supply chains for the critical minerals needed for
both the energy transition and new technologies running through Africa,
I would invite this distinguished panel to consider a broader vision of
security, not just in protecting the American people and homeland from
attacks, but also protecting their access to the strategic materials
which are essential for our defense systems and civilian economy.
Seventh, the challenge of terrorism in Africa and any derivative
threat to the United States cannot be addressed except in an integrated
fashion, with solutions that embrace a broader notion of human security
writ large--encompassing social, economic, and political development--
which, often enough, also must transcend national and other boundaries.
As I repeatedly emphasize during my service as envoy to the Sahel:
``The heart of the crisis in the Sahel is one of state legitimacy--a
perception by citizens that their government is valid, equitable, and
able and willing to meet their needs . . . Absent states' commitments
to meeting their citizens' needs, no degree of international engagement
is likely to succeed.'' This obviously is not a task for the United
States alone. Nevertheless, it is one which America has a strategic
interest in embracing and leading. This is especially true given the
forced retreat of our ally France and increasing activity of
geopolitical rivals like China and Russia (as well as the latter's
proxies like the Wagner Group criminal network set up by the late and
unlamented Yevgeny Prigozhin).
conclusion
Successive administrations, both Democrat and Republican, and the
Congress deserve credit for efforts in recent years to shift the
narrative on Africa toward a greater focus on the extraordinary
potential of the continent and its strategic importance. However, if
this momentum is to be maintained and the opportunities identified
grasped, the United States needs to redouble its own efforts and also
work closely with its African and other partners to manage the
challenges, overcoming terrorism and other threats to security which
stand in the way to an incredibly promising future.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much.
I now recognize Joshua Meservey for your 5-minute opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF JOSHUA MESERVEY, SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE
Mr. Meservey. Thank you.
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on this important topic.
My name is Joshua Meservey. I'm a senior fellow at Hudson
Institute. The views I express in this testimony are my own and
do not represent an official position at Hudson.
African terrorism is amid an extraordinary expansion.
According to the latest Global Terrorism Index, in 2022 the
Sahel was the site of 43 percent of all terrorism deaths world-
wide, up from 1 percent in 2007, while Sub-Saharan Africa as a
whole accounted for 60 percent of all terrorism deaths last
year. There are also now deadly and active Islamist terrorists
operating in parts of Africa, such as northern Mozambique and
eastern DRC, that have little history of Islamist terrorism.
These trends challenge the United States' ability to protect
the American homeland as Islamist terrorist Salafi-jihadi
theology requires them to fight the United States. African
Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates are largely autonomous,
and not all members subscribe to Salafi-jihadi theology, but
the core leadership behaves as though they do. American policy
makers should assume that an African terrorist organization
would attack the United States if given the chance.
Furthermore, as Chairman Pfluger noted in his opening
remarks, there are now vast spaces in Mali and Burkina Faso
that can serve as the type of safe havens where terrorists have
the time and space to plot more ambitious attacks.
The relatively good news is that the direct threat of
Afghan terrorism to the homeland is, for now, limited for
various reasons. The risk of American complacency and
distraction is real, however. Lone-wolf terror attacks likely
remain the most direct danger from African terrorism to the
homeland. Fortunately, there does not appear to be any African
terrorist organization with significant appeal within the
United States right now.
While African terrorism's most potent threats to the United
States are more indirect than an attack on the homeland, they
are still worrisome. They include, No. 1, attacking Americans
and American interests on the continent, something terrorist
groups have done for decades; No. 2, providing military leaders
with a pretext for launching coups--the putschists in Mali,
Burkina Faso, and Niger all invoked their country's worsening
terrorism fueled insecurity as justification for taking power;
No. 3, creating the type of instability that provides
opportunities for American competitors like Russia through its
Wagner Group; No. 4, undermining important economic projects
such as how ASWJ in northern Mozambique shut down operations
around a massive natural gas field in the area.
Unfortunately, current trends in Africa suggest that these
dangers will likely grow. The dismal state of governance on the
continent, of which the recent rash of coups is both symptom
and cause, enhances the appeal of terrorist messaging.
Furthermore, the Wagner Group, to which some governments have
turned, operates in ways that exacerbates the governance
deficiencies that contribute to terrorism in the first place.
Meanwhile, this is happening against a backdrop of the rapid
growth of Salafism in Africa that has widened the pool of
Muslims who share some core theological beliefs with Salafi-
jihadis.
Bearing in mind that the most effective interventions will
enhance what viable and committed governments, militaries,
civil society, and ordinary citizens are already trying to
achieve on the ground in terrorism-affected areas, the United
States should, No. 1, coordinate the fight against terrorism
with partners and allies. The problem with African terrorism is
far too large for the U.S. alone. No. 2 cooperate with the
remaining relatively stable West African countries to build a
terrorism firebreak. No. 3, hold Middle Eastern countries to
their promises to stop funding extremism, including the
proselytization of fundamentalist Islam. This appears to be
less of a problem now than it was a decade ago, but it requires
continued attention. No. 4, ensure adequate religious literacy
among U.S. diplomats and military personnel, as the United
States has a recent poor track record in understanding
religiously-motivated actors, like Salafi-jihadi terrorists.
No. 5, continue and enhance efforts to bolster trade and
investment between the United States and Africa, which would
help ameliorate one element of the enabling environment for
terrorism, which is the lack of economic opportunity many
Africans face. No. 6, continue, improve, and expand support for
Afghan civil society organizations. These groups are often
among the few that are capable and committed enough to push
their governments to perform better.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Meservey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joshua Meservey
September 27, 2023
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important
topic.
My name is Joshua Meservey, and I am a senior fellow at Hudson
Institute. The views I express in this testimony are my own and should
not be construed as representing an official position of Hudson
Institute.
the rise and rise of african terrorism
African terrorism is amid an extraordinary expansion. According to
the Institute for Economics & Peace's latest Global Terrorism Index, in
2022 the Sahel was the site of 43 percent of all terrorism deaths
worldwide, up from 1 percent in 2007. Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole
accounted for 60 percent of all terrorism deaths last year.\1\ The
Africa Center for Strategic Studies documented a nearly 50 percent
increase in 2022 in the number of deaths due to Islamist terrorism in
Africa, a growth rate around 2.5 times what it was 10 years ago.\2\ The
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project recorded increases in
political violence of 77 percent and 150 percent from 2021 to 2022 in
Burkina Faso and Mali, respectively, though those rates include more
than just terrorist violence.\3\
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\1\ Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2023,
March 2023, https://www.visiono.humanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/
03/GTI-2023-web-170423.pdf.
\2\ The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, African Militant
Islamist Group-Linked Fatalities at All-Time High, July 31, 2023,
https://africacenter.org/spotlight/africa-militant-islamist-group-
linked-fatalities-at-all-time-high/.
\3\ ACLED, The Sahel: Geopolitical Transition at the Center of an
Ever-Worsening Crisis, February 8, 2023, https://acleddata.com/
con.lict-watchlist-2023/sahel/.
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There are also now effective and committed Islamist terrorists
operating in parts of Africa with little history of Islamist terrorism.
In northern Mozambique, for instance, a group known as Ansar al-Sunna
Wa Jamma (ASWJ) in 2017 began rapidly expanding in Cabo Delgado
province, eventually rooting itself in 6 districts, killing thousands
of Mozambicans, and displacing many more. It became an affiliate of the
so-called Islamic State in 2021, which marked its peak when it may have
had as many as 5,000 fighters and associates. A Rwandan military
intervention that year finally pushed the group back and stabilized
much of the province. ASWJ is not defeated, however, as it took refuge
in the dense Catupa Forest from where it continues to launch attacks
that increasingly feature improvised explosive devices and suicide
bombers.
A group with a longer history than the ASWJ, called the Allied
Democratic Forces (ADF), is another example of the recent, rapid growth
of African terrorism. The ADF has existed for decades, but was such a
relatively minor player in the welter of eastern DRC's armed groups
that it was nearly defunct by 2017.\4\ However, around that time it
began receiving funding from the Islamic State that eventually
propelled it to its status today as one of eastern DRC's most potent
armed groups that recruits foreign fighters and performs operations in
multiple countries.\5\ A Ugandan military operation against the ADF--
officially known as Islamic State Central Africa Province following its
affiliation with the Islamic State--that began in 2021 has degraded the
group, but it continues to launch costly and brutal attacks, and
maintains ties to other terrorist organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The ADF formed in northern Uganda but was driven from there in
the 1990's. It has primarily operated in eastern DRC ever since.
\5\ These include a November 2021 triple suicide bombing in
Kampala, Uganda, and an increased tempo of attacks that killed nearly
triple the number of people in 2021 than they did in 2019. See Caleb
Weiss, Ryan O'Farrell, Tara Candland, and Laren Poole, ``Fatal
Transaction: The Funding Behind the Islamic State's Central Africa
Province,'' Program on Extremism at George Washington, June 2023,
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-06/fatal-
transaction-final_0.pdf and Tara Candland, Ryan O'Farrell, Laren Poole,
and Caleb Weiss, ``The Rising Threat to Central Africa: The
Transformation of the Islamic State's Congolese Branch.'' CTC Sentinel
15, no. 6 (June 2022) https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-threat-to-
central-africa-the-2021-transformation-of-the-islamic-states-congolese-
branch/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The spread of Islamist terrorism in Africa challenges the United
States' ability to protect the American homeland as hatred of the
United States is baked into Islamist terrorists' beliefs and
operations.\6\ Every significant African terrorist group subscribes to
Salafi-jihadism, a sub-sect of the Salafi wing of Sunni Islam. Salafis
believe that the only authentic practice of Islam is to live as did the
Salaf--the initial generations of Muslims, including the prophet
Mohammed and his companions--and according to a literal interpretation
of certain Islamic holy texts. Salafi-jihadis go further by claiming
that authentic Islamic practice requires Muslims to violently impose
``pure'' Islamic living on everyone, including on fellow Muslims who do
not interpret their faith in the precise way that Salafi-jihadis do.
Salafi-jihadis, then, believe that they are required to fight the West,
especially its leader, the United States. Salafi-jihadis especially
revile the West because of its tolerance of various religions, its
secular laws, its supposed subjugation and humiliation of Muslim lands,
and its societies that they believe are decadent and immoral.\7\
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\6\ Anti-Western, and specifically anti-American, screeds are
staples of Salafi-jihadi propaganda. For instance, in 1998, Osama bin
Laden issued a ruling declaring that it was the individual duty of
Muslims to kill Americans and Jews wherever they were found. One of the
Islamic State's on-line publications, the now-defunct Dabiq, is replete
with diatribes against the United States, while al-Shabaab's most
recent major propaganda release rails against America as well. For an
excerpt of the al-Shabaab video, see Live From Somalia
(@Live_F_Somalia), ``UPDATE: Al Shabab group's deputy leader Mahad
Karate said in a new video that they have seized vehicles, weapons,
munitions and other military gears worth $23 million following the
group's recent suicide and gun attack on SNA camp in Osweine area of
Galgadud region, X, September 15, 2023, 11:07 AM, https://twitter.com/
Live_F_Somalia/status/1702700694459851171. For bin Laden's fatwa, see
Federation of American Scientists, Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders:
World Islamic Front Statement, February 23, 2998, https://irp.fas.org/
world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm.
\7\ For example, see ``The Fitrah of Mankind and the Near
Extinction of the Western Woman,'' Dabiq, Vol. 15, https://
web.archive.org/web/20170421153001/https://clarionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/islamic-state-magazine-dabiq-fifteen-breaking-the-
cross.pdf.
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African Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates are largely
autonomous from their core organizations, and not all members of
terrorist organizations subscribe to the Salafi-jihadi theology. People
join such groups for a wide variety of reasons, including for money,
power, protection, or because of political beliefs. Yet the core
leadership of Salafi-jihadi organizations behave as if they have a
sincere commitment to the ideology, even if there are some esoteric
theological or tactical differences among and within the groups.
American policy makers should assume that, if given the chance, an
African terrorist organization would attack the United States.
Furthermore, there are now vast spaces in places like Mali and
Burkina Faso controlled or influenced by terrorist groups. These are
the types of safe havens where terrorists, if left unpressured, have
the time and space to plot more ambitious attacks, including against
the United States. America has painful experience of this reality after
Osama bin Laden spent undisturbed years in Sudan where he planned the
9/11 terrorist attacks.
The relatively good news is that the direct threat of African
terrorism to the American homeland is, for now, limited. African
terrorists are today focused on fighting their local governments or
other rivals, and they generally lack many of the advanced capabilities
necessary to strike within the United States. The requisite
coordination and planning for such an attack are especially difficult
in the African context, and the agencies tasked with protecting the
United States now have had decades of experience detecting and
disrupting terror plots.
The risk of complacency and distraction is real, however, and the
increased flow of illegal immigration across the Southern Border has
heightened the risk of an attack. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
recently reported an increase in the number of people on the FBI's
terror watch list trying to illegally cross the border.\8\ As the
number of illegal immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere has already
more than doubled this fiscal year from last, Africa likely accounts
for part of the increase in individuals on the FBI's watch list that
CBP has encountered at the border.
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\8\ Julia Ainsley, ``Number of People on Terrorist Watchlist
Stopped at Southern U.S. Border has Risen,'' NBC News, September 14,
2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/number-people-
terror-watchlist-stopped-mexico-us-border-risen-rcna105095.
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Nonetheless, lone-wolf attacks--attacks conducted by terrorists
inspired by but with no formal connection to an established terrorist
group--likely remains the most direct danger from African terrorist
groups to the U.S. homeland. Fortunately, there does not appear to be
any African terrorist organization with significant appeal within the
United States. Al-Shabaab once attracted support from dozens of
Americans and U.S. permanent residents, including by inspiring them to
travel to Somalia to fight,\9\ but that support has either largely
dried up or sympathizers no longer dare to act.
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\9\ Joshua Meservey, ``Travelling for an Idea: The Appeal of Al-
Shabaab to Diaspora in the West,'' in War and Peace in Somalia:
National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab, edited by Michael
Keating and Matt Waldman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
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the threat to the united states
While African terrorism's most potent threats to the United States
are more indirect than an attack on the homeland, they are still
worrisome. They include:
(1) Attacking Americans and American interests on the continent.
African Islamist terrorist groups have attacked American
targets on the continent for decades. The deadliest such attack
was the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania; one of the most recent was the 2020 strike on a joint
U.S.-Kenya military base in Manda Bay that killed 3
Americans.\10\ In the Sahel, al-Qaeda in 2015 and twice in 2016
attacked targets frequented by foreigners in Mali, Burkina
Faso, and Cote d'Ivoire, respectively, killing dozens,
including Americans.\11\ African terrorist groups will continue
looking for those types of opportunities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Joshua Meservey, ``A Growing Challenge for America's Somalia
Policy,'' The Daily Signal, January 9, 2020, https://
www.dailysignal.com/2020/01/09/a-growing-challenge-for-americas-
somalia-policy/.
\11\ ``Mali Hotel Attack: U.S. Citizen Among 21 Dead, American
Govt. Looking for Others,'' ABC News, November 21, 2015, https://
abcnews.go.com/international/americans-hostages-rescued-mali-hotel/
story?id=35319879; ``Burkina Faso Attack: Foreigners Killed at Luxury
Hotel,'' BBC, January 16, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
35332792; Aislinn Laing and Henry Samuel, ``Al Qaeda Claims
Responsibility for Ivory Coast Hotel Shooting in which 16 `Including
Four Europeans' Killed at Resort,'' The Telegraph, March 14, 2016,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/
cotedivoire/12192667/Ivory-Coast-hotel-shooting-Gunmen-open-fire-and-
kill-11-in-beach-resort-Grand-Bassam-latest.html.
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(2) Providing military leaders with a pretext for launching coups.
Putschists in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger invoked their
country's worsening insecurity as justification for taking
power. When a junta takes over, the United States' ability to
work with the affected government is circumscribed, both by
American law and because of the mismatch in governing systems
that promotes distrust and friction. Achieving U.S. national
interests in the country and its surrounding region becomes
more difficult in those scenarios.
(3) Creating the type of instability that provides opportunities
for American competitors. Russia's Wagner Group that is now
embedded in strategic areas of Libya entered the country during
the wide-spread instability brought on in part by terrorist
groups. Wagner also now has a major operation in Mali, Niger's
coup government contacted the group for help,\12\ and there are
rumors that the mercenaries may be in Burkina Faso, though that
is disputed.\13\ Wagner's activities contributed to the
European Union and some European countries suspending certain
types of assistance, including their provision of combat
training missions, in the Central African Republic and
Mali.\14\ The result is that the security situations in those
countries deteriorated, and the United States has fewer close
partners with which to cooperate on the problem.
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\12\ Sam Mednick, ``Niger's Junta Asks for Help from Russian Group
Wagner as it Faces Military Intervention Threat,'' AP, August 5, 2023,
https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-coup-niger-military-force-
e0e1108b58a9e955af465a3efe6605c0.
\13\ Lalla Sy, ``Wagner Group: Burkina Faso Anger over Russian
Mercenary Link,'' BBC, December 16, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-63998458.
\14\ ``Germany to End EU training Mission in Mali,'' Reuters, May
5, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-ready-continue-
un-mission-mali-defmin-2022-05-04/; ``France Suspends Aid, Military
Support for Central African Republic,'' Reuters, June 9, 2021, https://
www.reuters.com/world/africa/france-suspends-aid-military-support-
central-african-republic-2021-06-08/; ``EU Suspends Military Training
in Central Africa over Russian Mercenaries,'' Reuters, December 15,
2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/eu-centralafrica-security-
idAFL8N2T0586.
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(4) Undermining important economic projects. This is a less
pronounced threat than the others listed, but still meaningful.
Terrorism-related insecurity harms local and even national
economies, deepening poverty. It can also directly threaten
U.S. economic interests. For instance, ASWJ in northern
Mozambique shut down operations around a massive natural gas
field in the area, an operation supported by American companies
and the U.S. Government through the U.S. Development Finance
Corporation (USDFC) and EXIM.
the two pillars of african terrorism
Unfortunately, the situation in Africa suggests that these dangers
will remain potent and will likely grow. One pillar of the terrorism
problem in Africa is the dismal state of governance that creates an
enabling environment for terrorist appeals. In the latest Ibrahim Index
of African Governance, African countries average a 49 out of 100
score.\15\ Unaccountable, abusive, and incompetent governments
strengthen the appeal of terrorist groups who claim to have the
solution to problems governments cause or cannot solve. A government's
inability to protect its people also increases the chances that they
will acquiesce or support a terrorist group simply out of self-
preservation.
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\15\ Calculations by author. The data can be found at Mo Ibrahim
Foundation, https://iiag.online/.
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The recent rash of coups highlights the weak and insufficient
governance on the continent and suggests that the problem is going to
worsen. Coup governments rarely deliver the type of transparent,
effective, and responsive governance that is necessary to ameliorate
the enabling environment for terrorism. Burkina Faso and Mali are
illustrative examples. Terrorism-related deaths in the former grew by
376 percent in 2022,\16\ which followed the January coup that year that
ousted President Roch Marc Christian Kabore.\17\ In the latter, violent
terrorist incidents have increased three-fold since the country's first
coup in 2020.\18\ While the security situations in both countries were
extremely poor before the coups, it is highly probable that the new
military governments are even more incompetent at containing the spread
of terrorism than were the civilian governments they replaced.
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\16\ Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2023.
\17\ The leader of the January 2022 coup, Paul-Henri Sandaogo
Damiba, was himself unseated in September 2022 by a coup led by Captain
Ibrahim Traore, the current ruler of Burkina Faso.
\18\ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mali Catastrophe
Accelerating under Junta Rule, July 10, 2023, https://africacenter.org/
spotlight/mali-catastrophe-accelerating-under-junta-rule/.
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Furthermore, the Wagner Group to which some coup governments have
turned operates in ways that exacerbates the governance deficiencies
that contribute to terrorism in the first place. Wagner's habitual
brutality alienates communities whose support is needed to effectively
fight terrorism, and its parasitic nature leaches away the scant
governing capacity its partner regimes have.
The other key element of the African terrorism problem is the
Salafi-jihadi ideology that motivates the core of many of these groups.
Most Muslims in Africa traditionally practiced their faith according to
Sufi rites, the syncretism and mysticism of which repels Salafis. Over
the last several decades, however, Salafism has grown throughout the
continent, and even become the dominant practice in some countries like
Somalia. While only a small minority of Salafis are violent, and other
sects--including Sufiism--have produced Islamist terrorists, the rapid
growth of Salafism in Africa has widened the pool of Muslims who share
some core theological beliefs with Salafi-jihadis.\19\
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\19\ Joshua Meservey, ``Sahelian Islam's Shift Toward Salafism and
Its Implications For Regional Terrorism,'' Hoover Institution,
September 21, 2021, https://www.hoover.org/research/sahelian-islams-
shift-towards-salafiism-and-its-implications-regional-terrorism.
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A more recent global development may have negative consequences for
the fight against African terrorism as well. The poorly planned and
executed 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan amid the Taliban's
reconquest has once again created an entire country that can serve as a
terrorist haven. The notorious Haqqani Network--an eager supporter of
Islamist terrorism abroad--has embedded itself in the Taliban
government.\20\ And according to leaked U.S. Department of Defense
documents, the Islamic State now uses Afghanistan as a hub from which
to coordinate its activities and plot attacks against the United
States,\21\ while the United Nations reports that al-Qaeda recently
established 5 new training camps in the country.\22\ There is a long
history of African terrorists training or fighting in Afghanistan and
returning to the continent to strengthen or even start terrorist
organizations.\23\ Because of what happened recently in Afghanistan,
that danger is once again relevant.
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\20\ Jeff M. Smith, ``The Haqqani Network: The New Kingmakers in
Kabul,'' War on the Rocks, November 12, 2021, https://
warontherocks.com/2021/11/the-haqqani-network-afghanistans-new-power-
players/.
\21\ Dan Lamothe and Joby Warrick, ``Afghanistan Has Become a
Terrorism Staging Ground Again, Leak Reveals,'' Washington Post, April
22, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/22/
afghanistan-terrorism-leaked-documents/.
\22\ Some U.S. Government officials dispute the U.N.'s reporting,
as seen here: Jeff Seldin, ``UN Report Warns Al-Qaida, Islamic State
Growing in Afghanistan,'' VOA, June 14, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/
a/un-report-warns-al-qaida-islamic-state-growing-in-afghanistan/
7138133.html. However, some counterterrorism scholars have pushed back
on the U.S. officials' assertions here: Bill Roggio, ``On Eve of 9/11
Anniversary, U.S. Officials Continue to Downplay Al Qaeda's Presence in
Afghanistan,'' FDD's Long War Journal, September 11, 2023, https://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2023/09/u-s-officials-continue-to-
downplay-al-qaedas-presence-in-afghanistan.php and here: Kevin Jackson
(@alleyesonjihad) ``US intelligence claim that Ayman al-Zawahiri was
the only senior al-Qaeda official in the Taliban's Afghanistan. Not
everyone agrees though. For @akhbar, I profile Hamza al-Ghamidi, a top
Saudi al-Qa`ida leader said to be based in Afghanistan:,'' X, September
15, 2023, 10:39 AM, https://twitter.com/alleyesonjihad/status/
1702693543335035127?t=xbyODorGLXMptHLKoQJYVg&s=03. For the U.N. report,
see United Nations Security Council, Fourteenth Report of the
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to
Resolution 2665 (2022) Concerning the Taliban and other Associated
Individuals and Entities Constituting a Threat to the Peace Stability
and Security of Afghanistan, June 1, 2023, https://docplayer.net/
233358581-Security-council-united-nations-s-2023-370.html.
\23\ For instance, the Armed Islamic Group (known by its French
acronym, GIA), an offshoot of which would eventually become al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb, first connected with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. One
of the Sahel's most notorious terrorists, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, also
fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets, as did many of the founders
of al-Shabaab.
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recommendations
While the scale of the problem of African terrorism is daunting,
the United States is not helpless against it, though it is also not the
decisive actor in the fight. American interventions will only be
effective if they enhance what effective and committed governments,
militaries, civil society organizations, and ordinary citizens are
trying to achieve on the ground in terrorism affected areas.
The United States should:
(1) Coordinate the fight against terrorism with partners and
allies.--The problem of African terrorism is too large for the
United States alone, so it should partner as closely as
necessary to achieve the most effect with partners. That
includes non-African partners such as Israel and European
countries, as well as African States like Rwanda and Uganda.
The later two countries highlight a dilemma that faces American
policy makers, namely that some of the United States' most
effective and accommodating security partners in Africa do not
have the level of democracy that Washington wishes. Yet Rwanda
is by far the most effective force fighting ASWJ in northern
Mozambique. Uganda has been a core element of the anti-al-
Shabaab fight in Somalia for years, and is also battling the
truly vicious Allied Democratic Forces in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. In these cases, American interests
require that Washington work closely with those countries,
while also seeking opportunities to influence them toward more
democratic governance. Such are the difficult tradeoffs and
balancing acts that are necessary in the fight against African
terrorism.
(2) Cooperate with West African countries to build a terrorism
firebreak.--Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are the epicenter of
the explosion in Sahelian terrorism, and the problem is going
to worsen. Neighboring those countries are relatively stable
states like Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo that are
friendly to the United States, but which are threatened by
violence spreading from their terrorism-affected neighbors. The
United States should focus its efforts in the Sahel on helping
those countries protect themselves, which will require helping
to coordinate their counterterrorism efforts, sharing
intelligence, working with them to enhance their governance
capacities, and maintaining a robust counterterrorism presence
in the region.
(3) Hold countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar to their promises to
stop funding extremism, including the proselytization of
fundamentalist Islam.--Saudi Arabia alone spent tens of
billions of dollars spreading Wahhabism, its version of
Salafism, throughout places like Africa. Recently, however, the
Kingdom appears to be taking steps to make good on its promise
to reform,\24\ though judging such things with precision is
difficult. The United States should encourage Saudia Arabia's
efforts, though it should also monitor them to ensure there is
no reversal. The United States should also help countries like
Saudi Arabia and Qatar refine their abilities to disrupt the
flow of private money from their citizens to extremist causes
worldwide. Morocco, meanwhile, has for years run a home-grown
effort to debunk Salafi-jihadi theology,\25\ and the United
States should do what it can to support that program, and
encourage other Muslim-majority countries to do the same.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ For a few representative examples from the Muslim World
League, Saudi Arabia's most prominent and semi-official charity that
once funded extremism around the world, see ``The Vice President of
Burundi Inaugurates the International Forum of the Muslim World League
on `Religious and Ethnic Pluralism and Positive Coexistence','' Muslim
World League, January 21, 2019, https://www.themwl.org/en/node/35919;
``Muslim World League Head Becomes First Recipient of Award Uniting
Faiths,'' Jewish News Syndicate, June 9, 2020, https://www.jns.org/
muslim-world-league-head-becomes-first-recipient-of-award-uniting-
faiths/. See also Eldad J. Pardo, Review of Selected Saudi Textbooks
2020-21, Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in
School Education, December 2020, https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/
uploads/Review-of-Selected-Saudi-Textbooks-2020-21.pdf; Robert Satloff,
``A Historic Holocaust Awareness Awakening in Saudi Arabia, of All
Places,'' The Washington Institute, January 26, 2018, http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/a-historic-holocaust-
awareness-awakening-in-saudi-arabia-of-all-places.
\25\ Jean-Marie Lemaire and Sara Doublier, ``Video: Morocco's Anti-
Jihadist Strategy,'' France 24, May 25, 2016, https://www.france24.com/
en/20160325-reporters-morocco-anti-jihad-strategy-counter-terrorism-
intelligence.
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(4) Ensure adequate religious literacy among U.S. diplomats and
military personnel.--Religion remains the dominant organizing
principle in many societies around the world, but the United
States has a recent poor track record in understanding
religiously-motivated actors like Salafi-jihadi terrorists.\26\
Misunderstanding Salafi-jihadis' core religious convictions
makes it impossible to create an effective strategy for
fighting them, with potentially profound consequences for
American security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Emilie Kao and Joshua Meservey, Minding the ``God Gap'': ISIS'
Genocide of Religious Minorities and American Statecraft, The Heritage
Foundation, November 8, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/
report/minding-the-god-gap-isis-genocide-religious-minorities-and-
american.
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(5) Continue and enhance efforts to bolster trade and investment
between the United States and Africa.--One element of the
enabling environment for terrorism in Africa is the lack of
economic opportunity many Africans face. Increased U.S.
private-sector investment would allow American companies to
reap more of the economic opportunities on the continent while
also creating jobs for Africans and contributing to economic
growth. Understandably, few American companies are interested
in operating in the most terrorist-prone areas, yet any
contribution they make to growing economies and more jobs
elsewhere could help ameliorate some of the appeal of Salafi-
jihadism in those places. Congress can also ensure that U.S.
agencies like the USDFC and Prosper Africa prioritize helping
the U.S. private sector in Africa. It should also push State
Department to fulfill its obligation created by the Championing
American Business Through Diplomacy act to prioritize
commercial diplomacy.\27\
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\27\ U.S. House of Representatives, 22 USC Ch. 106: Championing
American Business through Diplomacy, no date, https://uscode.house.gov/
view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title22/chapter106- &edition=prelim.
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(6) Continue, improve, and expand support for African civil society
organizations.--These groups are often among the few that are
capable and committed enough to push their governments to
perform better. However, just as the security situation has
deteriorated in places despite substantial American military
investments, governance and democracy in Africa has also
weakened despite significant American support to African civil
society organizations. The United States needs to study why in
some cases our support for civil society and better governance
has failed, and make the necessary reforms.
conclusion
African terrorism is a generational challenge, and current trends
are running in the wrong direction. The United States must remain
focused and committed to supporting Africans who are on the front lines
battling the twin pillars of the problem, poor governance and the
Salafi-jihadi ideology. Any weariness or complacency about the
challenge is likely to have damaging consequences to Americans and
American national interests.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Dr. Zelin for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF AARON Y. ZELIN, RICHARD BOROW FELLOW, WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Zelin. Thank you, Chairman Pfluger. It's a pleasure to
see you again. Thank you, Ranking Magaziner and the
distinguished subcommittee for giving me the opportunity today
to testify in terrorism threats emanating from parts of the
African continent, in particular focusing on issues and
recommendations related to the Sahel region, especially in
Mali, where insecurity is getting worse by the day.
There are two main jihadi groups now operating there, the
Islamic State Sahel Province and al-Qaeda's branch, Jama'at
Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, or just JNIM. You can get more
specifics on the background of both groups in my written
testimony. This increased insecurity can be directly linked to
the August 2022 withdrawal of French forces. At the time of the
French departure, the Mali insurgency had not been deterred or
defeated, but it has undoubtedly worsened since the French
withdrew at the request of the current Malayan government,
which seized power after a coup in May 2021 and expressed its
preference for the Russian-backed Wagner Group as a preferred
counterterrorism partner.
According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
Project, 60 percent of Wagner's violent engagements in Mali
have targeted civilian noncombatants. Rights groups therefore
argue that such Wagner actions unintentionally drive support
for both the Islamics in Mali, or ISM, and JNIM, which
capitalizes on grievances against local governments for
recruitment purposes, highlighting that Washington and its
allies cannot bifurcate counterterrorism and power competition
as an either/or challenge, since it will only undermine the
challenge of both. According to a late August 2023 U.N. report
on ISM and JNIM, in less than a year, the Islamics in Mali has
almost doubled its area of control in rural eastern Menaka, in
large parts of the Ansango area in southern Gao. As for JNIM,
the report states that it controls several gold mining sites
across northern Mali and villages in at least the Mopti region.
Making matters even more complicated for Washington, on
September 16 Mali signed a mutual defense treaty with Burkina
Faso and Niger, an alternative and competitor to the French-led
G-Five Sahel alliance, one of the main bulwarks in recent years
over the challenge of IMS and JNIM in the region.
From an American security perspective, one area that is
potentially worrying in the future is that a cohort of regional
foreign fighters, mainly from surrounding countries, have
appeared in the ranks of both ISM and JNIM. In past conflict
zones with jihadis this has led to external operations against
Western homelands. It should be noted that JNIM and its parent
organization, al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghrib, has been
uninterested in external operations in Western homelands,
though it has targeted Westerners and Western interests
locally. The greater risk for potential external operations
comes from ISM, even if it remains a low risk at this current
juncture. History dictates, though, that the longer the group
possesses a safe haven and the opportunity to expand its rule,
the more capable be of planning operations, whether directed,
guided, or inspired, as previously observed by IS's provinces
in Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan.
The current Malayan preference for Wagner, which
effectively blocks Western nations from theater, limits U.S.
options for meaningfully shaping dynamics on the ground.
Tenuous U.S. ties with the current Nigerian leadership further
complicate the situation and may hinder the effectiveness of
the local U.S. drone base, which has been used against both IS
Sahel province and JNIM militants over the years. Washington
should therefore prepare for the possibility that Niger could
ask the United States to leave, as Mali recently did with
France. Contingency planning for a drone base could include
engaging countries like Ghana or Senegal along for a back-up
plan amid the current trajectory.
The U.S. Treasury Department should consider applying
broader sanctions against ISM and JNIM leaders and financial
networks. To date, only 4 senior figures have been designated
from JNIM and 2 from ISM, with 2 of these 6 figures now dead.
Furthermore, neither group has seen a designation against them
since 2021, even as both groups have gotten stronger.
Likewise, it is also worth confronting the Wagner Group and
its logistics without hesitation. In late July the United
States sanctioned 3 Malayan officials for facilitating and
expanding the Wagner Group's operations in the country since
December 2021. This is a good start, though it would be
worthwhile to target with sanctions those within the Wagner
Group specifically in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, as the United
States has done previously with its official activities in
places like the Ukrainian War.
Finally, there has been a growing perception, whether it is
true or not in the Sahel region, as well as elsewhere in the
world, that the United States can be fickle with its allies in
contrast to Russia. Therefore, before the security situation
devolves even more and spreads to other countries, it is
imperative that Washington sticks to its allies regionally and
make these efforts visible. Otherwise, do not be surprised if
Moscow tries to find cracks in the foundations of relations and
leverages insecurity to take advantage and undermine the United
States' position, as already seen in Mali, Burkina Faso, and
Niger. Remembering that counterterrorism and power competition
are linked in these conflict zones will also alleviate tactical
and strategic misunderstandings and deter Russia from taking
advantage of a warp view by Washington that these issue sets
are somehow not linked.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Zelin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Aaron Y. Zelin
September 27, 2023
Thank you Mister Chairman and Members of the committee for giving
me the opportunity to testify today on terrorism threats emanating from
parts of the African continent. In particular, focusing on issues and
recommendations related to the Sahel region, especially in Mali where
insecurity is getting worse by the day. There are two main jihadi
groups now operating there: the Islamic State's Sahel Province and
Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin (JNIM).
This increased insecurity can be directly linked to the August 2022
withdrawal of French forces operating under the Operation Barkhane
counterinsurgency mission. At the time of the French departure, the
Mali insurgency had not been deterred or defeated, but it has
undoubtedly worsened since. This suggests France at the very least was
managing the situation in hopes that a future easing of the political
tempest would facilitate a more sustainable resolution. As for the
French, they withdrew at the request of the government of interim
Malian president Assimi Goita, who seized power after a May 2021 coup
and expressed his preference for the Russian-sponsored Wagner Group as
a preferred counterterrorism partner.
Highlighting that Washington and its allies cannot bifurcate
counterterrorism and great power competition. A position that casts
counterterrorism and great power competition as an either/or challenge
will only undermine the challenge of both. While this discussion is
focused on Mali and the Sahel more generally, this dynamic first
occurred in Syria since the 2011 uprising and is also playing out in
Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal in mid-August 2021.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Aaron Y. Zelin, ``Syria at the Center of Power Competition and
Counterterrorism,'' Policy Notes 95, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, February 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/syria-center-power-competition-and-counterterrorism; Aaron Y.
Zelin, ``Looking for Legitimacy: Taliban Diplomacy Since the Fall of
Kabul,'' Policy Watch 3640, Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
August 15, 2022, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/
looking-legitimacy-taliban-diplomacy-fall-kabul.
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current state of play
According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, or
ACLED, 60 percent of Wagner's violent engagements in Mali have targeted
civilian noncombatants, as compared to 37 percent of Malian army
actions.\2\ Furthermore, each Wagner attack--a category that includes
kidnapping, sexual violence, and torture--kills an average of 7
noncombatants, twice the average caused by Malian army attacks.\3\
Rights groups argue that such Wagner actions unintentionally drive
support for the Islamic State in Mali (IS-M) and JNIM, which
capitalizes on grievances against local governments for recruitment
purposes.\4\ Likewise, on June 30, 2023, the U.N. Security Council
voted to end the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali (MINUSMA) mandate, raising the likelihood of greater impunity
for all sides.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ladd Serwat et al., ``Wagner Group Operations in Africa:
Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali,''
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, August 30, 2022, https://
acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-
targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali.
\3\ ``Wagner Routinely Targets Civilians in Africa,'' Economist,
August 31, 2023, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/08/31/
wagner-routinely targets-civilians-in-africa.
\4\ Sam Mednick, ``Violence Soars in Mali in the Year After
Russians Arrive,'' Associated Press, January 14, 2023, https://
apnews.com/article/politics-mali-government-russia-violence-
10ba966bceb2dc732cb170b16258e5a6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the late August 2023 U.N. report on IS-M and JNIM,
``the passage of time appears to favor the terrorist groups Jama'a
Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara,
whose military capacities and community penetration grow each day.''\5\
In the same report it states that ``in less than a year, [the] Islamic
State in [Mali] has almost doubled its areas of control'' in rural
eastern Menaka and large parts of the Ansongo area in southern Gao.\6\
As for JNIM, the report states that it controls several gold mining
sites across northern Mali and villages in at least the Mopti
region.\7\ Strikingly, within the month since MINUSMA's withdrawal from
northern Mali, the prevalence of violence has doubled, portending a
situation wherein IS-M, JNIM, other non-state actors can exploit a
growing vacuum unfilled by either the Malian military or Wagner.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ U.N. Security Council, ``Letter Dated 3 August 2023 from the
Panel of Experts on Mali Established Pursuant to Resolution 2374 (2017)
Addressed to the President of the Security Council,'' August 3, 2023,
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2023_578.pdf.
\6\ Ibid.
\7\ Ibid.
\8\ Associated Press, ``Mali's Junta Struggles to Fight Growing
Violence in a Northern Region as U.N. Peacekeepers Withdraw,''
September 22, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/mali-junta-rebels-
jihadi-peacekeeping-coup-insecurity-7af6356feec5ce409501f4- c7e7dc42f8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Making matters even more complicated for Washington, on September
16, Mali signed a mutual defense treaty, officially named the Alliance
of Sahel States, with Burkina Faso and Niger--an alternative and
competitor to the French-led G5 Sahel alliance (originally including
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger), one of the main
bulwarks against IS-M and JNIM in the region.\9\ Therefore, today, as
IS-M and JNIM exploit Mali's security vacuum, Washington lacks space to
productively intervene given its soured relationship with Bamako and
the military regime's preference for working with Wagner.
Unfortunately, the current trajectory will only benefit the jihadists
the Malian government claims it wants to defeat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ``Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso Sign Sahel Security Pact,''
Reuters, September 16, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-
niger-burkina-faso-sign-sahel-security-pact-2023-09-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
background
IS-M and JNIM's presence in Mali can be traced to an unrelated,
decades-old insurgency in the north focused on Tuareg rights that was
exploited by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its local allies in
2011-12. AQIM, which benefited from the Libyan weapons bazaar that
flourished after the 2011 fall of Muammar Qadhafi, seized territory in
spring 2012 in a region of northern Mali referred to locally as Azawad.
Even as France's Operation Serval dismantled this statelet in January
2013, the AQIM-led insurgency continued, prompting an expansion of the
jihadist campaign to neighboring countries, especially Burkina Faso.
Within Mali, the AQIM-led jihadist alliance included more localized
groups like Ansar al-Din and Katibat al-Macina, alongside AQIM splinter
groups more regionalized in scope including Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
fi Gharb Ifriqiya (JTWJ-GI) and Katibat al-Mulathamin.
AQIM's monopoly on the Malian ``jihadosphere,'' however, was
interrupted by the baya (allegiance pledge) given by Adnan Abu Walid
al-Sahrawi to then IS ``caliph'' Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on May 13, 2015,
which the group accepted on October 31, 2016.\10\ Sahrawi, who became
the first leader of IS-M, had previously cofounded JTWJ-GI and served
on its shura council. This group, founded in October 2011, merged in
August 2013 with Katibat al-Mulathamin, led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, to
form al-Murabitun, for which Sahrawi also served as a senior
leader.\11\ Remnants of al-Murabitun eventually merged back into AQIM
in December 2015, possibly in response to Sahrawi's announcement, which
Belmokhtar rejected.\12\ Likewise, the remaining pro-AQIM groups--Ansar
al-Din and Katibat al-Macina--publicly formalized ties with the al-
Qaeda branch on March 2, 2017, adopting the name Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam
wal-Muslimin.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, ``Announcing a New Amir and Giving
Bay'ah to al-Baghdadi,'' Jama'at at-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad fi Gharb
Ifriqiya, May 13, 2015, https://jihadology.net/2015/05/13/new-audio-
message-from-al-murabi%E1%B9%ADuns-adnan-abu-walid-al-%E1%B9%A3a%-
E1%B8%A5rawi-announcing-a-new-amir-and-giving-bayah-to-al-baghdadi; Abu
al-Walid Sahrawi, ``Pledge of Allegiance in Northern Mali to Shaykh Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi and Joining the Islamic State,'' Wi-Kallat Amaq al-
Ikhbariyah, October 30, 2016, https://jihadology.net/2016/10/30/new-
video-message-from-abu-al-walid-%E1%B9%A3a%E1%B8%A5rawi-pledge-of-
allegiance-in-northern-mali-to-shaykh-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-and-joining-
the-islamic-state.
\11\ Caleb Weiss, AQIM's Imperial Playbook: Understanding al-Qa'ida
in the Islamic Maghreb's Expansion into West Africa (Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point, April 2022), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/
aqims-imperial-playbook-understanding-al-qaida-in-the-islamic-maghrebs-
expansion-into-west-africa.
\12\ Abu Mus'ab Abd al-Wadud (Abd al-Malik Drukdil), ``About al-
Murabitun Joining the Base of Jihad Organization, Adopting the Recent
Mali Operation, and Messages to the West,'' al-Andalus Foundation for
Media Production, December 3, 2015, https://jihadology.net/2015/12/03/
new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-islamic-maghribs-abu-
mu%E1%B9%A3ab-abd-al-wadud-abd-al-malik-drukdil-about-al-
murabi%E1%B9%ADun-joining-the-ba.
\13\ Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin, ``Founding Statement,''
al-Zallaqah Foundation for Media Production, March 2, 2017, https://
jihadology.net/2017/03/02/new-video-message-from-jamaah-nu%E1%B9%A3rat-
al-islam-wa-l-muslimin-founding-statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the first few years when IS-M and JNIM operated
simultaneously in Mali, the ``Sahel exception'' prevailed, as described
by French journalist Wassim Nasr. According to this arrangement, the
two groups implicitly agreed not to fight each other directly--a
contrast with the situation in places like Syria, Yemen, Somalia,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere.\14\ But in early 2020, this tacit agreement
collapsed, and the two groups have engaged in bloody if select clashes
since due to JNIM's fears of fighter defections to IS-M.\15\ Setting
aside these clashes, IS and JNIM mostly operate in separate regions of
Mali. According to JNIM's claims of responsibility in the country, the
group has operated mostly in the southeastern, central, and far
northern regions of Mopti, Timbuktu, Koulikoro, Kayes, Segou, and
Sikasso, while IS-M--as of September 2023--has remained in the far
eastern regions of Gao and Menaka.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Wassim Nasr, ``ISIS in Africa: The End of the `Sahel
Exception,' '' Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, June 2,
2020, https://newlinesinstitute.org/isis/isis-in-africa-the-end-of-the-
sahel-exception.
\15\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compared with attacks claimed by other IS ``provinces,'' the IS-M
numbers appear paltry: 3 in 2016; 8 in 2017; 10 in 2018; 16 in 2019; 35
in 2020; 14 in 2021; 29 in 2022; and 15 as of September 2023. Of
course, before April 2019, the IS media office simply did not claim
Mali-based attacks, and it may have purposefully limited its claims
since.\16\ This approach would cohere with IS practices elsewhere,
particularly in Syria, where leaked documents show that military
commanders intentionally prevent publication of claims owing to a lack
of technology/internet access, security concerns, or mere
indifference.\17\ Moreover, in a recent issue of the Islamic State's
Pashto-language Voice of Khurasan magazine, the Khurasan ``province''
notes that the seeming decline in Afghanistan-based operations can be
attributed to a policy of silence, similar to that employed in
Syria.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Prior to IS officially claiming attacks in April 2019, the
data from 2016-April 2019 is from data shared with the author by
Menastream, a risk consultancy led by researcher Heni Nsaibia.
\17\ Aaron Y. Zelin and Devorah Margolin, ``The Islamic State's
Shadow Governance in Eastern Syria Since the Fall of Baghuz,'' CTC
Sentinel 16, no. 9, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-states-
shadow-governance-in-eastern-syria-since-the-fall-of-baghuz.
\18\ Islamic State's Wilayat Khurasan, ``Voice of Khurasan Magazine
Issue No. 25,'' al-Aza'im Media Foundation, August 28, 2023, https://
jihadology.net/2023/08/28/new-magazine-issue-from-the-islamic-states-
wilayat-khurasan-voice-of-khurasan-25-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When compared with JNIM's claimed attack data so far in 2023, it
further illustrates that IS-M is likely not claiming most of its
attacks, especially considering both groups control territory and
there's a major discrepancy between the two groups' attack tempo. JNIM
to date since January 1 has claimed 136 attacks this year, which is on
pace for 185 attacks.
From an American security perspective, one area that is potentially
worrying in the future is that a cohort of regional foreign fighters
mainly from surrounding countries has appeared in IS-M and JNIM's ranks
over the years. It is unlikely, however, that we will see a
mobilization similar to what happened in Syria last decade. One reason
for low fighter migration to sub-Saharan Africa is the area's lack of
religious-historical resonance for Muslims relative to the Levant and
Arabian Peninsula. More practically, transit to Mali is arduous,
whereas Turkey--a global travel hub--provides an easy gateway to Syria.
Yet the Mali situation bears watching all the same.
It should be noted that JNIM and its parent organization AQIM, has
been uninterested in external operations against the West in the
homeland. For example, in June 2021 AQIM leader Abu Obaida Yusuf al-
Annabi said that France was ``deceiving'' its citizens by saying that
the country's operations in Mali were necessary to protect France from
jihadist attacks at home, because there has never been an attack on
French soil by a Malian or orchestrated by Mali-based jihadists.\19\
However, AQIM/JNIM have had no qualms about attacking Western countries
or interests regionally in the past: its long-standing kidnapping
campaign going back 15+ years, the December 2012 In Amenas hostage
crisis and attack in Algeria, the May 2013 attack on a military
barracks in Agadez, Niger, and a French-owned and operated uranium mine
in Arlit, Niger, the November 2015 Radisson Blu hotel attack in Mali,
the January 2016 Cappuccino restaurant and Splendid Hotel attack in
Burkina Faso, and the March 2016 Grand-Bassam attack in the Ivory
Coast. Though it appears that since the group became known exclusively
as JNIM in Mali in 2017, there has been less of that activity
regionally too.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Sheikh Abu Obaida Yusuf al-Annabi, ``And God Will Surely
Support Those Who Support Him,'' al-Andalus Foundation for Media
Production, June 20, 2021, https://jihadology.net/2021/06/20/new-video-
message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-islamic-maghribs-shaykh-abu-ubaydah-
yusuf-al-anabi-and-god-will-surely-support-those-who-support-him.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The greater risk for potential external operations comes from IS-M,
even if it remains a low risk at this juncture. History dictates though
that the longer the group possesses a safe haven and the opportunity to
expand its rule, the more capable it will be of planning operations,
whether directed, guided, or inspired--as previously observed by IS
``provinces'' in Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Petter Nesser, ``Military Interventions, Jihadi Networks, and
Terrorist Entrepreneurs: How the Islamic State Terror Wave Rose So High
in Europe,'' CTC Sentinel 12, no. 3 (March 2019), https://
ctc.westpoint.edu/military-interventions-jihadi-networks-terrorist-
entrepreneurs-islamic-state-terror-wave-rose-high-europe; Aaron Y.
Zelin, The Others: Foreign Fighters in Libya, Policy Note 45
(Washington DC: Washington Institute, 2018), https://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/others-foreign-fighters-
libya; Aaron Y. Zelin, ``ISKP Goes Global: External Operations from
Afghanistan,'' PolicyWatch 3778, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, September 11, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/iskp-goes-global-external-operations-afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More immediately, IS-M's and JNIM's success in Mali may likewise
prompt forays into nearby regions. One possibility is that the infusion
of resources will be reinvested into faltering operations in North
Africa, especially Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia. Such a trend would mark
an effective reversal of the southward flow of arms, money, and
militancy from North Africa following the 2011 revolutions.
Alternatively, IS-M and JNIM might try to extend farther south into the
Gulf of Guinea countries like Benin and Togo, where both have grown
slowly in recent years, or even push into newer countries such as
Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, or Guinea.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Sam Mednick and Virgile Ahissou, ``Jihadi Violence Hits Benin,
Shows Spread Across West Africa,'' Associated Press, December 28, 2022,
https://apnews.com/article/islamic-state-group-al-qaida-politics-benin-
violence-e70ea4e0cf5211785cf1cb20c4b38487; ``Togo Extends State of
Emergency in North,'' Agence France-Presse, April 7, 2023, https://
www.barrons.com/news/togo-extends-state-of-emergency-in-north-5c083845;
``Ghana Sends Special Forces to Border as Sahel Violence Spreads,''
African Defense Forum, May 9, 2023, https://adf-magazine.com/2023/05/
ghana-sends-special-forces-to-border-as-sahel-violence-spreads; Annie
Linskey, ``Kamala Harris Pledges $100 Million to West Africa Nations to
Fight Extremist Threat,'' Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2023, https://
www.wsj.com/articles/kamala-harris-pledges-100-million-to-west-africa-
nations-to-fight-extremist-threat-6f02504e.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internally, worsening security dynamics across Mali will continue
to open operating space for JNIM and IS-M, particularly in light of
recent reports of conflict between the aligned Wagner Group and Malian
military and the formerly pro-government Coordination of Azawad
Movements (CMA),\22\ a coalition of Tuareg militant factions.\23\
Various Tuareg militants may also choose to align with one of the
jihadist factions (IS-M or JNIM), even though no evidence suggests this
has happened yet.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Coordination of Azawad Movements, post on X (formerly
Twitter), September 12, 2023, https://twitter.com/cicamazawad/status/
1701653679831478529.
\23\ Andrew Lebovich, ``Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel:
Mouvement Pour Le Salut de Azawad, Groupe D'Autodefense Tuareg Imghad
et Allies,'' European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2019, https://
ecfr.eu/special/sahel_mapping.
\24\ ``Letter Dated 3 August 2023 from the Panel of Experts on
Mali,'' https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2023_578.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Therefore, in Mali and the broader Sahel, security dynamics
involving local, regional, and global actors have produced a fluid
geopolitical situation that benefits the local Islamic State
``province'' as well as JNIM and other non-state actors. Today's
reality, of course, does great damage to the Sahelian population.
recommendations
The current Malian preference for Wagner, which effectively blocks
Western nations from the theater, limits U.S. options for meaningfully
shaping dynamics on the ground. Even if the United States or its French
or other allies were more inclined to assert themselves, broader
geostrategic concerns could hinder their appetite for a
counterterrorism turf war with Russia. Tenuous U.S. ties with the
current Nigerien leadership further complicate the situation and may
hinder the effectiveness of the local U.S. drone base, which has been
used against both IS Sahel Province and JNIM militants over the years.
Washington should therefore prepare for the possibility that Niger
could ask the United States to leave, as Mali recently did with France.
Contingency planning for a drone base could include engaging countries
like Ghana or Senegal, allowing for a back-up plan amid the current
trajectory.
The U.S. Treasury Department should consider applying broader
sanctions against IS-M and JNIM leaders and financial networks. To
date, only 4 senior figures have been designated from JNIM and 2 from
IS-M.\25\ With 2 of these 6 figures now dead. Furthermore, neither
group has seen a designation against them since 2021, even as both
groups have gotten stronger in Mali. Broader targeting could
potentially limit IS-M's and JNIM's ability to move money across
borders. However, clear insight into the deep bench of IS-M and JNIM
leadership or financiers is unavailable in the open source. Therefore,
the State and Treasury Departments should use classified information
and draw from the intelligence community to shed light on these
figures, in turn denying them opportunities to help IS-M and JNIM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ ``Individuals and Entities Designated by the State Department
Under E.O. 13224,'' U.S. Department of State, last updated June 20,
2023, https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224/#State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likewise, it is also worth confronting the Wagner Group and its
logistics without hesitation. In late July, the United States
sanctioned three Malian officials (Malian Defense Minister Colonel
Sadio Camara, Air Force Chief of Staff Colonel Alou Boi Diarra, and
Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Adama Bagayoko) for
facilitating and expanding the Wagner Group's operations in the country
since December 2021.\26\ This is a good start, though it would be
worthwhile to target those within the Wagner Group more specifically as
the United States has done previously with its officials' activity in
the Ukraine war. Due to the cross-border nature of the conflict in Mali
and its connections to the insurgencies in Burkina Faso and Niger, as
well as the two countries also working with the Wagner Group,
considering sanctions related to these activities in those countries is
worth exploring as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Anthony J. Blinken, ``Imposing Sanctions on Malian Officials
in Connection with the Wagner Group,'' U.S. Department of State, July
24, 2023, https://ru.usembassy.gov/imposing-sanctions-on-malian-
officials-in-connection-with-the-wagner-group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, there has been a growing perception, whether it is true or
not, in the Sahel region, as well as elsewhere in the world that the
United States can be fickle with its allies in contrast to Russia,
which backs them no matter what. Therefore, before the security
situation devolves even more and spreads to other countries again it is
imperative that Washington sticks to its allies regionally and make
these efforts visible. Otherwise, do not be surprised if Moscow tries
to find cracks in the foundations of relations and leverages insecurity
to take advantage and undermine the United States' position in the
region in the way we have already now seen in recent years in Mali,
Burkina Faso, and Niger. Remembering that counterterrorism and great
power competition are linked in these conflict zones will also
alleviate tactical and strategic misunderstandings and deter Russia
from taking advantage of a warped view by Washington that these issue-
sets are somehow not linked.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Dr. Zelin.
I now recognize Ms. Charles for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DONNA O. CHARLES, DIRECTOR OF WEST AFRICA AND THE
SAHEL, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
Ms. Charles. Good morning, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member
Magaziner, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I
thank you and your staff for the opportunity to discuss the
rise of terrorism in Africa and the potential threat it poses
to the homeland.
As director for West Africa and the Sahel at the U.S.
Institute of Peace, I lead the Institute's efforts to inform
public policy and programs that are designed to help our
partners counter violent extremism, prevent and stabilize
regional conflicts, promote community-led peace-building
initiatives, and advance good governance reforms in the region.
During my tenure at the State Department, where I focused on
terrorism in Africa, I witnessed how important it is for the
United States to remain vigilant in its efforts to neutralize,
contain, and deter threats against Americans at home and
abroad.
While my professional experiences will inform my testimony
and responses today, they are wholly my own and do not reflect
the positions or policies of the U.S. Institute of Peace or any
other department or agency.
My testimony focuses on three critical issues that I assess
are foundational to addressing the complex landscape of
terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa and how its evolution poses a
threat to the homeland.
The first is understanding capabilities and intent, which
shapes our knowledge of terrorist operations and how to best
counter them. The second is mapping out risks and
vulnerabilities to U.S. persons and interests at home and in
Africa, including our posture, our exposure, and our risk
tolerance. The third issue is building partnerships and
capacities where they matter most. These issues require a
robust set of tools and an equally robust policy that defines
our strategic interests and political will to apply resources
where they are lacking.
The evolution of terrorism in Africa has resulted in
significant shifts in capabilities and intent. A prime example
of this shift is al-Shabaab, the Somalia based al-Qaeda
affiliate. The group's capabilities have advanced substantially
over the last 15 years and almost proportionately to its
capacity to raise money. As a result, al-Shabaab remains the
wealthiest, largest, and most lethal al-Qaeda affiliate in the
world. It is only in the last 3 years, however, that U.S.
officials have publicly concluded that al-Shabaab is a threat
to the U.S. homeland. I refer you to my written testimony for
details about how al-Shabaab's plot, uncovered in the
Philippines in 2019, helped shift this assessment. In addition,
increased access to information technology, including social
media, as well as global transportation, trade, financial and
communication networks, create a target-rich environment for
terrorist groups in Africa and elsewhere.
Mapping and mitigating risks and vulnerabilities that
expose the homeland to terror threats must be an iterative and
well-resourced process. Consider our air borders. As of 2019,
at least 11 countries in Africa have a last point of departure,
or LPD, air route to the United States. This data point
illustrates how a terrorist in Africa could, after clearing
several layers of screening and security protocols, board a
flight bound for the United States and use various means to
attack the homeland, either before landing or upon doing so.
Our land borders present another vulnerability. Thousands
of migrants and special-interest aliens, or SIAs, from various
countries in Africa have made the dangerous trek to South or
Central America onward to the Southern Border. I again refer
you to my written testimony for countermeasures that I believe
have improved situational awareness along our borders.
I urge decision makers to embrace a both/and strategy
rather than an either/or approach to ensure we are successful
on both sides of the boom. Policy makers must take a hard look
at how U.S. strategies for engaging in Africa are reconciled
with the resources available. Also, we will fail if we abandon
security cooperation with military and law enforcement partners
on the continent.
I am encouraged by investments in prevention, including
through expanding civil military operations, analyzing
financial facilitation networks, and leveraging advanced open-
source intelligence and technologies. Continuing to invest in
these and other measures will pay dividends in protecting the
homeland.
I thank you for holding this hearing on this very important
topic. I'm honored to appear before this committee, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Charles follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donna O. Charles
27 September 2023
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee--I thank you and your staff for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the rise of terrorism
in Africa and the potential threat it poses to the homeland.
In my role as the director for West Africa and the Sahel at the
U.S. Institute of Peace, I lead the Institute's efforts to inform
public policy and programs that are designed to help our partners
counter terrorism and violent extremism, prevent and stabilize regional
conflicts, promote community-led peacebuilding initiatives, and advance
good governance reforms in the region. The U.S. Institute of Peace is
one of the few independent organizations of its caliber to have in-
country staff in some of the most challenging and dynamic areas in the
world. I am fortunate to have the opportunity to continue building on
two decades of experience in foreign policy and national security from
various corners of the U.S. interagency, which includes nearly a decade
of service as an active-duty officer in the U.S. Air Force. I am proud
of my service to this country and am honored for every opportunity I
receive to continue in that service.
During my tenure at the State Department, where I focused on U.S.
counterterrorism objectives, operations, and programs in Africa, I
witnessed how important it is for the United States to remain vigilant
in its efforts to neutralize, contain, and deter threats that could
threaten us here at home. While my professional experiences will inform
my testimony and responses before you today, they are wholly my own and
do not reflect the positions or policies of the U.S. Institute of Peace
or any other department or agency.
My testimony will focus on three critical issues that I assess are
foundational to addressing the complex landscape of terrorism in Sub-
Saharan Africa and how its evolution poses a threat to the homeland.
The first is understanding capabilities and intent, which shape how we
think about how known and suspected terrorists operate at home and
abroad and how to best counter their efforts; the second is mapping out
risks and vulnerabilities to U.S. persons and interests at home and in
Africa, including our posture, exposure, and risk tolerance; and the
third and final issue is building partnerships and capacities where
they matter most. In my experience, the issues I have identified
require a robust set of tools and an equally robust policy that defines
our strategic interests and political will to apply resources where
they are lacking.
capabilities and intent
When analyzing the capabilities and intent of prominent foreign
terrorist organizations operating throughout Africa, it helps to
understand that these groups are not cut from whole cloth. From al-
Shabaab in East Africa to ISIS in West Africa, there may be
similarities in their distorted ideologies and perceptions of Islam,
but their capabilities, intent, and in some cases, tactics, techniques,
and procedures, vary for practical reasons. For instance, while most of
these terror groups aspire to establish caliphates that extend to the
borders of the countries in which they operate and beyond, there is not
a single group operating in Sub-Saharan Africa that can accomplish this
without overcoming steep hurdles, including rival factions, armed
groups, regional forces, and vigilantes. What ISIS accomplished in
Syria and Iraq circa 2014 \1\ reminds us that the idea of establishing
a caliphate is possible but not durable. Understanding this landscape
should inform how we develop policies, programs, and operations meant
to reduce, if not eliminate, continuing and imminent threats to U.S.
persons and interests here and abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (Director of National Intelligence 2022).
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I am not aware of any credible evidence available publicly that
suggests terrorist groups operating in West Africa and the Sahel pose a
continuing and imminent threat to the U.S. homeland. In this case, it
is important to distinguish threats to U.S. persons and interests in
the region, including hard targets like U.S. embassies to soft targets
like hotels and shopping centers, from threats to the homeland.
Counterterrorism practitioners should not rule out how the evolution of
terrorist groups in Africa, for which we have many examples, has
resulted in significant shifts in capabilities and intent.
A prime example of this shift in capabilities and intent is the
Somalia-based al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab, a U.S.-designated foreign
terrorist organization \2\ that is also designated by the UN \3\ and
other countries and organizations.\4\ For almost 2 decades, analysts
have observed al-Shabaab's capabilities and tactics in asymmetrical
warfare advance substantially, and almost proportionately to the
group's capacity to raise funds and collect revenues from a range of
illicit activities and ostensibly legitimate businesses. A body of
credible open-source reporting and publicly-available testimony from
U.S. officials indicate that al-Shabaab remains the wealthiest,
largest, and most lethal al-Qaeda affiliate in the world.\5\ It is only
in the last 3 years that U.S. officials have publicly concluded that
al-Shabaab is a threat to the U.S. homeland as well.\6\ This conclusion
has much to do with the details of an al-Shabaab plot uncovered by
Filipino authorities in 2019 that involved an al-Shabaab operative who
was in the final stages of completing a flight training program in the
Philippines.\7\ While there have been reports of threats and plots
hatched by al-Shabaab against the U.S. homeland over the last
decade,\8\ this plot was one of the first indicators that al-Shabaab
had both the capability and intent to strike targets outside of the
East Africa region, and likely inside the United States based on
evidence found at the crime scene and elsewhere.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ (U.S. Department of State n.d.).
\3\ (United Nations n.d.).
\4\ (UK Home Office 2023).
\5\ (Department of Defense 2022).
\6\ (U.S. Department of State 2022).
\7\ (U.S. Department of Justice 2020).
\8\ (ABC News 2015).
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This plot, among others, should inform how the United States and
other partners continue to reevaluate and enhance our approaches to
countering terrorism threats. In the case of al-Shabaab, the
preponderance of resources, including training, equipping, and
generally building out counterterrorism capabilities of regional
partners like Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, have been focused
largely on neutralizing an agile and resilient threat on the ground
using traditional and conventional tools.\9\ However, the on-going
evolution of information technology, including social media, and the
growing interconnectedness of our transportation, trade, financial, and
communication networks have opened avenues of approach for terrorist
groups targeting the United States and our partners. Even modestly-
resourced terrorist groups no longer limit themselves to launching
asymmetrical physical attacks against local or regional targets of
opportunity. Most terrorist groups operating in Sub-Saharan Africa have
long used social media to radicalize, recruit, and propagandize their
campaigns against civilians, Western-aligned regional governments, and,
in some cases, the West itself.\10\ \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ (U.S. Department of State 2022).
\10\ (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2022).
\11\ (USIP, Wilson Center 2017).
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Al-Shabaab is in a league of its own in Africa when we consider its
long history of using social media and other tools to radicalize and
recruit youth from the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere
who traveled to Somalia, or attempted to travel there, to fight
alongside and work on behalf of al-Shabaab or al-Qaeda of East
Africa.\12\ Like many other like-minded terrorist groups, al-Shabaab
reportedly used its platform to praise the Taliban's takeover of
Afghanistan in August 2021.\13\ Despite this outward signal of support
for the Taliban's cause, I am not aware of any credible and public
information indicating the Taliban and Africa-based terrorist groups
are linked currently through finances or other means of assistance.
However, there is a body of historical reporting that links legacy
members of al-Shabaab and its precursor organizations (e.g., Al Ittihad
Al Islamiya, known as AIAI, which rose to prominence in Somalia in the
1990's) to training camps in Afghanistan.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ (Council on Foreign Relations 2022).
\13\ (Kaledzi 2021).
\14\ (United Nations 2022).
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Al-Shabaab's origin story, which dates to the early and mid-2000's,
paints a clear picture of a group that remains intent on establishing
an Islamic caliphate in a Somalia under shari'a law and ousting
Ethiopian and other Western-backed forces. The group's focus has been
highly localized, allowing it to amass enough power, personnel, and
resources to take over large swaths of territory in southern and
central Somalia. Over the next decade, al-Shabaab established
governance structures throughout the country, meted out justice and
retribution through harsh and savage tactics, and expanded its
operations to Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda, Ethiopia, and elsewhere in East
Africa. As African Union forces, with support from the United States
and others, beat al-Shabaab's forces back from strongholds along the
coast and the Juba River Valley, the group had less territory to govern
and more time to focus on external operations.\15\ The group's
endurance is due in large part to how pervasive al-Shabaab and its
proxies are in Somalia and by its capacity to penetrate almost all
aspects of Somali society, including financial services, commerce, and
telecommunications.\16\ In my estimation, the longevity of a group like
al-Shabaab is fundamental to its threat profile today. The fact that
al-Shabaab had the ability to deploy operatives beyond the continent to
obtain flight training speaks to the strategic patience of its
leadership, planners, and operatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ (Council on Foreign Relations 2022).
\16\ (United Nations 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
risks and vulnerabilities
This example demonstrates why the United States can ill afford to
underestimate the nature of the terrorism threat in other parts of
Africa, including West Africa and the Sahel, and leads me to the second
critical issue the United States must factor into its analysis--mapping
risks and vulnerabilities to the U.S. persons and interests, including
the homeland. Most terrorist groups operating in West Africa and the
Sahel, which include ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates, appear focused on
conducting asymmetric attacks against regional government forces and
softer civilian targets, with many having established human smuggling,
narco-trafficking, and kidnapping-for-ransom networks.\17\ The latter
often target Westerners whose countries are known to pay ransoms for
their release.\18\ Terrorist organizations based in West Africa and the
Sahel have also used their platforms to declare jihad against the West,
radicalize recruits, and make a gruesome display of their attacks
through social media.\19\ However, I have not seen credible, publicly-
available evidence to indicate any West Africa-based groups have
demonstrated the capability and intent to attack the homeland.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ (United Nations 2022).
\18\ (UK Home Office 2022).
\19\ (USIP, Wilson Center 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terrorist groups throughout the continent have demonstrated the
ability to evolve and improve their tactics, techniques, procedures,
and targets. This fact holds true for groups that have emerged in
recent years in Central Africa (ISIS in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo) and southern Africa (ISIS-Mozambique and related networks in
South Africa, for example). As a result, the United States should
continue to map and mitigate risks and vulnerabilities in the region
that unnecessarily expose the homeland to terrorism threats emanating
from the African continent. That mapping effort must include a constant
and rigorous assessment of the risk and vulnerability profile of our
land and air borders. As of 2019, at least 11 countries in Africa have
a last-point-of-departure air route to the United States.\20\ This
datapoint suggests that a terrorist actor in Africa capable and intent
on attacking the United States could, after clearing several layers of
screening and security protocols, board a flight bound for the United
States and use various means to attack the homeland, either before
landing or upon doing so. Similar scenarios include the failed attempt
by the ``Underwear Bomber,'' a Nigerian national serving life in prison
who had been recruited and trained by al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) to conduct the airline attack.\21\ While his flight to Michigan
was indirect from Yemen through Europe, this example and others--recall
al-Shabaab's failed plot to detonate an explosive-laden laptop in 2016
\22\ and AQAP's intercepted printer bomb in 2010 \23\--remain
illustrative of how terrorists exploit such vulnerabilities and only
need to be lucky once to achieve their objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ (Sims 2019).
\21\ (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2015).
\22\ (BBC 2016).
\23\ (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(Rewards for Justice) 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our land borders present another vulnerability that terrorist
groups in Africa could exploit as thousands of extracontinental
migrants and special interest aliens (SIAs) from various countries in
Africa have been known to make the dangerous trek to South or Central
America onward to the Southern Border.\24\ In previous positions, I
have reviewed several sensitive reports and handled in extremis
situations that required extensive coordination between U.S. and
foreign partners to identify, track, and apprehend SIAs from Somalia
and elsewhere in Africa who were en route to or had crossed our
Southern Border. Various U.S. administrations have taken measures to
leverage biometrics and other technology to improve situational
awareness along our air and land borders and reduce the threat to the
homeland from known and suspected terrorists.\25\ \26\ \27\ Most of
these programs require the U.S. Government to actively pursue and
cultivate partnerships all over the world that will ensure we continue
to close seams and gaps in the vast border network. If the United
States determines that its tolerance for risk in this regard is and
should remain low, then we must reckon with what lowering that risk
requires in terms of additional personnel, fiscal resources, and
purposeful diplomatic engagement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ (Yates 2019).
\25\ (U.S. Department of State 2019).
\26\ (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2023).
\27\ (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
building capacities and strengthening partnerships
Building and improving partner capacity must continue to be a
central part of our counterterrorism and border security strategy,
especially in many regions of Africa where borders are often porous and
security measures are easily evaded through bribery or overcome by
force.
In my view, the United States has shown exemplary effort in
developing and implementing whole-of-Government and whole-of-society
approaches to countering terrorism and violent extremism, but decision
makers and other stakeholders need to agree that these approaches must
use a ``both/and'' strategy rather than ``either/or'' to ensure we are
successful left and right of the boom. While trade-offs are unavoidable
when resources are finite, the United States cannot afford to
compromise on a comprehensive, effective counterterrorism strategy that
includes:
Sustainable physical security measures, including
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technology;
High-quality, strategic information sharing agreements such
as HSPD-6;
Sustainable capacity-building programs that facilitate
technology transfers; and
Initiatives that counter radicalization and recruitment,
support reconciliation and peacebuilding measures, and promote
political stability and reform.
erosion of democracy and the rise of insecurity
West Africa and the Sahel present a particularly challenging and
acute problem set. While the region has never been immune to various
forms of instability, the last 5 years have forced us to reckon with
decades of failed and stagnant policies that helped precipitate the
spate of coup d'etats we are witnessing today. The political
convulsions throughout the region, however, should not be viewed as a
monolith. The ostensible predicate for the coup in Guinea looks nothing
like what transpired in Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The run-
up to the recent coup d'etat in Gabon is reportedly beset by a
complicated brew of ruling family palace intrigue \28\ and Great Power
Competition.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ (Dougueli 2023).
\29\ (Deutschmann 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What most of these extra-constitutional movements have in common to
varying degrees is the role foreign adversaries aim to have in shaping
and further stoking anti-Western sentiments, regardless of whether they
are organic or sensationalized.\30\ The Russian Federation and its
proxies such as Wagner and Sewa Security Services continue to make
significant headway in exploiting critical minerals and natural
resources in exchange for flimsy security cooperation agreements \31\
largely because, in my view, these impressionable juntas in Mali,
Burkina Faso, and now Niger have created or intensified political and
security vacuums. These natural resources are crucial for the Kremlin's
on-going efforts to evade U.S. and Western sanctions and fund its
illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, but the juntas who seek
Russia's support to counter terrorism and armed groups in their
backyards have been left with little to show for these agreements.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ (Lucas 2023).
\31\ (Arieff 2023).
\32\ (Sany 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The security situation in Mali and Burkina Faso, which the juntas
in these countries used to justify their putsches, has not stabilized
or improved. In fact, recent reports indicate that these countries have
seen a rise in terrorist attacks since the juntas overthrew their
democratically elected governments.\33\ While the Burkinabe, Nigerien,
and Malian juntas enter security pacts to protect each, it appears
these militaries--before and after their coup d'etats--can barely
protect themselves and their people without considerable external
support. For instance, Burkina Faso's military has experienced several
mutinous uprisings over the last decade due to lack of pay and
inadequate training, resources, and leadership.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ (Rogan 2023).
\34\ (Al Jazeera 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
reassessing the u.s. approach
This security situation unfolding throughout and beyond West Africa
and the Sahel underscores the need for the United States and its like-
minded partners to reassess its policy, strategy, and posture on the
continent. The situation is complicated, but with sustained political
will and sufficient resources, the United States can help change the
unfortunate trends in the region. Specific remedies include taking a
hard look at how U.S. strategies for engaging in Africa are reconciled
with the resources being applied, including U.S. embassy staffing. The
United States must consider whether its objectives, programs, and
overall ambitions in Africa align with the resources provided for our
embassies in Burkina Faso, Niger, and in the Coastal West Africa
region, where additional resources provided through the Global
Fragility Act will be spread out over five countries.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ (National Security Council, Executive Office of the President
2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, U.S. security cooperation throughout Africa has been
mischaracterized in a way to suggest that training and equipping
African forces is a recipe for coup d'etats and political instability.
Those who watch the region closely will agree this misperception is
dangerous, counterproductive, and fails to address issues that existed
long before these partnerships emerged. Building core capacities to
counter terrorism, secure borders, and develop regional solutions to
regional problems at all levels of government and through civil society
is the ideal approach toward balancing the three ``Ds'' of U.S. foreign
policy--defense, development, and diplomacy.
conclusion
I am encouraged by the Department of Defense's desire to continue
developing tools that help get at the threat ``left of the boom''--
including through civil military operations, exchange programs, and
professional development programs like International Military Education
& Training (IMET). There is also room to improve upon critical
capabilities such as anti-money laundering and countering the financing
of terrorism (AML/CFT) programs funded by the Departments of Defense
and State that are designed to detect and deter the flow of funds to
terror groups like al-Shabaab and ISIS. The United States and its
partners are enhancing social network analysis and open-source
intelligence technologies as another means of identifying the front and
back ends of radicalization and terrorist recruitment networks.
Continuing to invest in these and other measures as part of a balanced
and strategic counterterrorism approach will redound to the United
States' efforts to protect U.S. persons and interests in the region and
in the homeland.
Thank you for holding a hearing on this important topic, as well as
your bipartisan commitment to safeguarding the country and its
citizens. It has been an honor and a privilege to appear before this
committee today and I look forward to answering your questions.
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america.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ms. Charles.
I now recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Magaziner. I ask unanimous consent that Ms. Jackson Lee
be permitted to sit with the subcommittee and question the
witnesses.
Chairman Pfluger. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask the committee for something slightly out of order. I
ask unanimous consent to offer Dr. Zelin about 2 minutes to
provide this committee a little bit of educational background
on the difference between ISIS and al-Qaeda. If you will give
us about 2 minutes on that. We have heard the terms, but tell
us about your testimony. It was very interesting and I think
the education will be really good for us.
Mr. Zelin. Thank you, Chairman.
So the two groups originally were previously together. So
the Islamic State of Iraq was part of al-Qaeda, then the group
broke away in 2013. Part of it was over doctrinal issues. One
was related to the issue of takfir, or saying that another
Muslim was not a real Muslim and therefore legitimizing their
shedding of their blood. Another was the issue of the
caliphate. The Islamic State wanted to announce the caliphate
and that they were the ones, and that al-Qaeda was subordinate
to it because they were just a group. So, essentially, the
Islamic State views itself as needing to have administrative
control in the areas that it operates right away and it doesn't
matter if they have the support of the local populations. Think
of ISIS as like a totalitarian regime, whereas al-Qaeda is more
like an authoritarian regime when it operates. Al-Qaeda, in
turn, as a consequence of lessons learned from the Iraq war,
believes that instead, it needs to first gain some level of
support from the population, sort-of, you know, hearts and
minds approach. Obviously, they're the ones who are still in
control, but they believe if they can explain to the local
population first their ideology, that in turn people will agree
with them because from their perspective what they believe is
the true Islam, even though, as we all know, it's a twisted
version of it.
So therefore, al-Qaeda has more of this gradualist approach
related to working with the population, taking over territory,
implementing Islamic law based off of their interpretation,
whereas the Islamic State has more of a direct approach where
they want to do it right away, and it doesn't matter who's in
the way, essentially.
So think of it as more of like a totalitarian versus an
authoritarian approach to their broader agendas.
Thank you.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
5 minutes of questioning, and an additional round of
questioning may be called after all Members have had the chance
to be recognized.
I now recognize myself for the first round of questioning.
I want to go to Ms. Charles, you said something very
interesting. It is pertinent today, and this was not in my line
of questioning, but you talked about the trek that people are
making from Africa to Central and South American countries and
the vigilance that we need to have on our Southern Border. Can
you please expand on that and what that threat is? I have
personally been to these regions. I have been to the Darien. I
saw people from West Africa, from Sub-Saharan Africa that were
in the Darien this summer. So please tell us that vigilance
that we need to be preparing for here.
Ms. Charles. Thank you, Chairman Pfluger. I'm happy to.
One of the things I want to emphasize at the outset is that
the migration crisis that we are seeing, especially as it
pertains to African migrants leaving the continent, is one that
should be considered from a humanitarian perspective as well. I
think it's important to understand that the vast majority of
people that are leaving dire conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa,
either because of environmental stresses, because of violent
conflict, because they have been victimized or targeted by
their governments, at the end of the day, people who are
willing to make this trek to South and Central America to the
Southern Border are clearly desperate. Now, I think it's also
important to recognize that within that group we have seen that
there are opportunities for threat actors to use these routes
to get to the United States or get to regions close to the
United States to conduct operations to facilitate other
elements of their organizations. It's important to be clear-
eyed about the threat that this poses.
While I will not speak for what any department or agency is
doing today, I will say that in my professional experience I am
aware of the routes that have been taken by certain actors who
are associated with terrorist organizations operating in Sub-
Saharan Africa. You'll see various methodologies for that. The
majority of people leaving Sub-Saharan Africa tend to migrate
toward Europe, right, using either the North African routes,
Libya----
Chairman Pfluger. Do they pose a terrorist threat in Europe
as well?
Ms. Charles. My understanding is that there are elements
within these large groups. You have to understand that these
are thousands of people.
Chairman Pfluger. Yes.
Ms. Charles. There are elements within that group that have
links and associations with terrorist organizations in Africa.
Chairman Pfluger. I am going to keep moving. I want to pick
up on this here in a minute.
But Mr. Meservey had a very interesting point. You said
that they are required, that these jihadists are required to
fight the United States. So picking up on where Ms. Charles
talked about, can you kind-of--and you said in your testimony
the African terror threat has likely become more acute because
of the Taliban's conquest of Afghanistan. You went on to talk
about the relationship was unlikely to dissolve soon, and the
Osama bin Laden effect, the allegiances that were sworn. It has
been 2 years since you published that particular article. Do
you feel that the Taliban's resurgence has impacted jihadist
states in the Sahel?
Mr. Meservey. I think certainly the Taliban's re-conquest
has provided, at the very least, a moral boost to these groups.
It's encouraging to see an organization like the Taliban defeat
the United States, essentially. I think that is how this is
interpreted. This is seen as a defeat of the United States. So
I think at the very least, it has provided them motivation. We
saw some of Afghan terrorist organizations actually celebrating
the Taliban's re-conquest of Afghanistan.
I have not seen any reports of direct links right now
between the Taliban and Afghan terrorist organizations. But as
I noted in my testimony, I think there's a very real danger
that will happen again. There is a history of it, of Afghan
terrorists fighting and training in Afghanistan and then going
back to the continent, so.
Chairman Pfluger. Ambassador Pham, while they may not have
the capability to conduct attacks on the United States homeland
right now, if they do, please tell us that is this headed to a
point where these groups, whoever they may be, al-Qaeda-
affiliated, ISIS-affiliated, do they have the motivation to
attack the U.S. homeland or U.S. interest?
Mr. Pham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As Mr. Meservey pointed out, the motivation, the
theological underpinnings are there. What they've lacked to
date, thank God, is the capability. But they're constantly
seeking. We've seen this, for example, with al-Shabaab in
Somalia, where they've increasingly built sophisticated,
increasingly sophisticated, even undetectable--the laptop bomb
case a few years ago. So they're striving for it. To date, they
haven't, but they will continue to do so.
The reasons Ms. Charles pointed out earlier, I would just
add to that we don't know what we don't know. Our databases of
individuals, especially for African terrorists organizations,
are not as robust because we haven't invested the resources
that we have, for example, for screening individuals from the
Middle East or South Asia. That's a vulnerability.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
I recognize the Ranking Member for your line of questions.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman, and I will pick up on
that point.
So Ms. Charles in her written testimony noted the 2019
incident where an al-Shabaab operative was found to be
completing flight training in the Philippines, and we assessed
that that was one of the first indicators that al-Shabaab had
the capability and intent to strike targets outside of the East
Africa region, including, potentially, the United States.
So what more can we be doing or should we be doing to
identify these plots and disrupt them before they occur?
Because to the prior point, the eyes of the world have been
focused on the Middle East and elsewhere. What do we as a
Government need to be doing to support that intelligence
gathering and disrupt those plots with regard to these African
terrorist groups?
Ms. Charles. Thank you for your question, Ranking Member
Magaziner.
What made the 2019 plot so significant was the fact that
Filipino authorities were the ones that detained Cholo Abdullah
in his hotel room, his quarters. While I cannot speak to in
this setting the specific circumstances that led the Filipino
authorities to Mr. Abdullah, I will say that it is critical to
understand that those partnerships, the partnerships that the
United States has with Filipino authorities as well as, when
you think about it, other authorities throughout Sub-Saharan
Africa and globally, really help us extend our visibility and
extend our awareness and understanding of the threats that are
plotting against either their interests or U.S. interests,
either in that region or in the homeland. So I will say that
what organizations and departments and agencies like the
Department of State and others have done, not just since that
attempted attack and prior to that is increase the partnerships
that we have in these regions from a military and a law
enforcement perspective. That just not includes liaison
relationships where we're exchanging information, but also
training and equipping and building capacities. When we build
capacities, then we are allowed to engage these organizations
and these entities in a way that is not just beneficial to them
when they're building out a prosecution case, but it's also
beneficial to us as well.
So that's my recommendation in that regard.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
Dr. Zelin, I was struck by something in your remarks just
now where you said that at times the United States can be
viewed as a fickle partner in the region. What do you mean by
that?
Mr. Zelin. Yes, thank you.
I think part of it is not just related to specifically in
the Sahel, but other areas on the world stage in the past,
whether it's related to actors in the Middle East in terms of
the United States and Iraq or the United States and Syria. We
were just discussing what happened in Afghanistan. Obviously,
it didn't make sense for the United States to continue to
remain fighting against the Taliban since nothing was really
changing on the ground. However, there's been a perception by
many U.S. allies that the United States won't stick it out,
even if it's very tough, even though, obviously we're there for
20 years. As a consequence, you've increasingly seen Russia
pushing to try and fill those vacuums by undermining the United
States and going in there and showing that they can do what
they do on the ground, especially in the context of Syria in
particular. The Assad regime was toast, more or less, until the
Russians came in. Now we've seen, as a consequence of that,
they've then parlayed that into greater relations with other
states in the Gulf region, in Egypt, and then, of course, what
we're seeing in Eastern Europe now related to Ukraine.
Mr. Magaziner. I have heard several of you in your remarks
allude to the need for the United States to be a good partner
to friendly nations in terms of economic and humanitarian
assistance as well. We are being asked to consider
appropriations bills that in their current form contain deep
cuts to food assistance programs and other aid through the
State Department budget and the Department of Agriculture
budget. I will open this up to any of you. Can any of you speak
to the importance from a national security perspective that the
United States be a good partner and not allow Russia or China
to subvert our engagement with friendly nations that share our
values?
I will open it up to anyone.
Mr. Pham. I'll take you up on that Ranking Member,
Magaziner.
I'm a firm believer that accountable foreign assistance is
critical to American leadership and our national interests in
many of these countries. They're the difference that has gained
us entree with civil society, with populations, they help shore
up friendly governments that partner with us. So in a number of
things, they reinforce. I've had the honor of working closely
with and advising military deployments throughout the
continent, and I've yet to meet a commander who didn't
emphasize the value of those other programs in creating the--
shaping the environment in a way that made his or her
operations easier and safer.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Following the lead of Mr. Magaziner in asking about the
risks of decreasing financial commitments, perhaps, to this
problem abroad, let me ask something a little differently, or
that going at it that same issue in another way maybe. I think
many Americans, although without your level of expertise
perhaps, believe that the $8 trillion that we spent in
Afghanistan and Iraq didn't work out well. There are other
examples to boot. I mean, Libya always comes to mind for me.
There has been a consistent policy architecture behind all of
those acts, all of those policies that continues to hold
amazing sway. In fact, I think the premise behind Mr.
Magaziner's question and your answer to it, Ambassador, was
that we have got to keep doing the same thing. Am I wrong? Is
that perception wrong that that policy didn't work out well in
Afghanistan and Iraq? Is it that the United States just wasn't
permitted to stay for 40 years or 50 years or 100 years, as
opposed to some other fundamental defect there?
Mr. Pham. Sir, if I may clarify my remarks.
I think our foreign assistance is critical to our
leadership, but it is foreign assistance with our partners.
Very often what we don't have is partners. A wonderful example,
I would say, is the leading beneficiary of PEPFAR, which is for
renewal, and beneficiary of AGOA, which is up for renewal next
year, is South Africa, a country I would hardly cite as a
partner of the United States, in fact, a partner of our
adversaries. Why they should be the leading beneficiary in
Africa befuddles me, sir.
Mr. Bishop. Anybody else want to comment on what I have
asked?
Ms. Charles.
Ms. Charles. Thank you, Representative Bishop.
One of the points that I'd like to emphasize, especially as
a veteran and somebody who has deployed to the Middle East and
have worked on training and equip programs, is that we learned
important lessons from the situation in Afghanistan. I think
that I would like to commend the entities and organizations
that have done extensive research on those lessons that we've
learned. One of the things that I think we learned is that
tactically, operationally, strategically, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to I would say, prop up a government, a
military with tools, resources, equipment that they will not
have the capacity to use for a long period of time. I would
make this distinction with what we're doing in Somalia. Again,
not the best situation when it comes to where al-Shabaab is on
the trajectory over 15 years, but we've helped build out a
Somalian national army that did not exist in its current form
15 years ago.
So I would say that we have learned lessons and that those
lessons can be applied to situations not just in Sub-Saharan
Africa and all over the world. Yes, large mistakes were made
when it comes to our foreign assistance and how we operated
there, but we've learned those lessons, and I'm seeing them
applied in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Mr. Bishop. I hear you. I would like to believe we have
learned lessons, and you just gave an example. But what it
evokes in me is a recognition that of the resources we invested
in the Afghanistan army and Americans saw it just collapse. I
am sure there are expert views about why that is a distinct
situation, but it doesn't really provide me comfort.
Let me ask you this. How many countries in Africa are U.S.
forces conducting operations in now?
Ms. Charles. Thank you, Representative Bishop.
From my perch, I would refer you to the Department of
Defense to provide specifics on that.
When we look at open-source information, it is clear that
Somalia is one of those countries. We also have partnerships
throughout West Africa where we're training and equipping.
We're providing support in various ways. But I would refer you
to Department of Defense for specifics on that.
Mr. Bishop. OK. Let me just ask one more for whoever wants
to take it.
How is it that China and Russia are able to win support in
Africa based off anti-U.S. resentment? What are the reasons
that people there resent the United States and be inclined to
join Russia or China and their efforts?
Mr. Meservey. Thank you.
I think how Africans feel about the United States varies
widely across the continent. There actually is a lot of support
for the United States among the general African population.
Now, there's also growing levels of support--or not growing on
an uninterrupted trajectory, but there is support for China, as
you say. I think that's due to decades of very intensive
Chinese engagement, diplomatic investments, loans, things of
that nature. But there's also a growing wariness of Chinese
engagement because of fears that perhaps some of these
countries are too engaged with China.
On the Russia side, yes, we saw Russian flags being waived
during some of these coups and such things. I would suspect
that some of that was Russian propaganda, frankly. I don't know
where they would have gotten those flags other than from the
Russians themselves. But it's also true that, yes, there is
resentment toward former colonizers like the French, for
instance, who have a very difficult history in that region.
So it's very, very complex. I don't think the United States
is out of the game, so to speak, as far as our person-to-person
diplomacy and our ability to win influence and support in the
general African population.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. D'Esposito [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Correa for 5 minutes.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both our Chairman and our Ranking Member
for holding this most important hearing. I want to thank the
Members today, witnesses for your testimony.
Africa: continent that is exploding in terms of importance,
population, center of resources. Russia, China, the United
States, everybody is trying to control, influence the area. For
the United States, I hate to say this, but we only pay
attention when we see smoke, and by then the fire is raging out
of control.
Mr. Chairman, I want to submit an article for the record
today. It is Calgary Herald by David Beasley, former South
Carolina Governor and ex former director of the U.N. World Food
Program. It is entitled ``Ahead of Business Forum in Banff,
Former Top U.N. Official Warms of Widespread Starvation Due to
Conflict.''
Mr. D'Esposito. Without objection.*
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* The information was not available at the time of publication.
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Mr. Correa. So David Beasley and I have been talking for a
number of months. I am going to quote him, and he says, ``I
cannot tell you how many times mothers would say to me, my son
or husband did not want to join ISIS or al-Qaeda but we had not
fed our little girl in 2 weeks. What were we supposed to do?
The extremist groups used food to recruit and especially in the
Sahel region as well as in the Horn of Africa, places such as
Somalia where you have Al-Shabaab.'' He goes on to say, during
the Arab Spring there were over 48 nations of unrest and
political instability due to rising food prices. The
international hunger crisis is much worse today than it was in
2010. He goes on to say the cost of feeding a Syrian in Syria
is about 50 cents a day. The cost, humanitarian, to support
that Syrian in Germany is about $70 or more per day. Heard all
of you very carefully, you barely mentioned starvation, food.
So I am going to ask all of you today, the United States is
the breadbasket of the world. Do you know how much foreign aid,
U.S. aid, we provided Africa? Mr. Pham. Mr. Meservey. Yes, go
ahead. I only have 2 minutes.
Mr. Pham. Yes. The approximate U.S. aid to Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa is approximately $6-7 billion a year.
Mr. Bishop. Is that going up or down?
Mr. Pham. The trend has been relatively steady.
Mr. Bishop. Is that enough?
Mr. Pham. I would say it is enough if spent wisely.
Mr. Pham. Mr. Meservey.
Mr. Meservey. Yes, I agree with the last comment. It has
to----
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Zelin, Dr. Zelin.
Mr. Zelin. I think we need to think about the continuing
degradation of the environment and how climate change is
affecting----
Mr. Bishop. So hunger is only going to get worse and worse
and hungry people do desperate things to feed their family.
Mr. Zelin. There's also the issue of the grain crisis from
the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that's affected a lot of nations
in Africa as well, since they don't have access to it now
because of the Russian blockade on Ukraine.
Mr. Bishop. So, Ms. Charles, go ahead.
Ms. Charles. I would say that the humanitarian assistance
is an important part of it, but we also need to work on the
opposite end, or the other side of that, which is improving the
technology transfer and allowing the information that we have
about agriculture to help transform lives, subsistence farmers,
et cetera. So we do a lot in humanitarian assistance, emergency
food assistance. For instance, we are the largest donor--
bilateral donor to Somalia.
Mr. Bishop. Ms. Charles, I would say that all of that is
good, but if you are starving today, by the time you get
technology transfer and other resources on the ground, it is
probably going to be too late. My concern as a policy maker--
and we are debating how much foreign aid we are giving
countries today in terms of food--is trying to get attention,
trying to understand the pragmatics, the reality where the
rubber meets the road. That family in Africa not having enough
to eat and how we can help possibly with food. As Governor
Beasley said, either you feed these people or you are going to
continue to throw gasoline on top of a fire that will
eventually overwhelm us.
So, you know, I would ask all of you to go back and think
about how important is it today to feed the starving people
like in South Africa, for our own personal interest.
Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Thank you very much.
Mr. D'Esposito. The gentleman's time has expired.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Meservey, in May 2023, you wrote a paper titled
``America's Best Choice in Sudan is the least bad option''. In
that paper, you mentioned that a sustained conflict in Sudan
would lead to a major humanitarian and migration crisis. How
could a potential refugee crisis from any country experiencing
instability in that region impact this Nation's on-going crisis
at the Southern Border?
Mr. Meservey. Yes, I think, as we've been discussing during
this testimony, or during this hearing, that when you get
increased migration flows, whether within Africa or across the
Southern Border, for instance, it does raise the risk of
terrorists using those flows to embed themselves. We've seen
this during the Syria crisis. We know for a fact that some
terrorists used that crisis and the migration flows into Europe
to get into Europe and wage attacks. So, yes, that always
should be a concern around these conflicts.
Mr. D'Esposito. Ambassador, you highlighted that the
centuries-old trade routes across the Sahara Desert are now
being used by blind actors for human trafficking and the
smuggling of narcotics and other contraband to Europe. Can you
briefly describe which specific drugs are coming through that
route?
Mr. Pham. Two in particular. Cocaine from Latin America,
some of it moving from Colombia via Venezuela to the Sahel. The
other one is cannabis, some of it grown on the continent, but
those are the two primary ones, sir.
Mr. D'Esposito. OK. These same routes also have a variety
of energy pipelines that support Europe's efforts to pivot from
Russian oil and gas. Can you briefly discuss the threats posed
to those pipelines and how these threats could potentially
impact global energy?
Mr. Pham. Europe is relying--the flurry of deals signed
since February 2022 with African countries, one of the ones
that most preoccupies, I think, energy analysts, is the Trans-
Sahara pipeline running through Niger, into Algeria, and then
over to Spain. That's been now put in doubt both because of the
coup in Niger, the petroleum minister being arrested, and now
the increased jihadist activity in that country, and in Mali,
in the northern part of Mali as well.
Mr. D'Esposito. OK. Now this is for any of you. So, the
Homeland Threat Assessment of 2024, published this month by
DHS, stated, and I quote: ``As of July, approximately 160 non-
U.S. persons in the TSDS attempted to enter the United States
via the Southern Border this year, most of whom were
encountered attempting to illegally enter between points of
entry. This represents an increase from the approximately 100
encounters in all of fiscal year 2022.'' Do you think the rise
in terrorism in Africa could be contributing to the increase in
this number?
Ms. Charles, you hit the button first, so go ahead.
Ms. Charles. Representative, thank you for the question.
I think the situation, when you look at it from a sheer
numbers perspective, can seem easier on its face to analyze.
It's a nuanced and complex situation. I think that the numbers
that we're looking at, especially from the TSDS, as you refer
to that information, is fed from various databases, as I
understand it, and the United States can do a better job at
scrubbing this information and ensuring that it is accurate. I
have seen in my professional experience that some of the
information is contestable, and so it's important to sort-of
provide that nuance and context there.
But at the end of the day, the rise of terrorism in Africa
does not necessarily mean that we are going to see a threat to
the United States that's proportionate. It's important for us
to ensure that the partnerships that we have in South America,
in Central America, and the tools and technologies that we're
using, like Bitmap, ATSG, PICES, et cetera, are employed in a
way that can help us identify those potential threats well
before they get to the Southern Border.
So that's the point that I wanted to emphasize.
Mr. D'Esposito. I only have 30 seconds left.
Dr. Zelin, through your research, have you seen any threat
indicators from jihadist groups from the region that we are
discussing today that would present a direct threat to the U.S.
homeland?
Mr. Zelin. Currently, no. It's a low risk. However, if they
continue to control territory, especially in Mali region, with
the Islamic State, they've shown previously in cases in Syria,
Libya, and Afghanistan, if they have the time and space, they
will attempt to either direct an attack or try to guide people
in the homeland that are already here or try to inspire them.
So it's something that needs to be focused on continuously.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you very much, Doctor.
My time has expired.
I now recognize Ms. Titus for 5 minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Getting back to the topic of what is happening in Africa
and what we can do there, I would ask you, Ms. Charles, to talk
a little bit about the Global Fragility Act. That was
established, for those who don't know, in 2019. Set aside ten
countries where we should be focused, directing our efforts in
those countries to try to stabilize the situation, look at what
the threats are to growing democracy, how the United States can
do better coordinating with locals on the ground there for
their input. Now, that is going to be running out fairly soon,
and it is woefully underfunded. Could you talk about how it
works and what its contributions are to countering this
terrorist rise?
Ms. Charles. Thank you, Representative Titus.
One of the things that I will say about the Global
Fragility Act and its related strategies is that it is meant
to, with the resources provided year over year, to help
capacitate not just national governments, but also working with
local governments, civil society, using a whole-of-society
approach to ensure that those elements that foster fragility,
if you will, can be addressed in a sustainable way. I
completely agree that the resources provided, especially year
over year, for a region like West Africa, coastal West Africa,
where you have 5 countries where ostensibly tens of millions of
dollars needs to be spread out over a period of time, may not
necessarily be adequate, may not be enough.
But at the end of the day, the idea behind the Global
Fragility Act is one that allows us to look at the problem set
from a balanced perspective, where we look at the three Ds,
development, diplomacy, and defense. We're balancing out those
elements of development and diplomacy, but we need to ensure
that our embassies in the region are capacitated and resourced
in a way that allows the efforts associated with the GFA to be
effective. We cannot mete out tens of millions of dollars to
affect any change without having the Ambassadors in place, poll
officers in place, reporting officers in place, programs
officers in place in countries like Niger, where my
understanding is that embassy staffing is well below 75, even
50 percent.
So I will say that GFA on its face is a fantastic idea and
concept, but in practicality, in implementation, there are
challenges that we need to address, especially when it comes to
presence.
One thing I will point out when it comes to strategic
competition is that if we aim to use this tool as part of an
effort to compete strategically with the likes of the Russian
Federation and the PRC, we need to ensure that we look at how
they're manning their embassies in the region and how we're
manning ours. If we cannot compete in that regard, then I think
things like GFA might not be as successful as they could be.
Ms. Titus. Well, we lost a lot of State Department folks
during the previous administration when that was pretty much
emasculated. We heard from the President at that time that
everything was transactional and wasn't going to be invested or
working with our allies in any part of the world, but certainly
in Africa was the case. Isn't it better to look at the causes
of this terrorism than trying to deal with them after they are
more established? We have seen that al-Shabaab especially in
some of these countries is seen as a stabilizing force. It has
its own governmental structure, provides employment, and that
is a big source of radicalization when young people are not
employed. It is not ideological necessarily. So if we are there
competing with these other things that we could do under the
Fragility Act, maybe that would be a way to circumvent it as
opposed to have to deal with it after the fact.
Ms. Charles. Rep. Titus very quickly on those two points. I
agree that it is important to look at the root causes, but,
again, as I mentioned in my opening statement, the both/and
strategy is the most I think effective, right. The United
States is one of the most sophisticated and capable governments
out there, especially when it comes to not just our
intelligence, our security services, but also our ability to
deploy what I call soft power. I think that's an important
thing to realize is that we are head and shoulders above a lot
of our partners in terms of what we're doing, and I think we
can do both things. We can walk and chew gum when it comes to
not just the securitized relationships that we have, military
and law enforcement, but the soft power skills that we're very
good at deploying as well. When it comes to working with
journalists in civil society, we do that very well too.
When it comes to the point you raise about al-Shabaab,
which I think is a critical one, over time, yes, it has been
shown that al-Shabaab has created structures, especially when
they govern most of southern Somalia, that people saw them as a
stabilizing force. However, I would argue with the idea that
they were preferred. Yes, they could adjudicate civil cases
right. With land reform, if you will. They were there when
there were no other security forces there. The problem,
however, is that al-Shabaab offered an extortion level of
security, if you will. These are people that would exact the
kind of justice that would make our hair stand on end. These
are people that would bury women in the ground to the shoulders
and stone them if there was an accusation of infidelity.
So I would beg people to understand that while there may
have been a level of stability, it was because there was a
vacuum. That's an important point to make.
Ms. Titus. I think the point is that if we are not there to
feel that vacuum, then we can't expect to have good results.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes gentlelady from the great State of
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. First of all, I can't thank the Chairman
and Ranking Member enough for what I think is an enormously
crucial hearing. This is not the Foreign Affairs Committee and
so I know that your extending to this area is crucial and it
just plays into my frustration.
I thank my colleague from Nevada for going where I will try
to go in a very short period of time, and that is the crucial
urgency of the relationship between the United States and the
continent. Recognize that there are more than 50 nations, but
the continent. I guess my chastising is that Republican and
Democratic administrations over the past 2 decades have failed
to understand the cruciality of our relationship. In terms of
the funding in State Department efforts, though, let me
compliment our foreign diplomacy team that I have seen all over
Africa who are working beyond hours with short staff. But we
have missed the most important moment in history. I don't know
if we can get it back, and that is why we are here talking
about it.
The Congressional Black Caucus, led by some of us intensely
engaged, were the ones that pushed for AFRICOM. That was an
approach as a first effort of really on the ground. I heard
you, Ms. Charles, speak about soft power. I am going to have a
question--just looking for the clock. But having gone to school
at the University of Ghana in Accra and Kumasi, University of
Nigeria, with campuses at Lagos and Ibadan, I know that Africa
could have been the continent, the greatest ally to the United
States of America.
My first question is going to be to each of the witnesses,
starting with you, Mr. Pham, thank you for your service. Is
Africa a strategic and economic force that the United States
should try to embrace with a very strong connection? I just
need yes or no.
Mr. Pham. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Sir, I am just going down the----
Mr. Meservey. Yes.
Mr. Zelin. Yes, definitely.
Ms. Charles. Absolutely, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. This is Republicans and Democrats who are
witnesses.
In 2014, I was the first Member of Congress to lead a
delegation in to deal with the kidnapping of the Chibok Girls,
which was by a terrorist group. That would have also been a
moment that we could have poured in our concern. We, as Members
went in, only three of us, to show compassion to the family.
The issue was in northern Nigeria, where they felt completely
abandoned, it was being taken over by ISIS or radicals, and
that was their way of showing the Nigerian government and
everyone else, burning Christian churches, et cetera, how
powerful they were.
So let me try to pose to you, Ms. Charles, what should be
the most targeted way that we can overcome China's presence
that takes and does not give? Wagner, that is in the central
African Republic. People may not think that pulls in a
terrorist look, but it is a look that is different from America
and argues against American values. That is what terrorism is.
It changes people's attitudes and moves them away from
democratic principles, being able to see the forest for the
trees, meaning that it is better to help collaborate and work
and build a bridge rather than be given a bridge, and then
extract every literal blood out of the country and give nothing
back. So what can we do? Terrorism is a multifaceted fight. It
is the hearts and souls of the continent, and it is a strategic
way of getting in.
If I am going to yield just a moment more, I do want to put
on the record, pay tribute to my predecessor, the Honorable
Mickey Leland, who sat in this place, and as far back as 1989
and beyond, he took up the cause of Sub-Saharan Africa by
bringing in food. He was making friends between Eritrea, Sahara
Desert, and Ethiopia, and he died on the side of an Ethiopian
mountain, taking grain to the starving African. That should
have been what we would have done. We would not be facing ISIS
or----
Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired, but
the Chair will allow one more minute.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. Or al-Qaeda.
If you can give us a schooling, please. I would appreciate
it.
I thank the Chairman for his indulgence.
Ms. Charles. Thank you, Representative Jackson Lee, for
your question.
I will be brief in my response in that, focusing on the
point that you raised about strategic competition and looking
at how China and Russia operate in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The United States would do very----
Ms. Jackson Lee. And how that opens the doors for the
terrorists.
Ms. Charles. Well, that's one element, and I think it's
again, a very nuanced conversation to have. But I would say
that the United States would do well to leverage one of the
most important things that we have that I would say that the
Russian Federation and the PRC do not have, which is a vibrant,
robust, and well-educated diaspora. The diaspora community has
been very vocal in its concerns about how the United States
appears to have a fickle way of addressing some of the issues
in Sub-Saharan Africa. If we are more consistent in our
engagement across the board and again use that whole-of-society
approach, engaging civil society, engaging the grassroots
organizations that Russia and China often ignore, I think that
we would do well and we will pay dividends to our influence on
the continent.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
The gentlelady's time has expired.
I thank the witnesses and our committee for the questions
that have been asked today. It is a busy day, and second round
does not look like it will happen, but I do want to offer the
Ranking Member the opportunity to make a closing statement at
this time.
Mr. Magaziner. Well, thank you, Chairman.
I am very glad that we held this hearing today. I am very
grateful to our witnesses and the experience and the insights
that they have brought. To our colleagues, as the Chairman
noted, this is a busy day and a busy week in Congress, but the
fact that so many of our colleagues came prepared to engage on
this topic, I think is a very positive sign.
As a Government and as a Congress, we need to constantly be
anticipating threats to the United States homeland before they
develop and plan for them in advance and diffuse them before
the threats become imminent. If we do not engage and continue
to engage and increase our engagement in Africa, we will all
regret it.
So I want to thank all of you for your insights. I was
particularly struck when Ms. Charles talked about the three Ds,
defense, diplomacy, and development. I think that is a great
framework through which to look at this work. We need to make
sure that we have robust defense and intelligence-gathering
capabilities in areas like the Sahel in West Africa where
terrorist threats are on the rise, we need to continue to
engage diplomatically with our allies in the region that share
our values and our interests, and we need to continue to invest
in development, not pull back, because those root causes of
radicalization that include poverty and hunger continue to be a
major challenge. We cannot have a foreign policy or a defense
strategy that is based just on sticks and not carrots. It needs
to be all of the above, not either/or.
Russia and China are moving into this region, not out of
altruism, not out of charity, but because they understand that
it is in their strategic interest to have a presence and to
have relationships in all regions, but particularly in Africa
in the 21st Century. There is a national security imperative
that the United States do the same, that we continue to engage
with defense, diplomacy, and development to ensure that our
adversaries, be they nation-states or terrorist organizations,
do not gain the upper hand.
So thank you, Chairman, for calling this hearing. Thank you
again to our witnesses and our colleagues. Let this be a
redoubling of our efforts in this area as we go forward.
Thank you.
Chairman Pfluger. I think the Ranking Member.
I will make a brief closing statement as well.
I couldn't agree with my colleague, the Ranking Member, Mr.
Magaziner, more on what he just said about anticipating. That
is the reason that we held this hearing today, is because your
testimony, your written testimony, the questions that you have
answered, the colleagues on both sides of the aisle, if there
is something that unifies this Congress, it is exactly this
subject right here on how to anticipate and then take action
and prevent these terrorist acts from impacting Americans,
American interest, and our partners and allies, which,
unfortunately, we have seen a track record and a motivation.
Maybe the capability and capacity isn't quite there yet, as was
mentioned, but it is going to be there. If left unchecked, it
will certainly impact us. So I appreciate everyone
participating in this today.
That is why we held this hearing. I look at the threat
environment around the world, it is growing. I think,
personally, myself, and having been deployed all over the
world, that we are probably in a threat environment that rivals
that of the pre-World War II environment, if not greater,
because of the complexity of the nature of threats and the
domains. That it is not just the land, air, and sea domain, we
have a cyber domain. We have got many places around the world
that are now, for the first time, experiencing these horrors,
as was mentioned by Ms. Charles. You know, these are graphic
images, but we have to keep those in mind. I am worried about
that threat environment and that landscape and the vacuum that
we see in the regions that you have pointed out throughout the
continent of Africa that are allowing a breeding ground for
terrorism, which has to be checked with the partnering with not
just these nations, but also with like-minded countries around
the world. The great power competition has obviously spilled
over into this threat, this extremism threat.
So I am very, very pleased with the results of this hearing
today. I want to continue the work here. I would implore all of
you to please continue your work because you are informing the
U.S. Government on those threats and the policy decisions that
we will make and the direction that we will go is hinging upon
your work, your research, and your expertise.
So I thank the witnesses. The Members of the subcommittee,
may have additional questions for you and we would ask that you
respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will
be open for 10 days.
Without objection, this committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for J. Peter Pham
Question 1. Given the recent death of Wagner PMC head Yevgeny
Prigozhin and the transition of leadership and general uncertainty
surrounding Wagner's Africa operations going forward, is there an
opportunity for the United States to exploit this instability in
Russia's largest PMC in Africa to diminish Russian influence in the
region and if so, in what way?
Answer. Indeed, the unlamented demise of Wagner boss Prighozhin and
the ensuing confusion caused not only by the taking out of several
senior Wagner leaders alongside Prighozhin, but also by the hitherto
not-entirely successful efforts by Russian authorities, led by Deputy
Defense Minister Colonel-General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, to take over
control of Wagner mercenaries and the various rackets they have
created, have created an narrow opportunity where a concerted effort by
the United States and its allies could result in diminishing Russia's
malign influence in the region. I am aware of two such efforts
currently under way and am willing to discuss them with the Members of
the subcommittee or your staff, but it would probably not be
appropriate for me to go into detail publicly. Suffice to say that it
is a case-by-case question and requires diplomatic and intelligence
resources which, as I noted in my testimony, we woefully lack in the
region. Moreover, the current U.S. administration needs to development
a robust strategy for the Sahel, rather than its reactive default
setting.
Question 2. U.S. foreign policy goals in Somalia have included
promoting political and economic stability, preventing the country from
becoming a terrorist safe haven, and helping reduce the humanitarian
crisis. In fiscal year 2022 the United States provided over $818
million in humanitarian aid to Somalia in addition to $275 million in
other assistance, primarily military aid.\1\ Does this support these
overarching United States policy goals effectively? What strategic or
financial changes would you recommend for the United States to pursue
in Somalia?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN FOCUS (2023), https://
crsreports.Congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10155.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. I regret to say that if our foreign policy goals in Somalia
are ``promoting political and economic stability, preventing the
country from becoming a terrorist safe haven, and helping reduce the
humanitarian crisis,'' we have chosen a very strange way of going about
it with an utterly inappropriate partner.
In my opinion, the resources cited in the question, almost of all
of which was spent in southern and central Somalia for the benefit of
the so-called Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) have been wasted. The
FGS is an unelected body (the last one-person-one-vote election in
southern and central Somalia took place in 1969) which, where it is not
deeply penetrated by Islamist extremists (e.g., the minister of
religion, Mukhtar Robow, used to be No. 2 in the al-Shabaab terrorist
organization and had a $5 million U.S. State Department ``Rewards for
Justice'' bounty on his head; he has never renounced his jihadist
ideology, but simply switched sides because he lost an internal power
struggle), is notoriously corrupt. Moreover, this so-called government
exercises little real authority outside of limited areas. To add insult
on injury, despite the prodigious amounts of U.S. taxpayer money spent
on them, the FGS almost never misses an opportunity to side with our
rivals, including China and Russia.
In contrast, the northern region of Somaliland (the former British
protectorate) which was independent before the former Italian colony of
Somalia and which declared itself independent again in 1991, has for
more than 3 decades been peaceful, had multiple one-person-one-vote
Presidential and legislative elections, and aligned itself with U.S.
partners (including mutual recognition with the Republic of China on
Taiwan). It boasts the finest deep-water harbor in Africa between Suez
and Durban as well as the continent's longest runway (originally built
by the United States for use in the Cold War against the southern
Soviet Union). The port of Berbera, expanded by the Emirati company DPW
with a significant investment from the government of the United
Kingdom, is also a vital transit hub for the region, including
landlocked Ethiopia.
At the very least, as the Congress itself has legislated in fiscal
year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, we need to carefully
study the benefits to U.S. interests of rebalancing our engagement in
the Somali lands, including security cooperation with Somaliland.
Question 3. You stated in your testimony that the Sahel region of
Africa represents nearly half of global terrorism deaths in 2022, and
if the trend continues this year, the total percentage of deaths will
eclipse 50 percent. What steps need to be taken to immediately reverse
this trend?
Answer. There are no quick fixes to a crisis that has developed
over a long period and is, ultimately, rooted in the failure of
governance, what I often described during my service as U.S. special
envoy for the Sahel region as the ``crisis of state legitimacy''
throughout that region. As I repeatedly emphasized at the time: ``The
heart of the crisis in the Sahel is one of state legitimacy--a
perception by citizens that their government is valid, equitable, and
able and willing to meet their needs . . . Absent states' commitments
to meeting their citizens' needs, no degree of international engagement
is likely to succeed.'' I believed that to be true then and I believe
it to still be true today.
While we cannot ``immediately reverse'' what decades of neglect
have wrought, it is nevertheless in America's strategic interest to
lead its allies and other partners in finding a solution, especially
when geopolitical rivals like China and Russia and as well as
malevolent forces like jihadist terrorists actively seek to exploit
these very vulnerabilities.
Question 4. You highlighted how Niger saw a 79 percent decrease in
deaths due to terrorism in your testimony. On Sunday, the French
president, Emanuel Macron, announced that he was withdrawing all French
troops from Niger within the next couple of months in the wake of a
coup d'etat that took place this summer. Most of these forces were
involved in anti-terror operations within the country. Is Niger at risk
of seeing an increase now and on the path of following the same haunted
fate as Burkina Faso and Mali?
Answer. We need to disentangle two separate issues, France's role
in Niger and America's role in the country and our strategic interests.
On the former, it is worth noting that while France has played a
helpful role with some counterterrorism operations and training, its
role in the lead-up to and during the July 2023 coup d'etat is far more
ambiguous and, frankly, rather troubling. As to the U.S. role and our
interests, including the importance of Air Base 201 not only for
tracking violent extremists across the Sahel, but also for kinetic
operations against those who threaten U.S. persons and interests as
well as those of our allies and partners, this is why it is important
to approach our engagements with the post-coup authorities
pragmatically to ensure that malign actors do not have a chance to fill
gaps created intentionally or unintentionally.
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Joshua Meservey
Question 1. Given the recent death of Wagner PMC head Yevgeny
Prigozhin and the transition of leadership and general uncertainty
surrounding Wagner's Africa operations going forward, is there an
opportunity for the United States to exploit this instability in
Russia's largest PMC in Africa to diminish Russian influence in the
region and if so, in what way?
Answer. Unfortunately, Wagner's Africa operations appear to have
largely continued uninterrupted, despite Prigozhin's death, and it
appears that Moscow has thus far successfully transitioned control of
those operations to its preferred leaders. I believe the opportunity
for the United States will come, however, when the counterproductive
nature of Wagner's operations in the fight against terrorism in places
like Mali becomes undeniable. Wagner's indiscriminate brutality cannot
long check the insurgencies in the Sahel, and the security situation
will continue to deteriorate. The United States should already be
planning for the potential collapse of Mali and perhaps Burkina Faso,
and be working with concerned partners, including regional states, on a
plan for trying to contain the fallout from such a crisis and stabilize
core areas within the countries.
Question 2. The United States has provided training, equipment,
intelligence, and other support to Somali troops, including their
special operations unit, and the African Union forces fighting in
Somalia against al-Shabaab. What more should the United States be doing
in Somalia to counter al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups?\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN FOCUS (2023), https://
crsreports.Congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10155.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. Mogadishu joined what began as a local clan uprising
against al-Shabaab's cruelty and onerous taxation to achieve
significant gains on the ground against the group. However, the
limitations of the model are already becoming obvious as the offensive
has largely stalled. While certain units of the Somalian armed forces
have fought well, the Somali National Army (SNA), despite many years of
training and billions of dollars of support from a variety of
countries, is still not capable of militarily suppressing al-Shabaab on
its own. In large part that is due to the political dysfunction of the
Somalian government, which for years has been distracted by elite power
struggles and seeking opportunities for corruption. Without a viable,
competent local government, the United States and other external
partners will never be able to help Somalia achieve a decisive victory
against al-Shabaab.
So, Washington should put a much greater emphasis on demanding
accountability from Mogadishu by establishing a series of measurable,
time-bound benchmarks for it to achieve to continue receiving American
assistance. It should also adopt a more decentralized model of
engagement. Rather than focusing so intently on Mogadishu, it should
recognize that only a highly decentralized governance system has any
chance of succeeding in the Somalian context given the realities of
Somalian society. Washington should work more with Federal member
states that have demonstrated a baseline of competency and legitimacy,
and it should recognize the reality that Somaliland is a de facto
independent state and treat it as such.
Question 3. You highlighted Wagner's presence across the continent
and the implications to U.S. interests in the region. China also has a
significant presence in the region. What steps can the United States
take to guide countries away from these authoritarian countries and
provide an alternative to what the PRC and Russian PMC groups have to
offer?
Answer. The United States first needs to conduct a clear-eyed
assessment of which African countries it can reasonably expect to make
gains in for its national interests, and which ones require engagement
because of their strategic significance. The United States should
ensure its engagements with those countries are sustained and
intensive. The engagements should focus on motivating and facilitating
U.S. private-sector investment in those countries. Most African
governments recognize that their countries' greatest need is jobs for
their exploding youth populations, something that American investment
can help with. The United States also needs to be unafraid to tout,
with appropriate sensitivity and tone, capitalism and democracy's
unmatched record in protecting people's rights and building safe and
prosperous societies. Congress should exercise strict oversight over
agencies like DFC and Prosper Africa to ensure the projects they
support advance American interests in the context of great power
competition; Congress should also remove DFC's development component as
the United States already has many agencies devoted to development, but
not enough committed to incentivizing and facilitating U.S. private-
sector involvement in Africa. Washington should also avoid exporting
its own culture wars into African countries that are inhabited by
populations that are on average highly conservative on social matters.
Doing so unnecessarily breeds resentment and distrust among African
countries.
Question 4. In your testimony, you state that there are ``vast
spaces in places like Mali and Burkina controlled or influenced by
terrorist organizations.'' With France announcing the withdrawal of
French forces from Niger within the next few months, do you foresee
Niger also quickly following the trend that we are seeing in Mali and
Burkina Faso?
Answer. The Nigerian junta has demonstrated a level of openness to
retaining ties with the United States and certain European states, and
before the coup, Niger was relatively better off in terms of security
than many of its Sahel neighbors. That suggests that Niger will not
descend into instability at the rate that Mali and Burkina Faso have,
yet the dangers that its security will nonetheless deteriorate are
real. Given the stakes and the reality that there are few other options
for the United States in the Sahel, Washington should continue to find
a way to have a working relationship with Niamey, as the region,
Europe, and the United States can ill afford another country plunged
into a Burkina Faso or Mali-style security crisis.
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Aaron Y. Zelin
Question 1. Given the recent death of Wagner PMC head Yevgeny
Prigozhin and the transition of leadership and general uncertainty
surrounding Wagner's Africa operations going forward, is there an
opportunity for the United States to exploit this instability in
Russia's largest PMC in Africa to diminish Russian influence in the
region and if so, in what way?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Given how extremist groups exploit local resources,
social grievances, and fragile governments, how can U.S.
counterterrorism efforts better work to address these root causes in
the Saleh region of Africa?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Salafi-jihadi activity in Burkina Faso helped create
the conditions that led to multiple coups. We are seeing an Islamic
State cell form in the tri-border region of Burkina Faso, Mali, and
Niger. The political and economic situations in this region paired with
the rise of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel have created eerily
similar conditions that we saw in Syria and Iraq in 2013. Would you
agree that these factors are creating a new breeding ground to
establish a caliphate in the Sahel that allows jihadist groups to
conduct and coordinate operations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Donna O. Charles
Question 1. Given the recent death of Wagner PMC head Yevgeny
Prigozhin and the transition of leadership and general uncertainty
surrounding Wagner's Africa operations going forward, is there an
opportunity for the United States to exploit this instability in
Russia's largest PMC in Africa to diminish Russian influence in the
region and if so, in what way?
Answer. In the wake of Prigozhin's death in August 2023, open-
source reports indicated that Russia's Defense Ministry has been
posturing to subsume most of Wagner's disinformation and mercenary
operations, including those in Africa.\1\ African governments that are
involved in security cooperation agreements with Wagner reportedly have
expressed concerns and regrets to U.S. officials about the situation
they are in, noting the mounting, credible reports of human rights
abuses, exploitative concessions to extract natural resources, and the
lack of progress on counterterrorism and other security objectives.
While it is unclear as to whether these lamentations are legitimate or
an attempt to gain leverage as a negotiating tactic, the United States
and Western partners have narrow windows of opportunity to regain
influence in parts of Africa where Wagner and the Russian Federation
have established a foothold. To do this successfully, however, the
United States must present serious and viable alternatives to Russian
proxies and mercenaries who have worked to cultivate these
relationships over years, and with alacrity.\2\ For instance, the
Russian Federation's sweeping influence in the Central African Republic
is, in part, the result of a multi-faceted, years-long initiative to
prop up a vulnerable government under President Touadera. This effort
has expanded into a thriving sociocultural propaganda campaign
involving language training, pageants, and academic exchange programs,
to name a few.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (Troianovski, 2023).
\2\ (Detsch, 2023).
\3\ (El-Badawy, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most viable opportunity for the United States to regain
influence in countries that appear beholden to the Russian Federation
is to demonstrate a long-term commitment to sustainable and scalable
security cooperation, as the United States has done through
relationships established in parts of East Africa over the last several
decades. Reported negotiations between U.S.-based Bancroft Global
Development and the Central African Republic paint a picture of what a
long-term security assistance relationship could look like, with a
strong contrast to the transactional Russian model.\4\ Although the
situation in Somalia today is far from perfect, Bancroft's long-
standing role in training, equipping, and mentoring Somali and African
Union security forces under the auspices of the State Department and
the Department of Defense \5\ could help the United States turn the
tide against Russian influence in parts of Africa gradually. However,
the 3Ds approach--defense, development, and diplomacy \6\--should be
applied as part of a durable U.S. engagement strategy. Security
cooperation through private military contractors is best fortified by a
robust and experienced diplomatic presence. At present, a large portion
of the U.S. embassies in countries where Russian proxies are prominent
are understaffed, which hampers implementation of a comprehensive and
balanced engagement strategy that goes beyond defense and security
cooperation.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ (Peltier, 2023).
\5\ (Naylor, 2015).
\6\ (Syed, 2010).
\7\ (Gramer, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Expanding the sphere of U.S. influence involves investing in soft
power approaches that complement traditional train-and-equip models.
The United States should also seek to expand effective exchange
programs such as International Military Education and Training (IMET),
the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), and the Young
African Leaders Initiative (YALI). Wherever legally possible,\8\ the
United States should tap its deep well of tailored programming and
initiatives to burnish its reputation as the security partner of choice
in Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ In its current form (Pub. L. 117-103, Division K), Section 7008
states that ``None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made
available pursuant to titles III through VI of this Act shall be
obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the
government of any country whose duly elected head of government is
deposed by military coup d'etat or decree or, after the date of
enactment of this Act, a coup d'etat or decree in which the military
plays a decisive role: Provided, That assistance may be resumed to such
government if the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the
appropriate Congressional committees that subsequent to the termination
of assistance a democratically-elected government has taken office:
Provided further, That the provisions of this section shall not apply
to assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation
in democratic processes: Provided further, That funds made available
pursuant to the previous provisos shall be subject to the regular
notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.''
(Congressional Research Service, ``Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S.
Foreign Aid Appropriations,'' September 1, 2022.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
References
Detsch, J. (2023, September 25). Wagner's African Hosts Regret Letting
Them In. Retrieved from Foreign Policy: https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/
09/25/wagner-africa-mali-libya-car-prigozhin-putin-russia/.
El-Badawy, E.M. (2022, March 23). Security, Soft Power and Regime
Support: Spheres of Russian Influence in Africa. Retrieved from Tony
Blair Institute for Global Change: https://www.institute.global/
insights/geopolitics-and-security/security-soft-power-and-regime-
support-spheres-russian-influence-africa.
Gramer, R.A. (2022, July 22). U.S. Embassies in Africa Are Chronically
Short-Staffed. Retrieved from Foreign Policy: https://
foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/22/africa-embassies-short-staffed-us-sahel-
china-russia/.
Naylor, S. (2015, January 22). Profit and Loss in Somalia. Retrieved
from Foreign Policy: https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/22/delta-force-
somalia-terror-blackwater-bancroft/.
Peltier, E. (2023, November 26). Battle for Influence Rages in Heart of
Wagner's Operations in Africa. Retrieved from The New York Times:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/26/world/africa/wagner-russia-central-
african-republic.html.
Syed, N.A. (2010, September 17). The 3 Ds of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved
from Harvard Political Review: https://harvardpolitics.com/the-3ds-of-
foreign-affairs/.
Troianovski, A.W. (2023, September 8). After Prigozhin's Death, a High-
Stakes Scramble for His Empire. Retrieved from The New York Times:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/08/world/europe/prigozhin-wagner-
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