[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCY
ACTIONS TO SECURE THE U.S.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ENTERPRISE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
AND TECHNOLOGY
OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 15, 2024
__________
Serial No. 118-34
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-779PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. FRANK LUCAS, Oklahoma, Chairman
BILL POSEY, Florida ZOE LOFGREN, California, Ranking
RANDY WEBER, Texas Member
BRIAN BABIN, Texas SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
JIM BAIRD, Indiana HALEY STEVENS, Michigan
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida JAMAAL BOWMAN, New York
MIKE GARCIA, California DEBORAH ROSS, North Carolina
STEPHANIE BICE, Oklahoma ERIC SORENSEN, Illinois
JAY OBERNOLTE, California ANDREA SALINAS, Oregon
CHUCK FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee VALERIE FOUSHEE, North Carolina
DARRELL ISSA, California KEVIN MULLIN, California
RICK CRAWFORD, Arkansas JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
CLAUDIA TENNEY, New York EMILIA SYKES, Ohio
RYAN ZINKE, Montana MAXWELL FROST, Florida
SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida YADIRA CARAVEO, Colorado
DALE STRONG, Alabama SUMMER LEE, Pennsylvania
MAX MILLER, Ohio JENNIFER McCLELLAN, Virginia
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia GABE AMO, Rhode Island
MIKE COLLINS, Georgia SEAN CASTEN, Illinois,
BRANDON WILLIAMS, New York Vice Ranking Member
TOM KEAN, New Jersey PAUL TONKO, New York
VACANCY
C O N T E N T S
February 15, 2024
Page
Hearing Charter.................................................. 2
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Frank Lucas, Chairman, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 13
Written Statement............................................ 14
Statement by Representative Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 15
Written Statement............................................ 17
Witnesses:
The Honorable Arati Prabhakar, Director, White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy
Oral Statement............................................... 18
Written Statement............................................ 21
Dr. Rebecca Keiser, Chief of Research Security Strategy and
Policy, National Science Foundation
Oral Statement............................................... 26
Written Statement............................................ 28
Dr. Geri Richmond, Under Secretary for Science and Innovation,
Department of Energy
Oral Statement............................................... 35
Written Statement............................................ 37
Dr. Michael Lauer, Deputy Director for Extramural Research,
National Institutes of Health
Oral Statement............................................... 45
Written Statement............................................ 47
Discussion....................................................... 51
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
The Honorable Arati Prabhakar, Director, White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy.................................. 88
Dr. Rebecca Keiser, Chief of Research Security Strategy and
Policy, National Science Foundation............................ 102
Dr. Geri Richmond, Under Secretary for Science and Innovation,
Department of Energy........................................... 111
Dr. Michael Lauer, Deputy Director for Extramural Research,
National Institutes of Health.................................. 125
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Documents submitted by Representative Frank Lucas, Chairman,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives
Statement from the Association of American Universities...... 142
Letter from Barbara R. Snyder, President, the Association of
American Universities, to Dr. Arati Prabhakar, Director,
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy........ 146
Report submitted by Representative Bill Posey, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives
``Research Security: Strengthening Interagency Collaboration
Could Help Agencies Safeguard Federal Funding from Foreign
Threats,'' United States Government Accountability Office.. 148
EXAMINING FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCY
ACTIONS TO SECURE THE U.S.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ENTERPRISE
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2024
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank
Lucas [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
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Chairman Lucas. The Committee will come to order. Without
objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of the
Committee at any time.
Welcome to today's hearing entitled ``Examining Federal
Science Agency Actions to Secure the U.S. Science and
Technology Enterprise.'' I recognize myself for 5 minutes for
an opening statement.
Thank you for joining us at this hearing on research
security and protecting our taxpayer investments. Research
theft is one of the single greatest threats to our
competitiveness as a nation. It takes our hard-won innovation
and puts it to work for our adversaries, hurting our economy
and our ability to stay at the leading edge of tech discovery.
This is no idle threat either. China has been explicit
about their efforts to steal the results of our research to
further their own technological progress. The Chinese Communist
Party has made it clear they intend to surpass us as the global
leader in science and technology (S&T), and they have no qualms
about using intellectual property theft, forced technology
acquisition, and other illicit means to do so.
That's why this Committee has been proactive in our
response to this threat and has passed multiple bills to
protect American research. In the 2020 NDAA (National Defense
Authorization Act), we passed the Securing American Science and
Technology Act, which established an interagency committee
within the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) to coordinate research security across the Federal
Government. That same year, the Trump Administration released
National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) 33 to direct a
national response to protect our research and technology.
In 2021, we went even further and began requiring all
Federal R&D (research and development) funding applicants to
disclose all of their sources of support, ensuring there are
consistent conflict-of-interest policies across agencies. And
in 2022, we passed several research security protections as a
part of CHIPS and Science Act to halt the theft of U.S.
innovation. We banned participation in malign foreign talent
programs designed to recruit researchers to work for our
adversaries. We also required plans to protect sensitive basic
research and created an Office of Research Security and Policy
at the NSF (National Science Foundation).
Taken together, these measures provide a strong framework
for research security, but to be of any use in protecting our
investments, the Administration needs to actually execute this
framework. Four years ago, we directed OSTP to coordinate and
harmonize research security across the Federal Government. In
that time, some progress was made, and while I'm pleased that
this hearing sparked the release of three different policy
guidance memos yesterday, congressional deadlines were missed,
and there's work still to be done.
The government needs to have timely, clear, and uniform
guidance on this issue for our agencies and our researchers.
It's unacceptable that we don't have that. We've heard from
agencies and stakeholders saying they are having trouble
implementing their own research security guidelines because
there are no governmentwide standards yet. I'd like to request
unanimous consent to enter into the record this statement from
the Association of American Universities (AAU), as well as a
letter sent by the AAU's President Barbara Snyder to Dr.
Prabhakar earlier this week.
Seeing no objection, so ordered.
This letter states that since the June 2023 comment
deadline, OSTP has not released final requirements or an update
to the research community on the status of finalizing the
requirements of research security programs. It goes on to
emphasize the importance of harmonizing these requirements
across the Federal Government and encourages OSTP to finalize
the requirements as soon as possible. So, today, I expect to
hear more about this work, and I'm hoping to get answers on why
we aren't further along in this process.
I understand that this is a complicated endeavor. America's
strength in science and technology has been driven by our
unique research ecosystem, which combines Federal, academic,
and private R&D efforts. For that system to work, we need a
degree of open science that facilitates collaboration and
transparency.
I also want to be clear, we're not here to target
researchers based on their race, but based on the actions they
have taken. Our goal is to ensure that all federally funded
scientists follow the U.S. principles of scientific fairness
and integrity. The United States has benefited greatly from
international scientific collaboration and the contribution of
foreign-born scientists. I want the United States to remain a
desirable place for brilliant minds to come and share their
ideas. That's what makes us different than China. We celebrate
freedom of thought, and when possible, we share information in
good faith so we can maximize innovation. Our challenge is
preserving this culture of transparency and openness,
particularly when it comes to basic research, while protecting
the sensitive information that could benefit our adversaries. I
believe that we are up to this challenge.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how
we can continue to keep America's R&D strong and productive.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Lucas follows:]
Thank you for joining us at this hearing on research
security and protecting our taxpayer investments.
Research theft is one of the single greatest threats to our
competitiveness as a nation. It takes our hard-won innovation
and puts it to work for our adversaries, hurting our economy
and our ability to stay at the leading edge of discovery.
This is no idle threat either. China has been explicit
about their efforts to steal the results of our research to
further their own technological progress.
The Chinese Communist Party has made it clear that they
intend to surpass us as the global leader in science and
technology, and they have no qualms about using intellectual
property theft, forced technology acquisition, and other
illicit means to do so.That's why this Committee has been
proactive in our response to this threat and has passed
multiple bills to protect American research.
In the 2020 NDAA we passed the Securing American Science
and Technology Act, which established an interagency committee
within the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
to coordinate research security across the federal government.
That same year, the Trump Administration released National
Security Presidential Memorandum-33 to direct a national
response to protect our research and technology.
In 2021 we went even further and began requiring all
federal R&D funding applicants to disclose all of their sources
of support, ensuring there are consistent conflict of interest
policies across agencies.
And in 2022 we passed several research security protections
as part of the CHIPS and Science Act to halt the theft of U.S.
innovation.
We banned participation in malign foreign talent programs
designed to recruit researchers to work for our adversaries.
We also required plans to protect sensitive basic research
and created an Office of Research Security and Policy at NSF.
Taken together, these measures provide a strong framework
for research security. But to be of any use in protecting our
investments, the Administration needs to actually execute this
framework.
Four years ago we directed OSTP to coordinate and harmonize
research security across the federal government. In that time,
some progress was made. And while I am pleased that this
hearing sparked the release of three different policy guidance
memos yesterday, congressional deadlines were missed and there
is work still to be done.
The government needs to have timely, clear, and uniform
guidance on this issue for our agencies and for our
researchers.
It's unacceptable that we don't have that. We've heard from
agencies and stakeholders saying they are having trouble
implementing their own research security guidelines because
there are no government-wide standards yet.
I would like to request Unanimous Consent to enter into the
record this statement from the Association of American
Universities, as well as a letter sent by AAU's President,
Barbara Snyder, to Dr. Prabhakar earlier this week.
This letter states that, ``since the June 2023 comment
deadline, OSTP has not released final requirements or an update
to the research community on the status of finalizing'' the
requirements for research security programs.
It goes on to emphasize the importance of harmonizing these
requirements across the federal government and encourages OSTP
to finalize the requirements as soon as possible.
So today I expect to hear more about this work and I'm
hoping to get answers on why we aren't further along in this
process.
I understand that this is a complicated endeavor. America's
strength in science and technology has been driven by our
unique research ecosystem, which combines federal, academic,
and private R&D efforts.
For that system to work, we need a degree of open science
that facilitates collaboration and transparency.
I also want to be clear; we are not here to target
researchers based on their race but based on the actions they
have taken. Our goal is to ensure that all federally funded
scientists follow the U.S. principles of scientific fairness
and integrity.
The U.S. has benefitted greatly from international
scientific collaboration and the contributions of foreign-born
scientists.
I want the U.S. to remain a desirable place for brilliant
minds to come and share their ideas.
That's what makes us different than China. We celebrate
freedom of thought. And when possible, we share information in
good faith so that we can maximize innovation.
Our challenge is preserving this culture of transparency
and openness--particularly when it comes to basic research--
while protecting the sensitive information that could benefit
our adversaries.
I believe that we are up to this challenge. I look forward
to hearing from our witnesses today on how we can continue to
keep America's R&D strong and productive.
Chairman Lucas. And with that, I yield back and recognize
the Ranking Member, the gentlewoman from California, for an
opening statement.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, thank you, Chairman Lucas, and for
today's hearing, and I'd like to welcome our distinguished
panel of witnesses.
For several years now, really, for the history of this
Committee, we've taken the lead in Congress on grappling with
hard questions around emerging technologies and implications
for U.S. competitiveness, national security in our society.
Specifically, the question of when and how to secure federally
funded research, it isn't new. We've been supporting research
behind closed doors for decades because it's deemed classified
or proprietary or otherwise subject to access restrictions.
Everything else, certainly everything else labeled as
fundamental research is carried out and published in the open,
as affirmed by President Ronald Reagan in National Security
Decision Directive 189. And that's been reaffirmed several
times since.
Now, two things have changed. One is the United States is
no longer the unquestioned leader in science, technology, and
innovation. When we were, our risk calculus might have been
different than it is now. In addition to our worthy but mostly
likeminded competitors around the globe, we face a growing
strategic competitor and I would say a threat from China.
The second thing is the confluence of several emerging
technologies with dual-use potential, including AI (artificial
intelligence), biotech, and quantum. As the landscape continues
to evolve, what's most important is we continue to approach
this challenge thoughtfully and clear-eyed about the tradeoffs
we're willing to make and not willing to make.
Now, I'm proud of the history of this Committee doing just
that. Chairman Lucas was a great partner to then-Chairwoman
Johnson in developing thoughtful, widely vetted policy
proposals in response to well-defined problems. For example,
this Committee developed the requirement for OSTP to lead in
updating and coordinating the disparate and confusing
disclosure requirements across Federal agencies. And we also
developed the requirement for Federal research security
training for all federally funded researchers.
Our primary purpose for this hearing, as the Chairman has
said, is to check on the implementation, and we do have some
questions about whether this has been speedy enough. It also
presents a hearing--this hearing an opportunity for the
Committee to continue to lead in the more esoteric, but equally
important, debates about the risk calculus.
I have long experience in immigration law, and I'd like to
just cite a couple of quick facts. Since 2000, 40 percent of
all U.S. Nobel laureates have been foreign-born. In addition,
according to an analysis from the National Foundation for
American Policy, more than half of the startups valued at $1
billion dollars or more were started by immigrants to the
United States. So we don't have to close our doors in the name
of securing research, but we have to preserve our global vision
and be the best country in the world to be a researcher.
When it comes to scientific collaborations across borders,
we all know that we can't do the biggest things all by
ourselves. To solve global challenges, we need to pool global
minds and resources. The COVID pandemic certainly reminded us
of that.
And finally, as the Chairman has said, this isn't about
targeting people by their ethnicity. Recently, I was at an
event unveiling the statue of Norm Mineta, our former
colleague. Norm was taken off the streets of San Jose with his
family wearing his Boy Scout uniform and interned because the
United States made a mistake. We confused ethnicity with
loyalty. And, of course, Norm went on to be a Member of
Congress, a Cabinet Secretary twice, out of the camps, walked
the most decorated unit in World War II. We cannot confuse
loyalty with ethnicity or race, and this Committee has a strong
record of that. We need to make sure that every effort is taken
to avoid profiling based on race, ethnicity, or nationality,
and I think that starts with this Committee and is in keeping
with the work we have done so far because we do need to secure
our national research facilities.
So I look forward to this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I thank
you for holding it, and I'm sure that it will be productive.
And with that, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:]
Thank you, Chairman Lucas, for holding today's hearing. I
would also like to welcome our distinguished panel of
witnesses.
For several years now--and really for the history of this
Committee--we've taken the lead in Congress on grappling with
hard questions around emerging technologies and implications
for U.S. competitiveness, national security, and society.
Specifically, the question of when and how to secure
Federally funded research is not new. We've been supporting
research behind closed doors for decades--because it is deemed
classified, proprietary, or otherwise subject to access
restrictions. Everything else--certainly everything else
labeled as ``fundamental research''--is carried out and
published in the open, as affirmed by President Ronald Reagan
in National Security Decision Directive-189, and reaffirmed
several times since.
Two things have changed. One is that the United States is
no longer the unquestioned leader in science, technology, and
innovation. When we were, our risk calculus was different than
it is now. In addition to our worthy but mostly like-minded
competitors around the globe, we face a growing strategic
competitor--and threat--in China. The second thing is the
confluence of several emerging technologies with dual-use
potential, including AI, biotech, and quantum.
As the landscape continues to evolve, what's most important
is that we continue to approach this challenge thoughtfully and
clear-eyed about the tradeoffs we are willing and not willing
to make.
I'm proud of our history on the Science Committee of doing
just that. Chairman Lucas was a great partner to then-
Chairwoman Johnson in developing thoughtful, widely vetted
policy proposals in response to well defined problems. For
example, this Committee developed the requirement for OSTP to
lead in updating and coordinating the disparate and confusing
disclosure requirements across Federal agencies. We also
developed the requirement for research security training for
all Federally funded researchers.
A primary purpose of this hearing is oversight, and we are
prepared with some questions for you about why implementation
of some of the requirements we put in law has been so slow. I'd
also like to know how we can help. But in addition to
oversight, this hearing presents an opportunity for this
Committee to continue to lead in the more esoteric but equally
important debate about the risk calculus of what happens if we
push too far in the wrong direction.
I have long been a champion for high-skilled immigration to
the U.S. Let me just cite a couple of quick facts for you.
Since 2000, 40% of all U.S. Nobel laureates have been foreign-
born. In addition, according to an analysis from the National
Foundation for American Policy, more than half of startups
valued at $1B or more were started by immigrants. We do not
have to close these doors in the name of securing our research.
We can instead choose to preserve the global vision of the
United States being the best country in the world to be a
researcher.
Furthermore, when it comes to scientific collaborations
across borders, we all know that we cannot do the biggest
things alone. To solve global challenges, we need to pool
global minds and resources. The Covid pandemic surely reminded
us of that.
And finally, we have witnessed that the rhetoric around
research security itself has been enough to send a chill across
our colleges, universities, and start-ups. In particular, it
has left many Asian Americans and Asian nationals feeling
unwelcome and even frightened. Shamefully, our nation has gone
down that dark road before. We must address real risks to our
security and competitiveness.
However, in doing so we must make every effort possible to
avoid profiling based on race, ethnicity, or nationality. And
that starts with our rhetoric.
I thank the distinguished panel for being here with us this
morning and I look forward to the discussion.
Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady yields back. And I always
appreciate her wise and insightful observations.
Let me introduce our witnesses. Our first witness today is
the Honorable Arati Prabhakar, Director of the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology. The doctor has led two
different Federal R&D agencies and worked with startups, large
companies, universities, government labs, and nonprofits across
a wide variety of sectors to create new solutions for critical
challenges.
Our next witness is Rebecca Keiser, Dr. Rebecca Keiser,
Chief of Research Security Strategy and Policy for the National
Science Foundation. Dr. Keiser is the first to hold this post
since its creation in 2020. She is a board member of Women in
Aerospace and a member of the American Academy for the
Advancement of Science and has her bachelor's degree in
Japanese studies, master's degree in politics of world
economy--that's a fascinating subject, I would acknowledge as
an ag economist--and a doctorate in international studies.
Next, we have the Honorable Geri Richmond, the Under
Secretary of Science and Innovation at the Department of Energy
(DOE). Dr. Richmond is also a member of the U.S. Naval Academy
of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and
has been honored by numerous awards, including most recently
the National Medal of Science in 2018.
And our final witness is Dr. Michael Lauer, the Deputy
Director of the Extramural Research at the National Institutes
of Health (NIH). The doctor has received numerous awards,
including the NIH Equal Employment Opportunity Award of the
Year and the Arthur S. Flemming Award for exceptional Federal
service in the recognition of his efforts to grow a culture of
learning and accountability.
And with that, I now recognize Dr. Prabhakar for 5 minutes
to present her testimony. Thank you for being here.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ARATI PRABHAKAR,
DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member Lofgren, all the Members of
the Committee, thank you so much for this opportunity to appear
before you today. I'm really pleased to be here with my--this
table full of my colleagues.
I am the President's Science and Technology Advisor and
Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy. As you all know very well, science, technology, and
innovation have been essential to American leadership in the
world for many, many decades. That simply would not have been
possible without the strong and consistent bipartisan support
of this Committee. I first appeared before this Committee 30
years ago when I was NIST Director, and so I've gotten to see
that commitment over quite a few decades now directly.
But today, we are operating in a global strategic
environment that is characterized by fierce military and
economic competition. That's a competition among many actors,
but I want to speak specifically about the People's Republic of
China (PRC) because they are the only competitor with both the
intent to reshape the global order and the ability to harness
both military and economic power to advance that objective. And
when you look at that economic and military competition,
technology and R&D are central to this competition.
Like every other developed and developing country, the PRC
pumps funding into R&D, it pursues global partnerships, it
seeks to trade in high-tech goods, but the PRC is different
than other global actors because of its use of illicit, as well
as licit, means to acquire foreign technologies because of its
engagement in unfair competition in targeted industries, and
because of its mandatory military-civil fusion.
President Biden has taken unprecedented action in the face
of this situation. This Administration has levied record fines
for export control violations. We've established new categories
for export controls. We've expanded the controls on outbound
investment from the United States in sensitive areas, and we
are rebuilding America's lead in semiconductor manufacturing
with the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act. As well, the
Department of Justice has pursued trade secret theft and
economic espionage cases. All of those actions are oriented
toward industry, which is the major source of significant
technology development. To address research security, the
Administration is implementing NSPM-33, NDAA provisions, and
provisions of the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act, just as has
been described.
The purpose of all of these efforts is to make sure that
universities and researchers understand our altered global
landscape. The world is not the same as it was a few years ago,
and that's so that they can be the first line of defense
against the illicit activities in the research environment.
Now, in addition to these realities of the PRC's actions,
two other factors shape our work on research security. One is a
fundamental American value, that our Nation values and respects
each individual, and xenophobia and racism are unacceptable.
The other factor is just a practical fact. We know that
immigrants to the United States and global interactions have
been essential to America's preeminent position in research and
in technology, and it clearly just wouldn't be to our advantage
to create an atmosphere that is hostile to attracting the
world's greatest minds, many of whom see freedom and
opportunity when they see the United States.
Getting research security right has been a complex task.
It's one that has required more time than expected. And I want
to highlight two important steps that we have accomplished. One
is releasing the common disclosure forms for researchers to
submit information. That's what allows agencies then to be able
to identify problems. We also have released guidelines for
restricting malign foreign talent recruitment programs. That's
what's accomplished at this point. What we're working on right
now very--in a very focused manner is guidance for research
security programs in universities. It is vital that these
programs protect national security and not just create another
checkbox for administrators. That's the focus of our work. This
is a very significant priority for me.
I'll finish simply by saying that Congress has emphasized
how important research security is. This Administration agrees
on its importance, and that is why we are taking the actions
that are necessary to continue American leadership in science
and technology. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Prabhakar follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Doctor.
I now recognize Dr. Keiser for 5 minutes to present her
testimony.
TESTIMONY OF DR. REBECCA KEISER,
CHIEF OF RESEARCH SECURITY STRATEGY AND POLICY,
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
Dr. Keiser. Thank you. Thank you very much, Chairman Lucas.
Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member Lofgren, and Members of the
Committee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to
discuss how NSF is working to secure the Nation's research
enterprise, while investing in groundbreaking innovations. When
I was doing my homework and reviewing NSF-funded research in
your districts, I saw that it ranged from cybersecurity
education to advanced manufacturing. And now I see, of course,
why other countries covet the U.S. research ecosystem.
At this time of unprecedented global competition and
concerning actions by the government of the People's Republic
of China, addressing research security is an essential part of
meeting NSF's mission, and it's critical to our Nation's
economic and national security.
In 2020, acting on the recommendations of national security
experts, and thanks to this Committee, NSF created my current
position. Over the past 3 1/2 years, the agency has moved
quickly to implement many reforms and new requirements to help
safeguard the taxpayers' investments in NSF-funded research. In
doing so, we've developed a set of basic principles that guide
our strategy to research security.
First, we need to be clear, comprehensive, and consistent.
NSF is focused on working to develop practical, implementable
policies for disclosure and to address research security risks,
while minimizing administrative overhead. In 2019 and 2020, NSF
actions included emphasizing compliance with disclosure
requirements both for NSF staff and NSF-funded institutions and
researchers, barring NSF staff from participating in foreign
talent recruitment programs, and requiring annual security
training for all NSF employees. In addition, after passage of
the CHIPS and Science Act, NSF has implemented the prohibition
on funding for researchers who participate in malign foreign
talent programs.
Now, we need to scale research security efforts to the
risk, and we're identifying and addressing issues that may be
unique or more prevalent in particular areas of research. To be
vigilant, we've developed a keen focus on data and analysis.
It's been critical for NSF to develop and fund capabilities to
better understand the scope and the scale of research security
issues and potential breaches.
NSF's system uses open-source data and allows the agency to
assess whether affiliations, sources of funding, patents,
collaborators, company ownership, et cetera, have been reported
properly. It further analyzes author affiliations, clusters,
proposals, and awards by topic, researcher, and country, and
identifies inconsistencies in materials submitted by
researchers. Importantly, these analytical tools can identify
participation in malign foreign talent programs, even when that
participation is not disclosed.
However, we need to get beyond compliance and develop
robust education and outreach efforts to transition from a
culture of compliance to one of partnership. NSF and our
partners have focused intensively on reaching out to the
academic community to build awareness, understanding, and
shared commitment. To be successful, we must provide training
and tools for researchers. On January 30, NSF launched four
interactive online research security training modules that we
developed in partnership with our agency counterparts that are
available to researchers and institutions across the United
States. They provide researchers with clear guidelines,
effective strategies to protect against existing and emerging
research security threats.
Furthermore, NSF is in the process of establishing the
Information Sharing and Analysis Organization called for in the
CHIPS and Science Act. This center will provide needed
information and tools to the research community. NSF is
currently reviewing proposals, and we expect to make an award
this summer. We're confident that we'll be able to establish an
innovative center that strengthens the security of our national
research enterprise as envisioned by the law.
And finally, we must also preserve and amplify the value of
the research ecosystem. This requires maintaining and actively
promoting the values that make the research enterprise
successful: openness, transparency, reciprocity, and
collaboration. NSF welcomes and encourages international
collaboration with likeminded partners. It's essential to
pursue the frontiers of science.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to testify before
you today, and I'm happy to answer any questions that you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Keiser follows:]
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Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Doctor.
I now recognize Dr. Richmond for 5 minutes to present her
testimony.
TESTIMONY OF DR. GERI RICHMOND,
UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND INNOVATION,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Dr. Richmond. Great, thank you. Thank you, Chairman Lucas,
Ranking Member Lofgren, and distinguished Members of the
Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to provide an update
on the Department of Energy's approach to research security. We
appreciate the Committee's sustained efforts to understand this
important topic and also develop constructive policies. We also
appreciate the close collaboration that we have with our other
agencies who are here.
Research security has been a priority for the Department of
Energy for decades, dating back to the Manhattan Project. It is
enshrined in our mission to ensure America's security and
prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental, and nuclear
challenges through its transformative science and technology
solutions. And what a broad mission that is, from nuclear
security to openly conducted basic science in the Office of
Science, from funding projects at the 17 national laboratories
to supporting research universities all across the country, and
more recently to funding development and deployment of those
discoveries while building the science and technology
workforce. The DOE's mission is critical to our national
security and economic security.
In my nearly 50-year career in research in the physical
sciences, I personally have witnessed the gradual and now
increasingly difficult task of balancing the benefit of open
science enterprise and the risks associated with countries of
concern, international collaborations, meetings, and contracts
in emerging technologies that have the potential national and
economic competitive implications that are requiring more
careful analysis to ensure that the risks are not compromising
the benefits.
We're in a different world today, as you recognize. We're
increasingly intense and actions of malign foreign governments
pose unacceptable risks to the Nation and to the Department of
Energy specifically. It is time, a time when we are pushing the
frontier of new technology advances, and success hinges on our
Nation's ability to recruit the best and the brightest
scientists and engineers in the world.
The Department of Energy takes these threats to our
research security very seriously. We take a comprehensive and
robust approach to guard against undue foreign influence, which
is responsive to changing legislative requirements. Because of
the very broad DOE research portfolio, we've expanded our
definition of research security to research, technology,
economic, security, or RTES, which addresses risk mitigations
for each of these research categories.
So DOE has taken three major actions to address the many
forms of RTES risks. First, DOE enhanced its existing process
to ensure that risks of undue foreign influence are considered
early in the competitive process and throughout the lifecycle
of a supported project or loan. Specifically, no person
participating in a foreign talent project sponsored by a
country of concern may participate in a project. Applications
must be fully--applicants must be fully transparent with
respect to foreign connections associated with proposed
participants, both individuals and entities.
Second, the Department has established a new RTES office,
which will implement and continuously refine DOE's process for
financial assistance and loan projects, build awareness
internally within DOE on RTES issues, engage with external
stakeholders, and assist in the review of DOE national
laboratory agreements with--involving foreign entities.
And third, DOE has established a departmentwide working
group that reports to the Secretary's office to address RTES
issues. The group is focused on developing and updating RTES
policies. DOE has also established RTES risk mitigation
policies designed to protect our national laboratories. Of
particular note is the science and technology risk matrix
developed in partnership with the laboratories that is designed
to protect the most critical emerging research and
technologies. The matrix highlights economic and international
competitiveness concerns beyond existing controls associated
with national security on export controls. National
laboratories use this risk matrix every day. To assess
international transactions, including requests for foreign
national access to our laboratories, staff travel to countries
of concern on restricted topics and engagement requests from
countries of concern with national laboratories.
So thank you. Thank you to this Committee for highlighting
in CHIPS and Science how tools such as the science and
technology risk matrix are important to our work to address
research security. The Department strives to strike the right
balance between protecting what has been determined to be most
important to DOE and the Nation, while also ensuring our
policies do not negatively impact our research ecosystem. This
is a process that requires continuing refinement as the world
changes, coupled with close dialog with other national
laboratories, university partners, and of course, all of you.
So thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to answering your questions on these important topics.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Richmond follows:]
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Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Doctor.
I now recognize Dr. Lauer for 5 minutes to present his
testimony.
TESTIMONY OF DR. MICHAEL LAUER,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH
Dr. Lauer. Chair Lucas, Ranking Member Lofgren, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you to testify on the work that
NIH is doing to protect the integrity of the U.S. biomedical
research enterprise from inappropriate foreign interference. It
is through these efforts that NIH enables scientific discovery
while assuring honesty, transparency, integrity, fair merit-
based competition, and protection of intellectual capital and
proprietary information. We appreciate the Committee's
continued interest and support of our efforts to address
research security issues.
As the largest public funder of biomedical research, NIH
sets the standard for innovation and scientific discovery. We
promote the highest levels of scientific integrity and public
accountability in the conduct of science. We promote open
collaboration by leveraging formal and informal cooperation of
scientists at research institutions around the world. This
exchange of knowledge is an essential part of innovation and is
critical to our global competitiveness.
Some foreign entities and governments, however, have
exploited the openness of our research system in order to
obtain a competitive advantage. In 2018, NIH described its
observations about certain behaviors, which do not align with
our focus on integrity. The description was developed as a
response to NIH learning in 2016 about certain inappropriate
activities of some peer reviewers who had been involved with
foreign talent recruitment programs or other foreign entities.
These behaviors include stealth employment, often at the
behest of malign foreign talent recruitment programs;
undisclosed and sometimes duplicative sources of foreign
research support; undisclosed financial conflicts of interest,
sometimes involving tens of thousands or even hundreds of
thousands of dollars given directly to scientists in personal
bank accounts or even in cash; breaches of peer review
integrity rules; and repeated misrepresentations to
institutional officials and to NIH. These misrepresentations
are sometimes abetted by foreign institutions in the form of
what we call comfort letters, which contain demonstrably false
information and can only be interpreted as attempts to mislead
American universities and U.S. Government agencies.
Since 2018, NIH has received allegations involving over 600
scientists. We in our Office of Extramural Research have
contacted institutions in 255 cases where there were likely
foreign interference concerns with scientific or budgetary
overlap, overcommitment, or undisclosed financial conflicts of
interest. Our efforts have led to hundreds of administrative
actions on grants, three criminal convictions, and two false-
claim civil settlements.
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that fewer
than 1 percent of the approximately 40,000 NIH-funded principal
investigator scientists have been linked to foreign
interference concerns.
Since 2020, the number of new allegations of undue foreign
interference have substantially declined and most have come
from university self-disclosures. This trend may be related to
outreach on the part of government agencies and professional
groups. We appreciate the proactive efforts many recipient
institutions are taking to comply with longstanding disclosure
requirements.
NIH has no tolerance for breaches of integrity or misuse of
taxpayer funds. It is never acceptable for scientists or
institutions to hide significant financial interests or to
provide information that is not true, complete, or accurate, as
this behavior may lead our agency to make inappropriate funding
decisions. It is particularly concerning when problematic
behavior occurs at the instigation of or with the support of
malign foreign actors.
We are pleased to work with our colleagues in the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the other
agencies who are here on implementing NSPM-33. Our work with
the NSF, with OSTP, and with our other colleagues here help
create updated forms, instructions, and policy terminology for
disclosure documents that also aim to reduce administrative
burdens. We have also partnered with other agencies and
participated in National Academies and international programs.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lauer follows:]
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Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Doctor. And I want to thank all
the witnesses for your insightful testimony.
The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
Dr. Prabhakar, as you mention in your testimony, your
office published draft guidance on requirements for research
security programs at the universities in March of last year.
There's been no communication from OSTP on any progress made
since then. Could you please elaborate on what has caused the
delay and provide an update on when the final guidance will be
issued?
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share your focus
on this issue. The research security program guidance is the
key thing that we now need to get done, and it is the focus of
considerable effort in our office and working with our
colleagues. What we learned from the feedback from the
community and--inside and outside of government, but across the
research base from that draft guidance that we put out gave us
considerable pause. We heard many comments on many aspects of
the draft guidance. They included concerns about administrative
burden, as you might expect because a lot of reporting and
training requirements were articulated in that draft guidance,
a burden of administrative--an administrative burden that, of
course, falls even heavier on smaller research institutions. I
think that's a factor.
What really has concerned me even more deeply is--what I
want to be sure of is that we don't turn this research security
program process into a checklist that an administrator signs
off on. The purpose is to make sure that researchers understand
this altered landscape so that in their ongoing interactions
and when they are recruiting students and postdocs, when
they're interacting in the global environment, that they have
an awareness of what's going on. And until we do that, that
research security program isn't really going to work. So that
has turned out to be more complex and taking us much longer
than I would like, but I want to assure you that it is a
priority and a focus for me and my team.
Chairman Lucas. Let me offer one follow up question along
that line. This is an issue that is critically important to the
Committee and for so many purposes overall. If you need any
additional authorities or directives from Congress to mandate
this, please let us know. We want to help facilitate this
process as quickly and as effectively as possible.
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I really
appreciate that.
Chairman Lucas. Dr. Keiser, Congress directed the NSF in
the CHIPS and Science Act to develop a plan to identify
research areas that require access to controlled unclassified
or classified information that may pose a greater risk to our
S&T enterprise, should they be targeted by our adversaries, of
course. Since the passage of CHIPS and Science Act in August
2022, what steps has the NSF taken to develop such a plan?
Dr. Keiser. We have developed a draft risk rubric, and we
have announced this risk rubric in our 2024 policy guidance
documents. The risk rubric is in draft because we're carefully
considering the areas in which we need to assess risk according
to NSF's mission of funding fundamental research. So this draft
has areas of technology and research that might be higher risk.
It has a column to assess undisclosed international
affiliations and sources of funding. It has a column to address
affiliations with countries of concern. We're in the process
now of road-testing this rubric with the JASON group, which is
a group of scientists in the community who do work for the
national government in areas of science and security. We'll get
their feedback, and then we plan to coordinate this risk rubric
with the community and then make it transparent and start
implementing.
At the same time, we're not waiting before we assess risk
in the new directorate, the Technology, Innovation, and
Partnerships (TIP) Directorate, because we do see an enhanced
risk because this is research that is more use-inspired,
translational, and of interest to our adversaries. So we've
been working from the TIP Directorate from the start. We have
language in the directorate's solicitations requiring research
security programs and points of contact for our awardees. And
we've been working also--we have a ban on reviewers for those
programs participating in foreign talent recruitment programs.
Chairman Lucas. Ranking Member, indulge me for one more
question.
Dr. Prabhakar, this Committee's first hearing of the 118th
Congress focused on considerations for developing a National
Science and Technology Strategy to--that would ensure a
comprehensive whole-of-government approach to research and
development and maximizes the return on taxpayer-funded
investments. Congress directed the OSTP to develop the strategy
a little later than 1 year after the implementation of the
Quadrennial Science and Technology Review. This Committee
expected the quadrennial review to be completed by December 31,
2023. Can you give us a progress update on the process of
developing the review and when you would anticipate its
completion?
Dr. Prabhakar. The Quadrennial Science and Technology
Review is work that's underway with our interagency process.
We've made good progress and hope to be able to get that out
quite soon.
I want to say I thought those were just really useful and
important provisions and taking that broad look at what we're
doing and then where we need to go with science and technology
is--I think that's core to our mission, and I appreciated the
opportunity to provide both of those reports. I look forward to
rolling that out soon.
Chairman Lucas. And I very much appreciate the old adage
about haste makes waste, but the sooner the better so that we
can respond to it.
With that, I yield back and recognize the Ranking Member
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this hearing
is a very useful one. Certainly, we need to be prudent in terms
of protecting the integrity of our research enterprise. On the
other hand, we don't want to kill our research enterprise.
I'm--as I mentioned in my opening statement, we have a very
large number of foreign students who have come here. Really,
this is the best place to go for science research. In fact,
more than half of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics) advanced degree recipients in the United States
are international students, 16 percent of them from China.
So here's the question. I mean, how do we balance our need
to attract the smartest people in the world to want to come
here, become Americans in most cases, with the need to protect
against some bad actors? How do we get that balance? Are we
losing in that balance with the efforts that we're making? Dr.
Prabhakar, can you address that?
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you so much, Ranking Member Lofgren.
You put your finger on what makes this challenge so complex.
And, you know, the measures that were described in law and that
we are implementing now, I think, are exactly the right place
to start. The specific procedures and having a common forum,
having the guidance from agencies so that awareness starts
growing in the research enterprise I think is an important
place to start.
These are the mechanisms, but again, the endpoint, the
picture in my head is what success looks like is that, as you
go through the education process, as you start into research,
as you become an American researcher in one of our universities
or research institutions, part of what you understand about the
world is how important it is to have these global
collaborations, the warm embrace of immigrants who have brought
so much to our science and technology enterprise, and that
we're no longer naive in the research community and understand
that there are malign actors and illicit activities. And simply
being aware is the first place to start, and to me, that's the
point of all of these mechanisms. I think we've made some
progress in raising that awareness, and as we complete our
work, that's where we need to get to.
Ms. Lofgren. Doctor, it took, as we mentioned, longer than
we hoped, but we were glad to see the release yesterday of the
common disclosure forms in talent recruitment programs, but
universities are still seeking guidance for standards for
research security programs. When do we expect that guidance to
be issued?
Dr. Prabhakar. Yes, I--yes, they are looking for that. I
know--I hear their frustration, and I share it because I think
we've introduced these ideas, but now we actually need to be
clear with everyone exactly what they need to implement. So I
understand that urgency. We are working through the very
significant comments that we received on the draft guidance and
revectoring accordingly. That is work that's happening with the
interagency process, and it's a significant focus. It's a
personal priority for me because I think we need to get this
sorted and clear for everyone. We will--we are very much
looking forward to getting that rolled out and completed.
Ms. Lofgren. Drs. Keiser, Lauer, and Richmond, I am
interested in what kind of guidance each of you or your
institutions are providing to our academic world, awaiting the
additional guidance that Dr. Prabhakar just mentioned.
Dr. Keiser. I can start. We, of course, are working very
closely with OSTP through the Research Security Subcommittee on
this guidance to universities for research security programs.
We have worked together as well in releasing the training that
I mentioned. And the training is a start. In my view, it is the
beginning of this building of this culture of research security
so that there's the awareness there. Then, it will build on the
next step of having the standards of how to build an actual
research security program itself.
Ms. Lofgren. So how do we--I mean, I want to hear from the
other two doctors, but I'm also concerned that we're not giving
conflicting advice between the various agencies, if you can
address that as well.
Dr. Keiser. Yes, absolutely. We talk pretty much every day
to make sure that we're coordinating on our policies going out
to universities. As an example, we mentioned the--this risk
rubric effort that I'm dealing with, and I talk to Dr.
Richmond's staff frequently about their S&T matrix to make sure
that we are consistent in what we're doing for the community.
We also work together on the training and the disclosure.
As you said, I think what's key is that we also share
information, which is another aspect of NSPM-33 that we'll be
working on to develop an information-sharing mechanism among
our agencies that protects the privacy of researchers, but
still shares information on research security with one another.
So we have this informal mechanism, and then through the
Subcommittee, we're also working on this more formal mechanism.
Dr. Richmond. Well, let me--first of all, that's a really
important question, and we certainly are very active with the
other agencies to put this together. We've had a disclosure
form since 2022 that we have on the web that has a lot of
details of what we need because we just--you know, we just have
to put things into operation while we wait to get the
coordination.
But I would say that even what we have in the disclosure
forms now, they're quite consistent with what we're working
with other agencies, too, and we're also sharing all the
details of our unclassified risk matrix because that is kind of
a model that we know to work forward. So I really think that
this is--the agency--interagency working group is great and
NSTC (National Science and Technology Council) working--we've
been leadership in that. It's a tough one, but the Department
of Energy has had to step out and say we're doing this right
now because we've got grants coming in. We've got to do this.
We would just like to see more consistency.
Dr. Lauer. I'll just add, I'll echo the comments of my
colleagues. We--there's been extensive coordination, but I'll
also add that we're trying to send a message that this is not
either/or. It's both/and. We can have security and integrity
and at the same time have proper collaboration. Proper
collaborations do not involve stealth employment, duplicative
funding, undisclosed financial conflicts of interest or
repeated misrepresentations. And by sending that message in
various ways, in many ways, we hope that we can meet exactly on
that balance.
I would also say that the fact that we're getting so many
self-disclosures and that the majority of our cases now are
self-disclosures says something about the effectiveness of the
work that everybody here is doing.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence
in my going over the time, and I yield back.
Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair turns to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Posey,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Posey. Thank you, Chairman Lucas.
Dr. Prabhakar, it's been almost 6 months since the
Administration extended the deadline for the U.S.-China
agreement on cooperation in science and technology to
reportedly allow time to negotiate a new agreement. Does the
Administration plan to extend the S&T agreement with China? And
if so, what new terms are being negotiated or included?
Dr. Prabhakar. Mr. Posey, thank you for your question. That
matter of the science and technology agreement is being handled
by the State Department, and very much to your point, the
purpose of that extension was to consider and to weigh and to
negotiate terms, recognizing the reality and the environment
that we're currently in. And that matter is under consideration
today at the State Department, and so I don't have any more
specifics unfortunately.
Mr. Posey. Yeah, I know. The State Department actually
prompted me to file a bill on solar panels. I don't know if
you're really familiar with it or not. But one thing President
Trump and President Obama agree upon is that we need to have
tariffs on China's solar panels. They do them with slave labor,
child labor, and they can undercut American products pricewise,
obviously, to be noncompetitive. And so the tariffs were a
follow-through with both those Administrations. So China
started shipping their China-made solar panels through
Indonesia, Thailand, and getting a label slapped on them, made
in Indonesia and China and avoiding the tariffs. The State
Department actually fleshed this out and exposed this, and I
filed a bill to reinstate the tariffs, in all fairness to
American productivity and passed in the House, passed the
Senate, and the President vetoed it.
So I have a little bit of difficulty wondering about the
sincerity of putting our country first in these agreements. Can
you give me some examples where we've been on the American side
and not the Chinese side on some of these issues?
Dr. Prabhakar. Mr. Posey, I'm sorry, I'm not familiar with
that particular matter. I've referred to several of the actions
that this Administration has taken to deal specifically with
Chinese industrial espionage, cases that the Department of
Justice is pursuing, very strategic thinking about advanced
technologies, including artificial intelligence, and what is
required in export controls to make sure that we're not simply
allowing the PRC to take our most advanced semiconductors, for
example, and use them in military systems that we could face in
an adversarial situation. That has been the consistent strategy
in the work and the thinking across the Administration in
dealing with the PRC in this heightened environment.
Mr. Posey. Thank you for that.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to include in the
record that GAO (Government Accountability Office) report,
``Research Security: Strengthening Interagency Cooperation
Could Help Agencies Safeguard Federal Funding from Foreign
Threats.''
Chairman Lucas. Seeing no objection, so ordered.
Mr. Posey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time is about
to expire, and I yield back.
Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time expired.
The Chair now turns to the gentlelady from Oregon, Ms.
Bonamici, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Lucas, Ranking
Member Lofgren. Thank you to the witnesses, a special warm
welcome to Dr. Richmond, who comes to the Department of Energy
via the University of Oregon, glad you're here.
You know, the successful culture of Federal research in the
United States relies on open access to scientific information,
data, and practices between and among Federal research agencies
and academic and research institutions, and often,
international partners. I think about all the work that's going
on, for example, in northwest Oregon, supercomputing,
semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing. We
know that to remain a leader in these fields, we must cultivate
a collaborative science ecosystem that preserves integrity
without imposing unintended costs on institutions that create a
chilling effect on recruiting top scientific talent to the
United States.
Leading Federal research institutions--and I think back
home about the University of Oregon and Oregon State
University--they're taking this issue seriously. They're
working to implement necessary compliance measures, creating--
they're hiring cybersecurity personnel, reallocating time and
funding to manage contracts and comply with training, and
creating new administrative departments to meet these security
requirements.
So I'm going to start with you, Dr. Prabhakar. You noted
that the increased administrative burden and costs are
affecting the implementation of the security guidance, so I
wonder if you could tell us a little bit more about your work
to develop and communicate research security standards, and are
research funding agencies providing any resources to
institutions to help them alleviate these costs? And would you
need dedicated funding to do that?
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you, Representative Bonamici, because
this is a practical issue that you're raising and that
universities are raising. This is part of what we have to
wrestle through as we finalize the research security program
guidance. And as that crystallizes, I think we'll be in a much
better position to assess what the cost and impact will be to
universities. A lot of the complexity is thinking through what
it means not just for our premier research universities that
have very substantial research funding, but also very
substantial administrative structures to be able to handle
today's administrative issues. And then, you know, for them,
this will be an additional task, but, you know, it'll be an
increment to something that they're already geared up to do.
I think about the research universities around the country,
HBCUs (historically Black colleges and universities), minority-
serving institutions, but across every part of our country we
have so much research talent, and we've already been concerned
that it's not being unlocked because those smaller institutions
don't have the staff to help faculty members write----
Ms. Bonamici. Exactly right.
Dr. Prabhakar [continuing]. Useful proposals. So I think--
NSF I think has--and perhaps NIH--I know at NSF there have been
really important efforts to make sure we boost that capacity
for all of our research institutions that aren't already fully
staffed up, and I think this will then add--the research
security measures then will add to that mix.
Ms. Bonamici. I appreciate that very much.
And, Dr. Richmond, welcome. I want to follow up on Ranking
Member Lofgren's line of questioning. You credit U.S.
leadership in science and technology research to our open
scientific enterprise, which is critical. And you explain that
thoughtful international collaboration strengthens our
competitiveness and encourages talented researchers to
contribute to the cutting-edge work that's being done here. So
has the increased suspicion in the name of research security
led to reluctance by international partners to engage in
Department of Energy-funded research? And also, how--can you
talk a little bit about what it looks like to have a research
security requirement that doesn't hinder our ability to recruit
and retain international talent?
Dr. Richmond. Well, thank you very much for that question
because--do you mind if I share a story?
Ms. Bonamici. Please do.
Dr. Richmond. I was recently at one of our major
universities, and I was talking to a young, sort of midcareer
faculty member from China. And he's built a wonderful program
there in material science, has a great research group there,
and he was almost in tears when he said, I'm scared now. I'm
scared that they'll find something in my record that'll make me
have to leave, and I'm not involved in any talent program. But
it was just--you know, when I think about those that are from
other countries, and even some of our own American scientists,
that worry that what they've built now is being threatened. And
so I hear it. I see it. And so I think that's why it's so
important at our universities to develop cultures around them
which is about security and also welcoming those that we need
to have and the talent.
Ms. Bonamici. Absolutely. It's critical that we get it
right, so I appreciate all your testimony and what you're
doing, and I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Dr.
Babin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
witnesses, for being here.
Dr. Prabhakar, last October, FBI (Federal Bureau of
Investigation) Director Chris Wray joined the heads of allied
foreign law enforcement agencies in highlighting the unique
threat the Chinese Communist Party presents to the U.S.
scientific enterprise. The quote is, ``The People's Republic of
China represents the defining thread of this generation, this
era. There is no country that presents a broader, more
comprehensive threat to our ideas, our innovation, our economic
security, and ultimately, our national security. We have seen
efforts by the Chinese Government directly or indirectly trying
to steal intellectual property, trade secrets, personal data
all across the country, and we're talking everything from
Fortune 100 companies down to smaller startups. We're talking
about agriculture, biotech, healthcare, robotics, aviation,
academic research. We probably have somewhere in the order of
2,000 active investigations that are just related to the
Chinese Government's effort to steal information.''
Very quickly, do you agree with Chris Wray's assessment?
Dr. Prabhakar. Yes, I think it's a good summary----
Mr. Babin. OK. Yes, ma'am.
Dr. Prabhakar [continuing]. Of the situation we're facing.
Mr. Babin. Thank you. President Reagan back in the 1980's
issued National Security Decision Directive 189, which exempted
foundational research, both basic and applied, from export
controls. Given Director Wray's assessment I just read, do you
believe that this exemption should be revisited?
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you for the question. I think it
really gets at the heart of what we are grappling with. I want
to just take a moment to share a personal reflection. A decade
ago, I had returned to public service to lead DARPA (Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency), where I had served many
years earlier. When I was the program manager at DARPA, the
cold war ended. One day I came to work and there was no longer
a Soviet Union. So I saw that chapter of what it meant to try
to drive very advanced science and technology in the
geopolitics of the late 1980's and early 1990's.
When I returned in 2012, what I found was that the world
had changed in a very important set of ways, and the most
striking thing was the behavior of the PRC. And that--I think
it was starting to become visible in that time period.
President Xi, I think, has made a shift that is quite palpable.
And what I've seen over the last decade is very much summarized
in your remarks, is a PRC that is aggressive. Again, many
countries are using technology to try to craft the future, but
they are taking it to a place that is causing a different set
of problems, and that's very much what we are grappling with--
--
Mr. Babin. Absolutely.
Dr. Prabhakar [continuing]. In this research in this area.
Mr. Babin. Well, let me ask this. Does China offer the
United States and other foreign nations reciprocal waivers for
the export of their foundational research? And if not, why
should we maintain this waiver? Do you know the answer to that?
Dr. Prabhakar. I'm sorry, I'm not sure the specific issue
to which----
Mr. Babin. OK.
Dr. Prabhakar [continuing]. That comment refers.
Mr. Babin. Does China, does the PRC offer other nations
reciprocal waivers?
Dr. Prabhakar. I'm so sorry, sir. I don't--I'm not sure
exactly what waivers that's in reference to.
Mr. Babin. Well----
Dr. Prabhakar. I'm happy to follow up if that's useful----
Mr. Babin. Yes, ma'am.
Dr. Prabhakar [continuing]. With your staff.
Mr. Babin. Well, what I'm trying to say is I think they do
not offer waivers to the United States and other foreign
nations when it comes to their Chinese companies, Chinese
researchers, or joint U.S.-China researchers. So my question
is, if they don't offer us waivers, why should we offer them
waivers? That's my question.
Dr. Prabhakar. I'm not familiar with where we might be
offering waivers. I think that's what I'm not understanding, so
I'm happy to follow up----
Mr. Babin. OK.
Dr. Prabhakar [continuing]. If that's useful. Yes.
Mr. Babin. OK. One other thing here, I've got a minute
left. This is also to you. Yesterday, you released new
disclosure guidelines for Federal researchers. As you know,
NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) is subject
to the Wolf Amendment, which prohibits NASA funding of
cooperation with China. A 2022 NASA Inspector General report on
NASA insider threats highlighted a number of instances of
criminal convictions tied to violations of research security
laws and policies related to the Chinese Communist Party.
However, one such case that the Department of Justice brought
against a University of Tennessee Knoxville professor, who was
also a paid professor at the Beijing University of Technology
during that summer, was dismissed because of uncertainty about
the China funding restriction and vagueness of disclosure
guidelines.
Do you believe the new disclosure guidelines that you
recently issued will prevent cases like the one I just
mentioned where researchers are quote, ``unaware,'' unquote, of
restrictions? NASA and the University of Tennessee, Knoxville
were very clear, but that didn't seem to matter in the
courtroom. So how do these new guidelines ensure greater
awareness than what is already required?
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you for that question. That is
precisely the purpose of the work that we are doing is to make
sure that every researcher is completely clear in this new
geopolitics that we are dealing with, and that change is one
that many researchers are not yet caught up to. That's exactly
why we are doing this work.
Mr. Babin. Well, we got a fine line to walk here. We don't
want to run people off, which has happened in the past, but we
also have to protect our information.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the lady from Michigan for 5
minutes.
Ms. Stevens. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Speaking of global challenges and tensions, many of you
know that we have a Select Committee on Strategic Competition
with the Chinese Communist Party, and it is a bipartisan Select
Committee run by Mike Gallagher as the Chair and Raja
Krishnamoorthi as the Ranking Member. And the Select Committee
issued in December a set of recommendations to bolster the
United States and our economic competitiveness, making such
recommendations as that we must here in the United States of
America fund open peer-reviewed research of critical
technologies. And it's important to note that this
recommendation was approved in a bipartisan, unanimous fashion.
So to the panel, could you highlight why this
recommendation, investing in open research at the levels
authorized in CHIPS and Science on topics like biotechnology,
quantum, and artificial intelligence, is absolutely essential
to maintaining our global leadership? And I don't know if Dr.
Keiser wants to start or----
Dr. Keiser. Sure.
Ms. Stevens [continuing]. Ms. Richmond.
Dr. Keiser. Thank you very much for the question. Open
research is extremely important, and in my view, we have to
communicate very clearly to the community about the concerns in
research security, which are not because of openness, but
rather they are because other countries are taking advantage of
our openness. And I'll tell you what I mean by this. Openness
is things like things we're funding in your district such as a
global center on climate change, which is collaboration with
many other countries, including Canada. We want this data on
climate change to be made open so that other researchers can
use it, they can challenge it, they can improve on it, and they
can continue to innovate. And we can't let adversaries keep us
from doing that. That way, they win.
So, at the same time, we need to communicate what issues
are we worried about? Well, we're worried about someone coming
into the United States or a U.S. researcher taking
prepublication research before it's even made open and taking
it to an adversarial country to be used for military-civil
fusion purposes. That's what we're concerned about. And we have
to be very, very clear about that and clear about that
distinction.
Ms. Stevens And, Dr. Prabhakar, just in your role at OSTP,
have you--your very important role, by the way--have you
observed any of the, you know, maybe potentially chilling
effects on scientists when open, collaborative science is
demonized, and the impact that that might be having on our
economic competitiveness?
Dr. Prabhakar. I thought that the Under Secretary's story
was telling. And we know researchers have left the United
States and returned to China to China's benefit. That happens
with friendly countries all around the world, and so some of
that could be OK, but we also know that it ultimately is to our
economic detriment. And so let's not be driving these people
away for sure.
I have certainly heard from the Asian-American and the
Asian researcher community about the chilling effect that this
whole issue has had. And part of why we have to get these
issues resolved is to establish research security and to make
sure that that uncertainty is removed and that people can go
forth and do the work that we need them to do.
Ms. Stevens. And you're playing at OSTP such a critical
role in keeping scientific research safe, secure, and open. And
just with, you know, the minute remaining, could you--just to
give you a moment to elaborate on how OSTP coordinates with
other Federal agencies to support open, aboveboard scientific
research.
Dr. Prabhakar. The reason I took this job when the
President asked me was because my great passion is science,
technology, and innovation for creating the future for our
country. And that doesn't happen unless this whole enterprise
is robust. And what we're talking about today, research
security, is part of making sure it's robust and the
environment that we live in. And, as we all know, there is much
more. It is funding support. It is making sure that we not only
write the best research papers, but that we harness that
information and build jobs and industries in every part of the
country. It's about meeting our health challenges in this
country. It's about dealing with the climate. So that is our
everyday work, and that getting research security right is
foundational to achieving all of that.
Ms. Stevens. And just looking out, right, it is such a
treat to have NSF, Department of Energy, and, in unique
fashion, the National Institutes of Health here at the Science
Committee. And I really want to salute all of you and the
agencies you represent, the scientists, and those contributing
to this enterprise in the United States of America. So thank
you so much, Mr. Chair, and I yield back.
Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady's time has expired. The
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
Fleischmann, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this important hearing. To the distinguished panel,
thank you very much for your very insightful testimony today.
I'm Chuck Fleischmann. I actually represent the Oak Ridge
Reservation and all the wonderful things it entails, so I work
very closely with the Department of Energy.
I have two questions, so I'm going to ask for a little bit
of brevity in response and--but the first one is on
standardization. The use of common forms such as biosketch and
other support and consistent definitions across agencies are a
welcome step for our government, academic, and industry
research institutions toward harmonization. Standardization
makes it easier for researchers to comply, which in turn
safeguards the research enterprise.
My question is how will Federal departments and agencies
continue working together to expand on the standardization of
definitions and harmonization of procedure?
Dr. Prabhakar. I'm happy to start. We put out the common
form through the interagency process a few months ago, and then
just recently now have put out guidance to agencies to help
them make sure that they are getting on the same page about
using that. We understand that different agencies have
different missions, and there will be times when exceptions are
needed, but our current guidance asks that we be informed of
that. And I think that--this is the process that will get us to
a place that reduces the burden, but actually allows for the
transparency that we need.
Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you. Doctor?
Dr. Keiser. Thank you. NSF has implemented the common
forms, and I know NIH has as well and Department of Energy, so
we're really very much in sync on this. Something now that we
have to focus on is communication to the community. No. 1,
here's what the common form means, here's how we're using your
information, and here's why we need it. And No. 2, we are not
interested in going after anyone for making a mistake on the
disclosure. This is about making sure that we have all the
information that we need to make sound funding decisions and
get rid of any concerning conflicts of interest or conflicts of
commitment.
Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you.
Dr. Richmond. So I would say at the Department of Energy
we've done this for a long time with our national laboratories,
and so it's not just the information that you gather, but it's
also how you use that and how you go back and forth with the
institution to get them to figure out what's going on. And so I
think there's a lot--and other agencies have asked us to share
the risk matrix which we've released because that helps put
together--it's sort of like stoplight, green light, yellow
light, red light on what you should go forward with and be
cautious about. So----
Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you. Dr. Lauer?
Dr. Lauer. Congressman, I completely agree with your
sentiments. I would say that one aspect of this whole
experience is that the agencies have been working very closely
with one another. Our staff at NIH and the staff at NSF has
spent probably thousands of hours working on every last detail
of these forms, as well as the research security programs, and
that's created a culture of standardization and collaboration
and, you know, making things as easy as possible for the
research community.
Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you. In my waning moments, the
security cost accessibility question, to buildupon
harmonization across government, we all recognize research
security carries additional costs for institutions, such as
administrative effort and IT (information technology) system
upgrades. How can research security standards be implemented in
a manner that allows for more organizations such as small or
emerging research institutions to participate?
Dr. Keiser. Thanks. Through the secure center that we are
going to be funding, we want to provide assistance,
information, tools to all entities, large and small, to help
them in the establishment of these research security programs.
In fact, my guidance to the team that's currently reviewing
these proposals for the center is we want the democratization
of research security, and the center needs to help in that
regard.
We also are establishing a track through the granted
program that Dr. Prabhakar mentioned, which is a program to
assist emerging research institutions. And it will be a track
in research security as well to help them.
Dr. Richmond. And I would say that a number of our national
laboratories are providing help with the smaller institutions
to provide advice on how to go forward, so I'm really proud of
what many of our national laboratories are doing, including Oak
Ridge.
Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you.
Dr. Lauer. We're working very closely, of course, with our
partner agencies, and we also have a number of efforts underway
at NIH to enhance the capacity of research institutions.
Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you. I thank the panel. Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Sorensen, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sorensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Lofgren, for convening this hearing, and our witnesses for your
willingness to appear with us here today.
Openness is a hallmark of the U.S. research ecosystem.
Before my career here in Congress, I was a meteorologist by
trade, also one of the people that took the risk to start
talking about how climate was impacting the weather some 15
years ago. I only did that because I was the trusted
communicator of that science. I only did that because I could
trust the science that I was learning from.
The purpose of our meeting here today is to protect
proprietary technology and scientific discoveries. So I want to
continue from what my colleague from Michigan was talking about
with Dr. Prabhakar and Dr. Keiser. How can we continue to
accelerate the research with respect to climate, while keeping
it--and keeping the politics out of it, but keeping the science
the focal point?
Dr. Prabhakar. Thanks for that question. It's good to see
you again, Representative. You know, I'll point to the National
Climate Assessment, the Fifth National Climate Assessment that
OSTP produced and that the President launched in November of
last year, I believe. This is a regular assessment of what is
happening with climate change in America. And what that
report--this particular report found was something I think
Americans across our country see very directly today is that
the weather is changing, that the effects of--the many effects
of a changing climate on--in terms of intensified storms, in
terms of droughts and wildfires. I'm a Californian, and I have
dealt with the smoke there many, many times.
That is very visible to everyone, and I think understanding
that comprehensively and clearly rolling up that research and
making it useful to people so that they can understand what's
happening community by community was a lot of the work that we
did in that report. We also found that people are taking action
across the country, and I found that very heartening because I
think this is a problem that--when you're in the middle of a
storm, it can feel overwhelming and as if there is no, you
know, turnaround in the future.
But in fact, people are taking action across the country
with the work that this Congress has done with the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law, with the Inflation Reduction Act. This
Administration has moved out with some of the most significant
actions on mitigating climate change. And all of that was--
we're starting to see that now in the climate assessment.
Everything I just described relies on exactly what you said,
which is having a solid base of scientific research, so that
continues to be a priority, I know, for everyone here.
Dr. Keiser. And NSF has funded a global center, as you
know, for international collaboration in climate change
research. And to me, working internationally on our processes,
on our research only bolsters the trust in that research
itself. And it's related to research security and research
integrity. In fact, the U.K. calls their research security
effort ``trusted research'' because if you can build integrity
into every step and be transparent about how the research is
conducted, you build the trust. And so that's what we're
focusing on as well.
Mr. Sorensen. I appreciate that. I have just about a minute
left. I want to go back to you, Dr. Prabhakar. This Committee's
Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, on which I serve as a
Ranking Member, held a hearing just yesterday in this room,
talking about NASA's plans for decommissioning the
International Space Station. The transition will require NASA
to go from being the owner and operator of the International
Space Station to becoming a customer for one of our commercial
space stations. So how might research security policies,
practices, and risk postures be different for the Federal
Government, federally funded research as we transition? To what
extent is OSTP considering commercial partnerships in
developing research security guidance to Federal agencies?
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you for that question. That's a
significant transition that NASA is working on, and I
appreciate that Subcommittee's focus on such an important
issue.
I think as we've been talking about research security here,
it's very--the focus here has been the research part, but of
course, protecting our technologies is something that is much
broader than just the basic research community. And many of the
measures that are in place and the actions that have been taken
specifically are about protecting our industrial technological
capacity.
The space station, though, I think, is a great example of a
place where the kind of research happens where there are so
many opportunities, and we've had so many excellent
international collaborations, so I'm sure that will continue to
be a major focus for NASA and its work.
Mr. Sorensen. And those certainly won't go away.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York,
Congresswoman Tenney, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Tenney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, and
thank you to the witnesses, and thank you for being here and
your expertise.
I first wanted to address my question to Dr. Prabhakar. Did
I pronounce that right? I would like to just draw attention to
your expertise as the Director of the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy and also your previous position
as head of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
otherwise known as DARPA. One of the many ways--and you just
alluded to this in the last questioner--that we protect
sensitive research is through the classification system. And I
wanted to ask you a few questions about this process that may
seem obvious, but I think it's important for the American
people to know since you are dealing with very sensitive
information, whether it's China, Russia, or other issues. And I
just want to ask you the first question because I'm sure you
know the answer to this, but do you know the penalty for
willingly retaining or leaking classified information under
title 18? It's technically chapter 37 in the U.S. Code.
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you for your focus on this important
issue. I have signed a number of documents in the course of my
career as I have received security clearances. I don't know the
specific penalties, but it was always clear to me that--the
legal reasons and the penalties were one of the many reasons
that I would not be disclosing classified information, so I
know it's a serious----
Ms. Tenney. The answer----
Dr. Prabhakar [continuing]. Very serious----
Ms. Tenney. And I understand this is technical, but the
answer is actually that it's up to 10 years of imprisonment for
violation of that section. And so if the proper investigatory
process found that this--that an employee, say, under your
advisory, someone in the department knowingly and willfully
mishandled and disclosed classified documents repeatedly, would
you continue to provide that individual with classified
information?
Dr. Prabhakar. A serious violation of that sort would
obviously require revoking of the clearance and whatever other
steps would be required.
Ms. Tenney. Would you fire someone that did that?
Dr. Prabhakar. I have not encountered that circumstance,
but when--if allegations of that sort were verified, then of
course, there would be legal action, but also employment action
I would expect.
Ms. Tenney. OK. Or at least a leave from the position in
the event that that would happen?
Dr. Prabhakar. I can't speculate, but of course----
Ms. Tenney. OK.
Dr. Prabhakar [continuing]. It's such a serious matter, it
would have to be handled with--it would have to be taken very
seriously, obviously.
Ms. Tenney. Thank you. And I know you're an expert on this,
and I'm bringing this up just because it's obviously relevant
to everything that's happening. But last week, Special Counsel
Robert Hur concluded that President Biden knowingly and
willfully removed, mishandled, and disclosed classified
documents repeatedly over a period of decades, not just a few
years. Special Counsel Hur also found that President Biden's
cognitive decline was so severe that he likely could not
convince a jury that Biden's actions were not willful. Either
President Biden, in my opinion as a lawyer, is mentally
competent and must stand trial, or the Cabinet must invoke the
25th Amendment or at least look into proceedings on that to
remove him from office. And I'm wondering if that's something
that you would consider in light of the bombshell testimony
that came out of the Special Counsel's Office.
Dr. Prabhakar. Representative Tenney, I can simply say to
you that in my interactions with the President in many meetings
that--what I have seen is someone who is very focused and digs
into details and is very incisive and----
Ms. Tenney. OK. So if he's very focused and able to do the
details, do you feel that he--did he mishandle--I mean, the
Special Counsel determined that he mishandled documents, so
shouldn't he be able to stand trial on that?
Dr. Prabhakar. I'm sorry, I--I'm not in a position to
comment on the special prosecutor's report.
Ms. Tenney. Thank you. I understand. Now, I just want to
get into a couple of questions on China since China is such
sensitive information. And my concern is--and obviously, in the
scientific community that researchers sometimes don't take
the--China's threat as seriously as they should. And I was just
wondering what the policy was in your office on China, how
deeply serious these security threats are with China, and what
you do in your office to make sure that that is something that
we're encountering every single day that you can discuss.
Obviously, this is sensitive information, but that's something
that's clear in your policy documents.
Dr. Prabhakar. Yes, thank you for the question. The focus
of this discussion, of course, has been on research security
and the issues for the basic research enterprise. I think we've
covered that ground pretty thoroughly. I think----
Ms. Tenney. Well, I guess, let me focus it back to
researchers, which is what we're talking about. These research
proposals do go through rigorous scrutiny to make sure that
that type of sensitive information is protected or disclosed to
understand the China threat.
Dr. Prabhakar. Yes. I'd like to draw a distinction. When
the PRC or its agents are going after conducting economic
espionage, trying to get into classified networks, of course,
we have very significant measures in place, an action is being
taken. We--there have been many measures relating to export
controls and financial flows for the basic research enterprise
that we're discussing here. There--again, there--most of that
information is widely available. It's intended to be public and
globally shared. We understand that there are some
sensitivities, for example, sensitive datasets, and in those
instances, there are policies and practices that are in place
or in development to make sure that we are protecting those
aspects.
Ms. Tenney. Thank you again for your work. I'm out of time.
I yield back. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member.
Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair now turns to the gentlelady from North Carolina,
Mrs. Foushee, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to Ranking
Member Lofgren, for holding this hearing and to our witnesses
today.
Dr. Prabhakar, I am honored to welcome you to the Committee
today, and I look forward to you coming to my district in North
Carolina next week to participate in our AI roundtable.
Artificial intelligence is a perfect example of the type of
research we need to be thoughtful about when we talk about
balancing openness with security. The United States must accept
some level of openness will be necessary to catch up with
China, which has advanced beyond us on certain AI technologies.
However, AI is an example of dual-use research of concern, a
technology that can be used for benefit or for harm. How does
dual-use research of concern pose a unique challenge to OSTP as
it develops policy guidance for Federal science agencies?
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you so much for that question. I'm
looking forward to being with not only you, but another Science
Committee Member in North Carolina next week.
I think artificial intelligence is a terrific example of a
powerful technology that--and we know how human beings--what
human beings do with powerful technologies. They get used for
good, and they get used for ill. And the research aspects of
artificial intelligence, the basic foundation for this
technology is something that we are--I think we are very
privileged to have a number of American researchers and
companies who have driven the major advances that have happened
in the last year or so. But I think it's important to recognize
that they, too, are part of a global community. Many of these
companies have research going on around the world. Just as an
example, the DeepMind company, now part of Google, is in the
U.K., and they are one of the global participants in advancing
this technology.
So I think we have great strengths, and it is rooted in
global research. And then when we get to the applications of a
technology like artificial intelligence, this is where we want
to make sure that we here in the United States are using AI.
Whether it's commercially or for public purposes, we want to
make sure that we are moving really in a focused manner, moving
fast, being aggressive about using this powerful technology in
ways that are both responsible but also effective to achieve
the great opportunities that it poses.
And something we've talked about a lot in this
Administration is the fact that this--AI is a technology today
that every country around the world is racing to use to build a
future that expresses their own values. And coming back to the
issues that we've been discussing with the PRC, I think we're
all clear that we don't want to live in a future that's defined
by technologies that have been shaped by authoritarian regimes,
and so yet another reason that as we use this powerful
technology that comes up out of a global base, that we make
sure that we are racing ahead of everyone else to put it to
work for all the things that we need to have happen.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you. How is OSTP considering AI
specifically when it comes to the forthcoming policy guidance?
Dr. Prabhakar. I think of this research security program
guidance that we are--that has to cover all areas of research,
and in fact, that's one of the complexities because research is
so varied. Artificial intelligence is an area of research in
itself, and it is--increasingly, it is a component in every
field of research. It's hard to find an area of research today
that isn't using the power of AI with the data that it has to
be able to accelerate what people are doing, so I think that it
will be--the research security policies will affect many
different aspects of AI.
Mrs. Foushee. Would any other panelist care to comment?
Dr. Richmond. Yes, thank you. The Department of Energy has
been working with AI, particularly in the secure side also, and
so what we're working on is a FASST project, Frontiers of AI in
Science, Security, and Technology. In this case, it's really
important for this country to develop for science and
technology in particular a big language model, a big model that
pulls in a lot of data, that we can develop language models
that help us go forward in AI in science and security. This is
a kind of model that companies wouldn't be doing because they
wouldn't have had the secure side, so I think for science and
technology, there's something very unique that we need to
develop in AI for this country to stay ahead in the area of
science, technology, and security. And because that's a huge
element of our laboratories, that's why our six big high-
performance computers, our exascale computers are ideal for
doing what the Nation needs.
Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Oklahoma,
Congresswoman Bice, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses
for being with us this morning.
I want to start with Dr. Prabhakar, following up on an
exchange that you had earlier with the Chairman on the research
security program requirements. Is OSTP committed to harmonizing
the research security program requirements across all Federal
agencies?
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you for that question. That is exactly
our goal, and I want to recognize again that Federal R&D spans
so many different mission agencies, and there are different
needs. In some instances, that's part of what we are wrangling
in this interagency process that we're in, so we do want to
make sure that we allow for sufficient flexibility. But at the
end of the day, this won't work and be effective unless it's
harmonized to a degree that allows our research institutions
and universities to adopt and implement it sensibly.
Mrs. Bice. Great. Pivoting a little bit, I want to talk
about foreign talent recruitment programs. It's been a big
topic in this Committee in my time here. Dr. Keiser, if I may,
Congress defined malign foreign talent recruitment programs in
the CHIPS and Science Act, which OSTP pointed to in the
guidance for Federal research agencies that was released
yesterday. In your opinion, is the current definition
sufficient to address concerns with malign foreign talent
recruitment programs?
Dr. Keiser. Yes, and--so I have to say, we really
appreciate the fact that there is a definition of malign
foreign talent recruitment programs rather than a list because
if we have a definition, it points to the very concerning
aspects of these programs that are concerning to us from a
research security and research integrity perspective.
Now, I do think that what we need to work on now is being
very clear with this definition, so the definition has a part
A, which is the concerning aspects, and then a part B, which is
the countries of concern and those requirements. And then it
also says international collaboration is excluded and is not
part of this malign definition. So we have a big role now in
communicating to the community of what this actually means. How
can they identify what a malign program is, and how can they
avoid being part of one?
And I'll give you an example. There's a U.S. researcher who
signed an application to be part of a Chinese entity, to use
his material science research for Chinese military purposes,
and he's committing to do that. To me, clearly, that's a malign
talent program. I don't know why he signed that, but certainly,
we need to go out to institutions and make sure that this
doesn't happen.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you. Do you think that Congress should
address any of these concerns, maybe put more definitive sort
of guidance out there? Or do you think it's--this is sufficient
for now?
Dr. Keiser. So, you know, I think that, frankly, there is
some room because there right now there's a part A and part B
of the definition.
Mrs. Bice. OK.
Dr. Keiser. And my concern is that it might not be as clear
as it could be.
Mrs. Bice. OK.
Dr. Keiser. And so I think that there is room, and we would
be very happy to work with your Committee on some thoughts and
making it even more clear.
Mrs. Bice. Perfect. Thank you for that. Pivoting back to
Dr. Prabhakar, let me ask, do you believe that the Federal
Government is well-equipped to identify malign foreign talent
recruitment programs? And what--if not, what resources do you
believe are needed to be able to do so? And Ms. Richmond may
also be able to sort of chime in on that as well.
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you for that question because
implementation here is key. The guidance that we've developed
is an important first step, and very much to Dr. Keiser's
point, now it's all about actually getting it out into the
world. And I think we will learn more as we go along, but at
the moment, I think the guidance is the first step that the
agencies really need to be able to start being clear with all
of the performers across the community.
Dr. Richmond. Yes, following up on that, and a good
question, too, I think that that the guidance is a really good
start, but as we learned from our experience in the--in our
national laboratories, universities, this is a huge cultural
change for them. This is a huge cultural change. And cultural
change is going to be difficult because it goes all the way
down to somebody working in a laboratory. And so it's going to
be a real challenge for our universities to help through that
cultural change. It's not just setting up an office. It's also
us from our agencies because we fund universities, too, is to
be able to work with them, to get them to trust us, that our
process----
Mrs. Bice. Educating them.
Dr. Richmond. Yes, really educating them. And, you know--
and to understand that--for all of us to understand that every
time you go out of your house in the morning, you face risks,
but you figure it's getting wherever you needed to go is the
benefit. So we have to figure out where that balance is. And in
our national laboratories and in the Department of Energy,
we're used to seeing threats come in and not going oh, no,
maybe we should just stop this person. Instead, we know how to
do the balance of thinking about it more clearly, what other
evidence, putting all the data together to come up with a
decision. And I think the other agencies feel this way, too.
But I think the universities need to be ready to let people
know in their institutions, their researchers, that this is
really important, and they need to think a little bit
differently about how they've done things in the past.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back.
Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Frost, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Frost. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
International collaboration among scientists, researchers,
and thinkers accelerate the pace of progress such as--such
cooperation strengthens and doesn't threaten our national
security. For example, using NSF funds, the University of
Central Florida (UCF), which is in my district, sends students
to South Korea to study semiconductor chip production. The
reshoring of chip production is a key national security and
economic goal and a priority for our Committee.
Dr. Keiser, how do we make sure that American universities
continue to have strong international partnerships and attract
international talent while still securing their work from bad
actors in unfriendly States?
Dr. Keiser. Mr. Frost, thank you very much for mentioning--
this is a wonderful example that you mentioned about
collaboration with South Korea and semiconductors. And this is
what we have to do to our communities is we have to provide
them with clear and tangible examples of beneficial, principled
international collaboration and why it is. And we emphasize
this in our research security training. We have a whole module
on international collaboration.
But with the semiconductor example, you can clearly see the
benefit to the United States. You clearly see the mutual
benefit also to the other country, the partner. You see how
they're both contributing to the enterprise and the
partnership. And so to me, I think this is what we have to
continue to communicate out.
The 2019 JASON report had a nice set of questions that one
can ask to--and--to be sure and feel comfortable with the fact
that you really are entering into one of these principled
international collaborations. And the questions are very much
along the lines of what I said. Also from our agencies we need
to continue to communicate about the beneficial international
collaboration and how it's just an essential part of science,
but that we do have countries of concern that are not playing
by these rules. And if that's the case, that's not
collaboration.
Mr. Frost. Thank you. Dr. Lauer, disease doesn't respect
borders. You know, improving Americans health has to be an
international thing. At the University of Central Florida, we
have folks who are researching HIV and patients in Panama, but
the pace of this kind of health research can either mean lives
lost or live saved. And so how do we make sure that research
security efforts don't hinder, slow down lifesaving work like
what we're seeing UCF do with HIV patients in Panama?
Dr. Lauer. Congressman, I completely agree with that
sentiment. There have been a number of examples of strong
international collaborations done right that have saved lives.
One example would be NIH-funded work on Ebola and developing
treatments and vaccines for Ebola that have turned this disease
from being nearly uniformly fatal to being something that's
potentially treatable and preventable.
I think one of the key points here is that we need to keep
hammering in the message of both and not either/or. It's not
either security and integrity or collaboration. The--it's both.
It's both/and. And actually, we have used the criteria that Dr.
Keiser referred to in that JASON report to help guide
scientists and administrators into ways in which it's fairly
straightforward to do things right.
Mr. Frost. Thank you. Do you have any other examples of
collaboration between international researchers----
Dr. Richmond. I'm happy----
Mr. Frost [continuing]. That have led to important
healthcare breakthroughs?
Dr. Richmond. Oh, you should continue.
Dr. Lauer. Yes. So I think HIV is another incredible
example, and this is an example of where we have, over the
years, converted HIV into a uniformly fatal disease. I remember
that from when I was a medical resident in Boston. There was
nothing we could do. We saw these young patients die in front
of our eyes. International work has now converted this from a
uniformly rapidly fatal disease into a chronic condition. It's
one of the amazing triumphs of modern medicine.
Mr. Frost. Did you want to add something, Madam Under
Secretary?
Dr. Richmond. Not so much on the health side, but I have to
point out that we have many international projects, for
example, in high energy physics and nuclear physics and fusion
physics and many other areas where these big facilities can't
be built by just one country. They have to bring these
countries together to do this. So on these huge projects, it's
just critically important that we have these types of
collaborations, so thank you.
Mr. Frost. Of course. Thank you so much, and I yield back.
Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Obernolte, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Obernolte. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Prabhakar, it's wonderful to see you again. I wanted to
continue the line of questioning that Congresswoman Eshoo
started about the competition with China with respect to
artificial intelligence. And I know you and I have had several
conversations on this topic. I remain very concerned about the
fact that the United States is falling behind in that
competition. I know you're aware that in 2017 the PRC made a
national commitment to being the leaders in AI development
throughout the world by the year 2030, and I think they're
pretty well along. Most people are aware that several years ago
they passed the United States in the number of computer science
Ph.D.'s that they're awarding. They'll probably award more than
double the number we award this year.
And you said something in your testimony that I thought was
really interesting. You said it'd be very unwise for us to
allow an authoritarian regime to shape future technology like
AI. But I think it's particularly poignant here because, in
addition to their investment in AI, the PRC has enacted some of
the most stringent restrictions in the world on the commercial
use of AI. So it's pretty clear they're seeing AI development
through a military and a national security lens and not an
economic lens.
You and I have discussed several times the Administration's
Executive order that they issued several months ago on AI, and
as I've shared with you before, I think that there was some
really deep thinking in there about making sure that the United
States remains competitive. What can we do, Congress and the
executive branch working together, to ensure that the United
States doesn't fall behind China in the race to develop
advanced AI?
Dr. Prabhakar. It's great to see you again, Mr. Obernolte,
and continue this important AI conversation. A very direct
answer to your question is about the National AI Research
Resource (NAIRR) and the AI Safety Institute. These are two
components of making sure that we step up, first, to make sure
that the data and the compute that are required for researchers
broadly to get access to the ability to build and interrogate
AI models, that's NAIRR, and then the AI Safety Institute is a
new effort within NIST that's just getting launched. That is
about making sure that we have the tools and methods to be able
to tell how effective and safe and trustworthy an AI model is.
That is essential for everything that we need to do with AI.
Those are two specifics that I would point to.
I really want to foot-stomp your comments. A number of
years ago--when I was at DARPA a decade ago, I saw this huge
surge in machine-learning technologies, this current generation
of AI. I saw so many different applications for the work we
were doing in national security and much more broadly. In the
years--at that time, a lot of the concern we all had was that
the PRC was using AI. Think about the amount of video
surveillance information. Think about the amount of genetic
information that that government has, those rich data sources
used, again, expressing their values in building a surveillance
state. They were--I think they surged ahead in the use of AI,
and to my great delight, what has happened in the last couple
of years is a surge ahead in the core technology with these
large language models, again, largely--in that case, largely
driven by American companies.
So we have this moment in time where we have phenomenal
strength in this technology here in the United States. It is in
the private sector. That's great. We want them to drive it, to
accelerate it, to do it in a responsible way, but we also know
that for public purposes and to make sure that we understand
the safety issues with AI, that we need the public investment
that exists across all of these agencies. You will find people
using and building AI, but we know it's not adequate. And so
this congressional support behind NAIRR and then the AI Safety
Institute, I think, are two concrete places where we can make
some critically needed progress.
Mr. Obernolte. Right. Thank you. I think we're in furious
agreement, especially on NAIRR, and I appreciate you
highlighting that because we're trying to codify that and
establish NAIRR permanently through the CREATE AI Act, which
I'm--I and a few other people here are co-sponsors of. But
thank you. We'll continue this discussion.
Dr. Richmond, in my remaining time here, I wanted to ask
about research security at DOE, and you talked about how that's
part of your core mission. But as co-Chair of the Fusion Energy
Caucus, I couldn't help but think about multinational projects
like ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor)
and the way that--you know, that's 35 different countries
coordinating. How do you ensure research security when the DOE
is just a small part of the international collaboration on
that?
Dr. Richmond. Thank you for that question because it is
something that we think about a lot with our large facility--
with these large international facilities like ITER is an
amazingly important project. There are scientific sides to it,
and in any multi-country activity, there's going to be some
political sides to it, too, and then some security sides to it.
So again, we have--with the different security processes that
we have in place, with our RTES and our risk matrix, we watch
that very, very closely. It's--and it changes all the time,
right? Every--all of this is evolving, but we've been there,
and we just try to do the best that we can. But I'm very
confident in the kind of people we have at DOE to make sure
we're making the right decisions.
Mr. Obernolte. All right. Thank you. I see I'm over time. I
yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Pennsylvania,
Ms. Lee, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Chairman Lucas and Ranking Member
Lofgren, for holding this hearing.
To probably go in a bit of a different direction as we
continue to celebrate and uplift the contributions of countless
Black inventors, scientists, and researchers during this Black
History Month, I'm glad that today's hearing serves as a
platform to further highlight the need for openness of
opportunity as a tenet of scientific research.
It should be recognized that American research
competitiveness has often failed to recognize contributions of
the Black community and many others, and we must consider this
when discussing strategies to maintain security over
government-funded research and development. The memory of the
late Eddie Bernice Johnson, the first and only Black person to
ever chair this Committee, will continue to enshrine her legacy
of providing access to career paths and opportunities in STEM
for countless Americans, regardless of origin, across the
country.
Prior to the 118th, only once has there ever been as much
representation from Black women, for instance, on this
Committee simultaneously. I'm proud to sit here today as part
of another class of four with Reps. Foushee, McClellan, and
Sykes. To reiterate, when I chose to be a Member of the Space,
Science, and Technology Committee, I did so to help create a
more equitable and just society, especially within the realm of
STEM education and workforce. I continue to do so against the
backdrop of unrealized dreams and potentials like those of
Trayvon Martin who once aspired to become an astronaut. I also
look forward to protecting proprietary technology and
scientific discoveries such as that of Henrietta Lacks, that it
never happens again.
I'm strongly of the position that the absence of Black
indigenous people of color, BIPOC individuals in STEM research
and development activities within Federal science agencies
poses a significant threat to security and integrity of
research outcomes. Without people like us not only hinders the
scientific community from fully realizing its potential, but
also jeopardizes the credibility and effectiveness of research
efforts. So we can't tolerate racial profiling and racism as
tools and ensuring research security.
While we must always be wary of threats our adversaries
pose toward our Nation, my belief is that we are best served
building resilience at home through supporting and developing
the talent we have here at home. The people I represent look
toward science and technology for innovation that will lower
healthcare costs, bring clean air and water, and improve their
living standards.
Dr. Keiser and Ms. Richmond, how are your agencies engaged
in interagency collaboration with agencies like the Department
of Education to promote science, history, education, especially
the contributions of Black, indigenous, or people of color
inventors, researchers, or scientists?
Dr. Keiser. Thank you very much for that question, Ms. Lee.
And, as you can imagine, we are extremely concerned, and we
believe that diversity in STEM is an essential part of research
security. The security of our Nation is only able to occur if
everyone is allowed to participate in the STEM enterprise. And
so NSF did fund a $10 million award to the University of
Pittsburgh through the Eddie Bernice Johnson INCLUDES
(Inclusion across the Nation of Communities of Learners of
Underrepresented Discoverers in Engineering and Science)
program, and this is to strengthen precollege STEM programs to
ensure we're reaching the full geographic and demographic
diversity of the Nation.
We, of course, also have many partnerships with other
agencies, and everyone benefits from these investments.
However, we need to do more. As you know, one of NSF's main
priorities is the Missing Millions, and we need to make sure
that we--all across NSF leadership, not just in one area, but
across what we fund--focus on this very important enterprise
effort.
Ms. Lee. Thank you.
Dr. Richmond. Well, thank you very much for that question.
Both Rebecca and I have spent a lot of time worrying about
this.
I do want to make one point, and it ties back to--on this
particular issue. It ties back to the issue of the--you know,
the number of graduate students, for example, that we have from
other countries. Right now, our graduate stipends are so low in
these emerging areas of technology that it's hard for graduate
students to make a living during their 20's, 5, 6, 7 years in
graduate school. Our graduate stipends across the agencies are
too low, and it hurts our underrepresented groups more than
others because, oftentimes, they don't come to graduate school
with any parental finances to help them through or a car that
can get them where they need to go. And so that is actually a
huge factor in our inability to recruit and retain this
talented group that we so much need. So the Department of
Energy has stepped up and raised our graduate stipends to 45K a
year, and I look forward to having the other agencies do that,
too.
But I'm saying that we can't do this alone. I think it's
really important that Congress step up and recognize that this
is the kind of funding that we need to really get the young
people into the system that are from all kinds of backgrounds
because those are the ones that are left behind. And if we get
those numbers up, we don't have so much need for those from
countries of concern.
Ms. Lee. Thank you. Time moves fastest when we're having
the most fun. I yield back.
Chairman Lucas. Absolutely. The gentlelady's time has
expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Williams, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Williams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Keiser, nice to see you again. You may not remember,
but not quite a year ago, we first--this is where this topic
first came onto my radar. And the concerns that you and a few
others highlighted was that there were serious problems. There
was movement to, you know, have rules change, but there was a
gap in enforcement, the ability to enforce these rules. Can you
update me at all from that conversation, either pro or con, of
what's happened?
Dr. Keiser. So I think that what we've been doing as--in
the past year is--No. 1 is we said making sure that we focus on
consistency in approach. And what I mean by this is NSF works
very closely with its Office of Inspector General. The Office
of Inspector General does investigations into potential
research security issues. They then make recommendations to NSF
on actions, administrative actions it should take to reduce
risk to the government. I believe that that's been a very close
and good relationship.
What we've been working on in the past year is NSPM-33. As
I mentioned, it says we should have information-sharing
mechanisms because many of these researchers are funded by NSF,
Department of Energy, and NIH, and so we all need to be able to
share information when we do see concerns here.
So we've been doing two things. No. 1, we've been ramping
up our own analytics efforts, and we've been sharing the
information on what we see through those analytics with our
partner agencies. We also make sure that our Offices of
Inspector General also communicate very closely on these
issues.
Mr. Williams. Thank you. Secretary Richmond, earlier, you
commented about a Chinese researcher who was in fear of losing
their grant funding and, I don't know, promised or pinky-
promised or swore on a stack of Bibles that he was not related
to the Chinese Communist Party. May I ask, have you ever been
on a submarine, one of our nuclear submarines?
Dr. Richmond. No, I haven't had the opportunity yet.
Mr. Williams. Well, the crew ranges from about 110 sailors
to about 160, and they are very fine people. And some of the
secrets that are being stolen out of American research actually
makes it easier for the Chinese Communist Party and the PLN,
the People's Liberation Navy, to find our submarines--it's the
most important deterrent weapon that we have--and their crews.
And I'm just trying to weigh the difference between the
sensitivity of the Chinese researcher who may lose his grants
and the 110 or 160 sailors that are in our nuclear submarines
off the coast of China today. I just wonder how you balance
that.
Dr. Richmond. Well, thank you for that question. Let me go
a little bit further with that to say what my advice was to
this particular individual, having no idea of what his
background was. I said the most important thing for you to do--
because it wasn't so much losing his grant funding as it was
that he would have to go back to China to do the kind of
research that he wants to do here, which he would prefer not to
be--not to have to do. But I said to him, the point is that
we--research security is very important to all of our agencies.
You will be--when you are putting in a proposal, you will be
asked questions, and you need to be very honest and transparent
with your university, as well as answering those questions
about your current and pending support because that's what we
will be looking at because we don't know whether to trust you
or not.
So--but I said you're going to get in trouble if you don't
disclose something and we find it. So that's why it's really
important for whatever you're doing, that you be as upfront as
possible with what your background is and give the
responsibility to your university, as well as your agency then,
recognizing that you may be looked into it. But let me let me
just also say----
Mr. Williams. If I may, just for the little bit of time
that I have remaining----
Dr. Richmond. Yes.
Mr. Williams [continuing]. And I appreciate your concern
for that person as an individual. I have a different
perspective.
Dr. Richmond. Yes.
Mr. Williams. I'm pretty sure I'm the only Member of
Congress that was in Tiananmen Square in May 1989 and visited
Beijing University and the Freedom Wall, as you may recall. My
very limited Chinese skills, at the time was very interested in
what the protests were about. We didn't know what was coming at
that point. This is after May 5 and before Gorbachev's visit.
But I would say that in my subsequent studies at Harvard
University for a year as a visiting student in the Chinese
Studies, Asian Studies Department, there were many of the
Chinese leaders, student leaders that had been exiled at that
time. And they were deeply concerned about, at that time, 1989,
the direction of the Communist Party, and we now see it in full
fruit. So I'm afraid that our kindness and our goodness are not
a good defense against a really purposeful enemy. Thank you.
Dr. Richmond. I agree.
Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from North
Carolina, Ms. Ross, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Ross. Thank you, Chairman Lucas and Ranking Member
Lofgren, for holding this hearing, and I'm happy to see all of
our witnesses here again.
As was mentioned earlier, we're very, very much looking
forward to hosting Director Prabhakar in North Carolina next
week, along with my colleague, Congresswoman Foushee, at our AI
roundtable, which will be held at North Carolina Central
University, an HBCU.
I represent a district that is home to the Research
Triangle, boasting several top research universities,
companies, startups, and Federal agency offices. And we've
benefited greatly from international scientific research and
the contributions from foreign-born scientists and
international students. My first question, though, will go back
to an issue that was touched on briefly, which is
cybersecurity. And universities are increasingly the target of
cyber attacks by both cyber criminals and nation-state actors
to obtain sensitive information and prepublication research.
However, the cybersecurity of our research institutions has
not been a central focus of research security discussions. To
address this issue, the CHIPS and Science Act required NIST to
produce cybersecurity guidance for universities conducting
research. However, even with this good guidance, our
universities often have tight budgets, and they're not fully
able to address this guidance.
I see Dr. Keiser nodding first, so I will ask you how your
agency is helping university awardees address cybersecurity
risks as part of research security efforts. And then, of
course, I want to go back to Dr. Prabhakar to describe your
thinking about that.
Dr. Keiser. Sure, and I'll try to be brief. Something that
we are going to be focusing on, No. 1, is NIH currently funds
secure data enclaves. And we are tasked to also fund secure
data enclaves at universities and through the--through our
authorization. So we're in the process of developing that, No.
1, to provide that to the universities.
Second, the secure center that I mentioned is going to be
partnering with the REN-ISAC (Research and Education Networks
Information Sharing and Analysis Center), which is a
cybersecurity consortium among universities to provide
cybersecurity information and guidance out to them. So we're
looking forward to that partnership as well.
And let me also just mention the importance, of course, of
cybersecurity education. So we fund--as you know, at Duke in
North Carolina and many other places, we fund CyberCorps and
cybersecurity education programs. That's essential from the
ground up to make sure that we have this as part of the
culture.
Ms. Ross. OK. Thank you.
Dr. Prabhakar. And I'll simply add that there's, of course,
a cost to upgrading cybersecurity. That's true for any
enterprise, including these universities. But of course, the
reason we're doing this work is we know there's a cost to not
doing it, and we just have to confront that.
Ms. Ross. OK. Dr. Lauer, do you have anything to add?
Dr. Lauer. We're very grateful for congressional support on
cybersecurity at NIH. It's become very much ingrained as part
of our culture and also the culture of our extramural research
systems, and so we very much appreciate that. We also work with
institutions when unfortunate cybersecurity incidents occur.
Ms. Ross. OK. Thank you very much. Back to the issue of
international collaboration, many academic societies and Asian-
American advocacy groups continue to raise the alarm about
racial profiling in the research security space. According to a
2021 analysis from the Committee of 100, many of the highest-
profile economic espionage cases tied to China have focused on
academics, despite research institutions only comprising 3
percent of all cases investigated under the Economic Espionage
Act. Given that this implies that bulk trade secret theft is
not occurring at universities, what considerations are uniquely
positioned within universities relative to industry? And, Dr.
Keiser, I'd like to start with you.
Dr. Keiser. Thank you. The fear that the--those in the
Asian-American research community have is real. It's real fear,
and we need to acknowledge that, and we need to build trust and
relationships. You know, I think--it breaks my heart when I
hear stories about fear. I heard a story about, you know, some
law enforcement agents during COVID, knocking on the door of a
researcher of Chinese descent, and she wasn't quite sure why.
This is something, of course, that we need to make sure that we
deal with.
The way we need to do it in my view is, No. 1, build trust
by interfacing. For instance, we have regular roundtables with
the Asian-American Scholars Foundation (AASF), and that's
something that we need to do to not only communicate to them,
but to listen to them and think about ways we need to
collaborate together in this area.
The second thing we need to do is make sure that our
actions are scaled to the risk. So we--that's why I mentioned
the information-sharing on research security violations. We
need to focus on the behaviors and the fact that we are not
looking at the people and their backgrounds. That's hard, I
think, for many to accept because we don't have the trust yet,
so we need to give out more examples of the fact that this is
what we're doing, as well as something in my view that I've
talked to the AASF about is we have to give examples of when
someone came forward and corrected an error, and we didn't take
action because it was corrected. Those kinds of things have to
get out there as well.
Ms. Ross. Thank you. My time has expired, and I yield back.
Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Franklin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And this is such a
critical hearing today, and obviously, we feel that tension
between the trust that we need to build in the scientific
community, but also protecting our national security.
Dr. Lauer, last year, you published a summary of NIH's
foreign interference cases. And to date, NIH has determined
that 80 percent of compliance reviews had at least one serious
violation, and in total, over half of the scientists were
removed from NIH grants. Now, those stats are obviously very
concerning. What actions can be taken to further prevent
violations? As important as compliance reviews are, it's kind
of a bit of the horse is out of the barn at that point. What
can we--are there things we can be doing to get out ahead of
that and lower these stats by having those violations not be
there to begin with?
Dr. Lauer. That's a really great point. And I think one of
the possible signs of success to date is that the number of new
allegations that we have seen has declined substantially since
2019, and most of the new allegations that we have seen have
actually come from institutions themselves where institutions
on their own discovered that there were problems as part of
their outreach and due diligence. And so that gets exactly to
your point, that what we really want to do is promote a culture
of both openness, as well as integrity and security.
Mr. Franklin. OK. Do you have the resources you need for--
to perform these audits and do the measures like that?
Dr. Lauer. Over the last few years, we have received
additional funding. Our office has received additional funding
from Congress to help us with our compliance reviews, also with
our IT and our analytics. We are very grateful for that
support, and we hope it will continue.
Mr. Franklin. OK. According to NIH Central Resource for
Grants and Funding, approximately 80 percent of NIH's budget
goes to support research grants, including grants to foreign
organizations. And in the spirit of being collaborative, many
of your grant dollars come without restrictions on them, which
is--again, goes to building that spirit of trust and
collaboration. How can we be sure these investments, especially
those made with foreign countries, are protected from our
adversaries?
Dr. Lauer. So any grant that involves substantial work in a
foreign entity has what we call foreign components. And before
we allow those foreign components to go forward, we require
what we call a prior approval. That involves consultation with
the State Department. We give the State Department then an
opportunity to comment on whether or not there may be any
foreign policy concerns regarding that project. So we have
built-in steps in place in collaboration with the State
Department to try to head that off.
Mr. Franklin. OK. And then I've got a couple of minutes
left here. I'd love to follow up a little bit more, Dr.
Richmond, and then also get your thoughts, Dr. Prabhakar, on
the--you know, one of the aspects of research security that we
don't focus on a whole lot is retention of the workforce. And,
you know, we--obviously, if folks don't feel trusted or they
feel threatened, they may leave and go elsewhere. But I'd love
both of your thoughts on how can we work harder to build that
trust that we need to, you know--what can Congress do to assist
you in helping to develop an ecosystem that facilitates that
trust that we need to ensure that the folks that we have that
come to our institutions, that get educated, they got great
things to offer aren't just simply hired away by the CCP? And
it's one thing to be inside the program and stealing, but
another if we can't retain them when they go elsewhere. It's
the same effect. We have the brain drain.
Dr. Richmond. Yes, that's really a tough one because
changing culture isn't easy, and changing culture means that
people trust what you've got at your institution.
I think that, you know, I can reflect on the fact that the
National Laboratories operate in many respects further ahead
than our academic institutions because when you come into work
in one of our laboratories, there is a culture that--we have a
safety culture that's really, really important that's embedded
in--woven through everything. And there's also security aspects
that's woven through everything that we do.
So you think about safety and security all--and, I mean,
just, you know, falling off a ladder. But the point is that
we've developed that culture in the laboratory so that somebody
that's coming in, like you would hope they would come into a
university, wanting to get grant money, that they buy into that
culture when they first come in. And it's trusted because it's
been there for a while.
And so I think being able to get universities to the point
where security is woven into everything that they are doing so
the researchers really understand that this is about the
Nation's competitiveness in particular areas. In this case,
there are six particular areas that we worry about with regards
to AI and quantum and bio and--six different areas. But it's
those areas that we've built that culture around, so that's
what I would say.
Mr. Franklin. Well, I appreciate your comments. And, Dr.
Prabakar, sorry, I'm out of time, but I would love to get your
feedback maybe later on, you know, how do we develop that
ecosystem so that we retain the best and brightest and while we
still have that trust that's necessary?
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you.
Mr. Franklin. But thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Dr. Prabhakar. I appreciate it.
Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time is now expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Tonko, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Tonko. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. I thank the Chair
and Ranking Member for holding this hearing, and thank you to
our witnesses for being here today, and more importantly, for
your excellent leadership in supporting our Nation's research
enterprise.
As many of you noted in your testimonies, research
integrity is a key part of research security, and research
integrity is buttressed by strong and uniform scientific
integrity policies. With the influx of new resources from the
landmark CHIPS and Science Act, it is important to ensure that
we can make the most of this opportunity to strengthen the U.S.
research enterprise and keep it clear of all threats to
research security, including domestic political interference,
distortion, or indeed disruption.
Scientific integrity is a cornerstone of Federal scientific
activities and something that I've made a priority during my
time in Congress by authorizing the Scientific Integrity Act.
So a question to the entire panel, how could stronger and more
uniform scientific integrity policies help mitigate risks in
research security and integrity? Anyone want to start? Mr.
Lauer?
Dr. Lauer. Thank you. So I think integrity and security
very much overlap, and virtually all the cases that we have
seen there have been integrity breaches, the integrity breaches
often manifest themselves as dishonesty, outright
misrepresentations of certain past activities.
So I am reminded of a report that was put out by the
National Science and Technology Council in 1999 about the
government-university partnership, and it pointed out that one
of the core principles, exactly as you say, of a successful
research enterprise is integrity, and specifically the
integrity of every individual participant. When there is a
breach of integrity, that threatens the credibility of the
entire enterprise, and that means security as well. Thank you.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. Anyone else on the panel?
Dr. Richmond. I think to say that the--you know, we are as
secure as our weakest link, and so that's why it's important
for us to focus on a broader spectrum of issues that we're
looking at than we might have in the past. I also think what
would be helpful is, with the CHIPS and Science Act, that part
of that is just authorized and not appropriated yet, and I
think that would help us go forward, too.
Mr. Tonko. Sure. Thank you.
Dr. Keiser. And I'll just add that research integrity, of
course, is essential to what we're talking about. What we also
are starting to focus more broadly on is overall foreign malign
influence because, as you said, there is the integrity of the
research itself, and then there is the way that other countries
are causing fear or manipulating faculty members, et cetera,
that are violating freedom of speech, that are violating
academic freedom, that are intimidating them. So to me, we have
to look at the broad picture, including integrity and including
these other areas of foreign malign influence.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. Dr. Prabhakar, since research
integrity and scientific integrity might be discussed as two
sides of the same coin, how would you recommend the agency
structure policies related to that research security and
scientific integrity to leverage these commonalities?
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you so much. I think my colleagues
actually spoke to this so beautifully. And I think it's worth
recognizing that the purpose of the scientific enterprise is
always to improve the scientific process and to get better and
better at understanding ground truth. And that, to me, is what
scientific integrity is all about. And I think Dr. Keiser made
an important point about that, that is complementary to
protecting against illicit activities from countries of
concern. But they all get wrapped up in a package of what are
the behaviors. And to the Under Secretary's point, these are
cultural issues about how we conduct the science and technology
that's so important for our country.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. Well, scientific integrity is a key
ingredient in securing our research enterprise, and I hope that
this Committee and the Administration can continue to work
together to ensure strong policies across our Federal research
landscape.
Another piece of research integrity--and therefore,
research security--is ensuring our researchers and institutions
conduct rigorous, reliable, and replicable research. Dr.
Keiser, in your written testimony you discuss the importance of
safeguarding taxpayer investments to research security. How can
agencies help safeguard taxpayer investments and ensure that
Federal funding is being used for that replicable and reliable
research?
Dr. Keiser. So I think over--what we have been doing quite
a bit--and, frankly, there's a lot more to do. We have
instituted additional training for our program officers and
program directors because what we want to do is make sure that
the researchers themselves whom we fund have the freedom to
conduct their research, but we also have to be very clear and
communicate to our program officers that their job is to ensure
that the--of the reliability and the integrity of the research
itself and the research projects.
Now, I have to say that this is a challenge because one
program officer can be overseeing 100 projects at one time, but
I think that it's extremely important to make sure that there
is that oversight, to make sure that the funds are used as the
researcher says they're going to be used, that they produce
results that are then made open and that are reliable.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you very much. With that, my time is
exhausted, and I yield back.
Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
Strong, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Chairman Lucas and Ranking Member
and our witnesses for sharing their expertise today.
Dr. Keiser, I'm sure we can all agree that we need ways to
cultivate and grow our workforce that understands research
security and that we can work in an academic setting. I often
hear from researchers in my district that they are hesitant to
work on restricted research due to the constant hurdles they
must jump through. What are some of the nuisances involved in
training a workforce prepared to deal with the growing research
concerns in academia?
Dr. Keiser. So NSF, when we fund research, we fund
fundamental research, and we ensure that it is not restricted
research. That being said, that's why education is so important
because that doesn't mean that everything should just willy
nilly occur in a lab without the safeguards that we talked
about being put into place. That's why we have to provide the
resources for research security programs, to make sure that
they understand, as Dr. Richmond said, that what we want to
create is a culture like a lab safety culture but of research
security without these additional restrictions.
Now, the JASON reports have spoken out quite strongly that
they do not like controlled but unclassified information, and
that is something, of course, by law that we do need to deal
with. And so I think that's something that our agencies are
trying to figure out how to fund CUI (Controlled Unclassified
Information) research in a way that doesn't provide--that
doesn't cause additional administrative burden on labs, et
cetera, and that's by building a culture.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. Are there ways to involve law
enforcement and intelligence and the intelligence community in
this workforce development?
Dr. Keiser. Yes. And I have to say we work very closely
with the intelligence community and law enforcement. If you
look at where we started in our communication as far as what
research occurs and how research occurs in the academic
setting, when we started this conversation in 2017, it was two
completely different lenses through which we were looking. We
now communicate very closely. NSF and DOE and HHS (Health and
Human Services), we're part of the National Counterintelligence
Task Force where we have these conversations and we need to
work together.
And so I think that we've come much more to a good
understanding of how research occurs in the labs. At the same
time, we need to still move forward, frankly, with the
researchers themselves understanding what it really means to
safeguard this research, so more work to be done.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. How can NSF promote a strong
research security workforce at our universities? And how can
Federal agencies better leverage expertise in cities like
Huntsville, Alabama, which is home to the second-largest
science and technology research park, to train the future
workforce?
Dr. Keiser. Yes, it's--I'm so glad you mentioned training
the next generation of research security workforce. I've been
thinking a lot about this because I do feel if we're going to
promote this culture, we need to figure out a way to encourage
and support the workforce in research security, that
understands this balance between openness and research
security. So what I'm thinking about is we're establishing a
Research on Research Security Program, a funding program, and I
would like to use an element of that funding program to train
that generation--next generation of research security
workforce.
Mr. Strong. I think one of the great statistics that I've
learned in recent days, the University of Alabama in
Huntsville, 72 percent of their graduates never leave. They
stay in the research park, in Redstone Arsenal area, and I
think that that right there shows a lot of hope for what all of
us are concerned about.
Dr. Keiser. Absolutely, creating that culture.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. Dr. Lauer, many international
students take advantage of optical--Optional Practical
Training, OPT programs, which allow them to obtain employment
in the United States for up to 3 years post-graduation. In 2022
OPT benefited more than 117,000 students with F-1 visas. How
can we assist research institutions in coordination of DHS
(Department of Homeland Security) to screen foreign national
students and restrict potential bad actors from receiving OPT
authorizations?
Dr. Lauer. So this is not an issue that I have or our
office has been personally dealing with, so I think what would
be best would be for me to research that and get back to you.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. According to the NIH Central
Resource for Grants and Funding, approximately 80 percent of
the NIH's budget goes to support research grants, including
grants for foreign organizations. In the spirit of being
collaborative, most of your grant dollars come without
restrictions. How can we be sure that these investments,
especially those made in foreign countries, are protected from
our adversaries?
Dr. Lauer. So as part of our standard processes, whenever a
grant involves substantive work that's occurring in a foreign
country, we require what we call prior approval, and that--and
this is prior approval for what we call a foreign component.
And what we do is we work through the State Department. Every
such grant like this is then sent over to the State Department
for their review, and they will then inform us if there are
significant foreign policy concerns.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Dr.
Baird, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the
witnesses for being here. I always learn something in these
meetings with the talented witnesses that you have here.
But, you know, I got to tell you, Mr. Chairman, I really
appreciate serving on a Committee with you. You're very
organized, you're very methodical, and I know exactly what you
expect of me, so I commend you on that.
Chairman Lucas. You are a great underclassmen.
Mr. Baird. But, you know, I have a research background, and
so the issue we're talking about here today, I strongly believe
that research is going to be our way to stay ahead of the rest
of the countries in this world, including some of our
adversaries, and so I really understand the open platform and
the reason for that. If you have an open platform, you don't
have to reinvent the wheel every time. But as every one of you
have mentioned, the concern is how do you do that, keep people
stimulated. And I've heard you say that, but I still want to
emphasize that we do have to pay attention to what our
adversaries are doing. And sometimes it seems innocent, but the
piece of information they get may be key. And I know you know
that, but I just want to reemphasize how important I think that
is.
So my first question is, Dr. Lauer, this Committee has
heard from researchers that they're blamed when identifying
foreign threats, as it reveals a weakness in their security
systems. So how can the Federal agencies sincerely protect and
support our researchers to address vulnerabilities without
impacting their strength to identify threats?
Dr. Lauer. So I think a major part of this is enhancing a
culture in which it is understood that we can have both
integrity and security, as well as strong science and strong
international collaborations. And in many respects, we get
quite practical. Dr. Keiser referred to the JASON report, which
has some amazingly good advice, which we've actually used, to
help individual scientists, as well as university
administrators develop international collaborations that do
exactly what you're saying, that assure high-quality science,
effective science, but at the same time, ensure that the
interests of all parties are being appropriately protected.
Mr. Baird. Thank you. Dr. Prabhakar, the CHIPS and Science
Act that we passed here a year or so ago directed the
development of the training modules for NSF that was launched
last month. The legislation also requires a certification that
all federally funded grantees complete an annual training on
research security policies and foreign threats. So how do you
expect universities to certify this requirement before the
research security program guidance is finalized?
Dr. Prabhakar. Thank you for that question. And that,
again, is part of the urgency. I'm failing to get that done and
to wrestle through all the complex issues that we're struggling
with on the research security programs. The CHIPS and Science
Act was--is such an important step forward, the training piece
is critical, and I know that NSF has been able to make some
good progress with that.
The CHIPS R&D component at the Department of Commerce is
ramping up now that--we had a great launch event last week for
that, and I know that Secretary Raimondo is particularly
focused on that--on the workforce components. So, again, I
think that's--getting that right is--I completely share your
focus on that.
Mr. Baird. So do either of the two of you left have any
comments in that regard?
Dr. Keiser. We look forward to coordinated, of course, on
the research security program standards, and we also are moving
forward with a certification of the training. So we're entering
it into our policy guide that the researchers on NSF grants who
usually also get grants, I said, from these other agencies are
going to need to certify that they've taken this research
security training.
Dr. Richmond. Yes, and I would say that at the Department
of Energy, we're coordinating very much with our other agencies
to make sure that the training that we provide is consistent
with what everyone else is doing. It is a--it's an evolving
issue, and we have to make sure that the training that we
create evolves with the threats that come to us, so thank you
for that.
Mr. Baird. Thank you. And you completed well on time. Mr.
Chairman, I got 9 seconds left, so I yield back.
Chairman Lucas. I am impressed, Doctor. I'll let an Indiana
Member question any day.
With that, we turn to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
McCormick, for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, appreciate this and
this topic especially.
We recognize the United States as the leader in research
and development with some of the brightest minds and the
greatest ideas. We don't always support the R&D the way that
people want to, sometimes from government, sometimes from
private entity, but collaboratively, we've been leading the way
in AI production for--since the beginning of its inception.
Research and innovation are the crux of the American dream.
The idea that people from all over the world with different
backgrounds can achieve success and prosperity through hard
work, determination, and initiative is the basis of our
society. Just a few weeks ago, I had the pleasure of visiting
the AI hub at Georgia Tech. We had three silos. It's amazing. I
watched this production of amazing technology where you get to
actually design the hardware and software together to work in
this next advancement in technology so we can do some really
special things. In Georgia, I think, when we lead the way--
three of the silos of the 30 are right there in Georgia, which
I'm really excited about and how it can apply to everything
from healthcare to engineering to literature, and you name it,
that is the future.
With that being said, though, we live in a time where real
national security threats exist, and we must ensure that our
universities and research systems have clear guidance to
place--in place to ensure that we are safeguarding our critical
research programs from foreign adversaries, specifically, the
Chinese Communist Party. I've watched them develop their AI
over time. They've invested a tremendous amount of resources
all from their government, all guided by them and a lot of
times for nefarious reasons. And they also were produced with
their slave labor and their manipulation in the market, a very
cheap product.
Unfortunately, all of our AI production is in Taiwan, which
the Chinese Communist Party has openly said they will take by
2027. And the CHIPS Act, by the way, didn't solve that, so I'm
very concerned.
Dr. Lauer, recent reviews of the Health and Human Services
Office of Inspector General and GAO have raised questions about
the NIH and its effectiveness in monitoring and overseeing its
ward recipients, particularly for grants involving foreign
subrecipients. In January 2022, HHS Office of Inspector General
recommended that NIH implement enhanced monitoring
documentation and reporting requirements, quote, ``for grants
with foreign subrecipients,'' and NIH agreed with the
recommendation, but subsequently stated that it may need to
obtain additional authority.
My question is this. Can you elaborate on what additional
authorities are required and what steps the NIH has taken to
implement this recommendation?
Dr. Lauer. So I think we have some good news there, which
is that we've been able to implement all the recommendations
from that audit. One of the things that we did was that we
provided a guidance or a clarification guidance that indicated
that all foreign recipients have to make available to their
prime domestic recipients information that informs progress
reports, so that would include laboratory notebooks, original
electronic files. And they have to do this in a timely way,
which would typically mean at least once a year, if not more
often than that.
We put that out in the Federal Register last June. We
received comments, we responded to the comments, and we put out
a final policy last fall. And that policy is now in the process
of being implemented.
Mr. McCormick. OK. I just want to point out that whether it
be the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization
(WHO), which China belongs to both and has manipulated
brilliantly in the over 20 law cases which they lose, and then
it gets better cheating. The WHO was we have serious questions
about what happened with COVID and its development. Just
another agreement with other foreign subsidiaries and
recipients doesn't really go into accountability. Just because
we have an agreement doesn't mean you don't cheat, and it goes
into arms wars and everything else that we've seen the
international community cheat at. So I don't want to just see
rules and agreements. I want to see oversight and
accountability, which is the bigger part and the harder part of
what we do. And could you address that?
Dr. Lauer. We completely agree. And, as you may know, we've
had a case in which a foreign subrecipient refused to provide
information that our agency was requesting that resulted in
termination of their subaward, and even more than that, it led
to debarment of that foreign institution for 10 years. So we do
take accountability very seriously, completely agree with you.
Mr. McCormick. OK. I want to point out, too, that even in
drug production, amoxicillin, Augmentin, and other drugs that
we have produced overseas specifically in the CCP, that we do a
very poor job of holding them to the same standard we have our
own people held to account. In other words, we investigate our
hospitals, our drugmakers, our manufacturing constantly, and
yet the very things we rely on China for safety and production,
we don't do, and when we do it, we give them announcement, we
give them warning, and we do it very infrequently. So
accountability is something we need to do a much better job of
those foreign subrecipients than we do with our own people.
And with that, I yield.
Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman's
time has expired.
It appears that all of our colleagues who were available
for questions have asked their questions. Therefore, I want to
thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony, and of
course, the Members for their questions. This has been a very
productive hearing.
The record will remain open for 10 days for additional
comments and written questions from Members. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix I
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by the Honorable Arati Prabhakar
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Responses by Dr. Rebecca Keiser
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Responses by Dr. Geri Richmond
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Responses by Dr. Michael Lauer
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Appendix II
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Additional Material for the Record
Documents submitted by Representative Frank Lucas
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Report submitted by Representative Bill Posey
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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