[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


 AMERICAN CONFIDENCE IN ELECTIONS: THE ROLE OF THE ELECTION ASSISTANCE 
             COMMISSION IN FREE, FAIR, AND SECURE ELECTIONS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                           COMMITTEE ON HOUSE
                             ADMINISTRATION

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                             JUNE 14, 2023
                               __________

      Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration
      

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                             www.govinfo.gov
                           www.cha.house.gov
                           
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
54-726                    WASHINGTON : 2024                              
                           

                   COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION

                    BRYAN STEIL, WISCONSIN, Chairman

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia            JOSEPH MORELLE, New York,
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia              Ranking Member
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina          TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
STEPHANIE BICE, Oklahoma             DEREK KILMER, Washington
MIKE CAREY, Ohio                     NORMA TORRES, California
ANTHONY D'ESPOSITO, New York
LAUREL LEE, Florida

                      Tim Monahan,  Staff Director 
                 Jamie Fleet,  Minority Staff Director 

                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                           Opening Statements

Chairman Bryan Steil, Representative from the State of Wisconsin.     1
    Prepared statement of Chairman Bryan Steil...................     3
Ranking Member Joseph Morelle, Representative from the State of 
  New York.......................................................     4
    Prepared statement of Ranking Member Joseph Morelle..........     6

                               Witnesses

Christy McCormick, chairwoman, Election Assistance Commission....     8
    Prepared statement of Christy McCormick......................    11
Benjamin Hovland, vice chairman, Election Assistance Commission..    26
    Prepared statement of Benjamin Hovland.......................    28
Donald Palmer, commissioner, Election Assistance Commission......    43
    Prepared statement of Donald Palmer..........................    45
Thomas Hicks, commissioner, Election Assistance Commission.......    60
    Prepared statement of Thomas Hicks...........................    62
Brianna Schletz, inspector general, Election Assistance 
  Commission.....................................................   125
    Prepared statement of Brianna Schletz........................   128

                       Submissions for the Record

Inspector general report.........................................    80
The Brennan Center June 2023 Voting Laws Roundup.................    91
Inspector general management advisory............................   105
New York Times article...........................................   114
Albert Hunt article..............................................   119

 
 AMERICAN CONFIDENCE IN ELECTIONS: THE ROLE OF THE ELECTION ASSISTANCE 
             COMMISSION IN FREE, FAIR, AND SECURE ELECTIONS

                              ----------                              


                             June 14, 2023

                          House of Representatives,
                         Committee on House Administration,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in 
room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Bryan Steil 
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Steil, Loudermilk, Griffith, 
Murphy, Carey, Lee, and Morelle.
    Also present: Representative Good.
    Staff present: Tim Monahan, Staff Director; Caleb Hays, 
Deputy Staff Director, General Counsel, Acting Parliamentarian; 
Hillary Lassiter, Clerk; Alex Deise, Elections Counsel, 
Assistant Parliamentarian; Jordan Wilson, Director of Member 
Services; Thomas Lane, Elections Counsel and Director of 
Elections Coalitions; Khalil Abboud, Minority Deputy Staff 
Director, Chief Counsel; Eddie Flaherty, Minority Chief Clerk; 
Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director; Sarah Nasta, Minority 
Elections Counsel; Owen Reilly, Minority Shared Staff; and Sean 
Wright, Minority Senior Elections Counsel.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRYAN STEIL, CHAIRMAN OF THE 
 COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
                           WISCONSIN

    Chairman Steil. The Committee on House Administration will 
come to order. I note that a quorum is present.
    Without objection, the chair may declare a recess any time.
    Also, without objection, the meeting record will remain 
open for 5 legislative days so Members may submit any materials 
they wish to be included therein.
    Thank you, Ranking Member Morelle, Members of the 
Committee, and our witnesses, for participating in today's 
hearing.
    The purpose of today's hearing is twofold. First, it serves 
as a long overdue Oversight hearing with the Elections 
Assistance Commission, or EAC. This is the Committee's first 
Oversight hearing of the Elections Assistance Commission since 
2011. As Chairman of the Committee on House Administration, I 
can assure you times are changing. I am excited. We are 
committed to a robust oversight of our Federal agencies to make 
sure we are protecting taxpayer dollars.
    Second, today's hearing will examine what improvements can 
be made to the EAC through the American Confidence in Elections 
Act to help improve voters' confidence that our Nation's 
elections are free, fair, and secure. Congress serves as an 
important check on Federal agencies to ensure they are 
fulfilling their purpose. The EAC was established to serve as 
an independent, bipartisan commission charged with helping 
voters participate in the electoral process and to help confirm 
election officials improve the administration of elections.
    Following the 2000 election, Congress decided that election 
administration problems were big enough that a new Federal 
agency needed to be created. In its first 6 years, the EAC 
doled out $3 billion in Federal taxpayer dollars in grants to 
States and has spent billions since.
    While some States have used the money effectively, we know 
some States have not. As part of the CARES Act, the EAC 
received $400 million in additional grant funding to prepare 
for the 2020 election cycle. The GAO found that the EAC is 
unable to account for the full $400 million due to poor 
accounting policies. The GAO also found that EAC conducted 
minimal oversight. Reporting made it--the reporting made, it, 
quote, difficult to determine how grant funds were spent across 
States, end quote.
    The failure to accurately track how States use these 
Federal grants has potentially enabled significant waste, 
fraud, and abuse.
    I am also concerned that some States spent the funds for 
political purpose rather than improving election 
administration. Let us look at how California spent their 2020 
funds. The State of California was awarded $35 million in 
Federal funds. California spent the money on a ``get out the 
vote'' campaign. The campaign targeted specific voters. The 
contract was awarded through an expedited process. The firm 
that was awarded the contract was SKDKnickerbocker. 
SKDKnickerbocker was Biden's campaign advisory firm. If you 
went to the company's website, you would see they listed 
themselves as part of, quote, Team Biden. If that is not a 
conflict of interest, I do not know what is. It is a violation 
of Federal law to use HAVA grant funds for ``get out the vote'' 
activity.
    The former EAC inspector general stated that the contract 
between the California secretary of state and SKDKnickerbocker 
presented a risk of improper use that required further 
examination. The American people demand more transparency and 
accountability in their Government, especially with respect 
with to elections.
    Today will bring much needed oversight to the EAC to 
examine how we can eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse. In doing 
so, we can help improve voters' confidence in both the EAC and 
our election process as a whole.
    I will now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Morelle, for 5 
minutes for the purpose of providing his opening statement.
    [The prepared statement of Chairman Steil follows:]

   PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE 
                   ADMINISTRATION BRYAN STEIL

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH MORELLE, RANKING MEMBER OF THE 
 COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
                            NEW YORK

    Mr. Morelle. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Steil, for 
welcoming us all today.
    I want to thank our witnesses for being here this morning.
    The role of the Election Assistance Commission, EAC, is a 
critical one. Every American must be able to cast their 
ballots, freely, fairly, and securely, and to have their vote 
counted as cast. Voters cannot do that without the hard work of 
the officials and poll workers who administer elections, and 
EAC's support of these officials is crucial.
    The EAC was established more than 20 years ago by the Help 
America Vote Act, also known as HAVA, with broad bipartisan 
support. In the past two decades, the EAC has evolved to meet 
its mission and to adapt new elections landscape. We should 
maintain this spirit of bipartisan support through all of this.
    As election-related myths and disinformation has grown, 
voters bear a growing burden of having to sort fact from 
fiction.
    A trusted clearinghouse of information and resources such 
as the EAC is invaluable to providing voters with resources 
they urgently need and ensuring election officials have the 
tools to educate voters and conduct safe and secure elections 
in an ever-changing environment. The EAC provides assistance as 
election officials face growing threats and partners with other 
Federal agencies to address critical infrastructure needs.
    In recent years, we have seen attempts to undermine public 
trust and confidence in our elections and the electoral 
process, and while voter confidence has improved in the last 
couple of years, having a trusted messenger of election 
information is vital to our democracy. One of the most 
significant needs in election administration is robust and 
consistent funding. Since 2018, Congress has provided more than 
$950 million in HAVA security grants and $400 million in CARES 
Act funding, but more is needed. Indeed, President Biden's 
budget calls for investing $5 billion over the next 10 years, 
and I fully support the President's budget request.
    Maintaining our democracy requires resources, and budgets 
reflect society's priorities. We need to make sure that we are 
consistent about this because that reflects our support for 
fair and open accessible elections. The need for funding is 
acute. Estimates for what it could cost to adequately fund 
elections over the next decade are in the billions of dollars, 
billions of dollars.
    Despite being designated critical infrastructure in 2017, 
Federal investment in elections is irregular, unpredictable, 
and insufficient. Simply will not do.
    We must provide for sufficient, regular, and predictable 
funding for States and local election administrators through 
HAVA grants, as well as fully funding the EAC.
    As a Ranking Member of this Committee and a Member of the 
House Appropriations Committee, I look forward to working with 
my colleagues to provide an adequate amount of election funding 
as an investment in protecting democracy, empowering election 
officials to do their good work, and to improve and modernize 
Federal elections.
    For years, the EAC was underfunded, targeted by my 
colleagues on the other side with measures to eliminate the 
agency. I hope we have moved on from the past days, and can all 
agree that the EAC has a critical role in our electoral 
process. It should be equipped with the funding necessary to 
meet its mandate and the evolving needs of our election 
officials. I was heartened to hear in recent testimony from 
Vice Chair Hovland and Commissioner Palmer about educational 
tools the EAC has developed for election officials to utilize 
new programs the EAC is working on, such as the field services 
program and the regular engagement of the commission with State 
and local officials, and other Federal partners.
    I look forward to hearing from all the Commissioners today 
about work the EAC is doing with election officials around the 
country about the implementation of the updated guidelines for 
voting systems and how the Commission is preparing for the 2024 
elections. Additionally, there is always room for program 
improvements. We all want to ensure taxpayer dollars are spent 
effectively and efficiently.
    I look forward to hearing from Inspector General Schletz 
about opportunities for those improvements. The work we do now 
laying a bedrock of education about the voting process, 
strengthening partnerships among Federal, State, and local 
governments, will further bolster voter confidence under the 
2024 Presidential election. The 2020 and 2022 elections showed 
that our national democratic experiment can hold, but we must 
remain steadfast in our commitment to democratic principles as 
we head into this next election cycle.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and 
thank you all, again, for being here, for the important work 
that you do each and every day.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Ranking Member Morelle follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE 
                 ADMINISTRATION JOSEPH MORELLE

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    Chairman Steil. Thank you very much.
    Without objection, all Members' opening statements will be 
made part of the hearing record if they are submitted to the 
Committee clerk by 5 p.m. today.
    Today we have two witness panels. We welcome the 
Commissioners on our first panel, and Ms. Brianna Schletz, 
Inspector General of the Elections Assistance Commission, will 
participate on our second panel.
    Commissioners, we appreciate you being with us today, and 
we look forward to your testimony.
    Pursuant to paragraph B of Committee rule 6, the witnesses 
will please stand and raise your right hand.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Chairman Steil. Let the record show the witnesses answered 
in the affirmative and may be seated.
    I will now introduce our first witness panel. Our first 
witness, Chairwoman Christy McCormick was confirmed by 
unanimous consent by the U.S. Senate on December 16, 2014, to 
serve on the U.S. Elections Assistance Commission. Chairwoman 
McCormick has twice served as Chair and currently serves as the 
Chairwoman of the EAC and is the designated Federal officer for 
the Technical Guidelines Development Committee.
    Our next witness, Commissioner Benjamin Hovland, was 
confirmed by the U.S. Senate on January 2, 2019, and currently 
serves as Vice Chairman of the U.S. Elections Assistance 
Commission and as the designated Federal officer for the Local 
Leadership Council. With 20 years of experience in elections, 
Commissioner Hovland's career has focused on legal issues 
related to campaign finance regulation, the administration of 
State and Federal elections, including recent poll worker 
training, voter registration list maintenance, statewide data 
base matching, voter education, and ballot initiative 
litigation.
    Our next witness, Commissioner Donald Palmer was nominated 
by President Trump, confirmed by unanimous consent to the U.S. 
Senate on January 2, 2019. Commissioner Palmer is a former 
secretary of the Virginia State Board of Elections and served 
as the Commonwealth's chief election official from 2011 to 
2014. He also previously served as Florida's State election 
director.
    Finally, Commissioner Thomas Hicks was nominated by 
President Obama, confirmed by unanimous consent to the U.S. 
Senate in 2014 to serve on the U.S. Elections Assistance 
Commission. Prior to his appointment with EAC, Commissioner 
Hicks spent nearly 10 at the Committee on House Administration 
serving as senior elections counsel and minority elections 
counsel.
    We appreciate you being here today and look forward to 
testimony. As a reminder, we have read your written statement, 
and it will appear in full in the hearing record.
    Under Committee rule 9, you are to limit your oral 
presentation to a brief summary of your written statement 
unless I extend the time in consultation with the Ranking 
Member.
    Please remember to press the button on the microphone in 
front of you so the Members can hear you. When you begin to 
speak, you will see a light that will turn green; 4 minutes, it 
will turn yellow; then it will turn red, and we will ask you to 
wrap up.
    I now recognize you, Ms. McCormick, for 5 minutes for the 
purposes of making an opening statement.

  STATEMENTS OF HON. CHRISTY MCCORMICK, CHAIRWOMAN, ELECTION 
  ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN HOVLAND, VICE 
CHAIRMAN, ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; THE HONORABLE DONALD 
 PALMER, COMMISSIONER, ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; AND THE 
   HONORABLE THOMAS HICKS, COMMISSIONER, ELECTION ASSISTANCE 
                          COMMISSION.

              STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTY MCCORMICK

    Ms. McCormick. Chairman Steil, Ranking Member Morelle, and 
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you today to discuss the work of the U.S. 
Election Assistance Commission as we prepare for the 2024 
elections.
    We appreciate the Committee's crucial oversight efforts and 
close attention to the EAC. Our Nation's elections have faced 
increased scrutiny in recent years, and the Committee has 
responded by demonstrating leadership in helping to support 
election administrators.
    By conducting this important series of congressional 
hearings, the House Administration Committee has shined a 
spotlight on increasing America's confidence in elections. As 
you move forward and consider election administration reform, 
the EAC stands ready to assist and carry out the provisions of 
that legislation. It is essential that U.S. elections are 
conducted with integrity and transparency, and are free, fair, 
and trustworthy. The bipartisan EAC works to uphold this charge 
each day.
    Over the past decade, the field of election administration 
has faced ever-growing challenges and the need for increased 
technology improvements to our election systems. Many of these 
challenges, including questions about adequate funding and 
security for voting systems, are not new. Others, however, have 
increased suddenly in recent years.
    For example, social media continues to evolve with new 
platforms and generative AI tools, making voter education more 
challenging. In addition to administering elections in voter 
education, officials must still prepare for cyber, physical, 
and personal security threats. Many election officials have 
left the field citing safety, increased requirements and 
expectations, and a lack of resources. Some communities have 
seen their entire elections department resign.
    Now more than ever our election officials need our support. 
With the help of this Committee, the EAC is determined to do 
all it can to meet these challenges. Over the past year, 
Commissioners have redoubled outreach by resuming travel across 
the country for in-person meetings, presentations, and visits 
with State and local election officials. Discussions during 
these visits underscored not only the outstanding work of 
election administrators in 2022 midterms but also the 
significant impact of efforts by the Federal Government to 
provide guidance, monetary resources, and best practice 
materials.
    Election officials have expressed sincere gratitude for 
recent assistance, especially for resources dedicated to safety 
and security. This includes $955 million in HAVA security 
grants provided by Congress and administered by the EAC. With 
support from Congress in the form of increased agency operating 
budget and more consistent HAVA funding to the States, the 
Commission continues to fulfill the agency's mission to improve 
the administration of Federal elections and to help Americans 
vote.
    As you are aware, the decentralized nature of U.S. 
elections results in a wide variety of practices, laws, and 
regulations. To support the country's multitude of election 
situations and meet HAVA's charge with developing election 
guidance, the EAC's Clearinghouse Division has generated a 
depth of informative products, including updated quick start 
guides, a new version of the election management guidelines, 
which is a primary for election administration, guides, 
checklists, and one-pagers, white papers, simulation videos, 
toolkits, and other products to assist election officials. 
These documents reflect the need for unbiased, trusted source 
of guidance as election officials navigate the complexities of 
election administration. This is especially important now as we 
welcome and train the many new officials across country.
    Earlier this year, the agency hired an experienced 
Government leader, Steven Frid, to serve as our new executive 
director. The EAC has also hired needed support staff to assist 
the election process and specifically the role it plays as 
critical infrastructure. Additionally, the EAC marked the 20th 
anniversary of HAVA in 2022, commemorating the historic 
milestone with the launch of Help America Vote Day and the 
celebration of the second national poll worker recruitment day.
    With more than 3,000 countries and thousands of localities, 
it takes nearly 1 million poll workers to operate election 
polling sites. This process supports more than 209 million 
registered voters. The EAC continues to strategically promote 
election worker information on social media and on our website. 
We created helpamericavote.gov a permanent outreach platform in 
2020 in service of the first national poll worker recruitment 
day. Over the course of 2022, through the agency's poll worker 
web pages had over 263,000 page views. We regularly receive 
modifications from election offices, and based on the 
responses, information is updated consistently.
    Looking forward to 2024 with ongoing support from Congress, 
the Commission will provide the necessary assistance to 
election officials to mitigate challenges and protect the 
integrity of U.S. elections. I would like to, again, thank the 
Committee for its oversight in support of the EAC, as well as 
for the opportunity to speak here today.
    I will now turn the discussion over to Commissioner Ben 
Hovland to discuss the Commission's internal financial 
oversight and grants management.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. McCormick follows:]

            PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTY MCCORMICK

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    Chairman Steil. Thank you very much, Chairwoman McCormick.
    Vice Chair Hovland, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

               STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN HOVLAND

    Mr. Hovland. Thank you, Chairman Steil, Ranking Member 
Morelle, and Members of the Committee for inviting us to 
testify about the work of the U.S. Election Assistance 
Commission. My name is Ben Hovland, and I am the current Vice 
Chair of the EAC.
    A core component of the EAC's mission is distributing, 
monitoring, and auditing the use of Federal grants for the 
improvement of election administration and security. Federal 
HAVA funds, including the $955 million provided since 2018, are 
a key resource for election administrators responding to 
increased technology and the changing demands of the field.
    To emphasize the importance and impact of this funding, I 
would note the election infrastructure sector-specific plan 
states, quote, it is impossible to make an honest assessment of 
the election infrastructure subsector's risk and the potential 
to mitigate that risk without an understanding of the chronic 
resource issues the subsector faces at all levels of 
government, end quote.
    As we look forward to 2024, I believe it has never been 
more challenging to administer elections or more expensive. 
That is why grant funding in partnership with the States is so 
crucial, and we value your efforts to address the needs of the 
State and local governments through the congressional 
appropriations process.
    As of this March, 95 percent of the Fiscal Year 2018 
election security grant funds have been expended, including 
additional election security funds from Fiscal Year 2020, 2022, 
and 2023. States have spent a total of $529 million in funds 
awarded between 2018 and 2023, which is approximately 56 
percent of the available grant funding.
    The spending rate depends on States' planned use with some 
States allocating the funds for long-term programs or 
resources. Some States provide these funds to local governments 
in the form of subgrants, while others rely on funds for staff 
and materials of the State level.
    With each States' different security priorities and 
timetables for significant purchases, such as voting system 
replacement or new statewide voter registration data bases, 
usage rates have varied across the country. The next 
expenditure reports are due to the EAC on July 30th. As set 
forth under HAVA, audits of election security grants are 
conducted after a State begins to expend the provided funds. 
Alongside distribution and administration efforts, EAC's office 
of inspector general recently added resources and staff to 
better monitor State spending of election security grants.
    With new staff leadership in place, the agency has invested 
in building up staff capacity strategically across the agency. 
However, the EAC still faces significant attrition challenges. 
It is essential that we maintain adequate staffing levels in 
mission-critical functions to ensure statutorily mandated 
requirements are met. The EAC's Inspector General has raised 
structural issues related to HAVA that are discussed in her 
report on management challenges for the U.S. Election 
Assistance Commission in Fiscal Year 2023.
    My colleagues and I concur with those observations and have 
included them in our legislative recommendations. Of particular 
note, the inability to pay competitive wages compared to 
Congress or other Federal agencies hampers our ability to 
attract and retain talent. We are, however, committed to doing 
everything we can with the resources we have. The EAC is 
grateful for the increased funding provided by Congress in 
recent years.
    After facing over a decade of significant fiscal 
constraints, EAC returned to pre-2010 budget levels for the 
first time in Fiscal Year 2023. For Fiscal Year 2021, and 2022, 
the EAC successfully adapted and executed the operating budget 
provided by Congress, ending each year with an obligation rate 
over 99 percent. Congressional funding has been fully utilized, 
enabling the agency to provide much needed assistance to 
address some of the pressing challenges facing the election 
community.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today, 
and I look forward to any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hovland follows:]

          PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN HOVLAND

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    Chairman Steil. Thank you, Vice Chair Hovland.
    Commissioner Palmer, you are now recognized.

                STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD PALMER

    Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Chairman Steil, Ranking Member 
Morelle, and Members of the Committee. I echo my fellow 
Commissioners in our appreciation of the investment you have 
made in the Nation's elections through continued support of the 
EAC.
    In preparation for the 2024 election, the EAC will continue 
to test and certify the Nation's voting systems and will 
continue--and the American public should be confident that 
their ballot will be counted.
    In 2023, the EAC will advance our testing and certification 
efforts in several areas. A voting system certification does 
not end with a successful test in an accredited laboratory; 
rather, the review of these voting systems continues during the 
lifespan of the voting equipment. As a result, the agency is 
preparing to launch an innovative field services program to 
help election officials strengthen their overall posture and 
preparedness with EAC-certified systems.
    This onsite collaboration is important for several reasons. 
First, the implementation assisting reviews in the field will 
ensure that equipment delivered to jurisdictions is equivalent 
to what was purchased. The effort will analyze system hardware 
and software configurations to verify the equivalency of the 
equipment to EAC certifications. Additionally, there will be 
jurisdiction site surveys of voting systems, the best practices 
assessments, collection of system census information, and 
analysis of anomaly reports. We recently onboarded the field 
services program manager and look forward to building out this 
initiative.
    In 2022, the Commission made some considerable progress by 
fully operationalizing version 2.0 of the Voluntary Voting 
Systems Guidelines, or VVSG. The new guidelines incorporate 
technological advancements in cybersecurity, accuracy, 
accessibility, usability, and audibility. Adoption of the EAC's 
new lifecycle policy along with the accreditation of two voting 
system test laboratories are necessary steps toward the 
realization of voting systems that are VVSG 2.0 tested and 
certified. The EAC has one system that is being currently 
tested against VVSG 2.0, and the Commissioners just recently 
visited the Pro V&V, the test lab, and got to see firsthand 
some of the testing that is going on in Huntsville, Alabama.
    We would also like to take this opportunity to emphasize 
that VVSG 1.0 and 1.1 certified systems will not be decertified 
by the EAC as a result of migration to the new guidelines. 
Voting systems that are currently deployed are still accurate 
and reliable, and they continue to be used and do not need to 
be immediately replaced or recertified to 2.0. In addition, 
they will continue to be tested and updated with security 
patches.
    It will take time and significant monetary expenditures for 
jurisdictions to implement VVSG 2.0, so it is unlikely that 
systems certified to 2.0 will be used in the 2024 elections. 
Congress and the American people, though, should have absolute 
confidence in this process. The EAC has amplified this message 
by publishing a communications toolkit to assist election 
officials in communicating about VVSG standards, updates in 
election security, and helping to boost confidence in the 
critical infrastructure of our election systems.
    As part of our election technology efforts, the agency 
launched the Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program, 
or ESTEP. This technology includes electronic poll books, 
electronic ballot delivery systems, election night reporting 
data bases, and voter registration portals. These crucial 
election-supporting technologies are crucial tools for both 
election officials and voters.
    As more States and localities adopt these technologies, 
officials are looking to the Federal Government for voluntary 
standards and guidance similar to what is provided currently in 
the VVSG. Election administrators today must rely on a 
patchwork of State laws, regulation, and certification programs 
of varying degrees and review. An establishment of the EAC 
program will provide for the development of robust voluntary 
security standards, testing guidance, and training materials 
covering these election-supporting technologies.
    Attacks from nation-state actors against our election 
infrastructure have specifically targeted election systems as, 
I pointed out, in the past, and these attacks are only going to 
escalate. The first technology pilot for ESTEP is electronic 
poll books, and these are critical election supporting 
technology for election officials as they are used in the 
polling place.
    As the cyber security threat landscape across the election 
community continues to evolve, the EAC is planning a voluntary 
coordinated vulnerability disclosure program. The EAC will lead 
a program to quickly identify and respond to vulnerabilities in 
our voting system alongside our Federal partners. Development 
of this program is in its preliminary stages and will require 
staff and resources to be fully realized.
    I would like to thank, again, the Committee for allowing us 
to speak with you today. I will now turn it over--the 
discussion over to Commissioner Tom Hicks to further expand on 
the Commonwealth's wealth of clearinghouse products further 
briefly mentioned by Chairwoman McCormick.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Palmer follows:]

            PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD PALMER

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    Chairman Steil. Thank you, Commissioner Palmer.
    Commissioner Hicks, you are now recognized.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS HICKS

    Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Chairman Steil, Ranking Member 
Morelle, and Members of the Committee for having us here today. 
My name is Thomas Hicks.
    In addition to the developments my fellow Commissioners 
have shared, the agency has also invested in increasing our 
clearinghouse capabilities.
    The EAC's Clearinghouse Division, composed of former 
election officials and subject-matter experts, help the agency 
share and develop resources for both the public and election 
administrators. In this role, the EAC serves as a trusted 
source of nonpartisan election information, especially in the 
ever-evolving election landscape as the field of election 
administration continues to see high levels of turnover.
    Leading up to the 2024 elections, the Clearinghouse 
Division has released more than 60 products over the past 2 
years, including a rise--range of best practices and toolkits. 
Topics range from resources on physical security threats 
against election officials to EAVS data collection and 
analysis. Clearinghouse products offer overall guidance to new 
election officials in conducting elections, such as improving 
chain-of-custody procedures, auditing, and better serving 
voters with disabilities. This includes new management 
guidelines, updates with increased focus on relevant election 
technologies that have changed since the last release 15 years 
ago.
    All of the products developed by the Clearinghouse Division 
are guided by the parameters set forth in HAVA. We have heard 
from election officials across the country about the escalation 
of threats they, their colleagues, and poll workers have faced. 
The agency has developed and distributed clearinghouse 
resources and information from other Federal partners, such as 
our dedicated landing page, as well as issuing guidance with 
the election security grants assistance.
    Another issue of concern are risks to the supply chain. 
While specific rules relating to paper ballot ordering are 
determined at State level, there are areas where the 
Clearinghouse Division can provide guidance moving forward, 
particularly in the event of an emergency. In the summer of 
2022, the EAC released an alert about the nationwide paper 
shortage and guidance on how to plan for depletions of paper 
inventory on election day.
    Additionally, States may use HAVA election security grant 
funding for procuring ballot stock that has security features, 
such as watermarks and unique ballot identifiers. Our grants 
team also issued guidance on this matter. The EAC will publish 
the 2022 Election Administration and Voting Survey, or EAVS, at 
the end of this month. This biennial report collects data on 
election administration from nearly 6,500 local election 
jurisdictions across all 50 States, the District of Columbia, 
and U.S. Territories. EAVS data is utilized by countless 
stakeholders in the election community.
    The EAC also remains committed to election officials 
fulfilling the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and HAVA's promise of a private and independent vote for 
all eligible Americans. We have hired a full-time subject-
matter expert for accessibility to lead these efforts. The EAC 
is working on a national study to document the experience of 
voters with disabilities in the 2022 midterms. The survey will 
be released this summer.
    The Commission intends to use the results to produce 
actionable items that are necessary to meet HAVA's vision of 
fully accessible elections.
    Our other voting accessibility resources include toolkits 
for in-person voting, voter registration, vote by mail, and 
assistance for voters with language access needs. These 
language resources were updated following the most recent 
update to section 203 of the Voting Acts requirements, which 
requires 333 jurisdictions to provide language assistance.
    With the 2024 election cycle already here, election 
officials face an ever-growing list of responsibilities and 
challenges. The EAC is working diligently to help them prepare 
for the expected and the unexpected to provide the best voting 
experience possible for every voter.
    Thank you for the opportunity to share some of the work of 
the EAC and your commitment to election administrators, poll 
workers, and voters. There is still a lot that needs to be 
done, and we look forward to working with you on these issues. 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look 
forward to answering questions and feedback you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hicks follows:]

            PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS HICKS

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    Chairman Steil. Thank you, Commissioner Hicks.
    We thank all of our witnesses for being here today.
    I will begin our questions today followed by the Ranking 
Member. We will then alternate between sides.
    I now recognize myself for the purpose of questioning our 
witnesses.
    We will hear from EAC Inspector General Schletz soon on the 
recently submitted OIG semiannual report to Congress.
    Commissioner and Chairwoman McCormick, you submitted a 
response to that report 2 weeks ago stating that you were 
pleased that the California audit recommendations have all been 
resolved and closed. The audit was conducted because California 
awarded a $35 million contract through an expedited process to 
Joe Biden's main election advisory firm.
    This does not inspire confidence that our funds EAC has a 
responsibility for are being properly used. Relating to the 
funds, the EAC budget 5 years ago was $9 million. The 2024 
budget request asks for almost $34 million, a roughly $25 
million increase from just 5 years ago and an almost 300-
percent increase in funds.
    Commissioner McCormick, has the EAC's jurisdiction 
increased since its creation under HAVA in 2002?
    Ms. McCormick. Only by the addition of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, Chairman Steil. We do have increased work on the 
Commission. There has been an expansion in concern over 
cybersecurity. We do have a lot more work to do to train 
election officials across the country. We do have increased 
responsibilities with grant management and making sure that the 
grants provided by Congress are appropriately used.
    We were also concerned about the California contract 
between SKD Knickbocker and the California secretary of state's 
office. In fact, we received several letters from this 
Committee, and we also asked our inspector general to look into 
that contract because of the concern of the inappropriate use 
of HAVA funds for ``get out the vote'' and voter registration 
activity.
    Chairman Steil. Commissioner McCormick, I mean, if we look 
at the website, I mean, SKD Knickbocker, I mean, this was not 
overly complicated. I mean, you go to their website, and it is 
Joe Biden for President. They are a--SKD is proud to be part of 
Team Biden. They are taking $35 million of Federal taxpayer 
money to run an election. They run an expedited grant process, 
and the grant process cannot be for ``get out the vote''; it 
has got to be to properly administer their elections. They give 
$35 million of Federal taxpayer money to someone that is a 
proud member of Team Biden, and they expect that the American 
people should have confidence that there is not political 
gamesmanship in this grant?
    Ms. McCormick. We agree with you, Congressman. This is not 
an appropriate use of HAVA funds, and that is why our inspector 
general--our new inspector general came in and did an 
investigation and audit of those HAVA funds that were provided 
to California.
    Chairman Steil. What do we do about it? The $35 million 
went out, went to California, and was spent. What are 
ramifications for spending $35 million to a proud member of 
Team Biden?
    Ms. McCormick. Well, the inspector general's office found 
that the money that was used for those activities was actually 
State funds and not HAVA funds. The inappropriate use of those 
moneys was not by Federal funds. It was utilized by State 
funds, and she resolved that investigation and closed that 
question out.
    However, that does mean we still remain concerned about how 
HAVA funds are used and whether they are being used 
appropriately, documented appropriately, and whether they are 
in--can be reconciled with the plans that the States provide to 
us on how they are going to use the funds.
    Chairman Steil. I read your written testimony. In your 
written testimony, you note that you are going to use some of 
this increase--the $25 million increase you are requesting--to 
enhance the auditing and oversight----
    Ms. McCormick. Correct.
    Chairman Steil [continuing]. of the grantmaking.
    How big is the team now? How big is it going to be? What 
are your needs in that respect?
    Ms. McCormick. Well, we have several members of--we have 
maybe three members in our Grants Division right now. We hope 
to expand that. We also are expanding--the inspector general is 
expanding her team as well, and you know, we need to have more 
resources to be able to have appropriate oversight. One of the 
issues that we have is that we have a short timeline when we do 
get this money from Congress to get that money out to the 
States. That does not excuse us not overseeing those funds 
appropriately, and it takes resources to do that. We appreciate 
that Congress has provided that to us.
    Chairman Steil. In 2022, you had 49 employees. It grew last 
year to 65. The request is to take it to 87, almost doubling in 
just 2 years. We think about the new 16 people that you are 
looking to bring on, you referenced increasing, improving the 
audit and oversight. Are there other specific things that they 
are going to work on?
    Ms. McCormick. Well, we have personnel that we are trying 
to place into the field to do field services following up on 
the testing and certification program. Right now we have no 
visibility of the voting systems once they leave our 
laboratories. We plan on hiring field service auditors to go 
out into the country and to make sure those machines stay up to 
date and are still meeting the certification requirements and 
to assist election officials in any kind of issues that they 
have with maintaining their voting systems.
    Chairman Steil. OK. I am going to go back because I pulled 
up your--while you are saying--the office of inspector general 
report, that according to SOS $11.8 million in EAC HAVA funds 
were used for SKDK contract, $9.9 million of which were CARES 
Act funds, and $1.9 million of 2018 consolidated funds. I just 
think it is broadly concerning to the American people when we 
see the appearance of political activity with Federal taxpayer 
dollars, and we are looking for an increase in your budget, you 
are overseeing a lot of the grants that are going out to the 
States.
    Some of our States are using these funds in productive and 
thoughtful ways to better administer elections. The reason I am 
pushing back is because some States are not, and I am uniquely 
concerned about this contract with California where they gave 
it to--all you had do was go to their website, and they were 
self-listing themselves as a proud member of Team Biden. I 
think that that should be concerning across the board.
    I appreciate all of our Commissioners being here.
    I will now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Morelle, for 
the purposes of asking questions.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    A couple things I just point out. I do want to correct the 
record. I believe EAC Commissioners were here in May 2019 on 
the question of election security, not 2011. I just wanted to 
make sure I made that point.
    I must admit, as much as I appreciate you holding up the 
Joe Biden for President sign--in fact, you could hold it up 
behind me, Mr. Chairman--I do want to just take a moment--I 
only have 5 minutes, but I do want to first of all submit, with 
unanimous consent, like to submit a copy of the inspector 
general's actual report on the issue that is being talked 
about. It is dated February 9th, 2022, and it comes from 
Inspector General Schletz.
    I just want to--I will read at least--a couple of things I 
do want to note since we are going to spend some time here 
apparently talking about this. First of all, the contract was 
not sole-sourced. It says that in the inspector general's 
report. Actually, a number of firms bid on the work, and SKDK 
was one of the vendors chosen. As it relates to the conclusions 
of the inspector general, first of all, the--in the first part, 
Federal funds were not used for registration drives. California 
launched a public education campaign called Vote Safe 
California.
    It indicates that nothing that SDKD--SKDK--I am going to 
get that right--did not violate anything in that regard nor did 
the contract, and as it relates to ``get out the vote,'' it 
says the EAC grants funds for messages educating a specific 
population about safety voting during the population is 
allowed. Similarly, EAC said an advertisement directing the 
public to California's voting website is allowable because the 
website has additional--educational information on how to vote 
safely or procedures for voting.
    We found no specific activities or messaging in the 
definition of ``get out the vote.'' It concludes--and this is 
the important part, I would think, the operative part, the 
conclusion by the inspector general is based on the evidence 
California secretary of state's office executed the SKDK 
contract in accordance with EAC guidelines. Funds were not used 
for unallowable costs, such as registration drives or 
activities meeting the definition of ``get out the vote''.
    I just wanted the record to reflect. We can talk about 
this, I suppose, all day long. The actual inspector general who 
you are referring to basically concluded that they had followed 
all the rules, California had, and there is no there there. I 
just want to just make sure that enters into the record with 
unanimous consent.
    Chairman Steil. Without objection.
    [The report referred to follows:]

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    Mr. Morelle. Using just my last few minutes, perhaps, 
Commissioner Hicks, our elections environment is constantly 
changing. Election administrators deal with ever-evolving 
cybersecurity threats and the rapid spread of mis- and 
disinformation. We need to consider the physical safety of 
election workers and now must respond to an increasing number 
of records requests, analysis requests, and respond to threats 
AI may pose to us all, and, on top of that, actually run 
elections.
    Could you please comment on how increased and reliable 
funding could alleviate some of this significant burden?
    Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Congressman, for that question. 
Increased funding--when we go to election offices, the No. 1 
thing they ask for is additional funding. It is usually one or 
two people in the office that is trying to do nine different 
jobs in an office. They are looking to--the Congressman--the 
Chairman had asked a little bit earlier, have we increased our 
authority. We have not increased our authority, but the scope 
of your jobs have increased in terms of cybersecurity issues 
that no one thought of in 2003 and 2002 when HAVA was enacted. 
Also the fact that we are also fighting nation-states in terms 
of mis- and disinformation. It is not really feasible to ask a 
city clerk in a small town to fight against a superpower for 
mis- and disinformation when the U.S. Government should be 
doing that.
    We have worked with our partners, with the Federal 
Government, that being the DHS. When elections were elevated to 
critical infrastructure, we were able to do a lot more things 
in that sort of realm. I do believe that, with increased 
funding, increased responsibility, we will have to be able to 
do that so that votes can be counted accurately.
    Mr. Morelle. Very good. I had a number of other questions, 
but my time is going to come to an end.
    Before I do that, Mr. Chairman, I also ask unanimous 
consent that the Brennan Center's June 2023 Voting Laws 
Roundup, which found, between January 1 and May 29, at least 11 
States have enacted 13 restrictive laws, including 7 that curb 
access to mail-in voting and an onerous law in Florida which 
would significantly reduce voter drives in advance of the 2024 
election.
    Chairman Steil. Without objection.
    [The Brennan Center's June 2023 Voting Laws Roundup 
referred to follows:]

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    Mr. Morelle. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Loudermilk is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Hit the wrong button. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you to each of our panelists for being here today.
    Chairwoman McCormick, last year, in 2022, the EAC received 
$75 million in elections security grants. In 2024, the EAC has 
requested $300 million in election security grants. Now, my 
calculation, that is about a 300-percent increase. Now, I know 
the entire Nation has been affected by the out-of-control 
Biden-flation that we have right now, but I do not even think 
that is at 300 percent. That leaves us to question, you know, 
what are these grants going for, and can you explain such a 
massive increase?
    Ms. McCormick. Thank you for the question, Congressman 
Loudermilk. The EAC itself is not requesting that money for our 
operations. We constantly hear from States and localities of 
the need for additional funding. Part of that is they are in 
the process of purchasing new and updated voting equipment. A 
lot of the equipment that is out there has been certified to 
standards that were passed in 2007. We need to update election 
equipment across the country.
    Additionally, we need to provide cybersecurity measures on 
all of the machines and all of our systems to make sure that we 
are fighting against any kind of intrusion on our election 
systems. It is a question of national security, and that is why 
there has been an increase in the request. We are approaching 
the 2024 elections. We have heard from our partners at CISA and 
other agencies that they expect a ramp up in attacks on our 
systems, and election officials need to defend those election 
systems in advance of the 2024 elections.
    Mr. Loudermilk. In summary, this is election integrity 
types of security?
    Ms. McCormick. A lot of it is election integrity and 
security.
    Mr. Loudermilk. OK. Security being securing ballots, 
securing individuals?
    Ms. McCormick. Securing the voting systems, securing the 
ballots, physical security, and cybersecurity.
    Mr. Loudermilk. OK. How are you going to ensure that the 
grants are distributed and used properly?
    Ms. McCormick. Well, there is a distribution formula that 
we have to follow. We make sure that our grants team follows 
all the Federal rules on grantmaking and requires all the 
Federal financial reports and progress reports, which are 
required usually semiannual. The last tranche of money required 
them to be filed quarterly. We follow up with the States on any 
issues that they have in using the grants appropriately. We 
also, then, make sure that the inspector general is aware of 
all of the ways that the States are utilizing that money, and 
she does the audits for the EAC.
    Mr. Loudermilk. OK. Hypothetically, if the--if there was a 
suspicion that grants were not used properly, what measures do 
you take to investigate that?
    Ms. McCormick. Well, the inspector general is the person 
who investigates whether funds were used appropriately or not, 
and then it can mean that that money can be repaid into the 
Federal Treasury if it is found to be used inappropriately.
    Mr. Loudermilk. OK. Thank you. On December 12, 2022, the 
EAC inspector general put out a management advisory, 23-01, 
over concerns that the Help America Vote Act does not define 
``voter registration,'' ``voter education,'' or ``get out the 
vote''. Yet HAVA funds cannot be used for these purposes.
    Are you aware of jurisdictions using HAVA funds to engage 
in these efforts in violation of HAVA?
    Ms. McCormick. We monitor the use of the election--the HAVA 
funds, and we have not found that to be the case. We are 
constantly making sure that the funds are used for allowable 
purposes only.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you. I yield my remaining time to the 
Chairman.
    Chairman Steil. Thank you very much. I just want to go back 
to a point my colleague made regarding the grant in California. 
I just think it is worth taking 10 seconds to clean up. I think 
it is technically true that the inspector general came back and 
noted that it was not for a technical ``get out the vote''. The 
challenge is the OIG issued the alert to the U.S. Elections 
Assistance Commission to identify risks because of the terms, 
the following terms ``voter registration,'' ``voter 
education,'' and ``get out the vote'' are not defined in HAVA, 
and EAC has not adopted its own formal definition.
    If we walk away with anything, it is, man, we have got some 
cleanup work to do to make sure that we are not allowing 
Federal funds to go to Team Biden to do--get out what I would 
call, and I think most Americans would call, ``get out the 
vote'' efforts. I just think that is an important piece 
cognizant of the time.
    I will now recognize Mr. Murphy--Dr. Murphy for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate y'all 
coming today. I had some interesting reading this morning. I 
just want to--I had not read the President's executive order, 
and you know guys, I just cannot help think, if we want clear 
and we want free and fair elections and everybody to vote, to 
legally vote, how much mail-in voting was pushed. I remember 
patients telling me so many times that, on different occasions, 
they would receive five or six ballots in the mail from their 
neighbors or somebody else.
    In testimony a few weeks ago, one of the gentlemen noted 
that secretary of state of Michigan did not want to remove 
25,000 dead people on a roll. To push out mail-in voting--I 
think it is great for our folks that cannot get out, but to 
push it out, I see no other method that is so ripe for the 
potential of fraud than mail-in voting. I just--I have to make 
that comment. I know my Democratic colleagues see very much 
differently, and the President sure is pushing that, but I 
just--it just seems like an absolute recipe for attempted fraud 
in that matter.
    Ms. McCormick, I am very interested--you know, everybody is 
talking about cybersecurity. Can you give me an example of what 
is being done and what we have found in the past as attempts to 
infiltrate our election process?
    Ms. McCormick. Thank you for the question, Dr. Murphy. We 
had found--CISA had found, in the 2016 election, that some of 
the--some of the nation-state actors had tried to utilize 
online voter registration systems and other election-supporting 
technology to intrude into the election system. They were not 
successful, but we have to----
    Dr. Murphy. I just ask--I need specifics on that when they 
get into the system. Do they mean actually go in and change 
ballots? What do you actually technically mean?
    Ms. McCormick. It was not changing ballots, sir. It was 
getting----
    Dr. Murphy. Machines and----
    Ms. McCormick. Getting information from the voting 
registration systems. We do not have the details of that. That 
is something you would have to ask CISA about. They have not 
shared that information, nor has the FBI, with us. We do take 
the security of our systems very, very seriously. We just 
recently passed an updated version of the VVSG 2.0 that has 
many increased requirements for security, and I can give you 
some of those.
    Dr. Murphy. Let me just continue.
    Ms. McCormick. Okay.
    Dr. Murphy. Thank you. You know, with the great Russian 
hoax that one of our colleagues persisted with a lot of the--
you know, one of the former President candidates, I do not 
think we have to hopefully worry too much about Russia. I think 
China is going to be--is right now our greatest enemy. I fear 
for what they would do. We have a President that is very pro-
China, and I am very fearful in that regard.
    Let me just go back to this executive order. Did you or 
anybody in your office consult with the White House about this 
executive order, or did this just come out from somebody in a 
cubicle with their grand ideas?
    Ms. McCormick. I am not aware of anyone in our office 
coordinating with the White House on that order. We are not 
tasked under that order to do anything. You know----
    Dr. Murphy. You are not in charge of implementing anything 
with that executive order?
    Ms. McCormick. We are not. We had a couple of Federal 
agencies ask us for assistance. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology asked us for information on--and a 
white paper on disability as they were tasked to look into 
disability issues with regard to that order. I believe GSA also 
asked us for some advice. We did not do anything other than 
what we already do to reply to that order.
    Dr. Murphy. Okay. Alright. Thank you. You know, there has 
been a lot of dark money or whatever, a lot of political 
influence from people who have a lot of money in this country. 
Mr. Hovland, can you expound our your support--you had voiced 
support for Mark Zuckerberg's private funding of the election 
administration? Why do you think he has the great--since he is 
one of the richest men in the world, why he should be 
determining our election outcomes?
    Mr. Hovland. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I do 
not believe that he had any determination in the outcomes, and 
what I testified to House Appropriations in 2021 was that I 
thought it was unfortunate that our election officials had to 
be dependent on the charity billionaires, that I feel that it 
is a failure of Government to not provide adequate funding for 
elections. I think philanthropic dollars have gone to do a lot 
of great things, but as far as funding elections, I think that 
is a responsibility of Government. I think it is critical that 
we provide adequate funding so that----
    Dr. Murphy. You do not feel the actions of Zuckerberg are 
really a good patriotic thing? That is what I am hearing you 
say.
    Mr. Hovland. From interviewing elections officials who 
received that money, I know so much of it went to get PPE, to 
have protective equipment, to have hand sanitizer to be able 
to----
    Dr. Murphy. You can understand the appearance of such, that 
it's influence, and we know of all those things happening. You 
know, I do not agree with the Supreme Court decision many years 
ago that allowed all this extra money to come in. I absolutely 
think it was the wrong thing to do. We just want free and fair 
elections across this country.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
    I seek unanimous consent to insert the inspector general's 
management advisory previously referenced.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    [The management advisory referred to follows:]

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    Chairman Steil. I now recognize Mr. Carey for 5 minutes for 
the purpose of asking questions.
    Mr. Carey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. I have 
a series of questions that I want to go to, but I just had one 
question for you, Ms. McCormick. When we are talking about the 
needs--the State requests and the needs, and you talk about the 
distribution formula. I think you mentioned that to the 
Chairman, there is a formula. I had not seen the Chairman--I 
had not seen that graph of the President on--before until 
today, but should that formula--should that not also include 
making sure that the vendors do not have--do not side with one 
side or the other, that they are completely bipartisan as it 
relates to receiving the HAVA grants?
    Ms. McCormick. The vendors do not receive the HAVA grants, 
Congressman. Those go straight to the States.
    Mr. Carey. The States, but then they in turn----
    Ms. McCormick. Well, the States usually provide subgrants 
to their counties.
    Mr. Carey. Right.
    Ms. McCormick. Then the counties and the States decide how 
that money will be used as long as it is allowable within HAVA. 
The vendors to not receive the money. However, they do get 
contracted by the States and the local jurisdictions to 
provide----
    Mr. Carey. They do not do it for free, right?
    Ms. McCormick. The vendors do not do it for free no, sir.
    Mr. Carey. Where do they get their money?
    Ms. McCormick. The vendors are hired--the States and local 
jurisdictions contract with the vendors. Oftentimes, they use 
HAVA money, but they also use other funds that are provided by 
the local government.
    Mr. Carey. The vendor may not receive HAVA grant directly?
    Ms. McCormick. Correct.
    Mr. Carey. Vis-a-vis a State or some other entity would 
then pay the vendor, but it is not directly related to the HAVA 
grant; is that what you are saying?
    Ms. McCormick. That is right. I do agree with you that it 
should be a nonpartisan provision of----
    Mr. Carey. Yes. Because I do not--whether it was President 
Biden or President Trump, it does not matter to me. I am just 
saying that I think it should be--that entity should not be 
partisan.
    Ms. McCormick. I would agree with you, Congressman.
    Mr. Carey. Okay. One other thing, I was reading through 
your testimony. You mentioned in here--and again, it is a 
question. I am not trying to--but you mentioned AI tools making 
it harder for voter education.
    Can you just give me briefly because I got some other 
questions I want to go to?
    Ms. McCormick. Yes, sir. That is something new that we are 
now combating and how to respond to possible mis- and 
disinformation and the use of AI in election information. We 
have created an internal working group to work on the ways that 
could happen, and what we might do to combat those AI-
generated----
    Mr. Carey. I may want to follow up with you on that just 
because I have a keen interest in that.
    Ms. McCormick. Sure.
    Mr. Carey. Mr. Palmer, No. 1, I want to thank you for your 
service to the country. Appreciate that. Where are most of the 
election equipment manufacturers, where are they located? Are 
they in the United States, or are they outside of the United 
States?
    Mr. Palmer. The manufacturers themselves are in the United 
States, yes.
    Mr. Carey. Do we have any of the manufacturers that are 
located outside of the United States?
    Mr. Palmer. No. If you are asking, are the voting machines 
manufactured overseas, that is yes.
    Mr. Carey. OK. When the EAC adopts a new VVSG standard, 
what happens to election equipment certified under a previous 
standard?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, it remains certified. We have--those 
standards were earlier standards. We have new standards. It 
takes time to migrate to the new higher standards, get the 
manufacturers to design and bring those to a test lab to be 
tested. We have full confidence that the systems that we tested 
are still operational. Those decisions on when to transition to 
let us say another 1.0 version or the new generation of 
systems, that is going to be a local decision or a State 
decision on when they feel they need to move on from their 
equipment.
    Mr. Carey. If--they can still be used, in other words?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Carey. Okay. Are there security threats that exist with 
still using the older type machines?
    Mr. Palmer. The--one--yes, I would say, yes, there are 
security concerns. That is why we take measures like, for 
example, we have added penetration testing to all our older 
systems. If there are any updates or upgrades before it goes to 
a lab, it needs to go through penetration testing. That was a 
new feature that we brought in. There was concerns, and so we 
are addressing those.
    Mr. Carey. Okay. Alright. Well, I want to thank all of the 
witnesses here today. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
    Ms. Lee is now recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Lee. Well, I would like to begin by thanking you for 
being here today, to have all four of you present with your 
collective experience and expertise is really valuable thing 
for us. I thank you for spending your time with us today.
    Commissioner Palmer, I would like to pick up right where 
you left off and spend a little more time talking about VVSG 
2.0, what that means for the election community, and how it can 
be implemented. You were speaking just a moment ago in response 
to Mr. Carey's questions about the continued use of voting 
systems that had been certified under--and tested under the 
previous guidelines.
    If you would share with me a little bit about how, if a 
State is interested in coming--in using systems that are 
compliant with 2.0, you mentioned that might take time to do. 
Share with us a little bit more about the logistical and 
expense considerations that are associated with replacing and 
updating a State's certified voting systems.
    Mr. Palmer. OK, sure. I mean, at the State level, for 
example, if you want to move to a 2.0 system, the reality, 
though, is that the manufacturers have to design those systems 
to meet the new standards. Once they feel confident that they 
can undergo a campaign at the EAC for that testing, they are 
going to make a submission. It is going to be tested, and it 
will eventually be approved or disapproved at some point in the 
process. That is only the first step. That only makes it 
available for that vendor to then take it to the States.
    There may be testing. There may be State testing, but at 
some point, the goal is to make sure that these are fully 
tested machines that are available to be purchased by the 
localities and for use by the voters, but it takes some time 
because we have got to go through that testing process first to 
make sure we are confident.
    Ms. Lee. At this point, have any of the voting systems' 
manufacturers developed and submitted a voting system that is 
compliant or that they report will be compliant with VVSG 2.0, 
or are those still being developed now?
    Mr. Palmer. We do have one system that is in an accredited 
lab undergoing testing, and, you know, every day you hear 
rumors that they will be bringing it in sooner than later, but 
then things get pushed. I cannot really give any definite 
details on the calendar or a timeline, but you generally hear 
that in 1925, 1926, you will have some systems that will be 
tested and, perhaps, going out to market at some point.
    Ms. Lee. OK, but so today----
    Mr. Palmer. There will not be 2.0 systems for 2024.
    Ms. Lee. Right now today, even if election officials were 
interested in converting, there is not a system that is ready, 
tested, available on the shelf for them to implement that is 
VVSG 2.0?
    Mr. Palmer. That is correct, Congresswoman.
    Ms. Lee. Share, if you would, a little bit more about the 
testing and the ongoing review and testing for the systems that 
are currently in use and some of the reasons you have 
confidence in the fact that they are secure and accurate and 
appropriate for use in American elections.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, the testing program does not end. I mean, 
we do have a lifecycle policy that we will continue to test 
these systems until 1 year after there is a new system in 
place, and so there are still systems that are being submitted, 
and we are undergoing testing.
    The Federal testing is really the first step. You know, we 
do have the penetration testing that we undergo at the Federal 
level, and then a lot of States will have their own testing 
program to either supplement that process.
    Then voters should be confident, the localities. They do 
logic and accuracy tests on the front end and after an 
election. It really is sort of an overwhelming number of sort 
of audits that take place and sort of testing of the voting 
equipment, and these are why we can be confident that the 
systems that are on the street, to say, are still as reliable 
and accurate as they were, you know, 6 months ago.
    Ms. Lee. You just touched on another thing that I think is 
so important and that is opportunities for the public to be 
engaged and to observe both in the development of new standards 
and also the testing of equipment and these pre-imposed 
election audits that occur.
    Would you share with us--and I know you have multiple forms 
of experience that are relevant to this question, both as an 
EAC Commissioner and as a former State elections director. 
Share with us, if you will, some of the opportunities for the 
public to be a participant, an observer in the development of 
new technology standards and also the testing of this 
equipment.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, the public had a large role in the 
development of these standards. When you go back to 2.0, that 
process of developing standards for 2.0 involved election 
officials, but it involved experts. It involved the public. It 
was out for public comment multiple times. When we would have 
hearings with our advisory boards, made up of election 
officials and experts, the public was often available for 
public comment.
    Then, when, you know, when you go to any State, for 
example, we were in Louisiana, Commissioner Hicks and I, on 
their discussions on new voting systems, and they would bring 
in the EAC and other experts to talk about what the standards 
would mean, what were the new security standards, what were the 
new audit standards. The public was there to make comment and 
to hear that testimony, including legislators and Congressmen.
    Ms. Lee. Alright.
    Thank you all. I have used my time. Thank you all again so 
much for being here.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Steil. The gentlewoman yields back.
    I request unanimous consent to enter into the record two 
articles.
    Anita Dunn was the managing director of SKDKnickerbocker, 
and so I seek unanimous consent to enter into the record a New 
York Times article titled ``Strategizing for the President and 
Corporate Clients, Too,'' from 2012, as well as an article 
published by Albert Hunt, ``Biden Needs to Institute a New Era 
in Public Ethics.''
    Without objection, so ordered.
    [The articles referred to follow:]

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    Chairman Steil. In consultation with the Ranking Member, we 
have one more Member who is in a foot race to get here. Knowing 
that we would otherwise switch panels, I ask our witnesses just 
to stand by for 2 minutes, with the hope that Mr. Good makes it 
before we wrap up this panel.
    We will pause in place for about 2 minutes.
    [Recess.]
    Chairman Steil. Alright. As our colleague gets seated, I 
will add one note here. Pursuant to paragraph (h) of Committee 
rule 9, and in consultation with the Ranking Member, I move 
that counsel for the majority and counsel for the minority be 
permitted to question our witnesses--we will utilize this on 
the next panel--our witnesses for up to 20 minutes, the time 
equally divided and available in 5-minute increments.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    Again, that will be for the next panel.
    Mr. Good, are you----
    Mr. Good. All good here, sir. I am ready to go.
    Chairman Steil. We appreciate you coming.
    Mr. Good. I think that is on.
    Chairman Steil. Alright.
    Mr. Good. It is taking a moment. If you would hold the 
clock for just a few seconds until it--we have got the old 
spinning going on here. The answers are in here. Actually, the 
answers are over there, right?
    Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, but it is taking a moment here.
    Chairman Steil. Take a second.
    Mr. Good. Alright. We are pretty dang close now. OK. Thank 
you.
    Chairman Steil. We appreciate you being here, Mr. Good.
    We have waived Mr. Good on from the great State of 
Virginia.
    Mr. Good, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for the 
purpose of asking questions.
    Mr. Good. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for 
letting me join this Committee for this special hearing today.
    I have got a couple of questions for Commissioner 
McCormick, if I may.
    In June 2022, the Cyber Infrastructure Security Agency, or 
CISA, conducted a vulnerability analysis of Dominion Voting 
Systems Democracy Suite ImageCast X, which is an in-person 
voting system used to allow voters to mark their ballot. CISA's 
report outlined nine vulnerabilities.
    With that said, how confident are you that our voting 
systems can be protected or even ideally made immune from 
hacking or other vulnerabilities?
    Ms. McCormick. Thank you for the question, Congressman 
Good.
    No system is immune from attack, but we do our best to 
protect the systems, and we are working to increase the 
security on our systems with our new VVSG 2.0 requirements.
    Additionally, we will be starting a consolidated 
vulnerability disclosure program to make sure that any kind of 
vulnerabilities are identified and addressed in a very 
efficient and quick manner to make sure that the voting systems 
remain secure.
    We also are just going to see the report ourselves today. 
We are interested in looking at that report, and we understood 
from the CISA's report of reviewing the Dominion machines that 
most of those vulnerabilities have been closed.
    Mr. Good. If you were going to compare how protected versus 
how vulnerable, say, November 2020, compared to how you hope it 
to be in 1924, how would you sort of quantify that in a 
guesstimate, an estimate? How much better are we, hopefully, in 
1924 than we were maybe in 1920?
    Ms. McCormick. You know, we did not see any vulnerabilities 
exploited in 2022, and I think we would----
    Mr. Good. Not any?
    Ms. McCormick. We did not see them exploited, no, sir. We 
believed that the machines were secure in 2022, and they will 
be secure or more secure in 2024.
    Mr. Good. Well, we all certainly hope so and trust so.
    The National Election Defense Coalition, according to them, 
has said that e-voting machines have added and subtracted votes 
not cast by voters, changed voters' choices on the screen, 
given voters the wrong ballot, passed pre-election testing and 
failed on election day. You know, they passed the pre-election 
testing, but they failed on election day, reversed election 
outcomes, broken down generally, and just caused long lines 
during elections. That is according to the National Election 
Defense Coalition.
    I will tell you, we held a roundtable discussion on this 
issue in my district, three Members of Congress and a number of 
State delegates and senators in Virginia and had some experts 
come in. I can tell you that I witnessed, I witnessed a 
demonstration. I am trying to bring it before this larger body. 
I and my colleagues witnessed a demonstration. This is a part--
this was a few months ago, apart from an actual election. It 
was not part of the--but where a tech expert appeared to hack 
into the voting systems and change results before our very 
eyes. We watched it happen. Changed things, changed them back 
to show us how easy it was to do.
    The CISA report--well, let me just pause. What is your 
reaction to that?
    Ms. McCormick. I am not aware of the demonstration that you 
are talking about. I would be interested----
    Mr. Good. Right. You would not be aware of that, but I am 
saying I watched this by this whom I believed to be a credible, 
trusted resource, do this before mine and two other colleagues' 
eyes, along with a number of other individuals that were there.
    What I mean is just the fact that that could possibly 
happen, what would be your reaction to that?
    Ms. McCormick. Well, I think, yes, vulnerabilities can be 
exploited for sure, but it depends on the environment we are 
in, how the setup is, how much time people have, what the 
machine is, has it been certified. There are a lot of questions 
that would need to be answered, and we would love to be able to 
see that and look at it.
    There are definitely anomalies that happen in the systems, 
but we do have a defense in-depth program through our VVSG and 
through other programs through CISA, and we are working to keep 
those machines as secure as possible.
    Mr. Good. To my colleagues on this Committee, we would like 
to try to bring this individual before individuals on this 
Committee.
    The last thing I will just ask: What is the likelihood that 
a foreign power, such as China, who has, obviously, an active 
spy operation, including trying to put the facility in Cuba, 
that they could leverage vulnerabilities for their interest 
with our election system?
    Ms. McCormick. Well, our machines are not--our voting 
systems are air gapped from the internet. It would be difficult 
for them to get to every machine across the country to exploit 
any kind of vulnerability.
    Mr. Good. Did I understand you to say they are gapped, 
meaning disconnected from the internet?
    Ms. McCormick. Correct.
    Mr. Good. OK. The demonstration I saw literally was through 
the internet, connecting that I saw.
    Ms. McCormick. Well, our machines are not connected to the 
internet, and they are not connected to each other. Each 
machine stands on its own. There are cases where the machines 
do get connected at the time that results are modemed in, in 
some cases. We require an air gap system in 2.0, and we will 
make sure that the machines are not connected to the internet.
    Mr. Good. Thank you, Commissioner.
    Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate it.
    Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
    We thank our colleague from Virginia for joining us today 
on the Committee on House Administration.
    We thank our witnesses today for appearing before us. It 
has been very helpful.
    Members of the Committee may have additional questions for 
you, and we ask you please to respond to those questions in 
writing.
    We will dismiss this panel, and we will begin our second 
witness panel momentarily.
    Thank you for being here.
    [Recess.]
    Chairman Steil. I am going to bring us back to order, if 
everyone is ready.
    Ms. Schletz, we appreciate you being with us today and look 
forward to your testimony.
    Pursuant to paragraph (b) of Committee Rule 6, the witness 
will please stand and raise your right hand.
    [Witness sworn.]
    Chairman Steil. You may be seated.
    Let the record reflect that the witness responded in the 
affirmative.
    I will now introduce our witness.
    Inspector General Schletz was appointed unanimously by the 
Commissioners of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission and 
began serving as the inspector general in November 2021.
    Prior to assuming the role of inspector general at the EAC, 
Ms. Schletz spent 8 years at the U.S. Agency for International 
Development Office of Inspector General where she served as 
director and established a new strategic division within the 
office.
    As a reminder, we have read your written statement, and it 
will appear in full in the hearing record.
    Under Committee Rule 9, you are to limit your oral 
presentation to a brief summary of your written statement.
    Please remember to push the button on the microphone in 
front of you. After 5 minutes, we will ask you to wrap up.
    Thank you for being here today, and I now recognize you, 
Ms. Schletz, for 5 minutes.

   STATEMENT OF BRIANNA SCHLETZ, INSPECTOR GENERAL, ELECTION 
                     ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

    Ms. Schletz. Thank you, Chairman Steil and distinguished 
Members of the Committee for inviting me to testify about the 
work of the office of inspector general of the Election 
Assistance Commission. We appreciate your interest and ongoing 
support for our work.
    Our mission is to safeguard the Federal investment in our 
electoral system by conducting objective and meaningful 
oversight. We do this through audits, reviews, investigations. 
Much of our work is mandated by the Help America Vote Act and 
the Inspector General Act.
    EAC funds and assists States and territories in improving 
election processes, and it is our role to offer information and 
recommendations that will help EAC build and run programs that 
promote public confidence by preventing waste, fraud, and 
abuse. I am proud that our efforts contribute toward ensuring 
confidence in America's election process.
    OIG's vision is to operate as a high-performing 
organization and help EAC be as efficient and effective as it 
can be. Our office has grown to a staff of now six, as of 
yesterday, allowing us to conduct audits with independent 
public accounting firms and also with our own team.
    We demonstrated that conducting work internally allows us 
to be more nimble and more responsive to incoming requests and 
areas of risk. For example, we recently identified issues with 
EAC's contracting practices. We investigated the problem. We 
issued an advisory to alert them, and then we announced an 
audit so that we can understand the scope of the issue and make 
recommendations for improvement.
    Another risk area that we are watching closely is related 
to grantees using HAVA funds for voter education. We issued a 
management advisory in December to alert EAC to the related 
risks because terms, such as ``voter education'' and ``get out 
the vote'' are not defined in HAVA.
    Our office maintains an OIG hotline for EAC employees and 
members of the public to report suspected fraud, waste, abuse, 
and mismanagement.
    Our increased stakeholder outreach over the last year has 
resulted in an awareness that our office exists, what our role 
is, and that this reporting mechanism is out there. As a 
result, we processed 375 unique hotline complaints in the first 
half of Fiscal Year 2023.
    We refer to the Department of Justice and the FBI any 
potential criminal acts related to Federal elections and voter 
fraud, and when we get complaints related to voter registration 
or the administration of elections, we refer individuals to the 
appropriate State election office.
    Our team reads every complaint that comes in, and to be 
responsive, when we noticed an up tick related to the 
misunderstandings about EAC's testing and certification 
program, we launched an audit. That recently issued audit 
report includes seven recommendations to improve the program.
    I commend the EAC staff and the Commissioners for their 
commitment to the mission of the Commission and supporting 
election officials in the spirit of HAVA.
    OIG is required to report annually on management challenges 
facing the EAC, and last fall we outlined four challenges 
impacting the EAC that I will discuss briefly. The first 
relates to balancing expectations of funding, and the second 
addresses challenges with attracting and retaining a highly 
skilled workforce.
    EAC's budget recently increased, and with that increase, it 
must responsibly spend the funds while meeting stakeholder's 
expanding expectations. However, we have noted that conditions, 
such as salary caps, make that difficult for EAC to attract and 
retain staff. EAC is using some of the additional resources it 
received to buildup divisions, and as new staff enters the 
agency, there is an expanded need for strong policies, complete 
records, and standard operating procedures. Our work has noted 
areas where EAC is making progress and others that still need 
attention.
    The third challenge relates to meeting customer service and 
critical infrastructure goals. Stakeholders are increasingly 
calling on the EAC to communicate election information at the 
Federal level. For EAC to fulfill its role as a customer 
service agency supporting critical infrastructure, it must 
continue to overcome challenges related to Federal 
coordination, Paperwork Reduction Act, and visibility, as not 
everyone is familiar with the EAC.
    Last, providing effective oversight of grantees. The EAC 
awards grants and monitors how States and territories spend 
those funds. We have noted that EAC's ability to do this can be 
hampered by both the grant type and grantee capacity. We 
acknowledge that EAC has taken some steps to strengthen its 
grant oversight, invested in a grants management system, and 
added new staff to its team, but our recent reports highlight 
the need for continued diligence in this area.
    For our part, OIG has seven ongoing HAVA audits right now. 
We are also being more strategic about how we do our work. For 
example, we recently announced an audit of 34 States' 
compliance with the requirements for interest earned. Our goal 
with that audit is to understand the challenges related to the 
requirement and then to also identify best practices to help 
grantees navigate it in the future.
    In conclusion, I want to thank you for the opportunity to 
provide this testimony on OIG activities. Our accomplishments 
are a credit to the dedicated staff that I have the privilege 
to lead, and I am thankful for their hard work. We are 
committed to independent and transparent oversight.
    As State officials work to prepare for the 2024 election, 
we realize the importance of ensuring that EAC is set up to 
support them. We believe our oversight can help position EAC to 
do just that.
    Thank you. I am happy to address any questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Schletz follows:]

             PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIANNA SCHLETZ

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    Chairman Steil. Inspector General Schletz, thanks for being 
here. Thanks for your testimony.
    We will begin with questions from Members. We will then 
proceed to questions from counsel, both from the minority and 
majority side as well.
    I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for the purpose 
of asking questions.
    Ms. Schletz, you recently submitted a report at the EAC 
OIG, a semiannual report to Congress, and I want to discuss 
some of the key findings in there. At the time the report was 
submitted, your office, you said, processed, I think you said, 
175--I had 174 in my notes--unique complaints so far this 
fiscal year. That is already an increase over the last Fiscal 
Year in 2022, which I believe had about 271 complaints that 
came through.
    Are there any common themes that you are seeing inside the 
complaints over the last 2 years or so?
    Ms. Schletz. The complaints vary. What we do see is an up 
tick when States are having elections. We will see more things 
come in. Quite a few of our complaints are related to the 
administration of elections. We are referring States to the 
right officials within that State to get closure on whatever 
that allegation may be.
    I cannot say that we have seen a specific trend, but I do 
have a breakdown of even more----
    Chairman Steil. Let me dive in maybe then specifically, 
so--if nothing jumps out to you. As we think about this last 
year, Georgia passed a voter integrity bill, made a lot of 
noise, right, a lot of news came out of this. The President of 
the United States called it Jim Crow 2.0. Major League Baseball 
took the All-Star Game and moved it out of Atlanta, really 
draconian and over-the-top rhetoric from my colleagues on the 
left.
    Did you see a huge up tick in calls from the State of 
Georgia following the passage of this law?
    Ms. Schletz. No. I can say that, for the fiscal 2023 
numbers, what we have seen, we had 374 unique complaints and 
only 5 of those involved Georgia. They all were around the 
general election and the Senate runoff.
    Chairman Steil. Less than 2 percent fiscal year, for folks 
that maybe are not always aware of fiscal years. There are 
annual years. You guys run on fiscal year, and Congress runs on 
a fiscal year, but that includes the election.
    Ms. Schletz. Yes.
    Chairman Steil. The election of last year, in 2022, after, 
quote, Jim Crow 2.0, voter integrity laws are passed in 
Georgia, less than 2 percent of your calls came from the State 
of Georgia. Is that accurate?
    Ms. Schletz. Yes, I can say only five involved it.
    Chairman Steil. Five out of 375. Less than 2 percent.
    The reason I say 2 percent is because it was randomly 
averaged over 50 States, and Georgia is bigger than average. It 
should show up at an even larger percentage if we assume it is 
based on population. What we are seeing is no real up tick at 
all. Why? Because people actually like the voter integrity law 
that was passed in Georgia. The evidence not only shows up that 
people are not calling in because they do not have compliance; 
it also shows up because people were happy, if you look at the 
polling data on how people felt about the process of voting in 
Georgia. Also, voter turnout increased in the State of Georgia 
and across all key demographic groups.
    Let me shift gears, if I can. Again, your office recently 
completed the audit of HAVA funds, and particularly as it 
relates to the CARES Act, awarded to California. How much money 
was awarded to California?
    Ms. Schletz. They had a total for all of the HAVA funds of 
$216.3 million.
    Chairman Steil. $216.3 million total funds awarded to 
California. Was the main group--the main group that it was 
awarded to in California was what firm?
    Ms. Schletz. Oh, so that is the total pot of money of 
election security funds, 251 funds, the 101 HAVA funds, and 
then also CARES funds.
    Chairman Steil. Then the CARES funds.
    Ms. Schletz. Okay. If you are speaking about the CARES 
funds, let me get you the exact number. I believe you are 
referring to the SKDK contract, how much was awarded there?
    Chairman Steil. Yes.
    Ms. Schletz. What we found is that $11.8 million in EAC 
HAVA funds were used for that contract. $9.9 million of those 
were CARES Act funds.
    Chairman Steil. Does it concern you that this entity, 
through an expedited grant process, has ties to the Biden 
campaign?
    Ms. Schletz. We issued a December advisory that outlined 
some of the risks that we see with there being no mention in 
HAVA about restrictions around voter education campaigns. We 
think it is just an area of risk in general.
    Chairman Steil. Would you recommend that policymakers put 
in place parameters to make sure that these types of grants are 
not going to entities with clear political, ideological 
leanings?
    Ms. Schletz. It is always, yes, more helpful for us to have 
strong criteria to audit against. Without that, we are reliant 
on kind of the EAC and what their guidance is on each 
individual case-by-case basis on a State. That is what we point 
out in the advisory, that that just raises increased risk that 
you are not providing the same guidance to each State without--
--
    Chairman Steil. I appreciate that. I think you pointed out 
a huge risk, and I think it is incumbent upon EAC and 
policymakers to put forward the guardrails that are needed to 
make sure that grant funding does not go to entities where you 
can simply go look on their website and claiming that they are 
part of a Presidential campaign. I think that is an affront.
    If you told somebody in Wisconsin we spent millions of 
dollars and gave it to an entity that was part of Team Biden or 
team anybody, I think they would look at you and think you are 
nuts. That is what happened, and I think we have got to put the 
guardrails in place, and I appreciate your review and 
examination.
    I now recognize Mr. Carey for 5 minutes for the purpose of 
asking questions.
    Mr. Carey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank the witness for being here today.
    Can you briefly describe the audit process at the EAC? Just 
kind of briefly describe how you go about doing that.
    Ms. Schletz. Sure.
    We do a risk-assessment process to determine what we are 
going to audit. We have a couple different types of audits. 
Some of our work is mandated by law, and those are, you know, 
required audits that we do annually. We also have the HAVA 
audits, which we do that based on a risk-based approach to 
determine which States are audited. Then we have discretionary 
audit work. The discretionary audit work is often launched when 
there is a risk area that we see or like a complaint comes in.
    For example, the testing and certification audit. We were 
getting, you know, additional complaints around that. We 
launched an audit to describe it. That is how we select an 
audit.
    Did you want me to also touch on the process or?
    Mr. Carey. Yes, I mean, because where I am going to go is 
in HAVA funds.
    Ms. Schletz. OK. For the HAVA funds, yes, we make a 
determination if we are going to do the audit internally or if 
we are going to hire a contracted independent public auditing 
firm or accounting firm in order to conduct that work. We have 
a scope determined of how many or how much of the funds is 
going to be audited, and then that audit follows the normal 
audit procedures.
    Mr. Carey. How many would you say were done?
    Ms. Schletz. We have--let me pull up the numbers.
    We currently have five ongoing audits that an independent 
public accounting firm is conducting. With the conclusion of 
those five audits, all States and territories will have been 
audited once at least. That was our goal is to get there.
    The additional factors that impact whether we are auditing 
can be, you know, if complaints come in, if something is raised 
from the grants team, we might highlight it for an additional 
audit, or if the findings are particularly significant.
    Mr. Carey. Along with that, so what steps does the EAC take 
to--how do I want to say--how do they respond to the audits?
    Ms. Schletz. EAC?
    Mr. Carey. Yes.
    Ms. Schletz. EAC is the responsible party for working with 
the State in order to close recommendations. They sort of act 
as an intermediary, as, you know, the one issuing the grants. 
We or the audit firm would put our recommendations to the State 
for things to correct our findings. EAC would be the one that 
looks at whatever they return and determines closure on those 
recommendations.
    Mr. Carey. Let me ask you--and, again, and probably some of 
my colleagues probably understand this process a little better 
than I do.
    When you make the recommendations or you say that these are 
the things, who rectifies the things that you have identified 
that are issues?
    Ms. Schletz. That would be the State office that is 
responsible for receiving the grant money. It can vary from 
State to State, but it would be the office within the specific 
State or territory that receives grant funds.
    Mr. Carey. What happens if they do not rectify?
    Ms. Schletz. The recommendation would remain open.
    I can, you know, say right now typically States have been 
pretty good about closing those. Right now we have eight open 
recommendations, four for the Northern Mariana Islands and four 
for Delaware.
    Mr. Carey. In the case where you have recommendations, what 
generally is the timeframe that you see on average per State or 
territory that they rectify?
    Ms. Schletz. Typically, we like to see closure within 6 
months, but we understand that, in some cases, depending on 
what the recommendation is, that could take longer. Usually the 
target is 6 months. Otherwise, those are reported in our 
semiannual report to Congress as open recommendations, open 
longer than 6 months.
    Mr. Carey. How many would you say have not been--do you 
have some that still--you have eight. You said five ongoing 
investigations or audits right now?
    Ms. Schletz. We have five audits, seven that we plan to 
start within this fiscal year.
    Mr. Carey. Okay.
    Then you have eight that are ongoing, you said?
    Ms. Schletz. I am sorry. We have eight that we expect by 
the end of the fiscal year. Two HAVA audits have been issued 
this fiscal year, and then we plan to start six more. We have 
quite a few that we are trying to do this year.
    Mr. Carey. Let me ask you: Are there any steps that the EAC 
should be taken that they are not taking in response to your 
audits?
    Ms. Schletz. I think the EAC generally has been responsive 
to our recommendations and working with the States in order to 
resolve those things. There are some areas where there could be 
improvement.
    Mr. Carey. Could you maybe elaborate on what you think 
there could be improvement?
    Ms. Schletz. Sure. We have noticed that there could be 
opportunities for capacity building. Specifically, we saw that 
with the Northern Mariana Islands. They just did not have the 
internal controls in place in order to receive those funds. 
They received them for the first time in 2020. I think that is 
an area for improvement.
    Additionally, we have identified findings where the Federal 
financial reports that are required to be submitted do not 
reconcile to the general ledger. That is an area where EAC 
oversight, you know, getting those Federal reports, they could 
be checking things like that.
    Mr. Carey. Well, listen, I want to thank the witness. Thank 
you for your time.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Loudermilk.
    [Presiding.]
    The gentleman yields.
    Okay. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. I apologize. I 
am popping in and out from different hearings.
    Ms. Schletz--Schletz? Is that right?
    Ms. Schletz. That is correct.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Alright.
    In March 2023, your office completed an audit of the EAC's 
testing and certification program. What was audited, and what 
led you to conduct the audit?
    Ms. Schletz. Yes. That audit was initiated based on us 
getting an up tick of complaints into our hotline mainly 
related to concerned citizens that had a misunderstanding of 
how the program operated. We launched that audit with two 
objectives. One was descriptive in nature, to just describe the 
program. The second that was going to identify or was meant to 
identify factors that could be improved on the program or that 
impact the program.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. Did you have any key findings of the 
audit, and what were they?
    Ms. Schletz. Yes. We, I think, overall, on that first 
descriptive objective, found that the EAC has a robust lab 
accreditation program and voting system certification process. 
However, the second objective that we had noted some areas that 
the program could be improved, specifically related to 
stakeholder coordination, policies, procedures, communication, 
and staffing.
    Then we also found that they had not done a formal 
assessment of risk with the program, which could help them in 
determining, you know, areas to focus attention or where 
staffing resources are needed.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Did you recommend any actions in response?
    Ms. Schletz. Yes. We made seven recommendations in that 
report.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. I do not have any other questions at 
this time.
    I now recognize the majority counsel for 5 minutes for 
questions.
    Mr. Hays. Well, good afternoon at this point. It is a 
little bit different being in this seat, and it is nice to see 
you in person, Ms. Schletz. We have really appreciated your 
regular contact with Committee staff and the updates that we 
have done virtually. Thank you for being here today.
    I want to start going back to the management advisory that 
Mr. Steil was discussing earlier. It was Management Advisory 
2301 that was released by your office on December 12th of last 
year. This is the one where you were discussing the 
difficulties that States have because the terms ``voter 
registration,'' ``voter education,'' and ``get out the vote'' 
are not defined in HAVA. That creates some of the, I think 
generously we will say, confusion, perhaps, that happened in 
some States.
    Are there other areas of Federal law that you are familiar 
with that might define these terms that the Commission could 
look at for some guidance?
    Ms. Schletz. Yes. Our advisory pointed out I believe two 
differing definitions. One being the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 offers a definition, and then also there is another 
definition that we pointed to as well that could have been 
used.
    Mr. Hays. Do you recommend that the Commission adopt one of 
these existing definitions, as opposed to writing its own?
    Ms. Schletz. I do not know that we have an opinion about 
that. It is more just helpful if there is clear guidance so 
that when we are looking at things, it is easier for us to 
identify if the cost is allowable or not.
    Mr. Hays. Understood.
    Has the Commission, EAC's guidance on these terms, the 
three I mentioned, has it always been the same, or has it 
evolved a bit over time?
    Ms. Schletz. Historically, what we have seen is there has 
been quite a few previous OIG reports that have pointed to 
challenges around this area. I am not sure if their definition 
has necessarily evolved or stayed consistent, but we do know 
that, you know, the findings related to this have been at least 
19 recommendations and over a million dollars questioned.
    I will say many of those end up not actually being 
sustained question costs because the EAC determines that the 
cost is allowable. I think that, for us, is where it is a 
challenge.
    Mr. Hays. Where it is difficult to understand getting to 
allowable whenever there is not a set definition?
    Ms. Schletz. Correct.
    Mr. Hays. Can you talk about the importance of 
consistency--not just with these three terms but consistency 
with guidance and definitions given to States on how to use 
HAVA grant funds and why that is important?
    Ms. Schletz. Sure. The criteria, like the Uniform Federal 
Guidance that guides all grants, that is very prescriptive. It 
has a lot of guidelines, and that is on purpose so that it is 
very clear when someone wants to know if they can do something 
or not, they can go and look that up. I think without having 
that consistent guidance, what we have found is it is often a 
grant team member providing guidance to a State on a one-off 
basis either through email or through even a phone call. That 
makes it very difficult for us to track, you know, that there 
is consistency and then also just that the communication is 
clear.
    Mr. Hays. It is probably all very well-intentioned. You 
know, this is a big process, but the way that this works is 
someone is going to call in and ask the question, and they want 
to get an answer. I think we understand that, but we 
definitely, on the staff, have been very in favor, as you know, 
of encouraging the development of consistent definitions to 
help our State partners.
    Going back to these definitions, has your office thought at 
all--you know, we are talking about where this is in the code 
or otherwise. Would it be more helpful for Congress to add 
definitions to HAVA itself? Or is this something that the 
Commission is able to do, that you would recommend that they 
would do and handle on their own?
    Ms. Schletz. I think it is kind of up to the legislators to 
decide. The way it stands right now, there is nothing in HAVA 
restricting the funds from being used, and what the restriction 
is, is it is through an EAC advisory opinion. The Commissioners 
essentially voted to put some limitations on those funds.
    When you are asking if they could put further limitations, 
yes, they could. If I think that it should be in HAVA? I mean, 
I think if there is an interest in putting more guardrails on 
the funds, and there are certain things that the voter 
education should or should not be spent on, then that could be 
in HAVA as well.
    Mr. Hays. Very good.
    Okay, so I have about a half a minute left.
    We have been watching. We saw, of course, that the 
territories that had been left out of HAVA, just because they 
had not sent a delegate to Congress at that point, the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, has recently 
received HAVA funds, and there has been an audit process going 
through there. It is the first time that they had HAVA funds.
    Can you talk just a little bit about the work that your 
office does to make sure everyone stays on the straight and 
narrow?
    Ms. Schletz. Yes. This specific one was flagged for us by 
the grants team because the Northern Mariana Islands were not 
doing their regular reporting requirements. We initiated an 
audit internally with our own staff to take a look at things.
    I think there is an opportunity here. There was a need for 
the money and an opportunity to do capacity building. I 
acknowledge that they received the funds during the pandemic. 
It made a site visit challenging, but that would have been a 
helpful thing for the grant team to do.
    Mr. Hays. Very good.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Loudermilk. The Chair now recognizes minority counsel 
for 5 minutes for purposes of asking questions.
    Mr. Wright. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Inspector Schletz, good afternoon to you as well. Thank you 
for your hard work of the Commission and on behalf of the 
American people. It has been, I agree with my colleague, 
wonderful chatting with you in advance of this hearing and our 
ongoing oversight work.
    I wanted to pick up a bit where my colleague started, and 
you have done a bit to contextualize your management advisory 
as well. A lot of discussion today about California and the 
conduct related to the CARES Act funding for California, which 
your February 9th letter that the Ranking Member introduced 
into the record demonstrates that those funds were used 
appropriately and were not used for GOTV funding.
    Your management advisory also lists the 19 recommendations 
and identifies specific States that were flagged for using 
those funds, including Mississippi, Florida, South Dakota, and 
Colorado, among others. I want the record to be clear on that 
fact.
    Am I correct in that assessment?
    Ms. Schletz. Can you repeat that? I sorry.
    Mr. Wright. Yes. Am I correct in my assessment that other 
States have been flagged for recommendations on using funds for 
GOTV and voter registration?
    Ms. Schletz. Yes, that is correct.
    Mr. Wright. Great. Thank you.
    I want to draw your attention to the Ace Act as introduced 
in the last Congress. One of the provisions provides a 
statutory cap on your office at seven full-time employees. In 
your written and oral testimony today, you have discussed how 
increased capacity for your office has allowed you to improve 
processes, have more resources, to use a mix of contracting and 
independent accounting firm assistance, as well as other 
outside Federal agencies, and that you are now, quote, well-
positioned to conduct audits internally, which allow you to be 
more nimble and more responsive to incoming requests and areas 
of risk.
    I want to ask you a few questions related to that. Would 
your office benefit from additional staff?
    Ms. Schletz. There is always more work that can be done. I 
think we have a good size right now in order to meet our 
mission, but there are areas where we could improve and do more 
oversight.
    Mr. Wright. Those are areas include having additional staff 
capacity to allow you to be more nimble or to internalize 
outside costs usually associated with independent accounting 
firms?
    Ms. Schletz. Yes. I think there are also other benefits of 
doing work internally. It allows us, you know, to pivot. If we 
have a contracted audit, we are, you know, bound by the terms 
of those contracts or the period of performance, you know, the 
scope. Those limitations can sometimes be challenging.
    Mr. Wright. That is great.
    What information would you want Congress, so all of us, to 
have so that we can more accurately understand the staffing 
needs of your office?
    Ms. Schletz. Well, I appreciate the confidence, you know, 
in our work. I have no plans currently of growing our office, 
but I do think that the limitation or the FTE cap would 
potentially contradict with the IG Act, which provides that the 
inspector general can appoint employees as needed to fulfill 
the mission.
    That said, to my knowledge, EAC OIG would be the only one 
with such a type of cap. Having the flexibility to be able to 
pivot from contracting to internal staff is critical, I think, 
in finding that right mix and having the flexibility to do so 
is important.
    Mr. Wright. Thank you.
    I want to draw back on a point you made, which, if I 
correctly heard you, you are not aware of any other statutory 
cap on the full-time employees of an inspector general office. 
Is that right?
    Ms. Schletz. Correct. Usually, the OIG has its own specific 
budget line item. There is a couple of us small ones that do 
not, but usually, yes, there is no FTE cap.
    Mr. Wright. Great. Thank you.
    Are there steps that Congress can take to help further and 
improve your office's independence?
    Ms. Schletz. I think, you know, speaking of just the 
budget, one of the things that we have raised with some of the 
other small OIGs is that our budget is combined with the agency 
budget, despite us having a separate request. It would increase 
our independence if we had a line item or even just not-less-
than language that allowed our budget to be separate so that we 
could, you know, put our resources toward that and not have to 
work with the agency on budgeting.
    Mr. Wright. Understandable.
    I think it is helpful for the--in this conversation, we 
have talked a lot about questions funds or unsubstantiated 
funds or funds spent for or put to better use. In your office's 
review and in all its capacities, is it fair to say that the 
majority or the vast majority of funds that the EAC is granting 
are used appropriately?
    Ms. Schletz. Yes. From our work, I mean, I think we have 
generally seen that States are administering grant funds in 
accordance with the guidelines. As far as the numbers, I mean, 
I think it is less than 1 percent of the cost or question of 
what we have audited in Fiscal Year 1922 and 1923.
    There are some States, you know, like the Mariana Islands 
where that number is higher, but generally, it is less than 1 
percent.
    Mr. Wright. Within that less than 1 percent cap, I know you 
have identified something around $2 million of questionable 
funds, and cognizant that most of the funds are used 
appropriately, do you have a sense of how effectively the 
Commission is working to clawback the unallowable funds or work 
with States to enter compliance?
    Ms. Schletz. Yes. The grants team works really hard. We 
actually partner with them quite closely to make sure that we 
are not duplicating efforts and we are, you know, working with 
the same interest in mind. They do take it seriously, and they 
do work with States as much as they can to try to build 
capacity and get them to have the internal controls needed so 
that there is no repeat findings and so that money that needs 
to be returned is returned.
    Mr. Wright. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Loudermilk. The Chair now recognizes the majority 
counsel for purposes of asking questions.
    Mr. Hays. Thank you very much.
    I wanted to just note a couple things here at the outset, 
that when, you know, we were looking through--and I know you do 
not have anything to do with legislative recommendations, but 
looking through the legislative recommendations that the 
Commission sent to us, we make it a priority to read what you 
send us, what the Commission sends us, et cetera. We just found 
it interesting that providing some of these clear definitions 
of the terms I was talking about earlier and terms related to 
grants in general, that that did not seem to be included in 
their legislative recommendation.
    Whether or not that is the right course of action is 
something we noted and something that, you know, we are looking 
through to find the right way to handle that.
    Can you talk a little bit--speaking of reading things that 
you send us, could you please talk a little bit about the 
mandatory reports that the EAC has planned for 2023? Just a 
brief summary of what it is expected to cover. I know that a 
lot of this is going to come from your oversight plan for the 
Fiscal Year 1923.
    Ms. Schletz. You mean mandatory audits?
    Mr. Hays. Mandatory reports.
    Ms. Schletz. The mandatory reports that we are required to 
do is FISMA, which is really just IT controls. The financial 
statement audit is an annual report that we are required to 
issue out on. Payment Integrity Information Act is a mandatory 
report. We have our semiannual reports to Congress. We also 
have the annual management challenges report.
    Mr. Hays. What else do you have planned this year in terms 
of discretionary projects or other planned work? Is there 
anything that our Committee Members should be apprised of as we 
partner with you, your office, and the Commission?
    Ms. Schletz. Ongoing we are looking at EAC's contracting 
practices. That is ongoing work that we hope to have completed 
either this Fiscal Year or next, early next.
    The other discretionary work that we are looking at is to 
also balance the contracted HAVA audits with some of our own 
work. Doing some of that work internally.
    We also have plans to try to look at more of the impact of 
the HAVA funds. Right now our audits focused largely on 
compliance. Did they use the funds appropriately? We would like 
to see how were those funds helpful, or were their needs 
assessed appropriately.
    Mr. Hays. I think that brings us to another really good 
point. You know, as our Committee Members say, and I do not 
want to put words into anyone's mouth, but, you know, many have 
said elections administration is not partisan. The election is, 
but not the administration. I think that is really important. I 
think that that carries over to the EAC, and as you can see 
from the questioning today, a lot of Members are headed in a 
similar direction with the EAC.
    I think one of those, too, you know, in our conversations, 
and I am glad to hear that the resources for your office are 
looking good, and they are in a good spot, but, you know, one 
of our things, too, is making sure that the inspector general's 
office has reserved spaces for staff, especially at a smaller 
agency.
    I know our Members look forward to working with you 
throughout this next year as they are working on legislation, 
however that ends up looking in the final piece, to make sure 
that you do continue to have the flexibility and the resources 
that you need, especially since we are talking about having the 
option of bringing audits internally so that there is a little 
bit more of that institutional process that plays out.
    As I wrap up here, can you talk just a little bit about 
your relationship with the four Commissioners? Just in the 
sense of, you know, is it a good working relationship? Are they 
responding to your reports in a good way? As my colleague 
mentioned, anything else about the independence of your office.
    Ms. Schletz. Thank you for that.
    The relationship that I have with the Commissioners is 
great. They are very receptive to the work that we are doing, 
very responsive, and I think also, you know, welcomed kind of 
the oversight that our office brings. It is quite a bit, you 
know, different, and we are doing some new and different work, 
and they have been receptive to that. I do not have anything, 
you know, else to add on the relationship piece.
    I think as far as the independence, coming from a larger 
OIG, there are challenges with the smaller OIG with 
independence particularly. We share IT services. We share 
budget. We share human resources, things that would be ideal if 
they were more independent, but also not wanting to, you know, 
create a whole new entity. I understand kind of the budget 
constraints there, but those are areas that we grapple with 
independence.
    Mr. Hays. Last question that I have: The EAC is a small 
agency, and it has moved several times in the 20 years, 20 so 
years of its existence. Has your office looked at the frequent 
movement of headquarters? Has that been an issue that is come 
up?
    Ms. Schletz. That is not something that we have looked at, 
but, you know, if you would like us to consider work, we would 
be happy to. I know the recent move happened during the 
pandemic. We have not taken a look at that. Part of the costs 
are audited as part of a financial statement on it, but 
specifically looking at the relocations we have not looked at.
    Mr. Hays. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Loudermilk. I now recognize the minority counsel for 5 
minutes for asking questions.
    Mr. Wright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Inspector, in your written testimony, you discussed a 
critical management challenge in addressing the gap between 
expectation on one hand and funding on the other, and I was 
really interested in that challenge. You noted that to fully 
address this challenge, the Commission must continue to, quote, 
advocate for funding, demonstrate progress, and work with 
stakeholders to manage expectations.
    Why is the need to match funding and expectation so 
critical?
    Ms. Schletz. I think just looking at kind of good business, 
if the EAC is trying to do more than they have the resources to 
do, they are going to fall short, and that is not good for 
anybody. I think just being able to do that.
    Then, also, allocate resources where risk is. One of the 
things that we pointed out in the testing and certification 
audit is the need for the EAC to look at both staffing and 
risk. There are lots of Federal guidance out there on how to do 
that, and that would help them determine what resources and 
staffing are needed in order to meet the areas to fulfill their 
mission.
    Mr. Wright. I think you touched on part of this, but what 
is your assessment of the Commission's efforts to address this 
management challenge?
    Ms. Schletz. I think there is an opportunity to do it in a 
more formal manner. Our strategic workforce planning guidance 
that is out there is fairly robust, but it would be helpful. 
Then also the same thing with the enterprise risk management 
framework that is out there for Federal agencies to comply 
with. It is a robust process, but I think that would help them 
to tailor it.
    I do think they are assessing risk and they are assessing 
staffing, but to do it more formally would be a good 
opportunity for them to improve.
    Mr. Wright. Thank you.
    This touches upon a question that the Chairman asked 
related to the OIG hotline. You noted, I think the Chairman 
noted as well, that you processed more complaints in the first 
half of the year than all of last year. Can you tell us a bit 
more about the process for receiving complaints, the 
percentages of complaints that are nonviable, and what your 
process is for referring those complaints out?
    Ms. Schletz. Of course. Of the 374 unique complaints, and I 
say ``unique'' because we get a lot of duplicates, 61 percent 
of those were nonviable. We had 13 percent that we referred to 
the Department of Justice. Those would be things related to 
election crimes or election fraud.
    There were 22 percent, so that is the highest referred out 
percentage, that go to State election offices. Those would be 
individuals that, you know, for example, went to go vote and 
they had challenges or they had challenges with registering in 
their State, whatever it might be, and we refer those 
individuals back to the specific State office where they can 
get the help that they need.
    The rest of those complaints, which are much smaller in 
percentage, are ones that we either look into internally 
because it actually deals with something that EAC OIG has 
jurisdiction over, or they are referred to another entity.
    Mr. Wright. Post referral, do you get any information from 
the entity that receives the referral?
    Ms. Schletz. We do not, no.
    Mr. Wright. Great.
    I think just very briefly I want to go through a quick 
battery of questions related to the California audit and SKDK 
funding. I think the record should reflect that. We have talked 
about it a lot.
    Again, for your context, you sent a letter on February 9th 
to a series of Members. I believe it was Representatives Comer, 
Davis, and Hice. In that, you discussed HAVA funding, CARES Act 
funding, and the contract. You noted that based on sample 
testing, that funds were not used by the California secretary 
of state when executing the contract. Isn't that right?
    Ms. Schletz. Were not used inappropriately?
    Mr. Wright. Inappropriately.
    Ms. Schletz. Yes, correct.
    Mr. Wright. Did you find any instances of lobbying or use 
of funds for lobbying in your investigation?
    Ms. Schletz. No, we did not.
    Mr. Wright. Did SKDK receive inappropriate access to voter 
information?
    Ms. Schletz. Not that we found, no.
    Mr. Wright. Were you able to ascertain the purpose of the 
Vote Safe California messaging and whether or not it was 
appropriate under law?
    Ms. Schletz. Yes. The Vote Safe ad campaign was appropriate 
based on what we looked at.
    Mr. Wright. Great.
    Ms. Schletz. The information we had.
    Mr. Wright. Thank you so much. I yield back.
    Mr. Loudermilk. The gentleman yields back.
    I would like to thank Ms. Schletz for your testimony and 
appearing with us today. It has been very helpful.
    Members of the Committee may have some additional questions 
that they will submit in writing. We ask that you respond in 
writing as well.
    Without objection, each Member will have 5 legislative days 
to insert additional material into the record or to revise and 
extend their remarks.
    If there is no further business, I thank the Members for 
their participation.
    Without objection, the Committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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