[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AMERICAN CONFIDENCE IN ELECTIONS: THE ROLE OF THE ELECTION ASSISTANCE
COMMISSION IN FREE, FAIR, AND SECURE ELECTIONS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE
ADMINISTRATION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 14, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
www.govinfo.gov
www.cha.house.gov
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-726 WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
BRYAN STEIL, WISCONSIN, Chairman
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia JOSEPH MORELLE, New York,
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia Ranking Member
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
STEPHANIE BICE, Oklahoma DEREK KILMER, Washington
MIKE CAREY, Ohio NORMA TORRES, California
ANTHONY D'ESPOSITO, New York
LAUREL LEE, Florida
Tim Monahan, Staff Director
Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening Statements
Chairman Bryan Steil, Representative from the State of Wisconsin. 1
Prepared statement of Chairman Bryan Steil................... 3
Ranking Member Joseph Morelle, Representative from the State of
New York....................................................... 4
Prepared statement of Ranking Member Joseph Morelle.......... 6
Witnesses
Christy McCormick, chairwoman, Election Assistance Commission.... 8
Prepared statement of Christy McCormick...................... 11
Benjamin Hovland, vice chairman, Election Assistance Commission.. 26
Prepared statement of Benjamin Hovland....................... 28
Donald Palmer, commissioner, Election Assistance Commission...... 43
Prepared statement of Donald Palmer.......................... 45
Thomas Hicks, commissioner, Election Assistance Commission....... 60
Prepared statement of Thomas Hicks........................... 62
Brianna Schletz, inspector general, Election Assistance
Commission..................................................... 125
Prepared statement of Brianna Schletz........................ 128
Submissions for the Record
Inspector general report......................................... 80
The Brennan Center June 2023 Voting Laws Roundup................. 91
Inspector general management advisory............................ 105
New York Times article........................................... 114
Albert Hunt article.............................................. 119
AMERICAN CONFIDENCE IN ELECTIONS: THE ROLE OF THE ELECTION ASSISTANCE
COMMISSION IN FREE, FAIR, AND SECURE ELECTIONS
----------
June 14, 2023
House of Representatives,
Committee on House Administration,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Bryan Steil
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Steil, Loudermilk, Griffith,
Murphy, Carey, Lee, and Morelle.
Also present: Representative Good.
Staff present: Tim Monahan, Staff Director; Caleb Hays,
Deputy Staff Director, General Counsel, Acting Parliamentarian;
Hillary Lassiter, Clerk; Alex Deise, Elections Counsel,
Assistant Parliamentarian; Jordan Wilson, Director of Member
Services; Thomas Lane, Elections Counsel and Director of
Elections Coalitions; Khalil Abboud, Minority Deputy Staff
Director, Chief Counsel; Eddie Flaherty, Minority Chief Clerk;
Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director; Sarah Nasta, Minority
Elections Counsel; Owen Reilly, Minority Shared Staff; and Sean
Wright, Minority Senior Elections Counsel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRYAN STEIL, CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WISCONSIN
Chairman Steil. The Committee on House Administration will
come to order. I note that a quorum is present.
Without objection, the chair may declare a recess any time.
Also, without objection, the meeting record will remain
open for 5 legislative days so Members may submit any materials
they wish to be included therein.
Thank you, Ranking Member Morelle, Members of the
Committee, and our witnesses, for participating in today's
hearing.
The purpose of today's hearing is twofold. First, it serves
as a long overdue Oversight hearing with the Elections
Assistance Commission, or EAC. This is the Committee's first
Oversight hearing of the Elections Assistance Commission since
2011. As Chairman of the Committee on House Administration, I
can assure you times are changing. I am excited. We are
committed to a robust oversight of our Federal agencies to make
sure we are protecting taxpayer dollars.
Second, today's hearing will examine what improvements can
be made to the EAC through the American Confidence in Elections
Act to help improve voters' confidence that our Nation's
elections are free, fair, and secure. Congress serves as an
important check on Federal agencies to ensure they are
fulfilling their purpose. The EAC was established to serve as
an independent, bipartisan commission charged with helping
voters participate in the electoral process and to help confirm
election officials improve the administration of elections.
Following the 2000 election, Congress decided that election
administration problems were big enough that a new Federal
agency needed to be created. In its first 6 years, the EAC
doled out $3 billion in Federal taxpayer dollars in grants to
States and has spent billions since.
While some States have used the money effectively, we know
some States have not. As part of the CARES Act, the EAC
received $400 million in additional grant funding to prepare
for the 2020 election cycle. The GAO found that the EAC is
unable to account for the full $400 million due to poor
accounting policies. The GAO also found that EAC conducted
minimal oversight. Reporting made it--the reporting made, it,
quote, difficult to determine how grant funds were spent across
States, end quote.
The failure to accurately track how States use these
Federal grants has potentially enabled significant waste,
fraud, and abuse.
I am also concerned that some States spent the funds for
political purpose rather than improving election
administration. Let us look at how California spent their 2020
funds. The State of California was awarded $35 million in
Federal funds. California spent the money on a ``get out the
vote'' campaign. The campaign targeted specific voters. The
contract was awarded through an expedited process. The firm
that was awarded the contract was SKDKnickerbocker.
SKDKnickerbocker was Biden's campaign advisory firm. If you
went to the company's website, you would see they listed
themselves as part of, quote, Team Biden. If that is not a
conflict of interest, I do not know what is. It is a violation
of Federal law to use HAVA grant funds for ``get out the vote''
activity.
The former EAC inspector general stated that the contract
between the California secretary of state and SKDKnickerbocker
presented a risk of improper use that required further
examination. The American people demand more transparency and
accountability in their Government, especially with respect
with to elections.
Today will bring much needed oversight to the EAC to
examine how we can eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse. In doing
so, we can help improve voters' confidence in both the EAC and
our election process as a whole.
I will now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Morelle, for 5
minutes for the purpose of providing his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Steil follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE
ADMINISTRATION BRYAN STEIL
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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH MORELLE, RANKING MEMBER OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
NEW YORK
Mr. Morelle. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Steil, for
welcoming us all today.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here this morning.
The role of the Election Assistance Commission, EAC, is a
critical one. Every American must be able to cast their
ballots, freely, fairly, and securely, and to have their vote
counted as cast. Voters cannot do that without the hard work of
the officials and poll workers who administer elections, and
EAC's support of these officials is crucial.
The EAC was established more than 20 years ago by the Help
America Vote Act, also known as HAVA, with broad bipartisan
support. In the past two decades, the EAC has evolved to meet
its mission and to adapt new elections landscape. We should
maintain this spirit of bipartisan support through all of this.
As election-related myths and disinformation has grown,
voters bear a growing burden of having to sort fact from
fiction.
A trusted clearinghouse of information and resources such
as the EAC is invaluable to providing voters with resources
they urgently need and ensuring election officials have the
tools to educate voters and conduct safe and secure elections
in an ever-changing environment. The EAC provides assistance as
election officials face growing threats and partners with other
Federal agencies to address critical infrastructure needs.
In recent years, we have seen attempts to undermine public
trust and confidence in our elections and the electoral
process, and while voter confidence has improved in the last
couple of years, having a trusted messenger of election
information is vital to our democracy. One of the most
significant needs in election administration is robust and
consistent funding. Since 2018, Congress has provided more than
$950 million in HAVA security grants and $400 million in CARES
Act funding, but more is needed. Indeed, President Biden's
budget calls for investing $5 billion over the next 10 years,
and I fully support the President's budget request.
Maintaining our democracy requires resources, and budgets
reflect society's priorities. We need to make sure that we are
consistent about this because that reflects our support for
fair and open accessible elections. The need for funding is
acute. Estimates for what it could cost to adequately fund
elections over the next decade are in the billions of dollars,
billions of dollars.
Despite being designated critical infrastructure in 2017,
Federal investment in elections is irregular, unpredictable,
and insufficient. Simply will not do.
We must provide for sufficient, regular, and predictable
funding for States and local election administrators through
HAVA grants, as well as fully funding the EAC.
As a Ranking Member of this Committee and a Member of the
House Appropriations Committee, I look forward to working with
my colleagues to provide an adequate amount of election funding
as an investment in protecting democracy, empowering election
officials to do their good work, and to improve and modernize
Federal elections.
For years, the EAC was underfunded, targeted by my
colleagues on the other side with measures to eliminate the
agency. I hope we have moved on from the past days, and can all
agree that the EAC has a critical role in our electoral
process. It should be equipped with the funding necessary to
meet its mandate and the evolving needs of our election
officials. I was heartened to hear in recent testimony from
Vice Chair Hovland and Commissioner Palmer about educational
tools the EAC has developed for election officials to utilize
new programs the EAC is working on, such as the field services
program and the regular engagement of the commission with State
and local officials, and other Federal partners.
I look forward to hearing from all the Commissioners today
about work the EAC is doing with election officials around the
country about the implementation of the updated guidelines for
voting systems and how the Commission is preparing for the 2024
elections. Additionally, there is always room for program
improvements. We all want to ensure taxpayer dollars are spent
effectively and efficiently.
I look forward to hearing from Inspector General Schletz
about opportunities for those improvements. The work we do now
laying a bedrock of education about the voting process,
strengthening partnerships among Federal, State, and local
governments, will further bolster voter confidence under the
2024 Presidential election. The 2020 and 2022 elections showed
that our national democratic experiment can hold, but we must
remain steadfast in our commitment to democratic principles as
we head into this next election cycle.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and
thank you all, again, for being here, for the important work
that you do each and every day.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ranking Member Morelle follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE
ADMINISTRATION JOSEPH MORELLE
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Chairman Steil. Thank you very much.
Without objection, all Members' opening statements will be
made part of the hearing record if they are submitted to the
Committee clerk by 5 p.m. today.
Today we have two witness panels. We welcome the
Commissioners on our first panel, and Ms. Brianna Schletz,
Inspector General of the Elections Assistance Commission, will
participate on our second panel.
Commissioners, we appreciate you being with us today, and
we look forward to your testimony.
Pursuant to paragraph B of Committee rule 6, the witnesses
will please stand and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Steil. Let the record show the witnesses answered
in the affirmative and may be seated.
I will now introduce our first witness panel. Our first
witness, Chairwoman Christy McCormick was confirmed by
unanimous consent by the U.S. Senate on December 16, 2014, to
serve on the U.S. Elections Assistance Commission. Chairwoman
McCormick has twice served as Chair and currently serves as the
Chairwoman of the EAC and is the designated Federal officer for
the Technical Guidelines Development Committee.
Our next witness, Commissioner Benjamin Hovland, was
confirmed by the U.S. Senate on January 2, 2019, and currently
serves as Vice Chairman of the U.S. Elections Assistance
Commission and as the designated Federal officer for the Local
Leadership Council. With 20 years of experience in elections,
Commissioner Hovland's career has focused on legal issues
related to campaign finance regulation, the administration of
State and Federal elections, including recent poll worker
training, voter registration list maintenance, statewide data
base matching, voter education, and ballot initiative
litigation.
Our next witness, Commissioner Donald Palmer was nominated
by President Trump, confirmed by unanimous consent to the U.S.
Senate on January 2, 2019. Commissioner Palmer is a former
secretary of the Virginia State Board of Elections and served
as the Commonwealth's chief election official from 2011 to
2014. He also previously served as Florida's State election
director.
Finally, Commissioner Thomas Hicks was nominated by
President Obama, confirmed by unanimous consent to the U.S.
Senate in 2014 to serve on the U.S. Elections Assistance
Commission. Prior to his appointment with EAC, Commissioner
Hicks spent nearly 10 at the Committee on House Administration
serving as senior elections counsel and minority elections
counsel.
We appreciate you being here today and look forward to
testimony. As a reminder, we have read your written statement,
and it will appear in full in the hearing record.
Under Committee rule 9, you are to limit your oral
presentation to a brief summary of your written statement
unless I extend the time in consultation with the Ranking
Member.
Please remember to press the button on the microphone in
front of you so the Members can hear you. When you begin to
speak, you will see a light that will turn green; 4 minutes, it
will turn yellow; then it will turn red, and we will ask you to
wrap up.
I now recognize you, Ms. McCormick, for 5 minutes for the
purposes of making an opening statement.
STATEMENTS OF HON. CHRISTY MCCORMICK, CHAIRWOMAN, ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN HOVLAND, VICE
CHAIRMAN, ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; THE HONORABLE DONALD
PALMER, COMMISSIONER, ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; AND THE
HONORABLE THOMAS HICKS, COMMISSIONER, ELECTION ASSISTANCE
COMMISSION.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTY MCCORMICK
Ms. McCormick. Chairman Steil, Ranking Member Morelle, and
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the work of the U.S.
Election Assistance Commission as we prepare for the 2024
elections.
We appreciate the Committee's crucial oversight efforts and
close attention to the EAC. Our Nation's elections have faced
increased scrutiny in recent years, and the Committee has
responded by demonstrating leadership in helping to support
election administrators.
By conducting this important series of congressional
hearings, the House Administration Committee has shined a
spotlight on increasing America's confidence in elections. As
you move forward and consider election administration reform,
the EAC stands ready to assist and carry out the provisions of
that legislation. It is essential that U.S. elections are
conducted with integrity and transparency, and are free, fair,
and trustworthy. The bipartisan EAC works to uphold this charge
each day.
Over the past decade, the field of election administration
has faced ever-growing challenges and the need for increased
technology improvements to our election systems. Many of these
challenges, including questions about adequate funding and
security for voting systems, are not new. Others, however, have
increased suddenly in recent years.
For example, social media continues to evolve with new
platforms and generative AI tools, making voter education more
challenging. In addition to administering elections in voter
education, officials must still prepare for cyber, physical,
and personal security threats. Many election officials have
left the field citing safety, increased requirements and
expectations, and a lack of resources. Some communities have
seen their entire elections department resign.
Now more than ever our election officials need our support.
With the help of this Committee, the EAC is determined to do
all it can to meet these challenges. Over the past year,
Commissioners have redoubled outreach by resuming travel across
the country for in-person meetings, presentations, and visits
with State and local election officials. Discussions during
these visits underscored not only the outstanding work of
election administrators in 2022 midterms but also the
significant impact of efforts by the Federal Government to
provide guidance, monetary resources, and best practice
materials.
Election officials have expressed sincere gratitude for
recent assistance, especially for resources dedicated to safety
and security. This includes $955 million in HAVA security
grants provided by Congress and administered by the EAC. With
support from Congress in the form of increased agency operating
budget and more consistent HAVA funding to the States, the
Commission continues to fulfill the agency's mission to improve
the administration of Federal elections and to help Americans
vote.
As you are aware, the decentralized nature of U.S.
elections results in a wide variety of practices, laws, and
regulations. To support the country's multitude of election
situations and meet HAVA's charge with developing election
guidance, the EAC's Clearinghouse Division has generated a
depth of informative products, including updated quick start
guides, a new version of the election management guidelines,
which is a primary for election administration, guides,
checklists, and one-pagers, white papers, simulation videos,
toolkits, and other products to assist election officials.
These documents reflect the need for unbiased, trusted source
of guidance as election officials navigate the complexities of
election administration. This is especially important now as we
welcome and train the many new officials across country.
Earlier this year, the agency hired an experienced
Government leader, Steven Frid, to serve as our new executive
director. The EAC has also hired needed support staff to assist
the election process and specifically the role it plays as
critical infrastructure. Additionally, the EAC marked the 20th
anniversary of HAVA in 2022, commemorating the historic
milestone with the launch of Help America Vote Day and the
celebration of the second national poll worker recruitment day.
With more than 3,000 countries and thousands of localities,
it takes nearly 1 million poll workers to operate election
polling sites. This process supports more than 209 million
registered voters. The EAC continues to strategically promote
election worker information on social media and on our website.
We created helpamericavote.gov a permanent outreach platform in
2020 in service of the first national poll worker recruitment
day. Over the course of 2022, through the agency's poll worker
web pages had over 263,000 page views. We regularly receive
modifications from election offices, and based on the
responses, information is updated consistently.
Looking forward to 2024 with ongoing support from Congress,
the Commission will provide the necessary assistance to
election officials to mitigate challenges and protect the
integrity of U.S. elections. I would like to, again, thank the
Committee for its oversight in support of the EAC, as well as
for the opportunity to speak here today.
I will now turn the discussion over to Commissioner Ben
Hovland to discuss the Commission's internal financial
oversight and grants management.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McCormick follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTY MCCORMICK
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Chairman Steil. Thank you very much, Chairwoman McCormick.
Vice Chair Hovland, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN HOVLAND
Mr. Hovland. Thank you, Chairman Steil, Ranking Member
Morelle, and Members of the Committee for inviting us to
testify about the work of the U.S. Election Assistance
Commission. My name is Ben Hovland, and I am the current Vice
Chair of the EAC.
A core component of the EAC's mission is distributing,
monitoring, and auditing the use of Federal grants for the
improvement of election administration and security. Federal
HAVA funds, including the $955 million provided since 2018, are
a key resource for election administrators responding to
increased technology and the changing demands of the field.
To emphasize the importance and impact of this funding, I
would note the election infrastructure sector-specific plan
states, quote, it is impossible to make an honest assessment of
the election infrastructure subsector's risk and the potential
to mitigate that risk without an understanding of the chronic
resource issues the subsector faces at all levels of
government, end quote.
As we look forward to 2024, I believe it has never been
more challenging to administer elections or more expensive.
That is why grant funding in partnership with the States is so
crucial, and we value your efforts to address the needs of the
State and local governments through the congressional
appropriations process.
As of this March, 95 percent of the Fiscal Year 2018
election security grant funds have been expended, including
additional election security funds from Fiscal Year 2020, 2022,
and 2023. States have spent a total of $529 million in funds
awarded between 2018 and 2023, which is approximately 56
percent of the available grant funding.
The spending rate depends on States' planned use with some
States allocating the funds for long-term programs or
resources. Some States provide these funds to local governments
in the form of subgrants, while others rely on funds for staff
and materials of the State level.
With each States' different security priorities and
timetables for significant purchases, such as voting system
replacement or new statewide voter registration data bases,
usage rates have varied across the country. The next
expenditure reports are due to the EAC on July 30th. As set
forth under HAVA, audits of election security grants are
conducted after a State begins to expend the provided funds.
Alongside distribution and administration efforts, EAC's office
of inspector general recently added resources and staff to
better monitor State spending of election security grants.
With new staff leadership in place, the agency has invested
in building up staff capacity strategically across the agency.
However, the EAC still faces significant attrition challenges.
It is essential that we maintain adequate staffing levels in
mission-critical functions to ensure statutorily mandated
requirements are met. The EAC's Inspector General has raised
structural issues related to HAVA that are discussed in her
report on management challenges for the U.S. Election
Assistance Commission in Fiscal Year 2023.
My colleagues and I concur with those observations and have
included them in our legislative recommendations. Of particular
note, the inability to pay competitive wages compared to
Congress or other Federal agencies hampers our ability to
attract and retain talent. We are, however, committed to doing
everything we can with the resources we have. The EAC is
grateful for the increased funding provided by Congress in
recent years.
After facing over a decade of significant fiscal
constraints, EAC returned to pre-2010 budget levels for the
first time in Fiscal Year 2023. For Fiscal Year 2021, and 2022,
the EAC successfully adapted and executed the operating budget
provided by Congress, ending each year with an obligation rate
over 99 percent. Congressional funding has been fully utilized,
enabling the agency to provide much needed assistance to
address some of the pressing challenges facing the election
community.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today,
and I look forward to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hovland follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN HOVLAND
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Chairman Steil. Thank you, Vice Chair Hovland.
Commissioner Palmer, you are now recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD PALMER
Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Chairman Steil, Ranking Member
Morelle, and Members of the Committee. I echo my fellow
Commissioners in our appreciation of the investment you have
made in the Nation's elections through continued support of the
EAC.
In preparation for the 2024 election, the EAC will continue
to test and certify the Nation's voting systems and will
continue--and the American public should be confident that
their ballot will be counted.
In 2023, the EAC will advance our testing and certification
efforts in several areas. A voting system certification does
not end with a successful test in an accredited laboratory;
rather, the review of these voting systems continues during the
lifespan of the voting equipment. As a result, the agency is
preparing to launch an innovative field services program to
help election officials strengthen their overall posture and
preparedness with EAC-certified systems.
This onsite collaboration is important for several reasons.
First, the implementation assisting reviews in the field will
ensure that equipment delivered to jurisdictions is equivalent
to what was purchased. The effort will analyze system hardware
and software configurations to verify the equivalency of the
equipment to EAC certifications. Additionally, there will be
jurisdiction site surveys of voting systems, the best practices
assessments, collection of system census information, and
analysis of anomaly reports. We recently onboarded the field
services program manager and look forward to building out this
initiative.
In 2022, the Commission made some considerable progress by
fully operationalizing version 2.0 of the Voluntary Voting
Systems Guidelines, or VVSG. The new guidelines incorporate
technological advancements in cybersecurity, accuracy,
accessibility, usability, and audibility. Adoption of the EAC's
new lifecycle policy along with the accreditation of two voting
system test laboratories are necessary steps toward the
realization of voting systems that are VVSG 2.0 tested and
certified. The EAC has one system that is being currently
tested against VVSG 2.0, and the Commissioners just recently
visited the Pro V&V, the test lab, and got to see firsthand
some of the testing that is going on in Huntsville, Alabama.
We would also like to take this opportunity to emphasize
that VVSG 1.0 and 1.1 certified systems will not be decertified
by the EAC as a result of migration to the new guidelines.
Voting systems that are currently deployed are still accurate
and reliable, and they continue to be used and do not need to
be immediately replaced or recertified to 2.0. In addition,
they will continue to be tested and updated with security
patches.
It will take time and significant monetary expenditures for
jurisdictions to implement VVSG 2.0, so it is unlikely that
systems certified to 2.0 will be used in the 2024 elections.
Congress and the American people, though, should have absolute
confidence in this process. The EAC has amplified this message
by publishing a communications toolkit to assist election
officials in communicating about VVSG standards, updates in
election security, and helping to boost confidence in the
critical infrastructure of our election systems.
As part of our election technology efforts, the agency
launched the Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program,
or ESTEP. This technology includes electronic poll books,
electronic ballot delivery systems, election night reporting
data bases, and voter registration portals. These crucial
election-supporting technologies are crucial tools for both
election officials and voters.
As more States and localities adopt these technologies,
officials are looking to the Federal Government for voluntary
standards and guidance similar to what is provided currently in
the VVSG. Election administrators today must rely on a
patchwork of State laws, regulation, and certification programs
of varying degrees and review. An establishment of the EAC
program will provide for the development of robust voluntary
security standards, testing guidance, and training materials
covering these election-supporting technologies.
Attacks from nation-state actors against our election
infrastructure have specifically targeted election systems as,
I pointed out, in the past, and these attacks are only going to
escalate. The first technology pilot for ESTEP is electronic
poll books, and these are critical election supporting
technology for election officials as they are used in the
polling place.
As the cyber security threat landscape across the election
community continues to evolve, the EAC is planning a voluntary
coordinated vulnerability disclosure program. The EAC will lead
a program to quickly identify and respond to vulnerabilities in
our voting system alongside our Federal partners. Development
of this program is in its preliminary stages and will require
staff and resources to be fully realized.
I would like to thank, again, the Committee for allowing us
to speak with you today. I will now turn it over--the
discussion over to Commissioner Tom Hicks to further expand on
the Commonwealth's wealth of clearinghouse products further
briefly mentioned by Chairwoman McCormick.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Palmer follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD PALMER
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Chairman Steil. Thank you, Commissioner Palmer.
Commissioner Hicks, you are now recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS HICKS
Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Chairman Steil, Ranking Member
Morelle, and Members of the Committee for having us here today.
My name is Thomas Hicks.
In addition to the developments my fellow Commissioners
have shared, the agency has also invested in increasing our
clearinghouse capabilities.
The EAC's Clearinghouse Division, composed of former
election officials and subject-matter experts, help the agency
share and develop resources for both the public and election
administrators. In this role, the EAC serves as a trusted
source of nonpartisan election information, especially in the
ever-evolving election landscape as the field of election
administration continues to see high levels of turnover.
Leading up to the 2024 elections, the Clearinghouse
Division has released more than 60 products over the past 2
years, including a rise--range of best practices and toolkits.
Topics range from resources on physical security threats
against election officials to EAVS data collection and
analysis. Clearinghouse products offer overall guidance to new
election officials in conducting elections, such as improving
chain-of-custody procedures, auditing, and better serving
voters with disabilities. This includes new management
guidelines, updates with increased focus on relevant election
technologies that have changed since the last release 15 years
ago.
All of the products developed by the Clearinghouse Division
are guided by the parameters set forth in HAVA. We have heard
from election officials across the country about the escalation
of threats they, their colleagues, and poll workers have faced.
The agency has developed and distributed clearinghouse
resources and information from other Federal partners, such as
our dedicated landing page, as well as issuing guidance with
the election security grants assistance.
Another issue of concern are risks to the supply chain.
While specific rules relating to paper ballot ordering are
determined at State level, there are areas where the
Clearinghouse Division can provide guidance moving forward,
particularly in the event of an emergency. In the summer of
2022, the EAC released an alert about the nationwide paper
shortage and guidance on how to plan for depletions of paper
inventory on election day.
Additionally, States may use HAVA election security grant
funding for procuring ballot stock that has security features,
such as watermarks and unique ballot identifiers. Our grants
team also issued guidance on this matter. The EAC will publish
the 2022 Election Administration and Voting Survey, or EAVS, at
the end of this month. This biennial report collects data on
election administration from nearly 6,500 local election
jurisdictions across all 50 States, the District of Columbia,
and U.S. Territories. EAVS data is utilized by countless
stakeholders in the election community.
The EAC also remains committed to election officials
fulfilling the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities
Act and HAVA's promise of a private and independent vote for
all eligible Americans. We have hired a full-time subject-
matter expert for accessibility to lead these efforts. The EAC
is working on a national study to document the experience of
voters with disabilities in the 2022 midterms. The survey will
be released this summer.
The Commission intends to use the results to produce
actionable items that are necessary to meet HAVA's vision of
fully accessible elections.
Our other voting accessibility resources include toolkits
for in-person voting, voter registration, vote by mail, and
assistance for voters with language access needs. These
language resources were updated following the most recent
update to section 203 of the Voting Acts requirements, which
requires 333 jurisdictions to provide language assistance.
With the 2024 election cycle already here, election
officials face an ever-growing list of responsibilities and
challenges. The EAC is working diligently to help them prepare
for the expected and the unexpected to provide the best voting
experience possible for every voter.
Thank you for the opportunity to share some of the work of
the EAC and your commitment to election administrators, poll
workers, and voters. There is still a lot that needs to be
done, and we look forward to working with you on these issues.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look
forward to answering questions and feedback you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hicks follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS HICKS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Steil. Thank you, Commissioner Hicks.
We thank all of our witnesses for being here today.
I will begin our questions today followed by the Ranking
Member. We will then alternate between sides.
I now recognize myself for the purpose of questioning our
witnesses.
We will hear from EAC Inspector General Schletz soon on the
recently submitted OIG semiannual report to Congress.
Commissioner and Chairwoman McCormick, you submitted a
response to that report 2 weeks ago stating that you were
pleased that the California audit recommendations have all been
resolved and closed. The audit was conducted because California
awarded a $35 million contract through an expedited process to
Joe Biden's main election advisory firm.
This does not inspire confidence that our funds EAC has a
responsibility for are being properly used. Relating to the
funds, the EAC budget 5 years ago was $9 million. The 2024
budget request asks for almost $34 million, a roughly $25
million increase from just 5 years ago and an almost 300-
percent increase in funds.
Commissioner McCormick, has the EAC's jurisdiction
increased since its creation under HAVA in 2002?
Ms. McCormick. Only by the addition of the Northern Mariana
Islands, Chairman Steil. We do have increased work on the
Commission. There has been an expansion in concern over
cybersecurity. We do have a lot more work to do to train
election officials across the country. We do have increased
responsibilities with grant management and making sure that the
grants provided by Congress are appropriately used.
We were also concerned about the California contract
between SKD Knickbocker and the California secretary of state's
office. In fact, we received several letters from this
Committee, and we also asked our inspector general to look into
that contract because of the concern of the inappropriate use
of HAVA funds for ``get out the vote'' and voter registration
activity.
Chairman Steil. Commissioner McCormick, I mean, if we look
at the website, I mean, SKD Knickbocker, I mean, this was not
overly complicated. I mean, you go to their website, and it is
Joe Biden for President. They are a--SKD is proud to be part of
Team Biden. They are taking $35 million of Federal taxpayer
money to run an election. They run an expedited grant process,
and the grant process cannot be for ``get out the vote''; it
has got to be to properly administer their elections. They give
$35 million of Federal taxpayer money to someone that is a
proud member of Team Biden, and they expect that the American
people should have confidence that there is not political
gamesmanship in this grant?
Ms. McCormick. We agree with you, Congressman. This is not
an appropriate use of HAVA funds, and that is why our inspector
general--our new inspector general came in and did an
investigation and audit of those HAVA funds that were provided
to California.
Chairman Steil. What do we do about it? The $35 million
went out, went to California, and was spent. What are
ramifications for spending $35 million to a proud member of
Team Biden?
Ms. McCormick. Well, the inspector general's office found
that the money that was used for those activities was actually
State funds and not HAVA funds. The inappropriate use of those
moneys was not by Federal funds. It was utilized by State
funds, and she resolved that investigation and closed that
question out.
However, that does mean we still remain concerned about how
HAVA funds are used and whether they are being used
appropriately, documented appropriately, and whether they are
in--can be reconciled with the plans that the States provide to
us on how they are going to use the funds.
Chairman Steil. I read your written testimony. In your
written testimony, you note that you are going to use some of
this increase--the $25 million increase you are requesting--to
enhance the auditing and oversight----
Ms. McCormick. Correct.
Chairman Steil [continuing]. of the grantmaking.
How big is the team now? How big is it going to be? What
are your needs in that respect?
Ms. McCormick. Well, we have several members of--we have
maybe three members in our Grants Division right now. We hope
to expand that. We also are expanding--the inspector general is
expanding her team as well, and you know, we need to have more
resources to be able to have appropriate oversight. One of the
issues that we have is that we have a short timeline when we do
get this money from Congress to get that money out to the
States. That does not excuse us not overseeing those funds
appropriately, and it takes resources to do that. We appreciate
that Congress has provided that to us.
Chairman Steil. In 2022, you had 49 employees. It grew last
year to 65. The request is to take it to 87, almost doubling in
just 2 years. We think about the new 16 people that you are
looking to bring on, you referenced increasing, improving the
audit and oversight. Are there other specific things that they
are going to work on?
Ms. McCormick. Well, we have personnel that we are trying
to place into the field to do field services following up on
the testing and certification program. Right now we have no
visibility of the voting systems once they leave our
laboratories. We plan on hiring field service auditors to go
out into the country and to make sure those machines stay up to
date and are still meeting the certification requirements and
to assist election officials in any kind of issues that they
have with maintaining their voting systems.
Chairman Steil. OK. I am going to go back because I pulled
up your--while you are saying--the office of inspector general
report, that according to SOS $11.8 million in EAC HAVA funds
were used for SKDK contract, $9.9 million of which were CARES
Act funds, and $1.9 million of 2018 consolidated funds. I just
think it is broadly concerning to the American people when we
see the appearance of political activity with Federal taxpayer
dollars, and we are looking for an increase in your budget, you
are overseeing a lot of the grants that are going out to the
States.
Some of our States are using these funds in productive and
thoughtful ways to better administer elections. The reason I am
pushing back is because some States are not, and I am uniquely
concerned about this contract with California where they gave
it to--all you had do was go to their website, and they were
self-listing themselves as a proud member of Team Biden. I
think that that should be concerning across the board.
I appreciate all of our Commissioners being here.
I will now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Morelle, for
the purposes of asking questions.
Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
A couple things I just point out. I do want to correct the
record. I believe EAC Commissioners were here in May 2019 on
the question of election security, not 2011. I just wanted to
make sure I made that point.
I must admit, as much as I appreciate you holding up the
Joe Biden for President sign--in fact, you could hold it up
behind me, Mr. Chairman--I do want to just take a moment--I
only have 5 minutes, but I do want to first of all submit, with
unanimous consent, like to submit a copy of the inspector
general's actual report on the issue that is being talked
about. It is dated February 9th, 2022, and it comes from
Inspector General Schletz.
I just want to--I will read at least--a couple of things I
do want to note since we are going to spend some time here
apparently talking about this. First of all, the contract was
not sole-sourced. It says that in the inspector general's
report. Actually, a number of firms bid on the work, and SKDK
was one of the vendors chosen. As it relates to the conclusions
of the inspector general, first of all, the--in the first part,
Federal funds were not used for registration drives. California
launched a public education campaign called Vote Safe
California.
It indicates that nothing that SDKD--SKDK--I am going to
get that right--did not violate anything in that regard nor did
the contract, and as it relates to ``get out the vote,'' it
says the EAC grants funds for messages educating a specific
population about safety voting during the population is
allowed. Similarly, EAC said an advertisement directing the
public to California's voting website is allowable because the
website has additional--educational information on how to vote
safely or procedures for voting.
We found no specific activities or messaging in the
definition of ``get out the vote.'' It concludes--and this is
the important part, I would think, the operative part, the
conclusion by the inspector general is based on the evidence
California secretary of state's office executed the SKDK
contract in accordance with EAC guidelines. Funds were not used
for unallowable costs, such as registration drives or
activities meeting the definition of ``get out the vote''.
I just wanted the record to reflect. We can talk about
this, I suppose, all day long. The actual inspector general who
you are referring to basically concluded that they had followed
all the rules, California had, and there is no there there. I
just want to just make sure that enters into the record with
unanimous consent.
Chairman Steil. Without objection.
[The report referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Morelle. Using just my last few minutes, perhaps,
Commissioner Hicks, our elections environment is constantly
changing. Election administrators deal with ever-evolving
cybersecurity threats and the rapid spread of mis- and
disinformation. We need to consider the physical safety of
election workers and now must respond to an increasing number
of records requests, analysis requests, and respond to threats
AI may pose to us all, and, on top of that, actually run
elections.
Could you please comment on how increased and reliable
funding could alleviate some of this significant burden?
Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.
Increased funding--when we go to election offices, the No. 1
thing they ask for is additional funding. It is usually one or
two people in the office that is trying to do nine different
jobs in an office. They are looking to--the Congressman--the
Chairman had asked a little bit earlier, have we increased our
authority. We have not increased our authority, but the scope
of your jobs have increased in terms of cybersecurity issues
that no one thought of in 2003 and 2002 when HAVA was enacted.
Also the fact that we are also fighting nation-states in terms
of mis- and disinformation. It is not really feasible to ask a
city clerk in a small town to fight against a superpower for
mis- and disinformation when the U.S. Government should be
doing that.
We have worked with our partners, with the Federal
Government, that being the DHS. When elections were elevated to
critical infrastructure, we were able to do a lot more things
in that sort of realm. I do believe that, with increased
funding, increased responsibility, we will have to be able to
do that so that votes can be counted accurately.
Mr. Morelle. Very good. I had a number of other questions,
but my time is going to come to an end.
Before I do that, Mr. Chairman, I also ask unanimous
consent that the Brennan Center's June 2023 Voting Laws
Roundup, which found, between January 1 and May 29, at least 11
States have enacted 13 restrictive laws, including 7 that curb
access to mail-in voting and an onerous law in Florida which
would significantly reduce voter drives in advance of the 2024
election.
Chairman Steil. Without objection.
[The Brennan Center's June 2023 Voting Laws Roundup
referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Morelle. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Loudermilk is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Loudermilk. Hit the wrong button. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to each of our panelists for being here today.
Chairwoman McCormick, last year, in 2022, the EAC received
$75 million in elections security grants. In 2024, the EAC has
requested $300 million in election security grants. Now, my
calculation, that is about a 300-percent increase. Now, I know
the entire Nation has been affected by the out-of-control
Biden-flation that we have right now, but I do not even think
that is at 300 percent. That leaves us to question, you know,
what are these grants going for, and can you explain such a
massive increase?
Ms. McCormick. Thank you for the question, Congressman
Loudermilk. The EAC itself is not requesting that money for our
operations. We constantly hear from States and localities of
the need for additional funding. Part of that is they are in
the process of purchasing new and updated voting equipment. A
lot of the equipment that is out there has been certified to
standards that were passed in 2007. We need to update election
equipment across the country.
Additionally, we need to provide cybersecurity measures on
all of the machines and all of our systems to make sure that we
are fighting against any kind of intrusion on our election
systems. It is a question of national security, and that is why
there has been an increase in the request. We are approaching
the 2024 elections. We have heard from our partners at CISA and
other agencies that they expect a ramp up in attacks on our
systems, and election officials need to defend those election
systems in advance of the 2024 elections.
Mr. Loudermilk. In summary, this is election integrity
types of security?
Ms. McCormick. A lot of it is election integrity and
security.
Mr. Loudermilk. OK. Security being securing ballots,
securing individuals?
Ms. McCormick. Securing the voting systems, securing the
ballots, physical security, and cybersecurity.
Mr. Loudermilk. OK. How are you going to ensure that the
grants are distributed and used properly?
Ms. McCormick. Well, there is a distribution formula that
we have to follow. We make sure that our grants team follows
all the Federal rules on grantmaking and requires all the
Federal financial reports and progress reports, which are
required usually semiannual. The last tranche of money required
them to be filed quarterly. We follow up with the States on any
issues that they have in using the grants appropriately. We
also, then, make sure that the inspector general is aware of
all of the ways that the States are utilizing that money, and
she does the audits for the EAC.
Mr. Loudermilk. OK. Hypothetically, if the--if there was a
suspicion that grants were not used properly, what measures do
you take to investigate that?
Ms. McCormick. Well, the inspector general is the person
who investigates whether funds were used appropriately or not,
and then it can mean that that money can be repaid into the
Federal Treasury if it is found to be used inappropriately.
Mr. Loudermilk. OK. Thank you. On December 12, 2022, the
EAC inspector general put out a management advisory, 23-01,
over concerns that the Help America Vote Act does not define
``voter registration,'' ``voter education,'' or ``get out the
vote''. Yet HAVA funds cannot be used for these purposes.
Are you aware of jurisdictions using HAVA funds to engage
in these efforts in violation of HAVA?
Ms. McCormick. We monitor the use of the election--the HAVA
funds, and we have not found that to be the case. We are
constantly making sure that the funds are used for allowable
purposes only.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you. I yield my remaining time to the
Chairman.
Chairman Steil. Thank you very much. I just want to go back
to a point my colleague made regarding the grant in California.
I just think it is worth taking 10 seconds to clean up. I think
it is technically true that the inspector general came back and
noted that it was not for a technical ``get out the vote''. The
challenge is the OIG issued the alert to the U.S. Elections
Assistance Commission to identify risks because of the terms,
the following terms ``voter registration,'' ``voter
education,'' and ``get out the vote'' are not defined in HAVA,
and EAC has not adopted its own formal definition.
If we walk away with anything, it is, man, we have got some
cleanup work to do to make sure that we are not allowing
Federal funds to go to Team Biden to do--get out what I would
call, and I think most Americans would call, ``get out the
vote'' efforts. I just think that is an important piece
cognizant of the time.
I will now recognize Mr. Murphy--Dr. Murphy for 5 minutes.
Dr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate y'all
coming today. I had some interesting reading this morning. I
just want to--I had not read the President's executive order,
and you know guys, I just cannot help think, if we want clear
and we want free and fair elections and everybody to vote, to
legally vote, how much mail-in voting was pushed. I remember
patients telling me so many times that, on different occasions,
they would receive five or six ballots in the mail from their
neighbors or somebody else.
In testimony a few weeks ago, one of the gentlemen noted
that secretary of state of Michigan did not want to remove
25,000 dead people on a roll. To push out mail-in voting--I
think it is great for our folks that cannot get out, but to
push it out, I see no other method that is so ripe for the
potential of fraud than mail-in voting. I just--I have to make
that comment. I know my Democratic colleagues see very much
differently, and the President sure is pushing that, but I
just--it just seems like an absolute recipe for attempted fraud
in that matter.
Ms. McCormick, I am very interested--you know, everybody is
talking about cybersecurity. Can you give me an example of what
is being done and what we have found in the past as attempts to
infiltrate our election process?
Ms. McCormick. Thank you for the question, Dr. Murphy. We
had found--CISA had found, in the 2016 election, that some of
the--some of the nation-state actors had tried to utilize
online voter registration systems and other election-supporting
technology to intrude into the election system. They were not
successful, but we have to----
Dr. Murphy. I just ask--I need specifics on that when they
get into the system. Do they mean actually go in and change
ballots? What do you actually technically mean?
Ms. McCormick. It was not changing ballots, sir. It was
getting----
Dr. Murphy. Machines and----
Ms. McCormick. Getting information from the voting
registration systems. We do not have the details of that. That
is something you would have to ask CISA about. They have not
shared that information, nor has the FBI, with us. We do take
the security of our systems very, very seriously. We just
recently passed an updated version of the VVSG 2.0 that has
many increased requirements for security, and I can give you
some of those.
Dr. Murphy. Let me just continue.
Ms. McCormick. Okay.
Dr. Murphy. Thank you. You know, with the great Russian
hoax that one of our colleagues persisted with a lot of the--
you know, one of the former President candidates, I do not
think we have to hopefully worry too much about Russia. I think
China is going to be--is right now our greatest enemy. I fear
for what they would do. We have a President that is very pro-
China, and I am very fearful in that regard.
Let me just go back to this executive order. Did you or
anybody in your office consult with the White House about this
executive order, or did this just come out from somebody in a
cubicle with their grand ideas?
Ms. McCormick. I am not aware of anyone in our office
coordinating with the White House on that order. We are not
tasked under that order to do anything. You know----
Dr. Murphy. You are not in charge of implementing anything
with that executive order?
Ms. McCormick. We are not. We had a couple of Federal
agencies ask us for assistance. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology asked us for information on--and a
white paper on disability as they were tasked to look into
disability issues with regard to that order. I believe GSA also
asked us for some advice. We did not do anything other than
what we already do to reply to that order.
Dr. Murphy. Okay. Alright. Thank you. You know, there has
been a lot of dark money or whatever, a lot of political
influence from people who have a lot of money in this country.
Mr. Hovland, can you expound our your support--you had voiced
support for Mark Zuckerberg's private funding of the election
administration? Why do you think he has the great--since he is
one of the richest men in the world, why he should be
determining our election outcomes?
Mr. Hovland. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I do
not believe that he had any determination in the outcomes, and
what I testified to House Appropriations in 2021 was that I
thought it was unfortunate that our election officials had to
be dependent on the charity billionaires, that I feel that it
is a failure of Government to not provide adequate funding for
elections. I think philanthropic dollars have gone to do a lot
of great things, but as far as funding elections, I think that
is a responsibility of Government. I think it is critical that
we provide adequate funding so that----
Dr. Murphy. You do not feel the actions of Zuckerberg are
really a good patriotic thing? That is what I am hearing you
say.
Mr. Hovland. From interviewing elections officials who
received that money, I know so much of it went to get PPE, to
have protective equipment, to have hand sanitizer to be able
to----
Dr. Murphy. You can understand the appearance of such, that
it's influence, and we know of all those things happening. You
know, I do not agree with the Supreme Court decision many years
ago that allowed all this extra money to come in. I absolutely
think it was the wrong thing to do. We just want free and fair
elections across this country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
I seek unanimous consent to insert the inspector general's
management advisory previously referenced.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The management advisory referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Steil. I now recognize Mr. Carey for 5 minutes for
the purpose of asking questions.
Mr. Carey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. I have
a series of questions that I want to go to, but I just had one
question for you, Ms. McCormick. When we are talking about the
needs--the State requests and the needs, and you talk about the
distribution formula. I think you mentioned that to the
Chairman, there is a formula. I had not seen the Chairman--I
had not seen that graph of the President on--before until
today, but should that formula--should that not also include
making sure that the vendors do not have--do not side with one
side or the other, that they are completely bipartisan as it
relates to receiving the HAVA grants?
Ms. McCormick. The vendors do not receive the HAVA grants,
Congressman. Those go straight to the States.
Mr. Carey. The States, but then they in turn----
Ms. McCormick. Well, the States usually provide subgrants
to their counties.
Mr. Carey. Right.
Ms. McCormick. Then the counties and the States decide how
that money will be used as long as it is allowable within HAVA.
The vendors to not receive the money. However, they do get
contracted by the States and the local jurisdictions to
provide----
Mr. Carey. They do not do it for free, right?
Ms. McCormick. The vendors do not do it for free no, sir.
Mr. Carey. Where do they get their money?
Ms. McCormick. The vendors are hired--the States and local
jurisdictions contract with the vendors. Oftentimes, they use
HAVA money, but they also use other funds that are provided by
the local government.
Mr. Carey. The vendor may not receive HAVA grant directly?
Ms. McCormick. Correct.
Mr. Carey. Vis-a-vis a State or some other entity would
then pay the vendor, but it is not directly related to the HAVA
grant; is that what you are saying?
Ms. McCormick. That is right. I do agree with you that it
should be a nonpartisan provision of----
Mr. Carey. Yes. Because I do not--whether it was President
Biden or President Trump, it does not matter to me. I am just
saying that I think it should be--that entity should not be
partisan.
Ms. McCormick. I would agree with you, Congressman.
Mr. Carey. Okay. One other thing, I was reading through
your testimony. You mentioned in here--and again, it is a
question. I am not trying to--but you mentioned AI tools making
it harder for voter education.
Can you just give me briefly because I got some other
questions I want to go to?
Ms. McCormick. Yes, sir. That is something new that we are
now combating and how to respond to possible mis- and
disinformation and the use of AI in election information. We
have created an internal working group to work on the ways that
could happen, and what we might do to combat those AI-
generated----
Mr. Carey. I may want to follow up with you on that just
because I have a keen interest in that.
Ms. McCormick. Sure.
Mr. Carey. Mr. Palmer, No. 1, I want to thank you for your
service to the country. Appreciate that. Where are most of the
election equipment manufacturers, where are they located? Are
they in the United States, or are they outside of the United
States?
Mr. Palmer. The manufacturers themselves are in the United
States, yes.
Mr. Carey. Do we have any of the manufacturers that are
located outside of the United States?
Mr. Palmer. No. If you are asking, are the voting machines
manufactured overseas, that is yes.
Mr. Carey. OK. When the EAC adopts a new VVSG standard,
what happens to election equipment certified under a previous
standard?
Mr. Palmer. Well, it remains certified. We have--those
standards were earlier standards. We have new standards. It
takes time to migrate to the new higher standards, get the
manufacturers to design and bring those to a test lab to be
tested. We have full confidence that the systems that we tested
are still operational. Those decisions on when to transition to
let us say another 1.0 version or the new generation of
systems, that is going to be a local decision or a State
decision on when they feel they need to move on from their
equipment.
Mr. Carey. If--they can still be used, in other words?
Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carey. Okay. Are there security threats that exist with
still using the older type machines?
Mr. Palmer. The--one--yes, I would say, yes, there are
security concerns. That is why we take measures like, for
example, we have added penetration testing to all our older
systems. If there are any updates or upgrades before it goes to
a lab, it needs to go through penetration testing. That was a
new feature that we brought in. There was concerns, and so we
are addressing those.
Mr. Carey. Okay. Alright. Well, I want to thank all of the
witnesses here today. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
Ms. Lee is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Lee. Well, I would like to begin by thanking you for
being here today, to have all four of you present with your
collective experience and expertise is really valuable thing
for us. I thank you for spending your time with us today.
Commissioner Palmer, I would like to pick up right where
you left off and spend a little more time talking about VVSG
2.0, what that means for the election community, and how it can
be implemented. You were speaking just a moment ago in response
to Mr. Carey's questions about the continued use of voting
systems that had been certified under--and tested under the
previous guidelines.
If you would share with me a little bit about how, if a
State is interested in coming--in using systems that are
compliant with 2.0, you mentioned that might take time to do.
Share with us a little bit more about the logistical and
expense considerations that are associated with replacing and
updating a State's certified voting systems.
Mr. Palmer. OK, sure. I mean, at the State level, for
example, if you want to move to a 2.0 system, the reality,
though, is that the manufacturers have to design those systems
to meet the new standards. Once they feel confident that they
can undergo a campaign at the EAC for that testing, they are
going to make a submission. It is going to be tested, and it
will eventually be approved or disapproved at some point in the
process. That is only the first step. That only makes it
available for that vendor to then take it to the States.
There may be testing. There may be State testing, but at
some point, the goal is to make sure that these are fully
tested machines that are available to be purchased by the
localities and for use by the voters, but it takes some time
because we have got to go through that testing process first to
make sure we are confident.
Ms. Lee. At this point, have any of the voting systems'
manufacturers developed and submitted a voting system that is
compliant or that they report will be compliant with VVSG 2.0,
or are those still being developed now?
Mr. Palmer. We do have one system that is in an accredited
lab undergoing testing, and, you know, every day you hear
rumors that they will be bringing it in sooner than later, but
then things get pushed. I cannot really give any definite
details on the calendar or a timeline, but you generally hear
that in 1925, 1926, you will have some systems that will be
tested and, perhaps, going out to market at some point.
Ms. Lee. OK, but so today----
Mr. Palmer. There will not be 2.0 systems for 2024.
Ms. Lee. Right now today, even if election officials were
interested in converting, there is not a system that is ready,
tested, available on the shelf for them to implement that is
VVSG 2.0?
Mr. Palmer. That is correct, Congresswoman.
Ms. Lee. Share, if you would, a little bit more about the
testing and the ongoing review and testing for the systems that
are currently in use and some of the reasons you have
confidence in the fact that they are secure and accurate and
appropriate for use in American elections.
Mr. Palmer. Well, the testing program does not end. I mean,
we do have a lifecycle policy that we will continue to test
these systems until 1 year after there is a new system in
place, and so there are still systems that are being submitted,
and we are undergoing testing.
The Federal testing is really the first step. You know, we
do have the penetration testing that we undergo at the Federal
level, and then a lot of States will have their own testing
program to either supplement that process.
Then voters should be confident, the localities. They do
logic and accuracy tests on the front end and after an
election. It really is sort of an overwhelming number of sort
of audits that take place and sort of testing of the voting
equipment, and these are why we can be confident that the
systems that are on the street, to say, are still as reliable
and accurate as they were, you know, 6 months ago.
Ms. Lee. You just touched on another thing that I think is
so important and that is opportunities for the public to be
engaged and to observe both in the development of new standards
and also the testing of equipment and these pre-imposed
election audits that occur.
Would you share with us--and I know you have multiple forms
of experience that are relevant to this question, both as an
EAC Commissioner and as a former State elections director.
Share with us, if you will, some of the opportunities for the
public to be a participant, an observer in the development of
new technology standards and also the testing of this
equipment.
Mr. Palmer. Well, the public had a large role in the
development of these standards. When you go back to 2.0, that
process of developing standards for 2.0 involved election
officials, but it involved experts. It involved the public. It
was out for public comment multiple times. When we would have
hearings with our advisory boards, made up of election
officials and experts, the public was often available for
public comment.
Then, when, you know, when you go to any State, for
example, we were in Louisiana, Commissioner Hicks and I, on
their discussions on new voting systems, and they would bring
in the EAC and other experts to talk about what the standards
would mean, what were the new security standards, what were the
new audit standards. The public was there to make comment and
to hear that testimony, including legislators and Congressmen.
Ms. Lee. Alright.
Thank you all. I have used my time. Thank you all again so
much for being here.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Steil. The gentlewoman yields back.
I request unanimous consent to enter into the record two
articles.
Anita Dunn was the managing director of SKDKnickerbocker,
and so I seek unanimous consent to enter into the record a New
York Times article titled ``Strategizing for the President and
Corporate Clients, Too,'' from 2012, as well as an article
published by Albert Hunt, ``Biden Needs to Institute a New Era
in Public Ethics.''
Without objection, so ordered.
[The articles referred to follow:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Steil. In consultation with the Ranking Member, we
have one more Member who is in a foot race to get here. Knowing
that we would otherwise switch panels, I ask our witnesses just
to stand by for 2 minutes, with the hope that Mr. Good makes it
before we wrap up this panel.
We will pause in place for about 2 minutes.
[Recess.]
Chairman Steil. Alright. As our colleague gets seated, I
will add one note here. Pursuant to paragraph (h) of Committee
rule 9, and in consultation with the Ranking Member, I move
that counsel for the majority and counsel for the minority be
permitted to question our witnesses--we will utilize this on
the next panel--our witnesses for up to 20 minutes, the time
equally divided and available in 5-minute increments.
Without objection, so ordered.
Again, that will be for the next panel.
Mr. Good, are you----
Mr. Good. All good here, sir. I am ready to go.
Chairman Steil. We appreciate you coming.
Mr. Good. I think that is on.
Chairman Steil. Alright.
Mr. Good. It is taking a moment. If you would hold the
clock for just a few seconds until it--we have got the old
spinning going on here. The answers are in here. Actually, the
answers are over there, right?
Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, but it is taking a moment here.
Chairman Steil. Take a second.
Mr. Good. Alright. We are pretty dang close now. OK. Thank
you.
Chairman Steil. We appreciate you being here, Mr. Good.
We have waived Mr. Good on from the great State of
Virginia.
Mr. Good, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for the
purpose of asking questions.
Mr. Good. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for
letting me join this Committee for this special hearing today.
I have got a couple of questions for Commissioner
McCormick, if I may.
In June 2022, the Cyber Infrastructure Security Agency, or
CISA, conducted a vulnerability analysis of Dominion Voting
Systems Democracy Suite ImageCast X, which is an in-person
voting system used to allow voters to mark their ballot. CISA's
report outlined nine vulnerabilities.
With that said, how confident are you that our voting
systems can be protected or even ideally made immune from
hacking or other vulnerabilities?
Ms. McCormick. Thank you for the question, Congressman
Good.
No system is immune from attack, but we do our best to
protect the systems, and we are working to increase the
security on our systems with our new VVSG 2.0 requirements.
Additionally, we will be starting a consolidated
vulnerability disclosure program to make sure that any kind of
vulnerabilities are identified and addressed in a very
efficient and quick manner to make sure that the voting systems
remain secure.
We also are just going to see the report ourselves today.
We are interested in looking at that report, and we understood
from the CISA's report of reviewing the Dominion machines that
most of those vulnerabilities have been closed.
Mr. Good. If you were going to compare how protected versus
how vulnerable, say, November 2020, compared to how you hope it
to be in 1924, how would you sort of quantify that in a
guesstimate, an estimate? How much better are we, hopefully, in
1924 than we were maybe in 1920?
Ms. McCormick. You know, we did not see any vulnerabilities
exploited in 2022, and I think we would----
Mr. Good. Not any?
Ms. McCormick. We did not see them exploited, no, sir. We
believed that the machines were secure in 2022, and they will
be secure or more secure in 2024.
Mr. Good. Well, we all certainly hope so and trust so.
The National Election Defense Coalition, according to them,
has said that e-voting machines have added and subtracted votes
not cast by voters, changed voters' choices on the screen,
given voters the wrong ballot, passed pre-election testing and
failed on election day. You know, they passed the pre-election
testing, but they failed on election day, reversed election
outcomes, broken down generally, and just caused long lines
during elections. That is according to the National Election
Defense Coalition.
I will tell you, we held a roundtable discussion on this
issue in my district, three Members of Congress and a number of
State delegates and senators in Virginia and had some experts
come in. I can tell you that I witnessed, I witnessed a
demonstration. I am trying to bring it before this larger body.
I and my colleagues witnessed a demonstration. This is a part--
this was a few months ago, apart from an actual election. It
was not part of the--but where a tech expert appeared to hack
into the voting systems and change results before our very
eyes. We watched it happen. Changed things, changed them back
to show us how easy it was to do.
The CISA report--well, let me just pause. What is your
reaction to that?
Ms. McCormick. I am not aware of the demonstration that you
are talking about. I would be interested----
Mr. Good. Right. You would not be aware of that, but I am
saying I watched this by this whom I believed to be a credible,
trusted resource, do this before mine and two other colleagues'
eyes, along with a number of other individuals that were there.
What I mean is just the fact that that could possibly
happen, what would be your reaction to that?
Ms. McCormick. Well, I think, yes, vulnerabilities can be
exploited for sure, but it depends on the environment we are
in, how the setup is, how much time people have, what the
machine is, has it been certified. There are a lot of questions
that would need to be answered, and we would love to be able to
see that and look at it.
There are definitely anomalies that happen in the systems,
but we do have a defense in-depth program through our VVSG and
through other programs through CISA, and we are working to keep
those machines as secure as possible.
Mr. Good. To my colleagues on this Committee, we would like
to try to bring this individual before individuals on this
Committee.
The last thing I will just ask: What is the likelihood that
a foreign power, such as China, who has, obviously, an active
spy operation, including trying to put the facility in Cuba,
that they could leverage vulnerabilities for their interest
with our election system?
Ms. McCormick. Well, our machines are not--our voting
systems are air gapped from the internet. It would be difficult
for them to get to every machine across the country to exploit
any kind of vulnerability.
Mr. Good. Did I understand you to say they are gapped,
meaning disconnected from the internet?
Ms. McCormick. Correct.
Mr. Good. OK. The demonstration I saw literally was through
the internet, connecting that I saw.
Ms. McCormick. Well, our machines are not connected to the
internet, and they are not connected to each other. Each
machine stands on its own. There are cases where the machines
do get connected at the time that results are modemed in, in
some cases. We require an air gap system in 2.0, and we will
make sure that the machines are not connected to the internet.
Mr. Good. Thank you, Commissioner.
Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate it.
Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
We thank our colleague from Virginia for joining us today
on the Committee on House Administration.
We thank our witnesses today for appearing before us. It
has been very helpful.
Members of the Committee may have additional questions for
you, and we ask you please to respond to those questions in
writing.
We will dismiss this panel, and we will begin our second
witness panel momentarily.
Thank you for being here.
[Recess.]
Chairman Steil. I am going to bring us back to order, if
everyone is ready.
Ms. Schletz, we appreciate you being with us today and look
forward to your testimony.
Pursuant to paragraph (b) of Committee Rule 6, the witness
will please stand and raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Chairman Steil. You may be seated.
Let the record reflect that the witness responded in the
affirmative.
I will now introduce our witness.
Inspector General Schletz was appointed unanimously by the
Commissioners of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission and
began serving as the inspector general in November 2021.
Prior to assuming the role of inspector general at the EAC,
Ms. Schletz spent 8 years at the U.S. Agency for International
Development Office of Inspector General where she served as
director and established a new strategic division within the
office.
As a reminder, we have read your written statement, and it
will appear in full in the hearing record.
Under Committee Rule 9, you are to limit your oral
presentation to a brief summary of your written statement.
Please remember to push the button on the microphone in
front of you. After 5 minutes, we will ask you to wrap up.
Thank you for being here today, and I now recognize you,
Ms. Schletz, for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF BRIANNA SCHLETZ, INSPECTOR GENERAL, ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
Ms. Schletz. Thank you, Chairman Steil and distinguished
Members of the Committee for inviting me to testify about the
work of the office of inspector general of the Election
Assistance Commission. We appreciate your interest and ongoing
support for our work.
Our mission is to safeguard the Federal investment in our
electoral system by conducting objective and meaningful
oversight. We do this through audits, reviews, investigations.
Much of our work is mandated by the Help America Vote Act and
the Inspector General Act.
EAC funds and assists States and territories in improving
election processes, and it is our role to offer information and
recommendations that will help EAC build and run programs that
promote public confidence by preventing waste, fraud, and
abuse. I am proud that our efforts contribute toward ensuring
confidence in America's election process.
OIG's vision is to operate as a high-performing
organization and help EAC be as efficient and effective as it
can be. Our office has grown to a staff of now six, as of
yesterday, allowing us to conduct audits with independent
public accounting firms and also with our own team.
We demonstrated that conducting work internally allows us
to be more nimble and more responsive to incoming requests and
areas of risk. For example, we recently identified issues with
EAC's contracting practices. We investigated the problem. We
issued an advisory to alert them, and then we announced an
audit so that we can understand the scope of the issue and make
recommendations for improvement.
Another risk area that we are watching closely is related
to grantees using HAVA funds for voter education. We issued a
management advisory in December to alert EAC to the related
risks because terms, such as ``voter education'' and ``get out
the vote'' are not defined in HAVA.
Our office maintains an OIG hotline for EAC employees and
members of the public to report suspected fraud, waste, abuse,
and mismanagement.
Our increased stakeholder outreach over the last year has
resulted in an awareness that our office exists, what our role
is, and that this reporting mechanism is out there. As a
result, we processed 375 unique hotline complaints in the first
half of Fiscal Year 2023.
We refer to the Department of Justice and the FBI any
potential criminal acts related to Federal elections and voter
fraud, and when we get complaints related to voter registration
or the administration of elections, we refer individuals to the
appropriate State election office.
Our team reads every complaint that comes in, and to be
responsive, when we noticed an up tick related to the
misunderstandings about EAC's testing and certification
program, we launched an audit. That recently issued audit
report includes seven recommendations to improve the program.
I commend the EAC staff and the Commissioners for their
commitment to the mission of the Commission and supporting
election officials in the spirit of HAVA.
OIG is required to report annually on management challenges
facing the EAC, and last fall we outlined four challenges
impacting the EAC that I will discuss briefly. The first
relates to balancing expectations of funding, and the second
addresses challenges with attracting and retaining a highly
skilled workforce.
EAC's budget recently increased, and with that increase, it
must responsibly spend the funds while meeting stakeholder's
expanding expectations. However, we have noted that conditions,
such as salary caps, make that difficult for EAC to attract and
retain staff. EAC is using some of the additional resources it
received to buildup divisions, and as new staff enters the
agency, there is an expanded need for strong policies, complete
records, and standard operating procedures. Our work has noted
areas where EAC is making progress and others that still need
attention.
The third challenge relates to meeting customer service and
critical infrastructure goals. Stakeholders are increasingly
calling on the EAC to communicate election information at the
Federal level. For EAC to fulfill its role as a customer
service agency supporting critical infrastructure, it must
continue to overcome challenges related to Federal
coordination, Paperwork Reduction Act, and visibility, as not
everyone is familiar with the EAC.
Last, providing effective oversight of grantees. The EAC
awards grants and monitors how States and territories spend
those funds. We have noted that EAC's ability to do this can be
hampered by both the grant type and grantee capacity. We
acknowledge that EAC has taken some steps to strengthen its
grant oversight, invested in a grants management system, and
added new staff to its team, but our recent reports highlight
the need for continued diligence in this area.
For our part, OIG has seven ongoing HAVA audits right now.
We are also being more strategic about how we do our work. For
example, we recently announced an audit of 34 States'
compliance with the requirements for interest earned. Our goal
with that audit is to understand the challenges related to the
requirement and then to also identify best practices to help
grantees navigate it in the future.
In conclusion, I want to thank you for the opportunity to
provide this testimony on OIG activities. Our accomplishments
are a credit to the dedicated staff that I have the privilege
to lead, and I am thankful for their hard work. We are
committed to independent and transparent oversight.
As State officials work to prepare for the 2024 election,
we realize the importance of ensuring that EAC is set up to
support them. We believe our oversight can help position EAC to
do just that.
Thank you. I am happy to address any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Schletz follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIANNA SCHLETZ
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Steil. Inspector General Schletz, thanks for being
here. Thanks for your testimony.
We will begin with questions from Members. We will then
proceed to questions from counsel, both from the minority and
majority side as well.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for the purpose
of asking questions.
Ms. Schletz, you recently submitted a report at the EAC
OIG, a semiannual report to Congress, and I want to discuss
some of the key findings in there. At the time the report was
submitted, your office, you said, processed, I think you said,
175--I had 174 in my notes--unique complaints so far this
fiscal year. That is already an increase over the last Fiscal
Year in 2022, which I believe had about 271 complaints that
came through.
Are there any common themes that you are seeing inside the
complaints over the last 2 years or so?
Ms. Schletz. The complaints vary. What we do see is an up
tick when States are having elections. We will see more things
come in. Quite a few of our complaints are related to the
administration of elections. We are referring States to the
right officials within that State to get closure on whatever
that allegation may be.
I cannot say that we have seen a specific trend, but I do
have a breakdown of even more----
Chairman Steil. Let me dive in maybe then specifically,
so--if nothing jumps out to you. As we think about this last
year, Georgia passed a voter integrity bill, made a lot of
noise, right, a lot of news came out of this. The President of
the United States called it Jim Crow 2.0. Major League Baseball
took the All-Star Game and moved it out of Atlanta, really
draconian and over-the-top rhetoric from my colleagues on the
left.
Did you see a huge up tick in calls from the State of
Georgia following the passage of this law?
Ms. Schletz. No. I can say that, for the fiscal 2023
numbers, what we have seen, we had 374 unique complaints and
only 5 of those involved Georgia. They all were around the
general election and the Senate runoff.
Chairman Steil. Less than 2 percent fiscal year, for folks
that maybe are not always aware of fiscal years. There are
annual years. You guys run on fiscal year, and Congress runs on
a fiscal year, but that includes the election.
Ms. Schletz. Yes.
Chairman Steil. The election of last year, in 2022, after,
quote, Jim Crow 2.0, voter integrity laws are passed in
Georgia, less than 2 percent of your calls came from the State
of Georgia. Is that accurate?
Ms. Schletz. Yes, I can say only five involved it.
Chairman Steil. Five out of 375. Less than 2 percent.
The reason I say 2 percent is because it was randomly
averaged over 50 States, and Georgia is bigger than average. It
should show up at an even larger percentage if we assume it is
based on population. What we are seeing is no real up tick at
all. Why? Because people actually like the voter integrity law
that was passed in Georgia. The evidence not only shows up that
people are not calling in because they do not have compliance;
it also shows up because people were happy, if you look at the
polling data on how people felt about the process of voting in
Georgia. Also, voter turnout increased in the State of Georgia
and across all key demographic groups.
Let me shift gears, if I can. Again, your office recently
completed the audit of HAVA funds, and particularly as it
relates to the CARES Act, awarded to California. How much money
was awarded to California?
Ms. Schletz. They had a total for all of the HAVA funds of
$216.3 million.
Chairman Steil. $216.3 million total funds awarded to
California. Was the main group--the main group that it was
awarded to in California was what firm?
Ms. Schletz. Oh, so that is the total pot of money of
election security funds, 251 funds, the 101 HAVA funds, and
then also CARES funds.
Chairman Steil. Then the CARES funds.
Ms. Schletz. Okay. If you are speaking about the CARES
funds, let me get you the exact number. I believe you are
referring to the SKDK contract, how much was awarded there?
Chairman Steil. Yes.
Ms. Schletz. What we found is that $11.8 million in EAC
HAVA funds were used for that contract. $9.9 million of those
were CARES Act funds.
Chairman Steil. Does it concern you that this entity,
through an expedited grant process, has ties to the Biden
campaign?
Ms. Schletz. We issued a December advisory that outlined
some of the risks that we see with there being no mention in
HAVA about restrictions around voter education campaigns. We
think it is just an area of risk in general.
Chairman Steil. Would you recommend that policymakers put
in place parameters to make sure that these types of grants are
not going to entities with clear political, ideological
leanings?
Ms. Schletz. It is always, yes, more helpful for us to have
strong criteria to audit against. Without that, we are reliant
on kind of the EAC and what their guidance is on each
individual case-by-case basis on a State. That is what we point
out in the advisory, that that just raises increased risk that
you are not providing the same guidance to each State without--
--
Chairman Steil. I appreciate that. I think you pointed out
a huge risk, and I think it is incumbent upon EAC and
policymakers to put forward the guardrails that are needed to
make sure that grant funding does not go to entities where you
can simply go look on their website and claiming that they are
part of a Presidential campaign. I think that is an affront.
If you told somebody in Wisconsin we spent millions of
dollars and gave it to an entity that was part of Team Biden or
team anybody, I think they would look at you and think you are
nuts. That is what happened, and I think we have got to put the
guardrails in place, and I appreciate your review and
examination.
I now recognize Mr. Carey for 5 minutes for the purpose of
asking questions.
Mr. Carey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witness for being here today.
Can you briefly describe the audit process at the EAC? Just
kind of briefly describe how you go about doing that.
Ms. Schletz. Sure.
We do a risk-assessment process to determine what we are
going to audit. We have a couple different types of audits.
Some of our work is mandated by law, and those are, you know,
required audits that we do annually. We also have the HAVA
audits, which we do that based on a risk-based approach to
determine which States are audited. Then we have discretionary
audit work. The discretionary audit work is often launched when
there is a risk area that we see or like a complaint comes in.
For example, the testing and certification audit. We were
getting, you know, additional complaints around that. We
launched an audit to describe it. That is how we select an
audit.
Did you want me to also touch on the process or?
Mr. Carey. Yes, I mean, because where I am going to go is
in HAVA funds.
Ms. Schletz. OK. For the HAVA funds, yes, we make a
determination if we are going to do the audit internally or if
we are going to hire a contracted independent public auditing
firm or accounting firm in order to conduct that work. We have
a scope determined of how many or how much of the funds is
going to be audited, and then that audit follows the normal
audit procedures.
Mr. Carey. How many would you say were done?
Ms. Schletz. We have--let me pull up the numbers.
We currently have five ongoing audits that an independent
public accounting firm is conducting. With the conclusion of
those five audits, all States and territories will have been
audited once at least. That was our goal is to get there.
The additional factors that impact whether we are auditing
can be, you know, if complaints come in, if something is raised
from the grants team, we might highlight it for an additional
audit, or if the findings are particularly significant.
Mr. Carey. Along with that, so what steps does the EAC take
to--how do I want to say--how do they respond to the audits?
Ms. Schletz. EAC?
Mr. Carey. Yes.
Ms. Schletz. EAC is the responsible party for working with
the State in order to close recommendations. They sort of act
as an intermediary, as, you know, the one issuing the grants.
We or the audit firm would put our recommendations to the State
for things to correct our findings. EAC would be the one that
looks at whatever they return and determines closure on those
recommendations.
Mr. Carey. Let me ask you--and, again, and probably some of
my colleagues probably understand this process a little better
than I do.
When you make the recommendations or you say that these are
the things, who rectifies the things that you have identified
that are issues?
Ms. Schletz. That would be the State office that is
responsible for receiving the grant money. It can vary from
State to State, but it would be the office within the specific
State or territory that receives grant funds.
Mr. Carey. What happens if they do not rectify?
Ms. Schletz. The recommendation would remain open.
I can, you know, say right now typically States have been
pretty good about closing those. Right now we have eight open
recommendations, four for the Northern Mariana Islands and four
for Delaware.
Mr. Carey. In the case where you have recommendations, what
generally is the timeframe that you see on average per State or
territory that they rectify?
Ms. Schletz. Typically, we like to see closure within 6
months, but we understand that, in some cases, depending on
what the recommendation is, that could take longer. Usually the
target is 6 months. Otherwise, those are reported in our
semiannual report to Congress as open recommendations, open
longer than 6 months.
Mr. Carey. How many would you say have not been--do you
have some that still--you have eight. You said five ongoing
investigations or audits right now?
Ms. Schletz. We have five audits, seven that we plan to
start within this fiscal year.
Mr. Carey. Okay.
Then you have eight that are ongoing, you said?
Ms. Schletz. I am sorry. We have eight that we expect by
the end of the fiscal year. Two HAVA audits have been issued
this fiscal year, and then we plan to start six more. We have
quite a few that we are trying to do this year.
Mr. Carey. Let me ask you: Are there any steps that the EAC
should be taken that they are not taking in response to your
audits?
Ms. Schletz. I think the EAC generally has been responsive
to our recommendations and working with the States in order to
resolve those things. There are some areas where there could be
improvement.
Mr. Carey. Could you maybe elaborate on what you think
there could be improvement?
Ms. Schletz. Sure. We have noticed that there could be
opportunities for capacity building. Specifically, we saw that
with the Northern Mariana Islands. They just did not have the
internal controls in place in order to receive those funds.
They received them for the first time in 2020. I think that is
an area for improvement.
Additionally, we have identified findings where the Federal
financial reports that are required to be submitted do not
reconcile to the general ledger. That is an area where EAC
oversight, you know, getting those Federal reports, they could
be checking things like that.
Mr. Carey. Well, listen, I want to thank the witness. Thank
you for your time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Loudermilk.
[Presiding.]
The gentleman yields.
Okay. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. I apologize. I
am popping in and out from different hearings.
Ms. Schletz--Schletz? Is that right?
Ms. Schletz. That is correct.
Mr. Loudermilk. Alright.
In March 2023, your office completed an audit of the EAC's
testing and certification program. What was audited, and what
led you to conduct the audit?
Ms. Schletz. Yes. That audit was initiated based on us
getting an up tick of complaints into our hotline mainly
related to concerned citizens that had a misunderstanding of
how the program operated. We launched that audit with two
objectives. One was descriptive in nature, to just describe the
program. The second that was going to identify or was meant to
identify factors that could be improved on the program or that
impact the program.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. Did you have any key findings of the
audit, and what were they?
Ms. Schletz. Yes. We, I think, overall, on that first
descriptive objective, found that the EAC has a robust lab
accreditation program and voting system certification process.
However, the second objective that we had noted some areas that
the program could be improved, specifically related to
stakeholder coordination, policies, procedures, communication,
and staffing.
Then we also found that they had not done a formal
assessment of risk with the program, which could help them in
determining, you know, areas to focus attention or where
staffing resources are needed.
Mr. Loudermilk. Did you recommend any actions in response?
Ms. Schletz. Yes. We made seven recommendations in that
report.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. I do not have any other questions at
this time.
I now recognize the majority counsel for 5 minutes for
questions.
Mr. Hays. Well, good afternoon at this point. It is a
little bit different being in this seat, and it is nice to see
you in person, Ms. Schletz. We have really appreciated your
regular contact with Committee staff and the updates that we
have done virtually. Thank you for being here today.
I want to start going back to the management advisory that
Mr. Steil was discussing earlier. It was Management Advisory
2301 that was released by your office on December 12th of last
year. This is the one where you were discussing the
difficulties that States have because the terms ``voter
registration,'' ``voter education,'' and ``get out the vote''
are not defined in HAVA. That creates some of the, I think
generously we will say, confusion, perhaps, that happened in
some States.
Are there other areas of Federal law that you are familiar
with that might define these terms that the Commission could
look at for some guidance?
Ms. Schletz. Yes. Our advisory pointed out I believe two
differing definitions. One being the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 offers a definition, and then also there is another
definition that we pointed to as well that could have been
used.
Mr. Hays. Do you recommend that the Commission adopt one of
these existing definitions, as opposed to writing its own?
Ms. Schletz. I do not know that we have an opinion about
that. It is more just helpful if there is clear guidance so
that when we are looking at things, it is easier for us to
identify if the cost is allowable or not.
Mr. Hays. Understood.
Has the Commission, EAC's guidance on these terms, the
three I mentioned, has it always been the same, or has it
evolved a bit over time?
Ms. Schletz. Historically, what we have seen is there has
been quite a few previous OIG reports that have pointed to
challenges around this area. I am not sure if their definition
has necessarily evolved or stayed consistent, but we do know
that, you know, the findings related to this have been at least
19 recommendations and over a million dollars questioned.
I will say many of those end up not actually being
sustained question costs because the EAC determines that the
cost is allowable. I think that, for us, is where it is a
challenge.
Mr. Hays. Where it is difficult to understand getting to
allowable whenever there is not a set definition?
Ms. Schletz. Correct.
Mr. Hays. Can you talk about the importance of
consistency--not just with these three terms but consistency
with guidance and definitions given to States on how to use
HAVA grant funds and why that is important?
Ms. Schletz. Sure. The criteria, like the Uniform Federal
Guidance that guides all grants, that is very prescriptive. It
has a lot of guidelines, and that is on purpose so that it is
very clear when someone wants to know if they can do something
or not, they can go and look that up. I think without having
that consistent guidance, what we have found is it is often a
grant team member providing guidance to a State on a one-off
basis either through email or through even a phone call. That
makes it very difficult for us to track, you know, that there
is consistency and then also just that the communication is
clear.
Mr. Hays. It is probably all very well-intentioned. You
know, this is a big process, but the way that this works is
someone is going to call in and ask the question, and they want
to get an answer. I think we understand that, but we
definitely, on the staff, have been very in favor, as you know,
of encouraging the development of consistent definitions to
help our State partners.
Going back to these definitions, has your office thought at
all--you know, we are talking about where this is in the code
or otherwise. Would it be more helpful for Congress to add
definitions to HAVA itself? Or is this something that the
Commission is able to do, that you would recommend that they
would do and handle on their own?
Ms. Schletz. I think it is kind of up to the legislators to
decide. The way it stands right now, there is nothing in HAVA
restricting the funds from being used, and what the restriction
is, is it is through an EAC advisory opinion. The Commissioners
essentially voted to put some limitations on those funds.
When you are asking if they could put further limitations,
yes, they could. If I think that it should be in HAVA? I mean,
I think if there is an interest in putting more guardrails on
the funds, and there are certain things that the voter
education should or should not be spent on, then that could be
in HAVA as well.
Mr. Hays. Very good.
Okay, so I have about a half a minute left.
We have been watching. We saw, of course, that the
territories that had been left out of HAVA, just because they
had not sent a delegate to Congress at that point, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, has recently
received HAVA funds, and there has been an audit process going
through there. It is the first time that they had HAVA funds.
Can you talk just a little bit about the work that your
office does to make sure everyone stays on the straight and
narrow?
Ms. Schletz. Yes. This specific one was flagged for us by
the grants team because the Northern Mariana Islands were not
doing their regular reporting requirements. We initiated an
audit internally with our own staff to take a look at things.
I think there is an opportunity here. There was a need for
the money and an opportunity to do capacity building. I
acknowledge that they received the funds during the pandemic.
It made a site visit challenging, but that would have been a
helpful thing for the grant team to do.
Mr. Hays. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Loudermilk. The Chair now recognizes minority counsel
for 5 minutes for purposes of asking questions.
Mr. Wright. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Inspector Schletz, good afternoon to you as well. Thank you
for your hard work of the Commission and on behalf of the
American people. It has been, I agree with my colleague,
wonderful chatting with you in advance of this hearing and our
ongoing oversight work.
I wanted to pick up a bit where my colleague started, and
you have done a bit to contextualize your management advisory
as well. A lot of discussion today about California and the
conduct related to the CARES Act funding for California, which
your February 9th letter that the Ranking Member introduced
into the record demonstrates that those funds were used
appropriately and were not used for GOTV funding.
Your management advisory also lists the 19 recommendations
and identifies specific States that were flagged for using
those funds, including Mississippi, Florida, South Dakota, and
Colorado, among others. I want the record to be clear on that
fact.
Am I correct in that assessment?
Ms. Schletz. Can you repeat that? I sorry.
Mr. Wright. Yes. Am I correct in my assessment that other
States have been flagged for recommendations on using funds for
GOTV and voter registration?
Ms. Schletz. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Wright. Great. Thank you.
I want to draw your attention to the Ace Act as introduced
in the last Congress. One of the provisions provides a
statutory cap on your office at seven full-time employees. In
your written and oral testimony today, you have discussed how
increased capacity for your office has allowed you to improve
processes, have more resources, to use a mix of contracting and
independent accounting firm assistance, as well as other
outside Federal agencies, and that you are now, quote, well-
positioned to conduct audits internally, which allow you to be
more nimble and more responsive to incoming requests and areas
of risk.
I want to ask you a few questions related to that. Would
your office benefit from additional staff?
Ms. Schletz. There is always more work that can be done. I
think we have a good size right now in order to meet our
mission, but there are areas where we could improve and do more
oversight.
Mr. Wright. Those are areas include having additional staff
capacity to allow you to be more nimble or to internalize
outside costs usually associated with independent accounting
firms?
Ms. Schletz. Yes. I think there are also other benefits of
doing work internally. It allows us, you know, to pivot. If we
have a contracted audit, we are, you know, bound by the terms
of those contracts or the period of performance, you know, the
scope. Those limitations can sometimes be challenging.
Mr. Wright. That is great.
What information would you want Congress, so all of us, to
have so that we can more accurately understand the staffing
needs of your office?
Ms. Schletz. Well, I appreciate the confidence, you know,
in our work. I have no plans currently of growing our office,
but I do think that the limitation or the FTE cap would
potentially contradict with the IG Act, which provides that the
inspector general can appoint employees as needed to fulfill
the mission.
That said, to my knowledge, EAC OIG would be the only one
with such a type of cap. Having the flexibility to be able to
pivot from contracting to internal staff is critical, I think,
in finding that right mix and having the flexibility to do so
is important.
Mr. Wright. Thank you.
I want to draw back on a point you made, which, if I
correctly heard you, you are not aware of any other statutory
cap on the full-time employees of an inspector general office.
Is that right?
Ms. Schletz. Correct. Usually, the OIG has its own specific
budget line item. There is a couple of us small ones that do
not, but usually, yes, there is no FTE cap.
Mr. Wright. Great. Thank you.
Are there steps that Congress can take to help further and
improve your office's independence?
Ms. Schletz. I think, you know, speaking of just the
budget, one of the things that we have raised with some of the
other small OIGs is that our budget is combined with the agency
budget, despite us having a separate request. It would increase
our independence if we had a line item or even just not-less-
than language that allowed our budget to be separate so that we
could, you know, put our resources toward that and not have to
work with the agency on budgeting.
Mr. Wright. Understandable.
I think it is helpful for the--in this conversation, we
have talked a lot about questions funds or unsubstantiated
funds or funds spent for or put to better use. In your office's
review and in all its capacities, is it fair to say that the
majority or the vast majority of funds that the EAC is granting
are used appropriately?
Ms. Schletz. Yes. From our work, I mean, I think we have
generally seen that States are administering grant funds in
accordance with the guidelines. As far as the numbers, I mean,
I think it is less than 1 percent of the cost or question of
what we have audited in Fiscal Year 1922 and 1923.
There are some States, you know, like the Mariana Islands
where that number is higher, but generally, it is less than 1
percent.
Mr. Wright. Within that less than 1 percent cap, I know you
have identified something around $2 million of questionable
funds, and cognizant that most of the funds are used
appropriately, do you have a sense of how effectively the
Commission is working to clawback the unallowable funds or work
with States to enter compliance?
Ms. Schletz. Yes. The grants team works really hard. We
actually partner with them quite closely to make sure that we
are not duplicating efforts and we are, you know, working with
the same interest in mind. They do take it seriously, and they
do work with States as much as they can to try to build
capacity and get them to have the internal controls needed so
that there is no repeat findings and so that money that needs
to be returned is returned.
Mr. Wright. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Loudermilk. The Chair now recognizes the majority
counsel for purposes of asking questions.
Mr. Hays. Thank you very much.
I wanted to just note a couple things here at the outset,
that when, you know, we were looking through--and I know you do
not have anything to do with legislative recommendations, but
looking through the legislative recommendations that the
Commission sent to us, we make it a priority to read what you
send us, what the Commission sends us, et cetera. We just found
it interesting that providing some of these clear definitions
of the terms I was talking about earlier and terms related to
grants in general, that that did not seem to be included in
their legislative recommendation.
Whether or not that is the right course of action is
something we noted and something that, you know, we are looking
through to find the right way to handle that.
Can you talk a little bit--speaking of reading things that
you send us, could you please talk a little bit about the
mandatory reports that the EAC has planned for 2023? Just a
brief summary of what it is expected to cover. I know that a
lot of this is going to come from your oversight plan for the
Fiscal Year 1923.
Ms. Schletz. You mean mandatory audits?
Mr. Hays. Mandatory reports.
Ms. Schletz. The mandatory reports that we are required to
do is FISMA, which is really just IT controls. The financial
statement audit is an annual report that we are required to
issue out on. Payment Integrity Information Act is a mandatory
report. We have our semiannual reports to Congress. We also
have the annual management challenges report.
Mr. Hays. What else do you have planned this year in terms
of discretionary projects or other planned work? Is there
anything that our Committee Members should be apprised of as we
partner with you, your office, and the Commission?
Ms. Schletz. Ongoing we are looking at EAC's contracting
practices. That is ongoing work that we hope to have completed
either this Fiscal Year or next, early next.
The other discretionary work that we are looking at is to
also balance the contracted HAVA audits with some of our own
work. Doing some of that work internally.
We also have plans to try to look at more of the impact of
the HAVA funds. Right now our audits focused largely on
compliance. Did they use the funds appropriately? We would like
to see how were those funds helpful, or were their needs
assessed appropriately.
Mr. Hays. I think that brings us to another really good
point. You know, as our Committee Members say, and I do not
want to put words into anyone's mouth, but, you know, many have
said elections administration is not partisan. The election is,
but not the administration. I think that is really important. I
think that that carries over to the EAC, and as you can see
from the questioning today, a lot of Members are headed in a
similar direction with the EAC.
I think one of those, too, you know, in our conversations,
and I am glad to hear that the resources for your office are
looking good, and they are in a good spot, but, you know, one
of our things, too, is making sure that the inspector general's
office has reserved spaces for staff, especially at a smaller
agency.
I know our Members look forward to working with you
throughout this next year as they are working on legislation,
however that ends up looking in the final piece, to make sure
that you do continue to have the flexibility and the resources
that you need, especially since we are talking about having the
option of bringing audits internally so that there is a little
bit more of that institutional process that plays out.
As I wrap up here, can you talk just a little bit about
your relationship with the four Commissioners? Just in the
sense of, you know, is it a good working relationship? Are they
responding to your reports in a good way? As my colleague
mentioned, anything else about the independence of your office.
Ms. Schletz. Thank you for that.
The relationship that I have with the Commissioners is
great. They are very receptive to the work that we are doing,
very responsive, and I think also, you know, welcomed kind of
the oversight that our office brings. It is quite a bit, you
know, different, and we are doing some new and different work,
and they have been receptive to that. I do not have anything,
you know, else to add on the relationship piece.
I think as far as the independence, coming from a larger
OIG, there are challenges with the smaller OIG with
independence particularly. We share IT services. We share
budget. We share human resources, things that would be ideal if
they were more independent, but also not wanting to, you know,
create a whole new entity. I understand kind of the budget
constraints there, but those are areas that we grapple with
independence.
Mr. Hays. Last question that I have: The EAC is a small
agency, and it has moved several times in the 20 years, 20 so
years of its existence. Has your office looked at the frequent
movement of headquarters? Has that been an issue that is come
up?
Ms. Schletz. That is not something that we have looked at,
but, you know, if you would like us to consider work, we would
be happy to. I know the recent move happened during the
pandemic. We have not taken a look at that. Part of the costs
are audited as part of a financial statement on it, but
specifically looking at the relocations we have not looked at.
Mr. Hays. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Loudermilk. I now recognize the minority counsel for 5
minutes for asking questions.
Mr. Wright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Inspector, in your written testimony, you discussed a
critical management challenge in addressing the gap between
expectation on one hand and funding on the other, and I was
really interested in that challenge. You noted that to fully
address this challenge, the Commission must continue to, quote,
advocate for funding, demonstrate progress, and work with
stakeholders to manage expectations.
Why is the need to match funding and expectation so
critical?
Ms. Schletz. I think just looking at kind of good business,
if the EAC is trying to do more than they have the resources to
do, they are going to fall short, and that is not good for
anybody. I think just being able to do that.
Then, also, allocate resources where risk is. One of the
things that we pointed out in the testing and certification
audit is the need for the EAC to look at both staffing and
risk. There are lots of Federal guidance out there on how to do
that, and that would help them determine what resources and
staffing are needed in order to meet the areas to fulfill their
mission.
Mr. Wright. I think you touched on part of this, but what
is your assessment of the Commission's efforts to address this
management challenge?
Ms. Schletz. I think there is an opportunity to do it in a
more formal manner. Our strategic workforce planning guidance
that is out there is fairly robust, but it would be helpful.
Then also the same thing with the enterprise risk management
framework that is out there for Federal agencies to comply
with. It is a robust process, but I think that would help them
to tailor it.
I do think they are assessing risk and they are assessing
staffing, but to do it more formally would be a good
opportunity for them to improve.
Mr. Wright. Thank you.
This touches upon a question that the Chairman asked
related to the OIG hotline. You noted, I think the Chairman
noted as well, that you processed more complaints in the first
half of the year than all of last year. Can you tell us a bit
more about the process for receiving complaints, the
percentages of complaints that are nonviable, and what your
process is for referring those complaints out?
Ms. Schletz. Of course. Of the 374 unique complaints, and I
say ``unique'' because we get a lot of duplicates, 61 percent
of those were nonviable. We had 13 percent that we referred to
the Department of Justice. Those would be things related to
election crimes or election fraud.
There were 22 percent, so that is the highest referred out
percentage, that go to State election offices. Those would be
individuals that, you know, for example, went to go vote and
they had challenges or they had challenges with registering in
their State, whatever it might be, and we refer those
individuals back to the specific State office where they can
get the help that they need.
The rest of those complaints, which are much smaller in
percentage, are ones that we either look into internally
because it actually deals with something that EAC OIG has
jurisdiction over, or they are referred to another entity.
Mr. Wright. Post referral, do you get any information from
the entity that receives the referral?
Ms. Schletz. We do not, no.
Mr. Wright. Great.
I think just very briefly I want to go through a quick
battery of questions related to the California audit and SKDK
funding. I think the record should reflect that. We have talked
about it a lot.
Again, for your context, you sent a letter on February 9th
to a series of Members. I believe it was Representatives Comer,
Davis, and Hice. In that, you discussed HAVA funding, CARES Act
funding, and the contract. You noted that based on sample
testing, that funds were not used by the California secretary
of state when executing the contract. Isn't that right?
Ms. Schletz. Were not used inappropriately?
Mr. Wright. Inappropriately.
Ms. Schletz. Yes, correct.
Mr. Wright. Did you find any instances of lobbying or use
of funds for lobbying in your investigation?
Ms. Schletz. No, we did not.
Mr. Wright. Did SKDK receive inappropriate access to voter
information?
Ms. Schletz. Not that we found, no.
Mr. Wright. Were you able to ascertain the purpose of the
Vote Safe California messaging and whether or not it was
appropriate under law?
Ms. Schletz. Yes. The Vote Safe ad campaign was appropriate
based on what we looked at.
Mr. Wright. Great.
Ms. Schletz. The information we had.
Mr. Wright. Thank you so much. I yield back.
Mr. Loudermilk. The gentleman yields back.
I would like to thank Ms. Schletz for your testimony and
appearing with us today. It has been very helpful.
Members of the Committee may have some additional questions
that they will submit in writing. We ask that you respond in
writing as well.
Without objection, each Member will have 5 legislative days
to insert additional material into the record or to revise and
extend their remarks.
If there is no further business, I thank the Members for
their participation.
Without objection, the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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