[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-39]
DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH TAIWAN
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 19, 2023
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-721 WASHINGTON : 2024
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eighteenth Congress
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
Chair RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi ANDY KIM, New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MATT GAETZ, Florida ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
DON BACON, Nebraska MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
JIM BANKS, Indiana VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida SARA JACOBS, California
MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan PATRICK RYAN, New York
RONNY JACKSON, Texas JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
PAT FALLON, Texas GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO,
NANCY MACE, South Carolina Pennsylvania
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
NICK LaLOTA, New York STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam JIMMY PANETTA, California
MARK ALFORD, Missouri MARC VEASEY, Texas
CORY MILLS, Florida
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia
Chris Vieson, Staff Director
Mark Morehouse, Professional Staff Member
William Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Owen McGeary, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
McGee, MG Joseph P., USA, Vice Director for Strategy, Plans, and
Policy, J-5, Joint Staff, Department of Defense................ 8
Ratner, Hon. Ely, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific
Security Affairs, Department of Defense........................ 4
Resnick, Mira, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Regional
Security, Department of State.................................. 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
McGee, MG Joseph P........................................... 71
Ratner, Hon. Ely............................................. 53
Resnick, Mira................................................ 61
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Banks.................................................... 81
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 81
Mrs. Kiggans................................................. 81
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Alford................................................... 88
Mr. Banks.................................................... 86
Ms. Sewell................................................... 87
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 86
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 85
DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH TAIWAN
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, September 19, 2023.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:36 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Today we'll continue our examination of the threats posed
by the Chinese Communist Party. Specifically, we will review
China's growing hostility toward Taiwan, why that should
concern the U.S., and how we should respond.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here and for their
service to our Nation. Over the last year, President Xi has
sought to intimidate and coerce Taiwan. He has ordered his navy
to surround the island with warships.
He has repeatedly launched fighters and bombers across the
centerline and he's personally overseen amphibious assault
exercises. I'm very concerned these escalatory military
exercises are a pretense for an invasion.
A couple of years ago, Admiral Davidson testified before
our committee that Xi would order an invasion of Taiwan before
2027. Since then, our committee has spoken with several other
Pentagon and State Department leaders who have reinforced that
timeline.
The ranking member and I recently traveled to Taiwan to
assess the situation firsthand. We met with President Tsai. We
discussed the threats they face and the actions her government
is taking to improve the defenses.
I was impressed with the progress they're making, and I was
pleased to hear they are working on new asymmetric capabilities
that are key to deterring China.
Much of Taiwan's progress is the result of military
training and weapons they receive from the United States. Last
year's NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] further
strengthened our defense partnership.
It authorized $1 billion annually in Presidential drawdown
authority for Taiwan, $2 billion annually in Foreign Military
Financing loans, and $100 million to begin stockpiling U.S.
equipment on the island.
But more needs to be done. To date, the administration has
only announced $345 million in drawdown authority. They have
not budgeted, and Congress has not appropriated, the funding
necessary to fully carry out the authorities provided in last
year's NDAA.
And Foreign Military Sales, the program we have primarily
relied on to provide military aid to Taiwan, is clearly broken.
Taiwan is waiting on the delivery of over $18 billion in FMS
aid. Some of it dates back to 2016 and that's unacceptable.
I'm interested in hearing from our witnesses on ways to
reform FMS program. For 40 years our relationship with Taiwan
and--China and Taiwan has been defined by the policy of
strategic ambiguity. To date, the policy has been successful in
putting off an invasion.
But with a rapidly modernizing Chinese military and an
increasingly despotic leader, I understand the arguments that
we may need to revisit that policy. It doesn't help that
President Biden is having trouble articulating a consistent
policy toward Taiwan or what would happen if Xi were to invade.
But whatever the policy is today, the use of military force
has been and will remain our most effective deterrent against
invasion. But for that deterrent to be credible our military
must be fully prepared for this conflict. I'm very concerned
that we're not there yet.
It was clear from our recent trip that we need to invest
much more in long-range fires, distributed logistics, and
missile defense. We need to grow our Navy and improve our
capabilities in space and cyberspace.
We also need to reinforce capabilities of our allies in the
region. If a Chinese invasion cannot be deterred it will be
catastrophic for Taiwan and the United States.
A successful invasion will cut off vital trade routes and
disrupt the supply of critical semiconductors and other
technologies. It will sink our economy, endanger our allies,
and severely undermine our national security.
Finally, everyone should remember that Taiwan is free and
democratic. The people of Taiwan have a right to self-
determination. They shouldn't have to live under the constant
threat of an invasion by a communist autocracy.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on ways we can
work together to strengthen Taiwan's defenses and improve our
own capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.
And with that, I yield to my friend, the ranking member,
for any comments he may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for
having this hearing and also for leading the trip to Asia we
did a couple of months ago. It was incredibly informative about
this challenge and other challenges in the region.
And the policy for the U.S. has always been clear and
remains clear. We want to deter an armed conflict in Asia.
There are a number of different flashpoints that are
challenging in that regard but none bigger than Taiwan, which
is why we have adopted the policy that we have had in place for
a number of decades.
And I will disagree with the Chair. I think that policy
remains very clear. It is a ``One China'' policy but crucially
China will not be reunified by force and the main challenge
that we have with this policy right now is that China has been
intimating that they will do it by force.
So we have a clear policy to deter that, and it is worth
noting that we have certainly done a lot more in the last 2
years to deter China in terms of building up Taiwan's defense
forces and, crucially, building partnerships throughout the
region to deter China than was done in the previous 4 years
without any question.
You look at the partnerships that have been built, the
number of countries that have spoken up against China
reunifying Taiwan by force. We are building a coalition to put
that policy in place.
Now, the one aspect of the policy--it's interesting to call
a policy of strategic ambiguity unclear. That's kind of the
point. You know, we don't wish to explicitly say that, you
know, we're going to go to war with China over Taiwan. That
sort of violates the ``One China'' policy.
What we carved out in that policy and what we maintain is
the right to make Taiwan strong enough to deter forcibly being
reunified. That is the purpose of strategic ambiguity and I
think it is really important.
I think it's also important to recognize that one of the
biggest motivators that would push China to act by force is any
sort of movement towards clear, unambiguous Taiwanese
independence.
I think everybody--right, left, center, all over the
spectrum--recognizes that is the red line of all red lines for
China. So we have to move forward with the policy we have,
arming Taiwan, building partnerships to deter, while not taking
that overly aggressive stance and, frankly, removing that
ambiguity.
That is what is incredibly dangerous, going forward. So we
need to maintain that policy. I believe the administration has
clearly articulated that and, more importantly, articulation
notwithstanding, they've built the partnerships and alliances
specifically in Taiwan and the efforts to work with the
Taiwanese government to make sure that they are strong enough
to deter that invasion, that they have support from their
allies and partners throughout the region.
Now, there are a number of questions--I think the chairman
raised some of them--that are really important. Number one is
the capability question--and I'll close here--and we have
certainly seen that in Ukraine.
We have done an amazing job of pulling together a
partnership and arming Ukraine and putting them in a position
to be as successful as they've been when combined with their
unbelievable courage and willingness to fight.
But we need to maintain those supplies. We need to maintain
those supplies of weapons, and I think that's what most of us
worry the most about.
Are we going to be able to have those capabilities, whether
it's flaws in the Foreign Military Sales or Foreign Military
Financing programs or whether it's the simple production
capacity, that we're most curious how we meet that.
You know, just closing this point on a positive note, but
the partnerships that we have built, you know, it's not just
going to be the United States of America that provides these
munitions. We have built partnerships across Europe, across
Asia, across the world. Fifty-three nations are contributing to
the defense of Ukraine. A similar number of nations, or
somewhere in the neighborhood at least, are working with us on
the Taiwan issue.
So the strength in numbers is really coming to bear. But I
do look forward to hearing more about how we can meet those
production challenges to be in a position to deter China in
Asia.
And I guess--sorry, one final point. It's not just Taiwan.
China claims the sovereign territory of at least a half dozen
other countries. If they are able to by force retake Taiwan,
they have their eyes on a number of other places.
There is territory in Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam,
Indonesia, India--I think someone told me even Russia--that
China claims that should be part of theirs.
If they can bully their way into Taiwan it is not the last
place that they're going to try to bully their way into, which
is why it is so important that we have an adequate deterrence.
With that, I look forward to the testimony and I yield
back.
The Chairman. I thank the ranking member for those very
thoughtful points.
I'd now like to introduce our witnesses: Dr. Ely Ratner,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security
Affairs; Ms. Mira Resnick is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Regional Security; and Major General Joseph McGee is
the Vice Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy for the Joint
Staff.
I welcome all of our witnesses. Thank you for taking the
time to be here and for your time and preparation for this
hearing. It's very important to us.
We will start with Dr. Ratner. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELY RATNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Ratner. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today to discuss how the Department of
Defense is strengthening deterrence across the Taiwan Strait.
At the outset of today's hearing let me be absolutely
clear. The Department remains committed to the well-established
``One China'' policy of the United States guided by the Taiwan
Relations Act, the Three Communiques, and the Six Assurances.
It is this longstanding policy that has helped to preserve
peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait for more than four
decades and it is why this administration opposes any
unilateral changes to the status quo.
At the same time, we are clear-eyed that the PRC [People's
Republic of China] is waging a campaign of military,
diplomatic, and economic pressure against Taiwan. China's
leaders have yet to renounce the use of military force.
Will they increasingly turned to the PLA [People's
Liberation Army] as an instrument of coercion in support of
their revisionist aims, conducting more dangerous activities in
and around the Taiwan Strait?
It is in part for these reasons that the Department's 2022
National Defense Strategy identified the PRC as our top pacing
challenge and it is also why we are laser focused on meeting
our commitments consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act,
providing Taiwan with self-defense capabilities as well as
maintaining our own capacity to resist any use of force that
jeopardizes the security of the people on Taiwan.
Mr. Chairman, as Secretary Austin has previously warned and
as you did just now, and I'm quoting directly here, ``conflict
in the Taiwan Strait would be devastating.''
Taiwan is a thriving democracy that plays a vital role in
the world economy with high-technology exports like
semiconductors. The strait itself is an international waterway
where high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight are
guaranteed under international law and absolutely essential for
global commerce and prosperity.
Military aggression across the strait, whether in the form
of an outright invasion, a blockade, or other means, would risk
human life and global prosperity unimaginable in this century.
As I told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2021,
Taiwan is located at a critical node within the first island
chain in the Indo-Pacific and its security is critical to the
region's security.
This is why we have seen a growing number of states in the
Indo-Pacific and throughout the international community raise
their voices about why peace and stability in and around the
Taiwan Strait matters so much to them. Maintaining peace,
stability, and deterrence across the Taiwan Strait is not just
a U.S. interest or an interest of the people on Taiwan.
It is clearly a matter of international concern. By
attempting to change the status quo the PRC would put at risk
the peace that has brought historic prosperity to the Indo-
Pacific and the world for decades.
Importantly, we do not believe that conflict is imminent or
inevitable, because deterrence across the strait today is real
and strong and we are doing more than ever to keep it that way.
Our budget request shows that the Department is focused on
delivering cutting-edge capabilities for our military right now
while investing in the capabilities we need to maintain
deterrence well into the future.
We are also making historic advances in our alliances and
partnerships, further reinforcing one of America's greatest
strategic advantages and the facts speak for themselves.
Over the past year we have announced transformative
achievements with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, among
others, that will make our force posture across the Indo-
Pacific increasingly distributed, mobile, resilient, and
lethal.
Meanwhile, we are drawing upon all available tools to meet
our commitments to provide for Taiwan's self-defense.
Partnering with the State Department, we're accelerating FMS
cases and cutting red tape.
We have also put to good use the authorities Congress has
provided us including by employing both Presidential drawdown
authority and Foreign Military Financing for Taiwan for the
first time ever this year.
Looking ahead, we know that funding to support these
authorities would advance our bipartisan whole-of-government
commitment to strengthening Taiwan's self-defense.
Mr. Chairman, we are confident that our approach is
yielding results. I'll conclude here by underscoring that the
continued maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan
Strait will require heightened urgency, attention, and
resources in the critical year ahead--years ahead.
The Department is seeking the partnership of this committee
and the entire Congress to keep delivering. The American
people, the people on Taiwan, and people across the rest of the
Indo-Pacific region and around the world deserve nothing less
than the peace, stability, and deterrence we seek to
strengthen.
Thank you for your time and attention and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ratner can be found in the
Appendix on page 53.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Ratner.
Ms. Resnick, you're recognized.
STATEMENT OF MIRA RESNICK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR REGIONAL SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Resnick. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on U.S. security cooperation with Taiwan
and for your strong bipartisan efforts to maintain peace and
security in the Taiwan Strait.
I'm grateful for the opportunity to appear here alongside
Dr. Ratner and Major General McGee. Before discussing the
various ways we have built up security cooperation with Taiwan
let me start by addressing why Taiwan matters.
Geographically Taiwan's shipping lanes are the arteries of
global commerce with half of the world's trade going through
the Taiwan Strait every year.
Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, any disruption would be
acutely felt around the world----
The Chairman. Ms. Resnick, would you pull the microphone a
little bit closer, please?
Ms. Resnick. Sure. Let me know if that works.
The Chairman. There you go.
Ms. Resnick. Any disruption would be acutely felt around
the world, threatening more than 180,000 American jobs and
snarling critical supply chains from Alabama to Washington and
beyond.
Economically, Taiwan's cutting-edge semiconductors are the
beating heart of the world's economy, and they are used in
everything from vehicles to iPhones to computers to pacemakers.
These advanced chips are also necessary for American defense--
our next-generation fighter jets, satellite, radars, and
missile defenses.
Moreover, Taiwan is a leading democracy. Taiwan's movement
from autocracy to a vibrant democratic society is an
inspiration for us all.
One of the keys to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait
is credible deterrence. Consistent with our longstanding policy
we are laser focused on strengthening our cooperation to
bolster Taiwan's defense and deterrence capabilities in the
months and years ahead. And while our policy toward the PRC has
not changed, PRC pressure against Taiwan has increased and,
therefore, Taiwan's capabilities must also increase to match
the threat.
Our commitment to Taiwan is rock solid and contributes to
peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and within the
broader region.
As Dr. Ratner mentioned, the National Defense Strategy
identifies the PRC as our pacing challenge and our cooperation
with Taiwan to support its asymmetric defense strategy is front
and center for deterring PRC aggression.
Thanks to the steadfast and bipartisan support of Congress
we have made significant progress strengthening our security
cooperation with Taiwan. We are expediting arms sales to Taiwan
to the greatest extent possible in line with our longstanding
policy of maintaining peace and stability across the Strait.
We are prioritizing Taiwan's defense capabilities with
unprecedented speed and urgency. Last year, we authorized the
highest single year number of Foreign Military Sales
notifications to Taiwan in at least 30 years.
In this administration we have authorized almost $6 billion
in Taiwan arm sales. With thanks to Congress for the new
Presidential drawdown authority for Taiwan, the Secretary of
State recently directed the transfer of defense articles from
DOD [Department of Defense] stocks to Taiwan.
We also recently notified Congress of our first-ever
provision of Foreign Military Financing to Taiwan. This funding
will prioritize capabilities that Taiwan needs now while
supplementing Taiwan's own defense budget, which has nearly
doubled in the past 7 years.
In addition, for the first time we have identified and
notified Congress that Taiwan is eligible to receive excess
defense articles as grant assistance not only for purchase.
This provides another mechanism to support Taiwan's self-
defense capabilities.
And the administration is taking a hard look at the global
Foreign Military Sales system to make it as lean and efficient
as possible, learning the lessons from Ukraine about the
changes that we have made in order to speed transfers to Taiwan
and to other global partners.
While we have taken several steps forward, we have more
work to do. We need to expand America's industrial capacity,
invest in our partnership through additional security
assistance and authorities, and make it clear to the world that
we will stand on the side of democracy and a free, open,
resilient, and secure international order.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Resnick can be found in the
Appendix on page 61.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Resnick.
General McGee, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF MG JOSEPH P. McGEE, USA, VICE DIRECTOR FOR
STRATEGY, PLANS, AND POLICY, J-5, JOINT STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
General McGee. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith,
committee members, good morning. I appreciate this opportunity
to update you on how our joint force supports the Department of
Defense efforts to strengthen deterrence across the Taiwan
Strait by delivering a forward leaning cutting-edge military
integrating with regional allies and partners and supporting
our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act.
Our National Defense Strategy identifies the People's
Republic of China as our pacing challenge, the only competitor
capable of integrating all the elements of its national power
to meet a sustained challenge to the rule-based international
order.
Over the last 2 years, we have seen a significant increase
in the PLA's maritime and air activity as the PRC continues its
pressure campaign against Taiwan and strives to increase its
regional influence.
Cross-strait peace and stability remains a fundamental U.S.
national security interest in the Indo-Pacific. So the PRC's
actions are destabilizing and increase the likelihood of
miscalculation.
However, conflict is neither imminent nor inevitable. U.S.
deterrence backed by the most capable and credible fighting
force in the world is real and strong today. Our forward-based
joint forces demonstrate resolve, support allies and partners,
and provide senior leaders with options during a contingency.
However, fielding combat-ready forces throughout the Indo-
Pacific requires access, basing, and overflight arrangements.
The Department is supporting U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's
pursuit of permanent and rotational operating locations
throughout the region to increase survivability in a contested
environment, reduce risk, and sustain the joint force with
distributed logistics.
The funding provided by Congress in 2023 and the
President's fiscal year 2024 budget request will enable the
joint force to continue necessary planning and implementation
of these efforts.
Next, our network of allies and partners is the joint
force's greatest asymmetric advantage. These alliances,
multilateral arrangements, partnerships, and friendships are
essential elements of this network and critical for providing
regional security.
Accordingly, the joint force fully supports the
Department's efforts to grow the coalition of partners
dedicated to preserving peace and stability throughout the
Indo-Pacific region.
We will continue to strengthen security cooperation,
training, and campaigning with partners by building capacity,
increasing interoperability, and enhancing shared security
based on mutual values, trust, and respect.
Lastly, the joint force supports the Department as it
continues to uphold commitments consistent with the Taiwan
Relations Act [TRA] including providing Taiwan with self-
defense capabilities commensurate with the PRC threat.
The TRA has enabled peace, stability, and deterrence across
the strait for over four decades. It also provides the
foundation of bipartisan support for providing Taiwan with
self-defense capabilities and maintaining the joint force's
capacity to confront anything that jeopardizes Taiwan's
security.
The capabilities we provide are tailored to counter the
military threat Taiwan faces and we believe they provide the
best return on investment and deterrent value.
Thank you for what this committee and this Congress have
done and continue to do to provide oversight and resources to
counter the PRC's increasingly coercive and aggressive
behavior.
I look forward to your questions and today's discussion.
[The prepared statement of General McGee can be found in
the Appendix on page 71.]
The Chairman. Thank all of our witnesses. I recognize
myself now for questions.
Dr. Ratner, you heard Ms. Resnick describe why Taiwan is
important generally. Why would you say Taiwan is important
specifically to the U.S. national security?
Dr. Ratner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thought
your opening statement did a terrific job of articulating that
as well--as well as DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary] Resnick
and it's an important message.
I would start that the national security of the United
States matters in terms of Taiwan's role in the global economy.
It is critical in terms of its own integration with the
United States and with the global economy, and what we have
heard is that conflict or crises or even disruptions of
economic activity in and around Taiwan would be devastating
from a broader--for the United States, for the people on
Taiwan, but also for people around the world and I think that's
a really important message that we need to be really clear
about.
In terms of broader U.S. national security interests, the
National Security Strategy has described the PRC as the only
country with the will and capability to refashion the world
according to its authoritarian preferences.
That's why the Department has described the PRC as the
Department's top pacing challenge, and a hostile invasion of
Taiwan, not only the devastation it would reap but what it
would mean for the region, would be a big step forward in terms
of the Beijing's efforts to try to advance that vision. That
would have real implications for our own military, our
alliances, and the future of international politics.
The Chairman. Ms. Resnick, is there anything--well,
specifically what should Congress do, if anything, that would
deal with this FMS backlog that we have talked a lot about?
Ms. Resnick. Thanks for your question, Congressman, and
also the opportunity to clarify about what a backlog actually
means.
The $19 billion that you referenced is actually cases that
have been approved by Congress, approved by the State
Department, and have either gone through contracting, which can
take a long time, or are waiting for industrial production.
I would refer you to a chart that I included in my written
testimony on page 7 which goes through all of the stakeholders
that are involved in how a capability requirement becomes a
weapon delivered.
And there are complicated processes, no joke. However, what
we have done at the State Department is look at the various
efficiencies, the lessons learned from how we were able to
speed transfers to Ukraine.
What are those lessons learned? How can we apply them
globally, including to Taiwan? We call it FMS 2023 and there
are a number of recommendations--10 recommendations that we
have put forward. I'll go over a couple of them today.
The first one is focusing on exportability as part of the
design phase. So it is of no use to our partners if the U.S.
military is using equipment that our partners need but that
that is not exportable to our partners.
We need to be able to build exportability into the design
phase so that we're not going back and reengineering at cost
for our partners. If we are truly to be elevating our alliances
and our partnerships we need to be able to do that with respect
to our partners' procurement.
I would also highlight this committee's important support
for multiyear procurement to allow our industry some
predictability when it comes to orders and then, lastly, an
expanded commitment and expanded flexibility for Foreign
Military Financing. Our FMF budget is 90 percent earmarked,
which means we have almost no flexibility to respond in a
contingency scenario.
We need more flexibility within the FMF budget to be able
to provide important investments for Taiwan and for other
partners that need it.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the ranking member.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Ratner, you mentioned this in your opening statement
but can you speak a little bit more about the importance of
strategic ambiguity and the fine line between making sure that
we protect Taiwan while not pushing towards independence
because of the impacts that that would have on President Xi and
China's reaction?
Dr. Ratner. Yes, absolutely, Ranking Member Smith. Thank
you for that question.
As I said, the administration is committed to our
longstanding policy. Strategic ambiguity is part of that and
has been part of our ability to maintain deterrence across the
Taiwan Strait for decades.
We believe that sustaining that policy is critically
important. It allows us under the Taiwan Relations Act to
fulfill the commitment we have to support Taiwan's self-defense
while also maintaining our policy of not supporting Taiwan
independence and not supporting unilateral changes to the
status quo from either side.
So we think that's a really important element and that
changing that policy could drive Beijing to initiate military
action even when it was not ready to do so.
Mr. Smith. Because there's some very realistic
nationalistic pressures in China. Granted, President Xi is
driving this, but it would be a mistake to think that it's just
him.
Is that fair? The Chinese people--if it were to be
perceived that we were pushing Taiwan towards independence or
some sort of formal defense agreement, there would be enormous
pressure in China, not--it wouldn't just come from President
Xi. Am I right about that?
Dr. Ratner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Smith. Okay. And that's why it's important to maintain
that this policy. It's what gives us the best shot at peace and
that's what we're trying to achieve here is to not have a war
in Asia and we can do that by maintaining a very sensible
policy, which is reunification, sure; we're going to leave the
specifics behind.
And actually Taiwan and China have been working very
closely together--had been working very closely together, you
know, from about 2000 until about 2015 and it was working just
fine.
There's no reason for China to feel the need to forcibly
reunify Taiwan. We need to make sure they're reminded of that.
Ms. Resnick, on partnerships. Really important that it's
not just the U.S. and Taiwan, that it is a global response, in
part because it impacts President Xi's calculation for what
costs there would be if he tried to do a military reunification
with Taiwan.
So talk to us a little bit more about what partnerships
we're building, how the rest of the world is responding, and
specifically the efforts the U.S. is making to strengthen those
partnerships to protect Taiwan.
Ms. Resnick. Thank you, Mr. Smith, for that question.
What we have found is that Taiwan is able to offer to
partners around the globe significant and sustainable benefits
to the citizens of those countries.
We work to grow those partnerships. We work to make sure
that Taiwan is included in a number of--in a number of
engagements.
In the context of the global cooperation and training
framework we work with Taiwan and many other partners to offer
workshops when it comes to cybersecurity, when it comes to HADR
[humanitarian assistance and disaster relief], to be able to
show how Taiwan can be value added to those relationships.
I'm happy to discuss in another environment some of the
specific partnerships that we--that we work on. But suffice it
to say that one of our lessons learned from Ukraine is the
importance of allies and partnerships and building those allies
and partnerships for reliance when it comes to scenarios--when
it comes to, like, a worst-case scenario.
Mr. Smith. Understood.
The world has a very powerful interest in making sure that
China does not invade Taiwan. The global economic disruptions
would be enormous. So I think it's really smart of the
administration to be using that and working on building
partnerships.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this very
important hearing. It's [inaudible] bipartisan support
Republicans and Democrats for the people of Taiwan. With that
in mind, my--and I appreciate the witnesses here, too--but my
appreciation and gratitude for the independence of Taiwan is
personal.
My father served in the Flying Tigers, the 14th Air Force,
in India and China during World War II. He served in Kunming,
Chengdu, Xi'an, and he raised me to have a great affection for
the people of China.
Twenty years ago, I had the opportunity to visit in Beijing
with President Jiang Zemin at the presidential compound. When I
was introduced as a Member of Congress--it didn't really hurt
my feelings, but he yawned. And then somebody said, hey, Joe's
the son of a Flying Tiger, and so he put his arms up in the air
and announced, ``The American military is revered in China.''
At that time, there was such reverence for what America had
done to liberate the country during World War II. But sadly, in
the last 20 years the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] has
murderously oppressed the people of China and increasingly the
Chinese Communist Party threatens its neighbors with a map that
was released by the government in Beijing in the last 2 weeks
which indicates that they have territorial claims threatening
India, Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines, and amazingly,
Russia.
And so the aggression that could occur we need to make
every effort, I believe, to stop. And with that in mind, Ms.
Resnick, for all of the arms sales to Taiwan approved by the
Department of State during the Biden administration, it seems
that everything continues to be delayed. We must expedite the
security of Taiwan to prevent the CCP aggression against the
people of Taiwan.
We must learn from the lessons of war criminal Putin's
murderous invasion of Ukraine and ensure that Taiwan is
prepared against CCP aggression. Taiwan should be, I believe, a
prickly pear to achieve peace through strength.
With that in mind, what are the greatest challenges and
delays associated with delivering arms to Taiwan and what are
you doing to address these delays? What is the average length
of time until systems to Taiwan are under contract?
Ms. Resnick. Thanks so much, Congressman, for your
question.
To the greatest extent possible, we expedite arms sales to
Taiwan through the State Department. Ninety-five percent of--
globally of arms sales go through the State Department in 48
hours and that includes--that includes our foreign policy
review. So that is 48 hours.
For that 5 percent where there might be stickier issues we
have embarked on this FMS 2023, which is our 10-point plan--our
10 recommendations on how we can find efficiencies within our
system.
But I will say that the cases that you are referencing have
already gone through the State Department. They've already gone
through congressional review. These are cases that are waiting
on industry for production and, by and large, the long pole in
the tent is industrial production.
That means that we need to work with industry to find
efficiencies in their processes, work with industry to make
sure that they are opening production lines here and abroad on
co-production to make sure that we're able to deliver on time.
The delays that we have seen in contracting are of concern.
I would defer to Pentagon colleagues on how their tiger team
has addressed contracting delays. But certainly, we will need
to improve contracting times to be able to address any delays
in the process.
Mr. Wilson. Well, hey, that's extraordinary--a pleasant
surprise to me, 48-hour approval. Hey, that's--hey, that's in
the interest of the American people. And so I hope you reach
the other 5 percent, too. Okay, so let's--whatever can be done.
And then, Mr. Ratner, indeed, there were Harpoon anti-
cruise missiles to be delivered to Taiwan to protect the people
of Taiwan. What's the status of the delivery?
Ms. Resnick. With the authority of the Secretary of State
under the Arms Export Control Act, I can certainly take that
question.
The Harpoons are expected to be delivered in the coming
years. We have worked with industry to be able to expedite
that. They are next in the production line. It is very
difficult to change the production queues because of the
bespoke----
Mr. Wilson. Hey, my time is up. But, hey, any way it can be
extradited, any----
Ms. Resnick. We're with you on that.
Mr. Wilson. Hey, any that we have in inventory should be
delivered. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, for holding this
hearing, which, again, I think has put some real clarity to an
issue where, again, there's a lot of concern but also a little
confusion. And thank you to all the witnesses for your hard
work.
General, President Xi Jinping has made it pretty clear
publicly that he's been calling on his military to be capable
and ready for an invasion by 2027. I just wonder if you could
just sort of talk a little bit about--I mean, obviously,
there's a lot of people who sort of look at China as 10 feet
tall and a military that is, you know, totally capable of
overwhelming force and doing whatever it wants.
But there is a logistical challenge in terms of the Straits
of Taiwan, in terms of the 120-mile width and also just the
complexity of an amphibious joint invasion.
And what--if you could just talk about that a little bit in
terms of what your assessment is, particularly with a sort of
2027 sort of date that certainly is out there?
General McGee. Sir, thank you for the question. I think it
is important to highlight the difficulties from a military end,
how difficult this invasion would be if the Chinese made the
decision to take such a course of action.
Obviously, we believe and hope that deterrence is going to
continue to stop them. But if they were first out they'd have
to cross the Taiwan Straits, which is between 90 and 120 miles.
By way of comparison to the D-Day invasion that was about
25 miles. They would have to mass tens of thousands, maybe
hundreds of thousands of troops, on the eastern coast and that
would be a clear signal this was beginning.
They would have to do a combined amphibious and airborne
air assault operation, we believe, which is an incredibly
complicated joint operation to be able to do, especially when
you're talking about those distances.
That would leave them in the middle of that gap, you know,
90-100 miles, susceptible to all the fires that could be
brought upon an invading force that was already telegraphing
their intentions.
They would be charging into a country which has a credible
and strong military force about the size of Taiwan. They'd be
hitting cities like Taipei with about 7 million people. That's
twice the size of Los Angeles.
They would also encounter an island that has very few
beaches where you could land craft on, mountainous terrain, and
a population that we believe that would be willing to fight.
So there is absolutely nothing easy about a PLA invasion of
Taiwan.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you. I think that's helpful for
a lot of folks who maybe haven't pulled out their geog--their
maps. But I think everything you said is what we saw on Mr.
Rogers' CODEL [congressional delegation] back in June.
Mr. Ratner, while we were there there was also a lot of
discussion with the Taiwan leadership about the fact that China
had, again, just come out of their COVID lockdown. All the
predictions in Wall Street that, you know, they were going to
come roaring back in terms of their economy clearly--now it's
pretty clear that China has a lot of structural problems with
its economy in terms of, you know, massive debt, a property and
real estate market that is overextended and collapsing, 20
percent unemployment for young Chinese.
How do you sort of look at that, which is a relatively
recent phenomenon, in terms of whether or not that adds risk in
terms of a decision to invade or for domestic political
pressures or whether or not, you know, a rational response
would be to tamp down, you know, enterprises like an invasion
because they've got work to do at home?
Dr. Ratner. Representative Courtney, that's a really
important question. In part, the answer to that is unknowable
and because of that what I will say is we are watching the PRC
economy very closely. We are seeing some of the trends you are
describing.
We are also watching some of the issues the PLA is having
in terms of how it's managing a different resource condition
than maybe they had expected when they were growing at higher
rates and seeing them making tradeoffs that maybe they weren't
expecting to have to make, as well as some of the institutional
challenges that they have as it relates to corruption and
otherwise.
And, of course, there's a broader range of internal
domestic issues associated with demographics, the real estate
market, political instability, any number of issues that you've
just raised that China's leaders have to contend with.
For our part, we have identified the PRC as the
Department's top pacing challenge and we're going to continue
investing in our own strength and capability such that, to the
earlier part of your question, when Xi Jinping wakes up every
day and looks out the window and considers whether or not it's
within his cost benefit analysis to initiate an invasion
against Taiwan that he says today is not the day.
I think we think--we're pretty confident that's true today
and we're doing everything we can to keep it that way.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank our
panelists for joining us.
Ms. Resnick, I wanted to focus on the Department of State's
FMS 2023 initiative, and essentially you're saying you're going
to prioritize and help in planning assistance in the future.
That's great in the future but we know the future is now
for Taiwan. Taiwan is pretty focused on getting things done. I
had an opportunity to meet with President Tsai with the CODEL
that I led there and she is adamant about making sure that
these Foreign Military Sales backlogs are filled.
As you heard the chairman, it's substantial, not only F-16s
but F-16 parts. As you know, having to scramble those jets
every time the Chinese fly into that air defense identification
zone wears those jets out. They need those parts for 141
aircraft. They need the 66 new aircraft.
Prioritization in the future doesn't address today's
constraints. The U.S. has plans to provide 66 aircraft and
that's great, but those plans had been started in 2019.
Here we are today and the Department says that, don't
worry--final delivery date is going to be 2026. That's 7
years--7 years--knowing that China has ramped up their efforts
in threatening not just Taiwan but threatening the region.
And we talk about partnerships. We talk about, oh, we're
going to have all these friends in the region that are going to
help us out. Doesn't appear that we're being very friendly with
the policies that we have and not helping and prioritizing
these Foreign Military Sales.
Congress has authorized the President a billion dollars of
drawdown authority. Okay. That's now but it hasn't been used in
the past.
Can you tell me why hasn't this been a priority up until
now when all of a sudden the lights are shining on this?
Everybody's looking at this and go, my gosh, we need to do
this. Why haven't we gotten further along with this?
I agree with President Tsai. They are in dire need of parts
and aircraft if they have any hope of deterring the Chinese.
Deterrence of the Chinese is a joint effort. It cannot just be
the United States, and Taiwan rightfully looks at us and goes,
you know what, you made a lot of promises, folks, but you
haven't delivered on the promises.
Assure me that we're going to deliver on those promises in
a timely manner and it's not going to take another 7 years to
deliver what they first asked for in 2019.
Ms. Resnick. Congressman, thank you for the--for the
question and, of course, again, the opportunity to clarify.
When the State Department approves and when Congress approves
of a weapon sale, that is the beginning of the process for
contracting.
It then goes through DOD's contracting. It then goes to----
Mr. Wittman. I understand about process. Tell me about
outcomes. Tell me about outcomes. I don't care--I don't care
about the process. Tell me about outcomes.
Ms. Resnick. After contracting it then goes to industry. So
we are waiting on industry. Industry--we have been working with
industry to step up their production. This has been a
particular effort at the Pentagon for Deputy Secretary `Kath
Hicks, who has worked tirelessly to be able to shorten those
production--those production timelines.
But you are absolutely right that we need to use other
tools. Let me talk about two of them.
The first is Foreign Military Financing, because knowing
that if we need to get something on contract in order for
production to start we have been using Foreign Military
Financing for the first time in this administration.
If a--if Taiwan is unable because of their fiscal year to
get something on contract then we can supplement Taiwan's
defense budget, which, as I said in my opening, has doubled in
the last 7 years.
So they have skin in the game here. But we are able to
supplement Taiwan's defense budget by getting something on
contract immediately and also so that they don't miss the
military acquisition window.
There's a second, which is, as you mentioned, the
Presidential drawdown authority. For the first time we use this
authority because for the first time Congress authorized that
authority. We thank you for that.
We think that this is a very effective tool. This is a
permanent authority so we will continue to use this. We do not
expect that we will need to have to come back to you over and
over again for a new authority here. So thank you for that
authority and we will continue to use it.
Mr. Wittman. As my time is running out, what pressures have
you put on industry with the urgency that is behind needing
these aircraft to help Taiwan protect itself? What have you
done to make sure that industry delivers?
Ms. Resnick. So we understand that what industry is looking
for is predictability, to make sure that they--if they are
going to open new production lines or if they are going to run
the production lines on overtime.
So we have worked very closely with Lockheed. I understand
that the Air Force and Lockheed are working together on this in
order to address some of the issues with the F-16. So we do
work with industry and we continue to do that.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you. Working needs to equal delivery. I
hope to see delivery of those aircraft here in the months to
come. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Norcross, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman, for calling this hearing
today--defense cooperation--and it's an incredibly important
hearing, and hearing from my colleague and Mr. Wittman, he
brings up great points about the deterrence, you know, three
primary ones being military, there's political, and then
there's certainly economic.
And when we talk about predictability, I think that is so
important because as China looks to the world and making that
calculation that you speak about each day, waking up, is today
the day to go after Taiwan, they look at the U.S. and what are
we thinking--what are we doing.
And when we look at--the focus of this committee has been
so much and so intent making sure the military and that we're
getting them the right equipment at the right time, but it's
also what we're doing.
So my question is when we look at what's going on in
Ukraine and now they're seeing a potential--call it a pause, a
pivot--the lack of predictability on what we're going to do in
helping Ukraine in funding, whether we're going to extend and
increase the amount of funding go there, it's not going to take
a genius for China to look at it and say, wow, are they in on
Ukraine?
What will they do when it comes to Taiwan? You know, that's
a very big issue that they're going on. So are we going to be
there? We're potentially getting ready to see what happens if
we shut down government. What does that do to our readiness for
our ability to deliver the F-16s?
So from a political standpoint--and I'd like to get some
focus on this--Dr. Ratner, where is the assessment when we talk
about lack of funding going on for Ukraine or a potential
shutdown? How does this fit into that calculus of what China
looks at when they look at the resolve of the U.S.?
Dr. Ratner. Well, thank you, Congressman. I think the
question that I would ask is what can the administration do in
partnership with Congress to strengthen deterrence across the
Taiwan Strait to address exactly the issues that you described,
and I think there are three particular actions building upon
what DAS Resnick said that should be top priorities to build
confidence in the region in--and assurance in Xi Jinping's mind
of U.S. deterrence.
First is we do need to see a full-year on-time
appropriation. The National Defense Strategy is singularly
focused on the PRC and the budget reflects that strategy and we
need that budget passed in full to be able to implement the
strategy and, of course, a continuing resolution or a shutdown
would inhibit our ability to do that.
Second, as DAS Resnick has emphasized, we really do need to
work together to strengthen the U.S. defense industrial base so
that we are better positioned as the United States to
strengthen our own readiness and to support key allies and
partners and we can do that through expanding and leveraging
multiyear procurement among other tools.
And then, finally, Congress can provide appropriations
against the new authorities that this committee has provided to
the administration and that Congress has provided so that we
can leverage Presidential drawdown authority and Foreign
Military Financing to their full effect because to date we have
those authorities, but they have not been appropriated against.
I think doing all of those three things would send a really
powerful message to Beijing.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
I want to just switch over--when we start looking at
tipping points or tripwires and from the military's standpoint,
you know, the modernization that we are hearing about.
Is there a tripwire when we--that you can see, General,
that there's certain equipment or cooperation that takes place
that might push China to making a hasty decision?
General McGee. Sir, our focus in terms of support to Taiwan
has been to increase their defenses. So the weapons that we're
providing them are simply for the defense of their country.
I can't tell you if there is a single asset or a type of
weapon that would set them over in terms of a tipping point.
But I think it's important to emphasize that the aid that is
provided to Taiwan is purely of a defensive means.
Mr. Norcross. Good point.
So let me switch over to the last one and that is the
political. Where might that tripwire be, whether it's by Taiwan
or the U.S., that would put us in a collision course? Is there
an election? Is there a statement that we believe that tripwire
is going to be?
Ms. Resnick. One way that we see that we can deter the PRC
is by demonstrating resolve for our support to Ukraine, and
don't trust me--senior Taiwan officials have said that
Ukraine's success against Russia will help deter aggression
from China.
Mr. Norcross. I'm sorry. My time is expired. I yield back.
My apologies.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr.
Bacon, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bacon. Thanks to all three of you. I appreciate the
level of preparation and the seriousness you're taking this.
I'm grateful to you.
First, I just want to say that, you know, Taiwan has 23
million people. They've embraced democracy, human rights, free
markets, our freedom of speech, religion, and the press, and we
have a moral and a strategic obligation to help Taiwan deter an
invasion and if deterrence fails, to help Taiwan defeat an
invasion by Communist China.
So this deterrence of Taiwan should be one of our highest
priorities and I can tell that you share that view.
My first question is for either Dr. Ratner or Ms. Resnick.
Our focus in our country in recent months or over the last year
or so has been on Ukraine. If Congress fails to help Ukraine
and Russia prevails what is the message that China will take
from this or even what will be the message that Taiwan takes
from this?
I'll ask Dr. Ratner first.
Dr. Ratner. I may allow--I'll say a word on that but Ms.
Resnick was maybe in the middle of a response to that question
with the last member.
So maybe if you want to finish your answer.
Ms. Resnick. Sure. We see that our support for Ukraine
bolsters Ukraine's deterrence but also bolsters Taiwan's
deterrence; that where we can, we should be making sure that
the PRC gets the right message from us, which is that we
support our partners, we support our allies, and that we are a
reliable partner.
Sending that message of reliability is exactly what we need
to be doing right now. Decreasing our support for Ukraine would
send exactly the wrong message to the PRC.
Mr. Bacon. It sends the message if we don't do this that we
don't stand up to the values we believe in and that we won't
stand up against a bully, and I think we need to.
General McGee, one of the options I don't hear much about
is a blockade. We talk about an invasion. I think a blockade is
another serious option the Chinese could be looking at.
How are the Taiwanese preparing for this, how are we
helping and, you know, they're not--they don't have a depth of
food or energy so this could be a serious issue.
General McGee. Taiwan takes their responsibility to keep
their nation provisioned with enough food to be able to survive
a blockade of a fairly significant amount of time. Maybe not
appropriate to discuss exact numbers here but I know that
Taiwan takes that seriously.
I know they take the threat of a blockade as a possibility.
I think it is an option but probably not a highly likely
option. When you start looking at the military options much
easier to talk about a blockade than actually do a blockade, I
think, when you're actually conducting military operations. I
know Dr. Ratner has looked at this quite a bit as well.
Dr. Ratner. Yeah, thank you. I mean, I would only just add
that a blockade would be devastating to the international
economy and would likely induce the kind of broad-based wide
deep response from the international community against China's
actions that Beijing would likely be trying to avoid in this
circumstance to coerce Taiwan.
So it would likely build an international coalition against
Taiwan. In addition, we believe based on our analysis that
Taiwan would have options on its own and with the international
community to ensure the delivery of industrial resources, raw
materials, energy, and other critical items in the event of a
PLA blockade.
So it would likely not succeed and it would be a huge risk
of escalation for the PRC where it would likely have to
consider whether or not it was willing to ultimately start
attacking commercial maritime vessels.
So for all that reason we think this would be a monster
risk for the PRC and a huge miscalculation.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
A follow-up, Dr. Ratner, on strategic ambiguity. When does
ambiguity become a weakness to deterrence versus having more
clarity and clear commitment to Taiwan?
Dr. Ratner. Well, Representative, what I would say is that
we see the PRC anticipating a U.S. response to a invasion of
Taiwan.
They train against it, they assume it's going to happen,
and, therefore, we don't think there would be additional
deterrence value in changing our position away from strategic
ambiguity and in fact doing that would upset our commitment to
the status quo and to opposing unilateral changes to the status
quo.
So we think there is political costs that would be borne by
the people on Taiwan for that kind of political action and very
little benefit in terms of deterrence. We believe today
deterrence is strong and deterrence is real.
Mr. Bacon. One real quick--one last real quick question.
You said earlier we weren't funding to 100 percent. What is it
that we need to be funding to for Taiwan compared to where
we're at?
Ms. Resnick. The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act that was
passed as part of last year's NDAA includes a $2 billion
authorization. Just to give you a sense of scale, the global
FMF budget is between $6 [billion] and $7 billion. It's 90
percent earmarked.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for shedding so much light on
the military side of our deterrence in terms of China and
Taiwan. But there's two other great historic events that have
taken place here during this time period that reflect on, I
think, major, major areas of deterrence that I'd like to just
discuss a little bit more--have you discuss more.
One is the--looking at the COVID pandemic and the effect on
the economy. The second is the war in Ukraine. With the first I
think Ms. Resnick brought clear the economic effects that
Taiwan's--an invasion of Taiwan would have in terms of half of
the world's trade going through the straits there, in terms of
their chips production.
But I'd also like to see a comment on the effects of an
aggressive action by China on Taiwan, specifically on how it
would affect their economy and how that is a deterrent factor
in their calculations.
And number two, we did a lot of talking about the
administration in terms of Ukraine. But what about Congress?
You know, we are a capitalist country. We have a military asset
base that's built in the private sector--in cooperation with
our own government, but in the private sector.
When that private sector sees CR [continuing resolution]
after CR after CR and not dealing with the budget how does that
directly affect their ability to produce the assets that we
need, their predictability, their ability to get capital in a
long-range sense?
And, secondly, in Ukraine, when Congress is talking about
cutting aid to Ukraine, abandoning commitments we had to
Ukraine, and we're talking about one of the greatest things we
have seen in terms of deterrence, in terms of helping Taiwan,
with the partnerships we have built in the region--the new
partnerships--if they see that kind of discussion here in
Congress about cutting aid, leaving our partners in the lurch,
what effect will that have?
So I gave you a lot to answer to in a little over 2 minutes
but I'll give you flexibility in answering them and be quiet.
Dr. Ratner. Congressman, maybe I'll just reiterate what I
said in response to Mr. Norcross, which is Congress does have
an incredibly important role to play here and we want to work
with this committee and the full Congress on resourcing issues
precisely for the reasons you described.
And, again, just to repeat myself, we are looking for a
full year on-time appropriation. That's required for us to
implement the strategy that we have written that is focused on
integrated deterrence against the PRC.
We need support in strengthening our U.S. defense
industrial base so we can be better positioned to provide for
our own readiness and for our partners, and we do need
appropriations against the new authorities that Congress has
provided for support for Taiwan that we haven't seen yet.
So I think that's really an important role for Congress.
What I would say on your first question, very quickly, that the
economic effects for the PRC would be devastating and that's
why the PLA is focused on trying to execute a rapid low-cost
invasion that Xi Jinping would view as at acceptable cost.
And when we think about combat-credible deterrence we want
to ensure that that remains too costly for Xi and we think we
are absolutely there today, and when we talk about the PRC as a
pacing challenge what we are talking about is staying ahead of
that cost calculation in the years and decades ahead.
Ms. Resnick. Mr. Keating, thank you for that question.
We believe that demonstrating our resolve with respect to
Ukraine is the best way to deter the PRC. Abandoning our
partners encourages the PRC to conclude that we will fail to
provide for Taiwan's sufficient self-defense. That is exactly
the wrong message to be sending.
Let me also just say a moment in this last minute about
what the lack of an on-time appropriation would do with respect
to our defense industry.
In the context of a shutdown, which we would all like to
avoid, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in the past--
and I can't speak to what would happen in the future, we
haven't issued guidance yet--but in the past the Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs has been unable to process new
licenses for any partner including Taiwan--has been unable to
process new Foreign Military Sales for any partner including
Taiwan, except in the context of an emergency.
This is something we would like to avoid.
Mr. Keating. And I'm running out of time. I'll just
emphasize you said without revealing who they are. The
Taiwanese people are looking at what's happening in Taiwan.
They are having discussions about what's happening here in
Congress. So I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
Gallagher, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Ratner, the President in Vietnam said, and I quote,
``Look, I think China has a difficult economic problem right
now for the whole range of reasons that relate to the
international growth and lack thereof and the policies that
China has followed.
``And so I--I don't think it's going to cause China to
invade Taiwan. And matter of fact, the opposite--it probably
doesn't have the same capacity that it had before.''
Do you agree with the assessment that China's economic
difficulties will make them less aggressive militarily and, if
so, what empirical support would you offer in support of that
hypothesis?
Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I would say in response at the
Defense Department we're focused on strengthening combat-
credible deterrence.
Mr. Gallagher. You don't have the view--I mean, you're the
China expert in the building. Do you have a view on whether
China's economic difficulties make them more or less aggressive
militarily, which I would argue is directly relevant to the
question of how do we defend against such an invasion?
Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I'd be happy to provide a more
detailed answer to that in a classified session.
Mr. Gallagher. So you don't want to answer that in public
session.
Dr. Ratner. Let me give you an assessment based upon the
information that we have. I would prefer to do that in a
classified session.
Mr. Gallagher. Just an assessment based on your deep
expertise for which I have enormous respect and which I've
repeatedly praised publicly.
Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I appreciate that. Again, I'd
rather take that question into a classified.
Mr. Gallagher. Okay. The President in that same press
conference said that our goal is not to contain China. Do you
agree with that and if you do what is our--what is our end
state with respect to China if it's not containment?
Dr. Ratner. We articulate our goal as it relates to the PRC
as integrated deterrence and we articulate our role in the
Indo-Pacific as building a free and open Indo-Pacific with--
alongside our allies and partners.
Mr. Gallagher. Okay. The President in that same press
conference said--I don't want to get this wrong: ``the only
existential threat humanity faces even more frightening than a
nuclear war is global warming going above 1.5 degrees in the
next 20--10 years.''
Do you agree with that assessment that the threat of global
warming is greater than the threat of thermonuclear war with
China?
Dr. Ratner. What I would say, Congressman, the 2022
National Defense Strategy identifies the PRC as the
Department's top pacing challenge and that's what we're focused
on as our priority at the Department.
Mr. Gallagher. So is the President suggesting something
different than the prioritization in the NDS [National Defense
Strategy]?
Dr. Ratner. I'm not going to speak for the President, sir.
I'm just going to say as it relates to the 2022 NDS, I believe
we are focused on the pacing challenge of the PRC I believe
with the consistency and focus and urgency that you're
suggesting is required.
Mr. Gallagher. I'm not trying to be difficult. I actually
think the question of prioritization matters greatly because as
you know there's a--there are some who suggest that, indeed, we
need to cooperate with China when it comes to climate change.
I would argue this is naive at best and China has no
interest in sort of abiding by commitments that are made at COP
27 [2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference] or any other
international fora, as their record demonstrates, and in a
practical level our attempts to engage with China on that issue
undermine the urgency that we need to take key defensive action
particularly when it comes to our military competition.
Along those lines, when it comes to this renewal of
engagement as a foundation of our foreign policy with respect
to China we have had four Cabinet-level officials or three plus
Secretary--former Secretary Kerry.
How has that improved the security situation in the Indo-
Pacific?
Dr. Ratner. Do you want to take this, from the State
Department?
Ms. Resnick. Secretary Blinken has been very clear that we
will cooperate where our interests align but that we're not
afraid of competing and we're not afraid of contesting where we
must.
So we believe that we need to manage this relationship
responsibly. Our--the American people expect us to manage the
relationship responsibly. Our allies and partners expect us to
manage the relationship responsibly and so we'll continue to do
that. That involves continuing to have open lines of
communication.
Mr. Gallagher. Have--is it not true that our attempts to
establish a crisis communication channel--military-to-military
communication--have been rebuffed by the Chinese Communist
Party?
Dr. Ratner. Absolutely. We have--Secretary Austin has said
repeatedly that we are interested in maintaining open lines of
communication and by and large--with some exceptions but by and
large the PLA has not been responsive to that.
Mr. Gallagher. And then, finally, in the 36 seconds I have
left, putting on my Select Committee on China hat, taking off
my HASC [House Armed Services Committee] hat, we just did a war
game in New York that focused on the economic and financial
aspects of this conflict.
I guess I just sort of assumed that there were people at
Treasury and Commerce wargaming and doing sort of financial and
economic escalation in the way we do rigorously when it comes
to conventional and nuclear escalation.
Have you, Dr. Ratner, ever participated in such an exercise
with Treasury and Commerce officials?
Dr. Ratner. Yes, I have. I have participated in
interagency--multiple interagency tabletop exercises with
representatives from Treasury and Commerce in which they are
considering the employment of economic tools as part of crisis
and conflict.
Mr. Gallagher. My time has expired. I look forward to
following up offline.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Carbajal, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses for being here today.
The National Defense Strategy states conflict with the
People's Republic of China is neither inevitable or desirable.
I firmly believe this and I think and hope that most if not all
members here in this room agree.
It is crucial the United States remain committed to
Taiwan's national security and continue providing the tools
necessary to detour any aggression from the PRC.
Dr. Ratner, can you speak to how well received U.S.
assistance is by Taiwan and can you characterize how some of
the assistance we provided complements Taiwan's own efforts?
Dr. Ratner. Yes, absolutely. Under the Taiwan Relations Act
we are committed to supporting Taiwan in its self-defense.
That is an important part of their effort to be able to
defend their democracy and we are focused with them on
identifying the right capabilities and getting to them at the
right time.
So, again, be happy to answer these questions in much
greater detail in a classified setting. But absolutely.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. We have heard there are issues
with the Foreign Military Sales process with an estimated $19
billion backlog. The State Department has a 10-point plan to
retool FMS and the Department of Defense has the FMS Tiger Team
to highlight and implement recommendations to improve FMS.
Ms. Resnick and Dr. Ratner, can you speak to where these
plans are and how you see them improving FMS, and can you both
discuss coordination between the State Department and the
Department of Defense on improving FMS?
Ms. Resnick. Congressman, thanks for your question and the
opportunity to go a little bit deeper into FMS 2023.
Just to clarify, the $19 billion that you reference were
cases that have been approved by the State Department already,
that have been approved by Congress already, and so these are
cases that are awaiting production.
So we rely on our defense industry to produce for our
partners and for ourselves for our own readiness, and so these
are cases that are in the queue for production.
We see that, and the data confirms that, cases go through
the State Department--95 percent of cases go through the State
Department within 48 hours. So we are working on those 5
percent, those stickier foreign policy issues and how we can
unstick them.
We are working on making sure that we remain competitive in
this age of heightened strategic competition globally and so
our recommendations include better training for our security
cooperation officers so that they better understand the
authorities under which they're operating.
We have worked on prioritizing FMS cases according to the
National Defense Strategy, worked on anticipatory policies so
that we don't have to wait for a partner to ask us for a
decision but we may have a decision already done and gone
through all of the recommendations--all of the approval process
before a partner even asks.
So we have a number of recommendations and we're working to
implement them now.
Mr. Carbajal. Anything to add, Dr. Ratner?
Dr. Ratner. Yeah. I would just say thank you for DAS
Resnick, for handling a number of the FMS questions today. It
turns out the Defense Department also ran a tiger team, co-led
by senior officials from OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] Policy as well as Acquisitions and Sustainment, to
look at a number of similar issues in concert with the State
Department through the entire life cycle of the FMS process and
found the same conclusions, which is the predominance of the
delays that we're now seeing are tied to industrial base
production challenges and that many of industry's challenges
could be solved by investing more in production lines to
increase speed and capacity.
So, again, I would come back to what I said a few minutes
ago. We are looking for partnership with Congress to try to
strengthen the U.S. defense industrial base together in a
bipartisan fashion and that's how we're going to get after
ensuring that we have not only the capabilities for our own
readiness but also for our vital allies and partners.
Mr. Carbajal. I have limited time so I'm going to get the
question out. You might have to give me the answer later.
Dr. Ratner and Ms. Resnick, in recent years the PRC has
increased gray zone pressures including increased frequency and
complex military exercises and aircraft, manned and unmanned,
flying closer to Taiwan than in years past.
Do you think there are steps Taiwan could take to detour
gray zone pressure?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 81.]
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.
Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congress authorized President Biden to send $1 billion in
defense aid to Taiwan during fiscal year 2023 through
Presidential drawdown authority.
The fiscal year ends in 11 days but the President has only
sent about one-third of that military aid to Taiwan. Ms.
Resnick, why has President Biden withheld $655 million in
Presidential drawdown authority from Taiwan?
Ms. Resnick. Thanks for the question. This is a very
important authority and we thank Congress for that. This
authority is now in permanent law so we expect to be able to
use this authority in the future.
The PDA is--the Presidential drawdown authority is one of
many authorities that we use----
Mr. Banks. Does that money expire in 11 days--$655 million
that he didn't spend in fiscal year 2023?
Ms. Resnick. It resets the clock. Even if there is a
shutdown, even if there is a CR, it resets the clock to $1
billion in authority and then it is up to the Defense
Department to see what they have in stock.
Dr. Ratner. Yeah, I guess--Congressman Banks, what I would
clarify is there is no money. There was an authorization for a
billion dollars against which Congress did not appropriate
replenishment funds different from how it has done with
Ukraine.
So the Presidential drawdown authority that the Department
has used it has taken out of hide, and as Secretary Austin has
said the Department is looking to Congress to appropriate
against those authorities so they can be best leveraged by the
Department in----
Mr. Banks. Is there a distinction between FMF and the
Presidential drawdown authority? Or is there no differ--you're
saying there is no difference?
Ms. Resnick. With Foreign Military Financing there is no
particular earmark for Taiwan. We have found out of hide $80
million for--in the supplemental.
Mr. Banks. You're saying there is not $655 million that has
been appropriated----
Dr. Ratner. Correct.
Mr. Banks [continuing]. To provide a Presidential drawdown
authority to Taiwan that is going to expire in 11 days?
Dr. Ratner. That's correct. It was--a billion dollars was
authorized. Zero dollars were appropriated. Three hundred and
forty-five million dollars were taken out of hide.
Mr. Banks. Okay. So the Taiwanese often complain about the
Biden administration offering them loans rather than outright
support. Can you talk about the difference and why the Biden
administration has only offered them loans?
Ms. Resnick. We have not. We have also offered them grant
assistance which we are working to implement now. This was just
notified in the last couple of weeks.
Congress authorized loans, and we understand that they may
not be interested in those loans but we are offering grant
assistance. We have offered grant assistance and we believe
that it is in our interest to do so.
Mr. Banks. Why are they not interested in the loans?
Ms. Resnick. I think that the rate may not be very
competitive and that is, again, something that we are working
on with FMS 2023.
Mr. Banks. What can we do about that?
Ms. Resnick. Well, we have--we have asked for authorities
in the supplemental to be able to provide a better rate to
partners and so we look forward to working with Congress about
that.
Mr. Banks. Can you compare those rates with what they might
find from elsewhere?
Ms. Resnick. Correct. We need to have a competitive rate.
Mr. Banks. Can you tell us, the committee, on what those
rates--why our rates aren't competitive versus rates they might
find elsewhere?
Ms. Resnick. I'm happy to take that for the record. I don't
have the numbers in front of me.
Mr. Banks. Thank you. I yield back.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 81.]
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Moulton, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In this discussion of funding and appropriations and all of
that, how would a government shutdown affect our ability to arm
Taiwan and deter aggression in the Pacific?
Ms. Resnick. I can start based on a State Department
perspective. And, again, I wasn't at the State Department, I
was here on the Hill when we had the last shutdown.
But based on past precedent, the State Department would be
unable to process new licenses for Taiwan or for any other
partner absent an emergency. We would be unable to process new
Foreign Military Sales. We would also be unable to process new
Foreign Military Financing which would not be--which would not
be included under a shutdown.
And just to clarify, when Congress moves forward on defense
spending that isn't--that does not include the State Department
and so, therefore, the Foreign Military Financing budget is not
included in defense spending. And so even if Congress moves
forward with defense spending, the State Department and our
partners would suffer.
Mr. Moulton. So the House leadership sent us home last week
without even voting on defense appropriations, which should be
the easiest of 12 appropriations bills to pass.
If we by some miracle avoid a shutdown and just have a
continuing resolution--a CR--is that okay? Or how does that
affect our ability to arm Taiwan and deter aggression?
Dr. Ratner. Congressman, from a broader regional
perspective, we are looking for a full appropriation against
our budget request. A continuing resolution prevents us from
making new investments in our own capabilities.
It also prevents us from initiating new major military
construction projects in the region associated with our forward
posture. So, yes, this affects our ability to support key
partners like Taiwan, but it also affects our ability to build
the kind of deterrent in the U.S. military that we're seeking
to build.
Mr. Moulton. Dr. Ratner, when we talk about supporting our
partner in Taiwan one of the questions that I hear from
constituents, the people back home, is, you know, are the
people of Taiwan going to stand up and fight. And I have
understood that there is a perception among some in Taiwan for
some time that a peaceful resolution to this crisis would be
ideal and perhaps that they would just follow the Hong Kong
model.
Is the Hong Kong model popular in Taiwan right now and what
do you think about their willingness to actually fight off
aggression from the--from the PRC?
Dr. Ratner. Congressman, what we have seen in recent years
is a Taiwan people and Taiwan government that has clearly
signaled a willingness to invest in its own defense and invest
in its own resilience and take difficult political decisions
and political reforms to do just that.
We have seen significant increases in their defense budget,
and I should just say we see them resisting PRC coercion every
day in terms of the economic and military and political
coercion and influence that they are experiencing and they have
stood up for themselves and stood up for their democracy.
Mr. Moulton. I think that's a good point that a lot of
people don't understand is in the same way that the Ukrainians
were really at war for the last 8 years, Taiwan is feeling the
effects of PRC aggression literally every single day.
General McGee, when I was last in Taiwan in October looking
at this as a Marine infantry officer I saw a territory that was
very defensible, kind of ideally defensible. I saw some very
enthusiastic work by the people of Taiwan and their army to
exercise, to get out there, dig trench lines and whatnot.
But I also saw a lot of room for improvement where some
advice from us would be helpful in developing the real tactics
on the ground to be most effective in the event of an invasion.
What are we doing to help--to help improve their
capabilities in the same way that we helped improve the
capabilities of the Ukrainians before Russia started that
illegal war?
General McGee. Sir, I'll just say when you look at a
nation's ability to fight or any military's I think it comes
down to a couple of key factors. They need to have a
capability. They need to have a capacity so they need to have
those assets at--in the numbers.
They need to have competence in terms of their ability to
execute any form of military operations, confidence in their
leadership at every--at every single level, and then most
importantly they've got to have that will to fight.
I think when we do any work with the people of Taiwan,
specifically with their military, most especially just recently
in Camp Grayling up in Michigan hosted an exercise where they
brought an infantry battalion to Michigan to conduct their
operations.
I think everyone who was part of that exercise was
impressed with what we saw from Taiwan's army, their
willingness on all those factors.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
Strong, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank each of the
witnesses for being here today.
U.S. policy and strategic ambiguity when it comes to the
Taiwans has been steadfast and consistent for decades. However,
the policy is undermined when leaders of major defense
companies come to the aid of the Chinese Communist Party,
making public statements such as, and I quote, ``Taiwan is an
integral part of China,'' close quote.
What messages do you think these types of statements send
to the CCP?
Ms. Resnick. Thanks for your question.
There's been no change in our government policy. What has
changed is the scale and sophistication of the PLA's intense
pressure on Taiwan. We work with the defense industry quite a
bit. Obviously, there are some commercial interests there. But
we work with the defense industry to make sure that we can help
Taiwan rise to meet that threat that the PRC is posing to
Taiwan.
Mr. Strong. Thank you.
Last week China announced sanctions against Lockheed Martin
and Northrop Grumman for providing weapons to Taiwan. Now, I
don't know about you all but that sounds like a badge of honor
to me. If you're a U.S. defense company and CCP friendly maybe
you should be reevaluating your business model.
Back in June the Department of Defense approved a tasking
memo to help accelerate institutional processes for Foreign
Military Sales.
In your opinion, what are some of the red tape barriers in
place that keep your departments from fully unleashing the
defense industrial base and improving FMS relationships with
allies and partners?
Ms. Resnick. Thank you so much for the question.
We have--we have 10 recommendations that we have included
in our FMS 2023 including using anticipatory policy so that we
don't have to wait for the partner to come to us, so that we
understand what a partner may need and be able to anticipate
that approval.
We have--we have begun to work with security cooperation
officers at embassies around the world to be able to make sure
that we're managing partners' expectations appropriately.
We are working on competitive financing. It is not a secret
that U.S. defense industry provides the best technology in the
world but it is also expensive. So we need to be able to
compete with our strategic competitors and even our friendly
competitors.
Mr. Strong. How can Congress help advance FMS acquisition
prioritization and award timelines?
Ms. Resnick. Thanks for that question.
I think that the most important role that Congress can play
is through your discussions with the defense industry of making
sure that you are able to underscore the urgency of the
situation with our partners around the world, the need for us
to be able to meet the demand that we're seeing globally so
that we can remain a reliable partner.
Mr. Strong. China continues its aggressive island building
and military exercises in the South China Sea. Just this
weekend the CCP launched over 100 warplanes, which included
fighter jets, toward Taiwan. It's bullying, plain and simple.
This year's NDAA includes a provision that requires the DOD
and the State Department to establish a comprehensive training,
advising, and institutional capacity building program with
Taiwan's military.
What are some of the things you believe should be kept in
mind while developing this program?
General McGee. I think with--as we take a look at what the
Taiwan military, you know, and their mission that they have I
think one of the critical factors because what they need to be
able to counter is an airborne and amphibious operation is the
idea of a joint concept and I think if you know the history of
our own military that's a very sophisticated and complicated
process to get there.
And I think any work that we could do to assist them in
improving joint capabilities, that integration of air, sea, and
land, space and cyber, to be able to strengthen their defense I
think would be time well spent.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mrs. Kiggans [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Strong.
The Chair now recognizes the Congresswoman from California,
Ms. Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for--all of
our witnesses for testifying.
We have heard a lot about this backlog and I kind of want
to drill down on it a little bit more. I think we're all very
concerned about the backlog, making sure we get Taiwan what it
needs.
But I think it's important to be clear exactly where this
backlog is coming from. You know, DAS Resnick, as you said,
these sales pass through the State Department within a matter
of days, and, Dr. Ratner, as you said, one of the primary
issues is that the industry is moving too slow.
You know, one of the things that's really frustrating to me
is that when we talk to industry about this we hear time and
again that what they need is a demand signal. But I think it's
very clear that they have this demand signal and they have had
for years for a lot of these weapons that Taiwan is in line to
get.
And, you know, I think it'd be helpful, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Resnick, if you could expand on what both you and Dr.
Ratner have hinted about and really what is needed from the
industry to address this backlog and how Congress can help make
this happen.
Ms. Resnick. Thank you so much for that--for that question
and for really drilling down on what is needed from industry.
It is true that industry needs a demand signal. They have a
fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders. We live in a
capitalist society. That is--that is truly important.
We believe that we have sent that demand signal and working
with industry to be able to open new production lines, to be
able to find ways to have either more hours for workers to be
producing what we need.
We have seen that with respect to F-16s, we have seen that
with respect to Javelins, that industry is putting some of
their own money. This needs to be widespread and this is a
point that our very senior leadership has made to industry
about what is needed from them now.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And, Dr. Ratner, could you talk
about how your department is working with industry to address
this backlog?
Dr. Ratner. Yeah, absolutely, and we are likewise engaging
with industry to try to understand how we can accelerate some
of these timelines.
We have had, as I mentioned, an FMS Tiger Team within the
Department to look at this same set of issues, recommended
embracing within the Department a more data-driven approach
which would inform our engagement with industry again and more
senior level attention to this matter as well among other
issues.
But I think the consistent demand signal and the health of
the defense industrial base, at the end of the day, is where
we're going to see improvements here. The process issues are
really important and we're focused on those.
But ultimately the strength and health of the U.S. defense
industrial base is going to be the key variable.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
And I just want to emphasize that. We need the defense
industrial base to step up themselves. They are part of our
national security and they benefit from our national security,
and I think especially when it comes to these specific weapons
we're talking about for Taiwan the demand signal has been there
for many, many years and the fact that they haven't made the
investments to me is, frankly, neglectful.
Really quickly, I just want to go to other assistance we
could be giving Taiwan. We have talked a lot about the lethal
assistance.
But, Dr. Ratner, in your testimony, you also talked about
supporting the integration of Taiwan's military and civilian
agencies on a range of issues like food, medical supplies,
energy, infrastructure.
Can you elaborate more on what this sort of nonlethal
assistance looks like and how your department and the State
Department work together to make sure that this is all
integrated?
Dr. Ratner. Absolutely, and would be happy to provide much
more detail in a classified setting. What I would say is one of
the elements that is widely recognized as important for Taiwan
is to have defense in depth, and as General McGee described
earlier, the difficulties of actually invading the island--the
defense of the island itself is incredibly important and
therein the integration between Taiwan's civilian agencies and
its military is a really important piece of that as well as
some of the institutional reforms that I described earlier as
it relates to reserve reform and others.
So there's absolutely a broad-based set of engagements
around these issues and I'd be happy to discuss them in more
detail in another setting.
Ms. Resnick. I can--I can speak to a little bit although
it's a little bit outside of my purview. We're working closely
with Taiwan's interagency to respond effectively in a crisis
and build societal resilience. That includes ensuring
sufficient water, energy, food, other critical resources to
build preparedness.
We're also working to support Taiwan's energy security,
encouraging Taiwan's regulatory bodies to require a larger
emergency energy stockpile, to modernize its grid. Taiwan
currently imports 98 percent of its energy resources and so
we're looking to help Taiwan to accelerate their deployment of
renewable energy.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. I yield back.
Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you, Ms. Jacobs.
The Chair now recognizes the Congressman from Guam, Mr.
Moylan.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the
witnesses.
As Guam's sole Member of Congress, this hearing is uniquely
important to me. Many of the analysts who predict that China
will invade Taiwan in the coming years also predict that China
will launch preemptive strikes on Guam.
To protect my home I must advocate for stabilizing policies
in the region and for an effective deterrence against CCP
aggression.
So my first question, Major General McGee and Assistant
Secretary Ratner, I've been an advocate for Guam missile
defense because the safety of my constituents is my focus. In
line with unfunded priority requests from the U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command, I was able to increase funding levels for Guam missile
defense in the House-passed NDAA.
As I continue these efforts I would like to ask what role a
robust missile defense of Guam plays in deterring Chinese
aggression against Taiwan?
Dr. Ratner. Well, Congressman, let me start off just by
saying that as administration documents like the Missile
Defense Review have made clear, Guam is part of the United
States and any missile attack on Guam or any other U.S.
territory would be met with an appropriate response.
That is in part why the Department is requesting $1.8
billion in the fiscal year 2024 budget for the defense of Guam.
This investment builds off of the $892 million appropriated by
Congress in fiscal year 2023 so nearly a 100 percent increase,
and the Department's efforts include active missile defenses,
enhanced regional deterrence and defense posture, ally and
partner assurance measures and increased readiness for all the
reasons that you describe.
General McGee. And, sir, from the joint force perspective,
certainly we have taken the lessons learned from Ukraine and
are applying it to the way that we provide a comprehensive air
defense against all threats and, of course, we have now seen it
coming from multiples.
It's not just--you know, it comes at every altitude from
drones all the way up to missiles. And so we are learning
tremendous amounts by watching that conflict and I think we are
continuing to get better at that.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you.
Ms. Resnick, I believe the strong relationship with our
regional partners is a path towards stability in East Asia.
Given the proximity to Taiwan and deep cultural ties to the
United States, one extremely important partnership is the
Philippines.
In 2020 the Quad Plus dialogues included attendees such as
Israel, Brazil, Vietnam, and New Zealand alongside with the
usual Quad members. We have the Philippines.
Why have the Philippines not been included in the Quad Plus
dialogues and when will the State Department begin to include
such an important regional ally in our multilateral
discussions?
Ms. Resnick. The Philippines remains a very important
partner to the United States. I will let Dr. Ratner discuss a
little bit about our EDCA [Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement] announcements.
But let me just say that in recent years we have included
the Philippines in a number of regional engagements. We have
also boosted our investment in security in the Philippines
through Foreign Military Financing and we have launched a
Philippine security sector assistance roadmap with the
Philippines this year to be able to understand the threats that
the Philippines faces, how those interact with our--so
understanding the mutual threats and so that we can work
together to build a more effective security assistance
framework for both countries.
Dr. Ratner. I would just say strengthening and revitalizing
our alliance with the Philippines has been one of the most
important advances and achievements of this administration.
We have over the last year announced new EDCA sites, the
agreement that we have with the Philippines for U.S. access to
Philippine facilities.
As you know, we don't have permanent forces or bases there
but we do have access to their sites under a decade-old
agreement and we have increased the breadth of those sites over
the past years to more strategic locations.
We have also renewed bilateral maritime activity in the
waters around the Philippines, which was an incredibly
important development in terms of strengthening deterrence in
the region, and we are integrating them with our closest allies
and partners.
I would just note that at the Shangri-La Dialogue this past
year for the first time ever we held a defense ministerial
between the defense ministers from the United States,
Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, and this kind of
networking among our allies and partners we believe is really
important to the progress we're making toward our common vision
for a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mrs. Chairwoman. Madam Chair, thank
you very much.
Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you, Mr. Moylan.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Tokuda.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Madam Chair.
You know, over the past few years we have seen a
significant increase in bills and resolutions introduced here
in Congress that would in some form or another politically and
diplomatically elevate Taiwan's status.
Unsurprisingly, the PRC has strongly protested these
symbolic gestures as deeply destabilizing and threatening to
the basic framework that the ``One China'' policy provides.
There's also been some public commentary from experts about
the risk posed by these types of symbolic gestures to Taiwan's
security.
For example, a recent Council on Foreign Relations task
force recommended that the U.S. should avoid symbolic political
and diplomatic gestures that provoke a Chinese response but do
not meaningfully improve Taiwan's defense capabilities,
resilience, or economic competitiveness.
Ms. Resnick, how does the PRC interpret or perceive
congressional initiatives that are symbolic in nature that
suggest an elevation of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship into
formal relations and how do these symbolic gestures affect
diplomatic efforts between the administration and the PRC as
well?
Ms. Resnick. What we are focused on is improving Taiwan's
self-defense capabilities. Symbols of sovereignty are one way
that we can do that but we don't think that that is the most
effective way for us to be able to do that.
So we would focus more on those areas that provide Taiwan
with real security and not symbolic security.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you.
Major General McGee, how has the PRC used such symbolic
gestures to escalate tensions, further alter the status quo in
cross-strait relations? How would you assess the impact of
these symbolic gestures on deterring PRC aggression overall?
General McGee. I'd like to defer to my Policy friend who
may have a better insight on that piece, frankly.
Dr. Ratner. Look, maybe what I'll say here is part of the
reason why this matters is because as we have spoken about at
the hearing today, what we see is a trend of growing
international attention among the international community to
this issue, and the more countries around the world are
committed to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait the less
likely it is for Beijing to initiate military action because
they understand what the repercussions would be on the
international stage.
As part of that, it is really important that the region see
who the aggressor is here and who the one is here that is
precipitating conflict and coercion. And therefore what we see
is day-to-day PRC military, economic, political pressure
against Taiwan and it's important that Taiwan itself but also
the United States is not taking political actions that the
Indo-Pacific region and the world see as leading to heightening
tensions.
So I thought the prompt of your question was really well
put and support everything you said there.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you.
Maybe to take it to a slightly different direction, looking
at our forward posture in the Western Pacific, I believe both
Dr. Ratner and Major General McGee's written testimony
emphasizes the importance of a forward leaning U.S. force in
the Western Pacific and a rigorous campaigning as part of our
efforts to deter aggression against Taiwan and our allies and
partners in the region.
Dr. Ratner, perhaps this question is for you. As you know,
we have addressed significant challenges with military
infrastructure needs in Hawaii, where I am from, and that left
unaddressed could complicate our ability to support and sustain
increased efforts in our forward posture and campaigning in the
Western Pacific.
In your assessment, how important is it to your work and
reassuring our allies and partners in the region that we invest
in sustaining and upgrading our military infrastructure?
Dr. Ratner. Our forward posture and presence in the region,
including in Hawaii, is fundamentally important to our defense
position in the region. It's fundamentally important to
deterrence and it's an area where this administration has been
incredibly focused and, frankly, made really historic advances
over the past year.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you. And, you know, as you know, Dr.
Ratner, we are close to finalizing renegotiations of the
Compacts of Free Association [COFA] with Palau, the Marshall
Islands, and Micronesia.
How critical is it that Congress expeditiously approve
these agreements in terms of our forward posture in the Western
Pacific? And as we approach the end of the fiscal year why is
it so important that Congress provide funding for these
countries under a continuing resolution?
You know, if we fail to act do we actually provide the PRC
with a window of opportunity, even a temporary one, to fill the
void and complicate a very strategic relationship?
Dr. Ratner. I would just say the compact states in the COFA
agreement is incredibly important for our position in the
region, as you described, and we look forward to working with
Congress to find a solution to sustain those agreements.
Ms. Tokuda. And, clearly, funding and support for this now
and going forward is absolutely critical to maintain the
relationship and not provide the PRC with any opportunity to
come and fill the gap.
Dr. Ratner. Absolutely.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you, Ms. Tokuda.
The Chair now recognizes the Congressman from Texas, Mr.
Fallon.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Xi Jinping has repeatedly and publicly stated that he's
willing to use force to unify China and bring Taiwan, as he
says, back under control in one nation.
I find that comment interesting because the Communist
Chinese have never ruled in Taiwan and I just think that's a
historical note to mention.
He's called it a natural requirement and for them to be
reunited and stating that the use of force is their policy,
preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan by force if
perceived as necessary by Beijing.
And then former INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command]
commander Admiral Philip Davidson stated in 2021 when talking
about China's potential for invading Taiwan said, and I quote,
``I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact,
in the next 6 years,'' and that means, of course, by 2027.
While nobody wants war what is the best way to prevent it?
And, you know, you have to take great care when you talk
about--when you use comparisons to the Nazis or Hitler and
things like that because it's, you know, overused.
But I think it is instructive to listen to what dictators
say. In January of 1939, Hitler gave a speech and he outlined
two goals. He wanted war and he wanted to annihilate the Jewish
race in Europe. And then, of course, in September of that year
he went ahead and tried to accomplish both objectives.
And then in 2021 in July, Vladimir Putin released an essay
and it was on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians,
and he went on to say essentially that they're not like
brothers; they share the same soul. Which, of course, is rather
chilling.
And then 7 months later he claimed he was going to liberate
and de-Nazify Ukraine. So I want to offer these examples not
to, of course, stoke fears but to illustrate that we need to
listen to what dictators are saying, and we can all hope for
the best but we need to prepare for the worst and I'm a little
afraid that we're not necessarily maybe preparing for the
worst.
Dr. Ratner, if you could, and I'm being not facetious here
but serious, I don't know what the Biden administration policy
is vis-a-vis Taiwan and a potential Chinese attack. Will we
defend Taiwan if attacked? Is that the policy?
Dr. Ratner. The policy, Congressman, is one of strategic
ambiguity----
Mr. Fallon. Okay.
Dr. Ratner [continuing]. And has been for decades and we
believe that remains most important to maintain that status quo
in our policy. We are clear-eyed about the PRC threat.
Mr. Fallon. And I apologize. I don't mean to interrupt you
but we just have a very limited time and I wanted to get to
your point and your answer about strategic ambiguity.
I think that was an okay policy when China didn't have the
capability to invade Taiwan successfully, which, clearly, years
ago they had not the capability to do so.
They have it now. So I would argue that--well, let me ask
you this question. Is--do you think Xi Jinping is more likely
than not to invade Taiwan if there were two circumstances: if
the United States President, whoever it was, said we will
defend Taiwan--that's scenario A--if attacked by the Chinese
Communists, or we maintain strategic ambiguity. Which--if you
are sitting in a think tank or you're in the war room at the
White House what do you think is more likely?
Dr. Ratner. I think the effects of changing our policy to
one of strategic clarity away from strategic ambiguity would
not strengthen deterrence by the United States. I think it
would increase political tensions and make conflict more likely
and I think it would cause us to lose the support of our allies
and partners as we described earlier.
Mr. Fallon. I mean, I respectfully disagree. I think you
have to do it in the right way. We're not saying--we're not
really changing the political policy at all. We're not saying
that we support Chinese--or Taiwanese independence, because I
do think what you just said that would exacerbate the issue.
All we're saying is if China uses force then we'll defend
Taiwan. I would argue that it's going to increase deterrence
because deterrence works. We know what dictators and
authoritarians do. They avoid strength and they attack
weakness.
If they--if he thinks he can grab it--let me ask you this.
If Xi thought he could grab Taiwan, have 6 months maybe of
economic sanctions, and then the world--much like Crimea
happened with Putin, do you think he'd do it?
Dr. Ratner. When we think about deterrence what we think
about is ensuring that he does not believe he could exact
aggression against Taiwan at acceptable cost.
Mr. Fallon. So do you--but do you think then if he did what
Putin did--Putin successfully grabbed Crimea. I think we'd all
agree with that. Do you think if Xi could follow that model he
would do it?
Dr. Ratner. I guess it depends what you mean by the Putin
model. If Xi Jinping believed by invading----
Mr. Fallon. The world, largely, forgot about what happened.
I mean, we normalized in 6-12 months and everybody went back to
the way they were living. That's what I mean.
Dr. Ratner. Look, I don't want to get into hypotheticals.
What I would say is I understand the questions that you're
asking and it is at the heart of how we think about deterrence
and ensuring that Xi Jinping does not believe he can do that at
acceptable cost. And we think today that is the case and that's
why we say deterrence is real and strong and that's why we say
we do not think an invasion is imminent or inevitable and we
are doing more than ever to keep it that way.
Mr. Fallon. I'm afraid that----
Mrs. Kiggans. The Congressman's time has expired.
Mr. Fallon. Yeah. I'm afraid that he may think in very
short order that it is acceptable.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mrs. Kiggans. The Chair now--the Chair now recognizes the
Congresswoman from Virginia, Congresswoman McClellan.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the
witnesses for being here today.
A key support mechanism for our military alliances in the
Pacific is a robust diplomatic presence. Yet, we face the very
real prospect of severe cuts to the State and foreign
operations budget that funds the State Department, USAID [U.S.
Agency for International Development], and other diplomatic
programs.
How would significant cuts to the international affairs
budget complicate efforts to maintain alliances and ensure we
are able to present a united front against political aggression
by the Chinese government against Taiwan?
Ms. Resnick. Congresswoman, thank you for the question.
We have used the diplomatic budget effectively throughout
the Indo-Pacific to be able to shore up alliances and
partnerships where it comes to reimagining our alliances and
partnerships with Japan, with Vietnam, with Korea, with Taiwan
of course, with the Philippines.
If the--if there are cuts to the State foreign ops
[operations] budget--and I can speak from the perspective of
the IMET [International Military Education and Training]
account, our peacekeeping operations account, and our Foreign
Military Financing--because these budgets are so heavily
earmarked we have very little flexibility. If there were cuts
what we would have to do is look at anything that isn't
earmarked and put it on the cutting room floor.
And there is no earmark for Taiwan. There are--there are
very few earmarks in the Indo-Pacific. And so we would be
looking at keeping status quo, which is that 70 percent of the
FMF budget is in the Middle East. We are--we cannot afford to
do that.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you. Secretary Ratner or Secretary
Resnick, the United States, Japan, and South Korea recently
concluded a summit that made progress on a number of fronts to
expand trilateral collaboration.
Can you elaborate on how we are expanding collaboration
with our trilateral allies, particularly the joint military
industrial base capacity expansion and specialization, and what
areas we are looking to further expand coordination in the
future?
Dr. Ratner. Sure. I'm happy to start, to say that the
leader-level meeting that President Biden hosted at Camp David
truly was historic in terms of bringing together two of our
closest allies around the world, Japan and South Korea, and I
think there's no question that all three of those countries are
more secure when we are all working more closely together.
During that summit there were two particular announcements
that were made as it relates to military cooperation. One was
to advance a program on data sharing for early missile warning
data between the three countries, particularly related to the
North Korea threat.
We're making progress on that and hope to have that in
place by the end of this calendar year. And, secondarily, in
addition, to be developing a more regularized program of
trilateral military exercises and cooperation.
That's also under development and we think this is a really
positive trend and it's one that is not just happening in
Northeast Asia. I should say that we are working increasingly
in combination with our allies and partners. Japan, Australia,
and the United States also as a trilateral configuration are
engaging in new and unprecedented forms of military cooperation
and we think this is really important for deterrence and for
regional security.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you.
One of the alarming but not unexpected dynamics of Russia's
war with Ukraine has been the tendency of African nations to
remain uninvolved or continue to engage with Russia despite its
gruesome war crimes, which I would characterize as colonial
war--a colonial war of aggression.
Would we expect a similar dynamic to play out in a Chinese
invasion of Taiwan and how are we working to increase
engagement with our African partners that would make them less
likely to side with China or continue to treat China normally
should it move aggressively toward Taiwan?
Ms. Resnick. Thanks for that question, and this is
something that we work on every day globally but including in
Africa to make the case for the rules-based international order
and how Africa especially can benefit from it.
We have a lot of work to do here, and especially in the
context of Wagner operations in Africa we have a lot of work to
do in order to remain competitive.
That is something that we have started in a number of
countries and we're happy to come back and brief you in a
different environment. We understand that there are some
lessons learned from these kind of conversations that could
apply in a Taiwan scenario and we'll continue to work those
relationships.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you. I yield back.
Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the
Congressman from Georgia, Dr. McCormick.
Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Ms. Chair.
Thank you to the witnesses for coming here today and
testifying.
I think everybody in this room agrees that Taiwan is
extremely important to us strategically. It's the linchpin of
the first island of the chain and as for now we obviously have
a lot of critical things going on in the area.
I'm worried about the technologies that it contains as far
as we really maintain the leader in AI [artificial
intelligence] and industry but where the AI chips are produced
is an island that entirely produces 100 percent of our AI
chips.
My concern is if China does what it says it's going to do--
and I'll take them for the face of their word--by 2027 and we
don't have a plan up here to take over that, what
capabilities--and I'll direct this to, you Major General
McGee--what capabilities or what kind of agreement do we have
with the Taiwanese in denying Chinese access to that AI
production in the case of an invasion or our access to that
same production, because without AI, of course, being the
leading technology of our day--matter of fact, of any day--that
will affect our economy and our--and our ability to produce the
next leading edge of technology?
How do we keep them from accessing or obtaining that and
keeping us from denying that access?
General McGee. Sir, I appreciate that question.
I think export control, though, might be more of a
Department of State question.
Dr. McCormick. I'm actually talking in the case of an
invasion. So actually a war. If they do what they say, by force
try to take Taiwan--and you can defer this question but it goes
back to a conflict where Taiwan and China are in a conflict,
how do we maintain our access to a hard-value asset which we
cannot produce ourselves and we're 2 years away from it even if
we do groundbreaking now, and how do we deny the Chinese from
obtaining that same hard asset in a time of war?
Dr. Ratner. I'd be happy to discuss that in another setting
but would say, of course, the broader question of how do we
maintain our advantages in peacetime and then how do we
maintain resilience or build resilience into crisis and
conflict is something we absolutely are looking at in terms of
trying to increase our supply chain resiliency of our defense
industrial base and support programs with domestic and
alternative materials as well as innovative manufacturing.
So you're identifying an important challenge and we're
laser focused on it and would be happy to follow up in a
different setting.
Dr. McCormick. Okay. So we'll put the war stuff on the--on
the table because I get that. I'm a military guy. So let's talk
peacetime.
One of the things I think is great maybe in a sort of
strange way is the Arunachal Pradesh region of India, which is
disputed by China, which has about 300,000 troops on the border
there disputing that. That's just per side.
So you have 600,000 troops right there in that region,
which I think they have to rotate every 3 months or so because
the altitude is so high, which is a great deterrence when you
talk about what China has to face in that region, which I think
is great to have great strategic allies in the area.
When we talk about deterrence, obviously, we did a horrible
job of deterring Russia from invading Ukraine. We knew--he had
talked about it. Nobody took it at face value. Then he did it.
We didn't do a good job. We weren't strong enough to deter them
from doing that.
What are we doing deterrence wise other than saying we're
investing in the military, we have great training, we have
great assets. But what are we doing to truly make it--make
China think second thoughts other than supporting Ukraine,
which I think is a great deterrent, saying, you know, we are
committed to our friends.
But what other things are we bringing to the table that
make China go, I really don't want any part of that, rather
than what we just discussed where we can't really give a good
answer as far as what do we do when they actually invade?
Dr. Ratner. Maybe I'll start and ask General McGee to build
upon the question.
I mean, look, we have a National Defense Strategy that has
informed a budget, that is focused on the capabilities that we
need to deter and prevail, if necessary, against the PRC, for
the first time a strategy focused on the PRC as the primary
challenge and our budget request reflects that.
So we are investing in the capabilities we need. Joint
Staff has been working very concertedly on the joint
warfighting concept and operational concepts that would--that
are designed to overcome operational problems that the PRC is
trying to present.
So it's capabilities and concepts. We are building out our
forward defense perimeter in the Indo-Pacific and have made
really important gains over the last year in Japan, in the
Philippines, in Australia, in Papua New Guinea such that we are
forward in the region and we are strengthening our alliances
and partnerships including in ways that are relevant to
potential China-related contingencies----
Dr. McCormick. And I know I'm out of time so I'll just
reinforce how important the Quad is, how important our
alliances and strategic alliance there and also our investment
in the area not just in what we do because we don't like
nuclear powers to go against each other but investment in other
strategically important allies in the region. That's why we do
what we do.
Thank you. With that I yield.
Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the Congresswoman from New Jersey,
Ms. Sherrill.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
First, I want to thank all of you for your hard work during
these really troubling times as we face a variety of complex
pressures around the world.
As a member of the Select Committee on Strategic
Competition with the Chinese Communist Party we know that
sufficient basing, supply chains, logistics efforts in the
INDOPACOM are critically important but also the role of
ensuring that economic factors at play are another critical and
sometimes as important role as we, the CCP, and our global
partners react to the Taiwanese contingency.
So I secured in this year's NDAA an amendment to have DOD
analyze where they can better partner with the Commerce
Department so we can ensure that economic and business factors
are thought of as we game plan our Indo-Pacific efforts and
assess consequences of our actions.
To each of you can, you give a quick overview of your
current efforts with Commerce and where you might see further
partnerships?
Ms. Resnick. I can say that from a State Department
perspective one of the things that we work on--and again, this
is a little bit outside of my area in the Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs--but we work on responding to economic
coercion and we work with the interagency on doing that.
That is both in the--in the Russia context and in the PRC
context, conducting tabletop exercises with respect to economic
coercion and making sure that we're able to shore up our allies
and partners if they are victims of that kind of economic
coercion.
Dr. Ratner. And the Department of Defense works closely
with Commerce as well as Treasury and other economic agencies
at the intersection of military and economic affairs.
We have worked closely with them on export controls that
are related to technology competition with the PRC relevant to
PLA modernization. We worked with the Commerce Department and,
of course, the Treasury Department on the new policy on
outbound investment screening and the Executive order on that
new process, and we continue to work with the Commerce
Department as well as interagency partners on potential
response options for both crisis and conflict.
So we see them as an integral partner in these scenarios
and are continuing to work with them closely.
General McGee. Ma'am, as you know, this is a complicated
and challenging problem and it needs a whole-of-government
approach.
As a member--you know, as the Joint Staff we are fully
engaged in the interagency process and we know that Commerce
always has a really important role and a voice in all of those
discussions and follow-on actions.
Ms. Sherrill. Well, I'm heartened to hear your responses
because, as you know, we work a lot on the Armed Services
Committee to make sure that we are implementing all the
deterrent military capabilities we can but, of course, the
economic piece is a critical part of that deterrence as well.
And as we go forward how can we as a nation with our
critical partner in Taiwan continue to improve interoperability
with the Taiwanese? What additional resources can Congress
provide to ensure we effectively strengthen our relationship
to, again, bolster deterrence?
General McGee. I think Congress has taken great steps to
help increase the military assistance with the Presidential
authorization.
I think, as we mentioned here, an appropriation would be--
would be tremendously helpful with that as well as opposed to
just an authorization.And I think--as I mentioned earlier, I
think where assistance can be provided to help with Taiwan is
their concept of a joint defense in order to defend that island
nation from an air threat, a sea threat, cyber and space and
that's complicated and difficult within military operations and
I think that's an area of potential great assistance.
Ms. Resnick. From a State Department perspective we agree
that fully funding the Taiwan Enhanced Resiliency Act for
Foreign Military Financing would be really useful. That would
allow things to get on contract more quickly but in the
meantime to provide an interim solution as we wait for industry
to provide Taiwan with what it needs.
Having backfill--just to reiterate Dr. Ratner's point,
having backfill--appropriating backfill for Presidential
drawdown authority to allow the Defense Department to take from
its own stocks, that provides the interim solution until
industry is able to provide something to Taiwan.
Ms. Sherrill. Well, thank you all again, and can I say
thank you as well to the State Department for coming to this
hearing. We don't always have you here and hearing from sort of
the whole of government is very, very helpful.
So thank you again. I appreciate it.
Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the
Congressman from Florida, Mr. Mills.
Mr. Mills. Thank you so much, Ms. Chair.
I want to start out by going to a question that was posed
moments ago, Ms. Resnick, with regards to the approval process.
As you know, the DDTC [Directorate of Defense Trade Controls]
has an actual DDTC response that you can track from your
submittals on a DSP-83 to a DSP-5 and I can tell you that your
comment that it's 48 hours an approval couldn't be further from
the truth.
I've watched where multiple times the DSP-5 was held up
within the DDTC and in some cases they are returned without
approval or returned without any type of response--negative or
positive--without any actual understanding of why, even when
the National Security Council and others have approved it.
I also noted that you said about wanting to put the blame
on industry. But the reality is--is that when there's no
confidence in industry that the approval is going to come out,
knowing the prolonged timeline in which we submit a proposal
which is supposed to get to the LCTA [lowest cost technically
acceptable] BAF--you know, BAFO [best and final offer], this
timeline could be a year, 2 years, which is why I've been very
much advocating on procurement reform to ensure that we could
also expedite these processes.
But again, the idea that it would take industry long to
purge lines to ensure that the previous contract didn't
actually have any overlapping materials to ensure that it was a
legitimate new cost doesn't take industry that long and I've
seen where they've done it.
They like to try and add that it costs more than it really
does--and I know how they fluff the things on this--and they
claim that they use GAAP, our generally accepted accounting
principles, but we know how that's been abused.
But I want to go back to outcome, not process. The OEM
[original equipment manufacturer] for F-16 parts--and we know
we just had, roughly, 103 Chinese aircraft that had basically
incurred a little bit of that on the line, kind of preemptive
response that allowed the Taiwanese having to spin up--every
time they cycle that aircraft for the F-16 that leads to a
closer point in which they're actually going to say, okay,
well, last time that we did this exercise we saw a 10 percent
increase in how many people responded than now.
That must mean that they don't have the necessary part. So
it gives the Chinese also an intelligence capability to gather
whether or not we're responding in a timely manner and whether
or not that their ability to ramp up to be able to deter this
so, again, providing very strategic military information.
What can we do to increase the approvals? Not the amount of
funding, not whether it's an FMS, FMF, or a DCS [direct
commercial sales] contract, which is even better for the United
States economy, but to speed up the actual process?
Because I can tell you, ma'am, it is not 48-hour approvals.
Ms. Resnick. First of all, Mr. Mills, thank you for your
leadership on this and for bringing up these very important
issues.
Highly advanced defense articles, as you know, must go
through an interagency clearance process that the Directorate
of Defense Trade Controls manages. So that goes through several
different stakeholders in the Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs.
It also goes through other stakeholders within this--within
the State Department and within DOD, within the Pentagon. We
are expediting arms sales to Taiwan as quickly as possible. We
approve--as I said, we approve most FMS cases to Taiwan within
48 hours. Those are the items that are under congressional
threshold.
Industrial production capacity and not State's review
process is what is holding us back at this point. With respect
to DDTC timelines, I understand that they may be different than
FMS timelines and you probably know best.
But understanding from an outcome perspective what we are
trying to do here is improve those timelines regardless of
where the choke points are.
Mr. Mills. Well, I can tell you that I'm committed to try
and work with you, your team, the DDTC to ensure that we
actually do get the necessary reforms to support industry and
support upcoming response.
You know, having run in multiple, you know, defense
companies in my past I can tell you my experience, whether it
was with a DSP-5, DSP-83, dealing with ATF [Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives] Form 249s, you name it. We
know the over-regulations.
But I do want to ensure that we're able to respond and I
want to comment on something that some of my colleagues have
talked about. They keep talking about the--how we handle
Ukraine determines the outcome of Taiwan and I slightly
disagree with this. And I disagree with this because what we
don't recognize is the non-kinetic economic and resource supply
chain capabilities that China has really tried to bolster in an
effort to try and prevent America from having. You know, the
Belt and Road Initiative is a good point where they try to look
at Eurasian expansion.
They look at the domination of Africa and Oceania to cut
off Western Hemisphere's supply chain while simultaneously
utilizing OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries], WHO [World Health Organization], WF, and others as
a way to attack the U.S. dollar as a global currency and we
have seen this. So we're not focusing in enough, in my opinion,
on the non-kinetic elements of influence, messaging, as well as
for the economic warfare of things.
So it's troubling when Joe Biden at the G-20 summit talks
about how much he wants China's economy to grow while not
giving a whole lot of confidence to our abilities to support
developing nations.
And my final thing--and I know I'm out of time, Madam
Chair--but my final thing is that we kept saying that we don't
want to send the message that we're being unreliable. We lost
that fight 2 years ago when we walked out of Afghanistan.
With that, I yield back.
Mrs. Kiggans. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the Congressman from Texas, Mr.
Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Madam Chair, thank you very much, and I want to
thank the panel for being here today.
I wanted to ask about--given Xi's statements about
reunification with Taiwan, how should we interpret the CCP's
commitment to peaceful reunification while also not renouncing
the use of force, and I was hoping that you all had an
assessment on those statements that he made.
Dr. Ratner. I would just say I think what he has stated is
fairly clear. I think there would be a--there's a preference
for peaceful unification but the PRC has not renounced its
willingness to use force to achieve that aim if it deems
necessary and if it believes it can do so at acceptable cost.
Mr. Veasey. And also, how does the Department of Defense
assess the progress of the People's Liberation Army
modernization program as outlined in the China military power
report and its implications for Taiwan?
General.
General McGee. I think we have seen an expansion of their
capabilities, really sort of a broad base. We think many of
those capabilities would enhance their ability to launch a
cross-strait invasion.
But that does not mean that would be an easy operational
challenge. I still want to highlight the significant
operational difficulties for China to be able to conduct that
operation.
Mr. Veasey. I know that CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]
Director Burns mentioned that Xi instructed the PLA to be ready
for a successful invasion by 2027 and I wanted to sort of
couple that with something that happened back in the 1990s
under President Clinton's administration, the third Taiwan
Strait crisis.
I know that that particular incident that took place back
in the 1990s--that that was a really big influence, you know,
on the Chinese as far as the way that they see themselves
projected in the region as far as ocean power was concerned.
Could you sort of talk a little bit about the significance
of that and how maybe that plays a role in how the Chinese
think today?
Dr. Ratner. Look, I think what I would say without getting
into their own psychology--what I would say is that we are
clear-eyed about the PRC challenge. The National Defense
Strategy identifies the PRC as the Department's top pacing
challenge and the National Security Strategy describes the PRC
as the only country with the will and increasingly the
capability to refashion the international community or the
international order in line with its authoritarian ambitions.
So we are aware of what their preferences are, what they're
trying to achieve. However, what we are trying to do is ensure
that they cannot achieve those aims at acceptable cost.
Mr. Veasey. I also wanted to ask you, we know that the
Chinese have been, you know, vehemently opposed to any sort of
upgrades on F-16s or new F-16s there to Taiwan. If there were
an invasion how helpful would F-16s actually be for Taiwan?
Would they--would they play a significant role? I mean,
obviously, the--you know, the Chinese military operation is
much more larger and much more expanse than that of the
Taiwanese.
Would those planes be a help to the--to Taiwan,
particularly when there's a new generation of plane out?
Ms. Resnick. We have notified a number of cases during this
administration to support Taiwan's F-16 program, which we
understand is very useful in defending Taiwan's airspace,
particularly with some of the gray zone activities.
I can say that this is something that we will continue to
support and we understand that Taiwan finds their F-16s
valuable.
Mr. Veasey. Okay. Well, thank you very much.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you very much, and I just wanted to
thank our witnesses for taking time. I know--I know you've been
here for a good portion of your day. So we're going to wrap up
this committee meeting. I just have a few last questions for
you guys.
So I had the privilege of traveling with Congressman
Wittman last month to Southeast Asia. We went to Japan, the
Philippines, and to Taiwan and could see kind of up close just
what is going on in that part of the world.
One of the places we went was to Kadena Air Base and the
complaints we heard were about infrastructure and their
inability to continue to do their very tip of the spear mission
without some infrastructure improvements and some quality of
life upgrades. Also talking to the Marines in Okinawa just
about housing.
I know that we're challenged in even the health care
department. We're having our military members and their
families being seen off base.
So we also learned, though, that our allied countries they
are very invested in our partnership so we know that Japan is
putting in 2 percent of their GDP [gross domestic product], the
highest ever, into their defense budget. We know that Taiwan's
is about 2.7 percent, I think, of their GDP. So we're seeing
them put their money where their mouths are.
So I guess my ask and my request is are we also asking them
to invest in some infrastructure for us in our base. We're
happy to be there and happy to partner and be allies with our
friends but we need some assistance here. Our defense budget is
already challenged.
Those are parts of the world that don't have
representatives that can fight for some of their base needs and
infrastructure needs. So is that--is that in the works? Are our
allies willing partners in helping in our military investment?
Dr. Ratner. Well, thank you for all of those comments. I
was actually just yesterday engaging with General Rupp,
commander of U.S. Forces Japan, and General Sklenka, the deputy
commander out at INDOPACOM, on quality-of-life issues
associated with our forces in Japan.
It's incredibly important for the Department and the
Secretary and we will continue to do whatever we can to address
some of those issues that you described.
I have also been encouraged, as you have, by the approach
that our allies and partners have taken. You mentioned Taiwan
increasing its defense budget. We're very encouraged by that.
We have seen Japan set on course to double its defense
budget over the next 5 years. The Philippines is also investing
in new ways and the Australians absolutely investing in their
own military, and we think that's important for their own
contributions to regional security.
It increases their ability to contribute to our alliance in
new ways as we think about integrating them in roles and
missions, and in a number of instances they are also
contributing to infrastructure and supporting our forward
presence.
So we think that's really important and I think the role of
our allies and partners is key to our success here.
Mrs. Kiggans. Good. I just ask that we continue to
prioritize that as well in addition to warfighting.
And then another question posed to us in Japan was the
issue of ship repair, and I represent a district that has a
large ship repair industry in Virginia and that often complains
they don't have enough business and they--you know, it's a lot
of factors.
We have not enough ships. I wish we had more. But the
Japanese want to be more involved. I want to make sure we're
repairing ships, you know, as quickly as possible. You know,
God forbid, there's a conflict we're going to need to repair
ships closer to where the action is.
So how can we ensure that we're being protective of our
ship repair industry while prioritizing the speed and just
capabilities we have in Southeast Asia and being inclusive of
Japan?
Dr. Ratner. I'm happy to take that question for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 81.]
Dr. Ratner. I understand there's a lot of factors here
including some of the domestic factors and getting that balance
right about our own domestic industrial capability here
associated with ship repair while also thinking about what
contributions our allies and partners can make and what the
operational requirements might be is a really important
question.
I understand there are conversations underway now between
the administration and Congress about some of these issues and
look forward to engaging on them, going forward.
Mrs. Kiggans. Okay. Good. Thank you. And then they also
brought up the issue of cognitive warfare and we were there
during Fukushima when they were--there was some environmental
groups and there was some interference from China.
They had a lot of bad press. They utilize cyber technology,
the media, to be influential to the Japanese people, which
right now are overwhelmingly supportive of our alliance and our
relationship--the relationship we have with Japan.
But just thinking forward, you know, are we cooperating and
being supportive of them on that cognitive warfare front as
well? I think it's an important thing that we sometimes
overlook, but just wanted to hear how we're prioritizing that,
too.
Dr. Ratner. Congresswoman, we are throughout the region
including in Japan and we do--I think what you've described is
a really good example of what we see throughout the Indo-
Pacific in terms of PRC propaganda and information operations
and disinformation.
We have seen it around the Fukushima issue. We have seen it
throughout Taiwan in a number of ways, in the Philippines as
well, in Australia and elsewhere, as the PRC is trying to
undermine our alliances and undermine the support for political
leaders who want to work with the United States.
We're working with these partners in terms of their own
cyber capabilities, their own cyber hygiene, as well as our own
demands, that we do as much as we can to be transparent about
the information we have about what the PRC is doing and we'll
continue to be focused on that.
Mrs. Kiggans. Good. Thank you very much. My time has
expired.
So I thank our witnesses for being here and our members for
their participation, and the committee now stands adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
September 19, 2023
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 19, 2023
=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
September 19, 2023
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Dr. Ratner. The Department is increasingly concerned about the
People's Republic of China's continued ``gray zone'' military activity
against Taiwan. These activities are destabilizing, increase the risk
of miscalculation, and undermine regional peace.
We continue to believe in the importance of investing in well-
integrated, asymmetric, whole-of-society defense that maintains and
improves Taiwan's readiness and capacity to respond to ``gray zone''
activities. [See page 25.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
Ms. Resnick. As of May 2023, Taiwan had access to interest rates
hovering around 1-2 percent domestically. Under the current FMF direct
loan authority, the Department is prohibited from offering an interest
rate on FMF loans that is lower than the prevailing interest rate on
marketable Treasury securities of similar maturity. Our rates would
only be competitive if the Department were authorized to offer an
interest rate below what Taiwan can access domestically. We have asked
for the authority to offer lower interest rates. [See page 26.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. KIGGANS
Dr. Ratner. The Department is focused on addressing challenges
facing our domestic ship repair industry through workforce development,
increased use of data analytics, and improvements in the supply chain
supporting public shipyards. Our activities with allies and partners in
the Indo-Pacific region do not adversely affect these efforts. [See
page 46.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 19, 2023
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. Which weapons systems would be best suited for the EDA
program and Taiwan's defense purposes?
Ms. Resnick. The only weapons that can be transferred under the
Excess Defense Articles program are those that have been determined by
the relevant military service to be excess to its needs. Those
determinations are made within the Department of Defense, and the State
Department is not involved in those decisions. Once weapons have been
declared excess, the State Department coordinates with relevant DOD
entities to gauge global demand, identify the recipient, and facilitate
the transfer, which may involve a Congressional Notification.
The interagency has, in close coordination with Taiwan
counterparts, identified a list of capabilities that Taiwan should
prioritize through defense trade or other means, including EDA. That
list includes cost-efficient, distributed, mobile, lethal, and
resilient capabilities that best support an asymmetric defense
strategy. This list, as required by Section 5502(e)(1) of the NDAA, was
provided to Congress on in May 2023. Some priority categories include,
but are not limited to, anti-ship missiles, command and control and
redundant communication systems, early warning radars, integrated air
and missile defense, and mobile artillery systems.
Mr. Wittman. How long does it take the US to provide weapons
systems to a recipient nation under the EDA program?
Ms. Resnick. The transfer time depends on numerous factors,
including the condition of the system, whether the system requires any
refurbishments or exportability modifications, the partner's ability to
absorb the equipment, and whether Congressional notification is
required. The timeline could be as short as several months or, in some
cases, span multiple years.
Mr. Wittman. Would the United States be able to complete an LCS EDA
request before President Tsai leaves office next Spring?
Ms. Resnick. Consistent with 10 USC 8677, a ship that is in excess
of 3,000 tons or less than 20 years old cannot be transferred without a
legislative enactment. As such, absent a change in the statutory
requirement, the process of approving and transferring such a ship to
Taiwan can only begin after the legislation is enacted. If such
legislation were enacted, a significant amount of time would still be
required to support the LCS' refurbishment needs and train the Taiwan
Navy on the new capability.
Mr. Wittman. Ms. Resnick, in recent years the PRC has increased
gray zone pressures including increased frequency and complex military
exercises in aircraft, manned and unmanned, flying closer to Taiwan
than in years past. Do you think there are steps Taiwan could take to
deter gray zone pressure?
Ms. Resnick. The PRC's continued provocative actions in the Taiwan
Strait are indicative of its unilateral attempts to change the status
quo, which has preserved global peace and stability for decades. The
PRC's activities include malicious cyber activity, disinformation
campaigns, economic coercion, and military exercises. Taiwan and the
United States must take all reasonable measures to strengthen Taiwan's
self-defense capabilities and bolster cross-Strait deterrence. To that
end, Taiwan's defense budget has significantly increased, and it is
acquiring advanced capabilities to better track and respond to PRC
military activity in the gray zone. In parallel, maritime security and
domain awareness have been prioritized within our bilateral security
cooperation efforts, and countering disinformation is a major focus of
our discussions. It is essential that Taiwan is prepared to respond to
a range of potential contingencies.
Mr. Wittman. General McGee, to what extent has the Department
worked with Taiwan to ensure resilient communications amongst the
Taiwanese people in the event of a catastrophic event? How is the
Department prioritizing telecommunications network security for Taiwan,
especially in light of the infrastructure concerns that came to light
on Guam?
General McGee. The Department continues to take steps to accelerate
and bolster Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, network, and
communications resilience. We are working with industry partners to
determine how best to partner with them in delivering capabilities to
Taiwan, to include areas for investment to increase production
capacity, bolster supply chains, and innovate procurement. We are also
reviewing resources and/or policy changes to speed up timelines.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
Mr. Banks. If the problem with arming Taiwan is that Congress
didn't appropriate funds for FMF grants last year, why did the Biden
administration refuse to call for any FMF grant funding for Taiwan in
its FY2024 budget request? Or draw down stocks via Presidential
Drawdown Authority?
Ms. Resnick. The FY 2024 Request includes $113 million in global
FMF to support emerging priorities, which could include Taiwan. In
addition, our pending supplemental request currently before Congress
requests $1 billion in FMF, a significant portion of which we intend to
provide to Taiwan. In FY 2023, the Secretary of State, under delegated
authority from the President, directed the drawdown of $345 million in
defense articles and services from DOD stocks via the Presidential
Drawdown Authority for Taiwan, and we will consider further use of this
authority in FY 2024, as authorized by Congress. We are exploring all
available options for resourcing this important policy priority.
Mr. Banks. Will the administration commit to requesting FMF grants
for Taiwan in its FY2025 budget request?
Ms. Resnick. The Administration is committed to supporting Taiwan
in enhancing its self-defense capabilities including through utilizing
FMF grant assistance. However, I cannot comment at this time on the FY
2025 Request since internal deliberations are ongoing.
Mr. Banks. Will the administration commit to requesting
appropriations to backfill stocks used for Presidential Drawdown
Authority for Taiwan in its FY2025 request?
Ms. Resnick. The Department of State would defer to the Department
of Defense (DOD) for information on questions relating to backfill of
DOD stock provided under a drawdown.
Mr. Banks. Can you tell us, the committee, on what those rates--why
our rates aren't competitive versus rates they might find elsewhere?
Ms. Resnick. I'm happy to take that for the record. I don't have the
numbers in front of me.
Ms. Resnick. As of May 2023, Taiwan had access to interest rates
hovering around 1-2 percent domestically. Under the current FMF direct
loan authority, the Department is prohibited from offering an interest
rate on FMF loans that is lower than the prevailing interest rate on
marketable Treasury securities of similar maturity. Our rates would
only be competitive if the Department were authorized to offer an
interest rate below what Taiwan can access domestically. We have asked
for the authority to offer lower interest rates.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. I understand that the Taiwanese government has asked for
any of the MQ-9Bs in any condition to be delivered before the end of
the year. However, the Air Force says that delivery can only begin by
early 2027.
What is DOD doing to accelerate the delivery of these MQ-9Bs?
I understand that General Atomics has told DOD it can make the
timeline and have them in the air next year if they take two machines
earmarked for the UK and send them to Taiwan instead.
Is that something DOD has considered?
Will you commit to doing so, and finding creative solutions to
accelerate that process like allowing flight certification to be done
in Taiwan, as it grants to the UK?
Dr. Ratner. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is actively
working a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case with Taiwan for the sale of
MQ-9B. This case is progressing on time and there have been no
indications from Taiwan that this delivery schedule is untenable. The
Department continues to evaluate all options available to speed
deliveries and increase efficiencies in providing capabilities to
Taiwan.
Mr. Waltz. The sale of the Harpoon Coastal Defense System was
notified to Congress on October 2020. The RFP (request for proposal)
from the Navy to Boeing came about a year later, on November 18, 2021.
However, the contract award for the missiles didn't come then until
March 2023, a year and a half after the RFP.
Why do you believe it took the administration almost two-and-a-half
years to go from congressional notification to contract award? Why did
the Navy take so long to get this contract awarded?
Dr. Ratner. The Department continues to prioritize security
cooperation processes for Taiwan. The Harpoon Coastal Defense System
sale went through several adaptations to ensure the program was
responsive to Taiwan's requirements. The Navy remains focused on the
execution of these efforts.
Mr. Waltz. I understand that the Taiwanese government has asked for
any of the MQ-9Bs in any condition to be delivered before the end of
the year. However, the Air Force says that delivery can only begin by
early 2027.
What is DOD doing to accelerate the delivery of these MQ-9Bs?
I understand that General Atomics has told DOD it can make the
timeline and have them in the air next year if they take two machines
earmarked for the UK and send them to Taiwan instead.
Is that something DOD has considered? Will you commit to doing so,
and finding creative solutions to accelerate that process like allowing
flight certification to be done in Taiwan, as it grants to the UK?
General McGee. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is actively
working an FMS case with Taiwan for the sale of MQ-9B. This case is
progressing on a timeline and there have been no indications from
Taiwan that this delivery schedule is untenable. The Department
continues to evaluate all options available to accelerate deliveries
and increase efficiencies in providing capabilities to Taiwan.
Mr. Waltz. The sale of the Harpoon Coastal Defense System was
notified to Congress on October 2020. The RFP (request for proposal)
from the Navy to Boeing came about a year later, on November 18, 2021.
However, the contract award for the missiles didn't come then until
March 2023, a year and a half after the RFP.
Why do you believe it took the administration almost two-and-a-half
years to go from congressional notification to contract award? Why did
the Navy take so long to get this contract awarded?
General McGee. The Department continues to prioritize security
cooperation processes for Taiwan. The Harpoon Coastal Defense System
sale went through several adaptations to ensure the program was
responsive to Taiwan's requirements.
Taiwan signed the HCDS Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) in May
2021 for a limited quantity of HCDS Launch Systems and Missiles. The
Navy awarded a contract to Boeing in September 2021 to start the Non-
Recurring Engineering (NRE) activities, as these activities are the
critical path to Launch System and Missile deliveries. Taiwan then
signed an LOA Amendment for the full quantities in October 2021, after
the Navy was already on contract. The Launch System production contract
was awarded to Boeing in March 2022, and the Missile production
contract was awarded in April 2023.
The critical path to deliveries remains the ongoing development
efforts that began before Taiwan signed its LOAs, as well as the NRE
efforts for Taiwan that were awarded in Sept 2021. The Navy remains
focused on the execution of these efforts.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SEWELL
Ms. Sewell. How can the United States maximize its options for
deterring aggression in the Taiwan Strait? What economic and diplomatic
measures are we taking, and how do trade relations fit into our
strategy? Is President Biden's U.S. Taiwan 21st Century Trade
Initiative a step in the right direction?
Dr. Ratner. Yes, President Biden's U.S. Taiwan 21st Century Trade
Initiative is a step in the right direction.
The Department is working closely with the Departments of Treasury,
Commerce, and State to ensure the U.S. Government is effectively
leveraging our diplomatic, financial, and economic tools to protect our
national security interests.
To strengthen deterrence in the Taiwan Strait consistent with
longstanding U.S. policy, we are working with the Department of State
and other interagency partners, aided by the support of Congress, to
ensure that Taiwan has the relevant defense articles, training, and
services that it needs to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability.
Ms. Sewell. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023 gave the president the authority for ``drawdown of defense
articles'' for Taiwan valued at $1 billion. In July, the Biden
Administration announced it is sending up to $345 million in defense
articles to Taiwan under this authority. Can you talk at greater length
about the authorities Congress granted to the president in the FY23
NDAA to transfer arms to Taiwan. How could these authorities help
Taiwan defend itself?
Ms. Resnick. We are committed to helping Taiwan bolster its self-
defense capabilities and deterrence, and appreciate the new authorities
provided last fiscal year. The FY 2023 NDAA included the Taiwan
Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA), which included several new authorities
for Taiwan, including a Taiwan-specific drawdown authority for defense
articles and services and combined with the FY 2023 State
appropriations act, the authority to provide up to $2 billion in FMF
loans and $2 billion in FMF loan guarantees.
We used these authorities to make significant progress in the past
year--the first notification of FMF for Taiwan, the most FMS
congressional notifications in a single calendar year in 2022 for
Taiwan in at least 30 years, and the first use of Presidential Drawdown
Authority for Taiwan.
On loans, though Taiwan has not shown interest in an FMF loan from
the U.S. government, this authority provides a helpful option to
explore in the future. We remain supportive of Taiwan taking every
measure possible to strengthen its self-defense capabilities.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ALFORD
Mr. Alford. The Taiwan Harpoon Coastal Defense System is urgent
from a national security perspective, however, it took the Navy from
2021 to April 2023 to get the system on contract. How can processes
like these be expedited going forward?
Dr. Ratner. The Department continues to prioritize security
cooperation processes for Taiwan. The Harpoon Coastal Defense System
sale went through several adaptations to ensure the program was
responsive to Taiwan's requirements. The Navy remains focused on the
execution of these efforts.
Mr. Alford. I understand that the Taiwanese have also expressed an
interest in an additional 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missiles.
How can you ensure the Navy pursues the fastest possible path to get
these missiles approved for FMS, on contract, and delivered to Taiwan?
Is the fastest path is a new FMS case or an amendment to the 2020 FMS
case?
Dr. Ratner. The Department remains committed to ensuring the
fastest path to additional Harpoon capability for Taiwan. Decisions on
the scope and details of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs lie
first and foremost with the FMS partner.
Mr. Alford. The Taiwan Harpoon Coastal Defense System is urgent
from a national security perspective; however, it took the Navy from
2021 to April 2023 to get the system on contract. How can processes
like these be expedited going forward?
Ms. Resnick. Expediting defense articles to Taiwan is a priority
for the U.S. government. However, industry does not start manufacturing
until receiving a signed contract and initial deposit, which often
takes place months or even years after the Congressional notification.
This is often due to negotiation delays by the partner. State defers to
the Department of Defense on possible ways to reduce contracting time.
Mr. Alford. I understand that the Taiwanese have also expressed an
interest in an additional 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missiles.
How can you ensure the Navy pursues the fastest possible path to get
these missiles approved for FMS, on contract, and delivered to Taiwan?
Is the fastest path is a new FMS case or an amendment to the 2020 FMS
case?
Ms. Resnick. The Department of State will expedite any future
Harpoon cases to the maximum extent possible. State defers to the
Department of Defense on contracting specifics.
Mr. Alford. The Taiwan Harpoon Coastal Defense System is urgent
from a national security perspective; however, it took the Navy from
2021 to April 2023 to get the system on contract. How can processes
like these be expedited going forward?
General McGee. The Department continues to prioritize security
cooperation processes for Taiwan. The Harpoon Coastal Defense System
sale went through several adaptations to ensure the program was
responsive to Taiwan's requirements.
Phased contracting to accelerate the award of Non-Recurring
Engineering (NRE) efforts ahead of production contracts is a proven
practice to initiate the pre-production work as early as possible. In
combination with the use of Undefinitized Contract Actions, or other
accelerated contracting initiatives, this allows for the most expedited
contracting activities to occur with the focus on the schedule-critical
elements.
For HCDS, the critical path to deliveries remains the ongoing
development efforts that began before Taiwan signed its LOA Amendment
for the full quantities. The use of the above phased contracting
approach has allowed for the Navy to contract the full scope of the
HCDS effort within the LOA cost and schedule requirements.
The Navy remains focused on the execution of these efforts.
Mr. Alford. I understand that the Taiwanese have also expressed an
interest in an additional 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missiles.
How can you ensure the Navy pursues the fastest possible path to get
these missiles approved for FMS, on contract, and delivered to Taiwan?
Is the fastest path is a new FMS case or an amendment to the 2020 FMS
case?
General McGee. The Navy remains committed to ensuring the fastest
path to additional Harpoon capability in Taiwan. Decisions on the scope
and details of FMS programs contracts lie first and foremost with the
FMS partner. However, I recommend amending the 2020 FMS case to
minimize administrative lead times.
[all]